French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796-1814: Working with Napoleon (War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850) 3030973395, 9783030973391

Citation preview

WAR, CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 1750–1850

French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814 Working with Napoleon Doina Pasca Harsanyi

War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850 Series Editors Rafe Blaufarb Florida State University Tallahassee, FL, USA Alan Forrest University of York York, UK Karen Hagemann University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, NC, USA

The series aims to the analysis of the military and war by combining political, social, cultural, art and gender history with military history. It wants to extend the scope of traditional histories of the period by discussing war and revolution across the Atlantic as well as within Europe, thereby contributing to a new global history of conflict in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. For more information see: wscseries.web.unc.edu More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14390

Doina Pasca Harsanyi

French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814 Working with Napoleon

Doina Pasca Harsanyi Dept of History, Powers Hall 106 Central Michigan University Mount Pleasant, MI, USA

ISSN 2634-6699     ISSN 2634-6702 (electronic) War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850 ISBN 978-3-030-97339-1    ISBN 978-3-030-97340-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Anna and Michael

Preface

I started working on this study some years ago almost by accident. One of the main characters in Lessons from America, a book on French émigrés in the United States I published in 2010, was Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry. One year after returning from the United States to France in 1800, Moreau was nominated adviser to the court of the duke of Parma, and immediately afterwards, Administrator General of the duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla. Following Moreau’s career trail seemed a promising avenue and I travelled to Parma with the intention of beginning research for a political biography. The treasure troves I found in the archives and libraries of Parma, Piacenza and neighbouring communities soon induced me to change my plans. The more I read, the more this archival bounty persuaded me to delve into the historical experience of the States of Parma during the French era (1796–1814). The present book is the result of those inquiries. Mount Pleasant, MI

Doina Pasca Harsanyi

vii

Acknowledgements

I am delighted to acknowledge at long last the many debts I incurred while working on this book. David Laven has cheerfully, and ever so tactfully, steadied my first forays into Napoleonic scholarship: he has always been kindness itself and I am so pleased to have a chance to thank him. The debt I owe to Patrice Gueniffey can never be repaid, but it is a joy to put in writing my gratitude for these many years of constant generosity and friendship. At different times, following the rhythms of academic gatherings, I had the good fortune to discuss my work with Rafe Blaufarb, Alex Grab, Ruth Godfrey, Rozzy Hooper-Hammersley, Peter Hicks, Marc Lerner, David Markham, Edna Muller Markham, Alex Mikaberidze and Ron Steinberg. I could not be more grateful for their freely given advice and considered comments that made me rethink what I thought I knew and see more clearly the path this project was taking. My colleagues in the history department at Central Michigan University have been models of patience and altruism as they listened to me talk about Parma, Napoleon and not much else: a heartfelt thanks to all. In Parma, warm appreciations are owed to the personnel at Biblioteca Palatina and the Archivio di Stato, even more to Valentina Bocchi and Luigi Pelizzoni, a librarian’s librarian who will find the answer to any question. I hope this book will go some way to convey my gratitude for the delightful conversations where professors Marzio Dall’Acqua, Claudio Bargelli and Carla Corradi Martini graciously shared their boundless knowledge and love for Parma’s past. Meeting Wallis Wilde Menozzi and Paolo Menozzi was one of those strokes of luck one does not deserve but one accepts eagerly and wholeheartedly. ix

x 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank Palgrave Macmillan’s anonymous reviewers for insightful recommendations that greatly improved the final version of the book. It was a pleasure working with Emily Russel, Steve Fassioms and Eliana Rangel, whose professionalism and unfailing courtesy did much to smooth the transition from manuscript to publication.

Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 Prelude to Napoleon  9 3 Parma and Bonaparte 31 4 From Duchies of Parma to States of Parma 53 5 Watershed: The Insurrection 77 6 Explanatory Narratives: Brigandage107 7 Pacification137 8 Order into Chaos163 9 Wooing the Elites195 10 Elite Collaboration213 11 The End of the Road: Conclusions241

xi

xii 

Contents

Bibliography255 People Index277 Place Index283

Abbreviations

AMAE AMD AN ASPc ASPr BP

Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris Archives du Ministère de la Défense, Vincennes Archives Nationales Paris Archivio di Stato Piacenza Archivio di Stato Parma Biblioteca Palatina Parma

xiii

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In December 1805, a violent insurrection broke out in mountain villages around the city of Piacenza in the States of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, a territory under French control although not fully included in the Napoleonic Empire. Authorities were taken aback. It defied reason that, only days after the much-publicized victory at Austerlitz, disparate bands of rural rebels arose at the sound of ancient alarm bells ringing across the Apennines (campana a martella) to test the will of the French state and its army. Although an isolated event, the violent popular rebellion forced senior imperial administrators and Napoleon himself to turn their attention to a peripheral territory best known for apathy and inertia. The Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, commonly referred to as the States of Parma, stood rather incongruously on the margins of French-dominated Italy. A territory of about 6000 square kilometers, with a population of little more than 420,000 inhabitants (426,512 in 1815), tucked between the Piedmont, the duchy of Milan, Genoa and Tuscany, the small state had changed hands between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons since 1731, when the Farnese line (rulers by papal decree since the sixteenth century) died out.1 Eventually, the duchies settled for Spanish guardianship at the Treaty of Basel (22 July 1795). In 1796, when General 1  For data concerning the surface and the population throughout the French occupation, see Lorenzo Molossi, Vocabolario topografico dei Ducatti di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_1

1

2 

D. P. HARSANYI

Bonaparte launched the First Italian campaign, Parma was undergoing a conservative restoration, in sharp contrast with the Enlightenment-minded reorganization carried out in Milan and Tuscany. Anxious to secure Spain’s neutrality, the Directory (the French government as of 1795) instructed General Bonaparte to refrain from any interference in the political status quo in Parma. Consequently, the duchies missed the political shakeup of the sister republic phase—the only exception to the policy of revolutionizing conquered territories during the First Italian campaign. Alone in Northern Italy, Duke Ferdinand remained on his throne until his death in 1802, the year when—to paraphrase Victor Hugo—Napoleon was bursting through Bonaparte. Still undecided on how to deal with this peculiar situation, he sent Moreau de Saint-Méry to Parma, with orders to introduce vigorous French reforms without obliterating traditional institutions and without disturbing existing social hierarchies. The insurrection of late 1805 amply proved that being simultaneously in and out of the French web was not a workable arrangement, not in an increasingly centralized empire. Emperor (as of 1804) Napoleon switched gears, abandoned the pretense of autonomy and propelled the States of Parma on a track of accelerated conversion into a French department. He and his local representatives considered the process completed in 1808 when the territory, renamed the Department of Taro, was absorbed in the imperial system. Or rather, the new department absorbed the imperial system, efficiently and durably: upon surveying the first years of post-Napoleonic Europe, David Laven and Lucy Riall established that it was in the duchies that ‘the most complete loyalty to the Napoleonic tradition was found’.2 Probing how and why a periphery long at odds with the political movements swirling outside its borders turned into a model of Napoleonic integration was the starting point of this study. Broadly speaking, two methodological paths tackle the Napoleonic period in Italy: modernization and colonialism. Both grapple with the double-sword nature of French rule, the mix of good and bad features that gave the regime a Janus face, in Alexander Grab’s inspired formula.3 (Parma: Tipografia Ducale, 1833–1834). The above quoted data, listed for the year 1815, on pp. 24–25. 2  David Laven and Lucy Riall, ‘Restoration Government and the Legacy of Napoleon’ in Napoleon’s Legacy. Problems of Government in Restoration Europe. Edited by David Laven and Lucy Riall (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 1–26 (10). 3  ‘Napoleon’s rule over Europe possessed a Janus face, combining reform and innovation with subordination and exploitation’. Alexander Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 19.

1 INTRODUCTION 

3

Modernization approaches tend to focus on the good.4 Early monographs addressed the period’s political conflicts, legal frameworks and philosophical debates, and treated Napoleon’s government there as the opening act for Italy’s unification in a modern state.5 By the second half of the twentieth century, historians had turned their gaze to signature Napoleonic administrative and judicial innovations, which cut through regional particularities to impose a uniform, centralized, secular governing apparatus throughout the peninsula—in short, kicking off the transition to a modern social order.6 As Anna Maria Rao concluded in an excellent 4  See Mark Elvin, ‘A short definition of ‘Modernity’?’ Past and Present, 113 (Nov. 1986): 209–213, on the difficulties of settling for a precise definition of a concept he qualifies as ‘elusive’ despite its ubiquitous use. John Breuilly has reviewed the main directions of modernization theories and suggested ways to avoid the pitfall of determinism in ‘Modernisation as Social Evolution: The German Case, c.1800–1880’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 15 (2005): 117–147. Slippery as the term modernization is, it will continue to inform our understanding of the Napoleonic period mainly because the historical actors involved believed in it, even though they did not use the same terminology. See the brief discussion in Philip Dwyer and Alan Forrest, ‘Napoleon and His Empire: Some Issues and Perspectives’, the introduction to the volume Napoleon and His Empire. Europe 1804–1814, edited by Philip G.  Dwyer and Alan Forrest (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1–16 (9–10). 5  Benedetto Croce’s historicism inspired many investigations focused on the movement of ideas and the evolution of theoretical models. A good overview of Crocean historicism can be found in David D.  Roberts, Benedetto Croce and the Uses of Historicism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). Landmark monographs: Vittorio Fiorini and Francesco Lemmi, Il Periodo Napoleonico 1799–1814 (1900); Francesco Lemmi, Le origini del risorgimento italiano (1789–1815) (1906). Notably, Lemmi extended the analysis to the Enlightenment in the second edition of the work: Le origini del risorgimento italiano (1748–1815) (1924). Later studies inspired by Lemmi’s intellectual framework: Giorgio Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia Moderna, vol. I ‘Le origini del Risorgimento’ (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1956); Carlo Capra, L’Età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica in Italia (Torino: Loescher, 1978). Antonino de Francesco’s recent work has focused on the Napoleonic era’s impact on the political culture in the peninsula: Antonino De Francesco, L’Italia di Bonaparte. Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni, 1796–1821 (Torino: UTET, 2011); Storie dell’Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica, 1796–1814 (Milano: Mondadori 2016). 6  In a detailed review, Steven Englund paid homage to Stuart Woolf’s pioneering examination of European integration for opening up the field to innovative historical studies that amount to ‘nothing less than a scholarly renaissance in terms of quantity, quality, and novelty of approach …. They have so decisively redirected the river of Napoleonic scholarship that it no longer bypasses places named society, culture, administration, economy, education, all of which are now, thanks to them, known to be as important as the older, more familiar ports of call (constitution, civil code, conscription, high politics, etc.)’. ‘Monstre sacré: the question of cultural imperialism and the Napoleonic empire’ in The Historical Journal, 51, 1 (2008):

4 

D. P. HARSANYI

­istoriography review, innovative methodologies greatly enriched our h understanding of the moving parts that built the Napoleonic system in Italy, but ‘questions of historical interpretation have remained basically the same’.7 Michael Broers’ prodigious work, beginning with The Napoleonic Empire in Italy: Cultural imperialism in a European context? (2005), trained the spotlight on the not so good, namely on the inescapable fact that the Napoleonic empire was a state born of military conquest, governed by force, principally to the benefit of France. As such, Edward Said’s orientalist thesis or historical anthropologist Nathan Wachtel’s concepts of acculturation and integration pertaining to the European expansion in Africa and Asia supply critical insights into the way the French accumulated, exercised and eventually lost power. Broers amply showed that categories borrowed from colonialism studies are especially helpful in dissecting the Napoleonic empire’s governing techniques, ranging from soft to hard, always geared towards coercion and control. The first step: ralliement, a form of integration that ‘implied a wide-ranging societal acceptance and approval of Napoleonic values and institutions’ on the assumption that enough Italians could be persuaded to ‘absorb French laws, institutions and mores without prompting and coercion’. Ralliement generally moved towards amalgame or ‘a policy entailing active participation in the regime and thus, submission to its mores’.8 Ideally, the ensemble of administrative tactics culminated in acculturation or assimilation to 215–250 (217–218). Englund referred to Stuart Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe (London and New York: Rutledge, 1991). For the Italian Peninsula, influential monographs include Pasquale Villani, Italia Napoleonica (Torino: Loescher, 1973); Livio Antonielli, I Prefetti dell’Italia Napoleonica: Repubblica e Regno d’Italia (Bologna: IL Mulino, 1983); John A. Davis Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796–1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-Century Italy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988); Alexander Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). See also the impressive collective work Italia Napoleonica: Dizionario Critico, edited by Luigi Mascilli Migliorini (Torino: UTET, 2011). In addition, many regional studies narrowed the focus to examine the interactions between local practices and imperial institutions. 7  Anna Maria Rao, ‘Old and New Trends in Historiography’, in Napoleon’s Empire. European Politics in Global Perspective. Ute Planert editor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 84–100 (86). 8  Michael Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796–1814. Cultural Imperialism in a European Context? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 23 and 123–124. The concept of ralliement builds on Nathan Wachtel’s concept of integration understood as unforced incorporation of foreign elements into indigenous systems.

1 INTRODUCTION 

5

the centralized, scientific, secular, bureaucratic, that is, modern, model of state and society in which the French took so much pride. As I worked my way through the voluminous files preserved at the State Archives in Parma under the laconic heading ‘The French in the states’ (Francesi negli stati), complementary insights from modernization and colonialism methodological threads helped me grasp the intricacies of life under French occupation in this distinctive periphery. What intrigued me most was Broers’ statement that the French experiment in Italy ended in failure: ‘The failure was to adapt French rule in ways that suited Italians enough to acculturate, not one caused by a lack of effective control of the periphery by the centre, at least in the obvious sense of preponderant power. Yet fail they did’.9 With this disconcerting assertion ringing in my ears, I returned to the archives with new questions: What counted as failure and what as accomplishment during the 12 years of French rule in the States of Parma? Who decided on the matter? To the point, what did the French think they were doing in this corner of Italy compared with what the Parmense thought the French were doing in their country? Looking for answers, I examined side-by-side local and French documents regarding the same set of circumstances. The archives and libraries in Parma and Piacenza are brimming with local testimonies to the French period: correspondence, diaries, and awkwardly worded reports from village mayors and priests, alongside diplomatic statements composed in polished French by Parmense notabilities. For the French side, I traced, from the same local archives to the National Archives, Ministry of Defense Archives and Foreign Affairs Archives in Paris the private writings and official records left by the French executives in place. The Napoleonic period in Parma has attracted modest historical scrutiny, compared with neighbouring Liguria, Tuscany or the Kingdom of Italy. The archival material is still lightly processed—indeed, I believe part of the impact of this book will come from unearthing a wealth of fascinating primary documents. Parmense historians tend to see the French occupation as a transitional episode sandwiched between the more alluring times of Bourbon rule and Maria Luigia’s reign. Surveys of Napoleonic Italy typically mention in passing an ‘also annexed’ territory that joined the empire in 1808.10 The relative marginalization stems from the unusual  Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 2.  A few recent articles have examined aspects of Napoleonic rule in the States of Parma, but interested readers must go back to the early twentieth century to find monographs of the 9

10

6 

D. P. HARSANYI

position on the Napoleonic chessboard, which, however, also accounts for Parma’s relevance to the study of French-dominated Europe. Due to international arrangements, the territory turned into a laboratory for political experimentation. Successive French governing teams oscillated between hands-off policies and intensive assimilationist schemes; the hesitancy forced all executives in charge, and at times Napoleon himself, to improvise and rethink key elements of the imperial agenda. Locals became experts at scrutinizing, and making sense of, fluctuating if relentless outside pressures. Even when open revolt broke out, as in the case of the Apennine insurgency, there was no compact on the anti-French front. Rather, the insurrection brought to the surface deeply buried fractures as the citizenry split into pro- and anti-insurgent camps; the rebels themselves squabbled over their own motivations and objectives. Crucially, elite ambivalence—an issue discussed in depth in this book—more than made up for popular resentment and complicated political calculations. The hardest part of life under Napoleonic occupation was not finding ways to fight it: it was separating the potential for a new beginning from the exploitative opportunism of the French state. Imperial administrators, on their side, were no less torn. Caught between Napoleon’s changing demands and the unpredictable reality on the ground, they struggled to be good occupiers, as they understood it: to bring good laws to people accustomed to bad laws and uphold the promises of an enlightened polity. For Napoleon’s representatives, the hardest part was not putting down rebellions and imposing the French order; it was deciding the ratio between fulfilling their law enforcement duties and staying true to the progressive governance ethos that justified their power to alter the lives of people they had never laid eyes on. The Napoleonic system restructured identities and compelled both the French administrators and their administrés to negotiate with themselves before negotiating with each other. The way this happened in the atypical circumstances of the States of Parma weaken the aura of French invincibility. It revealed scores of vulnerabilities concealed under the imperial swagger; quite to the surprise of all involved, entire period. Lenny Montagna, Il dominio Francese a Parma 1796–1815 (Piacenza: 1926); Vincenzo Paltrinieri, I moti contro Napoleone negli Stati di Parma e Piacenza (1805–1806). Con altri studi storici (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1927); Umberto Benassi, Il Generale Bonaparte ed il Duca e i Giacobini di Parma e Piacenza (Parma: Deputazione di Storia Patria, 1912). For current explorations see especially the contributions to the volume Storia di Parma, vol.V. I Borbone: fra illuminismo e rivoluzioni. A cura di Alba Mora (Parma: MUP, 2015).

1 INTRODUCTION 

7

this made the administrative machinery more intelligible and easier to handle. French administrators and local residents tacitly agreed that there was something unique about an occupation, which, in Carlo Zaghi’s words, ‘triggered, at all levels, reflections, perplexity, rethinking, hopes, and ferments’.11 Both sides had a stake in making a success of this extraordinary experience; however, the meaning of success varied with the ‘hopes and ferments’ that different groups, French and Parmense, placed in the French system. Recent research has emphasized the necessary collaboration between occupiers and occupied in Napoleonic Europe. I draw on these findings, but I argue that, beyond pragmatic deal making, citizens availed themselves of French ambivalence to interpret on their own terms the model of society landed in their midst. Despite the undeniable power imbalance, developments we now categorize as ralliement, amalagame, assimilation or indeed modernization did not just happen to them: local groups and individuals actively participated in the way French-imposed innovations worked—or not, as the case may have been—on the ground. To return to Michael Broers’ inference of failure: the French may have failed to adapt their system to suit Italian interests; in their turn, Italians— Parmense in this case—did not fail to adapt the French system to suit their idea of what the future of their society should be. This study’s main objective is to evaluate local capacity for agency and identify the strategies Parma’s residents deployed to inflect to their advantage policies made in Paris and not necessarily with their interests in mind. The book does not have the ambition to be a complete monograph. The archive-driven narrative explores the workings of successive French administrations through the parallel lenses of Napoleonic officials and Parmense citizens, with the focus on collaborative processes that eventually shaped the Napoleonic era’s legacy. To this end, each chapter includes granular analyses of relevant characters, events and occurrences that help distil day-to-day experiences, big and small, into the constant give-and-take that made this period so intriguing for all who lived through it and so rich in long-term consequences. A final note on the use of toponyms: the duchies were composed of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, but the latter played a lesser role compared with Parma and Piacenza. During the first Italian campaign (1796) 11  Carlo Zaghi, L’Italia di Napoleone dalla Cisaplina al Regno. Storia d’Italia diretta da Giuseppe Galasso (Torino: UTET, 1968), vol. 18, 100.

8 

D. P. HARSANYI

Bonaparte ignored the duchies’ neutrality and redistributed parts of Guastalla as the French army redrew borders and swapped territories. Moreau de Saint-Méry’s administration essentially ignored the city. On 30 March 1806, Napoleon awarded Guastalla and its environs to his sister Pauline who briefly enjoyed the title Duchess of Guastalla. Soon thereafter (24 May 1806) the Kingdom of Italy purchased the territory. For all these reasons, Guastalla is not included in the present book, the events discussed here concerning mainly Parma, Piacenza and their respective regions. Until 1808 when it became the Department of Taro, the country’s official name was States of Parma, which tends to overlook Piacenza. For concision’s sake, I follow custom and use either Parma or Parma–Piacenza to refer to the entire territory, and Parmense to refer to all the inhabitants. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from French and Italian are mine.

CHAPTER 2

Prelude to Napoleon

The Duchy of Parma was established in 1545 by Pope Paul III for Piero Luigi Farnese, presumably his own illegitimate son. With the city of Piacenza added the next year, the state was henceforth called the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza and ruled by the Farnese until the dynasty went extinct in 1731. Elizabeth Farnese, the last direct heiress of the family, married king Philip of Spain, a Bourbon, in 1714 and bequeathed the duchies to her son Don Carlos de Bourbon. Diplomatic-matrimonial games in the wake of the War of the Polish Succession complicated the situation: at the Treaty of Vienna (1738) Don Carlos agreed to give up the duchies in exchange for the larger, more prestigious kingdom of Naples and Sicily. He did not forget to take with him large collections of artwork along with the entire archive of the Farnese dukes, the former an act of naked robbery, the latter a thoughtless deed that caused untold subsequent administrative difficulties. Francis Stephen of Habsburg, Duke of Tuscany, took over provisionally until the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) stipulated the return of the duchies, enriched with the territory of Guastalla (a former Gonzague fief) to the Bourbons: Carlos’ younger brother Philip accepted the throne and founded the House of Bourbon-Parma. The formal name of the state became the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla. In the meantime three Bourbon Family Pacts (1733, 1743 and 1761) negotiated the fine points of the duchies’ loyalty to Spain and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_2

9

10 

D. P. HARSANYI

France equally. The marriage between Duke Philip and Louise Elisabeth, oldest daughter of Louis XV, tipped the scales towards France. Louise Elisabeth, only 12  years old the year of her wedding (1739), spent nine years in Madrid, to be groomed into a Spanish royal bride. Her attachment to France never weakened and her first independent act upon acceding, with her husband, to the throne of the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla was to visit her father at Versailles.1 Back in Parma, she gave birth to her only son, Infant Ferdinand (1751).2 Ferdinand would grow into a puzzling character and a weak, though stubborn, ruler. Throughout his childhood, he watched his mother put all her energies into fashioning the duchies in the image of France—the France of the lumières imagined by the philosophes Louis XV’s daughter very much admired. In this short time, she succeeded: Duke Philip had little appetite for governing and left most decisions to his wife. By the second half of the century, foreign visitors likened the duchies to a mini-France transplanted in Northern Italy, with its own Paris—the capital city of Parma—and its own Versailles at the ducal residence of Colorno, both re-designed by French architects and artists.3 Love for France was the most precious legacy Louise Elisabeth bequeathed to her son whom she expected to continue her life’s work: ‘I am French, my son […] When I am no more, you will better judge my motives; if I live, I hope that my conduct will prove to you that my duty is my first love. Love France, my son: your roots are there; you owe the country respect and deference for being who you are’.4 1  More details can be found in Henri Bédarida, Parme dans la politique française au XVIIIème siècle (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1930), 104–144. 2  Ferdinand had two older sisters. Isabelle Bourbon-Parma (1741–1763) married Austrian Archduke Joseph, future Emperor Joseph II.  Cultured and intellectually curious, she left several essays on education, marriage and politics. She was a dutiful wife but stood out at the court in Vienna for conducting a rather open homoerotic affair with her sister-in-law Maria Christina, Archduchess of Austria and an artist of some note. Isabelle de Bourbon-Parme (Bruxelles: Racine, 2002) by Ernest Sanger is a well-researched, sympathetic biography. Maria Luisa (1751–1819), a far less interesting character, married her cousin Infant Charles, future Charles IV of Spain. Many entertaining details on the three siblings in the collective biography: Juan Balansò, Les Bourbons de Parme. Histoire des Infants d’Espagne, ducs de Parme (Biarritz: J&D Editions, 1996), especially pp. 30–70. 3  Il Viaggio a Parma. Visitatori stranieri in età farnesiana e borbonica. Testi raccolti da Giorgio Cusatelli e Fausto Razzetti (Parma: Ugo Guanda Editore, 1990). 4  Letter from Louise Elisabeth to her son Ferdinand written in 1759 (no exact date), in Casimir Stryenski, Le Gendre de Louis XV. Don Philippe, Infant d’Espagne et Duc de Parme. D’après des documents inédits tirés des Archives de Parme et des Archives des Affaires Etrangères (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1904), 440. The entire letter is reproduced on pp. 436–444.

2  PRELUDE TO NAPOLEON 

11

Ralliement Avant la Lettre The transformation began in 1749, with the appointment of Guillaume Du Tillot (1711–1774), a little-known French clerk employed at the Spanish court, to the position of councilor to Duke Philip. Within a month, Du Tillot rose to the rank of General Intendant of the Household, in charge of the court’s expenses and book-keeping. Ten years later (1759), the duke nominated Du Tillot prime minister and essentially handed him over the reins of government. Marquis of Felino as of 1764, Du Tillot ran the duchies, unhindered, until 1771, and earned a European-­ wide reputation for competence and honesty, the very model of a well-­ meaning bureaucrat able to steer any society on the path to progress.5 Local historians have carefully examined Du Tillot’s 20 years at the helm of what contemporaries regarded as exemplary enlightened administration; these studies portray sympathetically a well-intentioned man bravely taking on the Herculean task of overhauling an order of things he found harmful to the people and to their rulers alike. ‘Nothing, absolutely nothing escaped his knowledgeable, genial, and tireless innovations and reforms’, wrote Umberto Benassi, summarizing the historical consensus.6 Overall, Du Tillot’s rule consisted in wielding the power of the state to launch a holistic programme of systematic reforms meant to restructure every aspect of life in the duchies, from fiscal policies to agricultural practices, public education and cultural initiatives—an audacious undertaking historian Massimo Ammato aptly labelled ‘social and economic 5  Du Tillot perfectly fits the type of well-intentioned government official in tune with the philosophical aspirations of his time drawn in Carlo Capra, ‘The Functionary’ in Enlightenment Portaits. Michel Vovelle editor. Translation Lydia G.  Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 316–355. On Du Tillot, see Umberto Benassi, Guglielmo Du Tillot. Un ministro riformatore dell secolo XVIII (Parma: Presso la Rivista Deputazione di Storia Patria, 1919); Bernardino Cipelli, ‘Storia dell’amministrazione di Guglielmo Du Tillot. Con introduzione di E. Casa’in Archivio Storico per le province parmensi, serie I, II (1893); Charles Nisard, Guillaume Du Tillot. Un valet ministre et sécrétaire d’état. Episode de l’histoire de France en Italie 1749–1771 (Reprint Adamant Media Corporation, 2001); Giovanni Tocci, Il Ducato di Parma e Piacenza. Un Colbert alla corte di Parma’ in Storia d’Italia. Diretta da G. Galasso (Torino: UTET, 1987), Vol XVIII, 79–103 (88–89). A digest of contemporary opinions on Du Tillot in Henri Bédarida, Parme et la France de 1748 à 1789 (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1928. Slatkine Reprints), 100–116. The discussion of Du Tillot’s entire career is on pp. 71–120. Very informative too is the analytical overview by Claudio Maddalena, ‘Il governo del ministro du Tillot’ in Storia di Parma, vol. V, 101–138. 6  Umberto Benassi, Storia di Parma da Pier Luigi Farnese a Vittorio Emmanuele II (1545–1860) (Parma, Luigi Battei, 1907), 162.

12 

D. P. HARSANYI

engineering’.7 Vast as the programme was, the prime minister treaded lightly whenever possible because, as Claudio Bargelli showed in a recent astute analysis, the vision of enlightened ideal city ran frequently into the reality of financial constraints and decidedly unidealistic political power struggles.8 The cautious step-by-step policy fits the political practice of ralliement outlined by Michael Broers for Italian territories conquered by the French armies, later absorbed into the Napoleonic state. The duchies were, throughout Du Tillot’s tenure, an autonomous state under French and Spanish protectorate, Du Tillot himself serving at the pleasure of local sovereigns. Still, considering the free hand he enjoyed for 20 years and his systematic efforts at modernizing Parmense society by means of injecting new content into pre-existing structures, his actions were consistent with an early experiment in ralliement. Overt assumptions of French superiority, more precisely of the France of Louis XV being the right kind of state for the right time, underpinned Du Tillot’s entire agenda. His closest advisers came from France to join a cast of French-speaking, French-­ educated local collaborators. In the historical arc between the beginning of the Bourbon reign and the fall of the Napoleonic regime, the interval dominated by Du Tillot (1749–1770) comes across as a dress rehearsal, heavy in forewarnings, for the future travails of French administrators struggling to integrate the duchies into the Napoleonic system. For this reason, it is worth recalling, briefly, just how extensive, and how thorough, Du Tillot’s project was, and how swiftly it collapsed.

Administration, Legislation and Tax Collection The duchies consisted of two halves, each run by a governor, one in Parma and one in Piacenza. The governors presided over all aspects of public life, from law and order mechanisms to commercial regulations and tax collection. At the local level, in Parma, Piacenza and several smaller urban centres, the citizenry relied on the civic corps of the Anzianati, composed of the most notable residents, that is, nobles joined by well-regarded property owners and professionals. A podestà, or mayor, assisted by 7  Massimo Amato, ‘L’ingegneria economica e sociale di Guillaume Du Tillot’ in Parma e il suo territorio. Un Borbone tra Parma e Europa. Don Ferdinando e il suo tempo. A cura di Alba Mora (Parma: Diabasis, 2005), 136–143. 8  Claudio Bargelli, La Città dei lumi. La petite Capitale del Du Tillot fra utopie e riforme (Parma: Monte Università Parma, 2020).

2  PRELUDE TO NAPOLEON 

13

commissioners, ran every commune, large or small, and reported to the governor or to the nearest Anzianato. Justice was dispensed through a layered system of magistrates (uditori civili e criminali) that converged into several councils or local courts, the highest court being the supreme council established by Alessandro Farnese in 1589.9 Du Tillot left all administrative and legal structures untouched and patiently worked with, rather than against, existing institutions. What he asked these institutions to do, however, went against entrenched habits and traditions. The years spent as intendant of the ducal household, with the mission of improving the state’s finances, persuaded him that expanding the tax base was essential to the survival of the state. This implied curtailing the massive fiscal privileges feudal landlords, and above all the clergy, had enjoyed since the Farnese era. Du Tillot launched his premiership with demands that Church revenues be subjected to state taxation. What seemed at first glance a technical financial alteration soon turned into a metaphysical struggle between two worldviews.10 It was a struggle Du Tillot did not seek but could hardly avoid. Two fifths of the land in the Piacentino region, two thirds in the Parma region, and fully half of all arable land in the Borgo San Donnino were in the hands of the clergy. Ownership of such vast properties came with no taxation, no supervision and an array of additional entitlements. Tactfully, the prime minister sought cooperation from the papacy by means of his 9  Details online of Farnese and Bourbon institutions in Giovanni Drei, l’Archivio di Stato di Parma. Indice General, storico, descrittive, ed analitco (Rome: Biblioteca Arte Editrice, 1941), 103–114. 10  By the mid-1700s members of the clergy comprised roughly 10% of the population of Parma and up to 14% in the Piacenza region, all organized in 91 churches, and 21 female and 18 male convents, one more conservative than the other according to Franco Venturi, ‘Parma e Europa’ in Settecento Riformatore, Vol. II La Chiesa e la Repubblica dentro i loro limiti 1758–1774 (Torino: Einaudi, 1976), 214, and Roberto Ghiringhelli, Idee, Società ed Istituzioni nel Ducato di Parma e Piacenza durante l’età illuministica (Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1988), 12. This was up from the 15 male and 24 female convents in the duchies at the end of the Farnese era: Umberto Benassi, Storia di Parma da Pier Luigi Farnese a Vittorio Emmanuele (1545–1860) (Parma: Luigi Battei, 1907), 125. The Farnese dukes ‘spoiled’ the clergy and accustomed its members and its orders to privileges they came to regard as inviolable rights. In time, the Farnese had reasons to regret their generosity: Ranuccio II, for instance, was aghast at the clergy’s refusal to contribute towards the tribute imposed on Parma by Emperor Leopold II during the wars between France and the Empire (1691–1694). By then the status quo had become unshakeable and the duke could do nothing but vent in fits of helpless fury. Benassi, Storia di Parma da Pier Luigi Farnese a Vittorio Emmanuele, 68–70.

14 

D. P. HARSANYI

favourite tactic, attuned to the encyclopaedic spirit of the times: carefully compiled studies, based on empirical data that spelled out the devastating effects of clerical privileges upon local communities. These were sent to the Holy See in hopes that scientific proof of damages to poor villagers would mollify papal resistance. Disappointingly, the pope replied with a steady stream of rebuttals that reaffirmed the validity of clerical fiscal rights. Judging that he had showed sufficient deference, Du Tillot broke the stalemate in 1764, with prammatica della manimorte. The law abolished the ancient practice of mortmain, which allowed feudal lords—individuals or syndicates such as ecclesiastic orders—to appropriate the inheritance of their serfs or subordinates; the legislation also targeted current contracts not yet concluded. (It should be noted that in France the mortmain or mainmorte was considerably weakened throughout the eighteenth century, but officially banned only in 1790.) The real giunta della giurisdizione created the following year went a step further in affirming the state’s authority by quietly abolishing fiscal privileges for Church properties.11 A new supervisory body called regio consiglio segreto, composed of a minister of state and three councilors, valiantly took on the confusing maze of privileges and established a tax farm based on the French model. This and a few other measures, like taxes on leather products starting in 1765, eventually improved returns. In essence, then, fiscal reform amounted to winning a few financial and legislative battles with the Church, to applause from local and French philosophes always happy to see the Church put in its place. Duke Philip did not exactly cheer but chose to stand on the sidelines and allow bureaucrats to replenish the state’s coffers as they saw fit. The duke proved a lot less amenable when it came to cuts into his own budget or to changes in routines he cared about. Highlighting the arbitrary nature of reforms executed under less than reliable absolutist rulers, personal tastes weighed heavily on public policies. Informed that improving agricultural output depended on making more land available for pasturing, Philip simply refused to limit the domain set aside for pleasure hunting.

11  Pierluigi Feliciati, ‘La dominazione borbonica a Parma’ in L’Ossessione della memoria. Parma settecentesca nei disegni del Conte Alessandro Sanseverini. A cura di Marzio dall’Acqua (Parma: Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Parma, 1997), 19.

2  PRELUDE TO NAPOLEON 

15

Agriculture and Industry Nudging into change people reluctant to give up longstanding privileges was bound to disappoint. Du Tillot put his trust, or rather his hope, in the persuasive capacities of scientific studies. The method foreshadowed Moreau de Saint-Méry’s penchant for empirical surveys and yielded very similar results. The prime minister shared with landowners what he learned from the investigations he commissioned. First, primitive agricultural techniques largely accounted for inadequate outputs. A case in point: notwithstanding abundant grape harvests over the 1773–1779 period, widespread ignorance regarding bottling and preserving wine inevitably caused a good deal of the wine production to go to waste. Prices fell not because of diminishing demand but because growers felt compelled to sell before the wine turned (Parma–Piacenza is home to the popular Lambrusco wines). Second, the large wolf population made it hard to increase the flocks, but this nuisance paled in comparison with the aggravations caused by numberless internal custom dues that hindered transhumance. The wolves could be dealt with; feudal privileges remained intractable: feudal landowners rejected attempts to limit or tax herds moving on private lands, on grounds that such taxes ran against what they considered ancestral rights. Economic historian Pier Luigi Spaggiari emphasized throughout his work the inertia of noble owners of fiefs, suspicious of the minister’s enthusiasm for habit-altering reforms. The few slightly better off peasants who owned land lacked access to capital and, in any event, were too absorbed with their own survival to risk implementing changes shunned by their social superiors.12 No wonder, then, that the administration’s carefully drafted studies produced little more than an academic analysis with next to no impact on either the development of Parmense agriculture or the standard of living of inhabitants trapped between ‘fraud and scarcity’.13 With government recommendations ignored, attempts at 12  Pier Luigi Spaggiari, L’Agricoltura negli Stati Parmensi dal 1750 al 1859 (Milano: Banca Comerciale Italiana, 1966), especially pp. 41–42, 86–88 and 94–95. 13  See Claudio Bargelli, ‘Le Terre di Montagna tra frode e miseria. La vita quotidiana nel ducato di Parma nel secolo dei lumi’ in Aurea Parma, 83, 2 (magio–agosto 1999): 265–284. The fraud involved mainly widespread smuggling. In a different study, Bargelli highlighted Du Tillot’s concern that deprivation might worsen to the level of famine, which led him to monitor the grain trade, establish emergency barns and even resort to imports. Claudio Bargelli, ‘Ubertose messi e pubblica felicità. Il commercio dei grani a Parma nel settecento’

16 

D. P. HARSANYI

reform did not go further than occasional experiments undertaken, on their own properties, by the few who needed no prompting, such as the philanthropist count Stefano Sanvitale.14 Lack of cooperation further thwarted Du Tillot’s ambitious plans for capitalizing on the fame of local varieties of cheese as well. For one thing, the army’s needs for fresh meat limited the herds raised for milk, a problem compounded by a series of devastating epizooties (1703, 1713, 1738 and 1746). As mentioned above, Duke Philip’s love of hunting killed the ambition of founding state-run cheese factories. In the meantime, stiff Lombard competition forced Du Tillot to resort to import tariffs to protect local specificity and discourage illegal sales.15 Introducing the culture of the potato was the only agricultural innovation adopted with relative ease. Industrial projects did not fare much better. As an unwelcome side effect, they set in motion waves of social discontent that gradually swelled into anti-French animosity, something that the prime minister simply did not think about. He certainly assumed locals would be glad to see, and work in, the textile factories set up around the duchies (Piacenza, Guastalla and Borgo San Donino). What he did not expect was that residents would resent being patronized by the numerous French artisans summoned to instruct them and by the French managers placed in charge of all aspects of the business. Silk manufacturing, for instance—the prime minister’s favourite economic branch—was entirely run by French craftsmen brought over from Lyon. In time, this branch expanded enough to be considered a success, but in general, industrial initiatives suffered from the perception of being an imported pastime for resident foreigners.16 in Aurea Parma, 82, 2 (maggio–agosto 1998): 149–183. On everyday life in the Parma area in the eighteenth century, very illuminating is Spaggiari’s analysis of a census commissioned by Du Tillot: Pier Luigi Spaggiari, ‘Famiglia, case e lavoro nella Parma del Du Tillot. Un censimento del 1765.’ Studi e ricerche della Facoltà di Economia e Commercio. 3, (1966): 163–236. 14  Spaggiari, L’Agricoltura negli Stati Parmensi dal 1750 al 1859, 99. 15  See Claudio Bargelli, ‘Una vaccheria benedettina tra Sei e Settecento: l’organizzazione produttiva casearia del cenobio di S. Giovanni Evangelista di Parma’ Aurea Parma, 2 (maggio–agosto 2007): 213–238, for an illuminating economic analysis of one exemplary cheese factory run by Benedictine monks from the fifteen through late eighteenth centuries. The article also offers a very helpful survey of the literature dedicated to the history of Parmesan cheese-making. See also the comprehensive survey by the same author: Claudio Bargelli, Dall’empirismo alla scienza. L’agricoltura parmense dall’età dei lumi al primo conflitto mondiale (Trieste: Ed. Goliardiche, 2004). 16  A few prominent local businessmen, such as Pietro Cavagnari, took over the silk manufactures. Marcello Turchi, ‘La fiorente industria della seta: imagine essenziale della Parma del

2  PRELUDE TO NAPOLEON 

17

Cultural Policies In his examination of Du Tillot’s social-engineering agenda, Massimo Amato underscored the utopian nature of the entire endeavour: in the context of the Enlightenment’s belief in rational reforms, Du Tillot was a dreamer.17 Indeed, who but a dreamer would believe strongly enough in the power of reason to take on the Church, keep trying to spread the tax burden, and launch well-meant economic initiatives in the face of stubborn resistance and bitter animosity? Let us add to Amato’s list the no less extravagant programme of reshaping, or re-engineering, to use the same terminology, Parma’s cultural landscape. Duke Philip heartily approved: the prime minister’s ambitions in such matters hurt no privileges, required no sacrifices of himself, and offered the duchies a chance to repair the damage caused by his brother’s spoliations. Luckily for Du Tillot, the duke was too indolent to notice his minister’s steady drive towards secularizing all aspects of life in the duchies. State-sponsored cultural establishments materialized almost overnight. The Academy of Fine Arts, with statutes modelled on the French institution of the same name, opened its doors in 1752, followed by the Academy of Parma, likewise a replica of French academies, in December 1757.18 Soon thereafter Gazzetta di Parma started bringing the news to interested readers (January 1760). The discovery of the Tabula Alimentaria came as a dream opportunity for Parma’s scholarly community to claim its rightful place on the European scene.19 Duke Philip gave his accord for the Ducal Museum of Antiquities (now the National Archaeological Museum of Du Tillot’ in Parma Economica, 4 (Dicembre 1987): 19–24. For details on French business activities in Parma see Bédarida, Parme et la France de 1748 à 1789, 179–186; pp. 121–186, on the entire French presence in the duchies during Du Tillot’s administration. The ubiquitous presence of French managers made it difficult for local would-be entrepreneurs of modest means to access capital. Spaggiari gives the example of one Giuseppe Tassi who stressed the difficulties of enrolling sceptical villagers in long-term projects when called on by Du Tillot to provide capital to poor farmers for raising sheep for wool, the raw material for a factory he intended to set up. Spaggiari, L’Agricoltura negli Stati Parmensi dal 1750 al 1859, 42. 17  Amato, ‘L’ingegneria economica e sociale di Guillaume Du Tillot’ art.cit, 140. 18  The Academy of Fine Arts soon earned a European-wide reputation with annual painting, sculpture and architecture competitions, opened to artists from all European countries. Francisco Goya, a young artist just starting out at the time, sent a painting for the 1771 competition; he did not win the prize, but his later fame bolstered Parma’s prestige. 19  The discovery of the Tabula Alimentaria at Veleia in 1747 prompted the beginning of archeological digs meant to rival the excavations at Herculaneum and Pompei. The large

18 

D. P. HARSANYI

Parma), founded in 1760 to coordinate further excavations at Veleia, and for a new Royal Library (now Biblioteca Palatina) opened to the public in 1761. Du Tillot selected the learned Paolo Maria Paciaudi, freshly returned from a year of studies in Paris, for the dual position of director of the museum and chief librarian of the Royal Library, responsible for acquisitions and cataloguing in both places.20 In 1768, Du Tillot invited the printer Giambattista Bodoni to set up shop in Parma, with generous government financial backing. Bodoni quickly became an international celebrity, widely admired for his technical prowess and stylistic creativity, his studio a tourist attraction on a par with the works of Parma’s beloved Renaissance painter Correggio.21 French architects and artists flocked to the duchies’ capital to design and decorate, in French neo-classical style, buildings fit to house the new institutions.22 It all amounted to an artistic bronze tablet dating from 101 CE details administrative measures regarding welfare and food distribution. 20  A Théatin priest influenced by Jansenist ideas and familiar with French intellectual approaches, Paciaudi (1710–1785) was exactly the kind of local aide Du Tillot was looking for. Indeed, a few clergymen generally receptive to Jansenism and hostile to the Jesuits responded to his entreaties, most importantly Adeodato Turchi, Archbishop of Parma, and Pietro Capellotti, Archpriest of Momigliano, the latter already pursued by the Inquisition for his liberal views. Crucial support came as well from the distinguished magistrates Giacomo Maria Schiattini, president of the chamber of magistrates, Aurelio Terrarossa, professor of law, Giambattista Riga, and count Girolamo Nasalli. They were joined by respected historians Ireneo Affò and Giuseppe Pezzana, the latter appointed first editor of Gazzetta di Parma. The commitment of this important segment of the educated classes helped Du Tillot stare down papal intransigence. 21  For a well-researched recent biography and commentary on Bodoni’s contributions to the printing arts, see Valerie Lester, Giambattista Bodoni: His Life and His World (Boston: David R. Godine, 2015). 22  Appointed chief architect with the mission of rebuilding the ducal palace, Ennemond Petitot arrived in Parma in 1753. Later, he built the grand gallery of the Biblioteca Palatina in neoclassical style and launched several urbanism projects until Du Tillot’s dismissal sent him into untimely retirement. A French duo, architect Pierre Contant d’Ivry and sculptor Jean Baptiste Boudard, were hired to modernize the ducal park at Colorno in the 1750s, which resulted in statue alleys and sculptural groups reminiscent of Versailles. Boudard also taught at the Academy of Fine Arts and helped train many artists who emulated his aesthetic principles. His neo-classical sculptures are still on display in Parma’s main park, Parco Ducale. Marco Pellegri, G.B. Boudard Statuario Francese alla Real Corte di Parma (Parma: Luigi Battei, 1976). There is a vast bibliography on Petitot and his work in Parma. For quick reference see the illustrated biography Giuseppe Cirillo, Petitot (Parma: Grafiche Step Editrice, 2008). For a study on the transformation of the urban landscape in Carlo Mambriani, see ‘La Città Ridisegnata’ in Storia di Parma, vol. V, 139–179.

2  PRELUDE TO NAPOLEON 

19

and intellectual awakening, with the educated classes keenly involved in the project of turning Parma into a high-culture hub. Du Tillot did not stop there. His greatest ambition and top priority, which he prudently did not bring up until 1768, was an out-and-out transformation of education in the duchies. Like financial reforms, such a transformative project could not be accomplished without fighting, once more, the power and the influence of the Church, and hence not without controversy and multiple hurdles.

The University of Parma The grand cultural makeover did not lack for enemies. The Society of Jesus swiftly emitted the charge of heresy on the entire government of Parma for allowing reformists to disrupt an order of things that, so far as they were concerned, needed no changes. On 30 January 1768, Pope Clement XIII weighed in with a monitorium that strongly condemned Du Tillot’s entire administration.23 However, the winds of change favoured Du Tillot’s way of thinking: fellow Bourbon-ruled states (France, Spain and the Kingdom of Naples) had already suppressed the Jesuit order. What better time to eliminate the Jesuits from leadership positions in Parma too? Duke Philip died in 1765, and while his son and successor Ferdinand leaned strongly towards obeying papal injunctions, he was not yet emancipated from his prime minister’s tutelage. To Du Tillot’s relief, the decree of expulsion of the Society of Jesus, issued on 3 February 1768 and published on 9 February in Gazzetta di Parma, met with general indifference. The Jesuits, it turned out, could not rely on the affections of the public to save themselves. Still, the editorial took pains to minimize the magnitude of the event and spare the feelings of Jesuit sympathizers: ‘Our Prince protects the Religion first and the Letters afterwards. The proscription of the Jesuits will leave no void among us. Ministers and instructors have been appointed to each sacred ministry formerly exercised by Jesuits and to each chair they used to hold’.24 23  Venturi, ‘Parma e Europa’, 219–222. The very interesting correspondence between Du Tillot and Parma’s ambassador at Versailles, baron d’Argental, revolves mainly on the strategy to be used for peacefully driving the Jesuits out of Parma. See Carminella Biondi, ‘La Correspondance Du Tillot—d’Argental’ in Carminella Biondi, La Francia e la Parma nel secondo settecento (Bologna: CLUEB, 2003), 103–171. 24  As quoted in Chiara Burgio, ‘L’attività culturale di P.M. Paciaudi nella Parma del Du Tillot e lo suo ‘Memorio intorno la Biblioteca Parmense” Aurea Parma, LXIV (April 1980): 6–39. See also Venturi, ‘Parma e Europa,’ 223.

20 

D. P. HARSANYI

With the Society of Jesus out of the way, Du Tillot’s main collaborator Paciaudi rushed to publish a new academic constitution which spelled clearly the goals of the reformed schools: ‘…the public education of youth must prepare useful citizens to the Fatherland, able ministers to the Church, faithful subjects to the Sovereign, all to the ornament and benefit of the State’. The new set of rules established the principle of public schools, state sponsored from the elementary level to university, with a uniform curriculum and textbooks approved by the (supposedly enlightened) government. Scientific education, modern languages and civics formed the core curriculum; scholastics was abolished as a subject of study, replaced by selections from Saint Augustine’s and Thomas Aquinas’ works. Enlightened circles in France and Italy rejoiced; not so Pope Clement XIII, who promptly declared null and void, on ecclesiastic grounds, the entire reform of the education system. In response, Gazzetta di Parma published a government decree that forbade all printers in the duchies to print and disseminate the pope’s verdict.25 Both the French and the Spanish courts remained unmoved and took the papal bluster as proof of Rome’s weakness, since no similar censure had been directed towards greater powers like, precisely, France and Spain. Hazard further played into Du Tillot’s hands: exceeded by events, the pope summoned a consistory to deal with calls for the total abolition of the Society of Jesus, but the project was forgotten upon his sudden death on 2 February 1769. The subsequent three-month conclave gave Du Tillot the opportunity to reduce the number of clerical congregations and convert their assets to secular institutions of public assistance. Finally, he also took advantage of the papal hiatus to abolish the tribunal of the Inquisition, a courageous break with the past that nonetheless went almost unnoticed in the shadow of the grand educational project. For all the clamour, the Jesuit College converted into the University of Parma with relative ease, an orderly transition even more impressive since the changes went very far indeed. To take just one telling example, the hiring of Claude François Xavier Millot (1726–1785), nominally a Jesuit 25  Voltaire did not miss the opportunity to ridicule the papacy once more in a small pamphlet allegedly translated from the Italian, titled ‘Les droits des hommes et les usurpations des autres’ (June 1768). As mentioned in Storia della Emilia Romagna, II, 457–468; Ugo Gualazzini, ‘Per le scuole della ragion civile e canonica del ducato di Parma e Piacenza’ in Archivio Storico per le Provincie Parmensi, 32 (1980): 352–362, and Burgio, art.cit.

2  PRELUDE TO NAPOLEON 

21

abbot, but long estranged from the order, as principal instructor at the university’s new chair of history left no doubt that the education of young Parmense was about to take a new direction. Millot was selected for the job on the strength of his Eléments de l’histoire de France (published in 1772), a book well received in scholarly circles for its accessible style and its studious neglect of divine causes in explaining the march of history. Millot took the appointment in Parma as a chance to change the teaching of the discipline: as soon as he arrived, sacred history disappeared from the curriculum in favour of a rational exposition of causes and motives behind events, all in the interest of helping students understand human nature and judge the past with ‘true philosophy’.26 Although firmly rooted in French intellectual soil, Du Tillot project paralleled developments elsewhere in Italy, chiefly in neighbouring Tuscany and Lombardy, and in Naples further to the south, where state-­ directed reforms reliant on the latest scientific thinking pragmatically aimed at ‘ameliorating society’, as Eric Cochrane defined Peter Leopold’s enlightened despotism in Florence.27 It was a two-decade tour de force meant to metamorphose the small state of Parma into a version of the città ideale imagined by the minister’s philosophe friends. To bring this ambitious vision down to earth one more piece of the puzzle needed to fall into 26  Venturi, ‘Parma e Europa’, 225. The work Millot accomplished in Parma resulted in his book Eléments d’histoire de l’Angleterre, depuis son origine sous les Romains jusqu’au règne de George II. Par M. l’abbé Millot, professeur en l’Université de Parme, des académies de Lyon et de Nancy (Paris: chez Durand, 1769). The introduction extols the works of David Hume, whom Millot strove to emulate. 27  Eric Cochrane, Florence in the Forgotten Centuries, 1527–1800 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973), 461. Parma’s Philip was no Peter Leopold, but he did not interfere with his minister’s agenda and allowed structural changes to take root. Albeit at reduced scale, Parma’s reformist trajectory could also be compared with the systematic transformation of the state apparatus in the Duchy of Milan, masterfully examined by Carlo Capra: Domenico Sella and Carlo Capra, Il ducato di Milano dal 1535 al 1796 (Torino: UTET, 1984. Volume 11 of Storia d’Italia under the direction of Giuseppe Galasso), 153–617. Capra put the emphasis on the work of bureaucrats doggedly building an innovative system of government in the face of hostility from traditional elites. This angle departs from the line of interpretation championed by Franco Venturi, centred on the history of ideas and the role of intellectuals. It would be impossible to even attempt to summarize in a footnote the rich historiography of the Italian Enlightenment. For a survey of different currents of thought, starting from Venturi’s influence and legacy, see Anna Maria Rao, ‘Enlightenment and reform: an overview of culture and politics in Enlightenment Italy’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 10, 2 (2005): 142–167.

22 

D. P. HARSANYI

place: educating Ferdinand, future ruler of the duchies and son of Du Tillot’s compliant master, into a philosopher-prince, capable of illustrating by example the meaning of enlightened government.

The Education of the Infant In a letter sent from Louise Elisabeth in Versailles to her husband Philip, Duke of Parma, she announced that she had made her choice of a tutor for their son Ferdinand. The honour fell upon Etienne de Condillac (1714–1780), a personality of the Parisian Republic of letters with a great reputation for erudition and intellectual depth. At the time of the appointment, he had already penned his major works: Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, Le Traité des systèmes, Le Traité des animaux and Le Traité des sensations. Parma’s Jesuits expressed bitter frustration at losing such a prestigious assignment to an almost declared Deist, frequent guest of philosophical salons and cherished friend of Diderot, Rousseau and Voltaire. But Condillac had not contributed to the Encylopédie and claimed to be a reasonable empiricist, not an intractable philosophe. This was enough to reassure the daughter of Louis XV who in turn reassured her husband of Condillac’s fitness for the job: ‘our son must be a good Catholic, not a doctor of the Church; it would be of no use to him to examine all sorts of [religious] controversies’.28 In Parma, Condillac was welcomed by Auguste de Kéralio (1715–1805), supervisor of the Infant’s education for the previous two years, during which time he tutored his august pupil in mathematics, geography and the rudiments of civil engineering. The teaching team included astronomer Jérôme Lalande (1732–1807) for the exact sciences and Alexandre Deleyre (1726–1796) for the humanities. Deleyre, a lapsed Jesuit, who made a name for himself with contributions to Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, also served as Condillac’s assistant, in which capacity he was asked to ‘summarize the works of all the friends of humanity’ according to his somehow plaintive description of his tasks in a letter to Rousseau dated 29 March 1761. Such distinguished mentors raised even the hopes of Voltaire, who wrote to 28  Louise Elisabeth’s letter to Philip of Parma, 25 March 1758, as quoted in Guerci, Condillac storico, 52. Also reproduced in Bédarida, Parme et la France, 412. For Condillac the appointment could not have come at a better time: in 1759 the Paris Parlement condemned the first seven volumes of the Encyclopédie, Hélvetius’ De l’Esprit and Condillac’s Traité des sensations. By the time the verdict was issued, Condillac was already in Parma.

2  PRELUDE TO NAPOLEON 

23

d’Alembert on 17 November 1760: ‘It seems that the Parmense Infant is in good company. He will have a Condillac and a Leire [Deleyre]. If he still becomes a bigot, the [divine] grace must be really strong’.29 Divine grace was strong indeed. In the beginning, things seemed to go according to expectations. To his new teachers, the Infant came across as an impressionable child, intelligent and eager to learn. He read the classics alongside works of French and Italian literature; daily lessons mixed philosophy, mathematics and physics with religious principles reliably voided of superstition; with the help of Kéralio, who strove to be a friend as well as a tutor, he plowed, planted and harvested a small field of wheat, to gain first-hand experience of nature’s precise workings. Day after day, in a gruelling routine that would mystify our schools of education, vast chunks of ideas, theories, facts and figures from all fields were poured onto Ferdinand’s tabula rasa, with no regard for the abilities of a youngster in his early teens to digest such complex information. In the belief that reasoned examination of the past opened the door to an enlightened future, the study of history anchored the 16-volume Cours d’études Condillac wrote in Parma, the core curriculum for a perfect education. One historian described the experiment as ‘the dream of a philosopher-abbot who wanted to shape his pupil, as he wanted to shape anyone who was to benefit from his teachings, into an individual able to reason and to grow by his own forces, thanks to vast learning and to the correct use of that marvelous instrument of communication, analysis and synthesis that is human language’.30 The final goal of the experiment was to help Ferdinand grow into ‘an enlightened though unchallenged prince’: wise, tolerant, learned, always mindful of the golden mean between tyranny and democracy.31 29  As quoted in Guerci, Condillac Storico, pp.  95 and 64, respectively. For a perceptive examination of the larger ramifications of young Ferdinand’s education see Elizabeth Badinter, L’Infant de Parme (Paris: Fayard, 2010). See also Alba Mora, ‘Don Ferdinando: ‘Il Duca ‘fuori tempo” in Storia di Parma, vol V, 193–212. 30  Carminella Biondi, ‘Condillac a Parma. La lunga premessa al Cours d’études’ in La Francia e la Parma nel secondo settecento, 59. 31  This was Du Tillot’s expressed hope. Guerci, Condillac Storico, 75 and Bédarida, Parme et la France, 83–84. Once more, such views corresponded with contemporary developments in Italy, where reforms occurred with support from absolutist rulers—Austrian rulers in Milan and Tuscany—schooled in the new ideas of the times but never in doubt of their legitimacy to exercise power and to maintain control over the way changes unfolded. See Jacob Soll’s examination of Peter Leopold’s utilitarian governing philosophy, a blend of Catholic, absolutist and core Enlightenment principles. Jacob Soll, ‘The Encyclopedic Prince: Grand Duke Peter Leopold (1747–1792) and the Meaning of Tuscan Enlightenment’ in Florence

24 

D. P. HARSANYI

Early indications that the young duke was on the verge of validating the hopes invested in him by his mother, his tutors, his two royal uncles and the better part of the Republic of letters were all deceptive. Within a year, the disappointing reality sank in. Impervious to either persuasion or physical punishment, both of which he received in ample doses, Ferdinand spent all the time and energy he could steal from his progressive studies to visit priests, indulge his taste for miracles and relics, and design his bedroom in the shape of a church. Matters only worsened when he became of age to reign and worsened even further after his marriage to the Habsburg princess Maria Amalia (1769). ‘I am told that this prince spends his days visiting monks and that his superstitious Austrian wife will be the mistress there. O, poor philosophie! What will be your fate!’ exclaimed Voltaire in a letter dated 15 October 1769. A few months later Pietro Verri wrote to his brother, Alessandro, that any hopes Condillac might have still harboured were irremediably thwarted; hence, the illustrious philosophe left the duchies in disgust, together with Kéralio. Millot resigned his post before completing his three-year contract and left as well. ‘They had plenty of reason to be astonished’, Verri wrote, ‘seeing that their pupil was so fond of the Dominican brothers that he went to take his meals with them and sing in their choirs and such’.32 Diderot pronounced the final verdict when he recommended Condillac’s Cours d’études to Russia’s Catherine II with the cautious remark that all that brilliance produced nothing but a ‘stupid student’.33 ‘The religious duke’, concluded Umberto Benassi, ‘abandoned his small soul full of scruples to the care of priests and monks’.34 Despite the concerted efforts of some of the most brilliant minds of the time, the After the Medici. Tuscan Enlightenment, 1747–1790. Edited by Corey Tazzara, Paula Findlen and Jacob Soll (New York: Routledge, 2020), 317–335. While Ferdinand’s all-French teaching team favoured French models, they were surely aware of Peter Leopold’s reputation as exemplary enlightened ruler, the kind their pupil was expected to become thanks to his progressive education. No less a figure than d’Alembert voiced the eagerness with which ‘those who enlighten nations’ awaited Ferdinand’s accession to the throne. Badinter, L’Infant de Parme, 68–70. D’Alembert wrote in response to Ferdinand’s translation into Italian, under Kéralio’s guidance, his discourse of reception to the Academy of Sciences (3 December 1768). 32  Both quoted in Guerci, Condillac Storico, 67. 33  Guerci, Condillac Storico, 68. 34  As quoted in Umberto Benassi, Il generale Bonaparte ed il Duca e I Giacobini di Parma e Piacenza (Parma: Pressa la R. Deputaziona di Storia Patria, 1912), 23.

2  PRELUDE TO NAPOLEON 

25

educational project came to nothing. As soon as he reached majority and became sovereign with full powers in 1765, Ferdinand proceeded to sabotage and eventually undo all the reforms of the last two decades.35

Dashed Hopes and the End of Reforms Ferdinand found a kindred spirit in his wife, who emboldened him to turn the Du Tillot page and move the duchies closer to his conservative sensibilities. In addition, Maria Amalia rejected categorically any hint of financial discipline.36 France’s Louis XV found the couple’s transgressions troublesome enough to convey his displeasure along with stern, though affectionate—in the beginning—advice on the decorum a prince ought to observe: Believe, my dear son that your happiness depends entirely on your conduct. It is natural that your youth should distract you at the very moment you are leaving behind a too rigid system of education. The light-heartedness of your age, the lack of experience of the princess you have married, too little thought given to the decorum your condition requires—not unusual in the first moments of freedom, have given rise to disorders that end up harming you at European courts and to that you must remedy at once.

The way to remedy ‘the disorders’ was to ignore the various intrigues woven around Du Tillot, whom the French king considered above

35  As Elizabeth Badinter has discussed in the last two chapters of L’Infant de Parme, the pedagogical failure ended up calling into question the Enlightenment’s faith in the power of ideas to mould human nature—or society, for that matter. 36  This was a great disappointment for Du Tillot, whose efforts at scrimping and saving had been briefly supported by Ferdinand’s decision to allow all inhabitants to hunt, provided they brought the hides of the animals to court for processing. This gave Du Tillot the great satisfaction of registering 0 pounds for ducal pleasure hunting on the books for 1765 and the following five years he served, for unlike his father, Ferdinand detested hunting. More savings on entertainment followed, but extravagance replaced prudence once the wedding with Maria Amalia of Habsburg took place in 1751. The ceremonies alone opened an ‘abyss that seemed impossible to fill’. Benassi, Guglielmo Du Tillot, 175–214. Du Tillot was forced to establish a special economic office for the purpose of erasing the post-wedding deficit. The exhausting squabbles between the young duchess and Du Tillot on the issue of household expenses are chronicled by Benassi, who concluded that Maria Amalia brought nothing but ruin and disorder to her new country, an opinion shared by all French observers, beginning with King Louis XV himself. Benassi, Guglielmo Du Tillot, 223.

26 

D. P. HARSANYI

reproach, as did Ferdinand’s other guardian, the king of Spain.37 Louis XV sent to Parma a personal emissary, count Chauvelin, with instructions that plainly illustrated how much he abhorred the extreme religiosity Ferdinand felt free to exhibit. The ambassador’s main task was to impress on the Infant that he stood to lose both the allowance that maintained his lifestyle and the political protection that guaranteed the survival of his states. The young duke accepted the scolding and vowed to mend his ways. In actuality, by means of deceptive obsequiousness mixed with persistent complaining, he managed to have his way against his royal guardians’ judgement and wishes, just as he had prevailed over several leading lights of the Republic of letters. The final clash came at the end of 1770, when Du Tillot drafted four decrees to cut back spending for religious purposes and limit the number of monks admitted in monasteries. Any talk of further touching clerical interests was unbearable to Ferdinand, so he set in motion the process of expelling Du Tillot: members of all communities and corporations throughout the duchies, including religious ones, were invited to come forward with criticism of the minister’s methods. Smelling blood in the water, many did just that. Placed under house arrest while a panel of three judges examined the objections, Du Tillot sent his archives to the tutelary courts of Spain and France. That both found the accusations baseless made no difference to Ferdinand.38 Du Tillot quit the duchies in disgrace, 37  Letter from King Louis XV to Ferdinand, Duke of Parma, dated 1 November 1769, in Lettres de Louis XV à l’Infant Ferdinand de Parme (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1938), 141–142. This is the first in a series of letters dealing with the ‘disorders’ brought about by Ferdinand and Maria-Amalia’s concerted efforts to undermine the administrative team headed by Du Tillot. 38  The instructions to the French envoy sent to assess the charges against Du Tillot clearly expressed the king’s puzzlement: ‘It is not at all credible that the marquis de Felino, who has justified the place he occupies and who has also been regarded by the deceased Infant Don Philip as a very honest person and zealous servant of his master, has suddenly embraced different principles and a different philosophy under the successor of this Prince’. However, the French and the Spanish kings agreed to investigate the matter; having done so, both pronounced Du Tillot not guilty and a victim of vicious persecution at the hands of disgruntled courtiers. ‘Mémoire pour servir d’instruction au sieur comte Dufort, commandant de l’ordre royal et militaire de Saint-Louis, maréchal de l’armée du roi, allant à Parme pour y exécuter en qualité de ministre plénipotentiaire auprès de l’Infant Duc de Parme la commission extraordinaire dont Sa Majesté l’a chargé. A Versailles, le 3 Juin 1771’. In Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traits de Westphalie jusqu’à la Révolution française, Publiés sous les auspices de la Commission des Archives Diplomatiques au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1893) X (Naples et Parme), 231–234.

2  PRELUDE TO NAPOLEON 

27

on the night of 19 November 1771; his most prestigious French associates left too, and local supporters suddenly found themselves out of favour.39 It all fell apart with astonishing speed. Religious orders regained their privileges and their clout; although the Society of Jesus was not formally reinstated, many of its members returned to the duchies and quietly filled the teaching positions they had been forced to vacate. The tribunal of the Inquisition was reinstated with full powers; the suppression of the mortmain, Du Tillot’s most progressive piece of legislation, was revoked. Save for the silk manufactures, plans for economic reforms came to a standstill. With few notable exceptions, court circles cheered the prime minister’s departure and applauded the return to an order of things where they fit comfortably and unquestioningly. Immediately after Du Tillot’s departure, Piacentino patrician Gaetano Tedaldi drafted for the duke a plan for turning back the clock—back to normal, as he saw it: Mezzo che si propone per rimediare ai mali della presentanea Sovranità di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla (1772). It was a working paper of sorts that called first and foremost for mending the link between local nobles and their sovereign, the sacred bond Du Tillot had broken with his reliance on bureaucrats and professionals. The duke should, Tedaldi insisted, select only born gentlemen for all state functions, given that members of the nobility were educated in the spirit of honour, justice and love for their sovereign. For their part, sons of the people should dedicate themselves to agriculture and other useful crafts, their calling being to practise the same trade as their fathers.40 Turning to recent changes in education, Tedaldi advised not 39  Paciaudi, for instance, briefly fell from grace in the wake of Du Tillot’s dismissal and was replaced in 1771 by Angelo Mazza, with whom he had professional disputes regarding the cataloguing process. However, the ducal wrath moderated within two years and Paciaudi was able to resume his position. Countess Malaspina, a close friend, was exiled without having been found guilty of any offence, an act of injustice that earned another firm reprimand from Louis XV. ‘If this goes on, I see no reason why I should have an envoy at your court’, the king finally shouted. ‘Letter of 9 September 1771’ in Lettres de Louis XV à l’Infant Ferdinand, 186. In the end, however, dynastic attachments prevailed, and Ferdinand was forgiven. He did not hold grudges and allowed most associates of Du Tillot to return to the duchies on condition that they keep a low profile. 40  The text is amply quoted and discussed in Ghiringhelli, Idee, Società ed Istituzioni nel Ducato di Parma e Piacenza durante l’età illuministica, 13–19. It is remarkable how closely Tedaldi’s assumptions of the nobility’s fitness for public service resemble those at the basis of the Ségur ordinances issued in France in 1781, which likewise claimed that nobles, educated in the spirit of honour, discipline and reverence for the king, made better soldiers then commoners, and hence the requirement of four quarters of nobility for admission to the officer

28 

D. P. HARSANYI

eliminating but slowing down the teaching of sciences and the ‘new ideas’ introduced by the French philosophes. Modern education had its benefits but should be limited to children of the nobility expected to run the state on behalf of their sovereign. Finally, Tedaldi advised that all foreigners, meaning all French nationals, be purged from the duchies so society could find its way back to domestic tranquility without the constant irritant of outside influences. In the same vein, the new director of finances, Girolamo Obach, recommended a return to feudal fiscal policies on the grounds that Du Tillot’s economic vision felt too alien to people accustomed to the old ways—a comment that foreshadows popular exasperation with French reforms at the beginning of the 1805–1806 insurrection. Evidence of popular irritation with the French presence explains to some extent why ducal officials chose to point the finger at the foreignness of Du Tillot’s reforms. In 1750, the adventurer-writer Giacomo Casanova passed through town for a couple of days. The shopkeepers’ grumbling against recently arrived French residents who insisted on speaking their language and imposing their taste made enough of an impression to be included in his memoirs.41 A less illustrious chronicler, a barber by the name of Sgavetti, wrote that in Parma foreigners were crowding out the natives even in church. This, he noted, tongue in cheek, hindered the spiritual concentration of Italian worshippers who could not help but burst into laughter at the sound of ridiculous, to their ears, French musical accompaniment.42 Du Tillot hardly noticed such sentiments, and when he did, he chose to ignore them. Believing, with his ally Condillac, that human nature was pliable, he never doubted that all social classes would, in time, open their eyes to the beneficial nature of his well-meaning, ­progressive reforms. The cheerful expectation that enlightened administrative measures had the power to transform peoples and societies reads corps. See on this topic Caste, Class, and Profession in Old Regime France, by David Bien, with Jay M. Smith and Rafe Blaufarb (St. Andrews: Centre for French History and Culture of the University of St. Andrews, 2010), a revised and updated version of David Bien’s article of 1974. 41  Casanova wrote that he only heard French spoken in the streets. Shopkeepers who meekly offered to send for French-speaking attendants when he walked in were elated to find out he was Italian. Mémoires de Jacques Casanova de Seingalt (Paris: FB Editions, 2014), II, 135–136. 42  The 1769–1772 section of Sgavetti’s diary has been published in Maria Montanari, “L’età d’oro della Corte di Parma nella cronaca di un barbiere” Aurea Parma (marzo–aprile 1924): 103–107. The full document is preserved at the Archivio di Stato di Parma.

2  PRELUDE TO NAPOLEON 

29

like a prelude to the ‘bureaucratic optimism’ that fuelled the daily exertions of Napoleonic administrators.43 In the eyes of his contemporaries though, this unshaken self-confidence was, as one sympathetic observer wrote, the fatal flaw of a man of faultless character, the hidden virus that destroyed the very foundations of his edifice: ‘It is a very big error for a minister to project sumptuous creations, to fail to understand in depth the capabilities of the locals, to not appreciate the true forces of the state, and to believe he can force nature’.44 Much the same could be said of the ambitions of French executives in Parma three decades later. Reforms screeched to a halt almost as suddenly as they had started, leaving Parma–Piacenza in cultural and political limbo. The conservative switch rolled back the fiscal restructuring, reconfirmed the privileged status of the nobility, and restored the Church to its traditional prominence. The intellectual daring that Condillac and his supporters brought to the duchies melted down to hushed, uncontentious conversations. Yet, Ferdinand was not a tyrant and, as Giovanni Tocci rightly noted, his debonair nature allowed literary and scientific research to go on—indeed, he was rather fond of natural sciences himself—so long as such activities hurt neither his religious sentiments nor the clergy’s interests.45 Accordingly, the institutions created by Du Tillot lowered their horizons, avoided controversy, and recruited Italian, not foreign, personalities, all the while continuing to receive state subventions.46 The University of Parma thought it prudent to revert to an all-Italian staff, but maintained its funding and its autonomy. Famed printer Bodoni too abandoned his international roster in favour of Italian, preferably local, writers. Gazzetta di Parma still hit the 43   Michael Broers coined the term ‘bureaucratic optimism’ to define the ethos of Napoleonic bureaucrats. ‘Les Enfants du Siècle: an empire of young professionals and the creation of a bureaucratic, imperial ethos in Napoleonic Europe’ in Empires and Bureaucracy in World History. From Antiquity to the Twentieth Century. Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons editors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016): 344–363 (362). 44  Report by Count Duranto Duranti, the Sardinian king’s ambassador, announcing Du Tillot’s dismissal in 1771. The entire report has been reproduced in Aurea Parma, I (gennaio–marzo 1997): 73–87. 45  Giovanni Tocci, ‘Negli anni di Ferdinando’ in Un Borbone tra Parma e l’Europa. Don Ferdinando e il suo tempo (1751–1802). A cura di Alba Mora (Parma: Diabsis, 2005), 71–95. For a nuanced portrait see the collective volume Il bigotto illuminato: ricordo di Ferdinando di Borbone. A cura di Giuseppe Bertini e Francesca Sandrini (Parma: Fondazione Monte di Parma. Museo Glauco Lombardi, 2002). 46  Famed playwright Carlo Goldoni received a pension from the duke, perhaps so that he could compete with the French at the French theatre that remained in operation.

30 

D. P. HARSANYI

stands every day, albeit treating readers to increasingly bland news delivered in an apprehensive, restrained tone.47 More consequential than the subdued cultural climate were Ferdinand’s complete abandonment of fiscal discipline and general disinterest in running his duchies. Affairs of the state fell to ministers from whom the duke expected conformity and deference after Du Tillot’s hyperactive premiership. Financial operations went little further than distributing subsidies received yearly from the tutelary courts of France and Spain. For more than 20 years, Parma’s executive worked in slow and cumbersome ways, out of step with energetic programmes of institutional overhaul in the immediate neighbourhood. The resulting bureaucratic and fiscal opacity horrified all French administrators, who invariably labelled the situation they found in Parma ‘chaos’ and saw their work there as the ultimate test of professional endurance. In sum, the duchies turned inward and abandoned their own reforms at a time when cities and regions all around continued to carry out Enlightenment-inflected changes. Elizabeth Badinter’s evocative image of complacent lethargy ‘disturbed only by the rhythmic toll of church bells’ best describes the two decades that followed Du Tillot’s exile.48 The tranquility, or rather stillness, lasted until 1796, when French troops under General Bonaparte marched into Northern Italy and Parma was thrown into turmoil again.

47  ‘Under the fearful Duke Ferdinand, after Du Tillot, Gazzetta di Parma turned from an instrument to build consensus into an instrument to avoid dissensions’. 1796. Napoleone a Parma. Ristampa Anastatica dell’annata 1796 della Gazzetta di Parma. A cura di Maristella Carpi (Parma: PPS Editirice, 1977), 67. 48  Badinter, L’Infant de Parme, 154.

CHAPTER 3

Parma and Bonaparte

By 1796, when the Army of Italy marched into the Italian Peninsula, Spain was acting as the sole custodian of the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, the French revolution having severed traditional ties with France. Spain, therefore, spoke for the duchies in all diplomatic encounters and it was Spain’s Prime Minister Manuel Godoy, the Prince of Peace, who committed Parma–Piacenza to passive neutrality on the political scene that emerged in the wake of the French Revolution.1 Keen to remain on friendly terms with Spain, the Directory decided to treat the duchies more gently than the other entities in Northern Italy and asked General Bonaparte to mind Spain’s interests and connections in the Peninsula. In practice, the careful approach meant that the French did not engage with sympathizers in the duchies while retaining the right to use local resources as they saw fit.2 France’s politics resulted in a different experience of the revolutionary triennio (1796–1799) and set the country apart throughout the Napoleonic domination of Italy.

1  This was decided at the Peace of Basel (22 July 1795) and reaffirmed in subsequent treaties with France. 2  Duke Ferdinand was not pleased and called repeatedly on his protectors, in plaintive Spanish language letters, to ensure that he would not ‘lose anything and not be constantly disturbed’. As quoted in Maria Victoria Lòpez-Cordòn Cortezo, ‘Le Realzioni con La Spagna da Elisabeta Farnese a Napoleone’, in Storia di Parma V, 349–365 (362).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_3

31

32 

D. P. HARSANYI

Duke Ferdinand followed the French Revolution closely. He was exceptionally well informed thanks to thoughtful and well-written analysis sent almost daily by the Bailly de Virieu, the envoy to France who had replaced d’Argental in 1788. Nothing in those events spoke to the duke’s mind or heart, appalled as he was by the dreadful fate revolutionaries reserved for Louis XVI and for Marie Antoinette, the sister of his wife, Maria Amalia. The language of popular sovereignty and militant secularism, so reminiscent of the Enlightenment principles Condillac and Kéralio fruitlessly imparted during his schooling years, horrified him. Regardless, Ferdinand followed Virieu’s advice, which, throughout his tenure, consisted in two principles: caution and neutrality. Virieu’s secretary, Joseph (or Giuseppe) De Lama, took over at the end of 1792 and maintained the exact same attitude. He urged that Parma recognize the French Republic, even in the aftermath of the king’s execution. ‘If H.R.H. wishes to shield his states from certain invasion, he must (by the intermediary of a diplomatic agent best suited to execute such orders) recognize the French Republic and reassure its leaders of his good will and friendship’.3 Almost a year later, the advice did not change: ‘The system of neutrality that our prince has so wisely observed until now is the only one that a prudent prince can hold with respect to the French Republic….The power of the Jacobins has reached the highest point; it is useless to fight against it’.4 Ferdinand listened to his ambassadors but thought it wise not to share this riveting news with his subjects. Gazzetta di Parma was instructed to maintain a 3  Letter from De Lama to Count Ventura, 23 December 1792, in Vicomte de Grouchy et Antoine Guillois, La Révolution Française racontée par un diplomate étranger. Correspondance du Bailli de Virieu, Ministre plénipotentiaire de Parme (Paris: Flammarion, 1903), 409. All letters from Virieu and De Lama are addressed to Count Ventura, Parma’s minister of foreign affairs. It is not clear why Virieu was abruptly dismissed, not without a rather generous pension, however. On De Lama’s missives from France see Silvia Molinari, ‘Giuseppe De Lama, scrupoloso ed erudito cronista della rivoluzione francese’ Aurea Parma, 3 (sett.- dic. 1993): 253–263. 4  Letter of De Lama to Count Ventura, 21 October 1793, in Grouchy and Guillois, La Révolution Française racontée par un diplomate étranger, 476. Perhaps hoping that the French armies would falter before reaching his states, Ferdinand entered a formal arrangement with Austria, pledging permission for Austrian commanders to recruit volunteers and purchase supplies in his lands, with the caveat that all promises were automatically invalidated should the French ‘irrupt’ in the duchies. Should that happen, the duke would immediately revert to neutrality. Ferdinand believed the move was both shrewd and prudent. It was neither: once the French government got wind of the duke’s machinations, it ratcheted up the price for abstaining from invasion, claiming that the French people were entitled to compensations for damages caused by benevolence towards the Austrian coalition.

3  PARMA AND BONAPARTE 

33

total blackout on the revolution unfolding in France; from 1789 on, the paper never mentioned the name of the country where people were rising in revolt, going as far as executing a fellow Bourbon king. Even when events spilled into the duchies, the readership was kept in the dark: there was no reporting on General Bonaparte’s epic military victories or on the political revolutions roiling in Northern Italy and no information on French troops crossing Parma’s borders on 7 May 1796. The first issue after the invasion, printed on 13 May 1796, cheerily announced the birth of Ferdinand’s granddaughter and the related visit of a few Spanish royals.5 Soon thereafter the duke decided to suppress the Gazzetta entirely: the last issue came out on 29 July 1796. Appointed commander in chief of the Army of Italy on 2 March 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte left Paris on 11 March with orders to invade Lombardy and force the Austrians to move troops south of the Rhine front. Arriving at Nice on 26 March, he immediately advanced towards Genoa, launching the bewildering campaign of conquests that put Lombardy and the Piedmont under French control in less than two months. The key events that transformed the political map were inaugurated by the victory over the Austrian-Piedmont-Sardinian allied troops at Montenotte on 12 April 1796, a brilliant display of his favourite strategy of dividing enemy forces by means of deceptive screen-movements. Subsequent French victories at Millesimo, Dego and Mondovi (14–15 and 21 April) led to the armistice signed at Cherasco on 28 April. The document included a provision that gave Bonaparte the right to cross the River Po at Valenza, about 30 miles west of Pavia where Austrian forces under General Beaulieu retreated after Montenotte. All roads from Northern Italy to Tuscany and to the Papal States went through Parma–Piacenza, which facilitated commerce in good times but offered an ideal corridor for movements of troops and supplies in times of war.6 The possibility of crossing the River Po at Piacenza, east of Pavia—surprising General Beaulieu who was expecting an attack at Valenza—was simply too convenient for Bonaparte to ignore for the sake of diplomatic niceties.7 5  1796. Napoleone a Parma. Ristampa Anastatica dell’annata 1796 della Gazzetta di Parma, 37–41. 6  Giovanni Tocci noted that geographical location was often the cause of the duchies’ misfortunes. ‘Il Ducato di Parma e Piacenza’, 305. 7  In preparation for the French armies’ arrival, Beaulieu had fortified his side of the river and burned the boats that the French might have been able to requisition. The Po had very few bridges; even at Piacenza the armies were able to use only a ferry and several boats. Up

34 

D. P. HARSANYI

On 6 May 1796 French troops entered the states of the Duke of Parma. Bonaparte installed his headquarters at Castel Giovanni, placed the governor of Piacenza, Dionigio Crescini, under arrest and declared that the duchies would be occupied to facilitate the flow of supplies his army needed. In addition, he announced that he intended to detain the Duke of Parma. This was a bluff, meant to induce local officials to comply without delay, for Parma’s role as a source of both cash and ‘complementary’ supplies for the French army had already been decided after Cherasco: My columns are marching. Beaulieu is running away. I hope to catch him. I will impose a contribution of a few millions to the Duke of Parma. He will make you peace-proposals: do not press him, so that I have the time to make him pay the costs of the campaign and charge him for supplying our warehouses and repairing the chariots.8

A flurry of letters between 29 April and 5 May show that plans for building mobile bridges over the River Po were drawn long before the army crossed the duchies’ borders. The shaken Crescini, protesting that he was but a lowly administrator with no political clout, was sent back to Piacenza with instructions to prepare two hospitals for wounded French soldiers. Crescini fulfilled his duty and informed the duke of the day’s events, whereupon the Spanish ambassador to Parma, count Valparaiso, wrote to the French high command with promises that the duke would acquiesce to any French demands and sign an armistice under the conditions he was going to be asked, when asked to do so.9 Bonaparte agreed to suspend hostilities provided emissaries would bring to his camp, until 6 May Bonaparte contemplated abandoning the fight over the Po. Bonaparte’s cavalier attitude towards the rights of a neutral state induced Beaulieu to do the same and violate the Venetian Republic’s neutrality during his army’s retreat towards Tyrol. Details on this episode in Guglielmo Ferrero, Aventure. Bonparte en Italie (Paris: Plon, 1956), 40–46. See also Carl von Clausewitz’s analysis in Napoleon’s 1796 Italian Campaign. Translated and edited by Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas University, 2018), 60–71. Clausewitz believed Bonaparte took advantage of General Beaulieu’s miscalculations. 8  Letter to the Directory, 10 Floréal an IV (29 avril, 1796) Correspondance de Napoléon Ier. Publié par l’ordre de l’empereur Napoléon III (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1858), #266, I, 243. 9  Benassi, Il generale Bonaparte ed il Duca e I Giacobini di Parma e Piacenza, 13–14. A day-by-day recount of the events complete with facsimile of several relevant documents in Emilio Ottolenghi, Storia di Piacenza (Piacenza: Tip.LE.CO, 1969), II, 55–91.

3  PARMA AND BONAPARTE 

35

­ vernight, written acceptances of the French conditions. Helpfully, he o added: ‘A few cavalry regiments, with a brigade, will advance 3 miles beyond Piacenza; this should be of no concern to the Duke of Parma, as soon as he accepts the agreed upon stipulations’.10 Not reassured in the least, Ferdinand sent Pietro Cavagnari, a loyal subject from a prominent merchant family, to plead with Bonaparte to spare his sovereign, neutral and compliant state. He received a less than encouraging reply: And how could your sovereign fathom that an army that is now descending the Alps, that has eaten nothing but chestnuts and potatoes for several months, would cross the amenable fields of Lombardy and continue living with the same privations?! No, no, the French army is not as eager to please as you imagine! I have no instructions from the Directory in this matter; nonetheless, I assure HRH the Duke of Parma that, depending on my circumstances, I will have all possible regards for a prince who belongs to the Spanish monarchy with whom France is fully at peace.11

Cavagnari painted as vividly as he knew how the desolation and misery certain to befall a population of less than 450,000, most of them rural labourers already on the edge of extreme poverty, if forced to contribute to France’s war effort. Unmoved, Bonaparte started the march towards Piacenza on the night of 6 to 7 May.12 The Directory’s instructions, arriving while troops were already settled in Piacenza, confirmed the government’s full endorsement: ‘As for the attitude to be adopted towards the Duke of Parma, it is just that he pays for his stubbornness in staying with the coalition; his states will have to provide us with what we need and with ready money in cash; but our links with Spain require that we refrain from 10  To the Minister of Spain in Parma. 18 Prairial an IV (6 may 1796), Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #358, I, 295. 11  Pietro Cavagnari, Alcune particolarità storiche della vita di Pietro Cavagnari. Nato in Piacenza il 7 aprile 1769. Antico segretario dei governi generali di Parma e di Parigi; già presidente del cantone della buona città di Piacenza; già membro del consiglio generale et del collegio elettorale del dipartimento del Taro; già inidviduo del corpo legislative di Francia. Rimastro, all’epoca della pace generale, privato suddito fedelissimo di sua maestà l’archiduchessa d’Austria Maria Luigia, Ducessa di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla e per grazia lei pensionato dello stato (Parma: Dalla Stamperia Carmignani, 1837), 6. 12  On 6 May Bonaparte sent one of his adjutants to Piacenza to locate suitable housing for the officers and to requisition bread, wine and meat for 12,000 men as well as feed for 4000 horses. He also mentions that the governor would be held hostage for a while, to keep him out of town. Letter to Lanusse, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #348, I, 289–290.

36 

D. P. HARSANYI

any unnecessary devastation there and spare these territories more than other possessions of our enemies. It is the Milanese that must not be spared at all; make sure to levy cash contributions at once, while they are terrorized by our approaching armies; use of the money with an eye to economy; the canals and the buildings of this country, which we will not keep in our possession, should feel the brunt of the war; but let’s be prudent’.13 The next day, the Directory’s instructions to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles Delacroix, set the course of action that would guide the policy towards Parma until 1801: The Executive Directory predicts, Citizen Minister, that the glorious march of the Army of Italy will bring the theater of hostilities closer to the duchy of Parma and force the general in chief of that army to make use of the right of war. The stubbornness the duke showed in siding with the coalition against the French Republic and his blindness to his own interests should not inspire the Directory in his favor. But the ties between the court of Parma and that of Madrid give the Directory the opportunity to cement the happy harmony that reigns between France and Spain. The Directory hastens to seize this opportunity and invites you to assign General Pérignon (the ambassador to Spain) the mission of letting the King of Spain know that, for the sake of the peace that unites the two nations, the Executive Directory will approve his intervention in favor of the Duke of Parma, either through the intercession of his ambassador to Paris or through that of the ambassador of the French Republic to Madrid. There is one important point that you should not neglect, Citizen Minister, in your dealings with that court: to persuade it to allow [us] to navigate in the Mediterranean under 13  Letter from the Directory to General Bonaparte, 18 Fructidor An IV (7 May 1796) in Recueil des actes du Directoire Executif: procès—verbaux, arêtés, instructions et actes divers. Publiés et annotés par Antonin Débidour (Paris: Imprimerie Nationle, 1910), II, 332. Once more, the Directory offered political cover for Bonaparte’s actions; at the same time, the general’s intentions and those of the government did not always coincide. In the same letter, the Directory announced the decision to have Bonaparte share the command of the Army of Italy with General Kellerman, which Bonaparte would manage to prevent from happening. A week later, the Directory seemed to have second thoughts and wished to somewhat soften the conduct towards the Duke of Parma. A letter to commissioner Saliceti counselled prudence, so that ‘in case of reverse, which must be considered even if unlikely, the Duke of Parma will not be able to turn against us or to do us harm. It would have been prudent to give him some gunpowder, some weapons, and other such items. We think this should not be forgotten when calculating the compensations that your victories will make possible’. Letter from the Directory to Saliceti, 16 May 1796, in Débidour, Recueil des actes du Directoire Executif, II, 389.

3  PARMA AND BONAPARTE 

37

Spanish pavilion which, being respected as neutral by the British, should greatly facilitate transportation on that sea; this is essential to our commerce and means of supplying France.14

The first French division entered the city of Piacenza on 7 May; two churches were hastily transformed into hospitals and Bonaparte himself came to supervise the building of a boat-bridge over the Po. Once he took up residence at the house of the prominent family Nasalli Rocca, he called a meeting with representatives of the communal government, the Anzianato, to whom he promised his protection. Members did not even have the time to thank the conqueror for his magnanimity, for in the early hours of 8 May Cristophe Saliceti, civilian commissioner of the French Republic, was already busy directing soldiers to confiscate the monies preserved in public coffers and seize all valuables deposited at the Monte di Pietà, the centralized pawnshops of the duchies.15 His actions emboldened lower officers to dip into the coffers for themselves, which in turn compelled Bonaparte to issue a formal warning: Piacenza’s governor must obey only orders signed by Bonaparte himself, chief of staff Berthier, chief maintenance officer Lambert or commissioner Saliceti. ‘Persons, property, and religion must be respected. This is the express order of the General in chief’, he wrote on 19 Floréal an IV (8 May 1796).16 The terrified Anzianato delegated count Cristoforo Landi to confer with Saliceti, who agreed to a meeting only to leave town the next day, before the hour of the appointment, but not before making sure that the draft of the armistice was completed. Indeed, the armistice was signed on 10 May. It read like an extortion note: the duke was expected to disburse, within 15 days, the equivalent of 2 million francs, 10,000 quintals of grain, 5000 bushels of oats, 5000 pairs of shoes, the same number of pairs of boots, 1200 working horses, 500 horses outfitted for cavalry, and 2000 heads of beef— all to be delivered at once to the French army’s base in Tortona, near Milan.17 This was in addition to the two hospitals to be maintained indefinitely for the use of the French army. The duke, reduced to playing 14  Letter of the Directory to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 Floréal an IV (8 May 1796), in Débidour, Recueil des actes du Directoire Executif, II, 339. 15  The pawnshops functioned like deposit banks where families entrusted precious belongings for safekeeping. 16  To the Governor of Piacenza, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #364, I, 297. 17  The text of the armistice in reproduced in Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, I, #368, p. 253. Three days later General Cervoni was ordered to go to Parma to supervise the orderly

38 

D. P. HARSANYI

bank-­teller to French officers, sought in vain to obtain some relief through the mediation of his Spanish protectors, on the grounds that the enormous French demands for agricultural products were sure to reduce his people to starvation. Ambassador Valparaiso only advised that he ought to count his blessings, keeping in mind that the French were known to be as magnanimous in peace as they were fierce in battle.18 Bonaparte himself had only good things to say about Piacenza: ‘I am here, without doubt, in the most agreeable city in Italy’, he wrote to the Directory immediately after crossing the River Po.19 According to one rare eyewitness account, marquis Alessandro Luigi Lalatta, distinguished aristocrat and member of Parma’s Anzianato, the French invasion threw the duchies into utter confusion.20 Confusion did not translate into disorder, however, for governors and podestà took care to involve the entire citizenry in the task of collecting money and goods, and help the citizenry cope. On 11 and 12 May, Parma’s Anzianato ordered a forced loan, on an income sliding scale, to meet ‘present vital needs’ and urged all citizens able to do so to come forward with money and objects, for the sake of the Fatherland. ‘All good citizens’, wrote Lalatta on 12 May, ‘brought in their contributions, for the sake of their sovereign and for the good of the fatherland, so that enough could be collected by the end of the day’.21 Indeed, many members of the nobility and high clergy, perhaps moved by the ethical mandates of noblesse oblige, made ‘entry of contributions’. To General Cervoni, 24 Floréal an IV (13 May 1796), Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #413, I, 274–275. 18  Bonparte’s letter of 22 July 1796: To the Executive Directory, 4 Thérmidor an IV (22 juillet 1796), Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #784, I, 615. Bonaparte reported a minor disagreement with Faipoult, who had been moved enough by the duke’s complaints to intercede in his favour and ask for lessening of the financial impositions on Parma. Bonaparte, of course, refused, but noted that the Spanish minister himself found that ‘we have been quite moderate’. Still, he noted wryly: ‘I have no doubt that the Duke of Parma will call in with complaints’. Valparaiso had a point: compared with how deposed rulers lacking friends among France’s allies were dealt with, the Duke of Parma had reasons to count his blessings. 19  To the Executive Directory, 20 Floréal an IV (9 May 1796) Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #367, I, 252. 20   An excerpt from Lallata’s diary was published under the title ‘L’Occupazione Napoleonica del Ducato di Parma e Piacenza’ in Aurea Parma, LXXXI, 2 (maggio-agosto 1997): 196–200. The entire diary (1782–1806) is part of the volume titled ‘Notizie storiche sopra la Città di Parma. Raccolta da antichi mansocritti che hanno il loro principio dall’Anno di nostra salute 320 e questa estese dall’Marchese Francesco Ottavio Piazza’ and is preserved at the Biblioteca Palatina Parma, Manoscritti Parmensi 1185, henceforth BP Mss. Parm. 1185. 21  Entry of 12 May 1796, BP Mss. Parm. 1185.

3  PARMA AND BONAPARTE 

39

a point of contributing generously: Count Camillo Marazani alone disbursed 100,000 pounds while all clergy members offered 215,000 pounds (the total sum collected at the end of 1797 stood at 2, 222,000 pounds). Ferdinand donated silverware from the Colorno ducal residence and pawned his family’s jewellery to replace belongings confiscated by the French. He also took the unusual step of dissolving a clerical order (Canonici Lateransi di San Agostino) and passing on their assets to the military hospital in Parma.22 It was not enough to prevent steep price increases and shortages of basic necessities. Exhortations to patient forbearance issued by the governors and bishops in the two main cities show how much local authorities feared that occupation would cause a breakdown in public order.23 Pleased with the immediate cash on hand, Bonaparte reported that ‘the Duke of Parma pays his contribution; he has already disbursed 500,000 pounds and is about to pay the rest’.24 For the long term, authorities in Paris enlisted the help of a banker, Jules Gantier, to estimate how best France could profit from the duchies’ resources. Gantier advised against purchasing local produce (the wines, e.g., were sweet and not easily transportable) and instead induced the locals to buy French commodities like Marseille soap, jewellery, clothing, and ‘sugar and coffee from our colonies’. Customs duties must not exceed 2%, loans should be requested at will, and no tax should be perceived on French merchandise in transit through the duchies; should a third party obtain more favourable commercial conditions, France’s position should automatically be upgraded.25 On 6 November 1796, in Paris, the Peace Treaty between the French Republic and the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla was signed in 22  Orders and letters of the Anzianato, Parma 11, 12 and 14 May 1796. Archivio di Stato di Parma (henceforth ASPr) Inv. 49, Gridario 1796. Numerous details in Benassi, Il generale Bonaparte ed il Duca e I Giacobini di Parma e Piacenza, 60–67. 23  The Bishop of Piacenza, for instance, called on citizens to resign themselves to the presence of French troops and heed the government’s call for contributions (4 June 1796). It is interesting that Piacenza’s governor Crescini also worried about illicit commerce between the locals and the French. In Parma, Governor Schizzatti promised exemplary punishments for those subjects of the duke who chatted about present events in public—the order being to keep quiet (16 October). ASPr, Gridario, 1796. 24  To the Executive Directory, 29 Floréal an IV (18 May 1796), Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #445, I, 294. 25  Copy of the letter to Citizen Delacroix, Minister of Foreign Relations, by Jules Gantier, Banker. Paris, 4 Prairial an IV (24 May 1796). Archives Nationales Paris (henceforth AN) AF/III/71.

40 

D. P. HARSANYI

Paris (co-signed in Parma on 24 November). The 16 articles, published in the Moniteur Universel of 30 Brumaire an V (20 November 1796), listed all the commercial clauses Gantier suggested plus an extra article on the French army’s future right to purchase—emphasis on purchase, not confiscate—unlimited quantities of foods, clothing and assorted supplies whenever the need arose.26 The cathedrals of Parma and Piacenza celebrated Te Deum high masses the very next day, in hopes that the treaty, burdensome as it was, marked the end of French exactions. These hopes were in vain: Pietro Cavagnari made several trips to Milan in 1797 to deliver the requested loans to the General Administrator of the French Army in Italy, Emmanuel de Haller, and came back each time with new demands tucked into the remaining balance, without ever collecting payments on previous loans. Things went steadily from bad to worse, and worse still, when the Masséna Division made a stop in the duchies in December 1797, expecting room and board, Cavagnari’s objections to this unforeseen and unannounced new imposition obtained a rather straightforward demand for a bribe from Citizen Haller, who, according to Cavagnari, ‘wanted to extract money out of everything’: You can assure your Court, my dear Cavagnari, that I did all I could to lessen the burden of the Masséna Division, as you asked me to do. But now this is difficult. If you would like, however, to purchase some of the goods from Saint Bendedetto for the price of 400 thousand French pounds, and pay the sum within a month, I will make the Division leave after 24 hours of your engagement, and I will see to it that you will not have another [division] coming to your town.27

In 1799 Austrian–Russian forces regrouped. To meet the new threat, French commanders began reassigning troops from the South to 26  Article 5 specifically stated that no ‘contributions’ would be solicited from Parma other than the ones decided by the armistice of 9 May 1796. Should other contributions be necessary, the French Republic committed itself to pay all of them at the agreed upon rate. This article was never enforced, unlike article 7, which stipulated the free passage of French troops and the duke’s obligation to deny such passage to any troops from other states. The Treaty was signed by Count Pietro Politti and Luigi Bolla representing the Duke of Parma and by Charles Delacroix, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. The marquis Del Campo, who acted as mediator, signed on behalf of the king of Spain. The full text is reproduced in 1796. Napoleone a Parma. Ristampa Anastatica dell’annata 1796 della Gazzetta di Parma, annex, 5–16. 27  Cavagnari, Alcune particolarità storiche, 16.

3  PARMA AND BONAPARTE 

41

Central-Northern parts of the peninsula, a move for which Parma– Piacenza provided the most convenient passageway. In June 1799, French divisions who had operated in Naples marched again through the territory to join General Moreau’s Army, camped a few miles away from the duchies’ border, across the River Po. Their commander, General Macdonald, issued several announcements promising to respect the neutrality of the duchies but made the customary requests for foodstuffs and other supplies. Rather than face another French general, Ferdinand fled to Vienna for a couple of months; his ministers struggled on their own to meet the French army’s latest demands.28 Nevertheless, Parma–Piacenza preserved a form of feeble sovereignty throughout the 1796–1799 period. After Bonaparte’s entry into Milan on 15 May 1796, Lombardy became the Transpadane Republic, South of the River Po, eventually ruled by the General Administration of Lombardy (proclaimed by Bonaparte on 29 October 1796). On 16 October 1796, pro-revolutionary French sympathizers held a congress that, with help from commissioner Pierre Anselme Garrau, made possible the formation of the Cispadan Republic north of the River Po. A thrillingly emotional congress at Reggio (7 January 1797) brought together representatives from both republics who expressed their collective desire to unite into one republic: the Cisalpine Republic, proclaimed on 29 June 1797, with the capital at Milan, the celebrated home of the most learned and forward-­ looking Italian intellectuals. Parma–Piacenza, the only state in the area not incorporated into one of the sister republics and never included officially on the list of conquered countries, experienced no such exploits. Unlike sovereign rulers around him, Ferdinand did not have to take the road of exile and did not have to witness changes in domestic power hierarchies; he was afforded instead the luxury of brooding over the inglorious end of 28  The list of demands included 20,000 pairs of shoes and provisions as follows: 200,000 rations of biscuits, 6000 pints of wine plus daily supplies of 250 quintals of flour, 20 heads of beef weighing at least 350 pounds each, 2000 pints of liquor (or 32,000 rations) and 3000 portions of oats. Governor Schizzati begged Cavagnari to use his experience in dealing with French army officials to trim down the demands to 5000 pairs of shoes and 50,000 rations of food—already an oppressive chore, he maintained, considering the city’s difficult circumstances. Cavagnari’s intervention obtained nothing but angry threats of retaliation in case Parmense officials dragged their feet. All documents in Cavagnari, Alcune particolarità storiche, 18–21.

42 

D. P. HARSANYI

his reign amidst the fading splendours of the Colorno palace. Yet, events did not pause at the River Po; despite the duke’s efforts, neither did news and ideas.

Revolutionary Waves and Realpolitik ‘The happiness and joy that irrupted in Lombardy when these impoverished Frenchmen appeared was such, that only the priests and a few noblemen realized the burden of the 6 million pounds contribution, shortly followed by others’, wrote Stendhal, in his fabulously sunny take on the French occupation in Italy.29 In reality, the population found no reason to rejoice when forced to part with public treasure—not in Lombardy, and not in Parma. Yet, Stendhal did not stray entirely from historical reality. In every region and in every town, the French found sympathizers called patriots, revolutionaries or giacobini, who assisted them in overthrowing long-established ruling dynasties. Working on the assumption that centuries of feudal political habits, Church domination and foreign occupation left the population ill-equipped to achieve revolution on its own, these hopeful militants believed that the shock administered by the French to the body politic was just the remedy Italians needed. The French occupation offered the unique historical opportunity to unite the peninsula and set up modern institutions that, once in place, would doubtless appeal to the entire population.30 29  Stendhal, La Chartreuse de Parme. Edition présentée, établie et annotée par Mariella di Maio (Paris : Gallimard, 2003), 49. 30  A discussion of the vast historiography of giacobinismo exceeds the scope of this chapter. A few relevant characteristics help contextualize the political situation in Parma at the end of the eighteenth century. The pivotal question is whether or not the revolutionary changes of the triennio resulted from popular demands or were imposed by a pro-French minority on a largely passive population. As early as 1801, Vincenzo Cuoco formulated the notion of a ‘passive revolution’ in a famous landmark essay that explained the failure of the Neapolitan revolution through the mutual distrust between well-meaning but patronizing elites and popular classes guided by ancient cultural and religious values. Social historians, beginning with Antonio Gramsci’s Marxist perspective, vigorously refuted this thesis and pointed instead to evidence of interest in the French revolution among large segments of the population before Bonaparte’s invasions; see especially Renzo de Felice, Italia giacobina (Napoli: Edizione Scientifiche Italiane, 1965). However, De Felice too acknowledged that republican intellectuals were unable to overcome their distrust of the people whom they idealized and patronized at the same time. Il giacobinismo italiano. Note e ricerche con un saggio introduttivo di Franceso Perfetti (Roma: Bonacci, 1990). After 1980, the shift in emphasis from social movements to political practices in the historiography of the French Revolution stimu-

3  PARMA AND BONAPARTE 

43

Parma–Piacenza did not lack intrepid citizens who sought to put the French occupation to the good use of overthrowing the ducal government and installing republican rule instead. Their numbers counted young firebrands and learned individuals, level-headed lawyers and craftsmen, soldiers and shopkeepers, and at least one great political mind, Melchiorre Gioia.31 They had a clear-cut objective: ‘… the democratization of Parma and Piacenza and their union to the territories already liberated by Bonaparte’s army, where they hoped that a republic would be soon organized’.32 Considering the revolutionary whirlwind in the immediate neighbourhood, it did not seem like a far-fetched ambition. Diplomatic calculations, however, shattered any chance of even trying to turn hopes into reality. The government in Paris deemed Spanish neutrality too precious to sacrifice on the altar of revolutionary dreams and threw to the wolves its own supporters in Parma. In exemplary realpolitik reasoning, General Clarke summarized the rationale for scrupulously keeping promises made to Spain, even though political change was no less feasible in the duchies than in the rest of Northern Italy: lated reappraisals of the Italian revolutionary triennio, tying it more closely to French post-­ revolutionary politics. See the analytical survey, with special emphasis on French–Italian connections, in Anna Maria Rao, ‘Introduction: L’expérience révolutionnaire italienne’ Annales historiques de la Révolution française, Numéro spécial sur le Triennio Révolutionnaire, 313 (1998):387–407. The Political Culture of the Sister Republics, 1794–1806: France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy, edited by Joris Oddens, Mart Rutjes and Erik Jacobs (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), is a more recent addition to this approach. A concise summary of giacobini’s political agenda in Anna Maria Rao’s entry ‘Giacobinismo’ in Italia Napoleonica. Dizionario Critico, 461-463. Rao observes that revolutionaries’ enemies favoured the term giacobini, the revolutionaries themselves preferring to call themselves patrioti; eventually these terms became interchangeable. 31  On the overall intellectual climate and the timid engagement with new political ideas in Parma–Piacenza see, in addition to Ghiringhelli’s volume cited above (Idee, società ed istituzioni nel Ducato di Parma e Piacenza durante l’età illuministica): Franco Catalano, Illuministi e giacobini del 700 italiano (Milano: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1959), 144–170 and Giuseppe Berti. Atteggiamenti del pensiero italiano nei Ducati di Parma e Piacenza dal 1750 al 1850 (Padova : Cedam, 1962), 197–287. For quick reference on Gioia’s important place in the history of political and economic thought in Italy see Pietro Barucci, Il Pensiero economico di Melchiorre Gioia (Milano: Giuffrè, 1965) and Nicola Pionetti, Melchiorre Gioia: il progetto politico del 1796 per un’Italia unita e repubblicana (Piacenza: Edizioni Lir, 2015). 32  Victor Criscuolo, ‘I Democratici e la Rivoluzione Oscurata (1796–1797)’ in Storia di Parma, V, 289–305 (298). Anecdotal details in Benassi, Il generale Bonaparte ed il Duca e I Giacobini di Parma e Piacenza, passim.

44 

D. P. HARSANYI

The Duke of Parma hopes everything from us, including domestic tranquility, currently under assault from rather numerous individuals who wish to bring about a revolution which we cannot afford to obtain because of our interests and of our alliance with Spain. The Infant of Parma is, so to speak, at the feet of French generals. It is good policy to let him enjoy all the advantages that depend on us.33

To the dismay of local giacobini, the Directory gave the Duke of Parma the green light to intimidate, harass and prosecute them as common criminals. By way of compensation, Bonaparte pressured Ferdinand to liberate the pro-French activists he had thrown in jail and arranged for the most prominent, beginning with Melchiorre Gioia, to depart for Milan. Those who could not seize this chance abandoned all hope. Some sank into despair to the point of self-humiliation and implicated former associates in exchange for personal tranquillity. Before long, all retired into private life, their illusions and struggles ignored by their comrades abroad and fellow citizens alike.34 French sympathizers suffered an additional blow when Bonaparte, possibly seeking to punish in some form the persecution of his allies, decided to slice off a parcel of 80,000 square metres from the duchies’ Oltrepo region, to be pasted onto the territory of the newly created Cisalpine Republic.35 Pier Luigi Politi, Ferdinand’s emissary to General Bonaparte, had been consulted, in a manner of speaking: during one interview, Bonaparte abruptly asked whether his sovereign was interested in swapping the Oltrepo region for a slim strip of land near Guastalla. Politi’s loss of words followed by the duke’s dignified protest made no difference to the final decision. Neither did the silent vigil held by

33  Lettre du Général Clarke au Directoire. Aperçu de toute la situation en Italie. AN AF/ III/ 72. By coincidence, this letter was sent the very day the Peace Treaty with Parma was signed in Paris. 34  Minutes of police interrogatories and other surveillance documents are collected at Biblioteca Palatina Parma, in the voluminous file Manoscritti Parmensi 1579 (henceforth BP Mss. Parm, 1579). I analysed this episode in detail in Doina Pasca Harsanyi, ‘Sidestepping a historical wave: a cancelled revolution in Northern Italy 1796–1797’ in Napoleonica La revue. Fondation Napoléon. 37 (2020): 2–24. https://www.cairn.info/revue-napoleonica-­ la-revue-2020-2-page-2.htm. 35  See Zaghi, idem, 335–345. Bonaparte contemplated some possibilities for a separate sister republic in Parma–Piacenza, an opinion he mentioned in a report to the Directory on 30 Floréal an V (26 May 1797). Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #1828, III, 85–86. The need to keep Spain on France’s side made him discard such projects.

3  PARMA AND BONAPARTE 

45

Piacenza’s Anzianato on the day borders were redrawn.36 The general in chief simply ignored his own edict of June 10, where he had promised to respect the duchies’ current frontiers. After the victory at Marengo (14 June 1800), First Consul Bonaparte, still relying on Spain’s neutrality, maintained the nominal autonomy of the duchies. For the price of providing food and shelter for French troops who crisscrossed the territories at the pleasure of their commanders, Parma– Piacenza was not included in the Consulate’s proposals for Italy’s reorganization. Autonomy added up to a meticulous shakedown, whereby French officers availed themselves of the territory’s resources as they saw fit while the distant government in Paris dispatched agents to seize monies, supplies and works of art, in effect ‘a veritable military occupation in all but name, with heavy consequences for the population and for the duchies’ public finances’.37 Bonaparte had another thing in mind too: he expected the duke to abandon sovereignty in return for kingship over a section of Tuscany (Treaty of Lunéville, 9 February 1801). Ferdinand retreated to his customary passive-aggressive posture of victim of epic injustice, by which he extracted the promise to retain his title until the end of his life—his states were to be ceded to France only after his death.38 36  Benassi, Il generale Bonaparte ed il Duca e I Giacobini di Parma e Piacenza, 60–70 and Montagna, I Ducati Parmensi nella diplomazia europea, 12–13. Lallata also noted in his diary, on 22 June 1797, the population’s consternation at this violation of the proclamation issued by Parma’s governor Schizatti, which quoted Bonaparte’s own decrees on the inviolability of current borders. 37  ‘Pierluigi Feliciati. ‘Arrivano I Francesi! Gli stati parmensi dal 1796 a 1814’ in L’Ossessione della memoria, 24–32 (27). 38  On 29 March 1801 he wrote a letter to the First Consul stating that he loved his subjects like a father and was loved by them in return. Moreau de Saint-Méry included this letter in correspondence with Talleyrand on 5 Germinal an 9. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (henceforth AMAE), 95/CP/47 microfilm P/10452. See also Leny Montagna, I Ducati Parmensi nella diplomazia europea dal 1796 al 1815 (Piacenza : Fratelli Bosi, 1907), 17–23. The Treaty of Aranjuez (21 March 1801) ratified the eventual French takeover. Ferdinand’s son was invited to become king of a part of Tuscany, renamed the Kingdom of Etruria on the occasion, under the name Lodovico (Louis) I. The son did not share the father’s love for Parma, for he readily accepted the deal and attended the ceremonies of transfer of sovereignty in Paris. It was a short reign, for Lodovico died in 1803. His widow, Maria Luisa of Spain, became regent in lieu of her underage son and heir to the throne. In 1807, when Spain’s neutrality ceased to be of any use to his designs, Napoleon dissolved the Kingdom of Etruria and reorganized it as three departments of the French Empire. See a summary of these events in Alexander Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 170–171.

46 

D. P. HARSANYI

Ferdinand interpreted this announcement as a moral victory but could do no more than go through the motions of sovereignty. Not only was the country under military occupation, the ducal court functioned like occupied territory, under the supervision of Moreau de Saint-Méry, Bonaparte’s special envoy bearing the deceptive title counsellor to Parma.39 Moreau de Saint-Méry’s principal task was to find non-violent ways of pushing the duke off his throne: ‘the main goal of your mission is the abdication of the Duke of Parma’, read Minister Talleyrand’s letter of appointment’.40 He did not have to work hard on this part of the assignment: less than a year from the counsellor’s arrival, Ferdinand breathed his last breath, and sovereignty passed to France. Furti d’arte One signature characteristic of the French revolutionary wars in Europe was the orderly, bureaucratic process of confiscating art for transportation 39  Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry (1750–1819) was born in Martinique and educated in France, where he pursued legal studies and was admitted to the Paris Parlement in 1771. In 1776 he left Paris for Cap Français in Saint-Domingue. Missing the intellectual climate of the metropolis, he returned in 1785 and in 1787–1788 published Déscription de la partie française de Saint-Domingue, an early study of the geography, climate, demographics and customs of Saint Domingue on which he built a reputation of expert in colonial affairs. On 1 July 1789 he was elected president of the Assembly of Paris electors, in which capacity he assisted the crowds who assailed the Bastille on 4 July. Yet, at the National Assembly he sided with the colonial planters on whose behalf he advocated relentlessly for pro-slavery legislation somehow softened by rights afforded to non-white freeborn men. In 1793 he immigrated to the United States, opened a bookstore in Philadelphia and hosted fellow French former members of the National Assembly. He recollected his American experience in a diary that remained unpublished until 1913: Voyage aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique 1793–1798. Edited with an introduction and notes by Stewart L. Mims (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913). Back in France, he enjoyed the protection of Talleyrand, a frequent guest at his bookstore in Philadelphia and minister of foreign affairs since 1797, who eventually helped him secure the appointment in Parma. Moreau de Saint-Méry’s work on Caribbean society has attracted much attention from scholars interested in the history of the Caribbean, the slave trade, race relations and anti-colonial movements in the Western Hemisphere. For quick reference, see Anthony Louis Elicona, Un colonial sous la révolution en France et en Amérique (Paris: Jouve et cie, 1934); Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World. The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 8–15; Doina Pasca Harsanyi, Lessons from America. Liberal French Nobles in Exile (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2010), passim. 40  Minister Talleyrand to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Paris 3 Ventôse an 9 (22 February 1801), AMAE, 95/CP/47 microfilm P/10452.

3  PARMA AND BONAPARTE 

47

to France. The sophisticated philosophical underpinning, derived from revolutionary ideology, made this episode different from any other customary plunder at the hands of conquering armies.41 Starting from the stirring assumption that, like peoples, works of art were yearning to break their chains, it made sense to proclaim that the rightful home of free art was Paris, the cradle of the revolution that had liberated the spirit of peoples and the creative genius of artists hitherto forced to yield to the whims of aristocrats and priests. French armies put theory into practice during the 1793–1794 campaign in the Austrian Netherlands; as of 1796, numerous paintings by Flemish masters were still awaiting processing at the Louvre. Presented with the irresistible embarrassment of riches in Italy, the Directory embraced unequivocally both the practice of and the philosophical justifications for art removal. General Bonaparte needed little persuasion to agree that collecting Italian masterpieces was part of his army’s glorious mission.42 To Parma fell the dubious honour of being the first Italian state to experience France’s art removal policies. At the time of the Cherasco armistice with Piedmont (28 April 1796) Bonaparte was not yet sure whether or not the right of conquest included confiscating art and refrained from including any artefacts among the dictated conditions. By the time he arrived in Parma, the Directory had made its intentions abundantly clear.43 In the report of 20 Floréal an IV (9 May 1796) the general in chief mentioned among the terms of the armistice 20 paintings to be sent to Paris, 41  Several studies dedicated to the topic have explored the meanderings of revolutionary thought on art transfers. Edouard Pommier, L’art de la liberté. Doctrines et débats de la Révolution (Paris : Gallimard, 1991) is an exceptionally thorough analytical guide to the complexities of revolutionary guiding principles in the field of art collection and dissemination. Other major studies: Andrew McClellan, Inventing the Louvre: Art, Politics, and the Origins of the Modern Museum in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999); Paul Wescher, I Furti d’arte (Roma: Einaudi, 1988); Patricia Mainardi, ‘Assuring the Empire of the Future’ Art Journal 48, 2 (2014) 155–163. https://doi. org/https://doi.org/10.1080/00043249.1989.10792604. 42  Ferdinand Boyer, ‘Les responsabilités de Napoléon dans le transfert d’œuvres d’art de l’étranger’ Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 11 (1964): 341–265. 43  The letter of 7 May 1796 spelled the policies towards Parma and Milan: ‘The Executive Directory is persuaded, citizen general, that you regard the glory of the fine arts as part of the glory of the army under your command. Italy owes to the arts much of her riches and of her illustriousness; but the time has come when they must hold their sway from France, for the sake of fortifying and embellishing the reign of liberty’. Débidour, Recueil des actes du Directoire Executif: II, 333.

48 

D. P. HARSANYI

with special emphasis on Correggio’s Saint Jerome, ‘said to be his best work’.44 In a fit of perhaps involuntary cynicism, the Directory ‘accepted the gift of several works of art that this prince wholeheartedly sent us for adorning the National Museum’.45 On 24 Floréal (13 May 1796) Bonaparte ordered General Jean-Baptiste Cervoni to go to Parma ‘for the purpose of taking, together with the minister of the duke of Parma, and with this prince himself, all measures necessary for the prompt arrival of the contributions stipulated in the armistice signed on 20 floréal’.46 Cervoni arrived two days later and executed his task with such dispatch that Bonaparte’s letter of 18 May—the reply to the Directory’s acceptance of Parma’s ‘gift’—already announced that all 20 paintings were on their way.47 Bonaparte boasted a little here, for Cervoni took care to send horses and furniture to the French headquarters in Tortona first. Then, on 19 May the general made a quick visit to the Academy of Fine Arts, to see for himself the four paintings marked ‘contributions’. Minister Ventura recalled architect Enemond Petitot from retirement to help select the other 16 pieces, in accordance with the terms of the armistice. Petitot did not hide his disgust at the task and tried to minimize the damage, in which he actually found some common ground with Cervoni, who, more interested in quality than quantity, declared himself satisfied with 15 items instead of 20. The actual removal of canvases from Parma’s Academy of Fine Arts (an exploit commemorated in an engraving now at the Louvre) was executed stealthily, during the night of 22 to 23 May, per order of the duke who insisted on ‘the most scrupulous secret’. First on the list: ‘The 44  To the Executive Directory. Piacenza 20 Floréal an IV (9 May 1796) Correspondance de Napoléon Ier. # 367, I, 302. He mentioned the same work in a letter addressed the same day to Carnot Correspondance de Napoléon Ier. #366, I, 300. The armistice, signed on 10 May 1796, contained indeed a special clause on the obligation of sending to Paris art of General Bonaparte’s choosing. He made choices on his own, because the committee tasked with selecting art and science objects marked for transfer from Italy to France started work a week later, on 17 May. It seems that Vivant Denon offered suggestions on what to include on the list. 45  Letter to General Bonaparte, 27 Floréal an IV (16 May 1796) in Débidour, Recueil des actes du Directoire Executif:, II, 394. 46  To General Cervoni, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier. #413, I, 329. 47  ‘Tomorrow will depart for Paris 20 superb paintings, chief among them the celebrated “San Girolamo” by Correggio which had been valued at 200, 000 pounds’. To the Executive Directory, 29 Floréal an IV (18 May 1796) Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #443, I, 352–353.

3  PARMA AND BONAPARTE 

49

famous image by Antonio Allegri, il Correggio, representing the B(eata) V(irgin) with the child, Saint Mary Magdalene, Saint Jerome and one putto’.48 Duke Ferdinand’s insistence on concealing the outcomes of his compliance with this particular section of the armistice shows that he realized, in ways French authorities did not, and did not bother to find out, the attachment his subjects felt for masterpieces people came from far and wide to admire. Sources on local reactions are scarce in the absence of any kind of newspaper (Gazzetta di Parma was no longer in print) but the few scattered testimonies point to unambiguous collective grief. Pietro Giordani distilled his compatriots’ humiliation in a letter to a friend: ‘The gravest insult that could have been leveled against us was precisely to have taken away the paintings which reminded to us, the subjugated nation, that, in the past, we used to be an inspiration for so many foreigners’.49 On 17 May, Lallatta wrote in his diary: It can truly be said that one demand in particular broke the hearts of all citizens: the contribution of 20 paintings by the most famous Authors. Among those, to our city has fallen the misfortune of having to part, among many others, with three most exceptional works by Correggio, admired in all Europe….The payments in money and produce were not as painful to the people as was the loss of these treasured monuments which make the pride and joy of our city all around Europe.50

It was indeed for Correggio’s Madonna of Saint Jerome, Parma’s emblem and talisman, that the hearts of the Parmense ached the most. Influential eighteenth-century artists and connaisseurs like Antonio Raphael Mengs and Andrea Appiani placed Correggio among the greatest of the greats.51 For two centuries, the painting attracted so many ­illustrious 48  See details on the chronology of this ‘first art spoliation’ in Parma in Antonio Musiari, Neoclassicismo senza modelli. L’Accademia du Belle Arti di Parma tra il periodo napoleonico e la Restaurazione (1796–1820) (Milano: Zara, 1986), 15–22. The list, complete with removals, additions and afterthoughts, is reproduced on pp. 189–191. 49  As quoted in Ettore Rotta, Le conquiste artistiche del periodo napolenico nei ducati parmensi (Catania: Di Mattei, 1913), 10. Remarkably, the sorrow did not sour Giordani on Napoleon. He went on to become a strong supporter of Napoleon’s legislative initiatives in Italy and even wrote a very obsequious Panegiric to the sacred majesty of Napoleon (1807). 50  Lallata’s diary, entry of 17 May 1796, BP Mss. Parm. 1185. 51  ‘In the hierarchy of great masters, let us put it this way, inimitably imitable, Correggio was suddenly placed at the highest level, with great felicitous consequences for the Parmense

50 

D. P. HARSANYI

travellers to the little church that sheltered it that the Farnese dukes, together with local aristocrats, pledged to build a gallery worthy of such fame. In the event, they did not build the gallery, but the fame endured. Soon after taking the throne, Duke Philip bought the work and transported it, under armed escort, to his private residence at Colorno. He allowed no reproductions and took great pride in rejecting Prussia’s Frederic the Great request to purchase it. Finally, in 1765, the newly built Academy of Fine Arts became Madonna of Saint Jerome’s proud host, and this is where General Cervoni found it and wrapped it up.52 Rumours that duke Ferdinand sought to buy the work back for one million local currency only increased its value, as did Bonaparte’s alleged haughty response: ‘This million, we will spend. A masterpiece is eternal. This one will adorn our homeland’.53 On 18 Prairial an IV (6 June 1796) the Moniteur Universel published a ‘Record of the objects of art and science taken for transport to Paris’ signed by commissioner Saliceti. It was an astonishing collection of works by Rubens, Luisini, Giorgione and Michelangelo, in addition to Rafael’s studies for the School of Athens, and an extremely rare Virgil manuscript having belonged to Petrarch. Still, Correggio’s ‘Madonna of St. Jerome’ led the list and the paper made sure to relay Bonaparte’s refusal to sell it back.54 artists’. Antonio Musiari, Neoclassicismo senza modelli, 33. Further comments on Correggio’s prestige in the eighteenth century on pp. 32–33. 52  It surely struck the citizenry as sadly ironic that Duke Philip’s gesture of offering the masterpiece to public viewing, free of charge, in the galleries of the Academy of Fine Arts made it possible for the French to snatch it. In keeping with French law, private collections did not suffer spoliations; all confiscated art came from public institutions and churches. 53  Painter Louis Prot judged this episode memorable enough, and presumably popular enough, to depict it in the oil canvas he showed at the Salon of 1852. Details of the entire saga of this most famous of Correggio’s works in Vincenzo Banzola, ‘La ‘Madonna di San Girolamo’ andata e ritornata da Parigi’ in Parma nell’arte (1989–1990): 11–16. A French traveller, Aubin Milin, reported hearing about the exchange between Ferdinand and Bonaparte during his 1811 stopover in Parma. Voyage dans le Milanais (1817), Tome II, 136. Napoleon’s cold reply, probably apocryphal, denotes the prevalent thinking on art removal. It echoes exactly Antonio Canova’s (documented) despair at seeing ancient sculptures leaving Rome after the truce at Tolentino: ‘Would it not have been better to give 10 more millions than to loose masterpieces so rich of history, who attract the foreigners here and make the glory of Rome? The millions can come back but these masterpieces—God only knows what destiny awaits them!’ As quoted in ‘1799: L’Héritage de la révolution française en Italie’ in André Fugier, Napoléon et l’Italie (Paris: J.B. Janin, 1947), 88. 54  List of works of art to be transported from Milan, Parma and Piacenza, established by General Bonaparte in Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #444, I, 292–294 (attached to the

3  PARMA AND BONAPARTE 

51

General Cervoni left Parma on 15 May 1796, with the precious Madonna of Saint Jerome and two convoys of artworks following him on the road to Paris. After him, as it were, the deluge: Parma’s artistic life nearly collapsed. Thanks to Ferdinand’s instructions on complete secrecy, it took members of the Academy a few days to realize the enormity of their loss. After a couple of routine sessions, dejected members found it impossible to carry on. Minister Ventura closed the institution on 28 May citing lack of funds in the wake of massive payments made to the French Republic. The general atmosphere in the duchies hardly lent itself to learned exercises anyway. With only a few sporadic activities, the Academy of Fine Arts, the institution that had put Parma in Italy’s cultural orbit, declined to the point of near disappearance. Moreau de Saint-Méry faced distrust and weariness in 1802, when he pledged to revive its fortunes. The humiliation of 1796 ripened into resentment and caused local citizens to take a dim view of subsequent French attempts at winning hearts and minds. One perceptive, though unsympathetic, visiting French officer noted just how deeply the wound cut and how futile were all efforts to pretend otherwise: I leave the city of Parma much displeased. The inhabitants there were still regretting so strongly their famous painting of Saint Jerome, sent to Paris some time ago, that by way of vengeance, they would have gladly sacrificed a few human victims to the glory of the Great Saint.55

Moreau de Saint-Méry must have become aware of these sentiments, for throughout his tenure he resisted Vivant Denon’s requests to send more works from Parma to Paris. The public would perceive any additional art transfers as an injustice, Moreau insisted, despite Denon’s promises to compensate the Parmense with replacement paintings removed from local churches.56 The citizenry did not share the philosophical rationale for Letter to the Executive Directory, #443, 29 Floréal an IV (18 May 1796), I, 292). See also Moniteur Universel. Réimpression de l’Ancien Moniteur (Paris: Plon, 1847), pp. 28, 305 and 339, respectively. A brief discussion in 1796. Napoleone a Parma. Ristampa Anastatica dell’annata 1796 della Gazzetta di Parma, 24. 55  Jean-Claude Carrier, as quoted in Gilles Bertrand, Paul Guiton et l’Italie des voyageurs au XVIIIème siècle ‘textes’ (Moncalieri : Centro Interuniversitario di ricerche sul Viaggio in Italia, 1999), 160. 56  See the corresponendence between Vivant Denon, director of the Musée National (later Musée Napoléon), and Moreau de Saint-Méry throughout 1803–1804  in Marie-Anne Dupuy, Isabelle le Masne de Chermont, Elaine Williamson, Vivant Denon: Directeur des

52 

D. P. HARSANYI

parting with beloved works of art and were not interested in receiving art removed from elsewhere. The wound healed only after 1815, after the Congress of Vienna stipulated the return of transferred artwork and Correggio’s Virgin Madonna of Saint Jerome again found its place on the walls of Parma’s Academy of Fine Arts.

musées sous le Consulat et l’Empire correspondance (1802–1815) (Paris: Editions de la Réunion des musées nationaux, Paris, 1999) pp. 70–73, 136, 184 and 344. Denon’s wish list of articles to be transported from Parma to Paris is preserved at ASPr, Manoscritti e stampe di Moreau de Saint-Méry, busta 28 and published in Musiari, Neoclassicismo senza modelli, 191–193. A brief analysis in Ferdinand Boyer, ‘La sorte delle opera d’arte nelle congregazioni sopppresse a Parma’ Archivio Storico per le Province Parmensi, XII (1960): 41–49.

CHAPTER 4

From Duchies of Parma to States of Parma

Ferdinand’s unexpected death on 9 October 1802 was so convenient to French policy makers that Ernest Lavisse wittily evoked an ‘exchange of politeness’: ‘When the French agent [Moreau de Saint-Méry] politely informed him on 25 March 1801 that he was dismissed from his throne, the duke declared categorically that, having been duke since the age of fourteen, he would remain so to his death. What followed was an exchange of politeness: France was gracious enough not to insist and, gallantly, the duke died one year later’.1 Rumours that the French, impatient to dispose of a nuisance, poisoned Ferdinand compelled Moreau to publish the results of the autopsy to prove that the accident, while not unwelcome, was indeed an accident. Not one to waste a crisis, the First Consul raised Moreau de Saint-Méry’s rank from observer to Administrator General with full powers the very next day, on 10 October 1802.2 His task was to 1  Ernest Lavisse, Histoire de la France contemporaine depuis la Révolution jusqu’à la paix de 1919 (Paris: Hachette, 1921), III, 119. 2  The decision was legitimated by the Treaty of Aranjuez’s stipulation that sovereignty defaulted to France should the duke become unable to reign. First Consul Bonaparte kept the territory in reserve for further possible diplomatic maneuvers: ‘Parma and Piacenza are part of negotiations at the center of all Europe’s attention; it is therefore advisable to wait and use the Parmense states as a peace ticket’, he told a disappointed Melzi d’Eril, who still hoped to incorporate the entire region into the Italian Republic. To Melzi d’Eril, Paris, 3 Frimaire an 12 (25 November 1803). Correspondence de Napoléon Premier, #7323, IX, 143.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_4

53

54 

D. P. HARSANYI

govern the duchies, henceforth referred to as the States of Parma, on France’s behalf, but—and this made a big difference—keep in mind that the territory was not an annexed department and he was not a prefect. The ambiguity, an anomaly in the rigidly centralized French administration, permeated all aspects of life in Parma and resulted in a general climate of uncertainty that weakened the authority of the Administrator General and of the French state it represented. The official decree that announced the French takeover explicitly reassured public functionaries that jobs and salaries remained untouched. The Administrator General expected, however, a change of heart: ‘[civil servants ought to] redouble their zeal and activity, work together to maintain order and public tranquility, assure the triumph of justice without which no society can exist … so people can enjoy the happiness derived from belonging to France’.3 It was a lot to ask in a country that, having skipped the sister republic phase, offered, in local historian Ettore Carrà’s suggestive description, the unusual spectacle of ‘an island frozen in aristocratic-­feudal forms of government in a world in transformation, in the constitutional sense’.4 Patricians, notables and high clergy by and large saw no choice but to fall in line; even the funeral oration composed by local magistrate and noted man of letters Luigi Umberto Giordani advised obedience to the new government, in honour of the deceased duke.5 Most, though, hedged their bets, reluctant to commit too strongly to a new order of things that might, like others before it, crumble at any moment.

Du Tillot bis Moreau de Saint-Méry was no stranger to ambiguity: a native of Martinique known for encyclopaedic studies on the Caribbean, at once pro-slavery advocate and militant revolutionary. Until the Revolution, he had spent  Announcement in two languages, 23 October 1802, ASPr, Gridario 1806.  Ettore Carrà, ‘L’Età Napoleonica’ in Storia di Piacenza (Piacenza: Cassa di Risparmio Paicenza, 1980) Vol. V, 21–70 (24). For a brief discussion of the difficulty of creating a coherent agenda under these unusual circumstances, see Montagna, Il dominio francese a Parma, 35–49. The cancelled revolution left the country bereft of a network of likely sympathizers, as former giacobini were either in exile or too demoralized to come to the Administrator General’s aid. On the political effectiveness of such networks of cultural institutions in Milan see Beatrice Maschietto, ‘Cultura e politica nell’Italia giacobina. Spunti dall’esperienza cisalpina’ in Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée T. 108 (N°2) 1996: 731–740. 5  Orazione funebre in morte di Ferdinando I di Borbone composta e recitata da L.U. Giordani. Parma 1803. BP Miscellanea 4 (D 8). 3 4

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

55

his life in Parisian literary circles, talking and writing about society and politics. He did the same at the National Assembly, where he perorated in support of colonial planters’ interests clustered at Massiac Club, although he belonged to, and voted with, the Patriot faction. At the time of his appointment to the ducal court, he had recently returned from emigration in the United States where he had hosted liberal and conservative French exiles with debonair equanimity. The assignment in Parma transformed him into a man of action with the power to put theories into practice. He received no instructions from the central government in Paris, other than the recommendation to use for general orientation the Law on the division of the territory of the republic and on administration of 28 pluviôse an 8 (17 February 1800). The flexibility suited his temperament but caused him to misjudge the challenges of wading into the unchartered waters of a territory neither independent nor integrated in the French empire, where government institutions created by the Farnese and the Bourbon dukes coexisted side by side or rather on top of each other.6 ‘He had to guide himself by his own lights’, he belatedly sighed in his Compte Moral, a long, self-justificatory memoir written immediately after his dismissal.7 His lumières inspired him to apply to Parma the sociological methodology at the basis of the Description of the French part of Saint-Domingue he had written a couple of decades earlier.8 He started by distributing around the territory survey forms with 53 questions pertaining to matters as diverse as the quality of the soil, the health of the inhabitants, communal taxes, marriage customs and popular entertainments.9 Data collection took four 6  An organigram of government institutions in pre-Napoleonic Parma in Drei, L’Archivio di Stato di Parma. Indice General, storico, descrittivo, ed analitco, 100–114. Du Tillot’s reforms left a very light imprint and Moreau was not supposed to upset the institutional apple cart. For comparison, see Alain Pillepich’s concise analysis of the series of laws that rapidly underpinned ‘a veritable political and administrative revolution meant to establish a modern state in all its aspects’ in the Kingdom of Italy. Alain Pillepich, Napoléon et les Italiens (Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions/Fondation Napoléon, 2003), 89–110 (90). 7  Moreau de Saint-Méry, Compte Moral, f.42. AN AF/IV/1717/1. In hopes of correcting the negative reputation he was stuck with, Moreau de Saint-Méry wrote his side of the story and submitted it to Minister Champagny several months after his dismissal. There is no evidence that the intended addressees ever read this account. 8  Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et historique de la partie française de l’isle Saint-Domingue, 1797–1798. For an insightful analysis, see Vincent Huyghues-Belrose, ‘Moreau de Saint-Méry. Arpenteur créole de Saint-Domingue’ in Moreau de Saint-Méry ou les ambiguïtés d’un créole des Lumières (Martinique: F. Paillart, 2006), 9–23 (17–20). 9  A selection of these questionnaires and the responses sent to the administration, preserved at the Biblioteca Palatina Parma Fondo Moreau de Saint-Méry, has been published by Stefania Avanzini, ‘Scorcio della Provincia Parmense donato a Médéric Louis Moreau de

56 

D. P. HARSANYI

years. Moreau compiled the results himself in what eventually became the Topographic and statistical description of the States of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, a mirror of contemporary economic habits and cultural practices throughout Parma–Piacenza.10 In the introduction, Moreau explained that he made every effort to ‘understand their [Parmense people’s] manner of living under the government of the former Infante’ not out of idle curiosity but ‘the better to justify the trust the Emperor placed in him’.11 Like his Caribbean studies, systematic inquiries into Parma’s social stratification and economic practices had a clear political goal: help the French government maximize the usefulness of the colony.12 He felt even more invested in the task now that he was the one in charge of transforming a foreign territory into a model polity France could be proud of, and profit from. The best way to do so, he believed, was to reach back across several decades and pick up the broken thread of Du Tillot’s reforms.13

Saint-Méry sul nascere del XIX secolo’ Malacoda, vol. V (1989) nos. Luglio-Agosto pp. 3–7; settembre–ottobre pp. 9–13; novembre–dicembre pp. 45–53 and Malacoda, vol. VI (1990) and Malacoda vol. VII (1991). nos. Gennaio-Febbraio pp.  37–40; Marzo-Aprile 37–40; Maggio-Giugno pp. 11–17; Lulglio-Agosto pp. 25–29. 10  Description topographique et statistique des Etats de Parme, Plaisance et Guastalla. Eight volumes preserved at the Biblioteca Palatina Parma. The study concerned the countryside, not the cities, deemed better known. Much of the Description has been transcribed by students at the Institute of Romance Languages and Literatures of Department of Letters and Philosophy, University of Parma, under the direction of Carla Corradi Martini. The volumes relevant to the topics addressed in this book are Maria Cristina Cattabiani, Description topographique et statistique des Etats de Parme, Plaisance et Guastalla à l’époque de 1811. V.II (pp. 1079–2034) Tesi di laurea. Facoltà di magistero. Università di Parma. 1985/86 and Cristina Gini, Moreau de Saint-Méry. Description. Passi scelti, Università di Parma. Tesi di Laurea, 1988/89. 88–94. Henceforth Cattabiani, Description, and Gini, Description. Passi Scelti. Valentina Bocchi offered a brief bibliographic account of the manuscript in L’Ossessione della memoria, # 144,159. An exceptionally informative structural study of the entire work in Carla Corradi Martini, ‘Un Monument à la gloire de Parme: La Description de Moreau de Saint-Méry’ in L’Administration napoléonienne en Europe, adhésions et résistances. Sous la direction de Christine Peyrard, Francis Pomponi, Michel Vovelle (Aix en Provence: Publications de L’Université de Provence), 17–34. 11  Cattabiani, Description, IX. 12   Vincent Huyghues-Belrose, ‘Moreau de Saint-Méry. Arpenteur créole de Saint-­ Domingue’ in Moreau de Saint-Méry ou les ambiguïtés d’un créole des Lumières (Martinique: F. Paillart, 2006), 9–23 (20). 13  An analytical study of Moreau’s deliberate use of Du Tillot’s principles and policies as a roadmap for his own initiatives in Carla Corradi Martini, ‘L’epoca Du Tillot nel giudizio di Moreau de Saint-Méry’ Aurea Parma, 83 (3), 1999: 410–428.

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

57

Legal Systems and Administration Like blowing dust from old furniture, Moreau’s first decrees aimed at dissipating the thick layer of feudal and religious statutes that fell over Parma after Du Tillot’s demise. On 21 Floréal an 11 (12 May 1803), he reinstated the abolition of the mortmain (announced by Du Tillot on 25 October 1764 but revoked by duke Ferdinand). On 22 Messidor XI (12 July 1803) Jews were accorded full civic rights in accordance with the Proclamation of the French Republic of 23 October 1802. On 24 Messidor (14 July 1803) torture as part of the judicial process was abolished.14 Such changes were urgently necessary because, in Moreau’s telling, with preferential treatment for the privileged a forgone conclusion, and with ordinary people trapped in incomprehensible edicts going back to the Farnese era, the sole purpose of existing legislation was ‘to extinguish the very notion of justice in those unfortunate lands’.15 Systemic reform is what he planned to carry out, within the limits allowed by Parma’s ambiguous status in the French state. On 10 Nivôse XII (1 January 1804) all traditional panels of judges merged into a unified Supreme Council of Civil Justice, a pyramidal structure based on a network of local law courts, with the apex formed of two criminal courts, one in Parma, one in Piacenza. Like all Moreau’s reforms, the new configuration emulated but did not entirely replicate the centralized French system of justice. There was no change of personnel and magistrates slid effortlessly from their old benches onto the new ones.16 Similarly, and in line with the inaugural decree’s promises, the 14  All published in the ASPr Gridario 1803. The latter decree also eliminated a host of medieval legal provisions: conviction on simple denunciation was no longer possible; legal assistance to poor defendants became mandatory; more stringent standards of evidence proof were required for death penalty or exile; Italian replaced Latin in trial briefs. The decree on civil rights extended to Jewish citizens was preceded by a Letter concerning the Jewish residents of Parma, published by Moreau on 31 March, where he listed the numerous vexing discriminations against Jews which made the special decree a moral and political necessity. ‘Let us cease to torment human beings, whoever they are, in the name of the heavens!’ he exclaimed in the concluding paragraph. ASPr, Gridario, 1803. Remarkably, this was one of the few instances where he broke with Du Tillot, who had accepted papal demands to restrict residency rights for Jews with a decree issued in 1752 and reconfirmed in 1762 and 1763. 15  Cattabiani, Description, pp. 150–158. 16  Pierluigi Feliciati suggested that this probably blunted potential resistance. ‘Arrivano in Francesi!’ in Osessione della memoria, 29. It was hard to please everyone though. The elevated status of the city of Parma broke the tradition of equality between Parma and Piacenza. Lallata noted in his diary that the year 1804 ‘started badly’ because of disrespect for customs the late duke had always revered. BP Mss. Parm. 1185.

58 

D. P. HARSANYI

entire bureaucratic scaffolding remained standing, though not untouched: Moreau did not eliminate time-honoured offices, but quietly deprived them of traditional prerogatives. The new courts made redundant the governors’ legal functions, French military commissions controlled local law enforcement mechanisms, and the civic corps of the Anzianati now met under the supervision of a General Council appointed by the Administrator General.17

Tax Collection ‘You already know as well as I do that the finances of these states are in a sorry situation because of the system of the deceased Infant who never bothered with budgets and constantly spent more than he had’, the new Administrator General wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs Talleyrand soon after taking his post.18 For more than three years, the bulk of his correspondence with Talleyrand laid out how he dealt, or was trying to deal, with the intricacies of a treasury in complete disarray, with taxes collected haphazardly if at all, since the duke was living mostly on credit and stipends from France while Spain kept alive his court’s countless employees. In addition, France had to consider whether, and to what extent, to honour Ferdinand’s debts, which part of his fortune should be transferred to his son, what annuity to offer his widow, and finally which ducal assets the French state should seize and sell as national property (biens nationaux).19 17  Anzianati in smaller cities, functioning somehow under the radar, enjoyed greater liberty in deciding communal matters, as did podestà and commissioners who remained at the helm of rural communes. Details in ‘Governo francese’ in Drei, l’Archivio di Stato di Parma. Indice Generale, storico, descrittivo, ed analitco, 125–131. Moreau exhorted the ‘archaic’, in his words, Anzianato to replace privilege with merit, much to the puzzlement of aristocrats who formed the bulk of the membership and believed the two qualities merged in their persons. Cattabiani, Description, 76. The one change that met with something resembling enthusiasm was the decision to number the main doors of houses on a given street, even numbers on the left side, uneven on the right, proceeding from the main square. Details in Daniele Marchesini, ‘Moreau de Saint-Méry et la ville: connaître pour gouverner (toponymie e numérotation urbaine)’ in L’Administration napoléonienne en Europe, adhésions et résistances, 35–47. 18  Moreau de Saint-Méry to Minister Talleyrand, Parma 17 Brumaire an 10 (8 November 1801) AMAE 95/CP/47 microfilm P/10452. 19  Things got disentangled somewhat only by a decree issued by the First Consul on 9 Ventôse an 12 (29 February 1804) but even then, letters from Spain’s and Austria’s chancelleries kept coming in with new requests on behalf of the duke’s widow and of the heirs of the king of Etruria. AMAE CP6/5.

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

59

All this did not exempt Parma from its annual obligation to France’s public coffers, set at 1,500,000 lire torinese by the Decree of 30 Thermidor XI (19 August 1803) which absorbed all the money collected through cumbersome local dues.20 A person more versed in financial matters might have found a solution to Parma’s empty treasury and obscure fiscal habits. That person was not Moreau de Saint-Méry, who put his faith in the civic spirit of the elites. At the beginning of 1803, his office invalidated all local dues and called for a one-time real estate tribute, calculated on a sliding scale, to be paid without delay because ‘Justice and the public good do not leave room for tolerance or evasion’.21 The treasury instantly swallowed the sums so collected without noticeable improvements in public finances. Moreau kept levying what he termed exceptional taxes: a communal contribution that obliged landowners and capitalisti or business owners to disburse 2% of their income, because, Moreau confessed, he had been unable ‘to allow any relief or reduction in costs’; another alleged one-time special income tax on the wealthiest citizens, including the ones residing abroad, to help pay the public debt incurred since 1796; a stamp tax on all judicial and commercial transactions; an exceptional ‘subvention’ for unspecified purposes.22 The Administrator General surely hoped that the sliding-scale basis for calculation, which circumvented most noble and corporate privileges, would find favour with the majority of the less fortunate he was trying to spare. People hardly had the time to ponder the issue: on 19 Prairial an 13 20  A detailed study of Moreau’s fiscal policies between 1802 and 1805 calculated that Moreau had to pay to the French government 300,000 francs per month, the approximate sum of the subsidies the late duke used to receive from France. Léo Elisabeth, ‘La Mission de Moreau de Saint-Méry à Parme’ in Moreau de Saint-Méry ou les ambiguïtés d’un créole des Lumières (Martinique: F.  Paillart, 2006), 51–62 (56). After being named Administrator General, Moreau reported to Barbé-Marbois. From 1802 to 1805, his letters amount to a string of complaints on the difficult task of raising funds and the near impossibility of paying external obligations along with pensions, stipends and operational costs for the local institutions closest to his heart (the Fine Arts Academy or the library). The tax on wine and grapes he instituted, hoping to capitalize on the popularity of the Lambrusco wines, brought negligible revenues and stirred a lot of grumbling. Details in Montagna, Il dominio francese a Parma, 46. 21  ASPr, Gridario 1803. The Anzianati of the two main cities had the unwelcome task of collecting this special tax. 22  Issued on 8 Brumaire an 12/31 October 1803; 11 Pluviôse an 12/1 February 1804; 1 Vendemiare an 12/2 September 1804; 16 Germinal an 13/6 April 1805, all published in the Gridario for the respective years (ASPr, Gridario 1803, 1804 and 1805, v. 126, 127 and 128, respectively).

60 

D. P. HARSANYI

(8 June 1805), an imperial decree ordered that all rents and real estate payments must be standardized in accordance with the law of 11 Brumaire an VII, that is, in accordance with existing French legislation. On 14 Prairial an 13 (3 June 1805), another Imperial decree informed citizens that the French Civil Code (Code Napoléon) would be in use in the States of Parma within 10 days from that date. Finally, the Imperial Decree of 2 Thermidor an 13 (21 July 1805) placed the states of Parma under the jurisdiction of the 28th Military Division and abolished in one stroke all existing tax legislation, including every one of Moreau’s acts. Henceforth, all property owners, without distinction, would pay the same percentage of their income for three kinds of statewide taxes: real estate, personal income, and doors and windows, all collected by officers nominated by Paris.23 After detailing on many pages of his Description his forays into legal and fiscal reform, Moreau concluded not without melancholy: ‘Lastly, the French administration came and destroyed the ancient claptrap of civil and criminal laws which had to be cast off, the goal towards which the Administrator General was all too happy to prepare people’s minds’.24 Sceptical that changes were ever to their benefit, people’s minds were in fact set on edge by the disconcerting unpredictability of rolling tax schemes that replaced a system that they held in contempt, but knew how to navigate.

Economy Historian Claudio Bargelli’s meticulous analysis of Moreau’s papers reveals a keen amateur agronomist who approached agriculture the same way he approached any subject, with methodical investigations into local farming practices.25 The results were not hopeful: strict family and clan hierarchies slowed down entrepreneurial aspirations, while ‘ignorant and indifferent’ absentee owners took the easy route of renting their lands rather than

23  Imperial Decree Milan 2 Thermidor (21 July 1805). ASPr Gridario 1805. By the same decree, all remaining belongings of the former Duke of Parma were merged into the National Domain. 24  Cattabiani, Description, 175. 25  This was a result of his interest in physiocratic economic doctrine, consistent with his encyclopédiste philosophical outlook. See Malick M.  Ghachem, ‘Montesquieu in the Caribbean: The Colonial Enlightenment between ‘Code Noir’ and ‘Code Civil’ in Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques, 25, no. 2 (1999): 183–210. Accessed August 19, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/41299142.

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

61

spend time and money trying to improve crops.26 An exceptionally detailed anonymous analysis produced for the Administrator General accentuated the distance between hope and reality. It included suggestions for improving beef and mouton husbandry and listed various kinds of promising cultures—wheat, beans and hemp, with special emphasis on producing and exporting the varieties of wine already popular abroad. This was the theory, the anonymous writer warned; in practice, primitive techniques coupled with habitual resistance to change—which he called l’empire de l’habitude— stood in the way of optimistic projections.27 Moreau was an optimist who believed in the power of theory, so he imported books on modern agricultural methods, funded a specialized journal (Giornale Economico Agrario) and encouraged the formation of an Economic-­Agrarian Society, all in addition to an advisory agency, Regia Economica.28 He wrote, ‘The sane part of the population shared my opinions’.29 Perhaps this was the case, but it all remained at the level of intellectual debate among a select circle. The ‘sane’ squires he tried to inspire treaded cautiously and commissioned additional studies that tended to take a long time, during which nothing much happened.30 Feudal landowners thought twice before committing to 26  Claudio Bargelli, ‘Aneliti rifomistici e fervide utopie. L’Agricoltura parmense nell’età del Moreau de Saint-Méry. Parte prima’. Aurea Parma, 88 (2004) fascicola II: 275–299 (288). 27  Memorie inedite alla S.A. sull’economia rurale nell Piacentino e nel Parmigiano (unisgned, undated). The document is discussed in Bargelli, Dall empirismo alla scienza. L’agricoltura parmenses dall’età dei lumi al primo conflitto mondiale (Trieste: Edizioni Goliardiche, 2004), 53–55. Bargelli also noted that the lack of a credit system able to liberate capital did not help either. Claudio Bargelli, Alla Periferia dell’Impero: Le Manifatture Parmensi durante l’Amministrazione del Moreau de Saint-Méry. Department of Economics, Parma University (2010), 29. 28  Articoli con quali Liberamente se Costituisce una Società Economico-Agraria in Parma, nel Principio dell’Anno 1805. Parma, 20 fiorile anno XIII (10 May 1805) signed Stefano Sanvitale, Luigi Bramieri, secrétaire. BP Miscellanea Erudita 387. The guidelines that specifically refer to the desire to infuse enlightened ideas into local practices are reproduced in Bargelli, Dall empirismo alla scienza. L’agricoltura parmense dall’età dei lumi al primo conflitto mondiale, 315–324. Excerpts of the main titles of the Giornale Economico-agrario, in Bargelli, Dall empirismo alla scienza, 309–314. 29  Moreau de Saint-Méry, Compte Moral, p. 21. 30  Letter from the representatives of the Regia Economica to Citizen Moreau, Parma, 28 Frimaire an 12 (20 December 1803) ASPr, Gridario 1803, Inv. 49, v. 126. Such initiatives did not convince Napoleon, who included the suppression of the Regia Economica in the Decree of 2 Thermidor.

62 

D. P. HARSANYI

changes meant to strip them of myriad privileges with doubtful compensations, while the wider citizenry came to equate the push for reforms with disruptions that could hardly come to any good.31

Cultural Reforms Moreau took undisguised pleasure in guiding the local arts and letters scene, the one field where he felt fully at home and most in touch with Du Tillot’s legacy. The Veleia archeological sites, the art gallery, the university and the library, all founded by his predecessor, benefitted from new funds and additional specialist personnel. Moreau showed all possible appreciation for celebrated printer Bodoni and sponsored the acquisition of 1611 titles to the Ducal Library.32 The University of Parma, already a model of secular scientific education since Du Tillot’s reforms of 1778, flourished. Sparing no expense, Moreau added several chairs in natural and medical sciences, complete with funds for hiring qualified faculty. The study of modern medicine took precedence, because, in Moreau’s words, neglect under the late duke ended up harming ‘the lower classes of the people’.33 The vigorous culture and education agenda could have brightened Moreau’s otherwise bleak job record, were it not for his tendency to run roughshod over local sensibilities. This is how a carefully planned visit to the San Paolo convent in Parma, where he wished to see a series of frescoes by Correggio, turned from goodwill gesture into public relations disaster. Parma’s bishop denied him permission to enter on grounds that San Paolo was a female convent where lay guests needed papal approval. Priestly foolhardiness, Moreau scoffed, and, unceremoniously availing himself of 31  Claudio Bargelli, ‘Aneliti Riformistici e fervide utopie. L’Agricoltura parmense nell’età del Moreau de Saint-Méry. Parte Seconda’. Aurea Parma 88 (2004) Fascicola III: 419–443 (437). Other studies reached very similar conclusions. To Moreau’s posthumous credit, many of his efforts, while disappointing in the short run, paved the way for reforms implemented later in the nineteenth century. Pier Luigi Spaggiari, L’Agricoltura negli Stati Parmensi dal 1750 al 1859 (Milano: Banca Comerciale Italiana, 1966), 25–27. 32  Now Biblioteca Palatina. Librarians selected from the local scholarly community compiled a scientific catalogue. As of 1804, the library contained 46,411 volumes. Montana, Il dominio francese a Parma, 51. 33  Luisella Brunazzi Celaschi,’ La Storia dell’Università di Parma negli scritti e nell’azione politica di Moreau de Saint-Méry’ in Studi Parmensi v. XXIV (1979): 67–112 (104). This analytical study, based on Moreau’s manuscripts preserved at Biblioteca Palatina, shows Moreau’s constant use of Du Tillot’s blueprint on how to achieve a balance between humanities and sciences.

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

63

his power, walked into the convent accompanied by a painter of some note, Giuseppe Locatelli, hired to copy the famous frescoes.34 To the Administrator General’s sincere astonishment, public opinion took issue with his audacity and sided with the bishop. All Moreau’s policies amounted to a strategy of ralliement, a blend of old and new forms supposed to bridge opposites and create a new basis for social harmony. It produced confusion instead, further aggravated by Parma’s ambiguous status on Europe’s political map, a confusion that Moreau, enthralled by the unique chance of acting in accordance with his own lumières, barely noticed. Napoleon’s short visit had the effect of a reality check.

Napoleon’s Visit Emperor Napoleon scheduled a trip to Parma immediately after his coronation as King of Italy in Milan on 26 May 1805. Moreau sought Talleyrand’s guidance as soon as he heard the news. ‘His Majesty’, came the answer, ‘whose visits are meant to improve the destinies of his states, will be pleased to receive clear information on the people whose administration he entrusted to you’.35 Anxious to make a good impression, Moreau planned welcoming ceremonies worthy of an emperor and asked his most trusted employees to lend a hand. Logistics were the easy part. Count Stefano Sanvitale agreed to relocate his family so that the emperor and his entourage might enjoy sumptuous accommodations in his palace next door to Parma’s Duomo.36 It took six weeks of uninterrupted renovation work, but on the evening of 26 June 1805 when Napoleon and Josephine entered Parma, the Sanvitale palace, adapted to their needs and wants, was ready.37 The same could not be said for statistics and financial accounts. 34  This incident is recalled in rich detail in Antonio Musiari, Neoclassicismo senza Modelli. L’Accademia di Belle Arti di Parma tra il periodo napoleonico e la Restaurazione 1796–1820 (Parma: Zara, 1986), 33–52. 35  Moreau to Talleyrand, Parma 4 May 1805 and Talleyrand to Moreau, Milan 5 May 1805, BP Mss. Parm. 544. All primary documents in this section are collected in this file. 36  Letters back and forth from Moreau to Sanvitale, 15–22 May 1805. Sanvitale earned in this way a short (a few minutes) encounter with Napoleon, to present the educational and economic projects at his Fontanellato property. 37  Details on the many renovations to the Sanvitale Palace (including the addition of custom-­built bathroom appliances) in Mario Zannoni, Napoleone Bonaparte a Parma nel

64 

D. P. HARSANYI

Overjoyed at being included in the crowd who witnessed Napoleon’s coronation, Moreau arrived in Milan on 15 May. For a few days, he forgot his troubles and joined the lucky few admitted to the higher social circles: carefully preserved invitation notices show that he attended dinners and other social calls with Ministers Talleyrand, Barbé-Marbois and Champagny, with Governor Lebrun and even with Empress Josephine (with whom he was proud to claim a distant family relation). During one such visit Moreau crossed paths with Napoleon himself, who promptly turned the chance encounter into a call to order. ‘He sends me back to work with State Councilor Collin, the General Director of Imperial Domains for everything that has to do with finances and taxes, and with Bigot de Prémeneau for all legal matters’, Moreau noted in his diary, despondency replacing the previous days’ bliss.38 In fact, Napoleon had already instructed Champagny to have Collin investigate Parma’s finances: ‘My intention is to see clearly. Up to this moment, the treasury only received two million [francs]. The duchy should deliver more’.39 The files Moreau handed over to Minister Champagny in Milan did not persuade, and Collin accompanied the Emperor to Parma a few weeks later to deal with the situation directly. Napoleon seemed to have already decided that 1805 (Parma: Museo Glauco Lombardi MUP editore, 2006), 27–37. Details on Moreau’s fretting over every detail for the upcoming visit, including commissioning welcome poems in Italian and Latin, pp. 74–79. 38  Entry of 23 May in Tambini. Journal de Moreau de Saint-Méry 1805, parte I, 300. Jean Baptiste Nompère de Champagny (1756–1834) served in the American War of Independence and represented the nobility at the Estates General of 1789. Minister of the Interior from 1894 to 1807, when he replaced Talleyrand as the head of Foreign Affairs. Jean Felix Julien Bigot de Préameneu (1747–1825) was a distinguished magistrate, one of the main authors of the Civil Code. Jean Baptiste Collin (1750–1826) was at the time General Director of Customs and an important economic adviser. Moreau reluctantly accepted their authority but kept stuffing financial reports with information on Parma’s culture and society—which they and the emperor routinely ignored. 39   Note pour le Ministre de l’Intérieur Milan, 23 Floréal an 13 (13 May 1805), Correspondance de Napoléon Premier, #8724, v. X, 501. François Barbé-Marbois (1745–1837), Minister of Finances under the Consulate and Empire until 1806; best known for having negotiated the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. Correspondence made up of short notes written in a hurry between Moreau and his main advisers, Platesteiner and Duplan, shows three completely unprepared bureaucrats scrambling from blunder to blunder, unable to gather specific information, constantly tripping over unanticipated hurdles that further slowed their already sluggish progress. On 6 June—a month after the emperor ordered Moreau to clarify his states’ finances—Collin still had no data to work with and asked curtly when he could expect the required documentation. BP Mss. Parm. 544.

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

65

Moreau’s experiments had lasted long enough. Prior to setting off for Parma he issued two decrees: the first, on 14 Prairial an 13 (3 June 1805), prescribed the introduction of the Civil Code; the second, on 20 Prairial an 13 (9 June 1805), restructured the legal system. Moreover, in preparation for the introduction of the Civil Code, most feudal dues were abolished without compensation, effective immediately.40 Public life in the States of Parma was about to change drastically but the decrees passed without immediate public reaction, the momentous event of the impending imperial visit absorbing everybody’s attention. Napoleon, Josephine and their 130-person entourage arrived on the evening of 26 June 1806. The short stopover unfolded like a comedy of manners, with local notables pouring their hearts into a grand welcome show that took weeks to prepare, while the busy emperor barely, if not disdainfully, went through the motions of state visit protocol. The imperial couple retired at 10:00 p.m., to the disappointment of Parmense aristocrats who, dressed in their finest, attended a much-anticipated theatre performance and subsequent ball without their august guests. The next day, 27 June 1806, Napoleon employed most of the morning dictating letters.41 In the early afternoon, he held an hour-long conference with the leaders of the Anzianato, Parma’s Bishop Caselli, Count Sanvitale and several officers of the honour guard. During the mid-day meal, he conversed with Carlo Formenti, a member of the Regia Economica, who pleaded for building a road between Parma and La Spezia, and with civil engineers Agostino Sardi and Antonio Coconcelli, who briefed him on the defence capacities of Parma’s fortress.42 In the afternoon, Napoleon toured (without dismounting) the exhibition of local agricultural and manufacture products organized in the gardens of the ducal palace, galloped through town, and returned to Sanvitale Palace at 6:00 p.m., where tables were already set for a luxurious feast. As was his custom, the emperor  Public announcement 13 June 1805. ASPr Gridario 1805.  An overview in Alberto Riggi, ‘Corrispondenze napoleoniche da Parma’ Aurea Parma XIV (IX) 1932: 10–14. The letter to Barbé-Marbois was written in the morning, and hence before the meeting with Moreau. 42  Carlo Formenti later submitted a plan for such a road, which Napoleon considered but, in the end, did not have the time or inclination to follow through with. Formenti’s project, where he referenced the emperor’s conversation with Coconcelli, dated 5 July 1805 at AN F1e/85. Details on the discussion with the two civil engineers in Luigi Ginetti, Napoleone I a Parma (Parma: Tipografia Cooperativa Parmense, 1912), 28–34. Napoleon’s busy schedule in Parma in Zannoni, Napoleone Bonaparte a Parma, 37–46. 40 41

66 

D. P. HARSANYI

finished dinner in about twenty minutes and left immediately afterwards for Piacenza, which he honoured with an even shorter and hastier visit.43 In between all these activities, he set aside time for a working interview with Moreau. It was a disastrous meeting. The Administrator General thought it appropriate to bring up Locatelli’s copies of Correggio’s frescoes. ‘Let us leave aside your toys and talk business’ (parlons affaires) was all that Napoleon had to say on the subject. Business was not Moreau’s strength, and it did not help that Parma’s treasurer, called in to provide details, confessed that he had never drawn a budget before 1802 because the dukes never asked for one and the entire process was a mystery to him. Dreading accusations of corruption, Moreau loudly protested his innocence and kept showing various statistics.44 In vain, for the emperor still could not see ‘what he had’: I do not see clearly in the affairs of Parma. I want you to send an employee of the Treasury, intelligent and cognizant of our way of accounting. He will go to Parma and will draw a budget, for revenues and expenses, for 1802, 1803, 1804, 1805. He will do the same for municipalities of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla. He will produce a report for each administrative branch on the national properties which had been sold and which not. Moreau de Saint-Méry, who should have done all this, is completely hopeless; and anyway, it is good to have a clear view of these things. You must send an intelligent man, mindful of the way we make budgets.45

The decrees of 14 and 20 Prairial, effective as of 13 Messidor (1 July 1805), suppressed Moreau’s legal infrastructure in its entirety. The emperor replaced it with a system of justice similar, but still not identical, to the one operating in French and annexed departments: two criminal 43  Paolo Negri, ‘Napoleone I a Piacenza nel 1805’, Bolletino Storico Piacentino, VI (1911): 74–86. 44  ‘I will not think harshly of you, I know you are an honest man; but I want to see clearly and understand what I have,’ Napoleon replied to Moreau’s protestations of innocence. Entry for 8 Messidor/27 June 1805. Gabriela Tambini, Journal de Moreau de Saint-Méry 1805 parte II, MA Thesis. Università degli Studi Parma. Facoltà di Magistero. Corso di Laurea in Lingue et Letterature straniere. Relatore Carminella Biondi (1982/83), 392. 45  A M Barbé Marbois, Paris 8 Messidor an 13 (27 June 1805). Correspondance de Napoléon Premier, #8951, v. XI, pp. 564–565. Until such a person could be found, Collin remained in Parma and was still poring over books with Formenti three days after Napoleon’s departure. Entry of 10 Messidor (29 June 1805) in Tambini, Journal de Moreau de Saint-Méry 1805 parte II, 402.

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

67

justice courts, one in Parma and one in Piacenza, each staffed by seven judges (six at minimum) plus a president (three quarters of the votes being necessary to pronounce a sentence), dealt with major crimes. Sentences could be appealed at the Court of Appeals in Genoa—outside the States of Parma. For lesser crimes, tribunals of first instance were to be installed in Parma, Piacenza and Borgo San Donino; justices of peace, eight in total, working in regional centres tended to misdemeanours. All judges, justices, substitutes and their various assistants were to be nominated by the emperor, at the recommendation of local officials.46 ‘But different concerns, the desire to make wise choices delayed the implementation of (the Administrator’s) plans and … everything turned, rightfully, to what He wished to order for that country’, Moreau noted gloomily as he watched his system of government crumbling in a single imperial stroke.47 That the said country’s citizens might balk at yet another complete overhaul of their daily routines did not concern Napoleon or any of his executives. Just the contrary: they picked up the pace. The Imperial Decree of 2 Thermidor on 13 (21 July 1805), issued at Saint-Cloud, cut the Gordian knot and incorporated the States of Parma within the 28th Military Division headquartered in Genoa under the command of General Louis Antoine Choin de Montchoisy.48 Further up, the 46  The final draft of the decree, with annotations, in AN BB/5/302. A detailed description of the system in Drei, ‘Governo Francese’ in L’Archivio di Stato di Parma. Indice General, storico, descrittive, ed analitco, 130–131. 47  Cattabiani, Description, 80. 48  Décret Impérial sur l’Organisation des Etats de Parme, Plaisance et Guastalla. No. 876 in Recueils des Lois et Décrets, 4ème série, no. 53 (Nancy: Vigneulle, an XIII/1805): 419–427. This was a de facto annexation; the juridical annexation occurred only in 1808. In several letters to Talleyrand, Viceroy Eugène and Maréchal Berthier, Napoleon kept hesitating for several years between maintaining some form of autonomy for the States of Parma and straightforward annexation. Louis Antoine Choin de Montchoisy (1747–1814) started his career in the royal artillery in 1765, served under Rochambeau in the American War of Independence, and rose to major of the Royal Chasseurs de Provence in 1788. He navigated skilfully enough the political waves of the Revolution and participated, alongside General Bonaparte, to putting down the republican attempted insurrection of 13 Vendémiaire. He advanced steadily through the ranks and was appointed commander of the 28th military division in 1805, a position he held until his death in 1814. Charles François Lebrun (1739–1824) a lawyer, bureaucrat and man of letters under the Old Regime, represented the third estate of Dourdan (Essonne) at the Estates General in 1789, where he tried to carve a median path between different factions. Twice arrested under the Terror, he was saved by the Thermidor coup of 27 July 1794, and nominated third consul in 1799. Widely praised for moderation and wisdom, Lebrun contributed to the fiscal and administrative reforms of the Consulate.

68 

D. P. HARSANYI

chain of command included Charles François Lebrun, Imperial Archtreasurer and Governor of Liguria, and Prince Eugene de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy as of Napoleon’s coronation as King of Italy on 26 May 1805, who supervised all military operations in Parma. On 30 Thermidor an 14 (18 August 1805), Lebrun issued a decree that aligned the postal and lottery system with that of Genoa. On 29 Fructidor an 13 (16 September 1805) Moreau published the French laws on registration and stamp taxes which suppressed all previous impositions and announced the abolition of the republican calendar by the Senatus Consultus of 22 Fructidor an 13 (9 September 1805). Summoned to implement so many changes in so short a time, a disoriented Moreau kept asking for clarifications throughout the summer of 1805. He learned that he had to make sure everything was functioning like in France, even though his states were not yet scheduled to be annexed to France. Here is a typical piece of advice from Minister Champagny: The Council of Contention represents under a different name the Council of the Prefect; it did not receive this title because the offices in your administration do not carry these names, but the assimilation must be perfect, except if certain regions oppose it, which I do not think will be the case.49

How exactly such a system should work and what to do when regional officials opposed the new organization the minister did not say.50 Moreau’s answers to insistent requests for information on Parma’s economic potential constantly came short of expectations, despite his many scientific investigations: his way of collecting data, informed by scholarly curiosity, In 1804, he accepted the title of Archtreasurer of the French Empire and, more reluctantly, the title of Duke of Piacenza (1808). He was governor of Liguria from 1805 to 1806, during which time he oversaw this province’s annexation to the empire and became involved in the Piacentino uprising. Eugène de Beauharnais (1781–1824) was Napoleon’s stepson, later adopted son. He served Napoleon steadfastly and competently at every step, from the First Italian Campaign (1796–1797) to the last battles of 1814. Nominated viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy in 1805, he ably walked the fine line between unreserved loyalty to the emperor and responsiveness to local concerns. 49  Minister Champagny to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Paris 13 Fructidor an 13 (31 August 1805) AN F/1e/86. 50  Later, Moreau touched, very cautiously, on the issue of unpredictability, which made it quite impossible for a conscientious employee like himself to impose his authority. Moreau de Saint-Méry, Compte Moral, p. 41.

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

69

no longer satisfied the demands of an imperial bureaucracy reliant on functional statistics.51 Paris was getting impatient. On 5 Fructidor an 13 (23 August 1805) Minister Champagny gave him a blunt ultimatum: His Majesty ordered me to request statistics pertaining to the situation in the States of Parma and to the new relationships established between this state and the Empire. He reminded me that this was a demand he had formulated before. You have let me know that you were in possession of rich material on this subject and I have no doubt you have used it in the best way; asking you to send [your materials] to me, I am also of a mind that it is important to announce to HM that you have obeyed his instructions.52

In follow-up correspondence, the Minister of the Interior kept pressing for details; in response, Moreau kept making excuses.53 In the meantime, financial inspectors visited Parma periodically to check the books.54 It was during these tense times that Viceroy Eugene inquired whether Moreau would consider recruiting 12,000 men from the ranks of the local militia and sending them to the reserve camp he was organizing near Bologna. To the embattled Administrator General, this seemed like a last chance opportunity to persuade his hierarchy of his managerial abilities. He answered the call in the affirmative, without considering what an arduous undertaking it was to ask 12,000 men to leave their homes at a moment’s notice (of a total population of about 420,000). The decision fell as the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back and provided an outlet for myriad pent up frustrations.

51  See Stuart Woolf’s discussion of statistics as central to making the administrative machine run smoothly. Napoleon’s Integration of Europe, pp. 107–110. 52  Minister Champagny to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Paris 5 Fructidor an 13 (23 August 1805) ANP F/1e/86. 53  In the cover letter to the Compte Moral, Moreau explained that the financial documents insistently requested by various officials had been lost, which is why he had been unable to provide them when asked—an explanation unlikely to satisfy any of his superiors; if anything, it only added to their disapproval. Letter to the Minister of the Interior, Paris 7 April 1806. AN F/1e/85. 54  An inspector by the name of Pelit arrived in Parma on 21 Fructidor (9 September 1805) to supervise Parma’s books, improve returns and try to squeeze additional profits from confiscated Church property. Tambini Journal de Moreau de Saint-Méry 1805 parte II, 557–576.

70 

D. P. HARSANYI

Monks, Nuns and Financial Headaches From the first days of his appointment, Moreau expressed nothing but disgust for Parma’s clergy, with an obstinacy that even Napoleon disapproved of.55 To begin with, there were too many priests, monks, nuns and assorted proselytes, he wrote in the Description: 1019 monks and 1633 nuns for total of 1652 (as of 1804/05) and an untold number of priests of all ranks. The lack of better career perspectives thickened the ranks of a slothful religious class who, instead of teaching Christian virtues, maliciously maintained the people in a state of ignorance impervious to rational thought: ‘It is easy to understand that, having almost nothing to do, they easily fell prey to the disease of idleness; morality suffered grievously. The constant goal of the clergy was to maintain the people in ignorance, the most natural source of superstition’. Worse, they solicited money for church services and even engaged in smuggling, with the result that the common people knew nothing but corruption and religious delusion.56 Moreau made his sentiments public in an open letter to one of the main priests of Parma’s cathedral, who suggested delivering a series of reflections on probity during the last week of Lent. Moreau’s reply was, in essence, too little, too late. To his mind, superstition and its companion idleness had already ‘invaded’ the sermons; the only remedy was to select Bible passages likely to teach the people dignified work ethics such as ‘you will earn your bread by the sweat of your brow’, a maxim he believed most of his subjects had never heard of.57 Moreau expressed here the spirit of the Concordat of 1801, which gave the Church free rein to cater to the 55  ‘M. Champagny, I read attentively M. Moreau de Saint-Méry’s report on the clergy. You will inform him that his first obligation is to respect the people’s way of life. If, by custom, the inhabitants of the States of Parma value illuminated churches that they like to frequent during the night, there is no reason to prevent them from doing so; they would feel their normal lives are hurt’. No such lenience was to be shown for the hierarchy, and the juridical rights of the bishops were suspended promptly, along with the sbirri’s policing prerogatives. ‘The bishops’ jurisdiction must be suppressed; the sbirri and their prisons, suppressed as well’. A. M. Champagny. Milan, 7 Prairial an 13 (27 May 1805). Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, Vol. X, # 8798. P. 449. 56  Gini, Description. Passi scelti, 88–94. 57  Réponse de l’Administrateur Général des Etats de Parme au Prédicateur de la Cathédrale de Parme. Parme, 23 Ventôse an 12 (14 Mars 1804). The original: Lettera a Sig. Felix de Vecchi Predicatore per la Quaresima nella Catedrale di Parma. Parma 23 Ventôse an 12, BP Palat. 15046. Luigi Pelizzoni analysed the manuscript in L’Ossessione della memoria #126, 152–153.

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

71

citizenry’s spiritual needs and attend to parish life without any pretension of recovering its former status of partner government institution. Priests were only called on to educate the masses in the spirit of those Christian virtues deemed compatible with republican morality. A modest Church acting as moral leader, oblivious to politics, made sense in post-­ revolutionary France; less so in Italy where the clergy had never suffered revolutionary blows and had no incentive to accommodate revolutionary ethics.58 On 20 Prairial an 13 Napoleon (9 June 1805) Napoleon issued a decree in 26 points that closed 44 monasteries in the States of Parma and declared their assets reunited with the National Domain—that is, they became the property of the French state.59 Monks and nuns were allowed the choice between transfer to one of the remaining houses or permanent relocation outside the duchies, at their own expense. New regulations forced each convent to trim membership to 25, eligibility being restricted to citizens of the duchies or foreigners with a minimum 15 consecutive years of residence. Not meeting residency criteria automatically triggered expulsion orders; the few novices allowed to join a monastic order had to provide proof of financial self-sufficiency. Finally, each monk and nun who met the eligibility threshold was entitled to an individual annual allowance of 350/250 francs respectively, deducted from the taxes convents contributed to the state budget.60 Nothing worked according to plan. Convents had trouble keeping track of the new way of managing money, and hence allowances went unpaid. Having old monks and nuns return to their country of origin proved almost impossible, because, with no family and no independent means, many ended up begging in the streets, hardly the outcome anticipated by laws meant to impose order.61 After Moreau’s dismissal, General 58  See Michael Broers, The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy. The War against God, 1901–1814 (New York: Routledge, 2002), 1–6, for an insightful discussion of Concordat policies and their divergent reception in France and Italy. 59  Published in two languages in ASPr, Gridario 1805. 60  Au Palais de Milan le 20 Prairial an XIII (9 June 1805). ASPr, Gridario 1805, Inv 49, v.127. The decree was to be published in all convents and all minutes preserved by Ignace Negri, curator at the public archives. The Administrator General was free to nominate replacements. 61  On 12 Messidor an 13 (30 June 1805) and 26 Messidor an 13 (15 July 1805). The first decree regulated the convents’ harvest; the other stipulated the sums to be allocated to monks and nuns unable to find shelter after being forced out of what used to be their home. Pensions for the former members of religious orders will continue to be a problem; later,

72 

D. P. HARSANYI

Junot and Administrator-Prefect Nardon kept trying to dispose of what looked increasingly like an intractable problem that could only be alleviated, never solved, with temporary solutions such as extended residence permits and sporadic food allowances. The general assumption at the root of these policies held that by draining the excess religiosity out of society, Parma, like any territory within the French orbit, would transform itself enough to join the modern world. One way to accomplish this goal was to incentivize hundreds of people to work productively rather than languish in pious idleness. In the end, Napoleon tired of the issue and simply closed all convents, leaving only one in Parma and one in Piacenza. Caring for displaced monks and nuns fell to the two bishops, with no further help or concern from the French state.62 As for ordinary Parmense, no one asked them what they thought. Most probably, brutal displacements, confiscations and overt distaste for religion disrupted customs people organized their lives around and bolstered what Michael Broers assumed struck people as ‘the most barbaric aspect of the last barbarian invasion’.63 Echoes of this kind of uneasiness found their way into the insurgents’ demands during the insurrection of 1805–1806.

A Well-Meaning Proconsul All Moreau’s public pronouncements and private writings show that he regarded himself as an instrument of change, specially selected for the task by Napoleon’s discerning eye. He genuinely believed that outward amiability, coupled with his scientific Encyclopédiste approach to governance, outweighed the French state’s methodical rapacity. He never missed an opportunity to impress on Parma’s inhabitants the sagacity and brilliance of all decisions emanating from the First Consul, then Emperor Napoleon, Junot issued further clarifications in his decree of 6 April 1806 on the sums to be paid and revenue to be collected from monasteries. 62  ‘I very much wish to suppress all the religious orders in the four departments of the Rhine, in the Piedmont, in Parma and in Genoa. I never want to hear about them’. Paris, 11 March 1810. Later, Napoleon clarified his thought: ‘All convents for monks and nuns will be suppressed in the Department of Taro, even those for beggar monks. There will only remain one convent in Piacenza, one in Parma, one in Genoa and one in Savona’ (Part of Project for the final decree to be signed on 15 June of the same year). Au Comte Bigot de Préameneu, Ministre du Culte, Paris, 11 March 1810, and Berg-op-Zoom, 9 May 1810, respectively. Correspondance de Napoléon premier, Vol. 20, p. 304, # 16323 and pp. 391–393, # 16449 respectively. 63  Broers, The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy. The War against God, 5.

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

73

on whose behalf he was governing them. But self-effacing Moreau de Saint-Méry was not. For a man prone to lecturing a captive audience on republican virtue, he proved hopelessly infatuated with old regime pomp and circumstance. Installed in the lavish ducal palace in Parma, he indulged his taste for the finer things in life and made it a habit to visit blue-blooded families in town, and was quite happy to marry his daughter into local nobility. Moreau’s interactions with the Collegio dei Nobili best illustrated how much he allowed himself to be carried away by the trappings of authority, leaving sceptical local observers to mutter that Napoleon’s man in Parma seemed eager to ‘emulate, if not to surpass the Farnese and the Bourbons’.64 Except, of course, that Moreau was neither a Farnese nor a Bourbon and role playing only hastened his downfall. College of Sainte-Catherine, nicknamed the Collegio dei nobili or College of the Nobility, was Parma’s flagship educational institution, run by Jesuits until 1768, when Du Tillot forced the Society of Jesus out of the duchies. Thereafter, Du Tillot entrusted the school to the Piarist brothers, and gave no further thought to it. After the minister’s disgrace, the Jesuits returned to Parma with Duke Ferdinand’s blessing and gradually resumed control of the college with a curriculum structured by the 1599 Ratio studiorum: a mix of academics, sports and dramatic arts.65 The humanist educational philosophy and the impressive resources (a first-rate horse ring and theatre auditorium among them) attracted families of proud noble ancestry from all over Italy. Much as he despised the Jesuits, Moreau was delighted that his administration had not scared away students bearing the most distinguished names in Italy, like the young Spada princes from Rome. Moreau visited the school often, attended ceremonies and thesis defences and financed the construction of a new theatre. In what could be considered the first of many instances of calculated obsequiousness on one side and naïve self-indulgence on the other, Moreau 64  Gaetano Capasso, ‘Il Colleggio durante l’ammministrazione francese’ in ‘Il Colleggio dei nobili di Parma. Memorie storiche’ in Archivio Storico per le province parmensi v XXVI (1901–1902): 1–248 (215). The section on the college under French rule can be found on pp. 214–236. 65  The collective volume Il Collegio dei Nobili di Parma. La formazione della classe dirigente (secoli XVII-XIX). Alba Mora editor (Parma: MUP, 2013) offers a detailed history of this college, including the main elements of the course of studies and extracurricular activities that built the school’s reputation. For a concise survey, see Michael Broers, ‘Le Lycée de Parme sous le Premier Empire’ in Napoléon et les lycées. Sous la direction de Jacques-Olivier Boudon (Paris: Fondation Napoléon, 2004), 147–164 (147–149).

74 

D. P. HARSANYI

inaugurated the theatre on 3 August 1803 with spectacular pageantry. The Administrator General arrived in the company of his son-in-law, with an escort of four cavalry officers, took his seat in a special loge, and presided over a grand spectacle planned around poems and songs recited by students. The show ended with muses Melpomene and Talia emerging deus ex machina from the clouds to crown a bust of Moreau de SaintMéry.66 As expected, an exceedingly pleased Moreau continued to shower the college with grants, on the sole condition that Napoleon’s portrait be prominently displayed in the entry hall. The school’s superintendents reckoned it was a small price to pay for the implicit permission of teaching their customary curriculum with no interference from the republican Administrator General. Gratitude took the form of more invitations to festivities where, according to Marquis Lalatta, Moreau put on princely airs, travelling ‘like a monarch’ with a large suite, in carriages drawn by six horses.67 Napoleon’s coronation as Emperor of the French and later King of Italy elevated the Administrator General’s status; displays of obsequiousness increased proportionally. At the 1805 ceremonies, Moreau received, from the hands of its author, Domenico Rosetti, a Cantata in honour of Napoleon’s coronation, with the preface: ‘Are you not, Excellency, to these peoples, the living image of the august Napoleon? Was not entrusted to your enlightened mind the general administration of these states where your name rimes with those of just judge, beneficial hero, and loving father?’68 On the same occasion, the graduating class’s main act featured Jupiter and Mars paying homage to Napoleon in music sung by a choir of happiness genii; it closed with a sonnet authored by alumni and offered, through Moreau’s intermediary, to ‘His Majesty

66  An executive decree issued on 24 Ventôse an 13 (5 March 1804) launched the works for the new auditorium. Details in Gaetano Capasso, ‘Il Colleggio dei Nobili di Parma’, 214–218. The inauguration was also greeted by Camillo Ugoni, representing the local scholarly society Academia degli Scelti, who praised the pure classical forms of the new building and concluded that all of Italy joined the Parmense in expressing gratitude to Moreau. Camillo Ugoni, Academia degli esercizi cavallereschi, dedicati etc dai convittori dell’Imperial Colleggio di S. Catherina di Parma nel’agosto dell’anno 1805 (Parma: Carmignani, 1805). 67  On 23 August 1804 Lalatta noted in his diaries that, in addition to travelling ‘like a monarch’ the Administrator General took his vast entourage to the Fontevivo campus where they did not refuse a superbissima collazione (delightful refreshment) before driving to Count Sanvitale’s estate. BP Mss. Parm. 1185. 68  Avvocato Domenico Rossetti, In occasione d’essere l’augusto Napoleone I coronato re d’Italia. Cantata (Parma: Presso Luigi Mussi, 1805). BP Miscellanea Erudita 4.

4  FROM DUCHIES OF PARMA TO STATES OF PARMA 

75

Napoleon I, Emperor of the French and king of Italy, in sign of profound reverence’.69 Somewhere along the way, Moreau lost the ability to distinguish between common courtesy and sycophancy.70 Being much made of became part of his life, and little by little the dutiful officeholder morphed into a grand proconsul. He surely believed that his affability would draw local luminaries to France’s side and smooth the path for French reforms. Watching the scene through lenses darkened by his many years at Parma’s court, Cesare Ventura had no doubt that it was all an act: ‘Moreau’s counselors put a mask on their faces and started talking the language of public good the better to deceive him’, he wrote in one of his reports to Minister Mozzi, the King of Etruria’s main adviser.71 The fatal combination of naïveté and arrogance struck observers as a ruinous weakness that explained why ‘… the Administrator General could not see what was made to pass under his eyes’.72 Cavagnari, the author of the above observation, had fallen out with Moreau over business dealings the Administrator General found unacceptable, so his assessment reflects his spite—but corroborates nonetheless Ventura’s cynicism. The golden circle around Moreau de Saint-Méry simply melted away when his position weakened. Moreau’s fortunes went downwards after Napoleon’s brief visit, slowly at first, precipitously once rebellion broke out and events inexorably took him to his doom. Starting in December 1805, his diaries show a man in complete disarray, a stark contrast with the first two years’ contented self-­ confidence. Parma’s notabilities, sensing the changing winds, limited themselves to minimum conventional courtesy. On 9 January, the president of the Anzianato, Filippo Linati, informed Moreau of this body’s intention to send a delegation to the viceroy. The Anziani had already met with Italy’s Minister of War Pino, an event mentioned as an afterthought during a casual visit on 10 January. That Parma’s leading citizens were now coordinating by themselves with French and Italian authorities caused in Moreau an outburst of powerless rage, which at least allowed  Programme of the show in BP Miscellanea Erudita 4.  He did not even find extravagant the offer to build a triumphal arch in his honour. Plans of the projected arch, designed by Ferdinando Cossetti, are preserved at BP Raccolta Mappe e disegni, vol 4 and 12. Analytical comments in Valentina Bocci, L’Ossessione della memoria (#127, 128, 129), 153. 71  Ventura to Mozzi, Parma 19 September 1803, as quoted in Montagna, Il dominio francese a Parma, 46. 72  Cavagnari, Alcune partcolarità storiche, pp. 65 and 83. 69 70

76 

D. P. HARSANYI

him to vent simmering resentments, obscured until then by the smooth duplicity of the aristocratic manners he had indulged in. ‘You persist in showing off, against my orders, noble decorations, although you are a French public servant… You are my subordinate, and it is in my power to remove you from your office whenever I see fit’, Moreau shouted at Linati, and for good measure: ‘I added that, in the old regime I would have been his equal, and that I was above him in the current regime—and that my son will always measure up to him, even without wearing the Cross of Malta’.73 Abandoned by his superiors and by his subordinates alike, the Administrator General could do little but host dinners for the military men who were now deciding the future of the States of Parma and using his office merely as a post box for reports from the field. On 26 January 1806, the arrival of General Junot, Governor General with extraordinary powers as of 19 January, formally terminated Moreau de Saint-Méry’s appointment in Parma, the inglorious end of a well-meaning but hopelessly out of touch pro-consul.74

73  This is at least how Moreau recorded the exchange. Later, representatives of the Anzianato softened the blow with a goodbye gift: a gold medal manufactured by Bodoni, packaged in a beautiful case of fine green leather. Entries of 10 January and 24 February 1806 in Dominique Faidherbe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV-1806 parte I (Università degli Studi di Parma. Facoltà del Magistero. Corso di Laurea in Lingue e Letterature Straniere. Relatore Carminella Biondi. 1982/83), 80–81 and 207 respectively. 74  Jean-Andoche Junot (1771–1813) was studying law when the Revolution broke out in 1789. He embraced the changes wholeheartedly, abandoned the law career path, and joined the army, where he advanced rapidly through the ranks. He was already a sergeant when he met Bonaparte at Toulon in 1793. He fought in the Italian campaign, was made brigadier general at the beginning of the Egyptian Campaign, and participated in the Brumaire coup of 1799. General of division in 1801, he was in charge of military affairs in Paris until 1803, served briefly in Arras and then Portugal, and fought at Austerlitz (1805). The position of Governor General of the States of Parma took him by surprise but lasted only until September 1806, when Napoleon appointed him Governor of Paris. Afterwards, leading a bloodless invasion of Portugal in 1807 earned him the title Duke of Abrantès. He served uninterruptedly in the Peninsular wars and then in the Russian campaign, more and more erratically though, seemingly because untreated wounds to the head impaired his judgement. His wife Laure Pernod (m. 1800), duchess of Abrantès, achieved a measure of fame with gossipy memoirs on the Consulate’s and Empire’s high society.

CHAPTER 5

Watershed: The Insurrection

In addition to inclusion in the 28th Military Division, the Imperial Decree of 8 Prairial an 13 (28 May 1805) ordered the formation of a company of gendarmerie under the command of Captain Lanault.1 It was the clearest signal to date that the imperial administration had decided to convert the States of Parma into a French imperial department, considering that, as Antoine Boulant noted: ‘the creation of the gendarmerie constitutes almost always one of the very first reforms enacted by the French authorities when attaching new departments to the empire’.2 Indeed, the main function of the newly formed gendarmerie units was to act as ‘the eyes and the ears of the government’.3 Their presence indicated the tightening of 1

 That portion of the decree read: A company of gendarmerie will be established in the States of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, paid and run like the companies of gendarmerie in the interior of the empire. ASPr, Carte varie amministrazione militare 1804–1816, Busta 67. This meant that each medium-size commune had to accommodate at least one brigade of six men.

 Antoine Boulant, ‘La Gendarmerie sous le Consulat et l’Empire’ in Police et Gendarmerie dans l’Empire napoléonien. Sous la direction de Jacques Olivier Boudon (Paris: Collections de L’Institut Napoléon. Editions SPM, 2013), 41–55 (52). In the States of Parma the gendarmerie preceded the creation of the court system. 3  Clive Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 155. 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_5

77

78 

D. P. HARSANYI

French control over the States of Parma, but unlike in departments already annexed to the Empire, the gendarmerie did not substitute itself for the local militia, which remained in place throughout 1805. Since 1588, 10 militia companies, each commanded by a colonel, a captain and, for the more populous districts, a lieutenant colonel as well, were responsible for keeping the peace in a designated district called a terzo, all under the command of the collaterale generale, who reported directly to the head of state. Communal funds financed small stipends for colonels and lieutenant colonels; more affluent citizens preferred to pay a military fee, which gave them a shortcut to leadership positions.4 The rank-and-file comprised all men above 14 years of age, responsible for owning a firearm and obligated to report for duty when called by the colonel of their terzo. Service was always uncompensated but not overbearing, on a rotation basis, for 25 years starting with each man’s 18th birthday.5 Moreau de Saint-Méry considered the militia a harmless archaic rite of passage for rural youth, but made sure to put all companies under the authority of French military place commanders (General Marion in Piacenza and General Le Soulier in Parma). On 27 Prairial an 13 (16 June 1805) another imperial decree informed the population that within a year conscription laws were to take effect there like in any department of the Empire.6 This was too far in the future to worry people already struggling with the obligations of maintaining 4  Giovanni Drei, L’Archivio di Stato di Parma. Indice General, storico, descrittive, ed analitico, 77–78. Additional details in Emilio Nasalli Rocca, Piacenza: dal medioevo all’età moderna. Studi Storici (Piacenza: Deputazione di Storia Patria, 1983), 146–149; Ettore Carrà, L’Ordine Pubblico nel Periodo Napoleonico (Piacenza 1806–1814. Piacenza: Tip.Le.Co, 2005), 91–107; Mario Zanoni e Massimo Fiorentino, L’esercito farnesiano dal 1694 al 1731 (Parma: Palatina editrice, 1981), 119. Pietro Cavagnari explained the system of paid militia in an Exposé rapide sur la position actuelle de la ville et Etat de Plaisance (14 Juin 1805) written for the benefit of French authorities. AN F/1e/85. 5  In 1805, 60,803 men were enrolled in the militia, of whom 16,680 paid the military fee. Colonels for each terzo were nominated by the head of state; hence, as of 1802, by Administrator General Moreau de Saint-Méry. Gini, Moreau de Saint-Méry. Description. Passi scelti, 200. 6  Details in Francesco Frasca, ‘Parma’ in Reclutamento e Guerra in Italia Napolenica. Prefazione André Corvisier. Introduzione Gabriele de Rosa (Padova: Editoriale Programma, 1993), 90–97. The decree was published in Parma in French the same day: Beginning with year 14, the Duchy of Parma will be subjected to the laws of military conscription, for a contingent of 100 men. ASPr, Gridario, 1805. Shortly, the numbers were revised upwards to 200 (Imperial Decree of 8 Fructidor an 13 (14 August 1805), for a total participation of 1,000 by 1809.

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

79

military hospitals and providing foodstuffs to armies crisscrossing their lands.7 By contrast, the publication of the viceroy’s November 1805 official call, endorsed by Moreau, for 12,000 men to join the reserve camp in Bologna hit close to home.8

Volunteer National Guards The relatively low number of recruits included in the conscription decree of 27 Prairial (16 June 1805) probably reflected Napoleon’s doubts regarding the military potential of the duchies.9 Viceroy Eugene had fewer hesitations. While Napoleon weighed different strategies and accelerated the training of his Grande Armée at the Boulogne camp, his viceroy kept an eye on the Anglo-Russian forces landing in the Kingdom of Naples. To meet any possible threat, Eugene issued on 5 Frimaire an 14 (26 November 1805) a decree establishing a Reserve Camp between Bologna and Modena, formed of Italian National Guards reinforced by National Guards from the States of Parma and Piacenza, all under the command of General Pino, Minister of War of the Kingdom of Italy. Eugene’s appeal to Parma probably resulted from difficulties encountered while trying to build volunteer National Guard units within the confines of the kingdom. Confusion between regular conscription and volunteer enlisting generated massive resistance, desertions and emigration.10 Eugene certainly hoped that recruitment would proceed more smoothly in territories not yet 7  As early as 16 December 1804, Moreau circulated detailed instructions on converting existing hospitals into military hospitals, on the beds and linen to be provided for French soldiers, and on the food and medicine to be kept in stock, and even printed entry and exit tickets to be used by future patients. ASPr, Gridario, 1804. 8  The following remarks summarize the analysis of Parma’s National Guards, in the context of war preparations in the Kingdom of Italy, I offered in ‘Between Glory and Good Sense. Resistance to conscription and National Guard experience in the States of Parma 1805–06’. Napoleonic Scholarship. The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society (December 2016): 21–36. 9  Napoleon’s correspondence with Eugene throughout the months of August through December 1805 is interspersed with direct orders as well as advice on how to transition the armed forces in Parma, such as they were, into the French army; officers having served under the Bourbons and unwilling to join the French army were to be pensioned. On 13 July 1805, Napoleon wrote to Berthier to order him to remove Parmense officers from leadership positions and place military installations across the States of Parma under French command. Correspondance de Napoléon 1er, vol 11, p. 11 #8978. 10  Pietro Crociani, Virgilio Ilari, Ciro Paoletti, Storia Militare del Regno Italico (1802–1814) (Roma: Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito. Uffico Storico, 2004) II, 832–835. Adolfo Bernadello,

80 

D. P. HARSANYI

exposed to previous rounds of military conscription. To this end, he awarded Lieutenant-Colonel Scipione Ferrante the new title of ‘organizer of the Parmense troops’ and sent him to Parma to shape rural militia members into a fighting force fit to join the reserve camp. During the preparations for the decree, Eugene sent Moreau explicit instructions: I have learned, M. de Moreau de Saint-Méry, of the good organization of national troops in the duchies under your rule. The moment has arrived when, using these troops for the defense of their homes, we would offer them the opportunity to demonstrate their attachment to the Emperor and zeal to serve him. I invite you to choose, from this numerous group, a corps of about twelve thousand men, to gather them together so they will be ready as soon as possible to execute the orders His Majesty may give them to defend their country and maintain good order.11

The language of the viceroy’s request was rife with ambiguities—it was unclear from whom these recruits would defend their country—but Moreau leapt at the opportunity to demonstrate goodwill. He sent circular letters to regional military commanders asking them to contact the colonels of each terzo and expedite recruitment. A small group of officers responded eagerly, perhaps yearning for something bold to do, for adventures like those chronicled in the famous Bulletins, and did not mind the confusion one bit, in fact welcoming it.12 Agostino Botti, the leader of the officers who rushed to answer the viceroy’s call, besieged Moreau with Da Bonaparte a Radetzky. Cittadini in Armi: La Guardia Nazionale a Venezia (1797–1849) (Venezia: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2011), pp. 69–87. 11  Letter to Moreau de Saint-Méry, dated 24 Brumaire an 13 (15 November 1805), included in Eugene’s letter to Napoleon dated 19 November. Mémoires et Correspondance du Prince Eugène publiés, annotés et mis en ordre par A. Du Casse (Paris: Lévy, 1858) I, 445–446. 12  It was no secret that the Bulletins offered dreams of glory under the guise of neutral information. Yet, there was always a public for this modern Illiad, as Jean-Bertaud termed the ensemble of the Bulletins’ narrative. Jean-Paul Bertaud, ‘Napoléon journaliste: les bulletins de la gloire’ Le Temps des Média, 2005/I (no. 4): 10–21. Alan Forrest pointed to the emotional appeal of the bulletins: ‘The soldiers listened because this was a language they wanted to hear, a discourse with which they could related. But it was also the only language they were allowed to hear; such was the strict regime of censorship which Napoleon had instituted’. Alan Forrest, Napoleon’s Men. The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire (Hambledon: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006): 74. See also Wayne Hanley’s work for a detailed analysis of the efficient propaganda mechanism, even before Bonaparte became Napoleon: Wayne Hanley, The Genesis of Napoleonic Propaganda, 1796–1799 (New York: Columbia Press, 2005).

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

81

letters detailing his attempts to organize two battalions, Infantry and Cavalry. Each letter pledged his and his fellow officers’ eagerness to leave their mundane tasks and serve. Moreau was all too happy to relay these proofs of enthusiasm to the viceroy, who in turn reported to Napoleon the positive news that ‘Shortly, thanks to Moreau de Saint-Méry’s actions and to the excitement Your Majesty inspires, I will have at my disposal 12,000 men of good will, animated by the best sentiments’. Two weeks later, Eugene optimistically praised Parma’s militia officers, who, he wrote, had offered their services spontaneously, without orders from their superiors.13 Moreau certainly hoped that Botti and his comrades represented the sentiments of the majority. Nothing could have been further from reality.

Revulsion and Excitement The population greeted calls for joining the viceroy’s reserve forces with defiance and distrust, not dreams of glory, for local communities did not interpret neighbourhood peacekeeping duties as a gateway to military life. Militia members were prepared to perform regular tours of duty in their villages, help in emergencies, perhaps arrest the occasional thief; by contrast, joining a military camp, miles away from home for indefinite periods, only spelled dread. Anonymous posters distributed around the market in Piacenza warned that Prince Eugene would send militiamen on missions filled with monstrous perils.14 Save for a small minority, all recruiting efforts remained fruitless. The few eager officers thanked Moreau for having been ‘like a father who… inspired us to leave our homes, who pulled 13   Letters to Napoleon, 20 November 1805, and 2 December 1805, Mémoires et Correspondance du Prince Eugène, I, 449 and 463, respectively. In the latter, Eugene also reported on Parma’s military hospitals. In Moreau’s diary, the entry for 13 Frimaire an 13 (1 December 1805) mentions a letter from Parmense officers under Colonel Botti’s command informing him that they had called on Prince Eugene to allow them to follow him at Padova. Tambini. Moreau de Saint Méry. Journal III, Parte II (1805), 977. In another letter, dated Modena 20 December 1805, 64 officers led by Botti begged Prince Eugene to be the patron of their regiments. The message made Eugene hope that the 12,000 recruits bar was still a possibility. Letter to Napoleon, Padova, le 2 Janvier 1806, in Mémoires et Correspondance du Prince Eugène, vol. II, 45. The officers’ letter to the viceroy in ASPr, Gridario 1805. 14  Posters pretending to quote the viceroy warned against massacres along the route of the French armies. Captain Dallasta from Parma’s urban militia asked Moreau to issue a special proclamation to dispel fears that ‘the Austrians will eat [the recruits] alive’. Entry of 12 Frimaire (3 December 1805) in Moreau’s diary. Tambini, Moreau de Saint-Méry, Journal— III (1805), 993; Dallasta’s request in the same entry, p. 887.

82 

D. P. HARSANYI

us out of our inertia, who advised us to lead a useful and laborious life, worthy of a man and of a citizen’. In the same letter, though, they admitted that ‘Too many of our comrades grew weak at the first hardships and vilely abandoned us’.15 The 12,000 would-be recruits had to be drafted from the mass of poor villagers, for whom, as Alexander Grab has shown, ‘Conscription was especially unsettling and alienating since the poor, who shouldered the lion’s share of the draft, were unaccustomed to military service and lacked any sense of national consciousness and military pride’.16 Resistance to joining volunteer National Guard regiments therefore mirrored strategies of resistance to conscription everywhere in French- controlled territories. People argued and even fought with recruiting officers; accusations that the poor suffered disproportionally abounded; families petitioned for exemptions or simply hid youth, despite the risk of provoking the ire of already pitiless recruiters; those who had no choice but to enlist deserted as soon as the occasion presented itself. Reports detailing an unstoppable wave of mass desertions from barely formed units, mutinies due to miserable garrison conditions (vermin were a recurring complaint), and uncertainty about the length of service hit the Administrator General’s office daily. A dry note on 22 January 1806, from militia commander Lieutenant Colonel Giacopelli, concluded that militiamen refused to take up arms and ‘declare themselves dismissed’.17 To understand why, 15  Letter to Moreau signed by 64 officers and Non-Commissioned Officers. Non-dated, marked ‘received’ on 14 January. Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 93. Scipione Ferrante endorsed the letter. Botti signed again as commander of all the officers. 16  Alexander Grab, ‘State Power, Brigandage and Rural Resistance in Napoleonic Italy’, European History Quarterly, 25 (1995), 39–70. Major titles from the extensive historiography of Napoleonic-era conscription and its impact on public order in Italy and elsewhere include Alexander Grab, ‘Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy 1802–1814’, in Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs? edited by Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, Harold D. Blanton (New York: Routledge, 2009), 122–134; Alain Pigeard, ‘La conscription sous le Premier Empire’, Revue du Souvenir Napoléonien, 420 (Oct.–Nov. 1998): 2–30; Alan Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters. The French Army during the Revolution and Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Carlo Capra, L’Età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica in Italia, 288–321. 17  Lt. Col. Luigi Giacopelli to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Pieve sotto ville, 11 January 1806. Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 168. Several anonymous reports dated 26 January 1806, Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 210; the daily entries in Moreau’s diary throughout December 1805 and 1806 give summaries of messages from regional leaders, all reporting widespread resistance to the calls for enrolment in units expected to join the reserve camp. Faidherbe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV, Parte I (1806), 154.

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

83

the Governor of Piacenza, Francesco Ferrari, sent quartermaster Leonardi on an undercover mission through villages around Piacenza. Posing as an ambulant seller of ribbons, Leonardi listened and took notes; his report announced, in straightforward fashion, that peasants simply did not want to join the National Guards and—should force be used against them— they preferred to be killed at home.18 On the morning of 7 December, a courier informed Moreau de Saint-­ Méry that the anger had grown strong enough to fuel a violent mutiny at Castel San Giovanni, a commune under Colonel Botti’s jurisdiction.19 The Administrator General took no measures; instead, he watched helplessly how the first sparks of rebellion snowballed into full-scale insurrection.

The Events The rebellion directly concerned only a handful of communes in the mountainous area around Piacenza. The events started with the 7 December revolt at Castel San Giovanni, but the news trickled in very slowly. Local officials were in no hurry to inform the authorities; on his side, Moreau seemed unable to make sense of the intelligence he received. As a result, village leaders had ample time to shape remarkably consonant narratives featuring bands of insurgents that poured down the mountains like unstoppable torrents to flood tranquil valley communities who, therefore, deserved compassion not punishment. Official reactions came from General Stanisals Marion, Piacenza’s military commander, Piacenza’s imperial prosecutor Pietro Albesani (as of 8 Fructidor an 13, General Imperial Prosecutor at the Criminal Court in Piacenza) and (making less haste) Piacenza’s governor Francesco Ferrari. From the first days, Albesani distinguished himself by the energy and rapidity with which he endeavoured to find out what was unfolding in his district. On 2 January, General Marion answered Albesani’s queries with his first thoughts: For five days now, all the inhabitants in the mountains of Ponte de l’Oglio and of Lugagnano have rebelled; the sound of bells comes from every place and resonates up to a mile from town. These brigands run down from the  Faidherbe. Moreau de Saint-Méry, Journal IV Parte I (1806), 38.  Entry of 16 Frimaire an 14 (7 dec 1805). Tambini, Journal III de Moreau de Saint-Méry parte II (1805), 905–906. This is the first record of the rebellion. Gendarmes were not involved in recruiting for National Guards, but they did keep watch over the camps where recruits awaited their assignment. 18 19

84 

D. P. HARSANYI

mountains and force the peaceful inhabitants of the lowlands to join them; they steal and commit the most atrocious crimes and leave the people in the greatest bewilderment (…) right this moment, I received a report on insurrection throughout the Trebbia Valley, with bells ringing in every commune.20

Marion’s image of ferocious bandits falling on peaceable citizens echoed initial witness accounts and foreshadowed the official French narrative centred on the explanatory formula of brigandage. By 4 January, Prosecutor Albesani’s insistent calls for information resulted in 10 short statements (denunciations, in juridical parlance) from several insurgent communes—or communes invaded by insurgents, as local public servants presented the situation. Here is a typical account: Carlo Perazzi, son of Riva’s console reported that after the lunch hour of last Sunday several natives of the commune of Cassano arrived in his commune and requested to ring the bells. On the following Monday, more than five hundred people armed with shotguns went to the commissioner of Riva and ordered him to disburse a thousand food rations for their soldiers.21

The 10 reports mirror each other to the point of using the same words and turns of phrase. They describe eerily similar sequences of events happening between the second half of December and the first days of January: armed insurgents turned up in undefended villages seemingly out of nowhere, asked the inhabitants to ring the bells, and raided the communes’ food reserves at gunpoint; all departed as suddenly as they had appeared. An additional longer report commented on the villagers’ reluctance to ring the bells, which they did only after repeated threats that the place would be set on fire.22 Albesani’s informative notes summarized tenaciously ­collected data and greatly helped the authorities in Paris form an early picture of the events. News from the Administrator General, on the other hand, was slow in coming and not nearly as precise. That commissioners and mayors took care to step out of the way as soon as trouble reached

20  General Marion to Monsieur le Procureur Général Impérial près de la Cour Criminelle de Plaisance, Plaisance le 2 Janvier 1806. AN BB 18/871. 21  Denunzia dated 4 January 1806, part of a list of 10 short reports copied on four pages, all preserved among the documents of a local judge named Berri. AN BB 18/871. 22  Denunzia dated Pianello città, 4 January 1806. The report is from console Francezo Plezzi and countersigned by his deputy Felice Pezzini. AN BB 18/871.

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

85

their own commune considerably hindered the transmission of vital information, further delayed by Moreau’s own stalling. The reports Moreau received, part eyewitness narratives and part exonerating statements, are typically dated between 1 and 15 January 1806. The events they recount were unfolding during the week between Christmas and New Year’s Eve, with some continuing until 4 or 5 January. Most are brief, hurried notes, written in a panicked tone that make no effort to hide the fear and dismay of local administrators caught between their official duties and their compatriots’ anger; a few longer reports, written weeks after the events took place, offer more polished narratives, carefully composed with their French readers’ expectations in mind.23 All corroborate the pattern emerging from the short notes collected by Albesani: episode after episode of gun-wielding insurgents descending from the mountains on unsuspecting villages, forcing priests to ring church bells, demanding provisions and horses, enlisting all those willing (as well as forcing the less willing) to join the uprising, and lastly heading for the mountains again. There were differences in detail: in some places, insurgents levied a sort of insurgency tax, which they called contribuzioni and collected weapons (e.g. six scudi of Milano and four rifles from the commune of Camporemoldi). In other places, they established the number of men coerced to join their ranks on the spot (15 men in the commune of Rivalta); everywhere, they left ‘great fear behind’, sighed Giulio Braghieri, console of the commune of Camporemoldi.24 Some local officials—not all—alluded to the anger caused by rough recruiting in the National Guards to explain the insurgents’ success with youth in their villages. Giuseppe Sicorè, commissioner of the town of Riva—the one referred to in the note to Albesani reproduced above—took the time to write a longer and more thoughtful report from the safety of the city of Piacenza where he moved with his entire family after a brush with insurgents. His letter describes events that started on 26 December 1805 and opens with militia members’ discontent over being badgered to join the Bologna reserve camp. Unwilling draftees explicitly told their colonel that ‘they did 23  A dozen reports collected by Judge Giuseppe Berri from Parma’s Criminal Court, BP Manoscritti Parmensi 543 (fos 15, 16, 21–25, 33). Most primary documents pertaining to the 1805–1806 insurrection are in this file. 24  Giulio Braghieri Console di Camporemoldi to Judge Berri, BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 15–16.

86 

D. P. HARSANYI

not want their sons to go to war and that he [the Colonel] should stop sending any other such orders in the future’. Sicorè added that the men also let it be known that they had murdered the envoy who brought the conscription order to their villages—this would be enrolment in the National Guards—and threatened to do the same with the colonel of their terzo, Giulio Bramieri. Later, Sicorè wrote, things heated up even more and a group of about 250 men surrounded the house of the colonel and started sounding the bells. At this point, according to Sicorè, villagers fearing further violence locked themselves in their houses. Events culminated on 30 December with a show of force: a 700-strong, well-organized group of insurgents coming from outside the village compelled municipal workers from several villages to pool their resources and distribute bread and wine. The next day, Sicorè moved to Piacenza, where he caught his breath and wrote his report while waiting for calm to return ‘before returning to his duties’.25 From the commune of Ferriere, commissioner Vincenzi reported to Piacenza’s Governor that, as early as 20 December, the bells were ringing in his village, relayed by churches in the neighbourhood, calling people to gather in the main square. Rumours of forced enlisting, and people not being entirely sure whether it was for the National Guards or the regular French Army, had turned his peaceful compatriots into a veritable mob. They came out armed with their rifles and, determined to resist recruitment, forced shop-owners to supply additional gunpowder. It took three weeks for Vincenzi to feel safe enough to file his report.26 Commissioner of Pellegrino, Lazzaro Cornazzani, communicated the same sequence of events on 11 January: a two-week-long movement around the Stirone and Tolla Valleys, with insurgents coming from outside—he could not tell where from—demanding, and obtaining, various provisions from hapless local officials. The residents, as a result, spent Christmas in great agitation, watching the rebels light large fires each evening around the time of the Ave Maria prayers, ostensibly for purposes of communication with other rebels, equally foreign to the community. The 25  Report dated 3 January 1806, addressed to the Criminal Tribunal in Parma, the highest court in the states of Parma-Piacenza (Alle Eccellenze Loro li signori Presidente e Supremo Consiglio di Giustizia Criminale di Parma). Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 9–10. This letter is also reproduced in Vincenzo Paltrineri, I Moti Contro Napoleone Negli Stati di Parma e Piacenza (1805–1806) (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli editore, 1927), 60–63. 26  Giuseppe Vincenzi to the Governor of Piacenza, 13 January 1806. BP Mss Parm. 543, fos 77–78.

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

87

commissioner declared that both he and the resident militia captain Dalla Tana did their best to calm the spirits and inform the authorities, but no one listened. A young medical doctor named Parolini, engaged at the time to the commissioner’s daughter, expressed some surprise at his future father-in-law’s lack of leadership: ‘Lazzaro Cornazzani, commissioner and political leader of the town, was so overwhelmed by fear that he left town with his wife and daughter, my fiancée, to go to Parma. Dalla Tana, ambitious as he was, followed him, hoping to join in a meeting with the Administrator of the duchy, Moreau de Saint-Méry. Without political guidance and bereft of military leadership, our commune fell into a state of anarchy’.27 True, while his colleague Sicorè had to deal with 700 men, Cornazzani found himself staring at a 5000-strong crowd (according to his own estimates), a fearsome sight that made him pack his bags and head for Parma, where he submitted his official declaration 10 days later.28 However, he did provide the important information that the captain of the insurgents was one Giuseppe Bussandri, nicknamed Mozzetta. Another long report, probably written on 10 or 11 January, from Carlo Caminati, console of Nibbiano, described a week of almost comical confusion, starting with men from outside his village storming in to ring the bells. The people assembled but did not know why; about 200 armed insurgents forced a few men to join them, although no one could tell for what purpose. Eventually, the crowd started organizing and elected several chieftains, growing hungry as they did so. Together with the local priest, Caminati distributed food and urged all townsfolk to go home without causing further trouble; sadly, news of French gendarmes approaching the village induced people to regroup in the face of a common threat.29 The insurgency spread to the commune of Bobbio in the neighbouring department of Genoa: on 3 January, insurgents from the villages of Mezzano and Scabiazza sent to Bobbio’s mayor advanced written orders for 1000 bread rations and fodder for 200 horses, threatening three hours of mayhem in case of non-compliance. The next day, they 27  Diary of Franceso Parolini, s.d. Manoscritti Parolini, part of a private archive reproduced in Angelo Micheli, Un episodio della Rivolta contra il Governo Francese a Pellegrino Parmense 1806–1810 (Salso Maggiore: Stab. Grafico Termale. Collezione Biblioteca delle Giovane Montana (78), 1929): 1–21 (8). 28  Notizie del Commessario del Pellegrino, Pellegrino 11 January 1806. Mss. Parm. 543, fos 155–156. 29  Carlo Caminati to Moreau de Saint-Méry, not dated, marked as received on 13 January. Mss. Parm. 543, fos. 75–76.

88 

D. P. HARSANYI

re-­ evaluated their requests upwards, soliciting money—levied, at the insurgents’ insistence, on the four most prosperous families in the village—in addition to new weapons and ammunition. They made the collection to the sound of church bells because rebel chiefs pretended to attend a special Te Deum in support of their struggle. French officials in the department of Genoa moved in swiftly to stem the contagion. Bobbio’s defiance was not directly the problem of commanders leading the Piacenza counter-­insurgency, and remained outside their reports.30

Military Repression Counter-insurgency policies relied on the binary strategy of ‘blowing hot and cold’ that, in Bruno Colson’s analysis, laid the foundation of ‘a school of counter-insurgency that developed subsequently in Indochina and North Africa’.31 ‘Blowing hot’ defined swift, pitiless military repression with the immediate tactical goal of ‘making examples’.32 ‘Blowing cold’ consisted of what Napoleon called ‘moral means’, that is, the more delicate tactic of giving weary populations different kinds of examples: the examples of the conquerors’ measured deference to local customs, benevolence towards compliant residents, and overall upright behaviour. Reliable moral means included involving local community leaders in ­pacification schemes and showing tolerance for religious practices, notwithstanding the French commanders’ indifference (when not outright contempt) for religion.

30  For the episode in Bobbio see Vincenzo Pancotti, ‘Un episodio della revolta Piacentina contro il Governo Fracese’ in Ars Nova III, 10 (Ottobre 1914): 434–437. 31  Napoleon on War. Edited by Bruno Colson. Translated by Gregory Elliott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 341–346. 32  The precedent for this line of action was the Vendée counter-insurgency. Although he had refused the task in 1795, Napoleon regarded the pacification of the Vendée, that is, reining in resentful masses who were not the revolution’s natural enemies (neither aristocrats nor invading foreigners), as a chief accomplishment. The French armies were not supposed to have enemies in the Italian peninsula either, since they came to liberate Italians from the double yoke of foreigners and feudal overlords. Hence, the Vendée methods offered a useful kit for dealing with popular uprisings in Italy too. A discussion on justifications for using force to quell popular rebellions in Bruno Colson, ‘Napoléon et la guerre irrégulière’ in Stratégique, I (93–96), 2009: 227–258. For details on many aspects of Napoleon’s views on the Vendée see the collective volume Napoléon Bonaparte et la Vendée, edited by Christophe Vital, Jean Tulard, Philippe de Villiers (Paris: Somogy editions d’art, 2004).

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

89

‘Blowing hot’ came first. The legal underpinning derived from the Directory’s efforts to stabilize France, a complex process on which Howard Brown’s work has shed much light. Torn between the imperative to promote liberty and the obligation to provide security, the Directory ultimately came down on the side of security and strengthened the militarization of the law-and-order apparatus. The complement to militarization was criminalization of resistance to authority, whereby the legal system gained in efficiency what it lost in nuance, with law enforcement operations cast in the language of war: the war on brigandage, to use Howard Brown’s terminology again (an issue dealt with in more depth further in this study). A la guerre comme à la guerre: old regime repressive techniques and elements of revolutionary justice—both disavowed initially by the new regime—regained the status of prerequisites for social peace. While authorities experimented with different methods of reaching stability, the winning formula bequeathed to the Consulate turned out to be a mix of rapidly acting mobile units (colonnes mobiles) and collective punishment of communities suspected of collusion with brigands, all crowned by military commissions set up to deliver swift justice and carry out executions within 24 hours.33 Subsequently streamlined and incorporated into the Consulate’s legal foundation, these methods formed the paradigm for counter-insurgency in French-controlled Italy as well.34 The tone was set early on: just one week after General Bonaparte’s triumphal entry in Milan (15 May 1796) a hostile crowd of about 700 peasants tried to stop the advance of the French army towards Pavia. In response, the French shot the entire municipality of Pavia for refusing to surrender the city and burned to the ground the village of Binasco. The General in Chief stated that the purpose of this exercise was to make an example, that is, to terrify 33  H.  G. Brown, ‘From Organic Society to Security State: The War on Brigandage in France 1797–1802’. The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, 4 (December 1997), 661–695. Brown has offered a comprehensive analysis of the move towards militarization between the Directory and the Consulate in his Ending the French Revolution, 119–358. 34  The Republic of Italy merely replicated French legislation. The Civil Code took effect in the Kingdom of Italy in 1805, to be followed by the Penal Code, Commercial Code and Code of Civil Procedure, all translations of the respective French codes. M.  Cappelletti, J. H. Merryman, J. M. Perillo, The Italian Legal System (Stanford, 1967), 40–44. In a concise analysis, Howard Brown pointed to the export of the system of repression: ‘The origins of the Napoleonic system of repression in France were also the origins of the system used to repress resistance beyond the frontiers’. ‘The origins of the Napoleonic system of repression’ in The Napoleonic Empire and the New European Political Culture. Edited by M.  Broers, P. Hicks and A. Guimerà (Palgrave, 2012), 38–48.

90 

D. P. HARSANYI

and stun the population into obedience once and for all: ‘Let the terrible example of Binasco open their eyes: its fate will be that of all towns and villages that persist in rebellion’.35 The tactic remained the same a year later, when the French returned to Italy armed with the Consulate’s legal apparatus. The commanders commissioned to quell the Piacentino rebellion in January 1806 came prepared for the task and, indeed, the military repression unfolded like a textbook operation: quick, brutal, coordinated and effective.36 According to Michael Broers’ analysis, the typical counter-insurgency plan consisted in three main steps: 1. disruption by mobile columns deep into the territory; 2. pacification executed by gendarmerie units; and 3. the rule of law upheld by local police forces under the supervision of central authorities.37 This general outline applies to the Piacentino insurrection as well. The commanders in chief of the military response to the Piacentino events, Generals Menou and Radet, had dealt with matters of law and order before, especially Radet, whose career was devoted to building the gendarmerie.38 Both were familiar with the cadence between mobile columns and the meticulous cleanup entrusted to the gendarmes, which they put into practice without a glitch. On the ground, Governor 35  Proclamation au peuple de Lombardie 6 Prairial an IV (25 May 1796). Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #493, I, p. 394. 36  I addressed several aspects of French military and political strategies in ‘Brigands or insurgents? Napoleonic authority in Italy and the Piacentino Counter-insurrection of 1805–1806’ French History, 30/1(March 2016 crv 034): 51–76. Part of the discussion in this and the following chapter builds on that article. 37   Michael Broers, ‘La Contre-insurrection et ses développements dans l’Europe Napoléonienne’ in Police et Gendarmerie dans l’Empire Napoléonien. Jacques-Olivier Boudon éditeur (Paris: Editions SPM, 2013) 147–165. 38  Etienne Radet (1762–1825), baron of empire since 1810, general of division in 1814, was a career officer with a distinguished record of service in the wars of the Revolution. At the time of the Piacentino rebellion, Radet was Inspector General of Gendarmerie, deeply involved in establishing gendarmerie corps in France, as well as in Corsica, Piedmont and Genoa. Later, in 1808, he helped Napoleon’s sister Elisa set up the Tuscan gendarmerie. He acquired international notoriety for arresting Pope Pius VII (July 1809) at the orders of Napoleon. Jacques François de Menou, baron de Bussy, later Abdallah de Menou (1750–1810) represented the second estate at the Estates General in 1789. He served in the revolutionary armies and joined Bonaparte’s expedition in Egypt, where he briefly took the high command after the assassination of General Kléber. He married the daughter of a wealthy Egyptian and converted to Islam. At the time of the insurrection, he was commander in chief of the Departments of the Alps and Marengo, cumulating military and civilian functions until 1808 when Camillo Borghese, Duke of Guastalla, replaced him.

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

91

Lebrun and General Montchoisy dispatched a battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Light Infantry, under the command of Montchoisy’s aide de camp Lieutenant Vivian, from Genoa to Parma on the morning of 1 January, that is, only hours after receiving Moreau’s report. The viceroy, coordinating with his colleagues in Genoa, sent about 3000 troops as well and asked General Menou to supervise the operation. ‘I received a letter, dated 11 [January] from Menou, from Turin. He comes to exterminate the rebels’, noted Moreau in his diary, almost with glee.39 Indeed, Menou promised ‘3,000 infantry soldiers and a cavalry regiment under the order of General Pouget. These troops are at my disposal. I am calling on General Pouget to leave some troops in Parma and Piacenza and will march afterwards to Castel San Giovanni’.40 By the time this letter reached the office of the Administrator General, Pouget was already in Parma and so was General Pino, with a few hundred extra troops and pieces of artillery.41 One thousand one hundred troops urgently dispatched from nearby garrisons in Mantua and Pizzighettone preceded Menou’s 3000 soldiers. General Radet, Inspector General of the Gendarmerie and, as he added next to his letterhead, ‘tasked by the viceroy to bring order to these states’, brought in reinforcements from the Apennine Gendarmerie units, led by Captain Paris, to support the regiment of gendarmes already stationed in Parma under Lanault. In addition, Diego Guicciardi, Director General of the Police of the Kingdom of Italy, concerned that Italian deserters might link up with the rebels, joined in. Overall, by the end of the first week of January 1806 a force of about 5000 men poured into the valleys of the Apennines, especially in the region of Val di Tolla, and their numbers grew to 10,000 by the end of the second week. Betraying no sense of panic or anxiety, Menou, Lebrun, Montchoisy, Eugene and their subordinates all acted in a calm, professional way, showing to what extent the repressive machinery had become a well-oiled routine, the success of which depended on precise execution. The first to act, forcefully, were the gendarmes who intervened at one of the centres of rebellion, Castell’ Arquato, about 40 miles from Castel  Faidherbe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV—1806 parte I, 107.  Letter from General Menou to Moreau, Turin 11 January 1806. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 37. 41  Domenico Pino (1760–1826). Minister of war of the Italian Republic from 1802 until the disintegration of the Kingdom of Italy (1814). He served in the Russian campaign and never reneged on his loyalty to Napoleon. Jean-Pierre Pouget (1761–1825) served in various capacities in Italy until 1808 when he was sent to the Army of Spain. 39 40

92 

D. P. HARSANYI

San Giovanni. On 1 January 1806, Moreau noted in his journal that he received a message from Captain Lanault, who had occupied the village of Castel l’Arquato and killed 15 rebels. ‘Curious, curious details on this matter’, sighed Moreau, still apparently incredulous that a rebellion was taking place under his very eyes.42 The battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Light Infantry—the first troops sent from Genoa by Lebrun and Montchoisy—arrived in the area on 3 January and immediately joined the regiments of gendarmerie who were besieging the other three communes identified as either centres of insurgency or inclined to sympathize with the rebels (Bardi, Borgotaro, Lugagnano). The same day, Captain Paris’ gendarmes arrived in Bardi as well. On 4 January, another battalion sent from Genoa reached Bardi, at which point Lieutenant Vivian took the command of all units. The swift defeat and occupation of the first two communes, at the price of several dead and 22 prisoners in the rebel camp, allowed the French troops to break into two columns, which proceeded to sweep the area. As they marched, commanders placed prisoners at the heads of columns, so that they could make the population aware of the fate awaiting potential rebels. Vivian also sent insurgents an ultimatum where assurances of leniency towards peaceful people (hommes paisibles) were mixed with threats of merciless vengeance against those who persisted in rebellion.43 Not receiving an answer, he ordered troops to advance in the mountain area of Pelizzone. In contrast, Captain Lebrun’s column ran into ambushes. Not easily knocked off balance, the French soldiers, united in pursuit of the rebels ‘across rocks, snow, and ice’, defeated them, set a village on fire, then split into two columns and combed the area until they all reached the town of Lugagnano.44 There, they joined the infantry troops under Lieutenant Vivian, arriving the same day after making short work of shabbily equipped rebels still resisting in some of the more remote villages.45 Later on, the troops completed a joint sweeping search operation (battue générale) as  Faidherbe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV, Parte I (1806), 5.  Details in the letter from Lebrun to Champagny, Genoa 15 January 1806. AN/F1e/85. 44  Report from Captain Lebrun, battalion commander within the 3rd regiment of infantry, to Général Pouget, Lugagnano 14 January 1806. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 100, 101. 45  When not carrying pitchforks and knives, the insurgents were equipped with old rifles, which Vivian described to Moreau as ‘flimsy contraptions (mauvaises patraques) that have not served for more than a century, or at least have not done any damage to the population’. Lieutenant Vivian to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Lugagnano 14 January 1806, Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 96. 42 43

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

93

Pouget announced the next day.46 A few days afterwards military commanders reported confidently that the rebellion had been subdued; insurgents were turning in their weapons and going home. ‘Order and calm are entirely established in the insurgent valleys’, General Pino wrote on 12 January’.47 According to Lebrun’s report to Champagny, 2400 men remained in the area, distributed among the main centres of the revolt (San Giovani, Bardi, Borgo Taro) to keep an eye on things. In addition, and for the same reason, an imposing force was stationed in Parma—the 10th line regiment, a Swiss battalion, another battalion belonging to the 67th regiment, two squadrons of Hanoverian chasseurs and four cannons—but, Lebrun insisted, as of 15 January the insurrection was a thing of the past.48 Bureax-Puzy concurred in his goodbye letter to Moreau: ‘We spoke of the past because at present, in actuality the insurrection no longer exists. This travesty is all done and over with’.49 Troops were no longer of use, he boasted. Describing how he took the village of Pelizzone—the operation Lebrun referred to in his letter to Champagny—Vivian informed his superiors that ‘I swept the country and inspired enough terror with the 350 men of my unit to force the brigands to hide in the mountains’. In addition, he insisted on informing His Serene Highness the Arch-treasurer that ‘our presence is no longer needed here and could be better employed in the valleys of Bardi and Borgo Taro’.50 Moreau summarized this report in another letter to Lebrun, on 11 January. A few days later, the prefect of the department of the Apennines further reassured Lebrun, in a letter 46  Letter from General Pouget to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Fiorenzuola 15 January 1806, BP Mss. Parm. 543 fo. 97. Another glimpse into the military operations comes from a letter, undated, probably late January, where Colonel Soulier asks for appropriate compensation for the soldiers of three battalions who, he says, have fought the most and in most strenuous circumstances before their transfer to Naples. These strenuous actions were, in essence, the battue générale: the three battalions (2,166 men and 89 officers) deployed throughout the insurgent territory, especially on high mountain villages inaccessible to regular local troops; there, they restored or maintained order on very difficult terrain. Their colonel asked for a rest period of about 10 days in Parma for his men, payment of back wages, and especially new shoes. BP Mss. Parm. 543 fo. 164. 47  Général Pino to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Fiorenzuoula 12 January 1806, on letterhead Corps d’Armée Commandée par son Altesse Sérénissime le Prince Eugène Viceroy d’Italie. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 72. 48  Lebrun to Champagny, Genova, 15 January 1806 ANP/F1e/85. 49  Bureaux-Puzy to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Vogherra 15 January 1806 Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 109. Bureauz-Puzy was referencing a conversation with Moreau de Saint-Méry’s son whom Moreau employed as his official secretary. 50  Vivian to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Lugagnago 10 January 1806. ANP F/1e/85.

94 

D. P. HARSANYI

mostly meant to praise the skills with which Vivian had deployed his troops across the communes of San Giovanni, Bardi and Borgo Taro: ‘You must have received the news of the insurrection or rather of the end of the troubles. It is certain that these troops are no longer needed in the Piacentino’.51 Finally, from Torino, Menou sent equally cheering messages to Champagny: ‘The troubles that started in the duchies of Parma and Piacenza in the Department of the Apennines and a section of Marengo, towards Bobbio, are almost entirely dealt with. The insurgents turn in their weapons and return to their home villages’.52 Minister Champagny, kept abreast of the events by Lebrun and Menou, wrote three reports to the emperor with abstracts of the military actions and assurances that the rebellion had no chance of either succeeding or spreading. Champagny conceded that it was, of course, ‘an affront that cannot be allowed to go on’ but in fact a minor inconvenience that the soon to be established military commissions would take care of.53 Showing that he left nothing to chance, Inspector Radet recounted in his own letter the gendarmes’ contribution to the return of domestic peace to Val di Tolla: ‘Our columns’ search operations consolidate the peace; for three days running, the weapons are being turned in everywhere, more than fifty communes have deposed theirs and this continues’.54 Likewise, the daily bulletins where Joseph Fouché condensed Lebrun’s and Champagny’s reports left no doubt as to the defeat of the insurrection: ‘We do not doubt that measures taken so far, the victories of the armies and the news of peace will put a prompt end to this insurgency’, read the bulletin of 13 January. The bulletin of 18 January, following Lebrun’s letter of 15 January and Champagny’s report of 17 January, declared that all was perfectly quiet in the Apennines; on 22 January, Fouché announced the publication of Lebrun’s final account ‘detailing the success of the operations’.55 All that remained to do was transfer all authority to General Pouget and start setting up a military commission for trying insurgent leaders, the final step in the tactical sequence that had proved so successful in fighting

 Rolland to Lebrun, Chiavari 17 January 1806, ANP F/1e/83/84.  Menou to Champagny, Torino 19 January. Champagny confirms receipt and thanks Menou. ANP F/1e/85. 53  Three reports from Minister Champagny to Napoleon dated 12, 16, and 17 January 1806. ANP AF/IV/1717. The last phrase is from the 17 January letter. 54  Inspector Radet to Moreau, 17 January 1806. Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 139. 55  La Police secrète du Premier Empire, pp. 223, 230, 235, respectively. 51 52

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

95

rebellions for more than a decade. On a restrained, confident tone, the reports communicated the officers’ pride in a job well done. The only reason for dissatisfaction came from suspiciously sluggish cooperation on the part of mayors and commissioners in the affected villages. Local officials responsible for maintaining public order failed to organize any significant municipal defense against insurgents; they did not even manage to alert the French gendarmes in a timely fashion. The example of Pellegrino, described above, is a good illustration: Pellegrino was a large commune, with jurisdiction over 15 villages. Commissioner Cornazzani was therefore a rather important local leader and he had by his side a militia captain. Both saw—or so they testified—their authority spurned by insurgents who pushed the audacity to daring the militia captain to join them, together with his men. The captain’s duty would have been to organize militia members into a defence force, while the commissioner should have provided guidelines for residents and promptly informed the governor in Piacenza. Instead, as soon as the situation reached a crisis point according to their own statement, both captain and commissioner left town and went to Parma, presumably to communicate better with the French authorities. The commissioner gave his version of the events only 10 days later, after French troops had already taken control of the neighbourhood, with no explanation for the delay. Caminati, Cornazzani’s colleague from Nibbiano, needed two weeks to collect his thoughts and report the ominous news, because, he said, spies were everywhere, and he worried his letter would fall into unfriendly hands. The tenor of most first-person accounts boiled down to total helplessness on the part of local authorities besieged by ferocious, disciplined rebels, all alien to each respective commune. Paris responded with raised eyebrows. The Imperial Police Bulletin of 11 January noted that, while the army was successfully curbing the disorders, ‘Local authorities are barely helping the operation; just as they barely assist the work of the gendarmerie. They did not make one single arrest’.56 On 18 January, reviewing for the minister of the interior the past three weeks of counter-insurrection operations, Lebrun deplored what he described as the cowardice of local officials who ran away at the hour of their people’s need.57 The question was how to interpret the faint-heartedness of mayors and commissioners in the face of

 Bulletin du Samedi 11 janvier 1806 #686, La Police secrète du Premier Empire, 222.  Lebrun to Minister of Interior Champagny, Genoa 18 January 1806, AN F/1e/85.

56 57

96 

D. P. HARSANYI

outside intruders entering village after village at will and helping themselves to all that their hearts desired from local storerooms. General Marion and Prosecutor Albesani, speaking for different institutions and expressing different perspectives, reached diametrically opposite conclusions. Marion accepted without second thoughts all declarations of powerlessness, and concluded that only French forces were capable of simultaneously defeating the rebellion and assisting the victimized population: ‘It pains me that I cannot, far lack of troops, succor these unhappy people’, he wrote in his lengthy first report to Albesani.58 On his side, Albesani read the same witness accounts with a lot more scepticism. His suspicions were awakened as early as 1 January 1806 when he communicated to Minister Régnier that the justices of peace and Piacenza’s governor procrastinated when pressed for information, on the pretext that the Imperial court had yet to be formally installed.59 This, to his mind, signalled ill will, and persuaded him that the picture of powerlessness projected by village representatives was only a ploy meant to conceal the entire population’s rampant resistance to existing (French) authority: The goal of each denunciation is to save one’s own commune and let the neighboring communes take the blame, saying they were forced to ring the bells and take up arms by bands—that some put at three hundred, others at four hundred and others even at two to three thousand individuals. There are no details in these reports, which fail to design any guilty persons, and pretend (with obvious affectation, since they all know each other) that they did not recognize anybody. In a word, it is evident that they only use these denunciations to shelter themselves from the retribution that they fear will fall upon their heads. We can also see that those who receive the reports show no interest in finding the truth.60

A few days letter, Albesani wrote dryly: ‘You will learn that eighteen communes are in a state of insurrection on the pretext that they were forced into it by the others’.61 Albesani’s assessments consistently collided with the narrative thread produced by village elders, and often with the conclusions reached by French officers stationed in the area. His unsparing 58  General Marion to Monsieur le Procureur Général Impérial près de la Cour Criminelle de Plaisance, Plaisance le 2 Janvier 1806. AN BB 18/871. 59  Albesani to Grand Juge Régnier Piacenza 1 January 1806, AN BB 18/871. 60  Albesani to Lebrun, Piacenza 4 January 1806, AN BB 18/871. 61  Albesani to Grand Juge Régnier, Piacenza 7 January 1806, AN BB 18/871.

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

97

breakdown of entrenched anti-French animus, although presented unsympathetically, risked rendering futile the prodigious means employed to strengthen French rule in foreign lands. French authorities’ goal was to establish order, understood not as a return to the status quo ante, but as a remedy to the wrong path that opened the door to dissent and agitation. Crucial to this process was agreeing that rebellion was an anomaly which but did not call into question overall imperial designs in Italy and everywhere, even though it signalled certain systemic malfunctions. That an entire region wilfully refused to consider the numerous benefits flowing from French rule ran contrary to these commanders’ core philosophical beliefs. Which is why they simply ignored Albesani’s warnings and selected, from the mass of available information, the constitutive elements of a narrative of causality consistent with the general belief in the French Empire’s positive impact in Italy.

Agostino Botti: Service and Self-Interest According to his service file, Agostino Botti, born in 1769 in Compiano near Parma, entered military service in 1785 as a cadet in the ducal regiments of Parma. He rose to lieutenant and then captain in 1787 and finally to colonel in 1802, in charge of the terzo Val Tidone.62 In official correspondence, he comes across as an active officer, caring too, regularly soliciting promotions for his men.63 Moreau believed his keenness merited extra compensation, and on 30 November 1804 he awarded Botti a bonus: As reward for the zeal and steady efforts deployed by the Colonel of the Terzo of Val Tidone in pursuit and arrest of criminals, vagabonds, that infest those jurisdictions, and of the vigilance and courage he showed in helping arrest numerous deserters, we bestow on this valuable officer a one-time compensation of fifty zecchini.64

62  Ermanno Loevinson, Gli Ufficiali Napoleonici Parmensi (Parma: La Tipografica Parmense. Pubblicazioni del R. Archivio di Stato di PARMA, 1930), 17. 63  On 11 December 1804, for instance, he asked for two such promotions within the militia company in Castel San Giovanni, under his command. ASPr Inventari Decretii Sovrani 1781–1816, 152/2. 64  ‘Botti, Agostino. Colonello del Terzo di Val Tidone per suoi rilevanti servigi dati allo Stato viene gratificatto di zecchini 50 per una volta. 30 Nov. 1804’. Signed Mederico Lodovico Elia Moreau de Saint Méry consigliere di Stato, uno dei comadnati della Legione d’onore ed Amministratore Generale degli Stati. ASPr, Decreti Rescriti 1804.

98 

D. P. HARSANYI

Moreau treated Botti as a friend, part of his inner circle, invited to dinners and family outings committed to memory in his diaries for 1804 and 1805. Moreau trusted him enough to send to Fouché at least part of the intelligence he provided: ‘#637. Different events. States of Parma. 200 men riot on matters related to the militia. Botty [sic] their commander designates the guilty’.65 As soon as the viceroy’s call for raising volunteer troops became government directive, Botti assumed responsibility for recruitment and made it his mission to enrol the requisite 12,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. In report after report, he announced the imminent formation of the two requested regiments, supported in this endeavour by the handful of fellow militia officers eager to embark on a new adventure. Eventually, their eagerness persuaded Ferrante to solicit, and obtain, approval for the formation of a two-battalion regiment on the simple promise that new recruits would join in due time.66 On 19 January 1806, Ferrante administered an Oath to the Viceroy. Overjoyed, Botti reported their success to Moreau and even boldly solicited the nomination of colonel of the not yet formed regiments.67 It is quite astonishing that Botti managed to stretch the truth for so long; in reality, the regiments never formed and callous recruiting methods caused widespread discontent.68 The very day Ferrante took the 65  Bulletin of 26 December 1805 in La Police secrète du Premier Empire. Bulletins quotidiens adressés par Fouché à l’Empereur. Tome II, 1805–1806. Publiés par Ernest d’Hauterive d’après les documents originaux déposés aux Archives Nationales (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1913), 206. 66  ‘By order of the His Highness, a regiment and two batallions will be formed in Parma and Piacenza out of the National Troops [Guards], to be recruited in the States of Parma’. Dal generale Fontanelli al Tenente Colonello Ferrante Comandante della Piazza e organizzatore delle Truppe Parmigiane a Conselvo, Piove di Sacco, 8 january 1806. More details follow (e.g. on uniforms) the same day, from the same to the same, same signature. Copie conforme for both: Louis Duplessis, chef de bataillon. The cavalry battalion expected to depart for Piove di Sacco on 12 January. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 19–20. The final contingent listed by name all officers for 9 companies of 8 battalions of 80 men each, Colonel Agostino Botti being again listed as commander. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 171–172. 67  BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 226. Letters not dated, marked as received on 28 and 29 January 1806. In a letter to Moreau de Saint-Méry dated Piove di Sacco, 10 January 1806, Botti expressed his undying gratitude to Moreau and places a request for promotion to commander of the new regiments. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 30. 68  Botti even hunted down deserters, although he had no authorization to do so, since arresting deserters was the gendarmes’ responsibility. There is one record of Botti arresting a Piacentino fugitive suspect, Giacomo Crespi, sometime in January 1806, although he never had permission to do so. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 240–241. In a very obsequious letter to

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

99

officers’ oath, Napoleon ordered General Junot to repress the insurrection and called for an end of any pretense of self-recruiting in Parma.69 Consequently, Eugene nullified the oath. ‘Just born and suddenly killed off’, Botti bemoaned, announcing the unbearable news in yet another desperate letter to Moreau.70 Unlike the Administrator General, his successor General Junot saw nothing good in Botti’s ambition and ruthlessness, which, he suspected, got the better of Moreau’s kind-heartedness. Two weeks into his rule, Junot fired Botti from all the functions he had held before and during Moreau’s administration: Colonel Botti, who has until the present day fulfilled the functions of Colonel of the terzo of Val Tidone, is relieved of his functions with specific interdiction to wear any kind of military uniform or distinction.71

Several entries in Moreau’s diary show that his circle of friends suspected Botti’s sacking to be the result of intrigues brewing among Parmense notables vying for the favours of the new French bosses. Most likely, though, Junot accepted that Botti’s brutality played a crucial part in fostering the discontent that snowballed into rebellion. Colonel Botti was the person most associated with cruel enlisting tactics. Punishing him publicly and making a high-profile example of his humiliation was a Machiavellian manoeuvre meant to divert some of the popular rage from the French towards reviled local executives, supposedly gone rogue and acting on their own. In a report recapping the year’s main events, the mayor of Piacenza noted that the public received Junot’s decision quite favourably:

Moreau dated 21 January 1806, Botti asked Moreau to allow them to arrest deserters, or they will never be able to meet the target fixed by the viceroy; next day, he reported he was unable to stop a desertion. Botti to Moreau de Saint Méry, 21 and 22 January 1806, Mss. Parm. 543, fos 180–182. 69  To Prince Eugène, Stuttgart, 19 janvier 1806. Correspondance de Napoléon premier, #9682, XI, p. 544. 70  Letter from Botti to Moreau, Piove de Sacco, 29 January 1806; letter signed by all the officers, Piove di Sacco, 3 March 1806. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 236 and 240–241, respectively. Shortly thereafter, Napoleon sent clear instructions on placing all Parmense military personnel under direct French command, in accordance with the States of Parma special military organization. Notes pour le Ministre de la Guerre, Paris 5 février 1806. Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #9754, XII, p. 9. 71  Order of the General Governor of the States of Parma, 5 February 1806. Archives du Ministère de la Défense (henceforth AMD) C-4-41.

100 

D. P. HARSANYI

At his arrival, his Excellency General Junot considered that the soldiers’ rebellion in Castel San Giovanni gave the first signal of the revolt that occurred later in our mountains. Colonel Botti, accused of having stirred, with his appalling behavior, the first movement of sedition among soldiers, was considered, albeit indirectly, the first instigator of this revolt. Public opinion does not favor him and accuses him of collusion with the soldiers.72

Botti found ostracism intolerable, openly disobeyed the interdiction to bear arms, and looked to make common cause with other individuals in trouble with the law. In a long letter to Administrator Prefect Nardon, Pompeo Aspetti, one of the police commissioners of Piacenza, described how Botti roamed the countryside in search of friendly company, becoming more dangerous by the day. At some point, Botti even stalked the commissioner and forced him to hire armed bodyguards wherever he went. Worse, the commissioner stated, Botti’s defiance risked upsetting public order: How would lawful authorities ever command respect when people could see with their own eyes a scoundrel’s antics go unpunished?73 The French might have agreed but had little appetite for making a popular hero out of a lowlife like Botti, so they simply waited for his public tantrums to wear off. In time, indeed, the villagers he amused and the long-­ suffering civil servants he tormented forgot about him. Four years later, the former colonel started drawing a French military pension. With the memory of the insurrection fading, army officials allowed Botti to rejoin the force in 1813 with the rank of captain in the 3rd foreign battalion. After Napoleon’s downfall, Botti transferred his loyalties to Parma’s new rulers and became a captain in the Maria Luigia regiment. He ended his life on a military pension, honourably discharged with the registration Mattricola Ufficiale 1814-25 N. 51. The meanderings of Agostino Botti’s career reflect the ambiguities that crisscrossed the relationship between French officials and their collaborators on the ground. Botti understood that serving the French secured him 72  Mayor Alberto Scotti to deputy prefect Caravel, Piacenza, 25 December 1806. Archivio di Stato Piacenza (henceforth ASPc), Copialettere del Maire. The episode is discussed in Ettore Carrà, L’Ordine Pubblico nel Periodo Napoleonico. Piacenza 1804–1816 (Piacenza: Edizioni TIP.LE.CO., 2005), 104. 73  Pompeo Aspetti. Rapport du jour 8 Juillet 1807 à son excellence L’Administrateur Préfet. The report was endorsed two days later in a brief note by Piacenza’s deputy prefect Caravel. Another general police report of 10 July 1807 confirms that Botti was under surveillance. All three documents in AN F/1e/86.

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

101

a path to self-advancement and found his way into the Administrator General’s graces. He certainly reckoned he could at once please the French and fulfil his ambitions when he ruthlessly coerced militia members under his command to enrol in the National Guards. That his eagerness backfired shows that he was a less than useful intermediary, who failed the French and his own people alike. Even so, the French army and the Parmense post-Napoleonic military establishment allowed him to resume his career. In the end, the French needed soldiers and the Parmense forgave one of their own.

An Accidental Martyr French authorities had a hard time establishing who the leaders of the insurrection were. The correspondence between French officials contains few names; even fewer remained on the short list of instigators. Rather than unfolding like a well-planned rebellion, the insurrection spread like fire, one village catching the sparks from another. Rebel chiefs established headquarters of sorts at Lugagnano but there was little coordination. ‘The leaders were local inhabitants; a very audacious notary, priests, mayors’, read the police bulletin of 27 January. Three weeks later, there was not much more to report: ‘Three priests signaled as ringleaders have been arrested. There is no clear rebel chief’.74 In follow-up reports, one name stood out: Giuseppe Bussandri, nicknamed Mozzetta for his habit of wearing his hair in a ponytail tied with a bow. His name recurs in all subsequent literature on the Piacentino insurrection, the only one consistently named as the leader, the general even, of the rebels. From report to report, and from one retelling to another, his persona ultimately took on a life of its own and transmuted into a brave leader of the wretched of the earth and defender of the Christian faith. In 1976, the Parmense poet Luigi Vicini heard enough to feel inspired to compose, in dialect, an ode to ‘General Mosseta’s glory’. A careful perusal of archival documents paints a more complicated picture. The first suggestion that Giuseppe Bussandri, from the village of Scipione, might have been a mastermind of the revolt came on 11 January,

74  Bulletin #739, 21 January and #829, La Police secrète du Premier Empire, pp. 241 and 268–269 respectively.

102 

D. P. HARSANYI

in a letter signed by the commissioner of Pellegrino, Lazzaro Cornazzani.75 Cornazzani cited a letter with the heading ‘Il Generale del Campo G.B.’ sent by courier on January 1, from the rebel camp in Val di Tolla to Pellegrino’s militia captain Della Tana. According to Cornazzani, the letter announced a third victory over the enemy (i.e. French troops) and enjoined the captain to ring the bells and summon his troops in support of the rebels who were chasing the ‘perfidious French’.76 On the strength of the commissioner’s word, Bussandri soon acquired a reputation for haughty defiance and—for the French—rabble-rousing. Yet, many respectable citizens, men with responsibilities at the local level, did all they could to dispel this image and change the French commanders’ minds. On 16 January 1806—two weeks after the events reported by Cornazzani—Captain Cornini from Scipione informed Administrator General Moreau de Saint-Méry that Giuseppe Bussandri had turned himself in to him, Captain Cornini, that very day. Bussandri held the rank of sergeant in the militia of Scipione, so he approached his immediate superior to explicate his case: the accusations against him were simply untrue, Bussandri affirmed, because he left the village before the troubles started and returned only after he saw Viceroy Eugene’s message posted around the region. In a long exculpatory letter to Moreau, Cornini used this instance both to speak in Bussandri’s favour and to defend himself against previous accusations of duplicity.77 Without explicitly saying so, constant references to the viceroy’s decree confirmed that the divide between obedient residents and rebels shifted with the events. Trusting in the prince’s magnanimity, Cornini wrote, so many people turned themselves in that to his mind, since Bussandri had likewise surrendered in good faith, he too should benefit from the pardon. A week later, Pietro Carancini, commissioner of the commune of Gallinela, submitted a character testimony of sorts: Bussandri was the nephew of a sharecropper, a trustworthy fellow named Bussandri Vincenzo, who had approached the commissioner three times to solicit a letter of good behaviour for Giuseppe. Carancini later 75  Notizie del Commessario del Pellegrino, Pellegrino 11 January 1806. Mss. Parm. 543, fos 155–156. 76  Cornazzani’s full report is reproduced in his son-in-law Parolini’s narrative. See note 39 in this chapter. 77  Captain Cornini to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Scipione 16 January 1806. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 115–116. There were indeed several complaints against Cornini being difficult and uncooperative while officers were trying to recruit members of the militia for National Guard units.

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

103

conferred with Captain Cornini on how to deal with this situation, since the presumed rebel’s uncle was guaranteeing upon his word that Giuseppe Bussandri was not a ringleader; at most, he might have unwittingly stepped into the whirlwind. On 9 February, Carancini made another move on Bussandri’s behalf, with a letter insisting that the former sergeant had voluntarily laid down arms; besides, Bussandri kept claiming he was not among the first nor even among the second group of rebels, Carancini wrote. Moreover, Carancini was prepared to approach Governor Junot with a written defence, on condition that Bussandri would remain in hiding for the time being (presumably, he was keeping his head down in Scipione or Gallinella). Concurrently, Bussandri secured a certificate of good conduct from Lieutenant Romani of Vigoleno, the deputy commander of his terzo, and would surely be able to obtain other such certificates, his protector promised, seeing that he was the son of ‘good parents’ and had never given anybody cause to believe he had fallen into ‘bad habits’.78 None of this was enough to save Bussandri. The Military Commission found him guilty of having been ‘the leader and first instigator of the insurrection’ on 1 April 1806; he was shot the next day. Remarkably, perhaps to balance out the harshness of his conviction, in the same session the Military Commission found 15 other defendants not guilty and free to go. The figure that emerges from archival sources is an accidental rebel, contrite and frightened, pulling all possible strings to save his life, the opposite of a righteous leader and fierce defender of the faith. The interventions on his behalf speak of a hothead briefly infatuated with insurrectionary actions, otherwise an ordinary person who sought neither glory nor martyrdom. What then accounts for the heroic aura bestowed on him in popular accounts? In recent accounts, to be precise, since Giuseppe Bussandri is a relatively new addition to local folklore. Mainstream historiography has not paid much attention to anti-French rebellions and even less to the rebels themselves, typically relegated to a fluid space between brigandage in the criminal sense in which the French understood it, fanaticism induced by the clergy’s influence on country folk, and discontent over economic and social pressures. Modernization narratives rarely designate by name characters like Bussandri; when they 78  Pietro Carancini to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Gallinella 24 January and 9 February, BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 202 and 249, respectively.

104 

D. P. HARSANYI

do, it is with the accompaniment of methodological warnings urging that quasi-mythical reputations be cut down to sociological size.79 More recently, Michael Broers deviated slightly from this line and sought to humanize insurgents pushed to the brink by the proto-colonial tactics of the French state. He too, however, cautioned against the temptation to romanticize people of dubious moral standing who most often fought the occupiers for opportunistic reasons not lofty ideals of liberation and justice.80 It was not until the 1990s that a group of historians clustered around the Istituto Storico dell’Insorgenza e per l’Identità Nazionale, located in Milan, deciding to treat folklore imagery as documentary evidence and ignore recommendations against glamourizing social banditry.81 In their essays, anti-Napoleonic fighters come across as stoic martyrs for the cause of religious and cultural freedom, heralds of a culturally unified Italian people rising—regardless of local factors—to defend its culture, its religion, its way of life and its history against foreign intruders who ruined the country for exploitative goals. In a volume tellingly titled La Vandeea Italiana, Massimo Viglione, a prominent member of this direction, listed all insurrections and, as far as he was able, the names of

79  See especially Zaghi, L’Italia di Napoleone. Relying on thorough analysis of police records, Zaghi concluded that rebel leaders rarely lived up to their mythical image. 80  Even so, he added a few brushes of fondly evoked social banditry: ‘Ordinary men got their moment in the sun, however swiftly it was eclipsed by the shadow of the gallows. For a moment they were free, masterless men, and they had before them the timeless example of how to act accordingly’. Napoleon’s Other War, 198. Eric Hobsbawm has immortalized the ‘social bandit’ type in Primitive Rebels (1959) and Bandits (1969). 81  Noted historians representing this direction are Sandro Petrucci, Massimo Viglione and Oscar Sanguinetti. In a critical review, Antonino De Francesco concluded that this approach often proceeds from a revisionist, if not outright revanchist ideological angle that sheds scant light on the historical dynamics of the time. Antonino De Francesco, ‘Il significato delle insorgenze nella cultura politica italiana’ in the collective volume Le insorgenze popolari nell’Italia Napoleonica. Crisi dell’Antico Regime e alternative di costruzione del nuovo ordine sociale (Milan: Ares, 2001), 31–44. The historians in question reject the revisionist moniker, claiming instead to recover a segment of national memory that most academic studies ignore. I offered a detailed examination of these historiography debates in ‘Brigands, Social Bandits, Freedom Fighters: the Portrayal of anti-Napoleonic Rebels in the Historiography of Napoleonic Italy’ Selected Papers of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era (2020): 1–11. Posted on Age of Revolution on 29 January 2021: https://ageofrevolutions.com/2021/01/29/brigands-social-bandits-freedom-fighters-the-portrayal-of-antinapoleonic-rebels-in-the-­historiography-­of-napoleonic-italy/.

5  WATERSHED: THE INSURRECTION 

105

insurgents beginning with the leaders whom the French executed according to the policy of making examples.82 Giuseppe Bussandri took his place among Viglione’s martyrs and from there migrated to several essays built on the thesis of culturally motivated resistance to French invasions and to modernity in general.83 In this, way, Bussandri re-entered the stream of local collective memory, which had largely forgotten him and the insurrection he had joined to his eventual regret. The wide gap between Bussandri’s moving reconstructed portrait and the prosaic reality transpiring from the archives brings to mind John Davis’ remarks on the difficulty of conducting dispassionate inquiries into the heavily romanticized subject of insurrection cum social banditry in Italy.84 Curiously, both Bussandri’s heroic aura and the bureaucratic classification of criminal mastermind rest on unsupported anecdotes. Eager to make examples, the French took hearsay at face value and punished in Bussandri a villainous chieftain whose crimes exonerated the gullible multitudes, as the official narrative had it. The French rush to judgement probably helped generate popular sympathy for Bussandri: in the face of France’s unrelenting intrusions in the social order they knew and understood, the restive people of the Apennines yearned for a daring champion—at least for a while. With the memory of the insurrection fading, twentieth-century deferential retellings weaved an invented tradition without bothering to consult the available archival material. Nevertheless, the fact that Bussandri’s actions were not equal to the grand role assigned 82  Massimo Viglione, La Vandeea Italiana. Le insorgenze controrivoluzionare dalle origini al 1814 (Milan: effedieffe, 1995), 310. The concluding chapter declares sombrely ‘We dedicate this book to all the martyrs and heroes of the Italian counter-revolution, of the anti-­ giacobin insurrection’. 83  Gustavo Buratti, ‘I Montanari contro Napoleone: une resistenza da rivendicare’ in Banditi e ribelli dimenticati. Storie di irriducibili al future che viene. A cura di Corrado Mornese e Gustavo Buratti (Milano: Lampi di Stampa, 2006), 235–250 (249–250). Buratti’s essay offers a comprehensive account of Bussandri’s valiant image in recent local popular literature. Bussandri as heroic leader and defender of Christianity is featured in Santino Cavaciuti, ‘L’Insorgenza del 1805–1806 nell’alta Val d’Arda nel quadro delle generali insorgenze italiane anti-napoleoniche’. Quanderni della Valtolla (2006): 17–17 (https://quadernivaltolla.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/l_insorgenza-del-1805.pdf. Accessed 30 August 2017) and in Francesco Mario Agnoli, Guida introduttiva alle Insorgenze Contro-­ Rivoluzionarie in Italia durante il dominio napoleonico (1796–1815) (Milano: Mimep, 1996), 25. 84  Davis, Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-Century Italy, 72.

106 

D. P. HARSANYI

to him posthumously should not detract from his historical significance: as Broers and others noted, despite the strong imprint Napoleonic occupation left on Italy, the cultural overhaul (acculturation in Broers’ terminology) ended in failure.85 While Bussandri was not responsible for this failure, those who made a hero out of him were.

85  Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 2–22. More discussion on this topic further in this work.

CHAPTER 6

Explanatory Narratives: Brigandage

Analysis accompanied reports of the uprising from the start. French commanders possessed information: if anything, they had too much material and too many explanations, all reflecting the writers’ ulterior motives. Aware that the French were organizing a brutal repression, mayors and commissioners did their best to strike a balance between denouncing suspect ring leaders and exonerating the citizenry. Civic leaders launched inquiries to placate the French, but also to capture popular sentiment. Rebel voices rarely appeared in these carefully crafted statements. The divergent accounts formed a polyphonic narrative that French commanders strove to mould into a unifying discourse meant to validate the legitimacy of French rule.

Local Italian Sources Moreau de Saint-Méry dismissed early news of mutinies in the countryside as passing flare-ups that would burn themselves out.1 The 10 short reports Prosecutor Albesani was able to collect by 4 January 1806, scribbled by mayors and commissioners while church bells were still ringing and men were still joining rebel bands, are the first eyewitness accounts. Pressured to explain a tricky situation, local representatives tried to play it safe and 1

 ‘I let the calm return by itself’, Moreau confessed in the Compte Moral, p. 38.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_6

107

108 

D. P. HARSANYI

limited themselves to succinct descriptions of facts; only the console of Pianello ventured an opinion on what caused the rebellion: ‘some say it was to prevent military conscription, some say it’s because of tax rises’.2 These two complaints returned in the longer retroactive accounts written by mayors and commissioners who fled as soon as troubles started and sent their reports days and even weeks after the events had subsided. In the heat of the action, thoughts on what was going on circulated faster by word of mouth. Moreau de Saint-Méry’s diaries show that he was already receiving complaints on the burden of fiscal impositions, usually accompanied by warnings on discontent brewing in the countryside, throughout November and December 1805. The issue of mule requisition alone took up most of the month of December 1805, and various protests continued into 1806. Even so, Moreau consistently failed to address the sources of instability as his job required. His superiors received instead a point-by-­ point breakdown of causes for popular dissatisfaction, complete with suggestions on how to handle the situation, from a group representing the upper classes of Piacenza. ‘The main property holders of the City of Piacenza distinguished themselves in true manly fashion, when they decided to put directly at the feet of Emperor Napoleon, their sovereign, a humble report where they uncovered the causes of the rebellion in the Piacentino and invoked his generous indulgence for those culpable of stirring trouble’, claimed Cavagnari in his memoirs.3 This letter, signed by 44 titled landowners and urban notables, listed three major sources of instability in the country, the first structural, the other two circumstantial: 1. The general climate of uncertainty, with constant changes in legislation, disoriented people accustomed to immutable rules and customs. The publication of Code Napoléon in 1805 nullified not only older laws but also decrees issued barely one or two years before, to which citizens were still struggling to adjust. While, of course, the letter continued, in an unctuous tone meant to blunt the damning picture of legislative chaos, ‘everybody was happy to obey’, poorly explained and publicized changes disrupted everybody’s lives. 2  Denunzia di Signor Francesco Plezzi, console di Pianella città, 4 January 1806 Pianello città. AN BB 18/871. 3  The letter, dated Piacenza 3 January 1806, is reproduced in Cavagnari, Alcune particolarità storiche, 86–87.

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

109

2. Requisition of mules: the French army’s insistence on requesting mules for transport affected families even more than the requisition of other goods, since mules were used for ferrying all kinds of merchandise and were often ‘the sole means of subsistence for their families’ who risked destitution in the absence of any reimbursement for losing such precious source of revenues. 3. Forced enlisting in National Guards units, which gave way to frustrations of all kinds and led to the first violent episode at Castel San Giovanni, in reaction to militia commanders manhandling recruits. Formulated in deferential language that avoided directly calling into question the legitimacy or even the efficacy of French power in the country, the letter pointed unerringly to the French administration itself as the structural cause for unrest: it was the French administration that changed one law after another on a whim; it was the French army that imposed unbearable burdens on already overburdened families; it was Italy’s French viceroy who demanded an unrealistic number of recruits, without a thought on how such expectations would hurt local communities. Remarkably, the letter left no room for possible alternative interpretations that might assign part of the responsibility to local customs or prior social dislocations. The people of Piacenza, these 44 self-appointed representatives implied, were innocent of all malfeasance but were cruelly put upon. The sensible way out was allowing them to express their sorrows to the viceroy—not to Moreau de Saint-Méry—thus giving them a sign that their French masters were, at long last, listening. Three lists with local grievances remained in the archives, collected by Count Leone Leoni and arranged into a coherent document by Sante Lusardi, mayor of Pianello, who claimed to have forwarded them to the viceroy (there is no evidence that Eugene ever received the documents). Similar in form to the cahiers des doléances brought to the Estates General at Versailles in 1789, these are the only documents that make audible the rebels’ voice. Movingly humble in their expectations and written in careful calligraphy by village mayors and public notaries, they reiterate concerns expressed in the anxious reports from the uprising’s early days, but go further than the immediate triggers of forcible enlisting in the National Guards and requisition of mules:

110 

D. P. HARSANYI

1. The abolition of all new taxes, the stamp tax and the doors and windows tax especially, but also the personal income tax. Two lists asked to pay only taxes issued by the Farnese dukes, wherever they were still applicable. 2. The reestablishment of religious communities and recognition of religious rather than civil marriages (more precisely: that only marriages celebrated according to the rights of the Holy Church be recognized). 3. The ability to buy and sell produce outside the confines of the state (of Parma) (meaning the abolition of certain customs duties). 4. That gendarmes should not oversee the execution of court orders or the collection of taxes. 5. That one single tax be established for all court districts. 6. That judges be guided by peace, rectitude and charity not by favouritism and the interests of the powerful. Apart from the last demand, which in its very broadness throws glaring light on deep-rooted frustrations, these are precise requests in reaction to specific recent policies: various taxes, the introduction of the civil code, the suppression of convents, and confiscations of select Church properties.4 One note etched on coarse paper in a script betraying unfamiliarity with writing is one of the very few unfiltered messages coming directly from rebels, not from intermediaries. Unsigned, it was probably one of the notes used in compiling the more properly composed lists forwarded to the viceroy. The frankness is striking, as is the unsympathetic sentiment towards the clergy: The Lord commander shall immediately let P(rince) Eugene and the administrator know that we do not want to pay the countless taxes asked from heads of household who can barely stay alive with their scarce revenue; better to seize the many benefits of priests and vicars who are stuffed like pigs. This shall be made known to Leclerc. If not—uprising.5

4  Mss. Parm. 543, f. 28. Sante Lusardi, podestà of Pianello, signed as witness and dated the documents Pianello, 9 January 1806. A digest of these requests has been published in Luigi Ginetti, ‘Sull’insurrezione dell’alto Piacentino nel 1805–1806’, Aurea Parma, 9 (settembre–dicembre 1913): 204–210. 5  Undated; marked ‘received’ at the General Administration’s office on 6 January 1806.

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

111

Anti-French Sentiments The outburst of disdain for the clergy contradicted more pious thoughts contained in letters written by village notables, but it is hard to determine whether this was an isolated opinion or the expression of widespread anti-­ priestly animus. In any event, its existence does place a question mark on the oft-invoked deference towards the clergy. In addition to precise demands, all messages to the French leaderships communicate a sense of bewilderment in the face of abruptly introduced new taxes and civil legislation which complicated everyday life, and Moreau was not wrong to highlight, albeit very cautiously, the consequences of legislative unpredictability: ‘Changes in the nature of financial contributions more than their amount frightened some souls and the mass of people received false ideas’.6 Was there a deeper anguish lurking behind angry outbursts against taxes and requisitions? With hindsight and safely removed from the scene, commissioners and mayors dared to point out, ever so gingerly, just how deep ill feelings towards the French ran in their communities. Giuseppe Lama noted that people routinely hurled the word giacobini, not meant as a compliment, at village heads.7 Lazzaro Cornazzani’s long account of events in the Pellegrino commune leaned on the opinion that taxes, especially the one on doors and windows coupled with the stamp tax, had had a negative effect on his population of about 4000 souls ‘of quiet disposition, fairly obedient and compliant with the orders of the government and of the commissioner’. Notably though, the amiable community mutated into an angry mob when they came under the influence of ‘mean-spirited men’ (cativi uomini) from neighbouring communes set on destroying the ‘perfidious French’—their words, not Cornazzani’s.8 Other accounts also confessed that the slur giacobini, short for French occupiers, dropped easily from the insurgents’ lips and cooperation with French authorities was the 6  ‘Changes in calculating and collecting taxes frightened a few and the masses formed wrong ideas’, Moreau wrote in the Compte Moral, describing his own confusion in the summer of 1805, when he was ordered to impose new taxes only moments after collecting the ones previously agreed upon. 7  Report by Giuseppe Lama, deputato del commune di Sarmata. 8 January 1806. Part of the file compiled by Judge Berri. BP Mss. Parm. 543 f. 17. 8  Commissioner Lazzaro Cornazzani to Moreau de Saint-Méry, BP Mss. Parm. 543, f. 155. In passing, he noted that what made his people vulnerable to negative influences was another unwelcome imposition, the interdiction of cutting wood from the forest without special approval from the Administrator General.

112 

D. P. HARSANYI

quickest way to lose the respect of one’s fellow citizens.9 These panicked testimonies corroborated the multiple indirect forewarnings contained in Piacenza’s notables’ suave letter and fleshed out Lebrun’s early observations on what he termed the cowardice of mayors and commissioners. Recent scholarship has emphasized the weight of local factors in anti-­ French rebellions. Starting from the premise that each region of Italy was, in its own way, a society in crisis, historians of the subject suggest that the French occupation put a face and name on long-simmering reasons for discontent that varied from one place to another. Frustrations and resentments accumulated long before the French arrived found a potent conduit in the language of anti-French hatred, coloured by popular religiosity and instinctive suspicion of foreign interference.10 Contextualized in this way, the Piacentino complaints against tangible matters of taxation and public order appear as the local variations of a general pattern. French reforms exposed, complicated and amplified local dysfunctions, piled new hardships on top of old ones, and gave scant reason for people to believe vague promises of better days to come. Conversely, the rebels’ writings can be read as a way of using the language of concrete demands to voice a gnawing sense of exasperation over losing the contours of an intelligible world. Less connected to the cosmopolitan Enlightenment that permeated the 9  Militia lieutenant Giacopelli lugubriously noted that his fellow citizens were openly wondering why he was not yet shot for treason, seeing that he had so diligently worked to recruit National Guards volunteers. Lt. Col. Luigi Giacopelli to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Pieve sotto ville, 11 January 1806. BP Mss. Parm. 543, f.168. 10  The collective volumes Folle Controrivoluzionare. Le insorgenze popolari nell’Italia giacobina e Napoleonica. A cura di Anna Maria Rao (Roma: Carocci, 1999) and Le insorgenze popolari nell’Italia giacobina e Napoleonica: Crisi dell’antico regime e alternative di costruzione del nuovo ordine sociale: atti del convegno di Milano A cura di Chiara Continisio (Milano: Ares, 1999) offer meticulous analyses of individual rebellions, with the emphasis on myriad local causes for popular discontent, which added up to a peninsula-wide structural crisis of the old regime. Anna Maria Rao’s introduction to Folle Controrivoluzionare cautions against attributing too much weight to nationalist feelings and religious fervour. Instead, Rao suggests a more subtle reading of anti-French animosity as a common idiom that expressed a variety of local grievances, often unrelated to the French occupation. ‘Folle Controrivoluzionare. La Questione delle insorgenze italiane’ in Folle Controrivoluzionare, 9–37. The collective volume Popular Resistance in the French Wars. Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates. Charles J. Esdaile editor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), with chapters dedicated to individual cases of rebellion and resistance, resulted in similar reflections, extended to the entire French Empire. In the preface, Charles Esdaile concluded that a typology of anti-Napoleonic resistance was not yet emerging from existing scholarship. ‘Popular Resistance in Napoleonic Europe: Issues and Perspectives’ in idem, 201–224.

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

113

upper-classes’ cultural makeup, and sceptical that foreign occupiers had their interests at heart, the rural population reverted to what Benedetto Croce concisely called ‘love for independence and traditional customs against foreigners and the laws they pretended to impose’.11 If not necessarily fully formed cultural angst, it was an unease harder to put in words than anger against yet another round of taxes or military recruitment, but enough to make taxes and other impositions feel intolerable. When exasperation turned to rage, known supporters of the French suffered the first blows, as the episode with Stefani shows. Croce’s analysis gives critical context to Prosecutor Albesani’s stream of indignant denunciations of collective deviousness and resistance to authority, for which he could find no room for empathy: The public mood (esprit public) is very insolent. People talk here and have always talked with no reticence against the French government—in cafés, in public places, in clubs of ten—twelve persons where they stay together until nine or ten in the evening. At the theater they mocked openly whenever the bulletins announcing the victories of the Great Army were read, and this under the eyes of the local authorities; and when the English landed in Naples, there were those who dared say that necessary measures should be taken to prevent French soldiers and other agents of the French government to escape, the goal being to murder them all.12

Moreau de Saint-Méry made it a habit of ignoring such sentiments. It was only during his last, heated meeting with representatives of Parma’s Anzianato that he lost all restraint in an angry outburst that must have shocked his interlocutors and showed he was quite aware that bonds of affection between local citizens and French rulers were very loose indeed: ‘You dare come and insult me—me, who have been only too charitable towards the lowlife of this country who hates us’.13 What could have caused such hostility, French officials wondered. Not given to cultural sensitivity and firm in the belief that French rule marked a step forward on the road to progress, they never looked to themselves for answers. It had to be something else. French administrators, officers on duty and reliable allies such as Albesani set out to detect external triggers.

 Benedetto Croce, Storia del Regno di Napoli (Bari: Laterza, 1972), 22.  Albesani to Grand Juge Régnier, Piacenza 1 January 1806, AN BB/18/871. 13  Faidherbe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV—1806 parte I, 81. 11 12

114 

D. P. HARSANYI

French Sources: Foreign Intervention and Malevolent Priests The French officials’ first set of explanatory hypotheses relied heavily on the stock formula of vindictive foreigners and a cunning, corrupt clergy throwing a quiet country into chaos. Moreau de Saint-Méry’s first report to Governor Lebrun read like a reflexive anti-clerical denunciation: ‘It came to my knowledge that men of the cloth have inspired disobedience and that the enemies of France’s glory have encouraged them’.14 Sentiments shared by the eager Louis Duplessis, who informed the viceroy that: ‘I believe that the poison that the priestly gang keeps distilling and the gold distributed by the odious and ferocious English are the real causes’.15 Prosecutor Albesani did not think otherwise: The true authors at the origin of this effrontery are the very ones whose saintly calling should compel to guide the people’s spirits, to calm them down and make them love the Government. On the contrary, these individuals use their very powerful influence to stir hatred among the people and incite them to rebel. Their conduct is appalling and all this in perfect impunity, since nobody among the people will denounce them and no judges, let alone their superiors, will punish them.16

The first full report by a French officer, Philippe Lacroix, aide de camp to the commander of the Apennine section of the 28th Division, Brigadier General Vabre, summarized the thinking of French representatives already in Parma, only with heavier emphasis on foreign interference than on clergy manipulation: For a longtime now the embers of insurrection were slowing burning. France’s enemies, bought by England with its gold, were stealthily drafting the plot; all Italy was about to become the theater of massacres, and what France held most dear was about to succumb under the assassins’ dagger. Agents had been dispatched along the coasts of Liguria and traveled as far as  Moreau de Saint-Méry to Lebrun, Parma 8 Nivôse an 14 (29 December 1805). AN F/1e/86. 15  Duplessis to Moreau de Saint Méry, Conselvo 11 January. In this letter Duplessis related his interview with the viceroy the previous day and transcribed some of the conversation. BP Mss. Parm. 543, f. 49. 16  Albesani to Grand Juge Régnier, Piacenza 1 January 1806 AN BB/18/871. 14

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

115

Parma and Piacenza, where, after getting together with individuals known for their lawlessness, they succeeded in stirring the inhabitants of the Apennine Mountains. Several superficial pretexts such as the increase of the tax on salt and tobacco, the conscription, and the [financial] contributions had been enough to provoke to insurgency an ignorant populace and to make it pick up weapons against a government the power of which they could not appreciate.17

This remarkable text brings together the main elements of the spontaneous French interpretation of such events: foreign intruders subsidized an uprising principally made up of outlaws who managed to draw in a few ignorant, easily manipulated villagers—an outrage to be squashed promptly by the overwhelming force of the French army. As for the exasperation over new taxes and especially conscription orders, so forcefully put forward in  local accounts: mere pretexts. Lacroix introduced a crucial element to which Moreau de Saint-Méry only hinted cursorily in his first letter: brigandage, soon to become the anchor of the official narrative. About a week after Lacroix’s report, another French officer (commander of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd regiment of infantry, coincidentally named Lebrun) wrote in the report addressed to General Pouget that calm had been restored, and, looking back at the causes of the rebellion: ‘…our belief is that England’s gold has corrupted several prominent people in the country and that, had our armies suffered a setback, the insurgency would have spread’. The concluding briefing to Minister Fouché, written by Governor Lebrun’s secretary, agreed: ‘H.S.H. believes that the insurgency has been prepared from afar, from abroad, abetted by the general disorder and the anarchy that dominates the country at present’.18 The Bulletin of 22 January, a digest of several earlier reports, was still relaying the information that: ‘The rebellion is attributed to noblemen and other disgruntled subjects, to the queen of Naples and to the English’.19 And then came Albesani’s usual grim assessment that mindless disobedience was in the blood since neither priests nor foreigners had to work too hard to  Troubles qui ont agité le Plaisantin dans le mois de Janvier 1806. A son Altesse Sérénissime Monseigneur le Prince Architrésorier de l’Empire, Gouverneur Général de la 28ème Division Militaire. Par M. Philippe Lacroix Lieutenant aide-de-camp du Général de Brigade Vabre. Not dated, probably 8 or 9 January AN F1e/86. 18  Bulletin of 13 January 1806 in La Police secrète du Premier Empire, 223. 19  Bulletin du 22 January 1806 in La Police secrète du Premier Empire, 235. 17

116 

D. P. HARSANYI

succeed in their nefarious deeds: ‘We must conclude, without fear of being wrong, that the spirits have been agitated in Piacenza and its neighboring villages long before the insurrection’.20

Streamlining Information Governor Lebrun’s task was to make sense of conflicting reports and to produce factual synopses, to be included in the daily bulletins compiled for Napoleon. The orderly and punctual communication between French officials hastily dispatched to Parma and the government in Paris reflected, at the level of local bureaucracy, the grand vision of bringing order into chaos. Lebrun and the officers in charge sifted patiently through all reports and gave the same scrutiny to reassuring analyses as to those that ran contrary to commonly accepted French views. Streamlining this mass of information implied reassessing, soberly, hastily collected intelligence. Careful evaluation failed to substantiate initial suspicions that foreign agents had incited the events. Accordingly, ‘the English, the queen of Naples’ and foreigners in general were no longer included among probable causes: ‘There was no trace of English or Neapolitan influence. We only saw local currency and no foreign money. The Russian and the Austrian soldiers arrested together with some rebels were deserters [not agitators]’.21 The culpability of the clergy was likewise stated rather than proved. All French officials were prepared to believe Moreau’s and Albesani’s contentions that a vexed clergy would stop at nothing to enflame the spirits of poor folks whose minds they had poisoned for so long. Yet, they noticed that neither Moreau nor Albesani backed their suspicions with concrete evidence. Some of the rebels’ grievance lists did call for the restoration of convents, but this was one request among many, not an essential demand. Besides, the one note coming directly from an insurgent camp articulated strong popular anti-clericalism, not blind submission to the Church. In addition, Lebrun was probably aware of the memoir on parish priests that Pietro Cavagnari had prepared for the Minister of Religious Affairs Portalis in August 1805. There, Cavagnari encouraged the French government to rely on parish priests whom he presented as ‘leaders of a military corps. They can as readily render important services to the state or fatally damage  Albesani to Arch-treasurer Lebrun, Piacenza 2 January 1806, AN BB 18 871.  Bulletin of 27 January. The bulletin of 21 February restated: ‘There is no proof that the enemy incited the rebellion’. La Police secrète du Premier Empire, 241 and 268, respectively. 20 21

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

117

in the eyes of the population the Government’s plans for regeneration’. Cavagnari urged the French government to treat these priests kindly, attend to their needs and rely on their intermediary services to maintain public order (already on rough terms with Moreau de Saint-Méry, Cavagnari did not mention the current administration). Underscoring the differences between Parma and Piacenza, Cavagnari called the minister’s attention to the mountainous region of Piacenza, less wealthy and tranquil than Parma and in need, therefore, of the kind of financial help likely to generate goodwill towards the government. Anticipating resistance to laws foreshadowing conscription (the Decrees of 16 June and 14 August 1805), Cavagnari believed that priests were the ones most likely to ‘dissipate this irrational aversion without having to call in the intervention of the public forces (army)’. Presciently, he continued: ‘In the lowlands, mutinies are easily defeated, but such is not the case along the mountain ravines, where strong, determined men, resilient and tough, accustomed to live on smuggling, do fear the bullets less and respect the voice of a minister of religion more’.22 Whether or not Lebrun had knowledge of this exposé, Cavagnari was one of the most trusted local interlocutors of the French and constantly advocated close cooperation with the clergy.23 The actions of the bishop of Piacenza, Monsignore Cerati, who counselled submission at the grand mass of 30 December 1805, proved him right: What would be the consequences of the senseless plans of these troublemakers if not to attract the full force of divine punishment as well as the just indignation of the Supreme Government? […] Remember the Apostle’s teachings: he who resists the [state] power resists God himself. Keep away from such deadly poison…’24

Governor Lebrun was quite pleased, especially since the prelate followed up with circular letters to parish priests, urging them to keep their 22  Cavagnari to Minister Portalis, Piacenza 26 August 1805, in Cavagnari, Alcune particolarità storiche, 44–46. 23  This was common practice throughout Italian territories. Napoleonic administrators frequently pressured the clergy, with varying degrees of success, to portray submission to the government as a Christian duty, prescribed by the Bible. Details in Tomaso Pedio, Il Briggantaggio Meridionale 1806–1863 (Lecce: Capone Editore, 1997), 37–40. 24  Dom Gregorio Cerati, ‘To the clergy and to the people’. The full text is reproduced in Emilio Ottolenghi, Storia di Piacenza (Piacenza: Tip.Le.Co., 1969) II, 90. See also Vincenzo Paltrinieri, I Moti Contro Napoleone Negli Stati di Parma e Piacenza (1805–1806), 67–68.

118 

D. P. HARSANYI

communities at peace: ‘The Bishop of Piacenza promises his zeal and his commitment and I will ask him to prove it to me by working with the parish priests to reestablish order’, wrote Lebrun on 1 January.25 Fortunately for Lebrun, preaching deference to authority came easily to Cerati, who worried constantly about his flock’s propensity for turbulence and waywardness.26 All good reasons to include the bishop’s contribution to pacification in Lebrun’s final report: ‘The Bishop of Piacenza awoke the zeal of parish priests and addressed the people with paternal advice…. Parish priests who were not able to prevent the uprising abandoned their rebellion-­stained communes; only one dared to bless the flag of the rebels, egged on by one of his nephews’.27 In a word: no hard feelings. Several priests were summoned by the Military Commission, of whom two were eventually executed, but they were punished as individuals, not as representatives of their order. Despite the vehement anti-clerical tone of early reports, French commanders concluded that religious passions had little to do with the climate of discontent, and hence clerical agitation, like foreign treachery, was discounted as a direct cause of the uprising. With large structural forces operating from within or without dropped from the causal chain, French officials reviewed local circumstances. Rough recruitment methods, which could conveniently be laid at the feet of clumsy local militia officers, remained listed in all subsequent reports as the most plausible trigger for insurrection.28 The synthesis drawn by Governor Lebrun during the rebellion, and by General Junot after the events, indicated that senior leadership circles were aware of the pile of distressing reports accumulating on Moreau’s desk. In the letter of 15 January to Champagny, Lebrun acknowledged that hardships triggered unrest: ‘Other causes prepared this movement: mule requisitions, a new  Lebrun to Champagny, Genoa 1er Janvier 1806, AN F/1e/86.  Broers noted that despite Cerati’s and other bishops’ opposition to French political reforms, fear of moral decay made them support law and order, even when imposed by the French administration they detested. The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy, 91–93. 27  ‘Insurrection dans les Etats de Plaisance—Détails’ Courier de Turin, 18 January 1806. Signed L’Archi-trésorier de l’Empire, Lebrun. 28  Even Napoleon subscribed to this view in a reproachful letter to Eugene: ‘You have broken up my camp in Alexandria and proceeded to levy troops in such haste that you have lit a fire in all Italy. Be more prudent and walk with more care’. Letter to Prince Eugene, Paris, 4 February 1806. Correspondance de Napoléon premier, #9745, XII, p. 5. French officials were quick to punish draft dodgers but made allowances for youngsters who shunned the supposedly volunteer service in National Guards. No such lenience will be shown when the conscription started in earnest, several months after these events. 25 26

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

119

system of contributions, and an additional tax on salt and tobacco’. Two months later, Junot wrote to an impatient Napoleon that ‘Y. M. reproaches me that I did not clarify what kind of complaints people have here; they complained that: 1. 400 mules were taken from them without compensation; 2. That they were ordered to provide 12,000 men and even when this number was lowered, exemptions for money and countless vexations angered the population—I do have proof; 3. That they had follow new laws, like the customs law, without prior notification, which opened the door to numerous arbitrary acts’.29 Of course, Junot hastened to clarify that taking note of local complaints did not mean accepting their validity: ‘None of this can legitimize a rebellion’. This was indeed the crux of the matter: nothing could authorize rebellion because it was simply not conceivable that the French presence generated confusion and resentment, and hence discontent and a call to arms. The revolution enshrined the right to rise against oppressive old regimes, but rebellion against a rational, enlightened administration set up for the people’s own good was absurd. This way of thinking explains why, despite meticulously reading reports from the field, no French officials stopped to analyse the multiple instances of anti-French animosity. There is no mention, in the many letters exchanged among these important men, of popular anxiety and general impatience with the overbearing French presence in the region. Nor did any French official pay any serious attention to Albesani’s warnings on the mauvais esprit public by which he meant abhorrence of the French occupiers. To their minds, there was a bureaucratic solution for every problem, and hence negative feelings and emotions resulted not from the occupation itself, but from errors of execution. All administrators had to deal with potential discontent; only incompetent ones would allow challenging issues to fester and get out of hand. Read in this way, and with only one allowance made for forced recruitment attributable to local militia chiefs, the various objections to French policies blended into proof of Moreau de Saint-Méry’s inadequate governing skills.

Professional Incompetence Bit by bit, throughout the vast correspondence between Moreau de Saint-­ Méry’s superiors, the Administrator General’s poor leadership and lack of vision cropped up as the root cause of what they all saw as entirely  Junot à S.M. L’Empereur des Français. Parma 24 January 1806. AN AF/IV/1717.

29

120 

D. P. HARSANYI

avoidable nuisances. Moreau de Saint-Méry’s executive abilities had already been called into question after Napoleon’s brief visit to Parma in June 1805. The plethora of inspectors milling through Parma since that fateful day never declared themselves satisfied with Moreau’s efforts. At the very beginning of the insurrection, Governor Lebrun sounded the alarm from neighbouring Liguria and, although hesitant to displace so unceremoniously a fellow administrator, decided to take charge: ‘I opted for a few acts of authority in Parma and Piacenza, and I will keep on working this way, because nothing is working in that country. The courts have not been installed, the contributions have not arrived, the conscription, which was almost entirely dealt with here [in Liguria] has not yet been initiated’.30 There was no time to waste, because ‘Everywhere, the lack of order in the country caused the troubles’, he wrote to Minister of the Interior Champagny on 1 January 1806.31 Champagny was not surprised: ‘On 20 Thermidor I asked M. Moreau de Saint-Méry to supply facts that could have allowed the Emperor to establish in those countries a regular administration; I did not receive anything. And still, M. M. de S. M. had appointed people for the positions of General Secretary and sub-delegates. I will fire those officials’.32 In fact, Champagny had already taken his own measures on 1 January 1806, when he assigned a former deputy-prefect of the department of Clermont named Leriche the title of permanent secretary of the Administration of the States of Parma, with the rather transparent duty to monitor the Administrator General’s daily activities.33 Word of the Administrator General’s incompetence spread fast. Delacroix, the viceroy’s envoy, felt entitled to make crucial decisions and hold talks with local leaders without bothering to consult with Moreau, at the time still the chief executive of the States of Parma.34 The Ministry of 30  Governor Lebrun to the Grand Juge Régnier, Genoa, 17 Frimaire an 14 (8 December 1805) AN BB/5/302. 31  Lebrun to Champagny, Genoa 1 January 1806. AN F/1e/87. 32  Champagny to Lebrun, Paris 8 January 1806. AN F/1e/87. 33  Nomination order signed Champagny, Paris, 1 January 1806. ASPr, Dipartimento del Taro, Busta 162. 34  ‘Proclamations are issued without me authorizing them, with my knowledge even; you sent priest and nobles around the country without notifying me. I am learning all this indirectly’, Moreau complained, bitterly aware of his growing irrelevance. Indeed, Delacroix ordered that Eugene’s proclamation be posted in public places on 6 January and Moreau only received a copy the next evening at dinner, when Delacroix coldly dismissed his concerns: ‘I had too much to do here and I am only following the orders of the prince’. Entry of 7 January 1806, Faidherbe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV—1806 parte I, pp. 48–49.

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

121

the Interior nominated deputy prefects (subdélégués) without as much as asking Moreau’s opinion.35 Two weeks after taking control of the levers of power, in a letter summarizing the military interventions, Governor Lebrun identified a number of objective factors for rebellion, but insisted that the main cause remained ‘the lack of organization in the country; the old authorities (are) unstable and hence unmotivated, the new ones still inactive’.36 Lebrun was especially exasperated that Moreau had failed to notify him and General Montchoisy of what was happening in his territory, thus hindering adequate counter-actions. The same day he wrote to Champagny, the Arch-treasurer dispatched a scathing scolding to Moreau, in response to the latter’s rather anodyne praise for Lieutenant Vivian’s leadership in routing attacks from the rebel camp: In awarding him this task, M. de Montchoisy and myself were aware of all he was capable of, and I regret that circumstances apparently beyond your control prevented you from reporting about a gathering insurrection which nearly set ablaze all our departments. It would have been so easy to nip this in the bud, without having to correct so many evils and punish so many people. I do not know how I can explain to His Majesty my not knowing what was going on in an important section of the 28th division, equally, M. de Montchoisy’s not being informed, hence the ridiculous role to which lack of information reduced him. Had order and harmony been secured, we would have mastered, with our eighty men, twenty miserable insurrections like this one. It pains me, dear former colleague, to be obliged to express such regrets; but I could not help seeing all too clearly the lack of organization that compromised, and is still compromising, our common tranquility and the successes I have obtained here so far. (The letter ends with an ‘invitation’ to be more diligent in future communications.)37

General Montchoisy, who had maintained an icy politeness since the beginning of the events, lost his composure at the news that there might be fresh outbreaks in spots, and admonished Moreau as if he were a mere schoolboy: ‘I sent you troops. What are they doing? How is it possible that 35  The new appointees reported directly to Governor Lebrun and had little reason to show any deference to Moreau. 36  Lebrun to Champagny, Genoa, 15 January 1806 AN/F1e/85. 37  Lebrun to Moreau de Saint-Méry Genoa 15 January 1806, F/1e/85.

122 

D. P. HARSANYI

territories that have been subdued with a handful of men are not yet brought to the strictest obedience?’38 Local notabilities were not helping either. The letter of the 44 notables pointed to antagonizing French legislation, another sign of Moreau’s failure to communicate properly. The restless Cavagnari opined that: ‘… it should be recognized that the problems of this region were not the work of its peaceful inhabitants, neither the product of corruption. They rather resulted from the misguided direction taken by a new, ephemeral, and transitory administration, determined to induce people to abandon ancient customs for the sake of submitting to innovations which most regarded with apprehension and did not readily accept’.39 Albesani’s letters to the Minister of Justice never mentioned Moreau, but repeated references to utter lawlessness throughout the territory implicitly questioned the current administrator’s fitness to govern: ‘These disorders are the logical consequence of confusion and anarchy’, he declared in the letter of 1 January and went on to supply a series of incriminatory details: Here, the powers are so mixed up that one does not even know where to go to obtain justice. Highway robberies are a common occurrence, especially around Parma and Piacenza. And yet, I have never seen a single criminal being punished. On the contrary, we almost always see the guilty go free. Since 19 October of last year, thirty-five or thirty-six robbers were released, I have the evidence to prove it. Not a day goes by that people do not find fault with the gendarmes, who are not supported by local authorities; just the contrary, every chance they get, they hinder the gendarmerie’s operations.40

Albesani’s counterpart in Parma, Emanuele Mastelloni, reported that confused local magistrates refused to even register lawbreaking episodes in their communes; as a result: ‘crimes are multiplying’.41 Besides, ‘what 38  General Montchoisy to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Genoa 28 January. BP Mss. Parm. 543 f.224. 39  Cavagnari, Alcune particolarità storiche, 83–84. 40  Albesani to Minister Régnier, Piacenza 1 January, ANP/BB 18 871. 41  Extrait d’une lettre écrite à S.E. Le Grand Juge par le Procureur Impérial près de la Cour de Justice Criminelle séante à Parme. 2 frimaire an 14 AN BB/5/302. A couple of weeks prior to this message, Moreau complained that the nominated imperial prosecutors (Emanuele Mastelloni in Parma and Pietro Albesani in Piacenza) had delayed their arrival, which prevented the installation of the courts. Wrong, came the Minister of Justice’s response: the courts should be set up, or rather should have been already set up, with existing

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

123

bumbling chief of administration would call troops to Parma when everyone knew that the insurrection went off in the Piacentino?’ Lalatta scoffed, in a sneering tone that illustrates why Linati and his colleagues ignored their administrator general and negotiated directly with French envoys.42 Moreau confided to his diary complaints muttered behind his back, relayed by concerned friends and acquaintances: ‘The nobles here reproach me for believing they had something to do with the rebellion—they say that all classes of people find fault with [my] government—that employees of the former duke murmur about not having received their fair share of the duke’s succession. That Linati was unhappy when I scolded him because the Anzianato wanted to organize a delegation to meet with the Prince Viceroy etc.’.43 By the time General Junot arrived in Parma on 25 January, it was a foregone conclusion that Moreau’s ineptitude had facilitated and amplified, and perhaps even directly caused, the present disorders. Parma’s new ruler was gracious enough to allow Moreau a couple of weeks to gather his belongings and pack his beloved books, but made no effort to soothe the fallen man’s wounded pride: ‘I will not conceal from you that I wrote to His Majesty that, given the current state of affairs, you are no longer in a position of doing good here’.44 What was Moreau’s gravest shortcoming? His outdated mannerisms occasionally raised eyebrows, but no whiff of scandal tainted this eager functionary’s reputation. Senior commanders reproached his faulty implementation of French reforms and lack of firmness in rallying the elites, but admitted he was trying hard. Much of the irascibility in the country rose from unpredictable changes in the legal system and prolonged uncertainty over Parma’s status for which the central administration, not Moreau, was responsible—he dared say so much in his Compte Moral.45 The issue of muscular enlisting in National Guards, again, could be blamed only personnel; besides the Minister was still waiting for a list with potential nominees for the lower courts. AN BB/5/302. 42  Lalatta, entry of 7 January. He was referring to the arrival of General Le Suire the previous day. BP Mss. Parm. 1185. 43  Faidherbe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV. Entry of 24 January 1806, p. 156. 44  Faidherbe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV. Entry of 26 January 1806, p. 184. 45  By way of meagre consolation, one day before General Junot rode into town, Moreau noted that friends shared with him the majority opinion that: ‘more time was necessary for people to familiarize themselves with French laws before submitting (to the French state)’. Faidherbe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV. Entry of 24 January 1806, p. 156. It was too late for him to be proven right.

124 

D. P. HARSANYI

­artially on Moreau’s weak leadership, as Napoleon himself acknowlp edged. Earnest efforts at contributing to the imperial treasury fell short of anticipations but could have succeeded given time and support. Even the fact that a rebellion broke out under his watch could have been passed over—such events had happened before and were largely considered inevitable when running a large empire. What could not be forgiven was indecision in a moment of crisis: it was the cardinal sin that cost the Administrator General the respect of his superiors, his job and the very ability to make a living. Moreau de Saint-Méry’s incompetence crystallized as the root cause for all troublesome events in his area of responsibility because he proved unable to identify and swiftly implement the right policy for the right circumstances, that is, to carry out the strategy of law and order France had perfected for more than a decade. By not restoring order in a timely fashion Moreau failed in the basic duty of a French imperial officeholder: legitimizing French power via efficient government and achieving social stability grounded in the rule of law. In the words of John Davis: ‘Law and order as the main claim to political legitimacy implicitly legitimized the authoritarianism of French rule’. In practice, it justified ‘the restoration of the law of order after the upheavals of the previous decade’.46 The States of Parma were subject to French law, notwithstanding their yet to be decided status and token autonomy; a senior administrator was expected to address social unrest by availing himself of the system of law and order that operated in the French Empire and the Kingdom of Italy. Moreau’s failure to do so made the French state appear weak and disorganized, an indefensible blunder that served as warning to the team who replaced him.

Brigandage Restoring law and order hinged on criminalizing any form of collective action that defied state power, which meant that popular rebellions easily fell under the heading brigandage. As a legal category, brigandage belonged to the militarization of the system of law and order discussed in Chap. 4. In Italy, as in France, the capacious term brigandage merged, in Alan Forest’s definition, ‘the anti-revolutionary and the anti-social’.47  Davis, Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth Century Italy, 121.  Alan Forrest, ‘The Ubiquitous Brigand: The Politics and Language of Repression’ in Popular Resistance in the French wars. Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates. Ed. C. J. Esdaile (Houndmills, 2005), 25–43 (31). 46 47

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

125

Consequently, the boundaries between politically motivated revolts and lawless disorders were vague; the system of repression, on the other hand, was precise and criminalized all resistance to authority. As in France, this occurred gradually. At the beginning of the First Italian campaign several civilian commissioners, true to their revolutionary ethos, found much to criticize in the conduct of their fellow French occupiers and made some effort to link select episodes of crowd violence to popular demands for justice.48 This, however, required more patient legal parsing than French officers had time for. In due course, in Italy as in France, any kind of active antagonism came to be categorized as brigandage, which greatly simplified the work of the authorities: ‘By branding resistance as brigandage, its perpetrators became mere insurgents and were immediately placed outside the protection of civil law and the decencies of war’.49 As in France again, resistance to conscription, first introduced in Italy in 1802, further justified the emphasis on criminality. Even more than in France (because the number of conscripts relative to the population was higher) masses of deserters joined thieves and vagrants to live off highway robberies and assorted illicit activities, which reinforced the authorities’ reliance on strict military justice.50 The war on brigandage, with its specific language and methods, thus moved from France to Italy, and for the same ostensible reasons: to end the anarchy and establish the rational post-revolutionary order. The working hypothesis at the foundation of coherent empire-wide counter-insurgency strategies contended that, in every case, a compliant majority had been set adrift by a minority of ill-intentioned villains, that is, the ubiquitous brigands so compellingly brought to life by Alan Forrest. The overall template explains why the official account of the Piacentino insurrection centred on brigandage, despite French authorities’ own findings on causality webs unrelated to criminality. 48  A discussion of crowd violence as a form of popular justice in revolutionary France in Colin Lucas, ‘Revolutionary Violence, the People and the Terror’ in The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, vol. 4, The Terror. Ed. K. M. Baker (Oxford, 1994), 57–79. Most relevant in this sense are the numerous letters sent in 1799 by Comissaire Amelot, who in his quality of Commissaire spécial du Directoire et Administrateur en chef des Contributions, Revenus et Finances de la République Francaise dans toute l’Italie knew what he was talking about: they form a long lament on the exactions imposed by the army supplemented with dire warnings of impending uprisings. AN AF/III/71, 72. 49  Davis, Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth Century Italy, 75. 50  For the close link between conscription, desertion and brigandage see the bibliography listed in note 16 Chap. 5 in this book.

126 

D. P. HARSANYI

Without waiting for a chance to investigate what was happening in his district, General Marion pointed to brigands in the first letter to prosecutor Albesani: ‘These brigands descend from the mountains and force peaceful inhabitants to join them; they steal, commit gross misdeeds and leave the people frightfully bewildered’. Moreau de Saint-Méry too cited at first ‘few residents accustomed to live off smuggling and assassination’, although he saw them as enabling elements rather than principal instigators.51 Philippe Lacroix’s early report assigned responsibility to generic ‘individuals known for their lawlessness’ next to priests and foreign interlopers.52 Writing from outside the concerned region, General Menou took for granted the overlap between brigands and insurgents: ‘We will comb the mountains and will not let one brigand, one insurgent behind ’.53 Inquiries into the causes of the events failed to uncover criminal mobs coordinating rebellious actions, although lawlessness was certainly not unknown in the States of Parma: petty theft and general disrespect for property along with highway robbery and murder, the latter most often related to family disputes, were facts of life.54 However, aside from smuggling, which counted as normal economic activity in the Apennines, there was no reason to believe that brigandage was flourishing there any more than in other parts of the peninsula. With conscription still in the planning phases and National Guard service supposedly completed on a voluntary basis, draft dodgers morphing into brigands had not yet become a critical 51  Moreau de Saint-Méry to Lebrun, Parma 8 Nivôse an 14 (29 December 1805). ANP F/1e/86. 52  Troubles qui ont agité le Plaisantin dans le mois de Janvier 1806. See note 17 sopra. 53  General Menou to Moreau, Turin 11 January, Parma BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 37. 54  Moreau de Saint-Méry repeatedly expressed dismay at the fatalism with which inhabitants regarded stealing of produce or poultry from one’s property, due, to his mind to a ‘jurisprudence that protects theft’. As quoted in Emilia Carra, Gli Inediti di Moreau de Saint-­ Méry a Parma (Parma: Fresching, 1954), 47. Statistics compiled by Ettore Carrà show that in their majority, crimes for the decade 1796–1806 were indeed thefts: 117 plus another 238 not labelled, most likely all manners of property damages, out of a total of 586. There were 35 homicides for this period, the most in 1805 and 1806 (10 and 12 respectively; the increases were probably related to clashes over National Guard recruitment and later to conscription orders). Ettore Carrà. L’Ordine Pubblico nel Periodo Napoleonico. Piacenza 1806–1814, 158–159. Moreau could boast of the successful prosecution of a criminal gang that terrorized the region until their exemplary punishment in August 1804. ASPr Gridario 1804–1805. Representatives of the Jesuits asked to be allowed to give the last rights to these unfortunate subjects, but no voices rose to ask for mercy. Details in D. Ferruccio Botti, La Forca d’Bretta. Storia del Bandito Berretta e cenni sui condannati a morte in Parma dal 1560 a 1857 (Parma, 1958).

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

127

issue, save for a few deserters trickling across the border from the Kingdom of Italy and promptly arrested by gendarmes. On their side, local Italians, unfamiliar with French law and order mechanisms, seemed to ignore the very word.55 Pietro Cavagnari, who marshalled any evidence he could think of in defence of villagers suspected of insubordination, made no mention of brigands in his pleas; likewise, Piacenza’s notables did not include banditry in the itemized list of possible triggers for rebellion. Mayors and commissioners who occasionally complained of rowdy montanari (mountain inhabitants) who took everybody by surprise never designated such individuals as briganti. The more French officers learned about local realities, the less they worried about brigands mutating into anti-French rebels. The few references to brigands and brigandage scattered throughout the syntheses produced for the Justice and Interior Ministries read either like convenient linguistic shortcuts or like a nod to conventional scenarios for revolts. In fact, General Junot did not even mention the issue of brigandage in the follow-up synopsis he drew for Napoleon.56 Yet, the official narrative authored by Governor Lebrun, first published on 18 January in Gazzetta di Genova, centred on the solid, unquestioned bedrock of brigandage.57 Lebrun began by describing chronologically the rebels’ manoeuvres and the counterinsurgency operations. Then, he singled out for praise the skilled French officers in charge and, immediately afterwards, helpful priests, energetically cooperative local leaders, and the many ordinary inhabitants whose ‘good sense’ contributed to restoring order. Together, these groups presented the 55  Enzo Ciconte neatly showed that what was standard procedure for French military and civilian authorities was still a conceptual novelty in Italy: ‘With the end of the eighteenth century arrived the French and with them arrived the brigands. The transalpine [authorities] defined as brigands the cut-throat hardened criminals who profited from the circumstance to rob, steal and sequester and all those who for the most varied reasons opposed the French military occupation’. Enzo Ciconte, Banditi e Briganti. Rivolta continua dal cinquecento all’ottocento (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2011), 63. The chapter on brigandage during the Napoleonic era pp. 63–121. See also Carlo Zaghi’s sympathetic account of the disruptions produced by the amalgamation between banditry and opposition to French rule in L’Italia di Napoleone dalla Cisalpina al Regno, 624–626. 56  General Junot to the Emperor of the French. Parma, 24 February 1806. AN AF/ IV/1717. 57  Gazzetta di Genova, No. 6, 18 January 1806. The account was reproduced in the Milan’s Giornale Italiano (19 January) and in Turin’s Courrier de Turin (22 January), afterwards reprinted in all major journals in the Kingdom of Italy, in French and Italian, but ignored by the press in France.

128 

D. P. HARSANYI

public with the picture of solidarity between the forces of good composed of all French executives, their collaborators on the ground and peaceful residents. Brigands alone materialized as the forces of evil, ‘roaming the land and spreading sedition’ and marked, therefore, for inflexible retribution.58 Throughout the document, Lebrun used ‘brigands’ and ‘insurgents’ interchangeably, clearly connecting the Piacentino rebellion with the prevailing empire-wide explanatory model which drew a straight line between brigandage and popular anti-­government protest. For conceptual consistency, data that did not fit the official template—including, curiously, the already agreed upon trigger of forceful recruitment in National Guards— was left out of the authorized narrative. The clear-cut exposé smoothed all divergences, silenced potential questions, and relegated to triviality the region’s messy realities. The goal was not to present accurately the complexities of the situation, but to reassure the public that this rebellion was no different from the numerous episodes that preceded it. Lebrun placed the events in the familiar pattern brigandage/deluded masses/law enforcement and concluded that the authorities had taken appropriate measures to bring order into chaos in due course. In contrast with Moreau de SaintMéry’s dithering, he wrote in the self-confident tone expected of a senior official confronted with riotous disobedience. These documents enshrined the official consensus, concurrently recorded by Viceroy Eugene in a brief paragraph of his memoirs: From the first days of January 1806, an insurrection incited by the clergy, broke out in this province. It was an isolated, thoughtless movement, which had no important goals and could gather no support. General Junot was sent to Parma by order of the Emperor and Prince Eugene deployed important armed forces. The movement was quickly brought under control. The principal instigators escaped punishment and were not, in fact, pursued too seriously. The viceroy spared the ignorant and fanatical masses who, as it always happens in this sort of brawls, were sacrificed, and pushed in harm’s way.59

58  Clearly separating brigands from the innocent masses was a matter of great importance, to which Lebrun returned on other occasions: ‘We are in the possession of information about the authors of the insurrection; but in the interest of justice, we will wait for further evidence, so we will only strike the truly guilty’. Governor Lebrun to Minister Champagny, Genoa 21 January 1806. AN F/1e/85 and Bulletin 55, published in Courier de Turin on 29 January 1806. 59  Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire du Prince Eugène, II, 49–50.

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

129

The People Beyond producing the approved version of specific events, Lebrun’s account sought to launch the grand work of restoring order, on which the viability of the regime depended, to quote Howard Brown once more.60 This was the ‘blowing cold’ half of the pacification strategy: an outstretched hand searching for common ground after a resounding show of force.61 Consistent with the douceur tactics of the counter-insurrection phase, it built on the assumption that a good majority of people caught up in rebellion passed the innocence test (though not necessarily the astuteness one). Benoît Garnot’s discussion of Enlightenment ideas on who the people were and what they stood for helps explain how widely shared philosophical assumptions reinforced and added moral weight to political decisions. In a nutshell, Europeans whose education and social status enabled them to consider from a distance the greater part of fellow human beings, viewed the lower classes with a mix of ‘contempt, wonder and fear’.62 The people were an unknown quantity that inspired reverence and dread in equal parts, the poignant aura of docile toiling alternating with images of dreadful brutality. Rousseau-inspired notions of purity of heart supposedly natural to rural folk settled the ambivalence by relegating violent movements to evil outside forces: When a mutiny erupts here or there, it is always because, observers say, it has been caused by individuals who seek to stir up a people they are not part of; if fact, there are instigators, all of them marginal and asocial, and there is the people who merely follows; the reasoning is that without instigators, there would be no risk of trouble.63

For a political order legitimized by popular revolution, the concept of people as repository of natural law was a philosophical prerequisite. But the revolution had also exposed the dangers of anarchy and destruction that society encountered when left to the mercy of angry mobs, the dangerous

60  H.  G. Brown, ‘From Organic Society to Security State: The War on Brigandage in France 1797–1802’, 682. 61  Colson, Napoleon on War, 341–346. 62  Benoît Garnot, Le Peuple au siècle des Lumières. Echec d’un dressage culturel (Paris: Editions Imago, 1990), 79. 63  Garnot, Le Peuple au siècle des Lumières, 83.

130 

D. P. HARSANYI

side of the people’s natural simplicity.64 French officers were sufficiently attuned to Enlightenment discourses to look for culprits beyond the people themselves, to the multiple damages wrought by retrograde regimes who kept the masses in darkness. In the words of Stuart Woolf: The people was always ignorant, normally passive, and rationally unknowable. Its ignorance was not only proof of its inferior status, but also surviving evidence of an earlier stage of civilization. Its passivity resulted from the bonds of obedience and deference inbuilt into family relations and was likely to be upset only through prolonged hunger or subversive incitement.65

In this logic, brigands supplied the outside subversive incitement, and it made sense to give a second chance to participants who merely went with the flow.66 In support of this line of reasoning, Lebrun referenced reports from the field that movingly described how the ‘unhappy inhabitants’ trapped in the events awoke from insurrection as if from a bad dream, grateful for the magnanimity French commanders showed once the dust had settled: Those who succumbed to violence bless with all their heart the forces who protect them and return to their homes; those who have been seduced, admitted the error of their ways; all that remains to accomplish is to subdue the real brigands, instruments of foreign powers, who deserve punishment without hope for mercy.67 64  On the general fear of popular violence in revolutionary events in Italy see Anna Maria Rao, ‘Il problema della violenza popolare in Italia nell’età rivoluzionaria’ in Rivoluzione Francese. La forza delle idee et la forza delle cose, a cura di H. Burstin (Milano: Guerini, 1990), 247–266. Garnot emphasizes that Rousseau himself did not equate the natural goodness of the people with gentleness or meekness. 65  Woolf, Napoleon’s Integration of Europe, 187. Armando Saita reached similar conclusions in a subtle analysis of the ‘passive revolution’ thesis centred on the Enlightenment notion of an immature but persuadable people. ‘Notes pour l’étude des attitudes politiques et des groupes sociaux dans l’Italie jacobine et Napoléonienne’ Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 312 (1997): 503–527 (522–527). 66  In tune with this general mindset, General Marion advocated for compassionate leadership to isolate the criminal element: ‘I wish, Sir, this storm to calm down as soon as possible, equally for the sake of these unfortunate folks duped by brigands and for the sake of fulfilling the government’s instructions’. General Marion to Monsieur le Procureur Général Impérial près de la Cour Criminelle de Plaisance, Plaisance le 2 Janvier 1806. AN BB 18/871. 67   Concluding paragraphs of Lebrun’s report in Gazzetta di Genova, No. 6, 18 January 1806.

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

131

These were exactly General Menou’s dispositions in the report where he declared the insurrection over: ‘there are a few chieftains who deserve neither grace nor pardon, and we will be sure to catch those; they will be handed over to the Military Commission’.68 Ordinary folks who turned in their weapons and went home would not be further pursued. Connected with belief in the malleability of human nature, another key Enlightenment concept, the condescending emphasis on the common people’s vulnerability to outside incitement, substantiated the brigandage thesis and strengthened the French administrators’ belief in their own suitability for leadership in occupied lands.69 To move things forward, French officers reached out to local elites, presumed impervious to manipulation thanks to their enlightened education and cosmopolitan lifestyle. It was not a matter of trust, for Napoleonic representatives recognized that irritation against occupiers could come from above as well as from below. However, they easily identified in Italian notables ‘people like us’ with whom they could communicate thanks to shared social norms, philosophical views and cultural references. The concept of immature popular classes belonged to this common idiom and informed what Stuart Woolf called ‘a dichotomist vision of society’: amorphous, unpredictable masses on one side, and, on the other side, rational, knowledgeable elites tasked with leadership responsibilities. Ideally, the multitudes who formed what the educated classes throughout Europe called the people—including those rowdy villagers still blind to their own future—were the ultimate beneficiary of the imperial administrators’ mission of bringing order into chaos and light into darkness. But the historical chance at changing the world could not wait until benighted rural folks grasped the magnitude of the moment. Which is why, as Woolf further argued, ‘the elites, preferably property owners, needed to be won over, not least because they functioned as role models for the people, who were ignorant and superstitious’.70 68  Menou to Champagny, Torino 19 January. Champagny confirms receipt and thanks Menou. ANP F/1e/85. 69  Relevant to this attitude is Bronislaw Bazcko’s discussion of vandalism discourse in the French revolution, which ‘legitimated a sharp division of roles between the civilizing power and a people in need to be civilized’. Bronislaw Baczko Comment sortir de la terreur: Thermidor et la révolution (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 303. See also his article ‘Vandalism’ in Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution. François Furet and Mona Ozouf editors (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 860–868. 70  Stuart Woolf, ‘Napoleon and Europe revisited’ Modern & Contemporary France (2000), 8(4), 469–478 (472). Notably, this view abandoned the dehumanizing language of the

132 

D. P. HARSANYI

The Perils of Collaboration An episode buried among reports sent to Imperial Prosecutor Albesani brings into sharp focus the wall of defiance that French authorities hit at every turn at the village level, even on the rare occasions when non-elite cooperation was forthcoming. In an exceptionally dramatic statement addressed to the Imperial Prosecutor, console Francesco Plezzi and his assistant Felice Pezzini from Pianello cità drew the customary picture of fearsome outside invaders—in their case, a horde of 7000 insurgents who marched into their commune and took over its day-to-day operations. In addition to the usual commandeering of food and weapons, these rebels used the detention facilities for their own purposes: on 2 January, they imprisoned in Montechio, one of Pianello’s dependent villages, a certain Carlo Stefani, console of the neighbouring Val Pecorara. At the same time, they released prisoners from the Pianello jail and took them to Mezzano.71 About a week later, with French troops closing in, a team of local luminaries attempted to justify Stefani’s imprisonment and offer French commanders the spectacle of fair communal justice. A document written in French on paper head-lettered Au Nom de Dieu (In the name of God) and signed Je, Francois Archi-Prêtre de Pecorara explains the liberation proceedings for Charles Stefani: the decision was taken in the name of the communes of Val Pecorara, Busseto, Marzonago and Cort’alta Roncaglia, each being represented by several delegates who signed next to the chief priest for a total of 30 signatures. Stefani had gravely injured the four communities, the document stated without giving any details, but residents were ready to grant him a pardon if he agreed to abide by collectively decided ‘rulings, pacts, and conditions’, stating that Stefani and his son would be deprived of voting in communal affairs; that he would pay 300 livres for ‘souls in Purgatory’ (to be paid directly to the priest); he would not seek to be reimbursed for any property lost during his arrest; on the contrary, he would pay all expenses related to liberation proceedings.72 Vendée and of the triennio years, which invoked the rebels’ unbending stubbornness to justify the need to exterminate them. 71  Denunzia console Francezo Plezzi, 4 Gennaio 1806, Pianello città. AN BB 18/871. 72  Chapitres, Pactes et conditions firmées (sic) et établies entre les communes de Val Pecorara, Bussetto, Marzonago, Cort’Alta Roncaglia pour la libération de Charles Stefani, prisonnier, pour avoir insulté les dites communes avec des mauvais traitements, avec des ironies très connues contre les dites communes qui se déclarent grièvement offensées. Au nom de Dieu, ainsi soit-il, L’an 1806 9 Janvier. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 26–27.

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

133

The letter was given to lieutenant of gendarmerie Martin—who signed to acknowledge receipt—with the request that he put the document under the eyes of General Radet, Inspector General of Gendarmerie. The signatories must have hoped that such an elaborate process, communicated in French for good measure, would impress imperial executives whose stated objective was the rule of law. If so, their attempt backfired spectacularly: decisions taken by village priests and commissioners in the name of God and in total disregard of current legal statutes could not have been more alien to the French concept of law and order. Indeed, General Radet flew into a rage when he learned that Stefani’s grievous crime, which the self-appointed judges had refrained from naming, was none other than loyalty to French authorities. ‘I came upon a document that would allow me to have all its authors shot’, fumed Radet as he retold the events from his viewpoint in a letter to Moreau de Saint-Méry: rebels in four communes arrested the named Stefani and only released him after extorting huge sums of money and arbitrarily stripping him of citizenship rights. His house had been destroyed during the nine days of unjustified arrest, but he managed to escape (incidentally, with help from the very person charged with collecting the punitive fee) and he was currently seeking Radet’s support. A quick investigation persuaded Radet that Stefani was ‘a property owner and honest man devoted to the French, guilty only of welcoming gendarmes in his home’.73 An attack on a person who cooperated so fully with French state agents was an attack on the French administration in its entirety. Retaliation came swiftly: on 16 January, Radet ordered a column of 400 men to sweep the four communes, together with the 300 troops already tasked with occupying San Giovanni, and then to join the 500-strong unit marching towards the larger commune of Vogherra. Radet’s fury abated after the four communes surrendered and he did not follow up on the threat to shoot all the signatories of the letter. The long hand of French justice reached the chief priest Francesco Franchi instead, and this despite Bishop Cerati’s intervention. Cerati took Franchi into custody along with two other problematic ministers, promised maximum severity, and even offered to defrock the lot of them, but insisted that clergymen had the right to be auditioned in an ecclesiastic court and not be turned over to Radet.74 It did not help.  Radet to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Piacenza 15 January 1806, BP Mss. Parm. 543, f. 106.  Bishop of Piacenza Cerati to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Piacenza 26 January, BP Mss. Parm. 543 f. 208. The other two were Lorenzo Cuneo, Capellano di Marzogano and Pio Batta Perazzo, Retore di Lazarello. 73

74

134 

D. P. HARSANYI

Franchi was removed from the bishop’s custody, and it is probable that Napoleon referred to him in the 7 February letter to Junot which expressed the wish that ‘the priest currently in the bishop’s hands be shot’.75 Franchi could therefore count his blessings when, in a separate closed doors session, the Military Commission pronounced a sentence of two years in jail, having found Francesco Franchi, archpriest of Pecorara, guilty of ‘Having extorted much of the fortune of Carlo Stefani by means of his influence over the people, and of not preventing the people to rebel’. A poster with the sentence and a summary of the deliberations, in French and Italian, was displayed in the communes implicated in these events—a warning to other intractable clergymen.76 Episodes such as this disgusted Albesani, who never tired of warning the French of the mauvais esprit public in the region. Stefani seemed to have few defenders among his compatriots since his ad hoc arrest and imprisonment stirred no efforts to come to his aid. It was hard not to arrive at the conclusion Radet reached, namely that the entire community banded together to torment a notorious collaborator of the French. The imminent arrival of French troops prompted local notabilities, including the chief priest, to cast collective vengeance in the mould of lawful dispensation of justice while the mayor looked on with a self-declared helplessness very suspicious to French eyes. Substantiating Albesani’s warnings, these actions communicated not just widespread resentment of foreign interference in a community’s life, but also calculated attempts at confounding the occupiers. It all ran contrary to the dichotomy of defenseless peasants/ferocious brigands at the centre of the official narrative, another indication that the discourse of brigandage was a matter of strategic choice rather than the outcome of observable reality.77

75  Au Général Junot, Paris le 7 février 1806, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #9772, XII, 18. 76  Jugement contre Francesco Ferrari, archi-prêtre de Pecorara. Piacenza 10 February 1806. BP Mss. Parm. 543 f. 252. 77  A similar episode occurred in the village of Mezzano, where, according to a gendarme captain’s report, a sort of mass rebellion started as soon as the French left. The one person who sided with the French fell victim to mob justice. The French commander admonished the local priest who responded so arrogantly that the commander declared he had no choice but to arrest him. This might be the reason why Mezzano was the village later targeted for exemplary punishment. BP Mss. 543, ff 176, 177.

6  EXPLANATORY NARRATIVES: BRIGANDAGE 

135

An Unexpected Stumbling Point The nobles of Piacenza listed lowly mules as some of the most important triggers for the insurrection, even ahead of recruiting for the viceroy’s reserve camp. Moreau too saw this as a major reason for discontent: ‘The Piacentino peasants are ready to rise in mass rebellion because we took away their mules, and customs workers drive them mad with laws they have not been told anything about’, an exasperated Moreau harangued the viceroy’s envoy.78 His personal diaries contained information obtained on the spot, and, unlike the carefully calibrated account he wrote months later, show the constant sense of panic at local communes’ refusal to comply with orders sure to devastate their homes. Moreau wrote repeatedly to the Anzianati of Parma and Piacenza to urge them to improve returns.79 Notified by the viceroy that troops were being scheduled to march through the states, he spent November and most of December scrambling to organize military hospitals, stock up on foodstuffs and other necessities, and meet requests for mules and horses, all the while leaving unanswered local representatives’ queries about how the population would be reimbursed for such extraordinary efforts. General Masséna’s demand for 120 mules provoked out-and-out anger and met with the most determined resistance.80 Mules were essential in the household economy of the area. Families relied on them for work in the fields and for transportation; for the poorest among them, a single mule accounted for the difference between survival and starvation. Entire communities would suffer should mules be taken from them, Cavagnari informed Governor Lebrun.81 According to Moreau’s diaries, the manner of finding, seizing and transporting mules took centre stage in his communications with local authorities for the better part of the months of October and November 1805.  Faidherbe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV, 53.  Tambini, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal III part II, Entry for 26 Vendémiaire an 14 (19 septembre 1805), 707. 80  Moreau’s journal entry for 19 Vendémiaire an 14 (11 octobre 1805): ‘General Demanelle arrives at noon from headquarters. He hands me a letter from Marshal Masséna which asks for 120 mules. I call Linati and I tell him to find 80 from Parma regions. I write to the Governor of Piacenza to ask for 70’. The entry for 8 Frimaire an 14 (29 November 1805) indicates that the viceroy kept insisting on timely deliveries of mules for the needs of the army while community leaders asked, in vain, how the army planned to compensate peasants for the loss. Tambini, Journal III part II, pp. 683 and 872 respectively. 81  Cavagnari to Lebrun, Parma 3 January 1806  in Cavagnari, Alcune Particolarità storiche, 83–86. 78 79

136 

D. P. HARSANYI

Under pressure from the viceroy’s insistence on timely delivery, the Administrator General held countless personal talks with disgruntled village elders, all of whom balked at the request. It is not clear how many mules were in the end seized from their owners, but there is no doubt that the idea of parting with animals so central to the local economy stirred deep and lasting resentment. This was why the Piacentini notables who mediated between French authorities and rebellious communes insisted that reimbursement for confiscated mules should be the administration’s top priority. In follow-up reports, Governor Lebrun and General Junot acknowledged complaints about mules requisitioned and not paid for, hinting that Moreau should have been able to take care of the issue. On his part, Moreau left out the mules from his final account of the insurgency, perhaps dreading to leave the impression that such lowly creatures may have caused the French Empire to tremble.

CHAPTER 7

Pacification

Like the military offensive, reconciliation followed the empire-wide blueprint centred on enlisting local elites in peace-keeping initiatives. French officers reckoned that the more local leaders contributed to restoring order, the more they would see themselves as part of the solution and, crucially, could be held accountable for the outcomes. In Napoleon’s own words: But, for a country to be properly submissive, the intendants, corregidors, and higher magistrates whom the people are accustomed to obeying must be appointed by you and go into these provinces, issue proclamations, pardon rebels who surrender and bring in their weapons, and above all issue circulars to the alcades and priests whereby the latter understand that they are under your government.1

Consistent with this general approach, French senior officers in the Piacentino sought ways to delegate locally a few law-and-order responsibilities as soon as the armed forces secured the area. They were knocking at an open door: the insurrection concentrated minds and prompted local 1  Napoleon to Joseph, Burgos, 20 November 1808, upon his transfer to the throne of Spain. Quoted in Colson, Napoleon at war, 341. In a previous note to General Savary (Bayonne, 19 June 1808) making similar recommendations, Napoleon stressed that this was the way public tranquillity had been achieved in France as well.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_7

137

138 

D. P. HARSANYI

leaders to come forward with offers of cooperation likely to secure them a measure of control. Implicit philosophical agreement on the nature of the people and the binary structure of society, with sensible elites watching over unpredictable masses, facilitated dialogue and would, in time, lead to collaboration. All documents penned by local elites, even when alluding to possible legitimate complaints, echoed the main French narrative line: the rebellion had been incited by malevolent outsiders and somehow took on a life of its own. Civic leaders took on the mantle of protectors of the people but made clear that they were the betters not the brothers of those they sought to shield from retribution—there is no evidence of nationalist bonding across class divides. In the letter that advised French authorities on the causes of rebellion, the 44 landowners and notables from Piacenza also declared their readiness to shepherd unwitting rebels back to the path of obedience, not so subtly stressing that, given their standing and deep roots in the country, they were the only ones who knew how to make the peasants listen. Their main recommendation was that a ‘wise and kind’ address to the rebels be issued presently.2 Official proclamations were indeed printed without delay and some of the signatories of this letter travelled to mutinous areas as early as 6 January.3 The same day Piacenza’s notabilities volunteered their services, Imperial Prosecutor Albesani offered Lebrun his hard-headed insights. Albesani confirmed that ancestral feudal bonds bestowed undisputable authority on men ‘venerated by the people’ like Marquis Anguissola and Count Scotti. In his matter-of-fact fashion that betrayed once more the scarce trust he put in  local pledges of allegiance to state authorities, he reckoned that noblemen were prepared to parlay this prestige into calming down the spirits because they were moved by a mixture of self-interest and vanity. There was no doubt in his mind that the spectacle of disgruntled crowds roaming the countryside, ringing bells and agitating against established 2  More details on these offers for mediation in Cavagnari, Alcune particolarità storiche, 87–93. Cavagnari wrote to Viceroy Eugène and Governor Lebrun advising on persons predisposed to cooperate with the French. He especially insisted on relying on parish priests as liaisons. According to Cavagnari, Napoleon received the letter the same day, 3 January. I found no evidence that this was indeed the case, but officials like Lebrun were most likely aware of the letter’s contents. 3  Letter signed by 44 noble landowners and urban notables from Piacenza, dated Piacenza 3 January 1806. Reproduced in Cavagnari, Alcune particolarità storiche, 86–87. The signatories also went to General Marion to implore him to not take too seriously events that had already occurred as of the writing of the letter on 2 January.

7 PACIFICATION 

139

order disturbed the local worthies no less than it did the French, enough to make them seek an alliance with the occupiers: I think that of their own initiative they will not put things right, but they do fear for their properties; and besides, should Your Highness (whom I have the honor to assure they hold in high esteem) honor them with a sign of trust, I dare say that tranquility will prevail in the lowlands and we will bring order to the mountainous areas too.4

Abesani astutely identified the noblesse oblige ethos which dictated that landowners protect villagers from outside dangers, not from daily hardships or exploitation; their mediation therefore did not aim further than containing the furia francese and obtaining clemency for those who provoked it.5 Anna Maria Rao’s analysis of old regime economic paternalism as a means of maintaining public order through age-old patterns of deference sheds additional light on the landlords’ manoeuvres: displaying firm leadership in crisis made them equally indispensable to French rulers and to rebel peasants.6 Traditional feudal paternalism fused with the strategic paternalism of the French authorities in a concerted effort at subduing peripheral territories that had escaped the control of both local and imperial centres of power.7

Pragmatism and Ambiguity The French were not quite sure what to make of these overtures, but suspicion was weighing heavier than trust: ‘Nobles and priests went among the rebels, under the pretext of discussing matters with them’, read Fouché’s Bulletin of 21 January 1806. ‘They brought back [the rebels’] conditions: restitution of monks’ property; suppression of duty taxes and  Albesani to Lebrun, Piacenza 2 January 1806, AN BB/871.  For quick reference to the European nobility’s traditional moral claims see Jonathan Dewald, The European nobility 1400–1800 (Cambridge, 1996), 186–196. Eric  Mension-­ Rigau, Aristocrates et grands bourgeois (Paris, 1997), 184–193; William Doyle, Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of Revolution (Oxford, 2009), 54–55. 6  Anna Maria Rao, ‘Folle Controrivoluzionarie. La Questione delle insorgenze italiane’ in Folle Controrivoluzionarie, 17–36 (see note 10, Chap. 6). 7  The dynamic centre-periphery as enabler of rural rebellions has been examined in Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796–1804, 105–113. For the French, of course, the States of Parma in their entirety were a periphery where local elites were expected to help establish order. 4 5

140 

D. P. HARSANYI

of the tax on doors and windows; exemption of all military service. It is probable that so-called negotiators have dictated these requests ’.8 French leaders had little doubt that mediators were using popular grievances as a medium for channelling the nobility’s own demands, in a transparent attempt to manipulate French decision-making. Believing this made it even easier to give no thought to the possibility that rebels did want what their wish lists stated they wanted. All the same, the grain of salt did not prevent French officers from grabbing hold of the common ground they identified between themselves and the local leadership classes. Agreements of principle between French state representatives and the most respected personalities in the region could not but impress on rebels the fatal mistake of taking up arms in revolt, further reinforced by Bishop Cerati’s frequent sermons on self-control and obedience. Secular and religious elites quickly adopted a realpolitik position partly because they recognized the futility of fighting the French state and partly because they genuinely preferred law and order to anarchy. The built in assumptions, omissions and ambiguities contained in the discourse of brigandage opened the door to a workable compromise, whereby local elites participated in pacification programmes without fear of losing the respect of their people. La douceur French commanders counted on efficient communication to complement decisive military action and took great care to publicize the thesis of innocent masses misled by deceitful leaders/brigands.9 By way of open letters posted in public places—the medium French commanders had used since the beginning of the First Italian Campaign—the population learned that the French were prepared to show limited goodwill, which took the name douceur. La douceur conveyed benevolence and patient understanding for people who had lost their way, the logical extension of the discourse of brigandage which separated the guilty few from the deluded many. The 44 signatories of the letter to Eugene applauded the initiative. In perfect coordination with the paternalistic tone adopted by French commanders, they stressed the simplicity of a populace never given to wickedness (non di cattivo animo), receptive to the slightest kindness coming from their  Bulletin of 21 January 1806. Police secrète du Premier Empire, II, 268–69.  For a detailed discussion of the concept of douceur see my article ‘Brigands or insurgents’ note 36, Chap. 5. 8 9

7 PACIFICATION 

141

betters.10 Parma’s civic leaders, whose city was less affected by the rebellion, made the same appeal in an early meeting with General Pino: ‘We must always start by using the means of douceur’, Linati and Nasalli told Moreau, briefing him on their interview with Pino.11 By contrast, Albesani’s abrasive, unyielding voice rose again to warn against policies reliant on misty-eyed visions of rural humility. Far from an alien intrusion, he wrote in a long letter to Liguria’s governor Lebrun, the criminal element consisted precisely of peasants presumed malleable or naïve: ‘I do not see how I can suggest methods in line with the ideas of moderation and douceur that characterize Your Highness et that I find in the letters with which you honored me’, Albesani declared. Going one step further than even the French on the road to deterrence, he suggested special courts without the right of appeal (in addition to military commissions) for all individuals caught carrying weapons, and outright deportation to penal colonies for all those suspected of having participated in the rebellion. As a concession to the soft touch, he agreed that such actions should be preceded by an informative note, not necessarily wise and kind, since he thought that simply talking to insurgents was charitable enough. Rebels only needed to know, in his view, that giving up resistance guaranteed one’s safety, while not doing so brought absolute desolation to their lands: ‘…all will be set on fire. Such methods are doubtless terrible, but I fear that these are the ones you must use despite the kindness of your heart; one occurrence will suffice to serve as example for all other villages given to seditious thoughts’.12 Governor Lebrun and Viceroy Eugene listened to both sides and issued messages composed in equal parts of carrots and sticks: not quite as soft as civic leaders wished, not quite as stern as Albesani recommended. Both built on the foundational thesis of brigandage. If there was indeed douceur in these messages, the goal was not to empathize with insurgents but to give them a last chance to save themselves by putting their fate in the hands of charitable, although by no means easy-going, French rulers. In conjunction with giving orders for military repression, Lebrun released a proclamation posted around the Piacentino during the first days of January 1806 to clarify the official French interpretation of the events. He omitted economic hardships and tax issues entirely. He accepted that recruitment  Letter to Prince Eugene, Cavagnari Alcune particolarità storiche, 86–87.  Faidherebe, Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal Parte IV, 82. 12  Albesani to Arch-treasurer Lebrun, Piacenza 2 January 1806, AN BB 18 871. 10 11

142 

D. P. HARSANYI

in the National Guard may have been a problem, but only because people, misled by brigands, did not understand the benefits of what he portrayed as a paid vacation. We are asking that a small part of your militia partakes for a few moments in the honor and advantages of regular service, that some of your sons who are not yet retained by family duties or occupations go without danger, without effort, well maintained and well paid to serve a Prince adored by those under his command, to watch over the precious arsenal the Emperor entrusted him, and which guarantees the peace you desire—and you want to deprive them of a glory all the French covet? … Armed forces surround you: one word is enough and, innocent or guilty, all of you will be punished. Return, I beseech you, to your homes and, while there is still time, listen to the voice of a father… In a few weeks I will be in your midst, I will listen to your complaints, and we will think together about ways of assuring your prosperity. Make sure my eyes do not fall on anything susceptible to anger me and that I will find everywhere proof of your repentance and the memory of my indulgence.’13

Echoing the same sentiments, the viceroy issued a separate appeal to the rebels which started with almost gentle reprimands and ended with the stern recommendation that all concerned reflect on the fate awaiting those who dared challenge the French empire—the time for reflection being limited to two hours: People of the States of Parma! We have heard with the greatest regret that some among you, doubtless provoked by enemies of peace, have armed yourselves, gathered in bands, and declared yourselves in a state of rebellion against the authorities and against the laws! What?! At this moment, when all the peoples of the continent take a respite from strife … only you mingle the cry of mutiny with the moving accents of joy and gratitude coming from all nations! Think carefully! French soldiers, generous with the enemies of their country, never concede to pardon rebellions. If in two hours from the present proclamation you did not disband, it is my sorrow to tell you that your families will for many years shed tears because of your disobedience and your crime.14

 AN BB 18/871.  ASPr, Atti Francesi, busta 1. Partially reproduced in Lenny Montagna, Il dominio Francese a Parma 1796–1815 (Piacenza: 1926), 68–69. Moreau de Saint-Méry distributed 13 14

7 PACIFICATION 

143

Ominous as it was, the viceroy’s letter corroborated Lebrun’s acknowledgment of possible improper recruitment into the National Guard and was open-ended enough to empower Piacenza’s military commander Marion to pledge a general pardon to all those who laid down their weapons. Extrapolating from this principle, General Marion permitted the spread of another rider to the prince’s message: that recruitment for National Guard, and by extension even conscription in the regular army— whenever it was going to start—would be on a voluntary basis only and exclude married men and heads of household. The prince, Marion announced, wanted only willing soldiers. While neither of these stipulations was clearly articulated, both were communicated to the rebels and never disavowed by the viceroy’s representatives.15 They became key elements in the strategy of pacification, often preventing armed interventions. Once again, the discordant voice was Albesani’s, who could not help seeing sly diversionary tactics in the rural communes’ grievances over rough recruiting: Many believe that recruitment for National Guard units, ordered to go to the Bologna camp, caused the insurrection. Some add that agents of England took advantage of this discontent to push people to rebellion. Everything is possible, but what is sure, is that for a long time, in fact from the very first days the Gendarmerie was organized in the region, they (villagers) rebelled and killed gendarmes, in a word, the public mood (esprit public) was the same before the recruitment, which could only have prompted them to put into action evil plans they already had in mind and were concocting for a long time.16

If the high officials in charge ignored Albesani on this point, it must have been for strategic reasons. Villagers passing judgement on French government officials did not fit the pattern of simple-minded peasants misled by experienced bandits; imperial administrators were not prepared to entertain the notion that small landholders and farm labourers, having given some thought to French rule, ended up deciding against it. Showing 1150 copies of the Viceroy’s message to local mayors throughout the Piacentino area. Lebrun’s and Eugene’s proclamations were also published in the Gridario 1806. 15  In a short note to Piacenza’s Governor, General Marion wrote that it was permissible to let people know that the prince only wanted willing men in his service, implying, though not clearly articulating the principle of voluntary enrolment. BP Miscellanea Moreau, V. 16  Albesani to Grand Juge Régnier, Piacenza 1 January 1806, AN BB/18/871.

144 

D. P. HARSANYI

a level of tolerance on the single issue of National Guard recruitment was a free concession, which allowed authorities to disregard entirely all objections related to taxes, requisitions and varied lifestyle changes brought in by the French administration. None of the popular concerns voiced in lists of grievances were examined and Governor Ferrari received no answer when he inquired whether the wishes of the ‘supplicants’ had been addressed; the subject simply never came up again.17 The shift towards paternalism conveniently displaced all discussion of the rebellion’s possible legitimacy, but allowed insurgents to choose between active criminality and passive spectator posture. Hammering this point even more forcefully, Lebrun issued another short announcement on the day of Eugene’s proclamation: all insurgents, except for the principal instigators, would be pardoned, including lower-level ringleaders who came forward to denounce the more prominent ones—provided they simultaneously abandoned the struggle, turned in their weapons and went home.18 Moreau blanketed the region with Eugene’s letter to the insurgents— he had more than a thousand copies printed. The noblemen kept their promise and carried the message into rebellious villages. According to reports mailed to the Administrator General’s office, it all worked like a charm. One clearly relieved commissioner from Fiorenzuola reported that news of the prince’s pardon, combined with the directive on recruitment on a volunteer basis, had an almost therapeutic effect: the insurgents fell silent, then decided to yield and started debating among themselves on how to proceed with the surrender (but still asked for bread, salami and wine to sustain them during deliberations).19 The same account came from a nearby commune: the rebels who had taken over one commune agreed to leave, listening to the entreaties of the priests and confident in the promised pardon, which they understood to be extended to all insurgents.20 Several communes in the neighbourhood of Lugagnago, the rebellion’s ad hoc headquarters, formally declared their submission to the government in front of gendarmerie captain Lanault, the letter being countersigned by Marquis Castati, who had showed them the viceroy’s  Ferarri to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Piacenza 12 January 1806. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 45.  Decree signed Lebrun, dated Genoa 7 January 1806. AN BB 18/871. For Lebrun’s and Eugene’s proclamations, also ASPr Gridario 1806. 19  Report signed by Andrea Laottice, Fiorenzuola, 11 January 1806. It describes events from the week before that date. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 45. 20  Giuseppe Canesi, Console di Stato, 9 January 1806, BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 15. 17 18

7 PACIFICATION 

145

message.21 Commissioner Vincenzi of Ferriere, whose report came three weeks after the beginning of the insurrection, confirmed that news of the peace guaranteed by Prince Eugene’s decree finally persuaded the crowds to disperse and return to peaceful pursuits.22 Citing the viceroy’s conciliatory message, priests hurried to act as guarantors of public tranquillity by collecting and delivering to relevant authorities weapons found in their parishes. Priests also produced certificates of good behaviour for citizens liable to fall under suspicion and declared that if members of their flock had taken to the hills it was only out of fear, not defiance.23 Of course, new problems arose, chief among them how to tell apart the innocent misled folks Lebrun and Eugene wished to pardon from the felons to be hauled before military commissions. Governor Ferrari shared with Moreau the concerns of the podestà of Nibbiano, who sought assurances that Count Leone Leoni, who brought promises of pardon to several mountain townships, was indeed speaking for the French authorities; his villagers, the podestà wrote, were ready to submit, but were waiting for guarantees on how, and how safely, they would be separated from the rivoltosi. Likewise, Captain Cornini from Scipione—the one who received alleged chief rebel Bussandri’s surrender—confessed that he found it impossible to pick out ill-intentioned rebels from the mass of humble foot soldiers, disoriented people falsely accused ‘by malice’.24 Besides, the already difficult retention of National Guard volunteers collapsed, for Eugene’s message emboldened many fresh recruits to abandon the units they had half-heartedly joined. Simultaneously, compliant officers were loosening their grip. Lieutenant Colonel Luigi Amadusi and Captain Luigi Marchesi, for instance, wrote on 8 February that they had dutifully enrolled men from their area of responsibility, but in view of Prince Eugene’s decree, they would not, and could not, compel married men and heads of family to wear the uniform. Moreover, the two officers declared that, despite being pressured by military inspector Duplan to go on with the recruitment, they decided to follow the spirit of the viceroy’s decree and allow unwilling soldiers to go home; surely, they concluded, Moreau’s 21  Captain of Gendarmerie Lanault to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Lugagnano, 11 January 1806. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 60. 22  Letter from Giuseppe Vincenzi to the Governor of Piacenza, 13 January 1806. BP Mss Parm. 543, fos 77–78. 23  BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 73–74, 98–99 and 108. 24  Ferrari to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Piacenza, 12 January 1806 and Cornini to Moreau de Saint-Méry, 16 January 1806, BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 57 and 202, respectively.

146 

D. P. HARSANYI

sense of justice would guarantee these innocent men’s safety.25 With confusion and foot-dragging gradually replacing open defiance, French commanders estimated that things were moving in the right direction: ‘I am overwhelmed with deputations from communes; they come to bring me assurances of atonement and to swear submission to the laws of the government’, wrote General Marion on 11 January. Well-founded fear of severe punishment accounted for much of the rush to lay down arms, but so far little repression had been needed and all was perfectly quiet.26 Anxious requests to be exempted from the ‘rebel’ label accompanied most protestations of devotion and ‘unalterable submission’.27 Mirroring the French rhetoric, surrender declarations left out the reasons for discontent carefully spelled out in the first reports and in the lists of grievances collected by Piacentini mediators. After the messages from Lebrun and Eugene were made public, all discussion of overburdening taxation, mule requisition, disruptive legislation and eventually even forcible recruiting in National Guard units vanished from the countless letters of submission that besieged Marion and swelled the paper mounds on Moreau’s desk. Muted too were the various expressions of anti-French animosity. The helplessness of villagers in the face of ferocious brigands, seemingly materializing out of nowhere, remained the focal point of accounts that fit like a glove the French narrative of brigandage, with the related douceur reserved for innocent victims of malicious bandits. Since it was unlikely that villagers magically forgot their grievances, the reason must be that mediators argued persuasively that there was no alternative to unconditional surrender. Reading Lebrun’s and Eugene’s messages, mayors and commissioners likewise concluded that the time for voicing discontent had passed; the best they could hope for was availing themselves of the carrots the French offered the better to avoid the sticks. In one illuminating episode, reported by the prefect of Genoa Bureaux-Puzy, regional 25  Amadusi and Marchesi to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Parma 8 February 1806. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 246. The two officers seemed to be unaware that Moreau was no longer in charge. ‘The innocent men’ in question were indeed not troubled by the authorities because Napoleon dissolved the National Guards on 19 January. 26  Charles Stanislas Marion, Commandant de Place, to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Piacenza 11 January 1806, BP Mss. Parm. 53, fo. 53. 27  For instance, Luigi Descalzi, chief priest of Vigoleno, ‘regretted’ the events but asked that his commune not be stamped with the mark of rebellion, emphasizing that, inspired by Bishop Cerati, he had always preached submission to the laws and now the entire people obeyed him. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 151. Other similar requests in idem, fos. 147 and 44.

7 PACIFICATION 

147

r­ epresentatives went as far as putting words into French officials’ mouths. Bureaux-Puzy was touring the Piacentino to make sure the insurgency would not spill over his side of the border. He ran into lieutenant of gendarmerie Paris, very puzzled to have been accosted by a group of self-­ described parlementaires who handed him an Italian-language note that read: We the undersigned, commissioned to negotiate peace among the people by order of the Commander General of Piacenza and of the aide de camp of H. S. H. Prince Eugène, we order you (underlined) and all other accompanying Gendarmes or regular troops of any sort to retreat at this instant from these mountains, considering that, in view of the same goal (peace) all the other French who were at Castel San Giovanni have already departed. Signed, Count Leone Leoni di Riccobanni, Father Gerolamo dalla Madonna di Campagna, Father Luigi dalla Madonna di Campagna.

Allegedly, this was the approximate translation of a French-language order signed by Piacenza’s Commander General Marion and addressed to an unnamed Commander of the Imperial Gendarmerie. It contained guidelines for treating the population kindly, in line with the viceroy’s promises and the overall goal of helping misled people arrive at the truth, not punishing them (‘According to the Prince’s intentions, it is douceur that we need’.). The forgery was so patently obvious that Lieutenant Paris arrested the emissaries for further inquiries, with the approval of both Piacenza’s Governor Ferrari and Bureaux-Puzy.28 The latter further alerted his colleagues to the ‘deplorable’ message the authorities would send, should such brazen attempts at manipulation remain unpunished.29 In the end, though, the events precipitated, and the entire incident was forgotten, most likely because French officers preferred to retain its constructive side: fake as it doubtless was, the dispatch propagated the French trope of manipulated masses, with culpability for mayhem falling on the few ‘chiefs’ who alone deserved to meet the full force of the law. In conclusion, ‘blowing hot and cold’, brutal repression combined with the paternalism folded into the language of brigandage worked quite well for the French. From open confrontation, representatives of the two 28  Bureaux-Puzy to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Vogherra 11 January 1806, BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 68–70, with copies of Lieutenant Paris’ note and the letter signed by Marion. 29  Bureaux-Puzy to Moreau (marked ‘received’ at Moreau’s office on 22 January) and to General Marion. Undated letters, probably 20 January. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fos 69–70.

148 

D. P. HARSANYI

parties slipped into a sort of unspoken understanding, whereby each moved away from issues susceptible to rekindling the conflict. Communities understood that douceur did not translate into sympathy for local difficulties and, deciphering the messages between the lines, tried to make the most out of public acceptance of French supremacy. In doing so, they abandoned any attempt at voicing grievances, even though Eugene’s letter specifically invited them to do so; surely, mayors and commissioners concluded that taking at face value rhetorical offers would only complicate their already bleak prospects. On their side, French military and civilian officers set aside misgivings on the mediators’ intentions and avoided probing the real sentiments behind the deluge of declarations of submission. In the interest of public order, simply accepting French rule was a good first step towards cooperation. The compromise agreement on brigandage alongside poor management as root causes for present disturbances supplied the platform for the next step—turning the precarious social peace into stable ground on which to build lasting institutions. What Lebrun and his colleagues failed to anticipate was Napoleon’s irate intervention, which, like a sudden jolt, thrusted the events on a much rougher path.

Rallying to the French The feudal property owners and urban professionals who, together with a handful of entrepreneurs, formed Parma’s leadership classes observed watchfully the gradual installation of French power in their lands. The sharp return to the status quo ante that followed the 20 years of Du Tillot’s reformist administration taught them that even radical changes could easily be reversed. Since the 1796 invasion, Napoleon’s confusing policies and the prolonged ambiguity of Parma’s status, neither independent nor fully integrated into the French system, invited further caution—if not duplicity as Moreau de Saint-Méry belatedly learned to his dismay. The insurrection had the effect of a watershed: the swift repression and corresponding administrative restructuring, all coordinated from Paris, left no one in doubt that the French had come to stay, and ambivalence was no longer an option. Not unlike historians two centuries removed from the events, people in positions of authority diagnosed the popular uprising as ‘the last stand of the old regime’ and positioned themselves accordingly.30  Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 80.

30

7 PACIFICATION 

149

With French troops streaming into the States of Parma, the Anzianati in the main cities approached the French authorities with a coherent position that, in contrast with Moreau de Saint-Méry’s panic-stricken agitation, secured them the part of reliable interlocutors, the adults in the room French officials could work with. Relative isolation may have made it easier for the duchies’ elites to rally to the French. Michael Broers noted that in the Piedmont, where the French felt real cultural affinity with the ‘products of an absolutist regime modeled closely on that of Louis XIV’ deep loyalty to the native dynasty made aristocrats hesitant to rally to the French (although bourgeois classes did rally). In Tuscany, prominent public figures did not rush to join French institutions, despite, or perhaps because of, prior active involvement with Peter Leopold’s reform programme.31 In Parma, by contrast, abrupt transfers of sovereignty were not a novelty and weakened the bonds between elites and ruling dynasties. Families with long histories in the region were prone to see themselves as autonomous entities, responsible for providing local leadership regardless of political vagaries. The signatories of the 3 January letter invoked the new international order to define the legal and moral framework for their decision. The Treaty of Aranjuez between France and Spain (1801) stipulated that the duchies would default to French rule, should the duke become unable to reign. This, they concluded, had undone their oath of fealty to Ferdinand and compelled them to transfer their loyalties to the French Emperor, the new legitimate sovereign. Carefully worded first messages show how diligently local leaders scrutinized the nature of French power and how quickly they identified a common discourse, based on shared systems of meaning that allowed them to address the French almost as equals. Writing in the tone of rational, responsible civic leaders, the Anzianati expanded on the familiar theme of the common people’s innate vulnerability to pernicious influences, to which they opposed their own readiness to end the existing chaos. Albeit using the same tropes, the two Anzianati approached the French authorities separately, each looking after the interests of the region they represented. 31  Broers, ‘The Imperial departments of Napoleonic Italy’, in The Napoleonic Empire and the New European Political Culture, 216–226 (223, 224). In both places, the French relied on former giacobini, although risks for political revenge called for caution. This was not even a possibility in Parma–Piacenza where the French squashed the movement of the giacobini in 1796.

150 

D. P. HARSANYI

Parma’s dignitaries distanced their city from insurrectionary activities as soon as they heard the news and, to Moreau’s considerable annoyance, hurried to offer support to the military commanders recently arrived in town. The minutes of Parma’s Anzianto’s meetings at the beginning of January 1806 indicate how swiftly the body responded to the events. On 8 January they discussed the viceroy’s proclamation and expressed relief that the message, addressed to revolutionaries, did not affect Parmense citizens because ‘far from having indicated even the shadow of sedition in the above named city and state [Parma], people here have maintained the strictest loyalty and submission to the present government’.32 On 9 January 1806, the assembly selected president of the Anziani Count Filippo Linati, reputed medical doctor Giacomo Tommassini and lawyer Luigi Torreggiani to travel to Eugene’s headquarters in Padua and pledge allegiance in person. This was announced in an official letter to Moreau de Saint–Méry, aimed first and foremost at extricating the city and region of Parma from the uprising in Piacenza. For this, it was essential to call the attention of all those in power to the synecdoche contained in the phrase ‘Peoples of the States of Parma’: The Manifest of his Most Serene Highness the Viceroy of Italy, published yesterday, has penetrated most vividly in the souls of the entire population. Being addressed to the Peoples of the States of Parma, a denomination that indicates the inhabitants of the city and its communes, who, albeit obedient to their Sovereign, are thus being mixed up with the rebels and stained with the shame of such reprehensible wrongdoing.

‘The people’s feelings have been deeply hurt’, the Anzianato sighed while promising the ‘constant fealty of the entire Paremense region’.33 On 10 January, the day the delegation left to meet the viceroy, the corps voted to 32  ASPr, Comune di Parma. Deliberazioni dell’Anzianato di Parma 1801–1813 Inv 8/2197/. 33  The president and the the Anziani of the Commune of Parma to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Parma, 9 January 1806  in Lettera dell’Anzianato di Parma a Sua Eccelenza il Signor Consiglere di Stato Mederico de Saint-Méry, uno dei commandanti della Legione d’onore, Amministratore Generale degli Stati di Parma etc etc. Dopo la Pubblicazione del Manifesto di S. A. Serenissima Il Principe Eugenio Vice Re d’Italia ai Popoli degli Stati di Parma e Successiva Riposta di Sua Eccelenza (Parma: Della Stamperia Imperiale, 1806). BP B.  Mich-Mar 1383.15. Moreau disliked the initiative but ended up supporting it, perhaps hoping that deference to authority expressed by his ‘subalterns’ as he always referred to Parmense notables would reflect positively on himself.

7 PACIFICATION 

151

host General Pino at Casa Sanvitale (Napoleon’s abode during the imperial brief sojourn). Angelo Mazza, the most famous local poet, wrote a sonnet to see them off and bid them to take to the viceroy the city’s ‘sacrosanct obedience and devotion’.34 A few days later, the three delegates reported that the prince had received them (not before making them wait a couple of days) and listened benevolently to their protestations of submission on behalf of the entire Parmense population.35 If Lalatta’s personal diaries are to be believed, Parma’s upper classes generally approved of their representatives’ lobbying efforts and were only upset with Moreau’s failure to report Parma’s indifference to whatever happened in Piacenza.36 Piacenza’s Anziani took a different tack. They too distanced the citizenry from unknown montanari whom the villagers, in their telling, fought at every turn: How sweet it is for us to be able to break our silence now that these revolting events are, at long last, behind us! True, we consoled ourselves knowing that the whole city (of Piacenza) and almost all the surrounding territory, and much of the hills and mountains under its jurisdiction resisted all entreaties and refused constantly and clearly to make common cause with men descended from the mountains who wanted, weapons in hand, to force villagers to join their side.

Their sense of duty, they wrote, compelled them to take their time because, unlike their neighbours, Piacenza’s leaders rushed to stem the unrest without worrying about appearances or thinking of their own safety. In a sentence dripping with scorn, Piacenza’s Anziani made it clear that, while their Parmense colleagues boasted of their blamelessness to Italy and all of Europe, they, Piacentini, set to the hard work of engaging with their misled compatriots: ‘Maybe it is less glorious to say that, a destructive malady having taken hold of some of our brethren, we hastened not only to prevent the disease but to cure those so afflicted’. By the present letter, they

34  Agli Ottimi Cittadini FL, GT, LT, spediti in deputazione dalla Communità di Parma A. S. A. I. Il Vice-re d’Italia. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 196. 35  Linati to Moreau de Saint-Méry, no date, probably 15 or 16 January 1806. Mss. Parm. 543 fo. 218. 36  Lalatta, entry of 7 January. Lalatta wrote this in a sneering tone that matches Linati’s and his colleagues’ barely veiled disdain for Moreau.

152 

D. P. HARSANYI

were asking Moreau to put at the feet of the throne the sincere remorse of the wrongdoers and the allegiance of the rest of the population.37 The sarcastic arrows flying back and forth between the Piacenza and Parma underscored the entrenched campanilismo that turned neighbouring cities (42 miles apart) into feuding rivals. Yet, present-day pragmatism trumped historical enmity; the entirety of the upper classes in Parma– Piacenza decided on a generally non-confrontational attitude towards their new masters, somewhere between dignified cooperation and calculated obsequiousness. Active collaboration was only one short step away.

Napoleon’s Reaction Fouché’s daily bulletins and Champagny’s letters kept Napoleon abreast of the events in the Piacentino, which he all but ignored until he read Lebrun’s account. Utterly displeased, the emperor took charge on the spot: he summarily dismissed Moreau de Saint-Méry and nominated General Jean-Andoche Junot to the new position of Governor General of the States of Parma ‘with the extraordinary mission to establish order’—as he saw fit, since he was endowed with absolute authority over all civilian and military institutions, including the military commission.38 The general barely had time to pack his bags: You will leave this very day; you will make haste night and day until you reach Parma; you will immediately communicate the attached decree to M. Moreau de Saint-Méry and, within two hours, you will print, publish, and distribute throughout the entire duchy a short and firm proclamation. You will assemble the armed forces. Parma is no place for the Arch treasurer to be. It is not with phrases that calm will be maintained in Italy. Do as I did at Binasco: a village must be burned; execute a dozen insurgents and set up mobile brigades to hunt down all brigands and give an example to the people of those regions.39 37  Anzianato di Piacenza to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Piacenza 16 January 1806. Signed Alberto Scotti, attuale priore del Anzianato, Avocatto Giambattista Maggi e Gaetano Bassini Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 121. 38  Décret Impérial # 1279, Stuttgart 19 January 1806. Lois et Actes Du Gouvernement, Volume 36 (Paris, De l’Imprimerie Impériale, 1806) pp. 249–250. A follow-up decree (5 February) detached the States of Parma from the 28th Military Division to give General Junot even more flexibility. Imperial Decree 5 February 1806. Notes pour le Ministre de la Guerre Paris le 5 février, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #9754, XII, 9. 39  Au général Junot, gouverneur général des états de parme et de Plaisance, Stuttgart, 19 January 1806, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #9678, XI, 543.

7 PACIFICATION 

153

The mention of Binasco—the terrible retribution visited on that rebellious commune in May 1796—telegraphed Napoleon’s wishes for quick and brutal punishment, unsoftened by concerns over the rebels’ grievances. He followed the accepted counter-insurgency narrative where brigands, whoever they were, shouldered the blame, but, unlike his subordinates, saw no distinction between guilty active brigand leaders and innocent deluded followers. That Lebrun made the distinction, moreover, that he made it public was to his mind an inexcusable error of judgement. Hence, all communication with the masses—other than explicit threats—had to stop: I just read a bulletin signed by you, titled Insurgency in the Piacentino. I can hardly convey to you my extreme displeasure for the lack of judgment to be found in this piece; it is as ridiculous as it is out of place. You do not have the right to advise the public; you only must keep me, and only me, informed. In truth, I do not even recognize you, allow me to say it frankly. You are not in Genoa to write, but to govern. As for Parma, it is within the jurisdiction of the 28th Military Division: only M. de Montchoisy ought to have gone there and crushed the rebellion in the bud, which would have been a lot better than all this nonsense. You have the gift of transforming a trifle into something that will bring great pleasure to all my enemies in Europe. I explicitly forbid you to print anything or to make any sort of proclamation; all this is pure ridicule. This Parma situation was at best worth the report of a gendarme captain.40

40  A. M. Lebrun, Strasbourg, 24 janvier 1806, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, #9700, XI, 675. The same day Napoleon wrote to Cambacères to inquire into Lebrun’s mental state (‘Tell me in confidence if he lost his mind. I begin to believe so’), which would somehow explain his lack of severity, and also to Fouché to ask him to make sure Lebrun’s report would not be reprinted, again worrying that it gave too much credit to local factors. Napoleon’s displeasure could be traced back to Lebrun’s hesitation to use brute force in Genoa only a few months prior to the insurrections in Piacenza: ‘Have you had the hope of governing people without first displeasing them? You will know that in fact government means force as much as virtue’. This was in response to Lebrun’s hesitation to coerce 15,000 experienced sailors from Genoa to enlist in the French navy, on the grounds that taking away so many heads of households at once would throw large sections of the population into poverty, increasing the risking of popular discontent at the same time. Napoleon would have none of it: ‘I am afraid you allow your conduct to be influenced, in so important a matter, by concern that the Genovese would get upset; but have no fear: willing or not, they must board my ships’. Accusations of wavering during the Piacentino rebellion were surely inspired by this episode. Letter from Napoleon to Lebrun, Camp de Boulogne 23 Thermidor an 13 (11 August 1805), Opinions, Rapports et Choix d’Ecrits Politiques de Charles François Lebrun, duc

154 

D. P. HARSANYI

Junot arrived in Parma, on the evening of 25 January. On 27 January he laid down the new order of things in a public proclamation to the inhabitants of Parma and Piacenza. He informed them that the emperor was displeased (‘You have disappointed the Emperor!’), which was why he, Junot, had come to Parma. He issued a series of decrees, effective immediately: all firearms must be collected by local priests and mayors and no person was allowed to bear any kind of weapon; individuals who kept weapons at home would be sent before the military commission; any commune who resisted French troops would be burned to the ground; any rebel caught carrying arms would be shot. Informed that several villages might have taken up arms again, he dispatched another mobile brigade to tear through the countryside.41 Remarkably, though, Junot left the door open for rebels to redeem themselves: ‘the authors of the rebellion must, and will be, punished… all who allow themselves to be fooled by scoundrels who want to profit from disorders, will suffer grievously’.42 The same day, in a harsh letter to Piacenza’s bishop that left little room for speculation on what he expected the prelate to do, he pointed out the same narrow escape route: …the priests must tell villagers that obedience alone will save them; that I made a proclamation to urge them to return to their homes, but that this (speech) comes with bayonets and that their village would already offer the frightening spectacle of desolation if I was persuaded that they were following some foreign advisers involved in the rebellion.43

The tone of Junot’s addresses to the locals, the stated differentiation between blameworthy rebel leaders and presumably unaware multitudes, de Plaisance. Recueillis et mis en ordre par son fils aîné et précédés d’une note biographique (Paris: Chez Bossange père, 1829), 103–104. 41  In a letter to Champagny dated Genoa, 4 February, Governor Lebrun reported that the new mobile brigade had chased insurgents from several villages; most importantly, many inhabitants joined in the search for rebels, and distinguished themselves by the greatest courage and loyalty. AN F/1e/87. A few days later, Champagny received a detailed report from Locard, the deputy prefect of Borgo San Donino, who also informed him that the insurrection had been vastly overestimated. Letter from Locard to the Minister of the Interior, Turin 9 February 1806. AN F/1e/ 85. 42  ASPr, Gridario 1806, vol. I. 43  Lettre à M. L’évèque de Plaisance, Parma 27 January 1806, AMD, C-4-41. The role of priests as mediators is discussed briefly in Paltrineri, I Moti contro Napoleone, 39–45; a deeper analysis in Broers, The Politics of religion in Napoleonic Italy. The War against God, 7–27.

7 PACIFICATION 

155

continued Lebrun’s policies and allowed for a cooling down period before striking. Michael Broers observed that ‘men on horseback’ came to inflict proper discipline in recalcitrant territories where the record of ‘pro-­consuls’ like Moreau de Saint-Méry remained disappointing.44 Junot was one such man and he certainly understood what Napoleon meant by ‘give an example to that country’. But he also thought it wise to hold back the emperor’s impulsive demands, and therefore took his time before putting threats into action. This blunted somehow the blow he was sent to deliver and inspired his wife to utter a few rare words of unqualified praise: ‘When Junot was in Parma, he was not only interested in punishing the guilty, but also in helping the emperor accomplish acts of justice…. He did wonders during his expedition in Parma, or in the Apennines, to be precise’.45 It is true that, not quite in line with his orders, Junot tried hard to flex the emperor’s compassion muscles. ‘Allow me to tell Your Majesty that this country yearns for His paternal gaze’, Junot implored.46 Never forgetting to blame Moreau for the general chaos—a word that came under his pen with regular frequency in every letter—he relied fully on the trope of fearsome brigands manipulating deluded villagers, to which he added a good dose of melodrama: ‘A few unfortunate old men and field hands have been the first victims of a rebellion to which they never participated’.47 Accordingly, punitive measures were a relatively small part of the Herculean work in front of him. What he needed was money, personnel and time, Junot wrote in the letters of 11 and 18 February: money to settle at least partially the salaries and pensions of the multitude of individuals formerly attached to the ducal court whose fate was still undecided; personnel to replace Moreau’s employees, without exception corrupt and u ­ ntrustworthy (short profiles, all negative, of Moreau’s closest assistants, Platesteiner and Duplan above all, accompanied the request); and time to familiarize himself with the multi-layered morass.

 Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 101.  Laure Junot, duchesse d’Abrantès, Mémoires complets et authentiques de Laure Junot duchesse d’Abrantès. Souvenir historiques sur Napoléon, la Révolution, le Directoire, le Consulat, l’Empire, la révolution de 1830 and les premières années du règne de Louis Philippe. Edition complète (Paris: Jean Bonnot, 1967), vol. 6, p. 232. 46  Junot to Napoleon, Parma 31 January 1806. AN AF/IV/1717. 47  Junot to Napoleon, Piacenza 1 February 1806. AN AF/IV/1717. ‘Nobody knows whom to obey and whom to command’, he wrote in the previous letter of 31 January, to underscore the chaos that riled people up. 44 45

156 

D. P. HARSANYI

On 11 February Administrator-Prefect Hugues Eugène Nardon arrived in Parma where General Junot immediately swore him in. The two clashed frequently, their egos hindering smooth cooperation, but they consistently agreed on one subject: the insurgency had been greatly exaggerated and only spread because of Moreau de Saint-Méry’s incompetence.48 On his way to Parma, Nardon stopped briefly in Piacenza. There he met with representatives of the local elites and, like Junot, left the city satisfied that while some malevolent individuals managed to ‘delude and mislead these unfortunate peasants… nothing too worrisome really happened’.49 A few days later, Nardon wrote again to the Minister of the Interior to reassure the government that ‘[Troubles] are over, order is reestablished; from now on, it is only a matter of judicious supervision and good organization’. Whereupon the eager functionary set to work: ‘We must repair, adjust, and set in motion the engine of the administration and of public opinion’.50 The most interesting feature of the letters and reports written by Junot and Nardon in the first days of their appointment is the absence of any sense of alarm regarding insurrectionary aftershocks. Intensely focused on putting things right in a place that they saw as full of potential but abandoned to chaos, the senior functionaries in charge of the States of Parma were only marginally interested in cracking the whip. This was, however, what their emperor demanded, relentlessly.

Crackdown General Junot’s conscientious reports did not cheer up Napoleon. In the letter appointing Junot, he had brought up Binasco for a reason: he wanted his envoy to make harsh examples.51 Accounts of the natives’  Napoleon expected Junot to be the grown up in the room and remember that, even though he was a military governor, ‘one must not behave like a corporal’. To General Junot, Saint Cloud 21 May 1806. Correspondance de Napoléon 1er, v. 12, 10254, p. 473. 49  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Piacenza 10 February 1806. AN F/1e/86. Like Junot and Lebrun, he pointed to inept management: ‘…nothing seems accomplished here. Old functionaries are still in place, with their old titles; judges named, but not instated. Collection of previous taxes abandoned and the rolls for the new ones not yet ready, empty coffers, no deputy-prefects in service, no mayors in the major cities; finally, an unbearable incoherence of old and new ways of doing things’. 50  Nardon to Minister of the Interior Champagny, Parma 14 February 1806, AN F/1e/85. 51  Junot should have considered himself lucky that the emperor did not recall to his benefit the way examples were made in Egypt: ‘every day I have three heads cut off and carried through Cairo: that is the only way of overcoming these people’. Colson, Napoleon on War, 341. 48

7 PACIFICATION 

157

numerous reasons for distress did not move but rather exasperated him: ‘I do not understand anything of all this. Prince Eugene must send you troops. Burn five or six villages; shoot about sixty persons’, he ordered, probably shouting as he dictated.52 His administrators’ penchant for separating rebels into guilty and (gullible) not-guilty only added to his fury and he did not mince words: ‘In fact, I do not share your opinion on the innocence of Parma’s peasants; they are a bunch of rascals who got themselves into huge trouble; what astonishes me is that one of my oldest soldiers would opine that it is not a great crime to resist my armies and disrespect my flags. What I want is that the flags be revered religiously’. And he proceeded to spell out again Junot’s to-do list: My intention is to set on fire the village that has risen to insurrection and headed towards Bobbio, to have shot the priest currently sheltered by the bishop of Piacenza, and to see sent to the galleys three of four hundred of the guilty. …Burn to the ground one or two large villages, say it is I who ordered it.53

Napoleon doubted not only Junot’s eagerness to execute such orders but the very quality of the information the general was sending him. A few days after firing off this letter, the emperor hired a spy to watch over and report on Junot’s activities. An officer named Bouillé, adjutant to Naples’ headquarters, received the order to tour the area between Alexandria and Ancona, with a special discreet stopover in Parma and Piacenza: ‘You will go to Parma and spend some time at Junot’s residence; you will stay long enough to let me know what you have learned about social peace in that country; you will then go to Piacenza and see what is being done around the Citadel. This mission is entirely confidential, and you will need to be discreet and behave as if you were there on your own’.54 Junot, likely unaware of being under surveillance, kept advancing the thesis of misled country folk in need of guidance and good order, which only amplified the emperor’s irritation. Firmness turned into scolding:

52  Au Général Junot, Paris, le 4 Février 1806, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier. #9712, XI, p. 560. 53  Au Général Junot, Paris, le 7 février 1806 Correspondance de Napoléon Ier #9772, XII, p. 23. 54  A.  M. De Bouillé. Paris 13 February 1806. Correspondance de Napoléon Ier #9807, XII, p. 41.

158 

D. P. HARSANYI

I am not at all satisfied by your extreme indulgence. How can you tell me that there are only six guilty men in the state of Parma when several thousand men have been under arms for two months, and during these two months they rang the bells (of rebellion) and resisted my troops? Your indulgence is softness. Apprehend 5 or 600 brigands and send several hundreds more to the galleys… They have known rebellion; now they must learn vengeance and punishment. I repeat my order to Prince Eugene to dispatch the 3rd infantry regiment and the 67th line regiment. … Do not spoil this people! I want them to supply conscripts and be quiet.55

In response, Junot listed the tough measures he had taken, beginning with the burning of a village, Napoleon’s most insistent demand: I receive the letter you have written me on February 18th. I will refrain from talking about the sadness it caused me. … I saw, or at least I wanted to see, the rebellion of a few villages as not nearly as serious as it was presented to me. … I have burned the large village of Mezzano, I gave orders that eight of these brigands be shot, several others sent to jail; at least twelve of those seen as chiefs will be shot, others put in jail; the entire country is cleansed of weapons: is this, Sire, not showing decisiveness? Is this softness?56

Indeed, softness was not the right word, and Junot’s rather amiable early forays into local social circles did not mean that punishment did not occur. The Military Commission started examining cases on 1 February. As regulations required, all sentences were executed within 24 hours. Between February 1 and April 1, 21 rebels were put to death by firing squad, including two priests; the commission pronounced 88 different jail sentences and 19 verdicts of long years of hard labour; four suspects died in custody. On 12 February, the village of Mezzano was burned to the ground under Junot’s adjutant Grandseigne’s supervision. On 19 February, Parma’s military commander General Pouget instructed Grandseigne to make sure weapons had been removed from all villages and announced the return to the Binasco method, should residents still fail to heed so many exhortations to listen to reason:

55  Au Général Junot, Paris 18 February 1806 Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, vol. 12, #9844, pp. 62–63. 56  General Junot to Napoleon, Parme le 24 Février 1806. AN AF/IV/1717.

7 PACIFICATION 

159

Should the path of priests and village mayors not give satisfactory results, you must use force; should even one shot be fired in one commune, the Governor instructs you imperatively [underlined] to burn [that commune]; it is finally time for the situation to return to order and submission; after having exhausted all the ways of kindness [douceur] it is incumbent to us to employ force and severity against any territory that would still attempt to raise the banner of rebellion.57

The kind of news that Napoleon approved of arrived shortly: ‘It pleases me to see that the village of Mezzano, the first to take up arms, will be burned’, he wrote in a tone of almost sadistic satisfaction, insisting that the population must be properly terrified. ‘Spread the word about this execution; order that graphic descriptions be published in all newspapers…. Speak firmly and make inhabitants suffer for the enormity of their crime’.58 Napoleon took the Piacentino rebellion as an opportunity to review his own ideas on restoring order in conquered territories: the mix of scolding and practical advice to Junot amounted to a concise how-to manual for counter-insurgency, structured around deterrent violence. Accusations of madness (Lebrun) and softness (Junot) reflected displeasure not so much with what his officers were doing—they were, after all, blowing hot and cold in line with prevailing counter-insurgency philosophy—but with the way they calibrated making examples versus reaching out procedures: ‘I see a bunch of chattering administrators prone to taking bad decisions’, he wrote disparagingly in the letter of 4 February. He grew especially frustrated with what he saw as overindulgent deference to local perspectives. Unwaveringly persuaded that searching for common ground and suggesting even modest levels of legitimacy for discontent signalled weakness, he pressed for tipping the balance towards more retribution and fear, with correspondingly less weight on benevolence and empathy: ‘I will not disapprove the compensations you would decide on, but sentences must be numerous and harsh; do not spare anybody’, he explicitly instructed  General Pouget to Adjutant Grandseigne, Parma 19 February 1806. AMD C-4-41.  Au Général Junot, Paris le 19 Février 1806. Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, vol. 12, #9852, p. 66. Mezzano was probably selected following the report of a captain of gendarmes (undated—probably the first days of February) who indicated that a sort of mass rebellion started there as soon as the French left and the one person who sided with the French was attacked by a mob of villagers, an incident reminiscent of the Stefani episode. Asked to quell the disturbance, the local priest responded arrogantly, and the gendarmes swiftly arrested him. BP Mss. Parm. 543, fo. 179. 57 58

160 

D. P. HARSANYI

Junot.59 It was incumbent on all imperial representatives, wherever they were, to think of their districts as no more than cogs in the majestic imperial engine where all parts moved in synchrony: I certainly have no concerns for the States of Parma; but I do have for the consequences, in all Italy, of repressing so lightly such a large and serious rebellion. I do not share your ideas of clemency. Being strict is the only way to be merciful, without which this unfortunate country and the entire Piedmont would be lost and establishing order in Italy would require torrents of blood.60

This exchange highlights the gap between the emperor’s grandiose views and his administrators’ preoccupation with the immediate task of governing. Napoleon hated wasting time and wished to run occupied lands in the same way he made war, that is, by overpowering local resistance quickly, completely and categorically.61 To him, this was not a matter of expediency but of vision—a vision that could not be dimmed by mundane concerns in one part or another of his vast state. Superior goals, in other words, justified, on occasion, questionable means. Regional imperial administrators worried about the means precisely because they shared the goals: they wanted local populations to see and feel how imperial rule was changing their lives for the better, which implied good-faith acquaintance with local needs.62 Napoleon was not a patient man. In rapid-fire letters sent after the quashing of the insurrection, he rebuked the principle of douceur and insisted that the first virtue of government was force, which concentrated minds, not benevolence, which invited defiance. What to lesser minds might look like arbitrary cruelty was in fact the only sure method of creating a coherent social order, thus achieving a higher moral imperative. Which is why Napoleon kept urging his chief executor in Parma to lift his eyes above the low horizons of the periphery he was temporarily governing: ‘Make extremely harsh examples because the 59  Au Général Junot, Paris, 7 February 1806, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, vol. 12, #9772. p. 18. 60  Au Général Junot, Paris, 7 February 1806, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier #9772, XII, p. 18. 61  Patrice Gueniffey, Bonaparte (Paris, 2013), 585–7. 62  See in this sense Michael Broers’ observation that Napoleonic bureaucrats were far too invested in regenerating Italy to be cynical or coldly fixated on realpolitik targets. Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 272–273.

7 PACIFICATION 

161

consequences of what is happening in Parma for more than a month are immeasurable for the security of all Italy. Great states can only be maintained with acts of severity’.63 After the burning of Mezzano, the Piacentino replaced Binasco as textbook template for action in cases of popular rebellion. When, a few months later, Joseph, freshly nominated king of Naples, faced an uprising in Calabria, Napoleon recommended he follow the Piacentino model, only without succumbing to Junot’s mollesse: Piacenza rebelled; at my return from the Great Army, I sent there Junot who was pretending that the country was not in rebellion and kept mailing me philosophical thoughts, French style [de l’esprit à la française]: I gave him the order to burn two villages and to execute several insurgent leaders, six priests among them. This was done; the country was pacified and will remain so for a long time.64

Shortly afterwards, he matter-of-factly advised his ill-fated brother that people were bound to loathe foreign occupation, and hence popular revolts must be anticipated and controlled, for the sake of long-term stability: ‘Any conquered people must have a rebellion, and I would tackle a rebellion in Naples the same way a father looks after children who contracted smallpox, provided [the condition] does not weaken the patient too much’.65 By May 1806, intelligence from Parma persuaded Napoleon that the examples made so far had been sufficiently terrifying to teach local populations the necessary lesson: ‘It pleases me to see that you govern with great energy. Sentencing to death or hard labor eightfour individuals is a salutary measure which will serve as example and prevent people from giving free reign to their natural inconstancy.’66

63  Au Général Junot, Paris le 18 février Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, v. 12, #9844, p. 62. ‘There will be much humanity and clemency in this act’, Napoleon insisted the next day. Au Général Junot, Paris le 19 février Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, v. 12, #9852, p. 66. 64  Au roi de Naples, Saint Cloud, 30 July 1806, Correspondance de Napoleon 1er, v. 13, p. 23 #10573. The tone differs markedly from Viceroy Eugene’s conclusion on sparing most of the insurgents. 65  Au roi de Naples, Saint Cloud 17 August 1806, Correspondance de Napoleon 1er, vol 13, #10657, p. 78. 66  Au Général Junot, Saint-Cloud 13 May 1806, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, v. 12, #10229, p. 369.

162 

D. P. HARSANYI

There is something frightening in the cold enumeration of merciless penalties cast in the form of pedagogical tools; at least, after this point, the States of Parma fell off Napoleon’s list of priorities. He left it to his administrators to sort out the aftermath of the rebellion and of his own intervention therein.

CHAPTER 8

Order into Chaos

The special military government, with leadership split between a Governor General and an Administrator-Prefect, made governance a cumbersome process, especially since the two appointees could barely stand each other.1 They had no choice but to work together for expectations were high: I thank Your Majesty for sending General Junot to Parma; everything was falling to pieces there due to civil and military anarchy; because of lack of organization and firm leadership an insurrection that I would have certainly defeated with the three hundred men I sent there, began to stir anew.2

Under constant pressure to demonstrate how competent management reliably brings order into chaos, both traced their moves in lengthy reports 1  Not without some scuffling, the two sorted out their respective roles: Governor General Junot dealt chiefly with ways of nipping in the bud any potential rebellious flare-ups and oversaw the entire government; Administrator Prefect Nardon managed all aspects of public life, organized tax collection and conscription drives, supervised territorial units and executed all government decisions, Junot’s rulings included—the job description of a regular prefect plus the obligation to report to Junot. The respective fields of activities were not neatly divided and Nardon often tried Junot’s patience, according to Champagny’s assessment. Report from the Minister of the Interior to the Emperor, Paris 26 March 1806, AN F/1e/86. 2  Letter to the Emperor, Genoa, 2 February 1806. Opinions, Rapports et Choix d’Ecrits Politiques de Charles François Lebrun, 111–112.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_8

163

164 

D. P. HARSANYI

full of facts and figures. Nardon especially, ever anxious to prove his dedication to the job, kept Minister of the Interior Champagny informed almost in real time—the rhythms of the post permitting—of his daily toiling. Once again, Parma’s citizens could do little but watch how a new order of things was being built for them.

Institutional Overhaul Junot and Nardon were fortunate to find a dependable, ready-to-use institutional infrastructure thanks to Liguria’s governor Lebrun’s efforts in the immediate aftermath of the insurrection. In March 1806, the States of Parma, reorganized on the model of French centralization, consisted of four arrondissements, each headed by a sub-délégué (deputy prefect). The main town in each arrondissement (chef lieu or capoluogo) was run by a mayor (maire) nominated by the Administrator-Prefect; deputy mayors selected by the mayors of main towns in consultation with the deputy prefects were to assume responsibility for smaller communes. Junot took over this organization and maintained the deputy prefects nominated by Lebrun in concert with Minister Champagny: Gian Battista (Jean-Baptiste) De Gubernatis in Parma; Gian Francesco (Jean-François) Caravel in Piacenza; Locard in Borgo San Donino and Payani in Guastalla (no first names recorded for the last two). All took their posts officially on 16 February.3 On 17 February, a decree co-signed by Nardon and Junot announced for 25 February the investiture of mayors and their adjuncts in the two major cities: Count Stefano Sanvitale in Parma and Count Alberto Scotti in Parma. On this occasion, to impress on the citizenry that, far from a routine change of personnel, the ceremony marked the beginning of an era put under the double sign of order and benevolence, the decree stipulated that ‘The town hall will be illuminated. There will be a distribution of 11 hundred rations of bread, meat and wine for the poor in each city’.4 Shortly afterwards, the countryside too was systematized into 13 large communes, each covering smaller villages, headed by mayors installed with similar pomp, albeit on a reduced scale.5 Offices with long history, 3  Lebrun’s decree, Parma 25 January 1806. Several counties were detached from Parma and united with the Department of the Apennines. ASPr Gridario 1806. Details on territorial redistricting in ASPr, Dipartimento del Taro, Busta 162. 4  ASPr, Gridario 1806. 5  Both mayors had already been nominated by Lebrun since 24 January but, like the deputy prefects, had not yet started working. Junot confirmed Lebrun’s nominations and made sure their investiture would make an impression on the population.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

165

like the podestà and the two highly respected Governor positions, with their constellation of networks, disappeared, barely noticed by a population too absorbed with the quick pace of change to react one way or the other. Besides, in almost all communes the podestà took the oath of loyalty to the empire on the appointed day and woke up a maire the next morning. Marquis Lalatta, the attentive chronicler, recorded the events with no comment, save for a few words of mourning in memory of Parma’s venerable Anzianato, who met for the last time on 24 February 1806, its functions taken over by the office of the Administrator-Prefect.6 Simultaneously, the new governing team hastened to bring to life the juridical apparatus mandated by the Imperial decree of 20 Prairial an XIII, the one that a disoriented Moreau had been unable to even begin to make sense of. Nardon and Junot published on 17 February 1806 the schedule for installing the new courts of justice: the Criminal Courts in Parma and Piacenza on 1 March; tribunals of first instance in Parma, Piacenza and Borgo San Donino on 2 March; justices of peace in the smaller communes on 5 March. The new courts had to be inaugurated ‘with suitable splendor and solemnity’—per Nardon’s and Junot’s orders.7 Mayor Sanvitale agreed and, in a follow-up letter, assured Parma’s military commander that the crowds had been suitably awed by the festivities and the soldiers rewarded for maintaining public tranquillity.8 For additional effect, all the judges took the oath to the empire on the same day. It was a remarkable logistical feat, but there was no time for rejoicing: Paris expected the territory to meet the customary obligations of taxation and conscription.9 These were 6  Marquis Lallata Diary, BP MSS 1185. Entry for 24 February 1806. Piancenza’s Anzianato vanished as well. 7  Both decrees of 17 February in the ASPr, Gridario 1806. 8  ‘I hurried to give orders that wine be distributed to the soldiers who watched over the courts’ installation’, he wrote to General Schreiber on 28 February. ASPr Minutes des lettres des maires de la ville de Parme. Commune di Parma 2203. An unsigned report, dated Piacenza 1 March 1806 probably written by one of the clerks, described the same ceremonies: Piacenza’s mayor invested the new judges, dressed in festive attire, and the public was treated with wine and food, all under the soldiers’ watchful eye. AN BB/5/302. On 28 February Junot reconfirmed military place commanders Schreiber in Parma and Marion in Piacenza and petitioned the Ministry of War for their promotion to the rank of brigadier general. AMD C-4-41. 9  As of 1806, priests everywhere, Parma included, were required to impress on their parishioners that they owed the emperor love, taxes and military service—on pain of eternal damnation. Jacques Régnier, Les Préfets du Consulat et de l’Empire (Paris: Librairie G.  Ficker, 1913), 107.

166 

D. P. HARSANYI

the fields directly under Administrator-Prefect Nardon’s responsibility. His letters and reports on both subjects lay bare the struggles of a man wrestling with forces beyond his control, though not beyond his willpower.

Economy and Taxation The economic situation in 1806 differed little from the one Moreau had grappled with since 1802. Moreau’s attempts at modernizing agriculture failed to create a momentum. Nardon did not even try. He simply accepted the reality that the needs of the army dictated the configuration of local economies, all inextricably tied up in the imperial web spun around France’s interests. He abandoned, therefore, the exuberant economic interventionism of his predecessor, whose passion for agronomy he did not share in the first place.10 It is hard to tell if more enthusiastic involvement would have made a qualitative difference. Feeding the troops marching unimpeded through the territory made it nearly impossible to grow the herds and acquaint the population with new farmstead methods. For instance, recurrent requisitions of meat obstructed ambitious entrepreneur Carlo Formenti’s experimental venture of breeding local sheep with the merinos variety. Nardon only showed some interest in infrastructure and quickly approved dike building projects on the River Po and bridges on smaller tributary rivers. Improved navigation, together with introduction of the metric system in July 1808, helped bolster local commerce, even though the most ambitious project, the highway between Parma and Spezia, remained unfinished. Mixed results is the most charitable way of

10  Nardon’s lack of interest in agricultural science was not entirely out of the mainstream. Laurent Brassart concluded that ‘the Napoleonic state failed in its project of encouraging agriculture’ as state sponsored research declined. Laurent Brassart, ‘Une politique agricole pour l’Europe?’ in L’Empire Napoléonien. Une expérience européenne? Sous la direction de François Antoine, Jean-Pierre Jessenne, Annie Jourdan et Hervé Leuwers (Paris: Armand Colin/Recherches, 2013), 191–210 (210). See also Stuart Woolf’s observation: ‘…in the Napoleonic years, theoretical debates about the workings of an economy appear to have lost the pride of place’. Woolf, Napoleon’s Integration of Europe, 136. The situation in Parma resembled developments elsewhere in Napoleonic Italy, except that political uncertainty made it even more difficult to see through new economic policies. At times, erratic economic integration struck even Junot as absurd: he complained that the jury of an upcoming industrial exhibition in Paris rejected straw hats manufactured in Parma because they competed with similar products from the Kingdom of Italy. Junot to Minister of Finances of the Kingdom of Italy, Parma 1 May 1806, AMD C-D-41.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

167

describing Nardon’s economic efforts, a field where limitations imposed from above met his own lack of imagination.11 To French bureaucratic minds, every aspect of Parma’s former governing style was a source of dismay and distress; public finances caused outright despair: ‘Parma’s finances are in deplorable state; there is nothing set aside, not for civil administration, not for the military, not even for public works; worse, there are no figures for anything’, Lebrun reported just after the defeat of the insurrection.12 This came as no surprise to Napoleon, who had noticed the deplorable state since August 1805 when he called for a person versed ‘in our ways of accounting’ to put things right. Nardon fitted this job description perfectly, for he compensated scarce interest in matters of production and commerce with real passion for accounting. In preparation for the first round of tax collection, Nardon produced and mailed detailed tables to each commune, with sample budgets and figures on the tax each owed. Starting with 1808, he also provided mayors with simple guidelines for calculating the land tax.13 The system was indeed better codified and did finally eliminate all internal dues and remnant feudal tributes.14 Revenues, however, consistently fell short of expectations. ‘Well administered, these states can yield 5,000,000 francs in taxes of all kinds’, Nardon assured Minster Champagny after reviewing the ensemble of economic possibilities.15 It caused him much distress that he never met this self-imposed target. Fortunately for him, expectations were so low that the setback annoyed but did not disappoint Napoleon, who

11  A brief overview in Pier Luigi Spaggiari, Economia e Finanza negli Stati Parmensi 1814–1859 (Milano: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1961), 14–15. In Nardon’s defence, Francesco Mineccia concluded in a synopsis of recent historiography that mixed results were the norm within the unavoidable colonial relationship with France, since the demands of permanent warfare weighed heavily on all economic activities. Francesco Mineccia, ‘Economia’ in Italia Napoleonica. Dizionario Critico. A cura di Luigi Mascilli Migliorini (Milano: UTET, 2011), 191–218. Like Spaggiari, Mineccia identifies new juridical and institutional systems as potential positive factors for the long run. 12  Letter to the Emperor, Genoa, 2 February 1806. Opinions, Rapports et Choix d’Ecrits Politiques de Charles François Lebrun, 111–112. Lebrun added that he sent some money from Liguria’s treasury to help pay the French soldiers’ salaries, surely to avoid disorder in the ranks. 13  ASPr, Dipartimento di Taro, Busta 162. The forms are also published in each year’s Gridario. 14  Spaggiari, Economia e Finanza, p. 43. 15  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 15 March 1806, AN F/1e/85.

168 

D. P. HARSANYI

understood at a glance that his keen Administrator-Prefect was indulging in overoptimistic projections—‘absurd’, in the emperor’s own words.16 Nardon inaugurated the new system with a decree posted on 15 February 1806. It streamlined tax collection into four categories (land; personal income; doors and windows; stamp tax), stabilized a centralized tax bureaucracy under the direction of a Director of Contributions and introduced a legal novelty, the kind that, in French eyes, separated French taxation from previous confiscatory practices: citizens who believed that their burden exceeded their fair share had the right to appeal to their respective deputy prefect.17 The decree aimed at projecting clarity, fairness and a sense of reassuring predictability. It achieved the opposite. Barely had citizens breathed a sigh of relief after the collection of the four main taxes that they learned of new obligations, beginning with a tax on salt specifically required by Napoleon.18 Purportedly for the sake of sharing the burden equitably, Nardon created a consumer tax on food and household items (octroi), identical to similar taxes in the interior of the empire (5 May 1806 for the two main cities, 31 August 1806 for the whole territory). Mounting opposition forced him to change course and jettison the octroi for a different consumer tax (des halles et des marchés) on 29 May 1807.19 Throughout 1807, the administration wrestled to collect both the

16  Napoleon recommended cutting Nardon’s estimates in half, to avoid unmanageable accounting problems. (A. M. Champagny, Paris 25 March 1806) Correspondence da Napoleon premier. Vol. XII, #10019, p. 266. Once again Napoleon bristled at not ‘seeing clear’ in Parma’s affairs and sent to Parma state councillor Dauchy, with orders to oversee Nardon’s work without getting too involved in administrative minutiae. Dauchy’s main task was to give the emperor a candid assessment of the country’s finances because Napoleon believed Nardon’s numbers simply did not add up. A M. De Champagny, Correspondance de Napoléon premier, Saint Cloud 12 Juillet 1806, Vol. 12, p. 656, #10481. 17  Announcement posted in the main cities, in the two languages, on 15 February 1806. ASPr, Gridario 1806. 18  By the Imperial Decree of 16 May, issued at Saint Cloud, the price of salt increased from 40 centimes per kg to 50 centimes per kg; by a salt tax that replaced a previous tax on road maintenance since 24 April 1806, also by imperial decree. The price of salt in Liguria, Parma and the Kingdom of Italy was an important issue that came up frequently in Napoleon’s correspondence throughout 1805 and 1806. 19  On 23 May Nardon informed Champagny of his expectations to collect the octroi by the beginning of July. Nardon to Champagny, Parma 23 May 1806. AN F/1e/85. Also reproduced in Pietro Silva, ‘I Primi Tempi dell’Amministrazione Nardon’ in Archivio Stato per le Province Parmensi, 2 (1922): 305–348, Appendix 336–338.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

169

previous year’s outstanding taxes and the current ones.20 All manner of tax avoidance ensued, compounded by abuses entirely out of line with the sound law and order regime the French were supposed to introduce.21 The neat organigram of tax employees failed to help improve economic output and brought little relief to the population, who found the new system no less exploitative than past ones. What changed, and it was no small feat, was the style: functionaries became accustomed to keeping records and using standardized forms and procedures. Struggling to detect positive features in the economic policies of the Nardon–Junot team, economic historian Luigi Spaggiari commended them for introducing what he called ‘administrative honesty’, that is, acquainting office workers with the notion of professional discipline.22 It was the kind of praise that would have probably pleased Nardon. In the event, he was forced to redirect a good portion of his oft-noted zeal towards conscription for the French army, which ran concurrent with tax legislation.

Conscription The day of 13 March 1806 was a busy one for news. In a long public proclamation posted in public squares, Governor General Junot offered an update of the state of the country and announced the disbanding of the sbirri to be replaced by a reorganized police force. These momentous announcements preceded—and may have been intended to soften the blow of—the biggest news of the day, namely the beginning of the first conscription drive. In 1805, Lebrun had portrayed supposedly volunteer service in National Guard regiments as a pleasant holiday from boring 20  On 1 October 1807, Nardon published a detailed decree on how to collect past land taxes for the last 100 days of 1806, which had not yielded the expected 155,282 fr. An earlier decree (3 May 1807) set the sums to be collected by the end of the year: land tax: 2,562,846; income tax: 164,130; doors and windows: 273.835, for a total 3,000,813 fr, short of the hoped for 5 million. All decrees published in ASPr Gridario 1807. On tax collection and the challenges of implementing a new system on old realities see Aldo De Maddalena, ‘Considerazioni sull’attività industriale e commerciale negli Stati Parmensi dal 1796 al 1814’, Studi Parmensi, IX, (1959): 46–83. 21  Inn keepers charging clients a non-existing residence tax was one egregious example that particularly irritated Junot, who ordered mayors to punish abuses severely. Governor General Junot to mayors, 3 May 1806. AMD C-D-41. Caravel’s 30 November 1806 letter to mayors urging them not to exaggerate the burden of taxation speaks volumes of the general atmosphere of revulsion against taxation. See Chap. 9, note 51. 22  Spaggiari, Economia e Finanza, 39.

170 

D. P. HARSANYI

day-to-day existence; Junot urged future recruits to bask in the civic pride derived from knowing that fighting under the imperial flag abroad secured social harmony at home: Among the sublime institutions of the French Empire, conscription stands out; it is by conscription that armies are recruited without violence and without effort; it is by conscription that the young, aware of the honorable weight they must bear, allow the rest of the population to dedicate themselves to arts and sciences, to administration and legislation.

Invoking the generosity of the emperor who deigned to assign Parma ‘a very small contingent of 200 men’, citizens were informed that conscription was to start presently under the supervision of Administrator-Prefect Nardon. This was a good thing, too, seeing that, as the communiqué concluded, ‘there is no higher honor than to be told by the emperor himself that one has fulfilled one’s obligations’.23 On 8 April 1806 Parma’s mayor Stefano Sanvitale issued recruitment details, subsequently posted everywhere in the states: all able-bodied young men, either self-supporting or under 21 years of age and living with their parents, must report to their commune’s mayor; selection was decided by drawing lots, and Sanvitale thought it wise to inform all concerned that youth who failed to appear at the appointed time and place would be moved to the head of the list.24 On 2 May, all public offices in the four arrondissement capitals published the official order of recruitment, signed by Nardon. Hopeful but not naïve, Nardon coached his adjuncts ahead of time on the best tactics for dealing with predictable manifestations of hostility, which by 1806 no French functionary could ignore. His letters warned that ‘fools, vagabonds, and schemers will come together to hinder the beginning of this sublime institution; it is our great duty to be alert in these circumstances … double our zeal and effort to undo malevolent attacks and prevent the effect of their criminal intentions’.25 Knowing what was expected of them, the four deputy prefects forwarded carefully drawn lists with the pool of potential draftees; by the 23  To the inhabitants of the States of Parma and Piacenza 13 March 1806. ASPr Gridario 1806. See also AN F/1e/86. 24  Announcement in the two languages signed Maire San Vitale, 8 April 1806. ASPr Gridario 1806, 130. 25  Copies of the circular letters to deputy prefects included in some correspondence with Minister Champagny, Parma 15 April 1806, AN F/1e/85/.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

171

end of summer, things were moving along without a hitch, if local draft supervisors were to be believed: no defections, no requests for replacement, even signs of enthusiasm for joining the army.26 All through 1806 and 1807, Nardon kept reporting that conscription in the States of Parma was advancing as a well-organized government programme should, the opposite of the anarchic enrolment in National Guard units that had produced rebellion and mayhem the year before. ‘The last and fourth contingent of my conscription will pass under review; it will be a brilliant operation’, wrote Nardon with undisguised satisfaction. He expected the same efficiency for the next round of recruitment, scheduled for 9 May 1807.27 He spoke too soon. Villagers drew on the experience accumulated while resisting enlistment in the viceroy’s National Guards and used every available stratagem to avoid joining the emperor’s armies. What the Administrator-Prefect so confidently called success consisted in overcoming, through a mix of cunning and brute force, collective rejection of the ‘sublime institution’ Junot glorified. Revulsion took familiar forms. Potential recruits vanished before their set date and parents routinely claimed ignorance of their sons’ whereabouts. Deputy prefects Gubernatis (Parma) and Caravel (Piacenza) learned with dismay that a brisk market in replacements and fake exemptions had materialized since the day conscription started, with perfectly healthy men feigning various infirmities. As a result, courts barely kept up with the bulging caseload of surgeons accused of trafficking in false medical certificates.28 With each subsequent drive, resistance intensified and took more desperate forms: young men resorted to self-mutilation (usually by cutting the right-hand index finger) or 26  Upbeat reports earned officials in the States of Parma an approving citation in Fouché’s bulletin of 26 April: ‘In Parma, well-executed conscription’. Police secrète du premier empire, 26 April, p. 340. 27  Nardon to Champagny, Parma 25 June 1806, AN F/1e/85. Although all orders emanated from Junot, fulfilling conscription quotas fell to Nardon, in his capacity of Administrator-Prefect. Nardon was certainly aware of Fouché’s opinion that ‘A prefect who fails to make conscription function and who tolerates deserters is not worthy of the emperor’s trust’. Quoted in Régnier, Les Préfets du Consulat et de l’Empire, 98. 28  A series of reports from Parma’s Imperial Prosecutor Mastelloni throughout 1806 and 1807 detail dozens of trials against local surgeons for the crime of extortion: asking money in exchange for false certificates of medical exemption. Mastelloni typically found the surgeons in question guilty of taking advantage of the peasants’ naiveté, which recalls the discourse of brigandage built on the masses’ supposed lack of sophistication. All correspondence between Mastelloni and Minister of Justice Grand Juge Régnier in AN BB/18/79.

172 

D. P. HARSANYI

banded together to chase recruiters out of their neighbourhood, heedless of the consequences. In a matter of months, the illusion of cheerful acceptance dissipated, and with it Nardon’s optimism. In accordance with French law, criminalization replaced persuasion. Jail time and fines were always on the table and the courts kept handing out sentences against men who refused to obey conscription orders, against parents who hid their sons and against villagers who discouraged their neighbours from reporting for conscription.29 Eventually, Nardon and his deputies ran out of options and resorted to the hated, and by their own account cruel, practice of garnissaires: the family of any recruit who failed to show up was obliged to host and feed one or several soldiers, for a length of time decided by the arrondissement’s executives. Regrettably, no other method would work, Piacenza’s deputy prefect Caravel insisted.30 It was all likely to end badly, Piacenza’s mayor Alberto Scotti retorted, and asked that extra basic foods be supplied to exasperated families on the brink of complete ruin. He also wrote to Captain Anguissola, the arrondissement’s chief public safety officer, to rein in billeted soldiers accused of demanding food and wine above the ration prescribed by law, further inflaming the spirits.31 Aware of public loathing of conscription, magistrates slow-walked proceedings, took blatantly contrived excuses at face value, and tacitly allowed many deserters to slip back into the population. Parma’s deputy prefect Gubernatis informed his superiors that lenience started at the level of justices of peace and continued all the way up to the higher courts because, moved by the draftees’ tales of sorrow, judges could not bring themselves to apply the law as written. Gubernatis worried that judicial softness would provoke acts of revenge against strict enforcers like himself: ‘nobody would risk running into unfortunate accidents, the consequence of 29  The Tribunal of First Instance in Parma published monthly the jail sentences handed out against men who refused to register with their communes’ mayor for conscription purposes. Authorities in both Parma and Piacenza found it useful to punish parents who failed to report their sons’ whereabouts, as well as neighbours and friends who, in the court’s opinion, feigned ignorance. Public court documents in ASPr Gridario 1806 and 1807. 30  Several letters from Caravel to Nardon during the months of September, October, and November 1806, ASPc, Copialettere del maire. Reports on various stratagems to avoid conscription throughout the territory in ASPr, Carte varie amministrazione militare 1804–1816, Busta 67. 31  Mayor Scotti to Deputy Prefect Caravel and Captain Anguissola, Piacenza, 1 August 1806 and 20 January 1807. ASPc, Copialettere del maire, #514 and #1158 respectively.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

173

impunity [for draft dodgers]’, he exclaimed, chagrined that local and French executives proved incapable of acting as one.32 The courts’ insistence on maintaining old regime conventions of reaching a three-thirds majority when handing down punitive sentences was probably connected to conscription too, since Imperial Prosecutor Mastelloni reproached his judges for caring more about pleasing public opinion than doing their job impartially.33 It is true that, grand ceremonies apart, the justice system wobbled quite a bit in the first few months, and Junot issued a series of decrees intended as guidelines for French-style courtroom protocol.34 The judges generally followed the rules, but did not hesitate to interpret conscription laws in ways that tempered, even subverted, clearly formulated statutes. They doubtless recognized how acutely these procedures affected the population, which substantiates Isser Woloch’s conclusion that conscription replaced taxation as the main battleground between state and society: ‘With Napoleon, conscription became the battleground, the ultimate contest of wills between individuals and local communities on the one hand and a distant, impersonal state on the other’.35 It was the one policy area where the elites felt enough empathy for the plight of their less fortunate compatriots to risk displeasing the French leadership.36 Turmoil at every level shows that citizens in the States of Parma loathed conscription in the French army just as much as they had loathed enlisting in National Guards, and no amount of rhetoric made them change their minds.37 Conversely, no amount of defiance made their rulers change their own minds. 32  Gubernatis to the General Director of military reviews and conscription, Parma, 18 July 1806. AN BB/18/79. 33  See the discussion on Mastelloni’s criticism of local judges’ propensity to avoid harsh sentences and even allow criminals to go free for the sake of not angering public opinion in Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 192. This was mostly the case for conscription-­ related offences, given that highroad robberies and other violent crimes were prosecuted quite vigorously. 34  All decrees in the ASPr, Gridario 1806. 35  Isser Woloch, ‘Napoleonic Conscription: State Power and Civil Society’ Past and Present, 111 (1986): 101–129 (101). 36  It should be noted that if magistrates and mayors felt the villagers’ pain, they most certainly did not share it: in Parma as elsewhere, young men from good families did not lack for opportunities to join elite regiments or pay for replacements. 37  Recruitment methods and resistance to conscription mirrored exactly the situation elsewhere in the Empire. Major studies on this topic in note 16, Chap. 5. See, in addition, an exceptionally detailed survey of conscription, including the social cost it exacted, in Alain

174 

D. P. HARSANYI

The same day he launched the sublime, as he called it, institution of conscription, Junot put out a state of the States of Parma of sorts. With superb self-confidence, he evoked the picture of a country on the verge of a bright future, at peace with itself, freed at last of discord and disruptions: His Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, in the middle of his triumphs in the fields of Moravia, took the time to look kindly on you! His Majesty wanted to give you a fixed organization, open to you the sources of glory, of grandeur and prosperity, by associating you to the destinies of the Great Nation. A few brigands have misunderstood the voice of the Fatherland…the brigands have been struck dead, your organization is proceeding rapidly and successfully, and shortly, French rule will be solidly rooted in this happy country; your mayors, your judges and your administrators are already hard at work.38

He was partially correct. In less than three months, various old regime offices expired, and the new bureaucracy started work without much ado. French-designed courts of law came to life with remarkable speed—not a small feat, considering that this meant a double conversion, from the Bourbon system to Moreau’s reforms, and from there to the current organization, similar to but still not completely French (one more step would be necessary to make the justice system the mirror image of the French one). By and large, and with the notable exception of conscription legislation, magistrates adopted French legal doctrine and mayors implemented the law. This was the big picture and Junot preferred not to dwell on the countless, everyday malfunctions that made the new administrative Pigeard, La Conscription sous le Premier Empire. Napoleonica. La Revue https://www.napoleon.org/histoire-des-2-empires/articles/la-conscription-sous-le-premier-empire/. By the end of his mandate, Nardon lost all hope. ‘Four years of experience here showed me that one must never expect obedience from mountain people, who are not given to honor their draft engagements, influenced as they are by the secret enemies of the system, by priests especially, who themselves fail in their duties’, he wrote in reaction to the amnesty (in fact a reprieve allowing deserters to re-enlist voluntarily) Napoleon granted in celebration of his marriage to Marie Louise. ‘His Majesty’s generosity will be lost on these people’, he added bitterly. Nardon to the Master of Requests, Parma 7 April 1810, AN F/7/8926. 38  To the inhabitants of the States of Parma and Piacenza 13 March 1806. ASPr Gridario 1806. See also AN F/1e/86. Notably, the institutional conversion Junot described exemplifies the definition of amalgame: ‘active participation in the regime and thus, submission to its mores’. Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 23–27.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

175

apparatus screech and squeal like a rickety mechanism too hastily put together (more on this further along in this chapter). But it did not matter that reality was not nearly as tidy as Junot proclaimed it, for the Governor and his Administrator-Prefect were determined to make it so.

Velvet Gloves How to persuade people to welcome in their hearts a government installed by military invasion, who habitually snatched young men from their families and sent them to fight, and most probably die, on battlefields in foreign lands? The first answer, Junot and Nardon believed, was putting a human face to the gendarmerie, whose biggest image problem stemmed from its active role in crushing the rebellion first, enforcing conscription orders later. At the same time, the corps’ discipline and accountability represented a material improvement relative to the uncontrollable sbirri the French disbanded to no one’s regret.39 Very much wishing to brandish the positive service side of the gendarmerie and obscure its negative coercive side, Junot took steps to reimagine French law enforcement as a benign force responsible for ‘public tranquility and the safety of travelers’—not for marching young men to draft offices.40 As much as they were able, both Junot and Nardon assigned unpleasant tasks to the extraordinary Military Commission seated in Parma—out of sight, unlike the gendarmerie units who patrolled the countryside.41 Their hope was that locals would begin to warm up to French law and order methods and eventually recognize the merits of a governmental ethos built on civic dependability and military greatness.42 Accordingly, Nardon warned repeatedly against 39  See Clive Emsley’s analysis “‘The Best Way to Keep the Peace in a Country”. Napoleon’s Gendarmes and their Legacy’ in Napoleon’s Legacy. Problems of Government in Restoration Europe, 257–274. 40  Junot’s decree of 22 February published in both languages. ASPr Gridario 1806. Junot referred often to the need for public tranquillity in his correspondence and public pronouncements. Each gendarmerie unit patrolled a 4-square mile territory in addition to providing security for the newly installed courts. The decree made no mention of conscription or other coercive tasks although the main function of the gendarmerie was supervising conscription, which implied inspiring fear in fresh recruits and capturing fugitives. Gendarmes in Parma–Piacenza participated in such tasks when other means of coercion were exhausted. 41  AMD C-4-41. On 25 Feb 1807. 42  Michael Broers noted the gendarmerie’s functions of representations: ‘the embodiment of imperial splendour, military glory, and solid, civic dependability’. It was the latter that

176 

D. P. HARSANYI

heavy-handed tactics and promptly reassigned individual gendarmes who drew complaints from the public.43 He also felt compelled to weigh punishing law enforcement officers guilty of ‘immorality’ (code for taking bribes) against the need to support their insertion in the community.44 In the meantime, Junot created police units recruited locally, headed by commissioners issued from nearby gentry families (three in Parma, three in Piacenza) tasked with shadowing the gendarmerie and helping to unlock the goodwill dormant in hearts and minds across the country, as government officials believed or hoped.45 Akin to the douceur strategies of the pacification phase, the relatively lenient approach to law enforcement aimed at fragmenting and diluting opposition to French rule. Post-­ insurgency pacification played down anti-French resistance by criminalizing rebellion; moving forward, post-pacification stabilization strategies centred on depoliticizing criminality.

Parma’s administrators preferred to convey after the end of the insurrection. Michael Broers, ‘The Napoleonic Gendarmerie. The State on the Periphery made real’ in Crime, Histoire et Société/Crime, History and Society, 20, 1 (2016). https://journals.openedition.org/ chs/1641 accessed on 6/19/2019. See on the same subject ‘Compatriots and Friends’ in Clive Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth Century Europe, 155–172. The problem was, of course, that flesh and blood gendarmes rarely lived up to the lofty roles assigned to them. 43  A list with complaints against gendarmes for the year 1807 is preserved at the ASPr Dipartimento del Taro, Busta 5. For an analysis of perennial frictions between local authorities and gendarmerie, particularly in smaller communes throughout the Empire, see Aurélien Lignereux, Servir Napoléon. Policiers et Gendarmes dans les Départements Réunis 1796–1814 (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2012), chapter 3, ‘Vivre l’Empire’ pp.105–127 and 5, ‘La Police dans l’Empire’ pp. 105–212. Nardon paid special attention to police matters: his second passion, after accounting, was systematic public order. His study of the pre-Napoleonic police system remains the best source on the subject: Rapport Général sur la Police secrète des Etats de Parme et Plaisance, Parme, Premier décembre 1806. AN F/1e/87. 44  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 14 July 1806 and Parma 20 September 1806, respectively. AN F/1e/85. Parma’s Gendarmerie Commander Lanaute complained that new rank and file gendarmes too often lacked discipline and an adequate sense of duty. The advice from his hierarchy was to keep trying to recruit only young men ‘whose morality makes them worthy of the title of imperial gendarmes’ and to refer to Nardon for any additional guidance or expenses. Letter from the Imperial Gendarmerie Headquarters to Captain Lanaute, Geneva, 8 March 1806, signed Col. Cdt. of the 28 Legion Bouveur. ASPr Dipartimento del Taro, Busta 5. 45  Assembling locally recruited police units was included in the decree of suppression of the sbirri, 13 March 1806.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

177

Amnesty Nardon’s chief preoccupation in the first year of his mandate was to demonstrate that political crimes were no longer an issue in the States of Parma. The few brigands guilty of stirring up trouble had been efficiently punished and neutralized, he repeated in the many letters sent to the Minister of the Interior. In keeping with brigandage tropes, Nardon wrote that the unfortunate souls who either gullibly followed the lead of malevolent bandits or passively stood by did not resent the French. Far from picking fights with representatives of the state, they appreciated the new order of things: ‘As for public opinion, perfect tranquility reigns, regular payment of taxes and the success of the conscription demonstrate the best sentiments (towards the government)’, he wrote on 23 March. Crime was still a problem, what with smuggling, grand theft and murderous settling of scores happening daily, but these were all misdeeds of the common kind and needed to be addressed as such; above all, it was important not to confuse delinquency with sedition. Indeed, the first step in fighting crime was to separate the two and clear the air by letting people know that the stigma of rebellion no longer hung over their heads. After the round of executions of 1 April, Nardon reverted to the douceur principle and asked for all punishments for cause of rebellion to stop: ‘I wish to see an end to all the military executions caused by the recent events: the thunder has struck. Great examples have been made and maybe this is enough’.46 Later that day, he submitted the same request to Governor Junot, in support of which he referenced Junot’s own proclamation of 13 March: At this time, allow me, Monseigneur, to share with you a thought that is constant on my mind: we had to avenge His Imperial Majesty and great examples had to be imposed (on the people), but Monseigneur, you said it yourself in your beautiful proclamation: the brigands have been struck. Great examples have been made; shouldn’t the terrible events of the last week, that made such a powerful impression on the public opinion, given who the offenders were, be the last of this kind; shouldn’t now be the time, Monseigneur, to utter the consoling word ‘amnesty’?… My devotion to His Majesty and my attachment to your person compel me to see it as my duty to ask you to request from His Majesty the authority of proclaiming a general amnesty in these States.

 Nardon to Minister of the Interior Champagny, Parma 8 April 1806, ANP F/1e/87.

46

178 

D. P. HARSANYI

The salient point, Nardon concluded, was that depoliticizing crime would strengthen, not weaken, law and order: Grand dignitaries, generals, officer will come and even settle in these beautiful lands: let indulgence precede them. We long, Monseigneur, to see you take the lead: after avenging your Master, let the inhabitants see the natural goodness of your heart … We will not supervise less, we will not punish crime less, we will not prosecute less the origins of the insurrection, but we will do it all by customary methods, and we will, in this way, quiet down the masses so intensely distressed by the last execution.47

Nardon’s superiors, it seems, agreed to loosen the reins, persuaded by or perhaps just tired of Nardon’s entreaties. The last political execution took place on 2 May 1806. The Military Commission changed its tactics and found more creative ways of dealing with suspects hitherto classified as rebels. On 14 June 1806, for instance, the Military Commission considered the case of seven defendants from Castel San Giovanni, the cradle of insurrection. Guilty of the rather serious crime of having attacked and molested a local gendarme by the name of Martinengo, they were neither hanged nor condemned to hard labour. Instead, they were sentenced to pay 3000 francs to the injured gendarme, the entire commune being held responsible for raising this sum; the offenders were to remain in jail until Martinengo himself attested in writing that he had collected all the money.48 Later that summer, the Military Commission did order the execution of 15 prisoners (two pairs of brothers among them), who had assaulted their French guards; yet, it counted as lenience that the rest of the convoy escaped any reprisal, on the grounds that the men involved only took advantage of the circumstances, in other words accessories to crime not instigators.49 The very existence of the Military Commission signalled the need for exceptional methods, and Nardon consistently argued in favour of assigning crime fighting operations to regular police and gendarmerie

47  Nardon to Gouverneur Général Junot, Parma 8 April 1806, AN F/1e/85. By ‘terrible events’ he meant the execution of two priests, which nearly set off another round of uprisings. A few days later, Nardon wrote again to Minister Champagny and repeated almost verbatim the arguments for a general amnesty. Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 18 April 1806, AN F/1e/87. 48  Military Commission of Parma. Judgment of 14 June 1806. AN BB/871. 49  ASPr, Judgment of the Military Commission, Gridario 1806.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

179

units.50 According to deputy prefects’ reports to Nardon and Nardon’s subsequent reports to the Minister of the Interior, conventional tactics like routine patrolling, stakeouts and infiltration of criminal bands produced scores of arrests. The prisons were full, Nardon wrote, sighing that he had to deal with the ‘leper’ of assassinations and robberies (the letter included a long list of violent crimes committed in the States of Parma since February), but he hastened to add that anti-French agitation was not part of the problem: ‘There are still a few fools and a few crooks around, rambling on and spouting unwise words; fortunately, I have a secret police that insinuates itself everywhere. I know the places and the (offending) individuals; I am prepared to shame them publicly or to punish them severely, as needed’.51 This report corroborated the findings listed a couple of days earlier, in another account where Nardon announced that all presumptive political agitators were ‘arrested or tracked down, and almost all of them identified’—thus unable to cause mayhem. As for the factors generating violence and disorder, one had to look no further than the mores of the place. Troublemakers were almost always young men, whose habit it was to parade their bravery by carrying a knife at all times, with the result that, when aided by drink, quarrels turned into crimes. Nearly all marriage celebrations ended in murder attempts, subsequently surrounded by walls of 50  He had some success on this line of argument: On 25 February 1807, a short decree by Junot’s successor Pérignon further limited the Military Commission’s to highway robberies compounded by attacks against French officers. On 23 October 1807, the Military Commission sentenced four men to decapitation, for highway armed robbery with aggravated circumstances of injuring several persons in the process and attacking a French convoy. ASPr Gridario 1807. 51  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 20 September 1806. AN /F/1e/85. Nardon employed, against Governor Junot’s advice to the contrary, a small band of informers who formed his own secret police. Initially, Junot seemed open to the idea and planned to set aside 4000 francs from the proceeds of the octroi to fund a secret police unit (draft of the order to do so 18 April 1806, AMD C-4-41). However, Junot changed his mind, probably after consultations with Napoleon: ‘As to the funds you are demanding, had His Majesty thought appropriate to do it [create a secret police] he would not have neglected to say so; since he said nothing on this subject, he does not believe this is necessary’. Junot was also concerned that a secret police would damage the image of impartial professionalism French gendarmes were supposed to project; hence, if he still insisted on using his informers, Nardon should be careful that standard procedure be observed at all times: ‘make sure these arrests are following the same rules and procedures in force throughout your administration’. To Administrator-Prefect Nardon, Parma, 13 July 1806. AMD C-4-41. Nardon kept using informers and spies anyway.

180 

D. P. HARSANYI

complicit silence that made punishment a practical impossibility. Competent law enforcement was the only remedy, but for the time being Nardon was hoping that Governor Junot’s decree (8 April 1806) that made carrying arms a punishable offence (itself relying on an old ducal ordinance of 23 March 1728, so as not to seem too foreign to the population) would begin to correct bad habits and slow down violent assaults.52 Pointing to backward customs to rationalize slow progress was standard procedure, as John Davis observed: ‘If things did not turn out as they were supposed to, the imperial administrators knew that the backwardness of the locals was to blame’.53 Like the discourse of brigandage, this way of thinking hinged on the notion of primitive populations victimized by the limitations of their own cultural norms—the only obstacle Nardon saw on his administrative path: ‘All aspects of the administration are organized, everything works with a few difficulties, and the execution of the laws meets no obstacle except for ignorance and the force of old customs’.54

52  Nardon’s ‘Report on criminal activities in the States of Parma’ Parma, 5 April 1806. ANP F/1e/87. A year later, Governor Marshall Pérignon, who replaced Junot (and who, like Junot, rarely agreed with the Administrator-Prefect), pointed towards the same toxic combination of weak institutions and entrenched bad habits: ‘In this country surrounded by mountains, at the border of several states, there was an organized brigandage that constantly put travelers and local inhabitants, coming to and from markets and fairs, in danger of being stopped, robbed, and often assassinated; criminals have been emboldened by impunity, owed to the lack of armed police forces and to the weakness of the courts’. Maréchal Pérignon to Grand Juge Régnier, Parma 17 May 1807 AN BB/817. Pérignon listed some of the measures he was taking: empower mayors to organize patrols and make arrests within 24 hours of crimes being committed to minimize possibilities for hiding in the countryside. An earlier gendarmerie report for the entire area supported Pérignon’s general assessment: ‘The States of Parma begin to offer the picture of a country entirely compliant with the laws and tranquility spreads everywhere, every day more. But the proximity of Italy on one side and of Etruria on the other side will force the government to take active and severe measures against brigands and wrongdoers of all sorts who keep streaming in the territory’. A Monsieur le Sénateur Fouché, Ministre de la Police Génerale. Colonel of 28th Legion Chauvenot, countersigned by General Moncey, Pavia, 10 December 1806. AN 8/7/8437. 53  John Davis, ‘Divided Destinies? Napoleonic Rule in Northern and Southern Italy’ in Napoleon and His Empire. Europe, 1804–1814. Edited by Phillip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 165–184 (165). See the longer discussion in Stuart Woolf, Napoleon’s Integration of Europe (New York: Routledge, 1991), 118–120. 54  Nardon to Junot, Parma 8 April 1806, AN F/1e/85. ‘This country will be purged of lazy individuals who spend their time stealing and harming society’, he wrote just as self-­ assuredly on 14 July, giving a hint on what he meant by efficient administration. Like Moreau

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

181

With the shift in focus from brigandage to backwardness Nardon succeeded in changing the perception of crime in his department. That the volume of criminal offences did not drop significantly was a disappointment, but one that the Administrator-Prefect interpreted as an operational delay caused by cultural inertia, not political hostility. He came to the same conclusion his colleagues elsewhere reached: the impressive scaffolding of French institutions could not achieve its purpose so long as hopelessly inept modes of organizing everyday life kept holding it back. Remarkably, though, belief in the malleability of human nature and faith in the universal applicability of French administrative expertise saved him from succumbing to chauvinism. All along his correspondence, Nardon blamed successive depraved governments, not the natives’ innate character, for the persistence of backward mores. Regeneration was what the people of Parma yearned for without knowing it—and fortunately, the course of action was readily available to conscientious executives: …a kind and paternalistic administration, for it is difficult to understand the kind of character the Parmesans have; the administrator should make it his duty to stimulate a little this character, push it towards the arts, or towards agriculture and industry, for which there is so much potential in these lands.55

Well-dosed leniency combined with systematic changes at the micro-level of everyday practices and routines, all within the framework of large-scale institutional restructuring, held the key to buying goodwill, transplanting French rule, and durably reshaping this remote periphery and its people. It was the belief Nardon communicated, in a hopeful tone, later that summer, in the first complete survey of the States of Parma submitted to Governor General Junot: The French institutions are founded; general administration, judicial order, land management, the administration of customs, of bridges and roads, of the mail, of the income resulted from the lottery; the spending accounts—

before him, Nardon believed that laziness was an ‘old habit’. Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 14 July 1806, AN F/1e/85. 55  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 1 May 1806. AN F/1e/85. Napoleonic administrators like Nardon channelled revolutionary pedagogy into bureaucratic assignments. On the revolutionaries’ project of individual and collective regeneration see the seminal work by Mona Ozouf, L’Homme régénéré: Essais sur la Révolution française (Paris: Gallimard, 1989).

182 

D. P. HARSANYI

everything is organized and works according to French rules; all that remains to do is to refine and improve the details of each sector.56

The devil, predictably, showed its face in those details.

A Kind and Paternalistic Administration The prodigious output of executive rulings collected in the Gridario for the year 1806 (the only year for which the Gridario needed two thick volumes of over 1000 page each) provides a good guide to what Nardon meant by a ‘kind and paternalistic administration’. Despite his determination to start afresh, Nardon was in fact following in Moreau de Saint-­ Méry’s, and indeed in Du Tillot’s, footsteps, for nothing escaped his reorganizing zeal. The difference, a significant one, was in vision and style: Nardon eschewed philosophical musings in favour of disciplined, thorough diligence. Each day brought new regulations and new instructions; no issue was too high or too low. The Administrator-Prefect took great pride in launching immunization campaigns in line with the most advanced public health policies in France and the Kingdom of Italy. It was his most successful initiative, enthusiastically endorsed by prominent local scientists and medical doctors. Building on Moreau de Saint-Méry’s earlier efforts, a central committee on vaccination started work in April 1806 so the entire population (convicted felons included) could benefit ‘from this great discovery’.57 Less glamourous aspects of public hygiene received the 56  Rapport au Gouverneur Général sur la Situation des Etats. Signed Nardon. Parma 17 June 1806. AN /F/1e/85. The report restates the list of accomplishments sent to the Minister of the Interior on 1 May. 57  Public announcement 26 April 1806, ASPr, Gridario 1806. Intellectual circles in Parma as elsewhere in Europe hailed smallpox vaccination as one of the best proofs of science benefitting humanity. Famous local medical doctors like Giacomo Tommasini got actively involved and the bishops in the main cities encouraged parishioners to accept the new procedure. Letters and public announcements on vaccination drives are collected at the ASPr, Dipartimento di Taro. Gabinetto del Prefetto, busta 3. Vaccination programmes continued after the Napoleonic regime and became routine public health practice in Maria Luigia’s government. See Virdis Raffaele, ‘The beginning of smallpox vaccination in the Duchy of Parma’ in Acta Biomed 90(2) (2019): 321–326. Everywhere in Italy, professors at medical schools and country doctors alike participated in the effort, supported by a vast centralized public health bureaucracy. See on this subject Alexander Grab, ‘The Napoleonic state and public health policies: smallpox vaccination in Napoleonic Italy (1800–1804)’ Società e Storia, Fasc. 145 (2014): 487–511.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

183

same attention: the administration issued guidelines for the humble tasks of trash collection, street sweeping and—showing rather touching concern for the poorest inhabitants—distribution of fresh water on hot days. Domestic retail was regulated by new rules for buying and selling all sorts of goods, complete with detailed instructions for running regular market days and special fairs. In addition, there were new dispositions for travelling and residing in the main cities; regulations for hunting, fishing and wood cutting; and clarifications on newly acquired national properties. In short, every aspect of life was subject to reform, all completing the work of new systems of taxation, new courts of law and ongoing conscription operations. Like myriad rivulets swelling into one imposing waterway, each contributed to the grand imperial edifice under construction in the States of Parma—or so Nardon intended. The Administrator-Prefect’s efforts fell short repeatedly, but not for lack of trying. Some initiatives enjoyed public support—like the vaccination programme, which produced a reliable working alliance between local scientists and French administrators. Too often, though, logistical changes that looked clear-cut on paper turned into entanglements on the ground. From Piacenza, property owners wrote in March 1806 that they were prepared to use the recently installed courts to seek compensation, because, in its haste to make the new justice system work, the government had seized parts of private buildings and even the homes of respectable citizens to house tribunals.58 Recent legislation on national properties (acquired through the sale of confiscated church possessions) triggered fresh concerns: new owners frequently intruded on lands they were not entitled to and mayors, still unsure how their powers differed from those of podestà, hesitated to act in response. It took yet another decree (23 April 1806) to clarify that these landlords did not have the right to pasture on nursery patches, nor could they cut wood to the point of deforestation. Members of the defunct Regia economica wondered whether they continued to be responsible for baking and distributing bread to prisoners; erratic state payments left them reluctant to use their own funds. Polite questioning turned to active defiance when reforms jeopardized entrenched interests, such as those of the companies of butchers who snubbed Nardon’s guidelines for butchering and selling meat, in which they saw intrusions in their affairs rather than improvements in public health. On 9 September 1806, Parma’s mayor Sanvitale ordered fines for  ASPr, Dipartimento del Taro, Busta 5.

58

184 

D. P. HARSANYI

non-­compliance, but, showing the precariousness of the central authorities’ reach in the population, the well-organized butchers found friends in high places: a justice of peace named Cartarelli routinely ignored the administration’s decrees and even detected legal loopholes in favour of butchers who refused to follow the rules. In vain did Piacenza’s mayor Alberto Scotti declare the local magistrate a recalcitrant subject and a danger to the commonwealth; the justice of peace remained at his post and the butchers continued working in concert to frustrate all attempts at regulating their business.59 The endless line of solicitors, and the deluge of unpaid bills validating the oft-deplored financial chaos, kept tormenting Nardon, robbing him of the peace of mind to enjoy the few successes he could claim after months of drudgery. It was in the interest of public order to pay at least some of the requests, Nardon explained wearily in response to Junot’s alarm at seeing so much money melting away: ‘…distributing monthly a small sum to each claimant, we feed the destitute, we inspire confidence, and while we get somehow behind in the budget, we keep the services going’.60 Even so, Nardon found it nearly impossible to keep up with demand. At the top of the list, various employees pensioned off either by the duke or by Moreau petitioned for their promised, never disbursed, annuities. Several had died in the meantime and their penniless widows made even the stern Nardon weep: ‘each one of my public audiences is torture for my soul and complete drain on my purse; can one say no to starving mothers?’ Nardon moaned, after months of trying to sort out the neediest cases.61 No less 59  ASPr Gridario 1806; Archivio di Stato Piacenza (henceforth ASPc), Copialettere del maire. Mayor Scotti to deputy prefect Caravel and to Governor Junot, both 30 May 1806. #259, 260. Disputes over butchering practices lingered for years, forcing each administration to issue ever more dire threats of heavy fines and jail penalties. According to Lalatta’s diaries, the public appreciated the concern for hygiene contained in the rules for butchering, but it is not clear if this was enough to show solidarity with Nardon rather than the butchers’ companies. Lalatta also expressed appreciation for other public welfare initiatives, such as removing snow from Parma’s main streets. BP Mss. Parm. 1185, entries of 2 September 1806 and 7 March 1806, respectively. 60  Rapport au Gouverneur Général sur la situation des Etats. Parma, 17 June 1806. AN F/1e/85. Reproduced in Pietro Silva, ‘I Primi Tempi dell’Amministrazione Nardon’ in Archivio Stato per le Province Parmensi, 2 (1922): 305–348, Appendix 338–345. 61  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 20 September 1806, AN F/1e/85. ‘M. Moreau gave away a lot of money and so did General Junot; everything is now falling on me’, added Nardon sorrowfully. The issues of begging and vagrancy remained a constant worry for all subsequent administrators. Nardon alerted frequently the Minister of the Interior on the

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

185

pitiful were the monks left homeless, aimless and desperate enough to turn to begging after the decree of 20 Prairial an 13 (9 June 1805) closed most monasteries. Not a day, it seems, went without requests for money. The director of the recently introduced postal services, a man named Bianchi, filed for reimbursements for extra expenses incurred during the insurgency. Parma’s Imperial Prosecutor Emanuele Mastelloni, an upstanding citizen and reliable ally of the French, claimed he was due back wages.62 The equally loyal Pietro Albesani, Piacenza’s Imperial Prosecutor, solicited money to cover the expenses of his court.63 Feudal landowners did not understand if, considering recently introduced tax legislation, they still had the right to collect rents, and if not, they too expected compensations. To help him navigate these difficulties, Minister of Justice Régnier sent a copy of the Bulletin of Laws, which got lost in the mail, to Nardon’s further distress (he tended to get distressed every time things failed to march according to plan). Overwhelmed but undeterred, Nardon pressed on. He took the bulk of his decisions at the beginning of his mandate and spent the remaining years trying to put them into practice, which often entailed punishing those who refused to submit—with variable success, as the case of the butchers illustrates. To top it all off, the public mood or esprit public failed to respond as expected to reforms that, in Nardon’s view, brought tangible improvements to each citizen’s life. Episodes of anti-government grumbling occurred with disturbing regularity, echoing the sullen atmosphere of Moreau’s times. Revulsion against conscription amplified and hardened into generalized mistrust of anything the French said or did.64 Nardon’s deputies in the field were constantly putting out fires. On 3 April 1806, Piacenza’s deputy prefect Caravel reported that, sadly, he was hearing all potential social disorder begging could generate and tried several schemes for employing the homeless and the destitute, especially in construction and textiles. See especially the letter to Champagny dated Parma 24 April 1806 which included a draft for a workfare project, intended to organize Parma’s numerous beggars and vagrants. AN F/1e/85. Alos reproduced in Silva, ‘I Primi Tempi dell’Amministrazione Nardon’. 62  ASPr, Dipartimento del Taro, Busta 163, files 1–11. 63  3 March 1806, ASPr Dipartimento di Taro, Busta 160/59. 64  See on this point Alexander Grab’s conclusion on conscription undermining the French government’s legitimacy: ‘Indeed, more than any other policy, conscription was responsible for the growing estrangement and suspicion with which much of the population regarded the state, and in this sense, it undermined the stability of the government and challenged its authority’. Alexander Grab, ‘Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802–1814)’ in The Journal of Modern History, 67, 1, (Mar. 1995): 25–54 (54).

186 

D. P. HARSANYI

too often disparaging comments against the current administration; it would take time for people to become accustomed to their new rulers, he concluded, trying to sound reassuring.65 Six months later, the situation had not improved and Caravel instructed mayors in his district to denounce troublemakers while urging them to ‘close their ears to any perfidious suggestion that could come from the enemies of the Government’ no matter how cleverly they disguised their aims.66 On 9 May, Junot curtly warned Parma’s Bishop Caselli to keep his clergy in line: it was brought to the governor’s attention that the archpriest of Langhirano refused to participate in the installation of his commune’s French-appointed mayor, fearing for the damnation of his soul in case he submitted to foreign orders.67 Such reproaches may have inspired the bishop to admonish from the pulpit parishioners who took to mocking their priests whenever they celebrated high masses in honour of the French armies.68 In Albesani’s lists of sentences, we find a certain Francesco Brondetta, condemned to three days in jail and a fine of 150 francs for the crime of insulting police commissioners on duty (on 30 June 1807). In July 1807, one of these commissioners, Pompeo Aspetti, regretted to inform the Administrator-Prefect that, while he was obliged to hire personal bodyguards against former colonel Botti’s aggressive conduct, the population had great fun at his expense, for nothing delighted the multitudes more than the public lampooning of a government official. Two days later, the same police commissioner mailed two leaflets anonymously distributed around Piacenza; in coarse language, the flyers promised that Nardon was about to meet the same fate as Moreau.69 Later that year, the deputy prefect of San Donino impressed on the administration the difficulties of keeping the peace at the micro-level of village politics. For this, he gave the example of two brothers who cooperated in the arrest of a notorious outlaw named Tomarrone 65  Caravel to Administrator-Prefect Nardon, Piacenza 3 April 1806. ASPr, Carte del Dipartimento del Taro, busta 2. 66  Circular letter published by Tipografia Del Majno in Piacenza, 30 November 1806. Reproduced in Ettore Cara, L’Ordine Pubblico a Piacenza nel periodo napoleonico (Piacenza: Editrice EMILSTAPA, 1990), 39–40. 67  Letter to Bishop Caselli, Parma 9 May 1806, AMD, C-4-41. 68  Public announcement 2 January 1807. ASPr, Gridario 1807. V. 131. 69  Aspetti to Nardon, 8 and 10 July 1807, respectively. The flyers caused Nardon to experience an uncharacteristic moment of despair and gloomily warn his minister that ‘Agitators have no restraints; this country might well be lost’. Nardon to Minister Champagny, Piacenza, 10 July 1807. All documents in AN F/1e/87. It is the only sign of discouragement I found in his official reports.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

187

only to be driven out of town by enraged neighbours who, apparently, disliked collaboration with French authorities more than they feared bandits’ raids.70 Efforts to endear the gendarmerie to the people did not meet readily with the presumed results: a report concerning gendarmerie activities over the ensemble of the 28th military division praised the increased professionalization of Parma’s brigades, but signalled numerous instances of hostility against the force.71 Nardon started his tenure with boundless faith in the transformative power of good governance. He relished the opportunity of showing by example how the methodical efforts of a competent administrator gradually chased out the chaos and inaugurated an era of rational order, crowned by the public’s eventual assent to French rule. He worked towards this goal every day; and every day, like an unreachable mirage, the goal moved further away, and he spent his waking hours struggling to keep afloat. Far from a Weberian bureaucratic state, the States of Parma offered the spectacle of barely controlled chaos. What to do? Nardon did not despair; at least he did not show it in correspondence with his superiors, who received unfailingly optimistic assurances that the country was becoming more French by the day. ‘In a little while, Monseigneur, the French administration will work here in a manner I dare qualify as brilliant’, Nardon announced early on: ‘the bulk of the work is done’, he declared just two months after his arrival.72 All follow-up reports, essentially inventories of the new administration’s accomplishments, presented equally optimistic accounts, culminating with two lengthy reports written on 1 May and 17 June 1806, for Minister Champagny and General Junot respectively, where he recorded successful beginnings in all fields: taxation, conscription, law enforcement, sale of church property, vagrancy and education. Barely noted, if not entirely ignored, were failure to meet taxation targets, rampant criminality, unrelenting anti-government grumbling, obstinate 70  A series of reports by Locard on a complicated case of mistaken identity. I analysed this incident, and its relevance for the relations between French administrators and local administrés in Doina Pasca Harsanyi, ‘Il dominio della legge. Un caso di giustizia criminale negli stati di Parma sotto il dominio napoleonico’ Aurea Parma Fascicolo II 2017 (Maggio– Settembre 2017): 147–155. 71  Rapport to M. le Sénateur Fouché Ministre de la Police Générale. Pavia le 10 dec. 1806, signed Le colonel de la 28ème Légion Tjevenot (or Chouvenot) AN F/7/8437. 72  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 14 March 1806 and 18 March 1806, respectively. AN F/1e/85. Follow up letters on 23 and 24 March provide abundant details on each administrative move.

188 

D. P. HARSANYI

resistance to conscription, and confusion over new legislation and the means of implementing it. In sum, Paris heard nothing that could have questioned the existence of the effective, attentive, paternalistic and inspiring administration emerging from Nardon’s official letters. Most administrators sent to Paris good news and glossed over less than desirable occurrences, lest they risk close inspection of their area of responsibility.73 Nardon was no exception, but he was clear-eyed too. In addition to a functionary’s instinctive inclination to please his superiors, asserting optimism was a strategy of buying time, for himself and for his administrés: time for allowing the system to set in and for people to grow accustomed to the new normal. In the short run, the strategy did buy a respite from scrutiny. Minister Champagny condensed the stream of sanguine updates in a report that assured the emperor that at all levels, from vetted personnel in key local government positions to tax collection and conscription methods, the situation in the States of Parma was more than satisfactory.74 Like Lebrun’s final public account on the defeat of the insurrection, Champagny’s review of the post-insurrection administration in Parma smoothed all divergences, brushed aside social asperities, ignored potential sources of discontent, and presented an aspirational state of affairs as tangible reality. Nardon’s writings show that, privately, he was aware of the difference. He also knew that, ideally, a good administrator reached the apex of his profession when he worked a particular kind of organizational magic: adapt general principles to local particularities, always with the understanding that French laws and governing methods were non-negotiable.75 To bring reality closer to his sunny utterings, the 73  In the words of R. C. Cobb: ‘Prefects gave the sort of information that they knew would be welcome’. Richard Charles Cobb, The Police and the People. France Popular Protests 1790–1820 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 58. Antonino de Francesco also stressed that tension, even when not rising to the severity of crisis, characterized the social climate in Italy under French rule. L’Italia di Bonaparte. Politica, statualità e nazione tra due rivoluzioni (1796–1821) (Torino: UTET, 2011), 104–105. 74  Minister Champagny. Report to the Emperor, Paris 26 March 1806. AN F/1e/86. Champagny gave high marks to all aspects of administration: courts, governing offices, gendarmerie, to which he added remarks on the condition of former clergy. He believed that misunderstandings of a private nature, like the exact share of responsibilities between Junot and Nardon, had been resolved too. Napoleon had his doubts and initially relied on discreet infiltrators for obtaining accurate news, but the minister’s report allayed most apprehensions and the States of Parma disappeared from Napoleon’s range of vision for about four years. 75  The ideal administrator was the one who understood that ‘mores, laws, habits, customs are infinitely variable’ but found ways to channel this diversity into the fixed principles guid-

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

189

Administrator-Prefect needed cooperation on the ground. Through the days of insurrection, Parma–Piacenza’s upper classes worked together with French officers on the commonly accepted goal of restoring law and order. Further down the road, the vigorous reorganization Nardon had in mind depended on deepening the alliance; like everywhere else, as Gavin Daly noted, ‘The notables’ local knowledge, experience and influence were vital to the day-to-day running of the regime’.76 Wooing the elites was of the essence.

sbiRRi: Past and Present In rural regions throughout Northern Italy, central authorities who found it impossible to police the countryside hired armed clans to fight crime any way they saw fit. The sbirri obeyed no law and delivered no order; they spread terror instead. Italian collective memory retained a figure of pure evil: He was considered a foul character, a villain, a scoundrel of the worst kind, who, living in the most hidden creases of society, operating in the most ambiguous and ill-famed marginality … had chosen a shameful profession by which he could, with little trouble, make a living and commit with impunity all manner of misdeed and violence.77

In 1790, French traveller Charles Dupaty captured the prevalent sentiment: ‘The sbirri are privileged brigands who fight against non-privileged brigands’.78 The opinion had not changed in 1806, when Elisa, the ing the government everywhere. See Igor Moullier, ‘Une révolution de l’administration ? La naissance de la science administrative impériale’. Annales historiques de la Révolution Française, 389, 3 (2017): 139–160 (149–152). The article reviews the scientific literature that, between 1802 and 1812, clarified the philosophical underpinning of post-­Revolutionary administrative offices and the related code of conduct expected from regional administrators such as prefects and deputy prefects. 76  Gavin Daly, ‘Little Emperors? Investigating Prefectoral Rule in the Departments’ in Napoleon and His Empire. Europe 1804–1814. Editors Philip G.  Dwyer and Alan Forrest (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 44–60 (51). 77  Furio Bianco, ‘Sbirri, contrabbandieri e le ‘rie sette dei malfattori’ nel settecento friulano’ in Emarginazione, criminalità e devianza in Italia fra i seicento e novecento. Problemi e indicazioni di ricerca. A cura di A. Pastore, P. Sorcinelli (Milano: F. Angeli, 1990), 68. 78  Quoted in Clive Emsley, ‘A typology of nineteenth-century police’ in Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 3, 1 (1999): 29–44. All contemporary observations

190 

D. P. HARSANYI

Duchess of Lucca, commented on the sbirri in a report that sketched for her brother Napoleon the main lines of her administration: The sbirri were a despised, reviled institution; they have been replaced by brigades of gendarmerie. I relied on your General Inspector in Parma, a dedicated and accomplished officer, who supervised the execution of my policies.79

In Parma, almost simultaneously, Administrator-Prefect Nardon echoed Elisa’s verdict: ‘[sbirri] were a vicious force, left in the hands of a group of individuals poorly paid, with no character and no interest in the law; this could not but generate numerous abuses’.80 Nardon’s predecessor Moreau de Saint-Méry pointed to the dangerous imbalance between the sbirri’s power and the rulers’ ineffectiveness: the sbirri, he wrote, routinely levied an illegal tax from each household (questura). The practice became so onerous that the last duke attempted to forbid it, only to back off when the sbirri and their allies—des hommes turbulents—mutinied and threatened to destabilize the countryside. Only an order from the emperor could break up and disarm these bands, Moreau concluded, by way of explaining why he had done nothing to weaken their networks.81 It is also possible that he simply felt no urgency in dealing with them. For all their fame for ruthlessness, by 1805 the sbirri had lost much of their brashness. As of 1802, French military commanders supervised the voluntary militia and kept an eye on the sbirri, now mostly relegated to the task of guarding convoys of prisoners and watching over gangs of convicts working in the salt mines at Salso Maggiore. Understanding that French control took much of the wind from the sbirri’s sails, local communities found it practical to call on these men for tasks militia members support Michael Broers’ conclusion that the sbirri, at once impossible to control and ineffective in curbing crime illustrated the weakness of small governments in Italy unable ‘to govern their own territory, at the most basic level’. Michael Broers, ‘Centre and Periphery in Napoleonic Italy: The Nature of French Rule in départements réunis, 1800–1814’ in Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe. Michael Rowe editor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 55–73 (58). 79  Princess Elisa to Napoléon, Lucca, 9 March 1806, AN AF/IV/1716. The General Inspector mentioned was probably Radet. 80  Rapport Général sur la Police secrète des Etats de Parme et Plaisance, Parme, Premier décembre 1806. AN, F/1e/87. This was an overview of the police system in Parma–Piacenza under the Bourbon dukes. 81  Moreau de Saint-Méry, Compte Moral, fos 28–19, AN AF/IV/1717.

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

191

were not eager to perform, night patrols especially. In September 1803, for instance, the podestà of Corte Maggiore, himself a militia captain, concluded a contract with the commander of the local sbirri (bargello) for assuring the town’s safety after dusk ‘whenever called on by the podestà’.82 In January 1805, in the same community, specially assigned French troops took over night patrols, leaving the sbirri effectively unemployed. The establishment of the gendarmerie as the main professional force for crime control and prevention in May 1805 nullified their stated role of crime fighting force. Soon thereafter, Napoleon included the sbirri among the remnants of feudalism marked for abolition once the Code Napoléon took effect in the States of Parma.83 Out of work sbirri found themselves reduced to begging for any kind of gainful employment: the bargello of Castel’Aquato, for instance, felt he had no choice but to accept the lowly task of repairing roads, for which, however, he solicited a raise on behalf of his beleaguered men.84 At the same time, at least some of the sbirri looked for ways to move out of their station: bargello Giovanni Alberetti humbly petitioned the commune of Corte Maggiore to admit his two sons to the local public school; he wanted them to acquire the education needed to choose another profession. It was an extraordinary request that gave the commune’s Anzianato pause: how would villagers react to such novelty, the city elders pondered, fearing that many would refuse to send their own children to a school frequented by sons of sbirri. In the end, the Anzianato concluded that the ‘new spirit of equality’ must prevail, accepted the bargello’s request, and ordered the school to accommodate the new pupils.85 In the winter of 1805, with insurrection gathering steam, French commanders suspected the sbirri of fanning the flames of rebellion. Further inquiries failed to substantiate these initial worries and final French reports 82  Mario Boscarelli, Dall’Ancien Régime a Maria Luigia in un centro minore degli Stati Parmensi (Milani: Giuffrè, 1980), 38. 83  In the letter advising relative lenience for certain religious customs, Napoleon also clarified that ‘The jurisdiction of bishops must be suppressed; the sbirri and the prisons they may run, suppressed’. A. M. Champagny. Milan, 7 prairial an 13 (27 May 1805). Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, Vol. X, # 8798, p. 449. 84  Archivio Comunale Castell’Arquato. Busta Deliberazioni Anziani. 13 November 1805. 85  The mayor worried that ‘since public opinion believes it shameful to have sbirri among school mates, many would abstain to send their children to school, this being a novelty never practiced in this country, as far back as memory stretched’. Boscarelli, ‘Dall’Ancien Régime a Maria Luigia in un centro minore degli Stati Parmensi’, 49.

192 

D. P. HARSANYI

did not mention sbirri agitation among causal factors. Still, the sbirri’s continuous presence, even if marginalized, remained too much a reminder of the chaotic past, so one of General Junot’s first acts as Governor General was to disband them on 13 March 1806.86 The decree of suppression contained two articles, followed up by a series of clarifications. 1. The companies known in these states under the name of company of sbirri are suppressed. 2. All (sbirri) must report at Parma’s Citadel on 25 March, each man carrying a certificate of good behaviour, with a brief note on his life and mores, issued by the mayor of his commune. Officers must bring their states of service. The decree spelled out what their fate would be: the wounded and the sick no longer capable of service would go to the Hotel des Invalides in Paris, armed with passports issued for the trip; the old would receive a small pension. The able-bodied would form a reserve company, under the supervision of the Governor General, who would nominate the officers, the Administrator-Prefect having the task of selecting the non-commissioned officers.87 Their pay was calculated in conformity with the decree issued in Milan on 24 Floréal an 13, which regulated the functioning of reserve companies. The entire plan depended on the emperor’s approval, which Junot expected quite confidently, since he did not hesitate to make public the smallest details. He was at least partially mistaken: ‘Where the hell did you learn that I can let the sbirri enter at Invalides? It is unacceptable!’ Napoleon roared.88 But sbirri had to be employed, ‘so that they do not become brigands’, Nardon wrote to Minister Champagny, who relayed the advice to the emperor on 18 March.89 In the end, Parma’s sbirri did 86  He announced this move in a letter to Napoleon on 11 March. AN AF/IV/1717. The decree was published in the two languages. ASPr, Gridario 1806. Junot sent Nardon a copy of the decree on 22 February and asked him to oversee the meeting of 25 February at Parma’s Citadel. AMD C-4-41. 87  Junot’s decree was included, with positive comments, in Fouché’s bulletin of 26 March. Police secrète du premier empire, #949, 26 March 1806, p. 308. 88  To General Junot, Paris 23 Mars 1806. Correspondance de Napoléon Premier, Vol. 12, p. 211, #1008. 89  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 10 March 1806, ANP F/1e/86 and Minister Champagny. Report to the Emperor, Paris 18 March 1806. ANP F/1e/86. A note in the

8  ORDER INTO CHAOS 

193

not go to Paris: the old and infirm were sent home with a token pension; the young were absorbed in gendarmerie or police units and in the reserve companies General Junot organized in Parma and Piacenza beginning in March 1806.90 Perhaps the best indication of how considerably the sbirri had been tamed emerged from the harsh tone in which they were spoken to. At the beginning of 1806, Count Sanvitale, recently installed mayor of Parma, was looking for ways of moving hardened recidivist criminals out of the general prison population already on the brink of mutiny because of dire living conditions (inadequate food, no straw for matrasses, overcrowding). On 1 April 1806, San Vitale wrote to Gatti, the former bargello of the sbirri in Parma, with orders to gather the forces he could still prevail upon. Gatti’s assignment was to escort a convoy of difficult prisoners to the factories at Mulini-Bassi, where the custodian planned to put them to work (nine out of the 14 most dangerous criminals were to be transferred to another location). This was in line with conventional sbirri duties, yet Sanvitale thought it appropriate to notify Gatti that this was a one-time commission that in no way foreshadowed a return to the old days of sbirri clout. Along with good marks for a job well done, the mayor instructed the bargello to explain to his men that ‘my particular, occasional orders must not flatter them with any notion of continuous existence, in the old forms, of the extinct corps of the sbirri’.91 The sbirri probably understood the message, since there is no evidence of defiance from within their ranks. With the memory of past deeds lingering, some officials chose to blame the gendarmes’ difficulties on the sbirri’s bad reputation. In a bilingual letter sent in November 1806 to all mayors in his district, Piacenza’s deputy prefect Gian Francesco Caravel announced that army regiments still stationed throughout rebellious areas would be removed. He also made sure to add that the slightest movement of insubordination would be met with military repression; more precisely, rebel chiefs would be executed, and their houses set on fire. Imperial Gendarmerie units stood ready to margins informed the emperor that the Governor General had recycled most sbirri in a reserve unit, minimizing the risk that letting them roam free would pose. Previous reports from Nardon to Champagny show that both he and Junot had been preparing the way for sbirri’s inclusion in supervised units before Junot issued the decree. 90  Ettore Carrà noted that at the end of 1806 all 12 new police officers in Piacenza (agents de police) were former sbirri. L’Ordine pubblico nel periodo napoleonico. Piacenza 1806–1814, 1. 91  ASPr. Comune di Parma. Minutes des lettres de la mairie de la ville de Parma depuis le 23 Février au 25 Novembre 1806 (1 and 2 April 1806). Inv 8/2197/.

194 

D. P. HARSANYI

execute these orders, Caravel assured, while expressing disappointment that many communes dithered instead of cooperating fully with the gendarmes. Was it because the latter called to mind the sbirri, he wondered: ‘People make false comparisons and parallels between these [gendarmes] units and certain old institutions specific to this region; and this becomes a reason—which does not exist in reality—to malign in the eyes of the public opinion so important a force, who is rendering such useful services, and who would serve even better if given more respect and more support’.92 At this point, the sbirri no longer existed as an independent body. Blaming their ill repute on the gendarmes’ poor standing in rural communities looks like a transparently convenient excuse. As Michael Broers noted, the sbirri amply earned their bad name and it is hard to give them any posthumous sympathy; it is also hard not to question whether their dark legend was maintained for the purpose of explaining away the new police’s less than flawless performance.93 Still, for the new regime that struggled to come to life in the States of Parma, what mattered most was the successful removal of an institution much feared and detested, but embedded in society for centuries: that the sbirri were relegated so swiftly and irrevocably to the past sent the unambiguous signal that a page was indeed being turned.94

92  Gian Francesco Caravel to the Maires, Piacenza 30 November 1806. Piacenza, Stamperia Del Majno: 1806 and ASPc, Gridario 1806. See comments on this text in Carrà, L’Ordine pubblico nel periodo napoleonico, 161–166. 93  Michael Broers, ‘Sbirri and Gendarmes. The Workings of a Rural Police Force’ in Corpi armati e ordine pubblica in Italia (XVI–XIX secoli) a cura di Livio Antonelli e Claudio Donati (Soveria Manelli: Rubbetino Editore, 2003): 203–211. 94  Marquis Lalatta, who rarely found good things to say about French rule, pointed to public approval when he noted in his journal entry of 13 March that the feared sbirri had been converted into police units. BP Mss. Parm. 1185.

CHAPTER 9

Wooing the Elites

Napoleon’s empire did not invent the wheel, administratively speaking. Any large state needs to achieve administrative coherence across regional particularities. For this, general acceptance of common rules and goodwill cooperation between central and regional authorities are paramount: ‘Napoleon faced challenges common to all empires, balancing the need to co-opt defeated kings and princes against systematic top-down authority, finding a workable strategy somewhere between creating a homogenized elite and ruling each part of the empire separately’.1 People well acquainted with the history of the Ancient world, part of any good education at the end of the eighteenth century, looked to the Roman Empire for a ready blueprint of successful co-optation of local elites.2 The secret to Roman durability, Franz Georg Maier observed, lay in Rome’s ability to promise provincial elites social advancement within imperial structures without loss of prestige at the local level. 1  Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 232. 2  The Napoleonic Empire emulated the Roman Empire, as Michael Broers put it: ‘No clearer, better-defined model for imperial rule had emerged in the western world since Rome itself, and Rome became the most consistent, pervasive model for the Napoleonic Empire, probably for this reason’. ‘Pride and Prejudice: The Napoleonic Empire through the Eyes of Its Rulers’ in Napoleon’s Empire. War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850. Ute Planert editor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 307–317 (307).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_9

195

196 

D. P. HARSANYI

Rome stabilized the existing social order in all conquered territories, as long as it rested on the timocratic principle, which determined the social structure according to wealth and property. […] The dominating reason for Rome’s policy was the awareness that the disparity in numbers between Romans and subjects, the vast extent of the empire and its rudimentary organization necessitated the integration of the local elites and the delegation of duties of government to their members.3

Similar principles and reasons (save perhaps awareness of rudimentary organization) guided the Napoleonic policy of coaxing the elites into cooperation. To do the job well, a French prefect had to find ways of ruling his department that were equally acceptable to the new subjects and to the Paris hierarchy, which implied managing simultaneously the discontent and the ambitions of all social categories.4 Rich or poor, public figures or humble labourers, each group had something to lose from foreign occupation; the perceptive prefect was the one who drew attention to what each had to gain. With the expectation that they would prevail upon the masses, the leadership classes had to be co-opted first, and hence engagement with wealthy and distinguished citizens was part of a prefect’s tactical panoply.5 Once more, the new team believed it had to rectify Moreau de Saint-Méry’s numerous blunders: The Administrator General, instead of using deftly the influence these classes exercised over the population, pushed away, and treated with the most absolute contempt, in public and in private, all those who belonged to or served the nobility. The nobles retired in their private residences, but their dependents shared their discontent and started grumbling; the priests fared even worse, and their influence is even greater.6

3  Franz Georg Maier, ‘Megaorganisation in Antiquity: The Roman Empire’ Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 15/4 (1995): 705–713 (708). C.G. Starr’s observation, quoted on p. 708, that the Roman Empire often ‘appears as a partnership between the emperors and the upper classes’ sums up the extent of the integration of provincial elites. 4  Antonelli, I Prefetti dell’Italia Napoleonica. Repubblica e Regno d’Italia, 475–484. Very instructive is a 24 August 1804 report where Giovanni Luosi, deputy prefect of Mirandola, listed the various manners of passive and active resistance he had to deal with and ways to remedy the situation (477). 5  On the political calculations involved in treating the elites so differently from the brutality reserved for brigands, deserters and the poor in general, see Annie Jourdan, L’Empire de Napoléon (Paris: Flammarion, 2000), 65–66. 6  Junot to Napoleon, Parma, 31 January 1806. AN AF/IV/1717.

9  WOOING THE ELITES 

197

As if on cue, Nardon nodded in approval: ‘People complain of his (Moreau’s) treating roughly the priests, who in Italy are very influential, and the nobles too, who form a class apart’, he wrote on 15 February.7 Moreau’s successors spotted here the same amateurish propensities that ruined the man’s entire tenure: he indulged his taste for aristocratic conviviality, picked favourites, and acted like a princely Maecenas when he should have impressed on the upper classes the sober dignity of a French state representative. No wonder that unscrupulous characters exploited his goodwill when he was in charge and betrayed him as soon as his fortunes changed, Junot concluded after he fired all of Moreau’s assistants, indicted collectively for ineptitude, fraud and abuse of office.8 Lesson learned, Junot and Nardon avoided personal attachments and did their best to maintain a coolly cordial super-partes persona meant to earn respect and build trust. Their hope was that local elites would agree to model this code of conduct, eventually endorsing the role of junior partner in launching an order of things where personal and local interests dissolved into allegiance to the French state.9 This was a sensible route towards a negotiated compromise, but the nature of the French empire and the Napoleonic administrators’ self-image called for more than mutually beneficial exchanges. Beyond replacing one form of government with a supposedly better one, coming under French rule meant embarking on a transformative journey from the past to the future. In the words of Stuart Woolf: ‘administrative reform could be hailed in pure Enlightenment terms, as the triumph of civilization over the traditional forces of obscurity’.10 Civilization here denoted French civilization on the firm belief that, thanks to its unique historical experience, France became the nation where abstract universal ideas came to earth in the shape of concrete prescriptions with universal 7  Nardon to Minister of the Interior Champagny, Parma, 15 February 1806. AN F/1e/85. In fact, Moreau cultivated the nobles but could not bring himself to humour members of the clergy. 8  In the 11 February 1806 letter to Napoleon, Junot concluded that Moreau’s only fault was his trusting nature. ‘M. Moreau wanted to do everything by himself, and finding the task impossible, he allowed himself be influenced by the scoundrels around him who did what they themselves wanted’. AN AF/IV/1717/2. 9  Michael Broers noted that impersonal professionalism was expected to instil ‘identification of personal and patriotic interests between the state and its servants’, a line of conduct exemplified by Eugene de Beauharnais’ career. Broers, ‘Les Enfants du Siècle: an empire of young professionals and the creation of a bureaucratic, imperial ethos in Napoleonic Europe’, 350. 10  Woolf, Napoleon’s Integration of Europe, 244.

198 

D. P. HARSANYI

applicability.11 The concrete formula, plainly obvious to all who had eyes to see, was the regenerated state materialized from the Revolution fully equipped with sound governing methods, enlightened legal codes and a way of life free of oppression, fear and superstition. So understood, faith in France’s universalism infused mundane tasks with metaphysical meaning and caused prefects to relish playing the part of emissaries from an enlightened future to people stuck in the past. Michael Broers portrayed this group to perfection: They were imbued with a clear mission to extend the unbreakable model to wherever the Emperor sent them, for embedded in the Code, its system of judicial administration and the whole edifice of civil government was their own vision of enlightened progress. They had a perfect template with which to reform Europe, and Europe would not be reformed until its peoples, with all their diversity notwithstanding, would not fit that template. It took a remarkable degree of confidence and clarity of purpose to rule half a continent by such lights.12

Broers and other historians have parsed the mix of philosophical certainty and sheer arrogance, prejudice and naiveté that drove French administrators and often alienated the very elites they wished to win over.13 Doubt was not part of their thinking process. Professional bureaucrats were well educated but rarely deep thinkers, certainly not given to pondering the ambiguities inherent in the Enlightenment’s legacy like Benjamin Constant or Germaine de Stael did at the time. Their ranks were equally open to old regime functionaries, to sobered up former revolutionaries, and to younger clerks raised in the sprawling Napoleonic bureaucracy.14 11  Nobody formulated better than Pierre Nora the spirit of this French philosophical tradition: ‘La France n’est pas universelle, comme Michelet le lui a fait croire au grand dérangement des autres nations. Mais elle est cette nation qui a eu l’universel dans son particulier. La nation révolutionnaire a été la matrice de transformation d’un universel abstrait dans un universel concret’. Pierre Nora, Recherches de la France (Paris: Gallimard, 2013), 28 12  Michael Broers, ‘Les Enfants du Siècle: an empire of young professionals and the creation of a bureaucratic, imperial ethos in Napoleonic Europe’, 357. 13  Michael Broers, ‘Cultural Imperialism in a European Context? Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Napoleonic Italy’ Past and Present, 170 (February 2001): 152–180; Broers, ‘Pride and Prejudice: The Napoleonic Empire through the Eyes of Its Rulers’; Stuart Woolf, ‘French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire’, Past and Present, no. 124 (Aug. 1989): 96–120. 14  Louis Begeron and Guy-Chaussinand-Nogaret pointed to the mixed background of civil administrators and showed that they all enjoyed great social prestige on account of the pre-

9  WOOING THE ELITES 

199

Bound by an esprit de corps that combined strict discipline and missionary zeal—the powerful ethos Broers called bureaucratic optimism—and buoyed by the exhilarating call of lifting entire societies from darkness to light, normally buttoned up office holders dipped into Stendhalian impassioned registers (minus Stendhal’s literary gifts) to describe processes historians define, prosaically, as assimilation and acculturation. Love, a word seldom associated with managerial proficiency, came easily under the pen of Napoleonic notables. Prefects especially, tasked with translating grand ideas into everyday practice in provinces far removed from the Parisian metropolis, were acutely aware of the obligation to earn not only the obedience but also the affections of residents turned imperial subjects. A set of rules for prefects published in 1808 by Louis-François Portiez de l’Oise explicitly reminded administrators of their duty to conduct business in ways that would allow ‘the government to be loved and in this way, accomplish the public good’.15 ‘For any people, it is only by administration that the government can be loved’, waxed lyrical Adrien Lézay-­ Marnésia, who wrote extensively on the importance of prefects reaching out to local communities.16 Another prefect declared, at the time he took his post: ‘I come here to seek not the keys, but the hearts of the city’, while one of his colleagues received a special commendation for making locals love the government.17 Gradually, a two-pronged strategy of ‘hearts sumed efficiency of the entire corps. Louis Bergeron, Guy Chuassinand- Nogaret, Les ‘masses de granit’ (Paris: Editions de L’Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 1979, pp. 32–33). This study also stresses the novelty of an entire class of professionals trained specifically for filling the ranks of the bureaucracy. Perceptive insights into the Napoleonic bureaucrats’ self-image as agents of enlightened political processes in Isser Woloch, Napoleon and His Collaborators: The Making of a Dictatorship (New York, 2001), passim, especially the preface pp. xi–xv. For a wide-ranging analytical collective portrait of Napoleonic administrators as resolute men of action linked by a distinct esprit de corps, see Aurélien Lignereux, Les Impériaux. Administrer et Habiter L’Europe de Napoléon (Paris: Fayard, 2019). 15  Moullier, ‘Une révolution de l’administration? La naissance de la science administrative impériale’, 151. 16  Adrien Lézay-Marnésia, prefect of Rhin-et-Moselle and later Bas-Rhin, as quoted in Gavin Daly, ‘Little Emperors? Investigating Prefectoral Rule in the Departments’, 50. Lézay-­ Marnésia’s ideas of good administration are discussed in Jacques Régnier, Les Préfets du Consulat et de l’Empire (Paris: Librairie G. Ficker, 1913), 115–133. Régnier also noted that official homilies repeatedly reminded church goers that the emperor was owed love, in addition to taxes and recruits for the army (p. 107). 17  Respectively, the prefect of Seine et Oise and praise for the prefect of Allier, as quoted in Jean Tulard et Marie-José Tulard, Napoléon et 40 millions de sujets. La centralisaton et le Premier Empire (Paris: Editions Tallandier 2014), 105.

200 

D. P. HARSANYI

and minds’ took shape throughout the empire: liberally compensated, prestigious appointments in the new administration offset potential losses and spoke to the mind; various attempts at fostering a pleasant social life, combined with elaborate cultural and educational designs, spoke to the heart.18

the Heart Perfectly in tune with the imperial ethos, Nardon yearned to touch the hearts of people under his rule: My cherished task, Monseigneur, is to mind the needs of the Administration, and to win over, on behalf of the emperor, the hearts of the inhabitants of these beautiful regions, so delightful and appealing thanks to their [geographic] situation; their riches, and their populations, compare favorably with the best and most loyal subjects of the government.19

The ‘hearts’ half of the strategy began with doling out favours in exchange for submission, presumably to break the ice and uncover the soft side of military occupation. On 29 January 1806, barely three days after his arrival, General Junot authorized unrestricted stage performances and other festivities in the city of Parma, by way of compensation for wisely sitting out the rebellion.20 Fortunately, the Governor General very much enjoyed an evening at the playhouse, to which he allotted a large chunk of his carefully dosed largesse. Meanwhile, he shut the theatre season in Piacenza, to give the Piacentini time to reflect on the merits of his ‘entertainment for cooperation’ policy. Nardon frequented Parma’s theatre out of duty, hardly an agreeable one since the plays Junot was so fond of left him cold when not indignant. 18  See on this point Napoleon urging Viceroy Eugene to find ways to persuade the public that he loves Italians. Alain Pillepich, Napoléon et les Italiens. République Italienne et Royaume d’Italie. 1802–1814 (Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions/Fondation Napoléon, 2003), 68. 19  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Piacenza 10 February 1806. AN F/1e/86/. 20  Letter to Bishop Caselli, 29 January 1806. He praised the bishop for preaching obedience and issued an order for authorizing theatre shows, masked balls and other Carnival entertainment in the city of Parma, as compensation for remaining ‘calm, obedient, and submissive’. The same day he wrote to the (still) Administrator General Moreau de Saint-­ Méry to make sure these festivities would go on unimpeded—unlike in Piacenza, where they were temporarily suppressed, Piacentini’s punishment for rebelling. Both letters in AMD C—4–41.

9  WOOING THE ELITES 

201

The plays, he wrote, ‘only serve to spread further all manners of indecency, to corrupt the mores, and to keep the mind fixated on brutal passions, with the attending readiness of using the dagger’—the very emotions that fuelled random banditry in the countryside. For Nardon, who always felt he carried a much larger burden than Junot, evenings at the theatre meant work, not pleasure. He used the time for sociological observations: Performances here are very interesting from political and moral perspectives … people are not rich, but the court accustomed everyone to spend a lot and to show off; ostentation, luxury and vanity are common, and they love their leisure. They go to a theater show like the French go to a salon.21

In his experimented hands, he concluded, the cherished custom could serve as a vehicle for introducing, surreptitiously, French norms of sociability to the point of changing his administrés’ taste first, then ideas, and finally their entire way of life. To this end, Nardon launched a charm offensive, a nearly superhuman feat for a person so utterly devoid of natural charisma. He invited local personalities for mingling and conversation at his residence, social occasions he called cercles (circles), no doubt trying to conjure the glamour of French salons celebrated all over Europe. The Administrator-Prefect did not care for socializing himself but was glad to report that the chore was contributing to the goal of inducing the locals— those who mattered, anyway—to take a liking to French ways: Individuals estranged from one another by prejudices end up socializing and talking serenely with one another. Italians are not accustomed, and have no means, to receive in their homes; it flatters them to be entertained by the authorities. In this way, they become acquainted with the French authorities; many people have observed the excellent results of similar social occasions held for foreigners at one’s home.22

Sounding more like a field commander than a genteel host, Nardon continued to impress on his superiors the strategic importance of his entertainment efforts: ‘All the functionaries of all branches, all distinguished 21  Both quotes in Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma, 10 September 1806. AN F/1e/86. 22  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma, 16 August 1806. Nardon added these reflections to a report on the festivities he organized on the occasion of Saint Napoleon Day, celebrated on 15 August. AN F/1e/85.

202 

D. P. HARSANYI

personalities patronize my circles regularly and seem to find such visits amusing. Do not abandon me, Monseigneur; my public expenses are connected to my work and its political results’.23 This being said, with theatre-­ going likely to remain a favourite pastime, it was imperative that French professionals decided the repertory and supervised performances; better yet, French actors should be transferred to Parma as soon as possible.24 That an average prefect, with 1000 things on his mind, cared what plays Italians watched seems merely controlling; that he would valiantly endeavour to coax blue-blooded patricians into a sort of cultural re-­ education programme signals that indeed, in every civil servant’s chest beat the heart of a missionary bent on making his administrés see the light. Nardon envisioned a top-down strategy, whereby familiarity with a combination of French literary styles and social graces was sure to have the excellent effect of inducing the educated classes to grasp the inadequacies of their own cultural background, therefore freely gravitating towards contemporary French models. Whereupon, the masses accustomed to defer to their betters would abandon, one by one, inherited customs and beliefs, the very ones which the Administrator-Prefect consistently found at the root of criminality and social volatility.25 By way of acculturation, 23  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma, 20 September 1806, AN F/1e/85. A note in the margin gives the number as 140–150 persons three times a week. Representation expenses were included in the prefects’ salaries. Nardon’s monthly income must have been between 12,000 and 16,000 francs, the standard for capital cities of between 15,000 and 30,000 inhabitants. For comparison, the work pay of a Parisian labourer was 3 francs. Jean Tulard et Marie-José Tulard, Napoléon et 40 millions de sujets. La centralisaton et le Premier Empire, 102–103. 24  Once more, Nardon’s first quality was not originality, but unrelenting doggedness. His efforts were part of empire-wide initiatives meant to ‘bring civilization by theater’ to conquered territories. Philippe Bourdin, ‘Les Limites d’un impérialisme culturel: le théâtre français dans l’Europe de Napoléon’ in Le Mouvement Social 4, no. 253 (2015): 89–112 (90). Many administrators believed in the long-term pedagogical outcomes of introducing French repertory and French styles of acting. Nardon was echoing the beliefs expressed unambiguously by Turin’s police commissioners in a letter to General Jourdan: ‘A French theater brought to a new people communicates to this people all great and just ideas’. Idem, 99. 25  Nardon’s educational attempts resemble the British Empire’s strategy of educating India’s local elites in the principles of British political liberalism. See Benjamin Weinstein, ‘Liberalism, local government reform, and political education in Great Britain and British India, 1880–1886’ The Historical Journal 61, 1 (2018): 181–203. The goal was to supplement economic and institutional efficiency with the gradual formation of a sound ‘public spirit’ capable of understanding, and hence putting to good use, the benefits of the British administration.

9  WOOING THE ELITES 

203

regeneration came full circle. It was a long-term vision that incorporated the more direct and less risky strategy of catering to the elites’ material and career interests.

the mind Governor Lebrun explicitly called for rewarding helpful citizens even before the new administration materialized: ‘Bardi is quiet, and Your Majesty has many loyal subjects; I am caressing and encouraging them as best as I can. I ask Your Majesty to allow me to open places at the lycées and at the honor guards for their sons, and give ecclesiastic promotions to a few priests’.26 The ‘minds’ half of the strategy had the dual goal of rewarding cooperation and attracting local talent to run the French-­ designed state apparatus. Junot approached nobles, entrepreneurs, magistrates and prominent former ducal employees with employment offers in the new institutions. It was a step towards replacing the hitherto social compact with a different kind of equilibrium: one that bridged past divisions and channelled the energy of ambitious citizens towards a French-­ inflected future.27 Service in regional offices under the ducal government or personal loyalty to Duke Ferdinand did not disqualify; closeness to Moreau de Saint-Méry was the most likely reason for not making the list of new appointees. All those solicited responded in the affirmative. Count Stefano Sanvitale graciously agreed to be Parma’s new mayor, assisted by marquis Soragna, Filippo Linati (president of Parma’s Anzianato) and banker Giuseppe Serventi. In Piacenza, the honour went to count Alberto Scotti, assisted by marquis Ranuccio Anguissola (president of Piacenza’s Anzianato) and former governor Francesco Ferrari. Simultaneously and 26  Letter to the Emperor, Genoa, 2 February 1806. Opinions, Rapports et Choix d’Ecrits Politiques de Charles François Lebrun, 111–112. Lebrun even tried to identify a few potential collaborators: Moreau noted in his diary that Lebrun asked him to give him the names of individuals, priests included, who had manifested ‘devotion to the government’. Entry of 20 January 1806 Faidherbe, Journal de Moreau de Saint-Méry IV, parte I, 136. 27  Gavin Daly’s analysis underscores the prefects’ strict adherence to integrative imperial policies defined as amalgame. ‘Guided by this social policy, prefects were expected to heal the political divisions of the past, whether between Jacobins and royalists in France or between Jacobins and the anti-French in the annexed departments, and to integrate the notables into the regime’s institutions and values’. Gavin Daly, “‘Little Emperors”? Investigating Prefectoral Rule in the Departments’, 51. Antonelli’s remarks on prefects trying to find a unifying discourse while facing competing interests are also relevant to this point. I prefetti dell’Italia Napoleonica, 359.

204 

D. P. HARSANYI

just as effortlessly were filled the positions of police commissioners. In Parma: Aurelio Torcellaghi, a judge on Parma’s tribunal, and Luigi Torregiani, member of the Anzianato, joined by a certain Aymé, citizen of Marseille (probably a new resident whose main quality was being French); in Piacenza: Pompeo Aspetti, clerk at Piacenza’s tribunal, and two former ducal employees, Pio Oldrini and Domenico Rocci.28 Revamping the court system offered plenty of opportunities for gainful employment, from justices of the peace to prestigious judgeships on the criminal courts and tribunals of first instance in the main cities. Thanks to the renowned law school at the University of Parma, and to the equally respected law school in nearby Pavia, Parma and Piacenza counted numerous well-prepared law professionals, many of whom had already lent a hand to Moreau de Saint-Méry’s judicial reforms. All sources show that the reorganization started by Lebrun and carried out by Junot and Nardon encountered no significant hurdles. Apart from the two senior imperial prosecutors—Mastelloni in Parma and Albesani in Piacenza, both transferred from Torino—local professionals staffed almost all available vacancies.29 Scores of lawyers, judges, court clerks and functionaries with law degrees hurried to pledge their readiness to serve in the new courts. Selections were quite rigorous: the minister of justice’s aides consulted spreadsheets with details on each candidate’s career history, personal assets and personality traits such as integrity and public reputation.30 As with administrative appointments, the French regarded legal skills acquired under the old regime as transferrable to the new one. Occasional tensions arose when individual preferences did not match actual assignments, although, in the interest of public tranquillity, authorities tried to send nominees to the places they wanted to live and work in.31 28  The mayors had already received their nominations from Governor Lebrun in January 1806. Junot changed a few members of the mayoral teams, often acting on individual requests. 29  Mastelloni hailed from Naples, but Albesani was a native son, born in Castel San Giovanni, near Piacenza. Initially, Lebrun ‘borrowed’ an experienced French magistrate, Liguria’s Imperial Prosecutor Legoux, to supervise the installation of the new court system. Legoux served as adviser to Mastelloni for the approximately two months he spent in Parma. 30  French administrators drew up lists of potential personnel, with short portraits of suitable candidates that included their personal fortune, past activities, aptitude for the job and reputation. Dionigio Crescini was considered ‘a mediocre mind’ (esprit mediocre) but hard working; Politi came across as reliable; Giordani as learned and hardworking. ASPr, Dipartimento del Taro, Busta 5. 31  Many petitions addressed to Minister of Justice Grand Juge Régnier at AN BB/5/302.

9  WOOING THE ELITES 

205

From the final years of Bourbon rule through the end of the Napoleonic era, the same names graced the rolls of prominent officers of law. To name a few judges: Pier Luigi Politi, Duke Ferdinand’s chief negotiator with General Bonaparte and Parma’s governor as of 1800; Dionigio Crescini, Piacenza’s governor at the time of Bonaparte’s invasion of 1796 and relentless prosecutor of giacobini; Parma’s ducal governor Francesco Schizatti; and Luigi Umberto Giordani, respected man of letters and author of Duke Ferdinand’s funeral eulogy. Not all who applied obtained suitable employment.32 Importantly though, French administrators hardly faced resistance or defections from the magistrates’ corps—Lama himself begged to serve and the rejection upset him. It is hard to disentangle the political or personal manoeuvrings behind each acceptance or denial, but overall, the judicial system did not lack for willing personnel, ready to serve and make the system work. At the middling level too, compliant village executives landed good spots on the bench. Commissioner Giuseppe Sicorè, who penned numerous reports during the first weeks of insurrection, obtained a judgeship at the Tribunal of First Instance in Fiorenzuoula; Carlo Caminati and Lazzaro Cornazzani (the latter, the chief informer on presumed rebel leader Giuseppe Bussandri) sat as justices of the peace.33 The ‘mind’ volley of the French outreach obtained multi-layered, steadfast collaboration between Napoleonic representatives and an array of middle-/upper-class cadres. The term collaboration calls for a brief methodological clarification. Inextricably linked with the Nazi occupation of Europe, collaboration evokes cowardice, moral vacuity and outright cruelty—in contrast with its luminous opposite, resistance born of moral courage. The outstanding literature on collaboration with Nazi Germany has identified numerous grey areas and shades of ambivalence in between the two poles.34 Insights 32  Michael Broers discussed briefly the rather puzzling rejection of Antonio Lama, a well-­ liked magistrate from a prominent Parmense family. Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 191–192. Antonio Lama’s (or de Lama’s) brother was Giuseppe de Lama, Duke Ferdinand’s main advisor during the French Revolution and the first French invasion, later secretary of Cesare Ventura, ambassador of the short-lived Kingdom of Etruria to Parma. These connections might have had something to do with the French hesitation to retain Antonio’s services. 33  Sicorè even solicited an adjustment in a letter where he thanked the Minister of Justice: he was happy with his appointment, except that it was far from home, so he requested a transfer to Piacenza, should a judge spot become available. Sicoré to Grand Juge Régnier, Fiorenzuola, 12 March 1806, AN BB/5/302. 34  Landmark studies on collaborationist France that place in larger perspective the social dynamics in Napoleonic Europe: Robert Paxton, Vichy France. Old guard and new order

206 

D. P. HARSANYI

borrowed from this rich body of work give larger context to the intricate interactions between foreign rulers, local elites and the larger society under all occupation regimes. Research into the motivations of civil servants is particularly insightful, considering the ease with which the Napoleonic administration recruited the personnel it needed.35 However, to avoid the trap of anachronistic misconstructions, it is essential to look past the moral dimension seared into all aspects of dealing with Nazi occupiers. On this issue, Michael Rowe has eloquently demonstrated that reading the give and take between rulers and ruled in Napoleonic Europe through the lenses of Nazi occupation would amount to obscuring a distinct historical reality to the point of unintelligibility.36 With concepts like nation-state and popular sovereignty in incubation phase in Italian political thought, the ruling classes interpreted ethical conduct in terms of loyalty to the legitimate sovereign. This was why civic leaders in Parma–Piacenza explained collective realignment to France by reference to international treaties that placed their country under French sovereignty.37 Seen through the prism of political legitimacy, engagement with the occupying power was nothing more than a morally neutral political strategy that sought to make the best out of a complicated situation. Parma’s aristocratic landowners and urban professionals, together with a handful of pioneer 1940–1944 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, r. 2001); Julian T. Jackson France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jean-Pierre Azéma, Vichy—Paris. Les collaborations (Paris: André Versaille, 2012, r. 2020). For a different context, see Gerhard Hirschfeld, Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1988). 35  See especially Marc Olivier Baruch, Servir l’Etat Français. L’administration en France de 1940–1944 (Paris, 1997). 36  Rowe recommended relying instead on ‘works of scholarly detachment [that] view collaboration as a political strategy, not pathological behavior: it is a possible way of managing conflicting interests, as indeed is resistance’. Michael Rowe, ‘Resistance, Collaboration or Third Way? Responses to Napoleonic Rule in Germany’ in Popular Resistance in the French Wars. Charles Esdaile editor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 67–89 (67). Tackling several cases of elite cooperation with Napoleonic state institutions, Katherine Aaslestad also noted that the dichotomy collaboration/resistance is unhelpful since ‘these ambiguous and relative terms do not render the essential complexity of the issue’. Katherine Aaslestad, ‘Napoleonic rule in German Central Europe: Compliance and Resistance’ in The Napoleonic Empire in the New European Political Culture. Edited by Michael Broers, Peter Hicks and Augustìn Guimerà (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 160–172 (161). 37  References to the Treaty of Aranjuez (1801) in the notables’ letter to the French, 3 January 1806.

9  WOOING THE ELITES 

207

e­ ntrepreneurs, weighed their options and almost to a man chose to collaborate with the Napoleonic regime. Which is not to say they surrendered unconditionally.

An ExemPlary bureaucrat Hugues-Eugène Nardon (1768–1812), an experienced though uninspiring career administrator and protégé of Joseph Bonaparte, was nominated Administrator-Prefect of the States of Parma on 28 January 1806. Honourable service as prefect of the department of Montenotte in Liguria, following an earlier stint as prefect of Angers, failed to impress Liguria’s governor, his superior at the time of his appointment to Parma: ‘It would be good for the country if that man could be replaced … I do not want him here’, Lebrun wrote to Minister Champagny, who agreed, but insisted the nominee was possessed of ‘great activity and prodigious zeal’.38 After the previous administration’s blunders, zeal was what the country needed most, in the opinion of all senior executives in Parma, Governor General Junot included.39 No two persons could have been more unlike one another than Moreau de Saint-Méry and Eugene Nardon. Both took great pride in the mission of bringing French rule to Parma, but this is where similarities stopped. With his aspirations of modern-day Maecenas, Moreau gave the impression of an accidental bureaucrat; Nardon cultivated a model functionary’s dependable blandness. Moreau sought to emulate his predecessor Du Tillot; Nardon read dire warnings in Moreau’s disastrous career arc: M.  Moreau, a proud man, intelligent and learned, replaced the Dukes of Parma; he took over, and got used to, their tastes, their power, and their house. Not anticipating the limits of this state of affairs he tweaked here and there; he ended up with huge expenses, personal and administrative. Many took advantage of the situation for their own profit. … The present circumstances of this magistrate are a striking example of human vicissitudes and of men’s fickleness. M. Moreau governed here and now all abandoned him.40 38  As quoted in the brief biographical outline in Piergiovanni Genovesi, ‘Dalla Rivoluzione alla Restaurazione: gli anni della dominazione francese (1802–1814)’ in Storia di Parma, V, 307–333 (318–319). 39  ‘I expect a lot from M. Nardon’s talents and zeal’. General Junot to Lebrun, Parma, 22 February 1806. AMD C—4–41. 40  Nardon to Minister of the Interior Champagny, Parma, 15 February 1806. AN F/1e/85.

208 

D. P. HARSANYI

From the first days in office, Nardon highlighted the sharp contrast between his sober conduct and his predecessor’s quasi-aristocratic mannerisms.41 He stripped the social calendar to a bare minimum, with events strictly dictated by political objectives. He toured the territory incognito, in simple garb, and on horseback—not for Nardon, the fine dining and the pleasure trips in six-horse carriages Moreau so enjoyed. In fact, impromptu social occasions caused Nardon nothing but embarrassed discomfort: ‘people fussed too much’, he protested in the letter describing to minister Champagny an invitation he had been unable to avoid, and made quite clear that he did not enjoy himself.42 Lack of decorum often backfired: the patrician mayors of Parma and Piacenza resigned after a year in office, citing personal reasons but transparently tired of the Administrator-Prefect’s uncouth ways. Impervious to introspection, Nardon counted on his zeal to make up for displeasing two valuable supporters of French rule: ‘I do what I can, Monseigneur, I throw myself wherever I see I must preserve harmony, establish our institutions, and maintain good order; work, vigilance, struggles, sacrifices, I spared myself nothing for the 21  months I have been in Italy’.43 Beyond differences in personality and temperament, Nardon’s demeanour reflected the increased professionalization of the Napoleonic bureaucratic corps. Rules and regulations defined a code of conduct that harnessed private initiative and supplied the guidance professional bureaucrats needed to avoid ‘getting lost in intellectual speculations’.44 The part of exemplary executor suited Nardon and amply satisfied his ambitions—he 41  ‘I found an administration filled with luxury, after the fashion of the former dukes, with no aptitude for French rules’, he wrote disapprovingly. Nardon to Minister Champagny Parma, 10 March 1806 AN F/1e/86. 42  Nardon to Minister Champagny Parma, 23 May 1806 AN F/1e/85. In the same letter he confessed that locals went as far as composing a sonnet in his honour, which he wanted the minister to learn from him rather than by public channels ‘out of consideration and courtesy’ (par délicatesse, par ménagement). Nardon’s public persona fits the type of ‘roughneck’ who could be counted on to pacify peripheral regions with no risk of ‘going native’ out of an excess of empathy. Michael Broers, ‘A Turner thesis for Europe? The frontier in Napoleonic Europe’ Napoleonica La Revue, No. 5, 2 (2009): 157–169. 43  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma, 11 April 1807. AN F/1e/85. Nardon found it prudent to defend himself pre-emptively against possible accusations of carelessness. To Nardon’s relief, both Sanvitale and Scotti remained in the service of the French after leaving the mayor seat. 44  Moullier, ‘Une révolution de l’administration? La naissance de la science administrative impériale’, 147.

9  WOOING THE ELITES 

209

belonged among the army of ‘faceless men’ Isser Woloch credited for much of Napoleon’s success.45 Unlike Moreau, he never presumed to be enlightened by his own lumières and readily subscribed to the kind of discipline defined early on by Lucien Bonaparte: ‘Any idea of an administration working as one would be destroyed if each prefect would allow himself to be guided by his personal opinion on a given law or act of the government’.46 If anything inspired him—if, that is, Nardon ever allowed himself a moment of reverie—it must have been the bureaucratic dream conveyed in heavy-handed prose by the creator of the prefect function, Jean-Antoine Chaptal. ‘The executive chain descends without interruption from the minister to the citizenry and transmits the law and the government’s orders to the furthest ramifications of the social order, with the rapidity of an electric current’.47 Nardon did his part by penning daily orders for his subordinates and countless reports regularly mailed to his superiors in Paris. Meticulousness earned him at least one approval, that of financial inspector Dauchy, who after only two weeks in Parma congratulated the Administrator-Prefect on his attention to detail, remaining loose ends notwithstanding.48 Nardon doubtless enjoyed the pat on the back, for such compliments rarely came his way; a less than glowing ‘can do better’ was the consensus on his performance. Napoleon’s tepid praise is a good example: ‘He has ambition and zeal, but there is something superficial in his way of seeing things; other than that, he has some merit’.49 At issue was  Isser Woloch, Napoleon and his collaborators. The making of a dictatorship, xii.  Lucien Bonaparte’s circular letter to prefects, 6 Floréal an VIII, as quoted in Moullier, ‘Une révolution de l’administration? La naissance de la science administrative impériale’, 155. While a certain ambiguity between strict adherence to rules and private initiative lingered, Lucien Bonaparte’s successors at the Ministry of the Interior emulated his efforts at providing a common discipline and uniform professional ethos for all agents of the state. See the analytical essay by François Monnier, ‘Fonction Publique’, in Dictionnaire Napoléon. Sous la direction de Jean Tulard (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1987), Vol. 1, 805–810. 47  As quoted in Christophe Charle, Les Hauts Fonctionnaires en France au XIXème siècle. Présenté par Christophe Charle (Paris: Editions Gallimard/Julliard, 1980), 80. This was part of Chaptal’s introduction to the Law du 28 pluviôse an VIII (17 February 1800) which organized the prefect corps. See also Régnier, Les Préfets du Consulat et de l’Empire, passim. 48  Letter from Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma, 16 August 1806. ANP F/1e/85. The praise contrasted with the blistering criticism heaped on Moreau after each financial review. Dauchy apparently succeeded to reassure the Emperor that Parma’s finances have been sorted out. 49  Au Roi Joseph, Paris 1 September 1807, Correspondance de Napoléon premier, V. XVI, p. 3 #13098. 45 46

210 

D. P. HARSANYI

the gap between projections and results, given that Nardon made a habit of promising that success was just around the corner, despite the mountain of difficulties he was scaling every day. Anxiety over tiptoeing on the edge of potential failure in the ill-omened shadow of his predecessor’s fate roused in Nardon a steely resolve approaching bureaucratic heroism. ‘Do not send me new employees; with zeal, good will, and work, everything can be achieved’, he exclaimed at the end of a long letter, full of fresh details on the chaotic conditions he grappled with in Parma.50 He held back neither zeal, nor goodwill, nor work, and repeatedly exhorted his deputies to do the same: ‘we all must act as one to punish crime, reestablish and maintain public tranquility, and plant for ever in this beautiful country the values, the customs, the principles, and the laws of the motherland’.51 Feeling the heat, deputy prefects put pressure on mayors under their control. This amounted, essentially, to demands that tax forms and survey sheets be filled in timely fashion. And this, in the end, may have been Nardon’s most tangible accomplishment. Four years into Nardon’s administration, Napoleon was still unimpressed: ‘I am told that in these countries [Parma, Genoa, Piedmont] the organization is not complete’, he notified the Minister of the Interior in 1810. He demanded a revision of local legislation to bring these territories under ‘an organization conforming to the one in the rest of France’—that is, the kind Nardon reported as fundamentally completed within months 50  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma, 14 March 1806, AN F/1e/85. Follow-up letters on 18, 23 and 24 March provide abundant details on each administrative move. In the end, overwork and stress affected his health: towards the end of his term, he suffered from severe burnout. A medical certificate signed by his personal doctor Berchet and esteemed professor of medicine Giacomo Tommasini described symptoms like loss of appetite, loss of blood, insomnia and dizziness, all compounded by his living in town where he rarely took a break from work to exercise. The doctors prescribed rest and relocating to the countryside. Etat de santé de M. le chevalier Baron Nardon, Préfet du Département du Taro, Parma, 9 September 1810. AN F/1bI/168/1 (Dossier Nardon). Nardon sent this certificate to Paris the next day to impress on his superiors the price he had paid for his unfailing zeal, hoping this would prompt them to speed up his reappointment. In the end, Nardon obtained the permission to join his protector Joseph Bonaparte in Spain, where he met his end in an anti-­ French uprising in 1812. 51  Circular letter to deputy prefects, copies of which were included in correspondence with Minister Champagny Parma, 15 April 1806. AN F/1e/85. Motherland doubtless stood for France. ‘It is imperative that all those around me give their all to serve His Majesty’, he wrote passionately in another letter to Champagny containing the happy news that he had managed to persuade bishops and deputy prefects to work together. Parma, 3 March 1806, AN F/1e/85.

9  WOOING THE ELITES 

211

of his appointment.52 However, this does not mean that nothing changed. Luigi Spaggiari’s verdict on the economic outlook of Parma speaks to Nardon’s entire administration: through a mix of bullying and cajoling, Nardon imposed structural uniformity and accustomed local executives to work according to standardized forms and procedures, to answer punctually official mail, and to observe formal deadlines—in short to act like public servants instead of vassals. His office introduced and passed to the new generation professional skills that helped maintain stability throughout Napoleonic rule and eased the transition to Maria Luigia’s government. Like Moreau, Nardon spent four years in office and like Moreau he left Parma unregretted and abandoned by his entourage. Unless office papers have memories, he was quickly forgotten too. Historians of administration have argued persuasively that Napoleonic bureaucrats’ main purpose was to find the balance between revolutionary disruption and the necessary stability of the social corps. Nardon’s daily toils added a page, or at least a footnote, to this process.53

52  To Count Montalivet, Paris le 10 March 1810. Correspondance de Napoléon premier, Vol. 20, p. 303. #16321. 53  Gaïd Andro and Laurent Brassart, ‘Administrer sous la Révolution et l’Empire’ Annales historiques de la Révolution française, no. 389 (2017): 3–18 (6).

CHAPTER 10

Elite Collaboration

Individual decisions depended on a combination of motivating factors ranging from concerns for social stability to attractive career prospects or financial rewards, circumstances for which Stephen Gilliat’s study of psychological mechanisms of collaboration with foreign, oppressive or coercive powers provides useful conceptual tools. Gilliat identified three broad categories of collaboration, each subdivided into more defined sub-­ categories: (1) collaboration as pathology (using the foreign power to obtain revenge or cause harm); (2) collaboration as continuation of institutional discipline and (3) collaboration as philosophical defence mechanism.1 Members of Parma’s upper classes routinely cited the second set of motivations—institutional stability formulated in terms of civic duty—as they continued their career paths or found new vocations in the French system. From the height of his unimpeachable reputation, as if wishing to pre-empt accusations of submerging pedestrian self-interest under the aura of civic responsibility, Count Sanvitale voiced the prevailing sentiment when he accepted the position of mayor of Parma: 1  The book centres on patterns of collaboration generated by Nazi rule, with its specific pressures and impositions, but Gilliat expands the analysis to extrapolate a few general principles applicable to historical situations preceding the Nazi regimes. Stephen Gilliat, An Exploration of the Dynamics of Collaboration and Non-Resistance (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 35–70.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_10

213

214 

D. P. HARSANYI

I could have easily invoked my personal business and the permanent attention that I need to devote to my charities at Fontanellato to ask His Serene Highness [Lebrun] and my compatriots to spare me the honorable weight of serving as mayor of Parma. Yet, I will do everything in my power to demonstrate my perfect devotion to Our August Emperor and to my fatherland.2

As service to the French emperor equated ongoing service to the fatherland—even more respectable since he did not need a job—Sanvitale opted for administrative stability or, in Gilliat’s terminology, institutional discipline. In the same vein, magistrates accepted assignments in the French court system with the understanding that dedicated guardians of law and order had a duty to continue their mission in the new administration. Many produced itemized curricula vitae that listed, in chronological order, positions held under the Bourbons and under Moreau de Saint-Méry to substantiate specialized expertise and apolitical commitment to the rule of law. See, for an example, the résumé Pietro (Pierre) Fainardi composed when requesting a judgeship in the recently reorganized court system in Parma. Upon obtaining a law degree from the University of Parma, Fainardi served as royal censor in the ducal government parallel with teaching law courses at his alma mater. The censor job vanished when Moreau de Saint-Méry took over, but the teaching career continued uninterrupted and led to a prestigious appointment outside Parma: President of the Criminal Court of the Department of the Apennines at Chiavari (1805). Fainardi petitioned for a transfer back to Parma as soon as he learned of Nardon’s institutional overhaul, of which he clearly approved, and was indeed nominated President of Parma’s Criminal Court in September 1806.3 Consistent with the shared vision of binary society that brought together French officials and local leaders in the wake of the insurrection, a comforting unspoken assumption filtered through the dry prose of employment arrangements: the Napoleonic state took over the country and introduced new institutions and new laws, none of which invalidated the natural order of things. Sovereigns and governments change with 2  Stefano Sanvitale’s letter of acceptance to Parma’s deputy prefect Gubernatis, Parma, 23 January 1806. The nomination decree was issued the next day. Minutes des lettres de la mairie de la ville de Parma depuis le 23 février au 25 Novembre 1806. ASPr. Comune di Parma 2203. 3  He was pleased with the promotion but asked to be transferred back to his native Parma for family reasons in a letter to the minister of justice: Pietro Fainardi to the Grand Juge Régnier, Chiavari, 5 March 1806. AN BB/5/302.

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

215

events; people at the top of the social pyramid, though, remain at the top, deservedly so, to guide the people in trying circumstances. The politically neutral professional ethos invoked in support of joining the French administration mirrored the French officials’ ostensible super-partes code of conduct, an implicit meeting of minds that contributed significantly to Parma’s relatively unproblematic institutional conversion. Large-scale reorganization of the kind undertaken by the French government was inherently disruptive, with citizens forced to change basic routines and employees fumbling with unfamiliar rules. The functionaries’ diligent work avoided fresh disorders; in the words of constitutional historian Carlo Ghisalberti: ‘the Napoleonic administration in Italy functioned fairly smoothly, despite the many structural changes it introduced at all levels, because distinguished members of former governments were receptive to the opportunity of continuing their careers in the Napoleonic bureaucracy and system of justice’.4 The collective action of Parma’s elites substantiates what John Dunne has called the ‘collaborationist view of Napoleonic rule’ that holds that notables were not coerced into collaboration but ‘willingly exploited access to state structures for purposes of self-­ advancement’.5 Ronald Robinson’s pertinent comments on collaborationist colonial elites shed additional light on the Italians’ methodical pursuit of professional fulfilment, financial security and social prestige. ‘From the standpoint of collaborators or mediators, the invaders imported an alternative source of wealth and power which, if it could not be excluded, had to be exploited in order to preserve or improve the standing of indigenous elites in the traditional order’.6 Assembling, from scratch, new courts of 4  Carlo Ghisalberti, ‘Le amministrazioni locali nel periodo napolenico’ in Dagli Stati preunitari d’antico regime all’unificazione. A cura di Nicola Raponi (Milano: IL Mulino, 1982), 431–454 (446–447). Financial security was not to be neglected either and many letters pointed gingerly to some of the candidates’ economic needs, although the emphasis was always on service. 5  John Dunne, ‘Power on the Periphery: Elite-State Relations in the Napoleonic Empire’ in Napoleon and his Empire. Europe 1804–1814, 61–78 (61). The opposite of ‘collaborationism’ is the earlier opinion that the Napoleonic state was too strong to allow notables to exercise any real power. The article reviews the historiography debates on this topic and concludes that more research is needed for a definitive consensus to take shape. 6  Ronald Robinson, ‘Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration’ in Studies in the theory of imperialism. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliff editors (New York: Longman, 1972), 117–142 (120–121). Ronald Robinson postulated that collaboration is key to the durability of what he terms ‘imperialism in the industrial era’. (Nineteenth and twentieth century European imperialism in Africa and Asia). He also urged

216 

D. P. HARSANYI

law and government offices created endless alternative sources of wealth and power eligible local candidates could enjoy and exploit; the demise of old feudal privileges ruffled few feathers and new privileges flowed steadily upwards.7

Modernization The ease with which old elites morphed into new elites had a lot to do with the peculiar political trajectory of the States of Parma.8 Lingering campanilismo aside, recent historical experience rendered the upper echelons in Parma–Piacenza more cohesive than elsewhere, which made it easier to coalesce around a common position towards the French. For comparison, see the situation in Milan, the capital of the Republic, then Kingdom of Italy, summarized by Ambrogio Caiani: ‘Milanese patricians such as Francesco Melzi d’Eril and Carlo Verri (brother of the more famous Pietro) had matured under the reforming culture of Joseph II’s enlightened absolutism, and they found affinities with the new regime. more examination of how local elites assessed the pros and cons of the occupation. For a recent case study illustrating this perspective see Nana Yaw Boampong Sapong, ‘Capitalist exchange, consumerism, and power in nineteenth century Gold Coast: Interrogating Ama Ata Aidoo’s Anowa and the contested personage of the merchant prince’ in Legon Journal of Humanities, 29, 2 (2018): 266–286. 7  The mutually advantageous, albeit conditional, cooperation between elites and occupying forces shows again the relevance of the Roman model. Discussing Tacitus’ cynical take on the process of Romanization, Mary Beard observed that ‘There was a dynamic combination of forces at work here: on the one hand, the power of Rome made Roman culture an aspirational goal; on the other hand, Rome’s traditional openness meant that those who wished to do ‘do it the Roman way; were welcome to do so—and of course it suited the stable maintenance of Roman rule that they should. The main beneficiaries (or victims, as Tacitus saw it) were the wealthy. But they were not the only ones to create a Roman identity for themselves’. Mary Beard, ‘Romanization and resistance’ in SPQR A History of Ancient Rome (London: Liveright, 2006), 404–502 (492). 8  In all territories conquered and annexed by the French, the way Napoleonic rule was accepted or resisted depended significantly on the heritage old governing structures left behind. For an overview of area studies showing how local historical experience and the inheritance of old regimes around Europe determined the nature and limits of local Napoleonic administrations, see Ambrogio A. Caiani, ‘Collaborators, Collaboration, and the Problems of Empire in Napoleonic Italy. The Oppizzoni Affair, 1805–1807’ The Historical Journal, 60, 2, (2017): 385–407 (385–390). For Italy, John Davis has offered an enlightening analysis of the way local political configurations and power dynamics modified or resisted French rule in different regions of Italy, ‘Divided Destinies? Napoleonic Rule in Northern and Southern Italy’ in Napoleon and His Empire. Europe, 1804–1814, 165–184.

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

217

They served not out of a personal loyalty to Napoleon, but out of a long-­ held sense of devotion to the reforming state. These men were extremely different in both outlook and behavior from the giacobini who had supported the French since 1796’.9 Naturally, each group and subgroup vied to interpret French directives to fit its own goals. By contrast, Parma– Piacenza lacked the experience of both enlightened absolutism and that of the sister republic phase. Reform-minded patricians had had little chance to act on their ideas during Ferdinand’s listless three-decade rule, and the Directory’s policy of side-lining local giacobini in 1796 decimated the ranks of revolutionary enthusiasts, now scattered either abroad or in internal exile. Absent deep ideological cleavages, different segments of the upper classes temporarily came together under a common ethos defined by Marco Meriggi as a ‘modernized version of aristocratic values’: open to gradual structural changes and relative equality at the top of the social pyramid, proud of being at once forerunners of progress and cautious guardians of public order.10 Napoleon’s slowness in resolving the status of the former duchies delayed full engagement.11 Not knowing what the future would bring induced caution throughout Moreau de Saint-Méry’s tenure; crushing the rebellion, brutality notwithstanding, clarified matters and prompted the leadership classes to focus on the positive: the French occupation was a burden, insufferable at times, but it did provide a way out of prolonged institutional hibernation.12 From 1806 on, after all semblance of autonomy had evaporated and the rhythm of changes intensified, soliciting or accepting employment with the French took a ‘doing well by doing good’ stand, one that Sanvitale’s biographer spelled out 9  Caiani, ‘Collaborators, Collaboration, and the Problems of Empire in Napoleonic Italy’, 390. 10  Marco Meriggi, ‘State and Society in Post-Napoleonic Italy’ in Napoleon’s Legacy. Problems of Government in Restoration Europe, 49–63 (58). 11  This mindset is similar to the ambivalence Melzi d’Eril observed among Italian elites who sought reassurances over the durability of the post-revolutionary French state in the peninsula before committing to the new order of things. See the discussion in Antonelli, I prefetti dell’Italia Napoleonic, 67–68. On the same topic, Carlo Zaghi pointed out that what the First Consul denounced as sluggish institutional performance in the Italian Republic reflected widespread doubts on the longevity of French dominion in Northern Italy. Carlo Zaghi, Napoleone e l’Italia. Prospettive e problemi (Napoli: Editrice Cymba, 1966), 237–246. 12  Anna Maria Rao’s discussion of the French occupation acting like a catalyst for long-­ running local crises is relevant to the Parmense elites’ sense of crisis in need of resolution. ‘Folle Controrivoluzionare. La Questione delle insorgenze italiane’ in Folle Controrivoluzionare, 9–37.

218 

D. P. HARSANYI

peremptorily: public opinion would have found fault with a man of the count’s abundant talents refusing to cooperate with the French when asked. Instead, he selflessly laboured towards bending the new order of things to the benefit of the entire people and set a virtuous example that prominent local personalities rightly followed.13 The few documents directly attesting to the state of mind of such individuals indicate that they saw themselves as advanced thinkers, indeed modernizers in the mould Michael Rowe described pro-Napoleonic functionaries in German lands: ‘…reforming statesmen in the Napoleonic period saw themselves as modernizers, though they did not use the term. They and their opponents were familiar with the rhetoric of “new” and “old…”’.14 These were the people who Moreau de Saint-Méry fondly referred to as ‘the sane part’ of the population: offspring of well-off families who read the same books French administrators read and moved comfortably in the intellectual space shaped by the cosmopolitan Enlightenment. Having had the leisure to observe the way French rule worked across the border in Liguria and the Kingdom of Italy, they felt reassured that the French of 1805 were not the French of 1796. The revolution, if this is what French occupation meant, would not be a storm, but a methodical updating of government structures, with willing elites in charge. After decades of immobility, many found the prospect appealing. It is not hard to understand why trained magistrates did not wait to be asked twice to immerse themselves in the process of reorganizing the court system. Even though the rigidity of French courtroom proceedings offended their sensibilities at times, there was professional gratification in bringing modern 13  Giovanni Adorno, Vita del Conte Sanvitale (Parma: Presso Filippo Carmignani, 1840), 32. The sentiment echoes the low esteem in which the population held the Prussian elites who fled in the face of French occupation instead of staying to bring succour to those who had no choice in the matter. Rowe, ‘Collaboration, resistance, or third way’ 75. 14  Rowe, ‘Napoleon and the “Modernization” of Germany’, 204. Rowe notes that the rhetoric tended to polarize. With a class of public employees less divided than elsewhere, the rhetoric was correspondingly less polarizing in the Parmense duchies. See also the analysis of collaborators’ motivations in the important study by Javier Esteban-Ochoa-de-Eribe, “‘Beneath the eagles of the great emperor”: Napoleonic collaboration experiences in the Basque provinces of Spain’, European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire (2021). https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2021.1971627 Basque collaborators came from the ranks of aristocratic landowners equally interested in modernizing government operation, maintaining social stability, and advancing their own careers: ‘These individuals would show themselves to be concerned patriots who desired peace and the implementation of a programme of reforms’. p. 5.

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

219

principles to legal proceedings.15 Well-heeled and well-read individuals like Stefano Sanvitale felt drawn to the French administration’s push for agricultural innovation and overall systematic thinking. The scientific inquiries Moreau launched mobilized concerned citizens unafraid to throw light on chronic dysfunctions left unaddressed since Du Tillot tried his hand at reform.16 Energized by the French can-do attitude, ambitious entrepreneurs came forward with advice on how to support decaying industries and ‘give people hope’—something successive ducal governments failed to inspire. Best of all, they theorized that setting expectations for a more disciplined work environment would finally cure the peasantry of laziness, the multi-generational plague responsible for crime and poverty in the countryside—music to the ears of any French civil servant.17 15  See Broers’ discussion of Mastelloni, and of Piacenza’s prosecutor Borri’s, impatience with magistrates who kept holding meetings in their homes and adapted strict French proceedings to what they saw as more benevolent justice compatible with local mores. They objected, however, to the style not to the legal doctrine. Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 192–193. A good example is Piacenza’s vigilant imperial prosecutor Albesani, who bemoaned, throughout his correspondence with the French Minister of Justice, the inefficiency of cumbersome laws that all but normalized theft and relished the opportunity to inaugurate a proper legal system. On Albesani’s determination to put in practice French law regardless of his compatriots’ feelings see my article, ‘The Voice of Duty: Collaboration and Ideology in Napoleonic Italy’ Napoleonic Scholarship, 10, (2019–2020): 97–108. 16  Antonio Boccia’s account best exemplified this critical outlook. At Moreau’s request, he travelled throughout Parma—Piacenza between June 1804 and September 1805 and completed a survey of economic and social practices, the result of which moved him to describe a country frozen in time, afflicted with desperate multi-generational poverty, neglected by a ruling class sorely lacking discipline and a sense of direction. His reports have been published under the title Viaggio ai Monti di Parma (Parma: Aurea Parma. Quaderni Parmigiani No. 2, 1970). ‘A hostile nature and sterile lands where misery breathes’ was the sad definition Boccia gave in the introduction to his study. Viaggio ai Monti di Parma, 7–8. After Moreau’s dismissal, Boccia produced for Nardon similar informative reports and did not forget to submit reimbursement vouchers for travels on behalf of the new administration. Two such reports and vouchers, dated 25 February 1809 and 8 April 1809 appear in ASPr, Gabinetto del Prefetto, mazzo 15 busta 3. Boccia was one of the very few former giacobini who had not entirely lost faith in France’s power to bring about positive changes in the States of Parma. 17  Pietro Cavaganari, Exposé rapide sur la position actuelle de la ville et Etat de Plaisance. 14 June 1805 AN F1e/85. He prefaced the advice he voluntarily extended to French officials with dire images of decay and corruption going back to the Farnese era. Like Boccia, Cavagnari served as one of Moreau’s main local consultants—he noted in a letter to Minister Portalis that he thought it important to give the Administrator General accurate information on the issues afflicting the duchies. Cavagnari to Minister Portalis, Piacenza, 30 Prairial an 13 (19 June 1805). The friendship broke up over various disagreements, but Cavagnari remained a strong ally of the French. Junot especially trusted his advice. Proposals are prof-

220 

D. P. HARSANYI

Certainly, as Caiani noted, it is far too neat to imply that local collaborators and French state representatives shared the same interests and motivations.18 It was true that the ducal regime was no golden era; it was just as true that Napoleonic administrators were not invited advisers, but occupiers chiefly interested in exploiting local resources for imperial priorities. The needs of the army and the overall interests of the empire hampered long-term projects, and many initiatives, like the ones discussed in previous chapters, never got off the ground. Individuals who willingly engaged with the French administration were neither naïve nor unaware of these shortcomings but reckoned that inconsistent and even, on occasion, harmful activity was better than prolonged immobility. Examining economic trends in the duchies, Alessandro de Luca noted that in a place as severely underdeveloped as Parma, Napoleonic rapacity repelled people less than elsewhere, because the little his regime left behind seemed a lot compared with the last Bourbon’s apathy.19 This also explains why the lower classes, who encountered modernization chiefly in the form of conscription enforced with bureaucratic preciseness, obtained little backing from their leaders. Fully aware of the Janus face of French policies—to borrow again Alexander Grab’s metaphor for the empire as a whole— mayors interceded with French authorities on behalf of families hit by garnissaire decrees and judges looked the other way when presented with forged certificates of exemption.20 However, mirroring the noblesse oblige ethos of earlier pleas for lenience, paternalistic empathy for the downtrodden never ripened into national solidarity.21 The simmering popular fered on combatting laziness in Pius Jacobacci’s letter to Moreau de Saint-Méry, Parma, 19 Ventoso an XII (10 March 1804). AN AF/IV/2. On French officials’ preoccupation with what they understood to be crime-inducing laziness see Broers, ‘The Myths of the Lazy Native’ in The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 217–244. 18  Caiani, art.cit., 391. 19  Alessandro de Luca, Linee di sviluppo delle manifatture nel parmense durante l’età napoleonica (1802–1814). Dottorato di Ricerca in Storia. Coordinatore Domenico Vera. Università degli Studi Parma (2009–2011), 127. 20  Such actions fit in what Gilliat termed the ‘shield’ part of the philosophical defence mechanism—whereby collaborators mediate with coercive powers to minimize violence and pain. Gilliat, op. cit, 77–80. The conduct resembles the actions of WWII collaborationist mayors who tried to find compromises likely to shield their constituents of the worst Nazi exactions. See on this issue Nico Wouters, Mayoral Collaboration under Nazi Occupation in Belgium, The Netherlands, and France 1938–46 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 120–185. 21  Francesco Leoni noted that while the better-off classes generally refrained from open opposition to French rule throughout the Italian peninsula, the lack of solidarity was most

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

221

­ ostility did not spill over the class barrier, and did not slow the building h of public institutions, which completed the shift from ralliement to amalgame in the States of Parma.

A Chance Like No Other Stefano Sanvitale (1764–1838), a model enlightened aristocrat and scion to one of the most affluent and prestigious Parmense families, unhesitatingly threw his lot in with the French. All sources describe Sanvitale as a gentleman’s gentleman, learned, loyal, courteous and magnanimous, equally commended for gaining admittance to the Academy of Fine Arts at only 24 years of age and for opening his own purse to save the region from famine when crops failed in 1801.22 The two trade schools he founded on his property at Fontanellato, one for orphan boys and one for orphan girls, secured him an almost saintly reputation. With a curriculum rooted in Enlightenment notions of social utility through work and self-­ reliance, the schools’ main purpose was to help the poor help themselves and, in the process, eradicate vagrancy and moral decay. In 1806, the facilities employed 46 youth, and manufactured linen and hemp textiles sold throughout Parma–Piacenza.23 Both Moreau and Nardon spotted in Sanvitale that rarest of specimens: a nobleman of impeccable lineage and revered by the people, who nonetheless grasped the core republican principle of civic responsibility.24 He surely reminded them of the French liberal aristocrats who joined the revolution in 1789, men who, in the words conspicuous in the duchies, where all and any manifestations of defiance came from the peasantry. Francesco Leoni, Storia della controrivoluzione in Italia (1789–1859) (Napoli: Guida Editori Napoli, 1975), 37. 22  Giovanni Adorno, Vita del Conte Sanvitale (Parma: Presso Filippo Carmignani, 1840) remains the most informative work on the personality and activities of Stefano San Vitale. Details on his work before the French occupation on pp. 20–46. 23  De Luca, Linee di sviluppo delle manifatture nel parmense durante l’età napoleonica (1802–1814), 116. 24  In 1805, Moreau de Saint-Méry asked Sanvitale to chair the newly founded Economic Agrarian Society in appreciation for his interest in agronomy. For the educational initiatives at Fontanellato and Moreau de Saint-Méry’s involvement see Fontanellato nella Description des États de Parme di Moreau de Saint-Méry, amministratore generale (1802–1806). A cura di Carla Corradi Martini; traduzione Elena Fermi; appendice documentario Valentina Bocchi (Fontanellato: Tecnostampa edizioni, 2005). Nardon toured the schools in the summer of 1806 and placed orders for prisons and other government outfits to support continuous production.

222 

D. P. HARSANYI

of David Bien, ‘felt impelled to take new roles, to be active, and by their own lights to be useful in one way or another’.25 Engaging with the Napoleonic administration gave Sanvitale the chance to be useful far beyond the possibilities a private citizen, even one with his vast resources, could realistically achieve in the old ducal regime. English agronomist Arthur Young’s reflections on the weaknesses of French aristocratic economic projects comparable to the Fontanellato enterprises bring valuable insights into this Italian aristocrat’s choices and decisions. During a trip to France in the late 1780s, Arthur Young observed the entrepreneurial efforts of the Duke de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, who, like Sanvitale, was an amateur agronomist and implemented new farming methods on his lands. Like Sanvitale again, he was concerned with the social effects of vagrancy and founded manufacturing facilities that doubled as schools for the poor. Young appreciated these efforts but noticed their inherent limitations: reforms enacted on one’s property were unlikely to produce significant change at the regional, let alone national, scale. The enlightened noble ethos, laudable in itself, could hardly replace sound government-sponsored, long-term planning. The inescapable conclusion was that private ventures, depending on the goodwill and life accidents of individual persons, risked going no further than well-meaning but structurally flawed amateur endeavours.26 Sanvitale may not have engaged in 25  David Bien, ‘Aristocracy’ in A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, edited by François Furet and Mona Ozouf (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 616–628. The progression of traditional noble virtues towards ideals of merit, social utility and equality is the subject of many essays. See Jean-Pierre Labatut, Les Noblesses Européennes de la fin du XVème siècle à la fin du XVIIIème siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978), 71–86 and Pierre Serna ‘The Noble’ in Enlightenment Portraits, 30–84. Due to France’s particular history, many in-depth studies examined the evolution of the French nobility throughout the eighteenth century and during the Revolution, stressing the correlation between nobility and patriotism. See Jay M. Smith, Nobility Reimagined. The Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth Century France (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), especially the chapter ‘Nobility in a nation of citizens’, 182–221, and the landmark essay by Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: From Feudalism to Enlightenment. Translated by William Doyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). More analysis in Patrice Higonnet, Class, Ideology, and the Rights of Nobles during the French Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). These studies help understand the mindset of Italian nobles faced with revolutionary changes, albeit by way of foreign occupation. 26  On the entrepreneurial efforts of the Duke de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt as exemplary for the enlightened segment of the nobility, see Jean-Dominique de La Rochefoucauld, Claudine Wolikow and Guy Ilkni, Le Duc de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt: 1747–1827. De

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

223

equally thorough critical analysis, but he too grasped the difference between private enterprises and state-planned programmes. Under the ducal regime, the count had to confine his ambitions to the boundaries of his own estates. The work/education projects at Fontanellato could not be, and were not, replicated elsewhere. By contrast, the budget he controlled as mayor of Parma afforded him the resources to design a citywide system of elementary schools that reached all families, not only those fortunate enough to live on his lands. In parallel, he drew on his many interests to set up a network of neighbourhood soup kitchens. He aimed at solving several problems at once: keep the poor fed and healthy on a fare of so-called economic soups, cooked under the supervision of a pharmacist who recommended a bone-broth base; combat truancy by employing needy vagrants—often the same individuals who found their meals there; and stimulate the economy by using locally sourced produce.27 In 1808, the mayor-count resigned his post in exchange for the exciting opportunity of running the French-founded Hospice de la Mendicité in Borgo San Donino, a pioneering welfare institution that covered the entire population of the States of Parma. He also took great pride in prison reform, which again would have been outside his reach had he declined to work with the French. Sanvitale expected neither riches nor social status—both of which he possessed in abundance—from his collaboration with the Napoleonic administration. What he gained was the opportunity to move from amateurism to professionalism, channel his scientific curiosity into large-scale projects, and exercise influence at the national level, beyond the horizons of private philanthropy. Bureaucratic optimism was not restricted to the circle of newly minted French executives.28 The ‘little emperors’ in charge of distant territories dreamt big and so did some of the local luminaries who decided to join them. Louis XV à Charles X, un grand seigneur patriote et le mouvement populaire (Paris: Perrin, 1980), especially pp. 85–139. Arthur Young’s comments in Arthur Young, Travels in France during the Years 1787, 1788 and 1789. Constantia Maxwell editor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929), 122–123. For a succinct overview see Doina Pasca Harsanyi, Lessons from America. Liberal Nobles in Exile 1793–1798 (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2010), 24–30. 27  Vita del Conte Sanvitale, 75. Sanvitale supervised the cooking himself to make sure the meals served to the poor responded to public health concerns. 28  Livio Antonelli’s detailed analysis of prefects’ work in the Kingdom of Italy has brought to light a similar pride and trust in the power of administrative reform to shake people out of ancestral complacency. To give just one example, Reno’s prefect Mosca believed, like Nardon, that local administrés were about to open their eyes to all the good the new administration

224 

D. P. HARSANYI

Obsequiousness and Equivocation The mix of adherence to modernization policies, concern for social stability and mundane self-interest resulted in workable compromises that kept the state machinery humming. However, Napoleonic administrators wanted more: they candidly pined for love, a word that covered the ardent wish to see people under their rule turn to France like sunflowers to sunlight until they became French in all but name. Did Parma’s upper classes fall in love? At a superficial glance, the answer would be yes. The elites answered French wooing moves with heavy-handed captatio benevolentiae tactics, in the form of epic praises for the French state and its representatives. Barely had Junot set foot in Parma than local publisher Luigi Mussi had issued a collection of poems in his honour. The opening sonnet (out of eight poems) flowed from the pen of revered poet Angelo Mazza, whose copious resourcefulness produced verses for every occasion. Obsequiousness is too weak a word for the tenor of these compositions; here is a sample: Fatherland, take heart: the clouds dissipate as the hero’s soothed fury falls quiet … And what should we fear? Here is JUNOT, the undefeated Arm of Mars, of the greatest of kings Who came to remove the disgrace of a crime not yours He will see—you will see as you welcome him That he will hurry to witness your righteous constancy And praise its merits.29

In the same volume, Luigi Umberto Giordani contributed a sonnet that thanked the heavens for Junot’s arrival, concluding: ‘So spoke Junot: strong words/Of tranquility and joy/Eagerly grasped by the universe he delivered: ‘it is agreeable to note that, as the new political and administrative institutions take root, so do public tranquility and confidence. The population recognizes the advantages of the progressive organization that replaces many years of the most disorderly opinions’. Antonelli, I Prefetti dell’Italia Napoleonica, 475. 29  Angelo Mazza, ‘In Pubblica Testimonianza d’omaggio in Parma a Sua Eccelenza Il Signor Junot, Generale di Divisione, Grand Cordone delle Legione d’Onore, Gran Croce dell’Ordine del Cristo, primo adjutante di campo di Sua Maestà l’Imperatore dei Francesi e Re d’Italia, Governatore Generale degli Stati di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla’ in Poesie Pubblicate dalla Communità di Parma (Parma: Presso Luigi Mussi, il 18 Febbraio 1806). The frontispiece carries the name JUNOT in capital letters.

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

225

conquered’. The selection included an earlier poem in Napoleon’s honour, composed and performed alternatively by two professors from the University of Parma, on the occasion of Napoleon’s visit in 1805. Giacomo Sanvitale, a relative of Stefano, published an Ode to Junot that started with ‘A hero greater than any other hero’ and ended with ‘The glorious golden era will return for ever’.30 Francesco Ghirardelli, professor of poetry at the University of Parma, wrote another Ode to Junot, printed on a flyer posted around the city. Not to trail behind, Piacenza too pressed its poets into service. At the Stamperia Del Majno on 1 February 1806 Giampaolo Maggi published a long poem titled ‘Against insubordination’, dedicated to Junot. (‘You will hear, Excellency, the applause and joy that resonate among us all as we await your arrival’, read the opening verse.) More praise came Junot’s way during a ball in his honour in Parma, where a mask playing time delivered a stream of compliments. At the end, the actor invited the Governor General to respond with the prepared lines: ‘Go, Time, and tell the Parmense that you will not be able to erase from my heart the love I have for them’.31 After a short trip to Piacenza, Junot received an ornate letter assuring him of the citizens’ ‘delight at being honored with his presence’.32 Even Nardon, to his mortifying embarrassment, had to endure flattering poems during service tours around the country: the Società Dilettante of Borgo San Donino offered their éloges with the only regret that the Administrator-Prefect’s visit was too brief; cities mailed welcome cards in verses ahead of his scheduled trips.33 The presses regularly churned out odes in Napoleon’s honour, each more elaborately sycophantic than the previous one.34  Ode à Junot (Parma: Stamperia Carmignani 1806).  A Signor Junot (Parma: Luigi Mussi 1806). 32  Mayor Scotti to Governor General Junot, Piacenza, 10 June 1806. ASPc, Copialettere del maire, #303. 33  The Società Dilletante printed the poems for its members’ reading pleasure and for distribution around town. Of course, Nardon and Junot were the first recipients. 34  See for instance Per il Giorno Onomastico di Napoleone Imperatore e Re Sonnetto. Composed by Francesco Cardinali at the request of Piacenza’s mayor (Piacenza: Del Maino, 1812). First stanza: 30 31

The ire of the king falls silent; silent is the Earth Full of your name, that all Italy adores And in You, Italia sees and reverently honors The Seigneur of Peace and of War.

226 

D. P. HARSANYI

The flattery was so over the top as to be entirely unbelievable, and indeed the addressees did not believe it. Nardon felt ill at ease with even conventionally courteous behaviour, so he avoided company outside gatherings he organized himself and reported all accolades as indications of ‘good public spirit’ resulting from his administrative efforts.35 After Junot’s departure, he fretted that such extravagant customs might confuse the general’s replacement, Marshall Pérignon, who may or may not have been aware of the Italians’ bottomless capacity for smooth talk.36 The French sensed that something had escaped them as they struggled to find their way in the fog of fawning sonnets and songs. On the one hand, Parma’s elites looked, spoke and acted the part of ‘people like us’; with a good dose of French culture, they could improve further. On the other hand, these ‘people like us’ did not seem to consider the French as such and seldom sought French company, which made the flood of compliments and praises even more disconcerting.37 Nardon and Junot were baffled, but never stopped to think that crude behaviour intermixed with patent indifference to Parma’s cultural rituals and fine artistic patrimony might hurt local sensibilities. Apart from a short visit to famed printer Bodoni, whose shop had become an obligatory destination for cultured travellers, Parma’s theatre was the only institution Junot graced with his presence, and not necessarily for the right reasons—a carelessly flaunted affair with dancer Fosca Migliorucci proved a breach of etiquette too far. Reserving the best loges for his entourage likewise made a poor impression on prominent families long entitled to attending opening night events.38 On his 35  Nardon frequently lamented the near impossibility of insulating himself against flattery. To illustrate his plight, he forwarded two letters to the Minister of the Interior, one from Piacenza, one from Parma. The letters contained elaborate praise of his on-site visits, which he realistically found impossible to take at face value. Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma, 16 April 1806. AN F/1e/85. 36  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 18 September 1807. Nardon helpfully supplied the names of some of the worst offenders, with Count Pallavicini (‘very sly, a true courtier’) at the top of the list because, in addition to fawning over the Governor General, the count disparaged the hard work of the Administrator Prefect. Nardon also worried that Pérignon was socializing too much with the better set in Parma, hence risked neglecting Piacenza, which Nardon favoured over the capital city. AN F/1e/85. 37  French representatives frequently felt unwelcome in the social circles of their districts. Illuminating letters expressing displeasure with local social scenes and disappointment with the slowness of elites to embrace French social graces in Lignereux, Les Impériaux, 168–179. 38  Letter to the Director of the Theatre of Parma, Parma 26 February 1806. AMD C-41-4. Overt disapproval compelled Junot to promise to reassign premier seating.

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

227

side, Nardon remained unmoved by Correggio’s or Parmigianino’s paintings; he had no time for the library founded by Du Tillot and enriched by Moreau and did not even try to simulate interest for theatre performances beloved by local audiences. Nardon probably wanted his business-­like approach to signal professionalism, an unmistakable indicator that a conscientious functionary replaced the distracted amateur who made a mess of things. None of this advanced his carefully planned charm offensive. The unsubtle tributes and accolades were never meant to be believed, but to be displayed, like a contraption sturdy enough to withstand French pressure and draw a cordon sanitaire around private spaces. Behind the screen of performative flattery social life carried on as before, that is, as if the French were not even there.39 Despite Nardon’s arduous efforts, local notables ignored entreaties to refashion themselves and visited his cercles out of duty, part of a job that in no way implied metamorphosis into Frenchmen.40 They vastly preferred the literary societies in Parma, Piacenza and Borgo San Donino, which met on the usual schedule all through the French years, to discuss Italian, not French, literature. In Parma, the prestigious Accademia degli Scelti, founded in 1728 as an appendage to the Colleggio dei Nobili, survived the dissolution of the college and held monthly sessions under the presidency of Angelo Mazza, whose reputation did not suffer from playing court poet to French officials. Society simply disregarded French-style salons and continued to socialize at the theatre, where audiences applauded every evening the Italian light productions the Administrator-Prefect frowned upon. For instance, the playbill for Parma’s fall season 1806 listed mostly plays marked giocoso or farsa, like the suggestively titled ‘Gypsy by despair’ (Lo zingaro per disperazione) or ‘Women transformed or how to raise hell’ (Le donne cambiate overo il diabolo a Quattro). Only a couple of opere serie on mythological themes (‘Cesar in Egypt’ enjoyed great success) came closer to the edifying literary exercises Nardon had in mind.41 Moreover, 39  See on this point Broers’ discussion of ‘hidden Italy’, that is, networks of communication that escaped the control of French authorities, such as reading circles for youngsters organized in Parma by a Venetian priest of suspect loyalties. Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 278–285 (282). 40  The magistrates’ habit of meeting privately before court decisions had probably more to do with norms of sociability than with rejection of French legal doctrine, despite Imperial Prosecutor Mastelloni’s worries. See note 15 in this chapter. 41  Paolo Emilio Ferrari, Spaettacoli drammatico—musicali e coreografici in Parma dall anno 1628 al anno 1883 (Parma: Forni editore, 1884). The repertory from 1805 to 1814 pp. 50–57.

228 

D. P. HARSANYI

theatre managers regularly mailed to the Administrator-Prefect’s office dramatically worded letters describing the plight of actors and stagehands selflessly working months on end without pay, their families reduced to the most frightful destitution.42 Under the circumstances, replacing impoverished local performers with French ones was clearly unadvisable, and in any event, Paris ignored Nardon’s request. Despite manifold pressures to do so, Parma’s theatre staged no French plays and featured no French actors. After three years of trying, a worn out Nardon admitted defeat and approved the application of a committee of ‘five distinguished citizens’ to support the playhouse with their own money, on condition they had control over the repertory for the following three  years.43 In gratitude, one of the plays included in the 1809 season was dedicated to Nardon, who did not attend the show and surely cringed at seeing the title and genre.44 French strategies of seduction and Parmense sycophancy functioned in tandem, a pantomime of make-believe that steadily frustrated French attempts to move from institutional amalgamation to cultural assimilation.

Accommodation The concerned citizens who negotiated on behalf of local villagers, the proud individuals who scoffed at Junot’s indiscretions or snubbed Nardon’s overtures, were the same ones who eagerly applied for positions in the Napoleonic bureaucracy, often the same ones who used their talents to compose brazenly sycophantic odes to French occupiers. Accommodation, a term offered by historian Philippe Burin, seems to describe more suitably than collaboration the fluid interplay between acceptance and rejection 42  Letter dated Parma, 22 October 1806. The theatre manager claimed that this sorry situation affected 68 employees responsible for feeding and clothing approximately 250 people. Nardon responded by naming a new director, Angelo Bianchi, with a yearly salary of 4000 fr including four years of back pay—from the carnival celebrations of 1802, presumably, the last event for which Moreau paid the bills. Idem, 94. 43  Nardon issued a short executive order on 11 October 1809 to authorize the transfer. The repertory in question centred on light comedies (opera buffe). Idem, 96. 44  Il tutore deluso, ossia, Rinaldo d’Asti: dramma giocoso per musica: da rappresentarsi in Parma nel teatro Filo-musico-drammatico nell’estate dell’anno MDCCCIX: dedicato al signor Nardon, cavaliere dell’impero e prefetto del dipartimento del taro (Parma: Dalla stamperia Carmignani, 1809). By then, even Nardon may have felt that acculturation endeavours had reached their limits.

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

229

that more than once wrong-footed French administrators.45 The policy of wooing the elites left ample room for flexibility: Napoleonic bureaucrats could be boorish and overbearing, but did not inspire fear. Educated Italians conversant with the French literary canon handled interactions with French officials quite effortlessly. Throughout the phases of Napoleonic occupation in Parma, from insurrection to pacification and direct rule, reports and letter exchanges written in French showed that local leaders accurately interpreted the cultural codes that shaped the occupiers’ decision-making processes. They manoeuvred accordingly and, with the additional advantage of the home turf, practised a sort of cultural jujitsu.46 Conversely, Paris-appointed office holders knew little about the culture of a place as remote as Parma, had trouble fitting in, and found all locals, including the Francophone upper classes, infuriatingly opaque: ‘I know that clever and restless men often mask their opinion the better to isolate the true friends of the French. It is a kind of intrigue widespread in Italy, more dangerous since large parts of the population eagerly joins in’, bemoaned Maréchal Pérignon, clearly exasperated with the feeling of disorientation.47 The intrigues Pérignon dreaded revealed the locals’ own doubts about their new masters’ much touted impartiality. Shortly before Governor General Junot left Parma, a long, anonymous memo arrived at the Ministry 45  Burin defined accommodation as: ‘…a common phenomenon in occupations, where inevitably certain points and surfaces of contact emerge, and people adjust to the new reality.’ He further identified three stages, similar to Gilliat’s classification: structural or constraint accommodation (everyday dealings necessary for maintaining a minimum of civil society), accommodation of opportunity (advancing, in limited ways, personal interests), and political accommodation. Philippe Burin, La France à l’heure allemande (Paris, Seuil 1994), 467–475. Parma’s elites would have certainly embraced the statement: ‘To be a hero is honorable; not to be one is not necessarily dishonorable.’ (471). For examples of accommodation to colonial rule in another context see David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920 (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2000), 37–116 especially. 46  Occasionally, this was replicated at lower levels as well. I examined in depth the case of a rural commune manoeuvring around the French discourse of brigandage and douceur in ‘Surviving Napoleon. A case study of small-town discursive strategies during the Piacentino rebellion (1805–1806)’ Modern Italy Vol. 22/3 (August 2017): 233–246. Online access: https://doi.org/10.1017/mit.2017.28. 47  Maréchal Pérignon to Grand Juge Régnier, Naples 10 November 1808. AN BB/5/302. These remarks, part of the letter in support of Pietro Albesani’s re-nomination, echo French frustration with the inability to decipher the natives’ mores. See more discussion of this topic in Lignereux, Les Impériaux, 227–240.

230 

D. P. HARSANYI

of the Interior in Paris: aggrieved citizens fearing to disclose their identity complained that new opportunities only went to individuals who managed to curry favour with the Governor General, while Moreau’s associates suffered unjust persecutions. They also found it scandalizing that dangerous rebel leaders, fortunate enough to have friends in high places, were brazenly escaping reprisals. The petition remained unanswered, probably because the minister or his assistants found it hard to believe that Junot knowingly allowed prominent insurgents to go free, and even harder to believe that he made any friends during his stay in Parma. The veracity of the facts may have been questionable, but the anonymous complaint brought to light the citizenry’s suspicions that skills neatly listed in résumés were not the only means of carving a place in the new order of things; cosying up to French bosses could help just as much. Failure to obtain one position or another prompted locals to speculate as to which rivals beat them to the game while French administrators threw up their hands in despair, wondering what people in their employ were truly thinking.48 Men endowed with extraordinary power sounded curiously insecure, as if lost in a labyrinth, haunted by fears that their entire mission risked drowning in miscommunication. Calls for renewal and progress were in fact not ignored, but they did not have the same ring in Paris as in peripheral territories whose residents were not beholden to the universalist credo that imbued with higher meaning the French bureaucrats’ every action. Andrew Abbott’s concept of historicality helps reconstitute dynamics that seemed perfectly reasonable to local actors but confounded French executives. When analysing major societal shifts, Abbott proposes to focus less on large social/political forces and more on individual experiences, on the premise that ‘individuals are central to history because it is they who are the prime reservoir of historical connection from past to present’.49 The continuities inherent in individual lives therefore form a powerful counter-weight that confronts, interprets and often ‘severely limits what large forces can in fact accomplish’.50 In this view, the massive outside forces unleashed by the 48  The main complaint targeted Pietro Cavagnari, who allegedly sweet-talked his way into Junot’s good graces, which, his accusers further contended, helped him procure a lucrative contract with Parma’s hospital. Suavely, the authors also wondered whether Junot’s judgment may have been clouded by his falling ‘into love’s embrace’ (in braccio del’ amori) alluding to his affair with dancer Foscarina. A Sua Eccelenza Monsignor de Serpigny, Piacenza 1 July 1806. AN F/1e/85/. 49  Andrew Abbott, ‘The Historicality of Individuals’. Presidential Address, SSHA in Social Science History, 29, 1 (Spring 2005): 1–13 (10). 50  Abbott, ‘The Historicality of Individuals’, 10.

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

231

French occupation, primed to restructure—or regenerate, as the French put it—the entirety of life in the area, stumbled on the speed bumps formed of the cultural backgrounds, philosophical judgements, personal histories, interests and ambitions the educated and well-off carried with them. The result was a process of elimination, not outright rejection. Members of the propertied or professional classes partly shared the French post-revolutionary worldview and had little trouble accepting, and even welcoming, the restructuring of administrative and legal bureaucracies, and not only for narrow opportunistic reasons. The process fitted with their own upbringing and philosophical viewpoints; it spoke to intellectual and ethical preoccupations as much as it did to career interests—in short, it made sense. Not so the nudging and prodding to follow the French lead on the road to personal and collective regeneration, which left the same individuals cold. Unlike the French sent to rule over them, the Parmense were not chasing theoretical certainties and felt no qualms about picking apart the ‘unbreakable model’.51 If local elites acted on a long-term plan, it was the kind of day-to-day undertaking Carlo Zaghi ascribed to patrician functionaries in the Republic, then Kingdom, of Italy: ‘to transform the sterile French occupation in North Italy, perennial source of preoccupation and alarm, into an element of concord and of peace’.52 In pursuit of this more modest goal, the Parmense elites accommodated to the French system deliberately, prudently, and exercising remarkable agency throughout.

The Limits of Persuasion Like Moreau before him, Nardon intended to capitalize on the tradition of academic celebrations at Saint Catherine College, better known as College of the Nobles. Like Moreau again, he did not let go unnoticed the happy coincidence that the usual mid-August graduation ceremonies fell 51  Geoffrey Ellis pointed to the pragmatic nature of Napoleonic occupation, with methods adapted to regional circumstances and administrators resigned to the fact that ‘results fell often far short of the ‘model’. The case of Parma—Piacenza shows that such pragmatism was not a choice; rather, it was forced on the French by local leadership figures’ refusal to accept the entire French template. ‘The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism’ in Napoleon and Europe. Philip G. Dwyer editor (London: Pearson, 2001), 97–117 (102). Ellis took issue here with Stuart Woolf’s thesis of organic integration around a uniform administrative model. 52  Zaghi, Napoleone e l’Italia, 162. Zaghi referred to Melzi d’Eril, but the observation applies to a wide variety of upper-class collaborators.

232 

D. P. HARSANYI

on or around the feast day of Saint Napoleon (15 August), recently elevated to the rank of Catholic martyr. Moreau had revelled in the role of magnanimous pro-consul who traded lavish endowments in exchange for loyalty. Nardon, not surprisingly, chose a blunter approach, helped in this sense by the Imperial Decree of 23 May 1806, which announced the organization of two lycées in the States of Parma. In the absence of any details, Nardon believed the best course of action was to repurpose the historic school and take it, physically and educationally, out of the hands of the Jesuits, whom he found impossible to tolerate: ‘The teaching here is decaying, like it always has in all Jesuit establishments’.53 With this in mind, Nardon placed the college under the direction of his close collaborator Armand Raynaud on 21 July 1806. Simultaneously, he ordered all members of the Society of Jesus—hence, the entire teaching staff—to leave Parma within five days. Raynaud’s nomination, Lalatta wrote in his journal, had the effect of a scarecrow and spelled the end of a beloved Parmense institution: ‘…the glory of this college, so attractive to so many foreigners who were glad to educate their children here, will now live in our memory only’.54 Not entirely indifferent to such sentiments, Nardon attached to the order an open letter that promised parents that the lycée was poised to surpass the college’s reputation for excellence, while their sons were essentially guaranteed the brightest of careers: ‘Each pupil will enjoy, upon graduation, the full advantages of birth, fortune, and education. And you can nurture in your hearts the promise that the government will compensate and put these talents to good use’. In addition, just in case anybody failed to notice the iron fist within the velvet glove: ‘You will doubtless appreciate His Majesty’s benevolence and will not put me in the position to tell Him that your children are deserting a place which He is gracing with special affection. You want the good of your children; I want the same thing and I thank His Majesty for trusting the Imperial College to my care’.55 53  Letter to Minister of the Interior, Parma 5 September 1806. Quoted in Michael Broers, ‘Le Lycée de Parme sous le Premier Empire’ in Napoléon et les lycées. Sous la direction de Jacques-Olivier Boudon (Paris : Fondation Napoléon, 2004), 147–164 (150). See this article for Nardon’s uncompromising contempt for any aspect of Jesuit education. 54  Lalatta diary, entry of 21 July 1806. BP Mss. Parm. 1185. Lalatta clarifies that the French government adopted the college because the Jesuits drifted back to Parma during the last duke’s benevolent rule, and everyone had been closing an eye ever since. 55  Letter distributed to families, dated Parma, 21 July 1806. Reproduced from the archives of the Maria Luigia College in Parma, in Gaetano Capasso, ‘Il Colleggio dei Nobili di Parma.

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

233

End of year celebrations started on 13 August, with public illuminations and an outdoor concert meant to benefit Count Sanvitale’s Fontanellato schools. The busiest day, 14 August, passed in a continuum of literary-dramatic exercises, at the end of which the most meritorious graduates received prizes and honourable mentions. A fair with objects made by Fontanellato’s pupils, followed by religious ceremonies and food distribution for the poor, closed the celebrations on 15 August. Nardon opened the festivities of 14 August with the traditional bestowing of the title of doctor in law on the most eminent student at the University of Parma. After a few shallow congratulatory words for the young man’s doctoral defence, Nardon addressed the entire class: ‘Young students, I hurried to come here and share my emotions with you. You are starting out on a new career path strewn with flowers…’. Students did not have to wonder long where the catch was, for Nardon soon converted the amiable commencement speech into a series of marching orders: You belong to Italy’s most notable families; return among them; tell them that you have become French, that your current education allows you to dream any dream! Talk to them about the zeal, the watchfulness, and the benevolence of your esteemed Director; about the wisdom of your administrative council; about the protection of the government. Tell them that we were on the brink of having this beautiful Italian institution of learning destroyed; but that moment of danger proved to be, on the contrary, a chance to protect and regenerate yourselves and the school.56

The day’s programme included two plays: ‘a little French play’ titled The Dragon of Thonville (French was one of the subjects all pupils studied) and, in Italian, The Battle of Austerlitz, with many local men of letters joining in to play key roles (lawyer Camillo Ugoni, at the time president of a local literary society, took the part of Napoleon).57 Thundering applause Memorie Storiche’. Archivio Storico per le Province Parmensi, XXVI (1901–1902), 1–248 (224–225). The section on the college during the French administration pp. 214–236. 56  Précis des Fêtes données à Parme à l’occasion de St. Napoléon. Parme. Imprimerie Impériale, 1806. 57  A sudden malaise prevented Nardon from attending the productions; financial inspector Dauchy, in town to check Parma’s notoriously muddled finances, took his seat. The entire show was re-enacted, just for Nardon, three days later. Capasso, ‘Il Colleggio dei Nobili di Parma. Memorie Storiche’, 227. Nardon penned a detailed description of the ceremonies for Minister Champagny; he also insisted on his wish to retain students from outside Parma, for which purpose he asked for ‘means’ and broached the idea of a Central College in Italy.

234 

D. P. HARSANYI

and acclamations warmed Nardon’s heart: surely, he reckoned, exposure to French educational standards was beginning to reshape the young minds freshly rescued from the Jesuits’ grasp.58 What awaited him instead was another bitter disappointment. Parents who travelled to attend their sons’ graduation enjoyed the shows and did not deny themselves a good time, but they heard Nardon clearly. The changes were not to their liking, and Nardon’s eager projections of a bright future failed to impress. Once the celebrations ended, pupils started withdrawing, one by one: ‘I cannot hold on to the wonderful institution that is the College of Sainte Catherine’, Nardon wrote plaintively on 25 August. He fought for each student, especially for the foreign ones: ‘…yesterday, I was robbed of two young Romans, today three Milanese left; I obsess over these losses and right now I vigorously resist letting go of two young men from Palermo, in Sicily’. This, Nardon ruefully reminded his minister, not even two weeks after 150 youth, little counts and princes bearing the most brilliant names in Italy, hailed the emperor and re-enacted the Battle of Austerlitz.59 How to fathom the thinking of people who applaud French plays one day and boycott a first-­ rate French educational institution the next? The Administrator-Prefect enlisted the help of Parma’s mayor Sanvitale, surely a better reader of Italian minds; the count agreed to organize a summer internship programme on his properties at Fontanellato, with the rather transparent objective of putting some distance between students and their families’ influence. In the meantime, Nardon worked on a reorganization plan, made public on 5 September. The eight-point document put in ­bureaucratic language the 21 July open letter to parents, promised imperial stipends to all who registered, and implored students to stay put: ‘the college will admit all the children of nobility who demand to study here’.60 It was to no avail: at the beginning of the new academic year, the school enrolled Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 20 August 1806. AN F/1e/85 (the letter contains much praise for Sanvitale’s help too). 58  ‘Great actions always awaken great sentiments, and this youth of noble birth would be an excellent instrument for bringing about significant changes in the way the nobles of this country think’. As quoted in Michael Broers, ‘Le Lycée de Parma sous le Premier Empire’ in Napoléon et les lycées, Sous la direction de Jacques-Olivier Boudon (Paris  : Fondation Napoléon, 2004), 147–164 (152). 59  Nardon to Minister of the Interior Champagny, Parma 25 August 1806. AN F/1e/85. 60  Projet d’Organisation du Collège de Sainte Catherine dit des Nobles à Parma. Parma 5 September 1806 AN F/1e/85.

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

235

only 34 students (out of 114 in July), most of them local Parmense; the last foreign student, a certain Carlo Borri from Milan, left on 31 December 1806. The college closed its doors for good in January 1807.61 Aching from the loss, Marquis Lalatta noted: ‘This first day of the year, by decree, the College of Sainte Catherine has been closed. This most respectable college that endured for more than 200 years’.62 Nardon blamed the dismal failure on Jesuits spinning their web of ‘ignorance and intrigue’. They induced parents to reproach him that ‘the way of thinking and education I give these students is too military, meaning not entirely priestly. That I take people out of their school environment [on field trips]. That I welcome to my circles, in groups of five or six, those students who behaved well the day before. That all this contributes to breaking familial bonds and deeply held beliefs’. With disarming candour, Nardon admitted: ‘…this is in fact true. To my eyes, this college was meant to become the first step in training subjects fit to carry far and wide the love for my fatherland, its laws and customs; fit too to spread the feelings of love, respect, and admiration that inspires in all noble hearts the name of the August Napoleon!’63 This is a remarkable exposé of assimilationist philosophy cum plan of action; a seduction strategy, which, as Michael Broers noted, borrowed heavily from the tactics of the very Jesuits he detested and chased out of Parma.64 Nardon wished to retain the shell of the Collegio dei Nobili, but, like pouring new wine into old bottles, to fill it with a curriculum and a code of ethics consistent with the general 61  On 31 December, Armand Raynaud formally took over the inventory of the college: furniture, precious religious objects, books and works of art. As he signed the records of transfer in the presence of four witnesses, he thanked the custodian Svante Sbarra, in service for more than twenty years, for his excellent management of the school’s assets. Raynaud also assured him the new lycée would amply compensate the country for the loss of the august establishment—the only good words the college’s employees ever heard from French rulers. Capasso, Il Colleggio dei Nobili di Parma. Memorie Storiche, 226–232. See also Andrea Sabini, Collegii Parmensis nobilium convictorum nomenclatura universalis cum notis historicis (Parma, 1820), 204–208. 62  Lalatta’s diary, entry of 1 November 1806. BP Mss. Parm 1185. Lalatta seems to fault Nardon for misapplying imperial orders. On the entry of 30 August, he gave the number of 34 students still enrolled out of the initial 114 because: ‘The youngsters, very little or not at all happy with the principal’s rules, shared their discontent with their parents. One by one, from 114 young nobles that attended the college, the greater part went home, and we counted only 34 at the time of their return to school’. 63  Nardon to Minister of the Interior Champagny, Parma 25 August 1806. AN F/1e/85. 64  Broers, ‘Le Lycée de Parme sous le Premier Empire,’ 151.

236 

D. P. HARSANYI

goal of radically transforming local mindsets and lifestyles. Similar to his intentions for Parma’s theatre, the idea was to take a venerable, beloved institution and turn it into an instrument of acculturation, the softer, affable, surreptitiously manipulative side of military and political occupation. In both cases, the plan failed and for the same reasons: the elites refused to be seduced. Remarkably, though, lack of support from Paris contributed equally to the fiasco, and this is what hurt Nardon the most. In September 1806, responding to Nardon’s frantic recruitment efforts, Champagny coldly announced that, informed of the situation, His Majesty ordered that the Administrator-Prefect allow parents of foreign students to withdraw their children. There was no reason to shed tears over an obsolete school, and anyway, the upcoming lycée had other objectives than to serve the interests of the noble class.65 Indeed, Champagny was expressing the larger social ambitions behind the construction of an imperial system of public education, that is, raising new meritorious elites intrinsically loyal to the state.66 This was simply not possible, Nardon wrote back, despairing of his superiors’ ignorance of basic realities on the ground: ‘The lycée will encounter resistance from the public opinion. People are not advanced enough in this country to rally in favor of such a system of education’. He believed the old upper classes would end up mutating into the new upper classes. This, however, could only happen if clever French administrators like himself averted the obvious risk that parents would retreat behind the walls of private homes and hire priests to educate their children, thus robbing the French of a whole generation of friendly elites. Much better, Nardon insisted, to charm parents into believing that children were still frequenting their favourite school while slyly but durably remoulding young minds and souls. Besides, the college was an economic powerhouse and Parma could ill afford the loss of about 300,000 pounds in tuition fees paid by foreign students, not to mention the profits the town’s merchants enjoyed when parents came to visit

65  Minister Champagny to Administrator Prefect Nardon, Paris 8 September 1806, AN F/1e/85. Champagny clearly stated that students had to adapt to French schools, not the other way around. 66  A competitive system of examinations selected the best pupils who qualified for stipends and subventions; still, the social position of the father weighed in when calculating individual merit. Philippe Savoie, ‘Construire un système d’instruction publique’ in Napoléon et les lycées, 39–55 (43). Noble parents were urged to send their sons to lycées like all ambitious families, with no special provisions in their favour.

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

237

throughout the academic year.67 Nardon went so far as to place himself in the French tradition of bureaucratic excellence by suggesting he was playing Colbert to Napoleon’s Louis XIV: It is true that the gratitude unites all noble hearts; it is indisputable that His Majesty will have many new subjects in foreign kingdoms; in the same spirit, Colbert submitted to Louis XIV lists with distinguished foreigners deserving compensations. I could not find a greater example to support my proposals, which I believe worthy of His Majesty’s approval.68

‘His Majesty’ remained unmoved and the answer was still no. Nardon persisted in vain and embellished increasingly desperate supplications with historical narratives detailing the past and present significance of the college. Champagny relayed that the emperor had no interest in accommodating Italian aristocrats and ended the discussion peremptorily: ‘His Majesty ordered a lycée and not a college for foreign nobles.’69 Indeed, on 18 December 1806, the Council of State ordered the college to shut down; the authorization for a future imperial lycée came on 25 June 1807.70 While Napoleon’s response, like his Minister of the Interior’s, is not surprising, local reactions are at the very least unexpected. Lalatta’s mournful tone expressed privately the sorrow many felt at the loss of yet another proud cultural tradition. Publicly, though, Parma’s senior officials rolled out the red carpet for the future lycée. On 14 August 1807, mayor Sanvitale and the newly appointed principal (former president of the Academy of Fine Arts Luigi Scutellari) traversed the town in a veritable procession, escorted by a reserve army company and preceded by official city criers, to baptize lycée impérial the vacated building of the Colleggio dei Nobili. Once on site, they proceeded to recite French-language pledges of loyalty so exaggerated as to beggar belief from the first sentence (‘Gratitude has already engraved in our hearts the oath we are about to 67  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 27 September 1806, AN F/1e/85. Nardon titled this exposition of his methods ‘Compte Moral’ (like Moreau before him) and insisted that his approach had already met with some success, since several foreign students chose to re-enrol. Even if this was correct in September, by the end of the year all out of town students had left Parma. 68  Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 5–6 October 1806. AN F/1e/85. 69  Minister Champagny to Administrator Prefect Nardon, Paris, 11 November 1806, AN F/1e/85. 70  Broers, ‘Le Lycée de Parme sous le Premier Empire’, 155. The actual opening stalled and in fact, the school never functioned as promised.

238 

D. P. HARSANYI

swear’) to the last (‘You will see, Gentlemen, that we are dedicated to fulfill unquestioningly the duties you have inspired. Full of respect and admiration for our August Emperor and always ready to obey the tutelary authorities in these States.’).71 Did such obsequiousness reflect at least partially real sentiments? There is a chance that Francophone elites gave good thought to Nardon’s promises of brilliant careers for the lycée’s alumni. Except for the fact that several lists of names of students enrolled in the forthcoming lycée contain none of the noble or well-established families of Parma. Was Nardon right, then, and indeed highborn youth quietly passed from the hands of Jesuits to the hands of family priests? If this is so—and it appears to be so—the showy ceremonies of 14 August 1807 come across as yet another segment in the wall of flattery local elites raised like a protective screen between themselves and the French authorities. Perhaps Parma’s upper classes wished to take their time and observe how the lycée functioned, what kind of education it proposed, and to what extent the new institution served their family’s interests before translating in deeds what they so freely offered in words. In any event, there was no rush to take a decision: the much-extolled lycée remained, as Capasso concluded, ‘a pious wish’. The very idea disappeared from public discourse as soon as the Napoleonic regime ended in Parma. On 7 September 1816, Maria Luigia resurrected the College Sainte Catherine and entrusted its direction to the order of Benedictines, with the explicit mission of restoring the reputation it had enjoyed under the Farnese and the Bourbons, as if the lycée was a bad dream, to be expunged from collective memory.72 Beyond adding to Nardon’s frustrations, the entire incident brings into sharp focus the limits of prefects’ autonomy: they were not, after all, ‘little emperors’ empowered to act as they saw fit. Part of their mission was to harmonize local circumstances with imperial guidelines, which required flexibility and social acumen. Napoleon himself, already impatient with his representatives’ propensity for douceur in Parma, cut short any attempt at meeting local subjects half-way. The indifference to, if not irritation with, 71  The entire pledge is reproduced in Capasso, Il Colleggio dei Nobili di Parma, 233–234. Curiously, the text is written in rather clumsy French, which seems to indicate that it was not the work of Sanvitale or of one of the more prominent local scholars. 72  At the occasion and in subsequent years, Maria Luigia received her share of extravagant poems; the longest, by Jacopo Sanvitale titled Il Genio di Parma, is a history in verse culminating with thanks to the Almighty for bringing the duchess to Parma. (Published by Carmignani in 1818, recited in public at the carnival festivities 1818).

10  ELITE COLLABORATION 

239

Nardon’s bait and switch tactics also suggests that senior executives in Paris did not value assimilation as highly as prefects did. Cajoling residents into internalizing French ways was preferable, but not a precondition for executing imperial policies: there were times when expeditious brute force proved the better method. In the case of higher education, imperial authorities had a plan, which they intended to implement uniformly throughout the empire, regardless of displeasure or opposition on the ground. For Nardon, the failure to save the college was one of the bitterest pills to swallow in a career made chiefly of setbacks. It put his efforts at acculturating the elites in a rather pathetic light and contributed further to his reputation for insensitivity and clumsiness—ironically, at the very time when he was trying to grasp something about the identity of the place he was ruling (granted, for the purpose of better reshaping it). The whole episode prompted Leny Montagna, the thorough local historian, to conclude that Nardon ended up causing harm even when he strove to do good.73

 Montagna, Il dominio francese a Parma, 88.

73

CHAPTER 11

The End of the Road: Conclusions

Two years after the appointment of the Special Military Government, executives in Parma estimated that the rebel lands that so angered Napoleon had been tamed enough to meet the criteria for annexation to France. By Senatus Consultus, the States of Parma and Piacenza were reborn as the Department of Taro on 24 May 1808.1 After a few months of painful uncertainty, which compelled him to draw the minister’s attention to his unflagging zeal, Hugues Nardon advanced to the position of full prefect: a ‘little emperor’ at last, freed from the obligation to report to a governor general.2 The institutional infrastructure remained unchanged, with only a few modifications in the system of justice: with the city of Parma’s status raised to capital of an annexed department, the functions of criminal courts in Parma and Piacenza merged into a single high court located in Parma, the apex of a pyramidal structure that mirrored exactly the French one. The remarkable personnel continuity made logistical changes pass almost unnoticed. The Minister of Justice confirmed most currently serving magistrates, on the same rationale that motivated initial 1  Nardon published the decree in Parma on 4 August. A copy is preserved at ASPr, Decretti e Rescritti, vol. 130. 2  ‘All important tasks are completed’, he wrote in a letter where he begged Champagny to take note of his efforts in the territory and supply a letter of recommendation, should the prefect position go to someone else. Nardon to Minister Champagny, Parma 25 May 1808. AN F1b I/168/1 Dossier Nardon. He received the official nomination on 11 July 1808.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7_11

241

242 

D. P. HARSANYI

appointments: continuous employment through different governments, with special praise for activities during the last three years. Politi’s profile, for instance, went from ‘reliable’ to ‘extreme probity, enlightened, well educated, with a marvelous memory, fruit of long years of practicing law’. The many years Politi worked for the Bourbons played in his favour once more on the grounds that specialized skills remained relevant regardless of shifting political loyalties.3 So too reckoned Pietro Fainardi when he asked to remain in his position, in support of which he cited ‘services performed for more than 29 years and the important places I have occupied under the French administration here and abroad’.4 Other well-known magistrates— Giordani, Monza and Baistrocchi—who moved seamlessly from the ducal to Moreau’s and then to Nardon’s administrations, continued to staff the upper echelons of the courts, armed with similarly complimentary performance reviews.5 Reorganization granted the right to send six deputies to the Legislative Corps in Paris, three from Parma and three from Piacenza, elected for limited terms through a complicated four-stage procedure. Unsurprisingly, the list of deputies represented a microcosm of traditional elites, men whom the citizenry had grown accustomed to seeing in prominent places irrespective of political upheavals, revolutions and invasions.6 All senior office holders were bilingual, and hence unaffected by the new obligation to conduct official business in French only. Between 22 April and 3 May 1810, Prefect Nardon organized a series of spectacular public festivities to celebrate Napoleon’s marriage to the Hapsburg princess Marie Louise (Maria Luigia in Italian), the daughter of 3  Mont Lois, deputy of the Department of Taro to the Legislative Corps to the Grand Juge Minister of Justice Régnier, Paris, 9 November 1809. An BB/5/302. On the strength of this recommendation, Politi earned the prestigious post of President of the General Council of the Department of Taro, for which he sent a thank you note to the Minister of Justice on 27 August 1810. 4  Pietro Fainardi to Grand Juge Minister of Justice Régnier, Parma, 4 November 1809. He attached a curriculum vitae that listed his entire work history, starting with positions occupied under the Bourbon dukes. AN BB/5/302. 5  Lists of profiles of high-level magistrates in ASPr, Dipartimento del Taro, Busta 5. These are essentially the lists drawn in 1806, updated in 1809 with comments on recent job performance. Prefect Nardon and the Minister of Justice went to significant lengths to ensure that no one would feel disadvantaged and placed in suitable positions magistrates whose positions had become redundant after the reorganization of the courts. 6  All so elected came from the feudal nobility, the high clergy or the well-established urban notability. The lists include prestigious names like Count Scotti, Count Sanvitale, Count Maggi, Cardinal Caselli and Count Linati.

11  THE END OF THE ROAD: CONCLUSIONS 

243

Austria’s emperor. It was his way of saying goodbye: on 7 August 1810, he left for Spain to join his protector, Joseph Bonaparte. Napoleon nominated in his place a younger bureaucrat, Baron Duport-Delporte, whose principal merit, in the eyes of local public opinion, was not being Nardon.7 This alone won him the hearts that remained closed to his predecessor from whom he adroitly distanced himself without substantively altering any policy. Conscription, the most hated of French impositions, continued as before but seemed lighter to bear after Dupont-Delporte ended the practice of garnissaires, declaring it a ‘violation of one’s sacred home’. He shifted responsibility for draft avoidance to local judges, whom he did not hesitate to report to the Minister of Justice for dereliction of duty at the slightest sign of lenience in pursuing conscription-related offences.8 Likewise, lowering the price of a few basic commodities softened the rigours of the tax system, which did not change either.9 Unlike Nardon, Dupont-Delporte found poring over the minutiae of economic projects a deeply satisfying part of the job. He adopted at once vigorous interventionist practices that evoked Du Tillot’s and Moreau de Saint-Méry’s exertions—within, however, the stringent limits of imperial economic dogma where all regional economies served France’s interests. For Parma–Piacenza, the change in status meant complete integration in the continental system introduced by Napoleon’s Berlin Decree of 21 November 1806 and expanded by the Fontainebleau Decree of 18 October 1810. Further complicating the situation, Napoleon decided that 7  Henri Duport-Delporte (1783–1854), Baron of the Empire since 1810, belonged to the new generation of career administrators educated in the Napoleonic system. He progressed from Council of State auditeur to administrator of mines in conquered territories, then inspector of army supplies (1807), and finally prefect of Ariège (1808). He arrived in Parma in September 1810 and received the title of Chevalier of the Legion of Honour in 1811. 8  In a long letter to the Minister of Justice, Parma’s Imperial Prosecutor Pietro Garbarini (Mastelloni’s successor after Parma’s reorganization into the Department of Taro) defended judges against accusations of indulgence that echoed Mastelloni’s and Guberanatis’ complaints from the first rounds of conscription. He attached a list with the trials of lawbreakers and the sentences handed down but admitted that the course of justice was slow, and many men were able to obtain medical certificates and false passports. Four years after the start of conscription drives, judges were still actively availing themselves of various procedural loopholes to avoid throwing the book at hapless youth reluctant to quit the life they knew for elusive glory in the emperor’s armies. Imperial Prosecutor Garbarini to Grand Juge, Duc de Massa, Parma, 24 March 1810. AN BB/18/79. 9  Details in ‘Il Prefetto Dupont-Delporte’ in Storia di Parma, vol. V, 325–333. Although Dupont-Delporte did not acknowledge it, he benefitted from his predecessor’s pushing and prodding which accustomed local officials to the intricacies of tax collection.

244 

D. P. HARSANYI

the new department would function like an administrative dependency of the Department of Genoa, part of a long game meant to compensate Genovese upper classes for losses incurred since annexation to the Empire.10 Dupont-Delporte had little room for manoeuvre and little time for pondering the best way forward, because his superiors mailed almost daily instructions that set the department’s agenda and micromanaged every economic sector.11 Even so, he made every effort to translate imperial dictates and restrictions into engines for modernization meant to validate the territory’s promotion to full French department. State subsidies and seed capital, together with public accolades publicized in the Giornale di Taro, rewarded residents willing to take a chance and work in the fields Paris assigned to their homeland: cotton, wool and silk manufacturing; in agriculture, trying new cultures like indigo and tobacco, in addition to the main disposition of producing sugar from beets and grape juice. Results remained uneven throughout Dupont-Delporte’s four-year tenure. Tobacco and indigo failed, because countless local conditions did not fit the planners’ blueprint; cotton did not obtain the hoped for results; sugar beet production took time to get under way.12 As brutally as ever, the war economy hampered promising ideas: Dupont-Delporte realized more clearly than Nardon the merits of Carlo Formenti’s indefatigable efforts at  Antonino de Francesco, L’Italia di Bonaparte. Politica, statualità e nazione nella peninsola tra due rivoluzioni 1796–1821 (Torino: UTET, 2011), 104. Liguria was divided in three departments: (Montenotte, Genoa and Apennines) and annexed to the French empire in 1805, a year-long process under the supervision of Governor General Lebrun. The annexation drastically curtailed Genoa’s control over maritime commerce, its traditional source of wealth and power. Taro’s junior partnership with Genoa was not surprising, given the prominent role Liguria’s governor Lebrun had played in reorganizing the States of Parma after the insurrection. It was for these efforts that Napoleon bestowed on him the honourary title Duke of Piacenza in 1808. 11  See Alessandro de Luca, Linee di sviluppo delle manifatture nel parmense durante l’età napoleonica (1802–1814), passim, for details on letters from the Ministry of the Interior intended as guidelines for the department’s economic activities. 12  Sugar beet was an important crop, destined to replace the cane sugar market lost in the wake of the successful revolution in the Caribbean. Its abrupt introduction in the region illustrated Taro’s dependency on Genoa: the decision to require high-volume production of this commodity in Parma–Piacenza correlated with the need to increase commercial traffic through Genovese ports hit by the continental blockade. Spaggiari noted that the technique of extracting sugar from sugar beets took time to develop and only functioned satisfactorily under Maria Luigia’s government, but it helped that the beets had become a common crop. Economia e Finanza negli Stati Parmensi 1814–1859, 15–30. 10

11  THE END OF THE ROAD: CONCLUSIONS 

245

breeding sheep for merinos wool variety, but requisitions for the French army still came first and the venture languished despite the prefect’s support.13 On the other hand, a few manufacturing sectors less targeted for army requisitions gave more reasons for optimism, ironically, because rigid centralization did less damage to weak economies than to stronger ones. The solid performance of the silk industry—the brightest spot on the territory’s economic map—validates Alessandro De Luca’s remark that in the maze of French imperial protectionism and interventionism Taro occasionally took advantage of its neighbours’ misfortunes.14 New subsidies helped, but the trade’s decline in the Kingdom of Italy, subjected to protectionist measures in favour of Lyon’s factories, helped even more. In essence, as with all forms of modernization from above, and regardless of the young prefect’s tenacity, French experiments in planned economy benefitted the few, not the many. Local entrepreneurs and affluent landowners eager to try something new availed themselves of government grants and enjoyed participating in showy venues like the industrial exhibition Dupont-Delporte inaugurated in Parma in 1811. For the majority of the population, though, the novelty of becoming a French department came mainly in the form of customs duties across normally porous borders with neighbouring regions currently incorporated in the Kingdom of Italy. Predictably, export expenses disrupted traditional exchange routes for popular varieties of wine and cheese, obstructed sales of newly 13  De Luca, Linee di sviluppo delle manifatture nel parmense durante l’età napoleonica (1802–1814), 152–159. It took 20 years for the initial plans to come to full fruition: it was only in the 1830s that the number of sheep doubled, and the quality of the wool improved. Spaggiari, L’Agricoltura negli Stati Parmensi dal 1750 al 1859, 43. Pertinent to these divergent developments is Woolf’s general observation that all over the empire, exploitative trade practices dictated from Paris subverted the potential benefits of better-organized local administrations. Napoleon’s Integration of Europe, 156. 14  De Luca, Linee di sviluppo delle manifatture nel parmense durante l’età napoleonica (1802–1814), 166. François Crouzet observed that silk production had no competition from Britain and did not suffer from the continental blockade: ‘Wars, Blockade and Economic Change in Europe. 1792–1815’ The Journal of Economic History, 24, 4 (Dec. 1964): 567–588 (581). The methodical weakening of this industry in the Kingdom of Italy resulted solely from Napoleon’s determination to prioritize France’s interests, as Alexander Grab demonstrated in ‘The Kingdom of Italy and the Continental Blockade’ in Revisiting Napoleon’s Continental System. Katherine B.  Aaslestadt and Johan Joor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 98–113 (107–110). See this volume for a thorough re-appraisal of blockade policies, region by region. Taro’s relative success was an unintended consequence of this heavy-handed interventionism.

246 

D. P. HARSANYI

produced goods, and local economies turned to smuggling even more than before, despite increased police presence in the border regions.15 Finally, for all his affability, Dupont-Delporte did little to help local cultural institutions.16 He presided over the downgrading of the University of Parma to the level of Imperial Academy within the jurisdiction of the University of Genoa, itself turned Imperial Academy of Genoa in 1809— another way of placating Genoa’s elites, which, curiously, elicited few local expressions of distress.17 The promised imperial lycée expected to replace the defunct Colleggio dei Nobili proved a disappointment, and the cherished Academy of Fine Arts operated only as a painting school. The Royal Library, now under the directorship of respected local scholar Angelo Pezzana, made a few acquisitions only because it salvaged books left homeless after the definitive closing of convents. Gazzetta di Parma started 15  From 1808 on, customs officials deplored the increase in illegal traffic along an already porous border. Grab, ‘The Kingdom of Italy and the Continental Blockade’, 104. See also Luigi Bulferetti, ‘L’Economia Piacentina nel periodo napoleonico’ Studi Parmensi, IX (1959): 31–41 (35). Claudio Bargelli discussed the entrenched problem of smuggling and the many efforts, mainly unsuccessful, of all administrations from the Farnese governors to the Napoleonic prefects, to control it. ‘Fra utopia annonaria e interesse privato’ Aurea Parma, fasc II (marzo—giugno 1998): 271–278. 16  In fact, the one isolated incident that broke the sycophantic continuum occurred under his administration. Jacopo Sanvitale, another relative of Stefano, wrote a short poem ridiculing the grandiose festivities held in honour of the birth of Napoleon’s son, the King of Rome (20 March 1811). For this deed, he ended up imprisoned for 14 months in a country fortress, Fenestrelle (he spent the time translating the Pentateuch). After a spectacular escape disguised in women’s clothes, he took refuge in the home of Count Joannini in Milan and Parma’s authorities no longer inconvenienced him. Luigi Sanvitale, ‘Il Pensiero civile di Jacopo Sanvitale. Il Patriottta e Dotto’ in Aurea Parma, I, 3–4 (Settembre–Ottobre 1912): 10–24. The melodrama softened the persecution in this case, but it is true that not all dissidents were so fortunate. Michael Sibalis has shown that with the ‘public spirit’ under surveillance and hundreds of political prisoners languishing in state prisons, the Napoleonic regime had all the makings of a police state. ‘The Napoleonic Police State’ in Napoleon and Europe, 79–92. 17  De Francesco, L’Italia di Bonaparte, 104–105. The Imperial Decree of 7 March 1808 stipulated the organization of a sole imperial university (Université de France) that guided the entire system of higher education to ensure a homogeneous curriculum. The lower status of Parma’s University was not therefore an exception. Ahead of the reorganization, a delegation headed by medical doctor Tommasini went to Paris to plead for maintaining the institution’s scientific programmes. In response, the University of Paris sent to Parma a commission led by natural scientist Georges Cuvier before the Imperial Decree of 7 May 1811 completed the conversion into Imperial Academy. Magawly-Cerati restored the university on 12 August 1814. For a brief overview see Giovanni Mariotti, ‘L’università di Parma dal 1766 al 1859’ Aurea Parma, VII (1923): 267–270.

11  THE END OF THE ROAD: CONCLUSIONS 

247

publishing anew under the name Giornale di Taro. This was to Dupont-­ Delporte’s credit but hardly a success, since readers quickly realized that in its new incarnation the broadsheet imparted propaganda, not news; by the prefect’s decree, schools and government offices took subscriptions for the 3000 daily copies which otherwise went unread.18 The citizenry had no reason to love the departmental administration any more than they loved previous French varieties and greeted the change in status with a collective yawn. Nevertheless, playing good cop to Nardon’s bad cop helped Dupont-Delporte project the image of ‘kind and paternalistic administration’ that kept eluding his predecessor. Amiable co-existence between benevolent administrators and content administrés was fully on display in October 1813, when the commune of Parma sent to Paris a delegation led by Stefano Sanvitale to express the city’s, and by extension the entire department’s, devotion to the imperial family. The reality of increased taxation, economic stagnation and ever stringent conscription demands faded behind this shiny façade, which caused local historians to issue benevolent verdicts: ‘Dupont-Delporte’s were the best years of the French administration’, declared Umberto Benassi, partially echoed a century later by Pierluigi Feliciati, who pronounced the administration of the Prefect of Taro ‘happy—at least in appearance’.19 After violent insurrection followed by sulking disgruntlement, apathy intermixed with elite collaboration could pass for approval. On 9 February 1814, news of the Allies closing in on Paris persuaded all French representatives that the time had come to leave Parma; there were no goodbyes and likely no regrets on either side. On the same day, a corps of Hungarian cavalry rode into town ahead of Austria’s representative General Laval Nugent. Count Sanvitale graciously welcomed the Austrian emperor’s envoy on behalf of local notabilities—just three months after guiding a delegation that pledged the same notables’ allegiance to the French emperor. On 16 February, France officially ceded 18  Alessandro de Luca, ‘Il Giornale di Taro e la Prefettura Delporte a Parma (1811–1814)’ Aurea Parma XCV 2011 (sett-dic): 411–418. Remarkably, the first issue (5 March 1811) published a decree clarifying conscription requirements and listed the penalties for counterfeited medical certificates submitted for exemption purposes. 19  Umberto Benassi, Storia di Parma (Parma; Luigi Battei 1907), VI, 189 and Pierluigi Feliciati ‘Arrivano in Francesi! Gli stati parmensi dal 1796 a 1814’ in L’Ossessione della memoria. Parma settecentesca nei disegni del conte Alessando Sanseverini, 32. By contrast, Feliciati considered Nardon’s administration ‘decidedely negative for the social consensus to the French domination’. Idem, 31.

248 

D. P. HARSANYI

the territory to Austria. Things limped along until 6 June, when Austrian Chancellor Metternich formed a regency in the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla in the name of Emperor Francis’ daughter Maria Luigia, hitherto Napoleon’s second empress. An Imperial Decree nominated Irish-­Parmense Count Filippo Magawly-Cerati Prime Minister to Maria Luigia, in charge of recasting current administrative divisions into a new mould defined as ‘absolutely monarchical, based on just laws and on the principles of paternalistic administration’. Reminiscent of the sharp inward turn that followed Du Tillot’s demise four decades earlier, Emperor Francis insisted on purging of foreigners all ranks of the administration.20 No foreign government employees stayed behind in Parma. A few tweaks, therefore, was all it took to delete France from public discourse and collective memory: all offices that could call to mind the Department of Taro were renamed or invalidated; the remaining religious orders regained (limited) legal status; maires recovered their old designation podestà; French ­language vanished from all government communication. At a deeper level, however, Magawly-Cerati was in no hurry to turn the page. ‘I arrived, put immediately into practice Your Majesty’s plan, and organized the most urgent administrative branches, maintaining what was good from both the old and the French regime’, he wrote to Emperor Francis. While doing so, he took care not to mention any French legislation and studiously avoided using the very word French in official papers (underlined in the text).21 Why not simply demolish the entire Napoleonic scaffolding, then? Because, according to his cabinet secretary, the Prime Minister agonized over the very real prospect of absolutism sliding into despotism. It was not the result he had hoped for after working day and night (Sundays too) to bring order into chaos, as he lamented in the same letter to Francis, sounding eerily like the long departed Nardon. The only way to sidestep the risk, he concluded in a paean to his French predecessors that would have made them swoon, had they known about it, was to embrace the Napoleonic organizational savoir-faire: 20  Instructions for the Minister of the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla. Signed by Emperor Francis. Schoenborn 27 July 1814, reproduced in Parma 1816. Dal Ministro Magawly alla duchessa Maria Luigia. A cura di Francesca Sandrini. (Parma : Museo Glauco Lombradi. Quaderni del Museo n. 16, 2016), 25. 21  Magawly-Cerati to Emperor Francis, Parma 8 November 1814, in Dal Ministro Magawly alla duchessa Maria Luigia, 32.

11  THE END OF THE ROAD: CONCLUSIONS 

249

The administrative operations under the French Empire had made such great progress, and so generally recognized that [the French administration] came to be regarded as a science. Count Magawly included those principles compatible with the new political form of government in the project he submitted to His Majesty.22

Potential parochial resentments wilted in the shadow of Magawly-Cerati’s remarkable bureaucratic ethos and, in the words of local historian Francesco Schupfer, ‘the state was not deprived of a good administrative organization’.23 A good French administrative organization, that is, because, except for surface modifications, the new regime rooted itself in the Napoleonic legal and governmental foundation.24 The cadres who staffed the Restoration’s institutions rallied to the new authorities professing the same apolitical commitment to civil service that had rationalized rallying to Napoleon a short while ago. They expected, and received, similar rewards. Magistrates who served in Napoleon’s courts remained on the bench and familiar names like Alberto Scotti and Dionigio Crescini soon joined the regency’s senior ranks.25 Without a shred of irony, the authors of countless homages to Napoleon now penned equally ingratiating poems in Maria Luigia’s honour. Once again, Count Sanvitale led the way: as soon as it was certain that Maria Luigia would be the country’s next sovereign, he travelled to Vienna where he briefed Emperor Francis on the situation in the duchies, because, as the Prime Minister’s secretary noted 22  Quelques notices sur le comte Philippe-François Magawly-Cerati concernant son administration des duchés de Parme, Plaisance and Guastalla comme ministre d’état, c’est-à-dire depuis le mois d’aout 1814 jusqu’au 31 décembre 1816. Par M.O. Jadis Secrétaire de cabinet du comte Magawly à présent Conseiller du Tribunal Suprême de révision des trois duchés Paris (Paris : A la Librairie Scientifique Française et Orientale, 1846), 18–19. 23  As quoted in Mario Palazzino, L’Occhio del governo. Sottoprefetti e governatori nei ducati parmensi dalla dominazione francese all’Unità dell’Italia (Parma : Diabasis, 2004), 27. This was, Schupfer further noted, a sign of wisdom, especially in Parma where the chaotic old regime administration came close to ‘barbaric’ lawlessness. 24  This was in line with other restoration regimes in Italy, who tacitly and sometimes surreptitiously maintained select Napoleonic innovations. See Marco Meriggi, ‘State and Society in Post-Napoleonic Italy’ in Napoleon’s Legacy, 49–63. A brief overview in Alexander Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe, 173–175. In Parma, the process was remarkably free of frictions compared with other regions. 25  Pietro Fainardi continued as President of Parma’s Court of Appeals with Pier Luigi Politi seated as Vice President; Antonio Rossi remained President of Piacenza’s Civil and Criminal Court, with Giuseppe Minghelli as Vice President, despite many negative reports about Minghelli’s temperament and alleged corruption. AN BB/5/302.

250 

D. P. HARSANYI

for the record, ‘[Sanvitale] never missed an opportunity to be useful to his fatherland’.26 Not surprisingly, the count accepted in due course the nomination of Great Chamberlain and chief advisor to Maria Luigia. At the same time, putting to good use skills acquired under the French administration (whose name he too may have no longer uttered), he coordinated and chaired, at Magawly-Cerati’s request, a welfare institute set up to tackle the vexing issue of endemic begging. Meanwhile, the population gave no sign of either enthusiasm or resentment.27 In contrast with the angry street agitation that culminated in the assassination of Finance Minister Prina in Milan (April 1814), citizens in Parma–Piacenza watched the transition from French to Austrian rule with the equanimity of spectators accustomed to frequent changes of scenery.28 The restoration proceeded carefully and took the shape of amended continuity from, rather than overthrow of, Napoleonic order. On 18 April 1816, Maria Luigia officially entered the city of Parma and started governing a country structured like a French department, with nothing but the name left from the Bourbon past.29

The Remains of the Day How do we find our city after twelve years of French domination? We must admit that French rule, although foreign and absolutist, and although it imposed its language, brought notable progress. Napoleonic legislation was introduced; many prejudices and all the privileges were abolished; freedom of conscience was respected; tribunal proceedings became more fair; the 26  Quelques notices sur le comte Philippe-François Magawly-Cerati concernant son administration des duchés de Parme, Plaisance and Guastalla comme ministre d’état, 17. For details on Count Sanvitale’s active engagement with Magawly-Cerati’s and afterwards with Maria-­ Luigia’s government see Adorno, Vita del Conte Sanvitale, 99–101. His son married Maria Luigia’s daughter and became the first mayor of Parma after the Italian unification. 27  ‘Calm’ is the adjective that best describes the local population’s demeanour during the transfer from Napoleonic rule to Maria Luigia’s regime. Paola Feldman, ‘La vita a Parma tra la caduta di Napoleone e l’avvente di Maria Luigia’ Aurea Parma, XXXVII (1952): 219–226 (222). 28  ‘I cannot believe that hatred for the French could be the cause of recent disorders and unfortunate events’, a dejected Eugene wrote to Melzi d’Eril in April 1814. As quoted in Pillepich, Napoléon et les Italiens, 185. See pp.  184–185 for popular expressions of anti-­ French hostility in Milan. 29  To the point, Michael Broers concluded that: ‘Marie Louise ruled Parma almost as a French department’. Broers, ‘The Imperial Departments of Napoleonic Italy. Resistance and Collaboration’, 225.

11  THE END OF THE ROAD: CONCLUSIONS 

251

influence of the clergy was much reduced thanks to the suppression of convents and monastic orders; for the same reason, the state gained a rent of about a million and half lire; the power of the nobility vanished with the abolition of feudal privileges; [French rule] favored the accumulation of wealth; dividing and selling national goods and then fairly reassessing land ownership augmented the number of small property owners; industry and agriculture improved significantly; old internal duties were suppressed which made it possible for our products to reach Spain and the Netherlands and even to cross the sea; people began to embrace education and work.30

Written at the beginning of the twentieth century, Umberto Benassi’s breezy enumeration reads like an ode to modernization, with barely a nod to briefly acknowledged drawbacks. In subsequent accounts, historians of the area attenuated the exuberance and added shades of grey but agreed on the substance. Examining the quick pace of institution building after 1806, Carlo Ghisalberti listed the uniformity and centralization of the bureaucracy, together with the merit-based system of selecting functionaries, as fundamentals of modernity, which persuaded him to issue a positive evaluation of Napoleonic rule in Parma–Piacenza.31 Pierluigi Feliciati noted that after 12 years of French rule the country could rely confidently on a code of laws that replaced the ‘jungle of regulations, rules, exceptions, and acts lodged for centuries in the humus of common law’—no small feat and, along with centralization, another mark of modernity.32 Mario Palazzino concluded a thorough analysis of governing structures almost apologetically: ‘Beyond the different kinds of judgment which could be passed on the Napoleonic experience, its importance and its modernity are not in doubt’.33 In less graphic language, the local historical 30  Umberto Benassi, Storia di Parma, vol. VI, 191. Benassi’s matter-of-fact assessment illustrates what Breuilly called the ‘shopping list’ take on modernization. John Breuilly, ‘Napoleonic Germany and State-formation’ in Rowe, Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe, 121–152. One such itemized list to be ticked off when assessing modernization in any given state in the introduction to Robin W. Winks and Joan Neuberger, Europe and the making of modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1–10 (1–2). It reads indeed like a general template for Benassi’s inventory. 31  Carlo Ghisalberti, ‘Le amministrazioni locali nel periodo napolenico’ art.cit., 450. 32  Pierluigi Feliciati, Porre mano all’intricata matassa. L’archivio del Presidente Ferdinando Conrnacchia e gli stati parmensi tra dominio francese e Restaurazione (Macerata : eum, 2015), 53. 33  Palazzino, L’Occhio del governo, 22. Referring to the Kingdom of Italy, Alain Pillepich put the same sentiment in more elegant language: ‘Without taking anything away from its glory; without denying anything that the country had endured during these agitated years;

252 

D. P. HARSANYI

consensus concurs with Philip Dwyer’s stinging cost-benefit analysis: ‘In some respects, Napoleon was an evil necessity, the foreign-political and social equivalent of an enema; never very pleasant, it can help clean up the system’.34 This seems to have been the opinion of upper-crust Napoleonic collaborators, whose role in carrying out the structural transformation of the state apparatus cannot be overestimated. It was by no means an inevitable course of action; underlying conditions in the former duchies brought together a mixed leadership class committed to reforms, which eventually took root without hurting major interests and without significant opposition.35 The elites’ input was as crucial when they actively worked to shore up the French system and when they passively prevented its erosion from below, by not joining in with the recalcitrant masses. The institutional architecture that impressed Magawly-Cerati to the point of leaving it in place unchanged was the concrete product of these decisions. For local civic leaders, it was a success. For French administrators, it was a half-­ finished job, frustratingly so. Their cherished vision of disparate elements complementing each other into a sublime organic whole loved by all shattered, repeatedly, on the wall of local indifference. Magistrates imbued with the dignity of their profession and blue-blooded aristocrats turned mayors neither loved nor hated the French and all that these restless occupiers stood for. To them, French rule did not present a metaphysical challenge; it was an unavoidable reality, with advantages and disadvantages, to be dealt with in transactional, dispassionate fashion. Unburdened by cultural angst or visionary infatuation, local luminaries availed themselves masterfully of what, in another context, Vaclav Havel called the power of the powerless to steer a pragmatic course around French exploitation and French idealism alike.36 without forgetting its characteristic qualities… It is only fair to recognize the benefits Italy derived from the passage of a conqueror who was a builder too, and not a stranger’. Napoléon et les Italiens, 196. 34  Philip Dwyer, ‘Introduction’ in Napoleon and Europe, 1–21 (20). 35  For comparison, see John Davis’ succinct assessment of the elites’ positioning in Northern-Central Italy: ‘Despite the modernizing rhetoric of the Empire, the battles that shaped the formation of northern states were about power and politics. In the longer run, the opposition of the elites would make the Restoration settlements impossible to maintain’. Davis, ‘Divided Destinies? Napoleonic Rule in Northern and Southern Italy’, 173. 36  Michael Rowe’s formula ‘à la carte menu’ to describe Rhinelander’s functionaries well suits the actions of Parmense elite collaborators. Rowe, ‘Resistance, Collaboration, or Third Way,’ 86.

11  THE END OF THE ROAD: CONCLUSIONS 

253

xxx

To sum up, in the political laboratory of Parma–Piacenza, the vicissitudes of the French administration read like a case study in accommodation to outside circumstances, shrewdly orientated towards local objectives and remarkably free of emotional entanglements. No sooner had the last French prefect, chased by the victors of the day, disappeared from sight than the entire society, from patricians holding distinguished imperial offices to villagers freshly freed from the terrors of conscription, forgot him and the mighty empire he represented. Historical forgetting has afflicted the entire French period in the duchies ever since.37 No places of memory remind the public of Napoleonic contributions. In a subtle act of role-reversal, the Glauco Lombardi Museum (dedicated to Parma’s cultural heritage from Bourbon rule to the end of Maria Luigia’s reign) features Napoleon as Maria Luigia’s first husband, with minimal attention paid to what occurred in Parma in the decade before the beloved duchess took the throne. Stuart Woolf’s conclusion that ‘the success of the Napoleonic model was to be seen after Napoleon’s disappearance’ fits the situation in the duchies too.38 After 12 years of hegemony, France lost an 37  On historical forgetting, see comments on society reacting to traumatic events in ways similar to individuals coping with accidents. ‘Some people will remain virtually unaffected by the event, others will get killed; and the great mass of poor people will remain poor, and will be ruled in much the same way-by other people than before, perhaps, but maybe also by the same. Therefore, if people start forgetting what happened, it will be “desired forgetting” in some cases, and ‘normal forgetting’ in others’. Anders Schinkel, ‘History and Historiography in Process’ in History and Theory Vol. 43, 1 (Feb. 2004): 39–56 (53). 38  Stuart Woolf, ‘Napoleon and Europe Revisited’ Modern & Contemporary France, 8, 4, (2000): 469–478 (476). Economic reforms in Parma began in earnest only towards the end of the century when, in a posthumous homage to Moreau, his surveys and collections of data prepared the groundwork for lasting agricultural development projects. Spaggiari, L’Agricoltura negli Stati Parmensi dal 1750 al 1859, 25–27 and Bargelli, Dall’Empirismo alla scienza, 73–75. Public health and welfare programmes likewise built on the pattern established by the French. The court and law enforcement system remained unchanged. See also Spaggiari’s observation that professional discipline helped stabilize government operations from Napoleonic rule to Maria Luigia. L’Agricoltura negli Stati Parmensi dal 1750 al 1859, 43. Similarly relevant is Giovanni Tocci’s conclusion that while economic developments under French rule were a mixed bag at best, what mattered most was that the flurry of activity brought into being a dynamic class able to separate itself from the traditional

254 

D. P. HARSANYI

empire, the illusion of grandeur and the claim to transformational universalism. Parma took the opportunity to make a clean break with the past, gained a functional state apparatus—and moved on.

feudal elites and grow into a modern bourgeoisie. Tocci, ‘Il Ducato di Parma e Piacenza,’ 106–111. For an analysis of the traces Napoleonic bureaucracy left in the organization of European public sectors see B.  Guy Peters, ‘The Napoleonic Tradition’ International Journal of Public Sector Management Vol. 21, 2 (2008): 118–132. A discussion of the content and applicability of the term Napoleonic tradition in public administration in the review article by Jos C. N. Raadschelders, ‘Public Sector Reform in Comparative Perspective? The Italian Case and Some Afterthoughts’ Public Administration Review, Vol. 71, 3 (May | June 2011): 507–510.

bibliograPhy

a Aaslestad, Katherine. “Napoleonic rule in German Central Europe: Compliance and Resistance.” In The Napoleonic Empire in the New European Political Culture, edited by Michael Broers, Peter Hicks and Augustìn Guimerà. 160–172. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Abbott, Andrew. “The Historicality of Individuals.” Presidential Address, SSHA in Social science history, 29, 1 (Spring 2005): 1–13 Adorno, Giovanni. Vita del Conte Sanvitale. Parma: Presso Filippo Carmignani, 1840. Agnoli, Francesco Mario. Guida introduttiva alle Insorgenze Contro-Rivoluzionarie in Italia durante il dominio napoleonico (1796–1815). Milano: Mimep, 1996. Amato, Massimo. “L’ingegneria economica e sociale di Guillaume Du Tillot.” In Parma e il suo territorio. Un Borbone tra Parma e Europa. Don Ferdinando e il suo tempo. A cura di Alba Mora, 136–143. Parma: Diabasis, 2005. Andro, Gaïd and Laurent Brassart. “Administrer sous la Révolution et l’Empire.” Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 389 (2017): 3–18. Antonielli, Livio. I Prefetti dell’Italia Napoleonica: Repubblica e Regno d’Italia. Bologna: IL Mulino, 1983. Avanzini, Stefania. “Scorcio della Provincia Parmense donato a Médéric Louis Moreau de Saint-Méry sul nascere del XIX secolo.” In Malacoda, V–VII (1989–1991). Azéma, Jean-Pierre. Vichy—Paris. Les collaborations. Paris: André Versaille, 2012.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7

255

256 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

b Badinter, Elizabeth. L’Infant de Parme. Paris: Fayard, 2010. Balansò, Juan. Les Bourbons de Parme. Histoire des Infants d’Espagne, ducs de Parme. Biarritz: J&D Editions, 1996. Banzola, Vincenzo. ‘La ‘Madonna di San Girolamo’ andata e ritornata da Parigi.’ Parma nell’arte (1989–1990): 11–16. Baruch, Marc Olivier. Servir l’Etat Français. L’administration en France de 1940–1944. Paris: Fayard, 1997. Bertrand, Gilles. Paul Guiton et l’Italie des voyageurs au XVIIIème siècle. Textes. Moncalieri: Centro Interuniversitario di ricerche sul Viaggio in Italia, 1999. Bianco, Furio. “Sbirri, contrabbandieri e le ‘rie sette dei malfattori’ nel settecento friulano.” In Emarginazione, criminalità e devianza in Italia fra i seicento e novecento. Problemi e indicazioni di ricerca. A cura di A. Pastore, P. Sorcinelli. Milano: F. Angeli, 1990. Bien, David, Jay M. Smith and Rafe Blaufarb. Caste, Class, and Profession in Old Regime France. St. Andrews: Centre for French History and Culture of the University of St. Andrews, 2010. Bien, David. “Aristocracy.” In A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, edited by François Furet and Mona Ozouf. 616–628. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989. Bargelli, Claudio. La Città dei lumi. La petite Capitale del Du Tillot fra utopie e riforme. Parma: MUP, 2020. ———. Alla Periferia dell’Impero: Le Manifatture Parmensi durante l’Amministrazione del Moreau de Saint-Méry. Parma: Parma University Department of Economics, 2010. ———. “Una vaccheria benedettina tra Sei e Settecento: l’organizzazione produttiva casearia del cenobio di S. Giovanni Evangelista di Parma.” Aurea Parma, 2 (maggio–agosto 2007): 213–238. ———. Dall’empirismo alla scienza. L’agricoltura parmense dall’età dei lumi al primo conflitto mondiale. Trieste: Ed. Goliardiche, 2004a. ———. “Aneliti rifomistici e fervide utopie. L’Agricoltura parmense nell’età del Moreau de Saint-Méry. Parte prima.” Aurea Parma, 88 (2004b) fascicola II & III: 275–299 & 419–443. ———. “Ubertose messi e pubblica felicità. Il commercio dei grani a Parma nel settecento.” Aurea Parma, 82, 2 (maggio–agosto 1998a): 149–183. ———. “Fra utopia annonaria e interesse privato” Aurea Parma, fasc II (marzo– giugno 1998b): 271–278. Barucci, Pietro. Il Pensiero economico di Melchiorre Gioia. Milano: Giuffrè, 1965. Baczko, Bronislaw. Comment sortir de la terreur: Thermidor et la révolution. Paris: Gallimard, 1989a.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

257

———. ‘Vandalism.’ In Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, edited by François Furet and Mona Ozouf. 860–868. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989b. Bédarida, Henri. Parme dans la politique française au XVIIIème siècle. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1930. ———. Parme et la France de 1748 à 1789. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1928. Benassi, Umberto. Il Generale Bonaparte ed il Duca e i Giacobini di Parma e Piacenza. Parma: R. Deputazione di Storia Patria, 1912. ———. Guglielmo Du Tillot. Un ministro riformatore dell secolo XVIII. Parma: R. Deputazione di Storia Patria, 1919. ———. Storia di Parma da Pier Luigi Farnese a Vittorio Emmanuele II (1545–1860). Parma, Luigi Battei, 1907. Bergeron, Louis and Guy Chuassinand-Nogaret. Les ‘masses de granit.’ Paris: Editions de l'École des hautes études, 1979. Bernadello, Adolfo. Da Bonaparte a Radetzky. Cittadini in Armi: La Guardia Nazionale a Venezia (1797–1849). Venezia: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2011. Bertaud, Jean-Paul. ”Napoléon journaliste: les bulletins de la gloire.” Le Temps des Média, 2005/ I (no. 4): 10–21. Berti, Giuseppe. Atteggiamenti del pensiero italiano nei Ducati di Parma e Piacenza dal 1750 al 1850. Padova: Cedam, 1962. Bertini, Giuseppe and Francesca Sandrini. Il bigotto illuminato: ricordo di Ferdinando di Borbone. Parma: Fondazione Monte di Parma. Museo Glauco Lombardi, 2002. Biondi, Carminella. La Francia e la Parma nel secondo settecento. Bologna: CLUEB, 2003. Boscarelli, Mario. Dall’Ancien Régime a Maria Luigia in un centro minore degli Stati Parmensi. Milano: Giuffrè, 1980. Botti, Ferruccio D. La Forca d’Bretta. Storia del Bandito Berretta e cenni sui condannati a morte in Parma dal 1560 a 1857. Parma, 1958. Boulant, Antoine. ”La Gendarmerie sous le Consulat et l’Empire.” In Police et Gendarmerie dans l’Empire napoléonien. Sous la direction de Jacques Olivier Boudon. 41–55. Paris: Collections de L’Institut Napoléon. Editions SPM, 2013. Bourdin, Philippe. “Les Limites d’un impérialisme culturel: le théâtre français dans l’Europe de Napoléon. ” Le Mouvement Social 4, no. 253 (2015): 89–112. Boyer, Ferdinand. ‘Les responsabilités de Napoléon dans le transfert d’œuvres d’art de l’étranger’ Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 11 (1964): 341–265. ———. “La sorte delle opera d’arte nelle congregazioni soppresse a Parma” Archivio Storico per le Province Parmensi, XII (1960): 41–49. Burin, Philippe. La France à l’heure allemande. Paris, Seuil 1994.

258 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brassart, Laurent. ”Une politique agricole pour l’Europe?” In L’Empire Napoléonien. Une expérience européenne? Sous la direction de François Antoine, Jean-Pierre Jessenne, Annie Jourdan et Hervé Leuwers. 191–210. Paris: Armand Colin/Recherches, 2013. Boccia, Antonio. Viaggio ai Monti di Parma. Parma: Aurea Parma. Quaderni Parmigiani No. 2, 1970. Breuilly, John. “Modernisation as Social Evolution: The German Case, c.1800–1880.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 15 (2005): 117–147. Broers, Michael. The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796–1814. Cultural Imperialism in a European Context? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. ———. The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy. The War against God, 1901–1814. New York: Routledge, 2002. ———. “Les Enfants du Siècle: an empire of young professionals and the creation of a bureaucratic, imperial ethos in Napoleonic Europe.” In Empires and Bureaucracy in World History. From Antiquity to the Twentieth Century, edited by Peter Crooks e Timothy H.  Parsons. 344–363. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016a. ———. “Le Lycée de Parme sous le Premier Empire.” In Napoléon et les lycées. Sous la direction de Jacques-Olivier Boudon. 147–164. Paris: Fondation Napoléon, 2004. ———. “La Contre-insurrection et ses développements dans l’Europe Napoléonienne.” In Police et Gendarmerie dans l’Empire Napoléonien. Jacques-­ Olivier Boudon éditeur. Paris: Editions SPM, 2013. ———. Napoleon’s Other War. Bandits, Rebels and their Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010. ———. “The Napoleonic Gendarmerie. The State on the Periphery made real.” Crime, Histoire et Société/Crime, History and Society, 20, 1 (2016b). https:// journals.openedition.org/chs/1641 accessed on 6/19/2019. ———. “Centre and Periphery in Napoleonic Italy: The Nature of French Rule in départements réunis, 1800–1814.” In Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe, edited by Michael Rowe. 55–73. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003a. ———. “Sbirri and Gendarmes. The Workings of a Rural Police Force.” In Corpi armati e ordine pubblica in Italia (XVI–XIX secoli). A cura di Livio Antonelli e Claudio Donati. 203–211. Soveria Manelli: Rubbetino Editore, 2003b. ———. “Pride and Prejudice: The Napoleonic Empire through the Eyes of Its Rulers.” In Napoleon’s Empire. War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, edited by Ute Planert. 307–317. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016c. ———. “Cultural Imperialism in a European Context? Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Napoleonic Italy.” Past and Present, 170 (February 2001): 152–180.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

259

———. “A Turner thesis for Europe? The frontier in Napoleonic Europe.” Napoleonica La Revue, No. 5, 2 (2009): 157–169. Brown, H. G. “From Organic Society to Security State: The War on Brigandage in France 1797–1802.” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, 4 (December 1997), 661–695. ———. Ending the French Revolution. Charlottesville: UVA Press, 2007. Bulferetti, Luigi. “L’Economia Piacentina nel periodo napoleonico.” Studi Parmensi, IX (1959): 31–41. Buratti, Gustavo. “I Montanari contro Napoleone: une resistenza da rivendicare.” In Banditi e ribelli dimenticati. Storie di irriducibili al futuro che viene. 235–250. A cura di Corrado Mornese e Gustavo Buratti. Milano: Lampi di Stampa, 2006. Burbank, Jane and Frederick Cooper. Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010. Brunazzi Celaschi, Luisella. “La Storia dell’Università di Parma negli scritti e nell’azione politica di Moreau de Saint-Méry.” Studi Parmensi v. XXIV (1979): 67–112. Burgio, Chiara. “L’attività culturale di P.M. Paciaudi nella Parma del Du Tillot e lo suo ‘Memorio intorno la Biblioteca Parmense’.” Aurea Parma, LXIV (April 1980): 6–39.

c Candeloro, Giorgio. Storia dell’Italia Moderna. Milano: Feltrinelli, 1956. Capasso, Gaetano. “Il Colleggio durante l’ammministrazione francese.” Archivio Storico per le province parmensi, XXVI (1901–1902): 1–248. Cappelletti, M., J.  H. Merryman, J.  M. Perillo eds. The Italian Legal System. Redwood: Stanford University Press. 1967. Capra, Carlo. L’Età rivoluzionaria e napoleonica in Italia. Torino: Loescher, 1978. ———. Il ducato di Milano dal 1535 al 1796. Storia d’Italia diretta da Giuseppe Galasso. Vol. 11, 153–617. Torino: UTET, 1984. ———. “The Functionary.” In Enlightenment Portraits, edited by Michel Vovelle. Translation Lydia G.  Cochrane. 316–355. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Carpi, Maristella ed. 1796. Napoleone a Parma. Ristampa Anastatica dell’annata 1796 della Gazzetta di Parma. Parma: PPS Editirice, 1977. Casanova de Seingalt, Jacques. Mémoires. Paris: FB Editions, 2014. Carrà, Ettore. Storia di Piacenza. Piacenza: Cassa di Risparmio Paicenza, 1980. ———. L’Ordine Pubblico nel Periodo Napoleonico. Piacenza 1806–1814. Piacenza: Tip.Le.Co, 2005.

260 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cavaciuti, Santino. “L’Insorgenza del 1805–1806 nell’alta Val d’Arda nel quadro delle generali insorgenze italiane anti-napoleoniche.” Quanderni della Valtolla (2006): 1–17. Caiani, Ambrogio A. “Collaborators, Collaboration, and the Problems of Empire in Napoleonic Italy. The Oppizzoni Affair, 1805–1807.” The Historical Journal, 60, 2, (2017): 385–407. Cattabiani, Maria Cristina. Description topographique et statistique des Etats de Parme, Plaisance et Guastalla à l’époque de 1811. Tesi di laurea. Università di Parma. 1985/86 Catalano, Franco. Illuministi e giacobini del 700 italiano. Milano: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1959. Cavagnari, Pietro. Alcune particolarità storiche della vita di Pietro Cavagnari. Nato in Piacenza il 7 aprile 1769. Antico segretario dei governi generali di Parma e di Parigi; già presidente del cantone della buona città di Piacenza; già membro del consiglio generale et del collegio elettorale del dipartimento del Taro; già inidviduo del corpo legislative di Francia. Rimastro, all’epoca della pace generale, privato suddito fedelissimo di sua maestà l’archiduchessa d’Austria Maria Luigia, Ducessa di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla e per grazia lei pensionato dello stato. Parma: Dalla Stamperia Carmignani, 1837. Charle, Christophe. Les Hauts Fonctionnaires en France au XIXème siècle. Paris: Editions Gallimard/Julliard, 1980. Ciconte, Enzo. Banditi e Briganti. Rivolta continua dal cinquecento all’ottocento. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2011. Cipelli, Bernardino. “Storia dell’amministrazione di Guglielmo Du Tillot.” Archivio Storico per le province parmensi, I, II. 1893. Chaussinand-Nogaret, Guy. The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: From Feudalism to Enlightenment. Translated by William Doyle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. von Clausewitz, Carl. Napoleon’s 1796 Italian Campaign. Translated and edited by Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas University, 2018. Cirillo, Giuseppe. Petitot. Parma: Grafiche Step Editrice, 2008. Cobb, Richard Charles. The Police and the People. France Popular Protests 1790–1820. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970. Cochrane, Eric. Florence in the Forgotten Centuries 1527–1800. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973. Colson, Bruno ed. Napoleon on War. Translated by Gregory Elliott. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. ———. “Napoléon et la guerre irrégulière.” Stratégique, I (93–96), 2009: 227–258. Corradi Martini, Carla. “Un Monument à la gloire de Parme: La Description de Moreau de Saint-Méry.” In L’Administration napoléonienne en Europe,

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

261

­ dhésions et résistances. Sous la direction de Christine Peyrard, Francis Pomponi, a Michel Vovelle. 17–34. Aix en Provence: Publications de L’Université de Provence, 2008. Corradi Martini. “L’epoca Du Tillot nel giudizio di Moreau de Saint-Méry.” Aurea Parma, 83, 3. (1999): 410–428. ———. Fontanellato nella Description des États de Parme di Moreau de Saint-Méry, amministratore generale (1802–1806). Traduzione Elena Fermi; appendice documentario Valentina Bocchi. Fontanellato: Tecnostampa edizioni, 2005. Continisio, Chiara ed. Le insorgenze popolari nell’Italia giacobina e Napoleonica: Crisi dell’antico regime e alternative di costruzione del nuovo ordine sociale: atti del convegno di Milano. Milano: Ares, 1999. Criscuolo, Victor. “I Democratici e la Rivoluzione Oscurata (1796–1797).” Storia di Parma, vol. V. I Borbone: fra illuminismo e rivoluzioni. A cura di Alba Mora. 289–305. Parma: MUP, 2015. Croce, Benedetto. Storia del Regno di Napoli. Bari: Laterza, 1972. Crociani, Pietro, Virgilio Ilari, Ciro Paoletti. Storia Militare del Regno Italico (1802–1814). Roma: Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito. Uffico Storico, 2004. Crouzet, François. “Wars, Blockade and Economic Change in Europe. 1792–1815” The Journal of Economic History, 24, 4 (Dec. 1964): 567–588. Cusatelli, Giorgio and Fausto Razzetti eds. Il Viaggio a Parma. Visitatori stranieri in età farnesiana e borbonica. Parma: Ugo Guanda Editore, 1990.

d Daly, Gavin. “Little Emperors? Investigating Prefectoral Rule in the Departments.” In Napoleon and His Empire. Europe 1804–1814. Edited by Philip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest. 44–60. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Davis, John A. Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796–1900. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. ———. Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-­ Century Italy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988. ———. “Divided Destinies? Napoleonic Rule in Northern and Southern Italy’” In Napoleon and His Empire. Europe, 1804–1814, edited by Phillip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest. 165–184. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. De Maddalena, Aldo. “Considerazioni sull’attività industriale e commerciale negli Stati Parmensi dal 1796 al 1814.” Studi Parmensi, IX, (1959): 46–83. Doyle, William. Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Drei, Giovanni. L’Archivio di Stato di Parma. Indice General, storico, descrittive, ed analitco. Roma: Biblioteca Arte Editrice, 1941. Du Casse, Albert. Mémoires et Correspondance du Prince Eugène publiés, annotés et mis en ordre par A. Du Casse. Paris: Lévy, 1858.

262 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dubois, Laurent. Avengers of the New World. The Story of the Haitian Revolution Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004. Dunne, John. “Power on the Periphery: Elite-State Relations in the Napoleonic Empire.” In Napoleon and his Empire. Europe 1804–1814, Europe 1804–1814, edited by Philip G.  Dwyer and Alan Forrest, 61–78. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Dupuy, Marie-Anne, Isabelle le Masne de Chermont, Elaine Williamson eds. Vivant Denon: Directeur des musées sous le Consulat et l’Empire correspondance (1802–1815). Paris: Editions de la Réunion des musées nationaux. 1999. Dwyer, Philip G. and Alan Forrest. “Napoleon and His Empire: Some Issues and Perspectives.” In Napoleon and His Empire. Europe 1804–1814, edited by Philip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest, 1–16. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

e Elicona, Anthony Louis. Un colonial sous la révolution en France et en Amérique. Paris: Jouve et cie, 1934. Elisabeth, Léo. “La Mission de Moreau de Saint-Méry à Parme.” In Moreau de Saint-Méry ou les ambiguïtés d’un créole des Lumières. 51–62. Martinique: F. Paillart, 2006. Ellis, Geoffrey. “The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism.” In Napoleon and Europe, edited by Philip G. Dwyer. 97–117. London: Pearson, 2001. Elvin, Mark. “A short definition of ‘Modernity’?’” Past and Present, 113 (Nov. 1986): 209–213. Emsley, Clive. Gendarmes and the State in the Nineteenth Century Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999a. ———. ‘’The Best Way to Keep the Peace in a Country. Napoleon’s Gendarmes and their Legacy.” In Napoleon’s Legacy. Problems of Government in Restoration Europe, edited by David Laven and Lucy Riall, 257–274. Oxford: Berg, 2000. ———. “A typology of nineteenth-century police.” Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 3, 1 (1999b): 29–44. Englund, Steven. “Monstre sacré: the question of cultural imperialism and the Napoleonic empire.’ The Historical Journal, 51, no. 1 (2008): 215–250. Esdaile, Charles J. ed. Popular Resistance in the French Wars. Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

f Faidherbe, Dominique. Moreau de Saint-Méry Journal IV—1806 parte I. Tesi di laurea. Università di Parma. 1982/83. de Felice, Renzo. Italia giacobina. Napoli: Edizione Scientifiche Italiane, 1965.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

263

———. Il giacobinismo italiano. Note e ricerche con un saggio introduttivo di Franceso Perfetti. Roma: Bonacci, 1990. Feldman, Paola. “La vita a Parma tra la caduta di Napoleone e l’avvente di Maria Luigia.” Aurea Parma, XXXVII (1952): 219–226. Feliciati, Pierluigi. Porre mano all’intricata matassa. L’archivio del Presidente Ferdinando Conrnacchia e gli stati parmensi tra dominio francese e Restaurazione. Macerata: eum, 2015. ———. “La dominazione borbonica a Parma.” In L’Ossessione della memoria. Parma settecentesca nei disegni del Conte Alessandro Sanseverini. A cura di Marzio dall’Acqua. 18–19. Parma: Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Parma, 1997. Ferrari, Paolo Emilio. Spaettacoli drammatico—musicali e coreografici in Parma dall anno 1628 al anno 1883. Parma: Forni editore, 1884. Ferrero, Guglielmo. Aventure. Bonparte en Italie. Paris: Plon, 1956. Fiorini, Vittorio and Lemmi, Francesco. Il Periodo Napoleonico 1799–1814. Milano: F. Vallardi. 1900. Fiorentino, Massimo and Mario Zanoni. L’esercito farnesiano dal 1694 al 1731. Parma: Palatina editrice, 1981. Forrest, Alan. Napoleon’s Men. The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire. Hambledon: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006. ———. Conscripts and Deserters. The French Army during the Revolution and Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. ———. “The Ubiquitous Brigand: The Politics and Language of Repression.” In Popular Resistance in the French wars. Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates, edited by Charles J. Esdaile. 25–43. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. de Francesco, Antonino. L’Italia di Bonaparte. Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni, 1796–1821. Torino: UTET, 2011. ———. Storie dell’Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica, 1796–1814. Milano: Mondadori 2016. ———. “Il significato delle insorgenze nella cultura politica italiana.” In Le insorgenze popolari nell’Italia Napoleonica. Crisi dell’Antico Regime e alternative di costruzione del nuovo ordine sociale. 31–44. Milan: Ares, 2001. Fugier, André. Napoléon et l’Italie. Paris: J.B. Janin, 1947.

G Garnot, Benoît. Le Peuple au siècle des Lumières. Echec d’un dressage culturel. Paris: Editions Imago, 1990. Genovesi, Piergiovanni. “Dalla Rivoluzione alla Restaurazione: gli anni della dominazione francese (1802–1814).” In Storia di Parma, vol.V. I Borbone: fra illuminismo e rivoluzioni. A cura di Alba Mora. 307–333. Parma: MUP, 2015.

264 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gilliat, Stephen. An Exploration of the Dynamics of Collaboration and Non-­ Resistance. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000. Ginetti, Luigi. “Sull’insurrezione dell’alto Piacentino nel 1805–1806.” Aurea Parma, 9 (settembre–dicembre 1913): 204–210. Gini, Cristina. Moreau de Saint-Méry. Description. Passi scelti. Tesi di Laurea, Università di Parma.1988/89. Ghachem, Malick M. “Montesquieu in the Caribbean: The Colonial Enlightenment between ‘Code Noir’ and ‘Code Civil’” In Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques, 25, 2 (1999): 183–210. Ghiringhelli, Roberto. Idee, Società ed Istituzioni nel Ducato di Parma e Piacenza durante l’età illuministica. Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1988. Ghisalberti, Carlo. “Le amministrazioni locali nel periodo napolenico.” In Dagli Stati preunitari d’antico regime all’unificazione. A cura di Nicola Raponi. 431–454. Milano: IL Mulino, 1982. Grab, Alexander, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. ———. “State Power, Brigandage and Rural Resistance in Napoleonic Italy.” European History Quarterly, 25 (1995a), 39–70. ———. “Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy 1802–1814.” In Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs? edited By Donald Stoker, Frederick C.  Schneid and Harold D.  Blanton. 122–134. New York: Routledge, 2009. ———. “The Napoleonic state and public health policies: smallpox vaccination in Napoleonic Italy (1800–1804).” Società e Storia, Fasc. 145 (2014): 487–511. ———. “Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802–1814).” The Journal of Modern History, 67, 1, (Mar. 1995b): 25–54. ———. “The Kingdom of Italy and the Continental Blockade.” In Revisiting Napoleon’s Continental System, edited by Katherine B.  Aaslestadt and Johan Joor. 98–113. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Gualazzini, Ugo. “Per le scuole della ragion civile e canonica del ducato di Parma e Piacenza.” Archivio Storico per le Provincie Parmensi, 32 (1980): 352–362. Gueniffey, Patrice. Bonaparte. Paris: Gallimard, 2013. Guillois, Antoine and Vicomte de Grouchy. La Révolution française racontée par un diplomate étranger. Correspondance du Bailli de Virieu, Ministre plénipotentiaire de Parme. Paris: Flammarion, 1903.

H Harsanyi, Doina Pasca. “Sidestepping a historical wave: a cancelled revolution in Northern Italy 1796–1797.” Napoleonica La revue. Fondation Napoléon. 37 (2020a): 2–24. https://www.cairn.info/revue-­napoleonica-­la-­revue-­2020-­2-­ page-­2.htm

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

265

———. Lessons from America. Liberal French Nobles in Exile. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2010. ———. “Between Glory and Good Sense. Resistance to conscription and National Guard experience in the States of Parma 1805–06.” Napoleonic Scholarship. The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society. (December 2016): 21–36. ———. “Brigands, Social Bandits, Freedom Fighters: the Portrayal of anti-­ Napoleonic Rebels in the Historiography of Napoleonic Italy.” Selected Papers of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era (2020b): 1–11. https://ageofrevolutions.com/2021/01/29/brigands-­social-­bandits-­freedom-­fighters-­the-­ portrayal-­of-­anti-­napoleonic-­rebels-­in-­the-­historiography-­of-­napoleonic-­italy/. ———. “Il dominio della legge. Un caso di giustizia criminale negli stati di Parma sotto il dominio napoleonico.” Aurea Parma Fascicolo II 2017 (Maggio– Settembre 2017a): 147–155. ———. “The Voice of Duty: Collaboration and Ideology in Napoleonic Italy.” Napoleonic Scholarship, 10, (2019–2020c): 97–108. ———. “Surviving Napoleon. A case study of small-town discursive strategies during the Piacentino rebellion (1805–1806)” Modern Italy Vol. 22/3 (August 2017b): 233–246. Online access: https://doi.org/10.1017/mit.2017.28 Hanley, Wayne. The Genesis of Napoleonic Propaganda, 1796–1799. New  York: Columbia Press, 2005. Higonnet, Patrice. Class, Ideology, and the Rights of Nobles during the French Revolution. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Hirschfeld, Gerhard. Nazi rule and Dutch collaboration. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1988. Hughues-Belrose, “Vincent. Moreau de Saint-Méry. Arpenteur créole de Saint-­ Domingue.” In Moreau de Saint-Méry ou les ambiguïtés d’un créole des Lumières. 9–23. Martinique: F. Paillart, 2006).

J Jackson, Julian T. France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Jacobs, Erik, Joris Oddens, and Mart Rutjes eds. The Political Culture of the Sister Republics, 1794–1806: France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015. Jourdan, Annie. L’Empire de Napoléon. Paris: Flammarion, 2000. Junot, Laure, duchesse d’Abrantès. Mémoires complets et authentiques de Laure Junot duchesse d’Abrantès. Souvenir historiques sur Napoléon, la Révolution, le Directoire, le Consulat, l’Empire, la révolution de 1830 and les premières années du règne de Louis Philippe. Paris: Jean Bonnot, 1967.

266 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

L Labatut, Jean-Pierre. Les Noblesses Européennes de la fin du XVème siècle à la fin du XVIIIème siècle. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978. de La Rochefoucauld, Jean-Dominique, Claudine Wolikow, Guy Ilkni. Le Duc de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt: 1747–1827. De Louis XV à Charles X, un grand seigneur patriote et le mouvement populaire. Paris: Perrin, 1980. Laven, David and Lucy Riall. “Restoration Government and the Legacy of Napoleon” In Napoleon’s Legacy. Problems of Government in Restoration Europe, edited by David Laven and Lucy Riall, 1–26. Oxford: Berg, 2000. Lavisse, Ernest. Histoire de la France contemporaine depuis la Révolution jusqu’à la paix de 1919. Paris: Hachette, 1921. Lester, Valerie. Giambattista Bodoni: His Life and His World. Boston: David R. Godine, 2015. Leoni, Francesco. Storia della controrivoluzione in Italia (1789–1859). Napoli: Guida Editori Napoli, 1975. Loevinson, Ermanno. Gli Ufficiali Napoleonici Parmensi. Parma: La Tipografica Parmense. Pubblicazioni del R. Archivio di Stato di PARMA, 1930. Lignereux, Aurélien. Servir Napoléon. Policiers et Gendarmes dans les Départements Réunis 1796–1814. Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2012. ———. Les Impériaux. Administrer et Habiter L’Europe de Napoléon. Paris: Fayard, 2019. Lòpez-Cordòn Cortezo, Maria Victoria. “Le Realzioni con La Spagna da Elisabeta Farnese a Napoleone.” In Storia di Parma, vol.V. I Borbone: fra illuminismo e rivoluzioni. A cura di Alba Mora. 349–365. Parma: MUP, 2015. de Luca, Alessandro. Linee di sviluppo delle manifatture nel parmense durante l’età napoleonica (1802–1814). Dottorato di Ricerca in Storia. Università degli Studi Parma (2009–2011a). ———. “Il Giornale di Taro e la Prefettura Delporte a Parma (1811–1814)” Aurea Parma XCV 2011b (sett-dic): 411–418.

m Maddalena, Claudio. “Il governo del ministro du Tillot.” In Storia di Parma, vol.V. I Borbone: fra illuminismo e rivoluzioni. A cura di Alba Mora. 101–138. Parma: MUP, 2015. Maier, Franz Georg. “Megaorganisation in Antiquity: The Roman Empire.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 15/4 (1995): 705–713. Mainardi, Patricia. “Assuring the Empire of the Future” Art Journal 48, 2, (2014): 155–163.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

267

Mambriani, Carlo. “La Città Ridisegnata.” In Storia di Parma, vol.V. I Borbone: fra illuminismo e rivoluzioni. A cura di Alba Mora. 139–179. Parma: MUP, 2015. Marchesini, Daniele. “Moreau de Saint-Méry et la ville: connaître pour gouverner (toponymie e numérotation urbaine). ” In L’Administration napoléonienne en Europe, adhésions et résistances. Sous la direction de Christine Peyrard, Francis Pomponi, Michel Vovelle. 35–47. Aix en Provence: Publications de L’Université de Provence, 2008. Maschietto, Beatrice. “Cultura e politica nell’Italia giacobina. Spunti dall’esperienza cisalpina.” In Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée T. 108 (N°2) 1996: 731–740. Mascilli Migliorini, Luigi ed. Italia Napoleonica: Dizionario Critico. Torino: UTET, 2011. Mariotti, Giovanni. “L’università di Parma dal 1766 al 1859.” Aurea Parma, VII, (1923): 267–270. McClellan, Andrew. Inventing the Louvre: Art, Politics, and the Origins of the Modern Museum in Eighteenth-Century Paris. Berkley: University of California Press, 1999. Mension-Rigau, Eric. Aristocrates et grands bourgeois. Paris: Perrin, 1997. Meriggi, Marco. “State and Society in Post-Napoleonic Italy.” In Napoleon’s Legacy. Problems of Government in Restoration Europe, edited by David Laven and Lucy Riall, 49–63. Oxford: Berg, 2000. Micheli, Angelo. Un episodio della Rivolta contra il Governo Francese a Pellegrino Parmense 1806–1810. Salso Maggiore: Stab. Grafico Termale. Collezione Biblioteca delle Giovane Montana. 78, (1929): 1–21. Mineccia, Francesco. “Economia.” In Italia Napoleonica. Dizionario Critico. A cura di Luigi Mascilli Migliorini. 191–218. Milano: UTET, 2011. Molossi, Lorenzo. Vocabolario topografico dei Ducatti di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla. Parma: Tipografia Ducale, 1833–1834. Molinari, Silvia. ‘Giuseppe De Lama, scrupoloso ed erudito cronista della rivoluzione francese’ Aurea Parma, 3 (sett.- dic. 1993): 253–263. Monnier, François. “Fonction Publique.” In Dictionnaire Napoléon. Sous la direction de Jean Tulard. Vol. 1, 805–810. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1987. Montagna, Lenny. Il dominio Francese a Parma 1796–1815. Piacenza: Stab. arti grafiche G. Favari di D. Foroni, 1926. ———. I Ducati Parmensi nella diplomazia europea dal 1796 al 1815. Piacenza: Fratelli Bosi, 1907. Montanari, Maria. “L’età d’oro della Corte di Parma nella cronaca di un barbiere” Aurea Parma (marzo–aprile 1924): 103–107. Mora, Alba ed. Il Collegio dei Nobili di Parma. La formazione della classe dirigente (secoli XVII-XIX). Parma: MUP, 2013.

268 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Moreau de Saint-Méry, Louis—Médéric. Voyage aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique 1793–1798. Edited with an introduction and notes by Stewart L. Mims. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913. Moullier, Igor. “Une révolution de l’administration ? La naissance de la science administrative impériale.” Annales historiques de la Révolution Française, 389, 3 (2017): 139–160. Musiari, Antonio. Neoclassicismo senza modelli. L’Accademia du Belle Arti di Parma tra il periodo napoleonico e la Restaurazione (1796–1820). Milano: Zara, 1986.

n Nasalli Rocca, Emilio. Piacenza: dal medioevo all’età moderna. Studi Storici. Piacenza: Deputazione di Storia Patria, 1983. Negri, Paolo. “Napoleone I a Piacenza nel 1805.” Bolletino Storico Piacentino, VI (1911): 74–86. Neuberger, Joan and Robin W.  Winks. Europe and the making of modernity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Nisard, Charles. Guillaume Du Tillot. Un valet ministre et sécrétaire d’état. Episode de l’histoire de France en Italie 1749–177. Ann Arbor: Reprint Adamant Media Corporation, 2001. Nora, Pierre. Recherches de la France. Paris: Gallimard, 2013.

O Ochoa-de-Eribe, Javier Esteban. “’Beneath the eagles of the great emperor’: Napoleonic collaboration experiences in the Basque provinces of Spain.” European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire (2021) https://doi. org/10.1080/13507486.2021.1971627 Ottolenghi, Emilio. Storia di Piacenza. Piacenza: Tip.LE.CO, 1969. Ozouf, Mona. L’Homme régénéré: Essais sur la Révolution française. Paris: Gallimard, 1989. O, M. Quelques notices sur le comte Philippe-François Magawly-Cerati concernant son administration des duchés de Parme, Plaisance and Guastalla comme ministre d’état, c’est-à-dire depuis le mois d’aout 1814 jusqu’au 31 décembre 1816. Par M. O. Jadis Secrétaire de cabinet du comte Magawly à présent Conseiller du Tribunal Suprême de révision des trois duchés Paris. Paris: A la Librairie Scientifique Française et Orientale, 1846.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

269

P Palazzino, Mario. L’Occhio del governo. Sottoprefetti e governatori nei ducati parmensi dalla dominazione francese all’Unità dell’Italia. Parma: Diabasis, 2004. Paltrinieri, Vincenzo. I moti contro Napoleone negli Stati di Parma e Piacenza (1805–1806). Con altri studi storici. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1927. Pancotti, Vincenzo. “Un episodio della revolta Piacentina contro il Governo Fracese.” Ars Nova III, 10 (ottobre 1914): 434–437. Paxton, Robert. Vichy France. Old guard and new order 1940–1944. New  York: Columbia University Press, 1975. Pedio, Tomaso. Il Briggantaggio Meridionale 1806–1863. Lecce: Capone Editore, 1997. Pellegri, Marco. G.B.  Boudard Statuario Francese alla Real Corte di Parma. Parma: Luigi Battei, 1976. Peters, B. Guy. “The Napoleonic Tradition.” International Journal of Public Sector Management Vol. 21, 2 (2008): 118–132. Pigeard, Alain. “La conscription sous le Premier Empire.” Revue du Souvenir Napoléonien, 420 (October–November 1998): 2–30. Pillepich, Alain. Napoléon et les Italiens. République Italienne et Royaume d’Italie. 1802–1814. Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions/Fondation Napoléon, 2003. Pionetti, Nicola. Melchiorre Gioia: il progetto politico del 1796 per un’Italia unita e repubblicana. Piacenza: Edizioni Lir, 2015. Pommier, Edouard. L’art de la liberté. Doctrines et débats de la Révolution. Paris: Gallimard, 1991.

R Raadschelders, Jos C. N. “Public Sector Reform in Comparative Perspective? The Italian Case and Some Afterthoughts.” Public Administration Review, Vol. 71, 3 (May | June 2011): 507–510. Rao, Anna Maria. ‘Old and New Trends in Historiography,’ in Napoleon’s Empire. European Politics in Global Perspective, edited by Ute Planert, 84–100. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. ———. “Enlightenment and reform: an overview of culture and politics in Enlightenment Italy.” Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 10, 2, (2005): 142–167. ———. “Giacobinismo.” In Italia Napoleonica. Dizionario Critico. A cura di Luigi Mascilli Migliorini. 461–463. Torino: UTET, 2011. ———. “Introduction: L’expérience révolutionnaire italienne. “ Annales historiques de la Révolution française, Numéro spécial sur le Triennio Révolutionnaire, 313 (1998): 387–407.

270 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

———. ed. Folle Controrivoluzionare. Le insorgenze popolari nell’Italia giacobina e Napoleonica. Roma: Carocci, 1999. ———. “Il problema della violenza popolare in Italia nell’età rivoluzionaria.” In Rivoluzione Francese. La forza delle idee et la forza delle cose. A cura di H. Burstin. 247–266. Milano: Guerini, 1990. Régnier, Jacques. Les Préfets du Consulat et de l’Empire. Paris: Librairie G. Ficker, 1913. Roberts, David D. Benedetto Croce and the Uses of Historicism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. Robinson, David. Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920. Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2000. Robinson, Ronald. “Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration.” In Studies in the theory of imperialism, edited by Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliff. 117–142. New York: Longman, 1972. Rotta, Ettore. Le conquiste artistiche del periodo napolenico nei ducati parmensi. Catania: Di Mattei, 1913. Rowe, Michael. “Resistance, Collaboration or Third Way? Responses to Napoleonic Rule in Germany.” In Popular Resistance in the French Wars, edited by Charles Esdaile. 67–889. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. ———. “Napoleon and the ‘Modernization’ of Germany.” In Napoleon and his empire. Europe 1804–1814, edited by Phillip G.  Dwyer and Alan Forrest. 202–220. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

s Saita, Armando. “Notes pour l’étude des attitudes politiques et des groupes sociaux dans l’Italie jacobine et Napoléonienne.” Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 312 (1997): 503–527. Sandrini, Francesca ed. Parma 1816. Dal Ministro Magawly alla duchessa Maria Luigia. Parma: Museo Glauco Lombradi. Quaderni del Museo n. 16, 2016. Sanger, Ernest. Isabelle de Bourbon-Parme. Bruxelles: Racine, 2002. Sanvitale, Jacopo. Il Genio di Parma. Parma: Carmignani, 1818. Sanvitale, Luigi. “Il Pensiero civile di Jacopo Sanvitale. Il Patriottta e Dotto.” Aurea Parma, I, 3–4 (Settembre–Ottobre 1912): 10–24. Sapong, Nana Yaw Boampong. “Capitalist exchange, consumerism, and power in nineteenth century Gold Coast: Interrogating Ama Ata Aidoo’s Anowa and the contested personage of the merchant prince.” Legon Journal of Humanities, 29, 2 (2018): 266–286. Savoie, Philippe. “Construire un système d’instruction publique.” In Napoléon et les lycées. Sous la direction de Jacques-Olivier Boudon. 39–55. Paris: Fondation Napoléon, 2004.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

271

Schinkel, Anders. “History and Historiography in Process.” History and Theory Vol. 43, 1 (Feb. 2004): 39–56. Serna, Pierre. “The Noble.” In Enlightenment Portraits, edited by Michel Vovelle. Translation Lydia G.  Cochrane. 30–84. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Sibalis, Michael. “The Napoleonic Police State.” in Napoleon and Europe, 79–92. Silva, Pietro. “I Primi Tempi dell’Amministrazione Nardon.” Archivio Stato per le Province Parmensi, 2 (1922): 305–348. Smith, Jay M. Nobility Reimagined. The Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth Century France. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005. Soll, Jacob. “The Encyclopedic Prince: Grand Duke Peter Leopold (1747–1792) and the Meaning of Tuscan Enlightenment.” In Florence After the Medici. Tuscan Enlightenment, 1747–1790, edited by Corey Tazzara, Paula Findlen, and Jacob Soll. 317–335. New York: Routledge, 2020. Spaggiari, Pier Luigi. L’Agricoltura negli Stati Parmensi dal 1750 al 1859. Milano: Banca Comerciale Italiana, 1966a. ———. “Famiglia, case e lavoro nella Parma del Du Tillot. Un censimento del 1765.” Studi e ricerche della Facoltà di Economia e Commercio. 3, (1966b): 163–236. ———. Economia e Finanza negli Stati Parmensi 1814–1859. Milano: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1961. Stendhal, La Chartreuse de Parme. Edition présentée, établie et annotée par Mariella di Maio. Paris: Gallimard, 2003.

t Tambini, Gabriela. Journal de Moreau de Saint-Méry 1805 parte II, Tesi di laurea. Università di Parma. 1982/83. Tocci, Giovanni. “Il Ducato di Parma e Piacenza. Un Colbert alla corte di Parma.” In Storia d’Italia. A cura di Giuseppe Galasso. XVIII. 79–103. Torino: UTET, 1987. ———. “Negli anni di Ferdinando.” In Un Borbone tra Parma e l’Europa. Don Ferdinando e il suo tempo (1751–1802). A cura di Alba Mora. 71–95. Parma: Diabsis, 2005. Tulard, Jean and Marie-José Tulard, Napoléon et 40 millions de sujets. La centralisaton et le Premier Empire. Paris: Editions Tallandier, 2014. Turchi, Marcello. “La fiorente industria della seta: imagine essenziale della Parma del Du Tillot.” Parma Economica, 4 (Dicembre 1987): 19–24.

272 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

u Ugoni, Camillo. Academia degli esercizi cavallereschi, dedicati etc dai convittori dell’Imperial Colleggio di S.  Catherina di Parma nel’agosto dell’anno 1805. Parma: Carmignani, 1805.

v Venturi, Franco. Settecento Riformatore, Vol. II. La Chiesa e la Repubblica dentro i loro limiti 1758–1774. Torino: Einaudi, 1976. Viglione, Massimo. La Vandea Italiana. Le insorgenze controrivoluzionarie dalle origini al 1814. Milan: effedieffe, 1995. Virdis, Raffaele. “The beginning of smallpox vaccination in the Duchy of Parma.” Acta Biomed 90(2) (2019): 321–326. Vital, Christophe, Jean Tulard, Philippe de Villiers. Napoléon Bonaparte et la Vendée. Paris: Somogy editions d’art, 2004.

w Weinstein, Benjamin. “Liberalism, local government reform, and political education in Great Britain and British India, 1880–1886.” The Historical Journal 61, 1 (2018): 181–203. Wescher, Paul. I Furti d’arte. Roma: Einaudi, 1988. Woloch, Isser. Napoleon and his collaborators. The Making of a dictatorship. New York, 2001. ———. “Napoleonic Conscription: State Power and Civil Society.” Past and Present, 111 (1986): 101–129. Woolf, Stuart. Napoleon’s integration of Europe. London and New  York: Rutledge, 1991. ———. “Napoleon and Europe revisited” Modern & Contemporary France 8, 4 (2000): 469–478. ———. “French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire.” Past and Present, 124 (Aug. 1989): 96–120. Wouters, Nico. Mayoral Collaboration under Nazi Occupation in Belgium, The Netherlands, and France 1938–1946. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Y Young, Arthur. Travels in France during the Years 1787, 1788 and 1789, edited by Constantia Maxwell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

273

Z Zaghi, Carlo. L’Italia di Napoleone dalla Cisaplina al Regno. Storia d’Italia diretta da Giuseppe Galasso. Vol. 18. Torino: UTET, 1968. ———. Napoleone e l’Italia. Prospettive e problemi. Napoli: Editrice Cymba, 1966. Zannoni, Mario. Napoleone Bonaparte a Parma nel 1805. Parma: Museo Glauco Lombardi. MUP, 2006.

manuscriPt collections archives nationales Paris. Série AF/III/71, 72. Série AF/IV/1717. Série BB/5/302. Série Série BB 18/871. Série F/ 1e/ 85. Série F/1e/86. Série F/1e/87. Série F/1bI/168/1

archives du ministère des affaires etrangères. 95/CP/47 microfilm P/10452.

archives du ministère de la défense. Dossier C-4-41.

archivio di stato di Parma. Inv. 49, GRidaRio 1796–1814. Carte varie amministrazione militare 1804–1816. Atti Francesi. Comune di Parma. Dipartimento del Taro. Gabinetto del Prefetto. Decretti e Rescritti.

274 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

archivio di stato Piacenza. Copialettere del Maire.

biblioteca Palatina Parma. Manoscritti Parmensi 1185. Manoscritti Parmensi 543. Manoscritti Parmensi 1579. Miscellanea Erudita 4. Miscellanea Moreau. Palatina 15046. Raccolta Mappe e disegni.

Published Primary documents Correspondance de Napoléon Ier. Publié par l’ordre de l’empereur Napoléon III. (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1858. Lettres de Louis XV à l’Infant Ferdinand de Parme. Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1938. Opinions, Rapports et Choix d’Ecrits Politiques de Charles François Lebrun, duc de Plaisance. Recueillis et mis en ordre par son fils aîné et précédés d’une note biographique. Paris: Chez Bossange père, 1829. La Police secrète du Premier Empire. Bulletins quotidiens adressés par Fouché à l’Empereur. Tome II, 1805–1806. Publiés par Ernest d’Hauterive d’après les documents originaux déposés aux Archives Nationales. Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1913. Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traits de Westphalie jusqu’à la Révolution française. Publiés sous les auspices de la Commission des Archives Diplomatiques au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1893. Recueil des actes du Directoire Executif: procès—verbaux, arêtés, instructions et actes divers. Publiés et annotés par Antonin Débidour. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1910. Recueils des Lois et Décrets, 4ème série, no. 53. Nancy: Vigneulle, an XIII /1805. Moniteur Universel. Réimpression de l’Ancien Moniteur. Paris: Plon, 1847. Stryenski, Casimir. Le Gendre de Louis XV. Don Philippe, Infant d’Espagne et Duc de Parme. D’après des documents inédits tirés des Archives de Parme et des Archives des Affaires Etrangères. Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1904. Sabini, Andrea. Collegii Parmensis nobilium convictorum nomenclatura universalis cum notis historicis. Parma, 1820.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

275

Il tutore deluso, ossia, Rinaldo d’Asti: dramma giocoso per musica: da rappresentarsi in Parma nel teatro Filo-musico-drammatico nell’estate dell’anno MDCCCIX: dedicato al signor Nardon, cavaliere dell’impero e prefetto del dipartimento del taro. Parma: Dalla stamperia Carmignani, 1809. Ode à Junot Parma: Stamperia Carmignani, 1806 Per il Giorno Onomastico di Napoleone Imperatore e Re Sonnetto. Piacenza: Del Maino, 1812. Poesie Pubblicate dalla Communità di Parma. Parma: Presso Luigi Mussi, il 18 Febbraio 1806.

People index1

A Alberetti, Giovanni, bargello, 191 Albesani, Pietro, 83–85, 96, 97, 107, 113–116, 119, 122, 122n41, 126, 132, 134, 138, 141, 143, 185, 186, 204, 204n29 Anguissola, Ranuccio, 203 Argental, d’, Charles Augustin, 19n23, 32 Aspetti, Pompeo, 100, 186, 204 Aymé, citizen of Marseille, 204 B Barbé-Marbois, François, 59n20, 64, 64n39, 65n41 Beauharnais, Eugene de, 68, 68n48, 197n9 Beaulieu, General, 33, 33–34n7, 34

1

Bigot de Préameneu, Jean Felix, 64, 64n38, 72n62 Bodoni, Giambattista, 18, 18n21, 29, 62, 76n73, 226 Bonaparte, General, 90n38, 205 Botti, Agostino, 80, 81, 97–101, 100n73 Bourbon, dukes of, 55 Braghieri, Giulio, 85 Bureaux-Puzy, Jean Xavier, prefect of Genoa, 146, 147 Bussandri, Giuseppe nicknamed Mozzetta, 87, 101–103, 105, 105n83, 106, 145, 205 C Caminati, Carlo, 87, 95, 205 Carancini, Pietro, 102, 103

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7

277

278 

PEOPLE INDEX

Caravel, Gian Francesco, 164, 169n21, 171, 172, 185, 186, 193, 194 Carlos de Bourbon, duke of Parma, king of Naples and Sicily, 9 Casanova, Jacques, 28n41 Caselli, Bishop, 65, 186 Cavagnari, Pietro, 16n16, 35, 40, 41n28, 75, 78n4, 108, 116, 117, 122, 127, 135, 138n2 Cerati, Bishop, 117, 118, 118n26, 133, 140, 146n27 Cervoni, Jean-Baptiste General, 37n17, 48, 50, 51 Champagny, Jean Baptiste, minister of interior, 55n7, 64, 64n38, 68, 69, 70n55, 93, 94, 94n52, 118, 120, 121, 152, 154n41, 163n1, 164, 167, 168n19, 187, 188, 188n74, 192, 193n89, 207, 208, 210n51, 213, 236, 237, 241n2 Chaptal, Jean-Antoine, 209, 209n47 Chauvelin, count, 26 Clement XIII, pope, 19, 20 Coconcelli, Antonio, 65, 65n42 Collin, Jean Baptiste, 64, 64n38, 64n39, 66n45 Condillac, Etienne de, 22–24, 22n28, 28, 29, 32 Cornazzani, Lazzaro, 86, 87, 95, 102, 102n76, 111, 205 Cornini, Captain, 102, 102n77, 103, 145 Correggio, Antonio Allegri, 18, 48–50, 49–50n51, 50n53, 52, 62, 66, 227 Crescini, Dionigio, 34, 39n23, 204n30, 205, 249 D Dalla Tana, Captain, 87 Dauchy, Luc Jacques, 168n16, 209, 209n48

Delacroix, Charles, 36, 40n26, 120, 120n34 Deleyre, Alexandre, 22, 23 Denon, Vivant, 48n44, 51, 52n56 Du Tillot, Guillaume, 11–22, 11n5, 15–16n13, 17n16, 18n20, 18n22, 19n23, 23n31, 25–30, 25n36, 26n37, 26n38, 27n39, 29n44, 30n47, 54–57, 56n13, 57n14, 62, 62n33, 73, 148, 182, 207, 219, 227, 243, 248 Duplan, 64n39, 145, 155 Duplessis, Louis, 98n66, 114, 114n15 Duport–Delporte, Henri, 243, 243n7 E Elizabeth Farnese, duchess of Parma, queen of Spain, 9 F Fainardi, Pietro, 214, 242 Farnese, dukes of, 9, 13n10, 50, 55, 110 Ferdinand, duke of Parma, 2, 31n2, 32, 49, 57, 73, 203, 205, 205n32 Ferdinand, Infant, 10 Ferrante, Scipione, 80, 98 Ferrari, Francesco, 83, 144, 145, 147, 203 Formenti, Carlo, 65, 65n42, 66n45, 166, 244 Fouché, Joseph, 94, 98, 115, 139, 152, 153n40, 171n26, 171n27, 192n87 Franchi, Franceso, archpriest, 133, 134 Francis, Emperor, 248, 249 G Gantier, Jules, 39, 40 Garrau, Anselme, 41

  PEOPLE INDEX 

Gatti, bargello, 193 Giacopelli, lieutenant-colonel, 82 Gioia, Melchiorre, 43, 43n31, 44 Giordani, Luigi Umberto, 54, 205, 224 Giordani, Pietro, 49, 49n49 Godoy, Manuel, 31 Gubernatis, de, Gian Battista, 164, 171, 172 H Haller, Emmanuel de, 40 Hapsburg, dynasty, 1, 242 J Junot, Jean-Andoche, General, 72, 72n61, 76, 76n74, 99, 100, 103, 118, 119, 123, 123n45, 127, 128, 134, 136, 152, 152n38, 154–161, 156n48, 156n51, 163–165, 163n1, 164n5, 165n8, 166n10, 169–171, 169n21, 171n27, 173–177, 174n38, 175n40, 179n50, 179n51, 180, 180n52, 181, 184, 184n59, 184n61, 186, 187, 188n74, 192, 192n87, 193, 193n89, 197, 197n8, 200, 201, 203, 204, 204n28, 207, 224–226, 228–230 K Kéralio, Auguste de, 22–24, 24n31, 32 L Lacroix, Philippe, 114, 115, 126 Lalatta, Alessandro Luigi, 38 Lama, Antonio, 205n32

279

Lama, Giuseppe (Joseph), 32, 111 Lanault, captain of gendarmerie, 77–106, 144 Landi, Cristoforo, 37 Lebrun, captain, 92–95, 92n44 Lebrun, Charles François, governor of Liguria, 64, 67n48, 68, 91, 114–118, 120, 121, 121n35, 127, 128n58, 135, 136, 138n2, 141, 154n41, 164, 203, 204n28, 244n10 Leriche, 120 Linati, Filipo, 75, 76, 123, 135n80, 141, 150, 151n36, 203 Locard, 154n41, 164, 187n70 Louis XV, king of France, 10, 12, 22, 25, 25n36, 26, 27n39 Louise Elisabeth, duchess of Parma, 10, 22 Lusardi, Sante, 109 M Macdonald, general, 41 Magawly-Cerati, Filippo, 246n17, 248–250, 250n26, 252 Maggi, Giampaolo, 225 Maria Amalia, 24, 25, 25n36, 26n37, 32 Maria Luigia, duchess of Parma, 5, 182n57, 211, 238, 244n12, 248–250, 250n26, 250n27, 253, 253n38 Marie Antoinette, 32 Marion, Stanislas, general, 78, 83, 84, 96, 126, 130n66, 138n3, 143, 143n15, 146, 147, 165n8 Martin, lieutenant of gendarmerie, 133 Mastelloni, Emanuele, 122, 122n41, 171n28, 173, 185, 204, 204n29, 243n8 Mazza, Angelo, 27n39, 151, 224, 227

280 

PEOPLE INDEX

Menou, Jacques – François Abdallah, 90, 90n38, 91, 94, 126, 131 Migliorucci, Fosca, 226 Millot, Claude François Xavier, 20, 21, 24 Montchoisy, Louis Antoine Choin de, General, 67, 67n48, 91, 92, 121, 153 Moreau de Saint-Méry, Médéric Louis Elie, 2, 8, 15, 45n38, 46, 46n39, 51, 53, 54, 55n7, 55n9, 59, 66, 70n55, 73–76, 78, 80, 81, 83, 87, 93n49, 102, 107–109, 113–115, 117, 119, 120, 124, 126, 126n54, 128, 133, 148–150, 152, 155, 156, 182, 190, 196, 200n20, 203, 204, 207, 214, 217, 218, 243 Moreau, General, 41, 230 N Napoleon, Emperor, 1–3, 2n3, 6, 8–30, 45n38, 49n49, 50n53, 61n30, 63–75, 63n36, 65n42, 66n44, 66n45, 67–68n48, 72n62, 76n74, 79, 79n9, 80n11, 80n12, 81, 81n13, 88, 88n32, 90n38, 91n41, 94n53, 99, 99n70, 100, 108, 116, 118n28, 119, 120, 124, 127, 134, 137, 137n1, 138n2, 146n25, 148, 151–161, 153n40, 156n48, 167, 168, 168n16, 168n18, 173, 174n37, 179n51, 188n74, 190–192, 191n83, 192n86, 195, 197n8, 209, 210, 217, 225, 233, 237, 238, 241–243, 244n10, 245n14, 246n16, 248, 249, 252, 253 Nasalli, Girolamo Count, 18n20

O Obach, Girolamo, 28 Oldrini, Pio, 204 P Paciaudi, Paolo Maria, 18, 18n20, 20, 27n39 Parmigianino, 227 Parolini, Francesco, 87, 102n76 Perazzi, Carlo, 84 Pérignon, Marshal, 36, 179n50, 180n52, 226, 226n36, 229, 229n47 Petitot, Enemond, 18n22, 48 Pezzana, Angelo, 246 Pezzini, Felice, 84n22, 132 Philip, Duke of Parma, 22 Pino, Domenico (Minister of War), 75, 79, 91, 91n41, 93, 141, 151 Platesteiner, Giovanni, 64n39, 155 Plezzi, Francesco, 84n22, 132 Politi, Pier Maria Luigi, 44, 204n30, 205, 242, 242n3, 249n25 Portalis, Jean Etienne, 116 Pouget, Jean-Pierre, General, 91, 91n41, 93, 94, 115, 158 R Radet, Etienne, 90, 90n38, 91, 94, 133, 134, 190n79 Raynaud, Armand, 232 Régnier, Grand Juge, 96, 171n28, 180n52, 185, 204n31, 205n33, 242n3, 242n4 Rocci, Domenico, 204 Romani, Lieutenant, 103 Rosetti, Domenico, 74

  PEOPLE INDEX 

S Saliceti, Christophe, 36n13, 37, 50 Sanvitale, Giacomo, 225 Sanvitale, Jacopo, 246n16, 247, 249, 250 Sanvitale, Stefano, 16, 61n28, 63, 63n36, 63n37, 65, 74n67, 164, 165, 170, 183, 193, 203, 208n43, 213, 214, 217, 219, 221–223, 225, 233, 234, 237, 242n6, 246n16 Sardi, Agostino, 65 Schizatti, Francesco, 45n36, 205 Scotti, Alberto, 138, 164, 172, 184, 184n59, 203, 208n43, 242n6, 249 Serventi, Giuseppe (banker), 203 Sicorè, Giuseppe, 85–87, 205, 205n33 Soragna, marquis, 203

281

Stefani, Carlo, 132, 134, 159n58 Stendhal, 42, 199 T Talleyrand, Charles Maurice, 45n38, 46, 46n39, 58, 63, 64, 64n38, 67n48 Tedaldi, Gaetano, 27, 27n40, 28 Tomarrone, 186 Torcellaghi, Aurelio, 204 Torregiani, Luigi, 204 V Vabre, brigadier general, 114 Ventura, Cesare, 48, 51, 75, 205n32 Vincenzi, commissioner, 86, 145 Virieu, bailly, 32, 32n3 Vivian, Lieutenant, 91–94, 92n45, 121

Place index1

A Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 9 Apennines, 1, 91, 93, 94, 105, 126, 155, 164n3, 244n10 B Bardi, 92–94, 203 Basel, Treaty of, 1, 31n1 Binasco, 89, 90, 152, 153, 156, 158, 161 Bobbio, 87, 88, 94, 157 Bologna, 69, 79, 85, 143 Borgo San Donnino, 13 Borgotaro, 92 Busseto, 132

1

C Camporemoldi, 85, 85n24 Cassano, 84 Castel Giovanni, 34 Castell’ Arquato, 91, 92, 191 Cherasco, 33, 34, 47 Colorno, 10, 18n22, 39, 42, 50 Cort’alta Roncaglia, 132, 132n72 Corte Maggiore, 191 D Dego, 33 F Ferriere, 86, 145 Fiorenzuola, 93n46, 144, 144n19

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. P. Harsanyi, French Rule in the States of Parma, 1796–1814, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97340-7

283

284 

PLACE INDEX

Fontanellato, 63n36, 214, 221–223, 233, 234 France, 4, 10, 12, 13n10, 14, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27n40, 30–33, 31n1, 35–37, 38n18, 39, 44n35, 45–47, 46n39, 47n43, 48n44, 53, 53n2, 54, 56, 58, 59, 59n20, 68, 71, 71n58, 75, 89, 89n34, 90n38, 105, 114, 124, 125, 125n48, 127n57, 137n1, 149, 166, 167n11, 182, 197, 198, 203n27, 205n34, 206, 210, 210n51, 222, 224, 241, 243, 245n14, 247, 248, 253 G Gallinella, 103, 103n78 Genoa, department of, 87, 88, 244 Guastalla, 1, 7–10, 16, 31, 39, 44, 66, 77n1, 164, 248 I Italy, 1–5, 20, 21, 23n31, 31, 38, 40, 42, 45, 47, 47n43, 48n44, 49n49, 51, 71, 71n58, 73, 74n66, 75, 82n16, 88n32, 89, 89n34, 90, 90n36, 91n41, 97, 105, 106, 109, 112, 114, 118n28, 124, 125, 127n55, 151, 152, 160, 160n62, 161, 174, 180n52, 182n57, 188n73, 190n78, 197, 208, 215, 229, 233, 234, 249n24, 252n33 Italy, Kingdom of, 5, 8, 55n6, 68n48, 79, 79n8, 89n34, 91, 91n41, 124, 127, 127n57, 166n10, 168n18, 182, 216, 218, 231, 245, 245n14

L Langhirano, 186 Liguria, 5, 68, 68n48, 114, 120, 141, 164, 167n12, 168n18, 204n29, 207, 218, 244n10 Lombardy, 21, 33, 35, 41, 42 Lugagnano, 83, 92, 92n44, 92n45, 101 Lunéville, Treaty of, 45 M Mantua, 91 Marzonago, 132, 132n72 Mezzano, 87, 132, 134n77, 158, 159, 159n58 MezzanoMezzano, 161 Milan, 1, 2, 23n31, 37, 40, 41, 44, 47n43, 50n54, 54n4, 63, 64, 89, 104, 127n57, 192, 216, 235, 246n16, 250, 250n28 Millesimo, 33 Mondovi, 33 Montechio, 132 Montenotte, 33, 207, 244n10 Mulini Bassi, 193 N Naples and Sicily, kingdom of, 9 Nibbiano, 87, 95, 145 P Paris, 5, 7, 10, 18, 33, 36, 39, 40, 43, 44n33, 45, 45n38, 46n39, 47, 48n44, 48n47, 50, 51, 52n56, 55, 60, 69, 76n74, 84, 95, 116, 147, 148, 165, 166n10, 188, 192, 193, 196, 209, 210n50, 228, 230, 236, 239, 242, 242n3, 244, 245n13, 246n17, 247

  PLACE INDEX 

Parma, 2, 10, 19–22, 31–52, 54, 78, 110, 141, 163, 200, 241 Parma, Duchy of, 9, 36, 78n6, 182n57 Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla (duchies of), 1, 7, 9, 10, 31, 39, 94, 248 Parma, States of, 1, 2, 5, 5n10, 6, 8, 21, 53–79, 76n74, 77n1, 77n2, 79n8, 79n9, 98, 98n66, 99n70, 120, 124, 126, 139n7, 142, 149, 150, 152, 152n38, 156, 158, 160, 164, 171, 171n26, 173, 174, 177, 179, 180n52, 181, 183, 187, 188, 188n74, 191, 194, 207, 216, 221, 223, 232, 241, 244n10 Pavia, 33, 89, 204 Pellegrino, 86, 95, 102, 111 Piacentino, 13, 27, 68n48, 90, 90n38, 94, 98n68, 101, 108, 112, 123, 125, 128, 135, 137, 141, 143n14, 147, 152, 153, 153n40, 159, 161 Piacenza, 1, 5, 7–9, 12, 13n10, 16, 33–35, 33n7, 35n12, 37, 38, 39n23, 40, 43, 45, 50n54, 53n2, 57, 57n16, 66, 67, 72, 72n62, 78, 81, 83, 85, 86, 88, 91, 94–96, 98n66, 99, 100, 100n73, 108, 108n3, 109, 112, 115–117, 120, 122, 122n41, 127, 135, 138, 138n3, 143, 143n15, 147, 150–152, 153n40, 154, 156, 156n49, 157, 161, 164, 165, 165n8, 171, 172, 172n29, 176, 183–186, 193, 193n90, 200, 200n20, 203–205, 204n29,

285

205n33, 208, 225, 227, 241, 242, 249n25 Pianello città, 84n22, 108n2, 132n71 Piedmont, 1, 33, 47, 72n62, 90n38, 149, 160, 210 Pizzighettone, 91 Po, River, 33, 34, 38, 41, 42, 166 Ponte de l’Oglio, 83 R Riva, 84, 85 S Scabiazza, 87 Scipione, 101–103, 145 Spain, 2, 9, 10n2, 19, 20, 26, 30, 31, 35, 36, 40n26, 43–45, 44n35, 45n38, 58, 58n19, 137n1, 149, 210n50, 243, 251 T Taro, Department of, 2, 8, 72n62, 241, 242n3, 243n8, 248 Trebbia, 84 Tuscany, 1, 2, 5, 21, 23n31, 33, 45, 45n38, 149 V Val di Tolla, 91, 94, 102 Val Pecorara, 132, 132n72 Val Tidone, 97, 99 Veleia, archeological sites, 17n19, 18, 62 Vigoleno, 103, 146n27 Vogherra, 133