French Investment in Colonial Cameroon: The FIDES Era (1946-1957) [New ed.] 1433104644, 9781433104640

Citation preview

The FIDES Era {1946-195'1)

Martin

Atangana

French Investment in Colonial Cameroon

Society and Politics in Africa

Yakubu Saaka General Editor

Vol. 20

PETER LANG New York • \Vashington, D.C./Baltimore • Bern Frankfurt am !\,fain • Berlin • Brussels • Vienna • Oxford

Martin Atangana

French Investment in Colonial Cameroon The FIDES Era ( 1946-1957)

PETER LANG New York • \Vashington, D.C./Baltimore • Bern Frankfurt am !\,fain • Berlin • Brussels • Vienna • Oxford

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Atangana, Martin-Rene. French investment in colonial Cameroon: the FIDES era (1946-1957) / Martin Atangana. p. cm. - (Society and politics in Africa; v. 20) Includes bibliographical references and index. l. Investments, French--Cameroon-History-20th century. I. Title. HG5869.A3A83 332.67 '344067 I 109045-dc22 2008046410 ISBN 978-1-433 1-0464-0 ISSN 1083-3323

Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek. Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the "Deutsche Nationalbibliografie"; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Intemet at http://dnb.ddb.de/.

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Counci l of Library Resources.

© 2009 Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York 29 Broadway, I8th floor, New York, NY I0006 www.peterlang.com

All rights reserved . Reprint or reproduction, even partially, in all forms such as microfilm, xerography, microfiche, microcard, and offset strictly prohibited . Printed in the United States of America

Contents

List of Tables ...................................................................................................... vii List of Figures...................................................................................................... ix List of Acrony1ns ................................................................................................ xi Preface ................................................

u .. , ... • ...... • ...... • .............. • ...... • ...... • ...........

XIII

I11troductlo11 ........................................................................................................ I 1

Tl1e En1ergence of FIDES ........................................................................... 5 The Political Framework: The Post-War New Order .................................. 5 The Constitution of October 1946 ......................................................... 5 The Trustees hip Agreement ................................................................... 8 The Origins and Birth of FIDES ................................................................... 9 The Sarraut Project ( 1921) ..................................................................... 9 The Colonial Conference (1934-1935) ............................................... 11 The Brazzaville Conference ( 1944) ..................................................... 13

2

Tl1e Orga1tlzatto11of FIDES ..................................................................... 17 The Imple mentation and Mechanisms of FIDES ....................................... 17 The Beginnings of FIDES in Ca1neroon .................................................... 23

3

The FIDES First Four-Year Plan (1949-1953) ...................................... 37 The General Situation ................................................................................. 37 The Polarization of Ca1neroonian Politics ........................................... 37 Private Capitalis1n and the General Situation ...................................... 38 Public Capitalism a nd the General Situation ....................................... 40 Evaluation of W orks Undertaken ............................................................... 42 The End of the Artificial " Boo1n" ............................................................... 45

4

The FIDES Second Four-Year Plan (1953-1956) .................................. 53 The Political Situation in Cameroon ........................................................... 53 " Financial Contribution": Ai1ns and Funding of the Second Plan ............. 54 The Capital of the Second Plan: a Compensation for

v1

French lnvestrnent in Colonial Cameroon: The FIDES Era the Withdrawal of Private Capital and a State Duty ..................... 54 Loans for European Goals .................................................................... 56 The Impact of the Second Plan on Ca1neroon' s Economy ........................ 59

5

Flnanclal Assessments of Public Investtnent .......................................... 65 The Final Cost of Internal Public Financing .............................................. 65 Public Capital of Metropolita n Origin ........................................................ 70 Ca1neroon: a Privileged Country? .............................................................. 77

6

Prt,,ate l11ves1Jl1e11t: a Reality ................................................................... 83 The Problem of Sources .............................................................................. 83 Financ ial Assess1nent .................................................................................. 84 The Policy of Persuasion or Incentives for Private InvestJnent and ReinvestJnent ................................................................................. 95

7

Prt,,ate l11vestn1e11t: a 1\ll)'th .................................................................... 101 Failure of the Policy of Persuasion ........................................................... IO I The Causes of Private Disinvest1nent ....................................................... 105 Financial Causes ................................................................................. I 05 Political Causes .................................................................................. I I 0

8

The Financial and Social ltnpact of FIDES Investment. ..................... 119 The FIDES Program: an Unprofitable and False Gift .............................. The Financial Costs of FID ES In vestment ............................................... FIDES: a Source of Social Frustration ..................................................... FIDES Achievements ................................................................................

9

119 121 123 125

Tl1e Economic Impact of FIDES ............................................................ 135 FIDES and the Structural I1nbalance in Ca1neroon's Econo1ny .............. 135 ALUCAM: To Serve the French Economy .............................................. 143 Inequalities in the Se1ni-Industrial, Co1nmercial and Agricultural Sectors ............................................................................ 147

Conclusio11 ....................................................................................................... 157 Appendix: Colonial Companies in French Ca1neroon by 1956 ..................... 161 Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 165 I11dex ................................................................................................................. 175

Tables

2.1. 2.2. 2.3.

2.4. 3.1.

3.2.

3.3. 4.1. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5.

5.6.

The develop1nent of the banking network in Ca1neroon fro1n 1939 to 1955 ......................................................................... 24 Credit in foreign exchange allocated to Cameroon for its equipment fro1n January I, 1947 to October 15, 1949 ................. 28 Pay1nent of annuities, interest and loan pay1nents, and contributions of Ca1neroon to the functioning of French organizations and services fro1n 1946 to 1949 ................. 30 The develop1nent of Ca1neroon's i1nports and exports fro1n 1946 to 1948 ......................................................................... 32 New companies and co1npanies increasing their capital invesunent in Ca1neroon and Black Africa from 1949 to 1953 .................................................................................. 41 Allocations of Cameroon's budget for debt service and contributions of the territory to the functioning of French agencies fro1n 1950 to 1953 .......................................... 42 Changes in the value of exports and i1nports of Ca1neroon fro1n 1949 to 1953 ......................................................................... 44 Allocations of the Ca1neroonian budget for debt service to FIDES fro1n 1954 to 1956 ............................................................. 59 Gross capital investlnent fro1n internal financing fro1n 1946 to 1956 .................................................................................. 67 Ca1neroon's o\vn contribution to FIDES and repay1nents of CCFOM loans under FIDES fro1n 1946 to 1956 ..................... 67 Repay1nents of non-FIDES loans fro1n CCFOM by local public organizations and co1npanies fro1n 1946 to 1956 .............. 68 lnvesunents of the Ca1neroonian budget fro1n local funds fro1n 1946 to 1956 ......................................................................... 68 Pay1nent orders of the Ca1neroonian budget for contributions to the functioning of French services and organizations, fro1n 1946 to 1950 ......................................................................... 69 Final cost of internal public financing or French investments fro1n Ca1neroonian funds fro1n 1946 to 1956 ............................... 70

v111 5.7. 5.8. 5.9. 5.10. 5.11. 5.12. 5.13. 5.14. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 6.7. 6.8. 7.1. 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 9.1. 9.2.

French lnvestrnent in Colonial Cameroon: The FIDES Era

Civilian capital spending in the French national budget for Ca1neroon fro1n 1946 to 1956 ....................................................... 73 Pay1nents 1nade by FIDES fro1n 1946 to 1956 .................................... 75 CCFOM invest1nents from 1946 to 1956 ............................................ 76 lnvesunent in Black Africa from local public funds ........................... 76 Ca1neroon's contribution to CCFOM invesunents in Black Africa fro1n 1947 to 1956 .............................................................. 77 Ca1neroon's contribution to non nlilitary spending in the French national budget for Black Africa fro1n 1946 to 1956 ................... 78 FIDES invest1nents in Black Africa, from 1947 to 1956 .................... 79 Distribution by territory of the FIDES and CCFOM credits until the end of 1955 ...................................................................... 80 Nu1nber of private co1npanies according to their type of econonlic activity in Ca1neroon in 1950 ....................................... 85 Geographical distribution of private finns in Ca1neroon in 1950 ....... 86 Bank loans to co1npanies in Ca1neroon fro1n 1949 to 1956 ................ 86 Declared profits of the largest finns of Ca1neroon fro1n 1946 to 1950 .................................................................................. 89 ReinvestJnent in Ca1neroon by the principal finns fro1n 1946 to 1950 .................................................................................. 91 ReinvestJnent in Ca1neroon by secondary finns fro1n 1946 to 1950 .................................................................................. 92 Breakdown by sector of private reinvest1nent in Ca1neroon fro1n 1946 to 1950 ......................................................................... 93 lnvesunents 1nade in Cameroon in 1951 and 1952 by new co1npanies or with ne\v capital ...................................................... 94 Transfers of private capital bet\veen Ca1neroon and the franc zone from 1949 to 1953 ..................................................... IOI The gro\vth of the nu1nber of civil servants by sector in Ca1neroon fro1n 1947 to 1955 ..................................................... 120 Principal exports of Ca1neroon fro1n 1946 to 1956 ........................... 126 Distribution by econonlic sectors and by periods of FIDES loans in Ca1neroon ........................................................... 130 Regional distribution of FIDES loans in Cameroon fro1nl946 to 1956 ........................................................................ 139 Ca1neroon's contribution to the capital of French public co1npanies. Situation by Dece1nber 31 , 1956 ............................. 143

Figures

5.1. 5.2. 6.1. 6.2. 7. I . 8.1 8.2. 9.1. 9.2. 9.3.

French public investinent in Cameroon from 1946 to 1956 ............... 74 Distribution by ten-itory of the FIDES and CCFOM Joans until the end of 1955 ...................................................................... 78 Nu1nber of private co1npanies according to their type of economic activity in Cameroon in 1950 ....................................... 87 Distribution by sector of private reinvesunent in Ca1neroon fro1n 1946 to 1950 ......................................................................... 93 Transfers of private capital between Ca1neroon and the franc zone fro1n 1949 to 1953 ..................................................... 102 Develop1nent of the quantity of the principal exports of Ca1neroon fro1n 1946 to 1956 ..................................................... 127 Distribution by economic sectors and by periods of the FIDES Joans in Ca1neroon ........................................................... 131 Distribution by region of FIDES loans in Ca1neroon fro1n 1946 to 1956 ................................................................................ 138 Develop1nent of Ca1neroon i1nports and exports fro1n 1947 to 1953 ............................................................................... 141 Develop1nent of the value of the 1nain Ca1neroon exports fro1n 1946 to 1956 .......................................................... 152

Acronyms

AEF AICDG ALUCAM ANCAM ANSOM ANU ARCAM ATCAM CCFOM CFA CREDICAM ENELCAM ENFOM FDSE FEA

FIDES FWA

IEDES JOC JOCF JORF ORSTOM SIC

SIP SEREPCA UN UPC

Afrique Equatoriale Franc;aise Archives de l'Institu t Charles de Gaulle, Paris. Societe Ah11niniu1n du Ca1neroun. Archives Nationales du Ca1neroun, Yaounde Archives Nationales, Section d'Outre Mer, Aix-e n-Provence Archives des Nations Unies, New York Assemblee Representative du Ca1neroun Assemblee Ten-itoriale du Ca1neroun Caisse Centrale de la France d 'Outre Mer Colonies Frarn;:aises d' Afrique or Conununaute Financiere Africaine Credit du Ca1neroun Energie Electrique du Ca1neroun Ecole Nationale de la France d'Outre Me r Faculte de Droit et des Sciences Econo1niques French Equatorial Africa Fonds d' lnvestisse1nent pour le Developpe1nent Econo1nique et Social French West Africa Institut d 'Etude du Developpe1n ent Econo1nique et Social Journal Officiel du Cameroun Journal Officiel du Cameroun Franc;ais Journal Officiel de la Republique Franc;aise Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d' Outre Mer Societe Im1nobiliere du Ca1neroun Societe lndigene de Prevoyance Societe d ' Exploitation et de Recherches Petrol ieres du Ca1neroun United Nations Union des Populations du Ca1neroun

Preface

This book is the translation of part of 1ny work Capitalis1ne et nationa/is,ne au Ca,neroun au /ende,nain de fa Seconde Guerre mondia/e (Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1998). Whereas my French book explored the political, econo1nic, and social forces involved in the Franco-Ca1neroonian relationship, the English edition deals exclusively with the financial and econo1nic factors of these relations during the decade that follo,ved the Second World War. It offers an analysis of the progra1n for the develop1nent of French overseas colonies kt10,vn as Fonds d'lnvestissernent pour le Deve/oppe,nent Econornique et Social des territoires d'outre 1ner (FIDES) and its socioecono1nic impact in Ca1neroon. I have reorganized the original chapters into 1nore detailed chapters and incorporated figures to better support and illustrate 1ny argu1nents. The decision to translate 1ny work was 1nade ,vith the hope that it will expand the existing li1nited literature in English on the history of Cameroon, and 1nake 1ny ,vork available to English-speaking scholars, students , and general readers. This work ,vould not have been possible without the generous support of various people and institutions. I would first like to thank Bea Vidacs who translated 1ny work from French to English. The translation was funded through a 2001-2002 PSC-CUNY Research Award that I was granted by the Research Foundation of the City University of New York. I gratefully acktlowledge that financial support. I also ,vish to thank the staffs of the follo,ving libraries where I conducted 1ny research: Bibfiotheque de Doc111nentation Internationale Conte,nporaine (BDIC, Nanterre); Doc111nentation Franraise (Paris); Bibfiotheque Nationa/e (Paris); Bibfiotheque Nationa/e Annexe (Versailles); Institut National de fa Statistique et des Etudes Econo,niques (INSEE, Paris); the Dag Ham1narskjold Library (Ne,v York); Archives Nationales, section d'outre mer (Aix-en-Provence); Archives Nationales (Yaounde); and Institut Charles de Gaulle (Paris). I a1n very grateful to Evelyn Ackennan {Leh1nan College and The Graduate Center of The City University of New York) ,vho read 1ny 1nanuscript in its entirety and 1nade corrections and invaluable co1nrnents. I

x,v

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

also feel indebted to the following individuals, for sharing their wealth of infonnation with ,ne, as well as their advice and critiques: Rene Girault (University of Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne); Jean Frenligacci (Centre de Recherches Africaines, Paris); Franc;:ois Dikoume, Adalbe,t Owona, and Leon Kaptue (University of Yaounde); Dieudonne Oyono (/nstitur des Relations lnternariona/es du Ca1nero11n); Rene Gobe (Cha,nbre d'Agricu/ture de Yaounde'); and Ho\vard Ruttenberg (York College of the City University of New York). I ,nust also mention Kizzy Charles, Elizabeth Ho\vitt, and Vanessa Grande who helped with the editing and formatting of my ,nanuscript and figures. Finally, ,ny thanks go to my wife Lois Atangana and her fanlily in Ne\v York, ,ny son Charles Atangana, and my fa,nily in Ca,neroon, for their enduring love and suppo,t.

Introduction

At the end of the Second World War France and her colonies found the1nselves in a weakened state, and their infrastructure \Vas partly destroyed or in a state of disuse. The establishment of an economic plan seemed to be a necessity to mend the national and imperial econo1ny. Parallel to the Plan Monnet which was the first plan adopted in France for the develop1nent of the national economy, the la\v of April 30, 1946, voted by the French National Asse1nbly established a Jong tenn progra1n for the development of France's overseas territories entitled Fonds d'lnvestisse,nent pour le Developpement Econo1niq11e et Social des Territoires d'Outre Mer (FIDES). This book is an analysis of French investments in Cameroon during the FIDES years (1946-1956). In the 1950s the French colonial e1npire appeared to be one of the principal bastions of French po\ver. Cameroon was one of the areas of French Black Africa in which France had a great interest after 1945. France invested in Ca1neroon alone al1nost as 1nuch as she did in French Equatorial Africa, a federation which was much larger and 1nore populous. But since colonial officials, civil servants, and researchers have ahvays grouped Cameroon together \Vith the territories of French Equatorial Africa \vhich were seen as less i1nportant, it did not receive the attention it deserved from econo1nists and economic historians. Franco-Ca1neroonian financial relations and the question of French invesllnents and their i1npact in Ca1neroon in the post-war decade are a1nong the problems that have been neglected. The goal of this study is to help fill this gap and 1nake a contribution to this aspect of the history of Ca1neroon. The analysis of the financial relationship between Ca1neroon and France after the Second World War offered in this study is not si1nply a matter of creating a balance sheet. Numbers are certainly necessary. Ho\vever, they do not provide any kind of certainty and objectivity. Neither will it be a question of 1neasuring how 1nuch Cameroon had cost and contributed to France. This \Vould be a useless exercise which 1nostly fits, in the case of the French colonial e1npire in general, into the ideological co1nbats decolonization gave rise to. For those who asked the1nselves this question in the 1950s and who are still asking it these days, it either leads to the condemnation of French colonialism by

2

French lnvestrnent in Colonial Cameroon: The FIDES Era

calling attention to the benefits France derived fro1n it or serves to absolve the ,netropole because of its generosity. Finally it does not simply try to evaluate the place of Cameroon a1nong the other territories under French rule, given that the conditions varied fro1n one ten·itory to another. What has to be appreciated is the role played by Ca1neroon in the dynamics of French capitalism and the part played by this capitalis1n in the develop1nent of the territory. Consequently, I s hall assess the 1nove1nents of capital between Cameroon and France and especially the export of French capital to Ca1neroon, and the impact of French invesunent in Ca1neroon fro1n 1946 to 1956. Assessing French invest1nent in colonial Ca1neroon during the FIDES era is not an easy task. What should one understand by "French invest1nent in colonial Ca1neroon"? What should be measured? What reality should be captured? Several factors need to be taken into consideration in this assess1nent. First of all the power that direct political do1nination granted to France allo,ved her to channel Cameroon's resources and expenditure according to the need of the ,netropole, and to finance a significant part of the basic infrastructure by using the territory 's budget. An exa1nination of the investJnent 1nade in Ca1neroon in relation to the local budget will pennit a measure1nent of the a1nount of metropolitan capital expo1ted to Ca1neroon. Capital expo1ts quantify French econo1nic intervention in Ca1neroon and 1neasure the ability of the colonial state to i1npose its vie,vs and authority. But an assessment of French inves unent from the point of vie,v of capital exportation alone is not sufficient. It is also necessary to take into consideration invest1nents directed by France to the ,nise en va/eur (develop1nent) of Cameroon, that is to say, to capital accu1nulation. The ele1nents involved here include invest1nent 1nade in Ca1neroon ,vith the local budget, the French budget, FIDES and CCFOM funds, and the reinvesunent of profits. In addition, the 1nilitary and civil operating expenses paid by the French Govenunent for Cameroon should also be considered. A 1neasure1nent of financial flo,vs between France and Ca1neroon allo,vs an evaluation of the arbitrage between financial organizations and industrial finns faced ,vith various invesunent opportunities in Ca1neroon. Measuring the totality of investments in Cameroon can help evaluate the power that the colonial assets gave to the ,netropole, and especially to determine the consequences of investments on the internal structures of the Ca1neroonian econo1ny and society. These are two distinct and co1nplementary analytical approaches which offer the possibility to " 1neasure" and "evaluate," and ans,ver so1ne funda1nental questions: ,vhat was the financial burden of Cameroon on France? What was the i1nportance of Ca1neroon to the ,nitropo/e? Did France's public intervention serve to direct the exploitation of the territory in the interest

Introduction

3

of France or did it serve to pro1note the interests of Cameroon? The ans\vers to these questions \viii be found in this book. It is hard to define French invest1nent in Cameroon, because it has a Jong history which is hidden and obscured. The history of Ca1neroon is intertwined \Vith that of three colonial po\vers: Gennany, France and Great Britain, as well as the Mandate System of the League of Nations, and the Tn1steeship Syste1n of the United Nations. Therefore, docu1nents pertaining to this history are spread over three continents. The scattered nature and even the Jack of docu1nentation contribute to render the history of French investment in Ca1neroon confusing, obscuring and unintelligible. The absence of econo1nic 1nonographs further co1npl icates the study of French investJnent in Ca1neroon, and especially of its actual influence on the econo1nic develop1nent of the territory. Ho\vever, this Jack of national-level econo1nic 1nonographs would not be an insunnountable difficulty if the balance of pay1nents for Ca1neroon covering a sufficiently Jong ti1ne period were available, and especially for the period under consideration here (1946-1956). The balance of everyday operations (essentially "capital revenue") and of capital \Vould have 1nade it possible to follo\v the evolution of French invest1nent. Unfo1tunately, this approach is not possible for various reasons. The theory of assi1nilation which incorporated the African countries under French rule \Vithin the geopolitical field of France (in the franc zone) during the colonial era and even for several years during the post-colonial era led to the establishment of a unitary balance of pay1nents between the entirety of the franc zone and the outside world. Up to a certain period there \Vas no balance of pay1nents bet\veen France and the rest of the franc zone. The first balance of pay1nents of this kind was established in 1968. Until that date, and despite the activities of the Monetary Co1nmittee of the franc zone, 1nediu1n and Jong term 1nove1nents of capital (especially of private capital) only appeared in the adjust1nents colu1nn or "invisible operations" which the Monetary Com1nittee of the franc zone labeled "unidentified operations." It \Vas not until the year 1968 that decrees relating to the adoption of a 1nodel of balance of payments to be applied systematically started to be published in Africa. Thus, there is no balance of pay1nent between France and Ca1neroon prior to 1968. In order to can·y out research for this work it was necessary to resort to other sources including archival docu1nents and statistical works. Taking into consideration the above factors this book \Vas organized in nine chapters. In the opening chapter, the 1najor develop1nents that led to the birth of the FIDES program \viii be explored. The second chapter \viii explain the organization of FIDES and the early stages of this progra1n in Cameroon. The third and fourth c hapters \viii look at the i1nple1nentation of the t\vo FIDES

4

French lnvestrnent in Colonial Cameroon: The FIDES Era

Four-Year Plans. The financial assess1nent of public investment in Ca1neroon during the FIDES era \viii be 1nade in chapter five, \Vhile chapter six and seven \viii discuss the develop1nent of private invesunent during the sa1ne period. Finally, in the two last chapters the effects of French invest1nents on the budget of colonial Ca1neroon and on the territory's social and econo1nic structures will be analyzed.

Chapter 1 The Emergence of FIDES

The Political Frame\\'ork: The Post-\1/ar Ne\\' Order T\vo factors were of funda1nental significance regarding the relationship between Ca1neroon and France after the Second World War: the constitutional changes concerning French Africa in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, and the placing of Cameroon and Togo under the Trusteeship Syste1n of the United Nations.

The Co11stil1ttio11 of October 1946 The constitution which created the Fourth Republic in France was approved by referendu1n on October 13, 1946, and took effect on Dece1nber 24, 1946. It e1nphasized the doctrine of assi1nilation and transfonned the federalist hopes of the Brazzaville Conference into a centralized French Union ' co1nprising 1netropolitan France, the overseas depart1nents and territories, and the associated states and territories. Cameroon and Togo \Vere incorporated into the French Union as "associated territories." Also, the new constitution gave the inhabitants of the French ten·itories of Africa the right to elect representatives to the parlia1nentary bodies in Paris. Ca1neroon was represented first by three and then by four deputies in the National Asse1nbly, three me1nbers on the Conseil de la Repub/ique (Senate), and five representatives in the Asse1nbly of the French Union. The 1nost i1nportant political reform of 1946 was ce1tainly the creation of local representative assemblies in the territories under French rule. 2 In Cameroon, the Assernblee Representative Ca1nero11naise (ARCAM) was created by decree on October 25, 1946. The la\v of January 6, 1952, changed ARCAM to Asse,nb/ee Terriroria/e du Ca,neroon (ATCAM) and 1nodified its co1nposition. The ntunber of representatives rose fro1n 16 to 18 for- the first college (that of the French) and from 24 to 32 for the second college (that of Ca1neroonians).

6

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

To understand this double college system, it should be explained that like all the inhabitants of France's dependent territories, Ca,neroonians \Vere ,nade citizens of the French Union by the Constitution of 1946. Ho\vever, this constitution distinguished bet\veen citizens with civil la\v status (French citizens and Ca,neroonians \vho had acquired civil la\v status) and citizens \Vith personal status, that is to say, the great ,najority of the indigenous population. The first category had the right to vote and constituted the first electoral college. In the second category only those \vho satisfied a ce,tain number of specific conditions had the right to vote and constituted the second college. 3 In the case of ARCAM, for example, the 2,611 voters registered in the first college elected sixteen representatives, \Vhile the 38,976 registered in the second college elected eighteen, and the High Com,nissioner of France in Cameroon appointed si x other Africans to the assembly. The disparity in these numbers beco,nes even clearer if we ,nention that the 4,000 French citizens \Vith civil status had sixteen elected officials and the twenty-four others represented three million Cameroonians. ATCAM, the asse,nbly of 1952, was enlarged to include 50 1ne1nbers of which 18 represented so,ne 12,000 French people in Cameroon and 32 represented 3 1nillion Ca1neroonians. The sphere of authority of the asse,nbly of Ca,neroon extended to several aspects of the life of the territory. In the financial field, for exa1nple, the Asse,nbly deliberated and voted on the budget. It had spending initiative. The financial autono,ny of Ca,neroon seemed quite strong since the territory retained the totality of its revenue. The International Tn1steeship System influenced the fiscal syste1n and the international i1nport-export trade; it was the open door policy which had been instituted in 1884 at the Berlin Conference for the Congo Basin. Under it, Cameroon could establish a \vide variety of taxes and duties, including the right of i1nportation and exportation. The powers of the Ca,nerooni an Asse,nbly also extended to the patrimony and above all to the econo,nic and social do,nains. Thus, this Asse,nbly deliberated on the progra,ns of econo,nic and social development planni ng in collaboration \Vith the Board of Directors of FIDES. Likewise it deliberated on the problem of incentives for production, the organization of savings banks and all that concerned co-operatives. However, the extent of the po\vers of the Ca,neroonian Asse,nbly should not be overstated. This assembly was essentially advisory in nature and its po\vers were vague. It is clear that the political changes j ust analyzed provided the European conununity of Cameroon \Vith a solid institutional base which enabled it to prevent political refonns. "In fact, the political institutions in Ca,neroon-and representation in the 1netropolitan asse,nblies- were effectively 1nonopolized by three forces: the French colonial ad1ninistration, the white settler society, and Ca,neroonians \vho did not threaten the fi rst t\vo. The predo,ninance of

The E,nergence of FIDES

7

these three collaborating forces \Vas ,naintained through the wide use of the t\vo-college syste,n \vhich granted political representation to the Europeans greatly disproportionate to their numbers; and secondly, by the very restrictive franchise determining \Vhich Cameroonians \Vere allowed to vote.',4 The double college \Vas the most important objection that could be raised against the asse,nbly of Ca,neroon and a great source of discontent for Cameroonians. The explanation provided on this ,natter by the colonial administration to the UN Visiting Mission in 1952 \Vas very clear. It fitted \Vith the govenunent' s line: At Cameroon's current developmental level the system of double college is still necessary to preserve the interests of the Europeans of the territory, whose contribution is indispensable for its economic development.5

The officials charged \Vith administering the territory ,nade the ftuther observation to the UN Mission: At present the elected members of the first college can enlighten their colleagues regarding certain economic problems, in particular on the question of the necessity of not taking certain steps likely to alarm or discourage French or foreign external private .

rnvest1nents ....

6

As for the colons (settlers) of Ca,neroon, they believed that with the institution of the si ngle electoral college "the Europeans will be definitively put aside, without it being taken into consideration that 9/10 (if not 1nore) of the econo,nic activity of the overseas ten-itories, ahnost all of the private capital invested, 1nining, industrialization, the i1nportant businesses of transportation and transit, banking, trade with the ,netropo/e and with foreign 7 countries etc, are done by the European element. Various actions \Vere taken by the representatives of Cameroon in the parlia,nentary bodies in Paris to have the double college abolished. These representatives included Douala Manga Bell, deputy of Ca,neroon at the National Asse,nbly; Ah,nadou Ahidjo, Andre-Marie Mbida, and Paul Soppo Priso, representatives of Ca,neroon at the Asse,nbly of the French Union. 8 In the territory, several forces expressed their disagree,nent: the K11111zse, traditional association of the Ba1nileke people, de,nanded the single college;9 the United Nations Mission of 1949 reported that the Ngondo, traditional association of the Duala people, protested against the institution of the double college.'° The Mission of 1952 pointed out that "the ,naintenance of the double college has aroused lively criticis,n a1nong the evo/11es [assimilated] of Cameroon (especially among such political parties as the Ca1neroonian section of the Socialist Party, Evolution Sociale Camerounaise and the Union des

8

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

Populations du Ca1nero11n (UPC)." 11 The criticis,ns \Vere generally based on t\vo ,nain factors. On the one hand, the syste,n of the double electoral college constituted racial discrimination; on the other, if the system of a si ngle electoral college had been instituted in French Togo, it should equally be instituted in Ca,neroon \vhich had the sa,ne status. Based on the infonnation it obtained, the UN Mission of 1952 considered that " it would be desirable to institute the si ngle electoral college syste,n as soon as possible in Ca,neroon." The French succeeded in ,naintaining this syste1n up until the Loi Cadre (Outline Law) of 1956. Indeed it \Vas Article IO of this la\v that introduced universal suffrage for all political and ad1ninistrative elections. 12 The Trusteeship Agree111e11t Initially, the French Govenunent did not accept to place Cameroon and Togo under the new Trusteeship syste1n established at the San Francisco Conference of April 1945, just as it had at first refused the Mandate status for the t\vo territories at the end of the First World War. But as in the earlier case, it soon relented under pressure fro,n other govern,nents, among which \Vere the United States and Great Britain. 13 The French opposition co,npletely disappeared when Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, announced on January 17, 1946, that the fonner British ,nandates of Tanganyika, British Ca,neroon and Togo \vould be placed under the International Trusteeship System. A text was proposed by the French and eventually adopted by the General Asse,nbly of the United Nations on Dece,nber 13, 1946. An analysis of this text sho\vs that France agreed: to respect the pri,nacy of the interests of the population of Ca,neroon and to develop their gradual participation in the ad,ninistration of their territory; to assure and safeguard their security; to defend their econo,nic interests and property rights; to ,naintain the open door policy and to ensure the equal treat,nent of all 1ne1nbers of the United Nations in econo,nic ,natters; to ensure the intellectual progress of the Cameroonians by developing pri,nary, secondary and vocational education; to facilitate freedo,n of conscience and worship and to aid the \vork of ,nissionaries of every nationality and their educational, 1nedical and social activities; to assure freedo1n of expression and association in Ca,neroon; and to allow the oversight of the Tn1steeship Council. In return France could: ad,ninister Ca,neroon as an integral part of its own territory; establish if necessary-but after consultation \Vith the local asse1nbly-custo1ns, fiscal or ad1ninistrative unions with other territories; establish ,nilitary bases or ,naintain troops in the territory \Vith the goal of ,naintaining peace and international security; set up public conunercial or industrial ,nonopolies dee,ned beneficial to the populations; de,nand reciprocal treaunent

The E,nergence of FIDES

9

in economic ,natters for the territory fro,n countries that benefit from the open door syste,n; organize popular elections to allo\v the populations to express 14 themselves on the subject of their political syste1n. The tenns of the Trusteeship Agree,nent caused a lot of discontent among a variety of forces in Ca,neroonian society. T he UN Visiting Mission of 1949 reported that it had "received requests suggesti ng the revision of the Trusteeship Agree,nent, notably \Vith regard to the clause of the agree,nent according to \vhich the territory would be ad,ninistered as an integral part of the French territory." 15 This particular clause which \Vas included in Article Four \Vas the ,nain focus of Cameroonian criticis,ns of the Trusteeship Agree,nent. T he dissatisfaction also ste1n1ned fro,n the fact that the proposed agree1nent had not been sub1nitted for the approval of the indigenous population before being presented to the United Nations. The po\ver that guaranteed France di rect political do1nination allo\ved her to formulate an econo,nic and financial policy orientation in the e1npire based on the needs of the metropolitan country. This is what clearly appears in another i1nportant post-war refonn: the FIDES plan. The Origins and Birth of FIDES At the end of the Second World War, France and her colonies had been drained to their limit, their infrastructure partially destroyed or co1npletely ,vorn out. T he adoption of a plan see1ned to be necessary for the re-launching of the national and imperial econo,ny. The first economic plan adopted by the French for the develop,nent of the national econo,ny was the Plan Monnet. 16 Paralleling this plan, the Jaw of April 30, 1946, laid down the pri nciples of an econo,nic and social develop,nent progra1n for the overseas territories. This program ca,ne to be kno\vn as Fonds d'lnvestissement pour le Developpe,nent Econornique et Social des Territoires d'Outre Mer (FIDES). It \Vas also so,netimes referred to as le Plan (the Plan). To discuss this plan, it is necessary to first recall its origins ,vhich can be found in the Sarraut Project of 1921, the Colonial Conference of 1935, and the Brazzaville Conference of 1944. The Sarra11t Project (1921)

It can be said that the Plan originated in the Sarraut Project of 1921. The time has come to substitute an overall and precise plan of action for the isolated and vague guidelines. This is all the more possible since today the period of territorial growth is over for our overseas domain. Relieved henceforth of the obligations of conquest, the effort of the French can now be devoted entirely to the organization of the

10

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era full exploitation of their patrimony. The sovereign interest of France in rebuilding the economy, after a war in which its heroism saved the fate of its colonies, coincides today with the interests of every colonial possession to confidently design the general plans creating a united vision for the organiz,1tion of the overall guidelines for the task of development. Tiiis united vision should organize the multiple tasks of all these workers under one overarching rule and should, through the single unceasing will of the nation, overcome the uncertainties and the upsets which had characterized the now past process of its exploitation in our overseas ten-itories. This is the precise goal of the present project. 17

This is how Albert Sarraut, the French Minister of Colonies, spoke during a parlia,nentary session on April 12, 1921 , in a 90-page prea,nble in the Journal Officiel (JORF) to define the goal of his bill ai,ned at establishing a program to develop the French colonies. This document not only revealed the principles and 1nethods of a new colonial policy but also gave an overview of the econo,nic value of the French colonial do1nain and its contribution not only to the French war effort, but also to its recovery. The proposed bill to \Vhich this vohuninous preamble \Vas attached as an appendix gave a detailed list in its first article of the public \vorks progra1ns to be carried out in the overseas territories. The San·aut project dedicated t\venty pages to Ca,neroon and provided maps of the port of Douala, one of which is very detailed. The project focused pri1narily on the ports and the conununication net\vork. Unfortunately, the Sarraut project failed. So1ne observers have attributed this failure to the absence in the plan of concrete measures about the financial 1neans necessary for its execution. 18 This view is clearly expressed by Annand Jean-Frani.ois: The government was perhaps not well-inspired when it failed to incorporate any articles in the project itself about the financial means which would have ensured its execution. Certainly there was enthusiasm about the Minister's plan. But certain events occurred which took precedence in public opinion. At the time France was in the throes of such financial difficulties that she deemed it her duty to try to remove the considerable internal obstacles which the development of the colonies seemed to demand. The enthusiasm of the first days diminished and with it the interest in colonial

affairs. 19

Thus, no attention whatsoever \Vas paid, as indicated by Jean-Frani.ois, either to the requests for ,nodification of the project ,nade by Deputy Rocques and several of his colleagues in 1921, or to the bill proposed by Senators Messi,ny and Monzy in 1925, which de1nanded the granting of incentives to the new industrial or agricultural companies in the colonies, or, finally, to the proposal of Daladier, \Vhich de1nanded the carrying out of a general develop1nent progra,n of production and trade in the colonies. Edouard Bonnefous also

The E,nergence of FIDES

II

evoked financial reasons to explain the failure of the Sarraut project \Vhen he \vrote that To finance railways, ports, the regulation of rivers, sanitation works, and so many other urgent projects, they envisioned then an expenditure of 4 billion (old) francs to be spread over ten to twelve years, that is to say about 130 billion francs of 1950. Only with the support of a State organi1~1tion could such a project succeed. The Minister proposed the creation of Credir Nario11al des Colonies (National Bank of the Colonies) .... The financial market, from which numerous other reconstruction loans were expected, was not up to the task of meeting the obligations which might have been issued by this Credir Nario11al des Co/011ies. The project was abandoned.20

But financial factors alone are not sufficient to explain the failure of the Sarraut Project. The Jack of support it encountered is also due to other reasons especially the doctrine of the colonial pact (pacre colonial) proclaitned by French industrialists according to which the colonies should remain the reservoirs of raw tnaterials and outlets for French tnanufactured products. The Colonial Conference (1934-1935)

The Colonial Conference of 1934-1935 had the clear intention of challenging the dogma of the colonial pact by making the point that "econotnic developtnent in the colonies is necessary for the intensification of trade." During this conference the Coin.ire des Industries de l'E,npire (Cotntnittee for the Industries of the Etnpire) stated: There is no question that the development of the new regions of whose fate a great country takes charge cannot be fully realized unless they are gradually turned into complex economies and evolve from a rudimentary stage of development to a more developed or better organized one of mostly diversified activities.2 1

The Colonial Conference tnade very specific proposals aitned at directly or indirectly protecting colonial producers. First there \Vere indirect protectionist tneasures taken against foreign cotnpetition. The first of these consisted of raising customs rates in France for those itnported products that were sitnilar to colonial products, including banana, citrus fntits, oleaginous plants, lead, zinc, coffee, tea, and other products. In return, such French products as salt and tobacco were protected against foreign competition by raising colonial custotns rates. Moreover, certain direct protectionist tneasures were also envisioned such as: incentives to producers of certain much needed products including banana, coffee, pineapple, tnanioc, rubber, tobacco, sisal, cotton, and

12

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

flax; the lowering of customs duty; the granting of the duty free entry of a quota of goods to France; tax relief to forestry develop1nent, rubber plantations and to oleaginous crop production; the lifting of all taxes on indispensable equip1nent for the 1nodernization or creation of factories necessary for the develop1nent of the colonies (saw1nills, manufacture of fuel, deco1tication of peanuts, etc). Financial meas ures \Vere also envisioned: the granting of land for the creation of ne,v industries; the granting of mediu1n tenn credit by the Credit Colonial to private finns which 1nodernized their technical equip1nent; the exemption from French taxes for colonial co1npanies during at least the first years of their colonial activities to facilitate the creation of ne,v colonial co1npanies and to thus help the develop1nent of the colony; the establish1nent of the official headquarters of these new co1npanies in France to ensure that only French fiscal legislation applied to the1n; the granting of short tenn credit to agricultural producers. All of this pre-supposed a 1nodification in the econo1nic policies of the colonial ad1ninistration. Consequently, a ce1tain nu1nber of measures ,vere suggested, such as: the obligation of colonial ad1ninistrations to use colonial products (1neat, leather, wool, hides, etc.); and the repeal of ad1ninistrative 1neasures regarding the transportation of ,vine, regulations concerning industrial alcohol, and sanitary regulations concerning colonial products i1nported by France. The role of private initiative ,vas strongly e1nphasized and the creation of professional associations was reco1nmended and encouraged. This dynamism of private initiative was to lead to the creation of ne,v finns and to the continued develop1nent of existing concerns. And the professional associations thus constituted ,vere to be able to carry out market surveys and propose their own 1neasures to adjust production and regularize or decrease the costs. Finally, the conference proposed the creation of a national fund for the public infrastructure of the overseas territories in order to develop the means of transportation necessary for the 1narketing of colonial goods. 22 Like the Sarraut Project, the 1935 conference was a failure. Edouard Bonnefous evoked once again financial causes: To create or reorganize the economic structures indispensable for the profitability of our colonies, the conference established the equivalent of 800 billion francs as the tolal of the sums to be invested. No territory, either with its own resources, or through loans could finance its part of such an extensive program. II was necessary to create a special organizaiion, a colonial fund, supported in part by a state subvention. These ideas had to be abandoned because of the difficulties France was experiencing at the time; they were not taken up again until after the war, when the FIDES was created.23

The E,nergence of FIDES

13

It \Vas not until after the Second World War that France could really put into practice the colonial develop1nent plans recom1nended first by the Sarraut Project and subsequently reconsidered and developed in 1935 by the i1nperial econo1nic conference. The 1nodernization and equipment plans of the French Union \Vere a logical continuation of the Sarraut Project of 1921 and the colonial conference of 1935. But they also took into consideration the reco1n1nendations of the Brazzaville Conference of 1944.

The Brazzaville Co11fere11ce (1944) The Conference of Brazzaville, which \Vas held fro1n January 30 to February 8, 1944, clearly 1narked the beginning of a ne\v era in invesunent policies in Africa. France expressed a co1n1nitJnent "not only to putting her honor on the line, but also to having an interest in having prosperous colonies" because "the access to wealth of everyone who carries the na1ne French is one ?4 of the 1nost clear pledges ...of the return to greatness."- The econo1nic intentions of the French were revealed in a speech 1nade on February I, 1944, at the launching of the \Vork of the hnperial Econo1nic Co1n1nission ( Co,nrnission de I' econo,nie irnperia/e) by Peter \vho \Vas Inspector of Colonies, Director of Econo1nic Affairs at the Depart1nent of the Colonies of the Provisional Govenunent of Alge r, and President of the hnperial Econo1nic Conunission at Brazzaville. He stated that The essential goal we seek in economic matters is the following: a policy of enriching our colonies. \Vhat we are striving for is to increase the buying power of the indigenous population which will allow a rise in their Iiving standards. We no longer conceive of the economy according to certain private interests, but rather we envision an economy which serves the general interest. This policy is not intended only for Africa. It also has the goal of facilitating the provisioning of the mhropole. It is clear that France will need a considerable amount of raw materials and that African colonies will have to do their utmost to send them all the resources. Thus this development policy does not pursue a purely African goal. It seeks as well to fulfill higher, more long-term goals to contribute to the recovery of the motlier count1y.15

After deliberation in a plenary session the conference adopted an i1nportant reco1n1nendation on econo1nic questions on February 7, 1944. These questions \Vere on "the rationalization of production, especially by the development of 1nechanization and by the reorganization of the procedures."26 The principle of industrialization retnained within the existing regulations of authorization and control by the public authority. The officials attending the Brazzaville Conference \Vere divided over the important question of industri-

14

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

alization.27 On this proble1n the final docu1nent to be presented by the Con-1111issaire aux Colonies (Head of the Depart1nent of Colonies) to the 1nembers of the Consultative Asse1nbly was cautious. If industrialization \Vas presented as an ele1nent of progress, allo\ving the buying power of the indigenous population to rise, it should be "pursued in stages with 1nethod and prudence, \Vithi n the strict li1nits set by the general production plan."28 Agricultural develop1nent was the second do1nain to which an invesunent program \Vas to apply. Fi nally, there \Vere a series of reco1nmendations practically reiterating both the propositions of the Sarraut Project and the conclusions of the Colonial Conference of 1935: the 1nai ntenance and extension of the road network, raihvay, ports, telecom1nunications as \Veil as the adaptation of the custo1ns system both to the vicissitudes of the world econ01ny and to the 1nultiple needs of the colonial territories.29 In his speech mentioned above, Peter recom1nended the setting up of a tenyear plan. This FIDES ten-year plan \Vas fi nally established and adopted 111 1946.

NOT ES I. The sections of the French Union are listed under Title VIll of the constitution, articles 60 to 82. 2. The details are contained in a series of decrees dated October 25, 1946 (see Jo11n,al Officiel de la Rep11bliq11e Fra11faise (JORF), October 27, 1946, pp. 109-129 and 150). On the creation of the Assmblee Represe111a1ive d11 Ca111ero1111 (ARCA,11), see ibid., Decree No. 462376, and "Rapport Annuel du Gouvernement Fran~ais" (1947), pp. 220-226. 3. The details on these conditions can be fou nd in "Rapport Annuel du Gouvernement Fran~ais" ( 1947), p. 14. 4. Joseph (R.), Le 111011ve111e11111a1io11alis1e "' This clearly amounts to saying that there is nothing else to do ... but put up with the policy imposed by Paris.27

For the author of this article, the consequences of this policy \Vere inflation, a fragile and rudderless economy, the closing of firms, and a desperate financial situation. By the beginning of 1953, these consequences beca1ne 1nore and 1nore obvious: The economy of Cameroon is in bad shape, disturbing noises can be heard about the situation of some firms, investment sources seem to have dried up, construction projects have considerably slowed down, in fact only projects that began in 1952 are being carried out; unemployment rages in tl1e urban centers and we have never seen so many Europeans looking for work, entire families have returned home in the middle of winter under dire circumstances.

As in French \Vest Africa and French Equatorial Africa, a fonnidable crisis is threatening, 1953 may lead to a real collapse if the authorities do not take measures to help firms meet their tax and customs obligations, and fight against the constant rise in the cost of Jiving, which will be made even worse by the taxes voled on at the budgeta,y session of ATCAM. If we give in passively to inflation, the cunent year will witness many more closings, breakups and bankruptcies. The goose that lays the golden eggs is in bad shape indeed ... The artificial prosperity of these last few years was nothing but a facade which is in the course of collapsing ... if it continues with its excessive taxation and living "from the blood of colonization·· the Administration may no longer find the money to pay itself.28

50

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

The nu1nber of une1nployed Europeans in Ca1neroon did not cease gro\ving, o\ving to continued layoffs due to cost saving efforts in all firms. Tens of thousands of Africans in urban centers found the1nselves in the sa1ne situation.29 After the only spinning null, the most i1nportant sawnlill of the territory also closed its doors. 30 In I 952 and 1953, several finns \Vere liquidated or \vent bankrupt. 31 An observer in I 953 noted that things \Vere especially bad in Douala, the econonlic capital of the territory. Despite the influx of people to Douala things are bad, we are told, they are worse and worse. A fancy department store, constructed at great expense on Colonel Leclerc Boulevard, does ridiculously linle business: some days their receipts amount to no more than 7,000 francs (CFA) ... People come in, look around and don·t buy anything. One is forced to think that money is scarce. And yeI, in the food stores any price is paid, the ladies pull thousand franc bills out of their handbags as if they were twenties ... YeI, it is undeniable that the c1isis is gelling worse. The ocean-liners are fu lly booked until June. No doubt many passengers are only going for vacations, however, many others will not return ... In general, rents in Douala, we are told, have decreased by one third and someiimes by one half. Some people, who had spent fortunes building homes, thinking that the good times will last forever, are now raising their anns to the heavens. The future, in fact, looks dark for everyone and morale is affected by it. 32

It is clear that the boo1n of the early 1950s was ending. Econonlic activities conti nued to slow do\vn during the Second Four-Year Plan.

NOT ES I. Oyono (0.), "La politique africaine du Cameroun, 1960-1985," these de Doctorat d"Etat, lnstitut d · Etudes Politiques de Paris, 1988, pp. 51 and following. 2. To this accusation can be added the charge of electoral fraud that Um Nyobe emphasized in his United Nations speeches; see Um Nyobe (R.), pp. 18 1- 186. Morgenthau described in deJail the technique used by the French officials to falsify the results of elections in their territories; see Morgenthau (R.S.). Political Parties in Frenclt-Speaking \Vest Africa (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1964). For the particular case of C1meroon, read La Voix d11 Camero1111 15 (May-June 1954), and Mbembe (J.A., ed), Le pro/Jleme 11atio11al Kamer1111ais (Paris: L'Hannattan, 1984). 3. See Le Vine (V.T.), Le Ca111ero1111 d11 mandat a /"i11depe11da11ce (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1984), pp. 192-198. 4. See Suret-Canale (J.), p. 8 1. 5. Chauleur (P.), "Impressions de Dakar," ,\1arcltes Co/011ia11x, 275 (February 17, 195 1): 459. 6. ANSOM, FIDES 351, "Le Plan et r evolution du Cameroun 1947-1956," p. 92.

The FIDES First Four-Year Plan ( 1949-/953)

51

7. Cltro11iq11es d"0111re Mer (February 1952). In 1953, three impo,tant agricultural companies from Indochina, permanently abandoning the Far East, transferred their operations to Cameroon. Compagnie du Cambodge, Compagnie des Cao111cho11cs de Padang and Socitite des Pla11wtio11s des Terres Ro11ges established themselves in the region of Sanaga Maritime, where they had each obtained rural holdings of 1,500 hectares (Le Camero,m Ubre, 460, December 1953). 8. Durand (H.), Essai sur la co11jo11c/llre de /'Afriq11e ,wire (Paris: Dalloz, 1957), p. 7 1. 9. Hoffher (R.), La coopera1io11 eco110111iq11eji-c111co-africai11e (Paris: Sirey, 1958), p. 58. 10. "Rapport Annuel du Gouvernement Fran9ais" (1952 and 1955). 11. "Les investissements publics nationaux et exterieurs dans les pays francophones d' Afrique tropicale, 1946-1960," Vol. 2, (Paris: IEDES, 1964), p. 50. 12. My account of the projects carried out in Cameroon during the First Plan is based on a variety of French reports, especially "Le Plan et !'evolution du Cameroun" (ANS0!\1 351. See also Bouchart (P.), "Le FIDES au Cameroun," Civilisations, Vol. VJ, No. 3, (1956). 13. ANSOM, FIDES 35 1, "Rapport sur 1·evolution des finances publiques au Cameroun entre 1938 et 1953," p. 25. 14. "5eme Rapport de la Conunission des investissements," Sw1is1iq11es et Emdes ji11a11cieres, s11pple111e111 fi11a11ces fra11raises I7: 61-62 I 5. ANSOM, FIDES 35 I , "Le Plan et I' evolution du Cameroun, 1947-1956," p. 92. I 6. Le Vine (V .T.), p. 83. 17. "Notes et Etudes Documentaires. La gestion de la France au Cameroun," p. 24. 18. Cited in Chro11iq11es d'Outre Mer (May 1952), p. 43. 19. See ibid. pp. 43-44. 20. Richard (R.), "Le budget du Cameroun et les investissements du FIDES," Memoire de stage, ENA, Paris, ( 1957), 4. 21. //)id. 22. ANSOM, FIDES 35 I , "Rapport sur !'evolution des finances publiques au Cameroun," p. 53. 23. //)id. p. I08. 24. //)id. p. 34. 25. "Rapport Annuel du Gouvernement Fran9ais" (1953), p. 86. 26. The elevated personnel expenditures were mostly due to the "Lamine Gueye law" and increases in salary payments from 1,5 12 million CFA in 1950 to 2,468 million in 1951, and then to 3,03 1 million in 1952. The implementation of the j udiciary refonn made the annual expenses of the service in question rise from 3 to 124 million between 1945 and 1953 (ANSOM, FIDES 351, "Rapport sur !'evolution des finances publiques," p. 53). 27. Le Ca111ero1111 Libre, 436 (December 1952): 2. 28. Le Ca111ero1111 Libre, 439 (15 January 1953): 3. 29. //)id. 30. L'Eveil du Camero1111, 438 (January I, 1953): I. 31. 1\1arclu!s Coloniaux, 413 (IO October 1953): 2799. 32. "Le ralentissement des affaires a Douala," Marches Co/011ia11x, 385 (28 March 1953): 986.

Chapter 4 The FIDES Second Four-Year Plan (1953-1956)

The Political Situation In Cameroon During the Second Four Year Plan relations bet\veen the French Ad1ninistration and the UPC reached a breaking point. This radicalization can be explained by the e,nergence of new factors, including the events taking place in Indochina and Algeria which no doubt influenced people's attitudes. Three factors influenced the perception of the Ca,neroon question. The first factor had to do \Vith French internal politics. Fro,n 1946 to 1954 France \Vas engaged in a war \Vith Indochina, a ,nember of the French Union. The defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Accords \Vere perceived by the French political and military authorities as a hu,niliation. Si,nilarly, the outbreak of the war in Algeria in 1954 was considered by France not only to be a challenge to be ,net, but also a gangrene whose spread had to be i1n1nediately stopped. It was essential for the French authorities that the UPC's de,nands for independence should not create a precedent in Black Africa. The second factor \Vas related to the international cli,nate. The UPC's de,nand for independence was unfolding at the height of the Cold War in a zone that \Vas considered to belong to the Western alliance, and the French Administration considered the party to be part of the international co,nmunist 1novement. A few years earlier in Indochina, faced with the attack of the viet111inh, France had transfonned its coloni al \var into a sort of crusade to protect the Free World. According to Georges Chaffard, U,n Nyobe, Secretary General of the UPC, was considered by his supporters to be the "Ca1neroonian Ho Chi Minh" at this ti,ne. 1 Finally, to these two factors was added the internal political context. The new High Co1n1nissioner, Roland Pre, who arrived in Ca,neroon in 1954, seemed to be ,nore concerned than his predecessor, Andre Soucadaux, \Vith the

54

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

econo1nic develop1nent of the ten-itory than ,vith the political debate. This preoccupation, coupled with the question of Indochina and Algeria, 1nade him little inclined to accept the UPC's de1nand for independence. T he considerable a1nount of French capital exported since 1946 to Cameroon allowed the launching of intensive infrastructure projects and the gro,vth of the investment of private capital in various finns. But the unfolding of French capitalis1n in this part of the colonial Empire also created hardships and imbalances, which contributed to and a1nplified gro,ving discontent in the 1nid 1950s. The UPC' s de1nands for independence and especially the increasing suppo1t for the nationalist 1nove1nent among a large pa1t of the Ca1neroonian population see1ned to be an expression of this. And "fro1n the 1no1nent ,vhen the empire beco1nes one of the ele1nents of French power, all revolutionary fennent provoked by a worsening in the fate of the indigenous population should either be crushed or neutralized by a financial contribution fro1n the ,netropo/e." 2 In the case of Cameroon the French Government adopted both solutions.

''Financial Contribution": Alms and Capital Investment of the Second Plan The Capital of the Second Plan: a Co111pensation for the Withdrawal of Private Capital and a State Duty

Due to the ,var in Indochina, the French overseas territories ,vere still suffering from restrictions on 1netropolitan loans in 1954. Paris decided to grant Cameroon a stun of 27 .5 billion CFA Francs from 1954 to 1958, as part of the Second Four-Year Plan. This decision was all the 1nore surprising since at that ti1ne the ,vords "independence" and "autono1ny" ,vere increasingly heard in Cameroon. Le Ca,neroun Libre co1nmented: While someiimes a relatively minor project placed on the table of the National Assembly can be discussed in commission, sent back, amended, etc .. .before finally being voted on, the celestial manna of which Cameroon is going to benefit was acquired through a simple stroke of a magic wand, we are still asking ourselves how, when barely three months ago dismay reigned: it looked as if there was going to be a disastrous reduction in FIDES loans in the 1953-1954 fiscal year .. . What happened" Could it be that the utterance of the word "independence•· by the delegation of the ·'Ngondo" in the cabinet of ministers at the same time as it was before the-very concemed--bodies of the UN, would have had the effect of loosening the purse strings? The Commissariar General d11 Plan has suddenly become magnanimous. Its generosity towards Cameroon borders on extravagance, to the point that we are a little worried: won·t the other territories be jealous• Cameroon, adopted child of the French Union, and for some time the most turbulent of

The FIDES Second Four-Year Plan ( /953-1956)

55

all on the political level, is so spoilt- at the moment when independence is often talked about-that others could find ·'fault'' with it. 3

In May 1955, the High Co1n1nissioner, Roland Pre, reported social and political activity in Dakar, Brazzaville, and particularly in Ca1neroon, where it \Vas especially felt, 1nore than elsewhere because Ca1neroon \Vas a "special territory, a bit like an only son ,vho is especially spoilt." For Le Ca,neroun Libre which com1nented on this state1nent all this \Vas paradoxical and worriso1ne: And indeed it is paradoxical. Cameroon is the spoilt child of the French Union. France spends fabulous sums on its equipment and facilities: France's massive public investment intends to make up for the disappearance of private investment. For the latter is scared away by political agitation, social problems, crushing costs directly due to personnel costs which are completely out of proportion with the level of economic development and especially by the continuing promises of emancipation. Cameroon is like a spoilt child to whom they always give in. In families it usually leads to a bad end.4

The above reactions lead to ce1tain state1nents on the infl ux of French public capital during the period of the Second Plan. First it can be said that the inco1ning capital served to ensure public investment, and it indeed co1npensated for the withdra,val of private capital. This ,vithdrawal began in 1953 and characterized the period fro1n 1953 to 1957, as ,vas highlighted by the French Administration's report on the Plan and the develop1nent of Cameroon: Although during the period between 1948 and 1953 we have seen a considerable growth in private investment, from 1953 to 1957 we noted an appreciable dip in these investments. Other than the Socihe /11d11s11'ie/le des Cacaos created in 1954, the small finns founded since this time barely deserve mentioning. Some factories even stopped all their activities. In fact the only important investments that were made in the industrial sector were made with semi-public funds. ALUCAM will begin to manufacture alumina in 1957, the oil factory of CFDT will begin producing in 1956, the slaughterhouses of Maroua Salak will be pushed into service starting in 1955. It seems that private capital, discouraged by the generally unfavorable conjuncture that has been in force for three years, is reluctant to invest. 5

In addition, it can be stated that the exportation of French public capital to Cameroon during the Second Plan \Vas a sovereignty constrai nt for France. As 1nentioned earlier, one of the effects of the develop1nent of French capitalism ,vas the appearance, from 1951 on, of the pheno1nenon of budget deficits in the territory. In 1955, the budget deficit of Cameroon reached 1,283,960,534 CFA Francs. 6 This deficit often had to be covered by advances fro1n the French

56

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

Treasury, \vhich \Vere to be rei1nbursed in yearly installments. Thus, Ca1neroon received a subvention of three billion francs in 1957.7 However, the new intervention of French state capitalis1n also aimed to calm the discontent of the territory's population, the rise of Ca1neroonian nationalis1n and ensure the do1nination of the French colonial state over Cameroonian society through the pursuit of the econo1nic and social develop1nent of the territory. It should be recalled that France \Vas accountable to the UN for its activities in Cameroon \vhich she administered for the international body. Therefore France had to avoid all criticis1n fro1n the international conununity. In l 952, A. Soucadaux, High Co1n1nissioner of Ca1neroon at the ti1ne, anticipated the proble1n when he declared: If despite the difticullies it is undergoing, the mhropole can continue to grant us the loans necessary for the implementation of the second part of the plan, the prosperity of Cameroon will be one of the best weapons of France in the intemational debates of tomorrow.8

But the ne\v influx of French public capital to Ca1neroon was an integral part of the new economic orientation decided on early in the 1950s \vhich required ne\v loans. Loans for European Goals

At the ti1ne of its creation the initial goals of FIDES \Vere to "satisfy the needs of the indigenous population" and to "pro1note the development of the econo1ny of the French Union." But starting in 1951, the 1nain objective of this program was redefined: "to increase agricultural and industrial production \Vith the European co1n1nunity in mind."9 Fro1n this 1no1nent on, the colonies \Vere to beco1ne increasingly drawn into the French econo1nic syste1n. The old econo,nie de traite (trade econo1ny) was replaced by a ne\v economie d'extraction (extraction econo1ny).'° Invest1nents \Vere no longer directed at basic equipment but rather at what \Vas necessary for the extraction or the harvesting of raw 1naterials. On this question it is interesting to recall so1ne European decisions. The reco1n1nendation of the Council of Europe of October 14, 1952 stressed the shortage of ra\v 1naterials in Europe as \veil as in the United States, and decided that it was necessary to considerably increase production. 11 Li ke the Asse1nbly of Strasbourg, the European Organization of Econo1nic Cooperation kno\vn as Organisation E11ropeenne de Cooperation Econo,nique (OECE) e1nphasized the need to obtain ra\v 1naterials pri1narily fro1n overseas countries. The adherence to the principle that ra\v 1naterials should be purchased at

The FIDES Second Four-Year Plan ( /953-1956)

57

the lo\vest possible price reinforced the doctrine according to which overseas countries should first and fore1nost be suppliers of raw materials. The restrictive texts of the OECE and of the Asse1nbly of Strasbourg regarding the eventual industrialization of the overseas territories ftuther reinforced the view that these two institutions had of this doctrine. 12 The priority was not industrialization but "to increase the expo1t of raw 1naterials towards the ,netropole as well as towards the dollar zone. Thus \Vas i1nposed the liberal strategy which, this ti1ne, assigned to the overseas territories the function of providing the largest possi ble quantity of raw 1naterials at the lowest possible price." 13 These considerations help to better understand the direction the Second Four-Year Plan took. It is first necessary to look at the Co1n1nittee that was charged with the preparation of the Second Plan. Presided over by Governor Roland Pre, this Com1nittee \Vas composed of high-ranking civil servants and representatives of financial and industrial groups \vhich had direct or indirect interests in overseas territories. A1nong the1n were: Bernard, industrialist; Brie, CEO of the co1npany in charge of electro-chemistry, electro-1netallurgy, and electrical steehvorks \Vithin the company kno\vn as Ugine; Gareau D01nbasle, CEO of Co,npagnie J\,finiere de Conak,y; Gonon, CEO of Banque de J\,fadagascar; Lefaucheux, CEO of Renault; Le1naigneu, CEO of Societe Conunerciale de /'Quest Africain (SCOA); de Vitry, CEO of Pechiney; and many others. The list of the 1ne1nbers of the subco1n1nittees \Vas equally telling: bankers, CEOs of important industrial or co1nmercial co1npanies and se1ni-public companies, all the representatives of capital had joined forces with the State agents to set the Second Four-Year Plan on its feet. 14 In the introduction to its repo1t of April 1954, the Com1nittee declared that "the Second Plan intends to carry out the considerable work of substantially raising the living standards of the autochthonous population that had begun in 1946." At the sa1ne tiine, ho\vever, the com1nentary accompanying this declaration of principle leaves one somewhat skeptical: The Second Plan, while continuing with investmenls of a cultural and social nature accords priority to production. II would be useless 10 try 10 look for long-term solutions (lo ensure the substantial raising of the living standards of the autochthonous populations .. .) without an enormous effort to develop production, which is the basis of any real progress. 15

As a result, the main goal of the Second Plan for Ca1neroon \Vas the develop1nent of production, na1nely that of agricultural production By the diversification and development of agricultural wealth (hence the creation of breeding farms which will produce well adapted and high yielding species, and the

58

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era creation of the modemiz,1tion sectors which will spread these species to the producers and guide the latter in modem agricultural techniques); By the intensification of intemal trade of the wealth produced (improvement of secondary roads and modemiz,1tion of the main axes of transportation); By improving the working conditions of producers (small undertakings of a social character relating to mral engineering, projects of interest to the mral population, water, electricity in the bush which had been much neglected by comparison to urban centers, primary education in rural areas to encourage keeping peasants on their land and to give them a chance of nonnal development, the provision of preventive medicine to the mral population, etc.); By educating producers in the sense of giving them a chance to take charge of the various activities which could not be entirely financed by ADES (partial subventions granted to undertakings of a collective nature, loans for housing and for the producers' • • ) 16 associations .

The 1netropolitan Joans granted to Ca1neroon to encourage the i1nplementation of this progra1n included first those of FIDES which \Vere the 1nost i1nportant; the payments 1nade by this organization which are given in detail in table 5.8 (see chapter 5) \Vere 4,268.1 nlillion CFA Francs in 1954, 3,806.9 nlill ion in 1955, and 3,501.7 nlill ion in 1956. There \Vere also CCFOM loans \Vhich \Vere granted to co1n1n unes , semi-public firms, and private firms. These loans \vhich can be seen in table 5.9 (see c hapter 5) a1nounted to 749.6 million CFA Francs in 1954, 1,453. 1 1nill ion in 1955, and 1,847.6 1nillion in 1956. Finally, civilian invest1nent for equip1nent by the state budget sho\vn in table 5.12 (see chapter 5) amounted to 233 1nillion CFA Francs in 1954, 692 million in 1955, and 829 1nillion in 1956. An analysis of these figures sho\vs that inves ttnent 1nade by CCFOM as \veil as credits fro1n the state budget continued to gro\v \vhile FIDES loans decreased. The state pri1narily invested in oil; about 76% of the expenditures of this budget during the period under consideration \Vere dedicated to the exploitation of and prospecting for oil in the ten·itory. CCFOM Joans \Vere 1nostly granted to public-private pa1tnerships and to private finns (about 74% of Joans), with the pri1nary goal of te1nporarily offsetting the effects of private disinves ttnent \Vhich began in 1953. The withdra\val of private capital explains in part the stagnation, or even relative decrease, of the 1noney supply in Ca1neroon fro1n 1954 to 1956. According to govenunent figures, the total a1nount of the means of pay1nent in Cameroon (fiduciary circulation, private credit accounts) \Vent fro1n 11,879 1nillion CFA Francs in 1954 to 11 ,28 1 1nillion in 1955, and to 11,208 1nillion in 1956. 17 Before discussing the i1npact of the investtnents of the Second Four Year Plan on the territory, it is important to first look at the costs of local public financing during the sa1ne period. What is being cons idered here include the

The FIDES Second Four-Year Plan ( /953-1956)

59

Table 4.1 Allocations of the Carneroonian budget for debt service to FIDES from 1954 to 1956 (amounts in CFA Francs) 1954 Annual repay1nents of loans Interest and depreciation of loans

I TOTAL

I

1955

1956

390,740,000

490,339,000

298,453,000

193,771,000 592,511,000

195,298,537 685,638,283

572,400,000 870,853,345

I

I

I

Source: "Cameroun fran~ais. Budget"

repay1nents, such as those of CCFOM loans and advances granted outside FIDES by the local ad1ninistrations and public co1npanies of Ca1neroon \vhich are shown in table 5.3 (see chapter 5). According to the figures given in this table, the stuns dedicated to these repay1nents a1nounted to 78.7 1nillion CFA Francs in 1954, 128 1nillion in 1955, and 185.3 1nillion in 1956. Rei1nburse1nents 1nade by local ad1ni nistrations and public companies show a net growth, going from 2.3 million CFA Francs in 195 I to 8.3 1nillion in 1953, to reach 185.3 1nillion in 1956. The repay1nents of Joans to CCFOM 1nade by the territory have to be added to these repay1nents. The figures provided by Instirur d'Erude du Developpe,nenr Econornique er Social (!EDES) show that the latter \Vere 1nore i1nportant than the former and their gro\vth was 1nore pronounced, going from 5.4 1nillion CFA Francs in 1952 to 82.1 1nillion in 1954, and to 352.5 1nillion in 1955 to dip to 325 1nillion in 1956_1 8 After 1954, the budgets of Ca1neroon no longer sho\v the details of the territory's contribution to the functioning of French agencies. A1nong "expenditures" there is a category for "contributions, subventions, cooperation fund , Joans and allocations," which, however, does not indicate the details of the Joans. By contrast, the sections pertaining to "public debt" sho\v annual repay1nents on Joans and interests and depreciation of Joans and advances granted by the FIDES as s u1n1narized in table 4. 1.

The In1pact of the Second Plan on Cameroon's Economy The First Four-Year Plan ended in 1953, and \Vith it concluded the phase of large infrastructural projects. The projects undertake n during the Second

60

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

Four-Year Plan consisted of the co1npletion or continuation of operations already underway. At the end of 1956, the following can be said about the territory's infrastructure for economic development. 19 The paved road bet\veen Eclea and Douala \Vas co1npleted. The north-bound axis was under construction. Tan·ing had been completed on the road to the bridge of Nka1n. Work was still being undertaken on the Bafang-Bafoussam section. This project \Vas not going to be continued beyond Mayo-Darle, in part, it was said, for financial reasons (the cost of the project to Ngaoundere was esti1nated to be 1,400 1nillion CFA Francs) and in pa,t because of lo\v profitability. The cost of the east-bound axis \Vas lower and would allo\v the opening up of the Chad region. One part of this project involved a connecting road to French Equatorial Africa. Work \Vas also underway on the Garoua-Maroua route. Besides these ,najor road projects, there were several less significant undertakings. In total, the territory had 12,000 kilometers of roads of \vhich 577 \Vere asphalted and 5,000 \Vere suitable for heavy traffic. I1nprove1nent in the main axes of co1nmunication follo\ved by the opening up of the richest regions led to considerable growth in the nu,nber of auto,nobiles, from 5,074 vehicles in 1949 to 21,531 in 1956. The bulk of the aviation infrastn1cture \Vas completed. Besides the airport of Douala, \vhich had been financed by the state budget, and for \vhich a ne\v n1nway was planned, the four ,nain aerodromes of the territory (Yaounde, Ngaoundere, Garoua and Maroua) could be used regularly by the large aircrafts of the period, such as DC4, DC8, and Cargo Nord 2501. The large project of the development of the Douala port was completed. Projects of lesser i1nportance continued at the po1t. The Wouri Bridge was opened to traffic in 1955, thus co1npleting the Douala-Bonaberi co,nplex. Further \York \Vas planned for the port of Garoua. The project of 1nodernizing the railways was practically co,npleted; the profitability of investtnents was over 25 percent. However, the 505 kilometers of railroads re,nained inadequate and in 1956 the Cameroonian raihvays co,npany had a deficit of about a 100 million CFA Francs. The econo,ny of the territory continued to be based on three ,nain export crops: banana, coffee, and especially cocoa. The price of these products, and thus, the inco,ne of the producers and the available funds of the territory depended on the 1narket. Speculation, the decline or collapse of the price of these products, as \Vas the case for cocoa in 1956, led to a crisis which caused hardships for the ten·itorial budget, and led to a slo\vdown of econo1nic activities and hardships for the rural population. The necessity of cushioning these risks as well as of providing the West with agricultural raw 1naterials explains the ,nain direction taken by the Second Four-Year Plan. It stressed the develop,nent and diversification of agricultural production. This required a

The FIDES Second Four-Year Plan ( /953-1956)

61

rational organization, which was 1nanifested in the establish1nent of sectors of agricultural 1nodernization in Ca1neroon. These sectors of agricultural modernization were endo\ved with considerable autono1ny. They constituted organizations where producers were associated with the 1nanage1nent of local interests and the ad1ninistrative, financial and technical operation of the organizations involved with the development of production. Each sector was to concentrate its efforts on one or more 1nain crops. There were five sectors: the Cocoa Sector (SEMAC); the sector of high altitude crops (SEMOCAL), which \Vas 1nostly concerned with the develop1nent of coffee and tea growing; the Pahn Sector which was established for the production of pahn oil; the Eastern Sector (SEMEST) concerned with a variety of crops; and the Northern Sector (SEMNORD) which \Vas entrusted \Vith developing peanut, cotton and rice production and ani1nal husbandry. Cotton gro\ving \Vas the province of a state co1npany known as Co,npagnie Franraise pour le developpe,nent des Fibres Textiles (CFDT). SEMNORD itself was divided into five sub-sectors: the sub-sector of rice-growing at Yagoua; the "herd-book" of Adamaoua charged \Vith the qualitative and quantitative i1nprove1nent of the cattle stock; the sub-sector of Lara \Vhich was entrusted to CFDT; the sub-sector of Guider \Vhich \Vas in charge of i1nproving and developing peanut growing; and the sub-sector of Doukoula which was specialized in soil conservation. There \Vere no banana sectors, the production of this crop being under the control of producers' cooperatives. There \Vere successes in ani1nal husbandry (Wakwa station). Coffee and cotton production increased. But cocoa production stagnated, as did that of peanuts and bananas \vhile pahn kernel production decreased. It turned out to be rather difficult to achieve short-tenn profitability in those operations \vhich tried to improve the agricultural 1nethods of peasants \Vho re1nained attached to ancestral procedures. The export figures of the period of the Second Four-Year Plan show this leveling off. Govenunent statistics indicate that exports went from 273,260 tons in 1953 to 310,934 tons in 1955. They also show that there \Vas no increase in value: 13,149.7 1nillion CFA Francs in 1956, as opposed to 13,095.4 million in 1953. It 1nust, ho\vever, be 1nentioned that the value rose to 16,550.5 million in 1955. It was the drop in cocoa prices, and a decrease of 20,000 tons in cocoa and banana production that provoked this decline. hnports outstripped exports both in tonnage and value. The volume of i1nports rose fro1n 287,788 tons in 1953 to 350,495 tons in 1956, \vhile their value increased from 14,073.3 1nillion CFA Francs to 16,669.4 1nillion in 1956, after having reached 17,870.9 in 1955. These indexes of the volu1ne of foreign trade reflect a "pause" in the econo1ny of the territory during the Second Plan. h1 the case of exports this

62

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

index is 139 in 1953 and 136 in 1956; for i1nports it is 153 in 1951 as opposed to 152 in 1956. Despite the decrease in the value of i1nports, the deficit of the trade balance due to the deteriorating external situation, especially for the price of cocoa, continually \vorsened after 1954, reaching more than three and a half billion CFA Francs in 1956. The lo\vering in the value of exchanges related to this weake ned econo,nic situation ,nust also be ,nentioned. While in 1954, thanks to the increased price of cocoa, the index gre\v to 148, later on it decreased from 136 in 1955 to 114 in 1956. Finally, one of the ,nain characteristics of the period of the Second FourYear Plan \Vas the ,narked slowdown in private invest1nents. The period also saw the establish1nent of an agricultural infrastructure directed at developing the totality of Cameroonian resources. However, with fe\v exceptions, efforts in this domain did not yield significant results until 1956. Indeed, since investlnents were 1nostly concerned with the establish1nent of an agric ultural infrastructure which would take longer than four years to build, the profitability of agricultural inves t1nents \Vould not be evident until after 1957. The deficit in the trade balance increased. A decrease in the i1nports of ce,tain goods \Vas evident; it \Vas the result of the develop,nent of s1nall -scale processing industries. The i1nportance of capital outflow fro,n France to Ca1neroon since the beginning of the Plan in 1946 \Vas considerable. However, as J. Marseille re,narked, "capital outflo\v alone does not lead to the solid establish,nent of the domination of the exporting country."20 At the end of 1954, the French Government \Vas indeed forced to ad1nit that its policy of the previous six years ai1ned at tryi ng to slow do\vn the progress of the UPC, the 1nost vigorous element of the nationalist 1nove1nent in Ca1neroon, had failed. Des pite the difficulties it faced, the UPC advanced throughout the ten-itory while the other co,npeting parties, ,nostly allied with the local ad1ninistration, re,nained stagnant. France' s financial contribution did not succeed in neutralizing the revolutionary nationalis,n of the UPC among Ca1neroonians. Rather than accepting the UPC's de1nands for independence, the French Govenunent decided to make a last atte1npt to sile nce this radical 1novement. Given the great popularity of the party and the solidity of its local organizations, this process pro1nised to be Jong and extremely bloody. It was in 1955 that the "Cold War" \Vhich ravaged the ten-itory at least since 1948 \Vas transfonned into actual \varfare. In March of that year, violent clashes took place in a number of local ities between Cameroonians, ,nany of \Vho1n \Vere UPC 1nilitants, and forces representing French colonial Jaw. Then in May, riots occun-ed in several towns of southern Ca1neroon. Many people \Vere killed a nd others \vounded.21

The FIDES Second Four-Year Plan ( /953-1956)

63

Both the Ad1ninistration and the UPC mutually accused each other of being responsible for the riots. Ho\vever, the incidents of May provided the colonial authorities with an excuse for dis,nantling and destroying the UPC. While the Ad1ninistration \Vas attempting to eli,ninate the UPC in Cameroon, efforts \Vere also being made in Paris to legally ban this pa,ty fro,n Ca,neroonian political life. On July 2, 1955, at the ,neeting organized in Conakry, Guinea, by the Co,nite de Coordination of the Rasse111b/e1n.ent De1nocratiq11e Africain (RDA), the UPC as \Veil as two other radical sections of the RDA, the Union De1nocratiq11e Senegalaise and the Parti Progressiste Nigerien, \Vere expelled fro,n the RDA. It ,nust be recalled that the UPC had s teadfastly refused to follow the strategy of Houphouet Boigny, leader of the RDA who, after 1950, broke ties \Vith the French Co1n1nunist Party. Howeve r, the 1nain reason that led to the expulsion of the UPC from the RDA in 1955 is the sa,ne as that \Vhich 1notivated the French Gove nunent's repression, that is the hostility to an organization \Vhich refused to give up its de1nand for the independence of Ca,neroon in favor of integration into the French Union.22 It \Vas also for the same reason that on July 13, 1955 the French Govern1nent presided over by Edgar Faure, \vho had recently replaced Pierre MendesFrance, banned the UPC as \veil as its subsidiary youth and wo,nen 's organizations, Jeunesse Dernocratique Camerounaise (JDC), and Union De1nocratiq11e des Fenunes Carnerounaises (UDFC). Fro,n that ti1ne on, anned struggle beca1ne the only choice for the UPC. The party was forced into a bloody conflict which began in Dece,nber 1956 and was to last for several years.

NOT ES I. Chaffard (G.), Les can,e1s secre1.r de la deco/011ismio11, vol. I et 2 (Paris: Calman Levy, 1967), p. 361. 2. Marseille (J.), Empire colonial e1 capi1alisme fra11 , ais. His10ire d·1111 divorce (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984), pp. 15 1- 152. 3. Le Camero1111 Libre, 474 (July 1- 15, 1954): I. 4. "La ruine de l' economie du Cameroon stopperait la progression sociale," Le Camero1111 Libre, 495 (May 15-3 I): I. 5. ANSOM, FIDES 351, "Le Plan et !'evolution du Cameroon 1947- 1956," p. 96. 6. "Deux milliards de subvention pour le Cameroon," La Presse d11 Camero1111 (November 14). The deficit was 780 million in 195 1, 551 million in 1952 (ANS0!\1, FIDES 35 1, "Rapport sur I' evolution des finances publiques," p. 3 I). 7. Grassard (J.), "Le budget du Cameroon pour 1955," La No11velle Rev11e de la France d·o111re Mer, 2 (February 1952): 49- 50. 8. Cited in Chro11iq11e t1·0111re mer (February 1952): 49- 50.

64 9. I0. 11. 12. 13. 14.

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era Davidson (B.), L 'Ajrique au XXe siecle (Paris: Jeune Afrique, 1979), p. 2 10. See i/)id and Marseille (J.), p. 273. See Le Ca111ero1111 Ubre, 438 (January I, 1953): 1-4. See ,11arches Co/011ia11x, 414 (October 17, 1953): 2821-2823. Marseille (J.), p. 275. Dumaine (A.L.), "La signification reelle du second plan," Prese11ce Ajricai11e (April- July 1955): 67.

Cited by Dumaine, Ibid. "Rapport Annuel du Gouvernement Fran9ais" (1957), p. 108. "Rapport Annuel du Gouvernement Fran9ais" (1956), p. 3 10. "Les investissements publics nationaux," p. 50. The following presentation is based on various archival documents the most important among which are the report entitled "Le Plan et l'evolution du Cameroun, 1947-1956" (ANSOM, FIDES 351, pp. 93 and following) and data from "Conunerce exterieur du Cameroon oriental." 20. Marseille (J.), p. 150. 21. The colonial administration presented the following assessment of the riots of May 1955: dead and 62 wounded among the forces of order; 4 dead (2 Africans and 2 Europeans) and 13 wounded ( 11 Europeans and 2 Africans) among the civilian population; 20 dead and 114 wounded among the demonstrators; 357 arrested and 85 warrants issued. For a summary of these riots, see: Atangana (1\1.) , Capitalisme e111a1io11alisme a11 Camero1111 au le11demai11 de la Seco11de G11erre 1\1011diale, /946- /956 (Paris: Publications de la Soroonne, 1998), pp. 157-159; "Cameroun 1955. Les Emeutes de mai" (Service de l'infonnation); and "Emeutes sanglantes au C1meroun" (1\1arclu!s Colo11ia11x, June 4, 1955, p. 1509). 22. See /111er-Ajriq11e Presse (June 2, 1955): 12. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

Chapter 5 Financial Assessments of Public Investment

There are 1nany statistical sources on public capital invested in Ca1neroon from 1946 to 1956. The figures vary according to the sources, but not all of these sources are reliable. The assess1nent that \viii be made in this chapter is for the most part based on data fro1n the excellent study, already cited several ti1nes, conducted by IEDES researchers, \Vho used the figures provided by CCFOM \Vhich was the principal instnunent of the mobilization of French overseas public investment during the period of this study. 1 From 1947 to 1959, the CCFOM issued its financial position, 1nonthly or annually. I have had the opportunity to consult these CCFOM docu1nents for the purpose of co1nparing and cross-checking data. The CCFOM docu1nents can be found in the French Overseas Archives at Aix-en-Provence, France. Assess1nents 1nade here concern invesunent realized in the public sector \Vith capital of local and 1netropolitan origin, private invesunent 1nade \Vith 1nedit11n tenn credit, the set up of companies and capital increases, and intangible research expenditures. The available financial infonnation on the types of invesunents \Vas to so1ne extent statistically centralized. This centralization, however, is lacking \Vith regard to long-tenn private borro\ving and self-financing of modern firms. Finally, it should be noted that the assess1nents are in CFA Francs after conversion fro1n French francs. To recall, one CFA franc during the period of this study \Vas worth 1.70 French francs in 1946 and 1947, 1.76 French francs in 1948, and 2 French francs during the rest of the period. The Final Cost of Internal Public Financing The necessity of assessing the invesunents made in Ca1neroon from the local budget has already been underlined: such assess1nents 1nake it possible to 1neasure the a1nount of 1netropolitan capital which \Vas exported to Cameroon, to quantify French economic intervention in the territory, and to assess the

66

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

ability of the colonial state to i1npose its vie\vs and authority. The calculation of the final costs of the internal public financing consists of evaluating, aside from the public investments of local funds or "gross investments," the various financial flows \Vhose purpose was to increase the volu1ne of French invest1nent in Cameroon. These financial flo\vs \Vere pri1narily the result of the follo\ving operations: repay1nents by the territory of advances that had been granted to it by CCFOM \Vithin the fra1ne\vork of FIDES; repay1nents by public organizations (urban and rural com1nunes, ports, railways, Cha1nber of Com1nerce, etc.), of loans and advances granted by CCFOM outside of FIDES; and Ca1neroon's o\vn participation in the FIDES progra1n. Infonnation about these 1nove1nents can be supple1nented fro1n the yearend financial statements of CCFOM and FIDES of Dece1nber 31. These state1nents 1nake it possi ble to differentiate bet\veen the payments disbursed , on the one hand, and the redemption of loans, on the other. The interest paid by the recipients of these loans is not taken into consideration. In the budget of the territory, already presented in the preceding chapters, the interest figures and depreciation pay1nents appeared in consolidated fonn, as did the figures of the loan annuities and the contributions of the territory to the functioning of certain French services. But an assess1nent of the flood of capital from Cameroon to France, based on these figures \viii be 1nisleading, inas1nuch as the budgets consulted only are co1nprised of entries which do not correspond to the actual a1nounts paid. Thus assessments 1nade here will be based only on the "financial s tatements" of FIDES and CCFOM. Ho\vever, the a1nounts of pay1nent orders relating to the contribution of Cameroon to French services \viii be included; it should be 1nentioned that the schedules \vhich could be recovered fro1n archival docu1nents, only cover the period fro1n 1946 to 1950. The following tables recapitulate the final cost of internal public invest1nent: table 5.1 indicates gross invest1nent from internal financing; table 5.2 is on Ca1neroon's o\vn contribution to FIDES and repayments by the territory of loans and advances fro1n CCFOM under FIDES; table 5.3 details the repay1nents of loans and advances, above and beyond FIDES, of CCFOM by local public organizations and co1npanies; table 5.4 sho\vs the investments of the Ca1neroonian budget fro1n local funds; table 5.5 is dedicated to pay1nent orders fro1n the local budget for the contribution of the territory to the functioning of French services such as Caisse lntercoloniale des Retraites, Bureau International de Berne, postal services and organizations, Ecole Africaine de A1edecine et de Phannacie de Dakar; Sen,ice Geographique, lnstitut International Sey11wur, lnstitut de A1eteorologie, organizations and publications of scientific and c ultural interest, Bureau d 'Accueil d'Alger, Centre Acridien du Soudan, and Centre des Hautes Etudes J\,fusul,nanes; and table 5.6 shows the final costs of internal public financing.

Financial Assess,nents of Public lnvest1nent

67

Table 5.1

Gross capital investment fron·1 internal financing fron·1 /946 to 1956 (a,nounts in 111//lions of CFA Francs) 1946 101.3 21.0 2.0

Budget Raihvavs Port budget Cocoa account Co1n1nunal budgets

I TOTAL

5.2

I

Budget

1948 377.8 26.5

11.2

I

129.5

18.5

I

112.5

422.8

I

1949 599.3 33.0

1950 884.7 38.0

82.0

196.0

30.0

42.8 1,161.5

744.4

I

1951 883.8

1952 2,053.4

1953 1,516.2

1954 580.8

1955 1,143.2

1956 421.1

182.0

33.8 161.1

233.8 260.0

278.0 300.0

399.8 351.2

138.8 136.9

324.5

605.0

219.0

68.0

89.5

111.2

IOI. I

111.4

113.9

Raihvavs Port budget Cocoa account Co1n1nunal budgets

I TOTAL

1947 87.3 14.0

I 1,458.3 I 2,942.8 I 2,340.2 1 1.259,9 1 1,985.6 I

810.8

I

I

Source: adapted from ·'Les investissemenls publics nationaux" vol II, p. 45.

Table 5.2

Ca,neroon's own contribution to FIDES and repay,nents of CCFOM loans under FIDES fro,n /946 to /956 (a,nounts in 111.i/lion of CFA Francs) 1946-51

1952

Contributions Reoav1nents

I TOTAL

1953

5.4

I

I

5.4

I

I

1954

1955

1956

82.1

352.5

325.0

352.5

I 325.0 I

82.1

I

Source: adapted from ·'Les investissemenls publics nationaux" vol II, p. 50.

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

68

Table 5.3

Repayments of non-FlDES loans from CCFOM by local public organizations and co111paniesfro1n 1946 to 1956 (anwunts in ,nillion of CFA Francs) 1946--50

1951 2.0 0.3

Local budget Co1n1nunes Other organizations Public co1npan1es

I TOTAL

1952 4.2 2. 1

1953 4.2 4.4

1954 61.2 16.6

1955 78.5 20.3

1956 111.3 19.0 47.5

I

I

2.3

I

6.3

I

8.6

I

0.9 78.7

29.2

7.5

I 128 I 185.3 I

Source: adapted from ·'Les investissements publics nationaux" vol II, p. 55.

Table 5.4

lnvesflnents of the Ca,neroonian budget fro,n local jitnds froni 1946 to 1956 (a,nounts in ,nil/ion of CFA Francs)

InfraStructures 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 195 1 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956

24.2 13.7 43.9 66.8 162.4 66.0 81.8 509.4 2 10.8 4 12.0 111.9

Ne\v buildings 22.3 6.6 130.6 285.4 432.4 659.6 1,780.2 679.0 103.8 273.0 72.5

Acquisition of 1naterials 54.8 67.0 87.4 193.4 287.4 158.2 191.4 283.8 266.2 417.2 234.4

Transfers

115.9 53.7 2.5

44.0 41.0 2.4

Source: adapted from ·'Les investissements publics nationaux" vol II, p. 17.

T OTAL

101.3 87.3 377.8 599.3 884.7 883.8 2,053.4 1,516.2 580.8 1,143.2 421.2

Financial Assess,nents of Public lnvest1nent

69

Table 5.5 Pay,nent orders of the Ca,neroonian budget for contributions to the functioning of French services and organizations, fro,n /946 to /950 (a,nounts in CFA Francs)

A B C

1946 205,946.5 17,388

1947 9 18,838

1948 2,171 ,150

1949 567,460 9,882.5

D E F G

H I J

1950

429,030

1,014,000 7,450,000

I0, 190,000

7,500,000

7 ,500,000 51,697 54,558

10,764.7 20,000 26,356 754,000 22,740

K

L M N

29,800 150,000

0

p Q

ITI 280,455.2 I 2,686,833 I 2.193,890 I 15,707,142

2,717,875 100,000 310,480.5

I 21,353,540,S I

Source: ANSOM, affaires economiques 84. Tiiis source does not specify whetlier tlie figures are adjusted for inflation or not. A: Caisse /ntercolo11iale des Retraites. B: 811rea11 !111enw1io11al de Berne.

C: D: E: F:

Postal services and organiz,1tions.

Treasury expenses.

G:

/ns1i1111 lmen,mional Seymour.

Ecole de Medeci11e el de Pharmacie de Dakar. Sen,ice Geograpltiq11e.

H: Accountancy expenses. I: Contribution to colleges. J: \Var damages. K: ills1i1111 de Me1eorology.

L: Organiz,1tions and publications of scientific and cultural interest.

70

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,n.eroon: The FIDES Era

M: 811rea11 d'Acc11eil d'Alger.

N: Organizing of the show of colonial engineers. 0: Ce111re Acr idie11 d11 So11da11. P: Ce111re des Hall/es Emdes 1\111s11!111a11es.

Q: Expenses for the delegation of Cameroon. T: TOTAL.

Table 5.6

Final cost of internal public financing or French invesun.ents fro,n Ca1neroonianji111dsfro1n 1946 to 1956 (a111011nts in millions of CFA Francs) YEAR 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956

AMOUNT 129.5 112.5 422.8 744.3 1,161.5 1,460.6 2,954.5 2,348.8 1,420.7 2,466.1 1,321.1

Source: adapted from ·'Les investissements publics nationaux" vol II, p. 57.

Public Capital of Metropolitan Origin Metropolitan public capital invested in Ca1neroon had three sources: FIDES, CCFOM, and the French state budget. The invest1nent activities take n from these sources so1neti1nes appear in the fonn of transfers and grants, Joans, advances and contributions, so1neti1nes in direct spending. Loan transactions \Vere mostly carried out by CCFOM, which acted as a public banking institution. The French State contributed to the financing of investinents either by direct spending, or by contributions to semi-public co,npanies, or by equip,nent grants to the local budget. Created by Article 3 of the Law of April 30, 1946, FIDES \Vas to provide financing for the develop,nent plans in Cameroon as \vell as in the other territories under French rule.

Financial Assess,nents of Public lnvest1nent

71

From a legal point of vie\v, FIDES was a single account a1nong the entries of CCFOM which exercised the rights and fulfilled the functions that had been assigned to it by the Decree of February 2, 1944 and by the Law of April 30, 1946 related to the establish1nent, financing, and imple1nentation of develop1nent plans for the ten·itories under the purvie\v of France Overseas Ministry. It 1nust be recalled that the resources of FIDES \Vere of two kinds: a subsidy detennined every year by the Finance La\v; the contributions of the territory either fro1n its o\vn resources or-this \Vas generally the case-from Jong tenn advances that the CCFOM granted based on the anticipated needs for the i1nple1nentation of the approved programs. FIDES operations were divided into two sections: first a general section that \Vas fully financed by the French Treasury and provided support for shared expenditures, including studies, scientific and 1nining research, as \veil as State acquisitions in the 1najor energy and mining concerns; secondly an overseas section supported by the contribution of the territories fro1n the advances of CCFOM and fro1n a subsidy by the French State, which financed local projects and activities. The general principle for an assess1nent of invest1nents 1nade by FIDES is to exa1nine the invesllnent at the level of actual spending as expressed by pay1nents 1nade. Such an assess1nent can be 1nade based on the "financial state1nent of CCFOM," dra\vn on June 30 of each year, fro1n 1947 to 1959. CCFOM \Vas the 1nain instru1nent for 1nobilizing French public invesllnents in Ca1neroon. Assess1nents 1nade here only take into consideration the organization's own transactions, that is to say its transactions outside of FIDES, can·ied out in keeping with the Law of April 30, 1946, to help finance programs foreseen by the Plan. Thus, the assessment of CCFOM inves11nent made here \viii exclude: 1nedit11n term rediscount transactions; granting of endorse1nent backing for the financing of procure1nent contracts; and CCFOM advances \Vhose duration and goals 1nake them pure cash advances. CCFOM operations considered here are those which contributed to gross capital fonnation. They concern firstly Joans and advances granted to the ten·itory, to local public organizations (com1nunes, chambers of co1nmerce, the national railway company, etc), to finns \Vith public financing (energy companies, real estate companies), and to private finns; and secondly contributions to the capital of semi-public co1npanies, state-owned companies, and private finns. The financial state1nents of CCFOM on December 31 of each year (from 1947 to 1959) 1nake such an assess1nent possible. The French national budget contributed to the spending for equip1nent 1nade by various French 1ninistries, such as the Ministry of Overseas France

72

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

and the Ministry of Public Works. In addition, 1nany FIDES and CCFOM investlnent projects received subsidies or grants from the French budget. The operating expenses related to scientific research will also be considered here. These expenses were for the 1nost part dedicated to the re1nuneration of researchers. They were the responsibility of certain organizations or institutions with a special status \Vhich \Vere funded entirely or in pa1t fro1n 1netropolitan budgets (Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre Mer [ORSTOJ\,1}, Co,nrnissariat a l 'Energie Aro,nique, research institutes, etc). There is also the case of the expenses of oil exploration research attached to the Bureau de Recherches Petrolieres (BRP). This institution received the quasi-totality of its funding from the State. What characterized these investments \Vas the general interest they served (aeronautics, mariti1ne signaling) and the co1nplexity of their allocations (ORSTOlvf, Energie Atomique, Bureau Minier, etc.) Military spending is excluded fro1n the assess1nents made in this study. The 1nain reason for this exclusion is that "the variety of financing 1nethods, the multiplicity of services and organizations, even the distribution of Joans a1nong the different budgets 1nake it very difficult to detennine (or even to assess) the State's budgetary spending in the fonner overseas territories."2 Also, responding to strategic i1nperatives, these expenses in general had little i1npact or influence on Ca1neroonian society. Finally, regarding the actual Marshall aid eannarked for the develop1nent of the overseas territories, the exchange value in francs passed through CCFOM. Therefore, this aid \viii be noted into the accounts at the sa1ne ti1ne as the running operations of the organization under FIDES (CCFOM advances for participation in FIDES). It is i1nportant to realize that the Marshall Plan for the overseas territories was kept separate only in reference to the allocation of currencies. In Ca1neroon, as elsewhere in Africa, the Marshall Plan played an i1nportant role by facilitating the reconstruction of the heavy equip1nent stock necessary for the 1najor infrastn1ctural \Yorks to be can·ied out in the territory. The follo\ving tables sum1narize the assess1nent of public capital invested in Ca1neroon fro1n I 946 to I 956 by the French national budget (table 5.7), FIDES (table 5.8), and CCFOM (table 5.9). To these tables \viii be added figure 5.1 \Vhich 1nakes it easier to have a quick overview of the develop1nent of French public invest1nent in Ca1neroon and the relative i1nportance of each source of financing. An exa1nination of these tables and figure leads to certain observations. Firstly, the funds deriving fro1n FIDES were the 1nost i1nportant; actually they constituted 1nore than half (approxi1nately 54 percent) of the total capital invested by France in Ca1neroon fro1n I 946 to 1956. It is interesting to note that the Ca1neroonian budget \Vas the second largest source of investlnent,

Financial Assess,nents of Public lnvest1nent

73

having provided nearly one quarter of the total. With a little 1nore than 16 percent of the total investments, the capital of CCFOM only co1nes in third place. Finally, the contribution of the French national budget was very lo,v, since it constituted about only 4 percent of the total capital invesunent. Secondly, it can be stated that after a net growth in invesunents fro1n 1947 to l 952, there ,vas a decrease fro1n 1953 on, that is to say fro1n about the ti1ne of the end of the First Four-Year Plan and the beginning of the Second Plan. The sums expended during the First Plan ,vere alinost double those spent during the Second Plan. For econo1nic and strategic reasons, the French attributed special i1nportance to infrastructure in Ca1neroon after the end of the \Var. More than 70 percent of FIDES total loans \Vere invested in this sector from 1946 to 1956. For the period of the First Four-Year Plan alone, this was 86 percent. The subsequent drop in invesunents during the Second Plan can be understood in light of the fact that the bulk of the infrastructural projects had been undertaken during the First Plan. Table 5.7

Civilian capital spending in the French national budget for Ca,neroon fro,n 1946 to 1956 (a111011nts in millions of CFA Francs) Aviation Infrastructure

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956

7 8 32 10 3 28 120 105 13 140 175

Other direct budgetary soendi ng (a)

30

81

Contributions of BRP to SEREPCA (b)

13 75 77 135 220 552 573

TOTAL

7 8 32 10 16 103 197 270 233 692 829

Source: adapted from ·'Les investissements publics nationaux" vol II, p. 92. (a) All other investments financed by the French budget are listed under this category. (b) BRP: B11rea11 des Recherches Petrofieres; SEREPCA: Societe d'£rpfoi1a1io11 et des Recherches Petrolieres a11 Ca111ero1111.

French lnvestlnent in Colonial Ca,neroon: The FIDES Era

74

Figure 5.1 French public lnveshnent In Ca111eroon from 1946 to 1956 •

lnvestlnents fro,n Cameroonian Funds

■

FIDES lnvest1nents

* ■

CCFOM lnvest1nents lnvestlnents fro,n the French State Budget

Years

5000 ~

(I)