Four samurai: a quartet of Japanese army commanders in the Second World War

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Tomoyuki Yamashita

Renya Mutaguchi

Masaki Honda

MM

Masaharn Homma

Arthur Swinson F O U R SA M U RA I A Q U A R T ET OF JAPAN ESE A R M Y CO M M AN D ERS IN THE SECOND W O RLD W A R

H U T C H IN S O N O F L O N D O N

ALSO BY ARTHUR SWINSON

Scotch on the Rocks Six Minutes to Sunset (Amritsar 1919) A Casebook of Medical Detection Kohima North-West Frontier The Great Air Race

H U TC H IN SO N & CO (Publishers) LTD 178-202 Great Portland Street, London W i London Melbourne Sydney Auckland Bombay Toronto Johannesburg N ew York ★

First published 1968

© Arthur Swinson 1968 This book has been set in Bembo, printed in Great Britain Antique Wove paper by Fisher, Knight & Co., Ltd., St. Albans, Herts, and bound by Win. Brendon, of Tiptree, Essex 09 089440 5

CO NTENTS

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Author’s Foreword The Warrior and the Code Homma and the Capture o f the Philippines Yamashita and the Triumph in Malaya Mutaguchi and the March on Delhi Honda and the Destruction o f the 33 rd Army Yamashita in the Philippines Journey to the Gods

9 15 34 79 115 151 190 221

Bibliography

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Appendix: Senior Commanders and Staffs of 14th Army 15th Army 25th Army 33rd Army 14th Burma Area Army

257 258 258 259 260

Index

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Frontispiece The Four Samurai MAPS Facing p. 34 The Japanese Landings on the Philippines Facing p. 80 Malaya and Singapore Facing p. 114 Central Burma Facing p. 150 Burma and Malaya Between p. 192 and p. 193 The Return to the Philippines Facing p. 262 The Philippine Islands

(The photographs o f Yamashita and Mutaguchi are reproduced by courtesy o f the Kyodo News Agency and those o f Homma and Honda by courtesy o f the National Defence College, Tokyo.)

ACKNO W LEDGEM ENTS

General Yamashita’s poems on pages 220 and 223 were translated from the Japanese by John Deane Potter and published in his work A Soldier Must Hang (Frederick Muller) 1963. They are reprinted here by kind permission o f the author. The letters o f General Homma are published by kind permission o f his widow, Mrs. Fujiko Homma. Permission was given to quote from Stanley L. Falk’s The March of Death by Robert Hale, New York.

A U TH O R ’ S FO REW O RD

Though more than twenty years have passed since the war with Japan came to an end, it has lost none o f its fascination, and indeed it is recognised as a unique event in military history. The great names like Pearl Harbour, Manila, Okinawa, Singapore and Imphal, still ring with drama and tragedy; histories, memoirs, and other books, not to mention articles and television programmes, continue to be produced; and old arguments are revived. The major Allied commanders like Mountbatten and Slim in England, or MacArthur and King in America, remain famous and even legend­ ary; their personalities and careers have stamped themselves on the nations. W ith the Japanese commanders, however, the situation is very different; for the most part they remain like ‘baddies’ on the skyline in an old Western. V ery few are known, even to those interested in military history, and some remain anonymous, even to the men who fought against them. For every person who has heard o f General Masaharu Homma, who took the Philippines in 1942, probably ten thousand know about Douglas MacArthur; Yamashita and Mutaguchi are known to specialists; and Honda is merely a name in the official histories. It may be worthwhile asking how this situation has come about, for it is by no means normal. Leading opponents both in the W orld Wars and lesser conflicts have usually acquired fame, or at least infamy or notoriety, and sometimes even glamour. Obvious names spring to mind: Rom m el, George Washington, Hindenburg, Kemal Ataturk, Bagdolio, Smuts, Botha, De W et, and more recently, Vo Nguyen Giap. There must have been almost as many lives o f Napoleon written in England as in France; and even school­ boys know about N ey and Soult. But to most people, it would 9

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seem, the Japanese are such a strange and foreign race that there is no basis for common understanding. Even a military historian remarked to me when I was embarking on this project, ‘Y ou could hardly argue that the Japanese commanders had the character o f a Montgomery or a Patton’. To him all Japanese (or Chinese or Indians, no doubt) seemed indistinguishable. Another reason is probably that, o f the vast mass o f w ar literature published in Japan, very little has been translated; works like General Imamura’s Reminiscences, General M uto’s Memoirs, Colonel Fujiwara’s The Tragic Imphal Operation, Sergeant-Major Toichiro Imanishi’s Burma Front Diary, Jo Kojim a’s War in the Pacific, and hundreds o f others. W ithout such literature one is left with books covering the various campaigns almost entirely from the British or American viewpoints, and the Official W ar Histories. The authors o f these large and detailed volumes, whether produced in London or in Washington, have been able to draw on a vast mass o f Japanese sources, including interview material from the main figures engaged, and give much interesting information about the other side. But naturally, the exploration o f character, the anecdotage which brings people alive, is quite outside their brief. Also, they deal with Arm y Commanders as they were during the campaign under considera­ tion; there can be no detailed examination o f their past careers and the forces and motives which shaped them and brought them to high rank. There can be no discussion o f their childhood, o f their private lives, o f their marriages; and indeed one often gets the impression from Official Histories that i f the generals took o ff their uniforms, they would dematerialise. Little attention has been paid either, especially in the British histories, to staffs, and even Chiefs o f Staff It would seem rather odd to write about Napoleon’s campaigns without mentioning Berthier, but in Volume III o f The War Against Japan, R enya Mutaguchi’s C hief o f Staff, Lieuten­ ant-General Kunomura, is not even mentioned by name. But i f one knew, for example, that in contrast to Obata (whom Mutaguchi sacked) Kunomura was a weak character who concealed bad news rather than face his commander’s anger, one’s understanding might be increased. But to return to the generals themselves: it is, o f course, nonsense to suggest that being Japanese they lacked recognisable character

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and were as alike as peas in a pod. N o one rises to high command, especially in a highly professional service like the Imperial Japanese Arm y, without considerable force o f character, personality and ability. Mutaguchi was as different from Homma as Alexander from Omar Bradley. Their family backgrounds were different. Their views on marriage, women, literature and a thousand other tilings were different. Their behaviour and treatment o f their staffs were different. Except that they were both Japanese and served in the same army, they had little in common at all. There are two other factors affecting the character o f Japanese commanders during this period, and neither in m y view has been fully appreciated so far: first, the political background, and second, the samurai code. The 1930s were, o f course, an explosive era in Japanese history, with the army trying to gain control o f the national destiny and launch itself into new conquests. It was a period o f what is often known as ‘government by assassination’ . From the early Meijian period in the 1860s there had been political cliques, but from the 1920s these grew in power and developed a merciless rivalry. Most ambitious officers joined one or more o f the cliques, and either advanced or blighted their careers as the struggle developed. Unfortunately, no full study o f the political allegiances o f the military hierarchy has yet appeared in English, and the available information is fragmentary. However, I have tried to indicate the climate in which m y quartet o f generals made their careers, and show how their various alliances and enmities lingered on. Such information, it seems to me, is essential for any true understanding o f them. For example, it is often said that Terauchi and Yamashita were old friends and that it was Terauchi’s influence which sent the latter to Malaya; in fact, they were old enemies, one belonging to the Control Faction and the other to the Imperial W ay. As the w ar progressed, it is true, some o f these political enmities mellowed, and Yamashita, for example, could choose General Muto as his C hief o f Staff; but others persisted even in the days when Japan was sliding towards defeat. The other factor, the samurai code, has largely been accepted as a cruel, barbarous tradition, responsible not only for fanaticism in battle and the willing acceptance o f death, but also for cruelty to prisoners o f war. It was a cruel code, most certainly, but deeper

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study soon indicates that it had many facets, some very surprising. It produced courage and loyalty, but also stupidity and rigidity. It led to great daring and the acceptance o f risks, but also to bad staff w ork and administrative blunders. It led also to a form o f ‘double-talk’ ; and as Lieutenant-General Iwaichi Fujiwara has said recently: ‘This contradiction between public expression and private thoughts can be considered a facet o f Japanese traditional samurai spirit. For m y part, I consider that w e Japanese are inclined to honour courtesy, and “ face” , more than is necessary. . . .’* He was referring to the Imphal battle where the ‘double-talk’ cost thousands o f lives: just one o f many examples. But it should not be imagined that all Japanese officers, even generals, lived and fought strictly by the code; some shirked its final rites and refused to com­ mit seppuku (or hara kiri); some obeyed only when it suited their purpose; and a few flouted the code. Often at moments o f crisis there would be bitter arguments as to the correct interpretation. But whatever their behaviour, the code was a basic reality in the lives o f all Japanese officers; and it seems to me that only by some real understanding o f its implications can one probe into their hearts and minds. I think that some explanation may be due as to how m y four samurai were selected. Masaharu Homrna seemed to suggest him­ self. T o m y knowledge, no full-length study has yet appeared in Enghsh, though his Philippines campaign was one o f the most sensational o f the entire war. As I hope readers w ill agree, he is a fascinating character, both as a man and a soldier, and should not be forgotten. Tokoyuki Yamashita, the ‘Tiger o f Malaya’, is perhaps the most famous o f Japanese generals, and many authorities consider him the best. A good deal has been written about him, but almost invariably as he was at his trial. Most Americans coming into contact with him at this time were captivated by him, whether they were Intelligence officers, security men, psychologists, or lawyers, and describe him as kindly, good humoured, considerate, gracious, and obliging—which he undoubtedly was. But for a real understanding o f Yamashita, one must look at him also in the days when he was making his career, knee-deep in political intrigue and assassination, encouraging young men into violent escapades, * ‘Retreat From The Chindwin’. See Bibliography.

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then abandoning them. There was no good-humour here; no graciousness; no consideration. Yamashita was a different man. H ow then did he progress from one character to the other? The answer is through disgrace and a mental crisis, events which I have endeavoured to probe, and so give a more rounded portrait. The inclusion o f Renya Mutaguchi m ay surprise many old Burma hands, for he has already figured at some length in Colonel John Barker’s celebrated work, The March on Delhi. M y excuse is first that I happen to have served in the A rm y which opposed his march, and secondly that he remains for me a figure o f enormous interest. M ore important perhaps is the fact that, since Barker’s book, more material has come to light, and the book itself sparked o ff a series o f events which brings the old warrior magnificently alive. I am sure that Colonel Barker w ill forgive me for this portrait o f his old friend. The choice o f Masaki Honda may seem quixotic, for compared to Yamashita and Homma, at least, he is a minor figure and quite unknown. Even in the official accounts o f the Burma campaign he is referred to simply as ‘M . Honda’, and no details o f him are given whatsoever. N ow , for some reason, I have always been fascinated by rearguards commanders: Roland at Ronscevalles, Shelton on the retreat from Kabul, N ey on the retreat from Moscow; and as an example o f courage in adversity, Honda seems to me superb. Three times his 33rd A rm y was almost smashed, by Stilwell, by Slim, and finally by Cowan. Y et month after desperate month he was able to bring order out o f chaos; to turn and fight again. Even when he was reduced to trudging on with only a cane to help him, he never lost command, never lost moral authority over officers and men. And just before the end o f the war, when one might have expected his A rm y to be long past action o f any kind, he was able to launch a savage counter­ attack. Such resilience, loyalty, and power o f command, it seemed to me were worth examining. In this study o f m y four commanders, it has been necessary to deal with campaigns which have been recounted many times before and at great length. I have made no attempt to cover them fully here, though it has obviously been desirable to give sufficient detail to create a coherent narrative and to provide background for those learning o f the campaigns for the first time. M y object,

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however, has been to portray character rather than recount military history, though naturally the first makes an impact on the second. If, o f course, in m y study o f character, I may have shed new fight on any campaign and therefore contributed to military history, even in the slightest degree, I shall not be displeased. In the preparation o f this w ork I have enjoyed the help and co-operation o f many people in England, in the United States o f America, and in Japan. M r. Morikuni Mutaguchi has given me many details o f his father’s fam ily and early fife, for which I am most grateful. I also have to thank Mrs. Homma and Mrs. Honda, widows o f General Homma and General Honda, who have supplied valuable information, as have Major-General Rikichiro Sawamoto, M r. Toshio Kato, M r. Tsutomu Masaki, and Lieutenant-General Yukio Kashara. The officers o f the National Defence College Historial Department have been most helpful in providing research material. M y old enemy, but present friend, M ajor Tokuji Morimoto, has been most kind in helping me to understand the samurai code and has also carried out valuable research. Also in Japan I have to thank General Hitoshi Imamura and Major-General Hazeyama for their advice and help. I must express m y apprecia­ tion, also, to M r. Mutsuya Nagao who again has co-operated with me in carrying out research and to his assistants Miss Noriko Kobayashi and Mr. Akira Nagami. In America, Professor Robert J. C. Butow and Professor Stanley L. Falk have both kindly offered advice and suggested lines o f research; and Mr. Jac Weller, Curator at West Point, has obtained material for me for which I am most grateful. In England, I have to thank Mr. Trevor Leggott, o f the B B C Japanese Service for his valuable advice. Also Major-General H. L. Davies, c . b ., c . b .e ., d . s . o ., m . c ., for his help, and Mr. D. W . King, C hief Librarian at the Ministry o f Defence, who as always has advised and guided me. His courtesy, like his vast memory, never fails. In conclusion, I would like to add, there have been listed, as an Appendix, details o f the armies commanded by m y four samurai, together with names o f subordinate commanders and staffs wherever possible. A good deal o f this information, I believe, has never been available before in English, and I hope it may be o f use to future students o f the Japanese campaign.

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THE W A R R IO R AND THE CODE

When Japan went to war in 1941 the samurai caste and the feudal order in which it flourished had been abolished for seventy-four years. But bushido, the code o f the samurai, was still preserved intact by the warrior families, and was taught to the officer corps o f the Imperial Japanese Arm y. The fact that the code was not incorporated into A rm y Regulations did not invalidate it, for it existed on a superior plane— an ideal, a faith, a creed, and a key to the ultimate things o f life and death. * Masaharu Homma was the son o f a landed gentleman; Tom uyuki Yamashita, o f a doctor; R enya Mutaguchi, o f a government official; and Musaki Honda, o f a civil servant. None had samurai blood in him, and yet to varying degrees all four lived by the code. Even when they flouted it, the code still remained a basic reality. The Imperial Rescript o f the Emperor Meiji, issued in 1873, was the document which brought to an end the feudal era, and founded the modem Japanese Arm y. In it were contained ‘Five W ords’ which laid down the conduct o f a soldier: 1. A soldier must do Iris duty to his country. 2. A soldier must be courteous. 3. A soldier must show courage in war. 4. A soldier must keep his word. 5. A soldier must live simply. These ‘W ords’ were taken immensely seriously by both officers and men; recently an ex-infantry officer wrote, ‘W e worked hard at our training, keeping the “ Five W ords” in our hearts. I think they are principles that w e should all live by.’ The emphasis on simplicity * The Arm y ‘registered names’ are used throughout, though Yamashita was commonly known as ‘Hobun’ and Honda as ‘Seizai’. 15

no doubt explains w hy Japanese uniforms, even those o f fieldmarshals and generals, were dull and undistinguished; and w hy even army commanders in the field Uved on the same rations as their troops. But i f the ‘Five W ords’ provided guidance to soldiers in respect o f their ow n conduct, they were quite inadequate when it came to behaviour o f officers or N C O s towards their men, and the in­ fluence o f bushido can be seen quite clearly. An officer had the right to order his men into suicidal attacks, against tanks, for example; a general could order a garrison commander to launch his troops into a last attack against besieging forces, every man fighting to the death. Any commander could suggest to a subordinate that the code demanded that he commit suicide to atone for his failure, and the suggestion was usually treated as an order. W ith the outbreak o f war, Tojo incorporated the samurai ideal in the Senjinkun, or Soldier Code, which laid down that a man should be ashamed o f trying to prolong his life by surrendering as a Prisoner o f W ar; his duty was to fight until he was killed or to kill himself. This idea was a very old one, embedded deep within the samurai tradition. It also illustrates one o f the basic differences between the Japanese A rm y and any other. As every man must learn to accept the fact o f death, so every army must learn to recognise that, once it goes to war, many o f its soldiers w ill be blown to pieces, maimed, shot, and either slaughtered or wounded in a variety o f horrific circumstances. Some armies, such as the British, have found great difficulty in recognising this fact, and gone to war pretending that with luck such eventualities might be avoided. So one may read o f campaigns in which the medical facilities were ludicrously inadequate and, worse still, the troops were mentally unprepared for the shock o f battle. Even today there is a tendency to employ euphemisms or stock cliches as cushions against reality; a regiment does not lose a lot o f men in killed and wounded, it ‘takes heavy casualties’ ; a division is not wiped out, it ‘ceases to exist as a fighting unit’ . So far as the individual soldier is concerned, he has usually been taught to do his duty and trust to luck; and encouraged to believe that, i f anyone gets hit, it w ill probably be someone else. The good regular soldier has usually overcome this negative approach by developing

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an intense professional interest in battle; and the majority o f amateur soldiers—by whom wars are fought in modem times—have for the most part developed sufficient moral resources to see them through. However, no Western arm y has been able to match the Japanese in absolute courage. As General Slim remarked during the Burma W ar: ‘Everyone talks about fighting to the last man and last round, but only the Japanese actually do it.’ And undoubtedly the reason w hy they were able to do it is that through hushido, the code o f the bushi—-the w ord means ‘soldier’ and is virtually synonymous with samurai—they were able to develop a far more positive attitude to death. The history o f the samurai caste goes back a very long way. The name comes from the verb saburou— to serve directly under a person more powerful than oneself; and so there were kuge-samurai, warriors to a court noble, and buke-samurai, warriors serving a feudal lord. Samurai also served the shogun or military governor. Their profes­ sion developed in the 10th Century, after the old conscript armies, led by effete aristocrats, decayed, and the country had fallen into disorder, with local governors rising up in insurrection. The nobles in Kyoto, the capital, lacked power to enforce the law, and were inevitably swept away by the new feudal order. B y the 12th Century and the coming o f the Kamakura Shogunate, clans began to form, with their headquarters based on fortified dwellings or castles owned by the ruling families. Each castle required its garrison, and so the samurai came into their own, developed the techniques o f war, and established a code for themselves. Their life was a harsh one, for each lord held absolute power over his men, and exacted total obedience to the point o f death. There was no deed, however cruel or barbarous, that the samurai would not carry out under his orders; and by their own code, they were absolved from guilt. In short, they regarded themselves as mere instruments, as weapons. B y the early 13 th Century Buddhism and the teachings o f the Chinese philosopher, Confucius, began making a profound impact on Japan, and slowly fused with the code o f bushido. The soldier was now taught to value such qualities as allegience, self-sacrifice, faith, trust, chivalry, uprightness, thriftiness, valour, frugality, honour, and a highly developed sense o f shame. But perhaps the most important contribution o f Confucian teaching was the notion o f a

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positive attitude to death. From now on the essence o f bushido was that the young warrior should aim at dying. Japanese myth and tradition is full o f stories illustrating this doctrine. In some areas the young men were told not to take lessons in swordsmanship, being warned, ‘I f you do so, you w ill develop the idea o f protecting your­ self. Y ou r aim, on the contrary is to die— killing as many o f the enemy as you can first, but to die.’ I f the samurai survived six months and proved his contempt for death, only then was he given lessons in fencing. In the Hagakure code, adopted by samurai in the Kyushu area it was written ‘Let it be realised that to die is the most necessary act o f a samurai.’ One o f the maxims o f W ang Yang-m ing, the last o f the Chinese sages, was, ‘I f it is right, the true man must be ready to die for it’, but this was distorted by the samurai to mean, ‘I f you are ready to die for it, you must be a true man and in some sense right.’ In any event, death for the samurai was not something to be avoided; it was ‘a consummation devoutly to be wished’ ; it was the realisation o f a great and wonderful ideal. This notion, taken from Buddhism in the 1 3 th Century, survived with remarkable power not only through the Feudal era, but through the centuries to come; it lived on through the M eiji era, ‘the age o f enlightenment’, from 1867 to 19 12 , and flowered again with the rise o f the military caste in the 1920s. N o more spectacular example can be given than the Tokkoki or Kamikaze pilots who crashed their bomb-laden planes on to American ships in the Pacific. But even since then examples o f ‘aiming at death’ have occurred; one a few years ago a boy mounted the platform and knifed the Socialist leader, Asanuma, in front o f the television cameras. The whole point o f this gesture was that he should have no possible chance o f escape. Later, no doubt under orders from his superiors, he hanged himself in his cell. It may be remarked here that bushido was formulated during an age o f great poverty, when life was cheap, and that it was only by offering his life that the samurai could eat, and later on, i f he survived, obtain a grant o f land and other privileges. W ith technological advance and the advent o f a complex industrial society, one might have expected it to decay, as the medieval orders o f chivalry decayed in Europe. But, in fact, no such process happened, and even in 1942 Renya Mutaguchi could write in an Order o f the Day, when his campaign

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was heading for disaster: ‘I f there is no breath left in your body, fight with your spirit.’ W hy has the code been preserved so com­ pletely? The most obvious reason, no doubt, is that the samurai caste saw quite clearly that, only by a strict adherence to it, could they first regain power and then realise their ambitions for Japan. But the second reason m ay well be that it fulfils a need in the Japanese soul. To illustrate this point it may be convenient to consider for a moment the practice o f committing suicide by seppuku, or hara-kiri. T his barbaric and painful method o f self-execution was first practised in the late 8th Century, and later became inextricably linked with the samurai code. It is virtually a method o f disembowelment, the knife being plunged into the abdomen then drawn across; only a man deeply committed to a rigid and ruthless code could even contemplate it. For the Japanese, however, seppuku has mythical and mystical connotations, for it is tied to the ancient notion that the mind exists in the stomach. Even today there is a common saying, ‘his abdomen is black’ , meaning ‘he is malicious.’ Therefore in seppuku there lies the idea that one is purging oneself, effecting an atonement and dying in the same act. The fact that the process is painful gives added glory to seppuku; there is the inference that only a man o f stoicism and courage, nurtured in bushido, could perform it. B y the Edo period, from the early 17th Century on­ wards, seppuku had developed into an elaborate ritual, and prevailed as an obligatory punishment for failure among the higher samurai. The hour, the place, the costume, and all the preliminaries were laid down in regulations and observed meticulously. This custom continued openly till the samurai caste was broken up, as already mentioned, in the Meiji Restoration o f 1867, but even after that cases occurred among the old families. These excited not condem­ nation, but praise; and one is reminded o f how local newspapers in India continued to eulogise widows committing suti, well into this century. As already mentioned, in 1941 Tojo reminded his troops o f their obligation to fight to extinction or kill themselves, in the Senjinkun or soldier code. Later on, as the tide o f war began to swing against him, and the Americans advanced from island to island in the Pacific, he began using the w ord Gyokusai signifying ‘die but never surrender’ , or ‘death before dishonour.’ Gyoku means jew el and sai, the act o f

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crushing oneself, and the implication is that one should not survive like a dead stone, but die courageously and beautifully. To reinforce this concept Tojo laid down that i f any man let himself be taken prisoner, his regiment should execute him were he re-taken and his crime should be visited on his entire family. The fact that Tojo could resurrect the ancient concept o f Gyokusai in the 20th Centuryshows the extent to which the conception o f bushido and seppuku still gripped the samurai and the men trained by them. After the surrender several leaders committed seppuku, including Field-Mar­ shal Sugiyama and his wife, General Honjo, Vice-Admiral Onishi, General Anami, and Lieutenant-General Koizumi. (Tojo, ironically, heaped abuse on himself by failing with his own suicide attempt.) The fact is that no people on earth sets a higher store on success; none is so downcast by defeat. The latter is not only a crime, it is the greatest o f sins and can only be atoned for by an act o f selfimmolation. Only this can satisfy the deep Japanese longing to deal in absolutes. The customs and traditions discussed so far belonged strictly to the samurai, whether members o f the old warrior families or officers trained in the code. They did not belong to the nation in general; and indeed to the mass o f people the samurai were a barbaric sect, quite apart from the rest o f the population. Today, i f one asks a Japanese doctor, author, or television cameraman his views o f seppuku or bushido one w ill probably find that these do not vary greatly from the views o f most Europeans. Left to themselves, the Japanese dislike pain, discomfort, hunger and the approach o f death as much as anyone else. They also disclaim any special access to courage. After the publication o f one o f his books in T okyo*, the author had the interesting experience o f corresponding with a number o f soldiers whom he fought against in Assam; and without exception their attitude was: ‘Y o u keep on saying how brave we were. That is not true. W e were frightened stiff most o f the time— but w e just had to obey orders.’ This point is to some extent sup­ ported by A . J . Barker, who writes, ‘. . . fatalistic resignation to death is not inherent in the Japanese character; there were just as many young men trying to avoid conscription as there were in Britain and the United States and the same subterfuges were used * ‘Kohima’.

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in attempts to gain exemption.’ Barker goes on to explain that, once in the army, recruits were subjected to an intense three-months course o f indoctrination ‘which changed them into fanatics, ready to die for their emperor, their country and the honour o f their regiments’ . Saburo Sakai has written in a similar vein o f his experience in the Japanese N avy: ‘our petty officers . . . were absolute tyrants in their ow n right. Their major obsession was to terrorise the new recruits—in this case, ourselves. W e regarded these men as sadistic brutes o f the worst sort. W ithin six months the incredibly severe training had made human cattle o f every one o f us. W e never dared to ques­ tion orders, to doubt authority, to do anything but immediately carry out all the commands o f our superiors. W e were automatons who obeyed without thinking.’ * Is this the sole reason w hy the Japanese A rm y revealed such a uniform and absolute standard o f courage on all fronts? N ot entirely. According to their historians, the Japanese derive a large measure o f dash and bravery from their Malayan ancestors, and the qualities o f discipline and loyalty from the Mongolians. Undoubtedly these qualities (whether denied or not) are latent in the vast majority o f the people, and can be developed through training to a remarkable degree. Whether a Japanese soldier comes from the samurai caste or not, he w ill still fight just as bravely. But are the other factors involved, such as religious and other beliefs? Like most nations in time o f war, the Japanese attempted to stiffen the national morale, and especially the morale o f the armed services, by formal religious observances. (Shinto had been made a State religion in 1867.) Twice a year elaborate rituals were observed at the Yasakuni shrine (the A rm y shrine in Tokyo) and in these the names o f the fallen were placed in an ark and carried up to the altar where, in the rites o f the Shinto faith, they were deified. Sedulously the idea was propagated that any one man dying in battle would join the Gods in any part o f his body, his nail parings even, could be brought back for the ceremony. And, resulting from this, came the practice o f recovering the dead from the battlefield even at * Samurai (Ballantine Books, N ew York), 1957.

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considerable risk. However, as elsewhere, religious observances merge into customs, and customs dwindle into ‘the done thing.’ It is doubtful i f religion played any great part in the hfe o f the Japanese A rm y, and certainly it was not a motivating force. There were no Orde Wingates. M ajor Tokuji Morimoto has written*: ‘There was no relation between religion and the regiment. There were no formal religious observances or services. As more men were called up for the army, these included priests, and w e some­ times had funeral services for the fallen, but that is all. Religious faith is a private thing, and each man is free to have his own. On the whole though I would suppose that our troops did not have such a deep rehgious faith as yours did.’ In short, for the vast majority, rehgious observance was purely conventional; the Shinto heaven was not so very different from the British Legion’s valhalla; and the Yasakuni shrine from the Ceno­ taph in Whitehall. However, as men o f all faiths have found in battle, one can find oneself calling upon gods long ignored. So in his moment o f anguish Mutaguchi called on Norito, and Homma and Yamashita said their last prayers to him. The Shinto religion belonged to the people for many centuries before it was taken over by the State in 1867, and fused with con­ ceptions o f the divinity o f the Emperor. It grew out o f myth and had no founder and no canon. One o f its basic ideas has always been that there is no essential difference between God and man, and therefore that man can reach God’s place by effort and sacrifice. In bushido quite naturally, ‘sacrifice’ came to mean sacrifice o f one’s life on the field o f battle. So, by extension, battle became an oppor­ tunity not only to join God but to become a god oneself. N o doubt in earlier centuries this behef was taken quite literally, but even though it became conventionalised with the passing o f the centuries, there can be no doubt that the behef that there is no limit to man’s destiny and power i f he w ill prepare, train, and accept sacrifice, is widespread in Japan. W ith it goes the idea that there are untapped sources o f power within each man which he can reach by his own effort. Early on the samurai adopted the art o f kiai, a mysterious force said to fie at the heart o f military efficiency. The word is a compound o f ki, meaning ‘mind’, or ‘w ill’, and ai, a contraction o f * In a letter to the author.

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the verb awasu, ‘to unite.’ Kiai is the motive power which prompts men into action; it is the power which gives him the resolution to overcome an opponent; it furnishes the ability to take advantage o f weakness. Here are some o f the sayings said to reveal the art o f kiai: ‘I have no parents; I make the heavens and the earth m y parents. I have no divine power; I make honesty m y divine power. I have no magic power; I make personality m y magic power. I have no body; I make stoicism m y body. I have no miracles; I make righteous laws m y miracles. I have no friends; I make m y mind m y friend. I have no armour; I make benevolence and righteousness m y armour. I have no castle; I make the immovable mind m y castle.’ Till a few years ago, no doubt, such notions would have been dismissed lightly in the W est as a doctrine o f ‘mind over matter’, but today, with judo and karate enjoying wide popularity, they may appear not quite so nebulous. W hen on television, for example, one sees karate experts breaking a stack o f bricks with their bare hands, it is difficult to dismiss the mysterious powers o f kiai. T o what extent did kiai and similar doctrines affect the training and character o f the samurai= Obviously their impact was enormous. The behef that there was no conceivable limit to the powers o f human endurance, and that i f one sufficiently cultivated hara (i.e. guts) one could attain superhuman powers, resulted in training and hardening techniques quite unknown in other armies. Many cases are told o f units being marched fifty miles with full pack, then made to run round a field three times. On one such occasion an officer remarked, ‘They aren’t nearly so exhausted as they think they are.’ A. J . Barker has written that Japanese officers ‘would drive their men unmercifully to a point to which no British soldier would ever have accepted and which would seem sometimes to be beyond the limit o f human endurance. A ll this the Japanese soldier would accept without unhesitating obedience.’ The point here is that what a European would consider the limit o f endurance, the samurai did not; given enough hara one could go on forever. From this doctrine there developed the idea that a samurai—even o f high rank—should never refuse an order because it was impos­ sible to carry out. He should attack, even i f he lacked troops, even

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i f he lacked supplies, and even i f he lacked ammunition. As will be seen, Mutaguchi accepted this doctrine completely, ordering his troops on one occasion to fight with their bare hands. Homma, however, rejected it, and when his attack ground to a halt in the Philippines, refused to continue until reinforcements arrived. This act shocked many generals; Homma, they considered, had broken the code o f bushido, and should be replaced. Whether his conduct was reasonable or strategically desirable, was quite beside the point. Another aspect o f bushido requires consideration. It has sometimes been described as an oriental form o f chivalry, and to the extent that it is a military code, the comparison holds good. But that is all. Chivalry not only laid down the correct conduct between knight and knight, but between knights and their enemies, civilians, women, and children. Bushido on the other hand was solely con­ cerned with relations between samurai and their conduct in battle. The samurai could have no relation with his enemy, for one would be the victor and the other would be dead. W om en and children were not protected by the code either, and could be slaughtered as thought fit. A samurai had complete power over the women o f his own household, and his interests were paramount; i f it were necessary for his daughters to become prostitutes to pay his debts, then the code laid down that they should do so without hesitation. This facet o f bushido explains the wide divergence o f treatment given to prisoners o f war by Japanese troops, from civilised to bestial. In the Philippines Homma chatted happily with Colonel Collier, while not far aw ay guards were beating exhausted men to death. The truth is that meeting an enemy, who was unwounded yet had stopped fighting, was an embarrassment to most Japanese soldiers. The author once asked a Japanese infantry officer what instructions had been given in his regiment concerning the treatment o f prisoners, and the reply was: ‘Our men had no special instructions beforehand. But when prisoners came in, w e instructed the troops to send them back to headquarters without injuring them. I think that although war is inhuman, w e must act as humanely as possible. W hen I took some o f your men prisoner in Burm a I gave them food and tobacco.’ In short, treatment was meted out according to individual inclina­ tions; and few troops feel particularly tender when they have just come through a battle.

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There is a last aspect o f bushido which made a profound impact on the Japanese Arm y. ‘Bushido’ writes TokujiM orim oto, ‘means doing everything thoroughly. In m y day this point was emphasised in all training and I adhered to it.’ This thoroughness m ay be illustrated in many ways. N ot only was the training and hardening o f the individual soldier extremely thorough, as w e have seen, but the training and education o f officers at all levels. From 1870 young officers were expected to attain a high level in arithmetic, algebra, geometry and trigonometry, and in literary composition. There was no ‘playing at w ar’ as in the British Arm y, and no confusion between military arts and prowess on the sports field. Officers could not take o ff time for hunting, or indeed for anything else. A British officer* has said that when he suggested to some A rm y Cadets that they should spend a day with him duck shooting, they stared with blank amazement. First they saw no point in shooting ducks, and secondly they thought it incredible that anyone should neglect their studies in this way. When it came to the study o f higher strategy, to the training o f senior officers and staffs, the Japanese were still just as thorough. N o officer could qualify for the staff until he had graduated in a series o f gruelling examinations, and he could not rise to general rank unless he gained high marks. The amateurishness o f other armies— except the German A rm y—never ceased to astound the Japanese. The adage that ‘war can only be learned by fighting’ they regarded as lunacy. Though the Japanese system led to a lack o f flexibility, it also brought astonishing suc­ cesses, as in the Russo-Japanese W ar o f 1905. General Sir Ian Hamilton (who was present as an observer in this conflict) had cause to admire the thoroughness o f Japanese planning and training, especially when he came to launch the Gallipoli operation ten years later. ‘A ll I had’, he told the Inquiry into the operation, ‘was an inaccurate map, a three-year-old handbook o f the Turkish A rm y and a report o f the Dardanelles drawn up before the W ar.’ O f his staff, he added, ‘One or two had just put on uniform for the first time in their lives. Their leggings were awry, their spurs upside down and their belts over their shoulder straps. I hadn’t a notion who they were. The administration and Q staff hadn’t even arrived —at this time they hadn’t heard o f their appointments.’ Homma, * F. J. Norman, The Fighting Men of Japan.

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as it w ill be seen had certain staff problems, when he came to plan the invasion o f the Philippines; but at least his officers were all highly trained. Such then were some o f the traditional, racial, and professional factors which to varying degrees shaped the character o f a Japanese general. But there was another powerful factor; the political situa­ tion and the operation o f military cliques. To indicate the atmo­ sphere in which Japanese officers pursued their careers in the 1930s, it is necessary to give a brief account o f the extraordinary events o f the time and to show how the cliques were involved hr them. Every ambitious officer had to make up his mind whether he would eschew politics altogether, or decide which o f the cliques to join. I f he chose the former course, there was the possible loss o f opportunity and promotion; i f he chose the latter, the opportunities were increased and the dangers also. A general naturally preferred men on his staff with the same loyalties, rather than men from a rival clique. But, i f the general were replaced by a successor com­ mitted to another clique, then obviously there would be a re-shuffle among the staff. Often it happened that a young officer would find himself isolated among colleagues belonging to rival cliques and remain ignored, except for the transaction o f essential business. Officers associated with a successful coup d’etat could make their reputations overnight, as Mutaguchi did in Peking; but a failure could prove a serious setback, as Yamashita learned. T o what extent officers were attracted to the various cliques through idealism and pure patriotic passion, it is hard to say. But for the most part it would seem that patriotism was mixed with opportunism; some men belonged to more than one clique, and others (like Mutaguchi) switched from one to the other, as the political situation developed. Some officers, like Homma and Honda, kept clear o f all cliques and prospered in isolation. But what were the cliques, and how did they come about? Behind them lay the strong determination that the Japanese Arm y should play a central and directing role in the life o f the nation. This in turn stemmed from ancient samurai traditions; after the M eiji restoration o f 1867, the land had swarmed with ronin, un­ employed warriors who had taken upon themselves the duty o f hunting down aliens, known unflatteringly as ketojin, or ‘hairy

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barbarians.’ Only samurai they believed were the true patriots, who could preserve the soul o f Japan, knock down her enemies, and increase her power. The samurai had a deep distrust o f all civilian rulers, all politicians, and all cabinets. They detested the notion that any problem should be settled cheaply through dip­ lomacy, when it could be settled expensively through war. They detested all talk o f disarmament; they were determined that never on any account should their occupation be taken from them. So in the 1920s there appeared the Sakura-kai, or Cherry Society, drawn largely from colonels and majors o f the Kwantung Arm y, its leader being Colonel Hashimoto. The declared aim o f the Society was ‘to purify the national life’ but in practice it was to grab more power for the army at the expense o f the political parties and the industrialists who were financing them. It also had ambitions for Manchuria*, and looked with distaste at Chiang Kai-shek’s success in unifying China. For some years the Japanese had been supporting Chang Tso-lin, the old Marshal o f Manchuria, and after he had refused to do a deal and trade his areas in Peking and north China for Manchuria, his car was blown up as it passed under a railway bridge. The Cherry Society had shown that it would use violence whenever necessary. It was not alone in this respect. B y 1930 a rival organisation was in the field, the Kodo-ha or Imperial W ay group who wished to set the Emperor above the cabinet or political parties, and in­ cidentally, to establish military rule directly under his aegis. The leaders o f the Imperial W ay group were two ambitious generals, Araki and Masaki, and they lobbied subalterns and captains o f the regiments in Tokyo, promising them appointments when the group’s aims were realised. In fact, when Araki became W ar Minister he did not help these young officers a good deal, though he appointed Masaki Vice-Chief o f the Imperial Staff and promoted more senior officers. Flowever, the young men kept their trust in him, many believing idealistically that he would be the saviour o f the army and therefore o f their country. The third group, equally ruthless and determined, was the * Historically a group o f nine provinces belonging to the Chinese outer territories. Manchuria had great importance strategically, since it bordered on Mongolia, Soviet Russia and Korea. Since the Russo-Japanese War, which had been fought on Manchuria soil, Japan had gained an interest in the area.

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Tosei-ha or Control Faction, led. by Major-General Nagata and Major-General Hideki Tojo. They recruited majors and colonels from the regiments in the Tokyo area, especially from the ist and 3rd Regiments which were politically very active. (It is interesting to note that in 1930 Tojo commanded the ist Regim ent while Yamashita, a member o f the Imperial W ay group, commanded the 3rd Regiment.) The Control Faction wanted power; they also wanted war with China, even at the risk o f a conflict "with America and Britain. On the 14th November, 1930, Premier Osachi Hamaguchi was shot as he walked along the platform in Tokyo R ailw ay Station, and later died. His assassin was a young man belonging to an extremist group led by Doctor Okawa, who disapproved o f Hamaguchi’s economy drive and his acceptance o f the terms o f the London N aval Disarmament Conference, by which the Imperial Japanese N avy would rank after the American and British navies. Okawa imagined that with the death o f Hamaguchi the cabinet would resign, but when no such tiling happened, he made contact with the Control Faction, and Colonel Hashimoto o f the Cherry Society and together they plotted a coup d’etat timed for the 20th March, 1930. The plan was to launch a demonstration against the political parties and the imperial Diet, and, after a major clash with the police had provided the opportunity for the arm y to intervene, declare martial law and appoint W ar Minister U gaki as premier. Negotiations went on at a high level, and strong hints were given to U gaki o f what was to happen. Eventually, as knowledge o f the plot spread throughout Tokyo, the leaders got cold feet and it had to be called off. Hashimoto found himself deserted by Ugaki and other senior officers, and temporarily faded from the scene. N o w came the turn o f the Imperial W ay group whose immediate ambition was to install General Araki as premier. The plan was to surround the W ar Ministry and General Staff headquarters, and arrest all senior officers who refused to co-operate. W hen this stage had been accomplished, Admiral Togo, hero o f the Russo-Japanese W ar, would be asked to seek an audience with the Emperor and inform him that only Araki could save the nation. B y this means, so the group hoped, the party system would be broken up, the army would be able to institute military government, and the Kwantung

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A rm y would be free to solve the ‘Manchurian Problem.’ But the October plot proved as big a fiasco as the March plot, and the cliques had to think again. Throughout 19 31 the political cauldron still bubbled. Then in September the extremists o f the Kwantung A rm y, mostly members o f the Cherry Society, acted again, provoking a dash with Chinese troops in southern Manchuria. During the following months, un­ deterred by orders from Tokyo, the Kwantung A rm y penetrated Manchuria until the whole territory had been occupied. Then state­ ments were put out by the Cherry Society—which had fought the cabinet’s policy o f moderation—that the army had acted in selfdefence, and that Manchukuo, the new arm y State which had been established, was not the creation o f Japan but the result o f a spon­ taneous rising among the people. These statements, o f course, were quite unacceptable to the rest o f the world, and from now on Japan became increasingly unpopular. When sanctions were hinted at in the League o f Nations, the extremists proclaimed that China, the United States and Britain were engaged in a conspiracy against Japan who must look to her own defence. In 1932 there were further assassinations. First Junnosuke Inoue, a former Finance Minister, and an industrialist called Baron Takuma Dan were shot by some civilian ‘patriots.’ Then in M ay a group o f young army and naval cadets, inspired by the Cherry Society, shot the 75-year-old premier, Tsuyoshi Inukai, who had sent emissaries to Chiang Kai-shek. General Araki, the W ar Minister, was known to be sympathetic to the criminals and they got o ff lightly. (In Japan political assassinations were regarded by the courts rather as crime passionel is in France.) But the action o f these young assassins brought about an important constitutional change; when Prince Saionji tried to fmd a successor to Inukai, he was informed by Araki that no new W ar Minister would be nominated unless the army approved o f the Prime Minister. Furthermore no W ar Minister in future would serve under a party administration; only under a national government. Parliamentary democracy had been brought to an end. However, the victory o f the army in this respect did not lessen the gang warfare between the cliques. Araki had been succeeded by General Hayashi, a leading figure o f the Control Faction; and

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Hayashi naturally sacked Araki’s friend, Masaki, substituting Lieu­ tenant-General Nagata in his place. The Imperial W ay group, horrified at its loss o f face and power—it had also been condemned by the Emperor himself—mined beneath the surface, desperately trying to affect a change. In November, 1934, Captain Masanobu Tsuji, a company commander at the Military Academy, learned that some o f his cadets, devotees o f the Imperial W ay, were plotting a coup, and decided to infiltrate a cadet into the conspiracy as a spy. In due course Tsuji nipped the plot in the bud and sent a list o f the boys involved to M ajor Katakura, a staff officer at Imperial Head­ quarters. Tsuji, an ally o f Hideki Tojo and therefore a member o f the Control Faction, had rendered service for which later on he was to be amply rewarded. As a reprisal for Tsuji’s action, LieutenantColonel Aizawa, shot the C hief o f Staff, General Nagata, a leader o f the Control Faction. W hen he was tried, R en ya Mutaguchi was in court, representing the Military Academy, and Yamashita, the W ar Ministry. Both, o f course, were members o f the Imperial W ay and therefore sympathetic to Aizawa. Yamashita treated the pro­ ceedings with unconcealed cynicism, remarking, ‘W h y do they bother to try Aizawa? It’s the commandant o f the Military Academy they should be after.’ Throughout 193 5 the power struggle continued, and it was quite obvious that soon there must be a major explosion. It came in Feb­ ruary, when, without warning, the 1st Infantry Division, which had not seen service overseas for thirty years, was suddenly posted to Manchukuo. N o officers liked the move, believing that once they left Japan, their names would vanish from the promotion lists; they also disliked the expense o f maintaining two establishments. In the 1st and 3rd Regiments were some young and fanatical adherents to the Imperial W ay, and these saw the move not only as a nuisance but as a sinister threat by the Control Faction generals. The object, so they thought, was to get them out o f the way. So, led by two captains o f the 3rd Regim ent, Nonaka and Ando, the young officers issued a manifesto called ‘The Great Purpose.’ They declared: ‘W ith due reverence, w e consider that the basis o f the divinity o f our country lies in the fact that the nation is destined to expand under the Imperial R ule until it embraces the world.’

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Unfortunately, they continued, that destiny was being thwarted by traitors in high places, statesmen, generals, admirals, and financiers. Through them Japan was being made the object o f contempt, and the people were being driven to despair. They went on: ‘It is clearer than light that our country is on the verge o f war with Russia, China, Britain and America, who wish to crush our ancestral land. Unless w e rise now and annihilate the unrighteous and disloyal creatures who surround the Imperial Throne and obstruct the course o f true reform, the Imperial Prestige w ill fall to the ground. . . . W e are persuaded that it is our duty to remove the villains who surround the Throne. W e, the children o f our dear land o f the gods, act with pure sincerity o f heart. M ay the spirit o f our Imperial Ancestors assist us in our endeavour.’ The plot was hatched at 5 a.m. on the 26th February, 1936. Six groups o f men went into action. The first seized the residence o f the W ar Minister, Kawashima, and presented him with a list o f demands, including the arrest o f all the leaders o f the Control Faction, and the appointment o f General Araki to command the Kwantung A rm y ‘for the purpose o f coercing R ed Russia.’ The second group seized the police headquarters and set up machine-gun posts at key points in the capital. The third group, 200 men strong, went to the home o f the Emperor’s grand chamberlain, Admiral Baron Suzuki, and. shot him, though fortunately his wife was able to save his life. The fourth group, 300 men, attacked Premier Okada’s residence, killing four policemen and the Premier’s brotherin-law, whom they mistook for Okada himself. Okada—as in some Ruritanian romance— escaped by hiding in a closet and then joining the mourners who had come to escort his body to the cemetery. The fifth group murdered the Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi. And the last group killed the Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal, the former premier, Admiral Viscount Saito. When daylight came, more assassinations were carried out, and these included men like Count Nobuaki Makino. However, instead o f stamping out the insurrection, the government negotiated with its leaders, and at the war ministry they were described euphemistic-

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ally as men who ‘rose to uphold and clarify the national constitution.’ The key positions held by the rebels were cordoned o ff by the police and loyal troops, and then, after an order to disband had been disregarded, it was suggested to the ringleaders that the only honourable course left open to them was to commit seppuku. This they agreed to do, i f the Emperor could be advised, but further talks failed, and the local District Commander therefore broadcast a message to the troops involved that i f they returned to duty their crime might be forgiven. Slow ly they drifted away, and except for one captain who committed suicide, the young officers sur­ rendered themselves. Fifteen officers were executed, and over eighty received sentences o f various kinds. Mazaki, Araki, and other senior officers who had been concerned with the plot were retired. Mutaguchi, as it w ill be seen, was suspected o f being privy to the plot, and was posted to Peking. Yamashita was also involved in a most curious w ay: some o f his proteges were among the con­ spirators and may even have discussed their plans with him; and later on it was his duty to advise them to commit seppuku*. The Imperial W ay was virtually destroyed; the Control Faction now held the field, and with Nagata dead, its other leader, Hideki Tojo, was soon to make his mark on national affairs. The vital step was taken on the 1st March, 1937, when he was appointed to the post o f C hief o f Staff o f the Kwantung Arm y. He had been in Manchukuo for some years, first as head o f the kenpei, the Military Police, which under his guidance had developed enormous powers, and then as chief o f security to the Kwantung Board o f Administration. Three months after his appointment as C hief o f Staff, he sent a secret telegram to the V ice-Chief o f the General Staff, urging that, to prepare for any future blow from Russia, the best policy was to eliminate ‘the Chinese menace’ which would otherwise threaten the arm y’s rear. A month later on the 7th Ju ly—with events not m oving as swiftly as he would wish — Tojo and his associates in the Control Faction engineered the Peking incident which exploded into full-scale w ar with China. One o f the officers cast for a leading role in the Peking incident was R enya Mutaguchi, who played it most effectively, so ensuring his promotion to general rank. The Peking incident will be con* For a more detailed account o f Yamashita’s role see page 85 et seq.

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sidered in more detail in the chapter dealing with Mutaguchi’s career. In this brief sketch o f events it need only be noted that it was the China war and the serious international situation it created which led directly to Pearl Harbour, and Japan’s entry into the Second W orld W ar, on the side o f Germany and Italy. B y this date, o f course, Tojo had risen to become Prime Minister.

Homma . . . Yamashita . . . M utaguchi. . . Honda . . . W hat were their attitudes to the conflict in which they were destined to play major roles? Homma detested Tojo and intrigued against his appointment as Vice-Minister o f war; Yamashita feared and mis­ trusted him. Both thought that the w ar was insane. Mutaguchi, owing a great deal to Tojo, probably saw an opportunity for conquest and further promotion. He entered the fray with enormous zest. Honda’s opinions are not recorded, but the probability is that while refraining from exultation, he resolved to do his duty. But whatever their personal attitudes, the men were all profes­ sional soldiers, and professional soldiers welcome war as a challenge, as a contest in which their years o f service and training m ay be tested and proved, as a sacrament. W ar is their business, and despite intellectual or emotional reservations, they go to it gladly. The identity o f the enemy is o f secondary importance. To what extent Homma, Yamashita, Mutaguchi, and Honda were representatives and products o f samurai teaching and tradition, and to what extent their own characters and personalities prevailed, can only be assessed after an examination o f their conduct in victory and in defeat. A t the same time it may be possible to arrive at a clearer estimate o f their standing as soldiers and the role they played in the fantastic episodes o f the war in the Far East. Twenty years after that w ar was ended, it is hardly sufficient to cast them merely as villains.

0

Lingayen Gulf Landings 22-24 December, 1941 r _ i Japanese i— i American ^ ^ A x i s o f L - J Units 1— 1Units ^ ^ ja p a n e s e advance rTTTTTn U.S.positions (approx.),night 24/25 Decem ber'

In fun try S I Armoured Command Mechanised Cavalry

2

HOMMA AND THE CA PTU RE OF THE PHILIPPINES

On the 2nd November, 1941, Masaharu Homma, Tom oyuki Yamashita, and Hitoshi Imamura, three senior lieutenant-generals, were shown into the office o f the C hief o f the General Staff, General Sugiyama. Here they received the most momentous news o f their entire careers: that in a matter o f weeks Japan would be at war with Great Britain and the United States, and they were to be appointed to key commands. Homma would lead the 14th Arm y against the Philippines, Yamashita, the 25th A rm y against Malaya and Singapore, and Imamura, the 16th A rm y against the East Indies. Dealing with Homma first, Sugiyama gave further details, such as the allocation o f divisions, air and naval cover, and the timing o f various phases o f the operation. Then he added: ‘Your orders w ill be to take Manila, the capital o f the Philippines, within fifty days o f the first shot being fired.’ Sugiyama expected Homma to reply in formal terms, expressing humble gratitude at being given such a command and accepting his orders without comment. To his surprise, however, when Homma spoke, it was in very different terms. ‘This figure o f fifty days’, he asked, ‘how has it been arrived at?’ ‘B y the General S taff’ Sugiyama replied, only to be pressed further. ‘But on what informa­ tion? Has there been a complete Intelligence study o f enemy forces, dispositions, and equipment? And have you taken into account American troop movements in progress now? Also I would like to ask: W h y is the 14th A rm y being allotted only two divisions? W ho exactly decided that such a force would be sufficient?’ Some­ what startled and embarrassed at this reaction, Sugiyama resorted to set phrases, such as: ‘The General Staff, after a detailed review o f the situation . . .’ only to be interrupted again by Homma: 34

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‘The fact is that w e don’t really know the probable strength o f the enemy. So isn’t it quite unreasonable to ask me to take Manila with two divisions in fifty days? In m y view the target date should be decided after the Intelligence survey has been completed, and the general situation studied in the light o f it.’ Sugiyama and Homma had disliked each other since a brush early on in their careers, and, i f the C hief o f General Staff could have had his way, it is doubtful i f Homma would have received his new appointment. But in the Japanese A rm y the crucial factor in an officer’s career was his pass mark on graduating from the Staff College, and Homma had gained only a few marks less than Imatnura, who had broken all records and was reckoned to be ‘at genius level.’ Added to this, Homma was not only the senior lieutenant-general in the Japanese Arm y, but had a fine record in action. Generally he was recognised as a superb strategist. A further cause for contention between the two generals was that Homma had made no secret o f his opposition to the impending war, con­ vinced that in the long run it was insane for Japan to challenge Britain and America. However, the war was now inevitable and its consequences must be faced. Growing angry, Sugiyama said flatly that, whatever Homma’s opinions might be, the period o f fifty days formed part o f the strategic pattern o f the entire Pacific campaign; it was quite firm, and he would have to accept it. From now on, according to one report*, the exchange continued thus: H om m a: Without accurate intelligence as to the enemy forces, how can I undertake to capture Manila in fifty days? S u g iy a m a : Y ou ’re not the only one facing difficulties. Everyone in this country is in the same position. Hom m a: Can I have some more troops to create a reserve? S u g iy a m a : N o . W e have none available. Is the command un­ acceptable to you? H om m a: Certainly not. But I cannot undertake to capture Manila within a certain period. The situation was growing uncomfortable and Imamura (an old friend o f Homma) was forced to intervene, before it got quite out o f hand. Homma was not being asked to give guarantees, he pointed out; he had been given a target date, and as a soldier * Masanori Ito, A History of the Rise and Fall of the Military Clique.

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he should do his best to meet it. N o one could do more. Yamashita supported this view, and with the result that Homma withdrew his objections, and the meeting passed to other matters. After it was over, Imamura and Yamashita assured Homma that they quite understood his reasons for standing up to Sugiyama, and were considering doing so themselves. Then, having wished each other luck, the generals parted for their respective commands. In his office, however, Sugiyama remained brooding over the clash with Homma. ‘A Japanese officer’ he remarked to a member o f his staff, ‘should be filled with pride and jo y to be offered such a command. W hat a man to ask questions like that!’ As subsequent events were to show, Sugiyama neither forgave nor forgot. On the eve o f war Masaharu Homma was fifty-four years old, tall for a Japanese—nearly 5 feet 10 inches—with clear-cut features and a dark brown complexion. His outward manner was cool and aristocratic, though not unfriendly; his temperament was highly artistic and emotional, and indeed there was something feminine about him. As a Japanese general he was something o f an odd fish, and certainly an odd man out. He wrote in both prose and verse; he knew about period furniture and paintings and prints; and had made a disastrous marriage with the daughter o f a Geisha girl. O f his poetry, a novelist* (echoing Samuel Johnson) once remarked, ‘It only reaches an amateur level, but the remarkable thing is that he writes it at all.’ Homma was a fine linguist, speaking and writing Enghsh with ease; he had a wide knowledge o f European culture, and was probably the most westernised o f all Japanese generals. Though he moved easily in high society and had many acquain­ tances in the cabinet, he had eschewed politics himself, and so far as one can tell, was never an active member o f any o f the military cliques. The only recorded political activity, up to the outbreak o f war, was his opposition to the appointment o f Tojo as ViceMinister o f the Arm y. This, he was convinced, must lead to war with America, and hurrying to Tokyo, he pleaded with every pohtician o f his acquaintance, even the Prime Minister, to have the appointment rescinded. His efforts were, o f course, completely unsuccessful. Reading o f Homma, one is irresistibly reminded o f * Hidemi Kon.

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General Sir Ian Hamilton, the British commander at Gallipoli; both were tall, lean, aristocratic, and courageous; both were artistic and essayed prose and verse; both were faced with mounting a large Combined Operation (i.e. a sea-borne invasion) at a critical moment in their careers; and both were ill-starred. Curiously enough, while Hamilton saw service with the Japanese Arm y, Homma saw service with the British Arm y, and both warned their countries about fighting the other. O f Hamilton it has been said that he possessed every quality o f a general except ruthlessness; whether the parallel holds good for Homma may still be considered. He was bom on the 27th November, 1887, on Sado Island, which lies o ff the north-west coast o f Japan. His father, a wealthy land owner, died while he was still young, and he was brought up entirely by his mother. She was unusually tall for a Japanese lady, elegant, and with a pale complexion. Her thoughts increasingly dwelt on her dead husband, and it was remarked by relatives that she spoke more o f him than o f her son. Undoubtedly her attitude had a psychological effect on the young Homma, for during the whole o f his life he had a craving to be loved, and his affairs were many and passionate. His education in the early stages was general rather than specialised, but when he was fifteen a decision was taken that he should become a professional soldier, and he sat the entrance examination for the M ilitary Academy. As his fam ily lacked any samurai tradition, it is quite probable that the choice o f career was Homma’s own, though again there is no direct evidence. However, it was at the Academy that his ability began to show itself, and here also he became friends with Imamura and another student called Shozo Kawabe*. A t the final examinations Imamura saw Homma leave the room long before any other student had com­ pleted the papers, and remarked, ‘Either he’ll come top— or bottom.’ In fact, Homma passed out at the head o f the fist. The year was 1907, and after a period as second lieutenant with an infantry regi­ ment, Homma became an attach6 to Prince Chichibu, younger brother to the Emperor. B y 19 14 he was at the Staff College, and, although his experience o f practical soldiering was less than most o f his fellow students, he continually outshone them and indeed the only rival was Imamura. Within their profession soldiers make * See page 115 etseq.

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reputations, not only on the battlefield, but in a variety o f theo­ retical exercises, such as ‘T E W T S ’ (Tactical Exercises W ithout Troops beloved o f the British Arm y). In these Homma excelled. His reports and appreciations were expressed in lucid, powerful, and even elegant language; he drew on a wide knowledge o f life and o f history. His concentration was tremendous, and, i f necessary, he would sit up all night with papers and maps before producing his solution to a problem. Some o f his solutions so impressed the instructors that they were passed on to Imperial Headquarters, and one o f them—a defence study—was to become famous through­ out the army. W hen he graduated from the Staff College, Homma was obviously regarded as a future general, and it was no surprise that, with Imamura, he was posted for duty in England.* O f this period, Imamura has written a good deal, some o f his stories throwing a strange hght on the character o f Homma. There is, for example the story dating from April 1918, when he was attached to a British unit at Oxford. One morning Imamura received the following telegram from Major Morita, who was at the Japanese Embassy in London: ‘There is an order from Tokyo that Captain Homma is to go on an attachment to the Western Front. Y o u are to succeed me as military counsellor here.’ Imamura thought there must he some mistake, for officers attached to the Embassy were always selected from those with experience on the General Staff. Homma was not only qualified in this respect, but was already serving at the Embassy, and the only conclusion Imamura could draw was that somehow their names had been switched round. Arriving in London, he put this idea to Morita who rephed that the situation was unusual, and probably there would be a subsequent order to put things right. Meanwhile, he insisted, Imamura would have to carry on and take over the office. T his he did, with some reluctance; then at four o’clock, Homma walked in, somewhat shame-faced, and anxious to explain himself. Having seen M ajor Morita carry out the duties o f counsellor, he said, with all the business o f ciphering and deciphering from morning to night, he had come to hate the look o f the job. He * In peace time it was the custom to send the best officers to Germany, the slightly less brilliant to France, and a few to England or the U S A As Germany was at war with Japan’s allies the system obviously had to be varied.

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therefore decided to pull a few strings and wrote an influential friend in the government, Sawaharu Ohsawa, pleading that he should be posted to a British unit on the Western Front. The result was, therefore, that his friend, Imamura, was saddled with the job o f counsellor—and he had now arrived to tender his abject apologies. I f Imamura wished, he added, he would try to get the post cancelled. To this Imamura replied: ‘I don’t like the jo b o f counsellor either— and i f you hadn’t told me your little secret I would have despised you. However, you didn’t give my name, and as far as you knew, someone else would be sent out from home. So I’ll look on the posting as my fate—and I won’t complain.’ Three days later Morita and Homma left for the Western Front, in time to witness the re­ treat o f the Fifth Arm y, and the subsequent Allied advance. The second story from Imamura is somewhat more dramatic. Soon after the war was over, he was serving an attachment at Aldershot (having escaped from the Embassy), and one Friday evening received a telegram which read: ‘I want to ask your advice. Please come to Sunrise Restaurant by Saturday noon.’ This was a Japanese establishment about two hundred yards from the Embassy, in Mayfair, and Imamura knew it well. On arrival he found Homma installed in a bedroom on the fourth floor, obviously in a state o f excitement and drinking large quantities o f whisky. Asked why he had taken to the bottle—Homma did not have a strong head for alcohol—he replied, ‘Look at this letter. I can’t help but drink.’ The letter, as Imamura soon realised, was from Homma’s mother, and told a sorry tale. She had received a telegram from his wife, Toshiko, asking her to meet their two children o ff the boat from the mainland, and did so, to find them in a state o f some distress. Later on a letter arrived from Toshiko, saying that it was impossible to bring up the children in Tokyo on a Captain’s pay, and Mrs. Homma had better look after them on Sado island. But, as it soon became clear, money was not the sole cause o f the trouble; Toshiko was now living as a prostitute, and appearing in a stage show o f ill-repute in Tokyo. Mrs. Homma’s letter ended: ‘I hate to give you this bad news, but cannot make it a secret any more. Please write to your matchmaker and ask him to advise and supervise your wife.’ Putting the letter back on the table, Imamura expressed his sympathy, but warned Homma that while he continued drinking,

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it was impossible to talk to him seriously. For a while Homma lay across the table, weeping bitterly; but then, shouting, ‘I don’t want to live’ , he suddenly hurled himself at the window and attempted to jum p out. Fortunately, Imamura was able to grab his legs, but being much smaller was quite unable to pull him back into the room. So for some minutes there was the extraordinary sight, even for Mayfair, o f two future Arm y Commanders o f the Pacific W ar, struggling with each other at a fourth floor window. W ith half Homma’s body suspended in space, it looked at first, as i f his desired end would be achieved, but then the restaurant owner happened to return from lunch and went to Imamura’s assistance. Slowly Homma, now in a state o f complete hysteria, was dragged back into the room and placed on the bed. Imamura knew a good deal about Toshiko, for six years pre­ viously at the staff college, Homma had asked his advice about marrying her. Her mother had been a Geisha in Akasaka, and her father was General Tamura. An elder sister had married General Yamanashi, sometime A rm y Minister. Hearing about the girl and her background, Imamura advised caution; the proud Mrs. Homma would never agree to meet the daughter o f a Geisha. Also, arm y officers had to be very careful whom they married; a scandal could wreck even the most promising career. However, Homma declared that he was so passionately in love with Toshiko he could not help himself; and in due course—not only against Imamura’s advice but against that o f his friends and relatives— he married her. N ow , six years later and separated from Japan by some 12,000 miles, Imamura was being asked his advice again, and could only reiterate the suggestion by Homma’s mother—that Masharu write immediately to his matchmaker, General Sohruku Suzuki, and arrange a divorce.* The following day Homma sent o ff a letter, * The matchmaker is an ancient institution in Japanese life. His mam duty is to decide the size o f the yuinokin, the money given by the bridegroom to the bride to cover the cost not only o f her trousseau, but furniture and fittings for the new home. It is customary for the bride to return half the money so that the bridegroom may buy new clothes for the wedding. If, among upper-ciass families, there is any question o f a dowry, this is negotiated by the matchmaker also, but it is not his principal duty. Homma’s matchmaker was an old family friend whom he could call upon for help and advice, especially as he had lost his own father. The idea o f romantic love is, o f course, quite foreign to the Japanese.

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taking the opposite course. Declaring once more his passionate love for Toshiko, he begged the General to persuade her to return. This request produced some astonishment, the General replying curtly: ‘What a weak character you are! Are you really a Japanese officer? Take your wife back now and everyone w ill laugh at you.’ Homma’s answer to this was: ‘I don’t mind being laughed at. I just want her back.’ But the position was hopeless; in due course Homma was forced to realise that his marriage was over and initiated divorce proceedings. To the fury o f his family he agreed to the penal terms demanded by the lawyers, and so Toshiko found herself presented with a sum equivalent to -£5,000 at present values. When Imamura asked w hy he had taken such a course, Homma shrugged and echoed Shakespeare’s— ‘When troubles come they come not as single spies but in battalions.’ Then added grandilo­ quently: ‘I have paid for the funeral o f m y love.’ Revenge was quite outside Homma’s nature; in love as in war, he did not bear malice. It was now that Shozo Kawabe, his old friend at the Military Academy, came back into the picture. About three years after the divorce—and after Homma, to the continued despair o f his family, had been indulging in an affair with a nineteen-year-old Geisha girl—Kawabe introduced him to a woman called Fujiko Takata. Aged twenty-one—that is fifteen years younger than Homma— she had already been married to and divorced from a professor. Her father was managing director o f Ouji Seishi and Company, a large paper manufacturing concern, and had travelled consider­ ably and spent long periods in the United States. Like Homma himself, Fujiko had adopted many European ideas, and was a very cultured woman. Homma fell in love with her immediately and soon they were married. The union was a happy one from the start. Fujiko knew nothing about the army or its traditions, and found the ladies o f the old samurai families as strange as they found her. ‘N o w ife for an officer’ was the general comment o f visitors to the house, though not infrequently they added— ‘though I suppose she’ll do for Homma.’ B y now, his matrimonial affairs, having been common gossip throughout the entire officer corps o f the Japanese A rm y, Homma was regarded as a somewhat extra­ ordinary character; brilliant, passionate, unpredictable, and slightly

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unstable. T o many officers, content with dull marriages compen­ sated for by sake and the service o f prostitutes, his quest for a deep passionate love, for romance, seemed slightly ludicrous. Fortunately, however, Homma retained his aristocratic disdain for the strictures o f others; and secure in his marriage with Fujiko gained stability and maturity. Despite the apprehension o f Imamura and his other friends, Homma’s career prospered. In 19 21 he became an instructor at the Staff College, where again his intellectual range and grasp made a great impression. Nineteen twenty-two saw him as a major doing regimental duty; 1923 as a military attache in India; and 1925 as a staff officer at Imperial Headquarters. Five years later he was sent abroad once more, to carry out a two-year attachment with the British Arm y. Unfortunately, little is known o f his views and experiences at this tune, but obviously he found increasing favour in Tokyo, for in 1933 he took over the 1st Infantry Regiment. This was a key appointment in the Japanese Arm y, recognition that an officer was one o f the most brilliant men o f his class and destined for promotion to general rank.* In 1935, at the completion o f his command, Homma was promoted to the rank o f Major-General and given the 32nd Brigade. After two years with this formation, however, he returned yet again to Imperial Headquarters, to take charge o f the A rm y Propaganda Department, a branch o f the General Staff. The Sino-Japanese W ar had now broken out, and Homma was employed to put the A rm y viewpoint, a task for which he was thought eminently suitable, because o f his great command o f language, and he threw himself into the w ork enthusiastically, writing not only articles but military songs. Like the vast majority o f Japanese o f his day, his views were that only when China had been taken over by Japan and given order and discipline, could a new order be established, and European power broken in Asia. He saw w ar with China, with Russia even, far preferable to war with Britain and America. On the 15th Ju ly, 1938, he was granted the opportunity to take a more active part in the war, being posted as commander, 27th Division, in China, and it was now that he was able to demonstrate that his theories worked as effectively in action * Tojo commanded the regiment in 1929 and Mutaguchi in 1936.

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as they had done on paper at the Staff College; that he was a man o f courage, resource, who knew how to command men. During this period his immediate superior was Prince Higashikuni, commander o f the 2nd Arm y, who was given orders to advance on Hang-chow, in south-east China. Considering the plan ill-advised, Homma persuaded the Prince that it might be preferable to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek and urge him to withdraw to an agreed line. I f he were not amenable, then the suggested operation could go ahead. Prince Higashikuni, an intelligent man but for a soldier very unaggressive, put up the plan to the Emperor Hirohito, who consulted Sugiyama. The latter, it may be needless to add, threw out the idea, and ordered the 2nd Arm y to carry on with the offensive at once. Unfortunately, his comments on Homma at this moment are not recorded, though they cannot have been very flattering. After the Hang-chow operation was over, Homma was appointed to the command o f the Tien-tsin Defence Arm y, where he had to deal with a number o f riots and insurrections staged by the Chinese. Relations with the British, who had a concession here, were somewhat difficult, but fortunately for Homma, Major Piggott, a friend from his early days in London, was in command o f the troops. It was therefore possible to make an amicable arrange­ ment, which held until Piggott returned to London, but afterwards relations with the British deteriorated, until Homma decided to close the concession. On the 2nd December, 1940, he was trans­ ferred to command o f the Formosa Arm y, and in the somewhat calmer atmosphere, concentrated on administration and training. Officers who served under him during this year, picture him as a somewhat withdrawn, intellectual commander, and rather cold, i f not unfriendly. According to one account, ‘He spent nearly all day alone in his office, studying intelligence reports and papers. . . . He only came out o f it to attend conferences.’ This is probably an exaggeration, but he certainly did not travel round his command as much as he might have done, keeping his eyes open, a failing for which he would have to pay dearly in due course. He took no great delight either in mess parties and the minor regimental functions beloved o f all armies. Though not ill at ease in male com­ pany, he felt no great need for it; all his deeper feelings were reserved

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for his wife, Fujiko. In considering these aspects o f Homma’s character, it is wise to remember that for anyone the position o f A rm y Commander is to some degree isolated and lonely. The responsibilities are enormous; and among them are the duties o f assessing the potentialities and performance o f subordinate com­ manders, and very often removing them from their commands. The more intimate an A rm y Commander is with his subordinates, the harder and more distasteful this task becomes. One should remember, too, that a Japanese general had no need to inspire his officers and men as, say, a Montgomery, or Slim, or Omar Bradley inspired theirs; and the iron discipline o f the Japanese Arm y made such inspiration unnecessary. Homma remained in Formosa until November, 1941, when he was hurriedly summoned to Imperial Headquarters by Sugiyama, to be given the 14th Arm y. T o anyone who has not worked on such a project, the immense task o f preparing a major Combined Operation must seem almost incomprehensible. There are the long and often acrimonious conferences between the commanding soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and then with the heads o f the planning staff. There is the agonising consideration o f winds, tides, beaches, weather, with men o f differ­ ent services and therefore o f different traditions and habits, arguing at cross-purposes. There is inevitably a plethora o f experts on everything from waterproofing vehicles to living o ff jungle fruits, and usually these disagree. W hen the major plans have been settled there comes the tedious business o f fitting men, machines, equipment, and ammunition into ships which are never big enough, and then allocating them to landing craft, the numbers o f which always seem to dwindle, even before plans are finalised. Frequently it is discovered that certain ships are not available, so that plans have to be scrapped. And usually there is a prolonged dogfight between soldiers and sailors as to the allocation o f storage space. D ay after day the cry goes up— ‘ Ships haven’t got elastic sides!’ The planning stage is a nightmare, even for the British or Americans whose armies and navies are usually on speaking terms. In Japan, how­ ever, there was a long and deep feud between the arm y and navy, which made matters even more unpleasant. T o compensate,

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however, the professional knowledge o f Combined Operations amongst the Japanese services was considerable and had been built up patiently over a long period. Even by the m id-i7th Century Japan could mount a pobshed and meticulously planned sea-borne offensive, far beyond the capability o f any European power. I f the British had possessed such professional skill three centuries later, when the Gallipoli expedition was mounted, history might have been very different. B y 1941, when Homma planned the invasion o f the Philippines, the A rm y Shipping and Movement sections at his disposal were tremendously experienced and sophisti­ cated. Once given their orders, they could co-ordinate movement by land, sea, or air, so that formations o f the 14th A rm y were concentrated at the right place and the right time. There was also a reasonable certainty that gunners would arrive in the same port as their guns, and tank crews as their tanks. Even so, the task facing Homma and his staff was a considerable one. The units designated to form the 14th A rm y were strung out over Japan, Formosa, and the islands in between, and he had neither met their commanders nor had an accurate idea o f their quality. Setting up his headquarters in Iwa Kuni, in Southern Honsu, on the 10th November, he summoned his subordinate commanders for a three-day conference, to begin on the 13 th. O f these, the leading figures were Lieutenant-General Morioka, commanding the 16th Division, and Tsuchibashi, commanding the 48th. He also met the senior officers o f the navy and air units, who were to provide cover—Vice-Admiral Tsukaharu o f the 3rd Fleet, and LieutenantGeneral Obata o f the 5th Air Group. As his C hief o f Staff, Homma discovered that Imperial Headquarters had appointed LieutenantGeneral Maeda, an undynamic individual, selected possibly because o f his knowledge o f the Philippines. This knowledge, so Homma soon realised, had been acquired many years previously, and was therefore out o f date. Signalling Sugiyama, he asked w hy officers with more recent knowledge could not be sent him, listing several names; the reply was that they had been posted elsewhere and were not available. It was now, despite the great burden o f organisation thrust on him, that Homma began a detailed study o f his objective— the Philippine Islands—both from maps and from air photos taken

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in December, 1940. The islands stretched from north to south, he observed, for a distance o f about a thousand miles, beginning about four hundred miles from the southern tip o f Formosa and ending up a similar distance from the east o f Borneo. Though the group comprised some hundreds o f islands and reefs, two large islands really mattered—Luzon to the north and Mindanao to the south. Both were largely covered with mountain and jungle, but Luzon held the capital, Manila, set deep in Manila Bay, an important anchorage required by Imperial Headquarters for the development o f their Pacific Campaign. The importance o f the Philippines was quite obvious; they formed the left flank o f the advance towards the rich ‘Southern Resources Area’— Borneo, Java, and Sumatra, which Japan required, to escape from the American blockade. So much for the terrain; what o f the enemy? The Intelligence summaries—which Homma tended to mistrust—spoke o f small American forces backed by several Filipino divisions, a total o f 40 to 50 thousand men, all under General Douglas MacArthur, the recently appointed commander o f U SA FFE— United States A rm y Forces in the Far East. Professional assessments o f this officer varied, but none was very flattering, and one report estimated that ‘His abilities are no higher than those o f General Percival, the British commander in Malaya.’ Opinion o f Filipino troops was not high in the Japanese Arm y either, though a meagre acquain­ tance with history would have elicited the fact that they had fought well against the Spaniards in the 16th Century, and later on as mercenaries for them. In 1899, by which time the Americans had taken over from the Spaniards, the Filipinos revolted, produced their own commanders, and fought with sustained courage. It was only after the Americans had launched a major offensive, employing 60,000 troops, that the revolt was finally stamped out. One o f the final actions o f the war was the heroic defence o f the Tila Pass by a Filipino force led by General Gregorio del Pilar, an action which was to become a legend in the islands. Altogether, the Filipinos are a martial race with a long tradition o f courage. T o what extent Homma was informed o f these matters, it is difficult to say; he certainly did not accept the more facile Intelligence summaries; he constantly warned his staff and subordinate commanders against

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under-rating the enemy; on the other hand he did not consider that man for man the forces pitted against him could match Japanese troops in the field. From the 14th to 16th November, Field-Marshal Terauchi held a conference at Iwakuni attended by senior commanders including Homma, Vice-Admiral Tsukaharu and LieutenantGeneral Obata. Here three vital decisions were made: that the American A ir Force must be destroyed or neutralised to gain complete air superiority; that airfields must be seized as quickly as possible so the army planes could support ground operations; and that the navy must co-operate both in the initial air attacks and by landing the advanced detachments. But how were these moves to be timed? Obviously they would commence within hours o f the attack on Pearl Harbour, the advance detachments landing the moment enemy airfields had been knocked out, followed by units o f the A rm y Air Force. But to achieve such precise timing, units would have to travel considerable distances across the ocean, even before the commencement o f hostilities. So the following plan was drafted: On the evening o f the day before the first air attack, two detachments o f 48th Division (under Colonel Tanaka and Colonel Kanno respectively) would leave Formosa and head for the northern coast o f Luzon, their objectives being the airfields at Aparri, Vigan, and Laoag. (Later their task would be to protect the flank o f the main landing force.) A t the same time two detach­ ments o f 16th Division—under Kimura and Sakaguchi— would leave Palau island, 550 miles to the east o f Mindanao, to seize airfields at Legaspi and Davao and protect the southern flank o f the invasion. The main body o f the 14th A rm y, consisting o f 48th Division, together with four artillery regiments and two tank regiments, would land a few days later in Lingayen Gulf, and advance on Manila via the defile west o f Rosario and Cabanatuan. A secondary force would take a parallel road to the west, via Tarlac and San Fernando. Meanwhile, the 16th Division under Morioka would have landed on the far side o f the island, in Lamon Bay, and would advance on Manila from the south-east. B y this plan Homma hoped to hem in MacArthur’s forces between the two prongs o f his army, and beat him in a decisive battle near Manila. The B ay could then be opened for units o f the Japanese

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Imperial N avy, and 14th A rm y’s mission would be accomplished. Some days later when he learned o f the plan, General Maeda was not entirely happy with it, and at the earliest opportunity gave Homma his reasons. I f American strategy was to hold out as long as possible in the Philippines, while she reinforced her fleet and reorganised her armies, it was probable that her forces, instead o f defending Manila, would withdraw to the Bataan peninsula, which jutted south into the sea, so forming the northern coast o f Manila Bay. The terrain in the peninsula was composed o f mountain and jungle, and there were only two coastal roads. For any attacking force the supply problem would be a nightmare. Conceding the validity o f Maeda’s argument Homma drafted the following signal: T o General Sugiyama: 1. W hat is the true objective in attacking the Philippines? To occupy Manila or destroy the enemy forces in the field? 2. I f it is to destroy the enemy forces in the field, it must be realised that this may not be possible in Northern Luzon. The main battle may take place in the Bataan peninsula. 3. I f the main battle develops on the Bataan peninsula the forces o f the 14th A rm y w ill be insufficient to bring it to a successful conclusion. Forces similar in strength to those allocated for Malaya or the East Indies w ill be necessary. T o these observations the reply was: T o General Homma: ‘The main purpose o f the attack on the Philippines is the occupation o f Manila which is not only the political capital but a place o f military importance. The troops opposed to you are third class and unworthy to face us in battle; i f therefore they retreat to Bataan there is no reason w h y you should not blockade them there.’ Receiving such explicit instructions, Homma saw no cause to argue further, and orders were drafted embodying the plans as agreed. These were issued under Homma’s signature on the 29th November, and, in view o f subsequent developments, it is interest­ ing to read the Object clause: 1. The object o f the operations w ill be to crush the enemy’s principal bases and defeat his forces in the Philippines. In

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co-operation with the N avy, the A rm y will land its main forces on Luzon, overcome enemy resistance, and quickly occupy Manila. Thereafter it w ill occupy vital points in the Philippines. The final paragraph read: 12. I General Homma w ill move with the second convoy and expect to land in Bauang on the second day o f the landing operation. The following day the General moved his command post to Takao, on Formosa, and here on the ist December received final instructions from Field-Marshal Terauchi. The attack on the American Fleet at Pearl Harbour would be made early on the morning o f Sunday, 8th December, and his own operation must commence soon afterwards. W ar was just a week away. At the prescribed time Homma’s plan went into operation. The landing detachments headed for sea; a large striking force surprised the Americans at Clark Field—the only airfield on Luzon capable o f taking heavy bombers—destroying hangars, barracks, stores, and rows o f B - 17 bombers, caught on the ground. Other forces struck against the fighter base at Iba Field, and again achieved complete tactical surprise. B y the afternoon any serious threat from enemy air forces had been removed. The following day other airfields were attacked— Clark Field, Nielson Field. B y the end o f the third day the American air forces virtually ceased to exist. Meanwhile, supported by strong naval and air forces, the advance infantry detachments swung into action. Tanaka landed 2,000 men at Aparri and Gonzaga without opposition; and though Kanno ran into stiff opposition at Vigan, on the western coast, he got ashore also and moved inland. Reports reaching Homma indicated that no substantial ground forces were being encountered in northern Luzon, and he ordered Tanaka to leave a small force covering the airfields and move south-west to join Kanno. Meanwhile, on the 1 2th December, Major-General Kimura, with a detachment o f 16th Division, had landed at Legaspi, and was moving north up the narrow tail o f Luzon. So far, Homma could report to Sugiyama that everything was going according to plan. During the next week, it continued to do so, and in fact the whole operation was showing itself to be a masterpiece o f planning. D

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On the 17th December, Morioka left Am ami Oshima in the Ryukyus on the six-day voyage for Lamon B ay (on the far side o f Luzon), with 7,000 men o f 16th Division. From what Homma had heard o f this Division’s record in China, he expected nothing spectacular from it, but at least it went to sea in good order. Mean­ while, the troops o f 48th Division were going aboard the transports at ports in Formosa. There were to be three convoys, moving twenty-four hours apart, and Homma was to be in the last. His ship was the Teikaimaru, and it was aboard this vessel that the novelist, Hidemi Kon, drafted as a w ar correspondent, met him. ‘He was’ writes Kon, ‘well above normal height and with sloping shoulders. He had large, distinctive eyes, long eyebrows, and seemed made for command. “ Y o u ’re Hidemi Kon, aren’t you?” he said—he knew m y name though I was not a famous author— then pointed to the ludicrous uniform I had been issued with. “ W ho told you to put on that thing?” he laughed. “ Y o u ’ll be a terrible embarrassment to Manila society” .’ Despite such pleasant­ ries, Homma was obviously under great strain; Hidemi Kon saw him as a man o f wit and culture, imprisoned by the iron straightjacket o f A rm y discipline, and so forced to dominate his subordinates and accept the orders o f superiors, however impossible. Homma’s individualism, and unconventionality, he considered, did not go very deep; the ideals o f the samurai were as real for him as for any other general. And he would realise them only by his death. Despite the tension, or perhaps to ease it, Homma continued his practice o f writing verse, and one poem o f this time still survives: *Great birds over the sea, great eagles over the land Ranging their silver wings Fly towards the southern sky. Swiftly they capture Nielson Field; Clark Field they destroy at a single blow. W here is the Sky Fortress? Where is the shadow o f the P40? W hat a splendid action in the enemy sk y! Seeing him scribble on deck, some o f the soldiers asked him * The above is, o f course, a literal translation. N o attempt has been made to reproduce the spirit o f Japanese poetry.

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i f he would write a song for them to sing, no doubt remembering his songs during the Sino-Japanese W ar. Good-humouredly Homma obliged. To any soldier, and not least to a Force Commander, the sight o f the enemy coast, with all its unknown hazards and dangers, is an intimidating one. And for obvious reasons, the operation o f landing an assault force is even more complex than embarking it. To begin with things did not go well at Lingayen Gulf, which Homma reached early on the morning o f 22nd December. The convoy had been spotted b y the Americans, who sent a force o f B - 1 7 S to bomb it, and then the shore batteries opened up with 155 mm. guns. These were not silenced until the Japanese warships had returned the fire for over an hour, and it was after five a.m. that the leading infantry units headed for the shore. W ith the coming o f daylight the weather deteriorated; there was wind and thick cloud, and the waves were six feet high. On the bridge o f the Teikaimaru, Homma waited anxiously for the return o f the landing craft, but there was no sign o f them, and he could only conclude that they had either been sunk by enemy action or beached by the heavy seas. In fact, they had been beached, the powerful tides hr the G ulf driving them several feet into the soft sand. To add to Homma’s discomfiture, there was no signal from the units ashore; and then one o f the transports— carrying a hospital unit—suddenly exploded and sank by the stem, having been hit by a submarine torpedo. As Homma wrote later: ‘I might have been badly beaten . . . the first assault wave was marooned on the beaches . . . I f we had been counter-attacked w e would have been helpless.’ * B y 5.30 p.m. the situation looked so hopeless that Homma ordered the fleet to move south to a point o ff Damortis, and meanwhile signalled the units ashore to occupy San Fabian and deal with the artillery units there. The move proved to be a wise one. On the morning o f the 23 rd December landing operations re-started, and this time went smoothly. W ith the landing craft plying regularly to and fro, the force on the beaches was built up steadily, and on the 24th the situation was secure enough for Homma to land himself. B y now Kanno and Tanaka had moved their detachments south to cover the left flank; and signals were soon to arrive giving the news 'Testimony at his trial.

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that General Morioka and his force from 16th Division had landed successfully at Larnon Bay, on the far coast o f the islands. B y the 25th Homma’s army was ready to advance south towards Manila along the highways traversing the central plain. It advanced rapidly. The Filipinos o f the 71st and n th Divisions, fulfilling Sugiyama’s prophecy, proved no match for the Japanese in open battle, and after a swift action on the 23rd, broke and fled. B y the 25th MacArthur’s line had been pushed back to Carmen, beyond the Agno river, and two days later it had gone back another twenty miles, resting on Gerona and San Jose. B y the 28th Homma’s column on the western road had reached Tarlac, and the parallel column to the east, Cabanatuan. Manila lay a bare ninety miles to the south. Meanwhile General Morioka approaching from the far side, had shown surprising energy—far more than Homma had expected—and with the loss o f only 268 men had secured the roads running through the Tayabas Mountains. The pincers were closing on Manila with relentless precision. T o Homma’s headquarters there came a stream o f congratulatory signals, from Imperial Headquarters, from Sugiyama, and from Count Terauchi, his immediate superior at Southern headquarters. To Homma’s annoyance, the latter suggested that the date for the invasion o f Java, by the 16th A rm y, should be brought forward, and Imperial Headquarters agreed. T o Homma, this was suspi­ ciously like a case o f ‘counting one’s chickens before they are hatched’ , for the 16th A rm y would be relying on a transfer o f the bulk o f his troops. The following day his suspicions were to some extent justified, for the monitoring service in T okyo picked up an American broadcast announcing that Manila was declared an open city. W hy had this decision been made? Large cities provided a good defensive position. Buildings give not only cover but excellent fire positions; roads can be blocked; ambushes can be laid; and troops can be assembled under cover for counter-attacks. No assault can possess a reasonable chance o f success unless backed by a three to one advantage in men and equipment. I f therefore MacArthur had decided to defend Manila, Homma could have expected a long and costly battle on his hands. But he had done the opposite, and decided to abandon the city. W here then did he intend to fight?

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On the 27th December Homma held a conference o f senior commanders to discuss the position. N ot unexpectedly, Maeda argued that MacArthur’s obvious intention was to slip away west­ wards and fight in the Bataan peninsula. In view o f this, he con­ sidered, Lieutenant-General Obata (5th Air Group) should be asked to bomb road, rail, and river bridges, to slow down the American retreat to the peninsula. Tsuchibashi should then switch the bulk o f the 48th Division to the west, and catch the enemy with a right hook, via San Fernando. Once MacArthur had moved his army into the Bataan mountains, Maeda concluded, the situation would change for the worse very rapidly. Homma’s reply to this argument was that the whole matter had been discussed with Imperial Head­ quarters before 14th Arm y had left Formosa, and their directive had been quite explicit. He agreed to signal Count Terauchi and warn him o f possible developments—but meanwhile the chief objective would remain Manila. In fact, Terauchi replied the follow­ ing day that there was no question o f changing the plan, concluding, ‘Y ou w ill expedite the capture o f Manila and its harbour defences.’ Though foreseeing trouble ahead, Homma was forced to do as he was told. However, without lessening the momentum o f the advance south, he ordered Tsuchibashi to send an infantry regiment with artillery support to seize the road leading into the peninsula. The geography at this point is somewhat complex, and it may be profitable to pause a moment to consider it. Below San Fernando the island o f Luzon narrows to its waist, as Manila B a y cuts in deep towards the capital. As the land narrows, the roads inevitably converge and at San Fernando itself the main road to Manila is crossed at right angles by the road from Arayat, running down the western fringe o f the Candaba Swamp, which penetrates some fifty miles north from Manila Bay. T o the east o f the swamp a third road ran down towards the Manila road, joining it near Plaridel. Homma attacked down all three roads, which meant that the American forces were split on either side o f the swamp. B y the 31st December their main forces were stretched on the west, along a twenty mile line from Bamban to Arayat, while a smaller force held Baliuag, north o f Plaridel. N ow , for this force to gain the Bataan peninsula, it would obviously fall back to the Manila road,

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then head north over the rail and road bridges at Calumpit— crossing the Pampanga river—to gain the crossroads at San Fernando where it would turn south-east. Leading the advance on this flank was Colonel Sonoda o f the 7th Tank Regim ent who, livid that the enemy kept eluding his grasp with their organised withdrawals, asked Colonel Akiyama, o f the 5th Air Group, to destroy the key bridges at Calumpit. They would obviously be prepared for demolition by the enemy, he argued, and the task should not be difficult. However, Akiyama refused point blank; the task, he said, was to take Manila, and once the vital bridges at Calumpit were down, this must inevitably be slowed. So a violent row ensued, Sonoda complaining to Tsuchibashi—who passed on the complaint to Homma—that he was being denied a chance to destroy the enemy. The following day General W ainwright (MacArthur’s second-in-command) ordered the bridge to be blown, the moment his last troops were across. Ironically he did this assuming that Homma would press after the Americans into Bataan; he did not know that the objective was still Manila. Though the situation continued to develop swiftly, it was not entirely without setbacks to the 14th Arm y. For example, Colonel Kanno’s detachment, pressing along the Cabanatuan-Tarlac road came under heavy fire from the 192nd Tank Battalion, and took such a hammering that it was unable to join in the attack on Tarlac. Though the Americans and the Filipinos went back, their artillery still inflicted heavy casualties; Homma was not only impressed by their professional skill but by the quantity o f ammunition at their disposal. B y the 2nd January W ainwright had withdrawn all his troops to the west o f the Manila road, and taken up a line running from Porac to Gargua, on the northern fringe o f the marsh. Homma moved his headquarters forward to Cabanatuan to begin planning the attack on Bataan, and here at 1040 hours a signal arrived from Tsuchibashi: ‘The A rm y’s hope o f preserving the city o f Manila has been lost through great fires. To rescue city from the conflagra­ tion must enter in force. Urgently request approval o f this plan.’ The signal was accompanied by a plea from Colonel Kawagoe, the C hief o f Staff, 48th Division, who wrote: ‘At the order o f m y superior I beseech you to approve promptly the plan proposed.’ Homma replied that Tsuchibashi might go ahead, occupy the city

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and harbour, and link up Morioka who was, o f course, approaching Manila from the opposite direction. Once order had been restored and an administration established, however, he wanted all available units o f 48th Division to come north for the attack on Bataan. Tsuchibashi went ahead, and by 1745 hours on the following day Manila was occupied. The campaign had lasted twenty-two days. W hat was the situation now? According to the orders from Imperial Headquarters, Homma’s task had been accomplished. The fact that the enemy had escaped into the Bataan peninsula did not vitiate this fact, the view in Tokyo, as stated by Sugiyama, being that ‘there is no reason w hy you should not blockade them there.’ Such a course was quite feasible, for the Japanese N avy now ruled the eastern Pacific, and all American attempts to reinforce MacArthur had failed. But, on the other hand, the strategic object o f taking Manila was to achieve free use o f the harbour, and with the enemy occupying both Bataan, and the Island o f Corregidor, which lay inconveniently at the mouth o f the B ay, the harbour was useless. This was appreciated with an incredible lack o f celerity both at Imperial Headquarters and at Terauchi’s Southern Head­ quarters. In fact, there was considerable confusion, which is illus­ trated by the fact that within minutes o f Tsuchibashi’s signal advising Homma that he had occupied Manila, there came a signal from Terauchi advising him that 48th Division and 5th A ir Force were to be withdrawn from 14th A rm y at once and despatched to the Dutch East Indies. Homma would therefore be left with Morioka’s 16th Division (a mediocre formation), together with 7th Tank Regiment, some artillery regiments, and a small air unit—• 70 fighters, bombers and reconnaissance planes. This force, a bare 40,000 men, would obviously be too weak to sustain in a campaign o f any length, and Homma signalled Southern Arm y, asking that Lieutenant-General Akira Nara’s 65th Brigade should be sent at once from Formosa. This formation had provisionally been allo­ cated to 14th A rm y before the operation began; it had been raised for garrison duty only the previous year and, according to its commander was ‘absolutely unfit for combat duty’. But even with the addition o f this Brigade group totalling 6,500 men, would the 14th A rm y be strong enough to take Bataan? On the 5th January Prince Takeda and Major-General Imoto arrived from

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Imperial Headquarters to study the situation, and to them Homma gave his views in no uncertain manner. The Americans had obviously fallen back on Bataan according to a long prepared plan, he said, and air reconnaissance showed that defence lines had been prepared. The mountainous and jungle-covered terrain was cut up by swift rivers and deep gorges and—as Imperial Headquarters had been warned before the campaign started—would provide enormous problems. And with the loss o f Tsuchibashi’s division, he added, operations would be completely jeopardised. Prince Takeda accepted this view and signalled Imperial Headquarters, urging that 48th Division should stay where it was. Count Terauchi, however, was determined to brook no interference from T okyo, and not only repeated his order to 48th Division, but sent a Movement Control officer to ensure that it was carried out. T o this officer Homma repeated his argument, only to be informed that from the viewpoint o f Imperial Headquarters the prime consideration was the attack on Java. The entire Pacific campaign must be com­ pleted swiftly so that, i f necessary, formations could be switched rapidly to the northern front. Russian troop movements to the north o f the frontier with Manchukuo were giving anxiety, he added. T o this Homma asked: ‘Are Southern A rm y prepared for hostilities in the Philippines to continue indefinitely?’ , to be told: ‘N o— but it is possible that the situation here may have to be dealt with after the campaign in Java.’ In short, Homma was in a back­ water, with the great Pacific offensive sweeping far beyond. And for some inexplicable reason Manila Harbour, the objective o f the whole Philippines campaign, suddenly appeared to have lost its importance. W hat had happened? T o begin with Sugiyama and Imperial Headquarters had been subject to intense political pressure by Tojo, who wanted to announce a major success to boost the national morale. Though tilings were going well with Yamashita in Malaya, it would obviously be some weeks before he reached Singapore, and so the ‘booster’ must be the fall o f Manila. (The fact that the harbour could not be used, would naturally be concealed from the public.) So, as already noted, Homma was sternly ordered to press towards the capital with all speed, and let MacArthur side­ slip into Bataan. But now it was that Imperial Headquarters fell

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into psychological confusion convincing themselves that because Manila Harbour was unusable, it was not vital. And, as an off­ shoot o f this confusion, there grew up a whispering campaign against Homma both at Imperial Headquarters and Southern Arm y. To quote the historian, Masanori Ito, for a moment: ‘M any staff officers at G H Q began blaming Homma for his conduct in the Philippines. For example, one o f them said, “ W hy did he let the enemy slip aw ay to Bataan so easily?” and another, “ Anyone could occupy Manila i f there were no enemy defending it.” The Staff, who had determined the general strategy and given orders that Bataan should be ignored, had to change their attitude. Thus 14th A rm y was ordered to turn on its heels and run after the enemy in Bataan. Homma and Maeda had no spare time to say “ Serve you right” .’ Sugiyama, now being questioned closely by the W ar Cabinet as to the nature o f his orders, naturally defended his position. I f Homma had shown the resolution and resource expected o f a commander in the Japanese Arm y, he argued, he would not only have taken Manila, but have caught the enemy with a right hook at the same time. He should have forced them to give battle instead o f retreating. In defending his position, o f course, Sugiyama was also repaying what he regarded as Homma’s insult at the meeting in November, and it must have been some gratification that his views were accepted so readily. Within a few days his position seemed so secure that he could suggest that Homma should be recalled. But, however motivated, were Sugiyama’s strictures justified? Could Homma have trapped W ainwright and the North Luzon force, while still carrying out his orders? There are two factors which must be taken into consideration here: the first, that he did not know what battles lay between him and the capture o f Manila; and the second, that on the 1st January, the vital day, his supply system had broken down— the 48th Division was entirely without petrol. However, by the 3rd January it was clear that whatever the rights or wrongs o f the case, and despite the withdrawal o f Tsuchibashi’s 48th Division, Imperial Headquarters still wanted the enemy forces in Bataan and Corregidor wiped out with all speed. Accord­

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ing to American military historians* he expected the task to be quite simple and that he would merely have ‘to pursue rather than attack.’ N o confirmation can be obtained for this view from Japanese sources, and indeed the opposite view seems far more probable. I f Homma could not smash the American/Filipino forces in the central plain, how could he do so in the mountains o f Bataan, with half the number o f men; Admittedly Intelligence reports were emphasising that the enemy were short o f supplies and in poor physical condition, but as an old soldier he largely discounted these. Intelligence summaries produced by almost every arm y (certainly the Japanese, British and American) are always optimistic in this respect. Naturally, Homma did not communi­ cate his doubts to subordinate commanders, and with Maeda continually muttering ‘I told you so’ there was no need to warn his staff; and quite properly his appreciations and orders showed complete confidence. In one respect the Intelligence summaries were woefully wrong: in their estimation o f the size o f the enemy forces. MacArthur, it was stated, had a total o f 45,000 men on Bataan and Corregidor, plus artillery and 40 tanks. O f this total, it was said, about 25,000 were on Corregidor. In fact, the total was far greater, there being 12,000 Americans and 70,000 Filipinos. As W ainwright’s troops retreated into the peninsula from North Luzon, they came under Major-General Parker’s Bataan Defence Force, according to a long standing plan called W PO -3. Formations were allocated into two A rm y Corps, those from North Luzon forming I Philippine Corps and the formations from South Luzon forming II Philippine Corps. The first o f these was allocated the western sector, and the second the east, and both came under the direct command o f General MacArthur. Responsibility for guarding the beaches against sea-borne attack was given to General W ainwright who had a force o f three divisions. The American line now ran from Mauban on the west coast to Mabatang on the east, with its centre in the Mount Natib area, a distance o f twenty miles. It was this force o f over 80,000 men that Homma was now preparing to attack with the 6,500 men o f Nara’s 65th Brigade. His orders were issued at noon on the 6th January: * History o f the U S Arm y in World War II, The Fall of the Philippines, p. 263.

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‘The 65th Brigade will immediately advance on the AngelesDinalupihan road. After reaching the front line (of the 48th Division) it will take over command o f and combine with the Takahasi Detachment o f the 9th Independent Heavy Field Artillery Battalion to destroy the enemy on the immediate front. A part o f the unit w ill advance to the mouth o f the pass east o f Olongapo and the main force w ill advance in the vicinity o f Balanga.’ In other words, he proposed to advance in two columns, the main one near the east coast, and the other near the west. During the 8th January, Nara, a good and energetic front-line commander moved his units forward to their concentration areas, ready for the attack which was now scheduled for the following morning. Homma, never a soldier to forget the power o f words, chose the opportunity to compose a message to MacArthur, which was dropped behind the American lines next morning, just before the guns opened up: ‘Y ou r Arm y is doomed. The question is how long you w ill be able to resist. Y o u have already cut rations by half*. . . . Y ou r prestige and honour have been upheld. To avoid needless blood­ shed and save your troops you are advised to surrender. Failing that our offensive w ill be continued with inexorable force.’ ‘ . . . with inexorable force’ . . . There was a definite element o f bluff about this phrase. Having inspected 65th Brigade, Homma realised that Nara’s own strictures were by no means exaggerated; the troops were over-age for combat, and many o f them rather portly; apart from this, the Infantry Gun companies were still on their w ay from Formosa, and though six heavy machine-guns were available, they dated from the year 1906, just after the RussoJapanese W ar. Nevertheless, the attack had to go in without delay. It began on the morning o f the 9th with an artillery concentra­ tion at the eastern end o f the line, near Abucay, with close co­ operation from fighter and bomber squadrons. At 3 p.m. Nara’s leading regiment, the 141st, attacked the Filipino 43 rd Infantry but was repulsed. Next day Nara brought into action the 1st and 8th Medium Field Artillery Regiments and the 9th Independent * Again Japanese Intelligence was inaccurate: MacArthur had in fact cut rations down to two-thirds.

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Heavy Field Artillery Battalions, but their fire was countered by brilliant shooting from the 41st Filipino Artillery Regiment. Nothing very much was achieved; so on the n t h Nara brought up the 142nd Regim ent which deployed to the right o f the 141st, but the attacks by this formation failed just as completely. And on the 13 th units from both regiments were thrown back with heavy casualties by the 41st Division. It was hopeless going on and Nara called a halt while he went personally to report to Homma. The terrain was appalling, he said, and the handling o f the artillery regiments was very inadequate. He would need time to revise his plan and reorganise. Though exasperated by the lack o f progress, Homma did not blame Nara personally, and indeed thanked him for reaching the battle area so swiftly. Meanwhile he decided to try and push down the western coast, supporting the 122nd Regim ent with 20th Regim ent from Morioka’s 16th Division. This sector was now placed under command o f Major-General Kimura, who acted with great energy, and by the 15th he was attacking Bagac, at the extremity o f the Americans’ main defence line. Here he received a rough handling and was thrown back over the river. However, by the following day, the resilient Nara was in action again, reinforced by Colonel Tagechi and the 9th Regiment. Shortly after noon the Japanese infantry broke through a sector o f the line held by the 51st Division which began disintegrating, and fresh waves o f troops poured through the gap. To Nara’s surprise, the shoulders o f the salient held, and then a well-organised counter-attack straightened the line again. However, despite the solid resistance, Homma could see that MacArthur was having difficulty in knitting together the junction o f his two A rm y Corps in the difficult Mount Natib area and ordered that pressure should be kept up here. He also ordered Kimura to carry out a left hook through the dense jungle around Mount Silanganan, and this proved a great success. B y the 21st Kim ura’s column had got behind the enemy lines and was attacking artillery positions and the line o f communications. B y the 23 rd the position o f I Corps, already weakened by calls for reinforcements from II Corps, was in a pre­ carious position. The pressure on II Corps was beginning to tell also, and by the night o f the 23 rd the whole enemy line was drawing back.

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The night o f the 26th found the entire American and Filipino forces on their Reserve Battle line. This ran from Bagac to Orion, a distance o f some fifteen miles. Unlike the previous lure, there was no mountain barrier splitting the two A rm y Corps, but Mount Samat, which lay to the rear o f the line slightly east o f centre, gave excellent observation. Unfortunately though, lateral communi­ cations were entirely lacking. The troops by now were very tired, and the long retreat had reduced morale. M any had lost their mosquito nets, and so malaria was taking its toll; many, too, had lost their water bottles, and other equipment, and unit by unit efficiency was steadily being reduced. Another factor was the steady bombardment and machine-gunning from the air, which had to be endured without possibility o f retaliation. And finally, there was the gripping sense o f isolation—no convoys from America had been able to get through, and realisation was dawning that they never would. Altogether, despite shortage o f men, Homma’s advantage was a considerable one, but he still failed to use it to wrest a decision. On the urgent plea o f Major-General Kimura, he had agreed to landings at Quinauan Point and Longoskawayan Point, but these had gone disastrously. Instead o f harassing the enemy rear areas and aiding the advance down the west coast, the landing parties were being steadily wiped out. On the 29th January, two attacks by Nara in the Mount Samat area ground to a halt, and his regi­ mental commanders began signalling that they could not go on. Colonel Tegechi sent a liaison officer who said angrily: ‘Our regiment has been out o f rations for six days. I have come to take back supplies.’ To this Nara retorted: ‘W e have no food either. This morning I gnawed half a piece o f dried bread. All I can give you is this.’ From his pocket he took out six plugs o f tobacco and handed the officer three o f them. The officer bowed and went back into the jungle. The 31st January was the date Imperial Headquarters had laid down for the conquest o f the Philippines; it was the last o f the fifty days. And though convinced that it was no fault o f his own, Homma knew that he had failed. The enemy was far from beaten, and indeed was putting in some spirited counter-attacks. Both Nara and M orioka had been to see him and reported that their

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troops were exhausted; there must be a break, they urged, to reorganise and bring up supplies. On the 3rd February, Homma gave his consent. His position now was a serious one, and before long, signals were arriving both from Southern A rm y and Imperial Headquarters, demanding to be advised what he proposed to do. To these demands his reply was that he could do nothing without more troops; that the size o f the enemy and his artillery had been completely underestimated by Intelligence, as had that o f the quality o f General Mac Arthur; that the maps he had been given were a disgrace. On the 4th February, enraged at Homma’s decision to call o ff the attack, Terauchi despatched Colonel Masami Ishii, a member o f his staff, with instructions to inform the A rm y Com ­ mander in the strongest terms, that no delay could be tolerated. He must attack at once. Homma listened to the officer quietly, but stubbornly refused to change his mind. After some argument the Colonel gave up, and flew back to Southern A rm y headquarters. On the 8th February Homma called a conference at San Fernando o f all subordinate commanders and staffs, and by nine a.m. the officers were assembled. Homma did not appear, however, and after some delay, it was suggested that Colonel Nakayama, o f the Operations staff, should go and fetch him. Making his w ay into the General’s office, the Colonel found him seated at his desk, the tears streaming down his face. Asking what had happened, the Colonel was shown a signal from Imperial Headquarters which read: ‘The Emperor is very concerned about your strategic situation. W h y are you making no progress?’ T o receive the reproof o f the Emperor was in theory the most humiliating experience for a general, but Homma was not deceived; he realised that the signal had been inspired by Sugiyama who had brought in the Emperor’s name in his effort to secure revenge. Homma’s tears were not o f self-pity, but o f frustration and rage with Imperial Headquarters, which had removed half his A rm y and was now blaming him for failure. Here, o f course, Homma was flouting the code o f bushido which laid down that a commander should go on and attempt to take his objective, whatever the shortages o f men and equipment and however hopeless the situation. B u t his intellect, his sense o f strategy, told him that at this precise moment the code made nonsense, and increased unpopularity through breaking it would

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have to be accepted. D rying his eyes and bringing his emotions under control, Homma stuffed the signal into his pocket and followed Colonel Nakayama into the conference room. Here, after he had outlined the general position, an argument developed as to which course should now be pursued. Maeda’s view was that offensive operations should be discontinued on the Bataan peninsula, and the blockade tightened, while the remaining islands o f the Philippines were occupied. B y this method the enemy would be starved out, and the 14th A rm y would be spared casualties. Nakayama, however, strongly opposed this course; the orders were, he said, to destroy the enemy on the Bataan peninsula with all speed and they could not be complied with by a policy o f inaction. In short he stated the demands o f bushido. For an hour or more the argument raged, officers rising to support one side or the other. Perhaps it m ay be necessary to explain here that long and impassioned arguments by staff before their commanders were quite a feature in the Japanese Arm y. The commander, having set the problem to be discussed, would not guide the discus­ sion—in the manner o f British or American generals— but let it range free and uncontrolled; and only when the subject had exhausted itself, would he intervene. This was the course followed by Homma at the conference in San Fernando; and his decision was to support Maeda against the irascible Colonel Nakayama and the purists. Maeda was asked to draft an appreciation to be sent to Imperial Headquarters; and in due course produced the following document: 10th February, 1942: As reported to you previously, the enemy has taken up a defensive line from Bagac to Orion through the northern foothills o f Mount Samat. A t the expense o f great labours he has built defensive positions deep in the jungle, and in these has deployed six or seven Filipino Divisions with Americans to their rear, a total o f 40 to 50 thousand men and 100 guns. They have ample ammunition and can bring down accurate fire on us by day and by night. The enemy can use jeeps, armoured cars, and tanks along the tracks he has constructed in the Mount Samat area; he can use his knowledge o f the terrain and take advantage o f our poor communications. He has considerable mobility.

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Also he commands the sea from the mouth o f Manila B ay to the western coast o f Bataan, and our sea-borne troops are in great difficulty as w e cannot evacuate them. 14th A rm y succeeded in the Mount Natib battle and began the attack against the Mariveles Mountains estimating that it would take three weeks to capture the peninsula. Despite some local successes w e have received a severe setback and heavy losses. Our present situation is that we see no prospect o f success and are in a serious state. I f w e try to go on with the operation things will become even worse. W e urge you to consider just how necessary it is to capture the Mariveles Mountains, and whether the expenditure in effort and casualties would prove worthwhile. W e consider that our first duty should be to administer the Philippines and extract all possible resources from it. On the other hand, the enemy seems to be short o f food, and we can expect their situation to deteriorate as the sea blockade continues. The course w e recommend therefore is that 14th A rm y is allowed a period to reorganise and rest the troops, and make new plans. W e do this weeping tears o f blood. (Signed) Masami Maeda, C hief o f Staff, 14th Arm y. Sugiyama’s reaction to this document was one o f rage. Reports had already reached him that Maeda was luxuriously installed in Manila, where he was enjoying good food and drink, and the ministrations o f servants, not to mention mistresses. And, not surprisingly, he had not been near the front for weeks. Sugiyama therefore recommended to the General Staff that Maeda should be sacked forthwith, and Homma with him. An A rm y Commander who was so unpredictable and had no knowledge o f how to behave was quite intolerable. The proposal concerning Maeda was agreed at once; but Homma was quite a different matter. T o begin with every command from a division upwards, was, theoretically, bestowed by the Emperor himself, and so the removal o f a senior officer on active service constituted an implied criticism o f the Sovereign. Apart from this, the blow to public morale would be a considerable one and therefore an embarrassment to the govern­ ment. So it was agreed that Homma should continue, but be

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provided, with a more energetic C h ief o f Staff, Major-General Takaji Wachi. It was also agreed that Colonel Masanobu Tsuji should join 14th A rm y Operations Staff. Tsuji was one o f the most extraordinary men in the entire Japanese A rm y and it is worthwhile pausing for a moment to introduce him. As w ill be seen in the next chapter, he had carried the research into jungle warfare which had proved so helpful to Yamashita in Malaya, and has then attached himself to 25th A rm y as an Operations Officer. Tsuji was a man o f extraordinary ingenuity and courage; he declared himself immune to death by enemy action, he was cruel and barbarous; he had mysterious sources o f power and probably direct access to Tojo; he carried out the functions o f a government spy. N o respecter o f persons he would advise his superiors without hesitation; often he would give orders in their name without the slightest authority. N ot unexpectedly he was detested throughout the entire Japanese A rm y; but where the business o f fighting was concerned, he was invariably right. Apart from Takaji and Tsuji, Imperial Headquarters also agreed to let Homma have the reinforcements he was demanding. It did so grudgingly, and without modifying its adverse opinions con­ cerning him—but the important thing was that the reinforcements would be adequate. Gradually through sources both official and, unofficial, Homma learned that Lieutenant-General Kenzo Kitamura would be arriving with the 4th Division, from China; that MajorGeneral Kameichiro Nagano would be coming with a detachment o f 21st Division, 4,000 men strong; and that several medium and heavy artillery battalions would be arriving under LieutenantGeneral Kineo Kitajima, commander 1st Artillery Corps. The air cover would be strengthened also. However, it is one thing to order units from A to B , and quite another to get them there, especially when shipping is involved. For the rest o f February and the whole o f March, Homma was forced to mark time while the troops and their equipment gradually came o ff the boats, reached their concentration areas, and went into training. Homma had arranged a full training programme, with large-scale field exercises. Having the guns he needed, his determination was that they should be used to maximum effect, so the gunners found themselves subjected to a long and arduous £

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course in jungle training. His determination had been strengthened by a discovery in the Government offices o f Manila o f Mac Arthur’s complete plans for the defence o f Bataan and Corregidor. Studying these, Homma realised that the task ahead was greater than even he had estimated, and that the Intelligence services had been w oe­ fully at fault. Though the American plan for the Bataan withdrawal, W PO -3, had been in existence for many years, no Japanese agent had even suspected its existence. During this period Nara’s 65th Brigade and Morioka’s 16th Division lay in defensive positions, making contact with the enemy solely by patrols. Both formations were pitifully weak and growing weaker, as malaria, beri-beri, and dysentery took their toll. Apart from 7,000 battle casualties, 14th A rm y had 13,000 sick, and with rations cut from 62 oz. to 23 oz. per day the figure was likely to increase steadily. B y the end o f February, Nara was given 3,500 reinforcements and Morioka a similar number, but most o f the men were raw and unaccustomed to jungle, which meant that the weak units had to be thoroughly reorganised. W hen Kitamura’s 4th Division began arriving, Homma was horrified at its condition. ‘This Division’ he exclaimed, ‘must be the worst equipped in the entire Japanese A rm y.’ Angrily signalling Tokyo, he demanded weapons, supplies, and uniforms to bring it up to standard. B y mid-March a most important addition to 14th A rm y arrived: two heavy bomber regiments from M ajorGeneral Kizo Mikami’s 22nd Air Brigade. Together with the new artillery regiments, these would form a striking force o f over­ whelming power. W hile Homma’s strength increased, that o f the Americans and Filipinos decreased; no reinforcements could reach them. O f 78,000 troops, 9,000 were sick in the forward areas, 25,000 were treated by their ow n units, and 12,000 lay in the hospitals in the rear areas. Drugs were short and medical supplies o f all kinds; and by the 1st March the troops were down to one-third rations. Only their stubborn courage kept them going. Though aware o f the enemy’s condition, Homma refused to be over-confident; he knew that, having failed once, he must succeed in the coming offensive or forfeit his military reputation forever. Some idea o f his state o f mind at this time may be gauged from a memorandum he drafted, apparently for his own benefit:

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1. I think it is true that while w e are in a state o f suffering, the enemy is in a far worse condition. When they were in a bad position and their attacks at a standstill, General MacArthur sent a report about 9th February to the United States saying that the darkest stage has come since Pearl Harbour, and on the 10th another message saying that the battle o f Bataan is hopeless. Furthermore the W ar Department said the chances o f holding their positions were very slim. When battle conditions do not progress I should always remind m yself o f this kind o f thing. 2. The book o f tactics has taught us, when planning operations, to expect the worst situation. But actually, when considering enemy movements, we expect that some convenient situation for us w ill be produced. So we were sometimes disappointed with the results o f our operations. I cannot predict whether the enemy will fight to the end on their 1st or 2nd line, or whether they will retreat back to Corregidor and fight, or escape to Australia, Bisaya, or Mindanao, or throw up the sponge at a suitable time, but I still propose to prepare for the worst. Considering Intelligence reports that the enemy is reorganising airfields, preparing gasoline pumps for the rainy season, and recruiting mechanics to assemble aircraft on Corregidor, it is important that w e do not underrate them. Homma goes on to give examples o f how underrating the Chinese sometimes led to disaster in the China W ar, and then reminds himself o f the saying o f Sun Tzu: ‘I f you know your enemy and yourself a hundred wars need not be feared.’ After many victories, he adds, it is difficult not to underrate your enemy, and ‘much selfcontrol is required to counteract this tendency.’ Commenting on the recent operations, Homma felt that his A rm y had done well to capture enemy positions in the Mount Natib area, considering that the scale o f the only maps available was 1/200,000. Then, quoting an example from the Russo-Japanese W ar, he recorded Iris view that: ‘When you hesitate to capture an enemy position in order to keep down the number o f dead and wounded, you are apt to get the opposite result. In m y view big sacrifices are necessary to win great victories.’

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Homma then turned to consider the future: 1. During the Russo-Japanese W ar, Port Arthur fell after the first attack which began in August. So it is with all impregnable fortresses. There is no reason w h y w e cannot destroy the enemy positions on Bataan in the same w ay as the forces which took Hong Kong and Singapore. Jungles make operations very difficult, but man can conquer them i f he is fully prepared. 2. The maximum enemy strength is 50,000 men. Excluding personnel on Corregidor, garrisons on other islands, guards on the shores from east to west Bataan, the enemy has approx­ imately 20,000 infantrymen. I f 25,000 men were lined up over a distance o f 25 kilometres, each man would be one metre apart. Such a line should be very easy to penetrate. 3. It seems that the enemy have about the same amount o f train­ ing as our men, and junior officers who have been trained at universities. They m ay be very efficient in battle. Filipino officers who have devoted their fives to America have great fighting spirit. It would appear that they are never allowed to go hungry. The enemy has a tendency to fire its guns w ildly but seems to have ample stocks o f ammunition. 4. Our four battle groups have been brought into the line and ten Japanese colours have been raised. W e have enough artillery. W e have more than enough special guns, and our supply arrangements are perfect. W e have devised means for con­ quering the jungle. There is no possibility o f our attack failing. 5. One o f our greatest advantages is that w e have complete air superiority. W hen the enemy artillery opens up, it w ill be nice to see them come under heavy attack from our air force.* To round o ff his memorandum, Homma drew on his memories from France and the w ar o f 19 14 -18 , observing that when the German A rm y penetrated the British lines in March, 19 18, and advanced on Amiens, a special feature o f the assault force was its great deployment in depth. From this he deduced that, ‘The greater the depth o f the enemy fines, the greater the deployment in depth * Translations o f this document from American and Japanese sources vary con­ siderably. The above is an amalgam o f them.

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required by the attackers.’ And though the document did not state so specifically, he would make his plans accordingly. B y the 22nd March the plans were ready. Imperial Headquarters had taken responsibility for the southern Philippines, and so Homma was able to concentrate his entire forces in Bataan, leaving only small detachments to keep order in Manila and the rest o f the island. 14th A rm y was now deployed facing the enemy, with Morioka’s 16th Division on the right flank (i.e. western) Nara’s 65th Brigade and 4th Division in the centre, and Nagano’s detachment from 21st Division on the left flank. Homma’s plan was to attack on a narrow front with Mount Samat as the first objective, and when this was taken he hoped to strike down the eastern coast, through Limay, then go on to Corregidor. The entire operation, he esti­ mated, would take three weeks. Attempts to persuade the enemy into surrender b y verbal means had already been tried. In one o f these messages, addressed to General W ainwright, he had said: ‘I have sufficient troops either to attack and put your forces to rout or to wait until you are starved out. I urge you to surrender. I f no reply is received by 22nd March I shall consider m yself at liberty to take any action whatsoever.’ There was no reply. On the 28th March Homma summoned his ‘Orders group’ and gave out final instructions. The main attack was assigned to Nara and 65th Brigade, while 16th Division to the west o f it, carried out diversionary attacks. The Nagano detachment would remain in reserve. A ll Artillery units (a total o f 241 guns) were grouped under command o f Lieutenant-General Kitajima in the Balanga area. The attack would be closely co-ordinated by heavy artillery and air bombardments not only on the front line, but on key points through Bataan and Corregidor. The bombardment began at 8 a.m. on the 3rd April and con­ centrated on the forward areas for seven hours before switching to the reinforcement areas. B y this time many frontal positions had ceased to exist and the Americans and Filipinos were back on their reserve line. As Homma had predicted, counter-battery shooting was blotted out by the Air Force.* A ll the night o f the 3rd/4th the bombardment continued, and at first light the aircraft came * The Air Force dropped 563 tons o f bombs in this operation.

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into action again. B y this time the Filipino 41st Division was disintegrating, as the 42nd had disintegrated a few hours earlier. So a large gap appeared and through this Homma pushed Nara’s 65th Brigade and at great speed it headed south till reaching the San Vincente river. On the morning o f the 5th Homma brought up his tanks which struck hard at the 21st Division, holding an area to the east o f the gap, and soon this luckless formation was falling back and disintegrating until it finally became a rabble. Only a few units managed to form up on the slopes o f Mount Samat and offer any organised resistance. But General W ainwright had not yet given up, and with great resource on the morning o f the 6th, launched three divisions from the 1st Corps into a counter-attack; but this ran headlong into Homma’s main forces as they advanced south, and though the 45th Division fought desperately, it had to go back, and the 33 rd Infantry was routed. The situation was becoming precarious for W ainwright along the whole line. B y the morning o f the 7th Homma’s offensive had developed a tremendous momentum, far greater than he had dared to hope. His artillery fire plan had gone like clockwork, and his infantry, including the units he had despaired of, were m oving magnifi­ cently. B y the night o f the 7th, the enemy was moving back behind the Alagan river, half w ay between the Mount Samat line and the tip o f the peninsula. The following day the Japanese infantry had pursued them a further five miles to the Lamao river, and set on them even before defensive positions could be organised. B y nightfall all organised resistance in the II Corps sector had ceased to exist. Over to the west, the situation was equally disastrous for the enemy, and at 1.30 p.m. an order went out from MajorGeneral K in g’s Luzon Force headquarters that all artillery, tanks, ammunition and equipment were to be destroyed. N ext morning W achi informed Homma that two representatives had arrived to discuss the surrender o f Bataan. The officers were Colonel Everett Williams and Major Marshall Hurt, and their object was to arrange a meeting between King and Homma. Also they had orders to bring to the attention o f the Japa­ nese the weakened condition o f the American and Filipino forces, and to obtain permission for them to be moved to any concentration

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area laid down by Homma, in tbeir ow n vehicles. Their letter o f instructions read as follows: a. The large number o f sick and wounded in the two general hospitals, particularly Hospital 1 which is dangerously close to the area where projectiles may be expected to fall i f hostilities continue. b. The fact that our forces are somewhat disorganised and that it w ill be quite difficult to assemble them. This assembling and organising our forces, prior to their being delivered as prisoners o f war, w ill necessarily take some time and can be accomplished by m y ow n staff under m y own direction. c. The physical condition o f the command due to long siege, during which they have been on short rations, which will make it very difficult to m ove them great distances on foot. d. In order to assist in this matter, I have issued orders directing the use o f motor transportation in assembling and delivering the personnel, to such places as might be directed. e. Request consideration for the vast number o f civilians present at this time in Bataan, most o f whom have simply drifted in and whom w e have had to feed and care for. These people are in no w ay connected with the American or Filipino forces and their presence is simply incidental due to circumstances under which the Bataan phase o f hostilities was precipitated. The meeting between the Americans and Nagano took place near Lamao, and after a brief discussion M ajor Hurt was sent back to fetch General King, who arrived some hours later. Homma, being advised by signal o f these developments, sent his senior operations officer Colonel Nakayama to represent him, and for a while a comedy o f errors ensued. King thought that Nakayama was Homma, and Nakayama thought that King was W ainwright, come to surrender the Philippines. Discovering K in g’s true identity and that he had no control over Corregidor, Nakayama flew into a tantrum, but, finally agreeing to accept unconditional surrender, demanded King’s sword. W hen informed that he had left it in Manila at the beginning o f the war, Nakayama, suspecting an insult, grew even angrier, but accepted his revolver in lieu. But even then he made it clear that, with Corregidor still resisting, it was impossible to negotiate a cessation o f hostilities, and each

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individual and unit would have to surrender unconditionally. He also refused to sign any surrender document, declaring, ‘The Imperial Japanese A rm y are not barbarians.’ Though no doubt relieved by the fall o f Bataan, Homma was now in an awkward situation. N o congratulations had been sig­ nalled from Tokyo, and the pressure was on him to reduce Corregidor with all speed. The operation would not be an easy one, for not only has the assault force to be ferried across three miles o f open water in the face o f enemy guns, but the island itself was a fortress developed by the Americans over a period o f years. In short, he was faced with an unenviable Combined Operation. T o launch this he had to concentrate his troops on the southern tip o f the Bataan peninsula, which meant that the area must be cleared, and his staff must allocate bivouac areas and assembly areas, detail routes, and altogether establish the vast administrative machinery needed before an arm y can be launched into fresh operations. But before any move whatever could take place, the area would obviously have to be cleared o f enemy troops and civilians, numbering some 100,000. As a good commander Homma had foreseen this difficulty, even before launching his offensive against Mount Samat, and detailed five officers to carry out the jo b : Major-General Yoshikata Kawane, 14th A rm y Transport Officer, who would lay on the vehicles, Colonel Toshimtsu Takatsu, a Staff Officer Administration, Major M oriya Wada, a Supply Officer, Major Hisashi Sekiguchi, o f the Medical department, and a lieutenant o f the well-digging unit. On the 23rd March, ten days before the offensive was launched, these officers submitted their plan to Homma, who gave his approval and sent the document to Major W ada to draft it in the form o f an order. The plan envisaged two phases, the first under Takatsu, the assembly o f captured troops and their organisation for removal to a camp in central Luzon; and the second under Kawane, the journey itself. To look after the sick and wounded among the captives, Kawane planned to establish field hospitals at Balanga and San Fernando, and smaller medical units were to be set up en route. There would also be rest areas where water and sanitary facilities would be available. As regards transport, Kawane estimated that there would be sufficient for about a quarter o f the captives and the rest would have to walk

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to San Fernando. From here on railway transport could be used. Included by the order as drafted by Major Wada was an instruction that the captives should be treated by unit commanders ‘in a friendly spirit’ ; and the order conformed to the Geneva Convention o f Prisoners o f W ar. Deeply involved in preparations for the Corregidor operation Homma left the execution o f the order entirely to his staff. In the chaos and confusion following the Bataan surrender he had little time to talk to his captives and, in fact, met only one American officer at this time, Colonel Collier, a member o f K in g’s staff. About a mile north o f the point where the surrender took place, a Japanese officer had stopped Collier’s jeep and he was taken to a mango grove where Homma’s command post was sited. For about forty minutes, Collier recorded, they sat on folding chairs at a small table and had a fluent conversation without the aid o f an interpreter. Having asked various questions about the fighting in a relaxed and friendly manner, Homma said he would take Corregidor within a week—obviously in a far more optimistic mood than a few weeks earlier. W hen Collier asked i f he might join General King, Homma replied, ‘Certainly’ and wrote out a pass and signed it. ‘Y ou r worries are over’, he added, bidding Coflier goodbye. ‘Japan treats her prisoners well. Y o u may even see m y country in cherry blossom time and that is a beautiful sight.’ The attack on Corregidor was timed for the 5th May. The island, roughly four miles long and a mile and a half across at its broadest point, is roughly the shape o f a tadpole. The head is called ‘Topside’, a piece o f flat ground surrounded by steep cliffs, which are cut by two ravines, James Ravine on the north side, and Cheney Ravine on the west. The tail is joined to the head by a narrow neck which forms the lowest part o f the island and is known as Bottomside. The tail resembles a hogback and points towards Manila; it is scarred by several small ravines and there are narrow beaches, mostly on the north side. Homma’s plan—based on Intelligence gathered both before the w ar and more recently—was for the N avy to land troops on the eastern side o f the island by darkness, and then to carry out a similar operation twenty-four hours later on the western side. The landings would be prefaced by a six-day bombardment from air and land, and would be supported by a

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massive weight o f artillery. The landing parties would be drawn from Kitamura’s 4th Division, the 7th Tank Regiment, and 3rd Battalion Mountain Artillery Regim ent. Three battalions would be held in reserve, ready to land on the island from D plus 2 day onwards. A ll the troops involved were to be given special training in close combat and the drill o f assaulting pill-boxes. They would carry a week’s supply o f rations and water, fuel and ammunition. The plan was a good one, but could not be put into operation until the assault craft were brought down the coast from the Lingayen Gulf; and when they reached the Manila B ay area it was necessary to pass them under the guns o f Corregidor which still commanded the North Channel. The only thing to do, Homma decided, was to make a few dummy runs during the daylight hours, then bring the craft round swiftly under cover o f darkness, and this plan succeeded. B y the afternoon o f the 4th the craft were all at their launching positions and the troops standing by to go aboard. The last phase o f the campaign could now begin. First there came a twelve-hour artillery bombardment, and as the American, Fred Stolley, who survived it has written; . . . there was little answering fire, most o f the batteries were out o f operation. B y late afternoon, all wire communications were knocked out, searchlights were put out o f action, land mines were detonated, machine-gun positions caved in, barbed wire entanglements were tom up, and beach defences were in a hopeless state.’ The bombardment switched to the harbour forts, then to the tail o f the island, then to the beaches on the north shore. A t 2130 hours, with the troops aboard them, the landing craft engines were warmed up, and soon afterwards they were on their way. It was full moon and Flomma could watch the landing craft from his command post, as they headed south over the sea. ‘This’ he remarked, ‘is the third critical moment o f the campaign’. W hat he could not see was that the swift current surging through the North Channel was sweeping the first wave o f barges o ff course, and in fact they came ashore no less than a thousand yards from the objective, the Malinta Tunnel. The defensive caught them broadside and inflicted heavy losses— only one man in three managed to get over the beaches. The second wave was dealt with just as severely, and

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the situation was saved only by Colonel Gempachi Sato, who gathered together the survivors and led them towards the ob­ jective. On Bataan Homma waited anxiously for the return o f the land­ ing craft, but all he could see was the flashes o f small arms fire on the island; and then there came messages o f disaster. The leading waves had been wiped out, he was told; nearly all the craft had been sunk. After his long and thorough preparations for the assault, such tidings were hard to bear, and for a moment, he almost panicked, exclaiming, ‘M y God! I have failed miserably on the assault!’ Though 14,000 troops were standing by to embark, he realised to his horror that there were barely twenty craft left to carry them. I f the enemy now succeeded in counter-attacking, the men ashore, the operation would come to an ignominious conclusion. However, he had not failed. Small parties o f infantry managed to get ashore, then detachments o f tanks and artillery. And the following morning, when these had been able to organise themselves, they were soon able to stamp out all further resistance. At 1030 hours General Beebe, a member o f W ainwright’s staff went on to the Voice o f Freedom R adio, and made an offer o f surrender. The campaign in the Philippines was over at last. It was 1230 hours when Homma heard o f the surrender, a message reaching him that a white flag had been hoisted on Corregidor. Immediately he despatched Colonel Nakayama to meet W ainwright, w ith orders to bring him back only i f the American was willing to surrender his entire forces. W ainwright, however, insisted on dealing with Homma direct, and after some heated argument Nakayama agreed, so the two parties met at a villa near Mount Samat. W hen Homma walked into the room with MajorGeneral W achi and Colonel Nakayama he found W ainwright seated at a table flanked by General Beebe and Colonel Pugh. An official interpreter was present also, for, though Homma spoke English, his staff did not, and he wished the proceedings to be understood by everyone. The meeting swiftly got down to business, W ainwright tendering a formal note o f surrender, and the following dialogue ensued, through the interpreter: H omma: I can only accept the surrender i f it includes all American and Filipino troops on the islands.

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a in w r ig h t :

Troops in the Visayan Islands are under General Sharp, who is under the direct command o f General MacArthur.

:

I refuse to believe this. The American Arm y radio named yourself as commander. When did you release General Sharp from command?

a in w r ig h t :

Several days ago, and since then I have had no contact. Even i f I did command the troops in the south I have no w ay o f communicating with them.

:

That is nonsense. I w ill send a staff officer to Sharp by aeroplane.

omma

omma

The argument continued for several minutes, W ainwright arguing that even i f a plane were sent, he still had no authority to surrender the Visayan-Mindanao force. Homma, suspecting that W ainwright was attempting to trick him, rose angrily from the table, and said: ‘When General King surrendered in Bataan, I did not see him. Neither have I any reason to see you, i f you are only a unit commander. I w ill negotiate only with m y equal.’ W ainwright’s position was one o f extreme difficulty. Loathe to go against orders and surrender Mindanao, he was desperately anxious about the disarmed and defenceless troops on Corregidor. Unless a surrender could now be negotiated with Homma, they would inevitably starve or be slaughtered. Requesting a moment to consider the matter, he had a hurried conference with Beebe and Pugh, after which he turned to Homma and said: ‘I am willing to surrender the entire Philippine garrison.’ This offer struck Homma as quite ludicrous. I f W ainwright did not possess authority to grant a general surrender five minutes ago, how could he possess it now? Nothing enrages a Japanese more than the suspicion that he is being trifled with, and to a proud patrician soldier like Homma, such conduct was both sly and contemptuous. As he could see quite clearly, W ainwright’s main object had been to play for time, hoping that it might not be necessary to surrender Mindanao. So, when W ainwright’s new offer was conveyed to him by the interpreter, he moved towards the door and retorted coldly: ‘H ow can you make this offer, since

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you have already denied your authority to make it? I advise you to return to Corregidor and think the matter over. I f you see fit to surrender, then surrender to the commanding officer o f the division on Corregidor.’ And with this Homma and W achi walked out, leaving the Americans with Nakayama. That evening Homma sent for Lieutenant-Colonel Hikaro Haba, an Intelligence Officer, and briefed him for a meeting with W ainwright on Corregidor the following morning. The American’s delaying tactics, he emphasised, would not be tolerated on any account, and he must sign a document taking over command o f the Mindanao force. W hen this was done he could then order General Sharp to surrender. Haba duly carried out his instructions, and W ainwright addressed a letter to Sharp, ordering him to surrender at once. He added: ‘Let me emphasise that there must be on your part no thought o f disregarding these instructions. Failure to fully and honestly carry them out would have the most disastrous consequences.’ That afternoon the letter was flown south; and on the ioth May, General Sharp surrendered. Homma did not expect any lavish congratulations from Imperial Headquarters and none arrived. The campaign had lasted four months longer than planned; and absorbed more troops and air­ craft. The Filipinos— contrary to the Intelligence forecasts—had fought well on the whole, and remained loyal to their American masters. Enraged at this conduct, Siguyama sent instructions that during the period o f occupation to come, they were to be treated severely— an instruction which Homma ignored. While Homma was signalling Imperial Headquarters, Colonel Mansanobu Tsuji was sending his confidential report. ‘Homma’ he wrote, ‘lacks ability. His staff is dull and stupid. M orioka’s 16th Division is unreliable’.* It may be added that immediately after the Bataan surrender, Tsuji had rung up unit commanders ordering them to shoot enemy troops as they came forward to surrender. Colonel Takeo Imai, commanding the 14 1st Regim ent in 65th Brigade suspected that the order had no authority and refused to obey it; unfortunately, however, some other officers, not so closely acquainted with Tsuji’s curious character, did as they were told. For these acts o f barbarism Major-General Nara has been blamed. * Quoted by Kenichi Tonan: ‘Masahara Homma’ , Maru Magazine.

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Homma had no knowledge o f Tsuji’s ‘order’ or the shootings; he had no knowledge either o f how his plans for evacuating pri­ soners to the north had completely broken down. He was not to hear o f ‘the Bataan Death March’ for three more years. W hat he did hear was the growing volume o f criticism in Tokyo, and it was little surprise when at the end o f August he was recalled home and placed on the Reserve. He left the Philippines without regret, and longed to be with his w ife again. W hatever criticisms there might be o f his conduct, he remained quite certain that he had done his duty. A short while before he left, Hidemi Kon talked to him about MacArthur. Unlike his troops, Homma had not been surprised that the American General should be ordered to quit the Philippines, and therefore did not feel cheated o f his prey. O f his adversary, he remarked, ‘I think o f him as a good soldier and a good political administrator. I am quite satisfied to have fought against him for my honour.’ N ot unexpectedly, MacArthur’s feelings were not quite so temperate, as in due course Homma was to discover.

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YAM ASHITA AND THE TRIUM PH IN M ALAYA Tom oyuki Yamashita received the honour o f commanding 25th A rm y in Malaya with mixed feelings, though unlike Homma he did not argue. He knew that i f Tojo, Sugiyama, and the Control Faction clique, which now wielded power, could have found any­ one else for the jo b , they would have done so. He knew also that he would be watched closely and spied on, and that i f he failed or even came close to failure, he would be dismised summarily. And he suspected that even success might not bring any noticeable rewards. Yamashita was a curious, complex man. Fat, yet highly strung; immensely talented, yet often misguided; ruthless and ambitious, yet very fastidious; modem in outlook, yet shackled to the past, to the samurai myth. In the past his craving for advancement had brought him strange allies; he had co-operated with men he des­ pised; and had done things o f which he was ashamed. Inevitably his career had gone through many vicissitudes, but through these he had come to know himself and to know other people. His mind cut through cant, hypocrisy, and evasion like a sword; he was realistic, and at times cynical. For a large part o f his career he had suffered from divided loyalties, from unresolved problems; and had become adept at running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Tahei Suematsu* has described him as being ‘halfway between clever and cunning’ and there is undoubtedly some truth in this. Though embroiling himself in dangerous ventures, he seldom let slip a careless word, and was careful to leave open an escape route. Part o f his problem was that, although not wedded to violence himself, his aims could not be accomplished without it. People dealing with Yamashita often complained that he was introvert, passive, for long periods, but here they misjudged him; every decision was prefaced by deep and concentrated thought, and when his attitude seemed passive or ambivalent he was in fact at his most active. Probably no Japanese general o f his time saw * One o f the accused in the conspiracy o f 26th February, 1936. 79

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so deeply into things; possessed such a commanding grasp o f affairs, both military and political. Despite flaws, errors and mis­ judgements, he seemed a big man in any company. He was bom on the 8th November, 1885, in Osugi Mura, a village on Shikoku, the smallest o f Japan’s main islands. As a boy he liked an open air hfe, to run in the mountains and fish in the river Yoshino. Schoolwork made little appeal to him, and both his teachers and parents became somewhat concerned about him. His father, Sakichi, who was the village doctor, came o f humble stock, and had only taken to medicine after some years as a school­ teacher. Fortunately his wife, Yuu, was the daughter o f a wealthy farmer, and her family was able to support him during the years he went to Nagasaki to study. Y u u ’s father was six feet one inch tall, an enormous size for a Japanese at this time, and Y u u herself stood five feet three inches which was very tall for a lady. Yamashita often said that he owed his powerful physique to his grandfather. For some reason, however, the biggest influence on Yamashita during his early years was not his parents but his brother, Tom oyoshi, a clever boy o f whom Yamashita remarked, ‘He was only three years older than me but he might have been ten. He was very brilliant.’ Tomoyoshi wanted to be a doctor like his father and for a while Tom oyuki was bent on following him, but money was short, and Tomoyoshi—instead o f attending a higher school— was apprenticed to a doctor in Osaka, working part o f the day and studying the rest. There seems to have been a great bond o f affection between the two boys, for when Tomoyoshi moved to Tokyo, where he was to complete his final studies, he sent home part o f his allowance, telling his parents, ‘Use this to put Tom oyuki through senior school.’ In due course Yamashita’s brother qualified as a doctor and his two sisters married into the medical profession but, though Yama­ shita’s performance at school had greatly improved, a decision was taken that instead o f medicine, his own career should be the army. O f this decision Yamashita has said: ‘It was perhaps m y destiny. I did not choose this career. Perhaps m y father suggested the idea because I was big and healthy and m y mother did not seriously object because she believed, bless her soul, that I would never pass the highly competitive entrance examination.’ However, he took

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the examination for the Military Academy at Hiroshima, and passed it with ease. In 1908 he passed out with high honours, ob­ taining fifth place, and was gazetted to the infantry. O f his character during these early years, his friend and C hief o f Staff, General Muto wrote: ‘ . . . he was both popular and respected by his class­ mates because o f his simplicity, kindheartedness, and industry. He never strove for leadership, nor was he ever a member o f any faction or clique. He was always the mediator in the usual argu­ ments . . . Even the hotheaded among his classmates respected the calm, open-minded fairness o f country-bred youth and abided by his fair, impartial judgement.’ Though General Muto wrote from long knowledge o f his subject, he was somewhat blinded by hero worship, and the picture may be slightly overdrawn. However, there can be little doubt that during his years as a cadet and in the period which followed as a young infantry officer, Yamashita made an excellent impression on both his superiors and contempories. In 19 16 he graduated from the Staff College in sixth place (how one would like to know who was above him !)* and then began a tour o f duty on the General Staff. Here he worked on mobilisation schemes and budgeting, and again impressed his superiors to such a degree that in three years he rose from captain to lieutenant-colonel. Towards the end o f his tour he was asked to w ork out a plan for a drastic reduction o f the Japanese arm y to a scale required solely for defence. This task he carried out brilliantly, but it was to make him many enemies; for ten years later, General Kazushige Ugaki, the W ar Minister, took the plan from the file, asked Yamashita to bring it up to date, then passed it through the Diet. Ugaki was promptly eased from office by the army, before the plan could be put into operation, but Yamashita’s name was still associated with it. In 1919 Yamashita left the Staff to go as military attache to Switzerland, and then to Germany. B y 1926, a major-general, he was an instructor at the Staff College, where he stayed for just under a year, before returning to Europe as an attache in Vienna. * Since writing, the above information has come to hand. At the head o f the list were five future generals: Sadamu Shimomura (the last War Minister), Gun Hashimoto, Ryukichi Tanaka (commander Eastern District at the end o f the war), Teiichi Yoshimoto (who committed seppuku after the surrender), and Keisaku Murakami.

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Though married in 19 16 at the age o f 3 1, an average age for a Japanese officer o f the time, Yamashita had no children. When with his wife* he lived quietly, his hobbies being fishing, gardening, and taking walks through the mountains. He enjoyed music though not a musician, but disliked dancing. He did not own a car and was never to do so in his entire life, and indeed never learned to drive. In private life, and away from the tensions o f his job, he had a civilised wit, and a puckish sense o f humour. His laughter was deep and hearty. Though he lacked the poetical or lyrical sense o f Homma, his language was always attractive, and he frequently made a powerful use o f irony. A religious man, he believed sin­ cerely in the great God Norito, and the bad God or Devil, Susano. Whether his belief in the religion was as deep and rooted as his belief o f the samurai code may still be argued. B y the late 1920s the military cliques were in action, and for some reason unknown, Yamashita attached himself to the Imperial W ay, and enjoyed the favour o f General Araki. In 1930, when he was commander o f the 3rd Regim ent it became the focus o f political activity, which he did nothing to check and is even alleged to have fostered. Having no children o f his own it was not surprising that he ‘adopted’ two o f the young officers under his command, Nonaka and Ando and, as he put it, ‘loved them like sons.’ Later they fol­ lowed him into the Imperial W ay, and formed the nucleus o f a group o f young fanatics. To what degree Yamashita indulged in these political activities from patriotic motives— even using the terms in its widest connotation—and to what degree he was interested in personal advancement, one cannot be sure. But undoubtedly his motives were mixed. That he hated the rich civilians and their use o f power is clear from his diary and he probably took a cynical view o f the political parties. The Imperial W ay, therefore, with its ambitions for military government was there­ fore very much to his taste; he greatly revered the Emperor. In after years, when General Muto asked him the origins o f the marked antipathy between Tojo and himself, Yamashita was always evasive, and on one occasion remarked: ‘I have nothing against Tojo— but apparently he has something against me.’ But the feud arm o r have been so simple or innocent. B o m within three weeks * Hisako, daughter o f General Nagayama.

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o f each other, their period both at the Military Academy and the Staff College overlapped, though at the latter Tojo was a year ahead. In 19 19 they were serving together in the embassy in Switzer­ land, and two years later in Germany. W hen Yamashita took over the 3rd Regim ent, Tojo had already been commanding the 1st for exactly a year and had made it a focal point o f activity for the Control Faction. A t this time, it will be remembered, the military cliques were sparring for power and so it is hardly surprising that the two regiments and their commanders developed a mutual antipathy. Tojo, there can be little doubt, bad disliked Yamashita for many years, probably through jealousy o f his natural powers o f leadership and intellect; and now, finding him a rival for political power, the antipathy grew. That Yamashita was unaffected by T ojo’s attitude, as he sometimes pretended, is far from the truth; again, as his diary reveals, he both feared and despised his rival. So to the events o f February, 1936. Tojo was a leader o f his clique, the Control Faction, and had made his reputation as head o f the kenpei in the Kwantung Arm y. Fie had transformed this from an orthodox corps o f military police into a secret police force, whose tentacles stretched not only throughout the army, navy and air force, but outside them. N o w appointed to the Security Board o f the Kwantung Administration, he had not closed down the channels developed during his years with the kenpei, but on the contrary was developing them, and extending his web o f influence and power, throughout the whole o f Japan. Yamashita meanwhile had left regimental soldiering for an appointment as head o f the Investigations Board o f the W ar Ministry, with the rank o f majorgeneral. In December, 1935, his proteges, Captain Nonaka and Captain Ando, called on him to talk over the political situation and their plans for setting it to rights. An election was in the air, and moderate opinion was gaining. The Premier, Mr. Keisuke Okada, a cynical old man with a taste for sake and geishas— the wittiest geisha in the country was his mistress—held all military cliques in the utmost contempt and was continually urging the army to deal with them. The W ar Minister, General Hayashi, had swung from the Cherry Society to the Control Faction and was therefore implacably set against the young officers o f the Imperial W ay. In these circumstances it was difficult for Nonaka and Ando to

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see how their great dreams could be realised, how the Japanese A rm y could stride victoriously through China, and dominate the Far East, unless there was a violent change. And, as they told Yamashita, they would obviously have to bring about the change themselves. It m ay seem extraordinary that the conspirators should confide so openly in a senior officer, but the practice was quite common at the time. The young men wanted advice on their plans and assurances that certain people would not interfere; and the senior officers were not averse to having their dirty w ork done for them, especially when it resulted in the elimination o f their rivals. Some idea o f the state o f the times and the boldness o f the plotters can be gauged from Major-General Ryukichi Tanaka’s protest: ‘Young officers barely out o f swaddling clothes went so far as to call on military personages as high as the W ar Minister by name, and to hold their superiors in obvious contempt . . . sly junior officers took pleasure in resisting their superiors, going over their heads and ‘preaching’ to their secret society bosses, and in some cases threatening the jobs o f their commanders. In consequence, those unit commanders who were not particu­ larly strong would get frightened and leave them alone. This was gekokujo (i.e. rule by juniors) at its worst’*. In this situation, therefore, it seemed quite natural for Ando and Nonaka to call on Yamashita. But what was said during their interview? M any versions have appeared, differing in detail, but remarkably similar in their general shape. Yamashita, it seems, though not committing himself to action, was one with the con­ spirators that something must be done. Okada, the premier would certainly have to be removed, and there was talk o f taking an axe to him. In some versions, Yamashita said, ‘Y o u ’ll have to wield the big axe’, meaning presumably that only a large and ruthless coup would have a chance o f success. He certainly did not advise the officers to drop their project, or even advise caution. On the contrary he seemed proud o f their ‘pure spirit o f patriotism.’ On the 20th February the result o f elections for the new Diet was announced—and showed a triumph for the moderates. A few days later the W ar Ministry gave notice that the First Division * Ryukichi Tanaka, The Causes of Defeat, Tokyo: 1947.

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(which included the 1st and 3rd Regiments) would move to Manchuria. N ot surprisingly Ando and Nonaka soon appeared before Yamashita clutching a draft o f their manifesto. (The text is quoted in Chapter One.) Faced with a concrete plan, Yamashita acted with some caution; and having read it, handed it back without comment. But he neither advised the conspirators to think again, nor threatened with arrest or exposure. Passively he let events take their own path. So on the morning o f the 26th February, 1,400 officers and men launched their insurrection, surrounded the Imperial Palace, and carried out their savage, murderous plan ‘with a pure heart’, and variable efficiency. B y nightfall, so they hoped, the leaders o f government, together with the elder statesmen who advised them and the Emperor, would be wiped out. When the news was phoned through to Yamashita he was eating an early breakfast with his brother-in-law, Kusao, and is said to have exclaimed ‘They’ve done it at last!’ Hurrying to the W ar Ministry, he learned that the Emperor took a very stem view o f the affair, and to the astonishment o f General Kawashima, the W ar Minister, had demanded, ‘When are you going to suppress the insurgents?’ Kawashima belonged to the Imperial W ay himseld and therefore had sympathy with the conspiracy; temporising, he answered, ‘The riot has been caused by maladministration. W e need a new cabinet to put things right.’ To this the Emperor had replied angrily, ‘The cabinet is not your affair. Y ou r first duty is to put down the insurgents.’ At 9 a.m. Kawashima called a conference attended by Sugiyama (Vice-Chief o f Staff), Terauchi, Mazaki, Araki, and, among the more junior officers, Yamashita. As all the senior officers belonged to either the Control Faction or the Imperial W ay, it was not surprising that there was some bitter argument, one faction led by Kawashima declaiming that the rebels should be disbanded by Imperial decree, and the other, led by Sugiyama and Terauchi, that martial law should be enforced. The meeting went on some hours while life in Tokyo came to a halt; trains and all transport ceased; schools closed; and offices were emptied. I f the generals were powerless to take decisive action because o f the division o f loyalties, the politicians were inhibited by fear. So, with the affected areas merely

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cordoned off, and the rebel leaders loosely confined in the residence o f the W ar Minister, the situation drifted. Yamashita’s role was to act as a go-between, working to the orders o f Genera] Araki. To what extent the General was acting within his position as a military counsellor, and to what extent he was playing the situation to his own advantage, it is impossible to say. Naturally, as leader o f the Imperial W ay, his position, like that o f Yamashita, was somewhat complex. I f the rebels’ demands were met, he would obviously steal a march on the Control Faction; but i f the Emperor’s view prevailed, then his position would become difficult or even perilous. However, at 3.30 p.m. Yamashita was despatched to interview Ando, Nonaka, and Asaichi Isobe, and read to them the following message: 1. The meaning o f your action has reached the Emperor. 2. I recognise that your intention is based upon a sincere desire to revive the real Japanese spirit. 3. The Military Council agrees to move in the direction advocated by you. 4. This move should be led by the Emperor. The three young officers listened to the message quietly, then Isobe began putting questions in an effort to ascertain how the somewhat vague phraseology was to be interpreted. Yamashita refused, however, to answer such questions, remarking, ‘Y o u ’d better listen to the message again.’ But Isobe was no more satisfied after the second hearing then the first, and persisted: ‘Then our action has been recognised as a patriotic action by loyal troops?’ Again Yamashita refused to comment, so the officers asked i f one o f their number might return with him to the Palace, with a view to opening negotiations with the Military Council direct. Yam a­ shita replied that this was impossible and brought the interview to an end. A t 9 p.m. one o f the rebels’ wishes was granted, and a meeting took place with Araki, Mazaki, and Yamashita, at the W ar Minister’s residence. Here Nonaka demanded that Mazaki should form a new cabinet, to put the Imperial W ay plan—o f direct military govern­ ment under the Emperor—into operation. To this, Mazaki replied that while the ‘incident’ remained in being, with Tokyo in a state o f chaos, no political reorganisation could take place; and he

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recommended all the officers and the men supporting them to return to their own regiments. The officers refused. N ext morning at 8.40 a.m. Prince Kan-in, an officer on the General Staff, issued a forma] order that the rebels should return to duty; but when this was ignored, a second meeting took place between the generals and Ando, Nonaka, and Isobe, with Yam a­ shita present. On this occasion Araki assured the young men that their action was quite understood by the Military Council, and their pure spirit o f patriotism was much admired. T o this, one o f the officers commented, ‘I f you approve o f our action, w h y don’t you inform the Emperor?’ Araki demurred, and the meeting broke up inconclusively. The probability is that although the Control Faction wanted the rebels dispersed, Araki, Yamashita, and the Imperial W ay leaders merely wished to give the impression o f acting responsibly, while using each new development to their own advantage. As negotiations went on, so it was noticed by the young officers, Yamashita’s manner grew colder and more formal; they took this as a bad omen, and not without cause. On the morning o f the 28th the Emperor, who was fast running out o f patience with both generals and politicians, approved a message drafted by Major Okubo o f the 1st Division. It was addressed to the other ranks involved in the insurrection and the text was as follows: ‘Hitherto you have obeyed your officers, believing their com­ mands to be just. His Majesty the Son o f Heaven now orders you to return to your barracks. I f you fail to obey you will be traitors. I f you return you w ill be pardoned. Your fathers and brothers and all the people are praying for you to return. Com e back to your barracks.’ Yamashita was informed o f the message at 9 a.m. and went straight to the young officers to inform them. ‘I f the order is put into effect’, he continued, ‘what do you propose to do with your­ selves?’ W hen Captain Nonaka asked what his advice was, Yam a­ shita replied brutally, ‘Kill yourselves.’ The act o f seppuku, he added, should be committed before the troops, so ensuring their pardon by the Emperor. The officers asked for a few moments to consider the matter, and moved to another room. Very soon they were back again, and Nonaka said: ‘W e have decided to kill ourselves.’ A t

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this, Yamashita, whose manner up to now had remained cold and formal, suddenly broke into tears. M oving down the line, he tapped each officer on the shoulder then shook his hand. 1 weep for your misfortune’, he said, ‘but am proud o f your manly determination to act like samurai.’ But then Nonaka, who had clearly emerged as leader o f the group, started making conditions. The group would only commit suicide, he said, i f the General Staff would hand to the Emperor a scroll bearing a list o f their names. Realising he was adamant, Yamashita hurried to the office o f General Kawashima, the W ar Minister, and then they both went across to General Honjo, A D C to the Emperor. Nonaka’s proposal, they argued, was quite reason­ able, and i f the Emperor’s consent could be obtained then the incident could be swiftly brought to an end and the capital could return to normal. Honjo was somewhat dubious as to the Emperor’s attitude, remarking that he had never seen him so enraged as within the last twenty-four hours. However, he would do his best. So Kawashima and Yamashita waited while Honjo went o ff to seek an interview, and in due course returned. In no circumstances, he reported, would His Majesty receive a scroll, for to do so would be tantamount to recognising ‘the loyal motives’ o f the rebels. ‘I f they wish to commit suicide,’ he had snapped, ‘let them go ahead and do so. But in any case their revolt must be put down. I want them crushed—not martyred.’ It was the morning o f the 29th before Yamashita had convinced Nonaka, Ando, and the other young officers that their situation was hopeless and they must either commit suicide or surrender. Since the earlier meeting several o f the young men had changed their minds, and now only two were intent on suicide—Yamashita’s proteges, Ando and Nonaka. A t one o’clock, Ando gathered all his men around him in the garden o f the residence and slowly they began to sing the song o f the 3rd Regiment. Then, as the last note ended, he drew a pistol and blew out his brains. Nonaka at the last moment had refused to die in front o f his men, and com­ mitted seppuku in a darkened room. W hile these melancholy events took place, Yamashita had been waiting by discreetly with M ajor Okamura, who had been detailed to assist him. N ow , as he moved from room to room, disarming the

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rest o f the officers, he was left in no doubt as to their attitude towards him. ‘Y ou let us in for this business’, some o f them shouted, ‘now you calmly tell us to commit suicide! W e’re damned i f we will. Y o u ’re like all the other generals—you want us to die for you.’ In one room Yamashita came face to face with Isobe, and asked, ‘W hat are your intentions’ ’ Isobe replied that he had no intention o f committing suicide—but would obey the Em peror’s orders and surrender himself. Yamashita gave him a cold look o f contempt, turned his back and walked out.* This was a most extraordinary episode, and surely holds a key to Yamashita’s character. He had seen Ando and Nonaka, the young men he loved as sons, both dead at his feet. He knew that to a large degree their suicides were his own fault. He knew that by the stupid and brutal coup the capital had been plunged into chaos. He knew that the Emperor was more angry than anyone had ever known him. He knew that the whole affair had proved an utter fiasco. One might have imagined that Isobe’s reasonable attitude in the circumstances would have elicited his praise, rather than otherwise. Y et the evidence is quite clear that the young officer’s determination to stay alive and face the music revolted him to the depth o f his soul. W hy should this be? The answer is surely that the samurai code demanded that failure should be followed by suicide. In no other w ay could the gods be appeased. This obsession over-rode all human feeling at this moment. Even, it would appear, any notion o f guilt. B y now leaflets had been showered on the rebel troops from the air, and with two o f their leaders dead and the others arrested, the men began filtering towards the barricades, where they were disarmed by the loyal troops and packed into lorries. The insurrec­ tion was over. W ithin the next few days over a hundred officers and under­ officers were charged with treason and swiftly brought before secret courts-martial. (The Emperor had forbidden any publicity.) Fifteen o f the accused were found guilty and were shot in batches * Among Isobe’s personal effects was found a diary in which he had listed his favourite Imperial W ay leaders. These were: Mutaguchi, Mutsui, Obata, Yamashita, Araki, Mazaki, and Kawashima. N ot surprisingly Yamashita’s name had been crossed out, but also Mutaguchi’s. One wonders exactly how Mutaguchi was involved in this affair.

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o f five, after which their bodies were cremated and their ashes disposed o f in secret. Nothing was returned to their families. Am ong those shot was Asaichi Isobe, and though he had shirked the duty o f committing seppuku he still died with courage, as did all the rest. One sang a patriotic song; another cried out, ‘I hope the privileged classes w ill reflect upon their conduct.’ And another, ‘Don’t let the Russians beat us.’ Then they all joined in three rousing banzais for His Majesty and the Empire, before receiving the bullets in their chests. The Emperor was still not appeased. He realised only too well that these young men were to some extent dupes o f the Imperial W ay. So Araki, Mazaki, Honjo, and Kawashima were either retired or dismissed from their posts. And Yamashita was remanded by having his name removed from the promotion list and being sent to command a brigade in Korea. In the Japanese phrase he ‘was excluded from T ok yo .’ This sign o f the Em peror’s displeasure hit Yamashita very hard, and officers serving under him during the next few years have said that he yearned for an opportunity to die in action. But such a chance never came, as after Korea he was mostly stationed in relatively quiet stations in North China and Manchuria, first as C hief o f Staff Northern China Area A rm y and later on as commander 4th Division. Curiously enough, despite the lack o f action, his military reputation continued to grow, and in November, 1937, the promotion ban was lifted, and he became a lieutenant-general. In Ju ly, 1940, he was recalled to T okyo where he succeeded Hideki Tojo as Inspector-General Air Aviation. A few months later, however, when Tojo became W ar Minister, one o f his first moves was to send Yamashita on a tour o f Germany and Italy. ‘This move’ says General Muto, ‘was widely criticised by many who believed that for some unknown reason General Tojo did not wish to have him in T okyo.’ As already indicated, the reason was not completely unknown. Tojo and Yamashita were rising figures in their respective cliques and naturally set in opposi­ tion; Tojo, like most men obsessed with building up secret police organisations, was insecure to an almost pathological degree, and was moreover jealous by nature; and Yamashita naturally attracted admiration and hero worship from those serving under him. In many quarters it was being said that he was the finest general

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in the entire army, and indeed the finest Japan had ever known. Remaining in T okyo, Yamashita would have provided a natural focus for all those elements opposed to Tojo in the critical period while he established himself. The assignment to Europe can there­ fore hardly have come as a surprise. Yamashita spent six months in Italy and Germany touring depots and training establishments, and visiting army and air force units. It had been understood that the armed services would show him their latest weapons, but, not surprisingly, they preserved a few secrets, or—as he was to put it in American slang— ‘I later dis­ covered that they had held out on me’. However, he saw enough to appreciate the progress that had been made, and on his return home submitted a report stating that, unless the Japanese Arm y carried out immediate and drastic improvements in its air force, tanks, signals equipment, and engineering units, it could not fight a modem war. Tojo was not pleased with the report and for the most part ignored it; and Yamashita was despatched to the unimpor­ tant post o f commander Kwantung Defence A rm y in Manchuria. Here he remained till November 1941 when he received the sum­ mons from Sugiyama and went to the meeting with Homma and Imamura, to learn o f his appointment to 25th Arm y.

Though against the war, Yamashita still believed that it was inevitable. He believed also that it was not principally the fault o f Japan. As he said later: ‘The cause o f this war is fundamentally economic. Fifty years ago Japan was more or less sufficient— the people could more or less live o ff the land. Since that time the population has almost doubled, so that Japan had to rely on outside sources for food supply and other economic requirements . . . she found it neces­ sary to expand her economic activities outside as well as inside her borders. In order to buy or import her commodities, she had to pay ultimately in commodities. This effort on her part was prevented for one reason or another by other countries. Japan made attempts to solve the misunderstandings through peaceful methods, but when all her efforts were thwarted or negated . . . she felt it necessary to engage in open warfare.’

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This kind o f statement might have been—and was— resorted to by politicians, and virtually amounted to an argument that i f one required territory for economic reasons, one might grab it by force. However, in modification he added, ‘In my own mind every effort should have been continued to solve the problem peacefully, even to the extent o f reducing armament expenses. . .’ Asked why, i f he so disapproved o f the war, he should have accepted high command, he replied: ‘It would have been inconsistent i f I had volunteered for any particular command. But in m y case the command came from above; it was my duty to assume the position offered as I had been brought up as a soldier and had to be true to m y responsibility.’ In this at least, most professional soldiers o f all nations would agree with him. However, with war fast approaching and an arm y to take into battle, Yamashita was forced to put aside theoretical considerations and concentrate on planning, concentrating his army, and studying his objective. For Japan, it did not need to be emphasised, Malaya was a great prize. It produced 38 per cent o f the w orld’s rubber and 58 per cent o f its tin; and at the southern tip o f the peninsula lay Singapore, Britain’s great naval base and the key to her power in the Far East. Curiously enough, the General Staff had only begun formulating plans for the capture o f Singapore within the last three months, and it was barely ten months previously that the problems o f tropical warfare had been tackled. The man selected by the Staff to tackle the jo b —probably at the suggestion o f Tojo himself—was Colonel Masanobu Tsuji who had gone to Formosa and set up a unit called ‘The Taiwan A rm y Research Section.’ As already indicated, Tsuji was a dark and sinister figure, but undoubtedly he was a man o f many talents, and proved ideal for the task in hand. His powers o f perception and assimilation were great, and he had a tremendous gift for looking at things, as i f for the first time. Never did he allow his thoughts about the jungle to be clouded by vague theories or phobias; he worked empirically, and while seeking information from experts o f every kind, did not become overawed by them, and took nothing on trust. H ow would tactics and strategy be affected by jungle? he asked. W hat clothing and equipment would be necessary? H ow would communications

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operate? H ow would, such problems as sanitation, hygiene, care o f the sick and evacuation o f wounded, be dealt with? As he re­ corded later on: ‘W e pestered specialists from every quarter. W e even used our siesta time for lectures which were always eagerly attended. . . . This unimpressive group was certainly at that time the supreme authority on tropical warfare.’ Regarding the objectives, Tsuji came to three conclusions which he had no hesitation in passing on: That the fortress o f Singapore was strong on the sides facing the sea, but was vulnerable on the side facing the peninsula, across the Johore Strait. That newspaper reports o f R A F strength in Malaya were propaganda. And that although the British Forces numbered 80,000 men—that is five to six divisions—less than half o f this number were Europeans, the bulk being Indians, Gurkhas, or Malayan troops. Yamashita welcomed Tsuji’s specialist information on jungle warfare, though this topographical data concerning Malaya proved inaccurate. Recently, a M ajor Terundo Kunitake, had been seconded to the Diplomatic Staff at Singapore, and had travelled the pen­ insula from end to end, making a swift survey o f roads, rivers, and bridges. On the main trunk road between the Thailand border and Singapore he reported there were no less than 250 bridges, far more than Tsuji’s estimate. In view o f this, Yamashita asked that an entire engineer regiment should be attached to each division, and quantities o f bridging material and engineering equipment should be drastically revised. Meanwhile, in the short time available, the sapper units were put on strenuous bridging exercises. Before dealing with Yamashita’s role at this moment, it w ill be worthwhile to examine the broader strategic and political pattern o f events. In Ju ly, 1941, the Japanese forces had entered southern Indo-China and so provided themselves with an advanced naval and air base at Saigon. On 23rd September they entered northern Indo-China; and four days later the Japanese government signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, by which the two European powers recognised her right to leadership in the estab­ lishment o f a new order in the Far East, and promised all possible assistance. But the key date, so far as the Malayan campaign was concerned, was the 6th September, when, at an Imperial conference before the

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Emperor, a compromise between the cabinet and the High Com ­ mand was confirmed. An attack against Russia, which had been lobbied by one set o f generals, was finally rejected; and the attack to the south, against Thailand and Malaya, was agreed on. Equally important, Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief o f the Combined Sea and Air Forces, who had long argued that in a war with America and Britain, Japan must inevitably lose in the long run, was rejected as a defeatist. The Naval General Staff now allied itself to the army. However, there were still some differences to be ironed out. The Naval Staff wanted the landings on the Malayan coastline to be prefaced by a prolonged bombardment o f the beach defences and an intensive attack against air bases. Deprived o f these, they argued, their warships would be vulnerable to air attack, or, as one admiral put it, ‘Tethered there guarding the convoys, w e should be like sitting ducks.’ The army, on the other hand, wanted the advantage o f surprise. The British, he was convinced, would not move a finger before war was declared, which meant that no air-strikes would be launched by them until daylight on the 8th December. B y this time, however, the Japanese 3rd Air Division would be in action, and, with its great superiority in numbers and material, should gain air supremacy in a matter o f hours. The argument went on some time, and was only resolved when Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, Combined Force Commander, rose and said, ‘I understand the arm y’s desire to land quickly and without prior bombardment. I say that the navy should accept the arm y’s proposals, even at the risk o f annihilation.’ So the plan went through. A t this time, o f course, Yamashita had not been appointed, and so on setting up his headquarters at Samah, a port on Hainan Island, was faced with a fait accompli. Fortunately, he agreed with the policy o f surprise, and was quite willing to accept the risks. But what troops were available for his army? In the initial discussions with Sugiyama, the latter had offered five divisions, with supporting troops, but Yamashita replied that he would do the jo b with three. This was not bravado; firstly, intelligence reports indicated that the enemy troops in Malaya were mostly Indians and not o f the highest class; and secondly, he knew only too well the Japanese habit o f flinging more troops into the battle than could possibly be main­

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tained. Three divisions, he considered, were the maximum which could be fed and provided with sufficient ammunition and equip­ ment, especially as the line o f communications lengthened, with the advance south towards Singapore. So the three divisions were decided on: Lieutenant-General Takuro Matsui’s 5th, Renya Mutaguchi’s 18th, and Nishimura’s Imperial Guards Division. The 5th was a very experienced formation, highly mechanised and generally regarded as containing some o f the finest troops in the army. It had gained considerable practice in opposed landings during the war with China. The 18th Division, though not so highly mechanised, enjoyed a sound reputation, and its bustling, choleric commander was well known to Yamashita. They had been many years together in the Imperial W ay, and had both been posted away from Tokyo after the incident o f February, 1936. For a period in 1937 Mutaguchi had served as Yamashita’s C hief o f Staff, and so it was no surprise to the latter when he arrived at 25th A rm y Headquarters, demanding a leading role in the operation for his division, and offering to lead all the w ay from the coast to Singapore. N o general ever lusted after military glory more than Mutaguchi. Yamashita’s relations with the remaining divisional commander, Takuma Nishimura, were not so happy. They had clashed some years earlier, when Nishimura was president o f a court-martial trying some young Imperial W ay officers. Nishimura, a stubborn man o f limited ability, resented being under Yamashita’s command, and had resolved to obey orders as little as possible. W hen Yam a­ shita saw the Imperial Guards Division on manoeuvres—it had not been in action since the Russo-Japanese W ar o f 1905— he frankly told Nishimura that it should be given some intensive battle training. Nishimura, however, did nothing in this direction, and even when his division went aboard the troop ships, opinion among 25th Arm y staff was that it was unfit for combat. T o complicate rela­ tionships further, Nishimura was an ally o f Count Terauchi, the Commander Southern A rm y, an old supporter o f the Control Faction, like Sugiyama. Yamashita therefore had enemies above him and an enemy below; and as he was soon to learn, Colonel Masanobu Tsuji was joining his staff, as a private spy for Tojo. His position was not an enviable one.

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But to return for one moment to the composition o f 25th A rm y: supporting the infantry divisions, were two regiments o f heavy field artillery and 3rd Tank Brigade. The total strength was some 60,000 men, and air cover would be provided by 3rd Air Division which totalled 459 aircraft and a further 139 from the navy. ViceAdmiral Ozawa’s Southern Squadron comprised a battle-cruiser, ten destroyers, and five submarines. Like the staffs o f other armies involved in the great Pacific offensive, the staff o f 25th A rm y had been assembled hurriedly from units and headquarters all over Japan; few o f the officers knew each other, or had met Yamashita, and how they would function as a team in the difficult operations ahead was a matter o f speculation. Fortunately, however, Yamashita’s personality made a deep and immediate impression; and though there was haste there was no panic and confusion (inseparable from any Combined Operation) it never developed into chaos. The C hief o f Staff was Lieutenant-General Sosaku Suzuki, assisted by Colonel Janjiro Iketani; the Operations Staff—as mentioned—was headed by Colonel Tsuji; and Intelligence by Lieutenant-Colonel Ichiji Sugita. There was also a Deputy-Commander 25th Arm y, Major-General Keishin Managi, who had a small staff o f his own. So much for the 25th A rm y and its task; what was the plan? In brief, this was that the invasions fleet would leave Samah on the 4th December— that is, four days before the outbreak o f war— and split up into five convoys. T w o o f these, carrying Matsui’s 5th Division and part o f Mutaguchi’s 18th Division would head for Singora, 120 miles north-west o f the Thailand-Malaya border, in the Isthmus o f Kra, two more convoys would head for Patani, 60 miles to the south-east, and a strong brigade group from 18th Division, under Major-General Takumi, would be transported by the remaining convoy to Kota Bharu in Malaya, just south o f the border. As a glance at the map w ill show, the trunk roads through the Malayan Peninsula run straight up to Singora and Patani, so aiding communications along the axis o f the advance. Also, as Yamashita could observe at once, by utilising these Thailand ports, he would be able to get the bulk i f not all o f his forces ashore before the British could cross north over the frontier and oppose them. The landing at Kota Bharu would undoubtedly be opposed and the

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risks involved were considerable; nevertheless it would act as a useful diversionary attack to the main thrust and i f all went well Takumi could deal with the forward airfields. Everything depended, o f course, on obtaining air superiority from the start. But first the transport ships had to be collected, not only from Japanese ports, but from Shanghai, Canton, and Formosa. Lieu­ tenant-Colonel Kera, C hief o f A rm y Shipping, seemed confident that they would all arrive before dark on the 2nd December, the scheduled date, but when none had been sited by 1600 hours the situation became somewhat tense. As there was a complete ban on radio signalling, Kera put through a series o f long distance telephone calls, but even these produced litde information, and Yamashita and his staff began wondering whether their skippers had misread the orders, or i f some major catastrophe had intervened. They wondered, too, i f the troops and equipment could be loaded in time, for the schedule was a tight one, and not a moment could be wasted. Then, just before sunset, some wisps o f smoke were sighted on the horizon and the ships began arriving. B y noon the following day, they were safely at their berths and prepared to receive passengers and cargoes; and Yamashita was informed by Suzuki that embarkation had begun on time. That evening he received the final orders from Terauchi: x. It is predetermined that military operations begin on the 8th December. 2. 25th A rm y is to co-operate with the navy for commencement o f military operations for the occupation o f Malaya. 3. 25th Arm y w ill begin operations based on previous orders. However, i f Japanese-American negotiations are concluded by the above fixed date the military assault operations w ill be suspended. N o one seriously considered that operations would be called off, and some officers considered that the insertion o f the word ‘i f ’ at this late stage might have a serious effect on morale. However, when Yamashita summoned his subordinate commanders the following morning and gave out his first orders as A rm y Com ­ mander, confidence returned. M any officers had tears in their eyes and the occasion was charged with emotion; this for the Japanese was what ‘Der T ag’ had been to the Prussians in 19 14 ; the day they G

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had dreamed o f and planned for so long; the God-given chance to smash the British and Americans and establish a new order in the Far East. They had complete confidence in the operational plan, and in Yamashita. Their morale was superb. M any accounts o f the British side o f this campaign have appeared, and there is no intention to recapitulate them here. However, in order to illustrate what Yamashita was facing and to introduce some o f the leading figures in the drama to come, a brief narrative m ay prove useful. The British had realised the possibility o f a Japanese offensive against Malaya since the invasion o f Manchuria in 19 3 1. But though the defences o f Singapore were accelerated the following year, it was not until 1937 that the service com­ manders began to realise that the fate o f the naval base was bound up in the fate o f Malaya. During this year, the G O C Malaya, Major-General W . G. S. Dobbie, began investigating the defence problem from this new angle, and explored the possibility o f enemy landings on the east coast. In October he reported to the W ar Office that, despite the views held heretofore, landings were possible during the north-east monsoon, and indeed the enemy might prefer this period (from October to March) as bad visibility would seriously limit air reconnaissance. Dobbie prepared an appreciation from the Japanese viewpoint, which was remarkably accurate, and indeed he hit on the three landing points at Singora, Patani, and Kota Bharu. From tins appreciation it was evident that the security o f Singapore depended on the security o f northern Malaya and reinforcements for the latter must be given priority. In the event, however, the British Government merely increased the garrison in Malaya by one battalion, and allocated the sum o f .£60,000 for defence works, most o f which was spent on machinegun emplacements in Johore. But before w ork had begun on these emplacements, in 1939, Japan had extended her conquests to southern China; and long before it was completed, Britain was at war with Germany. At the request o f the Chiefs o f Staff in London the three service com­ manders in Singapore submitted their first joint appreciation, the basic assumption o f which was that, in the absence o f a fleet, air power would be the principal weapon o f defence. W hat seriously

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worried the commanders, however, was a recent political decision that Japanese entry into Thailand would not be regarded as a casus belli. The role o f the R A F , it was considered, should be to repulse any assault force while it was still at sea, to shatter its attempts to land, and destroy it i f it succeeded. The army, meanwhile, would defend air and naval bases, and mop up any Japanese forces which might somehow elude the R A F . The desirable air strength, it was thought, should be 200 aircraft, building up to 566. A force o f this magnitude, it was argued, could deal not only with attacks from Thailand, but with sea-borne landings as well. The army could therefore be reduced to 23 battalions. Before this appreciation could be acted on, or even studied, Air-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham assumed his appointment as Commander-in-Chief Far East, and on the 7th December gave the Chief-of-Staff his own appreciation. The correct policy, he reasoned, should be to make the British defences in the Far East so strong that the Japanese would realise the uselessness o f aggression. The whole o f the Malayan peninsula must be held, the defensive role o f the army being combined with the strike potential o f the R A F . A few days after Brooke-Popham despatched this document, the Chiefs-of-Staff gave their reply to the earlier appreciation: the target for the R A F , they considered, should be modified to 336 aircraft, but a second infantry division would be sent from India. Though Churchill was against despatching any troops from theatres o f war, in due course the 9th Indian Division, less one brigade group, arrived, to add its strength to that o f the 8th Austra­ lian. The position was now somewhat improved, but hardly satis­ factory. On the 7th August Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival, who had now taken over as G O C Malaya, told the W ar Office that his estimate o f the troops necessary to defend Malaya was no less than six divisions, supported by two tank regiments, and corps troops, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. The R A F , he added, should be given four bomber and two fighter squadrons. These figures, he concluded, were based on a belief that Japan would attack with three divisions. This appreciation, perhaps, is sufficient to indicate that Percival was not the fool he has sometimes been depicted. In fact, he was a decent, civilised man, who on occasion had shown great courage.

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But he was a staff officer, rather than a commander. He lacked personality, and the power to lead and inspire; he was quite unable to think originally in war, or to impress his w ill in the face o f opposition. Like most other generals in the British Arm y, he had not even begun to face the implications o f jungle warfare, and to a large extent accepted the dictum that ‘the Malayan jungle is impenetrable’ without question. However, in his defence, it must be said that with commercial interests in Malaya remaining paramount, it was difficult to even get troops o ff the roads for field exercises. The rubber estates, which occupied large areas o f the peninsula, were sacrosanct and inviolable.* Ironically, possession o f Malaya proved the greatest o f disadvantages to the British. One o f the main things worrying Percival and Brooke-Popham was the situation over Singora. I f the initiative were to be wrested from the enemy, they argued, this port and air-base must be seized before he could reach it. So they concocted a plan called ‘Matador’ , only to be informed on the 17th September by the Chiefs-of-Staff that the policy was to avoid war with Japan, and so any idea o f entering Thailand before hostilities had commenced, was out o f the question. However, with the arrival o f D u ff Cooper, the W ar Cabinet’s special envoy, optimism revived, and at a conference in Singapore on the 29th September, opinions were confidently ex­ pressed that the Japanese were preparing for war against Russia rather than Malaya, and that, in any case, once the north-east mon­ soon arrived in October, no landing could be attempted on the east coast. W hen news arrived a few weeks later that Tojo had taken over as Prime Minister, this optimism was somewhat dented, but reassuring views continued to be expressed from London. On 26th October Winston Churchill even asserted that Japan would not launch herself into war until the Russians had been decisively beaten by the Germans. Allied Intelligence had failed to discover that the ‘Northwarders’ had been defeated by the ‘Southwarders’ some seven weeks earlier. So October passed and November; and the British Arm y in Malaya remained short o f two infantry divisions, two armoured * Hew T . M . Crawford in The Long Green Tunnel (Michael Joseph) tells an extraordinary story o f how, after the retreat had been going on for over a week, a planter tried to eject an ambulance unit from his estate.

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regiments, and anti-aircraft artillery. Its units were dispersed on airfield defence duties; its morale was far from high; its state o f training was deplorable. W orst o f all, it had yet to receive its first lesson in jungle fighting. And the lesson was to be a painful one. ‘N o enemy sighted in southern China sea.’ In various forms this signal came in repeatedly from the escorting aircraft and was handed to Yamashita aboard the steamship Ryijo. On the morning o f the 5th, a signal reported, ‘Enem y submarine 196 miles o ff Saigon, speed ten knots’, but later this proved to be a false alarm. On the 6th, however, at 1330 hours a large enemy plane flew alongside the con­ voy, and though attacked by the fighters, managed to escape. This was a Hudson, operating from Kota Bharu, and, as Yamashita surmised, it signalled accurate information regarding the strength, course, and speed o f convoy. Fortunately for him, however, the cloud increased and there were rainstorms, which closed down visibility.* A t 1900 hours the convoy swung to the north, as i f heading into the G u lf o f Siam, and luckily the following morning, when it changed course again, the sky had clouded over and the weather deteriorated. However, at 10 10 hours Vice-Admiral Ozawa signalled to Yamashita, ‘Landing operations may go ahead as scheduled.’ The landing most affected by the weather was that o f the Takumi detachment at Kota Bharu, but a signal relayed via the flag ship stated that although the waves were n ow up to one metre, condi­ tions were still good. A t 2355 hours, so Yamashita learned in due course, the three transports carrying Takum i’s troops and their naval escort had anchored o ff shore. In fact, they were 2000 yards to the south o f their correct position, and directly opposite the guns o f the 8th Indian Brigade. As Takumi recalled later: ‘There was the dull light o f an oval moon from over the sea to the east. A stiff breeze was blowing and I could hear it whistling in the radio aerials. The waves were now up to six feet.’ The last point had special significance, for, according to the Staff studies for the operation, waves o f this dimension were the largest acceptable during landing * (What he could not know, o f course, that even on receipt o f this information, the British Government had refused permission to launch ‘Matador’.)

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operations, and i f the wind increased any more, there would be chaos. In fact, this nearly happened. It proved difficult to lower the landing craft, and once they had settled into the water, they began swinging violently, veering away from the ships’ sides, then crash­ ing against them. The soldiers, afraid o f being crushed between ship and craft, shrieked and screamed in the darkness. To quote Takumi again: ‘They were not only encumbered with fife-jackets, but with rifles, light machine-guns, ammunition and equipment. It was very hard to jum p into the landing craft, and even harder to move forward to our places. A t intervals a soldier would fall screaming into the sea, and the sappers would fish him out.’ In these circumstances it took an hour before the first wave o f troops was in the landing craft, but then Colonel Nasu took com­ mand and, having received and acknowledged the fight signal from Takumi, headed for the shore. Takumi continues: ‘The landing craft pushed towards the coast in four lines. I could hear the sound o f the engines above the waves. Ten minutes passed . . . twenty . . . I was growing anxious. Then a red signal flashing twice from among the palm trees on the coast. This was followed by rifle fire in seven or more places, then artillery and machine-gun fire. The enemy seemed to be in strength.’ A t 0200 hours, with the second wave still not launched, the R A F came over and bombed the convoy. This so upset the Naval Escort Commander that he rang Takum i on the radio-telephone and demanded that the operation should be abandoned. Takumi refused. The third and last wave would be away by 1600 hours, he insisted, and until then the risks must be accepted. Reluctantly the Escort Commander gave way, but soon afterwards Takum i’s ship, the Awajisan Mam was hit and had to be abandoned. Hurriedly Takumi transferred his headquarters into a launch, but instead o f heading for another transport, made straight for the shore. Here he received a rough reception ‘M any officers and men were killed or wounded, many jumped into the water before the craft had beached and swam ashore. The enemy positions were about 100 yards from the water, and w e could see that their posts were wired in. Their guns were pointing directly at us.’ Other launches, as Takumi could observe, had beached just under the defence posts, and in even more difficult water; large numbers o f men were being

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killed by machine-gun fire. The sea was so rough that many people failed to keep their balance and were shot down as they frantically tried to scramble the few yards to dry land. ‘There was utmost confusion all along the beach.’ Takumi wrote, ‘but the commanders realised that i f they remained where they were, they would be killed to a man, so the order was “ go on” . The officers rushed in; and the men followed. Then the troops began to get round to the back o f the enemy positions and dig away the sand under the barbed wire. W e also threw grenades.’ It was nearly four a.m. before Yamashita received any news from Takumi, and this was a brief signal which read, ‘Succeeded in landing at 0215 hours.’ A t this time his ship was in Singora harbour where it had anchored at 0035 hours. The wind was blowing strongly from the east and the sea was choppy, but landing operations had begun immediately, and there was no resistance from the shore. Yamashita himself went ashore at 0520 hours, and his diary records: ‘0800 hours. Entered the Governor’s residence and ordered the police to be disarmed. 1300 hours. Succeeded in reaching a compromise agreement with the Thailand government. 2300 hours. Formalities completed allowing us to pass through Thailand.’ Meanwhile 25th Arm y Staff were energetically preparing for the advance south into Malaya. Colonel Tsuji had filled trucks with troops disguised as civilian refugees and Siamese troops, and rushed them over the border with orders to seize vital bridges, before they could be blown by the British. B y now, o f course, news had reached Yamashita o f the air-strike at Pearl Harbour; he knew that naval supremacy in the Pacific now belonged to the Japanese, and that air superiority was theirs also. R apidly during the 8th and 9th, Matsui’s 5th Division using the two trunk roads, from Singora to Alor Star, and from Patani to Kroh. The immediate objective was Jitra, which lies in the province o f Kedah, near the western coast o f Malaya, at the junction o f the Kangar road with the main trunk road. Jitra covered the A lor Star airfield and several smaller airfields further south and was therefore o f major importance. Intelligence reports reaching Yamashita indicated that a defensive position had been built there, but how

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strong this was and how stoutly it would be defended, he could not tell. But he suspected that the enemy would cling to the roads, and had little doubt that once the 25th A rm y began its rehearsed flanking movements through the jungle, they would pull back. A t this stage Yamashita was in luck. Jitra was held by the 1 ith Indian Division, which had been training to rush forward into Thailand on the ‘Matador’ Operation. W hen this had been aban­ doned, the formation was hurriedly switched to a defensive role, and scrambled into the Jitra defences, which had been dug before the war. Unfortunately for them, there had been heavy rain during the previous two days and the trenches were water-logged; worse still, the divisional ‘B ’ echelon (containing supplies and stores) was missing, and there was only time to put up some barbed wire, lay anti-tank mines, and a few telephone lines, before coming under attack. This began at 0800 hours on the n t h December, carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Saeki’s Reconnaissance Unit supported by ten medium tanks. A t first they scored a tremendous success, and a battery o f anti-tank guns was captured, the crews having abandoned them to shelter from the rain. But the following day resistance stiffened; and when Saeki’s men came up against some British and Gurkha troops, they lost heavily and their attacks petered out. N o w Major-General Kawamura, Infantry Commander 5th D ivi­ sion, took a hand, and prepared a double move involving a night attack to the west and a flanking move to the east. This succeeded, and news soon arrived that the enemy was pulling back in some disorder. Reports also indicated that many Indians were surrender­ ing, and Matsui wrote ‘They have no fighting spirit . . . they are glad to surrender . . . they are relieved to be out o f the w ar.’ On the 10th November Yamashita had written in his diary, ‘I f Indian troops are included in the British forces defending Malaya, the jo b should be easy’, and now considered his prophecy justified. W hat he could not know was that the Indian units encountered so far were only partially trained and bewildered, as were their officers; and in two years’ time the Indians would wreak a terrible revenge on the Japanese Arm y. However, there could be no doubt that Jitra was the key action in the Malayan campaign. From now on, as Yamashita drove south

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the enemy forces withdrew longer distances at a time, and there were signs o f disorganisation. M oving down the trunk road, Yamashita could see the havoc wrought by the Japanese aircraft; trucks, guns and equipment littering the verges. B y the 26th December his leading troops had crossed the great bridge at Perak unopposed, and he ordered Nishimura to send a regiment against Ipoh. The momentum o f the advance, Yamashita reasoned, would prevent any prolonged resistance, and risks could now be taken which, against a first-class enemy, would be unacceptable. He did not even caution Nishimura when the latter laid down that the standard drill for his division would be a frontal attack by a third o f his infantry, while two-thirds made a flank march to the rear o f the enemy. In fact, such tactics succeeded time and again. B y the 2nd January, after a three-day action, Kampar was outflanked; and by the 7th January the strong enemy position on the Slim river had been outflanked also. This meant that central Malaya now lay open to the 25th Arm y, and Johore would not long remain out o f reach. Soon news reached Yamashita that a Guards regiment had reached Ipoh; and on the n th Matsui signalled that his troops were in Kuala Lumpur, a large city and main base for the British 3rd Corps. Large stocks o f supplies and equipment had been captured. Incredible to relate, Yamashita had not yet landed his entire army, for several units o f Mutaguchi’s 18th Division were still at sea. Yamashita now decided to rest Matsui’s 5th Division, and ordering Nishimura to head for Malacca, signalled that the remainder o f the 1 8th Division should be landed at Singora by road transport. Looking ahead, Yamashita had decided that Percival’s only hope o f defending Johore was on the line o f the Sungei Muar, and so he told Nishimura to force a crossing, thus threatening enemy com­ munications on the trunk road. Nishimura, however, came up against the Australian commander, Bennett, who had thought out some effective tactics for trapping the Japanese in ambushes, and for some days no progress was made. However, Nishimura began working his w ay down the west coast in a series o f sea-borne landings, and, with his rear threatened, Bennett had to go back. B y mid-January Nishimura was over the Sungei Muar and heading for Johore Strait. A few days later air reconnaissance reports indi­

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cated that enemy troops were streaming over the causeway on to Singapore Island. On the evening o f the 31st January, Yamashita summoned his three divisional commanders to his tent, and drank a glass o f sake with them. Congratulating them on their efforts so far, he said it would take four days to carry out the reconnaissance for the crossing o f the Johore Strait, and orders would be given out as soon as possible. His headquarters at this time were set in the jungle near a village called Sugatai, which lay close to the Strait. From it, as one o f the officers recorded, one could even hear the sappers at w ork repairing the causeway. Despite his great success so far, Yamashita seems to have been far from pleased with himself, and indeed somewhat apprehensive. He had got it into Iris head that once Singapore had fallen, Tojo planned to have him assassinated, though what evidence he had to go on, it is not certain. Perhaps reports had reached him from home o f the extraordinary publicity being given him. W ith Homma’s campaign in the Philippines being bogged down, the Japanese press was writing up Malaya for all it was worth, and Yamashita had become a national hero. As he realised only too well, Tojo was a jealous creature and brooked no rivals; and Yamashita had been too involved in the business o f assassination himself, to doubt that Tojo would show any hesitation. Relations with Terauchi had deteriorated, too, and on the 1st January Yamashita wrote in his diary, ‘I can’t rely on communications with Terauchi and Southern Arm y, or an air support from them. It is bad that Japan has no one in high places who can be relied upon. Most men abuse their power.’ The following day he added: ‘I dislike the selfishness o f men in power. They have no conscience and their only aim is to grab even more power.’ On the 5th he was writing about the opportunists in Tokyo, ‘These men pressed into national service are seldom any good in a crisis. Both civilian and military officers abuse their powers. I shall have to watch them.’ It is difficult to view these entries without some reserve, sincerely as Yamashita may have meant them at the time; the officers in power were, o f course, Control Faction members (Tojo, Sugiyama, Terauchi and many lesser figures) and the civilians were the industrialists, whom he had always detested.

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I f his superiors did not win Yamashita’s approval, neither did his subordinates. O f his old enemy, Nishimura, he recorded, ‘He has wasted a week by disobeying orders’, and even Matsui and the 5th Division appeared little better. On the 6th January he was writing, ‘I ordered them to carry out a flanking movement and so trap the enemy and crush him. But m y orders weren’t obeyed. I am dis­ gusted with the lack o f training and inferior quality o f m y com­ manders.’ On the 8th he even wrote, ‘The battalion commanders and troops lack fighting spirit. They’ve no idea how to crush the enemy.’ N o doubt Yamashita was a perfectionist, but the extra­ ordinary thing is that, despite their rapid advance and victory in battle after battle, the Japanese troops were not highly trained. They chattered as they moved through the jungle; they lost their w ay; many officers and N C O s were bad at map reading; co-ordina­ tion between infantry and artillery was sometimes primitive; and the standard o f patrolling was lamentable. T o redress the balance, however, artillery and mortar fire was devastatingly accurate; and even foolhardy risks paid huge dividends. Like all army commanders, Yamashita did not welcome visitors to his headquarters, and on the 9th he wrote: ‘Five staff officers have arrived from G H Q Tokyo. I hate them.’ In fact, the nearer he drew to Singapore, the more he was harassed by T okyo and Southern A rm y headquarters, and then Terauchi committed a deliberate insult by issuing decorations to Takumi and his force, without consulting him. Yamashita became incensed. ‘I f Southern A rm y’ he wrote, ‘is going to hand out the awards, men w ill take their orders fiom it only, not 25th A rm y. That bloody Terauchi! He’s living in luxury in Saigon, with a comfortable bed, good food, and playing Japanese chess.’ As the month o f January wore on, Yamashita’s neurosis became so pronounced that his staff grew anxious, and Suzuki even recorded that ‘our general is near to mental explosion.’ On the 23rd the explosion was barely avoided, for on this date Lieutenant-General Osamu Tsukada arrived with voluminous notes from Terauchi on how to capture Singapore island, then (as Yamashita noted in his diary) ‘left after lunch with­ out even saying “ thank you” .’ Savagely Yamashita tore the notes into shreds, recording, ‘Whenever there are two alternatives, Southern Arm y always picks the wrong one.’

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B y the 4th February reconnaissance for the crossing o f the Johore Strait was completed, and having thrashed out a plan with Suzuki, Yamashita summoned his divisional commanders at 110 0 hours on the 6th and gave out his orders. Briefly these were that units o f Nishimura’s Imperial Guards Division would make a feint attack to the east on the evening o f the 7th, landing at Palau Ubin island; and that after dark on the 8th, the 5th and 18th Divisions would cross to the western end o f Singapore island. Once they had rushed inland, the Imperial Guards Division would follow. W ithin four days, it was anticipated, the campaign would be over. On the 20th January Churchill had signalled General W avell, the senior British commander in the Far East, ‘I want to make it absolutely clear that I expect every inch o f ground to be defended, every scrap o f material for defences to be blown to pieces to prevent capture by the enemy, and no question o f surrender to be enter­ tained until after protracted fighting among the ruins o f Singapore C ity.’ On the same day W avell flew into Singapore, to find that very little had been done to strengthen the northern defences on the island, or to obstruct the landing points along the Johore Strait. N o local defensive positions had even been built, and indeed the position seemed beyond Percival and beyond anyone. The reinforcements which had poured on to the island from the last convoy, seemed rather to have hindered the situation rather than helped it; no one seemed to know what to do; morale was low ; and organisation was breaking down. Singapore island measures some 20 miles long by 1 1 across, and, ignoring W avell’s orders, Percival had divided it into three sectors: the western to be held by the Australians: the northern by the 18th Division, and the southern by the Indian formations. One o f Percival’s great worries was the large civilian population in Singapore C ity which was now being bombarded from the air; once the water supply was cut off, as it inevitably must be, he knew that surrender could not long be delayed. Yamashita’s assault on Singapore went ahead as planned, the launching o f the infantry in their craft being heralded by heavy artillery concentrations and air-strikes. These knocked out communi­

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cations, with the consequence that even when the craft had been sighted from the northern shore, it was some while before the guns came into action. However, losses from machine-gun fire were heavy and some units had to make three or more attempts before they succeeded in landing. Those that did get ashore crept round to the rear o f the coastal positions and began knocking them out, and from then on the attack gained momentum. B y dawn on the 9th February the whole o f the 5th and 18th Divisions and part o f their artillery had been landed on the island, where now the sky was covered with black smoke from burning oil tanks. Over the Japanese radio sets came frequent requests from the infantry for the gunners to lengthen their range, as the advance swept on. A t sunset Yamashita and his staff crossed the Strait to establish headquarters in a rubber plantation north o f Tengah airfield. Here he received urgent signals from Nishimura who was growing increasingly enraged that his division was being held back from the battle. Finally Yamashita agreed that the Guards should cross to the west o f the causeway; but next morning a staff officer rushed up to him distraught, announcing that the division had been caught by a great blaze o f petrol which the British had ignited in the Strait, the leading regiment being annihilated. Soon afterwards the report was found to be greatly exaggerated, and in disgust Yamashita told the officer: ‘Go back to your divisional commander. Tell him the Imperial Guards Division can do as it likes in this battle.’ Yam a­ shita, who had long detested and despised Nishimura, wanted no more o f him. The advance went on steadily to the south-east, the British being pushed back towards Singapore City. Here a million civilians were enduring incessant air attacks, and there was growing concern for food and water. Yamashita had his supply problems, too. The gunner regiments were reporting that their ammunition stocks had run low . Within five or six days their guns would be silent, unless further supplies could be ferried over. Worse still, Suzuki now advised him that the ramshackle line o f communications from Singora had virtually ceased to function; and what the supply staffs at Southern A rm y were doing, he could not imagine. This was a situation that Yam a­ shita had long dreaded; little co-operation could be expected from

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Terauchi, and Southern A rm y Staff, he considered lazy and incompe­ tent. There was only one solution: 25th A rm y must keep up the pressure, must fire o ff ammunition at such a rate that Percival was deceived into believing that the supply was limitless. This was a terrible gamble; but it had to be taken. So the advance went on. Tengah airfield was taken, with several aircraft still on the ground and undamaged. And in the barracks, so Tsuji wrote later, ‘fresh bread and soup were still on the dining room tables, and clothing and suitcases were lying around.’ Yam ashita expected the British to concentrate their resistance at Bukit Timah, a hill some two miles north-west o f the city, and laid on an attack for the night o f the 10th. B y now the British artillery fire reached the highest peak yet experienced, and a fierce battle was expected. However, the enemy forces were becoming far more disorganised than Yamashita suspected, and in muddle and confusion they pulled back. B y the 13 th February they were penned into a 28-mile perimeter around the city and had lost the w ill and even the organising power to counter-attack. W orried increasingly by the supply position, Yamashita would have been relieved to know the true situation o f his enemies. On the 10th February, after paying a last visit, W avell had signalled Churchill, ‘Battle for Singapore not going well. Morale o f some troops is not good and none is as good as I should like to see. I have given the most categorical orders that there is to be no thought o f surrender and that all troops are to continue fighting to the end.’ Three days later Percival repeated this order at a conference, but in a private signal to W avell expressed doubts as to whether he could hold out for more than two days. Japanese bombing had damaged the reservoirs and the water supply system, and there was no hope o f restoring this. Soon there would come a point beyond which fighting would only produce needless suffering. T o this signal W avell replied, ‘Y o u must continue to inflict maximum losses on enemy for as long as possible by house-to-house fighting i f necessary. Y ou r action in tying down enemy may have vital influence in other theatres. Fully appreciate your situation but continued action essential.’ So the battle went on till nightfall on the 13 th . . . throughout the 14th . . . and to the morning o f the 15th. B y ten o ’clock Yam a-

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shita was with Mutaguchi at 18th Division headquarters, on the Bukit Timah road, and from a vantage point looked towards the city. The enemy artillery fire had slackened, he was glad to notice, probably because several batteries had been knocked out by the heavy air-strikes the previous day. Mutaguchi was still urging his troops forward along the coast and since dawn they had advanced two miles. Yamashita estimated that by evening they could reach the outskirts o f the city, though their casualties would be heavy. In any event, he ordered, the pressure must be maintained and the guns must keep firing down to the last round. Then he con­ tinued his tour o f the front. Had he known it though, his bluff had worked, and the battle was almost over. A t 1000 hours a patrol from one o f Mutaguchi’s forward units called out that a white flag had gone up among the trees straight ahead. An officer was summoned, who confirmed that the soldier’s observation was correct and through his field glasses he could also see a white flag on the broadcasting studios. Later a car drove out from the city under a flag o f truce, and LieutenantColonel Sugita, Intelligence Office 25th Arm y, went forward to meet it. A t a brief encounter on the road the British party announced that they had come to discuss surrender terms, and were escorted through the Japanese lines. News reached Yamashita at 1400 hours and, as he recorded, ‘I prepared m yself against being deceived and ordered the British commander to come in person.’ So the British delegation went back to the city, and at 17 15 hours Percival duly arrived with two staff officers and an interpreter, M ajor W ild. The two commanders were soon face to face in a room at the Ford factory at Bukit Timah, and after the Japanese interpreter, Hishikari, had made the necessary introductions, they shook hands and sat down on either side o f the table. According to the official Japanese account o f the meeting, the only full account available, the dialogue went as follows: ‘Answer me briefly. D o you wish to surrender unconditionally ?’ ‘Yes—we do.’ ‘Have you any Japanese prisoners o f war?’ ‘None at all.’ ‘Have you any Japanese civilians?’ ‘N o. They have all been sent to India.’

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‘Very well. W ill you please sign this document o f surrender?’ Percival read about half o f it then asked: W o u ld you wait until tomorrow morning?’ Yamashita replied angrily: ‘I f you don’t sign now w e shall go on fighting. All I want to know is: Do you surrender uncondi­ tionally or do you not?’ Percival went pale and began talking to the interpreter in a low voice, but Yamashita interrupted him, pointed his finger and shouted, ‘Yes or N o?’ Percival glanced towards the interpreter then said, ‘Yes.’ ‘V ery well. W e shall cease hostilities at io p.m. Japanese time.’ It may be worth noting here that afterwards Yamashita denied this version o f the scene. His anger, he insisted, was not with Per­ cival, whom he wished to treat courteously as a fellow soldier, but with the interpreter, who was not conveying the true meaning o f his words. This may well be true; Hishikari was a young officer, who for some reason had been called in specially for this meeting. Afterwards, Yamashita gave orders that he was never to be used as an official interpreter again. But to return to the meeting: Percival now requested that the Japanese forces should not enter Singapore City until the following morning, as he needed time to communicate news o f the surrender to his units and to the civilian population. After Yamashita had agreed, the following exchange took place: ‘W hat about the fives o f the civilians, and the British and Austra­ lian troops? W ill you guarantee them?’ ‘Yes. Y o u may be easy about that. I can guarantee them absolutely.’ The surrender document was signed at 18 10 hours, and some 130,000 British, Indian, and Australian troops fell into Japanese hands. Japanese losses totalled 9,824 o f which about 3,000 were killed. In seventy-three days Yamashita had gained the greatest triumph in Japanese history, greater even than Mukden. He had given his country the richest prize in the Far East. W hen Terauchi signalled Yamashita asking him when the triumphal entry into Singapore had been planned, the reply was, ‘25th Arm y w ill not hold parade but funeral ceremony is fixed for the 20th

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February.’ Yamashita had no intention o f strutting like a conqueror; apart from having no taste for such a ceremony, he could not spare the time. The situation throughout the island was chaotic; water and food supplies had to be restored to the civilian population, the vast numbers o f troops had to be put into prison or P O W cages, and the base organised as a spring-board for further campaigns. It was not long before Terauchi announced that he would be moving into Singapore with Southern A rm y headquarters, which meant that 25th Arm y would have to move to Indonesia. And in Ju ly Yamashita learned that he was to be transferred to the post o f 1st Area Commander in Manchukuo. As he knew, Imperial Head­ quarters were worried about the threat from Russia and reinforce­ ments were flowing into Manchukuo in large numbers. The command there was being reorganised and he would hold the responsibility for defending the eastern region o f the country, with the task (if war came) o f capturing the vital Siberian port o f Vladivostock. Altogether, the command would not be without some importance; but to Yamashita it could only be a deliberate insult. As a successful commander, he might have expected to take command in Burma and prepare an offensive against the frontiers o f India, or be given some other active role. But instead he was to be shunted away to a remote non-operational area where his prime occupation would be to train troops. However, he accepted the order and made no complaints; all he wanted now was to appear before the Emperor to ask forgiveness for his part in the bloody incident o f February 1936. Confident that the interview would be granted—-it was his right as a victorious general—Yamashita prepared a document to read before him. This gave some o f his thoughts on the campaign, which are not without interest: I judged that the British would surrender because o f water shortage i f I captured Bukit Timah. In fact I had to press on to­ wards the city. I thought that the enemy would locate the bulk o f his forces to the west o f the causeway, but in fact they were to the east. The enemy withdrew from his forward positions covering the channel because o f the heavy bombardment. I used 5th Division and 1 8th Division at all important points in the fighting. [Note: N o mention o f the Imperial Guards Division.] H

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But then there came two shattering blows. First he learned that Tojo, determined to prevent a public welcome, had sent orders that he was to go to his new command direct. Next he was informed that the Emperor had by no means forgotten the events o f February, 1936, and no interview would be granted either now or in the fore­ seeable future. On the 17th Ju ly Yamashita set out on the bleak journey to Manchukuo.

4

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On the 14th June, 1943, Lieutenant-General Kawabe, commander Burma Area A rm y (BAA), opened a four-day conference at his headquarters in Rangoon. The subject under discussion was the coming offensive towards Assam and India, and present to give their views were Senior Staff Officers o f B A A , o f Mutaguchi’s 15th Army, together with all Divisional Commanders. Field-Marshal Count Terauchi, Commander Southern Arm y, was represented by Major-General Inada, and Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo, by Colonel the Prince Takeda. There were also present experts on communications, supply, and field engineering. On the first day Mutaguchi outlined his own plan, to advance on Assam by a right hook through the Hukawng Valley, and pressed it with all the vigour and power at his command. But the plan did not find favour, either with the Operations Staff or the communications experts, and by the end o f the day it had been thrown out altogether. Still convinced that it was viable, Mutaguchi cornered Prince Takeda in an effort to persuade him to approach Kawabe, but Takeda was no more enthusiastic than anyone else, and Mutaguchi had to concede defeat. At the next session, however, he was on his feet again, this time proposing an offensive against Imphal (the forward Allied base beyond the Chindwin). This idea found more favour, and, under Kawabe’s leadership, the conference began thrashing out the broad strategic plan. This was, briefly, that the threat from Stilwell and the Chinese Armies in the north should be contained by the 1 8th and 56th Divisions; that the 28th A rm y (still to be formed) should launch an offensive in the Arakan with the object o f forcing Slim, the allied commander, to commit his reserves; and that, when 115

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this had happened, Mutaguchi would launch the 15th Arm y over the Chindwin and advance on Imphal. So at the age o f fifty-five, Mutaguchi was to be given the chance o f glory and conquest that he had lusted after so long. N o matter what their nationality, soldiers do not rise to general rank without strong personalities and the power o f command; very often and to the misfortune o f their troops, these qualities override others, such as intellect and professional knowledge. That Mutaguchi had strong personality, there can be no doubt; he was also one o f those rare men, even among professional soldiers, who actually love fighting and who will enter any fray, however bloody, not only without fear, but with exaltation. His katana had carved the casques o f his enemies in China and Malaya, and his reputation for personal bravery was second to none. A few people even looked on him as a man o f destiny, and with these Mutaguchi was in complete agreement. Never claiming to be an intellectual, he tended to see things in black and white. He moved instinctively, but with remarkable speed. He hated opposition and would do almost anything to sweep it aside. His appetites, especially for drink and sex, were considerable. However, there was a rough animal magnetism about him. He believed deeply in the cult o f bushido, in the mystic bond o f comradeship among soldiers; modem or western influences he despised. So far as his fellow generals and staff were concerned, he was more hated than loved, but on the whole he was respected. He was bom on the 7th October, 1888, in Saga Prefecture in the southern island o f Japan, the second son o f Nobutaka Fukuchi. The family was an old one and in its day had produced high officers o f state, but for some reason its fortunes had now declined. Nobutaka died while Renya was still young and in the latter’s phrase ‘m y brother and I were brought up almost hke orphans’ . Then the brother died, and R enya became the heir to Moritsune Mutaguchi, an agreement having been made between the two families. How they were linked it is not quite clear, though it seems possible that R en ya’s mother was o f Mutaguchi stock. However, the important thing is that Renya knew from an early age that i f the family were to be restored to high rank, it must be by his own efforts. There would be neither influence nor great wealth to help him. Whether

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he blamed his father for the decline o f the family fortunes one cannot say with complete certainty, though it seems very likely; he never spoke o f him unless asked a direct question and even then with reluctance. But undoubtedly it was the vicissitudes o f his childhood which generated the driving force, the passionate lust for promotion, fame, conquest, and honour which characterised R en ya’s career. Where his father had drifted, he was determined to forge ahead resolutely. Where his father had been overcome by events, he would bend them to his will. Where his father had faltered before opposi­ tion, he would blast it aside. Where his father had failed, he would succeed. Even as a schoolboy it was clear that Renya Mutaguchi was o f the stuff that conquerors are made of.* It was in 1908 that he first made contact with the army, becoming a cadet at the Military Academy. After passing out respectably i f not brilliantly, he was gazetted as a sub-lieutenant in the 13th Regiment, and stayed with it for five years until entering the Staff College in 1914. From now on he climbed the ladder o f promo­ tion steadily; by 1925 he was commanding a battalion in the Guards Division, and after a spell on the staff, went as an instructor to the Staff College. Early on he seems to have made up Iris mind that the best chances o f further promotion came through membership o f the political cliques, and for some years he belonged to the Cherry Society. After its failure in the coup d’etat o f 1930 he had joined the Koda-ha, the Imperial W ay group, some o f whose members launched the bloodthirsty attacks on 26th February, 1936. f

Mutaguchi’s role in this affair is still a matter o f dispute, but it was probably a minor one. His tendency to see things in black and white, and from the viewpoint o f his own self-interest, was by now generally recognised; and his lack o f subtlety and flexibility limited his talent for pohtics, even as this art was practised in the Japan o f the 193os. However, the authorities suspected his sympathy with the fanatics; and within a month he found himself posted to Peking, where he took over command o f the 1st Regiment. B y now com­ pletely disillusioned by the Cherry Society, and the Imperial W ay * For these family details I am indebted to Mr. Morikuni Mutaguchi, the General’s eldest son. f See page 85.

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group, he readily came under the influence o f Major-General Tojo, the C hief o f Staff, Kwantung Arm y. Tojo was a leader o f the Control Faction, whose intrigues (it will be remembered) were directed towards war with China. There is no evidence that relations between the two officers became very close, though they had served together in the W ar Ministry in 1927; but undoubtedly Tojo saw Mutaguchi, with his bluster and drive, as just the man needed to execute the plot now being hatched. H ow exactly the Peking incident came about*, and to what extent it was stage-managed by the Japanese, is still a matter for argument and speculation; but the more one studies it, the more one comes to the conclusion that it was the result o f long planning by the Control Faction. The situation was this. Since the Boxer rising o f 1900 foreign powers had been granted rights under protocol to station troops in the Peking concessions. The British and French kept token forces o f under 2,000 men, but the Japanese gradually increased their troops until by 1936 these numbered no less than 15,000. B y a signed agreement with the Chinese, the Japanese commander had the right to engage in field manoeuvres and rifle practice, though notice had to be given for night manoeuvres. On the night o f the 7th Ju ly, however, a company o f Mutaguchi’s regiment carried out exercises without warning, near the Marco Polo bridge, with the result that the Chinese garrison at Wanping opened fire. The Japanese company commander advised his battalion commander, Major Ichiki, who in turn telephoned Mutaguchi. One might have imagined that at this time o f night the Colonel would be in his own quarters, but instead he was seated by the telephone in his office, talking to a well-known war reporter, Takeo Imai. Mutaguchi acted at once and without reference to higher authority, ordering all troops in the area to stand by for action, despatched a second company to reinforce the company which had been fired on; then drove to see the local Chinese commander, General Hyochian. It is worth mentioning here that Mutaguchi’s superior officer at this time was none other than Shozo Kawabe, then, as later, cautious and anxious to avoid trouble. But it so happened that Kawabe had been called away from Peking this particular evening and Mutaguchi was in complete control. * Briefly mentioned on page 32.

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From now on events moved swiftly. Confronted by General Hyochian, w ho not unnaturally was enraged by the Japanese failure to keep to their agreement, Mutaguchi went into the attack demanding an apology for the firing and the return o f a private soldier, who, so it now appeared, was missing. W hen Hyochian replied that the Chinese knew nothing about the soldier, Mutaguchi demanded the right to send troops in to Wanping and make a search. This demand was refused also, though Hyochian said he would order a search by his own troops. Later on, after heated negotiation, he agreed that a joint search should be made, and gave the necessary orders. B y 4 a.m. on the 8th, however, by which time the search had been in progress for an hour or more, Mutaguchi was informed by M ajor Ichiki that three shots had been fired on his troops, and again acted ruthlessly and without hesitation. A ll avail­ able troops, he ordered, including artillery, would prepare to attack Wanping forthwith; and within a remarkably short time heavy firing was in progress. N ext day Mutaguchi still kept up the pressure and Hyochian was warned by Colonel Matsui (the C h ief o f Civil Affairs who had now taken over negotiations) that unless he sur­ rendered the garrison at Wanping, this position would be bom­ barded. Again the Chinese commander refused to be intimidated, and fighting broke out, casualties being sustained on both sides. On the afternoon o f the 8th, when he returned to Peking, Kawabe found Mutaguchi full o f bounce and confidence and in complete command o f the situation. Whether Kawabe would have liked to stop the conflict which was developing, it is impossible to say; but certainly he fell in with Mutaguchi’s plans, and even made further demands on Hyochian. Probably the truth is that he suspect­ ed or even knew that Mutaguchi was the instrument o f men far senior to himself, and chose the line o f least resistance. On the 9th the missing soldier turned up, quite unharmed—he had strayed from the platoon to relieve himself. Undismayed, however, Matsui suggested truce terms, which the Chinese readily accepted, and the Japanese began withdrawing to their concession. For some obscure reason, however, one company remained behind and at midnight began firing into Wanping. Mutaguchi, informed (so he said later) that the company had been attacked with rifle and mortar fire, ordered all his troops back towards the Marco Polo bridge. Signal­

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ling G O C commanding the Kwantung Arm y, Kawabe now declared that the Japanese position at Peking was imperilled, with the result that by the 12th the forces confronting the Chinese totalled no less than 20,000 men, complete with artillery and air cover. The plan had worked beautifully. Mutaguchi had good cause to be pleased with himself. Then there was a hitch, for on the 9th Ju ly, when Prince Konoe and his cabinet met to consider the Peking incident, they agreed that it should be localised. I f general conflict should break out, some members argued, this would complicate the arm y’s task o f maintaining adequate forces in Manchuria, to counter any Soviet threat. The N avy Minister was utterly against any escalation o f the trouble; and other members, though hankering for more control throughout northern China, considered that full-scale war was not the w ay to achieve this. However, the Tosei-ha generals sapped and mined below the political surface, threatened, cajoled and bul­ bed; by the 20th Ju ly Konoe had agreed to mobilise three divisions, and a week later was announcing his cabinet’s intention ‘to achieve a new order in East Asia.’ B y the 31st the whole Peking-Tientsin area was under heavy attack by the North China Expeditionary Force commanded by Kawabe; and by early September 160,000 troops were in the field. The China war, so longed for by the Tosei-ha, was in full swing. As might be expected, Mutaguchi’s services did not go unrecog­ nised, and promotion to the general ranks o f the army was not long delayed; by March, 1938, he was a major-general serving under Yamashita as C hief o f Staff to the 4th (Kwantung) A rm y; by August 1940, he was a lieutenant-general commanding 18th Division which, as w e have seen, he led in Malaya, with great success. And from Malaya he came to Burma where in March, 1943, he took over the 15th Arm y. Between his arrival in Burma and the Rangoon conference, there was a period o f three months and in this time Mutaguchi set himself the task o f mastering the geography o f this difficult area, and solving the problem o f how and when he could launch his army against the British. Between Burma and India, he learned, there lay a great barrier o f jungle-mountains, some six hundred miles long and two hundred across: the Naga hills to the north,

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then below them the Lushai hills and the Chin hills. Here, as he could see, was a very inhospitable region indeed, with alternating ridges and valleys running from north to south, interspersed with deep, swift-running rivers, cliffs, and every possible obstacle. There were no roads and few tracks; and to make matters worse, Assam was the wettest place on earth, where up to eight hundred inches o f rain had been recorded in a single year. Imphal, where the enemy base was sited, lies in the small state o f Manipur, to the south o f the Assam border, sandwiched between the Naga hills to the north and the Chin hills to the south. The Imphal plain lies 2,500 feet above sea level and spreads over some 700 square miles; it is open and fertile, and dotted with prosperous villages. O f the three entrances to the plain, the most important was via the metalled road which ran 130 miles from the railhead at Dimapur and south through Kohima. There was also a tracking running west from Bishenpur to Silchar in Assam, a distance o f 100 miles, punctuated by mountain passes and great gorges, spanned by suspension bridges; and a bridle path which ran from Tamu on the Burmese border and over the mountains. Altogether, the Imphal plain was as remote and inaccessible as any area in the world, and the country to the north o f it and towards Dimapur was even more formidable. When he discussed the possibility o f an offensive with his Chief-ofStaff, Major-General Obata, the latter had no hesitation in con­ demning the project, pointing out that even a single division could not be supplied in such territory, let alone a whole army. Though Obata was a highly respected authority on communications, Mutaguchi sacked him immediately, and the post was taken over by Todai Kunomura, a more docile character, who could be relied upon to do as he was told and not argue. And so the planning continued. T w o factors had a strong influence on Mutaguchi at this time: one was Major-General W ingate’s operation ‘Loincloth’, Mutaguchi reasoning simply that i f the British could cross the hills from west to east, he could do so in the opposite direction. The second factor was the personality o f Subhas Chandra Bose, supreme commander o f the Indian Nationalist A rm y which had now been formed and equipped by the Japanese. Bose, always plausible and resourceful, painted Mutaguchi a picture o f the whole o f India seething in dis­

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content. The British forces in India, he pointed out, were weak and over-stretched; and with the leaders o f the National Congress Party enflaming the mob, the situation was already poised on a knife-edge. Once news arrived from Burm a that the Japanese were on the w ay, there would be a great revolt from Calcutta to Bom bay and from Madras to the North-W est Frontier. This was the kind o f talk that Mutaguchi wanted to hear, and (as he was to admit later) he indulged ‘in private speculations’ or day­ dreams; and in some o f these he even saw himself riding through Delhi on a white horse. . . . So he came to the Rangoon conference in June and, after long argument, heard his alternative plan accepted. This was an oppor­ tune moment, so far as T ojo ’s government was concerned, for with the Japanese defeats at Guadalcanal, M idw ay Island, and in N ew Guinea, the strategic situation was deteriorating. Furthermore, as the Americans tightened their blockade, shipping losses were mounting, and the civilian population, subject to increasing hard­ ships, needed a success to boost their morale. This, a victory in Burm a would undoubtedly supply; and would also discourage Chiang Kai-shek from committing his divisions, apart from neutral­ ising any British offensive. So, in Ju ly, Mutaguchi was happy to learn that the necessary reinforcements would soon be on the way, and he would be allotted Yamauchi’s 15th Division, Yanagida’s 33rd, and Sato’s 31st, together with the Indian National A rm y Division under Chandra Bose. Setting up his headquarters in the pleasant town o f M aym yo, to the east o f Mandalay, Mutaguchi and his staff began planning in more detail. The object o f the coming operation, as laid down by Kawabe, was: ‘To upset the British base around Imphal in order to suppress the British counter-offensive. T o strengthen the defence o f Burma and to exercise political control over India.’ The ‘Scheme o f the Operation’ was ‘ . . . to rush into Imphal as quickly as possible.’ His relations with Kawabe were friendly and even cordial, and at one meeting Mutaguchi declared emotionally: ‘Y ou were m y chief at Peking as you are now . . . ‘W e rang up the curtain in China and w e w ill ring it down in Burm a.’ Despite such pronouncements, however, Mutaguchi kept a w ary eye on Kawabe, noting any moves towards caution and countering them immediately.

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The two commanders formed, o f course, a complete contrast, both physically and mentally. Kawabe was thin, short— even by Japanese standards— and looked ill most o f the time. His eyes peered through gold-rimmed spectacles. He was cold, sober, prudent, and in the Japanese phrase ‘severe as ice’. He showed no signs o f humour or wit, and abominated practical jokes. Remarkable for a Japanese general, he did not like alcohol or geisha girls or prostitutes; when obliged to attend social functions he left immediately after the speeches. On one occasion he complained that the waitresses were wearing too much perfume. W hat his personal views were on Mutaguchi at this time, it is hard to say; though it is difficult to beheve that the latter’s thirst and renowned sexual athleticism pro­ voked admiration. However, relations were fairly good—for the moment. Relations between Mutaguchi and B A A staff, especially with the C hief o f Staff, Lieutenant-General Eitaro Naka, were never good, from the moment that Mutaguchi arrived in Burma. And when the latter had to inform him that demands for supplies and equipment could not be met in full, they deteriorated rapidly. Towards the end o f October Yamauchi arrived, but with the disappointing news that his division had been delayed by shipping shortages, and now the bulk o f it was being put on road works on the Burm a-Siam border. Ranting at Naka, and then at Kawabe himself, Mutaguchi demanded that the division should be released at once, but received no firm promises. There was a further disappointment in Novem ber when Southern Arm y turned down a demand for fifty road building companies and sixty mule companies.* In desperation Mutaguchi went over Terauchi’s head and appealed to Tojo direct, to receive a reply that the matter would be reconsidered. However, no companies o f either kind began reaching Burma, and Mutaguchi was forced to consider supplying his army by elephant transport and by sending cattle on the hoof. He even considered goats also, reminding * Major-General Inada and his fellow staff officers at Southern Arm y already detested the names ‘Mutaguchi’ and ‘Imphal’ . One o f them commented bitterly to a war correspondent: ‘Mutaguchi would fling his troops anywhere i f he thought it would bring him publicity. H ow they are to be supplied he only thinks about afterwards’ . Another said ‘That man’s eyes are fixed on Tojo and promotion. The rest o f us don’t matter a damn’ .

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Kunomura that Genghis Khan had moved across Central Asia with herds o f goats on the hoof. N ot unreasonably Kunomura asked how cattle would react to shellfire and bombing, to fmd himself ordered to make a full-scale study o f the subject. So vets were called in to advise on feeding and training; and experiments were carried out to see how far cattle could march in a day. These showed the maximum to be thirteen kilometres, but how many days they could keep up this pace, and whether they could even negotiate the fearful country beyond the Chindwin, it was impossible to say. Some officeis thought the whole scheme was the craziest thing they had ever heard of; and at least one supply officer had the courage to tell Mutaguchi so. But the A rm y Commander remained supremely confident. ‘W hat is the worry?’ he asked. ‘Imphal will fall in three weeks and w e shall have all the supplies w e need.’ So the herding and ‘training’ o f cattle went on, and in time some 15,000 were assembled in the rear areas and troops were detailed to tend them and exercise them.* December was a frustrating month for Mutaguchi. Though preparations were still going ahead no executive orders had been received from Tokyo. On the 7th December, which marked the second anniversary o f Pearl Harbour, Tojo said in a broadcast that, ‘N ow , on the threshold o f a N ew Year, Japan w ill seek to consolidate her gains . . .’ but still Imperial Headquarters did not bestir them­ selves. B y the 22nd Mutaguchi, in an effort to spur things along, called a full-scale conference at M aym yo, which was attended not only by his own staff and commanders, but by Kawabe, and M ajorGeneral Ayabe, V ice-Chief o f Staff to Terauchi. Everyone was agreed that the sooner the operation was launched the better; and if Tokyo continued havering much longer the enemy might launch an offensive first. This view impressed itself on Ayabe, and after some discussion with Mutaguchi and Kawabe, he agreed to fly back to Singapore and put the position to Terauchi. Fortunately Terauchi proved amiable and sent Ayabe to Imperial Headquarters. In Tokyo, where he arrived on the 27th December, the mood was black, news having come in o f further American successes in the Pacific; * Mutaguchi’ s cattle training scheme was, o f course, in the tradition o f bushido which, in Major Morimoto’s phrase ‘means doing everything thoroughly.’ This incident illustrates the limitations o f the code, for i f the scheme was basically mis­ guided, not to say crazy, no amount o f ‘thoroughness’ could make it work.

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and Ayabe found himself closely questioned by Lieutenant-General Shuichi Miyazaki, C hief o f Operations Staff, and his subordinates. The grilling went on three days. As Ayabe could see, his former colleagues—he had recently finished a tour at Imperial Head­ quarters—were somewhat demoralised and confused. Though badly needing a success, none wanted to risk failure. Finally, Ayabe was informed that although they would not oppose the operation, the final agreement must come from Tojo in person, and disconsolately he went to the airport to await a plane for Singapore. Here, however, a message reached him that Colonel Nishiura o f the M ilitary Affairs Section had gone to see Tojo in person at his house, and a decision might soon be forthcoming. Though not directly connected with Mutaguchi, the scene which follows is so farcical as to demand relating. Arriving at T ojo’s house, Nishiura was informed by the maid that he was in the bath, but after a few moments was ushered into a dressing room. Through the glass door he could see the Prime Minister splashing about in the water, and, so he reported later, the dialogue went like this: T o jo : W hat’s the matter? N i s h i u r a : Sir, w e urgently want a decision on the Imphal Operation. T o jo : Imphal . . . yes . . . H ow about communications? Have they been properly thought out? Eh? Eh? It’s difficult country towards India you know. N i s h i u r a : Yes, sir. The whole plan has been gone into in great detail. T o jo : W hat about Mutaguchi? Are his plans up to schedule? Eh? Has he got any problems? N i s h i u r a : He is anxious to go ahead, sir. T o jo : W hat about air cover? W e can’t help him much. Does he realise that? N i s h i u r a : I take it he does, sir. T o jo : N o w what about the result o f pushing our defensive line towards India? What problems is that going to make for us? Eh? Are you sure it w ill make things better rather than worse? W hat’ll happen i f the Allies land on the Arakan coast? Has anyone thought o f that? Eh? Eh?

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Clambering out o f the bath and standing before the Colonel, quite naked, Tojo went right through the operation, phase by phase, pointing out the weaknesses o f the plan, then added: ‘Tell Ayabe that they should not be too ambitious.’ Though the exact meaning o f this observation is not quite clear, it was dutifully relayed to Kawabe, who, as it w ill be seen later, very much took it to heart. But meanwhile, having tried to memorise T ojo’s questions, Colonel Nishiura left the dressing room and walked across to the telephone. Phoning Myazaki he asked for assurances on the points Tojo had raised, then returned to the bathroom. B y this time the Prime Minister was vigorously towelling himself, but listened intently until the Colonel had finished. Then, after reflecting for a moment he said, ‘V ery good, i f you w ill draw up the necessary order sanc­ tioning the operation, I w ill sign it.’ Whether in the following days T ojo had second thoughts, or whether the Operations Staff tried to change his views, it is difficult to say. Certainly there is evidence that the more the staff thought about Imphal the less they liked it. It was not until the 7th January— some ten days after the bathroom interview—that Terauchi and Kawabe received a signal which read: ‘In order to defend Burma the Commander-in-Chief Southern A rm y may occupy and secure the vital areas o f north-east India in the vicinity o f Imphal by defeat­ ing the enemy in that area at the opportune time . . .’ The phrase­ ology was vague and, not surprisingly, Kawabe ruminated on the signal before passing it on to Mutaguchi. Meanwhile Imperial Headquarters, in another fit o f the jitters, had signalled Terauchi that the operation must be kept under strict control, and a new defence line established the moment Imphal had been taken. This signal Kawabe took to be further confirmation o f the message from Tojo relayed through Ayabe— ‘D o not be too ambitious’—and must be interpreted— ‘Keep a close watch on Mutaguchi or he’ll go careering o ff to the Brahmaputra and beyond, and probably end up by losing his arm y.’ So with these thoughts in mind Kawabe began drafting his detailed orders to Mutaguchi who, having despaired that a decision would ever be reached, received them on the 19th January. The main points o f the orders were as follows:

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1. Mutaguchi would seize Imphal before the Allies were ready with their counter-offensive. 2. He would build up strong defences covering Imphal and Kohima before the monsoon. 3. The offensive would begin between mid-February and early March so that it could be completed by mid-April. (This would leave a month before the monsoon began.) As planned early on, the offensive would be prefaced by the attack in the Arakan, and by now the formation o f 28th A rm y had been sanctioned and Lieutenant-General Sakurai had arrived to take command. But the really worrying thing, from Mutaguchi’s view­ point, was the non-arrival o f Yamauchi’s 15th Division which was still in Siam. Though he repeatedly demanded that its arrival be expedited, nothing happened, and so he was forced to go on plan­ ning without it. It was at this time that serious consideration o f Kohima began. This is a hill station, some 5,000 feet up in the vastness o f the Naga hills in central Assam, eighty-five miles to the north o f Imphal and about forty-five to the south-east o f Dimapur, the Allied base and railhead. The strategic importance o f Kohima had been pointed out at the December conference by Ayabe, who considered that it must be held as a northern bastion o f the Japanese defensive line, and also to prevent the enemy reinforcing Imphal. The sound­ ness o f this reasoning had been recognised almost immediately, and Mutaguchi allocated a regiment to take the town. Later on he changed Iris mind and detailed the entire 31st Division, commanded by Kotoku Sato. Sato, quite reasonably, wanted to know what his task would be once he had taken Kohima, for in his view there was no point in merely sitting there. A t one o f the planning con­ ferences the role o f the 31st Division was thrashed out in detail, though Sato, unable to be present in person, sent along a member o f his Staff, Colonel Kato. During this conference, Kato said that his commander’s plan was to hold Kohima with the main body o f the division to stop any movement towards Imphal, and to send one regiment to take Dimapur. Irritably Mutaguchi condemned this policy as unenterprising. ‘W h y should you stay at Kohima?’ he asked. ‘The enemy w ill be running back to Dimapur and your job is to get after them.’ According to Takahide Hasagawa, who

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reported this conversation, Kawabe made no comment at the time but noted the enlargement o f Mutaguchi’s ambitions and resolved to curb them. Sato and Mutaguchi had met many years previously, when they shared an office at Imperial Headquarters during an attachment to the historical section. Though both old members o f the Cherry Society, Sato had, by this time, got involved with Tosei-ha (the clique which Mutaguchi was to join later on), and except for essential business they ignored each other. Their relations did not improve now; for, having studied the operational plans, Sato began bombarding Mutaguchi with questions about the supply position. W hy, he wanted to know, was there a critical shortage o f adminis­ trative units? W h y was he having to detail infantry N C O s and men to drive cattle? And who on earth thought that the cattle would reach Kohima? Airily mentioning his ‘cattle training’ programme, Mutaguchi assured Sato that there was nothing to w orry about. Also, he had good news so far as communications were concerned: Lieutenant Masa Nishida and a small group o f men who had been across the Chindwin, reconnoitring routes, reported that the enemy had built a jeep track all the w ay to Kohima. This, Mutaguchi was confident, would enormously facilitate the supply problem. W ith horses and mules, the 31st Division could keep itself supplied for the first twenty days, and by the end o f fifty days communica­ tions would be opened up through Imphal. W hen Sato still de­ murred, Mutaguchi handed him over to Kunomura, who called in M ajor Usui and other administrative officers, and together they thrashed out a plan. This was that 15th A rm y would supply 31st Division with 8 tons o f ammunition per day, and 250 tons o f food within the first 23 days (i.e. between the 15th March and 8th April). Written confirmation was given and Sato departed, though not before forming some detrimental opinions regarding 15th Arm y staff. These opinions one might add, were not to improve. Sato’s reputation was not particularly high in the Japanese Arm y, and he was looked on as somewhat plodding and unimagi­ native, i f also sound and determined. Yamauchi and Yanagida were generally thought to be o f somewhat higher calibre, though Mutaguchi was not satisfied with either o f them. Unlike himself, they had served abroad, Yamauchi in Washington and Yanagida

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in Russia, and both were accomplished linguists. They were im­ pressed by American military potential, and Mutaguchi became so irritated that he took to referring to them sarcastically as ‘m y American generals.’ Sometimes he suspected that they lacked heart, let alone any passionate involvement in the operation, and Yamauchi was unwell from malaria. As for bushido neither o f them knew the real meaning o f the word. Still, whatever the personalities o f their commanders, the role o f the various divisions was now set. On the night o f D minus 7 33 rd Division would cross the Chindwin and launch a surprise attack on the 17th Division (positioned south-west o f Imphal), by assaulting Tiddim, and cutting the road back to Imphal at Tongzang and other points. This move it was considered would draw the British reserves away from Imphal. 33 rd Division would also send an armoured column under Major-General Yamom oto up the Kabaw Valley to seize Tamu. On D -D ay 15 th Division would cross the Chindwin further north in the Taungdut area and, with the IN A Division, attack the other forward division, the 20th Indian, under Gracey, on the Palel-Tamu road. I f his troops moved fast enough, Mutaguchi had high hopes that both the 17th and 20th Divisions would be trapped before they could get back to the Imphal plain, and once this move had been accomplished and the enemy commander, General Scoones, had committed his reserves, then he had no fears for the operation. The British base would be at his mercy. W ith complete confidence he gave orders that the full strength o f 15th A rm y geisha girls and prostitutes should be ready for the fly-in from D plus 10. There was no reason, he considered, w hy mid-April should not see Imphal just as gay as M aym yo had been. Contemplating Imphal, Mutaguchi realised with increasing pleasure what a wonderful prize it would be for his army. A ll the Intelligence reports flowing in were agreed as to its value. Apart from the all-weather airfield, there were workshops, hospitals, technical installations, and collections o f transport, tanks, and armoured cars, and vast stocks o f food, ammunition, and all the supplies needed to maintain an army. Its loss to the British would be calamitous, paralysing the whole front which might well collapse at a single blow. 1

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But January turned to February and still there was no sign o f the 15th Division. On the 4th February Sakurai marched against the Allied 15th Corps in the Arakan, but still there was no sign, and getting no change out o f Kawabe, Mutaguchi signalled direct to Terauchi: ‘D o you intend this operation to go ahead or not. I f so must have troops.’ On the n th the division began marching in, but the men looked thin and exhausted and their feet were a mass o f corns and blisters. Before the division could go into action, it needed new uniforms and shoes; and not only these. As the column straggled past him, Mutaguchi was horrified to see that one o f the cannons they had dragged all the w ay from Siam was made in 1899. However, D -D ay was now fixed for the 15th March, and after the months o f planning and frustration Mutaguchi found a new calm, and could even be seen in the garden o f his bungalow tending the roses. He was not even flurried when Kawabe reported that things were not going well in the Arakan; and that, far from re­ treating, the Allied 15 th Corps had stayed where it was and fought, supphed efficiently from the air. W hat interested him chiefly was that Slim should commit his reserves, and when his Intelligence officers reported that this had in fact happened, he expressed him­ self willing to launch his offensive. He was not shaken either by other unwelcome news— that Major-General Orde W ingate had launched another operation, sending a column on foot down from Ledo and flying in forces to the area south o f Mogaung. The first reports reached him on the 5th March, just nine days before his offensive, but his opinion was that local garrisons could deal with the nuisance. A few days later when the w ar correspondent, Yukihiko Imai, asked him i f W in­ gate’s men would not interfere with his line o f communications, ‘Good heavens no’ was his good humoured reply. ‘These men are orphans o f the jungle. W e’ll surround them and starve them out.’ He was confident, he added, that as soon as his arm y reached Assam, the air link to the Chindits would be endangered i f not severed. In the next twenty-four hours, however, he received a visit from Lieutenant-General Tazoe, commander o f the 5th Air Division, w ho viewed things very differently. The Allied A ir Forces, Tazoe said, had begun a series o f major actions in conjunction with the air-borne landings, and destroyed many o f his planes on the ground.

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‘I f W ingate’s forces build up,’ he added, ‘they w ill create a major threat to the M yitkyina-M andalay area’ and so throw the whole Japanese supply system out o f gear. Mutaguchi, however, with his chance o f glory almost arrived, refused to be impressed. Wingate, he said, could bring in 200 gliders at the most. But Tazoe disagreed: the British he said, now had two divisions o f parachute and glider troops and might employ the bulk o f them in this operation. ‘The Allied power to bring in transport, troops, guns, tanks, and equipment’, he added, ‘is beyond anything you have visualised. They can land 1,800 men a day with strong fighter cover. This is the equivalent in tonnage to 100 railway trucks.’ When Mutaguchi asked what Tazoe wanted him to do about this threat, the latter replied: ‘Postpone the Imphal offensive until W ingate’s forces have been wiped out.’ N ot surprisingly, Mutaguchi refused point blank. But Tazoe was not to be put o ff easily. Having seen Kawabe, he was back again on the 12th March with Lieutenant-Colonel Taketo Kamikasa, C hief o f Staff to the 3rd Air Arm y, and together the airmen warned Mutaguchi that the enormous enemy exertions on the Ledo road must be connected with W ingate’s operation, which now involved the best part o f a division. T o this he replied: ‘I can see that these air-borne operations are larger than estimated . . . but I am glad rather than sorry. The more men W ingate brings into Burm a the more w ill be caught like rats in a trap. I’d rather have them where they are than fighting against us at Imphal!’ W ith this Tazoe gave up. And three days later Mutaguchi’s army was launched across the Chindwin to begin its march on Imphal and Kohima. The die was cast.

‘The A rm y has now reached the stage o f invincibility and the day when the Rising Sun shall proclaim our victory in India is not far off. ‘This operation w ill engage the attention o f the whole world and is eagerly awaited by 100,000,000 o f our countrymen. B y its very decisive nature, its success w ill have a profound effect upon the course o f the w ar and may even lead to its conclusion . . . ‘I w ill remind you that a speedy and successful advance is the keynote o f this operation, despite all the obstacles o f the river,

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