Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area 9781472564191, 9781841137834

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Series Editor’s Foreword It is widely held that European Community law in general and the European Court of Justice in particular have a detrimental effect on the Member States’ laws of international civil procedure. The more benevolent observers simply believe that the perceived mess stems from a lack of legislative or judicial expertise. Others regard the intervention of the Community in this field as just another brick in the edifice of a ‘European Super State’, constructed by remote bureaucrats in Brussels and Luxembourg over and above the heads of the European peoples. The criticism is particularly vigorous in legal systems with a long and proud tradition in private international law. These include the jurisdictions to which most of the contributors to this volume belong, England and France, but German jurists have not stood apart. Erik Jayme and Christian Kohler, for instance, speak of ‘hegemonial gestures on the way towards total unification’ (‘Hegemonialgesten auf dem Weg zu einer Gesamtvereinheitlichung’)—at least this is the title of one of their recent annual surveys on matters of private international law and international procedure in the Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts. For a comparative lawyer it is fascinating to observe that the criticism emerging from the different jurisdictions is far from homogenous. The attacks on European law in this area reveal the extent to which domestic lawyers are attached to specific national doctrines and are willing to defend them. It is almost ironic to see how English and continental lawyers are united in their dislike of the decisions of the European Court of Justice in Gasser, Turner and Owusu which are the focus of this book, whilst they continue to rely on doctrines that are equally disliked on the other side of the Channel. The theory of ‘fraude’ and ‘abus de droit’, for example, which figures prominently in France, is not necessarily close to the heart of the English lawyer. On the other hand, continental lawyers find it difficult to warm to the English idea of a forum non conveniens. Moreover, less obviously and perhaps more importantly, the different criticisms reveal the critics’ perceptions of and their attitudes to their own and other legal systems, including European law. Thus we find Trevor Hartley in a recent article in the International and Comparative Law Quarterly in search of an explanation of precisely the three decisions mentioned above. ‘On the Continent’, he asserts, ‘they do things differently. They regard a legislative code as inherently superior to, and more desirable than, judge-made law. Codes of law are thought to represent a higher stage of civilisation’. The European Court of Justice, Professor Hartley tells us, is ‘a predominantly civilian court’. Thus it is, as ‘civil lawyers’ are in general, ‘more concerned with the structure of the law’, as opposed to the ‘practice-driven’ approach of the common law. These

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remarks sound slightly outdated in light of more recent comparative research. But let us assume for a moment that generalisations can be helpful tools in highlighting differences, and that the distinction between a clear-cut, rule-based, theoretical and systematic structure of the civil law on the one hand, and a flexible and pragmatic common law on the other hand, is one that holds in general. This assumption does not, however, overcome the fact that the particular areas of private international law and international civil procedure have traditionally been largely uncodified in continental jurisdictions and are widely regarded as paradigm examples of judge-made law there. Continental lawyers therefore do not necessarily object to the European Court of Justice contributing to the development of the law in these areas, and they perceive the Court, in its general approach and methodology, rather as a common law court. But they would not subscribe to the view that the Court is overly concerned with the structure of the law. It is precisely the supposed lack of principle, coherence and structure in the Court’s approach that is deplored. So we seem to witness in this area the use (or misuse) of general comparative law reasoning, referring to methodology and approach, in order to express dissatisfaction with the substantive decisions reached by the Court. This brings us back to the first level of criticism, ie, that referring to particular doctrines. And fortunately this was the focus of the conference, the proceedings of which are contained in this volume. It was held at University College, Oxford, on 31 March 2006, chaired jointly by M Jean Pierre Ancel, Président de la Première Chambre de la Cour de cassation, and by Lord Mance, a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, and attended by academics, practitioners and students alike. I am extremely grateful to Professor Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières of the University Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne) for the organisation of this event and the subsequent publication of the papers. Pascal was the penultimate post-holder in a long line of distinguished lawyers on secondment from Paris who teach at the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law. He prepared this conference under the aegis of the Institute and with the support of the Association Sorbonne-Oxford pour le droit comparé. The Association Sorbonne-Oxford was founded in 1999 with the aim of developing and promoting exchanges, teaching and research in the area of Franco-English comparative law as between the two universities. Its members are the University of Paris I, the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law and law firm Clifford Chance. The Association is principally funded by Clifford Chance. To date, most of the Association’s funds have been used to build up a considerable body of English legal material in the Paris University library, to fund an annual colloquium, and to fund an Oxford academic to teach in Paris. The 2006 conference was almost entirely sponsored by Clifford Chance, and I would like to express my gratitude for Clifford Chance’s strong support of the Association.

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The Institute of European and Comparative Law is one of the Research Centres of the Oxford Law Faculty, and it promotes teaching and research in the two disciplines, with a strong focus on their intersection. Obviously the topic of this volume is almost paradigmatic in this sense, looking at European law and its impact on two domestic systems in a comparative perspective. I am therefore particularly delighted to see this book included in the ‘Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law’. Stefan Vogenauer Director of the Institute of European and Comparative Law Oxford March 2007

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Foreword One of the issues left untouched by the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 (and by the Brussels-1 Regulation replacing it) concerns the leeway left to domestic courts when applying European rules on international jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. Is the court trying an individual case under a duty of strict compliance with the jurisdiction rule as it is drafted? Would such a duty go so far as to require the court to abide by the jurisdiction rule, even though this rule is used by one of the litigants against the other with a view to reach unmerited goals, for example to delay the adjudication on the merits? Under what conditions, if any, may the Court decline jurisdiction on account of any unsuitable forum shopping, thus ruling out the European provision on jurisdiction? Recent litigation in the ECJ has yielded, three times in a row, a rather—some would say ‘excessively’—restrictive answer (see: the Gasser case, 2003, Aff C-116/02; the Turner case, 2004, Aff C-159/02; and the Owusu case, 2005, Aff C-281/02). In these three noteworthy cases the European Court of Justice held that, under the Brussels-Lugano regime, the domestic court has no discretion to remedy any inconvenience arising from the strict application of the European provisions on jurisdiction, if such discretion were provided for by the lex fori. This series of rulings from the ECJ raises several questions in turn. It especially leads the observer to wonder whether it is appropriate for the European Court to prescribe a blind application of European rules on jurisdiction by domestic courts. This is all the more so as the legal traditions of EC Member States usually provide for corrective mechanisms—such as ‘forum non conveniens’ in English law and ‘exception de fraude’ in French law—available, among others, in cases where a party abusively triggers the jurisdiction of a court in order to obtain an unjust advantage. The time has now come for an analysis, under both Community and comparative law, of the ramifications of the recent Gasser/Turner/Owusu cases. One might thus determine to what extent this set of rulings leaves room for judicial discretion on the part of domestic courts when facing procedural abuses from a party, or, more generally, inappropriate attempts at litigation. With this aim in view, The Association Oxford-Sorbonne pour le droit comparé, with the support of the Institute of European and Comparative Law of Oxford University, hosted a panel of practitioners and academic experts from both sides of the Channel for a French-English bilingual conference on this issue in early spring 2006 at the University of Oxford. These organisations can now be proud of the final outcome of this event as it appears in the present book, collecting the updated and enriched

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versions of the papers then presented and making thus available to the reader a wealth of current comparative legal thought about forum shopping in the European Judicial Area under the Brussels-Lugano regime. Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières

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Avant-propos Une des questions laissées ouvertes par la convention de Bruxelles du 27 septembre 1968 (et maintenue telle par le règlement Bruxelles 1 qui lui succède) est celle de la marge de manœuvre dont dispose le juge national lorsqu’il applique les règles européennes de compétence internationale en matière civile et commerciale. Le juge saisi doit-il s’en tenir strictement à la solution fournie par la lettre du texte, alors même que la règle de compétence serait exploitée par l’un des plaideurs contre l’autre à des fins douteuses, notamment dilatoires ? Peut-il sanctionner certains forum shopping odieux, en faisant exception à la règle européenne de compétence, et si oui dans quels cas ? A ces questions l’actualité contentieuse a donné à la Cour de justice des Communautés, par trois fois au cours des trois dernières années, d’apporter par touches successives une réponse globalement (et peut-être exagérément) restrictive (arrêts Gasser, 2003, Aff C-116/02 – Turner, 2004, Aff C-159/02 – Owusu, 2005, Aff C-281/02). Le juge national s’est vu, dans ces trois affaires, privé du pouvoir de corriger—ne serait-ce qu’au moyen des outils procéduraux que lui fournit sa lex fori—le jeu normal des règles européennes de compétence, nonobstant les inconvénients auxquels leur application conduisait. La construction ainsi mise en place par la Cour européenne ne manque pas de soulever à son tour de nouvelles questions. Elle invite notamment à se demander s’il est opportun d’exiger des juges nationaux une application mécanique du droit européen de la compétence internationale, alors pourtant que les traditions nationales des Etats membres connaissent habituellement des mécanismes correcteurs—tels l’exception de forum non conveniens en droit anglais ou l’exception de fraude en droit français…) permettant de lutter contre les pratiques contentieuses abusives tendant à déclencher ou à exploiter la compétence d’un juge en vue d’en tirer contre l’adversaire un avantage injuste. Le moment est donc venu d’examiner en détail, dans une perspective communautaire et comparatiste, les tenants et aboutissants du récent triplet jurisprudentiel Gasser/Turner/Owusu, et la mesure dans laquelle cette jurisprudence laisse place, ou devrait laisser place, dans l’avenir, à un certain pouvoir des juges nationaux de réagir à des comportements procéduraux abusifs. Dans ce but, l’Association Oxford-Sorbonne pour le droit comparé, en collaboration avec l’Institut de droit européen et comparé de l’Université d’Oxford a réuni des praticiens et des universitaires spécialistes de ces questions des deux côtés de la Manche, dans le cadre d’un colloque bilingue de droit comparé franco-britannique organisé dans les locaux de l’Université d’Oxford au printemps 2006. Ces deux organisations peuvent désormais être fières du résultat de ces rencontres tel

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xii Avant-propos qu’il se manifeste dans le présent livre, réunissant les versions enrichies et mises à jour des communications produites pour la circonstance, et offrant au lecteur l’accès à une somme de réflexions juridiques actuelles concernant le forum shopping dans l’Espace Judiciaire Européen sous l’empire du régime mis en place par le règlement Bruxelles 1. Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières

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Contributors Andrew Dickinson, Solicitor Advocate (Higher Courts—Civil); Consultant, Clifford Chance LLP; Visiting Fellow in Private International Law, British Institute of International and Comparative Law. Richard Fentiman, Reader in Private International Law, University of Cambridge, Fellow of Queens’ College, Cambridge. Alexander Layton, QC, of the Middle Temple, Barrister. Pierre Mayer, Professeur à l’université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. Marie-Laure Niboyet, Professeur à l’Université Paris 10 Nanterre. Arnaud Nuyts, Professor at the University of Brussels, Avocat, Member of the Bar of Brussels. Edwin Peel, Fellow and Tutor in Law, Keble College, Oxford; Solicitor and Consultant, Clifford Chance LLP. Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières, Professeur à l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne; former Deputy-Director of the Institute of European and Comparative Law (Oxford). Horatia Muir Watt, Professeur à l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

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Introduction* EDWIN PEEL FELLOW OF KEBLE COLLEGE, OXFORD

There is an English saying that ‘you wait for ages for a bus and then three come along at once’. To some extent the triumvirate of decisions in Gasser,1 Turner2 and Owusu3 have that feel to them. The Brussels Convention came into force in the United Kingdom on 1 January 1987.4 Yet it is only very recently, and in quick succession,5 that certain key principles of English civil procedure, long cherished but always vulnerable to attack, have come within the range of the European Court of Justice. The saying in question is meant to convey a sense of frustration. If it is not entirely apt, it is only because, for most English lawyers, the frustration stems from the decisions having arrived, rather than in the waiting for them. In short order, in cases falling within the scheme of the Convention,6 English practitioners have been deprived of the primacy afforded to jurisdiction agreements (Gasser, Turner), the anti-suit injunction (Turner) and the doctrine of forum non conveniens (Owusu). All three, of course, are designed to curb the worst excesses of forum shopping. To a large extent, the answer given by the European Court in all three cases is that the necessary control is already provided by the scheme of the Convention and

* The most significant development since this chapter was presented as a paper is the decision of the House of Lords, in West Tankers Inc v Ras Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurta SpA [2007] UKHL 4, to refer to the European Court of Justice the question of whether an anti-suit injunction may be granted to restrain a person bound by an arbitration agreement from commencing or prosecuting proceedings in a court of another Member State. 1 Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693, [2005] 1 QB 1. 2 Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565, [2005] 1 AC 101. 3 Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383, [2005] 2 WLR 942. 4 Throughout this introduction references are made to the Convention and to the relevant Articles therein since it is with the Convention that each of the three decisions under consideration was concerned (the relevant version being that upon the Accession of Portugal and Spain: [1989] OJ L285/1). It also follows that references are made to ‘(non-)Contracting States’. Where appropriate, specific references will be made to the Regulation (Council Reg (EC) 44/2001, [2001] OJ L12/1) which has replaced the Convention (save in Denmark), and to ‘(non-)Member States’. 5 It has been referred to as ‘fifteen months of infamy’: A Briggs, ‘The Impact of Recent Judgments of the European Court on English Procedural Law and Practice’ Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht (2005) II 231, 232. 6 Of course, the understanding of what that means is crucial to at least one of them (Owusu): see below.

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the mutual trust between the Contracting States which is its underpinning. The principal focus of this conference lies in a clearer understanding of the detail of this answer, and an assessment of the ramifications for the future. In this latter regard, much of the fascination lies in the room which may have been left for the creativity of the common law to come to the fore.7 In the study of comparative law one is struck by what is often a clash of culture, but it is a feature of comparative civil procedure, and jurisdiction in particular, just how stark is that clash (or Justizkonflikt8). In matters of substantive law one regularly finds that the same, or very similar, answers are reached and it is only the reasoning or the methodology which differs. The same cannot be said of jurisdiction and the reason for this is not hard to find. To compare the French law of contract with the English law of contract is very largely to compare like with like9; it involves, at the very least, the comparison, on both sides, of private law. To compare the common law model of adjudication, as exemplified by English law, with the Convention model, at least as it is understood by the Court of Justice, is in one sense to attempt a comparison between private law and public law. The private law underpinning of the common law model is apparent from the role given to the consent of the parties, and the sense in which the decisions of the courts represent the vindication of rights and the enforcement of obligations. Two examples, both based on the existence of a jurisdiction agreement, should suffice by way of illustration. If the parties have agreed to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts10 each of them may assert their legal right not to be sued elsewhere as the basis for seeking a remedy if the other commences proceedings abroad.11 Conversely, if they have agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign court and one of them commences proceedings in England, the same legal right may be asserted.12 The subject matter of the agreement may be jurisdiction,

7 See, most notably, the development of a claim for damages for breach of contract as a means of enforcing a jurisdiction agreement: see below. 8 H Muir Watt, ‘Injunctive Relief in the French Courts: A Case of Legal Borrowing’ [2003] CLJ 573. 9 One should perhaps speak more broadly about the comparison of the law of obligations in each State. 10 And in some cases, it seems, even if they have only agreed to non-exclusive jurisdiction: Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan [2002] EWCA Civ 1643; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 571. 11 See, eg, Sohio Supply Co v Gatoil (USA) Inc [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 588 (injunction); Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588 (injunction); Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller [2001] EWCA Civ 1755; [2002] 1 WLR 1517 (damages). 12 See, eg, The Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490 (where, as is usually the case, the English proceedings were stayed), cf The El Amria [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 119 (where a stay was refused for the reasons explained in n 19 below).

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Introduction

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but the cause of action is breach of contract and the remedies are an injunction13 or damages.14 By contrast, consider this assessment of the recent approach of the Court: [T]he Court of Justice does not appear to see the issue of jurisdiction in terms of rights, agreements, private law. It made it clear, in Gasser and Turner, that it saw the issue in terms of public law, of rules of jurisdiction which were wholly and exclusively the concern of the court whose jurisdiction had been invoked, and which were of no legitimate concern to the courts of another Contracting State. To put it another way… the Convention is to be read as containing instructions to a court which are not within the parties’ power, and over which they have no private rights.15

As the writer notes, such a view not only goes a long way to explaining the decisions in Gasser and Turner, it might also suggest that it is impossible to open up any sort of meaningful dialogue between the two models of adjudication. That would be the extreme and pessimistic view. The clash of culture may be stark, but one should not lose sight of the fact that we are, ultimately, dealing with differences of degree, or emphasis. Under the common law model, jurisdiction is not simply left to the redistributive will of the parties. Even if the fiction that a jurisdiction agreement is automatically void as an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts has long since been left behind,16 the courts nonetheless retain the ultimate power to determine when it shall be exercised. Thus, a stay of English proceedings,17 or an order restraining a party from commencing or continuing foreign proceedings,18 may be refused even in the face of the parties’ agreement to sue elsewhere if it is in the interests of the sound

13 In both cases one seeks an order restraining the breach, even if the language of an injunction tends to be confined to the restraint of the party in default by bringing foreign proceedings (the ‘anti-suit injunction’) whereas the language of a ‘stay’ is employed to describe the restraint of the party in default by bringing English proceedings. 14 See below. 15 A Briggs, above n 5, 244. 16 This is a proposition which appears not to have taken root in English law (Cowen and Mendes da Costa (1965) 43 Can Bar Rev 453, 474–476; Gienar v Meyer (1796) 2 H Bl 603; Johnson v Machielsne (1811) 3 Camp 44) and which, in any event, has long since been abandoned following the Common Law Procedure Act 1854. It did hold sway in the US until about the 1940s (Benson v Eastern Building & Loan Association 174 NY 83, 86 (1903); Carbon Black Export Inc v The SS Monrosa 254 F 2d 297 (5th Cir); The Ciamo 58 F Supp 65 (1944); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association v Cleveland Woollen Mills 82 F 508, 510 (6th Cir 1897). It was left to Chief Justice Burger, in his masterly analysis in M/S Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Company (1972) 407 US 1, 12, to expose its fictional basis: ‘No one seriously contends in this case that the forum selection clause “ousted” the District Court of jurisdiction over Zapata’s action. The threshold question is whether that court should have exercised its jurisdiction to do more than give effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties, manifested in their freely negotiated agreement, by specifically enforcing the forum clause’ (emphasis added). 17 The El Amria, above n 12. 18 Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425.

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administration of justice to do so.19 Under the Convention, the consent of the parties, and the rights to be derived therefrom, is not without significance, if only in the very existence of Article 17. The Preamble to what is now the Regulation states that: ‘The autonomy of the parties to a contract… must be respected subject to the exclusive grounds of jurisdiction laid down in this Regulation’. There is no reference to Article 27 (ex 21) so that this still merely begs the question, which lies at the heart of Gasser and Turner, of which court should be expected to respect the parties’ autonomy, and uphold their rights. Nonetheless, it is clear that under both models of adjudication there is a balance to be struck between the public law administration of justice and the private law vindication of rights. In that sense, it is hoped that this conference will look forward, as much as it looks backwards, to see if there is any way in which the balance reached within the two models might be brought a little closer together than at first sight seems possible. By way of a final preliminary observation, the comparison drawn above between the common law model of adjudication and the Convention model was quite deliberate. That is the right comparison; not one between the common law model and the civilian model, however much the original Convention and much of its current version, as well as the regulation which has replaced it,20 is based on the civilian model. As Horatia Muir Watt has pointed out,21 if the civilian tradition finds itself able to borrow, and live with, the anti-suit injunction which typifies the approach of the common law, any objections to the importation of this, and other common law devices, into the scheme of the Convention must be found in the specific architecture of the Convention. They cannot be based on a simplistic and unthinking assessment of the cultural incompatibility of the common law and the civil law. It is with that specific architecture that we must now concern ourselves. The structure of this introductory report is dictated by the topics which are to follow in the conference. It will first comment on the decisions in Gasser and Turner individually and then draw out further comment based on their collective effect. This will be followed by consideration of the decision in Owusu.

19 Usually, as in the cases above (n 17, n 18), where there is complex litigation involving other parties not bound by the jurisdiction agreement and which can only be heard in a single venue by overriding the agreement. But, even here, the possibility that damages may be awarded instead of the specific relief claimed sustains the proposition that the courts are still principally concerned with the vindication and enforcement of the parties’ rights and obligations: see below. 20 Above, n 4. 21 Above, n 8.

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Introduction

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THE GASSER CASE: THE FATE OF JURISDICTION CLAUSES IN CASE OF LIS PENDENS

Lis pendens: Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the Prior Tempore Rule 49. Thus, where there is an agreement conferring jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention…, it is incumbent on the court first seised to verify the existence of the agreement and to decline jurisdiction if it is established, in accordance with Article 17, that the parties actually agreed to designate the court second seised as having exclusive jurisdiction.

The principal issue in Gasser was simple enough. Article 21 contains the clear, simple, and some would say blunt, rule that in proceedings involving the same cause of action22 and between the same parties23 any court other than the court first seised24 shall stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established and, if established, it shall then decline jurisdiction. If there are any exceptions to the operation of this rule, and the earlier decision of the Court in Overseas Union25 was interpreted in Gasser merely to have left open this possibility without reaching any conclusion,26 a valid agreement under Article 17 is not one of them. The implications of this are fairly obvious. A party to a contract which has secured the inclusion of a jurisdiction agreement, and taken the steps necessary to ensure that it complies with the requirements of Article 17,27 has not, by so doing, ensured that it will not first find itself having to contest proceedings in the courts of another Contracting State.28 The subsequent decision of the Court in Turner has outlawed the injunction

22 See Case 144/86 Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v Palumbo [1987] ECR 4861; Case C-406/92 The Tatry [1994] ECR I-5439; Case C-111/01 Gantner Electronic GmbH v Basch Exploitatie Maatschappij BV [2003] ECR I-4207. 23 See The Tatry, above n 22; Case C-351/96 Drouot Assurances SA v Consolidated Metallurgical Industries [1998] ECR I-3075. 24 There has been an important change under the Regulation (above n 4) so that the determination of when a court is seised is no longer left entirely to the national law of the court concerned: Art 30. 25 Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co [1991] ECR I-3317. 26 Though the English courts seem persuaded that Art 16 is an exception: Speed Investments Ltd v Formula One Holdings Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1512; [2005] 1 WLR 1936 (Lugano Convention). 27 As Richard Fentiman explains in his paper, it is wrong, strictly speaking, to describe the issue in Gasser as one of competing priority between Art 21 and Art 17 because, until a decision is reached as to the validity of the jurisdiction agreement by any court, one simply does not know whether there is a valid Art 17 agreement. In that sense, the issue really is one of kompetenz-kompetenz—which court should determine the validity of the agreement; the court putatively chosen or the court first seised? That said, if is the latter, Art 21 will, in effect, have prevailed. 28 ie in situations other than those where there is a basis of jurisdiction which takes priority even over the parties’ agreement: eg, the provisions of exclusive jurisdiction in Art 16 or the special rules for consumer contracts and insurance contracts which may allow an agreement to be overridden as against the non-consumer (Art 15), or the insurer (Art 12).

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which might have ensured this, but the decision in Gasser means that the application for it could never be made. Any application must be made to the court first seised and it is an application put directly to that court to decline jurisdiction on the strength of the jurisdiction agreement. The principal argument relied upon by the Court for this interpretation of Articles 21 and 17, and a theme common to all three decisions considered at this Conference, is ‘legal certainty’: [I]t is conducive to the legal certainty sought by the Convention that, in cases of lis pendens, it should be determined clearly and precisely which of the two national courts is to establish whether it has jurisdiction under the rules of the Convention. It is clear from the wording of Article 21 of the Convention that it is for the court first seised to pronounce as to its jurisdiction, in this case in the light of a jurisdiction clause relied on before it, which must be regarded as an independent concept to be appraised solely in relation to the requirements of Article 17.29

But certainty is a flexible concept, as is all too apparent from the Opinion of Advocate-General Leger. Dare one say it, but one detects a closer adherence to the common law model of adjudication in his observation that to give priority to Article 21 undermines ‘the effectiveness of Article 17 and the legal certainty that attaches to it’.30 If the Advocate-General and the Court take a different view of the legal certainty which is more relevant, they appear to share the same view about the scope of Article 17 and yet still draw very different conclusions from it. It may be noted from the passage above that the Court appears to regard the validity of the parties’ agreement as a matter to be determined ‘solely’ in accordance with the requirements of Article 17. This can be added to what is now a relatively long line of observations,31 but not clear-cut rulings, that all issues of validity are determined by compliance with Article 17. The Advocate-General takes an even clearer line: [T]he Court’s case-law shows that an agreement conferring jurisdiction must be regarded as an independent concept.32 It follows that the formal and substantive conditions governing validity to which agreements conferring jurisdiction are subject must be assessed in the light of the requirements of Article 17 alone.33

From this same premise, two different conclusions emerge. For the Court, it means that the court second seised is in no better a position than the court first seised to determine whether the latter has jurisdiction. This leads

29

Para 51. Para 57, Opinion delivered on 9 September 2003. 31 See also Case C-106/95 MSG v Les Gravières Rhénanes Sarl [1997] ECR I-911, para 15; Case C-378 Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV [2000] ECR I-9337, para 13; Case C-159/97 Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA [1997] ECR I-1597, paras 49, 51. 32 Case C-214/89 Powell Duffryn [1992] ECR I-1745, para 14. 33 Para 78. 30

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to the conclusion that certainty demands a clear answer to which of them should do so. For the Advocate-General, it reduces the risk of inconsistent judgments as regards the validity of a jurisdiction agreement thereby allowing the court second seised to refrain from applying Article 21 in circumstances where it is ‘absolutely sure’ that it has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 17. Whatever the right conclusion to have been drawn, is not the premise false in one sense and incomplete in another? It appears false in the assertion that the formal requirements of Article 17 are a sufficient guarantee both of formal and material validity. However often this may be repeated, it singularly fails to convince. If one party alleges that his ‘agreement’ was procured by fraud, duress, misrepresentation or some other vitiating factor is it really a proper answer to say that provided it was in writing, or complied with the alternative tests in Article 17,34 there was a real consensus between the parties? If the formal requirements in Article 17 are no guarantee of the material validity of an agreement, how is it to be tested? The answer to that is not clear, if only because the Court continues to insist on avoiding it, but to the extent that it may require the identification of an applicable law, that would mean one court may well be in a better position to assess the validity of the agreement and that court will most often be the chosen court.35 The falsity of the premise that Article 17 alone may determine all aspects of the validity of a jurisdiction agreement might be avoided by extracting an autonomous definition of what it means for the parties to have ‘agreed’,36 but this will be no easy matter and it is certainly not what the Court has been referring to in its rather naïve reliance on Article 17 to date. Furthermore, it will still leave the premise incomplete. Even the Court has accepted that the construction of the parties’ agreement so as to determine whether the dispute falls within its terms,37 or which courts have in fact been chosen,38 and probably whether the agreement is exclusive or non-exclusive, is for the court seised to determine. To the extent that this involves a choice of law, and that is certainly how it is viewed in the English courts,39 the chosen

34

Effectively, course of dealing and trade custom. On the basis that the choice of the courts of a particular legal system is often accompanied by the choice of the law of the same legal system, or because, in the absence of any express choice, the choice of court will be strong evidence of an implied choice of the law of that court: Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Art 3(1). 36 See A Briggs & P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (4th edn, Lloyds of London Press, 2005), 132–133. 37 Powell Duffryn, above n 32. 38 Coreck, above n 31. 39 See Carnoustie Universal SA v International Transport Workers Federation [2002] EWHC 1624; [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 657; British Sugar plc v Fratelli Babbini di Lionello Babbini [2004] EWHC 2560; [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 332; Provini Ltd v Aventis Animal Nutrition SA [2003] EWHC 961; [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 683. 35

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court is very likely to be best placed to determine the agreement’s application.40 If there is a deeper issue about the scope of Article 17 which is hidden away in the decision in Gasser, it must be conceded that, even when identified, none of the possible answers to the relationship between Article 17 and Article 21 is free from difficulty. Those who would give priority to Article 17, whether in an unrestricted fashion or subject to the conditions imposed by Advocate-General Léger, are still left with the risk of irreconcilable judgments. Some consider the risk to be overstated,41 but while it exists it does run counter to one of the central aims of the Convention. Furthermore, what is the party who would now be able to sue in the court second seised to do about the proceedings in the court first seised? He may rely on the court first seised to declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction because of the existence of the jurisdiction agreement. Here, there seems to be a difference of opinion between the Schlosser Report42 which states that he may so rely and the Court in Gasser which seems to have formed the view that a court is only required to decline jurisdiction of its own motion, without any appearance by the defendant, where there is another Contracting State with exclusive jurisdiction under Article 16.43 According to the Court this supported its decision to give priority to Article 21.44 The implication is that an application will have to be made to the court first seised in any event, so better in the interests of certainty and efficiency to confine the application to that court. How tempting it must have been for the United Kingdom representatives to argue that this problem could be avoided by the judicious use of an anti-suit injunction,45 but with one eye on the reference to come in Turner, one assumes they did not do so. There is no mention of such an argument in the Opinion, or the Judgment. The risk of a default judgment in the court first seised is, of course, one which the ‘innocent’ party may have been happy to run.46 The ruling of the Court leaves him with no option and, of course, it comes at a price. This brings us to the second topic for discussion.

40 See J Mance, ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements and European Ideals’ (2004) 120 LQR 357, 361–362. 41 Ibid, 362. 42 1979 OJ C 59, p 124, paras 22 and 174. 43 Para 52. In the Court’s ruling there is no mention of the first para of Art 20 which may form the basis of the comment in the Schlosser Report. It states: ‘Where a defendant domiciled in one Contracting State is sued in a court of another Contracting State and does not enter an appearance, the court shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction unless its jurisdiction is derived from the provisions of this Convention.’ 44 Ibid. 45 As in Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Cia Naviera [1994] 1 WLR 588. 46 It would rather depend on the circumstances, including in particular where the ‘innocent’ party may ultimately seek to enforce any judgment in his favour. If the other party’s only assets are located in the state of the court first seised, it would be unwise in the extreme not to appear and contest jurisdiction so as to avoid a default judgment which would take priority over any other judgment by virtue of Art 27(3).

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Fraud and Abuse in Matters of Jurisdiction 53. Finally, the difficulties… stemming from delaying tactics by parties who, with the intention of delaying settlement of the substantive dispute, commence proceedings before a court which they know to lack jurisdiction by reason of the existence of a jurisdiction clause are not such as to call in question the interpretation of any provision of the Brussels Convention, as deduced from its wording and its purpose.

It should be noted that this observation of the Court which is highlighted for particular comment was made as part of the answer to the second of the questions referred to the Court by the Oberlandesgericht, ie, the relationship between Article 21 and Article 17. There was a further question referred to the Court which asked whether the fact that proceedings in a Contracting State take an unjustifiably long time (for reasons largely unconnected with the conduct of the parties) can have the consequence that the court second seised is not required to proceed in accordance with Article 21. The Court answered this third question in the negative,47 but it was a quite different question to the second, not dependent in any way on whether proceedings had been commenced in the court first seised in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, and it is not the subject of any further comment in this introduction.48 Of course, where there is a jurisdiction agreement the party in breach may have commenced proceedings in a particular court precisely because of its reputation for delay, but the delaying tactics to which the Court is referring in Paragraph 53 are those which flow simply from having commenced proceedings in a court other than that chosen by the parties. Even in courts not known for taking an excessively long time to resolve challenges to their jurisdiction, this can be sufficient to delay resolution of the substantive dispute and obtain a distinct advantage for the party in breach. To an extent the Court helped to contribute to this problem by its earlier ruling49 that there is nothing in the Convention which prevents a party from commencing proceedings for a declaration of non-liability.50 What is striking about its response in Gasser is the open acknowledgement that this is a problem. Subsequently, in the English courts, it has been rather vividly demonstrated in JP Morgan Europe Ltd v Primacom AG51 in which Cooke J entertained little doubt that proceedings were commenced in Germany

47

As did Advocate-General Léger. This is not to deny that there is an argument to come on how this ruling might stand if it may leave a court assigned under an exclusive clause, but second seised, in breach of Art 6(1) of the Human Rights Convention because it has failed to progress the suit with reasonable speed: see J Mance, above n 40, 360. 49 Case C-406/92 The Tatry [1994] ECR I-5439. 50 Something it seems which is ‘generally’ allowed in the legal systems of the Contracting States: Opinion, para 68. 51 [2005] EWHC 508. 48

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with the primary intention of seeking to frustrate any attempt to obtain appropriate relief in the English courts in accordance with an exclusive jurisdiction clause.52 The requirement imposed on him by Gasser to give precedence to proceedings brought in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement was regarded by him as ‘self-evidently’ unjust; so much so that if he had only been faced with related actions within the meaning of Article 22,53 the need to avoid that injustice would be sufficient, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, to override ‘the strong presumption’ which lies in favour of a stay of the second action.54 What adds to the sense that the delay achieved by the party in breach may amount to fraud and abuse is that, with delay, comes cost. This may be exacerbated in two ways. First, not all the legal systems of the Contracting States allow for a challenge to be made to jurisdiction before, and separate from, consideration of the merits. For example, it was expressly noted by the Court of Appeal in Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Cia Naviera SA,55 where proceedings were commenced in Greece in breach of an agreement conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts, that under the Greek rules of civil procedure a defendant is obliged to file a defence on the merits at the same time as an objection to jurisdiction.56 This was clearly thought to risk the incurring of very considerable, and unjustified, cost. One possible solution lies in the recovery of those costs, but here the problem may be exacerbated by the fact that not all of the legal systems of the Contracting States award ‘costs in the cause’. On the basis that the ruling in Gasser is here to stay, but in the clear recognition even by the Court that there is the danger of abuse, perhaps the next development is to consider how that might be alleviated. Two possible solutions are suggested. First, is it now time to consider whether to adopt, as part of the Convention scheme, and now the Regulation, a uniform procedure allowing for early and speedy resolution of any challenges to jurisdiction? The Convention is, of course, not meant to affect national procedure so that the Contracting States are free to organise the proceedings brought before their judicial authorities. But, as affirmed by the Court in Turner, they ‘must make certain that the provisions thus adopted do not

52 Ibid para 10. As Richard Fentiman points out in his paper, nine months after Cooke J declined jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the German courts was successfully challenged on the basis of the jurisdiction agreement, but a delay had been obtained and a settlement followed shortly thereafter. 53 In fact, it was its successor under the Regulation, Art 28. Cooke J had found, however, that Art 21 (now Art 27) applied and he was bound by the ruling in Gasser. 54 Above, n 51, para 66. 55 [1994] 1 WLR 588. 56 It may not be entirely accurate to say that the defendant is ‘obliged’; however, if he does not file a defence on the merits, he will find that it is too late to do so if his jurisdictional challenge fails.

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run counter to the philosophy of the Convention’.57 Might that provide the basis for further harmonisation not only of the rules of jurisdiction themselves, but how they are enforced? Second, might it lie within the power of the court chosen by the parties to effect a remedy for the recovery of costs ‘wasted’ on a successful challenge to the jurisdiction of the court first seised? The first signs that the English courts are already beginning to think along these lines have been detected, but the need and basis for such a remedy are better assessed after consideration of the Court’s ruling in Turner.58

THE TURNER CASE: THE PROHIBITION ON ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS

Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Principle of Mutual Trust 28. … In so far as the conduct for which the defendant is criticised consists in recourse to the jurisdiction of the court of another Member State, the judgment made as to the abusive nature of that conduct implies an assessment of the appropriateness of bringing proceedings before a court of another Member State. Such an assessment runs counter to the principle of mutual trust which, as pointed out in paragraphs 24 to 26 of this judgment, underpins the Convention and prohibits a court, except in special circumstances which are not applicable in this case, from reviewing the jurisdiction of the court of another Member State.

If the central theme of the ruling in Gasser was legal certainty, that which pervades the ruling in Turner, as is all too apparent from this passage, is mutual trust. So convinced was the Court as to the force of this argument that it departed from its usual approach and gave a broad answer to what had been a narrowly drafted reference. The question referred to the Court was as follows: Is it inconsistent with [the Brussels Convention] to grant restraining orders against defendants who are threatening to commence or continue legal proceedings in another Convention country when those defendants are acting in bad faith with the intent and purpose of frustrating or obstructing proceedings properly before the English courts? [emphasis added]

To which the answer provided was: The [Brussels Convention]… is to be interpreted as precluding the grant of an injunction whereby a court of a Contracting State prohibits a party to proceedings pending before it from commencing or continuing legal proceedings before a court of another Contracting State, even where that party is acting in bad faith with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings. [emphasis added] 57 Above n 2, para 37, citing its earlier ruling in Case C-365/88 Hagen [1990] ECR I-1845, para 20. 58 See below.

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The anti-suit injunction per se has been outlawed under the scheme of the Convention; the notion of bad faith and the protection of the restraining court’s proceedings are seen as but one instance of when such an order might have been made, and even that will not suffice. Accordingly, there is clearly no longer any prospect of an order restraining a party from commencing or continuing proceedings in the courts of another Contracting State brought in breach of a jurisdiction agreement,59 even if Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough thought that this issue should not have been affected by the answer to the question referred by the House of Lords.60 For now, the English courts have persuaded themselves that they still have the power to award an injunction to restrain the breach of an arbitration agreement,61 on the supposition that the existence of such an agreement takes the application outside the scope of the Convention,62 but it seems unlikely that this would survive a further reference to the Court.63 Arbitration apart, the anti-suit injunction is dead so far as proceedings in the courts of another Contracting State are concerned, and the cause of death is mutual trust. Much of the difficulty felt by English lawyers about this ruling lies in the perception that, even after the submissions made to it, the Court still did not have a full and proper appreciation of the nature of the order which has come to be known as the anti-suit injunction.64 The seeds of doubt are sown in the passage with which this part began. The judgment made in the award of an injunction does not just imply an assessment of the appropriateness of bringing proceedings before a court of another Contracting State, it makes such an assessment on an entirely express basis, but it is an assessment of the conduct of the party in question; it is not an assessment of the court. It would be quite wrong to suggest that this distinction, based on the in personam nature of the injunction, was entirely lost on the Court, or Advocate-General Colomber. Nevertheless, while the latter conceded that such an analysis was ‘formally correct’, he thought it ‘undeniable’ that ‘as a result of a litigant being prohibited, under a threat of a penalty, from pursuing an action before a given judicial authority, the latter is being deprived of jurisdiction to deal with the case, and the result is direct

59 Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Cia Naviera [1994] 1 WLR 588 and the cases which have followed it may therefore no longer be relied upon. 60 Turner v Grovit [2002] 1 WLR 107, para [40]. 61 Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association (Eurasia) Ltd v New India Assurance Association Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1598; [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 67; West Tankers Inc v Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA [2005] EWHC 454; [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 257. 62 Art 1. 63 See A Briggs, ‘Anti-suit Injunctions and Utopian Ideals,’ (2004) 121 LQR 529, 531. The House of Lords has subsequently referred this question to the European Court of Justice: [2007] UKHL 4. 64 For a debate as to the correctness of the terminology, see Lord Hobhouse, above n 60, at para [23]. Cf A Briggs, ‘Decisions of British Courts During 2001,’ The British Yearbook of International Law 2001, 438.

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interference with its unfettered jurisdictional authority’.65 There is no sense in which, merely by awarding the injunction, an English court deprives another of its jurisdiction. What happens after the injunction has been awarded is a matter for the party to whom it is addressed. If he continues with the proceedings in the courts of another Contracting State, he will be in contempt of the English courts and subject to penalties before them, but there is nothing in the order itself which will prevent the proceedings from continuing.66 It may, of course, be different if an attempt is made to have the injunction recognised and enforced by the courts of another Contracting State, but that is another matter which is dealt with below. AdvocateGeneral Colomber is perhaps on safer ground when he describes the distinction between an order in personam addressed to a litigant and an order addressed to a foreign court as a ‘very fine one’,67 but it is a crucial distinction nonetheless. It is also right to remind the Court68 that it was happy to accept this distinction as the basis for its decision in Webb69 that the in personam claim by a beneficiary against a resulting trustee for an order to convey the land does not have as its object a right in rem in the land in question for the purpose of Article 16(1).

Relationship between European Rules on Jurisdiction and Domestic Rules on Procedure 29. Even if it were assumed, as has been contended, that an injunction could be regarded as a measure of a procedural nature intended to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings pending before the court which issues it, and therefore as being a matter of national law alone, it need merely be borne in mind that the application of national procedural rules may not impair the effectiveness of the Convention . . .

The key to this passage would seem to lie in the assessment that, even if procedural in nature,70 the grant of an anti-suit injunction would impair the effectiveness of the Convention. It is in the assessment of this 65

Para 34, Opinion, 20 November 2003. It is perhaps in the peremptory dismissal of the argument about the true nature of an anti-suit injunction that one sees the starkest contrast between the private law model of adjudication as practised in English law and the public law model embodied in the approach of the Court. 67 GA Bermann, ‘The use of anti-suit injunction in international litigation’ (1990) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol 28, 630–631; Peck v Jennes 48 US (7 How), 612, 624–625. 68 As does Briggs, above n 5. 69 Case C-294/92 Webb v Webb [1994] ECR I-1717. 70 The assessment of Lord Hobhouse in Turner that the injunction is intended to protect the integrity of the English proceedings does not wholly convince and was, perhaps, given added prominence in the hope of securing a more favourable ruling. There are types of proceedings where, in reality, it is the integrity of those proceedings which is under threat, eg, proceedings for a winding-up (see A Briggs & P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (4th edn, Lloyds of London Press, 2005) 432). In cases like Turner, however, the real concern is 66

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impairment on practical grounds, rather than in notions of mutual trust, that the Court may establish a more cogent basis for the outlawing of the anti-suit injunction. In the paragraph immediately following, it identified this problem: [I]t is liable to give rise to situations involving conflicts for which the Convention contains no rules. The possibility cannot be excluded that, even if an injunction had been issued in one Contracting State, a decision might nevertheless be given by a court of another Contracting State. Similarly, the possibility cannot be excluded that the courts of two Contracting States that allowed such measures might issue contradictory injunctions.

Even those highly critical of the ruling in Turner are forced to concede that ‘the problems of irreconcilable judgments which risked being summoned into existence, if a foreign court heard the claim on the merits and the English court ordered an injunction, were not insignificant’.71 There are a number of situations that would occur if Turner had been decided differently. If the court in the other Contracting State did proceed to a judgment on the merits, would the English court be obliged to recognise and enforce that judgment at the same time as holding the judgment creditor in contempt for having so obtained it? It seems inconceivable that it would do so and the solution would be to withhold recognition of the judgment on the grounds of public policy.72 Advocate-General Colomber would again appear to betray a lack of true understanding of the nature of an anti-suit injunction when he suggests73 that public policy would not be available in such a case because of the bar against using that defence to review the jurisdiction of the judgment court.74 As explained above, there is no review of the jurisdiction of another court in the granting of an injunction and no further review would be involved in regarding a breach of the court’s order as sufficient to trigger the defence of public policy. The judgment creditor is free to enforce his judgment anywhere else in the EU, but not in the English courts because of the wrong found to have been committed by him. More difficult would have been the situation if an attempt was made to ‘export’ the injunction, in particular to the court of another Contracting State hearing the claim on the merits. Would that court be required to recognise the English court’s order? Perhaps the answer is that it would be, but there would be no means by which it could be enforced because of the absence of the procedure for contempt by which the English courts back up

with the wrong done by the defendant which can only indirectly be said to frustrate or obstruct the proceedings before the English courts. 71 Briggs & Rees, ibid, 437. 72 Art 27(1). 73 Opinion, para 36. 74 Art 28, para 3.

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their own orders.75 Any attempt to export such means by first issuing a penalty in the English courts would surely fail on the basis that such a penalty is no ‘civil and commercial matter’. In this way the effect of the injunction might have been confined to the process of the English courts, which is consistent with the arguments put to the Court for its compatibility with the Convention. But this is all hypothesis, none of which will now come to pass, because whatever steps an English court might wish to take to sanction the wrongful conduct of the defendant, it must not now involve the use of an injunction. What then might be left? Ideally, something which takes account of the fact that certainty (Gasser) and trust (Turner) come at a cost to the claimant, who is obliged to take his challenge to the court before whom he should not have had to appear, but which does not interfere directly or indirectly with the scheme of the Convention as it is understood by the Court. An intriguing possibility has begun to emerge in some recent decisions of the English courts outside the scheme of the Convention. At least where the claimant is able to invoke a legal right not to be sued abroad, ie, the breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement,76 he may make a claim for damages representing the loss which flows from the breach. The prospect of such a claim has been approved in principle at the highest level77 and the Court of Appeal in Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller78 found it sufficiently arguable not to have been struck out as disclosing no cause of action. There may be formidable obstacles in the prosecution of such a claim.79 In simple cases, as exemplified by Zoller, the claimant may successfully have challenged the jurisdiction of the foreign court and can point to a fairly definite and assessable loss in the form of his wasted costs.80 But what if his claim is unsuccessful and he goes on to lose on the merits, or even to win, but less successfully than he would have done in the chosen court? How is his loss to be measured, and what is the effect, if any, of the 75 Cf H Muir Watt, ‘Injunctive Relief in the French Courts: A Case of Legal Borrowing’ [2003] CLJ 573. 76 Though there seems no reason why this might not be extended to cover the equitable wrong committed when the defendant commences proceedings abroad unconscionably so as to vex or oppress the claimant: see Briggs & Rees, above n 70, 449. 77 Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425, at [36] per Lord Bingham of Cornhill, [48] per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, [75] per Lord Scott of Foscote. 78 [2001] EWCA Civ 1755; [2002] 1 WLR 1517. See also: A/S D/S Svendborg v Akar [2003] EWHC 797 (Comm). 79 For further discussion, see E Peel, ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements: Purity and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws [1998] LMCLQ 182, 224-226; D Tan & N Yeo, ‘Breaking Promises to Litigate in a Particular Forum: Are Damages an Appropriate Remedy?’ [2003] LMCLQ 435; C-H Tham, ‘Damages for Breach of English Jurisdiction Clauses: More than Meets the Eye’ [2004] LMCLQ 46. 80 Subject to any recovery of costs from the foreign court (but the fact that the foreign court allows some recovery might of itself cause complications: Zoller, above n 78, at [36] per Schiemann LJ).

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finding of the foreign court that proceedings should continue because the jurisdiction agreement does not deprive it of its jurisdiction? This latter difficulty may be thought particularly acute if this development is extended to cover proceedings in a Contracting State brought, in the eyes of the English court, in breach of contract. The decision in Turner (backed up by Gasser in cases where the chosen court is second seised) requires the claimant to appear in the foreign court and persuade it to decline jurisdiction. If successful, of course, he may then commence proceedings in England free from the constraints of Article 21 and, by analogy with Zoller, he may pursue a claim by way of damages for loss suffered in having been wrongfully required to make his case for suit in England other than in England. But what if the foreign court has not been persuaded that there is a jurisdiction agreement which prevents it from exercising jurisdiction? On one view that must be the end of the matter. By dint of the automatic procedure for recognition, the foreign court’s ruling is the res judicata which estops the English court from reaching a finding that there has been any breach of contract.81 It has, however, been argued that this may be too simplistic.82 All that the foreign court may have decided is that there was not sufficient evidence to persuade it not to hear the case; that does not necessarily involve any finding about the underlying obligation created between the parties. The beauty of this argument is the way that it can be seen to accommodate the clash which was noted at the outset between the private law model of adjudication exemplified by the common law and the public law model exemplified by the Court’s interpretations in Gasser and Turner; when one looks at a jurisdiction agreement, one has to separate the ‘jurisdiction’ from the ‘agreement’. The irony is that while an award of damages might avoid the appearance of interfering with the jurisdiction of another court, which is associated with an anti-suit injunction, it is highly unlikely to be attractive within the scheme of the Convention. This is precisely because, unlike the anti-suit injunction and its effects, it cannot be confined to the internal process of the English courts. Any damages awarded might be inconsistent with the judgment of the other court (eg, where the foreign court proceeds to a judgment on the merits, but the English courts are persuaded that a different outcome would have resulted if the defendant had performed his contract and the case had been heard in England) and, as a judgment in a civil and commercial matter, it would have to be recognised and enforced

81 Unless it might be denied recognition on the grounds of public policy: see JP Morgan Europe Ltd v Primacom AG [2005] EWHC 508, para [48]. 82 A Briggs, above n 5, 257–258.

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in the courts of other Contracting States.83 But this may be what the European Court has wrought since the creativity of the common law and its adherence to a private law model of adjudication will not easily be subjugated.

THE OWUSU CASE: THE REJECTION OF ‘FORUM NON CONVENIENS’

The three passages which have been extracted from the judgment of the Court for particular comment essentially represent the principal reasons given by the Court for rejecting the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to regulate jurisdiction between the courts of a Contracting State and the courts of a non-Contracting State: (1) no exception on the basis of forum non conveniens was provided for on the accession of the United Kingdom in 1978; (2) the operation of the Convention would be rendered too uncertain; in particular, both defendants and claimants should be able to predict with reasonable certainty where the case between them may be heard; and (3) since the doctrine of forum non conveniens is recognised only in a limited number of Contracting States, to allow it to operate in cases like Owusu would affect the uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction contained therein. They are all concerned therefore with the second part of the Court’s judgment. In the first part, the Court rejected a submission that the Convention, and Article 2 in particular, had no application at all on the basis that a necessary intra-Community element was missing. There are some who see in this a grim portent of things to come in the further development of a European private international law,84 but that is a debate for another time. On the assumption that Article 2 did apply in the first instance, what of the conclusion that this left no room for the doctrine of forum non conveniens?

The Mandatory Nature of Article 2 and Derogation from the Rule It Lays Down 37. … Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory in nature and that, according to its terms, there can be no derogation from the principle it lays down except in the cases expressly provided for by the Convention.

This passage reads very much like a bald assertion. In the same paragraph the Court goes on to note that it is ‘common ground’ that no exception on 83 Subject to the defence that the judgment of the other court has already been recognised: see Art 34(4) of the Regulation. Curiously, in the Convention, this defence was only said to apply to the earlier recognition of inconsistent judgments from non-Contracting States: Art 27(5). 84 A Briggs, ‘The Death of Harrods: Forum Non Conveniens and the European Court’ (2005) 121 LQR 535.

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the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine was provided upon the accession of the United Kingdom and Ireland. This is, at best, inconclusive. Need anything have been included in the Convention about how to regulate jurisdiction as between the courts of the Contracting States and the courts of a non-Contracting State? Article 2 is mandatory in the sense that it shall be applied subject only to the other bases of jurisdiction in the Convention, but what is not clear is whether that is only true where the choice is between the courts designated by Article 2 and the courts of another Contracting State. In short, the real issue is the scope of the Convention and, on that, there is no clear answer in either the text of the Convention or the Schlosser Report.85 It is submitted that greater weight should be placed on the other reasons relied upon by the Court for its ruling.

The Principle of Legal Certainty and Forum Non Conveniens 38. Respect for the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives of the Brussels Convention… would not be fully guaranteed if the court having jurisdiction under the Convention had to be allowed to apply the forum non conveniens doctrine.

It is clear from the paragraphs which follow this passage that the principle of legal certainty is not to be seen in isolation, but as a means of facilitating the ‘legal protection of persons established’ in the EU. So, let us consider the persons involved. There is much concern in the reasoning of the Court with the position of the claimant. He must be assured that, if the jurisdiction of a court of a Contracting State is invoked it will be exercised, subject only to the exceptions or restrictions laid down in the Convention itself. This seems a curious inversion of the natural order of the Convention which is to be concerned with the position of the defendant, and not the claimant. If there is any concern in the Convention for the protection of the claimant, it is only in circumstances where the claimant may be thought to occupy a vulnerable position such that additional jurisdictional options are made available.86 There is nothing in the operation of forum non conveniens in cases like Owusu, or the earlier Harrods decision,87 which seeks to undermine this special protection since such additional optional bases of initial jurisdiction are still available and, if invoked, they may be taken into account in determining whether or not to exercise the power to stay

85 See further, E Peel, ‘Forum Non Conveniens and European Ideals’ [2005] LMCLQ 363, 367–370. 86 eg such as those made available to consumers (Arts 13–15) and the insured (Arts 8–12). 87 In Re Harrods (Buenos Aries) Ltd [1992] Ch 72.

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proceedings.88 Beyond these categories of the potentially vulnerable, the Convention exhibits no obvious concern with the plight of the claimant.89 That said, it has been pointed out to telling effect that Owusu did not perhaps represent the ideal case in which to refer to the Court the issue of the compatibility of forum non conveniens with the scheme of the Convention.90 The prospect of the tetraplegic Mr Owusu being sent to Jamaica eight years after he was first injured may have exerted some influence over the Court.91 Under the Convention, it is clear that the claimant does not enjoy a guaranteed choice of forum. In an earlier ruling, the European Court could find nothing wrong in a party commencing proceedings for a declaration of non-liability so as to ensure that the ‘defendant’s’ preferred forum was first seised for the purposes of Article 21.92 In this sense, it may be more accurate to say that what the claimant may be entitled to expect is that, if the courts of one or other of the Contracting States has jurisdiction, he will not be sent away from the EU altogether. This is, ultimately, an argument that he should not lose the benefit of a Convention judgment. It is an observable fact that it is easier to enforce a judgment under Title III of the Convention than it is under the national law of the Contracting States,93 but this might just as easily be regarded as a relevant factor94 in the exercise of the court’s discretion, rather than as a basis for its elimination.95 If the Court was right to be as concerned as it clearly was with the position of the claimant, it may be noted that the claimant in Owusu was

88 P Kaye, ‘The EEC Judgments Convention and the Outer World: Goodbye to Forum Non Conveniens’ [1991] Journal of Business Law 47. 89 The re Harrods decision has been castigated on the basis that the Convention ‘also takes the legitimate interests of the plaintiff into consideration… [and] guarantee[s] the plaintiff’s right to seek justice by recourse to the courts’: Geimer, (1992) ‘The Right of Access to the Courts under the Brussels Convention’ in Tebbens, Kohler & Kennedy (eds), Civil Jurisdiction & Judgments in Europe, 39. There is no textual basis or policy consideration advanced in support of this. 90 See A Briggs, ‘The Death Of Harrods: Forum Non Conveniens and The European Court’ 121 LQR 535, where further consideration is given to the question of whether the context of individual cases may have had a profound influence on the development of common law doctrine in England and Australia. 91 Perhaps if the ruling had been that a discretion was still available, the Court of Appeal might have been inclined not to stay this particular case on the basis that the additional delay represented a change of circumstance which would make it unjust to do so. 92 Case C-406/92 The Tatry [1994] ECR I-5439. 93 A judgment from a non-Contracting State court falls outside the enforcement regime in the Convention (and stays outside, notwithstanding any subsequent recognition by the court of a Contracting State under its national law: Case C-129/92 Owens Bank v Bracco [1994] ECR I-117). It can only be enforced under the national law of each of the Contracting States. 94 Even this may be said to go too far for assuming what it sets out to prove: since the issue is whether the proceedings should be heard in England in the first place, the loss of the benefit of an English judgment may be criticised as an attempt by the claimant to pull himself up by his own bootstraps. 95 International Credit and Investment Co (Overseas) Ltd v Adham [1999] ILPr 302.

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domiciled in England and the emphasis throughout is on the intention of the Convention to ‘strengthen in the Community the legal protection of persons therein established’.96 Does that mean forum non conveniens is still available in proceedings commenced by a non-EU claimant against a defendant domiciled in the EU, pursuant to Article 2?97 Unattractive and Euro-centric though it may be,98 it would be no great surprise to see such a distinction between local and foreign claimants being invoked, at least before the English courts. Turning from the claimant, what then of ‘our normally well-informed defendant’ who must be able ‘reasonably to foresee before which courts, other than those of the state in which he is domiciled, he may be sued’?99 In this regard the greatest consternation100 has been caused by Paragraph 42 of the judgment in Owusu and the Court’s assessment that, if forum non conveniens was available, the defendant would be deprived of his reasonable foresight. Quite simply, he would not. It is for the defendant to make the application to the court for a stay; it is not for the court to consider it of its own motion. Any defendant who might have wished to make such an application is now no longer able to do so and one view of the ruling in Owusu is that it has sanctioned a degree101 of forum shopping against defendants domiciled in the Contracting States.102 One is not left entirely persuaded by the Court’s emphasis on legal certainty which appears to be based in part on a misunderstanding of the true nature of an application to stay proceedings. As a consequence, the arguments for legal certainty seem all to be on the side of the claimant. Perhaps the argument that there is a benefit here on the other side is not for the defendant in any particular case, but for the greater good of defendants generally. Today’s defendant is tomorrow’s counter-party to a 96

Preamble to the Convention (emphasis added). See para 39 of the Court’s judgment. Contrary to some interpretations, the decision of the ECJ in Case C-412/98 Universal General Insurance Co v Group Josi Reinsurance Co SA [2000] ECR I-5925 does not affect the courts’ power to stay proceedings in such circumstances. It merely confirmed that the Convention rules (as opposed to national law) for establishing jurisdiction must be applied where the defendant is domiciled in a Contracting State, regardless of the domicile of the claimant. It said nothing about whether the courts are bound to exercise such jurisdiction. It might be argued that the ruling in Group Josi affirms the mandatory application of Title II when the conditions for its application are satisfied, ie, when the defendant is domiciled in a Contracting State, and that this implies that such jurisdiction must be exercised. It cannot be put any higher than that. See R Fentiman, ‘Stays and the European Conventions—EndGame?’ [2001] CLJ 10. 98 R Fentiman, ‘Jurisdiction, Discretion and the Brussels Convention’ (1993) 26 Cornell Int. Law Journal 59, at 93. 99 Para 40. 100 See A Briggs, above n 5 and ch 6 of the present volume, below. 101 One must speak in terms of degree since the bases of jurisdiction laid down in Title II are intended themselves to give effect to a degree of forum conveniens. 102 It is assumed that, in proceedings commenced against non-EU domiciled defendants under Art 4, the English courts retain a power to stay their proceedings, but for an argument that the ruling in Owusu might imply that it should be lost even here, see A Briggs, above n 5, 251. 97

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transaction which, if it does not go smoothly, may end up before the courts. Each of the parties103 needs to be assured that the jurisdiction of the courts of their preferred choice, if available and invoked, will be exercised. With this assurance in place, they will be encouraged to conduct the business at hand and contribute to the effective operation of the internal market; a theme which underpins, and perhaps dominates, the reasoning of the Court, such as it is. If this is the argument to be made on the ‘defendant-side’, I am reminded of a less than kindly dentist whose best attempts at soothing words for the terrified child before him was to point out that ‘you may not like this, but it really is for your own good’.

Sources of the Potential Alteration to the European Rules on Jurisdiction: Domestic Law or EC Law ? 43. …[A]llowing forum non conveniens in the context of the Brussels Convention would be likely to affect the uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction contained therein in so far as that doctrine is recognised only in a limited number of Contracting States, whereas the objective of the Brussels Convention is precisely to lay down common rules to the exclusion of derogating national rules.

In this passage one sees the opportunity to debate the extent to which some means may be found to regulate jurisdiction between the courts of a Contracting State and the courts of a non-Contracting State. Since no doctrine, or device, for so regulating is applied uniformly by the Contracting States, this passage should be interpreted as rejecting any solution based on national law and not merely forum non conveniens. While happy to reject one solution, one is left with a profound sense of disappointment104 that the Court did not find it necessary to answer the second question referred to it. This asked if there were at least some circumstances when it might not be inconsistent with the Convention to decline to exercise jurisdiction in favour of the courts of a non-Contracting State. The Court did however give some indication of when this might be possible, by observing that the second question was asked in connection with cases where there were identical or related proceedings pending before a court of a non-Contracting State, a

103 Since the application for a declaration of non-liability has been sanctioned as a legitimate tactic (see n 49 above), no assumption can be made about which of the parties might end up as claimant and which as defendant. 104 But no sense of surprise once the Court decided that it was unnecessary to resolve the issue in Owusu: Case C-314/96 Djabali [1998] ECR I-1149, para 19; Case C-318/00 Barcadi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins [2003] ECR I-905, para 42, and Joined Cases C-480/00 to C-482/00, C-484/00, C-489/00 to C-491/00 and C-497/00 to C-499/00 Azienda Agricola Ettore Ribaldi and Others [2004] ECR 1-2943, para 72.

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convention105 granting jurisdiction to such a court or a connection with that State of the same type as those referred to in Article 16106 of the Brussels Convention.107

In short, the exercise of a Convention jurisdiction might be declined where rules equivalent to those in Article 16 (exclusive jursidiction), Article 17 (choice of court agreements) and Article 21 (lis alibi pendens) pointed to the courts of a non-Contracting State. The idea of turning around certain of the jurisdictional rules of the Convention and pointing them at proceedings, or potential proceedings, in non-Contracting States was first suggested by Droz108 who referred to it as l’effet reflexive des competences exclusifs.109 Enough has been said to demonstrate that any so-called reflexive effect of the rules of the Convention cannot involve a full reflection, shorn of the safeguards which underpin the operation of the rules as between the Contracting States.110 But a partial reflection is certainly possible; one where the rules in Articles 16, 17 and 21 determine the scope of those areas in which jurisdiction may be declined, but not how and when this might happen. The obvious solution to the latter is to allow the operation of national law; indeed, this seems to be the practice of the English courts even post-Owusu so far as exclusive jurisdiction agreements in favour of the courts of nonContracting States are concerned.111 This may be viewed as a rather attractive compromise, though it almost certainly requires amendments to what is now the Regulation to provide the necessary textual basis. A degree of uniformity will have been achieved in the delineation of the circumstances when jurisdiction might be declined and it has been noted that such a limited form of discretion is not

105

Here, it seems clear that the Court is referring to an agreement of the parties. Now Art 22 of the Regulation. 107 Para 48. 108 G Droz, Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le marché commun (Paris 1972), paras 164–169, 204. See also: Guademet-Tallon, Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe (3rd edn, 2002); Loussouarn, Bourel & Vareilles-Sommières, Droit international privé (8th edn, 2004), para 485-1. 109 In its initial conception, the ‘reflexive effect’ was concerned with the ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction conferred by Arts 16 and 17 but, as indicated by the observation of the Court in para 48, it is now found associated with Art 21 as well: see A Briggs, ‘Forum Non Conveniens and Ideal Europeans’ [2005] LMCLQ 378, 380. 110 E Peel, ‘Forum Non Conveniens and European Ideals’ (2005) LMCLQ 363, 375-377; A Briggs, ibid. 111 Konkola Copper Mines Inc v Coromin [2005] EWHC 898 (Comm); [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 555, paras [74]–[101]; not appealed on this issue: [2006] EWCA Civ 5 (a stay was not granted because there was ‘strong reason’ not to so order). Even Schlosser in his Report (1979 OJ C 59, p 124, para 176) and the ECJ itself (Case C-387/98 Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV [2000] ECR I-9337) seem to support this approach to exclusive jurisdiction agreements in favour of the courts of non-Contracting States. 106

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altogether alien to other of the Contracting States.112 It is too late to re-visit the circumstances of Owusu. It is in the assessment of this more limited recourse to forum non conveniens that this conference might adopt a constructive approach which looks to the future.

112 A Briggs, above n 109. Perhaps one could be forgiven the parochial observation that this may amount to allowing some states to apply their national law to regulate jurisdiction between the courts of Contracting and non-Contracting States, but not the United Kingdom.

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1 Parallel Proceedings and Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe RICHARD FENTIMAN FELLOW OF QUEENS’ COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 49. Thus, where there is an agreement conferring jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention…, it is incumbent on the court first seised to verify the existence of the agreement and to decline jurisdiction if it is established, in accordance with Article 17, that the parties actually agreed to designate the court second seised as having exclusive jurisdiction. ECJ, 9 December 2003, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl (Case C-116/02) 49. Ainsi, en présence d’une clause attributive de juridiction, au sens de l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles… il incombe au premier juge saisi de vérifier l’existence de la clause et de se dessaisir, s’il est établi, selon les termes de l’article 17, que les parties ont effectivement convenu de désigner le tribunal saisi en second lieu comme exclusivement compétent. CJCE, 9 décembre 2003, Erich Gasser GmbH c MISAT Srl (Aff C-116/02).

INTRODUCTION

In JP Morgan Ltd v Primacom AG,1 Clarke J bowed to the inevitable. Several banks, acting through JP Morgan as agent, had lent substantial sums to Primacom, a German company. The loan agreement was subject to English law, and provided unambiguously that any disputes between the parties were to be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. Having failed to make two successive interest payments, Primacom initiated proceedings in Germany, for a declaration that it owed no interest. JP Morgan responded by initiating proceedings on the banks’ behalf in the English courts, pursuant to the jurisdiction agreement, in part for a declaration that interest was payable. It was clear that both actions turned on Primacom’s obligation to pay interest, and that those in Germany were initiated first. Article 27 of 1

[2005] EWHC 508 (Comm).

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Regulation 44/20012 was thus engaged, apparently requiring the English court, as the court second seised, to stay its proceedings, pending the outcome of the inevitable jurisdictional dispute in Germany. The only question was whether the English court was competent nonetheless under Article 23, given the jurisdiction agreement. But, since the decision of the Court of Justice in Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl,3 the answer was clear. Given that Article 27 applied, the express submission to English jurisdiction was irrelevant. The court second seised must stay its proceedings, even if it considers that it has jurisdiction under Article 23. Indeed, Article 27 forbids it from considering that issue at all. Only if the first court declines jurisdiction, because it recognises that the contractual forum has jurisdiction under Article 23, may the claim in the contractual forum proceed. For several reasons, the banks in Primacom must have thought themselves the victims of a cruel combination of circumstances—though after Gasser their predicament may be all too common. First, it is hard to see how the jurisdiction agreement could have been clearer. Unambiguously exclusive in effect, it clearly contemplated that all disputes between the parties were to be determined in England. It was perhaps unsurprising that the German courts eventually said as much, and declined jurisdiction—but only after the bank’s right to sue in England was suspended for several months. Secondly, Primacom had sought a negative declaration in Germany, thereby exploiting the tactical possibilities of such relief in the European context. As the Court of Justice has established, a defaulting party, lacking a positive claim, may always shelter behind Article 27, merely by claiming in its preferred forum that it is not liable for any wrong of which it might be accused.4 In the scheme of Article 27, a desire not to be sued is effectively a cause of action. Thirdly, although they had sued in Germany, it is not apparent that Primacom had any grounds for objecting to the English court’s exclusive jurisdiction. It is telling that Primacom’s counsel in the Commercial court seemed unable to identify any reason why the jurisdiction agreement was ineffective,5 and that the German court eventually upheld it. As this suggests, a party may obstruct proceedings in a contractually agreed court without having any substantial reason for doubting the effectiveness of 2 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1. 3 Case C-116/02 [2003] ECR I-14693; Fentiman, ‘Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl’ (2005) 42 CMLR 241. ‘Jurisdiction Agreements and Forum Shopping in Europe’ (2006) Jl Int Banking and Financial L 304; Mance, ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements and European Ideals’ (2004) 120 LQR 357; see generally Merrett, ‘The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements Within the Brussels Regime’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 315. 4 Case C-406/92 The Tatry [1994] ECR I-1517 (ECJ); Fentiman, ‘Tactical Declarations and the Brussels Convention’ [1995] 54 CLJ 261. 5 [2005] EWHC 508 (Comm), para 34.

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that agreement. Article 27 engages immediately the first court is seised, whether or not there are grounds for disputing the agreement. The ruse may eventually be exposed, when the first court declines jurisdiction and upholds the agreement. But the defaulting party will still have succeeded in delaying (and perhaps preventing) proceedings in the agreed court. Fourthly, German procedural law (in common with that of many civilian systems), allowed the banks no opportunity to mount a preliminary challenge to the German court’s jurisdiction, in advance of a hearing on the merits. This postponed examination of Primacom’s invocation of German jurisdiction. But it also exposed the banks to the costs of preparing a defence to Primacom’s substantive claim that interest was not payable. Yet such costs were inevitably wasted (and were always likely to be wasted), given the existence of the English jurisdiction agreement. Legal systems may legitimately manage disputes in the manner they consider appropriate. But the effect of such a process is inevitably to underwrite Article 27’s role as an instrument of obstruction and delay. Fifthly, whatever the strength of their case, the banks were placed in a position in which compromise must have seemed the best-worst option. Certainly, it is revealing that the parties appear to have settled once the German court had declined jurisdiction, and confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the English court. One seldom knows why and on what terms such settlements are achieved. But it is all too likely that a party in the position of the banks in Primacom will compromise even if the court first seised declines jurisdiction. Presented with an inevitable delay in pursuing its claim, and exposed to the costs of unwelcome litigation in the first court, any unwillingness to commence proceedings afresh in the agreed court is understandable. None could doubt that the decision in Primacom was inevitable in the light of Gasser. Yet none could deny that something here seems amiss. But what exactly is wrong? Is Gasser itself a flawed decision, or is the architecture of the Brussels regime at fault? If Gasser (or the regime) needs correction, how should this be done?

RELATED MATTERS

Before addressing these issues, two intimately related matters must be noted, though not explored. Gasser and Primacom concern a particular aspect of the problem of parallel proceedings in Europe. Where Article 27 is engaged, may the courts of another Member State entertain proceedings if it is alleged that they have jurisdiction under Article 23? But this is but one facet of the problem of regulating parallel proceedings where one court is already seised, and another is said to have exclusive jurisdiction. It is important to register that difficulty may arise in two other cases: first, where the basis of the second court’s exclusive jurisdiction is Article 22

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(perhaps because the dispute concerns property rights subject to that court’s exclusive jurisdiction); and, secondly, where the first court is seised under Article 28, not Article 27 (where the actions in each court are related, not identical, as Article 27 requires). It is a matter of speculation how the issues arising in such cases might be resolved. It has long been supposed that the court second seised may consider and assert its jurisdiction under Article 22.6 One reason is that the risk of irreconcilable judgments in such a case is minimal, given that both courts are likely to agree that the relatively straightforward grounds for engaging Article 22 are satisfied. The architecture of the Brussels regime also suggests a conceptual difference between Articles 22 and 23,7 which is reflected in suggestions in a leading case that parallel proceedings under Article 22 may be justified.8 But in Gasser Advocate-General Léger equated the practical operation of each provision. He argued that irreconcilable judgments may be no more (and no less) likely to arise in cases under Article 16 of the Brussels Convention (Article 22 of the Regulation), as under Article 17 (now Article 23). Again, the preoccupation of the Court of Justice in Gasser with the risk of parallel proceedings suggests that Article 22 may be qualified by Article 27 as much as Article 23.9 Since Gasser, therefore, it is uncertain whether even Article 22 transcends Article 27. And what if the first court is seised under Article 28? Suppose that X sues Y in Italy for damages for breach of contract pursuant to Article 2 (the defendant being an Italian domiciliary). Y replies by suing X in Austria under Article 23 for non-payment for the goods supplied. The actions are related, not identical, so Article 28 applies, not Article 27. Gasser presumably entails that Article 28 applies in such a case. It is not ousted by the claim under Article 23. But the Austrian court then has discretion whether or not to stay its proceedings. Gasser may suggest how that discretion should be exercised. It may signal that the avoidance of parallel proceedings overrides any arguments for enforcing the jurisdiction agreement. Alternatively, Gasser may imply nothing about Article 28. Certainly, it did not concern Article 28. Might the Austrian court then refuse to exercise its discretion to stay, on the ground that the jurisdiction agreement should be upheld? Cooke J in Primacom indicated that he would not have stayed the proceedings in that case, had they arisen under Article 28.10 But it is uncertain whether this can be correct.

6 Suggested (but not decided) by C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance v New Hampshire Insurance [1991] ECR I-3317, paras 20–26. 7 Fentiman, ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction and Article 17’ in Fentiman, Nuyts and Watté (eds), The European Judicial Area in Civil and Commercial Matters (1999), at 127. 8 C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance v New Hampshire Insurance [1991] ECR I-3317. 9 Judgment, para 48; Mance, n 3, at 360–361. 10 [2005] EWHC 508 (Comm), para 61.

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The difficulties surrounding Articles 22 and 28 are not the subject of the following remarks, which concern only the fact situation presented by Gasser and Primacom. It is important, however, to be aware of the broader context—not least because an examination of Gasser and Primacom may suggest how those broader questions might be answered.

MISCONCEPTIONS

Before proceeding, some misconceptions must also be addressed. It is all too easy to mistake the problems Gasser exposes. First, we cannot approach such cases as if the jurisdiction agreement is self-evidently valid and exclusive in effect. Cases such as Gasser arise before that can be known. They concern which court is entitled to answer that question. They concern not jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute, but the issue of competence-competence, jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. They concern which court is entitled to determine the validity and effect of an alleged jurisdiction agreement. Secondly, for similar reasons, the question is not whether Article 27 trumps Article 23. It clearly does not. In such cases, the potential defendant’s pre-emptive strike occurs before any court has determined the effect of the jurisdiction agreement, and thus whether Article 23 is engaged at all. Certainly, the courts of a Member State are obliged to decline jurisdiction if they consider that the courts of another Member State have exclusive jurisdiction under Article 23, as the very concept of exclusive jurisdiction entails.11 question in such cases is whether the court first seised under Article 27 has exclusive responsibility for determining the effect of the jurisdiction agreement, such that proceedings in the contractual forum are precluded. Thirdly, as this suggests, Gasser does not prize the avoidance of parallel proceedings above party autonomy. It certainly ensures that two courts may not concurrently address whether each has jurisdiction. But, in doing so, it merely ensures that the court first seised has priority in addressing whether Article 23 applies at all. And, in doing so, it contemplates that the first court will, if necessary, give effect to Article 23 and the principle of party autonomy which it embodies. Fourthly, the outcome in Gasser is not anomalous because it tolerates proceedings in a non-contractual forum. It is not singular because the court first seised is permitted to determine its own jurisdiction, even if that turns upon whether a jurisdiction agreement in favour of another court is effective. Nor is it odd because it allows one party to test the agreement’s effect in a non-contractual forum. All this would be true outside the 11 Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, n 3, Opinion, para 60; Schlosser Report on the amended Brussels Convention [1979] OJ C59/71, para 22.

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European regime if, say, one party sued in England in breach of a New York jurisdiction agreement. There can also be legitimate reasons to doubt the effectiveness of any jurisdiction agreement, though these may be few where the agreement is as unequivocal as it was in Primacom. Rather, what is anomalous about such cases is that Article 27 prevents a party, surprised by pre-emptive proceedings, from initiating proceedings in the named court. The crux is what Gasser means for the named court’s competence, not that of the court first seised. Fifthly, the problem underlying cases such as Gasser and Primacom is not, as might be supposed, excessive delay in the court first seised—or, indeed, delay at all.12 Delay may matter. If the delay is excessive, the consequences may be unjust to a party prevented from proceeding in the contractual forum—justice delayed is justice denied. And if that party is seeking compensation or money owed, the financial consequences of being out-of-pocket may be onerous. As we shall see, however, delay aside, the mere fact that a party may be required to defend proceedings in the court first seised may amount to a serious prejudice. Concern about the ‘Italian torpedo’, arising from the excessive delays to which the Italian proceedings were subject in Gasser, is not misplaced.13 But such delay is not the crux of the matter. The Italian torpedo is, in truth, the Article 27 torpedo.

THE DECISION IN GASSER

Whatever its consequences, it is doubtful that the Court of Justice in Gasser had any realistic choice but to decide as they did. To understand why, it is important to identify the doctrinal problem at the heart of such cases.

The Problem of Parallel Proceedings Gasser was fought on several fronts.14 But the root of the decision lies in the Court’s concern that any other outcome would permit parallel proceedings in two Member States, with the attendant risk of irreconcilable judgments. It is worth emphasising the importance of this consideration. The mutual recognition of judgments between Member States is the animating purpose of Regulation 44/2001, and its precursor the Brussels Convention.This objective would be hindered, however, if inconsistent judgments obtained in different states were equally enforceable. At first 12

Ibid, para 69. Franzosi, ‘Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo’ (1997) 7 EIPR 383. 14 For an account of the arguments see Fentiman ‘Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl’ n 3, at 244–248. 13

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sight the Regulation offers a ready solution to the problem. Article 3415 ensures that only one such judgment shall be recognised. Where incompatible judgments are obtained in different Member States, the first in time prevails,16 as does any judgment obtained in the state where enforcement is sought.17 But these rules of priority are not regarded in the scheme of the Brussels regime as a solution to the problem of conflicting judgments. At best, they are merely the last line of defence. At worst, they represent a problem, not a solution. The mere existence of irreconcilable judgments creates tension between Member States, undermining the mutual trust upon which the European jurisdictional regime is based. And, by giving overriding effect to a judgment obtained in the recognising state, Article 34 jeopardises the assumption of comity implicit in the regime. The European jurisdiction regime thus offers a front-loaded solution to the problem, by requiring that parallel proceedings in the same matter cannot occur.18 Nor could Article 34 ever be a complete solution to the problem of irreconcilable judgments. It regulates cases in which a conflict of enforcement arises. It deploys where judgments have mutually exclusive legal effects, in which a court must decide which of two judgments to prefer. But the Brussels regime defines irreconcilable judgments more broadly. Gasser and Primacom concerned Article 27 of the Regulation, in which conflicting judgments were threatened. But similar problems arise in cases under Article 28. Article 28, however, contemplates cases where two judgments, although inconsistent, do not compete for enforcement.19 It addresses the inefficiency and lack of uniformity which such inconsistency produces within the Community. It concerns a situation in which Article 34 is irrelevant, in which the only solution to the problem of irreconcilable judgments is to prevent parallel proceedings at the outset. Moreover, in a sense Article 34 never addresses the problem of irreconcilable judgments at all. At best it represents a tie-breaker, a rule of adjudication which allows an enforcing court to select between competing judgments. But there will always remain two judgments which will be effective by the lights of the courts where each was obtained. It hardly contributes to the uniform administration of justice in the Community, and does nothing to reassure litigants, if two contradictory judgments can coexist in the Brussels regime. The problem of parallel proceedings is thus the backdrop to Gasser. But how and why does the problem arise in such cases? Not at all, if Article 27

15

Art 27 of the Convention. Art 34(4). 17 Art 34(3). No rule equivalent to Art 34(4) exists in the Brussels Convention. The argument in Gasser proceeded on the basis that the only device for handling irreconcilable judgments in two Member States was that embodied in Art 27(3), the precursor to Art 34(3). 18 Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, n 3, Opinion, para 44. 19 Ibid. 16

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applies. But what if it does not apply, as was argued in Gasser? Difficulty arises because such cases concern competence-competence—a court’s power to determine issues of jurisdiction. They involve parallel proceedings, and the threat of inconsistent judgments, concerning such issues. This begs a cluster of hard questions about the recognition of judgments. What if one court determines its jurisdiction before the other does so? Is a decision concerning jurisdiction a judgment subject to the Brussels recognition regime? It is difficult to see why not, a conclusion supported by statements in the Schlosser Report on the Brussels Convention.20 It presumably follows that one court would be obliged to recognise another court’s decision that it has jurisdiction. But this might not prevent parallel proceedings on the merits. Strictly, each court can only ever determine its own jurisdiction. If each of two courts decides that it has jurisdiction, the issues in each case are different, which means there is strictly no conflict between the two decisions. Arguably, decisions on jurisdiction are always parallel, never conflicting. If, however, they do conflict, and if the Brussels recognition regime applies, a court is entitled to ignore another court’s finding concerning jurisdiction if it conflicts with a judgment of its own.21 The picture is further complicated, however, because such cases do not merely involve conflicting decisions concerning jurisdiction. In the course of determining its jurisdiction in cases such as Gasser, a court will inevitably make findings of fact and law concerning the validity and effect of the purported jurisdiction agreement. Irrespective of the recognition of any decision concerning jurisdiction, are such findings binding in other courts? Perhaps, if something akin to the English doctrine of issue estoppel operates in those courts. It is a rule of evidence in English law that a party cannot re-open matters decided conclusively in a foreign court. An English court may be bound, for example, by a foreign court’s decision concerning the effect of a jurisdiction agreement.22 Does such a doctrine operate within the Brussels regime? Not in terms. But it may perhaps do so on the basis that issue estoppel is a procedural matter, which is governed by national law, not the Regulation.23 In that event, national rules concerning issue estoppel continue to operate. The correct analysis of such situations remains, however, a matter for speculation. The picture is further complicated by a practical consideration. The perception that a court’s decision concerning its jurisdiction is distinct from any judgment it might give on the substance of the dispute, because obtained in separate, preliminary proceedings does not reflect the reality in

20

Schlosser Report on the amended Brussels Convention [1979] OJ C59/71, para 191. Art 34(3). The Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490 (HL); Briggs & Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (4th edn, 2005) 484. 23 Briggs & Rees, n 22, at 449–451. 21 22

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many Member States. Often, a court will address jurisdiction and substance simultaneously. In any case where a court has accepted jurisdiction, therefore, it is likely that it will have given judgment on the substance of the dispute. So the issue for any other court will be whether this should be recognised, rather than any decision relating to jurisdiction. As this suggests, it remains uncertain in cases such as Gasser whether any parallel proceedings concerning jurisdiction could evolve into parallel proceedings on the substance of the dispute. This depends upon difficult, unresolved questions concerning recognition in jurisdictional matters. But such doctrinal uncertainty itself suggests that there is a risk of parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments concerning the substance of any dispute.24 And, in any event, cases such as Gasser clearly involve the prospect of parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments concerning jurisdiction.

Parallel Proceedings in Gasser However it might have arisen, the Court in Gasser was presented with different possible solutions to the problem of parallel proceedings. The United Kingdom suggested interpolating a new rule into the Brussels regime.25 If a claimant invokes the jurisdiction of a Member State’s courts, where the parties have agreed that another Member State’s courts should have jurisdiction, the first court should stay its proceedings until the agreed court has declined jurisdiction. Advocate-General Léger advanced a different solution in his Opinion. He suggested that the contractual court could assert jurisdiction, despite a pending action elsewhere, and notwithstanding the risk of parallel proceedings—provided that its exclusive jurisdiction was manifest.26 He favoured the bolder course of simply allowing the latter to assert jurisdiction, because he feared that defendants in the first court might too readily seek a stay despite insufficient evidence of a jurisdiction agreement. In proposing this solution, the Advocate-General equated Article 16 of the Brussels Convention (Article 22 of the Regulation) with Article 17 (now Article 23), and suggested that the latter should operate in the same way as the former. The decision in Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co27 lent support. There the Court of Justice accepted that exclusive jurisdiction under Article 16 might prevail over Article 21, so that a court having exclusive jurisdiction might entertain proceedings notwithstanding that another court was seised. The case did 24 The role in such cases of national rules concerning issue estoppel introduces additional difficulty. Consider, eg, the implications of The Sennar [1985] 1 WLR 490 (HL). 25 Judgment, para 33. 26 Opinion, para 81. 27 Case C–351/89 [1991] ECR I-3317.

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not concern a jurisdiction agreement. But the judgment did not expressly distinguish between Articles 16 and 17, and indeed left open the possibility that they might operate in a similar fashion.28 The Advocate-General also equated Articles 16 and 17 in terms of their practical application. This was despite the familiar argument that Article 16 differs from Article 17 because there is unlikely to be disagreement as to when it applies. Whether, for instance, a dispute involves land situated in a given country is hardly a matter for discussion. By contrast, it is sometimes assumed that such disagreement is likely in connection with Article 17. Whether there is truly an agreement as to jurisdiction might be controversial. And, because courts may easily differ in their view of Article 17, some would argue that the court second seised cannot be said to be in a better position to apply Article 17 than the court first seised. In reply, the Advocate-General drew attention to the fact that Article 17 is no more, and no less, difficult to apply than Article 16. The operation of Article 16 is not free from uncertainty.29 Conversely, it is often tolerably clear whether Article 17 applies in a given case, because the validity of jurisdiction agreements now depends on the straightforward application of the tests for agreement laid down in Article 17 itself.30 These tests are readily applied, and whether a jurisdiction agreement is valid does not depend upon ascertaining and applying the law applicable under general rules of private international law. This means that Article 17 is no harder to apply than Article 16. And it ensures that cases in which a court will purport to assert jurisdiction in breach of Article 17 will be few. But the Advocate-General was clearly aware that this appealingly supple argument encounters a formidable objection. His solution apparently tolerates the risk of parallel proceedings (however unreal), which betrays the overriding objective of the Brussels regime. To this objection the Advocate-General’s Opinion suggests an answer. The named court may assert jurisdiction only where there is no possible doubt that that it has jurisdiction.31 The significance of this requirement is easily misread merely as a warning that the named court must be sure of its ground. In reality it is the crux of the Advocate-General’s Opinion, a potential solution to the problem of parallel proceedings. For if the named court’s jurisdiction is truly beyond doubt there is no possibility that the court first seised will eventually accept jurisdiction. So there is no risk of parallel proceedings, no spectre of irreconcilable judgments. Disagreeing with the Advocate-General, the Court of Justice readily concluded that the contractual forum has no competence once another

28

Judgment, para 26. Opinion, para 75. C-269/95 Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl [1997] ECR 3767; C-159/97 Transporti Castelletti SpA v Hugo Trumpy Spa [1999] ECR I-1597. 31 Opinion, para 83. 29 30

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court is seised. The principal reason was the overriding need to avoid parallel proceedings, which meant that Article 21 was to be interpreted broadly.32 Two understandable assumptions underlie this conclusion. The solutions advanced, both by the United Kingdom and by the Advocate-General, for avoiding the risk of parallel proceedings would have required the Court to legislate judicially. To propose that the first court should stay its proceedings in the face of an apparent jurisdiction agreement, or that the second court might entertain proceedings if their jurisdiction under Article 23 was manifest, are interesting suggestions. But they would have required the interpolation of new mechanisms not provided for in the Brussels regime. The only realistic alternative to the view taken by the Court was simply to allow the contractual forum to proceed, comforted by the thought that parallel proceedings were in fact unlikely. Given that some risk of parallel proceedings was inevitable, however, the Court was apparently not consoled by the argument that it was slight in practice. They appear to have accepted that genuine disputes might arise as to the effect of jurisdiction agreements,33 undermining the argument that courts are unlikely to disagree on the question, and that parallel proceedings were therefore unlikely. But it is also likely that the Court would have been concerned that any risk existed, however theoretical. They may not have greeted with equanimity the Advocate-General’s realistic conclusion that the risk of irreconcilable judgments is to some degree inevitable.34 Pragmatists might conclude that some risk of parallel proceedings is tolerable, given the arguments for upholding jurisdiction agreements. But this is to ignore the formalistic tendencies of the Court of Justice. And it underestimates the force of the argument that the primary goal of the European jurisdiction regime is to avoid parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments. Those experienced in international litigation are likely to share the Advocate-General’s more relaxed view. But, if we are to adhere strictly to the principle of avoiding parallel proceedings in the Community, the decision in Gasser was surely inevitable.35

THE TECHNICAL PROBLEM

Unavoidable as it may have been, Gasser remains problematic. Technically, the difficulty created by Gasser (as Primacom illustrates), is that Article 27 32

Judgment, para 41. Judgment, para 51. 34 Opinion, para 75. 35 This is not to say that the apparent position of the Court on some matters is uncontroversial. After Gasser it is possible that Art 22 of the Reg is no more secure than Art 23, and that a court has no duty (as some have argued) to enforce Art 23 ex officio. 33

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denies the named court any power to determine its own jurisdiction, at least until the court first seised declines to proceed. It is the inability of the party surprised by the other party’s pre-emptive strike to sue in the named court which fuels concern that Gasser creates commercial uncertainty, defeats legitimate expectations, and is unjust. Of course, proceedings anywhere but in the first court are prevented whenever Article 27 engages. But in a case such as Primacom the parties have purported to submit to the jurisdiction of the named court. At the least, this creates an expectation that any dispute between the parties, even one concerning the effectiveness of the agreement, will be heard in the named court. More strongly, it may give each party a right, independent of their right to pursue any substantive claim, to have the effect of the agreement determined there. It gives the named court competencecompetence. The suggestion that the parties have such a collateral right to have an agreement’s effect determined in the named court should not be misunderstood. It does not imply that the named court is better placed to resolve the issue, even if the agreement is governed by that court’s law. It means only that the parties are entitled to have the matter determined there. Nor does it imply that the named court has (or should have) exclusive jurisdiction to determine the agreement’s effect. A claimant in the non-contractual forum may have a legitimate argument that the agreement is ineffective (or non-exclusive). And in principle the non-contractual forum is entitled to determine its own jurisdiction, even if that means deciding whether the named court has overriding jurisdiction. This need not mean, however, that the named court should be disentitled to determine its own jurisdiction as well. Some, however, may detect circularity in the argument that a party has a right to test the effect of an alleged jurisdiction agreement in the named court. If the very question at issue is whether the jurisdiction agreement is effective at all, how can the agreement found such a right? The answer lies in a distinction between the existence of a jurisdiction agreement (which is a matter of law), and the existence of a jurisdiction clause (which is a matter of fact). Any right to test the existence of such an agreement does not presuppose that such an agreement exists. It depends merely upon the presence of a jurisdiction clause on the face of any documentation. This solution recalls that adopted to the different but related problem of determining which law governs the validity and existence of a contractual term selecting the law applicable to a contract. The answer is to apply not the law the parties have chosen (which is circular), but the law they have on the face of the contract purported to choose.36

36 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Art 3(4); Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws (14th edn, 2006), 1571–1578.

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Arguably, therefore, Gasser infringes the rights of a claimant who seeks to have the effect of a jurisdiction agreement determined in the nominated court. But it may also infringe such a party’s right to have the substance of the dispute resolved in that court. By doing so, it may infringe that party’s right to sue under Article 23, and consequently its right of access to justice in accordance with the Brussels regime. As we have seen, the problem directly raised by Gasser and Primacom concerns competence-competence—jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. But Gasser may also affect a court’s substantive jurisdiction. Suppose that the first court eventually decides that the named court has exclusive competence, and accordingly declines jurisdiction pursuant to Article 23. In principle, the named court has jurisdiction. The party wrong-footed by proceedings in the first court may at last bring proceedings in the agreed court, and indeed has the right to do so under Article 23. It is far from clear, however, that the vindicated party will in fact do so, or will be able to do so. This may be unrealistic, given the cost and delay occasioned by proceedings in the first court. The wrong-footed party, even if successful in ousting the jurisdiction of the court first seised, may be more inclined to settle or withdraw. The effect of giving priority to Article 27 in cases such as Gasser and Primacom is thus to render ineffective the rights of each party under Article 23. In theory, Gasser merely confirms which court is entitled to determine the parties’ rights under Article 23. But, in practice, it may render Article 23 valueless. Since Gasser, it is clear that the Brussels regime may infringe (in various ways) the rights of a party prevented from seising a nominated forum by Article 27. But the effect is magnified because the regime denies such a party any other means to vindicate its rights. In two other respects the Regulation denies redress to a party faced with a pre-emptive strike in the counter-party’s preferred forum. It may no longer seek from the English courts an injunction to restrain proceedings in another Member State, on the ground that they breach an agreement to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. Once they could.37 But the Court of Justice has ruled that such relief is inconsistent with the mutual trust inherent in the Brussels regime.38 Again, an English court cannot refuse to enforce a judgment obtained in another Member State contrary to a jurisdiction agreement effective under English law, as it can outside the Brussels regime.39 Nor does it appear to be possible to invoke the defence of public policy, and refuse enforcement to such a judgment by reason of the enforcing party’s bad faith in suing abroad. That would be inconsistent with that party’s right to challenge the jurisdiction agreement in a non-contractual forum,

37

Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588 (CA). Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101, although this outcome may be compelled by Gasser itself. 39 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s 32. 38

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embodied in Article 27 and affirmed in Gasser. Since Gasser, therefore, the last redoubt against tactical forum shopping under Article 27 has fallen.

THE TACTICAL STING

The problem with Gasser may thus be expressed in technical, juridical terms. It may deny a party’s right to have the effect of a jurisdiction agreement determined in the nominated court. But the penalty imposed by Gasser may also be tactical. If one party launches a pre-emptive strike in its preferred forum, the tactical sting lies in the fact that the other party is effectively obliged to defend the proceedings, or surrender. If the other party capitulates, the claimant in the first court is victorious. But even if the other party fights, the wrong-footed party may be prejudiced, whether or not the first court upholds the jurisdiction agreement. If the first court eventually concludes that the jurisdiction agreement is ineffective, the defendant in that court is exposed to more unwelcome litigation. Faced with taking the issue of jurisdiction on appeal, or (if not) of proceedings on the merits—or both—the defendant may prefer to settle. And if it does so, the terms are likely to be more favourable to the claimant in the first court than if proceedings had commenced in England. Suppose, however, that the first court concludes that the jurisdiction agreement is effective (as the German court did in Primacom). This may be a pyrrhic victory for the defendant in that court. Article 27 will have prevented any proceedings in England until that time. Access to justice according to the agreement will have been postponed, and recovery of any sums claimed by the now-victorious party delayed, perhaps for a considerable period. The position is all the worse if proceedings in the first court are tardy, or if the other party elects to appeal the first court’s conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction. As this confirms, merely to defend proceedings in the first court by itself thus represents a tactical victory for the claimant in the first court, which may eclipse the eventual outcome. The first court is unlikely to be the other party’s preferred forum—certainly not if the parties have agreed to another court’s jurisdiction. Both the procedural and substantive law applicable there may be less favourable. And the defendant’s costs in defending proceedings there will likely exceed any costs it might have incurred had it been able to sue as claimant in the agreed court—and may be irrecoverable under local law. The tactical impact of such pre-emptive proceedings is accentuated by the practice in many Member States of combining consideration of jurisdiction and the merits at a single hearing. This doubly prejudices the defendant. First, any requirement to plead both issues simultaneously increases the cost of defending such proceedings, an expense which is wasted if the jurisdiction agreement is eventually enforced. Secondly, the

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lack of any mechanism for dismissing proceedings immediately for want of jurisdiction postpones consideration of what may be a clear case for dismissal. The absence of such a preliminary procedure for dismissal may be viewed by some as an efficient marshalling of legal resources and court time, at least where any hearing occurs promptly. But any delay calls such an approach into question, which, combined with Article 27, may cause serious prejudice. The claimant in the first court may have no serious grounds for challenging the named court’s jurisdiction. Its case may be entirely frivolous. It may expect from the outset that the defendant will rely upon the jurisdiction agreement—and win—secure in the knowledge that tactical victory is won once the first court is seised. Any system unable to dismiss such claims swiftly rewards an unscrupulous litigant, by ensuring that the poverty of its case is not quickly exposed. But the effect is worse in a case such as Gasser, in which the defendant cannot restore the balance by suing in the contractual forum. Yet the victim of such a pre-emptive strike is all but forced to defend proceedings in the first court, by challenging that court’s jurisdiction. If it does not, it is uncertain whether the first court will examine the effect of any purported jurisdiction agreement of its own motion. An important passage in the Schlosser Report on the Brussels Convention suggests that it should.40 But neither the Convention nor the Regulation requires this—as it does expressly where Article 22 is involved.41 This may imply that such protection is not afforded to Article 23 and an absent defendant, an inference apparently drawn by the Court in Gasser.42 If the Court intended to confirm that a defendant must appear and plead Article 23, the effect is to make that party’s predicament even worse than might have been supposed. Not only is that party prevented from suing in the contractual forum, it is all but obliged to appear in the court first seised. Again, however clear the jurisdiction agreement may seem, a risk remains that the first court will find it ineffective (especially if the party relying upon it does not appear). The risk is less if the agreement is in writing and unambiguous, as often in substantial commercial transactions. It is also likely that the court first seised would reach the same conclusion as the named court about the agreement’s effect, in so far as this depends upon community principles common to all Member States.43 But, where the source of any agreement is an exchange of correspondence, different courts may take a different view of the facts, and the construction of such

40 41 42 43

Schlosser Report on the amended Brussels Convention [1979] OJ C59/71, para 22. Regulation, Art 19. Judgment, para 52. See, eg, Case C-269/95 Benincasa v Dentalkit [1997] ECR I-3767.

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agreements is for the forum.44 Uncertainty also surrounds the principles applicable where such an agreement is challenged on the basis of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation.45 If there is a risk that the first court will assert jurisdiction, it may also be uncertain whether the first court will reach the same conclusion on the merits as the contractual forum. If it does not, any judgment obtained there would be easily enforceable under the Brussels regime. That it was obtained in breach of a jurisdiction agreement enforceable in the enforcing court is irrelevant. Enforcement cannot be denied on that basis.46 The possibility of a different result is inherent in the differences between the laws of Member States, and in particular their rules for choice of law. True, in contractual disputes, the identity of the applicable law should be the same, whichever Member State is seised.47 But this is likely to be clear only if the applicable law has been expressly agreed. Even then this may be displaced by the mandatory rules or public policy of the forum (as was alleged in the German proceedings in Primacom).48 But not every dispute will involve a claim in contract. And even if the first court will in principle apply the same law as the contractual forum, it might not apply it in the same fashion, given the habitual difficulty of establishing one country’s law in another country’s courts.

BEYOND GASSER

Few could doubt that the consequences of enforcing Article 27 in a case such as Gasser are unacceptable. It may be that an amendment to the Brussels Regulation is the only cure. But, short of legislation, what other means are available to minimise or avoid the difficulties? What else might a party do to preserve its rights under a jurisdiction agreement?

The First Strike Gasser and Primacom involved potential defendants who launched proceedings for declaratory relief so as to pre-empt any claims against them. Clearly, this can be avoided if the potential claimant sues first in the named court, engaging Article 23 in its favour. But this solution is not as obvious as it seems. Potential litigants, especially those in a long-term or advantageous commercial relationship, normally prefer to temporise and negotiate rather than litigate. They are also unlikely to take steps against a 44 45 46 47 48

Case C-214/89 Powell Duffryn plc v Petereit [1992] ECR I-1745, 1778. See also Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws (14th edn, 2006), 528. Art 35. 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to contractual Obligations, Arts 3, 4. Ibid, Art 7(2), 16.

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counterparty if the effect would be to precipitate the latter’s insolvency. Nor will it always be clear that an arguable claim exists. Certainly, such a claim may not crystallise until the other party has clearly defaulted. But then it may be too late. Since Gasser (and Primacom), an informed litigant is likely to co-ordinate any deliberate default—a failure to pay or perform—with an immediate application for declaratory relief in its preferred court.

Damages In principle, damages for breach of contract may be available if one party sues contrary to an agreement to the exclusive jurisdiction of another court—at least in English law.49 Provided the terms of the agreement ensure that any dispute between the parties must be referred to the agreed court, each party is obliged not only to sue on the merits in that court, but also to raise there any objections to the agreement. A party forced to defend the agreement elsewhere might thus recover damages, representing the costs of defending proceedings elsewhere.50 But it is uncertain whether this is possible in cases such as Gasser and Primacom. The justification for allowing such redress lies in a distinction between the law of jurisdiction and the law of obligations. The exercise of jurisdiction under the Brussels regime may be conceptually distinct from any contractual liability litigants might incur while employing its rules.51 Following Gasser, therefore, a party may be entitled under the Brussels regime to seise a court other than the contractual forum, but not according to the terms of its contract with the other party. But this enticing argument encounters some formidable objections. At least this is so in any court (like an English court), in which local rules of procedure preclude the court from re-opening findings as to fact and law made in foreign proceedings.52 Where the court first seised asserts jurisdiction, despite any jurisdiction agreement, this is not merely a decision concerning its jurisdiction. It presumably rests upon a finding that the agreement is ineffective. Arguably, this is a finding which the English court would be bound to recognise, pursuant to the Regulation.53 If so, the English court would be precluded from considering whether it was a breach of contract to initiate the foreign proceedings. 49 Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425 (HL); Union Discount Co v Zoller [2002] 1 WLR 1517. 50 At least if the contract’s applicable law is English. A distinct question, not arising in cases involving foreign declaratory proceedings (like Gasser and Primacom), is whether a foreign damages award represents a recoverable loss. 51 Merrett, n 3, 332–333. 52 See generally Barnett, Res Judicata, Estoppel and Foreign Judgments (2001). 53 Art 32.

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A distinction must be drawn here between any decision made by the first court that it has jurisdiction, and any collateral findings of fact and law. The former is presumably one which is entitled to recognition in other Member States.54 But if the contractual forum is asked to determine whether the claimant there was in breach of contract no direct conflict with the first court’s decision is involved. The contractual forum is not required to determine which court has jurisdiction. There is thus no reason why the first court’s decision should have preclusive effect. Indeed, it would be irrelevant. Inevitably, however, the first court’s decision will depend upon findings of fact and law concerning the existence, validity and effect of the jurisdiction agreement. Identical findings will, however, form the basis of the contractual forum’s consideration of whether the initial claimant was in breach of contract. Arguably, these findings may have preclusive effect. But this is the case only if a number of important assumptions hold. It follows only if the Brussels Regulation embodies a doctrine akin to the English doctrine of issue estoppel, or (alternatively) if the Regulation permits an English court to deploy its national law on such matters. The Regulation itself provides no clear answer. But, if a judgment must be recognised under the Regulation, it no doubt follows that any findings which underpin that judgment must also be recognised. If not, the conclusion that it is worthy of recognition is undermined. Alternatively, it has been suggested that national law operates in such cases.55 The justification is that the Regulation requires a national court to treat a judgment capable of recognition as if it were one of its own, which may extend to treating as binding any findings upon which the judgment depends. As this suggests, the first court’s determination that the jurisdiction agreement is ineffective may perhaps preclude proceedings for breach of contract elsewhere, although this is uncertain. But other more stable considerations support the same conclusion. The Court of Justice has refused to countenance any distinction between regulating the conduct of a party who sues in the courts of a Member State, and questioning that court’s right to determine its own jurisdiction.56 Where another court has found that a jurisdiction agreement is ineffective, any subsequent finding by an English court that the claimant abroad is in breach of contract may thus subvert Article 27, if only indirectly. Nor may it cohere with the Brussels regime to penalise the infringement of a jurisdiction agreement in any way, when the regime refrains from doing so. Far from doing so, the

54 Suggested by Schlosser, Report on the amended Brussels Convention [1979] OJ C59/71, para 191. 55 Briggs & Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (4th edn, 2005), 449–450; Merrett, n 3, 332–334. 56 Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101.

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Regulation requires a judgment to be enforced even if the enforcing court considers that it was obtained in breach of such an agreement.57 But what if the court first seised upholds the jurisdiction agreement, and declines jurisdiction (as in Primacom)? Self-evidently, the foreign court’s finding supports rather than prevents any claim in damages. But merely because the claimant in the first court was wrong about the agreement does not mean that it was in the wrong to have sued there. Given the effect of Article 27, confirmed in Gasser, that party is entitled to test the effect of the jurisdiction agreement there. Arguably, to penalize such conduct would undermine that party’s right to seise its preferred court, embodied in Article 27. It might also be characterised as an assault on the entitlement of that court to determine whether it has jurisdiction.58 Such conceptual difficulties apart, to protect a jurisdiction agreement with an action for damages is an imperfect solution in practice. Such relief may compensate for the cost of defending proceedings in the noncontractual forum. But this does not affect the immediate expense and inconvenience occasioned by such proceedings. And it fails to deliver what many potential claimants may desire most, particularly in an action in debt; it cannot deliver prompt, summary judgment on the merits in the agreed court.

Arbitration The Brussels regulation does not regulate arbitration. Whatever doubt may surround the scope of this limitation, it is clear that Articles 27 and 28 only engage where civil proceedings are brought in the courts of different Member States. It follows that, if the parties have agreed to arbitration in England, and one sues the other in another Member State, Articles 27 and 28 do not engage.59 The other party may subsequently initiate arbitration according to the agreement. By this simple means a victim of pre-emptive proceedings may regain the initiative. But to agree to arbitration has additional benefits. First, many Member States have preliminary procedures for staying proceedings which breach arbitration agreements, thereby reducing the delay evident in Gasser and Primacom, and relieving the wrong-footed party of the burden of pleading the merits and jurisdiction simultaneously. Secondly, it is possible that any proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement might be restrained by injunction, although this remains controversial. The restraint of foreign proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement has been held to be unaffected by the Regulation, on the basis that disputes 57 58 59

Art 35. Cf Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101. Art 1(2)(d).

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subject to arbitration are entirely outside its scope.60 Thirdly, it is also possible (but also controversial) that any judgment obtained in breach of an arbitration agreement would be unenforceable in England on public policy grounds, at least if such proceedings defy an anti-suit injunction granted to enforce such an agreement.61 It is unsurprising, therefore, that commercial practitioners have responded to the difficulties caused by the Brussels regime by opting for arbitration, even in those areas (such as cross-border financing) where this was previously unusual. A simple bilateral agreement to arbitration would suffice. But careful drafting can allow the parties greater flexibility. An agreement to arbitrate in England might be combined with an agreement to the jurisdiction of the English courts.62 A dual provision of this kind might give one party or both the right to elect how the dispute is resolved. It might contemplate that any disputes should in the first place be litigated before the English courts. But in the event of pre-emptive proceedings elsewhere, it might allow the defendant in those proceedings to appoint arbitrators in England. Such a formulation allows a prospective claimant to sue first in the English courts, perhaps for summary judgment. But it also preserves that party’s right to retaliate by arbitrating in England, in the event of pre-emptive proceedings by the debtor elsewhere. The possibility of escaping Articles 27 and 28 by agreeing to arbitration goes some way to equalising the procedural position of the parties, by allowing a party surprised by a pre-emptive strike to reply by launching parallel proceedings. It robs the pre-emptive forum-shopper of an immediate tactical victory. And, for that reason, it may deter such manoeuvres altogether. But arbitration is not suitable for all disputes. Many commercial parties, such as banks engaged in cross-border lending, have always preferred to litigate. In its nature, arbitration is unsuited to proceedings involving third parties, a common feature of complex commercial disputes. And for a party whose primary concern is debt collection, not dispute resolution, arbitration cannot deliver the speedy summary judgment they prize. Some consider that the public nature of court proceedings discourages default, making the relative privacy of arbitration a disadvantage. And one particular benefit of arbitration, adjudication of technical matters by experts, is irrelevant to enforcing, say, the interest or repayment provisions in a loan. In principle, therefore, arbitration offers shelter from the effects of Articles 27 and 28. But it is far from a complete solution to the problems exposed by Gasser.

60 Through Transport Mutual Insurance Ltd v New India Insurance Co Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1598, applied, The Front Comor [2005] EWHC 456 (Comm) (question referred to ECJ in West Tankers Inc v RAS [2007] UKHL 4). 61 Philip Alexander Securities Ltd v Bamberger [1997] ILPr 73, 101–102. 62 NB Three Shipping Ltd v Harebell Shipping Ltd [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 2000; Law Debenture Trust Corp plc v Elektrim Finance BV [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 476.

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LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS

Existing devices for avoiding or reducing the problems exposed by Gasser are likely to prove an insufficient response. The case for legislation is pressing. Fortuitously, the operation of the Brussels Regulation is under review,63 which provides an opportunity for reform. But this begs questions of some difficulty. Some amendment to the Regulation seems inevitable, but what form should this take? And how far, if at all, does the new-minted Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements offer a solution?

The Hague Convention The newly agreed Hague Convention on choice of court agreements seeks to regulate the treatment of jurisdiction agreements amongst signatory states.64 Each Member State will be bound by the Convention, in the event that the Convention is ratified by the Community.65 Does this promise a solution to the problems revealed in Gasser? Superficially, the Convention is promising. Any court but the agreed court must decline jurisdiction.66 At best, however, the impact of the Convention is limited. In principle, it regulates agreements to the jurisdiction of Member State courts. But it engages only if one party is domiciled in a non-Member State, not if both parties are EU-domiciled.67 If the parties are EU-domiciled, the Brussels Regulation applies. Significantly, therefore, the outcome in cases such as Gasser and Primacom (where both parties were EU-domiciled), would be no different. Consider, however, a case to which the Convention does apply. Suppose that X and Y agree to submit any disputes arising between them to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. X is domiciled in New York, Y in France. X sues Y in France first, but Y then sues in England, the agreed jurisdiction. Is the English court required by the Convention to accept jurisdiction, or obliged by Article 27 to stay its proceedings? Any court but 63 Pursuant to Ch VIII of the Regulation. The following remarks were completed before publication of two important studies examining legislative solutions to the Gasser problem, which contribute further to the discussion: Hess, Pfieffer and Schlosser, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels 1 in the Member States (2007); Hartley and Daguchi, Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Agreement Convention (HCCH Publications, 2007). 64 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Twentieth Session, Final Act, 30 June 2005; Kruger, ‘The 20th Session of the Hague Conference: A New Choice of Court Convention and the Issue of EC Membership’ (2005) 55 ICLQ 447. 65 Opinion of the Court of Justice on the competence of the Community to conclude the amended Lugano Convention, ECJ, 7 February 2006, Opinion 1/03. 66 Art 6. 67 Art 26.6(a).

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the agreed court must decline jurisdiction.68 But this by itself is no solution to the problems revealed in Gasser. The same is true of the Brussels Regulation, at least if the defendant in the non-contractual forum relies upon the agreement.69 The Convention does not prevent a party from testing the effect of a purported jurisdiction agreement in a noncontractual forum. Importantly, however, the Convention has no equivalent to Article 27 of the Regulation. It does not require the named court to stay its proceedings if the courts of another Member State are first seised. On the contrary, Article 5(2) of the Convention provides that the contractual forum ‘shall not decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be decided in a court of another State’.70 In the event of tactical proceedings in another Member State, this suggests that the defendant in such proceedings might respond by initiating proceedings in the named court. If so, such a pre-emptive strike becomes an empty gesture, so much so that such manoeuvres may become a thing of the past. But the true impact of the Convention in such cases is uncertain. It is unclear whether Article 5(2) regulates the issue of competence-competence. Does it apply where two courts are asked to determine whether a jurisdiction agreement is enforceable at all, the issue in Gasser? If it does not, Article 27 of the Regulation prevails. Arguably, it continues to regulate parallel proceedings concerning jurisdiction, a matter on which the Hague Convention is silent, and which is beyond its scope. On this basis, there is no tension between the two instruments, which operate independently in their own spheres. But the uncomfortable result is that the problems revealed in Gasser remain. Certainly, Article 5(2) was designed to prevent recourse to provisions such as Article 27.71 But this is ambiguous. Article 27 regulates two distinct matters: declining jurisdiction when another court has determined that it has jurisdiction, and staying proceedings pending such a determination. The language of Article 5(2) suggests that it extends only to declining jurisdiction over a substantive dispute on the merits. It may not embrace cases where the named court is required to stay its proceedings pending a jurisdictional finding in another court. The suggestion that Article 5(2) overrides Article 27 encounters a further obstacle. Article 27’s survival may be assured because the Convention applies without prejudice to the Regulation’s rules for the enforcement of judgments between Member States.72 Arguably, Article 27, though not a rule regulating enforcement, is

68

Art 6. And perhaps if the defendant does not, if the defendant does not appear: Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, n 3, Opinion, para 60; Schlosser Report on the amended Brussels Convention [1979] OJ C59/71. 70 Art 5(2). 71 Dogauchi and Hartley, Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Draft Report, August 2004, para 99. 72 Article 26(6)(b). 69

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a necessary adjunct to those rules, by ensuring that parallel proceedings, and thus irreconcilable judgments, cannot occur in the Community.73 If so, Article 27 may be preserved. As this suggests, the Hague Convention offers no clear or comprehensive solution to the problems revealed in Gasser. It is irrelevant if both parties are EU-domiciled (as in Gasser), and arguably subject to Article 27 even if one party originates outside the Community. Neither the scope of the Convention, nor its wording, may now be altered. But it remains possible that the Regulation could be altered to clarify its relationship with the Convention where one party is domiciled outside the Community.

Amending the Regulation It may be necessary to amend the Brussels Regulation, to clarify its relationship with the Hague Convention. In principle, it would be enough to state whether or not Article 27 of the Regulation engages in cases where the parties, one of whom is domiciled outside the Community, have agreed to the jurisdiction of the courts of a Member State. If it is correct that each instrument operates independently in its own sphere either solution is possible. There is no sense in which compliance with the Convention demands that Article 27 should cease to operate. But this begs wider questions of principle and policy: regardless of the Hague Convention, what should be the role of Article 27 in cases involving exclusive jurisdiction agreements? This question arises, however, even in cases involving EU-domiciliaries, in which the Regulation clearly applies. Indeed, the relationship between the Convention and the Regulation is not in truth the issue; the issue is simply how the problems exposed by Gasser might be solved. Various amendments have been canvassed to remove or reduce the problems exposed by Gasser.74 Indirect Solutions Two possible amendments would provide an indirect solution. One technique is to make unenforceable any judgment obtained in breach of a jurisdiction agreement, at least in the contractual forum, where that forum considers the agreement enforceable. This reflects the position in English law in cases outside the European regime,75 and might discourage proceedings anywhere but the named court. Alternatively, it might be provided 73 C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance Co v New Hampshire Insurance [19991] ECR I-3317, paras 15–16. 74 Fentiman [2005] 42 CMLR 241. 75 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s 32.

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that a party prejudiced by proceedings in a forum other than the contractual forum is entitled to seek redress in damages, in the contractual forum, irrespective of a finding by the first court that the agreement is ineffective. But neither is a complete solution. The first is useless if any judgment obtained in the court first seised is enforceable there. And, as we have seen, damages may be of little use to the wrong-footed party. Moreover, both solutions involve ignoring determinations made in the first court. To contemplate that the first court’s finding on jurisdiction may be overridden in the contractual forum is no doubt contrary to the principle of mutual trust between Member States which informs the Regulation. Procedural Solutions A different approach is to focus on the procedures regulating jurisdictional disputes in Member States. One possibility would be to establish in Member States a uniform mechanism for addressing jurisdictional issues promptly in preliminary proceedings, without the necessity to plead the merits. This would minimise both the cost and the delay caused by pre-emptive proceedings in the court first seised. Again, provision might be made to ensure that a party forced to defend such proceedings might recover its costs in full, in the event that the first court upholds the jurisdiction agreement. It is uncertain, however, whether it is feasible to make such inroads into the civil procedure of Member States, or whether this lies clearly within the Regulation’s scope at all. Limiting Proceedings in the First Court Alternatively (or in addition), provision might be made to prevent proceedings anywhere but in the contractual forum. It is already the case that any other court must decline to exercise jurisdiction, once the jurisdiction of the contractual forum is established. But the Regulation might be amended to require the court first seised to stay its proceedings until the contractual forum declines jurisdiction. Advocate-General Léger was concerned that such a possibility might allow a defendant to invoke a sham agreement for tactical reasons.76 It is uncertain, however, whether this concern is well-founded. In practice, the contractual documentation will either contain a jurisdiction clause or it will not. No doubt, however, any amendment would have to stipulate the standard of proof expected of a defendant who invokes a jurisdiction agreement. Clearly, it would be inappropriate to require the first court to determine finally that the agreement is valid and effective, which misses the point that this is primarily a matter for the contractual forum. Equally, a 76

Opinion, para 74.

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mere allegation that such an agreement exists would clearly be insufficient. But provision might be made for granting a stay on the basis of prima facie evidence that a jurisdiction agreement exists.77 On inspection, however, this is no solution. Unless coupled with other changes to the procedural regime of the first court, it does not significantly improve the position of the wrong-footed party. In particular, it would assist only if provision were made for a prompt, preliminary enquiry into jurisdiction, without the need to plead the merits, combined with an entitlement to the full costs of that hearing if successful.

Empowering the Contractual Forum Most obviously, however, the Regulation might be amended to permit parallel proceedings in the contractual forum, in addition to any in the court first seised. This removes at a stroke the problems caused by giving effect to Articles 27 and 28. But it is uncertain precisely when such proceedings might be permitted. It is clear that a mere allegation by a claimant that such an agreement exists should be insufficient. But a distinction must be drawn between regulating the named court’s power to determine the substance of the parties’ dispute, and their power to address their jurisdiction. Thus, one option is to provide that the contractual forum may proceed to hear the merits of the dispute, presumably if in the view of the contractual forum the agreement is clearly valid.78 An alternative is to regulate when the contractual forum is entitled to consider whether it has Article 23 jurisdiction. It could perhaps do so if there is prima facie evidence of the existence of an agreement, or perhaps a serious case that it is valid and effective. Again, the contractual forum might be permitted to proceed if the first court has not addressed the issue of its jurisdiction within a prescribed period of time, or if in the view of the contractual forum the pre-emptive proceedings were commenced in bad faith. If proceedings in the named court are to be permitted, it is a matter for debate how, if at all, this should be regulated. The possibility of assessing whether one party’s conduct was abusive may be at odds with the tendency in the Court’s recent jurisprudence to ignore the conduct of litigants when applying the Regulation.79 And, given the importance of certainty in the scheme of the Regulation, it might be thought inappropriate to do so by reference, for example, to the strength of the case that Article 23 engages.

77

As suggested by the United Kingdom in Gasser. Favoured by the Advocate-General in Gasser, but rejected by the Court of Justice: Opinion, para 81. 79 See, eg, Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101 (ECJ) (anti-suit injunction cannot be granted to regulate the conduct of the claimant in another Member State). 78

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However, a simple requirement that there should be evidence of a jurisdiction clause in the documentation might be adequate to trigger consideration of the issue. Conversely, to allow proceedings after the expiry of a time limit has the advantage of certainty. But it may not lessen the tactical impact of pre-emptive proceedings in a non-contractual forum. As this suggests, the simplest solution may have most to recommend it: the simple expedient of allowing the named court to proceed despite proceedings in another Member State would, without more, remove the problems revealed by Gasser and Primacom. To permit proceedings in the named court would allow the wrong-footed party to regain the initiative. Moreover, it is likely to deter the other party from embarking on pre-emptive proceedings at all, by removing the tactical advantages of doing so. The last point has particular importance, because it should lessen the unease purists may have about tolerating parallel proceedings within the scheme of the Regulation. For, if the wrong-footed party can always litigate in the contractual court, the other party would gain little by attempting to pre-empt those proceedings. If any tactical first strike is intended to prevent or delay proceedings in the named court, it would simply fail. To grant the court second seised competence is not, therefore, to tolerate parallel proceedings, but to ensure that proceedings are heard exclusively in the named court.

CONCLUSION

The difficulties exposed by Gasser and Primacom are severe. The logic of the Brussels Regulation, so unswervingly applied in Gasser, prejudices any party to a contractual jurisdiction clause who is wrong-footed by preemptive proceedings in another court. Upon inspection, each of the several means to circumvent the problem is revealed as a palliative, not a cure. And the Hague Convention on choice of court agreements supplies neither a comprehensive nor an inevitable answer. It seems that only an amendment to Regulation 44/2001 could resolve the problem. How this should be achieved is unclear. But there is much to be said for providing simply that disputes in the contractual forum concerning the effectiveness of a jurisdiction agreement should no longer be subject to Articles 27 and 28. But the debate about Gasser prompts two more general observations about the scope and assumptions of the Brussels jurisdiction regime. Both reflect the unease many feel about its suitability for regulating sophisticated cross-border disputes. Consider first the possibility that some respite from the difficulties caused by the Regulation might be offered by opting for arbitration not litigation. The status of arbitration clauses within the Brussels regime is not without difficulty. But it is trite to observe that arbitration is a common means of resolving international commercial disputes, though not generally

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other disputes. Assuming the line between arbitration and the Brussels regime is held, this suggests a future in which commercial disputes in Europe are resolved by arbitration, leaving only other matters for the Brussels Regulation. It suggests, perhaps, a mixed regime, in which high-value, high-cost commercial litigation occurs beyond the Regulation, which largely regulates consumer complaints, debt collection and personal injury claims. This would no doubt frustrate the ambitions of many for uniformity in the European judicial area. And arbitration is often inadequate to resolve complex, multi-party, multi-jurisdictional disputes. But it reflects the intuition, shared at least by many English lawyers, that the Brussels Regulation is too unsophisticated, too uncommercial in its ideology, to regulate substantial commercial disputes—an intuition strongly reinforced by the decision in Gasser. Consider again the principle, at the heart of Gasser, that parallel proceedings must at all costs be avoided, to guard against the spectre of irreconcilable judgments. No tenet is more central to the Brussels regime. For many, however, especially for practitioners in commercial litigation, this preoccupation is puzzling, indeed misguided. In the world beyond the Regulation, it is certainly possible that two courts will be seised concurrently, given the likely importance to each party of manoeuvring the dispute into their preferred forum. But the likelihood that proceedings will advance significantly in both places is remote. This is not because both courts are likely to agree that only one has competence—an optimistic argument advanced in respect of proceedings in the Community by Advocate-General Léger in Gasser.80 Even if the parties intend to pursue the dispute to judgment, the cost of fighting on two fronts is likely to deter them. But litigants in costly cross-border disputes seldom have any intention of taking the dispute to judgment, or even to trial—certainly not a trial on the merits. The jostling for position so common in transnational disputes, with each party seeking to seise its preferred forum, is invariably intended to promote settlement, or surrender by the other party. The notion that either is seeking a judgment on the merits is unrealistic. For many practitioners, therefore, the more urgent danger is that one party will invoke a court’s jurisdiction for tactical reasons, and thereby dictate where battle is joined. For them the problem is not parallel litigation, but unfair forum shopping. The problem is most blatant where the parties have purported to agree to one court’s exclusive jurisdiction. And it is animated by the truth that to win the battle of forums is so often to win outright, at least by taking the advantage in settlement negotiations. As claimants know to their advantage, defendants sued in an inconvenient forum are apt to capitulate—just as defendants know that claimants unable to sue where they wish are likely to withdraw. Certainly, a potential

80

Opinion, paras 77–80.

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defendant who sues first in its preferred court is less likely to be choosing where proceedings are heard, than trying to avoid proceedings at all. As this suggests, the threat of parallel proceedings, the fear at the heart of Gasser, is not only an imaginary problem, but the wrong problem. It is certainly a problem born of a need for conceptual neatness, not the realities of cross-border litigation. It is a troubling irony that the potential injustice and commercial dislocation signalled by Gasser may be necessary to avoid a danger which is at best exaggerated, and at worst an illusion. To add insult to injury, however, not only does the Brussels Regulation fail to address the problem of forum shopping, it exacerbates it, by licensing the avoidance of contractual jurisdiction agreements.

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2 The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements Further to Gasser and the Community Principle of Abuse of Right ARNAUD NUYTS PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter, as proposed by my dear friend Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières, editor of this volume and organiser of the OxfordSorbonne seminar, is to comment on one single paragraph of the Gasser decision1 of the European Court of Justice. This paragraph (53) reads as follows: the difficulties of the kind referred to by the United Kingdom Government, stemming from delaying tactics by parties who, with the intention of delaying settlement of the substantive dispute, commence proceedings before a court which they know to lack jurisdiction by reason of the existence of a jurisdiction clause are not as such as to call in question the interpretation of any provision of the Brussels Convention, as deduced from its wording and its purpose.

In other words, for the European Court, even if a litigant has purposefully commenced proceedings in a Member State in breach of a jurisdiction clause, the court appointed in such clause must stay its proceedings until the court first seised has declared that it has no jurisdiction. The requirement for the chosen court to ‘wait and see’ would seem to have no time limit: it remains even if the duration of the proceedings before the court first seised, in general, is ‘excessively long’.2 The solution is presented as a simple and straightforward application of Article 27 of the Brussels

1 2

Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14694. Ibid, at para 73.

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Regulation3 (Article 21 of the Brussels Convention4), which provides that where the courts of different Member States are seised of the same dispute, ‘any other court than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings’ and, when the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, shall decline jurisdiction. This is probably one of the most controversial and criticised holdings from the trilogy of cases in Gasser-Turner5-Owusu6 that was the focus of the seminar on the practice of forum shopping in the European judicial area. It epitomises what is regarded as the acquiescence by the Court of Justice of the worst form of forum shopping, when an unscrupulous litigant purposefully engages in obstructive and delaying tactics, with no intention to have justice be rendered. This finding of the Court has been construed as giving the green light to the so-called Italian (or Belgian) torpedo,7 which was developed originally in patent litigation, but has potentially a much broader scope. The torpedo is the nickname given to the action for a declaration of non-liability which is initiated by a party having reason to believe that it may be shortly sued in the courts of a Member State. The potential defendant preempts those proceedings by bringing an action in another forum which is chosen in view of the fact that it is unlikely to bring a quick resolution of the proceedings, for instance, because of its limited judicial resources and/or heavy workload.8 The Gasser court seems to have validated such practice by refusing to allow an exception to the lis pendens rule in that situation. Lord Mance has pointed out that Gasser ‘promises problems for legitimate claimants and opportunities for those unwilling to meet their obligations’.9 In the same vein, it has been argued that the ruling ‘encourages the subversion of jurisdictional agreements’,10 and that, for the Court of Justice to say that the Court (which has not been chosen but has been seised first) alone is entitled to decide what to do, when the very thing the

3 Council Reg (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, effective 1 March 2002 (hereinafter ‘the Regulation’). 4 The 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters is superseded (except for Denmark) by the Regulation. 5 C-159/02 Turner v Grovit ECR I-3565. 6 C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson ECR I-1383. 7 The word was apparently coined by an Italian lawyer, M Franzosi, ‘Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo’ (1997) 7 European Intellectual Property Rights Review (EIPR) 383. 8 See M Franzosi, ‘Torpedoes Are Here to Stay’ (2002) International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law (IIC) 154. 9 ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements and European ideals’ (2004) LQR 357. 10 R Fentiman, (2005) CML Rev 241, at 253.

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parties have agreed upon is that the jurisdiction of that court will be invoked by neither of them, stands common sense on its head, and is inconsistent with the basic rule of pacta sunt servanda.11

The conclusion that is drawn is that the Brussels jurisdictional system ‘is now wide open to systematic abuse and delaying tactics’.12 Various solutions have been imagined to counter the difficulty created by Gasser and to ensure the enforcement of jurisdiction agreements further to this ruling. It had initially been suggested that the solution could come from the appointed court, through the issuance by that court of an anti-suit injunction to prevent the abusive continuance of the proceedings in the other forum in breach of that clause. But this solution would seem to have been ruled out in the further Turner case13: while this case did not involve the breach of a jurisdiction clause, the language used by the court in this judgment seems to imply a general ban on the use of anti-suit injunctions within the scope of application of the Brussels regime, and even maybe beyond. Another solution that has been advocated is for the court appointed by the parties to award damages for breach of the jurisdiction clause. There is some case law in England that supports this possibility,14 though the decisions currently relate to proceedings brought in non-EU states. It is unclear whether the appointed court could award damages in a case like Gasser, where the court seised in breach of the jurisdiction agreement is located in another Member State, especially if that court has not yet ruled on the matter, or if that court has already considered that there is no binding jurisdiction agreement.15 Another problem with that solution is that it does not provide an immediate remedy for the breach, but requires a further action and a further trial: as pointed out by A Briggs, should this be the only remedy further to Gasser, ‘litigation about where to litigate will be replaced by litigation about where the litigation should have taken place’.16 A more drastic solution would be to revise the text of the Brussels Regulation. This would have the great merit of addressing directly the problem which was created by Gasser, that is, that the court nominated by the parties is deprived of the right to assess for itself whether the

11 A Briggs, ‘The Impact of Recent Judgments of the European Court on English Procedural Law and Practice’ (2005) 124 Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht II 231; also available on the Social Science Research Network electronic library at , at 21. 12 N Andrews, ‘Abuse of process and obstructive tactics under the Brussels jurisdictional system: Unresolved problems for the European authorities’ (2005) Zeitschrift für Gemeinschaftsprivatrecth 8, at 8. 13 Turner v Grovit, n 5. 14 Union Discount Cp v Zoller [2002] 1 WLR 1517; Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425. 15 See L Merrett, ‘The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements within the Brussels Regime’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 315; see also above n 11, at 19. 16 See above n 11, at 20.

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jurisdiction clause is valid, leaving the issue to be decided by another court (even if that task takes ‘excessively long’). It has been suggested that the Regulation be amended to provide that the court first seised be required to stay its proceedings, at the defendant’s motion, until the named court has declined jurisdiction.17 Such solution, already envisaged by the AdvocateGeneral in Gasser, would however itself create the danger that the existence of a foreign jurisdiction clause be invoked abusively to block a legitimate action in a court of competent jurisdiction, a risk which caused the Advocate-General to reject this approach. It has been suggested that this problem could be solved through the requirement that it be demonstrated that there is at least a prima facie jurisdiction agreement.18 This flexible concept would, in essence, empower the judge to assess, on a case by case basis, whether the application to stay the proceeding on the basis of a foreign jurisdiction agreement is genuine, ie, that it is not raised abusively. While this solution, inspired by arbitration practice, is attractive, it requires that central rules of the Brussels regime (ie, those on the lis pendens rule and/or choice of court) be changed, and it is yet uncertain whether and when a political agreement will be found to that end by the European legislator. Besides, such modification of the text of the Regulation would only address the specific issue of the relation between the lis pendens rule and the choice of court rule. It would not provide an answer to the more general problem created by the seeming acceptance in Gasser of the torpedo practice, which has also developed in cases where there is no jurisdiction agreement. The purpose of this chapter is to suggest another potential avenue to address this problem, one which could be implemented without changing the wording of the Regulation. The goal here is to provide a general device to remedy the clearly excessive obstructive and delaying tactics used by unscrupulous litigants. Such goal can be achieved through recourse to general principles of European law, and more particularly to the Community principle of abuse of right. The main contention of this chapter is that, pursuant to this principle, when the provisions of the Brussels Regulation, as those of any other provisions of Community law, are relied upon in an abusive manner, the courts of the Member States are required, under Community law, to deny the litigant the benefit of those provisions. The limit herein advocated may be a narrow one, because the application of the Community principle of abuse of right is subject to strict conditions, and is confined to specific circumstances. However, it is a limit that exists under current European law, and it is a limit that could prove a useful tool to

17 18

See above n 10, at 256. See above n 10, at 256.

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prevent the most blatant obstructive tactics that have developed under the Brussels regime, such as with respect to the circumvention of choice of court agreements.

THE BRUSSELS JURISDICTIONAL REGIME IS SUBJECT TO GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY LAW

The rules of the Brussels Regulation do not operate in a vacuum. They form part of a wider legal environment that is shaped by the process of European integration and the gradual development of specific European values.19 Already in 1968, the Brussels Convention was adopted on the basis of Article 220 (now Article 293) of the EC Treaty, which calls upon the Member States to negotiate international conventions on certain matters where further integration was felt to be desirable for the establishment of the internal market.20 With the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty and the transformation of the Brussels Convention into a Community instrument, the rules of jurisdiction of courts in cross-border disputes have become an intimate component of the body of European law. The recognition of the European nature of the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels Regulation is not merely an issue of geographical or political attribution. It has potentially important consequences for how those rules are to be construed and applied in practice. In particular, every legal instrument adopted by the European institutions is subject to the application of certain general rules and principles of European law. For the purpose of this chapter, two principles should be mentioned.21 The first one is the principle of fair trial, which is enshrined in Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention and in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. This principle, which includes the right to effective court access and the resolution of disputes within a reasonable time, could alter traditional ways in which the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels Regulation are applied in practice, as legal writers have already started to recognise.22 19 See Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Evidence of an Emergent European Legal Culture: Public Policy Requirements of Procedural Fairness under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions’ (2001) 36 Texas International Law Journal 539. 20 In our field, Art 293 only mentions the simplification of formalities governing reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments, but it was felt that this goal would not be achieved without harmonising also the rules of jurisdiction, so the Brussels Convention was adopted as a ‘double’ treaty, providing both rules for the direct jurisdiction of courts and rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. 21 For an analysis of other general principles of Community law that need to be taken into account for the application of the Brussels regime, see A Layton and H Mercer, European Civil Practice (Thomson-Sweet & Maxwel, 2nd edn), at para 11.049 et seq. 22 See A Briggs and P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (LLP, 3rd edn, 2002), at 15; P Schlosser, ‘Jurisdiction in International Litigation: The Issue of Human Rights in Relation to National Law and to the Brussels Convention’ (1991) Revista di diretto internazionale 5; A

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Gasser does not necessarily undermine this conclusion. Admittedly, the Court, after noting the argument of the United Kingdom government that the lis pendens rule must be interpreted in conformity with Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention, still ruled that the lis pendens provision ‘cannot be derogated’ from even ‘where the Court first seised belongs to a Member State in whose courts there are, in general, excessive delays’ (para 70). But, in fact, this finding is perfectly understandable. Indeed, as was made clear in the opinion of the Advocate-General, to which the Court referred,23 the question which was submitted to the Court was whether it was possible to consider, once and for all, that in certain Member States there are, in general, excessive delays in their courts, which justify (with respect to those States) derogation from the lis pendens rule. The Court logically answered that this could not be accepted, for it would go, inter alia, against the principle of trust which the contracting states accord to each other’s legal systems.24 Hence, the Gasser Court did not, it is submitted, rule on the issue whether, under the specific circumstances of the case (and not ‘in general’), the excessive duration of the proceedings in the court first seised would compromise the right to a fair trial of the litigant, and would justify the adoption of appropriate measures to restore the Convention rights. The Commission had rightly pointed out that the human rights issue could only be determined on the basis of an appraisal taking account of all the circumstances of the case,25 and that in the case in point the referring court had not provided evidence in that respect, so the issue could not be dealt with by the European Court. More surprisingly, though, the Commission also took the view that the human rights issue could not be ‘settled in the context of the Brussels Convention’ at all, and that ‘it is for the European Court of Human Rights to examine the issue and the national courts cannot substitute themselves for it by recourse to Article 21’ of the Brussels Convention. The Court of Justice rightfully abstained from endorsing such view, which would amount to instructing the courts of the Member States to refrain from enforcing themselves the guarantees enshrined in the Human Rights Convention. Such instruction would indeed go against the Human Rights Convention system. Pursuant to an established line of authorities from the Human Rights Court, when it is demonstrated that the right to a fair trial of a party is being threatened, the contracting states must adopt appropriate measures to restore that right because they are ‘under the obligation to organise their legal system as to

Nuyts, ‘Due Process and Fair Trial: Jurisdiction in the United States and in Europe Compared’ in A Nuyts & N Watté (eds), International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations with Third States (Bruylant, 2005) 157. 23 See para 70 of the judgment and para 88 of the Advocate-General’s Opinion. 24 Para 72 of the judgment. 25 Para 69 of the judgment.

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ensure compliance with the requirements of Article 6’.26 The duty to restore the Convention rights does not only belong to the legislative authorities. It also binds national courts which are required to decide individual cases so as to ensure compliance.27 These principles apply also when the risk of infringement to the right of a fair trial stems from the application of Community law. The Treaty establishing the European Union, as modified by the Amsterdam Treaty, recognises that ‘the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the protection of human rights’, and stresses that those fundamental rights are to be treated ‘as general principles of Community law’.28 That means in practice that the rules adopted by the European institutions can be applied only as far as they comport with the fundamental rights embodied in the Human Rights Convention.29 The European Court itself has recognised, in the Krombach case,30 that the rules on the enforcement of foreign judgments of the Brussels Convention are subject to the fair trial doctrine. According to Krombach, if a court in a Member State has infringed the principles of the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Human Rights Convention, the ensuing judgment can be denied recognition in another Member State pursuant to the public policy exception of the Brussels Convention (Article 27(1), now Article 34(1) of the Regulation). The European Court stressed that in such a case the preservation of the right to a fair trial overrides the specific goal of the Convention that is at stake: even though the Convention is intended to secure the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments in courts or tribunals, it is not permissible to achieve that aim by undermining the right to a fair hearing. [Para 43]

The same principle should apply here: even though the lis pendens rule is intended to prevent parallel proceedings and the risk of irreconcilable judgments,31 such goals cannot be achieved by undermining the right of effective court access and the resolution of disputes within a reasonable time. The second general principle of Community law whose impact needs to be assessed in this matter is the principle of abuse of right.

26

De Cubber v Belgium, 26 October 1984, §35. The term ‘High Contracting States’ used in Art 1 of the Human Rights Convention is to be interpreted as designating all national authorities, including the courts: see Loukanov v Bulgaria, 10 March 1997, §40. 28 Art 6§1 TEU. 29 See the comments of ECJ judge Koen Leenarts, ‘Le respect des droits fondamentaux en tant que principe constitutionnel de l’Union européenne,’ Mélanges en hommage à Michel Waelbroeck (Bruylant 1999) 423, at 435. 30 Case C-7/08 [2000] ECR I-1935. 31 See text below at ‘Lis pendens and the Community Principle of Abuse of Process.’ 27

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Arnaud Nuyts THE PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHT UNDER COMMUNITY LAW

The doctrine of abuse of right is not recognised as such in the European Treaties. But the concept is mentioned in Article 54 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, entitled ‘Prohibition of Abuse of Rights’. This proscription is directed at those wishing ‘to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Charter’. More importantly for the purpose of this chapter, the doctrine of abuse of right has been developed progressively, by the Court of Justice, as a way to sanction the abusive reliance on provisions of Community law. The concept was used, though at that time without an express reference to it, as early as 1974 in the Van Binsbergen case, which recognised the right of a Member State to take measures to avoid the rules about the freedom to provide services being used ‘for the purpose of avoiding’ the professional rules of conduct where the activities are being carried out.32 In the following two decades, the Court has extended the use of the concept of abuse to other community matters such as the free movement of goods,33 the free movement of workers,34 and the Common Agricultural Policy,35 but only on a case by case basis, and without attempting to develop a general principle. The case law has witnessed a deeper transformation during the last decade. A major step forward was made in 1996 in Brennet v Paletta, where the Court of Justice expressed in general terms the principle that ‘Community law cannot be relied on for the purposes of abuse or fraud’.36 The Court ruled in that case that, for the application of social security schemes for employees moving within the Community, such as the payment of wages for incapacitated workers, the national courts may… take account on the basis of objective evidence of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the worker concerned in order, where appropriate, to deny him the benefit of the provisions of Community law on which he seeks to rely.37

In the Kefalas case (1998),38 the question that was referred to the Court of Justice was whether national courts may apply an anti-abuse provision of

32 Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299, at para 13; see also Case C-23/93 TV10 v Commissariaat voor de Media [1994] ECR I-4795, at para 21. 33 See Case 229/83 Leclerc and Others v Au Blé Vert and Others [1985] ECR 1, at para 27. 34 Case 39/86 Lair v Universitaet Hannover [1988] ECR 3161, at para 43. 35 Case C-8/92 General Milk Products v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1993] ECR I-779, at para 21. 36 Para 24. 37 Para 25. 38 Case C-367/96 [1993] ECR I-779.

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national law in order to assess whether a right granted by Community law is exercised abusively. The Advocate-General suggested a nuanced approach. On the one hand, he pointed out that, any legal order which aspires to achieve a minimum level of completion must contain self-protection measures, so to speak, to ensure that the rights it confers are not exercised in a manner which is abusive, excessive or distorted.39

On the other hand, the Advocate-General was of the opinion that the abuse of right could not be considered, at that time, as a general principle of Community law because, according to him, the conditions were not fulfilled to provide a precise and detailed common definition of the notion of abuse of right.40 The Advocate-General therefore suggested, pursuant to the principle of primacy of Community law over national law, precluding the possibility of domestic courts applying their own national rules on abuse of right.41 The Court of Justice has not followed this conservative approach. Starting with the then settled principle that ‘Community law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends’, the Court ruled that, consequently, the application by national courts of (anti-abuse) domestic rules… for the purpose of assessing whether the exercise of a right arising from a provision of Community law is abusive cannot be regarded as contrary to the Community legal order.42

While this decision brings a new development in the matter, the European Court has still abstained from indicating whether the abuse of right theory should be regarded as a general principle of Community law, ie, a principle that would apply irrespective of the existence in national law of an anti-abuse provision. Advocate-General La Pergola has taken that further step in the Centros case.43 For him, the principle of prohibition of

39

Para 24. Para 21. The Advocate-General added that in his view, there was less need for an abuse of right principle in Community law because, ‘the risk of there being a gap in the (Community law) system—which is, after all, what the abuse of rights principle, like all other catch-all provisions, seeks to avoid, is minor, or non-existent, in a legal order—like that of the Community which, through judicial interpretation and case-law in general, is more promptly amenable to adaptation to the needs of the society.’ Such proposition, based on the alleged superior adaptability of Community law, is difficult to reconcile with the observation by the Advocate-General that ‘any legal order’ must contain ‘self-protection measures’ to ensure that the rights it confers are not exercised in a manner which is abusive, excessive or distorted. 41 Para 15. 42 Para 21. The Court has however qualified such statement by stressing that the application of the national rule ‘must not prejudice the full effect and uniform application of Community law in the Member States’. On this point, see text below at ‘Lis pendens and the Community Principle of Abuse of Process’. 43 Case C-212/97 [1999] ECR I-1459. 40

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fraudulent or abusive reliance on Community law has not only been consistently upheld in the case law, it is also ‘among the general principles of Community law’.44 This conclusion is implicitly confirmed in the most recent case law of the Court of Justice, which assesses the existence of abuse of rights by reference to autonomous and community criteria, without any recourse to national law. Hence, in the Emsland case (2000),45 the Court devised a two-prong test for the notion of abuse of Community law: A finding of an abuse requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved. It requires, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules by creating artifically the conditions laid down for obtaining it. (Paras 52 and 53)

In the Diamantis case, decided the same year,46 the Court insisted on the fact that for a finding of an abuse of right, the conduct of the litigant must be assessed ‘in the light of the objectives pursued by (the) provisions of Community law’ involved in the case.47 The Court furthermore considered that the abuse could also be assessed on the basis of the test of proportionality that is traditionally a criterion of the concept of ‘abus de droit’ in continental legal systems48: according to the Court, an abuse can be assessed from the fact that, of the remedies available for a situation that has arisen in breach of (a Community) provision, (a party) has chosen a remedy that will cause such serious damage to the legitimate interests of others that it appears manifestly disproportionate.49

As a consequence, the theory of abuse of right would seem to have now rejoined, with an autonomous definition and common criteria, the other general principles of Community law, such as the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination.50

44

Para 20. Case C-110/99 [2000] ECR I-11569. 46 Case C-373/97 Diamantis [2000] ECR I-1459. 47 Para 34. 48 See W van Gerven, ‘The effect of proportionality on the Actions of the Member States of the European Community: National Viewpoints from Continental Europe’ in The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing, 1999), at 60; W van Gerven, ‘Principe de proportionalité, abus de droit et droits fondamentaux’ (1992) Journal des tribunaux (Belgium) 305. 49 Para 43. 50 For that conclusion, see H Schermers and D Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union (Kluwer Law International, 2001), at para 198; see also LN Brown, ‘Is There a General Principle of Abuse of Rights in European Community law?’ in Institutional Dynamics of European Integration: Essays in Honour of Henry G Schermers (Martinus Nijhof Pub, 1994, vol II), at 511. 45

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The principle of abuse of right should therefore have a general scope of application. It should also be relevant for Community provisions in matters of procedure and jurisdiction, including those of the Brussels regime. As a matter of fact, the concept of abuse of right has already found some application in the case law of the Court of Justice applying the Brussels Convention, though for the moment only in an ad hoc fashion and without reliance on a general Community principle.

EUROPEAN CASE LAW APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE OF PROCESS IN THE BRUSSELS REGIME

In at least three different instances, the Court of Justice has used, expressly or implicitly, the concepts of abuse in order to paralyse or restrict the reliance on jurisdictional rules of the Brussels regime. The first case is about the jurisdiction of Article 6 that permits, under certain conditions, the consolidation of various claims before a single court. Article 6(2) of the Brussels Regulation itself provides a kind of anti-abuse provision with respect to third-party actions: a person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State as a third party (such as for an action on a warranty or guarantee) in the court seised of the original proceedings, ‘unless these were instituted solely with the object of removing him from the jurisdiction of the Court which would be competent in his case’. The Luxembourg Court did not hesitate to extend the application of this corrective device to another provision, ie, Article 6(1) which concerns actions against multiple defendants. Despite the absence of any textual basis for doing so, the court has ruled in Kalfelis that this provision must be applied so as to exclude the possibility that a plaintiff ‘makes a claim against a number of defendants with the sole object of ousting the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State where one of the defendants is domiciled’.51 The assessment of the ‘object,’ or purpose, sought by the litigant who brings the action can be seen as an application of the above-mentioned Community test of abuse of right, according to which the intention of the person is scrutinised to verify whether it comports with the objective of the Community rule. Here, the Article 6 jurisdiction is designed to allow the consolidation of actions before a single court for the proper administration of justice, and the use of this rule for the improper object of removing the defendant from his home court is sanctioned.

51 Case 189/87 Kalfelis [1988] ECR 5565, para 9; see also Case C-51/97 Réunion européenne [1998] ECR I-6534, at para 47.

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The second case relates to jurisdiction in contractual matters (Article 5(1)), which is allocated to the place of performance of the contract.52 While the parties are free to define in their contract the place of performance, and thus indirectly to determine the competent court, the European Court has introduced a restriction in MSG: [the parties] are not entitled, having regard to the system established by the Convention, to designate, with the sole aim of specifying the Courts having jurisdiction, a place of performance having no real connection with the reality of the contract.53

According to the Court, such restriction is justified by the need to avoid the ‘circumvention’ of the rules on choice of court agreement.54 Hence, when the parties ‘specify a place of performance which has no actual connection with the real subject-matter of the contract’, it ‘becomes fictitious and has as its sole purpose the determination of the place of the Courts having jurisdiction’ with the consequences that to be valid such clause must respect the conditions laid down in Article 23 of the Regulation for choice of court agreements.55 Again, through this ruling, the Court in essence takes into account the purpose of the behavior of the parties to deny them the benefit of the advantage they are trying abusively to obtain. The third case concerns the matter of exclusive jurisdiction. Under Article 22(5) of the Brussels Regulation, in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments, the courts of the Member State in which the judgment is to be enforced has exclusive jurisdiction. In Autoteile56 the defendant sought to oppose the enforcement of the judgment by relying, as a way of set-off, on a claim that the courts of the same Member State had already rejected for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Justice ruled that the reliance on that claim ‘amounts to a clear abuse of process on the part of the plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining indirectly’ what he could not have obtained directly. Hence the Court held that Article 22(5) could not provide jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. The need to preclude abusive reliance by unscrupulous litigants on Brussels jurisdictional rules has also been emphasised in the Opinion of the Advocate-General in the recent GAT case.57 This case concerns Article 23(3) of the Regulation (16(3) of the Convention), which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Court where a patent was registered for proceedings 52 Which is defined as the place of performance of the obligation in question (Brussels Convention) or, since the modification of Art 5(1) by the Brussels Reg, the place of delivery of the goods (for sales of goods) or the place of the provision of services (for contracts of provision of services). 53 Case C-106/95 MSG v Les Gravières Rhénanes [1997] ECR I-911. 54 Para 57. 55 Or article 17 of the Brussels Convention. 56 Case 220/84 AS Autoteile [1985] ECR 2267. 57 Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik, judgment of 13 July 2006.

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concerned with the registration or validity of the patent. The Court ruled that this rule applies in all proceedings relating to the registration or validity of a patent, ‘irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or a plea of objection’. Hence, the Court took the controversial decision to impose respect of the exclusive jurisdiction of Article 23(3) not only when the issue of (in)validity of the patent is the principal object of the action, but also when it is raised as a defence against an action for infringement (while the latter, as such, is not subject to Article 22(3)58). In so deciding, the Court closely followed the Opinion of the AdvocateGeneral. But it is interesting to note that the Advocate-General had introduced a qualification to the above-mentioned principle: the court seised of the infringement action could still itself decide the whole case ‘should the defendant act in bad faith’.59 The Advocate-General referred here to the circumstance where the defendant would raise the issue of invalidity of the patent only to obstruct the pending proceedings relating to the infringement.60 In that case, as suggested by the Advocate-General, the court seised of the infringement action would not be obliged to stay its proceedings until a decision from the Article 22(3) court on the counterclaim of invalidity, but could itself reject such counter-claim and rule immediately on the infringement action. While the Court did not mention this correcting device—there was no question on this point raised by the referring court—it is difficult to imagine not applying it. To decide otherwise would imply that the defendant in an infringement action, with respect to a patent that is, as such, manifestly valid, would be empowered to block automatically the proceedings by the artifice of invoking, in bad faith, a totally absurd claim of nullity of the patent. Since the Court has decided to follow the approach suggested by the Advocate-General it should also come with the corrective device that the Advocate-General presented as a necessary complement to avoid abuses. The foregoing developments show that the party who seeks to rely abusively on the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels regime will normally be denied the benefit he seeks, being either the exercise jurisdiction (such as in Autoteile) or on the contrary the stay of proceedings (such as in GAT). This is not surprising, since it is only the application in this particular field of the general Community principle of abuse of right described above. What are the consequences of the foregoing principles for the application of the European lis pendens rule?

58

See case 288/82 Duijnstee [1983] ECR 3663. Para 46 (free translation from the French version of the Opinion, not yet available in English). 60 See para 45. 59

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Arnaud Nuyts LIS PENDENS AND THE COMMUNITY PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF PROCESS

As indicated above, the notion of abuse of right under Community law requires an assessment of the conduct of the litigant ‘in the light of the objectives pursued by (the) provisions of Community law’ involved in the case.61 Hence, according to the Court of Justice, a finding of an abuse of right can be deduced from the fact that a party ‘is seeking to derive, to the detriment of (the other party), an improper advantage, manifestly contrary to the objective of that provision’.62 Before considering how the abuse of right principle could potentially affect the application of the lis pendens rule embodied in Article 27 of the Brussels Regulation, it is therefore necessary to assess the objective of that rule. According to settled case law, the lis pendens rule is intended ‘to prevent parallel proceedings before the Courts of different contracting states and to avoid conflicts between decisions which might result therefrom’.63 The Court insists that the purpose of lis pendens is to preclude, in so far as possible and from the outset, the possibility of a situation arising such as… the non-recognition of a judgment on account of its irreconcilability with a judgment given in proceedings between the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought.64

Hence, the obligation for the court second seised to stay its proceedings is justified by the fact that there is already an action in another Member State which could lead to a judgment settling the dispute. As a consequence, pursuant to the Community principle of abuse of right, should a party raise the lis pendens rule with another purpose than this objective, to the detriment of the other party, there could be an abuse of right within the meaning of Community law. Hence, if it can be shown that a party has brought proceedings with no intention whatsoever of obtaining a decision resolving a dispute, but only to block any further action, the court, pursuant to the Community principle of abuse of right, should normally refuse to give the benefit of the lis pendens rule, ie, the court should refuse to stay its proceedings. That should be the case if the court first seised manifestly lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim so that there is no meaningful possibility that a judgment settling the dispute will be awarded by this court. The problem with this analysis, of course, is that in Gasser itself the European Court seems to have ruled out that an exception to the lis pendens rule be made in this situation. Indeed, in Paragraph 53 of the

61

Case C-373/97 Diamantis [2000] ECR I-1459, at para 34. Case C-367/96 Kefalas [1993] ECR I-779, at para 28. Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance [1991] ECR I-3317, at para 16; Case 144/86 Gubisch [1987] ECR 4861. 64 Overseas Union Insurance, n 63, at para 16. 62 63

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decision, already reproduced in the introduction to this chapter, the Court ruled that ‘the difficulties stemming from delaying tactics are not such as to call into question the interpretation of the Convention’. It is submitted here, however, that this finding of the Court does not constitute an absolute bar against the application of the Community principle of abuse of right by national courts, and that there is still some room for a further evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice in this matter. Several reasons support these propositions. First, Paragraph 53 of the Gasser ruling is an obiter dictum. It was never alleged, in the case at hand, that the party who had started the first action (by bringing proceedings in Italy) had engaged in delaying tactics by suing before a court which it knew lacked jurisdiction. And the referring court did not raise at all the question of whether there was a possibility of making an exception to the lis pendens rule in case of abuse of right. Secondly, the Court decided the case ‘in view of the disputes which could arise as to the very existence of a genuine agreement between the parties’.65 For the Court, it is because there was such possibility of disagreement as to whether the jurisdiction clause complies with the formal conditions laid down in the Brussels regime66 that it was necessary to determine clearly and precisely which of the two national courts should rule on the existence of such clause. Indeed, in the case at hand, it was not entirely clear that the Austrian jurisdiction clause relied upon by the party who objected against the jurisdiction of the Italian court complied with the formal requirements of the Brussels regime. The clause was printed on invoices that had been issued without the other party raising objection, but it is unclear whether, to use the words of the Court in Gasser, there was a ‘real consent’ to this clause, a requirement which is ‘justified by the concern to protect the weaker contracting party by ensuring that jurisdiction clauses incorporated in a contract by one party alone do not go unnoticed’.67 Hence, this was not a case where there is an obvious abuse on the part of the party who commences proceedings in breach of a jurisdiction clause incorporated in a contract signed by both parties which manifestly complies with all the Community requirements. From this perspective, the Gasser situation can be distinguished from a case such as Primacom.68 In that case, a German borrower who owed large sums of money to an English bank instituted proceedings in Germany in breach of an English choice of court agreement incorporated in the contract. The German party could not provide any reason why it challenged the English jurisdiction clause, other than the very fact that

65 66 67 68

Para 51. Art 23 of the Brussels Reg and Art 17 of the Brussels Convention. Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, n 1, para 50. JP Morgan Europe Ltd v Primacom AG [2005] EWHC 508 (Comm).

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proceedings had been commenced in Germany.69 The English court noted that the jurisdiction clause was manifestly valid and enforceable and that it could not see how the German court could potentially find that it would be entitled to exercise jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this finding, the English court felt bound by the decision in Gasser to stay its proceedings in favour of the German court. It is submitted here that Gasser, in fact, does not necessarily require such automatic conclusion, and that the London court could have reviewed whether, under the specific circumstances of the case, the German party was not, to use the above-mentioned Kefalas test, ‘seeking to derive, to the detriment of [the English bank], an improper advantage, manifestly contrary to the objective of [Article 27 of the Brussels Regulation]’. There is a third reason why the Gasser ruling does not necessarily represent the final word in this matter (even setting aside the possibility, discussed above, of a revision of the Regulation). In Gasser, the Court ruled that the difficulties stemming from delaying tactics are not such as to ‘call into question the interpretation of the Convention’. That is certainly correct as a basic principle, and unlikely to be overruled by the Court in the future. But it does not address as such the issue which is at stake here. Indeed, the question is not whether, because of the conduct of the litigants, the interpretation of the Convention is to be called into question: Article 27 of the Brussels Regulation is to be construed, as decided by the Court, as requiring the second court seised to stay its proceedings even if its jurisdiction has been claimed under a jurisdiction agreement. Hence the issue is not about altering the interpretation of this provision, nor of any other rule of the Brussels Convention/Regulation. It is about the power of national courts to take into account abuse on the part of the litigant who relies on Community law to deny him the benefit of it. The European Court’s jurisprudence already provides illustrations of the distinction that needs to be drawn between the two aspects (ie, the interpretation of provision of Community law v the sanction of abusive reliance on such provision), and of the room for evolution of the case law on the definition of the borderline between them. One of the most striking examples of such progressive refinement of the case law can be found in the area of European company law, more particularly with respect to the application of the Second Directive on the maintenance and alteration of the capital of public limited liability companies.70 The Court of Justice has repeatedly been requested to rule on the issue of whether the action for annulment of a capital increase of such a company for breach of the 69 While the German party also suggested that there might be some public policy argument against the effectiveness of the clause, it could not provide, according to the English court, any evidence of any kind suggesting that there were any arguments available in this respect. 70 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second para of Art 58 of the Treaty, in

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Directive can degenerate into an abuse. In a first case,71 the Court ruled simply that in order to preserve the full effect of application of Community law, it is excluded that such action be deemed abusive. In a second case,72 the Court ruled that an action could not be deemed abusive only on the basis that the company is in a financial crisis, because the Community provision is precisely designed to apply in such situation, with the consequence that a finding of abuse ‘would be tantamount to a declaration that the mere exercise of the right arising from that provision is improper’.73 And the Court insisted, in a Gasser-like wording, that if it was decided otherwise ‘the scope of that provision would be altered, whereas… the provision must remain applicable in such a situation’.74 But at the same time, the Court made a first opening by admitting, in an answer to a specific question from the referring court about the role of the abuse of right principle, that, Community law does not preclude a national court, on the basis of sufficient telling evidence, from examining whether, by bringing an action… for a declaration that an increase in capital is invalid, a shareholder is seeking to derive, to the detriment of the company, an improper advantage, manifestly contrary to the objective of that provision.75

In a third case,76 the Court went a step further and provided further guidance as to the circumstances where an abuse could be evidenced, pointing to the situation where, ‘of the remedies available… [the shareholder] has chosen a remedy that will cause such serious damage to the legitimate interests of others that it appears manifestly disproportionate’.77 For the court to deduce from such situation that there is an abuse of rights and to preclude the shareholder from pursuing the action ‘would not alter the scope of that provision and would not compromise its objectives’.78 The Court insisted that the assessment of the national court must be fact-specific: it must verify, whether, in view of all that has taken place, in law and in fact, since the alterations in the capital of the company, the type of reparation sought constitutes sufficient telling evidence… of abuse of the shareholder’s rights under (Community law).79

respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguard equivalent, [1977] OJ L26, 1. 71 Case C-441/93 Pafitis [1996] ECR I-1347. 72 Case C-367/96 Kefalas [1993] ECR I-779. 73 Ibid, para 24. 74 Ibid, para 25. 75 Ibid, para 28. 76 Case C-373/97 Diamantis [2000] ECR I-1459. 77 Ibid, para 43. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid, para 42.

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There seems to be no reason why these principles could not be transposed to the Brussels regime. The national court should be entitled to verify whether, in view of all the circumstances of the case, there is sufficient telling evidence that by rushing to bring an action for a negative declaration before the court of a Member State that manifestly lacks jurisdiction, a litigant is engaging in delaying tactics and seeks to obtain, to the detriment of another party, an advantage that is manifestly contrary to the objective of the lis pendens rule and, more generally, the Brussels regime.

CONCLUSION

The Gasser ruling has been much criticised for seemingly opening the door in the European judicial area to systematic abuse and delaying tactics by unscrupulous litigants. The foregoing developments suggest that the criticism may be unwarranted or at least exaggerated. Not because the Court would have been right to condone the kind of behaviour that is associated with obstructive and delaying tactics. But because the Court did not address as such the issue of abuse of process, a silence which cannot be criticised since this question was not raised by the referring court, and since there was, under the specific circumstances of the case as reported to the Court, no obvious abuse on the part of one of the litigants. True, the Court did rule that delaying tactics by litigants who seek to delay the settlement of substantive disputes are not such as to call in question the interpretation of any provision of the Brussels Convention, as deduced from its wording and purpose. But that should not be as such a subject for disapproval. Indeed, this seems to be plainly correct and in accordance with settled case law: the way the rules of Community law are interpreted is not to be altered only because there is a possibility that, under such interpretation, some parties might engage in abusive actions or behaviours. But at the same time, national courts keep the residual power, or even duty, to verify in view of all that has taken place, in law and in fact, that the rules of Community law are not relied upon abusively by the parties. Pursuant to the general Community principle of abuse of right, which under the most recent case law seems to have received a general scope of application, the national courts are entitled or are even required, when a manifest abuse occurs, to deny the abusing party the benefit of the provisions of Community law he seeks to rely upon. This is not to say that the Gasser ruling is not problematic, especially with respect to the basic holding that the court appointed by the parties is deprived of the right to assess for itself whether the jurisdiction clause is valid when another court has already been seised of a parallel proceeding in breach of the jurisdiction clause. The problem with this holding, which is linked in particular to the fact that it seems to apply even when the first

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action is for a negative declaration, may be cured only through a change of the wording of the Regulation. And it is equally true that the abuse of right correction is a particularly narrow one, which applies only in very particular circumstances, when there is clear evidence that a litigant is seeking to derive, to the detriment of another party, an improper advantage manifestly contrary to the objective of the Brussels regime. But though this tool should be used sparingly, it is still available under current European law and should indeed be relied upon to sanction the most blatant abusive tactics used by unscrupulous litigants within the European judicial area.

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3 Le Principe de Confiance Mutuelle et Les Injonctions Anti-Suit MARIE-LAURE NIBOYET PROFESSEUR À L’UNIVERSITÉ PARIS-X NANTERRE 28. [D]ès lors que le comportement reproché au défendeur consiste à se prévaloir de la compétence d’une juridiction d’un autre État membre, le jugement porté sur le caractère abusif de ce comportement implique une appréciation du caractère pertinent de l’introduction d’une action devant une juridiction d’un autre État membre. Or, une telle appréciation est contraire au principe de confiance mutuelle qui… est à la base de la convention. CJCE, 27 avril 2004, Gregory Paul Turner c Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd et Changepoint SA (Aff C-159/02) 28. [I]n so far as the conduct for which the defendant is criticised consists in recourse to the jurisdiction of the court of another Member State, the judgment made as to the abusive nature of that conduct implies an assessment of the appropriateness of bringing proceedings before a court of another Member State. Such an assessment runs counter to the principle of mutual trust which … underpins the Convention. CJEC, 27 April 2004, Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd et Changepoint SA (Case C-159/02)

Qu’il me soit permis d’abord de remercier et de féliciter les organisateurs de cette journée d’avoir eu cette excellente idée d’une analyse croisée franco-britannique de quelques décisions, présentant d’étroites connexions—décisions qui au surplus ont toutes retenu l’attention de la doctrine de part et d’autre de la Manche. Toutes ces décisions traitent en effet du même problème, appréhendé sous des angles différents. Mais ces connexions sont aussi à l’origine de la difficulté de l’exercice. Tout se tient. Il est très difficile de parler du principe de confiance mutuelle sans évoquer aussitôt celui de l’autonomie procédurale des Etats membres, des limites de celle-ci, lesquelles suggèrent ensuite une réflexion sur le moyen d’éviter les excès processuels, sous l’angle du droit national ou sous celui de la recherche d’une solution communautaire. Je profiterai donc de la liberté que nous ont très aimablement reconnue les organisateurs de cette journée—en essayant de ne pas en abuser—pour

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ne pas me cantonner strictement au seul motif qu’il m’a été demandé de commenter, en m’attachant d’abord à respecter l’esprit de cette journée : la confrontation des réflexions sur les failles de l’espace judiciaire européen et l’énoncé de propositions pour les combler de la façon la plus efficace possible. Le motif avancé par la Cour de justice pour condamner les injonctions anti-suit dans l’espace judiciaire européen, c’est le respect du principe de confiance mutuelle, principe qui est le leitmotiv de tous les nouveaux instruments de coopération judiciaire européenne, mais sur lequel on ne dispose pas encore d’études très approfondies. Or, comme beaucoup de commentateurs l’ont observé, y compris en France, quelle que soit la façon dont on envisage le principe de confiance mutuelle, la justification paraît un peu courte pour condamner les injonctions anti-suit. C’est ce que je rappellerai dans un premier temps de mon exposé. Pour autant, je ne crois pas qu’il faille regretter la solution de l’arrêt Turner. La condamnation du recours aux injonctions—du moins dans les relations intracommunautaires—peut se justifier au regard de l’unilatéralité du procédé, peu approprié me semble-t-il à l’état de développement de l’espace judiciaire européen. C’est le point que je voudrais souligner dans un second temps de l’exposé. Examinons donc la solution Turner, d’abord au regard du principe de confiance mutuelle, puis au regard de l’unilatéralité du procédé.

LES INJONCTIONS ANTI-SUIT ET LE PRINCIPE DE CONFIANCE MUTUELLE

Selon la Cour de justice, dès lors que le comportement reproché au plaideur consiste à se prévaloir de la compétence d’une juridiction d’un autre Etat membre… le jugement impliquant une appréciation sur le caractère pertinent de l’introduction d’une action devant une juridiction d’un autre Etat membre… est contraire au principe de confiance mutuelle… qui interdit au juge… de contrôler la compétence d’un juge d’un autre Etat membre.

C’est le motif 28. Ce motif est assez facile à démonter. Plus subtile est celui du point 25 auquel renvoie le point 28: Il est inhérent au principe de confiance mutuelle que les règles de compétence… qui sont communes à tous les Etats membres puissent être interprétées et appliquées avec la même autorité par chacune d’entre elles.

Le commentaire de ces deux justifications—celle que l’on trouve au point 28 et celle qui figure, par renvoi, au point 25—invite en réalité à s’interroger sur les différentes acceptions que l’on peut donner au principe

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de confiance mutuelle. Le principe de confiance mutuelle, appliqué à la coopération judiciaire européenne, peut en effet, s’entendre de trois façons différentes.

L’interdiction de remettre en cause la compétence des juridictions des autres Etats membres A l’origine de la convention de Bruxelles, le principe exprime l’obligation pour tous les Etats membres de reconnaître les décisions qui émanent des juridictions des autres Etats membres (cf les considérants 16 et 17 du règlement Bruxelles 1). C’est aussi, par anticipation du prononcé de ces décisions, l’interdiction de remettre en cause la compétence des juridictions des autres Etats membres, qui seraient déjà saisies du même litige dans une procédure parallèle. On peut donc poser un principe d’interdiction faite aux juges d’un Etat membre de contrôler le respect des règles de compétence de la convention par les juges des autres Etats membres, sous réserve de quelques cas bien délimités—principalement le respect des règles de compétence exclusive ou de certaines règles de compétence spéciale. Et cette interdiction est étendue aux cas de litispendance.1 Or, il est clair que les injonctions anti-suit délivrées dans les circonstances similaires à celles de l’affaire Turner ne conduisent pas à contester la compétence du juge d’un autre Etat membre, mais se bornent à combattre le comportement processuel abusif d’une des parties. C’était le cœur de l’argumentation britannique développée devant la cour de justice, tendant à soutenir que les injonctions de ce type sont des mesures de procédure, adressées in personam, et non des règles de compétence. En l’occurrence, en effet, la saisine du juge espagnol était critiquée en raison du but de cette action qui était d’intimider Turner pour l’inciter à abandonner la procédure qu’il avait précédemment introduite contre son employeur en Angleterre. Le juge espagnol avait été saisi d’une action en dommages-intérêts dirigée contre Turner, pour une somme considérable, en arguant d’un manquement de celui-ci à ses obligations, en réplique à la demande qu’il avait lui-même formée précédemment en Angleterre, et visant à dénoncer des agissements illicites de son employeur, équivalents à un licenciement abusif. On était donc dans l’hypothèse où l’injonction vise à faire cesser une procédure étrangère introduite à des fins vexatoires et oppressives, ici le harcèlement de l’une des parties, et non celle où l’on conteste le caractère approprié de la saisine d’un juge étranger, en raison du défaut de liens avec le litige. L’injonction ne remettait donc pas en cause la compétence du juge 1

Comme l’a rappelé l’arrêt C/351/89, Overseas Union Insurance du 27 juin 1991.

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espagnol, même indirectement. Du côté du juge espagnol, celui-ci restait libre d’exercer sa compétence. Et du côté du destinataire de l’injonction, celui-ci se trouvait empêché de profiter de la compétence des tribunaux espagnols certes, mais pour des raisons indépendantes de cette compétence. La confusion peut venir de l’observation précédente de la Cour selon laquelle le comportement reproché au défendeur consiste à se prévaloir de la compétence d’une juridiction d’un autre Etat membre.

Mais cette observation est contestable. Ce qui était reproché aux sociétés Changepoint et Harada, ce n’est pas de s’être prévalu de la compétence du juge madrilène. C’est d’avoir intenté une action à d’autres fins que celles qu’ils avaient affichées. C’était un détournement du droit d’action et non des règles de compétence judicaire. Il est vrai cependant que la distinction n’est pas aussi tranchée en droit anglais car dans l’appréciation de l’intérêt légitime conditionnant la délivrance d’une injonction intervient aussi l’appréciation du caractère adéquat de la saisine du juge étranger. Le caractère vexatoire de la procédure étrangère peut en effet se dégager de la saisine d’un juge éloigné. Mais, dans cette affaire, ce n’était pas l’éloignement du juge espagnol qui posait problème. Le juge espagnol semble avoir été choisi pour tenter de lui faire accréditer une présentation tronquée des faits, du moins complètement différente de celles que Turner avait soutenue devant les juges britanniques. C’est le même problème que celui qui surgit dans le débat sur le maintien de l’opportunité d’un contrôle de l’exequatur en Europe. Le principe de confiance mutuelle pourrait conduire à justifier la suppression de tout contrôle de régularité exercé sur les jugements européens. Mais la pratique révèle l’utilité de maintenir certains garde-fous contre les manœuvres de certains plaideurs.2 Ainsi, notamment, celle assez fréquente, qui consiste à dissimuler le domicile de l’adversaire afin de profiter d’un mode de signification peu efficace et ensuite d’une procédure par défaut, au cours de laquelle le demandeur développe son argumentation factuelle et juridique sans contradicteur. Ce n’est qu’au stade de la mise à l’exécution du jugement que le malencontreux défendeur peut s’apercevoir de la manœuvre et démontrer que la réalité est tout autre que celle qui a été présentée au juge d’origine. Dans un tel cas, le rôle du juge de l’exequatur ne consiste pas à contrôler le juge d’origine ni dans sa manière d’apprécier les éléments de fait ni dans celle d’appliquer les règles du système de Bruxelles 1, ni encore dans celle de juger. Le juge de l’exequatur se contente de sanctionner les manipulations—facilitées par la dimension internationale du litige—

2 Sur l’utilité du maintien d’un contrôle d’exequatur en Europe, voir « L’exequatur des jugements étrangers en France, étude de 1390 décisions inédites (1999-2001) », par M-L Niboyet et L Sinopoli, Gaz Pal 2004, n 169.

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dont le juge d’origine a pu être l’objet. D’ailleurs la meilleure preuve que ce contrôle n’est porteur d’aucune suspicion à l’encontre du juge d’origine est qu’on peut concevoir que ce soit le juge d’origine lui-même qui l’exerce, comme dans les nouveaux instruments communautaire immédiatement exécutoires.3 Le principe de confiance mutuelle—aussi poussée que soit l’intégration européenne—ne peut donc pas faire disparaître totalement le phénomène de la frontière et les difficultés qui lui sont inhérentes. Il en va pareillement des injonctions luttant contre les abus processuel, dites défensives. En se dotant d’un moyen efficace pour lutter contre ces abus, le juge anglais ne remet en cause ni la compétence ni les appréciations du juge d’un autre Etat membre, pas même, à mon sens, indirectement. Son propos est autre. Du reste, on peut concevoir que le juge étranger soit non seulement compétent selon les règles de la convention, mais aussi très bien placé pour connaître du litige, ce qui n’était pas vraiment le cas du juge madrilène dans l’affaire Turner, mais c’est une autre question. En d’autres termes la compétence du juge étranger n’interdit pas le prononcé d’une injonction, s’il a été saisi dans des conditions frauduleuses par l’une des parties. Ce n’est donc pas une atteinte au principe de confiance mutuelle, compris comme l’interdiction de remettre en cause la compétence des juridictions d’un autre Etat membre, qui condamne le recours aux injonctions.

La consécration d’un principe de fongibilité entre les règles et institutions des divers Etats membres On peut avoir une conception plus large du principe de reconnaissance mutuelle. Avec la communautarisation, on peut y voir la consécration d’un principe de fongibilité entre les règles et institutions des divers Etats membres, qui les rendraient équivalentes.4 Dans cette optique, il devrait être indifférent aux plaideurs que le litige soit porté devant la justice de tel ou tel Etat membre. La meilleure illustration de cette fongibilité est le règlement Bruxelles 2 bis et ses règles de compétence en matière de divorce. On a admis presque tous les fors possibles parce qu’ils sont tous présumés équivalents. Les distances au sein de l’Union européenne ne sont plus prises en compte, les différences

3 Cf le titre exécutoire européen créé par le règlement CE n805/2004 du 21 avril 2004, JOUE L143 du 30 mai 2004. 4 A comparer avec les conclusions prises dans cette affaire par l’avocat général Colomer, §31: « la notion de confiance mutuelle… présuppose que chaque Etat reconnaisse la capacité des autres ordres juridiques à contribuer de façon autonome bien qu’harmonisée à la réalisation des objectifs d’intégration fixés ».

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linguistiques ou de culture juridique non plus, de sorte qu’il n’y a plus de protection particulière du défendeur par rapport au demandeur, par exemple. Ainsi, pour Turner, il n’y a pas de préjudice lié à la saisine d’un juge espagnol. Il était parfaitement informé de la procédure espagnole—il est établi qu’il avait reçu la notification—et il pouvait soulever devant le juge espagnol l’exception de litispendance au profit du juge anglais. Pour la suite du raisonnement, il faut faire confiance au juge espagnol pour se dessaisir en raison de l’antériorité de la saisine du juge anglais (sous réserve d’une identité de litiges). Comme on l’a déjà observé, dans l’affaire Turner, le prononcé de l’injonction avait pour résultat de conforter les objectifs de la convention de Bruxelles. On peut même se demander s’il était vraiment utile, et si les mécanismes de la convention n’étaient pas suffisants pour dénouer la situation. On pourrait donc craindre que la pratique des injonctions n’exprime une méfiance à l’égard des juges des autres Etats membres qui serait contraire au principe de confiance mutuelle. Raisonner ainsi négligerait néanmoins un aspect pratique important. Les règles de la litispendance ne résolvent pas tout. Elles sont impuissantes à résoudre le problème de la charge que représente pour une partie d’avoir à se défendre dans deux procédures, surtout pour les petits plaideurs: la procédure introduite en premier et la procédure subséquente, pour soulever devant le juge second l’exception de litispendance. Les règles sur la litispendance préviennent le conflit de jugements—et à la condition que la situation de litispendance ait été connue des juges saisis en second—mais pas le conflit de procédures. C’est le point faible de tout système fondé exclusivement sur le critère de l’ordre des saisines, comme celui de la convention de Bruxelles et maintenant des règlements Bruxelles 1 et Bruxelles 2. L’on constate en effet que les hypothèses de conflits de procédures sont légion. Aussi, pour en revenir à l’affaire Turner, on aurait pu admettre que les saisines du juge espagnol ou du juge anglais étaient équivalentes. Mais la double saisine était un problème en soi et sans rapport avec le principe de confiance mutuelle. C’est encore une conséquence du phénomène de la frontière qui pousse les plaideurs à entreprendre des procédures parallèles concurrentes dans plusieurs pays. C’est pourquoi les raisons invoquées par la Cour de justice au point 28 n’emportent pas la conviction. Voyons maintenant si l’on peut invoquer la nécessité d’une application uniforme des règles de la convention, comme principe inhérent au principe de confiance mutuelle pour condamner les injonctions anti-suit?

La nécessité d’une application uniforme des règles de compétence L’arrêt Turner énonce au point 25 qu’:

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Il est inhérent au principe de confiance mutuelle que les règles de compétence… qui sont communes à tous les Etats membres puissent être interprétées et appliquées avec la même autorité par chacune d’entre elles,

en se référant à l’affaire Overseas. Toutefois, si dans cette affaire, comme dans l’affaire Gasser, il ’agissait bien de l’interprétation et de l’application des règles de compétence de la convention, ce n’était pas le cas dans l’affaire Turner. On pouvait donc penser que les juges anglais pouvaient se servir de leurs règles nationales de procédure, conformément au principe de l’autonomie procédurale des Etats membres. De deux choses l’une, en effet : soit l’on est dans le cadre de l’application des règles de la convention, soit on est dans celui des règles nationales de procédure, sous réserve du respect de l’effet utile des règles de compétence, point que je n’aborderai pas. Mais on ne peut pas reconnaître en même temps l’autonomie des Etats membres et imposer l’uniformité des droits nationaux. Cela paraît incompatible. Une circonstance de l’affaire Turner pourrait cependant justifier l’application uniforme. Il y avait un conflit avéré (et pas seulement potentiel) de procédures puisque le juge espagnol était saisi. Dans cette hypothèse, l’injonction interférait avec le mode de règlement des conflits de procédures pendantes établi par la convention. On peut donc estimer qu’elle interférait avec le système de compétence au sens large. Et cette interférence aurait justifié une application uniforme, ou du moins l’emploi de procédés similaires dans les différents Etats membres. Mais, même ainsi formulée, la critique ne serait pas dirimante. On peut très bien imaginer en effet que tous les Etats membres recourent aux injonctions. L’affirmation peut surprendre. L’institution est originaire des systèmes de common law et ces systèmes sont minoritaires dans l’espace judiciaire européen. Mais la technique injonctive peut parfaitement être introduite et généralisée dans tous les systèmes. L’exemple du droit français en atteste et rien, sans doute, ne devrait interdire aux autres systèmes de la consacrer dans des conditions similaires. Ainsi, peut-être sans en avoir eu véritablement conscience, la cour de cassation française a-t-elle, dans une affaire Banque Worms contre époux Brachot consacrer une véritable injonction anti-suit. Les juges français dans le contexte d’une faillite transfrontière—antérieurement à l’entrée en vigueur du nouveau règlement sur les procédures d’insolvabilité—n’ont pas hésité à délivrer à l’un des créanciers du débiteur en faillite une injonction sous astreinte de se désister d’une saisie immobilière introduite en Espagne d’un bien du débiteur situé en Espagne. L’injonction avait pour but d’empêcher ce créancier de porter atteinte au principe d’égalité des créanciers alors que le jugement d’ouverture de la faillite, non exequaturé en Espagne, ne pouvait produire d’effet suspensif des poursuites. A cette occasion, la cour de cassation a reconnu au juge français de la faillite compétent au fond le pouvoir de

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prononcer une injonction à la personne du défendeur d’agir ou de s’abstenir, quelle que soit la localisation des biens en cause.5

Dans cette affaire, l’injonction présentait une double finalité conservatoire et procédurale, même si c’est la première finalité qui a principalement inspiré la solution.6 Ce pouvoir d’injonction sanctionné par astreinte peut s’appuyer d’une part, sur le principe général de l’article 1382 du code civil, permettant au juge d’ordonner la cessation ou la prévention d’un préjudice, et d’autre part, sur l’article 33 de la loi sur les voies d’exécution qui dispose que « tout juge peut, même d’office, ordonner une astreinte pour assurer l’exécution de sa décision » (loi du 9 juillet 1991).7 Certes l’astreinte est moins intimidante que les sanctions du contempt of court mais elle possède quand même des pouvoirs comminatoires bien réels. On peut regretter dès lors que la cour de cassation soit revenue sur les potentialités de la jurisprudence Brachot dans un arrêt du 30 juin 2004 rendu dans l’affaire Stolzenberg.8 L’arrêt Stolzenberg est un arrêt très important. Il a admis qu’un freezing order délivré par un juge anglais contre un débiteur possédant des biens en France, était susceptible d’exequatur en France, en reconnaissant à l’injonction la nature d’une décision civile. Mais il a aussi retenu l’attention par son obiter dictum dans lequel la cour de cassation française a opposé l’injonction Mareva à l’injonction anti-suit pour dire que la première ne porte pas atteinte à une prérogative de souveraineté étrangère et n’affecte pas, à la différence de la seconde, la compétence juridictionnelle de l’Etat requis. Ce que l’on peut regretter, c’est le caractère trop tranché de cette opposition entre les deux injonctions et la trop grande généralité de la condamnation des injonctions anti-suit, notamment en ne réservant pas une exception en faveur des injonction tendant à lutter contre les abus de procédures, comme dans l’affaire Turner. Je ne reprendrai pas le débat doctrinal sur la question de la conformité au droit international des injonctions anti-suit, sur le point de savoir si elles portent atteinte ou non à la souveraineté étrangère, en raison de leurs effets indirects. On sait en effet que si les injonctions ne portent pas directement atteinte à la souveraineté étrangère, elles ont pour effet indirect de priver en fait le juge étranger de pouvoir exercer sa compétence.9 Je crois qu’on peut aujourd’hui adopter la 5 Cass 1ère civ 19 novembre 2002, JCP 2002, II,10201, concl Sainte-Rose, note Chaillé de Néré; D2003, p 797, note G Khairallah; RCDIP 2003, p 631, note H Muir Watt. 6 Voir les conclusions précitées note 4 de l’avocat général Sainte-Rose. 7 A comp avec P de Vareilles-Sommières, « Le forum shopping devant les juridictions françaises », Trav. Com Fr DIP 1998-2000, p 49. 8 Cass 1ère civ 30 juin 2004: RCDIP 2004, p 815, note H Muir Watt; JDI 2005, p 112, note G Cuniberti; Gaz Pal 2005, n 15, p 28, note M-L Niboyet. 9 Sur ce débat voir en France S Clavel, Le pouvoir injonctif extraterritorial pour le règlement des litiges privés internationaux, th Paris 1, 1999, p 236 et s et en Belgique, A Nuyts, L’exception de forum non conveniens. Etudes de droit international privé comparé, Bruylant, 2003, N 367 et s.

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position médiane qui a reçu récemment le renfort de l’Institut de droit international dans sa résolution de 2003, pour dire que les injonctions ne sont pas, par principe, contraires au droit international mais que tout dépend des conditions dans lesquelles elles sont exercées. S’agissant des injonctions visant à obvier à des comportements procéduraux abusifs et donc à protéger des intérêts privés concernant une procédure du for, le procédé semble légitime, spécialement quand le juge qui la prononce est compétent sur le fond du litige. A la condition toutefois d’en user avec beaucoup de prudence comme le préconise la résolution de l’Institut de droit international.10 On peut pour les mêmes raisons écarter le grief de contrariété à l’article 6 de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme. L’argument de l’article 6 est à double tranchant. D’un côté, il est indéniable que l’injonction empêche son destinataire de saisir un juge mais du point de vue de l’autre plaideur, on peut estimer qu’en luttant contre un abus processuel, l’injonction protège le droit d’accès à la justice de celui-ci, en le rendant effectif. Du reste, la cour européenne admet des restrictions au droit d’accès dès lors qu’elles sont légitimes et proportionnées. S’agissant d’injonction visant à obvier à des comportements procéduraux abusifs, et donc à protéger des intérêts privés concernant une procédure se déroulant devant les tribunaux du for, le procédé semble légitime, spécialement quand le juge qui la prononce est compétent sur le fond du litige. Dans ce contexte, il faut bien voir que l’injonction n’interdit pas le droit d’agir en justice à l’étranger mais seulement l’abus du droit d’agir en justice. Pourquoi dès lors empêcher de prévenir les abus, alors que personne ne songerait à contester la possibilité de sanctionner, a posteriori ces mêmes abus? Ce contexte est très différent de celui dans lequel l’injonction viserait à protéger des intérêts étatiques du for. En conclusion, ce n’est ni l’interdiction de remettre en cause la compétence du juge d’un autre Etat membre, ni la fongibilité des institutions des divers Etats membres, ni l’obligation de faire une application uniforme de la convention qui est en cause. On ne peut donc pas convoquer le principe de confiance mutuelle. On ne peut pas non plus s’abriter derrière ce principe pour refuser de voir la faille du système actuel de règlement des conflits de procédures. Mais si faille il y a, ce n’est pas au juge d’un Etat membre de trouver le remède dans son droit national. Comme l’avocat général Colomer l’a justement relevé il n’a pas été prévu d’autoriser les juridictions d’un Etat déterminé à s’arroger le droit de solutionner les difficultés que l’initiative européenne elle-même prétend aplanir.11

10 Résolution de l’Institut de Droit International sur les principes relatifs à l’usage de la doctrine du forum non conveniens et des injonctions anti-suit du 2 septembre 2003, Session de Bruges. 11 Conclusions précitées §31.

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En définitive, c’est le caractère unilatéral du procédé qui le rend mal adapté aux nécessités de la coopération européenne.

L’INJONCTION ET L’UNILATÉRALITÉ DU PROCÉDÉ

La solution Turner est juste, parce qu’elle fait bien apparaître le besoin, dans l’espace judiciaire, de mesures bilatérales. Le problème que soulève l’application des règles de la litispendance, en cas d’abus processuel, c’est la double procédure qui est imposée à la victime de l’abus tant que le conflit de procédures n’a pas été tranché. Les mécanismes actuels sont donc impuissants à remédier à ce type de difficultés. Il en va de même des autres techniques unilatérales, comme l’exception d’abus. Dans l’affaire Gasser, par exemple, la saisine du juge italien en violation de la clause désignant le juge autrichien oblige Gasser à se présenter devant le juge italien pour dénoncer l’abus, sinon la procédure italienne va suivre son cours, même si l’invocation devant le juge autrichien d’une exception d’abus pourrait paralyser une exception de litispendance.12 La clause attributive de juridiction ne le met donc pas totalement à l’abri de la saisine d’un autre juge. L’injonction, à cet égard, est un moyen plus efficace mais il est difficile d’admettre, comme l’a noté l’avocat général Colomer qu’une juridiction d’un Etat membre décide de son propre chef des moyens à mettre en œuvre pour régler les difficultés d’application du texte communautaire. Il peut donc paraître préférable de rechercher un mode de coopération judiciaire qui permettrait aux différents juges saisis de rechercher ensemble le règlement du conflit de procédure. Examinons d’abord le mécanisme, avant d’en souligner les avantages et les limites.

Le mécanisme Des techniques de coopération existent déjà dans d’autres domaines. En matière d’obtention des preuves, la mise en œuvre du nouveau règlement CE du 28 mai 200113 devrait conduire les juges concernés à une concertation transfrontière pour décider du mode de preuve à rechercher et des modalités de son administration afin d’ajuster au mieux l’exécution des mesures probatoires au cadre du procès au principal. Ainsi, le juge requérant devrait-il interroger le juge requis sur les possibilités dont il dispose dans son système national pour exécuter la mesure et le juge 12 13

Cf la solution proposée par A Nuyts, thèse précitée supra note 8, p 756 et s. Règlement n 1206/2001, JOCE 27 juin 2001, L174, p 1.

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requérant devrait-il s’enquérir des nécessités du procès principal. Cette coopération n’est pas explicitement énoncée mais elle est induite par la logique de l’instrument. En matière de responsabilité parentale le règlement dit Bruxelles 2 bis invite encore plus clairement les juges à se concerter lors du choix et de l’exécution des mesures relatives à l’enfant dans les relations transfrontières, pour déterminer la juridiction compétente, pour faire respecter un droit de visite ou pour statuer sur une demande de retour de l’enfant après son déplacement illicite.14 Dans d’autres domaines, la coopération porte plus précisément sur la question des conflits de procédures. On peut penser au droit de la concurrence avec la coopération des autorités de concurrence,15 ou peutêtre prochainement dans les procédures pénales.16 Il est vrai que dans ces deux derniers domaines, la matière n’est pas disponible et l’on peut accepter plus aisément l’ingérence des juges dans le règlement du conflit de procédures. Mais cette spécificité ne devrait pas exclure totalement la possibilité d’une transposition dans la matière civile et commerciale. Celle-ci nécessite simplement des aménagements. Enfin l’on dispose du modèle suivi dans les Etats fédéraux d’Amérique du Nord, pratiquant le renvoi de compétence, qui a inspiré le dispositif conciliant les techniques de la litispendance et du forum non conveniens de l’avant projet de convention de La Haye.17 Ce modèle consiste à permettre une coordination des deux techniques en prévoyant que le juge saisi en premier décline la primauté qui lui est offerte en faveur du juge saisi en second, si celui apparaît mieux placé, solution qui a séduit plusieurs auteurs et qui a été reprise dans les principes de Louvain et de Londres de L’association internationale de procédure.18 Aujourd’hui, les contacts transfrontières entre les juges des Etats membres sont possibles dans le cadre du Réseau judiciaire en matière civile et commerciale. Il ne reste donc plus qu’à formaliser les choses en modifiant le règlement Bruxelles1 et en ouvrant aux juges parallèlement saisis dans

14 Règlement CE n 2210/2003 du 27 novembre 2003. Sur ce règlement voir: Le nouveau droit communautaire du divorce et de la responsabilité parentale, sous la direction de H Fulchiron et C Nourissat, Dalloz, Thèmes et commentaires, 2005. 15 Cf le règlement CE n 1/2003 du 16 décembre 2002 relatif à la mise en œuvre des règles de concurrence prévues aux articles 81 et 82 du traité, JOCE du 4 janv.2003, L 1, p 1 et sur le réseau communautaire en droit de la concurrence voir B.Lasserre, « Modernisation: les adaptations nécessaires du Conseil de la concurrence », Concurrences 2005, n 1, p 29 et du même auteur « Le conseil de la concurrence dans le réseau communautaire », Concurrences 2005, n 3, p 42. 16 Voir le livre vert lançant une consultation sur les conflits de compétences et le principe non bis in idem dans le cadre des procédures pénales, Com (2005) 696 final. 17 Voir art 21 de l’avant-projet de convention mondiale de La Haye sur la compétence internationale en matière civile et commerciale, adopté par la commission spéciale le 30 octobre 1999. 18 Voir le rapport de la 69ème conférence de l’Association de droit international, .

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plusieurs Etats membres la possibilité d’un règlement concerté du conflit de compétences. Nous sommes en effet parvenus à un stade suffisamment avancé d’intégration pour concevoir et mettre en œuvre de telles techniques. C’est le paradoxe. A l’origine, les règles sur la litispendance européenne ont été présentées comme un progrès de la confiance mutuelle entre les Etats signataires. Aujourd’hui, cette même confiance mutuelle doit conduire à introduire un mode de concertation transfrontière pour résoudre les situations de litispendance. C’est l’idée que j’avais émise lors d’une conférence présentée à la cour de cassation.19 A la suite des interventions au débat qui s’est ensuivi, j’ai depuis réfléchi au régime qu’on pourrait imprimer à ce renvoi de compétence. Sans entrer dans les détails, car les difficultés ne manquent pas, on peut recenser les objectifs suivants: respecter le caractère disponible du litige en subordonnant le mécanisme à la demande de l’une des parties; respecter des délais très brefs pour régler l’incident de compétence et organiser les conditions et les effets d’une suspension des deux instances en cours; organiser un débat contradictoire par l’intermédiaire des juges concernés, le cas échéant par visio-conférence; prévoir le prononcé d’une véritable décision juridictionnelle, motivée, caractérisant l’abus de procédure et susceptible de recours, pourquoi pas une forme d’appel circulaire devant le juge qui accepte de décliner sa compétence?20

Les avantages et les limites On fustige beaucoup aujourd’hui l’argument de la sécurité juridique, souvent employé par la cour de justice. Pourtant, c’est un vrai problème. Les techniques de common law sont d’une grande subtilité. C’est indéniable. Mais leur souplesse a son revers. Elle stimule l’ardeur procédurale des plaideurs et participe, par là même, au renchérissement du procès. Ainsi, la délivrance d’une injonction peut-elle donner lieu à des discussions et déclencher des contre mesures, des anti anti—suit injonctions. Ce sont des nids à contentieux. Cette considération n’a sans doute pas manqué d’influencé la cour de Justice, crainte exprimée par son avocat général, qui a observé que « si tous les juges de l’espace judiciaire s’arrogeaient ce pouvoir ce serait le chaos» (point §33 et aussi point 30 de l’arrêt Turner). Un mécanisme de coopération judiciaire pourrait réduire les coûts et les aléas du règlement des conflits de procédures. 19 ‘la globalisation du procès civil international (dans l’espace judiciaire européen et mondial)’ JDI 2006, p 937. 20 A comp avec la proposition du professeur Schlosser, « Jurisdiction and International Judicial and administrative Coopération », RCDAI 2000, t 284, p 417; comp aussi avec l’appel des décisions de non retour dans le règlement Bruxelles 2 bis devant le juge d’origine, art 11-6-7 du règlement 2201/2003.

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Mais la solution ne vaut qu’en cas de conflit de procédures, ce qui était le cas dans l’affaire Turner. Il est facile à appliquer quand il y a un abus processuel. Dans l’affaire Turner, du reste, une simple information du juge espagnol sur la situation de litispendance aurait suffi. Le mécanisme pourrait aussi être utilisé pour corriger les règles de compétence—à l’instar du renvoi de compétence—quand elles désignent un juge moins bien placé pour trancher le litige, mais le mécanisme est alors plus complexe.21 Dans tous les cas, cette technique de coopération judiciaire suppose une modification du règlement Bruxelles 1. De plus, une telle coopération n’est possible que dans les relations entre les Etats membres. Dans les relations extra-communautaires, l’emploi de la technique des injonctions pourrait se défendre, en cas d’abus processuel, pour toutes les raisons qui ont été précédemment évoquées. On observera que l’arrêt Turner, comme l’arrêt Owusu, laisse ouverte la possibilité d’utiliser le droit national pour résoudre les conflits de procédures22. Dans une telle lecture minimaliste de l’arrêt Turner, limitée aux rapports intra-communautaire, on peut donc approuver la solution, dans l’attente de l’élaboration d’instruments de droit communautaire destinés à lutter plus efficacement contre le forum shopping dans l’espace judiciaire européen.

21 22

Voir notre article sur la globalisation du procès civil international… cité supra note 19. Cf Le commentaire ci-après de P de Vareilles-Sommières de l’arrêt Owusu.

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4 The Prohibition on Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Relationship Between European Rules on Jurisdiction and Domestic Rules on Procedure ALEXANDER LAYTON QC, 20 ESSEX ST, LONDON WC2R 3AL 29. Even if it were assumed, as has been contended, that an injunction could be regarded as a measure of a procedural nature intended to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings pending before the court which issues it, and therefore as being a matter of national law alone, it need merely be borne in mind that the application of national procedural rules may not impair the effectiveness of the Convention. ECJ, 27 April 2004, Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd et Changepoint SA (Case C-159/02) 29. À supposer qu’une injonction puisse, ainsi qu’il l’a été soutenu, être considérée comme une mesure de nature procédurale destinée à protéger l’intégrité de la procédure déjà pendante devant la juridiction qui l’émet et, à ce titre, comme relevant de la seule loi nationale, il suffit de rappeler que l’application des règles de procédure nationales ne saurait porter atteinte à l’effet utile de la convention. CJCE, 27 avril 2004, Gregory Paul Turner c Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd et Changepoint SA (Aff C-159/02).

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Alexander Layton INTRODUCTION

I have been asked to comment on Paragraph 29 of the judgment in Turner v Grovit1 and to consider what light it may throw on the relationship between the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels-Lugano regime2 and domestic rules of procedure. In a cross-cultural conference such as this I would have liked to present a beautifully crafted code of propositions, divided perhaps into three parts, attempting to cover all eventualities. But as an English lawyer whose experience has been honed in the empirical tradition of the common law, all I can do is to offer a few observations and ask a few questions.

CONTEXT OF THE TURNER DECISION

Before turning to the paragraph itself, it may be helpful to start by making two contextual observations, about the specific English context of the Turner case itself, and about the wider European case law context of the decision. First, at the risk of greatly over-simplifying an increasingly sophisticated body of domestic case law, anti-suit injunctions are characteristically granted by English courts in two broad classes of case, both of which, at root, are examples of wrongful conduct on the part of the restrained defendant. Most commonly they are granted to restrain a breach of contract, whether the contractual undertaking to submit a dispute to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts, or to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal with its seat in England. Less commonly they are granted to restrain a defendant from pursuing foreign proceedings if his doing so is ‘oppressive or vexatious’ in relation to the conduct of English proceedings. Turner is an example of this latter, less common, type of case. The judgment of the Court of Appeal makes plain that it regarded the conduct of Mr Grovit as reprehensible, and specifically designed to frustrate the conduct of pending English proceedings by Mr Turner.3 Secondly, as regards the wider European case law context, it is almost 20 years since the Brussels-Lugano regime came into effect in the United Kingdom. Over that period the adjustments, both of law and of litigation culture, which were necessary for it to function satisfactorily in the context of a legal system for which it had not originally been devised, have taken 1 Case C-159/02 Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565, [2005] 1 AC 101. A familiarity with the facts of the case, and of the rest of the judgment of the European Court, is assumed. 2 The term ‘Brussels-Lugano regime’ is intended to refer, without distinction, to the Brussels Convention, the Lugano Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001. 3 [2000] QB 345: see especially per Laws LJ, at 362: ‘it is… plain beyond the possibility of argument that the Spanish proceedings were launched in bad faith in order to vex the plaintiff in his pursuit of the application before the employment tribunal here’.

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place remarkably smoothly. But the grant of anti-suit injunctions, as Turner v Grovit illustrates, is one of the more obvious examples of a mismatch between the methodology of English procedural law and that of the continental European systems which spawned the Brussels-Lugano regime. There are two other obvious examples of friction points, both of which have only recently been the subject of rulings by the European Court and both of which have elements which overlap with the implications of the Turner judgment. They are the Owusu point, that is, the question whether (as the European Court held) it is incompatible with the Brussels-Lugano regime for a national court to stay its proceedings in favour of a non-contracting state,4 and the Gasser point, namely whether (as the European Court held) a court which has jurisdiction by virtue of an exclusive prorogation agreement must nevertheless in all circumstances comply with its obligation to stay its proceedings in favour of the court of another contracting state in which prior proceedings between the same parties on the same cause of action have been commenced.5 The former of these has prompted much attention and cannot detain us long here. It is worth pointing out, however, that while the Owusu point has taken on significance as a point of friction between the common law and continental legal perspectives, there is nothing inherent in the point which is peculiar to English legal thinking. I do not believe we have seen the end of this point, especially when it comes to defining the scope of any exceptions there may be to the generality of the European Court’s ruling. In particular, it is by no means clear that it is only English courts which will be troubled by the mandatory application of Article 2 in a case where the national court’s jurisdiction has been invoked in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of a third country. The Gasser point also is not peculiar to England, as the case itself—an Italian/Austrian dispute—illustrates; but it is a point which has arisen frequently in English commercial litigation and the decision, which runs counter to earlier English case law,6 has excited much interest. Again, this cannot detain us long here. But it is worth observing that in the Gasser judgment the European Court identified for the first time in this context a principle of mutual trust. In doing so, it took the principle of legal certainty, which has featured as part of its reasoning in many decisions on the Brussels-Lugano regime, and ratcheted it up a notch: it must be borne in mind that the Brussels Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to each other’s legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust which has enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within the purview

4 5 6

Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383, [2005] QB 801. Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693, [2005] QB 1. Continental Bank A v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588 (CA).

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of the Convention are required to respect, and as a corollary the waiver by those States of the right to apply their internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. It is also common ground that the Convention thereby seeks to ensure legal certainty by allowing individuals to foresee with sufficient certainty which court will have jurisdiction.7

It was that principle of mutual trust which, just four months later, formed the basis of the European Court’s decision in Turner: It is inherent in that principle of mutual trust that, within the scope of the Convention, the rules on jurisdiction that it lays down, which are common to all the courts of the Contracting States, may be interpreted and applied with the same authority by each of them.8

One has the sense from these and other recent cases9 that the European Court is adopting a more rigorous approach to the primacy of the European instruments over domestic solutions than it had some years previously.10

PARAGRAPH 29 OF THE TURNER JUDGMENT

Turning then to Paragraph 29 itself, the European Court there stated: Even if it were assumed, as has been contended, that an injunction could be regarded as a measure of a procedural nature intended to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings pending before the court which issues it, and therefore as being a matter of national law alone, it need merely be borne in mind that the application of national procedural rules may not impair the effectiveness of the Convention.

This paragraph seems to me to raise a number of questions. What is a ‘measure of a procedural nature’? Is it right to assume that an injunction is a measure of a procedural nature, and does it matter? In a brief examination of this question we may take as our starting point the rule (which is logical and which is common to the rules of private international law of most or all legal systems with which we are concerned) that procedure is a matter for the lex fori. It is all very well saying that a given state or a given court has adjudicatory jurisdiction over this 7

Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, n 5, at para 72. Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, n 1, citing Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance [1991] ECR I-3317, at para 23; Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, n 5, at para 48. 9 See, eg, Opinion 1/02, 7 February 2006 Opinion of the Full Court on the Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2006] ECR I-01145, at para 141 et seq. 10 eg, in Case C-119/84 Capelloni v Pelkmans [1985] ECR 3147, at para 20, the European Court stated that the Brussels Convention leaves to national procedural law the resolution of any question not covered by its specific provisions; see also n 11 below. 8

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defendant in respect of this claim, but by itself that is a relatively empty proposition. One must then go on to consider the linked question of how, if it has adjudicatory jurisdiction, the state or its court exercises that jurisdiction. And the question of how is a question for local procedural law. It is perfectly legitimate for local procedural law to be subject to the primacy of European norms, but the difficulty may come in determining the circumstances in which, and the criteria by which, one decides whether a European norm takes priority. Regrettably, the Turner decision does little in this regard to clarify the existing law, as laid down in Hagen v Zeehage.11 In that case, a broad attempt to define the relationship between Community and national procedural norms was made by the European Court. Hagen was a German conference organiser. Acting on behalf of a German client it contracted in its own name with Zeehage, a Dutch company, for the reservation of a large number of hotel rooms in The Hague. The reservation was later cancelled, Zeehage sued Hagen in the Netherlands and Hagen applied to have its German client joined as a third party under Article 6(2) of the Brussels Convention, which was resisted by Zeehage on the ground that it would complicate and protract the proceedings. Eventually the question came before the European Court whether that Article required the national court to permit the joinder of the third party or whether the national court could ‘assess the admissibility’ of the application to join the third party in the light of national procedural law. Drawing a distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility ‘properly so-called,’ the European Court said that the Convention was concerned with the former but not with the latter, but emphasised that a national court was not permitted ‘to apply conditions of admissibility laid down by national law which would have the effect of restricting the application of the rules of jurisdiction laid down in the Convention’.12 In other words, the effectiveness of the Brussels-Lugano regime is not to be impaired by national rules. It is that principle which the European Court applied in Paragraph 29 of its Turner judgment. The problem arises in seeking to define or delimit the circumstances in which the effectiveness of the regime is impaired. It will require further case law before we can gain a much clearer understanding of such a definition. For the present, we can, however, say that an anti-suit injunction is to be regarded as impairing the effectiveness of the jurisdictional rules in the Brussels-Lugano regime, and hence is incompatible with it, if it has the effect of preventing the pursuit of proceedings over which a court in another contracting state has jurisdiction and which is ‘admissible properly so-called’ by the law of that state. 11 12

Case C-365/88 Kongress Agentur Hagen v Zeehage BV [1990] ECR I-1845. Ibid, at para 35.

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What is not precisely articulated in the Turner decision is why an anti-suit injunction is to be so regarded. Lord Hobhouse insisted, in the decision making the reference to the European Court in Turner, that such an injunction does not affect the jurisdiction of the foreign court because it operates only in personam against the injoined party. But this proposition was not regarded with any favour by the European Court and I do not propose to place reliance on it here. In any event (in terms of the Hagen distinction) it deals only with the jurisdictional rules, and not with the rules of admissibility ‘properly so-called’ of the foreign court. The European Court’s reasoning was plain enough, namely that an anti-suit injunction is regarded as being contrary to the mutual trust which must exist between the national courts of Brussels-Lugano states. But I suggest that this is perhaps too broad-brush a criticism to be entirely convincing. Does it necessarily follow that the effectiveness of the BrusselsLugano regime is impaired by an English court granting a remedy known to English law against a person who is subject to its jurisdiction under the rules of the regime, merely because that remedy may have the effect of preventing that person from pursuing proceedings in another contracting state? For one thing, is this not a bilateral matter? That is, do the principles of effectiveness and of mutual trust not mean that both the English court and the foreign court have a legitimate stake in the outcome? And for another thing, are not remedies a matter of substantive law, a matter with which the European Court has repeatedly said the Convention is not concerned? It does not appear that the European Court grappled in Turner, at least in an intellectually satisfactory way, either with the bilateral nature of the problem or with the potential trespass into the realm of substantive law. And although its decision in Italian Leather (in which procedural divergences were held to be irrelevant to the recognition of judgments unless they led to irreconcilable judgments)13 is not directly in point, the differences between the two decisions do leave one wondering whether the Brussels-Lugano regime yet has a coherent approach to questions of procedural diversity as between contracting states. The short conclusion is that it appears, from the generality of the European Court’s language and the basis of its reasoning, that all anti-suit injunctions are simply regarded within the context of the Brussels-Lugano regime as impermissible. This reasoning, although not very palatable to English tastes, does at least have the virtue of clarity (or ‘legal certainty’) where one is dealing with an injunction which prevents the defendant from pursuing proceedings in the court of another contracting state. But not every case is going to be so clear-cut. It is not hard to contemplate circumstances where the 13 Case C-80/00 Italian Leather SpA v Weco Polstermobil GmbH & Co [2002] ECR I-4995, at para 42.

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injunction does not injoin the seising of a foreign court, or the pursuit of proceedings in that court, but rather injoins the defendant from advancing a case before a foreign court which is incompatible with its contractual obligations as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.14 And how widely is the principle of mutual trust to be applied? Does it mean (as Edwin Peel asked in an earlier contribution) that if a claimant, instead of seeking an injunction to enforce his contractual right not to be sued elsewhere than in England, claims damages for breach of that right, that too would be impermissible as impairing the effectiveness of the Brussels-Lugano regime? Or what about a claim for declaratory relief? Does the compatibility with the Brussels-Lugano regime, and hence the legitimacy of a declaration that a defendant is in breach of contract by suing in another contracting state, depend on the use which the plaintiff then makes of the declaration? If he seeks to deploy it in support of his challenge to the other court’s jurisdiction, is not that court bound to recognise the judgment and give effect to it? Turner v Grovit illustrates the tension between different principles underlying the Brussels-Lugano regime: the principles of legal certainty and of effectiveness pull one way, while the principle that judgments rendered in one state should be freely recognisable in other states pulls the other. The decision also illustrates the tension between the application of uniform European norms and that of divergent national procedural norms. In its result, it has neutered a potent and highly valued weapon in the procedural armoury of the English courts. It is a shame that, if it was going to do that, it did not do so more convincingly.

14 Something similar happened in Banque Cantonale Vaudoise v Waterlily Maritime Inc [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 347 (Comm Ct).

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5 The Mandatory Nature of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention and Derogation from the Rule It Lays Down PASCAL DE VAREILLES-SOMMIÈRES PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE 37. Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory in nature and… according to its terms, there can be no derogation from the principle it lays down except in the cases expressly provided for by the Convention. ECJ, 1 March 2005, Andrew Owusu v N B Jackson, trading as ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ and Others (Case C-281/02) 37. [L]’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles a un caractère impératif et…, ainsi qu’il ressort de ses termes mêmes, il ne peut être dérogé à la règle de principe qu’il énonce que dans des cas expressément prévus par ladite convention. CJCE, 1er Mars 2005, Andrew Owusu c NB Jackson, agissant sous le nom commercial ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ et autres (Aff C-281/02)

The Owusu case1 will remain famous for ruling out forum non conveniens under the Brussels Convention.2 In this case, the European Court of Justice held that, where the defendant is domiciled in England, the English court may not decline jurisdiction on the ground that contacts of the case with England are weak, while those with Jamaica are predominant, even though the defendants had claimed the removal of the case from the English court in favour of Jamaican courts, and whose jurisdiction seemed to be more appropriate.

1 Case C-281/02, Andrew Owusu v NB Jackson, trading as ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ and Others, [2005] ECR I-1383 (ECJ, 31 March 2005). 2 See for example, Briggs, ‘The death of Harrods : forum non conveniens and the European court’ (2005) 121 LQR 535–540; Peel, ‘Forum non conveniens and European ideals’ [2005] LMCLQ 363–377; Hartley, ‘The European union and the systematic dismantling of the common law of the conflicts of laws’, (2005) 54 ICLQ 813–828; Cuniberti, ‘Forum non conveniens and the Brussels Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 973–982; Chalas [2005] Rev Crit Dr Int Pr 708–722.

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Nevertheless, forum non conveniens is not the focus of the paragraph I have to comment on here: the very words ‘forum non conveniens’ do not appear in this paragraph, which looks at the more general issue whether Article 2 of the Brussels Convention3 is mandatory or not, as follows from its reading: It must be observed, first, that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory in nature and that, according to its terms, there can be no derogation from the principle it lays down except in the cases expressly provided for by the Convention.

In other words, where the defendant is domiciled within the territory of a Member State of the European Community (as provided for by Article 2), the courts of this State have jurisdiction as a matter of principle and it is only possible for these courts to decline jurisdiction where the Brussels Convention expressly provides for such a solution. Silence is kept by the EC Court, at this stage, regarding the forum non conveniens, which is to be dealt with a little further on in the judgment, when the Court rules that such a doctrine does not belong to the express exceptions to Article 2 as listed by the Convention. Such silence prompts me to set out two preliminary remarks. First, my task being to comment on the cited paragraph, I will not focus on the forum non conveniens doctrine. This is not to say that nothing will be said in this paper on the doctrine, but it will only be mentioned where the relationship between forum non conveniens and the mandatory nature of Article 2 is at stake. Secondly—and this remark is linked to the previous one—if the main ruling of the Owusu case deals with forum non conveniens, one may fear the lack of interest of developments, like these, concerning other aspects of the case. Yet it is easy to reassure those who worry: if forum non conveniens is not mentioned in the paragraph I have been allotted, it is worth noting that the raison d’être of the rejection of this doctrine by the European Court lies precisely in the principle of the mandatory nature of Article 2. It follows that this principle not only encompasses the rejection of forum non conveniens, but also reaches far beyond, preventing the defendant’s court of domicile from dismissing a claim (or staying the proceedings, as the case may be) for lack of jurisdiction on any other ground as long as it is not expressly provided for by the Convention. The wide impact of the ruling under examination will clearly appear once placed in the context of the Court’s reasoning. It actually has the part

3 The Brussels Convention was applicable to the case ratione temporis. For the sake of clarity, I have chosen to keep to the standpoint of the Court in this paper, and to mention only relevant articles of the Convention. Of course, issues explored here are relevant to EC Regulation No 44-2001 as well, and it will be easy for the reader to convert mentioned articles of the Convention into the relevant articles of the Regulation.

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of the major in a syllogism, the conclusion of which is nothing less than the ousting of the forum non conveniens from the Convention. This syllogism reads as follows: Major: Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory in nature and, according to its terms, there can be no derogation from the principle it lays down except in the cases expressly provided for by the Convention. Minor: Forum non conveniens does not belong to the list of derogations expressly provided for by the Convention. Conclusion: Forum non conveniens may not be used as an exception to the proper functioning of Article 2. Some may find the reasoning a little bit formal, not to say rigid and, at any rate, characterised by a lack of subtlety.4 They will probably not be convinced by the attempt of the Court to back up its solution on a more substantive argumentation,5 either. Be this as it may, the above syllogism allows the Court to avoid distinguishing between situations although the question referred for a preliminary ruling urged it to do so. The reference, drawing its inspiration from English scholarly opinions, suggested that the mandatory nature of the forum rei under the Brussels Convention is undoubtedly relevant within the relationships between Member States of the European Union, but is wholly inappropriate when it comes to the relationships between a Member State and third parties, since this would amount to preventing the court of a Member State from dealing with a case in accordance with its domestic (non-EC) rules even though the case is devoid of any contact with other Member States, and consequently should remain out of reach of EC rules such as the Brussels Convention. No sign of such a distinction can be found in the justification brought forward by the Court. To the European judges, Article 2 is equally mandatory—under the same derogations—whether it applies to cases involving conflicting adjudicatory jurisdiction amongst Member States or to cases where one Member State’s jurisdiction to adjudicate is in conflict with that of a non-Member State. The Court thus promotes a unified regime for the mandatory nature of Article 2, and it does so especially in the very paragraph relevant to us, the scope of which is not limited to relationships between Member States. This unified regime and its consequences will be addressed in the first part of this comment. Taking stock of the adverse effects of such a solution, we shall try, in the second part of the paper, to promote a new dualistic approach to the mandatory nature of Article 2.

4 See, among others, Briggs, ‘The Impact of Recent Judgments of the European Court on English Procedural Law and Practice’ [2005] Rev de Dr Suisse II 231–262, at 249. 5 The Court sought support in three arguments against admissibility of forum non conveniens under the Brussels Convention: respect for the principle of legal certainty would not be fully guaranteed (paras 38–41), legal protection of persons established in the Community would be undermined (para 42), and uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction would be affected (para 43).

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THE UNIFIED REGIME OF THE MANDATORY NATURE OF ARTICLE 2 ACCORDING TO THE EC COURT

The Assertion of a Unified Regime To the EC Court, as soon as the defendant is domiciled within the territory of a Member State, the forum rei becomes the court of competent jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention, if the case is connected with more than one Member State, as well as where the connections point to a given Member State, on the one hand, and non-Member State(s) on the other. To reach this solution, the Court follows a classical two-pronged approach: •

The Brussels Convention applies to the case at hand (usually due to the location of the defendant’s domicile on the territory of a Member State), in which case the only possible derogations are those expressly provided for by the Convention. Alternatively, the Convention does not apply to the case under examination (usually, because the defendant’s domicile is located out of the territory of a Member State), in which case the jurisdiction of the Court where the proceeding is filed is not based on Article 2, but results from the domestic law of the forum regarding international jurisdiction, including the forum non conveniens doctrine, if this law provides for such a doctrine.

•

As one can see, according to the EC Court, the mere fact that the domicile of the defendant is located in the territory of a Member State is enough, as a matter of principle, to trigger the jurisdiction of the Member State’s Courts, and the mandatory nature of this jurisdiction then applies (except express provisions of the Convention to the contrary) whatever the connections of the case with other Member States may be, including where no such connection exists. This is precisely why one may speak of a unified regime applicable to the mandatory nature of Article 2 according to the EC Court: this provision is mandatory irrespective of the conflict configuration of the dispute, as long as the dispute falls within the scope of the Convention. The reasoning is not devoid of consistency. In particular, it fits perfectly well with the Josi case,6 in which the EC Court ruled that, except in specific situations, the Brussels Convention applies to a civil or commercial dispute as soon as the domicile of the defendant is located on Member State territory. In spite of

6 Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company [2000] ECR I-5925 (ECJ, 13 July 2000); see also, lately, Opinion 1/02, Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2006] ECR I-01145 (ECJ, 7 February 2006), at para 144.

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these filiations, the unified regime enshrined by the Court in the Owusu case entails serious drawbacks, making the Court’s approach questionable, as will be shown in the following exposition.

The Drawbacks of a Unified Regime The main reproach incurred by the unified regime applied to the mandatory nature of Article 2 lies in the much too large scope given by this regime to the duty of a Member State court to assume jurisdiction if the defendant is domiciled within this Member State territory. In this respect, three main difficulties can be listed.7 The first series of problems arising from the Court’s approach relates to the matters covered by Article 16 of the Convention. A single example will be enough to demonstrate the kind of difficulties involved. A claimant intends to bring an action in rem before a court, claiming that the defendant has infringed on his property by erecting a building over the border between the land of the defendant and the one of the claimant. Both lands are located in the territory of a non-Member State, but the defendant is domiciled within the territory of a Member State. Will the courts of this Member State assert jurisdiction if the suit is filed with them? Pursuant to the rulings in Group Josi and Owusu, the answer must be positive: since the defendant is domiciled within the EC, Article 2 of the Brussels Convention applies; therefore the forum rei has jurisdiction, except for express provision to the contrary. It is worth recalling that Article 16 of the Convention expressly deviates from Article 2, in disputes which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property, but only if the property is situated within the territory of a Member State. In the particular instance, the immovable property is located in the territory of a third state, the case being consequently not covered by Article 16 and no exception to Article 2 being met either. The courts of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled will therefore retain jurisdiction. Such a result, however, is far from desirable. One should keep in mind that the law of the Third State is likely to provide for exclusive jurisdiction in favour of its own courts, especially for proceedings relating to immovable property located in the said State. Such an assertion should remain beyond discussion in Europe since the European Community itself uses the same basis for the jurisdiction of Member State courts in similar proceedings (Brussels Convention, Article 16). Moreover, the Member State judgment issued on the ground of Article 2 in violation of the exclusive 7 See, for example, Peel (above n 2), at 375; Hare, ‘Forum non conveniens in Europe: game over, or time for reflection?’ [2006] JBL 157–179, at 173; Muir Watt, [2005] Rev Crit Dr Int Priv 730–731.

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jurisdiction claimed by the foreign country would most likely suffer the consequences of such a defect, thus being deprived of recognition and enforcement in this country. A second difficulty arising from the unified regime set up by the EC Court for the mandatory nature of Article 2 regards litigation about contracts including a provision conferring jurisdiction to a court of a non-Member State. If the defendant is domiciled in the European Community, the claimant may well seek support from the Owusu case to evade the jurisdiction agreement and to bring the action before the tribunal of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled, instead of bringing it before the agreed judge. In this case the forum rei will be under a duty to support the fraud instigated by the claimant and to assert its jurisdiction over the dispute on the basis of Article 2, after noting that Article 17 of the Convention expressly provides for jurisdiction to the agreed forum, by way of exception to Article 2, only when this forum is that of a Member State of the European Community. A third difficulty likely to arise concerns parallel proceedings. Let us assume, for instance, that in a given case, the court of a non-Member State has been initially seised by a claimant whose domicile is within the territory of a Member State of the European Community; subsequently, the defendant in this first proceeding counter-attacks and files a suit involving the same cause of action with the court of the state where the domicile of his/her opponent is located. The court of this state, as a forum rei, will not be allowed to stay the proceeding on a plea of lis pendens, even though it is not the court first seised. Indeed, the letter of the Convention provides that the lis pendens plea may defeat a jurisdiction based on the domicile of the defendant only if the court first seised is itself a court of a Member State (Brussels Convention, Article 21). Since the judge first seised, in the chosen example, is that of a non-Member State, the court seised second will have the obligation to assert its jurisdiction over the case under Article 2, for no condition for derogation to this Article is met. As one may notice, the three problems listed above show a common feature: the jurisdiction of the court where the defendant is domiciled, as provided for by Article 2, conflicts with the jurisdiction of a Third-State court. It thus appears that the cases showing such a feature are precisely those where the mandatory nature of Article 2, as ruled by the Owusu case, raises difficulties, especially in that it encourages a deleterious forum shopping and would deserve a specific treatment because of this. Therefore it seems that the mandatory nature of Article 2 should be submitted to various treatments, depending on whether conflicting adjudicatory jurisdictions are those of at least two Member States, or only the one of a Member State confronted with third-state jurisdiction. This issue will form the object of the following exposition.

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PROPOSING A NEW DUALISTIC APPROACH TO THE MANDATORY NATURE OF ARTICLE 2

The proposed doctrine of a dualistic regime for the mandatory nature of Article 2 finds its origins in the need for a distinction between conflicting adjudicatory jurisdictions of two or more Member States on the one hand and conflicting adjudicatory jurisdictions of one Member State with one or more third states on the other hand. The purpose of this dualistic regime is to avoid situations that favour the forum shopping entailed by the unified approach as it has just been examined. Essentially, the proposed dualistic doctrine claims that the combination of Article 2 with Article 16, Article 17 and Article 22 should lead to distinct results, depending on whether, when a jurisdictional issue arises before the court of a Member State where the defendant is domiciled, the adjudicatory jurisdiction of another Member State is at stake or not. I shall demonstrate that this dualistic regime finds its ground in the Convention itself, which will enable me to go further in the study of the practical consequences of the distinction, and of the possible derogations to Article 2 where no jurisdiction of another Member State is at stake.

The Conventional Ground of the Dualistic Proposed Approach In maintaining that ‘Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory in nature and that, according to its terms, there can be no derogation from the principle it lays down except in the cases expressly provided for by the Convention’ without making any difference between cases where the jurisdiction of another Member State is at stake and cases where the only other conflicting jurisdiction is that of a third state, the European Court of Justice has neglected to heed the double nature of the jurisdiction rule laid down by Article 2. It is about time that one became aware of this hidden double nature: behind a single provision, two rules are hiding in Article 2; each, however, serving an entirely different purpose. Article 2 is, first of all, a rule on jurisdiction which enables a decision between several Member States of the European Community, with respect to jurisdiction over a given case connected to each of them in a way or another. This function of Article 2 is quite self-evident and I shall not dwell on this aspect. I shall just observe that it is in accordance with such a rule that, if the defendant is domiciled in a Member State of the European Community, the court of another Member State will have the duty to dismiss the case in favour of proceedings before the tribunal of the

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defendant, unless one of the conditions expressly provided for by the Convention for derogating from Article 2 is met.8 Deciding between different Member States connected in some way with a given case, however, is not the sole function of Article 2. In Owusu, all connecting factors pointed to Jamaica, apart from the claimant and the principal defendant domiciles, which were both situated in the United Kingdom. In applying Article 2 to assume its jurisdiction, an English court would obviously not decide between its own jurisdiction and that of another Member State. Hence the question: what is the role of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention when it does not decide, as in the Owusu case, the allocation of a case between two or more Member States? To this question, the usual and most obvious answer is that Article 2 enables the English court to assert adjudicatory jurisdiction for the United Kingdom over the case vis-à-vis Jamaica. From this point of view, Article 2 operates as a jurisdiction rule deciding between the courts of the United Kingdom and the courts of Jamaica, in favour of the former and to the detriment of the latter. This analysis has been used as a starting point by some authors putting forward the idea that, the United Kingdom jurisdiction being the only one at stake amongst the Member States, one should go back to the common law of England, and especially to the rules of civil procedure such as those related to forum non conveniens.9 A famous, but isolated, decision of an English court accepted this opinion.10 The argument may be relevant if Article 2, in the Owusu case, just played a part as a jurisdiction rule in favour of the United Kingdom courts. A closer look, however, allows us to become aware of the fact that the application of Article 2 to the Owusu proceedings involves much more than the mere assertion of a United Kingdom jurisdiction. Indeed, when analysing Article 2, one should keep in mind that the Brussels Convention (and even more now the Brussels I Regulation) is a stone contributing to the building of a new edifice: the European Judicial Area. This area is not limited to co-ordinating ‘domestic judicial areas’—if I may say so—of Member States, but it forms a new judicial system per se, integrating the domestic judicial systems of Member States. With this in mind, one can realise that, in the Owusu case, Article 2 does not solely

8 Even authors favouring admissibility of forum non conveniens under the Brussels Convention usually concede that this mechanism should not cover this category of cases (for example, Collins, ‘Forum non conveniens and the Brussels Convention’ (1990) 106 LQR 535; on the adverse side, Hartley, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (London,), 78, seems to be quite isolated. See also, in French, the synthesis of Gaudemet-Tallon, ‘Le forum non conveniens, une menace pour la convention de Bruxelles’ [1991] Rev Crit Dr Int Pr 121). 9 See the seminal article of Collins, cited above, n 8. For recent overviews, with further references: Nuyts, L’exception de forum non conveniens (Paris-Bruxelles, 2003, LGDJ/ Bruylant), 231–234; Chalas, L’exercice discrétionnaire de la compétence juridictionnelle en droit international privé (Aix-en-Provence, 2000, PUAM) 547–572. 10 In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1991] 3 WLR 397 (Court of Appeal, 19 December 1990).

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concern the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, as asserted vis-à-vis Jamaica, but also—and probably above all—the adjudicatory jurisdiction of this emergent judicial integrated order named the European Judicial Area, vis-à-vis the rest of the world in general, and Jamaica in particular. In other words, when Article 2 applies to an international case connected to the European Community through only one Member State, whereas the other connections of the case link it exclusively with Third State(s), it intervenes as a rule delineating the jurisdiction to adjudicate of the European Judicial Area, rather than as a rule allotting the case to United Kingdom sovereignty. The notion of ‘dédoublement fonctionnel’, brought to light in another context by Georges Scelle,11 is perfectly appropriate to describe the phenomenon of the English court being vested by Article 2 with the jurisdiction on behalf of the European Judicial Area. The domestic courts of the Member States are borrowed by the European legal order as European courts each time a case is sufficiently connected with the European Community to deserve a European treatment as far as jurisdiction is concerned. In those cases, as in the Owusu case, what is circumscribed by the Member State court is not exactly the scope of its own adjudicatory jurisdiction, but more precisely the scope of the European Judicial Area. In the Owusu case more particularly, in accordance with Article 2, the English Courts had to decide a European case falling within the limits of the European Judicial Area, not a British case just falling within the limits of United Kingdom jurisdiction.12 To sum up, the reason why, in the Owusu case, the jurisdictional issue directly concerned Europe, even though it did not directly involve other Member States than the United Kingdom—and why, consequently, the answer to this issue could not be left to domestic mechanisms of the Common law of England such as forum non conveniens—lies in the fact that, behind the jurisdiction of the English courts designated by Article 2, hid the jurisdiction of the European Judicial Area, which was the one actually delimited by the English court applying Article 2. Having outlined the double nature of the rule laid down by Article 2, it now becomes possible to deduce the consequences concerning the mandatory nature of this provision.

11 G Scelle, Précis de droit des gens (Paris, 1932–1934, Sirey, réimpression 1984, CNRS) 43–47. 12 A look at Art 4 will confirm the proposed analysis: when the defendant is not domiciled within the territory of a Member State, the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Member State whose tribunals are seised by the claimant shall be determined by its own law: this means that in such a case (except, of course, when Art 16, 17 or 18 applies), the jurisdiction of the European Judicial Area is not at stake, hence the applicability of the lex fori to jurisdictional issues before the national court. Here the national court does not circumscribe the scope of the European Judicial Area, but its own jurisdiction.

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The Consequences of the Proposed Dualistic Approach This part of the paper will try to ascertain to what extent the proposed dualistic approach of Article 2 influences the answer to the question of the mandatory nature of Article 2. Of course, the best way to know whether— and, as the case may be, to what extent—a legal provision is mandatory is to query the provision itself, or the legal instrument of which the provision forms part. With respect to Article 2, the response given by the provision is more precise for the rule in Article 2 deciding between Member States than for the one fixing jurisdiction of the European Judicial Area towards Third States. In so far as Article 2 dispatches cases amongst Member States, the conditions under which derogation from it is allowed are specified rather precisely by the Convention itself. It is actually for this kind of situation that the ruling of the European Court is most appropriate: Article 2 is then mandatory by nature without a doubt, and the only accepted exceptions to this rule are those expressly provided for by the Convention. If an English court is seised as the court of the country where the defendant is domiciled and if it appears that most of the other relevant connecting factors are pointing to another Member State whose jurisdiction consequently appears as more appropriate, the English court shall dismiss the plea of incompetence, without being allowed to apply the forum non conveniens doctrine since it is ruled out by the Convention. This solution seems legitimate beyond discussion, save probably when the jurisdiction of the court has been triggered by the fraudulent or abusive use of the jurisdiction by at least one of the parties,13 in which case this court should be allowed to decline jurisdiction.14 If henceforth Article 2 operates as a rule intended to delimitate the European Judicial Area vis-à-vis third countries, the extent to which it is mandatory should be slightly different from what it is when it just dispatches cases amongst Member States—despite the ruling of the Court in the Owusu case.

13 As a matter of fact, the European Court is more and more reluctant to stick to the applicable EC provision where its applicability is based on fraud or abuse; as the ECJ put it in a recent case: ‘It should be noted… that, according to settled case law, Community law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends… The scope of Community law must in no case be extended to cover abuses on the part of a trader, that is to say, activities which are not carried out in the context of normal commercial transactions, but only with the aim of circumventing the rules of Community law’ (Case C-456/04, Agip Petroli SpA v Capitaneria di porto di Siracusa and others [2006] ECR I (ECJ, 6 April 2006) paras 19–20). 14 See on this issue my previous article ‘Le forum shopping devant les juridictions françaises’, Travaux du Comité Français de Dr Int Pr 1998/200, 49–65, at 60; Nuyts, ‘Forum Shopping et Abus du Forum Shopping dans l’Espace Judiciaire Européen’ [2003] Global Jurist Advances Vol 3, No 1, 1–33, at 15; compare, M.-L. Niboyet, ‘La globalisation du procès civil international dans l’espace judiciaire européen et mondial’ [2006] JDI 937–954, at 944–945.

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First, it is striking that the EC Court itself gives the impression that it would not remain insensitive to the idea that litigation involving Third States’ jurisdiction deserves an original regime with respect to the mandatory nature of Article 2.15 The second question referred to the Court was meant to drive the Court into a corner and compel it to take a stand on the issue of whether or not it is permissible to extend the derogations expressly laid down by Articles 16, 17, and 21 in favour of Member States’ courts to relations with Third States. For procedural reasons, the EC Court denied the request for an answer to this question, but it did it in such a way that one can assume its intention to reserve the answer for the future, when a concrete case raises the question and when full light is shed on the issue thanks to a mature discussion between stakeholders.16 Going back over what the convention clearly and expressis verbis says, one has to admit that the conventional exceptions to the Article 2 forum rei jurisdiction (like Article 5, Article 16, Article 17… ) apply in favour of Member States only and enable a case to be taken away from the forum rei (as designated by Article 2) exclusively when this provision is used to decide between two or more Member States. Accordingly, an application of these provisions where Article 2 intervenes as a rule aimed at defining the jurisdiction of the European Judicial Area towards Third States would oddly convert Article 2 into an exclusive jurisdiction rule.17 I need not go back over the drawbacks of such a view, but I shall underline that they are hints that one should not stick to the letter of the provisions derogating from Article 2 when this Article is taken as a rule delimitating the jurisdiction of the European Judicial Area. Consequently the issue of the extent of the mandatory nature of Article 2 taken as a rule on jurisdiction of the European Judicial Area remains open. To resolve it, it seems that two situations have to be distinguished:

15 Even more significant is the opinion of Advocate-General Leger, whose conclusion in the Owusu case states (para 281) that ‘The Brussels Convention precludes a court of a Contracting State—whose jurisdiction is established on the basis of Article 2 of that Convention—from exercising a discretionary power to decline to exercise that jurisdiction on the ground that a court of a non-Contracting State would be more appropriate for the trial of the action, where the latter court has not been designated by any agreement conferring jurisdiction, has not previously been seised of any claim liable to give rise to lis pendens or related actions and the links connecting the dispute with that non-Contracting State are of a kind other than those referred to in Article 16 of the Brussels Convention’, thus expressly reserving the position of the Court as far as a combination of Arts 16,17 and 21 with Art 2 in litigation involving relationships between a Member State and a Third State is concerned. 16 See Hare, ‘Forum non conveniens in Europe: game over, or time for reflection?’ [2006] JBL 157–179, at 173: ‘given the lengths to which both the Advocate-General and the Court went in order to avoid dealing with the second question in the reference, there may be hope that this approach has its limits’. 17 See Gaudemet-Tallon [1992] Rev Crit Dr Int Pr 337, denouncing such a threat in the particular case where Art 17 of the Convention is at issue; Muir Watt [2005] Rev Crit Dr Int Pr 730–731; compare Fentiman, ‘National Law and the European Jurisdiction Regime’ in International Litigation in Europe and Relations with Third States (Brussels 2005 Bruylant) 82–128, at 93 and 105.

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If the Third-State court legitimately enjoys an exclusive jurisdiction, there is cause for calling the jurisdiction of the forum rei into question. This will be the case where jurisdiction of the Third State mirrors that provided for by Article 16 of the Brussels Convention. It admittedly makes sense for the European Community to recognise an exclusive jurisdiction claimed by Third States in circumstances where, mutatis mutandis, the European Community itself assumes such a jurisdiction.18 Exclusive jurisdiction claimed by a Third State whose courts have been agreed on by parties in a choice-of-court clause deserves the same attention. An English court has—correctly, in my view19—decided so in a recent and noteworthy case,20 dating from after the EC Court judgment in Owusu. In its judgment, the Queen’s Bench Division held, after a fair discussion, that the jurisdiction agreement by which parties had chosen a Third-State court was to have precedence over Article 2.21 This solution is undoubtedly the only one granting due regard to both the agreement of parties and the predictability of jurisdiction.22 If no Third-State exclusive jurisdiction is at issue, the reasons why one should take into account a Third-State jurisdiction so that Article 2 would be derogated from are less compelling, but still exist.

•

For a start, it is beyond question that the forum rei under Article 2 should not be entitled to rely on legal mechanisms provided for by its lex fori to avoid exercising its jurisdiction in favour of a Third-State court claiming jurisdiction by its own law: it does not fall to the domestic law of a

18 This solution has been advocated quite early by Droz, who based it on the ‘effet reflexe’ (‘reflexive effect’) of Art 16 of the Brussels Convention, see Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le Marché Commun (Paris 1972 Dalloz) 108; in favour of its survival in spite of Owusu, see, for example, Harris, ‘Stays of proceedings and the Brussels Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 933–950, at 945–946. 19 And in others: see, for example, Harris, above n 18, at 943–945; Peel, above n 2, at 376. 20 Konkola Copper Mines plc v Coromin [2005] EWHC 898 (Comm), [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 555, [2005] Rev Crit Dr Int Pr 722–731, note Muir Watt (Queen’s Bench Division, 12 May 2005). 21 It seems that the English judgment could get support from the European Court judgment in the case C-387/98 Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV [2000] ECR I-9337. On the other hand, a French court had previously ruled to the contrary, relying on Art 2 to rule out jurisdiction of a third-state court agreed upon by parties: Versailles, 26 September 1991 [1992] Rev Crit Dr Int Pr 333–340, note Gaudemet-Tallon. 22 With respect to Regulation 44-2001 more particularly, one must recall here the primary importance given by this instrument to the respect of jurisdiction agreements by the courts: see para 14 of the recital of the Regulation, under which ‘The autonomy of the parties to a contract, other than an insurance, consumer or employment contract, where only limited autonomy to determine the courts having jurisdiction is allowed, must be respected, subject to the exclusive grounds of jurisdiction laid down in this Regulation’; giving due regard to the jurisdiction agreement should lead the Member State court whose jurisdiction is ousted by the agreement to dismiss the case (or stay the proceeding) for lack of jurisdiction without any discretion (contra: Peel, above n 2, 375).

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Member State to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the European Judicial Area. An English court, for instance, would not be allowed to decline jurisdiction provided for by Article 2, for being forum non conveniens under the common law of England. To this extent, the stance taken by the court in the Owusu case seems to be beyond any criticism.23 Of course, this does not mean that a truly European forum non conveniens mechanism is ruled out by the Brussels Convention. Since the issue is not expressly dealt with by the Convention, one may well imagine a future bold ruling of the EC Court filling the vacuum by setting up a properly European conventional mechanism,24 but it seems to me that there are strong reasons against the transplant of this common law device into a Convention deeply inspired by civil law concepts.25 Given the fact that forum rei may not dismiss the claim on a forum non conveniens basis, what may be the cases where this forum shall, by way of exception to Article 2, decline jurisdiction in favour of a Third State endowed with non-exclusive jurisdiction over the case? It is submitted that at least three situations deserve attention: •

•

The first one covers all cases of fraudulent or abusive use of the jurisdiction rule by a party. For the same reasons as those put forward when Article 2 was studied as a rule to decide jurisdictional issues between Member States, a Member State court whose adjudicatory jurisdiction has been triggered by a fraudulent manoeuvre or results from an abusive use of the jurisdiction rule by a party must be allowed to react in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.26 The second situation concerns parallel litigation. It is submitted here

23 Even though it is sometimes suggested that the way for an English court to decline to hear the case where a non-Member State would have jurisdiction under Art 16, Art 17 and Art 21 of the Brussels Convention, if it were a Member State, ‘is by application of the doctrine of the forum non conveniens’ as provided for by the common law (Briggs, ‘Forum non conveniens and ideal Europeans’, [2005] LMCLQ, 378–382; Peel, above n 2, at 375–376). This does not seem consistent though with the need for European origin as far as derogation to Art 2 is concerned. 24 See, Nuyts (above n 9) 235: ‘La situation n’est pas nécessairement figée pour toujours. De même que l’exception de forum non conveniens s’est développée par voie prétorienne dans certains systèmes juridiques, y compris de civil law, qui rejetaient au départ tout assouplissement des règles de compétence, de même on ne peut exclure que les mentalités évoluent en droit prive européen’; Chalas, above n 9, at 562–564. 25 Limitations of space preclude me from further elaborating on this most visited issue. I shall just explain the main reasons of my disfavour for such a transplant. First, the reason why forum non conveniens has been integrated into the common law (viz, very broad bases of jurisdiction implying a corrective to avoid unfair proceedings before an English court loosely connected with the case) are not found in civil law. Secondly, there is no provision similar to Art 15 of EC Reg 2201-2003 (resembling, to a certain extent, forum non conveniens) in the Brussels Convention (nor in EC Reg 44-2001); hence the likelihood of such a mechanism being ruled out of the Convention whereas it could have been expressly received by it, as it has been by more recent regulations. Last, but not least, forum non conveniens increases the chance that new litigation—on jurisdiction—adds up to that on the merit, which is never desirable; for an extensive discussion of the issue, see, lately, Nuyts, above n 9, at 212–235. 26 See above n 14.

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that lis pendens should not be disregarded by the court of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled, even though the State whose court has been seised first of the same cause of action does not belong to the European Union.27 Of course, the dismissal of the case (or stay of the proceedings) for lack of jurisdiction by the forum rei must not be ordered blindly, but at least the forum rei should be entitled to decline jurisdiction if the Third-State court first seised is more appropriate.28 The contrary would encourage the development of conflicting proceedings, and eventually the occurrence of conflicting judgments, which should be avoided as far as possible. Such a move in favour of forum shopping does not seem to be desirable. Exploring the possibility of a defendant waiving the benefit of Article 2 may prove worthwhile.29 Article 18 of the Convention shows that this instrument adheres to fairly liberal views when it comes to compliance with jurisdiction rules in civil and commercial matters. One wonders why such liberalism should not apply when Article 2 offers the jurisdiction of the European Judicial Area to a defendant domiciled within the Community whereas other connecting factors point to non-Member State(s). Since Article 2 primarily intends to protect the defendant against the procedural move of the claimant, the defendant, as a beneficiary of the provision, should be entitled to give up this procedural advantage if he would rather get judged—as it was the case in Owusu—by the court of competent jurisdiction of another State.

To conclude, it is worth noting that if this series of exceptions to Article 2 was to be confirmed by law, this should be by EC law in so far as those exceptions imply restrictions to European rules. It thus falls to the European Community, either through EC regulation or through EC Court case law, to go back on the too-general assertion ruled by the Owusu case regarding the mandatory nature of Article 2.

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See also, among others, Harris, above n 18, at 946–947. See, Peel, above n 2, at 375. Similarly, Briggs, above n 2, at 538.

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6 Legal Certainty and the Brussels Convention—Too Much of a Good Thing? If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end with doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts he shall end in certainties.1

ANDREW DICKINSON CONSULTANT, CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP 38. Respect for the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives of the Brussels Convention… would not be fully guaranteed if the court having jurisdiction under the Convention had to be allowed to apply the forum non conveniens doctrine. ECJ, 1 March 2005, Andrew Owusu v NB Jackson, trading as ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ and Others (Case C-281/02) 38. Le respect du principe de la sécurité juridique, qui constitue l’un des objectifs de la convention de Bruxelles… ne serait pas pleinement garanti s’il fallait permettre à une juridiction compétente au titre de ladite convention de faire application de l’exception du forum non conveniens. CJCE, 1er Mars 2005, Andrew Owusu c NB Jackson, agissant sous le nom commercial ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ et autres (Aff C-281/02)

INTRODUCTION The principle of legal certainty expresses the fundamental premise that those subject to the law must know what the law is so as to be able to plan their actions accordingly. … Economic and commercial life is based on advance planning so that clear and precise legal provisions reduce transaction costs and promote efficient business. Legal certainty may thus be seen as contributing to the production of economically consistent results.2

1

F Bacon, The Advancement of Learning (1605), bk 1, ch 5, s 8. T Tridimas, General Principles of EC Law 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 242. 2

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As will be seen, the so-called ‘principle of legal certainty’ has played a key role in the developing jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice concerning the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of civil and commercial matters,3 and seems likely to play an equally significant role in determining the scope and effect of its successor, the ‘Brussels I Regulation’.4 In particular, as appears from the above-quoted extract from the judgment of the Court of Justice in the Owusu case, which is the subject of this paper, the recent rejection of the English doctrine of forum non conveniens within the framework of the Brussels Convention was explained on grounds of legal certainty. This paper considers that reasoning, focusing on the place of the principle of legal certainty within the Community legal order and the compatibility of the forum non conveniens doctrine with the principle, as explained by the Court of Justice in earlier decisions. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY AND THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION

Pre-Gasser—A Subordinate Role The relevance of the principle of legal certainty within the Brussels Convention framework is evident from the following passage from the report of Professor Jenard: Moreover, the purpose of the Convention is also, by establishing common rules of jurisdiction, to achieve, in relations between the Six and in the field which it was required to cover, a genuine legal systematization which will ensure the greatest possible degree of legal certainty. To this end, the rules of jurisdiction codified in Title II determine which State’s courts are most appropriate to assume jurisdiction, taking into account all relevant matters; the approach here adopted means that the nationality of the parties is no longer of importance.

The first sentence and the opening words of the second sentence of that passage might be taken as providing a strong indication that the rules contained in the Convention should provide the exclusive basis for assessing questions of ‘appropriateness’ of jurisdiction, and as answering in themselves the question put to the Court of Justice in Owusu as to the validity of the forum non conveniens doctrine. These statements must, however, be placed in context. As the closing words of the second sentence make clear, the passage was concerned with justifying the decision to extend the benefit of the provisions of the Convention to persons whom, 3

[1998] OJ C27, 1 (consolidated version) (hereafter, the ‘Brussels Convention’). Reg (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters ([2001] OJ L12, 1 (hereafter, the ‘Brussels I Regulation’). 4

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although not nationals of one of the six original Member States of the EEC, were domiciled in the Community ‘and who thereby contribute to its economic activity and prosperity’. The first reference to ‘legal certainty’ in the case law of the Court of Justice concerning the Brussels Convention would appear to be in its 1977 decision in Bavaria Fluggesellschaft v Eurocontrol, in which it was referred to as a ‘principle of the Community legal system’, which (in combination with ‘the objectives of the Brussels Convention in accordance with Article 220 of the EEC Treaty’) required a uniform application of legal classifications and legal concepts.5 Thereafter, in Elefanten Schuh GmbH v Pierre Jacqmain, concerning the formal requirements for jurisdiction agreements, the Court stated: Article 17 is thus intended to lay down itself the formal requirements which agreements conferring jurisdiction must meet; the purpose is to ensure legal certainty and that the parties have given their consent.6

More significantly, in Effer SpA v Kantner, the Court of Justice stated7: It is clear from the provisions of the convention, and in particular from the preamble thereto, that its essential aim is to strengthen in the Community the legal protection of persons therein established. For that purpose, the convention provides a collection of rules which are designed inter alia to avoid the occurrence, in civil and commercial matters, of concurrent litigation in two or more Member States and which, in the interests of legal certainty and for the benefit of the parties, confer jurisdiction upon the national court territorially best qualified to determine a dispute.8

On this basis, the competence conferred by Article 5.1 of the Convention in ‘matters relating to a contract’ was held to encompass the power to consider the existence of the contract itself. Otherwise, one of the parties could defeat that provision by claiming that the contract does not exist.9 It is evident that the Court of Justice in Effer saw legal certainty as being subordinate to the essential aim of strengthening the legal protection of persons established in the Community, consistently with the terms of Article 293 (ex 220) of the EC Treaty and with the preamble to the Brussels Convention. Interestingly, the Court chose to associate it with the objective of conferring jurisdiction upon ‘the national court territorially best qualified to determine a dispute’, sitting in this regard alongside the objective of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings. In contrast, the Court in the Martin Peters case, decided one year later, saw both ‘legal certainty and effective protection throughout the territory of the Community’ as being

5 6 7 8 9

(Joined cases 9 and 10/77) [1977] ECR 1517. Case 38/81 [1982] ECR 825, para 6 of judgment. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid, para 7 of judgment.

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undermined by multiplication of the bases of jurisdiction in one and the same type of action.10 Further, in the same decision, the Court emphasised that: respect for the purposes and spirit of the Convention requires an interpretation… which enables the national court to rule on its own jurisdiction without being compelled to consider the substance of the case.11

By the time, however, of its decision some ten years further on in Mulox v Geels, the Court’s emphasis appears to have shifted again. Although not expressly using the words ‘legal certainty’, the Court stated: 10. It is settled case-law that, as far as possible, the Court of Justice will interpret the terms of the Convention autonomously so as to ensure that it is fully effective having regard to the objectives of Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, for the implementation of which it was adopted. 11. That autonomous interpretation alone is capable of ensuring uniform application of the Convention, the objectives of which include unification of the rules on jurisdiction of the Contracting States, so as to avoid as far as possible the multiplication of the bases of jurisdiction in relation to one and the same legal relationship and to reinforce the legal protection available to persons established in the Community by, at the same time, allowing the plaintiff easily to identify the court before which he may bring an action and the defendant reasonably to foresee the court before which he may be sued.12

Here, the link to the national court territorially best qualified to determine the dispute has been replaced by the language of clarity and ‘legitimate expectation’, concepts closely associated with the notion of legal certainty.13 That shift in emphasis can perhaps be seen to best effect in the later decision of the Court in Custom Made Commercial v Stawa Metallbau in rejecting the submission that the Brussels Convention required that the court designated under Article 5.1 (in matters relating to a contract) be connected with the dispute in a particular case.14 In this connection, the

10 Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging Case 38/81 [1983] ECR 987, para 17 of judgment. 11 Ibid. 12 Case C-125/92 [1993] ECR I-4075, paras 10 and 11 of judgment. See also Rutten v Cross Medical Case C-383/95 [1997] ECR I-57, para 13 of judgment. See also Rösler v Rotwinkel Case C-241/83 [1985] ECR 99, para 23 of judgment (requiring ‘a clear and certain attribution of jurisdiction in all circumstances’); Soc Jakob Handte & Co GmbH v Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces SA Case C-26/91 [1992] ECR I-3967 (requiring that the application of Art 5.1 be ‘foreseeable’ by the defendant manufacturer); Marinari v Lloyd’s Bank plc Case C-365/93 [1995] ECR I-2719, para 19 of judgment (requiring ‘a clear and certain attribution of jurisdiction). 13 See Tridimas, above n 3, 242–3, 244–5, 251–2. 14 Although it should be noted that the Court of Justice’s approach to construing the rules of special jurisdiction in Art 5 has been strongly influenced by the desire to establish a close connecting factor with the dispute. See, for example, Rutten v Cross Medical Case C-383/95 [1997] ECR I-57, para 22 of judgment; Réunion Européenne SA v Spliefhoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV Case C-51/97 [1998] ECR I-6511, para 36 of judgment (see text to n 21 below).

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Court explicitly resorted to the concept of foreseeability15 and (as in the Martin Peters case) to the desirability of avoiding any examination of the substance of the dispute.16 The notion that legal protection of persons established in the Community was automatically promoted by rules having a certain and foreseeable scope was challenged in MSG v Les Gravières Rhénanes SARL. In considering the relationship between Article 5.1 and Article 17 (choice of court provisions) of the Brussels Convention, the Advocate-General commented: In the final analysis, I consider it absurd even only to conjecture that the Convention might be interpreted in such a way as to enable Article 17 to be circumvented, bearing in mind moreover the importance of Article 17 within the system of the Convention. In view of this, I am unable to agree with the Commission’s proposition that this is the price to be paid in order for there to be legal certainty and foreseeability of the courts having jurisdiction. In point of fact, those objectives are certainly not aims in themselves for example, making the application of the rules on jurisdiction foreseeable means first and foremost reinforcing the legal protection available to persons established in the Community by allowing the plaintiff easily to identify the court before which he may bring an action and the defendant reasonably to foresee the court before which he may be sued. I am unable to see, moreover, in what way legal certainty might be strengthened by a breach of Article 17.17

This passage, and the subsequent decision of the Court of Justice in line with the opinion,18 reinforce the point made above, that the principle of legal certainty is (at least at this stage in its development) properly viewed as being subordinate to the objective of reinforcing the legal protection available to persons established in the Community. The desire for legal certainty ought, therefore, to give way in situations where it would impede that protection. Further, as appears above, the need for certainty in the application of one provision of the Convention may conflict with, and be subordinated to, the need for certainty in the application of another provision. In MSG the certainty achieved by the formal requirements of Article 17 (first highlighted in Elefanten Schuh) prevailed over greater certainty in the application of Article 5.1.19 In a different vein, the Court of Justice in Réunion Européenne SA v Spliefhoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV suggested a link between legal certainty and the effective administration of justice in the following terms:

15

Case C-288/92 [1994] ECR I-2913, para 18 of judgment. Ibid, paras 19-20 of judgment, referring to Martin Peters (see text to n 11 above). 17 Case C-106/95 [1997] ECR I-911, para 19 of opinion. 18 Ibid, paras 26-35 of judgment. 19 The importance of the principle of legal certainty in the application of Art 17 (now Art 23 of the Jurisdiction Regulation) was reaffirmed by the Court in its decision in Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl Case C-269/95 [1997] ECR I-3767, paras 26 to 29 of judgment. 16

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That place20 meets the requirements of foreseeability and certainty imposed by the Convention and displays a particularly close connecting factor with the dispute in the main proceedings, so that the attribution of jurisdiction to the courts for that place is justified by reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings.21

In Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company,22 the Court of Justice held that the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Convention apply where the defendant has its domicile or seat in a contracting state, even if the claimant is domiciled in a non-contracting state. In reaching that conclusion, the Court did not expressly refer to the principle of legal certainty. The principle was, however, invoked by the Advocate-General to reject the suggestion that the Convention applied only to disputes which were integrated into the Community.23 Up to this point, therefore, it cannot be said that legal certainty had been established as an independent, guiding objective of the rules of jurisdiction in the Convention. Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd24 illustrates this. In considering the approach to determining the ‘place… where the employee habitually carries out his work’ in Article 5.1 of the Convention, the Advocate-General would appear to have favoured giving priority to legal certainty over the protection of persons domiciled in the Community (here, the claimant employee). He commented25: 46. … the Court concluded in Rutten, it is necessary to determine the place with which the dispute has the most significant link, while taking due account of the concern to afford proper protection to the employee as the weaker party to the contract. 47. I would add, though (and here I diverge to some extent from the views expressed by the Netherlands and United Kingdom Governments), that the latter concern cannot go as far as to allow the employee a discretion in choosing his forum or to imply that the forum should be determined on the basis of what is most convenient for him. On the contrary, the need to have uniform criteria, which ensure legal certainty, and to avoid any multiplicity of jurisdiction means that the concern must be more abstract, and not linked to the circumstances of the individual employee. Similarly, the necessary link between the dispute and the court hearing it will not always mean that a court of the country whose law is applicable to the contract will have jurisdiction, desirable though such a result undoubtedly is. [Emphasis added]

20

ie the place where the actual maritime carrier was to deliver the goods (see ibid, para

35). 21

Case C-51/97 [1998] ECR I-6511, para 36. Case C-412/98 [2000] ECR I-5925. This decision was relied on by the High Court judge in Owusu in declining to stay the proceedings on the ground that the forum non conveniens doctrine was incompatible with the Convention. See further n 66 below. 23 Ibid, para 16 of opinion. 24 Case C-37/00 [2002] ECR I-2013. 25 Ibid, paras 46–47 of opinion. 22

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In contrast, however, the Court of Justice placed greater emphasis on the protection of the particular employee, at the expense of legal certainty. While agreeing with the Advocate-General that the whole of the employee’s period of work should be taken into account, it suggested a presumption in favour of the place where the employee has worked the longest, subject to displacement if ‘the subject-matter of the dispute is more closely connected with a different place of work’.26

The Decision in Gasser and Beyond—Legal Certainty Untamed? The decision of the Court of Justice in Gasser v Misat Srl27 marks a turning point in more than one respect. First, in that the requirements of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, which hitherto had been given a high priority in terms of promoting legal certainty,28 were subordinated by the Court of Justice (disagreeing with the Advocate-General) to the requirement of legal certainty in the application of the lis alibi pendens provisions in Article 21.29 Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, legal certainty appears to emerge in this decision as a guiding principle in its own right, independent of the requirement of legal protection of persons established in the EC, and indeed capable of applying even in situations where it produces a result inconsistent with that requirement. Thus, in paragraph 72 of its judgment, in rejecting any derogation from the requirements of Article 21 where, in general, the duration of proceedings before the courts of the contracting state first seised is excessively long, the Court stated: it must be borne in mind that the Brussels Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to each other’s legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust which has enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within the purview of the Convention are required to respect, and as a corollary the waiver by those States of the right to apply their internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. It is also common ground that the Convention thereby seeks to ensure legal certainty by allowing individuals to foresee with sufficient certainty which court will have jurisdiction.

26

Ibid, para 58 of judgment. (Case C-116/02) [2005] QB 1. See further, in this volume, the Introduction and chs 1 and 2. 28 See text to nn 7 and 19 above. 29 Gasser [2005] QB 1, para 51 of judgment; cf paras 57, 62, 65, 67 and 70 of the Advocate-General’s opinion. For criticism of this aspect of the judgment, see Jonathan Mance (now Lord Mance) (2004) 120 LQR 357; Sir Anthony Clarke, ‘The differing approach to commercial litigation in the European Court of Justice and the courts of England and Wales’ (speech at Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London, 23 February 2006; available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/speeches/2006/sp060223.htm, reproduced at (2007) 18 EBLR 101). 27

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It is submitted that this reasoning, and the result in Gasser, places too much emphasis on legal certainty as an end in itself, and serves to undermine both the legal protection and the legitimate expectations of parties to a choice of court agreement, and (at least potentially) access to justice and the right to a fair trial. In terms of legitimate expectation, which (as noted above30) is a concept closely linked to legal certainty, it is submitted that the parties’ expectations at the time of contracting are paramount and that the Court of Justice in Gasser was wrong to approach the problem from the viewpoint of the parties, or the courts involved, at the time of the jurisdictional conflict. Whatever position each party may take as to the validity of his consent to the jurisdiction agreement, it seems inconsistent with their reasonable expectations at the time of contracting to allow the commencement by one party of proceedings in a forum other than that chosen to inhibit the competence of the chosen court to consider whether the agreement was valid and, if it so finds, to proceed to determine the issues between the parties in accordance with their agreement. As to considerations of access to justice, it is perhaps stating the obvious to suggest that legal certainty should serve, not undermine, the interests of justice. As Lord Wilberforce, a noted expert in matters of international law, observed in the following passage from his speech in The Despina R (a case concerning the proper currency of judgment): Undoubtedly, the present… rule produces certainty—but it is often simpler to produce an unjust rule than a just one. The question is whether, in order to produce a just, or juster, rule, too high a price has to be paid in terms of certainty.31

It must, however, be acknowledged that (as the Court of Justice made clear in determining the admissibility of the reference on this point32) Gasser was not a case in which there had been any actual infringement of the right of access to a court in Article 6.1 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Rather, the question was whether a general apprehension that the Italian proceedings would be unjustly delayed would be sufficient reason to qualify the lis alibi pendens rule. For the Court of Justice to decide that it was not a sufficient reason can be argued to be wholly consistent with the requirements of the Human Rights Convention.33 Notably, however, the European Court of Human Rights, while emphasising that the law must be accessible and foreseeable, has itself commented that the legal consequences which a given action may entail, need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train

30 31 32 33

See text to n 13 above. [1979] AC 685, at 698. Gasser, n 29 above, paras 56–57. Cf A Briggs (2004) 75 BYIL 537, at 541–543.

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excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice.34

Against this background, the approach of the Court in Gasser to the question of legal certainty appears too rigid and unyielding. Moreover, like the earlier decision in MSG,35 Gasser also illustrates the point that arguments based on legal certainty can be made to serve more than one master, as shown by the conflicting reasoning of the Advocate-General and the Court concerning the priority of Articles 17 and 21 within the Convention regime.36 This suppleness of reasoning accords with the following criticisms: Legal certainty is by its nature diffuse, perhaps more so than any other general principle, and its precise content is difficult to pin down. The case law [of the ECJ]37 has used it with creativity, invoking it in diverse contexts to found a variety of propositions both in the substantive and procedural plane… The cynic may argue that the principle is devoid of legal content because it can be used to support contradictory results… [L]egal certainty rarely dictates a specific result in itself. It is a conceptual tool which must not be viewed in isolation but in the context of judicial reasoning taken as a whole.38

For these reasons, it is submitted that the Court of Justice’s use of legal certainty reasoning in its decision in Gasser was flawed.

THE ‘FORUM NON CONVENIENS’ DOCTRINE—KEY FEATURES

Before turning to consider the application of legal certainty reasoning in Owusu v Jackson, it is appropriate to highlight some of the key features of the English law doctrine of forum non conveniens,39 which was the object of that decision. Three features of English law are particularly relevant for present purposes, as follows. 34 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1980) 2 EHRR 245, para 49 of judgment. See generally L Mulcahy (ed), Human Rights and Civil Practice (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), 95–96. 35 See text to nn 17–19 above. 36 See n 29 above. 37 The reference in the original is to the case law of the ECJ in relation, in particular, to the EC Treaty and legislation, rather than specifically in relation to the Brussels Convention, but the point remains valid in the present context. 38 Tridimas, above n 3, 243-4. 39 For criticisms of this language, which is used here for convenience, see Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, at 474 (Lord Goff: ‘I feel bound to say that I doubt whether the Latin tag forum non conveniens is apt to describe this principle. For the question is not one of convenience, but of the suitability or appropriateness of the relevant jurisdiction. However the Latin tag (sometimes expressed as forum non conveniens and sometimes as forum conveniens) is so widely used to describe the principle, not only in England and Scotland, but in other Commonwealth jurisdictions and in the United States,

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First, the doctrine is founded upon the procedural power to stay (ie, put a halt to) proceedings, originally based in the inherent jurisdiction of the courts40 and now enshrined in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (‘CPR’).41 The procedural nature of the power should not, however, disguise what (in this context) is essentially a rule of jurisdiction. The characterisation is put beyond doubt by Part 11 of the CPR (disputing the court’s jurisdiction), sub-rule (6) of which provides that An order containing a declaration that the court has no jurisdiction or will not exercise its jurisdiction42 may also make further provision including—… (d) staying the proceedings.

Secondly, the nature of a procedural power means that the court ultimately has discretion whether to stay proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens or otherwise. It is, however, submitted that the existence of a discretion in the application of a rule of law, jurisdiction or procedure is not per se contrary to the principle of legal certainty, provided that the basis upon which that discretion will be exercised is sufficiently clear for parties to be able to foresee with a sufficient (not absolute) degree of certainty how it will be exercised.43 Thirdly, the English courts have provided substantial guidance as to how the discretionary power to stay proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens should be exercised. In the leading case (Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd), a case which has provided the backbone of almost all subsequent decisions on the forum non conveniens doctrine, Lord Goff approved44 the following statement of principle taken from the judgment of Lord Kinnear in the Scottish case of Sim v Robinow: the plea can never be sustained unless the court is satisfied that there is some other tribunal, having competent jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice.45

As to the link between the doctrine and the achievement of the ‘ends of justice’, it should be noted that the focus is upon justice in the individual case. Thus, in Lubbe v Cape plc, Lord Hope stated:

that it is probably sensible to retain it. But it is most important not to allow it to mislead us into thinking that the question at issue is one of “mere practical convenience”.’ 40 As preserved by Supreme Court Act 1981, s 49(3) and Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s 49. 41 See CPR (SI 1998/3132), r 3.1(2)(f). 42 The primary relief under Part 11—see r 11(1). 43 See text to n 34 above. 44 [1987] AC 460, at 474 (HL). 45 (1892) 19 R 665, at 668.

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In my opinion the principles on which the doctrine of forum non conveniens rest leave no room for considerations of public interest or public policy which cannot be related to the private interests of any of the parties or the ends of justice in the case which is before the court.46

In Spiliada Lord Goff explained the practical application of the principle set out above in a case in which the competence of the English court had been established as of right (including under Article 2 of the Brussels Convention or the Jurisdiction Regulation): (a) The basic principle is that a stay will only be granted on the ground of forum non conveniens where the court is satisfied that there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e. in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice. (b) . . . in general the burden of proof rests on the defendant to persuade the court to exercise its discretion to grant a stay . . . It is however of importance to remember that each party will seek to establish the existence of certain matters which will assist him in persuading the court to exercise its discretion in his favour, and that in respect of any such matter the evidential burden will rest on the party who asserts its existence. Furthermore, if the court is satisfied that there is another available forum which is prima facie the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, the burden will then shift to the plaintiff to show that there are special circumstances by reason of which justice requires that the trial should nevertheless take place in this country (see (f), below). (c) The question being whether there is some other forum which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, it is pertinent to ask whether the fact that the plaintiff has, ex hypothesi, founded jurisdiction as of right in accordance with the law of this country, of itself gives the plaintiff an advantage in the sense that the English court will not lightly disturb jurisdiction so established . . . In my opinion, the burden resting on the defendant is not just to show that England is not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial, but to establish that there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum. In this way, proper regard is paid to the fact that jurisdiction has been founded in England as of right . . .; and there is the further advantage that, on a subject where comity is of importance, it appears that there will be a broad consensus among major common law jurisdictions . . . (d) Since the question is whether there exists some other forum which is clearly more appropriate for the trial of the action, the court will look first to see what factors there are which point in the direction of another forum. These are the factors which Lord Diplock described, in MacShannon’s case [1978] AC 795, 812, as indicating that justice can be done in the other forum at ‘substantially less inconvenience or expense’. Having regard to the anxiety expressed in your Lordships’ House in the Société du Gaz case, 1926 SC (HL) 13 concerning the use of the word ‘convenience’ in this context, I respectfully consider that it may

46

[2000] 1 WLR 1545, at 1566 (HL).

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be more desirable, now that the English and Scottish principles are regarded as being the same, to adopt the expression used by my noble and learned friend, Lord Keith of Kinkel, in The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398, 415, when he referred to the ‘natural forum’ as being ‘that with which the action had the most real and substantial connection’. So it is for connecting factors in this sense that the court must first look; and these will include not only factors affecting convenience or expense (such as availability of witnesses), but also other factors such as the law governing the relevant transaction (as to which see Crédit Chimique v James Scott Engineering Group Ltd, [1982] SLT 131), and the places where the parties respectively reside or carry on business. (e) If the court concludes at that stage that there is no other available forum which is clearly more appropriate for the trial of the action, it will ordinarily refuse a stay . . . It is difficult to imagine circumstances where, in such a case, a stay may be granted. (f) If however the court concludes at that stage that there is some other available forum which prima facie is clearly more appropriate for the trial of the action, it will ordinarily grant a stay unless there are circumstances by reason of which justice requires that a stay should nevertheless not be granted. In this inquiry, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, including circumstances which go beyond those taken into account when considering connecting factors with other jurisdictions. One such factor can be the fact, if established objectively by cogent evidence, that the plaintiff will not obtain justice in the foreign jurisdiction; see The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398, 411, per Lord Diplock, a passage which now makes plain that, on this inquiry, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff. How far other advantages to the plaintiff in proceeding in this country may be relevant in this connection, I shall have to consider at a later stage.47

This passage prompts three observations, relevant to the treatment of the forum non conveniens doctrine in Owusu, as follows: 1

It will be apparent that the discretion conferred on the court in exercising the power to stay on forum non conveniens grounds is in no sense unfettered or undefined. Indeed, both the general principle and the manner of its application have been clearly explained. That is not to say that problems have not arisen in practice,48 or that there have been no difficult cases,49 but simply that the doctrine should not be seen as the equivalent of the ‘Wild West’ in the universe of rules of jurisdiction. It will also be apparent that the focus of the doctrine is on achieving justice in the particular case, by promoting the resolution of disputes

2

47

[1987] AC 460, at 476–478. eg as to the concept of ‘available forum’ (compare the House of Lords decision in Lubbe v Cape plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545 with the first Court of Appeal decision in that case, reported at [1998] CLC 1559). 49 Compare, for example, Lubbe (above n 46) with the earlier decision in Connelly v RTZ Corp [1998] AC 854. 48

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in the most appropriate forum, subject to the requirement that both parties will obtain justice in that forum. Finally, although technically the court may stay proceedings of its own initiative,50 in practice, a defendant must make an application to the court and (in a case in which the court’s competence has been established as of right) bears the burden of showing that there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum.

3

LEGAL CERTAINTY AND OWUSU

Paragraph 38 of the judgment in Owusu, quoted in the title of this paper, is the second paragraph in the judgment under the heading ‘The compatibility of the forum non conveniens doctrine with the Brussels Convention’, and must be considered together with the remaining paragraphs under that heading (paras 37, 39 to 45). Each will be analysed in turn.

Paragraph 37 It must be observed, first, that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory in nature and that, according to its terms, there can be no derogation from the principle it lays down except in the cases expressly provided for by the Convention… It is common ground that no exception on the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine was provided for by the authors of the Convention, although the question was discussed when the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom was drawn up, as is apparent from the report on that Convention by Professor Schlosser (OJ 1979 C 59, p 71, paragraphs 77 and 78).

As to the first sentence, this appears difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with (a) the way in which the Advocate-General formulated the first question in Owusu,51 contemplating possible derogations in the case of a lis pendens or an ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ situation in a non-contracting state52 and with the Court’s view that the question need not be answered, (b) the Court’s reasoning in Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV as to the possible effect of a jurisdiction clause designating the courts of a third country,53 and (c) the following passage from the Court’s judgment in 50

CPR, r 3.3. Para 280 of opinion. Both the Advocate-General and the Court of Justice ruled inadmissible the second question concerning possible application of the forum non conveniens judgment in circumstances other than those existing in Owusu (see paras 47 to 51 of judgment). 52 ie a situation which, if connected with a contracting/Member State, would fall within Art 16 of the Brussels Convention (Art 22 of the Jurisdiction Regulation). 53 Case C-387/98 [2000] ECR I-9337, para 19. See also Schlosser Report, para 176 ([1979] OJ C59, 124): ‘There is nothing in the 1968 Convention to support the conclusion 51

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Van Uden Maritime BV v Firma Deco-Line as to the effect of an arbitration clause on the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels Convention54: Where the parties have validly excluded the jurisdiction of the courts in a dispute arising under a contract and have referred that dispute to arbitration, there are no courts of any State that have jurisdiction as to the substance of the case for the purposes of the Convention.

The relevance of the final sentence of paragraph 37, and the passages of the Schlosser Report there referred to, cannot be denied. Those passages cannot, however, be regarded as conclusive. In particular, there are indications that Professor Schlosser had in mind the relationship between the contracting states and did not rule out the possible relevance of forum non conveniens in an international context.55

Paragraph 38 Respect for the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives of the Brussels Convention… would not be fully guaranteed if the court having jurisdiction under the Convention had to be allowed to apply the forum non conveniens doctrine.

This appears to be a conclusion from the premises set out in the following paragraphs, which must therefore be examined in further detail. In this connection, however, reference may be made to the Court’s description, in summary form but otherwise unobjectionable, of the doctrine in paragraphs 8 and 9 of its judgment: 8. According to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as understood in English law, a national court may decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court in another State, which also has jurisdiction, would objectively be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action, that is to say, a forum in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice (1986 judgment of the House of Lords, in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, particularly at p 476). 9. An English court which decides to decline jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens stays proceedings so that the proceedings which are thus provisionally suspended can be resumed should it prove, in particular, that the foreign forum has no jurisdiction to hear the case or that the claimant has no access to effective justice in that forum. that such agreements must be inadmissible in principle. However, the 1968 Convention does not contain any rules as to their validity either.’ 54 Case C-391/95 [1998] ECR I-7091, para 24. 55 Schlosser Report, para 78 ([1979] OJ C59, 97): ‘Furthermore, the risk of a negative conflict of jurisdiction cannot be disregarded: despite the United Kingdom court’s decision, the judge on the Continent could likewise decline jurisdiction… To correct rules of jurisdiction in a particular case by means of the concept of forum conveniens will then be largely unnecessary.’

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Paragraph 39 According to its preamble, the Brussels Convention is intended to strengthen in the Community the legal protection of persons established therein, by laying down common rules on jurisdiction to guarantee certainty as to the allocation of jurisdiction among the various national courts before which proceedings in a particular case may be brought. No objection can be taken to this statement. Both Mr Owusu and Mr Jackson, being domiciled in the United Kingdom, were persons established in the Community, and entitled to the legal protection referred to. In other cases, however, the claimant may not be domiciled in a Member State (or otherwise established in the Community).

Paragraph 41 Application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, which allows the court seised a wide discretion as regards the question whether a foreign court would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of an action, is liable to undermine the predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels Convention, in particular that of Article 2, and consequently to undermine the principle of legal certainty, which is the basis of the Convention.

It cannot be denied that application of the discretionary forum non conveniens doctrine would make the application of rules of jurisdiction less predictable for claimants at the point of bringing proceedings, as their choice of forum may be opposed by defendants and denied by the court. Based on the explanation of the doctrine given above,56 however, it is submitted that the Court’s characterisation of the discretion as ‘wide’ is (at best) unhelpful and (at worst) misleading, and that the Court was wrong to suggest that the existence of a discretion, in itself, conflicted with the principle of legal certainty.

Paragraphs 40 and 42 40. The Court has thus held that the principle of legal certainty requires, in particular, that the jurisdictional rules which derogate from the general rule laid down in Article 2 of the Brussels Convention should be interpreted in such a way as to enable a normally well-informed defendant reasonably to foresee before which courts, other than those of the State in which he is domiciled, he may be sued. 42. The legal protection of persons established in the Community would also be undermined. First, a defendant, who is generally better placed to conduct his defence before the courts of his domicile, would not be able, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, reasonably to foresee before which other 56

See text above under ‘The “Forum non Conveniens” Doctrine—Key Features.’

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court he may be sued. Second, where a plea is raised on the basis that a foreign court is a more appropriate forum to try the action, it is for the claimant to establish that he will not be able to obtain justice before that foreign court or, if the court seised decides to allow the plea, that the foreign court has in fact no jurisdiction to try the action or that the claimant does not, in practice, have access to effective justice before that court, irrespective of the cost entailed by the bringing of a fresh action before a court of another State and the prolongation of the procedural time-limits.

As a matter of first impression the statement in paragraph 40 is unobjectionable, but curious. In referring only to the position of the ‘wellinformed’ defendant, the Court appears to overlook both the position of the claimant (in contrast, for example, to the formulations of the legal certainty principle in Mulox and MSG57) and the obvious point that the doctrine of forum non conveniens actually serves to advance the legitimate expectations of the defendant, by allowing him a means of redress where the claimant chooses an ‘inconvenient’ forum. Curiosity, however, turns to disbelief on reading paragraph 42, the second sentence of which shows a fundamental misunderstanding by the Court58 of the nature of the doctrine, which in practice invariably requires that the defendant apply to stay proceedings in the claimant’s chosen forum. As a consequence, forum non conveniens undoubtedly enhances rather than undermines the legal protection available to the defendant by allowing him to challenge the claimant’s choice on the basis that the interests of the parties and the interests of justice will be better served in another forum. In contrast, the mandatory application of Article 2 may weaken the legal protection of the defendant by reason of considerations such as those set out by the Court in paragraph 44 of its judgment, which the court accepted as ‘genuine’, if not material (see below).59 Further, the final sentence of paragraph 42, referring to the position of the claimant, is confused and, as a result, rather unsatisfactory. The Court, perhaps following from its earlier error, fails to acknowledge that the initial burden lies on the defendant to show that there is another available (ie, competent) court which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English court and in which prima facie the action may be tried more suitably for the interests of the parties and the ends of justice. Only at this point does the burden transfer to the claimant to show that a stay would, in fact, cause him injustice. Further, in the event that a stay is granted, either party may apply to reverse that stay if new facts come to light. Admittedly, the claimant’s position makes it more likely that he will make the application. If, however, he does so, the Court will consider afresh whether the stay was appropriate and, although the evidential burden will

57 58 59

See text to nn 12 and 17-18 above. But not the Advocate-General—see para 30 of his opinion. Owusu, para 45 of judgment.

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be placed on the claimant to show a change of circumstances, the legal burden will remain on the defendant.60 As to the cost entailed by the bringing of a fresh action, this is a matter which the Court will take into account in exercising its discretion.61 Finally, as to the ‘prolongation of the procedural time limits’, it may be pointed out that this was not a factor which appeared to concern the Court in the Gasser case.62 Overall, paragraphs 40 and 42 of the Court’s judgment in Owusu do not stand up to close scrutiny. By focusing on the procedural position of the claimant, however, the Court of Justice appears to have missed stronger reasons for excluding the possible application of the forum non conveniens doctrine in Owusu on the ground that it undermines the legal protection afforded to claimants established in the Community. First, the grant of a stay denies the claimant his forum of choice and, at least at the stage of initiating proceedings, complicates his task of identifying the court(s) having jurisdiction. Secondly, the grant of a stay has been argued to deny the claimant the possibility of commencing proceedings in another contracting state court having jurisdiction under the Convention, on the basis that the English court nevertheless remains ‘seised’ of the proceedings for the purposes of the lis alibi pendens provisions.63 In the present writer’s view, that argument is unconvincing,64 but it has yet to be settled either way. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the grant of a stay in favour of the courts of a non-contracting state may deprive the claimant of the opportunity to obtain a judgment which is enforceable under the favourable Convention regime.65 Although that is a factor which an English court would take into account in deciding whether to stay proceedings, there is (it is submitted) much to be said for giving the widest possible guarantee that disputes between persons established in the Community will be resolved in Community courts and enforced by means of the streamlined Convention procedure.

60 See, for example, Baghlaf al Zafer Factory Co BR for Industry Ltd v Pakistan National Shipping Co and Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (No 2) [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (CA). 61 Ibid, at 5 (Waller LJ). See also A Briggs and P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (4th edn, 2005), 225 for discussion of possible procedural solutions. 62 See above, chs 1 and 2, for discussion of this case. 63 See A Briggs and P Rees, above n 61, para 2.205 discussing the English case law on this point. 64 The overall approach of Clarke J (as he then was) in The Xin Yang [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 217, at 221–222 is preferred (see also Haji-Iannou v Frangos [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 339, at 347–348 (CA), but note the criticism of Briggs and Rees, above n 61, p 237, fn 1148). Following a stay, English proceedings should not be treated as ‘pending’ for the purposes of the lis alibi pendens rules. Any application to lift the stay should, it is submitted, be treated for these purposes as involving new proceedings. 65 See Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco Case C-129/92 [1994] ECR I-117, the decision to exclude non-contracting state judgments from the enforcement regime in the Convention being itself justified on grounds of legal certainty (see para 21 of judgment).

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These are powerful arguments, capable of supporting the final result in Owusu (in which, as noted above, both claimant and defendant were domiciled in the United Kingdom). It must, however, be noted that the force of the legal protection of the claimant as an argument for preserving the mandatory force of Article 2 diminishes in circumstances where the claimant is not domiciled, or otherwise established, in the Community. In such a case, it is not clear that Article 2, whose primary purpose is to protect the defendant,66 should have mandatory effect in circumstances where the defendant does not insist upon that protection and the proposed derogation seeks to promote a just result, as the doctrine of forum non conveniens does.67 If the parties to an arbitration (or non-contracting state jurisdiction) agreement can exclude Article 2 and other rules of jurisdiction in the Convention and if a defendant may confer jurisdiction on an otherwise non-competent court by submitting in accordance with Article 18,68 is it too great a leap of faith to suggest that the defendant can waive the protection which Article 2 affords to him in circumstances where the Convention can be argued to have no interest in protecting the claimant? Arguably, shorn of the objective of legal protection, the argument based on certainty loses much of its force in giving a teleological (rather than literal) interpretation to the provisions of the Convention. Attractive as this argument might instinctively appear, it may stretch credulity in the concept of teleological interpretation too far.69 Taken at face value in situations in which the claimant is not domiciled in a contracting state but the defendant is so domiciled, it would appear to justify application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens not only in favour of proceedings in a non-contracting state but also in favour of proceedings in a contracting state, something which even the English courts had not contemplated.70 Further, even if that conclusion may be resisted on the ground of a direct incompatibility with the Convention lis alibi pendens regime and with the framework contemplated by the Schlosser Report,71 it may be doubted whether it is appropriate for an international convention not only to be construed in such a way as to discriminate between different categories of claimants, at least indirectly, on grounds of nationality, but also to do so on the basis that one category

66 See Group Josi, above n 22, para 35. In Group Josi, in contrast to the case under consideration, the defendant sought to establish the jurisdiction of its place of domicile in the face of a claim by a party not domiciled in any contracting state before the courts of another contracting state. 67 See pp 12−13 of this chapter. 68 Jurisdiction Reg, Art 24. 69 See J Pontier and E Burg, above n 5, 84–87 discussing the role of the principle of legal certainty in securing respect for the wording of the Convention. 70 Cf Haji Iannou v Frangos, above n 64 at 345–346, although the claimants in that case appeared to be domiciled in a contracting state. See further Briggs and Rees, above n 61, p 257–258. 71 Above n 55.

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of claimants is not deserving of protection.72 Finally, as appears below, the Court of Justice’s opposition to the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Owusu may be capable of being justified on grounds other than legal certainty. But, whether or not the argument is accepted, the process of reasoning is plainly more complex than the Court of Justice was prepared or able to recognise.

Paragraph 43 Moreover, allowing forum non conveniens in the context of the Brussels Convention would be likely to affect the uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction contained therein in so far as that doctrine is recognised only in a limited number of Contracting States, whereas the objective of the Brussels Convention is precisely to lay down common rules to the exclusion of derogating national rules.

As appears from the use of the word ‘precisely’ this argument of uniformity is closely linked to legal certainty, although it approaches the problem from a different angle. In comparison, however, with the arguments based on foreseeability and legal protection, considered above, the argument based on uniformity seems better equipped to justify rejection of the doctrine of forum non conveniens even in a situation in which the defendant, but not the claimant, is domiciled in a contracting state. Thus, the availability to certain contracting state defendants,73 but not others, of the additional protection afforded by the doctrine could be argued to distort competition and to undermine the declared objective for the Convention of facilitating the working of the common market.74 This appears a better argument for giving mandatory effect to Article 2, subject only to qualifications which apply in all Member States. Paragraphs 44 and 45 44. The defendants in the main proceedings emphasise the negative consequences which would result in practice from the obligation the English courts would then be under to try this case, inter alia as regards the expense of the proceedings, the possibility of recovering their costs in England if the claimant’s action is dismissed, the logistical difficulties resulting from the geographical distance, the need to assess the merits of the case according to Jamaican standards, the enforceability in Jamaica of a default judgment and the impossibility of enforcing cross-claims against the other defendants. 72 See European Convention on Human Rights, Art 14, although the doctrine of forum non conveniens appears compatible, in particular, with Art 6.1 insofar as it requires that there be an available foreign forum in which the dispute may justly be resolved. 73 Ie those in the UK, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta. 74 Mund & Fester v Hatrex Internationaal Transport (Case C-398/92), para 11 of judgment; Owusu, para 33 of judgment.

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45. In that regard, genuine as those difficulties may be, suffice it to observe that such considerations, which are precisely those which may be taken into account when forum non conveniens is considered, are not such as to call into question the mandatory nature of the fundamental rule of jurisdiction contained in Article 2 of the Brussels Convention, for the reasons set out above.

The tone of these paragraphs gives the impression that the Court was not concerned that its decision, based in large part on legal certainty, would almost certainly undermine the legal protection of the defendants, including one defendant domiciled in a Member State. Whether or not that impression is misleading, the curt rejection of these arguments further evidences the recent detachment in the Brussels Convention case law, following the Gasser decision, of the principle of legal certainty from the requirement of legal protection. Even if the result of Owusu can be justified, this development gives cause for concern, as being liable to result in over-rigid application of rules of jurisdiction, and to undermine rather than promote the achievement of the ends of justice.

THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY AND THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION

If anything, greater weight is likely to be attached to the principle of legal certainty in the interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation. Indeed, Recital (11) appears to support both the recognition of legal certainty as an independent guiding principle and the rejection of the doctrine of forum non conveniens: The rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the subject-matter of the litigation or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different linking factor.75

Thus, regrettably in the present writer’s view, it appears that the change of direction signalled by the Court of Justice in Gasser and Owusu may well be irreversible. LEGAL CERTAINTY AND MEASURES IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE—DIFFERING STANDARDS?

Given the emphasis placed by the Court of Justice upon the principle of legal certainty in its decisions in Gasser and Owusu, one would expect those involved in the process of drafting and negotiating Community 75 As to uniformity, Recital (8) states that ‘common rules on jurisdiction should, in principle, apply when the defendant is domiciled in one of [the] Member States’.

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legislation to be alive to the need to create highly predictable rules, and to avoid conferring a discretion on Member State courts in the application of Community rules. In this regard, however, Article 8(3) of the 2005 Commission proposal for a regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)76 fails miserably on both counts. Article 8.3 provides: Effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of a country with which the situation has a close connection. In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, courts shall have regard to their nature and purpose… and to the consequences of their application for the objective pursued by the relevant mandatory rules and for the parties.77

In comparison with this proposed rule, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as defined by the English courts in Spiliada Maritime and the cases following it, appears to be a model of clarity. The United Kingdom opposed the predecessor to Article 8.3, Article 7.1 of the 1980 Rome Convention, on the reported ground that it was ‘a recipe for confusion… for uncertainty… for expense… and for delay’78 and there seems no reason to give a more favourable appraisal of the new text.79 The intensive EC legislative activity in the field of civil justice80 will provide an interesting test ground for the reformulated principle.

CONCLUSION

In the abstract, predictability of the law is undoubtedly a desirable objective. Yet the apparent development of ‘legal certainty’ into an independent, guiding principle81 in the case law of the Court of Justice on the Brussels Convention and in the Recitals to the Brussels I Regulation is a cause for concern. It must be remembered that the achievement of legal certainty in the application of one rule of jurisdiction may conflict with the achievement of legal certainty in another, and the principle in itself provides no answer as to which rule should take priority. Further, if 76

COM (2005) 650 final. See also Art 13.2 of the revised Commission proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (COM (2006) 83 final) in similar terms. 78 L Collins (ed), Dicey & Morris The Conflict of Laws (14th edn, 2006), para 32–143 quoting P North, Contract Conflicts (North-Holland 1982) 19–20. 79 For more detailed criticism, see A Dickinson (2007) 3 JPrIL 53. The UK has decided not to opt in to the Rome I proposal, citing the uncertainty in Art 8.3 as one principal reason for its decision. See further paras 3.1 to 3.5 of the UK Financial Markets Law Committee paper on the proposed Regulation, . The present writer was a member of the FMLC’s working group. 80 See A Dickinson (2005)1 JPrIL 197. 81 For more recent evidence of this trend in the ECJ’s case law, see Reisch Montage AG v. Kiesel Baumaschinen Handels Gmbh (Case C-103/05) [2006] ECR I-6827, para 24; Roche Nederland BV v. Primus (Case C-539/03) [2006] ECR I-6535, para 37; Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbh & Co v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteilgungs KG (Case C-403) [2006] ECR I-6509. 77

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allowed to operate independently of the requirement of legal protection, the principle of legal certainty is liable to lead to over-rigid application of legal rules and to be a cause of injustice. Thus, although the result in Owusu v Jackson may have been correct, the reasoning must be handled with care. Finally, if the requirement of legal certainty (whatever it may involve) is to be taken seriously, it is essential that the European Community should itself observe the standards which its Court has required of Member States in the field of civil justice.

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7 Forum non conveniens et Application Uniforme des Règles de Competence PIERRE MAYER PROFESSEUR À L’UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE 43. [L]’admissibilité de l’exception du forum non conveniens dans le cadre de la convention de Bruxelles risquerait d’affecter l’application uniforme des règles de compétence contenues dans celle-ci dans la mesure où cette exception n’est reconnue que dans un nombre limité d’États contractants, alors que le but de la convention de Bruxelles est précisément de prévoir des règles communes à l’exclusion des règles nationales exorbitantes. CJCE, 1er Mars 2005, Andrew Owusu c NB Jackson, agissant sous le nom commercial ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ et autres (Aff C-281/02) 43. [A]llowing forum non conveniens in the context of the Brussels Convention would be likely to affect the uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction contained therein in so far as that doctrine is recognised only in a limited number of Contracting States, whereas the objective of the Brussels Convention is precisely to lay down common rules to the exclusion of derogating national rules. ECJ, 1 March 2005, Andrew Owusu v NB Jackson, trading as ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’ and Others (Case C-281/02)

Avoir à commenter ce motif me place dans une situation quelque peu paradoxale: je ne suis pas un enthousiaste du forum non conveniens, mais je ne suis pas non plus un enthousiaste de l’uniformité recherchée au détriment des solutions nationales. Mes commentaires seront donc nuancés. Pour apprécier la condamnation du forum non conveniens, en se limitant au fondement de cette condamnation tiré de la nécessité d’uniformité dans l’application des règles, il faut répondre à trois questions: •

L’uniformité des règles de compétence appelle-t-elle nécessairement l’uniformité dans la façon d’exercer la compétence? La question est discutée, mais je pense que la réponse est affirmative.

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•

D’où la deuxième question: une application uniforme, non dans la rigidité, mais dans la souplesse imposée à tous, n’aboutirait-elle pas elle aussi à des solutions concrètes uniformes? La Cour de justice constate que le forum non conveniens n’est connu que d’un petit nombre d’Etats parties, mais n’auraitelle pas pu l’imposer à tous? Toutefois, on peut être sceptique sur la possibilité d’instaurer une uniformité concrète par la généralisation de la souplesse.

•

La prohibition du recours au forum non conveniens serait donc justifiée, si ne se posait une troisième question: que vaut l’uniformité? Est-ce un objectif toujours désirable? Quels sont ses mérites, quels sont ses inconvénients?

I. L’UNIFORMITÉ DES RÈGLES APPELLE-T-ELLE NÉCESSAIREMENT L’UNIFORMITÉ DANS LA FAÇON DE LES APPLIQUER?

Dans le motif commenté, la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes ne se prononce pas sur la compatibilité du forum non conveniens, en soi, avec la recherche de solutions uniformes. Dans le point 43, en effet, elle relève seulement que « cette exception n’est reconnue que dans un nombre limité d’Etats contractants ». De fait, si dans la plupart des Etats, les règles sont comprises de façon rigide, et dans une minorité, de façon souple, il est certain que l’uniformité recherchée—à supposer qu’elle doive réellement l’être—sera compromise. Sur ce plan, je ne suis pas convaincu par l’argument de certains commentateurs1 qui reprochent à la Cour d’avoir « manqué l’aspect le plus fondamental de la question », allant jusqu’à se demander « si elle lit les questions qui lui sont posées ». Ils font valoir que le forum non conveniens n’est pas une règle de compétence, mais une règle d’exercice d’une compétence préexistante. L’article 2 pose une règle de compétence (en faveur du juge du domicile du défendeur), règle dont l’application n’était en l’espèce contestée par personne. L’exercice ou le non-exercice de la compétence resterait, en revanche, en dehors du domaine de la Convention. Cette analyse du forum non conveniens est au départ juste: le juge anglais ne se déclare pas incompétent, il prononce l’arrêt de la procédure sur le fondement du forum non conveniens. Mais par rapport à l’exigence d’uniformité, cette distinction est beaucoup trop formelle. S’il est vrai que les rédacteurs de la Convention (puis du Règlement) ont voulu que la compétence des tribunaux des divers Etats soit toujours ouverte selon des critères identiques, ils n’ont pas pu vouloir que l’exercice de cette compétence soit conçu de façon totalement différente par les uns et par les autres, et puisse se traduire pour les uns, et pas pour les autres, par une fermeture de l’accès au tribunal déclaré compétent. Si l’uniformité est vraiment désirable au niveau de la compétence, qui ne se traduit après tout 1

V la note sous l’arrêt Owusu de Gilles Cuniberdi et Matteo Winkler, JDI 2005, 1177.

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de la part du juge saisi que par une position abstraite—une declaration— elle devrait l’être a fortiori au niveau de l’activité concrète de ce juge: connaître du litige. En fait, la question du forum non conveniens n’a pas été envisagée au moment de l’élaboration de la Convention de Bruxelles: ni le Royaume-Uni ni l’Irlande n’y ont participé. Par la suite, elle a été éludée, un consensus paraissant difficile à atteindre. Mais si elle avait été envisagée, et si la perspective d’un accord n’avait pas paru a priori exclue, elle aurait fait l’objet d’un article de la Convention, soit pour admettre, soit pour rejeter—mais pour tous les Etats—le forum non conveniens. La preuve du parallélisme entre l’ouverture de la compétence et son exercice effectif est fournie par le dernier état de l’avant-projet de la Convention de La Haye sur la compétence internationale et la reconnaissance des jugements étrangers. Il comportait un article 22, qui prévoyait que « dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, un tribunal peut suspendre la procédure si dans le cas de l’espèce, l’exercice de sa compétence est particulièrement inapproprié et si le tribunal d’un autre Etat est compétent et clairement plus approprié pour connaître du litige. » On recherchait donc l’uniformité au niveau de la mise en œuvre de la compétence. L’absence d’un texte analogue, plus ouvert ou plus strict, dans la Convention, quelles qu’en soient les raisons, ne signifie pas que la question soit indifférente. On est dans le domaine en quelque sorte naturel de la Convention (ou du Règlement).

II. UNE APPLICATION UNIFORME PEUT-ELLE ÊTRE ATTENDUE DE L’IMPOSITION DU FORUM NON CONVENIENS À TOUS LES ETATS MEMBRES?

L’article 22 du projet de La Haye montre que l’uniformité peut être recherchée dans la souplesse. Bien que le texte utilise l’expression: « un tribunal peut, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles… », l’objectif est que cette possibilité soit utilisée partout de la même façon, et en tout cas sur les même bases; sinon, il aurait suffi de renvoyer aux pratiques de chaque Etat; or, une proposition de rendre optionnelle l’application de l’article 22 avait été délibérément écartée. De plus, le texte cherche à créer l’uniformité en énumérant les circonstances pertinentes pour se déclarer conveniens ou non conveniens. Il eût donc été concevable, en l’absence d’un texte analogue, quoique plus difficilement il est vrai, d’imposer aux juges de tous les Etats l’obligation de se prononcer, au regard de certains critères, sur la prétention par le défendeur de voir le tribunal saisi décliner, comme non conveniens, l’exercice de sa compétence. Ce n’est pas, en effet, parce qu’un

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élément de souplesse dans la mise en œuvre des règles n’est pas mentionné par la Convention qu’il est nécessairement exclu. Cela paraît même, dans certains cas, indispensable. Ainsi, l’article 6, 1° de la Convention permet au demandeur de citer tous les défendeurs domiciliés sur le territoire communautaire devant le tribunal du domicile d’un seul d’entre eux, qu’il choisit; il ne mentionne pas que ce défendeur ne doit pas être fictif. La Cour de cassation française, dans un arrêt du 8 janvier 2002,2 n’a pourtant pas hésité à poser cette condition (qui, par nature, laisse au juge une certaine marge d’appréciation). L’annotatrice à la Gazette du Palais n’a pas critiqué cette solution; et de fait, on n’imagine pas que la Cour de justice adopte une position différente si la question lui est posée. Mais la position qu’elle prendra, quelle qu’elle soit, ne consistera pas à laisser libres les Etats d’introduire ou non le tempérament de la fictivité. Si elle l’adopte, elle l’imposera par là, du moins dans son principe (tout en laissant au juge saisi le soin de déterminer dans l’espèce qui lui est soumise s’il y a ou non fictivité). Ce qui paraît devoir être accepté, au regard de l’exigence d’uniformité, pour l’élément de souplesse qu’est l’exception de fictivité du co-défendeur, pourrait-il l’être pour le forum non conveniens? Autrement dit, si par un revirement de la Cour de justice, ou par une modification du Règlement, le forum non conveniens était accepté, imposé à tous, ne retrouverait-on pas l’uniformité, par une voie différente de celle prise par l’arrêt Owusu? Je ne le crois pas: si la Convention de La Haye sur la compétence internationale et la reconnaissance des jugements étrangers avait vu le jour, son article 22 n’aurait réalisé qu’une uniformité de façade. Le forum non conveniens s’est développé dans des tribunaux qui ont une certaine conception de leur rôle, et les moyens de la mettre en œuvre. Pour ces tribunaux, le temps est compté largement; les audiences peuvent durer plusieurs semaines; les témoins y sont longuement interrogés, selon une procédure particulière… Tout cela est mis au service d’un examen très sérieux, qui s’étend aux caractéristiques du système judiciaire préféré par le défendeur, et notamment, de son mode d’administration des preuves. Le fonctionnement d’un tel système n’est même pas concevable en France, où les considérations d’économie procédurale sont prépondérantes. Il n’est pas question de consacrer une fraction d’un temps strictement mesuré à une comparaison des mérites que présenterait la saisine du juge étranger par rapport à celle du juge français. Par ailleurs, l’une des circonstances les plus déterminantes dans l’appréciation du caractère conveniens est l’accès aux preuves, notamment par témoins; cette circonstance, si un juge français devait en tenir compte, le conduirait à se déclarer systématiquement non conveniens, même si les témoins résidaient en France, puisque de toute façon il ne les entend pas!

2

Gaz Pal, 21–23 juillet 2002, 24, obs M-L Niboyet.

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La généralisation du forum non conveniens ne permettrait donc pas une mise en œuvre uniforme des règles de compétence communes. Sortant un peu de mon sujet, j’ajouterai que cette généralisation ne me paraîtrait pas une bonne chose. Le développement du forum non conveniens en Ecosse, en Angleterre, aux Etats-Unis et dans quelques autres pays est lié à la réunion de trois circonstances: • •

•

La première, et la plus importante, est le caractère inadapté des règles de compétence, qui appelait absolument un correctif; La seconde est l’importance de la phase orale du procès, qui met au premier plan des considérations de proximité physique, notamment des témoins; La troisième est une conception partagée par les acteurs du procès— juges et avocats—que ni le temps ni l’argent des justiciables ne sont vraiment comptés—conception que le législateur anglais a cherché récemment à corriger, mais qui subsiste.

Avec de bonnes règles de compétence, telle celle de l’article 2 de la Convention, le jeu du forum non conveniens ne vaut pas la chandelle, car il reste que sa mise en œuvre coûte trop cher et prend trop de temps, si l’on veut faire les choses sérieusement, et qu’il offre au défendeur un procédé dilatoire qui est une menace pour tout procès international. Etant maintenant établi que l’uniformité ne peut être atteinte ni par la latitude laissée aux tribunaux de chaque Etat membre de se déclarer non conveniens, ni par une généralisation du forum non conveniens, il est temps de se demander s’il n’y aurait pas lieu de relativiser cet objectif d’uniformité.

III. L’UNIFORMITÉ EST-ELLE TOUJOURS DÉSIRABLE?

On peut tout d’abord constater, de lege lata, que la Convention elle-même n’impose pas toujours, pour atteindre cet objectif, l’application de ses règles. De ceci, l’affaire Owusu offre elle-même, toute question de forum non conveniens mise à part, une très bonne illustration. En effet, si l’affaire s’est concentrée sur le sort du premier défendeur, M. Jackson, domicilié au Royaume-Uni, qui invoquait l’exception de forum non conveniens pour échapper à l’exercice d’une compétence fondée sur l’article 2, il existait aussi des codéfendeurs, également cités à comparaître au Royaume-Uni, et ceux-ci étaient domiciliés en Jamaïque. L’article 6, 1° de la Convention relatif à la pluralité de défendeurs n’était pas applicable, car il ne vise que les « défendeurs domiciliés sur le territoire d’un Etat membre ». C’est donc selon le droit anglais que devait se régler la question de savoir si, à supposer que la compétence à l’égard de M. Jackson dût être admise, les codéfendeurs domiciliés en Jamaïque pouvaient également être attraits

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devant le tribunal siégeant à Sheffield. La solution du droit anglais n’est pas nécessairement, à cet égard, la même que celle de tel ou tel droit d’un autre Etat européen. Or ce manque d’uniformité risquait fort de rejaillir sur le sort de M. Jackson lui-même. En effet la stratégie de M. Owusu pouvait consister à réunir plusieurs codéfendeurs devant un même tribunal, plutôt que de diviser ses poursuites, de façon onéreuse, entre plusieurs tribunaux en fonction du domicile de chaque défendeur. Par conséquent, selon que M. Jackson était domicilié dans un pays de la Communauté dont le droit commun admettait la compétence fondée sur le domicile d’un seul défendeur, ou dans un pays dont le droit commun ne l’admettait pas, M. Owusu pouvait bien choisir d’agir contre l’ensemble des défendeurs—y compris M. Jackson—en Europe, ou au contraire en Jamaïque. Un second exemple, qui a été mis en avant par certains commentateurs, est celui de la litispendance. Les règles de la Convention sur la litispendence ne s’appliquent que lorsque les deux tribunaux successivement saisis appartiennent à des Etats membres. Lorsque en revanche le tribunal d’un Etat membre a été saisi, et qu’un tribunal d’un Etat extérieur à la Communauté a été parallèlement saisi, on est bien obligé de laisser jouer le droit commun de l’Etat membre. On ne peut pas, dans cette situation, étendre la solution conventionnelle de priorité au tribunal premier saisi, car elle supposerait que l’Etat tiers raisonne de la même façon, ce qu’on ne peut présumer. Par conséquent chaque Etat règlera à sa façon, et dans la diversité, les situations de litispendance entre ses tribunaux et ceux des Etats tiers. On doit conclure de ces exemples, à tout le moins, que même dans le système de la Convention, l’uniformité n’est pas un objectif commandant toutes les solutions; il cède manifestement du terrain lorsque sont en jeu les relations avec les Etats tiers. La Court of Appeal, et les défendeurs au principal, ont voulu pousser plus loin l’argument tiré de l’analogie avec la litispendance. C’est qu’en effet il y a là plus qu’une analogie: c’est en termes de forum non conveniens que les tribunaux anglais règlent les questions de litispendance. Ils en ont, incontestablement, le droit, dans le silence de le la Convention, et on ne voit guère comment ils feraient autrement. Pourquoi alors le forum non conveniens devrait-il être condamné, a-t-on fait remarquer, dans la situation voisine où les tribunaux d’un Etat tiers n’ont, certes, pas encore été saisis, mais où il existe une concurrence latente entre leur compétence et celle d’un tribunal anglais déjà saisi? L’argument, certes impressionnant, ne me convainc pas entièrement. Il est, en effet, excessif de dire que la Convention n’a pas vocation à s’appliquer aux rapports avec les Etats tiers. Le cas de la litispendance est particulier; des raisons techniques expliquent que la Convention ne puisse pas le régler lorsque l’un des tribunaux effectivement saisis est celui d’un pays tiers. En revanche, en l’absence de litispendance, la Convention, dès lors que le défendeur est domicilié sur le territoire d’un Etat membre,

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résout la question de compétence aussi bien à l’égard, par exemple, d’un demandeur domicilié à l’extérieur de la Communauté qu’à l’égard d’un demandeur domicilié dans la Communauté. Dans les deux cas elle donne une compétence, dont apparemment elle impose l’exercice, aux tribunaux du domicile du défendeur. Cela dit, en se plaçant désormais de lege ferenda, on peut se demander s’il est légitime, au nom de l’uniformité, de priver de toute autonomie les tribunaux nationaux dans l’exercice de leur compétence, spécialement lorsque les relations entre Etats membres ne sont pas concernées. Quels sont les mérites de l’uniformité, et vaut-elle les sacrifices qu’elle impose? Sur un plan général je dirai qu’on lui a beaucoup sacrifié pour pas grand’chose. J’en donnerai d’abord deux exemples, pris en dehors de la Convention de Bruxelles de 1968 (Règlement de Bruxelles I). •

•

Premier exemple: les Règlements de Bruxelles II et II bis. Le rapport explicatif de la Convention de Bruxelles II de 1998 (Convention devenue Règlement avant même d’entrer en vigueur) explique que, « dans l’effort de trouver des points d’accord acceptables pour tous, il a été décidé d’inclure les principaux critères retenus dans les divers ordres juridiques nationaux ». Le résultat de cette recherche d’uniformité et de consensus a été la consécration de huit chefs alternatifs de compétence, avec les conséquences désastreuses que l’on connaît. Deuxième exemple: l’avant-projet de Convention de La Haye sur la compétence internationale et la reconnaissance des jugements étrangers. Au lieu de se borner à une convention simple sur la reconnaissance des jugements, dans laquelle on aurait pu intelligemment insérer des règles de compétence indirecte, on a voulu unifier les règles de compétence directe, et entre autres l’exception de forum non conveniens. Comme on n’a pas pu se mettre d’accord sur ces règles le projet a échoué, et l’objectif, qui seul était important, de libre circulation a été sacrifié.

Pour en revenir à la Convention et au Règlement de Bruxelles I, la volonté d’adopter des règles de compétence directe communes, dans un espace en voie de se fédérer, se comprend mieux, et de plus cette volonté a pu aboutir. Mais les mérites réels de l’uniformité ainsi introduite paraissent minces. Certes, si l’on s’était mis d’accord sur un critère de compétence unique (le domicile du défendeur en général, d’autres critères dans des matières particulières), on aurait réalisé une répartition harmonieuse des compétences. Mais tel n’a pas été le cas, et le demandeur se voit donc offrir des options, dont le principe même est choquant, tout autant que si chaque Etat avait conservé ses propres critères. On ne peut guère mettre en avant qu’un seul avantage: la plus grande facilité qu’il y a, pour les parties, à connaître les règles de compétence lorsqu’elles sont communes à plusieurs Etats.

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Faut-il, à partir d’un si faible point de départ, imposer à chaque Etat dont les tribunaux sont compétents selon les règles communes l’obligation de connaître du litige qui leur est soumis? Le risque de surprise pour le demandeur qui se serait fié à ces règles est plutôt théorique: avant de saisir les juges d’un pays on consulte un avocat de ce pays et celui-ci ne manque pas de signaler la possibilité d’une décision de forum non conveniens si elle existe. Dans les rapports intra-communautaires on pourrait toutefois invoquer, à l’appui de l’exclusion du forum non conveniens, l’avantage de faire peser équitablement la tâche d’administration de la justice sur tous les Etats membres: l’un d’entre eux ne devrait pas pouvoir se décharger de ce poids sur les autres, qui eux ne s’en reconnaîtraient pas la possibilité. En revanche dans les rapports avec les Etats tiers—rapports qui étaient en cause dans l’affaire Owusu—j’avoue que l’utilité de l’uniformité m’échappe totalement. Il est vrai que si on laisse les Etats qui connaissent le forum non conveniens libres d’y recourir, alors que les autres Etats par hypothèse n’y recourent pas, le demandeur ne sera pas assuré du même résultat selon que le défendeur sera domicilié à Londres ou à Paris. Mais pourquoi devrait-il l’être? Et qui cela gêne-t-il qu’il ne le soit pas? Craint-on une inégalité entre défendeurs, en fonction de leur domicile? Mais où est-il écrit que toutes les personnes doivent être traitées de façon identique dans tous les pays de la Communauté? L’idée d’égalité de traitement est d’ailleurs peu présente dans la Convention: dans la situation symétrique des demandeurs domiciliés dans la Communauté agissant devant les tribunaux d’un Etat membre contre des défendeurs domiciliés en dehors, il n’existe aucune égalité, car seul le droit commun s’applique. Or ce que l’on sacrifie ainsi sans raison ce sont les traditions, les conceptions d’un pays, alors que ce pays est le seul en cause parmi les pays de la Communauté, et que la Communauté, en tant que telle, n’est tout simplement pas concernée. En fin de compte si, de lege lata, il me paraît difficile de nier que l’objectif d’uniformité, tel que l’on peut l’inférer des textes, et même s’il est borné par les limites dans lesquelles est enfermé le domaine spatial de la Convention, permettait difficilement à la Cour de justice de tolérer le recours au forum non conveniens par les tribunaux anglais, en revanche, de lege ferenda, la condamnation du forum non conveniens, lorsqu’il s’exercerait au profit du tribunal d’un Etat tiers, me paraît dépasser les buts légitimes de la législation communautaire.

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Conclusion HORATIA MUIR-WATT PROFESSEUR À L’UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE

Au terme de cette journée remarquablement enrichissante, excellemment préparée par Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières et admirablement remplie par l’ensemble des contributeurs, le temps est venu d’essayer de faire le point sur les analyses avancées et les directions proposées par les uns et les autres. A cet égard, il me semble qu’il s’en dégage, tout d’abord, une conviction selon laquelle le trio d’arrêts Gasser-Turner-Owusu est relié non pas seulement par une communauté d’objet (en ce sens qu’ils portent bien entendu tous les trois, pour les écarter, sur des institutions spécifiques, ou en tout cas particulièrement chéries, de la tradition de common law), mais aussi par une connexion proprement causale, qui explique que la critique, très forte, qu’encourt le positionnement de la Cour de justice, concerne autant leur effet conjugué que l’impact de chaque décision prise individuellement (§1). A ce stade, il est sans doute légitime de s’interroger sur les raisons, qui ne transparaissent guère dans les motifs de la Cour—scrutés de près aujourd’hui et jugés trop souvent légers ou incantatoires—d’un tel positionnement, dont on perçoit déjà certains des effets néfastes tant pour l’efficacité que pour la cohérence interne et la crédibilité internationale de l’espace judiciaire européen (§2). Mais la question la plus delicate—et la voie la plus réaliste—concerne les orientations qui se dessinent désormais, et—sauf à souhaiter un très improbable revirement de jurisprudence de la part de la Cour elle-même ou une ratification généralisée de la Convention de la Haye sur les clauses d’élection de for qui pourrait entraîner la neutralisation des prises de position du droit communautaire—les mécanismes dont disposent les juges nationaux pour sanctionner désormais les divers comportements stratégiques ou excès de compétence qui étaient précisément en cause dans les trois cas examinés (§3).

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LA RACINE DU PROBLÈME: L’EFFET CUMULATIF DES TROIS ARRÊTS

Commençons par le plus spectaculaire, ou du moins le plus commenté, à savoir la condamnation par l’arrêt Turner des injonctions anti-suit dans les rapports intra-communautaires (à supposer que ceux-ci puissent être définis: v infra au sujet de l’arrêt Owusu). En soi, c’est-à-dire prise isolément, cette condamnation est, du trio, la moins surprenante. La ligne de partage entre la dimension personnelle de l’injonction et l’effet produit sur le fonctionnement de la justice étrangère étant, de l’avis le plus autorisé,1 quelque peu floue, il était sans doute peu réaliste, en dépit des précautions prises à ce dernier égard par la Chambre des Lords dans la formulation de la question préjudicielle, de s’attendre à une réponse autre que celle apportée par la Cour de justice—que ce soit au nom du principe spécifiquement communautaire de confiance mutuelle ou du principe de droit international de non-ingérence dans le fonctionnement du service public de la justice des autres Etats souverains. Admettons par ailleurs que, dans l’affaire Turner, le refus (ou l’omission) du juge espagnol de mettre en œuvre le mécanisme de la litispendance, puisse s’analyser, soit en un accident regrettable mais rare lié à la non-comparution du défendeur en l’occurrence, et au défaut d’information subséquent du juge second saisi sur l’existence de la procédure préalablement engagée (mais devait-il alors surseoir d’office, par exemple sur le fondement de l’article 20-1 Convention/26-1 Règlement, alors que la litispendance est invoquée par voie d’exception?), soit en la conséquence d’une appréciation divergente mais parfaitement légitime de la part de ce juge quant à l’antériorité de sa propre saisine. Dans ce cas précis, l’indisponibilité des injonctions anti-suit n’est pas particulièrement grave. Il suffirait sans doute de réfléchir aux moyens d’améliorer l’accès à l’information concernant les procédures en cours dans les autres Etats membres, du juge (second) saisi en cas de non-comparution du défendeur, tandis que le risque d’appréciations divergentes relative à la date de saisine a vocation à diminuer avec le nouvel article 30 du Règlement Bruxelles I. Seulement, il est sans doute très peu réaliste de penser, en dépit de la prudence également très délibérée de la haute juridiction britannique, qui n’a pas inclus dans le champ de sa question préjudicielle la question du sort des injonctions protectrices des clauses d’élection de for, que la Cour de justice n’entendait pas englober dans sa réponse négative l’ensemble des manifestations du pouvoir injonctif du juge anglais, indépendamment du fondement juridique (fondement équitable pour l’abus de procédure, force obligatoire du contrat pour la violation des clauses attributives). Du moins, l’appel à la confiance mutuelle dans l’arrêt Turner semble revêtir une

1 Dicey Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 14ème éd, §1-011, p 7: ‘It used to be emphasised that an anti-suit injunction was directed to the party and not to the foreign court, but it is now recognised that that is not a realistic view’.

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portée qui dépasse largement la configuration de fait présente dans cette affaire, pour atteindre les cas où l’injonction est émise même en vue de sanctionner la violation d’une clause attributive.2 Or, c’est clairement là où le bât blesse, car l’arrêt Turner ne peut alors être lu isolément par rapport aux effets incitatifs que l’arrêt Gasser risque de produire sur la violation stratégique des clauses attributives de juridiction. Autrement dit, l’indisponibilité intra-communautaire des injonctions anti-suit, même en cas de violation de telles clauses, n’aurait pas non plus porté particulièrement à conséquence si, par ailleurs, le droit judiciaire communautaire fournissait des mécanismes alternatifs permettant de sauvegarder efficacement l’intégrité de ces clauses. Le problème est que, bien au contraire, l’arrêt Gasser dévalorise l’élection conventionnelle de for et crée un risque accru de comportements opportunistes nécessitant plus que jamais des sanctions. En effet, l’arrêt Gasser refusa de faire de l’élection de for une compétence exclusive pour les besoins de la litispendance, alors que l’arrêt Overseas Union avait laissé entr’ouverte cette possibilité.3 Concrètement, cela signifie donc que le juge second saisi, compétent sur le fondement d’une clause qu’il estime valable, ne bénéficie pas du fast track offert, par exemple, au juge de l’immeuble saisi en matière réelle immobilière (où, il faut dire, les chances d’un dédoublement d’instance sont nettement plus réduites). Il doit donc attendre que le juge premier saisi porte sa propre appréciation sur l’efficacité de la clause, et SE dessaisisse le cas échéant à son profit. Il est vrai que le statut du juge élu au regard du concept d’exclusivité est pour le moins ambigu. Si l’article 23 du Règlement qualifie bien désormais sa compétence d’ ‘exclusive’—à la différence de l’article 17 de la Convention—on sait, par exemple, que ses jugements ne bénéficient pas d’un effet exclusif au regard de l’article 35-1. Mais pour les besoins de la litispendance, que ne concerne ni l’un ni l’autre texte, on ne voit guère pourquoi les raisons qui justifient de court-circuiter la compétence du juge premier saisi dans le cas où le juge second saisi l’est sur le fondement de l’article 22 ne valent pas pareillement pour le cas où il le serait en vertu d’une clause attributive, où le risque d’une divergence d’appréciation entre les deux juges parallèlement saisis quant à la validité de la clause n’est probablement pas sensiblement plus important, au vu notamment des conditions de validité formelles très libérales de l’article 23 du Règlement, 2 Reste seulement la question—dont l’enjeu devient d’autant plus brûlant que les contentieux commerciaux internationaux risquent, comme on va le voir, de se déplacer vers l’arbitrage en conséquence de l’arrêt Gasser – de savoir si les injonctions anti-suit protectrices des clauses compromissoires, adressées à la partie qui a pris l’initiative d’une procédure judiciaire devant le juge d’un Etat membre en violation (alléguée) de la clause, sont également comprises dans la condamnation fulminée par l’arrêt Turner, ou si, comme le pensent les juridictions anglaises, à mon sens à très juste titre, que l’exclusion de l’arbitrage du champ de l’espace judicaire commun les en protège. 3 Par l’emploi du terme ‘notamment’, en évoquant les compétences de l’article 22 comme étant dérogatoires au régime de l’article 21…

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que dans le cas où il s’agit de se prononcer sur la qualification d’une action réelle immobilière au regard de l’article 22-1. Surtout, à supposer même qu’il y ait une incertitude réelle quant à l’efficacité du choix de for, il n’est pas choquant que le juge élu ait la primauté de l’appréciation de sa propre compétence. Refuser au juge élu la compétence-compétence, comme le fait l’arrêt Gasser, entraîne une double conséquence. La première est le curieux décalage qui existe désormais au sein du régime de la clause attributive de juridiction, dont l’autonomie a été admise par la Cour elle-même dans son arrêt Benincasa. Il résulte de ce dernier arrêt que la contestation de la validité du contrat principal n’est pas de nature à affecter la compétence du juge désigné par la clause qu’il contient. Il n’est guère besoin de souligner qu’une telle solution, empruntée au champ de l’arbitrage international, tend à déjouer les comportements stratégiques ou dilatoires des plaideurs, qui ne sont donc pas en mesure de paralyser (provisoirement) le jeu de la clause en soulevant devant le juge élu un moyen tiré de la nullité du contrat principal. Mais pour importante qu’elle puisse paraître, pareille protection accordée à la clause n’est pas grand-chose s’il suffit pour obtenir le même effet de neutralisation provisoire de la clause de saisir un autre juge compétent en vertu du Règlement. Même si, finalement, cet autre juge se reconnaît incompétent en vertu de la clause, l’objectif dilatoire recherché, mettant l’adversaire en difficulté en termes de coûts et de délais, est largement atteint. En effet, la seconde conséquence du refus de la compétence-compétence au profit du juge élu est d’affaiblir considérablement la force obligatoire des clauses attributives, qui n’ont plus qu’une valeur très relative. Leur violation est d’autant moins sanctionnée qu’aucune injonction anti-suit ne peut plus être émise—du moins contre la partie qui saisit le juge d’un Etat membre. Au-delà même de la dévalorisation des clauses, on peut penser que la jurisprudence Gasser a même un effet pervers, incitatif de comportements stratégiques. Pourquoi ne pas saisir l’occasion de vendre à son contractant un accord sur le for compétent, puisqu’en toute hypothèse, une telle clause est désormais dépourvue de valeur contraignante? A moins, bien sûr, que la violation de l’élection de for ne puisse en toute impunité communautaire donner lieu à une clause pénale ou à une surévaluation contractuelle des dommages-intérêts, qui serviront désormais d’équivalent fonctionnel et privatisé du pouvoir injonctif du juge. Soit pour l’effet collectif du tandem Turner-Gasser. Mais quid de l’arrêt Owusu? Comprendre la place de celui-ci au sein du trio jurisprudentiel passe par une relecture de sa signification réelle. Cet arrêt empêche le juge anglais de se déclarer forum non conveniens, au profit non pas de la juridiction d’un autre Etat membre, mais de celle d’un Etat tiers. En soi, la solution laisse perplexe. La justification la plus convaincante de cette immixtion du droit communautaire dans la sphère des rapports externes d’un Etat membre réside sans doute dans l’idée que la renonciation du for

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à sa compétence dans ce cas est de nature à priver le bénéficiaire du jugement potentiel de l’accès au régime accéléré de circulation des décisions—la sensibilité particulière de la Cour sur ce point semblant être liée à l’objectif premier de la Convention de Bruxelles, qui était bien d’assurer l’efficacité des jugements au sein de la Communauté, les règles de compétence uniformes n’en étant en réalité que la conséquence induite. Mais dans un contentieux dont le juge du for a précisément pensé, au vu des circonstances de l’espèce, qu’il serait tranché de façon plus approprié par un juge tiers au lieu où se trouvent à la fois les codéfendeurs et leurs biens, y compris la propriété sur laquelle l’accident a eu lieu, l’argument porte décidément peu. Quoi qu’on pense de l’opportunité de la position prise par la Cour relative à l’impact que pourrait avoir le jeu du forum non conveniens dans les rapports avec un pays tiers sur les relations intra-communautaires, l’essentiel n’est pas là. Bien au-delà de l’admissibilité du forum non conveniens, la vraie signification de l’arrêt Owusu porte sur l’extension et l’impérativité qu’il confère à l’article 2 en tant qu’il délimite le champ d’application de l’espace judiciaire commun. L’implication en effet de cet arrêt est que dès lors que le domicile du défendeur—ou de l’un des codéfendeurs—se réalise sur le territoire communautaire, l’applicabilité du Règlement (de la Convention) est impérative, en ce sens que la compétence communautaire prime nécessairement toute compétence parallèle du juge d’un pays tiers. Or, une telle compétence peut exister aussi bien en vertu de la réalisation dans le ressort d’un Etat tiers d’un critère de compétence exclusive de l’article 22—c’est l’effet dit « réflexe » ou miroir du Règlement—qu’en cas de litispendance lorsque le juge du pays tiers est premier saisi, ou encore lorsque le juge d’un pays tiers est désigné par une clause attributive de compétence. Aucun de ces trois points n’a été tranché par la Cour. Il est à espérer, bien entendu, qu’elle ne confère pas au champ du Règlement/de la Convention un champ excessif, au mépris de la coopération judicaire spontanée avec les pays tiers. C’est à ce stade qu’il convient de réintroduire l’arrêt Owusu au sein de la série jurisprudentielle examinée. Sans doute l’arrêt Owusu, pas plus que l’arrêt Turner, ne condamne-t-il pas le recours à une injonction anti-suit lorsqu’elle s’adresse au demandeur à une instance engagée dans un pays tiers, en vue de protéger une procédure en cours devant le juge d’un Etat membre. Elle ne ferait dans ce cas que renforcer l’impérativité que se reconnaît déjà l’article 2 et ne priverait d’accès au régime communautaire aucun jugement d’un Etat membre. Mais c’est précisément dans un tel cas que le recours à une injonction protectrice serait le plus contestable. La raison d’être de celle-ci est en effet de sauvegarder l’intégrité du for naturel du litige. Son exercice se fait dans le respect des exigences du ‘comité positif’, c’est-à-dire, du caractère réciproque de son octroi et du fondement raisonnable de la compétence qu’elle protège. Or, l’extension que confère l’arrêt Owusu au champ du Règlement vis-à-vis des pays tiers relève d’un

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unilatéralisme non bilatéralisable et dépourvu de réciprocité. Le champ laissé au pouvoir injonctif est donc quasiment inexistant. L’effet cumulatif des trois arrêts examinés est donc à double détente, à la fois publique et privée. Sur le premier terrain, celui des relations entre la Communauté européenne dans sa dimension judiciaire et le reste du monde, la jurisprudence de la Cour a un effet délétère en ce qu’il confère à l’espace européen un champ excessif, dont il n’est guère besoin de souligner l’impact potentiellement négatif sur les relations extérieures de la Communauté. Il serait dommage que la confiance réciproque, tant valorisée dans les relations intra-communautaires, ne trouve pas d’application dans les rapports avec les Etats tiers. L’expérience française est là pour rappeler au demeurant que toute affirmation exorbitante de compétence internationale finit par être contreproductive dans les relations privées,4 le résultat étant de détourner les partenaires potentiels venus d’ailleurs. Or, c’est précisément dans l’espace privé, cette fois-ci intra-communautaire, que se manifeste la seconde conséquence nocive de la jurisprudence Gasser-TurnerOwusu. Peu confiantes désormais dans la valeur des clauses attributives de juridiction devant les juges des Etats membres, les parties—y compris les institutions financières, traditionnellement abonnées à la justice étatique— fuient la justice publique pour se tourner vers l’arbitrage… Tout se passe comme si à force de brandir la confiance mutuelle entre Etats membres, on avait fini par générer une crise de confiance tant dans la communauté internationale des Etats (tiers) que dans la communauté transnationale privée des marchands.

LES TROIS MALENTENDUS

Si les motifs fournis par la Cour de justice, déclinant pour l’essentiel le principe de confiance mutuelle, ne permettent pas toujours de bien comprendre, positivement, les raisons de ses choix, ils éclairent en revanche davantage sur un certain nombre de malentendus qui expliquent au moins en partie l’orientation qu’elle a prise. Le premier concerne l’esprit et le fonctionnement des mécanismes processuels qu’elle condamne. Le deuxième met en cause l’architecture même de l’espace judiciaire. Et le troisième porte sur l’analyse des enjeux concrets du contentieux international auxquels l’espace judiciaire européen est appelé à faire face. Tout d’abord, on voit clairement tant à travers la motivation des trois arrêts examinés que dans la jurisprudence antérieure de la Cour, qu’elle 4 Qu’il s’agisse du risque associé au privilège de nationalité de l’article 14 du Code civil ou à la jurisprudence la Chambre commerciale de la Cour de cassation refuse l’opposabilité de la clause de choix de for au destinataire de marchandises en matière maritime, qui conduit un grand P&I Club à émettre l’avertissement suivant: «les membres doivent être informés que les tribunaux français ignorent les clauses d’arbitrage inscrites sur les connaissements quand le demandeur est une société française»… (cité par C. Legros, JDI 2006.632)

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perçoit comme un danger réel pour les fondements de l’espace judiciaire commun toutes les institutions processuelles nationales qui introduisent une insécurité juridique en augmentant les pouvoirs d’appréciation du juge. C’est ainsi que, dans l’arrêt Owusu, cette considération la conduit à fonder le rejet du forum non conveniens sur la protection de la prévisibilité ou de la sécurité juridique dû au défendeur. Mais comme on l’a fort bien rappelé aujourd’hui, pour respectable que soit cette préoccupation, elle est clairement sans application dans l’hypothèse—qui est précisément celle du forum non conveniens—où l’appréciation que porte le juge sur sa propre compétence est menée à l’invitation du défendeur lui-même, seul titulaire de l’exception. On peut se demander au demeurant si la crainte de l’ insécurité ne conduit pas plus généralement à déformer la réalité de la pratique du forum non conveniens, qui est fortement codifiée par les juges eux-mêmes et laisse peu de place à l’aléa tant redouté. Ensuite, en obligeant à affronter la question du champ d’application dans l’espace des règles de compétence contenues dans la Convention/ Règlement de Bruxelles, l’arrêt Owusu, venant dans le sillage de l’arrêt Groupe Josi, a pour effet de relancer la discussion sur la définition du conflit de juridictions; l’interrogation porte sur la définition même des conflits de juridictions que l’espace judiciaire commun se donne pour objet de départir. L’arrêt Groupe Josi (qui tranchait un cas où était en cause la compétence des tribunaux belges du domicile du défendeur saisis sur le fondement de l’article 2 de la Convention, et des tribunaux français dont la compétence était invoquée sur le fondement du droit commun), ne fait que préciser quels plaideurs pouvaient invoquer ou se voir opposer la Convention de Bruxelles (celle-ci est applicable chaque fois que le défendeur est domicilié dans un Etat contractant, même si le demandeur est domicilié dans un pays tiers), mais n’identifie pas les conflits de juridictions (impliquant les seuls Etats contractants ou s’étendant aux pays tiers) concernés5. Il a donc été proposé d’interpréter l’arrêt Owusu comme s’appliquant aux conflits de juridictions intracommunautaires (ce qui était le cas en l’occurrence en raison du domicile anglais du demandeur), mais de ne pas en étendre la portée au cas où le seul conflit de juridictions en présence est celui qui met en concurrence le for du domicile du défendeur et un for tiers. Pareille conception suppose cependant d’identifier, comme le propose Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières, au sein de l’article 2, une double fonction qui n’appelle pas un régime unitaire. D’abord celle, qui ne soulève pas de difficulté particulière, de répartir les litiges entre les tribunaux des Etats membres; ensuite celle, plus problématique depuis l’arrêt Owusu, de trancher les conflits de juridictions entre tribunaux communautaires et ceux des Etats tiers.

5

C Chalas, note sous l’arrêt Owusu, Rev crit DIP 2005.698.

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Enfin, l’analyse de Richard Fentiman attire l’attention sur le fait que l’extrême sollicitude dont fait preuve la Cour de justice à l’égard du risque de procédures parallèles et celui, corrélatif, de décisions contradictoires, est sans doute mal dirigée. Le vrai fléau pratique auquel l’espace judiciaire européen doit faire face n’est pas le risque de procédures croisées mais les comportements stratégiques abusifs des plaideurs—notamment ceux qu’induisent la protection insuffisante dont bénéficient les clauses attributives depuis l’arrêt Gasser. L’erreur de la Cour serait de faire primer un souci tout esthétique d’ordre sur la prise en charge effectives des réalités pratiques plus sordides du contentieux international. On ne saurait mieux dire: ‘The Italian torpedo is, in truth, the Article 27 torpedo’!

LES REMÈDES POSSIBLES

En supposant que cette jurisprudence se maintienne, quels sont les correctifs envisageables? De nombreuses hypothèses ont été émises au cours de la journée. •

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Une première possibilité consisterait à tirer les conséquences d’une comparaison des rédactions respectivement de l’article 17 de la Convention et de l’article 23 du Règlement, lequel qualifie expressément la compétence du juge élu d’exclusive, pour considérer que la portée de l’arrêt Gasser, elle-même étroitement liée à la position prise par l’arrêt Overseas Union relative à la possibilité de court-circuiter la litispendance en cas de compétence exclusive du juge second saisi, est en réalité limitée aux cas où le juge second saisi l’a été sous l’empire de la seule Convention…Saisi depuis le 1er mars 2002, il aurait tout simplement à donner effet à la jurisprudence Overseas Union, au vu de la nouvelle exclusivité de la compétence du juge élu… Se dessine ensuite la piste des clauses pénales ou des actions en dommages-intérêts pour violation d’une clause attributive, qui pourraient se substituer fonctionnellement au pouvoir injonctif du juge en vue de protéger celle-ci. La multiplication des contentieux relatifs au paiement des pénalités contractuelles est sans doute à prévoir, dont le moindre n’est pas de savoir s’ils relèvent ou non de la clause attributive violée… En troisième lieu, une ratification massive de la Convention de la Haye du 30 juin 2005 sur l’élection de for aurait pour effet de neutraliser l’effet de la jurisprudence Gasser, grâce à la mystérieuse alchimie de son article 26.6, qui fait prévaloir la Convention sur le Règlement chaque fois que l’une des parties à l’accord d’élection de for est établie dans un Etat tiers (par rapport au Règlement) contractant de la Convention. Pour se prémunir contre les procès stratégiques

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qu’encourage le droit communautaire, mieux vaut s’assurer… par un peu de forum shopping… un établissement extra-communautaire! En quatrième lieu, il conviendrait que la Cour de justice, revenant sur sa prise de position implicite dans The Ship Tatry, exclue du domaine de la litispendance les actions pour déclarations négatives portées devant le juge premier saisi. Lorsque le juge second saisi est le juge désigné par une clause attributive, celui-ci retrouverait donc la compétence-compétence dont le prive le torpedo de l’article 27. Enfin, Arnaud Nuyts a consacré toute son intervention à la construction d’un dispositif préventif de forum shopping stratégique, fondé sur une notion communautaire d’abus de procès, dont la sanction serait impérative pour le juge national. Reconnaissant que pareille voie ne constituerait un remède suffisant que si elle était de nature à rétablir l’équilibre rompu par l’arrêt Gasser, l’auteur rappelle les dires de la Cour dans l’arrêt Kelfalas pour proposer, de façon fort convaincante, que s’il apparaît soit au juge premier saisi devant lequel est invoquée la clause attributive en faveur du juge second saisi, soit au juge élu mais second saisi lui-même que le demandeur n’a aucune intention réelle d’obtenir une décision au fond mais intente une action dans le seul but de retarder ou de paralyser l’exercice de sa compétence-compétence par le juge élu, il est tenu, au regard de l’impérativité de la sanction de l’abus de droit communautaire, d’en tirer immédiatement les conséquences. Le juge premier saisi doit alors immédiatement se dessaisir au regard de la validité prima facie de la clause, et le juge second saisi doit refuser de surseoir dans les termes de l’article 27. Objecterait-on que dans l’arrêt Gasser, la Cour semble avoir neutralisé d’avance ce dispositif en rappelant que la volonté de sanctionner des manœuvres processuelles déloyales ne justifie pas de porter atteinte à l’interprétation de la Convention? L’auteur répond par une distinction subtile, qu’il tire de la jurisprudence elle-même: l’interprétation du droit communautaire, dont les juridictions nationales doivent bien entendu respecter l’intégrité, n’empêche aucunement la sanction du détournement abusif des dispositions de ce même droit. Bien au contraire, le droit communautaire l’exige… Cette dernière proposition permettant de conclure sur une note relativement optimiste sur l’existence de voies alternatives de lutte contre le forum shopping abusif dans les rapports intracommunautaires, la principale source de préoccupation reste alors les relations entre la Communauté dans sa dimension judiciaire et les Etats tiers, sérieusement atteintes par l’arrêt Owusu. Ici, semble-t-il, on ne peut qu’espérer que la Cour se montrera sensible à la séduction de l’effet réflexe du Règlement Bruxelles I. Paradoxalement, il faut souhaiter—au nom du principe de confiance—que l’impérativité de l’article 2 affirmée par l’arrêt Owusu était motivée par sa seule méfiance—aussi mal fondée qu’elle soit—à l’égard du forum non

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Annex 1 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (FULL COURT)

9 December 20031 (Brussels Convention — Article 21 — Lis pendens — Article 17 — Agreement conferring jurisdiction — Obligation to stay proceedings of court second seised designated in an agreement conferring jurisdiction — Excessive duration of proceedings before courts in the Member State of the court first seised) In Case C-116/02, REFERENCE to the Court under the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck (Austria) for a preliminary ruling in the proceedings pending before that court between

Erich Gasser GmbH and

MISAT Srl, on the interpretation of Article 21 of the abovementioned Convention of 27 September 1968, as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 1, and — amended text — p. 77), by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ 1982 L 388, p. 1), by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic (OJ 1989 L 285, p. 1) and by the Convention of 29 November 1996 on the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden (OJ 1997 C 15, p. 1), THE COURT (Full Court), composed of: V. Skouris, President, P. Jann, C.W.A. Timmermans, C. Gulmann, J.N. Cunha Rodrigues and A. Rosas (Presidents of Chambers), 1

Language of the case: German.

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D.A.O. Edward, A. La Pergola, J.-P. Puissochet, R. Schintgen (Rapporteur), F. Macken, N. Colneric and S. von Bahr, Judges, Advocate General: P. Léger, Registrar: M.-F. Contet, Principal Administrator, after considering the written observations submitted on behalf of: — Erich Gasser GmbH, by K. Schelling, Rechtsanwalt, — MISAT Srl, by U.C. Walter, Rechtsanwältin, — the Italian Government, by I.M. Braguglia, acting as Agent, assisted by O. Fiumara, Vice Avvocato Generale dello Stato, — the United Kingdom Government, by K. Manji, acting as Agent, and by D. Lloyd Jones QC, — the Commission of the European Communities, by A.-M. RouchaudJoët and S. Grünheid, acting as Agents, having regard to the Report for the Hearing, after hearing the oral observations of Erich Gasser GmbH, the Italian Government, the United Kingdom Government and the Commission at the hearing on 13 May 2003, after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 9 September 2003, gives the following

JUDGMENT

1. By judgment of 25 March 2002, received at the Court on 2 April 2002, the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) Innsbruck referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (‘the Protocol’), a number of questions on the interpretation of Article 21 of the abovementioned Convention of 27 September 1968, as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 1, and — amended text — p. 77), by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ 1982 L 388, p. 1), by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic (OJ 1989 L 285, p. 1) and by the Convention of 29 November

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1996 on the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden (OJ 1997 C 15, p. 1) (the Brussels Convention or the Convention). 2. Those questions were raised in proceedings between Erich Gasser GmbH (Gasser), a company incorporated under Austrian law, and MISAT Srl (MISAT), a company incorporated under Italian law, following a breakdown in their business relations.

Legal background 3. The aim of the Convention, according to its preamble, is to facilitate the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments in accordance with Article 293 EC and to strengthen the legal protection of persons established in the Community. The preamble also states that it is necessary for that purpose to determine the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States. 4. The provisions on jurisdiction are contained in Title II of the Brussels Convention. Article 2 of the Convention lays down the general rule that the courts in the State in which the defendant is domiciled are to have jurisdiction. Article 5 of the Convention provides, however, that in matters relating to a contract the defendant may be sued in the courts for the place where the obligation which the action seeks to enforce was or should have been performed. 5. Article 16 of the Convention lays down rules governing exclusive jurisdiction. In particular, pursuant to Article 16(1)(a), in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property, the courts of the Contracting State in which the property is situated are to have exclusive jurisdiction. 6. Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention deal with the attribution of jurisdiction. Article 17 is worded as follows: If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be either: (a) in writing or evidenced in writing; or (b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between themselves; or (c) in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or

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commerce is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce concerned. ... Agreements . . . conferring jurisdiction shall have no legal force if they are contrary to the provisions of Article 12 or 15 [insurance and consumer contracts], or if the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16. ...

7. Article 18 provides: Apart from jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this Convention, a court of a Contracting State before whom a defendant enters an appearance shall have jurisdiction. This rule shall not apply where appearance was entered solely to contest the jurisdiction, or where another court has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16.

8. The Brussels Convention also seeks to obviate conflicting decisions. Thus, under Article 21, concerning lis pendens: Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Contracting States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.

9. Finally, in relation to recognition, Article 27 of the Convention provides: A judgment shall not be recognised: ... 3. if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought.

10. According to the first paragraph of Article 28 of the Convention, ‘[m]oreover, a judgment shall not be recognised if it conflicts with the provisions . . . [concerning insurance and consumer contracts and the matters referred to in Article 16]’. The main proceedings and the questions referred to the Court 11. The registered office of Gasser is in Dornbirn, Austria. For several years it sold children’s clothing to MISAT, of Rome, Italy. 12. On 19 April 2000 MISAT brought proceedings against Gasser before the Tribunale Civile e Penale (Civil and Criminal District Court) di Roma seeking a ruling that the contract between them had terminated ipso jure or, in the alternative, that the contract had been terminated following a

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disagreement between the two companies. MISAT also asked the court to find that it had not failed to perform the contract and to order Gasser to pay it damages for failure to fulfil the obligations of fairness, diligence and good faith and to reimburse certain costs. 13. On 4 December 2000 Gasser brought an action against MISAT before the Landesgericht (Regional Court) Feldkirch, Austria, to obtain payment of outstanding invoices. In support of the jurisdiction of that court, the claimant submitted that it was not only the court for the place of performance of the contract, within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Convention but was also the court designated by a choice-of-court clause which had appeared on all invoices sent by Gasser to MISAT, without the latter having raised any objection in that regard. According to Gasser, that showed that, in accordance with their practice and the usage prevailing in trade between Austria and Italy, the parties had concluded an agreement conferring jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. 14. MISAT contended that the Landesgericht Feldkirch had no jurisdiction, on the ground that the court of competent jurisdiction was the court for the place where it was established, under the general rule laid down in Article 2 of the Brussels Convention. It also contested the very existence of an agreement conferring jurisdiction and stated that, before the action was brought by Gasser before the Landesgericht Feldkirch, it had commenced proceedings before the Tribunale Civile e Penale di Roma in respect of the same business relationship. 15. On 21 December 2001, the Landesgericht Feldkirch decided of its own motion to stay proceedings, pursuant to Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, until the jurisdiction of the Tribunale Civile e Penale di Roma had been established. It confirmed its own jurisdiction as the court for the place of performance of the contract, but did not rule on the existence or otherwise of an agreement conferring jurisdiction, observing that although the invoices issued by the claimant systematically included a reference to the courts of Dornbirn under the heading ‘Competent Courts’, the orders, on the other hand, did not record any choice of court. 16. Gasser appealed against that decision to the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck, contending that the Landesgericht Feldkirch should be declared to have jurisdiction and that proceedings should not be stayed. 17. The national court considers, first, that this is a case of lis pendens since the parties are the same and the claims made before the Austrian and Italian courts have the same cause of action within the meaning of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, as interpreted by the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, Case 144/86 Gubisch Maschinenfabrik [1987] ECR 4861).

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18. After noting that the Landesgericht Feldkirch had not ruled as to the existence of an agreement conferring jurisdiction, the national court raises the question whether the fact that one of the parties repeatedly and without objection settled invoices sent by the other even though those invoices contained a jurisdiction clause can be seen as acceptance of that clause, in accordance with Article 17(1)(c) of the Brussels Convention. The national court states that such conduct by the parties reflects a usage in international trade and commerce which is applicable to the parties and of which they are aware or are deemed to be aware. In the event of the existence of an agreement conferring jurisdiction being established, then, according to the national court, the Landesgericht Feldkirch alone has jurisdiction to deal with the dispute under Article 17 of the Convention. In those circumstances, the question arises whether the obligation to stay proceedings, provided for in Article 21 of the Convention, should nevertheless apply. 19. In addition, the national court asks to what extent the excessive and generalised slowness of legal proceedings in the Contracting State where the court first seised is established is liable to affect the application of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention. 20. It was in those circumstances that the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck stayed proceedings and referred the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: 1. May a court which refers questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling do so purely on the basis of a party’s (unrefuted) submissions, whether they have been contested or not contested (on good grounds), or is it first required to clarify those questions as regards the facts by the taking of appropriate evidence (and if so, to what extent)? 2. May a court other than the court first seised, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [the Brussels Convention], review the jurisdiction of the court first seised if the second court has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to an agreement conferring jurisdiction under Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, or must the agreed second court proceed in accordance with Article 21 of the Brussels Convention notwithstanding the agreement conferring jurisdiction? 3. Can the fact that court proceedings in a Contracting State take an unjustifiably long time (for reasons largely unconnected with the conduct of the parties), so that material detriment may be caused to one party, have the consequence that the court other than the court first seised, within the meaning of Article 21, is not allowed to proceed in accordance with that provision?

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4. Do the legal consequences provided for by Italian Law No 89 of 24 March 2001 justify the application of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention even if a party is at risk of detriment as a consequence of the possible excessive length of proceedings before the Italian court and therefore, as suggested in Question 3, it would not actually be appropriate to proceed in accordance with Article 21? 5. Under what conditions must the court other than the court first seised refrain from applying Article 21 of the Brussels Convention? 6. What course of action must the court follow if, in the circumstances described in Question 3, it is not allowed to apply Article 21 of the Brussels Convention? Should it be necessary in any event, even in the circumstances described in Question 3, to proceed in accordance with Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, there is no need to answer Questions 4, 5 and 6.

The first question 21. By its first question, the national court seeks in essence to ascertain whether a national court may, under the Protocol, seek an interpretation of the Brussels Convention from the Court of Justice even where the national court is relying on the submissions of a party to the main proceedings, the merits of which it has not yet assessed. 22. In this case, the national court refers to the fact that the second question is based on the premiss, not yet confirmed by the trial judge, that an agreement conferring jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention designates the court within whose jurisdiction Dornbirn is located as the court having jurisdiction to settle the dispute in the main proceedings. 23. It must be borne in mind in that connection that, in the light of the division of responsibilities in the preliminary-ruling procedure laid down by the Protocol, it is for the national court alone to define the subjectmatter of the questions which it proposes to refer to the Court. According to settled case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (Case C-220/95 Van den Boogaard [1997] ECR I-1147, paragraph 16; Case C-295/95 Farrell [1997] ECR I-1683, paragraph 11; Case C-159/97 Castelletti [1999] ECR I-1597, paragraph 14, and Case C-111/01 Gantner Electronic [2003] ECR I-4207, paragraphs 34 and 38).

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24. However, the spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary-ruling procedure requires the national court, for its part, to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions. In order to enable the Court to provide a useful interpretation of Community law, it is appropriate that the national court should define the legal and factual context of the interpretation sought and it is essential for it to explain why it considers that a reply to its questions is necessary to enable it to give judgment (see to that effect Gantner Electronic, cited above, paragraphs 35, 37 and 38). 25. According to the account of the facts given by the national court, the proposition that there may be an agreement conferring jurisdiction is not purely hypothetical. 26. Moreover, as has been emphasised both by the Commission and by the Advocate General in points 38 to 41 of his Opinion, the national court, before verifying the existence of a clause conferring jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention and the existence of usage in international trade and commerce in that connection — a process which may necessitate delicate and costly investigations — considered it necessary to refer to the Court the second question, to establish whether the existence of an agreement conferring jurisdiction allows nonapplication of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention. If that question is answered in the affirmative, the national court will have to rule as to the existence of such an agreement conferring jurisdiction and, if the existence thereof is established, it will have to consider itself to have exclusive jurisdiction to give judgment in the main proceedings. Conversely, if the answer is in the negative, Article 21 of the Brussels Convention will have to apply, so that the question whether there is an agreement conferring jurisdiction will no longer be an issue with which the national court is concerned. 27. Consequently, the answer to the first question must be that a national court may, under the Protocol, refer to the Court of Justice a request for interpretation of the Brussels Convention, even where it relies on the submissions of a party to the main proceedings of which it has not yet examined the merits, provided that it considers, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, that a preliminary ruling is necessary to enable it to give judgment and that the questions on which it seeks a ruling from the Court are relevant. It is nevertheless incumbent on the national court to provide the Court of Justice with factual and legal information enabling it to give a useful interpretation of the Convention and to explain why it considers that a reply to its questions is necessary to enable it to give judgment.

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The second question 28. By its second question, the national court seeks in essence to establish whether Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that, where a court is the second court seised and has exclusive jurisdiction under an agreement conferring jurisdiction, it may, by way of derogation from that article, give judgment in the case without waiting for a declaration from the court first seised that it has no jurisdiction. Observations submitted to the Court 29. According to Gasser and the United Kingdom Government, this question should be answered in the affirmative. In support of their interpretation, they rely on the judgment in Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance and Others [1991] ECR I-3317, in which it was held that it is ‘without prejudice to the case where the court second seised has exclusive jurisdiction under the Convention and in particular under Article 16 thereof’ that the Court held that Article 21 of the Brussels Convention was to be interpreted as meaning that, where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is contested, the court second seised may, if it does not decline jurisdiction, only stay the proceedings and may not itself examine the jurisdiction of the court first seised. According to Gasser and the United Kingdom Government, there is no reason to treat Articles 16 and 17 of the Convention differently in relation to the lis pendens rule. 30. The United Kingdom Government states that, whilst Article 17 comes below Article 16 in the hierarchy of the bases of jurisdiction provided for in the Brussels Convention, it nevertheless prevails over the other bases of jurisdiction, such as Article 2 and the special rules on jurisdiction contained in Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. The national courts are thus required to consider of their own motion whether Article 17 is applicable and requires them, if appropriate, to decline jurisdiction. 31. The United Kingdom Government adds that it is necessary to examine the relationship between Articles 17 and 21 of the Brussels Convention taking account of the needs of international trade. The commercial practice of agreeing which courts are to have jurisdiction in the event of disputes should be supported and encouraged. Such clauses contribute to legal certainty in commercial relationships, since they enable the parties, in the event of a dispute, easily to determine which courts will have jurisdiction to deal with it. 32. Admittedly, the United Kingdom Government observes that, to justify the general rule embodied in Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, the Court held, in paragraph 23 of Overseas Union Insurance, that in no case is the court second seised in a better position than the court first seised to determine whether the latter has jurisdiction. However, that reasoning is

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not applicable to cases in which the court second seised has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. In such cases, the court designated by the agreement conferring jurisdiction will, in general, be in a better position to rule as to the effect of such an agreement since it will be necessary to apply the substantive law of the Member State in whose territory the designated court is situated. 33. Finally, the United Kingdom Government concedes that the thesis which it defends might give rise to a risk of irreconcilable judgments. To avoid that risk, it proposes that the Court hold that a court first seised whose jurisdiction is contested in reliance on an agreement conferring jurisdiction must stay proceedings until the court which is designated by that agreement, and is the court second seised, has given a decision on its own jurisdiction. 34. MISAT, the Italian Government and the Commission, on the other hand, favour the application of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention and therefore consider that the court second seised is required to stay proceedings. 35. The Commission, like the Italian Government, considers that the derogation under which the court second seised has jurisdiction, on the ground that it enjoys exclusive jurisdiction under Article 16 of the Brussels Convention, cannot be extended to a court designated under a choice-ofcourt clause. 36. The Commission justifies the derogation from the rule laid down in Article 21, in the event of recourse to Article 16, by reference to the first paragraph of Article 28 of the Brussels Convention, according to which decisions given in the State of the court first seised in disregard of the exclusive jurisdiction of the court second seised, based on Article 16 of the Convention, cannot be recognised in any Contracting State. It would therefore be inconsistent to require, under Article 21 of the Convention, that the second court, which alone has jurisdiction, should stay proceedings and decline jurisdiction in favour of a court which has no jurisdiction. Such a course of action would result in parties obtaining a decision from a court lacking jurisdiction, which could not take effect in the Contracting State where it was given. In such circumstances, the aim of the Brussels Convention, which is to improve legal protection and for that purpose to ensure the cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil matters would not be attained. 37. The foregoing considerations do not apply, however, in the event of jurisdiction being conferred on the court second seised under Article 17 of the Brussels Convention. Article 28 of the Convention does not apply to the infringement of Article 17, which forms part of Section 6 of Title II of the Convention. A decision given in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction

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which the court second seised derives from a choice-of-court clause should be recognised and enforced in all the Contracting States. 38. The Commission also states that Article 21 of the Brussels Convention seeks not only to obviate irreconcilable decisions which, under Article 27(3) of the Convention, are not recognised, but also to uphold economy of procedure, the court second seised being required initially to stay proceedings, and then to decline jurisdiction as soon as the jurisdiction of the Court first seised is established. That clear rule is conducive to legal certainty. 39. Referring to paragraph 23 of Overseas Union Insurance, the Commission considers that the court second seised is not in any circumstances in a better position than the court first seised to determine whether the latter has jurisdiction. In this case, the Italian Court is in as good a position as the Austrian Court to establish whether it has jurisdiction under Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, because, by virtue of commercial usage between Austria and Italy, the parties conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the court in whose jurisdiction the registered office of the claimant in the main proceedings is located. 40. Finally, the Commission and the Italian Government observe that the jurisdiction referred to in Article 17 of the Brussels Convention is distinguished from that referred to in Article 16 thereof in that, within the scope of the latter article, the parties cannot conclude agreements conferring jurisdiction contrary to Article 16 (Article 17(3)). Moreover, the parties are entitled at any time to cancel or amend a jurisdiction clause of the kind referred to in Article 17. Such a case would arise, for example, where, under Article 18 of the Convention, a party brought an action in a State other than that to the courts of which jurisdiction has been attributed and the other party enters an appearance before the court seised without contesting its jurisdiction (see to that effect Case 150/80 Elefanten Schuh [1981] ECR 1671, paragraphs 10 and 11). Findings of the Court 41. It must be borne in mind at the outset that Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, together with Article 22 on related actions, is contained in Section 8 of Title II of the Convention, which is intended, in the interests of the proper administration of justice within the Community, to prevent parallel proceedings before the courts of different Contracting States and to avoid conflicts between decisions which might result therefrom. Those rules are therefore designed to preclude, so far as possible and from the outset, the possibility of a situation arising such as that referred to in Article 27(3) of the Convention, that is to say the non-recognition of a judgment on account of its irreconcilability with a judgment given in proceedings between the same parties in the State in which recognition is

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sought (see Gubisch Maschinenfabrik, cited above, paragraph 8). It follows that, in order to achieve those aims, Article 21 must be interpreted broadly so as to cover, in principle, all situations of lis pendens before courts in Contracting States, irrespective of the parties’ domicile (Overseas Union Insurance, cited above, paragraph 16). 42. From the clear terms of Article 21 it is apparent that, in a situation of lis pendens, the court second seised must stay proceedings of its own motion until the jurisdiction of the court first seised has been established and, where it is so established, must decline jurisdiction in favour of the latter. 43. In that regard, as the Court also observed in paragraph 13 of Overseas Union Insurance, Article 21 does not draw any distinction between the various heads of jurisdiction provided for in the Brussels Convention. 44. It is true that, in paragraph 26 of Overseas Union Insurance, before holding that Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that, where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is contested, the court second seised may, if it does not decline jurisdiction, only stay proceedings and may not itself examine the jurisdiction of the court first seised, the Court stated that its ruling was without prejudice to the case where the court second seised has exclusive jurisdiction under the Convention and in particular under Article 16 thereof. 45. However, it is clear from paragraph 20 of the same judgment that, in the absence of any claim that the court second seised had exclusive jurisdiction in the main proceedings, the Court of Justice simply declined to prejudge the interpretation of Article 21 of the Convention in the hypothetical situation which it specifically excluded from its judgment. 46. In this case, it is claimed that the court second seised has jurisdiction under Article 17 of the Convention. 47. However, that fact is not such as to call in question the application of the procedural rule contained in Article 21 of the Convention, which is based clearly and solely on the chronological order in which the courts involved are seised. 48. Moreover, the court second seised is never in a better position than the court first seised to determine whether the latter has jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is determined directly by the rules of the Brussels Convention, which are common to both courts and may be interpreted and applied with the same authority by each of them (see, to that effect, Overseas Union Insurance, paragraph 23). 49. Thus, where there is an agreement conferring jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, not only, as observed by the Commission, do the parties always have the option of declining to

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invoke it and, in particular, the defendant has the option of entering an appearance before the court first seised without alleging that it lacks jurisdiction on the basis of a choice-of-court clause, in accordance with Article 18 of the Convention, but, moreover, in circumstances other than those just described, it is incumbent on the court first seised to verify the existence of the agreement and to decline jurisdiction if it is established, in accordance with Article 17, that the parties actually agreed to designate the court second seised as having exclusive jurisdiction. 50. The fact nevertheless remains that, despite the reference to usage in international trade or commerce contained in Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, real consent by the parties is always one of the objectives of that provision, justified by the concern to protect the weaker contracting party by ensuring that jurisdiction clauses incorporated in a contract by one party alone do not go unnoticed (Case C-106/95 MSG [1997] ECR I-911, paragraph 17 and Castelletti, paragraph 19). 51. In those circumstances, in view of the disputes which could arise as to the very existence of a genuine agreement between the parties, expressed in accordance with the strict formal conditions laid down in Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, it is conducive to the legal certainty sought by the Convention that, in cases of lis pendens, it should be determined clearly and precisely which of the two national courts is to establish whether it has jurisdiction under the rules of the Convention. It is clear from the wording of Article 21 of the Convention that it is for the court first seised to pronounce as to its jurisdiction, in this case in the light of a jurisdiction clause relied on before it, which must be regarded as an independent concept to be appraised solely in relation to the requirements of Article 17 (see, to that effect, Case C-214/89 Powell Duffryn [1992] ECR I-1745, paragraph 14). 52. Moreover, the interpretation of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention flowing from the foregoing considerations is confirmed by Article 19 of the Convention which requires a court of a Contracting State to declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction only where it is ‘seised of a claim which is principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another contracting State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16’. Article 17 of the Brussels Convention is not affected by Article 19. 53. Finally, the difficulties of the kind referred to by the United Kingdom Government, stemming from delaying tactics by parties who, with the intention of delaying settlement of the substantive dispute, commence proceedings before a court which they know to lack jurisdiction by reason of the existence of a jurisdiction clause are not such as to call in question the interpretation of any provision of the Brussels Convention, as deduced from its wording and its purpose.

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54. In view of the foregoing, the answer to the second question must be that Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that a court second seised whose jurisdiction has been claimed under an agreement conferring jurisdiction must nevertheless stay proceedings until the court first seised has declared that it has no jurisdiction.

The third question 55. By its third question, the national court seeks in essence to ascertain whether Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that it may be derogated from where, in general, the duration of proceedings before the courts of the Contracting State in which the court first seised is established is excessively long. Admissibility 56. The Commission raises doubts as to the admissibility of this question and, therefore, of the questions which follow it and are related to it, on the ground that the national court has not provided concrete information such as to allow the inference that the Tribunale Civile e Penale di Roma has failed to fulfil its obligation to give judgment within a reasonable time and thereby infringed Article 6 of the European Convention for the safeguard of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (hereinafter the ‘ECHR’). 57. That view cannot be accepted. As observed by the Advocate General in point 87 of his Opinion, it was indeed in relation to the fact that the average duration of proceedings before courts in the Member State in which the court first seised is established is excessively long that the national court submitted the question whether the court second seised may validly decline to apply Article 21 of the Brussels Convention. To answer that question, which the latter court considered relevant for the decision to be given in the main proceedings, it is not necessary for it to provide information as to the conduct of procedure before the Tribunale Civile e Penale di Roma. 58. It is therefore necessary to answer the third question. Substance Observations submitted to the Court 59. According to Gasser, Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted in any event as excluding excessively protracted proceedings (that is to say of a duration exceeding three years), which are contrary to Article 6 of the ECHR and would entail restrictions on freedom of

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movement as guaranteed by Articles 28 EC, 39 EC, 48 EC and 49 EC. It is the responsibility of the European Union authorities or the national courts to identify those States in which it is well known that legal proceedings are excessively protracted. 60. Therefore, in a case where no decision on jurisdiction has been given within six months following the commencement of proceedings before the court first seised or no final decision on jurisdiction has been given within one year following the commencement of those proceedings, it is appropriate, in Gasser’s view, to decline to apply Article 21 of the Brussels Convention. In any event, the courts of the State where the court second seised is established are entitled themselves to rule both on the question of jurisdiction and, after slightly longer periods, on the substance of the case. 61. The United Kingdom Government also considers that Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted in conformity with Article 6 of the ECHR. It observes in that connection that a potential debtor in a commercial case will often bring, before a court of his choice, an action seeking a judgment exonerating him from all liability, in the knowledge that those proceedings will go on for a particularly long time and with the aim of delaying a judgment against him for several years. 62. The automatic application of Article 21 in such a case would grant the potential debtor a substantial and unfair advantage which would enable him to control the procedure, or indeed dissuade the creditor from enforcing his rights by legal proceedings. 63. In those circumstances, the United Kingdom Government suggests that the Court should recognise an exception to Article 21 whereby the court second seised would be entitled to examine the jurisdiction of the court first seised where (1) the claimant has brought proceedings in bad faith before a court without jurisdiction for the purpose of blocking proceedings before the courts of another Contracting State which enjoy jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention and (2) the court first seised has not decided the question of its jurisdiction within a reasonable time. 64. The United Kingdom Government adds that those conditions should be appraised by the national courts, in the light of all the relevant circumstances. 65. MISAT, the Italian Government and the Commission, on the contrary, advocate the full applicability of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, notwithstanding the excessive duration of court proceedings in one of the States concerned.

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66. According to MISAT, the effect of an affirmative answer to the third question would be to create legal uncertainty and increase the financial burden for litigants, who would be required to pursue proceedings at the same time in two different States and to appear before the two courts seised, without being in a position to foresee which court would give judgment before the other. The already abundant litigation on the jurisdiction of courts would thereby be pointlessly increased, contributing to paralysis of the legal system. 67. The Commission states that the Brussels Convention is based on mutual trust and on the equivalence of the courts of the Contracting States and establishes a binding system of jurisdiction which all the courts within the purview of the Convention are required to observe. The Contracting States can therefore be obliged to ensure mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments by means of simple procedures. This compulsory system of jurisdiction is at the same time conducive to legal certainty since, by virtue of the rules of the Brussels Convention, the parties and the courts can properly and easily determine international jurisdiction. Within this system, Section 8 of Title II of the Convention is designed to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction and conflicting decisions. 68. It is not compatible with the philosophy and the objectives of the Brussels Convention for national courts to be under an obligation to respect rules on lis pendens only if they consider that the court first seised will give judgment within a reasonable period. Nowhere does the Convention provide that courts may use the pretext of delays in procedure in other contracting States to excuse themselves from applying its provisions. 69. Moreover, the point from which the duration of proceedings becomes excessively long, to such an extent that the interests of a party may be seriously affected, can be determined only on the basis of an appraisal taking account of all the circumstances of the case. That is an issue which cannot be settled in the context of the Brussels Convention. It is for the European Court of Human Rights to examine the issue and the national courts cannot substitute themselves for it by recourse to Article 21 of the Convention.

Findings of the Court 70. As has been observed by the Commission and by the Advocate General in points 88 and 89 of his Opinion, an interpretation of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention whereby the application of that article should be set aside where the court first seised belongs to a Member State in whose courts there are, in general, excessive delays in dealing with cases would be manifestly contrary both to the letter and spirit and to the aim of the Convention.

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71. First, the Convention contains no provision under which its articles, and in particular Article 21, cease to apply because of the length of proceedings before the courts of the Contracting State concerned. 72. Second, it must be borne in mind that the Brussels Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to each other’s legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust which has enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within the purview of the Convention are required to respect, and as a corollary the waiver by those States of the right to apply their internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. It is also common ground that the Convention thereby seeks to ensure legal certainty by allowing individuals to foresee with sufficient certainty which court will have jurisdiction. 73. In view of the foregoing, the answer to the third question must be that Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that it cannot be derogated from where, in general, the duration of proceedings before the courts of the Contracting State in which the court first seised is established is excessively long.

The fourth, fifth and sixth questions 74. In view of the answer given to the third question, it is unnecessary to answer the fourth, fifth and sixth questions, which were submitted by the national court only in the event of the third question being answered in the affirmative.

Costs 75. The costs incurred by the Italian and United Kingdom Governments and by the Commission, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. On those grounds, THE COURT (Full Court), in answer to the questions referred to it by the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck by judgment of 25 March 2002, hereby rules: 1. A national court may, under the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and

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Commercial Matters, as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the accession of the Hellenic Republic, by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic and by the Convention of 29 November 1996 on the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, refer to the Court of Justice a request for interpretation of the Brussels Convention, even where it relies on the submissions of a party to the main proceedings of which it has not yet examined the merits, provided that it considers, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, that a preliminary ruling is necessary to enable it to give judgment and that the questions on which it seeks a ruling from the Court are relevant. It is nevertheless incumbent on the national court to provide the Court of Justice with factual and legal information enabling it to give a useful interpretation of the Convention and to explain why it considers that a reply to its questions is necessary to enable it to give judgment. 2. Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that a court second seised whose jurisdiction has been claimed under an agreement conferring jurisdiction must nevertheless stay proceedings until the court first seised has declared that it has no jurisdiction. 3. Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that it cannot be derogated from where, in general, the duration of proceedings before the courts of the Contracting State in which the court first seised is established is excessively long.

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Annex 2 ARRÊT DE LA COUR (assemblée plénière) 9 décembre 20031 «Convention de Bruxelles — Article 21 — Litispendance — Article 17 — Clause attributive de juridiction — Obligation de surseoir à statuer du juge saisi en second lieu désigné dans une clause attributive de juridiction — Durée excessivement longue des procédures devant les juridictions de l’État du tribunal saisi en premier lieu — Absence d’incidence» Dans l’affaire C-116/02, ayant pour objet une demande adressée à la Cour, en application du protocole du 3 juin 1971 relatif à l’interprétation par la Cour de justice de la convention du 27 septembre 1968 concernant la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, par l’Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck (Autriche) et tendant à obtenir, dans le litige pendant devant cette juridiction entre Erich Gasser GmbH et MIS AT Srl, une décision à titre préjudiciel sur l’interprétation de l’article 21 de la convention du 27 septembre 1968, précitée (JO 1972, L 299, p. 32), telle que modifiée par la convention du 9 octobre 1978 relative à l’adhésion du royaume de Danemark, de l’Irlande et du Royaume-Uni de GrandeBretagne et d’Irlande du Nord (JO L 304, p. 1, et — texte modifié — p. 77), par la convention du 25 octobre 1982 relative à l’adhésion de la République hellénique (JO L 388, p. 1), par la convention du 26 mai 1989 relative à l’adhésion du royaume d’Espagne et de la République portugaise (JO L 285, p. 1) et par la convention du 29 novembre 1996 relative à l’adhésion de la république d’Autriche, de la république de Finlande et du royaume de Suède (JO 1997, C 15, p. 1), LA COUR (assemblée plénière), composée de M. V. Skouris, président, MM. P. Jann, C. W. A. Timmermans, C. Gulmann, J. N. Cunha Rodrigues et A. Rosas, présidents de chambre, MM. D. A. O Edward, A. La Pergola, J.-P. Puissochet et R. Schintgen (rapporteur), Mmes F. Macken et N. Colneric, et M. S. von Bahr, juges, 1

Langue de procédure: l’allemand.

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avocat général: M. P. Léger, greffier: Mme M.-F. Contet, administrateur principal, considérant les observations écrites présentées: — pour Erich Gasser GmbH, par Me K. Schelling, Rechtsanwalt, — pour MISAT Srl, par Me U. C. Walter, Rechtsanwältin, — pour le gouvernement italien, par M. I. M. Braguglia, en qualité d’agent, assisté de M. O. Fiumara, vice avvocato generale dello Stato, — pour le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, par M. K. Manji, en qualité d’agent, assisté de M. D. Loyd Jones, QC, — pour la Commission des Communautés européennes, par Mmes A.-M. Rouchaud-Joët et S. Grünheid, en qualité d’agents, vu le rapport d’audience, ayant entendu les observations orales d’Erich Gasser GmbH, du gouvernement italien, du gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et de la Commission à l’audience du 13 mai 2003, ayant entendu l’avocat général en ses conclusions à l’audience du 9 septembre 2003, rend le présent

ARRÊT

1. Par arrêt du 25 mars 2002, parvenu à la Cour le 2 avril suivant, l’Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck a posé, en application du protocole du 3 juin 1971 relatif à l’nterprétation par la Cour de justice de la convention du 27 septembre 1968 concernant la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale (ci-après le «protocole»), plusieurs questions préjudicielles sur l’interprétation de l’article 21 de la convention du 27 septembre 1968, précitée (JO 1972, L 299, p. 32), telle que modifiée par la convention du 9 octobre 1978 relative à l’adhésion du royaume de Danemark, de l’Irlande et du Royaume-Uni de GrandeBretagne et d’Irlande du Nord (JO L 304, p. 1, et −texte modifié −p. 77), par la convention du 25 octobre 1982 relative à l’adhésion de la République hellénique (JO L 388, p. 1), par la convention du 26 mai 1989 relative à l’adhésion du royaume d’Espagne et de la République portugaise (JO L 285, p. 1) et par la convention du 29 novembre 1996 relative à l’adhésion de la république d’Autriche, de la république de Finlande et du royaume de Suède (JO 1997, C 15, p. 1, ci-après la «convention de Bruxelles»).

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2. Ces questions ont été soulevées dans le cadre d’un litige opposant la société de droit autrichien Erich Gasser GmbH (ci-après «Gasser») à la société de droit italien MISAT Srl (ci-après «MISAT»), à la suite de la rupture de leurs relations commerciales. Le cadre juridique 3. Il ressort de son préambule que la convention de Bruxelles a pour but de faciliter la reconnaissance réciproque et l’exécution des décisions judiciaires, conformément à l’article 293 CE, et de renforcer dans la Communauté la protection juridique des personnes qui y sont établies. Le préambule indique également qu’il importe à cette fin de déterminer la compétence des juridictions des États contractants dans l’ordre international. 4. Les dispositions relatives à la compétence figurent dans le titre II de la convention de Bruxelles. L’article 2 de cette convention énonce la règle générale selon laquelle sont compétentes les juridictions de l’État dans lequel le défendeur est domicilié. L’article 5 de ladite convention dispose toutefois que, en matière contractuelle, le défendeur peut être attrait devant le tribunal du lieu où l’obligation qui sert de base à la demande a été ou doit être exécutée. 5. Par ailleurs, l’article 16 de la convention de Bruxelles énonce des règles de compétence exclusive. Notamment, en vertu du point 1, sous a), de cet article, sont seuls compétents, sans considération de domicile, en matière de droits réels immobiliers et de baux d’immeubles, les tribunaux de l’État contractant où l’immeuble est situé. 6. Les articles 17 et 18 de la même convention visent les prorogations de compétence. L’article 17 est libellé comme suit: «Si les parties, dont l’une au moins a son domicile sur le territoire d’un État contractant, sont convenues d’un tribunal ou de tribunaux d’un État contractant pour connaître des différends nés ou à naître à l’occasion d’un rapport de droit déterminé, ce tribunal ou les tribunaux de cet État sont seuls compétents. Cette convention attributive de juridiction est conclue: a) par écrit ou verbalement avec confirmation écrite, soit b) sous une forme qui soit conforme aux habitudes que les parties ont établies entre elles, soit c) dans le commerce international, sous une forme qui soit conforme à un usage dont les parties avaient connaissance ou étaient censées avoir connaissance et qui

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est largement connu et régulièrement observé dans ce type de commerce par les parties à des contrats du même type dans la branche commerciale considérée. [ . . .] Les conventions attributives de juridiction [ . . .] sont sans effet si elles sont contraires aux dispositions des articles 12 et 15 [en matière d’assurances et de contrats conclus par les consommateurs] ou si les tribunaux à la compétence desquels elles dérogent sont exclusivement compétents en vertu de l’article 16. [ . . .]»

7. L’article 18 dispose: «Outre le cas où sa compétence résulte d’autres dispositions de la présente convention, le juge d’un État contractant devant lequel le défenseur comparaît est compétent. Cette règle n’est pas applicable si la comparution a pour objet de contester la compétence ou s’il existe une autre juridiction exclusivement compétente en vertu de l’article 16.»

8. La convention de Bruxelles vise en outre à prévenir les contrariétés de décisions. Ainsi, aux termes de son article 21, relatif à la litispendance: «Lorsque des demandes ayant le même objet et la même cause sont formées entre les mêmes parties devant des juridictions d’États contractants différents, la juridiction saisie en second lieu sursoit d’office à statuer jusqu’à ce que la compétence du tribunal premier saisi soit établie. Lorsque la compétence du tribunal premier saisi est établie, le tribunal saisi en second lieu se dessaisit en faveur de celui-ci.»

9. Enfin, en matière de reconnaissance, l’article 27 de ladite convention dispose: «Les décisions ne sont pas reconnues: [ . . .] 3) si la décision est inconciliable avec une décision rendue entre les mêmes parties dans l’État requis [ . . .]»

10. Selon l’article 28, premier alinéa, de la même convention, «[d]e même, les décisions ne sont pas reconnues si les dispositions [ . . .] [en matière d’assurances et de contrats conclus par les consommateurs ainsi que celles visées à l’article 16] ont été méconnues [ . . .]».

Le litige au principal et les questions préjudicielles 11. Gasser a son siège à Dornbirn (Autriche). Pendant plusieurs années, elle a vendu des vêtements pour enfants à MISAT, établie à Rome (Italie).

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12. Le 19 avril 2000, MISAT a assigné Gasser devant le Tribunale civile e penale di Roma (Italie) aux fins de voir juger que le contrat les liant avait pris fin de plein droit et, subsidiairement, que ce contrat avait été résilié à la suite d’un désaccord entre les deux sociétés. MISAT a demandé en outre au Tribunale de constater l’absence de toute inexécution du contrat de son fait et de condamner Gasser, pour manquement à l’obligation de loyauté, de diligence et de bonne foi, à réparer le préjudice subi par elle et à lui rembourser certains frais. 13. Le 4 décembre 2000, Gasser a intenté, devant le Landesgericht Feldkirch (Autriche), une action à l’encontre de MISAT pour obtenir le paiement de factures impayées. Pour justifier la compétence de ce tribunal, la demanderesse au principal a fait valoir que celui-ci était non seulement le tribunal du lieu d’exécution du contrat, au sens de l’article 5, point 1, de la convention de Bruxelles, mais également le tribunal désigné par une clause d’élection de juridiction, laquelle aurait figuré sur toutes les factures adressées par Gasser à MISAT, sans que cette dernière ait formulé la moindre protestation à cet égard. Selon Gasser, ces éléments démontreraient que, conformément à leurs habitudes et à l’usage en vigueur dans le commerce entre l’Autriche et l’Italie, les parties avaient convenu d’une clause attributive de juridiction au sens de l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles. 14. MISAT a soulevé l’incompétence du Landesgericht Feldkirch, au motif que le juge compétent était celui du lieu où elle était établie, conformément à la règle générale énoncée à l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles. Elle a également contesté l’existence même d’une clause attributive de juridiction et indiqué avoir introduit, préalablement à l’action intentée par Gasser devant le Landesgericht Feldkirch, une action devant le Tribunale civile e penale di Roma, fondée sur la même relation commerciale. 15. Le 21 décembre 2001, le Landesgericht Feldkirch a décidé de surseoir d’office à statuer, conformément à l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles, jusqu’à ce que la compétence du Tribunale civile e penale di Roma soit établie. Il a confirmé sa propre compétence en tant que tribunal du lieu d’exécution du contrat, mais n’a pas tranché la question de l’existence d’une clause attributive de juridiction, en relevant que, si les factures adressées par la demanderesse au principal comportaient systématiquement, sous la mention «tribunaux compétents», ceux de Dornbirn, les commandes, en revanche, ne faisaient pas état d’une élection de juridiction. 16. Gasser a fait appel de cette décision devant l’Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck en demandant que le Landesgericht Feldkirch soit déclaré compétent et qu’il ne soit pas sursis à statuer sur le litige. 17. La juridiction de renvoi estime, tout d’abord, qu’il y a bien, en l’occurrence, une situation de litispendance dès lors qu’il y a identité de

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parties et que les demandes formées devant les juridictions autrichienne et italienne ont la même cause et le même objet au sens de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles, tel qu’interprété par la Cour (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 8 décembre 1987, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik, 144/86, Rec. p. 4861). 18. Après avoir constaté que le Landesgericht Feldkirch ne s’était pas prononcé sur l’existence d’une clause attributive de juridiction, la juridiction de renvoi se demande si la circonstance que l’une des parties a réglé, de manière répétée et sans contestation, des factures adressées par l’autre partie alors même que ces factures contenaient une clause attributive de juridiction peut valoir accord sur cette clause, conformément à l’article 17, premier alinéa, sous c), de la convention de Bruxelles. La juridiction de renvoi relève qu’un tel comportement des parties correspondrait à un usage du commerce international applicable aux parties et qui serait connu ou censé l’être de ces dernières. Dans l’hypothèse où l’existence d’une clause attributive de juridiction serait établie, le Landesgericht Feldkirch serait alors, selon la juridiction de renvoi, seul compétent pour connaître du litige en application de l’article 17 de ladite convention. Dans ces conditions, la question se poserait de savoir si l’obligation de surseoir à statuer, prévue à l’article 21 de la même convention, devrait néanmoins s’imposer. 19. En outre, la juridiction de renvoi se demande dans quelle mesure la lenteur excessive et généralisée des procédures juridictionnelles dans l’État contractant dans lequel se trouve le juge premier saisi est susceptible d’affecter l’application de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles. 20. C’est dans ces conditions que l’Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck a décidé de surseoir à statuer et de poser à la Cour les questions préjudicielles suivantes: «1) La juridiction qui soumet des questions préjudicielles à la Cour de justice peut-elle poser ces questions en se fondant sur les allégations (non démenties) d’une partie, qu’elles aient été contestées (de façon circonstanciée) ou non, ou faut-il au préalable que ces points soient résolus, du point de vue de la matérialité des faits, au moyen d’une procédure consacrée à l’administration de la preuve (et si oui, dans quelle mesure)? 2) La juridiction saisie en second lieu, au sens de l’article 21, premier alinéa, de la convention de Bruxelles [ . . .], peut-elle examiner la compétence du tribunal premier saisi dans le cas où elle jouit d’une compétence exclusive en vertu d’une convention attributive de juridiction au sens de l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles, ou bien doit-elle, en dépit de la clause attributive de juridiction, procéder ainsi que le prévoit l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles? 3) Le fait que les procédures judiciaires soient excessivement longues dans un État contractant (et ce de façon très largement indépendante du

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comportement des parties), au point de pouvoir nuire gravement aux intérêts d’une partie, peut-il avoir pour effet que la juridiction saisie en second lieu, au sens de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles, ne doit pas procéder ainsi que le prévoit cet article? 4) Les remèdes prévus par la loi italienne n° 89, du 24 mars 2001, justifient-ils que l’on applique l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles même dans l’hypothèse où une partie voit ses intérêts mis en péril par l’éventuelle longueur excessive de la procédure devant la juridiction italienne et où, pour cette raison (voir la troisième question ci-dessus), il n’y aurait pas lieu de procéder ainsi que le prévoit l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles? 5) Dans quelles conditions la juridiction saisie en second lieu peut-elle se dispenser, le cas échéant, d’appliquer les dispositions de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles? 6) Comment la juridiction doit-elle procéder si, dans les circonstances exposées à la troisième question, elle ne doit pas appliquer les dispositions de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles? S’il faut néanmoins appliquer l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles, y compris dans les circonstances exposées à la troisième question, il n’est pas nécessaire de répondre aux quatrième, cinquième et sixième questions.» Sur la première question 21. Par sa première question, la juridiction de renvoi demande en substance si une juridiction nationale peut, en vertu du protocole, soumettre à la Cour une demande d’interprétation de la convention de Bruxelles, alors même que ladite juridiction se fonderait sur des allégations d’une partie au principal dont elle n’aurait pas encore vérifié le bien-fondé. 22. En l’occurrence, la juridiction de renvoi fait référence au fait que la deuxième question repose sur la prémisse, non encore confirmée par le juge du fond, selon laquelle une clause attributive de juridiction, au sens de l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles, désignerait le tribunal dans le ressort duquel se trouve Dornbirn comme étant celui qui est compétent pour trancher le litige au principal. 23. Il y a lieu de rappeler, à cet égard, que, compte tenu de la répartition des compétences dans le cadre de la procédure préjudicielle prévue par le protocole, il incombe à la seule juridiction nationale de définir l’objet des questions qu’elle entend poser à la Cour. En effet, selon une jurisprudence constante, il appartient aux seules juridictions nationales qui sont saisies du litige et qui doivent assumer la responsabilité de la décision juridictionnelle à intervenir d’apprécier, au regard des particularités de chaque affaire, tant la nécessité d’une décision préjudicielle pour être en mesure de rendre

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leur jugement que la pertinence des questions qu’elles posent à la Cour (arrêts du 27 février 1997, Van den Boogaard, C-220/95, Rec. p. I-1147, point 16; du 20 mars 1997, Farrell, C-295/95, Rec. p. I-1683, point 11; du 16 mars 1999, Castelletti, C-159/97, Rec. p. I-1597, point 14, et du 8 mai 2003, Gantner Electronic, C-111/01, non encore publié au Recueil, points 34 et 38). 24. Toutefois, l’esprit de collaboration qui doit présider au fonctionnement du renvoi préjudiciel implique que, de son côté, le juge national ait égard à la fonction confiée à la Cour, qui est de contribuer à l’administration de la justice dans les États membres et non de formuler des opinions consultatives sur des questions générales ou hypothétiques. Pour permettre à la Cour de donner une interprétation de la convention de Bruxelles qui soit utile, il est indiqué que le juge national définisse le cadre juridique et factuel dans lequel l’interprétation demandée doit se situer et il est indispensable qu’il explique les raisons pour lesquelles il considère qu’une réponse à ses questions est nécessaire à la solution du litige (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Gantner Electronic, précité, points 35, 37 et 38). 25. Or, il ressort des éléments factuels fournis par la juridiction de renvoi que la prémisse tenant à l’existence d’une clause attributive de juridiction n’est pas de nature purement hypothétique. 26. En outre, ainsi que l’ont souligné, d’une part, la Commission et, d’autre part, M. l’avocat général aux points 38 à 41 de ses conclusions, la juridiction de renvoi, avant de vérifier, dans l’affaire au principal, l’existence d’une clause attributive de juridiction, au sens de l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles, et celle d’un usage du commerce international à cet égard, vérification qui peut nécessiter des investigations délicates et coûteuses, a estimé nécessaire de poser à la Cour la deuxième question préjudicielle visant à savoir si l’existence d’une clause attributive de juridiction permet d’écarter l’application de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles. En cas de réponse affirmative à cette question, la juridiction de renvoi devra statuer sur l’existence d’une telle clause attributive de juridiction et, si cette dernière s’avère établie, elle devra se considérer comme exclusivement compétente pour statuer sur le litige au principal. À l’inverse, en cas de réponse négative, les dispositions de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles devront s’appliquer, de telle sorte que l’examen de l’existence d’une clause attributive de juridiction ne présentera plus d’intérêt pour la juridiction de renvoi. 27. En conséquence, il convient de répondre à la première question qu’une juridiction nationale peut, en vertu du protocole, soumettre à la Cour une demande d’interprétation de la convention de Bruxelles, alors même qu’elle se fonderait sur des allégations d’une partie au principal dont ladite juridiction n’a pas encore vérifié le bien-fondé, dès lors qu’elle estime, au regard des particularités de l’affaire, qu’une décision préjudicielle est

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nécessaire pour être en mesure de rendre son jugement et que les questions préjudicielles qu’elle pose à la Cour sont pertinentes. Il lui incombe toutefois de fournir à cette dernière des éléments de fait et de droit lui permettant de donner une interprétation de ladite convention qui soit utile ainsi que d’indiquer les raisons pour lesquelles elle considère qu’une réponse à ses questions est nécessaire à la solution du litige.

Sur la deuxième question 28. Par sa deuxième question, la juridiction de renvoi demande en substance si l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles doit être interprété en ce sens que le juge saisi en second lieu et qui est exclusivement compétent en vertu d’une clause attributive de juridiction peut, par dérogation à cet article, statuer sur le litige sans attendre que le juge saisi en premier lieu se soit déclaré incompétent. Observations soumises à la Cour 29. Selon Gasser et le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, il y aurait lieu de répondre par l’affirmative à cette question. À l’appui de leur interprétation, ils invoquent l’arrêt du 27 juin 1991, Overseas Union Insurance e.a. (C-351/89, Rec. p. I-3317), aux termes duquel il est dit pour droit que c’est «sous réserve de l’hypothèse où le juge saisi en second lieu disposerait d’une compétence exclusive prévue par la convention et, notamment, par son article 16» que la Cour a jugé que l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles devait être interprété en ce sens que, lorsque la compétence du juge saisi en premier lieu est contestée, le juge saisi en second lieu ne peut que surseoir à statuer, au cas où il ne se dessaisirait pas, sans pouvoir examiner lui-même la compétence du juge saisi en premier lieu. Il n’y aurait pas lieu, selon Gasser et le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, de traiter différemment les articles 16 et 17 de ladite convention au regard du mécanisme de la litispendance. 30. Le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni souligne que, si l’article 17 occupe une position inférieure par rapport à celle de l’article 16, dans la hiérarchie des bases de compétence prévues à la convention de Bruxelles, il occuperait toutefois une position supérieure par rapport aux autres bases de compétence, tels l’article 2 et les règles spéciales de compétence figurant aux articles 5 et 6 de la même convention. Les juridictions nationales seraient ainsi tenues d’apprécier d’office si l’article 17 trouve à s’appliquer et leur impose le cas échéant de décliner leur compétence. 31. Le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ajoute qu’il y a lieu d’examiner les rapports entre les articles 17 et 21 de la convention de Bruxelles en tenant compte des nécessités du commerce international. La pratique commerciale qui consiste à convenir des juridictions qui seront compétentes en cas de

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litige devrait être soutenue et encouragée. Ces clauses contribueraient, en effet, à la sécurité juridique dans les relations commerciales, car elles permettent aux parties, en cas de survenance d’un différend, de déterminer aisément les juridictions qui seront compétentes pour le trancher. 32. Le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni relève, certes, que, pour justifier la règle générale consacrée à l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles, la Cour a précisé, au point 23 de l’arrêt Overseas Union Insurance e.a., précité, que le juge saisi en second lieu n’est, en aucun cas, mieux placé que le juge saisi en premier lieu pour se prononcer sur la compétence de ce dernier. Ce raisonnement ne trouverait cependant pas application aux espèces dans lesquelles la juridiction saisie en second lieu dispose d’une compétence exclusive en vertu de l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles. Dans de telles espèces, la juridiction désignée par la clause attributive de compétence sera, en général, mieux à même de statuer sur l’effet de cette clause, dans la mesure où il y aura lieu de mettre en oeuvre le droit matériel de l’État membre sur le territoire duquel la juridiction désignée est située. 33. Enfin, le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni concède que la thèse qu’il défend pourrait créer un risque de jugements inconciliables. Pour prévenir ce risque, il propose à la Cour de juger que la juridiction saisie en premier et dont la compétence est contestée en vertu d’une clause attributive de juridiction doit surseoir à statuer jusqu’à ce que le tribunal désigné par ladite clause et saisi en second lieu se soit prononcé sur sa compétence. 34. MISAT, le gouvernement italien et la Commission se prononcent, en revanche, en faveur de l’application de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles et donc de l’obligation pour la juridiction saisie en second lieu de surseoir à statuer. 35. La Commission, comme le gouvernement italien, considère que la dérogation en faveur de la compétence du juge saisi en second lieu, au motif qu’il bénéficie d’une compétence exclusive au titre de l’article 16 de la convention de Bruxelles, ne saurait être étendue à un juge désigné en application d’une convention d’élection de juridiction. 36. La Commission justifie la dérogation à la règle édictée à l’article 21, en cas de recours à l’article 16, par l’article 28, paragraphe 1, de la convention de Bruxelles, selon lequel les décisions qui ont été prononcées dans l’État du tribunal saisi en premier lieu en violation de la compétence exclusive de la juridiction saisie en second lieu, fondée sur l’article 16 de ladite convention, ne peuvent être reconnues dans aucun État contractant. Il serait donc incohérent d’obliger, en vertu de l’article 21 de cette même convention, la seconde juridiction, qui est seule compétente, à surseoir à statuer et à se dessaisir en faveur de la juridiction incompétente. Une telle solution aboutirait à ce que les parties obtiennent une décision d’un tribunal incompétent, qui ne pourrait déployer ses effets que dans l’État

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contractant où elle a été prononcée. Dans ce cas, le but de la convention de Bruxelles, consistant à améliorer la protection juridique et à assurer, à cet effet, la reconnaissance et l’exécution transfrontalière des décisions en matière civile, ne serait pas atteint. 37. Ces considérations ne s’appliqueraient cependant pas en cas de compétence attribuée à la juridiction saisie en second lieu, en vertu de l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles. En effet, l’article 28 de celle-ci ne s’applique pas à la violation des dispositions de l’article 17, lequel fait partie du titre II, section 6, de cette même convention. La décision prononcée en violation de la compétence exclusive que la juridiction saisie en second lieu tire d’une clause d’élection de juridiction devrait être reconnue et exécutée dans tous les États contractants. 38. La Commission souligne également que l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles vise non seulement à éviter que ne soient prononcées des décisions inconciliables qui, d’après l’article 27, paragraphe 3, de ladite convention, ne sont pas reconnues, mais également à préserver l’économie procédurale, la juridiction saisie en second lieu devant d’abord surseoir à statuer, puis se dessaisir dès que la compétence du tribunal premier saisi est établie. Cette règle claire serait génératrice de sécurité juridique. 39. Se référant au point 23 de l’arrêt Overseas Union Insurance e.a., précité, la Commission considère que le juge saisi en second lieu n’est, en aucun cas, mieux placé que le juge saisi en premier lieu pour se prononcer sur la compétence de ce dernier. En l’occurrence, le juge italien serait aussi bien placé que le juge autrichien pour établir s’il est compétent au titre de l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles, au motif que, en vertu d’un usage commercial entre l’Autriche et l’Italie, les parties auraient fait attribution de juridiction exclusive au profit du tribunal dans le ressort duquel se trouve le siège de la demanderesse au principal. 40. Enfin, la Commission et le gouvernement italien observent que la compétence visée à l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles se distinguerait de celle visée à l’article 16 de celle-ci, en ce sens que, dans le champ d’application de ce dernier article, les parties ne peuvent conclure des conventions attributives de juridiction contraires (article 17, troisième alinéa). Par ailleurs, les parties auraient la faculté de supprimer ou de modifier à tout moment une clause attributive de juridiction visée audit article 17. Tel serait, par exemple, le cas, en application de l’article 18 de ladite convention, lorsqu’une partie intente une action dans un État autre que celui où il a été fait attribution de juridiction et que l’autre partie se constitue sans contester la compétence de la juridiction saisie (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 24 juin 1981, Elefanten Schuh, 150/80, Rec. p. 1671, points 10 et 11).

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Réponse de la Cour 41. Il convient de rappeler, à titre liminaire, que l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles figure, ensemble avec l’article 22, relatif à la connexité, au titre II, section 8, de cette convention, laquelle tend, dans l’intérêt d’une bonne administration de la justice au sein de la Communauté, à éviter des procédures parallèles devant les juridictions de différents États contractants et les contrariétés de décisions qui pourraient en résulter. Ainsi, cette réglementation vise, dans toute la mesure du possible, à exclure, dès le départ, une situation telle que celle envisagée à l’article 27, point 3, de ladite convention, à savoir la non-reconnaissance d’une décision en raison de son incompatibilité avec une décision rendue entre les mêmes parties dans l’État requis (voir arrêt Gubisch Maschinenfabrik, précité, point 8). Il en découle que, en vue d’atteindre ces objectifs, l’article 21 doit faire l’objet d’une interprétation large, englobant, en principe, toutes les situations de litispendance devant des juridictions d’États contractants, indépendamment du domicile des parties (arrêt Overseas Union Insurance e.a., précité, point 16). 42. Il ressort des termes clairs de l’article 21 que, dans une situation de litispendance, la juridiction saisie en second lieu doit surseoir d’office à statuer jusqu’à ce que la compétence du tribunal saisi en premier lieu soit établie et, lorsque tel est le cas, se dessaisir en faveur de ce dernier. 43. À cet égard, ainsi que la Cour l’a également relevé au point 13 de l’arrêt Overseas Union Insurance e.a., précité, l’article 21 n’établit aucune distinction entre les différents chefs de compétence prévus par la convention de Bruxelles. 44. Il est vrai que, au point 26 de l’arrêt Overseas Union Insurance e.a., précité, avant de juger que l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles devait être interprété en ce sens que, lorsque la compétence du juge saisi en premier lieu est contestée, le juge saisi en second lieu ne peut que surseoir à statuer, au cas où il ne se dessaisirait pas, sans pouvoir examiner lui-même la compétence du juge saisi en premier lieu, la Cour a réservé l’hypothèse où le juge saisi en second lieu disposerait d’une compétence exclusive prévue par ladite convention et, notamment, par son article 16. 45. Toutefois, il ressort du point 20 du même arrêt que, en l’absence de toute revendication d’une compétence exclusive du juge saisi en second lieu dans le litige au principal, la Cour s’est simplement abstenue de préjuger de l’interprétation de l’article 21 de la convention dans l’hypothèse qu’elle a spécifiquement réservée. 46. En l’occurrence, une compétence du juge saisi en second lieu est revendiquée au titre de l’article 17 de la convention.

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47. Toutefois, cette circonstance n’est pas de nature à remettre en cause l’application de la règle procédurale contenue à l’article 21 de ladite convention, laquelle se fonde clairement et uniquement sur l’ordre chronologique dans lequel les juridictions en cause ont été saisies. 48. En outre, le juge saisi en second lieu n’est, en aucun cas, mieux placé que le juge saisi en premier lieu pour se prononcer sur la compétence de ce dernier. En effet, cette compétence est déterminée directement par les règles de la convention de Bruxelles, qui sont communes aux deux juges et qui peuvent être interprétées et appliquées avec la même autorité par chacun d’entre eux (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Overseas Union Insurance e.a., précité, point 23). 49. Ainsi, en présence d’une clause attributive de juridiction, au sens de l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles, non seulement, ainsi que l’a relevé la Commission, les parties ont toujours la possibilité de renoncer à s’en prévaloir et, en particulier, le défendeur a la possibilité de comparaître devant le juge saisi en premier lieu sans soulever l’incompétence de ce dernier sur le fondement de la clause d’élection de juridiction, conformément à l’article 18 de la convention, mais, en outre, en dehors de ces hypothèses, il incombe au premier juge saisi de vérifier l’existence de la clause et de se dessaisir, s’il est établi, selon les termes de l’article 17, que les parties ont effectivement convenu de désigner le tribunal saisi en second lieu comme exclusivement compétent. 50. Il n’en demeure pas moins que, malgré la référence aux usages du commerce international, contenue à l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles, la réalité du consentement des intéressés est toujours l’un des objectifs de cette disposition, justifié par le souci de protéger la partie contractante la plus faible en évitant que des clauses attributives de juridiction, insérées dans un contrat par une seule partie, ne passent inaperçues (voir arrêts du 20 février 1997, MSG, C-106/95, Rec. p. I-911, point 17, et Castelletti, précité, point 19). 51. Dans ces conditions, eu égard aux contestations qui peuvent surgir quant à l’existence même d’un accord de volonté des parties, exprimé suivant les conditions de forme strictes énoncées à l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles, il est conforme à la sécurité juridique voulue par celle-ci que, en cas de litispendance, il soit déterminé de manière claire et précise lequel des deux juges nationaux établira s’il est compétent selon les règles de ladite convention. Il découle clairement du libellé de l’article 21 de cette dernière qu’il appartient au juge saisi en premier lieu de se prononcer sur sa compétence, en l’occurrence au regard d’une clause attributive de juridiction qui serait invoquée devant lui, laquelle doit être considérée comme une notion autonome devant être appréciée au regard des seules exigences dudit article 17 (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 10 mars 1992, Powell Duffryn, C-214/89, Rec. p. I-1745, point 14).

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52. Au demeurant, l’interprétation de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles qui découle de ce qui précède est corroborée par l’article 19 de ladite convention qui ne prévoit l’obligation pour un juge d’un État contractant de se déclarer d’office incompétent que pour le cas où il est «saisi à titre principal d’un litige pour lequel une juridiction d’un autre État contractant est exclusivement compétente en vertu de l’article 16». L’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles n’est pas visé par l’article 19. 53. Enfin, les difficultés, telles que celles invoquées par le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, découlant des comportements dilatoires de parties qui, souhaitant retarder la solution du litige au fond, engagent une action devant un tribunal qu’elles savent incompétent du fait de l’existence d’une clause attributive de juridiction, ne sont pas de nature à remettre en cause l’interprétation de l’une des dispositions de la convention de Bruxelles, telle qu’elle résulte de son texte et de sa finalité. 54. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, il y a lieu de répondre à la deuxième question que l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles doit être interprété en ce sens que le juge saisi en second lieu et dont la compétence a été revendiquée en vertu d’une clause attributive de juridiction doit néanmoins surseoir à statuer jusqu’à ce que le juge saisi en premier lieu se soit déclaré incompétent.

Sur la troisième question 55. Par sa troisième question, la juridiction de renvoi demande, en substance, si l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il peut être dérogé à ses dispositions lorsque, d’une manière générale, la durée des procédures devant les juridictions de l’État contractant dans lequel le tribunal saisi en premier lieu a son siège est excessivement longue. Sur la recevabilité 56. La Commission met en doute la recevabilité de cette question et, partant, des questions suivantes, qui sont connexes à celle-ci, au motif que la juridiction de renvoi n’aurait pas fourni d’éléments concrets permettant de conclure que le Tribunale civile e penale di Roma a méconnu l’obligation de statuer dans un délai raisonnable et violé ainsi l’article 6 de la convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, signée à Rome le 4 novembre 1950 (ci-après la «CEDH»). 57. Cette position ne saurait être admise. Ainsi que l’a relevé M. l’avocat général au point 87 de ses conclusions, c’est bien au regard de la circonstance que la durée moyenne des procédures devant les juridictions

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de l’État membre dans lequel le tribunal saisi en premier lieu a son siège serait excessivement longue que la juridiction de renvoi a posé la question de savoir si le juge saisi en second lieu peut valablement écarter l’application de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles. Pour répondre à cette question, que cette dernière juridiction a estimé pertinente pour la solution du litige au principal, il n’est pas nécessaire qu’elle fournisse des éléments sur le déroulement de la procédure devant le Tribunale civile e penale di Roma. 58. Il y a donc lieu de répondre à la troisième question. Sur le fond Observations soumises à la Cour 59. Selon Gasser, l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles doit être interprété, en tout état de cause, de manière à exclure les procédures excessivement longues (c’est-à-dire d’une durée supérieure à trois ans), qui seraient contraires à l’article 6 de la CEDH et comporteraient des restrictions aux libertés de circulation telles que garanties par les articles 28 CE, 39 CE, 48 CE et 49 CE. Il appartiendrait aux services de l’Union européenne ou aux juridictions nationales de déterminer les États qui, notoirement, connaissent des procédures juridictionnelles excessivement longues. 60. Aussi, dans l’hypothèse où aucune décision sur la compétence n’aurait été rendue dans un délai de six mois suivant l’introduction de l’action devant le juge premier saisi ou aucune décision définitive sur la compétence ne serait intervenue dans l’année suivant cette introduction, y aurait-il lieu d’écarter l’application de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles. En tout état de cause, les juridictions de l’État saisi en deuxième lieu auraient le droit de statuer elles-mêmes tant sur la question de la compétence que, moyennant des délais un peu plus longs, sur le fond de l’affaire. 61. Le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni estime également que l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles doit être interprété dans le respect de l’article 6 de la CEDH. Il observe, à cet égard, qu’un débiteur potentiel dans un litige commercial intentera souvent, devant la juridiction de son choix, une action en vue d’obtenir un jugement l’exonérant de toute responsabilité, en ayant connaissance que cette procédure durera particulièrement longtemps, et ce dans l’intention de retarder de plusieurs années une décision à son encontre. 62. L’application automatique dudit article 21 dans une telle hypothèse octroierait au débiteur potentiel un avantage substantiel et injuste qui lui permettrait de contrôler la procédure, voire de dissuader le créancier de faire valoir ses droits en justice.

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63. Dans ces conditions, le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni propose à la Cour de reconnaître une exception audit article 21 qui permettrait à la juridiction saisie en second lieu d’apprécier la compétence de la juridiction saisie en premier lieu lorsque: 1) le demandeur a intenté, de mauvaise foi, une action devant une juridiction incompétente dans le but de bloquer la procédure devant les juridictions d’un autre État contractant qui sont compétentes en vertu de la convention de Bruxelles et lorsque 2) la juridiction saisie en premier lieu n’a pas décidé de sa compétence dans un délai raisonnable. 64. Le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ajoute que ces conditions devraient être appréciées par les juridictions nationales, à la lumière de toutes les circonstances pertinentes. 65. MISAT, le gouvernement italien et la Commission défendent, au contraire, la thèse de la pleine applicabilité de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles, nonobstant la durée excessivement longue des procédures juridictionnelles dans l’un des États en cause. 66. Selon MISAT, une réponse affirmative à la troisième question préjudicielle aurait pour effet de créer une insécurité juridique et d’accroître la charge financière pour les parties au litige qui seraient tenues de poursuivre de front des instances dans deux États différents et de comparaître devant les deux juridictions saisies, sans être en mesure de prévoir quelle juridiction se prononcera la première dans le temps. Le contentieux déjà important en matière de compétence juridictionnelle s’en trouverait inutilement multiplié, ce qui contribuerait à une paralysie du système juridique. 67. La Commission rappelle que la convention de Bruxelles repose sur la confiance réciproque ainsi que sur l’équivalence des juridictions des États contractants et établit un système obligatoire des compétences que toutes les juridictions entrant dans le champ d’application de ladite convention sont tenues de respecter. Ceci permettrait d’imposer aux États contractants l’obligation de reconnaître et d’exécuter réciproquement les décisions de justice par des procédures simples. Ce système obligatoire de la compétence juridictionnelle servirait en même temps la sécurité juridique car, grâce aux règles de la convention de Bruxelles, les parties et les juridictions pourraient régulièrement et aisément déterminer la compétence internationale. Dans ce système, le titre II, section 8, de ladite convention viserait à prévenir les conflits de compétence et les décisions divergentes. 68. Il ne serait pas conciliable avec la philosophie et les objectifs de la convention de Bruxelles que les juridictions nationales aient l’obligation de respecter les règles régissant la litispendance uniquement si elles estiment que la juridiction saisie en premier lieu statue dans un délai raisonnable. En

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effet, ladite convention ne prévoirait nulle part que les juridictions peuvent prendre le prétexte de retards de procédure dans d’autres États contractants pour se dispenser d’appliquer ses dispositions. 69. En outre, le moment à partir duquel la durée d’une procédure devient excessivement longue, au point de pouvoir nuire gravement aux intérêts d’une partie, ne pourrait être fixé que sur la base d’une appréciation tenant compte de toutes les circonstances du cas d’espèce. Cette question ne pourrait pas être réglée dans le cadre de la convention de Bruxelles. Il appartiendrait, en effet, à la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme d’en connaître et les juridictions nationales ne pourraient se substituer à celle-ci en recourant à l’article 21 de ladite convention. Réponse de la Cour 70. Ainsi que l’ont relevé, d’une part, la Commission et, d’autre part, M. l’avocat général aux points 88 et 89 de ses conclusions, une interprétation de l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles selon laquelle l’application de cet article devrait être écartée dans l’hypothèse où le tribunal saisi en premier lieu appartiendrait à un État membre dont les juridictions connaissent, d’une manière générale, des délais de traitement des affaires excessivement longs serait manifestement contraire tant à la lettre qu’à l’économie et à la finalité de cette convention. 71. En effet, d’une part, ladite convention ne comporte aucune disposition en vertu de laquelle ses articles et, en particulier, l’article 21 cesseraient de s’appliquer en raison de la longueur de la procédure devant les juridictions de l’État contractant considéré. 72. D’autre part, il convient de rappeler que la convention de Bruxelles repose nécessairement sur la confiance que les États contractants accordent mutuellement à leurs systèmes juridiques et à leurs institutions judiciaires. C’est cette confiance mutuelle qui a permis la mise en place d’un système obligatoire de compétence, que toutes les juridictions entrant dans le champ d’application de la convention sont tenues de respecter, et la renonciation corrélative par ces mêmes États à leurs règles internes de reconnaissance et d’exequatur des jugements étrangers au profit d’un mécanisme simplifié de reconnaissance et d’exécution des décisions de justice. Il est également constant que ladite convention vise ainsi à garantir la sécurité juridique en permettant aux justiciables de prévoir avec suffisamment de certitude le tribunal compétent. 73. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, il convient de répondre à la troisième question que l’article 21 de la convention de Bruxelles doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne saurait être dérogé à ses dispositions lorsque, d’une manière générale, la durée des procédures devant les juridictions de l’État contractant dans lequel le tribunal saisi en premier lieu a son siège est excessivement longue.

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Sur les quatrième à sixième questions 74. Compte tenu de la réponse à la troisième question, il n’y a pas lieu de répondre aux quatrième, cinquième et sixième questions, lesquelles n’ont été posées par la juridiction de renvoi que pour le cas où il aurait été répondu par l’affirmative à la troisième question.

Sur les dépens 75. Les frais exposés par les gouvernements italien et du Royaume-Uni, ainsi que par la Commission, qui ont soumis des observations à la Cour, ne peuvent faire l’objet d’un remboursement. La procédure revêtant, à l’égard des parties au principal, le caractère d’un incident soulevé devant la juridiction de renvoi, il appartient à celle-ci de statuer sur les dépens. Par ces motifs, LA COUR , (assemblée plénière) statuant sur les questions à elle soumises par l’Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck, par arrêt du 25 mars 2002, dit pour droit: 1) Une juridiction nationale peut, en vertu du protocole du 3 juin 1971 relatif à l’interprétation par la Cour de justice de la convention du 27 septembre 1968 concernant la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, telle que modifiée par la convention du 9 octobre 1978 relative à l’adhésion du royaume de Danemark, de l’Irlande et du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord, par la convention du 25 octobre 1982 relative à l’adhésion de la République hellénique, par la convention du 26 mai 1989 relative à l’adhésion du royaume d’Espagne et de la République portugaise et par la convention du 29 novembre 1996 relative à l’adhésion de la république d’Autriche, de la république de Finlande et du royaume de Suède, soumettre à la Cour une demande d’interprétation de cette convention, alors même qu’elle se fonderait sur des allégations d’une partie au principal dont ladite juridiction n’a pas encore vérifié le bien-fondé, dès lors qu’elle estime, au regard des particularités de l’affaire, qu’une décision préjudicielle est nécessaire pour être en mesure de rendre son jugement et que les questions préjudicielles qu’elle pose à la Cour sont pertinentes. Il lui incombe toutefois de fournir à cette dernière des éléments de fait et de droit lui permettant de donner une interprétation de ladite convention qui soit utile ainsi que d’indiquer les raisons pour lesquelles elle considère qu’une réponse à ses questions est nécessaire à la solution du litige. 2) L’article 21 de la convention du 27 septembre 1968 doit être interprété en ce sens que le juge saisi en second lieu et dont la compétence a été

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revendiquée en vertu d’une clause attributive de juridiction doit néanmoins surseoir à statuer jusqu’à ce que le juge saisi en premier lieu se soit déclaré incompétent. 3) L’article 21 de la convention du 27 septembre 1968 doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne saurait être dérogé à ses dispositions lorsque, d’une manière générale, la durée des procédures devant les juridictions de l’État contractant dans lequel le tribunal saisi en premier lieu a son siège est excessivement longue.

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Annex 3 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Full Court) 27 April 20041 (Brussels Convention — Proceedings brought in a Contracting State — Proceedings brought in another Contracting State by the defendant in the existing proceedings — Defendant acting in bad faith in order to frustrate the existing proceedings — Compatibility with the Brussels Convention of the grant of an injunction preventing the defendant from continuing the action in another Member State) In Case C-159/02, REFERENCE to the Court under the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, by the House of Lords (United Kingdom), for a preliminary ruling in the proceedings pending before that court between Gregory Paul Turner and Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd, Changepoint SA, on the interpretation of the abovementioned Convention of 27 September 1968 (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 1, and — amended version — p. 77), by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ 1982 L 388, p. 1) and by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic (OJ 1989 L 285, p. 1), THE COURT (FULL COURT), composed of: V. Skouris, President, P. Jann (Rapporteur), C.W.A. Timmermans, C. Gulmann, J.N. Cunha Rodrigues and A. Rosas, Presidents of Chambers, A. La Pergola, J.-P. Puissochet, R. Schintgen, N. Colneric and S. von Bahr, Judges,

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Language of the case: English.

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Advocate General: D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Registrar: L. Hewlett, Principal Administrator, after considering the written observations submitted on behalf of: — Mr Grovit, Harada Ltd and Changepoint SA, by R. Beynon, Solicitor, and T. de La Mare, Barrister, — the United Kingdom Government, by K. Manji, acting as Agent, assisted by S. Morris QC, — the German Government, by R. Wagner, acting as Agent, — the Italian Government, by I.M. Braguglia, acting as Agent, assisted by O. Fiumara, vice avvocato generale dello Stato, — the Commission of the European Communities, by C. O’Reilly and A.-M. Rouchaud-Joët, acting as Agents, having regard to the Report for the Hearing, after hearing the oral observations of Mr Turner and of the United Kingdom Government, of Mr Grovit, of Harada Ltd and of Changepoint SA, and of the Commission, at the hearing on 9 September 2003, after hearing the Advocate General at the sitting on 20 November 2003, gives the following

JUDGMENT

1. By order of 13 December 2001, received at the Court on 29 April 2002, the House of Lords referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters a question on the interpretation of that convention (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 1, and — amended text — p. 77), by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ 1982 L 388, p. 1) and by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic (OJ 1989 L 285, p. 1, ‘the Convention’). 2. That question was raised in proceedings between Mr Turner, on the one hand and, on the other, Mr Grovit, Harada Limited (‘Harada’) and Changepoint SA (‘Changepoint’) concerning breach of Mr Turner’s employment contract with Harada.

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The dispute in the main proceedings 3. Mr Turner, a British citizen domiciled in the United Kingdom, was recruited in 1990 as solicitor to a group of undertakings by one of the companies belonging to that group. 4. The group, known as Chequepoint Group, is directed by Mr Grovit and its main business is running bureaux de change. It comprises several companies established in different countries, one being China Security Ltd, which initially recruited Mr Turner, Chequepoint UK Ltd, which took over Mr Turner’s contract at the end of 1990, Harada, established in the United Kingdom, and Changepoint, established in Spain. 5. Mr Turner carried out his work in London (United Kingdom). However, in May 1997, at his request, his employer allowed him to transfer his office to Madrid (Spain). 6. Mr Turner started working in Madrid in November 1997. On 16 November 1998, he submitted his resignation to Harada, the company to which he had been transferred on 31 December 1997. 7. On 2 March 1998 Mr Turner brought an action in London against Harada before the Employment Tribunal. He claimed that he had been the victim of efforts to implicate him in illegal conduct, which, in his opinion, were tantamount to unfair dismissal. 8. The Employment Tribunal dismissed the objection of lack of jurisdiction raised by Harada. Its decision was confirmed on appeal. Giving judgment on the substance, it awarded damages to Mr Turner. 9. On 29 July 1998, Changepoint brought an action against Mr Turner before a court of first instance in Madrid. The summons was served on Mr Turner around 15 December 1998. Mr Turner did not accept service and protested the jurisdiction of the Spanish court. 10. In the course of the proceedings in Spain, Changepoint claimed damages of ESP 85 million from Mr Turner as compensation for losses allegedly resulting from Mr Turner’s professional conduct. 11. On 18 December 1998 Mr Turner asked the High Court of Justice of England and Wales to issue an injunction under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, backed by a penalty, restraining Mr Grovit, Harada and Changepoint from pursuing the proceedings commenced in Spain. An interlocutory injunction was issued in those terms on 22 December 1998. On 24 February 1999, the High Court refused to extend the injunction. 12. On appeal by Mr Turner, the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) on 28 May 1999 issued an injunction ordering the defendants not to continue the proceedings commenced in Spain and to refrain from commencing

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further proceedings in Spain or elsewhere against Mr Turner in respect of his contract of employment. In the grounds of its judgment, the Court of Appeal stated, in particular, that the proceedings in Spain had been brought in bad faith in order to vex Mr Turner in the pursuit of his application before the Employment Tribunal. 13. On 28 June 1999, in compliance with that injunction, Changepoint discontinued the proceedings pending before the Spanish court. 14. Mr Grovit, Harada and Changepoint then appealed to the House of Lords, claiming in essence that the English courts did not have the power to make restraining orders preventing the continuation of proceedings in foreign jurisdictions covered by the Convention.

The order for reference and the questions submitted to the Court 15. According to the order for reference, the power exercised by the Court of Appeal in this case is based not on any presumed entitlement to delimit the jurisdiction of a foreign court but on the fact that the party to whom the injunction is addressed is personally amenable to the jurisdiction of the English courts. 16. According to the analysis made in the order for reference, an injunction of the kind issued by the Court of Appeal does not involve a decision upon the jurisdiction of the foreign court but rather an assessment of the conduct of the person seeking to avail himself of that jurisdiction. However, in so far as such an injunction interferes indirectly with the proceedings before the foreign court, it can be granted only where the claimant shows that there is a clear need to protect proceedings pending in England. 17. The order for reference indicates that the essential elements which justify the exercise by the Court of Appeal of its power to issue an injunction in this case were that: — the applicant was a party to existing legal proceedings in England; — the defendants had in bad faith commenced and proposed to prosecute proceedings against the applicant in another jurisdiction for the purpose of frustrating or obstructing the proceedings in England; — the Court of Appeal considered that in order to protect the legitimate interest of the applicant in the English proceedings it was necessary to grant the applicant an injunction against the defendants. 18. Taking the view, however, that the case raised a problem of interpretation of the Convention, the House of Lords stayed its proceedings pending a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on the following question:

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‘Is it inconsistent with the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters signed at Brussels on 27 September 1968 (subsequently acceded to by the United Kingdom) to grant restraining orders against defendants who are threatening to commence or continue legal proceedings in another Convention country when those defendants are acting in bad faith with the intent and purpose of frustrating or obstructing proceedings properly before the English courts?’

The question referred to the Court 19. By its question, the national court seeks in essence to ascertain whether the Convention precludes the grant of an injunction by which a court of a Contracting State prohibits a party to proceedings pending before it from commencing or continuing legal proceedings before a court in another Contracting State even where that party is acting in bad faith in order to frustrate the existing proceedings. Observations submitted to the Court 20. The defendants in the main proceedings, the German and Italian Governments and the Commission submit that an injunction of the kind at issue in the main proceedings is not compatible with the Convention. They consider, in essence, that the Convention provides a complete set of rules on jurisdiction. Each court is entitled to rule only as to its own jurisdiction under those rules but not as to the jurisdiction of a court in another Contracting State. The effect of an injunction is that the court issuing it assumes exclusive jurisdiction and the court of another Contracting State is deprived of any opportunity of examining its own jurisdiction, thereby negating the principle of mutual cooperation underlying the Convention. 21. Mr Turner and the United Kingdom Government observe, first, that the question on which a ruling is sought concerns only injunctions prompted by an abuse of procedure, addressed to defendants who are acting in bad faith and with the intention of frustrating proceedings before an English court. In pursuit of the aim of protecting the integrity of the proceedings before the English court, only an English court is in a position to decide whether the defendant’s conduct undermines or threatens that integrity. 22. In common with the House of Lords, Mr Turner and the United Kingdom Government also submit that the injunctions at issue do not involve any assessment of the jurisdiction of the foreign court. They should be regarded as procedural measures. In that regard, referring to the judgment in Case C-391/95 Van Uden [1998] ECR I-7091, they contend that the Convention imposes no limitation on measures of a procedural

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nature which may be adopted by a court of a contracting State, provided that that court has jurisdiction under the Convention over the substance of a case. 23. Finally, Mr Turner and the United Kingdom Government maintain that the grant of an injunction may contribute to attainment of the objective of the Convention, which is to minimise the risk of conflicting decisions and to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. Findings of the Court 24. At the outset, it must be borne in mind that the Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to one another’s legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust which has enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within the purview of the Convention are required to respect, and as a corollary the waiver by those States of the right to apply their internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of judgments (Case C-116/02 Gasser [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 72). 25. It is inherent in that principle of mutual trust that, within the scope of the Convention, the rules on jurisdiction that it lays down, which are common to all the courts of the Contracting States, may be interpreted and applied with the same authority by each of them (see, to that effect, Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance and Others [1991] ECR I-3317, paragraph 23, and Gasser, paragraph 48). 26. Similarly, otherwise than in a small number of exceptional cases listed in the first paragraph of Article 28 of the Convention, which are limited to the stage of recognition or enforcement and relate only to certain rules of special or exclusive jurisdiction that are not relevant here, the Convention does not permit the jurisdiction of a court to be reviewed by a court in another Contracting State (see, to that effect, Overseas Union Insurance and Others, paragraph 24). 27. However, a prohibition imposed by a court, backed by a penalty, restraining a party from commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court undermines the latter court’s jurisdiction to determine the dispute. Any injunction prohibiting a claimant from bringing such an action must be seen as constituting interference with the jurisdiction of the foreign court which, as such, is incompatible with the system of the Convention. 28. Notwithstanding the explanations given by the referring court and contrary to the view put forward by Mr Turner and the United Kingdom Government, such interference cannot be justified by the fact that it is only indirect and is intended to prevent an abuse of process by the defendant in

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the proceedings in the forum State. In so far as the conduct for which the defendant is criticised consists in recourse to the jurisdiction of the court of another Member State, the judgment made as to the abusive nature of that conduct implies an assessment of the appropriateness of bringing proceedings before a court of another Member State. Such an assessment runs counter to the principle of mutual trust which, as pointed out in paragraphs 24 to 26 of this judgment, underpins the Convention and prohibits a court, except in special circumstances which are not applicable in this case, from reviewing the jurisdiction of the court of another Member State. 29. Even if it were assumed, as has been contended, that an injunction could be regarded as a measure of a procedural nature intended to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings pending before the court which issues it, and therefore as being a matter of national law alone, it need merely be borne in mind that the application of national procedural rules may not impair the effectiveness of the Convention (Case C-365/88 Hagen [1990] ECR I-1845, paragraph 20). However, that result would follow from the grant of an injunction of the kind at issue which, as has been established in paragraph 27 of this judgment, has the effect of limiting the application of the rules on jurisdiction laid down by the Convention. 30. The argument that the grant of injunctions may contribute to attainment of the objective of the Convention, which is to minimise the risk of conflicting decisions and to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, cannot be accepted. First, recourse to such measures renders ineffective the specific mechanisms provided for by the Convention for cases of lis alibi pendens and of related actions. Second, it is liable to give rise to situations involving conflicts for which the Convention contains no rules. The possibility cannot be excluded that, even if an injunction had been issued in one Contracting State, a decision might nevertheless be given by a court of another Contracting state. Similarly, the possibility cannot be excluded that the courts of two Contracting States that allowed such measures might issue contradictory injunctions. 31. Consequently, the answer to be given to the national court must be that the Convention is to be interpreted as precluding the grant of an injunction whereby a court of a Contracting State prohibits a party to proceedings pending before it from commencing or continuing legal proceedings before a court of another Contracting State, even where that party is acting in bad faith with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings.

Costs 32. The costs incurred by the United Kingdom, German and Italian Governments, and by the Commission, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are, for the

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parties to the main proceedings, a step in the proceedings pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. On those grounds, THE COURT in answer to the questions referred to it by the House of Lords by order of 13 December 2001, hereby rules: The Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the accession of the Hellenic Republic and by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, is to be interpreted as precluding the grant of an injunction whereby a court of a Contracting State prohibits a party to proceedings pending before it from commencing or continuing legal proceedings before a court of another Contracting State, even where that party is acting in bad faith with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings.

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Annex 4 ARRÊT DE LA COUR (assemblée plénière) 27 avril 20041 «Convention de Bruxelles — Procédure engagée dans un État contractant — Procédure engagée dans un autre État contractant par le défendeur dans la procédure déjà pendante — Défendeur agissant de mauvaise foi et dans le but d’entraver la procédure déjà pendante — Compatibilité avec la convention de l’octroi d’une injonction contre le défendeur empêchant la poursuite de l’action dans l’autre État contractant» Dans l’affaire C-159/02, ayant pour objet une demande adressée à la Cour, en application du protocole du 3 juin 1971 relatif à l’interprétation par la Cour de justice de la convention du 27 septembre 1968 concernant la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, par la House of Lords (Royaume-Uni) et tendant à obtenir, dans le litige pendant devant cette juridiction entre Gregory Paul Turner et Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd, Changepoint SA, une décision à titre préjudiciel sur l’interprétation de la convention du 27 septembre 1968, précitée (JO 1972, L 299, p. 32), telle que modifiée par la convention du 9 octobre 1978 relative à l’adhésion du royaume de Danemark, de l’Irlande et du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord (JO L 304, p. 1, et — texte modifié — p. 77), par la convention du 25 octobre 1982 relative à l’adhésion de la République hellénique (JO L 388, p. 1) et par la convention du 26 mai 1989 relative à l’adhésion du royaume d’Espagne et de la République portugaise (JO L 285, p. 1), LA COUR (assemblée plénière) composée de M. V. Skouris, président, MM. P. Jann (rapporteur), C. W. A. Timmermans, C. Gulmann, J. N. Cunha Rodrigues et A. Rosas,

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Langue de procédure: l’anglais.

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présidents de chambre, MM. A. La Pergola, J.-P. Puissochet et R. Schintgen, Mme N. Colneric et M. S. von Bahr, juges, avocat général: M. D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, greffier: Mme L. Hewlett, administrateur principal, considérant les observations écrites présentées: — pour M. Grovit, Harada Ltd et Changepoint SA, par M. R. Beynon, solicitor, et M. T. de La Mare, barrister, — pour le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, par M. K. Manji, en qualité d’agent, assisté de M. S. Morris, QC, — pour le gouvernement allemand, par M. R. Wagner, en qualité d’agent, — pour le gouvernement italien, par M. I. M. Braguglia, en qualité d’agent, assisté de M. O. Fiumara, vice avvocato generale dello Stato, — pour la Commission des Communautés européennes, Mmes C. O’Reilly et A.-M. Rouchaud-Joët, en qualité d’agents,

par

vu le rapport d’audience, ayant entendu les observations orales de M. Turner et du gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, de M. Grovit, de Harada Ltd et de Changepoint SA, ainsi que de la Commission, à l’audience du 9 septembre 2003, ayant entendu l’avocat général en ses conclusions à l’audience du 20 novembre 2003, rend le présent ARRÊT

1. Par ordonnance du 13 décembre 2001, parvenue à la Cour le 29 avril 2002, la House of Lords a posé, en application du protocole du 3 juin 1971 relatif à l’interprétation par la Cour de justice de la convention du 27 septembre 1968 concernant la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale une question préjudicielle sur l’interprétation de cette convention (JO 1972, L 299, p. 32), telle que modifiée par la convention du 9 octobre 1978 relative à l’adhésion du royaume de Danemark, de l’Irlande et du Royaume-Uni de GrandeBretagne et d’Irlande du Nord (JO L 304, p. 1, et — texte modifié — p. 77), par la convention du 25 octobre 1982 relative à l’adhésion de la République hellénique (JO L 388, p. 1) et par la convention du 26 mai 1989 relative à l’adhésion du royaume d’Espagne et de la République portugaise (JO L 285, p. 1, ci-après la «convention»). 2. Cette question a été soulevée dans le cadre d’un litige opposant M. Turner, d’une part, à M. Grovit, à Harada Ltd (ci-après «Harada») et à

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Changepoint SA (ci-après «Changepoint»), d’autre part, à la suite de la rupture du contrat de travail conclu entre M. Turner et Harada. Le litige au principal 3. M. Turner, ressortissant britannique domicilié au Royaume-Uni, a été engagé en 1990, en qualité de conseiller juridique d’un groupe d’entreprises, par l’une des sociétés appartenant à ce groupe. 4. Le groupe, dénommé Chequepoint Group, est dirigé par M. Grovit et a pour activité principale l’exploitation de bureaux de change. Il comprend plusieurs sociétés établies dans différents pays, parmi lesquelles figurent China Security Ltd, qui a initialement recruté M. Turner, Chequepoint UK Ltd, qui a repris le contrat de M. Turner à la fin de l’année 1990, Harada, établie au Royaume-Uni, et Changepoint, établie en Espagne. 5. M. Turner accomplissait son travail à Londres (Royaume-Uni). Toutefois, en mai 1997, à sa demande, son employeur a accepté qu’il transfère son bureau à Madrid (Espagne). 6. M. Turner a commencé à travailler à Madrid en novembre 1997. Le 16 février 1998, il a présenté sa démission à Harada, au service de laquelle il avait été transféré le 31 décembre 1997. 7. Le 2 mars 1998, M. Turner a intenté à Londres une action contre Harada devant l’Employment Tribunal. Il affirmait avoir été victime de tentatives visant à l’impliquer dans des agissements illicites, ce qui, selon lui, équivalait à un licenciement abusif. 8. L’Employment Tribunal a écarté l’exception d’incompétence soulevée par Harada. Sa décision a été confirmée en appel. Statuant sur le fond, il a alloué des dommages-intérêts à M. Turner. 9. Le 29 juillet 1998, Changepoint a introduit contre ce dernier une action devant une juridiction de première instance de Madrid. L’acte introductif d’instance a été signifié à M. Turner vers le 15 décembre 1998. M. Turner a refusé la notification et contesté la compétence de la juridiction espagnole. 10. Dans le cadre de la procédure introduite en Espagne, Changepoint demandait à M. Turner 85 millions ESP à titre de dommages-intérêts en réparation des préjudices que M. Turner lui aurait causés par son comportement professionnel. 11. Le 18 décembre 1998, M. Turner a demandé à la High Court of Justice (England & Wales), de prononcer, sur le fondement de l’article 37, paragraphe 1, de la Supreme Court Act 1981, une injonction interdisant à M. Grovit, à Harada et à Changepoint, sous peine de sanction, de mener à terme la procédure introduite en Espagne. Une injonction temporaire en ce

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sens a été prononcée le 22 décembre 1998. Le 24 février 1999, la High Court a refusé de renouveler cette injonction. 12. Saisie sur appel par M. Turner, la Court of Appeal (England & Wales) a rendu, le 28 mai 1999, une injonction ordonnant aux parties défenderesses de ne pas poursuivre la procédure introduite en Espagne et de s’abstenir d’en introduire une autre en Espagne ou ailleurs contre M. Turner en raison de son contrat de travail. La Court of Appeal a motivé sa décision, notamment, par le fait que la procédure en Espagne avait été intentée de mauvaise foi, pour dissuader M. Turner de maintenir sa demande devant l’Employment Tribunal. 13. Le 28 juin 1999, déférant à cette injonction, Changepoint s’est désistée de l’action pendante devant la juridiction espagnole. 14. M. Grovit, Harada et Changepoint ont ensuite saisi la House of Lords en faisant valoir, en substance, que les juridictions anglaises n’ont pas le pouvoir de prononcer des injonctions empêchant la poursuite d’actions devant des juridictions étrangères auxquelles s’applique la convention.

L’ordonnance de renvoi et la question préjudicielle 15. Selon les indications fournies dans l’ordonnance de renvoi, le pouvoir exercé par la Court of Appeal dans l’affaire au principal est fondé non pas sur une prétention à définir la compétence d’un juge étranger, mais sur le fait que la partie à laquelle s’adresse l’injonction est soumise in personam à la compétence des juridictions anglaises. 16. Selon l’analyse faite dans l’ordonnance de renvoi, une injonction telle que celle émise par la Court of Appeal n’implique pas une décision sur la compétence du juge étranger, mais une appréciation du comportement que manifeste la partie intéressée en invoquant cette compétence. Toutefois, dans la mesure où une telle injonction interfère indirectement avec la procédure devant le juge étranger, elle ne pourrait être prononcée que lorsque le demandeur démontre qu’il y a nécessité évidente de protéger une procédure pendante en Angleterre. 17. L’ordonnance de renvoi indique que les éléments essentiels qui justifient que la Court of Appeal ait exercé, dans l’affaire au principal, son pouvoir de prononcer une injonction étaient: — le fait que le demandeur était partie à une procédure pendante en Angleterre; — le fait que les défendeurs avaient, de mauvaise foi, intenté une action contre le demandeur dans un autre pays, avec l’intention de poursuivre cette procédure dans le but d’entraver ou de faire obstruction à la procédure pendante en Angleterre;

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— le fait que, selon l’appréciation portée par la Court of Appeal, il était nécessaire, pour protéger l’intérêt légitime du demandeur dans la procédure anglaise, de prononcer une injonction à l’encontre des défendeurs. 18. Considérant toutefois qu’il s’agit d’un problème d’interprétation de la convention, la House of Lords a décidé de surseoir à statuer et de déférer à la Cour la question suivante: «Le prononcé par les juridictions du Royaume-Uni d’injonctions de ne pas faire contre des défendeurs qui menacent d’introduire ou de poursuivre une action en justice devant les tribunaux d’un autre État partie à la convention de Bruxelles, lorsque ces défendeurs agissent de mauvaise foi et dans le but d’entraver une procédure pendante devant les juridictions anglaises, est-il ou non compatible avec la convention du 27 septembre 1968 concernant la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale (que le Royaume-Uni a ensuite ratifiée)?»

Sur la question préjudicielle 19. Par cette question, la juridiction de renvoi demande, en substance, si la convention s’oppose au prononcé d’une injonction par laquelle une juridiction d’un État contractant interdit à une partie à la procédure pendante devant elle d’introduire ou de poursuivre une action en justice devant une juridiction d’un autre État contractant, quand bien même cette partie agit de mauvaise foi dans le but d’entraver la procédure déjà pendante. Observations soumises à la Cour 20. Les défendeurs au principal, les gouvernements allemand et italien ainsi que la Commission soutiennent qu’une injonction telle que celle en cause dans le litige au principal n’est pas compatible avec la convention. Ils font valoir, en substance, que la convention institue un régime complet de règles de compétence. Chaque juge ne saurait se prononcer que sur sa propre compétence au regard de ces règles, et non sur celle d’un juge d’un autre État contractant. Or, une injonction aurait pour résultat que la juridiction qui l’a émise s’attribue une compétence exclusive et prive la juridiction d’un autre État contractant de toute possibilité d’examiner sa compétence, ruinant ainsi le principe de coopération mutuelle qui est à la base de la convention. 21. M. Turner et le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni relèvent, tout d’abord, que la question préjudicielle concerne seulement les injonctions fondées sur un abus de procédure, adressées à des défendeurs qui agissent de mauvaise foi et dans le but d’entraver une procédure pendante devant une juridiction anglaise. Ayant pour objectif de protéger l’intégrité de la procédure dont

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est saisi le juge anglais, seul un juge anglais serait en mesure de décider si le comportement du défendeur porte atteinte à cette intégrité ou menace de la compromettre. 22. Ensuite, à l’instar de la House of Lords, M. Turner et le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni soulignent que les injonctions en cause ne comportent pas d’appréciation de la compétence du juge étranger. Elles devraient être considérées comme des mesures de procédure. À cet égard, se référant à l’arrêt du 17 novembre 1998, Van Uden (C-391/95, Rec. p. I-7091), ils font valoir que la convention ne prévoit aucune limite aux mesures d’ordre procédural susceptibles d’être ordonnées par le juge d’un État contractant, dès lors que celui-ci est compétent au titre de la convention pour connaître du fond d’un litige. 23. Enfin, M. Turner et le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni soutiennent que le prononcé d’une injonction peut contribuer à la réalisation de l’objectif de la convention, qui est de minimiser le risque de contrariété entre les décisions et d’éviter la multiplication des procédures.

Réponse de la Cour 24. D’emblée, il convient de rappeler que la convention repose nécessairement sur la confiance que les États contractants accordent mutuellement à leurs systèmes juridiques et à leurs institutions judiciaires. C’est cette confiance mutuelle qui a permis la mise en place d’un système obligatoire de compétence, que toutes les juridictions entrant dans le champ d’application de la convention sont tenues de respecter, et la renonciation corrélative par ces mêmes États à leurs règles internes de reconnaissance et d’exequatur des jugements étrangers au profit d’un mécanisme simplifié de reconnaissance et d’exécution des décisions de justice (arrêt du 9 décembre 2003, Gasser, C-116/02, non encore publié au Recueil, point 72). 25. Il est inhérent à ce principe de confiance mutuelle que, dans le champ d’application de la convention, les règles de compétence de la convention, qui sont communes à toutes les juridictions des États contractants, puissent être interprétées et appliquées avec la même autorité par chacune d’entre elles (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 27 juin 1991, Overseas Union Insurance e.a., C-351/89, Rec. p. I-3317, point 23, et Gasser, précité, point 48). 26. De même, en dehors de quelques exceptions limitées, énoncées à l’article 28, premier alinéa, de la convention, qui ne concernent que le stade de la reconnaissance ou de l’exécution et qui ne portent que sur certaines règles de compétence spéciale ou exclusive sans pertinence dans l’espèce au principal, la convention n’autorise pas le contrôle de la compétence d’un juge par le juge d’un autre État contractant (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Overseas Union Insurance e.a., précité, point 24).

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27. Or, l’interdiction faite par une juridiction à une partie, sous peine de sanction, d’introduire ou de poursuivre une action devant une juridiction étrangère a pour effet de porter atteinte à la compétence de celle-ci pour résoudre le litige. En effet, dès lors que le demandeur se voit interdire d’intenter une telle action par une injonction, force est de constater l’existence d’une ingérence dans la compétence de la juridiction étrangère, incompatible, en tant que telle, avec le système de la convention. 28. En dépit des explications fournies par la juridiction de renvoi et contrairement à ce qu’ont soutenu M. Turner et le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, cette ingérence ne saurait être justifiée par le fait qu’elle n’est qu’indirecte et qu’elle vise à empêcher un abus de procédure de la part du défendeur à la procédure nationale. En effet, dès lors que le comportement reproché au défendeur consiste à se prévaloir de la compétence d’une juridiction d’un autre État membre, le jugement porté sur le caractère abusif de ce comportement implique une appréciation du caractère pertinent de l’introduction d’une action devant une juridiction d’un autre État membre. Or, une telle appréciation est contraire au principe de confiance mutuelle qui, ainsi qu’il a été rappelé aux points 24 à 26 du présent arrêt, est à la base de la convention et qui interdit au juge, sauf cas particuliers inapplicables dans l’espèce au principal, de contrôler la compétence d’un juge d’un autre État contractant. 29. À supposer qu’une injonction puisse, ainsi qu’il l’a été soutenu, être considérée comme une mesure de nature procédurale destinée à protéger l’intégrité de la procédure déjà pendante devant la juridiction qui l’émet et, à ce titre, comme relevant de la seule loi nationale, il suffit de rappeler que l’application des règles de procédure nationales ne saurait porter atteinte à l’effet utile de la convention (arrêt du 15 mai 1990, Hagen, C-365/88, Rec. p. I-1845, point 20). Or, tel est le cas d’une injonction comme celle en cause qui, ainsi qu’il a été établi au point 27 du présent arrêt, a pour effet de limiter l’application des règles de compétence prévues par la convention. 30. L’argument selon lequel le prononcé d’injonctions peut contribuer à la réalisation de l’objectif de la convention, qui est de minimiser le risque de contrariété entre les décisions et d’éviter la multiplication des procédures, ne saurait être retenu. D’une part, l’utilisation d’une telle mesure prive de leur effet utile les mécanismes spécifiques prévus par la convention en cas de litispendance et de connexité. D’autre part, le recours à cet instrument est de nature à engendrer des situations de conflits pour lesquelles la convention ne contient pas de règle. En effet, il ne saurait être exclu que, en dépit d’une injonction émise dans un État contractant, une décision soit néanmoins rendue par une juridiction d’un autre État contractant. De même, il ne saurait être exclu que les juridictions de deux États contractants autorisant de telles mesures prononcent des injonctions contradictoires.

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31. En conséquence, il convient de répondre à la question préjudicielle que la convention doit être interprétée en ce sens qu’elle s’oppose au prononcé d’une injonction par laquelle une juridiction d’un État contractant interdit à une partie à la procédure pendante devant elle d’introduire ou de poursuivre une action en justice devant une juridiction d’un autre État contractant, quand bien même cette partie agit de mauvaise foi dans le but d’entraver la procédure déjà pendante.

Sur les dépens 32. Les frais exposés par les gouvernements du Royaume-Uni, allemand et italien ainsi que par la Commission, qui ont soumis des observations à la Cour, ne peuvent faire l’objet d’un remboursement. La procédure revêtant, à l’égard des parties au principal, le caractère d’un incident soulevé devant la juridiction de renvoi, il appartient à celle-ci de statuer sur les dépens. Par ces motifs, LA COUR (assemblée plénière) statuant sur la question à elle soumise par la House of Lords, par ordonnance du 13 décembre 2001, dit pour droit: La convention du 27 septembre 1968 concernant la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, telle que modifiée par la convention du 9 octobre 1978 relative à l’adhésion du royaume de Danemark, de l’Irlande et du Royaume-Uni de GrandeBretagne et d’Irlande du Nord, par la convention du 25 octobre 1982 relative à l’adhésion de la République hellénique et par la convention du 26 mai 1989 relative à l’adhésion du royaume d’Espagne et de la République portugaise, doit être interprétée en ce sens qu’elle s’oppose au prononcé d’une injonction par laquelle une juridiction d’un État contractant interdit à une partie à la procédure pendante devant elle d’introduire ou de poursuivre une action en justice devant une juridiction d’un autre État contractant, quand bien même cette partie agit de mauvaise foi dans le but d’entraver la procédure déjà pendante.

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Annex 5 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber) 1 March 20051 (Brussels Convention — Territorial scope of the Brussels Convention — Article 2 — Jurisdiction — Accident which occurred in a nonContracting State — Personal injury — Action brought in a Contracting State against a person domiciled in that State and other defendants domiciled in a non-Contracting State — Forum non conveniens — Incompatibility with the Brussels Convention) In Case C-281/02, Reference for a preliminary ruling under the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) Civil Division (United Kingdom), by decision of 5 July 2002, received at the Court on 31 July 2002, in the proceedings Andrew Owusu v N.B. Jackson, trading as ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’, Mammee Bay Resorts Ltd, Mammee Bay Club Ltd, The Enchanted Garden Resorts & Spa Ltd, Consulting Services Ltd, Town & Country Resorts Ltd, THE COURT (Grand Chamber), composed of P. Jann, President of the First Chamber, acting for the President, C.W.A. Timmermans and A. Rosas, Presidents of Chambers, C. Gulmann, J.-P. Puissochet, R. Schintgen (Rapporteur), N. Colneric, S. von Bahr and J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, Judges, Advocate General: P. Léger, Registrar: L. Hewlett, Principal Administrator,

1

Language of the case: English.

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having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 4 May 2004, after considering the observations submitted on behalf of: — Mr Owusu, by R. Plender QC and P. Mead, barrister, — Mr Jackson, by B. Doherty and C. Thomann, solicitors, — Mammee Bay Club Ltd, The Enchanted Garden Resorts & Spa Ltd and Town & Country Resorts Ltd, by P. Sherrington, S. Armstrong and L. Lamb, solicitors, — the United Kingdom Government, by K. Manji, acting as Agent, and D. Lloyd-Jones QC, — the German Government, by R. Wagner, acting as Agent, — the Commission of the European Communities, by A.-M. RouchaudJoët and M. Wilderspin, acting as Agents, after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 14 December 2004, gives the following

JUDGMENT

1. This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 2 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 1, and — amended version — p. 77), by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ 1982 L 388, p. 1) and by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic (OJ 1989 L 285, p. 1; ‘the Brussels Convention’). 2. The reference was made in the course of proceedings brought by Mr Owusu against Mr Jackson, trading as ‘Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas’, and several companies governed by Jamaican law, following an accident suffered by Mr Owusu in Jamaica.

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Legal background The Brussels Convention 3. According to its preamble the Brussels Convention is intended to facilitate the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals, in accordance with Article 293 EC, and to strengthen in the Community the legal protection of persons therein established. The preamble also states that it is necessary for that purpose to determine the international jurisdiction of the courts of the contracting States. 4. The provisions relating to jurisdiction appear in Title II of the Brussels Convention. According to Article 2 of the Convention: ‘Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State. Persons who are not nationals of the State in which they are domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that State’.

5. However, Article 5(1) and (3) of that convention provides that a defendant may be sued in another Contracting State, in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question, and, in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred. 6. The Brussels Convention is also intended to prevent conflicting decisions. Thus, according to Article 21, which concerns lis pendens: ‘Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Contracting States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court’.

7. Article 22 of the Convention provides: ‘Where related actions are brought in the courts of different Contracting States, any court other than the court first seised may, while the actions are pending at first instance, stay its proceedings. A court other than the court first seised may also, on the application of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the law of that court permits the consolidation of related actions and the court first seised has jurisdiction over both actions. For the purposes of this article, actions are deemed to be related where they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.’

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National law 8. According to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as understood in English law, a national court may decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court in another State, which also has jurisdiction, would objectively be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action, that is to say, a forum in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice (1986 judgment of the House of Lords, in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987], AC 460, particularly at p. 476). 9. An English court which decides to decline jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens stays proceedings so that the proceedings which are thus provisionally suspended can be resumed should it prove, in particular, that the foreign forum has no jurisdiction to hear the case or that the claimant has no access to effective justice in that forum.

The main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 10. On 10 October 1997, Mr Owusu (‘the claimant’), a British national domiciled in the United Kingdom, suffered a very serious accident during a holiday in Jamaica. He walked into the sea, and when the water was up to his waist he dived in, struck his head against a submerged sand bank and sustained a fracture of his fifth cervical vertebra which rendered him tetraplegic. 11. Following that accident, Mr Owusu brought an action in the United Kingdom for breach of contract against Mr Jackson, who is also domiciled in that State. Mr Jackson had let to Mr Owusu a holiday villa in Mammee Bay (Jamaica). Mr Owusu claims that the contract, which provided that he would have access to a private beach, contained an implied term that the beach would be reasonably safe or free from hidden dangers. 12. Mr Owusu also brought an action in tort in the United Kingdom against several Jamaican companies, namely Mammee Bay Club Ltd (‘the third defendant’), the owner and occupier of the beach at Mammee Bay which provided the claimant with free access to the beach, The Enchanted Garden Resorts & Spa Ltd (‘the fourth defendant’), which operates a holiday complex close to Mammee Bay, and whose guests were also licensed to use the beach, and Town & Country Resorts Ltd (‘the sixth defendant’), which operates a large hotel adjoining the beach, and which has a licence to use the beach, subject to the condition that it is responsible for its management, upkeep and control. 13. According to the file, another English holidaymaker had suffered a similar accident two years earlier in which she, too, was rendered tetraplegic. The action in tort against the Jamaican defendants therefore embraces

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not only a contention that they failed to warn swimmers of the hazard constituted by the submerged sand bank, but also a contention that they failed to heed the earlier accident. 14. The proceedings were commenced by a claim form issued out of Sheffield District Registry of the High Court (England and Wales) Civil Division on 6 October 2000. They were served on Mr Jackson in the United Kingdom and, on 12 December 2000, leave was granted to the claimant to serve the proceedings on the other defendants in Jamaica. Service was effected on the third, fourth and sixth defendants, but not on Mammee Bay Resorts Ltd or Consulting Services Ltd. 15. Mr Jackson and the third, fourth and sixth defendants applied to that court for a declaration that it should not exercise its jurisdiction in relation to the claim against them both. In support of their applications, they argued that the case had closer links with Jamaica and that the Jamaican courts were a forum with jurisdiction in which the case might be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice. 16. By order of 16 October 2001, the Judge sitting as Deputy High Court Judge in Sheffield (United Kingdom) held that it was clear from Case C-412/98 UGIC v Group Josi [2000] ECR I-5925, paragraphs 59 to 61, that the application of the jurisdictional rules in the Brussels Convention to a dispute depended, in principle, on whether the defendant had its seat or domicile in a Contracting State, and that the Convention applied to a dispute between a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State and a claimant domiciled in a non-Contracting State. In those circumstances the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1992] Ch 72, which accepted that it was possible for the English courts, applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, to decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by Article 2 of the Brussels Convention, was bad law. 17. Taking the view that he had no power himself under Article 2 of the Protocol of 3 June 1971 to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling to clarify this point, the Judge sitting as Deputy High Court Judge held that, in the light of the principles laid down in Group Josi, it was not open to him to stay the action against Mr Jackson since he was domiciled in a Contracting State. 18. Notwithstanding the connecting factors that the action brought against the other defendants might have with Jamaica, the judge held that he was also unable to stay the action against them, in so far as the Brussels Convention precluded him from staying proceedings in the action against Mr Jackson. Otherwise, there would be a risk that the courts in two jurisdictions would end up trying the same factual issues upon the same or similar evidence and reach different conclusions. He therefore held that the

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United Kingdom, and not Jamaica was the State with the appropriate forum to try the action and dismissed the applications for a declaration that the court should not exercise jurisdiction. 19. Mr Jackson and the third, fourth and sixth defendants appealed against that order. The Court of Appeal (England and Wales) Civil Division states that, in this case, the competing jurisdictions are a Contracting State and a non-Contracting State. If Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory, even in this context, Mr Jackson would have to be sued in the United Kingdom before the courts of his domicile and it would not be open to the claimant to sue him under Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention in Jamaica, where the harmful event occurred, because that State is not another Contracting State. In the absence of an express derogation to that effect in the Convention, it is therefore not permissible to create an exception to the rule in Article 2. According to the referring court, the question of the application of forum non conveniens in favour of the courts of a non-Contracting State, when one of the defendants is domiciled in a Contracting State, is not a matter on which the Court of Justice has ever given a ruling. 20. According to the claimant, Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is of mandatory application, so that the English courts cannot stay proceedings in the United Kingdom against a defendant domiciled there, even though the English court takes the view that another forum in a non-Contracting State is more appropriate. 21. The referring court points out that if that position were correct it might have serious consequences in a number of other situations concerning exclusive jurisdiction or lis pendens. It adds that a judgment delivered in England, deciding the case, which was to be enforced in Jamaica, particularly as regards the Jamaican defendants, would encounter difficulty over certain rules in force in that country on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 22. Against that background, the Court of Appeal decided to stay its proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘1. Is it inconsistent with the Brussels Convention … , where a claimant contends that jurisdiction is founded on Article 2, for a court of a Contracting State to exercise a discretionary power, available under its national law, to decline to hear proceedings brought against a person domiciled in that State in favour of the courts of a non-Contracting State: (a) if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State under the 1968 Convention is in issue; (b) if the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting State?

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2. If the answer to question 1(a) or (b) is yes, is it inconsistent in all circumstances or only in some and if so which?’

On the questions referred The first question 23. In order to reply to the first question it must first be determined whether Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is applicable in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, that is to say, where the claimant and one of the defendants are domiciled in the same Contracting State and the case between them before the courts of that State has certain connecting factors with a non-Contracting State, but not with another Contracting State. Only if it is will the question arise whether, in the circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, the Brussels Convention precludes the application by a court of a Contracting State of the forum non conveniens doctrine where Article 2 of that convention would permit that court to claim jurisdiction because the defendant is domiciled in that State. The applicability of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention 24. Nothing in the wording of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention suggests that the application of the general rule of jurisdiction laid down by that article solely on the basis of the defendant’s domicile in a Contracting State is subject to the condition that there should be a legal relationship involving a number of Contracting States. 25. Of course, as is clear from the Jenard report on the Convention (OJ 1979 C 59, pp. 1, 8), for the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels Convention to apply at all the existence of an international element is required. 26. However, the international nature of the legal relationship at issue need not necessarily derive, for the purposes of the application of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention, from the involvement, either because of the subject-matter of the proceedings or the respective domiciles of the parties, of a number of Contracting States. The involvement of a Contracting State and a non-Contracting State, for example because the claimant and one defendant are domiciled in the first State and the events at issue occurred in the second, would also make the legal relationship at issue international in nature. That situation is such as to raise questions in the Contracting State, as it does in the main proceedings, relating to the determination of international jurisdiction, which is precisely one of the objectives of the Brussels Convention, according to the third recital in its preamble. 27. Thus the Court has already interpreted the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels Convention in cases where the claimant was

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domiciled or had its seat in a non-Contracting State while the defendant was domiciled in a Contracting State (see Case C-190/89 Rich [1991] ECR I-3855, Case C-406/92 Tatry [1994] ECR I-5439 and Group Josi, paragraph 60). 28. Moreover, the rules of the Brussels Convention on exclusive jurisdiction or express prorogation of jurisdiction are also likely to be applicable to legal relationships involving only one Contracting State and one or more non-Contracting States. That is so, under Article 16 of the Brussels Convention, in the case of proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property between persons domiciled in a non-Contracting State and relating to an asset in a Contracting State, or, under Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, where an agreement conferring jurisdiction binding at least one party domiciled in a non-Contracting State opts for a court in a Contracting State. 29. Similarly, as the Advocate General pointed out in points 142 to 152 of his Opinion, whilst it is clear from their wording that the Brussels Convention rules on lis pendens and related actions or recognition and enforcement of judgments apply to relationships between different Contracting States, provided that they concern proceedings pending before courts of different Contracting States or judgments delivered by courts of a Contracting State with a view to recognition and enforcement thereof in another Contracting State, the fact nevertheless remains that the disputes with which the proceedings or decisions in question are concerned may be international, involving a Contracting State and a non-Contracting State, and allow recourse, on that ground, to the general rule of jurisdiction laid down by Article 2 of the Brussels Convention. 30. To counter the argument that Article 2 applies to a legal situation involving a single Contracting State and one or more non-Contracting States, the defendants in the main proceedings and the United Kingdom Government cited the principle of the relative effect of treaties, which means that the Brussels Convention cannot impose any obligation on States which have not agreed to be bound by it. 31. In that regard, suffice it to note that the designation of the court of a Contracting State as the court having jurisdiction on the ground of the defendant’s domicile in that State, even in proceedings which are, at least in part, connected, because of their subject-matter or the claimant’s domicile, with a non-Contracting State, is not such as to impose an obligation on that State. 32. Mr Jackson and the United Kingdom Government also emphasised, in support of the argument that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention applied only to disputes with connections to a number of Contracting States, the

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fundamental objective pursued by the Convention which was to ensure the free movement of judgments between Contracting States. 33. The purpose of the fourth indent of Article 220 of the EC Treaty (now the fourth indent of Article 293 EC), on the basis of which the Member States concluded the Brussels Convention, is to facilitate the working of the common market through the adoption of rules of jurisdiction for disputes relating thereto and through the elimination, as far as is possible, of difficulties concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the territory of the Contracting States (Case C-398/92 Mund & Fester [1994] ECR I-467, paragraph 11). In fact it is not disputed that the Brussels Convention helps to ensure the smooth working of the internal market. 34. However, the uniform rules of jurisdiction contained in the Brussels Convention are not intended to apply only to situations in which there is a real and sufficient link with the working of the internal market, by definition involving a number of Member States. Suffice it to observe in that regard that the consolidation as such of the rules on conflict of jurisdiction and on the recognition and enforcement of judgments, effected by the Brussels Convention in respect of cases with an international element, is without doubt intended to eliminate obstacles to the functioning of the internal market which may derive from disparities between national legislations on the subject (see, by analogy, as regards harmonisation directives based on Article 95 EC intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and working of the internal market, Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-4989, paragraphs 41 and 42). 35. It follows from the foregoing that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention applies to circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, involving relationships between the courts of a single Contracting State and those of a non-Contracting State rather than relationships between the courts of a number of Contracting States. 36. It must therefore be considered whether, in such circumstances, the Brussels Convention precludes a court of a Contracting State from applying the forum non conveniens doctrine and declining to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that Convention. The compatibility of the forum non conveniens doctrine with the Brussels Convention 37. It must be observed, first, that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory in nature and that, according to its terms, there can be no derogation from the principle it lays down except in the cases expressly provided for by the Convention (see, as regards the compulsory system of jurisdiction set up by the Brussels Convention, Case C-116/02 Gasser

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[2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 72, and Case C-159/02 Turner [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24). It is common ground that no exception on the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine was provided for by the authors of the Convention, although the question was discussed when the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom was drawn up, as is apparent from the report on that Convention by Professor Schlosser (OJ 1979 C 59, p. 71, paragraphs 77 and 78). 38. Respect for the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives of the Brussels Convention (see, inter alia, Case C-440/97 GIE Groupe Concorde and Others [1999] ECR I-6307, paragraph 23, and Case C-256/00 Besix [2002] ECR I-1699, paragraph 24), would not be fully guaranteed if the court having jurisdiction under the Convention had to be allowed to apply the forum non conveniens doctrine. 39. According to its preamble, the Brussels Convention is intended to strengthen in the Community the legal protection of persons established therein, by laying down common rules on jurisdiction to guarantee certainty as to the allocation of jurisdiction among the various national courts before which proceedings in a particular case may be brought (Besix, paragraph 25). 40. The Court has thus held that the principle of legal certainty requires, in particular, that the jurisdictional rules which derogate from the general rule laid down in Article 2 of the Brussels Convention should be interpreted in such a way as to enable a normally well-informed defendant reasonably to foresee before which courts, other than those of the State in which he is domiciled, he may be sued (GIE Groupe Concorde and Others, paragraph 24, and Besix, paragraph 26). 41. Application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, which allows the court seised a wide discretion as regards the question whether a foreign court would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of an action, is liable to undermine the predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels Convention, in particular that of Article 2, and consequently to undermine the principle of legal certainty, which is the basis of the Convention. 42. The legal protection of persons established in the Community would also be undermined. First, a defendant, who is generally better placed to conduct his defence before the courts of his domicile, would not be able, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, reasonably to foresee before which other court he may be sued. Second, where a plea is raised on the basis that a foreign court is a more appropriate forum to try the action, it is for the claimant to establish that he will not be able to obtain justice before that foreign court or, if the court seised decides to allow the plea, that the foreign court has in fact no jurisdiction to try the action or that the

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claimant does not, in practice, have access to effective justice before that court, irrespective of the cost entailed by the bringing of a fresh action before a court of another State and the prolongation of the procedural time-limits. 43. Moreover, allowing forum non conveniens in the context of the Brussels Convention would be likely to affect the uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction contained therein in so far as that doctrine is recognised only in a limited number of Contracting States, whereas the objective of the Brussels Convention is precisely to lay down common rules to the exclusion of derogating national rules. 44. The defendants in the main proceedings emphasise the negative consequences which would result in practice from the obligation the English courts would then be under to try this case, inter alia as regards the expense of the proceedings, the possibility of recovering their costs in England if the claimant’s action is dismissed, the logistical difficulties resulting from the geographical distance, the need to assess the merits of the case according to Jamaican standards, the enforceability in Jamaica of a default judgment and the impossibility of enforcing cross-claims against the other defendants. 45. In that regard, genuine as those difficulties may be, suffice it to observe that such considerations, which are precisely those which may be taken into account when forum non conveniens is considered, are not such as to call into question the mandatory nature of the fundamental rule of jurisdiction contained in Article 2 of the Brussels Convention, for the reasons set out above. 46. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question must be that the Brussels Convention precludes a court of a Contracting State from declining the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that convention on the ground that a court of a non-Contracting State would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action even if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State is in issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting State.

The second question 47. By its second question, the referring court seeks essentially to know whether, if the Court takes the view that the Brussels Convention precludes the application of forum non conveniens, its application is ruled out in all circumstances or only in certain circumstances. 48. According to the order for reference and the observations of the defendants in the main proceedings and of the United Kingdom Government, that second question was asked in connection with cases where there

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were identical or related proceedings pending before a court of a nonContracting State, a convention granting jurisdiction to such a court or a connection with that State of the same type as those referred to in Article 16 of the Brussels Convention. 49. The procedure provided for in Article 234 EC is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts by means of which the former provides the latter with interpretation of such Community law as is necessary for them to give judgment in cases upon which they are called to adjudicate (see, inter alia, Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher [1990] ECR I-4003, paragraph 18, Case C-314/96 Djabali [1998] ECR I-1149, paragraph 17, and Case C-318/00 Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins [2003] ECR I-905, paragraph 41). 50. Thus, the justification for a reference for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute (see, to that effect, Djabali, paragraph 19, Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins, paragraph 42, and Joined Cases C-480/00 to C-482/00, C-484/00, C-489/00 to C-491/00 and C-497/00 to C-499/00 Azienda Agricola Ettore Ribaldi and Others [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 72). 51. In the present case, it is common ground that the factual circumstances described in paragraph 48 of this judgment are not the same as those of the main proceedings. 52. Accordingly there is no need to reply to the second question. Costs 53. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) rules as follows: The Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic and by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, precludes a court of a Contracting State from declining the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that convention on the ground that a court of a non-Contracting State would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of

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the action even if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State is in issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting State.

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Annex 6 ARRÊT DE LA COUR (grande chambre) 1er mars 20051 «Convention de Bruxelles — Champ d’application territorial de la convention de Bruxelles — Article 2 — Compétence — Accident survenu dans un État tiers — Préjudice corporel — Action intentée dans un État contractant contre une personne domiciliée dans cet État et d’autres défendeurs domiciliés dans un État tiers — Exception du forum non conveniens — Incompatibilité avec la convention de Bruxelles» Dans l’affaire C-281/02, ayant pour objet une demande de décision préjudicielle au titre du protocole du 3 juin 1971 relatif à l’interprétation par la Cour de justice de la convention du 27 septembre 1968 concernant la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, introduite par la Court of Appeal (England and Wales) Civil Division (Royaume-Uni), par décision du 5 juillet 2002, parvenue à la Cour le 31 juillet 2002, dans la procédure Andrew Owusu contre N. B. Jackson, agissant sous le nom commercial «Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas», Mammee Bay Resorts Ltd, Mammee Bay Club Ltd, The Enchanted Garden Resorts & Spa Ltd, Consulting Services Ltd, Town & Country Resorts Ltd, LA COUR (grande chambre), composée de M. P. Jann, président de la première chambre, faisant fonction de président, MM. C. W. A. Timmermans et A. Rosas, présidents de chambre, MM. C. Gulmann, J.-P. Puissochet et R. Schintgen (rapporteur), Mme N. Colneric, MM. S. von Bahr et J. N. Cunha Rodrigues, juges, avocat général: M. P. Léger, 1

Langue de procédure: l’anglais.

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greffier: Mme L. Hewlett, administrateur principal, vu la procédure écrite et à la suite de l’audience du 4 mai 2004, considérant les observations présentées: — pour M. Owusu, par MM. R. Plender, QC, et P. Mead, barrister, — pour M. Jackson, par MM. B. Doherty et C. Thomann, solicitors, — pour Mammee Bay Club Ltd, The Enchanted Garden Resorts & Spa Ltd et Town & Country Resorts Ltd, par M. P. Sherrington, Mmes S. Armstrong et L. Lamb, solicitors, — pour le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, par M. K. Manji, en qualité d’agent, assisté de M. D. Lloyd-Jones, QC, — pour le gouvernement allemand, par M. R. Wagner, en qualité d’agent, — pour la Commission des Communautés européennes, par Mme A.-M. Rouchaud-Joët et M. M. Wilderspin, en qualité d’agents, ayant entendu l’avocat général en ses conclusions à l’audience du 14 décembre 2004, rend le présent

ARRÊT

1. La demande de décision préjudicielle porte sur l’interprétation de l’article 2 de la convention du 27 septembre 1968 concernant la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale (JO 1972, L 299, p. 32), telle que modifiée par la convention du 9 octobre 1978 relative à l’adhésion du royaume de Danemark, de l’Irlande et du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord (JO L 304, p. 1, et — texte modifié — p. 77), par la convention du 25 octobre 1982 relative à l’adhésion de la République hellénique (JO L 388, p. 1) et par la convention du 26 mai 1989 relative à l’adhésion du royaume d’Espagne et de la République portugaise (JO L 285, p. 1, ci-après la «convention de Bruxelles»). 2. Cette demande a été présentée dans le cadre d’un litige opposant M. Owusu à M. Jackson, agissant sous le nom commercial «Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas», et à plusieurs sociétés de droit jamaïquain à la suite de la survenance d’un accident corporel dont a été victime M. Owusu en Jamaïque.

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Le cadre juridique La convention de Bruxelles 3. Il ressort de son préambule que la convention de Bruxelles a pour but de faciliter la reconnaissance réciproque et l’exécution des décisions judiciaires, conformément à l’article 293 CE, ainsi que de renforcer dans la Communauté la protection juridique des personnes qui y sont établies. Le préambule indique également qu’il importe à cette fin de déterminer la compétence des juridictions des États contractants dans l’ordre international. 4. Les dispositions relatives à la compétence figurent dans le titre II de la convention de Bruxelles. Aux termes de l’article 2 de cette convention: «Sous réserve des dispositions de la présente convention, les personnes domiciliées sur le territoire d’un État contractant sont attraites, quelle que soit leur nationalité, devant les juridictions de cet État. Les personnes qui ne possèdent pas la nationalité de l’État dans lequel elles sont domiciliées y sont soumises aux règles de compétence applicables aux nationaux.»

5. L’article 5, points 1 et 3, de ladite convention dispose toutefois que le défendeur peut être attrait dans un autre État contractant, en matière contractuelle, devant le tribunal du lieu où l’obligation qui sert de base à la demande a été ou doit être exécutée et, en matière délictuelle ou quasi délictuelle, devant le tribunal du lieu où le fait dommageable s’est produit. 6. Par ailleurs, la convention de Bruxelles vise à prévenir les contrariétés de décisions. Ainsi, aux termes de son article 21, relatif à la litispendance: «Lorsque des demandes ayant le même objet et la même cause sont formées entre les mêmes parties devant les juridictions d’États contractants différents, la juridiction saisie en second lieu sursoit d’office à statuer jusqu’à ce que la compétence du tribunal premier saisi soit établie. Lorsque la compétence du tribunal premier saisi est établie, le tribunal saisi en second lieu se dessaisit en faveur de celui-ci.»

7. L’article 22 de cette convention prévoit: «Lorsque des demandes connexes sont formées devant des juridictions d’États contractants différents et sont pendantes au premier degré, la juridiction saisie en second lieu peut surseoir à statuer. Cette juridiction peut également se dessaisir, à la demande de l’une des parties, à condition que sa loi permette la jonction d’affaires connexes et que le tribunal premier saisi soit compétent pour connaître des deux demandes.

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Sont connexes, au sens du présent article, les demandes liées entre elles par un rapport si étroit qu’il y a intérêt à les instruire et à juger en même temps afin d’éviter des solutions qui pourraient être inconciliables si les causes étaient jugées séparément.»

Le droit national 8. En application de l’exception du forum non conveniens, telle que connue en droit anglais, une juridiction nationale peut décliner sa compétence au motif qu’une juridiction, également compétente, située dans un autre État, serait objectivement un for plus approprié pour connaître d’un litige, c’est-à-dire devant lequel le litige peut être tranché de manière adéquate au regard des intérêts de toutes les parties et des fins de la justice (arrêt de 1986 de la House of Lords, Spiliada Maritime Corporation/Cansulex Ltd, 1987, AC 460, spéc. p. 476). 9. Une juridiction anglaise qui décide de décliner sa compétence en application de l’exception du forum non conveniens surseoit à statuer de telle sorte que la procédure, ainsi provisoirement suspendue, est susceptible d’être reprise dans l’hypothèse où il s’avérerait, notamment, que le for étranger n’est pas compétent pour connaître du litige ou que le demandeur n’a pas accès à une justice effective devant ce for. Le litige au principal et les questions préjudicielles 10. Le 10 octobre 1997, M. Owusu, ressortissant britannique domicilié au Royaume-Uni, a été victime d’un très grave accident alors qu’il se trouvait en vacances en Jamaïque. En plongeant dans la mer à un endroit où l’eau arrivait à hauteur de l’abdomen, il a heurté un banc de sable immergé et a subi une fracture de la cinquième vertèbre cervicale qui l’a rendu tétraplégique. 11. À la suite de cet accident, M. Owusu a introduit, au Royaume-Uni, une action en responsabilité contractuelle à l’encontre de M. Jackson, également domicilié dans cet État. Ce dernier avait loué à l’intéressé une villa de vacances à Mammee Bay (Jamaïque). Selon M. Owusu, le contrat, qui stipulait qu’il avait accès à une plage privée, prévoyait implicitement que celle-ci serait raisonnablement sûre ou exempte de dangers cachés. 12. M. Owusu a également exercé au Royaume-Uni une action en responsabilité quasi délictuelle à l’encontre de plusieurs sociétés jamaïquaines, à savoir Mammee Bay Club Ltd (ci-après le «troisième défendeur au principal»), propriétaire exploitant de la plage de Mammee Bay, lequel avait fourni au demandeur au principal un accès gratuit à cette plage, The Enchanted Garden Resorts & Spa Ltd (ci-après le «quatrième défendeur au principal»), laquelle exploite un centre de vacances proche de Mammee Bay et dont les clients avaient également l’autorisation d’accéder à ladite

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plage, ainsi que Town & Country Resorts Ltd (ci-après le «sixième défendeur au principal»), qui exploite un grand hôtel adjacent à cette même plage et est titulaire d’une licence d’accès à celle-ci sous réserve d’en assurer la gestion, l’entretien et la surveillance. 13. Il ressort du dossier qu’une vacancière de nationalité anglaise avait eu, deux ans auparavant, un accident similaire qui l’avait également rendue tétraplégique. Aussi l’action en responsabilité quasi délictuelle introduite contre les défendeurs jamaïquains s’appuie-t-elle non seulement sur le fait qu’ils n’auraient pas averti les nageurs des dangers liés à la présence de bancs de sable immergés, mais également sur le fait qu’ils n’auraient pas pris au sérieux l’accident précédemment survenu. 14. La procédure a été ouverte par une assignation délivrée, le 6 octobre 2000, par le Sheffield District Registry de la High Court (England & Wales) Civil Division (Royaume-Uni). Cette assignation a été signifiée à M. Jackson au Royaume-Uni et le demandeur au principal a, le 12 décembre 2000, reçu l’autorisation d’assigner les autres défendeurs en Jamaïque. L’assignation a été faite aux troisième, quatrième et sixième défendeurs au principal, mais non à Mammee Bay Resorts Ltd ni à Consulting Services Ltd. 15. Tant M. Jackson que les troisième, quatrième et sixième défendeurs au principal ont déposé devant ladite juridiction un déclinatoire de compétence en ce qui concerne l’action introduite à leur encontre. À l’appui de leur demande, ils ont fait valoir que le litige avait des liens plus étroits avec la Jamaïque et que la juridiction de cet État constituait un for compétent devant lequel le litige pouvait être réglé de manière plus adéquate pour toutes les parties et aux fins d’une meilleure justice. 16. Par ordonnance du 16 octobre 2001, le juge siégeant en tant que Deputy High Court Judge à Sheffield (Royaume-Uni) a estimé qu’il ressort de l’arrêt du 13 juillet 2000, Group Josi (C-412/98, Rec. p. I-5925, points 59 à 61), que l’applicabilité des règles de compétence de la convention de Bruxelles à un litige dépend, en principe, de la question de savoir si le défendeur a son siège ou son domicile sur le territoire d’un État contractant et que la convention s’applique à tout litige opposant un défendeur domicilié dans un État contractant à un demandeur domicilié dans un État tiers. Dans ces conditions, la décision de la Court of Appeal (RoyaumeUni) de 1992, In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd (1992 AC 72), et par laquelle a été admise la possibilité pour les tribunaux anglais, en application de l’exception du forum non conveniens, de renoncer à exercer la compétence qu’ils tirent de l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles serait erronée. 17. Estimant qu’il n’était pas habilité à poser lui-même une question préjudicielle à la Cour pour clarifier ce point, conformément à l’article 2 du

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protocole du 3 juin 1971, le juge siégeant en tant que Deputy High Court Judge a considéré, à la lumière des principes énoncés dans l’arrêt Group Josi, précité, qu’il ne pouvait pas surseoir à statuer à l’égard de M. Jackson, dès lors que ce dernier a son domicile dans un État contractant. 18. Nonobstant les liens de rattachement que pouvait avoir avec la Jamaïque l’action dirigée contre les autres défendeurs, le même juge a estimé qu’il ne pouvait pas non plus surseoir à statuer à leur égard dans la mesure où la convention de Bruxelles s’opposait à ce qu’il sursît à statuer dans le cadre de l’action dirigée contre M. Jackson. En effet, dans le cas contraire, il y aurait eu le risque que différents tribunaux de deux États soient amenés à juger les mêmes faits sur la base de preuves identiques ou similaires et parviennent à des conclusions contradictoires. Le juge de première instance a donc conclu que le Royaume-Uni et non la Jamaïque constituait l’État où le for était approprié pour connaître du litige et a rejeté le déclinatoire de compétence. 19. M. Jackson ainsi que les troisième, quatrième et sixième défendeurs ont interjeté appel contre cette ordonnance. La Court of Appeal (England & Wales) Civil Division observe que, en l’occurrence, les juridictions ayant vocation à connaître du litige sont celles d’un État contractant et d’un État tiers. Si l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles s’imposait également dans ce contexte, M. Jackson devrait être attrait au Royaume-Uni devant les juridictions de son domicile et il ne serait pas permis au demandeur au principal de le poursuivre, au titre de l’article 5, point 3, de la convention de Bruxelles, en Jamaïque, où le dommage s’est produit, dans la mesure où cet État n’est pas un autre État contractant. En l’absence de dérogation expresse en ce sens dans ladite convention, il ne serait donc pas permis d’envisager une exception à la règle posée à l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles. Selon la juridiction de renvoi, la question de l’application de l’exception du forum non conveniens en faveur des juridictions d’un État tiers, alors même que l’un des défendeurs est domicilié dans un État contractant, n’a jamais fait l’objet d’un arrêt de la Cour de justice. 20. À cet égard, selon le demandeur au principal, l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles est d’application impérative de telle sorte que la juridiction anglaise ne pourrait surseoir à statuer au Royaume-Uni à l’encontre d’un défendeur domicilié dans ce même État, quand bien même ladite juridiction considère qu’un autre for, dans un État tiers, est plus approprié. 21. La juridiction de renvoi observe que, si cette position devait se révéler correcte, elle pourrait avoir des conséquences importantes dans un certain nombre d’autres hypothèses concernant des cas de compétence exclusive ou de litispendance. Elle ajoute que le jugement rendu en Angleterre qui trancherait le litige au fond et dont l’exécution serait envisagée en Jamaïque, particulièrement à l’égard des défendeurs jamaïquains, serait

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susceptible de se heurter à certaines règles en vigueur dans ce pays en matière de reconnaissance et d’exécution des jugements étrangers. 22. C’est dans ces conditions que la Court of Appeal (England & Wales) Civil Division a décidé de surseoir à statuer et de poser à la Cour les questions préjudicielles suivantes: «1) La convention de Bruxelles […] s’oppose-t-elle, lorsque le demandeur prétend que la compétence est basée sur l’article 2, à ce que la juridiction d’un État contractant décline sa compétence, en vertu de son droit national pour connaître d’une action intentée contre une personne dans cet État en faveur des juridictions d’un État tiers: a) si la question de la compétence d’une juridiction d’un autre État contractant de la convention de Bruxelles ne se pose pas; b) si le litige n’a aucun autre lien de rattachement avec un autre État contractant? 2) Si la réponse donnée à la première question sous a) ou sous b) est affirmative, la convention de Bruxelles s’oppose-t-elle à un tel déclinatoire de compétence dans toutes les circonstances ou seulement dans certaines circonstances et, le cas échéant, lesquelles?»

Sur les questions préjudicielles Sur la première question 23. En vue de répondre à la première question, il convient, tout d’abord, de déterminer si l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles est applicable dans une situation telle que celle de l’affaire au principal, c’est-à-dire lorsque le demandeur et l’un des défendeurs ont leur domicile sur le territoire d’un même État contractant et que le litige qui les oppose devant les juridictions de cet État présente certains liens de rattachement avec un État tiers, mais non avec un autre État contractant. Ce n’est que dans l’affirmative que se poserait, dans les circonstances de l’affaire au principal, la question de savoir si la convention de Bruxelles s’oppose à l’application par une juridiction d’un État contractant de l’exception du forum non conveniens, dans l’hypothèse où l’article 2 de ladite convention permettrait à cette juridiction de fonder sa compétence en raison du domicile du défendeur sur le territoire national. Sur l’applicabilité de l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles 24. Rien dans le libellé de l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles n’indique que l’application de la règle générale de compétence que cet article énonce en fonction uniquement du domicile du défendeur sur le territoire d’un État contractant est soumise à la condition de l’existence d’un rapport juridique impliquant plusieurs États contractants.

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25. Certes, l’application même des règles de compétence de la convention de Bruxelles, ainsi qu’il ressort du rapport sur ladite convention, présenté par M. Jenard (JO 1979, C 59, p. 1, 8), requiert l’existence d’un élément d’extranéité. 26. Toutefois, le caractère international du rapport juridique en cause ne doit pas nécessairement découler, pour les besoins de l’application de l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles, de l’implication, en raison du fond du litige ou du domicile respectif des parties au litige, de plusieurs États contractants. L’implication d’un État contractant et d’un État tiers, en raison, par exemple, du domicile du demandeur et d’un défendeur, dans le premier État, et de la localisation des faits litigieux dans le second, est également susceptible de conférer un caractère international au rapport juridique en cause. En effet, cette situation est de nature à soulever, dans l’État contractant, comme dans l’affaire au principal, des questions relatives à la détermination de la compétence des juridictions dans l’ordre international, qui constitue précisément l’une des finalités de la convention de Bruxelles, ainsi qu’il ressort du troisième considérant de son préambule. 27. C’est ainsi que la Cour a déjà interprété les règles de compétence édictées par la convention de Bruxelles dans des cas où le demandeur avait son domicile ou son siège dans un État tiers, alors que le défendeur était domicilié sur le territoire d’un État contractant (voir arrêts du 25 juillet 1991, Rich, C-190/89, Rec. p. I-3855; du 6 décembre 1994, Tatry, C-406/92, Rec. p. I-5439, et Group Josi, précité, point 60). 28. D’ailleurs, les règles de la convention de Bruxelles en matière de compétence exclusive ou de prorogation expresse de compétence sont également susceptibles de s’appliquer à des rapports juridiques impliquant uniquement un État contractant et un ou plusieurs États tiers. Il en est ainsi, s’agissant de l’article 16 de la convention de Bruxelles, en cas de litige en matière de droits réels immobiliers ou de baux d’immeubles opposant des personnes domiciliées dans un État non contractant et concernant un bien situé dans un État contractant, ou encore, s’agissant de l’article 17 de la convention de Bruxelles, dans l’hypothèse où une convention attributive de juridiction liant au moins une partie domiciliée dans un État non contractant élirait le tribunal sur le territoire d’un État contractant. 29. De même, s’il est vrai, comme l’a souligné M. l’avocat général aux points 142 à 152 de ses conclusions, que les règles de la convention de Bruxelles en matière de litispendance et de connexité ou de reconnaissance et d’exécution s’appliquent, ainsi qu’il ressort clairement de leur libellé, aux rapports entre différents États contractants, dès lors qu’elles concernent tantôt des procédures pendantes devant des juridictions de différents États contractants, tantôt des décisions rendues par des juridictions d’un État contractant en vue de leur reconnaissance et de leur exécution dans un autre État contractant, il n’en demeure pas moins que les litiges visés par

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les procédures ou les décisions en question peuvent avoir un caractère international impliquant un État contractant et un État tiers et avoir suscité, pour ce motif, le recours à la règle générale de compétence énoncée à l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles. 30. À l’encontre de la thèse de l’applicabilité de cet article 2 à une situation juridique impliquant un seul État contractant et un ou plusieurs États non contractants, les défendeurs au principal et le gouvernement du RoyaumeUni ont opposé le principe de l’effet relatif des traités, la convention de Bruxelles ne pouvant imposer aucune obligation aux États qui n’ont pas consenti à être liés par elle. 31. Il suffit, à cet égard, de constater que la désignation comme compétente de la juridiction d’un État contractant, en raison du domicile du défendeur sur le territoire de cet État, même à propos d’un litige qui se rattache, au moins en partie, en raison de son objet ou du domicile du demandeur, à un État tiers n’est pas de nature à faire peser une obligation sur ce dernier État. 32. M. Jackson et le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ont également souligné, pour justifier l’application de l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles aux seuls litiges se rattachant à plusieurs États contractants, l’objectif fondamental poursuivi par cette convention qui serait d’assurer la libre circulation des jugements entre États contractants. 33. À cet égard, il est vrai que l’article 220, quatrième tiret, du traité CE (devenu article 293, quatrième tiret, CE), sur le fondement duquel les États membres ont conclu la convention de Bruxelles, a pour objectif de faciliter le fonctionnement du marché commun par l’adoption de règles de compétence pour les litiges y afférents et la suppression, dans toute la mesure du possible, des difficultés relatives à la reconnaissance et à l’exécution des jugements sur le territoire des États contractants (arrêt du 10 février 1994, Mund & Fester, C-398/92, Rec. p. I-467, point 11). De fait, il est constant que la convention de Bruxelles contribue au bon fonctionnement du marché intérieur. 34. Toutefois, les règles uniformes de compétence contenues dans la convention de Bruxelles n’ont pas vocation à s’appliquer uniquement à des situations comportant un lien effectif et suffisant avec le fonctionnement du marché intérieur, impliquant, par définition, plusieurs États membres. Il suffit de constater à cet égard que l’unification en elle-même des règles de conflit de juridictions et en matière de reconnaissance et d’exécution des décisions de justice, opérée par la convention de Bruxelles, pour des litiges comportant un élément d’extranéité, a assurément pour objectif d’éliminer les obstacles au fonctionnement du marché intérieur pouvant découler des disparités des législations nationales en la matière (voir, par analogie, à propos des directives d’harmonisation fondées sur l’article 95 CE, destinées

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à améliorer les conditions de l’établissement et du fonctionnement du marché intérieur, arrêt du 20 mai 2003, Österreichischer Rundfunk e.a., C-465/00, C-138/01 et C-139/01, Rec. p. I-4989, points 41 et 42). 35. Il découle de ce qui précède que l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles s’applique à une situation telle que celle de l’affaire au principal, couvrant les rapports entre les juridictions d’un seul État contractant et celles d’un État non contractant et non les rapports entre les juridictions de plusieurs États contractants. 36. Il convient dès lors d’examiner la question de savoir si, dans une telle situation, la convention de Bruxelles s’oppose à ce qu’une juridiction d’un État contractant décline la compétence qu’elle tire de l’article 2 de ladite convention en application de l’exception du forum non conveniens. Sur la compatibilité de l’exception du forum non conveniens avec la convention de Bruxelles 37. Il convient d’observer, tout d’abord, que l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles a un caractère impératif et que, ainsi qu’il ressort de ses termes mêmes, il ne peut être dérogé à la règle de principe qu’il énonce que dans des cas expressément prévus par ladite convention (voir, sur le caractère obligatoire du système de compétence mis en place par la convention de Bruxelles, arrêts du 9 décembre 2003, Gasser, C-116/02, non encore publié au Recueil, point 72, et du 27 avril 2004, Turner, C-159/02, non encore publié au Recueil, point 24). Or, il est constant qu’une exception tirée de la théorie du forum non conveniens n’a pas été prévue par les auteurs de la convention, alors même que la question a été débattue lors de l’élaboration de la convention du 9 octobre 1978 relative à l’adhésion du Danemark, de l’Irlande et du Royaume-Uni, ainsi qu’il ressort du rapport sur ladite convention, présenté par M. Schlosser (JO 1979, C 59, p. 71, points 77 et 78). 38. Le respect du principe de la sécurité juridique, qui constitue l’un des objectifs de la convention de Bruxelles (voir, notamment, arrêts du 28 septembre 1999, GIE Groupe Concorde e.a., C-440/97, Rec. p. I-6307, point 23, et du 19 février 2002, Besix, C-256/00, Rec. p. I-1699, point 24), ne serait pas pleinement garanti s’il fallait permettre à une juridiction compétente au titre de ladite convention de faire application de l’exception du forum non conveniens. 39. En effet, selon les termes de son préambule, la convention de Bruxelles vise à renforcer dans la Communauté la protection juridique des personnes qui y sont établies, en prévoyant des règles communes de compétence de nature à garantir une certitude quant à la répartition des compétences entre les différentes juridictions nationales susceptibles d’être saisies d’un litige déterminé (arrêt Besix, précité, point 25).

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40. La Cour a ainsi jugé que le principe de la sécurité exige notamment que les règles de compétence qui dérogent à la règle générale énoncée à l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles soient interprétées de façon à permettre à un défendeur normalement averti de prévoir raisonnablement devant quelle juridiction, autre que celle de l’État de son domicile, il pourrait être attrait (arrêts précités GIE Groupe Concorde e.a., point 24, et Besix, point 26). 41. Or, l’application de la théorie du forum non conveniens, qui laisse une large marge d’appréciation au juge saisi quant à la question de savoir si un for étranger serait plus approprié pour trancher le fond d’un litige, est de nature à affecter la prévisibilité des règles de compétence posées par la convention de Bruxelles, en particulier celle de son article 2, et, par voie de conséquence, le principe de sécurité juridique en tant que fondement de cette convention. 42. La protection juridique des personnes établies dans la Communauté serait également affectée. En effet, d’une part, le défendeur, généralement mieux à même de se défendre devant les juridictions de son domicile, ne serait pas en mesure, dans les circonstances telles que celles de l’affaire au principal, de prévoir raisonnablement devant quelle autre juridiction il risque d’être attrait. D’autre part, dans l’hypothèse où a été soulevée une exception tirée de l’existence d’un for étranger plus approprié pour connaître du litige, il incombe au demandeur d’établir qu’il ne pourra pas obtenir justice devant le tribunal étranger en question ou, si la juridiction saisie décide de retenir l’exception, que ce tribunal n’est finalement pas compétent pour connaître du litige ou que le demandeur n’a, en réalité, pas accès à une justice effective devant ledit tribunal, indépendamment du coût que représente l’introduction d’un nouveau recours devant la juridiction d’un autre État et l’allongement des délais de procédure. 43. De plus, l’admissibilité de l’exception du forum non conveniens dans le cadre de la convention de Bruxelles risquerait d’affecter l’application uniforme des règles de compétence contenues dans celle-ci dans la mesure où cette exception n’est reconnue que dans un nombre limité d’États contractants, alors que le but de la convention de Bruxelles est précisément de prévoir des règles communes à l’exclusion des règles nationales exorbitantes. 44. Les défendeurs au principal insistent sur les conséquences pratiques négatives qui découleraient de l’obligation qu’auraient en l’occurrence les juridictions anglaises de connaître du fond de l’affaire, notamment quant aux coûts de procédure, à la possibilité de remboursement des frais en Angleterre en cas de rejet de l’action du demandeur, aux difficultés logistiques liées à la distance géographique, à la nécessité d’apprécier le fond du litige selon des critères jamaïquains, à la possibilité d’obtenir en

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Jamaïque l’exécution d’un jugement rendu par défaut et à l’impossibilité d’envisager une demande reconventionnelle à l’encontre des autres défendeurs. 45. À cet égard, quelle que soit la réalité de ces difficultés, il suffit d’observer que de telles considérations, qui peuvent précisément être prises en compte dans le cadre de l’application de l’exception du forum non conveniens, ne sont pas de nature à remettre en cause le caractère obligatoire de la règle fondamentale de compétence, contenue à l’article 2 de la convention de Bruxelles, pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus. 46. Compte tenu de l’ensemble des considérations qui précèdent, il y a lieu de répondre à la première question que la convention de Bruxelles s’oppose à ce qu’une juridiction d’un État contractant décline la compétence qu’elle tire de l’article 2 de ladite convention au motif qu’une juridiction d’un État non contractant serait un for plus approprié pour connaître du litige en cause, même si la question de la compétence d’une juridiction d’un autre État contractant ne se pose pas ou que ce litige n’a aucun autre lien de rattachement avec un autre État contractant. Sur la seconde question 47. Par sa seconde question, la juridiction de renvoi demande en substance si, pour le cas où la Cour devrait estimer que la convention de Bruxelles s’oppose à l’application de l’exception du forum non conveniens, une telle appréciation s’impose en toutes circonstances ou seulement dans certaines circonstances. 48. Il ressort de la décision de renvoi ainsi que des observations des défendeurs au principal et du gouvernement du Royaume-Uni que cette seconde question a été posée pour le cas où il existerait une situation de litispendance ou de connexité avec une procédure pendante devant une juridiction d’un État non contractant, une convention attributive de compétence en faveur d’une telle juridiction ou encore un rattachement à cet État du même type que ceux visés à l’article 16 de la convention de Bruxelles. 49. La procédure prévue à l’article 234 CE est un instrument de coopération entre la Cour et les juridictions nationales, grâce auquel la première fournit aux secondes les éléments d’interprétation du droit communautaire qui leur sont nécessaires pour la solution des litiges qu’elles sont appelées à trancher (voir, notamment, arrêts du 8 novembre 1990, GmurzynskaBscher, C-231/89, Rec. p. I-4003, point 18; du 12 mars 1998, Djabali, C-314/96, Rec. p. I-1149, point 17, et du 21 janvier 2003, Bacardi-Martini et Cellier des Dauphins, C-318/00, Rec. p. I-905, point 41). 50. Aussi la justification du renvoi préjudiciel n’est-elle pas la formulation d’opinions consultatives sur des questions générales ou hypothétiques, mais

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le besoin inhérent à la solution effective d’un contentieux (voir, en ce sens, arrêts Djabali, précité, point 19; Bacardi-Martini et Cellier des Dauphins, précité, point 42, et du 25 mars 2004, Azienda Agricola Ettore Ribaldi e.a., C-480/00 à C-482/00, C-484/00, C-489/00 à C-491/00 et C-497/00 à C-499/00, non encore publié au Recueil, point 72). 51. Or, en l’occurrence, il est constant que les situations factuelles visées au point 48 du présent arrêt ne sont pas celles du litige au principal. 52. En conséquence, il n’y a pas lieu de répondre à la seconde question.

Sur les dépens 53. La procédure revêtant, à l’égard des parties au principal, le caractère d’un incident soulevé devant la juridiction de renvoi, il appartient à celle-ci de statuer sur les dépens. Les frais exposés pour soumettre des observations à la Cour, autres que ceux desdites parties, ne peuvent faire l’objet d’un remboursement. Par ces motifs, la Cour (grande chambre) dit pour droit: La convention du 27 septembre 1968 concernant la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, telle que modifiée par la convention du 9 octobre 1978 relative à l’adhésion du royaume de Danemark, de l’Irlande et du Royaume-Uni de GrandeBretagne et d’Irlande du Nord, par la convention du 25 octobre 1982 relative à l’adhésion de la République hellénique et par la convention du 26 mai 1989 relative à l’adhésion du royaume d’Espagne et de la République portugaise, s’oppose à ce qu’une juridiction d’un État contractant décline la compétence qu’elle tire de l’article 2 de ladite convention au motif qu’une juridiction d’un État non contractant serait un for plus approprié pour connaître du litige en cause, même si la question de la compétence d’une juridiction d’un autre État contractant ne se pose pas ou que ce litige n’a aucun autre lien de rattachement avec un autre État contractant.

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Index (English) to the Introduction and chapters 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 abuse of right: Brussels regime and ECJ application, 65–7 place of performance of contract, 66 post-Gasser avenue, 58–9, 68–72 company law, 70–1 domicile rule and, 110, 113 EU principle, 62–5, 70–1 Gasser case, 56–7 parallel proceedings, 9–11 post-Gasser, 58–9, 68–72 pre-emptive strikes, 40–2, 56–7 proportionality, 64 two-prong test, 64 access to justice: delay, 9, 40–2, 55, 58, 60 legal certainty and, 122 principle of EU law, 59–60 anti-suit injunctions: breach of arbitration agreements, 45–6 Brussels Convention v domestic procedure rules, 13–17, 91–7 damages as alternative, 15–17, 43–5, 57 English use, 12, 92 exporting, 14–15 in personam orders, 12–13, 96 mutual trust principle and, 11–13, 78–86 oppressive or vexatious proceedings, 92 prohibition, Turner case, 1, 5–6, 11–17, 57, 78–89, 91–7 arbitration: anti-suit injunctions and, 45–6 Brussels regime and, 12, 45, 53, 128, 132 post-Gasser, 45–6, 52–3 preliminary rulings, 45

consent to jurisdiction, 4 domestic procedure rules and, 21–3 Hagen case, 95 Turner case, 13–17, 91–7 effectiveness, 13–14, 91, 94–6 entry into force, 1, 92 fair trial and, 59–61 general principles of EU law and, 59–65 Hague Convention and, 47 human rights and, 59–61 legal certainty principle, 18, 93–4, 116–23, 134 mutual trust principle, 11, 93–4 parallel proceedings abuse of process, 68–72 avoidance principle, 36–7, 53–4 prevention of irreconcilable judgments, 30, 32–3, 61, 68 reflexive effect, 22 uniform application, 21–3, 103, 104–6, 133, 137–44 case law: cumulative effects, 146–50 Gasser see Gasser case misconceptions, 31–2, 150–2 Owusu see Owusu case possible remedies, 152–4 Turner see Turner case choice of law see jurisdiction agreements civilian tradition, borrowings, 4 common law: creativity, 2, 17 jurisdiction agreements and discretion, 3–4 company law, abuse of process, 70–1 comparative civil procedures, 2–4 contempt of court, 13, 14–15, 84 contract see also jurisdiction agreements damages for breach, 43 place of performance, 66

bad faith, 11, 12 Belgian torpedo, 56 Briggs, A, 1n5, 3, 57 Brussels regime: abuse of right principle and, 9, 58–9 Article 6(2), 65, 95 ECJ application, 65–7 parallel proceedings, 68–72 amending parallel proceedings and jurisdiction clauses, 47–9, 57–8 post-Gasser, 47–9, 57–8 potential alteration of rules, 21–3 arbitration and, 12, 45, 53, 128, 132 Article 2 see domicile rule

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damages, 15–17, 43–5, 57 delaying tactics, 9, 40–2, 55, 58, 60 discretion see judicial discretion domestic procedure rules: European jurisdiction rules and, 13–17, 21–3, 91–7 jurisdiction and merits together, 29, 40 domicile rule: derogations, 103, 111, 114

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Index (English) to the Introduction and chapters 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6

dualistic approach to, 103, 107–14, 151 fraud and, 110, 113 mandatory rule, 17–18, 93, 101–14, 153–4 no forum non conveniens derogation, 103, 127–34 parallel litigation and, 113–14 third state involvement, 103–14, 111, 112 unified regime, 103–6 Droz, G, 22 duress, 7

limits of discretion, 126 lis alibi pendens and, 131, 132 Owusu rejection, 1, 17–23, 101, 113, 115, 127–34 uniform application of rules and, 21–3, 133, 137–44 forum rei, 103–6, 111–14 forum shopping, excesses, 1 Franzosi, M, 56n7 fraud, 7, 9–11, 106, 110, 113 freezing orders, 84 frivolous proceedings, 41, 92

enforcement of foreign judgments, 66 English law: anti-suit injunctions see anti-suit injunctions contempt of court, 13, 14–15 damages for breach of jurisdiction clauses, 15–17 forum non conveniens see forum non conveniens issue estoppel, 34, 44 recognition of foreign judgments in breach of arbitration clauses, 46 European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 59, 62 European Convention on Human Rights, fair trial, 59–61, 122 European Judicial Area, 108–9, 110, 111, 114 European Union: abuse of right principle, 62–5 fair trial principle, 59–61 general principles and Brussels regime, 59–65 exclusive jurisdiction: enforcement of judgments, 66 patent registration, 66–7 third states, 105, 112

Gasser case: English text, 155–72 French text, 173–91 issue, 1, 4, 93 jurisdiction clauses and lis pendens, 5–11, 32–42 abuse and fraud, 9–11 Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 5–8, 31, 34 prior tempore rule, 5–8, 33 tactics, 40–2, 55 technical problem, 37–40 legal certainty focus, 11, 93–4, 121–3 misconceptions, 31–2 mutual trust, 93–4 objectives, 36–7, 53–4 parallel proceedings, 35–7 no exception ruling, 68–9 post-Gasser solutions, 42–54, 55–9 abuse of right principle, 58–9, 68–72 amending Brussels Regulation, 49–52, 57–8 arbitration, 45–6, 52–3 damages, 43–5, 57 first strikes, 42–3 Hague Convention, 47–9 legislative solutions, 47–52 priority of principles, 31 public law approach, 3, 16 related issues, 29–31 German law, no preliminary rulings, 29

fair trial: delay and, 9, 40–2, 55, 60 Gasser case, 122 principle of EU law, 59–61 foreign judgments see recognition of foreign judgments forum non conveniens: arguments against, 131 burden of proof, 125–6, 127 compulsoriness of Article 2, 17–18, 101–3 ends of justice, 124–5, 126–7 English doctrine, 123–7 exclusion from Brussels regime, 103, 110, 113 legal certainty and, 17, 18–21, 115–36, 116 Owusu case, 127–34 limited recognition, 17, 21–3

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Hague Convention, 47, 47–9 human rights, Brussels regime and, 59–61 in personam orders, 12–13, 96 in rem actions, 105 issue estoppel, 34, 44 Italian torpedo, 56 Jenard Report, 116 judicial discretion, 3–4, 12–13, 124, 129 jurisdiction agreements: abuse of right, place of performance, 66 choice of law mechanism, 7–8 choice of non-member state law, 106 common law and, 1, 3–4 contractual autonomy, 2–3, 38–9

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Date: 23/11

JOBNAME: Sommieres: Forum Sho PAGE: 3 SESS: 2 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 27 13:21:37 2007

Index (English) to the Introduction and chapters 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 Convention and, 4 damages for breach, 15–16, 43–5 fraud, 106 parallel proceedings and fraud and abuse, 9–11 Gasser case, 5–11, 32–42, 72–3 Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 31, 34, 72–3 misconceptions, 31–2 pre-emptive strikes, 31, 32, 40–2 Primacom case, 9–10, 27–9, 69–70 prior tempore rule, 5–8, 33, 106 tactics, 40–2, 55, 58 technical problem, 37–40 post-Gasser, 49–54, 55–9 abuse of right principle, 58–9, 68–72 amending Brussels Regulation, 49–52, 57–8 arbitration, 45–6, 52–3 damages, 43–5, 57 first strikes, 42–3 Hague Convention, 45–9 sham agreements, 50, 58 third state, choice of, 112

non-discrimination, 64 Owusu case: clash of legal cultures, 93 domestic procedure rules and Brussels Convention, 21–3 domicile rule and, 108–9 English text, 209–21 French text, 223–35 issue, 93 legal certainty, 18–21, 115, 116, 127–34 mandatory Article 2, 17–18, 101–2, 102 rejection of forum non conveniens, 1, 17–23, 101–2, 113, 115 parallel proceedings: Brussels regime abuse of process, 68–72 avoidance rule, 36–7, 53–4 prevention of irreconcilable judgments, 30, 32–3, 61, 68 costs, 29, 40, 50 domicile rule and, 113–14 frivolous cases, 41 Gasser case, 35–7 misconceptions, 31–2 no exception ruling, 68–9 related issues, 29–31 technical problem, 37–40 injunctions see anti-suit injunctions jurisdiction clauses and fraud and abuse, 9–11 Gasser case, 5–11, 32–42 Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 31, 34 Primacom case, 9–10, 27–9, 69–70 prior tempore rule, 5–8, 106 technical problem, 37–40 legal certainty, 6–7 post-Gasser, 42–54, 55–9 abuse of right principle, 58–9, 68–72 amending Regulation, 49–52, 57–8 arbitration, 45–6, 52–3 damages, 43–5, 57 first strikes, 42–3 Hague Convention, 45–9 pre-emptive strikes, 31, 32, 40–2, 56 prior tempore rule, 5–8, 33, 56 problem, 32–5 tactics, 40–2, 55, 58 patents, 56, 66–7 preliminary rulings: breach of arbitration agreements, 45 Hague Regulation and, 50 lack of, 29, 40–1 Primacom case: clear jurisdiction clause, 28, 32 costs, 29 German court declination of jurisdiction, 40, 45 implications, 28–9

Kompetenz-Kompetenz: Gasser case, 5–8, 31, 34 jurisdiction agreements, 72–3 lis pendens and prior tempore rule, 5–8, 34 Primacom case, 39 legal certainty: Brussels I Regulation, 134 Brussels regime, 18, 93–4, 116–23 discretion and, 124, 129 European Court of Human Rights, 122–3 forum non conveniens and, 17, 18–21 Owusu case, 127–34 Gasser case, 11, 15, 93–4, 121–3 Owusu case, 18–21, 115, 116, 127–34 parallel proceedings, 6–7 pre-Gasser, 116–21 principle, 115–16 Rome I Convention, 135 Turner case, 96 legal cultures, clash, 2–4, 93 legitimate expectations, 38, 118, 122, 130 lis pendens see parallel proceedings Lugano Convention, 92 misconceptions, 31–2, 150–2 misrepresentation, 7 Muir Watt, Horatia, 4 mutual trust: anti-suit injunctions and, 11–13, 78–85 Convention principle, 2, 93 Gasser case, 93–4 Turner case, 11–13, 15, 78–85, 96, 97

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Date: 23/11

JOBNAME: Sommieres: Forum Sho PAGE: 4 SESS: 2 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 27 13:21:37 2007

240

Index (English) to the Introduction and chapters 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6

Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 39 parallel proceedings jurisdiction clause and, 27–8 no exception ruling, 69–70 pre-emptive strike, 9–10, 28, 42, 43 related issue, 30 settlement, 29 private law, public law and, 2–4 proportionality, 64 public law: private law and, 2–4 Turner and Gasser cases, 3, 16 public policy, 14, 42, 125 recognition of foreign judgments: automatic recognition, 16 basic principle, 32 judgments in breach of arbitration clauses, 46 judgments in breach of jurisdiction clauses, 39–40 mutual trust, 78–85 parallel proceedings and, 32–3, 34 remedies, 152–4 res judicata, 16

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Rome Convention, 135 Scelle, Georges, 109 Schlosser Report, 8, 18, 34, 41, 127, 128 teleological interpretation, 132 third parties: arbitration and, 46 Article 6(2), 65, 95 domicile rule and, 103–14, 111, 112 relations with member-states, 148–50 Turner case: anti-suit injunctions, prohibition, 1, 5–6, 11–17, 57, 78–89, 91–7 Brussels Convention v domestic procedure rules, 13–17, 91–7 context, 92–4 English text, 193–200 French text, 201–8 issue, 4 legal certainty, 96 mutual trust, 11–13, 15, 78–85, 96, 97 public law approach, 3, 16 vexatious proceedings, 41, 92

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Date: 23/11

JOBNAME: Sommieres: Forum Sho PAGE: 1 SESS: 2 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 27 13:22:24 2007

Index (French) to chapters 3, 7 and the conclusion abus de procès: affaire Gasser, 153 affaire Turner, 77, 79, 80, 84, 89 application des règles de litispendance et, 82, 86 confiance mutuelle et, 77 contrôle, 80–1 coopération judiciaire, 86–9 exemples, 80 remède, 153 accès à la justice, 85 affaire Gasser voir aussi trio d’arrêts abus de procès, 153 compétence-compétence, 148 injonctions anti-suit, 147 litispendance, 86, 147–8 remède, 152 texte anglais, 155–72 texte français, 173–91 affaire Owusu voir aussi trio d’arrêts application uniforme des règles, 137 désirabilité de l’uniformité des règles, 141–2 forum non conveniens, 137, 148–50, 151 rapports avec États tiers, 144, 148–50, 151, 153 texte anglais, 209–21 texte français, 223–35 affaire Turner voir aussi trio d’arrêts abus de procédure, 77, 79, 80, 84, 89 application uniforme des règles de compétence, 83 confiance mutuelle, 77, 146–7 décision juste, 86 non remise en cause de compétence, 79–80 règles de litispendance et, 82, 146 texte anglais, 193–200 texte français, 201–8 association internationale de procédure, 87 astreinte, 83–4

affaire Turner, 77, 146–7 autonomie des États et, 77, 83 fraudes et, 81 injonctions anti-suit et, 78–85 application uniforme des règles, 82–6 non-remise en cause des compétences étrangères, 79–81 principe de fongibilité des règles, 81–2 litispendance et, 88 principe de coopération judiciaire européenne, 78 Convention de Bruxelles: application uniforme des règles, 82–6 affaire Owusu, 137 désirabilité, 141–4 forum non conveniens et, 137–44 souplesse, 138, 139–40 uniformité des règles et, 138–9 article 2 voir domicile, règle du champ d’application, 151 litispendance, 82, 142 pluralité des défendeurs, 141 rapports avec États tiers, 142, 144, 148–50, 151 reconnaissance des décisions étrangères, 79 uniformité des règles application uniforme et, 138–9 désirabilité, 141–4 Convention de La Haye, 87, 139, 140, 143, 145, 152 Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, 85 coopération judiciaire: mécanisme de résolution des conflits, 86–9 principe de confiance mutuelle, 78 responsabilité parentale, 87 dédoublement fonctionnel, 109 divorce, 81 domicile, règle du: application des règles, 138 bonne règle, 141 dissimulation du domicile, 80 double fonction, 107–14, 151 impérativité, 153–4 dommages-intérêts, 152 droit commun: excentricités, 154 pluralité des défendeurs, 142 souplesse, 88

clauses attibutives: dommages-intérêts, 152 litispendance et, 86 violation, 146–50, 152 compétence voir règles de compétence compétence-compétence, 148 confiance mutuelle:

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Date: 23/11

JOBNAME: Sommieres: Forum Sho PAGE: 2 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 27 13:22:24 2007

242

Index (French) to chapters 3, 7 and the conclusion

droit international, injonctions anti-suit et, 84–5 égalité de traitement, 144 forum non conveniens: accès aux preuves, 140 affaire Owusu, 137, 148–50, 151 application uniforme des règles, 137–44 sécurité juridique et, 144 Convention de La Haye, 139, 140, 143 coût de la procédure, 140, 141 développement, 140, 141 États fédéraux d’Amérique, 87 généralisation, 139–41 reconnaissance limitée, 138 règle d’exercice de compétence, 138 France: affaire Brachot, 83–4 arrêt Groupe Josi, 151 arrêt Stolzenberg, 84 économie procédurale, 140 injonctions anti-suit, 83–4 fraudes, 81 injonctions anti-suit: accès à la justice et, 85 affaire Gasser, 147 affaire Turner, 146 comportement abusif, 79 confiance mutuelle, 78–9 objectifs, 82 confiance mutuelle et, 78–85 droit international et, 84–5 États tiers, 149 France, 83–4 in personam, 79 institution minoritaire, 83 origine, 83 relations extracommunautaires, 89 unilatéralité du procédé, 78, 85, 86–9 injonctions Mareva, 84 litispendance: abus processuels et, 82, 86 affaire Gasser, 86, 147–8 affaire Turner, 82, 146

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application intracommunautaire, 142–3 changement, 153 charges, 82 confiance mutuelle et, 88 droit anglais, 142 extrême sollicitude, 152 ordre des saisies, 82, 142 malentendus, 152–4 reconnaissance des décisions étrangères: application uniforme des règles de compétence, 79–81 Convention de Bruxelles, 79 Convention de La Haye, 143, 152 fongibilité des règles et institutions, 81–2 non-remise en cause, 79–81 règles de compétence: affaire Turner et, 79–80 application uniforme, 82–6 affaire Owusu, 137 forum non conveniens et, 137–44 souplesse, 138, 139–40 uniformité des règles et, 138–9 correction des règles, 86–9 non remise en cause des compétences étrangères, 79–81 règles du divorce, 81 renvoi de compétence, 87, 88 uniformité, 78, 81–2 application uniforme et, 138–9 désirabilité, 141–4 rapports avec états tiers, 142, 144, 148–50 remèdes, 152–4 renvoi de compétence, 87, 88 Réseau judiciaire en matière civile et commerciale, 87 responsabilité parentale, 87 trio d’arrêts: critique, 145 effet cumulatif, 146–50 jurisprudence antérieure, 150–1 malentendus, 150–2 remèdes possibles, 152–4

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Date: 27/11