Forty Years of German-American Political Relations

Citation preview

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Forty Years of German-American Political Relations

BY

JEANNETTE KEIM

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GHADUATB SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILADELPHIA

PRINTED BY WILLIAM 1919

J.

DORNAN

COPYBIGHT

JEANNETTE KBIM 1919

:

PREFACE The

study covered by this thesis was begun in the autumn of

1916 and was undertaken for the purpose of discovering the general character of the relationship between the United States and Ger-

many

after

both nations had become world powers, but before

events occurred leading immediately to the great war. so long a period, I have confined field

of

my

Covering

study fairly closely to the

government publications and to autobiography.

The

nature of the subject, the recent character of the material and the conditions of the times have- prevented access to the manuscript archives of either government.

Therefore the only unpublished

materials available were the very interesting Bancroft and Davis

manuscripts dealing with the 1870 period.

I

have found, however,

such^n abundance

of material in the published sources mentioned,

that I

in tracing from

feel justified

it

the following conclusions

First The general relationship between the two countries shows three main periods of development: There was the early period, comprising approximately the first decade after the founding of the Empire, in which the relations were spontaneously cordial. This was followed by a period of friction developed partly by the increasing economic rivalry of the two countries, but mostly by the development in Germany of an aggressive expansion system, and characterized by an indifference on the part of the German Government toward the effect of that policy upon the United States. The third period, comprising the decade following the Spanish-American war, shows a status again of generally good relations, created in part by the solution of certain outstanding controversies and in part by the deliberate policy of the German Government to cultivate in the interests of the empire the friendship of the United States. The expansion policy progressed steadily, but it took into account the factor of the United States. :

PREFACE

IV

Second: The commercial controversies between the two councentered chiefly in their contrasting interpretations of the "most-favored-nation" principle as expressed in the Prussian Treaty of 1828. The United States correctly maintained that the treaty stipulated clearly for a basis of reciprocity, and the American Government acted uniformly upon this principle throughout the Germany, ignoring the equivalence clause of the negotiations. treaty, incorrectly claimed unconditional "most-favored-nation" treatment and did not itself throughout this period act uniformly upon that principle. The German Government, however, ultimately adopted the interpretation of the United States. Third: The policies of the two countries toward the natives of the lands of their commercial enterprise were in contrast. This was shown in the several distant spheres in which the German and American commercial interests came in contact with each other, particularly in Samoa, in China, and in Venezuela. The German Government asserted German interests in these spheres, with some deference to the policy of other great powers, but with little or no concern for the rights or independence of the natives or of the politically weak governments rightfully sovereign there. The United States, on the other hand, whether working for the independence of the Samoans, for the integrity of China or for the prevention of forcible measures against Venezuela, threw its influence constant^ in defense of native peoples, their rights to self-government and to undisputed possession of their territory. tries

Material for this thesis has been found in the libraries of the

New York am indebted the New York

University of Pennsylvania, in the Public Library of

City and in the Library of Congress in Washington. to

Mr.

Paulsitz, of the manuscript division of

I

Library, and to the staff of the manuscript division of the Library of Congress for their interest

especially indebted to

in my work. I am Crowne, Miss Anna W. Hill,

and assistance

Miss Helen

Miss Nellie C. Smith and others

S.

of the library staff of the

versity of Pennsylvania for their generous help throughout

three years'

work

at the University.

Miss Julia Russell efficient

my

cooperation as

I wish, finally, to

secretary.

my

express to

grateful appreciation of her cordial

my

Uni-

and

CONTENTS Preface

CHAPTER

I

Relations between the United States and Germany, 1870

CHAPTER, II Treaty Relationship

.

CHAPTER American Citizens op German Birth

7

36

III .

51

.

.

64

.

..112

.

.

216

.

244

IV

*

.

.

....

—Their Rights in Germany

CHAPTER Commercial RELATior^s

...

.

.

.

CHAPTER V Samoa: The United States and Germany in the Pacific

CHAPTER The Spanish-American War

.

CHAPTER Germany and the OpSn Door

in

f Germany and the Monroe Doctrine

Bibliography

Appendix

.

VI

....

.

VII

China

CHAPTER

.

.

.

VIII .

.

.

.

.

.

.

273

305 319

ABBREVIATIONS A.

&

Accounts and Papers (British State Papers). Foreign Relations of the United States (U. S. diplomatic correspondence with foreign countries). Verhandlungen des Reichstags.

P.

P. R.

V. R. R. Gbl.

Reichs^Gesetzblatt.

M. Sen. Ex. Doc.

House

Ex'.

Doc.

Sen. Misc. Doc.

House Misc. Doc. Sen. Rep.

House Rep. R. L.

S.

For description

Malloy's "Treaties, Conventions, etc." Senate Executive Documents. House Executive Documents. Senate Miscellaneous Documents. House Miscellaneous Documents. Senate Reports. House Reports. Robert Louis Stevenson: "A footnote to history,"

of the

etc.

above works and other sources used see Bibliography.

—

FORTY YEARS OF GERMAN-AMERICAT^ POLITICAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER

I

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 The newly

created

from the United

GermRn Empire

States.

Many

received a cordial

welcome

combined to create in warm sympathy for the

factors

the American Republic a feeling of

German people who had just fought a successful war against a monarch unpopular in the United States, and who were now This sympathy and steadily increasing population

uniting, like those states, into a federal union.

had a natural of

German

and

basis in the large

extraction in the United States,' and in the personal

political intercourse

engendered.

between the two countries which

There was also present the

recent American Civil War, during which Prussia, the

new German

this

reminiscence of the leading

had been one of the few friends of the Union cause in Europe, whereas the most hostile of European powers during the American crisis was in 1870 the foe of Germany. Such forces, making for friendly relationship, were increased in state in the

their

effect

minister to

nation,

by the pronounced sympathies Germany for the country of his

of

the

American

residence

and

his

earnest personal desire to see cultivated a close friendship between

new empire and the United States. The American friendliness for Germany was brought

the

during the Franco-Prussian war.

out

In spite of the careful neutral

stand taken by the government, there was, at the beginning of the conflict at successes of the

least, much unconcealed satisfaction over the German armies. Mr. Davis, Assistant Secretary

' Congressional Globe, 1870-71, Part 2, p. 956, 41st Congress, 3d Session. Senator Sumner reported Bismarck as declaring that

"Germany had

in the United States her second largest state after Prussia."

GERMANY, 1870 RKLATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND

8

an incident of a of State records in his Journal^ the war: of during the early days

meeting

of

the

Cabinet

" news was brought in from "While we were talking," he writes, had been captured by the Weissenbruch that the Associated Press of the French did not defeat bloody fight. The

Prussians after a

seem to make anyone

less cheerful."

During the same Cabinet meeting President Grant conversed with the Assistant Secretary on the relations of the United States to the belligerents.

He

instructed

Mr. Davis to inform Mr.

Berthemy, the French Minister, when the opportunity offered, "That it was the intention of the United States Government to

must not be among the people

preserve a strict neutrality in the war, but that he surprised

if

a strong feeling manifested itself

in favor of the Prussians; that the people

had good memories,

and they remembered that while the Germans sympathized with the Union and took its bonds freely during the War the French people had manifested no sympathy for the Union but had negotiated a loan for the Rebels, and the French Government had sent an expedition into Mtexico which had been construed by the people as an act hostile to this country." That the President's predictions were verified

American consular

was

by Mr. John M. Read, an who wrote^ that there was a

attested

official in Paris,

very strong prejudice in that country against Americans on

account of the sympathy shown by the people of the United States

Germany.

for

The French

M. Berthemy,

Minister,

2

J.

C. B. Davis, Journal, 1870-71 (August

s

J.

C. B. Davis Mss.

5,

analyzed*

1870).

37

Avenue Austin,

Paris,

August

16, 1870.

John Meredith Read to Davis: ". Since the war was declared I have been charged with the consular affairs of the North German Confederation throughout France and .

.

as the representative in this particular of the "Prussians" I am not looked upon with favor by the masses of the French. There is a very strono- preiudice against all Americans on account of the sympathy shown by the'peonle' of the United States for Germany, and when one adds to this the offense of representing in any respect the "Prussians" it does not add to one's "

safetv

'

J.

C. B. Davis, Journal, September

42d Congress, 2d Session, Part

2,

6,

1870.

1871-72, p. 1069.

Also Congressional Globp

'

AMERICAN SYMPATHIES DURING FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR the American sentiment as divided along party crats favoring the

lines,

the

9

Demo-

French and the Republicans sympathizing with

Germany. The Assistant Secretary of State replied to him that he had not himself been aware of such a division; that it was his private opinion, however, that the American sentiment was personal to the Emperor and his dynasty and not against France or the French people. The French Minister could not wonder '

that there should be in the United States such a feeling against

the Emperor and his government because of their policy during the recent American war,

when they gave

aid to the Rebels

by

permitting loans in Paris to the Confederacy, and in addition to this,

attempted to establish a monarchy on the southern border

The

the United States.

mentioned by the French Minister was also voiced in Congress, Senator Morton, of

of Indiana, declaring of the

it

political division

to be a notorious fact that the

many and against France, and equally notorious Democratic party was

of the

Among of the

sympathy

Republican party, as a general thing, was in favor of Gerfor

that the sympathy

France and against Germany.

the reasons for this, he stated, were the liberal sentiments

Germans, which accorded with the principles

lican party.

There was

of the

Repub-

also the feeling that Louis Napoleon, a

usurper, had overturned a republic and had declared war against

Germany without adequate and proper

cause.

Sentiments toward the two warring countries found expression in a Senate discussion^ over the sending of a relief ship to

The

Europe.

joint resolution provided that a naval vessel be authorized to

carry to Europe "such supplies as of the

may

be furnished by the people

United States for the destitute and suffering people

France and Germany." February, 1871, after the

This resolution being introduced

German

of

in

armies had overrun France,

one of the Senators, Mr. Howard, of Michigan, declared that he did not consider that the Germans were in need of any supplies

from the United States, and moved to

*

Congressional Globe, 1870-71, Part

February

4,

1871.

2, p.

strike out the

954

ff,

words "and

41st Congress, 3d Session,

10

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

Germany."

This motion called forth prompt opposition and led

to a discussion of the comparative relations of the United States

two belligerents. Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas, declared that though the French were the ancient allies of the United States, the Germans were the modern allies, had helped to recruit the northern armies with men and had saved the life of the nation. to the

Senator Morton, of Indiana, stated that this war was inaugurated

and brought on by France

—that he

could sympathize, however,

with the suffering of the French people, responsible for

He

it.

Mr. Fowler,

who were

of Tennessee,

in

no way

took a different

any evidence that Germany had had received any particular assistance from Germany during the late war, and that since the German Government's raid on the people of France after the battle of Sedan he had personally no sympathy with it. Senator Stewart, of Nevada, reminded him that Germany alone had taken five or six hundred million dollars of United States bonds when the country was most in need of credit and when those bonds were debarred from the exchange in London and from the Bourse in Paris. The Senator from Tennessee replied that that fact only showed that the Germans had made a good business investment, that, moreover, he had never seen any effort on the part of the Germans to establish free and stand.

said he failed to see

ever been an ally of the United States or that the country

independent governments, but that they had shown a concentration of despotic power, while the French people were the freest

on the continent and had been constantly struggling for

free institutions.

At

this juncture

Senator Schurz, of Missouri,

rose to the defense of the land of his birth

and declared that he

did not think there were any governments on the face of the globe

who

expressed their sympathy with the cause of the Union

straightforwardly and emphatically as

Government of German governments generally, and "it was the same with the German people. Moreover, in the matter of the United States bonds, these were taken by Germany when the issue of the war was by no means decided; it was a dangerous venture, but they embarked on it because they believed in the as

Prussia and the

the

PRO-GERMAlSr SYMPATHIES OF BANCROFT

11

Republic of the United States, had faith in the great destinies

and because

of the country,

their sympathies impelled

risk their interests with the fortunes of the

them

to

American Govermnent.

In conclusion of the discussion, Senator Sumner, of Massachusetts,

acknowledged the equal debt

of the

United States to both nations.

After reviewing the services of France at the time of the Revo-

and the permanent obligation

lution

tinued

from

arising

it,

he con-

:

"But

is

our obligation to

Germany

men

this great country, fertile in

less?

cannot forget that

I

as in thought, has contributed

to ours a population numerous and enlightened, by which the

Republic has been strengthened and our

civilization elevated.

France contributed to national independence, Germany to national

and

strength

France,

The

life.

How

shall

undertake to determine the

I

between these two obligations?

difference

we owe

We

owe

infinitely to

Germany."

infinitely to

discussion gave no evidence of a division of sentiment

political

lines,

all

on

the speakers being Republican, but was in

general illustrative of the prevailing friendly feeling toward the

German

An

nation at this time.

extreme exponent of this attitude was Mr. George Bancroft,

American Minister to the North German Union and subsequently accredited to the German Empire. His dispatches to Mr. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, and to

his

own nephew, Mr.

Bancroft Davis, then Assistant Secretary of State, are

sympathy

German

for the

German

and the United

C.

with

cause in the war, with admiration for

close political relationship

States.

He

of self-defense

between the new Empire

considered the war throughout to be

one of "aggression" and "without a

series of

J.

character and institutions and with unaffected effort to

promote a very

and one

filled

on the part

cauge"'^

of

on the part

Germany.

Prussian victories, which he terms

of France,

When,

after the

"magnificent," the

" J. C. B. Davis Mss., Bancroft to Davis, Berlin, September 5, 1870. Also Bancroft Mss., No. 136, Berlin, September 21, 1870. See also in J. C. B. Davis's Mss. a letter from Henry W. Ryder, American Consul at Chem-

nitz, to

Davis, August 30, 1870.

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

12

demands

against France were presented

by Bismarck, Bancroft'

reported that these demands were considered throughout neutral '

Bancroft Mss., No. 136.

American Legation, Berlin, September 21, 1870. Sib: I am able to report to you on the best authority the views which are entertained by the allied German governments in relation to the conditions The pledges for of peace to be established between themselves and France. peace contained in the Plebiscite so lately adopted in France have not been made good. Events have showu that excitability of the disposition of the French nation. The inajority of the French Chamber, the Senate, and the organs of public opinion through the press have demanded a war of conquest against Germany so loudly that the isolated friends of peace lost all courage to oppose, and the Emperor may have thought hiniself justified in asserting that he had been forced into the war by pubhc opinion. In view of these facts the German alhed governments cannot find a guaranThey must not therefore tee of peace in the disposition of the French people. deceive themselves into the behef that there is no reason to expect after this peace a speedy renewal of attack. Whatever may be the conditions which may be demanded from France, the French nation will never forgive the Even series of defeats which have attended their present war of aggression. though the Germans were to demand no cession of territory, no indemnity, no advantage except the glory of their arms, there would remain the wounded self-love of the French people and their hereditary desire of conquests, and they would only wait for a day when they might hope to renew the war with better success. The forbearance of the German Governments in 1867 was due to their desire not to conjure up an era of bitterness and angry passions, but by patience and the careful culture of friendly relations between the two nations to lay the foundations of an era of peace and reciprocal good-will. As this moderation failed of its effect, and as the Germans against all their efforts have been compelled to encounter a war of aggression, they regard it henceforward as necessary to look for some securities against the next attack other than can be found in the good-will of France. The guarantees which were estabhshed in 1815 against the same ambition of the French people have lost their effect and Germany must now rely on its own strength and its own resources. The Germans ought not to be continually exposed to the necessity of again making the same exertions which they have done at this time, and material securities are therefore needed for their own protection and for the preservation of the peace of Europe. These securities are to be demanded not from any transient government of France but from the French nation, which has shown itself ready, as the history of past centuries proves, to follow any government into war and under any government to seek acquisiIn order therefore to establish peace, tions of territory from Germany. securities must be obtained against the next imminent attack from France and that can be found only in the change of the present defenseless boundary of South Germany, so that the point from which future attacks may emanate may be more remote and the fortresses with which France has hitherto threatened Germany may so far be brought into the power of Germany as to constitute hereafter defensive bulwarks against invasion. The views which I have here detailed to you I know to be those which are entertained in the cabinets of the German princes. They also exist in all but irresistible strength in the mind of the German people. I will add but one remark of my own: A true guarantee for Germany against future attacks from France would be the political union of Germany itself, and the most earnest negotiations are now pending between N. Ger-

:

Bancroft's views on german terms

13

Europe to be "moderate" and to be necessary securities against the "next imminent attack from France." Should Germany retire from France, he wrote/ leaving boundaries as they were, France would soon renew the battle for the Rhine, and as the many on

the one side, and S. Germany, especially Wtirtemburg and Bavaria, on the other, for the accompUshment of that object. Germany, being united, will have nothing to fear from France on the one side, or Russia on the other.

Bancroft Mss., No. 145.

American Legation, Berlin, September 29, 1870.

Sm:

On

the 24th of this

month

I sent

you the following telegram

Fish, Secretary, Washington, District Columbia,

Conditions: Convention to be called; offered Favre truce. Yesterday Favre rejected offer. to hold Strasburg, Verdun, Toul.

"Bismarck

Germany

Bancroft."

"The account conveyed

in the telegram

is

authentic.

In the opinion of

The statement that the Germans offered were moderate. demanded Mount Valerien is a misrepresentation. Now, the fall of Toul has been followed by the momentous event of the surrender of Strasburg Seventy just 189 years after the day on which it was seized by Louis XIV.

Europe the terms

thousand troops are thus set free to invade southwestern France; the left wing to touch Lyons. The effects of the surrender on the war are immense. I cannot represent to you strongly enough the fixedness of the purpose of Germany to retain Strasburg and with it Alsace as a part of Germany. All Germany demands it from a patriotic national feeUng, S. Germany as a necessary defense. The acquisition of this territory proves the strongest incentive to the S. Germans to form themselves into one empire with the N. Germans, for Alsace is the bulwark of S. western Germany and the transrhinane possessions of Bavaria leave her no option but to overcome her ." jealousy of Prussia and assist in forming a united Germany. .

8

J.

C. B. Davis Mss., Baincroft to Davis.

Berlin, October

"This government disclaims utterly any desire

12, 1870.

for territory as such,

and

wishes for no acquisition for Prussia; the change of boundary is the demand Were Germany to retire from France of the military as a line of defense. now, leaving boundaries and fortresses as they were, France would soon renew The day will inevitably come when Belgium will ,the battle for the Rhine. be annexed to France, and then the German-Rhenish provinces would be To guard against it, Germany exposed to the most imminent danger. demands Strasburg, a demand which is now in Europe not censured as extravagant; Germany demands also Metz, and on that the European mind is more divided. These demands are made primarily in the interests of South Germany, whose princes formerly constituted the Rheinbund of Napoleon, and have held their lands on sufferance. France holding Strasburg could at any time march to Munich. This sense of danger is controUing, and you may set it down as fixed and resolved upon to hold at the peace both Metz and Strasburg. On the right of demand I give no opinion; but peace depends^ on its being complied with."

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

14

day would come when Belgium would be annexed to France, the German Rhenish province would be exposed to imminent danger. To prevent this Germany was demanding Strasburg, and this

demand was not censured in Europe as extravagant. With regard to the demand for Metz, opinion was divided, and while not expressing his own opinion on the right of this demand, the minister asserted that peace depended on

its

"Finally," he wrote, "I will not withhold

being complied with".

my

opinion that the

are now engaged in a war not only for the peace, independence and union of Germany, but also for the best interests of civilization, of civil and religious liberty and of popular

German armies

freedom."

^

Holding such a viewpoint toward the two beUigerents, it is not surprising to find the American minister hoping for some evidence In Sepof similar feelings on the part of his home government. tember, 1870, Mr. Bancroft^" wrote in confidence to his nephew,

Mr. Davis, that he had been hoping to see from Mr. Fi^h "some good strong word expressing a complaint of a declaration of war so injurious to commerce and without a cause," or if this could not "Bancroft Mss., No. 121

" "

J.

(to Secretary of State Fish).

C. B. Davis Mss., Geo. Bancroft to Davis.

(Secret

and

confidential.)

Dear John:

I have been hoping to see from Mr. Fish some good strong word, not violating neutraUty, but perhaps expressing a complaint of a declaration of war so injurious to commerce without a cause, and if that cannot be, then what all Europe and all neutral governments would respond to, an energetic remonstrance against the needless cruelties exercised toward the Germans domiciled in France, a most numerous, a most industrious, wealthy, orderly, peace-loving, cultivated people. good letter expressing sympathy with the Germans would have a most important effect and perhaps in our elections carry them in November. I am certain it is best, i. e., right in itself and politic for the Government, in some way to mark strongly a sympathy with the

A

Germans. Another consideration not so free from doubt presents itself. The neutral European powers will, when the negotiations for peace begin, attempt to exercise a pressure adverse to the Germans. The question arises whether we could, and if we can, whether we should, exercise a counter-pressure, so as to leave the matter to be settled exclusively by the two nationalities, German and French, without meddlesome intervention from powers that like ourselves profess neutrahty. I do not presume to offer an opinion on this subject, only to call attention to an aspect of the negotiations which is very likely to

arise.

I

am ever

affectionately yours,

Geo. Bancroft."

EFFORTS TO SECURE ACTION IN FAVOR OF GERMANY be, then at least cruelties

"an

15

energetic remonstrance against the needless

toward the Germans domiciled

in France." Such a sympathy with these Germans would, he declared, have an important effect and perhaps carry the home elections in November. He considered it both right in itself and politic for letter expressing

the United States Government "in some

way

to

mark

strongly a

sympathy with the Germans." Moreover, in regard to the future, he hoped that if the neutral European powers should attempt to exercise during the peace negotiations " a pressure adverse to the

Germans," that the United States would "exercise a counterpressure; so as to leave the matter to be settled exclusively

two

by the

German and French." In reply the Assistant Secretary summed up" the general attitude nationalities,

"J. C. B. Davis Mss

"My Dear

(to Bancroft, reply to

September 5

letter

Washington, September

from

B.).

23, 1870.

Uncle:

(

)

how Mr.

Fish could have well done more- than he did do to manifest our individual sympathy for the German cause in this war. There was throughout the country a deep-seated feeUng in their favor until it was beUeved they showed a determination to prolong the war for the sake of acquiring territory inhabited by a population that does not wish to come under their sway. When the pubHc got this idea, which may or may not have been correct, they ceased to feel the intense sympathy which they had previously exhibited, and an attempt by the administration to interfere in any way in their favor, or to swerve from a rigid neutrality, would have been resented by the good sense of America. We have not received here any evidence of needless cruelties toward the Germans in the execution of the decree of expulsion. Washburne has made no complaint. The decree itself may have been harsh and uncalled for, but it seems to have been a mihtary measure, entirely within the discretion of the French military authorities. Sherman did the same thing at Atlanta-^so that we are the last people who could complain of the principle. There has been a studied and persistent pressure from the German Legation since the beginning of the war to force us into an attitude toward France inconsistent with our neutrality. Baron Gerolt has spared no effort to entrap me into improper positions. He tried to make me protest against the expulsion of the Germans. What right had we to protest in an affair which did not concern us until we were asked by the North German government to be their mouthpiece which they have never done. He grew angry when I told him of open violations of the neutrahty laws by his consul in New York, and refused at first to take any warning. And he had several times pressed similar questions upon me in a way that has obliged me to be almost harsh with the old gentleman. What he has done to Mr. Fish I cannot say. In spite of all this, we have always construed, and without giving France cause of offense, that the sympathies of the Administration are with Germany. I think I may safely say that the whole country is satisfied with the course Mr. Fish has pursued in this matter. As to intervention on our part, I do not think that it will take place without the previous consent of both parties nor will it take place then by any prospect if it is to be done jointly with other powers." I don't see

—

—

2

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

16

of the

He

American people and the administration toward Germany. was a deep-seated feeling throughout the

stated that there

country in favor of the Germans until they sought to prolong the war, in order to acquire territory inhabitated by a people who did not wish to come under their rule/^ after the American public had received the impression that this was being done, there was less sympathy for Gerhiany, and " an attempt by the administration to

any way" in favor of the Germans or "to swerve from neutrality would have been resented by the good sense

interfere in

a rigid

America."

of

Mr. Davis

set forth the difficulties

in maintaining that rigid neutrality.

Minister, he wrote, spared no effort

have the Government protest against the

positions, seeking to

German

expulsion of

decree

may

encountered

Baron Gerolt, the German to entrap him into improper

civihans from France.

have been harsh and uncalled

While that expulsion

for, it

seemed to him to

be a military measure within the discretion of the French military authorities.

Moreover, he had had to complain to the German

minister of the open violation of the American neutrality law

the

German

officers to

consul in

New

by

York, who had been assisting German

return to the army."

In spite of such actions he had

C. B. Davis Journal, August 29, 1870.

12

J.

"

Baron Gerolt said he had

called in consequence of information received through the Associated Press that England, Russia and Austria intended intervening in the war to make peace, to ask what would be the public feeling in the country in regard to such an intervention that those powers naturally looked with jealousy on the increase of German influence and power and would oppose an increase of territory. He added that he was induced to make the request because I had told him at my house that the people of this country would not look favorably on the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine. I replied that what I had said to him I had said privately as one gentleman to another in my own house; and that I had no objection to repeat in the

—

same way that it was my individual opinion that the demand of territory would prolong the war and in that way would not be favorably regarded by the people of the United States but that officially I had only to say to him that while the United States do not permit European intervention in the affairs of their continent, they did not on the other hand intervene in European

—

affairs."

"

J.

C. B. Davis Mss., 1870-71.

August 1, 1870. at once to my note. I told him that I had taken call at the Department because I had seen in the newspapers and heard otherwise that Mr. Roessing, the North German "

The Baron responded the liberty to ask him to

CAREFUL NEUTRALITY OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

17

always construed, " and without giving France cause of offense, that the sympathies of the administration were with Germany."

In reference to intervention, Mr. Davis asserted that such would

hardly take place without the consent of both belligerents, and not at

The

all if it

required joint action with other powers.

claims of the

German

Minister and of Bancroft that the

United States should issue a protest against the expulsion

German

civilians

of

from France were based on the function, which

had been assumed by the American Governmeiat, of acting as protector in France of all citizens of the North German Union." This immense work was in the hands of Mr. E. B. Washburne, United States Ambassador to Paris.

In addition to other services,

he distributed among needy Germans the funds forwarded to him Consul at New York, was receiving persons at the consulate and furnishing them with the means of returning to Germany to take part in the war, and that I thought it due to the Baron as a friendly act, to say that if that was so he had better be cautioned, as this Government intended to preserve and enforce its neutrality in this contest. The Baron answered quite testily", that Mr. Roessing had done nothing to violate our laws that over 600 people had applied to him for means to go back, but that he had refused all except persons who had left Germany under written obligations to return in case of war and serve out their term in the army that there were a dozen or sixteen of such persons to whom he had loaned money to pay their expenses back to enable them to go into the army that such persons were not citizens that we had no claim upon them that they were bound of the United States to go back that they were now in the Prussian army that if they did not go back they would be deserters^— that Mr. Roessing in assisting them did not violate the law that in what he had done he had acted with the sanction of the Baron and that they would return individually and not in squads. I got the statute and pointed out to the Baron that it was an offense to assist (?) a person within the jurisdiction of the United States to go beyond their limits with intent to enter in the service of a foreign prince, as a soldier, marine or seaman, and I told him that I was afraid that Mr. Roessing would be held by our courts to have already violated that law, and I thought it but a The Baron replied that it could not be so. friendly act to caution him. Mr. Roessing had violated no law of the United States no court would hold so and proceedings could be commenced against him to test it if we thought he had done wrong. Seeing the temper he was in I contented myself with saying that I had given him notice and he must exercise his own judgment ." as to what he would do.

—

—

—

—

—

—

— —

—

—

—

.

.

"Bancroft Mss. No. 121 (to Secretary of State Fish). Mr. Bancroft wrote that England having taken over the protection of the French in Germany would have gladly undertaken to help matters, even the protection of Germans in France. Bismarck, however, "refused to allow this and by turning over the office to our government, called the United States visibly into the circle of

first class

powers."

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

18

by the Prussian Government. Mr. Washburne at one time wrote to Bismarck that he was giving assistance to twenty-nine hundred Germans." His efficient services in this capacity, while satisfactory to France, won the praise of Bismarck and the German Emperor^" and contributed effectively to the good feeling in Germany toward the United States. At the time of the French order of expulsion of the North Germans from France, Mr. Washburne, acting under private instructions from the State Depart-

ment, presented to the

Duke of Gramont an

appeal," " in the

"Hepner, Adolf: "America's Aid to Germany in 1870-71," No. Mr. Washburne to Count Bismarck, Paris, March 3, 1871. "'Ibid., No. 154, Prince Bismarck to Mr. Washburne:

name

123.

Berlin, June 13, 1871. "His Majesty has commanded me to convey to your Excellency his grateful recognition of the zeal and kindness you have devoted to the interests of the German residents under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, and with corresponding sacrifice of time and personal comfort. I beg to add the reiterated expression of the sense of obligation I shall ever preserve for the uniform promptness and courtesy I have experienced from you in a business connection of nearly a twelvemonth's duration. With sentiments of the highest consideration, I have the honor to be .

.

.

Your

Excellency's obedient servant

Bismarck. Also Bancroft Mss. No. 126, Bancroft to Fish, Berlin, August 22, 1870. Also Congr. Globe, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part III, p. 2456.

Cameron

(of

Pennsylvania), April

16, 1872.

"I ask leave to introduce a joint resolution, and in introducing it, I desire to say a single word. The Emperor of Germany, wishing to manifest his gratitude to ministers and consuls of the United States in France, is desirous of paying them some substantial compliment, but that cannot be done without the permission of Congress. I, therefore, offer a joint resolution on the subject for the purpose of having it referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

There being no objection, leave was granted to introduce a joint resolution R., No. 6) permitting certain diplomatic and consular officials of the United States in France to accept testimonials from the Emperor of Germany for their friendly services to the subjects of the. Emperor during the war between France and Germany; which was read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed." (S.

" For Washburne's protest to Gramont against Expulsion Order of North Germans from France see Correspondence of E. B. Washburne, FrancoGerman War and Insurrection of the Commune. Washington Gov. Print. Office, 1878, No. 44. Washburne to Fish, August 22, 1870, pp. 40 ff. "I said (to Gramont) further that in carrying out the wishes and instructions of Government, I wished in the name of humanity to make an

my

REMONSTRANCE AGAINST EXPULSION OF GERMANS

19

humanity," to revoke the order, or if that were not possible to so modify it as to permit the larger class of Germans in Paris to of

remain, whose conduct could give no possible cause of complaint to the French Government."

Secretary of State Fish directed'^

Assistant Secretary Davis to instruct

Mr. Washburne to do what

he could consistently with public law and with the United States' position as a neutral to mitigate the severity of the recent French

Mr. Fish

order.

considers that, the measure being within the

recognized rights of a belligerent, the United States could not

"protest" but might "remonstrate" and "use good offices." Mr. Davis informed Baron Gerolt of Mr. Washburne's remonstrance

and the German Minister wished to have the action States

made

of the

United

This, however, the Secretary, in the interests

public.

of neutrality, refused to do."

earnest appeal to the French Government, through him, to revoke the order if it should be considered possible; and if that could not be done to so modify it as to permit the large class of Germans in Paris to remain whose conduct could give no possible cause for complaint to the French Government."

Formal note August

17, 1870,

Enclosure 2 m. No. 44,

p. 46.

"Under

these circumstances therefore, I feel that I should fail to discharge the full measure of the duty devolving upon me in this regard, and that I should be forgetful of the obUgations of humanity did I not make the strongest appeal to the government of his Majesty, through your Excellency, to further consider this question and to ask that if it be not possible to suspend action altogether, that there may be at least some modification of the measures already taken so as to permit such subjects of the belligerent powers as are under my protection, who are now in France, to remain in the country so long as their conduct shall give no cause of complaint, and further to ask for them that protection which the law of nations accords to unarmed enemies. In making this appeal I but obey the wishes of my Government, which has instructed me to do everything which is consistent with the position of my country as a neutral, and with the law of nations to alleviate the condition of things now existing as regards these people with whose protection I have been charged." .

I'J. C. B. Davis Mss. Hamilton Fish to Davis, Garrisons, Tuesday morning, August 16, 1870. " Upon the Baron's insisting, Assistant Secretary Davis informed him that he could not permit any foreign minister to advise the department as to

and that it was for the United States Governwould or would not make pubhc its acts. C. B. Davis Journal, August 13, 1870.

the arrangement of

ment J.

its affairs

to decide whether

it

.

.

.

morning a telegram from Washburne that Germans were that many were poor, without means to go that great suffering might result and that he wished to know if the Prussian Govern"Received

this

ordered to quit France

—

—

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

20

\^ \

A factor holding

adverse to the friendly relationship between the United States and Germany at this time was the sale possibilities

place means at his control to pay for their passage. Sent at once a copy to Mr. Bancroft and to Baron Gerolt. The Baron called to know what we intended to do. I answered that we had communicated the information to Bancroft, and that it was for the Prussian Government, not He said, "Will you not instruct for us, to now decide what should be done.

ment would

Mr. Washburne to "protest against this? It is an act of cruelty the hke of which has not been perpetrated for over three hundred years. There are over two hundred thousand Germans in Paris, most of them poor operatives, and the suffering will be incredible. This must be the act of a mob. It cannpt be the act of the French Government." I answered that Mr. Washburne had already protested that three weeks ago the Due de Gralnont had given notice that it might become necessary to take such a step and that Mr. Washburne had written a long and able paper trying to prevent it, and that his course meets with the approbation of the department. I added they have the right to do this, cruel as it may be, and having decided to do it, after full representations from this government of reasons why it should not be done, it is for Prussia to decide whether she will or will not provide the means for moving these unfortunate men. He said the thing was. cruel and wrong, and that at least the department ought to make pubHc what had been done. I answered that it was for this government to judge whether it would or would not make public its acts, that in case it seemed to me proper that we should not pubKsh what we had done whatever were our individual sympathies, whether with France or Germany, we intended to maintain a strict neutrality and would do no act which could be construed by either party as done in the interest of the other. He showing a purpose to continue the discussion, I said I would not permit any foreign minister to advise us as to the management of the internal affairs of this department."

—

—

The whole State Department seems to have had its trials with the German Baron Gerolt, who apparently was retained because of having been

minister.

Mr. Bancroft wrote that at the least suggestion from the Department the German Chancellor would recall him. See J. C. B. Davis Mss. Bancroft to Davis, October 12, 1870. so long in the service.

"As to the planner and matter of Gerolt, he would be disavowed here. have privately requested a friend of his to give him a warning, but he is too weak and too dull to be teachable; were I to speak to the government, Bismarck, who cannot endure his imbecility, would insist immediately on his recall. So a word, a half word, or a whisper, and the good old man will be left with leisure to prepare for a better world. I would get him reproved, but Bismarck would mark the sincerity of the reproof by removing him. Perhaps this had better be done. With France represented by an able man like Berthemy or Paradet, Germany should no longer be represented by a broken down old man who in his best years was not the wisest of mankind." I

J

.

C. B. Davis Mss.

Hamilton Fish to Davis, Washington, October

Thursday— "Dip.

13, 1870.

day." I am in momentary apprehension of the apparition of Gerolt with his pocket full of papers covered with German text uncertain which is the paper he wishes to let off at me, and when he has made several mistaken selections and has appealed to me to know wliat it was he came to say, the good little old man at last may remember that he has been instructed to bring to my notice the shipment in French steamers of guns packed 'in original cases' having the name of the U. S., etc., etc. In

"This

—

is

—

SALE OF MUNITIONS TO FRANCE

American munitions to France.

of

It

21

was recognized that

this

was

within the right of private firmSj^" but the question of neutrality

when such arms were found to bear the mark of United arsenals. The protests came from the citizens and senators of German sympathies within the United States rather than from German official sources. Mr. Bancroft wrote that he had seen no evidence of dissatisfaction in Germany against was

raised

States

Government

the actions of the United States in this matter and that the

German Government was fectly fulfilled his

War

duty as a

satisfied that the President

neutral. ^^

had per-

Since the close of the Civil

the United States Government had been selling wherever

could the oversupply of munitions

left

on

its

hands,^^

and

it

after

I remind him of the late proclamation for which he professed so gratitude, in vain will I tell him that France thinks the Proclamation of the 8' Aout unkind that Berthemy has told me it would 'cause great regret in France in vain will I tell him that during our Civil War Germany All in vain the Fable of the Justice sold arms to us and also to the Rebels. and the Farmer one's bull goring the other's ox ^was made to illustrate the relative position of Belligerents and Neutrals. It cati't be helped. I I have already listened to Berthemy. shall have to listen to Gerolt.

vain will

much

— —

—

'

——

this last sentence Gerolt is announced. I go to it, invoking the patience of which I am capable and hoping for the particular inspiration of a little more. "Tis done the long agony is o'er." He had nothing to say except that he "goes this afternoon to Baltimore to see his Banker" the only significance I can see in this important communication is in connection with a cheque which Gerolt passed through the Department to. the Secretary of War yesterday for one hundred and three 27 dollars [$103.27] to procure the release of a soldier. What may not France say to Germany for obtaining a soldier in the uniform of the United States 'in original cases.' By the time you return we shall have a nice batch of intricate questions

While writing

all

—

shall I keep 2"

J.

them

—

in 'the original cases?'

C. B. Davis Mss.

"

Bancroft to Davis

(P.S.,

January

23, 1871 or 2).

Our treaties with Frederic the relations are too plain for question. Great, with his successor and with the father of the present king all set forth in the clearest terms the right of Americans to carry contraband of war to a power at war with Prussia all on our side having the sanction successively of Franklin, John Adams, and Jefferson, of John Q. Adams and Henry Clay. In Statutes at Large Treaties, Vol. VIII, page 90, Articles XII, XIII, page I have, therefore, been able 168, Articles XII, XIII, page 384, Article XII. here to preserve myself and you from the slightest charge of unfriendliness though regrets have been expressed as when at Orleans most all the guns taken were Springfield guns."

"Our

—

Also F. R., 1871, p. 374. Bancroft to Fish, No. 160. Bancroft Mss. No. 156. Bancroft to Fish. Berlin, November 2, 1870. 22 Hamilton Fish to Davis. Washington, October 13, J. C. B. Davis Mss. 21

1870.

•

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

22

the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war

it

continued to

sell

these

government-made arms to American munitions firms within its borders. ^When, however, certain of those firms were found to be acting as agents for the French Government, these sales, according to the statement of the Secretary of State, were discon-

own

why

Mr. Davis, that he did not

Nevertheless, he wrote to

tinued.

see

a "manufacturer or dealer in arms three or four thousand

up shop whenever Lew Nap and and go to fisticuffs to settle whether their boundary should be this

miles off should be expected to shut Bill

Hohenzollern take

which

is

the better

off their coats

man

or

or that side of the goose-pond." test

Despite the lack of formal pro-

from Germany, the subject was brought up in the Senate and,

upon a resolution introduced by Senator Sumner of Masschusetts, was placed in the hands of a special committee for investigation. ^^ The committee report cleared the Government^* of any infringement of the laws of neutrality, declaring that Congress having directed the Secretary of nition,

War

to dispose of these stores of

ammu-

they might have been delivered to Frederick William or

Louis Napoleon in person, without violating the obligations of neutrality,

ton

&

Co.,

and the decision not to sell arms to the firm of Reminghad been an unnecessary prudence. The issue of this

report practically closed the controversy on the subject, though

Senator Sumner registered his protest against the report on the

ground that the investigating committee was composed only of '^

953

Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part ff. and pp. 1014 S.

2,

1871-72, pp.

"It was Sumner's allegation that at the time when arms were sold by the Government to Remington it was known that the firm was an agent of the French Government. This was denied by opponents of the measure, who contended that Mr. Sumner and Mr. Schurz were trying to establish a case which if established would authorize Prussia to demand an apology and indemnity for a violation concerning which it had not occurred to that country to protest."

p.

" Senate Report No. 183 "Sales of Ordnance," 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, XII also pp. XVII and XVIII. Conclusion of report.

"Your Committee, duly jealous of the honor of our country and the reputation of the officers of our Government, have great satisfaction in being able, after the most thorough and impartial investigation, to say that there is nothing in these transactions which reflects dishonor upon either."

Bismarck's oriental policy, 1870

The

those opposed altogether to the inquiry.^^ of

23

general subject

munitions sales had received more attention from Congress

than from the diplomatic departments

of

the two countries

involved.

Among many common interests pointed out by Mr. Bancroft between Germany and the United States was an agreement expressed at this time on policy toward the Far East.

The Chinese

mission under Mr. Anson Burlingame^^ received a cordial welcome in

Germany and

the Chancellor marked throughout

sympathy with the Chinese" and

26 Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Pt. Carl Sohurz: "Speeches," etc., vol. V, p. 34 S.

To Edward

its

stay a

a desire to " do his part in saving

2,

1871-72, p. 3325.

L. Pierce.

New

York, November

23, 1889.

"The Senate

constituted the investigating committee for the evident purpose of acquitting. In defiance of well-established customs, those who moved the inquiry were rigidly excluded from membership. On the contrary they were made to appear as accused parties. I was, however, permitted to ask questions. Nevertheless, the investigation clearly estabhshed two things: I. That the rule of neutral duty as laid down by the Administration itself had been glaringly violated, and that the defense of the War Department consisted of the' most transparent subterfuges; and II. That in making these sales the laws governing the sale of arms and ammunition of the Government had been most unceremoniously set aside."

Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner by Edward L. Pierce, vol. IV, pp. 504 to 514. In connection with the debate in the Senate on the subject of munitions sales to France, Senator Schurz answered the charge that it was "unpatriotic to expose a breach of neutrality on the part of the Administration," saying, "The Senator from Wisconsin cannot frighten me by exclaiming, My country, right or wrong!' In one sense I say so too. My country and my country is the great American Republic my country right or wrong; if right, to be kept right, and if wrong to be set right!" a retort which drew applause from '

—

—

the galleries."

Bancroft Mss. No. 65. Bancroft to Fish. Berlin, January 18, 1870. Bancroft Mss. No. 73. Bancroft to Fish. Berlin, March 3, 1870. According to Mr. Bancroft, Mr. Burlingame met with a very different policy on the part of France. 26

2'

" P. S. Secret. In Paris Mr. Burlingame at first met with some obstructions. The French minister was slow to receive the idea that China could lay claim to equal respect. One day de Lavalette talked to him in a very high strain in the interest of the Roman Catholic Church. Claims were even put forward for property belonging to the Catholics centuries ago before they were driven out of the empire and very high words were used and even menaces of war by de Lavalette in regard to the liberty and protection that are now to be

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

24

the Chinese Empire from disintegration. " asserted, further, that he

The American minister Count Bisby side side country his

believe that

had reason to

marck was "particularly pleased to place

with the United States on a question so important not for commerce only, but for the future history of the world. " In regard to the measures to be taken at this time

by the powers

for the pro-

German Government (then the government of the North German Union) instructed its representatives to act in harmony especially with the represenAt the request of the American tatives of the United States. tection of native Christians in Japan,^* the

Government, Count Bismarck during the Franco-Prussian war agreed to sign a truce with France in regard to the naval forces of

In

the two countries operating in Chinese and Japanese waters.^^ general,

Mr. Bancroft wrote to the Secretary

of State"" that

he was

accorded to missionaries in every part of the Chinese empire. The language of the French minister becartie at last so unreasonable and menacing that Mr. Burlingame interrupted him saying, 'I see that I must write to the Chinese Government that they must prepare for war; but if France should really undertake a war against China I assure you it would not be a short or a hght war but a very serious one (far more serious than the affair in Mexico), one of the most difficult and serious in which France was ever engaged.' " =8

Bancroft Mss= No. 99.

Bancroft to Fish.

Berhn, June

9,

1870.

(See

footnote 30.)

" Bancroft Mss. No.

162.

Bancroft to Fish.

Berlin,

November

16, 1870.

"Sir:

Your communication respecting a truce respecting France and Germany and Japanese waters, was forwarded to Headquarters, and I have received from the foreign office the telegraphic answer of Count Bismarck of the 14th of this month in which he declares that the minister of in the Chinese

the marine sees no objection to the concluding of a formal convention as proposed by America for the Japanese and Chinese waters, and I have been requested to communicate to you the assent of this government. I annex to the Despatch a copy of the telegram. I remain, Sir,

Yours

sincerely, (signed) Geo.

,

Bancroft."

Telegram to Count Bismarck from Versailles to the Foreign

November

Office, Berlin,

14, 1877.

"Marine Minister kein Bedenken gegen den von Amerika vorgeschlagenen Abschluss formUcher Convention fuer die japanesisch-chinesischen Gewaesser. Bitte Herrn Bancroft unsere Zustimmung auszusprechen." Bismarck. '»

Bancroft Mss. No. 90.

Bancroft to Fish.

American Legation, Berlin,

May

23, 1870.

Sir:

Your by me

instruction No. 190, was, in substance, immediately communicated to the North German Government. I particularly explained the

PROBLEM OF AMERICAN MEDIATION authorized to state that the

German Government

the same poUey with the United States in

its

25

desired "to hold

dealings with China

and Japan and would always be found ready to develop that policy which the common interest and sense of justice of the two nations

had

initiated."

With the proclamation of the republic in France and its prompt recognition by the United States" there was presented the problem of the

United States' mediation between the two belligerents.

A

request that the United States join the other powers in intervention for the purpose of peace

was presented by the French Minister

of

Foreign Affairs immediately on receiving the news of the United States' recognition of the

new

republic.

The proposal

for joint

action was at once rejected^^ as being contrary to a uniform caution which you desired to exercise in the -Chinese seas and the grounds of it. In reply I have received repeated hearty assurances of the wish of this Government to go hand in hand with the United States in its Eastern Asiatic policy. ." It accepted unconditionally every suggestion made by you. .

Bancroft

Mss No.

99.

.

Bancroft to Fish.

American Legation, Berlin, June

9,

1870.

"Sir:

Today I am able to reply to your No. 192 of April 18, '70, in relation to the systematic persecution of the native Christians by the authorities of Japan. The protocols of the conferences of the representatives of the treaty powers were duly communicated to the cabinet of BerKn. This Government is sincerely disposed to move in concert with the U. S. It has therefore instructed its representatives in Japan to act in harmony with his colleagues, especially with the representative of the U. S. The instructions direct him for the present at least not to employ force and not to make any menace of an intention to employ force, but if by any necessity armed force should be employed by the U. S. and North Germany for any other imperative reason, it might then become not improper to take advantage of the situation to speak with more energy for the protection of the Christians in the Japanese Empire. This Government will be wilKng to issue to its own representatives instructions analogous to yours. I am authorized to add as a general rule this Government desires to hold the same policy with the U. S. in its deaUngs with China and Japan and will always be found ready to develop that policy which the common interest and sense of justice of the two nations have initiated. I remain,, Sir,

Yours

"F. **

J.

R., 1870, pp. Ill, 116

and

sincerely, (signed)

Geo. Bancroft.

117.

C. B. Davis Journal.

Septemder

8,

1870.

President called at 11 o'clock. I told him that Washburne had recognized the new government in Paris and that Favre had expressed profound emotion. I read the dispatch stating that France desired me to join the other powers in efforts for peace. He said that his impressions were against that. I said that mine were, too, and that in no event would I make ." ,a joint effort, to which he assented.

"The

.

.

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

26

Mr. Bancroft was instructed^' to ascertain whether Germany desired to have the good The American minister offices of the United States interposed. advised emphatically against intervention'* in any form, on the ground that it would be rejected by Germany and therefore prove

foreign policy of the United States, but

embarrassing to the American Government and of no benefit to any other. In fuller explanation of his cabled message, Mr. Bancroft set forth in two despatches'^ further reasons

''

why

the

F. R., 1870, p. 193.

No. 142. Mr. Fish to Mr. Bancroft (telegram).

Department of State, September

9,

1870.

"Washburne telegraphs that France requests United States to join other powers in effort for peace. Uniform policy and true interest of United States not to join European powers in iijterfererice in European questions. President If strongly desires to see war arrested and blessings of peace restored. Germany also desires to have good offices of United States interposed, President be glad to contribute all aid in his power to secure restoration of peace between the two great powers now at war, and with whom United States has so many traditions of friendship. Ascertain if North Germany desires such offices, but without making the tender thereof unless assured they will be will

accepted."

Fish. 3*

F. R., 1870, p. 206, No. 160.

Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish

(cable telegram).

Berlin, September 11, 1870. (Received September 11.)

"No

now

for America to intervene. Germany rejects all foreign Every other power holds bacli. America would stand alone and unable to accompKsh anything. Our interest, dignity require us for the

time

interference.

present to stand aloof."

Bancroft. 35

Bancroft Mss. Nos. 132 and 133.

No. 132.

American Legation, Berlin, September 12, 1870. "Nothing can be more easy than to give an answer to your inquiries by telegram. In the first place, no power of Europe has as yet made any effort at mediation or intervention or interference for the restoration of peace between Germany and France; and therefore there are no powers which the United States could join. Secondly, at the time when France meditated the unprovoked declaration of war, neither a European power nor the United States interposed their influence to prevent the war of aggression and conquest. It is therefore the unanimous opinion of Germany, expressed in the most solemn manner by addresses from its considerable cities, that Germany and France should, without foreign interposition, be left to themselves to settle the peace. The German Government have not formally given their adhesion to these addresses, but I have no doubt that they substantially express their poUcy. I give it as my undoubting opinion, that the interposition of the

BANCROFI^'S OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN MEDIATION

27

United States should undertake no action at that time between

When France meditated, said Bancroft, "the unprovoked declaration of war, neither a European power nor the United States had interposed their influence to prevent the the warring powers.

war

of aggression

and conquest."

was therefore the opinion left to themMoreover, if the various European It

throughout Germany that the two nations should be selves to settle the peace.

powers should " combine to exercise a pressure unjustly on either United States as a mediating power would, at the present time prove embarrassing to our own Government and of no benefit to any other."

No.

133.

American Legation, Berlin, September

12, 1870.

"Sir: In further reply to your telegram received on the tenth, it may be said that many reasons exist why the American Government should as yet adhere strictly to its traditional pohoy with regard to foreign alTairs. Should the European powers combine to exercise a pressure unjustly on either of the belligerents the question might arise whether the United States might not properly exercise a counter-influence on the side of right. Even in this contingency there would still be room for doubt. As things stand at present, I think the United States cannot interfere in any manner consistent with its dignity.

We

all as Americans are ready^to welcome the restoration of the republic in France, and to desire for it a chance for free development. I certainly wish to see it estabhshed as the permanent form The strength of our republican sympathies formally expressed by our highest representative in France might in the eyes of many unfit us for the strict impartiaUty of a mediator. great difficulty presents itself at the threshold in the want of a recognized government in France. acknowledge that which has just been constituted at the Hotel de Ville but more than half of Europe has not done so. Germany has not done so. The United States would therefore appear in the attitude of deciding for Europe and for one of the belUgerents the question as to the valid government of France. In about three weeks France has seen three ministers succeed each other. may beheve in the permanence of the present ministry, but a large part of Europe will hardly do so. !

A

We

We

It is uncertain if the people of France would consider themselves bound by a peace which the present government should form. There are many who insist that according to legal forms the regency has not been properly deposed and that the new ministry has not yet received the sanction of a popular vote or a pohtic constituent assembly. To those who reason in that way General Trochu is the only authorized agent of the government. For he had the sanction of the two chambers of the regency and also of the gathering at the Hotel de Ville. Further the United States would be embarrassed in any attempt to suggest The demands of moral support just and proper conditions of peace. on the side of France would necessarily be very exacting, so that the attempt to befriend might end in the deep and permanent dissatisfaction of the party that asked to be befriended. The Germans are bent on the reannexation This is a point on which the United States of Alsace and German Lorraine. Government might prefer not to give advice."

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1S70 whether the United States might not properly exercise a counter-influence on the side of right. "36 There was also the difficulty of determining whether of the belligerents the question

might

arise

the present ministry in France, though recognized

by the United

Furthermore, "the United States would be embarrassed in any attempt to suggest just and proper conditions of peace." The Germans were bent on the "reannexStates,

was a permanent

one.

German Lorraine," and this was a question "on which the United States might prefer not to give advice." From the various reasons set forth by Mr. Bancroft, it is evident that the American Minister did not wish the United States to be a party to any movement that would rob Germany of the fruits of victory.^^ These reasons set forth by Mr. Bancroft were acknowledged shortly afterward by the Secretary of State^^ to be " among ation of Alsace and

»«

J.

Bancroft to Davis.

C. B. Davis Mss.

There

is little difficulty

side of right."

September

5,

1870.

in determining the belligerent referred to

by "the

(See confidential letter to Davis, quoted in footnote 10.)

" Carl Schurz: "Speeches,"

etc., vol. I, p. 519 ff. This viewpoint was also held by Senator Schurz. Letter from Carl Schurz to Hamilton Fi§h, Sec'y of State.

St. Louis, 10, 1870.

Septembbk

me that the President has signified to the Prussian his willingness to serve as a mediator between the belligerents Judging from the tone of the German press and all the indications which float on the surface, there seems to be but httle probability that the offer will be accepted. I glad you disclaimed at the same time any inten"The

telegraph informs

Government

in Europe.

am

tion on the part of the United States to take part in any combination of neutral Powers for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the conffict. From a purely American point of view I think it will be the best pohcy for us to let the denouement of that war take care of itself. As to giving an expression of our moral sympathy with the Republic as such and in France it

—

exists only in name Mr. Washburne has devoted I fear he has created hopes which will be

—

himself to that in his doomed to disappointment; the men who have undertaken to revive the traditions of 1792 an impossible task under existing circumstances—will be apt to catch at straws and then abuse other people for leaving them in the lurch, because the straws are not timbers."

own way.

—

'»F. R., 1870, p. 194, No. 146. Mr. Fish to Mr. Bancroft.

Department of State, jx

Washington, September 24fi

30, 1870.

Your dispatch No. 133, of the 12th instant, has been received the reasons which you present against an American. intervention between 1' ranee and Germany are substantially among the considerations, which "Sik:

SIMILARITY OF

GERMAN AND AMERICAN FEDERATIONS

29

the considerations which determined the President " in the policy of "rejecting all idea of of

mediation unless upon the joint request

both of the warring powers."

A

further important factor creating in the United States a

marked

friendliness

toward the new German Empire was the

prevailing belief that that ation, the

Empire represented

really a confeder-

United States of Germany, and that the German people

were going through a unification process very similar to that of the original American States.

It

was the conviction

of

American

statesmen that the unification of Germany signified the adoption in

Europe

of the

American system

liberal ideas of representative

of federation

government.

and American

The outcome

of the

war was held to have demonstrated the success of a republican form of government and to have therefore influenced

American the

civil

German statesmen

to try a similar form.

Referring to the

North German Union, Mr. Bancroft asked Count Bismarck'^ whether the striking points of resemblance

constitution of the

determined the President in the course and poUoy indicated to you in the cable dispatch from this office on the 9th instant, and in rejecting all idea of mediation unless upon the joint request of both of the warring powers. It continues to be the hope of the President, as it is the interest of the people of this country, that the unhappy war in which France and North Germany are engaged should find an early end. This Government will not express any opinion as to the terms or conditions upon which a peace may or should be established between two governments equally sharing its friendship, but it is hoped that the prolongation of the war may not find its cause either in extreme demands on the one side, or extreme sensitiveness on the other side. So far as you can consistently and without any official interposition of advice or of counsel, it is hoped that you will lose no proper opportunity to indicate the wishes and hopes of the President and of the American, people as above represented, and to contribute what you may to the presentation of such terms of p6ace as befit the greatness and the power which North Germany has manifested, and as shall not be humihating or derogatory to the pride of the great people who were our earliest and fast ally. I am, sir, your obedient servant, Hamilton Fish."

"Bancroft Mss.

(Table conversation with Count Bismarck.)

Thursday, September 26, 1867. "During dinner he was exceedingly courteous directing a word to one and another but talking with me more than the rest. I reminded him of the strong points of resemblance between our constitution and the constitution of the North German Union, and asked him if it was the result of imitation He said 'a little of each.' or that the same necessity led to the same results. The Bundesrath he regarded as in fact a Chamber. It had the power of pro-

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

30

between

it

and the constitution

of the

United States were the

whether "the same necessity led to the same results," and the Count replied, "a little of each."- Later the result of imitation or

American minister

reports*" that in remodelling the constitution

posing laws, amending them and negativing them. The members of it were indeed subject to recall, but then, though they appeared as the representatives of various sovereigns, those sovereigns were restrained by their respective constitutions, representative assembhes and responsible ministries so that there was none of them hkely to send a delegate who should not substantially represent the opinion of the state to which he belonged."

« Bancroft Mss. No.

152.

American Legation, Beklin, October 17, 1870. "Sib:

There

is

much

discussion of the constitution best adapted to United

Germany. For centuries the Enghsh constitution was for continental Europe the model of constitutional freedom; but it is no longer looked to for an example, and the constitution of the United States is now the study of the statesmen who wish to renovate Europe. A federal union is now become the ideal. The opinion prevails that the system of two legislative chambers is better than that of one and that the present Reichsrath of North Germany The want is not sufficiently invested with co-ordinate powers of legislation. is felt of a body Uke our Senate, which should have an organic life as a whole and Ufe in all its parts. The Councillor who last went from the Foreign Office to Headquarters took with him a copy of the Constitution of the United States and a commentary upon it. As the several provinces of Prussia and the states of Germany have their respective Diets, a Senate for Germany might be elected precisely in the same maimer as our Senate is elected. all

In a leading article of the 11th of this month the new Prussian gazette, reputed to be the organ of conservatism, eulsgizes our Senate as the body that harmoniously unites the principle of general union and the principle of the vitaKty of the several states, and in commenting on the forms necessary for Germany it remarks: 'The Senate of the United States of America gives the most striking proof that such a house of states is not a mere monarchical and still less a mere feudal institution, but that it is necessary for every federal union, if that union is also to maintain its federal character.' As yet the members of the Reichsrath will be chosen by the several provincial legislatures, but the principle of election and not of descent is. established and will not be changed. In the present constitution of the North German Union there is no hereditary power whatever recognized except that of its head and I believe that no change in this respect will take place. Suggestions have indeed been made for the estabhshment of a house of princes, but I think that the question has been settled in favor of the example of the United States. Germany will have an elective senate, not an imitation of the British House of Lords. The federation union of all Germany has not as yet been definitely agreed upon; but to iny question the answer from those who know best is that there is good ground for hope. The difficulty at present hes mainly in settling the place of Bavaria in the event of a general union. At the present moment it seems probable that the King of Prussia will not be proclaimed Emperor of Germany; that the present North German Union will be'come more nearly a German union; and that it -nill remain, as it now is, a republic with a permanent hereditary executive. According to our American ideas of repubhcanism, there is more of sohd, substantial, law-respecting, enduring repubhcanism in Germany than in any other state of Europe, not

:

Bancroft's expectations of republicanism in Germany

31

North German Union to suit the needs of United Germany, German statesman were studying the constitution of the United of the

States rather than that of Great Britain, since a federal union

become

German

press as

of general

states."

had

The United States Senate was praised in the "a body that harmoniously united the principle

their ideal.

union and the principle of the vitality of the several In the constitution of the North German Union no

hereditary power was recognized except that of

its

head, and Mr.

Bancroft believed no change would' take place in that respect in the enlargement of the union. At that time (October, 1870) it

seemed to him probable that the King proclaimed Emperor of

Germany but

remain, as he then considered hereditary executive.

it,

of Prussia

would not be

that the country would

a republic with a permanent

In summing up the

American minister wrote to the Secretary

political situation the

of State

"According; to our American ideas of republicanism there is of solid, substantial, law-respecting, enduring republicanism in Germany than in any other state of Europe, not excepting England, and it proceeds in part from the character of the German mind, in part from the very great number of little republics with

more

which Germany was crowded through many hundred years, till the close of the last century and even in the beginning of the present. This has had an influence on laws, language and precedents which facilitate the general transformation of Germany into a popular, federal union."

The final change of name for the "Chief of the United States of Germany " from that of President to that of Emperor was made, according to Bancroft, *i at the request of Bavaria. The title of Kaiser, he asserted,

many having

was not

renounced

especially in favor, regenerated Ger-

all affinities

with the

Roman empire

of the

excepting England, and it proceeds in part from the character of the Gerrnan mind, in part from the very great number of little republics with which Germany was crowded through many hundred years till the close of the This has had an last century and even in the beginning of the present. influence on laws, language and precedents, which facilitates the general transformation of Germany into a popular, federal union." ^'

Bancroft Mss. No. 165. 3

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANTT, 1870

32

middle ages.

In general the American minister expected to see tor liberal govern-

United Germany the establishment of the "most

ment

in

Europe."

In one sense he considered

America," since but

for the success of the

it

the "child oi

Union cause

in the

American civil M^ar it would not have been established. That success "sowed the seeds of regeneration of Europe," of which the New Germany was a product.

New Germany stood for liberal

This opinion that the

Senator Schurz,

government was not held by Bancroft alone.

of

tendencies

himself a fugitive from Prussian rule in 1849, predicted*^ ^t this

form

time that in spite of the monarchical

Germany

steadily progressive. "

This new

together would have to

make

and the two nations would

government

Germany and

the United States

the international law of the world

find their interests to agree

on

all

President Grant himself emphasizted the simi-

essential points. larities

of

would turn out to be "the most progressive power,

between the two unions, the American and the German.

In a special message to Congress*' in February, 1871, in w)iich he_ «2

Carl Schurz: "Speeches,"

etc.,

Vol.

I, p.

519

ff.

Letter from Carl Schurz to Hamilton Fish, Sec'y of State. St. Louis,

September

10, 1870.

It

One thing is settled now. Germany is destined to be the great power of Europe, and it will be a very substantial one. There are no humbugs and shams about it. It is all solid and real from top to bottom. And in spite of its monarchical form of government, it will also turn out to be the most progressive power, steadily progressive. And this Germany and the United States together will have to make the international law of the world. I expressed that opinion long before Sadowa, and now it must be apparent to everyone who knows the two countries. They will find their interests to agree in all essential points, and before long they will, without pre-concert, meet in the pursuit of common objects, especially as far as the regulation of the trade of the world is concerned. We ought to keep tliis prospect in view in all our diplomatic doings."

« House Misc. Doc. 210, Part 7, 53rd Congress, 2nd and Papers of the Presidents." (Richardson), p. 120 f.

Session.

"Messages

Executive Mansion, February 7, 1871. r, the Senate and House of Representatives: The union of the States of Germany into a form of government similar many respects to that of the American Union is an event that cannot fail to touch deeply the sympathies of the people of the United States. This umon has been brought about by the long-continued, persistent

«mio

m

,

,

—

grant's views on the unification of GERMANY

33

recommended that the American representatives at Berlin be placed on the same footing with the American representatives in London and Paris, he took occasion to sum up the many common interests of the two countries. The American people, he declared, saw in the union of Germany an attempt to reproduce in Europe some of the best features of the American constitution. The local governments

of the several states

were preserved while the power

conferred on the chief would impart strength for purposes of efforts of the people,

self-

with the deliberate approval of the governments and German States, through their regularly constituted

people of twenty-four of the representatives.

In it the American people see an attempt to reproduce in Europe some of the best features of our own Constitution, with such modifications as the history and condition of Germany seem to require. The local governments of the several members of the union are preserved, while the power conferred upon the chief imparts strength for the purposes of self-defense, without authority to enter upon wars of conquest and ambition. The cherished aspiration for national unity which for ages has inspired the many milhons of people speaking the same language, inhabiting a contiguous and compact territory, but unnaturally separated and divided by dynastic jealousies and the ambition of short-sighted rulers, has been attained, and Germany now contains a population of about 34,000,000, united, like our own, under one Government for its relations with other powers, but retaining in its several members the right and power of control of their local interests, habits, and institutions. The bringing of great masses of thoughtful and free people under a single

government must tend to make governments what alone they should be the representatives of the will and the organization of the power of the people. The adoption in Europe of the American system of union under the control and direction of a free people, educated to self-restraint, cannot fail to e.xtend popular institutions and to enlarge the peaceful influence of American ideas. The relations of the United States with Germany are intimate and cordial. The commercial intercourse between the two countries is extensive and is increasing from year to year; and the large number of citizens and residents in the United States of German extraction and the continued flow of emigration thence to this country have produced an intimacy of personal and political intercourse approaching, if not equal to, that with the country from which the founders of our Government derived their origin. The extent of these interests and the greatness of the German Union seem to require that in the classification of the representatives of this Government to foreign powers there should be no longer an apparent under-valuation of the importance of the German mission, such as is made in the difference between the compensation allowed by law to the minister to Germany and those to Great Britain and France. There would seem to be a great propriety in placing the representative of this Government at Berhn on the same footing with that of its representatives at London and Paris. The union of the several States of Germany under one government and the increasing commercial and personal intercourse between the two countries will also add to the labors and the responsibilities of the legation. I therefore recommend that the salaries of the minister and of the secretary of legation at Berlin be respectively increased to the same amounts as are allowed to those at London and Paris. U.

S.

Grant."

RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870

34

defense without authority to enter upon wars of conquest and

ambition.

The

unification of great masses of thoughtful

people under a single government must tend to

and

free

make that govern-

and the organizer of the power of the people. The result of the adoption in Europe of the American system of federation must be "to extend popular institutions and to enlarge the peaceful influence of American ideas." The

ment the

representative of the will

between the United States and Germany were "intimate and cordial" and the commerce between the two countries "extenIt was therefore very fitting that the sive and increasing." mission to Germany should be placed on an equality with the relations

missions to England and France.

In the

final

summing up

of the

important

ties

between the two

countries the American Minister wrote to the Secretary of State**

that

if

the United States needed the "trusty good-will of any

government

in

Europe

" Bancroft (Howe)

to

it

could have that best with Germany,

Hamilton Fish. Berlin, October

18, 1870.

Count Bismarclc's words to me were: 'I clearly understand why your government should choose to be neutral;' at the same ".

.

.

As

to this war,

time he has always desired to cultivate particularly friendly political relaOur foreign political interests tions between Germany and the United States. almost always run parallel with those of Germany and are often in direct conBismarck and the king were true to our union flict with those of France. during our civil war, when France took sides against us. Germany respected the independence of Mexico; the French supported the Austrian adventurer. The United States were the first power to speak for the security of private property at sea in time of war; Germany is the only power which as yet fully adopts the American idea. Germany desires to follow the East Asiatic poUcy of the United States; France, whose commerce with China is but one per cent, of the whole, intrigues for power through the monstrous demands of its Jesuit missionaries. Germany, like America, is adverse to ultramontane usurpations; it was the French RepubUc which destroyed the Roman repubUc and garrisoned the Papal dominions. Germany adopts from us the federative system; France, whether empire, monarchy, or republic, adheres to the system of centralization. Germany leaves Spain to choose her own government and regulate her own affairs; and for 160 years France has steadily endeavored to subordinate Spanish interests and pohcy to her own. The relations of Germany and formerly of Prussia to England are much the same as ours; and they have been so for a hundred years. And Bismarck loves to give the United States prominence in the eyes of Europe as a balance to Great Britain. If we need the solid, trusty good-will of any government in Europe, we can have it best with Germany; because German institutions and ours most nearly resemble each other; and because so many millions of Germans have become our countrymen. This war will leave Germany the most powerful state in Europe, and the most free; its friendship is, therefore, most important to us and has its foundations in history and in nature."

FACTORS CREATING COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS because

German

American

and American most nearly resembled

institutions

each other and because so

many

Germans had become Germany the most Europe and the most free. Its friendship was

citizens.

powerful state in

35

millions of

The war would

leave

most important to the United States. " This feeling of community of interests was to no small degree reciprocated by Bismarck, who was fond of giving the United States prominence

therefore

in the eyes of

Europe as a balance to Great

referred on

many

since they

were

Britain,

and who

occasions to the good relations existing unbroken

first

inaugurated by Frederick the Great.**

An

event reinforcing the relationship thus outlined was the decision

rendered by Emperor William I in 1872, who, as arbitrator between

Great Britain and the United States on the question of the Northwest boundary, rendered his verdict according to the American

The emperor decreed that the boundary line should be drawn through the Haro Channel. This confirmed to the United States its claim to San Juan and the archipelago of islands lying between the continent and Vancouver Island, a claim which had been contested by Great Britain for more than twenty-six years. claims.*^

« Bancroft (Howe), p. 223 To EKhu B. Washburn.

f.

.

Berlin, March > « V. R., 1879, Anl. Vol. VI, Nr. 239. Denkschrift, p. xiii. « House Ex. Doc. No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 85; also Thurston Report, A. & P., 1889 (C-5629), p. 72 (especially p. 168).

« V.

R., 1879, Anl. Vol. VI, Nr. 239.

" V.

R., 1879, Anl. Vol. VI, Nr. 239.

" Ibid., " Ibid.,

p.

Denkschrift, p. xiii. Denkschrift, p. xvii.

67 (see Appendix).

pp. 121 and 122; also pp. 137

and

138.

BRITISH

AND GERMAN MEASURES TO SECURE TREATIES

129

sent to both the American and British Consuls of the reason for the action and declaration was made that there would be no interference with private property

and foreign

interests

and that

for the sake of avoiding such interference the harbor of

Apia had

not been included in these measures.

Preceding this event there had been considerable friction between the foreign consqls on the islands, especially between the American and German representatives. At the request of the British consul, Sir Arthur Gordon, the

German consul, Mr. Weber, had agreed to unite with him in seeking to conclude with the Samoan Government, a convention^" which should obtain from the Taimua certain concessions with regard to the local government of the town of Apia. The concessions planned by the converition were considered by the British consul to be in the interest of all the

On

foreign residents in the islands. action, the

American consul, Mr.

being requested to join in this

Griffin,

had

refused, stating that

he had been instructed by his Government "not to take part with the representatives of other nations nor to interfere in any

the governmental affairs of Samoa. "*^

way with

This seems somewhat at

variance with the instructions which Secretary Evarts declared to the Griffin

German on

representative at Washington he

his return to Samoa,°^

colleagues in

any undertakings making

peace and order in the islands.

had given to

namely, that he should

It

is

assist his

for the establishment of

quite possible, however, that

the American consul did not consider the convention as an undertaking making for peace and order. of non-interference

In his assertion, of the policy

with the native Samoan Government, he was

correctly carrying out the United States' oft-expressed policy.

The

met with delay and refusal in the proSamoan Government, presented it certain respects to the Taimua with the

British consul having

jected convention with the

once more modified in

threat that within twenty-four hours force would be used to

exact such guarantees as might be considered necessary .^^

upon the Samoan Government appealed

There-

to the United States

™

Ibid., p. 89.

"

Ibid., p. 92.

52

Ibid., p. 57, also p. 113.

*'

Ibid., p. 110.

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

130

Consul and Mr. GrifEn hoisted the American

Upon

Samoan Government.

that of the

flag at

the

MuHnuu

German

over

consul's

request for an explanation, he stated^* that he had taken that action

Governments both

to protect the

Samoa from

the United States and of

further indignities at the hands of the British repre-

sentatives, that Sir

people of

of

Samoa a

fication for his act.

not to interfere in

Arthur Gordon's attempt to force upon the

them was sufRcient justihe had been instructed the governmental affairs of Samoa, he had not treaty obnoxious to

He added

that, while

been instructed to refuse to take the islands under the protection of the United States under such conditions as

now

prevailed,

and that

the American flag was raised at the unanimous request of the '{

Taimua and Faipule (upper and lower houses Government).

of the native

Samoan

This action, though technically contradictory to

I

j

the consul's instructions and disavowed by the American Govern-

ment, was in general

character

consonant with the American

I

policy of prevention of encroachments

Such was the

state of affairs

upon the

when

the

rights of the natives.

German Consul

seized

the ports of Saluafata and Falealii for the purpose of claiming

most-favored-nation treatment as guaranteed by 1877.

The American Consul

its

agreement

of

Griffin protested against the seizure

of the ports as

without justification and as contrary to inter-

national usage.^5

The German agreement Mdth

the chiefs, on which

the seizure was based GrifEn declared to have been "only a tem-

porary matter

made during

the time of war for the protection of

The British acting consul, Robert Swanston, took a different stand requesting to be provided with a copy of the agreement" and afterward testifying to its" validity as foreign property in Samoa."*"

an instrument.

In several instances at this time

it is

noticeable

's 104 and 107. j^id., p. 124. nothing in the agreement to indicate its temporary character and the conditions of signing seem to have been formal and regular (Ibid, Yet it is strange that it seemed to be unfamiliar a year later both p. 136). to the British Acting Consul in Samoa (Ibid., p. 125) and to Lord Salisbury

^'

Ibid., pp.

"^

There

is

himself (Ibid., p. 136), each having requested to be furnished with a copy

the agreement.

"

Ibid., pp.

125 and 133, also

p. 87.

-of

COOPERATION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANS that the British and

German

131

policies coincided in regard to their

procedure in the protection of their interests in the islands.^* Especially in the

Samoa was

German

efforts to obtain

a commercial treaty with

the British support evident, Lord Salisbury instructing

the British consul to lend his whole influence to the support ("mit

German efforts The German consul was

seinem ganzen Einfluss zu unterstuetzen ") of the conclude a treaty with Samoa.^''

to

instructed

reciprocally

to

assist

the

British

obtain a similar treaty for Great Britain.

been

little

compunction on the part

representative

to

There seems to have

of either of the

two nations

against using force against the natives to obtain the conventions desired.

Meanwhile the Samoan ambassador Le Mamea had returned him the eagerly sought treaty with

to the islands bearing with

He was brought back to Samoa on the U. S. S. "Adams" and was accompanied by a special commissioner from the United States, Mr. Gustavus Goward,"" who attended the the United States.

ceremonies of the ratification of the treaty by the Taimua and Faipule, addressed the assembled chiefs, and later superintended

the transfer of the harbor of Pago-Pago to the United States

according to the provisions of the treaty. transfer,

he erected the American

flag

As evidence

of

the

on Goat Island commanding

the harbor. *8

Ibid., p. 89.

Sir

Arthur Gordon to His Imperial German Majesty's Consul

for

Samoa.

Apia, 16th February, 1878.

"Not only does it appear to me that the interest of all foreign residents Samoa are, in substance identical, but I am aware that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty are entirely in accord as to the poUcy to be pursued

in

Whatever, therefore, be your decision as to have the satisfaction of knowing that in any case

with regard to those interests. this request, I shall at least

we have the same

object in view." (See also Ibid., p. 93 (Anl. D), p. 112, No. 25, p. 87).

5'

Ibid., p. 142.

For Mr. Coward's report on his mission to Samoa see Senate Executive Documents No. 2, 46th Congress, 1st Session. A resolution calling for the report was adopted by the Senate, March 3rd, 1879, the Senate immediately ^^

thereafter

entered

into

Executive

Session.

Congress, 3rd Session, 1878-1879, p. 487.)

(See

Senate

Journal,

46th

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

132

Mr. Goward

.was

enthusiastically

whose delight over the treaty seems taneous.^^

it

by the Samoans,

have been quite spon-

first

nation to conclude a treaty with Samoa,

thereby recognized to be an independent nation.

drew attention the

to

In return he set forth to them the good-will of the

United States, the

which

received

to the fact that the treaty

had been

H,e

ratified

by

Samoan Government, free from influence or force on the part

of the

United States.

stipulated

In case of trouble the United States

by the treaty

—stood

ready to extend

its

good

—as

offices,

Samoa having

the honor to be the first place so far distant which had induced the United States to so extend its active influence. The Samoans were apparently entirely satisfied with the treaty and seemed to consider that Le Mamea had gained for them what they had sought."^ Mr. Griffin announced to them that they now «i

Sen. Ex. Doc. No.

^2

Goward Report, No.

(Sen. Ex. Doc.

"On

No.

2,

46th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. 1. "The Reception of the Treaty with Samoa." 46th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3.) 2,

receiving the ratified treaty, I replied as follows:

"'Great is the love which America bears to Samoa strengthened by your action this day in the ratification of the treaty I hold in my hand. The first instrument of the kind in your history, it is a living testimony of the love and high respect in which you hold the guardian of your choice. Of America's vast extent of country, power, wealth, resources, and population your late ambassador, Mamea, will tell you. After many years of petition, at last America, in her faith in the brotherhood of mankind, has heard yoiir pathetic appeals, and seven thousand miles away has stretched forth her powerful hand to your aid. She recognizes your assembled rulers and chiefs, the Taimua, and Faipule, as the Samoan Government, and Samoa itself as an independent nation among other nations of the earth such as England, Germany, and' France, entitled with them to the courtesies and rights known to international law. Other people like yourselves, struggling for independence and national position, have in vain sought for her powerful aid and recognition. You have the honor to be the first to induce her to extend her good offices and active infiuence to islands so far distant. She does this in the hope that the faith she has in you has not been misplaced, and that you prove yourselves as worthy of confidence in the future as today you make manifest. By such treaties nations with each other bind more closely the ties of friendship and increase their commercial intercourse. So it will be in this case, creating public prosperity and advancing your progress. The voluntary readiness and unanimity with which you have ratified this treaty, free from influence or force on our part, will be a most pleasing duty for me to report to the United States Government. For the welcome and expressions of gratitude to which you have given utterance, be pleased to accept thanks.' "Consul Griffin remarked, in closing the interview, that they now had what they had asked for, and that everything had come to pass as he had foretold them; they could always rely on the American Government as sure to keep its promise and as bearing good will towards them."

RECEPTION OF AMERICAN TREATY

133

had what they had wished for, which was misleading in view of the fact that they had asked for annexation. Just what their understanding was of their relationship to the United States through the treaty

German ConsuF

not clear but

is

it

was at

least feared

American protection, although the treaty did not provide a status.

The

by the

that they considered themselves to be under

fear as to just

United States might

affect

how

the

for such

Samoan enthusiasm

for the

commercial interests of Germany and

Great Britain in the islands expressed

itself

in

an attitude

of

coolness on the part of the

the

German and British Consuls toward American commissioner. They absented themselves from the

celebrations in honor of the treaty and the criticisms of their press

were adverse.

Mr. Goward expressed satisfaction that he had been able to secure prompt ratification of the treaty by the Samoan Government, thus preventing active interference by other foreign officials.'^*

ard's

From

the \aewpoint of the

attitude seemed

interests.

In an

(erledigt); that Article

CowGerman Herr Weber

Consul, Mr.

unfriendly to

Mr. Goward had told German agreement of 1877 to be terminated IV {i. e., granting to Germany most-favored-

interview''^

that he considered the

" V.

German

high-handed and

R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 88.

Der Kaiserliche Konsul an das Auswaertige Amt. "Heute kam mir seine (Mr. Maudslay, British Consular Superintendent) Korrespondenz mit Herrn Griffin zu Gesioht, woraus hervorgeht, dass die Taimua sieh unter amerikanischen Sohutz stellen und anscheinend nur duroh Vermittelung des Mr. Griffin mit dem englischen Vertreter verhandeln wollten indem Herr Griffin auf Grund des abgesohlossenen Traktats das Recht der Intervention, beanspruoht und den englischen Vertretern quasi das Recht abspricht, direkt mit den samoanischen Autoritaeten zu verhandeln, beziehungsweise Repreasalien anzuwenden. Der englisohe Vertreter wird selbstredend heirvon keine Notiz nehmen. Es wuerde fuer alle Besitzenden auf Samoa hoechst unheilvoU sein wenn der Traktat Amerikas eine seiche Interpretation zulassen und dieselbe von anderen Staaten anerkannt werden soUte.

Aus den bisher bekannt gewordenen Inhalt jenes Traktats ist solches indess nicht herauszulesen, und waere ja ein solcher Anspruch auch nioht denkbar, wenn die Amerikanisohe Regierung nicht ausdruecklich eine Pro(gez.) Th. Weber. tektorat ueber Samoa erwirbt." " Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess., « V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 115.

p. 10.

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

134

nation privileges in Samoa) could only be considered as polite phraseology; it was not at all necessary for Samoa to conclude

with the other nations represented there.

treaties

The German

Consul replied that the German inhabitants of the island had earned for themselves the right to a voice in the affairs of the Samoan Islands and that, while they never claimed anything

which could be considered to be a restriction of the treaty rights of other nations, nevertheless, equahty of treatment in Samoa had

become Germany's unquestioned right. After inquiring into the conditions of the treaty which the Germans proposed to conclude with Samoa, Mr. Goward offered to act as intermediary.

This

Herr Weber promptly refused as incompatible with the dignity

German

the Imperial Government and of the status of

of

interests

Meanwhile the German warships continued to hold the harbors of Saluafata and Falealii until the German

in the islands.

possession of

treaty could be consimamated.

The

actions of the

American Consul and

of

Mr. Goward were

only examples of that overzealousness on the part of local (of

officials

each of the three nations) which became a typical cause of

The hoisting Mulinuu by Mr.

international troubles in Samoa."*^ flag over the

Samoan

flag at

of the

American

was disMr. Griffin

Griffin

avowed by the Government of the United States. himself was transferred to the Fiji Islands and Secretary Seward gave the German ambassador at Washington to understand that the instructions given to the new consul, Mr. Dawson would prevent the repetition of such occurrences.^'

On

his return to the

United States, Mr. Goward presented a

report of his mission and included in

it

a review of the commercial

developments in Samoa and his impressions as to the value of the islands.

He

emphasized the importance of the harbor at Pago-

Pago, which had just come into the possession of the United States.

He pronounced

it

the most important harbor in the south seas,"*

being large enough to hold the

« F. " V. ««

fleets of several nations,

and at the

R., '94, p. 507. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 141; also p. xviii of Denkschrift.

Sen. Ex. Doc. No.

2,

46th Cong., 1st

Sess., p. 15.

GOWARD REPORT

135

same

time, so land-locked as to be secure from hurricanes and storm and easy of defense from land or sea attacks. As a con-

clusion to the whole report of his mission to

Samoa, he repeats

his

convictions of the importance of Pago-Pago to the United States in the following

terms :^'

"To Pago-Pago reference to fitness for

its

harbor in

a naval station and

Additional allusion should be

a naval point of view

and

itself

attention has been called with

topographical features,

it is

its

its

possession

made

to

its

capacity,

internal

its

by the United

States.

general importance.

the key position to the

In

Samoan Group,

likewise to Central Polynesia, admirably located for the pro-

tection of

American commerce, upon the increase

The Samoan Archipelago

is

now, by reason of

in those waters. its

geographical

position in the center of Polynesia, lying in the course of vessels

from San Francisco to Auckland, from Panama to Sydney, and from Valparaiso to China and Japan, and from the fact of being outside the hurricane track, the most valuable group in the South Pacific.

Situated half

way between Honolulu and Auckland,

Pago-Pago would be a most convenient stopping place or coaling station for vessels or steamers either for supplies or the exchange

Should a naval station and the adjuncts that

of commodities.

accompany be established, and the Pacific mail steamers make it a port of call, it would necessarily become the controlling commercial point in that part of Polynesia. These are ends most worthy of accomplishment, from the results that would follow, in the

civil-

ization of the natives, in the starting of profitable industries,

and

the establishment of factories and plantations on the different islands.

With trade connections throughout the south

seas, this

wealth of products would be augmented and naturally the hands of Americans interesting themselves,

market

for their

San Francisco.

is

a commercial matter of such paramount

immediate attention and action." «9

into

find a

commodities in the nearest American port of

This

importance to the merchants of the Pacific States as to their

fall

who would

Sen. Ex. Doc. Nc. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29.

call for

136

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

Goward's testimony was endorsed shortly afterward by J;he German minister in Washington, who, in announcing to Seward the consummation of the German treaty, admitted that the \

United States had secured the best harbor in Samoa.'^" In spite of such praise, however, the public in the United States took little interest in the

to vote

a

it

number

new

harbor, the

a coalyard and

it

of Representatives refused

House

remained deserted and undeveloped

for

of years.

delay—which were

After considerable difficulty and

due to the opposition of

rival influences in the islands

declared

—the German

Consul and the commander of the German warship "Ariadne" ^^ succeeded in obtaining from the Samoans the long-sought treaty. Immediately on its signature they raised the siege of the harbors

and saluted the Samoan Government. The German treaty with Samoa '^ had as the securing for the

German Empire

its

underlying motive

of all the privileges of the

most-favored-nation in relations with the island group. therefore openly admitted that

it

It

was

had been modelled to a considerSamoa and the United

able extent on the recent treaty between States. '^

The

latter

country having been granted the harbor of

Pago-Pago, the Germans chose for themselves that of Saluafata, obtaining in that harbor the exclusive right to establish a naval or coaling station for

'°

F.

p. 440.

German

ships.'*

W. Seward, "Reminiscences

of a

It

was expressly

stipulated,

Wartime Statesman and Diplomat,''

(See also Appendix.)

" V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 179.

" '*

Ibid., p.

1.

Ibid., p.

1.

"

Aktikel

Ibid., p. 185.

V

"Es soil dendeutschen Kriegsohiffen freistehen, in den Hafen von Saluafata einzulaufen, daselbst zu ankern, zu verweilen, Bedarf einzunehmen und auszubessern, und der deutschen Regierung soil es ferner freistehen, in jenem Hafen nach eigenem Ermessen alle fuer die deutschen Kriegsschiffe und deren Besatzungen nuetzlichen Einrichtungen und Anordnungen zu treffen. Die Samoa Regierung ist ferner damit einverstanden, dass die deutsche Regierung an den Ufern jenes Hafens Gebaude Zwecks Lagerung von Kohlen und irgend anderen Bedarfsgegenstaende fuer die deutschen Kriegsschiffe und deren Besatzungen errichtet. Es soil der deutschen Regierung auch freistehen, auf dem Lande wo die Stationsgebaeude errichtet werden ihre Flagge aufzuziehen, jedoch soil die Oberhoheit der Samoa Regierung ueber den Hafen von Saluafata dadurch in keiner Weise geschmaelert oder beeintraechtigt werden,

GERMAN-SAMOAN TREATY, however, that the sovereignty

of the

137

1879

Samoan Government

over the

harbor should be in no wise diminished or affected by the conSaluafata was chosen because

cession.'^

vessels

it

oflEered

protection to

throughout the whole year, whereas Apia lay open to the

full force of

the hurricanes during the stormy season.

being the' commercial center of the islands,

it

But, Apia

was considered

necessary to guarantee that place a free and independent develop-

ment, so that a special clause was inserted providing against any future

curtailment of

German

rights

clauses of the treaty provided for or guaranteed to

other

nations in Samoa.

principle treaty.

Germany

somewhat It

Germans on the

islands

Apia harbor.

mutual freedom

Other

of intercourse,

equal commercial treatment with Article

different

provided that

in

all

VIII,'*

all

however, involved a

from any contained in the American laws, regulations

and taxes to which

might be subjected were to be submitted

andererseits aber 'verpflichtet diese auch nichts zu thun, wodurch die der deutschen Regierung in diesem Artikel gewaehrten Rechte irgendwie werthlos gemacht oder beeintraechtigt werden koennten. Auch soil durch die in diesem Artikel der deutschen Regierung gewaehrten Rechte der Hafen von Saluafata den Kriegs- oder Handelsschiffen derjenigen Nationen welchen der Samoa Regierung ihre Haefen offenhaelt nicht verschlossen werden, jedoch darf die Regierung von Samo^ in Bezug auf diesen Hafen und seine Ufer keiner anderen Nation gleiche Rechte, wie die der deutschen Regierung gewaehrten, bewilligen. Es soil den deutschen Kriegsschiffen ferner freistehen, auch in alle anderen Plaetze, Haefen, und Gewaesser Samoas einzulaufen daselbst zu ankern, zu verweilen, Bedarf einzunehmen und auszubessern, nach Massgabe etwaiger, zwischen den beiderseitigen Regierungen zu vereinbarenden Gesetze, und verspricht die Samoa Regierung hier ferner, dass sie keiner anderen Nation in irgend einer Weise irgendwelche Vorrechte vor der deutschen Regierung in Bezug auf den Hafen von Apia und dessen Ufer bewilligen will, sondern dass die deutsche Regierung auch in dieser Beziehung mit anderen Nationen immer gleichberechtigt sein soil."

" Consul Weber stated that this stipulation was inserted because of instrucfrom his government (V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 187). There is no corresponding reservation in the article governing the transfer of Pago-Pago to the United States. (See Appendix, or U. S. Statutes at Large, tions

45th Congress, 1877-1879, Vol. xx, p. 704.) ™ V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. vii.

Article VIII "Alle Gesetze und Verordnungen, welchen die in Samoa sich aufhaltenden deutschen Staatsangehoerigen und Schutzgenossen sich zu unterwerfen, sowie alle Steuern und Abgaben, welche dieselben demgemaess der Samoa Regierung zu entrichten haben, soUen von dem deutschen Konsul oder anderen zu dem Zwecke von der deutschen Regierung ernannten Personen zusammen mit

138

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

German Consul or other German representative, who should discuss them with the Samoan official, and after this had taken

to the

were to become valid only after they had received the sanction of the German Government. This Consul Weber

place, those laws

considered to be a necessary measure" to assure to the Imperial Government the right to exert over the regulation of affairs in

Samoa an

which he held to be justified by the condition The Imperial Government, he considered, could

influence

of affairs there.

not reject such a limited participation without laying the present

German

The

open to foreign influence.

there

interests

pre-

dominance of German developments in Samoa, resulting in the

by German subjects, made it, he said, fltting and necessary that the Germans should have a voice in questions of taxation. The clause seems to have met with no great proportion of taxes being paid

'

great objection from the interested, yet

it

Samoans

Samoan Government. Another secured for the

or

from the other foreign nations

distinctly compromises the autonomy

Germans

of the

clause of the treaty (Article VI) ^*

living in

Samoa

definite title to

aU their

lands purchased up to that date and stipulated against any further

The treaty was suited to the Goveriunenf to be well considered by the German protection of German interests in the immediate Samoan group, but that it would have little effect unless completed by other

question as to the validity of their possession.

treaties or

agreements with the other island groups, for the com-

merce of which Samoa served as a point supply for

of distribution.

The

labor

the plantations on Samoa had to be secured from the

other islands of Polynesia,'" consequently there was keen rivalry

firms

the case of islands

— especially

between the Gerand importing workers. In which had become definitely protectorates of

between the competing companies

man and Enghsh

—in

securing

Beamten der Samoa-Regierung berathen werden, ebenso alle zweokdienstlichen Massregeln, um die Beobaohtung solcher Gesetze und Verordnungen durch die Deutschen in Samoa herbeizufuehren, jedoch sollen alle solche gemeinschaftlich von den Beamten der beiderseitigen Regierungen berathenen und vereinbarten Gesetze und Massnahmen erst nach erlangter Bestaetigung derselben durch die deutsche Regierung in Kraft treten."

" V.

"

R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 188.

Ibid,, Denkschrift, p. xx.

«»

Ibid., p. 209.

'»

Ibid., p. vi.

GERMAN TREATIES WITH POLYNESIAN CHIEFS

139

Great Britain, the inhabitants were not permitted to emigrate to any but British possessions and Great Britain secured thereby a

monopoly

of the labor supply in those regions. ^^

held important to keep open to

German

plantation labor in the Pacific and Consul

It

was therefore

firms the sources of

Weber was

sent on a

cruise throughout Polynesia, forming with the chiefs treaties or

agreements, the main tenor of which was to prevent any other nations from securing a monopoly and to assure for

most-favored-nation treatment in

respects.

all

tants were not sufRciently civilized to

make

Where

Germany

the inhabi-

a writteil agreement

The poUcy, however, as expressly stipulated in the instructions of the foreign possible, the site for a coaling station

was purchased.

office^^ was to avoid the actual purchasing of harbors and to secure merely the use of them for German naval vessels; to secure equal treatment of German interests, but nowhere to conclude agree-

ments which should

interfere

with the freedom of intercourse

of other nations in those islands.

In summing up the German

policy in the Pacific at this time, the Secretary of the Foreign Office declared^'' before the

Reichstag that

&

»'

Ibid., p. 174, also A.

*2

Ibid., Denksohrift, p. xix.

*'

V. R., 1879, Vol.

II,

58

P., 1889,

all

the agreements concluded

LXXXVI

(C-5629), p. 73, par. 183.

Sitz., 13 Juni, 1879, p. 1602.

Von Buelow

(Bevollmaechtigter zum Bundesrath, Staatssekretaer Aiiswaertigen Amts, Staatsminister).

des '

,

"Es wuerden aber diese Vertraege auf nichts anderes hinauslaufen, als auf ein gleiches Recht fuer alle; wir wollten kein Monopol, keine Aussohliessung anderer. Somit naehmen wir fuer diese Niederlassungen einfach das Recht in Anspruch, dass dasjenige, was duroh die treue deutsche Arbeit, durch den ehrenwerthen tuechtigen Unternehmungsgeist dort gegruendet und in erfreulicher Weise entwickelt sei, auch das Recht behalte, was es durch seinen Ursprung erworben und in der Stille entwickelt habe, naemlich, das gleiche Recht mit Allen, Schutz gegen unberechtigte Konkurrenten, die zum Nachtheil des deutschen Handels und der deutschen Niederlassungen gereichten: Das ist in jedem der Schriftstueoke, die abgedruckt und beigefuegt sind, als leitender Gedanke mehr oder weniger zum Ausdruck gebracht, uns ist dies der leitende Gedanke geblieben. Ich betrachte es als ein glueckliches Anzeichen fuer das Gelingen der sich ,daran knuepfenden Bestrebungen fuer die Aufrechterhaltung dieses Vertrages, dass wir gleichzeitig mit dem Abschluss desselben von Seiten der beiden grossen befreundeten Seemaechte, welche gleichfalls Interessen in Samoa haben

und

vertreten, die

Anerkennung und freundliche Anerkennung bekommen

haben, dass Vertraege dieser Art der rechte

Weg

seien,

um

der Unsicherheit

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

140

!

;

,

'

—

aimed at nothing further than an equal right for all that Germany wished to found no colonies and to establish no monopolies but only to, make certain that German commerce should enjoy good and equal rights with that of any other nation. sidered

it

as a

happy evidence

had received from both

Moreover, he con-

of the success of the treaty that

recognition that treaties of this sort were the right uncertainties

Upon

he

of the other interested powers, friendly

way

to end

and solve the problems involved.

the conclusion of the

German

treaty with

Samoa, Herr

Weber, the Germta Consul, following his instructions, set about s* assisting the British Consul to obtain a treaty for Great Britain. While the negotiations were in progress an event occurred which revealed rather clearly the contrasting attitudes of the foreign representatives toward the

Government

of

Samoa. ^^

The Taimua

and Faipule sent out an invitation

to the three consuls to

them

making

in conference concerning the

of certain laws

meet and

especially to ask the consuls for their opinion as to the advisability of taking into the

government

gentleman then residing in Apia.

as adviser a certain

American

Herr Weber stated that he was

opposed to the Samoans taking any foreigner into their govern-

ment in the

as adviser, believing that it

would give

rise to difficulties as

time of Steinberger. Moreover, such an adviser should have

the endorsement of the three governments,

Germany, England

and America, which could not well be done until the Samoan ein Ende zu machen. Ich bin ueberzeugt, dass gerade die freie Gleichberechtigung, die sich nicht weiter in die inneren Verhaeltnisse einmiseht als zur Aufrechterhaltung und Durchfuehrung des Vertrags, zur Sicherstellung der erworbenen Privatrechte, der freien Ein- und Ausfuhr noethig ist der einzige Weg ist, die grosse Konkurrenz der Nationen wie ich sohon erwaehnte, gerade an diesem Punkte der Suedsee mehr und mehr friedlich auszugleichen.

So viel ueber diesen Vertrag, meine Herren. Was aber im uebrigen die weiteren Entwuerfe und Vorbereitungen zu Vertraegen oder wie man sie nennen will, mit den umliegenden kleinen Inseln angeht, die Sie in der sehr interessanten Rundfahrt des Herrn Kapitaen von Werner beschrieben finden, so glaube ich, darauf verweisen zu duerfen dass die Sachs noch nicht abgeschlossen ist, dass aber dieselben Grundsaetze, welche fuer diesen heutigen Vertrag lei tend gewesen sind, auch da geltend bleiben: wir wollen keine Kolonien dort gruenden, wir wollen kein Monopol gegen andere haben, wir wollen nur feststellen, soweit man es feststellen kann, dass deutsche Sohifff ahrt und Handel dort gutes Recht und gleiches Recht haben." »^

Ibid., p. 190.

85

Ibid

p, 191,

,

BRITISH-SAMOAN TREATY, 1879

Government had made some form

of

141

agreement with England.

In the meantime the consuls of the three powers would be glad to lend their assistance and advice to the

Samoan Government in The British

framing new laws or regulations for the islands.

acting consul/" Mr. Swanson, expressed a similar opinion, stating

that while his country had no defined relations with the

Government, which had the right to appoint what

Samoan

officials it chose,

nevertheless, he thought that the service of foreigners in the

government was not needed and would probably create jealousy and trouble. The United States Consul, Mr. Dawson, however,

was emphatic

do as they pleased. The United States had recognized the Samoans as a free and in his assertion of their right to

—

as such they had the right to avail themany assistance they wished or to take fifty foreigners into

independent nation selves of

their service

if

they saw

fit

to do so.

doing, however, he refused to

commit

On

the expediency of so

himself or to give any

advice.

The

British treaty with

Samoa was

the end of the same year.^'

finally

consummated toward

This was also based on the general

and their interests equal and privileges with subjects of all other foreign nations in Samoa. The British also secured for themselves the right to

principle of securing for British subjects rights

a naval and coaling station in the islands in any harbor except that of Apia, Saluafata, or " that part of the harbor of Pago-

'establish

Pago which

may

be hereafter selected by the Government of the

Great Britain was also guaranteed

United States as a station." the peaceable possession of

all

lands purchased

from the Samoans in regular manner pute was admitted and

its

—but the

by her

settlement provided for

commission of Samoan and British

officials.

by a mixed

This differed radically

from the German clause which practically prevented

up

to the date of the treaty**

gation of disputed

titles

lished the firm of

Goddefroy

»«

subjects

possibility of dis-

all

investi-

and estab-

in full possession of all the lands

Ibid., p. 192.

"

Hertslet's

88

A.

&

Commercial Treaties, Vol. XV,

P., 1889,

LXXXVI

(C-5629), p. 63.

p.

334 S.

(See Appendix.)

142

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

Like the claimed by them and disputed by other nationals. in the voice determining on a insisted British Germans, the municipal laws and police regulations as they subjects, Article

VII

afPected British

stipulating that British subjects

would be

instructed to observe "such of the existing municipal laws and as may be hereafter agreed upon by of Her Britannic Majesty Government agreement between the and that of the Samoan State. " Like the corresponding German clause^ this was a limitation of the sovereignty of the Samoan police regulations of

Samoa

Government.

The British-Samoan Treaty was concluded with King MaUetoa, lately restored to power and recognized by the three Treaty Powers as de facto ruler. The German treaty had been concluded with two houses of Samoa, the Taimua and Faipule, who had for two years without a king held the reins of government.

There

is

nothing in either the British or

German

treaties

which

parallels the clause in the American treaty providing for the

friendly intervention or the exercise of

troubles arising between

Samoa and

good

offices in case

a third nation.

of

This clause

placed the United States in the unique position of a kind of volun-

tary protector of the independence of Samoa.

Very shortly

after the signing of the British

convention'' was drawn up between the

and the Consuls

Government

of

Samoa

of the Powers, providing for the neutralization of

the district of Apia, the

government

Treaty a general

town and harbor being placed under the

of a municipal

board consisting of the consuls of those

House Ex. Doc, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 1887-1888, Vol. XXVIII, No. 238, Convention of September 2nd, 1879, also Ibid., pp. 9 and 10. Secretary Bayard, in 1885, defended the Municipal Convention in his instructions to Consul Greenebaum (House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10). »»

p. 132.

"The municipality -

of Apia," he wrote, "is not

such a protectorate;

it is

a

compact for the administration of a settlement largely peopled by ahens, whose estabhshed interests there are entitled to the security which such an arrangement affords. While it is true that the Municipality Convention was intended to exert a moral influence in favor of stable and good government in the islands, you must, as the American consul, be careful to distinguish between its special and local aims, and any idea of a tripartite protectorate to which this Government may be deemed a party." (See also House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 30.)

APIA MUNICIPAL CONVENTION

143

nations having treaty

relations with Samoa. The municipal board was given power to make and enforce regulations concerning peace and order, public works, sanitation, taxation and other

subjects of public concern within the territory designated, and such

regulations were to be binding on

all

persons within the district.

In time of war this district was to be held as neutral territory be-

tween the warring factions and the municipal council was empowered to take what measure it considered necessary to protect that

Having thus taken

neutrahty.

ment

into their

own hands

the govern-

of the principal port of the islands, the representatives pro-

ceeded to give better appearance to their act by providing that the

Samoan

flag should

council held

its

wave over the

meetings and the

building where the municipal territorial integrity of

Samoa

was to be considered in no way prejudiced. The convention was drawn between Samoa and Great Britain, the other two nations acceding to the articles of the convention through separate articles to that effect.

The American representatives (Consul Dawson and

Captain Chandler of the U. S. S. "Lackawanna") acceded to the agreement merely provisionally, subject to the approval of the

The convention was never ratified by the United States Government. In practice, however, the American consuls took their due part in the administration of the United States Government.

district of

that

Apia according to the provisions

was

it

tacitly accepted

This convention of

may

by

of the convention, so

all.

be considered to conclude the early period

—the

Samoan diplomacy

period of the treaties.

Each

of the

three great nations having commercial or strategic interests in the islands

had placed

itself

on a basis of equality

by formal agreement with the inhabitants

of

treatment with the other powers repre-

Each nation had formally acknowledged the indeSamoa. Yet Great Britain and Germany in the same

sented there.

pendence of treaties in

mised

it

Samoan

which they announced that independence, had compro-

through the clauses providing for their control over the legislation affecting British

and German

subjects.

The

United States' treaty contained no provision for American over-

Samoa even where The Convention establishing

sight or control over domestic legislation in

American citizens might be 10

affected.

144

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

the Municipality of Apia placed the administration of that locality entirely in control of the representatives of the three powers,

and

Samoan native rule within The United States, by taking part in this

constituted therefore a curtailment of

the prescribed area.

consular government of Apia, shared in the foreign control over this part of the island,

but never became formally a signatory to

the convention.

The

following period

The

the islands.

is

marked by increased disorder throughout

frequent conflicts between the native chiefs

were now increased in importance by the support given to one side or another

by the

foreign firms established there.

What would

have been a petty war between one Samoan chieftain and another

became much more serious when one of those chieftains was conchampion of German interests and his opponent champion of American or British interests then the strife the became an affair of the consuls and finally of the home governments. The treaties having definitely granted equal treatment to each of those governments, there was the increased tendency on the part of foreign residents to work the native factions for national sidered to be the

—

ends, or at least to consider national interests to be involved in the

ordinary commercial rivalries.'" '

According to Robert Louis Stevenson, the celebrated chronicler of events was especially true of the great German firm of Goddefroy & Co., now bearing the title of "Deutsche Handels- und Plantagengesellschaft fuer Sued See Inseln zu Hamburg." ("A Footnote to History Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa," in "Letters and Miscellanies of Robert Louis Steven'"

in Samoa, this

—

son, Vol.

XIX,

p. 396.)

"The

firm is GuUiver among the LiUiputs; and it must not be forgotten that while the small, independent traders are fighting for their own hand and inflamed with the usual jealousy against corporations, the Germans are inspired with a sense of the greatness of their affairs and interests. The thought of the money sunk, the sight of these costly and beautiful plantations menaced yearly by the returning forest, and the responsibihty of adnainistering with one hand so many conjunct fortunes, might well nerve the manager of such a company for desperate and questionable deeds. Upon this scale, commercial sharpness has an air of patriotism, and I can imagine the man, so far from higgUng over the scourge for a few Solomon Islanders, prepared to oppress rival firms, overthrow inconvenient monarchs, and let loose the dogs of war. Whatever he may decide, he will not want for backing. Every clerk will be eager to be up and strike a blow; and most Germans in the group, whatever they may babble of the firm over the walnuts and the wine, will rally around the national concern at the approach of difficulty. They are so few I am ashamed to give their munber, it were to challenge contradiction they are

—

—

FOREIGN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

The

chief cause of native disturbance

kingship of Samoa.

king

who had

rivalry over the

There seems to have been almost never a

the sanction of

hand one or more

was

145

all

Samoa.

chiefs aspiring to

There were always on

make themselves king and

only

looking for a sufficient following or sufficient ammunition to start a. revolution.

So

that,

when a

foreign commercial firm considered

that the monarch then in power was opposing

no trouble in finding

rival candidates to

its interests, it

had

oppose him and his

measures.

In 1879, by the action of the German Captain Deinhard in agreement with the American and British representatives, the

were induced to meet on board the "Bismarck," then at anchor at Apia, and sign an agreement"

chiefs of the rival factions

to end hostilities.

They

also reaffirmed the ratification of the

American, German and British treaties with Samoa, together with the municipal convention, and appointed as king (for his lifetime)

Malietoa Talavou, with his nephew Malietoa Laupepa as regent.

A new flag was adopted which should belong to no but should show the unity of

all

Samoa.

though having signed the agreement,

particular king

The opposing

party,

w'as not long in repudiating

war again threatened and the consuls of the three deemed it advisable to give active support to the ruler whom they had recognized. They therefore concluded with the king an agreement'^ to support him during his lifetime as head of the Samoan Government, to agree upon his successor and to This establish immediately an executive council for the king. executive council was to consist of an American citizen, a German and a British subject, who should be nominated by the three consuls from among the residents of Samoa and who should hold it,

and

civil

nations

so few, and the amoimt of national capital buried at their feet is so vast, that we must not wonder if they seem oppressed with greatness and the sense of empire. Other whites take part in our babbles while temper holds out, with a certain schoolboy entertainment. In the Germans alone, no trace of humor is to be observed, and their solemnity is accompanied by a touchiness Patriotism flies in arms about a hen; and if you comoften beyond beUef. ment upon the color of a Dutch umbrella, you have cast a stone against the

German Emperor." " House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., S2

Ibid., p.

207

f.

1st Sess., p.

201

ff.

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

146

respectively the offices of minister of justice, minister of finance

and minister

of public works.

The

three nations were explicitly

referred to as "the three protecting powers. "

The agreement was

formed at the proposal of the German Government and the consuls of the other two nations received instructions to unite with their

an agreement to protect the government of Malietoa. However, when completed the agreement was not formally confirmed by the Treaty Powers. ^^ The British Government concolleagues in

sidered that such an arrangement

would

practically give over the

administration of the islands to the three governments represented

Nevertheless the agreement was put

by the Executive Council.

and American governments reserving the right^^ to withdraw from it at any time. The stand taken by the United States was that the agreement was to be looked upon, not as a treaty "but simply as a scheme of into effect as a working arrangement, the British

arrangement between the consular body and the government

of

the islands for the protection of the interests of foreigners."

"The

three advisers" were selected, and assisted the legislative

body

to pass certain laws regulating quarantine, prohibiting the

sale of

ammunition, intoxicants,

etc., after

which they withdrew

temporarily and seem never to have resumed their functions in

As salaried ministers of the same time, citizens of foreign nations, the three advisers constituted an anomaly in what had been declared to be an autonomous government. relation to the native government.

Samoan Government and

Another outbreak

at the

of the insurgent

pafty resulted in a second

reconciliation through the efforts of the foreign consuls

agreement was signed, ^^

this

the "Lackawanna," and was

By

it

and another

time on board a United States vessel,

known

as the

Lackawanna

the chiefs of both parties and the consuls of

all

peace.

three nations

Laupepa to be King of Samoa and his rival Tupua Tamasese to be Vice-King^^ a compromise created to make

declared Malietoa

—

&

LXXXVI

»»

A.

»
" Sen. Ex.

of the three

of actual administration,

Doc. No. 102, 5Qth Cong., 2nd

Sess., pp.

and

8 and

how-

powers

9.

it

was

BRITISH SUPPORT OF also evident

GERMAN POLICY

173

from the reports of the commissioners that the

partite control, such as

was impracticable.

had

The

tri-

existed to greater or less degree hitherto

solution, therefore,

seemed to He in the

alternate control of the islands for a limited period

by one

of

In the choice of which power should first act mandatory. Her Majesty's Government considered " that pre-

the three nations. as

ponderating commercial interests should be taken into consideration."

Moreover, since Mr. Thurston, Mr. Travers and Mr.

Bates all agreed that this preponderance was possessed by Germany, Her Majesty's Government was ready " to consent to the mandatory power being exercised by the German representative for the first term of five years," absolute equality of treatment in commerce and all other matters being secured to the three powers. Sir Lionel also presented a plan for the establishment of an international Land Court to dispose of claims of title to land in Samoa, which claims were to be first investigated by a land commission. In respect to the matter of kingship, it was evident that although Malietoa had long been recognized by the powers and Tamasese denied that recognition, nevertheless, the situation was now such that a new election was imperative. In case of such an election.

Her Majesty's Government expressed no

opinion, either favorable

or adverse, to Malietoa. It

is

thus evident that the British and

German

policies

were in

accord in the most important feature, namely, the administration because of preponof the islands by one power, and that power derance of commercial interests Germany. Secretary Bayard's

—

—

policy involved the opposite principle, namely, the constant equal participation of the three powers in the administration of the islands

and

also the reducing of that participation to a

in order to give as

much

opportunity

minimum

as possible for native inde-

pendence. " In opposing the idea that " preponderating commercial interests should serve as a basis for any plan for governing Samoa, Secretary

Bayard pointed out that the

chief importance of the islands lay in

their geographic position, directly in the

just being developed.

The

path of a Pacific commerce

recent developments of the American

Northwest and the plans for the isthmian canal

all

gave a new

174

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GEEMANY IN THE PACIFIC

importance to these islands from the viewpoint of the United States. Moreover, the European nations, Great Britain, Germany,

France and Spain had already absorbed nearly all the important island groups in Polynesia, whereas the United States, with its long Pacific coast-line, had not secured a foot of territory in that There was therefore something in question beyond the region.

value of land and products and for this reason the United States wished to secure this group of islands for the "common use of

Von Alvensleben and Sir Lionel contended that the mandatory plan in no way contradicted this idea. But Secretary Bayard pointed out that the German minister had stated in his memorandum^^^ that, nations."

" It cannot be expected that she (Germany) should consent to remain more or less excluded from the efficient control of the country, and have it pass to one of the two powers who have less

interests."

Here Secretary Bayard showed was a "clear proposition

of

Inequality."

" If

Germany could not be expected to consent to remain more or how could she expect another power to remain so? There was upon the very proposition of exclusion the mark of less

excluded,

inequality which

is

in contradiction to the idea

with which the

conference began."

The British representative then replied that the mandatory plan itself was not based on the principle of preponderating interests, but was conceived of as the best means of securing a stable government in the islands, the tripartite control having proved a failure as was testified to by all three commissioners after their investigaHer Majesty's Government was willing, tions in the islands. "seeing the great interest Germany has in Samoa, tQ accord to the German representative the first term of five years as mandatory of the other two powers," and did not see that any exclusive con158

Sen. Ex. Doe. No. 102, 50th Cong.,

2nd

Sess., pp. 12

ff.

and 38

fE.

CONTRASTING POLICIES

175

was involved in the arrangement, as the mandatory power could only be exercised with the consent of the other two powers, so that it seemed a matter of small importance which power should trol

be the

first

to exercise

The problem was

of a

it.

method

of adjusting conflicting land-claims

also discussed at length in the conferences but, as the organi-

zations proposed for this purpose took their character from the general plan of government, the national policies conflicted on this

subject also. Finally, considering that there as he viewed

it,

the

German

made the preponderance

was no hope

of agreement, because

by Great Britain, and consequent inequality

plan, acquiesced in

of interests

of influence " the actual basis

and controlling principle of the whole government," Secretary Bayard proposed that the conference adjourn until autumn, in order that the German and British scheme

of

ministers might submit the protocols of the conference to their respective governments and receive from them " instructions of a

more

definite character."

The conference was to

show the

three powers.

therefore adjourned without result except

differences of principle actuating the policies of the

With Germany and Great

Britain the principle was

the natural outgrowth of a colonial policy of extending the protection of the State over commercial developments once definitely

established in regions unclaimed

had stated

by any civilized power. Bismarck

definitely iu^^' 1884:

"We intend, moreover, as in West Africa, so also in the South Seas to place under the direct protection of the Empire those regions which, through the predominating extension of German trade or in consequence of the preparations for this, seem fitted for it."

Secretary Bayard's stand was more of a defense against a feared aggression in a region which he held to be important to the United States

1^1

by reason

of its geographic position.

His method was

V. R., 1885, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 167, p. 718.

lation.)

12

(Author's trans-

176

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

therefore to insist on a

maximum

of

autonomy

for

Samoa.

In

pursuing this Hne of pohcy he was forced to ignore and act in contradiction to the advice of the American Commissioner, Bates,

who

had, from his experience on the islands,

come

Mr.

to the

conclusion that a strictly independent native government was an impossibility

and a

tripartite

Mr.

government impracticable.-

Bates even considered that the United States' policy in the Samoan question should be governed

by the Monroe Doctrine which,

originally stated, applied not

merely to the continent but to the

whole Western Hemisphere, and therefore included nearly Polynesia.

all

as

of

Secretary Bayard was also forced to take the seemingly

inconsistent stand of checking the

Hawaiian movements. ^^^

If

the United States stood for the independence of the small native

House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 52, 54 and 60; also For Mr. Bates' application of the Monroe Doctrine Polynesia, see F. R., 1889, p. 276 f.

>«»

pp. 101 to 105 inclusive. to

(Extract from Mr. Bates' Report)

"American Intervention in the

Pacific.

"To

return to the subject of sole control. Whether our Government would be willing to undertake it, even with the consent of the other powers, is a question which, of course, I cannot determine. I do not believe that a vigorous and decided interest in tlie welfare of these native communities would be in opposition to the declared policy of our Government, but that it would fall within the limits of exceptions, not only well defined, but which have been enumerated and adhered to by successive officers in charge of our foreign affairs, of all parties.

The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine first qualified the general policy of non-intervention and prescribed the limits to which it was to he thereafter confined. This pubHc notice to the world that we would not subrfait to an extension of the European system to this hemisphere, or to the establishment upon it of European colonies in addition to those then existing, was put upon the express ground that

we should regard such

action as dangerous to our

peace and safety.

The true limitation, therefore, of the doctrine of non-intervention with the operations of any European powers was thus stated. It was that such action should not be permitted as might be considered by us dangerous to our peace and

safety.

would be impossible, in view of the marvelous growth of the United States in population and its resources, and the extension of its territory, both by acquisition and settlement, that the Umitation by President Monroe should at all periods of our history be geographically the same. Although perhaps there exists at least to some extent a popular impression that the Monroe Doctrine was intended to apply to acquisitions by foreign powers upon this continent, neither the terms in which the doctrine was originally stated nor the action of our Government since, will be found to justify any such conclusion. A very early application of the spirit of this doctrine to a country not embraced in the continent will be found in our diplomatic correspondence respecting Cuba; and while the United States have It

—

—

SECRETARY BAYARD's POLICY governments

in the Pacific,it

177

would be expected to encourage the

enterprise of one of the strongest native kings in his attempt to

confederate with and strengthen the other Polynesian monarchs

encroachments

as against

The Secretary evimovement on the part of bound economically by treaty to the

of all foreigners.

dently feared, however, that such a

Hawaii, which was so closely

United States, would be misinterpreted and cause the colonizing

powers to seek more definite control over Samoa.

The two years

following the Washington conference represent

the period of greatest tension between the three governments in reference to the

Samoan

question.

Bismarck agreed^" nominally

refused to interfere with the possession of that island by Spain, it was declared more than sixty years ago by Mr. Clay, and has been repeated in substance many times since, that we would not consent to the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico by any other European power. So in the Pacific. As the extension of our commerce and the settlement of our Pacific coast made it apparent that the possession by a European power of the Sandwich Islands would be dangerous to our peace and safety indeed, more so than would be true as to the South American RepubUcs our Government has not hesitated to declare that their conquest or occupation by one of the great powers of Europe would be a result which we would not hesitate to prevent by force of arms if necessary. This statement has been repeated substantially though in different terms, by Mr. Webster, Mr. Legare, Mr. Clayton, Mr. Marcy, Mr. Fish, Mr. Blaine, Mr. FreHnghuysen, and yourself. The relation of the Samoan group to the future commerce of the Pacific is the same in kind, though at present less in degree, as that of the Hawaiian group.

—

—

The intelligent foresight of our Goverment has, at a time when the future of that region was much less certain than it is now, secured exclusive rights on the island of Tutuila in a harbor probably not equalled and certainly not Having thus long ago acquired this surpassed in the Pacific foothold in the South Pacific, it would be short-sighted indeed if we were to permit the advantage of this action to sUp away from us by leaving the way open to European domination in this group. It is because of the conviction that the situation in these islands requires more active intervention in their domestic affairs than was contemplated by instructions to secure to our own people the rights and privileges which naturally belong to them that, while reporting the best plan I could devise in accordance with the instructions. I have been constrained to go beyond it and to urge more independent action on the part of this Government than

my

has been heretofore contemplated." 1*1

Ibid., pp.

Theil,

No.

No.

54.

Department tion

by

59 and 60.

(For

German original see Weissbuch,

1889, Fuenfter

5.)

(Left at the Prince von Bismarck to Mr. von Alvensleben. (Translaof State by Mr. von Alvensleben, August 29, 1887.

source.)

Vakzin, August 7, 1887. (Received August 29.) "Mr. Bayard has dechned to agree to the German-English proposition to appoint one adviser to the Samoan Government as the representative of

178 in

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

view of Secretary Bayard's objections, to drop the German-

English plan and take into closer consideration the American the treaty powers, and has proposed instead the institution of an executive counoil, consisting of the King of Samoa, a native official, and three representatives of the treaty powers (i. c, one to be nominated by each). In the course of the discussions on this proposition it has been pointed out by the German as well as by the English plenipotentiary that under such a composition of the executive, the unsettled and lawless condition of affairs which has hitherto prevailed in Samoa would continue, and that a uniform administration of the Samoan Government, offering sufficient guarantees for public peace and order, would thereby be rendered illusory. The Imperial Government, while maintaining these views, and although it would have been considered desirable if also the United States Government could have convinced itself of the practical advantages of the German-English proposition, is nevertheless prepared, in view of the objections raised by Mr. Bayard, to drop that point, because Germany has no treaty claim upon the consent of America to the proposed institution, and because we are endeavoring to regulate the relations of the interested powers to Samoa in a common understanding with the Government of the United States, connected by friendship with Germany. The Imperial Government does not see in the American counter-proposition any redress of the now existing evils; it does not aim, notwithstanding the preponderance of German interests over those of other nations in Samoa, at the exercise of a stronger influence with regard to the affairs of the islands than England and America, unless such influence would, in the common interest of the three nations, be willingly conceded to it, as has been done by Great Britain, and as we were in hope would be done by the United States, too. This hope having proved to be erroneous, we consider, as we have done hitherto, the now existing equality of rights of the three nations, as the acknowledged basis of their relations to Samoa. We do not, however, anticipate a favorable result from a participation of the so-called King and of one of his officials in the negotiations of the consuls, neither for the aifairs themselves, nor for the agreement of the powers and their consuls between each other. The Imperial Government agrees, therefore, to the adjourimient of the conference proposed by Mr. Bayard and will, jointly with the British Government, take into closer consideration the American counter-proposition of a common control of the Samoan Government to be exercised by the three treaty powers. The Imperial Government is, however, unable to renounce an immediate reparation for the insults against His Majesty the Emperor and the national honor committed by partisans of Malietoa, on the 22nd of March last, on the occasion of His Majesty's birthday, by the ill-treatment of German citizens in Samoa and by violence inflicted upon them. We also must obtain due satisfaction for the thefts and robberies committee on German plantations, which have hitherto remained unpunished, and for the systematical refusal of legal protection in oases of criminal offenses committed by Samoans against German subjects; and, furthermore, we must obtain sufficient guaranties that our treaties with Samoa be in future respected and the German interests there duly protected. The latter are in consequence of the uncalled-for intermeddling of the Hawaiian Government in the political affairs of Samoa, now menaced by imminent outbreak of a civil war, endangering life and property of the Germans residing there. Under these circumstances ai!d having convinced ourselves, to our regret that our representatives in Apia do not enjoy the expected support of their colleagues in cases of disagreements and disputes with Malietoa, we have to consider it our duty to independently protect our own interests and rights and to obtain the satisfaction and reparation which is due to our national honor.

Bismarck's view of American plan

179

counter-proposition, but he stated plainly that he saw in solution for the existing evils.

ment

of the conference,

it

no

While agreeing to the adjourn-

and acknowledging

as hitherto the equality

Samoa, Germany could not, he declared, "renounce an immediate reparation for the insults against His Majesty the Emperor and the national honor comof

rights

of the three nations

in

mitted by partisans of MaKetoa." or not powerful enough, to give

If

the king were either unwilling

Germany

the necessary satisfac-

and sufficient guarantees for the future, the Imperial Government would feel obliged to declare war on him personally. And if the king of Hawaii should interfere in favor of Malietoa, then the former would be entering into a state of war with Germany. tion for the past

We

shall therefore if Malietoa is either not wiUing or not powerful enough to give us the necessary satisfaction for the past and sufficient guaranties for the future, feel obliged to declare war on him, and refuse to recognize his government. In case Hawaii, whose King acts according to financial principles which it is not desirable to extend to Samoa, should try to interfere in favor of MaUetoa, the King of the Sandwich Islands would thereby enter into (a) state of war with us. The Imperial Government is, of course, far from intending to bring about any change in the political relations which the three powers represented there and coimected by friendship entertain to Samoa; on the contrary, we maintain imaltered the existing treaties and stipulatifins between us and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States with regard to that group of shall also islands, as well as the equality of rights of the treaty powers. in the future continue our endeavors to arrive at an understanding about the necessary reforms in order to estabUsh a lasting peace on the Samoan Islands, But we are unable to in the interest of the foreign and native population. allow the dignity of the German Empire and the security of the German subjects to be any longer sUghted in such a manner as has been done by Malietoa. I respectfully request you to bring the foregoing remarks to the notice of Mr. Bayard and, if he desires it, to leave a copy of them in his hands.

We

v.

-

Count Bismarck

later terminated negotiations concerning

(Sen. Ex-. Doc. No. 31, 50th Cong.,

Memorandum handed

to

2nd

Bismarck.''

Bayard's plan.

Sess., pp. 6 to 9.)

Bayard by Baron

v.

Zedwitz,

November

4th, 1887.

"If therefore, the American Government cannot be convinced of the pracadvantages of the German-English proposition, and if it regards the carrying out of the same as dangerous to the independence and neutrality of Samoa, and as a deviation from the traditional poUcy of the United States in the Pacific Ocean, the Imperial Government has no desire to adhere to the plan and renew the discussion thereof. The Imperial Government, however, for the reasons stated, considers the counter-propositions made by Mr. Bayard during the conference for an executive branch of the government composed of five members as impracticable, and is unable to regard the same as sufficient ground for further negotiations. tical

Count Bismarck.

180

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

The

especial insult referred to

the Emperor's birthday, of the followers of

when a

by Bismarck was the conflict occurred

Malietoa and the

German

residents

act of celebrating the birthday of the

in the

reports^''^ as to

affair of

between some

who were The

Emperor.

the seriousness of the conflict vary widely according

to their source, the

German

consul emphasizing the gravity of the

American and British reports minimizing the whole Germany, however, made it the occasion for entering upon

event, the affair.

an aggressive policy against Malietoa.

A

heavy

fine

and abject

apology for this and past offenses were demanded^^' of the king,

and when these were not obtained, war was declared against him.'^* Great Britain offered her conciliation but this was declined by

Germany. Malietoa fled inland. Tamasese was transported to Apia in a German man-of-war and saluted as Kiag of Samoa. The American and British consuls immediately issued a proclamation'*5 stating that they and their governments did not recognize Tamasese as King but would continue as heretofore to recognize Malietoa they urged the Samoans, however, to submit and

—

await the deliberations of the nations.

The

pursuit of Malietoa

continued and he later surrendered and was carried into

exile

on

1^- For accounts of the ''affair of March 22nd," the Emperor's birthday, see Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 3. (Becker to Bismarck.) R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 418 ff. A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 149.

'«

House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p."67 ff. That the German Government did not expect Malietoa to comply with the demands, nor exhausted effort to have him do so, is evident from the "*

foUowing.

(A.

The Marquis

&

P., 1889,

LXXXVI

(C-5629), p. 138, No. 143.

of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet.

Foreign Office, August

15th, 1887.

(Extract.)

"The German Ambassador called upon me today, and left with me the dispatch of which I enclose an extract, explaining the policy which the German Government propose to adopt toward Samoa. I asked the Ambassador whether it would not be possible to give directions to the British Consul to take steps for removing the differences between King Malieta and Germany, by including the former to meet the demands of Germany as far as they were well founded. His Excellency said that such a course might be adopted later but that it would be inconvenient for the present that any instructions should be given which might prematurely announce the intentions which the Chancellor had confidentially explained." «* Ibid., p. 147.

GERMAN WAR AGAINST MALIETOA

181

board a German war-vessel.

Meantime Tamasese was being The "gentleman Brandeis," who had been quietly assisting him in the organization of his forces, now became his prime minister^s^ and assisted him In the organizatioQ of his government. Throughout one year Samoa was under their regime. The American Consul, Mr. Sewall, offered constant and determined opposition, refusing to recognize the new ruler in any established in the kingship.

manner, and declining to serve on the Municipal Council"' under the flag of Tamasese, thus eventually causing the abandonment of the municipal government of Apia.^^^

-pj^g

British Consul,

on the

other hand, was instructed"' to recognize Tamasese as the de

Samoa and

facto ruler of

him

to enter into such

as the situation required.

strict neutrality as

on the

islands.

Ambassador

He was

communication with

also instructed to observe

between the German and American authorities

In addition to this Sir Lionel West, the British

Washington, was instructed"" to use his influence Government of the United States "to address to their Consul pacific and conciliatory instructions." The United States Consul Sewall was later instructed by Secretary Bayard to preserve strict "neutrality between the Malietoa and Tamasese in

to induce the

parties,

but to uphold

The war

all

rights of the United States.""^

against Malietoa

had involved almost no bloodshed and

very slight military measures, but Bismarck reahzed that such "« Ibid., p. 173.

'"A.

&

P., 1889,

LXXXVI

(C-5629), p. 163, No. 180

The American Consul Sewall protested

and

p. 170,

No. 189.

against the assumption of rule of

Tamasese over the municipality of Apia as a violation of the Municipal Convention of 1879 (House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 91).

German Consul, Becker, declared it necessary to consider that convention abeyance because the American Consul, Sewall, had refused to consent to

Thfe in

the continuance in office of the present magistrate, and had refused to attend meetings of the Municipal Board. Mr. Becker asserted that it was not the

German Commander (as alleged by Mr. Sewall) but the Samoan Government that had taken over the administration of Apia. Moreover, he pointed out that the Convention of 1879, on which Mr. Sewall based his protest, had not been ratified by the United States. «8A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), No. 7. 1" Ibid., pp. 169, 172 and 173. "1 Weissbuch, Fuenfter Theil, No. 12.

p. 172; also

Weissbuch, 1889, Vol. V, '" Ibid., p. 158.

182

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

measures as had been taken were creating a hostile opinion among

He

the other powers.

therefore instructed the

German

Consul,'"

remove the German marines Bismarck wrote to Mr. Becker,

as soon as he thought it possible, to

from Apia.

Their presence there,

was giving the American and Australian press just the excuse wanted to cast suspicion on the German policy in the Pacific, and to accuse

it

of aggression against the treaty rights of others in

Samoa. The Chancellor had hoped that the removal of the hostile Malietoa and the installation of Tamasese, who was friendly to

Germany, would be subjects

and

sufficient assurance of the protection of

their interests.

was

lasted, the consul

As long

German

as the military occupation

to avoid anything

which would give that

occupation any other character than merely a measure of support of the

Any further action, moreover, was name of Germany nor in reference to special but in the name of the present Samoan govern-

newly recognized king.

to be taken not in the

German

interests

ment, the support of which the Chancellor wrote would be the interest. of

for

all. ,

by the German Government to further German interests in the islands. The king hostile to Germany was removed and replaced by a chieftain friendly to German interests and well controlled by a German advisor as This reveals completely the part played

his

prime minister.

This .having been accomplished,

sary to seek to overcome the hostihty aroused

powers.

The

it

was

among

neces-

the other

chancellor therefore ordered the immediate removal

by which the coup had been accompHshed and new regime should be rendered as to a government thoroughly Samoan. The Tamasese-Brandeis regime lasted approximately a year and of the signs of force

directed that the support of the

accounts are contradictory'" as to whether intrinsically 1" Weissbuoh, Fuenfter Theil,

it

was

No. 13. Mr. Stevenson refers to the severe but salutary laws enacted, the roads built, beacons set up, instruction given to the natives in agricultural methods, and in the raising of cacao and other products to relieve the dependence on the one product, copra. In general he writes, "The more I learn of his brief term of rule, the more I learn to admire him and to wish we had his like." In contrast see also Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 159.

i"R. L.

S.,

Vol.

XIX,

p. 439.

TAMASESE-BRANDEIS REGIME

183

mostly good or

evil. But all seem to agree that the rule was not Samoan but thoroughly German. This fact and the strict regulations enforced made his rule unpopular with native Samoans and the creation of a new opposition party was the natural result.

This opposition centered in the person of Mataafa, a chief of. the old Malietoa party. According to the allegations of the Germans, it

was supported by the American Consul and certain British Through whatever causes, the opposition grew and

residents."*

the situation the

German

now became

of the de facto king, the less

i"

the reverse of that under Malietoa,

representatives in

Samoa now

rallying to the support

American representatives lending more or under Mataafa."^

active support to the opposition forces

R. L.

S.,

Vol.

XIX,

p.

432

f.

"The white enemies of the new regime were of two classes. In the first stood Moors and the employees of MoArthur, the two chief rivals of the firm, who saw with jealousy a clerk (or a so-called clerk) of their competitors advanced to power. The second class, that of the officials numbered at first exactly one, Wilson, the English Acting-consul, is understood to have held strict orders to help Germany. Commander Leary of the Adams, the American Captain, when he arrived, on the 16th October and for some time after, seemed devoted to the German interests and spent his days with the German officer. Captain von Widersheim, who was deservedly tjeloved by all who knew him. There remains the American Consul-general, Harold Marsh Sewall, a young man of high spirit and a generous disposition. He had obeyed the orders of his government with a grudge; and looked back on his past action with regret almost to be called repentance. From the moment of the declaration of war against Laupepa, we find him standing forth in bold, consistent, and sometimes rather captious opposition, stirring up his government at home with clear and forcible dispatches and on the spot grasping at every opportunity to thrust a stick into the German wheels. For some while he and Moors fought their difficult battle in conjunction; in the course of which first one and then the other, paid a visit home to reason with authorities in Washington; and during the Consul's absence there was found an American clerk in Apia, William Blacklock, to perform the duties of the The three names just brought office with remarkable ability and courage. together, Sewall, Moors, and Blacklock, make the head and front of the opposition; if Tamasese fell, if Brandeis was driven forth, if the Treaty of Berlin was signed, theirs is the blame or the credit:" I" R. L.

No.

S.,

Vol.

XIX,

p. 494; also

Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 27.

27.

Berlin, den 24. Nov., 1888.

Bismarck to Konsul Knappe. der Unterstuetzing, welche der Kommandant des amerikanischen und der amerikanische Konsulatsverweser den Aufstaendischen gewaehrt haben, sind Vorstellungen in Washington erhoben worden. Die beiden amerikanischen Beamten haben in Folge dessen Weisung erhalten, eine Einmisehung in den Aufstand und Konflikte mit deutschen Behoerden zu

"Wegen

Kriegsschiffes

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

184

The

situation

was more

serious this time because of the presence

of the naval forces of each nation

now

stationed at the islands in

The German and

anticipation of the threatening troubles."^

American commanders took active part in the situation, backing The period is referred to as that of the "Furor their consuls. Consularis."^"

The Tamasese forces were routed and Mataafa Finally, German mariines landed for the proGerman plantations were attacked by Mataafa

proclaimed king.^'* tection of the

forces at Fangalii

and

lost

more than

Germany then prepared

number.

war, Bismarck declared'" that the

falls

men, 40 per cent,

of their

to take action in earnest and

declared war on the Mataafa forces.

vermeiden und,

fifty

In announcing the state of

German armed

forces

were

Schwierigkeiten entstehen, neue Instruktionen abzu-

warten.

Was unsere eigene Haltung in Samoa betrifft, so handelt es sich in erster Linie darum, die Reichsangehoerigen und deren Interessen wirksam zu schuetzen. Es wuerden uns allerdings erwuenscht sein, Tamasese zu halten, wenn dies aber in Hinblick auf die Stimmung der einheimisohen Bevoelkerung nicht angaengig ist, erscheint es als angezeigt, wenn thunlioh, einen Vergleich zwischen Tamasese und Mataafa zu Stande zu bringen. Tamasese wuerden hierbei moeglischst guenstige Bedingungen zu sichern sein." See also Ibid., Nos. 32, 33, 34 and 36. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 50tli Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 137. Rear Admiral Kimberley was instructed to keep one of his ships continuously in Samoan waters and to give her commanding officer full instructions "to intervene

™

vigorously, should occasion arise, to protect the persons

and property of Count Arco, German Minister, informed Secretary Bayard (Ibid., p. 161) that the German fleet was being dispatched to Samoa owing to the unsettled condition of affairs in the islands, but had no definite information as to any specific object for this. '"Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 161. Instructions were sent by both the German and American Governments to their consuls American

citizens there residing."

to endeavor to avoid all friction or conflict of interests of the

two governments

between the

citizens

in their business operations in those islands.

(See

Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 28 and No. 29. After the defeat of Tamasese by the Mataafa forces, the German Consul was instructed to confine his efforts to the protection of the life and property of German subjects also

(Ibid., p.

162).

"» Sen, Ex. Doc. No. 31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 125. '9 House Ex. Doc. No. 118, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., 15. p.

No. 4

(e).

Prince Bismarck to

Count von Arco- Valley.

(Translation by source,)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, January 13, 1889. "I have already notified Your Excellency that, according to telegraphic

GERMAN WAR AGAINST MATAAFA FORCES instructed to avoid

and that

all

all

injury to neutral

185

commerce and property

treaty rights of Americans and British in Siamoa would

be preserved, and that the military measures^^" had in view only the punishment of the murderers of

German

soldiers.

The German

Consul, Dr. Knappe, however, being personally eager for annexation,

adopted measures of unauthorized

vigor'''

and placed the

communications from Apia on the 18th December of last year, a detachment German naval forces which had landed at the requisition of the Imperial Consul for the protection of the German settlements which were endangered by the conflicts between the native parties there, was attacked by armed Samoans belonging to the party of Chief Mataafa. This unprovoked attack is said to have taken place under the leadership of an American named Klein. On this occasion more than fifty German soldiers and officers were killed and wounded. In consequence of this we have been transplanted from the territory of mediatorial negotiations, by which the Imperial Consul in Apia was trying to reconcile the contending parties, and for which he had sought the cooperation of his English and American colleagues, into a state of war of

with the assailants, to our regret.

We

shall carry on the contest which has been forced upon us by Mataafa his followers, with the utmost consideration for English and American Our mihtary measures have in view only the punishment of the interests. murderers of German soldiers and the protection of our countrymen and their As they, on their part, are at war with Tajnasese, our interference propertj'. will necessarily assume the character of assistance to Tamasese. In the endeavor for the just punishment of a murderous crime we hope for the cooperation of the treaty powers in Samoa in friendship with us, and

and

the Government of the United States to be good enough to furnish the consuls, and the commander of its ships of war in Samoa, with suitable instructions. Our armed forces there are instructed to avoid and to prevent all injury to neutral commerce and property, and to adopt measures of reprisal and destruction only against the followers of the party which initiated the contest against our troops by a murderous attack. We shall of course abide by the agreements with America and England with respect to Samoa, and pay due regard under all circumstances to the* rights of those powers as established by treaty. I Iseg Your Excellency to bring this communication to Mr. Bayard's knowledge by reading it to him, and to leave a copy of it with him if he requests it.

we ask

Von Bismarck."

Bismarck empowered the German representative to call upon German warships for aid provided the outlook for success was assured. (See Weissbuoh, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 33.) i'»

Bismarck to Gen. Konsul, Sydney. 23. Dbz., 1888. "Ic'h ermaechtige Sie gegen Aufstaendische, welche deutsches Eigenthum schaedigen, Huelfe unserer Kriegsschiffe nach zu suchen, falls Aussicht auf Erfolg gesichert ist."

Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 35. Dr. Knappe was eager for and wrote to Bismarck that if it were possible to annex the islands the German forces present in Samoa would be suffiBismarck rephed (Ibid., No. 37) that owing to the cient to restore order. 181

direct annexation of the islands

agreement with America and England, annexation was out of the question ("Selbstverstaendhch ausgeschlossen").

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

186

whole islands under martial law. diately'*^

by the American and

IJrotests

British Consuls

made imme-

were

and

their

Govern-

who refused to permit the jurisdiction over their respective citizens in Samoa to occurred. Whitney."

INSTRUCTIONS TO ADMIRAL KIMBERLY

189

forces in the Pacific to proceed in his flagship, the Trenton, to

Apia.

He was

instructed "to extend

full

protection and defense

to American citizens and property," to "protest against the sub-

jugation and displacement of native government of

Germany," but to inform the German and

Samoa by

British representatives

of his readiness to cooperate in restoring peace

and order on the

Samoan independence. The whole correspondence on the Samoan question was communicated by President Cleveland to Congress^" for its .consideration. The President declared that basis of

>" Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 68, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p.

2.

Message to Congress.

January

"On

^

!

16, 1889.

the second of April, 1888, I transmitted to the House of Representaresponse to a resolution passed by that body, a report from the Secretary of State relating to the condition of affairs in the Samoan Islands, together with numerous letters, dispatches, and the documents connected with the subject, which gave a history of all disorders in that locality up to that date. On the 21st day of December, 1888, this information was supplemented by the transmission to the Congress of such further correspondence and documents as extended this history to that time. I now submit a report from the Secretary of State, with later correspondence and dispatches exhibiting the- progress of the disturbances in Samoa up to the present date. The information thus laid before the Congress is of much importance since it has relation to the preservation of American interests and the protection of American citizens and their property in a distant locality and under an unstable and unsatisfactory government. In the midst of the disturbances which have arisen at Samoa, such powers have been exercised as seemed to be within the executive control under our Constitution and laws, and which appear to accord with our national policy and traditions, to restore tranquilhty and secure the safety of our citizens. Through negotiations and agreement with Great Britain and Germany which, with our own Goverimient, constitute the treaty powers interested in Samoan peace and quiet, the attempt has been made to define more clearly the part which these powers should assume in the government of that country, while at the same time its autonomy has been insisted upon. These negotiations were at one time interrupted by such action on the part of the German Government as appeared to be inconsistent with their further continuance. Germany, however, still asserts, as from the first she has done, that she has no desire or intention to overtiirn the native Samoan Government or to ignore our treaty rights, and she still invites our Government to join her in But thus far her propositions on this subject restoring peace and quiet. seem to lead to such a preponderance of German power in Samoa as was never contemplated by us and is inconsistent with every prior agreement or understanding, while her recent conduct as between native warring factions gives rise to the suspicion that she is not content with a neutral position. Acting within the restraints which our constitution and laws have placed upon the executive power, I have insisted that the autonomy and independence of Samoa should be scrupulously preserved according to the treaties made with Samoa by the powers named and their agreements and understanding with each other. I have protested against every act apparently tendmg tives, in

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

190

German proposition and German power and indicated

the

Much

neutral position.

of a half million dollars

actions aimed at a preponderance of

that

feeling

was aroused

was voted

States' interests in Samoa.^^^

was appropriated

Germany was not content with a

for the

aiid

an appropriation

for the protection of

United

In addition one hundred thousand

development

of the

harbor of Pago-

an opposite direction, and during the existence of internal disturbance one more vessels of war have been kept in Samoan waters to protect American > citizens and property. These things will abundantly appear from the correspondence and papers which have been submitted to the Congress. A recent collision between the forces from a, German man-of-war stationed in Samoan waters and a body of natives rendered the situation so delicate and critical that the warship Trenton, under the immediate command of Admiral Kimberly, was ordered to join the Nipsic, already at Samoa, for the better protection of the persons and property of GUI' citizens, and in furtherance, of efforts to restore order and safety. in

or

The attention of the Congress is especially called to the instructions given to Admiral Kimberly, dated on the 11th instant, and the letter of the Secretary of State to the German Minister, dated the 12th instant, which will be found among the papers submitted. By means of the papers and documents heretofore submitted and those which accompany this communication, the precise situation of affairs in Samoa is laid before the Congress and such executive action as has been taken is fully exhibited. The views of the Executive in respect of the just policy to be pursued with regard to this group of islands, which lie in the direct highway of a growing and important commerce between Australia and the United States, have found expression in the correspondence and documents which have thus been fully, communicated to the Congress, and the subject in its present stage is submitted to the wider discretion conferred by the Constitution upon the legislative branch of the Government.

Gkoveh Cleveland.'' Executive Mansion,

January '«8

15, 1889.

Congressional Record, Vol.

XX,

The Committee on Appropriations

Part

2,

the Diplomatic and Consular Appropriation

"For the execution of the

Sess., p. 1283.

of the obligations

bill

in-

the following:

and the protection

of the interests

United States, existing under the treaty between the United States

and the Government

may

50th Cong., 2nd

reported, January 29, 1889, to insert

of the

Samoan

Islands, $500,000, or so

much

thereof as

be necessary, to be expended under the direction of the President, this appropriation to be immediately available. For the survey, improvement, and occupation of the bay and harbor of

Pago-Pago in the Island of Tutuila, Samoa, and for the construction of the necessary wharves and buildings for such occupation, and for a coaling station therem, under the direction of the President, f 100,000, this appropriation to be immediately available." For Congressional discussion of the Samoan situation, see (January 29, 1889) and pp. 1325 ff. (January 30, 1889).

Ibid., pp.

1283

ff.

CONGRESSIONAL MEASURES Pagoi89 which

had remained

as

it

was when

191.

first

transferred to the

United States in 1878. Realizing that afPairs in the islands had reached a

Bismarck concluded that

it

was important

critical stage/'"

for the three

powers to

come to an agreement concerning the future of Samoa. He therefore proposed to Lord Salisbury^'^ that the British Government unite with him in inviting the American Government to continue in Berlin the conference begun in Washington and to renew the 1" Congressional Record, Vol. XX, Part 2, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1290, January 29, 1889. Senator Sherman, of Ohio, after the lengthy discussion on the Samoan correspondence and situation, set forth the following recommendation:

"Mr. President, the conclusions to which I have come, without wearying the Senate any further, are that the first thing to be done is to assert our power and occupancy and possession of the Bay of Pago-Pago, and so much of the shores of the Island of Tutuila as is necessary for a coaling station. This is a mere rocky island, comparatively, of a few square miles, but it possesses this magnificent harbor, and one of the amendments of this bill proposes that we shall take possession of it, occupy it, erect a coaling station there and such other buildings as may be necessary. That ought to be done immediately, because it is manifest that whatever may happen in regard to controversies in the South Sea Islands, having secured by law and by treaty a foothold there, we ought to secure that, and not treat it as we have done our privileges in the Hawaiian Islands. The Government of the United States undertook, or started to do it some time ago, but without saying anything in respect to the mode in which it was defeated it was finally dropped out of the appropriation bill on the score of economy. If we had had a foothold in this bay as firmly and as strongly as the Germans have theirs in their bay, i beheve American interests would not be so endangered as they are today.

needs no war to protect the nation's rights. The mere assertion of those a due regard for them, the expenditure of. money there, the storing of all these are an assertion of power far coal there, the landing of vessels there more powerful, far more influential than protocols or diplomatic correspondence. That we ought to do." It

rights,

—

i™Carl Schurz, "Speeches, etc.," Vol. V, p. 1. (Also see Appendix.) Count von Arco-Valley, German IMinister at Washington, consulted Senatoi Schurz on the Samoan question. The Senator, speaking as a private citizea recommended that Count Arco advise his Government to allow the pubKcation of the protocols of the conference of 1887, which it had hitherto refused to do. The Senator recommended also that the German Government accompany its invitation to the conference in BerHn with the frank statement that the basis of the negotiations would be the autonomy of Samoa and the maintenance of all treaty rights. Count Arco informed Mr. Schurz that he would report these views to his Government.

the

German Government

isii

Both

Weissbuch, 1889, Achter Theil, No.

(C-5629), p. 276, No. 316.

13

of these actions were

taken by

in arranging the Berlin Conference. 1; also

A.

&

P.,

1889,

LXXXVI

192

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

attempt to end the

hostilities in

Samoa.

In making this proposi-

German minister was instructed to assure Lord Salisbury Germany did not aim to gain the islands for herself, nor to

tion the

that

put in question the equality of rights of the three powers there. On receiving the acceptance of Great Britain, Bismarck then submitted to Secretary Bayard^**^ his proposal that the United States " resume

with Germany and the British Government the consulta-

Samoan question." In extending this invitation, "any supposition that Germany neutral position in the Samoan with a satisfied

tion regarding the

the Chancellor declared that

would not feel Islands" was unfounded and that

it

was not Germanj^'s intention

" to put in question the independence of the island group, nor the

equal rights of the treaty powers."

On this basis

Secretary Bayard

accepted the invitation on the part of the United States,"^ with the added suggestion that the three treaty powers at once instruct their officers in

Samoa

to suspend

the decision of the conference.

all

belligerent action pending

Unless the free election of a new

king by the natives should alter them, affairs in to remain in statu quo during the

powers.

The

negotiations

Samoa were between the

proposals for the conference and Germany's assur-

ance that autonomy of the islands and equality of representation of the

powers should be the basis of the negotiations relieved to a

great degree the tension between the

States

and Germany.

Governments

Possibility of hostilities

of the

United

between the naval

was suddenly prevented by a great natural catastrophe, the famous hurricane of March 16, 1889, which destroyed the entire naval forces of the United States and forces stationed at the islands

Germany then

stationed in the harbor of Apia.^^*

"2 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 3, No. 3. "' Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 4, No. 4. 1" R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 541 ff. The naval vessels of the three powers

then anchored in Apia harbor were (American) the Trenton, Nipsic, and VandaUa; (German) the Adler, Eber, and Olga; (British) the Calliope. Of thirteen vessels assembled in the harbor the Calliope

was the

sole survivor.

After a vivid description of the storm Mr. Stevenson concludes

"Thus in what seemed the very article of war, and within the duration of a single day, the sword arm of each of the two angry powers was broken, their formidable ships reduced to junk; their disciplined hundreds to a horde of

:

.

THE CONFERENCE

OF^

BERLIN

193

The possible factors for danger having thus been removed, the Conference of Berlin was opened under favorable auspices which were soon realized in the success of the negotiators"^ in reaching terms of agreement. The American delegates were furnished with the following instructions :''^ castaways, fed with difficulty, and the fear of whose misconduct marred the sleep of their commanders. Both paused aghast; both had time to recognize that not the whole Samoan Archipelago was worth the loss in men and costly ships already suffered. The so-called hurricane of March 16th made thus' a markmg epoch in world history; directly and at once it brought about the congress and treaty of Berlin; indirectly sJnd by a process still continuing, it founded the modern Navy of the States. Coming years and other historians will declare the influence of that." '"^

Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 181, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., p.

7.

The Plenipotentiaries were as follows: The United States: Mr. John A. Kasson, of Iowa (Former Minister to Germany). Mr. William Walter Phelps, of New Jersey (Minister

to

Germany).

Mr. George H. Bates,

of

Delaware (U.

S.

Commissioner

to

Samoa,

1886).

Germany:

Count Herbert Bismarck

(Minister of State, Secretary of State of

Foreign Affairs).

Baron von Holstein (Actual Privy Councillor Dr. Krauel (Privy Councillor of Legation).

of Legation).

Great Britain Sir Edward Baldwin Malet (British Ambassador to Germany). Charles Stewart Scott (British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to

Joseph Archer Crowe

the Swiss Confederation).

Commercial Attach^ for Europe). Pqp instructions to the United States delegates see F. R., 1889, pp. 195 ff also resume of these instructions as presented by Secretary Blaine to Congress (Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 81, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1 to 6.) (British

196

.,

"They were instructed to be governed in the fulfilment of their mission by the most earnest assurance that the Government of the United States desired a speedy and amiable solution of all the questions involved; that, while it would steadily maintain its full equality of right and consideration in any disposition of these questions, it was as much influenced by an anxious desire to secure to the people of Samoa the conditions of a healthy, prosperous, civilized life as it was bound by its duty to protect the rights and interests of its own citizens wherever their spirit of lawful enterprise might carry them; that, in the cooperation of the three governments, the President hoped and beheved that frank and friendly consultation would strengthen their respect for each other, and the result prove that it was not the wish of any of them to subordinate the rights of the native Samoans to the exigencies of a grasping commerce, or to the political ambition of territorial extension on the part of any one of the powers maintaining treaty relations with them. They were further instructed that in consenting, at the request of the Emperor of

194

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

1. They were to ask for the restoration of the status quo^^'' "in order that the disturbance of the equal rights of the powers in Samoa, which had been caused by the intervention^^^ of Germany

and the deportation of MaUetoa Laupepa, might be removed and their footing of equahty restored. 2. They were to strive for "the organization of a stable governmental system for the islands whereby native independence and autonomy should be preserved free from the control or the preponderating influence of any foreign government.'"'"' Any intervention of the three powers should be temporary merely and "avowedly preparatory to tjie restoration of as complete independence and autonomy as was practicable." 3. They were to secure the settlement of the land question on some equitable and comprehensive basis which would save' a reasonable proportion of the territory for the natives. 4. They were to prohibit or regulate the importation and sale of firearms and alcoholic liquors.

'

Germany, to reopen at Berlin, the adjourned proceedings of the Conference of Washington of 1887, the President, while thus manifesting his entire coniidence in the motives and purposes of the German Government desired it to be borne in mind that the step was the continuance merely of the efforts already made toward an adjustment of pending questions, and not the initiation of a new conference on another basis, inasmuch as the Government of the United States could not admit the conditions directly influencing the deliberations of the conference of Washington to have been changed by any " subsequent occurrences in the South Pacific

1" Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 81, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., p.

"The

3.

status quo however, was not to be submitted as an ultimatum which would close the conference or prevent the President from considering any plan put forward as a substitute."

restoration of the

"« Ibid., p.

3.

"AVhile the President was unwilhng to consider that action of Germany, which immediately followed the suspension of the conferences at Washington as intentionally derogatory either to the dignity or the interests of the other treaty powers, yet he could not but regard it, under all the circumstances, as an abrupt breach of the joint relations of the three powers to ^ach other and to the Government of Samoa, and impossible to reconcile with the frank and friendly declaration of the German Government, preliminary to the meeting of the conference of 1887, that it intended to maintain the status as it had theretofore existed and had neither interest nor desire to change an arrangement found satisfactory to the three governments." ""Ibid., p. 3.

"Besides these evils necessarily attending the subordination of Samoan independence to any one predominant aUen interest, the United States could not consent to the institution of any form of government in those islands, subject, directly or indirectly, to influences wliich in the contingencies of the future might check or control the use or development of the right acquired on the part of the United States by lawful treaty to establish a naval station at Pago-Pago and to control its harbor to that end."

INSTRUCTIONS TO AMERICAN DELEGATES

193

5.. They were to use their own judgment on the subject renewing the municipal administration of Apia.

The

result of the conference^""

was

in the

main "entirely

of

in

accord with the instructions under which the American plenipotentiaries acted."2"i islands of

Provision was

Samoa should be

made

first of all

that the

considered a neutral territory in which

the citizens and subjects of the three signatory powers were to

have equal rights

of residence, trade

and personal protection.

Neither of the powers was to exercise any separate control over the

which were recognized as having an independent governThe natives of the islands were acknowledged to have

islands

ment.

the free right to elect a king or choose their forms of

according to their

own laws and customs. In view

conditions in the islands, however,

considered inadvisable, therefore

Samoa

it

Government

of the disturbed

an immediate election was was decided to restore to

monarch Malietoa Laupepa, who had three powers in former years. It was pro-

as king the former

been recognized by

all

vided that Malietoa's successor should be duly elected according to the laws

and customs

of

Samoa. ^"^

There were altogether nine formal conferences held in and June 14, 1889. The results were embodied in an agreement known as the General Act of the Conference of Berlin signed at Berlin, June 14, 1889. F. R., 1889, pp. 353 ff., also Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 81, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., ^'"'

Ibid.,

p.

4.

Berlin between April 29

™

p.

6

ff.

.

^» R. L.

S.,

Vol.

XIX,

p. 561.

"In the Berlin Act, the three powers recognize, on the threshold, 'the independence of the Samoan Government and the free right of the natives True the to elect their chief or king and choose their form of government.' text continues that, 'in view of the difficulties that would surround an election in the present disordered condition of the Government, Malietoa Laupepa shall be recognized as king unless the three powers shall by common accord otherwise declare.' But perhaps few natives have followed it so far, and even those who have, were possibly cast all abroad again by the next clause, 'and his successor shall be duly elected according to the laws and customs of Samoa.' The right to elect, freely given in one sentence, was suspended in the next, and a Une or so further on appeared to be reconveyed by a side wind." Sen. Misc. Doc, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. II, No. 81, p. 43. One exception was made in the event of such an election. At Count Bismarck's request it was agreed in the fifth session of the conference (and embodied in the protocol), that in view of the outrages committed upon German soldiers the Chief Mataafa should not be eligible to the kingship of Samoa.

,

196

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC to the native government

of foreign assistance

The problem

was adjusted in the Act by the establishment of a Supreme Court for Samoa under the jurisdiction of a single judge termed the Chief nominated by the three treaty powers, or ,2»3 if they could not agree, by the King of Sweden and Norway and his decisions were to be final. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was to include all questions arising under the General Act,

He was

Justice.

to be

including questions of rightful kingship, questions of the powers

claimed by any king or chief in the exercise of his versies

between the Samoan Government and any one

powers, and

who were

all civil suits

still

contro-

office,

of the treaty-

except those of crimes of those foreigners

imder the jurisdiction of their

own

consuls.

For the settlement of the land question the General Act provided that

future alienation of

all

Samoan

lands to foreigners

should, with certain exceptions,^"* be prohibited.

putes as to land

titles

a land commission

was

To adjust

all dis-

to be appointed, to

named by each of the treaty powers. by a "natives' advocate," appointed

consist of three persons, one

These were to be assisted

by the

ruler of

Samoa with

the approval of the Chief Justice.

labors of the commission were to be closed in if

The'

two years or sooner

practicable.

The municipality

Apia was redefined and placed imder the

of

jurisdiction of a Municipal Council elected district,

by the

residents of the

and a magistrate appointed by the Council.

were not to be

eligible as Councillors

by the Council were

but

to be submitted to

approval before becoming laws.

all

The

consuls

regulations passed

them

for

unanimous

Should agreement of the three

consuls not be reached, the matter in dispute

was to be

referred

«™F. R., 1889, p. 417. It was first arranged that the Chief Justice of to be named by the Lord Chief Justice of England and to be of English professional experience, but the United States Government objected to giving "one of the three signatory nationahties an appointment entailing so much poUtioal importance," and made the suggestion finally embodied

Samoa was

in this article of the treaty. 2»< F. R., Town lots in the MunicipaUty of Apia might still 1889, p. 357 f. be bought by foreigners, and agricultural tracts might be leased for not over

forty years, Justice.

all

purchases and leases to

first

receive the approval of the Chief

GENERAL ACT OF BERLIN, to the Chief Justice for final decision.

197

1889

The President

the

of

Municipal Council was to be agreed upon by all three powers, or failing this, was to be selected from the nationals of Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Mexico, or Brazil, and nominated by

own

the ruler of his

natioft.

Further agreements were

made

concerning methods of raising

revenue, the regulation of the sale of firearms and alcohohc hquors, etc.,

and inasmuch as certain

treaties of the

of these conflicted

Powers with Samoa,

it

with the several

was provided that

in all cases

of such conflict the present act should be considered binding, after

the Government of

Samoa should have given

its

formal assent to

the Act.

The Conference of Berlin did much to relieve the immediate the Samoan question. The negotiations were con-

difficulties of

ducted in a '

spirit of cooperation^"^

agreed upon by

all

in creating a plan of

™

and the basic

three nations, there was

little

government involving those

principles being serious difficulty principles.

The

F. R., 1889, p. 419. Mr. Kasson, American representative, paid the lowing tribute to Count Bismarck.

fol-

" 'I should neglect a duty, which is both an obligation and a pleasure, if I failed to express on the part of the American plenipotentiaries our appreciation of the important service, which His Excellency, Count Bismarck has rendered by his fairness and impartiality as our presiding officer. The conciliatory attitude which he has maintained, and the friendly spirit in which he has conducted the business of the conference have exercised the most beneficial influence on the deliberations which now touch their end, and demand our frank recognition.' 'I beheve that I interpret the sentiments of all the plenipotentiaries when I beg His Excellency to convey with him the assurance not only of our high appreciation of the official qualities which he has so usefully displayed throughout our proceedings, but also of the personal traits associated with them which have added a charm to official functions.' Sir E.

Malet

said:

'On behalf of the British plenipotentiaries I am anxious to say that we most cordially associate ourselves to the expressions which have fallen from Mr. Kasson, and that we desire that his words should be considered as coming equally from us.' Count Bismarck was anxious to express his warmest gratitude for the very He appreflattering words addressed to him by Mr. Kasson and Sir E. Malet. ciated and valued very highly the oomphmentary expressions uttered by them; but he considered that, if the conference had been able to perform work which would prove satisfactory to the governments concerned, it was mainly due to the loyal and conciliatory attitude of each and all of the plenipotentiaries and to the large amount of good work which they had done."

198

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

salient feature of the conference in the

demands

of the

was the acquiescence

United States.

of Germany^o^

In response to the request

the Mataafa forces by German forces in the The Tamasese government was

of Secretary Bayardj^"' the warfare against

was stopped and the islands were entirely

left

losses sustained

unexpiated.

abandoned.

Throughout the Conference equality

of

was emphasized and

all

representation of the three countries effort to utilize

Samoa

the "preponderating interests" of

Germany

in

was abandoned. The situation by Germany's restoration of the former

to obtain special treatment

on the islands was relieved

king Malietoa Laupepa and reestablishment of the status quo.^"^ 2«»

R. L.

S.,

Vol.

XIX,

p. 555.

"It was agreed so far as might be to obUterate two years of blundering; and to resume in 1889 and at BerUn those negotiations which had been so unhappily broken off at Washington in 1887. The example thus offered by Germany is rare in history: in the career of Prince Bismarck, so far as I am instructed, it should stand unique. On a review of these two years of blundering, bullying, and failure in a httle isle in the Pacific, he seems magnanimously to have owned his policy was in the wrong. He left Fangalii unexpiated; suffered that house of cards, the Tamasese government, to fall by its own frailty and without remark or lamentation, left the Samoan question openly and fairly to the conference; and in the meanwhile, to allay the local heats engendered by Becker and Knappe, he sent to Apia that invaluable pubKc servant. Dr. Stuebel. I should be a dishonest man if I did not here bear testimony to the loyalty since shown by the Germans in Samoa." Secretary Bayard himself testified to this attitude in a letter to Senator (From "Speeches," etc., Schurz, Vol. V, p. 16.)

Schurz.

From Thomas

F. Bayard.

Department of State, Washington, February 28th,

1889.

"Now

that I have succeeded in attracting Prince Bismarck's attention to the real condition of Samoa, I find his views and disposition very much as I expected them to be moderate and conciliatory. As I wrote you, the shopkeepers at Samoa got hold of ofBoial power and abused it, and the scene is so distant that the mischief was done before the facts were known."

—

.

2»'

.

.

F. R., 1889, p. 194.

">^

F. R., 1889, p. 198. If this had not been done, there would have been vigorous opposition on the part of the United States, as is evident from the following instructions to the American delegates.

"The President hopes that these opinions will receive the consideration to which he thinks them entitled. You will submit them to the conference with temperate firmness. If it be urged, as it may be, that this forcible mtervention has had consequences which practical good sense cannot disregard, because they can not be undone, you will say that the restoration of status quo is necessary to place the treaty powers upon their footing of equality.

FEATURES AND EFFECTS OF BERLIN CONFERENCE

199

The participation of the European nations in the administration of Samoa was focussed in the powers of the Chief Justice, but the disinterested character of that officer was secured by the stipulation that he be approved by all three powers or be appointed by a neutral nation.

In transmitting the agreement to the Senate

for ratification President Harrison declared,

" I am pleased to find in this general act an honorable, just, and equal settlement of the questions which have arisen during the past few years between the three powers having treaty relatiohs with and rights in the Samoan Islands."

From

other viewpoints than that of solving temporarily a

cult diplomatic situation, the Berlin ful.

In the

first

place

it

was a

diffi-

agreement was not so successself-contradictory instrument.

Starting out with a broad declaration of the independence of the

Samoan Goverrmient,

then proceeded to draw up a scheme of

it

administration which gave merely nominal recognition to the native executive and placed all real powers in the hands of foreiga officers. For instance, the natives were declared to have the free right to elect their

own king

according to their

own custom, but any

question over the rightful election was to be decided by the, Chief Justice.

Moreover, any question as to the validity of the powers

claimed by the native king was also to be decided by that foreign officer.

Justice

In

all civil suits

had the

between natives and foreigners the Chief

final decision

and might apply the code

of the

United States, England or Germany as he thought most appropriate.

The municipality

of

Apia was recreated and placed under The Act was therefore

|he control of the foreign residents there.

and does not prevent the treaty powers and Samoa from making any changes in the future which justice and an unselfish interest may suggest as necessary. The desire of the Government of the United States to see status quo reestablished as the basis for future deliberation and action in no way commits it to the partisan support of any plan or person. You will not submit this proposition as an ultimatum which would close the conference or prevent the President from considering any plan which

may

be suggested as a substitute.

But should the proposition be

rejected,

you will not accept such conclusion except ad referendum. You will communicate such result as promptly as possible, and the President will then decide upon the course which he deems it his duty to adopt, and you will be instructed accordingly."

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

200

no sense a guarantee

in

of the independence^"^ of the islands

rather a regulation of the foreign limitations placed

but

upon that

independence.

From

the viewpoint of American foreign poUcy, the Berlin

General Act was exceptional.

It.

committed the United States by

formal agreement to active participation with European powers in the administration of a neutral territory distant from its shores.

many

thousands of miles

Even the plan submitted by Secretary

Bayard at the Washington Conference, involving, as it did, a much slighter participation of the Powers, was declared by his successor. Secretary Blaine,^" to go

beyond the President's

desires

harmony with the established poUcy of the United States Government. The General Act, however, was an actual tripartite government,"^ a system which was not only contrary and

2"«

to be out of

F. R., 1894, p. 511.

report on "Affairs in the

Secretary of State

Samoan

Gresham stated

in 1894, in his

Islands:"

obvious that the machinery thus devised for the government of the It is true that inaccurately -styled an 'autonomous government.' in the first article of the act the contracting parties declare that they 'recognize the independence of the Samoan Government and the free right of the natives to elect their chief or King and choose their form of government according to their own laws and customs.' This declaration, however, only adds force to the fact that we may look in vain in all the comprehensive framework of the treaty for a single provision that secures to the nominal and unsalaried King or to the natives either independence or any substantial part in the exercise of the Government. AU these powers are in reahty discharged by foreign officials actually chosen by the treaty powers and backed up "It

is

islands

is

^

their force and their funds. The so-called 'autonomous goverrmient' is more than a joint protectorate. It is in substance and in form a tripartite foreign government, imposed upon the natives and supported and administered jointly by th^ three treaty powers. Such is the arrangement to which the United States, in the pursuit of its new policy, has committed itself for the purpose of securing the so-called neutrahty of these distant islands."

by

2i»

F. R., 1889, p. 201.

Referring to Bayard's plan, Blaine declared in his

instructions to the delegates to the Berlin Conference:

"This scheme goes beyond the principle upon which the President desires

Samoan Government based, and is not in harwith the estabhshed poKcy of this Government. For if it is not a joint protectorate, to which there are such grave and obvious objections, it is hardly less than that and does not in any event promise efficient action." to see our relations with the

mony

"' Ibid., p. 202. No provision was made that this government should" be temporary in character and preparatory merely to restoring complete selfgovernment to the natives, although the American delegates were instructed that it was the earnest desire of the President that any intervention in Samoa

,

:

RELATION OF BERLIN ACT TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY American foreign policy but contrary

to

the commissioners sent to

Samoa

in 1886.

201

also to the advice of all

Each

men had

of these

declared that a simultaneous participation of the three powers in the administration of

able

and a source

Samoa had been proved

to be impractic-

of international controversies.

No

provision

was made that this government should be temporary in character, although this was the earnest desire of the American President. The conclusion of the General Act of Berlin may be considered to complete the second period of the

The equaUty

Samoan diplomatic

of rights of the three nations in the island

history.

group had

been expressed ten years before in the separate treaties of each

power with Samoa.

That equality was now made emphatic by

formal treaty between the three powers, with the acquiescence

Samoa.

of

During the intervening decade, the commercial and

political interests of the three nations in the islands

had developed.

German commerce there had grown and with the strengthening of German colonial policy, that commerce received increasingly the support of the Imperial Government and

The United trade,

its

military forces.

States, through the general increase in its Pacific

and through the plans

for

an isthmian canal, had become

increasingly conscious of the importance of these islands to its

commercial future in the

Therefore, the State Depart-

Pacific.

ment opposed decisively any measures which it considered would in any way jeopardize its status of equality in Samoa Und especially its

hold over the harbor of Pago-Pago.

In instructing the Ameri-

can delegates to the Conference at Berlin, Secretary Blaine had declared^i^ that

"In any question involving present

should be merely temporary.

Lord Salisbury stated

or future

in his instructions to

the British Plenipotentiaries: reports which have been sent in to their governments by the respecConsuls-General, and the impressions which have been left by past experience in these islands do not leave to us much hope of the successful conduct of affairs by an aboriginal government acting under the simultaneous impulse of three rival but coordinate powers."

"The

tive

(A. 212

&

P., 1890,

Ibid., p. 201.

LXXXI

(C-5907), No.

9,

p. 6.)

In opposing the plan of placing the islands under any one

power as mandatory, the Secretary

of State

had asserted the following policy

obligation of the Government of the United States in the South Pacific is to protect the rights and interests of our citizens who may be resi-

"The

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND' GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

202

Government cannot accept even temporary subordination and must regard it as inconsistent with that international consideration and dignity to which the United States, by continental position and expanding interests, must

relations

in the Pacific, this

always be entitled."

role

Great Britain, while maintaining

all rights

Samoa, had played the of mediator between Germany and the United States. Annexa-

of British subjects

tion measm-es

New

and

their interests in

had been attempted by the British

colonies, particu-

home government, having come an understanding with Germany on the division of spheres

larly

Zealand, but the

interest in the

colonies

to of

South Seas, had discouraged the aspirations of the

and had given sanction to the German policy

in Samoa.^'^

dent there and engaged in any lawful pursuit. We have no desire to dominate, and every wish to develop a stable and just government. If there have been troubles and annoyance, they have not proceeded from any groundless hostility of the Samoan Government or the Samoan people. They have arisen and been fostered into mischievous activity by the avarice and eagerness of competing merchants and land speculators, and the irregular conduct of foreign officials who are, perhaps naturally and excusably but most injudiciously, sympathetic with the prejudices and interests of their immediate constituents, the resident foreigners. To convert the assumed supremacy of any one of these contesting interests into a legaUzed government of these islands, does not, in the opinion of the President, promise any rehef from the embarrassing dissensions which at present disturb the orderly condition of things. But there are other reasons why the Government of the United States cannot accept this scheme of subordination. The interests of the United States require the possession of a naval station in these remote parts of the Pacific, and by a treaty with the lawful authorities of Samoa they have been put in control of the harbor of Pago-Pago for these purposes. We cannot consent to the institution of any form of government in Samoa subject directly or indirectly to influences which in the contingencies of the future might check or control the use or the development of this American right. " Nor can the Government of the United States forget, what we are satisfied the other treaty powers will cordially recognize, that our interest in the Pacific is steadily increasing; that our commerce with the East is developing Idrgely and rapidly; and that the certainty of an early opening of an Isthmian transit from the Atlantic to the Pacific (under American protection) must create changes in which no power can be more, directly interested than the United States. And .

any question involving present or future relations in the Pacific, this government cannot accept even temporary subordination, and must regard it as inconsistent with that international consideration and dignity to which the United States by continental position and expanding interests must always in

be entitled."

House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., Mr. Sewall to Mr. Porter.

*i=

1st Sess., p. 61,

No.

56.

Consulate General op the United States, Apia, Samoa, August

15, 1887.

(Received Sept. 12.)

Sik:

have the honor to report that although, for reasons set forth elsewhere, there has been no meeting of the municipal board since my arrival here, the I

BRITISH-GERMAN ACCORD ON SAMOAN QUESTION

203

In reply to an interrogation concerning the Samoan situation, Sir J. Ferguson, British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Afi'airs,

had declared to the House of Commons in 1888^'* that he could not tell what the future of Samoa would be. The German people formed some of the best colonists in the British possessions. It

was not suprising "that the Government of Germany, with people spread all over the world, should have settlfed to some extent in colonies of their own, rather than altogether in those of Great Britain and the United States." The British people "ought not to view with jealousy the advent of the civilized powers to colonies

adjacent to their own." tiaries to the Berlin

In instructing the British plenipoten-

Conference, Lord Salisbury declared that the

Her Majesty's Government in taking part in the conwas merely to secure a stable government which could

object of ference

maintain tranquillity there and that the British interests in Samoa were "comraercial and not political."^'^

The German Chancellor openly acknowledged

j

the British-

union between the British and German consuls in support of the German candidate for municipal magistrate continues. The British pro-consul acts agaiiist his personal judgnient but under personal instructions to support the German candidate for six months from April last, These are not the first instructions from the British Government to its representative here that have strengthened the German hand and tended to German domination in Samoa. As early as April, 1886, Dr. Stuebel, German Consul-general informed Mr. Ruge, the associate German representative on the board, that Count Hatfefeldt had written Berhn that the British foreign office had instructed its representative here to act with the Germans. In September, 1886, written instructions to this effect were exhibited by the British consul. These instructions went further and instructed him to request the then magistrate, a British subject, to resign. I enclose a copy of an extract from a letter called forth by this action, written by Sir Robert Stout, Premier of New Zealand, to Sir F. D. Bell, agent general for that colony in London. There is from another source confirmation of English' support of the Germans, and indirect encouragement to the rebels here. In a letter referred to in my dispatch numbered 10, written by Meisake, interpreter and clerk at the German consulate, dated June 1, 1887, and addressed to Mataafa, Chief of Atua, it is affirmed that, 'by will of Great Britain and Germany, Germany's desires here will be approved and carried out.' I have, etc.,

Habold M. Sewall." (See also inclosure Sir E. Malet,

— account

of interview

between the British Minister,

and Prince Bismarck.) and 185.

2» F. R., 1889, pp. 184 216

A.

&

P., 1890,

LXXXI

(C-5907), No.

9, p. 6.

204

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

German Entente on

the colonial question.

In an address before

the Reichstag in 1889 Bismarck announced:^"

"In Zanzibar as in 'Samoa we are in absolute unity with the English Government and with it we are going hand in hand,^'^ and I am firmly resolved to hold fast to these relations." In further emphasis he continued ''This impression chief thing

is,

according to

my

—

political conception, the

just as in other colonies, in

Samoa

for

example

—

hold unquestionably to the accord with the English Government, and to the resolve, as soon as we are in agreement with the same, to go forward together, and as soon as we are that no longer, to refrain or to act with restraint. I consider England as the old, 2>« V. R., 1889, Bd. Ill, 27. Sitz., 26. Januar, 1889, S. 618 (B.) and S., 619 (B). This speech was rendered during the first discussion of a biU concerning slave

traffic

and protection

of

German

interests in

East Africa.

(Translation

by

author.) "' A. & P., 1889,

LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 279, No. 322. Lord Salisbury took exception to this statement by the Chancellor as hable to misconstruction, and expressed the following modification as his view of the situation. No. 322.

The Marquis

of Salisbury to Sir. E. Malet.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1889. "Sir: In speaking to Count Hatzfeldt today, I referred to the speech delivered by the Chancellor in the Reichstag on Sunday last. I expressed the satisfaction with which I had read the language appKed by the Chancellor to the value which he attached to the good understanding between the two governments. The only comment which it was at all necessary for me to make, other than that of entire sympathy and concurrence, appHed to a remark of his Highness, as to the attitude of the two countries with respect to Samoa. His statement, that in regard to that matter the Governments of Great Britain and Germany were going hand in hand, might be open to misconstruction. It was entirely correct to say that our views were in agreement as to' the arrangement to be put in force for the government of these islands in the future, but in the conflict which existed at present between the German Government and a certain portion of the inhabitants, it could not be said that we were going hand in hand with Germany. We were maintaining an attitude entirely neutral, and were in no degree concerned in or responsible for the action which the German Government thought it right to take. Count Hatzfeldt expressed himself entirely in accord with me as to the accuracy of the correction and said that he had no doubt that when the Chancellor used that expression, he was speaking of the more permanent arrangement with respect to which the views of the two governments were

the same. I

am, &c., (Signed)

Salisbury."

OPERATION OF THE GENERAL ACT traditional

ally,

when

ally,

no

say

I

treaties

205

with whom we have no conflicting interests; that is to be taken in a diplomatic sense; we have

with England; but

I

wish to hold fast also in colonial

questions to the feeling which

we have had with England for at least one hundred and fifty years. (Bravo on the left.) And if it were to be shown to me that we were losing that, then I would become cautious and seek to prevent the

The

third period of

difficulties of

Act.218

loss."

Samoan diplomacy was

characterized

by the

putting into operation the stipulations of the General

At the base

of these difficulties

was the reluctance

of the

natives to submit to a centralized government, or to the restrictions of

any government. Being averse

were required to

collect these

to taxes, coercive measures

—the warrants of the Supreme Court

went unheeded and the Treaty Powers were compelled to send men-of-war to enforce the rulings of the court. In 1893 revolutions broke out again requiring the of the treaty powers.^^'

and the order

armed

interference of

all

three

In order to uphold the rule of Malietoa,

Mataafa and several insurgent

of the islands,

chiefs

were deported to the Marshall Islands and retained there at the expense of the three governments. Difficulties also arose concerning the powers of the Chief Justice^^" as in conflict with those of the President of the Municipal Council,

who had

relationship of the Chief Justice to the Consuls

"*F. R., also A. 219

&

LXXXI

F. R., 1894, p. 512

also a source of

For diplomatic correspondence on

'94, p. 511.

P., 1890,

was

and

(C-5907), p.

594

ff.

CIX

and

1893,

The

British

by The

been- given

the Treaty the power to act as adviser to the native king.

this period, see

(C-6973).

and German Governments

agreed to disarm the natives by force, but the United States objected on the ground that such measures were unnecessary and hkely to frustrate the good

651 and 655.) Chief Justice, Mr. Cederkranz, was a Swede, appointed according to the terms of the treaty by the King of Sweden and Norway. The President of the Municipal Council was a German subject the BerKn Conference. ^"F. R., 1894, p. 512. The

effects of

(Ibid., pp.

first

Baron Senfft von Pilsach. Both of these became involved in difficulties connected with their powers, with questions of currency and the management Mr. Henry C. Ide, an American, former of the Treasury, etc., and resigned. member of the Land Commission, was proposed by Germany and endorsed by aU three governments as Mr. Cederkranz' successor in the position of Chief Justice.

Mr. Schmidt, former German Vice-consul at Apia became President

of the Municipal Council.

206

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

difficulty^-' as

was the power

of the President of the

Municipal

Council over the native treasury.^^^

The

troubles culminated, at the death of the old king Malietoa.

Great Britain suggested even before this occurred, that in view of

Powers should

possible troubles arising from this event, the Treaty

The

consider arrangements for the selection of his successor. ^^^

United States maintained that the Berlin Treaty clearly stated the right of the

own

Samoans to

own king

elect their

according to their

custom, and that the United States would abide by this and

would support the choice

The

of the people.

British

Government

concurred in supporting the treaty stipulations, but suggested that the treaty powers through their consuls might arrange the

manner

Germany shared

of procedure.

States considered

Meantime

as

an

it

"undue

influence

this view,

but the United

and violation

of the treaty."

groups of the natives,

offset to certain

who were

assembling against the old king, the former chief Mataafa and his

companions were, by agreement

back to Samoa

loyal to Malietoa

and

of the three powers,

brought

promise that they would remain

after signing a

At the death

his successors.

of the old king,

however, this agreement was ignored and Mataafa claimed the kingship,224 his

opponent being the king's son Malietoa Tanu.

Following the provisions of the Berlin Act, the matter was placed

hands Mataafa had in the

who rendered

of the Chief Justice,

the decision that

at the time of the Berlin Conference

to be ineligible for the kingship,^^^

Malietoa Tanu.

The adherents

of

been declared

which should therefore

fall

to

Mataafa refused to accept the

decision, declared war, defeated the Malietoa forces in conflicts

involving considerable

damage

to the property of Europeans, and

established themselves in possession of the Government.

Chief Justice and Malietoa

,

'

"' F. R., 1894, p. 735 ff. '^ F. R., 1899, pp. 605 ff.

™ Sen.

Misc.

Doc,

51st Cong.,

Tanu

The

himself were given refuge on

222

p.

r^

224

a.

& p.,

i895, (2), pp. 1136 ff. 1899, (0^9506), p. 2.

1st Sess., Vol. II,

CX

No.

81, p. 43.

This

was brought forward by Count Bismarck during the fifth session of the Conference; it was approved by the British representative, and no objections were raised by the American. See note 202, also A. & P., 1899, stipulation

CX

(C-9506), p. 3.

INSURRECTION OF MATAAFA board the British war

vessel.

207

After several conferences between

the foreign consuls, the naval commanders, the Chief Justice and the President of the Municipal Council, it was decided to recog-

Mataafa and his party, then in de facto possession of the government, to constitute the Provisional Government of Samoa, pending instructions from the three Treaty Powers.^^e Notwithstanding this decision, the American and British forces at Apia, nize

desiring to support the decision of the Chief Justice,

and thus

enforce the provisions of the Berlin Act, gave active assistance to

the

IVfeilietoa

forces.^"

Malietoa adherents were brought from

various parts of the island to Apia and furnished with arms and

ammunition.

For the protection of American and British citizens and property in Apia, marines and sailors patrolled the streets and the American naval vessel "Philadelphia," assisted by the British ships "Porpoise"

and "Royalist;" opened

made

these activities were later tration.2-*

The Mataafa

forces

across Apia, bomDamages caused by

fire

barding the Mataafa forces behind the town.

the subject of international arbi-

were in great strength and

it

was

evident that the local

officials were unable to control the situation, which meant that the authority of the Berlin Act was being defied.

The

island affairs claimed, therefore, once

of the

more the intervention

home governments.

CX

2» A. & P., 1899, (C-9508), p. 3. 2" Sen. Doc. No. 85, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., p.

9, also

F. R., 1899, p. 616.

By

exchange of notes, August 23rd, 1899, the German and British Governments agreed to submit to arbitration the claims presented by individuals or companies for damages inflicted by the mihtary action of British or German officers at Samoa at this time. The United 228

F. R.,

1889, p. 670

ff.

States accepted the invitation to cooperate in this settlement, and became signatory to a convention for this purpose, November 7, 1899. The King The decision rendered of Sweden and Norway accepted the role of arbitrator.

by Oscar II, on October 14, 1902 (See M., II, p. 1595 or F. R., 1902, p. 444) was in favor of Germany. The military action of the British and American forces on the islands at the time of the revolution was considered unwarranted, and the British and American Governments were, therefore held responsible The amount of claims allowed for the losses incurred through these activities. was finally placed at $40,000, of which the United States and Great Britain each paid 820,000. 14

(See Sen. Doc. No. 85, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. III.)

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

208

agreement of the three powers^^' a second Samoan Commis-

By

sion was sent to the islands for the purpose of "restoring tranquiUity and order therein." Identic instructions^^" were issued to the commissioners, directing them to undertake the provisional Government of the islands, for which purpose they were to exercise supreme authority in Samoa. Consular and naval officers were

ordered to submit to their decisions, which were not necessarily

by the Berlin Act. No act of the commissioners, however, was to be vaUd unless acceded to by all three.^'^ After securing temporarily a condition of peace in the islands they were to be governed

to consider plans necessary for the future

government

Though

for the modification of the Berlin Act.

its

of

Samoa

or

purpose was,

main, the same as that of the Commission sent by the three

in the

governments to the islands in 1886, the conditions of procedure were very

different.

The Commission of 1899 was given temporary

sovereignty in Samoa, and the unity of action on the part of the

members was not only recommended but required. The work of the Commission in Samoa was efficient and

three I

fy]

232

their

-pj^g

^^Q

jjy^i native factions

success-

were induced to surrender

arms and ammunition to the Commissioners and to disband

their forces.

Tanu was

The former decision of

the rightful king,

the Chief Justice that Malietoa

was upheld

but to solve the immediate practical

was abolished

entirely.

as a matter of principle,

difficulties,

the office of king

This met with approval from the natives,

^'^'Witte, Emil, "Ten Years of German-American Diplomacy," p. 54 f. According to Mr. Witte, at this time an attach^ at the German Embassy, the suggestion of sending the commission was first made privately by Lord Pauncefote, the British Ambassador at Washington. Von Holleben, German Ambassador, quickly secured the consent of his Government to the plan and also the consent of Secretary Hay. According to this author, Lord Pauncefote wished a simple plurality vote to determine the vaUdity of any resolutions of the Commissioners. Von Holleben, however, iasisted that unanimity be secured before action of any kind should be taken. =»» ="1

F. R., 1899, p. 614

ff.

The Commissioners appointed were as follows: Mr. C. N. E. EUot, C. B., Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington. For Germany Freiherr Speck von Sternburg, Counselor of Legation and First Secretary of the Embassy at Washington. For the "United States: Mr. Bartlett Tripp. F. R., 1899, p. 615.

For Great Britain:

:

^^ F. R., 1899, pp. 621

ff.

:

JOINT COMMISSION OF 1899 for

whom

form of

tribal organization

209

under High Chiefs was the normal

society, the kingship

having been an artificial creation produced under the influence of foreigners. The Commissioners then gave their attention to a careful study of conditions in the islands, the causes for the finally

prolonged

Samoa and

difficulties in

agreed upon recommendations which they considered would

be "if not entirely satisfactory, at least workable."

General Act of Berlin as a modifications, the of the native king,

basis,

most important

of the executive

administrator, to be chosen from assisted

by a

of which, besides the

were the aboHshment

and the estabhshment

Using the

they introduced a number of

power

some

removal

of consular jurisdiction,

hands of an

in the

disinterested

power and

council of delegates from the three governments.

Ha\ang framed this scheme as the best one they could devise under the tripartite principle of control, the commissioners then recorded in their joint report their opinion^'^

^i^^^ "^jjg ^j^iy

natural

and normal form of government for these islands, and the only system which can assure permanent prosperity and tranquillity, a government by one power." The American Commissioner, Mr. Tripp, reemphasized this viewpoint in his private report to is

Secretary Hay.^^*

"I am by no means sanguine," he wrote, "that the form proposed will produce the effect desired, for, while I have no doubt that any one of the great powers could easily govern these islands in the manner proposed, I fear their ability to do so when acting together, and I cannot forbear to impress upon my Government not only the propriety but the necessity of dissolving this partnership of nations which has no precedent for its creation nor reason for its continuance. It will produce national jealousies and endanger the friendly relations that have so long existed between the powers. Considerations of national welfare should terminate this unusual alliance at the earliest moment that it can be done with proper regard for the rights and interests of the powers concerned."

A

Samoa

similar stand in opposition to the joint control over

was taken

five years previous

by Secretary

Concluding a report to Congress on Samoan

of State,

afFairs,^'^

Gresham.

he stated

»

235

^^ Ibid., p. 659. F. R., 1899,p. 638. Earlier in the report (p. 509) Secretary F. E., 1894, p. 513.

Gresham

210

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

"Soberly surveying the history of' our relations with Samoa we may inquire what we have gained by our departure from-our established policy beyond the expenses, the responsibilities, and the entanglements that have so far "been its only fruits. One of the greatest difficulties in dealing with matters that lie at a distance is the fact that the imagination is no longer restrained by the contemplation of objects in their real proportions. Our experience in the case of Samoa serves to show that f oi? our usual exemption from the consequences of this infirmity, we are indebted to the wise policy that had previously preserved us from such engagements as those embodied in the General Act of Berlin, which, besides involving us in an entangling alliance, has utterly failed to correct, if indeed it has not aggravated, the very evils which it was well

designed to prevent."

The

many

objections to tripartite control over the island group had

German officials and when after the report of the 1899,^'* the move was made to dissolve the " entang-

times found expression by British and

special commissioners.

Commission

of

ling aUiance," it

Therefore,

found favorable sentiment in

all

three countries.

gave further expression to his disapproval of the participation of the United States in the administration of Samoa.

"In reviewing this chapter in the history of our relations to Samoa, fraught with so much peril to our 'safety and prosperity,' we look in vain for any compensating advantage. So far as the departure from our early and conservative policy had produced any appreciable result, it had been one of unmitigated disadvantage. It certainly cannot be maintained that the condition of the natives was improved by our interference. On the other hand, no interest of our own had been promoted. The whole trade of the islands is of small value, and of this only an insignificant part is with the United States. We have never found it necessary to interfere in the affairs of a foreign country in order to trade with it."

™

Thayer, Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 220. Concerning the results of the Commission, Secretary Hay, wrote to Henry White, September 9, 1899..

"We are on the best of terms about Samoa; Sternburg backed up Tripp in everything. It was rather the English Commissioner who was offish. The Emperor is nervously anxious to be on good terms with us on his own terms. Men enlendu."

—

The American Commissioner

also wrote of

von Sternburg

(F. R., 1899, p.

634):

"I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the German member of the Commission. With one less experienced, less honorable and conscientious, representing the great Empire of Germany, our task would not only have been difficult, but I fear a hopeless and unprofitable one."

PARTITION OF THE ISLANDS

211

The move was made by the German Government.

It strongly

urged^" thg partition of the Islands, "the United States to retain Tutuila and adjacent islets, and England and Germany to divide the rest." Secretary Hay replied immediately that the President

was "disposed to regard

this proposition favorably if details could be satisfactorily arranged with due regard to the national interests^'^

and to the welfare

of the inhabitants."

Meantime the German and

British governments were negotiating concerning the disposition

—

between them of the remainder of the group the difficulty being, as Lord Salisbury stated, that there were " three parties to divide

and

really only

two

islands to be divided."

For

after setting apart

Tutuila for the United States, the only other island of value was

Upolu on which Apia was situated. The result of the negotiations was the conclusion of a preliminary agreement^'' between Great 2»'

F. R., 1899, p. 663 S.

^' F. R., 1899, p. 662. The American Commissioner, Mr. Tripp, in his final, individual report to Secretary Hay, expressed the opinion that the American national interest in Samoa centered in the island of Tutuila.

"The importance of the Samoan Islands, however, lies not so much in their commercial advantage as in their geographical location. They are in the great future pathway of commerce, and their importance in this respect can not be overestimated. I cannot impress upon my Government too strongly the necessity of its undivided possession of this harbor (Pago-Pago). It is the only one worthy of the name on the islands. The harbor and the entire island should be under our individual control. A coaling station within the harbor, or the harbor alone would be of httle value. The modern coaling station must be fortified, and to do this the adjoining bay of Leone must be had with its connecting peninsula. In short the whole island must be had; and it would, in my judgment, be a wise policy to give our alUes and the world to be informed that our interests in Samoa center most closely about Pago-Pago and the island of Tutuila, and that we should not look with favor upon any effort on the part of any nation to interfere with our rights or make them less available for future requirements of the nation, by curtailment of our interests in the harbor or in the island itself. Negotiations between England and Germany have been several times had to exchange the the individual interests of the one for the sole possession of other island properties. So far as I am informed, the proposition has been only to surrender to Great Britain the German interests. This Germany wiU probably decline to do so long as the German firm retains its interests in the large German plantations; but recently, it is said, large offers have been made by British capitalists for these properties. Should this result be brought about, it would undoubtedly follow that Germany would exchange her Samoan interests for some British island interests, and the United States, which has so long been the buffer power between these two great nations, would be in a position to ask for a severance of the joint rule we have so long maintained contrary to all our former national pohcies and traditions." .

.

.

,

2" F. R., 1899, p. 665.

.

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

212

Britain and

Germany,

standing colonial issues rights over Tutuila

Samoan

which a new settlement of many outwas made. Both countries renounced their in

and Great Britain renounced

group, receiving in return from

tion of the latter's rights in the

all

Germany

Tonga and

rights in the

the renuncia-

parts of the Solomon

Islands.^*"

The preliminary agreement between Great Britain and Germany was followed a few weeks later by a Convention of all three powers concluded in Washington, December 2, 1899.^^1 The General Act

and

of Berlin

ments, relating to

all

previous treaties, conventions and agree-

Samoa were

Germany renounced

annulled.

in

favor of the United States all rights over the Island of Tutuila

and

all

other islands of the

in favor of the

Samoan group

east of Longitude 171

Great Britain made a similar renunciation

west of Greenwich.

United States.

States renounced in favor of

Reciprocally thereupon the United

Germany

the Islands of Upolu and Savii and

all

group west of Longitude 171 west of

and claims over other Islands of the Samoan Greenwich. It was further all

rights

agreed that the three signatory powers were to continue to enjoy all

of either of

all

may

ports which

them."

by

the

be open to the commerce

,

In surveying the is

" equal to tho§e enjoyed

Samoan group

privileges in the

sovereign power in

Samoan

situation as a whole, the conclusion

evident that this outcome though taken on the initiative of

Germany was

favorable to the United States.

what the United States Secretary

of State

Although possessing acknowledged to be

"only an insignificant part" of the trade of the Samoan Islands, it

secured

less in

full

control over a part of the island group which, though Germany, contained " the finest

area than that retained by

harbor in the South Pacific." "» Thayer, "Life of Hay," Vol. "i F. R., 1899, p. 667.

potentiaries

Secretary Hay^*^ considered Tutuila

II, p.

281.

(See footnote No. 242.)

The Convention was signed by the

following pleni-

:

For the United States: John Hay (Secretary of State). For Germany: Von HoUeben (German Ambassador). For Great Britain: Lord Pauncefote (British Ambassador). 2« Thayer, "Life of

Hay," Vol.

II, p.

281.

>

CONVENTIONS OF 1899

213

to be " infinitely -the

most important of the islands " and the most useful to the United States, and declared that the United States Navy Department, which had for a long time been anxious for this solution, was delighted with the outcome of the negotiations. In addition to the fact of the value of Tutuila, was the fact that the United States, having Uttle commercial interests in the islands

Hay

to Joseph

H. Choate.

November "I

was kept quite

in the dark

up

to the last

moment

28, 1899. as to the arrangement

made between Germany and England. The newspapers have announced, without the least reserve, that England was to keep Samoa and Germany get the Gilbert and Solomon Islands, or, as the boys with a natural reminiscence of the 'opera bouffe,' called them, 'The Gilbert and Sullivan.' I should have been glad if you had squandered a httle of the public money, letting me know by telegraph the true state of the case. It is a satisfaction to me to know that Lord Salisbury assured you that equal rights as to trade and commerce would be reserved for the other Powers in Samoa, and of this he was informed by your letter before the German Embassy received the authentic news that the arrangement had been made. Germany, it is true, has been excessively anxious to have the matter concluded before the Emperor's visit to England, and, in the intense anxiety, I am inchned to think they have somewhat lost sight of their material interests in the case. Our interests in the archipelago were very meager always excepting our It is interests in Pago-Pago, which was of the most vital importance. the finest harbor in the Pacific and absolutely indispensable to us. The general impression in the country was that we already owned the harbor, Seeing the intense anxiety of but this, as you know, was not true. the Emperor that the negotiations should be hastened, I sent at his personal request the dispatches which you have received; assured that all our interests would be safeguarded and knowing also that in case the arrangement proposed was not satisfactory, we always had the power of a peremptory veto. Our Navy Department has for a long time been very anxious for this consummation, and of course, they are delighted with it. Tutuila, though the smallest of the islands, is infinitely the most important and the most useful to us. The argument from size, which the Sun makes so much of, is hardly worth a moment's consideration. An acre of land at the corner of Broad and Wall Streets is worth something like a million acres in Nevada. The proof that size has nothing to do with the case is that Savaii, by far the largest of the islands, was considered by Germany and by England as entirely worthless. .

.

.

.

.

.

.

My

own

opinion

and that she was Secretary

Hay

is

Germany has the least valuable bargain of the by her sentimental eagerness into a bad trade."

that

led

also

.

three

gave public expression to his satisfaction over the out-

come of the Samoan question in an address before the Commerce, November 19, 1901.

"We

.

New York Chamber

consider our interests in the Pacific Ocean as great

any other power and destined

to indefinite development.

now

We

of

as those of

have opened

our doors to the people of Hawaii; we have accepted the responsibility of the Phihppines which Providence imposed upon us; we have put an end to the embarrassing condominium in which we were involved in Samoa, and while abandoning none of our commercial rights in the entire group, we -have established our flag and our authority in Tutuila, which gives us the finest harbor in the South Seas."

214

SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC

renounced to Germany, and retaining

still

equal opportunities to Secretary

trade there, lost practically nothing in the transfer.

Hay

considered that

Germany had made "the

least valuable

bargain of the three," and was probably led into doing

it

by her

have the Samoan and other colonial questions settled with the British Government before the Emperor's visit to England. Whatever the reasons, the proposition was the result of an arrangeCjagerness to

ment between Germany and England. The United States merely accepted the offer made by agreement of the other two powers. The whole of the third period of Samoan diplomacy was characterized by better feeling between the treaty powers in regard to their interests in the islands. Germany, at the time of the Berlin treaty, apparently abandoned all attempts to make her "preponderating interests" the basis of policies of administration in the islands. residents of

There continued to be the participation

Samoa according

of the white

to their nationalities in the disputes

But the representation of the three powers by the Berlin Act, so that, although a means to control the native Samoans, it was not

of native factions.

had been

fairly well regulated

defective as

without value in relieving friction between the foreign governments.

however, as a practical means for maintaining

Its failure,

law and order in the of the difficulties

gave renewed evidence to the powers^*'

islands,

of

There was therefore

continuing a tripartite little

opposition

was presented by Germany.

By

government

when the plan

there.

of division

the removal of a long continued

source of controversy, this solution had a favorable effect on the relations

between that country and the United States.

The long

history of the

Samoan controversy

demonstration of the contrasting foreign policies of the United States.

With Germany the Samoan

German commercial developments

gives a clear

Germany and

Islands and the

there were merely a factor of

a great expansion system, a factor therefore to be both supported utilized by the home Government toward that end. The United States' object in the islands was the retention unquestioned

and

2« F. R.,

Congress.)

1899, p.

XXVI

ff.

(President McKinley's

Annual Message to

CONTRASTING POLICIES OF GERMANY AND UNITED STATES

and unlimited

of the harbot of

for trade already established

and the British

colonies,

and

215

Pago-Pago as a protective point

between the American west coast

for the increased trade expected after

the building of an Isthmian Canal. also directed

The American policy was toward preserving the independence of the islands.

As we have

seen, therefore, throughout both the negotiations of

the

home governments and

the activities in Samoa, the American was on the defensive. The German Government, on the other hand took constantly the offensive in measures in and con-

policy

cerning the islands.

the native Samoans.

The contrast is marked in the treatment The German authorities dictated terms

of

to

the native kings and did not hesitate to resort to military measures if

their

terms were not promptly met.

tives at

The

The American representano time exacted by force concessions from the Samoans.

different attitudes of the

two nations toward self-government

With the Germans the problem was always as to how a strong government could be secured. With the Americans the problem was how an independent native governments*^ might be maintained. The Germans do not appear to have misrtded the Samoans. Reports from non-German sources testify to the well-kept plantations and the general well-being of the workers, but the rule was to be thoroughly German and favorable to German interests. The rights of the natives did not factor in the measures adopted. The effect was clearly reflected in the measures initiated from time to time by the Samoan chiefs. Several attempts were made by them to secure annexation of the Islands by either Great Britain or the United States. But there is no record of a Samoan king or council appealing for annexation to Germany. were demonstrated.

'

•

2" Root, " Military

and Colonial Policy of the United States," pp. 161 and Mr. Root, American Secretary of War, voices clearly the Americ'an Government's principles of colonization. In his report for 1899 on Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, the Secretary writes: 162.

"I assume, also, that the obligations correlative to this great power are of the highest character, and that it is our unquestioned duty to make the interests of the people over whom we assert sovereignty, the first and controlling consideration in all legislation and administration which concerns them, and to give them, to the greatest possible extent, individual freedom, self-government in accordance with their capacity, just and equal laws, and opportunity for education, for profitable industry, and for development in civilization."

CHAPTER

VI

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR The

years from 1897 through 1900 represent the time of greatest

between the United States and Germany in the forty-year period under consideration. Dr. Andrew D. White, who was sent on his second mission to Germany in 1897, testifies in his Autofriction

biography to the marked change of sentiment in that country from the time of his earher mission in 1879.^ relations of

18702

Berlin, however,

prevailed.

still

At that time the

Upon

his

second

cordial

arrival in

he found public opinion generally adverse to the

The

United States, and among some classes bitterly

hostile.

German

and featured

press

was overwhelmingly

and scandals The American press replied in kind, pub-

whenever possible accounts in the United States. lished

anti-German

anti-American

articles

anti -American editorials

of administrative frauds

and

editorials,

and republished the

from German newspapers.'

The

hostile

attitude toward the United States

was not confined to the press and to the rival commercial interests, but was shared by men who stood high at German universities and who had once been warm friends of America.*-

1

White: Autobiography, Vol. II, p. 144 ff. I, Relations between the United States and the German

See Chapter Empire, 1870. "

*Witte: Revelations of a Sitz.,

11 Feb.,

'99,

p.

German

Attache; pp. 30

ff.

V. R., '98-00, 30

808.

^ See Chapter IV, Commercial Relations. Commercial Relations of the United States, 1899, Vol. VII, p. 244. Mr. Frank H. Mason, American Consul General at Berlin, wrote the following comment in his report of September 20, 1899.

"It

is

not to be denied or overlooked that while the attitude of the Imperial

Government towards our country has been uniformly correct, there is in certain business circles here a feeling of enmity and resentment which did not exist prior to 1898. The heavy balance of trade which the United States now

•

CAUSES OF FRICTION

A

number

217

combined to create this hostile atmosphere. Fundamental was the increasing economic rivalry between the two countries and the legislative measures enacted by the two of causes

governments to protect their to a

head at

this time.

seemed to come The American cattle-raisers and meatrival trade interests

packers were embittered by the

German

decrees of prohibition

against their product, and the American fruit-growers had a similar grievance. American life insurance companies were excluded from Prussia. American lumber and oil interests were protesting

at the preferential rates granted

by German government-owned

railways to products from Austria and Russia.^

On

the other

hand German sugar-growers resented the American surtax on sugar from bounty-paying countries which they considered a discrimination.

German manufacturers who had

considered the

McKinley tariff as ruinous to their interests were bitterly hostile over the new Dingley tariff, which went still further. At the same time they were so dependent on American raw materials that they could not retaUate effectively against the United States.

The

Agrarians were American rivals of long standing and the increase of American food exports increased their opposition and their demands on the government for restrictive measures. There was also a

widespread fear of American commercial penetration of

Germany and an United States.

anxiety over the trade balance in favor of the

Almost the only

class as

such which showed any

holds against the Fatherland, the deohne in textile exports and the sharpened customs regulations against undervaluation, the concessions recently granted to France, and above all, the enormous growth of American manufactured exports, the aggressive competition of American metal and other products in South American and Eastern markets all these weigh heavily on the hearts of the people here, and will be heard from when the new tariff and treaties come to open debate in the Reichstag. What most enlightened thinkers expect, or at least hope for, is that out of all these mutations will come a broad, liberal, comprehensively framed treaty, or series of treaties, between the United States and Germany, in which all the vexed and irritating questions relating to naturalized citizenship, countervailing duties, and port charges on vessels shall be regulated and liberal justice to imports of food products secured by reciprocal concessions and embodied in permanent conventions between the two countries."

—

5

See F. R., 1896, 1897, 1898 and 1900 for correspondence on these subjects.

Also, see Fisk, G. M., in Journal of

223

ff.,

and White: Autobiography,

Political

Economy, March,

Vol. II, p. 158

ff.

1903, pp.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

218

sympathy with the United States was that of the Social Democrats and other radicals.^ In the poUtical field a number of important questions were still pending. The Samoan situation had not yet received its solution through the division of the islands and was still a source of friction.

Germany had taken_Kiao-chao and, with the subsequent by the other European Powers, the dispiemberment of

In China, seizures

that empire was threatened and the United States had not yet secured from any of these nations a declaration agreeing to maintain the integrity of

commerce

China and to establish the "open door" to

there.

The most immediate and

direct factor, however, in creating

Germany at Germany during the war with

unfriendly relations between the United States and this

time was the attitude taken by

From the' very outbreak of the war the pubhc sentiment Germany was pro-Spanish and the United States was looked

Spain. in

upon

as the oppressor of a small nation in a

The cause

of the

war unjustly provoked.'

Cubans, so appealing to the public in the United

States, seems to

have been totally disregarded.

This was true

not only in the case of Germany but throughout the continent of Europe, and significant evidence of the general attitude was given in the joint note^ presented to President

McKinley by the

repre-

'V. R., '98-00, Bd. I, 3 Sitz., 12. Dez., 98S.,27D. VonHaUe: "Deutsohland und die oeffentKche Meinung in den Vereinigten Staaten,'' Preussjsche Jahrbuecher, Bd. 107, 1902, p. 205. 'V. R., '98-'00, Bd. I, 3 Sitz., 12. Dez., '98 S., 25 D. White: Autobiography, Vol. II, p. 168. Witte; Revelations of a German Attach^, p. 30 ff. «

F. R., '98, pp. 740

and

741.

Joint

Note

'op

the Powers Washington, April

6,

1898.

"The undersigned representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, duly authorized in that behalf, address, in the name of their respective Governments, a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain. They earnestly hope that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford in Cuba.

all

necessary guarantees for the reestablishment of order

The Powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and purely

disinterested

SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF SPAIN sentatives of the six powers, Great Britain, ,

219

Germany, France,

Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy, appealing to him to maintain peace.

This note was presented by the powers on the grounds of

humanity.

President McKinley's reply was in substance that

the United States shared their wish for peace, but

if

it

should

would be on the same grounds of humanity. John Hay, then Ambassador to Great Britain, testified to the antiAmerican sentiment on the continent, where he declared sympathies were openly against the United States. This he condeclare war,

it

trasted with

Enghsh public sentiment, which was predominantly

pro-American.^ character of this representation will be fully recognized and appreciated the American nation.

Julian Pauncefote, For Great Britain. Jtiles

Cambon,

For France.

Db Woulant,

'

by

Holleben, For Germany. von Hengelmuellee, For Austria-Hungary. G. C. Vinci,

For Russia.

For Italy."

The President's Reply "The Government of the United States recognizes the good will which has .prompted the friendly communication of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein expressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between the United States and Spain by affording the necessary guaranties for the reestabUshment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition of disturbance there, which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the tranquilhty of the American nation by the character and consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sentiment of humanity. The Goverimaent of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the powers named, and 'for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has become insuiferable." Powers was not presented in more vigorous form is A similar address was presented two days later by the same nations at Madrid, supporting the Pope's plea for an armistice. Spain yielded and ordered hostiHties in Cuba suspended. (See Benton: "International Law and Diplomacy of the SpanishAmerican War," p. 89.) ' Letters and Diaries of John Hay, Vol. Ill, pp. 119 S. Hay to H. Cabot Lodge. American Embassy, London, April, 1898. "Dear Lodge:

That the note

of the

said to have been due to the influence of England.

i

do not know whether you especially value the friendship and sympathy I think it important and desirable in the present state of

of this country.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

220

Germany drew upon

herself in particular the

resentment of the

Many

United States because of her actions in the Far East.

Americans were convinced that Germany United States of the

The immediate

fruits of victory

and

intended to rob the

seize the Philippines.'"

cause of this feeling on the part of the pubUc was

Dewey-von Diederichs episode in Manila Bay. Though extensively featured by the press and causing

the

hostile feehng, especially in the

so

much

United States, the story was not

by the chief actors untiV fifteen years afterward, wheii Admiral Dewey pubhshed his Autobiography and Admiral von Diederichs repHed with his own account^' of the controversy. Admiral told

—

the only European country whose sympathies are not openly will not waste time in discussing whether the origin of this feeling is wholly selfish or not. Its existence is beyond question. I find it wherever I go not only in the Press, but in private conversation. For the first time in my life I find the 'drawing room' sentiment altogether with us. If we wanted it, which, of course, we do not, we could have the practical assistance of the British Navy, on the do ut des principle naturally. I think, in the near future, this sentiment, even if it amounts to nothing more, is valuable to us. You may imagine what it is to be, absolutely without light or instruction, compelled to act from day to day on my own judgment, and at no moment sure of the wishes of the Department. What I should have done, if the feeling here had been unfriendly instead of cordially sympathetic, it is hard to say. The commonest phrase is here: 'I wish you would take Cuba at once. We wouldn't have stood it this long.' And of course no power on earth would have shown such patience, and such scrupulous regard for law." things,

as against us.

it is

We

—

—

—

.

Ibid.

Hay

to

.

.

H. Cabot Lodge.

American Embassy, London, May 25,

'My dear Lodge:

1898.

The state of feeling here is the best I have ever known. From every quarter, the evidences of it come to me. The royal family, by habit and most careful not to break the rules of strict neutrality, but even among them I find nothing but hearty kindness, and, so far as is consistent with propriety— sympathy. Among the poUtical leaders on both sides, I find not only sympathy but a somewhat eager desire that the other fellows shall not seem the more friendly. Chamberlain's startling speech was partly due to a tradition, are

'

'

conversation I had with him, in which I hoped he would not let the opposition have a monopoly of expression of good- will to America. He is greatly pleased with the reception his speech met with on our side, and says 'he don't care a hang that they say about it on the Continent.' i«

V. R., '98-'00, 30

"Von

Sitz., 11 Feb., '99, p. 791, p. 808.

A

Statement of Events in Manila Bay: Translated by permission from Marine Rundschau and pubhshed in Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. LIX, No. 437, August, 1914, pp. 421 to 446 inclusive.

Diederichs:

DEWEY-VON DIEDERICHS EPISODE

221

Dewey

calls his chapter "A Period of Anxiety." The Spanish had been defeated but the battle had depleted Dewey's stores of ammunition to such an extent that he could not have met the emergencies of another engagement, and in this situation he was

fleet

confronted with the knowledge that a stronger Spanish squadron

was on

way and with

its

assembling a powerful over,

was showing

the realization that another nation was

fleet in

Manila harbor.

That

nation,

more-

determined to ignore his authority and inclined to fraternize with the Spanish officials in Manila. Having itself

decided to allow visiting naval vessels every privilege admitted

under international law to neutrals in a blockaded harbor, permitted

Dewey

war to enter the harbor, insisting only on the right of boarding them to estabhsh their identity. The British, French and Japanese vessels acquiesced, and on their all

foreign ships of

Dewey and asked where German vessels, on the other hand, omitted this etiquette and moved about the harbor as they chose, taking soundings. On its entering the harbor at night Dewey found it necessary at times to halt a German vessel by firing a shot across its bow. The German ofiicers frequently visited the Spanish troops first

entrance to the harbor reported to

they might anchor.

—

and outposts, where they were paid marked attention the talk town of Manila being that Germany would intervene in favor of Spain. Vice-Admiral von Diederichs himself had paid an of the

oflScial visit to

at night.

the Spanish captain-general,

According to

Dewey no

who

returned his

call

other senior foreign naval

Admiral Dewey had not even made mention of the controversy in his In his autobiography he states (Chap. XVII, p.

reports to the Department. 252):

"At a dinner given me at the White House upbn my return home President McKinley mentioned the repeated statements in the press about the friction in my relations with Vice-Admiral von Diederichs, in command of the German Asiatic squadron.

'There is no record of it at all on the files,' he said. 'No, Mr. President,' I answered. 'As I was on the spot and familiar with the situation from day to day, it seemed best that I look after it myself, at a time when you had worries enough of your own.'"

Dr. White, American Ambassador to

Germany has stated that no explanaGerman Government by the United 1907, cited by Latan6, America as

tions of the episode were sought from the States.

(Washington Post, April

World Power,

p. 38.)

17,

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

222 officer

had made such an

exchange of

official

Most

Spanish chief of command.

visits

with the

disturbing to the American

commander, however, was the fact of the increasing number of German naval vessels which kept arriving in the harbor. Within one week there were five German men-of-war in Manila harbor, two of them having a heavier displacement than any of Dewey's

own

Beside these a

ships.

German

transport, the

"Darmstadt,"

had arrived bringing as reUef crews for the German vessels a force of 1400 men, nearly equal to the total number of Dewey's own crews. While the "Darmstadt" received Dewey's permission for this transfer, it did not add to the American commander's peace of mind that the transport remained at anchor in the harbor It was in reference to Admiral Dewey's question

for four weeks.

concerning the presence of the large

German

that Admiral von Diederichs was said to have

by order

here

of actual controversy

between the two commanders an officer on board

right of the blockading force to send

each neutral war vessel to establish it

am

of the Kaiser, sir."

The subject was the

force at Manila

replied, " I

to enter the blockaded zone.

its

identity before permitting

This right Admiral

Dewey claimed

under international law, though he disclaimed any intention of exercising the technical "droit de visite" search.

neutral

which involved

Admiral von Diederichs denied'^

war

vessels, holding that

if

rights of

this right of boarding

a neutral warship was admitted

within the zone, then the belligerent had no more authority over the ship than during peace; that there was no requirement to report the arrival of neutrals to the blockading party; that the

only requirement was that of an

command

official visit

by the

officer in

—a duty with which he had complied.

as in time of peace

Correspondence on the subject was exchanged, in which Dewey

quoted several authorities on international law his

position.

who -supported

Admiral Dewey then relates that Admiral von

Diederichs notified him that he would submit the point to a conference of

" Von

all

senior officers of men-of-war in the harbor, but that

Diederichs:

Royal United Service

"Statement of Events Institution, Vol.

in

Manila Bay;"

LIX, No.

437, p. 430.

in Journal of the

"

CONTROVERSY ON RIGHTS OF BLOCKADING SQUADRON

223

only one officer appeared, Captain Chichester, the British senior

According to Dewey, Captain Chichester held that the American commander was acting entirely within his rights and that he had received instructions from his government to comply

officer.

with even more rigorous restrictions than Admiral Dewey had laid down. Admiral von Diederichs gave a radically different account of the proceedings, stating that he communicated individually with the French, Austro-Hungarian and Japanese officers, that they agreed with him that the boarding of a neutral war vessel

was not permissible and they gave orders identity.

to refuse visits to establish

In the case of Captain Chichester, the German Admiral's

account states that though

first agreeing with Dewey, he was convinced of the correctness of von Diederich's stand." This does not seem in keeping with the subsequent actions of the

later

British Admiral. The controversy was finally settled by a ruling forwarded to the German commander from his home government (upon agreement with the government of the United States)

instructing that " for the future, and, as a rule, prior to the arrival

German

of

ships of

war before blockaded

ports, the

ships should be

communicated to the commander

ading squadron,

when

names

of

such

of the block-

that will be required will be for these

all

to exchange signals with the

commander

ron or his representative."

of the blockading

squad-

This ruling thus steered a middle

German and American comAdmiral Dewey had in the meantime expressed, in an

course between the views of the

manders. "

Ibid., p. 440.

Describing the interview with Captain Chichester, Admiral von Diederichs wrote: " He brought with him a work deahng with blockade, and endeavored to prove, by showing me several paragraphs, that Dewey's assertions were justified. In every instance I was able to prove that his book referred only to merchant ships. On being asked, he admitted the phrase 'inquiries necessary to estabhsh identity' as implying 'search for evidence.' I then asked him the question what he would do were an officer of another nation to endeavor thus to act against him, and received the reply, I would fire on him.' He then admitted that a search was unpermissible, that only a polite questioning could be allowed, and that this could go no further than the officer questioned chose to allow, and he added: 'If the officer does not take my word for it the worse for him.' .

.

.

'

15

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

224

interview with a young

German

officer," his rights

in regard to the blockade in vigorous

instructed the officer to convey these to Admiral

After this incident, as

Dewey

and

intentions

and unmistakable terms and

himself records,

von Diederiehs. "there was no

further interference with the blockade nor breach of the etiquette

which had been established by the common consent

of the other

commanders. The account of Admiral von Diederiehs was written as an answer^^ to that of Admiral Dewey, as a defense of the German

foreign .

" Ibid., p. 438. The young officer referred to was a Lieutenant Hinze. Admiral von Diederiehs gives this officer's account of the interview in which, as Hinze describes it, he listened and Dewey talked.

"Then suddenly Admiral Dewey exclaimed angrily, 'Why, I shall stop each vessel, whatever may be her colors; And if she does not stop I shall When the fire at her, and that means war, do you know, Sir? etc., etc' words 'if Germany wants war' and so on were repeated, I took my departure.' I received the impression from this trivial matter that the explosion material engendered for some time past in Admiral Dewey through mistrust rumors and press reports, was on the point of going off!" Admiral von Diederiehs then comments on this interview as follows:

"Admiral Dewey knew well enough that a declaration of war could not emanate either from him or from me. I put down this behavior toward a young officer, who was interviewing him as the representative of a foreign commander, as due to the burden of his responsibility as commander of the blockading squadron and the nervous strain." This attitude of excusing Dewey's behavior on the ground of his difficult and unenviable situation at Manila is characteristic of the general tone of the von Diederiehs account. Dewey's own account of the interview reads as follows:

(Autobiography, p. 267):

"On

the following day Vice-Admiral von Diederiehs sent a capable, tactful young officer of his staff to me with a memorandum of grievances. When I had heard them through, I made the most of the occasion by using him as a third person to state candidly and firmly my attitude in a verbal message which he conveyed to his superior so successfuly that Vice-Admiral von Diederiehs was able to understand my point of view. There was no further interference with the blockade or breach of the etiquette which had been established by the common consent of the other foreign commanders. Thus, as I explained to the President, after the war was over, a difference of oiJinion about international law had been adjusted amicably, without adding to the sum of his worries."

« V. R., 1914, Bd. 293, S. 7505, 19. Februar, 1914. After the pubhoation Dewey's Autobiography, the subject of the Manila controversy was brought by Mr. Erzberger (Center Party) before the Reichstag. In the course of a discussion of the naval budget, Mr. Erzberger spoke as follows (translation of

by

author):

"If I am rightly informed the American Commander proceeds from quite false premises. He speaks of a blockade. I know nothing of the fact that

ADMIRAL VON DIEDERICHs' ACCOUNT

225

Admiral's actions at Manila and as an explanation of the presence of the German forces there. Admiral von Diederichs takes up point for point the incidents related by Dewey, and in some cases offers his

explanation and in others gives direct contradiction.

the main he stresses the following points official

:

First, that there

In

was no

announcement to him of the establishment of a blockade. of Manila had been announced to the Spanish

The blockade

May 1, but its contents were first commuGerman consul, at his request, by the GovernorGeneral on May 10. But that neither to the German commander nor to the German consul was there made directly or indirectly Governor-General on

nicated to the

any declaration of blockade from the American side announcing the time of commencement, the limits of the blockaded territory, etc., as required

by

international law and as carried out

States on the coast of Cuba. the Spaniards in Manila tion as a neutraP^

by the United

Secondly, that the intercourse with

was merely that due

and to the customary

official

to

Germany's

posi-

observation of con-

a blockade was estabKshed at Manila, at least nothing of the kind has been On the occasion, however, he made against the German officer, the well-known Admiral von Diederichs, quite serious reproaches. Now that is in itself not to be taken so seriously; for when a man has been victor in so great a sea-fight as took place fifteen years ago at Manila (amusement) then he is conscious of himself (dann fuehlt er sich); he looks at everything through a magnifying glass. Such things often occur in memoirs. I only wish that these very colored (tendenzioesen) representations, which allow our German officers to appear as quite inferior officials who haven't a glimmer or a notion of international law, or of marine law, or of decorum should be confronted with the necessary evidence from official German sources, and that we do not permit this unpleasant impression to be in any way strengthened by our silence. Personally I can still give expression to the conviction that the officer in command of our squadron during the war in the Philippines cannot deserve the slightest reproach. That is my firm conviction and I have reason to express it. But if this is so, then those in official positions should lay aside all timidity and speak the truth." published.

.

.

.

.

.

.

In reply Admiral von Tirpitz informed the Reichstag that Admiral von Diederichs intended to issue a complete publication of the events of that (This was published in the Marine Rundschau.) "Ibid., p. 431.

time.

Von

Diederichs records that he had two

official

interviews with the Governor-

General:

"I paid an official visit to the Governor-General of Manila just as I did to Admiral Dewey. The Spanish flag waved over Manila and under its folds lived very many Germans and others under the protection of Germany. The Governor-General behaved towards these in an indulgent and friendly manner; but even had this not been the case, I should have regarded it as a

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

226 ditions of warfare. in

Thirdly, that the

movement

of

German

and around the harbor was in no way different from that

vessels

himself and Admiral

Dewey was soon smoothed

vessels in the harbor of

the protection of

over and cordial

Finally, the presence of the first

relations restored. ''

war

Fourthly, the controversy between

other neutrals.

of

German

ships of the

German

Manila was due to the necessity

nationals during hostilities.

The

for

pres-

ence of the increased force was due to exceptional circumstances breach of international etiquette had I, for any trifling reason, omitted to greet the leading representative in the place of one of the great European nations living in peace with the German Empire. That would have been to behave, not in a neutral, but in a brutal manner. According to agreement, General Augustin returned my visit the same day at the German Consulate."

—

Von Diederichs was told that the French Admiral did the same but he did know about the other neutral commanding officers. Concerning the visits of German officers to the Spanish, von Diederichs states (p. 432) not

"The officers took a professional interest, as did other neutral officers, in following the course of the operations between the Spaniards and the rebels. I was inclined to sanction the gratification of this wish so long as no breach of neutrality was occasioned. No complaints on this matter reached me. certain acquaintance with the terrain in which the operations were carried on was acquired by tlie officers, but in this case there was nothing improper, and no possible injury could be done to anybody but the Spaniards."

A

"

Ibid., p. 444.

Admiral von Diederichs

'

relates:

"The relations with Admiral Dewey soon took on a more friendly complexion The Admiral sent me a present of some mutton from a transport bringing frozen meat for the American forces, and owing to the want of fresh meat experienced during the blockade, the change was very welcome. I made a return with a Uve calf which I had received from Hong Kong. Thus a dead sheep and a Uve calf formed something of the nature of a sacnfice on the altar of friendship."

The German Admiral then quotes a letter received from Admiral Dewey the following year in reply to von Diederichs' congratulations on Dewey's promotion. U.

S.

Naval Forces on Asiatic

Station Flagship Olympia, Manila, P. I., 16 April^ '99.

"Dear Admiral von Diederichs:

wish to thank you most heartily for your cordial letter of congratulamy promotion. It is a great pleasure to me to feel that my advancement is a source of satisfaction to you, and I rejoice that our differences have been of newspaper manufacture. Hoping to have the pleasure of meeting you again before leaving the station, I

tions

I

upon

.

am

,

Very (Sd.)

sincerely,

George Dewey, Admiral U.

S. Navy, Com'ding U. S. Naval Force on

Asiatic Station."

:

ADMIRAL VON DIEDERICHs' ACCOUNT

227

which von Diederichs then proceeds to explain, chiefly on the ground that, it being necessary to maintain one or two vessels there for the protection of

German

citizens, it

to bring the transport and supply ship "

and have the other

seemed advisable

Darmstadt "'^

to that port

come from Tsing Tao to the "Darmstadt" for their relief crews and supplies. Realizing that this might awaken unfortunate suspicions, he had taken care to vessels

Dewey

explain to Admiral extra ships.^'

the reasons for the presence of the

In general, von Diederich's account of events seeks

to minimize the significance of

and to account

at that time

German

activities in the Philippines

for the hostile

and suspicious

feelings

engendered by attributing them to Dewey's natural anxiety over

and to the unfortunate rumors circulated in Manila that Germany intended to come to the rescue

his isolated position

town

the

of

of the Spaniards there. ^° It

is

difficult to

toward the validity

understand Admiral von Diederichs' attitude of the

blockade in any other light than that of

'* Ibid., Admiral von Diederichs states that the "Darmstadt" had p. 427. been ordered to Manila before any intention of the American attack on the PhiUppines had been issued, and that, being unarmed and filled with recruits and stores, it could only be regarded as a source of weakness because of the

protection

it

required.

Admiral Dewey asked Admiral von Diederichs if Prince Henry, then about to visit China, were coming to Manila and the Admiral von Diederichs rephed in the negative. The German Admiral then continued 1'

Ibid., p. 427.

'I then joined in and explained the reason of my arrival and of the coming of two more German ships. The expression, 'I have come here by orders of the Emperor' may then have been used, but only in the sense that only a direct order had brought me there, not a wish to add to the forces before Manila and with the addition of the conjecture that the alarm created among the Germans threatened by the insurgents may possibly have aroused a wish in the highest quarters to obtain from me personally an impartial verdict as to the actual danger of the situation. The expression is used and is, indeed, customary among German officers, since the orders for the movement of the ships on foreign stations are authorized after being reported to His Majesty, and are accepted as Royal Commands. I certainly did not use in their almost '

threatening sense the words, 2»

'I

am here by order of the Kaiser,

Sir.'"

Ibid., p. 445.

"A misdirected

public opinion in Manila had expressed a wholly unjustified and thus a mistrust of Germany's intentions was aroused. Many newspapers, especially those published in Enghsh on the East Asiatic Coast, spread abroad all rumors having a mistrustful reference

hope

to

of

German

Germany."

assistance,

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

228

-the desire to oppose permit.

it

so far as technical interpretations would

The German admiral even

goes so far as to declare that

"there was never any 'effective' blockade at Manila."

This does

not harmonize with Dewey's statement, not contradicted by von Diederichs', that

all

merchant

were stopped at the harbor

vessels

warned

entrance, informed of the blockade and

with

off,

unless laden

in which case they were allowed entrance and their

coal,

The war

cargo purchased for the American squadron.

neutral nations were admitted as an act of courtesy.

vessels of

That they so

recognized this was evident from their acquiescence in Dewey's

measures and their policy of reporting to him

oiji

entering the bay

and asking him to assign them anchorage. Then, too, the very grounds of the complaint which Admiral von Diederichs addressed

Dewey, namely, that

to

across the

bow in

of stopping

order to force

of the efEectiveness of the

the

German Government

shown

German

vessels with a shot

them to report

is

evidence in

American admiral's blockade.

did not question

in the instructions sent to

its

itself

That

effectiveness^^

is

Admiral von Diederichs directing

German ships before arri\dng at blockaded ports should report to the commander of the blockading squadron. The Qerman admiral and the officers of the other German vessels seemed that

determined to ignore Dewey's authority in the bay and the existence of the blockade so far as

Three months

bay

it

was

after the naval battle,

for the taking of the

town

of Manila.

were notified to move out of the probable

and French

The

do

so.

proceeded up the

foreign men-of-war

line of fire.

The German

vessels took positions to the north of the city,

British Captain (Chichester) followed

town and placed foreign fleet.

possible to

Dewey

his

Dewey's

fleet

but the

near to the

two warships between the American and the

This act was not only deeply appreciated by Admiral

Dewey but was

featured and cheered in the American press as

evidence of the British sj-mpathies for the United States in the 2' Witte: Revelations of a German Attach^, p. 31. Mr. Witte states that Dr. A. von Mumm, German minister at Washington during the absence of Ambassador von Holleben, confessed to him privately that in the von Dieder-

ichs controversy the fault lay

on the German

side.

EFFECT OF GERMAN ACTIONS AT MANILA

229

This sentiment was supported by Ambassador Hay, who wrote from Londotfs to Senator Lodge that if the United States wished it could have the practical assistance of the British navy. war.22

-

The controversy between

the two commanders was of short

duration, aad would have excited httle States

had

it

comment in the United not been interpreted by the American press and

pubhc to be indicative not only of anti-American sympathies on the part of Germany but also of that country's intention to annex the Philippines. While there was much opposition in the United States to the retention of those islands

by the American Governthem taken by a strong power which had definitely embarked on a colonial

ment,2*

still

there was greater opposition to having

policy in the western Pacific.

had acquired her

In the preceding decade Germany

large colonial possessions in Africa,

and

in agree-

ment with Great Britain had divided the remaining unclaimed islands of the West Pacific into British and German spheres of interest for purposes of colonization.^"

she had annexed the north coast of

New

During the same period Guinea and the adjacent

^ Dewey: Autobiography, p. 280. Admiral Dewey also records the fact that upon this formal notification to the foreign commanders of the American occupation of the city, Captain Chichester was the only commander who acknowledged the notification with a national salute of twenty-one guns. 23 Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 165 (see footnote 9). ^Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, pp. 198 and 199. Among the opponents of annexation, which was termed "imperialism," were Senator G. F. Hoar, Senator Carl Schurz, Charles Francis Adams, Charles Ehot Norton and Edward Atkinson. Mr. Hay, then Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. Whitelaw Reid November 29, 1898:

"There is a wild and frantic attack now going on in the press against the whole Philippine transactions. Andrew Carnegie really seems to be off his head. He writes me frantic letters signing them 'Your Bitterest Opponent.' He threatens the President, not only with the vengeance of the voters, but with practical punishment at the hands of the mob. He says henceforth the entire labor vote of America will be cast against us and that he will see that it is done. He says the Administration will fall in irretrievable ruin the moment it shoots down one insurgent Fihpino." For the Senate opposition to Annexation see Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 733, 921, 1211, 1239, 1241, 1299, 1348, 1349, 1479, 1480, Senator Schurz believed the 1485, 1486, 1529, 1678, 1740, 1741, 1830. Philippines should be placed under a guarantee of neutrality by the powers having interests in the Islands. (See Schurz, Speeches, etc.. Vol. VI, p. 37.) 2' See Chapter V, Samoa.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

230 islands.

In Samoa the German interests had come into

contact with

those of the

United States.

direct,

Just the year before the

Manila episode Germany had taken the port of Kiao-chao

in China,

extending her influence through the province of Shantung, and the Kaiser's brother. Prince Henry, visit to

Kong.^*^

was at that time paying an

the Orient with his squadron and being feted at

The German

in the Pacific.

Government was openly asserting

its

official

Hong power

Moreover, Germany had in the previous decade

negotiated with Spain over the Caroline Islands, and, while this

by Spain, new Germany and Spain

controversy resulted in the retention of the islands negotiations were being conducted between at this time."

There would therefore have been nothing contra-

dictory to the policy pursued

by Germany up

to that time in the

inclusion of the Philippines in the colonial program.

It

was evident

The United States had colonies. The Philippines

that Spain was about to lose the islands.

always shown

itself

averse to foreign

would therefore be unattached. feeling that

Consequently the American

Germany's aims extended to

natural foundation.

Though

it

this island

group had

seems, therefore, most probable

that Germany's colonial ambitions in this region included the Philippines, they

^°

Dewey:

were not considered by the Imperial Governments^ Autobiography,

p.

185.

Admiral Dewey met Prince

Henry

frequently during this visit and relates the following:

"Upon one occasion, in discussing the possible outcome of our complications with Spain, Prince Henry remarked that he did not beHeve that the powers would ever allow the United States to annex Cuba. 'We do not wish to annex Cuba, your Highness,' I answered, 'but we cannot suffer the terrible condition of affairs which exists at present in that island at our very doors to continue, and we are bound to put a stop to it.' 'And what are you after? What does your country want?' the prince asked jokingly on another occasion, in referring to the general scramble for a foothold in the Far East. 'Oh, we need only a bay,' I said jokingly in return, having in mind that this was aU the Germans said that they wanted at Kiau Chau. It did not then occur to me that we should be taking Manila Bay permanently."

"V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. II, 54 Sitz., 11. Maerz, 1899. Von Diederichs: Events in Manila, Journal' of Royal United

2'

Service

LIX, No. 437, August, 1914, p. 424. Admiral von Diederichs declares in his account that on being ordered to Manila he had no pohtical instructions, that only one utterance from the Foreign Office in regard to the question of the Philippines came to his knowledge. This stated that the Institution, Vol.

GERMANY AND THE PHILIPPINES sufficient to

warrant

231

direct, open^' opposition to the policy

the United States in the' islands.

of

As a demonstration of her

acquiescence in the American authority in the Philippines, Ger-

many

shortly after the taking of the

ships, except for

German of the

one

town

of

Manila withdrew her

from the islands and placed the

cruiser,

nationals and their interests there under the protection

United

States.'"

That Germany was seeking more islands in this region, however, the Imperial Government made no attempt to deny. The policy became quite clear in the purchase of the CaroHnes.'^ In March, Kaiser had altogether disclaimed any idea of the establishment of a German protectorate over the PhiHppines. The German Admiral holds that this declaration was probably called forth by the "irresponsible allusions" current against

German

intentions in the islands.

Revelations of a German Attache, p. 61. Mr. Witte then employed by the German Embassy at Washington under the title of "Councillor of Legation/' testifies to Germany's indirect opposition to the He states: acquisition of the Philippines by the United States. 2'Witte, Emil:

"I can testify, however, to the fact that between the Filipinos and the Foreign Office in Berhn there was a secret alliance which was brought about by Professor Blimientritt, pubUcity agent in Prague for the insurgent natives fighting for their freedom. Only a few days before the German interests in the PhiUppines were placed under American protection, I received, to translate, or perfect for the press, an official order which Professor Blumentritt had prepared for Count von Buelow about the Filipino uprising. This account contains the most intimate details of the means of defence and reserves of the FiUpinos, the ways and means of their arming and equipment, their possessions in munitions and means of sustenance, the personnel of their leaders, etc., etc., and_ends with the prophecy that the Americans would never subjugate the Filipinos, who, besides, would be glad to put themselves under a German protectorate. This last remark of the professor explains in part the polite attention which George Dewey and the American fleet received from Admiral von Diederichs. When I expressed my surprise that the Ambassador should publish such an article at a time when Germany was seeking the protection of America for its interests in the Phihppine Islands, I received the following very significant answer: 'We must not allow America to become too large.'" All support of the Filipinos as against the United States was emphatically denied by Secretary von Buelow before the Reichstag. (See V. R., 18981900, Bd. I, 30 Sitz., 11. Feb., '99, S. 794 D.

V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. I, 30 Sitz., 11. Feb., '99, S. 795. F. R., '99, p. 302. Revelations of a German Attach^, p. 60. 'Mr. Witte declares that Germany had Herr Speck von Sternburg to thank for the acquisition of the CaroUnes. Baron von Sternburg was temporarily in charge of the German Embassy during the war and was on friendly terms with Mr. Roosevelt. 30

"Witte:

The German attach^

states that

it

was through the personal influence

of

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

232

(member of the Freisinnige Volkspartei) questioned the Government in the Reichstag^^ as to whether it was true, as stated in the foreign press, that the German Government was conducting negotiations with the Spanish Government con1899, Dr. Richter

cerning the sale of the Caroline Islands. of the Foreign Office, replied that

anything

definite.

little profit

in

He

Von Buelow,

he was not prepared to report

considered, moreover, that there would be

an academic discussion of the question whether the

acquisition of these or those South Sea Islands

German

interests.

The

Spain should have been

when

would make

situation could first be taken

sideration after the peace treaty

Later,

Secretary

up

for

for con-

between the United States and

ratified.

the treaty with Spain ceding the Caroline, Pelew

and Marianne Islands was brought before the Reichstag,'^ Secretary von Buelow set forth the government's reasons for their acquisition in the

and the relation

West

Pacific.

of these islands to the

Through the

German

policy

acquisition of the Carolines, he

made formed had complete. Up to this time, the Secretary stated, they an extended, disconnected semicircle; now that circle was closed and formed a connected whole. If these islands had gone out of the possession of Spain into the possession of another power than explained, the

German

possessions in the South Sea were

Germany, he pointed out that the German colonial territory (Schutzgebiet) in the South Seas would have been split up and its von Sternburg with Roosevelt that the United States withdrew the Caroline and Pelew Islands (except Guam) from its territorial claims. Mr. Witte is probably mistaken in this, since at the time of Germany's acquisition of the Carohnes (by treaty concluded with Spain, February 12, 1899) Mr. Roosevelt was Governor of New York and could hardly have influenced President McKinley's foreign pohcy to such an extent. '2 V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. II, 54 Sitz., 11. Maerz, At the time ,1899, S. 1490. of Dr. Richter's question the

German agreement with Spain concerning

Carolines had been in existence for a month. 1899.

It

was signed on February

(See V. R., 1898-1900, Vol. Ill, Anlagen, p. 2503.)

the 12,

Dr. Richter in

opposing the purchase of more colonies declared that he considered it selfevident that such a treaty of purchase could not be concluded without the consent of the Reichstag. It is interesting to note that the agreement deter-

mining the price and all other considerations was signed the previous month. » V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. Ill, pp. 2695 S-

GERMAN POLICY development checked. political interests

From

in the

IN THE PACIFIC

233

German

the standpoint of

general

South Seas, therefore, Secretary von

Buelow declared that this new extension of the German sphere of power there was useful and necessary and the situation of the newly acquired islands was particularly favorable. Finally he

who

advised that those members of the Reichstag

considered

the price too high should remember that in questions of large

must be weighed besides the exact number of the inhabitants.

policy other considerations

value of the territory and

Secretary von Buelow then declared that this present treaty

with Spain acquiring the Carolines resembled the treaty with

China concerning Kiao-chao and Shantung, in that both treaties were milestones on the same road and links of a chain. In both cases Germany had proceeded calmly (ruhig), soberly (nuechtern) and deliberately

He

(besonnen).

said

that

however, for the government to see to disturbed in no

way Germany's

it

it

had been

that this

new

necessary, acquisition

relation to other powers.

and cautious procedure Vorgehen) it had accomplished timely

(rechtzeitiges this,

without

und (as

Through

vorsichtiges

he especially

emphasized) obliging Germany to grant any return concessions to anyone.

Secretary von Buelow asserted, however, that

to the Americans.

Germany

South Sea any opposition In that great region there was room for more

had had no intention

of setting

up

in the

than one people and he hoped through the new possessions the

Germans would enter

into

still

closer relations with their nearest

neighbors there, the Americans and the Japanese. utterance a very frank expression of the

German

This

official

national expan-

sion policy in which the recent acquisitions constituted merely

The

milestones of progress. indications of the

new

secretary's

speech also gives

first

policy adopted, that of taking into account

the factor of the United States.

The

relations created with the

1898 to 1900 were made

United States by these events

V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. I, 3 Sitz., 12. Dez., '98, S. 25 Fritzen (Center Party) (translation by author). =«

of

the subject of discussion in the Reichstag.^*

ff.

"In the Spanish-American war the Imperial poKcy maintained a strict harmony with the great majority of the German

neutrahty, and indeed in

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

234

Most

of the speakers

prevailed throughout

admitted the sympathy for Spain which had, Germany, but declared that the Government

-had observed a careful neutrality throughout the conflict. Secretary

von Buelow' explained that the government had had during the conflict the double duty of seeing to it that the relations of Germany with both Spain and the United States should remain undis-

—

and even though in this war the sympathies of our nation I say it qmte openly stood on the side of the weaker and unjustly provoked belligerent (Bravo! in the center and on the right, laughter on the left), nevertheless all the reports of the English and American papers which talk of a violation, of the principle of neutrality, especially by our navy, may be people,

—

rejected as evil inventions."

Dr. Riohter (Liberal People's Party) (Freisinnige Volkspartei),

S.

27 D.

"I too consider the conduct of the German Government in the SpanishAmerican war entirely correct, but I am not of the opinion of my colleague Mr. Fritzen that the sympathies in Germany stood everywhere predominantly on the side of Spain. (Very true! on the left)" Dr. Richter then urged a liberal commercial treaty and policy with the United States.

Von Kardorff (Empire

party) (Reichspartei), p. 70

C:

"In connection with America I should like to refer to a statement which the, representative, Mr. Fritzen, made. The representative, Mr. Fritzen, said that in the Spanish-American war the sympathies of the German people were with Spain. To a certain extent Mr. Fritzen is right. It Kes in the. peciiliarity of our national character that, when a weaker (nation) is attacked by a stronger, we are always inclined to take the side of the weaker and in the

German

nation there existed to a certain extent the feeling that the conflict of poor Spain with powerful America was an unequal conflict. Gentlemen, I admit that I, too, was not entirely free from this conception, but I must say that

a sentimental conception which poKtically cannot be turned to account, on the right). We must remind ourselves that it is more useful to us that a great aspiring people like the Americans should win the upper hand, especially since the conditions in Spain have shown themselves to be so decadent as has come to light during this war. I hope that we preserve through the future the good relations with the United States which the Prussian goverimient has maintained since the time of Frederick the Great. At first it may have seemed rather startling that the Americans should all at once begin to pursue a quite different policy from that which they were formerly accustomed to pursue; an expansion policy which formerly all American statesmen had opposed. But, gentlemen, I believe that actually it is more to our interests here in Germany that a coimtry like America should enter into competition with all the great powers which compete in the world, and which possess fleets and armies ready for conflict. We have no cause to regret this fact in any way, just as little (cause) as towards Japan. But in the case of America I have, besides, the feeling that it gives me a certain satisfaction to see the Anglo-Saxon, the Germanic stock for the Americans are in great part Germanic come forward so powerfully as the Americans have done in the last war. When I hope for a good understanding with America for the future, then I am counting on it that the old Bismarck principle shall be revived, namely, not to mix commercial-political questions with other pohtical questions." is

(nicht verwertbar) (very true!

—

—

.

ATTITUDE OF THE KAISER

235

In the interest of humanity and from the standpoint of

turbed.

international commerce, he stated,

Germany would rather have seen prevented a war which inflicted grievous wounds on both sides. Nevertheless, he said, after the efforts toward this end had proved

Germany to do but to The Cuban affair, the secretary

unsuccessful, there remained nothing for

allow things to take their course. stated, did not constitute

Germany

called

in the conflict.

an actual interest of Germany, nor was upon to judge who was right and who was wrong Germany, he said, had merely the task of observ-

That duty, he declared, Germany had fulmost conscientiously and never at any stage of the war had the German Government contemplated unauthorized interference in any form. The American ambassador. Dr. White, endorses^^ ing a loyal neutrality.

filled

the statement that the

official neutrality stand was correctly maintained by Germany and that the course, especially of the

Foreign Office under Count von Buelow and Baron von Richthofen,

was

all

that could be desired.

In regard to the Kaiser himself,

Dr. White states that never to his knowledge did the monarch

show the

toward the Spanish, and that, when and statesmen suggested measures against the

slightest leaning

certain publicists

American Republic, the Kaiser quietly but effectively put his foot upon them. The American Ambassador relates that at the time of the visit of Prince

Henry

to America the

Emperor

said to him:

White: Autobiography, Vol. II, pp. 168 and 169. For accounts of the British-German controversy as to the actions of both governments in 1898, see Latan^ "America as a World Power,'' pp. 63 and 64; also Review of Reviews, Vol. XXV, pp. 267 ff.; also the Nation, '*

^'Ibid., p. '204.

1902, Vol.

LXXIV,

p. 141.

The

following are the references

made

to this

subject in the British Parliament:

ParHamentary Debates, Vol. II of Session 11 Feb., 1902, p. 992. Mr. Norman (Wolverhampton, S.). "I beg to ask the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether Great Britain, through her Ambassadors ever proposed a Joint Note in which the Powers should declare that Europe did not regard the armed intervention of the United States in Cuba as justifiable, and whether in consequence of the refusal of Germany this step was abandoned; and whether he can make any further statement upon the subject." Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Cranborne, "No! Great Britain never proposed through Her Majesty's Ambassadors or otherwise any declaration adverse to the United States in regard to their intervention in Cuba. On the contrary Her Majesty's Government declined to assent to any such proposal."

The

Rochester).

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

236

"My

brother's mission has no poUtical character whatever, If the efforts made in certain parts of

save in one contingency. Europe to show that the

German Government sought to bring about a European combination against the United States during your Spanish War are persisted in, I have authorized him to lay before the President certain papers which will put that slander to rest forever." Dr. White adds that "As it turned out there was little need of this, since the course both of the Emperor and his government was

otherv^ise

amply vindicated."

The' evidence" referred to by the Emperor and later published consisted of despatches from the

German ambassador

at Washing-

ton transmitting the joint proposal of the diplomatic corps that a collective note be sent to the United States remonstrating against its

intervention in Cuba.

The Emperor had written on the margin

of the despatches his express disapproval. _

There were, however,

many

^

contradictory statements issued

by the German and British Governments and their representatives in regard to this movement at the opening of the Spanish war. The German ambassador had accused Lord Pauncefote of being the leader of the movement. Lord Cranborne, British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, denied categorically before Parliamentary Debates, Vol. Ill of Sess. 14 Feb., 1902, pp. 38 and 39. Mr. Charles Hobhouse: "On behalf of the honorable member for South Wolverhampton, I beg to ask the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is able to recall any statement concerning a meeting of Ambassa-

Ambassy in Washington in April, 1898." The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Cranborne Rochester). "The meeting which took place on the 14th April, 1898, was convened by Lord Pauncefote as Doyen of the Ambassadors at the verbal suggestion of some of his colleagues. Whatever opinions were expressed by Lord Pauncedors at the British

fote during the discussion, which was of an informal character, were personal to himself and not in pursuance of any instructions from Her Majesty's Government. The discussion resulted in an agreement by the Ambassadors to forward an identical telegram to their respective governments suggesting a further communication to the United States. On the receipt of this message, Her Majesty's Government at once rephed objecting to the terms of the proposed communication as injudicious. Two days later Lord Pauncefote was informed that Her Majesty's Government had resolved to take no action. had at that time no information of the attitude of the German Govern-

We

ment." Mr. Dillon. "Is the noble Lord prepared to state whether the official German statement as to what has taken place is correct or incorrect?" Lord Cranborne. "I have nothing to add to the answer I have just given to the House."

" Latan6 America :

Vol.

XXV,

pp. 269

ff.

as a

World Power, pp. 63 and 64;

also

Review of Reviews,

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

238

von Buelow made a long speech

in the

subject of the relations between

Germany and

After reiterating the

strictly

neutral

Reichstag" on the special the United States.

by the German ships

course followed

empire, he declared emphatically that the presence of

Manila was actuated by no other motive than the obligation to protect German life and property and that of the subjects of other at

natibns

who had been

German protection. The Germany was supporting

placed under

accusation of the foreign press that

the resistance of the Filipinos against the American occupation*'

he declared to be absolutely the

German and American

false.

The

officers at

reports of tension between

Manila the Baron termed

myths, and he asserted that their intercourse was conducted in the spirit of

He

mutual courtesy.

hostilities

pointed out that after the close of

Germany had withdrawn

all

her ships except one cruiser

from the Philippines because she was convinced that the Germans would be_sajejmder the prntectiojL^_the_Unite d~5ta tes." The Secretary then declared that the relations between the

German

Government and the American Government were good and friendly and had never ceased to be such. The distinguished representative of the United States at Berlin, Mr. White, had testified to this in his speech on the Fourth of July.

From

of rational policy the Secretary declared there

the standpoint

was no reason why

Germany and America should not stand toward each other " V.

R., 1898-1900, Bd.

"•Schurz:

Speeches,

I,

etc.,

30

Sitz., 11.

Feb., '99, S. 794

D

in the

ff.

Vol. VI, p. 37.

New To Charles Francis Adams,

York, January

16, 1899.

Jr.

"As to the intention of Germany to pounce upon the Philippine Islands as soon as our forces are withdrawn, nothing could be more absurd. I became firmly convinced of this by a conversation I had, immediately after his return from Europe, with the German ambassador Mr. von Holleben. He gave me the most ample proof that the German Government did not only not intend to cross our purposes in any way, but that it was on the contrary bent upon doing its utmost to remain on friendly terms with the United States. It seems to me the true poUcy is for the United States to secure an agreement of the powers most interested in that region to put the Philippine Islands under the cover of a guarantee of neutrality, as Belgium and Switzerland are covered in Europe.

The only Power that might feel inchned to frustrate such a scheme might be Great Britain who would hke to force us to take the Philippines for good and thus become dependent in a sense, upon her protection."

OW ON RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES He saw no n

hostile

3S

of

point at which

manner, and

German and American

also, in

development need cross

way begrudged

239

the future, no point

in hostility.

Germany,

the Americans the fruits of their

jerman public opinion, the Secretary explained, had rom the brave and sorely tried Spanish people the s

sympathy, and

this expression

n the United States

would not have been

certain foreign press organs

if

liously distorted it in order to create in

many.

The Baron then concluded with

America

references

commercial and social intercourse between the and to their friendly poUtical relations throughout of

ne evident to

German

•man sentiment

in the

leaders that the danger of a

United States was a real one,

aid be harmful to allow

it

to

that the friendliness of the aniairds

had been a

make further headway, German public opinion

political mistake*^

and that in

made

progress in

the great rival England, had

can favor.

m

The American Secretary

of State

to favor close relations with England^'

John

and to

Duetsohland und die oeffentliche Meinung in den Vereinigten sche Jahrbuecher, Vol. 107, 1902, p. 205. idly attitude towards the Transvaal in 1896, so was the e of German pubUc opinion towards America at the outbreak IT, undoubtedly a political mistake. The latter is the more it concerned a war with Spain, that country which from war on to the refusal of the German-Spanish commercial It 3 ago, has mostly confronted Germany as an opponent. ,bly further from the German realm of custom, culture and 3 the United States, and its wretched colonial administration iSe for

any sympathy."

Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 221. Henry White September 24, 1899:

Thayer: to

tay here no action shall be taken contrary to my conviction ipensable feature of our foreign policy should be a friendly But an alliance must remain, in the present ;h England.

unattainable dream." secretary

Hay

wrote to Henry White, November 21, 1900,

•man-British agreement over China:

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAE

240

In the most recent events in

oppose Germany.

Samoa

the British

and American forces had combined against 'the German.*^

The

had shown sympathy with the United States in the recent war and had encouraged the Americans to retain the Philippines.^^ British

It

clear that Germany must take steps to undo what harm had been done and to endeavor to

was therefore very

as far as possible

build

up

The

in the

United States a sentiment in favor of Germany.*'

speeches of Baron von Buelow, referred to above, might

mark

be considered to

ducted along

many

the opening of this policy which was con-

lines

during the next decade.

One

of the lines

England and the effort to make appear that not Germany but Great Britain was the real enemy of procedure

was

hostility to

the United States.^'

of

Another method was the cultivation of the

"At least we are spared the infamy of an alliance with Germany. rather, I think, be the dupe of China, than the chum of the Kaiser." See also von Halle:

it

I

would

"Deutschland und die oeffentliche Meinung in den

Vereinigten Staaten," in Preussische Jahrbuecher, Vol. 107, 1902, p. 207. Von Halle refers to Hay as an undoubted Anti-German and an Anglophile "ein zweifeUoser Deutsohengegner und Anglomane."

See Chapter V, Samoa. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3rd Session, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Senator Bacon, of Georgia, declared that the reason Great Britain p. 737. was anxious to have the United States retain the Philippines was that, in case of a war of the powers over China the United States could lend her effective '^ **

aid from this important base of operations. Senator Schurz held the reason to be so that the United States would become dependent on British sea-power. « Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 220. Secretary Hay wrote to Henry

White Sept.

9,

1899:

"The Emperor is nervously anxious own terms, bien entendu."

to be

on good terms with us

—on

his

Von Buelow: "Imperial Germany, p. 50. Prince von Buelow gives frank acknowledgment of this new policy adopted by Germany. "During the Spanish- American War a section of German pubhc opinion manifested strong sympathy with Spain, which was resented in the States. German relations with America had also been clouded by the way in which part of the English and American Press had interpreted certain incidents which had occurred between our squadrons and the American fleet off Manila. This difference reached its height in February, 1899, so that it seemed desirable strongly to advocate preparations for a better understanding between the two nations of kindred race."

"

Witte:

German Attach^, p. 39. Mr. Witte, appointed German Embassy in Washington, writes:

Revelations of a

as Press Attache of the

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES

German-American element

as a nucleus for the creation of public

sentiment favorable to the Fatherland.*''

were given cordial reception. landed in the United States.

medieval

German

241

A A

special

in Germany Germany was

Americans

direct cable to

casts of

collection of

architecture and sculpture

was presented by

the Emperor to Harvard University. The daughter of the American President was requested to christen the Kaiser's yacht.

The brother of the Kaiser was sent to visit the United States.*" The following year the American squadron was very cordially entertained at Kiel.^" The German Ambassador von Holleben,

my duties I received general instructions to make every the papers keep silence, which were antagonistic to Germany, and to perform the miracle of turning them from bitter opponents to friends and admirers of the Emperor, as well as to make it appear that the real enemy of the United States in America was not Germany but England." "In entering upon

effort to

make

Ibid., Chap. XXII. Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 378. " F. R., 1902, pp. 422 to 425, Mr. Jackson, Secretary of the American Embassy at Berlin, wrote to Secretary Hay after the visit of Prince Henry