Flood Control Politics: The Connecticut River Valley Problem, 1927–1950 [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674423954, 9780674423879

Citation preview

Flood

Control

Politics

Flood Control

Politics

THE CONNECTICUT RIVER V A U E Y PROBLEM · 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 5 0

WILLIAM EDWARD

LEUCHTENBURG

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS·CAMBRIDGE· 1 9 5 3

Copyright, 1953, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

Distributed in Great Britain by GEOFFREY

CUMBERLEGE,

Oxford University Press, London

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number

53-6031

Printed in the United States of America

Acknowledgments I am indebted to Professor Henry Steele Commager for his encouragement to undertake this study, for his guidance in organizing it, and for his many helpful suggestions drawn from his own knowledge of the West River Valley and the Connecticut Valley country. Professor Arthur Maass of Harvard University, Richard Martin, Director of the Connecticut State Water Commission, Leland Olds, former Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, and the North Atlantic Division of the Corps of Engineers have read this manuscript in its entirety, and, from different approaches to the relations of government to water resources, have made invaluable contributions. The section on the "seven TV As" has been read by Paul Appleby, Hon. Benjamin V. Cohen, Morris L. Cooke, Milton Eisenhower, Hon. Harold L. Ickes, Judson King, and Marguerite Owen. Hon. William M. Citron permitted the use of his private file of manuscripts from the period when he was Congressman-at-large from Connecticut, and Morton Braun and Vickery Hubbard made available their unpublished studies of the Connecticut Valley. I acknowledge gratefully the assistance of a great number of individuals in providing information, notably Hon. George Aiken, George H. Arris, Wallace Dickson, George Duncan, John Edelman, Leonard R. Frost, Hon. Foster Furcolo, Francis King, Hon. Herman P. Kopplemann, Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., C. W. Mayott, A. F. Pimentel, Orville S. Poland, Hon. A. A. RibicofT, and Philip Shutler. I am indebted to Colonel L. H. Hewitt and Warren Davidson of the Corps of Engineers, John I. Ahem, Vice President of the New England Electric System, and Amico J. Barone, Jr., Executive Director of the Pioneer Valley Association, for making available photographs used in this book. The librarians of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, Ν. Y., of the National Archives, Washington, D. C., of the Smith

vi

Acknowledgments

College Library, Northampton, Mass., and of the Amherst College Library, Amherst, Mass. were particularly helpful in securing material for this study. Mrs. Daniel Walker did yeoman work in preparing the final manuscript form. I owe a great debt to my wife, Jean Mclntire Leuchtenburg, less for the traditional secretarial assistance than for the cheerful spirit in which she freed me from my share of household chores to finish this manuscript. W. E. L. Northampton, Mass. April, 1951

Contents I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII

Sources of Conflict

I

Government Action in the Valley before 1927

16

The Failure to Harness the River, 192J-1935

27

The Flood Control Conflict

46

TVA on the Connecticut

72

The Federal Government Ta\es Over

82

Hurricane Politics

no

The Skirmish at Union Village

121

Power Dams and River Boats

147

The Battle of the West River Valley

158

The States Ta\e Over, 1945-1948

183

The New Campaign for Federal Power

212

An Assessment:

245

7927-/950

Notes

259

Bibliography

293

Index

327

Flood Control

Politics

CHAPTER 1

Sources of

Conflict

In any river valley, the attempt to provide flood control inevitably entails conflict. Since it involves the question of the best use of the resources of the valley, different interests will quarrel over the allocation of these resources. If the river crosses state lines, this conflict will tend to be intensified, because rival groups will present themselves in the garb of contending states, and private interests will be able to summon up state loyalties to confuse issues. That such conflicts took place in the Connecticut Valley is an item of limited interest to the student of American politics of the second quarter of the twentieth century; what makes the subject of particular concern is that the disputes, as they took shape, reflected the political configurations and moral attitudes of the major contesting interest groups in the era of Franklin Roosevelt. The question of federal-state conflict in the Connecticut Valley is a microcosm of the political struggles of the period. Ostensibly, a number of different groups were contending over a relatively minor matter on which there was common agreement — the need for flood control in the Connecticut Valley. One would expect to find disagreement over types of dams and their location, discord over technical details of flood protection, and a falling out over which groups should benefit and which should contribute. What is surprising is the bitterness of the strife, the important part flood control played in the political contests of the period, and the elevation by 1950 of the resources fight in N e w England to a national issue, finding a place in the President's State of the Union message. If the flood control issue could have been isolated, none of this might have happened, but flood control could not be considered by

2

Flood Control Politics

itself, because, since it involved the issue of the proper use of the resources of the entire valley, it became entangled with the question of power development. Once flood control became enmeshed with the power issue, it became involved in the whole ideological warfare that raged around the question of public power and the emotional storm aroused by the phrase "Power Trust," which implied that there was a conspiracy of private power companies intent on exploiting the American people by monopolizing the chief source of energy. Thus, the question of flood protection in the Connecticut Valley was decided not merely by arriving at the proper technical decisions, nor by resolving conflicts of interest within the valley, but by the interplay between these interests and contesting ideologies on the relation of business to government, and the virtues of positive and centralized government. The development of the Connecticut River Valley during these years can only be understood if one grasps the fact that liberal leaders in New England regarded the question of a few cents' change in electric rates as one of the major moral issues of our time, and that other men believed that just as great moral questions were entailed in the right of the states to determine their own destiny, and the right of businessmen, even of natural monopolies, to carry on unmolested by the federal government. Although western New England appeared to be quarreling over the best use of resources during this period, the form of the dispute was determined as much by these moral attitudes as by differences over method or conflicts of interest. ι New England possessed a long tradition of hostility to private utilities and advocacy of public power development, going back at least as far as the writings of Edward Bellamy, a son of Chicopee, and Frank Parsons, the Boston University professor, both of whom gave a great impetus to the movement for municipal ownership of utilities.1 As early as 1890, the Boston Herald was calling on the governor to veto a bill giving legislative permission to consolidations of gas and electric companies, warning of watered stock and "speculative financiering," and declaring that the bill was "strenuously

Sources of Conflict

3

opposed by all those who dread the further domination of great corporate interests in our state." 2 When Governor John Q. A. Brackett vetoed the bill, the legislature sustained him, 34-3, and the Herald proclaimed: "When the claims of corporations and the interests of the public come in conflict, the corporations must go to the wall." 3 This suspicion of the power companies was strengthened by Theodore Roosevelt's vetoes of the Rainey and James river bills, not merely for the doctrines he set down in those messages, but also for the language he used in warning against a "growing monopoly, the most threatening which has ever appeared." 4 The iniquity of the "Power Trust" became a fundamental tenet of the New England conservationists who followed Roosevelt and Gifiord Pinchot. During these same years, one New England city after another created municipal power plants, until by 1930 there were forty-three municipal plants operating in Massachusetts, and a number of others in the other Connecticut Valley states.5 This concern over the power question became a major issue in New England in the years after World War I, in part because of the tremendous growth of the electrical industry. In 1902, only 4,678 million kilowatt hours of electricity were generated in this country; by 1929 the output had reached 97,352 millions. Much of this growth took place in the 1920s.8 In 1919 the capitalization of power companies in the nation was about equal to that of iron and steel companies; by 1927 it was almost twice as great. In that year, the output of kilowatt hours was almost four times as great as a decade before.7 Alarm over the power companies came less from the sheer physical expansion of the industry than from the concentration of financial control which the growth of transmission systems helped make possible. In the years after the war, the financial empires of the power companies reached out across the country "as though an enchanted evil spider were hastening to spread his web over the whole of the United States." 8 Originally, electricity had been supplied by a series of independent companies, each operating within the limits of a single town for the most part, with capital supplied by New England investors, and local people managing the plant. Gradually, this gave way to the control of local firms by out-of-state holding companies, controlled in turn by financial interests in New York or elsewhere.

4

Flood Control Politics

As early as 1916, the North Adams Gas and Light Company, with total expenditures of $318,000, was paying $240,000 to a West Virginia corporation for supplies, construction and management. 9 By 1930, seven big systems, many of them dominated by "foreign" financial interests, controlled almost all of the electric business of Massachusetts. Critics of holding companies contended that the systems were grouped not in the public interest but in a haphazard fashion to meet the needs of financial manipulators, that the financial structures of the companies were overvalued, and that local N e w England companies were frequently managed by outside personnel and controlled by absentee owners. The overdevelopment of holding companies, declared one critic, tended to produce "prestidigitation, double shuffling, honeyfugling, hornswoggling, and skullduggery," while "it would turn the hair of a Philadelphia lawyer gray" to disentangle their financial relationships in N e w England. 1 0 One of the leading foreign corporations in Massachusetts was the Associated Gas and Electric Company, whose financial structure the conservative Barron's Weekly termed "a financial nightmare." 1 1 Moreover, the holding company empires resulted in exorbitantly high rates for N e w England consumers. As one Massachusetts legislator put it: No amount of sophistry, statistics or plausible propaganda can explain away a rate of &Y2 cents imposed on the people of Boston, whose population is one of the most highly congested in the world, and that of 4 cents made by the municipally owned plant in Holyoke. The 5-cent rate (to be still further reduced to 4V2 cents on July x) enjoyed by the citizens of the sparsely settled town of Belmont, but a few miles from the great Boston Edison plant, cannot be blotted out by any smoke screen of explanation.12 Matching the inadequate staffs of state commissions against the highly-paid counsels and technical staffs of great national corporations often failed to provide adequate protection for the people. " A s well set a lapdog to hold a grizzly bear in restraint as to expect that the puny efforts of a single commonwealth shall not be outmatched by the power and prestige of a combination extending over twenty or more states." 1 3 Commissioners were badly underpaid; in New

Sources of Conflict

5

Hampshire, they received only $3500 a year. 14 Not only did the state commissions lack trained personnel, but they frequently acted as little more than training schools for the power companies who snatched away commissioners and staff personnel to represent them in cases before the very commissions they had previously served. For example, Justin W . Lester, formerly Chief Counsel of the Public Service Commission of Massachusetts, was hired by the Edison Electric Illuminating Company of Boston. 15 Even when a commission was aggressive enough to force down rates, the companies could tie up rate reductions, sometimes for years, by appeals to the courts. Litigation with respect to the Worcester and Cambridge companies cost the two utilities a total of $452,122.21, all of which could be charged to operating costs and eventually passed on to the consumer. 16 All of these developments made it difficult for the advocates of regulated monopoly to reply to the leaders of the public power movement as convincingly as they would have liked to, but it was less these developments than the aggressiveness of the utilities which gave the public power advocates their greatest boost. The faith of the people of Massachusetts in regulated monopoly rested on the assumption that regulation would be effective, and the Massachusetts commission, deciding rates on the basis of the prudent investment doctrine, was recognized as one of the most effective regulatory bodies in the country. When the Massachusetts utilities decided to take a case to the United States Supreme Court to force the Massachusetts commission to accept the reproduction cost doctrine, they were threatening to dynamite the whole tradition of regulation in the Bay State. If this doctrine prevailed, even men of a rather conservative bent would prefer public ownership in its stead. By 1929 the Massachusetts commission had come to the conclusion that it needed a "birch rod in the cupboard," that public operation might be necessary as a supplement to regulation. T o prevent Massachusetts from becoming the "happy hunting ground" of "financial adventurers," Henry C. Attwill, Chairman of the Commissioners of the Department of Public Utilities, recommended legislation to give the utilities an ultimatum of signing a contract agreeing to accept prudent investment as the basis of regulating their rates, or face in-

6

Flood Control Politics

creased municipal competition as a consequence of not signing. The Public Franchise League, represented by LaRue Brown, backed the Attwill proposal, and John Fahey, former President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, declared: " A s a businessman I would prefer private ownership, but when the public cannot obtain the best possible service at the lowest possible cost, the advantages of private ownership disappear." Massachusetts householders paid four times as much as people in Ontario or Los Angeles with their public systems, Fahey asserted, adding that no conceivable amount of graft in public companies would be as costly as the waste revealed in the operation of the Cambridge and Worcester utilities. When the utilities accused Attwill of seeking political advantage by his attack on the power companies, he replied haughtily: "I will never be a candidate for public office within the gift of the people of this commonwealth — I determined on that when we adopted woman suffrage." 1 7 The holding company growth in the 1920s not only made the ordinary problems of state regulation more difficult, but created the new problem of how to regulate the transmission of electricity over state lines. The Supreme Court held that when a distributing company negotiated a contract to buy power wholesale from an out-ofstate company, the state into which the power was imported could not regulate the rates. 18 In another case, the Court held that the state which was exporting the power could not regulate the rates. 19 Thus, the Court apparently created a "no-man's land" in which the states had no control over interstate transmission of electricity, unless they undertook the tortuous path of interstate compacts.20 By 1927, the year when the first disastrous floods occurred, the power war was coming to a head. In that year, Professor Ripley warned that "the Northeastern Power Company, superposed upon the Insull interests in the northern half of N e w England and the N e w England Power Company in the southern half, may bring to pass what will amount to an effective and monopolistic control of the entire region." 2 1 The old assumptions of the efficacy of state regulation of utilities were breaking down under the strain of attempting to regulate power companies controlled by great financial empires, and the arguments of public power advocates seemed more

Sources of Conflict

7

reasonable than they had for many years past. In 1924 General Guy E. Tripp told the First World Power Conference in London: Certain of our newspapers committed to government ownership are demanding that the government take over these developments; public ownership leagues are broadcasting propaganda; and a bill, calling for the creation of a nation-wide government-owned superpower system, was recently introduced in both houses of Congress.22 Yet, in an age of faith in private industry, little of this concern over the utilities reached the mass of the people of New England. It required the revelation of the political activities of the power companies to make the utility question an important regional issue. The allegation that the utilities were involved in buying state legislatures and corrupting regulatory commissions not only spiked the argument that utilities could be effectively regulated but aroused deep moral indignation at the power companies. J. Henry Roraback, President of the Connecticut Electric Service Company, was believed to control the political life of the state of Connecticut, while the Insull interests were presumed to be even more dominant in Maine and New Hampshire.23 Much of this, however, was little but hearsay until the inquiry of the Federal Trade Commission carefully documented the interrelationships of the utilities and various political institutions, schools and newspapers. Most shocking to New Englanders was the revelation that the International Paper Company had purchased a controlling interest in the Boston Herald and Boston Traveler and that the company was operated by the International Paper and Power Company which also controlled the New England Power Association.24 Equally revealing was a much-quoted letter from the Chicago utility magnate, B. J. Mullaney, to Martin J. Insull, describing the activities of a power lobbyist named Gordon: Gordon's old home is in New Hampshire. He reports that the former Progressives, Rooseveltites, Governor Winant, former Governor Bass, etc., are stirring up utility discussions there, with a Government ownership slant, a la Governor Pinchot. . . . Gordon has suggested that he be sent into New Hampshire for some seed sowing to counteract the Winant-Bass propaganda. Your interests being so large in New Hamp-

8

Flood Control Politics

shire, the Bond and Share people have hesitated to send Gordon there without your knowledge and approval. If you think well of the suggestion, a word to Clapp of the National Electric Light Association will put Gordon into action at no cost or obligation except railroad fare and incidental travelling expenses.25 The purchase of a Boston newspaper by a firm with headquarters at 89 Broad Street, N e w York City, and the long arm of Samuel Insull reaching from Chicago into the interior of N e w Hampshire demonstrated convincingly that traditional assumptions on the efficacy of regulated monopoly required a reassessment.

11 The moral imperative for public power development arose not merely from concern over such political manipulation but, more importantly, from the vision of a group of men who saw a new Electrical A g e on the horizon. They thought of the power issue not in terms of regulating monopolies or restoring financial sanity so much as in terms of the achievement of a N e w Jerusalem. By the proper harnessing and distribution of electricity, one could construct a new, humane civilization. Man would enter this new world not by the grace of God, nor inner redemption, but through the adaptation of a new technology to the needs of the people. Electric power was the key to a happy, prosperous world; ultimately it might "transform men and make them intelligent rulers of their own political destiny." 26 In the first place, electricity could solve the age-old problem of human want. Electric power, declared Norman Thomas, was, "the slave on which mankind must depend to conquer poverty." 2 7 By technological development, one might hope to achieve Steinmetz' dream of electricity so cheap it would not pay to meter it, so abundant that men would work only 200 four-hour days a year. T h e effects of such cheap power were immeasurable, because electricity was the lifeblood of the whole economy. "In its full development, electricity can yoke a whole continental economy into something like one unified machine, one organic whole," 28 observed Stuart Chase.

Sources of Conflict

9

Secondly, electricity could make possible the leisure which would free men from continuous toil at machines, leaving them time for music and literature, for the creation of a new polity, for self-development. It would mean "the oncoming of a new kind of civilization altogether," 2 9 declared Stuart Chase. "Electricity," he observed on another occasion, "can give us universally high standards of living, new and amusing kinds of jobs, leisure, freedom, an end to drudgery, congestion, noise, smoke and filth. It can overcome most of the objections and problems of a steam-engine civilization. It can bring back many of the mourned virtues of the handicraft age without the human toil and the curse of impending scarcity which marked that age." 3 0 Thirdly, electricity would make possible decentralization, returning man to the land where he belonged. Decentralization of industry through electric power would "break up the great conglomerations of people in sprawling, dirty, noisy slums and brutalizing sweatshops, lift the swarming hordes out of tenements and subways and street-cars, and put them back on the land." 3 1 The steam engine was "a magnet drawing human iron filings," while "the electric motor is a fan blowing population broadly over the map." 3 2 T o fulfill this dream, electricity had to be cheap and abundant. T o say that it was already so, as the utilities claimed, was "to dishonor the dream by saying that it had been realized." 3 3 One cannot grasp the moral urgency of the electric power issue without realizing that men like Norris and Pinchot saw electricity as creating a new destiny for Man, and saw the power companies not merely as reprehensible businessmen but as destroyers of the dream. Instead of providing abundant, low cost electricity, the utility magnates were building up pyramids of inflated paper in order to charge exorbitant prices. They were building roadblocks on the way to Jordan. "If it is not wrecked by the brute claims of an obsolete financial system," electric power "promises a world replete with more freedom and happiness than mankind has ever known." 3 4 The task of men of good will was to frustrate those "brute claims." If one did not do so, one would be enslaved by the private utilities; one had only these choices — a future brighter than one's wildest dreams, or ignominious subjection. If uncontrolled, warned Gifford

10

Flood Control Politics

Pinchot, the power monopoly would be "a plague without previous example." 3 5 " W e shall see the time when every stream that flows downhill will promote the happiness of mankind or will be used by private monopoly as a chain to fasten humanity to the earth," declared Senator Norris. The only issue was whether we were going to develop this power or give the utilities the "opportunity to bind our children and our children's children to practically a form of slavery." 36 The difficulty was not merely that the utilities were iniquitous but that they did not understand their own business. Save for a rare exception like Samuel Ferguson in Hartford, they did not appreciate, as Ford had appreciated, the virtues of low prices with a high turnover. After a bitter court fight, the Massachusetts commission succeeded in forcing down the rates of a private company in Worcester. Although the company claimed that the new rates would be confiscatory, its profits for 1929 were the largest in its history. On another occasion, the commission found that the maximum lighting rates in Cambridge could be cut in half and still allow the company an 8 per cent return. 37 Thus, the government had to enter the field of power development in order to demonstrate the potentialities of cheap, abundant power. Even if one did not agree with Senator Norris on the need for a national system of federal power development, one might conclude that Governor Roosevelt's "yardstick" proposal would be a worthwhile experiment. Ill Defenders of the utilities argued that the holding companies provided the benefits of more skillful administration, centralized financing, a wide distribution of risk, and economies in power production. Moreover, the utilities contended, electric rates were not high; in 1929 the American people paid $605,878,000 for electricity for their homes and $974,400,000 for ice cream. 38 The real strength of the power companies, however, lay not in such arguments but in the faith in private enterprise which characterized the 1920s, and the general suspicion of criticisms of the business structure and proposals to increase government intervention in the economy. As long as the

Sources of Conflict country was prosperous, it seemed the wiser policy not to search too diligently for minor defects. Nor, many believed, was there much fault to find with the existing system. "It is my belief that the public service commissions with very little just criticism are proving themselves fully adequate to control the situation," 39 Herbert Hoover told the national convention of the National Electric Light Association in 1925. T h e growth of public power development was also frustrated by a general aversion to positive government, which, despite such exceptions as municipal ownership, prevailed in N e w England. This faith in limited government was more than a casually held belief; it was a kind of regional religion, particularly in northern N e w England. Actually, Massachusetts had a long history of intervention in the economy of the state, and the northern N e w England states had taken important steps toward controlling their hydroelectric power resources. Yet any such steps were regarded as exceptions to the rule, and similar action could be taken only after overcoming the prevailing belief that governments should not attempt to direct the destinies of men. State regulation of monopolies was essential, and welfare legislation might have to be passed to protect people against the worst hazards of industrialism, but one should be very careful not to confuse state intervention of this sort with direct operation of business enterprises like power projects. This faith in limited government was closely related to a faith in decentralized government. T h e fundamental principle of government was held to be the dispersion of power, and danger lurked in any centralized government, however benign. During the era of the N e w Deal, these two tenets, limited government and decentralized government, were generally regarded as one; N e w Englanders fought the N e w Deal both because it meant positive government and because it meant centralized power in Washington. In the 1920s, however, the issues were much more complex; one could argue for positive government without challenging the regional faith in states' rights. Indeed, when one had a Coolidge or a Hoover in the White House, and a Pinchot or a Roosevelt in the State House, liberals were by no means so committed to the idea of federal intervention as they were a decade later; many could be found defending the very

12

Flood Control Politics

instrument or interstate compacts they were to attack so bitterly in the 1930s. Henry Attwill opposed the Couzens bill to give the Federal Power Commission authority to regulate the rates of utilities engaged in the interstate transmission of electricity, in part on the interesting grounds that this would be a step that would benefit the utilities and cause high rates. Federal regulation, reasoned Attwill, would mean applying the doctrines of the Supreme Court to Massachusetts, which had preserved itself as an island of prudent investment doctrine. If these "fantastic and unsound" theories of regulation were forced on Massachusetts, it would "inevitably result, in our judgment, in the growth of public ownership and operation of electric utilities in this Commonwealth." 40 At the same time, there was a foreshadowing of the alignments of the 1930s when public power men would look on the insistence on states' rights as a mask worn by the power companies to prevent any power development, federal or state. The experience of men like Pinchot with the compact device was not such as to earn continued support for this method of legislation. When the Pennsylvania legislature refused to take any action toward an interstate compact, Governor Pinchot, by executive order, set up a new Giant Power Board in 1925. On October 26, 1925, at the instigation of a member of this Board, the governors of N e w York, N e w Jersey, and Pennsylvania announced the appointment of commissioners to a joint Giant Power Commission to negotiate a compact on the interstate development and exchange of electric power. Neighboring states were invited to send observers, and seven states did so. The meetings turned into a total fiasco. By the third meeting, Commissioners Vanneman and Prendergast of N e w York submitted statements declaring that a compact was unnecessary, since there was only a small amount of power in interstate commerce, and the states could deal with this problem working separately. Prendergast went on to point out that the compact was an unwieldy instrument at best, and New York shortly pulled out of the proceedings, thereby ending the negotiations. 41 Although men like Gilford Pinchot advocated interstate compacts in order to develop power, the main interest in compacts derived

13

Sources of Conflict

from the attempt of utility leaders to block proposals to strengthen the authority of the Federal Power Commission over the national network of operating and holding companies. T o meet this threat, utility leaders urged instead state regulation of utility companies, with interstate compacts wherever transmission lines crossed state borders. In December 1926, in Providence, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover warned the quarterly meeting of the N e w England Council that "the growing encroachment of Federal power" threatened "disaster" and recommended interstate compacts as a solution. 42 The bitterness of the debate over flood control compacts in the Connecticut River Valley a decade later was in part the result of a suspicion of the interstate compact device because it had originally been acclaimed as an instrument to avoid federal control of hydroelectric power. IV

Thus far, the debate over public power has been discussed in terms of rival ideologies, of contesting attitudes toward government and business. Yet the conflict over public power was not merely an ideological debate, but also a contest of interest groups — of the utilities, the CIO, farm groups, manufacturers' associations, and fish and game clubs. During this period, individuals and groups committed to a particular attitude toward government were frequently forced to square their ideas with economic and other interests which ran contrary to their beliefs. For example, most Vermont farmers were opposed to positive government, to government ownership of utilities, and to centralized government. However, they also were keenly aware of the need for greater rural electrification. What would happen to their ideological commitments if they became convinced that private utilities and limited government would not produce rural electrification ? Although farms in the Connecticut Valley states were highly electrified compared to most of the country, the lack of rural electrification was a sore point. N o one of the valley states had more than half of its farms electrified by the end of 1929, and only one out of every nine farms in Vermont had electricity by that date. 43 At the very first meeting of the N e w England Council, the regional cham-

14

Flood Control Politics

ber of commerce, in Worcester on November n , 1925, the conflict of interests between private utilities, attempting to sell to an assured market, and farm groups, who wanted wide development of cheap electric power for rural areas, broke out into the open. There was considerable criticism thereafter of the domination of the council by utility leaders.44 The economic interests of Vermont and N e w Hampshire farmers were to play an important part in shaping flood control legislation in later years. However, if it would be a mistake to attempt to tell the story of the power war in New England wholly in terms of ideology, it would be equally incorrect to tell it wholly in terms of economic interests. Ideological convictions were forced to bend as economic interests conflicted with them, but it is no less true that the tenacious hold of ideology shaped the attitudes of interest groups in the Connecticut Valley during these years. It was to require years of frustration before Vermont farmers became convinced that they should surrender some of their ideological convictions, that, in some instances, public power might be preferable to private power, positive government preferable to limited government, federal action preferable to state action. Thus, flood control legislation, as it became involved with the power question, was influenced both by changing ideological attitudes and by conflicts of interest groups. ν The conflict in the Connecticut Valley during these years would not have been nearly so bitter if it had not taken place in an atmosphere of great concern over the economic decline of N e w England. While during the 1920s and '30s the country witnessed a rise of over four million manufacturing jobs, N e w England not only did not share in this rise, but actually lost 30,000 jobs. It was not surprising that New England did not grow as rapidly as the rest of the country, but the relative economic decline seemed much too rapid, particularly with respect to competition from the South. From 1929 to 1948, per capita income rose 2 54 times as much in the South as in N e w England. Lower wages, higher and less rigid work loads, and government subsidies in the South all placed the region in a more favor-

Sources of Conflict

15

able competitive position with N e w England, which suffered as well from a lack of raw materials, distance from markets, and a tendency toward lack of enterprise on the part of some of its business leaders. The depression years of the 1930s and the crisis in the textile towns after World War II both increased the anxiety about the health of the regional economy, and every governmental policy was carefully examined to see what its effect would be on the economic life of the region. T h e bitter anti-New Deal feeling of N e w England businessmen stemmed in part from the belief that social welfare legislation resulted in an increase in taxes which was particularly hard on N e w England, since it paid a disproportionate amount of the national tax bill. Government power projects in the Tennessee and Columbia valleys seemed positively diabolical in that they drained money out of N e w England to benefit the very regions that were already at a competitive advantage. N e w England business, they contended, would inevitably be damaged by any increase in government spending, since this would not only raise costs but raise them disproportionately. Hence, opposition to further federal government power development was more than the expression of the familiar doctrines of private enterprise and localism; it was regarded as absolutely essential to regional survival, and advocates of federal government power projects were viewed as irresponsible architects of the economic decline of the region. Public power advocates replied that this kind of thinking was in large part responsible for the current plight of N e w England. T h e answer to federal government power projects in other regions was not opposition to these projects, which added to the national wealth of the country, but a demand for similar projects in N e w England to cut power costs and pump federal money into the sagging economy. Thus, federal government power projects were advocated in the Connecticut Valley, apart from their intrinsic merits, as instruments of regional revival, and opponents were condemned as backward-looking mossbacks whose policies would accelerate the economic decline of N e w England. In this atmosphere of hope, fear and recrimination, the struggle over the development of the Connecticut Valley took place.

CHAPTER II

Government Action in the Valley before 1927 The complexity of the conflict between different interest groups and between different state governments, as well as the interrelation of ideology and interest, was revealed quite early in the fight over the Enfield dam. The Enfield rapids a few miles north of Hartford had been an obstacle to navigation in the Connecticut since the time three hundred years before when they had forced Adriaen Block to turn back in the very first exploration of the river. For many years, they represented the head of navigation, and the fur trader, William Pynchon, took advantage of this to build a warehouse on the east bank of the river which has given the name of Warehouse Point to the area ever since. In later years, as the river traffic flourished far to the north, men determined to cut through the rapids and avoid the cost of transshipment. As early as 1791, the Connecticut assembly granted the privilege of a lottery to improve navigation at the falls, but nothing came of it. 1 Not until 1824, when the Connecticut legislature chartered the Connecticut River Company to develop the Connecticut, operate steamboats, and dig a canal around the Enfield falls, was there a determined effort to provide an adequate waterway. 2 In the fall of 1829, a crew of Irish workers who had arrived in the valley on scows, carrying all their worldly goods in bright red bandannas, camping in the woods and cooking their food in huge tar cauldrons, finished the digging of the Enfield canal, and by 1833 the Enfield site was already being used for water power as well. 3 When Charles Dickens made his famous tour of America, he was able to travel from Springfield to Hartford by steamboat, albeit one of "half a pony power" and so small that "Mr. Paap, the celebrated Dwarf, might have lived and died happily in the cabin," which "looked like the parlour of a

Government Action before 1927

17

Lilliputian public-house, which had got afloat in a flood or some other water accident, and was drifting nobody knew where." 4 The advent of the railroads ended the brief day of glory of the river boats, and during the next few decades, the river traffic was relatively unimportant, particularly above Hartford. During these years, the federal government continued a concern for improving the navigation of the Connecticut that had started with the arrival of an Army engineer in the valley in the summer of 1825 to direct surveying parties studying the feasibility of linking the Connecticut with an ambitious canal system to Canada.5 Between 1836 and 1886, Congress passed no less than twenty acts directing surveys or appropriating funds for the War Department to improve navigation on the river.8 In 1871 the federal government turned toward improving the river above Hartford for the first time, and in the next fifteen years a small amount of wing-dam work was completed between Hartford and Enfield. 7 All of this work was of a routine enough character and not of the sort to engender any political controversy, save that, once the federal government started to improve the river above Hartford, it encountered the old problem of surmounting the Enfield rapids, since the existing canal was no longer adequate for large vessels. When the War Department in 1897 issued a favorable report on the proposal to redevelop the Enfield works so that commercial vessels could go as far north as Holyoke, Massachusetts, the river towns of southern Massachusetts revived hopes that they would once again become thriving ports.8 The Massachusetts legislature appropriated funds to send lobbyists down to Washington,9 and Springfield printing presses were shortly turning out broadsides entitled Is There Any Good Reason Why Hartford Should Have Better Facilities for Water Transportation than Springfield and Holyoke? 1 0 The proposal in turn aroused the hostility of Hartford interests, and the hopes of the Massachusetts town were dashed when, after a resurvey, the War Department issued another and unfavorable report because of the large expense and the doubtful economic returns in lowered transportation costs.11 The up-river interests and the War Department now sought a means to defray the heavy cost of the project and hit upon the idea

18

Flood Control Politics

of having the Connecticut River Company, which owned the existing works at Enfield, build a new dam at Enfield at its own expense which would permit commercial navigation, harnessing the fall of the river for electric power in return. Secretary of War Henry Stimson approved the project in 1913, on condition that the company pay a reasonable annual return to the federal government for the power rights, in keeping with the policy set by Theodore Roosevelt. 12 In this revised form, the bill passed the Senate but was killed in the House because of the objections of a "group of Congressmen who held that the federal government had no control over water power on the Connecticut River and thus could not legislate on the subject without violating states' rights. 13 In 1915 the district engineer of the War Department recommended that, if private interests did not develop the project in a reasonable amount of time, the federal governmeAt should do so and lease the power, 14 and Representative Treadway of Massachusetts urged the federal government to go ahead on this project three years later, 15 but the idea met with even less favor. For the next decade all hopes of the Massachusetts interests hinged on whether a private utility would step in to assume part of the cost of the project. Finally, after years of waiting, the people of western Massachusetts heard the good news that the Northern Connecticut Power Company, successor of the Connecticut River Company, was definitely interested in the proposal. On February 1, 1928, the company, owner of the water rights at Enfield rapids, was granted a license by the Federal Power Commission to redevelop the works at Enfield. T w o months later the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors ordered the Army Engineers to review its last unfavorable report, since a private utility had at last been found to build the dam. On April 17, 1930, the War Department reported that its recommendations were still unfavorable, because the cost of raising bridges would be prohibitive, 16 but, after assurances from Massachusetts towns that they would assume this expense, the Engineers issued a second report, House Document 36, a week later giving the project a favorable report. 17 Despite bitter opposition from Connecticut forces under Senator Walcott, Congress included the Enfield project in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1930, 18 and, after more than three

Government Action before 1927

19

dccades of strife, it appeared that the Massachusetts cities had been victorious, and a channel was to be cleared from Holyoke to the sea. The Rivers and Harbors Act provided for the extension of the twelve-foot river channel from Hartford to Holyoke through the construction of a lock and dam at Enfield rapids by private interests, and of a lock and dam near Hartford and the lengthening of the lock at Enfield by the federal government. All this could only be done if local interests undertook certain projects, including the construction of terminal facilities, and if the Bulkley or Memorial Bridge across the Connecticut River at Hartford were not disturbed. The entire authorization was contingent on action by the private utility, but, wholly unexpectedly, the company decided to drop the whole idea, and on September 30, 1931, the Federal Power Commission was forced to revoke its license. The Northern Connecticut Power Company was bitterly attacked for falling through on its proposal to redevelop the Enfield works, and the real reasons for its action are still a subject for conjecture. Ostensibly, the company lost interest because the economic collapse of 1929 had resulted in a sharply lessened demand for "peak" power, so that a project which seemed economically feasible in 1928 did not seem so in 1931. Other reasons have been suggested, however, including a corporate link with economic interests in Connecticut, notably the railroad, which were opposed to the navigation project, to which the power development was tied. Since there no longer seemed to be any possibility of interesting a private company, a demand now arose in Massachusetts for the federal government to construct the entire works, including a power plant at Enfield, and once more the Corps of Engineers was set to work reviewing the project. The district engineer recommended construction of the power dam by the federal government, but he was overruled by the division engineer, the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, and the Chief of Engineers, all of whom felt that this would make the cost of the project prohibitive. In particular, they observed that the Enfield canal, originally built solely for navigation purposes, now served a number of small power plants, and the federal government would probably have to buy out the rights of the Northern Connecticut Power Company before it could operate, prob-

20

Flood Control Politics

ably at a considerable cost. Moreover, they noted that the provision in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1930 that the Bulkley Bridge at Hartford be undisturbed would exclude freight steamers and large tankers, and place restrictions on other vessels, thus greatly reducing the estimated transportation benefits. A t the same time, the construction of a pipeline from Providence to Springfield would, when completed, greatly reduce the value of the proposed waterway for reducing transportation costs for petroleum products. The final blow to the recommendations of the district engineer was the refusal of J. H . Roraback, president of the Northern Connecticut Power Company, to name any specific fee he would be willing to pay the federal government for power, if the government built the Enfield plant. Thus, the Chief of Engineers, in House Document 27, recommended no change in House Document 36, incorporated in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1930, save that the wording be changed to permit construction of the dam by any state, municipal, or private interest under license issued by the F P C . 1 9

ι The Enfield issue had yet to become the fierce controversy it was to be a decade later, but certain aspects of the later controversy over Enfield, and indeed of the broader problem of the development of the water resources of the valley, had already been presaged. First, one could note that the commercial rivalry of Holyoke and Hartford had readily been converted, by the historical accident of a state border, into a quarrel between two state governments. Second, although most of the people of Massachusetts did not favor public power development, they were perfectly willing to support a proposal for the first federal government power project in N e w England when this appeared to be the only way they could achieve their immediate economic aim of a waterway. As conservative a man as Representative Treadway gave his support to such a proposal, suggesting that ideological commitments might yield to more pressing economic interests. A t the same time the hostility of Treadway to federal development of the Connecticut and to public power projects throughout this period suggests that the dominant

Government Action before 1927

21

ideologies tended to bend rather than break, that they yielded only in specific instances. Third, Connecticut, at this juncture, was able to present fairly united opposition to a federal public power project at Enfield, not only because it appeared to hurt the economic interests of Hartford, but also because it conflicted with the prevalent doctrines of states' rights and private development. However, when the N e w Deal era resulted in the election of a group of Connecticut Congressmen committed to a federal public power program, Connecticut's defense of the commercial interests of Hartford became much less ardent, for Enfield would provide an entering wedge for public power development. A s the dominant ideologies changed, "Connecticut" became more amenable to the desire of "Massachusetts" for a waterway. Fourth, once the federal government entered the picture, the issue of states' rights tended to become complicated, with one state willing to use the federal government as a lever against the other state. Moreover, any N e w England project then had to fit into a pattern of national policy, and Connecticut Valley projects could no longer be discussed wholly in terms of regional sentiments but involved the dicta of men like Henry Stimson and the predilections of senators from Alabama and Nebraska. Finally, it was already evident that single-purpose development of the river would run into difficulties; the navigation aspects of the Enfield issue could not be considered apart from the power aspects. Before long, the Enfield issue would involve questions of flood control and recreation benefits as well.

II

Except for the concern of the Corps of Engineers with river navigation and the Enfield issue, government development of the Connecticut River was almost wholly confined to state governments in the years before 1927. There was almost no suggestion of multipurpose development of river valleys in N e w England by the federal government during these years. Even avowed advocates of development by the federal government rarely extended their references past Muscle Shoals, Boulder Dam, and the St. Lawrence seaway, "the only great natural power sources still owned by the peo-

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Flood Control Politics

pie." 2 0 Not until 1929 did the Public Ownership League of America announce that, in addition to municipal ownership and the Muscle Shoals and Boulder D a m projects, it regarded "the development of hydro-electric power by means of control of the flood waters upon the tributaries of the river, and the ownership and control of the whole system by public bodies" as "one of the newest and most logical of our public ownership problems and possibilities." 2 1 Even then, the league referred to power and flood control projects only in the Mississippi Valley. When a Massachusetts commission investigated the power question in 1929, Representative Leo Birmingham filed a minority report attacking the commission for ignoring the possibility of public power development "in a manner so timid as to be, in view of the fundamental importance of the question, almost dramatic." 2 2 However, he went on to explain, save for a brief reference to the possibility of a state power authority, that he thought of "public power" solely in terms of municipal ownership. H e not only made no suggestion of federal development but urged that Congress "take the steps necessary to return to the States control of their own business," so that they would not be hampered by federal courts in fixing electric rates. 23 If the public power issue had been restricted to the question of municipal ownership, it might never have become involved with the controversy over flood control and river valley development. If any public power projects were to be launched in the Connecticut Valley, it appeared as though the state governments rather than the federal government would take the initiative. The growing realization of the need for integrated development of the hydroelectric power resources of N e w England had moved a number of states to action, even to a consideration of public power projects. Surveying the water power resources of the region was the major activity affecting the Connecticut River of the four valley states in the period between 1865 and 1927, 24 N e w Hampshire undertaking an examination of its power resources as early as 1870, Vermont in 1908.25 In a series of laws starting in 1909, Massachusetts appropriated funds to enable the United States Geological Survey, under cooperative agreement, to survey the water power resources of the state 28 In 1913, the Connecticut Valley Waterway Board submitted its famous re-

Government Action before 1927

23

port to the Massachusetts legislature, in turn leading to still further state action in the Connecticut basin.27 The Commission on the Conservation of the Natural Resources of the State of Vermont warned in its report of 1912 against the concentration of hydroelectric power in a few cities and the control of power by a few individuals and corporations. The commission called attention to the dangers of centralization, and suggested that the legislature consider restrictions on the transmission of power in order to insure the widest distribution of control and development. In addition, the state should reserve to itself the right to control all hydro power, and no one should be allowed to use it without a franchise. If private interests allowed the valuable "white coal" to go to waste, the state should develop the power itself. In all of this, L a Follette's state of Wisconsin offered an excellent model.28 In 1918 the Massachusetts Commission on Waterways and Public Lands, established in 1915 with a grant of $20,000, issued a 432 page report to the legislature contending that opportunities for water power utilization in the state were going to waste and recommending a state commission with authority to require the coordination of electric facilities, and, if need be, to construct reservoirs and either lease them or operate them directly.29 Three years later the Vermont Water Resource Commission found that additional power storage facilities were needed if existing developments, particularly in the White River Valley, were to be operated efficiently, and noted that the great advance in the price of coal pointed up the need for dualpurpose reservoirs for flood control and power. Unlike the Massachusetts commission, the Vermont body made no specific recommendations, save for further study.30 The most important developments took place in New Hampshire, where the Commission on Water Conservation and Water Power reported in 1919, after a study by the United States Geological Survey similar to the studies the Geological Survey had made for Massachusetts and Vermont, that there was a serious waste of water power in the state, both because of the failure to develop choice sites and the lack of an integrated power system. The commission, appointed by the New Hampshire legislature, recommended the creation of a state authority under whose jurisdiction storage reservoirs for power

24

Flood Control Politics

development would be constructed. 31 In 1923 former Governor Robert Bass guided a bill through the N e w Hampshire House providing for construction of reservoirs by the state with contracts for the sale of power to private companies, but the bill was killed in the Senate by four votes. 32 Three years later, a five-man N e w Hampshire Power Survey Committee appointed by the President of the University of N e w Hampshire, headed by Bass and including John G . Winant, went even further in urging the need to control the new giant holding companies like the Insull combine and suggesting the possibility of forming rural electrical cooperatives to market power. 33 While the campaign of Bass for a state power authority met defeat at the time, his recommendations provided the basis for the Water Resources Board which the state of N e w Hampshire was to establish a decade later. In addition to concerning themselves with the problem of power development, the valley states turned to the questions of flood control and pollution abatement during these years. In 1884 the Massachusetts Board of Harbors and Land Commissioners was authorized to "examine the channel and course of the Connecticut River within the confines of the Commonwealth, and to investigate the cause and effects of floods upon the same." In the following year the legislature passed " A n Act in relation to the Conservation of the Connecticut River" giving the Board authority to ban structures and encroachments interfering with navigation or increasing flood hazards, and these powers were extended in an act of 1891. 34 Starting in 1888, the state built protective works along the river banks at Hadley, Hatfield, Agawam, Northampton, and West Springfield. If Massachusetts made the greatest strides in navigation and flood control, and N e w Hampshire in power development, it was the state of Connecticut which clearly set the pattern in pollution abatement. Connecticut's investigations of the pollution problem started in 1889 and continued regularly thereafter, 35 but not for another thirty-five years was the need for a regular state agency with some measure of punitive powers to check pollution recognized in the state. A s late as 1921, in hearings before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, Representative Treadway of Massachusetts opposed a national anti-pollution bill because a ban on throwing acids into streams

Government Action before 1927

25

would hurt the paper interests of the Connecticut Valley, and because a river clears itself anyway. 3 6 Connecticut was finally moved to action in the spring of 1925, motivated primarily not by a concern for beauty or health or wildlife conservation, but by the need to provide clean water for the processing phases of the textile and paper industries, which were threatening to leave the state. The paper industry, in particular, had found that the right to pollute streams at will was more of a curse than a blessing. In addition, the state was concerned with the threat to water supplies, the pollution of bathing beaches, and the loss of oyster beds. On May 27, 1925, the General Assembly created the first state anti-pollution agency in the Connecticut Valley, the Connecticut State Water Commission. The move came none too soon. When the commission began work in 1926, it found that every Connecticut city in the valley was dumping raw sewage into the Connecticut River. 3 7 Ill T h e record of the four valley states by 1927 in developing the resources of the Connecticut Valley sounded fairly impressive. With the aid of the United States Geological Survey, the water resources of the region had been carefully mapped. The states, with varying degrees of success, had attempted to achieve a coordinated development of hydroelectric sites. T h e first steps had been taken toward a pollution abatement program, and for decades past, cities, states, and even private organizations had constructed dikes and other works to protect the valley from floods. Unfortunately, all this did not actually add up to as much in practice as it did on paper, and what had not been done was overwhelmingly more important than what had been done. If the Connecticut State Water Commission under General Wadhams did an important educational job and could even point to concrete accomplishments in municipal sewerage systems, it was notably reluctant to take action against industrial offenders. As inadequate as the Connecticut system was, it was still far superior to that of the other three states. A s late as 1936, of the ninety-seven public sewerage sys-

26

Flood Control Politics

tems in the valley, only two had complete treatment, and eighty-two discharged raw sewage directly into the river. 38 Despite the public agitation over integrated power grids, state encouragement of coordinated power development had yielded nothing by 1927, and was ultimately to produce results only in N e w Hampshire, and there on a minor scale. Most important, after decades of study and action on flood control, the Connecticut River was as great a menace to the people of the valley as it had been three hundred years before. It was universally recognized that flood control in the Connecticut Valley could be obtained only by interstate action, but this served as an excuse for state inaction rather than as an impetus to any interstate agreement. There was general indifference to the question of flood control in the Connecticut Valley in 1927; there had been no major flood in the valley for several years, and none of disastrous proportions for almost three centuries. Flood disasters, like hurricanes, occurred in other parts of the country, not in N e w England.

CHAPTER III The Failure to Harness the River, 7 9 2 7 - 1935 Early in November 192J, a tropical storm moved up the Atlantic Coast from Cuba; heading harmlessly out to sea, it struck a high pressure wall off the New England shore and was driven north up the Connecticut River Valley. At the same time a cold, autumn rainstorm from the Mohawk Valley sweeping northeast encountered a high-pressure area along the St. Lawrence and was deflected southward. The cold, western stormbank collided with the warm, southern stormwinds laden with moisture, precipitating a deluge of torrential rain over western New England. The rains started to fall on November 2, pelting creeks and rivers already high from unusually heavy summer and autumn rainfall, and on November 3, rivers jumped their banks in almost every section of Vermont, as well as western Massachusetts and Connecticut. In the next thirty-six hours, more than ten inches of rain drenched western New England. By November 4 New England realized it was experiencing the greatest flood disaster in its history. Eighteen lives had already been lost, including that of Lieutenant Governor S. Holliston Jackson of Vermont, drowned in Barre, and a false rumor that a huge reservoir above Montpelier had collapsed, taking over two hundred lives, quickly gained credence. The Vermont capital was so completely isolated that there was no way to scout the tale. The National Guard evacuated people from Rutland, where rafts of furniture were used to navigate the streets, and the Mad River covered the main street of Winsted, Connecticut with a foot of water. Railroads in Vermont were paralyzed, and scores of towns were pocketed by the water, cut off from any communication with the world save for the feeble signals of amateur radio operators trying to break through the storm.

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Overnight, the Connecticut River Valley turned into a vast inland sea. Radio reports on November 4 flashed the news that the river was five feet over the record high and rising fast. The White River jumped from eight to thirty-eight feet in twelve hours. In the Berkshire hill town of Becket, a dam burst, unleashing a wall of water 150 yards wide which roared down on the little Massachusetts village, leaving one dead and 150 homeless, wiping out the silk mill that supported much of the town, a greater disaster averted only by the vigilance of one man who watched the dam through the night and fled to the village sounding the alarm as the dam began to crack. Downstream, ten thousand persons were routed from their homes in the suburbs of Springfield, Massachusetts, while people along the riverbanks watched the corn stalks swept down by the current, eloquent evidence of the inundation of farm lands above. Three hundred persons were sheltered in churches and halls in Westfield, and even greater danger threatened Hadley where a squad of prisoners from the Northampton jail labored to save the dikes. The force of the river swept seventy boats from their moorings off Hartford. As the swollen Connecticut washed over river islands in Massachusetts, missions from the mainland rescued colonies of people marooned on the islands, while startled field mice and muskrats swam for dry land. The damage was greatest, and the suffering most intense, not in the Connecticut Valley but in the Winooski basin of western Vermont. The community of Bolton under towering Camel's H u m p suffered a heavy loss of life when the floodwaters swept a score of highway workers in a shed to their death and carried two tons of dynamite downstream. Food and fuel had to be rationed in Montpelier, while cadets at Norwich University put the town of Northfield under martial law. The river claimed twenty-six lives in Waterbury, Vermont, scene of the most vaunted feat of heroism in N e w England. A newspaper editor drove a team of horses through the water, the horses swimming as he guided them with the reins while swimming behind; then he tethered his team afloat to a second story window and calmly proceeded to rescue his marooned mother. On another rescue mission, the editor swung hand over hand across a steel cable over the Winooski River and completed his labors by

The Failure to Harness the River

29

rowing across the treacherous stream to carry quinine to the people of Duxbury. Vermonters gathered in general stores to talk about the ghost house that had gone bouncing down the Winooski, all its lights aglow, while people on the river banks cheered a pig swimming downstream like a porpoise and a rooster logrolling on a barrel. Others read with a rueful grin of the destruction by the floodwaters of hundreds of kegs of newly-made Italian wine in the cellars of East Hartford, a terrible blow in the midst of Prohibition. Otherwise, there was little enough cause for humor in Vermont. The Army sent wagon trains through Smuggler's Notch with medical supplies and food for Waterbury, and state officials mobilized all their forces, but the relief problem was desperate. When the rivers finally receded on November 7, near zero temperatures and a heavy snowfall left scores of families isolated in farmhouses in the Winooski Valley, living in wet clothing with no heat and no medical supplies. Many of the Winooski villages were almost inaccessible, because the roads were a sea of slime, with mudholes hidden by a treacherous mantle of snow. The flood virtually crippled northern Vermont. Twenty-three bridges were partially or wholly washed away between Montpelier and White River Junction. A prosperous farmer in the Connecticut Valley watched his land, his livestock, his entire investment destroyed in a few hours, his wife driven out of her mind by the shock. In Barre, people developed skin diseases from drinking contaminated water. Railroad tracks and bridges were so badly twisted that officials reported that Montpelier would have no railroad service for several months. Governor Weeks called the flood the "worst catastrophe in Vermont's history"; fifteen years later, flood reconstruction was still the major cause of the bonded indebtedness of the state. The floodwaters took eighty-four lives and destroyed thirty million dollars in property in Vermont alone, fifty-five of the deaths in the Winooski Valley. In much of the Connecticut Valley, the floodwaters reached their greatest height in three centuries. The November 1927 flood was incomparably more destructive than any previous flood in the history of N e w England. 1

Flood Control Politics

30 ι

The great Mississippi flood of 1927 had badly shaken the beliefs of those who held that flood control was wholly a local question, and the New England disaster a few months later won new converts to the idea that the federal government should assume responsibility for a national flood control program. On November 6 Representative Reid of Illinois, Chairman of the House Flood Control Committee, announced that his committee would prepare a national flood control bill, and that attention would be given to other rivers as well as the Mississippi.2 For a time it appeared that the two disasters would shock Congress into passing a federal flood control act, embracing all the great river basins of the country, but ultimately advocates of such a policy had to settle for a compromise measure in which Congress approved increased federal intervention in the Mississippi Valley but drafted no specific plan for flood control in New England.3 Nor was New England greatly disturbed by this policy. For the most part, the region continued to regard flood control as wholly a matter of state concern, and, so far as Connecticut and Massachusetts were concerned, not too great concern at that, particularly since the greatest damage had occurred in Vermont and another such flood was not to be expected for another century. The Massachusetts legislature in 1928 directed the Department of Public Works to make a survey of the flood problem in the Connecticut and Hoosac valleys and recommend what action should be taken to provide adequate flood control. Furthermore, the legislature appropriated the princely sum of $60,000 to provide flood protection for North Adams on the Hoosac and for Hadley and Hatfield on the Connecticut. The Department of Public Works could make no adequate survey, for the legislature appropriated no additional funds for the survey. After holding hearings that fall at Springfield, Northampton, Greenfield, and Pittsfield, the department reported that $500,000 could be spent on local protection alone in the Connecticut Valley, but recommended that no action be taken unless there was a local demand for it, with the localities assuming a considerable part of the cost. The department concluded that effective regulation was impossible

The Failure to Harness the River

31

save by interstate action, since the Connecticut would have to be checked in Vermont and N e w Hampshire, but made no recommendation at all to petition Congress for federal legislation or to take steps to draft an interstate compact. "The Department's study does not indicate that there are conditions at present which in flood stages of the river threaten serious damage or loss of life. . . . The Department, therefore, makes no recommendation for legislation." 4 On November 22, 1927, the House Committee on Flood Control held a hearing in Washington to find out what action the N e w England states wanted Congress to take to provide flood protection for the region. Committee members repeatedly asked Representative Treadway to state concretely what he wanted the committee to do, but Treadway could only reply, "I do not know that I have any constructive suggestions to make." When Representative Sears of Nebraska asked him pointedly, "Are your people trying to develop any plan or theory to avoid a recurrence of that flood?" Treadway replied, "No." When Congressman Swing of California asked Treadway if he proposed to return at a later date with more specific proposals, he answered that he felt "absolutely helpless in the way of any suggestion," 5 short of some kind of a study. Representative Gibson of Vermont talked almost wholly about flood relief, rather than flood control, although he told the committee that he too hoped for a survey by the War Department. 6 On the other hand, Representative Brigham of Vermont pointed out quite correctly that there was no point in asking Congress to authorize a new survey for one had already been approved. On January 21, 1927, Congress had passed a Rivers and Harbors A c t 7 adopting House Document 308 of the 69th Congress, ist Session,8 one of the most important acts affecting water resources in our entire history. In House Document 308, the Corps of Engineers and the Federal Power Commission had recommended surveys of each of the nation's major river valleys to provide plans for flood control, navigation, power, and irrigation development. In the ensuing years, the War Department issued a series of "308" reports mapping the great river valleys and recommending flood control and other projects that Congress should authorize, thus providing the documentary basis for the water resources policies of the federal govern-

32

Flood Control Politics

ment. If there was no point in Congress passing any additional survey legislation for N e w England, it might well have acted to expedite the field work of the Army Engineers. Unfortunately, no "308" report was prepared for the Connecticut basin for eight years, just in time for the 1936 flood, which required a complete revision of plans. The most popular solution for the flood control problem in N e w England was to encourage the private utilities to build more storage reservoirs. The Deerfield River dams of the N e w England Power Association, which held all the waters of the river during the flood and still had room to spare, were regarded as models for flood control works. The committee appointed by the Boston Society of Civil Engineers to investigate the 1927 flood reported in 1930 that N e w England conditions did not warrant the use of such measures as levees and detention reservoirs, but felt that the development of power storage reservoirs offered a great deal of hope.9 N o one suggested that the federal government construct multipurpose dams for power and flood control. Insofar as state action was contemplated, it was to reduce the financial burden of the private utilities in constructing the reservoirs. T h e complete interrelation between the states and the utilities with respect to flood control is revealed in Lieutenant Governor Stanley C. Wilson's terse report on the Vermont legislature of 1929: "Flood control was considered and cooperation between the State and power development companies provided." 1 0 If Massachusetts was unconcerned about flood control, Vermont displayed a lively interest, and the Green Mountain State appeared wedded to the idea of a network of private storage reservoirs as the answer to the problem. Vermont allotted $16,000 for flood control studies in 1928 from emergency state flood rehabilitation funds, on condition that the sum be matched by the private utilities. The utilities quickly appropriated $16,000 more, and the United States Geological Survey contributed an additional $5,000, while the War Department, acting on an initial Congressional appropriation to begin its "308" studies, compiled flood and channel data in the Champlain basin. On December 15, 1928, Prof. Η . K . Barrows of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, consulting engineer, issued a preliminary

The Failure to Harness the River

33

report holding that flood retention dams of the type built in the Miami Valley in Ohio, heretofore the model for flood control works, would be too costly for Vermont, which had no cities like Dayton to protect, and that multipurpose dams, with part of the cost defrayed by the sale of power, was the only feasible method. Barrows recommended a master plan for the construction of a series of dams on the White, Winooski, Lamoille, Missisquoi, and Passumpsic rivers, the five rivers in the Connecticut, Winooski, and Ghamplain basins that had done the greatest damage in 1927. Since the power potential in these five rivers was far greater than the current demand, Barrows proposed to harness them as the market developed, with the better projects constructed first and the others over a period of time until almost total flood protection was achieved. Barrows suggested the N e w York Storage Act of 1915 as a model for Vermont legislation, proposing that the legislature authorize the formation of public river regulating districts, with directors to issue bonds to finance the construction of reservoirs and to assess benefits. 11 T h e Vermont legislature voted $5,000 more to continue the survey, if the utilities would match this amount, which they did. Barrows extended his survey to sixteen other rivers, aided by the surveys of the Army Engineers in the Connecticut River Valley, and on December 15, 1930, issued a final report, buttressing the power storage reservoir recommendations of the preliminary report. The Advisory Committee of Engineers on Flood Control, approving Barrows's findings, recommended "urgently" an act of the Vermont legislature to provide for public river regulating districts to finance the construction of an initial program of seventeen of the eighty-five reservoirs in the master plan. Of the initial program of seventeen, eight would be in the Connecticut River Valley, including Union Village, Gaysville, Groton Pond, Ludlow, East Haven, Lyndonville, Rickers Pond, and Bridgewater Corners. The first four of these sites would be storm centers for years to come. 12 After the Vermont surveys had been completed, N e w Hampshire decided to adopt the same procedure, employing Professor Barrows and the Boston engineering firm of Metcalf and Eddy to determine the feasibility of a series of storage reservoirs for power and flood control in N e w Hampshire. As part of a master plan for N e w

34

Flood Control Politics

Hampshire, Barrows recommended the construction, initially, of five reservoirs, three in the Merrimack River basin, in addition to Pittsburg and West Canaan in the Connecticut Valley. 1 3 In his final report in the spring of 1934, Barrows observed that the cost of the reservoirs could be borne by the users of power, but that since the state got the benefits of flood control and recreation, it should handle the financing, thus affording lower interest rates and expediting the condemnation of land. Once more, he cited the N e w York experience, but added that it would be more advisable to create a N e w Hampshire state authority than a series of river regulating districts.14 The state of N e w Hampshire decided to adopt the Barrows program, creating the N e w Hampshire Water Resources Board in 1935 as a state authority, 15 and planning immediate construction of two reservoirs in the Merrimack River Valley in the fall of 1935, pending receipt of an expected grant from the federal government. The federal money never arrived, because of a slash in P W A funds, but the state of N e w Hampshire went ahead on its own, ultimately constructing Pittsburg dam in the northernmost part of the valley. 18 Vermont, however, would have none of it. In his inaugural message to the Vermont legislature in 1931, Governor Wilson warned against "giving to public service corporations, under the guise of flood control, rights in our valleys, without adequate compensation both to the individuals concerned and to the state." 1 7 The bill to authorize the creation of river regulating districts was introduced in the Vermont legislature in 1931 but died in committee, because, as one of the committee members, George Aiken of Putney, later governor and senator, explained, the bill "would provide the power companies with control of the destiny and development of the state," and create district directors who would have been "virtual dictators of economic life of the district." 18 11 Nor were efforts toward interstate control of stream pollution much more successful. The Connecticut State Water Commission carried on an important program of research, accompanied by education and cautious efforts to persuade offenders to reform, which

The Failure to Harness the River

35

placed it far ahead of the other New England bodies in developing an adequate pollution abatement program. 19 New Hampshire undertook a survey of the Ammonoosuc and began work to clear the stream of excessive pollution.20 For a time, it appeared that the Massachusetts division of the Izaak Walton League had succeeded in arousing the Connecticut River towns sufficiently to form a network of "clean river councils" in each community dedicated to a broad pollution abatement program, but the valiant attempt to establish a genuine "grassroots" organization fell through.21 An even more promising development was the conference held in August 1930 at the Hotel Astor in New York City at the invitation of the Hearst New York American which had aroused wide interest in the pollution question by a series of sensational articles on pollution in the waters of New York harbor. Representatives of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut attended the meeting at which United States Senator Royal S. Copeland, former Commissioner of Health in New York City, presided. The conferees agreed to further meetings to discuss the possibilities of interstate action, and on June 3, 1931, the three state commissions met in New York City and organized the Tri-State Treaty Commission. This new commission drafted an interstate compact to require treatment of sewage in a specified area around New York harbor. New York ratified the agreement in 1932, and when New Jersey voted its approval in 1935, the Interstate Sanitation Commission went into operation. Not until 1941 did the state of Connecticut ratify the compact, ten years after the agreement had been drafted, an eloquent comment on the tardiness of state action in New England, particularly since Connecticut led all other states in the region in awareness of the stream pollution problem.22 Ill Although the New Deal was to give it its greatest impetus, regional planning had become deeply rooted in several New England communities long before 1933. Hartford had established the first official local planning board in 1907, and in 1913 Massachusetts passed a law requiring all cities and towns with over 10,000 people

36

Flood Control Politics

to establish planning boards. 23 In 1927 a resolution was introduced into the Massachusetts legislature to create a Connecticut Valley Regional Board, composed of the three valley county commissioners and four others, including a landscape engineer, to make recommendations to the General Court, but the resolution was killed. 24 In addition to these official planning boards, numbers of private agencies were engaged in regional planning, either exclusively in the Connecticut Valley or in all of N e w England. By 1935, in addition to such region-wide bodies as the N e w England Council, valley agencies like the Westfield Valley Parkway Association, the Old Hampshire Planning Council, and the Connecticut Valley Council supplemented the work of the official government agencies. 25 Despite this auspicious start, regional planning in N e w England in 1933 was still largely an unexplored idea. Not only was there no over-all regional plan for N e w England, but there was not a single state planning board in all of N e w England, while local planning boards did not exist in most of the cities and towns of the region, particularly in northern N e w England. On November 8, 1933, President Roosevelt announced a great expansion of the federal relief program aimed at putting four million men to work at thirty hours a week at a living wage rather than a subsistence dole. He created the Civil Works Administration under Harry Hopkins to administer the program and indicated that regional and state planning projects would be eligible for federal grants. A t the same time, the National Planning Board of the Public Works Administration offered funds to the states to carry out planning projects but made clear that no funds would be available unless the governors of the states created temporary planning boards and the state legislatures later established permanent statutory boards. 26 With this inducement, state planning boards sprang up almost overnight, and regional planning in America flourished like the green bay tree. Governor Winant of N e w Hampshire set up the first state planning board in the region early in December 1933, and Connecticut followed later in the month. Vermont set up its first planning board the following spring, but Massachusetts did not come into line until September 1935, after a statutory grant of authority from the Massa-

The Failure to Harness the River

37

chusetts legislature in the summer of 1935. By then, each of the other three states had not only set up temporary boards but had also enacted statutes meeting Secretary Ickes' second requirement of permanent state planning boards. 27 T h e establishment of state planning boards led in turn to the creation of the N e w England Regional Planning Commission for the six N e w England state planning boards in March 1934, although at that time some of the states had yet to establish official temporary state boards, let alone statutory bodies. In later years, some N e w England leaders were to declare that the most compelling argument against a valley authority or other federal agency in N e w England was that the six N e w England states had spontaneously established state planning boards and had banded together to work out a regional plan, thus providing united action without the surrender of state sovereignty at least as quickly and efficiently as the federal government could have provided a regional plan. In this instance, the assertion is disingenuous. Although the N e w England Council, in particular its Executive Vice President, Dudley Harmon, did yeoman work to establish the N e w England Regional Planning Commission, state officials made little contribution, and the greatest share of the credit for the creation of the commission must go to federal officials. In particular, the perseverance of Charles W . Eliot, 2d, of the National Planning Board, and the field work of George W . Lane, Regional Advisor of P W A , made the N E R P C possible. Moreover, without the paid "consultants," who were frequently actually executive secretaries of the state planning boards, provided by the federal government, the N E R P C might not have survived the early years. 28 In the next few years, the N e w England Regional Planning Commission and the state planning boards used federal funds to chart the great river basins of N e w England, make land utilization studies, map flood control projects, lay out plans for airports and highways, and explore the possibilities of restoring northern forests and developing ocean beaches. Early in April 1934, state planning boards met with the National Planning Board at Concord, N e w Hampshire, to discuss pollution abatement in the Connecticut Valley. The F E R A made possible the employment of large numbers

38

Flood Control Politics

of men to study sources of pollution in the Connecticut Valley, and the P W A agreed to lend 30 per cent of the cost of labor and materials to communities for pollution abatement projects; Hartford obtained $900,000 from this fund for a sewage-disposal project.29 T h e Chairman of the N E R P C appointed a Water Resources Committee in 1934 which, working with P W A engineers, studied and classified public works projects on water resources in N e w England; drafted forms for interstate compacts in the major river valleys; and mapped out a procedure for conducting investigations in the Connecticut Valley. By December 1936, the N E R P C was able to publish a careful survey of the Connecticut River Valley, a survey greatly expanded in the report of the N E R P C the following year, and more particularly in the drainage basin study published by the Massachusetts State Planning Board in 1939. 30 Although Massachusetts was the last of the state planning boards to get underway, it rivalled the alert state of N e w Hampshire in producing results. The State Planning Board and other Massachusetts state agencies directed workers provided by the federal government in carrying out a wide range of assignments. The State Planning Board sponsored W P A water resources surveys in each of the river basins of the state, including studies of the Deerfield, Westfield, Chicopee, and other tributaries of the Connecticut. From September 18, 1935 to November 30, 1935 alone, the state of Massachusetts received $31,494 from the W P A for the Connecticut River drainage study and an additional $55,366 for other work; moreover, the State Planning Board drew heavily on the Weather Bureau and the United States Geological Survey for its river basin studies. 31 The State Planning Board directed W P A staffs in flood control surveys and the State Department of Public Health used W P A workers in pollution abatement projects, while both relied on consultants provided by the National Resources Committee. Using W P A staffs, the Massachusetts State Planning Board was able to make the first scientific record of any flood in the Connecticut Valley during 1936, with workers on double shifts twenty-four hours a day recording hourly flood heights and other data basic to an adequate flood control ίο program. Little of this would have been possible without federal action, not

The Failure to Harness the River

39

merely in providing men and money, but in encouraging the reluctant states to take on the responsibility of planning for themselves. Connecticut was a particular problem. " W e certainly must keep Connecticut in line because if they withdraw from our regional planning work, it would be a very serious blow," Victor Cutter, Chairman of the N E R P C , wrote Charles W . Eliot, 2d, Executive Officer of the National Resources Board, when it was feared Connecticut would pull out shortly after the N E R P C was formed. 33 Federal money was poured into the state to keep the planning movement alive. In 1934 the F E R A provided thirty-three workers for the state pollution study and for mapping drainage areas in the state.34 Connecticut appropriated only $5000 a year for the entire work of its planning board, while in 1936, the W P A supplied forty workers, and the National Resources Committee a part-time consultant and a full-time engineer. 35 A s late as November 1936, the Committee consultant reported to Eliot that it was still a discouraging business. " I don't believe that we can tell until next Spring whether the State Planning Board of Connecticut is going to amount to anything, or go out of existence. They very seldom meet!" 36

IV

If the N e w England Regional Planning Commission accomplished nothing else, it would still be important because it made it possible for the N e w England states to consider jointly the problem of flood control in the Connecticut Valley. Despite the fact that everyone realized that the flood control problem crossed state lines, no attempt was made to provide flood protection after the 1927 disaster save by isolated state action. For eight years after the flood, no action of any kind was taken on an interstate basis, and as late as the spring of 1936, the N E R P C complained that while everyone recognized the need for cooperation in N e w England, thus far "the cooperation has been principally conversation." 3 7 Once more, it was the federal government which served as a catalyst. In December 1934, the governors and governors-elect of N e w England recommended to the N e w England Council that it draft a regional public works program that could secure federal

40

Flood Control Politics

funds, and six weeks later, the council reported out four programs, one of which was "flood control, power and storage reservoir projects in relation to the Connecticut River and its tributaries." 38 In March 1935, Governor Cross of Connecticut wrote governors Cur ley of Massachusetts, Bridges of New Hampshire and Smith of Vermont, pointing out that the National Resources Board had listed the Connecticut River Valley as a logical recipient of public funds for flood control, pollution abatement and similar projects. However, Cross warned, the federal government clearly could not approve any projects in the Connecticut Valley unless the states agreed on a common program. Despite this, "so far as I know, no attempt has been made by them to formulate a policy of cooperative action. It is my view of the matter that it will be extremely difficult to secure public funds for any considerable works projects in the Connecticut River Valley until such time as the states concerned can agree on a program of improvements for the Valley. . . ." 39 If the hope of federal largesse did not move the states to action, the fear of federal development of the Connecticut Valley did. In January 1935, Representative Citron of Connecticut introduced a bill to create a Connecticut Valley Authority, arousing a stormy debate over the merits of a T V A for New England throughout the region. The Water Resources Committee of the N E R P C , headed by Η . K . Barrows, at a meeting in Boston in March found that the Citron bill was "completely at variance" with its own approach to resources development and declared it "urgent" that enabling legislation for interstate compacts be enacted.40 On April 8 Victor Cutter, Chairman of the N E R P C , directed Barrows to prepare a model bill to give Congressional consent to an interstate compact, and Barrows finished this work in June. 41 Meanwhile, on April 17 the N E R P C formally voted to reject the T V A approach in favor of the interstate compact method of developing the water resources of New England.42 As soon as Cutter received the model compact legislation in June, he sent a copy to Congressman Citron, stating: "We should very much like to get your re-action to it. Possibly you would like to introduce a bill of this kind, in view of your known interests in such matters." 43 This bold attempt to get the very man who had spon-

The Failure to Harness the River

41

sored the valley authority legislation to introduce the compact bill succeeded. On August 13, 1935, after a summer of negotiations, Citron filed H.J. Res. 377 to give advance Congressional consent to interstate compacts. In June Connecticut created a commission on interstate water problems and N e w Hampshire authorized the governor to negotiate compacts and later set up a permanent Commission on Interstate Cooperation. 44 The Vermont State Planning Board voted unanimously at a meeting in Burlington in December in favor of the interstate compact rather than the valley authority method and recommended that the legislature empower an official state agency to negotiate compacts in the Connecticut Valley. 45 By the end of 1935, the four Connecticut Valley states appeared to be well on their way toward drafting an interstate flood control agreement, a marked change from their situation twelve months before. In a report issued the following spring, the New England Regional Planning Commission noted that the National Resources Committee had warned against the use of the interstate compact as a method for solving continuing problems, and had cited the Port of N e w York Authority as an example of the failure of the compact method.46 The commission study repeated Governor Pinchot's warning that "in most cases . . . discussion of interstate compacts seem to be merely a way to prolong debate and keep us from doing anything," and reported that the National Resources Committee "most distrusted" use of the compact method in the field of natural resources. While the N E R P C noted that Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis had recommended the compact as a likely device in the field of natural resources,47 the commission was prone to accept the condemnation by the National Resources Committee as essentially accurate. Nevertheless, the N E R P C recommended the adoption of the interstate compact approach by the N e w England states to achieve flood control and water resources development, because the alternatives were individual state action, which would be far more inadequate, or federal action, which would be intolerable. " N e w England is congenitally averse to the imposition of Federal authority; agencies official and unofficial, governmental, industrial, and commercial have declared their opposition to direct Federal action through an authority independent of the states — like the T . V . A . — in flood

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Flood Control Politics

control work." The compact method was "essentially clumsy," but its weakness was the price that had to be paid for "the safe-guarding of local privileges from inroads of Federal interference." 48 ν Although the federal government played an important role in goading the N e w England states to joint action on flood control, it would be inaccurate to assume that there was a clear-cut federal policy for the development of water resources, nationally or in N e w England, and even less accurate to suppose that the conflict that was shortly to develop between the federal government and the N e w England states in the Connecticut Valley resulted simply from a shortsighted, parochial inability of the N e w England states to recognize the benefits of the federal water resources program. Indeed, one would be hard put to demonstrate that at any time from 1927 to 1936 there was a clear-cut federal program for the Connecticut Valley. When Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933, there was no national water policy. Roosevelt's first year in office was marked largely by improvisation, by the creation of agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority without any direct indication of whether the President proposed to use the T V A pattern as the basis of development elsewhere in the country. Hence, on February 2, 1934, Congress passed the Norris-Wilson resolution requesting the President to prepare "a comprehensive plan for the improvement and development of the rivers of the United States, with a view of giving the Congress information for the guidance of legislation which will provide for the maximum amount of flood control, navigation, irrigation, and development of hydroelectric power." 49 Roosevelt called on his Secretaries of Interior, War, Agriculture, and Labor to prepare such a report, asking that they select ten specific projects that he might recommend to Congress as having the highest priority. Ten weeks later, the report of the President's Committee on Water Flow was ready, a remarkably speedy performance which did not permit any original study, but only the assembling of already available information. Ten projects were recommended, none in N e w England, but they were recommended with considerable reluctance

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because of the need for further study, and Roosevelt, in submitting the report to Congress in June, asked Congress to take no action but to allow him "between now and the assembling of the next Congress, to complete these studies and to outline to the next Congress a comprehensive plan to be pursued over a long period of years." 50 The report of the President's Committee on Water Flow is a revealing document. Of the four cabinet members who signed the report, three found it necessary to add qualifications, an eloquent indication of the lack of agreement and coordination in the Administration in this field. Secretary Perkins felt that the "uncoordinated and often conflicting" policies called for long range planning by a single agency, preferably the National Planning Board, but Secretary of War D e m would have none of it. In a remarkably frank statement of the intransigence of the War Department when asked to coordinate its activities with other departments working in the same field, D e m explained that he had signed the report "with strong mental reservations." H e could see no need for all this talk about careful planning of river valley development. T h e War Department had done such work in the past and should do so in the future. T h e Army Engineers had gathered all the information anyone would need in the "308" reports; "the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers can, within a very short time, prepare for you a comprehensive plan such as Congress has requested." If Congress would adopt the "308" reports, and give the War Department the money to construct projects, no more would be needed, save, of course, that irrigation projects would be under the Interior Department. Dern's letter revealed that the Army Engineers had learned nothing in a century of river valley development. " I have been trying to make up my mind whether all elements of a program of national planning should be combined in one plan," D e m observed. " I do not think it is necessary to do so." "For example, putting an end to stream pollution seems to have little or no connection with improving the streams for navigation, flood control, power or irrigation, because it is chiefly a matter of the construction of sewage-disposal plants, which so far has been a municipal question." Nor did soil erosion and reforestation have to be tied in with any program of

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Flood Control Politics

flood control or river valley development. "Each of these activities is a special problem, to be handled by a special group of experts if satisfactory results are to be obtained. Here is a place where too much coordination, or the coordination of unrelated activities, might prove harmful instead of beneficial." 5 1 Throughout his administration, President Roosevelt was engaged in a constant struggle to get the Army Engineers to conform to his national program, but the Engineers, supported by Congressmen interested in "pork barrel" legislation, succeeded in thwarting him. The later developments in the Connecticut Valley cannot be understood, unless one realizes that the dominant federal agency in the valley throughout this period was the Corps of Engineers, an organization generally indifferent to the need for an integrated development of the watershed which would meet the needs of the regional economy. # On June 30, 1934, Roosevelt established the National Resources Board, and on November 28, only five months later, the board was able to complete an inventory of the nation's assets in a report on national planning and public works which recommended immediate study of "the Connecticut River power, flood-control and streampollution project." 52 In 1935 the National Resources Board, after a study by Η . K . Barrows, recommended a series of multipurpose reservoirs in the Connecticut basin. The report listed fifty-eight possible storage sites that could be constructed at a cost of $53,530,500, the largest sites being Gaysville, Upper Fifteen Mile Falls, Pittsburg, and Newfane, but the Administration made no effort to push such a program in Congress. 53 Not until February 1936, over eight years after the 1927 flood, did the War Department, handicapped by inadequate Congressional grants, issue its "308" report on the Connecticut River, the famous House Document 412. The Army Engineers observed that although floods were "comparatively frequent" and caused "serious damages" in the Connecticut basin, a comprehensive plan of flood control would be justified only if there was power development as well. The Engineers recommended the ultimate construction of thirty-three reservoirs for flood control and power, but since there was no present or prospective market for large quantities of power, they recom-

The Failure to Harness the River

45

mended the adoption of an initial plan of ten reservoirs, all in Vermont and N e w Hampshire. Total annual benefits from the construction of these ten dams would be $638,000, of which only $180,000 would represent a saving in reducing flood losses; the rest would be from power development. However, the War Department observed that the dams should not be constructed unless local interests provided all rights of way, assumed all damages, paid one-half of the cost of construction, and agreed to take over and operate the works after their completion. The Army recommended the creation of conservancy districts in Vermont and N e w Hampshire to negotiate agreements for the payment of stored water and to raise funds by assessing local benefits, the same proposal which Aiken and other Vermont leaders had rejected a few years before as playing into the hands of the utilities. Actually, the division engineer remarked, since there was no immediate demand for electric power, "realization of the initial flood control plan will probably be delayed pending development of a demand for the added power made possible by the plan." 54 Clearly, the War Department in February 1936 saw no need to hurry about flood control. Although the 1927 flood had done considerable damage, a flood of this magnitude was not to be expected for another century. Since flood control depended on the construction of storage reservoirs, which could only be justified by power benefits, any flood control plan would have to wait on the desire of the utilities for more power. At such time, the states and local communities would presumably be more interested in paying 50 per cent of the construction costs and assuming all other responsibilities. When all of this transpired, the Connecticut Valley would have achieved a bare minimum of flood protection, but enough to avoid another disaster like that of 1927. If the plan could be carried out, there would be no cause for concern over a repetition of that disaster — unless the river chose to strike in the spring instead of the fall, unless the greatest damage was done not in Vermont but in the southern valley, or unless the flood was of a greater magnitude than that of 1927. On these three premises, the reliability of House Document 412, and the security of the people of the valley, hinged.

CHAPTER

IV

The Flood Control Conflict The winter of 1935—36 was one o£ the severest in the history of New England. By late fall the mountain streams had frozen and the rivers were soon jammed with ice. Early in March New England experienced a week of unseasonably warm weather melting the snow on Vermont and New Hampshire hillsides. On March 10 a torrential storm struck the region, the rain coursing off the hard hillslopes to add to the melting snow and the thawing ice of the rivers. On March 12 the hill streams of Vermont and New Hampshire jumped their banks. Twenty-four hours later, the rivers of New England had already taken ten lives, while two hundred thousand persons were made idle by the closing of factories. At Mount Tom Junction an ice jam thirty feet high and one-quarter mile wide backed up water for six miles, spilling over the Northampton meadows, and threatening disaster to the industrial town of Holyoke below. On March 15, with a tremendous roar, the ice jam at Mount Tom broke, hurling great slabs of ice in the air and splitting large trees into splinters, but the river passed harmlessly downstream. By the morning of March 16 the "danger was definitely over." 1 A second rainstorm followed swiftly in the wake of the first, and by 2:15 a.m. on March 18 the river was rising ominously once more at a rate of two feet an hour in Brattleboro. Later that day the raging waters swirled through the dike at Hatfield, trapping more than 150 Hatfield residents in the Town Hall with three feet of rushing water outside the building. More than 1500 flood refugees from Hatfield and Sunderland fled to Amherst where they were quartered in the baseball cage at Amherst College and the gymnasium of Massachusetts State College. The flood waters isolated Bellows Falls

The Flood Control Conflict

47

and the power failure in Brattleboro plunged the town into darkness. Sandbag crews worked in a shroud of fog all night long in Northfield, while several hundred people in Deerfield were marooned in second-story rooms. Ten blasts of the fire alarm in the night called out Greenfield's National Guard unit for the first time in over twenty years. In later years, the main memory of that night was of the terrible silence of the relentlessly rising river broken only by the warning barks of state-police revolvers along the river banks. In the morning the river revealed its cargo of barns and bridges, of dead cattle and horses, of priceless family heirlooms, some from seventeenth century American homes, some that had been carried to the new world from Poland. All day long one could hear the droning of a seaplane attempting to rescue people who had been marooned on islands in the river. By March 19 industrial life in western N e w England had come to a standstill. N o railroad was running in the Connecticut Valley. T h e National Guard had moved into almost every major town in the valley, while the United States Coast Guard had sent a score of boats including two power surf boats into the Northampton area to add to the flotilla provided by the Boston N a v y Yard and Gloucester fishermen. A t 6 p.m. that evening, the river swept into Hartford and the flood waters reached the highest mark in the recorded history of the city, although the peak of the flood did not strike for another thirty-six hours. Hartford was almost completely paralyzed, with the city under virtual martial law. People walked the darkened streets with flashlights, and telegraphers sent messages to the outside world by flickering candlelight. Fresh downpours of the intermittent rain continued, turning the streets of the city into canals. Bellboys worked in hip boots in the lobbies of Hartford's leading hotels, and rowboats plied between hotel lobbies and the railroad depot. By March 22 Hartford was in a virtual state of siege. Anyone on the streets after 9 p.m. was summarily arrested. Everyone entering the area had to be inoculated, ten thousand inoculated in one day. Massachusetts appointed a Flood Relief Administrator with dictatorial powers to seize food, clothing, and medical supplies. Every village and town and city in the valley had its tale of terror

48

Flood Control Politics

and violence, of heroism and courage, even its tales of wry humor. In Wethersfield, a murderer was granted a reprieve because the execution chamber was flooded. In Hadley, a man received federal relief for a new pigsty, after solemnly explaining that he had been able to recover his pigs several miles downstream because he knew each one by its face. In Deerfield they sang the praises of an anonymous young hero from Eaglebrook school who rode a polo pony through the treacherous waters to rescue five people from a house on the river bank. In Hartford they told of the Coast Guard cutter that set out in hot pursuit of two runaway gasoline tanks to sink them by shellfire before they exploded against any Connecticut bridges. Amherst College related with a touch of pride that its undergraduates had served as interpreters for the Polish-speaking farmers who were housed at the college, while a Smith College professor announced that the corpse that had been swept from a shallow grave in Northampton was that of an eighteenth century Indian girl. The flood was a major disaster for the Connecticut Valley, by far the worst in memory, perhaps the worst, certainly the most devastating, since Reverend Hooker had migrated to the valley with his flock. It cost at least sixty million dollars at a time when the valley was only slowly recovering from the great depression. The N e w England floods took twenty-four lives and left 77,000 homeless. 2 ι As the flood waters subsided and the people of the valley turned to the tasks of rebuilding their homes, clearing their tobacco fields, and repairing their roads and bridges, a spontaneous demand arose in every section of the valley for federal aid for flood control works to check the turbulent Connecticut and prevent another disaster. On March 23 members of the House of Representatives from the flooded district held a caucus to draft a plan for flood control legislation, and on March 25 the Senate Committee on Commerce revealed that its new omnibus flood control bill would include an allocation of over thirteen million dollars for a system of ten reservoirs on the upper Connecticut. 8 The new bill marked a revolutionary step in flood

The Flood Control Conflict

49

control legislation, because for the first time it provided for a national program of flood control, including reservoirs on tributaries, instead of the previous practice of enacting separate bills for each river system, and providing only for dikes and levees. The major debate on the new bill, the so-called Copeland bill, centered on the question whether the federal government should assume the entire cost or whether local contributions should be asked for rights of way, levee foundations, and costs of maintenance. On April 25 the Senate Commerce Committee voted ten to six that states and municipalities must pay local costs in return for federal flood control works. In the Connecticut Valley, the federal government would spend $10,028,900 on flood control construction, if local authorities would spend $3,344,100. On April 27, when Senator Copeland of N e w York reported the bill to the floor of the Senate, Senator Walsh of Massachusetts read a letter from the Committee Representing the Cities of the Connecticut Valley protesting local contributions. Both Walsh and Senator Bilbo, who led the fight on the measure, used the Connecticut Valley as their main example in alleging it was impossible to allocate local costs. The major damage in the Connecticut Valley occurred in Massachusetts and Connecticut, while almost all the dams would have to be built in Vermont and N e w Hampshire. H o w could you decide how to allocate costs to Vermont and N e w Hampshire and get them to agree to pay the costs, when they were relatively indifferent to flood control in comparison to Massachusetts and Connecticut? T h e problem of how to reach an agreement in the Connecticut Valley revived Representative Citron's proposal, H.J. Res. 377, to enable the N e w England states and N e w York to draft interstate compacts for water conservation, pollution abatement, flood control, and other improvements. On April 15, a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary opened hearings on the resolution, which had heretofore apparently been buried beyond recall in committee. All of the witnesses who came before the committee urged approval of the resolution, although Representative Kopplemann warned that "the possibility of getting the States of N e w England together" was "very remote," and told the committee that xoo per cent federal expenditures might be preferable to the delay that the compact method

50

Flood Control Politics

would probably entail.4 Citron, on the other hand, saw the resolution as a final effort of the N e w England states to provide an alternative to a valley authority, since "home rule, cooperation of all concerned, mutual assistance, will bring better and more satisfactory results." " N o w if the N e w England States want to get together, and can get together, and public sentiment is for it, we should give them this opportunity. Otherwise, I think the Federal Government ought to step in, as it did in Tennessee, and we will have a Connecticut Valley Authority up there in Connecticut. I am willing to have an alternative. I have such a bill; but I am willing to first give them an opportunity of agreeing among themselves." 5 On May 13, 1936, the resolution was favorably reported, with the addition of Ohio Valley states to the original seven, and on June 8 the bill became law. The favorable reception to Citron's resolution served to speed acceptance of the principle embraced in the omnibus flood control bill of local contributions with interstate compacts to allocate these local costs. On May 21, after Copeland had described the Bilbo amendment to have the federal government assume the total costs as "unAmerican" and Senator Vandenberg had asserted it would "open a Nation-wide racket" of pork barrel legislation, the Senate defeated not a the Bilbo amendment, 15-55, single N e w England vote cast for it. The omnibus flood control bill had been received coldly by the Administration. Charles W . Eliot, 2d, Executive Officer, and Abel Wolman, Chairman of the Water Resources Committee, of the National Resources Committee, subjected the bill to a searching analysis and concluded that almost every section of the bill ran counter to Administration policy. In particular, they noted that Section 4 provided for the consent of Congress to interstate compacts, but that the compacts in turn were tied in with the approval of the Secretary of War, and "the intrusion of the War Department into the picture seems likely to set a dangerous precedent for other types of interstate cooperation." A further objection was that the bill set forth a division of costs for flood control projects, establishing "for the first time a basic philosophy of distribution of costs as between Federal and State units without the amount of prior consideration which

The Flood Control Conflict

51

this problem deserves." Finally, they observed: "Section 5 includes a great number of undertakings in areas which are under study by a number of federal agencies and the conclusions of which will not be available for some months. It anticipates conclusions and may be in many instances in conflict therewith." 6 A t the request of Frederic Delano, Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the National Resources Committee, Eliot and Wolman presented a draft of an alternative to the Copeland bill to representatives of the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service on April 29, and obtained their approval of this new bill. On the following day, Delano sent a memo to Secretary Ickes, presenting this information, and adding: I think the Copeland Bill is very bad, and that almost everything the Resources Committee has done would be wrecked if it passes. I realize that if I should go to the President with this matter, even with your approval, I perhaps very properly would incur the hostility of the rest of the Resources Committee. So the matter is very serious.7 On May 1 Roosevelt sent a confidential memo to Senator Robinson, stating he had not finished examining the Copeland bill "but as far as I have gone I think the Bill is thoroughly unsound." After detailing the objections of the National Resources Committee, the President recommended the substitute bill which would authorize the President to set up a joint study of the problem of flood control by the departments concerned, with a report sent to Congress in January 1937. 8 T h e Senate, however, paid little attention to the President's objections and passed the bill by a comfortable margin on June 3, 1936. On the same day, after a conference, the House agreed to a conference report, 297-51, with not a single N e w England vote in the House cast against it,9 and on June 22 the "thoroughly unsound" bill received the President's signature. 10 The Omnibus Flood Control Act of 1936 (the Copeland Act) not only provided for a series of flood control projects on the Connecticut River, but also included a new section, Section 4, which granted consent to two or more states to enter into flood control compacts to allocate the costs of acquiring the lands, easements, and rights of

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way necessary for the erection of the dams. Thus the N e w England states were authorized by both H.J. Res. 377 and the Copeland Act to enter into flood control compacts. 11 Before the federal government could construct any flood control projects, the states had to work out an agreement on the distribution of local costs. Each of the four states in the Connecticut Valley designated commissioners to draft an interstate compact, and at a meeting in Boston in June, the commissioners arranged a tour of inspection of proposed flood control reservoirs in northern N e w England, with Henry I. Harriman heading the party as Chairman of the N e w England Joint Commission on Interstate Compacts for Flood Control. On the ensuing trip through Vermont and N e w Hampshire, the conferees ran up against formidable local opposition to dams that would flood valleys and require the relocation of highways, railroads, and telephone lines. That fall, at a meeting in Boston, representatives of the four states agreed that flood control would have to be carried out by an interstate corporation, but the Vermont commissioner, Walter S. Fenton, insisted that Vermont reserve all power rights, and that the new corporation be concerned only with flood control. With the aid of a lawyer from the A r m y Engineers, Attorney General Edward J. Daly of Connecticut drafted a compact which had to be revised at a December meeting, again to meet the objections of Vermont and N e w Hampshire. 1 2 Even after the compact had been revised, hopes for its adoption were faint. In March 1937, the N e w England states appeared to be no nearer to a flood control program than they had been a year before when the Connecticut had overrun its banks. A t the Republican state convention in Montpelier on September 24, the party had resolved: "In co-operating with other states in the Connecticut River valley basin relative to control of floods, we pledge ourselves not to relinquish large fertile farm areas for this purpose, and in the relinquishment of such areas as may yet be set aside for the control of the flood, we will insist that Vermont and Vermonters not only receive adequate compensation at the time of taking but adequate return for future loss." 1 3 On January 7, in his inaugural address, the new governor of Vermont, George D . Aiken indicated he was no more interested than his predecessor in flooding good Vermont

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land merely to benefit other states of the valley. 14 At a press conference on January 26, President Roosevelt told reporters: I don't know what happened in Ohio and New York; but in the case of New England they have had that Commission which has been at work ever since I was there in the summer, and they have arrived at no conclusion. Connecticut is 'kicking' now because Massachusetts and New Hampshire and Vermont have not come together. In other words, it is an illustration of this compact thing not working. Q. Another sitdown strike. T H E P R E S I D E N T : Yes. 1 5 On February 1, Representative Citron wrote Governor Cross of Connecticut: "In regard to flood control of the Connecticut Valley, it seems to me that the President is about right — that the compact idea is a failure since the program of State co-operation for land purchases is certainly lagging." Governor Cross replied that everything seemed to hinge on a meeting of the four legal representatives of the states that week, but "of course, if it doesn't work, there is no doubt but that a purely federal program is the solution if anything is to be accomplished." 1 6 On March 8, more than fifty state and local representatives from the four valley states met in Hartford, where Secretary of War Woodring told them they must "put up or shut up" if they wanted any federal flood control projects. He observed that the President was personally interested in getting an early start on a reservoir program, but that the conditions of local cooperation must be met. The disastrous floods in the Ohio Valley pointed up the fact that the Mississippi basin was much more important than the Connecticut Valley, Secretary Woodring stated bluntly, and unless the N e w England states produced a compact within ten days he would be happy to forget about the whole idea of flood control in the Connecticut Valley. H e expected each state to name three men immediately to negotiate, and he expected them to meet in continuous session until they had hammered out an agreement. Governor Aiken complained that the valleys of his state were so narrow that all the good lands lay along the rivers, so that great reservoirs would mean heavy losses to Vermont in flooding arable

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lands and, consequently, in land taxes. He also expressed his fears that the recreational facilities of his state might be damaged, citing the case of the township of Newfane, where 150 properties had been bought by out-of-town vacationists. General Markham, Chief of Engineers, replied that with 360 dam sites to choose from in New England, they could easily pick out ten that would do no harm to the vacation trade. At the same time Vermont received another jolt from General Markham, who explained that it would not be possible to develop power from the dams to be built by the federal government under the Omnibus Flood Control Act. He added that, if Vermont wished, it might heighten the dams sufficiently to develop power, but it would have to reimburse the federal government for the construction costs. Governor Cross called the Hartford conference "the most important thing that has happened since the colonists got together to keep the Indians out." 1 7 At the end of the conference, Vermont decided to waive its objections, and representatives of the four states sat down to iron out their differences. By March 22 the commissioners were able to approve the completed draft of a flood control compact for the Connecticut Valley at a conference in Boston. Five days later, Governor Aiken recommended to the Vermont legislature the approval of the Connecticut River compact.18 That spring, each of the state legislatures approved the compact with almost no opposition, and on the afternoon of July 6 representatives of the four states met in Governor Hurley's office in the State House to ratify formally the agreement. The compact provided for the creation of The Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Commission, consisting of twelve commissioners, three from each of the four states. The commission would have power to acquire by lease and to hold lands, easements, and rights of way necessary for the construction of the flood control reservoirs. Each state was charged with the duty of acquiring the necessary lands and leasing them to the commission for a period of 999 years. The commission would pay for the cost of acquiring lands out of funds contributed to it by the signatory states, Massachusetts paying 50 per cent, Connecticut 40 per cent, and Vermont and New Hampshire, 5 per cent each. The commission would be responsible

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for maintaining the flood control works after they were constructed and m a k i n g payments in lieu of taxes to the communities whose lands were taken. T h e compact specifically listed eleven sites, eight of which were to be chosen for reservoir sites, three in Vermont, three in N e w Hampshire, two in Massachusetts. Although the states would lease the lands to the commission for 999 years, the "title to such lands, easements and rights of way shall be taken in the name of the state wherein the same are located." T h e section of the Connecticut River compact which ultimately aroused the greatest controversy was Article 8, which stated in part: " T h e rights to be acquired and exercised by the commission are solely for flood control purposes, and each of the respective signatory states wherein any reservoir may be situated, reserves respectively unto itself, all benefit or advantage of water conservation, power storage or power development that may be inherent in such reservoir site." Article 8 further provided that "the terms and conditions under which any such signatory state shall make available the rights of water conservation, power storage or power development herein reserved shall be determined by separate agreement or arrangement between such state and the United States. . . " 1 9

II

T h r o u g h the spring of 1937, rising hopes for flood control on the Connecticut, as the compact was approved by one after another of the four N e w England legislatures, slowly gave way to fears of Administration and Congressional opposition, as disquieting murmurs of discontent with the power provisions of the compact grew louder, and rumors began to circulate that the President's advisers viewed the compact with disfavor. Early in April, Representative Herman Kopplemann of Hartford had secured a photostatic copy of the Connecticut River compact as it was presented to the Connecticut state legislature. Kopplemann immediately concluded that the compact not only violated the provisions of the Flood Control A c t of 1936 but also ran counter to federal water power policy. W h e n a federal attorney substantiated his interpretation of the compact, he submitted the compact to the Chairman of the Federal Power

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Commission, pointing out his concern over several sections of the agreement, particularly Article 8.20 On June 27 the Hartford Courant reported that Chairman Frank R. McNinch of the F P C had drafted a memorandum on the compact, detailing the objections of the commission to the clauses reserving ownership of dams to the states and providing for power development only at the instance of and with the consent of the states.21 Nevertheless, as late as July 22, N e w England senators of both parties expressed confidence that the compact would be approved by Congress. 22 On July 10, four days after the states had formally ratified the compact, the eight N e w England senators from the Connecticut Valley introduced S.J. Res. 177 authorizing Congressional approval of the interstate compact, and Representative Charles Clason of Massachusetts filed a companion bill in the House, H.J. Res. 435. The Senate Committee on Commerce requested the advice of the Federal Power Commission, and on July 27, the advocates of the flood control compact received the verdict of the Administration. The F P C officials told the committee that the Connecticut River compact was "a radical departure from the established policy of the federal government with respect to the development and conservation of the water power resources of the United States." The compact conflicted with the Flood Control Act of 1936 because it failed to convey project lands, easements, and rights of way to the United States Government or to provide for payments to the Secretary of War so that he might purchase the lands in the name of the government. Furthermore, the compact violated the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 23 in making the licensing of power projects a matter of joint authority between the states and the federal government, quite apart from the fact that the states had no authority under the 1936 act to discuss power at all.24 On July 28, 1937, Oswald Ryan, General Counsel of the Federal Power Commission sent a memo to President Roosevelt stating that Congress should either unconditionally refuse to approve the compact resolutions or approve them on condition that they be revised. If the latter course were followed, and Ryan noted that this would have the advantage of placing the burden of delay in achieving adequate flood control on the states, the compacts should be revised to

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change the clauses vesting ownership of lands in the states and reserving power rights to the states.25 After a White House conference on August 2, Representative Kopplemann announced that the President opposed the approval of any compact unless all power rights arising from the construction of the reservoirs were reserved to the federal government. 26 On the following day, the President sent a memo to James Roosevelt: "Find out who is in charge of the N e w England Compact Joint Resolutions and show them this opinion of Ryan's and tell them that I am absolutely opposed to the Compacts in their present form." 27 On the same day that the F P C voiced its opposition to the N e w England compacts, Senator Maloney of Connecticut, for the Committee on Commerce, reported out favorably S.J. Res. 177. On August 6 and August 19 proponents of the compact resolutions attempted to get unanimous consent for their consideration, but on both occasions Senator L a Follette objected. On August 19 Senator Lodge stated he was afraid that Congress would not act on the compact resolutions at that session, because the President was opposed, and because both Senators L a Follette and Barkley had denied unanimous consent. For his part, Senator Lodge thought that Attorney General Paul Dever of Massachusetts had summed the question up nicely in stating the whole question of power was "academic," for only two of the proposed sites had power potential and the economic feasibility of even these two was "very questionable." 28 On August 21, 1937, when Mrs. Rogers tried and failed to get unanimous consent for the consideration of H.J. Res. 494, the Merrimack compact, in the House, she asserted: "I believe this administration will sorely regret the fact that it has not helped N e w England, whose need is so great." 29 Representative Phillips of Connecticut replied that the compacts were "an attempted steal by the power people." [Applause] " W e think that for 999 years they are trying to take the birthright of the people away from them." [Applause] 3 0 In both houses the flood control compact resolutions eventually died on the calendar. The advocates of the Connecticut River compact became more and more enraged as it became clear that Congress was unlikely to give its approval. On July 28 the Hartford Courant lashed out at

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opponents of the compact as men who would leave the valley "protectionless by their efforts" against any future flood, noting that there was little hope that the compact would survive "the attack of the Power Commission, the President's power theories, and Mr. Kopplemann's penny's worth." 3 1 On July 29 Governor Cross wrote President Roosevelt urging White House support for the compact, arguing that federal rights were unimpaired,32 and on August 2 he wired Representative Citron to back the compact, because "PUBLIC OPINION PARTICULARLY IN THE CONNECTICUT VALLEY IS RUNNING HIGH AGAINST

On August 8, at the fourth annual pilgrimage to Calvin Coolidge's birthplace in Plymouth, Vermont, Governor Aiken accused the Administration of seeking to dominate "the people of every state through the control of every dollar's worth of natural resources within those states." 34 In the face of almost solid support for the compact on the part of the New England Congressional delegation, a few Connecticut Congressmen — notably Citron and Koppelmann — abetted by Representative Joseph Casey of Massachusetts came to the aid of the Administration. In the upper house, one lone Senator, Fred Brown of New Hampshire, supported the President in his opposition to the compacts. "My own thought is that all the power rights would be lost to the people for 999 years if this compact was agreed to by the Congress," 35 Representative Kopplemann asserted. Representative Phillips of Connecticut stated that the compact would "sell the Connecticut River Valley, lock, stock, and barrel, for all time to the power interests." 36 Senator Brown remarked that he never had had any "affection" for the compact idea, and that its strongest adherents were the power interests of New England, notably the Associated Gas and Electric Company. 37 CRITICISM."

33

On August 6 the Administration spokesmen took the offensive by introducing S.J. Res. 198, the Brown-Casey resolution, to give advance consent by Congress to a flood control compact for the Connecticut River basin, providing it reserved power rights, water rights, and reservoir ownership to the federal government.38 It further provided that if any two states reached an accord, the War Department might acquire the lands in other states which were necessary for the project. Thus, if Massachusetts and Connecticut drafted an

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agreement, the federal government could go into Vermont and N e w Hampshire to acquire lands and construct dams in those states. T h e resolution had been drafted the previous day in James Roosevelt's office, at a conference of Brown, Casey, and Ryan. 3 9 Senator Brown, a former public service commissioner of N e w Hampshire and a long-time foe of the private utilities, explained: The people up our way were promised flood control. They are anxious to have this flood control, and they do not want extraneous power questions mixed with it. Since it has become impossible for them to get flood control through the original compact approved by the Legislatures, I believe the new resolution is the best way of cutting the Gordian knot and permitting a new approach to the question.40 On the previous day, President Roosevelt had given his personal stamp of approval to the Brown-Casey resolution in a conference with Representative Citron. 41 On August 7, Governor Cross received a letter from the President stating that it was his "profound conviction" that proposals to develop water resources "are properly the subject of Federal legislation and not of interstate compacts," and that the "Federal Government should preserve inviolate its plenary power with respect to them." 4 2 The advocates of the interstate compacts were already unhappy over Administration opposition to their approval, but the BrownCasey resolution was the last straw. Governor Aiken warned: This scheme seems so preposterous that to seriously consider the possibility of its adoption may seem absurd to many. Yet it is a source of very real danger — Federal domination through control of natural resources in those States. H e stated flatly that, if Congress passed the Brown-Casey resolution, he would refuse to call a special session of the Vermont legislature "for the express purpose of surrendering the natural wealth of our state to anyone." 4 3 Representative Treadway of Massachusetts asserted that the resolution would "turn the entire power business of N e w England over to the government, which is entirely contrary to American standards." 44 James W . Hook, President of the N e w England Council, wrote President Roosevelt: " I think the Congress

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and the executive departments of the federal government may rest assured that N e w England will sacrifice the prospective benefits of the flood control program if it is obliged to choose between such benefits and the surrender of any rights over its streams enjoyed by its states under existing l a w . " 4 5 Throughout the flood compact fight, the powerful Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts had taken a cautious stand, fearing to cut himself off either from the Administration or from his Democratic supporters in N e w England. When the Brown-Casey resolution was introduced, Senator Walsh stated he would not commit himself until he had received the advice of the governor of Massachusetts and his advisers. On August n Governor Hurley wrote Walsh that he had met with Attorney General Paul Dever, Elisabeth M. Herlihy, Chairman of the State Planning Board, and other state officials, and that they were unanimous in expressing their belief that the President's proposal would "constitute an unjustifiable invasion of the rights of the state." T h e governor found the opposition to ratification of the original compact "both surprising and disappointing." 46 Henceforth, Senator Walsh was firmly allied with the opponents of the President. On August 16 the House Committee on Flood Control opened a three-day hearing on the interstate compacts and on the BrownCasey resolution. Chairman McNinch of the Federal Power Commission not only denounced the compacts as contrary to federal water power policy but strongly urged the passage of the BrownCasey resolution "as offering a perfectly safe and sound method and one completely in harmony with the Flood Control Act of 1936." 4 7 Representative Casey explained: Up there in New England we have power companies who are the slickest and cleverest political operators in the country. They buy their power from each other at Statelines and so remain intrastate. They do that because they do not want to be governed by the supervision of the Federal Government, because they feel they can get a great deal more in the line of political favors from the States of New England. . . . We are fearful of the influence of the power companies with the State of Vermont. They have a great deal more influence with the State of Vermont than with the Federal Government.48

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When Attorney General Dever of Massachusetts pointed out that even the radical Brown-Casey proposal would not solve the Merrimack problem, because the Merrimack involved only the states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and that if New Hampshire balked, Massachusetts would have no one to enter into a compact with, Representative Casey went one step further. If Massachusetts would appropriate the funds, the War Department would enter New Hampshire without its consent and build the dams, the reductio ad absurdum of the interstate compact device. A parade of witnesses from New England urged the committee to approve the compacts and kill the Brown-Casey proposal. Dever explained that Massachusetts was interested only in flood control, and "we candidly viewed the problem as one where we went up into Vermont and New Hampshire, two recreational States, and destroyed their recreational values by the creation of what was aptly referred to as mudholes. . . . We were faced with a reality, and without the inclusion of article 8 I am convinced, and the representatives of Vermont and New Hampshire so stated, that it would be impossible to obtain the concurrence of the legislatures of those States." Moreover, the whole power issue was a "straw man," for there was no power to be developed. "The question might logically be raised, 'Well, if there are no such sites in Massachusetts, why did you reserve to yourself such rights as you do concerning them?' We will make the confession to you that that was just to have frosting on the cake for the legislature whom we had to convince to pass the compact." 49 Judge Whittington observed acidly: "You might get along fine with your legislature up there, but you played the dickens down here," 50 and Congressman Casey snorted: "Even if it was just something to kid the legislators, how do we know that his interpretation is not kidding us?" 5 1 As for the Brown-Casey resolution, Dever said that, quite apart from "the damage which would be done to neighborly relations with a bordering State," there was another objection which was "fatal." It would be absurd for Massachusetts to go to the expense of maintaining reservoirs in the state when the title to the dams and the land rested in the federal government. When Whittington asked if the objection would be removed "by a stipulation that the

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Federal Government be required to maintain them," Dever replied : "I think that does injury to the individualistic spirit of Massachusetts." 82 Walter Fenton of Vermont observed that Dever was mistaken when he said there were no power sites in Vermont, that there were two important ones. However, if anyone attempted to build a dam at Gaysville, the people of the White River Valley "would come out with shotguns before they would let anybody flood that valley," while a dam at Newfane would destroy the homes of out-of-state vacationists who had come to the West River Valley in large numbers in the past decade. It was to prevent the construction of such dams that Vermont insisted on the reservation of power rights, thus preventing the new interstate commission from flooding its lands. A few minutes later, however, Fenton stated that electric power was an important resource to the tiny state of Vermont, and argued that Vermont must preserve the power sites, because if the federal government developed power, Vermont would not receive the benefits. He further explained that Article 8 of the Connecticut River compact was necessary because Vermont might want to develop the sites for power, while the three other states on the interstate commission might insist that the dams be constructed for flood control only. At no time did Fenton explain how the very same sites could be developed for electric power for the benefit of Vermont and at the same time not developed so that the river valleys would not be flooded.53 Connecticut and New Hampshire also opposed the Brown-Casey resolution, Daly explaining that "the Connecticut people generally do not live that way and do not do business that way," 54 while John Jacobson stated flatly: "I have found no one in the State of New Hampshire or any newspapers favoring it. The public and everyone is absolutely ioo% opposed to the Casey resolution." 55 Elisabeth Herlihy solemnly told the committee that if the compacts were not ratified, "then government of the people, by the people and for the people shall have perished from the earth." 56 In general, the press of New England was united against the President's program, but the Springfield Republican, in a thoughtful editorial on August io, 1937, held that the President was clearly right

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in asserting federal ownership of water power sites, for this was a policy that went all the way back to Theodore Roosevelt's veto of the Rainey River bill in 1908. The governor of Vermont, apparently, would go so far as to reverse the policy of President Theodore Roosevelt when he claims exclusive ownership of these power sites in perpetuity for his own state. That could not be permitted without virtually repudiating a national power policy originating 30 years ago: and there will be plenty of La Follettes and Norrises in Congress to see that it is actually safeguarded. 57 Ill THE CASE FOR THE COMPACT

T h e authors of the interstate flood control compact contended that they had acted in strict accordance with the provisions of the federal statutes, and that, after a year of hard work, their labors had been set at nought by an arbitrary ruling of a capricious national administration. T h e following paragraphs present a paraphrase of the position of the authors and advocates of the Connecticut River compact.* T h e Flood Control A c t of 1936 clearly indicated that the states were to hold title to the lands they provided to the federal government for dam sites. There was no provision in the act which would authorize any federal agency to acquire and hold lands for flood control purposes. Indeed, the act specifically forbade the W a r Department to spend any money until the Secretary of W a r had been given assurances by the states that they would "maintain and operate all the works after completion in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of W a r . " If the flood control projects were to be federal property, why should the states have been required to "maintain and operate" them? T h e federal government had no more right to these dams than to the Lincoln T u n n e l or the Triborough Bridge, both of which were built with federal funds. N o r was there any conflict between the power provisions of the compact and the Flood Control A c t of 1936. T h e act gave the W a r Department no authority to generate and sell electricity. A t the same * They do not necessarily represent the views of the writer; rather they are to be read as though the advocates of the compact were speaking.

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time, Congress realized that the reservoirs might have value for power development, so the act specifically authorized the War Department to install "penstocks or similar facilities." Since the War Department could not generate this power, Congress must have intended such facilities to be utilized by the states, since the states were required to maintain and operate the completed projects. This was made even clearer by the amendment to the Flood Control Act which provided that the Secretary of War might modify any reservoir project to provide "additional storage capacity for domestic water supply or other conservation storage on condition that the cost of such increased storage capacity is contributed by local agencies and that the local agencies agree to utilize such additional storage capacity in a manner consistent with Federal uses and purposes." The compact did not conflict with the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, because that act gave the Federal Power Commission licensing power only over the construction of "government dams." Since the Flood Control Act prevented the War Department from constructing dams for any purpose but flood control, unless the states provided the money, and since the states were required to maintain the dams, these projects were not "government dams" in the meaning of the act of 1920. Furthermore, the compact did not violate the provisions of the Federal Water Power Act which provide that no "person, state or municipality" may develop electric power on any navigable stream without a license from the F P C . In the first place, the dams were to be built not on the Connecticut River but on tributaries which were not navigable and did not affect interstate commerce and hence were outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. Even if the streams were within the jurisdiction of the F P C , the compact did not infringe on the rights of the federal government, since it specifically provided that no power development could be undertaken save with the consent of the federal government. From the moment the act was passed, representatives of the four states had cooperated fully with representatives of the federal government. Throughout the summer and fall of 1936, representatives of the states conferred with the Army Engineers on their proposals. When the question of power development was raised at the Hart-

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ford meeting in March 1937, Secretary Woodring and General Markham assured the states that the W a r Department would cooperate with them in constructing reservoirs to permit power development so long as the additional costs were borne by the states. On April 26, 1937, more than a month after the terms of the compact were known to the federal government, Secretary Woodring stated in a radio broadcast: The War Department is gratified with the prompt action of the four New England States of Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts in agreeing to an interstate compact, which will permit their compliance with the requirements of local cooperation established in the Flood Control Act, and at the same time will reserve for the states the right to develop the reservoirs in the future for other and additional purposes, and which is now being submitted to the legislatures of the respective states for approval. This compact, if adopted by the states and approved by Congress, will point the way to a closer cooperation between the states and Federal Government in the execution of measures for the conservation and utilization of our national water resources.58 While the states lived up to the letter and the spirit of the act, the federal government chose not merely to violate the provisions of the act but to accuse the state governments of bad faith, despite the fact that federal officials had given their approval to the compact. The terms of the compact were made public in March and "not a suggestion of criticism was heard" concerning the compacts until July. 59 On August 30, 1937, the War Department issued circular letter 42 providing that no flood control reservoir could be constructed on a power site unless the title of the lands was conveyed to the United States. 60 This order not only violated the Flood Control Act of 1936 but directly contradicted the statements Secretary Woodring made in the spring of the same year. The opposition argued that lawyers for the private utilities drafted the compact, but even if one accepted this canard as true, one would have to note the more important point that the compact was overwhelmingly approved by the legislatures of four N e w England states, and it would be absurd to assume that all these men acted at the dictation of the power companies. Furthermore, the utilities could have had no possible interest in these sites, because there wa§

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no power to be developed. Most of the reservoirs did not even have a hypothetical power potential, and the two or three sites that did would not have been commercially feasible. In short, the opponents have argued about who was going to develop power, when there was no power to develop. Moreover, as Senator Lodge observed, New England had all the power it needed anyway. 81 The New England states suffered greatly during the depression, and the proposed flood control project represented a heavy expense. In order to help defray the total costs, the commissioners were obliged to provide for power development. If one intends at any future time to use dams for power purposes, one must make provision at the very beginning by constructing dams with a broader base. That was why the power provisions were inserted in the compact. Quite apart from their rights in the matter, once the states decided to take advantage of the provision of the act of 1936 for the construction of penstocks, and the offer of Secretary Woodring to build power dams, it was absolutely essential that the states own the dams. If the commissioners had decided to turn over the rights to the United States in order to let the federal government develop the power, there would have been no one to whom they could have conveyed title, for there was no federal agency with the right to develop power. The War Department was specifically forbidden to spend money for any purpose but flood control. The commissioners had the choice of working out an immediate agreement on power development, or of allowing the War Department to build singlepurpose dams at each of these sites, which would have meant that no power could ever have been developed by either the federal government or the state government. Hence, they inserted in the compact provisions for the development of power, provisions which were in every way consonant with federal statutes, including the Flood Control Act of 1936.62 IV THE CASE AGAINST THE COMPACT

While the authors of the compact protested that they were honorable men who had acted wholly in accord with federal policy, oppo-

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nents of the compact stated that the agreement had been drafted by three attorneys for private utilities who sought to "strike down throughout the United States Federal control in the people's interest of water power, established by the act of 1920; paralyze the Federal Power Commission; hamstring the President's Regional Conservation program; radically a£fect the policy governing the administration of T V A , Bonneville, and all yardstick plants; and establish the utilities' doctrine of states' rights as a national power policy." 6 3 T h e following paragraphs present a paraphrase of the arguments of the opponents of the Connecticut River compact.* It was absurd for the N e w England states to contend that they lived up to the letter of the Act of 1936, because if they had acted in accordance with the act, they would never have had to go to Congress for approval of the compact, and, hence, there would never have been any controversy. T h e act granted prior consent of Congress to the compact, so long as all money to be expended and work to be performed was expended and performed by the Secretary of War. If any controversy arose, the states, not Congress nor the federal government, were to blame. It was clear not merely from the most obvious interpretation of the act of 1936 that the United States Government was to have title to the lands, but there was a clearcut precedent in a previous act which did convey the title of lands to the states, and specifically stated so in the act.64 Since there was no provision in the Omnibus Flood Control Act of 1936 for the conveyance of title to the states, Congress presumably intended to vest ownership in the federal government. The Connecticut River compact further violated the Flood Control Act of 1936 in making provision for the development of power. Repeatedly, in committee hearings and on the floor of the Senate, Senator Copeland specified that this act was to provide flood control dams only. The only legal power given to the states under the act of 1936 was to allocate costs to pay for the flood control projects. They had no authority whatsoever to discuss the question of power development. When Congress provided for flood control dams only, it in• They do not necessarily represent the views of the writer; rather they are to be read as if the opponents of the compact were speaking.

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tended that existing national law would govern any future power development that might occur. Since under the compact any state had the right to develop power "at its option at any time hereafter, by itself or through such agents as it may designate," the compact violated the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. T o be sure, the states could not act without the consent of the federal government, but the federal government could not act without the consent of the states either. Therefore, the compact violated the Federal Water Power Act, which gave the F P C plenary control over power development. A "government dam" under the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 was "a dam or other work constructed or owned by the United States for government purposes with or without contribution from others." Hence, the dams that were to be constructed under the act of 1936 were "government dams," and their construction, as well as operation, should have been subject to the regulation of the F P C . Under the compact, the federal government would have had nothing but a veto. It not only would have been stripped of its authority to develop power in its own right, but it could no longer have determined which agency should develop any given power site and thus could not have exercised its right to give preference to "states, public bodies, public districts, or municipalities." The existing N e w England power situation would have continued — high cost electricity, inadequate supply, undeveloped resources — allowing private utilities to set their own terms in providing electric power for a growing market. They would have had a private domain reserved to them in four entire states, and the federal government would have been absolutely helpless. The drafters of the Connecticut River compact protested that they consulted the federal government throughout their negotiations, and that, inexplicably, the government suddenly turned against them in July although "not a suggestion of criticism" had been heard up to that time. As early as March 27, War Department engineers had advised that the compact would have to be submitted to Congress, because "it exceeds conditions laid down in the 1936 act." 6 5 Representative Kopplemann had called attention to the power provisions of the compact as early as April, and Representative Rankin had

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announced his opposition to the compact long before the final ratification. The legislatures of the four states received repeated warnings that the power provisions of the compact violated federal statutes, but persisted in going ahead with the draft. It was strange indeed that the commissioners who drafted the compact spent an entire year in negotiations and determined to write into the compact provisions on power development without once consulting any member of the Federal Power Commission. Any talk of their sincere cooperation with the federal government could have referred only to conferences with the Army Engineers, an agency not noted for its concern over preserving power rights from private monopoly. Actually, there was good reason to believe that the compacts were drafted by lawyers for the private utilities in a flagrant effort to subvert federal law. When Representative Whittington of Mississippi observed at a Congressional hearing that "if you had just left this power feature out of this compact it would help us a lot," Attorney General Daly of Connecticut replied: "It was Vermont and New Hampshire who insisted on it. Mr. Walter Fenton is here and can speak on that question." A little earlier Attorney General Dever of Massachusetts protested: "I must make the statement that Clause 8 is not my baby. It is a clause we had to adopt in order that Vermont and New Hampshire would be satisfied." 66 It was clear, first, that the power clauses were inserted in the compact at the insistence of Vermont and New Hampshire, and, secondly, that the dominant member of the Vermont commission was the aforementioned Walter Fenton, while the dominant member of the New Hampshire commission was Robert W . Upton, appointed by the governor to the commission despite the fact he was not a state official. Walter Fenton had been attorney for the Central Vermont Public Service Corporation, a member of the Insull empire, of the Green Mountain Power Corporation, controlled by the New England Power Association, and the Twin State Gas and Electric Company. Mr. Fenton appeared regularly for many years before sessions of the Vermont legislature as a spokesman for private utilities and was regarded as a representative of the Insull interests. Under questioning by Congressman Jerry Voorhis, John Jacobson, Chairman of the New Hampshire Public Resources Board and one

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of the three commissioners, testified that Robert W. Upton "has no connection with any power company I know of," 6 7 a statement which indicated at best that Mr. Jacobson was wholly innocent of any knowledge of the private utilities of his state. Mr. Upton had been a registered lobbyist for the utilities in New Hampshire since 1931, and an attorney for the Associated Gas and Electric System since 1930 in its tenacious fight against the investigation launched by Governor Winant. In the session of 1937, during which the flood control compacts were drafted, Mr. Upton received fees of $1100 for representing the New Hampshire Gas and Electric Company, Alton Electric Light and Power Company, Meredith Electric Company, Pemigewasset Electric Company, and Goodrich Falls Electric Company. Furthermore, the Chairman of the New England Joint Commission on Interstate Compacts for Flood Control was Henry I. Harriman. Mr. Harriman was founder and former president of the New England Power Association and a former director of the New England Gas and Electric Association and of the National Electric Light Association. "Hence Mr. Harriman did have official connection for one year with the creation of this compact," observed Judson King, "and to assume that he was playing golf or reading Shakespeare all that time is a severe tax upon credulity." 68 ν Congress adjourned in August 1937 without taking action on either of the resolutions on compacts in the Connecticut River Valley, but the debate continued throughout the fall with unabated intensity. At the Governors Conference in Atlantic City on September 15, Governor Aiken contended that if the Administration program were carried to its logical conclusion any natural resource of a state could be commandeered by the federal government: I cannot help but feel that this situation is due to the insatiable desire of certain Federal authorities for more and more control of all of us and our possessions and resources, public and private — to what end? It is time that we faced this issue for what it is and not confuse it with discussions of flood control, power control, or any other subterfuge. 60

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Governor Murphy of N e w Hampshire told the Eastern States Exposition in Springfield that the states would never surrender to the federal government, "even if God's child is President," title to their natural resources.70 The Boston Transcript agreed, because it was clear that "floods, no matter how disastrous, are more welcome than the N e w Deal control of N e w England power." 7 1 A t the annual meeting of the New England Council in Boston on November 18, Governor Cross summed up the case against the Administration: For me there is no amusement in twisting the tail of power companies, if indeed they have tails. . . . Nor can I go along with the so-called Brown-Casey bill. . . . The bill provides that if Massachusetts and Connecticut should agree upon a compact, then the Secretary of War would be authorized to go into Vermont and New Hampshire and just take any land he likes for flood-control reservoirs. It seems to have been forgotten that the people of New England are all kin in whichever state they may live. Neither the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts nor the Governor of the State of Connecticut could be counted upon to submit to his legislature a compact involving the rape of two sister states. Despite all their faults, there still survive in these Governors, I trust, some traces of honor.72 A month earlier at the Eastern States Exposition in Springfield, Governor Cross had stated bluntly: "There is no room for a T V A in Vermont nor in N e w England." 7 3 By the fall of 1937, this sentence pointed up the area of conflict in N e w England. Men were no longer primarily concerned with flood control but with the question of whether the federal government should create regional authorities on the rivers of N e w England. Indeed, the entire conflict over the flood control compacts can only be understood in terms of the abortive effort to establish a T V A in the Connecticut Valley and the shifting policy of the Administration toward federal development of the water resources of the nation.

CHAPTER

V

TVA on the Connecticut In his message to Congress in the spring of 1933 urging passage of the T V A act, President Roosevelt noted: "If we are successful here we can march on, step by step, in a like development of other great natural territorial units within our borders." 1 T h e entire controversy over the N e w England compacts was fought in the shadow of the national water resources program of the Roosevelt administration, and sponsors of the compacts sought to use them as defensive weapons against N e w England valley authority proposals which they feared the President might unveil at any moment. When President Roosevelt announced the so-called "little T V A " plan of regional authorities on June 3, 1937, a majority of the N e w England members of Congress feared this would mean the end of the Connecticut River compact. Representative Charles W . Tobey of N e w Hampshire stated: All the work that the states have done is just so much wasted motion. It seems to me that this new plan of T V A s throughout the country has definitely disposed of our interstate compact. 2

Both the Brown-Casey proposal and the later Brown-McCormack amendment to have the federal government assume total costs of flood control projects were regarded in N e w England as attempts to remove the last remaining obstacles to the establishment of a Connecticut Valley Authority. "Personally, I am proud to say I never approved the Muscle Shoals proposition nor the T . V . A . proposition," Congressman Treadway declared during hearings on the BrownCasey resolution. " A n d further than that, I should oppose to the best of my ability the establishment of a T . V . A . outfit in N e w Engl a n d . " 3 Early in 1938, Senator Bridges warned:

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I very much fear that if the apparent administration intention to set up a T V A in New England is successful that we in New England will experience the same kind of monkey business, hurtful to the rights of the people, that has characterized the administration of the T V A . . . . I cannot too strongly praise the courage and tenacity of the New England governors in standing firm for the compacts and refusing to approve the administration proposal for 100 percent federal payment which would give the administration a clear field for a New England T V A . 4 As glowing reports of the success of the new authority reached N e w England, Administration supporters in the region gave increasing thought to the possibility that the T V A approach of multipurpose watershed development by an independent federal corporation might be applied to the Connecticut Valley and other waterways of N e w England and viewed the compacts as roadblocks in the way of establishing such agencies. Representative John Rankin of Mississippi was one of the earliest and bitterest opponents of the interstate compacts, favoring instead the development of a T V A for the Northeast, and he was soon joined by Senator Norris of Nebraska. 5 " I only hope that the Omnibus Flood Control Bill will not be used as a means of scotching the proposed Norris Bill, concerning which you wrote me on April 26," Congressman Citron wrote President Roosevelt in the spring of 1937, " I have already talked with Senator Norris, and I think we will have another battle on our hands with the combined power group of the United States, who will use all their resources and means of blocking your ends." β Representative Casey stated the position of Administration Democrats even more bluntly at the Congressional hearings that summer: At the next session of Congress, when, in all probability, the national T.V.A. bill will be passed, I want the New England section to be in a position to take advantage of it. I do not want to see any compacts entered into that will preclude the people of the New England States from receiving the benefits of cheap electricity under a national T.V.A. policy.7 ι The controversy over a T V A in the Connecticut Valley actually preceded the debate over the compacts by more than three years.

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When the people of Connecticut elected William Citron of Middletown Congressman-at-large in November 1934, he immediately took steps to draft legislation for a Connecticut Valley Authority. On January 29,1935, Citron, who had fought the Roraback machine and Old Guard Democrats on the private utilities issue in the Connecticut legislature, introduced H.R. 4979, modeled on the T V A act, to establish a Connecticut Valley Authority. The Citron bill proposed to establish a public corporation, the C V A , with a board of five members serving for seven-year terms. The board was not only to concern itself with a wide range of functions, including navigation, reforestation, and the development of recreation, but would have the power to construct and operate hydroelectric plants, erect transmission lines, and contract for the sale of electric power. Ten per cent of the gross proceeds received by the board from the sale of electricity, water power, or water in any of the four valley states was to be paid to the state from which the money was received. H.R. 4979 contained one novel feature that aroused considerable attention and indicated the state of thinking in New England at the time; Section 15 gave the consent of Congress to the four states to enter into compacts for a comprehensive plan for the development of the Connecticut River. It was thus possible for Congress and the valley states to proceed either along the lines of the T V A act, in which Congress set up a public authority, or along the lines of interstate cooperation, with the four states themselves establishing an authority to provide for multipurpose development of the Connecticut basin. Thus, even ardent New Dealers in New England hoped to gain the benefits of the Tennessee Valley Authority without a surrender of "states' rights." 8 The Citron bill aroused the hostility of the private utilities but failed to summon any considerable political support in the region, and the bill was never granted a public hearing, let alone reported out of committee. Its death was less the result of lack of regional support, however, than the apparent decision of the Roosevelt administration to adopt a passive attitude toward all proposals for valley authorities until the T V A was firmly established, particularly in regions like New England where there was likely to be serious opposition. On April 12, 1935, the President wrote Citron:

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Before I can really consider going along with any further Regional Authorities, such as a Connecticut Valley Authority, it seems to me that there should be a fairly unanimous sentiment in the area affected. D o you think that the Governors of Vermont, N e w Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut would support the idea of an Authority? Each of these states would be affected in more ways than one.0

On March 5, 1935, the acting director of the Bureau of the Budget, Daniel Bell, had sent the President a memo, asking whether the more than twenty bills pending in the current session of Congress proposing regional authorities were in accord with his fiscal program, and the President had replied that no new authorities were to be established that year. 10 On March 9,1936, in reply to a letter from Marion Dickens, President of the White and Black Rivers Flood Control Association, Newport, Arkansas, asking for a T V A in Arkansas, Roosevelt once more replied that until the program of the Tennessee Valley Authority was completed, no other regional authorities should be started. 11 Even Citron had to retreat under a cross fire of criticism that proposals for valley authorities not only might delay flood control but would establish a superstate in New England that would usurp the rights of the states, a contention he could not answer without firm Administration support. On February 16, 1937, he reintroduced a bill for a Connecticut Valley Authority with modifications suggested by Thomas Corcoran. 12 In addition to the board of the C V A , the new bill proposed to create an advisory commission of ten members to be appointed by the President from the valley states and Maine with the advice and consent of the governors of the states. Even this concession to local pride, however, was unlikely to meet with any greater success unless there was a more aggressive Administration program for regional development of resources. 11 By the end of 1936 it was clear that the Roosevelt administration would have to discard its practice of improvisation in favor of a clear-cut national power policy, because a number of controversial issues were coming to a head. The Administration would have to

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decide whether to attempt to work out an agreement with the private utilities or to move forth on a bold public power program, whether the Tennessee Valley Authority was to be an isolated yardstick experiment or whether it was to set the pattern for national resources development. Such questions had in turn to be related to the attempt to reorganize the executive branch of the government, to the opposition of a considerable body of Congressmen and of the Army Engineers to any tampering with the traditional method of flood control legislation, and to the hostility of the existing departments to any proposal that would take away their own powers and turn them over to a valley authority or similar agency. In order to solve these knotty problems and to deal with the immediate problem of how to distribute power from Bonneville dam, the President created early in 1937 a new Informal Committee on Power Policy, headed by Harold Ickes, with Frederic Delano, Morris Cooke, Frank McNinch, and Robert Healy as the other members. 13 While the Informal Committee was hammering out its recommendations on Bonneville, Senator Norris came forth on February 5, 1937 with a proposal for "enough T V As to cover the entire country," 1 4 while five days later, Senator Barkley, with Senator Bulkley of Ohio, filed a more modest proposal, S. 1440, setting up regional flood control authorities, including an Atlantic Seaboard Authority that would embrace the Connecticut Valley. 1 5 As soon as its work on Bonneville was completed, the Informal Committee set to work, at the President's request, on legislation for regional planning agencies, and early in March, Benjamin V . Cohen drafted a bill to create a series of regional authorities modelled on T V A . Leaving the White House after a conference with the President on March 31, Senator Norris told reporters that he had discussed a national power and flood control plan with President Roosevelt and that he would introduce legislation for a series of T V As. 1 6 Through the spring of 1937, as the controversy over the N e w England flood control compacts grew more heated, the press was filled with reports of an Administration bill to establish "seven T V A s " including one for the Atlantic region which would include the river valleys of N e w England. On May 14 Speaker Bankhead announced: " I think the President, probably within a few days — probably next

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TVA ori the Connecticut

week — will send to Congress his views for the establishment of additional T V A s in this country." 1 7 On the surface, it appeared that the Roosevelt administration had made a firm decision to support legislation to establish a series of valley authorities, but, behind the scenes, a bitter contest was being waged, with Henry Wallace and Harry Woodring irrevocably opposed to the Norris proposal. Both men feared that the Norris bill would destroy the existing departments by stripping them of their powers and assigning these powers to seven virtually autonomous regional agencies. 18 T o meet this opposition, and that of the National Resources Committee, Roosevelt had Cohen draft a second bill calling for regional agencies which would not be actual operating agencies like the T V A , but which would work out regional plans which the regular departments would execute. When President Roosevelt sent his longawaited message to Congress on June 3, he deliberately phrased it in an ambiguous enough fashion to permit support of either measure, although its general tone lined Roosevelt up behind the approach of Wallace and Woodring rather than that of Senator Norris. 1 9 On the same day that the President sent his special message to Congress, Senator Norris introduced S. 2555 in the Senate, calling for "seven little T V As," while Representative Joseph Mansfield of Texas filed H . R . 7365 in the House, a bill providing for a series of regional planning agencies, but also making possible the creation of regional power authorities which would be operating agencies. On the following day, John Rankin introduced H . R . 7392, almost identical with the Norris proposal, in the lower house. Ill Both the Norris and Mansfield bills were anathema to supporters of the compacts, although the Norris bill was obviously the more offensive. Apart from the fact that they would result in an enhancement of federal power at the expense of the states and provided for the development of hydroelectric power by the federal government rather than private companies, both bills gave the regional agencies power over interstate compacts. The Norris bill provided that compacts had to receive the approval of the regional authorities, the

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Mansfield bill, that the compacts be approved by the President, after consultation with the regional agencies. Although Senator Pope of Idaho stated that a number of New England citizens had asked to be heard because the bills interfered with the flood control compacts, no one from New England appeared at either the Senate or the House hearings that summer, although both bills got a raking over in the New England press. New Englanders preferred to concentrate on getting Congressional approval of the compacts. "I feel, too, that there should be no time lost in submitting the compact to the Federal Congress," General Wadhams wrote. "It might very well be that, if hearings on the Regional Authority proposal are under way, it would adversely affect the chances of passage of the New England compact." 20 In a fireside chat on October 12, 1937, President Roosevelt announced he would call a special session of Congress to convene on November 15, and listed as one of the reasons for calling an emergency session the need to create "seven planning regions, in which local people will originate and co-ordinate recommendations. . . ." 2 1 At a press conference in Hyde Park the previous week, the President had stated unequivocally that what he was proposing was not a series of T V A s but regional planning agencies without administrative powers; he even went so far as to say that this was all the Norris bill envisaged.22 "Maybe the President has changed his mind, but I thought they were to be T V A s , " 2 3 Norris told reporters. Whatever the degreee of understanding or misunderstanding between Roosevelt and Norris, the President was unquestionably now committed to the general approach of the Mansfield bill. Following a call at the White House on November 22, Speaker Bankhead commented that hopes for passage of a planning bill were now much higher, because "many thought that the plan was for seven T V A s . " That was "not in contemplation at this time." 2 4 On November 23, the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors resumed its hearings on the Mansfield and Rankin bills, with the New England group playing a major role. From the very first, it was evident that the Norris-Rankin bill would be killed in committee, and the only question was whether a watered-down version of the Mansfield bill would survive the committee hearings. Through-

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out the hearings, Representative Bates of Massachusetts tied the fate of the Connecticut River compact to that of the Mansfield bill. "Those states in New England are just simply fearful of the repetition of the 1936 floods," contended Bates, "because this bill has hogtied this committee and nothing is being done towards alleviating this flood situation in New England when everybody wants it done." 2 5 On December 10 Governor Aiken of Vermont urged the committee to defeat the Mansfield bill, because "we believe that further federalization of authority and ownership will result in an increasing breaking down of the self-reliance and initiative of our citizens." 26 General S. H . Wadhams, appearing at the request of Governor Cross, announced he was opposed to any bill which provided for planning "imposed on the region by an agency having no direct responsibility to the people of the region." 27 Elisabeth Herlihy, representing Governor Hurley of Massachusetts, told the committee she was opposed to the regional planning bill, although she had given her life to planning. 28 On the same day, Representative Bates asked the committee to dispose of the bill, because that would "release the pressure" and Congress could "get down to brass tacks" on approving the compacts.29 On the final day of the hearings, December 18, Representative Ferguson of Oklahoma stated that the House Committee on Flood Control had reported out a bill agreeing to interstate compacts so long as they did not violate the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 or the Flood Control Act of 1936, and that Connecticut and Massachusetts had agreed to go up to Vermont and New Hampshire to buy lands. "It is no secret," Ferguson continued, "that the National Resources Committee and the people who are urging this legislation have stopped the consideration of this legislation, have held up those operations because they do not want this method of StateFederal operations to be a success. They want to put it into regions so that power, regardless of whether flood control will suffer or irrigation will suffer, can be the dominating factor in the construction of these dams." 30 A few minutes later, Representative Phillips of Connecticut became involved in an acrid exchange with committee members when he attempted to reply to Ferguson. The committee attempted to cut

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off Phillips when he read sections of Judson King's pamphlet on the grounds that the committee was concerned with the Mansfield bill, not the N e w England compacts, although the committee had encouraged Ferguson's testimony and frequent references had been made to the tie between the compacts and the Mansfield bill. Phillips finally managed to read King's pamphlet into the record, and added his own testimony in support of the bill, stating: I am not ashamed to say that I am interested in the power in it. . . . I have seen the goldfish floating in the hotel lobby, and I know what the flood is, and I want to see floods done away with, but I do not want to see floods done away with, though I think they should be done away with everywhere they can be, where it is done at a sacrifice of the birthrights of the people of N e w England. 3 1

On December 15, the Administration, which failed to get a single major piece of legislation through the special session, appeared to be in full retreat on the question of regional planning. The House Rivers and Harbors Committee let it be known that it was planning to strike all references to hydroelectric development from the Mansfield bill, except in the Columbia Valley where the Bonneville dam was already in operation. Mansfield reported that the committee had already decided to eliminate the power provisions of his bill, despite the fact that hearings were still in progress, and that a new measure would be drafted providing for a national planning board which would coordinate the work of the Army Engineers, the Department of Agriculture, and the Reclamation Bureau, each of which would remain supreme in its own field. Mansfield admitted he expected a fight on the new bill from the Norris-Rankin group, but there was no indication they would have Administration support. 32 When the committee finally reported out the new bill the following March — "a pretty weak, mealy-mouthed sort of a bill" 3 3 — the decision of the twenty Democrats and seven Republicans to reject the President's original proposal was unanimous, a remarkable development on a committee containing such N e w Deal stalwarts as Havenner of California. By the end of 1937, Administration Democrats in N e w England were in the unenviable position of having blocked the interstate

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compact approach to flood control without having anything to offer in its place. Supporters of the compact could proceed with the knowledge that the proposal for regional power authorities had been soundly thrashed, and that the idea of a series of T V As, which had been such a source of concern earlier in the year, had scarcely received consideration, and had mustered almost n o political support. Opponents of the compacts could no longer quiet the fears of people in the valley of another flood by presenting the vision of a valley authority which would bring lowered electric light bills and greater regional prosperity, as well as flood control. T h e burden of proof now lay squarely with the Administration to provide a new answer to the problem of flood control in N e w England.

CHAPTER

VI

The Federal Government Takes Over In the fall and winter of 1937, as the proposals for regional authorities were being buffeted in committee hearings, the angry debate over the interstate flood control compacts continued, and the two opposing camps appeared farther than ever from agreement. After its hearings in August, the House Committee on Flood Control had attempted to unravel the knot by reporting out favorably the Clason resolution to approve the Connecticut River compact, but with the provisos that nothing in the compact should be construed as limiting the power of the War Department under the Flood Control Act of 1936 nor of the Federal Power Commission nor the jurisdiction of the federal government over navigable waters. This was confusion worse confounded. If these provisos really amended the compact, then it would have to be ratified by the four state legislatures once more, and if they did not amend the compact, then they resolved nothing at all. The report was an open invitation to lawsuits, for it approved the compact, which stated that title to dams lay in the states, and it reasserted the authority of the act of 1920 which would give title to these "government dams" to the federal government. Four members of the committee — Jerry Voorhis of California, Mon Wallgren of Washington, Lex Green of Florida, and B. J. Gehrmann of Wisconsin — filed a minority report stating that if the resolution passed, "a pall of doubt and uncertainty" would be "spread over the whole power policy of the Government." 1 The dissenters asserted that the only solution was the passage of the Brown-Casey resolution, but it was equally clear by the fall of 1937 that the attitude of Connecticut and Massachusetts made this proposal just as impractical. On September 6, Governor Murphy had told New Hampshire farmers at the Coos and Essex County

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fair that he would never approve compacts which "called for the surrender of New Hampshire's natural resources to the federal government," 2 and his statement was echoed and re-echoed by the other New England governors. At an all-day session at the Hartford Club on October u , flood control delegates voted a "last-ditch" fight to ratify the compacts.3 Perhaps no single incident exposed the irreconcilable nature of the conflict so much as the storm aroused by the release by the National Popular Government League of Judson King's pamphlet asserting that the compacts were the result of a deliberate maneuver by the private utilities in New England and directly naming Fenton of Vermont, Upton of New Hampshire, and Harriman of Massachusetts as the key manipulators.4 Representative Casey observed: "The statement shows what I have contended all along . . . The power joker in these compacts made it impossible for any real friend of the people to vote for approval." Congressman Kopplemann agreed: "Private utility interests influenced the drawing up of the pacts. I am afraid the result has indefinitely held up flood control for my city as well as for the rest of New England." Representative Citron stated that the King pamphlet was "sound in every way and worthy of study by everyone." 6 The New England press and the supporters of the compacts took a different view of Mr. King's efforts. "Just what the National Popular Government League is, and whether it comprises just Mr. King and two other members, is a question," the Boston Post observed.6 "Mr. King has long been a proponent of many things the conservatives call isms as well as a baiter of utilities," commented the Hartford Times. "Possibly Mr. King's pamphlet ought not to be taken too seriously. It contains too much misinformation to be accepted by anyone who will analyze carefully his statements."7 "Certainly Governor Aiken never has won the reputation of being a particular friend of the utilities and anybody who knows him cannot believe he would keep on the flood control commission a man whom he even suspected of being the representative of that group," asserted the Burlington Free Press? The very next day, Governor Aiken stated that he had chosen Fenton "with full knowledge of his previous utility connections" and that "Vermonters can be depended

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upon to serve Vermont even at personal sacrifice." 9 The Rutland Herald chimed in: "It has apparently never occurred to the league that Vermonters and other New Englanders sometimes look a gift horse in the mouth; that, in fact, the rumored bounties of federal power development may even be looked upon with some suspicion in these parts." 1 0 The response from N e w Hampshire was even more forceful. Representative Arthur B. Jenks bristled: " I think it is above the dignity of the State of N e w Hampshire to enter into any chicanery whereby it would play into the hands of the utilities," and Congressman Tobey added, "I would trust the Public Service Commission of my State to protect the interests of the people against any group in preference to putting my trust in any federal agency." 1 1 The editor of the Concord Monitor wrote an article entitled, "Here's Your Hat Mr. King," 1 2 while the Manchester Union dismissed the pamphlet as "another dirty bit of propaganda." 1 3 ι Although the Federal Power Commission was still advocating the Brown-Casey resolution as late as January 1938, 14 the Roosevelt administration gradually realized through the winter of 1937 that this proposal offered no hope, and that a new solution would have to be found. On November 18, 1937, Clyde Seavey of the Federal Power Commission sent a memorandum to the President recommending the advisability of considering the payment of total flood control costs by the federal government, including local costs, in an effort to break the deadlock and avert "some very unhappy controversies." 1 5 On January 13, 1938, Marvin Mclntyre informed Roosevelt that Jim Farley thought the New England flood control question had been worked out and arranged to have the President see Brown, McCormack, and Casey on January I5· 1 6 On January 17, 1938, two days after the White House conference, Representative John McCormack of Massachusetts stepped in to break the flood control deadlock by introducing H.R. 8997 to amend the Flood Control Act of 1936 by providing for 100 per cent federal contributions for dams and reservoirs, because the requirement for

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local contributions had made the 1936 act a "failure." 1 7 McCormack's proposal, which Senator Brown filed in an identical form in the Senate, further provided that the Secretary of War be authorized to acquire lands, easements, and rights of way in the name of the United States. In short, under the Brown-McCormack amendment the compact idea would be scrapped entirely, and the Army Engineers could enter Vermont and New Hampshire without the consent of those states to erect dams, with the full cost assumed by the federal government. On the following day, the President described the proposal as "plausible and reasonable," 1 8 a direct reversal of his attitude three months before when he had scoffed at the plan for total federal payments. On January 19 the President met with the New England governors, and a host of New England officials talked with Administration officials for several hours, but a day of offers and counteroffers climaxed by a meeting over cocktails and sandwiches at the Mayflower Hotel at night failed to produce an agreement. Senators Bridges, Gibson, and Austin swore they would oppose any legislation that would surrender the rights of the states. It was generally agreed that the position of the New England governors, who continued to press for approval of the original compacts, was greatly weakened by the presence of a number of utility lobbyists in the N e w England delegation. Governor Aiken bolted the afternoon meetings, stating: "I am not fighting on behalf of the power companies or the utilities, but I came down to Washington for the protection of the people and interests of my state." He added that he thought it a mistake for the N e w England Council, an organization he said had utility leanings, to have such a large part in the program. Representative Phillips of Connecticut also bolted the sessions, saying: "The N e w England Council represents the utility interests. I'm damned if I will attend their cocktail party. The cocktail lobby in Washington can be just as pernicious as any lobby there is." 1 9 The Administration's position in backing the Brown-McCormack amendment was weakened by the opposition of three Democratic Senators, Walsh, Maloney, and Lonergan, and both of the Democratic governors, Hurley and Cross. Hurley's position became increasingly difficult as a Democratic governor in Massachusetts oppos-

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ing the President, and rumors began to circulate that Roosevelt would support either Attorney General Paul Dever or State Auditor Thomas Buckley against Hurley in the Democratic primaries. On January 24 Buckley attacked Hurley for opposing the President's flood control program in a speech in Haverhill, and on January 27 the western Massachusetts CIO condemned Hurley for blocking multipurpose development of the Connecticut Valley. On the night of January 28 the opposition front broke when Hurley urged the other New England governors in a radio address to "consider the merits" of the Brown-McCormack amendment. On the same day, following Hurley's lead, Senator Walsh announced that he was now backing the Brown-McCormack amendment.20 The other governors were unmoved, however, and Aiken reiterated his stand, calling the amendment "a means to an end and that end is to centralize control of all resources in the White House." 2 1 On March 30 hearings on flood control legislation for 1938 opened before the House Committee on Flood Control. On April 4 the committee listened to a parade of witnesses who were unanimous in supporting the recommendations of the Army Engineers for local protective works at seven cities in the Connecticut Valley, but on the following day, the unanimity on New England flood control matters ended as the hearings shifted from levees and dikes to the controversial subject of dams and reservoirs. Governor Aiken led off the attack on the Brown-McCormack amendment, stating: "Without going into the question of the actual loss Vermont would sustain, due to highway and bridge relocation costs, loss of tax revenue to towns and State, depreciation in value of property adjacent to storage or retention dams, loss of population, restricted residential and recreational development, and increased inconvenience to our people, I must say that Vermont does not approve of any bill which gives the Federal Government the right to take without permission the natural resources of any State or any of the authority to self-government now vested in the States." Aiken added that he feared the federal government would build a dam at Newfane where "particularly in the last two years 182 out-of-state families have bought homes . . . and there is a very fine recreational and residential development taking place," and a dam at Groton

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The Federal Government Takes Over

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Pond, which "would damage existing recreational developments where work has been done by the C.C.C. and only affects a drainage area of 17 square miles." In reply to a question on the navigability of the streams on which the federal government proposed to build dams, Aiken observed drily that they were "not very navigable, except for brown trout in high water." Despite the fact that his questioners were friendly, and trying to help him build the strongest possible case, Aiken appeared curiously ill-informed on a number of important points and gave the impression at times of a man desperately groping for a position that would square the facts with his theories of government. When Representative Clason asked if multipurpose dams "would result in reduction of the cost of electricity to consumers in Vermont," Aiken replied, " I do not know." "You never looked into that?" Clason persisted. " N o , " Aiken retorted. When Representative Zimmerman asked what Vermont would do with any power it developed, he admitted it would probably be leased to private utilities, although he was rather vague about it. "I do not understand that we need more electricity at the present time," he added. When Representative Ferguson asked if Vermont was willing to provide the money to develop the various dam sites for power purposes, Aiken replied: " I do not think so." Aiken held fast to the position that the power resources of the state must be maintained for the people of the state, although there probably was no power worth anything, and the state was not willing to develop it if there was. A t the same time Aiken refused to defend either the private utilities or the Army Engineers, although the omniscient wisdom of the Engineers was part of the creed of the other N e w England spokesmen. "My personal opinion is that I object to either the Federal Government or private utilities gobbling up our natural resources that rightfully belong to the people of the State," Aiken asserted. When asked why the Army Engineers would recommend a dam at Newfane, Aiken replied, "because it is a beautiful place to put a dam." When Zimmerman asked if he really believed that the Army Engineers decide to build a dam solely on the grounds that a given site is a beautiful place for one, Aiken answered: "I'm afraid they do, »»22 sometimes.

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T h e delegates f r o m N e w Hampshire and Connecticut told the committee that they opposed the B r o w n - M c C o r m a c k

amendment,

as was expected, although some of the Connecticut delegates indicated that they w o u l d g o along with any kind of a reasonable proposal, including one to strike all reference to power f r o m a n e w compact. "It seems to m e on the question of power it is mighty unfortunate that the t w o States paying the lion's share w h e n the cost is considered are held up because of the controversy that has arisen," Judge D a l y of Connecticut lamented. 2 3 Jacobson of N e w Hampshire first said that he w o u l d be amenable to removing the power question entirely f r o m the compact but later hedged on this, 24 while A i k e n refused to commit himself at all. General W a d h a m s of Connecticut, however, indicated he was still satisfied with the original compact and that he feared d a m construction by the federal government w o u l d be "the beginnings of a very nice little T . V . A . "

25

M o r e sur-

prising than the testimony f r o m the other states was that of Elisabeth Herlihy of Massachusetts, w h o was expected to take a more conciliatory stand, f o l l o w i n g Governor Hurley's speech. Miss Herlihy said bluntly: " I was a member of the compact commission. I was heartily in favor of it w h e n it was written. I a m heartily in favor of it n o w . "

26

Representative M c C o r m a c k appeared as the m a i n witness in favor of his measure, arguing that the 1936 act had failed, because it required local agencies to acquire lands or give necessary assurances that they were doing so, and that in all but a f e w instances they had failed to do so, blocking the entire program of reservoir and d a m construction. M c C o r m a c k contended that his proposal offered the only w a y to break the log jam, ending at one stroke the problems of land title, local contributions, maintenance of dams, and electric power. 2 7 Representatives K o p p l e m a n n and Citron of Connecticut likewise endorsed the B r o w n - M c C o r m a c k amendment. In a letter to President Roosevelt, Citron indicated clearly w h y he believed the B r o w n - M c C o r m a c k amendment should be supported: I believe any departure from this program will leave some of your friends in a very embarrassing position in N e w England. W e will have to explain why we held up the original proposal for such a length of time, only to finally go forward with a similar proposal involving state

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contribution. If we are going to ask for state contributions, then the states in turn will ask that they be given something in exchange, viz., the right to develop power.28 On May 19 the House Committee on Flood Control reported out H . R . 10618, the omnibus flood control bill for 1938, retaining the principle of local contributions for dams and reservoirs, but providing that the local governments would have to pay only 30 per cent of local costs. In this way, the committee hoped to retain the principle of local contributions as a guard against "pork barrel" legislation, while setting the costs so low that most communities would not object to appropriating the money. The committee still failed to meet the N e w England problem squarely, for in the Connecticut Valley, the problem was not one of costs, but one of title to the lands and reservoirs. Representative McCormack introduced a new amendment giving the Secretary of War the right to enter and acquire lands which he believed to be valuable for the development of power in the Connecticut and Merrimack valleys, but with local governments still required to pay 30 per cent of local costs. Thus, the federal government would have the right to enter without the consent of the states to build multipurpose reservoirs, where feasible, and title would rest with the federal government. McCormack pointed out that he had introduced a bill providing that the federal government pay 100 per cent of the costs of reservoir projects, but recognizing that the committee had come as close to his wishes as the "practical situation" would permit, he was not pressing this solution at the present time. 29 Representative Phillips of Connecticut stated that every N e w England Democrat in the House supported the new McCormack amendment, and, tying the amendment in with his war on the private utilities, he stated: " T h e loss suffered in various parts of N e w England through the depredations of the power interests runs every year to a great many more million dollars than the loss suffered from the flood in one year." 3 0 If the "practical situation" dissuaded McCormack from pushing his proposal for 100 per cent federal contributions, a plan which had the merit of logical consistency, it was unfortunate that he was un-

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able to come up with a more meritorious program than his new amendment. H e apparently not only expected the N e w England states to agree to federal ownership of the projects, with the interstate compact still pending in Congress, but he also expected them to pay a portion of the 30 per cent allotted for local costs. Moreover, he expected the states in the Connecticut and Merrimack valleys to maintain the projects, despite the fact that title rested with the federal government. If, on the other hand, he expected continuing opposition from the valley states, and was proposing to grant the federal government authority to construct dams without the consent of the states, he had failed in this respect too, for the requirement for 30 per cent contributions from the states for local costs meant that a new compact would have to be negotiated before construction could begin, thus leaving the situation as knotted as it had been before. McCormack's new proposal stirred the angriest debate on the House floor since the controversy had started two years before, with a group of N e w England Republicans, notably Bates, Clason, Mrs. Rogers, and Treadway, joining Whittington in opposing the amendment. Representative Phillips's statement that utility commissions in N e w England were a "disgrace and a joke" caused a particularly bitter protest. Mrs. Rogers refused to yield for a question from Phillips, shouting, " I remember the gentleman's very unjust accusation. I cannot yield to h i m . " 3 1 Representative Treadway likewise refused to yield, stating: " T h e gentleman ought to know better about prices and about the qualifications of people holding office. I deny the fact that the Public Utilities Board of Massachusetts are thieves as he accused them of being." 3 2 On another occasion, Representative Bates snapped at Kopplemann: " I would like to ask the gentleman from Connecticut to keep quiet just for a moment." 3 3 In the end, McCormack's amendment failed to have any "practical" advantages, either; it was defeated by a vote of 84—53 in the Committee of the Whole. When the long debate finally ended, Judge Whittington observed wearily: "There is less power and more talk about power in N e w England than in any other section of the United States." 3 4

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II

On May 23, 1938, President Roosevelt received a memo from Clyde Seavey and Oswald Ryan of the Federal Power Commission objecting strenuously to the present form of the flood control bill. The bill authorized over ninety dam and reservoir projects, many with power possibilities, they pointed out. Despite the fact that the federal government would now bear over 90 per cent of total costs, only in the Denison project on the Red River and the Bluestone project on the N e w River did the bill provide that title should be vested in the federal government. Moreover, by implication, the rest of the projects would definitely not be owned by the federal government, since it was specifically stated in these two instances that title lay in the federal government, and it would be a fair presumption that this would not be the case for the remainder of the projects. For almost a year this Commission has advised against the ratification of the New England Flood Control Compacts on the ground that the provision in the compacts reserving title to the projects in the New England States is contrary to the provision of the Flood Control Act of 1936 as well as the established national power policy. If the pending flood control bill is enacted without making clear that title to all dam and reservoir projects shall be in the United States, any future program of Federal ownership and operation of flood control-power projects will be seriously impeded, if not foreclosed. In addition, the F P C observed, the bill referred to "permanent pools," suggesting that some of the dams might not be multipurpose dams, with full development of power potential, but simple flood control dams with permanent pools for such uses as municipal water supply and recreation. In a second memo on May 26, the F P C noted another objection, that the bill contained a provision, similar to that in the pending Rivers and Harbors bill, "that hereafter Federal investigation, planning and prosecution of improvements of rivers and harbors for flood-control and allied purposes shall be a function of and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of War and the supervision of the Chief of Engineers, except as otherwise specifically provided by

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Acts of Congress." This, the Power Commission stated, was part of a concerted drive to vest control of water resources in the A r m y Engineers. Meanwhile, on May 25 President Roosevelt had sent the first F P C memo on to Senator Barkley with the note: The attached is tremendously important and there are several other objections to the Flood Control Bill which have been raised by the Budget, including a dangerous tax feature. As the Bill stands now I should, of course, have to veto it. I do not want to take this up with Copeland directly but will you do it? 3 5 After his defeat in the House, McCormack announced that he was pinning his hopes on Senate action, but on May 21, the Senate Commerce Committee voted down a proposal that the federal government bear all costs of reservoir projects, and the proposition seemed to be dead for that session of Congress. 36 On June 6, however, John Rankin announced that Norris would introduce amendments to the flood control bill in the Senate providing that the federal government pay all costs of dams and reservoirs and that the F P C instead of the A r m y Engineers determine whether power development was feasible at government dams. Rankin said the bill would be a "monstrosity" that would "wreck the administration's conservation program" without these amendments, and he predicted the President would veto the bill unless the amendments passed. 37 On June 8, Roosevelt asked Mclntyre: " W i l l you get hold of Seavey of the Federal Power Commission and have him see Barkley on this Flood Control Bill and have him give Barkley any recommendations he may want to suggest? 3 8 On the following day, Barkley started out cautiously by filing an amendment to the bill reimbursing localities 70 per cent of the cost of relocating streets, bridges, and utilities, and a like amount for local costs incurred in programs of channel improvements. T h u s Barkley did not direct a frontal assault on the principle of local contributions, but contented himself with extending the area of federal contributions, possibly because he feared a bolder move would meet with defeat. Senator M c N a r y , however, indicated he wanted to amend the bill to provide for total assumption of costs for relocating

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highways, railroads, and utilities by the federal government but added that he would not file the amendment if it would result in Roosevelt's vetoing the bill, as Senator Copeland feared. Barkley replied that he did not know the President's views on the question, although he knew he believed in some degree of local contribution. A t no time did Barkley indicate that he had received instructions from the President to amend the bill to provide for federal ownership of the dam sites, which could only be achieved by 100 per cent assumption of costs by the federal government. 39 In addition to citing Roosevelt's letter to Whittington of April 28, 1937, urging local contributions, Senator Copeland stated: I have understood from rather authoritative sources if the Congress should determine to place 100 percent of the cost of the construction of these works upon the Federal Government that the bill would bring a veto. I am not speaking authoritatively, but I am reciting to the Senate the statement made to me by a member of the House of Representatives who was very active in connection with the bill.40 Senator Norris replied that he favored 100 per cent contributions, no matter what the President's attitude was, that no local contributions were ever required by the T V A , and that if Roosevelt vetoed the bill, it would not be because of the elimination of local contributions but because of the attempt to turn control of water resources over to the Army Engineers. The Army Engineers, Norris alleged, "have never shown any great love for hydroelectric power development. . . . Their whole professional career has been connected with other interests than the development of power for the poor and needy of God's country. . . ." 4 1 Under the leadership of Barkley and Norris, the Senate overhauled the 1938 flood control bill with astonishing suddenness, passing in quick succession both the Barkley and McNary amendments, together with another Barkley amendment giving the Federal Power Commission as well as the Chief of Engineers the power to recommend the installation of penstocks and other facilities. Finally, Barkley offered the key amendment giving the federal government title to dams and reservoirs, and providing for the assumption by the federal government of all costs of reservoir con-

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Flood Control Politics

struction, including local costs of acquiring lands, easements, and rights of way. Copeland, infuriated by the rapidity with which the bill he had nursed along for months was being torn apart, denounced the F P C amendments as an attempt to use flood control for power development, "a slyly cunning scheme to outwit the Constitution," and "a form of public immorality that deserves condemnation from all who seek the preservation of democratic institutions and processes." Whereas Copeland had previously stated the President would veto the bill, if amended, he now asserted that the Administration was hoping the Senate would reject the amendments, thus giving Roosevelt an excuse to veto the bill and revive the proposal for seven regional authorities. Copeland declared: However, there is some reason to believe that these amendments are now belatedly proposed wholly for the purpose of justifying a Presidential veto if they are not accepted. The motive behind a Presidential veto is the unremitting effort finally to secure passage of the so-called seven T.V.A. bill. Adoption of the present flood control bill would virtually preclude revival of the seven T.V.A. bill. This flood-control bill reiterates the congressional policy for the control of our streams as laid down in the flood-control bill of 1936. Its enactment would leave no room for a second and diametrically opposed stream-control policy. Hence there is ground to believe that this proposal is not in good faith, is made wholly as a means of securing grounds for a Presidential veto.42 After almost no debate, with only Copeland and Austin speaking against the proposal, the Senate voted to accept the Barkley amendment. On June 10 Whittington and other House conferees announced they would not accept the Senate amendments and would see President Roosevelt to get his views on the measure. T h e President let it be known that he favored the Senate version, and the conferees bowed to the President's wishes. On June 14, Representative Whittington, who had led the fight on the McCormack proposal less than a month before, now defended the conference report vigorously on the House floor. . . . The argument of States' rights has no place in these discussions. The Federal Government has the power to condemn in every State in the Union now without the consent of the States, to acquire lands for post offices and for Federal purposes. I have already pointed out that

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during the past 35 years, 80 reservoirs have been constructed for reclamation and 35 are under process of construction. The title to all these reservoirs is in the United States. The United States has had the power to condemn lands for reservoirs in reclamation for more than 35 years. The Members of Congress who would deny this power for flood-control reservoirs are inconsistent.43 The N e w England delegation in the House accepted the conference report with remarkable equanimity, only Representative Treadway rising to object to the new power of the federal government, and even he indicated he would vote for the bill. That same day, the bill passed 226-4, with only two dissenting N e w England votes, Plumley of Vermont and Luce of Massachusetts. On the same day, the conference report reached the Senate floor, and it received a much rougher reception in the upper house. Senator Gibson of Vermont and Senator Copeland of N e w York had refused to sign the conference report, because it threatened "every vestige of State control and State's right." In a bristling speech, Senator Warren Austin damned it for "the most shocking disregard of the rights of States that has yet occurred," "an outrageous trespass," on the sovereignty of the state of Vermont, permitting the "exercise of an arbitrary autocratic power." Vermonters had given their very lives to preserve land titles inviolate from the transgressions of the Royal Governor of N e w York, he fumed, and the Green Mountain State would not be lacking in Ethan Aliens to fight this "rape of the states" today, although they would resort to the courts rather than to their muskets. " T h e inhabitants of the Green Mountains want to have some right of participation in the decision of the question as to whether the inhabitants shall be forced off and driven out and sent away and landed where the Federal Government says they can live rehabilitated somewhere, these old people who have lived there for generations, moved out, forsooth, without their consent, willynilly. 44 Senator Walsh, who had been presumed to be a supporter of the Brown-McCormack proposals, leapt into the fray on behalf of his sister state. In a speech remarkable for its misinformation and logical contortions, Walsh denounced the "revolutionary step" to take away the resources of Vermont by offering the states "an indirect bribe"

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Flood Control Politics

of federal funds. 45 Senator Lodge observed that, in the light of the cooperative attitude Vermont and N e w Hampshire had displayed throughout the controversy, it was "scarcely gracious or fair" for Congress to take this "wanton and unnecessary" step.46 When the bill passed the Senate on the following day by the relatively close vote of 51—32, of the eight Connecticut Valley senators, only Senator Brown of N e w Hampshire cast a vote in favor of the measure. The long fight over flood control on the Connecticut now appeared to be decided over two years after the river had jumped its banks in March 1936. The interstate compacts were dead and buried beyond hope of recall. The delicate question of defining the exact powers of the federal government and the state governments in the development of water resources had now been decided in favor of no states' rights at all. The federal government had now been vested by Congress with absolute power in developing the resources of New England; no one could yet see that to exercise this power in the face of the determined opposition of the states was to prove quite another matter. Ill It is now possible to review the flood control snarl in N e w England in the light of federal water resources policy and the political problems of the Roosevelt administration. One can get a proper perspective on the heated debate over the interstate compacts only if one sees how they were related at any given instance to Administration policy, and, more broadly, to the movement for the establishment of regional conservation agencies. Much of the confusion over the compacts may be traced in the first instance to the ill-conceived and wretchedly drafted Flood Control Act of 1936. Almost every section of the bill was subject to more than one interpretation, and few understood all of its implications when it was enacted. At a meeting in Springfield in the spring of 1938, Oswald Ryan of the F P C admitted that the 1936 act did not specify where title to dam sites would rest, adding: "It is most regrettable that the language was not specific." 47 The 1936 act ran directly counter to the Administration's slowly evolving program for multipurpose river basin development, with

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its special emphasis on public power generation. Not only did the law provide mainly for one isolated function, flood control, but the provision that the dams would not be built for power unless the states paid for the additional construction costs left the determination of national power policy in the hands of the individual states and gave much support to the later contention of the states that the compacts were correctly drawn in reserving power rights to the states. Senator Copeland made no secret of the fact that the flood control bill excluded "a good many projects where power and other benefits are involved, but which for flood control alone have not been considered meritorious." 48 Indeed, Copeland indicated later that the 1936 act was designedly drafted to block any program of regional authorities and federal power development. In 1938 he noted of his flood control bill of that year that it reiterated "the congressional policy for the control of our streams as laid down in the floodcontrol bill of 1936. Its enactment would leave no room for a second and diametrically opposed stream-control policy." 49 The 1936 act was designed to restrict federal river valley development to the single field of flood control; to hamper any federal power policy; to augment the strength of the Army Engineers; and to encourage the states to assume as great a share as possible of river basin development. Roosevelt's advisers were well aware of all this, and the President must bear much of the responsibility for the 1936 act. After three years in office, he had no broad program of flood control and water resources legislation ready to submit to Congress. The 1936 floods caught the Administration unprepared, and Roosevelt's suggestion that Congress scrap the Copeland bill in favor of an authorization to study the problem, with no report expected for many months, naturally fell on deaf ears, for Congressmen had to return to constituents who were crying for relief from future floods.50 Moreover, Congressmen from the Ohio Valley, who felt they had received insufficient support for flood control from areas like N e w England that had been relatively free of the menace of floods, wanted to take advantage of this opportunity to pass an omnibus bill. N o r was Congress far wrong in its sense of urgency, as the disastrous floods of the following year in the Ohio valley demonstrated.

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Flood Control Politics

There was much in the Flood Control Act of 1936 to support the contention of the states that they should retain title to the reservoir sites. As Dever inquired, why should the states be required to maintain dams if the federal government owned them? Since the act provided for penstocks, made it incumbent on the states to provide funds if power was to be developed, obligated the states to maintain the facilities, and authorized no federal agency to develop power, it was not unreasonable to assume that the states had the right to generate power. Moreover, since the controversy arose long before the N e w River case 5 1 had been decided, and since the dams were on apparently non-navigable streams, it was highly questionable whether the federal government had the right to develop power at the sites anyway. On July 30, 1937, Ryan sent a memo to Roosevelt on the question: " A r e Projects Constructed by the W a r Department under the Flood Control Act of 1936 Federal or Non-Federal Projects?" Ryan pointed out the W a r Department held that "projects undertaken pursuant to that Act will, when completed, be owned by the States directly benefited by such projects," because the act stated that the states should "provide" land for projects, not "convey" it. This interpretation was based on a survey of previous acts, Ryan continued, but was faulty, because it failed to realize that the 1936 act was an entirely new departure, providing for dams and reservoirs, while previous acts had been concerned solely with levees, where no power could be generated, and the question of ownership was unimportant. If the act was construed to permit state ownership of reservoirs or non-navigable tributaries, the government's contention in the pending N e w River case that the F P C had authority over power on non-navigable tributaries might be "seriously jeopardized," Ryan added. 52 On the following day, the President forwarded this memo to Attorney General Cummings, noting that it was "of the utmost importance that the Government shall have beyond question a sufficient title in dams, levees and reservoirs, etc., to control absolutely such structures and basins for power, water supply and similar purposes." 5 3 Cummings replied that since there was no provision in the act that land be conveyed to the United States, and since there was a provision that states or localities maintain and operate dams, "the statute is

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susceptible of the construction which the War Department is said to have placed upon it. In any event, it seems clear that it does not contain terms sufficiently unequivocal to insure accomplishment of the policy outlined in your memorandum." 54 A t the same time, the attitude of injured innocence of the states throughout the controversy is unconvincing. Our federal system works only if it is kept flexible, only if both the federal government and the state governments are willing to make concessions on controversial issues, and the dogmatic insistence of Aiken that any federal power program was the product of Roosevelt's insatiable lust for power was not only unreasonable, but manifested a remarkable unfamiliarity with federal resources programs since the turn of the century. The contention of Attorney General Dever of Massachusetts that a total federal flood control program, with no local contributions, violated the individualistic spirit of N e w England, would be more convincing if the states had not received federal largesse so gratefully throughout this period, and if the leader of the fight against local contributions in 1936 had not been Senator Walsh of Massachusetts. T h e contention that the Administration was to blame for the lack of flood protection in 1938 when the hurricane floods struck is absurd. Quite apart from the fact that little work could have been completed by 1938, it must be noted that the states failed to draft any compact for over a year after the 1936 floods, and cooperation was ultimately achieved only through Woodring's ultimatum. Finally, it was patently foolish to argue that there was no power at any of the sites and hence no grounds for federal objection to the compacts, but at the same time that the power was so valuable that the states must reserve it for themselves. The belief that the compacts were deliberately drafted to outwit the government by spokesmen for the private utilities won wide acceptance in Administration circles. In the summer of 1937, Basil Manly of the Federal Power Commission wrote Mclntyre: It would appear almost certain that the compacts in question were put through the New England legislatures by the New England Power Association and its affiliated companies. I would therefore suggest that, in addition to the legal analysis of the compacts which this Commission is preparing, a quick investigation

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Flood Control Politics

will be made to uncover the activities of the power interests responsible for these compacts. It is clear that there will be a hot fight on this matter and it seems to me the President should be armed with all available information.55 It is impossible to judge with any finality how much merit there is in the argument that the compacts were a deliberate move by the utilities to block the federal power program. Certainly, Governor Aiken could not be accused of being a spokesman for the utilities, and one could interpret the 1936 act in the same fashion the utilities did without having any sympathy for their political objectives. A t the same time, a study of the compact negotiations reveals that Article 8 was inserted at the behest of Vermont and that the most influential delegate from that state was Walter Fenton, a representative of the Insull interests. Without ascribing any malevolent motives to Fenton, one could conceive of his believing sincerely that the interests of Vermont would be best protected by halting any federal power program and taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the compact negotiations to insert a proviso reserving power rights to the states. This, however, is only conjecture, and unless more than the circumstantial evidence that has been presented so far comes to light, one must rest with the observation that, whatever the merits of the case, the foes of the compacts were strongly motivated by the belief that they were the handiwork of the utilities, a belief which the lobbying of the power interests did nothing to shake. Even if it be agreed that the interstate compacts were wholly in accord with the 1936 act, and this is by no means clear, the federal government was correct in holding that the compacts violated the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, since they would have denied the federal government plenary power over hydroelectric power development and required the consent of the states for any generation of power by the federal government. Approval of the compacts would have resulted in a sharp reversal of federal power policy. Advocates of multipurpose river basin development were opposed to embarking on a policy which would result in forty-eight different programs of water resources development and which would allow each state to execute a different program with respect to a river which flowed across state lines. Nor did men like Senator Norris believe that the

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interests of the nation would be safeguarded by giving the states control of the power resources of the country, not merely because private utilities had generally had a stronger hold on state legislatures than on Congress, but also because he believed that no state had the resources to undertake the kind of program achieved by the T V A . If these points be granted, there was no reason that Congress in 1937 should not decide differently from 1936; the 1936 act was not a fundamental, unalterable law, and Congress was entitled to change its mind without being accused of bad faith. It is clear that Roosevelt knew that the compacts might have been improperly drafted almost as soon as they were framed. On April 1, 1937, Citron wrote the President warning him that "the power interests, in the usual sly and tricky fashion" had written the compacts to protect their interest. Moreover, Citron added that "Mr. Corcoran spoke to me about a week ago and told me that he had conferred with you about this problem for N e w England," 56 indicating that Roosevelt might have had knowledge of the compacts even earlier. Despite this, Roosevelt scotched reports that the federal government would revise its program to end the requirement for local payments on April 9, and the Springfield Republican reported that "he seemed distressed that the committee of the Connecticut Legislature considering the compact has suspended consideration after rumors were printed that the government will change its flood control policy." 5 7 The President does not appear to have requested any report on the progress of the compacts from any of his officials until late in June. Perhaps the most serious error of judgment made by the Administration was that it was too sanguine about the possibilities of getting an adequate flood control program on the Connecticut by means of an interstate compact. It never faced up to the problem presented by the fact that Vermont and New Hampshire were being asked to let their good land be flooded, although they would get almost no flood control in return, in order to benefit Massachusetts and Connecticut. The Administration hoped that the problem would be solved by letting Vermont itself decide what part of its land could be flooded through the instrumentality of the interstate compact. Vermont wanted to drive as hard a bargain as it could for surrendering its land, thus writing the provisos into the compacts, and it

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wanted to surrender as little land as possible, thus resulting in a flood control program of limited effectiveness. One should not judge Roosevelt too harshly for insisting on the principle of local contributions, because the President seemed to be taking a forthright stand against "pork barrel" legislation, and because at the time one could not foresee all the trouble it would cause. It took Roosevelt two years to grasp the fact that the principle of local contributions meant that any state could block the federal program simply by refusing to contribute, even though this would hurt another state. Even under the Brown-Casey resolution, a group of states could block the federal program. Thus, the President unintentionally forged a weapon giving the states a veto over federal policy. That the attitude of the Administration was strongly influenced by the pending regional authority legislation is inescapable. When Roosevelt, through Mclntyre, asked McNinch for an analysis of the compacts, McNinch replied: " I can see at a glance at these Compacts that they would deprive the Federal Government of certain centralized planning control in areas affected and would also be in conflict, in some respects, with your plan for Conservation Authorities." 58 On July 17 McNinch sent Ryan's critical analysis of the compacts to Roosevelt, stating that "with Mr. Ryan's analysis and the conclusion that certain provisions of the compacts are in conflict with the Federal Power Act and the proposed Norris and Mansfield Conservation Bills, and that their ratification would tie the hands of the Federal Government and might provide a formidable obstacle to the furtherance of a national water policy in the two regions affected, I am in full accord." 5 9 The 1936 act was drafted at a time when Roosevelt was discouraging valley authority bills and moving cautiously toward a national water power policy. When the compacts which were drafted by authority of the 1936 act were submitted to Congress, however, Roosevelt had already submitted his message to Congress on regional conservation agencies, and appeared determined to pursue a policy of multipurpose development. Quite apart from any defects in the compacts, they were bound to receive a cool reception, for they did not provide for integrated development of N e w England's rivers. T h e

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proposals for regional conservation authorities ran counter to the New England compacts not merely because they were different approaches to river basin development, but because the Norris bill specifically provided that compacts be approved by regional authorities and the Mansfield bill that they be approved by the President before becoming law. Torn by conflicts between different federal agencies, the Administration did not attempt to muster popular support for either the Norris or Mansfield bills. At no time did the Administration ever attempt to show the people of N e w England what benefits would result concretely from either piece of legislation. "Neither the administration nor the governors made particular effort to elucidate the details of the situation for the popular understanding," 60 observed Bulkley Griffin in a column in the Hartford Times. Moreover, the President allowed two of his departments to attack different phases of the Mansfield bill and never succeeded in achieving agreement among cabinet members on either of the two bills. It is not too much to say that on a number of critical issues, there was no Administration policy whatsoever. On July 7, 1937, Representative Citron wrote the President: If w e do not like the compact, . . . we must offer something to N e w England which is immediate and better than the compact. Even Senator Norris agreed with me that we should not stop flood control projects in N e w England unless we can offer them a better method than what they have devised under the compact system which, as you know, is based on the flood control bill of 1936. If it is not our intention to go through with the Norris bill for a national power and flood control project, I suggest that we should either put through a bill such as mine, H . R . 4 8 1 1 , for a C V A or else admit that we must go along with the Copeland-1936 flood control bill and accept the N e w England compact based on this latter bill.® 1

Instead of following Citron's advice, the President decided to support the abortive Brown-Casey resolution. In the last analysis, the President was correct when he wrote Cross in August 1937, that water resources were not properly the subject of interstate compacts but of federal legislation. This applied to flood control as one phase of water resources development, for one might

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choose different sites for reservoirs if one was interested in flood control alone from what one would choose in attempting to develop power and provide for other uses of the river. Moreover, dams which could not be justified economically for one purpose alone could be justified if they were multipurpose projects. Despite this, Roosevelt not only approved the original proposal to draft interstate compacts but, at the very same time he was writing Cross, was pushing the Brown-Casey resolution, which continued to adhere to the compact method. The Brown-Casey resolution was a move born of desperation. It offered no solution to the stalemate on flood control, for it was clear to everyone that Massachusetts and Connecticut would not make use of it, if it passed. Roosevelt might have simply refused to approve the compacts, and asked the states to draft compacts for flood control alone, although this would still have had the disadvantage of providing single-purpose development. Or he might have asked Congress to amend the 1936 act by providing for federal title to dam sites and 100 per cent federal contributions. Or he might have pressed for a modified type of T V A for N e w England, which would not have been passed by Congress, but which would have offered the emotional appeal of T V A and the political appeal of low-cost electricity, instead of leaving the impression that the Administration was merely capricious and had no program of its own. Instead, Roosevelt adopted the one course, a mockery of interstate cooperation, that was certain to alienate everyone and solve nothing. The Brown-Casey proposal had to be shelved almost as soon as it was presented. The Brown-Casey resolution provided for single-purpose dams at a time when the President had committed the Administration to multipurpose development, and allowed planning to be done by the states, aided by the A r m y Engineers, at the same time that the President was vetoing a bill giving planning powers to the Army Engineers on the grounds that this ran counter to Administration policy. Since the President was arguing that the states and not the federal government had violated the original agreement of 1936, he was committed to offering a plan whereby the compacts could be approved at a time when he had lost faith in the compact method. In

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his attempt to throw the burden of proof on the states through the Brown-Casey resolution, he only succeeded in appearing petty and obstructionist. A broad Administration program for the development of N e w England's resources was never unveiled, leaving the flood control stalemate farther from solution than ever. By the time the President got around to backing the Brown-McCormack proposal and the 1938 Flood Control Act, he was in the position of supporting federal seizure of lands, after having argued the merits of interstate compacts, and of backing total costs after having insisted on the principle of local contributions. T h e apparent inconsistency of his position made it all the harder for Vermont to accept an unpopular law. Yet, when all this is said, it must be remembered that President Roosevelt was operating under severe political handicaps. It was not Roosevelt but Congress, and particularly Congressman Whittington and the "pork barrel" group centered in the Mississippi valley, which wrote the 1936 Flood Control Act, that "confused and confusing piece of legislation." 6 2 Roosevelt not only attempted to block the bill but tried to establish the National Resources Board as a permanent planning agency, only to have the proposal killed in committee. In December 1936, when the compact commission appeared to be hopelessly stalled, the National Resources Committee issued a report asking immediate construction of Pittsburgh and Victory dams and an appropriation of $100,000 for immediate investigation of other projects, as the first steps in a comprehensive multipurpose development of the Connecticut Valley, but Congress would have nothing to do with long-term planning of resources development. 63 T h e general attitude of Congress was summed up nicely by the House Committee on Flood Control considering the 1938 bill: " T h e committee believes that the Congress and the country have had enough of theoretical planning." 6 4

IV

T h e only agency whose actions seem inexcusable throughout this period is the A r m y Engineers. A s early as the fall of 1936, Vermont and N e w Hampshire made clear that they woud not agree to any

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compacts without the reservation of power rights, and the Engineers helped the states draft compacts reserving power rights without once consulting the Federal Power Commission and with no concern over whether the compacts might violate federal power policy. Woodring's speech in April 1937 approving compacts which would "reserve for the states the right to develop the reservoirs in the future for other and additional purposes" 65 certainly did not suggest federal ownership and did suggest state power development. Moreover, Woodring made this speech after both Citron and Kopplemann had warned that the compacts violated federal law. As late as July 30, Woodring wrote Whittington that the interstate compacts should be reported out favorably, with a proviso stating that the compacts did not violate existing law, a solution that was clearly no solution at all. 66 The War Department must also bear the responsibility for a much more serious development. Aiken went down to Hartford in March 1937, swearing he would not surrender any good Vermont land, and left the conference agreeing to a flood control compact. The only explanation we have for Aiken's change of heart is Markham's assurance, when Aiken mentioned his fear that Newfane might be flooded, that out of 360 sites, the Army Engineers could easily pick ten. Thus Markham achieved an agreement by consenting to a limited flood control program he knew to be inadequate with no assurance that Vermont would be any more amenable in the future and with the apparent understanding that the Corps of Engineers would not build a dam at Newfane in the West River Valley, a position it was to reverse only six years later. If Markham had made clear in 1937 that Vermont would not go along with an adequate flood control program, the federal government might well have gained the support of at least Connecticut and Massachusetts, thus changing the political balance entirely, and forcing a showdown before the problem had become inextricably confused with other issues and freighted with such emotional significance that a stalemate was almost inevitable. The belief that Markham's action was not a real solution but only an unfortunate postponement of an issue that should not have been postponed is borne out not only by later events, but by a remarkable

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statement by Henry Harriman on the problem shortly before the Hartford conference: Vermont does not object to the four or five reservoirs of the original project of nine, which would be located within her border, but it is very doubtful whether her consent could be obtained for the eleven, out of the twenty of the large project, which would be built in that State. The joint Commission is, therefore, faced with the problem of whether it should recommend the initial project in view of grave doubts as to the possibility of carrying out the complete project. Massachusetts and Connecticut must also consider whether the annual charges are warranted in view of the fact that only partial flood protection can be obtained.67 The Army Engineers officiated at the dismemberment of its own plan for flood protection. Of the eleven reservoir sites from which the eight compact sites would be chosen, only three had been selected by the Army Engineers for its initial plan. Even more striking, six of the eleven sites had not even been listed in the comprehensive plan of thirty-three reservoirs in House Document 412. N o r did the new plan give as much flood protection. The original W a r Department program would have controlled 951 square miles of the drainage area; at best, the compact plan would control 872 square miles, at worst only 522. The quiet acquiescence of the War Department to the plan of the compact commission was essentially a victory for the forces opposing the combination of hydroelectric power development with flood control in the Connecticut Valley. In particular, the Engineers agreed to the removal of Gaysville from the initial plan for flood control and apparently gave some kind of satisfactory assurance to Aiken with respect to Newfane. Gaysville and Newfane were two of the four best sites for multipurpose development in the entire valley. Professor Barrows was particularly critical of the provision in the compact that North Hartland be restricted to "flood control purposes only" since it had a considerable power potential. 68 Irrespective of the merits of the two different approaches to river basin development, one may well question whether the decision in favor of singlepurpose development should have been made by a single federal

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agency, particularly when its views ran counter to those of the Roosevelt administration, and especially to those of the National Resources Committee. The modification of the War Department's plan to meet the demands of the N e w England states was incorporated in House Document 455, which was adopted in the 1938 Flood Control Act. The new comprehensive plan for the Connecticut called for twenty reservoirs, instead of the original thirty-three, and local protection for seven downstream cities, but, because of the stalemate over the compact, the plan requested only authorization of the seven dikes. Of the thirty-three sites in House Document 412, twenty-one were killed. The report stated bluntly that the reservoirs were "for flood control alone, no provision being made for storage in the interest of conservation or other purposes." 69 "In selecting the 30 reservoir sites considered by the district engineer, the problem was to obtain the storage capacity necessary for flood control, avoiding sites which might have greater value for some other purpose in the future." 70 All of the compact sites were embodied in the new comprehensive plan. The real significance of the change between House Document 412 and House Document 455 becomes apparent when one examines the list of twenty-one reservoirs missing from the latter plan. Of the four reservoirs with power potential at the site of at least 10,000 kw. in House Document 4x2, two were deleted. Of the fourteen reservoirs adaptable to conservation storage for power purposes with an effective capacity of at least 20,000 acre-feet, eight were deleted; only two of the fourteen were included in the compact, Victory and Bethlehem Junction. In drafting House Document 455, the Engineers did not "adequately take into account the important water uses and aspects of power and recreational use and sanitary benefits which will result from the well-regulated and increased low-water flow," observed Professor Barrows. 71 At the same time, the decision to favor single-purpose development was not final. House Document 455 continued to talk of the possibility of modifying dams to provide additional conservation storage, and it included in the long-term plan both Newfane and Gaysville. In short, in removing Gaysville from the initial plan and quieting

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Aiken's fears about Newfane, the Engineers were agreeing to a truce that they might break at any moment. Even more important, the compact plan of reservoirs provided flood control of only 7V2 per cent of the drainage basin, and 25 per cent was universally regarded as the barest minimum for adequate protection. Throughout the debate over the compacts, there seemed no reason to suppose that the alignments were not permanent — the Roosevelt administration versus a united, harmonious alliance of the four Connecticut Valley states buttressed by the Army Engineers. It was not yet apparent that the atmosphere of harmony had been achieved by overlooking two explosive issues. What would happen if the War Department decided to press for the adoption of one of the remaining multipurpose reservoirs? What would happen when the states of Massachusets and Connecticut asked Vermont to agree to the flooding of additional land to provide more than the 7V2 per cent coverage agreed on in the compact ? Ultimately, both of these issues were to come to a head at Newfane, the very site that had so deeply concerned Governor Aiken when he went down to Hartford that day in March.

CHAPTER

VII

Hurricane Politics The morning of September 21, 1938 was an uneasy one in N e w England. Four days of rain had turned northern streams into torrents, breaking small dams and washing away roads and bridges; by September 20 the storm had already claimed ten lives. A locomotive and four freight cars had been derailed by a landslide in East Deerfield, killing two men, and another man plunged to his death as a car ran off a causeway into the Charles River. Charles Street, cutting between Boston Common and the Public Gardens, was under a foot of water. The Connecticut River had risen two feet in three days and was still rising at over an inch an hour. The 1936 flood had been the worst in at least three centuries, but N e w England appeared to be in for one just as bad only two years later. It was not the fear of people along the river banks, nor even the mounting anxiety over the Czech crisis, that accounted for the disquieting feeling. There was something strange about the day itself, oppressively warm for late September, about the very air, hot and moist and salty, and the decreasing atmospheric pressure left a queer feeling in one's ears. On the southern shore, the Portuguese fishermen refused to go out in their boats, because there had been two coppery sunrises in succession. Vermonters wondered at the smell of sea in the air. Through the morning the uneasiness grew as the barometer continued to drop and a high wind started to blow. By ι p.m., the wind had reached gale force, strong and warm, carrying a salt spray with it. At 2 p.m., the rain started to fall once more, only with a purposeful ferocity that the earlier storm had lacked. A man in a boat off the southern shore saw what appeared to be a thick gray fog racing in from the sea; suddenly, terror-struck, he realized it was not fog but a mass of wind-lashed, green-black water

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riding toward shore. A few minutes before, at 2:30, N e w Englanders had turned on their radios to hear Anthony Eden's speech and heard instead the awesome news that a tropical hurricane had struck N e w England. T o be sure, it was not the first they had heard of the hurricane. If they read their newspapers with care, they had seen for some days past accounts of a hurricane headed for the Florida coast. Small dispatches related that the storm had veered to sea, and if the subject was given any thought at all, it was only to observe how fortunate N e w England was to be free of such a menace, and to wonder why anyone would live in hurricane country. The West Indian tempest moved north oil Cape Hatteras at 45 miles an hour, and the curve of the storm indicated clearly that it would spend its force at sea. But when the hurricane moved oceanward, it struck a North Atlantic high, which was exceptionally close to shore. T o the west was another high, leaving a narrow channel of warm, low-pressure, moist air straight up through N e w England. Headed north through this funnel, the hurricane had no chance to expand and thus dissipate but moved toward eastern Long Island and N e w England at full force at the almost unheard-of speed of 60 miles an hour. The center of the storm struck the N e w England coast a little west of N e w Haven and moved northward along the western rim of the Connecticut River Valley through Vermont crossing the Canadian border around midnight. T h e fiercest part of the storm was on its eastern edge where counter-cyclical winds of over 1 1 0 miles an hour hit the Rhode Island shore, and winds reached at least 186 miles an hour in Boston. The greatest single disaster occurred at Watch Hill where a host of people looking at the storm from the hillside watched in horror as mountainous seas descended on them. More than fifty bodies were taken from the sea near Westerly. Hour after hour people huddled in cottages along the shore, a nightmare world of blackness, as horizontal sheets of salt rain seeped into the houses and the shrill, squealing wind battered the walls. A huge tidal wave swept the Shore Line N e w York express from a causeway, two cars dangling in the water, the engine's nose pressed against a sixty-foot trawler tossed upon the tracks. Passengers jumped out to fight their way to land. The sea clawed small cottages from the

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land and threw boats into trees. In Essex harbor, all but five or six of 200 boats were destroyed in an hour, while 350 craft in Boston harbor were battered into driftwood. Winds of 125 miles an hour swept up V-shaped Narragansett bay, the storm waves hemmed in as they approached Providence harbor, driving the waves higher and higher. The tremendous gale lashed the waters from the bay into narrow Providence River, and in an instant the main square of Providence was flooded ten feet deep and water poured into second story windows. Trolley cars were swept from their tracks, and scores of shoppers had to swim to safety. A woman driving along a dry street through the heart of Providence was drowned in her car before she could move. So powerful were the waves that huge, coal barges were lifted out of the water and deposited in the streets of downtown Providence. In a few minutes, the one sensation in the city was of hearing a terrible, persistent noise, the awful din of short-circuited alarm-bells and ambulance sirens. The hurricane struck at a time when tides were higher than normal, in some places a foot higher than usual, because the moon was near its closest point to earth and was nearing the phase of the new moon. In N e w London the tides and the winds blew the barkentine Marcelas ashore, upsetting its galley stove which set fire to buildings along the wharf. Firefighters were helpless, the fire engines blocked by fallen trees across the exits of the firehouse. By nightfall an entire New London block had burned down, and the fire was still raging. N e w London officials called it the worst disaster since the city was razed by Benedict Arnold. The sheer force of the storm surpassed belief. Seismographs in Sitka, Alaska, recorded the shocks of the pounding of the waves on the N e w England coast. T h e storm deposited ocean salt on the windows of houses in Montpelier, Vermont. Salt spray turned pine needles brown forty miles inland in Connecticut. A large yacht starting out for sea with engines at full power was blown all the way back to its pier by the wind. Once again, the Connecticut Valley felt the impact of a major flood. The river inundated the east side of Hartford, and lamp post bulbs glowed "like floating Japanese lanterns" in Bushnell Park in

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front of the State House. For a time, it appeared that a greater catastrophe than that of 1936 menaced the city, but the "Battle of Colt's Dike" held the ramparts. Heroic efforts created a two-mile barricade of sandbags which the pounding river failed to crack. A t Northampton, C C C boys from the camp at Mount T o m saved the key dike. The "big wind" blew down and damaged two hundred and fifty million trees, two and a half billion board feet of timber. Twenty per cent of the maple sugar trees of Vermont, some over a century old, were felled, a heavy loss, for it takes almost fifty years to grow a producing sugar bush. Of three thousand sugar maples in one section of central Vermont, only one hundred were left standing. In Stonington, Connecticut, the tree warden had marked one dying tree to be cut down; after the storm, it was the only one on an entire block still standing. Fifteen hundred specimen trees in the Arnold Arboretum were destroyed. On a dozen N e w England campuses and scores of village greens, the great elms and oaks were toppled. The property damage was the greatest in any disaster in American history, worse than the San Francisco earthquake or the Chicago fire. The storm took a particularly heavy toll of the N e w England crops at a time when the economy was already reeling from the "recession" of 1938. Four million apples were blown to the ground. Carloads of onions were immersed in the Connecticut to mix with the strange cargo of tapioca swept downstream from a plant in Orange, Mass. The failure of electric power cut off incubators, killing thousands of unborn chickens. In the tobacco country of western N e w England, the gale blew through slits in the sheds, destroying the drying leaves, while other sheds caught fire from charcoal braziers used to dry the tobacco. T h e storm completely recast the shoreline of N e w England, scouring out new channels, heaving oyster beds, piling debris on carefullytended seaside gardens. Bailey's Beach at Society's summer capital of Newport was destroyed and the famous Ocean Drive was rent in a dozen places by the angry surf. Three sisters in Connecticut were planning to sell a fifty-acre seashore tract, their only property in the world, in a few days; after the storm, there were only two acres left. Ancient landmarks vanished in the wake of the storm, doubtless nothing so ancient as the dinosaur tracks near Holyoke, many of

Flood Control Politics

which were lost when the storm dislodged slabs of rock. The frigate, Old Ironsides, was torn from its moorings in Boston Navy Yard but survived the rigors of the storm. The three-century-old Sentinel Pine at the Flume, New Hampshire, was blown down, and the big wind felled trees at Dartmouth College that had been planted by Daniel Webster. Scores of the lovely elms of New Haven and many of the historic trees of Boston Common went down before the fury of the wind. "The face of New England had been changed forever." 1 The hurricane took 488 lives. In Easthampton, a newsboy making his rounds was electrocuted by a wire snapped off by the wind. In Worcester, a man was blown through a window to his death. Three girls were killed by a falling chimney at Northfield Seminary. The Republican candidate for Secretary of State in Connecticut was drowned in the waters of Long Island Sound. One wave engulfed ten women gathered for a church social in a cottage. When the storm subsided, seven children were found drowned in a bus on an island in Narragansett Bay. A woman in Connecticut parked her car under a tree to wait out the storm; the tree fell, crushing the car — when police removed her, they found she had been reading Gone with the Wind. For a time it appeared that the universe itself had assumed some strange, new form, changing all the familiar patterns of life. Arctic birds like the gannet, and rare seabirds like Leach's petrel found themselves perched in trees in Vermont alongside yellow-billed birds from the tropics. Telegrams went from Boston to New York via London, and milk from Vermont farms reached Boston by way of Montreal. New Englanders heard the alien accents of men from Nebraska and Arkansas rushed in to untangle the maze of telephone wires, while gay-shirted Mexicans repaired railroad lines in Connecticut. Ducks got a new lease on life in Lake Champlain on the eve of the hunting season, as the storm washed away hunters' blinds. Years later, the mere mention of the word "hurricane" was enough to start most men in New England off on a long reminiscence of their personal adventures in the storm. No single act of nature had ever provided so universal an experience for the people of New England. Everyone had his tale to tell; a favorite was that of the safecrackers who failed to blow up a safe because the hurricane cut off

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the electricity for their electric detonator. In Providence they told of the man, knee-deep in water, who calmly tried on hat after hat floating out of a haberdashery until he found the right fit. In N e w Hampshire, each October, the ghost of Ocean-born Mary comes to visit her eighteenth-century home on a hilltop near Concord, riding in a phantom stagecoach. This year she came early, the night of the hurricane, "her ghostly skirts whipped by the wind," to save her home from the wrath of the gale. A sandwich man allegedly walked through Boston Common with the sign: "For twenty-five cents I'll listen to your story of the hurricane." The very next morning N e w England housewives were busy scrubbing leaf juice from the white paint on their walls, but the memory of the hurricane was not so easily erased. N o act of man could have halted the gale, but men who had seen their homes inundated by the rising Connecticut but two years before, and who had since heard so much confusing talk about flood control, wanted to know why the river had not been checked in all that time, why the dams had not been constructed, why the dikes had not been built. There was bound to be a political reckoning. 2 ι From the very first, the N e w England Congressmen realized that their opposition to the compacts left them in a politically vulnerable position unless the Administration was able to produce a workable flood control program. As early as the spring of 1936, Congressman Citron had charged the power companies with launching a campaign to defeat him at the polls, noting that he, Kopplemann, and Senator Maloney were listed in the annual reports of the Hartford Electric Light Company and the Connecticut Power Company as supporters of "destructive" legislation, each having voted for the WheelerRayburn holding company bill. 3 Samuel Ferguson, President of the Hartford Electric Light Company, admitted that his report had included this data, but added: " W e considered it proper information for our stockholders. I presume the shoe pinches. However, I know of no 'campaign' against the congressmen." 4 At the hearings on the Brown-Casey bill in the summer of 1937, Kopplemann explained;

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In opposing the compact I realize I am putting myself on the spot — that I am laying myself open to the charge of holding up flood control. . . . The public quickly gets the picture when they tell them they won't have flood control. They remember all too well the suffering they underwent during two successive years. They tremble lest there be a recurrence next year. The power question does not grip them emotionally. Power does not leave them wet and cold. Floods do. Power does not cover their homes and their belongings with disease-infested slime. Floodwaters do. Power does not creep into their places of business, wreck their machinery, ruin their merchandise — floodwaters do.5 That fall, Representative Phillips of Connecticut declared: " I heard a high official in the State of Connecticut say that it was regarded as a fact, practically, in our State, that our colleague, Congressman Casey, would not be returned to Congress because he opposed these compacts, and the same thing about our colleague, Mr. Kopplemann." 6 When the Flood Control bill of 1938 came before Congress, McCormack wrote to President Roosevelt: I consider this to be a matter of vital importance to New England, and if I may speak from a Party angle, without being misunderstood, to the Democratic Party in New England. I am inclined to feel that we are likely to be put on the defensive unless some provision is inserted into the pending bill which will enable the projects in New England, authorized by the 1936 act, to be constructed. This would be particularly so if any people, living in any part of New England which is in the flood area, should be visited by another flood between now and next November.7 When the hurricane struck N e w England in September and the Connecticut River towns were once more flooded, the Republicans lost no time in making political capital of the disaster. In a long, angry, seething editorial called "ΟΓ Man River Mocks Mr. Kopplemann," the Hartford Courant cried: As Congressman Kopplemann and Congressman Citron view the turbulent waters of the Connecticut, witness the inconvenience and suffering to which thousands of persons have been put and note the damage that is being done to property over a large area, they may perhaps begin to suspect that their unreasonable, not to say demagogic, opposition to the Flood Control Compact . . . will now receive the full force of the public

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condemnation it deserves. . . . The opinion seems to be general that they have rendered this entire community a great disservice for which they can make no possible atonement. . . . Let Mr. Kopplemann tell it today to the suffering East Side, to the people rendered homeless, to the small merchants whose business has been paralyzed and whose stocks have been damaged, how sincerely devoted he is to the alleviation of human distress and what abiding faith he has in the objectives and promises of the New Deal. 8 Republican candidates in Connecticut made the flood the main issue of the 1938 campaign. William J. Miller of Wethersfield, running for Congress against Kopplemann, told an East Side Hartford meeting: " T h e N e w Deal fiddles while we get flooded." 9 D r . James L . McConaughty, President of Wesleyan and Republican nominee for Lieutenant-Governor, asserted: Some of the flood damage might have been avoided and all of our fears of the flood lessened if a few stubborn, blind Democratic Congressmen had been willing to put the welfare of the citizens of their State above a will-o'-the-wisp about which they could make political speeches. I have yet to find a thoughtful person in any party in the State, including all my newspaper editor friends, Democratic as well as Republican, who believes that Congressmen Citron and Kopplemann were justified in the selfish attitude which they took. 10 T h e White House was flooded with desperate pleas for help from Democratic leaders in Connecticut, N e w Hampshire, and Massachusetts. Representative Citron told the President he must act quickly, or "some of your friends may be defeated because of the attacks of the power group." 1 1 Kopplemann observed, "If the timing of this flood is any criterion, G o d and nature must be on the side of the republicans this year!" 1 2 Owen Johnson, Democratic candidate for Congress against Treadway in western Massachusetts, explained: The State Compacts people and the Republican leaders are trying desperately to save their faces over their obstructionist program over the last two years by these partisan tactics. The whole election will turn on this issue. My own prospects for election were excellent before this crisis and they should be doubled if I can be of immediate service along the lines which every community is demanding. 13

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On September 30, in letters to Kopplemann and Senator Brown, President Roosevelt declared that the charge that the compacts would have averted the floods was "wholly untrue." Even if the compacts had been ratified, "it would have been physically impossible to have completed any reservoir this summer," he pointed out. " T h e mentality of those guilty of such implications and suggestions for purely partisan reasons is not very different from the words of those in international affairs who seek, in very similar ways, to play with human lives. . . . Y o u and I do not get angry with such people, we have for them only the utmost pity." 1 4 On the same day, he told Clyde Seavey of the Federal Power Commission to do something about helping out Citron, Kopplemann, and Fitzgerald in Connecticut, and on the following day, Steve Early wrote Seavey, Harry Hopkins, and General Schley of the Army Engineers to meet to work out a program of emergency flood control aid. 15 JI Hopkins, Seavey, and General Kingman (representing Schley) found that they could scrape together eleven million dollars for flood control projects in N e w England from War Department, W P A , and P W A funds, and recommended immediate construction by the Army Engineers of reservoirs at Knightville and Birch Hill, Massachusetts, Union Village, Vermont, and Surry Mountain, N e w Hampshire, as well as local protective works in the Connecticut Valley. On October 4 President Roosevelt wired Hopkins to go ahead with construction. 16 Administration supporters and the nervous Congressmen were jubilant over the President's announcement, but the news was received sourly elsewhere. Governor Murphy of N e w Hampshire declared: "I will go to law if necessary and I hope the situation will not reach a point where I will have to call out the national guard." 1 7 Aiken said that the September hurricane demonstrated that the most effective flood control for the downstream cities could be obtained by the construction of reservoirs on small streams in Massachusetts and Connecticut and by the construction of dikes, and he hoped that the plan for flood control would be revised accordingly and "on a nonpolitical basis." Representative Tobey condemned the President's ac-

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tion as "an attempt to buy the election in New Hampshire." "New Hampshire will say pour in your millions. We'll take your money but we will vote as free men, so help us God." Senator Bridges thought it "very peculiar that President Roosevelt waited for a great disaster and the arrival of an election campaign before taking any positive action to contribute to New England flood control." Even Senator Brown, while grateful for the money, announced he would seek to revise the plans of the Army Engineers to build the Riverhill dam in the Merrimack Valley. 18 The last minute decision to start immediate flood control work in New England failed to turn the tide. The elections in November proved disastrous for the New Deal generally and for the foes of the compacts and the advocates of a federal power program in New England in particular. Kopplemann, Citron, Fitzgerald, and Phillips were defeated in Connecticut, as was Senator Brown in New Hampshire. Of the outspoken opponents of the compacts, only Representative Casey survived. Advocates of a federal program of multipurpose development of New England's rivers were quick to point out that the Democratic Party had suffered a major setback nationally, and that there was no reason to believe flood control had anything to do with the Democratic losses in New England, and that the Republican tide had swept away Democrats like Governor Cross, who supported the compacts, and the Democratic governor and both of the Democratic Congressmen from Rhode Island, who were not involved in the issue of flood control at all. 19 Their protests carried little weight. The Republicans replied that it was passing strange that the Democrats lost only four of their six seats in Connecticut, and that the four opponents of the compacts were defeated, while the two supporters of the compacts were victorious. Moreover, in both New Hampshire, where Tobey unseated Brown, and in the Hartford district, where Miller defeated Kopplemann, the 1938 flood was probably the leading issue of the campaign. At the very moment when the Army Engineers were invading Vermont and New Hampshire to take lands without the consent of the states, leaders of both parties who believed the 1938 act to be unconstitutional were now further convinced that it was a hasty, intemperate act in the closing hours of a Congress which had just been repudi-

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ated by the American people. The Administration was now faced with the task of executing an unpopular law at the very moment that a change in political fortunes had placed the Republican Party in control of both the executive and legislative branches of every one of the six New England states, men for the most part convinced that the movement to repeal the 1938 law was a righteous crusade that had just won the overwhelming support of a long suffering, resentful people.

CHAPTER

VIII

The Skirmish at Union Village The War Department chose the Union Village project in the Ompompanoosuc Valley in Vermont, one of the sites named in the 1937 compact, for the first test of strength of its new powers under the 1938 act, and Army Engineers spent the summer of 1938 making preliminary surveys. By late September the Army was ready to acquire land, and Lieutenant Colonel John S. Bragdon, district engineer, informed the Vermont commissioner of highways, Η. E. Sargent, early in October, that construction of the dam was about to commence and asked his help in rearranging highways. Sargent relayed this news to Governor Aiken, who wrote Woodring on October 15 that Vermont did "not recognize the right of the United States to purchase or acquire land within the State without the consent of the State. The State of Vermont will, however, cooperate with the federal government in the construction of this dam in accordance with the laws of this State, and we are willing to confer with you or your representatives to discuss this matter." 1 A week later, at a conference between Governor Aiken and Brigadier General John J. Kingman, Assistant Chief of Engineers, Bragdon, and Captain Vimey of the Engineers in Montpelier, the governor asserted he was willing to have the Vermont Public Works Board purchase the land at Union Village and convey it to the United States Government, although he would not change his stand on the principle of states' rights. On October 26, Brigadier General M. C. Tyler, Acting Chief of Engineers, wrote Aiken: I am pleased to advise that the Secretary of War has this date approved the recommendation of this office that the Department avail itself of your offer. . . . I desire to express my appreciation of your kind offer of

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cooperation and feel sure that the construction of the project will be facilitated thereby.2 On the same day, Secretary Woodring wrote Aiken: "I am gratified to receive your kind offer of cooperation in the prosecution of the flood-control project at Union Village and am sure that such action on your part will facilitate an early completion of the work." 3 Woodring acted on the advice of General Tyler, who also told Woodring that the Army should agree to negotiate a formal contract with the state of Vermont, if Aiken demanded one.4 In less than ten days, Governor Aiken had won a striking victory. T o be sure, the precious Vermont land was still to be flooded, and the Rutland Herald grumbled that the "Compromise" surrendered a valuable recreation area and took a considerable section of land from the tax lists.5 Nevertheless, Aiken had forced the federal government to heed his refusal to permit dam construction without his consent, and while this mattered little at Union Village, Aiken could properly say at a later time that if the Secretary of War recognized the right of the state of Vermont to surrender land at Union Village, he would also have to recognize the right of the state to refuse to surrender land elsewhere. The Brattleboro Reformer termed Tyler's letter "a clean victory for Governor Aiken," but also observed prophetically: It may or may not be noteworthy that the agreement comes from the chief of army engineers rather than the secretary of war or the White House. This may be calculated to leave room for a reversal of policy by someone higher up at some future time, but whoever tries it will find he hasn't much room to turn in.® Colonel Bragdon met with the Vermont Public Works Board on November 4 and submitted a tentative agreement between the United States and Vermont on Union Village. Although Vermont officials raised the question of whether penstocks would be installed, Bragdon felt that no controversial question was involved in the negotiations, because they agreed that the question of penstocks was beside the point.7 On November 14, however, the Public Works Board wrote Bragdon suggesting certain changes in the agreement, later referred to by Governor Aiken as "clarifying changes," 8 which Brag-

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don immediately recognized the federal government could not agree to. In addition to stipulating that Union Village could be developed only for flood control, the state of Vermont insisted that the contract contain the clause, "but without recognition by the State of Vermont of the validity of said Act of Congress." 9 Four days later, Secretary Woodring told President Roosevelt that Vermont was willing to convey lands to the United States but that it would deed title "for flood control purposes only." "As a matter of public policy," continued Woodring, "I consider it extremely objectionable that the United States should accept deeds of conveyances subject to the restriction that the lands shall be used 'for flood control purposes only' or any like restriction." Woodring told the President that the department proposed the project be undertaken free from any restrictions, and added that he would ask the Federal Power Commission to recommend whether penstocks be installed.10 On the following day, Attorney General Homer Cummings sent the President a memo holding that the Vermont proviso would violate federal law, for it would convey not title but an easement.11 On November 28 the President wrote Woodring from Warm Springs that, in view of the ruling of the Attorney General, "no such deeds should be accepted." 12 While behind the scenes the Administration attitude was rapidly stiffening against Aiken's policy, everything still appeared to be harmonious on the surface. On December 10 the Brattleboro Reformer reported that feeling in Montpelier was that if power were introduced, "entirely new ground for negotiations . . . might be provided," for there had originally been no mention of power, 13 but any talk of conflict ended when on December 19 a contract was formally drafted between the state of Vermont and the United States setting the terms for the acquisition of land at Union Village, and signed by Bragdon for the United States.14 The contract had been drafted by the War Department, and, according to Aiken, Bragdon declared it had the approval of the War Department.10 Aiken stated that Bragdon did not know whether a penstock would be constructed, but added that assurance had been given that the dam would be kept at a constant level in the summer months in order to allow the development of recreational facilities on the lake

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behind the dam. Aiken had apparently not only won an impressive victory, but had succeeded in putting it into writing, with only the signatures of Schley and Woodring needed to ratify the Union Village contract. Bragdon had faithfully carried out orders from his superiors. On December 2, Wanamaker, Chief of the Miscellaneous Civil Section of the War Department had written Captain Marshall that Woodring would not sign a contract containing any strings such as "for flood control only," even if the Federal Power Commission found that there actually was no power at Union Village to be developed. Wanamaker added that, if the FPC recommended that penstocks not be installed, the Army Engineers could tell this to Aiken and a contract could then be negotiated without any strings to the satisfaction of all concerned.16 Five days later, Wanamaker wrote Bragdon to tell Aiken that there was no need for a formal contract, but that the War Department would negotiate one if Aiken insisted, and if there were no strings.17 Meanwhile, on December 3 Seavey had told Woodring that the Federal Power Commission had decided that penstocks should be installed at Union Village.18 If Aiken is correct in stating that he signed the agreement after Bragdon told him he "did not know whether a penstock would be constructed," the most charitable interpretation one can make of the incident is that Woodring or one of his subordinates had neglected to relay this important piece of information from the FPC to Bragdon in the next sixteen days. For two weeks nothing more was heard from Washington. On the afternoon of January 6, Governor Aiken picked up a copy of the Christian Science Monitor to learn that Secretary Woodring had refused to approve the contract, and on the following day, Aiken received a letter from Woodring stating: "I do not feel that it will be necessary to complete the drafts of formal agreements which have previously been prepared covering this procedure." 1 9 Woodring apparently wrote Aiken after the Attorney General had once more objected to the contract, in particular because it contained an obscure clause reading that Vermont could convey the lands "without prejudice to the rights of the state of Vermont with respect to other proceedings." 20 The armistice over Union Village had come to an

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abrupt end, and Governor Aiken moved quickly to prepare a war message to the Vermont legislature. ι On January 12, after a militant address by Governor Aiken, a stormy joint session of the Vermont legislature voted to approve a $67,500 "defense f u n d " to fight "in all legal and proper ways" the encroachment by the federal government on the rights of the state. After detailing the history of the negotiations, Governor Aiken stated the issue was not one of flood control, for Vermont was willing to surrender the land, nor one of "cheap power development by the Federal Government, because the agreement as signed by the State of Vermont did not prevent the Federal Government from developing power," but one of democracy itself. All the talk of flood control and power for the past year had been nothing but a clever device "to prepare the way for a little group of men to run things their way — good sometimes, bad sometimes — but always their way, forgetting that a check with the home folks and their wishes is not only good practical horse sense but the very essence of democracy." After repeated references to the Green Mountain Boys and eighteenth century virtues, both houses of the legislature voted by overwhelming margins not only to approve the grant of money, but also to petition Congress to approve the contract and rescind the Barkley amendment to the 1938 Flood Control Act. 2 1 On the same day, Secretary Woodring retorted: "I cannot accept lands transferred to the Federal Government if any restrictions are imposed by the State. I have served as Governor of a State myself and I do not concede to Governor Aiken nor to any other person in the United States a greater championship of States' rights." 2 2 N e w England opponents of the Administration were jubilant, Senator Bridges describing Aiken's position as "sound," and Senator Gibson asking "If Secretary Woodring does not have some idea of reneging, why doesn't he sign the agreement?" Senator Walsh observed that Aiken's address might lead Congress to reconsider the 1938 act and settle definitely the rights of the federal government and the states.23

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At a conference in Boston on the following day, the six New England governors issued a proclamation protesting any alienation of the rights of the states by the federal government, although the most important feature of the resolution was its mild character, probably in deference to the views of Governor Saltonstall of Massachusetts who had attacked "quibbling" about flood control in his inaugural message a few days before. Governor Aiken reiterated his attack on Woodring, denying there were any "strings" in the contract, and adding: "If there were, he put them in, because the War Department attorney wrote every word of that contract." 24 The Vermont controversy was featured on the front page of newspapers across the country, and Governor Aiken was depicted as a stalwart Pym fighting a tyrant whose lust for power would not stop at attempting to destroy the highest tribunal of the land but was now bent on taking away the last remaining rights of the states as well. The New York Times observed: "It is encouraging to see the issue of States' rights once more raised in vigorous fashion." 25 The Washington Post and the Baltimore Sun were no less vigorous than Connecticut Valley newspapers in applauding the governor's stand.28 Dorothy Thompson contended that Vermonters were "very, very sore" about the defeat of the compact in Congress and objected to the "extremely casual" attitude of the federal government toward Vermont land. "They haven't forgotten yet that way back 5 years ago some of the boys from the Rural Resettlement Administration declared Vermont to be 52 per cent uninhabitable and suggested the citizenry ought to be evacuated off the hill farms." 27 The Springfield Union gave "three cheers for Vermont" which would "not yield in lazy acquiescence to high-handed federal interference," and the Greenfield Recorder was pleased that Governor Aiken had "called the spade by its name in the nauseating attitude toward flood control of the federal administration." 28 A boom was immediately gotten underway for Governor Aiken as the Republican standard-bearer in 1940. Erwin Canham, writing in the Christian Science Monitor, speculated that anti-New Dealers who had used the sunflower in 1936 might turn to the sugar maple for a symbol in 1940, for Aiken's speech was "enough to cause the blood to run fast in the veins of new Republican majorities." 29 The

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Boston Transcript noted that the Southern reaction to Aiken's speech would be carefully watched, for 1940 might "bring an informal coalition between Republicans and right wing Democrats and the flood control issue may help to show to what extent conservative Democrats are willing to return to traditional Democratic doctrines in defending state sovereignty." 30 Aiken's first Southern support was not long wanting; on January 16 in Savannah, Georgia, the Francis B. Bartow Camp of the Sons of Confederate Veterans commended the Governor, declaring: "The doctrine of States' rights has waited long for so valiant a champion." 3 1 The Barre Times retorted huffily that it was "a far cry between having a desire to deed land formally to the federal government and insisting on the right of maintaining human slavery." 32 The New York Herald Tribune concluded: It appears that Vermont, and specifically a minor project on a tributary of the Connecticut in a community of 50 inhabitants, has been picked for the first test of this proposed usurpation. Somehow the obscurity of the setting among poor Vermont villagers enhances the dramatic value of the principle at stake. Here is an attack on the type of local autonomy which is of the very essence of the American democracy. We shall be much mistaken if not only New England but the country generally does not rise in support of Governor Aiken.33 On January 14 the Administration struck back with a surprising move. At a White House press conference, Steve Early revealed that President Roosevelt had made clear to senators from New England that he would not press a fight over Union Village, preferring to cancel the Vermont projects entirely rather than to engage in a controversy. "If Vermont doesn't want the protection," Early stated, "it doesn't have to have it. Other States want and can use the money. The War Department is acting in entire accord with the Flood Control Act. There was no resentment when it was passed." 34 "President Roosevelt has decided to run," Governor Aiken replied. "The President does not want this fundamental issue of the people's rights to reach the Supreme Court." 3 5 Erwin Canham observed: "Governor Aiken becomes the first opponent since 1932 who can accuse President Roosevelt of turning tail." 36 Administration leaders in New England rallied to the support of

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the President. Representative Casey labeled the attitude of New England's governors "false and silly," and said that if it were logically carried out, one state could block flood control on the entire Mississippi River.37 The Springfield Daily News declared Casey's statement would find "widespread accord," 38 and the Springfield Republican pointed out that the federal government had a clear right to go into Vermont and exercise its powers of eminent domain for any "necessary and proper" purpose, and not even Governor Aiken would deny that flood control was necessary. The Republican summed up: "Brandishing an obsolete principle of state sovereignty, as something equal to or superior to national sovereignty, in the case even of a navigable, interstate river, Governor Aiken stands in the way of flood protection. He has gone Calhoun." 39 The Nation asserted that Aiken's address "would have come more appropriately from the late Jefferson Davis. . . . One almost expected the address to close with a ringing call for secession." 40 The most devastating lampoon of Aiken's position came from his own state when Senator Herbert B. Comings introduced a bill in the Vermont legislature to appropriate another $67,000 to buy flintlocks and dry powder to defend the state against the "mounted minions of the alien Federal Government." After several lengthy clauses on the contamination of the honor of Ethan and Ira Allen, Seth Warner, Remember Baker, and Thomas Chittenden, the Comings bill resolved: that the self-reliant, independent, individualistic, two-fisted he-men and she-women descendants of the Green Mountain Boys purchase such a number of blunderbusses as shall not exceed the number of patriotic defenders of the realm of Vermont for the defense of the sacred bog, swamp or morass commonly known as the Village of Union. 4 1

On January 16 the debate shifted to the floor of the House, where Representative Plumley asserted that "the vital issue involved is not and cannot be disposed by flippant remarks emanating from the White House or anywhere else." "The sight of the United States Army engineers marking out land for seizure did not dismay the descendants of the Green Mountain Boys," Plumley continued. "The spirit of Ethan Allen stalks abroad with the words of Governor Aiken: 'We can fight or we can run.'" Under questioning from

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Whittington, Plumley admitted that the federal government had the right, and had frequently exercised the right, to condemn land without consent for reclamation dams in the West, but Plumley added: " W e are going to undertake to repeal that." T h e issue of states' rights was so plain that it loomed "above the Presidential fog as does Mount Shasta over the fogs that drift eastward at its base." 4 2 Representatives Whittington and Rankin led the counterattack, and observers noted with irony two Mississippi Congressmen arguing with a Vermonter against states' rights. Rankin described the whole controversy as a campaign of the "Power Trust." Oh, I know that Governor Aiken imagines he is running for President on the Republican ticket. Why, he might as well forget it. . . . A Power Trust candidate for the Presidency in 1940 will not stand any more chance to be elected than the Republican elephant would to hang from a horizontal bar by his eyebrows. Whittington constantly interrupted Plumley's speech with sharp questions, pointing out that in the creation of national forests, land was condemned without consent and that this had actually been done in Vermont. Plumley went on unmoved, assuring the House that Vermont would defend its rights against the United States Government, "even at the untold cost of blood and treasure," and ending his speech by quoting President McKinley on liberty. 43 A t a press conference on January 17, President Roosevelt confused matters further by calling the controversy "a tempest in a teapot," and adding that there would be no objection to Vermont or any other state retaining title to lands in federal flood control projects if the states wanted to pay the total cost of the project, and, if they did so, they could also supervise the projects on their completion. 44 On the following day, Representative Whittington delivered a long, learned address to the House of Representatives, pointing out that the federal government had had the right to condemn without consent since χ 888; that it had exercised this power on a number of occasions, notably in reclamation projects; that whenever the federal government had paid the entire cost of a reservoir, it had taken title to the lands; that formal contracts in the Mississippi Valley had been an exception, and that if Aiken had accepted Woodring's suggestion

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that they proceed without a formal contract, "the controversy respecting States' rights would never have been heard of." When Sam Rayburn asked Whittington if N e w England was not "really a strange place for the doctrine of States' rights to be propounded," Whittington replied: " I may say in answer to that question that the State of Mississippi, honoring Jefierson Davis as it does, stands for States' rights as much as any State in the Union, but I undertake to say further that we do not stand for States' rights in the guise of obstructing necessary public improvements for political purposes." 45 On January 19 the House Appropriations Committee announced that Governor Aiken's stand was such a spur to its "economymindedness" that it was lopping off $2,200,000 from the first deficiency appropriation bill which would have gone to Vermont and other N e w England states for repair of hurricane damage. The committee further provided that federal funds remaining in the bill must be matched by state money, stating that if Aiken was so insistent on protecting states' rights in connection with flood control, he should have the privilege to match federal money used to prevent fires and salvage timber in Vermont woodlands. Aiken replied that the committee had acted like "a spoiled child," and described the deed as "petulant and unworthy of Congressional committeemen." "If they think they can impose their will upon N e w England by bribes and threats and induce us to give up to them our heritage and means of livelihood, they better spend a little time reading N e w England history." 46 11 At this juncture, with relations between Montpelier and Washington at a stalemate and both adversaries snarling at one another, Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts entered the arena to attempt to work out a compromise. On January 14 Senator Austin had announced he would introduce an amendment to repeal the Barkley amendment to the 1938 Flood Control Act and make it mandatory that the consent of the states be obtained. Austin said two of the selectmen of Union Village were living on the same land their ancestors had settled and refused to be removed from these

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lands by anyone without their consent. Austin scored the Barkley amendment as a deliberate attempt to nationalize the hydroelectric sites of the nation in the guise of flood control.47 T w o days later Austin changed his mind and asked Walsh to introduce the amendment instead, holding that a Democratic sponsor would have more political authority.48 Walsh first indicated he would introduce the bill but then decided to take on the difficult job of ironing out a compromise between the two sides. After a conference with Woodring in Washington, Walsh met with Aiken and Governor Murphy of New Hampshire at his home in Clinton on January 23 and gained a general acceptance for a compromise agreement, although Aiken insisted that any agreement must be in writing, because this was required by the laws of Vermont, while Murphy said all he wanted was an agreement, in any form whatsoever. A t a dinner at the Somerset Club in Boston that night, Walsh got the approval of Governor Saltonstall for the agreement. 49 On January 26 Walsh presented Woodring with the fruits of the Clinton conference, but the Administration refused to go along with the new draft. 50 Representative Casey revealed that President Roosevelt was willing to agree to a written agreement stating the Union Village dam would be "primarily" for flood control, but Aiken insisted on a stipulation that the dam would be for flood control purposes only, thus blocking future power development. 51 Since there was no mention of power in the tentative agreement, some Administration leaders also feared the federal government would have to obtain the state's consent to develop power in the future, thus violating the Federal Water Power Act of 1920.52 Judson K i n g denounced the tentative agreement as a move of "all the vast national utility interests centering around Wall Street" to "bedevil the government and confuse the public," 5 3 and Senator Norris warned the President that Woodring was negotiating an agreement that would sign away the power rights of the federal government. 54 On January 27 Walsh and President Roosevelt revamped the compromise, which would take the form of an exchange of letters between Aiken and Woodring and would not mention power, and the Vermont Congressional delegation stated it agreed to all but one word, although it did not reveal

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what that word was. 55 On February 2 Governor Aiken announced there was no reason construction on Union Village could not begin immediately, "now that the Federal Government has conceded its lack of authority to take natural resources without the consent of the State." 56 At this point, with negotiations apparently proceeding harmoniously, the federal government decided it would insist on receiving a grant of exclusive jurisdiction from the states for its flood control program. It was made known that federal attorneys had concluded that if the federal government utilized its power of eminent domain, it could seize lands, but it would not have exclusive jurisdiction and thus might be harassed by the exercise of taxation and police powers by the states. This explained in part why the federal government was willing to accept Walsh's offer of mediation so soon after deciding it would not enter into a written agreement with Vermont. The Administration now decided not merely that it would not exercise its right of eminent domain, but that it would take no action at all on flood control for N e w England under the 1938 Flood Control Act, unless it received the consent of the states to exclusive jurisdiction. The President had taken Aiken's doctrine of the consent of the states and twisted it around to place the burden of proof on the states instead of the federal government. 57 Meanwhile, the Administration had achieved considerable success in driving a wedge between the northern and southern New England states. Roosevelt's statement that the funds could be used elsewhere, and Casey's warning that N e w England might get nothing at all if it continued to be obstreperous had thrown a scare into Connecticut and Massachusetts.58 In reply to Aiken's request for support, Senator Maloney of Connecticut stated on January 19 that while still an advocate of states' rights, he was "not blind to the fact that changing conditions and a changing public desire necessarily bring about a change in governmental policy and practice," and would be "unresponsive to the pressing needs of the people of my state if I joined with you in an uncompromising stand." 59 More important still was the attitude of Massachusetts, for there were no flood control works in Connecticut, and the consent of that state was not required. On January 30 Secretary Woodring told two Mas-

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sachusetts officials that "if Vermont and N e w Hampshire don't want flood control, we will give it to Massachusetts." 60 The Bay State was quick to take the hint, all the more readily since Governor Saltonstall had never had any patience with Governor Aiken's intransigence. Senator Walsh announced that the Administration, "very properly," was unwilling to proceed without the consent of the states and added that he would now undertake to secure the necessary legislation. In Vermont existing law made possible exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, but new legislation would be necessary in Massachusetts and N e w Hampshire. 61 On February ι Governor Saltonstall sent a special message to the Massachusetts legislature asking that blanket consent be given the federal government to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any flood control projects it saw fit to construct in Massachusetts, observing that since the 1938 act did not grant any right to develop power, no substantial question of states' rights was involved. 62 On February 6 Walsh and Saltonstall appeared arm in arm before the Joint Judiciary Committee of the Massachusetts legislature to support the consent bill. Walsh explained that if the federal government entered a state under the 1938 act, it subjected itself, like any individual or corporation, to the law of that state, including taxation and police power. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution provides: [The Congress shall have power] . . . to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings; Since flood control works were included in the phrase, "other needful buildings," 63 the federal government now desired to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over them by consent of the state legislatures. Walsh said the federal government could not develop power at any of these sites without another act of Congress, but he admitted that

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if such an act were passed, the state would have nothing to say about it, if it passed the consent bill, because it would already have surrendered exclusive jurisdiction. On the other hand, Walsh pointed out, the federal government had the right to develop power without the consent of the states anyway, even if it would not have exclusive jurisdiction over such sites. Walsh declared that he had fought the 1938 act, but "as I have studied this thing, . . . I have come to see the Federal point of view much better than I did when I started out." Whereas he started out with the idea of "not going to give an inch," he now believed that the federal government should install penstocks in flood control works, wherever feasible. When Representative Philip Sherman of Somerville, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, pointed out that the United States Supreme Court had decided that property of the United States could not be taxed by the state, even if the property lay outside an area of exclusive jurisdiction, 64 Walsh replied that he did not know that, but, even if this were so, the states would still retain police powers and might be able to harass the federal government. Hence, he strongly urged the committee to report favorably a bill following as closely as possible Saltonstall's message. 65 Instead, the committee decided to draft an entirely new bill, retaining jurisdiction over the taxation of private individuals; holding concurrent jurisdiction over all civil processes and state criminal processes; providing that exclusive jurisdiction would revert to Massachusetts if the federal government ceased to use the projects for flood control purposes; and stipulating that "surplus electrical energy . . . shall not be sold, marketed or otherwise disposed of except in accordance with regulations of the state department of public utilities and subject to such taxes as may be levied by authority of the commonwealth." 66 The committee sent the new bill to Walsh, and on February 10 Walsh met with federal attorneys who took "strong objection" to the bill. 67 The committee then decided to strike all these provisos from the bill, but to limit consent to exclusive jurisdiction to specific projects, instead of giving the blanket consent that Saltonstall requested. On March 9 Walsh wired the committee that Woodring was willing to go along with such a bill, but only if all four of the proposed projects

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were approved, Birch Hill, Knightville, Tully, and Naukeag. 6 8 On March 15 the committee reported favorably a new bill giving legislative consent to exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government at these four sites, holding this to be "a substantial concession on the part of the Federal authorities." 69 The committee noted that the federal government needed no added authority to come into the state and acquire land under the right of eminent domain, and that such land would be exempt from state taxation. The new bill, in granting exclusive jurisdiction, would take away from the state the right to tax private property kept on federal reservations, private individuals living thereon, and private transactions taking place thereon; surrender any civil or criminal jurisdiction over the territory; and prevent the enforcement of any state police legislation thereon. 70 Senator Laurence Curtis filed a concurring opinion, saying he was agreeing to support the bill only with the greatest reluctance and mainly because power potential at the four sites was so small. Curtis contended that Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution was the last remaining protection of the states against the establishment of "a little T . V . A . , " and said that if the legislature had granted the blanket consent Saltonstall requested, the state would have been helpless. Since, without exclusive jurisdiction for the federal government, the state could probably "tax and regulate the sale of hydroelectric power," the pending bill would still enable the state to block any federal power developments outside of these four sites. 71 While the main spotlight had been focused on Vermont, the Administration had found the state of N e w Hampshire equally adamant in refusing to permit the federal government to acquire land without its consent, and by December 1938, the Army Engineers had been forced to give up operations not only at Union Village but also at Surry Mountain. On February 7 .Governor Murphy announced he would hold a meeting of the special commission named to study the problem on the following day, and, regardless of what the commission decided, he would ask the state legislature to grant consent to the federal government. 72 It soon became clear, however, that Murphy meant consent on his own terms. First, he wanted to retain all power rights for the state; when this was turned down,

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he decided to give exclusive jurisdiction one project at a time, but the federal government rejected this plan too. In turn, the state of New Hampshire refused to go along with the federal request for blanket consent, and when the federal government next suggested state consent for six specific sites, New Hampshire balked again, because three of the sites, in particular the Riverhill project in the Merrimack watershed, ran up against strong local opposition.73 On March 22 the Army Engineers abandoned their Bellows Falls headquarters, indicating a hopeless stalemate that would prevent construction of either Union Village or Surry Mountain.74 On March 23 the New Hampshire Flood Control Commission agreed to recommend that the state legislature grant exclusive federal jurisdiction over six projects. Of the original six projects submitted by the Army Engineers, the commission struck out three, two in the Merrimack Valley, and one, Claremont, in the Connecticut Valley. The commission agreed to three projects in the Connecticut Valley, Stocker Pond to replace Claremont, Surry Mountain, and Bethlehem Junction.75 On March 28 Senator Walsh announced that the War Department was "not unalterably opposed" to the new proposal,76 and on April 5 Governor Murphy appeared personally before the legislature in Concord to ask passage of the consent measure for the six sites.77 After considerable opposition in the upper house, the bill passed the New Hampshire legislature late in May, and on May 31 the measure received the governor's signature, making New Hampshire the first state to pass the necessary legislation.78 The Massachusetts bill passed the lower house quickly in March and was expected to move quickly through the Senate behind bipartisan sponsorship, but the private utilities' lobby, working quietly behind the scenes, succeeded in blocking its progress. Representative Sherman stated: "Powerful interests are sabotaging the flood-control proposal by undercover lobbying," 79 and the Christian Science Monitor was at a loss to explain why, with the backing of the Republican Saltonstall and the Democrat Walsh, and in "the absence of any apparent opposition," the measure had been "delayed mysteriously for more than two months." 80 Not until May 22 did the bill pass the Senate, and then only over the strident attempt of Senator Curtis to amend the bill by having jurisdiction revert to the states

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in case the federal government attempted to generate power at the four sites in the future. Curtis, who had previously approved the bill, albeit reluctantly, now contended that the bill would permit the creation of a "little T V A in this state," unless his amendment passed, but the Senate rejected the amendment after a long debate. 81 T h e bill now returned to the House for final concurrence, and even at this juncture "in view of the strong opposition from those speaking in behalf of the private power interests, most of which has been expressed behind the scenes, . . . observers at the State House would make no definite predictions as to final disposition of the measure." 82 The bill had, however, surmounted its greatest obstacle, and on June 14 it received Governor Saltonstall's signature, making it possible for flood control construction to commence in both Massachusetts and N e w Hampshire, insuring a considerable degree of protection for the Merrimack basin and to a lesser degree for the Connecticut Valley. 8 3 Ill By virtue of a law passed in the early days of the N e w Deal, Vermont was the one state, ironically enough, which had a statute on its books permitting exclusive jurisdiction by the federal government for such public works as flood control projects. Senator Walsh had high hopes for a speedy end to the conflict between Vermont and the federal government, once the Administration had indicated its willingness to go along with obtaining the consent of the state. A t the Massachusetts hearings in February, when Walsh stated, "Vermont is going to do it," Representative White observed drily: "If you get Vermont, Senator, you are getting something." 84 The legislator's skepticism was well merited, for Governor Aiken lost no time in demonstrating that the new attitude of the Administration was no more pleasing than the old. In a bitter speech in Pittsburgh on February 1 1 , Aiken excoriated the "totalitarian ambition emanating from Washington," stating: "It is not inconceivable that those who seek to control all persons and all things in this nation would not hesitate to create a national emergency or even a war to perpetuate and strengthen their control." 8 5

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The Vermont legislature, unhappy with its existing law, decided to enact a new statute preventing the federal government from condemning and acquiring land itself, as it had the power to do under the 1938 Flood Control Act, and providing that land must first be acquired by the state public works board in the name of the state and then transferred to the federal government only after the written consent of the governor had been obtained. After the bill passed the Vermont Senate, legal advisers of the War Department let it be known that if the bill were enacted, the federal government would not proceed with flood control work until Vermont repealed the act and passed another law granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government along the lines of the pending Massachusetts and New Hampshire bills.86 On March 31, however, the lower house went ahead and passed the bill, 190—30, and it received the governor's signature four days later.87 Another chapter of the conflict over flood control had come to an end. The state of Vermont and the federal government had once more come full circle, and the stalemate now seemed permanent. Not for five more years was the Administration to attempt to establish a flood control reservoir in Vermont. Otherwise, the diplomatic mission of Senator Walsh could be regarded as a marked success. For the first time, Governor Aiken had been cut off from his neighbors. On June 16 the War Department announced that construction would start immediately on Surry Mountain and Knightville. 88 IV

The one element in the Union Village fight that remained constant, no matter how the particular issues shifted at any given moment, was the determination of Vermont to prevent the seizure of land without its consent, despite the fact that the 1938 Flood Control Act had given this power to the federal government. Before the negotiations with the federal government began, and even when they appeared to be progressing most favorably, Vermont leaders persisted in attacking the totalitarian ambitions of the Administration and insisting that they would repeal the law at the earliest opportunity. The War Department, on the other hand, conducted

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its negotiations as though Vermont were not only contented with the law but were actually going out of its way to assist it in acquiring land. Woodring did not retreat from this position until much too late, when he repudiated an agreement his own officials had drafted, thus allowing Vermont to appear the wholly wronged party. Under any circumstances, the attempt to administer the 1938 law in Vermont would have resulted in considerable strife, but the particular lines on which the issue was fought, and the degree of bitterness that ensued, were largely the product of Aiken's dogmatic intransigence and the War Department's singular obtuseness. The attitude of Vermont shortly before the Union Village negotiations began is indicated by Senator Gibson's statement on September 29,1938: The recent storm and flood make it clear that it is the duty of the New England senators to insist upon the adoption of the compact resolution for flood control in New England. Immediately after Congress reconvenes New England senators will take up this question and will fight to the last extremity and protect the states' rights, taking the issue to the courts if necessary.89 On October 22, after receiving Woodring's genial letter and after the harmonious conference with the Army Engineers, Aiken wrote Kingman that the negotiations "should ascertain whether the Federal administration is motivated by a desire for flood protection of New England states, or under the guise of flood control is seeking to destroy the sovereignty of the States and to centralize all authority in Washington." 90 On January 2, several days before Woodring cancelled the agreement, Senator Gibson announced that he planned to work for the amendment of the 1938 Flood Control Act in the new session of Congress opening the following day. 91 In his second inaugural address in Montpelier on January 5, Aiken asserted: "We have felt obliged to disagree with the desire of certain Federal officials to remodel the lives and direct the ways of our people," and vowed he would resist oppression "from within or without our national borders." 92 It was the normal procedure for the federal government not to exercise its power of eminent domain crudely, without reference to

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state officials, but to consult with the state government and to use its good offices wherever possible. Hence, the W a r Department was correct in requesting the aid of the state highway commissioner in Vermont in relocating highways, and, indeed, in accepting any unconditional offers of aid from the governor. There could be no objection to the state of Vermont serving as an agent of the United States in buying land — indeed this might expedite matters — but it had to be made clear to Aiken from the first that the United States was not going to recognize his right to veto projects, and this the Army never made clear. Aiken made no unconditional offer of help to Woodring, insisting on maintaining what he regarded as his rights throughout, and, insofar as he agreed to cooperate at Union Village, he reserved the right to refuse to cooperate elsewhere in Vermont. Despite this, with the same reluctance to force a showdown he had manifested at the Hartford conference, Woodring gave his personal approval to formal negotiations that had the character of an agreement between two sovereign powers. Even granting that the federal government should have made every effort to demonstrate its good intentions, Tyler's decision to negotiate a formal agreement suggested very strongly that the Army Engineers were permitting Aiken to amend the 1938 Flood Control Act by requiring the consent of the state. The insistence by Vermont that the Union Village dam be constructed "for flood control purposes only" woke Woodring up for a time, but he still was willing to accept the bad advice of the Army Engineers to resume negotiations of a formal contract, even after it was clear that Aiken was attempting to negotiate on his own terms. Yet the real onus of blame must be placed not on Woodring but on the Army Engineers, It is particularly difficult to understand why Bragdon not only gave assurances to Aiken that the lake behind the dam would be maintained at a constant level in the summer months, which might affect the use of the reservoir for power purposes, 93 but also drafted an agreement containing the clause "without prejudice to the rights of the state of Vermont with respect to other proceedings." Whatever this clause might mean, it was presumably deliberately placed there in order to appease Governor Aiken, despite the fact that Bragdon knew full well that Aiken's view of "the rights of the state of Ver-

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mont" might be contrary to the intent of the 1938 act. Together with Wanamaker's instructions that Bragdon get Aiken to agree to this particular site because it did not involve power, despite the fact that other sites in Vermont clearly did, the conduct of the Army Engineers indicates that they were still in the dangerous business of borrowing future trouble for the sake of an immediate advantage. Suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, Woodring changed his mind and repudiated the agreement Bragdon had negotiated, possibly on orders from the President, although this is not clear. On January 19 Secretary Woodring phoned the White House, leaving this message for Mclntyre: I wanted to get this word to M a c before he spoke to Senator Walsh, who will be calling him or the President. Senator Walsh has been wanting to act as an intermediary in this N e w England flood control thing. H e phoned late yesterday and said that he had discussed it with Governor Aiken and some other N e w England people. I think the proposition he is working out is all right but includes the idea that I would sign some kind of an agreement with them. A s a matter of fact, I won't sign an agreement because under the Act I am not permitted to do so. Tell Mac, and ask him to get word to the President not to agree to my signing any agreement. W e will go ahead and work out a solution, but not sign an agreement. 94

This communication suggests that Woodring was personally concerned not to have to sign any agreement, and that he was trying to get the President to agree with him rather than the reverse. A t the same time, it should be noted that the Cummings memorandum made clear he should not negotiate any agreement with strings attached, yet he persisted in doing so, or at least Bragdon did. Whatever the circumstances, for Woodring to switch his stand so suddenly and so irrevocably was the height of political ineptness. Aiken felt that he had negotiated in good faith, and that he had gone a long way in agreeing to the flooding of Union Village. H e was particularly upset by Woodring's accusation that there was a "string" in the agreement, since the agreement had been drafted by the War Department, and Bragdon had even signed it. Roosevelt then proceeded to make matters still worse by his statement that if

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Vermont did not want protection, it did not have to have it. This ignored the fact that the Union Village dam was not being erected to protect Vermont but to protect Massachusetts and Connecticut, while Early's statement that there had been no opposition to the 1938 act when it had been passed was not only foolish but was not designed to placate the irate Vermonters. Vermont's claim that the federal government had no constitutional rights to enter the state and condemn land for flood control purposes was not very substantial. Senator Austin admitted that the federal government had the power to acquire without the consent of the states sites for forts, arsenals, magazines, and dockyards. The Supreme Court in Kohl v. U.S.95 decided that the United States could take property by eminent domain for any necessary and proper purpose. In James v. Dravo Contracting Co.96 the Court held that a state may not tax a private contractor building a federal government dam; that a dam is a "needful building," and that the state may not interfere even when the federal government does not have exclusive jurisdiction. Governor Murphy of New Hampshire declared in the spring of 1939, on advice of "good counsel it is my positive opinion the United States Government, in the exercise of its powers, undoubtedly has the right to acquire without State consent land it requires for flood control." 97 In a speech in Congress on January 18, Representative Whittington stated the case for the rights of the federal government with precision. Congress had authorized the federal government to condemn land without the consent of the states as early as 1888,98 Whittington pointed out, and this power was granted again in the Reclamation Act of 1902." The federal government had used this power and had retained title after paying the entire costs in the T V A dams, Fort Peck, Bonneville, Grand Coulee, and Boulder Dam. In Arizona v. California, Mr. justice Brandeis stated: "The United States has power to construct a dam across a navigable river for the purpose of improving navigation, and need not first obtain approval of its plans by the State in which the dam is to be located even though this be expressly required of it by statute of the State." 100 As for Aiken's stand on Union Village, Whittington concluded: "Consent and condemnation are incompatible." 101

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After determinedly pushing through the 1938 act giving the federal government the right to enter states without their consent, and having such a good legal case to support this statute, why did Roosevelt suddenly decide that he would not use the right of eminent domain, and, in fact, would build no flood control dams at all unless he received a grant of exclusive jurisdiction from the states? Roosevelt could have given little heed to the contention of Senator Curtis that the states might tax valley authority projects modelled on T V A in New England, even if Congress provided otherwise. Nor could he have been overwrought over the question of jurisdiction over civil and criminal processes. Senator Walsh's explanation that the Administration was insisting on a grant of exclusive jurisdiction from the states merely because it was concerned that the states might exercise their police and taxing powers does not seem an adequate explanation. Even when one grants that the constitutionality of T V A had not been conclusively determined, and that the extent of the powers of the federal government over the nation's streams had not yet been established by the New River case,102 the extent to which the states could have interfered with federal power projects was highly questionable. As the Federal Power Commission pointed out in a memorandum to Senator Walsh, the Supreme Court had decided as early as 1885 that buildings on lands taken by the federal government without the consent of the states would be "free from any such interference and jurisdiction of the State as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed;" 1 0 3 that the federal government had authority to undertake flood control projects; and in the Ashwander case that the federal government could, in conjunction with flood control projects, generate and dispose of electrical energy. 104 A more plausible explanation of Roosevelt's conduct is that he was unwilling, for a variety of reasons, to use the power of eminent domain in Vermont to force an issue and that the most politic way out of the controversy was to insist that the states themselves demonstrate they wanted flood control badly enough to grant the federal government exclusive jurisdiction, thus throwing the burden of any delay on the states. Roosevelt, already under heavy fire as a would-be dictator after his attempted reform of the Supreme Court, was polit-

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ically astute enough to shun a fight that would line up the power of the federal government against the two selectmen of Union Village, whose ancestors had lived on the lands that the government wanted to flood. Erwin Canham of the Christian Science Monitor observed: "President Roosevelt has probably been politically wise in 'withdrawing' from the battle, for by fighting he would have made this a real issue." 105 Moreover, Roosevelt was well aware that the 1938 Flood Control Act had been enacted before the November elections and that the new Congress which had just convened contained a great many new Republicans who were determined to repeal the act, and who could count on the support of Western Democrats like O'Mahoney, Burke, and King. There was no point in handing them such an emotionally-charged issue. Throughout the controversy, Governor Aiken contended that power was not an issue, that at no time had he attempted to block power development by the federal government at Union Village, and that the agreement which Woodring repudiated would not have limited the power of the government in this respect. Whatever may be thought of the other Vermont participants in the contest, Aiken could not fairly be accused of being a tool of the private utilities, attempting to use the flood control issue as a weapon to preserve the interests of the power companies. When Rankin asserted that the Union Village squabble was a cloak for the effort of the Power Trust to deprive the people of N e w England of cheap electricity, Aiken replied that he would not "dignify the gentleman from Mississippi by quibbling" about his charges, and noted a recent message to the Vermont legislature in which he stated: I strongly recommend if any more so-called flood control dams are constructed in Vermont, where power development is deemed likely or probable, that the title to such dams be held by the public for the benefit of all our people. N o more entangling alliances with private utility companies should be made. 1 0 6

In a speech in New Haven on May 4, 1939, Aiken declared: During my public life I have seen utility companies benefit from the inflation of values. I have seen them spend your money and mine working for selfish ends. I have seen them unload their tax burden on the

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breaking backs of those who could scarcely stand. But I would not destroy the American form of government in order to get even with them. 107 Aiken made the only controversial speech at the meetings of the N e w England Council that fall championing agricultural cooperatives and warning that New England farmers would join with the federal forces in developing electricity unless they speedily received "adequate service and proper rates." 1 0 8 A few months later, Aiken accused the private utilities of "reskimming" profitable areas and denying service to less profitable areas. 109 There was nothing in Aiken's public life before becoming governor, nor anything in his subsequent career as a supporter of R E A and an advocate of the St. Lawrence project, that would suggest anything but that Aiken was the most powerful foe of the private utilities in high office in the state of Vermont. Despite this, Aiken's contention that power was not an issue in the Union Village dispute does not ring true. If power were not an issue, why did Aiken make a point of saying in his appeal to the state legislature for a defense fund: The War Department is acting under a Congressional act of June, 1938, empowering it to proceed with a flood-control program. Although the act itself says nothing about power, the authorization has been construed here as permitting the auxiliary development of electrical plants at public expense.110 If power were not an issue, why did Aiken desire an agreement providing that the Union Village dam could be used "for flood control purposes only?" If power were not an issue, why had Flanders written the War Department as early as October 22, 1936 asking what were the most lenient rules the War Department would accept for operating Union Village for flood control o n l y ? 1 1 1 While Aiken's opposition to power development might have been motivated solely by a desire to keep the level of the reservoir even for recreational purposes, many of his associates like Austin and Fenton were uncompromising foes of any federal power development, and the intensive activity of the power lobby in Boston that spring indicated the degree to which the private utilities were concerned to frustrate

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the execution of the 1938 act. Nor was it clear that the final agreement, even if drafted by the War Department, would not block federal power development. As Senator Walsh observed: "In the contract the Governor of Vermont put in a clause which tried to reserve to itself what it could not reserve after it had given away exclusive jurisdiction." 1 1 2 If the residents of Union Village did not want any government to exercise the right to take their land without their consent, 113 it would seem that this principle would apply to action from Montpelier as well as from Washington, and Vermont did not deny itself the right of eminent domain. It was not just a moral issue, as Senator Austin claimed, but one of making the wisest political decision, achieving the best balance of interests. There can be no question that whatever the legal rights of the matter, however much the private utilities manipulated the symbol of the Green Mountain Boys to their own advantage, states' rights was not just a shibboleth in Vermont. Vermonters were deeply concerned over preserving title to their lands, distrustful of any government that appeared to use any calculus for determining its political decisions other than the utility of the action for preserving individual liberty, and convinced that the possession of real property was the best guarantor of that liberty. In a sense, Aiken's protest represented a last cry against industrialism, with its consequence of the leviathan state, a plea to return to Jeffersonian principles. A t the same time, it is difficult to see how the desire of the federal government to protect Massachusetts and Connecticut from floodwaters, and to benefit from the construction of the dam by the generation of electric power, represented a serious threat to the liberties of Vermont. N e w Hampshire, whose governor was no less vigilant to preserve its rights than Governor Aiken, finally saw the matter differently, and the Green Mountain State might well have followed the example of its eastern neighbor.

CHAPTER

IX

Power Dam $ and River Boats Early in 1939, at the height of the struggle over Union Village in Vermont, the War Department revived the ancient controversy over the Enfield project in the southern part of the valley. At the very moment when the federal government was being denounced for attempting to " T V A i z e " Vermont by installing penstocks at Union Village, the Army Engineers recommended that the federal government construct the entire Enfield project by lengthening the navigation lock and installing a power plant with five units totalling 29,500 kw. with an ultimate installed capacity of 37,200 kw. The War Department decision was wholly unexpected, because, as late as June 1, 1938, the division engineer had declared: "Greater Federal participation in the total cost of the project by the construction of a lock and dam at Enfield Rapids, either for navigation only or for power and navigation, is not warranted." 1 After consistently opposing any proposal to have the federal government construct the whole project as uneconomical, the Army now suddenly reversed itself and urged the approval of a project that would result in the building of the first federal power dam in New England. 2 ι On March 14, 1939, the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors opened hearings which continued through April and May. The project won the enthusiastic support of the Massachusetts cities, with the Springfield Chamber of Commerce, the city of Chicopee, the Holyoke Chamber of Commerce, and a number of large firms including the Fisk Rubber Company, A. G. Spalding and Brothers, and the American Bosch Corporation favoring the project. Even

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Representative Allen Treadway announced he would support the proposal, including the government power plant, although he hated to see an entering wedge for a T V A on the Connecticut. 3 The War Department estimated that 388,000 tons of petroleum, 160,000 tons of coal, 42,000 tons of wood pulp, 10,000 tons of newsprint, and 7,000 tons of fertilizer would move over the waterway, and it was clear throughout the hearings that the main interest of the Massachusetts cities was in lower transportation costs, not in hydroelectric power. Joseph Lafleur, President of the Chicopee Board of Aldermen, declared that Chicopee was not interested in the power angle but that the navigation channel would lead to an industrial revival in Chicopee, where industries had fled because of the floods. He asserted that the waterway would break the "monopolistic grip" of the railroads, and channel dredging would reduce the flood hazard in the Chicopee area.4 Hugh McLean, representing Mayor Yoerg of Holyoke, told the committee he could recall barges laden with lumber, lime, and sulphur coming up the Connecticut and remembered the days when palatial vacation steamers moved downstream. " I was born and raised on the banks of the Clyde where the mighty Clyde was made so wide and deep that they could launch the Queen Mary on it, and I have hoped to look on the same things in this river," McLean said. 5 By clever questioning, Representative Dondero of Michigan got the people in favor of the project to concede that there was a surplus of power and that power was unimportant. Treadway declared that he understood the private utilities did not oppose the Enfield project, because the amount of power involved was negligible, and Conrad Hemond of the Holyoke Chamber of Commerce agreed that this was true. N o one seemed to realize where Dondero's questioning was leading them. If the power aspects of the Enfield project were insignificant, and if the project admittedly would be uneconomical if navigation benefits alone were considered, then the Enfield project could not be justified. Opponents of the project struck at both the alleged power and alleged naviagtion benefits. General Wadhams, representing Governor Baldwin, told the committee there was an excess of power, and that if the federal government were going to spend any money in the valley, it should spend it on flood control projects, not on

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power dams.6 Professor F. F . McNamara, consulting electrical engineer of the Public Utilities Commission of Connecticut, testified there was a surplus of 200,000 kw. of power, and Dwight Phelps, Vice President of the Colt's Fire Arms Company, declared not only that the river was unimportant as an artery of transportation, but that the electric power rates charged his company were reasonable. The Windsor Locks Canal Company, formerly known as the Northern Connecticut Power Company, asserted it had never redeveloped the Enfield site because the power was unreliable and was only peak power, for which there was no market, and because its parent company, Connecticut Light and Power, owned better sites on the Housatonic. 7 The entire Connecticut Congressional delegation of four Republicans and two Democrats, elected in the "hurricane election" of 1938, opposed the new Enfield project. Representative Miller, who had replaced Kopplemann, declared the Enfield dam would flood lands upriver, which was why the towns of northern Connecticut were opposed. West Springfield, Massachusetts also condemned the project because it feared an additional flood hazard, as well as because it objected to public power projects. Miller pointed out that gasoline in Hartford was one cent dearer than in Springfield; how would Springfield get cheaper gasoline than Hartford by building a waterway, when Hartford was closer to the ocean and was now paying more? The whole economic case of the Army Engineers rested on petroleum transportation savings, and it would be cheaper to build a pipeline than to construct the Enfield project. The N e w York, N e w Haven, and Hartford opposed the project as uneconomical, apart from the cost to the railroad of raising bridges, and it challenged the accuracy of the War Department figures on freight rate savings. Railway labor denounced the plan, because the railroads would be hurt, while the coal interests attacked the proposal as an effort by Standard Oil and Gulf Oil to bring in Venezuelan oil and disrupt the domestic coal industry.8 There were transparent inconsistencies in the opposition to the Enfield project, but supporters of the plan failed to bring them out. If Hartford was so concerned with the welfare of the railroads and the trucking companies, why did it insist on the maintenance

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of the channel below Hartford, which, insofar as it was used for transportation, presumably hurt the railroads and trucking companies ? If the Connecticut River was too temperamental to be trusted as a source of hydroelectric power, why did power interests persist in relying on the Connecticut at Holyoke and other sites to the north? If the Hartford group objected to depriving the railroads of the oil traffic, were they sincere in recommending the construction of a pipeline, which would also cut out the railroads? If the construction of the Enfield project would make possible so great an importation of Venezuelan oil that the domestic coal industry would be disrupted, was the hope of up-river cities that the waterway would result in cheap fuel such a chimera ? T o only one point of the opposition was there an effective rebuttal. Representative Clason of Massachusetts pointed out that the federal government had spent $370,000 on surveys, so that the War Department's statistics were based on an extensive study, and the W P A had interviewed over two thousand merchants and manufacturers in southern Massachusetts to find out whether there was an economic need for the Enfield project. The proponents of the Enfield project failed to establish a case and early in May the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors voted 9-8 to kill the proposal. A week later, however, the Committee agreed to reopen hearings, a personal triumph for Representative Clason.9 This time Treadway said that he had been flooded by communications from opponents of the proposal, but Representative Rankin told him the opposition came from Wall Street and the "Power Trust." Clason declared he was as strong as ever for the project, declaring there would be a great need for power by 1942-43 when the plant would be completed, and the committee was persuaded by Clason to reverse itself and approve the project, 12-4. 1 0 On May 17 Representative Mansfield offered the Enfield proposal as a committee amendment on the floor of the House. Representative Miller led the fight against the amendment, mainly on the grounds that Enfield constituted a flood hazard, and Representative Van Zandt of Pennsylvania opposed the project on behalf of railway labor and the coal miners. Clason, who led the fight for the amendment, and Treadway, who had come around to support the Enfield proposal once more, both

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tried to belittle the importance of the power aspects, stating that the utilities were not opposed, but the men who could see the Enfield project only as symbolic of the fight for public power would not let them. Rankin insisted that the amendment should be adopted because it would establish a power yardstick for the Connecticut Valley, while Dondero warned against "setting up a little T . V . A . proposition on the Connecticut." The Associated Press reported earlier in the day that "opponents of the measure concede there is little chance to defeat the amendment," but the House rejected the Mansfield amendment, 98-36, thereby killing the Enfield proposal for at least two more years.11

II

When Congress considered the Enfield project again in the spring of 1941, prospects for adoption seemed much brighter than they had two years earlier. The 1940 elections in Connecticut had followed the familiar pattern of a Democratic sweep in Presidential years, and the Roosevelt tide carried Kopplemann and other Democrats back into office. Kopplemann led the fight for the Enfield proposal, while Governor Hurley of Connecticut refused to allow any state official to oppose the project in the name of the state of Connecticut. The War Department declared that events in the past two years had proved much of what they said in 1939 to be correct. In particular, Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Bragdon, Corps of Engineers, asserted that Professor McNamara had been incorrect in contending that there was a great surplus of power. Actually, the Connecticut Valley was approaching a serious power shortage, because the spread between net assured capacity and peak load had been reduced from 430,000 kw. to 185,000 kw. from 1938 to 1940, wiping out reserves for expansion and eating into reserves for breakdown past the danger point. The Federal Power Commission estimated that power demand in 1945 would be twice that of 1939 in the Hartford-Springfield area, and declared that the Enfield project alone would not begin to meet the needs. Six hundred thousand people in a thirty-mile radius of the Enfield dam provided a sure market for power, and the Enfield project might yield even greater amounts of power when tied in

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with a series of upstream reservoirs in Vermont and New Hampshire. Thus the Enfield project was seen as part of the same picture as Union Village and the West River Valley. Representative Rankin declared he was unimpressed by the testimony of the Colt Firearms Company that there was no need for abundant, low-cost power, pointing out that Colt and the Hartford Electric Light Company were tied by an interlocking directorate.12 Bragdon also noted that his prediction of increased river tonnage had been borne out since 1939 and observed that the river had been closed by ice a total of only one month during the past four years. There would be no flood hazard in northern Connecticut, because the War Department was planning to install movable floodgates.13 Representatives of the city of Chicopee urged adoption of the project in part because it would make possible boating, swimming, and fishing in the river, when tied together with a pollution abatement program. M. J. Duryea, representing the Springfield Power Squadron and the Springfield Yacht and Canoe Club, declared the recreation business would be an important source of revenue to southern Massachusetts, pointing out that the boating industry was a $100,000 a year business in Hartford alone. 14 Both sides attempted to tailor their arguments to the effort to make the United States the "arsenal of democracy," and the threat of American involvement in a second world war. Supporters of the Enfield project saw the river as an invaluable channel of transportation in wartime. They noted that railroads had proved vulnerable in the European war, while the Kiel Canal was still in commission after repeated bombings. Since the Springfield area was a great railroad center, as well as the site of the Springfield Arsenal and Westover Field, it would be a natural bombing target, and it was important to construct the waterway to provide a safe means of transportation.15 Once again, the critics of the Enfield proposal launched a devastating attack. They hit again and again on the fact that the War Department had issued an unfavorable report as late as June 1938, while that November, they had suddenly reversed themselves and found the Enfield project economically justifiable, mainly because of potential savings in oil shipments and the greater value of power.

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These new estimated savings totalled $138,000, giving total benefits of only $79,600 over costs, or net benefits of .6 of 1 per cent. Thus everything hinged on oil and power. Since oil prices were now identical in Hartford and Springfield, Springfield could scarcely expect any lower rates than Hartford by virtue of the waterway, the critics of the project continued. The War Department estimated 82 per cent of the total benefits of river navigation from petroleum, but the transportation of oil would be cheaper by pipeline than by river tankers. A pipeline from Hartford to Holyoke would cost only one-twentieth as much as the Enfield project, and the oil companies could be expected to build the pipeline themselves. Moreover, any savings in oil transportation costs under the Enfield project would be at the expense of the N e w York, New Haven, and Hartford, already in receivership. If the Enfield waterway would result in a saving in transportation costs, why were Connecticut manufacturers in Windsor Locks and Thompsonville, who would presumably stand to benefit since they were above the dam, unanimously opposed? Finally, the War Department case was based in part on savings in the cost of shipment of products like newsprint by water to Springfield, which were not now being shipped by water to Hartford. 16 Nor, declared the opponents of the proposal, could the Enfield project be justified in terms of power benefits. A steam plant good 365 days a year could be constructed to give 6,000 kw. at one-tenth the cost of the Enfield plant, and one giving 30,000 kw. at half the cost. Yet the War Department admitted that only 6,000 kw. of the Enfield output would be dependable, and that only 95 per cent of the time. The Engineers proposed to operate the dam for peak power, but there was no market for peak power, and such an operation could not conceivably result in lower electric rates, even if there were a market. The Enfield dam would not fit into a rural electrification program, because farmers could not use electricity available only four or five hours a day. 17 The most important new development since 1939 was the defection of the Holyoke Chamber of Commerce, while the Springfield Chamber of Commerce approved the project in a poll by a vote of only 55 per cent-45 per cent. The Holyoke group argued that over

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80 per cent of the total benefits would be in petroleum transportation and that these savings would go to the oil companies. There was no reason to believe they would pass them on to consumers. The project would damage the interests of the Holyoke and Westfield Railroad, in which the city was a major stockholder, and from which the city of Holyoke derived about $22,000 annually. N o r would it be wise for the federal government to subsidize Enfield to enable it to undersell the municipal electric department of the city of Holyoke. Holyoke would not benefit from the project unless it constructed a terminal at a cost of $80,000, which would cost $33,000 a year to maintain. Why should the federal government subsidize river navigation when it had been proved a century ago that it could not survive in fair competition with the railroads? 1 8 Supporters of the project were attacked for arguing that the Enfield development would both aid national defense and provide a backlog for postwar employment; clearly, it could not do both at the same time. Actually, it would hurt national defense by diverting men and money from defense projects and would be unsuitable for postwar employment, because dredging operations require specialized, skilled labor, not general laborers. Fifteen bridges and two dams across the river would make the waterway highly vulnerable in wartime, and during the First World War, there had been no increase in tonnage on the river below Hartford. Kimberley Cheney concluded the national defense argument with a highly ingenious bit of reasoning. The Connecticut State Chamber of Commerce, Cheney explained, was unanimously opposed to the project because it would be inimical to the program of national defense. Why? Because President Roosevelt had pointed out that the country could be no stronger internationally than its domestic structure, and this project would "tend to disrupt rather than consolidate our internal domestic well-being . . . because it [would] be inimical to the railroad." 1 9 Once again, the Enfield project was tied to the struggle over flood control in Vermont. Opponents observed that the building of dikes at Hartford had backed water upstream, and that the Enfield dam would back up still more water. Governor Wills of Vermont wrote the committee: " I trust that your committee will not ask this State

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to make sacrifices for a flood-control program to benefit the citizens of those States and then accede to their wishes in a navigation project that will help to nullify that sacrifice." 2 0 The proponents of the Enfield project were even less able to demonstrate that they had a case than they were in 1939, despite the fact that they actually had a good case with respect to the need for additional sources of power. Much of the blame for this must be placed on the War Department. Bragdon could produce no evidence that industry in the Enfield area was demanding more electric power or feared an imminent power shortage. He shifted ground under questioning on the cost of transmission of electric energy from Enfield. He could not produce figures on how much of the cost of Enfield dam could be charged to power. He did not even attempt to demonstrate how the Enfield development would reduce the cost of electric power in the area. Despite the inadequacy of the case for developing the Enfield site, the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors incorporated the Enfield proposal in an omnibus rivers and harbors bill, including the St. Lawrence project and the Florida ship canal, which was reported out early in 1942. The bill was roundly assailed as a pork barrel measure, peculiarly inappropriate in wartime. The Administration shelved the bill, and thus once more buried the Enfield project. Ill When the Enfield proposal next received Congressional consideration, at a hearing of the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors on October 19, 1943, the political complexion of Congress had changed once more, and the project was doomed to defeat from the outset. In the 1942 elections, William J. Miller had succeeded in ousting Kopplemann again, and Raymond Baldwin was returned to the State House in a typical "off year" Republican sweep. None of this was particularly startling, but the opponents of the Enfield project were able to read considerable political significance into the elections, because Miller had made Enfield the main issue of his campaign. " I had enlarged photographs of the site of the Enfield Dam on the windows of my campaign headquarters," Miller told

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the committee. "My continuous opposition to this project is well known to the residents of the first congressional district." 2 1 The War Department recommended little change in the Enfield proposal, save that the federal government assume the total cost of raising two railway bridges, an item that had been a particular sore point with the railroad interests, and that any power generated at the dam should be sold under conditions approved by the F P C . The Army Engineers noted that the increased river traffic since the last committee hearing further supported the navigation features of the Enfield project, but almost the entire discussion in 1943 hinged on the question not of navigation but of hydroelectric power. Brigadier General John J. Kingman, Senior Member of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, pointed out that power could be delivered to the Army at Bradley Field for 4 mills per kilowatt hour, while the Connecticut Power and Light Company was charging the Army 1 7 % mills. Kingman added that when the Army protested this exorbitant rate to the Connecticut public utilities commission, Professor McNamara had been the rate consultant who had heard the case, and McNamara had told the War Department that the federal government could well afford to pay the charge. Moreover, Kingman observed that McNamara had told the House committee in 1939 that a reserve of 205,000 kw. would be ample for any emergency, while it had actually been found necessary to increase the amount of steam power in the area by over 233,000 kw. in the next four years. A . F . Pimentel, Secretary of the Chicopee planning board, followed up the effective, hard-hitting testimony of Kingman by introducing some very important information of his own. He declared that both the United States Rubber Company and the American Bosch Corporation had stated that the project would result in cutting their costs. Even more important, he asserted that the Enfield project would result in savings in the cost of electric power and that the city of Chicopee would purchase electric power generated at Enfield. 22 Ironically, the proponents of the Enfield project succeeded for the first time in demonstrating they had some kind of case, that there was a shortage of power, that power costs were high, and that there was a market for Enfield power, but by 1943 there was no hope for approval of the project.

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Save for some feeble attempts to explain away the high rates at Bradley Field, the main reply of the opponents of the Enfield project to Kingman's testimony on electric power was the statement of Ferguson of Hartford Electric Light that they would be the main customers for any power produced at Enfield, and they were not interested, because the power would be too expensive, and because they already had enough.23 Congressman Miller, who led the opposition, criticized the proposal as a flood menace, observing that Kopplemann had conceded that the dam would flood 900 acres and that it cost $1800 to raise an acre of tobacco.24 The Hartford Times denounced the project as "chimerical and silly" and one which appealed to "the pride of Massachusetts communities, some of which have only recently abandoned the idea of becoming seaports." 25 Finally, Governor Wills of Vermont once more demonstrated the community of interest between the northern valley states which opposed flood control projects and the state of Connecticut which feared the Enfield proposal by denouncing the project as a threat to the railroads, which would need all the traffic they could get in the postwar period. After listening to the testimony of the opposition, the House committee voted to kill the War Department recommendation on redeveloping Enfield, thereby interring the project for several more years.26 At no time since 1927 did there seem less reason to expect its ultimate adoption.

CHAPTER

Χ

The Battle of the West River

Valley

If Governor Ai\en could be accused of spinning vague theories of dual federalism in the dispute at Union Village, his role in the conflict over the West River Valley was quite something else again. Here he was concerned not with the principle of written agreements, nor with degrees of jurisdiction, but with defending his native soil. He had lived in or near the West River Valley all his life. "I know virtually every foot of it," Aiken told a House committee. "As a small boy I used to climb two or three miles to the top of Putney Mountain and sit there looking out over the valley which could be seen almost from one end to the other." 1 Aiken's love of the West River Valley, and his fear that the federal government would erect a dam at Newfane and flood much of the valley had been the main reason for his early intransigence over flood control when he took office in 1937. Not until the War Department had assured him that sites could be chosen that would do no substantial damage had he agreed to go along with the interstate compact at the Hartford conference in March 1937. Early in 1939, Aiken told reporters once more that Vermont had prevented private utilities from building a dam at Newfane, and it was not going to let the federal government do it either.2 A few days later, on January 17, 1939, selectmen from the West River Valley went over to Bellows Falls to a hearing of the Army Engineers to protest against the construction of any dam at Newfane, arguing instead for small dams on tributaries and for clearing the channels of debris.3 When Congress passed the 1938 Flood Control Act, it authorized the ultimate construction of the Newfane dam, as one of the twenty reservoirs in House Document 455^ Subsequently, the Army En-

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gineers once more revised their comprehensive plan for the Connecticut basin and, in House Document 724, substituted for the Newfane dam a dam at Williamsville on the Marlboro tributary of the West River, the new project to have a drainage area of about 400 square miles, an acre-foot capacity of 150,000, and an estimated total cost of $6,280,000, including $320,000 for power adaptations.5 The Flood Control Act of 1941 authorized the Williamsville project, but also empowered the War Department to make "such further modifications as may be found justifiable." 6 The Army Engineers did not have money to go ahead on the Williamsville project, and, when President Roosevelt ordered all work on flood control projects, save those directly related to the war effort, to cease, the West River controversy seemed to be indefinitely postponed. In June 1943, however, the House Committee on Flood Control decided to hold hearings on new projects which the Army Engineers had recommended since 1941 so that work could get underway as soon as the war ended. At that point, Congress had already authorized $45,584,000 for flood control in the Connecticut basin of the estimated $101,758,000 needed for total flood control in the valley. The War Department now came before the committee to ask an additional authorization of $30,000,000, in particular because the Army Engineers had decided that the Williamsville dam should be a high dam, constructed for power as well as flood control. Major General Thomas M. Robins, Assistant Chief of Engineers, described the Williamsville dam as "the most important one in the whole system. It has more storage in it than any of the others and in any post-war program I think it should go ahead by all means." 7 Colonel George R . Goethals, son of the builder of the Panama Canal and Chief of the Flood Control Branch of the Army Engineers, told the committee that "the additional amount of $30,000,000 proposed in the new bill could be applied for completion of all of the Williamsville Reservoir, which is one of the largest expenditures in the list," and listed the Williamsville dam as the first to be built when construction was resumed.8 Through the summer of 1943, residents of the West River Valley indignantly watched engineers making borings and surveying land, an indignation that knew no bounds

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when it was learned not only that the Army Engineers planned to go ahead with a dam in the West River Valley, not only that it would be a power dam, "a higher dam than is strictly needed for flood control," 9 but that preliminary surveys indicated the most "desirable" location for the dam would be not Williamsville but a site just below the village of West Dummerston on the mainstream of the West River. 10 I In late September, the first protest meeting in the valley was held in Williamsville, and the Brattleboro Reformer sounded a call to action to other towns in southeastern Vermont. 11 On October 8, more than two hundred persons met at West Dummerston under the leadership of the writer, Frederic F . Van de Water. Before the meeting, Van de Water explained: "Everyone up and down the valley is against the dam, and we think we can do a lot to raise a stink against it." 1 2 The gathering elected Thomas Tier and Richard Wilson as delegates to whatever committee of defense would be organized in the valley. Tier stated: "I believe this is a fight not only to save our homes but to help win the war. If the manpower shortage is as great as claimed, how can trained Army engineers be spared to work up a purely civilian project?" Wilson agreed: "This fight is for the same things our boys are fighting for. The dictator nations have no regard for their peoples, and move them about as it suits them." 1 3 Thus began the spirited, angry campaign to prevent the building of a dam in the West River Valley, carefully fostered and directed by Van de Water and Howard Rice, publisher of the Brattleboro Reformer, but a movement which unquestionably reflected the resentment of most of the residents in the valley. It was a campaign which determined to stop at nothing to achieve its ends, often passing all bounds of good taste and good sense in pillorying its opponents, but one which needed no justification in the eyes of the majority of people in the valley, for nothing could be so monstrous as destroying a beautiful valley for a few more kilowatts of power and demolishing ancestral homes without the consent of the poeple. The general tone of the campaign may be judged in part from

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this editorial in the Brattleboro Reformer, peasers" and:

which lashed out at "ap-

a few Caspar Milquetoasts . . . who take the position that there's no use opposing the project because it's going to be built anyway. They are in that state of mind where they metaphorically hold their breath whenever they travel the main highway north of West Dummerston because their imagination tells them that thoroughfare will shortly be many feet under water yet fill their lungs whenever they get near a particularly redolent manure pile in the conviction they might as well get used to the sort of summer atmosphere that will overhang the valley a few years hence. . . . Intestinal fortitude has come to be one of their deficiencies.14 The Reformer chose to forget that five years before it had attacked Aiken for urging dams on tributaries, in particular in order to avoid constructing the Newfane dam. At that point, the Reformer explained : The smaller branches flow through narrow, sharply rising valleys. The basin behind the dams would not accommodate enough water to do any good. That is why the army engineers chose a location where the valley spreads wide behind the dam site and is gentle enough to drop so that the water can back up several miles. . . . The only reason the Newfane site was listed was that it was the only point on the river where a reservoir of effective capacity could be built. 15 On October 15, seventy-five persons gathered in another protest meeting at the historic Round schoolhouse in Brookline. 16 Three days later, in Brattleboro, Van de Water attacked the ambition of the federal government to make Vermont "a combined powerhouse for the rest of N e w England and a swamp." 1 7 At a protest gathering in Newfane on October 22, Van de Water suggested ordering the Army Engineers off the ground they were surveying, stating Judge Edward J. Shea of Brattleboro had told him he would find anyone who refused to leave guilty of trespassing. 18 On October 28, over one hundred persons met in the T o w n Hall in Townshend to protest the dam, and on October 31 delegates from West Dummerston, Townshend, Newfane, Brookline, and Williamsville voted to form Freemen, later known as Freemen, Inc., as an organization of residents of the West River Valley to fight the dam. 19

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During early November, Wardsboro, South Newfane, and Marlboro joined the fight, sending delegates to Freemen,20 and on November 13 at West Dummerston, Governor William H. Wills told Freemen he would lead the fight against the dam. He warned them it would be a long struggle, but promised them he would give them ample notice if it seemed necessary to get out their shotguns.21 Other sections of Vermont rallied to the support of the West River Valley, although the editorials were less remarkable for their support of the embattled West River folk than for their temperate tone. The Randolph Herald expressed its admiration for the traditional "spirit of standing up for one's rights regardless of cost" southeastern Vermont had inherited from fights with Indians and Yorkers, and the Rutland Herald complained that the attitude of the federal government was "not encouraging for Vermonters who still believe that we should have a voice as a state in handling our natural resources."22 The Bennington Banner hoped that some alternative could be found to building the dam, but observed that the dam might be of great value to downstream cities, and Vermont must be a good neighbor.28 The engineers, who continued their surveys in the West River Valley, were harassed by every means short of physical violence. Everywhere they went, they encountered remarks like that by Van de Water: "It seems a shame that these men should be sent here for this work while fathers are being drafted for service on the fighting fronts." 24 The selectmen of Brattleboro refused to grant the engineers a license for explosives so that they could buy dynamite needed for their surveys.25 When Freemen protested against preferred gas rations for the Engineers, the local board explained apologetically that they would like to cancel the rations, but the state ΟΡΑ officials would only overrule them 26 On December 18 the state emergency board voted $10,000 to Governor Wills for a defense fund against the dam, giving a new spur to the efforts of Freemen.27 A few days later Senator Walter Hard, the mountain poet, accepted an honorary membership in the organization, observing that the Green Mountains had obviously "produced too many Republicans and now the intent is to drain the present sources of Republican voters so that later generations

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will be missing when the vote is counted." 28 Freemen continued to echo the bellicose tones of the hot war across the seas, stating "the presence in West Dummerston without State sanction, of a growing host of dam builders is as cynically brutal as an armed invasion." "If it can be made to happen here, similar rapes of Vermont and forty-seven other States will follow." 2 9

II

On February ι the House Committee on Flood Control resumed hearings on H.R. 4485, the 1944 flood control bill, and for the first time a full dress discussion was held on the merits of the West Dummerston dam. In particular, after five months of vitriolic attack, the Corps of Engineers was given its first opportunity to explain why it had decided to build a dam at a site it knew would arouse fervent objections. Originally, the Army Engineers had planned to construct a small flood control dam at Williamsville, but preliminary field investigations revealed that by building a dam a little below West Dummerston, more flood storage could be obtained, and that by increasing the height of the dam only 78 feet, the reservoir would provide an important source of hydroelectric power as well. "The site at West Dummerston is the best site for a multiple-purpose development in the West River Valley and probably in New England." 3 0 The dam would be the most important of a series of twenty dams to provide flood protection in the Connecticut watershed, the War Department explained. The proposed dam would be 300 feet high and would impound 440,000 acre feet of water, backing water up twelve miles in the valley, 119,400 acre-feet for flood control, 320,600 acre-feet for "possible future power draw-down and for dead storage," at an estimated cost of $29,100,000. The dam could be constructed with relatively little damage, the Engineers continued, flooding 5,430 acres of land, but no important manufacturing area. Seventy-six per cent of the land flooded would be woodland, 14 per cent agricultural, 6 per cent pasture, 2 per cent urban, and 2 per cent swamp. The high dam would inundate the village of West Dummerston (pop. 275), the lower portion of Wil-

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liamsville (pop. n o ) , part of the village of Harmonyville (pop. 70), and a few buildings in West Townshend (pop. 130). If a dam 218 feet high were built for flood control alone, it could be constructed for only $6,300,000, but it would do almost the same amount of damage, as far as the villages were concerned, although it would flood only 2,460 acres. Thus, it would be foolish to fail to exploit the power possibilities in the valley, involving the installation of three units of 60,000 kw. each. Moreover, they contended there was considerable support for the project in Vermont, despite the assertions of Freemen, Inc. On February 11 William Loeb, publisher of the Burlington Daily News and St. Albans Daily Messenger, wired the committee: Re West River Dam, respectfully suggest you look for man hidden in woodpile, so-called Vermont opposition to West River Dam. Believe you will find this opposition stirred up and kept going by two groups: First, powerful utility lobby, part of which seems to be Public Utility Director Howard Rice and his newspaper, Brattleboro Reformer; second, summer residents, literary lights, and other synthetic Vermonters. Utility lobby fears possible competition to their own high rate from power from dams. Summer residents and literary men like Vandevanter probably mostly come to Vermont to escape the troubles of today's world and are interested in keeping Vermont undeveloped and a combination of the rich man's hunting preserve, old folks' home, and antique shop. Vermont farmers in southern counties who know that in addition to saving lives and property untold in the Connecticut River Valley by preventing floods, they can have cheap Federal electricity from the dam to develop their farms and increase their incomes, do not oppose it. 31 The Engineers reported that Charles Taft, a relative of the former President, "expressed himself very strongly in favor of the development," which also had the support of Oscar Howe of Brookline and W. T . Richardson of West Dummerston who said "the great mass of the people in that entire valley" favored it.32 Finally, the project would provide not only flood control and power development, but would "beautify the area" by creating a splendid recreational lake for swimming, boating, and fishing, resembling Lake Sunapee, New Hampshire. Instead of destroying

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the scenic appearance of the area, the project would actually add to it, providing new income for the valley from a flourishing recreational development, the Engineers concluded. 33 Ill A delegation of Vermonters, headed by Aiken, now a United States Senator, descended on the committee to refute the arguments of the A r m y Engineers. They made clear that their fundamental objection was not to this particular dam, as monstrous as it was, but to the principle implicit in the 1938 Flood Control Act that land could be taken away from an American citizen without the consent of his state. Alban J. Parker, state attorney-general, stated: "In 1938 we found ourselves legislated right out of the picture entirely," and " w e want to be put back in the position where we, in conjunction with our sister States, can say we want to do this, and if you will come in and give us some help we would like to have it." 3 4 Senator Austin told the committee that federal flood control, even on a navigable stream, was unconstitutional, unless the state gave its consent, and urged Congress to ratify the 1937 compact, although this was no longer even technically possible since the passage of the 1938 act. 35 Representative Plumley denounced the pending bill as "just another of those attacks which, if permitted to grow, are bound, termitelike, to destroy the vitals of and to topple into the dust the temple of our Republic." 3 6 " T h e State of Vermont would never have come into the Union as the fourteenth State if she had understood that centralization was coming to the point where it is today," Judge Parker added. 37 Freemen, Inc. filed a brief with the committee stating there was no need for a power dam on the West River, because Vermont already produced more electricity than it could absorb, exporting from 38 per cent in a dry year to 65 per cent in a year of high water. Moreover, as "intimates of the river," Freemen, Inc. told the committee they knew it to be a "mild and shallow stream" save for a few days each spring. Thus, the power potential of the river had been greatly exaggerated and "the vast dam which the national administration intends to build seems excessively oversize." 3 8

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The idea that a power dam would provide a recreational area Freemen, Inc. viewed "less with indignation than with sour amusement." The dam would not only flood out the present, substantial recreation center of the valley, but would create the type of reservoir Vermont had already seen too much of behind the N e w England Power Company dam at Whitingham: Each summer, mud, slime, rotting stumps, water weeds are exposed in a continually widening, increasingly unsightly rim. Each summer at the height of the recreation season, the water level of the reservoir is at its lowest. F e w venture to wade through a treacherous border of swamp in search of 'recreation.' F e w hardy souls have built pleasure or amusement palaces on the edge of that annually bared quagmire. 3 9

"It is no use to talk to us Vermonters of the beauties of a storage reservoir," Senator Aiken agreed. " W e know that when the water is drawn down they smell. W e know that they are not good for fishing because if they are to be of value for flood-control purposes, the water must be drawn down at the time of the year when the better game fish are spawning." 40 The West Dummerston project would be a serious blow to the Vermont economy, Aiken added. Nearly two hundred out-of-state persons had purchased homes in the valley in the 1930's, and the numbers were increasing when the war came. A t the end of the war, the migration of city people to the country would continue, and of all our valleys, "the West River Valley is perhaps the most beautiful." The dam would not only flood out the homes of vacationists now in the valley, but would create a foul-smelling mudhole that would repel other prospective settlers.41 Most important of all, continued Aiken, was what the dam would mean to the people of the valley, inundating their homes and their farms, destroying the graves of their ancestors, completely disrupting the lives and welfare of people for miles around. If the dam were built, enough farms and homes would be destroyed so that there would no longer be enough pupils left to maintain the small high school in Townshend, which drew its pupils from the surrounding towns. Those who were left would have to go twenty miles to the nearest high school, and, rather than do that, many more families

The Battle of the West River Valley who were not directly flooded out would leave the area in order to educate their children. 42 What reason was there to bring such devastation to this valley? Allegedly to provide flood control for southern N e w England, but did the people of southern New England demand that the West River Valley be flooded? Representative Miller of Connecticut stated: "If I ever see even a Chinaman's chance of repealing certain sections of the 1938 Flood Control Act, I want a hand in repealing those sections." 43 Governor Baldwin of Connecticut wired: "Believe best and quickest results can be accomplished by divorcing flood control from power project and that effective flood control could be accomplished through and by inter-New England State compacts as originally." 44 In a letter to the committee, General Wadhams put the state of Connecticut on record in opposition to the West Dummerston project, first, because multipurpose dams were a mistake in any flood control plan; secondly, because a series of low dams would give just as much protection; thirdly, because Vermont should not have to bear so great a burden for the benefit of Connecticut; and finally, because of vigorous opposition to the 1938 Flood Control Act, particularly in regard to the attempt of the federal government, in the name of flood control, to enter the field of private industry to develop hydroelectric power. 45 Moreover, Freemen, Inc. alleged, the proposed dam at West Dummerston was "a mockery of flood control." Any system of flood control which started off by flooding twelve miles of a beautiful valley was a failure before it even began. The most effective means of achieving flood control in the West River Valley would involve a series of small dams on such tributaries of the West River as the Marlboro branch, the Wardsboro branch, Turkey Mountain Brook and the Winhall River. N o investigation of this proposal had ever been made by the Army Engineers. Since the so-called "low" dam for flood control would be almost as devastating as the "high" multipurpose dam, the War Department should undertake immediately a survey of the smaller "feeder" brooks in the valley as an alternative program, Freemen, Inc. concluded.46

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168 IV

The House Flood Control Committee voted to accede to the request of the Army Engineers for an additional authorization of thirty million dollars in the Connecticut basin but provided "that neither this authorization nor the previous authorizations shall be construed to authorize the construction of a high dam at the Williamsville site." 47 Thomas Tier, President, Freemen, Inc. commented that he was pleased that the House committee had lowered the dam from 300 to 218 feet but added that the organization would be opposed to even an 18 inch dam if "forced upon Vermont by arbitrary federal power." "Until Vermont is taken into consultation by the national authority, . . . Freemen, and all other citizens who value their state's integrity, must combine to answer N o to whatever compromise is offered us." 48 On May 8 the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole to consider H.R. 4485, the 1944 flood control bill, with Whittington leading off the debate with a slashing attack on those who "under the guise of States' rights but in reality voicing the policy of the Power Trust" opposed the construction of reservoirs for flood control, when the reservoirs had power possibilities. Men shed crocodile tears about reservoirs that would destroy beautiful valleys in the magnificent Green Mountains and White Mountains, Whittington said pointedly, but if tears were to be shed, "we might equally be concerned when those same valleys and the same areas are destroyed by projects that develop power where high dams are essential for the development of that power, by utility companies." 49 Representative Clason, representing the river towns of Springfield and Northampton, and Representative Miller of Hartford warmly defended the bill, indicating a sharp division between Vermont and its southern neighbors that had not been apparent in the committee hearings. Clason pointed out that the system of twenty dams would provide adequate flood control for the cities of the valley, and that the dam on the West River was essential, for that stream drained an area 60 per cent greater than any other tributary of the Connecticut. "The objection of the people of Vermont has been fully taken care of" by the proviso against a power dam, Clason added.80

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In a choleric, frequently incoherent speech, Representative Plumley made clear that Vermont's objections had by no means been taken care of, attacking the whole idea of building dams as silly, and then terming the refusal of Congress to pass the compact, which would have authorized the building of dams, "an outrageous, highhanded act, indefensible and un-American." Plumley fumed: We are now undertaking to stop our damnable work by installing dams to catch dirt and silt in order to make deserts, stop floods. How silly. What a joke. It is a most asinine proposition. . . . Why do we go haywire when a little common sense would salt and savor the salad. Does not somebody have it, or do votes for reelection count so much against your self respect? You will have to live with yourself forever. . . . You cannot beat God. God knows you cannot stop floods by dams — you cannot beat Nature or Nature's God, no matter how smart you are. 51 A t this point, the debate over the dam in the West River valley became inextricably intertwined with the debate raging 2000 miles away over reclamation rights. In the interval since 1938, when Senator O'Mahoney had been able to muster only a small number of adherents to fight the Barkley amendment, Western Senators had become increasingly concerned over maintaining a tighter control over river diversion projects, particularly in the fear that water for reclamation projects in the upper Missouri Valley would be diverted for a navigation channel to benefit the lower basin. On May 9 Representative Stearns of N e w Hampshire filed an amendment to H . R . 4485 providing that if the governor of any state filed an objection with the Secretary of War within three months after the passage of the act, all work would cease, and no further action could be taken until after an investigation had been made and Congress authorized the project a second time. T h e amendment further provided that in the future, the Secretary of W a r would have to submit reports to Congress, after cooperation with the states, and west of the 97th meridian with the Secretary of the Interior, setting forth the recommendation of the states and the views of the Secretary of the Interior on the proposed projects. Whittington led the attack on the amendment, accusing Stearns of not even knowing what the amendment contained, saying he had been imposed on by Westerners be-

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set by unfounded fears with respect to reclamation. Under the procedure proposed by Stearns, there would be no flood control or reclamation at all, or, if there were, the projects would be approved only after unconscionable delay. The Stearns amendment was rejected. 52 When Plumley next offered an amendment to stop any dam at the Williamsville site at all, Representative Miller announced that he did not "want to participate in any civil war in N e w England," but the choice of sites had to be left to the Army Engineers. Clason told Plumley that "to leave out this dam would be like the boy in Holland with the dike. Y o u would have a complete, beautiful dike, but you would have a hole in it, and no one would be plugging the hole. The result would be we would suffer huge losses along this river, regardless of how much we had expended on the other 19 dams." McCormack pointed out that Miller, who had called the 1938 hurricane the "Kopplemann Flood," and Clason, who had sponsored the bill giving Congressional approval to the interstate compacts, were now beginning to realize the inadequacy of the compact for achieving flood control on the Connecticut, although he hesitated "to enter into this very pleasant and interesting Republican dispute from N e w England." "Perhaps it is possible that some of the Republican friends from N e w England know when they are licked, but we do not want to be drowned after that," Miller replied. 53 The Plumley amendment was defeated, and on the same day the House passed H . R . 4485, with the provision for a flood control dam in the West River Valley, and with the principles of the 1938 act intact. The Brattleboro Reformer noted that Plumley had summed the matter up nicely; Vermont "took quite a licking." 54

ν On June 1 a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce started hearings on the section of H . R . 4485 relating to the Connecticut basin. Instead of repeating the objections they had made to the House Committee, the Vermonters developed a new line of argument against the bill. Senator Aiken made clear that he was not only opposed to any dam in the West River Valley, but opposed the en-

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tire increased authorization of $30,000,000 to the A r m y Engineers, because their program of ten dams in Vermont out of a total of twenty in the basin would flood portions of almost every valley in the eastern part of the state. 55 The Vermont delegation took exception to almost everything the Army Engineers had told the House committee. The idea that the people of the West River Valley supported the project was fantastic; "Colonel Goethals was unfortunate in the names he cited to that effect." A s for the recreational possibilities of the reservoir, quite apart from the fact that it would be a "stink strip," Vermonters "live where and as they do because they detest the boating-bathingfishing playgrounds that have ruined other countrysides." N o r was there any power to be developed in the West River, for during summer and autumn, one might walk across the river dry-shod from rock to rock, and the small powerhouse above West Dummerston was frequently unable to operate for more than an hour a day in the summer. The West River was not a flood menace, anyway. When the crest of a flood reached Springfield and Hartford, the high water from the West River had already passed these cities. In the 1936 flood, the Deerfield River was far worse than the West River. The dam would require the relocation of 1500 to 2000 people, and would flood sixteen cemeteries, quite apart from destroying small businesses in the valley. 56 Instead of the program of the Army Engineers, Philip Shutler urged Congress to approve the plan of the state of Vermont, which would cost only two or three million dollars more, and would give almost two-thirds as much protection as the West Dummerston dam, although "it would not provide the absolute stoppage of the bottle that a dam at the lower part of the river would." In addition to asking approval of the Vermont plan for dams on the feeder brooks in the West River Valley, Shutler urged the committee to oppose dams like the one at Gaysville which would doubtless be built for power as well as flood control. Vermont was in strong competition for recreational business with N e w Hampshire, and when tourists saw unsightly storage reservoirs drawn down during the summer months when the stream flow was very small, they would flee the state.57

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The Army Engineers replied point by point. One hundred and seventy people would be affected by the dam, not 1500 to 2000; four cemeteries would be flooded, not sixteen. In the 1936 flood, the West River put out 7,000 more second-feet than the Deerfield. The very fact that twenty dams were provided demonstrated that the War Department was concerned with doing as little damage as possible, and the dams "do not make much of a dent in the scenery of Vermont when you get right down to it." In order to achieve adequate flood control, you needed to control 25 per cent of the drainage area, and the dam at West Dummerston would control one-sixth of the controlled drainage area in the Connecticut plan. If the West Dummerston dam had been in operation, the 1936 flood would have been 1.8 feet lower at Hartford and 1.2 feet lower at Springfield. The plan of dams on the feeder brooks was both economically and technically unsound; "the higher up you go on the tributaries, the less drainage area you control, and the rain falls below the dams instead of above them, so it just does not work." 58 Senator Walsh wrote the committee protesting any elimination of the Williamsville dam, and Representative Clason noted that the Army Engineers had stated that even with a complete reservoir system, a big flood would inundate farm lands which were not protected by dikes. In both the 1936 and 1938 floods, the tobacco and onion farmers had lost over one million dollars in both Hatfield and Hadley, Clason continued, and the removal of the Williamsville dam would invite another catastrophe.59 The political weight of these protests, however, was offset by the testimony of General Wadhams, representing Governor Baldwin of Connecticut. Wadhams stated he was opposed to even a low dam at West Dummerston, unless no alternative sites were available, and the Vermont engineers had a plan which should receive serious consideration. Moreover, Wadhams asserted that Connecticut objected "very strenuously to any Federal agency coming into our State and taking our land without any consultation" and urged the committee to study the amendment Baldwin had previously suggested to the rivers and harbors bill, making it mandatory for the Secretary of War to cooperate with the states.60 Senator Overton of Louisiana, Chairman of the sub-committee,

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demonstrated little patience with the Vermonters through most of the hearings. At the outset he had lectured Aiken: Now, there is no flood-control project that contains dams, which are very necessary, that does not . . . affect certain private interests and to some extent certain local public interests, and if we were to condemn any dam because it does injuriously affect the local interests or cause either public or private damage, why we would just simply have to cease flood control legislation insofar as reservoirs are concerned. . . . I think the wishes of the local people ought to be considered, they ought not to be absolutely controlling.61 When Senator Austin appeared in favor of the O'Mahoney-Millikin amendment, a Senate version of the Stearns amendment, Overton replied that if the amendment were reported, there was no point in reporting the bill, because there would be no bill by the time the states and the Department of the Interior got through objecting. 62 Yet Overton could not overlook the political situation that saw Connecticut and Massachusetts undecided or at odds over policy, with Vermont the one state determined to have its way, particularly since the committee could not afford to alienate any more states if the attempt of the Western bloc to amend the bill was to be stopped. Nor could Overton fail to be impressed with the sincere desire of Aiken to prevent the flooding of his valley. On the very first day of the hearings, long before several of the key witnesses had been heard, Overton worked out a tentative agreement with the Vermont delegation, providing, first, that there would be no dam on the West River, and, second, that none of the other dams in Vermont would be equipped for the generation of power. Even this agreement, however, gave no promise of being a final solution, for Shutler stated there would still be local objection to the Gaysville, Tunbridge, and East Brookfield dams, while the Vermont Senators appeared to be split on the power question. Austin strongly supported Shutler's argument against power development, while Aiken insisted: "If power can be developed for the benefit of the local people at any of these dams without causing undue, unnecessary, additional damage, I think it ought to be done." 6 3 It was still too early for Freemen, Inc. to claim a victory, for not only might Aiken kick over the traces

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on the power amendment, but Connecticut and Massachusetts were still to be heard from. Through the summer of 1944, there were ample indications that the bill would encounter opposition from both quarters. On June 13 Anthony Pimentel, chairman of the postwar planning committee of Chicopee, Massachusetts, sent communications to all mayors and planning commissions in the surrounding towns urging them to protest to Congress against the elimination of the West Dummerston dam. Pimentel asserted that Freemen, Inc. had a $75,000 fund and was allied with "Hartford power interests" to fight any development of the Connecticut Valley, an alliance of opponents of flood control dams in Vermont with foes of the Enfield project.64 Thomas Tier, President of Freemen, Inc., replied that the total collections of the organization amounted to only $3,300, and attacked Pimentel for "extravagant mendacity," calling the statement "at best . . . a rash and unsubstantiated slur." 6 5 On June 22 the Senate Commerce Committee voted to eliminate power from the proposed Vermont dams, but, by a vote of 5—5, refused to accept the recommendation of its subcommittee that the West Dummerston dam be stricken from the bill, after Senators Walsh and Weeks and Representative Clason of Massachusetts had urged the committee to retain the dam. 66 Freemen, Inc. lamented that they could not understand the action of Clason and "our other enemies" who appeared to have forgotten the Connecticut River compact in arguing that the West Dummerston dam was essential, and, in a wire to the Republican national convention, Tier stated that in terms of the action of the federal government on flood control, "democratic government becomes only a longer name for Fascism." 67 On June 23 Senator Aiken indicated he was equally displeased with the committee report and served notice that he would fight the provision preventing the generation of power at Vermont dams when the bill reached the Senate floor in the fall. Aiken stated that the idea there was no power left to be developed in the Connecticut watershed was mistaken, that both rural electrical cooperatives and small municipal power plants would benefit from federal power, which would also serve to provide a yardstick to reduce private

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rates in Vermont which were twice as high as in other sections of the country.68 On August 3 officials of communities and industries in the Massachusetts section of the Connecticut Valley met in Chicopee to protest the proposed O'Mahoney-Millikin amendment to the flood control bill, which would enable the states to block any flood control project until Congress had reauthorized it. Clason asserted that Vermont had had six years to produce a better plan and had not done so, and that their talk of an alternative program was just stalling. Of course there was hardship when land was inundated, Pimentel said, but Massachusetts had gone through it without a whimper when the Metropolitan Water Supply project was constructed, and that system has flooded a much larger section than would be flooded by the West Dummerston dam. If Vermont was in a fighting mood, Massachusetts was ready to match blow for blow. 69

VI

On November 21 the Senate began considerations of H.R. 4485, the 1944 Flood Control bill, with a fierce, often personally bitter, debate between foes and advocates of valley authorities, with sponsors of a Missouri Valley Authority like Senator Murray of Montana charging opponents with attempting to preclude the establishment of an M V A by the passage of the flood control bill giving sanction to the Pick-Sloan plan, the proposal to have the Army Engineers and the Reclamation Bureau develop the Missouri Valley. On the following day, as the debate continued, continuous conferences were held to iron out an agreement between proponents of the O'MahoneyMillikin amendment and members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, in particular Senator Overton, spokesman for the downriver interests and the Army Engineers, an agreement that would also solve the vexing dispute on the Connecticut River. For an entire week, the Senate engaged in a strange debate over minor sections of the bill, making veiled references to the conferences going on outside the chamber, but repeatedly passing over the main points at issue. On November 27, O'Mahoney announced that he and Millikin

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accepted the language which had been suggested by Aiken and Governor Wills of Vermont and that they would be ready to present the compromise plan to the Senate as soon as it had the approval of Senator Austin, who was returning to town on the following day. The omnibus compromise unveiled by O'Mahoney the next day provided that the War Department must consult with governors of the states before submitting reports on flood control projects and with the Secretary of the Interior on projects west of the 97th meridian. The proposal would affect only future projects, because the only conflicts over past and present authorizations were in the Connecticut Valley. In addition, nothing in the act or in any previous act could be taken to authorize construction of any dam other than a retention type dam in Dummerston or Newfane. Nor could any proposal previously authorized for dams at Cambridgeport, Ludlow, South Tunbridge, and Gaysville, nor any modification of the comprehensive plan for the Connecticut basin authorized in the 1941 act, be made without consultation with the governor of Vermont and report to Congress. The bill would retain the authorization of $30,000,000 for the Connecticut basin. 70 Aiken leaped to the defense of the new compromise, arguing that it would give the people of Vermont a chance to be heard, but Senator Maloney of Connecticut warned O'Mahoney that the section on the Connecticut basin would jeopardize his whole proposal, for it would destroy existing law and "keep open the flood gates in northern N e w England." "I have long since concluded that we cannot have States' rights to the degree which is desired by the Senator from Wyoming and at the same time have flood control." 7 1 Senator Walsh declared that the Army or Navy could go into any city in the nation and take land without consent for national defense, and that the Senate should realize flood control was "something perhaps even more vital than the preparation for national defense," something which should not be thwarted by a little local opposition. " B y this amendment the clock would be turned backward, and in effect we would have to start all over again," Senator Weeks agreed. 72 Maloney asserted that he was willing to go along with a low dam in the West River Valley, but that the present proposal was too low. When he asked Austin if he would consider raising the dam another

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sixty-three feet, Austin said he would have to consult with his colleagues and see. At the same time, Aiken attacked the provision of the bill providing that no power could be generated at any of the Vermont dams, stating that this would be a boom to the private utilities of Connecticut and Massachusetts. Overton replied that he put in the clause at the request of Austin in an off-the-record conference, that he was indifferent to the power issue and was just trying to be obliging. Austin retorted that the clause came from Shutler and from Albert Goss, Master of the National Grange, although he admitted he had endorsed it. All he wanted, Austin added, was a provision that no power be generated, "except by negotiation with the people of the State, and by their consent." Any attempt to drive a wedge between Aiken and himself on that point would be a failure, Austin concluded, and Aiken agreed that they were in harmony on the question, and that he could not recall Austin's asking for any prohibition of power development. Overton left the debate in a state of bewilderment.73 On the following day, the six senators from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Vermont met to work out a final compromise. On October 7 Vermont had released an alternative proposal for eight dams in the West River Valley, and the southern New England states desired to turn this to advantage. That afternoon, November 29, Austin announced that an agreement had been reached, providing that nothing but a flood control dam could be established in the West River Valley at Dummerston and Newfane, providing further that the Army Engineers be authorized and directed to construct eight reservoirs in the West River Valley instead of this one flood control dam, in accordance with the plan of the Vermont State Water Conservation Board, or a modification of it agreed to by the Board and the Army Engineers, the alternative plan of eight dams to be followed so long as it did not cost more than $11,000,000 and secured at least 75 per cent of the protection provided by the West Dummerston dam. Under the new compromise, the Army Engineers would still be required to consult with the governor of Vermont before constructing dams at four other sites, but the provision that no power could be generated at any of the Vermont dams was stricken out. The Vermont board estimated that the eight dams would cost

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$9,514,240, as against the revised estimate of $8,400,000 for the West Dummerston dam, and would provide 88 per cent as much protection.74 The Senate adopted the final compromise that day, and on December 12 the Senate received the conference report, leaving the compromise intact, save that the Army Engineers was specifically named as the agency which would determine whether the eight dams cost more than eleven million dollars. Aiken astounded everyone by objecting to the report, because Clason had told him it meant that if the eight dams cost more than $11,000,000, the Army Engineers would then go ahead and build the West Dummerston dam. Austin and Overton replied that this was, of course, true, that it was clear from the beginning, and was, indeed, the very basis for the compromise. Despite Aiken's plea that he never understood the amendment to mean what everyone now said it meant, the Senate adopted the conference report later that day. 75 On December 22, H.R. 4485 received the President's signature, along with a message calling the act "a step forward in the development of our national water resources and power policies," but warning that while it was, of course, a good idea to call upon the states for their ideas, this procedure "should not be interpreted by anyone as an abrogation by the Federal Government of any part of its powers over navigable waters." 76

VII

Throughout the controversy over the ratification of the interstate compacts of 1937, the N e w England states stoutly maintained that the compacts provided a splendid solution to the problem of flood control in N e w England. Some advocates even argued that, but for the interference of the Administration, the compacts would have spared the river towns the ravages of the 1938 hurricane floods. The compact device was hailed as a peculiarly fitting instrument of government for a region which had always cherished self-government and had been capable of resolving its difficulties without resort to Washington. If the West River dispute

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did nothing else, it shattered the illusion that the 1937 compact would have provided adequate flood control in the Connecticut Valley, and that the compact device offered a panacea for resolving water resources problems in N e w England. A cardinal point in Vermont's catechism on the compacts was that, at great personal sacrifice, the state had agreed to flooding its valleys in order to provide flood control for its southern neighbors. As the West River controversy developed, however, it became clear that Vermont at no time had had any intention of providing any more flood control than it absolutely had to, and that it was largely indifferent to the fate of the southern N e w England cities. Aiken, in particular, demonstrated an astonishingly callous attitude, telling the House Flood Control Committee "that it would be far better and in the long run cheaper to spend money in removing people from the danger areas, rebuilding their homes on higher ground, than it is to spend this same money in destroying the beautiful country where people would prefer to live." 7 7 A little later, Aiken declared: "I would suggest to this committee, as I suggested to the House committee, instead of spending millions and millions and millions of dollars in destruction of property up in my State, that they spend part of that amount in removing these city slums and antiquated factories from the banks of the Connecticut River down below and putting them up on higher ground." 78 Aiken made this statement after hearing testimony that even with 100 per cent protection, farm lands of Hadley and Hatfield would be flooded, and the removal of good farm land to the surrounding hilltops would require a remarkable feat of engineering. The river was not just a flood menace to the downstream cities; it had important industrial uses in the paper and textile industries, and the movement of these plants from the river banks, particularly in Holyoke, where the whole industrial life of the town revolved around the river and the network of canals, was inconceivable. Aiken knew perfectly well that the relocation of factories and houses in cities like Springfield, Hartford, and Chicopee would have completely disrupted the lives of these industrial centers, and could only have been achieved at a staggering cost, a cost which neither Congress nor any other

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agency would have assumed. That Aiken would offer such a proposal to two different Congressional committees was a measure of the cavalier attitude assumed by Vermont toward the problem. The attitude of the Freemen, even more than that of Aiken, indicated that the Vermonters had almost lost touch with reality in their fight to maintain the right to veto flood control proposals. Tier's statement that the 1938 Flood Control Act made democracy only a longer name for fascism typified the approach of the Freemen to the problem of providing flood control in the Connecticut basin, as did his argument that the West River, the most dangerous tributary of the Connecticut, offered no menace to the down-stream cities. Senator Austin's position that federal flood control projects on navigable streams were unconstitutional was no more enlightened. Representative Clason sponsored the resolution giving Congressional approval to the compacts in 1937, and announced early in 1939 he would offer an amendment to the 1938 act to restore the principles of the 1936 law, but after his subsequent experience with Vermont, Clason decided the 1938 law had been "the only possible solution of the difficulties of the great rivers," 7 9 a position taken by Senators Maloney and Walsh and other former supporters of the compacts. General Wadhams made the remarkable assertion that the 1937 compact provided "a very adequate program for flood control," 8 0 but General Robins commented that the A r m y Engineers had not considered the eight dams in the compact "all that was necessary to completely protect the Connecticut River Basin from floods,"81 and Aiken agreed that the original compact contemplated that other dams would be added to the original eight dams as agreed on by the states.82 The fight over the West Dummerston dam, with Tier calling Clason an "enemy" and Clason charging Vermont was stalling, suggested that the four states would never have agreed on an adequate flood control program. When Senator Overton asked Clason if it was not true that the dams agreed upon under the compact would not have provided an adequate solution to the problem of flood control in the Connecticut valley, Clason replied:

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That is true. They could not have been. They would not have been adequate, and I doubt if they would ever have been satisfactory, either in operation or in carrying out of the compact. I say that, for one reason at least, because there was no unanimity of feeling among the officials of the various States, so that that would likely have been true even if we had ultimately got the compact through.83 Although the Newfane project had been approved by Congress as early as 1936, the state of Vermont failed to work out any alternative plan for curbing the West River in the ensuing eight years. The attitude of Aiken and the contention of the Freemen that the West River was a gentle stream which had had no effect on the inundation of Hartford suggested that none would ever have been forthcoming, save for the fear that the Army Engineers would build a dam at West Dummerston. When Vermont's alternative plan of eight dams was made public on October 6, 1944, Attorney General Parker declared that flood control on the West River was a "bitter pill at best," and that they might at least get a "sugar-coated variety." 84 Without that coercion of the federal government, there is no reason to believe that a plan to check the West River would ever have been achieved. It would be difficult to work out an exact formula to determine how many kilowatts of electricity must be generated to justify the flooding of how many acres of land, how many homes, how many orchards, and many would find it inconceivable that enough kilowatts could be produced to justify the inundation of so beautiful a valley as that of the West River. Unfortunately, the problem of the West River Valley was not simply one of working out this social equation. When the West River went on a rampage, it brought misery and suffering, flooding the homes of poor Italian families in Hartford, throwing men out of work by driving factories from Chicopee, destroying in a single day a long hard season's labor in the tobacco and onion fields of Hadley. The West River had to be curbed, even though it would work a hardship on the people of the West River Valley, because far more hardship would result if it were not. Almost every attempt to answer the demands of modern industrial civilization for water, for electricity, for flood control, has resulted in sacrifice, and, in an

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old country like New England, the destruction of ancient landmarks and the uprooting of families from their ancestral homes. The construction of the Quabbin reservoir for the water supply of metropolitan Boston wiped out the towns of Enfield, Dana, Greenwich, and Prescott, uprooted 2500 people, and required the removal of 7516 bodies from cemeteries. If one is angered at this, one should be angry at the rise of cities and modern industrialism, not at the men who plan and build the reservoirs. Yet the Army Engineers must bear the burden either of having advocated a plan of flood control that would needlessly have flooded one of the loveliest valleys in N e w England, when a perfectly feasible alternative proposal existed, or of having agreed to a final "compromise" plan which failed to provide adequate flood protection for the lower valley. The War Department first asserted that it was impossible to go up the feeder brooks and build dams that would give adequate protection and then agreed to a proposal that did just that. Moreover, if a high flood control dam was required on the West River, then hydroelectric power could have been developed, and the final compromise sacrificed power as well. At the Senate hearings, Albert Goss, Master of the National Grange, declared that the Army Engineers was "very apt to do that thing the quickest and the shortest way, and not to give sufficient consideration to the value of farm land." 8 5 What emerged most clearly from the fight over the West River Valley was the tragic inadequacy of the policy of entrusting decisions affecting the people of the valley to an agency incapable of executing an overall plan for the entire basin. Whether a dam should be built at Newfane or anywhere else in the valley could not be decided without reference to such matters as soil conservation and reforestation, the relative costs of hydro and steam power, rural electrification in southern Vermont, the future prospects of dairy farming, recreation values, and pollution abatement. Such a decision the Army Engineers was not equipped to make.

CHAPTER

XI

The States Take Over, 1945 - I 948 The years following the 1944 Flood Control Act, particularly the period from 1945 through 1948, are significant largely as a test of the efficacy of state control and development of interstate river basins. The states had long argued against federal domination of their water resources, and had maintained they were fully capable of handling problems of power development, flood control, and pollution abatement themselves. When streams crossed state lines, an interstate compact between friendly New England states was the democratic way to solve the problem. Federal officials could scarcely have been more cooperative in giving this experiment a fair try. The Army Engineers repeatedly stated that they would build no dam anywhere in New England, even when they had full authorization from Congress to do so, if any state objected. When a dam was approved, it was only after a long period of hearings in the locality affected and of negotiations with state officials to meet the demands of the state. Valley authority legislation was virtually forgotten, and the federal government made no attempt to establish the first federal power project in New England. The first problem that this new approach of federal-state cooperation had to solve was the old, vexing question of flood control in the West River Valley. After a careful study in the spring of 1945, the War Department found that the state of Vermont's plan, calling for a series of small dams including two on the West River itself, would not provide adequate flood control and would not meet the terms of the 1944 act. In its place, the Army Engineers proposed a series of three dams on the mainstream of the river, including one at Williamsville Station below the confluence of the West and the Marlboro. The West River war bade fair to break out anew, with

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the Brattleboro Reformer observing: "Admittedly a dam at Williamsville Station high enough to control flood flow of the Marlboro Branch as well as the main stream, would be as objectionable to West River valley residents as the non-power dam at West Dummerston would have been, because of the land that would have to be taken." 1 In July the Engineers started surveys at the three proposed West River sites, Williamsville Station, West Townshend, and Ball Mountain, and on August 7 the people of the valley once more gathered at Newfane to hear what the new controversy was about. Federal and state officials explained that the Vermont board had not yet accepted the three-dam plan, but that both groups were attempting to work out a compromise between one dam and eight dams. The Army Engineers had found that an eight-dam system would cost over $16,000,000 instead of the $9,200,000 estimated by Shutler, and this would exceed the $11,000,000 limit set by Congress. One big dam could be built for $7,000,000, three dams, for about $11,000,000. No specific details of the Army plan were ready yet, but Shutler told the meeting that, if no agreement were reached, the Army would probably build a single big dam, although without power, since they were so directed by the 1944 act.2 The Brattleboro Reformer appeared piqued that Vermont state authorities had not seen fit to accord Freemen, Inc. any formal role in the proceedings, and noted that Vermonters were doubly alarmed over the latest development in the West River Valley because of the experience of their New Hampshire neighbors. The Claremont Eagle had just published a report on how the hilltown of Surry felt three years after the construction of the Surry Mountain dam. The reservoir had taken 1400 acres of land, including some of the best pasture. Cattle herds were disappearing, and numbers of people had been forced to leave the little town of two hundred residents. The people of Surry were now convinced that they should have vigorously fought the dam project in 1939, for they had got nothing out of it but "a terrible smell when the wind is blowing in from the right direction," and a tremendous increase in the mosquito population. On the night before the Newfane meeting, two hundred people gathered at Claremont, New Hampshire, to oppose a new flood control project on Sugar River. 3

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While the Army Engineers were faced with the problem of puzzling out an answer to the West River question and getting the consent of the state of N e w Hampshire to five more projects, the states stepped in to give them a hand. A t the suggestion of Governor Tobin of Massachusetts, Governor Baldwin of Connecticut called a meeting of the six N e w England governors for October 23 in Hartford to study the problem of Hood control. Under the leadership of Governor Tobin, five N e w England governors (the governor of Maine was not present) agreed to create a N e w England Interstate Flood Control Commission to help overcome the difficulties which had heretofore prevented the completion of flood control projects recommended by the Army Engineers. Brigadier General J. A . O'Connor, chief of the N e w England division of the Army Engineers, told the governors that the Connecticut River program had been stymied by local opposition. Explaining that his organization was "a bystander in what amounts to family problems," General O'Connor complained there had been too many "no" people at löcal meetings. The governors agreed that the main job of the commission would be educating local groups to the importance of making sacrifices for the general welfare and getting out "yes" elements at local hearings. At the same time, Governor Dale of N e w Hampshire and Governor Proctor of Vermont left no doubt that they would oppose many of the dam sites selected by the A r m y Engineers. Congressman Rankin's proposal to establish a series of regional authorities, a revival of the Norris-Rankin proposal of a decade before, spurred the states to action, Governor Pastore explaining that Rhode Island was interested in flood control, since it would come under the proposed Atlantic Seaboard Authority. 4 Attorney General Alban J. Parker of Vermont hailed the formation of the commission as an important step to head off valley authorities, which would destroy private utilities and relegate the Army Engineers to a secondary place. Parker warned the state of Maine that it should be concerned over the issue, even though it had no interstate flood control problem, because the federal government could claim jurisdiction over the navigable waters of Maine. 5 On November 1, as an earnest of its intent, the state of Vermont reaffirmed its consent to the building of the Union Village dam. 6

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On December 19, 1945, the Army Engineers came up with a new answer to the West River riddle, proposing to eliminate the dam at Williamsville Station, and build only the dams at West Townshend and Ball Mountain, getting the necessary storage by raising the height of the dam slightly at West Townshend. Both of the West River dams would be of the flood detention rather than the reservoir type.7 In a signed editorial in the Brattleboro Reformer, Howard Rice declared that residents should feel "extremely satisfied" with the new proposal, and on January 3 Freemen, Inc. voted unanimously to approve the new plan which would affect fewer than twenty homes.8 If the West River Valley problem appeared near solution, the Army Engineers met with less success elsewhere in Vermont, as the State Water Conservation Board launched a series of local hearings on proposals of the Engineers. On January 31 nearly three hundred people met in Springfield, Vermont to protest a proposed North Springfield dam, because it would submerge fertile farm land and bring financial ruin to the town of Weathersfield. T w o weeks later, over four hundred White River Valley folk gathered in Bethel to protest the Gaysville dam, which would inundate parts of Stockbridge and Rochester. A meeting at Bellows Falls on March 1 brought out local opponents of the Brockway Mills dam on the Williams river, although Shutler pointed out to the crowd that the Army Engineers had full power to build the dam, as well as the Union Village, Victory, Hartland, and North Springfield dams, without asking local consent, and that the meeting was evidence of the cooperative attitude of the War Department. Later that month, residents of Tunbridge, Chelsea, and Royalton came out to protest the proposed South Tunbridge dam, assuring state and federal officials that reforestation could take care of the flood control problem.8 On March 28 the whole question was plunged deeply into politics, when Ernest O. Gibson, Republican gubernatorial-primary foe of Governor Proctor, attacked Proctor for not opposing the Army Engineers more firmly. Gibson said the governor should state flatly that not a single foot of fertile farm land should be flooded and no project constructed unless it benefited Vermont as well as Massachusetts and Connecticut. 10 Since Proctor had yet to agree to a single

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controversial project, the Army Engineers rubbed their eyes at the idea that any Vermont state official had not been sufficiently firm. Proctor replied to Gibson that he had no intention of sacrificing any Vermont interest, and henceforth the Engineers were treated to a political campaign where Gibson's alliterative battle-cry of "I am opposed to flooding one foot of fertile farmland," was met in kind by Proctor's assurance to the people of Vermont of his own intransigence. 11 On April 3 Gibson told a Brattleboro audience that each acre of Vermont land that was flooded reduced Vermont's total milk export, thus bringing in Western farmers and giving them a foothold to cut Vermont farmers out of the market. The Cambridgeport dam would take away a million and a half pounds of milk production, and the Brockway Mills project a million pounds. If the flood control plans drafted by the state of Vermont to preserve their fertile lands from inundation were economically unjustifiable because costs would exceed benefits, they should be adopted anyway, and the states of Connecticut and Massachusetts should make up the difference. 12 Meanwhile, local opposition continued to make itself heard at meetings in Bellows Falls, protesting the Cambridgeport dam, and at Ludlow, opposing the Ludlow dam on the Black River. In June seven White River Valley towns formed "Imperiled Vermont, Inc." to fight the Gaysville dam. 13 The Army Engineers planned to begin construction shortly at Tully dam in Massachusetts and at Union Village in Vermont, and on July 18 Governor Proctor formally approved the two-dam plan for the West River Valley, 14 but otherwise there was little hope for an early completion of flood control works. At a surprise emergency session in April, Governor Dale and the Executive Council of New Hampshire had revoked state consent on the very day that the War Department had planned to let a contract to build the Mountain Brook reservoir at Jafirey in the Merrimack Valley, an omen of the attitude of the Granite State. 15 Even grimmer news for the Army Engineers came from Vermont; Ernest Gibson upset an old tradition that an incumbent Republican Governor could never be beaten in a primary and ousted Proctor from office, in part because Gibson was a spokesman for the liberal wing of the Republican party represented by Aiken, but also

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in large part because the people of Vermont believed that Proctor had truckled to the Army Engineers in working out a flood control program. ι If Governor Gibson was opposed to letting the federal government flood good Vermont land, he was no less opposed to letting the private utilities do it, and no controversy dogged his administration so persistently as that concerning Wilder dam. Since 1882, private power and pulp interests had operated a small thirty foot dam crossing the Connecticut River at the village of Wilder, Vermont running from the town of Lebanon, N e w Hampshire to the town of Hartford, Vermont, a little north of White River Junction. In 1942, the Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corporation, a subsidiary of the N e w England Power Company, later the N e w England Electric System, purchased the existing works and asked the Federal Power Commission for a license. Following an opinion in the fall of 1943, the F P C granted a license on April 22, 1944, with the proviso that the company redevelop the Wilder site to obtain a greater output of hydroelectric power. 16 The action of the Federal Power Commission confirmed rumors and newspaper intimations that had been making the rounds for several months past that the power company was planning to raise the height of the dam, for company agents had been quietly buying up land since 1942. In March 1944, a special session of the Vermont legislature appointed a committee to investigate the effect of raising the level of the Wilder dam, and indignant farmers protested that they were being attacked on one flank at the very time they were attempting to defend the other flank in the West River Valley. Foes of the private utilities made much of the fact that the very newspapers that were protesting vehemently the flooding of Vermont lands by the federal government in the West River Valley could see no evil in the flooding of Vermont lands by private utilities in the Wilder basin. On the other hand, public power advocates were attacked for favoring federal action in the West River Valley but denouncing the Wilder project as a "rape" of the Connecticut Valley by the electric light companies. The debate over the Wilder dam was

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to cut more deeply into the issues of power development and states' rights than had any previous incident. The Rutland Herald could see no contradiction in opposing federal action in the West River Valley, while favoring the Wilder project, and its rationalization met with a favorable response in other Vermont newspapers. The Loeb papers of Burlington and St. Albans think it a much more serious invasion of individual rights for a private power company to propose to inundate farm land at Wilder on the Connecticut than for the federal government to do the same thing in the West river valley. Publisher Loeb presents the broad implication that the outcry of state officials against the West River project and their silence regarding the Wilder dam is some sort of deep dyed utility plot. It was, of course, always unpleasant to have to flood farm land, continued the Herald, but the Wilder case was different from the West River fight, because any flooding done at Wilder would be done under state law. " T h e interests of the people of Vermont at large are duly represented by the Public Service Commission in such cases," while there was no state agency recognized in the West River Valley. Moreover, if the dam level had to be raised, it was because the federal government insisted on it, before it would grant the utility a license. If the farmers felt they had any grievance, they should attack the Federal Power Commission, not the electric power company. 17 On September 28, 1944, the Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corporation filed an application with the F P C to amend its license to provide for the redevelopment of the Wilder site by increasing the output of the plant from 5,000 to 33,000 kw. The following month, the Federal Power Commission and the N e w Hampshire Water Control Commission held a joint hearing at Hanover, N e w Hampshire, and for two days farmers filed into the college town to testify for or against the project. After the Hanover hearings, the F P C decided to take no action until state consent had been secured, and on June 7, 1945, the N e w Hampshire Water Control Commission gave its approval to the Wilder project, finding that it would result in badly needed electric power for N e w Hampshire, as well as a

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great increase in tax revenues for the town of Lebanon, New Hampshire. The Public Service Commission of New Hampshire granted the right to construct the necessary transmission lines in November 1945.18 After stormy public hearings in May and October, 1945, the Vermont Public Service Commission approved the project on November 9, 1945, over the bitter protest of farmers in the Wilder basin. The commission noted that for four months in 1942 and two months in 1944, the plants at Bellows Falls and Wilder had had to import power to meet local demands, and the redevelopment of Wilder would provide an important source of electric energy. Nor was the commission impressed by the argument that this power was being secured only at the cost of flooding far more valuable pasture land. T h e acreages overflowed or otherwise to be damaged in this Wilder basin must represent but a small fraction of those acres of excellent farm lands in Vermont either presently idle and negligibly productive or so farmed as to yield far below their productive capacity. Hardly a town exists in the state but in which a large number of such idle acres are to be found; in some instances there are to be found individual farms with idle tillable meadowlands whose acreages exceed the bottom land acreages in this basin to be overflowed. So long as such conditions exist, not too much weight will be given to the contention that this proposed undertaking would be ruinous to the agriculture of Vermont. 1 9

In a signed editorial, Howard Rice, of the Reformer, who had made the flooding of West River Valley lands a sacred cause, applauded the action of the state commission. Although the multipurpose dam at Newfane had been derided because Vermont had so much electric power it did not know what to do with it all, Rice justified the Wilder project because of the power shortage in Vermont and held that a negligible amount of land would be flooded "despite the sound and fury of the protestants' legal representatives." 20 If the Reformer could see no connection between the fight at Newfane and the proposal to redevelop Wilder, the people of Vermont saw the matter differently, and the decision of the Vermont Public Service Commission was heatedly condemned as a sellout of the interests of Vermont farmers by toadies of the private power

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companies. The commission had acted after the Vermont legislature had passed an act providing that the public service commission must take into consideration how any project would affect the economy of the state, particularly with respect to agriculture and wildlife, before any more land could be flooded. Even more important, the legislature had passed a resolution ordering the governor and the Vermont Congressional delegation to hold the level of the Wilder dam to a level lower than 380 feet, if this highly dubious project was approved at all, and the commission had gone ahead and approved an elevation of 385 feet above sea level, which would back water 46 miles. The Vermont farmers carried their fight to the Vermont Supreme Court, contending that the commission had ignored important evidence and had not allowed sufficient time to make a careful study of how much damage the Wilder project would do to the farmland of the Wilder Basin. While the Vermont court was considering the case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in First Hydro-Cooperative, Petitioner, v. Federal Power Commission 2 1 that states did not have concurrent jurisdiction with the FPC. The Vermont court, following this case, found it had no jurisdiction, because the consent of the Vermont Public Service Commission was not required.22 At this juncture, when the cause of the Vermont farmers seemed hopelessly lost, Ernest O. Gibson made the Wilder project the main issue of his campaign through the spring and summer of 1946, denouncing Governor Mortimer Proctor for capitulating to the private utilities and to the federal government in failing to protect the welfare of the farmers of the state. Gibson's victory in the Republican primaries in August changed the whole political complexion of the Wilder issue 23 At the height of the campaign, when the FPC was about to proceed to grant its approval, the three Vermont farmers who had been chosen to represent the dairymen of the Wilder basin asked a reopening of the hearing, and Governor Proctor belatedly asked to intervene formally on behalf of the agricultural interests. A new hearing was held in Windsor in September at which the Vermont farmers once more voiced their protest against the redevelopment of the Wilder dam, aided by Gibson, whose election in November was assured in Republican Vermont.24

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On October 31, 1946, the Federal Power Commission authorized redevelopment of the Wilder project by raising the dam sixteen feet to a height 385 feet above sea level.25 The Federal Power Commission order appeared to be final, but it only served to arouse Gibson and his farmer allies to greater activity. As the preliminary construction of the dam got underway during 1947, the Bellows Falls HydroElectric Corporation took full-page ads to defend the plan because of the shortage of power, while the Vermont Farm Bureau News replied that the dam would benefit mainly the New England Power Association and that most of the power would go down to Massachusetts. One local property owner told a newspaper correspondent that the federal government was "looking into the muzzle of a gun;" it appeared that the West River Valley war was to be fought all over again.26 So great was the outcry in New Hampshire, outside the town of Lebanon, which would benefit from the project, that Senator Bridges was forced to join Senators Aiken and Tobey in introducing S. J. Res. 155 to rescind the order of the Federal Power Commission approving the Wilder project. On January 29, 1948, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Works held hearings on S.J. Res. 155, with Senator Aiken and Governor Gibson leading the fight for its approval. The Federal Power Commission opposed the Aiken-Bridges-Tobey resolution, pointing out that it had not acted until it had obtained the consent of commissions in both states, and that even after it had done this, it had granted a rehearing. There had been ample opportunity for both sides to be heard; the Vermont Public Service Commission held an extended hearing a year after the Hanover hearings at which over two thousand pages of transcripts and exhibits were presented. Both the farmers and the state of Vermont could have appealed the FPC decision of October 31 to the Circuit Court of Appeals, after requesting a rehearing by the FPC within thirty days after the FPC decision, but they had not done so. Instead of exhausting their legal remedies, they had chosen to ask Congress to establish the precedent of upsetting an FPC order, solely because of the objections of an interested party. Finally, as to the merits of the case, the power benefits would far outweigh the loss to agriculture; indeed, only 629 acres would be flooded in both states, and the amount of additional

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land that might be rendered unproductive would be negligible. As an added consideration, the N e w England Electric System had already spent $2,285,000 in developing Wilder, and had incurred additional commitments of about $2,105,000; it had done so on the assumption of the good faith of the federal government. 27 The sponsors of the resolution answered each point in turn. The F P C relied heavily on the unfair hearings of the Vermont Public Service Commission; the findings of the commission could not be challenged, because the Vermont Supreme Court had denied the farmers a review. A t no time had there been an adequate study of what the effects of flooding would be; the F P C , to be sure, had obtained a consultant from the Department of Agriculture, but he was of no help, because he had no adequate field studies on which to base an opinion. Although new hearings were held in September, presenting a great deal of testimony for the F P C to digest, the commission was able to issue an order on October 31. Why did they act so rapidly ? Was it to forestall any action by Gibson ? The state of Vermont had the right of appeal within thirty days, but Gibson did not take office until January 9, too late to appeal, and the farmers were financially unable to appeal. The F P C figures on the amount of farm land that would be rendered unproductive were far too low, because they ignored the damage from seepage and from the rising of the water table. Moreover, Vermont farms had to be balanced by one-third meadow, onethird woodlot and timber, and one-third pasture. If you destroyed the meadow, the other two-thirds would be worthless. T h e Wilder basin was a very important dairy farming area, and the state of Vermont was almost wholly dependent on its dairy industry. There would be a possible potential loss of ten million pounds of milk per year by the redevelopment of the Wilder dam, "a substantial matter when you consider we are hanging on to the Boston milk market by a small margin," Governor Gibson pointed out. 28 T h e power benefits from the Wilder project had been estimated at $29,230, but the loss of income of milk producers alone would be $700,000 a year. The amount of power that would be developed would be insignificant, one-thousandth part as much as would be developed by a single dam on the St. Lawrence. It would cost one

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cent per kilowatt-hour to generate electricity at Wilder, but steam power was being generated on the coast near Boston and Providence for three-quarters of a cent per kilowatt-hour. It was unwise to flood fertile farm land to obtain hydroelectric power, when steam power was less costly, when power could be developed in the St. Lawrence Valley, and when atomic energy would soon be available as a source of electric power. 29 The sponsors of the Aiken-Bridges-Tobey resolution were particularly nettled by one unfortunate remark of Nelson Lee Smith, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission: "It is, I think, not without significance that of all those directly affected, only three land-owners have complained." 3 0 It was quickly developed that the three farmers were official delegates of a mass meeting of the towns of Thetford, Fairlee, Bradford, and Newbury. The farmers had scraped together the large sum of $7500 to hire counsel to represent them, while, as Senator Aiken declared, "the power companies could spare that before noon and never miss it, because they put it on the end of your light bill." 8 1 Arthur Packard, President of the Vermont State Farm Bureau, told the committee: These farmers that are coming here today, some of them right in your room here today, are kinds of fellows that would have been better off to have sold out and not paid out their life savings here to defend this fertile land. T h e y would have been better off but society would not have been better off. 3 2

Nor was opposition confined to the Wilder basin. The Vermont Farm Bureau voted unanimously to oppose the Wilder project at its state convention, and hundreds of farmers had signed petitions and contributed money, while the N e w Hampshire Farm Bureau was no less adamantly against the raising of the dam. Smith was forced to backtrack: There is no desire on our part to mislead the committee by reference to only three protestants among those directly interested. . . .

It is true

that the only landowners who formally protested to the Commission and participated in the hearing were the three named, but we have no thought, of course, of suggesting that the interest in the matter is so closely limited. 38

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The cross-questioning by the Senate committee brought out the limitations of single-purpose development of a river valley by an agency concerned with only one phase of resources development. When Senator McClellan asked Farley, head of staff studies for the FPC, what instructions he had received, he replied that, other than talking to the three farmers, his only assignment was to "make an investigation as to what would be the most economic height of the dam." McClellan asked: "What do you mean by the most economic, most economic for the power interests?" "Yes, sir," Farley replied. The questioning continued: SENATOR McCLELLAN: Did you, in the performance of your duties that you undertook in carrying out the instructions of the Commission make such an investigation as would enable you to determine whether the economic benefits that would flow from the building of the dam to this height . . . would equal or exceed the damages that would flow and harm that would result to that local economy by reason of the lands being taken? Did you make any determination about that? MR. FARLEY: Let me put it this way: I did develop an economic analysis from the power end of it. That one end of it with which I am familiar. On the other I made no determination. SENATOR McCLELLAN: You made no determination, and then you did not report any to the Commission, did you? MR. FARLEY: No, sir. 34 A few minutes later Senator Cooper of Kentucky asked a similar series of questions of Nelson Lee Smith. SENATOR COOPER: Mr. Smith, in reaching your findings, of course you had to find, I assume, that this construction would add to the power supply for some market area there in New England. Did you take into consideration the requirements of that identical area for food and the effect that the construction of this dam would have upon the supply of food for that area? MR. SMITH: No; I do not think it could fairly be stated we took that into account in any precise way. That would get us into a whole lot of things we do not know very much about. 35

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Whatever the merits of the Gibson-Aiken argument on Wilder dam — and without a careful examination of the relations of the power issue to agriculture and to the whole New England economy, they are difficult to establish — it was clear from the outset that the Senate committee could do nothing to help them. The best Aiken could hope for would be a new hearing by the Federal Power Commission, although Aiken went so far as to ask Congress to order a rehearing before the Department of Agriculture. The F P C was restrained by law, notably by the Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.™ from reopening the case itself, once it had granted a license, and Congress was understandably unwilling to establish the dubious precedent of rescinding the F P C order. In short, the Aiken-Gibson forces were defeated before the Senate hearings had begun. The Senate hearings proved to be the last stand of the opponents of the Wilder project, although the debate continued with unabated intensity. Early in 1949, a New Hampshire legislative committee considered a resolution to instruct Governor Adams and the New Hampshire Congressional delegation to press for a rehearing before the FPC, occasioning two months of strident arguments between utility executives and representatives of farm organizations. William Loeb, publisher of the New Hampshire Morning Union in Manchester, as well as two Vermont papers, asserted that the Vermont Public Service Commission under Proctor had not had "the integrity of a yellow dog," and quoted Irwin Moore, President of the New England Electric System, as stating he was sure of his firm's ability to maintain "political control of New Hampshire in regard to the dam." 37 There was little anyone could do at this juncture, however, and Governor Arthur of Vermont effectively ended the Wilder controversy early in 1950 by refusing to act on Senator Aiken's request for an official appeal against the F P C order, observing: "I find that there has been a great exaggeration of the damage to tillable farm land." The Brattleboro Reformer commented: This fight never amounted to much more than a harassment of the N e w England Electric System, although enough has been said and printed on it to do justice to a cause celebre. Construction of the dam has been going on all the while and it is scheduled to go into operation next fall. 3 8

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The New Hampshire Morning Union, however, continued to view the project as the scheme of a "heartless utility" to ruin a great area of land so that it would only be fit for a "water lily harvest." The opening of the Wilder dam late in 1950 would be "the dedication of an outrage." 39 11 During this period when state responsibility for resource development was being stressed, the states launched a number of surveys of their own, of which the best known were two Massachusetts legislative studies. A 1946 investigation of Connecticut River navigation resulted in a report highly favorable to multipurpose development of the river, particularly with respect to the Enfield project, a conclusion resulting in part from the fact that the chairman of the commission, Senator Ralph Lerche, came from the river town of Northampton, and the consultant, Anthony Pimentel, from the river town of Chicopee. The commission embarked on a survey starting at Essex at the mouth of the river in a little cabin cruiser drawing only three feet of water, but the cruiser ignominiously ran aground on a sandbar a little below Windsor Locks, bringing home to the commission the "present deplorable condition of the river." Since Massachusetts was "struggling for its industrial existence," the commission urged the construction of a waterway from Holyoke to the sea, in the hope that it would start the same kind of commercial boom that had resulted from the improvement of the Fox River in Wisconsin and the redevelopment of the Port of Albany. The commission was equally persuaded of the need for more hydroelectric power, because the strike of the coal miners had resulted in dim-outs in cities supplied by steam power, while cities served by hydro power had not been affected. Although the report also called attention to the need of river regulation for pollution abatement, creating fast-flowing, cold channels to replace the warm, shallow, slow-moving currents in which bacteria incubated, the major theme of the report was the need to adopt the Enfield proposal, and the document was generally viewed as little but a political broadside from western Massachusetts legislators to stir up support for their pet project.40

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The following year the legislature set up another commission to investigate the water resources of the state which approached the problem from a decidedly different point of view. T h e commission noted that in December 1946, the N e w England Interstate Flood Control Commission had asked the governors to appoint three commissioners from each state to negotiate a flood control compact, but although the commission observed that no action had been taken, it made no recommendation for compact negotiations and declared that "no additional legislation" was necessary for flood control. N o r did the commission recommend any action with respect to pollution abatement or navigation. "Relative to the use of flood control reservoirs for compensating the flow in streams to reduce pollution, our Commission has no recommendation to make at this time," the report observed, while any decision on Enfield should be deferred. Most of the report of the commission was devoted to the question of hydroelectric power. Since "it was impracticable for our special Commission to investigate by surveys the subject matter of the adequacy of developed power on the waterways of the Commonwealth with the limited funds available," the commission based its findings on a legislative report issued almost thirty years before. Since the 1918 report had found a limited amount of hydro power in Massachusetts, the commission concluded that there were no important hydro sites left. This was the full extent of its research on the matter. T h e second question considered by the commission was whether power might be more economically generated by government-operated agencies. The extent of the commission's research on the question was summed up in two sentences: It has been reported to our Commission that rates as levied by the Tennessee Valley Authority are found to be as much as 16 per cent higher than the average companies. In this connection there is appended as Appendix II a copy of an article alleged to have been printed in the 'Los Angeles Examiner' under date of June 23, 1947, entitled 'Tennessee Valley Authority — A Horrible Example.' T h e editorial did not discuss the question of rates, but spoke of the T V A as one of the "Federal satrapies" which have resorted to "financial fraud" in the process of "grandiose socializing" with the result

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that American taxpayers have been "swindled." A 1918 legislative report and a Hearst editorial were the only documents cited by the commission in the entire section on hydroelectric power. 41 These two Massachusetts reports were the only significant contributions to the problem of how to develop the resources of the region from any N e w England legislature in this period. Ill The one field in which the N e w England states claimed considerable progress during this period was pollution abatement, highlighted by the N e w England Interstate Pollution Control Compact of 1947. In his account of his tour of the Connecticut Valley, Timothy Dwight wrote of the "purity, salubrity, and sweetness" of the waters of the stream that might "perhaps with as much propriety as any in the world, be named the beautiful river." 4 2 Since Dwight's day, the river had been fouled by industrial and municipal waste, and efforts at restoring the river to some degree of "purity, salubrity, and sweetness" had been blocked, first, by the refusal of state legislatures, acting at the behest of industries and river towns, to give its state boards sufficient powers, and, secondly, by the futility of individual state action when other states allowed the river to be polluted. The Connecticut State Water Commission had an ample grant of power, due in part to the fact that Connecticut was the greatest sufferer because it received the wastes of the three states above it and because the shallowness and small fall of the river in Connecticut lessened the ability of the river to cleanse itself. The Massachusetts Department of Health, however, could not compel the construction of pollution treatment works until 1941 unless it could be shown that there was a menace to health or a public nuisance, and even the 1941 law did not permit the department to interfere with existing industries or sewerage works. 43 Not until 1945 did the Massachusetts legislature give the department control over existing systems and industries, placing it on a par with Connecticut.44 Although the Vermont Senate killed a bill prohibiting additional or larger sewer outlets in Vermont streams, after it had been passed by

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the lower house in 1945, the state did decide to launch an educational program on pollution abatement and two years later passed legislation enabling municipalities to organize sewage disposal districts, while the state of N e w Hampshire started a more ambitious program with the creation of a state water pollution board. 45 Although encouraging progress was being made in the individual states, there was still no interstate agreement to check pollution in the Connecticut Valley, and the ultimate achievement of an interstate compact on pollution abatement must largely be credited not to the states, but to the federal government. The National Resources Planning Board created a Subcommittee on Classification of N e w England Waters which brought together state sanitary engineers and other state and federal officials, and under the stimulus of the N R P B committee, a plan for classifying streams according to present and future use was worked out. 48 These discussions laid the groundwork for the recommendation of the N e w England Conference of State Sanitary Engineers in October 1946 for an interstate pollution compact. 47 The compact drafted by the state sanitary engineers received the approval of the Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island legislatures in 1947, and of N e w York in 1949, while Congress granted its consent to the interstate compact on pollution abatement in 1947. 48 The federal government contributed to the negotiation of the compact not only through the efforts of the N R P B but by the threat that if the states did not act, the federal government would. Attempts to pass a federal pollution abatement act had been repeatedly defeated, save in the field of oil pollution in coastal waters and substances affecting navigation, but by 1946 when the N e w England compact was drafted, it was clear that a federal act would not long be postponed, and the amount of federal authority would very likely be in inverse ratio to the amount of state action. W . J. Scott of Connecticut admitted frankly that "an important reason for the drafting of the N e w England Compact was a desire to forestall complete Federal domination and control of pollution abatement programs." 4 9 T h e Barkley-Taft Pollution Act of 1948 turned out to be a moderate measure, relying largely on federal grants, research, and the power of persuasion to carry out the national program, and was widely

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condemned as a "sell-out" because it provided for no punitive action by the federal government without state consent.50 The N e w England compact provided for a commission of five men from each state, two of whom were to be from the state health department and the water pollution control board (insofar as the states had separate boards), while the remaining three, unless the state decided otherwise, were to represent the state fisheries or conservation agency, industrial interests, and municipal interests. N o act of the commission would bind any state unless a majority from each state was in favor. The commission was given no engineering staff, save for one engineer director, and only limited authority. The commission had no power to issue orders. It was merely to establish standards for stream classification, with each state submitting its classification of its own waters for approval, and pledging to provide for abatement. Although the compact was hailed as conclusive proof that the states were fully capable of handling water resources problems on interstate streams, it actually proved nothing of the sort. T h e compact made it possible for any three men from a single state to tie up the entire commission and further provided that two of the three men should be representatives of the very interests, the municipalities and the industries, which the compact was attempting to curb. If an alliance of these two representatives in a single state could win over any one of three state officials, the commission could be blocked. Moreover, since the commission had no technical staff and no punitive powers, the effectiveness of the compact depended wholly on the interest of the individual states. 31 Connecticut, as might be expected, took vigorous action, ordering Bridgeport, Waterbury, and Norwich to build disposal plants. Richard Martin, the energetic director of the State Water Commission, declared that the commission had come to the conclusion that there was no time like the present in dealing with towns that kept offering excuses, a far cry from the equivocal attitude of the commission two decades before. Voters in the Metropolitan District of Hartford authorized construction of an interceptor sewer and a second treatment plant, while other communities were aided by an act passed by the 1949 legislature enabling cities to provide for the treatment of

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industrial wastes and charge the industries for the cost. By the end of 1949 Connecticut could pride itself on the fact that 92 per cent of all sewage collected would be treated under its program and that the commission had scheduled hearings for some of the remaining offenders. 52 The attitude of the other states, however, may be judged by the testimony of Arthur Weston, chief engineer of the State Department of Public Health, before a Massachusetts Senate Ways and Means Committee in the spring of 1947. Although urging the passage of a bill suggested by Anthony Pimentel of Chicopee to further pollution abatement with particular respect to the Connecticut River and approve an interstate compact, he told the committee: " T h e Connecticut river is no more polluted when it leaves Massachusetts than it is when it comes in," a truly remarkable assertion. State action was necessary, however, Weston warned, because the alternative would be federal control over the waters of the state, a "dangerous condition" on which he would not elaborate except behind closed doors where he would give the committee private information on the subject.53 When in June 1947, the State Board of Health sent out letters to twelve different Massachusetts communities in the valley which had no sewage treatment plants, three of the twelve did not even bother to answer, while all of the rest declared federal financial aid was necessary before they would act. The board assured the cities that it did not expect immediate action.54 That a pollution abatement agreement was achieved at all was perhaps more remarkable than that the agreement was not an exceptionally forceful one, and it presents an interesting study of the nature of the compact device. Although pollution had been a serious problem for decades, no interstate agreement was reached until 1947. What elements were present in 1947 that had not been there before? The most striking new feature was the fact that most of the states had solved or were on their way to solving the problem of stream pollution in their own states, and that the key state of Massachusetts had given punitive powers to its state agency just two years before. The interstate compact was the next logical step; not until the problem was solved within state borders, not until a political victory had been won over industrial and municipal interests within

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the states, was an interstate compact possible. Secondly, the interstate compact would not have been achieved, or would not have been achieved until much later, if it had not been for the federal government, which first guided the states to cooperative action and then goaded the states to final action by the threat of federal intervention. Thirdly, the interstate compact did little more than restate the existing situation; it added no new punitive powers, and retained all responsibility for action in the hands of the individual states. It did so despite the fact that the reason for drafting the compact was the inadequacy of individual state action; the New England states had yet to demonstrate that the compact would result in any more action on the part of the states than would have been undertaken without an interstate agreement, and the attitude of Massachusetts did not offer much ground for hope.

IV

The War Department found that its policy of cooperation with the states, asking approval even for sites that had already been approved by Congress, netted it little, and that the public hearings it staged, however necessary, served only as focal points for local opposition. On August 15,1945, the people of Swanzey, New Hampshire protested the Honey Hill reservoir because of the destruction of farm and timberlands and of hunting and fishing areas. On the following day, at a hearing in Claremont, New Hampshire, the Claremont dam on the Sugar River was attacked because it was too close to the center of the town and thus would prevent expansion of the town in the direction of the reservoir. At Canaan, New Hampshire, strenuous objections were raised to the West Canaan dam on the Mascoma River, largely because it was to be a multipurpose dam with conservation storage for downstream power users.55 It was in this atmosphere of contention that the Army Engineers prepared their Comprehensive Plan of 1947. The War Department had already issued two "interim" reports Be modifying House Document 455, both of which had been authorized by the 1941 Flood Control Act, and the more important of the "interim" reports, House Document 724, had helped precipitate the

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West River Valley controversy in its recommendations for the Williamsville site. However, the A r m y Engineers had yet to issue a final comprehensive plan for the Connecticut Valley which would modify House Document 455 in the light of knowledge gained from the 1938 hurricane and in accord with instructions in the 1944 act to restudy the Ludlow, Gaysville, Cambridgeport, and South Tunbridge sites in cooperation with the state of Vermont. The 1947 plan, a "preliminary" comprehensive plan, provided for twenty-two reservoirs and ten protective works controlling 26.2 per cent of the area above Hartford. Six of the twenty reservoirs in the existing plan were stricken out, and eight new sites were listed. The plan was another striking victory for the opponents of multipurpose reservoirs in the Connecticut Valley. Of the eight sites with adaptations for power in House Document 724, four were killed in the 1947 plan, Ludlow, Williamsville, Victory, and West Canaan, and it was by no means clear that the other four sites would be used for power purposes as well as flood control. 57 " T h e reservoir sites of the revised comprehensive plan are not adaptable to development for both power and flood control because of limited storage possibilities or high cost of additional storage, except possibly Tully, Gaysville, East Burke and Knightville." Investigations at Gaysville had "not progressed beyond the preliminary stage," while the proposal for power storage at East Burke, one of the new sites, was "tentative," and the modification of Knightville was still "under study." 58 Local opposition had succeeded in removing two of the four sites named in the 1944 act, only Gaysville and Cambridgeport remaining, while the West River Valley proposal now called for three small dams once more, the Weston Island site in Londonderry as well as Ball Mountain and Townshend. Three controversial sites in N e w Hampshire were retained, Claremont, Sugar Hill, and Honey Hill, but the one site in N e w Hampshire that had been opposed mainly on the grounds that it was a multipurpose dam, West Canaan on the Mascoma River, was killed. This was probably the most remarkable single feature of the 1947 plan, the removal of the West Canaan site which Barrows had chosen over a decade before as one of the five finest sites for multipurpose power and flood control development in the entire valley. 59

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A f e w weeks after the A r m y Engineers released their new Comprehensive Plan of March 1947, the Vermont State Water Conservation Board issued a report stating that the 1941 flood control plan would destroy about eight hundred thousand dollars in taxable property in Vermont, flood one hundred and thirty farms producing more than six million pounds of milk annually, and affect more than twenty thousand acres of farm land. 60 Thus, northern N e w England might be expected to be in a receptive mood to the new plan, for it was convinced that the existing project was not in its best interest, but the immediate response was decidedly cool, despite the concessions of the Army Engineers. That summer, Governor Gibson told a N e w England Council meeting in Manchester, Vermont, that no more Vermont farm land was going to be flooded, and announced that the state was working on a plan for dams in the high mountain areas, even if they were more expensive and less efficient than those in the Army plan. 61 On April 8, 1948, Gibson instructed the Vermont Flood Control Committee to recommend the construction of Victory dam at a meeting of the interstate flood control commission in Woodstock, 62 but it had long since been recognized that Victory would flood little save cutover woodland, and Gibson showed no indication that he would go along on such projects as the Gaysville dam. Moreover, the Army Engineers had specifically excluded Victory from its 1947 plan, and the approval granted by the state of Vermont for the construction of Victory was conditioned on agreement by the federal government to give the state an option to redevelop the dam for power storage or recreational purposes, as it saw fit. 63 On August 17, 1948, once more in the midst of a successful campaign for the gubernatorial nomination, Gibson told a meeting of electrical cooperatives in West Halifax, Vermont that he had kept his promise that no fertile Vermont land would be flooded. There were no more hydro sites left in Vermont, which was not to be mourned, for steam plants could now produce electricity as cheaply as hydro. With atomic power on the horizon, "where would our vision and foresight be if today we converted more of our valleys and ravines into stagnant unsightly reservoirs and tomorrow we obtained abundant power from a carload of uranium?" 6 4 Nor did

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the new Comprehensive Plan end local opposition. At a hearing sponsored by the Vermont Water Conservation Board on December 9, strong opposition was voiced to the Weston Island flood control dam in the West River Valley, because it would flood six hundred acres in Londonderry and Weston. William Loeb, editor and publisher of two Vermont papers and the powerful New Hampshire Morning Union, who had written off the West River Valley war in 1944 as a campaign of the power lobby, now urged the people to fight the Weston Island proposal, and declared that firm action could halt the Ball Mountain dam in Jamaica Gorge as well.65 ν While the effort to provide flood protection for the Connecticut Valley was being stymied by opposition within the state borders of Vermont and New Hampshire, New England's attempt to demonstrate that it was fully capable of solving the interstate problems of flood control by itself was proving little more successful. The program initiated by the Hartford conference in the fall of 1945 got off to a bad start. By the end of 1946, only a year later, it had collapsed completely, with none of the state legislatures acting on the recommendations of the interstate commission to authorize the drafting of an interstate compact. In November 1947, however, the governors reactivated the Interstate Flood Control Commission. As chairman, the commission chose General Sanford Wadhams of Connecticut, the leading foe of multipurpose dams in New England, an outspoken advocate of retention dams which would not permit power development, river regulation for pollution abatement, or recreational lakes, and one of the few men in southern New England who continued to support the state of Vermont in 1944 even when it became apparent that Vermont would not, of its own volition, agree to a program of adequate flood control for southern New England. 66 One of the major problems in achieving flood control in the Connecticut Valley was that federal statutes made no provision for the reimbursement of local communities for tax losses. Since the government assumed virtually every other cost of flood control projects,

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this was not unreasonable. At the same time, this procedure frequently left towns with the heavy burden of maintaining roads and other services when much, or even most, of its taxable property had been flooded out. This explained the frequently unanimous opposition of localities to projects, for not only did some residents object to having their land flooded, but the remaining residents balked at shouldering the additional tax burden. The New England Interstate Flood Control Commission had realized from the very first that a new interstate compact would be needed to meet this problem, but a satisfactory agreement could not be reached without clearing a number of high hurdles. The New England News Letter, the organ of the New England Council, which normally mentioned no obstacle to flood control but New Deal megalomania and regarded any talk of fundamental state dissension as blasphemous, now talked frankly of "the conflicting interests of up-river states and down-river states with respect to flood control works." "Hartford, Middletown, etc., feel they must have more protection from Connecticut River floods; Vermont communities feel they cannot spare any more valley farm lands for the purpose of flood control dams and reservoirs," the News Letter observed.67 In the spring of 1948 the commission gave promise of a future agreement when its twelve members toured proposed dam sites from the First Connecticut Lake to the West River Valley,68 and that summer, following the announcement of Governor Dale of New Hampshire that he was willing to meet with the other New England governors to discuss flood control plans, the New England Interstate Flood Control Commission made definite plans for autumn meetings to consider the 1947 preliminary comprehensive program of the Army Engineers.69 vi While the states were slowly approaching an interstate agreement toward the end of 1948 after what appeared an interminable delay, the rivers of western New England, fed by hours of torrential rains and days of rapidly melting snows, roared over their banks on New Year's eve in the worst flood in a decade. The industrial city of North

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Adams was isolated by the rain-swollen Hoosac River. All highways out of Pittsfield were flooded. In Great Barrington, where roads were a foot under water, the Housatonic rose two feet higher than during the hurricane floods of 1938. Air-raid sirens sounded in the night to warn residents of the Westfield River Valley to evacuate their homes. Westfield, a busy city of twenty thousand, was cut off from the world. Water pollution was feared in Lee and Stockbridge, and typhoid serum was rushed to the area. Only the miracle of a sudden frost which changed the rain to harmless snow prevented a major disaster. When the river subsided and the dreary work of reconstruction slowly began, the citizens of western N e w England counted four dead and over a thousand homeless. The idyllic Berkshire Festival towns of the Housatonic Valley were covered with silt and rubble. In one street in North Adams, rocks and dirt were piled six feet high. T h e total cost to Berkshire County alone was over two million dollars. 70 Although the Connecticut Valley did not feel the full brunt of the storm, the floods caused over a million dollars worth of damage and only the lack of snow cover in Vermont, an unusual circumstance at this time of year, averted far more serious damage. The storm turned the West River into a raging torrent flooding highways in the valley, and, with the turbulent White River, sending the Connecticut to flood heights at Brattleboro, Turners Falls, and Holyoke. 7 1 If the authorized flood control plan had been completed, two-thirds of the damage in the Connecticut Valley could have been prevented. Almost half of the total damage was caused by the failure to build a single dam, at the Ball Mountain site in the West River Valley. 7 2 The West River Valley controversy, and the subsequent failure of the War Department and the state of Vermont to come to an agreement, had cost the people of the valley half a million dollars, and the river had served a stern warning that further dilatory action might take a far greater toll in the future.

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VI

T h e rivers appeared to be mocking the efforts of man to control them. On the very day they jumped their banks, December 31, 1948, representatives of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, and N e w Hampshire released the draft of an interstate flood control compact for the Connecticut basin, which was signed in Hartford two weeks later. The most important part of the document set up a system for the payment by down-river states of the greater part of the costs incurred by up-river states in the flooding of their lands, because of damages and tax losses. In addition, it provided for payments to states in which reservoirs had already been constructed prior to the negotiation of the compact; for example, the compact provided for the reimbursement of N e w Hampshire for losses suffered in the construction of Surry Mountain, although that dam had been built six years before. T h e Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Commission, composed of twelve members, three from each state, would administer its terms. Reservoir sites specifically approved by the four states were West Townshend, Ball Mountain, North Hartland, Groton Pond, Victory, and Bloomfield in Vermont; South Keene, Walpole, Bethlehem Junction, Franconia, and Swift River in N e w Hampshire; and Barre Falls in Massachusetts. Eight of these twelve sites had not been included in the 1947 plan, and two, Victory and Bethlehem Junction, had previously been rejected by the Army Engineers after appearing in earlier plans. Of the remaining four, two were West Townshend and Ball Mountain, thus specifying only two dams in the West River Valley instead of the three provided for in the 1947 plan. 73 The news of the compact agreement was received with general approval throughout N e w England as an indication of progress in achieving flood control in the Connecticut Valley until Judson King, an octogenarian veteran of a half a century of political wars over water resources, issued a typewritten memorandum from Washington on January 29, 1949, which he circulated among opinion leaders in N e w England. K i n g found that the compact was "25 years behind the times" and reflected the attitude of the utilities industry and big business which were the hidden controlling factors in the abortive

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flood control compacts of 1937. The compact made provision for flood control only and no other conservation purpose, and thus reflected an antiquated approach to resources development. It provided only for cooperation with the War Department, making no mention of the Federal Power Commission. Even more significantly, it left out a series of important multipurpose sites, notably Enfield, Gaysville, and Upper Fifteen-Miles Falls. Most important of all, K i n g pointed out, was the provision in Article I V that the Corps of Engineers could add additional reservoirs to the list, if "approved by the commission and by the signatory state wherein the reservoir is located." Thus, the compact was nothing less than an effort by the N e w England Council crowd to side-step the Federal Power Commission, a move curiously reminiscent of a former attempt in 1937. "The former effort failed. This one will fail; and besides making themselves ridiculous, the gentlemen may discover that even the Army Engineer Corps have learned a lot about multi-purpose projects in the past decade." 74 King's objections were soon echoed elsewhere in N e w England. Representative Rudsten of Dorchester denounced the compacts as a "deceitful" attempt to "stop the development of cheap electric power," and urged Governor Dever to "disapprove" the compacts, because low, single-purpose dams failed to meet the need of N e w England for hydroelectric power. 75 In Northampton, George McCarthy, sponsor of a C V A bill, declared the compact was "a devious duplication of the 1936 flood control sham," and found it "disgraceful indeed to see Mr. Dever exhume this hackneyed old brain child of the power trusts." 76 Leland Olds expressed the viewpoint of the Federal Power Commission: The proposed Connecticut River Valley flood control compact suffers from the same myopia toward multiple-purpose development of the region's river basin resources as does the New England Council Report. It is based on the single-purpose flood control concept presumably leaving power development to single-purpose private undertaking. It thus excludes from consideration all the rich advantages of a comprehensive water regulation program. But it goes one step further in that, if ratified by the States and by Congress, it would give any one of the four States an effective veto not only over a comprehensive Federal river basin pro-

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gram but also over a multiple-purpose flood control power project which one of the other States might desire to have constructed by the Federal government within its own borders. A single State, influenced by reactionary interests, might well cast the deciding vote against the interests of all the people in the full use of their water resources. I feel certain that such a proposal will not be ratified.77 The prediction of Commissioner Olds on the fate of the compacts proved well-founded as far as the 1949 session of the N e w England legislatures was concerned. Action was delayed in northern N e w England, because Governor Dever of Massachusetts and Governor Bowles of Connecticut were rumored to be opposed to the compact. In a message to the Massachusetts legislature on April 24, however, Governor Dever urged approval of the compact, but the legislature took no action. When Bowles likewise decided to approve the compact, Representative Carroll Coburn, chairman of the Vermont House conservation and development committee, introduced the compact for approval by the Vermont legislature, observing sardonically: "If the Connecticut went on a rampage, the water might not only wash down Charter Oak street in Hartford but might also wash Bowles right out of the state house." 78 Connecticut alone ratified the compact that spring, but the other three valley states all gave their approval by the summer of 1951, leaving Congress once more with the problem of deciding whether to give its consent to a flood control compact in the Connecticut Valley. 79

CHAPTER

XII

The New Campaign for Federal Power After the abortive attempt to establish seven regional authorities in 1937, no concerted effort was made to extend Federal power to N e w England, save for the Enfield episode, for more than a decade. President Roosevelt occasionally resurrected the proposal for seven regional planning agencies, and Representative Rankin periodically reintroduced his bill for regional authorities, but nothing ever came of either one. When men like David Lilienthal proposed the extension of the T V A idea to other sections of the country, they always referred to the Missouri and Columbia valleys, never to N e w England. In a speech dedicating the Kentucky D a m of the T V A in the fall of 1945, President T r u m a n made clear that, as far as he was concerned, T V A provided no hard and fast method of procedure, and that other regions of the country should be perfectly free to choose such instruments as interstate compacts instead. 1 If the hope for a valley authority in the Missouri basin was dim, particularly in view of President Truman's friendship with General Pick of the A r m y Engineers, it was wholly out of the question in N e w England, despite occasional outcries in the Hearst press or speeches by Representative Thomas L a n e of Massachusetts in favor of a Merrimack Valley Authority. There was not only no valley authority in N e w England, but no federal power project of any kind, and no likelihood that there ever would be. A t the beginning of 1948, it would have been political suicide in most parts of N e w England to support a federal power project, let alone a valley authority for the region. In all of N e w England it was a dead issue. Sections of this chapter have previously appeared in William E. Leuchtenburg, "Power War in New England," The Survey, L X X X V (September, 1949), 461-464. NOTE:

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ι The new campaign to establish a federal power authority in New England began quietly enough with the announcement of the Holyoke Municipal Gas and Electric Department on November 18, 1947 that it had filed a request with the Federal Power Commission for a three-year preliminary permit to prepare a plan to develop the waters of the Connecticut from Enfield to Holyoke. 2 Since 1902 the Holyoke Municipal Gas and Electric Department had waged a running war with the Holyoke Water Power Company over the territory each would serve, the department operating a steam plant and distributing gas and electricity to the homes of Holyoke, as well as taking care of the municipality's power needs, while the company supplied electricity to Chicopee and South Hadley, as well as to a number of industries in Holyoke, and operated the dam and generating plant on the Connecticut River. The new move of the municipal gas and electric department seemed little more than another round in the war between the two organizations, although everyone was struck by its breath-taking quality, for the department proposed nothing less than the acquisition of the property of the Holyoke Water Power Company, the development of the power site at Enfield, Connecticut, and the redevelopment of the Holyoke site to triple the existing capacity, and ultimately to increase the capacity six times. The application of the department caught the company in a particularly vulnerable position, for it had not filed a request for a license to operate the dam at Holyoke until March 1944, when it was convinced by the conformity of other New England companies with the Supreme Court decision in the N e w River case 3 that the F P C had jurisdiction over the entire Connecticut basin. The F P C had not acted on the application, and at that juncture, no one had a recognized right to develop the power of the river at Holyoke. Holyoke had been founded by a group of Boston industrialists who had laid out the city in the belief that it would be an excellent location for a mill town, and who had carefully planned the industrial development of the city so that the Connecticut could be used to provide power for the mills and at the same time water for industrial processing through an intricate network of canals.4 The deter-

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mination of the department to increase the generating capacity of the Holyoke site by concentrating the head at one point, instead of diffusing it through three sets of canals, aroused the intense opposition of the mill owners, who contended that the full force of the water was needed for cleansing their products and that the amount of water the department proposed to allow the mills for processing was wholly inadequate.® Mayor Toepfert of Holyoke declared that he had been duped by Francis King, manager of the municipal department, into approving the application and would "oppose it to the bitter end." 8 Edward Hallisey, secretary of the three man Gas and Electric Commission, revealed dissension within the commission itself when he denounced the project as "grandiose" and financially unsound, and asserted that he was opposed to "confiscation." 7 When the project was announced, the Holyoke Daily Transcript stated it was a fine thing that Holyoke had such an alert group of young men in the department, as well as in the company, and commented benignly: "We in the grandstand will be rooting for both teams as they carry the ball." By December 2, however, the Transcript was worried about giving politicians so much money to play with, and two weeks later declared: "The forces that would confiscate the canal system are strictly totalitarian." 8 Up to this point, Holyoke had been witnessing a typical skirmish between city public and private power forces within the city, a struggle little different from that which had taken place at the turn of the century when the municipal department had been established under the stimulus of the writing of Edward Bellamy, a son of neighboring Chicopee. The debate revolved around the question of public power only in that it involved an extension of the activities of a venerable municipal department; in no sense did it involve the question of federal power or a T V A for New England. On January 19, 1948, the entire picture changed, and newspaper readers in Holyoke stared at banner headlines in the Transcript, reading: " G & Ε P L A N IS E N T E R I N G W E D G E FOR V A S T P U B L I C L Y - O W N E D POWER S Y S T E M I N N.E." In a signed article, William Dwight, managing editor, wrote that he had just finished a three-day tour of Washington, where he learned that the Holyoke Gas and Electric Department petition was "the entering

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wedge for big time public power operation in N e w England. High officials in the Federal Power Commission here openly talk about it as their opportunity to crack what they consider to be a private power monopoly in New England." Among the many "undisclosed facts" Dwight stated he had uncovered were that the plan suddenly unveiled in November had been in the works for some time and had strong backing within the F P C ; that the redevelopment of the Holyoke site would flood the Northampton meadows by raising the height of the dam; that, since the Holyoke Water Power Company did not have an F P C license, it could be declared a trespasser on the river, and have its properties sold for "junk"; and that, according to private power sources, Francis King fancied he would someday be the "Lilienthal of New England." 9 Henceforth, the Holyoke controversy ceased to be judged on its merits but as a symbol of the attempt of the federal government to extend its control over the resources of N e w England. On August 6 the contest became more sharply joined when the Holyoke Water Power Company announced it had withdrawn its original application to the F P C for a license and had filed a new permit calling for a redevelopment of the site at Holyoke. The company proposal was less ambitious than that of the municipal department in that it proposed to maintain the canal system and would not include the Enfield development. 10 Otherwise, it closely resembled the municipal plan and went farther in that it proposed to begin work immediately instead of making a three-year study. (In the fall of 1948, the municipal department filed a new application for a license, likewise providing for immediate construction rather than a study.) K i n g called the company plan "a God damned steal," but the Transcript beamed: "Holyoke Water Power Company Recaptures Its Ancient Visions." 1 1 When the Federal Power Commission opened hearings on the two petitions in Holyoke on February 15, 1949, public interest was so intense that the hearings had to be moved to a large city auditorium in order to hold the throng. Reporters from Boston newspapers and press associations arrived in Holyoke to cover the hearings, and people all over N e w England read accounts of the proceedings, day by day. The hearings immediately surrendered all pretext of involving nothing more than a dispute between two Holyoke

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organizations, as Professor Philip Coombs of Amherst, representing Americans for Democratic Action, former Mayor Roger Putnam of Springfield, and western Massachusetts labor leaders urged the F P C to approve the municipal petition as the first step in a broad program of multipurpose development of the Connecticut River Valley, while the attorney for the Holyoke Water Power Company argued that the hearings had a far greater importance than might be apparent, for the success of the Municipal Gas and Electric Department would "have tremendous consequences for all hydroelectric power companies in the nation." On one point, both sides were agreed; irrespective of what the F P C ultimately decided on the license, the real significance of the Holyoke hearings was that they served as a forum on the question of public power, and more particularly on federal power development for all of N e w England. 1 2

II

The real impetus behind the new drive to establish a T V A in N e w England came not from the Holyoke development nor the plans of the Federal Power Commission but from a growing concern over the industrial decline of the N e w England states. F e w themes in American history are so old as that of the decline of N e w England, and the region had long since learned to accept its prophets of doom as part of the landscape. Economists had been pointing out for years that factories were antiquated, labor costs disproportionately high, and plants too far removed from raw materials, but no one could pay much heed to predictions of economic collapse when N e w England factories were busy twenty-four hours a day turning out textiles and machinery during the war. The end of the war revealed the economic vulnerability of N e w England. The entire country felt the impact of the sudden withdrawal of government orders, and, when the postwar boom of consumer purchasing started to run out, there were economic dislocations throughout the nation, but no area suffered so greatly as N e w England. During 1948, shoe production declined 20.5 per cent in N e w England, and cotton spinning was off 21.8 per cent, both twice the rate of national decline. By mid-January 1949, unemployment

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was up 40 per cent over 1947 in Vermont, and in March only one of the eight big cotton mills in N e w Bedford was working a full five-day week. 1 3 Unemployment insurance claims reached an elevenyear peak in Connecticut in April, and in July Governor Dever soberly reported that 258,000 workers were jobless in Massachusetts, and that one out of every five workers in the state might be unemployed by the end of September. 14 Communists moved into N e w Bedford and Lawrence to organize the unemployed and attack the "cold war" policy of the trusts, while jobless parades reminiscent of the Great Depression were threatened in Connecticut. 15 Of the 25,000 peak wartime labor force in the great wool town of Lawrence, 22,000 were drawing unemployment insurance benefits in the spring of 1949. " T h e situation," declared Representative Lane of Massachusetts, "has all the elements of a full-scale depression." 1 6 N o single incident dramatized the economic plight of N e w England so vividly as a stunning announcement from Nashua, N e w Hampshire, on the morning of September 13, 1948: " T h e board of directors of Textron, Incorporated, voted to run out all work in progress prior to December 31, 1948, and to dispose of all physical properties in Nashua, N e w Hampshire." 1 7 Textron, and its president, Royal Little, had become great favorites in N e w England. At a time when other textile mills were fleeing the area in quest of lower production costs in the South, Little had demonstrated his faith in N e w England by buying textile plants in the region and operating them at a tidy profit, proving there was nothing to the talk of unfavorable competitive disadvantages with the South. Without warning, Little had now decided to scrap his Nashua plant, which employed one out of every five workers in the city, a terrible blow to the entire community. The Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, demanded a Congressional investigation, and Senator Tobey responded immediately, going up to Nashua to conduct hearings. Day after day, the story of Textron's operations pushed all other news out of the headlines, and worried N e w Englanders read little else but Little's repeated warnings that no one in the textile industry could afford to remain in N e w England any longer, because of Southern competition. The hearings revealed Little to be a callous financial manipulator,

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but no matter how much one wanted to believe that the Nashua story involved nothing more than the milking o£ a profitable enterprise by an "economic pirate," 1 8 there was no question that Little's testimony struck home. Little told the committee that his power bill per kilowatt-hour in Charlotte, North Carolina was 6 mills, in Nashua 12.4 mills, in Manville, Rhode Island 17 mills. If the cotton-textile industry of the South had to pay N e w England rates, its power bills would be increased $27,000,000 a year. 19 Men who had been warning for years that N e w England had been suffering from high-cost power by its failure to develop the resources of its great river valleys, now had concrete evidence to support their position. If N e w England was worried about the movement of industry from the region, the answer was plain enough — harness the Connecticut and the Merrimack and the rivers of Maine, reducing costs for industries in N e w England and luring new industries into the region. The Textron probe affected the power question in N e w England in another and unexpected fashion. In discussing the movement of industry from the region, Royal Little placed even more emphasis on the difference in work loads between the South and North than on power costs. The C I O had always been in the forefront of the movement for establishing valley authorities, but it was now absolutely imperative that it establish that power costs were the reason for the economic decline of N e w England, not labor costs or work loads, if it was to escape responsibility for the flight of industry from the region. T o be sure, this had been a problem ever since the movement of segments of the shoe industry from Massachusetts, but never before had the regional war been so sharply contested, nor public interest in the question so pointed. Conversely, industrialists who desired to focus attention on the need for heavier work loads in N e w England mills stood to gain by minimizing the importance of power costs in the movement of industry. On December 1 1 , 1948, Emil Rieve, President of the Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, told a cheering state C I O convention in Boston: "It's about time the spokesmen for N e w England stopped acting as business agents for the private monopolies, and gave some thought to the welfare of their own people." " Y o u have had the spectacle of mills closing down because there was not enough

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electricity to keep them going," Rieve reminded the delegates. "You have seen seaside villages rescued from cold and darkness by the generators of a Navy ship, anchored ofi-shore. . . . New England's answer should not be to oppose public power — but to get a share of it." 20 Four weeks later, Rieve told a state CIO convention in Hartford that the river valleys which had flooded Connecticut two weeks before should be harnessed to provide power to keep the mills of New England running, preventing future floods at the same time by multipurpose dams. 21 Henceforth, the need for cheap, abundant power became a major point in the credo of every state CIO organization in New England. Ill The November 1948 elections, which were expected to return to office men who were unlikely to tamper with the structure of private power in New England, resulted instead in the victory in Connecticut of Chester Bowles, who had advocated the development of the nation's river valleys on the pattern of T V A in a radio address in 1946; in Massachusetts, of Paul Dever, whose principal resources adviser, Orville Poland, was a member of Judson King's National Popular Government League; and in Vermont, of Ernest Gibson, a redoubtable foe of the utilities throughout his public life. In a special message to the Vermont legislature in January, Governor Gibson urged the creation of a Vermont Power Authority "with power to build generating plants, transmission lines, to buy and sell electricity and to issue bonds to secure capital," 2 2 following a similar recommendation from Senator Aiken in a speech in Montpelier on October 19, 1948 2 3 On January 6 Governor Dever asked the legislature for a commission to survey the river valleys of Massachusetts and to work with state and federal governments to develop the power resources of the Bay State.24 In New Hampshire, legislation was introduced to create a Merrimack Valley Authority, and Representative George D. Angus of Claremont filed a bill to establish a New Hampshire Power Authority "to prevent power trusts from further use of water power resources." 25 At a conference at Goddard College on January 29, the Vermont Farm and Labor Council drafted

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a sharply-worded report condemning private utilities "controlled by concentrated wealth" in N e w York and Boston for failing to serve the people of Vermont, and urging approval of Gibson's plan for a state power authority, so that Vermont need not continue "to waste thousands of dollars annually in legal battles with private utilities who keep well-financed by extracting high rates from consumers." 26 Supported by the whole Maine delegation, Senator Margaret Chase Smith revived the ancient project of harnessing the tides at Passamaquoddy, once the prize butt of Republican jokes at the N e w Deal. 27 Under the leadership of Governor Pastore of Rhode Island, the N e w England governors began to meet regularly to discuss the economic problems of N e w England, and at an all-day session at the State House in Boston on March 21, the six N e w England governors agreed to a ten-year compact by which the states would spend ten million dollars to boost industrial expansion and develop the natural resources of the region. T h e compact, which had to be ratified by the respective state legislatures and approved by Congress, proposed to create a N e w England Development Authority which would survey power resources, investigate the possibilities of importing natural gas, conserving marine fisheries, establishing a steel industry, extending flood control works, checking pollution, and similar projects, and seek federal funds for any of these proposals. 28 Even more important were developments on the national level. Representative Lane reintroduced his bill for a Merrimack Valley Authority, and Representative Woodhouse of Connecticut filed a new bill for a Connecticut Valley Administration, providing for a single administrator with an advisory board composed of the six N e w England governors and the heads of the principal federal agencies involved. On February 2 Secretary of the Interior K r u g urged the creation of a federal power authority for N e w Y o r k and N e w England, based on the development of the St. Lawrence project, and declared that N e w England could have electric rates as low as those of the T V A region. 29 On the same day, in an address to the National Rural Electric Co-operative Association, Senator Aiken scoffed at the "musty, moth-eaten, mirages of the power interests, which never have and never will come true." Warning against "the apostles of

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scarcity and high prices" who were now stating there was no power shortage in the Northeast, Aiken remarked that this same argument had been used before, and " I hate to think of what would have happened if we had not had the T V A , Hoover, and Bonneville projects during the last war." 30 Judson K i n g appeared on the scene once more to urge a T V A for N e w England in a pamphlet flaying the utilities with such observations as "I often wonder how these gentlemen will square themselves when St. Peter asks them what respect they had for the Ninth Commandment." 3 1 Particularly careful attention was given to a speech in Worcester in May by C. Girard Davidson, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and widely regarded as the Administration spokesman on regional development, who called on N e w England to produce a new abolition movement, saying the new abolitionist "would look to the abolition of high-cost electric power not by cutting out demand but by increasing supply." Davidson asserted that the high cost of power in N e w England could be traced to the fact that three-fourths of the installed generating capacity of the region was in steam power, which required expensive fuels not produced in N e w England, and only one-fourth in hydro power. The total generating capacity of N e w England, steam and hydro, could be doubled simply by harnessing the river valleys of N e w England, without any assistance from steam plants, Davidson declared. Instead of following the Ford method of low prices and large turnover, utilities in N e w England preferred the Rolls Royce approach, he observed. " A s a result, the people who can't afford Rolls Royces — which includes most of us — are going elsewhere to buy Fords." 3 2 By the spring of 1949, it was clear that N e w England was witnessing the hottest public power controversy in its history. T h e statements of Administration officials like Davidson and K r u g and the new legislation for valley authorities raised a hornet's nest of opposition, and the N e w England press was filled with editorials, letters, and retorts debating the power question. T h e N e w England Council posted a one hundred dollar reward for anyone proving a single instance of an industry moving to the South because of high power costs in N e w England. (Orville Poland, economic adviser of Governor Dever, later made an unrecognized claim to the reward on the

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basis of the shutdown of the Fisherville, Massachusetts textile plant because of power costs.) 33 The Boston Herald declared that New England was "currently being made the butt of a persistent misrepresentation," for there was "not the slightest basis in fact" for the charge that power rates had been forcing industry out.34 A t hearings in Hartford, William B. Cafky, assistant executive vice president of the Connecticut Chamber of Commerce, attacked the proposal for a Connecticut Valley Administration as "creeping socialism." 35 J. C. Richdale, president of the New England Council belayed labor leaders for "propagating untruths" about mills moving south because of cheap power, adding: "We suggest the New England textile workers would be better served by their unions if the latter would concern themselves with the differentials as to wages and productivity which are the chief inducements offered to our manufacturers by the South." 36 The valley authority approach, agreed the Hartford Times, was probably a good idea in the Columbia Valley, with its great hydroelectric power potential and undeveloped resources, but a Connecticut Valley Authority would be "one C V A too many." All the dams would be built in Vermont and N e w Hampshire, requiring the northern states to let their best farm lands be flooded to provide a negligible amount of power for Massachusetts and Connecticut. The campaign for a Connecticut Valley Authority came "from the outside— from those who believe that wherever water flows, electricity should be developed, regardless of any other considerations; supported by those who have been caught by outside arguments." 37

IV THE CASE A G A I N S T

FEDERAL POWER

DEVELOPMENT

While the contest between admirers of the T V A and defenders of private power and state control of resources had been fought in the 1930s largely through the manipulation of symbols, ranging from Ethan Allen to Samuel Insull, the new struggle resolved itself largely into an attempt to manipulate statistics. The citizens of N e w England who a decade before had to cut through a forest of moral ex-

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hortations about states' rights and evil utility executives to reach the heart of the issue now found themselves confronted with the task of mastering the finer points of "base loads," "peaking," "estimated saturation," and "transmission losses." For the most part, it was a fruitless task, for the statistics did not represent the end result of objective studies of data but were merely bludgeons to be used to beat sense into one's opponents. Having determined their conclusions beforehand, individuals, organizations, and agencies then went ahead to make elaborate surveys to prove they were right all along. Given the circumstances, this was probably as good a method as the "impartial survey" neutral parties requested to resolve the conflict, because no survey, however "impartial," could fail to reflect the assumptions of the investigators, and you got an entirely different figure on how much power could be generated in New England if you assumed single-purpose plants that would have to be operated to yield a profit to private utilities than if you assumed multipurpose plants operated by the federal government, particularly if "intangible benefits" were weighed in against the cost. The foes of federal power development in New England marshalled a far greater amount of evidence to support their position than did their opponents, although the latter refused to concede that the quality of the material matched its quantity. The case against a federal power program could be found in such ambitious studies as the New England Council survey prepared by Charles T . Main, Inc. in 1949; the report of Clarence W . Mayott to Senator Hart of Connecticut in 1945, published by the Hartford Electric Light Company; the address of Professor Howard M. Turner of Harvard University to the ninety-fifth quarterly meeting of the N e w England Council at Manchester, Vermont in 1949; and the articles by George Arris appearing in the Providence Journal-Bulletin in the fall of 1949.38 Arris, financial editor of the paper, made a tour of N e w England for the avowed purpose of deciding whether the N e w England Council or the Federal Power Commission figures were correct and ended with conclusions largely buttressing the N E C position. The following paragraphs summarize the main arguments in these documents and in the statements of utility executives, public officials, and other individuals opposed to the establishment of a regional

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planning agency on the T V A model or the extension of public power in N e w England.* 1. There was no significant amount of hydroelectric power that could feasibly be developed in N e w England. Water power had been intensively developed in N e w England long before other sections of the country harnessed their streams, and the great textile industry of New England had been founded on the power of the Merrimack and Connecticut rivers. N e w Hampshire, for its size, had more developed water power than any other state in the country, and only three states in the country had a higher percentage of water power harnessed than the combination of the five N e w England states outside of Maine. There were power dams on every important fall of the Merrimack and Connecticut. The N e w England Council study found only 500,000 kw. of potential hydro power in all N e w England, only 139,000 kw. in the Connecticut basin, and these figures were corroborated by the Arris study which found a technical possibility of developing 1,084,775 kw. in N e w England, of which only 500,000 to 600,000 were economically feasible. The F P C report was "an engineering job based on book records," for no engineer actually went into the field to make studies. Save for such fantastic projects as Passamaquoddy, the F P C was very vague about where it would develop power. In only three instances did the F P C cite specific projects, and not one of these was feasible. For example, a proposed development at Penacook, N e w Hampshire, would require double the present amount of rainfall and would require almost twice as much electricity to pump water back above the proposed dam as the whole project would generate. 2. In the Pacific Northwest, you could build giant dams without flooding anything but desert, and even this could be turned into a positive asset by constructing reclamation works. N e w England, on the other hand, was densely populated and intensively developed; you could not back water up in most parts of N e w England for even a small project without having to relocate bridges, highways, and railroads, and this made the cost of most developments prohibi* T h e s e paragraphs do not necessarily represent the v i e w s of the writer but are offered rather as a s u m m a r y of the most frequently heard arguments of the opponents of public p o w e r .

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tive. Even more important, you would have to flood out villages and towns or good farm lands. If you flooded 36 per cent of the state of Massachusetts with ten feet of water and obtained a highly improbable drop of 150 feet of water from the huge dam required to hold back these waters, you still would be far short of meeting the power requirements of the state.39 3. Insofar as there were undeveloped hydro sites, most of them were in Maine, whose Fernald Act prohibited the export of power in interstate commerce, except by special act of the legislature. 40 Successive attempts to repeal that law had failed, and it constituted a major barrier to any hydro development, since the markets for Maine power would be largely in other states. The N e w England Council report estimated that of the 500,000 kw. hydro potential, 263,000 were in Maine, and the Federal Power Commission conceded that 60 per cent of the undeveloped power was in that state. 4. If there were such a great amount of hydro power to be developed, why had not the private utilities leaped at such an opportunity to invest their funds profitably? 5. It would appear that power rates in N e w England were somewhat higher than in some other sections of the country, but this was because N e w England was so dependent on steam power and had to import all its fuels from other sections of the country. Even if you developed all the power the F P C claimed there was in the rivers of N e w England, you would still have to rely heavily on steam. So rates would never reach the T V A level. 6. Rates could never reach the T V A level anyway, because those rates were subsidized by the American taxpayer. In particular, they were subsidized by the N e w England taxpayer, because N e w England paid a far larger share to the federal government than it received. 7. Hydroelectric power in N e w England was highly unreliable. It was not available at all for several months of the year, because of the low flow of the rivers, and the recent droughts demonstrated the danger of relying on it too heavily, as Maine and Vermont had tended to do. Under most circumstances, steam power was as cheap as hydro power today, because of a series of technological improvements that had cut down fuel cost, and because you could locate

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steam plants in the center of a peak load and cut transmission costs involved in moving hydro power from the falls to the market. Since steam power was as cheap, and much more reliable, it would be unwise to depend on hydro power as the primary source of energy in the future. 8. This whole power controversy was based on the fallacy that industry had been driven out of N e w England by high power rates. In the first place, very little industry had left N e w England for any reason. In the second place, there was absolutely no evidence of industries leaving because of power costs, and there was little evidence of N e w England manufacturers complaining of power costs, and they would presumably be the first to complain. Thirdly, and most important, power costs formed an insignificant amount of the total cost of production save in industries like aluminum and magnesium, and the rate differential between North and South was not appreciable. A study for the N e w England Council's Committee on Economic Development by Charles T . Main Inc. found that a typical woolen mill, operating on a two-shift basis with annual sales of about three million dollars, would save only .12 of 1 per cent on power costs by moving to the South Atlantic states. Considerably more would be saved by moving into the T V A area, but there was no instance of any important cotton or woolen mill locating in the T V A territory since T V A started operating, in itself an eloquent refutation of the argument that industries migrated to the area of lowest power costs.41 9. There was no shortage of power today, and there never had been. The New England Council estimated that the demand for power in the decade would rise by 1,100,000 kw., and private utilities were perfectly capable of meeting this demand. By 1952, N e w England's utility companies would have spent more than five hundred million dollars for new construction since the end of the war. If you developed as much power as the government wanted to develop, there would be no market for the power, and generators would lie idle. 10. Multipurpose dams were a hoax. If you used the dams to store water for power purposes, they were not safe for flood control. There was no reason to tie the power question to flood control and pollu-

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tion, for the N e w England states were solving these problems without any intervention by the federal government. Of course, you could make any site seem economically justifiable by charging part of the cost to wildlife conservation or "intangible benefits," but this was a dubious kind of arithmetic. It was unfair for the federal government to use this method to drive "business-managed, taxpaying" private utilities out of business. As the Boston Herald observed: "There is no considerable amount of undeveloped water power in New England that can be developed on any sound economic basis. But if you mix water power with conservation and recreation, you maybe can kid yourself along that the whole thing is justifiable. That is the idea Mr. Truman is working on." 42

ν THE

CASE

FOR F E D E R A L

POWER

DEVELOPMENT

With the exception of the Federal Power Commission study on the single subject of future market estimates,43 there was no report in favor of federal power development in N e w England comparable to the ambitious studies opposing such development. T h e most important documents were the report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission and the reply of the F P C to Senator Saltonstall's request for comments on both the power study of the N e w England Council and the findings of the special unpaid commission relative to the development of the inland waterways of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.44 Otherwise one had to assemble the case for a N e w England valley authority or a Northeastern power authority largely from such public addresses as that of Leland Olds before the Hampshire County Chapter of Americans for Democratic Action in Northampton in March 1949 when Olds was still a member of the Federal Power Commission, 45 and that by Assistant Secretary of the Interior Davidson in Worcester in May I949,46 and from the attack on the Arris study by John W . Edelman, Washington representative of the Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, which appeared in the Providence Evening Bulletin on March 3, 1950. The following paragraphs paraphrase the main arguments in favor of a

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T V A for N e w England or the Northeast, or a similar extension of federal power in the region.* i. T h e great river valleys of N e w England were seriously underdeveloped. It would be possible to develop over 950,000 lew. of hydro power on the Connecticut alone, more than the present development on that river. When utility-dominated groups like the N e w England Council gave lower estimates it was because they examined a series of isolated sites, instead of treating the river basin as one unit and determining how storage upstream would increase power potential downstream. Moreover, the N e w England Council accepted or rejected a power site solely on the basis of whether it would yield a substantial profit as a power operation, ignoring the fact that multipurpose dams, providing for flood control, navigation, soil conservation, recreation, and other benefits, made some sites feasible which would not be if considered for power alone. Single-purpose dams were grotesque vestigial remnants of the nineteenth century. They were bad from the point of view of the scientific husbandry of natural resources, and they were economically unsound. They were a costly tribute paid to the private utilities in the form of soil erosion, stream pollution, and high-cost power. Finally, the N e w England Council based its estimates on the assumption of private financing, thus ignoring the benefits of federal financing of projects. In determining whether the F P C or the N E C figures were correct, one should note that the N e w England Regional Planning Commission in 1936 found that 725,000 additional horsepower could be developed in the Connecticut basin, five times the figures of the N e w England Council, and the Commission was composed of official representatives of the N e w England states and chaired by Victor M. Cutter, no public power zealot. 47 As late as January 1949, the N e w England states experienced a disastrous flood, while there had been no flood in the Tennessee Valley since the inception of T V A . Yet, we were told that N e w England had met the problem of flood control, and that multipurpose dams were not effective for flood control. * T h e s e paragraphs do not necessarily represent the v i e w s of the writer but offered rather as a s u m m a r y of the most frequently heard assertions of the p o w e r advocates.

are

public

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2. N e w England power rates were the highest of any section of the country. A consumer in Vermont paid more for electricity than in forty of the other forty-eight states. In Barre, Vermont, he would pay $4.38 for 100 kwh., in Decatur, Alabama, $2.00 for the same amount. If one wondered why textile mills were locating in the South, one needed only to observe that a mill would have to pay $3,659 a month for 200,000 kwh. in the area served by the Central Vermont Public Service Company, but only $1,953 to the Alabama Power Company. Chattanooga could light a department store using 6000 kwh. of electricity for $90 a month; the same store would pay $230.16 a month in Lowell, Massachusetts. The people of New York and New England paid $400,000,000 more annually than they would if they lived in the T V A country. 48 3. N e w England has been suffering not only from high-cost power but from inadequate supplies of power, forcing industries to locate elsewhere in the country. The utilities successfully blocked the development of federal power in New England before the war and failed to expand their own operations with the result that N e w England suffered from a serious power shortage which became particularly acute in the fall of 1947. A destroyer escort had to be sent to Portland to provide electric power for towns in Maine. The Maine Public Service Company had to ration power, and in Aroostook County, electric light gave way to candles and kerosene lamps. St. Johnsbury and three other Vermont cities ordered their industries to switch to night operations, and by February 1948, Governor Gibson considered invoking martial law in northern Vermont because of the power shortage.49 During 1947 the shortage of power required load reductions totalling 1,278,000 kw. and in the summer of 1948, Business Wee\ stated: "As everyone knows, demand for electric power and supply are now touch and go in many parts of the U.S.," adding that electric companies had been forced to postpone promotion of new appliances.50 Throughout this crisis, the Edison Electric Institute maintained that any mention of a power shortage was utility-baiting, and roundly attacked "rumors" of a shortage as "unwarranted and untrue." 5 1 The private power industry had demonstrated that its estimates of future power demand were untrustworthy, for it had

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consistently followed the principle of selling high-cost power to an assured market and underestimating the power of American industry to expand. On April n , 1949, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Davidson announced that any sudden demand for increased power for defense purposes would require civilian rationing, and pointed out that there had been a 50 per cent cutback in aluminum production, because of the power shortage, at a time when aluminum was badly needed for an expanding Air Force. 52 The F P C estimated that 2,135,000 kw. additional capacity would be needed in N e w England by 1957, as against the estimate of 1,100,000 kw. of the N e w England Council, and, in view of the irresponsibility and unreliability of utility estimates in the past, one should view the N E C figures warily. Indeed, the present contention of groups like the N E C that there would be a surplus of power if as much power was generated as the F P C believed would be needed by 1957 sounded strangely like the report of the Muscle Shoals Commission, appointed by Hoover in 1931, and of the Army Engineers that it would be disastrous for the federal government to develop the Tennessee River, because there would be no market for the power. T V A today had a market for more power than it could produce, and one would not like to contemplate what would have happened to this country if the power of T V A and of the great Northwest dams, also condemned as white elephants, had not been available for aluminum, airplane, and atomic energy production in World War II. 4. Of course, as Senator Aiken pointed out, if you kept power expensive enough there would be no market for it. N e w England consumers used less electricity than other sections of the country, because the high price discouraged them from buying it. Vermont used 1,350 kwh. per capita, compared to 2,040 kwh. nationally, and 2,870 kwh. in the state of Tennessee. The average residential consumer in N e w England used a little more than 1,000 kwh. a year, while areas like those around Tacoma, Seattle, and Chattanooga used between four and five thousand kwh. annually. Instead of lowering rates and selling to a wide market, N e w England utilities sold at high rates to an assured, restricted market. In the first quarter of 1949, generation of electricity increased βι/2 per cent nationally over

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the same period of the previous year, while in New England it actually increased 2/4 per cent.53 5. It was absurd to say that the small percentage of total cost made up by power charges was insignificant; this percentage might spell the difference between profit and loss. A large textile operation with a gross of $6,500,000 might net around $340,000 in a city like New Bedford, on the basis of 1948 figures. The same operation would earn $400,000 in Greensboro, North Carolina on the difference in power rates alone.54 6. The question of the relation of power costs to the location of industry could not be measured solely by how many industries left an area. Even more important was how many industries did not come into a region that might otherwise have done so, or how many already in the region did not expand. Actually, the importance of power in luring industries from one region to another had been over stressed by the neomercantilists of New England. Greater prosperity depended not on taking away industries from other sections of the country, but on increasing the total national product, and the contribution of the T V A was in increasing the economic well-being of a region not by taking plants from other sections of the country, but by stimulating the creation of entirely new industries.55 7. The New England economy was badly in need of readjustment to the national economy. New England industrialists proposed to make this adjustment by engaging in a regional war to see which section could lower wages and raise work loads fastest, a program that would have a devastating effect not only on the workers of New England but on the entire economy. Instead of this negative counsel of desperation, the development of the resources of New England by scientific, multipurpose planning would inject new streams of abundant, low-cost energy into the stagnant New England economy, resulting in the kind of regional revival experienced by the people of the Tennessee Valley. The words of Henry Kaiser were singularly prophetic: You New Englanders can be the richest people in the nation or the poorest. The choice is yours. If you develop your neglected water power, you can expand your industries tremendously and create thousands of new ones. But if you continue to waste water power — your most valua-

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ble natural asset — you will lose factory after factory until your famous manufacturing centers will be little more than ghost towns. The highly electrified South and West will outsell you and outstrip you. And you will find yourselves increasingly helpless. Poverty and privation beyond anything you have ever experienced or imagined will be the terrible price you will pay for failing to use the vast and unceasing energy which God has placed at your disposal.56 VI

The first round of the contest was a clear-cut victory for the opponents of federal power development in N e w England. On June 7, 1949, Maximilian G. Baron, F P C examiner at the Holyoke hearings, recommended that the license for the Connecticut River project be granted to the Holyoke Water Power Company, since the plan of the Holyoke Municipal Gas and Electric Department was "not economically feasible" and "not equally well adapted to a comprehensive plan for developing the Connecticut River at Holyoke." T h e F P C had indicated in the course of the hearings that it could not go along with the change in the canal system; when the municipal department then attempted to change its petition to make it identical with that of the gas and electric company, thus assuring the license since municipalities were given preference by the law, opponents of the department on the Board of Aldermen blocked the move, making the ultimate decision of the F P C inevitable. 87 The examiner reported that the department plan would cost three times as much as the private project; that annual costs would exceed benefits; that abandonment of the canal system, an integral part of the industrial life of the city, would not be in the public interest; and that the department lacked legislative authority to operate outside the city of Holyoke and to issue revenue bonds to finance the project. 58 T h e recommendations of the examiner were later formally approved by the Federal Power Commission. Public power advocates met with no greater success on the legislative front. Vermont rejected Governor Gibson's proposal for a state power authority "in response to pressure from a public-utilities lobby headed by Albert A . Cree, president of the Vermont Public Service Corporation," 59 and both Maine and Vermont rejected the ten-year

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compact for a regional development authority. The regional development authority was a moderate enough proposal, but apparently there was considerable fear of what it might become under the guidance of men like Governor Bowles. Governor Gibson roundly scolded the private utilities for securing the defeat of his plan for a state power authority, while Representative Fogarty of Rhode Island held the same group responsible for the defeat of the compact.60 With the regional development compact defeated and most of the state legislatures adjourned, no one expected much agitation of the power question during the summer of 1949. Once more, however, they reckoned without the weather. Heavy rains in December had sent the rivers over their banks, calling forth demands for flood control through multipurpose development of N e w England's rivers, while now a prolonged drought, with no general rain from May until August, added agricultural distress to the industrial decline, causing renewed demands for federal aid to bolster the N e w England economy. The Department of Agriculture proclaimed all N e w England, save Maine, a disaster area, with many sections experiencing the hottest July in recorded history. As the infantile paralysis toll rose, the low flow of the rivers because of the drought called new attention to the pollution problem. In January, when Representative Lane introduced a bill for a Merrimack Valley Authority modeled on the Missouri Valley Administration bill of Senator Murray, he had been derided by opponents who laughed at provisions for irrigation, applicable to the Missouri basin but clearly anachronistic in N e w England. In the summer drought, however, farmers were forced to irrigate lands to save their crops, and Congressmen Furcolo and Heselton petitioned the Department of National Defense for army and navy pumps to save the parched tobacco and onion fields of western Massachusetts. Less than seven months after Lane had introduced his bill, Republican Leader Joseph Martin was drafting legislation to give N e w England irrigation benefits on a parity with the west. 61 Once more, public attention was focused on the interrelationship between the economic well-being of N e w England and the wise utilization of the water resources of the region. On July 26 Governor

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Paul Dever of Massachusetts announced an eight-point program to speed the economic revival of New England, including "a valley authority for development of New England rivers for production of low cost hydroelectric power. Massachusetts is now paying $100,000,000 a year more for electricity than the cost would be at rates prevailing in the hydroelectric systems of the T V A, Bonneville, and Ontario areas." 62 Dever and other Democratic leaders had decided by now that the issue of low-cost electric power, in addition to its intrinsic merit, had a natural appeal to voters in the New England states. As the third of a series of regional meetings across the country, the Democratic party scheduled an official party conference on power and resources in New England for November 20 in Boston. In reply to such taunts as that of the Hartford Times that "cheaper electricity through public power development is a slogan that appeals in cosmopolitan centers where Democratic voters largely are," 63 Governor Dever replied that public power development would be a major political issue in Massachusetts "for many years to come . . . if the Republican party maintains its present marriage to the private power interests." 64 The Boston regional conference was slated to be an impressive affair with President Truman and an array of cabinet officers, including Secretary of the Interior Krug, as well as Mayor Curley of Boston, among the speakers, but an unusual series of mishaps upset the plans of the party. James H. Vahey, Massachusetts State Chairman of the Democratic Party, and the spark plug of the conference, died unexpectedly in the midst of his labors; Secretary Krug resigned; Mayor Curley was ousted in the November 1949 elections; and, on the eve of the conference, the meeting was called off. Despite this setback, Democratic leaders in New England were no less convinced that public power was the key regional issue. Indeed, the question of hydroelectric power for New England, a dead issue at the start of 1948, had become part of the national program of the Administration two years later. In his State of the Union message in January 1950, President Truman declared: We need to enlarge the production and transmission of public power. This is true not only in those regions which have already received great

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benefits from federal power projects, but also in regions such as New England where the benefits of large-scale public power development have not yet been experienced.65 vxi The Enfield power and navigation project, apparently dead beyond hope of recall in 1943, was unexpectedly revived late in 1949 in a series of startling developments that radically changed the old political alignments. In 1946 and 1947 Congress directed the War Department to make a new study of the proposal. At hearings at Bradley Field, Connecticut, in April 1947, four major oil companies, Standard, Gulf, Sunoco, and Texaco, came out strongly in support of the project for the first time, but the traditional opposition of the Connecticut Light and Power Company, the Connecticut Chamber of Commerce, and the N e w Haven railroad left little reason to believe that the future of the Enfield project would be any brighter than its past.66 The New England Division of the Army Engineers continued its studies and in June 1949 issued another favorable report on the proposal for a waterway from Holyoke to the sea, but with a number of important modifications of the original proposal. Instead of creating a pool by building a small dam at Hartford to back water to Enfield, the Engineers proposed to dredge a navigation channel north to Enfield. Instead of a power dam at Enfield with a crest elevation of 39.4 feet, permitting an installed generating capacity of 29,500 kw., and a claimed firm capacity of 27,000 kw., the new plan provided for a dam with a crest elevation of 45 feet, an installed capacity of 48,000 kw., and a firm capacity of 42,000 kw. The Engineers were able to raise the height of the proposed dam by deciding that a U.S. Circuit Court decision 67 setting 39.4 feet as the maximum height a dam at Enfield could reach without disturbing upstream water rights did not apply to a dam built by the federal government. By raising the height of the dam, the Army Engineers succeeded in increasing the power capacity of the Enfield project from 170,000,000 kwh. annually to a net of 237,000,000 kwh. annually. The report combined the projects below Hartford and above Hartford,

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providing for the deepening of the navigation channel below Hartford from fifteen to sixteen feet, as well as for the twelve-foot channel above Hartford, thus giving Connecticut as well as Massachusetts river interests a stake in the project.68 At a public hearing of the Connecticut Flood Control and Water Power Commission on the new proposal, Robert H. Knowlton, president of the Connecticut Light and Power Company and the Windsor Locks Company, exploded a bombshell by announcing that the company was no longer opposed to the project, since a preliminary examination of the new plan suggested it was "economically feasible." Moreover, Knowlton declared, if the Windsor Locks Canal Co. found, after a detailed examination, that the plan was indeed feasible, the company would be happy to construct the powerhouse and install the necessary generating equipment at Enfield. 69 The Connecticut Flood Control and Water Policy Commission gave its approval to the project late in 1949, finding that the power installation would be practicable, and that the power produced would find a market in Connecticut. In addition to asking certain minor revisions, the commission urged "that careful consideration be given to the offer of any private power company to construct the proposed power generating facilities at the dam." As for the navigation channel, the commission declared that the state of Connecticut would benefit from the deepening of the channel below Hartford, and would not be hurt by the creation of a channel above Hartford. 70 On January 12, 1950, the Windsor Locks Canal Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Connecticut Light and Power Company, made formal application to the Federal Power Commission for a preliminary permit to develop power facilities at Enfield. Knowlton explained that the company had considered the Enfield development before but had rejected the idea as economically unfeasible, because the company needed more steam power, not hydro power. The sharply increased demand for power in recent years had changed the situation so that additional hydro power was now needed for "peaking," and this new demand for hydro power and the decision of the War Department to raise the height of the dam made the proposal much more inviting than it had been in the past.71

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While the changed attitude of the Connecticut Light and Power Company had caused the state of Connecticut to end its official opposition to the project, important interests in Massachusetts now decided they no longer favored the proposal. The amount of hydroelectric power that can be generated depends on the depth of the fall of the river; by raising the dam at Enfield and backing water upstream, the new War Department project would raise the level of the river at the foot of the Holyoke dam and other up-river dams, thus reducing the depth of the fall, and hence the amount of power that could be generated. Elmer C. Tucker, executive vice-president of the Chemical Paper Manufacturing Company of Holyoke, declared early in 1950 that the Enfield project would cost his company at least 25 per cent of its power rights by raising the water level at his mill's installations on Holyoke's third-level canal. At the same time, Conrad J. Hemond, secretary-manager of the Holyoke Chamber of Commerce, struck at the navigation features of the plan, observing that while a channel to Holyoke would once have been a boon, the proposal was now very questionable, since coal and oil could be hauled by trucks relatively cheaply. Although the Springfield city council continued to support the project, both Springfield and Chicopee objected to being asked to pay for the rebuilding of sewer outlets and bridges and requested the federal government to shoulder the costs.72 Seventy-five N e w Englanders jammed the hearing room at Gravelly Point, Virginia, on January 27, 1950 to testify before the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors on the N e w England Division's proposals, Richard Martin, director of the Connecticut State Water Commission, headed the delegation in favor of the project, and Governor Bowles let it be known that he supported the plan, while Mayor Bell of Middletown told the Board that the project, including a deeper channel below Hartford, would bring great benefits to Middletown. Other Connecticut interests were much less warmly disposed, William Cafky, assistant executive vice president of the Connecticut State Chamber of Commerce, declaring: " I am fearful of a hydro-electric power project that would be a step in the door and lead to a little T V A . " 7 3 Eugene P. Sullivan of the N e w York, N e w Haven and Hartford railroad denounced the proposal as "an

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outright subsidy of water transportation in competition with the N e w England railroads," and James Rabbett, town clerk of Windsor Locks, protested that the reduction in canal water might bar the expansion of industry in his town. 74 Congressman Ribicoff of Hartford reflected the divided attitude of the state by remarking on the eve of the hearings that he would press for Congressional authorization of the project but would oppose immediate appropriations to carry it out until there was a "better budget picture and a healthier tax structure." 7 5 Massachusetts spokesmen gave general, but decidedly qualified, approval to the project. The city of Springfield favored the proposal, if the federal government paid for alterations in the city sewage plant, a mere matter of $144,000, apart from annual maintenance. Senator Ralph Lerche of Northampton approved the plan, if the federal government agreed to pay damages to industries and utilities in western Massachusetts, a sum which the Holyoke Water Power Company estimated at $24,000 to its firm alone, while the Western Massachusetts Electric Company issued a statement demanding compensation for any reduction in the output of its plant on the Chicopee River because of a rise in the water level. 76 In many ways, the desire of the Army Engineers to gain approval for the Enfield project in 1943 had been vindicated. The interest of the Connecticut Light and Power Company in developing the Enfield works demonstrated that the Federal Power Commission had been correct in its estimates of future power needs in the valley, and the derision of the private utilities ill-founded. The concentration of the N e w Haven railroad on the argument that the waterway was subsidized transportation suggested that, apart from the merits of this particular question, enough freight might be shipped by river to provide serious competition to the railroads, and that the argument that the waterway would not be used had little substance. By modifying the project to raise the height of the dam, however, a move that won the support of the Connecticut Light and Power Company, the Army Engineers alienated many of its backers in western Massachusetts, and aroused serious doubts as to whether the ultimate cost to the federal government might not be excessive. A t the end of 1950, the Enfield project had yet to gain the approval of the Board of En-

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gineers for Rivers and Harbors, since the board felt that the navigation benefits had not been clearly established, and the Federal Power Commission had taken no action on the application of the Connecticut Light and Power Company for a license. T h e ancient controversy over Enfield entered the second half of the century still unresolved. VIII

It soon became apparent that N e w England valley authority legislation was no more likely to be passed, or even to receive hearings from Representative Whittington's Committee on Public Works, than similar legislation for the Columbia and Missouri valleys. Advocates of federal power in N e w England were faced with the necessity of finding a new legislative tool if they were to keep the issue of power development alive. At the same time, political moderates who were afraid to incur the wrath of the private utilities by favoring a T V A for N e w England but who also wanted to ride the wave of interest in lower electric rates had to find a political position that would meet both requirements. A man like Senator Lodge, for example, who could afford to ignore the power issue in 1947, and even lead the fight on the St. Lawrence project, could no longer afford to do so in 1949, particularly if he had national ambitions. Both the political moderates and the supporters of federal power eagerly seized on legislation to survey the water resources of N e w England as the proper device to meet their needs. One could reasonably say that it was impossible to come out for or against a C V A , because the figures of the F P C and the N e w England Council differed so greatly, and before one could take a position, an impartial survey would have to be made of the subject. On the other hand, federal power advocates realized that a survey that turned out the right way would be an important step forward in achieving a regional authority at the very time that the project seemed hopelessly lost in Congress. Here agreement between the two groups ended. The real issue was not whether a survey should be made, but who should make it, for this might well be expected to determine the findings. A series of bills calling for a survey of the water resources of N e w England were introduced in the spring of 1949. On February 28

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Representative Furcolo filed a bill for a survey of N e w England's water resources by the Army Engineers and the Federal Power Commission, a companion bill to Senator Lodge's proposal "to provide for a comprehensive survey to promote the development of hydroelectric power, flood control, and other improvements on the Merrimac and Connecticut rivers, and such other rivers in the N e w England states where improvements are feasible." 77 On July 20 Lodge asked the Senate Public Works Committee to incorporate his proposal in the omnibus rivers and harbors bill, declaring: Citizens of New England are required to contribute millions of dollars for low cost hydroelectric projects on the rivers of the South, West and Northwest. It is only fair that the people of New England share in the benefits of such policies. . . . The recently manifested trend of large industrial concerns to move away from New England to other sections of the country makes this study especially vital. 78

Convinced that a survey by the Army Engineers and the F P C alone would be inadequate and possibly indecisive, Senator Green of Rhode Island introduced a bill to establish a N e w England River Basin Survey Commission, appointed by the President, with a chairman from N e w England, one representative each from the departments of the Army, Interior, and Agriculture, and from the Federal Power Commission, and six members to be recommended by the six N e w England governors. Yet a third bill was filed by the conservative Mrs. Edith Nourse Rogers of Lowell, long a foe of any federal power development on the Merrimack, providing for a survey by the Army Engineers alone. On February 9, 1950, President Truman placed his stamp of approval on the survey approach in a letter to Vice President Barkley urging adoption of Senator Green's new proposal to amend the rivers and harbors bill to provide for a survey of the resources of N e w York and N e w England by a seven-man commission appointed by the President, with at least one member from N e w England and four to represent federal agencies. The Green amendment, which Representative Furcolo introduced in a companion measure in the House, received the personal endorsement of Assistant Secretary of the Interior Davidson. In urging adoption of the Green amendment,

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the President specifically directed attention to the power question, stating there were "real possibilities for increasing the present power capacity of New York and the New England states by as much as 50 per cent." 79 A proposal to find out what possibilities there were for further development of the resources of the Northeastern states appeared innocent enough of any political purpose or any particular ideological motivation, but the foes of public power in New England believed, with good reason, that the Green amendment was the latest move of the Administration to extend federal power programs to the Northeast. Richard Bowditch, former President of the New England Council, attacked the Green bill as the "beginning of an attempt by the present administration in Washington to take jurisdiction over the future use, conservation and development of our land and water resources." 80 Truman's endorsement of the Green bill confirmed "the importance the Democrats attach to this question," observed the Lewiston (Me.) Sun, adding that the Truman program would "offer fictitiously low-price power at the expense of natural resources in our river basins that private enterprise has protected. It would create blocs of power before there is a market for it, and conceal the vast cost by the same kind of bookkeeping that makes the T V A an apparent success." The Concord Monitor saw President Truman as an "Indian Giver" who would "exchange a study, and possibly some public works for ever higher taxes and the loss of our independence and responsibility as American citizens." 8 1 Congress chose to ignore Truman's recommendations, and passed the rivers and harbors bill with a provision for a survey of New England by the Army Engineers alone. Although he signed the bill, the President sent a special message to Congress on May 22 castigating it for adopting a proposal so "seriously deficient" for sound planning. Declaring "this piecemeal approach" to be "obviously inadequate," Truman condemned the law for failing to provide for multipurpose planning and for assigning the New England survey to a single agency, trained in only one phase of resources development, and noted that the bill made no provision for a survey of New York, ignoring entirely the possibility of an interconnection of

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St. Lawrence power with facilities in New England.82 The President urged Congress to undo its work by providing for a comprehensive survey instead, and Senator Green, joined by Senators Benton and McMahon of Connecticut, Lehman of New York, and Leahy of Rhode Island, reintroduced his original proposal in the form of a separate bill the following month.83 Truman had already taken steps toward a new national water resources policy on January 3, 1950 by establishing a seven-man commission, headed by Morris Cooke, to study and make recommendations on existing federal legislation and policies in the water resources field.84 On July 25 the commission held hearings in Springfield to gather information on New England, and, while Governor Dever spoke favorably of federal river valley development and declared it "economically unjustifiable and socially wrong" to continue single-purpose development, a flood of witnesses told the commission that there was no power shortage in New England, that there was little hydro power undeveloped, and that the federal government should keep its "hands off" the water resources of the region.85 Opponents of federal development believed that the parade of witnesses at Springfield and the massive testimony they had presented should be decisive and were stunned to read only two days later that President Truman had declared sharply at a White House press conference that New England was "asleep at the switch" and had better wake up to the need for more electric power.86 The President's statement was roundly attacked not only by the New England press but by the New York Herald Tnbune and in a nationwide radio broadcast, by Fulton Lewis, Jr.87 The New York Times reported that utility executives, although declining to be quoted, were "exceedingly bitter in private" over the President's statement.88 When Congress showed no indication it would mend its ways by giving Senator Green's new proposal for a survey commission more courteous treatment than his previous bill, President Truman decided to take matters into his own hands. On October 11 the White House made public letters the President had sent to the departments of the Interior, the Army, Agriculture, and Commerce, the Federal Security Agency and the Federal Power Commission, directing them to form an interagency committee to survey the resources

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of New York and N e w England in cooperation with the seven state governments. The committee, which was to report to the President not later than July i, 1952, was to make a careful inventory of regional resources, analyze the data collected, determine what projects should be adopted, and recommend specific action to carry them out. The Department of the Army was named chairman agency. 89 Thus, with a single stroke, the President ended the long debate over N e w England survey legislation by an executive edict that sidestepped Congress entirely. N e w England could now settle down to watch how individual groups and agencies would attempt to influence the findings of the committee, with no decision to be expected for another year and a half. President Truman had broken the log jam in the N e w England survey controversy; he had yet to demonstrate that the mere juxtaposition of independent federal agencies would either produce a definitive answer to the question of undeveloped power potential or result in an adequate program to develop the resources of the New York-New England region.

CHAPTER

XIII

An Assessment:

1927-

1950

As the interagency commission carries on its extended study of the water resources of the region, it would be well to attempt to assess the experiences of the Connecticut Valley over the past two decades with federal and state efforts at river valley development, to determine what has been accomplished and what remains to be done, and to evaluate the instruments that have been used in resolving conflicts over water use in the valley. In a period of only eleven years, three devastating floods struck the Connecticut Valley. Despite the harsh lesson taught by these floods, despite the expenditure of more than sixty million dollars for flood control, A. F. Pimentel of Chicopee was able to say in the spring of 1950 that the people of the valley "are in worse shape so far as real floods are concerned than in 1936. Our dykes under the present condition are really a menace for they are built on the assumption that flood control dams — not yet built or building after all these years — will be in efficient operation." 1 After more than two decades of agitation of the flood control question, only five reservoirs have been built, controlling only 615 square miles, less than 5% P e r c e n t of the total drainage area. Moreover, the reservoirs which have been built are single-purpose dams, with no use for power or recreation or pollution abatement or other purposes at the present time.2 Η. K . Barrows has estimated that the present, and proposed, flood control system has cost and will cost twice as much as it should, because the dams have failed to exploit the power potential of the basin.3 Not a single kilowatt of hydro power is generated at these dams; not a single home is lighted, nor a single wheel turned by electric power from these reservoirs.

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Instead of providing recreational lakes, which could be an important asset to the N e w England economy, the Corps of Engineers has built dams of the retarding basin type. N o r do the reservoirs serve to curb pollution in the Connecticut Valley by regulating the flow of the river. Indeed, despite more than half a century of state attention to the problem of water pollution in the Connecticut Valley, an astonishing amount remains to be done. The President's Water Resources Policy Commission reported: Into the Connecticut River, more than 100 cities and 300 industries pour sulphite waste, acids, dyes, cyanides, ink, and other toxic materials, along with untreated and treated sewage. In sum, this waste represents the equivalent of the raw sewage from more than 1,600,000 persons.4

Cities the size of Holyoke, Northampton, Chicopee, and West Springfield continue to pour raw sewage into the river, forty million gallons of wastes discharged daily from Holyoke. As great as the problem of municipal waste is, the pollution of the river by industrial interests is far more serious, because state agencies have insufficient funds to deal with industrial offenders and because of deference to the arguments of business leaders who claim that a vigorous pollution abatement program would place them in an unfavorable competitive position with other sections of the country. When the director of the Connecticut State Water Commission testified before the President's Commission in Springfield, he conceded that even when all current projects in Connecticut were completed, half of all industrial wastes would still be untreated. 5 Why, in a region which prides itself on its attention to public issues, in a region where river valley development has been a controversial question for more than two decades, is the record so poor ? Why has so little been done? Why has so much that has been done been done so badly? ι Much of the explanation lies in the practice of assigning responsibility for water resources to a number of federal agencies, each

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isolated from the rest, often working at cross purposes, with no fixed responsibility for developing a coordinated program. Despite the lesson of the 1937 flood control compacts, the War Department and state agencies persisted in drafting the 1949 compact without consulting the Federal Power Commission, 6 and the F P C in turn has continued to issue estimates of power potential at different sites in the valley without relating them to recreation or other uses, or to the regional economy. Similarly, although the National Park Service has been a consultant agency to the Corps of Engineers nationally since 1945 on the recreational use of reservoirs, it has received no request for assistance in developing reservoir sites in the Connecticut Valley. 7 Although the 1936 flood control act provided for studies of soil erosion, runoff and waterflow retardation in the Connecticut Valley by the Department of Agriculture, not even a tentative report was issued by the department until 1950. More seriously, the tentative report, produced by the regional office in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, related the forest and soil studies only to the existing reservoirs in the valley and did not consider either the proposed projects of the Corps of Engineers or any comprehensive multipurpose plan for the development of the valley. The report recommended an expenditure of $53,000,000, without explaining how much the program would reduce floods or to what degree it was to supplement the War Department or other plans; no one interested in regional capital budgeting had any basis for determining whether the expenditure was justified. 8 Most important, the Corps of Engineers has shown little concern for an integrated development of the water resources of the valley. The lack of coordination of the work of the Corps of Engineers with that of other agencies in the valley is suggested by the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel R. A . Wheeler of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors in reply to questions from Congressman Clason at the hearings on the 1938 flood control bill. C L A S O N : Are there any local representatives of the Federal Power Commission in N e w England? W H E E L E R : I do not know, sir.

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Wheeler explained that a great deal of hydroelectric power could be generated at a series of sites in the Connecticut Valley. C L A S O N : At the present time, is there any market for this additional water? W H E E L E R : I do not know. Under questioning by Clason, Wheeler added that there were over 440,000 k w . of installed capacity in the valley. C L A S O N : Do you know whether or not that is ample to meet the present market requirements? W H E E L E R : No, sir; I do not know its relationship to market requirements.9 T h e A r m y Engineers, the agency given the greatest authority in the Connecticut Valley, was the agency least capable of undertaking multipurpose development of the valley.

11 A second reason for the poor record of the Connecticut Valley during this period stems from the inadequacy of individual state action and the limitations of the compact device. If the contention that the states have lost no powers to the federal government that they were effectively exercising be extreme, there is little in the history of the Connecticut Valley for the past two decades to challenge it. Although the 1927 flood was the costliest in the history of N e w England up to that time, the Connecticut Valley states made no move toward interstate action for flood control in the valley and did little to secure flood control within state borders. T h e y showed even less initiative in regional planning, establishing planning boards only as a way to obtain federal funds, and even then only diligent action by federal officials kept the planning movement alive. W h e n the 1936 flood disaster struck the valley only nine years after the 1927 flood, the states once more failed to reach an agreement on interstate flood control, until they were forced to combine by the ultimatum of Secretary Woodring. T h e y then drafted a compact

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which failed to provide for an adequate flood control program, one which the lower valley states condemned only seven years later. Throughout this period, the states did nothing to harness the power potential of the valley, save for a single project in N e w Hampshire. The 1944 flood control act has been hailed in the valley as a triumph for states' rights, ushering in a new era when state governments would demonstrate they were at least as capable as the federal government of developing water resources. Actually, the record of the valley states since 1944 has been singularly unimpressive. Despite the impetus of the 1944 act, the states dropped all efforts at a flood control compact only a year later. They resumed their efforts in part out of fear of federal action if they did not, and not until 1951 did they achieve an agreement, succeeding in getting a compact woefully inadequate and based on the antiquated approach of singlepurpose development. They showed no ability to undertake studies of water resources development themselves, one Massachusetts survey being a notable fiasco. They failed to give adequate funds to their state agencies for pollution abatement programs and negotiated the 1947 compact less as a positive move taken on their own initiative than an attempt to ward off federal action. T h e compact left final decisions in the hands of agencies handicapped in their own states by lack of funds and, frequently, by an unwillingness to take action against important industrial interests. T h e supporters of the interstate compact argue that when a river crosses state lines, individual states, which have shown little initiative in developing water resources within their own borders, are capable of entering into agreements for the development of interstate streams which will be in every respect as effective and as well considered as would federal development of those streams. Much of the debate over interstate compacts has been couched in legalistic terms, as though what were involved was no more than a difference of approach to instrumentalities of government. Actually, one cannot evaluate the compact device without studying the political and economic forces behind its supporters. Although the interstate compact had been used on numbers of occasions for almost a century, it received its real impetus in the field of water resources in the 1930s. This was not an historical acci-

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dent. The interstate compact for water resources came into favor at the very time that control of water resources shifted from state governments to the federal government, and, more particularly, when the strengthening of the Federal Power Commission and the construction of the T V A and other public power projects threatened the interests of private utilities. Up until then, as Gifford Pinchot remarked, the utilities opposed state control and were "all for Federal control — because there wasn't any." 10 The attitude of the utilities toward the effectiveness of state and federal regulation was openly revealed by the action of the Hartford Electric Light Company and the Connecticut Power Company in terminating their interstate power line arrangements in August 1935, a few hours before President Roosevelt signed the public utilities bill. The New England News Letter reported: Samuel Ferguson, chairman of both companies, was quoted as saying that the terminated arrangements had meant savings to the consumers of t w o to three million dollars a year, but despite these economies, the management chose to remain under the control of state utilities commissions and so eliminated the interstate connections. 1 1

A recent study by Connecticut's "baby Hoover commission" indicated that public utility regulation in that state had not improved materially in the past fifteen years.12 The study found that commissioners had generally had no previous experience or particular competence in the field, that their appointments were based on "partisan political considerations," and that the commission had chosen to "eschew the role of an aggressive protector of the public's interest." Since the legislature would not vote sufficient funds, the commission had an inadequate staff, "unable to keep abreast of current developments," and the commission was "forced to rely heavily on the data and information submitted by the private utilities." Even more striking, the commission showed no interest in obtaining additional staff. The commission had permitted rates so high that companies had not had to challenge rates in the courts for more than ten years. The report concluded: T h e existence of the Commission may lead the public to believe that it is being protected by a vigilant Public Utilities Commission w h e n in

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fact rates and services are being determined by a monopolistic industry which is subject to only perfunctory regulation. 13 One can no more discuss the question of the role of the states in river valley development solely in terms of political theory than one can discuss the sectional conflict of i860 solely in terms of the states' rights doctrine. The concern to have the states rather than the federal government control water resources development, the impetus to the movement for interstate compacts, came from those forces — private utilities opposed to public power sites, industries opposed to effective pollution abatement programs, farm groups opposed to the flooding of arable land — which believed that the states, or a combination of states, would be less successful than the federal government in halting the opposition of these private interests. The interstate compact was not a device chosen by state governments which, on their own initiative, were developing the resources of the Connecticut Valley, but was hit upon as a means to prevent such development by the federal government. Insofar as state governments actively sought interstate cooperation, it was because powerful economic interests within the state cut across state lines. For example, an interstate compact on pollution abatement was possible in part because the need for clean industrial water cut across state lines and, hence, the compact was supported, in varying degrees, by manufacturers in each of the valley states by 1947. This still does not explain the peculiar inappropriateness of the compact device for river valley development, as evidenced by the experience of the Connecticut Valley states in this period. T h e main problem in developing a river valley is the resolution of conflicts between different water users. Shall farm land be flooded to permit the generation of electric power ? Shall a reservoir be used for power or recreation? Shall a river be used as a sewer for industrial wastes or for fishing and swimming? These issues are difficult to resolve at best; the inadequacy of the interstate compact is that, while ostensibly it seeks to resolve such issues, it actually tends to exacerbate them, either by postponing a decision, or by working out a temporary makeshift at the expense of sound resource development. T h e essential feature of the interstate compact is that it attempts

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to resolve conflicts by giving one of the parties to that conflict a veto. Unless the other states will agree to the terms of any particular state, that state can refuse to enter into an agreement. T h e division of a river basin on state lines accentuates the division of interests, making it far more difficult to strike the best balance of interests. It is exceedingly difficult to resolve the conflict between men who want to use a given piece of land for farming and men who want to use the same piece of land to protect downstream cities from floods. It becomes much more difficult to resolve that same conflict when, instead of being a difference between two groups of men, it becomes a difference between the sovereign state of Vermont and the sovereign state of Massachusetts. It becomes almost impossible to resolve the conflict when one of the sovereign states is conceded the power of veto. Yet this is what the interstate compacts for water resources attempt to do. There is a general tendency for conflict to develop between upstream and downstream interests, in the Missouri Valley between the reclamation and the navigation states, in the Connecticut Valley between those states, N e w Hampshire and Vermont, largely indifferent to flood control and desirous of protecting their arable lands, and those states, Massachusetts and Connecticut, desirous of flood protection and largely indifferent to the problem of flooding arable lands. Nor is this conflict confined to the problem of flood control. The concern over pollution increases as one goes downstream; Connecticut, which accumulates the waste of the three states to the north, has led the movement for interstate action for pollution control; Vermont and New Hampshire have been rather indifferent. On the other hand, through most of this period, Connecticut opposed the desire of Massachusetts to develop the Enfield project, for navigation improvement would threaten transportation and other interests in Connecticut. When Connecticut finally changed its mind on the Enfield issue, it was for reasons that occasioned important groups in Massachusetts who had favored the project to oppose it. T o be sure, as a recent study of the T V A 14 discovered, any attempt at multipurpose development will be faced with the problem of dealing with special interests, and compromises will have to be made. The compact device is least able to resolve conflicts between different

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users of the valley in the public interest, because conflicts are heightened by being transformed into interstate disputes, and because there is frequently no reason for a state to acquiesce, since there is little possibility of compulsion. This is particularly striking in the case of Vermont. The state of Vermont, which could use new sources of cheap power in its small textile plants and to electrify its farms, has consistently opposed multipurpose projects in its state, because it does not want to obtain hydroelectric power at the cost of flooding its lands. A s the demand for power in Vermont grew in the 1940s, the state was able to maintain this position for one reason: it believed that the pending St. Lawrence project, which Senator Aiken sponsored, would provide power for Vermont, although very little would go elsewhere in N e w England, without the flooding of Vermont lands. Under such circumstances, there was little hope that Vermont would agree to an adequate flood control compact or to the construction of multipurpose dams, for any such agreement would require considerable sacrifice on the part of the state with very little in return. The result of state development of water resources, with interstate compacts when streams cross state lines, is that important issues are not resolved; hence, very little development of any kind takes place. For the most part, this plays into the hands of the very interests which advocate a states' rights policy. T h e failure to enact a vigorous pollution abatement program does not alarm industrial offenders. T h e failure to enact an adequate flood control program does not upset Vermont farm interests. The failure to construct government power dams does not embitter the private utilities. The Izaak Walton League was forced to conclude that "as a legal means of putting oil the day of reckoning in pollution control, the inter-state compact probably has no equal." 1 5 Throughout a half century of debate over the Enfield project, no one ever suggested a compact between Connecticut and Massachusetts on the question, because the conflict of interests was too apparent. Nor has anyone yet drafted a flood control compact which would provide adequate protection for the southern valley, because Vermont would not agree to such a compact. T h e attitude of Vermont toward dams in the West River Valley in 1944 indicated that

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the state would not have agreed to the construction of any dams at all in that valley, save for the threat of federal intervention if it did not. Moreover, it should be noted that the interstate compact method accentuates parochialism at the expense of the national interest. Insofar as conflicts are resolved, they are resolved by building expensive dams, which, according to Professor Barrows, cannot justify their cost, and doing this by spending the money of citizens from all fortyeight states. Frequently, they are resolved by refusing to build multipurpose dams, no matter how great the national interest may be in new sources of power. The position of the Connecticut Valley states is that they should have the right to decide how the millions of dollars appropriated by Congress should be spent, and that any attempt of federal agencies to construct projects at sites opposed by the states would be a denial of fundamental liberties. That every compact must be approved by Congress, that Congress must appropriate funds for each project does not in itself guarantee that the national interest will be protected. If one accepts the viewpoint of the valley states, all this does is to give Congress a veto. It may do little more than produce a stalemate, a situation which important economic interests in the valley may view unperturbed, and which may deny the national interest in development of the valley. Those interests which oppose sound river valley development benefit from the confusion over the role of federalism in water resources management. Industrialists have argued for decades that no state should pass a strong pollution abatement law, because it would place N e w England industries at a competitive disadvantage with factories in other sections of the country which had lenient laws. On the other hand, as soon as the federal government proposed to pass a uniform national law for pollution abatement, these same forces' argued that this was a denial of states' rights. Thus the cloak of states' rights was used to prevent any action at all. As late as November 15, 1950, Truman Safford of the N e w England Council warned that the demand of sportsmen for clean streams might drive industries from N e w England. 1 6 Actually, the argument of competitive disadvantage is a strong argument for the inadequacy of regional solutions to national problems, and the inability of inter-

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state compacts in a given river basin to provide an adequate answer. There is a long tradition of individual and local action in New England, a tradition which can be ignored only at great peril to the success of any plan. It is important that this tradition be enlisted on the side of comprehensive planning and development in the Connecticut Valley, and in a cooperative endeavor between the federal and state governments, the states would have much to contribute. 17 Flood plain zoning, the planning and operation of recreational facilities, forest land management, and experimentation at state agricultural stations are all legitimate functions of the states, and each state can serve as a laboratory for experimentation in river valley development. At the same time, one must recognize that single-purpose projects in the Connecticut Valley "have now gone about as far as is possible without creating serious conflicts." 1 8 T h e resolution of these conflicts cannot be entrusted either to the states, individually or collectively, or to any single federal agency. Professor Maass writes: Congress for a great number of years has followed a procedure of legislative self-restraint with respect to water resources developments. It will not authorize any improvement which has not received a favorable report from the Chief of Engineers. And since the Engineers attempt to maximize local desires, it may be said that Congress has transferred important responsibility for the adjustment of group interests from its own body to the U.S. Engineer Department, an executive agency. 19

The poor record of the Connecticut Valley over the past two. decades has largely been the result of the failure of the Corps of Engineers to achieve these adjustments of group interests, and the inadequacy of state efforts in the same field. Ill A final reason for the failure to develop the Connecticut River Valley stems from the inclination of economic interests and political parties to turn every water resources problem into an ideological dispute, to view every question, no matter how technical, as a moral issue. Indeed, on a number of important issues, such as the clash

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over Union Village, the power of ideas was as great as that of economic or other forces in determining the outcome. The major issues in developing the Connecticut River Valley are not, of course, simple technical matters; whether or not one builds a large dam on a given stream in Vermont will depend on your attitude toward the relative importance of industry and agriculture, the virtues of the familysize farm, and the glory or iniquity of public power projects. Since this is so, there is no reason why ideological considerations should not be basic to making decisions; in the Connecticut Valley, however, such considerations were carried to extreme lengths, making a resolution of differences very difficult. Instead of determining objectively what measures would provide the necessary flood protection, up-river interests, intent on preventing the flooding of farm land, advocated flood plain zoning, reforestation, and similar measures in lieu of reservoirs, although, actually, such measures were hopelesly inadequate by themselves. Likewise, although the T V A and other experiences demonstrated the value of multipurpose reservoirs, state interests, fearing multipurpose reservoirs might be an entering wedge for federal power development, argued that such reservoirs would not provide flood control and were actually a flood menace. They did so, although, at an earlier time, when there was no danger of public power development, industrial leaders supported multipurpose reservoirs; for example, Owen D . Young urged the first meeting of the New England Council in Worcester in November 1925 to build storage reservoirs for power which would yield flood control benefits as well. 20 During the same period, when private utilities planned to undertake all power development, cheap power was regarded as a cure-all to halt the movement of industry from the region. A decade later, when there was a danger that the federal government might develop power resources, the importance of power costs in the movement of industry was belittled. Finally, it should be noted that advocates of public power generation frequently advocated multipurpose development less because they were interested in the careful development of water resources than as a justification for harnessing the Connecticut as part of a national public power program. Democratic party leaders and CIO

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officials made much of the need for multipurpose development when they were actually interested in little but the single purpose of public power generation. They viewed the T V A not as an experiment in water resources management which might profitably be used in the Connecticut Valley; they saw only the giant concrete structure of Hiwassee dam, the alluring figures on low electric light bills in Chattanooga and Tupelo. In each of these instances, instead of deriving conclusions from an analysis of data, a variety of groups warped the facts to make them fit conclusions that had previously been arrived at, conclusions founded on moral considerations and political dogma.

IV

The Connecticut River Valley has witnessed more than a century of controversy over the use of the river. The current dispute over the Enfield project, which if it is not modified will destroy the spawning grounds of the shad between Hartford and Holyoke, resembles the controversy stirred up by the efforts of George Beach, Esq. and other gentlemen to improve the Connecticut over a century ago. A special Northampton town meeting in 1826 remonstrated against any further tampering with the river, since the South Hadley dam had resulted in the "flooding of the fertile lands above the dam, thereby rendering a soil naturally too wet, a little better than a stagnant Pool, and as a natural consequence causing a pestilential miasma wholly insufferable to a community that had before that time enjoyed the blessings of health." And what had been the effect of all these dams on the abundance of fish in the Connecticut since 1792? A t that time the river was filled with fish to an extent not surpassed by any stream in N e w England, and those of a superior quality. T h e tables of the rich were replenished with the delicious salmon — the less wealthy were not excluded from this luxury, by any enhanced value resulting from scarcity; and the shad abounded in such profusion that the poorest class could be supplied for a mere trifle with that which is now procured with avidity from afar, as a great luxury; and from the enjoyment of which the poor are excluded by reason of their scarcity. W h a t is now the

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case? N o t one salmon has been known to enter the river since the second or third year from the erection of a vexatious D a m at Montague falls, twenty odd feet high, directly across Connecticut river, nor has one shad been known to pass another vexatious dam recently erected across the said river at South Hadley; . . . 2 1

Conflicts such as this, between groups of men who have wanted to use the river for different purposes, have raged for decades past and will very likely be with us a century hence. The unique character of the history of the valley since 1927 is that these conflicts of use have been intensified and have been transferred from groups of men to state governments and to disputes between state governments and the federal government. In attempting to resolve these conflicts, the Connecticut Valley states have sought to rely on the doctrine of states' rights, frequently expressed in words that would have sounded strange on the lips of N e w Englanders like Daniel Webster. Largely as a consequence of the acceptance of this doctrine, the states have attempted to develop the valley by ignoring the principle that sound river valley development is based on treating the river basin as a single unit. The result has been a chronicle of failure. The rise of the leviathan state has not vitiated the importance of the principle of decentralized authority; if anything, it has made all the more urgent the need for popular control of government. Nothing in the history of the Connecticut Valley, however, suggests that an unreasonable adherence to the dogma of states' rights makes any contribution to that end. One cannot answer the urgent need for flood protection by quoting Tocqueville. If the future development of the Connecticut Valley is to be accommodated to the N e w England faith in local authority, the state governments must demonstrate that they are interested in exercising power not to frustrate action by government at any level but to develop the river in the interest of the people of the valley.

Notes Chapter I.

SOURCES OF CONFLICT

1. The best statement of Parsons' views is The City for the People, Rev. ed. (Philadelphia: C. F. Taylor, 1898). There is an illuminating discussion of Parsons in Arthur Mann, "Conceptions of Social Reform in Boston, 18801900," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, 1951. 2. Boston Herald, June 28, 1890. 3. Boston Herald, July 1,1890. 4. The Rainey River veto may be found in Congressional Record, 60th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 4698 f. The James River veto is House Document 1350, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 5. Mass. House Doc. 1200, March 1930, Report of the Special Commission on Control and Conduct of Public Utilities, p. 21. 6. John Bauer, America's Struggle for Electric Power (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1935), p. 7. 7. William Z. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1927), p. 276. 8. Report of the Giant Power Survey Board (Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1925), p. xii. 9. W. Z. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street, p. 309. 10. Ibid., pp. 303, 296. 11. Ibid., p. 323. 12. Representative Leo M. Birmingham in Mass. House Doc. 1200, Report of the Special Commission on Control and Conduct of Public Utilities, p. 253. 13. W. Z. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street, p. 340. 14. M. L, Ramsay, Pyramids of Power (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1937), pp. i94f. 15. Dexter M. Keezer and Stacy May, The Public Control of Business (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1930), p. 247. 16. Mass. House Doc. 1200, Report of the Special Commission on Control and Conduct of Public Utilities, p. 55. 17. Boston Herald, March 1,1929. 18. Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 265 U.S. 298 (1924). 19. P.U.C. v. Attleboro Steam and Electric Co. 273 U.S. 83 (1927). 20. Actually the states could still exercise some authority. See the careful discussion in Hugh L. Elsbree, Interstate Transmission of Electric Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931). 21. W. Z. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street, p. 283.

260

Notes to Chapter I

22. National Electric Light Association, Prosperity Through Power Development (New York: National Electric Light Association, 1925), p. 27. 23. Albert Levitt, "Who Owns Connecticut?" The Nation, CXXXVIII, (May 2,1934). 24. Ernest Gruening, The Public Pays (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1931), pp. 209f. The hearings also revealed that the Boston Post used utility propaganda for editorials, as did such papers as the Hartford Times and the Providence Journal, and that the Herald had printed one power lobby article because the utilities agreed to buy extra copies at ten cents apiece. 25. Ibid., p. 142. 26. Ramsay, Pyramids of Power, p. 293. 27. Ibid., p. 294. 28. Ibid., p. 295. 29. Ibid., p. 297. 30. Ibid., p. 295. 31. Ibid., p. 296. 32. Ibid., p. 297. 33. Herbert Agar, cited in Ramsay, Pyramids of Power, p. 298. 34. Stuart Chase, cited in Ramsay, Pyramids of Power, p. 297. 35. State of Pennsylvania, Report of the Giant Power Survey Board, p. xi. 36. Ramsay, Pyramids of Power, p. 315. 37. Charles H. Porter, " A Comparison of Public and Private Electric Utilities in Massachusetts," The Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, VII, 431 (February 1931); H. S. Raushenbush and Harry W. Laidler, Power Control (New York: New Republic, Inc., 1928), p. 108. 38. National Electric Light Association, Electric Service in the American Home (New York: National Electric Light Association, 1931), p. 4. 39. Raushenbush and Laidler, Power Control, p. 117. 40. Mass. House Doc. 1200, Report of the Special Commission on Control and Conduct of Public Utilities, pp. 22 iff. 41. Elsbree, Interstate Transmission of Electric Power, pp. i74ff. 42. New York Times, December 18, 1926. 43. National Electric Light Association, Electric Service in the American Home, pp. iof. 44. New York Times, November 12, 1925. Chapter II.

G O V E R N M E N T A C T I O N IN THE V A L L E Y BEFORE

1927

1. Records of the State of Connecticut, 1787-1792, p. 21 of 1791. Cited in Charles Rufus Harte, "Connecticut's Canals," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 16, igj8 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 118-179. 2. The Hartford interests had been spurred to action by the challenge of New Haven, which hoped to divert the Connecticut River trade from Hart-

Government Action before 1927

261

ford by a canal to Northampton. The best accounts of this rivalry are in Edward C. Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation, I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 66-81, and Thelma M. Kistler, The Rise of Railroads in the Connecticut River Valley, Smith College Studies in History, Vol. XXIII (Northampton: Smith College, 1938). 3. Harte, "Connecticut's Canals," pp. i66ff. Nellie Grace Abbe, "Traffic on the Connecticut River Half a Century Ago," The Connecticut Quarterly, III, 271 (July, August, September, 1897). 4. Charles Dickens, American Notes (London: Chapman and Hall, 1842), P· 173· 5. The Army engineer arrived at the behest of a four-state meeting at Windsor, Vermont. The surveys extended from the upper headwaters of the Connecticut south to Barnet, and from Barnet to the Canadian border in search of routes for a canal to Lake Memphremagog. Two years later, Army engineers again moved into the valley, this time at the request of the governor of Vermont, to determine the practicability of a canal between the Connecticut River and Lake Champlain. Henry W. Erving, The Connecticut River Banking Company (Hartford: Connecticut River Banking Company, 1925), p. 59; Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention, Holden at Windsor, Vermont, February 16, 1825; for the Purpose of Taking Preliminary Measures to Effect an Improved Navigation on Connecticut River (Windsor: W. Spooner, 1825); Report of the Presidents and Directors of the Connecticut River Company, January 3, 1826 (Hartford: Philemon Canfield, 1826). Edwin M. Bacon, The Connecticut River (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906), pp. 32of. 6. Senate Miscellaneous Doc. 91, Laws of the United States Relating to the Improvement of Rivers and Harbors from August 11, 1790, to March 3, 1887, Vol. II. 7. 16 U.S. Statutes 538 ( 1 8 7 1 ) ; House Doc. 136, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., Survey of Connecticut River, between Hartford, Conn., and Holyo\e, Mass. 8. House Doc. 136, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., Survey of Conn. River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyo\e, Mass. 9. Resolves of 1898, c. 104. 10. Connecticut River Navigation Association, Is There Any Good Reason Why Hartford Should Have Better Facilities for Water Transportation than Springfield and Holyo\e? (Springfield: Connecticut River Navigation Association, 1913). Also see Connecticut River Navigation Association, The Connecticut River. Importance of Opening It to Navigation from Hartford, Conn., to Holyo\e, Mass. (Springfield: Connecticut River Navigation Association, 1898). 1 1 . House Doc. 231, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., Report of a Survey of the Connecticut River between Hartford and Holyo\e. 12. Senate Doc. 1067, 62d Cong., 3d Sess., Proposed Agreement with the Connecticut River Company.

262

Notes to Chapter II

13. T h e best statement of this position appears in the Senate minority report on the bill: Committee on Commerce, Senate Report 1131, 6 ι ά Cong., 3d Sess., Construction of a Dam and Loc\ in the Connecticut River. 14. House D o c . 417, 64th Cong., ist Sess., Connecticut Hartford, Conn., and Holyo\e, Mass.

River,

between

15. Connecticut River between Hartford and Holyo\e, Hearings before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, December 11, 1918 (65th Cong.). 16. House Doc. 35, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., Connecticut River above Hartford, Conn. 17. House D o c . 36, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., Connecticut River above Hartford, Conn. 18. Rivers and Harbors, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, M a y 15, 1930 (71st C o n g . ) , Part II. 19. House D o c . 27, 73d Cong., ist Sess., Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Springfield and Holyo\e, Mass. 20. Franklin D . Roosevelt, " T h e Real Meaning of the Power Problem," Forum, L X X X I I , 327-32. 21. Public Ownership L e a g u e of America, Public Ownership (Chicago: Public Ownership League of America, 1929), p. 19. 22. Mass. House Doc. 1200, March 1930, Report of the Special Commission on Control and Conduct of Public Utilities, p. 264. 23. Ibid., p. 275. 24. A t the close of the Civil W a r , the Connecticut Valley states drafted the first interstate agreement on the development of water resources in America, w h e n , to encourage the return of shad and salmon to the valley, Massachusetts agreed to build fishways at H o l y o k e and Turners Falls, if V e r m o n t and N e w Hampshire w o u l d provide the fish for restocking, and Connecticut w o u l d build a fishway at Enfield rapids and ban the use of gillnets. H o w e v e r , largely because Seth Green, the able fish commissioner of N e w Y o r k state, assisted Connecticut in restoring its shad industry, Connecticut lost interest in sharing its profitable business w i t h other states, and the project fell through. Clifford J. H y n n i n g , State Conservation of Resources, a study made for the National Resources Committee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 52fi; State of Vermont, Report of Commissioners Relative to the Restoration of Sea-Fish to the Connecticut River and Tributaries (Montpelier: Freeman Steam Printing Establishment, 1866); State of V e r m o n t , Report of the Fish Commissioners of the State of Vermont by Albert D. Hager and Charles Barrett (Montpelier: Walton's Steam Printing Establishment, 1867). 25. Report of the Commissioners on the Preliminary Examination of the Water Power of New Hampshire (Manchester: N . B . Clarke, 1870). Acts of 1908, N o . 215. 26. Acts of 1909, c. 359; Acts of 1911, c. 622; Acts of 1912, c. 564.

263

The Failure to Harness the River

27. Report of Connecticut Valley Waterway Board on an Investigation of the Connecticut River, March, 1913 (Boston: Wright and Potter, 19x3). 28. Report of the Commission on the Conservation of the Natural Resources of the State of Vermont, 1911—1912 (Rutland: The Tuttle Company, 1912). 29. Mass. Senate Doc. 289 (1918), Report of the Commission on Waterways and Public Lands. 30. Special Report of the Vermont Water Resource Commission (Rutland: The Tuttle Company, 1921). 31. Report of Commission on Water Conservation and Water Power, 19171918, January 1, 1919 (Concord: State of New Hampshire, 1919). 32. Richard S. Holmgren, "The Pittsburg Conservation Reservoir Development of the New Hampshire Water Resources Board," Journal of the Boston Society of Civil Engineers, XXVII, 112 (April 1940). 33. New Hampshire Power Survey Committee, New Hampshire Power (Concord: Rumford Press, 1926). 34. Resolves of 1884, c. 58; Acts of 1885, c. 344; Acts of 1891, c. 266. 35. Conn. Pub. Doc. 73 (1923), Report of the Commission to Investigate the Pollution of Streams to the General Assembly, January Session, 1923. See, for example, Herbert E. Smith, "Report of the Investigations of Rivers Pollution and Water Supplies," Report of the Connecticut State Board of Health for 1894 (Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1894). 36. Pollution of Navigable Waters, Hearings before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, December 7 and 8, 1921 (67th Cong.), Part 2. 37. Sanford H. Wadhams, "Connecticut State Water Commission — A Review of Its Five Years of Existence," Papers and Transactions for 19] 1 of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers (New Haven, 1931), pp. 28-41. First Biennial Report of the State Water Commission for the Years 1925-1926 (Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1926). 38. Leland Olds, "Comprehensive Development of the Connecticut River," Address before the Hampshire County Chapter, Americans for Democratic Action, Northampton, Mass., March 18, 1949, mimeographed, pp. 4L Chapter III.

T H E F A I L U R E TO H A R N E S S THE R I V E R ,

1927-1935

i. The description of the flood is based largely on contemporary accounts in the Brattleboro Reformer, New York Times, Hampshire Gazette, Springfield Daily News, Springfield Union, Springfield Republican, and Boston Post. See also Julia M. Shipman, "The New England Flood," The Journal of Geography, XXVII, 36-40 (January 1928); Julius W. Eggleston, "Glacial Geology and the Vermont Flood," Science, n.s. LXIX, 621-23 (June 14, 1929); George H. Bigelow, "The Flood in Massachusetts," American Journal of Public Health, XVII 1248 (December 1927); H. C. Frankenfield, "November Floods in New England and Eastern New York," Monthly Weather

264

Notes to Chapter III

Review, LV, 496-499 (November 1927); R. E. Atwood, Stories and Pictures of the Vermont Flood, November, 7927 (Burlington: R. E. Atwood, 1927); Julia M. Shipman, "Local Phases of the New England Flood," Bulletin of the Geographical Society of Philadelphia, XXVI, 169-184 (July 1928) Η. B. Kinnison, "The New England Flood of November, 1927," Papers and Transactions for 192.8 of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers (New Haven, 1928), pp. 123-143. 2. New York Times, November 7, 1927. 3. For the Mississippi story, see Arthur De Witt Frank, The Development of the Federal Program of Flood Control on the Mississippi River (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930). 4. Mass. House Doc. in,'December 1, 1928, Special Report of the Department of Public Works Relative to Protecting the Cities and Towns in the Hoosac and Connecticut River Valleys from Flood Damage, p. 6. 5. Flood Control, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control, November 22, 1927, and January u , 1928 (70th Cong.), Part 7, Floods in the New England States, pp. 4925fr. 6. Ibid., pp. 4939ff. 7. 44 U.S. Statutes 1010 (1927). 8. U.S. Engineer Department, Estimate of Cost of Examinations, etc. of Streams Where Power Development Appears Feasible, House Document 308 (75th Cong.), 69th Cong., ist Sess. 9. "Report of the Committee on Floods, March, 1930," Journal of the Boston Society of Civil Engineers, XVII, 293-464 (September 1930). 10. New England News Letter, April 15, 1929. 11. Vermont Public Service Commission, Report of Advisory Committee of Engineers on Flood Control, December 15, 1930 (Montpelier: State of Vermont, 1930). 12. Vermont Public Service Commission, Report of Advisory Committee of Engineers on Flood Control, December 15, 1930 (Montpelier: State of Vermont, 1930). 13. Η. K. Barrows, "Report upon Power-Storage Regulation of Flow Connecticut River Easterly Tributary Streams in Ν. H.," September 12, 1933, typewritten; Η. K. Barrows, "Storage-Power Projects in New Hampshire," September 20, 1933, typewritten; Η. K. Barrows, "Report upon Five Storage Reservoir Projects in the State of New Hampshire," November 20, 1933, typewritten. 14. Η. K. Barrows, "Report upon Storage and Power Projects in the State of New Hampshire," March 30, 1934, typewritten. 15. Laws of 1935, c. 121. 16. New England News Letter, September, 1935; Holmgren, "The Pittsburg Conservation Reservoir Development of the New Hampshire Water Resources Board," 110-135. 17. New England News Letter, January 1931.

The Failure to Harness the River

265

18. George D. Aiken, "Flood Control Compacts," Proceedings of the Governors' Conference, Atlantic City, September 14-16, 1937 (Live Oak, Florida: Suwannee Democrat, 1937), pp. I5if. Ultimately, a multipurpose dam for flood control and conservation storage was constructed at Waterbury and detention dams at East Barre and Wrightsville in the Winooski valley, largely by the expenditure of federal funds, and using CCC labor. Comprehensive Flood-Control Plans, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control, March 30 to April 19, 1938 (75th Cong.), pp. 378ff; Ralph Nading Hill, The Winooski (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 192s. 19. New England News Letter, April 1931. Connecticut's efforts at pollution abatement are recorded in the biennial reports of the Connecticut State Water Commission. 20. New England News Letter, March 1934, p. 4. 21. Ibid., March 1934, p. 4; April 1934, p. 6. 22. Sanford H. Wadhams, "The Interstate Sanitation Commission," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 18,1942 (New Haven, 1942), pp. 44-51. 23. New England Planning Bulletin, I (April 1936), 2. 24. Phillips Bradley, "The Connecticut Valley in Massachusetts — A Regional Potential," American Planning and Civic Annual (Washington: American Planning and Civic Association, 1937), p. 171. 25. Phillips Bradley, "A T V A for New England?" The American City, L (June 1935), 4of. 26. U.S. National Resources Board, State Planning in New Hampshire, Report Submitted to State Planning and Development Commission of New Hampshire and National Resources Board, March 15, 1935 (Concord: U.S. National Resources Board, 1935); "Memo of National Planning Board to City, County, Regional and State Planning Organizations, November 16, 1933" in National Archives, National Resources Planning Board, Region One, General Correspondence, 1934-35. 27. New Hampshire, February 20, 1935 (c. 6); Vermont, April 11, 1935 (Act 18); Connecticut, April 18, 1935 (c. 122a); Massachusetts, August 9, 1935 (c· 475)· 28. These conclusions are based on a study of the correspondence concerning the creation of the New England Regional Planning Commission in the National Archives, National Resources Planning Board, Region One, General Correspondence. 29. Marian Murray, "Cleaning up the Connecticut," The New Republic, LXXX (September 12,1934), 128. 30. U.S. National Resources Committee, Drainage Basin Problems and Programs, December, 1936 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937); U.S. National Resources Committee, Drainage Basin Problems and Programs: 1937 Revision (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938); New Eng-

266

Notes to Chapter III

land Regional Planning Commission, Water Resources of New England, Publication No. 51, December, 1937 (Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1938); Massachusetts State Planning Board, Drainage Basin Study No. 2 — Connecticut River (Boston: Massachusetts State Planning Board, 1939). 31. Mass. Pub. Doc. 156 (1935), First Report of the State Planning Board, From September 18, 7935, to November 30, 7935. 32. Massachusetts State Planning Board, Progress Report on State Planning for Massachusetts: 1936 (Boston: Massachusetts State Planning Board, 1936); Mass. Pub. Doc. 156 (1936), Annual Report of the State Planning Board, November 30, 7936, p. 3. 33. National Archives, National Resources Planning Board, Region One, General Correspondence, 1934-35. 34. Report of the State Planning Board, December 15, 1934 (Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1934). 35. Conn. Pub. Doc. 87, January 1, 1937, Summary of Wor\ of the Connecticut State Planning Board. 36. Joseph T. Woodruff to Eliot, November 25, 1936, National Archives, National Resources Planning Board, Region One, General Correspondence, 1934-35· 37. J. T. Howard, Review of References on Interstate Compacts, New England Regional Planning Commission, Publication No. 34, May 20, 1936 (Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1936), p. 13. 38. Dudley Harmon, Executive Vice President, New England Council, to Hon. H. Styles Bridges, February 12, 1935. National Archives, National Resources Planning Board, Region One, General Correspondence, 1934-35. 39. Cross to Curley et al., March 29, 1935. National Archives, National Resources Planning Board, Region One, General Correspondence, 1934—35· 40. New England Regional Planning Commission, Water Resources Committee, "Preliminary Report," mimeographed (Boston, April 18, 1935). 41. Flood Control Compacts in New England States, Hearing before Subcommittee No. IV of the House Committee on the Judiciary, April 1 5 May 6, 1936 (75th Cong.). 42. U.S. National Resources Committee, Regional Factors in National Planning and Development, December, 1935 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 46. 43. Cutter to Citron, June 5,1935, Citron MSS. 44. New England Regional Planning Commission, Recent Advances in Legislation Dealing with Interstate Water Problems in the New England States, Publication No. 28-D, May 21, 1936 (Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1936). 45. New England Planning Bulletin, I (January-February, 1936), 2. 46. The National Resources Committee report was Regional Factors in National Planning and Development.

The Flood Control Conflict

267

47. Throughout this period, the most frequently cited article on interstate compacts was Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, 'The Compact Clause in the Constitution; a Study in Interstate Adjustments," Yale Law Journal, XXXIV, 685 (May 1925). 48. Howard, Review of References on Interstate Compacts. 49. House Doc. 395, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Development of the Rivers of the United States, p. iii. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., pp. ioif. 52. U.S. National Resources Board, A Report on National Planning and Public Worths in Relation to Natural Resources and Including Land Use and Water Resources with Findings and Recommendations, December 1, 1934 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 287. 53. U.S. National Resources Board, Inventory of the Water Resources of the North Atlantic Drainage Area, Η. K. Barrows, Regional Water Consultant (Washington: National Resources Board, 1935). 54. House Doc. 412, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., Connecticut River, Conn., Mass., N.H., and Vt. Chapter IV.

T H E FLOOD CONTROL C O N F L I C T

1. New York Times, March 16, 1936. 2. The account of the flood is based on contemporary accounts in the New York Times, Springfield Republican, Hartford Courant, Hampshire Gazette, and Brattleboro Reformer·, Representative Herman Kopplemann's report in Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., March 27, 1936, pp. 451 if.; the dramatic narrative of the flood at Hadley, Bertram O. Moody, "Connecticut Flood," Scribner's Monthly, CI (March, 1937), 62-65; and U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Geological Survey, The Floods of March 1936, Part I, New England Rivers, Water-Supply Paper 798 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937). 3. New York Times, March 26,1936. 4. Flood Control Compacts in New Eng. States, Hearing before Subcommittee No. IV of the House Committee on the Judiciary (75th Cong.), p. 26. 5. Ibid., pp. 2, 28. 6. The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Papers, The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, The National Archives, Hyde Park, New York, Official File 1092. Henceforth cited as FDR, O.F. 1092. 7. Ibid. 8. FDR, O.F. 132. 9. Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., April 27, 1936 — June 3, 1936, pp. 6ΐ43ίϊ., pp. 7938f., pp. 8636f., pp. 8855t 10. 49 U.S. Statutes 1570.

268

Notes to Chapter IV

11. General Wadhams, one of the Connecticut commissioners, later made the statement that because of the doubtful wording of the Flood Control Act of 1936, the interstate compacts were drafted under the authority of the Citron resolution. Comprehensive Flood-Control Plans, Hearings before the Committee on Flood Control (75th Cong.), p. 365. 12. Hartford Courant, October 3,1938. 13. Ibid., September 25, 1936. 14. Springfield Republican, January 8, 1937. 15. Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, VI (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 25. 16. Citron to Cross, February i, 1937; Cross to Citron, February 4, 1937. Citron MSS. 17. The meeting was closed to the public and the press. I have relied mainly on the account in the Springfield Republican, March 8, 1937, March 9> I 937·

18. Springfield Republican, March 28, 1937. 19. Committee on State Administration, Mass. House Doc. 1774 (1937), Special Report of the State Planning Board Recommending Ratification of Certain Compacts with Other New England States for Flood Control in the Valleys of the Connecticut and Merrimac\ Rivers. It should be noted that a companion agreement, with identical terms, was negotiated by New Hampshire and Massachusetts for the Merrimack Valley. The Flood Control Act of 1936 provided for a series of reservoirs in Vermont and New Hampshire, in accord with House Document 412. The Clason bill, H.R. 6585, granted permission for reservoirs in Massachusetts and Connecticut as well, in conformity with the Connecticut compact. 20. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., November 15, 1937, A5. 21. Hartford Courant, June 27, 1937. 22. Springfield Republican, July 23, 1937. 23. 41 U.S. Statutes 1063, as amended by 41 U.S. Statutes 1353, 46 U.S. Statutes 797 and 49 U.S. Statutes 838. 24. Committee on Commerce, Senate Report 955, 75th Cong., ist Sess. Calendar 979, Connecticut River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compact. 25. FDR, O.F. 2845. 26. New York Times, August 3, 1937. 27. FDR, O.F. 2845. 28. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., ist Sess., August 19, 1937, pp. 9337f. 29. Ibid., p. 9669. 30. Ibid., p. 9670. 31. Hartford Courant, July 28, 1937. 32. New York Times, July 30, 1937. 33. Cross to Citron, August 2,1937, Citron MSS. 34. New York Times, August 9,1937. 35. Springfield Republican, August 3, 1937.

The Flood Control Conflict

269

36. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., ist Sess., August 5, 1937, A1987. 37. Springfield Republican, August 7,1937. 38. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., ist Sess., August 6, 1937, p. 8351. 39. FDR, O.F. 2845. 40. Springfield Republican, August 7, 1937. 41. New York Times, August 6, 1937. 42. Ibid., August 8,1937. 43. Ibid., August 9,1937. 44. Springfield Republican, August 10, 1937. 45. Ibid., August 11, 1937. 46. Ibid., August 12,1937. 47. Merrimac^ River Valley and Connecticut River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compacts, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control, August 16, 17 and 18, 1937 (75th Cong.), pp. 30f. 48. Ibid., pp. 125L 49. Ibid., pp. 960. 50. Ibid., p. 99. 51. Ibid., p. 125. 52. Ibid., p. 98. 53. Ibid., pp. ii4ff. 54. Ibid., p. 109. 55. Ibid., ψ. 9i. 56. Ibid., p. 106. 57. Springfield Republican, August 10,1937. 58. Report on Interstate Compacts for Flood Control by the Commissioners for the State of New Hampshire (Concord: Concord Press, 1938), pp. i5f. 59. Walter S. Fenton, "The New England Compacts for Flood Control," Public Utilities Fortnightly, XXI, 644 (May 26, 1938). 60. Ibid., pp. 655^ 61. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., ist Sess., August 19, 1937, pp. 9337f. 62. The ablest statement in support of the compacts may be found in Report on Interstate Compacts for Flood Control by the Commissioners for the State of New Hampshire. Cf. Committee on State Administration, Mass. House Doc. 1774 (1937), Special Report of the State Planning Board . . . for Flood Control in the Valleys of the Connecticut and the Merrimack, Rivers·, W. S. Fenton, "The New England Compacts for Flood Control"; Edward J. Daly, "Discussion of the Legal Questions Which Have Arisen in Connection with the Compact," and James A. Newlands, "Water Power Proposals Which Have Entered into the Writing of the Compact," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 16, 1938 (New Haven, 1938); Charles M. Mills, "New England's Stand on Flood Control Compacts," Public Utilities Fortnightly, XXI, 451-462 (April 14, 1938);

270

Notes to Chapter IV

Congressional Record, 75th Cong., ist Sess., August 4, 1937, A1963; August 5, 1937, A1986. 63. Judson King, Why the Power fo^er in the New England Flood-Control Compacts? The National Popular Government League, Bulletin No. 181 (Washington: The National Popular Government League, 1937), p. 1. 64. 45 U.S. Statutes 534, 536. 65. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., November 15,1937, A5. 66. Merr. River Valley and Conn. River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compacts, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control (75th Cong.), p. 101. 67. Ibid. 68. King, "Why the Power Joker in the New England Flood Control Compacts?" p. 18. The best statement of the contention that the compacts were drafted by utility lawyers appears in King's pamphlet. The ablest general statements of the objections of the FPC to the compact appear in Committee on Commerce, Senate Report 955, 75th Cong., ist Sess., Conn. River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compact, and Oswald Ryan, "The New England Flood and Power Compact Stymie," Public Utilities Fortnightly, XXI, 67-80 (January 20, 1938). 69. New York Times, September 16, 1937. 70. Boston Globe, September 21, 1937. 71. Boston Transcript, December 1,1937. 72. Hartford Times, November 18,1937. 73. New York Times, October 17,1937. Chapter V.

T V A

ON THE CONNECTICUT

1. Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, II (New York: Random House, 1938), 123. The attempt to extend the T V A idea is discussed in William E. Leuchtenburg, "Roosevelt, Norris and the 'Seven Little T V As,'" Journal of Politics, XIV, 418-441 (August 1952). 2. Springfield Republican, June 4, 1937. 3. Merr. River Valley and Conn. River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compacts, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control (75th Cong.), p. 146. 4. New Haven Register, January 25,1938. 5. Rankin to the writer, February 20, 1950; Citron to the writer, February 17,1950. 6. Citron to Roosevelt, May 24, 1937, Citron MSS. 7. Merr. River Valley and Conn. River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compacts, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control (75th Cong.), p. 131. 8. For a discussion of this feature of the bill, see Phillips Bradley, "A T V A for New England?" The American City, L (June, 1935), 39-41.

TVA on the Connecticut

271

9. Citron MSS. 10. FDR, O.F. 834. 11. Ibid. 12. Citron to Roosevelt, August 18, 1937, Citron MSS. 13. New York Times, January 19, 1937. Roosevelt to Delano, January 16, 1937, National Archives, National Power Policy Committee, File 55. 14. Washington Star, February 5, 1937. 15. Dr. Harlow S. Person, loaned to the Informal Committee by the REA, noted the main objections to the Barkley-Bulkley bill in a memo to Morris Cooke: "Too much Corps of Engineers, even with respect to upstream engineering, soil conservation," and "Department of Agriculture left out of the picture." George W. Norris Papers, Library of Congress, Tray 80, Box 6. Henceforth cited as Norris Papers. 16. New York Times, April 1,1937. 17. New York Times, May 15, 1937. 18. The Norris bill, Wallace wrote Ickes, "would violate basic principles of sound organization, would demoralize the executive departments, and would deny to the President the over-all help to which he is entided. Administrative confusion, personal jealousies, and bitterness would be rampant both in the field and in Washington." National Archives, Agriculture, Secretary's Correspondence, 1937, Meetings. 19. Where the words "regional authorities" appeared, the words "or agencies" were added, and through the rest of the message the phrase "regional bodies" was used. FDR, President's Personal File, i - F . Roosevelt's message to Congress is House Doc. 261, 75th Cong., ist Sess., Creation of National Planning Board to Provide for Conservation and Development of National Resources. 20. Wadhams to Joseph T. Woodruff, June 11, 1937, National Archives, National Resources Planning Board, General Correspondence, 1937. 21. New York Times, October 13,1937. 22. Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, III (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), 4i6f. 23. Washington Post, November 11,1937. 24. New York Times, November 23, 1937. 25. Regional Conservation and Development of the National Resources, Hearings before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, November and December, 1937 (75th Cong.), p. 533. 26. Ibid., p. 614. 27. Ibid., p. 616. 28. Ibid., p. 621. 29. Ibid., p. 627. 30. Ibid., p. 789. 31. Ibid., p. 801.

272

Notes to Chapter V

32. New York Times, December 16, 1937. 33. Cohen to Roosevelt, FDR, O.F. 834. Chapter VI.

T H E F E D E R A L G O V E R N M E N T T A K E S OVER

1. Committee on Flood Control, House Report 1631, 75th Cong., ist Sess., Connecticut River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compact, p. 11. 2. Springfield Republican, September 7, 1937. 3. Ibid., October 12, 1937. 4. King, "Why the Power Joker in the New England Flood Control Compacts?" 5. Christian Science Monitor, November 30, 1937. 6. Boston Post, December 1, 1937. 7. Hartford Times, December 1,1937. 8. Burlington Free Press, November 30, 1937. 9. Rutland Herald, December 1,1937. 10. Ibid. 11. Springfield Union, November 30, 1937. 12. James M. Langley, "Here's Your Hat, Mr. King," Yankee, Vol. IV (January, 1938). 13. New Hampshire Morning Union, December 1, 1937. 14. Springfield Republican, January 10, 1938. 15.

F D R , O . F . 2845.

16. FDR, O.F. 1320. 17. Springfield Republican, January 11, 1938. 18. Ibid., January 19, 1938. 19. Ibid., January 20, 1938. 20. Ibid., January 25, 28, 29, 1938. 21. Ibid., January 30, 1938. 22. Comprehensive Flood-Control Plans, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control (75th Cong.) pp. 296ff. 23. Ibid., p. 361. 24. Ibid., pp. 3ΐ4ίϊ. 25. Ibid., p. 372. 26. Ibid., p. 358. 27. Ibid., pp. 985(1. 28. Citron to Roosevelt, March 29, 1938, Citron MSS. 29. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d. Sess., pp. 7156(1. 30. Ibid., p. 7167. 31. Ibid., p. 7168. 32. Ibid., p. 7170. 33. Ibid., p. 7170. 34. Ibid., p. 7171. 35. FDR, O.F. 132C.

The Federal Government Takes Over

273

36. New York Times, May 22, 1938. 37. Springfield Republican, June 7, 1938. Rankin revealed that the amendments had been drafted by Judson King. 38. FDR, O.F. 132C. 39. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d. Sess., pp. 8605fr. 40. Ibid., p. 8608. 41. Ibid., p. 8613. 42. Ibid., p. 8619. 43. Ibid., p. 9293. 44. Ibid., pp. 921 iff. 45. Ibid., pp. 92i7ff. 46. Ibid., p. 9368. 47. Springfield Republican, June 6, 1938. 48. Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2d. Sess., May 20,1936, p. 7573. 49. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d. Sess., p. 8619. 50. Whittington, in discussing the question the following year, remarked that Roosevelt had wanted action deferred, but after twenty years of surveys, it was time to act. Springfield Republican, May 20, 1937. 51. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 52. FDR, O.F. 2845. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid., August 2,1937. 55. Ibid., July 14, 1937. 56. FDR, O.F. 2845. 57. Springfield Republican, April 10, 1937. 58. FDR, O.F. 2845. 59. Ibid. 60. Hartford Times, September 27, 1938. 61. FDR, O.F. 2845. 62. Robert de Roos and Arthur A. Maass, "The Lobby That Can't Be Licked," Harper's, CXCIX (August, 1949), 23. 63. U.S. National Resources Committee, Drainage Basin Problems and Programs, December, 1936 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. ι off. 64. Committee on Flood Control, House Report 2353, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., Comprehensive Flood-Control Plans and Worlds for Reservoirs, Levees, and Floodwalls, p. 5. 65. Report on Interstate Compacts for Flood Control by the Commissioners for the State of blew Hampshire, pp. i5f. Italics mine. 66. Committee on Flood Control, House Report 1631, 75th Cong., ist Sess., Conn. River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compact, p. 4. 67. New England News Letter, March 1937. 68. Η. K. Barrows, "Water Resources Committee Recommendations for

274

Notes to Chapter VI

N e w England," Civil Engineering, VII, 744. Mason Young defends the North Hartland decision in the same issue. 69. House Doc. 455, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., Connecticut River, Mass., N.H., Vt., and Conn., p. 4. 70. Ibid., p. 7. 71. Barrows, op. cit., p. 743. Chapter VII.

HURRICANE POLITICS

1. Bernard De Voto, "Paradox on Betelgeuse," Harper's, C L X X V I I I (December 1938), I I I . 2. T h e description of the hurricane is based primarily on newspaper accounts, notably those in the N e w York Times, the Springfield Republican, and the Hartford Courant. T h e best single summary of the storm is F. Barrows Colton, "The Geography of a Hurricane," The National Geographic Magazine, L X X X V , 529-552 (April 1939). T h e most vivid personal account of the impact of the hurricane is Frances Woodward, "Wind and Fury," The Atlantic Monthly, XLXII, 749-757 (December, 1938). Also see De Voto, op. cit., pp. 109-112; John Q. Stewart, "New England Hurricane," Harper's, C L X X V I I I (January, 1939), 198-204; Stuart D. Goulding, "Neither Storm, Nor Strife . . .," Commonweal, X X X , 123-25 (May 26, 1939). 3. T h e Washington Daily News, May 23, 1936. 4. T h e Hartford Times, May 23, 1936. 5. Merr. River Valley and Conn. River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compacts, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control (75th Cong.), p. 147. 6. Regional Conservation and Development of the National Resources, Hearings before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, November and December, 1937 (75th Cong.), p. 800. 7. F D Ä , O.F. 132C, May 20, 1938. 8. Hartford Courant, September 24, 1938. 9. Ibid., September 22, 1938. 10. Hartford Times, October 6, 1938. Congressman Citron was informed that Governor Aiken had sent down Philip Shutler to get statements from Connecticut state officials asserting that the failure to act on the compacts had resulted in the flood damage. Citron MSS. 11. F D R , O.F. 132, September 26, 1938. 12. F D R , O.F. 83, September 26,1938. 13. FDR, O.F. 132, October 2, 1938. 14. Hartford Courant, October 1, 1938. 15. FDR, O.F. 132. 16. N e w York Times, October 5,1938. 17. Bulkley Griffin, "New England Secession," The New Republic, X C V I I (November 16,1938), 41.

The Skirmish at Union Village

275

18. New York Times, October 6, 1938. 19. Springfield Republican, November io, 1938. Chapter VIII.

T H E S K I R M I S H AT U N I O N V I L L A G E

1. Letter of October 15, 1938, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 387fr. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Tyler to Woodring, October 25, 1938, National Archives, War Dept., Flood Control, Connecticut River, Union Village Res. 5. Rudand Herald, October 26, 1938. 6. Brattleboro Reformer, October 28, 1938. Actually, the Secretary of War also gave his approval on this occasion, although he was later able to disavow Bragdon's contract negotiated in December, much as the Reformer feared. 7. Memo of Bragdon on visit to Montpelier, National Archives, War Dept., Flood Control, Connecticut River, Union Village Res. 8. New York Times, January 13, 1939. 9. Bragdon to Meier, November 16, 1938, National Archives, War Dept., Flood Control, Connecticut River, Union Village Res. 10. FDR, O.F. 2845. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Brattleboro Reformer, December 10, 1938. 14. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 387fr. 15. New York Times, January 13, 1939. 16. Wanamaker to Marshall, December 2, 1938, National Archives, War Dept., Flood Control, Connecticut River, Union Village Res. 17. Wanamaker to Bragdon, December 7, 1938, National Archives, War Dept., Flood Control, Connecticut River, Union Village Res. 18. Seavey to Woodring, December 3, 1938, National Archives, War Dept., Flood Control, Connecticut River, Union Village Res. 19. For the text of the letter, see Congressional Record, 76th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 387fr. Woodring may have made the decision as early as December 22. A War Department memo of December 23 states: "The situation has been altered by the oral instructions of the Secretary of War of the 22d inst. It will be noted that courtesy requires that some reply be made to the Governor of Vermont in the near future. He is waiting now for an approved copy of the agreement." Hall to Division Engineer, New York City, December 23, 1938, National Archives, War Dept., Flood Control, Connecticut River, Union Village Res. 20. Springfield Republican, January 18, 1939. 21. New York Times, January 13,1939.

276

Notes to Chapter VIII

22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid., January 14, 1939. 25. Ibid. 26. Washington Post, January 16, 1939. For other editorial comments, see "In the Name of the Great Jehovah . . .," Commonweal, Vol. XXIX, 383-84 (January 27, 1939). 27. Washington Post, January 16, 1939. 28. Reprinted in Brattleboro Reformer, January 20, 1939. 29. Christian Science Monitor, January 16, 1939. 30. Boston Transcript, January 16, 1939. 31. New York Times, January 17, 1939. 32. Reprinted in Brattleboro Reformer, January 21, 1939. 33. New York Herald Tribune, January 14, 1939. 34. New York Times, January 15,1939. 35. Ibid. 36. Christian Science Monitor, January 16, 1939. 37. Springfield Republican, January 16, 1939. 38. Springfield Daily News, January 17, 1939. 39. Springfield Republican, January 16,1939. 40. "Vermont Prefers Floods," The Nation, CXLVIII, io8f (January 28, I 939)· 41. New York Times, January 14, 1939. Brattleboro Reformer, January 13, 1939· 42. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 390fr. 43. Ibid. 44. New York Times, January 18, 1939. 45. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 454fr. 46. New York Times, January 20, 1939. 47. Ibid., January 15,1939. 48. Springfield Republican, January 17, 1939. 49. New York Times, January 24,1939. 50. Ibid., January 27, 1939. 51. Christian Science Monitor, January 27, 1939. 52. Ibid. 53. New York Times, January 27,1939. 54. FDR, O.F. 2845, January 28, 1939. 55. Springfield Republican, January 28, 1939. 56. New York Times, February 3, 1939. 57. Springfield Republican, February 1, 1939. Brattleboro Reformer, February 3, 1939. 58. Christian Science Monitor, January 31,1939. 59. Springfield Republican, January 20, 1939. 60. Christian Science Monitor, January 31,1939.

The Skirmish at Union Village

277

61. Brattleboro Reformer, February 3, 1939. 62. Christian Science Monitor, February 1, 1939. 63. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). 64. Van Brockfin v. State of Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886), and Springfield v. United States, 99 Federal (2d) 860 (1938). 65. Committee on the Judiciary, Mass. House Doc. 2101 (1939), Statement of Representative Philip Sherman of Somerville, House Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, with Reference to House Bill No. 2056, with Annexed Exhibits and Testimony; Also Supplementary Statement of Senator Laurence Curtis of Boston, Member of the Committee on the Judiciary, pp. 24fr. 66. Ibid., pp. 13L 67. Ibid., pp. Ι5ίϊ. 68. Ibid., p. 20. 69. Ibid., p. 5. 70. For the powers of the states over federal property over which the United States does not have exclusive jurisdiction, see Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1897); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Surplus Trading Co. v. Coo\, 281 U.S. 647 (1930); Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U.S. 242 (1934). 71. Committee on the Judiciary, Mass. House Doc. 2101, Statement of Representative Philip Sherman, pp. 55fr. 72. Christian Science Monitor, February 7, 1939. 73. Ibid., February 7, 1939, March 23, 1939. 74. Brattleboro Reformer, March 23, 1939. 75. Ibid. 76. Christian Science Monitor, March 28, 1939. 77. Ibid., April 5,1939. 78. State of New Hampshire, Laws (Jan. Session, 1939), c. 149. 79. Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1939. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid., May 23,1939. 82. Ibid. 83. Acts and Resolves (1939), c. 284. 84. Committee on the Judiciary, Mass. House Doc. 2101 (1939), Statement of Representative Philip Sherman, p. 54. 85. New York Times, February 12, 1939. 86. Brattleboro Reformer, March 23,1939. 87. Laws of Vermont, No. 2, 1939, April 4, 1939, amending Section 52 of the Public Laws. 88. Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 1939. 89. Brattleboro Reformer, September 29,1938. 90. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., ist Sess., January 18, 1939, p. 388. 91. Springfield Republican, January 3, 1939. 92. New York Times, January 6, 1939.

278

Notes to Chapter VIII

93. This same provision had been written into the flood control compact. 94. FDR, O.F. 132C. 95- 91 U.S. 367 (1876). 96. 302 U.S. 134 (1937). 97. Christian Science Monitor, April 5,1939. 98. 40 U.S. Statutes 257. 99. 43 U.S. Statutes 421. 100. 283 U.S. 451. 101. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 454fr. 102. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. 3 1 1 U.S. 377 (1940). 103. Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe 114 U.S. 525 (1885). 104. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Senate Doc. 34, 76th Cong., ist Sess,, Legal Aspects of Flood Control. 105. Christian Science Monitor, January 16,1939. 106. Springfield Republican, January 16, 1939. 107. Christian Science Monitor, May 4, 1939. 108. New York Times, November 24,1939. 109. Brattleboro Reformer, January 15, 1940. 110. New York Times, January 13,1939. HI. Bragdon to Chief of Engineers, January 28, 1939, National Archives, War Dept., Flood Control, Connecticut River, Union Village Res. 112. Committee on the Judiciary, Mass. House Doc. 2101 (1939), Statement of Representative Philip Sherman, p. 24. 113. It is by no means certain that Aiken accurately reflected local sentiment. On March 22, 1939, Phoebe A. Sargent, Breton W. Clark and Guy Aldrich, Selectmen of Thetford, Vt. (the town that would be flooded) wrote the War Department that Aiken did not give "a true picture of the sentiment of a very large majority of our citizens," stating that the people wanted the dam for a recreational lake even if it was a high dam. "Two members of our former board of Selectmen tried to gain some notoriety parading with a bag of States Rights over their shoulders but the townspeople tired of this and changed the personelle at March meeting." Chapter IX.

P O W E R D A M S AND R I V E R BOATS

i. Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyo\e, Mass., Hearings before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, March 20 and 21, 1941 (77th Cong.), p. 103. The Enfield issue had bobbed up previously in the spring of 1935 when railroad interests had attempted to repeal a reauthorization of the project, but they were blocked when Connecticut legislators, interested in multipurpose development, came to the support of Massachusetts, Both Senator Lonergan and Representative Citron indicated their support. Rivers and Harbors, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, April 22 to June 4, 1935 (74th Cong.).

The Battle of the West River Valley

279

2. House Doc. 165, 76th Cong., ist Sess., Connecticut River above Hartford, Conn. 3. Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyohe, Mass., Hearings before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, March 14, April 4 to 6, and May 10 and 15, 1939 (76th Cong.), p. 30. 4. Ibid., pp. 6ff. 5. Ibid., pp. 3iff. 6. Ibid., p. 18, pp. goff. 7. Ibid., p. 151. 8. Ibid., pp. 65fr. 9. Ibid., pp. 1780. 10. New York Times, May 16,1939. 11. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., ist Sess., May 17, 1939, pp. 5665^; Christian Science Monitor, May 17, 1939. 12. Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyo\e, Mass., Hearings before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, March 20 and 21, 1941 (77th Cong.), p. 11, p. 93. 13. Ibid., p. 19. 14. Ibid., pp. 36f. 15. Ibid., p. 20. 16. Ibid., pp. 24fi. 17. Ibid., pp. 25fr. 18. Ibid., p. 70. 19. Ibid., pp. 76f. 20. Ibid., p. 132. 21. Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyo\e, Mass., Hearings before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, October 19, 1943 (78th Cong.), p. 27. Kopplemann corroborated Miller's account of the election and the importance of the Enfield issue in a personal interview, April 21, 1950. 22. Ibid., p. 5 f f . 23. Ibid., p. 28, p. 51. 24. Ibid., pp. 26fi. 25. Hartford Times, October 16, 1943. 26. C. W. Mayott, Analysis of Navigation Project on Connecticut River, between Hartford, Conn., and Holyo\e, Mass. (Hartford, 1946) is the most ambitious statement of the case against the Enfield project. Chapter X.

T H E B A T T L E OF T H E W E S T R I V E R V A L L E Y

1. Flood-Control Plans and New Projects, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control, February 1 to 23, 1944 (78th Cong.) II, 1183^ 2. Christian Science Monitor, January 12, 1939. 3. Bratdeboro Reformer, January 18,1939.

280

Notes to Chapter Χ

4. House Doc. 455, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., Connecticut River, Mass., N.H., Vt., and Conn., House Document 455. 5. House Doc. 724, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., Connecticut River and Tributaries, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont. 6. 55 U.S. Statutes 629. 7. Flood-Control Plans and New Projects, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control, May 13, June 1 to June 11, 1943 (78th Cong.), I, 51. 8. Ibid., p. 52. 9. Ibid., p. 51. 10. Brattleboro Reformer, September 28, 1943. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., October 7,1943. 13. Ibid., October 9, 1943. 14. Ibid., October 8, 1943. 15. Ibid., November 18, 1938. 16. Ibid., October 16, 1938. 17. Ibid., October 19, 1943. 18. Ibid. October 23, 1943. 19. Ibid., October 29,1943; November 1,1943. 20. Ibid., November 12, 1943; November 13, 1943. 21. Ibid., November 15, 1943. 22. Reprinted, ibid., November 1,1943. 23. Reprinted, ibid., October 7, 1943. 24. Ibid., October 7, 1943. 25. Ibid., November io, 1943. 26. Ibid., December 17, 1943. 27. Ibid., December 18,1943. 28. Ibid., December 22,1943. 29. New York Times, December 29, 1943. 30. Flood-Control Plans and New Projects, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control (78th Cong.), II, 722. 31. Ibid., II, 721. By "Vandevanter" he, of course, means Van de Water. 32. Ibid., II, 1 1 3 1 . 33. Ibid., II, 1130. This section is based on the testimony of Maj. Gen. Robins and Col. Goethals at the hearings on February 11 and February 22, 1944, pp. 705ff., pp. ii25fi. 34. Ibid., II, 71 if. 35. Ibid., II, 1156fr. 36. Ibid., II, 1202. 37. Ibid., II, 714. 38. Ibid., II, 1209. 39. Ibid., II, 1210. 40. Ibid., II, 1184. 41. Ibid.

The Battle of the West River Valley

281

42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., II, 717. 44. Ibid., II, 1201. 45. Ibid., II, 718L 46. Ibid., II, 1209. 47. The Williamsville site was an all-embracing term, intended to include the Williamsville-Newfane-West Dummerston area of the valley. 48. Brattleboro Reformer, March 27,1944. 49. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 4i22f. 50. Ibid., p. 4129. 51. Ibid., pp. 4i35f. 52. Ibid., pp. 4207fr. 53. Ibid., pp. 42iof. 54. Brattleboro Reformer, May 11,1944. 55. Flood Control, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, May 29, 31, June 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 1944 (78th Cong.), pp. Χ49ίί. 56. Ibid., pp. I49ff., pp. 576fr. 57. Ibid., pp. i9off. 58. Ibid., pp. 138!?. 59. Ibid., pp. 789fr. 60. Ibid., pp. 170ft. 61. Ibid., p. 151. 62. Ibid., pp. 576ff. 63. Ibid., p. 194. 64. Springfield Union, June 13, 1944. 65. Brattleboro Reformer, June 14, 1944. 66. Ibid., June 23, 1944. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid., June 24,1944. 69. Ibid., August 4, 1944. 70. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 8430, 8485. The political strategy of the states' rights forces had been worked out at a conference in Chicago in September called jointly by the Texas delegation to the National Rivers and Harbors Congress, the National Reclamation Association, the Northeastern States Conservation Conference, and Incodel. The New England states played a major role at the meeting with Alban J. Parker, Attorney General of Vermont, Chairman of the conference, and Philip Shutler of Vermont demanding special consideration for the Connecticut Valley. "Stenographic Transcript of Water Conservation Conference," September 7-8, 1944, typewritten copy in offices of Connecticut State Water Commission, Hartford, Connecticut. 71. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 8488^ 72. Ibid., p. 8491.

282

Notes to Chapter Χ

73. Ibid., pp. 8495^. 74. Ibid., pp. 8553t 75. Ibid., pp. 9259ff. The same proviso for a greater role for the states was included in the Rivers and Harbors Law of 1945. 76. New York Times, December 24, 1944. The act also forbade the Army Engineers to substitute the Sugar Hill reservoir for the Bethlehem Junction site in New Hampshire. The New Hampshire controversy was similar to that in the West River Valley. 77. Flood-Control Plans and New Projects, Hearings before the House Committee on Flood Control (78th Cong.), II, 1185. 78. Flood Control, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce (78th Cong.), p. 803. 79. Ibid., p. 789. 80. Ibid., p. 173. 81. Ibid., p. 179. 82. Ibid., p. 184. 83. Ibid., p. 789. 84. Brattleboro Reformer, October 7, 1944. 85. Flood Control, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce (78th Cong.), pp. 149^!:. Chapter XL

T H E STATES T A K E OVER,

1945-1948

1. Brattleboro Reformer, April 16, 1945. 2. Ibid., August 8, 1945. 3. Ibid., August 4, August 8, 1945. 4. New England News Letter, November 1945, p. 4. 5. New York Times, October 7, October 24, 1945. Holyoke Daily Transcript, October 23, 1945. 6. Brattleboro Reformer, November r, 1945. 7. Ibid., December 19, 1945. 8. Ibid., December 20, 1945, January 3, 1946. 9. Ibid., February 1, February 15, March 1, March 2, March 22, 1946. 10. Ibid., March 28, 1946. ix. Melvin S. Wax, "Vermont's New Dealing Yankee," The Nation, CLXVIII, 660 (June 11, 1949). 12. Brattleboro Reformer, April 3, 1946. 13. Ibid., May 8, June 21, 1946. 14. Ibid., July 18, 1946. 15. Holyoke Daily Transcript, April 27, 1946. 16. The original order, an opinion of the Federal Power Commission bringing the Wilder project under Federal license, was issued on October 26, 1943. (4 F.P.C. 3). 17. Rudand Herald, March 20, 1944, April 3, 1944.

The States Take Over, 1945-1948

283

18. Brattleboro Reformer, June 23, 1945. Wilder Dam Project, Hearings Before a Senate Subcommittee on Public Works, January 29, 1948 (80th Cong.), pp. 72S. 19. Brattleboro Reformer, November 10, 1945. The company, after originally proposing a 390 foot level, asked to raise the dam to 385 feet., 20. Ibid., November 14, 1945. 21. 328 U.S. 152 (1946). 22. In re Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corporation (May Term, 1946, 114 Vt. 443, 47 A. 2d 409). 23. William Gilman, "Vermont Goes Radical," Collier's, CXIX (April 19, 1 947)> PP; i 2 f i· 24. Wilder Dam Project, Hearings before a Senate Subcommittee on Public Works (80th Cong.), pp. 72f. 25. Opinion No. 144, Proj. No. 1892, not reported. 26. New York Times, September 7, 1947. 27. Wilder Dam Project, Hearings before a Senate Subcommittee on Public Works (80th Cong.), pp. 71 pp. 28. Ibid., p. 24. 29. Ibid., pp. 6ff. 30. Ibid., p. 78. 31. Ibid., p. 53. 32. Ibid., p. 59. 33. Ibid., p. 80. 34. Ibid., p. 96. 35. Ibid., p. 101. 36. 329 U.S. 424 (1947). 37. New Hampshire Morning Union, February 16, 1949. 38. Reprinted, New England News Letter, April 1950, p. 13. 39. New Hampshire Morning Union, August 10, 1950. Boston Globe, July 17, 1949. 40. Mass. House Doc. 1730, December 1946, Report of the Special Commission to Investigate Connecticut River Navigation. 41. Mass. House Doc. 1765, December 3, 1947, Report of the Special Unpaid Commission Relative to the Development of Inland Waterways of the Commonwealth. 42. Timothy Dwight, Travels in New England, II (New Haven: Timothy Dwight, 1821), 337f. 43. Acts of 1941, c. 388. 44. Acts of 1945, c. 615. 45. Bratdeboro Reformer, April 5, 1945. "State Stream Pollution Abatement Today," American City, LXII (October, 1947), 11. 46. New England Regional Planning Commission, The Rivers Spea\ (Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1942), p. 15. There is an excellent discussion of the pollution question in Morton Braun, "Water Re-

284

Notes to Chapter XI

sources of the Connecticut River Basin: Problems and Proposals," Unpublished Master's thesis, Department of City Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1948. 47. W. J. Scott, "The New England Compact for Stream Classification and Pollution Abatement," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers (New Haven, 1948), pp. 63t. 48. 61 U.S. Statutes 407 (1947). 49. Scott, op. cit., p. 63. 50. Bill Davidson, "Our Poisoned Waters," Collier's, CXXII (October 16, 1948), 21. 62 U.S. Statutes 758 (1948). 51. On August 9, 1950, the New Hampshire Resources and Development Council voted tentative approval and further study of the compact proposal. Keene Evening Sentinel, August 10, 1950. Although Vermont had not accepted the New England compact by the end of 1950, it did join with New York in the creation of the Interstate Commission on the Lake Champlain Basin in 1949 to consider pollution abatement as well as recreation, economic development, forest utilization and related problems. Quebec was invited to become a member of the Commission. Both Vermont and New Hampshire ratified the New England pollution compact in 1951. 52. Richard Martin, "Connecticut Acts to Cut Sewage Pollution," American City, LXIV (December 1949), 92-93. 53. Springfield Daily News, April 8, 1947. 54. Brattleboro Reformer, August 2, 1947; Holyoke Daily Transcript, October 17, 1947. Recent developments in pollution abatement in New England are discussed in William E. Leuchtenburg, "What New England Is Doing About Pollution Control, American City, LXVII (December, 1952), 88—89. 55. New Hampshire State Planning and Development Commission, Progress Report, Flood Control Studies and Projects as They Pertain to New Hampshire, January 15, 1946 (Concord: New Hampshire State Planning and Development Commission, 1946). 56. House Doc. 724, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., Connecticut River and Tributaries, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont·, House Doc. 653, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., Connecticut River and Tributaries, Conn., Mass., N.H., and Vt. 57. Richard Martin contends that the power potential of the Victory site was negligible; that the Ludlow area had been so intensively developed that it could not be flooded without great loss; and that the cost of railroad relocation made the cost of the West Canaan site prohibitive. 58. U.S. Engineer Department, Comprehensive Plan for Flood Control, Connecticut River Basin, March, 1947 (Boston: New England Division, Corps of Engineers, War Department, 1947). 59. The War Department defended the decision on West Canaan, because "recent data indicate that the flood peak from the Mascoma River enters the Connecticut River from 12 to 14 hours after the main river has peaked

The States Take Over, 1945-1948

285

at their confluence." U.S. Engineer Department, Comprehensive Plan for Flood Control, Connecticut River Basin, op. cit., p. 34. Although it is not clear what new data could be available that was not available after the 1927, 1936, and 1938 floods convincing enough to require such a re-evaluation, this decision, at best, indicates the limitations of single-purpose development, for no one questioned that the Mascoma valley could be developed for power storage. 60. Brattleboro Reformer, May 1, 1947; Vermont State Water Conservation Board, Effects in Vermont of the "Comprehensive Plan for Flood Control of the Connecticut River," (Montpelier: Vermont State Water Conservation Board, 1947). 61. Brattleboro Reformer, June 21, 1947. 62. Ibid., April 8, 1948. 63. Philip Shutler to the writer, January 31, 1951. 64. Bratdeboro Reformer, August 18, 1948. 65. Ibid., December 10, 1948. 66. Wadhams' views on flood control reservoirs were of long standing. As early as 1937, he had declared that the Miami Conservancy District offered the best model for New England. Wadhams to William A. Liddell, February 5, 1937, National Resources Planning Board, Region One, General Correspondence, 1937, National Archives. 67. New England News Letter, February 1948. 68. Brattleboro Reformer, May 27, 1948. 69. Holyoke Daily Transcript, July 27, 1948. 70. The description of the flood is based mainly on accounts in the Boston Globe, the Christian Science Monitor, the Boston Herald, the Brattleboro Reformer, and the Springfield Union. 71. Brattleboro Reformer, December 31, 1948. 72. Ibid., February 2, 1949. Report of Col. James Stratton of the Army Engineers. 73. "Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Compact," mimeographed copy issued by Massachusetts State Planning Board; New Hampshire Morning Union, January 15, 1949. 74. Judson King, "Memorandum on the New Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Compact," January 29, 1949, typewritten. 75. Boston Globe, February 22, 1949. 76. Hampshire Gazette, April 24, 1949. So great was the interest in Federal action by this time that when McCarthy issued a statement urging the creation of a Connecticut Valley Authority in the name of the Connecticut Valley Development Committee at the time of the New Year's eve floods, it received wide publicity in New England newspapers and merited an editorial in the Boston Globe, although McCarthy's "Committee" had little substance. Congressman Furcolo later introduced McCarthy's C V A bill "by request." 77. Olds, "Comprehensive Development of the Connecticut River." 78. Boston Globe, April 24, 1949. The approval of Bowles and Dever was

286

Notes to Chapter XI

secured by the addition of a section asserting that the compact was not in eonflict with federal law. 79. During 1950, state representatives agreed to amend the compact to provide that loss of taxes and economic losses at each dam would be determined in advance of construction rather than afterward, so that down-river states could protest the construction of dams where costs would be higher than benefits. In addition, the states agreed to the appointment of an arbitration board to resolve deadlocks among the compact commissioners after the compact became operative. There was to be no change, however, in any of the sites previously agreed upon. Shutler to the writer, January 31, 1951. Chapter XII.

T H E N E W C A M P A I G N FOR F E D E R A L POWER

1. New York Times, October 11, 1945. 2. Holyoke Daily Transcript, November 18, 1947. 3. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 4. Constance Green, Holyo\e, Massachusetts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939). 5. Holyoke Daily Transcript, December 9, 1947. 6. Ibid., November 26,1947. 7. Ibid., December 2,1947. 8. Ibid., November 18, 1947, December 2, 1947, December 13, 1947. 9. Ibid., January 19,1948. 10. Ibid., August 6,1948. 11. Ibid., August 6, 1948, August 7, 1948. Holyoke Gas and Electric Department, Water Rights on the Connecticut River, September 9, 1948 (Holyoke: Holyoke Gas and Electric Department, 1948). 12. Holyoke Daily Transcript has the best account of these hearings; see especially editions of February 15-17, 1949. Also see accounts in Springfield Union, Boston Globe, Boston Herald, and Christian Science Monitor. 13. Bennington (Vt.) Banner, March 18, 1949. The best index to economic trends in New England is provided by the publications of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, whose monthly statistics are digested in the New England News Letter of the New England Council. 14. Boston Traveler, April 6, 1949; Hampshire Gazette, July 26, 1949. 15. William E. Leuchtenburg, "Our First Post-War Depression," The New Leader, XXXII (May 28, 1949), 5; Boston Globe, April 29, 1949; Daily Worker, March 16, 17, 22, 24, 25, April 1, 3, 1949. 16. Leuchtenburg, "Our First Post-War Depression," p. 5; William E. Leuchtenburg, "Lights Out Along the Merrimack," The Progressive, XIII (July, 1949), 2if. 17. Arthur W. Hepner, "The Nashua Story," Harper's, CXCVIII (February 1949). 74-8I· 18. Boston Herald, February 23, 1949. "What's Behind the Nashua Mill

The N e w C a m p a i g n for Federal Power

287

Shutdown?" Business Week., October 23, 1948, pp. 44-56. "Whose Mistakes at Nashua?" Fortune, XXXVIII (November, 1948), 98-100. 19. Investigation of Closing of Nashua, N.H., Mills and Operations of Textron, Incorporated, Hearings before a Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, September 22, 23, and 24, 1948, Part i, pp. 32f. 20. Emil Rieve, Address before the Massachusetts CIO convention, Boston, Massachusetts, December 11, 1948, typewritten. 21. Emil Rieve, Address before the Connecticut CIO convention, Hartford, Connecticut, January 16, 1949, typewritten. 22. Special Message No. 1 (Appendix No. / to Inaugural Message) (Montpelier: State of Vermont, 1949). 23. Brattleboro Reformer, October 20, 1948. 24. Mass. Senate Doc. 1, January 6, 1949, Inaugural Address of His Excellency Paul A. Dever to the Two Branches of the Legislature of Massachusetts. 25. Boston Record, December 2, 1948. 26. New York Times, January 30, 1949. Royce S. Pitkin, President, Goddard College, to the writer, February 17, 1949. 27. Boston Record, December 1, 1948; Boston Globe, January 20, 1949; Christian Science Monitor, January 22, 1949; New York Times, August 21, 1949. 28. New England News Letter, March-April, 1949, pp. 3f.; Christian Science Monitor, March 25, 1949; Boston Herald, March 22, 1949; Boston Globe, March 22, 1949. 29. New York Times, February 3, 1949; Christian Science Monitor, February 3, 1949. 30. Ibid. 31. Judson King, New England Power: Public or Private? (Boston: The Excelsior Press, 1949), p. 13. Mr. King may have had in mind the Eighth, rather than the Ninth Commandment. 32. C. Girard Davidson, Address before the Tenth Anniversary Banquet of the Textile Workers Union of America, Worcester, Massachusetts, May 14, 1949, mimeographed. 33. Hampshire Gazette, June 20, 1949. 34. Boston Herald, April 15, 1949. 35. Springfield Daily News, April 14, 1949. 36. Christian Science Monitor, April 6, 1949. 37. Hartford Times, April 21, 1949. 38. George H. Arris, Water Power — Myth or Fact? (Providence: The Providence Journal Company, 1949). 39. Springfield Union, October 19, 1949. 40. Revised Statutes of Maine, 1930, Ch. 68, p. 1108. 41. New England News Letter, May 1949, pp. 7f. 42. Reprinted, ibid., June, 1950, p. 23.

288

Notes to Chapter XII

43. Federal Power Commission, Power Market Survey: Power Requirements in New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island (New York: Federal Power Commission, Bureau of Power, New York Regional Office, 1949). 44. The President's Water Resources Policy Commission, Ten Rivers in America's Future, Vol. II of the Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950); Federal Power Commission, "Memorandum on Information Requested by Senator Leverett Saltonstall," February 17, 1949, Washington, D. C. 45. Olds, "Comprehensive Development of the Connecticut River." 46. C. G. Davidson, Address before the Tenth Anniversary Banquet of the Textile Workers Union of America. 47. Olds, "Comprehensive Development of the Connecticut River." 48. State of Vermont, Special Message No. 1, p. 4; Boston Sunday Advertiser, January 30, 1949; New York Times, October 30, 1949; recent editions of Federal Power Commission, Typical Electric Bills. 49. New York Times, November 6, 7, 30, 1947, February 5, 1948; Holyokc Daily Transcript, November 7, 1947; "U.S. Power Shortage Looms," Business Wee\, August 9, 1947, p. 17; E. Robert De Luccia, "Power Supply and Requirements in the United States," Address before the Midwest Power Conference, April 19, 1949, Sherman Hotel, Chicago, Illinois; F. L. Van Schaick, "Power Shortage," Editorial Research Reports, II, 531-547 (August 4, 1948). 50. "Future Demand to Make Power Industry Hustle," Business Wee\, July 31,1948, p. 25. 51. New York Times, December 15, 1947. 52. New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1949. 53. C. G. Davidson, Address before the Tenth Anniversary Banquet of the Textile Workers Union of America. The basic source of data on electric light bills is the annual publication of the Federal Power Commission, Typical Electric Bills. 54. C. G. Davidson, Address before the Tenth Anniversary Banquet of the Textile Workers Union of America. 55. Tennessee Valley Authority, The Valley Is Paying Off (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 4. 56. Boston Sunday Advertiser, February 2, 1947. The question of whether the New England economy was declining was debated in Seymour E. Harris, "New England's Decline in the American Economy," Harvard Business Review, XXV, 156-180 (March 1948), and Charles D. Hyson and Alfred C. Neal, "New England's Economic Prospects," Harvard Business Review, XXVI, 156-180 (March 1948). The writer's own views on the merits of the power controversy are best summarized by Professor Harris in his study, The Economics of New England (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), Ch. 2r. 57. Francis King to the writer, April 2,1951.

The N e w C a m p a i g n for Federal Power

289

58. Hampshire Gazette, June 7,1949. 59. Wax, "Vermont's New Dealing Yankee," p. 660. 60. New York Times, May 22, 1949; Congressional Record, 81st Cong., ist Sess., May 18, 1949, p. A3265. 61. Springfield Union, July 9, 1949; Hampshire Gazette, July 15, 1949. Richard Martin points out that no connection between pollution and polio has ever been established. 62. Hampshire Gazette, July 26,1949. 63. Reprinted, New England News Letter, June 1950, p. 23. 64. Hampshire Gazette, October 25, 1949. 65. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., January 4, 1950, pp. 62ft. H.D. 389. 66. Holyoke Daily Transcript, April 30, 1947; Springfield Daily News, June 11, 1947; Braun, "Water Resources of the Connecticut River Basin," PP- 73*· 67. 20 Fed. 71 (1884). 68. A summary of the Division Engineer's report appears in New England News Letter, July 1949, pp. 5fl. The writer is indebted to Clarence W. Mayott, Assistant to the President of the Hartford Electric Light Company, for permission to consult a confidential memorandum he prepared on the report. Richard Martin does not believe that the deepened navigation channel materially influenced Connecticut's decision on Enfield. 69. New England News Letter, July 1949, p. 21, as corrected by a second report in the following issue. The company later amended its application to include the construction of the dam as well. New England News Letter, June 1951. 70. Hampshire Gazette, December 22, 1949. Springfield Star, December 30, 1949. 71. New England News Letter, January-February, 1950, pp. i2f. C. W. Mayott to the writer, February 2,1951. 72. Springfield Star, January 27, 1950. 73. Boston Globe, January 28, 1950. 74. Springfield Union, January 28,1950. 75. Hampshire Gazette, January 27,1950. 76. Springfield Union, Jaunary 28, 1950; Hampshire Gazette, January 27, 1950. 77. Springfield Union, August 23, 1949, discusses these proposals. 78. Flood Control — Rivers and Harbors, Hearings before a Senate Subcommittee on Public Works, Part 1, July 12-15, 19-22, 25-26, 1949 (81st Cong.), pp. 352f. 79. Springfield Star, February 24, 1950; Hampshire Gazette, February 10, 1950. 80. New England News Letter, March 1950, p. 2. 81. Reprinted, ibid.

290

Notes to Chapter XII

82. New York Times, May 23,1950. 83. New England News Letter, June 1950, pp. 2f. 84. New York Times, January 4,1950. 85. Hampshire Gazette, July 25, 1950; Holyoke Daily Transcript, July 25, 1950; Springfield Union, July 25, 26, 1950. 86. Hampshire Gazette, July 27, 1950; New York Times, July 28,1950. 87. Springfield Union, August 9, 1950; New England News Letter, August 1950, pp. ι iff. 88. New York Times, July 30, 1950. 89. Hampshire Gazette, October 11, 1950; New England News Letter, November 1950, p. 2. As a result of the Korean War, the date for completion of the survey has been extended to 1954. Chapter XIII.

A N ASSESSMENT,

1927-1950

1. A. F. Pimentel to the writer, April 9, 1951. 2. Knightville and Tully may be developed for power in the future. 3. Η. K. Barrows, Floods: Their Hydrology and Control (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 304. 4. The President's Water Resources Policy Commission, A Water Policy for the American People, Vol. I of the Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 186. 5. Richard Martin, "Conservation and Development of the Water Resources of Connecticut and New England," Paper Submitted to the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, Springfield, Massachusetts, July 25, 1950, mimeographed, p. 16. 6. The Federal Power Commission was, however, consulted later, after objections had been raised to the compact. 7. The President's Water Resources Policy Commission, Ten Rivers in America's Future, Vol. II of the Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 493. The report observes: "This may result both from the fact that fluctuating flood control pools thus far have been considered of little recreational value in a region of many natural lakes, and from the planning of recreational development by the States." 8. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service in cooperation with Soil Conservation Service, Tentative Report on Flood Control Survey of the Connecticut River Watershed (Upper Darby, Pa.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1949), mimeographed. 9. Comprehensive Flood-Control Plans, Hearings before the Committee on Flood Control (75th Cong.), pp. 203fr. 10. J. W. Scott, "Is Federal Control of Water Power Development Incompatible with State Interests?" George Washington Law Review, IX, 634 (April 1941). 11. New England News Letter, September 1935.

An Assessment: 1927-1950

291

12. Marver H. Bernstein, "Public Utilities Commission," in George A. Graham, Marver H. Bernstein, and D. G. MacDonald, "Regulative Agencies, Report of Survey Unit No. 9 to the Commission on State Government Organization," November 21, 1949 (Hartford, 1949), mimeographed. 13. Ibid., p. 64. 14. Philip Selznick, TV A at the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of Calif ornia Press, 1949). 15. Kenneth A. Reid, "Pollution Control — A Post-war Public Works Opportunity for the States," State Government, XVIII, 32 (February 1945). 16. Springfield Union, November 16, 1950. 17. A plan for cooperative federal-state action is set forth in Directive Committee on Regional Planning — Yale University, The Case for Regional Planning with Special Reference to New England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947). 18. The President's Water Resources Policy Commission, Ten Rivers in America's Future, p. 473. 19. Arthur A. Maass, "Congress and Water Resources," in James W. Fesler, ed., "Government and Water Resources," The American Political Science Review, XLIV, 577 (September 1950). 20. New York Times, November 13,1925. 21. George Beach, Esq. and the Northampton Town Meeting, January 2, 1826 (Northampton, 1826), pp. 5f.

Bibliography MANUSCRIPTS William Citron Papers, Middletown, Connecticut. These papers are cited as Citron MSS. George W. Norris Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. These papers are cited as Norris Papers. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, The National Archives, Hyde Park, New York. These papers are cited as FDR. Records of the Department of Agriculture, National Power Policy Committee, National Resources Planning Board, and War Department, The National Archives, Washington, D.C. U N I T E D S T A T E S GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS Artman, Charles E. Industrial Structure of New England. Part I of the Commercial Survey of New England, U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930. Baldwin, Henry I., and Charles F. Brooks. Forests and Floods in New Hampshire. New England Regional Planning Commission, Publication No. 47, December 1936. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1936. Comey, Arthur C. Integration of the New England Regional Plan. Publication No. 68, National Resources Planning Board, Region One. October 1942. Boston: National Resources Planning Board, 1942. Gordon, Lincoln. "Power and Fuels," U.S. National Resources Planning Board, Industrial Location and National Resources. December 1942. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943. Howard, J. T. Review of References on Interstate Compacts, New England Regional Planning Commission, Publication No. 34. May 20,1936. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1936. Hynning, Clifford J. State Conservation of Resources. A study made for the National Resources Committee. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939· Kinnison, Η. B., L. F. Conover, and B. L. Bigwood. "Stages and Flood Discharges of the Connecticut River at Hartford, Connecticut." United States Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Water Supply Paper 836-A. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938.

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New England Regional Planning Commission. Connecticut River Valley Water Resources Bibliography. Publication No. 40, August 1936. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1936. Connecticut River Valley Water Resources Data. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1936. A Decade of Regional Planning in New England. Publication No. 72. June 1943. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1943· Forestry Organizations in New England. Publication No. 61. June 1940. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1940. Meeting of Interstate Compact Commissions. Publication No. 28-G. June 5, 1936. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1936. Membership of Interstate Compact Commissions on Interstate Water Problems in the New England States. Publication No. 28-F. May 29, 1936. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1936. Proceedings of the New England Regional Planning Conference. Hotel Westminster, Boston, Massachusetts, May 10, 1940. Publication No. 62. June, 1940. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1940. Recent Advances in Legislation Dealing with Interstate Water Problems in the New England States. Publication No. 28-D. May 21, 1936. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1936. Recreation in New England. Publication No. 53. September 1938. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1938. Recreation in New England: A Summary of Present Facilities. Publication No. 46. November 1936. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1936. The Rivers Spea\. Publication No. 65. January 1942. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1942. Six for One and One for Six. Publication No. 48. January 1937. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1937. Water Resources Committee. "Report upon Form of Federal Enabling Bill for Interstate Compacts in New England." Boston, August 14, 1935. Typewritten. Water Resources Committee. State Compact Form. Publication No. 13. June 12, 1935. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1935. Water Resources Committee. "Preliminary Report." Boston, April 18, 1935. Mimeographed. Water Resources of New England. Publication No. 51. December i, 1937. Boston: New England Regional Planning Commission, 1938. President's Water Resources Policy Commission, The. A Water Policy for

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the American People. Vol. I of the Report. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. Ten Rivers in America's Future. Vol. II of the Report. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. Water Resources Law. Vol. Ill of the Report. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on Water-Power Development in the United States. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Committee on Flood Control. Authorizing a Preliminary Examination of the Connecticut River, with a View to the Control of Its Banks in the State of Massachusetts. House Report 1381, to accompany H.R. 8562. 73d Cong., 2d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934. Committee on Flood Control. Completion of Local Protection Wor\s at Hartford, Conn. House Report 3033, to accompany S. 4362. 76th Cong., 3d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940. Committee on Flood Control. Comprehensive Flood-Control Plans and Works for Reservoirs, Levees, and Floodwalls. House Report 2353, to accompany H.R. 10618. 75th Cong., 3d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938. Committee on Flood Control. Connecticut River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compact. House Report 1631, to accompany H.J. Res. 493· 75th Cong., ist Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937. Committee on Flood Control. Preliminary Examination of Connecticut River, Flood Control, etc. House Report 1564, to accompany S. 203. 74th Cong., ist Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935. Comprehensive Flood-Control Plans. Hearings before the Committee on Flood Control, House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., on Report of the Chief of Engineers, April 6, 1937, House Flood Control Committee Document No. 1, 75th Cong., ist Sess., and Subsequent Reports of the Chief of Engineers, and Amendments to the Flood Control Acts of June 15, 1936, June 22, 1936, and August 28, 1937. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938. Connecticut River. Executive Document 42. Letter from the Secretary of War, Transmitting a Report of the Survey of the Connecticut River below Hartford. 46th Cong., 2d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880. Connecticut River above Hartford, Conn. House Document 35. Letter from the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, Transmitting Report of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors on Review of Reports Heretofore Submitted on Connecticut River above Hartford, Conn. 71st Cong., 2d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930. Connecticut River above Hartford, Conn. House Document 36. Letter from the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, Transmitting Report

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Subject of the Improvement of the Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn, and Holyoke, Mass., Held before the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, House of Representatives. 65th Cong. December 1 1 , 1918. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918. — Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass. Hearings before the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., ist Sess., on the Improvement of the Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass., October 19, 1943. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943. — Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass. Hearings before the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, House of Representatives, 77th Cong., ist Sess., on the Improvement of the Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass., March 20 and 21, 1941. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941. — Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass. Hearings before the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., ist Sess., on the Improvement of the Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass., March 14, April 4 to 6, and May 10 and 15, 1939. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939· — Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyo\e, Mass. House Document 417. Letter from the Secretary of War, Transmitting with a Letter from the Chief of Engineers, Reports on Preliminary Examination and Survey of Connecticut River, between Hartford, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass. 64th Cong., ist Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915. — Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Springfield and Holyo\e, Mass. House Document 27. Letter from the Secretary of War Transmitting a Letter from the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, Dated April 18, 1933, Submitting a Report, Together with Accompanying Papers, on a Preliminary Examination and Survey of, and Review of Report on Connecticut River, between Hartford, Conn., and Springfield and Holyoke, Mass., Authorized by the River and Harbor Act Approved July 3, 1930, and by Resolution of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, House of Representatives, Adopted December 17, 1930. 73d Cong., ist Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933. —Connecticut River, Conn, and Mass. Hearings on the Subject of the Improvement of Connecticut River, between Hartford, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass. Held before the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, House of Representatives, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. January 27, 1922. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922. — Connecticut River, Conn., Mass., N.H., and Vt. House Document 412. Letter from the Secretary of War Transmitting Pursuant to Section 1 of the River and Harbor Act Approved January 21, 1927, a Letter from

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House of Representatives, 74th Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 6803, March 22 and 23, and April 2, 1935. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935. — Flood Control Act of 194g. Hearings before the Committee on Public Works, House of Representatives, 81st Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 5472. May 16-20, 23-27, June 1, 2, 1949. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949. — Flood Control Bill of 1946. Hearings before the Committee on Flood Control, House of Representatives, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 6597, April 8 to 19, and May 2, 3, and 14, 1946. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. — Flood Control Compacts in New England States. Hearing Before Subcommittee No. IV of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.J. Res. 377, April 15-May 6, 1936. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936. — Flood-Control Plans and New Projects. Hearings before the Committee on Flood Control, House of Representatives, 77th Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 4911, April 21 to May 14, 1941. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941. — Flood-Control Plans and New Projects. 1943 and 1944 Hearings before the Committee on Flood Control, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 4485. Vol. I, May 13, June 1 to June 11, 1943. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. — Flood Control Plans and New Projects. 1943 and 1944 Hearings before the Committee on Flood Control, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 2d. Sess., on H.R. 4485. Vol. II, February 1 to 23, 1944. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. — Merrimac\ River Valley and Connecticut River Valley Interstate Flood Control Compacts. Hearings before the Committee on Flood Control, House of Representatives, 75th Cong., ist Sess., on H.J. Res. 482, H.J. Res. 435, H.J. Res. 436, and H.J. Res. 430, August 16, 17 and 18, 1937. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937. — Miscellaneous Fish and Wildlife Bills. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives. 8 ist Cong., ist Sess. May 12, 13, and 24, 1949. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949. — Navigation and Water Power Surveys. Hearings before the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, House of Representatives, 69th Cong., ist Sess., on the Subject of Surveys of Streams with a View to Formulating Plans for Improving Navigation, Developing Water Power, Controlling Floods and Irrigating Arid Lands. April 26, 1926. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926. — A Permanent System of Flood Control. Hearing before the Committee on Flood Control, House of Representatives, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., on

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— Committee on Commerce. Construction of a Dam and Loc\ in the Connecticut River. Senate Report 1 1 3 1 , to accompany S. 8033. 62c! Cong., 3d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913. — Committee on Commerce. Flood Control on the Connecticut River at East Hartford, Conn. Senate Report 1248, to accompany S. 3324. 76th Cong., 3d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940. — Committee on Commerce. Preliminary Examination of Connecticut River for Control of Floods and Prevention of Erosion on Its Ban\s in Massachusetts. Senate Report 1035, to accompany H.R. 8562. 73d Cong., 2d. Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934. — Committee on Commerce. To Amend the Flood Control Act of May 15, 1928. Senate Report 1662, to accompany S. 3531. 74th Cong., 2d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936. — Comprehensive National Plan for Prevention and Control of Floods — Veto Message. Senate Document 95. 75th Cong., ist Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937. — Connecticut River at East Hartford, Conn. Senate Document 32. Letter from the Secretary of War to the Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, Transmitting in Response to a Resolution of the Committee a Report of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, on Reexamination of Connecticut River at East Hartford, Conn. 76th Cong., ist Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939. — Connecticut River Navigation. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, on S. 298, S. 1619 and S. 3034. February 6 and 7, 1912. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912. — Creation of Conservation Authorities. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, U.S. Senate, 75th Cong., ist Sess., on S. 2555, June 21 to July 7, 1937. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937. — Emergency Flood Control Wor\s. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 78th Cong., ist Sess., on S. 1134, June 26, 1943. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943. — Flood Control. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 78th Cong., 2d. Sess., on H.R. 4485, May 29, 31, June I, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 1944. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. — Flood Control. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 77th Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 4911, July 15, 16, 21, and 23, 1941. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941. — Flood Control — Rivers and Harbors. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate, 81st Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 5472. Part 1. July 1 2 - 1 5 , 19-22, 25, 26, 1949. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949. — Investigation of Closing of Nashua, N.H., Mills and Operations of

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Textron, Incorporated. Hearings before a Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. Senate, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess., on Investigation of Closing of Nashua, N.H., Mills and Operations of Textron, Incorporated. Part i. September 22-24, 1948. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. Investigation of Closing of Nashua, N.H., Mills and Operations of Textron, Incorporated. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. Senate, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., on Investigation of Closing of Nashua, N.H., Mills and Operations of Textron, Incorporated. Part 2. October 26, 27, 28, November 8, 9, 10, 22, 23, 24, December 7 and 8, 1948. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949. Laws of the United States Relating to the Improvement of Rivers and Harbors from August //, iygo to March 3, 1887. Senate Miscellaneous Document 91, Vol. II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887. Legal Aspects of Flood Control. Senate Document 34. Letter of the Acting Chairman of the Federal Power Commission to Senator David I. Walsh Transmitting Memoranda of the Bureau of Law and of the Bureau of Engineering of the Commission Relative to the Various Aspects of Flood Control. 76th Cong., ist Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939. Proposed Agreement with the Connecticut River Company. Senate Document 1067. Letter from the Secretary of War, Transmitting, in Response to Senate Resolution of February 5, 1913, Information as to the Agreement Proposed to be Entered into with the Connecticut River Co. Relative to Generation of Power. Ö2d Cong., 3d Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913. Public Utility Holding Company Act. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce, U.S. Senate, 74th Cong., ist Sess., on S. 1725. April 16 to 29, 1935. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935. Rivers and Harbors. Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 11781. Part I, May 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 13, 1930. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930. Rivers and Harbors. Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 74th Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 6732, April 22 to June 4, 1935. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935. Wilder Dam Project. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., on S.J. Res. 155. January 29, 1948. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. U.S. Council of Economic Advisers. Committee on the New England Economy. The New England Economy. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951. U.S. Department of Agriculture. Forest Service in co-operation with Soil Conservation Service. Tentative Report on Flood Control Survey of the

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Connecticut River Watershed. Upper Darby, Pa.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1949. Mimeographed. U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Transportation by Water: 1916. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920. U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey. Floods in the United States. Water-Supply Paper 771. Washington: Government Printing Offic., 1936. The Floods of March 1936. Part I, New England Rivers. Water-Supply Paper 798. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937. Geologic Features of the Connecticut Valley, Massachusetts as Related to Recent Floods. Water-Supply Paper 996. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947. Hurricane Floods of September 1938. Water-Supply Paper 867. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940. Power Capacity and Production in the United States. Papers by C. R. Daugherty, A. H. Horton, and R. W. Davenport. Water-Supply Paper 579. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928. Surface Water Supply of the United States. Part I, North Atlantic Slope Drainage Basins. Water-Supply Paper 561. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925. Surface Waters of Massachusetts. By C. H. Pierce and H. J. Dean. Water-Supply Paper 415. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916. Surface Waters of Vermont. By C. H. Pierce. Water-Supply Paper 424. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917. U.S. Engineer Bureau. "Report of the Surveys and Examinations of the Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass., Made since 1867," Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers for I8J8. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878. U.S. Engineer Department. Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1927-1949. Comprehensive Plan for Flood Control, Connecticut River Basin, March, 1947. Boston: New England Division, Corps of Engineers, War Department, 1947. Estimate of Cost of Examinations, etc. of Streams Where Power Development Appears Feasible. House Document 308. Letter from Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, and Secretary of Federal Power Commission, Showing All Navigable Streams Upon Which Power Development Appears to Be Feasible and Estimate of Cost of Examinations of Same, April 13, 1926. 69th Cong., ist Sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926. U.S. Federal Power Commission. Annual Reports, 1927-1949. "Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corporation and Connecticut River Power Company." Docket No. IT-5584. Copy of Official Stenographer's Report before the Federal Power Commission. Springfield, Massachu-

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setts. October 23, 1939-May 15, 1950. 7 Vols. Washington: 1939-1940. Mimeographed. "Memorandum on Information Requested by Senator Leverett Sal tonstall." February 17, 1949, Washington, D.C. "Minutes of the Six Hundred and Eighth Meeting," February 3, 1937, Washington, D.C. National Power Survey. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935Plant and Ownership List to Accompany Map Entitled "Principal Electric Utility Generating Stations and Transmission Lines in the United States." Revised. June 30, 1948. Washington: Federal Power Commission, 1948. U.S. Federal Power Commission, Bureau of Power, New York Regional Office. Power Market Survey. Power Requirements in New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island. August 1949. New York: Federal Power Commission, 1949. U.S. National Resources Board. Inventory of the Water Resources of the North Atlantic Drainage Area. Η. K. Barrows, Regional Water Consultant. Washington: National Resources Board, 1935. A Report on National Planning and Public Wor\s in Relation to Natural Resources and Including Land Use and Water Resources with Findings and Recommendations. December 1, 1934. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934. State Planning. June 1935. Washington: National Resources Board, 1935· State Planning in New Hampshire. Report Submitted to State Planning and Development Commission of New Hampshire and National Resources Board. March 15, 1935. Concord: U.S. National Resources Board, 1935. U.S. National Resources Committee. Drainage Basin Problems and Programs. December 1936. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937. Drainage Basin Problems and Programs: 193J Revision. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938. "Drainage Policy and Projects." Report of the Special Sub-Committee of the Water Resources Committee of the National Resources Committee. February 1936. Washington, 1936. Mimeographed. Energy Resources and National Policy. January 1939. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939. The Future of State Planning, March 1938. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938. Regional Factors in National Planning and Development. December 1935. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935. Regional Planning. June 1938. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938.

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Water Planning. February 1938. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938. U.S. National Resources Planning Board. Interstate Water Compacts, 1785 to 1941. Technical Paper No. 5. Washington: National Resources Planning Board, 1942. Regional Resources Development-Report for ig42. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942. Region One. Meeting of the Maine and Central New England Drainage Basin Committees. November 18, 1941. Boston: National Resources Planning Board, 1941. U.S. War Department. Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers for 1891. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891. U.S. Works Progress Administration. Raging Rivers and the WPA. New Hampshire, October 1936. Concord: U.S. Works Progress Administration, 1936. U.S. Works Projects Administration. Massachusetts. Report on Sources of Pollution, Chicopee River Valley, Massachusetts. Pollution Studies Project 18120. August 1940. Boston: U.S. Works Projects Administration, 1940. Report on Sources of Pollution, Connecticut River Valley, Massachusetts. Pollution Studies Project 18120. January 1940. Boston: U.S. Works Projects Administration, 1940. Report on Sources of Pollution, Deerfield River Valley, Massachusetts. Pollution Studies Projects 12387 and 13683. Boston: U.S. Works Projects Administration, 1937. Report on Sources of Pollution, Millers River Valley, Massachusetts. Pollution Studies Project 18120. May 1940. Boston: U.S. Works Projects Administration, 1940. Report on Sources of Pollution, Westfield River Valley, Massachusetts. Pollution Studies Project 18120. July 1940. Boston: U.S. Works Projects Administration, 1940. S T A T E GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS Interstate Interstate Sanitation Commission. Report. New York: Interstate Sanitation Commission, 1949. New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission. Annual Reports, 1938-1950. New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission. News Letter. 1950-1951. New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission. Textile Wastes — A Review, 1936-1950. Boston: New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission, 1950.

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Colorado Colorado Water Conservation Board. Interstate Compacts. Denver: Colorado Water Conservation Board, 1936. Connecticut Biennial Reports of the State Water Commission, 1925-1946. Public Document No. 78. Bernstein, Marver H., "Public Utilities Commission," in George A. Graham, Marver H. Bernstein and D. G. MacDonald. "Regulative Agencies. Report of Survey Unit No. 9 to the Commission on State Government Organization." November 21, 1949. Hartford, 1949. Mimeographed. Compendium of Studies and Maps, Connecticut State Planning Board. January i, 1937. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1937. Connecticut State Planning Board, "Report on the Connecticut River Drainage Basin." Hartford, August, 1936. Typewritten. Digest of Connecticut Administrative Reports to the Governor. Hartford: 1947-1949. Post-War Planning Board. Post-War Connecticut. Interim Report of the Post-War Planning Board. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1944. Report of the Commission to Investigate the Pollution of Streams to the General Assembly. January Session, 1923. Public Document 73. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1923. Report of Connecticut Rivers and Harbors Commission to the General Assembly. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1911. Report of the State Flood Control and Water Policy Commission Pursuant to Special Act 5 7939 to the General Assembly. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1939. Report of the State Planning Board. December 15, 1934. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1934. Report on the Investigation of the Pollution of Streams by the State Board of Health Under Authority of Chapter 220, Public Act of 1913. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1915. Report on the Water Resources of Connecticut by State Water Commission. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1930. Smith, Herbert E., "Report of the Investigations of Rivers Pollution and Water Supplies," Report of the Connecticut State Board of Health for 1894. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1894. Summary of Wor\ of the Connecticut State Planning Board. Public Document No. 87. January 1, 1937. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1937. Suttie, Roscoe Henry. "Report of the Water Resources of Connecticut," State of Connecticut, State Geological and Natural History Survey, Bulletin No. 44. Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1928.

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Massachusetts An Act to Confirm an Act of the General Assembly of the State of Vermont, entitled "An Act to provide for improving the Navigation in the valley of Connecticut River." Boston: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1826. Annual Reports of the Massachusetts State Planning Board, Public Document 156, 1935-1949· Committee on the Judiciary. Statement of Representative Philip Sherman of Somerville, House Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, with Reference to House Bill No. 2056, with Annexed Exhibits and Testimony, also Supplementary Statement of Senator Laurence Curtis of Boston Member of the Committee on the Judiciary. House Document 2101. Boston: Wright and Potter Publishing Co., 1939. Committee on State Administration. Special Report of the State Planning Board Recommending Ratification of Certain Compacts with Other New England States for Flood Control in the Valleys of the Connecticut and Merrimac\ Rivers. House Doc. 1774. Boston: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1937. "Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Compact." Mimeographed copy issued January 1950 by the Massachusetts State Planning Board. Department of Public Works. Report on Investigation of September 1938 Flood to the Department of Public Wor\s. Moore and Haller, Inc., Consulting Engineers. Mimeographed. 2 Vols. Boston: Commonweath of Massachusetts, Department of Public Works, 1939. Inaugural Address of His Excellency Paul A. Dever to the Two Branches of the Legislature of Massachusetts. Senate Doc. 1. January 6, 1949. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1949. Massachusetts Geodetic Survey. High Water Data, Flood of March 1936 in Massachusetts. Boston: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1936. Massachusetts State Planning Board. Drainage Basin Study No. 2 — Connecticut River. Boston: Massachusetts State Planning Board, 1939. Drainage Basin Study No. 3 — Farmington River. Boston: Massachusetts State Planning Board, 1938. Drainage Basin Study No. 4 — Millers River. Boston: Massachusetts State Planning Board, 1939. Drainage Basin Study No. 5 — Deerfield River. Boston: Massachusetts State Planning Board, 1939. Drainage Basin Study No. 6—West field River. Boston: Massachusetts State Planning Board, 1936. Progress Report on State Planning for Massachusetts: 1936. Boston: Massachusetts State Planning Board, 1936. Report of a Hearing before the Committee on Public Health in Relation to the Necessity of Preventing the Pollution of Water Supplies of Cities and Towns. February 1884. Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1884.

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Report of Connecticut Valley Waterway Board on an Investigation of the Connecticut River. March 1913. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1913. Report of the Commission on Waterways and Public Lands. Senate Doc. 289. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1918. Report of the Department of Public Health on the Sanitary Condition of Certain Rivers of the Commonwealth. House Doc. 1735. February 1, 1938. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1938. Report of the Special Commission on Control and Conduct of Public Utilities. House Doc. 1200. March 1930. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1930. Report of the Special Commission Relative to the Textile Industry and to Prevent the Removal Thereof from the Commonwealth. House Doc. 2950. May 12, 1950. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1950. Report of the Special Commission to Investigate Connecticut River Navigation. House Doc. 1730. December 1946. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1947. Report of the Special Unpaid Commission Relative to the Development of Inland Waterways of the Commonwealth. House Doc. 1765. December 3,1947. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1948. Some Remarks Made before the Joint Committee on Rivers and Canals Relating to the Proposed Improvement of Connecticut River and the Extension of the Hampshire and Hampden Canal. February, 1828. Boston: Dutton and Wentworth, 1828. Special Report of the Department of Public Wor\s Relative to Protecting the Cities and Towns in the Hoosac and Connecticut River Valleys from Flood Damage. House Doc. 1 1 1 . December 1, 1928. Boston: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1928. Special Report of the Department of Public Health Relative to the Sanitary Condition of Certain Rivers in the Commonwealth. House Doc. 2050. January 1939. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1939. New

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Message on Flood Control by His Excellency Francis P. Murphy, Governor of the State of New Hampshire. Concord: State of New Hampshire, 1939. New Hampshire Fish and Game Commission. Biological Survey of the Connecticut Watershed. December 1939. Concord: New Hampshire Fish and Game Department, 1939. New Hampshire State Planning Board. Area of Water Bodies in the State of New Hampshire. December 1, 1934. Concord: New Hampshire State Planning Board, 1934. New Hampshire State Planning and Development Commission. Industrial and Commercial Damages — March rg^6 Floods in New Hampshire. A Report to the New Hampshire Flood Reconstruction Council by the Sub-Committee on Industry and Commerce. Concord: New Hampshire State Planning and Development Commission, 1936.

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New Hampshire State Planning and Development Commission. Progress Report, Flood Control Studies and Projects as They Pertain to New Hampshire. January 15, 1946. Concord: New Hampshire State Planning and Development Commission, 1946. Report of Commission on Water Conservation and Water Power, 191J-1918. January 1, 1919. Concord: State of New Hampshire, 1919. Report of Commission on Water Conservation and Water Power, 1919-1920. January 1, 1921. Concord: State of New Hampshire, 1921. Report of the Commissioners on the Preliminary Examination of the Water Power of New Hampshire. Manchester: Ν. B. Clarke, 1870. Report on Interstate Compacts for Flood Control by the Commissioners for the State of New Hampshire. February 15, 1938. Concord: Concord Press, 1938. State Planning and Development Commission. Biennial Reports, 1936-1941. Water Resources Board. Biennial Reports, 1935-1940. Vermont Development Commission. Effects in Vermont of the "Comprehensive Plan for Flood Control of the Connecticut River." A Report to the Vermont State Water Conservation Board. February 1947. Montpelier: State of Vermont, 1947. "On the Necessity for Control of Vermont Streams and Watersheds by an Agency of the State." Prepared for the Vermont State Planning Board. October 1938. Typewritten. Progress Report Submitted to the Vermont State Planning Board and the National Resources Committee. Montpelier: State of Vermont, 1936. Public Service Commission. Report of Advisory Committee of Engineers on Flood Control. December 15, 1928. Montpelier: State of Vermont, 1928. Report of Advisory Committee of Engineers on Flood Control. December 15, 1930. Montpelier: State of Vermont, 1930. Report of Commissioners Relative to the Restoration of Sea-Fish to the Connecticut River and Its Tributaries. Montpelier: Freemen Steam Printing Establishment, 18 66. Report of the Commission on the Conservation of the Natural Resources of the State of Vermont, 1911—1912. Rutland: The Tuttle Company, 1912. Report of the Committee Designated by the Vermont General Assembly in No. 11 of the Acts of the Special Session of 1944 to Investigate Flood Damage in the Upper Valley of the Connecticut River. Mimeographed. Montpelier: State of Vermont, 1945. Report of the Committee Designated by the Vermont General Assembly in No. 26 of the Acts of the Special Session of 1944 to Study Power Dams and Their Relation to Agriculture. Montpelier: State of Vermont, 1944. Report of the Fish Commissioners of the State of Vermont by Albert D.

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Armstrong, Robert M. "The Seven Wooden Horses of Troy," The Nebraska Municipal Review, November, 1937, pp. 33-41. Arris, George H. Water Power — Myth or Fact? Providence: The Providence Journal Company, 1949. Atwood, Albert W. "The Long River of New England," National Geographic Magazine, LXXXIII, 401-34 (April 1943). Atwood, R. E. Stories and Pictures of the Vermont Flood, November, 7927. Burlington: R. E. Atwood, 1927. Bacon, Edwin M. The Connecticut River. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906. Barrows, Η. K. Floods: Their Hydrology and Control. New York: McGrawHill, 1948. "Report upon Five Storage Reservoir Projects in the State of New Hampshire." November 29, 1933. Typewritten. "Report upon Storage and Power Projects in the State of New Hampshire." March 30,1934. Typewritten. "Report upon Power-Storage Regulation of Flow Connecticut River Easterly Tributary Streams in N.H." September 12, 1933. Typewritten. "Storage-Power Projects in New Hampshire." September 20, 1933. Typewritten. Water Power Engineering. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934. "Water Resources Committee Recommendations for New England," Civil Engineering, VII, 740-744 (November 1937). Bauer, John. America's Struggle for Electric Power. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1935. Bendiner, Μ. H. "Stream Pollution and the Disposal of Waste," Editorial Research Reports, II, 255-268 (September 17, 1935). Bigelow, George H. "The Flood in Massachusetts," American Journal of Public Health, XVII, 1248 (December 1928). Bigwood, B. L. "The Hurricane Floods of September, 1938 in Connecticut," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for the Year Ending March 22, 1939 (New Haven, 1939), pp. 137-167. Boucher, Henry G., Jr. "Hydro-Power Development in the Connecticut River Basin." Unpublished essay submitted for Honors in the Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, 1950. Bradley, Phillips. 'The Connecticut Valley in Massachusetts — A Regional Potential," American Planning and Civic Annual (Washington: American Planning and Civic Association, 1937), pp. 165-172. "A TVA for New England?" The American City, L (June, 1935), 39~41· Braun, Morton B. "Water Resources of the Connecticut River Basin: Problems and Proposals." Unpublished Master's thesis, Department of City Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1948.

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"Curbing the Connecticut," Scientific American, CLXV, 204-206 (October 1941). Daly, Edward J. "Discussion of the Legal Questions Which Have Arisen in Connection with the Compact," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 16, 1938 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 84-92. Daniels, Jonathan. A Southerner Discovers New England. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. Davidson, Bill. "Our Poisoned Waters," Collier's, CXXII (October 16, 1948), 20-81. Davidson, C. Girard. Address at the Tenth Anniversary Banquet of the Textile Workers Union of America. Worcester, Massachusetts, May 14, 1949. Mimeographed. Davis, Eugene E. "Ten Great Floods in Connecticut River." Unpublished manuscript, Forbes Library, Northampton, Massachusetts. Northampton, 1928. Dayton, Fred Erving. Steamboat Days. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925. De Luccia, Ε. Robert. 'Tower Supply and Requirements in the United States." Address before the Midwest Power Conference, April 19, 1949, Sherman Hotel, Chicago, Illinois. De Voto, Bernard. "Paradox on Betelgeuse," Harper's, XLXXVIII (December, 1938), 109-12. Dewey, Τ. M. "Early Navigation on the Connecticut River," Papers and Proceedings of the Connecticut Valley Historical Society, 1876-1881 (Springfield: Connecticut Valley Historical Society, 1881), I, 114-122. Dickens, Charles. American Notes. London: Chapman and Hall, 1842. Directive Committee on Regional Planning — Yale University. The Case for Regional Planning with Special Reference to New England. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. "The Disastrous Flood in New England," The Literary Digest, XCV (November 19,1927), 13. Dwight, Timothy. Travels in New England and New Yor\. 4 Vols. New Haven: Timothy Dwight, 1821. Eggleston, Julius W. "Glacial Geology and the Vermont Flood," Science, n.s. LXIX, 621-22 (June 14, 1929). Elsbree, Hugh Langdon. Interstate Transmission of Electric Power. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931. Erving, Henry W. The Connecticut River Banking Company. Hartford: Connecticut River Banking Company, 1925. Evans, Helen. "The Economic Development of the Connecticut Valley in Massachusetts." Unpublished M.A. essay, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts.

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Goulding, Stuart D. "Neither Storm, Nor Strife. . . ." Commonweal, X X X (May 26, 1939), 123-125. Grattan, C. Hartley. "What Makes New England Go?". Harper's, CXCIX (August 1949), 92-90. "Where is New England Going?" Harper's, CXCIX (September, 1949)» 35-42· Gray, John H. "The Dilemma of Giant Power Regulation," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, C X X I X (January, 1927), 1 1 0 - 1 1 7 . Green, Constance. Holyo\e, Massachusetts. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939. Griffin, Bulkley. "New England Secession," The New Republic, X C V I I (November 16,1938), 41. Griswold, Roger M. "First Sailing Vessels and Merchant-Mariners on the Connecticut River," The Connecticut Magazine, X, 463-473 (July, August, September, 1906). Gruening, Ernest. The Public Pays. New York: The Vanguard Press, 1931. Gunby, F. M. "Power Supply for New England Industry," Transactions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Part I, LI (New York: The American Society of Mechanical Engineers), 133-144. Hard, Walter. The Connecticut. New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1947. Harris, Seymour E. The Economics of New England. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952. "New England's Decline in the American Economy," Harvard Business Review, X X V , 359-360 (Spring 1947). Harte, Charles Rufus. "Connecticut's Canals," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 16, 1938 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 118-179. " A Partial List of Booklets and Articles on the Hurricane of September 21, 1938," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 22, ig^g (New Haven, 1939), pp. 191-196. Hartford, Connecticut. Court of Common Council. Report of the Committee and Engineer, on the Subject of a Canal from Enfield Falls to Hartford to Furnish the City with Water and Water Power. Hartford: Case, Tiffany and Burnham, 1847. Hartford, Connecticut. Court of Common Council. Report of the Committee on the Proposed Hartford Dy\e. Hartford: Wiley, Waterman and Eaton, 1867. Hartford Electric Light Company. "Connecticut River — Enfield." Hartford: Hartford Electric Light and Power Company, 1950. Mimeographed. Facts in Answer to Questions About the Electric Power Business in New England. Hartford: Hartford Electric Light Company, 1950. Hayes, Lyman S. "The Navigation of the Connecticut River," Proceedings

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Jacobson, John, Jr. Specch before the New Hampshire League of Women Voters, Durham, N.H., October 19, 1937. Typewritten copy in N.H. State Library, Concord, N.H. Journal of the Convention, Holden at Windsor, Vermont, Sept. 28th & 30th, 1830, jor the Purpose of Taking into Consideration Subjects Connected with the Improvement of Connecticut River. Windsor: Simeon Ede, 1830. Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention, Holden at Windsor, Vermont, February 16, 1825; for the Purpose of Taking Preliminary Measures to Effect an Improved Navigation on Connecticut River. Windsor: W. Spooner, 1825. Keezer, Dexter M. and May, Stacy. The Public Control of Business. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1930. Kent, Rose Lindley. "Flood-tales of Bennington," The Vermonter, XXXII, 55-62 (No. 4,1928). Kern, Col. T. F. "Engineering Aspects of Flood Control in New England," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 20, 1946 (New Haven, 1946), pp. 115-135. Kerwin, Jerome G. Federal Water-Power Legislation. New York: Columbia University Press. 1926. King, Judson. "Memorandum on the Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Compact." January 29, 1949. Typewritten. New England Power: Public or Private} Boston: The Excelsior Press, 1949. Why the Power fo\er in the New England Flood-Control Compacts? The National Popular Government League, Bulletin No. 181. Washington: National Popular Government League, 1937. Kinnison, Η. B. 'The New England Flood of November, 1927." Papers and Transactions for 1928 of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers (New Haven, 1928), pp. 123-143. Kirkland, Edward C. Men, Cities and Transportation. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. Kistler, Thelma M. The Rise of Railroads in the Connecticut River Valley. Smith College Studies in History, Vol. XXIII. Northampton: Smith College, 1938. Langley, James M. "Here's Your Hat Mr. King," Yankee, Vol. IV (January, 1938)· "Why Regional Planning?—New England," American Planning and Civic Annual (Washington: American Planning and Civic Association, 1937). PP· 149-15 2 · Lepawsky, Albert. "Water Resources and American Federalism," in James W. Fesler, ed., "Government and Water Resources," The American Political Science Review, XLIV, 631-649 (September 1950).

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Mayott, Clarence. Analysis of Navigation Project on Connecticut River between Hartford, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass. Hartford, 1946. "The Power Situation in the Northeast with Reference to the Proposed St. Lawrence Development." Hartford, n.d. Report on Flood Control, Navigation and Hydro-Electric Developments (as to Existing and Potential Sites) on the Watersheds of the Connecticut, Thames and Housatonic Rivers. Hartford: Hartford Electric Light Co., 1945. McClelland, Donald H. "The Economics of Multipurpose Development of the Connecticut River Basin." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, Harvard University, March, 1949. McDonald, Charles C. 'The Flood of June 16-18, 1943, in the Upper Connecticut River Basin," Journal of the Boston Society of Civil Engineers, XXX, 238-261 (October 1943). "The New Hampshire Flood of June 14-15, 1942," Journal of the Boston Society of Civil Engineers, XXX, 1-22 (January 1943). McKinley, Charles. "The Valley Authority and Its Alternatives," in James W. Fesler, ed., "Government and Water Resources," The American Political Science Review, XLIV, 607-631 (September 1950). McLaughlin, Glenn E. and Stefan Robock. Why Industry Moves South. NPA Committee of the South, Report No. 3. Washington: National Planning Association, 1949. McNamara, F. T. "Connecticut's Power Resources," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 20, 1940 (New Haven, 1940), pp. 113-128. Merriam, Charles E. "The National Resources Planning Board; A Chapter in American Planning Experience," The American Political Science Review, XXXVIII, 1075-1088 (December 1944). Merrill, O. C. "Federal Versus State Jurisdiction Over Power Development and Its Supervision," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CXXIX, 110-117 (January 1927). Meyer, Β. H. History of Transportation in the United States before i860. Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917. Mills, Charles M. "New England's Stand on Flood Control Compacts," Public Utilities Fortnightly, XXI, 451-462 (April 14, 1938). Moody, Bertram O. "Connecticut Flood," Scribner's Monthly, CI (March, 1937), 62-65. Murray, Marian. "Cleaning up the Connecticut," The New Republic, LXXX (September 12,1934), 127-28. National Electric Light Association. Electric Service in the American Home. New York: National Electric Light Association, 1931. Prosperity Through Power Development. A Compilation from Papers Presented at the First World Power Conference Held at London, England, July 1924. New York: National Electric Light Association, 1925.

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Putney, Bryan. "Regional Planning and Development," Editorial Research Reports, II, 3-25 (July 3,1937). Ramsay, M. L. Pyramids of Power. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1937. Rauschenbush, Η. S. and Harry W. Laidler, Power Control. New York: New Republic, Inc., 1928. Reid, Kenneth A. "Pollution Control — A Post-war Public Works Opportunity for the States," State Government, XVIII, 30-32 (February 1945). "Report of Special Committee, New England Flood of 1927," Bulletin of the American Railway Engineering Association, XXX (August, 1928), 3-105. "Report of the Committee on Floods, March, 1930," fournal of the Boston Society of Civil Engineers, XVII, 293—464 (September 1930). Report of the Joint Special Committee of the Court of Common Council and That of City Engineer Frederick^ L. Ford on the East Side Flood Protection. Hartford: The Case, Lockwood and Brainard Co., 1909. Report of the President and Directors of the Connecticut River Company. January 3, 1826. Hartford: Philemon Canfield, 1826. Report to the Associated Industries of Massachusetts of Its Power Investigating Committee. Boston: Associated Industries of Massachusetts, 1924. Rieve, Emil. Address before the Connecticut CIO convention, Hartford, Connecticut, January 16, 1949. Typewritten. Address before the Massachusetts CIO convention, Boston, Massachusetts, December 11, 1948. Typewritten. Ripley, Ε. B. "The Connecticut Valley Power Exchange," Papers and Transactions for 1930 of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers. New Haven, 1930, pp. 48-57. Ripley, William Z. Main Street and Wall Street. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1927. Robinson, David W. "Voluntary Regionalism in the Control of Water Resources," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCVII, 116-123 (January 1940). Roby, Harrison G. "Government Hydro Plant Construction Takes Important Place in Works of Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army." Civil Engineering, XIX, 48-54 (November 1949). Roos, Robert de and Arthur A. Mass. "The Lobby That Can't Be Licked," Harper's, CXCIX (August, 1949), 21-30. Roosevelt, Franklin, "The Real Meaning of the Power Problem," Forum, LXXXII, 327-32 (December 1929). Rosenman, Samuel I., ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 13 Vols. New York: Random House, Macmillan, Harper, 1938-50. Ryan, Oswald. "The New England Flood and Power Compact Stymie," Public Utilities Fortnightly, XXI, 67—80 (January 20, 1938). Saville, Caleb Mills. "Some Floods and Droughts on New England Streams,"

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Thompson, Carl D. Public Ownership. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1925. "Trials and Heroisms of the New England Flood," The Literary Digest, XCV (November 26,1927), 38—44. Troxell, E. L. "Flood Control in Connecticut," Science, n.s. LXXXIV, 24748 (September 11, 1936). Turner, Ellwood J. "The Place of the States in the Field of Watershed Development," State Government, XVIII, 19-22 (February 1945). Turner, Howard M. "Water Power in New England." Address to the 95th Quarterly Meeting, The New England Council, Manchester, Vermont, 1949. Mimeographed. Twentieth Century Fund. The Power Industry and the Public Interest. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1944. Two Reports Made by Committees Appointed by the Directors of the Association for Improving the Navigation of the Connecticut River Above Hartford. January, 1825. Hartford: P. B. Goodsell, 1825. "U.S. Power Shortage Looms," Business Wee\, August 9, 1947, p. 17. Upham, George B. "Early Navigation on the Connecticut," Granite Monthly, LI, 362-368 (August 1919). Van Schaick, F. L. "Power Shortage," Editorial Research Reports, II, 531-547 (August 4,1948). "Vermont Defends a Principle," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXVI (March 25, 1944), 108. "Vermont Prefers Floods," The Nation, CXLVIII, 108-09 (January 28, 1939). Verrill, A. Hyatt. The Heart of Old New England. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1936. Wadhams, Sanford H. "The Connecticut," State Government, XIX, 218—236 (September 1946). "Connecticut State Water Commission — A Review of Its Five Years of Existence," Papers and Transactions for 1931 of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers (New Haven, 1931), pp. 28-41. "Historical Account of Flood Control Compacts for the Connecticut River," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 16, ig$8 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 49-67. "The Interstate Sanitation Commission," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 18, 1942 (New Haven, 1942), pp. 44-51. Walter, Charles T. Lights and Shadows of the Flood of 1927. St. Johnsbury: Cowles Press, 1928. Wax, Melvin S. "Vermont's New Dealing Yankee," The Nation, CLXVIII, 659-60 (June 11, 1949). Webbink, Paul. "Federal Water Power Policy," Editorial Research Reports, I, 61-85 (January 22, 1929). Wells, Philip P. "Federal and State Relations in the Control of Power Devel-

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opment and Distribution," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CXXIX, 126-131 (January 1927). Westfield, Massachusetts. Majority and Minority Reports of the Committee Appointed December 18, 1878, to Report the Best Plan for the Permanent Protection of the Town from Future Floods. Westfield: Clark and Story, 1879. "What's Behind the Nashua Mill Shutdown?" Business Wee\, October 23, 1948, pp. 44-56. White, Gilbert Fowler. Human Adjustment to Floods. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1945. White, Gilbert Fowler. "National Executive Organization for Water Resources," in James W. Fesler, ed., "Government and Water Resources," The American Political Science Review, XLIV, 593-607 (September 1950). Whittlesey, Charles W. Crossing and Re-Crossing the Connecticut River. New Haven: The Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor Company, 1938. "Whose Mistakes at Nashua?" Fortune, XXXVIII, 98—100 (November 1948). Wilgus, William J. The Role of Transportation in the Development of Vermont. Montpelier: Vermont Historical Society, 1945. Wilson, Harold Fisher. The Hill Country of Northern New England. Columbia University Studies in the History of American Agriculture, Vol. III. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936. Winsor, Frank E. "Diversion of Interstate Waters for Domestic Water Supply," Journal of the New England Water Wor\s Association, XLV, 267286 (September 1931). "Winter Power Pinch to Nip Many Areas of U.S.," Business Wee\, October 23, 1948, pp. 19-20. Wise, William S. "Salvaging the Water Resources of Connecticut Through Pollution Control," Annual Report of the Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers for Year Ending March 21, 1945 (New Haven, 1945), pp. 48-61. Woodward, Frances. "Wind and Fury," The Atlantic Monthly, XLXII, 74957 (December 1938). Wright, John K., ed. New England's Prospect: 1933. American Geographical Society, Special Publication 16. New York: American Geographical Society, 1933. Young, Mason J. "Army Engineers' Plan for Connecticut Valley," Civil Engineering, VII, 744—750 (November 1937). Young, Owen D. "A 'Power Pool' for New England," Review of Reviews, LXXIII, 603-604 (June 1926). NEWSPAPERS AND BULLETINS Boston Globe, 1927-1950. Boston Herald, 1937-1950. Boston Transcript, 1927-1937.

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Brattleboro Reformer, 1927-1950. Christian Science Monitor, 1927-1950. Hampshire Gazette (Northampton, Mass.), 1927-1950. Hartford Courant, 1927-1950. Hartford Times, 1927-1950. Holyoke Transcript, 1927-1950. Keene Evening Sentinel, 1927-1950. Massachusetts CIO News, 1947-1950. New England News Letter, New England Council, 1927-1950. New England Planning Bulletin, 1935—1942. New Hampshire Morning Union (Manchester, N.H.), 1927-1950. New York Times, 1927—1950. Rutland Herald, 1927-1950. Springfield Republican, 1927—1946. Springfield Union, 1927-1950.

Index Adams, Sherman, 196 Agawam, Mass., 24 Agriculture, U. S. Department of, 80, 193, 196, 233, 246 A. G. Spalding and Bros., 147 Aiken, George D „ 34, 45, 52-54, 58, 59, 63. 7o, 79, 83, 85, 86-87, 99, 100, 106, 107, 109, 118, 1 2 1 , 1 2 2 - 1 3 2 , 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 , 139, 140, 141, 142, 144146, 158, 165, 166, 1 7 0 - 1 7 1 , 173, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 1 8 1 , 187, 192, 194, 219, 220, 221, 230, 252 Alton Electric Light and Power Company, 70 American Bosch Corporation, 147, 156 Americans for Democratic Action, 216 Amherst, Mass., 46 Amherst College, 46, 48 Ammonoosuc River, 35 Angus, George D., 219 Arizona v. California, 142 Army, Department of. See War Department, U. S. Arris, George, 223, 227; survey by, 223, 224 Arthur, Harold J., 196 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 143 Associated Gas and Electric System, 4, 58, 70 Associated Press, 151 Atlantic Seaboard Authority project, 76, 185 Attwill, Henry C., 5-6, 12 Austin, Warren, 85, 94, 95, 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 , 142, 145, 146, 165, 173, 176-177, 178, 180

Baldwin, Raymond, 155, 167, 172, 185 Ball Mountain, Vt., 184, 186, 204, 206, 208, 209 Baltimore Sun, 126 Bankhead, William B., 76-77, 78 Barkley, Alben W., 57, 76, 93 Barkley Amendment. See Flood Control Act, 1938 Barkley-Taft Pollution Act of 1948, 200201 Baron, Maximilian G., 232 Barre, Vt., 27, 29, 229 Barre Falls, Mass., 209 Barre Times, 127 Barron's Weekly, 4 Barrows, Η. K., 32-33, 34, 40, 44, 107, 108, 204, 244, 253 Bass, Robert, 7, 24 Bates, George, 79, 90 Beach, George, 256 Becket, Mass., 28 Bell, Mayor, 237 Bell, Daniel, 75 Bellamy, Edward, 2, 214 Bellows Falls, Vt., 46-47, 136, 158, 190 Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corporation, 188, 189, 192 Belmont Electric Light Department, 4 Bennington Banner, 162 Benton, William, 242 Bethlehem Junction, Ν. H., 108, 136, 209 Bilbo, Theodore, 49 Bilbo Amendment. See Flood Control Act, 1936 Birch Hill, Mass., 118, 135 Birmingham, Leo, 22

328 Black River, 187 Block, Adriaen, 16 Bloomfield, Vt., 209 Bluestone flood control project (New River), 91 Bolton, Vt., 28 Bonneville Dam, 67, 76, 80, 142, 221, 234 Boston, Mass., 4, 110, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2 , 182 Boston Herald, 2-3, 7, 222, 227 Boston Post, 83 Boston Society of Civil Engineers, 32 Boston Transcript, 7 1 , 127 Boston Traveler, 7 Boulder Dam, 21-22, 142 Bowditch, Richard, 241 Bowles, Chester, 2 1 1 , 219, 233, 237 Brackett, John Q. Α., 3 Bradford, Vt., 194 Bragdon, John S., 1 2 1 , 122-124, 1401 4 1 , 1 5 1 , 152, 155 Brandeis, Louis D., 142 Brattleboro, Vt., 46, 47, 162, 208 Brattleboro Reformer, 122, 123, 160, 161, 164, 170, 184, 186, 190, 196 Bridgeport, Conn., 201 Bridges, Styles, 72-73, 85, 119, 125, 192 Bridgewater Corners, Vt., 33 Brigham, Elbert S., 31 Brockway Mills Dam, 186, 187 Brookline, Vt., 161 Brown, Fred, 58, 59, 84-85, 96, 118, 1 1 9 Brown, LaRue, 6 Brown-Casey Resolution (S. J. Res. 198). See Connecticut River Compact Brown-McCormack Amendment. See Flood Control Act, 1936, Amendments Buckley, Thomas, 86 Budget, U. S. Bureau of the, 75, 92 Bulkley, Robert J., 76 Burke, Edward R., 144 Burlington Daily News, 164, 189 Burlington Free Press, 83 Business and Government. See Government and Business Business Week., 229

Index Cafky, William B., 222, 237 Cambridge Electric Light Company, 5, 6, 10 Cambridgeport, Vt., 187, 204 Canham, Erwin, 126, 127, 144 Casey, Joseph, 58, 59, 60, 61, 73, 83, 84, 116, 119, 128, 1 3 1 , 132 Central Vermont Public Service Corporation, 69, 229 Champlain Basin, 32, 33 Charles T. Main, Inc., 223, 226 Chase, Stuart, 8, 9 Chelsea, Vt., 186 Chemical Paper Manufacturing Company, 237 Cheney, Kimberley, 154 Chicopee, Mass., 2, 38, 147, 148, 152, 156, 1 7 4 . 179, 1 8 1 , 197» 202, 213, 214, 237, 245 Christian Science Monitor, 124, 126, 136, 144 Citron, William, 40, 41, 49, 50, 53, 58, 59, 73, 74, 75, 83, 88-89, 101, 103, 105, 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 , 118, 1 1 9 Citron Bill, 74-75, 103 Civilian Conservation Corps, 87, 1 1 3 Civil Works Administration, 36 Clapp, Paul S., 8 Claremont, Ν. H., 136, 203, 204 Claremont Eagle, 184 Clason, Charles, 56, 87, 90, 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 , 168, 170, 172, 174, 175, 178, 180181, 246-247 Clason resolution, 82 Coast Guard, U. S., 47, 48 Coburn, Carroll, 2 1 1 Cohen, Benjamin V., 76, 77 Colt's Fire Arms Company, 149, 152 Columbia Valley Project, 15, 80, 212, 222, 239 Comings, Herbert B., 128 Committee Representing the Cities of the Connecticut Valley, 49 Concord Monitor, 84, 241 Congress, U. S., 7, 17, 30, 3 1 , 42, 64, 70, 74, 75, 93, 95, 96, 97, 1 0 1 , 105, 119, 125, 133, 142, 144, 1 5 1 , 155, 159 169, 196, 200, 203, 2 1 1 , 235, 241, 242, 253. See also Enfield Dam

Index project; Union Village project; West River Valley project Congress of Industrial Organization, 13, 86, 218, 219, 255-256 Connecticut, 27, 35, 36, 37, 41, 49, 79. 106, 111-114, 1 1 7 , 230; flood control in, 30. 53» 54-55» 65, ior, 104, 107, 109, 118, 132, 142, 146, 149, 157, 159, 167, 173, 186, 187, 209, 251; Flood Control and Water Power Commission, 236; legislature, 16, 74, 200, 201, 210, 249; pollution abatement program, 24-25, 39, 201-202; and public power development, 21, 62, 82, 88, 151, 167, 172, 177, 236-238; Public Utilities Commission, 149, 156, 249-250; State Chamber of Commerce, 154, 235, 237; State Water Commission, 25, 34-35, 199, 201, 2 37> 245; waterways, 16-20, 21. See also Enfield Dam project; and under names of cities Connecticut Electric Service Company, 7 Connecticut Light and Power Company, 115, 149, 156, 235, 236-237, 238, 239, 249 Connecticut River Compact (1937), 118, 121, 158, 165, 174, 178, 180-181, 246, 247-248; arguments against, 6670; arguments for, 63-66; Article 8, 55—58, 61, 100; Brown-Casey resolution, 58-59, 60-62, 71, 72, 82, 84, 101, 103, 104, 105, 115; federal opposition to, 55-58, 72-73» 79» 82, 88, 91, 96, 97, 100, iox, 102, 103, 104, 109, 115, 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 , 119» 169; provisions of, 64-65; and public opinion, 115-118 Connecticut River Company. See Northern Connecticut Power Company Connecticut River Valley, 33; conflicting interests in, 1-2, 13, 14, 25, 250254, 256; 1927 flood, 27-29, 247; 1936 flood, 38, 46-48, 171, 172, 247; 1938 hurricane, 1 1 0 - 1 1 5 , 172; 1948 flood, 207-208. See also under names of states and specific flood control and power projects

329 Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Commission, 54-55, 209 Connecticut Valley Authority project, 40, 71» 73» 74» 75, 103, 148, 210, 220, 222, 239. See also Citron Bill Connecticut Valley Council, 36 Connecticut Valley Regional Board, 36 Connecticut Valley Waterway Board, 22 Conservation, 55, 182, 227, 246 Constitution, U. S., 133, 135 Cooke, Morris, 76, 242 Coolidge, Calvin, 11 Coombs, Philip, 216 Cooper, John Sherman, 195 Copeland, Royal S., 35, 49, 50, 67, 93, 94» 95» 97 Copeland Act. See Flood Control Act, 1936 Corcoran, Thomas, 75, 101 Corps of Engineers, U. S., 32, 52, 69, 80, 85, 86, 87, 97, 104, 118, 119, 124, 128, 135, 136, 139, 140-141, 167, 168, 175, 176, 187, 188, 209, 210, 254; Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, 237-239, 246; Comprehensive Plan of 1947, 203-207, 230; and Enfield Dam project, 18, 19, 20, 21, 147, 149, 156, 235, 2 3 8 239; and Federal water policy, 44-45, 91-92, 93, 105-107, 109; and legislation, 64, 68, 76; and multipurpose development, 245-247; surveys by, 31, 33, 121, 235, 240; "308" reports, 3 1 - 3 2 , 43, 44-45; and West River Valley project, 158-159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 170, 1 7 1 , 172, 178, 180-186 Couzens Bill, 12 Cree, Albert Α., 232 Cross, Wilbur, 40, 53, 54, 58, 59, 71, 79» 85» 103» 104. 119 Cummings, Homer, 98, 123, 141 Curley, James M., 234 Curtis, Laurence, 135, 1 3 6 - 1 3 7 , 143 Cutter, Victor, 39, 40, 228 Dale, Charles M., 185, 187, 207 Daly, Edward J., 52, 62, 69, 88 Davidson, C. Girard, 221, 227, 230, 240

330 Deerfield, Mass., 47, 48 Deerfield River, 38, 1 7 1 Deerfield River Dams, 32 Defense, U. S. Department of, 233 Delano, Frederic, 5 1 , 76 Democratic Party, 73, 74, 80, 89, n 6 , 1 1 7 , 1 1 9 , 1 2 7 , 234, 241, 255-256 Denison flood control project (Red River), 91 Dern, George H., 43 Dever, Paul, 57, 60, 61, 69, 86, 98, 99, 2 1 0 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 7 , 2 1 9 , 233-234, 242 Dickens, Charles, 1 6 - 1 7 Dickens, Marion, 75 Dondero, George, 148, 1 5 1 Duryea, M. J., 1 5 2 Duxbury, Vt., 29 Dwight, Timothy, 199 Dwight, William, 2 1 4 - 2 1 5 Early, Steve, 1 1 8 , 1 2 7 , 142 East Brookfield Dam, 1 7 3 East Deerfield, Mass., 1 1 0 East Hartford, Vt., 29 East Haven, Vt., 33 Edelman, John W., 227 Edison Electric Illuminating Company of Boston, 4, 5 Edison Electric Institute, 229 Electrical industry: capitalization of, 3; growth of in 1920s, 3; interstate transmission problems, 6, 1 2 , 1 5 5 . See also Enfield Dam project; Holding companies; Holyoke, Mass.; Interstate compacts; Power companies, municipal; Power companies, private; Power development, public; Rural electrification; and under names of companies Electric Bond and Share Corporation, 8 Electricity: New England's output in 1920s, 3; rates, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 1 1 , 1 2 , 22, 1 7 5 , 194, 198, 2 1 8 , 225, 226, 229, 2 3 1 ; social importance of, 8-9 Eliot, Charles William, 2d, 37, 39, 50, 51 Enfield Dam project, 1 6 - 2 1 , 147, 182, 197, 198, 2 1 0 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 5 , 2 5 1 , 252, 256; case against, 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 , 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 , 1 5 2 - 1 5 4 , 1 5 7 ; case for, 1 4 7 - 1 4 8 , 150,

Index 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 , 156; controversial 2 0 - 2 1 ; navigation aspects 1 4 7 - 1 5 0 , 1 5 2 - 1 5 4 , 156, 236, 237-238, 2 5 1 ; 1949 235-239. See also Rural tion Essex, Mass., 197

aspects of, of, 1 6 - 2 1 , 197, 2 3 5 revival of, electrifica-

Fahey, John, 6 Fairlee, Vt., 194 Farley, James Α., 84 Farley, W. R., 195 Federal Emergency Relief Administration ( F E R A ) , 3 7 - 3 8 , 39 Federal Power Commission, 12, 1 3 , 18, 19. 20, 3 1 , 55-56, 57, 64, 67, 68, 69, 82, 84, 9 1 - 9 2 , 93, 98, 99-100, 106, 1 2 3 , 124, 143, 1 5 1 , 156, 188, 189, 1 9 1 , 192, 193, 195, 196, 2 1 0 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 5 , 2 1 6 , 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 230, 232, 236, 238, 239, 240, 246, 249 Federal-state conflict, 1 , 2, 1 1 , 1 2 - 1 3 , 18, 37, 4 1 - 4 2 , 5 ° , 59-62, 7 0 - 7 1 , 7 2 - 7 3 , 77, 79, 82, 84-87, 89, 96, ι ο ί , 183, 247-248, 250, 253, 255, 256. See also Connecticut River Compact; Enfield Dam project; Flood control; Interstate compacts; Pollution abatement; Union Village; Water resources; West River Valley project; Wilder dam; and under individual states Federal Trade Commission, 7 Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 56, 64, 67, 68, 79, 82, 100, 102, 1 3 1 Fenton, Walter S., 52, 62, 69, 83, 100, 145 Ferguson, Phil, 79, 80, 87 Ferguson, Samuel, 10, 1 1 5 , 157, 249 First Hydro-Cooperative, Petitioner, v. Federal Power Commission, 1 9 1 Fisk Rubber Company, 147 Fitzgerald, William J., 1 1 8 , 1 1 9 Flanders, Ralph, 145 Flood control, 25, 226-227; conflicting interests in, 1 ; federal, 30, 44-45, 48-49, 64, 66, 67-68, 76, 85, 1 0 8 109, 1 8 1 ; federal aid to states, 48, 67, 84, 159, 237; federal emergency aid,

Index 1 1 8 - 1 2 0 ; interstate action, 26, 3 0 - 3 1 , 39» 41. 49. 80-81, 99, 178, 185, 206, 207, 209-211, 247; legislation for, 14, 48-50, 56, 67, 68, 76, 85, 86, 91, 92-96, 97, 104; state action in, 24, 30, 32, 39, 52-53, 183, 226-227, 244, 247, 248; tax question in, 206207, 209. See also Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Commission; Corps of Engineers, U. S.; Flood Control Acts; Interstate compacts; Power companies, municipal; Power, companies, private; Power development, public; Regional resources development; State planning boards; Water resources; and under names of states Flood Control Acts, Omnibus: 1936 (Copeland Act), 48-52, 54, 55, 56, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 73, 79, 82, 84, 88, 91, 94, 96-100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 116, 180, 246; BrownMcCormack Amendment to Act of 1936, 72, 84, 85, 86, 88, 94, 105; Act of 1938, 89, 90, 92-95, 96, 97, 105, 108, 116, 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 , 1 2 1 , 125, 127, 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 , 132, 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 , 138, 139, 140-142, 143, 144, 145-146, 158, 165, 167, 169, 170, 180, 210; Act of 1941, 159, 176, 203; Act of 1944, 163, 168, 170, 173, 174, 175, 178, 183, 184, 204, 248 Fogarty, John E., 233 Ford, Henry, 10 Fort Peck Dam, 142 Forest Service, U. S., 51 Francis B. Bartow Camp of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, 127 Franconia, Ν. H., 209 Frankfurter, Felix, 41 Freemen, Inc., 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 173-174, 180, 181, 184, 186 Furcolo, Foster, 233, 240 Gaysville, Vt., 33, 44, 62, 107, 108, 1 7 1 , 173, 176, 186, 187, 204, 205, 210 Gehrmann, Β. J., 82

331 Geological Survey, U. S., 22, 23, 25, 32, 38 Gibson, Ernest, 3 1 , 85, 95, 125, 139, 186-187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 205, 219, 220, 229, 232, 233 Goethals, George R., 159, 171 Goodrich Falls Electric Company, 70 Goss, Albert, 177, 182 Government and Business, 2, 10, 1 1 , 15, 2 1 , 167, 227, 241 Grand Coulee Dam, 142 Great Barrington, Mass., 208 Green, Lex, 82 Green, Theodore, 240-241, 242 Greenfield, Mass., 30, 47 Greenfield Recorder, 126 Green Mountain Power Corporation, 69 Griffin, Bulkley, 103 Groton Pond, Vt., 33, 86-87, 209 Gulf Oil Company, 149, 235 Hadley, Mass., 24, 28, 30, 48, 172, 179, 181 Hallisey, Edward, 214 Hard, Walter, 162-163 Harmon, Dudley, 37 Harmonyville, Vt., 164 Harriman, Henry I., 52, 70, 83, 107 Hartford, Conn., 17, 19, 20, 21, 28, 35, 38, 47, 48, 1 1 2 , 119, 149, 150, 152, 153, 1 7 1 , 174, 179, 181, 188, 201, 235, 237, 256 Hartford Conference of Governors, 1937, 53-54, 158 Hartford Courant, 56, 57-58, 1 1 6 Hartford Electric Light Company, 1 1 5 , 152, 157, 223, 249 Hartford Times, 83, 103, 157, 222, 234 Hartland, Vt., 186 Hatfield, Mass., 24, 30, 46, 172, 179 Havenner, Franck, 80 Healy, Robert, 76 Hearst newspapers, 212 Hemond, Conrad J., 148, 237 Herlihy, Elisabeth M., 60, 62, 79, 88 Heselton, John, 233 Holding companies, 3-4, 6, io, 13, 24, 115

332 Holyokc, Mass., 4, 17, 19, 20, 46, 113, 147, 148, 150, 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 , 179, 197, 208, 2 1 3 - 2 1 5 , 232, 235, 237, 245, 256 Holyoke Daily Transcript, 214, 215 Holyoke Municipal Gas and Electric Department, 213, 2 1 4 - 2 1 5 , 216, 232 Holyoke Water Power Company, 213, 216, 232, 238 Holyoke and Westfield Railroad, 154 Honey Hill, Ν. H., 204 Hook, James W., 59-60 Hoosac River, 208 Hoosac Valley, 30 Hoover, Herbert, 11, 13, 221, 230 Hopkins, Harry, 36, 118 Housatonic River, 149, 208 House of Representatives, U. S., 18, 48, 51, 77. 90, 94, 95, 240; Appropriations Committee, 130; Flood Control Committee, 30, 31, 60, 79-80, 82, 86, 89, 105, 159, 163, 168, 179; H. Doc. 27: 20; H. Doc. 36: 18, 20; H. Doc. 308: 3 1 ; H. Doc. 412: 45, 107, 108; H. Doc. 455: 108, 158, 203, 204; H. Doc. 724: 159, 203, 204; Judiciary Committee, 49-50; Public Works Committee, 239; Rivers and Harbors, Committee on, 18, 24-25, 78, 80, 147, 150, 155, 156, 157 Howe, Oscar, 164 Hurley, Charles F., 54, 60, 79, 85-86, 88, 151 Ickes, Harold, 37, 76 "Imperiled Vermont, Inc.," 187 Informal Committee on Power Policy, 76 Insull, Martin J., 7 Insull, Samuel, 8, 222 Insull Utilities Interests, 6, 7, 24, 69, 100 International Paper Company, 7 International Paper and Power Company, 7 Interstate compacts, 6, 11-13, 35, 40, 41, 49, 5°, 51-53, 59, 61, 72, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 101, 104, 105, 106, 167, 170, 178J 79, 183, 202, 212, 220, 247, 249, 250-251, 252-253, 254. See also Mer-

Index rimack River Compact; New England Interstate Flood Control Compact, 1948; New England Interstate Pollution Control Compact Interstate Sanitation Commission, 35 Irrigation, 233 Izaak Walton League, 35, 252 Jackson, S. Holliston, 27 Jacobson, John, 62, 69-70, 88 Jaffrey, Ν. H., 187 James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 142 James River Bill, 3 Jenks, Arthur B., 84 Johnson, Owen, 1 1 7 Kaiser, Henry, 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 King, Francis, 214, 215 King, Judson, 70, 131, 209, 210, 219, 221; pamphlet by, 80, 83 King, William H., 144 Kingman, John J., 118, 121, 139, 4 5 6 157 Knightville, Mass., 118, 135, 138, 204 Knowlton, Robert W., 236 / ' . , Λ Kohl v. U. S., 142 Kopplemann, Herman, 49-50, 55, 57, 58, 68, 83, 88, 90, 106, 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 , 1 1 7 , 118, 119, 151, 157 Krug, Julius, 220, 221, 234 Lafleur, Joseph, 148 LaFollette, Robert, Jr., 57 Lamoille River, 33 Landis, James M., 41 Lane, George W., 37 Lane, Thomas, 212, 217, 220, 233 Leahy, Edward, 242 Lebanon, Ν. H., 188, 189, 192 Lee, Mass., 208 Lehman, Herbert, 242 Lerche, Ralph, 197, 238 Lester, Justin W., 5 Lewis, Fulton, Jr., 242 Lewiston Sun, 241 Lilienthal, David, 2 1 2 Little, Royal, 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 ;

Index Lodge, Henry Cabot, 57, 66, 96, 239, 240 Loeb, William, 164, 189, 196, 206 Londonderry, Vt., 204, 206 Lonergan, Augustine, 85 Los Angeles Examiner, 198 Luce, Robert, 95 Ludlow, Vt., 33, 176, 187, 204 Lyndonville, Vt., 33 Maass, Arthur, 254 McCarthy, George, 210 McClellan, John, 195 McConaughty, James L., 1 1 7 McCormack, John, 84-85, 88, 89-90, 92, 116, 170 Mclntyre, Marvin, 84, 92, 102, 141 McKinley, William, 129 McLean, Hugh, 148 McMahon, Brian, 242 McNamara, F. F., 149, 1 5 1 , 156 McNary, Charles, 92-93 McNinch, Frank R., 56, 60, 76, 102 Maine, 75, 185, 220, 225, 232-233; Fernald Act, 225; private utilities in, 7 Maine Public Service Company, 229 Maloney, Francis T., 57, 85, 1 1 5 , 132, 176-177, 180 Manchester Union, 84, 196, 197, 206 Manly, Basil, 99 Mansfield, Joseph, 77, 80, 150 Mansfield Conservation Bill, 77-78, 79, 80, 102, 103 Markham, Edward M., 54, 65, 106 Marlboro, Vt., 162, 183-184 Marshall, James C., 124 Martin, Joseph E., 233 Martin, Richard, 201, 237 Mascoma River, 203 Massachusetts, 1 1 , 12, 27, 28, 36-37, 47, 49. 79, 106, 1 1 0 - 1 1 3 , 1 1 7 , 217, 236; Board of Harbors and Land Commissioners, 24; Board of Health, 202; Commissioners of the Department of Public Utilities, 5; Commission on Waterways and Public Lands, report of, 23; Department of Public Health, 38, 199, 202; Depart-

333 ment of Public Works, 30-33; federalstates' rights question, 133-135, 136137; flood control in, 24, 30-32, 38, 54-55, 60, 61, 65, 101, 104, 107, 109, 118, 132-133, 137, 142, 146, 173, 186, 187, 198, 209, 251; legislature, 24, 30, 36, 37, 133, 197-198, 199, 200, 202, 2 1 1 , 248; and pollution abatement, 38, 197, 198, 202203; power development in, 3, 5, 20, 22-23, 82, 198, 225, 234, 237, 238; private utilities in, 4-6, 177; Public Service Commission, 5, 10; Public Utilities Board, 90; State Planning Board, 36-37, 38, 60; water surveys, 197-199; waterways, 17-20, 21. See also under names of cities Mayott, Clarence W., 223 Meredith Electric Company, 70 Merrimack River, 224, 240 Merrimack River Authority project, 212, 219, 220, 233 Merrimack River Compact, 57, 61, 89, 90, 91, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 109, 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 , 119, 178, 180-181, 246 Merrimack River Valley, 34, 89, 90, 119, 136, 137, 187 Metcalf and Eddy Company, 33 Metropolitan Water Supply project, 175 Miami Valley, 33 Middletown, Conn., 237 Miller, William J., 1 1 7 , 119, 149, 155, 157, 167, 168, 170 Millikin, Eugene D., 175-176 Missisquoi River, 33 Mississippi River, 30; 1927 flood, 30 Mississippi Valley, 105 Mississippi Valley project, 22, 30, 53, 129 Missouri Valley, 169, 212, 251 Missouri Valley Authority project, 175, 233, 239 Montpelier, Vt., 27, 28, 29 Moore, Irwin, 196 Mount Tom Junction, Mass., 46 Mullaney, Β. J., 7 Murphy, Francis P., 71, 82, 118, 1 3 1 , 135-136, 142

334 Murray, James E., 175 Muscle Shoals, 2 1 - 2 2 , 72, 230 Nashua, Ν. H., 217 Nation, The, 128 National Electric Light Association, 8, 1 1 , 70 National Guard, 27, 47 National Park Service, 246 National Planning Board. See PWA National Popular Government League, 83, 219 National Resources Board, 40, 44, 105 National Resources Committee, 38, 39, 41, 50, 51, 77, 79, 105, 108 National Resources Planning Board, 200; Subcommittee on Classification o£ New England Waters, 200 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 220 Naukeag, Mass., 135 Navigation, 16-20, 21, 24, 82, 87, 1 4 7 148, 154, 155, 156, 197, 198, 227, 235. 237, 239, 250, 251 Newbury, Vt., 194 New Deal, 11, 15, 21, 35, 71, 1 1 7 , 119 New England: economic decline, 1 4 - 1 5 , 216-219, 229, 231, 233; ideological climate of, 2, 1 1 , 13, 14, 15, 16, 1 9 20, 41, 74, 247, 254-256. See also Flood control; Pollution abatement; Power development, public; Water resources development; and under individual states New England Conference of State Sanitary Engineers, 200 New England Council, 1 3 - 1 4 , 36, 37, 39-40, 59, 71, 85, 145, 205, 210, 221, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 230, 239, 255; Committee on Economic Development, 226 New England Development Authority, 220 New England Electric System. See New England Power Company New England Gas and Electric Association, 70

Index New England Interstate Flood Control Commission, 185, 198, 206, 207 New England Interstate Flood Control Compact, 1948, 209-211, 246 New England Interstate Pollution Control Compact of 1947, 199, 200-201, 209, 248 New England Joint Commission on Interstate Compacts for Flood Control, 52, 70 New England News Letter, 207, 249 New England Power Association, 7, 32, 59. 7°, 99» 192 New England Power Company, 6, 166, 188, 193, 196 New England Regional Planning Commission, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 228; Water Resources Committee, 38, 40 Newfane, Vt., 44, 54, 62, 86, 87, 106, 107, 108, 109, 158, 161, 176, 177, 181, 190 New Hampshire, 14, 38, 49, 79, 96, 1 1 1 - 1 1 5 , 1 1 7 , 119, 171, 251; Commission on Interstate Cooperation, 41; Commission on Water Conservation and Water Power, 23; federal-states' rights question, 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 ; flood control in, 30, 33-34» 52, 54~55» 61» 65» 101, 105-106, 133, 137, 185, 187, 209; Flood Control Commission, 136; legislature, 23-24, 136, 196; pollution abatement in, 34-35, 200; power development in, 22, 23, 24, 26, 62, 69, 83, 88, 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 , 189-190, 192, 194, 203, 219, 224, 248; Power Survey Committee, 24; private utilities in, 7, 8; Public Resources Board, 69; Public Service Commission, 84, 190; state regulation commission, 4-5; Water Control Commission, 189; Water Resources Board, 24, 34 New Hampshire Farm Bureau, 194 New Hampshire Gas and Electric Company, 70 New Jersey, 12, 35 New River, 91, 98 New York, 12, 35, 200, 242, 243 New York American, 35 New York Herald Tribune, 127, 242

Index New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, 149, 1 5 3 , 235, 237-238 New York Storage Act of 1 9 1 5 , 33, 34 New York Times, 126, 242 Norris, George, 9, 10, 73, 76, 77, 92, 93, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 1 3 1 Norris BUI ( " 7 Litde T V A s " ) , 73. 77. 102, 103, 185 Norris-Wilson resolution, 42 North Adams, Mass., 30, 207-208 North Adams Gas Light Company, 4 Northampton, Mass., 24, 30, 47, 1 1 3 , 168, 197, 2 1 5 , 238, 245, 256 Northeastern Power Company, 6 Northern Connecticut Power Company, 1 6 - 1 7 , 18, 20. See also Windsor Locks Canal Company Northfield, Vt., 28, 47 North Hartland, Vt., 107, 209 North Springfield Dam, 186 Norwich, Conn., 201 Norwich University, 28 O'Connor, J. Α., 185 Ohio Valley, 50, 53, 97 Old Hampshire Planning Council, 36 Olds, Leland, 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 , 227 O'Mahoney, Joseph C., 144, 169, 1 7 5 176 O'Mahoney-Millikin Amendment. See Flood Control Act, 1944 Ompompanoosuc Valley, 1 2 1 Overton, John H., 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 , 1 7 5 , 176, 178, 180 Packard, Arthur, 194 Parker, Alban J., 165, 1 8 1 , 185 Parsons, Frank, 2 Passamaquoddy project, 220, 224 Passumpsic River, 33 Pastore, John, 185, 220 Pemigewasset Electric Company, 70 Pennsylvania, 1 2 Perkins, Frances, 43 Phelps, Dwight, 149 Phillips, Alfred N., 57, 58, 79-80, 85, 89, 90, 1 1 6 , 1 1 9 Pick, Lewis, 2 1 2

335 Pick-Sloan Plan, 175 Pimentel, A. F., 156, 174, 1 7 5 , 197, 202, 244 Pinchot, Gifford, 3, 7, 9 - 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 2 - 1 3 , 4 1 , 249 Pittsburg Dam, 34, 105 Pittsfield, Mass., 30, 208 Plumley, Charles, 95, 128, 129, 165, 169, 170 Poland, Orville, 2 1 9 , 2 2 1 - 2 2 2 Pollution abatement, 43-44, 152, 182, 226, 233, 245, 248, 250, 2 5 1 , 253; federal action, 200, 203; interstate action, 3 4 - 3 5 , 3 7 - 3 8 , 200, 201, 2 0 2 203; state action, 24, 25, 35, 183, 199, 200-201, 203. See also New England Interstate Pollution Control Compact; and under names of states Pope, James P., 78 Port of New York Authority, 41 Power companies, municipal, 2, 3, 4, 11, 213-216 Power companies, private, 89, 144, 148, 150, 1 5 1 , 220, 2 2 1 , 225, 226, 242, 249-250; arguments for, 1 0 - 1 1 ; development in New England, 2—15; entrepreneurial shortcomings of, 2, 4, 6, 10, 145, 220, 229-230; and flood control, 32, 3 3 , 45, 185; political activities of, 7, 8, 1 3 , 57-58, 60, 65-66, 67, 69-70, 74, 83, 85, 99-100, 1 0 1 , 1 3 6 - 1 3 7 . 1 4 5 - 1 4 6 , 164, 168, 174, 209-210, 232, 233, 234; and power development, 2, 236, 255. See also Holding companies; Holyoke, Mass.; Regulation, state; Wilder Dam project; and under names of cities, states, and specific companies Power development. See Power companies, municipal; Power companies, private; Power development, public Power development, public, 2 - 1 5 , 22, 182, 2 1 8 - 2 1 9 , 226; arguments for and against, 2, 8, 9, 1 5 ; federal, 56, 75-76, 81, 84, 92, 97, 100, 145, 174, 2 1 2 , 2 1 5 , 216, 220, 2 2 1 , discussed 222-232, 2 4 1 , 255; legislation, 79, 80, 89, 98, 1 0 1 ; state, 2 1 , 22-24, 2 5 26, 55, 97, 1 0 1 , 106, 1 8 3 , 220, 2 2 6 -

Index

336 227, 248. See also Federal Power Commission; Federal-state conflict; Flood control; Interstate compacts; Power companies, municipal; Power companies, private; Regional resources development; Regulation, state; Rural electrification; Water resources "Power Trust," 2, 3, 129, 144, 150, 168 Prendergast, William Α., 12 President's Committee on Water Flow, report, 42-43 President's Water Resources Policy Commission, 227, 245 Proctor, Mortimer, 185, 186-187, 188, 191, 196

Providence Journal-Bulletin, 223, 227 "Prudent investment" doctrine, 12 Public Franchise League, 6 Public Ownership League of America, 22

Public Works Administration, 34, 38, 118; National Planning Board, 36, 37, 43 Putnam, Roger, 216 Pynchon, William, 16 Quabbin Reservoir, 182

See also Flood Control Acts; Interstate compacts; Mansfield Conservation Bill; Norris Bill; Power development, public; State planning boards; and under names of specific projects Regional planning agencies, 76, 78 Regulation, federal. See Federal Power Commission Regulation, state, 4-5, 6-8, 11, 13, 90, 249. See also under individual states Reid, Frank R., 30 Republican Party, 52, 80, 90, 116, 117, 119, 120, 126, 127, 155, 187, 234

Rhode Island, m - 1 1 3 , 185, 200 Ribicoff, Abraham, 238 Rice, Howard, 160, 164, 186, 190 Richardson, W. T., 164 Richdale, J. C., 222 Rickers Pond, Vt., 33 Rieve, Emil, 218-219 Ripley, W. Z., 6 Riverhill Dam, 119, 136 Robins, Thomas M., 159, 180 Robinson, Joseph, 51 Rochester, Vt., 186 Rogers, Edith Nourse, 57, 90, 240 Roosevelt, Franklin, 10, 11, 36, 42, 43, 4 4 . 5 1 , 53, 5 7 , 5 9 , 62-63, 72, 74~75>

Rabbett, James, 238 Railroads, 17, 27, 47, 148, 149, 150, 152, 154, 156, 157, 238

Rainey River Bill, 3, 63 Randolph Herald, 162 Rankin, John, 68-69, 73, 77, 92, 129,

76, 77, 78, 85, 86, 91, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, ΙΟΙ, 102, 103, 104, 105, 118, 119, 123, 127, 129, 1 3 1 ,

142, 143-144, 249

132,

I4I-

154, 159, 178, 212,

Roosevelt, James, 57, 59 Roosevelt, Theodore, 3, 18, 63 Roosevelt ( F . D.) Administration, 81, Rankin Bill, 77-78 84, 97, 99 i political problems, 96, Rayburn, Sam, 130 120; resources development policy, 74, Reclamation, 224-225, 250; A c t of 75, 76, 80-81, 85, 93, 94, 101, 102, 1902, 142; U. S. Bureau of, 80, 175; 103-105, 108-109, 178· See also Corps rights, 169, 170 of Engineers, U. S.; Power developRecreational facilities, 54, 61, 86-87, 91, ment, public; Union Village project; 123-124, 152, 164-165, 166, 171, Water resources 182, 205, 227, 246 Roraback, J. Henry, 7, 20, 74 Red River, 91 Royalton, Vt., 186 Regional resources development, 15, 2 1 Rudsten, Representative Daniel, 210 22, 35-39, 40, 67, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, Rural electrification, 13-14, 24, 153, 79, 80, 81, 96, 97, 102, 129, 175, 182, 144, 150, 151, 152, 185, 212

183, 2X0-211,

212,

220, 221, 227~

228, 232-233, 234, 239, 242,

247.

174-175, 182 Rural Resettlement Admin., 126, 145

Index Rutland, Vt., 27, 162 Rutland Herald, 84, 122, 189 Ryan, Oswald, 56-57, 59, 90, 96, 98, 102 Safford, Truman, 253 St. Albans Daily Messenger, 164, 189 St. Johnsbury, Vt., 229 St. Lawrence Seaway, 21-22, 145, 155, I93-I94> 220, 239, 241, 252 Saltonstall, Leverett, 126, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 227 Sargent, Η. E., 121 Schley, Julian L., 118, 124 Scott, W. J., 200 Sears, Willis G., 31 Seavey, Clyde, 84, 90, 118 Senate, U. S., 18, 51, 67, 77, 93, 94, 95> 96, !74> !75> 178; Commerce Committee, 48-49, 56, 57, 92, 170, 175; Public Works Committee, 192, 195, 196, 240 Shea, Edward J., 161 Sherman, Philip, 134, 136 Shutler, Philip, 171, 173, 177, 184, 186 Smith, Margaret Chase, 220 Smith, Nelson Lee, 194, 195 Soil Conservation Service, U. S., 51 South Hadley, Mass., 213, 256 South Keene, Ν. H., 209 South Newfane, Vt., 162 South Tunbridge, Vt., 204 Spalding, A. G., and Bros. See A. G. Spalding Springfield, Mass., 17, 28, 30, 147, 149, 152, 153, 168, 1 7 1 , 179, 237, 238 Springfield Arsenal, 152 Springfield Daily News, 128 Springfield Power Squadron, 152 Springfield Republican, 62-63, 101, 128 Springfield Union, 126 Springfield Yacht and Canoe Club, 152 Standard Oil Company, 149, 235 State planning boards, 35-39, 247; federal aid to, 37-39 States' rights. See Federal-state conflict Stearns, Foster, 169, 170 Steinmetz, Irving, 8 Stimson, Henry, 18, 21

337 Stockbridge, Mass., 208 Stockbridge, Vt., 186 Stocker Pond, 136 Sugar Hill, Ν. H., 204 Sugar River, 184, 203 Sullivan, Eugene P., 237 Sunderland, Mass., 46 Sun Oil Company, 235 Supreme Court, U. S., 5, 6, 12, 142, 143, 191, 196, 213 Surry Mountain, Ν. H., 118, 135, 136, 138, 184, 209 Swanzey, Ν. H., 203 Swift River, Ν. H., 209 Swing, Philip D., 31 Taft, Charles, 164 Tennessee Valley Authority, 15, 42, 67, 72, 74. 75» 76, 93» 101, 104, 143, 198, 212, 221, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 234, 241, 249, 251, 255, 256 Texas Oil Company, 235 Textile Workers Union, CIO, 217, 219, 227 Textron, Inc., 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 Thetford, Vt., 194 Thomas, Norman, 8 Thompson, Dorothy, 126 Thompsonville, Conn., 153 Tier, Thomas, 160, 168, 174, 180 Tobey, Charles W., 72, 84, 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 , 192, 217 Tobin, Maurice J., 185 Toepfert, Mayor, 214 Townshend, Vt., 161, 166-167, 204 Tread way, Allen, 18, 20, 24-25, 31, 59, 72, 95, 148, 150 Tripp, Guy E., 7 Tri-State Treaty Commission, 35 Truman, Harry S., 1, 212, 227, 234, 240, 241, 242, 243 Tucker, Elmer C., 237 Tully, Mass., 135, 187, 204 Tunbridge, Vt., 173, 176, 186 Turner, Howard M., 223 Turners Falls, Mass., 208

338 Twin State Gas and Electric Company, 69 Tyler, M. C., 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 140 Union Village, Vt., 33, 1 1 8 Union Village project, 1 2 1 - 1 4 6 , 152, 185, 186, 187, 255; action by federal government, 127-128, 130, 132; attempted compromise, 1 3 0 - 1 3 2 ; Congressional debate, 128-130; "Defense Fund," 125; post mortem, 138-146; press comments, 126-127; states' rights issue, 1 2 1 - 1 2 6 , 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 , 137-138, 139, 142, 146 U. S. v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 98, 143, 213 U. S. Rubber Company, 156 U. S. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 196 Upper Darby, Pa., 246 Upper Fifteen Mile Falls, Ν. H., 44, 210 Upton, Robert W., 69, 70, 83 Utilities, private. See Power companies, private Utilities, public. See Power companies, municipal; Power development, public; and specific utilities by name Vahey, James, 234 Vandenberg, Arthur, 50 Van dc Water, Frederic F., 160, 161, 162 Vanneman, Charles, 1 2 Van Zandt, James, 150 Vermont, 14, 27, 28-29, 3°> 36, 49, 79. 96, n o , 1 1 3 , 119, 1 7 1 , 217, 2 5 1 ; Commission on the Conservation of Natural Resources, 23; farm group, 1 3 - 1 4 , 188, 189-194; flood control in, 3 1 . 32-33. 34» 52, 53-55. 65. 86, 95, 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 , 105-107, 109, 133, 137, 142, 154-155, 173, 176» 1 7 9 - 1 8 1 , 186-187, 188-189, 205, 208, 209; Flood Control Committee, 205; ideological climate, 23, 34, 86, 1 2 1 , 176; legislature, 32, 33, 34, 125, 138, 188, 191, 199-200, 2 1 1 ; pollution abatement in, 200; and power development, 22-23, 33» 62, 63, 69, 86-87, 100, 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 , 165, 174, 205, 2 1 9 220, 232-233, 252; private power in-

Index terests in, 60, 87, 144, 146, 158, 164, 188; Public Service Commission, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 196; Public Works Board, 1 2 1 , 122; State Planning Board, 41; State Water Conservation Board, 177, 186, 205, 206; Supreme Court, 191, 193; Water Resource Commission, 23. See also Union Village project; West River Valley project; Wilder Dam project Vermont Farm Bureau, 194; Neu/s, 192 Vermont Farm and Labor Council, 2 1 9 220 Victory Dam, 105, 186, 204, 205, 209 Vimey, Captain, 121 Voorhis, Jerry, 69, 82 Wadhams, Sanford H., 25, 78, 79, 88, 148-149, 167, 172, 180, 206 Walcott, Frederic C., 18 Wallace, Henry, 77 Wallgren, Mon, 82 Walpole, Ν. H., 209 Walsh, David I., 49, 60, 85, 86, 95-96, 99, 125» 130, 1 3 1 , 132, 133» 134, 136, 137» 138, 1 4 1 , 143, 146, 172, 174, 176, 180 Wanamaker, William W., 124, 141 War Department, U. S., 17, 43, 45, 50, 58, 61, 64, 65, 66, 82, 98, 99, 106, 107, 108-109, 1 1 8 , 1 2 1 , 123, 124, 126, 127, 136, 138, 140, 1 4 1 , 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 1 5 1 , 152, 153, 155. 156, 157, 159, 163, 176, 182, 186, 187, 203, 208, 210, 235, 236237, 243, 246. See also Corps of Engineers, U. S. Wardsboro, Vt., 162 Washington Post, 126 Waterbury, Vt., 28, 29, 201 Water resources, 1, 25, 38, 65, 92, 96, 178, 179, 183, 224, 233-234, 250; interstate action on, 220, 248-249; multipurpose development of, 2 1 , 32, 33, 44, 73» 74, 86, 96-97, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107-109, 159, 163, 167, 1 7 1 , 197, 203, 204, 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 , 216, 219, 226-228, 231, 233, 241, 247, 251, 252, 253, 255-256; policy

339

Index of federal government on, 31-32, 424 4 . 7 0 , n , 75» 82, 91-94» 9 6 , 97» 100, 102, 104-105, 178, 215, 242, 243>

253; state action on, 197, 199,

201,

251-254;

surveys

of,

239-240,

241, 242-243, 248. See also Conservation; Federal Power Commission; Flood control; Interstate compacts; Navigation; Pollution abatement; Power development, public; Public Works Administration; Regional resources development Weather Bureau, U. S., 38 Weeks, John E., 29 Weeks, Sinclair, 174, 176 West Canaan, Ν. H., 34, 203, 204 West Dummerston, Vt., 160-161, 171 West Dummerston Dam, 160, 163, 166, 167, 172, 180, 184

174,

175,

176,

177,

178,

Western Massachusetts Electric Company, 238

Westfield, Mass., 28, 38, 208 Westfield River Valley, 208 Westfield Valley Parkway Association, 36 Weston, Vt., 206 Weston, Arthur, 202 Westover Field, 152 West River, 159, 160, 171, 172, 180, 181-182, 183, 208; tributaries, 16*7 West River Valley, 62, 106, 209 West River Valley project, 152, 158188, 204, 206, 208, 252-253;

cam-

paign against, 160-163, J65, 166-167, 169, 170, 171; campaign for, 164165, 172; compromise plans, 175178, 186, 187; Congressional debate on, 168-178, 182; original plans of Corps of Engineers, 163-164; political aspects of, 186-188; tributary dams, 167, 171, 172; Vermont's alternative plan, 167, 171-172, 181, 183 West Springfield, Mass., 24, 149, 245 West Townshend, Vt., 164, 184, 186, 209

Weathersfield, Vt., 186 Wethersfield, Conn., 48 Wheeler, R. Α., 246-247

Wheeler-Rayburn Holding Company Bill, 115 White, Representative, 137 White and Black Rivers Flood Control Association, 75 White River, 28, 33, 208 White River Junction, Vt., 29, 187, 188 White River Valley, 23, 186 Whitingham, Vt., τ 66 Whittington, William M., 61, 69, 90, 94, 105, 129, 142, 168, 169-170, 239

Wilder Dam project, 188-192; AikenBridges-Tobey resolution, 192, 194; background of, 188-189, J 9 3 ! Congressional debate on, 192-197; political aspects of, 191, 196; and power company activities, 189, 190-191, 195, 196, 197; public reaction to, 189-191

Williams River, 186 · Williamsville, Vt., 161, 163-164, 204 Williamsville Dam, 159-160, 163, 168, 170, 172, 183-184, 186

Wills, William H., 154-155, 157, 162, 175 Wilson, Richard, 160 Wilson, Stanley C., 32, 34 Winant, John, 7, 24, 36, 70 Windsor Locks, Conn., 238 Windsor Locks Canal Company, 149, 153» 197. 236 Winooski Basin, 28, 29, 33 Winooski River, 28-29, 33 Winsted, Conn., 27 Wisconsin, 23 Wolman, Abel, 50, 51 Woodhouse, Mrs. Chase Going, 220 Woodring, Harry, 53, 65, 66, 77, 99, I06, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129-130, I 3 I - I 3 5 , 139, 140, 141, 247

Worcester Electric Company, 5, 6, 10 Works Progress Administration (WPA), 38, 39, 118, 150

Young, Owen D., 255 Zimmerman, Orville, 87