Fire and Water: Scientific Heresy in the Forest Service [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674422148, 9780674422131

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Fire and Water

FIRE AND W A T E R Scientific Heresy in the Forest Service

Ashley L. Schiff

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts • 1962

© 1962 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London

Publication of this volume has been aided by a grant from Resources for the Future, Inc.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: Printed in the United States of America

62-9429

To Dorothy and Dana

Preface

During a tour of Harvard Forest in 1954, its director, Hugh M. Raup, alluding to catastrophe's impact on ecological processes, remarked that fire was probably instrumental in perpetuating Douglas fir. Later, while perusing Rutherford Piatt's A Pocket Guide to The Trees, I discovered that longleaf pine depended on fire for its survival. This knowledge proved most unsettling, especially to one who had for several years taught youngsters that fire was synonymous with forest destruction. Yet not until Professor Arthur A. Maass suggested that the Forest Service's reaction to H. H. Chapman's work on longleaf might be a fertile area for research did I realize that the subject had fascinating administrative implications. Leopold and Maddock's The Flood Control Controversy called attention to another issue, that of the significance of forests in flood abatement. A preliminary examination, indicating that study of administrative-research relations might link the fire and water problems, gave focus to the venture.

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PREFACE

This book is not intended to fan the flames, or roil the waters, of controversy. If the variables involved are numerous, they are also elusive and difficult to isolate. The present endeavor, then, is only a prologue to future efforts to identify advances in the physical sciences as a baseline against which to plot and evaluate organizational responses in differing political-administrative contexts. The author hopes, in a projected study in the field of comparative administration, to probe some of the tentative conclusions propounded here. Neither a forester nor involved in the disputes described below, I have attempted to reconstruct the past as it appeared to participants. Extensive use of quotations from original sources commended itself to me as an excellent means to this end. Throughout this endeavor, Professor Maass has been an unfailing source of inspiration, information, and guidance. As a result of his counsel, this investigation was spared from innumerable shoals and cul-de-sacs. A grant from Resources for the Future, Inc., enabled me to continue explorations in Washington. And Dr. Marion Clawson of RFF contributed much toward a more sophisticated interpretation of administrative behavior. Without the cooperation of the United States Forest Service, this investigation would not have been nearly so fruitful. The following Service officials willingly related their experiences: Leonard Barrett, A. A. Brown, Roy Chapman, Raymond Conarro, John Cooper, William A. Dayton, James Diehl, Bernard Frank, V. L. Harper, William Huber, D. M. Ilch, Merle Lowden, George Jemison, Richard McArdle, C. W . Mattison, Warren T. Murphy, Ivan Sims, Arthur Spillers, and William Stahl. I had the benefit of correspondence and/or discussions with these retired foresters: Frank Albert, E. L. Demmon, Inman F. Eldredge, Charles F. Evans, Eugene

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1X

Gemmer, Edward Kotok, Edward N . Munns, A. C . Shaw, and W . G . Wahlenberg. A special debt of gratitude is owed Professor H. H. Chapman. H e graciously shared his wisdom with me during several interviews and reviewed a draft of the "Fire" chapters. I am further indebted to Arthur A. Hartman for invaluable comments on the history of prescribed burning. His enthusiastic response to an appeal for information filled many gaps in my story. I would also like to express my deep appreciation to S. W . Greene for better acquainting me with events in which he played so conspicuous a role. Hugh M . Raup enriched my knowledge of forestry. I am grateful for the careful attention he devoted to a reading of the "Fire" chapters. Maynard Hufschmidt advanced my understanding of the flood controversy, as did Howard Cook, R. A. Hertzler, Thomas Maddock, and Arthur Ringland. In the course of my research, I have utilized the resources of the Harvard University library system, the Yale

University

School of Forestry Library, the National Archives, and the Department of Agriculture Library. Dr. Frances Bolton and her aide, Leila Willner, at Yale and Dr. Harold T . Pinckett and his assistants, Helen T . Finneran and Stanley W . Brown, at the Archives were particularly helpful in facilitating my task. Despite the press of his law studies, Hiller Zobel gave generously of his time to suggest needed revisions in the "Fire" chapters. A grant for typing assistance from the University of Southern California relieved me of the numbing drudgery of that work. I was fortunate enough to have my mother perform this toil during earlier phases of manuscript preparation. O f course, I alone am responsible for whatever errors remain in the text. A . L. S. University of Southern California, April 1961

Contents

î . Crusaders and Scientists

1

2. Forests and Fire: Defining the Research Problem

15

3. Forests and Fire: Administrative Travail

51

4. Forests and W a t e r

116

5. Administrators and Scientists

164

Participants and Positions

185

Notes

193

Index

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Fire and Water

i. Crusaders and Scientists

N o harsher criticism was ever lodged against the old Division of Forestry than Gifford Pinchot's strictures on its failure to practice forestry in the woods. He chided his predecessor's administration (1886-1898) for confining its attention to research and the propagation of information while eschewing responsibility for applying its findings to the formidable task of forest management. As Pinchot charged, "the old Division saw too many lions in the path. It held that before it could manage a forest growth intelligently it must know first of all the biology or life history of all the kinds of trees which compose it." 1 Though Pinchot, who became head of the unit in 1898, did not entirely discount the value of scientific research, he did believe that action, not investigations and exhortations, was most essential if the Division of Forestry (redesignated the Forest Service in 1905) were to secure and maintain control of the national forests, then under the aegis of the Department of the Interior. T h e lions he himself discerned constituted a different breed—a grasping water-power trust, timber and cattle

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barons, and the mining magnates. Launching of the conservation crusade, coupled with difficulties encountered in administering its newly acquired domain, completely absorbed Service energies. In the process, research was slighted—despite the fact that the American Association for the Advancement of Science had first expressed concern over the nation's timber resources and that Pinchot later credited a National Academy of Science report with originating federal forest policy. 2 For activists like Pinchot, resolution of policy problems was more pressing than advancement of knowledge through research. 3 Once applied to the woods, forest management made little provision for continued scientific effort. Ironically, after science had inspired action, it was then sorely neglected. Scientific deficiencies, however, soon impressed foresters with the exigent need for expanded inquiry if the forests were to be competently administered. 4 T o the crusaders, federal research under Department of Agriculture auspices seemed particularly compelling for these reasons: the national or regional character of the problems; the federal ownership and administration of one fifth of the nation's timberland; farmers' holdings, too small to permit self-financed research, accounting for one third of forest acreage; the federal obligation to stimulate forestry development as a national enterprise. 5 Whether the Service itself should be invested with research responsibilities was not quite so obvious. W o u l d consolidation or separation of research and management functions harness most effectively the scientific potential? Arguments abounded on either side of the question. Proponents of unification opted for this course because it would insure investigations directed toward answering pressing administrative dilemmas. As Pinchot urged Roosevelt, in protesting the projected Service transfer to Interior in 1940: " T h e Forest Service is a research as well as an executive organization. This union of research and administra-

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3

tion underlies the progress of forestry and the morale and efficiency of the Service. To separate the two would ruin the Service. This union is also the distinguishing characteristic of the Department of Agriculture."6 Unless research men were "compelled to keep in mind that their function is service" to administrative divisions, such data might not be forthcoming. 7 With integration, scientists could not retreat to their ivory towers and disclaim responsibility for assisting in the preparation of Service programs. Then, too, researchers might be spared the danger of permitting data to accumulate without submitting it to analysis and interpretation in an attempt to remain above controversy. Legislators looked with a jaundiced eye on research for its own sake. They would appropriate more adequate funds for research when it was attached to an "action" agency. Of what value, the integrationists reasoned, is freedom to determine one's own objectives if funds to support this work are lacking? Moreover, establishment of experiment stations in national forests would lead to greatly expedited application of results since these lands represented natural demonstration centers. Extensive administrative contacts with private landowners might also further the acceptance of findings. Fusion might benefit administration in still another way. Resort to the scientific method, with its uncompromising concern for honesty and integrity, its relentless search for truth, and its requirement for freedom of inquiry, would tend to enhance administrative accountability. Thus, bureaucracy might be prevented from "getting into ruts" 8 and from succumbing to the arrogant and intolerant attitudes characteristic of crusading organizations. Since the scientific ethic and the democratic credo were inseparable, assigning research duties to an action agency could produce nothing but salutary consequences.9 Whatever impairment of science's critical faculty might oc-

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cur as a result of integration, other observant scientific agencies in the resources area would rectify: nature's mandates were not confined, in their effects, within boundaries formalized by governmental organization charts. T h e Geological Survey in the water-resources field, the Biological Survey in wildlife management, the Bureau of Plant Industry in entomological and botanical studies, the Bureau of Animal Industry in grazing matters, and the Weather Bureau in forest-influences research, all were superbly qualified to curb unwarranted statements. Indeed, to avoid entanglement with these organizations, the Service would prudently temper its claims. In any event, the proponents of consolidation argued, reliance on policies contravening scientific principles would ultimately prove unsatisfactory, if not embarrassing. Evidently, convinced of the merits of entrusting research functions to an administratively oriented bureau, Raphael Zon proposed, on M a y 6, 1908, establishing experiment stations in the national forests. Simple in design and dimension, the scheme did not precisely define relationships between these stations and the already existing Section (later Office) of Silvios. N o r did the plan provide for distinct administrativeresearch spheres of authority. T h e stations were conceived merely as "local institutions to work largely upon the immediate forest problems in a rather restricted locality." Stations would be set up "in the woods away from the haunts of men, so the investigators would be in close communion with nature and so in intimate touch with her problems." 1 0 Opponents of this arrangement, expressing themselves more fully in later years, predicted research's inevitable suppression. Pointing to the task the Service faced in destroying the myth of resources inexhaustibility, they argued in favor of separation as best calculated to suit the requirements of both research and administration. Embarking on a crusade to convert the country

CRUSADERS

AND

SCIENTISTS

5

to conservation, the "men in green"* had acquired an introverted, militant corporate spirit. This posture manifested itself in educational campaigns permeated with strong emotional tones to gain public acceptance of action programs. As a former chief declared, the Service was "born in controversy and baptized with the holy water of reform." 1 1 Certainly, Pinchot grasped the importance of appealing to women to wield their moral influence in behalf of conservation: " T h e issue is a moral one, and the women are the first teachers of right and wrong. . . . Women both in public and at home, by letting the men know what they think and by putting it before the children can make familiar the idea of Conservation, and support it with a willingness that nobody else can approach." 12 But the danger loomed that moral righteousness when embroidered with scientific technology would be too attractive in a scienceworshipping age. 13 Moral appeals might even lead "researchers" astray by encouraging tendencies to oversimplify and overgeneralize complex problems. Worse yet, their thinking might become rigidified, thereby losing the best qualities of the research mind. Administrative evangelism aside, the full-blown commitment to public education represented by the conservation movement would create commitment to previously enunciated doctrines. Consequently, one might discover, in aggravated form, a reluctance to promote research or release results which seemed to jeopardize success of agency projects. This argument applied especially to agencies, like the Service, enjoying a notable degree of discretionary power and anxious to utilize this authority in accord with liberal notions of executive responsibility. 14 Interestingly, the Service's first law officer, George Woodruff, played an important role in formulating the theory that the President * So styled by Hiller Zobel, "Gifford Pinchot and the Men in Green," honors thesis, Harvard University, 1 9 5 3 .

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as steward of the public welfare might undertake any action not specifically forbidden by the Constitution. 15 One political scientist, linking this concept of executive initiative to the growing employment of propaganda as an essential governmental tool, has concluded that policy thus originated may encourage the fashioning of "controlled publicity" for establishing its legitimacy and insuring its political acceptance.16 If this proclivity represents a perversion of the democratic process, its implications for science are no less clear. Further, commitment to an aggressive educational effort connotes the weaving of a seamless web of relationships with other organizations through which information is channeled. In the event of attacks on established policies arising from new research findings, public responsibility might be compromised: to repudiate past policy would embarrass cooperating groups. Government monopolization of employment opportunities for foresters might compound the inertia. The healthy counterpoise afforded by existence of talent located outside the web was absent. And forest schools, preoccupied with training foresters for federal and state service, were ill prepared to accept responsibility for criticizing Service policy. Lastly, critics forecasted undue concentration of governmental science on the known and predictable. Close association of research with administration would intensify opportunism in the drafting of research programs. Requirements similar to those of the Department of Agriculture, that scientists state in advance probable procedures, results, and termination dates, are not conducive to the most fruitful investigation. Rather, they bespeak concern with budgetary considerations and temporal exigencies. In a sphere where salient patterns often emerge only after laborious exploration and quite adventitious observation, such prior specification may frustrate, not facilitate, scientific progress. As Edward Higbee has ob-

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7

served: "This obligation to play it safe brings results but rarely does it lead to basic discovery. . . . There is altogether too much emphasis on research and not enough on research."17 The research branch of an administrative agency could hardly resist pressures for immediate results if units completely divorced from action programs fall prey to this evil. As expected by advocates of scientific autonomy, administrative interference so fettered research under the 1908 plan that it could not effectively contribute to formulation of Service policy. Unfortunately, isolation "in the woods" did not furnish adequate shielding against those pressures. Recognizing this fact, in 1915 the Secretary of Agriculture called for reappraisal of the department's functional distribution—research, regulation, and extension. The Service's research effort, scattered in several branches under the jurisdiction of administrative officers, had become stagnated—a result of indifference and antagonism.18 Assistant Chief Earle Clapp complained that limited career opportunities in research hobbled recruitment. Subordinated as research was to the administrative forces, lack of status and recognition induced those with scientific inclinations to aspire to more highly rewarded positions in the administrative hierarchy. And physical isolation of the stations, which interdicted professional contacts, heightened their despair.19 Commingling of research and administrative concerns was obviously inimical to achievement of scientific progress. Despite past failures, however, the Service did not feel that transfer of its research operations was justified; internal restructuring seemed to promise greater returns. Hence, within its own ranks, the Service proposed separate but equal status for research. Now subordinated only to the chief forester, research would possess adequate authority to repulse infringements on its domain. According to this scheme, effected in 19x5, research activities were to be consolidated in a branch of research. Ex-

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periment stations would report directly to the head of research in Washington who, in turn, had immediate access to the chief forester. Thus, two lines of authority were recognized: one flowed from the chief through the regional forester to the ranger district, and the other ran by way of the branch of research from the chief forester to the experiment station. Research was fused, yet located sufficiently distant, the Service averred, to maintain a critical attitude and a detached outlook. Partly out of a desire to allow full rein to individual initiative and ingenuity, research itself was "highly decentralized" from the standpoint of Washington office supervision.20 "Resources management begins and belongs on the ground"21—this idea had long been a Service touchstone; scientists would give it added vitality and strength. Clearly, research's ability to function as a critical force— "a safeguard to democratic principles in administration and . . . an effective offset to any trend toward authoritarianism or subjugation of science to politics"22—depends on policies fostering the free exchange of scientific information. Ever since its inception, the department had endorsed this sine qua non of scientific development. To be sure, organic legislation establishing the department had defined its obligation "to acquire and diffuse among the people of the United States useful information on subjects connected with Agriculture in the most general and comprehensive sense of the word."23 Reiterating this aim, Secretary of Agriculture J. M. Rusk subsequently wrote that the department was obliged to make research results available "by a comprehensive scheme of publication. . . . The Department must in its information program be exact, objective, critical and detached, even if this seems to make it slow and ponderous as well. It must not make too much haste. It cannot afford to be in error. Its reputation for authority entails

CRUSADERS AND SCIENTISTS

9

24

heavy responsibility." Mindful of the furor provoked in 1 9 1 3 by the Bureau of Public Roads' hiring of a "publicity agent," Milton Eisenhower, as director of information, later contended that his office had refrained from propagandizing the "Department's functions or activities. Our job is far different. Our function, as set out in the organic act of the Department, is to take the results of scientific research, put them into an understandable form and distribute them." 2 5 Only recently, in 1955, the department reaffirmed its intention to pursue an "open-door" information policy encouraging correspondents to examine its operations "freely and without restriction." 26 As a constituent member of the Department, the Service is pledged to uphold this policy. It has likened its role to that of a corporation manager responsible through a board of directors (Congress) to the stockholders (citizens), with all this implies for communication to the public. 27 Admittedly, information programs serve a dual purpose: to win consent for administrative decisions and to keep the electorate abreast of developments, however unpleasant, which might affect it. Foresters considered the stations to have potential value as demonstration centers embracing both objectives. C . A. Pearson (onetime Director, Fort Valley Station) has stressed the first: " A n experiment station, if at all accessible, is visited by great numbers of people annually. M a n y are attracted by mere curiosity, but others show a genuine interest in the work. N o t a few of these visitors are persons of scientific prominence. T h e experiment station is thus called upon to uphold the scientific prestige of the Forest Service." 28 B u t L . F . Kneipp (Assistant C h i e f ) understood them to have a critical function as well: a "secondary but hardly less important purpose" of the stations was to "provide for the demonstration of results, favorable or otherwise." 29 It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the Service had assured

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Congress that research personnel "should be and are given the fullest freedom to report and interpret the facts in any field of investigation as they find them, whether or not they support current administrative practices or are in conformity to preconceived ideas of the political group which happens to be in power. . . ," 3 0 T h e line delineating respective spheres of research and extension has not been an easy one to draw. Still, if freedom for scientists to disseminate results holds any meaning, the assumption of a modicum of extension responsibilities by research was inevitable. Thus H . L . Mitchell (Southern Station) exhorted his colleagues: W e are a research organization and as such our primary function is research. . . . Research, however, isn't our only responsibility. As public servants we are obligated to keep the taxpayers we are hired to serve reasonably well informed of our work, and to make the best possible use of available means of getting our results to the people who need and will benefit the most therefrom. . . . W e cannot afford to "pass the buck" entirely to the extension agencies on the grounds that it is primarily their job, and that we are too busy, not interested in, good at, or equipped for public relations work. . . . In case of failure, you can be sure that it will be research that is held accountable. 31 Communication facilitates cooperation. Following the 1 9 1 5 reorganization, the Service signified its readiness to look to the forestry schools for "inspiration and guidance in research as we have in many other things, and for results as well to aid in the full development of forest practice." 3 2 Such collaboration would reduce possibilities of duplicated research. Also, it would throw light on crucial areas needing examination. Of course, other institutions had a reciprocal duty to inform the Service of projects on which they were engaged. Creation of researchstation advisory councils—comprising representatives of industry, state forest agencies, heads of forest schools and state

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agricultural colleges—was an attempt to institutionalize this process. These groups would alert stations to "gaps [in their programs] which are preventing the full and well rounded attack upon some phases of a particular problem." 3 3 In addition, the Texas-fever research incident probably was still vivid in the memories of many. Though aware of cattlemen's contention that a tick transmitted the disease, Dr. John Gamgee (a British veterinarian employed by the department), ridiculing this notion, concluded, to the department's later regret: " A little thought should have satisfied anyone of the absurdity of the idea." 3 4 Undoubtedly, foresters desired to avoid a recurrence of this situation; subjected to criticism from "grass-roots" members of advisory councils, station staffs would earnestly consider local observations of natural phenomena, thus obviating future embarrassment. On balance, therefore, the Service believed that alterations made in 1 9 1 5 furnished adequate insulation for research while enabling scientists to lay the groundwork for administrative decisions. Research and administration, it was hoped, might "foster and reinforce each other." Inasmuch as the Service deemed administrative experience "splendid" background for research work, "the availability of men in the administrative staffs . . . [was] always considered." 35 Further, administration was assigned a "substantial" role in determining research programs and priorities: " I n other words, the segregation of research has been complete for the determination of the research technique and the current administration of the research itself, but the work is on programs jointly recommended by administrative officers and the investigative staff." 3 6 Administration might also review reports covering investigation results. Lastly, periodic conferences between regional office and station personnel were scheduled to promote intra-Service harmony and understanding. 37

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W h e n in effect for twenty years, in 1934 Chief Forester Silcox thought these arrangements had fulfilled their intended objectives. H e immediately rejected regional foresters' demands that the stations be placed under their jurisdiction. O n that occasion, Silcox reminded the Service: The plan of regional office supervision of the forest experiment stations was once tried over a period of several years and failed. On the other hand, the trial of independent supervision has led to an impressive development of research in the Forest Service and the promise of a far greater development. . . . I was greatly impressed in the West last summer with the stimulus which comes from the present setup. The Research group acquires new information which they want to see put into effect. By the nature of their work they see the work of the Administrative organization on the national forests and elsewhere from a different angle and are critical of it. . . . With Regional office administration of the forest experiment stations there would always be ground for the suspicion of outsiders in the future as there has been in the past that the desire to sustain administrative policies on controversial questions had influenced results. Independent research has been and would be accepted as impartial.38 Earlier, observers warmly applauded station achievements and, by implication, research's position in the Service. Impressed by its plans, procedures, and accomplishments, the president of the American Paper and Pulp Association had flatly stated: "It is not a lack of program which has deterred any branch of the Research Department of the Forest Service, but rather a lack of adequate appropriations. T o me there seems but one thing to do and that is to see that adequate appropriations are made for Forest Service activities." 39 Words outstripped deeds; pecuniary factors were not solely responsible for the lag. N o one perceived this more keenly than Assistant Chief for Research Earle Clapp. Upon promotion to Associate Chief in 1935, he confided to Silcox his strong reser-

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vations on the wisdom of including a budding scientific unit in a crusading organization: I am leaving Research with an uneasy feeling about its future in the Forest Service which I know is shared by others. As yet it has not in my judgment been conclusively shown that it is possible, in a bureau such as the Forest Service, primarily administrative in its functions to develop and permanently maintain a strong effective research organization. This feeling is based on such things as: the recent transfer of four men from key positions in Research without any assurance that the vacancies could be filled satisfactorily. T h e Forest Service in general has been indifferent to or has actively opposed practically every constructive move to develop research. For many years there have been periodic efforts to break it down. One of the most thankless and difficult duties of the man in charge of Forest Service research has been to fight constructive research developments through the Forest Service. Another has always been to protect and hold the things which are necessary for effective research. The last few years have had their full share of efforts which if consummated would have wrecked the entire research effort. Such efforts may not be quite as active now as they have been in the past, but they may be even more dangerous because instead of being advocated by men openly hostile, they are now being advocated by men with an academic interest but with little conception of what research really is and what the requirements for good work are. The recent decision to maintain the independent status of the forest experiment stations and the placing of Research in Washington on a par with national forest administration and state and private forestry are decidedly reassuring as far as they go. T h e purpose of this memorandum is to urge the approval of some additional principles in order more fully to assure a permanent place for effective research in the Forest Service set-up. If I can have your approval of these principles I can leave Research with a much greater feeling of assurance as to its future, a feeling which I believe will be shared by the entire Research organization. (1) It is the declared purpose and policy of the Forest Service to develop and maintain research as one of its major activities, and to make the provisions necessary to insure a thoroughly effective functioning. The reasons for this

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are: (a) To supply the basic biological, social, economic, and other technical information which is necessary for the rapid and well rounded progress of the whole forestry movement in the United States, (b) To help make the Forest Service into a technical organization in spirit and in fact instead of the nontechnical organization which it now is too largely in spirit as well as in fact, (c) To have at all times in the Forest Service a group not under administrative domination, idealistic from the very nature of its work, ready when occasion demands to supply the criticism which the Forest Service needs to keep it alive and forward-looking, and also to perform the same function for American forestry as a whole. [Clapp then discussed the need for qualified experiment-station directors and condemned the lack of attention paid to station directors at regional foresters' meetings.] What at bottom I am driving at is this, that in time, and in my judgment the time is already long overdue, major Forest Service policies and major national forestry policies will have to be based on fact and not on opinion, and this means basing them on research results. This means still further that the Forest Service in its councils should recognize the men who collect and interpret these facts on a basis of equality with the men whose job it is to apply them. These recommendations are, I fully realize, pure heresy from the traditional administrative standpoint of the Forest Service. For making them I shall be charged with trying to break the Forest Service down into separate compartments. But this is the time-honoured argument that has always been used in the effort to prevent the development of research. Like the "save the constitution" argument, it really covers something else.40 W h a t could have moved Clapp to comment so frankly? Would the facts justify his accusations? Let us explore the problem further.

2. Forests and Fire: Defining the Research Problem

W h a t white pine was to the North and Douglas fir to the Pacific Northwest, longleaf pine had been to the South. This pine subsisted on sandy soils of generally low fertility along the coastal plain from North Carolina to eastern Texas. Most esteemed of the four major Southern conifers (longleaf, slash, loblolly, and shortleaf), longleaf outranked even Douglas fir as the nation's leading timber export. Described in the literature as possessing high density with a straight, compact grain and a large proportion of heartwood, its wood was deservedly prized. Weight for weight stronger than steel, longleaf found extensive use in the heavy-construction, shipbuilding, and housing fields. Adapted to a wide variety of other uses, it was also employed for poles, masts, interior finish, railroad ties, shingles, paving blocks, freight cars, and wood pulp.1 Foresters conceded, however, that longleaf did not "come back" after lumbering. If peregrinating hogs in their search for

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palatable forage did not altogether devour tiny longleaf seedlings, fire would consume the remainder. Following exhaustion of virgin supplies, longleaf would largely disappear as a commercially important species unless certain conditions were met. Prevent fire, exclude hogs, leave ample seed trees, and nature herself would restore longleaf to its primeval state. Typically, fire protection became 90 percent of silviculture. Y e t the South was most deficient in this regard, being the last region to commence protection operations. These statistics give point to the problem: barely 8 million acres of private and national forest land received protection in 1 9 2 1 , and that merely seasonal; in 1927, 45 percent of the Florida pine area burned over annually. Fires had been especially numerous in the coastal plain stretching 1,500 miles from Virginia to Texas. For many years fire-fighting equipment remained extremely crude and primitive, even nonexistent over major areas. Firecontrol implements valued at $10,600 were all the sixteen Southern states could muster in 1926 to combat this hazard. Incredible as it seems, scarcely fifty fire towers stood watch over more than 200 million acres of timberland—a faithful yardstick of the South's interest in sustained-yield forestry. 2 T h e shocking dearth of state organizations and professional schools furnish other revealing indices. After Louisiana became the first Southern state to make legal provision for forestry (1904), North Carolina created the Office of Forester in the State Geological and Economic Survey ( 1 9 0 5 ) . Texas followed in 1 9 1 5 . Later, South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Alabama tried without noticeable success to initiate action. In fact, Professor H . H. Chapman of the Yale Forestry School reminded the first Southern forestry congress in 1 9 1 6 that these formal declarations of intent lacked substantive content. T o be sure, not one state forester had been employed. As Chapman reported,

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

17

"Alabama [1908] created a State Forestry Board of seven men, including the Governor, a member of the State Tax Commission, the State Game and Fish Commissioner, the Commissioner of Agriculture, a lumberman, a member of the U. S. Forest Service, and a Professor at Alabama Polytechnic Institute. These men met at least once, and that is the last that has been heard of them." 3 Passage of the Clarke-McNary Act, providing federal grants-in-aid to the states for fire protection, spurred Alabama (1924), Georgia (1925), Mississippi and Oklahoma (1926), Florida and South Carolina (1928) to enter the lists against the Red Demon, leaving Arkansas as the sole Southern state lacking organized protection.4 In 1921, a forest school associated with the University of Georgia constituted the only functioning educational institution. Although established as early as 1906, its enrollment had continued small and graduates few. 5 Unquestionably, the South was the Service's "problem child." Several explanations have been advanced to account for its tardy behavior. As one of the last sections exploited for its virgin-timber supplies, the illusion of inexhaustibility persisted there with tenacity—particularly when, owing to congenial climatological factors, its forests possessed unrivaled recuperative powers. Moreover, largely confined to duff, piney-woods fires failed to excite the alarm and incite the action to suppress them that spectacular crown fires—Peshtigo (Wisconsin), Hinckley (Minnesota), and Yacolt (Washington), Bitter Root and Coeur d'Alene (western Montana and northern Idaho)—occasioned elsewhere. Instead, incessant annual woods burning had a far more insidious effect. While not destroying mature growth outright, these fires decimated young stands, thus preventing adequate reproduction. Probably most crucial was the woods-burning habit itself. Dating back to the settlement

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of the coastal-plain flatwoods three hundred years ago, man had used fire initially to clear ground for fanning and then to provide improved winter pasture for his livestock. H e had observed that animals fared better on a fresh burn which destroyed the mat of dead grass, needles, and litter suppressing succulent new growth. 6 Migrating pioneers carried this custom into the Piedmont uplands and the Appalachian, Arkansas, and Missouri mountains. Some residents claimed that fire could also serve other purposes: to kill chiggers, ticks, and snakes, render turpentining operations and the location of stray cattle easier, and insure protection against disastrous fires. Foresters intended to exorcise these "superstitions" from the traditions of the old South. Only a crusade, it appeared to them, would shatter such pernicious beliefs. Not all those conversant with the problem, however, shared the view that these attitudes were either entirely superstitious or completely unjustified. Indeed, several propounded the theory that fire on certain occasions might actually benefit the species by facilitating reproduction and reducing fire hazards.

Cassandras in the Piney Woods Early travelers through the longleaf pine belt had recorded their observations on the periodic burning practices of Indians and settlers—Lawson in 1 7 1 4 , Catesby in 1722, Bartram in 1773, and Michaux in 1802. 7 Perhaps the first intimation that fires might create conditions amenable to longleaf development came from Charles Lyell. Referring to an area near Tuscaloosa, Alabama, the English geologist said in 1849: These hills were covered with longleafed pines and the large proportion they bear to hardwoods is said to have been increased by the Indian practice of burning the grass; the bark of the oaks and other kinds of hardwoods being more combustible, and more easily injured by fire, than most of the fir tribe. Everywhere the seedlings

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

19

of the longleaved pine were coming up in such numbers that one might have supposed the ground to have been sown with them. 8 In 1889 Mrs. Ellen Long went so far as to suggest: T h e annual burning of the wooded regions of the south is the prime cause and preserver of the grand forests of Pinus Palustris [longleaf pine] to be found there; that but for the effects of these burnings . . . the maritime pine belt would soon disappear and give place to a jungle of hardwood and deciduous trees . . . . The statute books of almost every southern state contain enactments prohibitory of setting fire to the woods, and severe penalties are attached to violation of the law. There may be sound reason for such legislation, since great loss of property often results from burning fences and buildings. But viewed from a forestry standpoint we believe the total abolition of forest fire in the South would mean the annihilation of her grand lumbering pineries.9 Reviewing the status of Southern timber resources for the old Division of Forestry, Charles M o h r concluded in

1896

that longleaf's intolerance of shade might necessitate clearing of denuded areas of "every obstacle in the way of free access of the rays of the sun before the sowing." 1 0 N o advice as to how this might be accomplished was forthcoming. Curiously, Pinchot soon discovered longleaf's singular ability to withstand the effects of fire. W h e n contrasted with Mrs. Long's discussion, however, it becomes apparent that Pinchot did not envision a role for fire: The eastern pitch pine protects itself in the same way. So do many other trees including the longleaf pine, which adds to the quality of bark another method of protection that places it at the head of all the trees of my acquaintance in its capacity to resist fire. Almost all trees yield readily to slight surface fires during the first ten or fifteen years of their life. T o this statement the longleaf pine is a conspicuous and rare exception. Not only do the young trees protect themselves in early youth by bark which is not uncommonly

20

FIRE AND WATER

as thick as the wood . . . but they add to this unusual armour a device specially adapted for their safety when growing amid long grass, usually a most fatal neighbor to young trees in case of fire.11 Pursuing this theme in his silvical study of longleaf pine, G . Frederick Schwarz in 1907 sought to define more precisely its fire-resistant qualities. H e found destruction wrought by surface fires "somewhat exaggerated and misunderstood; at any rate, so far as concerns seedlings over two or three years of age." 1 2 Seeds and seedlings of less than two years' maturity would readily succumb; young trees might prove unsound in the future. H e agreed with M o h r that longleaf seed demanded light for germination. Nonetheless, Schwarz characteristically saw no need for man to assist nature in this process. 13 T h e toll exacted by old age, disease, lightning, and windstorms, Schwarz reasoned, would undoubtedly create openings in the crown cover through which sufficient light could penetrate to the seedbed. Both Schwarz and Mohr recognized the encroachment of other species; Pinchot and Schwarz commented on longleaf's peculiar fire-resistant characteristics. However, no Forest Service member had yet sanctioned fire use in print. In 1907, T . T . Munger (Forest Assistant; later a director of the Northwest Forest Experiment Station) became alarmed over longleaf's potential extinction. A research paper submitted to his superiors embodied

several proposals for securing adequate

pine restocking. O n e advocated clear cutting of the forest with provision

for leaving

seed

trees. Another

contemplated

a

selective-cutting operation. Both alternatives were considered impractical; they failed to remove the ground litter that prevented the seed from reaching mineral soil. Whereas

fire,

when introduced as a tool of forest management, might render the first silvicultural system acceptable, nothing could be said

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

21

in favor of the second. T h e latter was silviculturally—and thus economically—unsound. Finally, Munger noted: The method lately suggested by the United States Forest Service [no evidence exists to confirm Service approval of this plan] which does seem entirely practical, which is cheap, is suited to the habits of longleaf pine, requires no especial skill for its practice, and is not at variance with the present method of logging and turpentining, is as follows: A lumberman owns a large tract of longleaf pine land which he is going to log during the next twenty or thirty years. When he sees by the small cones on the trees that a good seed year is coming he purposely bums over, under careful supervision, the land which he is planning to log during the next five or six years. This fire will prepare the soil for the reception of the seed, which when it falls in the autumn, should germinate even in the light shade of the old trees and form a carpet of seedlings through this section of the forest. The owner then installs an efficient system of fire protection so that the seedlings which start after the good seed year will not be killed. After the seed is shed from the trees the lumberman proceeds to log this section, cutting everything merchantable, only taking reasonable precautions not to destroy the little pine seedlings. . . . The fire protection on this section will be continued until the young growth is past the age when it can be killed by fire, which is about 10 years of age. Thereafter it may be advisable to burn over the tract each year during the wettest part of the year, so that the pine straw will not collect for years and be the source of a serious conflagration when it does catch fire.14 Anton T . Boison (Acting Chief of Silvics and, like Munger, a graduate of Y a l e Forestry School) might very well have consulted either Munger's manuscript, a preliminary report by renowned Service dendrologist W . W . Ashe, advocating fire treatments for loblolly, or H. H . Chapman's statement on longleaf, before preparing the following answer to an inquiry addressed to the Service:

22

FIRE AND WATER

Fire is of course the great enemy of the longleaf pine, and protection against fire is an absolutely essential first step toward securing a new crop. Rightly used, however, it may be of considerable assistance in securing new growth. If an area which is to be logged is burnt over just before the last seed year, thus destroying the leaf litter and exposing the mineral soil, favorable conditions for germination will then be secured and large quantities of seedlings should result. If fire is then excluded and the logging done with moderate care enough of the seedlings should be left to form a good second crop. Seed trees should, however, always be left. 15 Boison's views were never accepted (neither were Munger's) as the basis of a rational fire policy. Boison's subsequent decision, however, to resign in September 1908 and enter Union Theological Seminary does not appear to have been motivated by opposition

to

the

above opinion. Certainly

his

chief,

Raphael Zon, never publicly expressed the need for employing fire

during

seedbed

Henry Graves

(Chief

preparation Forester)

operations. 16

Undeniably,

sanctioned deliberate

trolled burning of litter in stands of mature "very

con-

fire-resistant

species," though strictly limiting it to hazard-reduction purposes until protection could be assured. 17 Circular 149 (1908) more accurately reflected Service thinking and objectives: " W h e r e fire is kept out, reproduction of the pine forest is a comparatively simple process. . . . T h e first step in the solution of the problem of waste cutover longleaf pine lands is to provide a law to prevent fire and a law that shall carry with it adequate provisions for its strict enforcement." 1 8 T h e initiative in assessing beneficial fire use thus passed to foresters in nongovernmental employ, or to those few "men in green" who dared voice their opinions unofficially as members of the Society of American Foresters. Chapman, brilliant, pugnacious, assistant professor at Yale, began his studies on the ecology of Southern pine in 1907 in the Missouri Ozarks. Shifting his headquarters in the following year to Clay and

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

23

Coosa counties, Alabama, in conjunction with the second annual Southern trip of the senior class, he suggested facilitation of longleaf restocking by burning in the fall preceding the seed year and again after "the end of the period of fire danger to young trees." 1 9 Chapman spurned any alliance with the woodsburners; he explicitly warned that protection was absolutely mandatory in the interval between germination and the mature fire-resistant stage. Species survival required modification of local customs, not their eradication. "Fire always has and always will be an element in longleaf forests," Chapman maintained, "and the problem is not how fire can be eliminated, but how it can be controlled so as, first, to secure reproduction; second, to prevent the accumulation of litter and reduce the danger of a really disastrous blaze." 2 0 Bryant of Yale in 1909 confirmed Chapman's finding that heavy grass growth appearing after logging had prevented longleaf seeds from reaching mineral soil. Burning to him also seemed well advised. 21 T o the Service, however, the Coeur d'Alene conflagration of 1 9 1 0 confirmed the necessity for absolute protection; fire, man's universal enemy, would be attacked with equal vigor on all fronts. Anesthetized by its experiences in other sections, the Service could hardly accept the argument that fire might prove a blessing in disguise. T h e question as to whether good might issue from evil was a discussion fit only for sophists. Even attempts to validate the theory were anathema. Inman Eldredge (the first supervisor of the Florida National Forest) futilely urged special consideration for the unique problems of his domain. 22 Evaluating the Southern woodsman as a "shrewd" individual who, once converted to any improvement, would be "quick to make use of it," and confining his attention to the protection problem, Eldredge argued that unusually heavy fuel accumulations in the pineries amply justified fire utilization as a hazard-reduction measure. Eldredge's plead-

24

FIRE AND WATER

ings smacked of the California "light burning" argument; on this ground alone they were discredited. To be sure, Eldredge had defended his plan's applicability only in the event it proved impossible to "assure complete and continued fire protection." Yet he cautiously added that, in view of the growth of a "rank and worthless" understory of scrub oak, such protection as was instituted should be harmonized with "the silvicultural needs of the forest." Whether Eldredge was cognizant of longleaf's silvicultural requirements is not known. He certainly did not amplify this point. Presumably, Service efforts to secure enactment of state fire legislation after the Coeur d'Alene holocaust also influenced Chapman to stress the protection aspects of controlled burning and to play down its silvicultural objectives. Distinguishing between Northern and Southern pines and their ability to resist fire, he claimed that laws modeled after those of the Northern states ultimately invited complete destruction of the Southern forests.23 Chapman later reiterated this belief to delegates assembled at the first meeting of the Southern Forestry Congress in 1916. Meanwhile, Roland Harper (a botanist associated with Alabama Polytechnic Institute) plagued the Service with a series of articles, appearing from 1 9 1 1 to 1914, on the relation between longleaf and fire. Given wide circulation through the pages of the Literary Digest, Harper's article, "A Defense of Forest Fires," noted the common tendency of those familiar with the "more spectacular and awe-inspiring" blazes typical of Northern conditions to scorn fire everywhere as an "unmitigated evil." In words recalling Long's thesis, Harper perceived that periodic fire in Southern pine served to forestall hardwood succession. As Chapman had, Harper condemned promiscuous use of fire, while proposing more selective treatment:

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

2

5

At the present time most of the fires in the pine woods are set purposely, to burn off the grass and improve the grazing. This practice has been repeatedly denounced by persons who have spent most of their lives outside of the longleaf pine regions, but really the only just criticism of it that can be made is that it is done too often; oftener than nature intended, one might say.24 Neither a member of the profession nor affiliated with the Service, Harper was derisively labeled a "car-window botanist" and his arguments dismissed as of little value. T h e Service continued to preach the need for complete protection, thereby favoring encroachment of more tolerant slash pine on longleaf sites. Thus did it validate its own pronouncement that slash was intrinsically the superior species. Curiously, it cited the following factors as responsible for the spread of slash: its frequent seed production (longleaf masts occurred only once every seven years), very rapid growth, shade tolerance, ability to withstand the combination of hogs and fire, and capacity to adapt itself to a wide variety of environments. 25 Search and Research. T h e Service set about buttressing its statements with scientific evidence. In 1 9 1 5 W i l b u r Mattoon and Ashe (Service research personnel) established a one-acre sample plot at Urania, Louisiana, to test the effect of fire and hogs on longleaf reforestation. 26 T h e Roberts plots, as they were called, comprised four quarter-acre sections: one bumed and grazed, one unburned and grazed, a third burned and not grazed, and the last given complete protection. Annual burning, instead of periodic burning, was planned, clearly indicating Service indifference to Chapman's and Harper's advice; though accurately portraying damage, this experiment was hardly structured to reveal benefits. Significantly, the test stand probably owed its

20

FIRE AND WATER

existence to repeated fires on the tract which had prepared a seedbed for the 1 9 1 3 mast. Nevertheless, references to this experiment, or to the results obtained, invariably fail to mention the circumstances prevailing prior to seedfall. Appearing with Chapman before the Southern Forestry Congress, James W . Toumey, also of Yale, supported his colleague's view that fire could be both a blessing and a curse; that regulation, not exclusion, most suited longleaf's requirements. "Fire, more than anything else," declared Toumey, "appears to be the silvicultural tool which is to determine the future stands." 27 Shortly thereafter, a meeting with F . A. Leete (a former conservator of the forests of Burma) induced Chapman to intensify his efforts to plumb the mysteries of longleaf silviculture. As Chapman recollects, in 1887 a British forester, who held fire exclusion responsible for the failure of teak regeneration, advocated its use, only to be censored for his efforts. A detailed field examination twenty years later, with Leete participating, confirmed the forester's claims: " T h e Forest Service personnel could have stuck their heads in the sand but they wanted to succeed in growing teak. From then on, fire played its role in British management of Indian forests and was soon applied also to the chir pine in the Himalayas." 2 8 T o all outward appearances, the Service remained united in its campaign for outright exclusion. Correspondents were told that burning was not recommended policy since "it can never be done without some damage to young trees and reproduction." 29 T h e most energetic Southern state organization, headed by R . D . Forbes, proclaimed light burning deleterious to the range for killing out the better forage plants and to timber for gradually eating into and weakening trunks and causing windfall. 3 0 Even so, a few people questioned hallowed dogma. Austin Cary, Professor of Forestry at Harvard and Y a l e and later an

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

27

itinerant Service missionary of practical forestry in the South (as he had been in the N o r t h ) , wondered "not indeed as to whether fire free and uncontrolled is a bad thing but whether there is not, in some conditions at [sic] the South, a field for the use of fire." Cary then briefly recounted a plan for securing longleaf reproduction in the Florida National Forest (Choctawhatchee unit) in 1920. T h e Choctawhatchee, a territory of deep sandy soil, contained longleaf with an understory of blackjack oak and sparse wire grass. "Early in the year preparatory to the fall of mast in October [ 1 9 2 0 ] , " related Cary, The forest was all burnt over to consume the fuel for fire and to have the soil as much as might be for seed reception. Now, with the seed down and rooted, the forest for two years at least will be kept as free from fire as possible. After that, because the young trees will stand light fire, and because in the local conditions fire at some time is almost inevitable and coming at a bad time may be destructive, it is intended to bum the territory over once in about two years, at a suitable time and under safeguards. 31 Admittedly, a two-year burning cycle following the initial b u m was designed solely for protective purposes. This later phase, however, could not have elicited such interest from Cary as did silvicultural aspects of the 1920 seedbed-preparation burn. Indeed, Eldredge had conceded a decade earlier that protective burning in the Choctawhatchee was essential owing to the scanty communications, inadequate transportation, alternate-section pattern of federal land ownership, nature of fuel accumulations, and frequency of lightning strikes and woods-burning habits that characterized the unit. Throughout this period protection had been limited to active naval-stores areas, while large portions of the remaining national-forest acreage were "light burned" with single fires encompassing 15,000 to 20,000 acres. Hence, were Cary looking for evidence

28

FIRE AND WATER

of official protective burning, he was not constrained to confine his observations and remarks to the 1920 experiment. Rather, this scheme probably intrigued him because it demonstrated local Service concern with the silvicultural arguments of Ashe and Chapman. Curiously, regardless of Assistant Forester for Research Earle Clapp's expressed intention to collaborate with researchers employed by private institutions, Chapman was never notified of this project. And research had a hand in the matter. Forbes and Lenthall Wyman (Director and Associate Silviculturist, respectively, with the recently established Southern Experiment Station) conducted field investigations on these plots in May 1922, and received verbal approval from Joseph Kittredge, of the Service's Washington office, to continue their studies. Forbes reported that the 1920 burn had consumed a seven-year accumulation of hardwood leaves, dead grass and similar litter, and a good deal of scrub oak, thus providing favorable conditions for longleaf germination.32 Confirming Cary's account, Forbes also noted that plans called for a burn in the spring of 1923 to be repeated at two- or three-year intervals until the next heavy mast year. Fresh from his experiences as Louisiana state forester, where he had ardently championed protection, Forbes expressed some reservations on the silvicultural aspects of the program. On the whole, however, he felt it justified, although advising cryptically: "Forest fires in the southern coastal plain have hitherto been very little studied. Generalizations concerning their effects are dangerous because of the wide variety of conditions in the region."33 If Forbes had not digested Harper and Chapman, he did have the benefit of Ashe and Mohr and his own empirical evidence. A perusal of his unpublished "Forest Fires in the Southern Coastal Plain" is illuminating; it demonstrates that station research into damage had incidentally uncovered vital

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

29

information on longleaf's fire-resistant qualities. By 1924, Forbes understood that first-year seedlings of all pine species were extremely sensitive to even the lightest fire. No contrary observations have ever been made on this point, so far as known, and whenever in the cutover pine lands of the South abundant pine reproduction of any species exists it is a practical certainty that through some chance the site escaped burning during the early months following germination of the seed, and has not burned every [original emphasis] year after that. . . . Experiments have conclusively proven that beginning with the second winter, that is, fifteen to sixteen months after germination, young longleaf seedlings may be burned annually in the winter for four or five years without appreciable mortality. . . . But after a few years of comparative immunity to killing by winter fires, longleaf pine seedlings again enter a brief period of danger. . . . General observation points to the conclusion that an occasional fire burning in the winter time will thin out but not decimate longleaf pine reproduction after the first fifteen months. Just how far apart the periodic fires must be in order to permit the survival of a satisfactory stand is unknown. Had Forbes been inclined to pursue research on periodic fire effects, had he revised the Roberts plot experiment, contrasting annual burning with complete protection, perhaps the controversy which later developed might have been averted. Had Chapman been aware of Forbes' observations, he might have thrown his support behind such an endeavor. Unfortunately, this article was never published. While it is not possible definitely to assign responsibility for this failure, one factor does emerge —research's fear of administrative reproof. Requested to review the article, E. F. McCarthy, a silvculturist (Southern Station), though evidently schooled in administrative thought patterns, cautioned Forbes: While I do not advise promulgation of false doctrine to support fire protection work, any suggestion that burning is ever good

30

FIRE AND WATER

practice should be withheld until it is known to be proper practice and its results can be weighed. The whole doctrine of burning at intervals of several years and in favorable periods seems to have been treated too lightly. An instance of this is the report of the experiment on the Florida National Forest, where controlled burning is being tried [original emphasis] and may yet be abandoned. I doubt the feasibility of telling the public about it at this time. It may be wrongly interpreted. . . . I feel that most of the State Foresters of the region would not approve this publication for general distribution because of the prevalent feeling that fire must first be outlawed before any concessions can be made to it. If there are practical uses of fire, technical journals rather than general circulars should probably be the first place for the advance of such theories.34 It may be noted that Forbes' conclusions were not even promulgated through the suggested media. Oddly, Mattoon, after acquainting the public with fire damage, managed to insert this piece in his bulletin on longleaf: In order that the [longleaf] seedling may get a good start it is necessary for the seed to come in contact with or close to mineral soil. In low ground where the soil cover is very heavy (rough) and contains more than a year's growth, this is not apt to happen. The necessity then arises of preparing the ground to receive the seed. Observations show that even in deep grass a few seeds fall in openings and germinate successfully. In some cases it may be found advisable, during the winter or early spring before a good seedcrop is anticipated, to burn over lands which it is desired to reforest. This will afford a light grass cover which is probably more favorable to successful germination than entirely bare soil, such as the seed would fall upon directly after the burning. Where fires have been of yearly occurrence and in regions of thin grass such measures will be unnecessary.35 Appearance of this reference to beneficial use presumably constituted an editorial oversight; Mattoon's Longleaf Primer,

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

3*

superseding Bulletin 1061, contained no mention of the "heretical" doctrine. Here, invasion of scrub oak on longleaf sites was given the orthodox interpretation—the result of failure to leave seed trees and the combined action of fire and hogs.36 Timberland owners were offered similar advice in successive revisions of the bulletin (1926, 1940). Interestingly, Mattoon's Making Woodlands Profitable in the Southern States (Farmers' Bulletin 1071, issued originally in 1920 and revised in 1922, 1924, and 1932) stated the case for protection, while at the same time displaying two pictures headed "Fire the Arch Enemy of the Forest" and captioned: "Longleaf pine cutover lands in northern Louisiana containing a full young stand of shortleaf and loblolly pines as a result of protection from fire. Extensive areas of such cutover lands come up to slash, shortleaf, and loblolly pines, the small seeds of which are widely scattered by the wind from occasional trees left in the section and are practically immune from hog damage." 37 Of course, it had always been Chapman's contention that nature would, in the long run, disclose the weaknesses of absolute exclusion by encouraging encroachment of other pine species, and eventually hardwoods, on longleaf sites. Thus, unwittingly, the Service embraced the Yale forester's position. But so preoccupied were its research specialists with the adverse effect of annual burning that most of them could not perceive the deeper meaning that lay behind what they had recorded. Occasionally, it appears they were on the verge of grasping the alliance that longleaf had made with fire. Assailed by their own doubts, and buffeted by their fears of possible administrative rebukes, their insights jarred loose and lost, foresters literally failed to see the forest for the trees. Evidence obtained from the Roberts plots (1924) seemed to vindicate complete protection. On the two plots open to

32

FIRE AND WATER

grazing, hogs had, by 1918, completely devoured the longleaf. With reference to the annually burned plots on which hogs were excluded, fires had little effect on the seedlings beyond retarding height growth; not until the fire of January 1921 were any marked number of seedlings killed. In striking contrast, seedlings on the unburned, ungrazed area suffered "no perceptible loss from any cause, and exhibited a greater rate of growth than where fires occurred. . . . This greater number of seedlings per acre was in spite of the fact that there were two or three large seed trees on this protected plot which reduced the number of seedlings under them through shading or root competition or both." 38 Extrapolating from this data, the Service condemned all fire regardless of frequency or intensity. At last, however, administrators were furnished the proof needed to dissuade Southerners from firing the piney woods. Statistics pointing up the difference between height growth and mortality on unburned and burned plots presently infused Southern antifire propaganda with a new compelling precision. The Louisiana State Forestry Commission subsequently graphed them, comparing seedling height to age on both burned and unburned areas. After station remeasurement, these graphs were updated each year. But the station had not anticipated that the firethinned plot would eventually record higher growth rates. When, in the late twenties, sapling growth on the unbumed plot slackened and actually fell below its neighbor, the charts were quietly abandoned. Significantly, the station made no public protest of this action. It had not anticipated that thinning caused by fire would enable whatever seedlings remained on burned plots to make more rapid growth, nor that the inordinate number of seedlings on unburned plots would hamper their future development. Chapman later penned a stern letter to Chief Forester Stuart criticizing Service failure to continue

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

33

observations on the two hog-grazed plots. It will be remembered that one had been untouched by fire since 1918 and the other unburned since prior to the 1913 seedfall. The obvious consequence was an accumulation of litter and vegetation on the seedbed by 1920. Abandoned by the station in 1921, these plots were then fenced by the Urania Lumber Company, owner of the property, so that Chapman might further observe results of complete protection. Stuart later admitted that station personnel had noticed the 1920 seed mast's failure to restock these plots. Revision of prevention publicity, however, was not attempted.39 Nor were annual burning experiments reoriented to accord with this evidence. While Clapp outlined a "balanced" national program of forest research, declaring that the Service was devoting thought to using fire as a silvicultural tool, Chapman produced the first systematic treatise on the interrelationship of longleaf and fire.40 Published as Yale Forestry Bulletin 16 (1926), Factors Determining the Natural Reproduction of Longleaf Pine on Cutover Lands in LaSalle Parish, La. recommended fire use on a three-year rotation. Fire preceding the seedfall represented an initial step, to be employed thereafter both to suppress competing vegetation and for hazard reduction. Moreover, Chapman suggested burning of afflicted needles to control brown-spot disease (longleaf with its long tap root can survive a period of defoliation). Though first described in 1884, this blight went unnoticed for over thirty years. Foresters observed effects of the fungus in 1918. W. H. Long of the Bureau of Plant Industry advanced the novel theory that fire might check the disease, since protection had encouraged its spread. The station partly concurred in this opinion but remained dubious of the measure's value, since infected seedlings apparently succumbed more readily to fire.41 Ashe, the Service's leading dendrologist east of the Rockies,

34

FIRE AND

WATER

and frequently at odds with official silvicultural policy on Southern pine, in a privately published critique of Bulletin 16 urged serious consideration of Chapman's sanitation concept. "There are doubtless some," predicted Ashe, "who will place this recommendation

in the same category as burning

to

eradicate ticks or the boll weevil, procedures fatuously advocated in part of the South. W e i g h t must be given to this suggestion certainly, in those sections where the needle rust is so prevalent as to be a menace." 4 2 Y e t Munns (Director, Branch of Silvics) seemed anxious to disprove Chapman's argument. H e proudly reported to his superiors: Chapman after a cursory study came out with the statement that fires kept down the blight, whereas study by the Station over a period of years and in a number of localities shows definitely that fires have no influence upon blight development or upon the severity of the attack. Fire destroys many blighted needles and undoubtedly destroys much blight, but it does not eradicate the blight and does not improve the health of the young tree.43 Regarding other aspects of Chapman's paper, E. L. D e m m o n (Director, Southern Station, 1927) and E. W . Hadley (also of the station) called his data inconclusive "particularly as they are not substantiated by work along similar lines elsewhere in the South." 4 4 Convinced of the correctness of their position, Service research personnel belittled the importance of Chapman's results. N o t before the winter of 1928-29, and then quite by accident,* did the station embark on research to test the validity of Chapman's periodic burning thesis; not until 1931 did it discover the truth of his sanitation theory. * As personnel of Hardtner's Urania Lumber Company were preparing to commence controlled-burning operations, Southern Station researchers happened on the scene and quickly laid out check plots. (Source confidential.)

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

35

The Dixie Crusaders Passage of the Clarke-McNary law greatly intensified the drive for complete protection. To summarize briefly: fire protection was furnished in 1928 on less than 5 percent of the forested lands of Georgia and Florida. Scarcely 3.3 and 1.6 percent, respectively, of the forested acreage of Mississippi and South Carolina received coverage (see the table below). The All forested lands and forested lands under protection (thousands of acres) Forested lands under protection State Florida Georgia Mississippi South Carolina

Forested lands

1928

1935

1945

1955

20,684 20,562 14,834

670 997 500

1,542 3,275 3,214

5,540 6,388 4,659

14,068 20,851 13,187

12,187

195

1,750

8,254

11,943

Sources: C. F. Evans, "Can The South Conquer the Fire Scourge?" American Forests, 50:228 (May 1944); Erie Kauffman, "The Southland Revisited," American Forests, 61:13 (September 1955).

Florida agency could boast of only ten permanent employees, and Georgia led the field with twenty-seven; the foresters of Mississippi and South Carolina had no assistance whatsoever.45 The Forest Service, perforce, devoted its efforts to aiding the newly organized state services in a crusade against Southern woods burning. Absolute proscription of the Red Demon was deemed imperative—the Service's opposition to controlled burning became even more adamant. In the Yearbook of Agriculture for 1927 there appeared an article written by Harry Lee Baker (future Florida state forester) of the Forest Service, presenting evidence that annual burning retarded longleaf development.48

36

FIRE AND WATER

Demmon repeated this refrain to readers of American Forests and Forest Life.*7 Page Bunker (Alabama state forester) ridiculed the assumption that fire played a critical ecological Tole: All sorts of extravagant statements have been made in this direction even to the effect that the longleaf seed will germinate only on burned ground. . . . Like most hasty conclusions, such popular conceptions are at variance with known and easily ascertainable facts. . . . It is sometimes hard for the layman, however, to divorce himself from tradition and guesswork. When reminded that during the development of the longleaf pine there was no one to burn the woods, he naively replies that lightning probably set the fires [see detailed rebuttal "Lightning in the Longleaf," by H. H. Chapman in American Forests, 1950]. However, throughout the time during which the longleaf pine was developing, vulcanism was confined practically entirely to the western part of the continent. . . . Further, all indications are that the warm temperature climates of these periods were not of the kinds characterized by frequent electrical storms. Geological evidences of forest fires are quite rare. Moreover, to assume that such a violently destructive agent as fire could by a fortuitous combination of circumstances be based upon the pine forests of a particular species for extended ages with such regularity and temper as to bring about adaptive changes rather than elimination must tax the credulity of even the most reckless theorist.48 The American Forestry Association, rallying behind this campaign to rid the woods of fire, in 1927 started a three-year educational attack on the problem. Designated the Southern Forestry Education Project, it distributed pamphlets and posters prepared by cooperating forest agencies. The association itself issued "Woods Fires—Everyman's Enemy." Teams of young men, called Dixie Crusaders, spearheaded the assault on Southern customs as their truck caravans rolled through the piney woods broadcasting "with all the drama of the day" these slogans: "Stop Woods Fires," "Growing Children Need

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

37

Growing Trees," "Everybody Loses When Timber Burns." The Crusaders traversed 300,000 miles, disseminating 2 million pieces of literature along the way. More than 5,200 motion picture programs and lectures were presented to 3 million people, one half of them children, with the USDA film, "Trees of Righteousness" enjoying the "most universal appeal." By 1929 the woodsburner, sought out in his own lair, had been made "to know the way of his transgressions."49 A "great tide of indignation," the Association asseverated, "was sweeping out over the Piney Woods, mobilizing sentiment against the woodsburner."50 On the strength of optimistic reports, plans were drafted by its Florida affiliate for a three-year extension of the campaign.51 Events soon intervened, however, to force their cancellation. During these years the Service, solicitous of the pleas of state foresters, endeavored both to weed from its publications all references to possible beneficial use and to banish fire from its own domain. In truth, fire became an outlaw in the woods. Accordingly, the Service's branch of public relations prepared for Chief Forester Greeley's signature an antiburning policy, officially referred to as "light-burning policy," "looking towards more emphasis upon complete fire protection as the desirable and ultimate goal." In a preliminary statement, the Service admitted that "an element of good" might attend light burning but argued that it could not be sanctioned since it threatened the effectiveness of organized protection: Light-burning for silvicultural reasons will not be permitted, unless and until the experiments now under way prove conclusively that this practice is desirable under certain well defined conditions.52 The Service attached priority to a prevention campaign aimed at creating Southern antifire sentiment. As a memo-

3»

FIRE AND WATER

randum for field use instructed foresters: " W e need not be greatly concerned over whether controlled burning is desirable or undesirable until after a good start, at least, has been made toward getting rid of the uncontrolled burning." Meanwhile, personnel were assured that the problem commanded the best thoughts of station researchers.53 Editors scrutinized publications with a view to eliminating favorable references to controlled burning; compliantly, scientists made the indicated revisions. Though fully cognizant of the advantages of silvicultural burning for seedbed preparation on the Choctawhatchee, Forbes minimized the necessity and value of controlled burning, placing the "main emphasis upon ultimate complete organized fire protection without controlled burning," in Technical Bulletin 204 on Timber Growing, Logging and Turpentining Practices in the Southern Pine Region.6* At one point, state foresters objected to this paragraph in a station article on "Forest Fires in the South": Some maintain that under special conditions and with adequate safeguards burning is beneficial to the forests. To the present time such benefits have not been proven. It is proper that experiments should be made if necessary to determine this question competently directed and effectively safeguarded. We must recognize the limitations of existing knowledge and the need for being openminded in dealing with the problems of each region. But at best the use of fire in the woods of the South is a hazard justified only by assured means of control; and the lack of control of fire is today the outstanding cause of forest destruction in the South. Yielding to administrative pressures, Demmon (Acting Director of the station, succeeding Forbes) acquiesced in the statement's deletion. He informed Girvin Peters (Acting Assistant Forester, Bureau of Public Relations): "until we are certain of the possibilities of using fire as a silvicultural agent, it would seem the safer policy to say nothing about it." 56

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM Several men proved intractable. Admired for his

39 "blunt

honesty and tart practical comments," Austin Cary, for one, confided to the state forester of South Carolina: Many years ago, in New England, I thought I saw places where fire had done good, for instance, where culled and very unpromising stands had been replaced by fresh growth of better varieties and more rapid production. The idea occurred to me then that perhaps we should use that idea some day, though as a matter of policy I think I never gave public expression to it. But I have had no reason since to change my personal views on the matter. In the South again my mind from the beginning has been open. I do not suppose that anyone realizes more strongly than myself the vast damage uncontrolled and irresponsible fire is doing in the South, the necessity for converting the people to different practices and ideas that many hold at present. At the same time I have been open to the belief that fire might do good sometimes; the idea of employing it as a cultural measure even does not shock or repel me. 56 Ever since 1926 the Service's regional office had attempted to institute some control in the Choctawatchee forest, but to no avail; local personnel believed the task futile. This attitude remained unaltered, when in 1927 the branch of public relations (at this time it included state and private forestry operations as well) pressed for the antiburning policy cited above. One ranger regarded the effort as not only hopeless but undesirable. Cary, "the Yankee Peddler," sided with him in a protest to the regional and Washington offices. Upon first visiting the Florida forest in 1 9 1 7 , Cary recollected, he had observed that "successful" protection had given rise to dense thickets of blackjack oak which greatly interfered with longleaf reproduction. Longleaf survival from the 1920 mast where brush had been light further impressed Cary. Chapman's Bulletin 1 6 confirmed his previous suspicions. "However far exact study may be carried," he averred, "the final conclusion will be along the

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FIRE AND WATER

lines indicated. That means, as a matter of practical management, as I see it, that fire is to be used more or less on the forest in the interest of the reproduction of timber." Like Chapman, Cary carefully sought to disassociate himself from the promiscuous woodsburner. Untimely and repeated fires he judged the archenemy of all Southern pine. But, as Harper also had discerned, controlled burning was a cut of a different order. Believing any policy not consonant with nature's laws foredoomed to failure, Cary therefore asked: Putting one and two together, the question of external policy as against actual fact comes up. That is to say, suppose you are satisfied that fire helps to promote reproduction and safeguard cups and faces on the Florida Forest, is it wise to act in accordance with that idea, or better on policy grounds to smother that belief and re-engage in the effort to shut out all fire? I myself favor the former course and will give my reasons. In the first place, I think it bad policy to manage a tract of government timber land as large and conspicuous as this in any other than what is believed to be the most effective and businesslike fashion, such as the other men can safely follow. Secondly, it seems to me a very desirable thing for the management of the National Forests to be pleasant and friendly, easy to do business with, not rigid or stickling unnecessarily for things the local people don't believe in. . . . It has seemed to me that it would be wisest not to face this state of things with rigid and universal opposition to the custom.57 Cary may have sensed that a continuing source of discord between stockmen and timberland owners, generally thought inevitable in the piney woods, might be mitigated by permitting discreet use of fire: "Oak sprouting up after fire protection not only hinders reproduction of pine but excludes grass, whereas you get some little grass on areas occasionally burned over. T o the best of my belief, therefore, the local people with stock have that much real ground for desiring the use of some fire."

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

41

In conclusion, Cary prophesied, "fire will be more or less used in the future systematic management of southern pine lands by way both as a protective and silviculture agent. Anyone may be wrong. However, if I should happen to prove right in this, a too straightout attitude in the early years of our forest control work would later prove more or less embarrassing." Cary, along with Chapman, though convinced that fire might be gainfully employed under certain circumstances, purposely avoided bringing the issue to public attention. Professional pride weighed too heavily on these foresters to permit this approach. Instead, they hoped the Service would see the weakness of its stand; that the New Orleans station would comprehend the defects in its research program, concentrating as it did on annual to the exclusion of periodic burning tests. During this period (1927-1930) sub rosa burning of fifty to sixty sections annually was carried out on the Choctawhatchee in disregard of the 1927 order but with Forest Supervisor A. C. Shaw's concurrence.58 Of course, no immediate threat would be posed to Service policy as long as knowledge of this controlled burning and Cary's and Chapman's pleadings remained within the ranks. The real challenge would issue from another quarter. "The Forest that Fire Made" To the dismay of the American Forestry Association, the Service, and the state foresters, an animal husbandman, S. W . Greene, shortly produced evidence exploding the myth that "greening up the grass" adversely affected cattle grazing. As stated earlier, annual burning to improve forage values was traditional practice in the pineries. In an attempt to determine the effects of annual burning and cattle grazing on longleaf reproduction, survival and growth, the forage of unimproved woods pastures, and the soil, scientists devised an

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experiment in 1923 at McNeil, Mississippi—resembling the Roberts plots in basic design in that its area included two pastures of one hundred and fifty acres each and two ungrazed plots of ten acres each. One of the pastures and one of the plots were burned over each winter so that four conditions were represented: burned pasture, unburned pasture, burned ungrazed plot, and completely protected plot. Unlike the Roberts plots, however, responsibility for conduct of the research fell to three agencies of the federal government: the Forest Service and the Bureaus of Plant and Animal Industry.59 In their zeal to prevent woods fires, foresters had preached that annual burning was detrimental to grazing as well as destructive to timber. To be sure, Forbes had rated the contention that protection actually encouraged suppression of range grasses by invading scrub oaks, gallberries, and worthless wire grass as the "hardest argument to answer in all of the stockman's repertoire of excuses for burning,"60 Yet, deeply committed to administrative policy, the station director exhorted a conference of research personnel: "Stockmen have been accustomed to burning the woods in the belief that it improved grazing conditions. We need proof that fire does not benefit the range."61 Munns felt this evidence had been supplied by 1926. He informed the fortieth annual convention of the Association of Land Grant Colleges that the quality and quantity of browse on the unburned pasture surpassed that "on the pasture burned annually with consequent effect upon the stock."62 Acting on this information, the Southern Forestry Education Project subsequently endorsed the notion that "Everyone Loses When Timber Burns." A pamphlet, Woods Burning in the South, appeared, declaring, "The South needs productive forest and range lands to maintain its prosperity but cannot have them while woods burning continues."63 Greene, of the Bureau of Animal Industry, stationed at

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

43

M c N e i l , demolished this view in 1929. As he demonstrated to the American Forestry Association, cattle made greater weight gains on burned vis-á-vis unburned pastures—the difference ranging from thirty-two to sixty-two pounds per head. This weight advantage, Greene contended, thoroughly verified the cattlemen's argument that "cattle do better on burns." 64 Nevertheless, counseling moderation, he concluded that "the increased gains to be made by cattle appears to be the only logical reason for burning the woods," since the practice destroyed organic matter, contributed to sheet erosion, and damaged forest growth. These three disadvantages struck W a r d Shepard, Acting Assistant Forester for Public Relations, as "a much stronger argument for range management than for burning." There the matter rested until L. J. Pessin (Associate Ecologist, Southern Station) observed a markedly better seed catch on that part of Chapman Forest burned over prior to seedfall on October 19, 1928. Presumably this experience persuaded Pessin that fire might not be evil under all circumstances. Apprised of Greene's findings, he grasped their significance and immediately advocated disseminating them to various Southern forestry interests. Getting wind of this, the Dierks Lumber and Coal Company lodged a protest with the Service's Division of Information. T h e division's acting chief addressed a memorandum to his superior (Fred Morrell), expressing concern for the future of fire protection: In this instance, there is an apparent contradiction between the results of the investigations at McNeil, Mississippi, of cattle grazing in burned and unburned woods, and the principle that the Forest Service has been teaching that it is bad practice to burn the woods. Obviously, this office cannot ask that the results of the investigation be not made known to the public upon the plea that it will cause the farmers to set more fires. To do this, we would be

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virtually taking the stand that the information secured from scientific investigations shall be used only when it substantiates our pet theories and policies. On the other hand, we cannot afford to pass out to the public information derived from research work which is almost certain to be misinterpreted without accompanying it with appropriate explanation. It is natural for people to interpret facts to suit their own ways of thinking. In the South there exists a widespread idea that the burning of the woodland pastures is beneficial, and consequently we have the problem of great numbers of forest fires that are set out for the purpose of burning off the range. The results of the experiments at McNeil appear to completely substantiate this notion. . . . Aside from the matter of the relative correctness of the claims from a public relations and administrative standpoint is the possible effect if Doctor Pessin's statements are broadcast throughout the South. I fear they may nullify the Forest Service efforts to stop widespread woods burning. 65 After investigating the problem, Morrell advised against the distribution of material claiming that burning was deleterious to stock raising. Given his position, Morrell revealed a high order of objectivity and detachment in adding: Frankly, my thought as to this whole situation is that it is perhaps one of the preachments that forestry agents have put out in support of a desire to prevent burning in order to grow trees that does not stand the test of critical analysis, and if this be true, forestry agencies should revise their teachings and do the best they can to accomplish results by recognizing the merits of the other side. I think we will get farther if we do that. 66 Unfortunately, Morrell's advice had little effect on Service publicity. Surely, one might think, revisions were indicated to accord with Greene's argument and Chapman's thesis. Regarding the latter, Forbes' Technical Bulletin 204 went to press in October 1930 without mentioning the possible silvicultural use of fire. Despite the fact that his own research confirmed theirs, Forbes thoroughly rebuked C h a p m a n , Ashe, and Cary:

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

45

The weight [of the longleaf seed] no doubt contributes to its marked ability to penetrate a mat of tangled grass and surface vegetation to the mineral soil necessary to successful germination. A satisfactory stand rarely fails of establishment merely because a proper seedbed was not exposed. In fact the burning occasionally advocated as necessary to clear the ground for the reception of longleaf pine seed may so expose the resulting seedlings to frost, direct-heat killing, and to dry out the surface soil, as to defeat the very end sought; undoubtedly much depends on the weather following germination.67 Curiously, Forbes became ensnared in his own sophistry while tracing invasion of slash pine on longleaf sites to successful protection. Fearing a published statement on controlled burning for silvicultural purposes might be seized upon as an excuse for indiscriminate burning by those indifferent or opposed to protection, and restrained by a devotion to the profession, Chapman—forestry's most prolific writer—refused to publish anything beyond Bulletin 16. Rather, he elected to correspond with several foresters, namely R. M. Evans (Assistant Regional Forester of Region 7, the eastern region including the South), Fred Morrell, and C. F. Evans (Region 7 Forest Inspector for the southeastern states). C. F. Evans, reviewing Technical Bulletin 204 in the Service periodical Forest Worker (a journal with limited circulation), scored Forbes for dismissing Chapman's work "with a single unsatisfying sentence. If controlled burning of rough areas prior to seedfall helps to establish longleaf reproduction, the sooner we know it the better."68 This critique may or may not have been known to Greene. Nonetheless, working independently of Chapman, Greene had arrived at a strikingly similar position. As a young animal husbandman visiting farms from South Carolina to Texas in 1918, Greene constantly encountered pastures where secondgrowth longleaf survived despite the incidence of annual burn-

46

FIRE AND WATER

ing. After fruitless search in the published literature, he sought to discover the answer himself. Greene had the story pretty well in mind by 1928 and was openly advocating it in 1929 and 1930 to Service men stationed at McNeil. 6 9 Irritated by antifire propaganda which he believed had "run wild/' Greene was ready to "take issue publicly with errors and misrepresentations fostered by the Forest Service, the state agencies, and the American Forestry Association." Danger of a "serious impasse" on this issue prompted one Forester to urge that " w e take stock of the situation that is developing in consequence of the M c N e i l experiment." 7 0 Meanwhile, Director Demmon endeavored to rectify past errors. On a tour of Chapman forest in November 1930, he told the Research Advisory Council that two-and-a-half times as many longleaf seedlings became established on the area prepared by burning as on the protected area. 71 Besides, he was "very fair and impartial" about an eight-year progress report on the M c N e i l experiment; upon discovering that two men assigned the task had selected false samples instead of the random samples they were instructed to collect (to support their preconceived notions of what should have occurred), he quickly removed them from the job. 72 Despite Demmon's efforts in N e w Orleans, the Service remained unwilling to modify its information program, although additional evidence on brown-spot disinfection and quailhabitat improvement only strengthened the argument for periodic controlled burning. 73 N o longer able to contain his feelings, Greene commenced a campaign of ridicule and vituperation, denouncing the American Forestry Association for spreading false doctrine in the piney woods. Shocked by this heretical yet apparently scientifically based attack, its president sought Service guidance:

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

47

Our educational work in the South has been modeled after similar work by the Forest Service. . . . W e have accepted the views of the Forest Service. . . . Mr. Greene's charges against the Association are serious. His assertions are so contrary to the situation as we understand it that I should like to have your comments on his conclusions. Our Board of Directors at its last meeting voted to undertake another three year project. . . . In view of the fact that we have already begun the solicitation of private funds for a new project we will appreciate a statement at as early a date as possible. 74 A reply formulated May 28 went undispatched until June 24 as repeated attempts to secure Bureau of Animal Industry concurrence fell through. In the meantime, Ovid Butler (Executive Director, American Forestry Association) explained to Greene: If our propaganda has not been in accord with facts as recent years have disclosed, it has been innocently so and because the source of our information, namely the Department of Agriculture, has not officially or publicly revised its findings in respect to woodsfires. . . . 7 5 Also, in the interim, Chapman circulated a statement, for professional enlightenment, sharply critical of the Service for not ascertaining the facts. A recipient of this material, R . M . Evans, confessed to misgivings on the wisdom of complete protection for several years but pleaded reliance on research to supply the correct answers (research had assured him the fire policy was sound). Moreover, Evans acknowledged, "it required dynamite from outside the profession to awaken us," and he hoped that "some good will come out of this fiasco, along with the bad. Certainly, we shall have suffered a loss of prestige before the commotion dies down.'" 76 Stuart's belated response to the A F A inquiry defended past

FIRE AND WATER information policy as dictated by considerations of expediency, but he conceded that some modifications were now desirable. Unfortunately, the reply accomplished little in the way of clarifying matters, for, Stuart added: T o what extent our former views, based on general observation, will need to be formulated and restated in the light of the still uncompleted series of carefully controlled experiments at McNeil, we are not as yet in position to say, and for one reason because the experiments are being made under an agreement of the Bureau of Animal Industry and the Forest Service, not to draw and publish conclusions independently of each other. . . , 77 In keeping with what he conceived to be Stuart's position, Morrell suggested that the education unit modify its policy to: ( 1 ) sanction carefully controlled burning by landowners under competent supervision; (2) advise against fire use in other than longleaf stands and where watershed values require complete protection; (3) discontinue statements that woods burning is inimical to stock and quail production. 78 Opposition from H . J. Eberly (Regional Forest Inspector), among others, effectively scuttled Morrell's plan to distribute the statement to agency personnel. T h e Service was unprepared to yield even this ground. M i n d f u l of the "see-sawing over in the Department" with respect to the A F A ' s request, and not satisfied by Stuart's reply, Butler now confided to Chapman: " I t seems to me that sooner or later we may have to open the guns on the Forest Service to fish or cut bait on this proposition.'" 79 Before they could move, Greene mounted his attack. Unmollified by the chief's answer to Butler and piqued by the dogmatic attitude of the Mississippi state forester, Greene, through his chief, submitted a manuscript to the Service describing longleaf's relations to fire—"The Forest T h a t Fire M a d e . " His request

DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

49

for publication denied, Greene appealed to Milton Eisenhower, then Agriculture's Director of Information. Aware of the Service's prestige and influence, Eisenhower decided against independent review of the case. H e offered this explanation: If Greene were a member of the Forest Service and prepared this article for publication, and the Chief of the Bureau disagreed with the viewpoint given yet was willing to have the paper published in order to stimulate discussion and research, I should, of course, not feel obligated to disapprove publication. But since Mr. Greene is a member of another bureau and is writing outside the scope of his bureau, and inasmuch as his statements are in conflict with those of the bureau having supervision over the matter discussed, I must necessarily withhold approval for publication.80 Refusal forced Greene to seek another outlet for his story. He offered it next to Country Gentleman. A routine check with Washington disclosed that the Service disclaimed any responsibility for the article—Greene would have to be represented as its sole author. Under these circumstances, the magazine chose not to proceed with the enterprise. "The pressure from above then got so hard," Greene recollects, that he "was ready to concede defeat." As a last resort, he spoke to his cousin, Kent Cooper (General Manager of the Associated Press), who agreed to handle the story as a press release to all papers in the longleaf region in the event no other outlet was available. "The word evidently got around," recalls Greene, "and much to my surprise American Forests wrote me that they would publish it. (I had never thought of offering it to them.) I was told later that some of the top men of American Forests took the position that it was coming out through some source and it would be better for them to publish it." 81 Publishing the article in its October issue, the magazine likened the "subdued fire in the hearth that warms the home and the devastating flames that reduce the home to ashes" to

5°

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the distinction between controlled and uncontrolled burning. 82 Unable to "vouch for the accuracy of Greene's conclusions," it nevertheless believed they merited attention. Greene's analysis was basically valid. Chapman, however, in an editorial written at Butler's request, held, with much justification, that the article did not lay sufficient stress on the deleterious nature of annual burning. 83 Undoubtedly, the controversial subject did demand a more precise prescription than Greene's vague assertion, "where seed trees are available all that is necessary to get a pure stand of longleaf without a hardwood undergrowth is to have frequent grass fires."84 Chapman informed readers that annual fires would interfere with reproduction by killing off newly germinated seedlings. Moreover, summer burns were often as destructive to longleaf as to other species (Chapman thought winter the best time for burning). In fairness to Greene, it should be noted that the required emendations were made in reprints mailed (by Greene) to thousands of Southern farmers. In addition, timberland owners were alerted to the editorial in the Southern Lumberman: Mr. Greene's opinion on this subject is rank heresy but it is no mere idle expression of views founded on nothing more substantial than his unsupported conjectures. . . . His article is the result of his deliberate consideration of the result of his investigations. He may be wrong, but his presentation of his views shows that he has carefully considered all sides of the question. . . . Mr. Greene's article will undoubtedly arouse considerable discussion in the ranks of foresters; and it will be interesting to observe the outcome of the further consideration of this novel idea.85

3- Forests and Fire: Administrative Travail

Commitment to absolute exclusion now made any retraction of publicized shibboleths difficult. The Service had been willing to permit research on controlled burning; disseminating the results was quite another matter. Belief persisted that promulgation of information would lower the prestige of federal and state organizations. At the same time, it was thought such material would be misinterpreted as sanctioning indiscriminate woods burning. Service personnel, denied the latest information on this subject, were presented with a prosaic piece by Chapman condemning annual burning. 1 Moreover, there appeared an article by A. L. McKinney of the Appalachian Station (now Southeastern Station), entitled "Longleaf Pines Subjected to Thirteen Years' Light Burning Show Retarded Growth." 2 This came out despite objections from several high-ranking foresters who had questioned the wisdom of including such material in

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view of recent statements by Chapman and Greene. For example, R. M . Evans wrote to Chief of State Cooperation A. B. Hastings: In view of the fact that a great many people who are interested in fire protection in the longleaf pine type do not yet know of the controversy that has been raised over the subject in the South, we [Evans, and Frothingham, Director of Appalachian Station] both feel that there might be disadvantages in trying to give wide publicity to the article although the article by itself undoubtedly is sound. It is our view that the best procedure is to have the article published in the Forest Worker, following which a letter could be sent from your office to the State Foresters and extension foresters, calling their attention to the article as being an important contribution on one angle of the subject. These men could be depended upon to see the relation of this article to the whole question in controversy. To those, however, who are not aware of the changing point of view, the article might be interpreted in such a way as to solidify the older and somewhat erroneous viewpoints, thus making it more difficult to establish a modified position which we assume will be brought forth in the coming months. 3 Most state officials, well aware of the controversy then brewing, remained firmly opposed to any public mention of the possible value of controlled burning until "the objective of the fire prevention program has been accomplished." 4 T h a t the program's success, whenever and wherever attained, might in itself impose obstacles to dissemination of information was overlooked. Perceiving the dilemma, the Mississippi extension forester complained to C h a p m a n that the Service's attitude reflected a certain disinclination to trust the common man's common sense: I am wondering why foresters did not grasp the facts you published five years ago and give them the publicity they merit and give the landowners the benefit of this knowledge. Now they have

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TRAVAIL

53

made the position of Extension Foresters in this region exceedingly difficult. Also, it would be puzzling for landowners if I teach one practice while a district forester in South Mississippi is putting out contrary publicity. Some laymen of considerable influence have been so completely sold on the necessity of complete fire prevention that the security of my proposition might be imperiled if I came out with a strong public statement on this subject. Of course, I am giving the County Agents and others the facts when there is occasion to do so. Our farmers are not fools, but too many desk foresters think they are morons and not prepared to know the truth.5 T h e Service confronted the problem by ignoring it. Certainly, no corpus of knowledge and skill existed to warrant advocacy of controlled burning. Indeed, Chapman had no intention of "bursting into print" before more fully evaluating the results of his 1931 burn. Fire effects on physical and chemical characteristics of the soil profile needed scientific appraisal. Given data based on relatively small test plots, extrapolation to largescale areas proved unfeasible; determination of cost-benefit ratios necessitated trials by administrative officers on national forest lands.* Furthermore, as one forester expressed it, "only after you get control of fire can you practice useful burning." However, this did not justify refusal to modify antifire publicity to reflect research evidence. T h e public was entitled to such information once investigations indicated the possibility that fire might prove useful. That the Service was ill prepared for administrative testing, if not employment of controlled burning as an accepted tool of forest management, Chapman attributed to the station's preoccupation with establishing that all fire was evil and that he was wrong. As Chapman claimed: * Administrative testing as distinguished from experimentation by research-station personnel.

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54

There are all shades of possibilities and attitudes toward experimental work and research from that expressed by R . D. Forbes in the Service Bulletin in which he protested against the Forest Service investigating tropical woods because of facts which might be brought out being injurious to the practice of hardwood forestry in the United States, as one extreme, to absolute openmindedness and guidance only by curiosity and limitations of opportunity on the other. . . . It would require very fine perception to determine to what extent the planning of fire investigations in longleaf and their adequacy and form have been influenced by the almost universal horror of turning out any facts or propaganda which would encourage burning in the South. 6 Stuart admitted Service "responsibility for not being ready with the necessary results," but h e maintained that the "fundamental difficulty does not lie so much in questions of balance of program . . . as it does in the fact that our organized research in the South did not start soon enough.'" 7 Earle Clapp, with the contretemps of 1 9 3 1 vivid in his memory, could not agree. Difficulties

encountered

in

organizing

the

station—rapid

growth, partially trained men, personnel losses,

inadequate

facilities, and a large territory—Clapp insisted, did not really excuse poorly defined objectives. As late as 1932, he continued to prod D e m m o n to get a proper focus on problems: The most serious weakness of our Southern Station programs has been and still is in not being thought entirely through to clear-cut objectives which meet realistically problems on the ground and those which are troubling the general public. If we had been able to do this several years ago on fire we would have been in a much stronger position in the face of criticisms from Greene and Chapman. 8 The

station's reputation now sorely impaired,

Demmon

determined to avoid similar accusations in the future. B y the end of 1 9 3 1 , experiments were initiated at L a k e City, Florida,

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and Bogalousa, Louisiana, to test Chapman's observations.9 During the winter of 1932-33 the station scheduled burning in longleaf and loblolly stands near Urania and Lake City in the Osceola National Forest. 10 Demmon made certain to notify Chapman that he had covered potential salutary as well as confirmed detrimental effects of fire in a talk to thirty state foresters.11 Leaning heavily on Chapman's work, he composed a six-page statement, intended for limited distribution, on the fire-Southern pine nexus. Anticipating objections, he prefaced his paper with a description of extensive fire damage in the South, underscoring the need for protection. Next, specifically confining his remarks to longleaf, he stressed that all burning operations demanded skill and experience. In conclusion, Demmon warned: Until we are more certain of all the effects of fire on land restocking or growing longleaf and other southern pines whose primary object of management is timber production, organized fire control is recommended. There must be compromises in the use of fire in the South, these compromises to depend on the purposes of land management, but so far as timber growing is concerned no single set of recommendations will cover all conditions. [Passage italicized in original.]12 Demmon sent this preliminary draft to C. F. Evans for examination. Evidently, Evans was disturbed by the twelvethousand-acre fire which ravaged the Osceola National Forest in 1932, mocking the efforts of trained fire fighters aided by excellent equipment, ample funds, and previously constructed firebreaks. Indeed, he may already have written "Flaming Forests" for American Forests (June 1932) deploring reduced protection appropriations for the ensuing year, imposed by a legislature concerned with retrenchment in the wake of the Great Depression. He therefore cautioned Demmon:

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It seems to me that you are getting into pretty deep water on the question of policy dealing with the matter of controlled burning. This subject is very much muddled at this time. . . . In view of the ticklish situation of policies affecting this question, I do not believe that you can help matters any by sending out a statement dealing with this subject at this time. I think it would be much better if you would confine your statement to the subject of damage and let questions of policy wait until they can be worked out more definitely.13 Evans took particular exception to the paragraph cited above, which he thought cast doubt on the necessity for organized control. He also opposed publication of a station progress report entitled "Forest Fires in the Southern Coastal Plain." Although the paragraph was deleted from the final version, the statement's release provoked widespread criticism from numerous state and federal fire-control personnel. If material published for professional perusal kindled such intense opposition, it is small wonder that only the vaguest statement drafted for public (or Congressional) consumption escaped suppression. The following excerpt from the National Plan for American Forestry (1933) illustrates the tendency to obfuscate issues: "In a relatively few instances research has indicated the possibility that it may be advantageous or even necessary to use fire as a beneficial agent in silviculture. Research of this character, however, lies almost entirely ahead." 14 While Demmon feuded with administrators, state and federal, Fred Morrell worked on a revision of the 1927 policy —to which Cary had dissented—outlawing all fire in the South. Heavy fire losses sustained by Georgia and Florida forests in the winter of 1932, coupled with charges of Service incompetence issuing from Chapman and Greene, had dramatized the need for a policy change permitting expenditure of Clarke-McNary cooperative protection funds in places where

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57

burning was desired. Morrell felt the directive should be accompanied by an informational statement. After formulating both parts, Morrell circulated the declaration among various foresters in Region 7 (Southern Region) for comment. Eberly considered the information section extremely weak— "largely theoretical"—and likely to be severely criticized by state departments: " W e seem to have largely abandoned our camp and gone over to the enemy." 1 6 Mattoon asked that it extend approval to silvicultural burning "only at the end of the rotation anywhere from 30 to 60 years." 16 Disseminated on June 16, the statement alluded to the "opinion of some foresters" that burning for seedbed preparation, brown-spot-disease suppression, and vegetation control "may be used to advantage under certain conditions." It mentioned the difficulty of "securing this gain without at the same time incurring greater loss" measured in terms of "decreased annual growth, killing of seedlings, especially in the cotyledon stage and increased susceptibility to insect attacks." 17 T h e Service viewed with more pessimism controlled burning for protective purposes; this it thought "likely to be misunderstood by the general public. . . . Many do not recognize the difference between it and indiscriminate uncontrolled burning. T h e practice of controlled burning may tend, therefore, to perpetuate the custom of indiscriminate burning." One may trace these misgivings in a ruling stating that burning for protective purposes with state approval would not necessarily disqualify a cooperator for federal assistance under the ClarkeMcNary Act.* T h e statement further instructed foresters to * The Forest Service could not legally cooperate with a landowner practicing controlled burning in an attempt to secure longleaf regeneration. Under the Clarke-McNary Act, federal assistance was limited to aiding state and private fire-protection efforts. It is interesting that the above qualification was not contained in a June 1 version of the statement. If burning was for grazing and game-production values, the areas so burned

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avoid generalized interpretations of the McNeil experiment, or of woods-burning effects on soil erosion, pending acquisition of more complete data. T h e order did not sit well with some state functionaries who felt betrayed, as they had about Demmon's summary, when faced with mounting sentiment for protective burning and "inconclusive" evidence on fire's silvicultural benefits. In a letter to Eberly, which the latter sensed was a "very polite and diplomatic way of expressing his disapproval," Bunker (Alabama state forester) inquired as to whether controlled burning was not merely a "speculative possibility." 18 Seeking to allay Bunker's fears, Eberly emphasized in reply that the ruling did not advocate use of controlled fire as a substitute for adequate protection. Sole authority over the statement's distribution in Alabama still rested with Bunker. Eberly admitted that protective burning was only a "speculative possibility," but cited several cases of successful burning for silvicultural purposes: P. V . Siggers' experiments on brown-spot disease, a 1920 seedbed burn by the Great Southern Lumber Company at Bogalusa, Louisiana, and the firing of several plots by Chapman and station members. Bunker remained obdurate; his opposition persisted throughout his last six years in office, as reflected in pronouncements of the Alabama Forest News. Other states similarly avoided discussion of controlled burning. T h e Texas Forest News, for example, described loblolly and shortleaf encroachment on areas once endowed with "magnificent" longleaf stands, even listing as contributing factors: lack of longleaf pine seed trees, the presence of hogs, and fire protection. It couched a suggested remedy, however, in oracular terms: "If there is some longleaf pine on the area would be disqualified for aid, but the remaining areas might continue to benefit from federal cooperation.

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it should be given preference in the silvicultural treatment of the stand." 1 9 A rash of protective burning, feared after the bad fires of April 1932 and subsequent promulgation of the policy statement, failed to materialize. Florida alone was willing, under certain circumstances, to cooperate with a private landowner in securing protection, despite the fact that he practiced controlled burning. Cary's experiments on Alex Sessom's holdings near Cogdell, Georgia, so favorably impressed Georgia's state forester, B . F . Lufburrow, that he considered following Florida's lead. Y e t Florida did not publicly announce this policy revision, preferring to handle each case on its own merits. 20 Lufburrow's attitude was vacillating at best. Late in 1934, he inveighed against controlled burning as sound forest practice; he urged permitting fire for protective purposes solely in naval-stores operations. 21 A . B . Hastings told Cary, " I know Lufburrow has been very reluctant to recognize any burning at all in the T.P.O.'s. [Timber Protective Organizations], Possibly sometimes he does not let his right hand know what his left hand does." 2 2 Understandably, these equivocal decisions perplexed timberland owners in Florida and Georgia. Qualifications attached to the federal directive compounded the confusion generated by Lufburrow's indecisiveness. Thus, William Oettmeier (President, Superior Pine Products Company, Fargo, Georgia) was probably correct in asserting: W e were criticized [ 1 9 3 3 ] by the Forest Service for our so-called controlled burning and were threatened with loss of participation in C M - 2 funds [for cooperative fire protection under section 2, Clarke-McNary Act], I had Charlie bring Joe Kircher [Regional Forester] and two men from Washington to Fargo to look over what we had done. They were actually amazed at the results for I showed them thousands of burned acres in which the straw had

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very little brown on it, yet the ground underneath the trees was black and clean of all debris. Charlie himself was in favor of control burning, but Joe Kircher was not and I do know that some Forest Supervisors did some burning on the sly and called it experimental. 23 This reminiscence, by a former Louisiana forest commissioner, supports Oettmeier's allegation: When landowners of Florida first started experimenting with prescribed burning, the U. S. Forest Service was outright opposed to the idea and even threatened to withold C M - 2 funds from the Florida Forest Service if landowners didn't discontinue the practice. And they meant it too. I recall one day on my way to work I stopped the car to observe one of the landowners scraping the blackened bark off his trees. When I asked why he was doing that, he informed me that the U. S. Forest Service was sending a team of inspectors next day to check on the prescribed burning in the area and he wanted to get rid of the telltale blackened bark where his prescribed burning got too hot. 24 A seventeen-thousand-acre blaze which ravaged the Sessom property in 1934 finally gave an impetus to protective burning. Aroused by that conflagration, twelve companies commenced burning off the accumulated "rough." Apparently, this development persuaded Hastings to urge that " [ w e ] face the issue squarely, very much in line with our policy as expressed in the statement of June 16, 1932." 2 5 Whether the organization altered its stand in response to this recommendation is not known. In any event, the policy order itself was not amended. Ever since circulation of Demmon's brief résumé, dealing with fire and Southern pine, the New Orleans station had directed its efforts toward appraising silvicultural aspects of fire utilization. Admittedly, on one occasion, Clapp complained that Demmon still had failed to get a "clear-cut focus" on the

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matter; on another, Munns asked whether the station might not "devote more of its energy and resources to this pressing problem." 2 6 In fact, however, much progress had been made by 1936. T h e Mississippi Forestry Commission might dismiss Greene's M c N e i l results as "propaganda"; the station could ill afford to take this approach—not with Professor Chapman presently installed as President of the Society of American Foresters. 27 T h e station executed burns in 1932 for silvicultural and protective purposes. Demmon then established three other experimental forests to study fire effects—Harrison ( D e Soto National Forest, Mississippi), Olustee (Osceola National Forest, Florida), and Palustris (Kisatchie National Forest, Louisiana)—while retaining secondary centers for similar investigations at Bogalusa and Urania. 28 T h e station completed preliminary work in 1933 on six major manuscripts, including Demmon's "Forest Fires in the South," and Heyward and Barnette's " T h e Effect of Frequent Fires on the Chemical Composition of Forest Soils in the Longleaf Pine Region." T h e former, after submission to Washington, was never published. Heyward and Barnette's study, appearing as Florida Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 265 ( 1 9 3 4 ) , demolished the "widely accepted belief" that recurrent woods fires exhausted soil fertility: soils subjected to frequent fires were found to contain less acid and possess higher percentages of replaceable calcium and total nitrogen, as well as more organic matter, than unburned soils. Siggers (Southern Station), publishing his observations on brown-spot disease, confirmed Chapman's view that a three-year burning cycle (until the start of height growth) would control the fungus. 29 Wahlenberg, Greene, and Reed jointly prepared a comprehensive report summarizing evidence gathered at M c N e i l over a ten-year span. T h e station's 1933 annual report indicated it

0 2

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was "being put into shape for possible publication as a government bulletin." Chapman—appointed to the station's advisory council after the 1931 furor—received a copy for review. Following a wait of six months, interested in the manuscript's fate and suspecting the censor's hand, he inquired when it might be available to foresters and others in the South. Demmon, denying any censorship, tried to placate Chapman: Never for a moment have I entertained the idea that any information the Southern Station might present for publication or for an address on the subject would be suppressed or altered in Washington to bring it in line with any preconceived ideas on the subject. According to long established policy, such publications or addresses are subject to editorial review in Washington. I have never heard, however, of any attempt by anyone in our Washington office to suppress any established fact for policy reasons.30 And Clapp replied that delays encountered were the product of inadequate appropriations for editorial review of research reports. He told Chapman, however, that the Service was "anxious to get valuable information out at the earliest possible date, and where it seems worthwhile in the public interest we do not hesitate to resort to other methods than formal publication." 3 1 Shunted back and forth from New Orleans to Washington, the report was revised so much in the process that it was outdated when eventually published in June 1939. But more of this below. Most administrative personnel in Region 8* were genuinely concerned lest station information releases jeopardize fire prevention.! Chief Forester Silcox sought to resolve the station* Carved out of Region 7 on July 1, 1 9 3 4 , with Kircher retaining his former post as regional forester, regional office at Atlanta. t State foresters, as a rule, did not object to field research but wanted no publicity on beneficial use. For example, the Florida state forester would not have opposed publication of technical research findings, but the

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region dispute by defining their respective educational responsibilities. "Extension work in the broad sense is a function of the Regional Foresters," he informed both parties. On the other hand . . . the Station directors cannot escape and are expected to take certain responsibilities for the publication of results of research work. Since results of research may affect existing local administrative policies, releases by the stations should be made so as not to embarrass the administrative functions. The Stations are expected to follow this practice of consultation and agreement with the Regional Office on new results or interpretations as they relate to administrative policy prior to release. The Region also should follow the policy of referring to the Director before release publicity which crosscuts the interests of the Station. Publicity which may involve service-wide policy should be referred to this office before release.32 Many foresters carefully skirted any stand on the dissemination question that might have stamped them as advocates of censorship. Instead, they usually affirmed support of Morrell's contention (previously cited) and then proceeded to qualify it almost out of existence simply by adding that it did not "apply directly to the proposed news release." Assistant Chief Loveridge objected to a release headed "Grass Fires Benefit Pine Soils." If it is true that 90% of the reading public gains its most lasting impressions from the headlines, that title would clearly give the impression that grass fires in any pine type are beneficial. I cite that as illustrative of the loose makeup of the article. . . . The Forest Service . . . should not be in the position of appearing to withhold the findings of "research". . . . Very possibly we will not be able to agree on the article even after it has been revised, but I believe we should in this manner invite a request for assistance in making a revision.33 mailing list would probably have been so restricted that it would have had the same effect as suppression. (Confidential source.)

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If the public was kept ignorant of controlled burning's potential advantages, the forestry profession also suffered. Prior to 1934, to acquaint forest rangers with these developments was to run risk of "leaks" to the general public. Indeed, one ranger observed experimental burnings at McNeil, adjacent to his district, for some time before being informed by his superiors of their purpose. Chapman set out to educate his brethren on a field trip over sample plots at Urania; he succeeded in persuading many skeptics. 34 Chapman, president of the society, likewise succeeded in placing "Forest Fire Control in the Coastal Plains Section of the South" on the agenda of its 1935 annual convention. Butler chaired the session arranged by Demmon. Principal speakers, besides the director, included Greene, Stoddard, Hardtner, Wahlenberg, and Eldredge. This event marked the initial attack within the profession on the notion that complete protection was ultimately desirable. As one participant put it: " T h i s is the first time that censorship on the subject has been removed and we have been told the facts." 3 5 Hastings opened the symposium with a paper discussing past accomplishments and future requirements of Southern protection. Demmon then outlined the general problem of fire and longleaf silviculture. W h i l e condemning annual burning, he enumerated benefits attributable to periodic applications. T h e following speaker, W . G . Wahlenberg, named several factors hampering longleaf in its competition with other vegetation: excessive cutting, infrequent seeding, large and heavy seeds, prompt germination conducive to winter kill, hog and brown-spot depredations, slow initial growth, intolerance of shade and fiTe exclusion. He argued, moreover, that timber growing and grazing were not necessarily incompatible, pointing to McNeil, where "moderate grazing by cattle injures long-

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leaf pine reproduction little or not at all." Greene expanded on Wahlenberg's remarks.* Eldredge's frank treatment of administrative problems associated with control in the longleaf-slash region highlighted the session. First supervisor of the Florida national forests (at the time, Director of the Southern Regional Forest Survey), Eldredge noted the comparatively insignificant damage suffered by stands subjected to frequent fires—"The tally sheets of the Survey show that 86 per cent of the pine area which has fire history is classified as having little or no visible damage from fire." Excoriating complete protection policy, he pointed out that it encouraged development of a dense undergrowth of gallberry, scrub oak, palmetto, and wire grass, which when ignited produced holocausts of unmanageable proportions. Though recognizing "much room for improvement . . . in fire-fighting technique," Eldredge understood that cost-benefit calculations militated against complete protection: I have fought such fires in the Southeast with all the equipment and men I could desire and with an experienced and able organization at my back, and still lost three or four thousand acres per fire before the last spark was out. My neighbors in that region and in nearby north Florida with facilities as good or better have met similar situations with no better luck and suffered staggering losses of area and timber during every one of the periodic dry seasons.. . . In my opinion the development of fire protection has suffered from an over-dose of blue-pills and the time has come to replace shotgun doses with treatment based on expert diagnosis. If controlled burn* Greene substituted the words "Winter Grass" for the word "Forest" in the title of his talk, "The Relation between Forest Fires and Grazing in the Longleaf Pine Type." He made a similar revision in an article submitted to the Journal of Agricultural Research (published May 15, 1 9 3 5 ) , to prevent the Forest Service from "holding up publication of the manuscript, as it was expected that they would do at that time." (Letter from Greene to author, Ocober 1957.)

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ing at certain periods is indicated as a correct procedure, then w e should use it. In silviculture, in utilization and in other phases of forest management, w e foresters have fitted our practice always to the case in hand, b u t as regards fire, we have, for the main part, rallied behind the premise that the only way to manage any forest anywhere in the United States, from Alaska to Florida, is to cast out fire, root, stem and branch, now and forever. W e have with closed ranks fiercely defended this sacred principle against all comers and under [sic] circumstances and any forester w h o questioned its universal application was suspected of treason or at least was considered a dangerous eccentric. 3 6 Heartened lack

of

by

research

conclusive

results,

evidence

was

Eldredge "rapidly

f e l t certain being

that

overcome."

A n d , w h i l e s y m p a t h i z i n g w i t h difficulties foresters c o n f r o n t e d in a t t e m p t i n g a volte-face,

h e sternly m a i n t a i n e d , as h e h a d in

1 9 1 1 , t h a t t h e Service w o u l d n o t h a v e cause t o regret

such

action: From w h a t I know of the people in the coastal plain, they will respond m u c h more wholeheartedly to a wise and governed use of fire as a tool in forestry than they have, even after years of costly effort to sway them to a program which, to the best informed of them seems to lack sound appreciation of all the facts involved. It is well to realize that these people have not lived a century in complete ownership and control of their forests without learning something about them. T h e thing w e refer to as the technique of controlled burning, for instance, is already c o m m o n knowledge among a large number of timber owners in the naval stores belt. Remember also that these native people are, as a group, vitally interested in the timber around t h e m — i t is their bread and meat. 3 7 T h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e p r o g r a m was a n t i c l i m a c t i c . S t o d d a r d e x p l a i n e d fire's role in southeastern u p l a n d g a m e m a n a g e m e n t , a n d H e n r y H a r d t n e r r e c o u n t e d his o w n experiences w i t h

fire

a t U r a n i a . F i n a l l y , C a r y disclosed t h a t h e h a d purposely ref r a i n e d f r o m p u b l i c i t y in t h e p a s t b e c a u s e " t h e r e w a s a n official

ADMINISTRATIVE TRAVAIL policy which one would not care to counter unnecessarily; comity to state foresters holding similar views was another element in the case, then what one might say stood a good chance of being misunderstood or distorted when it got out into the country with disastrous results." T h e 1935 annual convention thus represented the opening assault on those administrative divisions which "in the last analysis" were responsible for "publishing officially any advocacy of the use of fire for any purpose." 38 "Acceptance

of Fire . . . A Step-by-Step

Process"

Evidence already obtained justified much optimism concerning fire use. Its acceptance as desirable practice now hinged on development of suitable techniques for large-scale burning. Progress in this field, however, greatly depended on the speed of professional conversion to the need for burning. Many could not bring themselves to embrace what they had so fervently castigated. A renewed struggle over dissemination of research results and continued failure to revise antifire publicity illustrate the anxieties disturbing foresters. Concurrent with the 1935 meeting came the first, if limited, abatement in the flood of absolute protection propaganda. Wahlenberg's Occasional Paper 40, covering the same ground traversed by Demmon and the author in Washington, stressed the importance of adequate fire-control organization and cautioned against overgeneralization. It called, however, for a "revised conception of the fire problem" as "inevitable in the light of recent observations and experiments." 39 In spite of limited distribution, its release occasioned considerable criticism of the station; overhauling of Service publicity suffered further postponement. Antifire statements made in 1929 were considered good enough for use in 1935, as well as in 1940. No

individual better exemplified the Service's

Southern

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educational campaign against woods burning than did H . N . Wheeler—its "bush-rattling," fire-prevention spellbinder. T h e son of a preacher, Wheeler had served as ranger and supervisor in national forests in California and Colorado. After a spell as public-relations head of the Denver regional office, he became a peripatetic lecturer for the organization in 1923, spending long periods in the South. As late as 1940, the renowned cartoonist, J. N . Darling (former chief of the U . S. Biological Survey), termed his evangelism "one of the hopes of this generation. W i t h so many souls to be saved it is unfortunate that we can't cross you with a rabbit and have several hundred of you right away. Some day when your schedule has an open week I wish they would date you up in Washington, D. C . , to speak only to the government circles and make their attendance compulsory." 40 Wheeler's histrionics hardly pleased Roy Headley (Chief, Division of Fire Control), himself a confirmed opponent of controlled burning. Yet, cognizant of their "effectiveness," he resisted attempts to curb them. M y reactions to Wheeler's form of lecture are very mixed. I dislike the touches of Billy Sunday emotionalism and techniques, but recognize the effectiveness of such. They make the people believe and do things while more intellectual and logical treatments leave them cold. . . . Wheeler has developed his powers and methods intensively for many years. I doubt if technical supervision has much chance to be useful in such cases.41 Wheeler was "pretty well 'sot' in his ways and too old to change," one forester recalls. His influence gradually waned in professional ranks, but his remarks were never checked for accuracy as he continued his antifire crusade. Wheeler protested publication of Occasional Paper 40. Demmon's retort, "there is much yet to learn about fire but we do not believe in

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withholding information just because we do not know everything on the subject," only motivated Wheeler to complain again that controlled-burning releases left state foresters in an awkward position, what with explanations to wardens, volunteers, and the Civilian Conservation Corps necessary: The C C C boys . . . do not all understand why they must keep hands off from such a fire. No matter if Paper 40 does reach only a few selected intelligent people. They talk about it; Stoddard, Green [sic] and others make as much of it as possible, very soon the countryside knows about it and years of education against fire are lost and we are back where we started only, worse. . . . Can we afford to put our State and other cooperators, who are fighting valiantly against woods burning, on the spot?42 Unfavorably disposed to controlled burning for its imagined threat to fire prevention, Wheeler was also obsessed with a passsionate hatred for fire. He believed all fire detrimental to good forestry. Writing later that year in the confidential Service Bulletin, Wheeler derided the technique. Full of forebodings for protection, his remarks betray profound ignorance of the basic principles of forest management: Forest Service men of years of service, under the impression that the Forest Service has changed front and now favors woodsburning under some conditions, speak of qualifying our public statements about woodsburning. There has been this concession by the Forest Service: That a man who wishes to bum may do so and under some conditions may still receive help under the Clarke-McNary law. How much more concession is to be made? Surely it can not be claimed that the millions of dollars spent to keep fire out of longleaf pine have been wasted and that the state and private landowner cooperatives have been led astray. If longleaf pine is not reproducing as it should, why not plant young trees in the barren areas? European countries do planting after they have been logged. Some people will say here is a man or company owning 100,000

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acres and can't afford to plant, and that fire is a cheap way to help him get a new forest started. Is it? If he can't afford to handle his land without fire he has too much land. . . . Fire has wrought havoc in every timber region in the United States. Fire destroys little trees, injures big ones, causes soil erosion, bakes the soil, makes streams irregular in their flow, drives out game, burns nests of birds and destroys their food and shelter. It makes land unsightly for tourists. It probably does other things we can't prove. Let us get our feet back on the ground and discourage all this loose talk favorable to burning in the woods. It is well enough to continue to experiment here and there with fire, doing it in the most painstaking and thorough manner under all possible conditions. Careful studies should be made of thousands of fires both controlled and uncontrolled, and records compiled year after year. After keeping records twenty-five years or so valuable data on controlled burning should be available for publication.43 N o amount of argument could convince Wheeler. And the Service did not require him to make the necessary alterations in his "sermons." Wheeler's position was not far removed from that of the Service's Division of Information and Education. W i t h the backing of the Division of Fire Control and the Branch of State and Private Forestry, releases prepared by this unit usually omitted references to controlled burning. It was rare enough for foresters like Headley, preoccupied as they were with the fate of protection, to admit that if fire was the means for securing longleaf reproduction "then a way should be found to use fire without a resulting loss in slash and other stands which obviously should not be burned." 44 Inaccurate statements and examples of promiscuous burning easily convinced them that all material would be misconstrued. A prevention campaign conducted along traditional lines seemed to assure a greater measure of success. Headley's reaction to a clearly false item in a Columbia, South Carolina, newspaper is illustrative:

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The attached clipping confirms our worst fears. It shows how easy it is for scientists to start something which they cannot control when it rolls on into destructive phases which they did not intend. The clipping is grossly erroneous in its main points—the ones which will register with the public. The government has not placed its stamp of approval on the long standing southern custom of burning all types of woods during the early spring. The study was specifically confined to longleaf pine types and certain soil types. . . . Hundreds of thousands of non-longleaf acres will burn annually because of the "controlled" burning campaign. . . . H. H. Chapman cannot evade a share of responsibility for the bad results from this agitation. Perhaps he would cooperate in stemming the tide as a means of protecting his ultimate standing as a forester.45 The episode furnished a fresh excuse, Headley remarked, for a "real" educational campaign to encourage distinctions and better understanding of the whole matter. If followed, this course obviously required discussion of damages and benefits, of uncontrolled and controlled burning. But a balanced approach lacked administrative appeal. As Vernon L. Harper (silviculturist, Southern Station) put it: "Good psychology would dictate making an issue of something simple to preach."46 Consequently, the Service once again summoned Wheeler to embark upon a spring lecture tour of the South in 1937. Over the protests of several foresters, a pamphlet, Forest Devastation in the Bible, went "to battle" for the cause of protection. Henceforth, preachers would carry the prevention message to backwoods communities. Thus, the gospel became ensconced as the handmaiden of dubious forestry practice.47 Leaving no method untested, the renewed control effort of 1937 prompted Headley to invoke the aid of psychology. Eminent psychologists and sociologists were enlisted as members of an Advisory Council on Human Relations in order to diagnose "man-caused" facets of the fire problem. The Service

FIRE AND WATER employed a psychologist, Dr. John Shea, to pursue these investigations in the national forests. Shea examined Southern woods-burning habits, selecting for his sample a "typical" forest unit, centrally located in Region 8—the Talladaga National Forest, Alabama. After an investigation of some six months' duration, in 1939 Shea explained why "our pappies burned the woods." He believed the primary motives, once economic, had now been transmuted into a vehicle for emotional release: "the defensive beliefs of a disadvantaged culture group." T h e problem defined, Shea asked: " W h a t can be done about it? Mere propaganda and prohibitions are about as effective as a popgun against an elephant. T h e southern agrarians will continue in their beliefs until actual demonstrations convince them otherwise." 48 His work confined to the southernmost spur of the Blue Ridge, Shea was not familiar with conditions in the coastal-plain longleaf belt. Unfortunately, he deemed his observations generally applicable to the piney woods. It would be interesting to know if the Service ever acquainted him with Chapman's studies. Yet, lent specious plausibility by their prejudices, Shea's study received accolades for "striking at the very root of our forest fire problem." 4 9 T h e grim truth was that Wheeler's proselytizing and Shea's psychoanalyzing had little appreciable effect on woods burning along the coastal plain. Science alone could supply the answers. Foresters still debated the merits of controlled burning; they argued bitterly over means of disseminating whatever information was available. T h e y agreed, however, on the need for further experimentation. Some even sanctioned administrative tests to study techniques, determine cost-benefit ratios, and educate personnel. Accordingly, C . A. Bickford (Southern Station) was directed to lay out plots bearing differing ages or depths of roughs in order to appraise germination and survival

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of the 1935 bumper longleaf seed crop. With Stoddard engaged by the region as a wildlife consultant, Assistant Regional Forester A. C. Shaw requested supervisors of the Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas national forests to initiate large-scale, five-thousand-acre, experimental burns. As fire treatments varied on these tracts, facts obtained on a three-year cycle could be compared with those gathered on annual and biennial burns. The early work was performed at the personal initiative and risk of administrative field personnel. At this point, Regional Forester Kircher recognized that "controlled burning for some purpose or other will be with us for some time to come." Yet no national-forest administration officer in Washington embraced large-scale applications. Indeed, as one retired forester has observed, "someone there [Washington] was very effective in opposing the burning program on the National Forests. . . . As a matter of fact, we continued burning up to 500 acres or more under the name of administrative studies although we were not financed to do so. Much of the work was done on our own time." Almost inevitably, ineptitude marred one burning operation. It so greatly alarmed Assistant Regional Foresters Evans and Shaw that they considered abandoning the entire program. But in the Kisatchie National Forest (Louisiana), Supervisor Arthur Hartman successfully burned about nine hundred acres for seedbed preparation. Supervisor L. L. Bishop of the Texas National Forest placed two burns in the Angelina district, one for hazard reduction and the other for seedbed preparation. The catch on the latter area (Boykin Springs) was excellent.50 By January 1936, four thousand additional acres were scheduled for burning in the Texas forest alone. 61 Buoyed by these fruitful results, Kircher determined that Region 8 "must tackle it [controlled burning] and get to the

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bottom of it, regardless of psychological effects elsewhere."52 Assistant regional foresters—C. F. Evans, A. C. Shaw, and }. F. Brooks—shared his view on official trials, perhaps none so strongly as Shaw. Shaw (currently in charge of regional timber, range, and wildlife management) had used fire while supervisor of the Florida National Forest. All experimentation on national forest land would come under his command. In 1937, he suggested that the Service seriously consider adopting a policy favorable to employment of controlled burning. C. F. Evans had earlier commended protective operations on H. M. Wilson's eleven-thousand-acre tract of slash pine. But, as assistant regional forester in charge of state and private forestry, his attitude now reflected the doubts of state officials and private operators. It is noteworthy in this regard that relations with state organizations in the South were more acutely strained than in other regions. According to Earl Loveridge, Evans leaned "over backwards in his sympathy for the State Foresters and their problems."53 By 1938, his patience had worn thin. Evans became convinced, Loveridge reported, that "the more they get the more they want. In a few cases the difficulty is strictly a question of jealousy on the part of State Foresters. They, quite naturally, want to be the big gun in their state, but they also resent any participation by the Federal Government—other than to furnish the funds with which to run their show." Despite this apparent disaffection, Evans remained conservative on the fire issue. In a speech to a regional gathering he noted that controlled burning "seemed simple and reasonable in theory," but warned that it required "real skill for success."54 The highest regional officials, therefore, agreed on benefits of controlled burning. Many field men, however, judged absolute exclusion mandatory. In fairness to them, most timber on forests acquired in the early 1930s was too small to

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be burned by any method without incurring excessive damage. Moreover, little accumulation of inflammable material existed in these areas to justify protective burning. Conditions differed markedly on private land where older forests possessed considerably more rough. At any rate, the region had to "sell" controlled burning to the supervisors and rangers. Kircher realized that "this could not be done overnight." 35 Gradually, through informal discussion, debates, and "show-me" excursions, personnel taught in Northern forestry schools to despise fire, men whose attitudes were subsequently hardened by Service indoctrination and actual experience in fighting fire, became convinced of its value when skillfully employed. Administrative experimentation proceeded on some areas in the piney woods, and covert burning, under the guise of administrative studies, occurred in the Florida National Forest. Supervisor Raymond Conarro executed additional burns on the Leaf River ranger district of the De Soto National Forest in Mississippi. T h e regional office expressed dissatisfaction; C. F. Evans questioned whether it was properly planned: This is broadcast burning, not control burning, as understood by men who really want to know the best technique and what it cost. . . . I dislike very much to be so critical, but we have heard for four years that the Forest Service is going to get some good data based on the burning of large areas. Statements along this line have been made public so generally that I think we will have some explaining to do to save our faces unless we frankly admit that we have no such experiments under way.66 Kircher concurred in this estimate: "there is no controlled burning here. I don't think the supervisor knows what it is." District Inspector Stabler stated: "I do not think we are getting very far in knowing much about controlled burning." T h e situation was, indeed, disquieting—Conarro's tests com-

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prised the sole continuous experiment pursuant to Shaw's order of 1935. It especially disturbed the regional office inasmuch as the Loveridge-Fitzwater report of 1938 had recently called upon station and region to prepare a comprehensive summary of information on the practice. In 1936, Kircher had confidently informed a Service-wide conclave of fire-control personnel: "In a few years we should be able to speak with authority about the subject."57 Yet progress in the administrative area was painfully slow, faltering, and spotty. Save for psychological reorientation of some foresters in Region 8, almost the only perceptible development involved proposed substitution of the word "prescribed" for "controlled" burning. Administrative experimentation, commenced in 1935, served more effectively to reorient Service personnel than it did as a tool for evaluating various burning procedures. Judged from the standpoint of organizational harmony, this testing was probably instrumental in paving the way for the modus vivendi effected between region and station by 1937. Once administrators and research personnel grappled with similar problems, accommodation of conflicting views on information releases proved easier, and relations improved. Demmon carefully notified Washington of this development: The gap between the latest findings of Research and Administrative practice in our region is not a serious one. That there is a gap is only natural and to be expected. Our efforts should be directed toward keeping this gap to a minimum. . . . There seems to be a psychological attitude on the part of many of the administrative men in this region which rather belittles research. This is probably a hangover from the days when the Research program was not pointed up as well as it is today, and also because it took the Station some years to develop a background and some specific results of studies that could be put into practice. I believe that we have gone a long way in breaking down this phyological [sic] attitude through having our men stationed for long periods of

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time on the national forests where the frequent contact between the two groups has served to well acquaint the men with each other and where the results of our work could be put into immediate practice. . . . In some cases the regional men have adopted the conservative attitude such as in connection with the controlled use of fire for protection purposes. W e can all readily understand their fear of using fire and the consequences in a region where the general public has been more or less in favor of using fire for a long time past.88 Undoubtedly, rumors of feuding still reached Washington. Assistant Foresters Loveridge and Fitzwater, on an integrating inspection tour of Region 8 in 1937, recorded, however, that a "spirit of cordiality and mutual endeavor" prevailed to an extent surpassing what they had expected. Despite this optimism, the inspectors thought it wise for Silcox to reassert the 1934 principles regarding research and administration's respective responsibilities for education. 59 Kircher reassured the chief forester that the "old jealousies" and "lack of respect which at one time existed between Research and the Region have entirely disappeared: but frankly, there are still some men in your office who will not believe this." 60 Perhaps Kircher here overemphasized the existence of consensus; the amity was never quite this apparent. O n the other hand, it seems that the Service never actually split into two sharply antagonistic fashions. As a rule, research specialists having spent their first years in the administrative hierarchy were somewhat imbued with the outlook that such experience fostered. Others hoped for eventual reassignment to administrative positions. Demmon himself, several foresters have observed, typified an administrator adept in public relations more than he did a scientist. This controversy, therefore, was eventually resolved as much by administrators, who, educated to the value of controlled burning, commenced to persuade

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their colleagues, as it was by research personnel breaking down administrative resistance. Of course, this approach required research's patient acquiescence. And Demmon, coerced as well by the chief of research, seems to have been willing not to force the issue.* At the annual regional conference in 1938, Demmon pledged that the station would not release information until additional evidence justified controlled burning.61 Several articles in the Journal of Forestry accounted for most of the publicity granted the technique. Volume 35 (1937) included three articles by Southern Station members; Volume 36 contained two articles, both written by staff members of other stations. In addition, controlled burning merited a brief reference in a Southern Station pamphlet explaining its operations and programs.62 Further, four "occasional papers" partly touching on the fire problem were given limited distribution. In Economics of Our Southern Forests, Demmon pressed for adequate protection against uncontrolled fires; nothing was said concerning the possible virtues of controlled fires. Interestingly, L. J. Pessin, in his The Effect of Nutrient Deficiency on the Growth of Longleaf Pine Seedlings, noted that ashes left on the soil surface after burning might produce temporary increases in salts normally unavailable, thus stimulating longleaf seedling growth. But Pessin did not elaborate. W . E. Bond's The Work of the Southern Forest Experiment Station and Its * Forsling to Demmon, F S F , December 3, 1 9 3 8 , p. 4 : "Among other things that call for attention are: the desirability of bringing together the available information on controlled burning and on longleaf pine management; the setting up of a formal liaison service between the Station and the region; the desirability of indicating in signs, press releases, etc., that the Southern Station is a part of the Forest Service, and that in press releases, contacts, etc., definite precautions be taken not to unnecessarily embarrass the Region or State Foresters. In general that the policy be followed of consulting and agreement with the Region on matters of this kind."

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Application to Private Forest Management obliquely commented, "our studies have shown that there is no place for fire in the loblolly and shortleaf pine type." Finally, Demmon, in a summary of "Research Results in Science" presented before the Texas Academy of Science, merely observed, "longleaf pine seedlings grown without grass competition grow twice as fast as similar seedlings grown with grass, all other conditions being the same. These results suggest the possibility of stimulating growth of young longleaf pines by removal of the surrounding vegetation." He left it to his listeners to draw their own conclusions. Significantly, two of the most forthright accounts came from administrative personnel. After recording his observations on the Boykin Springs burn of October 1935, Shaw commended the Texas forest organization for being "willing to try almost anything once." 63 Moreover, W . R. Hine (formerly member of the Southern Station, afterwards Louisiana state forester, and currently with the Division of State and Private Forestry, Region 8) advocated judicious winter burning for reducing brown-spot infection.64 To my knowledge, only once did a Southern Station scientist deal directly with possible advantages of controlled burning: Wahlenberg's lecture on the McNeil experiment, delivered before a pasture symposium at the annual convention of the Association of Southern Agricultural Workers.65 In view of this, it is ironic that delayed publication of the WahlenbergGreene-Reed report should have injured the Service's reputation beyond Wahlenberg's power to repair it. Despite the Service's announced intention in 1934 to publish results of a decade's research, the year 1936 found the manuscript pigeonholed. It had been approved in three pages by the other cooperators, but attached to it were eighteen pages of objections from eight foresters. Indeed, Headley had not yet had the

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chance to review it. Accorded this opportunity in April 1937, he regarded it as a "fine piece of work" and thought its deficiencies

could be "cured in an appropriate way without dis-

turbing the final crystallization of the manuscript." 6 6 Basically, he suggested inclusion of a "good strong full foreword" plainly stipulating that only controlled

burning was useful. T h e ob-

jections were soon cleared up and the manuscript transmitted to the Department of Agriculture on July 2 1 , 1937. W a h l e n berg voiced the hope that it would " g o direct to the Government

Printing

Office from

there." 6 7

But

this

expectation

quickly died, said Irvin Haig, Acting Chief of the Division of Silvics (January 22, 1 9 3 8 ) , when: Some members of the Department asked for certain alterations aimed at pointing up the erosion and runoff effects which might result if dual use of grazing and forestry were attempted too generally on farm wood lots throughout the upper coastal plain. W e have just recently written the Director of the Southern Station in regard to such revisions which we feel may be desirable before pressing further for the publication of the McNeil results. It is our plan that as soon as these revisions are made to push the McNeill [sic] manuscript toward publication as rapidly as we can. 68 A query from C h a p m a n , after nine months had elapsed, brought this response from Forsling: The manuscript to which you refer has certainly had a rather stormy career. It was sent to the Department for final editing about a year ago and, as is usually the case, referred to other Bureaus for such criticisms as they might have. W e had thought ourselves pretty well in the clear with this manuscript because of previous review, but a number of critical questions were raised about it and in view of these it has been extensively rewritten. W e feel that this has resulted in material improvement without weakening the manuscript in any respect. It was again submitted to the Department for final editing on September 16, 1938. I doubt if

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additional review in the Department will raise material questions about it and we hope to see it in print within the next few months.69 The monograph first saw the light of day in June 1939. 70 Critical of the Service, Chapman congratulated the authors "on having the results of this experiment published at all, much less with a lag of only six years between the completion of the text and its final appearance."71 That the bulletin ever appeared can be largely attributed to Wahlenberg's perseverance. Greene had been eased out of his position in 1936. 72 Opposition to its publication had emanated primarily from the Division of Information and Education and the Division of State and Private Forestry—the latter echoing sentiments of state foresters. In fact, Demmon showed himself very responsive to these pressures. The station reported to the region in 1939 that its studies had not resulted in any final conclusions except on definite benefits ascribable to burning a year prior to seedfall.73 "Pineways to Profit," the first exclusively Southern fire-prevention film, in attempting to convince the small farmer "that keeping fire out of the woods means cash in his pocket," ignored even this evidence.74 In a special fire-prevention number of American Forests, Headley exclaimed, "a whole nation can be led to appreciate the forests and hate fire with an effective hatred." 75 Also, Supervisor Conarro declared: "The United States Forest Service is no advocate of the 'isms' of Europe but it is teaching a doctrine of hate in the schools on the National Forests in Mississippi. Specifically, it is a hate against Forest Fires." 76 Opposition to all fire hardly appealed to representatives of the Florida Forest and Park Association, obliged to debate the controlled-burning issue with the Florida Cattlemen's Association and interested timber landowners. The president of the

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forestry group was confused by Service silence on controlled burning while the Bureau of Animal Industry suggested fire treatments for longleaf stands. 77 Promulgation of statements by the state department of agriculture on the M c N e i l and Penney farms experiments also perturbed him. Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, requested to resolve these inconsistencies, recommended the convening of a conference at which members of the various agencies could discuss their respective positions. 78 Held in Jacksonville in July 1939, the meeting notably failed to formulate a "reasonable and understandable policy" respecting use of fire in timber growing, grazing, and game. Much talk and no agreement on policy characterized the session. Answering requests for a statement on use in Florida's slash and longleaf belt, C . F . Evans said evasively: " I do not believe foresters can give you a definite statement for a region extending from North Carolina to Texas. T h e Secretary of the U . S. Department of Agriculture said he could not write a policy statement for the United States, and I think he could well have said that for the South. I doubt if any of the agencies present here could prescribe a treatment that would cover all conditions satisfactorily." Evans might at least have informed the group of the station's report (April 1939, referred to above), on the desirability of a seedbed-preparation burn. Reluctance to release information on this subject clearly indicated that policy revision would be even more difficult. Evans understood the dilemma; aware that fire could prove most serviceable, he pleaded, "in our efforts to stop the practice of promiscuous burning it is not practicable always to explain that fire under certain conditions is a useful tool." Frank Albert (Supervisor, Florida National Forest) recommended that landowners be enlightened selectively through "personal dealings rather than by broadside newspaper releases which are so

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easily misunderstood by the lay mind and cause irreparable damage to the other interests affected." Florida Chief Forester Harry Baker and Stoddard agreed. Soil Conservation Service's Florida forestry division unsuccessfully urged publication of a statement advising landowners on proper practices to follow "according to our best present knowledge." Four more years elapsed before the Forest Service reversed its 1932 controlled-burning policy. The trend, however, was unmistakable. Publication of Technical Bulletin 683 in June 1939 marked the Service's first official recognition of the merits of prescribed fire use in longleaf. Nevertheless, other detailed expositions did not follow.79 The Service found it easier to repeat the old damage theme than to reword its publicity. Indicative of this was Forest Outings, a book sponsored by the Service, intended for popular consumption. It thoroughly deprecated the woods-burning custom: Firing "greens up" the grass, the people there say. They say it kills rattlers, destroys the "germs" of pellagra and of tuberculosis and of infantile paralysis, rids the woods of chiggers and malaria. Probably it does none of these things. . . . What indiscriminate burning of the forest floor, or open range land, does is to cremate such living organisms as remain in the upper top soil. It bums out part of the land's richness. It makes the piece of soil less fertile and all the more likely to wash or blow away. This grass may look green and fresh at first, but its meat producing values are not improved. It looks like a nice clean job, maybe, for the first week or so, but the resulting growth is sparser, coarser, ranker.80 Incensed by this flagrant disregard for scientific accuracy—the veiling of unwelcome facts in the interest of propagandaChapman demanded an apology from Clapp (then Acting Chief of the Service).81 Clapp admitted Service dereliction, but alleged that the overstatements made

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were entirely through inadvertence in a desire to strike a blow for better fire protection in the South. The author, as the text shows, was alluding to indiscriminate burning, but it is evident that in his enthusiasm he took in too much territory. This, of course, does not excuse failure to stay within the facts, but at least an error due to momentary overzealousness is better than one due to blindness or perversity.82 If Chapman could not prove perversity in this case, he did discover strong evidence of it in another. Chapman charged that this "attitude of suppression" registered itself in an attempt to route a Society of American Foresters field excursion near Lufkin, Texas, in 1939, so as to avoid an important and instructive demonstration of experimental burning in longleaf pine by the Forest Service on the Angelina unit, for the stated reason of those who planned the routing that they did not wish to be responsible for any encouragement of the use of fire in Texas.83 Occasionally, personnel did endeavor to correct factual distortions. Yet these efforts impress one as irresolute gestures at setting the record straight. They would certainly never enable the untutored reader to arrive at a balanced view of the situation. For example, a caption beneath the first picture in Butler's "The Piney Woods are Coming Back" (American Forests, February 1940) reads: "Given protection from fire, a few seed trees will soon bring back the baby pine by the thousands." Mattoon, author of the longleaf and slash-pine bulletins, suggested "sometimes" or "under certain favorable conditions" as suitable words to be added at the close.84 In failing, however, to explain why these words were necessary, the proposed revision served to perpetuate the error. As the complete protectionist position became more unten-

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able, many hedged. Headley, for example, gave Kircher this bit of gratuitous advice: It is my feeling that invaluable hints, leads and isolated facts may be drawn from the experimental work of H. H. Chapman and our own fire research men. Even if they seldom develop facts or conclusions which are directly usable, it is important to sift carefully all they do develop, in the search for facts and ideas which can be translated into usable material for over-all management purposes.85 At this point, Headley acknowledged that fire might prove helpful and even called for adjustments in control policy to reflect the verdicts of science. H e confessed, however, that "advocates of controlled burning do not seem to stay put in their opinions of statements of fact." His philosophy of not trying to make the tail wag the dog led him to defer to the objections of state foresters and their allies in the Service against acceptance of a "more rational policy on fire exclusion." Some remained obdurate. Although Chapman's efforts to lead this group out of the cave were unavailing, they, by their very obstinacy, probably enlightened other members of the profession. If conducted "somewhat in the nature of a crusade," the chief spokesman for the antifire zealots continued to argue, an effective campaign could be waged against woods burning. W h e n the general evil was finally scotched, Wheeler admitted, one might openly discuss and practice controlled burning "in some localities." 86 Chapman, countering with his usual incisiveness, claimed that the appropriate antidote for misleading publicity was not more misleading publicity. . . . It lies rather in open and honest publicity to counteract misstatements of both kinds. The crusade against uncontrolled fire can then command the united support of professional men and in time fires can be controlled by public sentiment and law enforcement. . . . The final excuse for

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the present policy lies in the belief that the public cannot be educated to the control of fire, that distortion and misuse of facts cannot be effectively combated by counter-acting publicity based on these facts, and that an unquestioning belief in total fire exclusion is a prerequisite to the proper education of the public in the control of fire, and is an absolute necessity in overcoming the ingrained ignorance and wilfulness of the majority of southern farmers and woodsmen.87 In rebuttal, Wheeler could do no better than revert to the long-cherished balance-of-nature concept. Use of fire before the whole story had been pieced together, he maintained, might "destroy the balance." T h e "facts" on controlled burning, he averred, might "prove fallacies in the long run." 8 8 Chapman conceded this possibility, noting that it represented a risk inherent in all empirical research. But an unwillingness to admit unpalatable facts, Chapman sensed, had prompted Wheeler's insistence on postponing action. 89 Clearly, by late 1 9 4 1 , the power of the complete protectionists was rapidly ebbing, their numbers thinning. Fear of employing fire continued to dominate some minds, but foresters, highly placed in Region 8, awaited the propitious moment when prescribed burning might be generally introduced. Illustrative of this new mood, the station requested that its efforts in "keeping open within Government agencies the possibilities of such use as well as for helping to shape controlled burning practice along sound and sane courses" be accorded due recognition. T h e Journal of Forestry, which had printed an article on controlled burning in the Western white-pine type in 1939, now published one dealing with fire's role in perpetuating yellow birch, hemlock, other pines, and the intolerant hardwoods of northern Wisconsin. 9 0 And, doubtless to the chagrin of foresters like Headley, Eugene Gemmer (Southern Station)

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recommended "perhaps in rare cases" that fire be used for seedbed preparation in loblolly stands.91 Bickford—researching under Demmon—also received permission to propose in the Journal applications on southeastern flatwoods. Other factors more directly influenced the decision to make the switch in time that saved the pine. Increased experience with prescribed burning in Southern national forests lent credibility to the belief that fire might be safely used. Burning practice involved more art than it did science. Even the most dedicated prescribed burner spent years mastering requisite skills and overcoming natural, and conditioned, fears. As Hartman (Supervisor of Kisatchie National Forest—subsequently, Assistant Regional Forester, Fire Control R - 8 ) has revealed: "A mind does not arrive at any one time to acceptance of fire use in all of its present types or purposes of use. It is a step by step process."92 As early as 1935, Hartman executed his first seedbed-preparation burn. Not then a confirmed burner, his state of mind could best be described as "fluid." He gradually accumulated significant evidence through frequent contacts with, and observations of, the relation between damage and extent of fuel accumulations. After visiting Stoddard in 1937, he came away convinced that fire was essential for intensive game management; later he realized its silvicultural value. Although initially impressed by the brown-spot infestation hazard, he did not burn to control the disease until 1942. He has recounted this incident to me: A. C. Shaw . . . had some appreciation of the extent of mortality occurring in the longleaf plantation developed thru the use of CCC facilities. I was assigned to make a general inspection of all activities and the administrative management of the Mississippi National Forest. Before starting on that inspection Shaw asked me to find out what they had done with the funds he had made available for

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plantation burning. . . . I got my first bad jolt on the Bienville Ranger District. With the Ranger we set out to view a cross-section of the some 12,000 acres which appeared on the planting maps. Examination revealed 90 per cent mortality, with some plantations completely smothered. Further, there was no knowledge, and the Ranger had no knowledge or remembrance of any previous plantation burning. Then I went to the Chickasawhay District with Ben Hughes, who had just taken over as Supervisor, and with Ross Levitt, who was Assistant Supervisor. There we found plantations in various stages of deterioration, according to their age. There were two particular plantations about one mile south of Botwell's store which were badly diseased but strong enough to offer hope of saving. Shaw's allotment was still unused. W e announced to Ranger Carl Benson that we were going to burn the plantation south of the road that afternoon and asked him to arrange right then to send a tractor plow and crew of men to that area. Benson was against it and did not want it burned. He was afraid of the reaction of the local residents. At any rate, the plow lines were placed and Hughes, Levitt and myself spread out and did the firing. The action did stir up a commotion. Botwell, the storekeeper, a local leader and friend of the Service in preaching fire prevention, told us he never thought the Service would come to firing the woods. Explanations were made to a number of citizens as to why that fire was made and they were asked to reserve judgment until they had a year or two to observe the results of that particular use of fire. Those seedlings were cleaned and blossomed out with healthy needles. They soon started height growth. [The stand is now pulpwood size.] Frustrations experienced in fighting wild fires satisfied foresters of prescribed burning's merits. Grass fires in one-year roughs were "whipped o u t " by means of pine tops or swatters —a method impractical, however, where heavy accumulations of understory brush and pine needles prevailed. A n d holocausts began to strike the national forests (Region 8) in 1 9 4 1 . According to Hartman, the Impassable B a y fire in the Osceola (Florida)

almost completely destroyed twenty-five thousand

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acres of its finest slash and longleaf pole stands. T h e rate of spread and intensity of the flames, Hartman recalls, just plumb surprised our organization. The area was mostly 8-year rough or more. It could be said that the Service not having previously met such conditions had not recognized the potentials and was not ready in thinking, equipment or techniques to control a fire under these conditions. Conflagrations recurred the next year; in the early spring of 1943 forest-acreage loss and resultant monetary damage established new regional records. " T h e n we knew," adds Hartman, "that on old rough areas we were losing more timber from fire over a period of time than the increment of the areas. In other words, we were playing a losing game." W h a t the Service was coming to accept, many private owners had already been practicing. Burning for hazard reduction, always used in naval-stores operations, had gained increasing popularity with other timberland owners ever since the Cogdell blaze of 1934. In the winter of 1942, William Oettmeier (President, Superior Pine Products Co., Fargo, Georgia) alone deliberately fired thirty thousand acres. Despite Service attitudes, controlled burning among private operators was to make increased headway. T o save face with these companies, policy reversal seemed prudent. N o w foresters found themselves the sole governmental advocates of complete protection. Various agencies advised different treatments for similar conditions. A Soil Conservation Service officer recorded the following areas of disagreement: use of fire in silviculture, sanitation, and fire prevention, as against complete protection and the benefits or damages resulting from grazing in woodlands of different types and conditions. 93 One S C S employee appended this remark to a letter sent Chapman: "Please regard this as a personal letter, not for

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publication. Policy on fire in regard to woodland is dominated by the Forest Service in the Dept. of Agriculture. Therefore, the Soil Conservation Service must follow their dictum, and I, as an employee of the SCS, would be reprimanded if my opinions were disseminated."94 The Service could refrain from releasing information only at great peril to its scientific standing. To the chorus of protest against Service policy emanating from the Bureau of Animal Industry and the SCS was added the Bureau of Plant Industry's publicity on brown-spot disease.95 Indeed, this bureau had partly confirmed the woodsburners' contention that burning destroys ticks and chiggers, although it recommended studies to "determine the precise relationship of the use of fire to these arthopods." 98 Stoddard, moreover, consistently advised owners of some two million acres of woodland to control burn for game-habitat improvement. Mobilization, following the outbreak of World W a r II, aggravated control problems. Pearl Harbor meant the disbanding of the Conservation Corps camps. It signified that "all fires are enemy fires." But patriotism could not prevent all fires and, what is more, suppress those intentionally set. Manpower to fight fires became scarce; construction activities were suspended. No longer could CCC men install lookout towers, string telephone lines, and cut truck trails into the back country. As the danger mounted, control effectiveness declined. To be sure, several companies had previously developed the fire-line plow. Compared with models available in the postwar period, however, these tractor-pulled units were cumbersome and heavy. Though unable to compensate for loss of C C C labor, they did lower costs and enhance the safety of burning operations with heavy fuels. All these factors contributed to the vexation of foresters chafing under outmoded rulings. Administrative testing may

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have demolished ingrained dogmas and given personnel practical experience. Yet, as Supervisor Conarro insisted, the Service had never compiled comparable cost data for differing types of bums. He added confidently, however: "Further studies do not appear to me to be necessary. I strongly recommend that we about-face." Almost a year passed before Washington took decisive action, though definite indications of policy alteration appeared as early as January 1943. Longleaf and Loblolly Meanwhile, again anticipating the research branch, H. H. Chapman published a monograph presenting the thesis that loblolly, like its cousin longleaf, needed periodic light burns to insure species survival from invading hardwood competition.* As longleaf yielded to loblolly over part of its range in the absence of fire, so both softwood types would eventually succumb to hardwood encroachment were fire not employed. Recognizing the "inevitability" of this trend if not effectively reversed, Chapman espoused an even-aged silvicultural system —requiring clear and not selective cutting. Fire might be profitably used, under the former mode of operations, for seedbed preparation and hazard reduction. Loblolly's greater susceptibility to damage—especially when contrasted with longleaf in its youth—demanded more sparing use. Accordingly, while the same silvicultural system applied to longleaf and loblolly management, burning treatments varied. Chapman's fundamental silvicultural claim that pine did not represent a true regional forest climax, thus necessitating hardwood understory suppression, was hardly original. In a paper delivered to the SAF in 1914, Ashe owned that annual * Management of Loblolly Pine in the Pine-Hardwood Region in Alabama, and in Louisiana West of the Mississippi, Yale School of Forestry, Bulletin 49 (1942).

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or periodic burning had, in innumerable instances, prevented loblolly establishment. Yet, he keenly perceived, "on dry soils when the water level is low, one slow winter-burning is desirable, in order to expose the mineral soil as a seedbed for loblolly." 97 Decrees which failed to account for this fact, Ashe predicted, would encounter the stern opposition of timberland owners. Professor Toumey subsequently referred to Ashe's arguments on loblolly regeneration in addressing the first Southern forestry congress. It is instructive to investigate the Service's reaction to this impiety. Known for being endowed with a rather unimpressive personality, Ashe was at no time an effective "self-advertiser." Indeed, L. F. Kneipp commented: The fact that his academic training and technical experience had not been wholly orthodox inspired attacks on his findings—attacks which deterred him from making other contributions he might well have made. When a southern Lumberman once urged Ashe to publish for slash pine technical notes similar to those he had published for longleaf pine, he observed that he had no desire to again court criticism such as his longleaf notes had provoked.98 Significantly, Ashe financed publication of his review of Chapman's Bulletin 16. Moreover, personal factors aside, he did not have the advantage of an independent position. Foresters ignored Ashe's Bulletin 24 on loblolly; this impelled Cary to inquire in 1920: After having turned to it 2 or 3 times for needed help with the result each time of being thoroughly satisfied, one is led to wonder why a work that has been out 6 years and covers a very important field has never been reviewed in the periodicals of the profession.99 Perhaps Cary's remarks came to the attention of J. A. Cope (Maryland assistant state forester); he, too, suggested fire for

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100

loblolly reproduction. T h e Service, however, was too absorbed in damage research to give thought to this prospect. Whereas the Appalachian Station recommended study of "reproduction, growth, and management of cut-over loblolly pine lands" as a project "to be definitely added to the Station's program in 1927," a glance at the 1927 annual report reveals its traditional orientation: gauging adverse fire effects on loblolly restocking. This tendency became even more pronounced in 1928, when the Appalachian Station took charge of loblolly studies initially conducted by the Southern Station, contrasting complete protection and annual burning. Hardwood encroachment received recognition in 1 9 3 1 . Without mentioning fire use, a study then initiated proposed these methods for undesirable-hardwood eradication: sodium-arsenite solution introduced in ax cuts, girdling, and felling. One might suppose that the Appalachian Station would have benefited by mistakes of its sister station at N e w Orleans. Indeed, Chief of Research Clapp sought in 1932 to keep Director Frothingham in Asheville informed of developments in longleaf territory, and to suggest possible avenues for similar loblolly research: M y second question relates to the controversial problem of the place of fire in pine silviculture, and particularly to longleaf. Copies of correspondence with Chapman on this subject have been sent to you. . . . There is much more loblolly pine than longleaf in your territory. The fire problem in loblolly is undoubtedly very different from that in longleaf, and yet there is a critical fire problem because of the prevalence of fire throughout the loblolly range. What we ought to have is an investigative attack adapted to loblolly conditions. Please let me have your recommendations. 101 T h e station's subsequent failure to respond to this challenge was ascribed to lack of funds. Frothingham proposed a lob-

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lolly controlled-buming study for protective purposes, classifying it, however, as priority six among nine listed items. 102 Given low priority in 1935, the project was discarded the following year, albeit the annual report contained a section entitled "Urgent Problems of Fire Investigations." In extenuation of continued lack of station research, the 1939 report entreated: "Silvicultural research leading to effective forest management practices in coastal plain pine and hardwood forests cannot be carried on with the present staff." In 1940 budgetary limitations again were singled out by Director Richard McArdle for the "piecemeal attack" on Southern pine problems. To what extent the station endeavored to acquaint budget drafters and Congress with fire's potential significance in combating hardwood encroachment is not known. One finds no reference to this subject in printed Congressional committee hearings. Only when administrative personnel expressed concern over thick hardwood undergrowth on thirty thousand acres of the Texas national forests (1941) did research—in this case, the Southern Station—enter the picture.* Chief of Research C. L. Forsling indicated that he was "glad to see investigation of this by SS [Southern Station]." This belated notice came in time to save the Service from the predicament it fell into after release of Yale Bulletin 16 (Chapman's longleaf piece of 1926). The reception accorded his Bulletin 49 on loblolly by two Southern Station scientists was quite favorable, if circumspect. Indeed, Chapman declared, " I am gratified that the reviewers Tecognized the possibility that fire has a role in preparing the seedbed for loblolly pine. From previous experience with long* In 1 9 4 1 , Conarro, with the advice of Len Barrett of the Appalachian Station, performed burning on the Croatan National Forest (N.C.) for hazard reduction under young loblolly. Since there was no report on these operations in the regional office, the work did not contribute to available knowledge.

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leaf pine I had expected considerable general opposition to this idea, but if it exists it has not been expressed to me." 1 0 3 Chapman's past exhortations had produced their intended effect. It was hardly a coincidence that Gemmer (Southern Station) should have intimated in 1941 that fire might serve the purposes of loblolly management while Chapman readied his more extended monograph for publication. Nor was it unusual that Brinkman and Swartout—concerned with the same problem—arrived at a similar conclusion in 1942. A number of foresters no longer blinked at the possibility of using fire. Yet the censor still harassed research personnel. When Brinkman and Swartout's original manuscript, suggesting fire use, emerged, it innocuously read: "Thick mats of grass or leaf litter may have to be broken so that the pine seed may fall directly upon the soil." 104 At the same time, three other requirements for longleaf regeneration, mentioned by the Alabama agricultural-experiment station scientists, were left untouched: adequate seed; protection from fire and grazing for five years after seedfall; openings (in the crown cover) of onequarter acre in size made just prior to a good seedfall. In all likelihood, the Service would have treated material relating to fire and longleaf in similar fashion had it been submitted in 1942. The Service attitude on release of scientific information, however, was appreciably altered in 1943 regarding longleaf, though it remained unchanged for loblolly until 1949

The Switch in Time that Saved the Pine Catastrophe precipitates action as nothing else can. A protracted drought during the 1942-43 winter fire season, combined with a shortage of trained fire-control men and heavyfuel accumulations, resulted in the most appalling damage experienced in a decade. Stunned by disastrous blazes, administrators turned to prescribed burning as a solution. Conarro's

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suggestion that the Service reverse its stand soon earned almost universal approbation in Atlanta. Of course, prescribed burning's protective aspects, not its silvicultural features, had greater salience for administrators. Convinced that policy revision was now required, Kircher invited Chief Forester Lyle Watts personally to survey conditions. Shortly after completing his tour, and agitated both by this experience and ensuing events, Watts told Albert (Supervisor, Florida National Forest): I assure you that I will not soon forget the ten days I spent with Joe [Kircher] and the others in the deep South. Certainly I won't forget that in Florida there is an acute fire problem and that adequate heavy equipment is one of the essential requirements for getting on top of that job. I must admit that control burning has me somewhat confused. The way that the big fire substantiated your own judgment of things to happen—within a week after you had explained it to me—lends a lot of emphasis to your own ideas. I hope that you and Joe are able to work out a program designed to get at answers which the land administrator must have. 105 P. A . Thompson, recently appointed Fire Control Chief, happily was not possessed with the pyrophobia that so bedeviled his predecessor. Along with Kircher, Pat Thompson spearheaded the drive for acceptance of prescribed burning. Making a regional circuit after Watts, Thompson spared no feelings in reporting to Assistant Chief Granger. H e charged, as did Conarro in August 1942, that "nothing substantial nor concrete has been done" toward meeting the objectives laid out for administrative burning by Shaw. 1 0 6 T h e station and region's failure to prepare a "comprehensive statement" on prescribed burning requested by the 1937 investigation team drew this query: " W h e r e there is such unanimity of opinion and so much interest in a problem, one is forced to wonder why the Region and the Station have not responded to the

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'urge' of the 1937 inspectors and given more positive leadership and assistance to the field officers." 1 0 7 Assistant Regional Forester Brooks, supported by Kircher, took issue with Thompson, contending that ten thousand acres in North Carolina, along with several large tracts in Florida, Mississippi, Texas, and Louisiana, had been burned during the previous season. In admitting, however, that "only in the last year have we been ready to go all out," he actually confirmed Thompson's allegation. 108 Administrative burning had not attained the dimensions Loveridge and Fitzwater envisaged. Certainly, the aims stated in Shaw's 1935 memo were not fulfilled. Nonetheless, these recriminations should not obscure the main point: Region 8, and Thompson, Granger, Loveridge, and Watts in Washington, all labored for a policy change long overdue. Kircher and Thompson arranged for Arthur Nelson (Timber Management, Washington office) and W a l t Dutton (Chief, Division of Grazing, Washington office) to tour the South before writing the projected directive. Granger prodded Kircher to "get down to brass tacks on . . . the important question of control burning. W e are all looking forward to concrete expressions of these principles in your resource management plans as a result of this joint consideration of the problem." 1 0 9 Meanwhile, C . F . Evans sought to line up state foresters behind the contemplated move; Bickford kept them abreast of late research developments. Acknowledging that the organization had been "in a rut," and feeling " w e should rethink our position," Evans circulated the following letter from a county agricultural agent among various state foresters: Looking back over the 26 years, I have come to the conclusion that our efforts during that period have been practically worthless. I see no improvement in preven [sic] forest fires, and this destructive practice continues year after year. The past two months have demonstrated

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the correctness of my statements. There is something radically wrong with a procedure that does not get any better results in a quarter of a century.... Farmers do not adopt practices over a generation that do not give them an advantage in some way. They may not understand the basic reasons, but they are thoroughly aware of the results. . . . Let's quit asking him not to bum the woods and get down to the basic principle of the matter and give him a substitute that will answer his need and leave him satisfied. He will then not want to burn the woods. 110 Brooks pondered in what manner agencies could, without undue humiliation, recast old protection literature: Dr. Wheeler has preached absolute fire exclusion all over the region. All fire prevention literature from the Chief's office and all other sources urges the same thing. . . . W e have featured elimination of uncontrolled [orig. emphasis] fire but it is doubtful if the distinction registers with most people [see "Preventing Fires in Southern Woodlands," Farmer's Bulletin no. 1926, USDA, issued 1943]. I suppose if we were sufficiently interested and doing our job we would come up with a solution for this difficulty, but must admit that we haven't figured out how to get across to several hundred thousand people who live in and near forested lands, that sometimes controlled burning is all right and sometimes it isn't. 1 1 1 Watts approved prescribed burning for national-forest lands on August 3, 1943, following a favorable report by Dutton and Nelson (June 10, 1943). But an informational policy statement was not worked out by the Service and state forestry agencies until December in what is remembered as " T h e Treaty of Lake City." In the interim, the Service and one state organization made token releases to the public. Irritated by the Dutton-Nelson report's failure to credit the Southern Station with advocating fire for silvicultural and protective purposes "for many years," Demmon insisted on keeping "the

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record straight," not as "a matter of 'I told you so,' but rather as a recognition that research was on the job." 1 1 2 T o substantiate his contention, Demmon rushed Occasional Paper 105, The Use of Fire in the Protection of Longleaf and Slash Pine Forests, into print. 113 Many timberland owners were thereby first officially apprised of the merits of prescribed burning. The station frankly admitted that fear of unfavorable public reaction had served as "one of the chief deterrents to the use of prescribed burning." Prior to the Lake City, Florida, conclave, two additional questions were resolved. One involved prescribed burning's relation to provisions of the Clarke-McNary law permitting partial federal reimbursement to the states for protection costs. C . F. Evans convincingly demonstrated that denial of federal funds for practices which the Service itself deemed essential had proved a "source of considerable embarrassment" to the region. Kircher soon extricated the Service from this ticklish situation. He announced to the state foresters that policy would henceforth allow "constructive participation . . . in the development of techniques or in sharing in the expenses of execution." 1 1 4 This decision clarified the federal obligation by abandoning the equivocal wording of its 1932 statement: where states considered controlled fire necessary for hazard reduction, costs incurred for state operations might be included in expenditures reported for federal reimbursement. The other problem concerned fire utilization on nationalforest property. Previously, only administrative experimentation had been sanctioned. Now, over the opposition of several foresters in Washington—notably the head of State and Private Forestry (erstwhile Director, California Forest Range. Experiment Station, and future head of research)—Watts authorized Kircher to permit prescribed burning in the longleaf and longleaf-slash types. He advised that this information be passed

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along to field personnel, state agencies, and interested private owners—those residing or having holdings near national-forest areas slated for burning. Watts granted burning authority for several purposes, subject to "safe limits of technical knowledge and public reaction": protection, seedbed preparation, brownspot control, vegetative suppression, grazing and wildlife-habitat improvement. 115 Specifying the scope of his operations, Kircher, in turn, gave Hartman (then Regional Chief of Fire Control) precise instructions as to operations and objectives. Hartman recollects the story: From there on and with the help and advice of a lot of folks, I headed the laying out, designing, organizing and pushing of the operations; set up the controls, and the production of records and data which might lead us towards the then unknown answers involved in large scale administrative use of fire. The key attitude was our certainty that we did not know what we could accomplish or just how things should be done, plus awareness that each individual burning block would contain conditions of topography, soils, fuel composition, ground cover and stand species mixtures, different from any other block. W e were of a mind to try out anything that appeared as reasonable, expected to make plenty of mistakes, and expected to be guilty of under- or over-doing some things in the trial and failure quest for identification of combinations of actions which would zone results into those of most reasonable balance. 116 A prescribed-burning conference was arranged for Lake City in December 1943, both to obtain agreement on program goals and to formulate information policy. Service representatives (research and administrative), three state foresters, an assorted group of private landowners, and such individual authorities as Chapman and Stoddard attended. According to one report, "the general spirit of the meeting was good. There was a lot of interest in the subject and it seemed evident that controlled

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burning was in the picture to stay and was going to be used, undoubtedly on an increasing scale, in one way or another." 1 1 7 Another observer held this view as it related to revision of national-forest and so-called C - M 2 policies. Acceptance of these alterations, however, was purchased at the cost of compromise on public-relations tactics. T o allay state fears, a decision was made to withhold publicity on the new policy: foresters would generally Tefrain from advocating prescribed burning for privately owned forests. Conference participants discussed techniques, methods, and planning operations "very freely and frankly." 1 1 8 Indeed, Kenneth Davis, representing research, remarked, " I was given to understand that it was quite a feat to get all these divergent interests together to discuss this matter in an objective way." Of the three state foresters present, however, J. M . Stauffer (Alabama) did not commit himself on the value of prescribed burning; the Florida chief remained "openminded" on the subject; and the South Carolina head was recorded as merely "expressing interest" in the program. "In the Picture to Stay" Chapman was not a party to the Lake City agreement. Believing a "realistic appraisal" of fire's role to be in order, he laid the facts before readers of American Forests. They doubtless were startled to learn that without fire Southern pine could not survive since the region was a hardwood zone, not a natural pine belt. 1 1 9 Chapman pointed out that prescribed periodic burning would confine longleaf, loblolly, and slash to their respective ranges. Slash encroaching on longleaf sites under complete protection would succumb either to drought or to a stem rust (Cronartium fusiforme)— longleaf was immune to this disease. T h e initially faster-growing but less fireresistant loblolly would regain ground yielded to longleaf as a consequence of overfrequent burning, and would surrender to

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longleaf the territory it had invaded under complete exclusion (loblolly was also susceptible to the Cronartium infection). Fire would, therefore, maintain a balance among these three conifers, while at the same time preserving them against hardwood encroachment. Butler's editorial, "To Burn or Not To Burn," appreciated the value of Chapman's findings. It hopefully declared that control of indiscriminate use might be "nearer achievement with full knowledge and admission of the need and technique of controlled burning. . . ,"120 C. F. Evans' reply to this challenge recognized that the scourge might be expunged only by adjusting to, and compromising with, coastal-plain usages. Inability to perceive the alliance woodsburners had attempted to make with nature partly accounted for the painfully slow progress in the past. As Evans counseled: Bigger and better engines of suppression in great quantity with all the attendant gadgets will not by themselves enable us to keep ahead of the woodsburner. . . . Most fires are started by people who have reasons for burning the woods. . . . There is not room enough in the jails for all the people who stick fire into other people's woods, so fire law enforcement is not the final solution. . . . We have been too reluctant to listen to the native who used fire to serve his purposes and to learn from this experience! He has used it unwisely in most cases to be sure, but there was more validity to his practices than appeared on the surface.121 Evans' endeavor to lay bare Service failings placed the organization in a most embarrassing position. It also embittered statefederal relations. Wheeler demanded suspension of prescribed burning because, he alleged, it might kill little pine trees and interefere with Air Force pilot training.122 Others suggested that regional offices be granted a veto over publication of Tesearch papers. The former request was ignored; the latter, though considered, was rejected. Instead, Washington pursued

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the less offensive course of authorizing regional review of station manuscripts. Though adamantly opposed to administrative burning, the chief of research (former head of State and Private Forestry) could not bring himself to countenance a "veto power of such grand magnitude" as the one proposed. 123 Perhaps a subordinate's* adamant stand against censorship compelled him to throw support behind the right of scientists to disseminate their results unfettered by requirements for administrative approval. Or perhaps he reacted as any researcher would whenever suppression of information is intimated. " T o avoid giving any impression that the Forest Service says one thing and does something else or is not united," Chief of State and Private Forestry Richard McArdle thought "fair play" demanded that personnel affected by publications "appearing suddenly in public print" be given prior opportunities to inform themselves on these scientific developments. 124 T h e Service chose this approach. Delays dictated by this procedure constituted a major obstacle to harmonious region-station relations. T h e following exchange between station and region seems to bear out this conclusion. Southeastern Station Director Haig wrote Regional Forester Stone: The proposed article by James M . Mann, intended for the Forest Farmer, is submitted for your review prior to publication. I wonder if it might not be possible, now that some time has passed since Mr. Granger's memorandum [directive requiring administrative review], to simplify our review procedure on prescribed burning manuscripts. . . . As the prescribed burning practice he describes is now used extensively for protection purposes by the national forest organization in the South in the types and conditions concerned and this practice is well known, I see little point in having a manu* Kenneth Davis, head of the Division of Timber Management Research.

FIRE AND WATER script of this kind submitted for review in the Regional office. No doubt you would be interested in seeing manuscripts dealing with less well established policies such as the use of fire in loblolly types, or in areas other than coastal plain longleaf and slash pine stands. Would it be possible for you to specify the types of fire manuscripts which you would like to see before publication so that we may send these to you as heretofore without holding up our manuscripts for Regional office review? 125 T h e regional forester concurred in publication of Mann's manuscript but, with an eye to state sensitivities, refused to consider revision of the 1945 policy: W e have never viewed our position as being one of censorship. . . . In 1943 when the Service decided to embark upon a policy of recognizing and using fire on a large scale, various of the State Foresters were greatly disturbed by their belief that unguarded publicity could result in the breaking down of their fire prevention work in certain of their areas. They wished Forest Service publicity generally to be confined to residents living in or near the National Forests and to technical men, with State-wide publicity to be left to the State Foresters. An understanding along these lines was reached. Publicity relations are still quite delicate in some states. Only two weeks ago we had to meet a flare up. . . . It is probable that the vast majority of publications would contain nothing adverse, but here and there one would unknowingly and unintentionally say something which hit a sore spot, possibly in a State not within a Station's territory. 126 T h e Service faced these alternatives: either it might actively disseminate information, thereby risking alienation of state agencies and influential private cooperators, or it could maintain their confidence by acquiescing in objections to projected station releases. Actually, the Service steered neither of these tacks; it cleaved to a middle path, thus avoiding undue antagonism to any interest. Professional journals or periodicals with restricted circulation remained the main publication out-

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lets: Journal of Forestry, Southern Station Annual Report, and Fire Control Notes. Appearances of Better Management on Southern Coastal Forest Ranges and Prescribed Burning Pays were uncommon events.127 Until furnished the "unknown answers" to large-scale burning, the states were content to wait; 128 this feeling applied particularly to loblolly. By so temporizing, state foresters might effect a demarche at less risk to their prestige. Willingly, the Service assumed this course. A joint research-administrative study comprising two hundred study plots—under the direction of Bickford and Ranger Larry Newcomb in the Osceola National Forest—was set up to identify superior techniques and economic operations and to determine probable damage values resulting from various approaches. Bickford and Newcomb spent several years recording their observations; their work completed, prescribed burning passed from "the hit and miss sharpshooting era to knowledgeable area analysis and burning planned under professional prescriptions."129 Prescribed-burning meetings were held with increasing frequency. 130 In 1946, Wahlenberg published his definitive Longleaf Pine, hailed by Eldredge as "gratifying evidence that forestry has at last passed its adolescent stage." 131 Continued experimentation by Southern Station members—Bickford, Bruce, Wakeley, and Muntz—augmented previous data on longleaf silviculture. Administrative burning proceeded at an accelerated rate. By April 1946, 580,000 acres had been treated within the previous three burning seasons. In the winter of 1943-44 alone, 143,000 acres were fired in Region 8. Related Hartman: Of course we were criticized for being brash, but that was a matter of judgment and knowledge of the stakes on the table. Time was running against us. We had vast areas of valuable timber standing

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over lethal sized accumulations of flash fuels. In numerous places we could lose a million dollars worth of values on any high fire danger day. W e figured we were gambling to win with the percentage in our favor so just closed our ears to the calamity howlers. . . . I spent a considerable portion of my time indoctrinating and training men to speed the work to new areas, worked in the woods with them examining conditions and preparing prescriptions, attended all the burns possible while they were in progress. 132 Thus, "after a good many false starts," the region had a goodsized burning program. W i t h inhibitions dispelled, foresters became increasingly sympathetic to controlled-burning experiments involving other pine species. Chapman's Bulletin 49 had pointed the way. Admittedly, the Service's research into, and administrative experimentation with, fire in loblolly was partly intended to avert the kind of criticism encountered in the longleaf domain. Kircher, for example, warned his staff that "the Forest Service was caught in a very embarrassing position with regard to burning in longleaf pine and does not want that situation to be repeated with loblolly and shortleaf." 1 3 3 Still, knowledge gained from burning in mixed-pine stands was no less important a factor. As Hartman describes the process: When one burns longleaf they usually are also burning loblolly present in general mixture or sizeable clumps. When one burns loblolly there is a lot of shortleaf present and on and on. . . . It was just a matter of observing effects of burning on species incident to the treatment of the preponderant species. One then builds up a studied concept as to what can be done with fire silviculturally in areas beyond the hill. [Letter to author.] A clue that the Service contemplated fire for hardwood suppression and seedbed preparation in the shortleaf-loblolly types appeared in April 1948. Requested to authorize this

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practice, Watts granted permission.134 In this instance, administrators moved quickly after research results: the Southeastern Station had not commenced comprehensive studies until late 1946. Obviously, both station and region greatly depended upon Chapman's research. T h e Southeastern Station's 1947-48 biennial report (1949) suggested, "if the hardwoods are small, prescribed burning looks like a cheap, effective tool. . . . It will serve to keep hardwoods small and within controllable size if used occasionally during the life of the stand and at harvest time." 135 Hartman's article, "Fire as a Tool in Southern Pine" published in Trees, Yearbook of Agriculture for 1949, referred briefly to explorations in loblolly-shortleaf: "Indications are that fire can have a favorable effect under certain limited conditions."* Station reports justifiably circumspect in 1949 were more positive two years later. The Southeastern Station's report proclaimed: "prescribed burning, if properly done, is a highly valuable tool in hazard reduction, hardwood control, seedbed preparation, and improving forage and wildlife habitat." Forthright articles by Hartman and others, in the Yearbook section devoted to discussion of "Fire, Friend and Enemy," foreshadowed the promulgation of more conclusive evidence on loblolly as soon as it was uncovered. Nothing could be more convincing to Information and Education, and State and Private Forestry, than evidence that incendiarism sharply declined on treated tracts: the average area burned annually by wild fires of all causes dropped from 3.4 to 0.033 percent in the 150,000-acre Osceola National Forest, almost two thirds of which had previously been prescribed-burned over a five-year * Hartman alluded to the recently inaugurated attempt of the Southern Station to suppress yaupon encroachment on lobolly sites by employing fire in the "Big Thicket" area of southeastern Texas (pp. 524-525). T h e article excellently summarizes the development of prescribed burning.

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span with negligible damage. These statistics appealed to state foresters who were eager to preserve gains made under complete protection. Acting Texas Forester S. L. Frost urged facing up to the facts that fire under certain conditions is beneficial to certain types of forest growth. . . . Such an approach will help measurably in arriving at forest fire prevention objectives, gain much more local support, and reduce the number of incendiary fires—than our present attitude of preaching and enforcing laws on complete fire prevention. The Texas Forest Service must be prepared to provide a prescribed burning service for woodland owners which must go far beyond the stages of advising when to burn.137 That a reported seed catch ranging from satisfactory to heavy had been obtained on 90 percent of a 20,000-acre prescribedburn area in the Osceola at 1 percent of planting costs could not be gainsaid. Evidently these results influenced the chief forester's endorsement in 1949 of burning or scarification for loblolly and pitch-pine regeneration. And, just as C. F. Evans had conceded in 1944 that the Service erred in managing longleaf, so now I. T . Haig confessed to readers of American Forests: Though most foresters and landowners have thought in terms of pine perpetuation, we have worked quite effectively against this objective through such widely accepted and forcefully advocated policies of complete fire protection, fire exclusion if you will; partial cutting, thus encouraging more vigorous growth of tolerant hardwoods; and commercial harvest cutting, which have removed the pine and left the hardwoods to grow to dominance.138 In the Virginia coastal plain, it was estimated, hardwood species had intruded on 20 percent of a two-million-acre loblolly site, while in South Carolina they predominated on 39

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9

percent of the forests in 1947, as against 27 percent a decade earlier. Solution of the dilemma, Haig explained, would require fire, release cuttings, mechanical means, and chemicals; prescribed burning alone was insufficient. Whereas Haig admitted that "most foresters have been overly slow to realize this situation and accept its implications," he did not explicitly account for this tardiness. Chapman put the matter in proper perspective, reproving the profession for allowing "preconceived notions" and "popular slogans" to substitute for sound thinking in the management of Southern pine. 1 3 9 Though inadequate, information was being released—especially on longleaf. " T h e woods are full of inhibited men," charged Hartman in writing to a professor who was preparing a course on fire control, but he noted with satisfaction: "Southern foresters are more and more adopting the wholesome and, shall we say, scientific approach, segregating facts for what they are and laying them out in the open for nonemotional assessment. . . . Several state forestry organizations have trained their district men to where they may give technical advice to landowners on whether or not to b u m . " 1 4 0 Watts might omit reference to the ticklish predicament attending Service readjustment; he did tell a House appropriations subcommittee, however, that "fire has a definite place in the deep South" for longleaf brown-spot control and hazard reduction. 1 4 1 On the other hand, his testimony on prescribed burning in loblolly demonstrates the extent to which emotions, rather than hard analysis and calculation of the sort Hartman advocated, still influenced official behavior. T h e chief forester said: "Fire is of some definite value in the control of hardwood in the South although probably the answer in the hardwood is the use of chemicals rather than fire." Watts may have speculated on the success of recently introduced weed killers; perhaps he envisioned a technological breakthrough. This belief was

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grounded more on faith than on fact. Certainly, the Southeastern Station, in its 1949-50 report, exhibited no such doubts on fire's role. And, H. H. Muntz of the Southern Station, studying effects of Ammate treatments on pine release under scrub oak, deliberately refrained from considering economic questions. 142 Indeed, the prohibitive cost of bulldozing, poisons, and cutting operations precluded their widespread application. 143 No one denied the utility of chemicals in selected instances.144 But to suggest they might entirely displace fire was mere conjecture. One can cite yet another illustration of the continued dominion that man's inhibitions wielded over his reason. A report to the House agriculture committee on "Research and Related Services in the U S D A " contained a short, though complete, account of the longleaf program. Unfortunately, the Service presented Congress with a partial and inaccurate description of loblolly and shortleaf research: "Investigations in the use of fire to contest hardwood brush and for other silvicultural purposes in loblolly and shortleaf pine and determination of its effects on soil are being initiated in both the Southern and Southeastern States." 145 Undeniably, the two stations had launched projects on loblolly and shortleaf in 1950. By the Service's own admission, however, research had actually commenced in 1946, and tentative conclusions framed three years later. Congress was entitled to this information. Publicity on prescribed burning in loblolly approximated that given longleaf in 1944. Reluctance to recommend loblolly treatments is excusable, since evidence from administrative tests was largely lacking, but this does not extenuate Service failure adequately to inform legislators of these developments. Foresters did not generally propose burning for loblolly regeneration before 1954. Interestingly, not until then was a long outdated longleaf bulletin revised to incorporate beneficial fire

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TRAVAIL

information. 146 By that time, Wakeley's thoroughly rewritten Planting

the Southern

Pine went to print, advising fire for

longleaf and loblolly silviculture. T h e Service gained from its longleaf experiences in one important respect: administrative burning proceeded at an equal pace with research studies. For example, personnel applied fire in 1949 to twenty-five thousand acres of loblolly located in national forests in South Carolina and Texas. Even summer burns for reducing hardwoods too large to be killed by winter fires were attempted. Further, the stations executed plans of greater dimensions than those originally essayed in longleaf areas. This strategy insured, first, data

acquisition

readily translatable into administrative decisions; second, systematic

professional

enlightenment;

and,

finally,

prompter

dissemination of information to the public. Significantly, earlier strained relations between the regional office and the Southern Station did not reappear when researchers published their conclusions on fire in loblolly. In truth, longleaf "led the way," leaving shattered dogmas behind. Loblolly management profited immensely from the cleared atmosphere. 147 Currently, most foresters acknowledge the desirability of prescribed burning in the piney woods. Attitudes of private forestry interests range from that of the International Paper Company—a complete protection stronghold which only recently succumbed to the necessity of using fire—to that of the Fordyce Lumber Company

(Fordyce, Arkansas), which has

already distributed a pamphlet outlining correct burning procedures for establishing a "bumper crop" of shortleaf and loblolly pine seedlings. 148 A state official reported: " M a n y of our large industrial forest owners [Georgia] are preaching a 'no fire policy' to the general public, while, on the other hand, they prescribe burn thousands of acres of their own land." 1 4 9 Southern state forestry fire programs reflect this diversity of

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views. Recurrence of unusually devastating conflagrations during the 1954-55 season—paralleling those encountered during W o r l d W a r II—stimulated operations by several states. Fortunately, sufficient acreage had previously been burned to afford a standard of comparison on protected as against unprotected areas (analysis of this kind was not possible in 1 9 4 2 - 4 3 ) . Hartman evaluated the evidence in favor of professional fire use: Last spring (1955) in areas of the coastal plains pine lands where prescribed burning had not been practiced, they lost their shirts. . . . Kill was very high and while salvage was done, the quantity of killed timber was too great to save more than a fraction before the bugs riddled the wood. . . . Fuels accumulated without benefit of fuel reduction burns and they were crown fires too violent for control forces to handle. Last year was very dry. Ponds, swamps and streams were without water. Fuels were tinder dry and fires were intense. The relatively few amounts of fuels on our coastal plains ranger districts, as a result of extended burning programs, saved our bacon time after time. . . . Several outside crown fires hit our boundaries in high. Had it not been that prescribed burning patterns were in place and we were thus able to hold these fires we would have lost the whole west side of the Osceola. On the Croatan, the pocosin got on fire. The pocosin is without timber but it is covered by dense swamp brush and we do not place men or equipment on those fires. W e only attempt to stop pocosin fires when they come out on the surrounding pine lands. That fire came out in high gear. As can be substantiated by the color photos taken thereafter, damage to pine was minor wherever recent prescribed bums had been made. The value of the burning can be illustrated by the fact that during the tough 1955 fire year, the million acre Mississippi lost only 2,400 acres, the Kisatchie in Louisiana 277 acres, and Texas 477 acres, all with light damage. 150 Whatever resources the Georgia Forestry Commission could muster to fight the 1954-55 blazes proved insufficient. Despair-

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ing of success, State Forester Guyton DeLoach ruefully confessed to a group of foresters: I have been dreading this for a long time. It has been more or less my policy in the past few years to stay clear of prescribed burning. We have recognized the need for it and the importance of it when done right, but, frankly, we didn't have enough knowledge about it to get out and do too much preaching on it, and we were afraid if we advocated it too much people would bum too much and say that the Commission and the Forest Service say it is all right to burn, and we were having too much burning anyhow. . . . We have had one continuous fire season for the past couple of years. This has caused us to go into prescribed burning whether we wanted to or not.. . . We are getting a late start, but better late than never.151 Georgia thereupon announced plans for conducting farmertraining sessions. Gratified by landowner reception to educational material, Georgia's extension forester told Chapman: We have known for many years that prescribed burning has not only been beneficial, but necessary, to good forest management to many areas in the South. We apparently assumed that the farmers did not have sense enough to do this job. I do not pretend to be much of a teacher, but it has always been my opinion that the worst mistake any teacher could make is to assume that his students do not have sense enough to learn. . . . We received some criticism regarding this publication but, on the other hand, we have received a better response from many landowners and many foresters from this bulletin than from any we have ever published. ["Prescribed Burning in Slash and Longleaf Pine Forests in Georgia," Bulletin 594, Dec. 1955.] 152 Not to be outdone by its neighbor, the Florida Board of Forestry issued Controlled Burning—Using Fire Wisely, endorsing the technique when "wisely-done" and offering its services to farmers in solving their woodland problems.153 Undoubtedly, these states were very much in earnest, for Chap-

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man was informed: "Prescribed burning is no longer a hushhush procedure in my section of the country, and all of the professional foresters that I work closely with are advocating it." 1 5 4 Organizations sporadically lapse into practices reminiscent of the period when fire was anathema in the piney woods. Doubtless, there will always be those who, "ignorant of the past, are condemned to repeat it." The Southern Forest Fire Prevention Conference held at New Orleans (sponsored by the American Forestry Association, April 1956) was so intent on "striking a blow for forestry" that it condemned wild fires and incendiarism without calling attention to the benefits of prescribed burning. Seeking to justify this inadvertence, the editor of American Forests argued that the meeting's purpose was "to arouse public opinion and stir up action in the most direct manner possible. It succeeded." 155 Disheartened by this recourse to tactics adopted by the Dixie Crusaders, Chapman asked: What kind of education with no mention of the indispensable role of prescribed fire? Do we consider that it is impossible to educate the "natives" to the proper (indispensable) use of prescribed fire? Is it hopeless to expect that we can, at the same time, get tough with incendiaries and use prescribed bums? Must we continue to practice prescribed burning as an illicit, sub-rosa affair of the hushhush type and frown upon it in the official attitudes of state foresters and others? Is the professional work of trained foresters ever to be publicly recognized as offering the only sound practical means of restoring and protecting pine in the southern forests? . . . 1 5 e Chapman had not felt constrained to make such criticism since 1950. His protracted silence alone is evidence that errors of this

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nature were increasingly rare, and hard to discover if they did exist. O n balance, it might reasonably be said that the record of the Service and its allied groups was rather creditable after 1949. Y e t the errors that did appear were hardly fortuitous and, in this respect, they are highly significant, for they point up failings of the conservation crusade. 167 From the start, a high sense of purpose had infused the struggle to safeguard a vanishing heritage. Sanctified by an administrative theory granting zealous technocrats broad latitude for action, purpose was transmuted into mission, a campaign into a crusade. In the field of fire protection, as one critic of Forest Service policy remarked, "twenty years or so of iteration and auto-suggestion has made of complete fire protection, in all circumstances and regardless of conditions, not a theory but a religion, an idée fixe."158

Ignoring early caveats,

the Service tragically slipped into a rut from which escape proved difficult and embarrassing. Thus had evangelism subverted a scientific program, impaired professionalism, violated canons of bureaucratic responsibility, undermined the democratic faith, and threatened the piney woods with ultimate extinction.

4- Forests and Water

W h i l e prescribed burning had intensely agitated the Service, no issue was more laden with historical and social import than that of forest influences—the effect of vegetal cover on streamflow.1 Born of mounting concern over water supplies, the conservation movement saw in that subject a connective thread justifying comprehensive development of the nation's natural arteries. Thus, debate on the hapless Newlands Bill (circa 1908-1917)—providing for integrated water-resources planning and management—concerned the whole magnitude of forest influences. 2 Then again, controversy attending passage of the Weeks Act (1911)—authorizing land purchases for Eastern national forests—raised the question to a matter of high constitutional principle. In fact, interest in forest influences originally eclipsed study of the forests themselves. As Pinchot recollected, "Whoever turned his mind toward Forestry in those days [1880s] thought little about the forest itself and more about its influences and about its influence on rainfall first of all. . . . As for Forestry itself, there wasn't even a suspicion of it at Yale." 3

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Unfortunately, the claim that deforestation accounted for stream dessication or destructive floods had never been established. Though some European hydrographers felt they had proved "beyond peradventure" the beneficial effects of vegetal cover on torrents, others presented evidence discounting, wholly or partially, forest influences on stream regimen. 4 The dispute sharply divided American conservationists as well. Franklin B. Hough, the government's first forestry agent, once discerned a "growing tendency to floods and droughts" directly occasioned by "clearing of woodlands." 5 Later, B. F. Fernow, head of the Division of Forestry, called such statements unfounded: One of the arguments upon which a change of policy in regard to our forests, and especially on the part of the National Government, is demanded, refers to the influence which it is claimed forest areas exert upon climate and waterflow. It is argued that the wholesale removal and devastation of forests affects climate and waterflow unfavorably. Popular writers on forestry, friends of forestry reform, and the public mind have readily taken hold of this proposition, enlarged upon it and generalized without sufficient and relevant premises, and before it was possible for science and systematic observations to furnish grounds or sound deductions; hence we have had only presumptions supported by superficial reasoning and occasional experiences. Even scientific writers have discussed the question without proper basis, and have sought to reason out the existence or absence of such an influence upon general premises and such evidence as the history of the world seemed to furnish, or else upon observations which were either of too short duration to allow elimination of other disturbing factors or else were otherwise unreliable.6 Forests might reduce flood height and frequency, but he cautioned against relying on them to prevent inundations: abnormal precipitation and unique topography often conspired to nullify their beneficial effects. Moreover, scale considerations

Il8

FIRE AND WATER

exposed the forest's shortcomings: absence of tributary flooding furnished no certain index to main-channel conditions. "In a larger river, like the Ohio or Mississippi," reasoned Fernow, the question of floods becomes still further complicated. For here not only the regime of the main river, but also that of all its affluents and the topographic, stratigraphic, and surface conditions of their catchment basins become elements of disturbance. Here the comparative lengths of the affluents above may become all important, since the simultaneous or nonsimultaneous arrival of flood waters may determine the occurrence or non-occurrence of high floods. Deforestation of a minor watershed might even be advantageous to "waterflow in the main river by allowing its removal before the arrival of the flood waters of another affluent." Vital as vegetative cover was to soil conservation, Fernow recognized its failure to meet the challenge of big floods in majOT river courses. More than a decade later, Forest Assistant William B. Greeley, later Chief Forester, viewed the question in similar light. At the outset, Greeley warned readers not to exaggerate vegetation's benign effects: Forest cover is but one of a number of far-reaching factors whose combined influence produces a stream of a given character; and great care must be taken not to attribute to the presence or absence of forest cover upon a drainage basin results which may be due primarily to other causes.7 Echoing Fernow, Greeley ranked vegetation as least significant among factors governing streamflow and stressed the "fragmentary and inconclusive" character of accumulated evidence. Concurring with both Femow and Greeley, Pinchot charged

FORESTS AND WATER

"9

that "much of the writing and talking" was based on "little definite fact or trustworthy observation."8 Pinchot's central theme, however, smacked of the attitude he had just deplored. Whereas "G. P." understood that the forest floor, once saturated by prolonged precipitation, would shed rainfall "almost as fast as it would under bare ground," he thought that the favorable influence varied directly in importance with the extent of drainage-basin coverage. Admittedly, the correlation was never quite perfect: "the forest may not prevent floods altogether." Nonetheless, he clearly implied that a thoroughgoing reforestation program could modify flood crests appreciably. Should this prove unfeasible, dams, levees, and other downstream improvements could furnish supplementary assistance. "A Little Rioting"—Passing the Weeks Bill This argument found increasing favor with groups advocating establishment of national forests in the Southern Appalachian and White Mountains; it provided a constitutional peg on which to support legislation authorizing land acquisition for resource conservation. National forests in the West were created from public-domain lands reserved from sale by Presidential proclamation. Since few tracts remained in governmental possession east of the Mississippi, acquisition became necessary. If the effect of forests on floods was shown to be sufficiently deleterious to navigation, the commerce clause might then be invoked to warrant, on constitutional grounds, the purchase of desired sites. Proponents of an Appalachian Reserve had mentioned the issue as early as 1899,9 but the Secretary of Agriculture's preliminary report of 1901 confined it to a position of secondary importance.10 Not until 1906 did the American Forestry Association (its president was Secretary of Agriculture Wilson; Service per-

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sonnel including Pinchot sat on its board) concentrate on those points charged with greatest popular appeal: streamflow regulation and assurance of future timber supplies. Associate Forester Overton Price, among others, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, confidently referred to the forest's capacity to contain recent Ohio floods. His efforts were unsuccessful; a bill approving land acquisitions valued at $3 million passed the Senate only to fail in the House. 1 1 Nettled by repeated failures to override Speaker Cannon's opposition, Pinchot confided: " T h e situation seems to me to be essentially of the kind that calls for a little rioting. . . . T h e only remedy, as I see it, in our form of government, is an outburst of public opinion such as can not be trifled with." 1 2 New floods on the Ohio, in January 1907, supplied the material Pinchot sought. Already the American Forestry Association assigned blame for the deluge: "Again the mighty Ohio is out of its banks. News dispatches of January 18 reported the flood to be the greatest the river has known for more than twenty years. . . . While it is not claimed that this and similar disasters are wholly due to forest destruction, that they are largely due to this cause there can be no doubt." 1 3 And Pinchot, ignoring previous qualifications, lent his support to the A F A statement: " T h e great flood which has wrought devastation and ruin in the Upper Ohio Valley is due fundamentally to the cutting away of the forests on the watersheds of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers." 1 4 Henceforth, the Service capitalized on these floods to illustrate the baneful consequences of denudation. One forester, for example, counseled educators: It is unfortunate that little is now taught in the public schools which the teachers can use as a foundation for inculcating right

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views concerning these problems. . . . Suppose the teacher lives in a little town on the Ohio River—a town that is being menaced by ever-increasing floods. The teacher of geography may tell pupils that these floods are due to the removal of the forests from the Appalachian Mountains, and that as the forests are further removed, the floods become worse and worse; but the pupils have possibly not been taught anything about the influence of forests upon streamflow and so do not really understand the situation. They are told a bare external fact and that is the end of it. 15 The writer failed to advise on improving pedagogic techniques. Fortunately, H. M . Chittenden, albeit a Service critic, has faithfully described methods used in demonstrating the absorptive capacity of forest litter: The lecturer exhibits a smooth impervious surface that sheds water readily, as representing the cleared land, and on some portion of this he places a piece of blotting paper or other absorbent material to represent the forest bed. He then sprinkles the entire area and the audience readily sees how the water runs off from the hard smooth surface but is largely retained by the absorbent surface. The lecturer coolly assures them that the action of the blotting paper represents the normal effect of the forest bed in restraining the runoff from rainfall.16 Although hyperbole marked this stage of the conflict, it more accurately characterized the period following release of the Secretary of Agriculture's Final Report on the Southern Appalachian and White Mountain Watersheds in December 1907. Recognition of insufficient data by the Service and the Geological Survey did not deter them from asserting: "The present torrential discharge is due to the extent to which the forest has been cut away or damaged. The more this sole equalizing factor is lessened, the more extreme will be the floods on the one hand and low water stages on the other." 17 Dubious of these claims, Representative Charles L. Bartlett of

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Georgia requested an opinion (January 30, 1908) of the House Judiciary Committee on the legislation's constitutionality. Its sponsors, correctly anticipating an adverse ruling, amended another bill in the Senate to meet this objection. As a result, the revised land-purchase measure aimed solely to preserve "the navigability of navigable streams." T h e opposition demanded that a direct and substantial relation be shown; astute choice of words would not suffice. T h e Service and the Geological Survey presently took issue with contrary interpretations of the Weather Bureau and Corps of Engineers (hereafter referred to as the Corps). So intense did the ensuing battle become that Service officials expediently withdrew from the A F A . One forester explained, " I feel that the time has come when the Government, or especially, the Forest Service must suppress itself in the movement. W e are already suspected of being partisans and biased observers and it seems to me that we should not take a very prominent position in this movement as far as publicity is concerned." 1 8 T h e Service, however, hardly disassociated itself from the drama; only formal ties were severed. Indeed, to determine strategy and fashion legislation, Pinchot regularly convened meetings in his home. Official publications now espoused doctrines earlier rejected by Fernow and Greeley. W . W . Ashe's "Special Relations of Forests to Streamflow in the United States" maintained that land-treatment practices in the Southern Appalachians would greatly improve stream regimen, obviating the need for mainstem channel improvements. 19 His conciliatory gesture, "the engineer and the forester must work hand in hand," hardly mollified the Corps. In rebuttal, Colonel Chittenden emphasized that extremes of flow, not the median condition, controlled river-regulation costs. Saturated by heavy, protracted rainfall, forests had consistently shown their inability to in-

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fluence riverflow. In fact, as Fernow feared, forests not only failed to restrain floods but, by virtue of their "uncontrolled reservoir action, may actually intensify them." 2 0 W o e f u l l y inadequate during "great general" deluges, vegetal cover could merely mitigate shower runoff and freshet severity. Weather Bureau Chief Willis Moore corroborated Chittenden's findings before the House Agriculture Committee. His testimony belied Pinchot's insistence on denudation as fundamentally responsible for the Ohio floods.21 Debates on the Weeks Bill, introduced in July 1909, further rigidified the divergent positions. Committee hearings extending over a nine-month period, followed by spirited floor discussion, failed to reconcile differences on basic issues. Nor did Pinchot's replacement by Henry Graves in February 1 9 1 0 alter the Service's stand. Rather, projected Service release of William Hall and H u Maxwell's "Surface Conditions and Stream F l o w " contributed additional fuel to the dispute. Hall and Maxwell speculated: "Undoubtedly, it is the clearing away of the forest on the mountainous watersheds of the streams [Monongahela, Potomac, Ohio, Cumberland, Savannah, Allegheny, and Tennessee] that has caused the great increase in frequency and duration of floods." Continuing, the authors surmised that "under perfect forest conditions it is well-nigh impossible for any surface run-off to take place." 2 2 They adroitly explained away inundations occurring prior to advent of civilization by ascribing them to the imperviousness of frozen soil: " M a n y rivers experience their worst floods when their drainage basins are frozen. On account of this condition it is impossible to claim that extreme floods will not come in a stream with a forested watershed. Fortunately, the condition arises but seldom." Such decisively relevant factors as precipitation and topography, and differences stemming from varying magnitudes of

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river basins, received scant treatment. Occasionally, Service personnel did take cognizance of these elements. Thornton T . Munger, a young Service researcher, wrote: Torrents or floods in small mountain streams are due to rapid surface runoff, following heavy rains (usually of short duration and of limited area) or sudden rapid melting of snow. Any factor, therefore, which retards this runoff tends to lessen the torrents. . . . Forests have this effect. But the floods in large rivers are usually occasioned by much more complicated factors, particularly when their tributaries rise in regions of different seasonal or climatic conditions. The role of forests in controlling the floods of such rivers is of much less consequence than it is with mountain torrents and the hydrology of every river may be said to have a law of its own.23 But this statement went unpublicized; obviously the Service eschewed anything which might prejudice the bill's passage. If Munger's admissions were to be exhumed, let that burden fall to the opposition. Requested by the Committee on Agriculture for advice on the Hall-Maxwell thesis, Weather Bureau Chief Moore referred to a watershed's dimensions as significant in the hydrologic equation. He also took Maxwell and Hall to task for contending that floods were on the increase: data revealed that the average flow of the Ohio, as well as its high- and lowwater marks, had not changed in recent times. 24 Even more galling to foresters, Moore argued that precipitation remained the most crucial determinant of streamflow. T h e meteorologist's observations won immediate approval from Major William Harts, district engineer for the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, who accepted them as conclusive for his region. 25 Several months later, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Burr's Merrimac Survey pointed to the same results, though with a rather singular twist: "Deforestation has not increased the height

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of extraordinary floods or duration of winter and spring floods, the most severe of the year. Neither has it affected adversely the characteristics of such floods. On the contrary, such floods appear to have been lower and shorter at or about the time when forest areas were least, but a longer period of observation is necessary to a definite conclusion." 26 Fernow, too, found Moore's paper valuable for its assault on the warped notions of many conservationists: It properly inveighs against the irresponsible lucubrations of illinformed people, against the false reasoning and mistaken statements of well-meaning enthusiasts, and effectively lays bare their ignorance. . . . With many positions which the author takes, we are . . . in hearty sympathy and are glad that he has undertaken to smash the false prophets of forest influences, who are dealing in broad generalizations. W e have always claimed that the arguments for forest conservancy as far as they refer to the influence on climate, and to some extent on waterflow, were skating on thin ice.27 Yet emphasis on precipitation to the neglect of topographic and geological conditions disturbed him; this stand controverted Moore's professed desire to avoid a dogmatic interpretation. T h e danger, however, lay not so much in what Moore said as in the way his conclusions might be misconstrued to thwart enactment of the Weeks Bill. Fernow voiced concern that Moore's conclusions will be accepted as dogmas and as proved facts by Congressmen and newspaper writers, and by all those who are fishing for arguments against the forest reformers. Indeed, these will go a step further, they will overlook the saving clauses which the author here and there puts in, and proclaim that the whole idea of forest influences is "bosh." . . . The fictions of those asserting broadly the salutary influence of forest cover were at least working for Good. It is to be hoped that the mischief which this truth seeker has wrought will not swing the pendulum of forest conservation too much in the wrong direction.

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More astringent criticism of Moore was not long in appearing. Forester Filibert Roth (University of Michigan), geologist L. C. Glenn (Vanderbilt), and civil engineer George F. Swain (Harvard) rallied behind the Service in an AFA symposium. Conceding that vegetation offered no panacea for averting floods, they still affirmed its strongly benign influence.28 Unwittingly, Glenn's analysis paralleled Moore's in one salient respect, that relating to the importance of river basins: On the Savannah, the Broad, the Catawba, and all other large rivers heading in the Southern Appalachian Mountains the locus of maximum flood violence and destruction is near where they, or their headwater components, first leave the mountains, not far out on the plains along their middle and upper reaches. It is noteworthy that the distinctions drawn by Glenn (and Moore) were not made by Service foresters in articles designed to catch the public eye. With differences between freshets and floods and between navigable and nonnavigable rivers overlooked, a distorted picture necessarily resulted. Barrington Moore's treatment of forest influences is typical. He forecast that floods similar to those then ravaging Paris would imperil the eastern United States unless Congress passed corrective legislation.29 Again, in American Forestry (March 1910), Forest Supervisor F. A. Fenn attributed Ohio floods to deforestation : The forests provided by nature as a protective cover for the watersheds of rivers are the best possible regulator of stream flow. Maintain that cover and the rivers will be most efficient in the discharge of those functions so beneficial to mankind; destroy it and they become relatively inefficient or positively injurious and destructive because of erratic flow. Though spurious, these pleas proved exceedingly attractive in convincing not only Congress, which finally passed the

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Weeks Bill (February 15, 1 9 1 1 ) , but an impressive list of organizations, including the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Society of Civil Engineers, and the National Association of State University Presidents. 30 F e m o w termed the popular decision a "moral and a practical victory for the Forest Service over the position taken by the Weather Bureau." 3 1 H e noticeably reserved comment on its scientific merits. Even the Service realized that inadequate data supported the act. W h a t is more, it soon acknowledged that erosion prevention outweighed all other benefits. 32 This concession notwithstanding, foresters assumed that further observations would substantiate their claims. T h e Weeks Act, in keeping with the House Judiciary Committee ruling of 1908, made land acquisition contingent on favorable Geological Survey reports as to the effect of planned purchases on navigation downstream. Foresters interpreted this provision as a pro forma requirement. A perfunctory investigation, begun in M a y 1 9 1 1 , conducted on tributary brooks of the east branch of the Pemigewasset River apparently yielded satisfactory results. Chief Hydrographer M . O. Leighton felt that comparison of runoff from two "brooks" (one largely deforested) afforded ample evidence, " f o r the purposes of the National Forest Reservation Commission," that a "direct relationship exists between forest cover and stream regulation." 33 H e further deemed results of the Burnt Brook (a 4.75-squaremile watershed) and Shoal Pond Brook (5.16 square miles) studies applicable to the entire W h i t e Mountain region: "throughout the W h i t e Mountains the removal of forest growth must be expected to decrease the natural steadiness of dependent streams during the spring months at least. T h e foregoing conclusion forms a strong basis for arguing the desirability of painstaking methods of administration in respect to forest lands in the W h i t e Mountain region."

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"Shot Full of Propaganda"— Qualitative Analysis Enshrined Meanwhile, the Service had launched its own experiments at W a g o n W h e e l G a p , Colorado. Patterned after one near Emmental, Switzerland, the plan proposed to examine two contiguous watersheds (two hundred acres each, and designated "sites A and B " ) alike in topography and forest cover; to observe carefully their meteorological and streamflow characteristics; then to denude one watershed while continuing measurements until effects of this treatment could be ascertained. 34 T h a t the Weather Bureau, and not the Geological Survey, jointly participated in the work did not, at first, trouble the Service—Forester Carlos G . Bates originally selected the watersheds as representative of average forest conditions in the Rockies. As late as November 1 9 1 2 , Raphael Zon (Chief of Research) reported, "as far as the thoroughness of our W a g o n W h e e l G a p investigations is concerned, the latter [Wagon W h e e l ] is by far more intensive and will yield more conclusive and scientifically accurate results than the W h i t e Mountain watersheds." However, following analysis of data obtained during the first year's operations, Zon considered proposals for extending the experiment into areas possessing denser forest cover in order to secure more striking evidence. Samuel T . Dana (Assistant Chief for Forest Investigations) agreed that erratic streamflow and the low ratio of runoff to precipitation now made selection of watershed sites A and B seem unwise: There is an irregularity about the records so far obtained which will probably make it possible to draw varying conclusions from them. For example, the maximum spring runoff from Watershed B in 1 9 1 1 was approximately 12.6 per cent greater than that from Watershed A, while in 1 9 1 2 the maximum runoff from B was

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nearly 33 per cent greater. . . . Another possible weakness in the present study lies in the fact that the runoff from both areas is a comparatively small per cent of the total precipitation. This fact may tend to obscure any change in runoff resulting from denuding one of the watersheds. 35 S o m e w h a t earlier, the acting district (regional) forester had expressed misgivings on the project's o u t c o m e : I feel that in order to obtain comparisons of forested and denuded watersheds which will be so striking that there can be no possibility of misinterpreting the figures, we must consider the optimum rather than the average forest conditions. I therefore, while anticipating possible objections by the Weather Bureau to extension of the experiment, very strongly recommend it. . . . I wish to emphasize the need for making the streamflow experiment primarily a work of the Forest Service rather than of the Weather Bureau. In the past, on account of our difficulty in obtaining the proper man to take charge of the Wagon Wheel G a p Station, the Weather Bureau quite largely had control of the day to day handling of the work and while, with the careful supervision that has been given from this Office, I do not think that any important steps have been taken which are disadvantageous to the Forest Service, yet it should be perfectly apparent that our interests should be constantly looked after by the men on the ground. T o accomplish this end, it seems to me that if necessary the Forest Service should pay the expenses of two of the three employed rather than having the Weather Bureau do this. 36 W h e n foresters initially broached the subject to the Bureau, Moore

demurred.

Its local forecaster, B e n j a m i n

C.

Kadel,

questioned the Service's motives. H e later wrote M o o r e : T h e following spring [ 1 9 1 2 ] district forester Riley came to the camp, followed by Bates; and after a number of mysterious trips by Bates and the local men to various points they finally decided on the new experiment on watersheds E and F . Now this new experiment was never mentioned until after the first year's records

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had been tabulated, and the mysterious and secret manner of its launching convinced me that the E and F experiment was intended to hedge against a possibly disappointing result in connection with the original experiment.37 Acting Assistant Forester Earle Clapp felt "somewhat sorry that this plan had already been brought to the attention of the Weather Bureau," but h e sanguinely advised Riley to continue investigation of watersheds A and B while negotiations proceeded in Washington: The results may not be as striking as they would if the forest cover were denser, but as you repeatedly emphasized yourself, the forest conditions on the watersheds at Wagon Wheel Gap are average conditions for the Rocky Mountains and the conclusions therefore will be more applicable to the actual conditions than an exceptionally dense cover would be. The new project should not in the least detract our attention from the experiment at the Wagon Wheel Gap Station; there should be the same enthusiasm and confidence in conducting it as there was at the time it began. Unfavorable comments and false conclusions will undoubtedly be made from time to time on the results obtained at the Wagon Wheel Gap by persons who take the opposite view from ours, but this should not in any way lead us away from the aim which we have set before us in this study.38 T h e issue was not settled until 1 9 1 4 . Indeed, at one point, the Bureau bitterly announced its readiness to withdraw should the Service remain apprehensive lest data prove inconclusive. Replying to this accusation on December 16, 1 9 1 3 , Chief Forester Graves emphatically denied that the new scheme was "prompted by a feeling that watersheds A and B will not furnish conclusive Tesults but by the desire to expand the original study in order to secure a quantitative as well as a qualitative basis for measuring the effect of different densities of forest cover." Moore finally consented to the revision, but

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only after Graves assured him that extension would not "alter in the least the original plan as far as watersheds A and B are concerned." 39

Ironically,

seepage

through

weirs

later

con-

structed on watersheds E and F repeatedly balked efforts to inaugurate this aspect of the study. These difficulties were not surmounted by September

1916, whereupon

extension

was abandoned. Observations on areas A and B, however, were made periodically until June 30, 1919; subsequently, workers denuded watershed B. This

second phase terminated

"by

mutual agreement," on October 1, 1926. Yet, as Dana had predicted, the evidence obtained was disappointingly indecisive. T h e final report admitted: "there appeared very little surface runoff at any stage of the experiment. . . . O n the watershed denuded in the present study the original ratio of high to low stages was about 12 to 1 and this was increased only to 17 to 1 by denudation." 40 Save for these comments, foresters took little note of the event. Reproving his colleagues, Zon almost disclosed the true cause of this oversight: Thoroughgoing reviews of current literature are an infallible sign of a healthy professional spirit. . . . Measured by this standard, I am afraid our professional spirit is at low ebb. . . . Here is a piece of work which extended over a period of more than 15 years. It involved an expenditure of about $150,000. It touches upon one of the most fundamental problems in forestry. It appeared nearly six months ago. Yet there was barely a reaction on the part of the profession to the results published. One need not accept all the conclusions of the authors, and yet be tremendously impressed with the stupendousness of such a piece of research. . . . W h a t is the real meaning of these conclusions? . . . The effect of forest cover on streamflow is greatly exaggerated; furthermore, if the interests of irrigation are to be considered, the watershed denuded of forest cover makes available a greater amount of water during all stages than the forest covered watershed.41

1

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Striving to preserve its status in the flood-control field, the Service refrained from publicizing

information that

would

jeopardize that position. Of course, the W a g o n W h e e l G a p report did not completely depreciate forest influences. Certain passages leave a contrary impression: The height of the B crests, formerly averaging only 6 per cent greater than those of A were, however, increased by denudation so that their average excess over those of A was 64 per cent. . . . The flood runoff of watershed B before denudation was the same as that of A; after denudation of B the spring flood on that watershed increased to a peak discharge in the third year after denudation of about 35 per cent excess and then diminished until the end of the experiment when it was 22 per cent greater than that of A. These figures are, nonetheless, misleading if taken out of context. T h e y conceal these facts: runoff accounted for only a small fraction of total precipitation; a 1922 crest of B exceeded that of A by 85 percent, though not quite so high as a 1 9 1 2 crest; and revegetation shortly reduced crests of B nearly to those of A . Further, storm duration is not mentioned. E v e n so, the Service saw in these statistics a splendid opportunity for conveying an image of the forest as nature's agent against floods. A press release committed the inexcusable error of equating conditions on a two-hundred-acre Colorado watershed to the grim Mississippi situation in

1927.

Receiving

notice of this story prior to release, a timely W e a t h e r Bureau protest resulted in its suppression: In its present form, the release appears to me to be purely a propaganda for forestry and immediately related topics many of which are in a controversial stage. . . . W e cannot but feel that there must be a sense of proportion between the experiment at Wagon Wheel Gap and the problem of the Mississippi River. 42

FORESTS AND WATER

!33

Bureau Chief C. F. Marvin did not censure the entire dispatch—"I think that some of the statements in the release would not bear criticism at all"—for the Wagon Wheel Gap account amply documented Service handling of the erosion and siltation issue. Indeed, this phase of the flood problem had stirred increasing interest among foresters since Zon's remark that "the prevention of erosion undoubtedly outweighs all other benefits of forestation."43 Not until 1927 did material released to the public reflect this shift. Over the intervening years, the Service persisted* in stressing adverse consequences for streamflow, though several considerations eventually induced a more moderate course. First, recurring floods on the Ohio and Mississippi underlined vegetal cover's limitations while corroborating the American Society of Civil Engineers' opposition.44 Again, the Emmental and Wagon Wheel Gap investigations exploded the hoary notion that forest litter absorbed vast amounts of precipitation. The sponge theory discredited, some foresters perceived that vegetation of any kind might serve equally well to maintain infiltration capacity of the soil itself.45 Finally, as a result of these factors, old professional cleavages reappeared. Vexed by unverified claims for forest influences in Dana's What the National Forests Mean to the Water User, Fernow acidly commented: This is a "stylish" publication, in artistic dress, on glazed paper, highly finished pictures comprising more than half the contents. The contents are of a propagandist nature and of popular character making irrigation projects, water-power development, and domestic water supply appear dependent on forest conditions. The * See Forestry Facts: A Compendium of Short Items, Paragraphs and Handy Information for Use by Newspapers, Speakers, Teachers and Other Citizens of the United States Interested in Renewing and Perpetuating America's Great Heritage of Forests, U S F S , 1926, p. 9.

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few isolated examples of torrential action cited suggest the propriety for the Forest Service of enlarging this field of inquiry and collecting with discretion all the cases which can be truly authenticated of changed water conditions due to deforestation and reforestation. 46 Profiting from experience in Colorado, Bates also sought to enlighten his colleagues: The key to the flood problem is in the erosion problem. . . . As an illustration of the extent to which the ardor of propaganda has carried our well-meaning and otherwise estimable friends off their feet, I cite the following statement by one of our best known foresters: "the most permanent, effective, and cheapest protection against erosion, however, is a forest cover. Grass while effective in preventing erosion, does not diminish the surface runoff, and serves no other useful purpose." . . . This statement, of course, is so absurd that it could not possibly do any harm, but I sometimes wonder whether many another statement fully as far from the truth as this, and more insidiously deceptive, has not been made about forest influences. . . . Let us then put the emphasis where it belongs, not on the trees, but on vegetation of any kind as a means of prevention erosion.47 Silting of Elephant Butte Reservoir gave cogency to Bates' emphasis. T h e 1927 deluges thrust erosion prevention to the fore. Criticism directed at foresters came from a former chief, Willis Moore. 48 More significantly, the Service's erstwhile ally —the Geological Survey—deserted to the opposition. Whereas Chief Hydrographer Nathan Grover (succeeding Leigh ton) thought it possible to "improve" the Mississippi's regimen through reforestation, he declared that provision for headwater forests and reservoirs would never produce material reductions in flow on the lower river: " T h e quantities of water in a Mississippi flood are so great that these two influences . . . can probably never have a major effect, and at most can

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only add some small amount to a reasonable factor of safety which should be contained in any plan of flood control." 49 Abandoned by its former supporter, the Service capitulated. Chief Greeley presently implored: " T h e first thing needed in trying to stop floods by tree growth is to drop all exaggerations about it." 5 0 Zon, too, called for a "frank and dispassionate" reappraisal of forest influences on large drainages: Soils covered with forests can store up a quantity of water corresponding to a precipitation of 0.16 inch, or in very favorable conditions 0.24 inch at most. A cover of moss can absorb water amounting to from 200 to 900 times its weight; dead leaves of birch, maple or other hardwoods 150 to 220 times their weight, and pine needles from 120 to 1 3 5 times. These amounts are insignificant when compared to the enormous quantities of precipitation that cause excessive floods. . . . Very soon after a heavy rainfall . . . the forest floor becomes so completely saturated with water that it allows any further rain to pass off, just as it would from open ground. 51 If forests played a part, Zon averred, they did so by virtue of the protection from silting that was afforded engineering works. E . F . McCarthy (Director, Central States Station) arrived at a similar conclusion. 52 And so, pressed by its adversaries to quantify streamflow statements, the Service prudently seized upon the sedimentation argument. Foresters did not completely discard the former issue. Remaining noncommital about precise effects, they still insisted that forest influences, however inscrutable, were operative. "Sanity" and "common sense" would henceforth gauge the efficacy of conservation measures in reducing flood crests: Forests have a place in the plan for dealing with the Mississippi River, but a place that cannot be defined in sweeping or general terms. . . . Nevertheless, it is an influence which should be brought

X

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into play in the progressive betterment of conditions which contribute to destructive floods.53 Only deeply probing investigations could render a definitive exposition possible—and only after 1930 did this work commence. In the interim, the Service distributed two bulletins and a Congressional document on the subject. All referred to the "supplementary" and "auxiliary" nature of vegetal cover's role in Mississippi flood abatement. 54 In no sense would forests serve as alternatives to engineering measures. Rather, vegetation would stabilize the soil, thus insuring permanence of downstream improvements. However temperate and restrained these views, they were offset by other allegations in a 1929 account submitted to Congress.* Instead of confessing outright its inability to offer a precise estimate when asked for guidance on the flood problem, the Service attempted a quantitative analysis. Supplied with experiment-station statistics, Secretary of Agriculture W . M . Jardine told President Hoover: The added study of the problem has brought to light some startling facts worthy of your closest attention for they show that the forests of the Mississippi watershed were responsible for a reduction in the possible flood crest of nearly 1 5 inches. Furthermore, were all the forest of the Mississippi valley properly protected and managed in accordance with established forestry principles and practices, a further reduction in possible flood crests of 55 inches would be possible.53 Of course, this judgment hardly squared with conclusions found elsewhere in the document: * In response to Section 1 0 of the 1928 Flood Control Act (45 Stat. 5 3 8 ) , directing the Secretary of Agriculture to ascertain "the extent to and manner in which the floods in the Mississippi Valley may be controlled by proper forestry practice."

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The effect of such action [reforestation] on floods . . . will be largely unrecorded for the reason that its significance will be largely in what does not happen under changed conditions but what would have happened had the old order continued. . . . Just how great or how small this influence would be in a vast watershed like the Mississippi no one can ever say for the forces involved are too vast and complex for measurement. Yet the report highlighted Jardine's statement; almost inevitably, this segment caught the press's attention. 58 Garbed in qualitative phraseology, the Service interpretation was highly suspect. It assumed that reforestation had provolced "marked changes" in stream regimen. But installation of works beneficial to uniform waterflow, the report continued, had counterbalanced, and so obscured, these effects. As ardent an exponent of forest influences as Walter Lowdermilk (then associated with the California experiment station) discerned the report's intent: " T h e document is a brief for the favorable influence of forests in flood control. N o attempt is made to evaluate the various studies made in the past, Tesults from some of which have been interpreted as minimizing favorable effects of forests. . . . Such an evaluation . . . is needed to clarify divergent views upon this important problem." 57 Nevertheless, he supported Service reluctance to comment publicly on material discounting the significance of vegetal cover. This attitude carried over into individual dealings with Congressmen. Despite its disclaimer, a letter sent by Associate Forester E . A. Sherman to Senator Harry B. Hawes of Maryland exaggerated the importance of forests in controlling streamflow: Floods on the Mississippi cannot be cured by forests alone. . . . Upon the other hand, I do not agree with Professor Harris that the situation is hopeless. . . . I believe that the expenditure of $5,000,000 annually by the Federal Government, in cooperation with the states and farm owners in the control of soil erosion . . . together

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with the application of reasonable forestry practice upon lands where such practice is actually good business, will in the course of a few years materially change the regimen of the Mississippi.58 Evidence obtained from an erosion-streamflow study located on uplands of the Tallahatchie watershed (Holly Springs, Mississippi) seemed to buttress the agency's interpretation— during a ten-week flood period approximately 27 inches of rain fell on the area; of this amount 62 percent ran off immediately from cultivated land, 54 percent from abandoned fields, 2 percent from a scrub-oak forest, and 0.5 percent from an undisturbed oak forest.59 To one forester, this contrast denoted that floods are "due not so much to quantity of rainfall as to the type of land on which the rain falls." 60 While not questioning this explanation as it applied to the Yazoo area, engineers cautioned against facile extrapolation of the statistics to other regions. To be sure, Munns (Chief, Division of Silvics) ad' mitted "only in a few instances have our researches gone far enough to show just what really happens [under flood conditions]." 61 Service publicity, however, generalized on that data in trumpeting the crucial role played by the sponge phenomenon: "Falling leaves, decaying organic matter, and a network of roots in the soil hold rain and snow water as a gigantic sponge, allowing it to seep slowly and evenly into the springs and stream beds, preventing destructive floods from heavy rains or melting snows. . . ," 62 The specter of soil erosion sapping a nation's vitality gripped the public's attention in the early thirties as never before. Bates and Zeasman's study painted a grave picture of its implications.63 Director Edward Kotok (California Station) maintained that denudation invited erosion, thereby accelerating runoff and intensifying floods.64 The problem was also discussed at length in the Service's National Plan for American Forestry

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(1933). On another occasion, Bates emphasized its perils in a talk to the American Society of Civil Engineers.65 Seldom, however, was soil erosion stressed at the expense of the streamflow argument. Bates' "Chaining of Waters" (1931) stands out as the chief exception: The Forest Service has cautiously suggested that the recent great floods in the river [Mississippi, 1927] might have resulted from the clearing of about half of the original forested area of her watershed within the past century. Too many other changes have occurred at the same time to make this a clear-cut case. . . . The writer [Bates] does suggest forestry as the prime curb for the evils that beset the Mississippi. . . . Soil vandalism is the greatest economic problem facing the conservation forces of the country today.66 Usually both aspects received treatment. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the National Plan. The survey prominently listed soil erosion as a problem in numerous drainages; irregular streamflow also ranked highly. Indeed, the plan considered denudation one of the "major contributing causes of excessively rapid runoff and destructive floods." One half of the nation's forest area exerted a "major" influence on watershed protection, another one fifth produced "moderate" effects. A quantitative measure was only obliquely ventured: "Proper management of the 20 per cent of the watershed [Mississippi] still in forest may reduce flood crests by the critical feet or inches that often spell the difference between high water and disaster." Challenged by the Corps to recommend modifications in the design of engineering works allowing for these claimed reductions, the Service failed to respond. Nevertheless, endorsed by an enthusiastic President, support waxed for an upstream flood-control program. Under a resolution introduced by Senator Norris of Nebraska, a Presidential

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Committee on Waterflow

(consisting of the secretaries of

Interior, W a r , Agriculture, and Labor) hastily prepared plans for multipurpose river-basin development. 67 Then, in

1935,

Little Waters: A Study of Headwater Streams and Other

Little

Waters—Their

Use and Relations

to the Land generated fur-

ther interest in reforestation and land treatment. 68 Transmitting the report to Congress, Roosevelt admonished those who would overlook the importance of healthy watersheds to mainchannel conditions: Our disastrous floods, our sometimes almost equally disastrous periods of low water, and our major problems of erosion . . . do not come full grown into being. They originate, in a small way, in a multitude of farms, ranches, and pastures. T h e philosophy of Little Waters was at sharp variance with the assumptions underlying the 1935 Flood Control Bill, passed by the House in August 1935 but deferred in the Senate until 1936. W h e n reported out of the Senate Commerce Committee on April 27, 1936, the bill provoked conservationist criticism for its disregard of the Little

Waters

orientation. 69 T h e Presi-

dent voiced dissatisfaction with the bill as reflecting an engineering bias to the neglect of land-treatment measures designed to safeguard agricultural lands. Alluding to water-infiltration experiments at Cornell, he claimed that they definitely proved two things: The first is that a plowed field, a cultivated field furnishes the greatest immediate runoff. Next, the pasture or field with grass on it holds two or three times as much moisture as the plowed field does. Third, the woods hold seven or eight times as much moisture as the field does and at least twice as much as the pasture does. . . . 70 A t Roosevelt's behest, Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona introduced an amendment authorizing the Secretary of Agricul-

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H

1

ture to conduct investigations of watersheds and measures for runoff retardation and erosion prevention.71 Congressional acceptance of this proviso climaxed years of effort to secure recognition of the forest's role in mitigating the flood peril. Yet the Service's previously intensive campaigning nearly went unrewarded; only in conference was a clause deleted assigning responsibility for prosecution of watershed studies to the head of the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) rather than to the Secretary of Agriculture or the chief of the Service.72 Apparently, the rising influence of the "land doctors"* almost surpassed the prestige of the "men in green." But, in truth, the Service had gambled for higher stakes: against the background of the 1936 spring floods, it had drafted legislation providing land-acquisition funds for a vast watershed-protection program. Curiously, the National Plan (1933) had recommended such an endeavor, though many purchases made to date were "directed to lands having little if any bearing on water problems."73 Acting Forester Clapp unveiled the $9i8-million plan in a letter to Secretary of Agriculture Wallace that was reminiscent of the hyperbole found in the 1929 report to Congress: All agencies agree that forest denudation has been a prime factor in the destructive flood stages which our rivers have attained, 01 will attain within the next few days. Forest restoration therefore becomes a major feature of any program of flood prevention which may deserve consideration by the President and the Congress. . . .74 Unfortunately for the Service, H. R. 12517, incorporating the scheme's chief elements, was consigned to Representative William Whittington's Flood Control Committee. A supplementary report by Munns and Ivan Sims, accompanying the bill, repeated the shopworn claims made by the National * Charles Hardin, The Politics of Agriculture, p. 54.

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15

Plan. Believing Hayden's amendment to the 1936 Flood Control Bill to be adequate recognition of conservationist demands, a hostile committee vetoed the Service attempt.78 Perhaps this explains the last-minute efforts to strike the phrase delegating to the SCS authority for watershed surveys. Seeing its plan for independent action doomed to defeat, the Service decided to cast in its lot with the SCS. Transfer of responsibility for upstream investigations went to the Secretary of Agriculture and thus insured the Service, at least temporarily, against utter subordination to "Big Hugh's" soil scientists. Before operations commenced, the Service participated (summer 1936) in a nation-wide study of drainage-basin problems initiated by the National Resources Committee. Engineerconsultants appointed by the NRC's Water Resources Committee (itself lacking forester representation), however, prepared the final report. To the Service's dismay, many basin reports disregarded its data; the department denounced them as "engineering paradises" replete with dams, levees, jetties, and sea walls, but "sans land, sans crops, sans trees, sans people." 77 Foreseeing the publication of a summary similarly slanted, based on these preliminary studies, the Service submitted a report emphasizing land treatment and reforestation. It readily confessed past errors in a letter to the director of the Drainage Basin Survey: Some foresters have undoubtedly been overenthusiastic at times in claiming the values of forest in regulating streamflow. Many otherwise well-informed people interested in conservation have gone much further even to the extent of hailing forestry as a panacea for all water problems. As a result of so many extreme or at least unproven claims, other scientific groups have become skeptical, at times, of even the proven effects of forests on waters.78 If the Service report aimed to "clarify the situation," it fell wide of the mark. By its own admission, statistics were glaringly

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79

deficient. Results obtained from experiments in Utah, Colorado, and California could hardly apply to conditions on major eastern river basins. T h e Holly Springs, Mississippi, tests it acknowledged to be of limited value. (The Coweeta Hydrologic Laboratory, Franklin, North Carolina, had only recently been established.) Nonetheless, the Service plunged into a "hypothetical" discussion, suggesting that with the adoption of conservation measures, a smaller storage would suffice. To be sure, there are insufficient data to show how much smaller or larger the storage should be under different conditions of landuse. That is one of the principal deficiencies of basic data confronting a water planner On many watersheds the actual flood reduction resulting from forestation and protection of all available areas may be so small as to be insignificant when compared to the huge factors of safety and uncertainty in estimating flood peaks. This, of course, might be true on watersheds with negligible areas "available" for forestry, or other protective and runoff reducing measures. . . . As recent findings are analyzed and runoff factors adjusted in accordance with them, and as more distinction is made between protected and unprotected or pastured forests, etc., the differences should be even greater. Engineers remained convinced that foresters only deluded themselves in expecting to procure such evidence: the observed absence of favorable records conformed to well-known hydrologic principles. 80 T h e Service report had betrayed an unfamiliarity with these scientific canons: ( 1 ) expected runoff per square mile diminishes with increased drainage area; 81 (2) value of upstream measures for flood control in the main channel declines rapidly downstream—"even though so many hundreds of thousands of acre feet would have been withheld way up here beyond Pittsburgh, the height of the flood down at Cairo or below won't be affected by a small fraction of an inch. It flattens out by distance"; 82 and ( 3 ) overriding im-

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portance of the precipitation factor. But hydrologists judged data collection to be worthwhile were the Service thus apprised of its untenable stand. Attempting to resolve the dispute, the W a t e r Resources Committee constituted a Subcommittee on the Relation of Vegetal Cover to Floods, consisting of seven members: two from Agriculture, two from Interior, and one each from the Tennessee Valley Authority, a public utility, and the Federal Power Commission. 8 3 T h e issue proved fundamental, for differences imperiled conduct of joint surveys by the Corps and the U S D A . Since the F P C had consistently maintained impartiality on the matter, the designation of its representative, Thomas R . Tate, as chairman was intended to facilitate agreement. Munns' selection, however, as Service spokesman indicated that it would be difficult to reach an accord. Occasionally, Munns might admit that the evidence for vegetal influences was slight, though his faith continued unshaken. 84 Presented with data disproving claims for forestry, Munns is said to have pleaded, " A l l that may be true, but I think with my heart as well as my head." 8 5 And Munns became embroiled in interand intradepartmental feuding while heading the Division of Forest Influences. N o t confined to work on the vegetal-cover subcommittee, he also represented the Service on the department's Flood Control Coordinating Committee. This unit, under the department's Office of Land-Use Coordination, coordinated departmental activities under the 1936 act. It included representatives from the S C S , the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and the Service. Unfortunately, Munns' actions soon vitiated the objective outlook required of scientists. A history of both committees would seem to verify this appraisal. Let us first examine proceedings of the vegetal-cover subcommittee. Commencing with the first meeting on March 10,

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1937, interdepartmental squabbling marred its sessions. The Corps considered vegetal cover's effect too insignificant and indeterminate to warrant modifying structures on larger rivers.86 Suspecting an effort by other subcommittee members "to get the Department out on a limb and so remove it from the flood control field," Agriculture drafted a report declaring that land treatment would "help greatly" to reduce floods. 87 A letter accompanying the document conceded the failure to sample entire watersheds, yet offered as "overwhelmingly convincing data" results gathered from a "great multitude of research projects" chiefly limited to small tracts.88 Pointing to measurements taken during the Yazoo floods ( 1 9 3 1 - 3 2 ) , the department rejected the contention that saturated soil conditions had ever been demonstrated. W . G . Hoyt (Geological Survey) ridiculed this interpretation. 89 Indeed, Herman Stabler (also of the Survey) went further, criticizing a preliminary subcommittee task-force paper for not immediately dismissing land treatment as important in flood control.* One paragraph in the task-force draft read: " T h e effect of vegetal cover . . . is of relatively small magnitude in comparison with the flood producing rains when infiltration rates are low because of frozen ground, high water content of soil, impervious sub-surface layers and other conditions conducive to high run-off." Stabler insisted on appending the phrase "and ever present in extreme floods."90 Six months' debate brought reconciliation no nearer; in fact, relations between Interior and Agriculture deteriorated. Requesting its submission to the Runoff Committee of the American Geophysical Union, the Survey held that a U S D A supplemental report of June 23, 1937, only contributed "more mud to the controversy." Hoyt particularly scored the Service: * The task force was staffed by J. D. Fitch of the F P C , R. H. Davis of the SCS, and Hoyt.

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During the past 30 years or more the Department of Agriculture has spent millions of dollars in experimental research relating to vegetal cover, soil conservation practices, water conservation, and floods. The total sum of our quantitative knowledge on their interrelations is today almost negligible. Not because the problem is complicated by so many "hydrologic and biologic processes," but because the changes which have been brought about by streamflow regulation through agricultural and forestry practices over broad areas are in general, so insignificant and tenuous that they are indeterminate. . . . The supplemental report . . . drags forth anew our old friends the oak forest in the Yazoo River flood of 1 9 3 1 , the potato fields near Ithaca, New York, during the March 1936 flood, the grass plots in Ohio during the January 1937 flood, and the unburned San Dimas watershed during the New Year's flood of 1934. Any hydrologist could take these and the many other examples presented in the two reports [April and June] and prove their absurdity when applied to drainage basins as a whole. Certainly, no forested area as a whole is capable of absorbing 25.7 inches of water during a flood period; this being the amount credited to the undisturbed oak forest in the Yazoo River basin. . . . It is a sad commentary on a so-called scientific organization like the Forest Service that during its existence it has never published a report on the role played by vegetal cover on the hydrologic cycle which was in accord with well-established hydrologic principles. In the history of that organization the hydraulic engineer or hydrologist engaged on experiments relating to the influence of vegetal cover on streamflow has been conspicuous by his absence. . . . 9 1 In a compromise report hammered out by late 1937, Agriculture yielded on two questions: applicability of small-plot evidence to large drainages; and modification of engineering works to allow for vegetal-cover influences. 92 As Gilbert W h i t e (Secretary of the W a t e r Resources Committee) observed, " t h e Subcommittee's operations may have been worthwhile if for that reason alone." 9 3 Despite these concessions, M u n n s and

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»47

Dr. Austin Patrick (an SCS representative) personally clung to their former views. Disappointed over the outcome, one Agriculture participant later lamented, "the only tangible result . . . was the obvious loss of much time. . . . The discussions in committee widened the breach between the Geological Survey and the Department." 94 Milton Eisenhower, Land-Use Coordinator, reluctantly approved the final report, though opposing public release on these grounds: It contains nothing not now available in various documents. It minimizes results obtained from plot and small basin studies. It is incomplete. It omits some features of upstream engineering which have a significant bearing on flood control. It does not deal adequately with the distinction between great and local floods, contenting itself merely with a definition of the two. Perhaps most important the report has a tone of reluctant admission on certain elementary facts which I should greatly regret in a document bearing the prestige of an N.R.C. publication.95 Eisenhower's stand well illustrates the dilemma confronting the Department of Agriculture. Its flood-control program rested on meager information, but to abandon the field pending data collection involved far greater danger. Hence in December 1937 he instructed the departmental Flood Control Committee then working on a revision of Drainage Basin Problems and Programs to prepare a "statement as short, simple, and straightforward as possible, and [to] understate rather than overstate the relation of land use adjustments to flood control." Simultaneously, he sought recognition of land treatment's contribution to flood prevention from the NRC's Water Resources Committee: The fact that most members of the central planning agency [NRC] have the pure engineering point of view makes it highly

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likely that we will re-experience the thing that happened with the [first] drainage basin report. . . . The Department's representatives who discuss the upstream engineering aspects of the water problem are listened to with tolerance, but I feel very certain that our concept is not penetrating their minds. . . . The only thing that I can see to do is to work honestly and above-board with the Water Resources Committee in an attempt to make coordinated interdepartmental planning successful. If it fails to succeed from our point of view, then I think we shall be compelled to let the White House know this.96 Anxious not to offend the engineering fraternity, Eisenhower stressed the worth of vegetal cover in moderating minor floods on small streams and in protecting reservoirs from siltation. Shrewdly, he refrained from advocating deletion of references to the causes of major floods, as Munns and Patrick implied should be done: "Although the main conclusions were accurately stated, they had been so qualified by citation of rare or unusual occurrences as to deprive the report of the clarity of statement to which the Water Resources Committee is entitled."97 By limiting claims for land treatment, Eisenhower sought to render the department's operations immune from attack. He therefore notified the vegetal subcommittee that Agriculture contemplated a separate report documenting the watershed problem. Not surprisingly, the Service and the SCS chafed under these restrictions. Indeed, conflict rivaling that which beset the vegetal subcommittee marked many sessions of the department's Flood Control Coordinating Committee. A brief chronicle of its activities is consequently illuminating. Eisenhower (then Director of Information) had originally opposed appointing a Director of Flood Control Survey and Plans to coordinate the work of various bureaus under the 1936 act. Instead, he endorsed the creation of a central office of land use, attaching to it a flood-control unit. This arrangement, Eisenhower hoped, might avert future embarrassment:

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This Department should not dramatize its flood-control responsibilities as such. If we do, we may find ourselves out on a limb. If, in the name of flood control, we survey an entire watershed and then subsequently spend a great deal of money on floodcontrol operations within that watershed, putting certain lands into forests, treating all farms scientifically, and using engineering works on lands and in streams—only to be followed a few years later by a major flood, the public reaction would be terrific. . . . People would probably not recognize that the proper land-use within the watershed had prevented many minor floods. . . . The better approach is that of proper land-use to prevent soil and moisture wastage, with resulting help in preventing minor floods and perhaps alleviating somewhat—though no one knows—the major floods. . . 98 The department heeded Eisenhower's advice. Yet the precise nature of its functions under the 1936 act remained undefined for several years. The Quantitative Approach Triumphant Many assumed that the act merely required rather generalized statements justifying a watershed program, supported by qualitative analyses of accruing benefits. In 1937 a Bureau of Agricultural Economics representative rejected this reasoning. He felt it incumbent on the department to include exact estimates in survey reports submitted to Congress: " W e have to be specific in the reports to make a case for the needs of the works we are recommending. All of these preliminary examinations should introduce enough evidence to justify the program."99 Two years later, an SCS spokesman entered similai pleas in calling for suitable yardsticks to measure effects of upstream operations on flood peaks. Contrasting Agriculture's neglect of hydrology with concern for quantitative analysis displayed by the Corps, the soil conservationist noted that the Army "in their justification and estimates was able to give

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FIRE AND WATER

approximate figures on flood crest reduction in inches with allowance for a reasonable latitude of error."100 M . M . Kelso (BAE) concurred: "Our estimate of benefits must show the reduction in acre-feet of reservoir siltation and 'inch' reduction of flood crests." Munns vetoed these proposals; Corps calculation, he remarked, "embraced considerable leeway for approximation." Although Munns sometimes acknowledged serious data deficiencies, he did not resort to the most efficacious means of rectifying this weakness. A dearth of technical personnel impaired Service efforts. Significantly, Munns continually opposed employing trained hydrologists to aid the coordinating committee. In part, this failing stemmed from a Service belief that foresters themselves could easily master the rudiments of hydrology. Actually, most foresters possessed neither the requisite interest in nor knowledge of the field. Perhaps the Service was apprehensive lest hydrologists with a Survey viewpoint infiltrate its ranks. Service-Weather Bureau relations tend to substantiate this impression. In spite of Congressional directives to cooperate with the Bureau (and the Bureau was then in the Department of Agriculture), the coordinating committee repeatedly avoided this. L. C . Gray (BAE) accused the committee of long and inexcusable delay in approaching the Weather Bureau with a view to arranging for such cooperation. In fact, no steps were taken to that end until late in the past winter [1938-39]. The delay is all the more regrettable because of the serious handicaps and deficiencies of the field program in regard to the hydrological phase of the task.101 Possibly Munns favored for the time a program based on inadequate evidence, for continued uncertainty sustained faith in the potency of forest influences.

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151

Until 1941, the department's program had proved signally "barren of results." As of October 1939, no flood-control surveys under the 1936 act had been forwarded to the Secretary of Agriculture for transmission to Congress. Arthur Ringland (Flood Control Committee chairman) assigned three reasons for this delay: (a) diffusion of responsibility among a "bewildering" number of committees in Washington and the field, (b) inadequate control of expenditures and project cost accounting, and (c) "a romantic and doctrinaire conception of flood control and the Department's responsibilities under the Flood Control Act of 1936." He even thought it likely that the department's "professional integrity may be impeached." 102 This last factor warrants elucidation, for it concerns the qualitative approach mentioned above. Since the founding of the coordinating committee in January 1937, and much to Ringland's despair,* Service and SCS personnel had made a virtue of necessity. They believed that the meager data then available excused use of qualitative terminology. For one thing, the lack of precise data effectively blunted any rebuttal by opponents. Use of nebulous phraseology served other interrelated purposes. As long as Service research did not disprove traditionally held ideas, Munns could resist efforts to relegate Agriculture to subordinate status under the 1936 act through depreciation of the department's contribution to flood control. Though the 1938 Flood Control Act expressly authorized upstream operations only where the Corps had previously been directed by * See the letter of Eisenhower to Howard Tolley ( B A E ) , July 5, 1 9 3 9 : "Originally when we established the Coordinating Committee, S C S designated Mr. Ringland as its representative, F . S. designated E d . Munns, and B A E designated Dr. C . I. Hendrickson, later M . M . Kelso. Ringland was elected chairman by the Committee itself, but he remained the S C S representative. Subsequently, the S C S , feeling that Mr. Ringland prosecuted his own personal ideas vigorously but failed to represent the S C S viewpoint, added Dr. Patrick."

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Congress to prosecute work downstream, Munns stubbornly adhered to his conviction that the Service (department) possessed equal powers and responsibilities. Moreover, he objected to signing a "Memorandum of Understanding" covering cooperation with the Corps because he feared such an agreement might circumscribe the Service's (department's) freedom of action.103 Further, Munns refused to concede that forest influences were significant solely in specific areas characterized by high-intensity rainfall and unusually favorable geologic structure. On the contrary, he viewed its program as having national scope irrespective of river-basin location and magnitude. Economic considerations also entered into Munns' thinking. Were Agriculture reduced to a subordinate position, the cost of upstream measures might appear to exceed benefits obtained; once the Army "skimmed the cream," Munns realized, Agriculture would encounter difficulty demonstrating sufficient benefits. This situation had prevailed on the Merrimack and Youghiogheny: land-treatment practices, of the type proposed, were not economically justified unless the Service could take benefits downstream from Corps dams. Munns is recorded as having stated on this occasion: "The Army was not too particular about taking benefits above or below the structure and . . . we could not afford to be too particular. . . . W e could not be narrowly confined on damage and benefit sources."104 Vagueness aided the Service not only in estimating costbenefit ratios. The agency also profited by not being compelled to place exclusive reliance on the sedimentation argument—an issue of no mean importance, albeit financially unremunerative. Whereas the government heavily supported flood control, regarding it as a public responsibility, soil stabilization was deemed a private obligation. As Philip Glick (Chief, Agriculture Land Policy Division) explained its import:

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[This is] not an academic question. These facts present a situation which may prove embarrassing. When the Department submits its preliminary examinations and surveys of watersheds to Congress, it will have to include recommendations for specific measures to be carried on, together with recommendations as to how the costs shall be distributed between the Federal Government, the States, local governmental organizations, and landowners. If the measures included in these recommendations are considered to be flood control measures, then it will be expected that the bulk of the expenditures should be defrayed from public treasuries. If the measures are considered to be erosion control operations, then it will be expected that the bulk of the cost should be thrown upon the landowners.105 Of course, Agriculture might lay claim to flood-abatement benefits on minor streams. But these were predominately of an on-site nature—and thus virtually indistinguishable from soilconservation benefits as such. Paucity of relevant and exact data therefore enhanced Service ability to masquerade under a floodcontrol banner, with all it implied for increased appropriations. Lastly, Service publicists exploited this state of affairs in writing articles like those composed during the pre-1936 era. T h e Land-Use Coordinator's office endeavored to temper some unrestrained tracts recommending use of this framework: Land treatment will contribute five distinct things to flood control: 1. Save the soil for farming, grazing and forestry. 2. Eliminate what would otherwise be recurring minor floods. 3. Reduce the volume and speed of run-off. 4. Greatly reduce the sedimentation of reservoirs. 5. Minimize the silting of stream channels.106 Ringland lacked authority to compel conformity to the departmental matrix; attempts to implement that policy "uniformly did not succeed." 107 While alluding to the suggested analysis, many statements included other material transgressing the stated bounds. 108 In large measure commendably judicious, C. L. Forsling (chief

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of Research) did contend that vegetal cover could "materially reduce the crest of major floods." Chief Silcox warned National Farm and Home Hour listeners that no panacea existed for preventing floods. At the same time, he assured them that the great Ohio floods of 1937 were unparalleled for their destructiveness: an obvious aftermath of deforestation. Later, in American Forests, he likened conditions on highly unstable southern California mountain slopes to those obtaining in the Ohio basin. The Service artfully employed negative phraseology to magnify forest influences. Thus, a sentence in the pamphlet Work of the United States Forest Service reads: "Foresters know that the preservation of vegetative cover on watersheds will not absolutely prevent floods." Though Munns penned an objective account in the Yearbook of Agriculture (1938), he afterwards told a nation-wide audience that forests played a "major part" in flood control and cited the Yazoo data to support his point. 109 Some flood stories open with overdrawn remarks on vegetal cover's significance which are qualified only in concluding observations. To cite one example: at the outset, Carlos Bates informed readers of American Forests, " W e have been told by engineers . . . that control of the headwaters of streams cannot possibly have any significant effect upon floods in the lower valleys. No one with a grain of common sense is going to believe such a statement, no matter how the 'calculations' may be manipulated to demonstrate it." 1 1 0 In summary, however, Bates commented: "In all cases forests have some value in protecting soil surfaces, but in many cases the storage capacity for excessive amounts of rainfall does not exist. It is believed these latter cases explain the contention of engineers that in great floods the forests have no effect, but they do not justify any such absolute statement." Exclusive of Munns' Yearbook article—and this was the

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product of SCS collaboration—a well-balanced Service exposition intended for widespread circulation has not been uncovered. (An impartial treatment in the 1937-38 annual report, Appalachian Station, probably received only limited distribution.) The coordinating committee, however, subjected Service information releases to the necessary refining in publications bearing its own imprimatur. No one, including Eisenhower, Ringland, the BAE, and, in part, the SCS, desired to incite engineer, hydrologist, and meteorologist criticism. Early in its history the coordinating committee, at Ringland's urging, had prepared a report discussing departmental flood-control responsibilities compiled from material supplied by the Service and the SCS. Several draft paragraphs typify publicity written by these bureaus for public consumption. Denying denudation as a primary flood cause, nonetheless it attributed a "large" influence to vegetal cover. If properly managed, the soil constituted the greatest and most effective reservoir for water storage (excepting the oceans); absorptive capacity of forest litter afforded further insurance against inundations. Rarely did extreme conditions nullify its beneficial effects, which over vast river basins proved "enormous." 111 Fortunately, most of these claims were deleted from the text when it was finally issued in 1939. Still, one egregious statement remained: "There is no longer any doubt that the uses to which we have put our land have been responsible for much of the silt and water which make up a flood." Concurrent with the editing of The Land in Flood Control, the Office of Land-Use Coordination readied a more comprehensive monograph for publication. Influences of Vegetation and Watershed Treatments on Runoff, Silting and Stream Flow (Misc. Pub. 397, July 1940), it will be remembered, was first submitted to the N R C Vegetal Cover Subcommittee on April 1, 1937, as "The Relation of Vegetal Cover and Other

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Watershed Treatment to Floods and Associated Problems." T h e Service and the S C S brief clearly presented an inflated picture of forest influences. Yet, unable to completely approve the final subcommittee account, Eisenhower announced the department's intention to release a separate report—the one eventually emerging in July 1940. As of September 1938, the document with its changed title had received substantial editorial attention. Additional revisions, however, were needed. As C. W . Thornthwaite ( S C S ) wrote E . M . Rowalt (writer, Coordinator's office), he "personally would prefer a more objective and less propagandistic treatment of the subject." 1 1 2 Rowalt agreed, requesting Thornthwaite to indicate his objections. Thornthwaite tartly replied: In editing the first draft an effort was made to delete all statements that obviously were pleading for a cause. Unfortunately all of the Department's literature on this subject is so shot full of propaganda that any review taken from previously published work is bound to reflect a bias. It is high time that we had a publication that treats this subject objectively. The Department is embarking on a program of many millions of dollars to further land treatment for flood control, and about all we have in the form of publications to support such a program are enthusiastic interpretations of a great mass of unrelated data scattered throughout a hundred publications. We have nothing to hand to a person who wants to know the facts on which we base our program. To supply this need is the purpose of this publication. A year elapsed before the report finally cleared the Service and the SCS. Despite this long interval, other interested departmental bureaus had not yet granted their approval; some "sharp reactions" were expected. 113 These conclusions were still included: "Land measures that help rains to enter the soil make use of the greatest freshwater reservoir on earth for the purposes of flood control. . . . T h e influence of vegetation

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on waterflow is greater than popularly realized. . . . " 1 U Happily, the published version omitted these assertions, as well as other references to flood-crest reductions achieved through vegetal-cover manipulation. Further, the final copy substituted the words "run-off retardation" for "flood reduction," as Representative J. Buell Snyder of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the W a r Department Subcommittee on Appropriations, had previously suggested. 1 1 5 In the end, the document cast great credit on the department both for its moderate tone and its frank admission that precipitation was of pre-eminent importance. W h i l e it treated the problem chiefly in qualitative terms, the report's conservative character heralded the day when quantitative analyses would predominate. T h a t time fast approached. Indeed, the President ordered a National Resources Planning Board review of departmental recommendations prior to release of flood-control funds. T h e board, in turn, now required quantitative proof obtained by suitable technical procedures on upstream-treatment benefits. Undoubtedly, pressure from this source was intense: by 1941 a policy of "quantitative approach" became generally accepted. T w o additional factors probably facilitated the adjustment. Protracted struggle over the proposed transfer of the Service to the Department of the Interior under the Reorganization Act of 1939, especially bitter in 1940, may have inclined it toward rapprochement with the Corps. 1 1 6 Support for this view comes from a high-ranking S C S official, who confided to his chief: The other day you asked that we give you the "lowdown" concerning the flood control situation as we see it. . . . W e cannot help but feel that one of the reasons, perhaps the main reason, why the Department is unwilling to take a definite stand with reference to the formulation of a clear-cut flood control policy is the fact that

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Agriculture needs the support of the War Department in the controversy which has been growing for some time between Interior and Agriculture. Consequently, Agriculture is not willing to take a stand if by so doing there is the faintest possiblity of alienating the W a r Department's support in this controversy. Secondly, growing disenchantment in the profession with the adequacy of qualitative analysis also eased the shift. O n e might associate this increasingly critical attitude with a flowering of the scientific spirit in the Society of American Foresters. In the

flood-control

and watershed-management area, as in

that of fire protection, initial signs of professional maturation manifested themselves before 1941. Even so, it did not adequately materialize until after World W a r II, when foresters indoctrinated in the old protectionist philosophy of the Pinchot era retired from government service. E. A. Colman, at the society's 1939 annual meeting, condemned the Service for placing inordinate stress on "purely qualitative research." Criticizing this orientation, he said: " I have looked through the 1936 to 1939 issues of the Journal of Forestry and have found perhaps a dozen papers dealing with forest influences. Most of them are very general in nature, and those that aie factual are not much better than qualitative. . . . Is it not time we stopped rediscovering that vegetation prevents erosion and started finding out to what its protective influence can be attributed and to what extent it is effective?" 1 1 7 Its professional reputation at stake, the society's Committee on Watershed Management exhorted

foresters to

(of which Munns was a member)

"make

good

in

demonstrating

their

understanding and execution of measures which will control floods," and so to dispel "any suspicion which foresters' statements in the past in the field of forest influences may have aroused." 1 1 8 Interestingly, though self-enlightenment did occur, it was hastened, if not inspired, by external pressures. 119

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Reorganization of the department's flood-control coordinating machinery in February 1941, in accord with retiring Chairman Ringland's suggestions, fostered the adoption of more scientific procedures: a technical review board, consisting of a hydrologist, soil conservationist, forester, and economist, subsequently passed on the technical soundness of survey reports. 120 Whether Ringland's advice regarding publicity controls was taken is not known.* One thing is clear: accounts now were remarkably free from distortion. Testimony before Congress limns this change. T h e chief of research, for example, openly conceded that research into upstream flood abatement was "not strong enough to give the soundest basis" for proposed measures. 121 T h e Service purposefully restricted comments on forestation's value to areas similar in type to experimental plots from which data had been collected. If information related to conditions on steep hillsides of southern California, foresters wisely did not draw analogies to the Ohio River situation; distinctions between major and minor floods, main channels and tributaries, precipitation of prolonged and short duration, were respected with increasing frequency. 122 As Edward Kotok (chief of research) told the Agriculture appropriations subcommittee: Let us speak about the western United States; let us take Mr. Sheppard's county [California]. No downstream engineering can prevent completely those floods that come down from steep moun* See the memo of Ringland to Wiecking, Associate Land-Use Coordinator, February 10, 1940. Ringland advised: "It seems to me imperative to establish a firm and undeviating policy on any Department publicity that relates to the flood control program under the Flood Control Act of 1936, etc. I suggest: 1. That all stories be checked for technical validity by the bureau of origin, and that such bureau assume responsibility for such check; 2. That all stories upon approval by the bureau of origin be cleared through O L U C especially by Mr. Rowalt before release."

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tain slopes and where civilization is living at the foot of the slopes. . . . Then if you take the Wasatch Mountains, for example, in Utah, you have steep slopes again. Some have mismanaged ranges or other types of denudation. Here again, downstream engineering will not prevent floods: with upstream engineering floods can be prevented. Now, if you take a mainstream like the Mississippi, what we do upstream may not in any large measure affect what you are doing downstream; but all of the movement of soil—I do not know in how many years; it depends on the conditions—will ultimately silt up your reservoirs, and you may not have another reservoir site. You cannot take the silt out of the reservoir so easily as one might think. So in major streams like the Mississippi, the only work we did along the Mississippi was in the Yazoo basin, where we studied river breaks, to prevent bank caving and destroying the area by sedimentation. 123 Munns, too, along with his loyal assistant Bernard Frank, admitted that a watershed program's conservation benefits far surpassed its flood-control advantages: " T h e majority of watershed reports show that the greatest proportion of total benefits accrues to the lands on which the work is done." 1 2 4 Finally, he owned that small, frequent floods on the "lesser" tributaries were most amenable to reduction by upstream operations. Indeed, such flooding caused greater losses to agricultural land than did main-channel inundations. Attaining a better perspective on this subject, foresters became more receptive to plans for improved water yields requiring selective deforestation. Starting in the early 1940s, the Service applied itself to the problem of augmenting runoff for water-supply purposes. Forestry thus advanced beyond the custodial era dominated solely by protectionist impulses. T o preserve the forest inviolate only impaired the resource; conservation necessitated management. Initially, however, the Service had reacted adversely to this revolutionary doctrine. A 1933 Geological Survey report (Hoyt-

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Troxell), taking its cue from the W a g o n W h e e l G a p experiment, stressed potentialities for increased runoff offered by denudation. Stimulating much controversy, it induced noticeably little positive response. 125 Statements by Joseph Kittredge and Charles Connaughton (1936 and 1939, respectively), favoring this research, failed to elicit from the profession the interest they deserved. But gradually opposition to the radical suggestion diminished. B y 1 9 4 1 , the Service informed Congress that it was conducting investigations to "affect the volume or to regulate the distribution of water supplies." 1 2 6 Four years later the Service guardedly announced: "Evidence is accumulating to show that management of the forest with the water resource in mind may, under some conditions, increase the yield of water for irrigation, industry and domestic use." 1 2 7 In the following year, Charles Hursh (Chief of Forest Influences, Southeastern Station) went further in stating that "removal of vegetative growth has definite possibilities for increasing summer stream flow."128 Some could not unshackle themselves from the long-held commitment to full protection. T h e belief that forests always benefited streamflow had become part of the "philosophy of conservation" subscribed to "almost [as] a tenet of faith." 1 2 9 This attitude continued to govern administrative policy. Harold G . W i l m (silviculturist, Southern Station) maintained that foresters had overemphasized protection needs in planning reforestation of old burned areas at high altitudes. If they aimed to develop the water resource, W i l m demonstrated, reforestation provided no solution: "Such areas usually present minor flood problems and are good water producers in their present grass-covered condition; . . . planting them with trees for timber production is unprofitable." 1 3 0 Accounting for this behavior, W i l m felt that forestry-in-transition remained unduly hidebound to traditional concepts of land management.

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Similarly, respecting flood abatement, in 1945 the Land-Use Coordinator feared that enthusiastic publicists might repeat discredited claims. Again, he cautioned the operating agencies: The Department's type of watershed land use program, even with more emphasis placed upon inclusion of small headwaters and streambank structural work, cannot hope to control the major floods that give the public so much concern. But, because we are mentioned in the Flood Control Act some seem to expect us to control floods. This misunderstanding, however, is beginning to disappear now that we have published survey reports available, and increased educational efforts both among the Department's own personnel and the public, will in time eliminate the remaining misconceptions. 131 Despite his injunction, several overwrought passages typical of information disseminated prior to 1941 appeared in the annual reports for 1947, 1950, and 1951. 1 3 2 However, no longer was the Service infused with the crusading ardor of Pinchot and his disciples. Witnessing its flagging evangelism, Mrs. Gifford Pinchot appealed for a rekindling of the former spirit. 133 Chief Richard McArdle discerned the futility and folly of this call: W e live in different times. W e cannot recreate the initial crusade for forestry anymore than we can rediscover America. That crusade was pointed toward creating a widespread public awareness of our need for the products and services of forest lands. . . . I think our task in the next half-century is more concerned with action than with publicity. 134 For zealousness, the

"Land Doctors"

easily

outmatched

the " M e n in Green." By the late 1940s, the S C S had assumed leadership of the department's flood efforts. 135 Seeking only to retain whatever influence it still possessed, in 1953 the Service requested Congress to set up the Pilot Watershed Program as

FORESTS AND WATER a departmental appropriation.

163 136

Though Congress assented, a

majority of small watersheds selected as demonstration areas constituted examples of agricultural rather than forest land problems. And the Service expected that plans drafted under the small-watershed legislation of 1954 would confirm this S C S orientation. 137 In fact, foresters were not even invited to the first national watershed congress, organized to stimulate interest in the program. Gifford Pinchot and his foresters would have presided over that gathering had it been convened fifty years earlier.

5- Administrators and Scientists

Studies in the administration of governmental functions that relate to natural resources have an especially strong appeal: they lead one into a consideration of that most fundamental of all relationships—the relation of man to his environment. T h e Department of Agriculture and the family of institutions in the state and local governments are engaged in the exciting task of exploring that environment and in relating their findings to the needs and desires of man. Creative and inventive abilities are called into play in order best to devise the institutions whereby man can utilize this knowledge. To the political scientist, therefore, studies of government in this field bring a most stimulating opportunity for association with the work of the natural scientist on the one hand, and for the analysis of social and economic procedures and institutions, on the other. If he undertakes his researches adequately, he need no longer engage in discussion about the coordination of the various social sciences or divisions of knowledge generally: he is himself engaged in analyzing problems that refuse to be bound by any formal categories and that relate every operation of society to the effort of man to wrest a living from the soil.1

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Traditional theories of organizational ontogeny suggest that, as barnacle encrustation progressively impairs ship performance, so may administrative structures lose their responsiveness through time. Thus, institutional inflexibility is usually deemed an infirmity of advancing years. W h i l e this pathological diagnosis has considerable merit, it ignores the effect of militancy on agency behavior. 2 In the case of the Forest Service, an aggressive posture produced consequences that afflicted the organization throughout its early history. Although a heightened sense of professional responsibility—the "inner check"—has gradually replaced the self-righteous and somewhat arrogant attitude of youth, 3 a study of that crusading era is instructive for the light it sheds on factors conditioning the development of research in the Service. W h i l e the conservation movement invoked the authority of science, it also resorted to highly emotional appeals in an attempt to enlist support for its policies. Unfortunately, the evangelistic approach introduced elements of parochialism and rigidity into analyses of problems, thereby contributing to erosion of the movement's scientific base. 4 This crusading spirit, and the oversimplification it encouraged, too often prevented the Service from attaining a proper focus on questions of resource management. As one forester has argued, The Forest Service is more expert on administration in the narrow sense than on resources management from the technical and fundamental standpoint. I suspect we give too much emphasis, in selecting men for key positions, to demonstrated administrative skill and experience. I think there is danger of placing too little stress on breadth of view, imagination, and deep-seated concern for resource management on its own account and in relation to social objectives and criteria. There is as much danger of oversimplify-

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ing, in our thinking, the technical problems in resource management as there is of making them seem too complex. . . . 5 Exalting expertise, the Service believed that it alone could master the requisite knowledge. An emotional orientation consequently helped to conceal possible solutions from view at the same time that it discouraged cooperation with other groups advancing contrary interpretations. Advice offered by scientists with backgrounds in related, if not more fundamental, disciplines frequently went unheeded: only foresters within the Service were thought to possess the necessary "credentials of expertness." 8 Administrative evangelism thus aggravated this symptom of group introversion—a bureaucratic trait obviously inimical to the vitality of interorganizational channels of communication. Not surprisingly, even state advisory councils failed to fulfill their avowed function of exposing deficiencies in the research effort. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the Service intended program review to be their chief objective. R . D . Forbes, first director of the Southern Station, once noted the "ostensible purposes" which such bodies could serve: ( 1 ) to assist the Station through advice on scientific methods (2) to coordinate forest research throughout our region (3) to coordinate forest research with other scientific and economic research (4) to correlate forest research with the needs of the region. Significantly, he next described the council's actual mission: The above are, as already stated, the ostensible purposes for which an Advisory Council should be created. However, it is my opinion that in our region and at the present time the main value of such a council will lie in the educational effect which it will have on its own members, and the advertisement and support, both moral and political, which it will give us. . . .7

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167

If such a quasi-religious approach induced a false conception of the situation confronting administrators, it also tended to perpetuate that outlook. An intensive campaign of public education, designed to arouse an apathetic nation to the dire consequences of profligacy, unknowingly carried these erroneous notions into the hinterlands. Evangelism and the appeal to "mob psychology" 8 won converts to "the cause." In so doing, it created a commitment to promulgated doctrine, and this inevitably impaired the ability of the Service to retract statements later demonstrated by research to be inaccurate. Were publicity an infinitely malleable material in the hands of the administrator, such circumstances would never be allowed to occur. 9 Certainly, the Department of Agriculture has denied that its information program lacked resiliency: "It is flexible. It is dynamic, not static: elastic, not hidebound. T h e annual reports of the Office of Information prove that constant, carefully planned efforts are made to meet emergencies and new situations as they arise, and to adapt the informational program to new needs and requirements. Errors are recognized; self-criticism is apparent; corrective action is taken continuously." 10 Yet the experience of the Service as reflected in its antifire and flood-control literature refutes this claim. And Philip Selznick's study of the Tennessee Valley Authority presents further evidence that publicity is more than a mere tool of the administrator. Invariably, publicity becomes an inextricable part of the policy that it is intended to serve. Evaluating the effect of TVA's espousal of the idea of grass-roots democracy upon the agency itself, Selznick has concluded:

Where doctrine itself creates commitment, as in the institutionalization of policy, executive decision is not readily reversible. Policy which ostensibly should be determined on the basis of a scientific appraisal of practical means for the achievement of formal ends

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becomes invested with prestige and survival value and may persist as official doctrine despite a weakening of its instrumental power.11 Revision of information policy is likely to be deferred should alterations, suggested by research findings, appear to undermine the organization's investment in ongoing programs. A normal bureaucratic proclivity to secrecy is exaggerated when the agency's previous stand has been cast in almost sacred terms. 12 Fear of embarrassment is not the sole explanation for Service reluctance to disseminate the results of scientific investigation. Commitment to doctrine brought with it a commitment to other organizations as well. T o the problem of administrative accountability posed by a crusading agency embracing the stewardship theory of executive responsibility was added the obstacles inherent in a federal system. 13 State forest services had aided the national Forest Service in its political struggles; they expected their help to be reciprocated. Abrupt policy reversal on controlled burning would probably have antagonized many state foresters. For years the Forest Service prided itself on the amicable relations it had sedulously cultivated with state bodies. Interchange of personnel between state and federal groups had been common practice. In fact, it was reported: State foresters have, on the whole, a more genuine spirit of cordiality and respect towards the representatives of the Forest Service than any other group of state officials has towards federal officials with whom it deals. This is explained, in part, by the care which the Forest Service has in the past bestowed on the selection of its Clarke-McNary men. It has attempted to carry on its relationships with the state foresters as informally as possible. It has a policy of not writing a letter on any matter of importance when its representative can take the matter up with the state forester personally.14 The Service strove to retain this loyalty at the calculated risk

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169

of neglecting its responsibilities to science. It is understandable, in this regard, that the Service's Division of State and Private Forestry particularly insisted on respecting state-forester sensibilities. This branch quite effectively opposed measures which threatened to alienate local supporters of Service doctrine. As Selznick has observed, "individual parts of the administration tend to become like private pressure groups in that they have their own particularistic and parochial interests to defend and promote." 15 Although the Service thus preserved an entente cordiale with the states, it violated an obligation—requiring "vigorous action from time to time" to promulgate evidence unearthed by its research unit. 16 Exponents of the plan of 1915 had foreseen that the "action" arm might get into just such a rut. Still, they confidently expected that research, acting in a critical capacity, could supply the stimulus needed to keep the organization flexible both in purpose and procedure. Indeed, Pinchot had held research's greatest contribution to administration to be the inquisitive spirit it introduced into the conduct of Service affairs: "Under the pressure of executive work the technical ideas of the forester at times grow dim. It is Forest Research which has kept the sacred flame burning and has helped to raise Forestry to the level of the leading scientific profession." 17 But research's reaction to the flood and fire problems indicates that the evangelistic fervor displayed by administrators was highly infectious. So deceptively persuasive were the "shock techniques" employed that many research specialists fell victim to an administrative "interest-bound bias." 18 Sharing the same myopic outlook as administrators, research personnel failed to "anticipate information needs so that the facts may be available when wanted." 19 In the end, therefore, administration itself suffered because research was too closely identified, from a spiritual and structural standpoint, with "the cause."

FIRE AND WATER

It could hardly have been otherwise. Although foresters have always regarded grass-roots management as the touchstone of democratic administration, the Service was, in actuality, a centralized organization by virtue of the "unified philosophy" which guided a decentralized decision-making process. Whereas Luther Gulick appraised performance standards governing forester behavior as "more comprehensive and specific than any set of administrative standards we have encountered in any other area of public administration," he judged their "total impact" to be secondary to the "coordinative effect of the ideas and standards developed and maintained through the profession." 20 Herbert Kaufman arrived at a similar conclusion in surveying activities in a George Washington National Forest ranger district: Though one type of organization may manipulate the thinking and values of its members while the other directly controls their behavior by orders, both types succeed in obtaining the kind of administrative decisions and behavior they desire; one just as certainly as the other molds the actions of its members. The Forest Service has succeeded . . . in putting inside the Ranger a predisposition to act in an organizationally prescribed pattern under certain circumstances. . . . With respect to purpose and action, the Forest Service is, to all intents, a centralized organization. 21 This "unity of education and doctrine" constituting the "dominant central idea" of Service administration made decentralization possible. 22 Still more important, it permeated the research and administrative hierarchy. A policy encouraging transfer of operating officials to scientific positions (in effect during the early stage of the Service's scientific development; now largely precluded owing to the considerable technical competence demanded of recent appointees)

ADMINISTRATORS AND SCIENTISTS

17 1

served to fasten on research an administrative orientation. Indeed, as Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson have observed, former forest rangers filled most of the professional positions in the Service.23 "Endless circumstances," moreover, brought administrative and research men together in Washington and the field, thereby furthering organizational harmony.24 When, on occasion, disputes flared up between regional offices and experiment stations, Washington bent its energies to insure composure of differences: research's function was to aid administration, not to hold it up to ridicule. And, since research had to "live with" an operating agency, acquiescence in administration's objections was more readily secured. Influence on the research branch took other forms. Research might conduct investigations, but members of both groups jointly drafted the scientific program. Here expedience entered into the determination of priorities. Faced with a continuing problem of limited appropriations, administrators generally opted for those projects which promised immediate benefits to action programs. Compulsory presentation of detailed work outlines, prepared prior to initiation of research (following the preliminary exploration phase), indicated whether studies offered favorable prospects of applicable results. This procedure, unfortunately, promoted conformity to a framework of analysis originally prescribed. While this requirement received administrative blessing, it did not lead to the most fruitful scientific achievement. The history of controlled burning and forestinfluences investigations notwithstanding, the Service deemed this procedure "perfectly flexible in allowing or requiring revision of plans whenever the development of the work calls for it." 25 As with research appropriations, funds for publication of results were usually inadequate, and Service statements con-

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stantly stressed the gravity of this situation. 26 It is, nevertheless, noteworthy that the agency managed to publish such monumental surveys as the Relation of Forestry to the Control of Floods in the Mississippi Valley, The National Plan for American Forestry, and The Western Range. W h e n the success of major "action" programs was involved, the Service detailed men to gather data and found the wherewithal to finance promulgation of findings. Significantly, research once complained about this practice: "The frequency of these calls for special reports not in the regular research program" created an "unfavorable environment" for scientific development. 27 Despite the fact that important information lay unpublished for want of funds, it promptly disseminated results of projects demanded by administrators. And the Service did not permit requests for review of these special reports to delay their release, as was too often true of studies challenging established operating policies. If some conditions adverse to research prevailed, the blame was traceable, in greater measure than foresters openly acknowledged, to the Service itself: "Amelioration of these unfavorable conditions for research must come in large part from sources outside and above the Forest Service. Most of them involve considerations of government administration which must be carried to the President or to Congress." 28 Earle Clapp more accurately assessed the situation: "It has not in my judgment been conclusively shown that it is possible in a bureau such as the Forest Service, primarily administrative in its functions, to develop and permanently maintain a strong effective research organization." 29 As long as a crusading spirit pervaded the organization, formal separation of research from administration could not afford the former sufficient insulation. Furthermore, criticism issuing from interested governmental agencies—for instance, the Weather Bureau, the Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Animal Industry—only partly

ADMINISTRATORS AND SCIENTISTS

*73

succeeded in curbing the distribution of misleading publicity and in effecting a redirection of the research program. Their opposition eventually sparked a reappraisal of doctrine. Years elapsed, however, between filing of charges and the date of policy reversal. The Service's initial reaction had been to commence or continue research to "prove a theory instead of to find out the facts." 30 At first, controversy froze thinking, preventing any infusion of fresh viewpoints; only gradually did attitudes thaw. That past misconceptions were finally rectified was due, in no small degree, to the persistent intervention of these bureaus. Yet nothing could compensate for efforts already expended in attempting to establish the influence of forests on floods and the effect of fire on longleaf survival. Chapman's and Fernow's analyses cut to the root of these issues. Still, sympathetic to Service goals, they worked for policy changes solely within the profession. Recourse to this strategy sharply limited the potency of their appeals. There is no doubt that the Journal of Forestry represented a forum for the "free and unhampered expression of opinion." 31 Nevertheless, the pervasive influence of Service foresters in the society meant that criticism could be ignored, with relatively minor repercussions, if iconoclasts elected not to precipitate controversy outside professional ranks. The conditions described above throttled forest science. This situation might not have arisen had research, from the start, been completely separated from an "action" agency. Admittedly, an autonomous, federally sponsored research program would encounter those obstacles peculiar to all government scientific work, such as limited popular and legislative support for appropriations. On the other hand, its investigative staff could better retain an independent outlook, little swayed by administrative ideology and uninhibited by fear of administrative sanctions. An operating organization would, in the long

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run, benefit from this arrangement because disinterested inquiry resolved perplexing questions of resource management. In addition to providing fertile soil for germination of insights, this move would facilitate the growth of a competing power center within the profession capable of generating discussion on unorthodox interpretations. And administrative personnel constantly exposed to such ferment would probably prove more receptive to unconventional opinions. Divorce, however, would not automatically insure creativity, for administrative influence is not the sole peril to scientific progress. Professional autarchy is also to be eschewed. While increased knowledge often alerts public opinion to the necessity for wise resource utilization, 32 the perception of a problem demanding drastic corrective action often comes when scientific understanding is itself severely limited. Unfortunately, in the process of developing a new discipline, shortsightedness may take hold; valuable contributions of other sciences are likely to be dismissed as having little bearing on matters to which a nascent profession has addressed its attention. Implicit in the balance-of-nature concept, long espoused by foresters, is comprehensive treatment of resource-management questions. Yet, even in this area, one has cause to fear that "occupational psychosis" may militate against attainment of a perspective broad enough to realize nature in all her dimensions. Preservation of a sense of relatedness is indispensable. Hence administrative arrangements should be worked out to encourage the pursuit of an interdisciplinary approach. A full-bodied attack on land-management problems requires strengthening of private research as well. Indeed, H . H . Chapman has long championed this course. His contention is that governmental research programs, despite advantages in appropriations, trained specialists, and equipment, are hampered in several ways:

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175

( 1 ) Delay in editing, sometimes censoring, publications so that they do not appear for years, if ever. (2) Tendency to freeze formal plans, for experiments, which slows down the uptake of results which occur during the period of the project and prevent its modification to test new ideas. (3) Absorption of budgets by this mass of formal plans so that new lines cannot be formally undertaken and hence are not taken up at all. (4) Shifting of personnel to the extent that a man practically is never able to follow up the work he starts.33 T o be sure, industrial research is not free from defects. Its efforts are also marked by concern with matters of immediate urgency to the neglect of basic research. Commonly of a confidential nature, the results obtained are frequently unavailable to the public. Finally, privately supported research is by no means immune from the pressures of special interests, fearful lest scientific evidence weaken their positions. As T . Swann Harding has observed: There is a sort of invisible censorship in every laboratory. . . . Projects can be discontinued as surely because some director of an industry is hostile to them as because powerful groups cause politicians to deny them funds. It is true that some powerful interest may prevent the performance of research and the dissemination of its results in some state university, but benefactors may quite ignorantly stipulate that funds shall not be used for wise purposes in scientific research institutes. Again, freedom of publication may be impaired because some powerful interest would find the results inimical to its presumed welfare.34 Much can be said, however, for diversity as a virtue in itself. For all those who conform, there are usually a few enlightened individuals, such as Henry Hardtner of the Urania Lumber Company, who are prepared to examine the worth of a unique hypothesis. When both industry and government undertake

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research, the laws of chance alone would seem to favor flexibility, comprehensiveness, and consequent productivity. It would seem that educational institutions generally represent a vast talent pool which can be tapped to extend man's knowledge of his physical universe. But forestry schools afforded no such opportunity. Overburdened with teaching responsibilities, their faculties had little time for intensive investigations. Moreover, instructors were originally selected "without particular reference to their inherent aptitudes and special training as investigators" under a curriculum geared primarily to train administrators. 35 Chapman's experimentation proved rather the exception than the rule. Though of signal importance, his success merely demonstrated the potential significance of academic research. At that point, the schools clearly possessed neither the resources nor the personnel for undertaking comprehensive research programs. Yet, were finances no object, the danger of professional parochialism still might have cautioned one against allocating funds chiefly to this segment of the scientific community. Forestry research institutes, placed in a "university environment," but freed of "academic and pedagogic control" and employing researchers with varied interests and education, could make more profitable use of these funds. Just as scientists in government service would benefit by contact with specialists in allied fields, so, too, might personnel investigating under private auspices. Indeed, a plan for research institutes, set forth in 1929, was designed with this objective in mind. 36 Once a professional spirit (in its fullest sense) prevails, plurality is assured; the rationale for complete separation of research from administration no longer remains compelling. Remedies valid for one period in an agency's development may later become self-defeating; they are, in the words of Maass and Radway, merely tools for the task, not dogma for the ages. 37 Organizations often undergo a metamorphosis as

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the rashness of youth yields to the self-criticism of maturity. One should, therefore, tailor organizational proposals to accompany this transformation. It may be helpful, in this regard, to conceive of developmental history in terms of administrative generations. 38 Crusades implant in their participants attitudes highly resistant to change. Dogma may persist in spite of scientific information to the contrary. But, to those men who did not personally experience the crises that spawned the movement, evangelistic doctrine is much less attractive. One step removed from the scene of struggle, these officials bring to their calling new ideas and a different perspective on policy matters. Still, it is necessary for the crusaders to retire before these men can succeed to positions of authority. Decades may pass while this process unfolds, as we have seen with the Forest Service. Paralleling and as a consequence of this development, a shift occurred in the agency's programmatic emphasis: attention focused on forest protection was redirected to forest management. And gaps in existing knowledge became apparent: possibilities for intensive resource utilization are being explored. Awareness of these gaps has encouraged scientific advance, and support for governmental research has been augmented. Forest Service research appropriations, for example, have risen from $286,578 in 1 9 1 5 , and $1,973,146 in 1938, to almost $5 million in 1949. 39 Although these increases are no greater proportionally than those granted administration, still their impact has established research as a sturdy third leg in the agency's tripartite structure. Interestingly, the Service's present chief, Richard McArdle, is the first to rise through research ranks. As we have seen, McArdle repudiated the proposed revival of evangelism; he expects research to provide the foundation for intensive forest management over the next half century. Moreover, out of an expanding research effort there gradu-

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ally emerges a technology so complex that it eludes the grasp of all but a few educated to comprehend its significance. Transfer of operating personnel to the scientific unit is thereby precluded, and a vital source of administrative influence disappears. It is noteworthy that the number of these men engaged in Service research has dropped sharply since the thirties. In 1937, full-time researchers numbered 442 as against 462 part-time investigators and 565 "casual" workers. Sixteen years later, administrative personnel conducting research comprised but a small fraction of the 1937 figure.40 As bonds linking research to administration are severed, scientists can better discern why their own research has been unproductive. Cognizant of past mistakes, they come to appreciate the value of investigations pursued by researchers with backgrounds in related sciences. Demmon, the director of the Southeastern Station, has recently emphasized the need for research into these "more basic" sciences: biology, ecology (silvics), tree physiology, genetics, forest pathology, and forest entomology. Further, research will undoubtedly applaud as a "healthy trend" a diversified scientific effort by academic institutions and private industry. 41 W h a t is more, research soon spurs nonfederal action through contracts negotiated with private organizations for studies that they are most qualified to make. Balance in an agency's program is thereafter improved by selecting as advisory-council members those who reflect the positions of opposing interest groups—such as the grazing, water-supply, and timber-industry composition of the Service's Forest Research Advisory Committee. Adoption of this procedure almost inevitably impels the establishment of exchanges with other governmental scientific bureaus. In the course of research's evolution, professionalism is heightened. Foresters now look approvingly on a multibased research endeavor. Thus, Hardy L. Shirley (former Dean, New York State School of Forestry) concludes:

ADMINISTRATORS AND

SCIENTISTS

179

The number and diversity of agencies involved assures us of a varied approach to future problems. . . . Contributions by men outside the profession are especially welcome because they bring a fresh approach, a viewpoint uncolored by the forestry training, and new techniques that enrich forest research.42 Operating officials also exhibit greater breadth of vision. The administrative agency is not the monolithic entity it once had been. As Ralph Hosmer (Professor of Forestry, emeritus, Cornell) has said of foresters: While continuing to hold the Forest Service in deep regard, the members of the Society had come to know their own minds and to think for themselves. They had come to realize that in a professional society the dicta of official authority must yield to the personal freedom of judgment of the individual. In short, as one observer of the Society expressed it, the early members had "experienced a process of intellectual release."43 Coupled with a code of ethics* and an independent means of publishing scientific contributions,! professional pressure may free research personnel, in large measure, from administrative restraints. Thus, administrative analysts are forced to consider professional influence, the level at which research presently functions, Service maturation, and the decentralization of the scientific task, before advancing recommendations on a proper setting for research. Curiously, when this stage is reached, one can no longer suggest that divorce would benefit science. * Section 3 of the Code (Society of American Foresters) reads: "He will strive for correct and increasing knowledge of forestry and the dissemination of this knowledge, and will discourage and condemn the spreading of untrue, unfair and exaggerated statements concerning forestry." Section 6 reads: "He will refrain from expressing publicly an opinion on a technical subject unless he is informed as to the facts relating thereto, and will not distort or withhold data of a substantial or other nature for the purpose of substantiating a point of view." t Forest Science, published by the Society of American Foresters.

l8o

FIRE AND WATER

Judged in this framework, transfer of research would probably impede, not hasten, the progress of forestry. Close collaboration between administrators and researchers can lead to most productive results and expedite their application. T h e combined efforts of W . B . Osborne (Chief of Fire Control, North Rocky Mountain Region) and }. V . Hoffmann (Director, North Rocky Mountain Experiment Station), which resulted in the introduction of a fire-danger meter, confirm this view. It is also borne out, Shirley notes, by the successful teamwork of "research specialist and administrator working on producing forests as was developed on the Chippewa National Forest, Minnesota, and in Swiss, German and Danish forests by Berger, Wiedemann, and Moller." 4 4 Intensive resource management demands yet further liaison; the current arrangement for research can satisfy that requirement. Although a certain degree of freedom is necessarily sacrificed through research's affiliation with an action agency, the loss need not prove unduly detrimental to science. In addition to the many groups now engaged in research which are prepared to criticize the federal program, the profession stands as a bulwark against any bureaucratic meddling that threatens to subvert research. Today the Service and the Society of American Foresters are increasingly technical organizations, both "in spirit and in fact." Y e t had research, at the outset, been separated from administration, this reorientation would doubtless have occurred decades earlier. This study, however, is not restricted in its purview merely to the Forest Service. A corresponding mode of analysis may enable one to determine at what point in their growth other research units—such as the Geological Survey and the Soil Survey 45 —may be advantageously combined with administrative organizations (the Bureau of Reclamation and the Soil Conservation Service, for instance) responsible for utilizing

ADMINISTRATORS AND SCIENTISTS

l8l

scientific findings.* Consolidation and divorce are not in themselves ultimate desiderata. Premature unification may stifle research; unduly prolonged separation may limit its usefulness. Only as organizational schemes are related to the programmatic objectives of both adminstrators and scientists do they acquire meaning. Inquiries into the nature of professionalism, and into the character of research and administrative corps, may reveal when either alternative, or its variants, is no longer justified. * Similarly, a study of the Atomic Energy Commission might also yield fruitful insights.

Participants • Notes • Index

Participants and Positions

Albert, Frank. Supervisor, Florida National Forests; Director, Georgia Forest Research Council. Ashe, W . W . Forester, North Carolina Geological Survey ( 1 8 9 2 1 9 0 5 ) ; Forest Inspector, U.S. Forest Service ( 1 9 0 5 - 3 2 ) . Baker, Harry Lee. Assistant Inspector, Division of State Cooperation, R - 7 ( 1 9 2 5 - 2 8 ) ; Florida State Forester ( 1 9 2 8 - 4 0 ) . Barrett, Leonard. Silviculturist, Southern Station; Silviculturist, Appalachian Station. Bates, Carlos G . Forester in Charge, Wagon Wheel Experiment ( 1 9 0 9 - 2 6 ) ; Lake States Station ( 1 9 2 8 - 4 9 ) . Bennett, H. H. Chief, Soil Conservation Service. Bickford, C . A. Silviculturist, Southern Station. Bishop, L. L. Supervisor, Texas National Forests. Boisen, Anton T . Acting Chief of Silvics, U. S. Forest Service. Bond, W . E . Forest Economist, Southern Station. Brooks, J. F . Assistant Regional Forester for Operations, R - 8 . Bruce, David. Forester (fire research), Southern Station. Bryant, Ralph C . Professor of Forestry, Yale University. Bunker, Page. Alabama State Forester ( 1 9 2 7 - 3 9 ) . Burr, Edward. Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers. Butler, Ovid. Executive Secretary, American Forestry Association ( 1 9 2 3 - 4 4 ) ; Executive Director ( 1 9 4 5 ).

i86

PARTICIPANTS AND POSITIONS

Cary, Austin. Logging Engineer ( 1 9 1 0 - 3 5 ) . Chapman, H. H. Professor of Forestry, Yale University; President, Society of American Foresters ( 1 9 3 4 - 3 6 ) . Chittenden, H. M . Various grades from Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers. Clapp, Earle. Forest Inspector, Silviculture ( 1 9 1 1 - 1 5 ) ; Assistant Chief for Research ( 1 9 1 5 - 3 5 ) ; Associate Chief ( 1 9 3 5 - 3 8 ) ; Acting Chief ( 1 9 3 8 - 4 3 ) . Conarro, Raymond. Supervisor, Mississippi National Forests. Connaughton, Charles. Silviculturist ( 1 9 3 4 - 3 6 ) ; Director, Southem Station ( 1 9 4 5 - 5 1 ) ; Regional Forester, R - 8 ( 1 9 5 1 - 5 6 ) . Cooper, John. Naval Stores Program Supervisor. Cope, J. A. Maryland Assistant State Forester. Dana, Samuel T . Assistant Chief, Office of Forest Investigations ( 1 9 1 0 - 1 8 ) ; Assistant Chief for Research ( 1 9 1 9 - 2 1 ) ; Director, Northeast Station ( 1 9 2 3 - 2 7 ) ; Professor of Forestry, University of Michigan ( 1 9 2 7 - 5 0 ) , now Dean emeritus. Darling, J. N. ( " D i n g " ) . Cartoonist; Chief, U. S. Biological Survey (1934-35)Davis, Kenneth. Chief, Forest Management Research (1944-45); Professor of Forestry, University of Michigan ( 1 9 4 9 - ). De Loach, Guyton. Georgia State Forester. Demmon, E . L. Silviculturist, Southern Station ( 1 9 2 5 - 2 8 ) ; Director, Southern Station (1928-44); Director, Lake States Station ( 1 9 4 4 - 5 1 ) ; Director, Southeast Station ( 1 9 5 1 - 5 6 ) . Dutton, Walter. Chief, Division of Grazing. Eberly, H. J. Inspector, Cooperative Fire Control Division, Branch of State and Private Forestry, R - 8 ( 1 9 3 0 - 3 9 ) . Eisenhower, Milton. Director of Information, U. S. Department of Agriculture [USDA] (1928-40); Director, Office of LandUse Coordination, USDA ( 1 9 3 7 - 4 2 ) . Eldredge, Inman F . Supervisor, Florida National Forests ( 1 9 0 9 1 7 ) ; Director, Southern Forest Survey ( 1 9 3 2 - 4 4 ) . Evans, C. F . Assistant Regional Forester for State and Private Forestry, R - 8 ( 1 9 3 0 - 5 0 ) . Evans, R. M . Assistant District Forester, R - 7 ( 1 9 2 2 - 3 4 ) . Fernow, B. E . Chief, Division of Forestry (1886-98); Professor of Forestry, N.Y.S. College of Forestry at Cornell ( 1 8 9 8 1903); Professor of Forestry, University of Toronto ( 1 9 0 7 - 2 3 ) . Fitzwater, J. A. Assistant Chief for State and Private Forestry.

PARTICIPANTS AND POSITIONS

187

Forbes, R . D. Louisiana State Forester ( 1 9 1 7 - 2 1 ) ; Director, Southern Station ( 1 9 2 1 - 2 7 ) . Forsling, C . L . Assistant Chief for Research ( 1 9 3 7 - 4 4 ) . Fowler, F . H. Director, Drainage Basin Survey, N R C . Frank, Bernard. Senior Forester, Watershed Survey ( 1 9 3 8 - 4 1 ) ; Forester assigned to Technical Review Board for U S D A Flood Control Coordinating Committee ( 1 9 4 1 - 4 3 ) . Frost, S. L . Acting Texas Forester. Frothingham, E . H . Director, Appalachian Station ( 1 9 2 2 - 3 5 ) . Gemmer, Eugene, Jr. Forester, Choctawhatchee National Forest ( 1 9 2 6 - 3 1 ) ; Silviculturist, Southern Station ( 1 9 3 1 - 4 4 ) . Glick, Philip. Chief, U S D A Land Policy Division; Assistant Solicitor, U S D A ( 1 9 3 4 - 4 2 ) . Granger, C . M . Assistant Chief for National Forest Administration (1935)• Graves, Henry. Professor of Forestry, Yale University ( 1 9 0 0 - 1 0 ) ; Chief Forester ( 1 9 1 0 - 2 0 ) . Gray, L . C . B A E representative, Flood Control Coordinating Committee, U S D A . Greeley, William B . Forest Assistant, Regional Forester, North Rocky Mountain Region ( 1 9 0 4 - 1 7 ) ; Chief Forester ( 1 9 2 0 28). Greene, S. W . Animal Husbandman, B A I , in charge of McNeil Station (Mississippi). Grover, Nathan. Chief Hydrographer, U . S. Geological Survey (1913)• Hadley, E . W . Silviculturist, Southern Station. Haig, Irvine T . Chief, Division of Forest Management Research ( 1 9 3 8 - 4 3 ) ; Director, Southeast Station ( 1 9 4 4 - 5 1 ) . Hall, William L . Chief, Branch of Forest Products ( 1 9 0 5 - 1 0 ) ; Chief, Section of Land Acquisition ( 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 ) . Hardtner, Henry. President, Urania Lumber Co. (Louisiana). Harper, Roland. Botanist, Alabama Polytechnic Institute. Harper, V . L., Jr. Forester, Southern Station ( 1 9 2 7 - 2 9 ) ; Leader, field studies ( 1 9 2 9 - 3 5 ) ; Chief, field division, Forest Management Research ( 1 9 3 5 - 3 7 ) ; Assistant Chief of Forest Management Research ( 1 9 3 7 - 4 3 ) ; Chief, Forest Economics ( 1 9 4 3 4 5 ) ; Director, Northeast Station ( 1 9 4 5 - 5 1 ) ; Assistant Chief for Research ( 1 9 5 1 ). Hartman, Arthur. Ranger, Ouachita National Forest (Arkansas);

i88

PARTICIPANTS AND POSITIONS

Supervisor, Kisatchie National Forest (Louisiana); Assistant Regional Forester for Fire Control, R - 8 . Harts, William. District Engineer for Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers (Major, Corps of Engineers). Hastings, A. B . Chief, Division of State Cooperation. Headley, Roy. Chief, Division of Operations ( 1 9 1 9 - 3 5 ) ; Chief, Division of Fire Control ( 1 9 3 5 - 4 2 ) . Henry, A . J . Meteorologist, Weather Bureau. Heyward, Frank. Silviculturist, Southern Station ( 19??—37) ; Georgia State Forester ( 1 9 3 7 - 3 9 ) . Hine, W . R . Forest Assistant, Southern Station ( 1 9 2 1 - 2 4 ) ; Assistant Silviculturist, Southern Station ( 1 9 2 4 - 2 5 ) ; Louisiana State Forester ( 1 9 2 5 - 2 9 ) ; Executive Secretary, S A F ( 1 9 2 9 3 4 ) ; Inspector for State and Private Forestry, R - 8 ( 1 9 3 4 - 4 6 ) ; Chief, Information and Education, R - 8 ( 1 9 4 7 - 5 7 ) . Hoffman, J. V . Director, North Rocky Mountain Station. Hough, Franklin B . Chief, Division of Forestry ( 1 8 7 6 - 8 3 ) . Hoyt, W . G . Hydrographie Engineer, Conservation Branch, U S G S ; Geological Survey representative on W R C Vegetal Cover Subcommittee. Hursch, Charles. Chief, Division of Watershed Management Research, Southeastern Station. Kadel, Benjamin C . Forecaster at W a g o n Wheel Station, Weather Bureau. Kelso, M . M . B A E representative on U S D A Flood Control Coordinating Committee; Head Agricultural Economist, B A E (1938-41). Kircher, Joseph. Regional Forester, R - 8 ( 1 9 7 7 - 4 6 ) . Kittredge, Joseph. Chief, Office of Forest Experiment Stations ( 1 9 1 9 - 2 3 ) ; Silviculturist, Lake States Station ( 1 9 2 3 - 3 1 ) ; Professor of Forestry, University of California ( 1 9 3 2 - 5 4 ) , now Professor emeritus. Kneipp, L . F . Chief, Division of Land Acquisition. Kotok, Edward. Director, California Station ( 1 9 2 6 - 4 1 ) ; Assistant Chief, State and Private Forestry ( 1 9 4 1 - 4 4 ) ; Assistant Chief for Research ( 1 9 4 4 ). Lette, F . A. Conservator of the forests of Burma. Leigh ton, M . O. Chief Hydrographer, Geological Survey ( 1 9 0 6 -

PARTICIPANTS AND POSITIONS

189

Long, W . H. Forest Pathologist, Bureau of Plant Industry ( 1 9 1 1 37). Loveridge, Earl. Assistant Chief for Operations and Information (1935-55)Lowdermilk, Walter. Senior Silviculturist in charge of erosion, streamflow investigations, California Station (1928-33); Assistant Director, Soil Erosion Service, Department of Interior ( 1 9 3 3 - 3 5 ) ; Chief of Research, S C S ( 1 9 3 5 - 3 9 ) ; Assistant Chief, S C S ( 1 9 3 9 - 4 7 ) . Lufburrow, B. F . Georgia State Forester ( 1 9 2 5 - 3 6 ) . McArdle, Richard. Director, Rocky Mountain Station, Appalachian Station ( 1 9 3 8 - 4 4 ) ; Assistant Chief for State and Private Forestry ( 1 9 4 4 - 5 2 ) ; Chief Forester ( 1 9 5 2 ). McCarthy, E . F . Silviculturist, Southern Station ( 1 9 2 1 - 2 7 ) ; Director, Central States Station ( 1 9 2 7 - 3 1 ) . McKinney, A. L . Silviculturist, Appalachian Station; Silviculturist, Southern Station. Marvin, C . F . Chief, Weather Bureau ( 1 9 1 3 - 3 4 ) . Mattoon, Wilbur. Forest Examiner ( 1 9 1 2 - 2 2 ) ; Extension Forester, Bureau of Public Relations ( 1 9 2 2 - 4 1 ) . Merrill, Fred. Mississippi State Forester. Moore, Barrington. Forester. Moore, Willis. Chief, Weather Bureau ( 1 8 9 5 - 1 9 1 3 ) . Morrell, Fred. Assistant Forester for Public Relations ( 1 9 2 9 - 3 5 ) . Munger, Thornton T . Forest Assistant, Forest Examiner and Silviculturist ( 1 9 0 8 - 2 4 ) ; Director, Northeast Station ( 1 9 2 4 - 3 8 ) . Munns, Edward N . Assistant California State Forester ( 1 9 2 1 - 2 3 ) ; Chief, Office of Forest Experiment Stations ( 1 9 2 3 - 3 7 ) ; Chief, Division of Forest Influences ( 1 9 3 7 - 5 1 ) ; representative on U S D A Flood Control Coordinating Committee ( 1 9 3 7 4 3 ) ; representative on N R P B Land and Water Committees (1936-42). Müntz, H. H. Research Forester, Southern Station ( 1 9 3 4 - 5 1 ) . Nelson, Arthur. Division of Timber Management. Newcomb, Larry. Ranger, Osceola National Forest (Florida). Oettmeier, William. President, Superior Pine Products C o . (Fargo, Ga.) Osborne, W . B . Chief of Fire Control, North Rocky Mountain Region.

xgo

PARTICIPANTS AND POSITIONS

Patrick, Austin. S C S representative on U S D A Flood Control Coordinating Committee. Pessin, L . J. Associate Ecologist, Southern Station. Peters, J. Girvin. Acting Assistant Forester for Public Relations. Pinchot, Gifford. Chief Forester ( 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 1 0 ) . Ringland, Arthur S. Chairman, U S D A Flood Control Coordinating Committee ( 1 9 3 7 - 3 9 ) . Rowalt, E . M . Chief writer, Office of Land-Use Coordination. Shaw, A. C . Supervisor, Florida National Forests; Assistant Regional Forester for Timber Management, Range Management, and Wildlife Management ( 1 9 3 4 - 4 3 ) . Shepard, Ward. Acting Assistant Forester for Public Relations. Sherman, E . A. Associate Forester ( 1 9 2 0 - 3 5 ) . Siggers, P. V . Associate Pathologist, Division of Forest Pathology, Bureau of Plant Industry. Silcox, Ferdinand A. Chief Forester ( 1 9 3 3 - 3 9 ) . Sims, Ivan H . Silviculturist, Northeast Station. Stabler, Herman, Chief, Conservation Branch, U S G S , representative on W R C Vegetal Cover Subcommittee. Stauffer, J. M . Alabama State Forester. Stokes, J. W . Acting Chief of Forest Investigations. Stone, J. Herbert. Southern Regional Forester ( 1 9 4 6 - 5 1 ) . Stuart, Robert Y . Assistant Chief for Public Relations ( 1 9 2 7 - 2 8 ) ; Chief Forester ( 1 9 2 8 - 3 3 ) . Tate, Thomas. Federal Power Commission representative (and Chairman) on W R C Vegetal Cover Subcommittee. Thompson, Pat. Chief, Division of Fire Control. Thornthwaite, C . W . Chief, Climatic and Physiographic Division, SCS (1935-46). Toumey, J. W . Professor of Forestry, Yale University. Wahlenberg, W . G . Silviculturist, Southern Station ( 1 9 2 7 - 4 6 ) ; Silviculturist, Southeastern Station ( 1 9 4 6 ). Wakeley, Philip. Silviculturist, Southern Station ( 1 9 2 4 ). Watts, Lyle F . Chief Forester ( 1 9 4 3 - 5 2 ) . Wheeler, H. N . Lecturer, U . S. Forest Service. White, Gilbert. Secretary, Water Resources Committee. W i l m , Harold. Silviculturist, Rocky Mountain Station ( 1 9 3 8 - 4 8 ) ; Silviculturist, Southern Station ( 1 9 4 8 - 4 9 ) ; Chief of Flood Control Surveys, Pacific Northwest Station ( 1 9 4 9 - 5 1 ) ; Chief,

PARTICIPANTS AND POSITIONS

191

Division of Forest Influences Research ( 1 9 5 1 - 5 3 ) ; Associate Dean, College of Forestry, State University of New York (1953)• W y m a n , Lenthall. Associate Silviculturist, Southern Station (1921-34). Zon, Raphael. Chief of Forest Investigations ( 1 9 0 7 - 2 2 ) ; Director, Lake States Station ( 1 9 2 3 - 4 5 ) .

Notes

Department of Agriculture records were found in the "greenhouse" of its South Building (abbreviated as U S D A R C in notes). Recent Forest Service documents were inspected in an attic of the South Building (cited as F S R ) . Other Forest Service papers are in the custody of the National Archives (cited as F S F ) , as are records of the Weather Bureau ( W B R ) , the Soil Conservation Service ( S C S F ) , and the National Resources Planning Board ( N R P B F ) . T h e Chapman Papers ( C P ) may be consulted in the Library of the Yale School of Forestry. T h e reader will observe that some statements in the text lack documentation. I have been obliged to respect the wishes of those correspondents who have indicated a desire to remain anonymous. Such confidential material is, however, in my possession. Chapter 1.

Crusaders and Scientists

1. Gifford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1 9 4 7 ) , p. 134. 2. John Ise, The United States Forest Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 2 0 ) , pp. 42, 128. 3. Norman W e n g e r t , Natural Resources and the Political Struggle, Short Studies in Political Science 24 (Garden C i t y : Doubleday, 1 9 5 5 ) , p. 2 1 .

194

NOTES TO C H A P T E R

1

4. E. N. Munns, "The Organization and Development of the Federal Forest Experiment Stations," in Proceedings, 40th Annual Convention, Association of Land Grant Colleges (1927), p. 186. 5. House, Hearings, "Reforestation, Pollution of Streams," Agriculture, 70 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 107. 6. Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Conservation, 1 9 1 1 45, General Services Administration, F D R Library, 2 vols. (New York, 1957), II, 971. 7. Forest Service, "Research in The United States Forest Service," [processed] National Archives, Forest Service Files [hereafter cited as FSF], Jan. 10, 1938. 8. Ibid., p. 13. 9. Alfred Stedman, "Public Information and the Preservation of Democracy," Yearbook of Agriculture for 1940, Farmers in A Changing World, p. 1076. 10. Munns, p. 186. 1 1 . William B. Greeley, Forests and Men (Garden City: Doubleday, 1 9 5 1 ) , p- 2 1 6 .

12. Gifford Pinchot, The Fight For Conservation (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1 9 1 0 ) , pp. 106-107. 13. Charles M. Hardin, The Politics 0/ Agriculture (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), p. 248. 14. U. S. v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 ( 1 9 1 1 ) . 15. Pinchot, Breaking New Ground, p. 303. 16. Harold W . Stoke, "Executive Responsibility and the Growth of Propaganda," American Political Science Review, 35:498-9 (June 1941). 17. Edward Higbee, The American Oasis (New York: Knopf, 1957), p. 252. "The estimates are that 95 per cent of our public research is devoted to tasks where the probability of success is high because the research follows known rules and the paths of past attainment" (p. 2 5 1 ) . 18. Earle Clapp, "Research in the United States Forest Service, A Study in Objectives," National Plan For American Forestry, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Document 12, p. 652. 19. Memo of Earle Clapp to Henry Graves, "Organization for Silvical Investigations in the National Forest Districts," FSF, Dec. 5, 1916, pp. 3-7. 20. Earle Clapp, "The Decennial of The McSweeney-McNary Act," Journal of Forestry, 36:834 (1938). 21. Forest Service, Forest Service Manual, p. 1. 22. Forest Service, "Research in The United States Forest Service," FSF, Jan. 10, 1938, p. 13. 23. U.S.C. 5 1 1 . 24. T . Swann Harding, "Information Techniques of the Department of Agriculture," Public Opinion Quarterly, 1:84-5 (Jan. 1 9 3 7 ) . 25. Quoted in J. A. R. Pimlott, Public Relations and American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 5 1 ) , p. 73. 26. House, Replies from Federal Agencies to Questionnaire submitted by the Special Subcommittee on Government Information Programs,

CRUSADERS AND SCIENTISTS

195

Committee on Government Operations, Committee Print (Nov. 1 , 1 9 5 5 ) , 84 Cong., 1 Sess. 27. Forest Service, Annual Report for 1948, p. 22. See C. J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1 9 4 1 ) , p. 398. 28. G . A. Pearson, "The Administration of A Forest Experiment Station," Forestry Quarterly, 1 2 : 2 2 1 ( 1 9 1 4 ) . 29. L. F. Kneipp, "A National System of Experimental Forests and Ranges," Science, Nov. 28, 1930. 30. Forest Service, "Research in The United States Forest Service," F S F , Jan. 10, 1938, p. 57. 31. H. L. Mitchell, "Getting Research Results into Practice," presented at a technical staff meeting, Southern Station, New Orleans, FSF, Feb. 8, 1945. 32. Earle Clapp, "The Contributions of American Forest Research," Journal of Forestry, 1 5 : 1 7 4 (Feb. 1 9 1 7 ) . 33. Munns, p. 190. 34. A. Hunter Dupree, Science in The Federal Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 154. 35. Forest Service, "Research in the United States Forest Service," F S F , Jan. 10, 1938, pp. 56-8. 36. Forest Service, National Plan, p. 655. 37. Forest Service, "Research in The United States Forest Service," F S F , Jan. 10, 1938, p. 29. 38. Letter of Silcox to Clapp, FSF, Oct. 1, 1934, pp. 1 - 3 . 39. D. C. Everest, "Solving Forest Problems," Report of Conference of Commercial Forestry, Chamber of Commerce (1927), pp. 2 1 - 3 . 40. Memo of Earle Clapp for The Forester, FSF, May 19, 1935, pp. 1-8. Chapter 2.

Forests and Fire: Defining the Research Problem

1. P. L. Buttrick, "Commercial Uses of Longleaf Pine," American Forestry, 21:902 (Sept. 1 9 1 5 ) . 2. E. Murray Bruner, "Progress in Forest Protection in the South," Journal of Forestry, 26:304-9 (1928). 3. H. H. Chapman, "Organization of State Forest Protective Systems," Proceedings, Southern Forestry Congress ( 1 9 1 6 ) , p. 85. 4. When Louisiana finally vitalized its forestry apparatus in 1918, it directed the state forester to "give his special attention to the fire problem as the most vital forestry work now before the State." "Louisiana Forestry Law Goes into Effect," American Forestry, 24:298 (May 1 9 1 8 ) . It should be noted that fire protection continues to be the pre-eminent concern of most state foresters. Luther H. Gulick, American Forest Policy —A Study of Government Administration and Economic Control (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1 9 5 1 ) , p. 148. 5. E. L. Demmon, "Twenty Years of Forest Research in the Lower South," Journal of Forestry, 40:34 (1942).

196

NOTES TO CHAPTER

2

6. Arthur W . Hartman, "Fire as a Tool in Southern Pine," Trees, Yearbook of Agriculture for 1949, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., House Document 29, P- 5177. Leroy Watson, Jr., "Controlled Burning and the Management of Longleaf Pine," Journal of Forestry, 38:44 (Jan. 1 9 4 0 ) . 8. H. H. Chapman, "Is the Longleaf Pine a Climax?" Ecology, 1 3 : 3 3 1 (Oct. 1 9 3 2 ) . 9. Ellen Call Long, "Forest Fires in Southern Pine," Forest Leaves, 2:94 ( 1 8 8 9 ) . 10. Charles Mohr, The Timber Pines of the Southern United States, Bulletin 1 3 , Division of Forestry ( 1 8 9 6 ) , p. 65. 1 1 . Gifford Pinchot, " T h e Relation of Forests and Forest Fires," National Geographic Magazine, 10:398 (Oct. 1 8 9 9 ) . In this same article Pinchot insisted that Douglas fir owed its existence to fire which suppressed hemlock growth (p. 4 0 2 ) . In another report Pinchot informed the state of New Jersey that an "occasional light surface fire" might be used as a hazard-reduction measure in the rather fire-resistant pitch-pine stands of southern New Jersey, in the absence of adequate organized fire services. He was convinced, nevertheless, that "forest fires encourage a spirit of lawlessness and a disregard of property rights." Appendix to Annual Report for 1898 of State Geologist of New Jersey, " A Study of Forest Fires and W o o d Production in Southern New Jersey," Geological Survey of New Jersey, pp. 1 9 - 2 1 . 1 2 . G . Frederick Schwarz, The Longleaf Pine in Virgin Forest—A Silvical Study (New York: John Wiley, 1 9 0 7 ) , pp. 24, 7 1 . 1 3 . T h e "textbook silviculture" of this period often alluded to the desired germination of seed on "bare mineral soil." F . S. Baker, "Silviculture," in Fifty Years of Forestry in the U.S.A., ed. Robert Winters (Washington: Society of American Foresters, 1 9 5 0 ) , p. 70. Graves advised woodland owners of southern New England: " I t sometimes happens that pine seeds do not germinate on a dry matting of needles and leaves. Under these circumstances reproduction is assisted by burning off surface litter." The Woodlot, Bureau of Forestry, Bulletin 42 ( 1 9 0 3 ) , p. 1 8 . 1 4 . Thornton T . Munger, " T h e Future of Longleaf Pine," Forest Service Files [hereafter cited as F S F ] , 1907, p. 2. 1 5 . Boison to Helen E . Gaulden, F S F , Aug. 29, 1907. 16. Zon to Hugh Garden, F S F , Aug. 29, 1907. 1 7 . Henry Graves, Protection of Forests from Fire, Bulletin 82, Forest Service ( 1 9 1 0 ) , p. 27. 18. S. J. Holmes and J. H. Foster, Condition of Cutover Longleaf Pine Lands in Mississippi, Circular 149, Forest Service ( 1 9 0 8 ) , p. 6. 19. H. H . Chapman, "Pinus Palustris—Conclusions Regarding Longleaf Pine Drawn from Studies Made by the Senior Class of the Yale Forestry School in Clay and Coosa Counties, Alabama," F S F , Spring 1908, p. 2. 20. H. H . Chapman, " A Method of Studying Growth and Yield of Longleaf Pine Applied in Tyler County, Texas," Proceedings, Society of American Foresters, 4 : 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 ( 1 9 0 9 ) .

DEFINING THE RESEARCH

PROBLEM

197

2 1 . R. C. Bryant, "Some Notes on the Central Pine Forests of Central Alabama," Proceedings, Society of American Foresters, 4:72-83 (1909). 22. Inman F. Eldredge, "Fire Problem on the Florida National Forest," Journal of Forestry, 6:166 ( 1 9 1 1 ) . 23. H. H. Chapman, "Forest Fires and Forestry in the Southern States," American Forestry, 1 8 : 5 1 2 (Aug. 1 9 1 2 ) . 24. Roland M. Harper, "A Defense of Forest Fires," Literary Digest, (review of "Government Report on Forests" originally published by Alabama Geological Survey), 47:208 (Aug. 9, 1 9 1 3 ) . 25. Wilbur R. Mattoon, "Slash Pine—An Important Second-Growth Tree," Proceedings. Society of American Foresters, 1 1 : 4 0 5 (Oct. 1 9 1 6 ) . 26. H. H. Chapman, "The Initiation and Early Stages of Research on Natural Reforestation of Longleaf Pine," Journal of Forestry, 46:505 (1948). 27. J. W . Toumey, "The Regeneration of Southern Forests," Proceedings, Southern Forestry Congress (July 1 1 - 1 5 , 1 9 1 6 ) , p. 1 5 1 . E. F. Andrews took essentially the same position in "Agency of Fire in Propagation of Longleaf Pine," Botanical Gazette, 64:503 ( 1 9 1 7 ) . 28. H. H. Chapman, "Prescribed Burning Versus Public Forest Fire Services," Journal of Forestry, 45:804 (1947). 29. J. W. Stokes (Acting Chief of Forest Investigations) to James M. Mitchell, FSF, August 13, 1918. 30. B. F. Fernow, review of R. D. Forbes' "Forest and Grass Fires in Louisiana," Bulletin 6, Louisiana Department of Conservation, in Journal of Forestry, 16:932 (Dec. 1 9 1 8 ) . 3 1 . Cary to William L. Wilson, FSF, May 13, 1 9 2 1 . 32. R. D. Forbes, "Forest Fires in the Southern Coastal Plain," FSF, revision of June 10, 1924 (never published), p. 46. 33. Ibid., p. 54. 34. E. F. McCarthy, comments on "Forest Fires in the Southern Coastal Plain," FSF, Dec. 1 1 , 1925. 35. Wilbur Mattoon, Longleaf Pine, Bulletin 1061, Department of Agriculture (July 29, 1922), p. 37. 36. Wilbur Mattoon, Longleaf Pine Primer, Farmers' Bulletin i486, Department of Agriculture (1926), pp. 3-4. Farmers' Bulletin 1256, issued in May 1922, on slash pine suggested the use of fire for seedbed preparation (p. 29). This advice was deleted from the revised edition of 1931. 37. Wilbur Mattoon, Making Woodlands Profitable in the Southern States, Farmer's Bulletin 1071, Department of Agriculture ( 1 9 2 2 ) , p. 24. 38. Lenthall Wyman, "Results from Sample Plots in Southern Pine Experiments," Journal of Forestry, 20:784 (1922). Wyman indicates that S. T . Dana, Assistant Chief of Forest Investigations, established the Roberts plots. 39. Stuart to Chapman, Chapman Papers [hereafter cited as CP], vol. 1 1 5 , Nov. 10, 1 9 3 1 . 40. Earle Clapp, A National Program of Forest Research (Washington: published by American Tree Association for Society of American Foresters, 1926), p. 66.

198

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2

41. Lenthall Wyman, p. 785. See note in W . R. B. Hine's "Hogs, Fire and Disease versus Longleaf Pine," Southern Lumberman, 1 1 9 : 4 5 - 4 6 (May 2, 1925). 42. W . W . Ashe, "The Establishment of Longleaf Pine, A Review of Professor Chapman's Paper on the Establishment of This Species," 1926, p. 1 (copy in Herbarium Library, Harvard University). 43. Forest Service, minutes of Service Committee meeting, FSF, Nov. 17, 1927. 44. E. L. Demmon and E. W . Hadley, review of Chapman, "CutOver Lands in LaSalle Parish, La., and Natural Reproduction of Longleaf Pine," in Journal of Forestry, 2 4 : 8 1 1 ( 1 9 2 5 ) . 45. Erie Kauffman, "The Southland Revisited," American Forests, 6 1 : 1 3 (Sept. 1955). 46. Harry Lee Baker, "Tree Growth Retarded by Fires; Young Trees Killed; Soil Depleted," Yearbook of Agriculture for 1927, p. 635. 47. E. L. Demmon, "Fires and Forest Growth," American Forests and Forest Life, 35:273 (1929). 48. Page Bunker, "Some Notes on the Longleaf Pine," Alabama Forest News, 2:4 (June 1928). 49. "Southern Forestry Educational Project," American Forests, 35:569 (Sept. 1929). 50. "Two Years with the Dixie Crusaders," American Forests, 36:582 (Sept. 1930). 51. "Florida Association Votes Extension of Educational Project," American Forests, 37:239 (Apr. 1931). 52. Forest Service, A Light Burning Policy for the South, FSF, Aug. 25, 1927, p. 453. Forest Service, "Fire in the Southern Pine Region," memo for field use, FSF, Mar. 1927, pp. 1 - 3 . 54. Forest Service memo for PR from R. E. Marsh (Acting Assistant Forester), FSF, Sept. 3, 1927, pp. 1 - 2 . 55. Demmon to Peters, FSF, Mar. 2, 1928, pp. 2 - 3 . 56. Frank Heyward, Jr., "Austin Cary, Yankee Peddler in Forestry," American Forests, 61:29 (June 1955). 57. Source confidential, but see "Memorandum on Affairs and Proposed Work in the South" by Austin Cary, FSF, July 15, 1918. 58. R. M. Conarro, "Rough Draft of Memo for the Regional Forester," quoting A. C. Shaw, FSF, Aug. 19, 1942. 59. W . G. Wahlenberg, S. W . Greene, and H. R. Reed, Effects of Fire and Cattle Grazing on Longleaf Pine Lands as Studied at McNeill, Miss., Technical Bulletin 683, Department of Agriculture (1939), p. 46. 60. R. D. Forbes, "Forest Fires in the Southern Coastal Plain," revision of June 10, 1924, FSF, p. 24. 61. R. D. Forbes, "Fire Problems in the Southern Pine Region," Proceedings, Forest Experiment Station Conference, Madison, Wisconsin (Mar, 1 0 - 2 2 , 1924), p. 20. 62. E. N. Munns, "The Organization and Development of the Federal

DEFINING THE RESEARCH

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Forest Experiment Stations," in Proceedings, 40th Annual Convention, Association of Land Grant Colleges (1927), p. 193. 63. Forest Service, Woodsburning in the South, Leaflet 40, Forest Service (May 1929), p. 2. 64. S. W . Greene, speech read before meeting of American Forestry Association, Feb. 1929, in memo of Ward Shepard to Munns, FSF, Mar. 30, 1929, p. 4. 65. Duthie to Morrell, FSF, July 11, 1930. 66. Morrell to Duthie, FSF, Oct. 6, 1930. 67. R. D. Forbes, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices in the Southern Pine Region, Technical Bulletin 204, Forest Service (Oct. 1930), pp. 7, 1 0 1 . 68. C. F. Evans, review of Technical Bulletin 204, in Forest Worker (Jan. 1931)' P- 2 469. Greene to Chapman, CP, vol. 1 1 2 , Nov. 11, 1 9 3 1 . 70. Forest Service, minutes of Service Committee meeting, FSF, Feb. 1 2 , 1931, P- 57 1 . Forest Service, "Guide to Field Trip and Description of Experimental Areas at the Urania Branch of Southern Forest Experiment Station," 7th Annual Meeting, Southern Forest Research Advisory Council, FSF, Nov. 7, 1930. 72. Greene to Chapman, CP, vol. m , Aug. 5, 1 9 3 1 . 73. H. H. Chapman, "Report of a Prescribed Fire at Urania, La., on Longleaf Pine Land," Journal of Forestry, 4 5 : 1 2 1 (Feb. 1947). Also, Herbert L. Stoddard, The Bobwhite Quail: Its Habits, Preservation and Increase (New York: Scribner's, 1 9 3 1 ) . Aldo Leopold threw his support behind Stoddard. See Leopold to Chapman, CP, vol. 111, Aug. 7, 1 9 3 1 . 74. Greene to Chapman, CP, vol. 1 1 2 , Nov. 9, 1 9 3 1 . 75. Butler to Greene, CP, vol. 111, June 25, 1 9 3 1 . 76. R. M. Evans to Chapman, CP, vol. 1 1 4 , June 20, 1 9 3 1 . 77. R. Y. Stuart (Chief Forester) to George D. Pratt (President of AFA), CP, vol. 1 1 4 , June 24, 1 9 3 1 . 78. Fred Morrell, statement on fire problem, FSF, July 1, 1 9 3 1 , p. 6. (Includes Eberly's criticism.) 79. Butler to Chapman, CP, vol. 1 1 4 , June 29, 1 9 3 1 . 80. Eisenhower to Mohler, CP, vol. 1 1 1 , July 30, 1 9 3 1 . 81. Letter to the author, October 7, 1957. It is probable that Butler was in a more receptive mood than Greene supposed, for Chapman had said in a letter to Austin Cary on July 2, 1 9 3 1 , "Butler is just as sore as Greene is." CP, vol. 1 1 4 . 82. S. W . Greene, "The Forest That Fire Made," American Forests, 37:583 (Oct. 1 9 3 1 ) . 83. H. H. Chapman, "Fire—Master or Servant?" American Forests, 37:605 (Oct. 1 9 3 1 ) . 84. Greene, "The Forest That Fire Made," p. 618. 85. "Harmful or Beneficial?" editorial, Southern Lumberman, 144:20 (Oct. 1 5 , 1 9 3 1 ) -

200

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Chapter 3.

3

Forests and Fire: Administrative Travail

1 . H . H. Chapman, "Successful Reproduction of Longleaf Pine on Norfolk Soils," Forest Worker (Sept. 1 9 3 1 ) , p. 1 7 . 2. A. L . McKinney, "Longleaf Pines Subjected to Thirteen Years' Light Burning Show Retarded Growth," Forest Worker (Sept. 1 9 3 1 ) » p. 1 0 . 3. Evans to Hastings, F S F , Aug. 2 1 , 1 9 3 1 , p. 1 . 4. V . H. Sonderegger (State Forester of Louisiana) to Chapman, C P , vol. 1 1 4 , Oct. 27, 1 9 3 1 . 5. D . E . Lauderburn to Chapman, C P , vol. 1 1 4 , Oct. 30, 1 9 3 1 . 6. Chapman to Stuart, C P , vol. 1 1 5 , Nov. 16, 1 9 3 1 . 7. Stuart to Chapman, C P , vol. 1 1 5 , Nov. 10, 1 9 3 1 . 8. Clapp to Demmon, F S F , July 25, 1 9 3 2 , p. 3. 9. H. H . Chapman, "Some Further Relations of Fire to Longleaf Pine," Journal of Forestry, 30:604 (May 1 9 3 2 ) . 10. Southern Forest Experiment Station, Twelfth Annual Report ( 1 9 3 2 ) , p. 10. 1 1 . Demmon to Chapman, C P , vol. 1 1 5 , Dec. 1 5 , 1 9 3 1 . Interestingly, Munns (Director of Silvics) also desired to purge himself of sins committed on behalf of complete fire protection. Reviewing a report on a light burning study being carried on in Africa, Munns wrote: " I t is only through sound investigations that we shall be able to arrive at the truth, and what may be true for one vegetative type of ecological condition may not be true for another. Generalizations based on limited knowledge of conditions in one region have been held all too freely to apply widely to other regions where conditions are entirely dissimilar. In spite of all our beliefs and in spite of research to date, there is yet much to learn as to the possible use of fire in land management. Less loose talk and more clear thinking should characterize American consideration of the problem." E . N . Munns, " A Light Burning Study in South Africa," Forest Worker, January 1 9 3 2 , p. 24. 1 2 . E . L. Demmon, "Fires in the Southern Pine Region," F S F , Apr. 27, 1 9 3 2 , PP- i - 5 1 3 . Evans to Demmon, F S F , May 3, 1 9 3 2 . 1 4 . Forest Service, National Plan for American Forestry, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Document 1 2 , p. 673. 1 5 . Eberly to Morrell, F S F , Apr. 19, 1 9 3 2 . Eberly later told Morrell, F S F (Apr. 25, 1 9 3 2 ) : "Please do not misunderstand my attitude or purpose in writing this letter. I wish to make it absolutely clear that I am not advocating controlled burning, but I am writing to see if it might not be high time to devise some means for our learning more about the use of fire as a protective measure, rather than to arbitrarily condemn its use. If there is anything to this use of fire as a practical and desirable protection measure I certainly feel that we should be the first to learn of it, rather than to wait and have some of the private owners find out while we stand by saying that it can't be done. . . . I would like to see some man like Cary put on a project to work with the southern states. . . . "

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201

16. Mattoon to A. B. Hastings, F S F , undated. 1 7 . Forest Service, "Federal Policy Relating to Controlled Burning in Longleaf Pine Region," Forest Worker (July 1 9 3 2 ) , p. 7. 18. Bunker to Eberly, F S F , June 28, 1932. 19. Texas Forest Service, "Loblolly Pine Encroaching on Longleaf Pine Sites," Texas Forest News, 1 5 : 1 - 2 (Jan. 1 9 3 3 ) . 20. C . F. Evans to Cary, F S F , Feb. 28, 1933. 2 1 . Georgia Department of Forestry and Geological Development, "Is Control Burning a Sound Forest Practice?" Forestry-Geological Review, 4 : 1 (Nov. 1 9 3 4 ) . 22. Hastings to Cary, F S F , Feb. 1 3 , 1935. 23. Oettmeier to Chapman, CP, July 1 7 , 1956 (unbound as of May 1957)24. James Mixon, "Progress of Protection from Forest Fires in the South," Journal of Forestry, 54:651 (Oct. 1 9 5 6 ) . 25. Hastings to Cary, F S F , Feb. 1 3 , 1935. 26. Munns to Demmon, F S F , June 6, 1934. 27. Mississippi Forestry Commission, Fourth Biennial Report (June 30, 1 9 3 3 ) , pp. 2 0 - 1 . 28. Southern Forest Experiment Station, Fourteenth Annual Report (1934). P- 729. P. V . Siggers, "Observations on the Influence of Fire on the Brownspot Needle Blight of Longleaf Pine Seedlings," Journal of Forestry, 32:556 (1934). 30. Demmon to Chapman, CP, vol. 1 1 6 , Aug. 16, 1934. 3 1 . Clapp to Chapman, C P , vol. 1 1 6 , June 29, 1934. 32. Silcox to Kircher, citing R ( F ) supervision letter of October 1 , 1934, F S F , Apr. 5, 1938, pp. 2 - 3 . 33. Loveridge to Granger, F S F , Sept. 6, 1935. Loveridge began his statement: "Basically, however, it seems to me to be a question of whether or not the Department is going to release to the public the findings of its research, and when our research has demonstrated certain things, I think by all means those things should be expressed in ways that will reach interested people and if that hurts us some I would be willing to take the hurt that comes along in order to follow a consistent policy." 34. Anonymous, Journal of Forestry, 32:661 (Aug. 1 9 3 4 ) . 35. Society of American Foresters, "Forest Fire Control in the Coastal Plains Section of the South," Journal of Forestry, 33:360 (Mar. 1 9 3 5 ) , statement by a Mr. Komaresk. 36. Ibid., p. 344. 37. Ibid., p. 345. 38. H. H. Chapman, "Prescribed Burning versus Public Forest Fire Services," Journal of Forestry, 45:806 ( 1 9 4 7 ) . 39. W . G . Wahlenberg, Fire in Longleaf Pine Forests, Occasional Paper 40, Southern Forest Experiment Station (Jan. 9, 1 9 3 5 ) , p. 3. 40. Forest Service, "The Brass Ring to Dr. Shea and Dr. Wheeler," Dixie Ranger, Southern Region, 6:3 (Apr. 1940). See editorial comment: " W e were pleased to see in the Service Bulletin Ding Darling's tribute to Chief Lecturer Wheeler."

202

NOTES TO CHAPTER

3

41. Memo of Headley, FSF, Jan. 21, 1937. 42. Demmon to Wheeler, CP, vol. 116, May 2, 1935; Wheeler to Demmon, C P , vol. 116, May xo, 1935. 43. H. N . Wheeler, "Controlled Burning," Service Bulletin, 19:5 (Nov. 11, 1935)44. Merrill and Baker, state foresters of Mississippi and Florida, respectively, though incensed at the Southern Station for putting "their ideas in circulation before they were properly matured and tested," once were prepared to reveal the "practical truth" about controlled burning "in a way that should be accepted by all concerned, including the general public." Roy Headley, memo written after tour of Region 7 and 8, FSF, Jan. 2, 1936, p. 4. 45. Appended to Roy Headley, memo to Mr. Parkinson (head of Information and Education), Jerry Cook, and Rachford, FSF, July 2, 1937. Attached is a clipping from a Columbia, S. C., newspaper: "Woods Burning Results." 46. V . L. Harper, "Fire Research in the Lower South," Fire Control Notes, 1:230 (Aug. 9, 1937). 47. Forest Service, minutes of fire-control meeting with North Carolina Assistant State Forester, FSF, Mar. 19, 1937, p. 27. 48. John Shea, "Our Pappies Burned the Woods," American Forests, 46:162 (Apr. 1940). 49. "The Brass Ring to Dr. Shea and Dr. Wheeler," Dixie Ranger, 6:4 (Apr. 1940). 50. A. C . Shaw, "Timber Management in Texas," Dixie Ranger, 4:2 (Mar. 1938). 51. Roy Headley, memo after tour of Region 7 and 8, FSF, Jan. 2, 1936, p. 3. Following his tour of the South in December 193;, Headley reported that both Mississippi and Florida were ready to release information on controlled burning to the general public. He felt that millions of acres in the longleaf type in Mississippi needed greater density of reproduction. "If fire is the means of accomplishing this end," he observed, "then a way should be found to use fire without a resulting loss in slash and other stands which obviously should not be burned." Certainly, Headley was not quite sure what constituted the "practical truth" of the matter, for he added: "The evidence I was able to get as to the necessity of burning in order to get longleaf reproduction was so conflicting that I could not form any conclusion in my own mind." 52. Forest Service, "Minutes of Conferences on the Southern Station Investigative Program between Representatives of the Regional Forester's Office and Members of the Southern Station Staff," Crossett (Arkansas), FSF, Apr. 29-30, 1937, p. 10. 53. Forest Service, general investigative inspection, 1937, Southern Region, Loveridge and Fitzwater, FSF, Jan. 17, 1938, p. 8. 54. Forest Service, minutes, annual investigative meeting, Southern Region and Southern Station, Olustee and Lake City, Fla., FSF, June 1 5 16, 1938, pp. 31-2. 55. Kircher to Watts (Chief Forester), FSF, July 22, 1943, p. 1.

ADMINISTRATIVE TRAVAIL

203

56. Raymond M. Conarro, "Memorandum for the Regional Forester," F S F , Aug. 19, 1942, pp. 1 2 - 1 4 . 57. Forest Service, fire-control meeting, Spokane, FSF, Feb. 10, 1936, p. 1 0 1 . 58. Demmon to Marsh, FSF, Nov. 3, 1936, p. 2. 59. Silcox to Kircher, FSF, Apr. 5, 1938, pp. 2-4. The inspectors also recommended that all research results "be released only through the administrative branches of the U. S. Forest Service and then only after careful deliberation and due consideration of persons to whom material is released. . . . Your inspectors are not advocating approval of this proposal with its implications of censorship but are recording it as representing a problem." General integrating inspection, Southern Region, 1937, report dated Jan. 17, 1938, pp. 7 1 - 2 , Loveridge (Assistant Chief) and J. A. Fitzwater (Assistant Chief), Division of Timber Management, FSF. 60. Kircher to Silcox, FSF, Dec. 22, 1938, p. 2. 61. Forest Service, minutes, annual investigative meeting, Southern Region and Southern Station, Olustee and Lake City, FSF, June 1 5 - 1 6 , 1938, p. 30. 62. Forest Service, The Southern Forest Experiment Station ( 1 9 3 7 ) , P- 7 -

63. A. C. Shaw, "Timber Management in Texas," Dixie Ranger, 4:2 (Mar. 1938). 64. W . R. Hine, "Some Observations on Planting Private Forest Land," Southern Lumberman, 1 5 7 : 1 5 2 - 3 (Dec. 15, 1938). 65. W . G. Wahlenberg, "Pasturing Woodland in Relation to Southern Forestry," Journal of Forestry, 35:554 (June 1 9 3 7 ) . Also given before pasture symposium, 38th Annual Convention of the Association of Southem Agricultural Workers, Nashville, Tenn., Feb. 4, 1937. 66. Headley to Granger, FSF, Apr. 2 1 , 1937. 67. Wahlenberg to Greene, Aug. 19, 1937 (postcard), in author's possession. 68. Haig to Korstian (Duke University), CP, vol. 1 1 6 , Jan. 22, 1938. 69. Forsling to Chapman, CP, vol. 1 1 6 , Oct. 22, 1938. 70. Wahlenberg had received a letter from the regional forester saying that he could not approve the publication of any bulletin that suggested actually using fire in the culture of any species of Southern pine. 7 1 . H. H. Chapman, review of Technical Bulletin 683, in Journal of Forestry, 37:912 (Nov. 1939). 72. Wahlenberg to Greene, Oct. 30, 1936. Greene had been eased out of his position in 1936. 73. Forest Service, report of investigative committee meeting, Southern and Appalachian Stations and Southern Region, Atlanta, FSF, Apr. 5-6, 1939, P- 374. W . C. Branch, "New All-Southern Fire Prevention Film Completed," Dixie Ranger, 5:5 (Sept. 1939). 75. Roy Headley, "Who Starts these Fires?" American Forests, special fire-prevention number, 45:193 (Apr. 1939).

204

NOTES TO CHAPTER

3

76. Raymond Conarro, "Fighting Tommorrow's Fires Today," American Forests, 45:214 (Apr. 1939). 77. Florida Forest and Park Association, "Minutes of Meeting for the Purpose of Discussing and Formulating Reasonable and Understandable Policy Based on Facts on the Beneficial and Detrimental Use of Fire in Growing Timber, Grazing, and Game Management," Jacksonville, Fla., Yale School of Forestry Library, July 26, 1939, p. 1. 78. Ibid., p. 7. Wallace replied over the signature of James L. McCamy. 79. E. L. Demmon, Forest Research and the Southern Lumber Industry, Occasional Paper 90, Southern Forest Experiment Station (Apr. 18, 1940), p. 5. Contains only scant reference to beneficial effects of fire. 80. Forest Service, Forest Outings (1940), p. 163; see letter from Chapman to Acting Forester Earle Clapp, July 8, 1940, in Journal of Forestry, 38:748 (Sept. 1940). 81. H. H. Chapman, letter to Clapp, July 8, 1940, in Journal of Forestry, 38:748 (Sept. 1940). 82. Earle Clapp, letter to Chapman (undated), in Journal of Forestry, 38:748 (Sept. 1940). 83. H. H. Chapman, letter to H. N. Wheeler (undated), in Journal of Forestry, 39:888 (Oct. 1941). 84. W. R. Mattoon, letter to the editor, American Forests, 46:146 (Apr. 1940). 85. Headley to Kircher, FSF, Apr. 23, 1940, p. 3. 86. H. N. Wheeler, letter to Chapman, June 7, 1941, in Journal of Forestry, 39:887-8 (Oct. 1941). 87. H. H. Chapman, letter to Wheeler (undated), in Journal of Forestry, 39:888-890 (Oct. 1941). 88. H. N. Wheeler, letter to Chapman, June 30, 1941, in Journal of Forestry, 39:890 (Oct. 1941). 89. H. H. Chapman, letter to Wheeler, July 2, 1941, in Journal of Forestry, 39:891 (Oct. 1941). 90. D. K. Maissurow, "The Role of Fire in the Perpetuation of Virgin Forests of Northern Wisconsin," Journal of Forestry, 39:207 (1941). 91. Eugene Gemmer, "Loblolly Pine Establishment as Affected by Grazing, Overstory, and Seedbed Preparation," Journal of Forestry, 39:477 (1941)92. Letter to the author, July 30, 1957. 93. D. E. Lauderburn, "Accomplishments in Forestry on Farms in the South," Journal of Forestry, 40:83 (Feb. 1942). 94. R. Margolis to Chapman, CP, vol. 116, Feb. 4, 1942. 9;. George Hepting, Reducing Losses from Tree Diseases in Eastern Forests and Farm Woodlands, Farmers' Bulletin 1887, Bureau of Plant Industry (1942). 96. Florida Forest and Park Association, minutes, meeting at Jacksonville, Fla., July 26, 1939, p. 1 1 . 97. W . W. Ashe, "Management of Loblolly and Shortleaf Pines," Proceedings, Society of American Foresters, 5:99 (1910). See also his Bulletin 24, North Carolina Geological and Economic Survey (1914).

ADMINISTRATIVE TRAVAIL

205

98. L. F. Kneipp, "Pathfinders in Southern Forestry—W. W. Ashe," American Forests, 50:240 (May 1944). 99. Austin Cary, memo, FSF, Dec. 13, 1920, pp. 1-2. 100. J. A. Cope, "A Progress Report on the Reseeding of Cut-Over Lands to Loblolly Pine," Journal of Forestry, 22:172 (1924). 101. Clapp to Frothingham, FSF, June 14, 1932, p. 5 (not sent but read by Frothingham in Washington). 102. The 1933 report (Appalachian Station) stated that the heavier mortality befalling longleaf in plots bumed over after fourteen years of protection was not to "be taken as too strong an argument for the practice of controlled burning" since "no data are available on effects of controlled burning on growth, site quality and establishment of reproduction" (p. 12). 103. H. H. Chapman, "Common Sense Needed," Journal of Forestry, 41:726 (Oct. 1943). 104. H. H. Chapman, review of K. A. Brinkman's and P. A. Swartout's "Natural Reproduction of Pines in East Central Alabama," Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Agriculture Experiment Station Circular 86, in Journal of Forestry, 42:614 (Aug. 1944). 105. Watts to Albert, FSF, Apr. 29, 1943. 106. Thompson to Granger, FSF, May 7, 1943, p. 4. 107. Ibid., p. 5. 108. J. F. Brooks to Kircher, FSF, May 17, 1943, p. 2. 109. Granger to Kircher, FSF, May 8, 1943, p. 1. 110. Letter from a county agent to Evans, FSF, May 12, 1943, p. 1 (Evans' comments are appended). 1 1 1 . Brooks to Kircher, FSF, May 17, 1943, p. 3. 112. Demmon to assistant chief for forest research, FSF, July 28, 1943, P- 1. 1 1 3 . C. A. Bickford and John Curry, The Use of Fire in the Protection of Longleaf and Slash Pine Forests, Occasional Paper 105, Southern Forest Experiment Station (Aug. 15, 1943), p. 1. See also R. S. Campbell (Southern Station), "Trees, Grass and Cattle," Mississippi Forests and Parks, 9:13 (Dec. 1943); Stuart Holbrook, Burning an Empire (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 174. 114. Kircher to state foresters, FSF, July 14, 1943, p. 1. 115. Watts to Kircher, FSF, July 24, 1943. 116. Letter to author, July 30, 1957. 117. Kenneth P. Davis, report on Southern Station trip, FSF, Mar. 8, 1944, P- 14118. H. J. Eberly, report on Lake City conference, FSF, Dec. 23, 1943, p. 1. 119. H. H. Chapman, "Fire and Pines—A Realistic Appraisal of the Role of Fire in Reproducing and Growing Southern Pines," American Forests, 50:63 (Feb. 1944). See a recent statement in Marston Bates, The Forests and The Sea (New York: Random House, i960), p. 119. 120. Ovid Butler, "The Editor's Log—To Burn or Not to Bum," American Forests, 50:53 (Feb. 1944).

2O6

NOTES TO CHAPTER

3

1 2 1 . C. F. Evans, "Can The South Conquer the Fire Scourge?" American Forests, 50:229 (May 1944). 122. H. N. Wheeler, "Controlled Burning in Southern Pine," Journal of Forestry, 42:449 (June 1944). 123. Chief of Research to Granger, FSF, Aug. 20, 1945. 124. McArdle to Granger, FSF, Aug. 21, 1945. 125. I. T. Haig (Southeastern Station director) to Region 8, FSF, Sept. 30,1947. 126. J. Herbert Stone to Haig, FSF, Oct. 13, 1947, p. 1. See minutes of meeting, Advisory Council of Gulfcoast Branch, Southern Forest Experiment Station, Harrison Experimental Forest, Saucier, Mississippi, Feb. 20, 1946, for opposition to controlled burning by Mississippi Extension Service and International Paper Company. Porter of International Paper remarked that the Forest Service was drifting more and more apart from others on this matter and that, if prescribed burning was justified at all, development should be gradual, to circumvent sharp reaction. Also see the comic book entitled, "How Money Goes Up in Smoke," by the same company. 127. Forest Service, Better Management on Southern Coastal Forest Ranges, Agricultural Information Series 17 (1945), Department of Agriculture, pp. 6-7. 128. Florida first recognized the beneficial nature of fire in its biennial report for 1944-46. South Carolina first mentioned it in a bulletin issued in 1944, entitled, "Handbook of Forestry Practices for South Carolina." Mississippi quoted extensively from the 1943 annual report of the Southern Station in Mississippi Forests and Parks (Sept. 1944). 129. Letter to author, July 30, 1957. 130. For instance, the Southeastern Section meeting at Lake City, Fla., attended by fifteen members of SAF. Tour of prescribed burned areas in Osceola, Journal of Forestry, 44:309 (Apr. 1946). 1 3 1 . Inman F. Eldredge, review of Wahlenberg's "Longleaf Pine," in Journal of Forestry, 44:301 (1946). 132. Letter to author, July 27, 1957. 133. Forest Service, summary of the discussions held at technical staff meeting, Region 8, FSF, Feb. 6-9, 1945, p. 2. 134. Watts to J. Herbert Stone, FSF, Jan. 14, 1949. 135. In an analysis of a 1946 loblolly prescribed bum in loblolly stands, published in April 1949, the Southeastern Station cautioned: "few of the statements contained herein are incontrovertible. Most are based on interim observations which may or may not be verified upon conclusion of the investigations. But the demand for information is persistent. We therefore issue this preliminary version." L. E. Chaiken, The Behavior and Control of Understory Hardwoods in Loblolly Pine Stands, Technical Note 72 (Apr. 1949), foreword. 136. See also Kenneth P. Davis, Forest Fire: Control and Use (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 495-6. 137. S. L. Frost, "Recommendations for a Texas Forestry Program," FSF, June 1948, p. 21.

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207

138. I. T . Haig, "Solving the Riddle of Low Grade Hardwoods," American Forests, 56:29 (Feb. 1950); see also Frank Heyward, Jr., "Tidal Wave of Hardwoods," American Forests, 63:28 (1957). 139. H. H. Chapman, "Time Now for Silviculture," Journal of Forestry, 48:282 (Apr. 1950). 140. Arthur Hartman, "Letter to A Professor in Forest Protection," Fire Control Notes, 1 1 : 3 5 - 6 (July 1950). 1 4 1 . House, Hearings, "Appropriations Bill for 1 9 5 1 , " 81 Cong., 2 Sess., part 3, p. 917. 142. fi. H. Muntz, "Releasing Pine Planted Under Scrub Oak," Southern Lumberman, 1 8 1 : 200 if (Dec. 15, 1950). 143. Arthur Hartman, "Letter to A Professor in Forest Protection," P- 37144. I. T . Haig, "Solving the Riddle of Low Grade Hardwoods," p. 40. 145. Department of Agriculture, Research and Related Services in the USD A, II, prepared for House Committee on Agriculture, 81 Cong., 2 Sess. (Dec. 1 , 1950). 146. H. H. Muntz, How To Grow Longleaf Pine, Farmers' Bulletin 2061, Department of Agriculture (1954), p. 1. 147. Reports of the Southern and Southeastern stations cover progress of prescribed burning in this type. Service annual reports (1949, 1 9 5 1 ) contain brief, though guarded, reference to fire in loblolly. The subject merited discussion in the United Nations forestry periodical UNASYLVA (Thomas Lotti and R. D. McCulley, "Loblolly Pine," July-Sept. 1 9 5 1 ) . A station technical note describing hardwood control in loblolly stands appeared in 1 9 5 1 : R. J. Riebold, "Summer Burns for Hardwood Control in Loblolly Pine," Fire Control Notes, 16:35 (Jan. 1955). 148. R. H. Clark, How to Use Controlled Burning to Establish a Bumper Crop of Pine Seedlings, Fordyce Lumber Co., p. 1. 149. Letter of extension forester to Chapman, CP, July 16, 1956 (not filed as of May 1957). 150. Hartman to Biswell, Forest Service Records [hereafter cited as F S R ] , Mar. 5, 1956, p. 3. At a meeting in Atlanta on October 7, 1955, Hartman demonstrated that "almost universally, man-caused fires have gone down as prescribed burning took hold. As the people learn more about prescribed burning, they think of more and more reasons not to burn. W e have found that prescribed burning is a good prevention measure." Minutes of Georgia meeting on prescribed burning, USFS, Division of State and Private Forestry, FSR, Oct. 7, 1955, p. 7. 1 5 1 . Ibid. (Georgia meeting), p. 1 . De Loach's speech is not quoted verbatim. At this meeting it was decided to urge burning in longleaf and slash stands in the coming year. 152. Letter to Chapman, CP, July 16, 1956 (not filed as of May 1957). 153. Georgia requested Professor Kenneth P. Davis (University of Michigan) to make a post-mortem study of its forest-fire situation, embracing a definition of the problem and suggestions for needed research. After surveying the problem in flatwoods of the lower coastal plain, Davis concluded: "While many people have understandable reluctance to de-

2O8

NOTES TO CHAPTER

3

liberate use of fire, it is felt strongly that it has a vital place in some areas and that it should be faced frankly, squarely and fully. The need is to use fire as a tool wisely and effectively, not to avoid it." (Forest Fire Control Problems and Research Needs in Georgia, p. 1; see shorter version, Forest Fires in Georgia—Problems and Research Needs.) A Georgia Forest Research Council was created in line with Davis' proposals, with former Forest Supervisor Frank Albert as director. Note the talk John W . Cooper (USFS) delivered in fall 1957 to the Vocational Agriculture Forestry Clinic at Valdosta, Georgia, entitled "Using Prescribed Burning in Forest Management." See also, Thomas Lotti, A Special Fire Plan for the Santee Experimental Forest, Southeastern FES, Asheville, N.C. ( 1 9 6 1 ) . 154. S. A. Boutwell (Gair Woodlands Corp., Savannah) to Chapman, CP, July 24, 1956 (not filed as of May 1957). 155. American Forests, editor's note, 62:55 (Aug. 1956). 156. H. H. Chapman, "To Whom It May Concern," American Forests, 62:3 (Aug. 1956). 157. See Edward F. Kerr, "Southerners Who Set the Woods on Fire," Harper's, July 1958. 158. Jenks Cameron, The Development of Government Forest Control in the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1928), p. 320. Chapter 4.

Forests and Water

1. Bernard Frank, "Forest Influences," Fifty Years of Forestry in The USA (Washington: Society of American Foresters, 1950), p. 148. 2. Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 22-6, 108-9, 203-5. 3. Gifford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1947), P- 34. "Review of Periodical Literature," Forestry Quarterly, 5:327 (1907). 5. John Ise, The United States Forest Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920), p. 30. 6. B. E. Fernow, Relation of Forests to Water Supplies, Bulletin 17, Division of Forestry (1893), p. 9. 7. William B. Greeley, "The Effect of Forest Cover on Streamflow," Forestry and Irrigation, 1 1 : 1 6 3 ( 1 9 ° 5 ) 8. Gifford Pinchot, A Primer of Forestry, part II, Bulletin 24, Division of Forestry (1905), p. 56. 9. Samuel T. Dana, Forest and Range Policy (New York: McGrawHill, 1956), p. 124. 10. Charles D. Smith, "The Movement for Eastern National Forests, 1 8 9 9 - 1 9 1 1 , " unpublished dissertation, Harvard (1956), p. 74. 1 1 . Ise, pp. 209—210. 12. Smith, Jan. 28, 1907, p. 242. 13. "The Ohio Overflow and the Appalachians," Forestry and Irrigation, 1 3 : 5 (Jan. 1907)-

F O R E S T S AND W A T E R

209

14. "The Upper Ohio Floods," Forestry and Irrigation, 1 3 : 1 6 9 (Apr. 1907). 15. Hugo Winkenwerder, Forestry in The Public Schools, Circular 130, Forest Service, p. 6. 16. H. M. Chittenden, "Forests and Floods," Engineering News, 60:468 (Oct. 29, 1908). 17. Department of Agriculture, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture on Southern Appalachian and White Mountain Watersheds, Senate Document 9 1 , 60 Cong., 1 Sess. (1908), p. 18. See also, Raphael Zon, memo to Pinchot concerning the relation of forests to streamflow, FSF, 1908. 18. William Hall to Barker, FSF, Dec. 22, 1908; cited in Smith, p. 302. 19. W . W . Ashe, "Special Relations of Forests to Streamflow in The United States," in Preliminary Report of Inland Waterways Commission, Senate Document 325, 60 Cong., l Sess. (1908), p. 524. 20. "The Relation of Forests to Streamflow," editorial, Engineering News, 60:478 (Oct. 29, 1908). Chittenden quoted. 2 1 . Chittenden, p. 470. 22. William L. Hall and Hu Maxwell, "Surface Conditions and Stream Flow," abstract of Circular 176, American Forestry, 17:374 (June 1 9 1 1 ) . 23. Thornton T . Munger, on forest influences, FSF, Feb. 2 1 , 1910. 24. Willis Moore, "The Influence of Forests on Climate and on Floods," Engineering News, 63:249 (Mar. 3, 1 9 1 0 ) . See also, M. D. Leighton, "Relation of Water Conservation to Flood Prevention and Navigation in the Ohio River," Preliminary Report of Inland Waterways Commission (Washington, 1908), p. 60. 25. William W . Harts, "The Relation of Forests to Streamflow," Engineering News, 63:245 (Mar. 3, 1 9 1 0 ) . 26. Edward Burr, Report on Preliminary Examination of Merrimac River, 62 Cong., 1 Sess., House Document 9 (May 1 9 1 0 ) , p. 27. 27. B. E. Fernow, review of Moore's "TTie Influence of Forests on Climate and on Floods," Forestry Quarterly, 8:74 ( 1 9 1 0 ) . 28. Filibert Roth, L. C . Glenn, and George F. Swain, "Forests and Streamflow," American Forestry, 1 6 : 2 1 3 - 2 2 3 (Apr. 1 9 1 0 ) . 29. Banington Moore, "Checking Floods in France," American Forestry, 16:199-206 (Apr. 1 9 1 0 ) . 30. Ise, p. 217. 3 1 . B. E. Fernow, review of Circular 176, Forestry Quarterly, 9:283 (1911). 32. Raphael Zon, "Forests and Flood Prevention," American Forestry, 18:395 (June 1 9 1 2 ) . 33. U. S. Geological Survey, "Preliminary Statement on White Mountains," Report 13, FSF, p. 30 (mimeographed). 34. Weather Bureau, Monthly Weather Review, reprint from Monthly Weather Bureau Supplement 30, 56:79 (Mar. 1928). 35. Memo to " S " from Dana, FSF, Jan. 1 7 , 1 9 1 3 . 36. Letter of acting district forester to chief forester, FSF, July 25, 1912.

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4

37. Letter of Benjamin C. Kadel to chief, Weather Bureau Files [hereafter cited as W B F ] , Nov. 12, 1 9 1 3 . 38. Letter of Earle Clapp to district forester, FSF, Oct. 18, 1 9 1 2 . 39. Letter of Graves to chief of Weather Bureau, FSF, Dec. 16, 1 9 1 3 , p. 2. 40. Monthly Weather Review, pp. 79, 85. 41. Raphael Zon, review of "Forest and Streamflow Experiment at Wagon Wheel Gap, Colorado, Final Report on Completion of the Second Phase of the Experiment" by Bates and Henry, Monthly Weather Bureau Supplement 30, in Journal of Forestry, 26:1031 (1928). 42. Letter of C. F. Marvin (chief of Weather Bureau) to E . A. Sherman (associate forester), FSF, May 10, 1927. 43. Raphael Zon, "Forests and Flood Prevention," American Forestry, 18:395 (June 1 9 1 2 ) . 44. American Society of Civil Engineers, "Final Report of the Special Committee on Floods and Flood Prevention," Paper 1400, Transactions, 81: 1 2 2 3 - 1 2 5 8 ( 1 9 1 7 ) . See also, Robert Reynolds, "The Ohio Floods: Their Cause and The Remedy," American Forestry, 19:282 (May 1 9 1 3 ) . 45. Raphael Zon, review of Engler's "The Effects of Forests Upon Streamflow," Journal of Forestry, 18:632 (1920). 46. B. E. Fernow, review of Dana's "What the National Forests Mean to the Water User," Journal of Forestry, 1 7 : 7 1 7 - 8 ( 1 9 1 9 ) . 47. Carlos G. Bates, "The Erosion Problem: Erosion Is the Cause of Many Calamities," Journal of Forestry, 22:499-504 (1924). 48. Willis Moore, "Forests and Floods," American Mercury, 1 1 : 2 5 7 (July 1927). 49. Nathan Grover, "Runoff Characteristics of The Mississippi River Drainage Basin," Proceedings, American Society of Civil Engineers, 53:2486 (1927)50. William Greeley, "The Part of Forestry in Flood Control," excerpts from address at Mississippi Flood Control Conference on June 3, 1927, in Forest Worker (Sept. 1927), p. 6. 51. Raphael Zon, "Do Forests Prevent Floods?" American Forests and Forest Life, 33:388 (July 1927). 52. E. F. McCarthy, "Forest Cover as a Factor in Flood Control," Proceedings, ASCE, 53:2513 (1927). 53. Appalachian Station, Annual Report for 1927, Forest Service, pp. 1 - 3 . 54. Ward Shepard, Forests and Floods, Circular 19, Forest Service (1928), p. 2; E. A. Sherman, The Protection Forests of the Mississippi River and Their Part in Flood Control, Circular 37, Forest Service (Aug. 1928), p. 1; Relation of Forestry to Control of Floods in the Mississippi Valley, House Document 573, 70 Cong., 2 Sess. (1929), p. 2. 55. Forest Service, House Document 573, p. V I . 56. Washington Post, editorial, July 3, 1929. 57. Walter Lowdermilk, review of House Document 573, Journal of Forestry, 27:856 (1929).

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WATER

211

58. Letter of E . A. Sherman to Senator Harry B. Hawes, FSF, May 1, 1931. 59. Forest Service, A National Plan for American Forestry, Senate Document 12, 73 Cong., 1 Sess. ( 1 9 3 3 ) , p. 307. See also, H . G . Meginnis, " T h e Yazoo Flood and Its Causes," American Forests, 38:593 (1932)60. Meginnis, p. 593. 61. Letter of Munns to N . N . W o l p e r t (assistant editor, W a f e r Works Engineering), FSF, undated. 62. Forest Service, "Eastern and Southern National Forests," 1932, p. 3. See also, Extension Service Review, 2 : 1 1 2 (July 1 9 3 1 ) . 63. Carlos G. Bates and O. R. Zeasman, Soil Erosion: A Local and National Problem, Wisconsin Agriculture Station Research Bulletin 99 (i933)64. E . I. Kotok, "Solving t h e Forest and W a t e r Problem," American Forests, 38:491 (Sept. 1 9 3 2 ) . 65. Carlos G . Bates, "Forests and Streamflow," Transactions, American Society of Civil Engineers, Paper 1858, 99:35 ( 1 9 3 4 ) . 66. Carlos G . Bates, "Chaining t h e Father of W a t e r s , " American Forests, 36:69 (Feb. 1 9 3 1 ) . 67. Report of President's Committee on Waterflow, House Document 395, 73 Cong., 2 Sess. (1934). 68. Rural Electrification Administration, Little Waters: A Study of Headwater Streams and Other Little Waters, by H . S. Person with cooperation of E . Johnston Coil and Robert T . Beall, Senate Document 167, 74 Cong., 2 Sess. (Nov. 1 9 3 5 ) , published in 1936. Prepared for t h e joint use of the Soil Conservation Service (Bennett), the Resettlement Administration (Tugwell), and the Rural Electrification Administration (Cooke). 69. Arthur A. Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 5 1 ) , p. 84. T h e Commerce Committee had consulted almost entirely with the Corps. 70. Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Conservation, General Services Administration, F D R Library ( 1 9 5 7 ) , I, 5 1 0 - 5 1 1 . 7 1 . Congressional Record, 74 Cong., 2 Sess., vol. 80, p. 7575. 72. Ibid., p. 7575. See also, Conference Report 2918, 74 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1. 73. Society of American Foresters, "Report of Committee on Watershed Protection," Journal of Forestry, 3 4 : 1 7 2 (1936). 74. Nixon, I, 500 75. Forest Service, Supplemental Report on Permanent System of Flood Control; Forests in Flood Control (Munns and Sims), 74 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1. 76. House, Hearings on H. R. 1 2 5 1 7 , 74 Cong., 2 Sess. (May 21, 1936). 77. Milton Eisenhower (actually written by Collier), memo to Paul Appleby, U S D A Record Center [hereafter cited ai U S D A R C ] , Aug. 6,

212

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4

1938. Describes relations between the Department of Agriculture and the National Resources Committee. 78. Letter of L. F. Kneipp to F. H. Fowler (Director, Drainage Basin Study, N R C ) , FSF, Nov. 16, 1936. 79. Forest Service, "Report on Relation of Land Use, Especially Forestry, to the Use and Control of Water," FSF, Sept. 1936, p. 4. 80. Harlan H. Barrows, "After the Floods," American Forests, 42:447 (Oct. 1936). See also Bates, review of "Headwaters Control and Use," Journal of Forestry, 35:879-881 (Sept. 1 9 3 7 ) . 81. Walter Lowdermilk, comments on paper by Isaiah Bowman, "Influence of Vegetation on Land-Water Relationships," in Headwaters Control and Use, Soil Conservation Committee (Apr. 1 9 3 7 ) , p. 102. 82. House, Hearings on S. 3531 (Control of Floods on the Mississippi), Committee on Flood Control, 74 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 24. See also, Luna Leopold and Thomas Maddock, The Flood Control Controversy (New York: Ronald Press, 1954). 83. Subcommittee on Vegetal Cover, minutes of first meeting, National Resources Planning Board Files [hereafter cited as N R P B F ] , Feb. 5, 1937. 84. E. N. Munns and I. H. Sims, "The National Forests," Yearbook of Agriculture for 1938, p. 228. 85. Confidential statement to the author. 86. Letter of W . A. Snow (Major, Corps of Engineers) to Tate, N R P B F , Mar. 10, 1937. 87. Department of Agriculture, "Relationship of Vegetal Cover and Other Watershed Treatment to Floods and Associated Problems," Provisional Report to Subcommittee on Vegetal Cover and Floods, N R P B F , Apr. 1 , 1937, p. 14. 88. Letter of Appleby to Abel Wolman (Chairman, Water Resources Committee), N R P B F , Apr. 1, 1937. 89. Subcommittee on Vegetal Cover, minutes of meeting, N R P B F , Apr. 19, 1937, p. 4. 90. Memo to Tate from Stabler, N R P B F , May 13, 1937, p. 2. 91. Memo to Tate from W . G. Hoyt, N R P B F , July 15, 1937, p. 1 . 92. Vegetal Committee Report (final draft), N R P B F , Nov. 30, 1937, pp. 1, 15. 93. Letter of Gilbert White to H. H. Barrows, N R P B F , Feb. 25, 1938. 94. Milton Eisenhower (actually written by Collier), memo to Paul Appleby, USDARC, Aug. 6, 1938. 95. Memo, Milton Eisenhower to Munns and Patrick, FSF, Dec. 23, 1937.

96. Memo to Paul Appleby from Milton Eisenhower, FSF, Oct. 2 1 , 1937. See also, Eisenhower Proposed Revision in Section 7 of Progress Report by Ohio-Lower Mississippi Subcommittee of W R C , USDARC, Oct. 30, 1937, Eisenhower to Wolman. 97. Letter of Munns and Patrick to Tate, N R P B F , Oct. 18, 1937. 98. Letter of Eisenhower to Wallace, FSF, Sept. 14, 1936. 99. Flood Control Coordinating Committee [hereafter cited as F C C C ] , minutes, meeting of Mar. 1 , 1937, FSF. Statement by Behre.

F O R E S T S AND W A T E R

213

100. F C C C , minutes, meeting of Dec. 20, 1938, FSF. Statement by Kinnear. 1 0 1 . L. C. Gray, report on flood-control surveys, Soil Conservation Service Files [hereafter cited as SCSF], May 1939. 102. Memo, Arthur Ringland to Roy Kimmell ( B A E ) , USDARC, Oct. 20, 1939. 103. F C C C , minutes, meetings of June 1 5 - 1 6 , 1939, FSF, p. 1. 104. F C C C , minutes, special field meetings of May 1 - 2 , 1939, FSF. 105. Memo, Philip M. Glick to Eisenhower, USDARC, Sept. 1, 1937. See also, Arthur A. Maass, "Protecting Nature's Reservoir," Public Policy, 5:82 (1954). 106. Milton Eisenhower, "Farmer and Engineer Form New Partnership for Flood Control," Extension Service Review, 8:136 (Sept. 1937). 107. Memo, Ringland to Wiecking, USDARC, Feb. 10, 1940. Concerning Rep. J. Buell Snyder's request for a radio story on the department's flood-control survey of Youghiogheny watershed. 108. C. L. Forsling, "Stabilizing Streamflow as Viewed by A Forester," Journal of Forestry, 35:1028 (1937); Silcox, Bennett, and Eisenhower, radio discussion on National Farm and Home Hour, Feb. 9, 1937; F. A. Silcox, "A New Policy for Flood Control," American Forests, 43:106 (Mar. 1937); Forest Service, Annual Report for 1938, Annual Report for 1940; Forest Service, Work of The United States Forest Service, USDA Misc. Pub. 290 (Jan. 1938). 109. E. N. Munns, radio broadcast with M. M. Kelso and A. L. Patrick, National Farm and Home Hour, May 3 1 , 1939, pp. 1 , 4. 1 1 0 . Carlos G . Bates, "Controlling Mad Waters," American Forests, 43:280 (June 1937). Cf. a more detached view by Bates, Journal of Forestry, 36:1073 (Oct. 1938). 1 1 1 . Office of Land-Use Coordination, The Land in Flood Control, preliminary statement, U S D A R C (Apr. 1 9 3 7 ) , passim. When revised, this appeared as USDA Misc. Pub. 331 (1938). 1 1 2 . Memo to Sidney Frissell (SCS) from E. M. Rowalt, USDARC, Dec. 2, 1938. 1 1 3 . Memo to Guy Stewart (SCS) from R. M. Rowalt, USDARC, Dec. 22, 1939. 1 1 4 . Office of Land-Use Coordination, Influences of Vegetation and Watershed Treatment on Run-off, Silting, and Streamflow, USDARC, draft of Dec. 28, 1939, p. 1. 1 1 5 . Ibid., pp. 4, 10; see also, memo of A. C. Ringland, USDARC, June 8, 1938. 1 1 6 . Nixon, II, 4 1 4 - 4 1 5 , 4 1 7 - 4 1 8 . 1 1 7 . E . A. Colman, comments on George Craddock's "Forestry and Water," Journal of Forestry, 38:145 (1940). 1 1 8 . Society of American Foresters, "Report of Committee on Watershed Management," Journal of Forestry, 38:120 (1940). 1 1 9 . See American Society of Civil Engineers, report of Committee on Hydraulics, "Flood Control Methods: Their Physical and Economic Limitations," Proceedings, 66:272 ft (1940).

214

NOTES TO C H A P T E R

4

120. Bernard Frank and E. N. Munns, "Watershed Flood Controls: Performance and Possibilities," Journal of Forestry, 43:240-241 (Apr. 1945). Note that the F C C C was abolished and reconstituted as the Flood Control Advisory Committee. An "officer in charge of flood control" was designated. Interagency field committees were disbanded, and surveys henceforth were directly assigned to one of the two action agencies. 1 2 1 . House, Hearings, "Agriculture Appropriations for 1942," Committee on Appropriations, 77 Cong., 1 Sess. ( 1 9 4 1 ) , p. 595. 122. House, Hearings, "Agriculture Appropriations for 1 9 4 1 , " Committee on Appropriations, 76 Cong., 3 Sess. (1940), p. 1168; "Agriculture Appropriations for 1943," 77 Cong., 2 Sess. (1942), p. 668; "Ag. Approp. for 1945," 78 Cong., 2 Sess. (1944), PP- 510, 533; "Ag. Approp. for 1948," 80 Cong., 1 Sess. (1947), part 2, pp. 53-78. 123. House, Hearings, "Ag. Approp. for 1946," Committee on Appropriations, 79 Cong., 1 Sess. (1945), p. 677. 124. Frank and Munns, p. 243. For a discussion of the distinction between flood control and conservation benefits, see H. H. Wooten, "The Agricultural Flood Control Program," Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, 22:41 (Feb. 1946). See also, Maass, Public Policy, p. 82. 125. Harold G . Wilm, "The Status of Watershed Management Concepts," Journal of Forestry, 44:969 (Nov. 1946). See also, Kittredge, "Forest and Water Aspects Which Have Received Little Attention," Journal of Forestry, 34:417 (1936); Connaughton, "Watershed Management More than Mere Protection," Journal of Forestry, 37:341 (1939). 126. House, Hearings, "Ag. Approp. for 1942," Committee on Appropriations, 77 Cong., 1 Sess. ( 1 9 4 1 ) , p. 562. 127. Forest Service, Annual Report for 1945, p. 26; see also, Kotok testimony, House, Hearings, "Ag. Approp. for 1946," 79 Cong., 1 Sess. ( i 9 4 5 ) , P- 674. 128. Charles Hursh, "Where Little Waters Write Big Stories," American Forests, 52:576 (Dec. 1946). 129. Forest Service, Annual Report for 1949, p. 16. 130. Harold G. Wilm, "Making Watershed Management More Effective," Journal of Forestry, 47:523 (July 1949). 1 3 1 . Office of Land-Use Coordination, "The Department of Agriculture and The Flood Control Program," for administrative use only, USDARC, May 1945, pp. 14-22. 132. But see G. L. Vamay, "Some Aspects of Forest Land Behavior During the Floods of August 1955," Region 7 (Northeast), sent to regional foresters. It is an account of the limitations of forest cover. 133. "New Forest Conservation Society Organized," Journal of Forestry, 52:59 (Jan. 1954)134. Robert McArdle, "The Forest Service Looks Ahead," American Forests, 61:90 (Mar. 1 9 5 5 ) . 135. House, Hearings, "Ag. Approp. for 1949," Committee on Appropriations, 80 Cong., 2 Sess. (1948), part 2, pp. 5-32; "Ag. Approp. for 1950," 81 Cong., 1 Sess. (1949), pp. 45-52; Senate, Hearings, "Ag. Approp. for 1950," 81 Cong., 1 Sess. (1949), pp. 358-364. See also the

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215

Secretary of Agriculture's Memo 1325 (Apr. 1, 1 9 5 3 ) , assigning the SCS authority for prosecuting the department's work in the flood-control field. 136. House, Hearings, "Ag. Approp. for 1954," 83 Cong., 1 Sess. ( 1 9 5 3 ) , part 5, P- 643. 137. Harold G . Wilm, "Foresters in the Watershed Movement," American Forests, 62:47 (Feb. 1 9 5 5 ) . Chapter 5.

Administrators and Scientists

1. John Gaus and Leon Wolcott, Public Administration and the USD A (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1 9 4 0 ) , pp. 3 9 4 - 5 . 2. Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Chicago: Row, Peterson, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 108. 3. William Greeley, Forests and Men (New York: Doubleday, 1 9 5 1 ) , p. 81. See also, Raphael Zon, "Forestry Mistakes and W h a t They Have Taught Us," Journal of Forestry, 4 9 : 1 7 9 ( 1 9 5 1 ) . 4. Norman Wengert, Natural Resources and the Political Struggle, Short Studies in Political Science 24 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1 9 5 5 ) , pp. 3, 8. See Roland Young and Henry Fosbrooke, Smoke in The Hills (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, i 9 6 0 ) , for an interesting account of the failure of the Uluguru land-usage scheme in Tanganyika. For the influence of catastrophe on resources policy, see Maass, Muddy Waters; Henry Hart, "Crisis, Community and Consent in Water Politics, Law and Contemporary Problems, 22:323 (Summer 1 9 5 7 ) ; Vincent Ostrum, Water and Politics, (Los Angeles: T h e Haynes Foundation, 1953)- For religious influence on Gifford Pinchot, see M . Nelson McGeary, Gifford Pinchot: Forester-Politician (Princeton University Press, i 9 6 0 ) , p. 13. 5. Memo of R . E . Marsh to E . W . Loveridge, F S F , Oct. 19, 1944. 6. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1957) p. 128 (2nd ed.). 7. R . D. Forbes, memo on advisory council, F S F , Oct. 9, 1924. 8. Wallace Hutchinson, " W h a t Have W e Bought and Where Are W e Headed?" Journal of Forestry, 2 9 : 4 7 6 ( 1 9 3 1 ) . 9. James McCamy, Government Publicity—Its Practice in Federal Administration (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1 9 3 9 ) , pp. 252, 262. 10. T . Swann Harding, "Informational Techniques of the Department of Agriculture," Public Opinion Quarterly, 1:96 ( 1 9 3 7 ) . 11. Philip Selznick, T V A and The Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 4 9 ) , p. 70. See also, Herbert Simon, Donald Smithburg, and Victor Thompson, Public Administration (New York: Knopf, 1950) p. 233. 12. C. J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1 9 4 1 ) , p. 52. See also, Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson, p. 242. 13. Paul Appleby, Morality and Administration (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1 9 5 2 ) , p. 105. 14. V . O. Key, Jr., The Administration of Federal Grants to the States

2l6

NOTES TO C H A P T E R

5

(Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1 9 3 7 ) , pp. 102, 3 1 1 . See also, George F. White, "The Forest Service and the States," Journal of Forestry, 5 3 : 1 3 6 ( 1 9 5 5 ) , for an expression of loyalty by a state forester to a federal agency. 15. Selznick, TV A, p. 146. 16. Key, p. 373. 17. Gifford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground, p. 310. 18. Luther H. Gulick, American Forestry Policy (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1 9 5 1 ) , p. 78. 19. E. L. Demmon, "Research Aids to Southern Forestry," Journal of Forestry, 40:154 (Feb. 1942). 20. Gulick, p. 74. 21. Herbert Kaufman, "Field Man in Administration," unpublished dissertation, Columbia University (1950), pp. 225-7. See also his The Forest Ranger—A Study in Administrative Behavior (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, i960), p. 230. The following remark, "the work of the research branch of the administrative family, though important, is not germane to the discussion of national forest administration and will not be explored further" (p. 4 3 ) , is belied by his own perceptive analysis (pp. 234-5). Indeed, the author mentions the prescribed-burning controversy (p. 82). 22. Luther Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in Papers on The Science of Administration (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1 9 3 7 ) , pp. 37-8; see also, Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, p. 235. 23. Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson, Public Administration (New York: Knopf, 1950). 24. Earle Clapp, "Research in the United States Forest Service: A Study in Objectives," National Plan for American Forestry, 73 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Document 12, p. 656. 25. Forest Service, "Research in the United States Forest Service" [processed], FSF, Jan. 10, 1938, p. 25. 26. I bid., p. 64. See also Earle Clapp, in National Plan, p. 691, and "The Decennial of the McSweeney-McNary Act," Journal of Forestry, 36:835 (1938). 27. Forest Service, "Research in The United States Forest Service," F S F , p. 63. 28. Ibid., p. 65. 29. Memo of Earle Clapp "for the Forester," FSF, May 19, 1936. 30. H. H. Chapman, "A Bit of History—Research on Longleaf Pine at Urania, Louisiana," CP, vol. 12; see also, Zon, p. 182. 3 1 . Ralph Hosmer, "The Society of American Foresters—An Historical Summary," Journal of Forestry, 48:760 (1950). 32. Wengert, p. 16. 33. Chapman, "A Bit of History," vol. 12. 34. T . Swann Harding, "The Place of Science in Democratic Government," American Sociological Review, 12:624 (1947).

ADMINISTRATORS AND SCIENTISTS

217

35. I. W . Bailey and H. A. Spoehr, The Role of Research in the Development of Forestry (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 55. 36. Ibid., p. 82. 37. Maass, Muddy Waters, p. 1. 38. For a discussion of political generations, see Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), p. 264ÂF. For a treatment of its administrative salience, see Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Chicago: Row, Peterson, 1957). 39. Hardy L. Shirley. "Forest Research Today," Journal of Forestry, 51:484 (1953). See also, Forest Service, "Research in The United States Forest Service," FSF, p. 8. 40. Shirley, p. 485. 4 1 . E. L. Demmon and P. A. Briegleb (directors, Southeastern and Southern Stations, respectively), "Progress in Forestry and Related Research," Journal of Forestry, 54:676 (1956). Many colleges of forestry have initiated research, thereby swelling the scientific budget from $256,525 in 1940-41 to $1,199,710 in 1950-51 (R. H. Westveld, "Forest Research in Colleges and Universities Offering Forestry Education," Journal of Forestry, 52:86 [1954]). By 1955, 15 percent of the nation's forestry research was under the direction of private institutions and colleges (E. L. Demmon, "The Reasons for Research," American Forestry, 61:42 [1955]). Although industry and foundation grants are considerable, only a few schools have received this aid. Industry has expanded its allocations for research: it accounts for over 50 percent of total research inputs. Most, however, is earmarked for forest-products investigations (Shirley, p. 484; also, Demmon, p. 42). 42. Shirley, p. 486. 43. Hosmer, p. 762. 44. Shirley, p. 486. See also, editorial, Journal of Forestry, 47:3 (1949). 45. See Wallace Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1954); David Gardner, "The National Cooperative Soil Survey of the United States" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1958).

Index

Agriculture Department: 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 47, 49, 80, 119, 121, 136, 140-142, 144-154, 156-159, 162, 164, 167, 2121177; Small Watershed Program, 162, 163. See also individual Secretaries Agricultural Economics, Bureau of, 144, 149, 150, 1 5 m , 155 Alabama forestry organization, 101. See also Bunker, Page Albert, Frank, 82, 96, 208m 53 Allegheny River, 120, 123 American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2, 127 American Forestry Association: 37, 41, 43, 46-48, 119, 120, 122, 126; Southern Forest Fire Prevention Conference, 114; Southern Forestry Education Project, 36, 42 American Geophysical Union, Runoff Committee, 145 American Pulp and Paper Association, 121 American Society of Civil Engineers, 127, 1J3, 139

Andrews, E. F., i97n27 Angelina unit. See Texas National Forest Animal Industry, Bureau of, 4, 42, 47, 48, 82, 90, 172 Appalachian Mountains Reserve, 119, 121, 122, 126. See also Weeks Act; White Mountains Appalachian Station, 93, 94, 155, 2o5nio2. See abo Southeastern Station Ashe, W . W . , 21, 25, 28, 33, 34, 44, 9 i , 92, 122 Association of Land-Grant Colleges, 42 Atomic Energy Commission, 1 8 m Baker, Harry Lee, 3;, 83, 202n44 Barnette, R. M., 61 Barrett, Leonard, 94n Bartlett, Rep. Charles L., 121 Bates, Carlos G., 128, 129, 134, 138, 139, 154 Bickford, C . A., 72, 87, 97, 105 Bienville ranger district. See Mississippi National Forest

220 Biological Survey, 4, 68 Bishop, L. L., 73 Bogalusa, La., 55, 58, 61 Boison, Anton T., 21, 22 Bond, W . E., 78 Boykin Springs burn. See Texas National Forest Brinkman, K. A., 95 Brooks, J. F., 74, 97, 98 Brown-spot disease, 33-35, 46, 57, 58, 61, 64, 79, 87, 100, 109 Bruce, David, 105 Bryant, R. C., 23 Bunker, Page, 36, 58 Burr, Edward, 124 Butler, Ovid, 47, 48, 50, 64, 84, 102, 1991181 Cannon, Speaker Joe, 120 Cary, Austin, 26-28, 39-41, 44, 56, 59, 66, 92, i99n8i, 200m 5 Chapman Forest, 34, 43, 46 Chapman, H. H., 16, 21-26, 28, 29, 31-34, 36, 39-41, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50-56, 58, 6 i , 62, 64, 71, 80, 81, 83-86, 89, 91, 95, 100-102, 105-108, 113, 114, 173, 174, 176, I99n8i Chittenden, H. M., 121, 123 Choctawhatchee unit, 27, 38, 39, 41. See also Florida National Forest Clapp, Earle, 7, 12-14, 28, 33, 54, 60, 62, 83, 93, 130, 141, 172 Clarke-McNary Act (C-M2 provision), 17, 35, 56, 57, 59, 60, 69, 99, 101, 168 Coeur d'Alene fire, 17, 22, 24 Cogdell, Ga., 89 Colman, E. A., 158 Conarro, R. M., 75, 81, 91, 94n, 95, 96 Connaughton, Charles, 61 Cooper, Kent, 49 Cope, J. A., 92 Corps of Engineers, 122, 139, 144, 145, 149, 150, 152, 157, 172

INDEX Coweeta Hydrologie Laboratory, 143 Croatan National Forest, 94n, 112 Cumberland River, 123, 124 Dana, Samuel T., 128, 131, 133, 197^8 Darling, J. N. ( " D i n g " ) , 68, 20in40 Davis, Kenneth P., 101, io3n, 207ni53 De Loach, Guyton, 113 Demmon, E. L., 34, 36, 38, 46, 54-56, 58, 60-62, 64, 67, 68, 76-79, 87, 98, 99, 178 De Soto National Forest, 61, 75 Dierks Lumber and Coal Company, 43 Dixie Crusaders, 36, 37, 114. See also American Forestry Association: Southern Forestry Education Project Douglas fir, 15, 1 9 6 m l Drainage Basin Problems and Programs, 142, 147 Dutton-Nelson report, 97, 98 Dutton, Walt, 97, 98 Eberly, H. J., 48, 57, 58, 200m 5 Eisenhower, Milton, 9, 49, 1 4 7 149, 1 5 m , 155, 156 Eldredge, Inman F., 23, 24, 27, 64-66, 105 Emmental, Switzerland, 128, 133 Evans, C . F., 45, 55, 56, 59, 60, 73-75, 82, 99, 102, 108 Evans, R. M., 45, 47, 52, 57 Fargo, Ga., 59, 89 Federal Power Commission, 144, 145 Fenn, F. A., 126 Fernow, B. F., 117, 118, 122, 123, 125, 127, 133, 173 Final Report on the Southern Appalachian and White Mountain Watersheds, 121

INDEX Fire Control, Division of, 68, 70, 76, 96. See also Headley, Roy; Thompson, P. A. Fitzwater, J. A., 76, 77, 97, 203n59 Flood Control Coordinating Committee, 144, 147, 148, 1 5 1 , 155, 159, 2i4ni20 Flood-control legislation: Act of 1928, iî6n; Bill of 1935, 140; Act of 1936, 141, 144, 1 5 1 , i59n, 162; Act of 1938, 151 Florida Cattlemen's Association, 81 Florida Forest and Park Association, 81, 82 Florida forestry organization, 35, 59, 101. See also Baker, Harry Florida National Forest, 23, 27, 30, 39, 40, 65, 73-75, 82, 96

Forbes, R. D., 26, 28-30, 38, 42, 44, 45, 54, 166 Fordyce Lumber Company, h i The Forest that Fire Made, 48-50 Forest Influences, Division of, 144. See also Munns, E. N. Forsling, C. L., 78n, 80, 94, 153 Frank, Bernard, 160 Frost, S. L., 108 Frothingham, E. H., 52, 93 Gamgee, Dr. John, 1 1 Gaus, John, 164 Gemmer, Eugene, 86, 95 Geological Survey, 4, 121, 122, 127, 128, 134, 145, 147, 150, 160, 180 Georgia forestry organization, 35, 1 1 2 , 1 1 3 . See also Lufburrow, B. F. Glenn, L. C., 126 Glick, Philip, 152 Granger, C. M., 96, 97, 103 Graves, Henry, 22, 123, 130, 1 3 1 , 196m 3 Gray, L. C „ 150 Great Southern Lumber Company, 58

221

Greeley, William B., 37, 118, 122, 135 Greene, S. W., 41-50, 52, 54, 56, 61, 64, 65, 69, 79, 81, i99n8i, 203n72 Grover, Nathan, 134 Gulick, Luther, 170 Hadley, E. W., 34 Haig, Irvin T., 80, 103, 108, 109 Hall, William, 123, 124 Harding, T. Swann, 175 Hardtner, Henry, 34n, 64, 66, 175 Harper, Roland, 24, 25, 28, 40 Harper, Vernon L., 71 Harrison Experimental Forest, 61 Hartman, Arthur W., 73, 87-89, 100, 105-107, 109, 112, 207ni50 Harts, William, 124 Hastings, A. B., 52, 59, 60, 64 Hayden, Sen. Carl, 140, 142 Headley, Roy, 68, 70, 71, 79, 81, 85, 86, 202n44, 202n50 Heyward, Frank D., 61 Higbee, Edward, 6, 194m 7 Hinckley fire, 17 Hine, W. R., 79 Holly Springs, Miss., 138, 143 Hosmer, Ralph, 179 Hough, Franklin B., 1 1 7 House of Representatives, U. S.: Agriculture Committee, 123, 124; Flood Control Committee, 141; Judiciary Committee (ruling of 1908), 122, 127 Hoyt-Troxell report, 160, 161 Hoyt, W. G., 145, 160 Hughes, Ben, 88 Human Relations, Advisory Council on, 71 Hursh, Charles, 161 Impassable Bay fire. See Osceola National Forest Influences of Vegetation and Watershed Treatments on Runoff, Silting and Streamflow, 155-157

222

Information and Education, Division of, 3 7 - 3 9 , 70, 8 1 , 1 0 7 Interior Department, 1 , 2, 140, 144, 145, 157 International Paper Company, 1 1 1 , 2o6ni2Ö Jardine, W . M., 1 3 6 , 1 3 7 Kadel, Benjamin C . , 129 Kaufman, Herbert, 170, 2 i 6 n 2 i Kelso, M . M . , 1 5 0 , 1 5 m Kircher, Joseph, 59, 60, Ö2n, 73, 7 5 - 7 7 , 85, 96, 97, 99, loo, 106 Kisatchie National Forest, 6 1 , 73, 87, 1 1 2 Kittredge, Joseph, 28, 1 6 1 Kneipp, L . F., 9, 92 Kotok, Edward, 1 3 8 , 1 5 9 Lake City, Fla.: 54, 55; Treaty of Lake City, 9 8 - 1 0 1 The Land in Flood Control, 15; Land-Use Coordination, Office of, 144, 1 4 7 , 1 5 3 , 1 5 5 , 1 5 6 , 1 5 9 " , 162 Leete, F. A., 26 Leighton, M . O., 1 2 7 Leopold, Aldo, i 9 i n 7 3 Levitt, Ross, 88 Light-burning policy, 37, 39 Little Waters, 140 Long, Ellen, 19, 24 Long, W . H., 33 Louisiana forestry organization, 26, 28, 3 1 , 32, 60. See also Forbes, R. D. Loveridge, Earl, 63, 74, 76, 77, 97, 2oon33, 203n59 Loveridge-Fitzwater report, 76, 97, 203n59 Lowdermilk, Walter, 1 3 7 Lufburrow, B. F., 59 Lyell, Charles, 18 Maass, Arthur A., 1 7 6

INDEX McArdle, Richard, 94, 1 0 3 , 1 6 2 , 177 McCamy, James L., 204n78 McCarthy, E . F., 29, 1 3 5 McKinney, A. L., 51 McNeil experiment, 4 1 - 4 4 , 46, 48, 58, 6 i , 64, 79, 80, 82. See diso Greene, S. W . ; Wahlenberg, W . G. Mann, James M . , 1 0 3 , 104 Marvin, C . F., 1 3 3 Mattoon, Wilbur, 25, 30, 3 1 , 57 Maxwell, Hu, 1 2 3 , 1 2 4 Merrimac River, 1 2 4 , 1 5 2 Mississippi forestry organization, 35, 48, 52, 61 Mississippi National Forest, 73, 87, 88, 1 1 2 Mississippi River, 1 1 8 , 1 3 2 - 1 3 9 , 160 Möhr, Charles, 19, 20, 28 Monongahela River, 120, 1 2 3 Moore, Barrington, 1 2 6 Moore, Willis, 1 2 3 - 1 2 6 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 0 , 134 Morrell, Fred, 4 3 - 4 5 , 48, 56, 57, 63, 200ni5 Munger, Thornton T . , 20-22, 24 Munns, Edward N . , 34, 42, 6 1 , 1 3 8 , 1 4 1 , 144, 146, 148, 1 5 0 1 5 2 , 1 5 4 , 1 5 8 , 160, 2 0 0 m l Müntz, H. H., 1 0 5 , 1 1 0 National Academy of Sciences, 2 National Association of University Presidents, 1 2 7 National Plan for American Forestry, 5 6 , 1 3 8 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 1 , 1 7 2 National Resources Committee, 1 4 2 , 1 4 7 , 1 5 5 , 2 i 2 n 7 7 . See also Water Resources Committee; Vegetal Cover to Floods, Subcommittee National Resources Planning Board, 157 Nelson, Arthur, 97, 98 Newcomb, Larry, 1 0 5

INDEX Newlands Bill, 116 Nords, George, 139 Oettmeier, William, 59, 60, 89 Ohio River, 1 1 8 , 120, 1 2 1 , 123, 124, 126, 133, 154, 159 Olustee Experimental Forest, 61 Osceola National Forest, 55, 61, 88, 1 0 ; , 107, 108, 1 1 2 Palustris Experimental Forest, 61 Patrick, Austin, 147, 148, i ; i n Pearson, C. A., 9 Pemigewasset River, 127 Penny Farms experiment, 82 Peshtigo fire, 17 Pessin, L. J., 43, 44, 78 Peters, Girvin, 38 Pinchot, Gifford, 1, 2, 5, 19, 20, 1 1 6 , 1 1 8 - 1 2 0 , 122, 123, 158, 162, 163, 1 9 6 m l Pinchot, Mrs. Gifford, 162 Pine: chir, 26; longleaf, 15, 16, 18-27, 29-36, 39, 45-47, 4952, 54-58, 64, 65, 70-73, 78n, 79, 82-84, 87, 89, 91-95, 1 0 1 , 102, 104-106, 108, 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 3 , 202n5i, 205ni02, 207ni5i; loblolly, 15, 21, 31, 55, 58, 87, 90-95, 1 0 1 , 102, 104-111, 206m 3 5, 207ni47; pitch, 108, 1 9 6 m l ; shortleaf, 15, 3 1 , 58, 105-107, 1 1 0 ; slash, 15, 25, 31, 45, 65, 74, 82, 89, 92, 1 0 1 , 104, 113, 197^6 Plant Industry, Bureau of, 4, 33, 42, 90 Potomac River, 123 Price, Overton, 120 Public Relations, Bureau of. See Information and Education, Division of Radway, Laurence, 156 Reclamation, Bureau of, 180 Reed, H. R., 61, 79

223 Relation of Forestry to Control of Floods in the Mississippi Valley, 136, 172 Reorganization Act of 1939, 157 Research reorganization plan (1915), 7, 8, 10, 1 1 , 169 Ringland, Arthur, 1 5 1 , 153, 155, 159 Roberts plots experiment, 25, 29, 31, 42 Rocky Mountains, 128-130, 132 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 2, 139, 140 Roth, Filibert, 126 Rowalt, E. W., 156, i59n Rusk, J. M., 8 San Dimas watershed, 146 Savannah River, 123, 126 Schwarz, C. Frederick, 20 Selznick, Philip, 167, 169, 2 1 7 ^ 8 Senate, U. S.: Agriculture and Forestry Committee, 120; Commerce Committee, 140 Sessom, Alex, 59, 60 Shaw, A. C „ 41, 73, 74, 76, 79, 87, 96, 97 Shea, John, 72 Shepard, Ward, 43 Sherman, E. A., 137 Shirley, Hardy L., 178, 180 Siggers, P. V., 58, 61 Silcox, F. A., 12, 54, 62, 63, 77 Sil vies, Office (Division) of, 4, 34, 80, 138 Simon, Herbert, 1 7 1 Sims, Ivan H., 141 Small Watershed Program. See Agriculture Department Smithburg, Donald W., 1 7 1 Snyder, Rep. J. Buell, 157 Society of American Foresters, 22, 61, 64, 84, 91, 158, 173, 179, 180, 2o6ni3o Soil Conservation Service, 83, 89, 90, 1 4 1 , 142, 144, i45n, 1 4 7 149» 1 5 1 , 1 5 5 - 1 5 7 , 162, 163, 180

224 South Carolina forestry organization, 35, 39, 101 Southeastern Station, 51, 52, 61, 103, 107, 110, 2o6ni35, 207ni47 Southern Forest Fire Prevention Conference. See American Forestry Association Southern Forestry Congress, 24, 26, 92 Southern Forestry Education Project. See American Forestry Association Southern Station: 10, 28, 29, 34, 38, 41-43, 54, 60, 61, 7 1 , 72, 76, 78-81, 86, 93-96, 98, 99, I07n, 110, 1 1 1 , 161, 202n44; Research Advisory Council, 46, 62, 166 Stabler, Herman, 145 State and Private Forestry, Division (Branch) of (formerly Office of State Cooperation), 52, 70, 74, 81, 99, 103, 107, 169 Stauffer, J. M., 101 Stoddard, Herbert L., 64, 66, 69, 73, 83, 87, 90, 100, I9in73 Stone, J. Herbert, 103 Stuart, Robert Y., 32, 33, 47, 48, 54 Superior Pine Products Company, 59, 89 Swain, George F., 126 Swartout, P. A., 95 Talladega National Forest, 72 Tallahatchie River, 138 Tate, Thomas R., 144 Tennessee River, 123, 124 Tennessee Valley Authority, 167 Teak, 26 Texas fever, 1 1 Texas forest organization, 58, 108 Texas National Forest, 73, 79, 84, 94, 1 1 2 Thompson, P. A., 96, 97 Thompson, Victor A., 1 7 1

INDEX Thornthwaite, C. W., 156 Toumey, James W., 26, 92 Treaty of Lake City. See City, Fla.

Lake

United States vs. Grimaud, I94ni4 Urania, La., 55, 61, 64, 66 Urania Lumber Company, 33, 34n, 175 Vegetal Cover to Floods, Subcommittee on the Relation of, 1 4 4 146, 148, 155, 156 Wagon Wheel Gap experiment, 1 2 8 - 1 3 3 , 161 Wahlenberg, W . G.: 61, 64, 65, 79-81, 105, 203n7o; Occasional Paper No. 40, 67-69 Wakeley, Philip, 105, 1 1 1 Wallace, Henry A., 82, 1 4 1 , 204n78 War Department, 140, 158. See also Corps of Engineers Wasatch Mountains, 160 Water Resources Committee, 142, 144,146,148 Waterflow, Presidential Committee on, 140 Watts, Lyle, 96-100, 105, 107, 109 Weather Bureau, 4, 122-124, 12 7— 130, 132, 133, 150, 172 Weeks Act, 1 1 6 , 123, 125, 127. See also Appalachian Mountains Reserve; White Mountains The Western Range, 172 Wheeler, H. N „ 68-72, 8;, 86, 98, 102, 20in40 White, Gilbert, 146 White Mountains, 119, 1 2 1 , 127, 128. See also Appalachian Mountains Reserve; Weeks Act Whittington, Rep. William, 141 Wiecking, Ernest, 159n Wilm, Harold G „ 161

225

INDEX Wilson, H. M., 74 Wilson, James, 1 1 9 Wolcott, Leon, 2 1 5 m Woodruff, George, 5 Wyman, Lenthall, 28, 1 9 7 ^ 8 Yacolt fire, 17

Yale School of Forestry, 16, 2 1 - 2 3 , 26, 1 1 6 Yazoo River, 138, 145, 146, 154, 160 Zon, Raphael, 4, 22, 128, »33, 135

131,