Families and Social Change in the Gulf Region 9780367481056, 9780367481025, 9781003037996

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In a nascent niche as Gulf Family Studies, this book is a trifecta: it fills a gap, has purpose, and serves social policies. Touching on overlooked aspects of the region, specifically the multi-functions of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) family, the book delves into a plethora of critical considerations: t raditional to transnational households, changes to child-rearing and domestic help, youth, power sharing, and female work. Almost uniquely exposed to complex intersect between state and social-public life, the intimate complications of Gulf homes are impressively articulated. This book serves as a much-needed contextual grab on the contemporary understanding of the region and its private sphere. Rima Sabban, Associate Professor, Zayed University

Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group

http://taylorandfrancis.com

FAMILIES AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE GULF REGION

This timely volume explores the impact of dramatic social change that has disrupted established patterns of family life and human development in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It addresses several major deficits in knowledge regarding family issues in the Gulf countries, bringing a critical perspective to the emerging challenges facing families in this region. Lansford, Ben Brik, and Badahdah examine the role of urbanization, educational progress, emigration, globalization, and changes in the status of women on social change, as well as tackling issues related to marriage, fertility and parenthood, and family well-being. This book explores how family relationships and social policies can promote physical health, psychological well-being, social relationships, safety, cognitive development, and economic security in the Gulf countries, placing a unique emphasis on contemporary families in this region. Families and Social Change in the Gulf Region is essential reading for scholars from psychology, sociology, education, law, and public policy. It will also be of interest to graduate students in these disciplines. Jennifer E. Lansford is Research Professor at the Duke University Center for Child and Family Policy in Durham, NC, USA. Her research focuses on parenting and child development in diverse cultural contexts. She has consulted with international agencies, such as UNICEF, on parenting programs and child well-being around the world. Anis Ben Brik is Associate Professor at Hamad Bin Khalifa University College of Public Policy, Qatar. His research focuses on welfare systems, policy evaluation, family policy, child welfare, social protection, and sustainable development in the MENA region. He has advised numerous public entities and international agencies on social issues. Abdallah M. Badahdah is Associate Professor of Sociology at South Dakota State University, USA. He previously was the Director of Family Research at Doha International Family Institute in Qatar and the chair of the Department of Social Sciences at Qatar University. His research focuses on families, gender, health, and parenting.

Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group

http://taylorandfrancis.com

FAMILIES AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE GULF REGION Edited by Jennifer E. Lansford, Anis Ben Brik, and Abdallah M. Badahdah

First published 2021 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 The Gulf Research Centre Cambridge The right of Jennifer E. Lansford, Anis Ben Brik, and Abdallah M. Badahdah to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this title has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-48105-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-48102-5 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-03799-6 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by codeMantra

CONTENTS

List of Contributors 1 Families in the Gulf Region Jennifer E. Lansford, Abdallah M. Badahdah, and Anis Ben Brik 2 Perspectives towards Intimate Partner Violence, as Influenced by the Introduction of the First and Only Women’s Crisis Advocacy Programme in the Middle East and North Africa Mary-Justine Todd, Zoe Jarvis, and Rona Murad

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3 Fertility Transition in Oman: Understanding the Puzzles of Rapid Decline in Fertility M. Mazharul Islam

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4 Children’s Perceptions of Parenting Styles: Ten Years of Research with Omani Families Said Aldhafri

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5 Parental Involvement in Education in the Gulf Region Suha Al-Hassan 6 The Role of Families in Supporting Youth Employment in Qatar Nader Kabbani and Nejla Ben Mimoune

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7 Youth Independence in Relation to Social Change in the Gulf 117 Abdulnabi Alekry 8 The Impact of Work-Family Conflict on Job Satisfaction: A Qatari Perspective 131 Noora Lari 9 Social Impact of Foreign Female Domestic Workers from South Asia and Africa on GCC Families 152 Dessislava Vassileva Ivanova 10 Personal Financial Risk Management Practices among Households in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 171 Masahina Sarabdeen, Ann Largey, Noreha Halid, A.C. Muhammadu Kijas, and Abad Alzuman 11 Policies and Programs to Promote the Well-being of Families in the Gulf Region 184 Anis Ben Brik, Jennifer E. Lansford, and Abdallah M. Badahdah Index 205

CONTRIBUTORS

Said Aldhafri, Sultan Qaboos University, Oman Abdulnabi Alekry, Bahrain Center for Studies, Bahrain Suha Al-Hassan,  Emirates College for Advanced Education, United Arab

Emirates Abad Alzuman, Princess Nourah Bint Abdulrahman University, Saudi Arabia Abdallah M. Badahdah, South Dakota State University, USA Anis Ben Brik, Hamad Bin Khalifa University College of Public Policy, Qatar Noreha Halid, Princess Nourah Bint Abdulrahman University, Saudi Arabia M. Mazharul Islam, Sultan Qaboos University, Oman Dessislava Vassileva Ivanova, Charles University, Czech Republic Zoe Jarvis, Women’s Crisis Care International, Bahrain Nader Kabbani, Brookings Doha Center, Qatar A.C. Muhammadu Kijas, International Islamic University, Malaysia

x Contributors

Jennifer E. Lansford, Duke University, USA Ann Largey, Princess Nourah Bint Abdulrahman University, Saudi Arabia Noora Lari, Qatar University, Qatar Nejla Ben Mimoune, Brookings Doha Center, Qatar Rona Murad, Women’s Crisis Care International, Bahrain Masahina Sarabdeen, Princess Nourah Bint Abdulrahman University, Saudi

Arabia Mary-Justine Todd, Women’s Crisis Care International, Bahrain

1 FAMILIES IN THE GULF REGION Jennifer E. Lansford, Abdallah M. Badahdah, and Anis Ben Brik

Introduction When Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman passed away on January 10, 2020, the international press highlighted the dramatic social changes that occurred during the course of his 50-year rule. When he became Sultan in 1970, the country of Oman had only three schools and six miles of paved roads (Gambrell, 2020). Laws banned electricity, radios, and eyeglasses, yet slavery was legal. Under his rule, Oman became a wealthy, modern, urbanized nation with global financial and political connections. Dramatic social changes, such as urbanization, increases in female education and labor force participation, and technology uptake over recent decades are not limited to Oman. Rapid social changes have occurred in all six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC; Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates). From a multidisciplinary perspective, the chapter introduces how the rest of the book tackles issues related to intimate partner relationships, fertility, and parenthood, and how community contexts influence families in the GCC. The chapter provides an overview of the subsequent chapters, which attend to how social changes and family relationships in the GCC are both similar to and different from other areas of the world. The chapters also attend to programs and policies designed to promote the well-being of families in the GCC. The book brings a critical perspective to the emerging challenges facing families in the GCC and opens lines of inquiry among scholars from diverse disciplines.

Social Changes in the Gulf Region Over the last five decades, remarkable social changes have disrupted the established patterns of family life in the GCC. These social changes include

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urbanization, increases in female education and labor force participation, technology uptake, improved economic status due to oil revenues, an influx of immigrants, globalization, and the advent of new ideological implications concerning social equality, social justice, and protection of the rights of women and children. These changes have led to contraction or decline in traditional family roles, changes in norms and attitudes toward family life, changes in family structure, the rise in a culture that attributed great social significance to symbols of material differentiation, and shifting patterns of female labor force participation. Women’s empowerment and leadership have become the cornerstones for many national and regional development initiatives in the Gulf. Traditional cultural values and social norms of parental behavior are in flux, as are the timing and means of procreation and the customary gender division of labor within the household. Fewer people are getting married; couples who marry are doing so later in life, splitting up more frequently, having fewer children, and living longer than ever before. The weakened role of the elder generation is an additional social change. Many Gulf families are dependent on foreign female domestic workers (maids, servants, and babysitters), a dependence that may carry negative connotations because it is associated with socialization of children and of young family members by individuals who may not share traditional Gulf social values. Social media influences the values, traditions, and practices of Gulf youth and complicates socialization by their families. Despite negative short- and long-term effects, intimate partner violence and child abuse have been underreported and not adequately documented in the Gulf countries. We describe in turn implications for Gulf families of several of these social changes.

Urbanization Closely tied with modernizing is the migration of the population to cities. The GCC is one of the most urbanized regions in the world, where almost 100% of the populations of Kuwait and Qatar live in urban areas (Statista, 2020). The population in urban areas has grown faster than in non-urban areas of the GCC and presents challenges for families (Ramadan, 2015). For example, urban housing units are typically designed to accommodate nuclear rather than extended families and can cut families off from traditional community ties (Ramadan, 2015). Researchers have argued that social disorganization is more likely in urban areas when family ties are weakened, which can increase the likelihood that marriages will end in divorce (Alzuhrany, 2010) and decrease the likelihood that families will be guided by traditional tribal ties (Alterman, 2019). Urbanization also can bring financial vulnerabilities to families, increasing the need for families to be aware of how to protect themselves from financial risks (see Sarabdeen, Largy, Halid, Kijas, & Alzuman, this volume).

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Increases in Female Education and Labor Force Participation Roles of women and their social status in the life of the community have changed dramatically in recent decades in the GCC. Gender parity has been achieved in education in all six Gulf countries, and women have outpaced men in enrollment in higher education (González, 2019). A larger proportion of women are employed in the paid labor force than in the past, but a substantially smaller proportion of women than men are employed, in part because of continued expectations for women to marry and fulfill domestic roles rather than work for pay (González, 2019). Women in the GCC are increasingly conflicted regarding decisions related to education, work, and family ( James-Hawkins, Qutteina, & Yount, 2017). Nevertheless, changes in women’s education and employment have had several important effects on family formation and family life in the GCC. For example, women are now older, on average, at the time they marry and begin bearing children, which has contributed to a decline in the birth rate (see Islam, this volume). Maternal education consistently predicts lower infant and child mortality and better maternal and child health (Mensch, Chuang, Melnikas, & Psaki, 2019). A further advantage of promoting women’s education is that doing so may also facilitate parents’ involvement in their children’s education, which is important in fostering children’s academic achievement (Al-Hassan, this volume). Although higher levels of female education and employment rates have contributed to an increase in gender equality and more rights for women, women still have fewer rights than men with respect to choosing a spouse, decision-making within the marriage, and legal rights in the case of divorce (Davis-Packard, 2016).

Technology Uptake Technology has been important in the GCC not only because of the financial and educational advantages that technology provides but also because access to the Internet has connected the GCC to a variety of ideologies that have challenged traditional ways of thinking. For example, exposure to Western media through the Internet has provided models of gender equality and ideas about human rights that were not part of traditional discourse in the GCC and has provided ways for young people to organize around these issues (HarrelsonStephens & Callaway, 2014). Access to social media has opened channels of communication for young people to correspond with one another directly, outside of the direct supervision of their families, and has provided a new forum through which they can express themselves and explore their identity (Guta & Karolak, 2015). Technology also offers the potential to maintain close family ties even in the face of geographic separation, such as when young adults study or work abroad yet are able to remain in frequent contact with family via technology. Technology can also present challenges for families, however, as

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reflected in concerns regarding how access to pornography on the Internet may be harming marriages, access to new ideas may spur disagreements between parents and their children, and how modesty consistent with Muslim values can be maintained over social media (e.g., Vieweg & Hodges, 2016).

Improved Economic Status Due to Oil Revenues The discovery of oil reserves on the Arabian Peninsula led to financial transformations in the GCC. The GCC itself was established in 1981 to serve a set of common goals, recognizing the unity of Islamic principles and cultural values in the six member states. The rapid economic development of the region resulted in the current status of the GCC as among the wealthiest regions in the world. The countries’ improved financial status fostered improvements in healthcare, education, and other indicators of living standards that have altered life for families in the GCC in important ways. All six countries in the GCC are seeking ways to diversify their economies and reduce reliance on oil revenues in the future, which will continue to bring about social changes that will impact families in the GCC. For example, families may take on important roles in helping young adult children search for jobs, particularly if employment in the public sector becomes more limited (see Kabbani & Ben Mimoune, this volume).

Influx of Immigrants The GCC is unique in that nationals comprise only 45% of the total population in Bahrain, 30% in Kuwait, 56% in Oman, 13% in Qatar, 62% in Saudi Arabia, and 13% in UAE (Gulf Research Center, 2020). Expatriates comprise the rest of the population and include both high-income workers who immigrate to contribute to global business enterprises and the knowledge economy as well as low-wage workers who immigrate under sponsorship systems to work in service industries (see Ivanova, this volume). Immigration affects Gulf families both directly, such as when foreign female domestic workers take on roles as primary caregivers for children and elderly family members, and indirectly, such as when local communities adopt policies or programs to serve the needs of more diverse populations.

Globalization Several factors, including the discovery of oil with its attendant economic consequences, an influx of immigrants, and the proliferation of technology, have contributed to the globalization of the GCC. For families, globalization has affected many aspects of daily life. For example, citizens of the GCC have been exposed to new ideas through immigrants to the GCC, many of whom have

Families in the Gulf Region  5

close ties to families by serving as domestic workers. In addition, young people frequently study and work abroad, which shapes their expectations and behaviors even after they return home (see Alekry, this volume). Global perspectives are also now widely available through the Internet. Family relationships can be challenged when older and younger generations hold different beliefs and values that might be a reflection of their different experiences with diverse other cultures, yet globalization also provides many opportunities.

Social Equality, Social Justice, and Protecting the Rights of Women and Children In part as a result of globalization and technology uptake that has disseminated ideas from other regions of the world, social equality, social justice, and human rights have gained attention as important issues to address in the GCC. Many of these issues are related to gender equality both in public spheres (e.g., in education and the labor force) and family life (e.g., right to protection from intimate partner violence). Little national population-based data exist on intimate partner violence in the Arab world, but rates of physical intimate partner violence are estimated to be between 6% and 43%, with higher estimates in facility-based than community-based samples (Elghossain, Bott, Akik, & Obermeyer, 2019). Cultural contexts in which men are expected to defend their honor and in which women are expected to maintain sexual purity are also more likely to condone intimate partner violence (Vandello & Cohen, 2008). In a study of 18- to 60-year-old women in Saudi Arabia, 12% reported having experienced intimate partner violence in the last year, but only 3% of the abused women had reported the abuse to the police or a judge and none had reported the abuse to a physician or women’s protection agency (Alzahrani, Abaalkhail, & Ramadan, 2016). Lifetime prevalence of experiencing any form of intimate partner violence was reported to be 43% in a different sample of married Saudi women ages 30 to 75 years (Alquaiz, Almuneef, Kazi, & Almeneessier, in press). Cultural expectations in the Arab region that women will uphold the family honor are a barrier to reporting instances of intimate partner violence (Al-Ghanim, 2009). The Qatari Penal Code currently in force (No. 11 for 2004) does not criminalize domestic violence or violence against women or children, but it does specify crimes of physical assault, molestation, defamation, insult, and exposing children to danger, and it specifies penalties for felonies or misdemeanors involving any of these crimes (Al-Ghanim, 2009). Newly established resources for women who have experienced intimate partner violence are an important step toward advancing women’s rights to protection (see Todd, Jarvis, & Murad, this volume). Children are at greater risk of directly experiencing violence in homes where their mothers experience violence and are also harmed indirectly through

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increased levels of stress, anxiety, and depression that follow witnessing domestic violence (UNICEF, 2006). Detriments to children who witness domestic violence are similar to the behavioral and psychological problems of children who themselves are abused (UNICEF, 2006). Children who witness domestic violence are at greater risk for behavioral and psychosocial problems during childhood and of abusing their own future spouse and children (Smith, Ireland, Park, Elwyn, & Thornberry, 2011). Children also are in need of protection and positive parenting to reach their full developmental potential. Because most instances of abuse and neglect go unreported, accurate statistics on rates of abuse and neglect are difficult to obtain. Prevalence estimates obtained through self or parent reports are more than ten times higher than official rates of substantiated maltreated (Gilbert et al., 2009). A study conducted by the Supreme Council for Family Affairs suggested that 20% of children in Qatar experience psychological, physical, or sexual abuse at home, at school, or in the community (Scott, 2013). This rate is similar to rates reported for other high-income countries (e.g., Finkelhor, Turner, Shattuck, & Hamby, 2015). The United Nations (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) sets forth children’s right to protection from abuse and exploitation. The CRC, which has been ratified by all countries except the United States, asserts that all forms of violence against children (including corporal punishment, no matter how mild) are a violation of children’s right to protection from abuse. A workshop designed to consider the CRC from an Arab perspective included 32 participants from Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Morocco, and the Sudan, primarily from organizations such as Save the Children, the Bernard van Leer Foundation, UNICEF, and the Arab Resource Collective (Bibi & Arab Resource Collective, 1994). The workshop participants concluded that the CRC is in harmony with Islamic Sharia as well as Arab cultural traditions and values. More recently, Goal 16.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015 is to “End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children” (Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, 2015). One indicator of achievement of SDG 16.2 adopted by the United Nations is the percentage of children aged 1–17 who experienced any physical punishment and/or psychological aggression by caregivers in the past month (Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2018). Another is the number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age, and form of exploitation. The SDGs are guiding the international development agenda through 2030. As of June 2020, 60 countries have outlawed all forms of corporal punishment of children (including in the home). No countries in the GCC have outlawed corporal punishment in all settings, although the UAE government has indicated commitment to outlawing corporal punishment in all settings. The lack of legal bans of corporal punishment has been raised as a concern in

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the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights, as outlawing corporal punishment is regarded as one step toward protecting children from abuse. Internationally, legislation outlawing corporal punishment accompanied by education campaigns to promote awareness of the law and teach non-violent forms of discipline, has been demonstrated in a study in Austria, France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden to be an effective combination of steps to protect children from violence (Bussmann, Erthal, & Schroth, 2011), with long-term benefits to their well-being. In this five-country study, corporal punishment was most prevalent in France, which had neither outlawed corporal punishment nor launched a public awareness campaign about the harms of corporal punishment, followed by Spain, which had not banned corporal punishment at the time of the study but had a national public awareness campaign about the detriments of violent childrearing (Bussmann et al., 2011). Corporal punishment was least prevalent in Sweden, which in 1979 was the first country to outlaw corporal punishment, followed by Germany, which had a public awareness campaign as well as a legal ban, and then Austria which had a legal ban but not accompanying public awareness campaign. One year after the legal ban in Germany, only 30% of parents knew about the legal ban (Bussmann, 2004), suggesting the need for rigorous public awareness campaigns to accompany legal bans of corporal punishment. Several country-specific programs to protect children at home have been introduced in the Arab region. For example, the Child Hotline in Saudi Arabia uses a helpline to assist children who have been abused. The Sidra Medical and Research Center launched the Sidra Child Advocacy Program as Qatar’s first child abuse protection program (Sidra Medicine, 2018). Stigmatization still follows some victims of abuse, suggesting the need for extreme caution in protecting the identity of victims, such as in the UAE’s new system through the Child Protection Centre in the Ministry of Interior. The National Family Safety Program (2018) in Saudi Arabia commissioned a study to assess the kingdom’s readiness to apply programs to prevent child abuse and concluded with a set of recommendations that included the need for raising public awareness of child abuse, training professionals in how to deal with cases of child maltreatment, monitoring reports of child maltreatment, and setting national standards for how to approach child maltreatment. Ultimately, the goal is to move from protecting victims of abuse and neglect to preventing abuse and neglect from occurring in the first place. Overall, globalization and technology uptake, in particular, have contributed to the dissemination of ideas about social equality, social justice, and the need to protect the rights of women and children.

Traditional and Contemporary Families in the Gulf Region GCC countries have youthful populations with one third to one half of their populations under the age of 25 (AlMunajjed & Sabbagh, 2011). Young

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populations bring opportunities for energy, creativity, and innovation but also challenges for education, employment, community engagement, and leisure (AlMunajjed & Sabbagh, 2011). Families and public institutions alike grapple with how to support children and youth in the face of social changes. Parents who are able to balance supportiveness with placing appropriate demands on children are likely to foster children’s social, emotional, behavioral, and academic adjustment (see Aldhafri, this volume). In the last 50 years, the social, economic, cultural, and demographic structures of the Gulf countries have changed rapidly, leading to many changes in family life. Traditionally, families lived in extended family households that were in close connection with other households that shared tribal and kinship ties (El-Haddad, 2003). Although traditional tribal ties continue to be important, especially with respect to marriage, living arrangements have shifted from extended to nuclear family structures. The average family size in the GCC has declined precipitously in recent decades in some countries (e.g., from an average of 8.6 births per woman in 1988 to 3.9 births per woman in 2018 in Oman; Islam, this volume). Social changes have created new pressures and needs with respect to family life. Among the Gulf countries, existent welfare state policies have been reformed and new ones drafted in response to the challenges posed by the changing patterns of family dynamics. Different types of child care arrangements have emerged, along with policies for the care of elderly family members. Diverse public measures have been implemented to strengthen the family, and to harmonize work and family life (see Lari, this volume).

Marriage and Divorce in the Gulf Region Marriage is the foundation of the family unit in the Gulf. No chapter in this book specifically focuses on marriage, although many refer to marriage in a number of ways. Notably, the average age at marriage has increased over time, particularly for women, and the percentage of women who choose to remain single is growing. For example, in surveys in the 2000s, 10% of women ages 45–49 years in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar had never married (De Bel-Air, Safar, & Destremau, 2018), in contrast to virtually none in the past. Polygamous marriage is legal in the GCC, as Islam allows men to have up to four wives in certain circumstances (Hinchcliffe, 2014), yet it has become less common over time. Akhtar (2020) discusses changing norms in marriage practices in modern day Qatar, focusing in particular on the issue of ‘marrying out’ where Qataris marry non-Qataris. Drawing on empirical data gathered from fieldwork in Qatar, involving interviews with individuals and legal personnel involved in marriage processes, she presents a unique insight into Qatar’s family law framework. Although the majority of marriages in the GCC continue to

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be between men and women with the same citizenship, marriages between couples from different national backgrounds are on the rise. Such couples often have difficulty navigating marriage laws and sometimes use unregistered religious marriages as a bridging mechanism to enable them to start a family while continuing to try to gain legal recognition of their marriage. Such marriages are not legally binding, and children resulting from such marriages might not have citizenship, depending on the citizenship of the mother and the father and the country in which they reside. Divorce rates are high in some GCC countries and have been increasing in recent years. For example, between 2000 and 2015, the divorce rate increased by 71% in Qatar (Toumi, 2017b). Approximately 60% of marriages in Kuwait end in divorce (Toumi, 2017a), and between 18% and 37% of marriages in Saudi Arabia end in divorce, depending on the geographic region (Tago, 2016). Divorce rates are considerably lower in consanguineous marriages than in non- consanguineous marriages (e.g., 18% vs. 64%, respectively, in Qatar; Toumi, 2017b). “Interest-driven” marriages, in which couples marry to attain a specific financial or citizenship goal in the absence of an intention to form a lifelong partnership, have contributed to the increase in divorce rates. Financial incentives provided by the government for couples to marry include the promise of loans for newly married couples; once couples have attained these financial benefits, they sometimes choose to divorce. Thus, understanding marriage, divorce, and other aspects of family life in the GCC requires attention to how families are embedded in broader societal contexts and affected by social changes.

Overview of the Book The chapters in this volume are structured around two central themes related to families in the context of social changes in the Gulf region: (1) intimate partner relationships, fertility, and parenting; (2) economic and community factors influencing Gulf families. Some of the chapters present new empirical findings; others provide critical reviews. Each chapter begins with a broad overview of the topic and goals of the chapter, presents background research on the topic from the international literature, reviews whether findings in the GCC are similar to or different from findings in other countries, provides new empirical data or reviews empirical studies from the GCC, suggests implications for policy and practice in the GCC, summarizes limitations of the current state of the field and directions for future research, and ends with implications for understanding family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region. A brief description of each chapter follows. The first section of the book focuses on intimate partner relationships, fertility, and parenting. First, Todd, Jarvis, and Murad (this volume) describe attitudes toward intimate partner violence in the context of the first and only women’s

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crisis advocacy program in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Attitudes toward intimate partner violence (IPV) and perceptions of how it exists within individual communities play an important role in determining not only the prevalence rates of violence against women around the world, but also in the willingness of communities to make response mechanisms available for women. Although there is substantial research in Western societies looking not only at prevalence rates but other factors that intersect with IPV, there is little research within the MENA region that examines much beyond its mere existence. Western studies on factors influencing IPV have shown the importance of victims’ crisis advocacy programs in improving attitudes toward violence prevention, decreasing its acceptance within society, and in ultimately creating positive outcomes for victims of abuse and for women’s empowerment ideals overall. This chapter considers whether the same may hold true in the Gulf region by analyzing how the introduction of the first women’s crisis and victims’ advocacy program in the entire region, at Women’s Crisis Care International (WCCI) in Bahrain, has positively influenced the attitudes toward IPV of individual members within the community, namely, the WCCI volunteers and clients, and considers whether these changes might lead to long-term improvements in women’s place within society. Next, Islam (this volume) focuses on Oman, a traditional Muslim country that has experienced a rapid fertility decline in recent times. This chapter analyzes the fertility transition in Oman and explores the underlying causes of rapid decline in fertility. Fertility in Oman declined from 8.6 births per woman in 1988 to 3.9 births per woman in 2018, a decline of 4.7 births per woman within a short period of 30 years. Delayed age at marriage, the government’s policy toward fertility reduction, modernization, educational development of women, and women’s participation in the workforce are the major factors that have affected the reproductive behavior of women and reduced fertility in Oman. The unique “Birth Spacing Programme” in Oman could be a role model for other high fertility Muslim countries, including other Gulf countries for further reducing fertility and improving maternal and child health. Aldhafri (this volume) describes research in Oman that has utilized different methodologies to understand how parents interact with their children and how this interaction influences children’s outcomes. The issue of how Omani children and adolescents perceive their parents’ parenting styles has become an important one in the last ten years. Cumulative research shows that authoritative parenting styles (characterized by high warmth and high control) are the most common among Omani parents followed by authoritarian parenting styles (characterized by low warmth and high control). Permissive parenting styles (characterized by high warmth and low control) are less common in the Omani context. These parenting styles predict different child outcomes, including academic self-efficacy beliefs, self-concept, mental health, learned helplessness, goal orientation, depression, and academic achievement. The chapter presents

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findings that contribute to understanding how families have changed in the last ten years and how different demographic and family variables influence parenting styles and children’s adjustment. Al-Hassan (this volume) focuses on parental involvement in education in the Gulf region. Over the past decades, many countries of the Gulf region have heavily funded several initiatives to reform and improve education. The Gulf countries are motivated to prepare their citizens to deal with economic and social changes for an increasingly globalized and competitive world, and so have embraced ambitious and inclusive education reform strategies, which are closely tied to national agendas. However, and despite the availability of the massive financial resources, the outcomes are falling behind the initial expectations, which has made policy makers keen on revising plans to achieve education-related goals. For the education reform initiatives to be successful, all stakeholders, including parents, should be involved in the process. Parent-school partnerships are a critical factor in the holistic development of the child (socially, behaviorally, emotionally, and academically). Parental involvement is often linked to socioeconomic factors and parental attitudes. Schools that are successful in improving the achievement of students tend to have strong partnerships with families and local communities. This chapter focuses on parental engagement in education and home-school partnerships in the Gulf region. The second section of the book discusses economic and community factors influencing Gulf families. Kabbani and Ben Mimoune (this volume) focus on the role of families in supporting youth employment, with particular attention to Qatar. Family ties in Qatar are strong and form a solid support system for the country’s youth. Access to family networks can help young people during their job search and improve their employment outcomes. Families can also influence the sector in which young people end up working. Thus, families can play a role in supporting economic diversification and other policy priorities of the state as articulated in the National Development Strategies of the country. This chapter examines the extent to which family connections help young people in Qatar transition more effectively to employment. The chapter examines the determinants of using family support to initiate young Qataris’ career, the impact of family support on job search dynamics and outcomes, and the gender dimensions of the family role and family policy in youth employment. Findings suggest that relying on family connections to look for a job decreases the likelihood of unemployment among both male and female young Qataris and reduces the probability of being out of the labor force for non-Qatari females living in Qatar. The chapter suggests ways to enhance the role of families in supporting youth in both Qatar and the international community. Alekry (this volume) focuses on youth independence in relation to social change in the Gulf. The Gulf family has been going through deep and comprehensive transformations with effects on functions, roles, authority, and structure. Youths are influenced by social changes and family transformations occurring

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in the Gulf. Youths also play a vital role in both social change and family transformations. This chapter examines the independence trend of Gulf youths in relation to family transformation within the context of social change. The chapter examines the incentives and deterrents of Gulf youth independence. Particular areas of focus include major decisions relating to higher education, professions, entrepreneurship, marriage, housing, social status, political affiliation, and other choices that tend to be assumed after reaching age 25 but are more negotiable during adolescence and the transition to adulthood. In addition to addressing Gulf youth independence as a pan-GCC phenomenon, the chapter also highlights variations among GCC countries and variations according to gender, community, and social status. Lari (this volume) focuses on the impact of work-family conflict on job satisfaction, particularly in Qatar. The performance of employees in any organization depends on numerous factors, which can be related to job satisfaction, family life, or both. A work-life balance is highly desirable for employees, as it helps to reduce friction between professional and domestic lives. This chapter provides a discussion of the implications of work-family conflict on the well-being of Qatari families as seen critically in light of the current provisions of national laws, which are intended to help reduce work-family conflict. The main questions addressed include the relation between work-family conflict and job satisfaction and how Qatari employees can achieve job satisfaction and low work-family conflict through human resources policies in the workforce. Ivanova (this volume) reviews literature regarding the influence of female domestic workers from South Asia and Africa on the receiving families in the GCC countries. Current theoretical conceptualizations suggest that the social impact of the foreign female domestic workers in the families can be defined in terms of social benefits, social implications, and social problems. Benefits to Gulf families include greater social freedom of the female members of the families and higher social status of the families employing foreign female domestic workers. Potential negative effects include perceived implications for moral, language, and religious aspects of the family and social problems in the realms of domestic conflicts, childcare, and care for older family members. The literature review thus takes a balanced view of the influence of South Asian and African domestic workers on the receiving families in GCC countries. Sarabdeen et al. (this volume) focus on factors that present financial uncertainties to families in the context of social changes in the Gulf region as well as personal financial risk management practices that families take to mitigate financial risks. Families’ well-being can be affected by household debt, losing a job, financial loss in business, damage to property that is a source of income, loss of mortgages, medical expenses, and other unforeseen events. To prevent these events from draining families’ financial resources and undermining their well-being, families should recognize financial risks they face and take actions

Families in the Gulf Region  13

to protect themselves against adverse effects of such risks. Using data from households’ financial decision-makers in Saudi Arabia, this chapter examines predictors of families’ financial risk management practices. Finally, the book concludes by providing an overview of main take-home messages from the rest of the chapters in the book and synthesizing the main points across the chapters. The final chapter also discusses implications of the findings reported in the prior chapters for policies and programs to promote the well-being of families in the Gulf region.

Conclusions This book examines contemporary trends and issues in families over the life course and how they interact with family-oriented social policies of modern welfare states in the Gulf region. The life-course perspective extends the conventional analyses of family policies, which tend to emphasize public programs and benefits clustered around efforts to harmonize work and family life during the early years of childrearing. The chapters that follow discuss state polices that attempt to address the challenges that face contemporary families in the Gulf. The book addresses several major deficits in knowledge regarding family issues in the Gulf countries. The book also provides a context in which to understand how family relationships and social policies can promote children’s physical health, behavioral adjustment, psychological well-being, social relationships, safety, cognitive development, and economic security in the Gulf countries. Government involvement in the lives of families may stem in part from the recognition that families do not exist in a vacuum. Public policies affect families, providing the context within which individuals develop their relationships and rear their children. The current concerns in the Gulf that have led governments to reflect on what is happening to the family include concerns about demographic trends, employment, gender relationships, human rights, health, education, identity, and political stability. The book provides needed research and data to guide these efforts in the Gulf region. The book addresses questions such as: What types of support do families need? What are the specific challenges that couples face in trying to maintain healthy families and fulfilling relationships? How do parent-child relationships function in the context of social changes? How best should governments allocate their resources? Overall, the book brings a critical perspective to the emerging challenges facing families in the Gulf, as well as opens lines of inquiry among scholars from diverse disciplines, including sociology, psychology, human development and family studies, anthropology, social work, public policy, and other social sciences. The multidisciplinary perspective reflects the need to understand Gulf families in the context of rapid social changes that span many aspects of modern life in the GCC.

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References Akhtar, R. C. (2020, in press). Religious-only marriages and cohabitation: Deciphering differences. In R. C. Akhtar, P. Nash, & R. Probert (Eds.), Cohabitation and religious marriage: Status, similarities and solutions. Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press. Aldhafri, S. (2021). Children’s perceptions of parenting styles: Ten years of research with Omani families. In J. E. Lansford, A. Ben Brik, & A. Badahdah (Eds.), Family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region (pp. 60–79). New York: Routledge. Alekry, A. (2021). Youth independence in relation to social change in the Gulf. In J. E. Lansford, A. Ben Brik, & A. Badahdah (Eds.), Family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region (pp. 117–130). New York: Routledge. Al-Ghanim, K. A. (2009). Violence against women in Qatari society. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 5, 80–93. Al-Hassan, S. (2021). Parental involvement in education in the Gulf region. In J. E. Lansford, A. Ben Brik, & A. Badahdah (Eds.), Family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region (pp. 80–95). New York: Routledge. AlMunajjed, M., & Sabbagh, K. (2011). Youth in GCC countries: Meeting the challenge. Retrieved from https://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/ library/2011_Youth_GCC_Countries_Meeting_Challenge_Eng.pdf Alquaiz, A. M., Almuneef, M., Kazi, A., & Almeneessier, A. (in press). Social determinants of domestic violence among Saudi married women in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Journal of Interpersonal Violence. Alterman, J. B. (2019). Ties that bind: Family, tribe, nation, and the rise of Arab individualism. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Alzahrani, T. A., Abaalkhail, B. A., & Ramadan, I. K. (2016). Prevalence of intimate partner violence and its associated risk factors among Saudi female patients attending the primary healthcare centers in Western Saudi Arabia. Saudi Medical Journal, 37, 96–99. Alzuhrany, A. (2010). Urbanization and problems of cities in the GCC countries. Retrieved from http://www.al-jazirah.com/2010/20100511/ar6.htm Bibi, G., & Arab Resource Collective. (1994). Rights of the child in the Arab world: Needs and Challenges. Cyprus: Arab Resource Collective. Bussmann, K.-D. (2004). Evaluating the subtle impact of a ban on corporal punishment of children in Germany. Child Abuse Review, 13, 292–311. Bussmann, K.-D., Erthal, C., & Schroth, A. (2011). Effects of banning corporal punishment in Europe: A five-nation comparison. In J. E. Durrant & A. B. Smith (Eds.), Global pathways to abolishing physical punishment: Realizing children’s rights (pp. 299–322). New York: Routledge. Danish Institute for Human Rights. (2018). The human rights guide to the sustainable development goals. Retrieved from http://sdg.humanrights.dk/ Davis-Packard, K. (2016). Women’s rights and family law in the Middle East and North Africa. Retrieved from https://agsiw.org/womens-rights-and-family-lawin-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/ De Bel-Air, F., Safar, J., & Destremau, B. (2018). Marriage and family in the Gulf today: Storms over a patriarchal institution? Arabian Humanities, 10. doi: 10.4000/ cy.4399 Elghossain, T., Bott, S., Akik, C., & Obermeyer, C. M. (2019). Prevalence of intimate partner violence against women in the Arab world: A systematic review. BMC International Health and Human Rights, 19(1), 29.

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El-Haddad, Y. (2003). Major trends affecting families in the Gulf countries. New York: UNICEF. Finkelhor, D., Turner, H. A., Shattuck, A., & Hamby, S. L. (2015). Prevalence of childhood exposure to violence, crime, and abuse: Results from the national survey of children’s exposure to violence. JAMA Pediatrics, 169, 746–754. Gambrell, J. (2020). Sultan Qaboos bin Said, who modernized Oman, dies at 79. Retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-01-10/ state-media-say-omans-sultan-qaboos-bin-said-has-died Gilbert, R., Widom, C. S., Browne, K., Fergusson, D., Webb, E., & Janson, S. (2009). Burden and consequences of child maltreatment in high-income countries. Lancet, 373, 68–81. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children. (2015). Ending violent punishment of children – A foundation of a world free from fear and violence. Retrieved from http://endcorporalpunishment.org/assets/pdfs/briefings-thematic/ SDG-indicators-on-violent-punishment-briefing.pdf González, A. L. (2019). Women’s university attainment and labor force participation in Gulf Cooperation Council countries. In B. English, M. E. Frederickson, & O. Sanmiguel-Valderrama (Eds.), Global women’s work: Perspectives on gender and work in the global economy (pp. 250–262). New York: Routledge. Gulf Research Center. (2020). GCC: Total population and percentage of nationals and non-nationals in GCC countries. Retrieved from https://gulfmigration.org/ gcc- total-population-and-percentage-of-nationals-and-non-nationals-in-gcccountries-national-statistics-2017-2018-with-numbers/ Guta, H., & Karolak, M. (2015). Veiling and blogging: Social media as sites of identity negotiation and expression among Saudi women. Journal of International Women’s Studies, 16, 115–127. Harrelson-Stephens, J., & Callaway, R. L. (2014). You say you want a revolution: The Arab Spring, norm diffusion, and the human rights regime. Human Rights Review, 15, 413–431. Hinchcliffe, D. (2014). Polygamy in traditional and contemporary Islamic law. In M. A. Baderin (Ed.), Issues in Islamic law (pp. 63–78). London, UK: Routledge. Islam, M. M. (2021). Fertility transition in Oman: Understanding the puzzles of rapid decline in fertility. In J. E. Lansford, A. Ben Brik, & A. Badahdah (Eds.), Family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region (pp. 38–59). New York: Routledge. Ivanova, D. V. (2021). Social impact of foreign female domestic workers from South Asia and Africa on GCC families. In J. E. Lansford, A. Ben Brik, & A. Badahdah (Eds.), Family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region (pp. 152–170). New York: Routledge. James-Hawkins, L., Qutteina, Y., & Yount, K. M. (2017). The patriarchal bargain in a context of rapid changes to normative gender roles: Young Arab women’s role conflict in Qatar. Sex Roles, 77, 155–168. Kabbani, N., & Ben Mimoune, N. (2021). The role of families in supporting youth employment in Qatar. In J. E. Lansford, A. Ben Brik, & A. Badahdah (Eds.), Family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region (pp. 96–116). New York: Routledge. Lari, N. A. (2021). The impact of work-family conflict on job satisfaction: A Qatari perspective. In J. E. Lansford, A. Ben Brik, & A. Badahdah (Eds.), Family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region (pp. 131–151). New York: Routledge.

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Mensch, B. S., Chuang, E. K., Melnikas, A. J., & Psaki, S. R. (2019). Evidence for causal links between education and maternal and child health: Systematic review. Tropical Medicine and International Health, 24, 504–522. National Family Safety Program. (2018). Domestic violence and child abuse and neglect in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from https://nfsp.org.sa/ar/awareness/DocLib/e.pdf Ramadan, E. (2015). Sustainable urbanization in the Arabian Gulf Region: Problems and challenges. Arts and Social Sciences Journal, 6(2). doi: 10.4172/2151-6200.1000109 Sarabdeen, M., Largy, A., Halid, N., Kijas, A. C. M., & Alzuman, A. (2021). Personal financial risk management practices among households in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In J. E. Lansford, A. Ben Brik, & A. Badahdah (Eds.), Family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region (pp. 171–183). New York: Routledge. Scott, V. (2013). Report: One in five children in Qatar subject to abuse. Retrieved from https://dohanews.co/report-one-in-five-children-in-qatar-subject-to-abuse/ Sidra Medicine. (2018). Sidra launches child advocacy program dedicated to protect children from abuse and neglect. Retrieved from http://www.sidra.org/sidralaunches-child-advocacy-program-dedicated-to-protect-children-from-abuseand-neglect/ Smith, C. A., Ireland, T. O., Park, A., Elwyn, L., & Thornberry, T. P. (2011). Intergenerational continuities and discontinuities in intimate partner violence: A twogenerational prospective study. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 26, 3720–3752. Statista. (2020). Share of urban population in the Gulf Cooperation Council region from 2005 to 2030. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/957368/ gcc-urban-population/ Tago, A. H. (2016). 5 divorces every hour in KSA. Retrieved from https://www. arabnews.com/node/948551/saudi-arabia Todd, M.-J., Jarvis, Z., & Murad, R. (2021). Perspectives towards intimate partner violence, as influenced by the introduction of the first and only women’s crisis advocacy program in the Middle East and North Africa. In J. E. Lansford, A. Ben Brik, & A. Badahdah (Eds.), Family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region (pp. 17–37). New York: Routledge. Toumi, H. (2017a). Alarm sounded as divorce rate in Kuwait reaches 60%. Retrieved from https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/kuwait/alarm-sounded-as-divorce-rate-inkuwait-reaches-60-1.2030151 Toumi, H. (2017b). Divorce rates up by 71% in Qatar. Retrieved from https://gulfnews. com/world/gulf/qatar/divorce-rates-up-by-71-in-qatar-1.1964489 UNICEF. (2006). Behind closed doors: The impact of domestic violence on children. New York: UNICEF. Vandello, J. A., & Cohen, D. (2008). Culture, gender, and men’s intimate partner violence. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2, 652–667. Vieweg, S., & Hodges, A. (2016). Surveillance and modesty on social media: How Qataris navigate modernity and maintain tradition. Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing, February 2016, 527–538.

2 PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, AS INFLUENCED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF THE FIRST AND ONLY WOMEN’S CRISIS ADVOCACY PROGRAMME IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA Mary-Justine Todd, Zoe Jarvis, and Rona Murad Introduction The 21st century has seen worldwide efforts to decrease violence against women and improve victims’ outcomes. Similarly, in the MENA region, many organizations aim to raise awareness of violence against women and provide services to women who have been victims of violence. For example, the National Family Safety Program in Saudi Arabia is an organization that raises awareness of domestic violence and provides professional training on the topic (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [CEDAW], 2016). Likewise, the Dubai Foundation for Women and Children was established to provide care, rehabilitation, and awareness services for women and children who have been victims of violence (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [CEDAW], 2014). Similarly, Women’s Crisis Care International, a non-profit organization founded in 2016, provides services for victims and seeks to create community awareness of issues surrounding domestic and sexual violence against women. In contrast to the other GCC organizations however, WCCI is the first and only advocacy organization in the MENA providing full-scale 24/7 crisis response services for victims of abuse, following all international standard of care protocols. WCCI, which operates fully in both English and Arabic and is funded by international and local sponsorships, has a three-fold mandate: 1

Crisis advocacy response includes support 24 hours a day and seven days a week by trained volunteers who provide emotional, informational, and logistic support both on the phone and in person. This includes accompaniment to police stations, courthouses, shelters, and hospitals, as well as

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2

3

referral and emergency provisions such as food, transportation, and shelter. The WCCI team trains all crisis response volunteers during a comprehensive 40-hour training that covers a variety of topics such as understanding trauma, response procedures, and safety protocols. The entire training programme is modelled after two primary sources: The New York State Rape and Violence Crisis Curriculum and the United Nations Office for Drug and Crime Handbook for Victims (United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention [UNODCCP], 1999). Case management offers medium- to long-term care to victims of abuse through talk support, goal setting, logistics management, and referral to services for counselling, legal/immigration support, employment support, and medical care. Community education and outreach about violence against women includes creating and participating in community events, online campaigns, as well as sensitivity and awareness training for volunteers, medical, and humanitarian professionals.

Overall, the mission of WCCI is to support women who are victims of abuse. In parallel, there seems to have been a positive shift in providing support for women over the past decade within other entities in Bahrain. For example, Bahrain has committed itself to enhancing gender equality by following UNDP goals and guidelines. Furthermore, the creation of the quasi-governmental Supreme Council for Women (SCW, 2009) in Bahrain has helped to create equality for women before the law, specifically in the courtroom and within marriage. Statistics gathered by the SCW identify a positive increase over the years towards women’s representation in parliament. Furthermore, in 2015, Bahrain became one of the first countries in the region to officially outlaw and criminalize domestic violence (DV). Domestic violence is defined “as assaultive and coercive behaviour that adults use against their intimate partners” (Holden, 2003, p. 55; Yount, Halim, Hynes, & Hillman, 2011, p. 873). Overall, Bahrain has shown its commitment to enhancing the position of women in the country over the past few years by creating laws in favour of protecting women and increasing their presence in the public and private sector. In light of these changes in support of women in society, Bahrain provides an important context in this study’s endeavour to better understand if WCCI volunteers and beneficiaries self-reported an enhanced understanding of IPV after volunteering for or interacting with WCCI. Moreover, the goals are to understand the role and degree of influence an advocacy programme such as WCCI’s may have on shaping the attitudes towards IPV within society. This study will begin by providing a detailed overview of the current research, internationally and regionally, available on IPV. The international research on the topic of IPV will first be discussed by identifying the main themes that have been examined, which include the presence of IPV globally and the consequences for victims. Next, an overview of the research within the MENA

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and GCC region will discuss the presence of IPV in the region, reporting rates and attitudes towards help-seeking. Furthermore, the empirical findings of the study are then discussed, including whether the advocacy training positively influenced the attitudes on IPV of newly trained volunteers by comparing their responses to the survey as well as tests carried out before and after the advocacy training. Additionally, the findings will highlight the self-reported answers of beneficiaries and whether they believe that their attitudes and awareness of IPV were positively shaped following their interactions with WCCI. Next, the suggested policy and practice implications of advocacy programmes are examined through recommended legislative and legal reform aimed at further combatting IPV and violence against women. Finally, the study refers to the limitations of this research and what can be improved for future studies, which includes conducting a longitudinal study and a comparative study between the GCC member countries. The chapter concludes by analysing the ways in which advocacy programmes may influence family structures in a positive manner through perceived increased awareness of IPV and DV.

Background on Intimate Partner Violence in International Literature International studies on IPV are predominantly focused on discussing the prevalence of IPV, highlighting the seriousness of the matter. IPV is a concern that impacts women from all backgrounds (Alhabib, Nur, & Jones, 2009). For example, globally, “6 out of every 10 women experience physical and/ or sexual violence in their lifetime” (Haddad, Shotar, Younger, Alzyoud, & Bouhaider, 2011, p. 79). Additionally, women are at more risk of experiencing violence from an intimate partner than from any other type of perpetrator (Garcia-Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise, & Watts, 2006). In addition to the worldwide literature on prevalence, the research also discusses the harmful outcomes of IPV on victims of abuse, including “physical, mental and sexual” consequences (Wee, Todd, Oshiro, Green, & Frye, 2016, p. 55). Moreover, a strong correlation has been found between abuse and low self-esteem (Fageeh, 2014). Lastly, international research has addressed the ways in which advocacy work can lead to positive outcomes for women who utilize IPV advocacy services. The current literature addressing the topic is only evident within the United States. For example, in Illinois, United States a study conducted by Bennett, Riger, Schewe, Howard, and Wasco (2004) revealed that “24% of women who worked with advocates” (p.818) experienced minimal adverse outcomes. Additionally, women who have received advocacy help have had positive outcomes which include “fewer depressive symptoms and were more effective at acquiring social support than the control group” (Bennett et al., 2004, p. 818). The positive impacts are reflected as well in research demonstrating how victims of abuse who work with advocates, “experienced less violence over time, reported

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higher quality of life and social support, and had less difficulty obtaining community resources” (Sullivan & Bybee, 1999, pp. 51–52). Existing literature on the impact of advocacy work clearly suggests that advocacy support has a direct and positive influence on victims of abuse.

Background on Intimate Partner Violence in the GCC CEDAW Reports – Summary of GCC Countries Overall, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) reports within the GCC region reflects a strong commitment to enhancing and strengthening the role of women in society. The reports have identified an increase and improvement in the status of women both socially and economically. For example, the report finds that many of the GCC countries have seen an increase in the number of women employed in the public and private sector. Additionally, many regulatory bodies and councils have been created in the region to enhance the role of women. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has established the Supreme Council for Motherhood and Childhood and the Dubai Foundation for Women and Children (CEDAW, 2014). The goal of these councils is to provide resources to women, especially in the context of violence against women. The reports also specifically address violence against women and find that many organizations have been established with the aim of decreasing violence. These resources include helplines and shelters for victims of abuse. Moreover, countries such as Kuwait have implemented institutional mechanisms in the country’s development plans in an attempt to reduce violence against women (CEDAW, 2015). The majority of the GCC countries have created training programmes for police and those operating within the criminal justice systems, seeking to improve the awareness of these topics among police officers as well as improve how police are equipped to respond to violence. This has included enacting confidentiality policies for victims, and a mandate to provide official police reports for victims if requested. Some GCC countries have established the goal of developing future policies that will create legislations for violence against women, such as the Law of Protection from Abuse, which is being developed in Saudi Arabia as a national mechanism (CEDAW, 2016). Overall the CEDAW reports reveal that the GCC countries are successfully implementing strategies to effectively reduce violence against women and consider it a national strategy to focus on within the coming years.

CEDAW Reports on Bahrain Bahrain’s CEDAW (2018) reports have identified Bahrain’s efforts in enhancing the position of women in society, especially in the context of violence against women. The report identifies that Bahrain has enacted specific legislative acts

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to raise awareness on the topic and to provide appropriate rehabilitation, treatment, shelter, and resources to victims. Additionally, the Supreme Council for Women provides legal and psychological services to women, including victims of abuse. The report discusses that the council has also launched a national strategy against domestic violence, which focuses on “prevention, protection, services, laws and legislation and awareness” (CEDAW, 2018, p. 20). The CEDAW report (2018) also identifies that the Institute of Judicial Studies is organizing specialized training for judges, prosecutors, and the police on violence against women. Moreover, in 2017, the country launched a national statistical database on domestic violence, called Takatof, which “coincided with a global campaign against violence against women” (CEDAW, 2018, p. 21). A domestic violence shelter has also been established in Bahrain to provide temporary shelter and support for victims of violence. Overall, the CEDAW report positively identifies Bahrain’s actions to reduce violence against women, which includes establishing the Supreme Council for Women and providing temporary shelter to victims of abuse. Currently, as the first advocacy programme in the country and the wider region, WCCI’s work also directly contributes to the country’s overall objective to provide support and awareness on violence against women.

Empirical Research on IPV in the MENA Region As with much of the international research, there is substantial research in the MENA region that focuses primarily on identifying the prevalence of IPV within Arab societies. For example, the rates of IPV within the MENA region “can exceed 40%” (Al-Nsour, Khawaja & Al-Kayyali, 2009, p. 570). Moreover, in Palestinian territories IPV is experienced by Palestinian married women through “psychological aggression, physical assault and sexual coercion” (Haj-Yahia & Clark, 2013, p. 797). In Egypt, 1 in 3 women become victims of physical abuse following marriage (Clark, Bloom, Hill, & Silverman, 2009). In the GCC region, Research by Fageeh (2014) on the topic of DV suggests that the prevalence of DV within the city Medina ranges from “39.3% to 57.7%” (p. 2). Further research in Saudi Arabia by Tashkandi and Rasheed (2009) found physical and emotional abuse “to be as high as 57.8%” (p. 1246). The research conducted in Bahrain on IPV primarily focuses on identifying the rates of IPV. For instance, the Supreme Council for Women (2009) conducted a study on the prevalence of violence against women in Bahrain between 2005 and 2006 and found 1,344 reported cases. Regional literature seems to focus primarily on the prevalence of IPV, on the likelihood of victims reporting IPV, and on the help-seeking patterns within Middle Eastern societies. Specifically, the literature focuses on barriers preventing victims from accessing protection and response services after something like a domestic abuse incident. Ahmed (2010) also discussed how certain social services within Bahrain, such as an anti-domestic violence centre, might have raised more awareness on the topic of IPV. Studies conducted in the GCC

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have also found the reporting rates of violence against women (VAW) to be low. Following abuse the majority of women do not seek help, while a minority would choose to go to social services (Afifi, Al-Muhaideb, Hadish, Ismail, & Al-Qeamy, 2011). Moreover, in Bahrain findings by the Supreme Council for Women (2009) indicate that the majority of women would report incidents of violence to the police and a minority would report to a court. Within the MENA region, Arab women tend to accept violence when they believe that their actions justify the abuse (Linos, Khawaja, & Al-Nsour, 2010). For example, “86% of women in Egypt, 61% of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and 40% of women in Turkey” tend to justify VAW in certain circumstances (Linos et al., 2010, p. 410). Likewise, 69% to 73% of Arab women justified a husband’s use of violence if a wife was unfaithful within the marriage (Boy & Kulczycki, 2008). As a result, women tend to internalize their experience with abuse as their fault (Boy & Kulczycki, 2008). An obstacle that limits the ability of Arab women to seek help is societal beliefs. For instance, when IPV does arise, society encourages resolving the issue internally between family members (Boy & Kulczycki, 2008). As a result, the majority of Arab women would respond to IPV by ignoring the violence, only a minority would proceed with a divorce (Haj-Yahia, 2000). Although research in the MENA region reflects high levels of IPV, there have been recent attempts to reduce the stigma by increasing overall governmental support and resources for victims of IPV (Spencer, Shahrouri, Halasa, Khalaf, & Clark, 2014). Although there has been some research conducted in the MENA and GCC regions on the obstacles that deter women from seeking and receiving external help regarding IPV, only international research has discussed the direct positive influence of advocacy work on victims of IPV. Currently, within the GCC region, there are no data available on whether victims’ advocacy work shapes the attitudes of beneficiaries or volunteers acting within that programme. This chapter aims to discuss the direct self-reported impacts of advocacy centres, such as WCCI, on the attitudes of volunteers as well as beneficiaries after they interact with the programme.

Empirical Findings Overview of Study Design In this study, a guided interview questionnaire was designed for participants. The perspectives of volunteers were measured before and after they completed training to become a volunteer. The perspectives of beneficiaries were measured only once, after they contacted WCCI as victims of abuse. The questions were created to examine the perspectives and understanding of advocates and beneficiaries around IPV after interacting with WCCI either as a volunteer or a client. Each question aims to identify a specific attitude or belief related to

Perspectives on Intimate Partner Violence  23

IPV, focusing on three topics: the perception of intimate partner violence of participants, abuse “red flags” (warning signs of abusive behaviour), and the level of tolerance towards intimate partner violence and if that has shaped the participant’s current relationships.

Sampling Methods and Study Procedures We recruited a sample of 27 women that included 17 volunteers and 10 beneficiaries of WCCI to participate in this study. Participant eligibility was based on the criteria of being 18 or older, a resident of Bahrain, and having worked with WCCI or utilized WCCI’s services. All beneficiaries who were interviewed for this study were closed cases with WCCI and thus presented no identifiable conflict of interest. Volunteers were selected through a convenience sample by interviewing women who signed up for the 40-hour WCCI volunteer advocate training in July 2019. WCCI beneficiaries were randomly selected as part of a convenience sample and were offered the opportunity to voluntarily participate in the study. When reaching out to beneficiaries of WCCI, a script was used with each beneficiary. The beneficiaries suggested the time and day that they would be available to participate in the study. Beneficiaries chose the interview locations, which were various coffee shops within Bahrain. During the meeting, the interviewer initially read through the informed consent form with the participant. The informed consent form included an overview of the study, details about confidentiality, and gained their consent to participate. WCCI beneficiaries were not provided compensation but a coffee was offered during the interview to support a comfortable atmosphere. Due to the nature of the questions, all participants were offered support services after the interview. However, none of the participants requested such services following their interview. On average, the interviews with beneficiaries lasted 45 minutes. During the data collection, the participants were first asked a series of demographic questions. Volunteers were asked to answer 27 questions assessing both their knowledge and perspectives around IPV, and beneficiaries were asked to answer only seven questions. The questions aimed to assess the changes in perspectives surrounding IPV after interacting with WCCI. Volunteers and beneficiaries were also asked four open-ended questions that explored their perspectives on topics such as marriage. Furthermore, beneficiaries were asked to consent to the interviews being recorded using an application called iTalk. Two beneficiaries declined.

Analysis and Coding All questions were framed to understand whether respondents believed they have an enhanced understanding of IPV after their training or interactions with WCCI. A thematic analysis was used on the open-ended questions. Common

24  Mary-Justine Todd et al.

words, which were mentioned at least twice, were noted and coded amongst the responses of participants. Each word received one point for every time that it was mentioned, highlighting thematic trends within the responses. Additional answers that were only mentioned once were categorized into the ‘other’ category.

Participant Characteristics As shown in Table 2.1, the participants in this study ranged from 18 to 59 years old. The majority of volunteers representing 53% of the respondents were identified as Arab and approximately 47% as non-Arab. In total, the study included participants from eight different nationalities. Among the beneficiaries interviewed, 60% identified as Bahraini, while 40% as non-Arab. Approximately 81.5% of the participants have been residents of Bahrain for over ten years. Nearly 48% of the participants are single, 3.7% are engaged, 37.0% are married, and 11.1% are divorced. About 55.6% of the participants identify as Muslim, 22.2% as Christian, 11.1% as other, and 11.1% as non-religious. Moreover, 3.7% of the participants had a below-high school diploma, and 40.7% had a Bachelor’s degree. Among the WCCI volunteers 47.1% reported a preference for English language shifts. Approximately 52.9% reported that they volunteer for both the TABLE 2.1 Selected Sociodemographic Characteristics of the Sample (N = 27)

Sociodemographic

N

%

10 5 6 1 2 0 2 1 0

37.0 18.5 22.2 3.7 7.4 0.0 7.4 3.7 0.0

15 1 5 1 1 1 1 2

55.6 3.7 18.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 7.4

Age 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60+ Race - Arab (Bahraini) - Arab (GCC) - Indian - Sub-Saharan African (Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, etc.) - North America (USA, Canada) - Pacific Islander (New Zealand, Australia, Islander) - Eastern European (Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia, etc.) - Western Europe (UK, France, etc.)

Perspectives on Intimate Partner Violence  25

Sociodemographic

N

%

2 3 22

7.4 11.1 81.5

13 1 10 3 0

48.1 3.7 37.0 11.1 0.0

15 6 0 3 3

55.6 22.2 0.0 11.1 11.1

1 4 2 11 8 1

3.7 14.8 7.4 40.7 29.6 3.7

8 9 0

47.1 52.9 0.0

9 1

90.0 10.0

Residency in Bahrain Less than five years Between five to ten years More than ten years Marital status - Single - Engaged - Married - Divorced - Widowed Religion - Islam - Christianity - Buddhism - Other - None Educational qualifications - Below high school diploma - High school diploma - Some college - Bachelors - Masters - MD Shifts preference - English only - Arabic and English - Arabic only Length of interaction with WCCI (beneficiaries) - Less than a year - Between one and five years

English and Arabic helpline; no one reported that she would only take Arabic shifts. Among the WCCI beneficiaries, the duration of their interaction with WCCI ranged from less than one year (90%) to up to two years (10%).

Results Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics regarding participants’ understanding of IPV, understanding of warning signs of abusive behaviour, and tolerance levels towards IPV in general.

26  Mary-Justine Todd et al. TABLE 2.2 Influence of Women’s Crisis Care International on the Attitudes of

Volunteers and Beneficiaries Regarding IPV Volunteers (n = 17)

Beneficiaries (n = 10)

Survey Item

Pre-training Post-training Difference score mean score mean ± (Post-Pre) SD (range) mean ± SD ± SD (range)

p-valuea

Post-training score mean ± SD (range)

Q1. Self-reported level of knowledge towards IPV Q2. Acceptance of IPV as normal Q3. Self-reported level of awareness of abuse warning signs Q4. Levels of awareness between healthy and abusive relationships Q5. Tolerance of abuse within intimate partnerships Q6. Likelihood to intervene as a bystander witness of abuse Q7. Confidence levels in reporting effectively to abuse

2.88 ± 0.78 3.65 ± 0.86 (1–4) (2–5)

0.76 ± 0.83

0.002*

4.80 ± 0.63 (3–5)

1.06 ± 0.24 1.00 ± 0.00 (1–2) (1–1) 4.24 ± 1.03 4.24 ± 0.83 (2–5) (2–5)

−0.06 ± 0.24 0.00 ± 1.00

0.332

1.00 ± 0.00 (1–1) 4.60 ± 0.70 (3–5)

4.24 ± 0.83 4.59 ± 0.51 (2–5) (4–5)

0.35 ± 0.79

0.083

4.80 ± 0.70 (4–5)

1.53 ± 0.62 1.06 ± 0.24 (1–2) (1–3)

−0.47 ± 0.62

0.007*

1.30 ± 0.67 (1–3)

4.35 ± 0.70 4.24 ± 0.83 (2–5) (3–5)

−0.12 ± 1.11

0.668

4.30 ± 0.67 (3–5)

3.82 ± 0.95 4.35 ± 0.61 (2–5) (3–5)

0.53 ± 1.12

0.070

4.00 ± 0.82 (2–5)

0.999

Score: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree; IPV = Intimate Partner Violence. a One-sample t-test for post-pre difference compared to zero difference. *p < 0.01.

Among volunteers, the change in score from pre- to post-training was significantly different from zero on survey items 1 and 5. The mean “selfreported level of knowledge towards IPV” item score increased by 0.76 of a point, and the mean “tolerance of abuse within intimate partnerships” item score decreased by 0.47 of a point.

Perspectives on Intimate Partner Violence  27

The mean scores for the “levels of awareness between healthy and abusive relationships” and “confidence levels in reporting effectively to abuse” items increased from pre- to post-training, but these differences were not statistically significant from zero at the 0.05 significance threshold. The mean scores for “acceptance of IPV as normal” and “likelihood to intervene as a bystander witness of abuse” items decreased from pre- to post-training, but these differences were not statistically significant from zero. The mean score for the “self-reported level of awareness of abuse warning signs” item did not change from pre- to post-training. Among the beneficiaries, mean post-interaction scores were all between 4 = Agree and 5 = Strongly agree for the following survey items: “Self-reported level of knowledge towards IPV,” “Self-reported level of awareness of abuse warning signs,” “Levels of awareness between healthy and abusive relationships,” “Likelihood to intervene as a bystander witness of abuse,” and “Confidence levels in reporting effectively to abuse.” Mean post-interaction scores were at or near 1 = Strongly Disagree for the following survey items: “Acceptance of IPV as normal” and “Tolerance of abuse within intimate partnerships.” Specifically, prior to the training with WCCI, none of the volunteers reported an expert level of knowledge on the topic of IPV. The majority of volunteers, 59%, reported feeling only neutral about their level of expertise on IPV. After training with WCCI, 65% of volunteers either agreed or strongly agreed that their knowledge of nuances, causes, and consequences of IPV was at an expert level. Moreover, 90% of beneficiaries reported that after interacting with WCCI, they would consider their knowledge of this topic to be at an expert level. When asked about the acceptability of IPV, there was only a slight change in perspectives for volunteers from before to after the WCCI training. Namely, before joining WCCI 94% of volunteers reported that they would consider IPV to be unacceptable, which could be attributed to the fact that volunteers who self-select to apply to become trained as crisis advocates are already inclined to be opposed to IPV in general. After becoming a trained advocate, 100% of volunteers reported that they would consider IPV to be unacceptable. After interacting with WCCI, 100% of beneficiaries reported that they strongly disagree with the statement about the acceptability/normality of IPV. Next, we asked about the level of awareness of abuse warning signs (red flags) within a relationship after training with WCCI or using the organization’s services. Prior to joining WCCI, 53% of volunteers reported that they were fully aware of the possible signs of abuse within relationships. After becoming a trained advocate, only 41% of volunteers believe that they are now completely aware of the possible signs of abuse. Volunteer responses perhaps indicate that after becoming trained crisis advocates, the volunteers realized that in fact abuse is not always obvious and that there are complexities that may not be apparent to an outsider. Thus, although the volunteers might have previously suggested that they could have always identified the signs of an abusive

28  Mary-Justine Todd et al.

relationship, they now understand that sometimes abuse is hidden and hard to identify. Among the WCCI beneficiaries, after interacting with WCCI, 70% of beneficiaries state that they are now fully aware of red flags for abuse within intimate and domestic relationships. None of the WCCI volunteers reported that they were totally unable to differentiate between a healthy and an unhealthy relationship before or after training, which may indicate that everyone coming into the WCCI programme came with some intrinsic knowledge of healthy intimate relationships. However, 12% of the volunteers reported their awareness at a neutral or below level. When asked about the ability to distinguish between a healthy versus abusive relationship, 88% of volunteers prior to joining WCCI either agreed or strongly agreed that they could do so. In contrast, after the training 100% felt that they were able to differentiate between good and bad behaviour within intimate partnerships. Eighty per cent of beneficiaries strongly agreed that after their interaction with WCCI, they are able to distinguish between a healthy and an unhealthy relationship. The last set of questions explored the participants’ overall tolerance of abuse, their likelihood of intervening as a bystander witness of abuse, and their ability to react calmly and effectively when faced with it. There was not a single WCCI volunteer who reported feeling as though they should tolerate abuse either before or after training, indicating that the women who come to WCCI to volunteer were most likely a self-selected group of women already strongly opposed to abuse. However, the number of volunteers who reported that they strongly disagreed with tolerating abuse went from 53% to 94% after joining WCCI. After using WCCI’s services, zero beneficiaries felt strongly that they should have to endure harmful treatment, and 80% felt that under no circumstances would they tolerate abuse within an intimate partnership. When asked about bystander intervention, before and after completing the WCCI volunteer crisis advocacy training, none of the volunteers reported that they would have been very unlikely to intervene if they witnessed abuse. Prior to the training, 47% of volunteers reported that they would be very likely to intervene while after the training this number decreased to 41%. This change may be on account of volunteers’ increased understanding of the possibility for retaliation from the perpetrator of abuse, as well as an increased understanding of the women’s situation and safer, more effective ways to support women. Amongst WCCI beneficiaries, the percentage of women who are reportedly likely to intervene when witnessing abuse in someone else’s relationship is 55%. When asked how they would respond when witnessing IPV around them, there was a substantial change in how volunteers predicted that they would react after completing the WCCI advocacy training course. For example, prior to becoming a WCCI volunteer advocate, only 24% of volunteers reported that they felt entirely confident in their ability to calmly respond in the presence of

Perspectives on Intimate Partner Violence  29

IPV. Having completed the WCCI advocacy training, 41% of volunteers report that they now feel totally confident that they would know the best way to respond to a situation with IPV. Additionally, before the training, a full one-third of the volunteers reported their ability to respond calmly to abuse to be at a neutral level or below. After becoming a trained volunteer, 94% either agreed or strongly agreed that they were now confident in responding. Amongst the beneficiaries, 70% agreed that they would now react calmly in the presence of abuse after interacting with WCCI.

Knowledge before and after Advocacy Training This research also included a pre- and post-test for all volunteers studying to become certified crisis advocates. The test included 20 true-false and multiple-choice questions that assess the perspectives and knowledge of participants before and after completing the WCCI advocacy training. Before the WCCI advocacy training, 41% of volunteers scored below 90% on questions that assessed their attitudes towards victims of IPV. After the training, the number was reduced to 24%, indicating an improvement in the volunteers’ attitudes around IPV. Before training to become a WCCI advocate, 94% of volunteers scored below 90% on 12 questions assessing their knowledge of IPV. After completing the WCCI training, only 29% scored below 90% on the knowledge questions, indicating a substantial increase in volunteer knowledge of IPV.

Qualitative Findings Open-ended questions were asked with the objective of capturing individual participant narratives on the concept of healthy relationships. The questions and subsequent discussions are described here. 1

What are the top five qualities a partner should have? Objective: To understand which characteristics participants value in a partner and whether those values align with the values of WCCI. Prior to the training, the volunteers produced a total of 30 themes. The most common response from volunteers was “respect,” which was mentioned 12 times amongst all volunteers. After the training, a total of 26 themes were produced. Similarly to the pre-training answers, “respect” was the most common quality (11 times) that a partner should have. Moreover, following the training, volunteers emphasized the importance of being “empathetic.” Beneficiary responses produced a total of 37 themes. Likewise, the most commonly occurring response amongst beneficiaries was “respect” (5 times); this indicates that respondents appear to understand what a healthy relationship should entail.

30  Mary-Justine Todd et al.

2

3

4

What are the important qualities to teach future generations? Objective: To identify if participants would consider education and awareness about abuse as an important subject to teach future generations. Volunteers produced a total of 37 themes prior to the WCCI training. However, similarly to the previous question, “respect” was the most common response mentioned (8 times). Furthermore, the importance of teaching the future generations about abuse was a recurring theme in the answers given by volunteers. After completing the WCCI training, “respect” was mentioned 11 times amongst the volunteers. Although the importance of education about abuse was not mentioned, volunteers emphasized the importance of teaching future generations how to be empathetic and compassionate. Beneficiaries produced a total of 26 themes. Similar to the responses of volunteers prior to their training, “respect” was the most common response generated across all participants. Education about abuse was also mentioned 3 times amongst beneficiaries. The frequent mention of the importance of education about abuse implies that it is a factor regarded as significant among some of the participants who have either chosen to become trained in or accessed WCCI services. What is needed to create safe spaces within marriages? Objective: To understand whether their interactions with WCCI would positively influence participants’ general attitudes on marriage. The volunteers, prior to the WCCI advocacy training, produced a total of 22 themes. The most commonly reported response was “communication” between spouses. After completing the WCCI training, 15 themes were produced. The common response for volunteers thereafter was the concept of “respect,” which is important in the creation of safe spaces within a marriage. The response from beneficiaries produced 29 themes. The most common themes amongst beneficiaries (mentioned 3 times each) include honesty, respect, privacy, communication, and trust. What is needed to create safe spaces for women within society? Objective: To understand how participants would envision an environment that is accepting and protective of all women, especially in the context of abuse. Prior to the WCCI training, volunteers responded across 16 themes. Awareness about abuse was mentioned frequently (7 times) amongst WCCI volunteers before their advocacy training. The response on the topic of safety may be a result of the training, which emphasizes the level of danger that can be experienced by victims of abuse. After the training, 26 themes were generated by the volunteers. The main themes repeated amongst volunteers were the presence of respect for women and education about abuse. Both themes were mentioned 6 times amongst volunteers. Overall, the beneficiary responses produced 18 themes. Similar to previous answers, “respect” was a commonly mentioned quality that would create safe spaces

Perspectives on Intimate Partner Violence  31

for all women (4 times). Moreover, WCCI was mentioned 3 times amongst beneficiaries as a crucial quality that could further enhance the creation of safe spaces for women. The mention of WCCI by some of the beneficiaries implies that those who have used the service consider the presence of crisis response programming within society as a key factor in creating generally safe and supportive spaces for women.

Discussion This study aimed at identifying whether the introduction of the first IPV advocacy programme in the MENA region (WCCI) has had a self-reported positive impact on shaping the perspectives of volunteers and beneficiaries on the topic. It is the first of its kind in the region, and potentially worldwide, examining the efficacy of advocacy programmes on shaping perspectives towards IPV. Although there is research in Western countries examining the influence of advocacy work on victims of IPV, this study examines the influence of advocacy programmes, such as WCCI, on both victims and volunteers in a region where neither has been done before, making it particularly unique. Overall, the findings confirm that the introduction of the first advocacy programme in the region has had an impact on the self-reported knowledge and perspectives towards violence against women for volunteers who have trained with WCCI or those beneficiaries who have used the organization’s services. Even within the limitations of this small-scale study, the data suggest the following conclusions about volunteers and beneficiaries of WCCI. The introduction of the region’s first and only crisis response programme has resulted in a reported change in perspectives for a majority of those who interact with the programme. This change includes the participants’ general understanding of IPV overall, as well as specific issues such as an increased awareness of abuse warning signs. Many volunteers reported feeling “neutral” on their level of knowledge before the training. After the training, 53% of volunteers agreed that they now have an expert level of understanding on the topic. For beneficiaries, the majority reported that they have an expert level of understanding of IPV and strongly rejected the idea that abuse was acceptable within society. The results for volunteers and beneficiaries may be due to the quality of the advocacy help, which primarily focuses on supporting the beneficiaries and their choices. With regard to the acceptability/normality of IPV, there is only a slight increase in the strong disagreement of volunteers. This slight increase may be due to a prior understanding of IPV before choosing to volunteer for WCCI. When volunteers were asked about their awareness of signs of abuse, volunteers after the training experienced a decrease in their perceived level of awareness. The decrease may be due to the extensive information that is provided on IPV during the training that they may have not been aware of before. As a result, they may be more careful to not make assumptions.

32  Mary-Justine Todd et al.

Most volunteers and beneficiaries believed that WCCI enhanced their ability to differentiate between healthy and unhealthy relationships. None of the WCCI volunteers indicated that they were totally unable to differentiate between a healthy versus abusive relationship after training, again indicating that they all gained some knowledge of good and bad behaviour in intimate partnerships. The findings reveal that WCCI, through advocacy, case work, and volunteer training, was related to a reported improvement in the ability of both volunteer advocates and beneficiaries: (a) to recognize the signs of IPV in a relationship and (b) to distinguish between a healthy relationship and an abusive one. There is a decrease in the tolerance of IPV for volunteers after training by WCCI. Additionally, WCCI beneficiaries are intolerant of abuse after contacting WCCI. Participants were also asked about the likelihood of them intervening as a bystander when witnessing abuse. Interestingly, the numbers are not clear on the effects of the advocacy training and services on their likelihood to intervene. After training to become a volunteer and receiving WCCI support, more participants reported themselves as likely to intervene rather than very likely to intervene. This may be due to the participants’ awareness of the consequences of IPV after volunteering or interacting with WCCI, which makes them more cautious. When asked about how they might react in the presence of abuse, volunteers expressed an increase in the likelihood of being confident in their reaction after joining WCCI. The increase is likely owing to the extensive training that volunteers undergo before becoming an advocate, which trains them to react confidently to IPV cases while on duty. However, a minority of beneficiaries reported that they would react calmly to abuse. Furthermore, the improvement in test scores measuring the attitudes and knowledge of IPV may indicate that WCCI training can shape perspectives on the topic in a positive manner. For instance, the 40-hour training provides in-depth information on types of abuse, characteristics of abusers, and the most effective approaches to supporting women in crisis situations. Additionally, the training discusses subconscious biases and the stigmas associated with being a victim of abuse. The training may prove to have a direct influence on improving attitudes and enhancing knowledge of IPV for all who interact with it. Further, the volunteers may be able then, to not only support the WCCI beneficiaries as intended, but they may also organically start disseminating the information learned, and normalizing the new attitudes introduced amongst their friends and family groups. This may result in an overall decrease in their likelihood of experiencing future abuse, reduce the stigma associated with violence against women in their own communities, and decrease the general ignorance around these complex topics. Throughout the open-ended question discussions, interestingly, both volunteers and beneficiaries emphasized the importance of “respect.” This common

Perspectives on Intimate Partner Violence  33

response between volunteers and beneficiaries may be due to the ethos of WCCI, which consistently upholds the respect of all women. For example, volunteers are taught in the advocacy training programme about subconscious bias and the disrespectful ways in which women are portrayed in the media. As a result, the ideology of respect is reinforced throughout, both by volunteers during crisis advocacy and by case workers during case management for beneficiaries. Research on violence against women finds that psychological abuse includes “ongoing belittlement or humiliation” (Krantz & Garcia-Moreno, 2005, p. 819), making it important for women’s advocacy programmes to focus on respect. A theme produced throughout the open-ended discussion was the importance of increased education and awareness about abuse. Participants believed that education and awareness should be taught to future generations and is crucial in order to create safe spaces for women. The response of participants may be owing to their exposure to the WCCI training environment that educates both volunteers and beneficiaries alike about the topic of violence against women. However, both volunteers and beneficiaries did not specify the ways in which education should be undertaken within society. This study adds to the body of literature already looking at the ways in which advocacy work positively influences the lives of IPV victims around the world, in that it actively enhances their decision-making and problemsolving skills (Bennett et al., 2004). The majority of participants noted that they believed there was a difference in their perspectives towards IPV after they volunteered for, or came into contact with, WCCI. By examining the perspectives of participants, this study shows that advocacy programmes can positively impact both the beneficiaries and the volunteers. Future studies regarding advocacy programmes in this region should consider understanding the reasons that lead to changes in perspectives rather than reporting it from an observational standpoint. Additionally, a further study could examine whether the changes in perspectives as influenced by WCCI impacted co-survivors and/ or friends and family of the volunteers. Understanding the exponential effects of the programme would offer further insight into the value and influence on society overall.

Implications for Policy and Practice Due to the potential for advocacy programmes to increase understanding and awareness around IPV among both volunteers and beneficiaries and to improve outcomes for victims, the following changes in regional policy and practice are recommended: A

Healthcare regulatory authorities should ensure that all local hospitals and clinics have advocacy programmes in place for victims of abuse seeking

34  Mary-Justine Todd et al.

B

C

D

E

medical care. This should include universal screening questions about abuse for all patients. Social welfare regulatory authorities should ensure that advocacy/helpline programmes are in place throughout society to provide response support for all women nationwide. Advocacy organizations should adapt and expand education and awareness programmes throughout society to increase awareness amongst all residents, not only those who volunteer. Legislative authorities should ensure that all forms of violence against women are criminalized, giving a strong foundation of support for response programmes. All actors and stakeholders should coordinate and streamline services for victims, following the UNODCCP handbook for victims, which provides recommendations to ensure more positive outcomes for victims.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research The limitations of this study include self-report bias, by using interviews as the main data collection method, which may have interfered with the reliability of the results. Furthermore, only volunteers answered comparative questions that examined their perspectives before and after the training while beneficiaries were only interviewed after interacting with WCCI. The reason that beneficiaries were not interviewed prior to receiving WCCI services is owing to the nature of advocacy work that would not allow for questions about attitudes and knowledge to be asked since the priority is to address their crisis. Additionally, in order to protect the beneficiaries from re-traumatization during the initial interview, certain words that were used with volunteers such as “IPV” and “abuse” were substituted with “harmful treatment.” The substitution may skew the results, as “harmful treatment” may be perceived differently than “IPV” or “abuse.” Lastly, the study did not introduce a control group to measure the effects of advocacy work in comparison to similarly motivated individuals who did not receive advocacy training. The results of this study reflect and add to the literature currently available on the topic of IPV. The current regional literature primarily focuses on the prevalence of IPV whereas globally it offers insight into the influence of advocacy programmes on outcomes for abuse victims. However, this research attempts to expand upon the current literature by reflecting on how WCCI, a non-profit IPV advocacy organization, has created a greater understanding of IPV in order to promote greater self-worth and reduced tolerance towards abuse. The findings from this study reveal opportunities for future research and work to be done on perspectives of IPV as influenced by advocacy programmes

Perspectives on Intimate Partner Violence  35

in the Middle East. Specifically, there is a need to determine if there is a direct and causal relationship between advocacy organizations and an actual reduction in IPV within MENA societies as well as producing results that can be broadened to encompass the wider population. Based on the results of this study, certain recommendations can be made to enhance the initial findings. For example, research on the direct and causal relationship between advocacy programmes and reduction of IPV in society can be examined. Future studies may also introduce a control group. Additionally, a longitudinal study that measures contemporaneous knowledge over a longer period of time to better understand the impact of advocacy trainings or services on perspectives of IPV, would reduce self-report bias and increase the validity of the findings. For future studies volunteers could be interviewed before, during, and after they have completed their annual training. Interviewing beneficiaries before interacting with them may prove difficult and even unethical, but an alternative study design could be implemented to better measure results over time.

Conclusion WCCI is the first programme in the MENA region that provides full-scale crisis advocacy response services for victims of abuse, following the victimcentred streamlined approach recommended by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – Handbook for Victims of Crime (UNODCCP, 1999). Overall, WCCI has had a positive impact on beneficiaries and volunteers alike. The programme has played a direct role in enhancing women’s understanding and improving the perspectives surrounding IPV through education and awareness of those with whom it interacts. WCCI has acted as a positive catalyst for social change for victims of abuse by providing clients with services that encourage them to leave abusive situations if they choose, as well as decrease the likelihood of the abuse reoccurring. It has impacted how volunteers and beneficiaries view marriage, and may have ultimately raised their standards for how they would like to be treated within intimate partnerships. Indirectly, WCCI is enhancing the larger societal understanding of IPV, as its volunteers and beneficiaries spread what they have learned into their personal and familial relationships, both within current and future generations. Although this study examines effects of the organization on a small scale, the impact on the volunteers is not surprising, given that they all undergo an extensive 40-hour training programme based on the New York State rape crisis advocacy curriculum, and they are subsequently required to sign up and volunteer for a minimum of 24 hours per month of crisis advocacy duty. Nor is the impact on the beneficiaries surprising, because they are all supported first by these highly trained advocates during their time of crisis and are subsequently

36  Mary-Justine Todd et al.

all offered consistent medium- to long-term case work support by the WCCI case work management team. This study sought to examine and understand the impact of advocacy programmes on families and societies in the Middle East. It is important because it is the first of its kind internationally, as well as regionally, that examines the impact of women’s crisis advocacy services not only on its beneficiaries, but on its volunteers as well. Women’s crisis advocacy programmes have the potential to have substantial influence on women who interact with the organizations, making them well positioned to become agents of change within Middle Eastern societies at large.

References Afifi, Z. E. M., Al-Muhaideb, N. S., Hadish, N. F., Ismail, F. I., & Al-Qeamy, F. M. (2011). Domestic violence and its impact on married women’s health in Eastern Saudi Arabia. Saudi Medical Journal, 32(6), 612–620. Ahmed, D. A. A. (2010). Bahrain. In S. Kelly & J. Breslin (Eds.), Women’s rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress amid resistance (pp. 59–88). New York: Freedom House. Alhabib, S., Nur, U., & Jones, R. (2009). Domestic violence against women: Systematic review of prevalence studies. Journal of Family Violence, 25(4), 369–382. Al-Nsour, M., Khawaja, M., & Al-Kayyali, G. (2009). Domestic violence against women in Jordan: Evidence from health clinics. Journal of Family Violence, 24(8), 569–575. Bennett, L., Riger, S., Schewe, P., Howard, A., & Wasco, S. (2004). Effectiveness of hotline, advocacy, counseling, and shelter services for victims of domestic violence. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 19(7), 815–829. Boy, A., & Kulczycki, A. (2008). What we know about intimate partner violence in the Middle East and North Africa. Violence Against Women, 14(1), 53–70. CEDAW. (2014). United Arab Emirates. Retrieved from https://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/ ARE/2-3 CEDAW. (2015). Kuwait. Retrieved from https://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/KWT/5 CEDAW. (2016). Saudia Arabia. Retrieved from https://undocs.org/en/CEDAW/C/ SAU/3-4 CEDAW. (2018). Bahrain. Retrieved from https://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/BHR/4 Clark, C. J., Bloom, D. E., Hill, A. G., & Silverman, J. G. (2009). Prevalence estimate of intimate partner violence in Jordan. Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal, 15(4), 880–889. Fageeh, W. M. K. (2014). Factors associated with domestic violence: A cross-sectional survey among women in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. BMJ Open, 4(2), e004242. Garcia-Moreno, C., Jansen, H. A. F. M., Ellsberg, M., Heise, L., & Watts, C. H. (2006). Prevalence of intimate partner violence: Findings from the WHO multi-country study on women’s health and domestic violence. The Lancet, 368(9543), 1260–1269. Haddad, L. G., Shotar, A., Younger, J. B., Alzyoud, S., & Bouhaidar, C. M. (2011). Screening for domestic violence in Jordan: Validation of an Arabic version of a domestic violence against women questionnaire. International Journal of Women’s Health, 3, 79–86.

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Haj-Yahia, M. M. (2000). Wife abuse and battering in the sociocultural context of Arab society. Family Process, 39(2), 237–255. Haj-Yahia, M. M., & Clark, C. J. (2013). Intimate partner violence in the occupied Palestinian territory: Prevalence and risk factors. Journal of Family Violence, 28(8), 797–809. Holden, G. W. (2003). Children exposed to domestic violence and child abuse: Terminology and taxonomy. Clinical Child and Family Psychology, 6(3), 151–160. Krantz, G., & Garcia-Moreno, C. (2005). Violence against women. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 59, 818–821. Linos, N., Khawaja, M., & Al-Nsour, M. (2010). Women’s autonomy and support for wife beating: Findings from a population-based survey in Jordan. Violence and Victims, 25(3), 409–419. Spencer, R. A., Shahrouri, M., Halasa, L., Khalaf, I., & Clark, C. J. (2014). Women’s help seeking for intimate partner violence in Jordan. Health Care for Women International, 35, 380–399. Sullivan, C. M., & Bybee, D. I. (1999). Reducing violence using community-based advocacy for women with abusive partners. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 67(1), 43–53. Supreme Council for Women. (2009). Summary of the study of violence against women in the Kingdom of Bahrain (2005–2006). Retrieved from https://www.scw.bh/en/SupportCenter/Studies/Social Studies/Summary of the study of violence against.pdf. Tashkandi, A. A., & Rasheed, P. (2009). Wife abuse: A hidden problem. A study among Saudi women attending PHC centres. Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal, 15(5), 1242–1253. UNODCCP. (1999). Handbook on justice for victims. Retrieved from https://www.unodc. org/pdf/criminal_ justice/UNODC_Handbook_on_ Justice_for_victims.pdf Wee, S., Todd, M.-J., Oshiro, M., Greene, E., & Frye, V. (2016). Modifiers of neighbors bystander intervention in intimate partner violence: A concept mapping study. Violence and Gender, 3(1), 55–63. Yount, K. M., Halim, N., Hynes, M., & Hillman, E. R. (2011). Response effects to attitudinal questions about domestic violence against women: A comparative perspective. Social Science Research, 40(3), 873–884.

3 FERTILITY TRANSITION IN OMAN Understanding the Puzzles of Rapid Decline in Fertility M. Mazharul Islam

Introduction Sultanate of Oman, a small country in the Arabian Gulf Peninsula, has experienced a rapid demographic transition in recent times with a sharp decrease in fertility that is quite stunning and more than expected, yet has remained largely unnoticed. Until the 1980s, the fertility level in Oman remained almost constant at a high level of more than 8 births per woman. Fertility started to decline rapidly during the 1990s (Islam, Dorvio, & Al-Qasmi, 2011). One study showed that Oman is one of the top five Muslim countries that have achieved more than a 60% decline in fertility within a period of three decades (Eberstadt & Shah, 2011). Survey results showed that fertility in Oman has declined from 8.6 births per woman in 1988 to 3.3 births per woman in 2008, a decline of 5.3 births per woman or a 62% decline within a period of 20 years. By contrast, Europe took centuries to go from 5 to 2 children per woman (Courbage & Todd, 2011). In Europe, fertility mainly declined due to declining demand or desire for more children, increased use of contraception, and modernization. By contrast, the rapid decrease in fertility in Oman has occurred with a low (around 30%) and declining rate of contraceptive use, in the absence of any official population control or family planning program, and in the midst of high desired family size (6 children). Although there is no official population control program or family planning program in Oman, since 1994 the country has had a unique health care program called “Birth Spacing Program” under the directive of His Majesty, the Sultan of the country. In addition to the Birth Spacing Program, the government of Oman has implemented a variety of development programs, including increasing support for women’s education, empowerment, and participation in the labor force, as well as other modernization programs

Fertility Transition in Oman  39

that affect fertility both directly and indirectly. The objective of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the recent fertility decline in Oman and provide some plausible explanations for causes of fertility decline in recent times, focusing on the changes in direct and indirect determinants of fertility. To analyze demographic changes, historical time series data are the essential ingredients. Oman has a very short history of demographic data, which limits detailed analysis of the demographic changes in the country and is a common problem with other Gulf countries, too. However, during the 1980s and 2000s, the Ministry of Health of Oman conducted national level demographic and health surveys. These time series data are used in this chapter to describe the demographic transition in Oman. Bongaarts’ (1978) Aggregate Proximate Determinants Model is used to analyze the fertility-inhibiting effects of the major ‘proximate determinants’ of fertility in the process of fertility transition in Oman. The chapter begins by providing a broad overview of the context and objectives of the study. The chapter then briefly reviews fertility transition theory with a view to align the empirical evidence internationally with fertility decline in Oman. Next the chapter provides background on fertility decline in Oman and other countries in the Arab world. The chapter then describes the data and methodology used in the current analysis and presents empirical findings related to patterns of and explanations for fertility decline in Oman. Implications for policy and practice are provided next, followed by a discussion of limitations and future directions, and conclusions.

Background on Fertility Decline in the International Literature Over the last century, several theories on fertility transition have been developed to explain the causes of fertility decline. The most common theme of the transition theories is that the modernization of societies changes couples’ attitude toward childbearing in such a way that a smaller family size appears to them advantageous. By contrast, in traditional agrarian and non-industrialized societies, children are considered as beneficial from an early age as a source of labor and thus income, support in old age, physical security, and political strength of the family. As a result, having a large number of children becomes a conscious goal of parents. Though a complete review of these theories is beyond the scope of this chapter, a brief summary of the central ideas of major theories is presented here. The classic demographic theory or traditional demographic theory, as described by Thompson (1930) and Notestein (1953), attributes fertility decline to changes in social life due to socioeconomic development and modernization. Modernization includes urbanization, industrialization, social mobility, and change in women’s status through factors such as education, income

40  M. Mazharul Islam

earning opportunity outside the home, role in society, and decision-making power. These changes produce a decline in mortality and create a way of life in which couples’ demand for children decreases, thereby reducing the size of families. The classic transition theory fits fairly well with most populations in the West, and in some populations in East Asia and Latin America. However, the theory is less consistent with the demographic history of many countries. In many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, fertility has declined close to replacement levels without much socioeconomic development, indicating an apparent contradiction to the idea that development and modernization precede fertility decline. In addition, countries at similar levels of economic development often display very different patterns of fertility behavior (Bongaarts & Watkins, 1996). Lesthaeghe (1995; Lesthaeghe & Surkyn, 1988; Lesthaeghe & Wilson, 1986) has elaborated classic transition theory by adding to economic modernization a shift in values toward individualism and self-fulfillment that occurs with rising affluence and secularization. This addition to transition theory fits the data from Europe quite well, but fits data from several developing countries much less well (Mason, 1997). Becker (1960), Schultz (1973), Easterlin (1975, 1978; Easterlin & Crimmins, 1985), and many others provided a neoclassical microeconomic theory of fertility (known as ‘demand theory’), which emphasizes three aspects of couples’ fertility choices: the opportunity cost of children, the couple’s economic status, and their preferences for children. Caldwell’s (1982) theory of wealth flows, which combines the concept of the economic demand for children and the sociological aspects of childbearing, attributes fertility decline to the ‘emotional nucleation’ of the family. The main ingredient of Caldwell’s ‘emotional nucleation’ theory is the idea that extended families change to nuclear families through a process in which individuals’ emotional bonds to their spouse grow stronger relative to their emotional ties to natal kin, which applied in the many parts of South Asia and Africa that Caldwell (1982) studied extensively. Caldwell’s theory fits well in sub-Saharan African countries as it was developed based on sub-Saharan experience, but does not work well in many parts of the world (Freedman, 1979). Another theory of fertility decline is the ideational theory developed by Cleland and Wilson (1987; Cleland, 1985). This theory hypothesizes that fertility decline is produced by the diffusion of new ideas and knowledge about fertility control rather than by changes in socioeconomic factors. According to the ideational theory, fertility decline in most developing countries is due to official family planning programs. Although this theory adds an important element to earlier theories, it is less precisely formulated than demand theory and thus is harder to test in the usual way, by using it to generate predictions that can be compared with data. In addition, there has been little direct observation of the diffusion of ideas and information about fertility control.

Fertility Transition in Oman  41

Background on Fertility Transitions in the Muslim World Demographic changes in the Muslim world have been widely unnoticed as compared to in Europe, the United States, and other developed countries. Though later than the West, the Muslim world has been experiencing dramatic demographic transitions within a short period of 30–35 years during the late 20th century and early 21st century. During this time period, the number of children per woman in the Muslim world has dropped by more than 3 children (with a few exceptions in sub-Saharan Africa Muslim countries). The contemporary demographic changes in the Muslim world have been described as “a veritable sea-change, still curiously unnoticed” (Eberstadt & Shah, 2011, p. 2). Oman has been called the “world record-breaker” in the history of recent fertility decline. Similarly sharp fertility declines have been experienced by some other Arab countries like Algeria, where fertility fell by 5 children, from 7.4 children per woman in 1970–1975 to 2.4 children per woman in 2005–2010 (Mirkin, 2010). Libya’s fertility decline was equally dramatic, falling from 7.6 children per woman in 1970–1975 to 2.7 children per woman in 2005–2010 (Mirkin, 2010). The sharp fall in fertility in Oman in recent times is quite stunning, as the country previously had the third-highest fertility rate in the world with more than 8 children per woman, after Rwanda and Yemen at the top, during the early 1980s (United Nations, 2013). Oman was a poor and isolated country until oil and gas production began in the late 1960s. By the late 1980s, Oman was transformed into a state with all the modern facilities and infrastructures. The standard of living and health status has improved enormously since the mid-1970s. Female education and participation in the labor force also increased over this period. The country made impressive gains in the achievement of key Millennium Development Goals (Al-Lamki, 2010), and almost all health indicators show tremendous improvement. With a gross domestic product (GDP) of about $70 billion (27.2 Omani Rial) (National Center for Statistical Information [NCSI], 2018), Oman now is classified as a high-income country by the World Bank. In the early 1950s, the total population of Oman was less than half a million. By 2017, the total population of Oman was 4.56 million, of which 2.51 million (55%) were Omani nationals and 2.05 million (45%) were expatriates (NCSI, 2018). The annual growth rate of the population increased from 1.66% in 1950 to more than 5% during the 1980s and an all-time high of 6.7% in 2015, which is one of the highest population growth rates in the world (United Nations, 2019). After 1970, the annual population growth rate accelerated due to continued high fertility and declining mortality as well as an increasing rate of labor immigration. However, the annual growth rate of the population in Oman has never been uniform. After 1985, the growth rate started declining and reached a very low level of about 1% in 2000, and then again started rising (United Nations, 2019). The recent demographic transition in Oman and many other Arab countries follows the same demographic process as Europe went through in the

42  M. Mazharul Islam

past, but the transition has occurred in the Arab world at a later but faster rate than observed in Europe. However, fertility transitions show a sharp difference between the two regions. In Europe, fertility decline was preceded by postponement of marriage and increasing numbers of permanent singles, declining demand or desire for more children, and increased use of contraception. By contrast, fertility decline in Oman and many other Arab countries occurred due to rising ages at marriage despite the continuation of nearly universal marriage (Fargues, 2005; Rashad & Khadr, 2002), low contraceptive use, and little change in desire for more children. Rashad and Khadr (2002) have shown that nuptiality has played a larger role in fertility decline than modern family planning in Arab countries. For example, the ‘sea-change’ in the total fertility rate (TFR) in Oman has occurred with a low (around 30%) and even declining rate of contraceptive use, implying that contraception plays a less prominent role in fertility reduction in Oman than it has in fertility reduction elsewhere. Another puzzling matter is that the steep fertility decline in Oman has occurred in the absence of any official population control program or family planning program with a parity-specific target of fertility reduction. For example, fertility decline in China, India, Iran, and many other Asian and African countries occurred due to strong family planning programs with a strategy to attain replacement levels of fertility. The Omani government is concerned about rapid population growth, but it has no official policy for controlling the population growth.

Empirical Findings on Fertility Transition in Oman Source of Data Oman has very limited data on population issues. Before 1988, there was no national level survey or census on the population. The 1988 Oman Child Health Survey (OCHS) was the first national-level survey on health and population, conducted by the Ministry of Health of Oman. The first population census occurred in 1993. Subsequently, three more national-level surveys were conducted by the Ministry of Health with the latest one in 2008. These are the 1995 Oman Family Health Survey (OFHS), the 2000 Oman National Health Survey (ONHS), and the 2008 Oman National Reproductive Health Survey (ONRHS). This study utilizes secondary data obtained from these surveys and official 2018 statistics obtained from the Statistical Yearbook published by the National Center for Statistics and Information (NCSI).

The Analytic Model Human reproduction is a very complex process as it is governed by a number of biological and behavioral factors on the one hand and socioeconomic, demographic, cultural, and environmental factors on the other (Bongaarts, 1978;

Fertility Transition in Oman  43

Bongaarts & Potter, 1983). The biological and behavioral factors influence fertility directly, whereas socioeconomic, demographic, cultural, and environmental factors affect fertility through modification of one or more biological or behavioral factors. Bongaarts (1978) in his seminal paper termed the biological and behavioral factors as “proximate determinants of fertility.” Bongaarts and Potter (1983) further observed that 96% of the variability in the total fertility rate of any population could be explained by the four principal proximate determinants of fertility, which are marriage, contraceptive use, postpartum infecundability, and induced abortion. This observation simplifies the analysis of the determinants of fertility by focusing just on these four principal proximate determinants of fertility. Bongaarts (1978) developed an aggregate model for analyzing the fertilityinhibiting effect of the four principal proximate determinants by computing an index for each proximate determinant. The model is given as: TFR = Cm × C c × Ci × C a × TF

(1)

where TFR is the total fertility rate, TF is the total fecundity rate, Cm is the index of marriage, Cc is the index of contraception, Ci is the index of infecundability, and Ca is the index of abortion. The value of the indices can vary from 0 to 1, where zero denotes a complete fertility-inhibiting effect and 1 means no fertility-inhibiting effect. Thus the complement of the value of a given index is the proportionate reduction in fertility due to the inhibiting effect of that proximate variable. Because the model is multiplicative, the smaller the value of an index, the greater effect it has on reducing fertility from its biological maximum. Because abortion is illegal in Oman, with strict penalties (e.g., imprisonment for a minimum of three years) for women seeking an illegal abortion, the index of abortion has been considered as 1. The details of estimation procedures of the indices may be seen in Bongaarts and Potter (1983). Bongraarts (1982) estimated an average value of TF as 15.3 and further observed that it is less variant across populations. In this application, the TF is also assumed to be 15.3.

Patterns of Fertility Decline in Oman Table 3.1 shows the levels and trends in total fertility rate (TFR) and agespecific fertility rates (ASFRs) in Oman from 1988 to 2018. It is evident that the overall TFR has declined from 8.6 births per woman in 1988 to 3.3 births per woman in 2008, a decline of 5.3 births per woman or 62% reduction of fertility over a short period of 20 years (Table 3.1). However, the latest official statistics from the NCSI indicate a slight increase in fertility from 3.3 births per woman in 2008 to 3.9 births per woman in 2018, an increase of 0.6 births per woman or 18% increase in fertility from 2008 to 2018. Both urban and rural areas experienced declining trends in fertility from 1988 to 2008. The fertility level in rural areas was significantly higher than

44  M. Mazharul Islam TABLE 3.1 Age-Specific Fertility Rates (ASFRs) per 1,000 Women and Total Fertility Rates

(TFR) from 1988 to 2018 Age Group

1988 OCHS

2008 ONRHS

% Change 2018 NCSI % Change from 1988 from 2008 ASFR Relative ASFR Relative ASFR Relative to 2008 to 2018 Contribution Contribution Contribution (in %) (in %) (in %)

15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 TFR (all) TFR (rural) TFR (urban)

220 12.8 383 22.3 382 22.2 323 18.8 251 14.6 117 6.8 43 2.5 8.6 9.2 8.1

8 1.2 89 13.4 178 26.9 190 28.7 133 20.1 47 7.0 18 2.7 3.3 3.8 3.1

−96.3 −76.8 −53.4 −41.1 −46.9 −60.1 −57.9 −61.6 −58.6 −61.7

12 107 208 202 162 77 11 3.9 NA NA

1.5 13.8 26.7 25.9 20.8 9.9 1.4

46.3 20.8 16.6 6.1 21.4 65.5 −42.0 18.2

that in urban areas. However, the gap between urban-rural fertility is gradually diminishing over the period. For instance, in 1988, the TFR in rural and urban areas were 9.2 and 8.1, respectively, as opposed to 3.8 and 3.1, respectively, in 2008 (Table 3.1). This reduced rural-urban fertility gap resulted primarily from the diffusion of new ideas throughout the country; the expansion of the rural health network system with the establishment of community health centers, clinics, and hospitals in rural areas; development of road communication networks; and the promotion of maternal and child health care, with a consequent reduction in infant mortality. There is a substantial change in the age pattern of fertility in Oman from 1988 to 2018. Significant fertility decline occurred in all age groups over the period 1988 to 2008 (Figure 3.1). The decline was most prominent among the younger groups of women aged 15–29. The highest fertility decline occurred among the women aged 15–19 years, from 220 births per 1,000 women in 1988 to 8 births per 1,000 women in 2008, a decline of 96%. However, after 2008, there was a slight increase in fertility in all age groups, except the oldest age group of women aged 45–49, but the relative contribution of ASFR to TFR remains almost the same as it was in 2008. The relative contribution of ASFR to TFR declined from 35% in 1988 to 15% in 2008 for the women under age 25. The relative contribution of ASFR to TFR increased for the women aged 25 and above over the period, indicating a shift in age-pattern of fertility toward older age groups in Oman. The increasing age at marriage and age at first births might play the major role in this shifting age pattern of fertility in Oman.

Fertility Transition in Oman  45 450

1988 OCHS

Age-specific fertility rate

400 350

2008 ONRHS

300

2018 NCSI

250 200 150 100 50 0

FIGURE 3.1

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–34 35–39 Age group

40–44

45–49

Age-specific fertility rate from 1998 to 2018 per 1,000 women in Oman.

Causes of Fertility Decline in Oman The rapid fertility decline in Oman can be attributed to both changes in the proximate determinants of fertility and many contextual factors that led to socioeconomic development in the country. Since 1970, the Government of Oman implemented many welfare policies, such as universal free education, free health care facilities, a birth spacing program for maternal and child health development, urbanization, and infrastructure development. Most of the government-provided public services are free of charge or heavily subsidized. Welfare state policies may have both positive and negative impacts on the reproductive behavior of the couples in the country. The following subsections briefly describe the changes in the proximate determinants of fertility (marriage, contraception, and lactational infecundability) and contextual factors such as government policy toward education and health that can impact fertility reduction. Marriage: A revolution of delayed marriage caused fertility reduction. Family formation through marriage has always been a sacred social system, and early and universal marriage and childbearing has been a long tradition in the Arab world, including Oman (Rashed, Osman, & RoudiFahimi, 2005). However, changes have occurred in the marriage and family formation system in Oman due to modernization and socioeconomic development. This profound change in marriage and its subsequent impact on fertility reduction in Oman and other Arab countries has been described as a marriage revolution or a nuptiality transition (Rashad & Osman, 2003; Tabutin & Schoumaker, 2005). In Oman, there has been a remarkable increase over time in mean age at marriage for both males and females, and the tradition of early and universal

46  M. Mazharul Islam

marriage is gradually diminishing. The mean age at marriage for females increased from 19.2 years in 1988 to 26.8 years in 2008, a rise of about 8 years within a 20-year period (Islam, 2017). The mean age at marriage for males is less variant than for females, a rise of 3.5 years, from 25.6 years in 1988 to 29.1 years in 2008 (Islam, 2017). Because the mean age at marriage has increased more among women than among men, the age gap between spouses has also decreased. Among women of reproductive age, the overall proportion of single women increased from 18% in 1988 to 39% in 2008, an increase of 167% within a 20-year period. The age-specific proportion of single women also shows an increasing trend. The most significant rise in the proportion of single women occurred in the age groups from 15–19 years through 30–34 years. For instance, the proportion of single women in the 15–19 age group increased from 63% in 1988 to 94% in 2008 (Figure 3.2). However, by age 39 almost all women marry, indicating nearly universal marriage in Omani society. A wide range of social, economic, behavioral, and cultural changes have played increasingly important roles in delayed age at marriage in Oman. With socioeconomic development and women’s emancipation from traditional roles as wives and mothers, women are increasingly pursuing higher education and participating in the labor force, which delays their marriage. On average, women who are more highly educated marry later than women with less education. Women are expected to enter the marriage market after they finish their education. At the same time, education might make females more selective in their partner choice, thus further delaying marriage because it takes time to get a suitable marriage partner. Another important cause of marriage postponement is the rising cost of marriage. Among other things, money needs to be saved for the wedding party, the dowry, housing, furniture, jewelry, electronic devices (televisions, satellite 100

1988 OCHS 2000 ONHS

90 80

1995 OFHS 2008 NRHS

% single

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

FIGURE 3.2

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–34

Age

35–39

40–44

45–49

Total

Percentage of single women in Oman by age at different time points from 1988 to 2008.

Fertility Transition in Oman  47

antennas, refrigerators), and other expenses. Housing and wedding parties in particular have grown more expensive (Puschmann, 2011; Winckler, 1998). Many changes regarding nuptiality have occurred, but it is striking that consanguinity has stayed a specific feature of marriage in Oman. Like most other Arab countries, consanguineous marriage is highly prevalent in Oman. National health and population surveys, as well as clinic-based studies, consistently demonstrate that the prevalence of consanguineous marriages in Oman remains high (around 50%) (Islam, 2012, 2017; Rajab & Patton, 2000). Family honor, modesty, family solidarity, property consolidation (versus property fragmentation), and stability of marriage have been put forward as the most important reasons that this type of cousin marriage functions as an ideal in the Arab world (Islam, 2012; Khlat, 1997). Nuptiality changes have brought about profound changes in the life course of women. Due to delayed age at marriage, females today enjoy a prolonged period of single life in their family of origin, which opens up new opportunities for women to extend their education and participate in the labor market. As women are making progress outside the household, their position is also strengthening within the household decision-making. Women can also spend more time on non-reproductive related activities. The shift from reproductive to more non-reproductive tasks has positive effects on the health and wellbeing of women. Because of delayed and reduced fertility, maternal mortality is, for example, decreasing. As childbearing is confined to formal marital unions, the timing of first marriage and the ultimate proportion of women who marry have marked effects on fertility. The delayed age at marriage dampens the proportion of married women of prime childbearing age and helps reduce fertility. Birth spacing program and contraceptive use enhanced fertility reduction. Due to its small population size (less than 2 million, including approximately 0.29 million expatriates in the 1990s), the government of Oman was not concerned about Omani population growth until the beginning of the 1990s. The government was in favor of maintaining the population growth of that time. However, the high population growth and large family size as observed in the first population and housing census of 1993 in Oman prompted the government to take some measures to slow the population growth. In 1994, the Ministry of Health introduced policies to bring down the high fertility rate by integrating a family planning program with a health care program, and introduced a new ‘Birth Spacing Program.’ To promote acceptance and easy implementation among the public, the program was named ‘birth spacing program’ to avoid cultural and religious sensitivity attached with the term ‘family planning.’ It was a major and bold shift in government policy, from a previous pro-natalist to anti-natalist policy. The birth spacing policy in Oman is in harmony with the global shift in demographic strategies that occurred as a result of the landmark Program of

48  M. Mazharul Islam

Action of the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development that identified improved access to health care and education for women as more effective means to curb population growth and reduce fertility than traditional birth-control campaigns. The primary objectives of Oman’s Birth Spacing Program are to improve the health of Omani women and children by reducing high-risk pregnancies and increasing reasonable spacing between births, and to provide women with the means to regulate their fertility safely and effectively with modern contraceptives so they can conceive when they desire (Al Rawahi & Sharts-Hopko, 2002). The ultimate goal of birth spacing is to reduce fertility in a way that is culturally acceptable by promoting healthier families (Drysdale, 2010). The birth spacing program provides information about contraceptive methods through counseling in different health outlets and distributes contraception free of cost. Contraceptive methods are also available through commercial outlets such as pharmacies. Since the introduction of the birth spacing program in 1994, the average birth interval increased from 25.5 months in 1995 to 34 months in 2008 (Islam, 2017). Soon after implementation of the Birth Spacing Program, the contraceptive prevalence rate increased substantially, from 8.6% in 1988 to 31.7% in 2000, an increase of more than three-fold. The rate has since declined somewhat but remained at 29.7% in 2014 (Figure 3.3). The reduction in the overall contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) after 2008 was mainly due to reduction in the use of modern methods, while the use of traditional methods showed monotonic increase over the period. The recent decline in CPR, however, does not match with the decline of fertility in Oman (Figure 3.4).

% using contraceptive methods

35

31.7

30

24.4

23.7

25

24.6

20

18.1

5 0

8.6 7.5

9.1

10.9

1.1 1988 OCHS Any method

FIGURE 3.3

7.1

5.6

18.8 15.3

15 10

29.7

1995 OFHS

2000 ONHS

Any modern method

2008 ONRHS

2014 NCSI & UNICEF

Any traditional method

Trends in current use of family planning methods from 1988 to 2014.

Fertility Transition in Oman  49

8.0

Total fertility rate

36.0

8.6

29.7

7.0

7.1

6.0

23.7

24.0

24.4

21.0

4.8

4.0

18.0 3.3

3.0

FIGURE 3.4

2.9

Total fertility rate Contraceptive prevalence rate

1.0 1988 OCHS

15.0 12.0 9.0

8.6

2.0

30.0 27.0

5.0

0.0

33.0

31.7

1995 OFHS

2000 ONHS 2008 ONRHS 2014 NCSI & UNICEF

6.0

Contraceptive prevalence rate

9.0

3.0 0.0

Total fertility rates (TFRs) and contraceptive prevalence rates (CPRs) in Oman from different national surveys between 1988 and 2014.

According to the 2014 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey in Oman, about 30% of the currently married women were using some form of contraception, 18.8% being modern methods and 10.9% traditional methods (Figure 3.3). Modern methods account for 63% of the total use. The substantial contribution of traditional methods to overall CPR deserves special attention by the family planning program managers as the effectiveness of traditional methods is very low. Continued longer duration of postpartum infecundability relates to fertility reduction. Duration of the period of postpartum infecundability, which is associated with the duration of breastfeeding, is one of the major proximate determinants of fertility. Breastfeeding is not only beneficial for children’s and mothers’ health, but also provides natural contraception through lengthening the postpartum amenorrhea and thus increasing the length of birth intervals. The natural contraceptive mechanism, however, depends on the frequency and intensity of breastfeeding. Survey results in Oman indicate almost universal breastfeeding as more than 95% of the children born during the five years preceding the survey were breastfed (Sulaiman, Al-Ghassany, & Farid, 1992). This is true irrespective of level of education and place of residence. All the surveys considered in this study provided estimates of duration of breastfeeding, but no direct estimates of postpartum infecundability. However, in the absence of direct estimates of the duration of postpartum infecundability, estimates can be obtained indirectly from the duration of breastfeeding by using the fitted model suggested by Bogaarts and Potter (1983): 2

i = 1.753e 0.1396 × B − 0.001872 × B , R 2 = 0.96

(2)

50  M. Mazharul Islam

where i is the average duration of postpartum infecundability and B is the average duration of breastfeeding. Using the above fitted model, Islam (2017) obtained estimates of postpartum infecundability. The study observed that both the duration of breastfeeding and postpartum infecundability showed an increasing trend over the period from 1988 to 2008. The duration of breastfeeding increased from 16 months in 1988 to 21 months in 2008, while the corresponding duration of postpartum infecundability increased from 10 months in 1988 to 14 months in 2008 (Islam, 2017). The increase in the duration of breastfeeding in Oman is supported by the current health policy in promoting prolonged breastfeeding in the community. Increasing educational development accelerated fertility reduction. Oman has a short history of formal education system development. In 1970, there were only three formal schools in Oman with a total of 909 male students (Al Shmeli, 2009). At that time education in Oman was considered just for boys who study Quran, principles of Arabic language, mathematics, and history (Al Shmeli, 2009; Baporikar & Shah, 2012). As part of the modernization drive, the government of Oman has put much emphasis on the expansion of education to both males and females since 1970, providing free education at all levels. The education sector in Oman has made remarkable progress since 1970, particularly in expanding access to education and developing an Omani teaching force. Oman’s success in expanding education within a short period of the last three decades can be described as massive and unprecedented. The net enrollment rate in primary school increased from 5% (Zurayk, 1979) in the 1970s to almost 100% in recent times, and the literacy rate reached over 90% (NCSI, 2018). The share of female school students has increased from 13% in 1972 to more than 50% now, indicating that the gender gap in literacy rates has almost disappeared, and at universities females are already better represented than males. Expansion of education among females is also reflected in the education make-up of the ever-married females. National survey data as depicted in Figure 3.5 indicate that during the 1980s more than one-third (68%) of the ever-married women of reproductive age had no formal education, which declined to 17% in 2008. By contrast, the percentage of the ever-married women with at least a secondary level of education increased from 13% in 1988 to 52% in 2008. The impressive expansion of education, particularly for females, increased the social status of women as well as their control over their own reproductive lives (Al-Riyami & Afifi, 2003), which has affected the rising age at marriage, contraceptive use, and birth spacing, which ultimately reduce the fertility level. According to the 2008 Oman National Reproductive Health Survey (ONRHS), the total fertility rate for the women with no education was found to be 4.3 births per woman compared to 2.9 births per woman among women with more than primary education.

Fertility Transition in Oman  51 80 70

68

Percent

60

51.7

49.7

50

38.3

40 26.9

30 20

19

31.4 23.4

13.2

31.3

30.3 17

10 0

FIGURE 3.5

1988 No education

1995 Primary

2000 2008 Secondary & above

Trends in educational development among ever-married women in Oman from 1988 to 2008.

Decline in infant and child mortality helps reduce fertility. According to the classic demographic transition theory, fertility declines occur following mortality declines, particularly childhood mortality. The possible mechanisms through which childhood mortality may operate to influence fertility are biological, replacement, and insurance effects (Preston, 1978; Richter & Adlakha, 1989). The biological effect mainly operates through the shortening of the birth interval after the death of the infant. The replacement hypothesis proposes that fertility control will be low among couples whose child dies, because they will continue childbearing to replace the child they lost. The insurance effect is the expectation of couples that their desired number of children will survive. Fertility transition in Oman has occurred following the classic demographic transition theory that fertility decline follows infant and child mortality decline. Oman has experienced rapid decline in infant and child mortality since 1970 (Figure 3.6). The infant mortality rate, which was around 110 per 1,000 live births in 1970, declined to about 8 per 1,000 live births by 2015, a decline of 93% over the last 45 years. Under-five mortality also declined from 168 per 1,000 live births in 1970 to 9 per 1,000 live births in 2015. A decline in infant mortality, particularly, contributed significantly to the decline in overall mortality rates and to an improvement in life expectancy at birth, which increased from a very low average of 52 years in 1970 to 77 years in 2015 in Oman (Figure 3.6). The decline in mortality in Oman can be attributed to rapid increase in the availability of and access to quality health care services and improvement in socioeconomic conditions and quality of life. Growing oil revenues enabled the government to increase allocations to the health sector. Awareness campaigns

52  M. Mazharul Islam

Infant mortality rate Under-five mortality rate Life expectancy at birth Crude death rate

160 140 120

16 14 12 10

100

8

80

6

60 40

4

20

2

0

FIGURE 3.6

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year

Crude death rate

Infant and under five mortality rate

180

0

Trends in infant and under-five mortality rates per 1,000 live births, crude death rates, and life expectancy at birth in Oman from 1970 to 2015.

Source: United Nations (2019).

through mass media also played a crucial role in increasing utilization of the expanding health services provided by the public sector. Progress in women’s education played a key role in achieving almost 100% participation in child immunization programs and antenatal care programs, which resulted in the drastic lowering of infant and child mortality in Oman (Ministry of Health, 2016). The decline of infant mortality has had a profound impact on the country’s fertility transition. Because children are less at risk of dying in infancy, parents can now choose to have fewer children. Parents now have higher aspirations for their children and invest more money in their education. Paradox of unchanging high level of fertility preferences and fertility decline. The fertility level of a country is closely related to the percentage of respondents of reproductive age who want to have more children. In a classic study, Pritchett (1994) showed that there is a strong relation between actual fertility and fertility desire and argued that fertility desire plays the main role in decreasing fertility. Thus, policies that improve socioeconomic conditions and reduce the demand for children are the most important and sustainable way to reduce fertility. Ideal family size is an indicator of fertility preference. Data on ideal family size in national surveys in Oman were collected by asking the ever-married respondents a hypothetical question about the number of children they would choose to have if they could start their reproductive life again, irrespective of whether they can accomplish it, and irrespective of the number of children they already have. Table 3.2 summarizes the results by presenting the distribution

Fertility Transition in Oman  53 TABLE 3.2 Desired (Ideal) Number of Children in Oman

1995 OFHS Mean desired (ideal) number of children Desired number of children (%) 1 2 3 4 5+ Non-numeric (e.g., God knows) Total

2000 ONHS

2008 ONRHS

6.4

5.5

6.0

0.6 4.3 4.8 15.7 60.6 13.9 100.0

0.2 3.7 3.6 27.1 52.4 12.9 100.0

1.6 3.5 3.7 17.1 51 23.1 100.0

of ever-married women according to their perceived ideal number of children as well as the mean ideal number of children. The majority of Omani women would prefer to have five or more children in their lifetime. From 1995 to 2008, the desired family size remained almost unchanged, despite the fact that actual fertility levels declined substantially. It is interesting to note that a substantial proportion of women (14%–23%) provided non-numeric responses, such as “God knows” or “do not know,” about their preference for ideal number of children. This may be attributed to the dominant culture of Arab countries as well as the abstract nature of the question, which may provoke verbal or non-numeric answers.

Role of Major Proximate Determinants in Fertility Reduction Any change in fertility level of a population is necessarily due to change in one or more of the proximate determinants. From a policy point of view, it is, therefore, important to understand the relative contribution of each of the proximate determinants of fertility to an observed change in fertility between two points of time. To improve understanding of the causes of rapid fertility decline in Oman, the fertility-inhibiting effects of the major proximate determinants of fertility: marriage, contraception, and postpartum infecundability, and their relative role in reduction of fertility over the period 1988–2008 were analyzed using Bongaarts’ aggregate model. The estimated values of the indices derived from each of the surveys are shown in Table 3.3. As the complement of the estimated index of a proximate determinant reflects the magnitude of fertility-inhibiting effect of the corresponding proximate determinant, the lower the index value, the greater the fertility reducing impact.

54  M. Mazharul Islam TABLE 3.3 Fertility-Inhibiting Effect of Major Proximate Determinants over the

Period 1988–2008 Model Indices

1988

1995

2000

2008

Index of marriage (Cm )

0.89

0.72

0.63

0.57

Index of contraception   (C c )

0.92

0.78

0.70

0.78

Index of postpartum infecundability (Ci )

0.70

0.64

0.67

0.61

Index of abortion (C a )

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.573

0.359

0.295

0.271

Combined effect (Cm × C c × Ci × C a ) Total fecundity (TF)a Predicted TFR

15.3 8.8

15.3 5.5

15.3 4.5

15.3 4.1

a As suggested by Bongaarts (1978, p. 117), the average value of TF was assumed to be 15.3 for Oman for each year.

Over the period 1988 to 2008, the indices for marriage, contraception, and postpartum infecundability show declining values, indicating increased fertility-inhibiting effects. For instance, the index value of marriage decreased from 0.89 in 1988 to 0.57 in 2008, which indicates that the fertility reducing impact of marriage increased from 11% (1−0.89 = 0.11) in 1988 to 43% (1−0.57 = 0.43) in 2008. Overall, the index of marriage declined by 36%, while the index of contraception and postpartum infecundability declined by 15% and 13%, respectively. There are many changes in the role of fertility reducing effects of the major proximate determinants over the period 1988–2008. While postpartum infecundability was the highest fertility reducing factor in 1988, the marriage pattern appeared as the most important fertility reducing factor by 2008. To estimate the relative contribution of each of the major proximate determinants of fertility, Islam (2017) decomposed the observed change in fertility between 1988 and 2008, and reported that the marriage pattern alone contributed more than half (58%) of the total reduction in fertility from 1988 to 2008, while contraception contributed 25% of the total reduction, and postpartum infecundability contributed 21% of the total reduction in fertility.

Implications for Policy and Practice The rapid decline in fertility in Oman over the last three decades resulted from several factors that have implications for policy and practice in nations interested in managing high fertility. For instance, the female literacy rate and education level increased significantly, which led to an increase in the marriage age and shortened the childbearing period. This increase in women’s education also raised their public awareness and led to their further participation in various areas of family decision-making, particularly with respect to mate

Fertility Transition in Oman  55

selection, marriage, and family formation. In addition to the Birth Spacing Program, the government of Oman has implemented a variety of measures that reduce fertility levels either directly or indirectly. These measures include strengthening the health care system; promoting public education, particularly for girls; promoting women’s empowerment and job opportunities; and developing electricity, drinking water, transport, and communication networks in remote areas of Oman that contributed to the country’s modernization and had an indirect effect on fertility. Although there is no official population control program or family planning program in Oman, since 1994 it has had a unique health care program called “Birth Spacing Program” with the directive of His Majesty, the Sultan of the country. To promote wider acceptance and easier implementation, the program refers to birth spacing to avoid cultural and religious sensitivity attached with the term ‘family planning.’ This program might have a substantial impact on reduction of fertility in Oman, which is reflected in increasing interbirth intervals in Oman since the inception of the program. The program could be a model for other high fertility Muslim countries, including other Gulf countries.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research An important limitation in understanding fertility in Oman is the lack of comprehensive national surveys since 2008, although more limited data are available in 2018. A direction for future research is to investigate the prospect of future fertility decline in Oman and whether Oman will achieve a replacement level of fertility. The prospect seems to be very slim in the near future unless couples are strongly motivated to have fewer children and adopt necessary actions, such as increased contraceptive use and increased birth spacing along with the rising trends in delayed age at marriage. To achieve a replacement level of fertility of 2.1 children per woman, the desired fertility level should converge to 2.1 or less. However, in Oman the desired fertility level is much higher than the required 2.1 births per woman. Although Oman experienced rapid decline in fertility, with more than three children per woman, it is still a high fertility country, and recent official statistics demonstrate that the fertility rate in Oman is showing an upward trend, which might be a reflection of continued desire for a large family size.

Conclusions Oman has undergone a rapid fertility transition from a natural level of fertility with nearly 9 births per woman in the late 1980s to a controlled level of fertility with about 3 births per woman in the early 2000s. This decline of more than 5 births per woman within a short period of 20 years represents one of the steepest declines in fertility in the world. Iran, another contemporary

56  M. Mazharul Islam

traditional Muslim society in the region, has also experienced a comparable rapid fertility decline from 7 births to 2 births per woman between 1986 and 2000, a decline of 5 births per woman within 16 years (Erfani & McQuilan, 2008). However, the two countries have quite different scenarios of fertility decline. In Iran, fertility declines have occurred due to a strong population control program and low desired family size. A high rate of contraceptive use is the norm for fertility reduction in Iran, as more than 70% of currently married women are using family planning methods in the country. In Oman there is no official population control program, and the contraceptive use rate is less than 30%. Recent national surveys show that the contraceptive prevalence rate slightly declined in recent times. Fertility decline in Oman has occurred due to delaying and spacing births through delayed age at marriage and age at childbearing as well as due to the practice of longer duration of breastfeeding, which led to longer duration of postpartum amenorrhea. Oman has a unique birth spacing program integrated with its strong health care program. The birth spacing program in Oman provides counseling for reasonable spacing between births, avoiding high-risk pregnancy through effective use of modern family planning methods, and conceiving when couples desire, and thus helps reduce fertility. The analysis of the proximate determinants of fertility suggests that delayed marriage is the most important inhibitor of fertility in Oman, with contraception as the second most important fertility inhibitor and postpartum infecundability as the third. The marriage pattern alone is responsible for more than half (58%) of the total reduction in fertility from 1988 to 2008. Oman has experienced massive economic and social development, resulting in many changes in the reproductive behavior and lifestyles of women. Since 1970, the government of Oman put much emphasis on expansion of education to both males and females. As a result the net enrollment rate for females aged 6–10 has increased to almost 100%. As elsewhere, there is a strong negative correlation between education and fertility. In recent times, due to increases in women’s education and social status in Oman, women’s control over their own reproductive lives has increased. Women are increasingly taking part in the labor force and all aspects of Oman’s development (Chatty, 2002). This clearly has had a major impact on fertility through modification of the major proximate determinants of fertility. Although the increasing trends of delayed marriage appeared as the most prominent determinants of fertility reduction in Oman, considering the prevailing culture and social norms of universal marriage in Oman, it is unlikely that marriage will be delayed beyond a certain age, and few women are likely to remain permanently single. Thus the future prospect of further decline in fertility by delaying marriage is not bright. The prevailing prolonged duration of postpartum infecundability through the practice of universal and long duration of breastfeeding is also likely to decrease in the future due to modernization effects. Under these circumstances, future fertility trends in Oman

Fertility Transition in Oman  57

will largely depend on the motivation of couples to have smaller families and effective use of contraception to materialize their fertility intensions.

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Erfani, A., & McQuillan, K. (2008). Rapid fertility decline in Iran: Analysis of intermediate variables. Journal of Biosocial Science, 40, 459–474. Fargues, P. (2005). Women in Arab countries: Challenging the patriarchal system? Reproductive Health Matters, 13, 43–48. Freedman, R. (1979). Theories of fertility decline: A reappraisal. Social Forces, 58, 1–17. Islam, M. M. (2012). The practice of consanguineous marriage in Oman: Prevalence, trends and determinants. Journal of Biosocial Science, 44, 571–594. Islam, M. M. (2017). Rapid fertility decline in Oman: Understanding the role of proximate determinants. Middle East Fertility Society Journal, 22, 275–284. Islam, M. M., Dorvlo, A. S. S., & Al-Qasmi, A. M. (2011). Proximate determinants of declining fertility in Oman in the 1990s. Canadian Studies in Population, 38, 133–152. Khlat, M. (1997). Endogamy in the Arab world. In A. Teebi & T. Farag (Eds.), Genetic disorders among Arab populations (pp. 63–80). New York: Oxford University Press. Lesthaeghe, R. (1995). The second demographic transition in Western countries: An interpretation. In K. O. Mason & A.-M. Jensen (Eds.), Gender and family change in industrialized countries (pp. 17–62). Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. Lesthaeghe, R., & Surkyn, J. (1988). Cultural dynamics and economic theories of fertility change. Population and Development Review, 14, 1–45. Lesthaeghe, R., & Wilson, C. (1986). Modes of production, secularization, and the pace of the fertility decline in western Europe. In A. J. Coale & S. C. Watkins (Eds.), The decline of fertility in Europe (pp. 261–292). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mason, K. O. (1997). Explaining fertility transitions. Demography, 34, 443–454. Ministry of Health. (2016). Annual health report 2015. Muscat, Oman: Ministry of Health. Mirkin, B. (2010). Population levels, trends and policies in the Arab region: Challenges and opportunities. Arab Human Development Report Research Paper Series. New York: United Nations Development Programme. National Centre for Statistics and Information (NCSI) and UNICEF. (2018). Statistical year book 2017. Muscat, Oman: Ministry of National Economy. Notestein, F. (1953). Economic problems of population change. In Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference of Agricultural Economics. London: Oxford University Press. Preston, S. (1978). The effects of infant and child mortality and fertility. New York: Academic Press. Pritchett, L. H. (1994). Desired fertility and the impact of population policies. Population Development Review, 20, 1–56. Puschmann, P. (2011). Casablanca. A demographic miracle on Moroccan soil? Leuven, The Hague: Acco Academic. Rajab, A., & Patton, M. (2000). A study of consanguinity in the Sultanate of Oman. Annals of Human Biology, 27, 321326. Rashad, H., & Khadr, Z. (2002). The demography of the Arab region: New challenges and opportunities. In I. Sirageldin (Ed.), Human capital: Population economics in the Middle East (pp. 37–49). Caïro, Egypt: The American University of Caïro Press. Rashad, H., & Osman, M. (2003). Nuptiality in Arab countries: Changes and implications. In N. Hopkins (Ed.), The new Arab family (pp. 20–51). Caïro, Egypt; New York: The American University in Cairo Press. Rashed, H., Osman, M., & Roudi-Fahimi, F. (2005). Marriage in the Arab world. Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau.

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Richter, K., & Adlakha, A. (1989) The effect of infant and child mortality on subsequent fertility. Journal of Population and Social Studies, 2, 43–62. Schultz, T. W. (1973). New economic approaches to fertility. Journal of Political Economy, 81, 2, 11. Sulaiman, A. J. M., Al-Ghassany, A., & Farid, S. (1992). Oman child health survey 1988– 89. Muscat, Oman: Ministry of Health. Tabutin, D., & Schoumakers, B. (2005). The demography of the Arab world and the Middle East from the 1950s to the 2000s: A survey of change and a statistical assessment. Population, 60, 505–615. Thompson, W. S. (1930). Population problems. New York: McGraw-Hill. United Nations. (2013). World population prospects: The 2012 revision. New York: United Nations. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2019). World urbanization prospects: The 2019 revision. Retrieved from https://population.un.org/wup/ Winckler, O. (1998). Rapid population growth and the fertility policies of the Arab countries of the Middle East. In J. Albert, M. Bernharsson, & R. Kenna (Eds.), Transformation of Middle Eastern natural environments (pp. 444–466). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Zurayk, H. (1979). The changing role of Arab women. Population Bulletin of the United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia, No. 17. New York: United Nations.

4 CHILDREN’S PERCEPTIONS OF PARENTING STYLES Ten Years of Research with Omani Families Said Aldhafri

Introduction The family is the starting point for raising children, and parent-child relationships are the foundation of children’s behaviours. Thus, investigating parenting styles has attracted considerable interest due to the impact of these styles on children’s developmental outcomes and future life (Chao, 2000; Gadeyne, Ghesquiere, & Onghena, 2004; McLeod, Wood, & Weisz, 2007; Talib, Mohamad, & Mamat, 2011). The current chapter reviews the international literature related to parenting styles and summarizes findings related to parenting styles in the GCC with a focus on the Omani context in the last ten years. The chapter also highlights how variation in measurement approaches influences understanding of parenting styles in relation to children’s outcomes. It also outlines possible future research in parenting styles. The chapter is divided into four main parts. The first section sets the stage by defining parenting styles, describing why parenting styles are important in the prediction of children’s developmental outcomes, and discussing measurement approaches that are used in examining parenting styles. The second section reviews literature related to parenting styles in Western contexts. It starts by reviewing parenting styles as perceived by parents and then as perceived children. Variations in parenting styles based on demographic variables and studies that compared parents’ perceptions with their children’s perceptions are discussed. The third section is devoted to empirical studies conducted in GCC countries with a focus on Omani studies. Finally, the chapter concludes with critical examination of the influence of culture, directions for future research, and implications for policy and practice in the GCC.

Children’s Perceptions of Parenting Styles  61

Definitions and Conceptualizations Parenting style is “the manner in which parents treat, communicate with, discipline, monitor, and support their children” (Slicker, Picklesmier, Guzak, & Fuller, 2005, p. 228). The first recorded use of the concept of ‘parenting styles’ was by Baumrind (1971), who is known as the pioneer researcher in parenting styles. Baumrind delineated two key dimensions in parents’ behaviour: demandingness and responsiveness. Demandingness tends to be used to refer to the degree of control practised by parents over their children (e.g., setting strict rules, demands, and limits). Responsiveness refers to the degree of warmth, supportiveness, and acceptance (Baumrind, 1971). These two dimensions were illustrated in Baumrind’s original framework as a 2 × 2 matrix, with one axis represented by the demandingness dimension and the other axis represented by the responsiveness dimension. Hence, four parenting styles have been reported, namely authoritarian, authoritative, permissive, and neglectful (Baumrind, 1991). Authoritarian parenting (high demanding and low responsiveness) refers to autocratic parents who use harsh punishment, set strict rules, control their children’s behaviours, expect to be obeyed without negotiation, and curb children’s autonomy. However, authoritative parents (high demanding and high responsiveness) are characterized by encouraging positive conversations with their children and providing them with clear explanations of their rules and parental controls. Although they value warmth, supportiveness, and autonomy, authoritative parents confirm discipline and use firm control while taking into consideration their children’s needs and interests. Permissiveness (low demanding and high responsiveness) is described as non-punitive parenting. Permissive parents show a high degree of warmth and affection towards their children. They provide children with few demands, allowing children to control their own behaviours without receiving any form of parental guidance, discipline, or regulations. Neglectful parenting, also known as uninvolved parenting, is a style described by the lack of both dimensions (low demandingness and low responsiveness). In other words, neglectful parents are neither accepting of nor demanding towards their children. They are indifferent and completely dismissive (Baumrind, 1967, 1971, 1991, 2005).

The Importance of Parenting Styles Much work on the contribution of parenting styles to child development has been carried out since the middle of the 20th century. The findings of previous literature suggest that authoritative parenting has an optimal influence on positive child outcomes, including academic achievement and school performance (Cohen & Rice, 1997; Kaisa, Hakan, & Jari-erik, 2000; Newman et al., 2015), academic achievement identity (Aldhafri & Al-Harthy, 2016),

62  Said Aldhafri

achievement goal orientation (Aldhafri & Al Odeh, in press), self-esteem (Chan & Koo, 2011; Martínez & García, 2007; Pinquart & Gerke, 2019), self-efficacy (Aldhafri, 2011; Qazi, 2009; Tam, Chong, Kadirvelu, & Khoo, 2012), psychological adjustment (Aldhafri, 2016; Aljahwari & Aldhafri, 2020), mental health (Abubakar, van de Vijver, Suryani, Handayani, & Pandia, 2015; Dwairy et al., 2006), reduction of violence (Spano, Rivera, & Bolland, 2011), and high cognitive competencies (Rudasill, Adelson, Callahan, Houlihan, & Keizer, 2013). There is, to some extent, general agreement on the negative impact of authoritarian, permissive, and neglectful parenting on children’s outcomes and development (Chen, 2015; Gonzalez, Holbein, & Quilter, 2002; Hoskins, 2014; Ren & Edwards, 2015). Children who perceive their parents as highly strict, lenient, or dismissive show high levels of school anxiety (Butnaru, 2016; Mellon & Moutavelis, 2011; Sagar & Lavalle, 2010), poor academic achievement (Dornbush, Ritter, Leiderman, Roberts, & Fraleigh, 1987), maladjustment (Lamborn, Mounts, Steinberg, & Dornbusch, 1991), low self-esteem (Herz & Gullone, 1999), external locus of control (Qazi, 2009), and drug use and delinquency (Clausen, 1996). However, the findings of previous studies regarding the effect of each parenting style on child outcomes differ somewhat according to the cultural context.

Measurement of Parenting Styles Previous literature has investigated the issue of parenting styles through using surveys (e.g., Parental Authority Questionnaire, Measure of Parental Styles) answered by either parents or children and adolescents, or through observing parental behaviours and practices. Some studies have been carried out to examine the parenting styles as perceived by parents themselves (e.g., Solantaus, Leinonen, & Punamaki, 2004) or children (e.g., Aldhafri, 2016; Rudasill et al., 2013; Wen & Hui, 2012). Fewer attempts have been made to compare between parents’ and children’s perceptions of parenting styles (e.g., Cohen & Rice, 1997; Mayuri, Divya, & Kiran, 2015). However, it has been argued that parents’ perception of their own parenting styles might not convey reliable data or reflect reality (Aldhafri, 2014; Kaufmann et al., 2000). Children might have different perceptions towards their parents’ parenting styles and practices than do their parents, and children’s perceptions might be more strongly connected to their development than their parents’ perceptions.

Background on Parenting Styles in the International Literature Parenting Styles as Perceived by Parents Several studies in perceived parenting styles have drawn on the convergence in fathers’ and mothers’ parenting styles to create composite scores of both

Children’s Perceptions of Parenting Styles  63

parents to analyse the data (Baumrind. 1991; Smetana, 1995; Steinberg, Lamborn, Dornbusch, & Darling, 1992). However, it is crucial to examine the distinctive parenting styles of mothers and fathers because they may parent their children differently (McKinney & Renk, 2008). Few researchers have addressed the separate findings of paternal and maternal parenting styles and the differential influence of each parent on child outcomes (Ang & Goh, 2006; McKinney & Renk, 2008; Milevsky, Schlechter, Netter, & Keehn, 2007; Rinaldi & Howe, 2012). Because parents’ self-reports of their parenting might be biased (Aldhafri, 2014), parents’ perceptions towards their own parenting styles as well as their spouses’ parenting could provide more accurate data compared to merely asking parents to self-report their own parenting (Winsler, Madigan, & Aquilino, 2005). A very small number of studies on parenting styles as perceived by parents have been conducted in both Western and non-Western populations (Al Rub, 2013; Al-Said & Al Zbidi, 2001; Gamble, Ramakumar, & Diaz, 2007; Gaspar & de Matos, 2017; Russell et al., 1998; Tavassolie, Dudding, Madigan, Thorvardarson, & Winsler, 2016; Winsler et al., 2005). The samples of these studies have included mainly the parents of young children because children at this age have difficulty reporting on their parents’ parenting styles, so most of the parenting styles measures constructed for identifying parenting styles used with young children were developed for fathers and mothers (Robinson, Mandleco, Olsen, & Hart, 1995). A great deal of similarity has been found between fathers’ and mothers’ parenting styles (Gamble et al., 2007; Tavassoli et al., 2016; Winsler et al., 2005). However, Winsler et al. (2005) reported that mothers’ and fathers’ authoritative parenting was not correlated.

Children’s Perceptions of Parenting Styles Considerable attention has been devoted to examining adolescents’ perceptions of parenting styles and their influence over the life span of children in Western societies. Sorkhabi (2005) argued that all parenting styles could be found in individualistic cultures (Western countries). Although Barnhart, Raval, Jansari, and Raval (2013) reported that authoritarianism is the representative parenting style of American adolescents’ parents, most Western studies have generally indicated that children perceived their parents as more authoritative (e.g., Kritzas & Grobler, 2005; Olivari, Wahn, Maridaki-Kassotaki, Antonopoulou, & Confalonieri, 2015; Rudasill et al., 2013). However, several differences have been found in retrospective perceptions of the most common parenting style used by fathers and mothers. Maternal authoritative parenting was perceived as being more predominant compared to paternal authoritative parenting (Newman et al., 2015; Olivari et al., 2015). This result is in line with Western mothers’ perception of their own parenting style as they were more likely to perceive themselves as endorsing authoritativeness when compared to fathers

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(Russell et al., 1998). However, when children’s perception of paternal parenting style was studied separately, they viewed their fathers as predominantly authoritative (Antonopoulou, Alexopoulos, & Maridaki-Kassotaki, 2012). Moreover, even though authoritative parenting was perceived as being the most common parenting style in many countries, several differences regarding the degree of authoritativeness across Western populations were observed. For example, Olivari et al. (2015) studied 702 Swedish, Italian, and Greek adolescents and found that maternal authoritarian parenting is significantly more practised in Italy compared to Sweden and Greece, while authoritarian parenting style was less used by Italian fathers. However, a permissive parenting style was perceived to be more common in Sweden and Greece when compared to Italy. The effect of parenting styles, as perceived by children, on child outcomes has also been investigated in Western contexts. It is mostly agreed that previous research on this issue provides further support for the positives of authoritativeness. These positives entail educational, social, emotional, and cognitive outcomes. Perceived authoritative parenting was positively associated with adaptive achievement strategies (Kaisa et al., 2000), academic achievement (Newman et al., 2015), internal locus of control (Qazi, 2009), resilience (Kritzas & Grobler, 2005), cognitive abilities (Rudasill et al., 2013), and empathy and global self-esteem (Antonopoulou et al., 2012). However, some inconsistencies were found regarding authoritative parenting styles. For example, Newman et al. (2015) found that the perceived parenting style of American mothers was not related to children’s self-esteem. Because of presumptions of the negatives of authoritarian and permissive parenting styles, some unexpected findings also have been reported. For instance, Kritzas and Grobler (2005) found that fathers’ authoritarian parenting style was positively associated with emotion-focused coping strategies. Antonopoulou et al. (2012) pointed out that there was no significant association between the perceived paternal permissive parenting style and self-esteem and empathic growth.

Comparative Studies of Parents and Their Children Few researchers have investigated the agreement between the perceptions of parents and their children towards parenting styles. Cohen and Rice (1997) found that there was a poor alignment between parents’ perception towards their own parenting styles and 8th and 9th grade adolescents’ perceptions of their parents’ parenting styles. Adolescents perceived their parents as having lower levels of authoritativeness and permissiveness and higher levels of authoritarianism. However, this result did not match with parents’ self-reported parenting styles. Mayuri et al. (2015) compared parents’ and children’s perceptions of two dimensions of parenting: responsiveness and demandingness. The participants were from rural and urban areas in India. The results showed that there were many differences in the perceptions of parents and their children.

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Children perceived their parents as more authoritarian, less permissive, and less authoritative than parents believed they were. More rural parents were perceived as authoritative compared to urban parents, who were perceived as more authoritarian.

Parenting Styles across Demographic Variables An increasing number of studies have found that many demographic variables are significantly correlated with mothers’ and fathers’ parenting styles (e.g., Conrade & Ho, 2001; Elstad & Stefansen, 2014; Jaradat, 2012; Russell et al., 1998). Different parenting styles have been examined across the gender of parents and children, grade levels, age, socioeconomic status (SES), and parental education. Research findings related to differences in parenting styles according to these demographic variables have been contradictory and inconsistent. The following is a discussion of these findings obtained from different cultural contexts. In relation to parent and child gender, significant differences between fathers’ and mothers’ parenting styles used with boys and girls have been found. Although some studies reported that there was no significant correlation between gender and parenting styles (e.g., Al Rub, 2013; Nwokocha et al., 2017; Paulson, 1994), a large number of studies found that the perceived parenting styles of mothers differed from those of fathers, and that parents use different parenting styles in rearing boys and girls (Baumrind, 1991; Conrade & Ho, 2001; Dornbusch et al., 1987; Forehand & Nousiainen, 1993; Olivari et al., 2015). In relation to the gender of parents, several studies found that mothers were viewed as more authoritative than fathers, whereas authoritarian parenting was mostly practised by fathers (Conrade & Ho, 2001; Russell et al., 1998; Winsler et al., 2005). However, this result significantly differs from other studies (e.g., Jones-Sanpei, Day, & Holmes, 2009; Rudasill et al., 2013), which showed that children experienced their fathers and mothers as more authoritarian. Contrary to expectation, Barnhart et al. (2013) found that no significant gender differences in parenting styles were perceived by Indian and American college students. Regarding the gender of children, compared to female adolescents, males were more likely to perceive their fathers as authoritarian (Dwairy et al., 2006; Niditch & Varela, 2012; Olivari et al., 2015). Thus, authoritative parenting style was perceived as being more experienced by girls, while authoritarian parenting was perceived more by boys (Lytton & Romney, 1991; Russell et al., 1998; Someya, Uehara, Kadowaki, Tang, & Takahashi, 2000). With respect to age differences, past research showed that no significant differences in parenting styles were found based on age (Dornbusch et al., 1987). Steinberg and Morris (2001) recognized that the authoritarian practices involving manipulating and controlling child behaviours and choices generally decrease when children get older. In contrast, Rudasill et al. (2013) found that

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younger children experienced their parents as more permissive compared to older ones. Parenting styles also have been found to differ by SES. Early research on the effects of SES on parenting style was conducted by Bronfenbrenner (1958) who highlighted that working-class families were more likely to follow discipline and control practices consistent with an authoritarian style, whereas parents of middle-class families were more warm, accepting, and responsive (authoritative and permissive). This finding is in line with Dwairy et al.’s (2006) research conducted in Arab culture, which found that authoritarian parenting style was associated with low SES. Surprisingly, a recent study found that no statistically significant differences were found in perceived parenting styles and students’ socioeconomic class (Nwokocha et al., 2017). Specifically with respect to family income, it has been found that children from low income families perceived their parents, especially fathers, as more demanding and less responsive (authoritarian), whereas those from higher income families viewed their parents as more authoritative ( Jaradat, 2012). Parental education differences have been long discussed in research on parenting styles. Almost all studies have agreed that more highly educated parents are more likely to use authoritative parenting and avoid the use of harsh and physical punishment that is characteristic of authoritarian parenting (Chen, Dong, & Zhou, 1997; Gracia & Herrero, 2008; Jaradat, 2012; von der Lippe, 1999; Worden & Carlson, 2005). In addition, Elstad and Stefansen (2014) have argued that low levels of parental education were positively associated with neglectful and intrusiveness parenting styles. However, they unexpectedly found that demandingness and responsiveness dimensions were not associated with parental education. Jaradat (2012) pointed out that mothers who were more highly educated (college or above) were perceived as more authoritative. Bluestone and Tamis-LeMonda (1999) investigated the effect of both SES and parental education on perceived parenting styles and found that maternal authoritative parenting was practised by highly educated mothers who were from working- and middle-class families. This finding is consistent with findings reported by Assadi et al. (2007) in Iran and Tam et al. (2012) in Malaysia.

Background on Parenting Styles in the GCC Parenting Styles as Perceived by Parents in the GCC Many unexpected findings have been observed regarding perceived parenting styles in Arab culture. As mentioned earlier, authoritarianism was the dominant style of parenting practised by Arab parents, who are traditionally described as patriarchal and strict in making family decisions. However, Arab parents perceived themselves as being more authoritative (Al Rub, 2013). Contrary to expectations, Al Rub (2013) reported that mothers were perceived as

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more authoritarian compared to fathers. This result contradicts the general stereotype of mothers as being more loving and lenient compared to fathers who typically use severe disciplinary practices with their children (Bentley & Fox, 1991, as discussed in Al Rub, 2013). Overall, further research is needed due to the lack of research studies associated with differences in parenting style and its effect on children from the perspective of parents themselves in the GCC.

Children’s Perceptions of Parenting Styles in the GCC Unlike parents’ perceptions of parenting styles, adolescents’ and adults’ (e.g., university students) perceptions of their parents’ parenting styles have been studied extensively in the GCC. Several studies investigating perceived parenting styles have been conducted among adolescents and undergraduates in Asian and Arab countries. Past research on parenting styles in non-Western contexts has argued that Asian and Arab parents were expected to apply more authoritarian parenting (e.g., Brown & Iyengar, 2008; Pong, Hao, & Gardner, 2005). It seems possible that this result was due to the socialization values to be highly respected in non-Western societies (e.g., obedience, social integrity, and respect with fear to family) as well as the Islamic values regarding Arab Muslim countries (Dwairy et al., 2006). For example, in Jordan, 883 Arab refugee adolescents were asked to assess their fathers’ and mothers’ parenting styles, and the results indicated that permissive parenting was only perceived for mothers (Smetana & Ahmad, 2018). Authoritative parenting styles have been related to positive outcomes in many studies of non-Western children. For example, authoritativeness has a significant relationship with mental health and satisfaction (Abubakar et al., 2015), self-efficacy (Tam et al., 2012), academic achievement (Newman et al., 2015), and adjustment (Smetana & Ahmad, 2018). However, results regarding the effectiveness of authoritarian and permissive parenting styles have been more inconsistent. In UAE, there was a significant association between demandingness (mostly relevant to authoritarian parenting) and high academic achievement (Alsheikh, Parameswaran, & Ethoweris, 2010). In other words, more demanding parenting styles were associated positively with students’ better GPA. Inconsistencies across countries in the findings to date suggest the need for further studies investigating perceptions of parenting styles among GCC children.

Empirical Findings: Parenting Styles in Oman Few studies were identified that examined Omani parents’ perceptions of parenting styles. One study found no significant relation between the attitude of Omani mothers of pre-schoolers towards child rearing practices and children’s social behaviours (Al-Said & Al Zbidi, 2001). This result differed from

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significant relations reported in previous studies (e.g., Kochanska, Aksan, & Koenig, 1995). Another study found high levels of positive parenting styles as perceived by Omani parents as well as high levels of parenting protection over the child (Aldhafri, 2014). The study found low levels of non-positive parenting styles such as child-discrimination, being authoritarian, child abuse, and inflicting pain on children. Most Omani studies on parenting styles were conducted by examining children’s perceptions of parenting styles and have yielded four similar findings. First, almost all studies conducted in Oman found that authoritative and authoritarian parenting styles were the most common styles of Omani parents with their children, and the permissive parenting style of both fathers and mothers was perceived as the least practised parenting style (Al Alawi & Aldhafri, in press; Aldhafri, 2014; Aldhafri, 2016; Aldhafri & Al-Harthy, 2016; Aldhafri et al., 2011; Al Hattami, 2017; Aljahwari & Aldhafri, 2020; Al Nabhani & Aldhafri, sent for publication; Al Riyami & Aldhafri, in press; Al Saidi & Aldhafri, 2019; Al Syabi, Aldhafri, & Elsiddg, in press). These findings have been explained by many researchers through referring to the nature of Omani society concerning cultural norms and Islamic principles. Similar to Arab culture, Oman is a collectivist society that places great emphasis on supporting full compliance to parental authority and showing respect to parents (Abu-Hilal, Aldhafri, Albahrani, & Kamali, 2016). The results of these studies might provide a general indication that Omani parents are perceived to practice demanding parental practices since the dimension of demandingness is characterized as being high in both authoritative and authoritarian parenting, but not in the permissive style (Baumrind, 1991). However, authoritative parenting styles are more common in Oman than authoritarian parenting styles, which could be interpreted with regard to the strong social ties and family cohesion among Omani family members (Al-Ghadani, 2004). In addition, the cultural, social, and economic changes that have recently occurred in Omani society have also helped to raise parents’ awareness of positive parenting styles and practices. Thus, parents have used a positive democracy in making conversations with their children. Consequently, the dominant parental practices have changed from using severe controls to more democratic parental patterns (Al Saidi & Aldhafri, 2019). The second shared similarity among all Omani studies on parenting styles as perceived by children is that they were conducted in samples of adolescents whose ages ranged from about 12 to 21. The majority of these studies included samples of school students (e.g., Aldhafri & Al Odeh, in press; Aljahwari & Aldhafri, 2020; Al Nabhani & Aldhafri, sent for publication; Al Rawahi & Aldhafri, sent for publication; Al Saidi & Aldhafri, in press a), or undergraduate students (Aldhafri, 2016; Aldhafri & Al-Harthy, 2016; Al Syabi et al., in press). A third similarity relates to the methodology used to examine the perceived parenting styles as well as how these styles are related to different

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child outcomes. Most studies have reported the perceived parenting styles of fathers and mothers separately (e.g., Aldhafri & Al Odeh, in press). The fourth similarity among studies is that the variation of children’s perception of parenting styles was investigated according to a set of demographic variables such as gender, age, and grade level (e.g., Al Alawi & Aldhafri, in press). In spite of the similarities discussed above, the main focus of each study has varied by investigating different factors that might be associated with perceived parenting styles, such as children’s academic, social, or psychological adjustment. Two studies were conducted to investigate the relation between parenting styles and children’s academic achievement (Al Riyami & Aldhafri, in press; Al Saidi & Aldhafri, in press a). Al Riyami and Aldhafri (in press) found a positive association between authoritative parenting and academic achievement and that task value mediated the association between perceived parenting styles and academic performance in mathematics. Al Saidi and Aldhafri (in press a) found that permissive and authoritarian parenting styles were negatively associated with academic achievement. They also found that learned helplessness has a predictive role between parenting styles and academic achievement. Paternal authoritative parenting was negatively associated with learned helplessness, and authoritarian parenting was positively related to learned helplessness. In addition, Aldhafri and Al Odeh (in press) studied the relation between achievement goal orientations and parenting styles. The authors conducted this study on 919 adolescents (grades 7–10) and found that the perceived maternal parenting style was related to achievement goal orientations, namely performance-avoidance, performance-approach, and master-approach, whereas master-avoidance goals were mostly predicted by the perceived maternal permissive parenting style. Al Saidi and Aldhafri (in press b) discussed the mediating role of goal achievement orientations in the association between parenting styles (as perceived by 10thgrade students) and learned helplessness. They found that paternal permissive parenting and maternal permissive parenting were positively associated with expecting failure through the mediating role of mastery-avoidance goals and performance-avoidance goals, respectively. With regard to social factors, Al Saidi and Aldhafri (2019) investigated the predictive role of parenting styles in relation to social self-concept as perceived by 509 cycle two students (grades 6–10). Social self-concept was significantly predicted by perceived parenting styles after controlling for gender. Psychological adjustment problems, mental health, and emotional intelligence are three psychological factors that have recently been studied in Oman. Aldhafri (2016) found that psychological adjustment problems were predicted by maternal authoritarian parenting style, whereas non-psychological adjustment problems were predicted by maternal authoritarian and paternal permissive parenting styles. Al Nabhani and Aldhafri (sent for publication) have studied the relation between mental health and parenting styles perceived by 2,243 12th-grade students in Oman. A high level of mental health was observed

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among the study participants. Mental health problems were predicted by maternal and paternal authoritarianism, along with paternal authoritarianism and maternal permissiveness. Al Alawi and Aldhafri (in press) found high levels of emotional intelligence among Omani 12th-grade students as well as a positive association between emotional intelligence and the two most common parenting styles perceived in this study: authoritative and authoritarian. All in all, the findings of recent research on children’s perceptions of their parents’ styles of parenting in Oman have some similarities and differences. Additional studies are needed to target various age groups and investigate factors that influence parenting styles. Similar to Western literature, there is scant research that used a comparative approach to examine both parents’ and their children’s perceptions of parenting styles in Oman. Only two studies were identified. Aldhafri (2014) examined a sample of parents and their children in four regions of Oman using an Arabic version of Buri’s Parenting Authority Questionnaire. The sample consisted of 466 mothers, 444 fathers, and 503 grade-nine students. The results showed that fathers viewed themselves as less permissive, less authoritarian, and less authoritative than did their children. The biggest difference between the fathers’ and children’s perceptions was found for whether fathers were authoritarian. Similar discrepancies were found between the mothers and their children except for the authoritative style; mothers reported higher levels of authoritativeness than were reported by their children. When comparing fathers’ perceptions with the perceptions of their wives, wives perceived themselves as more authoritarian and more permissive. No differences were found in perceptions of the permissive style. Across all evaluations of children and their parents, the results confirmed early research in the Omani context, which suggested that the authoritative parenting style is the most common style and the permissive style is the least. Aldhafri (2014) reported that the children’s perceptions of parenting styles were better predictors than their parents’ perceptions of parenting styles of children’s outcomes (e.g., academic self-efficacy beliefs, mental health). Another study was conducted by Aldhafri (2017) using 999 12th-grade students’ perceptions and their parents’ perceptions of parenting style using the short version of Buri’s Parenting Authority Questionnaire that was validated for the Omani context (Alkharusi, Aldhafri, Kazem, Alzubiadi, & Al-Bahrani, 2011). Fathers and mothers perceived themselves as being more authoritative than did their children. No differences were found in authoritarian or permissive parenting styles. When comparing mothers’ with fathers’ perceptions of parenting styles, similarities were found among the couples. The findings were consistent with early research related to the commonality of the authoritative parenting style in Omani families and supported the findings that the permissive style is the least common parenting style as perceived by children and parents.

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Differences in parenting styles were examined across different demographic variables. For example, many researchers have addressed the differences of mothers’ and fathers’ parenting styles as perceived by Omani adolescents due to gender of parents and children (Al Alawi & Aldhafri, in press; Aljahwari & Aldhafri, 2020; Al Nabhani & Aldhafri, sent for publication; Al Riyami & Aldhafri, in press; Al Saidi & Aldhafri, 2019). Although all of these studies showed that child or parent gender was significantly related to differences in parenting styles, some studies found gender to be related only to one or two styles of parenting. For example, Aljahwari and Aldhafri (2020) found that there were statistically significant differences between males and females only in the authoritative parenting of both fathers and mothers in favour of females. This result is consistent with Al Alawi and Aldhafri’s (in press) finding that, compared to Omani male adolescents, Omani female adolescents perceived their fathers and mothers as being more authoritative. However, Al Saidi and Aldhafri (2019) found gender differences in paternal authoritarian, maternal authoritarian, paternal permissive, and maternal permissive parenting styles, with more use of these styles with male than female adolescents. School level is another variable that might be associated with differential parenting styles. However, less attention has been paid to this variable. Butnaru (2016) has found that more authoritarian and permissive parenting styles were perceived by 8th-grade students compared to 5th and 7th graders, and less authoritative parenting was perceived by 8th graders compared to 7th graders, consistent with other results (Al Saidi & Aldhafri, 2019). In contrast, Aljahwari and Aldhafri (2020) found significant relations between school level and parenting styles, except for the maternal authoritarian style. It was found that 7th-grade students perceived their parents as more permissive and authoritative compared to 11th- and 12th-grade students. In addition, Al Riyami and Aldhafri (in press) found that school level was significantly related to fathers’ authoritative parenting as well as fathers’ and mothers’ authoritarian parenting styles favouring 7th-grade students, consistent with the findings of Al Alawi and Aldhafri (in press), but contradicted Aldhafri et al. (2011) where the levels of parenting styles were in favour of upper grade classes. Omani studies also examined variations in parenting styles based on family income. For example, Al Nabhani and Aldhafri (sent for publication) found a statistically significant difference in perceived permissive parenting style and maternal authoritarian style according to family economy favouring low family income. High family income is significantly related to Omani adolescents’ differential perceptions towards authoritative parenting style. These results are consistent with early research reported by Aldhafri (2014) who found that as family income increases, the use of positive parenting styles increases. Parental education level was also examined in relation to parenting styles. Aldhafri (2014) found statistically significant differences in positive parenting

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styles favouring fathers with high education levels. Similar findings were reported for mothers in some positive aspects of parenting (acceptance, availability, consistency, and credibility), and no statistically significant differences were found in other aspects of parenting (sacrificing, interacting, beneficent, and dignifying) based on mothers’ education level.

Implications for Policy and Practice in the GCC The research findings across different samples highlight the importance of increasing parents’ awareness of the effects of their parenting styles on their children’s development. Therefore, there is a need for intervention programmes for parents to help them sustain a supportive family environment that helps children to experience high levels of mental health and well-being across their life span. These programmes need to take into consideration different contextual and demographic variables that influence parenting styles and moderate their effects on children’s development. The policy agenda for the GCC should focus on how to promote the role of the family within growing interfering factors influencing the social, psychological, and behavioural development of children and adolescents of this generation. A strong emphasis should be also directed to the children as they influence their parents’ interaction and parenting styles.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research Findings of Western and GCC studies involve a number of similarities and differences about parenting styles. Additional research is needed in the GCC to examine parenting styles while adopting a comprehensive approach that incorporates different contextual, personal, and family factors that interact with each other to shape the styles that parents use. The goals of socialization for children (boys and girls) set by parents vary across cultures, which in turn affects parenting styles (Chao, 2001). Parents in Western, individualistic cultures value the goal of parenting their children in an autonomous manner through enhancing the concept of self-confidence and self-sufficiency (Keller & Otto, 2009), whereas non-Western parents (e.g., Asian and Arab parents), more strongly emphasize the goals of interrelationships, social interdependence, respect, and full obedience to family and parents, particularly fathers (Ahmad, Smetana, & Klimstra, 2015; Keller & Otto, 2009; Sharifzadeh, 2004). The characteristics of authoritarianism are in line with the socialization goals of non-Western parents, who are more inclined to use an authoritarian parenting style. Authoritarian parenting has been found in some studies not to be related negatively to children’s psychological well-being as has been reported in Western studies (Dwairy & Achoui, 2010), and children were even satisfied

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with authoritarian parenting styles in some studies (Achoui, 2003; Al-Khawaja, 1999; Hatab & Makki, 1978). Parenting styles may be related to children’s development in different ways based on differences in socialization goals of different cultures. In recent years, however, there have been noticeable variations and inconsistencies in the results regarding the perceived parenting styles in Arab societies and the influence of these styles on children. Moving towards rapid modernization in Arab countries has changed Arabs’ parental practices and parenting styles of childrearing from being authoritarian and strict to more democratic and responsive (Al Rub, 2013; Dwairy et al., 2006). Because the results of previous studies are contradictory and societal changes have influenced parenting styles, future longitudinal and cross-cultural research is needed to better understand parenting styles across different cultures and contexts worldwide. Overall, the aforementioned results indicate that inconsistencies in parenting styles matter even within each culture across different demographic variables. Therefore, further examination of the differences in perceived parenting styles due to various demographic variables is needed. Also, all of the studies in Oman reviewed in the current chapter used middle school student samples or older. There is a need for studies that examine parenting styles as perceived by younger children, although such studies are challenged by lacking suitable measures that can be completed by young children.

Conclusions Cumulative research supports the importance of parenting styles in shaping children’s characteristics and outcomes. Studies suggest the need for parents to value the importance of adapting their parenting styles to be more authoritative and less authoritarian and permissive. Generally speaking, the results of ten years of studies in Oman regarding the association of perceived parenting styles with children’s social, academic, and psychological characteristics provide parents with accurate empirical evidence of the parenting styles they should use to enhance their children’s development and success. Because other Gulf countries share many similarities with Oman, the results reviewed in this book might also generalize to parenting and child development in other GCC countries.

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Achoui, M. (2003). Taa’dib al atfal fi al wasat al a’ai’li: Waqea’ wa ittijahat [Children disciplining within the family context: Reality and attitudes]. Al tofoolah A Arabiah, 16(4), 9–38. Ahmad, I., Smetana, J., & Klimstra, T. (2015). Maternal monitoring, adolescent disclosure, and adolescent adjustment among Palestinian refugee youth in Jordan. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 25(3), 403–411. Al Alawi, K., & Aldhafri, S. (in press). The relationship between parenting styles and emotional intelligence among seventh and twelfth grade students in the Sultanate of Oman. Al-Qanatir: International Journal of Islamic Studies. Aldhafri, S. (2011). Self-efficacy and physical self-concept as mediators of parenting influence on adolescents’ adjustment and wellbeing. Journal of Psychology in Africa, 21(4), 511–520. Aldhafri, S. (2014). The parenting styles in the Omani families: Your children, how to raise them? Muscat: Alnahdhah Press. Aldhafri, S. (2016). The relationship between students’ perceptions of parenting styles and their university life adjustment. Journal of Educational and Psychological Studies, 10(4), 687–696. Aldhafri, S. (2017, November). Variations within family members’ perceptions of parenting styles: How coherent shall we be? Paper presented at the 7th International Conference, Kuwait. Aldhafri, S., & Al-Harthy, I. (2016). Undergraduate Omani students’ identity and perceptions of parenting styles. Review of European Studies, 8(2), 114–123. Aldhafri, S., & Al Odeh, A. (in press). The relationship between achievement goals orientations and parenting styles for school students of the second cycle in the Sultanate of Oman. Journal of Educational Sciences (Egypt). Aldhafri, S., Kazem, A., Alzubiadi, A., Yousif, Y., Al-Bahrani, M., & Alkharusi, H. (2011). Parenting styles as perceived by Omani children (classes 7 to 12) and their relationships with some demographic variables. International Journal of Research in Education, 29, 1–26. Al-Ghadani, N. (2004). Parenting styles as perceived by children and their relation to emotional intelligence among students with verbal disabilities in Muscat Governorate (unpublished Master Thesis). University of Nizwa, Muscat. Al Hattami, A. (2017). Predicting contemplative thinking through parenting styles and problemsolving skills among students with visual disabilities and sighted students in Muscat Governorate, Sultanate of Oman (unpublished Master Thesis). Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat. Aljahwari, M., & Aldhafri, S. (2020). The prediction of coping styles through parenting styles among school students in Oman. Journal of Educational Science, 32(1), 117–140. Alkharusi, H., Aldhafri, S., Kazem, A., Alzubiadi, A., & Al-Bahrani, M. (2011). Development and validation of a short version of the Parental Authority Questionnaire. Social Behavior and Personality, 39(9), 1193–1208. Al-Khawaja, M. (1999). Alshabab al A’rabi [Arab youth]. In K. Zakareya (Ed.), Derasat fi almojtamaa’ al A’rabi almoa’aser [Studies in the contemporary Arab society] (pp. 255–304). Damascus, Syria: Al Ahali Publications. Al Nabhani, H., & Aldhafri, S. (sent for publication). Parenting styles and mental health among 12th grade students in Sultanate of Oman. Al Rawahi, A., & Aldhafri, S. (sent for publication). The impact of parental involvement and marital adjustment on Omani grade 12 students’ academic achievement: The mediating role of academic self-efficacy beliefs.

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Gonzalez, A., Holbein, M., & Quilter, S. (2002). High school students’ goal orientations and their relationship to perceived parenting styles. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 27, 450–470. Gracia, E., & Herrero, J. (2008). Beliefs in the necessity of corporal punishment of children and public perceptions of child physical abuse as a social problem. Child Abuse & Neglect, 32(11), 1058–1062. Hatab, Z., & Makki, A. (1978). Al-solta el-abawia wal-shabab [Parental authority and the youth]. Beirut, Lebanon: Ma’had El-Inmaa’ El-Arabi. Herz, L., & Gullone, E. (1999). The relationship between self-esteem and parenting style: A cross-cultural comparison of Australian and Vietnamese Australian adolescents. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 30(6), 742–761. Hoskins, D. (2014). Consequences of parenting on adolescent outcomes. Societies, 4(3), 506–531. Jaradat, A. (2012). Socio-demographic factors predicting perceived parenting styles: Implications for counsellors. The Arab Journal of Psychiatry, 44(262), 1–12. Jones-Sanpei, H., Day, R., & Holmes, E. (2009). Core family process measures in the NLSY97: Variation by gender, race, income, and family structure. Marriage & Family Review, 45(2–3), 140–167. Kaisa, A., Hakan, S., & Jari-erik, N. (2000). Parenting styles and adolescents’ achievement strategies. Journal of Adolescence, 23(2), 205–222. Kaufmann, D., Gesten, E., Santa-Lucia, R. C., Salcedo, O., Gobioff-Rendina, G., & Gadd, R. (2000). The relationship between parenting style and children’s adjustment: The parents’ perspective. Journal of Child and Family Studies, 9(2), 231–245. Keller, H., & Otto, H. (2009). The cultural socialization of emotion regulation during infancy. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40(6), 996–1011. Kochanska, G., Aksan, N., & Koenig, A. (1995). A longitudinal study of the roots of preschoolers’ conscience: Committed compliance and emerging internalization. Child Development, 66(6), 1752–1769. Kritzas, N., & Grobler, A. (2005). The relationship between perceived parenting styles and resilience during adolescence. Journal of Child and Adolescent Mental Health, 17(1), 1–12. Lamborn, S., Mounts, N., Steinberg, L., & Dornbusch, S. (1991). Patterns of competence and adjustment among adolescents from authoritative, authoritarian, indulgent, and neglectful families. Child Development, 62(5), 1049–1065. Lytton, H., & Romney, D. (1991). Parents’ differential socialization of boys and girls: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 109(2), 267–296. Martínez, I., & García, J. (2007). Impact of parenting styles on adolescents’ self- esteem and internalization of values in Spain. The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 10(2), 338–348. Mayuri, K., Divya, V., & Kiran, K. (2015). Parenting styles as perceived by parents and children. International Journal of Science and Research, 6, 978–982. McKinney, C., & Renk, K. (2008). Differential parenting between mothers and fathers: Implications for late adolescents. Journal of Family Issues, 29(6), 806–827. McLeod, B., Wood, J., & Weisz, J. (2007). Examining the association between parenting and childhood anxiety: A meta-analysis. Clinical Psychology Review, 27(2), 155–172. Mellon, R., & Moutavelis, A. (2011). Parental educational practices in relation to children’s anxiety disorder-related behavior. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 25, 829–834.

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5 PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION IN THE GULF REGION Suha Al-Hassan

Introduction A growing body of literature worldwide shows the impact of parental involvement in their children’s education on academic performance and school success. Research is increasingly showing that parental involvement in their children’s lives has a positive impact on children’s development in many different ways, such as better behaviour and less aggression, more advanced social skills in interactions with peers, better mental health, and higher self-esteem, in addition to the undeniable impact on education and academic achievement, which is the focus of this chapter (Hornby & Lafaele, 2011; Pomerantz & Moorman, 2007). GCC countries are committed to improving their education systems, and currently most GCC countries are going through major educational reforms. This chapter explores education systems in the Gulf region in terms of current performance and how parental involvement in children’s education is related to school performance. The chapter reviews findings from empirical studies in the GCC related to parental involvement in education and discusses successes, challenges, and opportunities. The chapter first discusses parental involvement in education in light of international literature, including key findings from research globally. Next, a review is provided of the education systems in Gulf countries. Following that, background information about parental involvement in education in the Gulf countries is reviewed and discussed with reference to empirical studies and literature reviews from GCC countries. The chapter then discusses implications for policy and practice in the GCC followed by limitations, directions for future research, and conclusions that address family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region.

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Background on Parental Involvement in Education in the International Literature Home-school effective and successful partnerships are the responsibility of both schools and parents. Hence, schools should always look for effective ways to engage parents and provide the necessary support and means to help parents make their children’s learning successful. Parents’ involvement should go beyond providing financial and material support to their children, such as paying for their education or securing school supplies; what matters the most is parents’ presence, attitude, and being part of their children’s learning. Parental involvement in their children’s education can be defined in several ways. Abdullah et al. (2011) defined parental involvement in education in terms of the activities happening between parents and children or between parents and teachers at school that may impact children’s educational outcomes and development. Fishel and Ramirez (2005) defined parental involvement in more general terms and referred to it as parents’ participation in their children’s education with the purpose of promoting their academic and social success. The United States No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 defined parental involvement as regular participation of parents in a two-way process that includes meaningful communication involving students’ school activities and academic learning that can encompass helping children learn both at home and at school and being involved in decisions related to education. Due to the wide range of behaviours and practices that might come under parental involvement, in many empirical studies researchers preferred to use a broader and multidimensional type of definition, which I adopt in my chapter, which is similar to the Fishel and Ramirez (2005) definition mentioned above (Domina, 2005; Epstein, 1995; Fan, 2001; Grolnick & Slowiaczek, 1994). Researchers agree that four fundamental dimensions constitute school climate: safety, interpersonal relationships, teaching and learning support, and student sense of belonging. All four dimensions of school climate can be affected by parental involvement in their children’s education, and parents’ partnerships with schools have a profound effect on students’ success. For example, in a study conducted in the United States, the researchers examined whether greater parental involvement in terms of having high aspirations for their children’s education and contact with the school regarding benign issues predicted 10th graders’ higher self-efficacy and intrinsic motivation in math and English (Fan & Williams, 2010). Parents’ contact with the school regarding students’ problems was related to students’ lower motivation in school. By contrast, parents who imposed rules related to watching television had children who were more engaged in and had higher intrinsic motivation in math and English. Several studies have revealed that the more schools are successful in getting parents involved, students’ academic performance improves and serious behavioural issues and bullying at school are prevented and minimized (Faour, 2012). Despite

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these clear benefits of parental involvement, a report that was published by the OECD (the Paris-based Intergovernmental Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which administers the Program for International Student Assessment [PISA]) shows that the majority of parents who were interviewed for the latest PISA, which was held in 2015 in 18 countries around the world, do not interact with the school and are not involved in school activities. Parents can be engaged in children’s education in many different and meaningful ways, such as being involved in the daily activities of their children at home (e.g., reading, drawing, checking homework and progress in school) and outside the home (e.g., taking them on outings to museums and other educational venues). Another form of involvement is to participate actively in school activities and routines (e.g., being in touch with teachers about children’s academic progress and general behaviour, volunteering with extracurricular school activities, helping with school events). Parents can push schools to reach for high performance and influence school policies both formally (being a member of school parents’ councils) and informally (continuous communication with the school and active involvement in school events). Most countries make available to parents a range of opportunities for participating in schools and policy making (serving in school governing boards is required in some countries) as well as regulations and mechanisms for voicing their concerns in case of a decline in the quality of education their children receive. For example, there may be a formal process in place for filing complaints, such as an ombudsman or a designated agency for complaints and grievances. With the increase in understanding of the importance of parent-teacher partnerships and how these partnerships can be instrumental in helping students with their academic achievement and having a successful schooling experience, school leaders in many countries have taken serious measures to increase parental involvement in school life (Epstein, 2001). Parental involvement both supports children’s learning and activates the accountability of education systems. School leaders have to work actively to research the barriers that prevent parents from being actively involved in their children’s education and in school life, and then do whatever they can to remove the identified barriers to parents’ involvement (Raikes & Love, 2002). Barriers to parental involvement reported in the literature include conflict with parents’ work schedule, parents’ inability to get to schools due to transportation-related issues especially in countries where public transportation is not readily available, and child care needs. Cultural and language barriers can also prevent parental involvement, especially when parents and teachers do not speak the same language as is often the case in countries where the population is diverse either due to immigration of families from other countries or the temporary residence of families following work opportunities. Other barriers might be related to a lack of familiarity with the institution and a lack of information about opportunities for parental involvement (Hornby, 2011; Hornby

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& Lafaele, 2011). The extent of involvement may also differ between parents depending on their socioeconomic background, which may, therefore, increase inequities in education. As Epstein (1992) stressed, schools should take the lead and be responsible for responding to the needs and demands of parents by providing opportunities for parents’ involvement. Schools should keep in mind that parents usually look for  specific occasions, levels, and forms of involvement. Epstein (1992) and Epstein and Lee (1995) developed a well-known framework using six levels of parental involvement: 1 2 3 4 5 6

Parenting: Improve parenting skills to help establish supportive learning environments. Communicating: Open two-way communication channels between schools and parents. Volunteering: Organize events that encourage families to volunteer in providing support for schools and students. Learning at home: Keep families informed of ways they can help their children with school-related work. Decision-making: Consider parents’ opinions in decision-making. Collaborating with community: Enrich students’ learning through integrating community in different school events.

Parental involvement has been linked to a wide range of child outcomes in a number of countries. For example, a cross-sectional survey of 2,669 6th grade students in rural eastern Uganda found that children had better numeracy and literacy scores when their parents were more involved in the parenting and communication aspects of Epstein’s parental involvement framework, controlling for a number of individual, school, and household variables (Mahuro & Hungi, 2016).

Background on Parental Involvement in Education in the GCC The economies of the Gulf countries have witnessed rapid growth and developed from an agricultural economy based on pearl diving in most cases to a knowledge economy funded by oil revenues. This swift growth over a few decades has led the countries to import foreign labour, which resulted in social changes that affected the local societies in many ways, including with respect to education. Education is recognized across the GCC as a strategic priority to ensure better future prospects, similar to many other countries globally. GCC governments have set ambitious goals to achieve advance ranks of the education systems compared to the rest of the world. International large-scale assessments (ILSAs) play an important role in educational developments. The GCC countries have shown commitment to

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measuring progress against international standards by gathering and sharing data alongside the global education community to be used to inform future development. Years ago the GCC decided to participate in ILSAs such as the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), and Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) that focus on students’ achievement in reading, mathematics, and science, but the GCCs are currently considering other outcome measures as well. These studies gather a rich array of data on students, schools, and the home environment. According to the 2015 results of ILSAs (NFER Education Briefings, 2018), students in Bahrain and the UAE scored highest among the GCC countries in Grade 4. In Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, students scored better in reading than in math and science, but in the other GCC countries, performance in different subjects was more consistent. The international average score on these tests is 500, with two-thirds of students scoring between 400 and 600 on the PIRLS and TIMSS internationally. Looking at the results of GCC countries in comparison to the international average we find that the average scores for Grade 4 mathematics ranged from 353 in Kuwait to 452 in UAE, average scores for Grade 4 science ranged from 337 in Kuwait to 459 in Bahrain, and average scores for Grade 4 reading ranged from 393 in Kuwait to 450 in UAE. Although there is a long way to go for most GCC countries, they are showing improvement in their scores over the years (NFER Education Briefings, 2018). In the past three decades, Gulf countries have made remarkable progress in the field of education, but this progress has been most notable in quantitative aspects, such as number of schools (public and private) and school enrolment, largely due to the rapid and vast economic growth in these countries. Nevertheless, Gulf countries are aware of the need to improve the education sector and have already started a massive education reform. The reform has focused on changing the education process and policies, to improve the quality of education and keep it aligned with the changes that the Gulf countries are witnessing in the social, economic, and infrastructure aspects of their modern societies. Following is a brief description of the educational reform in each GCC country. In UAE, the importance of advancing education and bringing it to the front of strategic development plans (UAE Vision 2021, the Abu Dhabi Vision 2030, and the Dubai Strategic Vision) has been long recognized. In 2006, UAE started a massive educational reform effort with the main goal of creating a diverse and competitive economy based on improving the quality of educational outputs. The educational reform efforts are directed to respond to a variety of challenges, such as diversifying the student population, strengthening schools and curricula, improving the quality of the school environment, creating effective approaches to development, evaluating and assessing progress, improving educational guidance for students, and achieving greater family involvement in the education process (ECSSR, 2011).

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In Qatar, the government was keen to respond to the educational challenges. More than a decade ago, Qatar started a systematic reform designed to transform Qatar’s schools and Ministry of Education into a world-class competitive education system, known as Education for a New Era (EFNE) (Brewer et al., 2007). The reform focused on different aspects of the K-12 system, aiming at increasing school independence, improving curriculum and student assessments, and supporting teachers’ and school leaders’ standards and licencing. The reform introduced a new school system that is based on decentralizing authority while increasing autonomy, accountability, and other schooling aspects within the system. Parents can choose from a variety of proposed programmes when enrolling their children, informed by schools’ performance communicated through school report cards. These measures aimed at increasing parental involvement right from the beginning (Brewer et al., 2007). In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the government sought to reform their educational system to address perceived weaknesses in their global standing. As a result, the King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Project for Public Education Development, called the Tatweer Project (meaning development), was established in 2007 to reform the Saudi educational system. The project focuses on school development, recognizing that efforts at reform and improvement are often best implemented at the level of schools. School self-evaluations are part of the reform. The reforms emphasize professional learning and development and self-planning and evaluation. The principles guiding the reform are stated as follows: Excellence for all, Commitment from everyone, Accountability of all, Professionalism from everyone, Transparency and clarity by everyone (Alyami, 2014). In Oman, the education system has witnessed reform efforts during the past few decades. Since 2010, Oman has implemented substantive initiatives aiming at improving teaching practices, including the creation of teaching forums and teaching collaboratives. In addition and gradually, schools were given the autonomy to manage their own initiatives and professional development programmes, and this included the development of curriculum, collaborative initiatives, and training programmes. Most public schools are in line with national and strategic initiatives, stressing self-sufficiency initiatives with a general aim to build capacity of Omani teachers and effective teacher professional development programmes. A broad aspect of this project was to support schools to share expertise with each other and initiate collaborative communities between and within schools and to encourage parents’ involvement in the education process (Al-Jardani, 2012; Nasser, 2019). In Kuwait, continuous educational reform policies included the launching of a five-year technical cooperation agreement among the Kuwait Ministry of Education, the National Center for Education Development (NCED), and the World Bank in 2015. The program supports capacity building of teachers and school leaders, improves the quality of teaching and learning, and monitors the

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systemic improvement of education on schools and students. Furthermore, the recent education reform in Kuwait aims to build the capacity of the Ministry of Education and the NCED in policy, decision-making, and implementation of integrated reforms, some directed towards educational expansion and others towards quality development (Alkhoja, Halabi, Abdullah, & Al-Shamali, 2014; Alsaleh, 2019). Since 2005 in the Kingdom of Bahrain, education has experienced major reform initiatives as part of the National Education Reform Project in order to be aligned with and to help achieve the goals of Bahrain’s Economic Vision 2030. As a result, the Education and Training Quality Authority (BQA) was created as an independent entity that is responsible for ensuring quality in education and training in Bahrain. The Bahraini government has established the Directorate of Government Schools Review which comes under the umbrella of BQA and is responsible for conducting quality reviews for all Bahraini government schools (Albaker, 2017). Gulf countries are working hard to change their educational approaches and shifting their focus from literary arts to applied sciences. All Gulf countries are now keen more than ever to follow and employ global best practices, particularly in the education field to improve the quality of life of their own citizens and expatriates. Therefore, Gulf countries are open to learning from best practices and successful educational systems in other countries, such as Singapore and Finland. In addition, Gulf countries are recognizing the need to look for ways to sustain economic development and know that education is the tool to do so (Al Asoomi, 2010). To keep up with rapid economic growth, education systems in the Gulf countries are developing in a way that promotes the growth of non-oil economic sectors. The investments now in Gulf countries are more directed to renewable energy, transport infrastructure and logistics, manufacturing industries, and telecommunications (Al Asoomi, 2010). The current and more modern education systems in Gulf countries are not a form of westernization. By contrast, the reforms stress the importance of national identity, citizenship, preserving traditions, and allowing the nationals to be qualified to serve their societies. In addition, the current educational policies in Gulf countries stress the importance of teaching young generations in a way that encourages openness and tolerance. The education sector in the GCC continues to be the priority of all governments despite the economic challenges. In the last few years, authorities in the Gulf region have adopted several initiatives, such as putting policies in place to encourage and facilitate the private sector to be a strong partner in the education industry. The private sector increased its investments and became a strong partner to the public sector in the region as a result of demographic changes (e.g., around 40% of the population is under the age of 25), the increase in the expatriate population, and the higher GDP per capita which increased the demand for K-12 private education across the region. Nevertheless, the education

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sector continues to face some challenges related to the increase of competition, high operating costs, and students preferring to study abroad after finishing school. The GCC governments are trying to deal with these challenges by supporting initiatives such as establishing entities to regulate education processes and improving professional development programmes for teachers. Ministries of Education in Gulf countries have focused on improving the education standards in public schools. The objective of policy makers is to have students who are proficient in English as well as in Arabic, proud and committed to their identity and heritage, and qualified to pursue their higher education in the top institutions around the world to contribute to the advancement of their country. This reform initiative has led policy makers to partner with the west for better solutions and outcomes (Phillips & Ochs, 2003). However, sometimes a practice that was originally designed for the west is borrowed without taking into consideration the uniqueness of the Gulf context, potentially reducing the benefits of the practice (Harold, 2005). GCC governments very much value education and consider it the core tool for human development. Most Gulf countries have embraced the “World Declaration of Education for All” and have been steadily working towards achieving its goals (Baker & Hourani, 2014; United Nations, 2000). Gulf countries are working hard towards reaching sustainable human development to keep up with the changing world and know that improving the quality of education is the key. Education reform cannot be accomplished without engaging parents as key stakeholders.

Empirical Findings Regarding Parental Involvement in Education in the GCC Despite the recognized value of parental involvement in relation to children’s academic achievement and the importance of studying the impact of parents’ involvement in the education of their children, there is only limited literature in non-Western countries in general and in Gulf countries in particular. Understanding the relations between family involvement and school success in the Gulf region represents a pressing and critical dimension to reforming educational policies and practices in these fast growing societies. The literature reviewed in Gulf countries examined parental involvement in their children’s education in several different ways, such as attitudes towards family involvement and the influence it has on children’s academic achievement, parental involvement in high school and higher education, parental involvement for children with special needs, and factors hindering parents’ participation. The literature reviewed showed that parents in the Gulf region view homeschool partnerships as important to students’ school success, and several studies revealed a long tradition with open communication between schools and families, especially at the primary school level, on issues related to students’

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behaviour, academic improvement, and more. The literature also stressed the importance of having healthy partnerships between schools and homes, where parents visit schools frequently to be more involved in school activities rather than visiting school just when problems arise (Al-Mahrooqi, Denman, & AlMaamari, 2016). Several studies documented that parents are increasingly coming to school to show their support and appreciation (e.g., Al-Barwani, Albeely, & Al-Suleimani, 2012). Other studies conducted in Oman showed that parents believe more in the importance of their participation in their children’s education by doing at-home activities, such as helping with homework and discussing school-related matters (Al-Harrasi & Al-Mahrooqi, 2014). Several studies also showed that parents in various Gulf countries believed that schools have polices in place to encourage parental involvement. When it comes to children with special needs and parents’ involvement, studies in some Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) revealed that parents understand that for children to achieve the best results in education and be successful in school, parents should play an active role in their children’s education, especially when children have special needs where they require more care and attention (Alnaim, 2018; Al-Shammari & Thomas, 2008). However, teachers believed that parents who have children with special needs do not engage sufficiently in their children’s education. The challenge, as can be seen by teachers, is that in many cases, parents are not qualified or trained to deliver the type of support needed. Al-Shammari and Thomas (2008) suggested that there is a need to develop specific strategies to encourage more parental involvement in special education programmes. The study concluded that parents can play an important role in supporting their children’s education by being actively involved as their involvement would positively impact students’ school progress. Parents of special needs children can be involved in classroom and school activities in many different ways. Parents’ involvement in the education of preschool and kindergarten children has also been examined in a few studies in Kuwait (Almazeedi, 2009), Oman (Al-Qaryouti & Kilani, 2013), and Qatar (Ihmeideh, AlFlasi, AlMaadadi, Coughlin, & Al-Thani, 2018). The findings revealed that parents of kindergarten children were involved in home-based activities more than school-based activities. In addition, as children progress through kindergarten, parents tended to express greater interest in participating in the development of their emergent literacy skills. Child grade level, family size, and the parent’s gender, level of education, and employment were each found to have a significant influence on certain types of parental involvement. One of the studies found that school staff were more positive about parent-school relationships than were parents (Ihmeideh et al., 2018). Of the six types of parental involvement described in Epstein’s (1992) model, parents’ involvement in learning at home was the most common and decision-making was the least common.

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Other studies looked at parents’ attitudes towards being involved in higher education in Oman (Al-Barwani et al., 2012) and in UAE (Daleure, Albon, Hinkston, Ajaif, & McKeown, 2013), where the findings revealed that parents believed in the importance of continuing to be involved. However, the findings revealed that in higher education the involvement would take different forms, such as financial and moral support, monitoring academic progress, helping solve academic and social problems, and sometimes extending to help with selecting majors and courses to study. The use of the English language as a medium of instruction is growing among all Gulf countries, and some studies, conducted in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, looked at parental involvement in their children’s education that is specifically related to English language learning (Al-Mahrooqi et al., 2016; Mahmoud, 2018). The findings identified English language as a barrier to involvement where English is the language of instruction and, as a result, indicated a limited level of involvement of parents in their children’s English language studies depending, in most cases, on parents’ level of education, difficulty of the curriculum, and type of school their children are enrolled in. Studies advised that schools could put systems in place to actively encourage parents’ participation in English language classes in particular as this is considered to be a barrier to parents’ involvement in their children’s education. Parents are not always aware of the importance of their active participation in their children’s education and may not be motivated to play a more active role. A study conducted in Bahrain concluded that parents’ councils should be activated by keeping ongoing discussions with teachers throughout the school year and that parents and teachers should jointly develop methods to achieve competencies that are in line with students’ abilities (Albaker, 2017). Parents can be encouraged to visit schools to attend training seminars and workshops on how to support their children’s education. In recognizing the importance and positive effects of parental involvement on children’s education and school success, some GCC government bodies have required parental involvement in all aspects of children’s education and created mandates for establishing a policy of parent involvement. For example, the Ministry of Education in the UAE required all government schools to have a Parent Involvement Policy that articulates different strategies to encourage parental involvement. It is required that this Policy be communicated to both staff and parents, and according to this policy, parents are encouraged and supported to engage in their children’s education at the school. At the same time, all private schools are required to improve their practices in the areas of parental involvement. To measure the impact of this practice, a wider study conducted in UAE by the Department of Education and Knowledge found that schools have adhered to the requirements and drafted parental involvement policies. The schools articulated the strategies in place to encourage parental involvement, but parents believed that these strategies were not fully implemented.

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Moreover, parents do not necessarily engage in volunteer work; in private schools only 28% of parents supported classroom activities, compared to 54% in government schools (ADEK, 2014). The literature shows clearly that parents’ involvement in GCC countries is improving, but there is a discrepancy between the attitudes of parents and families towards parents’ involvement in their children’s education and actual practices. The findings of several studies conducted on parents involvement concluded that many parents in the GCC perceive their participation and involvement in their children’s academic life as important and vital in order for the children to be successful at school, but parents’ actual participation and involvement are still limited and need to be addressed collaboratively by all stakeholders in each of the GCC countries (Lancaster, 2017; Mahmoud, 2018; Romanowski, Ellili-Cherif, Al Ammari, & Al Attiyah, 2013). The literature has documented a number of barriers to parental involvement in the education of their children in the Gulf region, many of which are similar to barriers mentioned in other geographic regions. Both teachers and parents acknowledged many of these barriers, such as lack of communication between school and parents and parents feeling that they are not valued partners and that they are not welcomed at the school. In addition, many parents do not know how they can contribute or even be partners with the school, and face other barriers related to parents’ lack of time and conflicts with school schedules (Almazeedi, 2009; Al Sumaiti, 2012). Other barriers to parents’ involvement include parents’ lack of understanding the educational system and how to care for children, especially when children have special needs. Sometimes language differences, not being able to communicate in English, having a limited literacy level, rapid cultural changes, and transportation issues pose additional barriers. Barriers that are related more to the teachers’ side include lack of teacher training on how to communicate effectively with parents and to form partnerships with them, in addition to failing to make parents feel as valued as they should be (Al-Harrasi & Al-Mahrooqi, 2014, Al-Mahrooqi et al., 2016; Alnaim, 2018; Mahmoud, 2018). In a study of reasons teachers gave for low parental involvement, teachers suggested parents’ lack of education, lack of concern about their child because their child will be easily hired by the government for any job and parents know that they will not be fired, being too busy, that many students have private tutors and parents are in communication with the tutors, and that it is often the maid who is involved in the children’s lives (Romanowski et al., 2013). The findings also revealed that not all parents can provide the needed academic support or help at home as they may not have enough skills to do so. Parents also are not always aware of new teaching approaches or methods, which might result in supporting their children in the wrong ways, creating a pressing need for more cooperation and coordination between parents and teachers.

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The barriers to parental involvement that were found in the Gulf literature are consistent with barriers identified in the international literature. Among the barriers identified in both the GCC and other countries include conflicts with parents’ work schedule, language barriers when parents and teachers do not speak the same language, a lack of familiarity with ways to help children academically, and a lack of information about opportunities for parental involvement or how parents can help.

Implications for Policy and Practice in the GCC Based on the review of literature presented in this chapter, it can be concluded that parents’ involvement in education can play a key role in students’ academic and social success in schools. All six GCC countries are keen on developing their nations and clearly understand that education reform should be a priority, as it has been for the last years, to achieve each country’s goals in advancing their economies to rely on human capital in the future generation as opposed to relying only on natural resources. Although most GCC countries have some sort of policies or initiatives to encourage parents’ involvement, parents’ participation in the education of their children still needs more work. It is encouraging that parents in the GCC see their involvement in their children’s education as important and having a positive impact. Therefore, there is a need to facilitate realistic roles and responsibilities for parent involvement that reflect mutually receptive practices within a policy framework, with the support of the education system, and informed by international and locally based research. It is also imperative to activate parents’ councils by keeping ongoing discussions between parents, teachers, and school personnel throughout the school year. In addition, parents and teachers should jointly develop methods to achieve competencies that are in line with students’ abilities. Moreover, governments in each GCC country should mandate school policies that reflect and reinforce cultural norms and expectations surrounding involvement of mothers and fathers. All concerned government bodies in each Gulf country should have in place a school evaluation system that takes into consideration how schools encourage parental involvement in more and less effective ways. Schools should receive good ratings when they demonstrate successful initiatives related to communication and involvement with parents, as occurs already in some GCC countries, such as the inspection system that is applied in UAE public and private schools. Sometimes schools’ strategies to improve communication and parental involvement have met with limited success, which can be due to parents not completely understanding their role as partners in their children’s education and focusing more on day-to-day activities and support. Therefore, current parent-school communication efforts in GCC schools should be reformed to bring more attention to parents’ involvement and provide support to parents

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to encourage and help them to be more involved with the school and ultimately with their children’s education. For example, parents and teachers could utilize different media channels to communicate progress, achievement, and behaviour-related issues. To promote parents’ involvement in the education of their children in Gulf countries and overcome the barriers to their participation, the following recommendations are suggested: 1

2

3

4

Communicate to parents the benefits and value of their participation and involvement in their children’s education, which will impact children’s academic achievement and successful school experience. This can be done by holding face-to-face meetings with parents, using media channels including social media, newsletters, and so on. Schools should be mandated to adopt different strategies to increase the level and quality of parent involvement and provide the needed resources and support to parents, such as providing training to parents in areas needed, especially for parents who have children with special needs. Activate parents’ councils and involve parents in the decision-making process and the strategic planning of the school and education policies where they would feel that their presence is important. Schools should be mandated to always find ways to communicate with parents in their mother tongue and never make language challenging to parents.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research This literature review highlights the important role that parent involvement plays in students’ academic success. This review was challenging as the literature in the Gulf countries that examines this issue is limited, and when available generally deals with attitudes and perceptions surrounding parental involvement rather than actual behaviour. Future research is needed to measure the impact of different forms of parental involvement on students’ academic and social success in the GCC. Studies that measure parent involvement and student outcomes in similar ways in the six Gulf countries will facilitate comparisons among them. Research institutions in Gulf countries are encouraged to study parental involvement and generate ways to bridge the gap between research findings, on the one hand, and policy and practice, on the other.

Conclusion This chapter discussed parental involvement in education in the Gulf countries, which have made remarkable progress in their education systems in

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recent decades. Parental involvement is not yet fulfilling its full potential, leaving room in educational reforms for instituting policies to make parents and schools real partners. Gulf countries have the means and power to have the best education systems in the world. To do that, Gulf countries need to work harder on improving the educational systems in their own countries and make the best use of the resources they have to guarantee a generation of welleducated citizens who can carry on building nations reliant on human capital. Some Gulf countries already have started this process and others should be on their way. The literature has discussed and examined a wide range of factors that are associated with enhancing school experience in general and improving children’s academic outcomes in particular. In addition to good quality teaching, qualified teachers, availability of resources, community support, and other factors, such as parents’ education and socioeconomic status, among the most influential factors is parental involvement.

References Abdullah, A. G. K., Seedee, R., Alzaidiyeen, N. J., Al-Shabatat, A., Alzeydeen, H. K., & Al- Awabdeh, A. H. (2011). An investigation of teachers’ attitudes towards parental involvement. Educational Research, 2(8), 1402–1408. ADEK. (2014). Parental engagement in schools in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. Abu Dhabi: Abu Dhabi Education Council. Al Asoomi, M. (2010). Education for development. Gulf News. Retrieved from https:// gulfnews.com/business/analysis/education-for-development-1.651505 Albaker, K. (2017). Analytical view of Bahrain’s government schools’ performance: A quality perspective. SAGE Open. doi:10.1177/2158244017736555 Al-Barwani, T., Albeely, T., & Al-Suleimani, H. (2012). Parental involvement in higher education in Oman. Malaysian Journal of Education, 37(1), 13–24. Al-Harrasi, S., & Al-Mahrooqi, R. (2014). Investigating Omani parents’ involvement in their children’s schooling. European Journal of Scientific Research, 117, 272–286. Al-Jardani, K. (2012). A study of educational reform and teacher training in Oman. International Journal of Applied Linguistics and English Literature, 1(1), 64–69. Alkhoja, G., Halabi, S., Abdullah, M., & Al-Shamali, F. (2014). Kuwait education program achievement report: School education quality improvement program. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Al-Mahrooqi, R., Denman, C., & Al-Maamari, F. (2016). Omani parents’ involvement in their children’s English education. SAGE Open. doi:10.1177/2158244016629190 Almazeedi, H. (2009). An investigation of the perceptions of parents, teachers and principals concerning parental involvement in kindergartens and primary schools in Kuwait. Order No. U520942, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne (United Kingdom), 20. Alnaim, M. (2018). Special education teachers’ perceptions about parent involvement in the education of their elementary school age children with learning disabilities in Saudi Arabia. Doctoral dissertation, Saint Louis University. Al-Qaryouti, I. A., & Kilani, H. A. (2013). Role of Omani parents: Fostering emergent literacy skills. Education 3–13, 43(3), 336–348.

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Alsaleh, A. (2019) Investigating instructional leadership in Kuwait’s educational reform context: School leaders’ perspectives. School Leadership and Management, 39(1), 96–120. Al-Shammari, Z., & Thomas D. Y. (2008). Extent of parental involvement in improving the students’ levels in special education programs in Kuwait. Journal of Instructional Psychology, 35(2), 140–150. Al Sumaiti, R. (2012). Parental involvement in the education of their children in Dubai. Dubai School of Government: Policy Brief, January, No. 30. Alyami, R. (2014). Educational reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Tatweer schools as a unit of development. Literacy Information and Computer Education Journal, 5(2), 1515–1524. Baker, F. S., & Hourani, R. B. (2014). The nature of parental involvement in the city of Abu Dhabi in a context of change. Education, Business and Society: Contemporary Middle Eastern Issues, 7(4), 186–200. Brewer, D. J., Augustine, C. H., Zellman, G. L., Ryan, G. W., Goldman, C. A., Stasz, C., & Constant, L. (2007). Education for a new era: Design and implementation of k-12 education reform in Qatar. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. Daleure, G., Albon, R., Hinkston, K., Ajaif, T., & McKeown, J. (2013). Home environment, family involvement, and Emirati college student academic achievement. Ras Al Khaimah, UAE: The Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research. Domina, T. (2005). Levelling the home advantage: Assessing the effectiveness of parental involvement in elementary school. Sociology of Education, 78(3), 233–249. ECSSR. (2011). Education in the UAE: Current status and future developments. Abu Dhabi, UAE: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Epstein, J. L. (1992). School and family partnerships. In M. Alkin (Ed.), Encyclopedia of educational research (6th ed., pp. 1139–1512). New York: MacMillan. Epstein, J. L. (1995). School/family/community partnerships: Caring for the children we share. Phi Delta Kappan, 76, 701–712. Epstein, J. (2001). School, family, and community partnerships: Preparing educators and improving schools. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Epstein, J. L., & Lee, S. (1995). National patterns of school and family connections in the middle grades. In B. Ryan, G. Adams, T. Gullotta, R. Weissberg, & R. Hampton (Eds.), The family-school connection: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 108–154). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Fan, X. (2001). Parental involvement and students’ academic achievement: A growth modelling analysis. Journal of Experimental Education, 70(1), 27–61. Fan, W., & Williams, C. (2010). The effects of parental involvement on students’ academic self-efficacy, involvement and intrinsic motivation. Educational Psychology, 30(1), 53–74. Faour, M. (2012). The Arab world’s education report card: School climate and citizenship skills. Washington, DC: The Carnegie Middle East Center. Fishel, M., & Ramirez, L. (2005). Evidence-based parent involvement interventions with school-aged children. School Psychology Quarterly, 20(4), 371–402. Grolnick, W. S., & Slowiaczek, M. L. (1994). Parents’ involvement in children’s schooling: A multidimensional conceptualization and motivational model. Child Development, 65(1), 237–252. Harold, B. (2005). Spreading the word: An analysis of the impact of Australasian educational ideas on a new nation state. Presented at Australian Association for Research in Education. Retrieved April, 14, 2019 from http://www.aare.edu.au/05pap/har05593.pdf

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Hornby, G. (2011). Parental involvement in childhood education: Building effective school-family partnerships. New York: Springer. Hornby, G., & Lafaele, R. (2011). Barriers to parental involvement in education: An explanatory model. Educational Review, 63(1), 37–52. Ihmeideh, F., AlFlasi, M., Al-Maadadi, F., Coughlin, C., & Al-Thani, T. (2018). Perspectives of family–School relationships in Qatar based on Epstein’s model of six types of parent involvement. Early Years. doi: 10.1080/09575146.2018.1438374 Lancaster, F. E. (2017). Emirati parents of gifted students: A study of role construction and involvement. Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California. Mahmoud, S. S. (2018). Saudi parents’ perceptions of the kind of help they offer to their primary school kids. English Language Teaching, 11(3), 102–112. Mahuro, G. M., & Hungi, N. (2016). Parental participation improves student academic achievement: A case of Iganga and Mayuge districts in Uganda. Cogent Education, 3(1), Article: 1264170. Nasser, R. (2019). Educational reform in Oman: System and structural changes. IntechOpen. doi:10.5772/intechopen.84913 NFER Education Briefings. (2018). Key insights from international large scale assessments in the Gulf. Retrieved from https://www.nfer.ac.uk/nfer-education-briefings-keyinsights-from-international-large-scale-assessments-in-the-gulf/ Phillips, D., & Ochs, K. (2003). Processes of policy borrowing in education: Some explanatory and analytical devices. Comparative Education, 39(4), 451–461. Pomerantz, E., & Moorman, E. (2007). The how, whom, and why of parental involvement in children’s academic lives: More is not always better. Review of Educational Research, 77(3), 373–410. Raikes, H. H., & Love, J. M. (2002). Early Head Start: A dynamic new program for infants and toddlers and their families. Infant Mental Health Journal, 23(1–2), 1–13. Romanowski, M., Ellili-Cherif, M., Al Ammari, B., & Al Attiyah, A. (2013). Qatar’s educational reform: The experiences and perceptions of principals, teachers and parents. International Journal of Education, 5(3), 108–135. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, World Education Forum. (2000). The education for all 2000 assessment: Country reports. (United Arab Emirates, Part III: Prospects). Retrieved from http://www.unesco.org/education/ wef/countryreports/ united_arab_emirates/rapport_3

6 THE ROLE OF FAMILIES IN SUPPORTING YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN QATAR Nader Kabbani and Nejla Ben Mimoune

Introduction Qatar has achieved remarkable strides in economic development over the past two decades. Revenues from oil and natural gas have helped Qatar improve educational outcomes, support business startups, increase labor force participation, and reduce unemployment rates to among the lowest in the world. Indeed, Qatar has consistently been able to successfully absorb the incoming cohorts of young Qataris into the labor market, including young women. This stands in sharp contrast to other countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, including its Gulf neighbors (Kabbani, 2019). Unemployment rates among Qatari youth stood at less than 1% in 2018 (Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, 2018a), as compared to 30% across the MENA region and 13% worldwide (Kabbani, 2019). Qatar does face economic challenges, including diversifying its economy away from reliance on oil and gas and creating a vibrant private sector that is able to drive long-term sustainable economic growth. Indeed, Qatar’s strong employment outcomes mask the fact that over 80% of Qatari nationals work in the public sector or for a public enterprise (Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, 2018b), and their wages are financed through oil and gas revenues. Qatar’s Vision 2030 and its two most recent National Development Strategies have emphasized the importance of economic diversification. Qatari families can support the economic diversification priorities of the state by preparing their youth to play a role in a more diversified future, by offering advice, affording access to networks, and providing support, including access to finance to start a business. This chapter examines the role of families in the transition of Qatari youth from school to work. It provides an overview of the literature and an analysis of

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available data. Based on these findings, the chapter distills policy recommendations on how to facilitate the family’s role in improving employment outcomes among Qatari youth in line with the country’s national development priorities. The chapter first reviews the literature from the MENA region and internationally on the role of families in the transition to work. The chapter next outlines the labor force situation of youth in the GCC and reviews the literature on the role of families in the GCC and Qatar. The chapter then outlines an analytical framework for conceptualizing the role of family in youth transitions and presents the empirical models used in the chapter and empirical findings from Qatar. Finally, the chapter outlines policy implications, reviews the limitations of the analysis, provides directions for future research, and concludes.

The Role of Families in Supporting Youth Employment in the International Literature Families in the MENA region have traditionally played an important role in helping their youth transition from school to work and family formation. Families support their youth through three main channels: offering advice, affording access to networks, and providing support, including financial support. Family support through any of these channels can influence a young person’s choice of career, the duration of their job search, and the kind of job they end up securing. Family support can also help young people establish and finance their own business. The way in which family support interacts with the decisions of young people is complex and can lead to both positive and negative outcomes. Families start shaping their children’s career path at an earlier age when advising them on educational tracks. After leaving school, access to family networks can help young job seekers secure more attractive offers, shorten job search spells, and mitigate information asymmetries that might discourage firms from hiring them. However, families can also inadvertently hinder youth transitions to work, by promoting career paths that are not in demand or by creating a mismatch between young people’s expectations and labor market realities. Furthermore, relying on family financial support can provide youth with a protective cushion that may encourage prolonged job search. The family’s role is especially strong in the context of female transitions. Despite the myriad of ways in which families influence and support young people’s transition to work, the literature from the MENA region is rather limited. Most of the research on the subject attempts to capture the cumulative effect of the family’s role by including parental educational attainment as a parameter when examining young people’s education or labor market outcomes. Some studies also include parents’ employment situation and occupation. Most of the research focuses on youth education, employment, and unemployment, although some studies delve deeper into job sector and quality.

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Also, much of the evidence comes from Egypt, which has the richest survey data for examining youth transitions. There is some literature on the influence of family factors on educational outcomes. El-Hamidi (2006) found that children with more educated parents in Egypt were more likely to choose general education leading to a university degree over vocational schooling. Hailat (2018) found that pre-school enrollment of children in Jordan increased as parental education levels increased. Salehi-Isfahani, Hassine, and Assaad (2014) found that family background was the main driver of inequality of educational opportunity across the region. Assaad, Salehi-Isfahani, and Hendy (2014) found that higher parental education was associated with higher educational attainment among children in a number of Arab countries, but with different patterns of influence. Jemmali (2019) showed that parental education and economic status in Tunisia significantly shaped children’s years of completed schooling. Krafft and Alawode (2018) argued that children of illiterate mothers in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia had the lowest probability of attaining higher education, whereas children of mothers with higher education were the most likely to attend a higher education institution. Across all three countries, they found that fathers’ education had a relatively small effect. In terms of the transition from school to work, El-Hamidi and Wahba (2005) investigated the factors shaping youth unemployment duration and their transition into the labor market during the 1990s economic reforms in Egypt and found that parental education did not influence the unemployment probability. Assaad, Binzel, and Gadallah (2010) found that parental education had a U-shaped effect on the school-to-work transition of young men with at least an upper secondary education in Egypt, which they explained as a tradeoff between the resources provided by parents to help their sons find a first job and their higher expectations for formal employment. Sons of unemployed, unpaid working, or self-employed fathers transitioned faster into employment; sons of fathers with regular non-government jobs had the longest transition, which suggested that a long transition is affordable only by households with regular incomes. Hendy (2015) examined the effect of parents’ education and work status in Egypt between 1998 and 2012 on subsequent employment decisions of 15-year olds. She found that parental education below secondary significantly raised the employment probability for all individuals compared with children of parents educated above secondary school. Having a working mother significantly increased female employability across time, whereas fathers’ work status had no significant effect. Sieverding (2015) examined how parental education and employment status affected the intergenerational dynamics of employment among Egyptian women. She found that daughters of mothers working in the public sector were 76% more likely to ever work than daughters of non-working mothers. The likelihood of becoming employed was even more significant if the mother was self-employed or a wageworker in the private sector.

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Assaad and Krafft (2016) investigated youth unemployment dynamics in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia using labor market panel surveys. Across all three countries, they found that although fathers’ education may predict who could afford to be unemployed, it had no significant impact on unemployment duration. Selwaness and Roushdy (2017) found that young Egyptians graduating between 2005 and 2010 who had a father with an above secondary education compared to a father with a below secondary level had a higher probability of transitioning to a first good job within 18 months conditional on ever transitioning. Limam and Ben Hafaiedh (2018) showed that higher parental education increased the individual’s earnings in Tunisia, especially if the parents had a university education. However, as the educational attainment of the individual increased, the parental education effect decreased. Research from other parts of the world provides a more in-depth and nuanced analysis of the role of families. Crockett and Bingham (2000), in a review of the literature, found that lower parental education was associated with lower educational aspirations as well as expectations of earlier transitions into work and marriage among youth. Magnuson and Berger (2009) found that, in the United States, family structure was related to the achievement and behavior trajectories of children. For instance, children of single mothers were more likely to have behavioral problems and lower educational achievement. DavisKean (2005) examined how parental educational attainment and income indirectly influenced children’s academic achievement through parental behavior and expectations. Yamamoto and Holloway (2010) confirmed that the parental expectation effect varies among different racial groups. Other researchers focused on the use of family networks and connections to secure a job. Holzer (1988) showed that applying directly for a job without referral and use of family and relatives’ connections were the most used job search methods among unemployed young Americans. Both methods were also found to be the most effective in producing job offers. Mau and Kopischke (2001) studied job search methods among 11,000 American college graduates. They found that, almost equally between men and women, 12% used family and friends’ network as the primary method to look for employment. Try (2005) found that 16% of young Norwegians used relatives and acquaintances as the main method to search for a job.

Background on Youth Transitions and the Role of Families in Qatar and the GCC Qatari citizens represented over 8% of the population in 2018 and their share in the labor force was just over 5% (Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, 2018b), since most foreign workers live and work in Qatar without their families. As a result, the labor market has been able to absorb the incoming cohorts of young Qataris even when the vast majority end up working in the public sector or for a government corporation. Indeed, unemployment rates among

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Qatari youth are the lowest in the world, estimated at less than 1% in 2018 (Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, 2018b). Public sector jobs are part of a social contract in which the government distributes revenues from natural resources through employment, social services, and exclusive business opportunities. However, this absorption capacity is temporary. The sooner Qatar can diversify its economy the easier it will be to develop the drivers of sustainable economic growth when oil and gas revenues eventually fall. Qatar is unique in the MENA region in terms of its low youth unemployment rates. High rates of youth unemployment have plagued the MENA region for over three decades (Kabbani, 2019). Even countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have youth unemployment rates among their citizens that are higher than the global average of 13%. Unemployment rates are especially high among young female nationals, reaching 52% in Saudi Arabia in 2018, as compared to 31% among young men, and 37% in Kuwait in 2017, as compared to 21% among young men (Kabbani & Ben Mimoune, 2020). In Qatar, unemployment rates are also higher among young women (0.9%) as compared to young men (0.3%), but both are low by international standards (Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, 2018a). As in most Arab countries, females are less likely to enter the labor market than their male counterparts. However, once they want to work, they are less likely to find a job with employment conditions that meet their preferences and are compatible with their countries’ conservative social norms (Kabbani, 2019). There is not much literature from the Gulf addressing the role of families in youth transitions. In Qatar, Al-Balam and Raza (2009) analyzed the effect of family responsibilities on career success, focusing on married employees in the semi-government sector. They found that family responsibilities had a negative effect on the ability to achieve job objectives, which could be mitigated if flexible family policies were present at the workplace. Sellami et al. (2017) investigated factors shaping occupational choices in Qatar. They found that children of university educated parents and children for whom at least one parent was working in a STEM field were more likely to aspire to a career in business or in a STEM field and less likely to aim for a public sector job. James-Hawkins, Qutteina, and Yount (2017) examined how patriarchal social norms and family considerations shape Qatari women’s school-to-work transition. Most of the interviewed young women reported that their parents, even if they did not have a university education, supported their pursuit of a higher education. However, regardless of their different educational and professional goals, all respondents agreed that once married, priority should go to childcaring. There is little research on the role of families in youth transitions from other Gulf countries. Rutledge, Madi, and Forstenlechner (2014) examined parental influence on occupational aspirations of young Emirati women after graduation. They found that sociocultural factors decreased the likelihood of female labor force participation, particularly if the woman reported high levels

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of parental interference. Youth with tertiary levels of education experienced fewer sociocultural barriers to employment and were more likely to aspire to a public sector job. Women were more likely to prefer private sector employment if they had an immediate family member working in the private sector.

Frameworks for Understanding Family Support of Youth Employment Arab culture emphasizes strong family ties. Historically, such ties were formed through kinship and tribal affiliations (Gold & Naufal, 2012). In modern times, these connections evolved to include friends and colleagues. The use of these connections to get things done is known as “wasta” (Abalkhail & Allan, 2016). Wasta is used to gain admissions to schools and universities, secure employment, secure permits, and more (Gengler, 2013). Wasta relies on reciprocity and exchanging favors and is often found in collectivistic cultures. In Russia, the phenomenon is known as “Blat” and in China as “Guanxi” (Abalkhail & Allan, 2016). In the Arab world, wasta does not carry the same negative connotations as nepotism does. It is more akin to the concept of social capital, including a person’s networks, group memberships, and relationships that have been developed and nurtured over time (Ramady, 2016). In many respects, the accumulation and use of social capital is natural in a well-functioning society. However, the use of connections also gives “certain people advantages that they would not otherwise merit, thereby creating an unjust and inefficient allocation of funds, services, and/or positions” (Kropf & Newbury-Smith, 2016, p. 3). In particular, when the labor market is dependent on social capital to secure employment, those without appropriate connections may become discouraged and may not apply for jobs at all. Harry (2007) argues that in the GCC, nationals are reluctant to apply for jobs, as they perceive the application process itself as an indication of the absence of social power. Because wasta revolves around the person’s family or tribal name and reputation, it not only affects the job search process, but also job performance and the work environment. Therefore, wasta could lead to a significant increase in inequality of opportunity. For women in the Gulf, it is harder to rely on connections to enter the labor market because access to because social capital is traditionally accessed through men who hold the higher social and economic positions. In such gendered and male-dominated societies, wasta strengthens the patriarchal system. Thus, despite being aware of the importance of these social connections, many women choose not to rely on them due to the negative double standards associated with the concept, which in return deprives them of receiving access that their male counterparts enjoy. In addition, as connections and networks depend heavily on social position and class, those from lower social classes find themselves more disadvantaged when it comes to securing a job or progressing to the next level (Abalkhail & Allan, 2016). Harry (2007) explains that GCC citizens

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who lack the relevant skills, qualifications, and wasta cannot secure attractive jobs and have to accept lower level clerical positions. In Qatar, as in other GCC states, extended families and tribes are the backbone of the social structure. However, in modern times, direct family connections have become more important as families have become more nuclear (Alshawi & Gardner, 2013). Indeed, families in Qatar and the wider MENA region play an important role in guiding their youth in their career development and supporting them during their transition to economic independence and family formation. Family support can improve youth employment outcomes by allowing them to access family networks, forgo less attractive job offers, and mitigate information asymmetries. Families can also inadvertently hinder youth transitions by encouraging prolonged job search and creating a mismatch between the youth expectations and labor market realities. The family’s role is especially strong in the context of female transitions and can even be negative. Families can be unsupportive of young women’s continued education, especially if it requires her to live far from home (UNDP, 2016). Family influence is even stronger in the context of women’s decision to work as well as the choice of occupations, employment sectors, and work environments that are deemed to be socially acceptable.

Channels through Which Families Affect Youth Employment Families can affect youth employment decisions and outcomes through several channels, including: •

•

Education and Career Choices: Families play a major role in helping their children make education and career choices. Such advice (in some cases pressure) is often based on parental experiences and access to social networks. In traditional, slow-changing societies, families can help youth avoid pitfalls and access opportunities. However, in fast-changing, technologically driven economies, uninformed advice can steer youth to careers that are overcrowded or in decline. Family advice can also direct young women to more traditionally acceptable fields of study, thus limiting their career options and excluding them from promising employment possibilities. Job Search and Family Networks: Family networks are a main channel through which young people obtain their first job. Family networks can mitigate information asymmetries, by inducing firms to hire untested young people based on the commitment of a family member. Youth with access to networks can quickly set on a career path. Youth without access to networks are at a disadvantage, including young women who seek work without the full support of their families (Kabbani & Kamel, 2007). However, relying exclusively on such networks can also limit a young person’s options to careers within the network.

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•

•

Setting Expectations: Families play an important role in setting expectations regarding the kinds of jobs that are acceptable and wages that young people should expect. Youth in the MENA region tend to expect better jobs and higher wages early in their careers than what is typically available. This can be a result of benchmarking against classmates who have successfully transitioned to a good job or position. Gender stereotypes and biases can also limit job searches to specific fields and sectors, which can lead to an expectations mismatch that can prolong the job search of young women and men. Family Support: In MENA societies, young people typically live with their families until they have secured both a job and the resources needed to set up a family of their own. Indeed, few families would compel their children to work at a level below that of their educational qualifications. This is essentially a form of informal social protection. Family support can allow young people to wait for decent job opportunities and forgo unattractive prospects. However, this comes at the cost of a prolonged transition, during which young people could have been gaining experience and building their careers.

Each of these family support channels can help improve or weaken youth employment outcomes. The dynamics of each channel vary depending on many factors, including a family’s socioeconomic status, geographical location (i.e., country, city, rural/urban area), parenting style, marital status, household structure (presence of extended family members), and other factors. These differences help determine the impact, positive or negative, that families have on the education and employment decisions and outcomes of their children.

Empirical Findings for Understanding Family Support in Qatar Research Questions This chapter aims to develop a better understanding of the role of families in supporting youth transitions from school to work by addressing the following empirical questions: •

• •

What are the characteristics of young Qataris who rely mainly on family and friend connections to look for and find a job early in their professional life? To what extent is the use of family and friend connections associated with the likelihood of securing employment among Qatari youth? To what extent is the sector of employment (private vs. public) associated with the use of family and friend connections among Qatari youth?

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Data This chapter uses data from a school-to-work transition survey module that was included as part of the 2014 Qatar Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). The survey covers 2,000 Qatari nationals and 2,000 non-Qatari expatriates living in Qatar, who are not included in the analysis reported in this chapter. This dataset was selected with regard to its ability to shed light on the role of families in youth transitions from school to work. Although the GEM survey has been carried out in other GCC countries, the school-to-work transition module was unique to Qatar. Thus, a comparison of results across GCC countries is not possible. The analysis below focuses on young Qataris aged between 15 and 29 years (N = 232 females and 333 males). This age range aligns with most of the empirical literature, which differs from United Nations reported data on youth that cover ages 15–24. The longer age range allows us to include young people still in transition after completing university. The empirical analysis uses a combination of descriptive statistics and regression analysis. Some of the descriptive statistics include regional comparisons that are drawn from the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) School-to-Work Transition Surveys that were conducted in Egypt (2012 and 2014), Jordan (2013 and 2015), and Tunisia (2013). Population weights were applied to the descriptive figures presented below. Regression analysis was conducted on the unweighted survey sample.

Analytic Plan The regression analysis is conducted in three parts. The first is a logistic regression analysis to identify the characteristics of individuals who rely more on family and friend connections to search for a job, as compared to those who rely on their own initiative, including online search for job opportunities, contacting employers directly, registering with an employment office, using a university placement office, and applying through a job/career fair. We apply the following empirical model, where F(z) is the cumulative logistic distribution: 1

Prob (FamilyConnectioni = 1) = F (β0 + β1 Femalei + β2 Agei + β3 Age2i + β4 Marriedi + β5 Educ_Seci + β6 Educ_Dipi + β7 Educ_Uni&Abovei + β8 Wealth_Lowi + β10Income_Lowi) The model regresses the binary dependent variable on a number of explanatory variables and estimates the reference probability that an individual with particular economic and demographic characteristics mainly uses family connections instead of personal initiative to look for a job. The dependent variable (FamilyConnection) captures the job search strategy of employed individuals and unemployed individuals, who were actively searching for work, at the time of the survey. It takes a value of 1

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2

if the individual relied mainly on family and friends’ network and 0 if they relied on personal initiative. There are also data on the job search strategies of those who were out of the labor force at the time of the survey but had been previously employed. However, their sample size is small (N = 37), and there are no corresponding data regarding the job search strategies of those who were out of the labor force and were previously looking for work. We therefore do not include this category in our analysis, noting that including them does not alter the main findings of our analysis. Individual characteristics include gender, age, marital status, and highest level of educational attainment consolidated into four categories: less than secondary (omitted), secondary, post-secondary diploma, and university and above. We introduce wealth and income in separate models (models 2 and 3). The wealth variable is self-reported as being below average, average, or above average. Low income status means that a family’s annual income was less than the upper poverty line as defined by the World Bank, 5.50 USD per person per day; for the purpose of constructing this variable household size was capped at 11 individuals (noting that the results do not change if household size was not capped). Given the very different transitions of young men and women in Qatar, and throughout the MENA region, separate regressions are run by gender. The focus of our analysis is Qatari youth. Non-Qatari expatriate youth face very different transition processes that are dependent on their own widely divergent social-economic circumstances, their families’ circumstances in their home countries, and on their ability to secure work permits in Qatar. The second empirical model is an analysis of the individual characteristics associated with employment status in the survey, including use of family and friend networks. For this analysis we use logistic regression, where F(z) is the cumulative logistic distribution: Prob (Employedi = 1) = F (β0 + β1 Femalei + β2 Agei + β3 Age2i + β4 Marriedi + β5 Educ_Seci + β6 Educ_Dipi + β7 Educ_Uni&Abovei+ α8 FamilyConnectioni) Employment status (Employed) is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the employed and 0 for the unemployed (actively seeking work). Separate regressions were run by gender. Individual characteristics include gender, age, marital status, highest level of educational attainment (less than secondary, secondary, post-secondary diploma, and university and above). The regressions include a variable that identifies whether an individual used family and friends’ connections to obtain a job or search for a job. Finally, we examine the individual characteristics associated with employment in the public and private sectors, including the association between family and friend connections and the sector of employment. We

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3

use another set of logistic regressions for this analysis, where F(z) is the cumulative logistic distribution: Prob (Sector i = Private = 1) = F (α0 + α1 Femalei + α2 Agei + α3 Age2i + α4 Marriedi + α5 Educ_Seci + α6 Educ_Dipi + α7 Educ_Uni&Abovei + α8 FamilyConnectioni) Sector of employment (Sector) is a categorical variable that takes on two values (public sector = 0 and private sector = 1). Private sector includes the self-employed and those working for a family business. The public sector is used as the reference point. Separate regressions are run by gender. Individual characteristics include gender, age, marital status, highest level of educational attainment (less than secondary, secondary, post-secondary diploma, and university and above). The regressions include a variable that identifies whether an individual mainly used family and friends’ connections to obtain a job or search for a job.

Results We begin each subsection by presenting descriptive statistics followed by the results of the regression analyses, which can help control for other variables and test the statistical significance of key relationships. Use of family networks to search for and obtain a job: Qatari nationals aged between 15 and 29 years at the time of the GEM survey relied on family support and connections to a significant degree (46%), but slightly less than strategies involving personal initiative (54%). Young Qatari men and women were both roughly equally likely to rely on family and friend connections. This is a curious finding, given that the circumstances and labor force outcomes of young men and women in Qatar, and the MENA region in general, tend to be quite different. Young Qatari nationals who were employed at the time of the survey were slightly more likely (46%) than unemployed young Qataris (40%) to have relied on family support and family/friend networks as a main job search technique. To benchmark the use of family and friend networks among young people in Qatar, we compare these rates to empirical data from other MENA countries. We distinguish between job search strategies among those looking for work (Figure 6.1) and those who successfully found a job (Figure 6.2). We find that Qatari youth searching for a job use family and friend networks to a similar degree as young people in Egypt and Jordan. The outlier in our data is Tunisia, where young people appear to rely less heavily on networks of family and friends in their job search. However, in terms of success in finding a job, all four countries are roughly similar in terms of the extent to which family and friend networks were the main method they used to find the job (Figure 6.2). Finally, it is worth noting

Families Supporting Youth Employment  107 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%

Male

Female

Egypt 2014 (N=457)

Male

Female

Jordan 2015 (N=455)

Family/Friends Connections

Male

Female

Male

Qatar* 2014 (N=80) Personal Initiative

Female

Tunisia 2013 (N=466)

Other

*Qatari nationals

FIGURE 6.1

Job search among unemployed youth (age 15–29).

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Egypt 2014 (N=1693) Jordan 2015 (N=1112) Qatar* 2014 (N=311) Family/Friends Connections

Family Business

Male

Female

Tunisia 2013 (N=837)

Personal Initiative

Other

*Qatari nationals

FIGURE 6.2

How did you find this job? (Primary method).

that young women were less likely than young men in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia to indicate that their current job was secured through family and friend networks, possibly suggesting that young women’s families are less inclined to truly support their finding a job. In Qatar, the use of family networks appears to be slightly higher among women. Predictors of use of family networks to search for a job. We next examine predictors of young people’s use of family and friends’ connections to search for or obtain a job. The results are presented in Table 6.1. As observed in the descriptive analysis above, an interesting feature of the Qatari case is that, after pooling the data across employed and unemployed individuals, gender does not have a significant association with use of family connections. Even controlling for other factors, young Qatari women are just as likely as young Qatari men to rely on family connections versus their own initiative. Marriage is another variable with no statistically significant association with use of family and friend networks among young Qataris. Age, by contrast, has an inverse association with use of family networks. As young people become older, they rely less on family and friend connections and

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more on formal methods of job search. This association is highly significant, non-linear, and weakens with age. Educational attainment has no discernable association with job search strategies. This result is a bit surprising. One would expect young people with different educational backgrounds to use different job search strategies. However, this does not appear to be the case among Qatari youth. Regardless of their educational levels, Qatari youth seem to equally rely on family connections and personal initiative to secure employment. Wealth and income also do not appear to be associated with job search strategies (Models 2 and 3 in Table 6.1). Here too one would expect young TABLE 6.1 Logistic Regression Results on Job Search Strategies among Employed and

Unemployed Qatari Youth Model 1 Female Age Age square Married

Model 2

Model 3

0.002 (0.183) –1.227** (0.451) 0.024** (0.00936) 0.175 (0.196)

–0.043 (0.191) –1.256** (0.487) 0.025* (0.0101) 0.205 (0.207)

–0.018 (0.199) –1.483** (0.530) 0.029** (0.0109) 0.157 (0.215)

–0.240 (0.344) –0.143 (0.418) –0.062 (0.365)

–0.214 (0.375) –0.048 (0.451) –0.097 (0.401)

–0.263 (0.386) –0.144 (0.464) –0.123 (0.415)

15.20** (5.397) 532 0.015

–0.245 (0.222) –0.064 (0.303) –0.008 (0.199) 15.83** (5.837) 493 0.019

18.32** (6.385) 451 0.016

Education (Ref: Below Secondary) Secondary Diploma University & above Wealth (Ref: Below Average) Average Above average Low income Constant Observations Pseudo R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

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people from different socioeconomic backgrounds to use different job search strategies, but again this does not appear to be the case among Qatari youth. It seems that job search strategies involving family and friend networks are equally used by educated and non-educated and high income and low-income individuals. Predictors of employment status. Turning to predictors of employment status, the results of the logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 6.2. The reference status is “unemployed” and the coefficients are presented in comparison to employed. Young Qatari women are less likely to be employed than unemployed compared to young men. Given the different forces affecting the employment and labor force participation decisions of young women, it makes sense to run separate multinomial regressions for each. Young Qataris, both men and women, are more likely to be employed as their age increases. Unemployed youth tend to find jobs over time, a fact which is positively correlated with age. Marital status does not predict employment status for either young

TABLE 6.2 Logistic Regression Results on Employment Status (Employed vs.

Unemployed) of Qatari Youth Predictor Female Age Age square Married

All

Male

Female

–1.964** (0.317) 1.314 (0.721) –0.020 (0.015) –0.020 –0.009 (0.331)

2.081 (1.294) –0.032 (0.029) –0.032 –0.987 (0.688)

0.336 (0.983) –0.001 (0.021) –0.001 0.208 (0.379)

1.357** (0.505) 2.069** (0.798) 1.320* (0.560) 0.726* (0.299) –18.38* (8.302) 532 0.225

2.041** (0.785) 2.489 (1.303) 1.171 (0.883) 0.292 (0.479) –29.13* (14.44) 323 0.264

1.089 (0.720) 1.948 (1.053) 1.299 (0.764) 0.995* (0.389) –8.184 (11.48) 209 0.140

Education (Ref: Below Secondary) Secondary Diploma University & above Family connections Constant Observations Pseudo R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

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men or women. Higher educational attainment is associated with higher likelihood of being employed as compared to being unemployed for both young Qatari men and women. Interestingly, the marginal effects appear to be greatest for young Qataris who completed a post-secondary school diploma, suggesting that they may have the fastest entryway into jobs after school. Finally, the reliance on family and friend connections in looking for and finding a job is associated with increased likelihood of being employed (versus being unemployed). For the two separate models by gender, this holds for young Qatari women only. This finding suggests that family connections are important in helping young people who are already looking for a job in finding one. Family connections and employment sector. An important issue to examine is the extent to which family connections are associated with the likelihood of securing a job in the public versus the private sector, which has implications for the economic diversification objectives of Qatar. One might expect that family connections play less of a role in securing a job in the public sector, TABLE 6.3 Logistic Regression Results on Working in Private Sector among

Qatari Youth Predictor Female Age Age square Married

All 0.533* (0.271) –0.713 (0.661) 0.0141 (0.0137) –0.424 (0.304)

Male

–1.524 (0.837) 0.0309 (0.0174) 0.00756 (0.417)

Female

0.494 (1.171) –0.0117 (0.0241) –0.993* (0.48)

Education (Ref: Below Secondary) Secondary Diploma University & above Family connections Constant Observations Pseudo R-squared

0.889 (0.763) 1.392 (0.808) 0.840 (0.781) 0.0379 (0.265) 6.342 (7.954) 431 0.032

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

1.202 (1.06) 1.645 (1.112) 1.271 (1.09) 0.123 (0.347) 15.46 (10.04) 282 0.031

0.411 (1.138) 1.192 (1.221) 0.460 (1.154) –0.157 (0.424) –6.376 (14.22) 149 0.051

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given the absorption capacity and the more significant bureaucratic nature of hiring practices in the public sector. Then again, family connections might be important in securing specific positions and job titles within the public sector. Furthermore, the private sector might be more meritocratic and less prone to the use of connections to secure a job. Controlling for other factors, the regression results show that among young Qataris, being female is associated with greater likelihood of working in the private sector. Among young Qatari women, being married is associated with lower likelihood of working in the private sector. Among young Qataris, both men and women, there is no statistically significant association between using family networks and employment in the private sector (see Table 6.3). These findings suggest that use of family networks has not contributed higher employment in the private sector, including starting one’s own business. Separating self-employment and employment in a family business does not change the results of the analysis. These results make sense in the context of a country with abundant employment opportunities for their young citizens in both the public and private sectors. The result also suggests that the orientations of individuals and families are aligned in terms of sector of employment.

Implications for Policy and Practice Families can play an important role in youth transitions from school to work. Family support can improve youth employment outcomes by guiding them to promising sectors, allowing them to access family networks, encouraging them to forgo less attractive job offers, and helping to mitigate information asymmetries that might discourage firms from hiring them. Families can also (inadvertently) hinder youth transitions by providing them with inaccurate or incomplete information, encouraging prolonged job search, and creating mismatches between their expectations and labor market realities. Finally, it is important to note that family support can align with or run counter to a country’s national development priorities. Thus, formulating a family policy that aligns with other national policies and priorities or, at least, integrating family elements into national youth policies should be a priority for countries in development. Family connections may be especially important in countries where tribal connections and social norms can determine the employment and career prospects of young men and women. In traditional societies, women and men may be relegated to specific sectors and occupations that are deemed socially acceptable. A lack of family connections may present a double burden, especially on young women who want to work, resulting in economic exclusion. However, in the case of Qatar, these concerns appear to be mitigated, given the exceptionally low rates of unemployment among Qatari youth and the availability of

112  Nader Kabbani and Nejla Ben Mimoune

public sector jobs to anyone who wants one. Our empirical analysis of Qatari youth found no statistically significant features that distinguish youth who used family and friend connections versus personal initiatives in searching for or securing a job. Use of family connections was similarly prevalent among young men and women and youth of different educational and socioeconomic backgrounds. The only major distinction was that the use of family and friend connections declined with age. In terms of labor market outcomes, the reliance on family and friend connections is associated with a greater likelihood of young Qataris who are already in the labor force of securing a job. In other words, they are significantly less likely to be unemployed versus employed. This finding suggests that family connections are important in helping young people who are already looking for a job to find one. However, the analysis did not find a statistically significant association with the sector of employment (private versus public). These findings suggest that although family connections are important at an individual level, they do not appear to be supporting the economic diversification priorities of the country beyond the personal initiative of individuals. In light of these empirical findings, Qatari authorities should develop policies and programs that support the role of families in helping their children transition from school to work. For example, providing families with information about current and future career opportunities can help them guide young family members to make better career choices. Also, improving family access to professional and social networks can help improve key employment connections. In addition, the government should promote better alignment between family support policies and private sector development strategies of the country. Indeed, integrating the family dimension into youth programming and policy development can help improve policy impact and ensure that young people are receiving the support they need both inside and outside the household. Unfortunately, families as a unit have not been systematically integrated into youth policy and programming. Several MENA countries have developed national youth policies or strategies (Kabbani, 2019). However, none of these fully address the role of families in supporting youth transitions. The absence of a role for families in youth policy is also evident within the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Four SDG targets focus on youth, all of which relate to school-to-work transitions. These targets are: (4.4) increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs, and entrepreneurship; (8.5) achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value; (8.6) reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education, or training; and (8.b) develop and operationalize a global strategy for youth employment and implement the ILO Global Jobs Pact. However, in

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none of these is there an explicit role for the family. Policymakers in Qatar and other countries are failing to mobilize a key development actor, the family, in addressing youth employment and private sector development priorities of the state.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research Despite the strengths of our analyses in advancing understanding of the role that families play in shaping the job search and employment outcomes of young Qataris, the analysis also has several limitations as a result of applying existing data to analyze issues of interest rather than collecting data specifically designed to answer the research questions posed in this chapter. First, the key survey response used throughout the empirical analysis asks respondents about their use of friend and family networks. Although the two networks might overlap quite a bit in the context of youth, they are not the same and more nuanced questions should be developed. Second, the empirical analysis only examines high-level labor market outcomes (labor market status; sector of employment). Future work should consider the quality of the job match. Family connections may increase the likelihood of finding a job, but not necessarily a decent job or the right job. Similarly, family connections are used equally by young men and women, but there might be important differences in the types and quality of the jobs secured for each. Third, context matters. Even though use of family connections was not found to be associated with socioeconomic status, this association relates to finding a job. There could be significant differences in the quality of the job match. Future work must provide greater disaggregation of family circumstances in order to identify which families are struggling to support their young members and might benefit from the support of targeted public policies and programs. Finally, the results likely underestimate family influence. Survey responses distinguish between family and personal decisions, but families can influence personal decisions. For example, a young person who leaves school early because he or she does not like school may be in a family that does not value or support his/her education. Future work must unpack these dynamics to better understand the role of families in youth transitions. This should include an examination of the families’ own priorities in the career and employment choices of their children.

Conclusions Families can play an important role in supporting young people transitioning from school to work. Families can support education and career decisions, provide access to family networks during the job search process, and provide financial support to enable youth to search for and obtain a good job or start a business. An analysis of survey data on Qatari youth found that reliance on

114  Nader Kabbani and Nejla Ben Mimoune

family and friend connections is associated with a greater likelihood of young Qataris in the labor market securing a job. However, there was no statistically significant association between the use of family networks and the sector of employment (private versus public). The findings suggest that policymakers in Qatar and other countries could mobilize families as a resource in addressing the youth employment and private sector development priorities of the state.

References Abalkhail, J. M., & Allan, B. (2016). “Wasta” and women’s careers in the Arab Gulf States. Gender in Management: An International Journal, 31(3), 162–180. Al-Balam, N. M., & Raza, S. A. (2009). Impact of family responsibilities on career success among employees working in the semi-government sector in the state of Qatar. International Journal of Arab Culture, Management and Sustainable Development, 1(2), 208–223. Alshawi, A. H., & Gardner, A. (2013). Tribalism, identity and citizenship in contemporary Qatar. Anthropology of the Middle East, 8(2), 46–59. Assaad, R., Binzel, C., & Gadallah, M. (2010). Transitions to employment and marriage among young men in Egypt. Middle East Development Journal, 2(1), 39–88. Assaad, R., & Krafft, C. (2016, April). Labor market dynamics and youth unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa: Evidence from Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. Economic Research Forum Working Paper Series (Vol. 993, pp. 1–27). Assaad, R., Salehi-Isfahani, D., & Hendy, R. (2014, May). Inequality of opportunity in educational attainment in Middle East and North Africa: Evidence from household surveys. Economic Research Forum Working Paper Series (Vol. 834). Crockett, L., & Bingham, C. R. (2000). Anticipating adulthood: Expected timing of work and family transitions among rural youth. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 10(2), 151–172. Davis-Kean, P. E. (2005). The influence of parent education and family income on child achievement: The indirect role of parental expectations and the home environment. Journal of Family Psychology, 19(2), 294–304. El-Hamidi, F. (2006). General or vocational schooling? Evidence on school choice, returns, and ‘sheep skin’ effects from Egypt 1998. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 9(2), 157–176. El-Hamidi, F., & Wahba, J. (2005). The effects of structural adjustment on youth unemployment in Egypt. Presented at the 12th annual conference of the Economic Research Forum. International Labor Organization. Gengler, J. (2013). Collective frustration, but no collective action, in Qatar. Retrieved from https://merip.org/2013/12/collective-frustration-but-no-collective-actionin-qatar/ Gold, G. D., & Naufal, G. S. (2012). Wasta: The other invisible hand, a case study of university students in the Gulf. Journal of Arabian Studies, 2(1), 59–73. Hailat, M. A. (2018). Education of Jordanians: Outcomes in a challenging environment. Economic Research Forum Working Papers (No. 1221). Harry, W. (2007). Employment creation and localization: The crucial human resource issues for the GCC. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 18(1), 132–146.

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Hendy, R. (2015, November). A quarter century of changes in labor force participation. Economic Research Forum Working Paper (973). Holzer, H. J. (1988). Search method use by unemployed youth. Journal of Labor Economics, 6(1), 1–20. James-Hawkins, L., Qutteina, Y., & Yount, K. M. (2017). The patriarchal bargain in a context of rapid changes to normative gender roles: Young Arab women’s role conflict in Qatar. Sex Roles, 77(3–4), 155–168. Jemmali, H. (2019). Inequality of opportunities among Tunisian children over time and space. Child Indicators Research, 12(1), 213–234. Kabbani, N. S. (March 2019). The conundrum of youth employment in the MENA region: Revisiting and reframing the challenge. Doha: Brookings Doha Center Policy Briefing. Kabbani, N. S., & Ben Mimoune, N. (December 2019). Youth unemployment in the GCC. Doha: Brookings Doha Center Working Paper. Kabbani, N.S., & Ben Mimoune, N. (August 2020). Economic Diversification and Human Capital Development in the GCC. Doha: Brookings Doha Center Working Paper. Kabbani, N. S., & Kamel, N. (2007). Youth exclusion in Syria: Social, economic, and institutional dimensions. Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper (4). Washington, DC and Dubai. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1088037 Krafft, C., & Alawode, H. (2018). Inequality of opportunity in higher education in the Middle East and North Africa. International Journal of Educational Development, 62, 234–244. Kropf, A., & Newbury-Smith, T. C. (2016). Wasta as a form of social capital? An institutional perspective. In M. A. Ramady (Ed.), The political economy of Wasta: Use and abuse of social capital networking (pp. 3–21). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Limam, I., & Ben Hafaiedh, A. (2018). Education, earnings, and returns to schooling in Tunisia. In R. Assaad & M. Boughzala (Eds.), The Tunisian labor market in an era of transition (pp. 194–234). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Magnuson, K., & Berger, L. M. (2009). Family structure states and transitions: Associations with children’s well-being during middle childhood. Journal of Marriage and Family, 71(3), 575–591. Mau, W.-C., & Kopischke, A. (2001). Job search methods, job search outcomes, and job satisfaction of college graduates: A comparison of race and sex. Journal of Employment Counseling, 38, 141–149. Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority. (2018a). Labor Force Survey Quarterly Reports 2018. Doha, Qatar: Planning and Statistics Authority. Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority. (2018b). Labor Force Survey Report 2018. Doha, Qatar: Planning and Statistics Authority. Ramady, M. A. (Ed.). (2016). The political economy of wasta: Use and abuse of social capital networking. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Rutledge, E., Madi, M., & Forstenlechner, I. (2014). Parental influence on female vocational decisions in the Arabian Gulf. MPRA Paper (47521). Salehi-Isfahani, D., Hassine, N. B., & Assaad, R. (2014). Equality of opportunity in educational achievement in the Middle East and North Africa. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 12(4), 489–515. Sellami, A., Kimmel, L., Hunscher, B., Cotter, A., Wittrock, J., Al-Emadi, A., & AlEmadi, D. (2017). Factors shaping Qatari students’ interest in STEM, business or

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public sector careers. Eurasia Journal of Mathematics, Science and Technology Education, 13(10), 6491–6505. Selwaness, I., & Roushdy, R. (2017). The Arab Spring and the employability of youth: Early evidence from Egypt (28). GLO Discussion Paper. Sieverding, M. (2015, December). Intergenerational mobility in women’s employment outcomes in Egypt. Economic Research Forum Working Paper (Vol. 978). Try, S. (2005). The use of job search strategies among university graduates. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 34(2), 223–243. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2016). Arab human development report 2016: Youth and the prospects for human development in a changing reality. New York: United Nations Development Programme. Yamamoto, Y., & Holloway, S. D. (2010). Parental expectations and children’s academic performance in sociocultural context. Educational Psychology Review, 22(3), 189–214.

7 YOUTH INDEPENDENCE IN RELATION TO SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE GULF Abdulnabi Alekry

Introduction The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain), described as affluent and rentier states, have been witnessing dramatic social changes. Likewise, the Gulf family, at the heart of societal changes, has been undergoing deep and comprehensive transformations that affect its functions, roles, authority, and structure (Abdulmalek, 2018). Youth are very much influenced by the Gulf social changes and family transformation as part of these changes. At the same time, youth play important roles in both the social change and family transformation. The objective of this chapter is to examine the Gulf youth independence trend in relation to family transformations within the context of social changes by addressing the roots, manifestations, and implications of this phenomenon. The youth population often is considered to be the most vital and active in society, but all societies and states face the challenge of meeting youth expectations. This chapter focuses on one aspect of Gulf youth challenges: the pursuit of independence and self-reliance within the context of family and social changes. The chapter examines incentives and deterrents of Gulf youth independence. Despite the variability of definitions of “youth,” the United Nations standard of defining youth as spanning from 15 to 25 years is adopted in this chapter. The United Nations has recognized youth rights in its conventions, which can serve as guidelines for member states. As Gulf youth independence occurs within the context of the changing family, the chapter addresses the Gulf nuclear family, which is the basic block of the society, and the transformation it has been undergoing within the context of social changes.

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The Gulf countries have been witnessing what is known as a “Youth Boom,” which is a demographically large young generation. The chapter addresses aspects of Gulf youth and early adulthood that are especially salient in terms of implications for independence, such as major decisions related to higher education, professions, entrepreneurship, marriage, housing, social status, and political affiliation that have implications even after the age of 25 years. In addressing Gulf youth independence as a pan GCC phenomenon, the chapter takes into consideration that there also are variations among GCC countries, which will be highlighted. There are also variations related to gender, community, social status, and other factors. The chapter first considers youth independence at the international level before providing background on youth independence in the GCC. Concepts specific to the GCC are reviewed, paying attention to the commonalities within the GCC and the peculiarities of each GCC member state. The chapter then examines to what extent the Gulf context of youth independence is similar to or different from the international context. Next, reviews of empirical data on youth independence in the GCC are presented. The chapter then explores GCC policies towards youth. The individual GCC states have their own strategies and policies with their own government ministries, agencies, and councils to implement strategies and policies. Despite the crucial role of youth in contributing to the well-being of the nations in the Gulf and elsewhere, there are few academic studies addressing Gulf youth independence, so the chapter suggests needed directions for future research. The chapter concludes by discussing youth independence in the Gulf in relation to family changes in the context of social changes in the Gulf region.

Background of Youth Independence in the International Literature The international literature on youth independence within the context of family and social change is rich, diverse, and complex (e.g., Peters & Camp, 2010). Youth independence phenomena have been experienced by civilizations, nations, and societies throughout history. Some key concepts are as follows. First, family changes and social changes are part of the dynamics of any lively society that meets the challenges of an ever changing world. There is no eternal family or social structure, function, values, roles, and so forth. Second, although family and social changes occur globally, they are manifested with vast peculiarities pertaining to different ages, countries, cultures, religious beliefs, social status, class backgrounds, and other sociodemographic factors. Third, criteria that define the family differ depending on cultural norms, laws, and customs; so although a widely accepted family form involves formal marriage binding an adult male and female, with or without children, many other forms are accepted legally or defacto as recognized family. Fourth, just as

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families take many diverse forms, so do social transformations. Fifth, multiple motives, considerations, and consequences are related to youth independence phenomena and have been studied by sociologists, economists, anthropologists, psychologists, politicians, law-makers, and state officials, among others. Sixth, in addressing the phenomenon of youth independence, some link this trend with family adaptation to human advancement, whereas others consider youth independence as a factor adversely affecting the cohesion of the family and consequently undermining the fabric of society. Seventh, the international literature considers youth independence as a factor contributing to and a product of the transformation of society based on extended family to nuclear family units. Eighth, the definition of youth varies internationally when biological, physical, mental, and psychological factors are taken into consideration. Age criteria defining this period vary, with the United Nations defining childhood up to 18 years and “youth” from age 15 to 25, but legal systems of different countries sometimes apply different definitions and even extend “youth” up to 35 years.

Background of Youth Independence in the GCC Before oil production, the Gulf region was backward socially, impoverished economically, and fragmented politically. The pre-oil population was scarce, with settlements on the Arab coast of the Gulf that were aggregates of extended families engaged in traditional economic activities dependent on the sea, agriculture, and basic trading with a few port cities. The inland was dominated by nomad tribes, oases settlements, and trading cities. The pearl industry shaped the social order and economic prospects (Fuccaro, 2017). The influx of emigration followed oil exploration during the post-World War II era but accelerated with a massive influx after the October 1973 war that signalled an oil boom and consequently huge revenues. Regional Gulf and Middle East conflicts, and the establishment of the GCC as a regional alliance, made the GCC a haven of stability and prosperity and contributed to an unprecedented economic boom that required a huge influx of immigrants. During the last 50 years, the GCC countries have changed beyond recognition in urban development, life style, economy, demography, state administration, and culture (Alnajr, 2018). The GCC citizens population in the period 1976 to 2012 increased from 7.5 million to 24.2 million. During this same period, the expatriate population increased from 2.2 million to 22.3 million. Despite some downfalls of the economy, the influx of immigrants continues steadily, and the total Gulf population now exceeds 52 million (Alshehabi, 2014). With the exceptions of Saudi Arabia and Oman where citizens are the majority of the population (68% and 60%, respectively), the citizen populations are in the minority in Kuwait (32%), Bahrain (45%), UAE (11%), and Qatar

120  Abdulnabi Alekry TABLE 7.1 Percentage of Citizens and Expatriates among Population and Work Force

in 2015a

Country

Saudi Arabia (%)

Oman (%) Kuwait (%)

Bahrain (%)

UAE (%)

Qatar (%)

Citizens Expatriates Citizens workforce Expatriate workforce

68 32 45

60 40 23

32 68 19

45 55 23

11 89 8

14 86 6

55

77

81

77

92

94

a The figures were collected from GCC Statistical Bureau and individual GCC member states statistical bureaus.

(14%). The citizen workforce is an even lower minority, as shown in Table 7.1 (Abyad, 2018). The dramatic changes in the demography and labour market have created extreme dependency on the expatriate community and introduced deep and comprehensive changes to the social fabric of Gulf countries, with implications for fundamental changes in Gulf families. Gulf societies that previously were based on tribal, kinship, religious, and neighbourhood affiliations have been transformed into modern societies where affiliations are based on class, profession, and socioeconomic-political belonging, instead of or in addition to more traditional affiliations. In addition, the traditional extended family has been transformed to the nuclear family. But unlike nuclear families in many other high-income countries, the Gulf nuclear family is bigger with around six to eight members, on average (El-Hdaad, 2003). The form, function, and relationships within the nuclear family have been shaped by many factors, especially modernization, globalization, mobility, media, technology, values, education, and affluence. The nuclear family that adopts modern values is in favour of youth independence, in contrast to the traditional extended family where bonds connecting families are very strong (Zahlan, Partrec, & Findlow, 2009). Native families have become dependent on the expatriate population. For example, one feature of the Gulf family dependency on the expatriate community is the indispensable house maids who are responsible for taking care of household tasks and childrearing (Khalifa & Nasser, 2015). This situation of widespread reliance on the expatriate population is unique compared to many other parts of the world. However, with the drop of oil prices starting in 2013, the GCC member states started to take austerity measures and impose taxes. Privileges granted to citizens and even some to expatriates have been regulated. Guaranteed government jobs and other benefits to citizens were limited, which stimulated young graduates to pursue jobs in the private sector or start

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businesses as entrepreneurs. The state and family have needed to find ways to be supportive in the new social and economic context, which has contributed to the youth independence trend (Bohaji, 2018).

Empirical Findings on Youth Independence in the GCC Several factors, including improved living conditions, high fertility, and ready access to health care, have contributed to large youth populations in the GCC. The percentages of the citizen population of the GCC member states between the ages of 15 and 25 are 19% in Saudi Arabia, 23% in Oman, 20% in Kuwait, 26% in Bahrain, 23% in UAE, and 26% in Qatar (World Bank, 2017). Public education up to secondary school is free for citizens, university charges are minimal, and post-graduate and specialization study are commonly available. Private education inside and outside the GCC is affordable to middle and upper income citizens. Therefore, GCC youth are provided with education that enables them to secure jobs, though there is a disparity between school curricula and the nature of education on one side and the needs of the market on the other. Although education has enabled most GCC youth to secure jobs, contributing to youth independence, unemployment has been increasing among GCC youth due to disparities between education qualifications and market needs, austerity measures, and economic structural changes, limiting youth independence (Gateway Gulf Investment Forum, 2018). Unemployment rates for GCC citizens ages 15–25 who are not in school are 28% in Saudi Arabia, 23% in Oman, 15% in Kuwait, 8% in Bahrain, 10% in UAE, and 11% in Qatar. Unemployment rates are generally higher for GCC female citizens ages 15–25 who are not in school (33% in Saudi Arabia, 43% in Oman, 15% in Kuwait, 32% in Bahrain, 6% in UAE, and 14% in Qatar) (Fadel, 2016). Unemployment means economic dependency on the family, which deters free choices and limits youth independence, particularly for females.

Similarities and Differences for Youth across the GCC The GCC was established in May 1981, and the GCC countries share some commonalities. For example, the importance of the family to the state is stipulated in all six GCC state Constitutions (in the case of Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar) and Basic Orders (in the case of Oman and Saudi Arabia). Each of the six member states also has its own legislation, policies, and institutions that influence social change, the family, and youth independence. Thus, despite some commonalities in social changes, families, and youth independence across the GCC, specific features of each country and variations within countries are also important (Alnajar et al., 2014). Major features of the GCC that contribute to youth independence include free movement with ID, the right to property

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ownership, and opportunities and choices related to education, work, private business, and marriage. Despite these commonalities in support for youth independence across the GCC, several differences also exist. For example, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar are more privileged with oil revenues, rentier state advantages, affluent economies, and higher per capita incomes than Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain. Consequently, youth have more options and more secure futures in the first three states than in the latter three, facilitating youth independence (AlZahrani, 2011). The extent of urbanization also varies from state to state and even varies within the same country. For example, youth independence is stronger in urbanized centres than in rural areas.

The Gender Factor In examining the phenomenon of Gulf youth independence, it is important to be aware of gender differences. The average Gulf family looks at the female with great concern for her reputation, honour, and behaviour. Gulf societies are still conservative and tend to tolerate acts of dissent more from young males than from young females. Females are more vulnerable than males to discrimination, subjection, and dictation within the family and the society at large. Disparity between males and females starts in the family, where parents, brothers, and other relatives dictate their terms on the females in the family and the society at large. Young males are more free to act in the society than young females. Females have fewer options of university specializations than do males. Jobs offered to males are more varied than those offered to females. Family business is usually controlled and inherited by males. Males dominate state hierarchies, businesses, and different facets of life. In marriage the groom has more choice than the bride. Within the family, the husband has more authority than the wife. Despite these widespread gender disparities in the GCC, females are making progress in many respects. For example, there has been increasing enrolment of females at all educational levels, including at universities, where more females are high ranking graduates (World Bank, 2017). The per cent of female registered students at universities is 38% in Saudi Arabia, 49% in Oman, 44% in Kuwait, 61% in Bahrain, 64% in UAE, and 80% in Qatar. By contrast, female employment in the labour market remains lower than male employment (19% in Saudi Arabia, 13% in Oman, 50% in Kuwait, 39% in Bahrain, 38% in UAE, and 49% in Qatar), with females less likely to own businesses, lower ranking at both public and private institutions, and more likely to be unemployed (Fadl, 2015). These gender disparities reflect the impact of the traditional societal outlook to women, official policies, and the rentier system in each state. Policies, legislation, and empowerment programmes are increasingly favourable to women, but they still fall short of gender equity.

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These and other factors impose restrictions and constraints on independence of females, including young females. Young females usually are not permitted to live independently away from their family before marriage, although some young males do. Young males are allowed to travel alone for business and tourism, whereas females are much less free to do so. Young males are entrusted by their families and accepted by the society to engage in public spaces such as civil society networks, organizations, and activities, but females often are not. It is a norm that male students seek university and higher education away from their country of residency, whereas many safeguards and restrictions are imposed on female students. It is common for young males to work or to run businesses in other countries, especially in other Gulf states, but it is very rare for single Gulf young females to work or run businesses outside their homeland. Many jobs and professions are not accessible to females, especially in the private sector (AlMara, AlKhalejia, Wa, & AlTanmea, 2019). Thus, several factors limit the independence of young females, compared to young males. Despite the greater restrictions on females compared to males, compared to the past, females today are increasingly engaged in all aspects of public life including education, employment, business ownership, economic functions in the society, politics, culture, state administration, and so forth. All of these historical changes are contributing to free females of constraints and restrictions imposed by the family, society, and the state (AlMara et al., 2019). These historical changes extend to family life. For example, husbands increasingly prefer a working wife to share in meeting the heavy financial demands of the new urban life. Hence, marital life is increasingly based on partnership as far as supporting household needs and family administration (Fadl, 2015). This transformation in females’ empowerment was not anticipated a few years ago. These changes will enhance females’ independence, and for young married couples, will strengthen their independence in relation to others (Alias et al., 2013).

Aspects and Forms of Youth Independence Youth independence can take many forms and encounter many challenges. Domains of independence for GCC youth include post-graduate education, securing economic independence, forming a family, and living independently. Each of these domains will be considered in turn. Education. Education that enables students to be creative, innovative, independent-minded, and qualified with skills compatible with the needs of the labour market and advancement of human knowledge are of utmost importance to GCC youth. However, public education, including university education, in the GCC states is still considered traditional and has not kept pace with advancement and modernization, tending to produce obedient, non-critical, and non-innovative graduates. During the last decades private education has been expanding with parents belonging to the middle and upper classes tending

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to enrol their offspring in private educational institutions. Graduates of private secondary schools then often enrol in Western universities. Except for Saudi Arabia, the rest of the GCC states encouraged the establishment of branches of Western universities or local universities accredited by Western universities in their countries. These universities have elements of the methodology and the spirit of Western universities, including encouraging critical thinking and independence. These universities tend to encourage self-dependence during the university epoch and post-university practical life. Western universities are expensive, but there is official sponsorship for nationals who are admitted in some GCC states such as Qatar and UAE. Affluent families tend to send their sons and daughters to the Western universities, whereas less affluent families opt for Arab and Asian universities. Substantial numbers of Gulf students are enrolled at universities abroad. The impact of education and life in modern, democratic, and free societies on the Gulf young university students and graduates is positive, in a sense of acquiring wide knowledge, critical thinking, liberal values, diverse skills, accomplishment aspirations, competitiveness, democratic orientations, gender equity, and human rights, all of which contribute to youth confidence and independence (El-Hdaad, 2003). In addition to the university itself, being away from their homeland, society, and family also contributes to self-dependence and self-management of life. Gulf university students abroad, especially in the US and UK, often work while studying so as to finance their education expenses, which also contributes to their self-dependence. There is a tendency among some Gulf youth graduates not to return home and secure lucrative jobs that do not necessarily satisfy their aspirations, but instead to stay abroad to work. In most cases, the financial rewards are less than at home, but the intellectual rewards are sometimes worth the economic sacrifice. This trend towards remaining abroad is a manifestation of young people’s aspiration to free will and an independent mind. Economic independence. The Gulf economies, though still dependent on oil and gas (hydrocarbons), have reached a consensus to diversify the economy and to be less dependent on hydrocarbons. Each GCC state has adopted strategies for promoting a sustainable economy that is diversified and less dependent on oil and gas. This change requires that the private sector be the major economic actor and the state to be the regulator rather than provider of services. Accordingly, the state will not be the major employer of secured and less demanding jobs for the nationals. The private sector is to provide jobs for increasing numbers of nationals but on competitive bases. The current Gulf economies are relatively modern and competitive. Young nationals seeking employment in the state or private sector, initiating their own business, or even joining a family business, face challenges that were not present decades ago. They are faced with expatriates who compete for the same jobs, especially in the private sector. Expatriates’ private business enterprises

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are increasingly competing with national private business enterprises with the liberalization of the economy (El-Hdaad, 2003). Due to these factors, unemployment in the GCC states, except for UAE and Qatar, is increasing. To cope with these challenges, Gulf youth have to be more competent and to master the professions that are required by the market. The tradition that young people join the family business or seek a profession chosen by the family is receding, and youth are increasingly making more independent choices regarding their professional lives. Marriage, remaining single, and divorce. Societal changes in marriage are also contributing to increases in youth independence. In the traditional marriage, the norm is that the potential bride has no say in choosing the potential groom. Social compatibility is of great importance, and social disparity could lead to revoking marriage. It was common for males and females to marry very young, and even underage for females (Alshehabi, 2012). With the modernization of the Gulf society, there have been phenomenal changes in all relevant aspects of forming the family, but this does not mean a complete end of previous considerations. The spheres of work, residence, and education in urban communities provide individuals of both sexes with more opportunities than in non-urban communities to meet and to get acquainted, which could lead to marriage. Co-education, in particular, facilitates friendship between young men and women, which can contribute to more independence in decisions about marriage. In this new social environment, there has been a transformation from totally arranged marriages to marriages based on prior acquaintance between the bride and the groom who later receive the approval and the blessings of the family. Though the consent of the two families generally remains necessary, there are rare cases of marriage without the families’ consent. Men and women in the Gulf also are increasingly choosing to remain unmarried. The decision to remain single is not because women can’t find husbands or men can’t afford to marry. It reflects a desire to delay the “marriage project” by males or females until they realize their personal aspirations, such as obtaining the highest levels of education or mastering a certain profession or developing their own business. Such persons, especially females, are often very busy in realizing their aspirations so they delay marriage (Zayed, 1998). Choosing to remain single reflects more independent decisions by young males and females regarding when to form their own family, despite family and social pressures. The divorce rate also has been increasing in all GCC states, especially among young adults, with varying rates from one state to another. This phenomenon is considered to be a negative product of societal and family modernization, but it also reflects more freedom by both partners to end unsuccessful marriages despite pressures from their families and in defiance of societal norms. Despite progress in marital and family legislation in the GCC states, the reference base

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is still Islamic law “Sharia,” where females have fewer privileges than males (Bahrain Women Union, 2019). The determination and persistent drive for disprivileged females to seek divorce, despite odds and in defiance of the family and societal pressures, is a manifestation of strong will in pursuit of independence for the sake of dignity and freedom. This also could be true for males in some cases. Residential independence. The traditional extended Gulf family with up to three generations living together is now rare. The post-oil era was accompanied by a metropolitan boom. In addition to the expansion of the traditional towns, villages, and residential gatherings, the growth of new ultra-modern towns and real estate complexes has been phenomenal. All six GCC states have sponsored affordable residential housing assigned to citizens’ families. The housing takes various forms, such as providing a housing unit, a plot of land, a sum of money, or a low-interest loan, but these housing units were not designed for extended families. The majority of contemporary families moved to their new residential areas away from their traditional family residence. It has become customary that some young males move to independent residences even before marriage. In contrast to previous housing that promoted interdependence among families, contemporary housing makes independence from extended family more the norm (Alshehabi, 2012). Cyber communication and knowledge revolution. A knowledge revolution has been facilitated by cyber communication because the Gulf population enjoys very high rates of internet access and ownership of laptops, iPads, and smart phones. The adoption of social media in the Gulf is among the highest in the world (Gulf Development Forum, 2017). These forms of modern communication have made it possible for the majority of Gulf youth to overcome state media control and censorship plus societal sanctions. These capabilities have contributed to new freedoms with implications on values, culture, social networking, education, professions, and life styles. Major implications have been a relative dissociation from traditional sources of knowledge, information, and communication and defiance of state dictations, which have contributed to youth independence. Travel and living abroad. Travel and living abroad contribute to acquiring values and life styles that encourage self-reliance and thus contribute to more independence of Gulf youth. Many Gulf youth today live abroad, away from family and homeland. The majority are students, but many also are abroad as employees or managing their own business. The prevalence of living abroad has been motivated by the integration of Gulf economies in the capitalist globalized economy. In living abroad, Gulf youth have forged relationships with their counterparts worldwide, which has contributed to more independence of thinking, knowledge, decisions, and actions in the face of local constraints imposed by the state, society, and the family.

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Implications for Policy and Practice in the GCC Understanding increases in youth independence in the context of social and family changes has several implications that apply across the GCC. First, usually youth affairs are entrusted to a high council led by a senior member of the ruling family and are sometimes handled along with sport affairs. The council is composed of appointed persons, but not elected to represent the youth organizations and affiliations. The council draws the policies and supervises their implementation. This structure creates a deep gap between the youth and the council. The adopted policies are in many ways not responsive to youth aspirations and needs. Although there is a need for an official agency relevant to youth affairs, it should include elected representatives of youth organizations and be responsive to their aspirations. Care should also be taken to avoid duplication among government agencies dealing with youth, to reduce costs and confusion about responsibilities and to facilitate implementation of policies and projects. Second, there is a need for policy-makers to address the intellectual aspects of youth needs, such as enhancing modernity values, civil rights, knowledge, creativity, innovation, and development of specific skills. Some of these intellectual aspects extend to youth economic empowerment through supporting youth employment and entrepreneurship to fulfil youth aspirations. There is a need for partnerships with youth in drafting policies, mobilizing resources, and implementing concrete measures to ensure that policies are enforced. Many of the current official policies undermine youth independence, innovation, and progress. If new policies with youth participation are adopted, youth independence will be facilitated. Third, many restrictions are imposed on youth organizations and clubs. Youth should be supported to establish their own organizations, associations, and clubs without dictation or imposition. Similarly, freedom of expression and association in all forms are very restricted in public spaces, where prior permits are required for any public event, including those related to youth. Freedom of expression for youth should be encouraged and protected. Discrimination among youth based on gender, religion, sect, social status, or other factors should be incriminated, and solutions sought for remedying injustices based on discrimination. The government, the business sector, and the civil society should cooperate in addressing these and other youth issues. The three parties should seek the support of the UN specialized agencies to build on their successful experiences in other contexts.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research It clear that there is an acute shortage of thorough scientific research on social change, family transformation, and youth issues in the GCC. Several vital statistics are either absent, unreliable, or contradictory with respect to a number of

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indicators of youth independence tendencies. Because some of these issues are considered sensitive or sanctioned, field studies on subjective phenomena are often lacking. The GCC General Secretariat should establish an independent institution or a centre entitled to embark on scientific research on youth issues conducted by qualified researchers. Each member state should support the existing academic institutions and research centres to address youth issues. Cooperation both within the region and with international academic institutions will advance understanding of youth affairs in the Gulf region.

Conclusions Unforeseen oil and gas (hydrocarbons) production in the GCC generated huge revenues and initiated vast economic and social changes in the last five decades that have led to transformations in family life that have had many implications for youth independence in the Gulf. Traditional affiliations based on kinship, tribe, clan, religion, sect, and neighbourhood still exist. But new networks and affiliations are evolving in the modern society that involve new social structures, classes, and institutions, all of which contribute to the transformation of the society and the family. Changes in the function, formation, and role of the family have been at the heart of social change. Youth independence trends are a manifestation of both the family and societal transformation and modernization. But modernization, which is characteristic of transformation, has been undermined by several factors, especially the authoritarian state, traditional society, conservative religious establishment, and privileged private sector. The rentier state manipulates its resources to sustain dependence on the state and enforce selective and restricted transformation and modernization. Modernization goes along with democracy and civil rights and is undermined by strategies that control people and resources through sustaining outdated values, affiliations, and practices that restrict individual, especially youth, potential. The youth independence trend, though occurring in all GCC countries, has some variation from country to country and is more prevalent in urban than rural areas, in affluent communities rather than poor communities, and in more modern professionals, academics, business leaders, and intellectuals. Gender disparities in independence exist between Gulf young males and females. Constraints by the family, society, and the state restrict mobility and independence more for Gulf young females than males. Youth independence, self-assertiveness, and self-reliance are stronger economically and socially than politically. Youth independence is manifested economically in choice of profession and self-entrepreneurship in business, which leads in many cases to less economic dependence on the family. Social independence is manifested in the shift from extended to nuclear family, and strengthening affiliations with non-traditional organizations, although

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traditional social groups such as the tribe and sect still have some influence. Political free choice is less common due to state sanctions of political formations and activities, but even in the political domain there is increasing youth independence in political beliefs, values, and allegiances. Youth are the forefront of change, advancement, and modernity so often challenge forces and policies undermining progressive transformation. Globalization, modern technology, and social media have contributed to wider outreach for youth. Youth independence is a manifestation and result of many social and familial transformations, but traditional social structures, linkages, and values have not vanished completely but rather coexist with new societal norms and values. Social changes and changes within the family will continue to have implications for youth independence in the Gulf, and the drive of youth for independence will continue to motivate further changes in society and the family.

References Abdulmalek, A. (2018). Demographic changes in the GCC countries. Dubai, UAE: The Nation Daily. Abyad, A. (2018). Demographic changes in the GCC countries: Reflection and future projection. Middle East Journal of Age and Ageing, 15, 20–24. Alias, Y. and others (2013). Issues of Gulf social policies (Arabic). Manama, Bahrain: Executive Bureau. AlMara, AlKhalejia, Wa, & AlTanmea. (2019). Gulf women and development. Retrieved from https://www.df.ae/meetings/index.php?type=4# Alnajr, B. (2018). Alhadatha Almomtna Fi Alkhalej AlArabi (Arabic) (Contested modernity in the Arabian Gulf ). Beirut: Dar AlSaqi. Alnajar, B. and others. (2014). Facing social phenomena and problems in the GCC. Manama, Bahrain: Executive Bureau. Alshehabi, O. (2012). Ektla AlJodoor (Arabic) (Uprooting: The real estate projects and demography defect). Beirut: Arab Unity Center. Alshehabi, O. (Ed.). (2014). Sokan AlKhalej (Arabic) (The Gulf population). Kuwait: Gulf Development Forum. AlZahrani, S. (2011). AlTalem AlAali Wa Tanmea fi Majlis AlTawon (Arabic) (Higher education and development in the GCC countries). Retrieved from https://www. df.ae/meetings/index.php?type=4 Bahrain Women Union. (2019). Montada Mokarna Kawanin AlOsra AlArabia (Arabic). Manama, Bahrain: Seminar on Comparative Family Laws in The Arab Countries. Bohaji, H. (2018). AlTanmia Fi Hawamish AlKhalej (Arabic) (Development on the Gulf margin). Kuwait: Gulf Center for Development Studies. El-Hdaad, Y. (2003). Major trends affecting transformation of the families in the Gulf. Bahrain: University of Bahrain. Fadel, M. (2016). GCC youth between education and labor market. Manama, Bahrain: Executive Bureau. Fadl, M. (2015). AlMobadrat Ledwal Majlis AlTawon Fi Majal Tamken Amara Fi AlKeta AlKhas (Arabic) (The GCC implemented initiatives for women empowerment in the private sector). Manama, Bahrain: The Executive Bureau.

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Fuccaro, N. (2017). Histories of city and state in the Persian Gulf. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gateway Gulf Investment Forum. (2018). Manama Bahrain. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/10/the-gulfs-youth-is-our-trump-card-butgovernments-shouldnt-spoil-them-business-leaders-say.html Gulf Development Forum. (2017). Takneat AlMalomat fi Dewal AlKhalij AlArabi (Arabic) (Information and communication technology and development in the Gulf ). Manama, Bahrain: Gulf Development Forum. Khalifa, B., & Nasser, R. (2015). The closeness of the child to the domestic servant and its mediation by negative parenting behaviors in an Arab Gulf country. Proceedings of the Australasian Conference on Business and Social Sciences 2015, 258–269. Peters, E., & Camp, C. (Eds.). (2010). Marriage and family: Perspective and complexities. New York: Columbia University Press. World Bank. (2017). GCC: Economic outlook. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank. org/en/country/gcc/publication/economic-outlook-april-2017 Zahlan, A., Partrec, N., & Findlow, S. (2009). Education and development future: Human resources and development in the Arabian Gulf. Abu Dhabi, UAE: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Zayed, A. (1998). AlOsra, AlMadena Wa Altager AlEjtmai (Arabic) (Family, city and social transformations – between development and modernization). Manama, Bahrain: Executive Bureau of the Council of Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

8 THE IMPACT OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT ON JOB SATISFACTION A Qatari Perspective Noora Lari

Introduction Much of the debate over Work-Family Conflict (WFC) in the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar) revolves around the establishment of employee-oriented human resources policies, which have the potential to improve both work and life satisfaction. The achievement of a work-family balance has become more difficult to sustain, particularly for female employees who find themselves in a dilemma created by the pressures of professional and personal responsibilities. Women in Qatar and the rest of the GCC countries are being overburdened by family responsibilities owing to cultural and religious expectations, which promote possible work-life imbalance and job dissatisfaction (Mitchell, Paschyn, Mir, Pike, & Kane, 2015). All GCC countries have labor laws, but each country has attempted to implement a different set of reforms at various times over the last decade. For instance, the State of Qatar has implemented changes to its labor laws (i.e., the Civil Human Resources Law of 2016 and the Labor Law of 2004). Yet despite these reforms, the changes have been marginal and limited in scope. The questions of how, and to what extent, work-family conflict affects Qatari working adults’ job satisfaction have not been thoroughly examined. To better understand this phenomenon, this chapter aims to assess the family-friendly human resource policies in addition to examining how such policies are related to job satisfaction. This chapter has three objectives: (1) to generate knowledge on the factors influencing the labor market outcomes for employees in Qatar (namely, work-oriented policies, and job circumstances); (2) to examine the intertwined relations between labor force participation and family conflict, after

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simultaneously controlling the most influential factor among others, which is gender differentials; and (3) to establish social policy recommendations and amendments to the current provisions of the Civil Human Resources Law of 2016 and the Labor Law of 2004 for a long-term agenda to improve the well-being of Qatari families, including a work plan for further economic growth. The chapter will answer the following research questions: 1

2 3

How familiar are working Qataris with provisions in national laws intended to support work-family balance (i.e., the Civil Human Resources Law of 2016 and the Labor Law of 2004)? What is the relation between WFC and job satisfaction in terms of public and private sectors? To what extent are employee benefits necessary to achieve work-family balance, according to working Qataris’ views?

The next section introduces WFC in theory and practice and presents an overview of the international literature about job satisfaction and WFC. Then, the chapter addresses GCC’s labor laws and policies related to achievement of work-family balance. Against this background, the empirical findings section draws on original survey data from Qatar to better understand the varying conditions across GCC countries, detailing how familiar Qatari employees are with provisions in national laws intended to support work-family balance and the degree to which employers support these reforms. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the prospects for the broader GCC and speculates on the opportunities for reform in the future in order to illuminate the dynamics underlying WFC and its implications for family cohesion.

Background on WFC in the International Literature WFC is related to many critical employment and personal life outcomes that include work and family outcomes, physical health, psychological health, and life satisfaction (Kossek & Lee, 2017). It is a continuous process, whereby an employee negotiates attending to family, individual, and work obligations. Female employees have achieved great success in their careers, but their responsibilities toward their families have not been reduced (Anuradha & Pandey, 2016). It can be especially difficult for women to prioritize between their family and work responsibilities. The increased employment of mothers and the tendency toward working longer hours can cause WFC for female employees (Fawole & Ogunbowale, 2016). All employees can become obsessed with their work when searching for a promotion or when attempting to complete a heavy workload. These employees can end up with a work-life imbalance, which can result in conflicts between their work life and their out-of-work life (Al-Muftah, 2017).

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The link between employment and instability in the work-family domains has long been investigated, and work-life balance has been defined and studied extensively (Anuradha & Pandey, 2016; Carlson, Grzywacz, & Zivnuska, 2009; Carlson & Kacmar, 2000; Fawole & Ogunbowale, 2016; Ueda, 2010). Worklife balance is the degree to which employees are equally engaged and satisfied in their work and in their family role at the same time (Greenhaus, Collins, & Shaw, 2003). Accordingly, work-life balance requires a balance of three things: time, satisfaction, and psychological involvement. In the modern workplace, however, striking a balance between job roles and family or personal roles has become difficult. More often than not, employees find themselves spending more time on their job responsibilities and less on their personal roles, thanks to issues such as unemployment and inflation (Maeran, Pitarelli, & Cangiano, 2013). Many surveys show that people find it hard to strike equilibrium between their professional and private lives. This is even harder for women who have more responsibilities at home than men do. The lack of a work-life balance has several consequences, including fatigue, poor health, difficult relationships with family and coworkers, and more unmet expectations. Customs and traditions are among several factors that may affect female employees because of their roles in the household (e.g., housework and childcare responsibilities). Therefore, female employees face challenges in balancing family roles and career responsibilities at the same time. For instance, one study from Nigeria found that excessive pressure to meet employers’ goals has created a work-life conflict among working women, thus making them choose their families over work (Ajayi, 2013). Other studies have also corroborated these findings; they observed that the disregard for leave entitlements and lack of family and welfare programs have worsened work-life balance among women and discouraged them from being as productive at work as would otherwise be possible (Kumari, 2012; Obiageli, Uzochukwu, & Ngozi, 2015). Technological advancement has also negatively impacted work-life balance, owing to the usage of technology to perform family duties while at work and vice versa. However, companies that have work-life support programs have higher employee job satisfaction (Ueda, 2010). The United States government confirmed the recognition of work-life balance as a main human resource management issue in 1990 (Bird, 2006). As such, employee-oriented human resources policies, is an essential component of both work and family satisfaction. Many publications have emphasized the importance of both emotional and practical social support from an individual’s social network of family, friends, co-workers, supervisors, and spouse, all of which can help employees to accomplish their work objectives (Bickford, 2005; Charoensukmongkol, Moqbel, & Gutierrez-Wirsching, 2016; Menguc & Boichuk, 2012; Wallace, 2005).

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Research on Job Satisfaction Job satisfaction is defined as the general attitude that employees show toward their jobs, and it has become an important field in the study of organizational behavior. Al-Muftah (2010) explored the relation between employees’ job satisfaction and stability in their work and family life and defined the factors that can impact job satisfaction such as: satisfactory pay benefits, trust and security at work, respect, career growth, a healthy environment, and the ability of employees to sustain a work-life balance that meets their work and out-of-work obligations. Satisfied employees are critical for the success of the organization because they are likely to exert more effort to improve their job performance. Accordingly, there is a close relation between job satisfaction and work-life balance. One study, for instance, established that a link exists between the recognition of employee contributions at the workplace and work-life balance, which increased employee satisfaction (Rania, 2011). A study has illustrated that a work-life imbalance correlates with workaholism, workaholic behavior, and less job satisfaction, which can occur regardless of gender (Aziz & Cunningham, 2008). There are no gender differences in experiences with work-life conflict, and work flexibility can help both genders to cope with conflict (Sav & Harris, 2013). A study evaluating the work-life balance impacts on the motivation of working women in Nigeria demonstrated that the realities of patriarchal culture in Nigeria negatively impacted the work-life balance among women. Motivation and job satisfaction were lost due to the pressure to perform familial as well as work duties, leading to a reduced commitment toward improved organizational performance (Nwagbara & Akanji, 2012). Work-life balance programs can have an impact on employees’ job satisfaction. Noor (2011) confirmed that employees prefer to work in organizations that have programs in place to balance work and personal life. A lack of such programs will often lead to quick employee turnover. According to Ueda (2010), work-life balance programs have had different effects on male and female employees. For male employees, the study demonstrated that they were satisfied with their employers, their overall job roles, and the work-life balance programs initiated by their employers. For female employees, the study concludes they were only satisfied with their employers. There are also variables that influence the level of employee job satisfaction such as working conditions, reward system, experience, status and seniority, marital status, and perceived supervision quality (Gayathri & Ramakrishnan, 2013). Employees’ job satisfaction might be achieved when their work-family balance is high and their WFC is low, as these two factors determine organizational performance on the one hand and family well-being on the other (Nadeem & Abbas, 2009).

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Research on Organizational Benefits Strategy Some studies claimed that organizational benefits that can be provided to employees might lead to career commitment and job satisfaction (Bashir, 2008; Batool, 2013). For instance, Batool’s (2013) work has shown that a negative correlation exists between job stress and organizational commitment and that reducing stress levels at the workplace can improve the individual’s productivity and organizational performance. Bashir (2008) established a correlation between organizational commitment and the importance of implementing work-family policies in Pakistan as ways to reduce the conflict between employees’ work and family responsibilities. In private and public sectors, the prioritization of employees’ work roles and personal lives has implications for their psychological, social, and mental well-being, which can lead to the development of a positive employee attitude toward performance at the workplace (Hillman & Salama, 2018; Mitchell et al., 2015). Therefore, it is essential to create a family-friendly culture through adopting the best forms of supportive family-friendly policies at work (Mansour & Tremblay, 2016; Santos & Cardoso, 2008). For instance, factors that promote balanced work-life activities, such as a leave policy, can improve employees’ job satisfaction and subsequent job performance (Aluko, 2009; Belwal & Belwal, 2014). More recently, research has shown that access to services and technologies at home, as well as variables that describe the macroeconomic context and the supply of flexible jobs in labor markets, are also important factors (Marchionni, Gluzmann, Serrano, & Bustelo, 2019).

Background on Work-Family Policies in the GCC Several studies have established that incorporating a work-life policy in the GCC countries is different to some extent from other countries. Regardless of how supportive work-family policies are, women are obligated by Sharia Law (in addition to social and cultural norms) to conduct themselves within and outside the home in ways that sometimes defeat the intended goals of WFC policies. In some GCC countries, the number of women involved in the labor force is expected to continue rising, and women will become an integral part of the economic growth of the region. Both Qatar and United Arab Emirates are considered progressive states when it comes to implementing policies that help women manage their worklife balance; they have embraced the leading role in enhancing gender parity in the workforce. The net effect is increased time spent with family, thus improving the overall work-life balance. Moreover, Saudi Arabia records a 30% employment rate for women (Walker, 2016). However, women in GCC states have traditionally assumed the role of taking care of their families, including nurturing children and handling domestic tasks.

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According to Belwal and Belwal (2014), the absence of family-friendly policies contributed to WFC and subsequent job dissatisfaction among women in Oman. The same study recommended more family-friendly policies and a more supportive outlook for the well-being of women working in Oman. A study by Sidani and Al Hakim (2012) identified that women face the heaviest pressure in the work setting because they are often underpaid and undervalued as workers. That prejudice is even greater if women raise their children as single parents. This study also shows that in the GCC, most women lack upward mobility in their roles. The lack of professional fulfillment ostensibly forces women to look to the familial setting to acquire job satisfaction.

The Case of Qatar Qatar is a small state in the Arabian Peninsula and has quickly developed in recent decades because of its petroleum-rich economy (World Bank, 2014). One of the main goals of the Qatar Second National Development Strategy (QNDS) 2018–2022 is strengthening family cohesion and realizing the full potential of Qatari men and women in the labor force (General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2018). While many policies are currently being implemented in Qatar to help address these challenges, there is still little empirical research to help guide this policy. Therefore, a more comprehensive understanding of the socioeconomic implications on the labor force potential of the country as well as family cohesion is essential (Al-Muftah, 2010; AlMuhannadi, 2011; Berrebi, Martorell, & Tanner, 2009; Liloia, 2018; Williams, Bhanugopan, & Fish, 2011). Qatar has widely sought to improve the conditions of Qatari women in the public sphere through initiating provisions within the Labor Law policies to ensure their equal rights, and to eliminate the socio-cultural constraints that discriminate against them. Women in Qatar have made significant strides in the labor market over the last decade, which has positively contributed to increased economic growth (Daly, 2007; World Bank, 2012). According to a statistical report by the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (2018) Qatar experienced sustained growth of its female labor force participation where the rate is 36.4%, well above the GCC average of 25%. Moreover, women in Qatar are also catching up with men in the educational arena and in some cases surpassing them. This means that the traditional male “breadwinner” model is changing to a dual-earner model in Qatari society. In addition, Qatar government has put forward numerous initiatives for creating family-friendly policies, promoting the well-being of Qatari families, and achieving economic growth. Yet, women still face many challenges in participating in the labor force, which presents a substantial hurdle toward making full use of the country’s human resources as a potential driver for economic development. Women make up 47% of the economically inactive population

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(Planning and Statistics Authority, 2018; Statista, 2018), which translates to almost a third of the working population. Several factors, such as family composition, social norms, marital status, education, age, ethnicity, skills, and experience, can shape women’s choices in participating in the labor force. For instance, a significant discrepancy was observed between married and unmarried women’s labor force participation rates, and married women represented almost half (47%) of the economically inactive population (Planning and Statistics Authority, 2018). Married Qatari women, who are more highly educated than Qatari men, are less likely to pursue employment due to cultural constraints and family commitments (Stasz, Eide, Martorell, Constant, & Goldman, 2011). A recent statistical report also indicated there are more non-Qatari women working in the labor force compared to Qatari women (Planning and Statistics Authority, 2018). This adds an intriguing dynamic to the question of employment distribution in Qatar. Three-quarters of the Qatari labor force works in the public sector. Yet non-Qataris make up almost 80% of the private sector employees in the country; that number is also evenly matched between the genders. Hence, in addition to cultural factors and inhospitable WFB policies, Qatari women face competition from non-Qatari women, especially in the private sector.

Implications for Qatari Families Existing research shows the consequences of fundamental changes in the family brought about mainly by women’s labor market participation and educational outcomes that have taken place in the last two decades (Al-Ammari & Romanowski, 2016; Gebel & Stefanie, 2016; Roylance & Barlow, 2015). Patriarchal societies tend to assign gender roles that make women the primary caregivers in their societies. While massive strides have been made to alter this assignment of gender roles, there is still immense pressure on women to fulfill their familial chores as primary caregivers in the home setting, even when they work in the modern economy for pay. Difficulties in reconciling gender roles, domestic responsibilities, and employment in the labor market have been shown to contribute to low work-family balance. The gender roles of most women as wives and mothers in the GCC limit their options and make work-family balance difficult for them to achieve (Hendy, 2016). Therefore, social norms regarding the role of women in the household (e.g., household work, childcare responsibilities, and marital responsibilities), family structure, and marriage can negatively affect women’s career development (AlMufta, 2010; Al-Muhannadi, 2011; Williams et al., 2011). For instance, female employees are challenged by long working hours, as these hours rob women of the time spent with their families, therefore women may not be willing to take jobs with long working hours (Berrebi et al., 2009). To simultaneously assess

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issues of WFC, it is essential to provide insights on Qatar’s Labor Law and employment benefits in order to increase women’s labor participation in line with Qatar’s National Vision 2030 strategy.

The State of Qatar Legislation and Labor Law Qatar Labor Law provides a body of laws and regulations outlining the legal rights, restrictions, and obligations of workers, employers, and workers’ committees. These provisions are intended to support work-family balance, safeguard employees’ rights, secure a better working environment, and provide information that guides employers and employees to enjoy a mutually beneficial interaction in both private and public engagements (Hukoomi, 2016). The law was originally adopted in 2004 before being amended in 2014 and 2015. To promote a work-life balance, the law prescribes a five-day-per-week working schedule, with each day not lasting more than eight hours. The main provisions of the Civil Human Resources Law of 2016 are applied to public sector employees, and the provisions of Labor Law of 2004 are applied to the private sector. Both laws relate to work-family balance. Female employees working in the public sector benefitted from the following policies: 60 days of paid maternity leave; 90 days of paid maternity leave in the case of twins; five years of paid leave for mothers to care for a child with disability; paid leave for mothers to accompany a sick child during treatment in either a public or private hospital within Qatar, in accordance with the medical report; and two nursing hours per day for a period of two years. Women employees working in the private sectors also benefited from policies including 50 days of paid maternity leave and one nursing hour per day for a period of two years. Government entities may also allow some positions to follow a part-time schedule, in accordance with conditions and regulations issued by the Council of Ministers. According to the existing literature, the public sector seems to be the preferred choice for married women, as it provides the possibility of more adequately reconciling the family and professional spheres (Hendy, Kamionka, Assaad, Sofer, & Bushinsky, 2011).

Conceptual Framework This section presents a summary of the conceptual framework of WFC implications on job satisfaction in the State of Qatar. Based on the literature review, the model presented in Figure 8.1 shows that WFC can be caused by some job characteristics (i.e., inadequate human resources policies), which directly affect employees’ job satisfaction. Several provisions in national law were being investigated in terms of familiarity within the context of the labor market and effectiveness and expectations as a means to support a work-family balance in the public and private sectors. Here, it is conceptualized that WFC mediates

Work-Family Conflict and Job Satisfaction  139

Resources • Job Resources: Family-Friendly Benefits

FIGURE 8.1

Work Outcomes

WFC • Work-toFamily

• Well-being: Job Satisfaction

Conceptual framework of work-family conflict (WFC) implications on job satisfaction.

the relation between job resources (i.e., national provisions intended to support a work-family balance) and job satisfaction (Figure 8.1).

Empirical Findings Methods Data were collected in 2017 by the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University in collaboration with Doha International Family Institute (DIFI), after obtaining approval from Qatar University’s Institutional Review Board. Informed consent was obtained prior to the guided interviews, and respondents’ personal identification details were not collected to maintain their privacy and confidentiality. The structured questionnaire was programmed into a computer-assisted personal interview system using BLAISE software. All the individual interviews were merged and saved in a single BLAISE data file, and the data have been weighted. This dataset was then cleaned, coded, and saved in STATA formats for data analysis. Sampling plays a critical part in any survey process because the ability to make any valid inference regarding the population relies upon a rigorous sampling design. The final weights in the data are constructed from three components: the base weights reflecting the sample selection probability, the adjustment factors to account for a non-response, and calibration to ensure the survey results are in line with the population numbers. Weight trimming is also used because highly variable weights can introduce undesirable variability in statistical estimates (Potter, 1990). Base weights are the inverse of the selection probability of the unit in the sample. Due to the systematic sampling, all housing units in the same zone have the same chance of being selected, and the weights are given by this formula: housing  unit Wbase = 1/ p housing  unit where Wbase is the base weight for the housing unit, and p is the probability of selection.

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The base weights are then adjusted by the number of eligible persons in the household to arrive at person-level base weights: person housing  unit Wbase = k * Wbase

where k is the number of eligible persons in the household. To adjust factors for non-response, if the responding and non-responding units are essentially similar with respect to the key subjects of the investigation, the base weights can be adjusted to account for the non-response by this formula: person W person =∝ Wbase

where ∝ is called the adjustment factor for non-response, which is based on the propensity that a sampled unit is likely to respond to the survey (Varedian, 2003). The weights were also calibrated to ensure the results were in line with the population estimates. This calibration can help reduce the effect from nonresponse and under-coverage of the sampling frame. SESRI uses the “raking” method in the calibration to adjust the weights of the cases in the sample so that the proportions of the adjusted weights on certain characteristics agree with the corresponding proportions for the population.

Data and Measures The present study included 807 Qatari working males and females. Only one person 18 years or older in each household was selected for the interview. There were 478 males (59.2%), with an average age of 39.29 years, and 329 females (40.8%), with an average age of 36.82 years. This indicated that working Qatari females were generally younger than working Qatari males and that the average age of participants was 38.28 years. Of all the participants, 71.7% were married, and around 90% had five children or fewer. The participants were generally welleducated; almost half of them reported having completed a bachelor’s degree or some form of higher education. In terms of their occupations, 87% of participants worked in the public sector, mostly as managers or professionals. In terms of overall earnings, most of the participants reported earning more than $11,000 per month, and 88.3% of them were either satisfied or very satisfied with their income.

Public Awareness of National Laws To assess awareness of current national laws and benefits intended to prevent WFC in Qatar, respondents in the public and private sectors were specifically asked: “Do you know about the new Human Resources Law of 2016 in regards to several aspects intended to prevent WFC?” Responses are shown in Table 8.1.

Work-Family Conflict and Job Satisfaction  141 TABLE 8.1 Awareness of the Provisions in National Laws Intended to Support Work-

Family Balance in the Public and Private Sector Law

1 I Know a 2 I Know Lot (%) Enough (%)

3 I Know a Little (%)

4 Not at All (%)

50.79 30.04

21.89 19.31

14.02 16.60

13.30 34.05

24.46

17.74

16.45

41.34

32.90

23.75

14.59

28.47

56.08

21.32

10.30

12.30

23.38 33.77

23.38 32.47

23.38 14.29

29.87 19.48

Human Resources Law of 2016 60 days of paid maternity leave 90 days of paid maternity leave in the case of twins Five years of paid leave for mothers to care for a disabled child Paid leave for mothers to accompany a sick child during treatment Two nursing hours per day for a period of two years Labor Law of 2004 50 days of paid maternity leave One nursing hour per day for a period of two years

Table 8.1 shows that employees in the public sector generally reported awareness of the provisions of Human Resources Law of 2016. For instance, over half of the respondents (72.68%) reported they know a lot or enough about the 60 days of paid maternity leave, whereas 27.32% of them reported that they know a little or not at all. In addition, 56.65% of respondents know a lot or enough about the provision of paid leave for mothers to accompany a sick child during treatment compared to 43.6% reporting knowing little or nothing about it. Moreover, 77.4% of respondents reported that they know a lot or enough about the two nursing hours per day for a period of two years compared to 22.6% who knew little or nothing at all. Around half of the respondents (50.65%) reported that they know little or nothing about the provision of the 90 days of paid maternity leave in the case of twins, and a majority of respondents (57.79%) reported they knew little or nothing of the five years of paid leave for mothers to care for a disabled child. The employees in the private sector who followed the Labor Law of 2004 reported that 46.76% know a lot or enough about the provision for 50 days of paid maternity leave compared to 53.25% knowing little or nothing at all. Note that more females (62.5%) than males (35.5%) reported understanding this provision in full. Moreover, around 66.1% know a lot or enough about the provision of

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one hour per day for maternal nursing for two years; again, more females (80%) than males (57.6%) reported being aware of this provision.

Gender Differences The association between gender and the awareness of the national provisions of the Human Resources Law of 2016 and the Labor Law of 2004, which are intended to support work-family balance, is shown in Table 8.2. The Poisson regression with robust variances was used to calculate the estimated confidence intervals. The model showed gender differences in terms of awareness of national provisions intended to support work-family balance in the public and private sectors. For most provisions, women were more likely to be aware of the provisions and reported a greater understanding of the policies and benefits than males. For instance, most females reported a full understanding of having two hours per day for two years to support mothers’ nursing of infants, whereas only 68.5% of males reported the same.

Job Satisfaction Job satisfaction, the outcome of interest, was measured using the following question: “To what extent does your employer meet your expectations in terms of offering benefits for achieving work-life balance?” These benefits include: (1) prenatal leave, “leave available prior to the delivery date of a child,” (2) paid paternity leave, “leave available to fathers at the time of the birth of a child,” (3) paid maternity leave, “leave available to mothers at the time of the birth of a child,” (4) parental paid leave, “leave available to mothers and fathers in order to care for their children,” (5) flexible working hours after returning from maternity leave, (6) flexible working hours to care for dependents more generally, (7) telecommuting or working from home to care for dependents more generally, (8) on-site breastfeeding room, (9) on-site childcare facility, and (10) part-time, job-sharing, or other reduced-hour options. The following scale was used: (1) exceeds expectations, (2) meets expectations, (3) less than expectations, and (4) does not meet expectations at all. The scores were dichotomized into two categories: meets expectations (“exceeds expectations” or “meets expectations”) and does not meet expectations (“less than expectations” or “does not meet expectations at all”). Regardless of the respondents’ type of employment and sector, they were asked to rate the benefits, and it is to be noted that some benefits are only applicable to respondents who currently have children (Table 8.3). The measurements of the perceptions of employees regarding employer benefits imply that the more the employer meets the expectations of employees, the more job satisfaction and the less WFC. Respondents rated most employer

Work-Family Conflict and Job Satisfaction  143 TABLE 8.2 Association between Gender and Awareness of National Provisions

Intended to Support Work-Family Balance in the Public and Private Sector Provision

5 Coef.

6 Std. Err. 7 t

8 P>|t|

9 [95% Conf. Interval]

10 Human Resources Law of 2016 −.0551213

.0219221

−2.51

0.012

−.098163-.0120796

−.0115865

.0204346

−0.57

0.571

−.0517076.0285346

−.0327806 .019772

−1.66

0.098

−.0716007.0060395

.025738

1.52

0.129

−.0075513.0590273

−.0535223 .0214712

−2.49

0.013

−.0956788-.0113658

1.680244

.0504396

33.31

0.000

1.581211 1.779277

50 days of paid −.0641023 .056853 maternity leave −.0534254 .0587672 One nursing hour per day for a period of two years _cons 1.699342 .1481337

−1.13

0.263

−.1773844.0491798

−0.91

0.366

−.1705215.0636707

11.47

0.000

1.404179 1.994505

60 days of paid maternity leave 90 days of paid maternity leave in the case of twins Five years of paid leave for mothers with a disabled child Paid leave for mothers with a sick child Two nursing hours per day for Two years _cons

.016955

Labor Law of 2004

benefits for achieving work-life balance as “meeting expectations.” For instance, 77.77% of respondents rated paid maternity leave as “meeting expectations,” 60% reported having flexible working hours after maternity leave, 53.62% had prenatal leave, and 51.05% had flexible work hours to care for dependents.

144  Noora Lari TABLE 8.3 Employer Benefits for Achieving Work-Life Balance Meeting Employee’s

Expectations Employer Benefits

11 Exceeds 12 Meets Expectations (%) Expectations (%)

13 Less Than Expectations (%)

14 Not at All (%)

15 Prenatal leave Paid paternity leave Paid maternity leave Parental paid leave Flexible working hours after maternity leave Flexible working hours to care for dependents Telecommuting or working at home to care for dependents On-site breastfeeding room On-site childcare facility Part-time, jobsharing, or other reduced-hours options

10.56 8.15 11.94

43.06 23.26 65.83

10.00 11.13 10.83

3.33 10.34 1.94

8.55 8.06

32.01 51.94

12.72 17.50

8.75 4.72

8.55

42.50

18.22

6.57

7.06

31.85

14.75

6.32

6.11

24.72

13.06

9.72

5.28

23.06

11.39

11.11

5.70

33.58

16.85

9.79

In contrast, the following aspects were classified as “not meeting expectations”: 26.64% reported they were not offered part-time and other reduced-hour job options (e.g., job sharing), 24.79% reported having less flexible work hours to care for dependents more generally, and 21.07% reported having less flexible work locations (e.g., telecommuting or working from home). Table 8.4 shows the percentages of employees who reported their employers do not offer work-family benefits. For instance, around 45% of respondents reported that their employers do not offer paid paternity leave at all, and around 36.9% reported not having parental paid leave at their workplaces. In addition, 45.8% reported that on-site breastfeeding room options are not offered, and 48.3% of employers do not offer an on-site childcare facility. Moreover, 38.2% of employees reported not being able to care for dependents more generally because they did not have the opportunity to telecommute or work from home, and around 32.3% of employers did not offer part-time jobs or reduced-hour options.

Work-Family Conflict and Job Satisfaction  145 TABLE 8.4 The Percentage of Employers Who Do Not Offer Work-Family

Benefits Employer Benefit

17 Prenatal leave Paid paternity leave Paid maternity leave Parental paid leave Flexible working hours after maternity leave Flexible working hours to care for dependents Telecommuting or working at home to care for dependents On-site breastfeeding room On-site childcare facility Part-time, job-sharing, or other reduced-hours options

16 Employer Does Not Offer WFB Benefit (%) 30.00 45.53 8.06 36.98 16.30 22.30 38.29 45.83 48.33 32.34

Discussion Previous research has shown an intertwined relationship between WFC and job satisfaction, and several variables are associated with the level of employee contribution to an organization (Valcour & Batt, 2003). Hence, the lack of work-family balance benefits contributes to increasing WFC and in turn affects employees’ job satisfaction. In fact, when employees experience high WFC, they are likely to consider the personal, marital, or work outcomes unsatisfactory. In particular, as they receive more demanding responsibilities at work, they have less time for household obligations. The results of the survey in Qatar indicated that for most employees, a successful work-life balance is difficult to achieve due to the inadequate implementation of work-family benefits and policies within the national laws. Enduring long working hours and a heavy workload may have a large impact on job satisfaction as well as on social activities and the desire to spend time with the family. Most employers in Qatar do not provide part-time, job-sharing, or other reduced-hour options, which decreases time spent with spouses, children, and families; however, because it is mandated by the national provisions, only 8% of respondents claimed that their employers do not offer maternity leave, or “leave available to mothers at the time of the birth of a child.” On average, these results indicate that employers are not meeting their employees’ expectations in terms of work-family support. For instance, the availability of on-site childcare and on-site breastfeeding rooms is classified as an essential benefit for preventing WFC for female employees, but they were not available in many workplaces. It is clear that employers incorporate mandated national provisions into their policies and benefits leaving gaps in benefits that are not nationally mandated.

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Qatari working adults are generally well-informed of work-family legislation and provisions, with provisions in national laws being necessary to achieve work-family balance (i.e., the Civil Human Resources Law of 2016 and Labor Law of 2004); however, employees’ expectations of employer benefits are not being met in some areas, potentially contributing to WFC. Employees desire additional friendly-family benefits, including the availability of prenatal leave, flexible work hours to care for dependents, and financial assistance for childcare at home. These benefits are essential to achieving work-family balance within the country.

Implications for Policy and Practice in the GCC There is great concern that WFC is one of the major challenges with which contemporary societies, including Gulf countries, continue to grapple. Understanding work-family conflict has implications for policy, practice, and research across the GCC states. Attention to the role of public opinions and attitudes is important in reducing WFC. Previous scholarly attention in the Arab world has been limited, making it difficult to know whether institutions have accorded both men and women the opportunity to achieve work-life balance and see how that affects their job satisfaction. In terms of practice, this chapter has implications for public opinion since it discusses the population’s job satisfaction and organizational commitment, as well as ways to set boundaries between professional and personal lives through family-friendly strategies that enable employees to cope with WFC. It is imperative for governments to enact policies that improve the work-life balance of employees. The findings reported in this chapter illustrate for policymakers in the GCC region, the Middle East, and elsewhere how incorporating worklife balance policies can improve employees’ levels of job satisfaction as well as organizational performance. Therefore, this is a win-win situation for both the individual employees and organizations. The following policy recommendations may help reduce WFC in the GCC region, particularly the State of Qatar: 1 2

Prioritize the well-being of Qatari families to benefit both individuals and organizations. Expand the Human Resources Law of 2016 and amend the Labor Law of 2004 to adopt the following aspects: a b c d

Parental paid leave Flexible working hours after returning from maternity and paternity leaves Telecommuting or working from home options On-site childcare facilities

Work-Family Conflict and Job Satisfaction  147

e f 3

Part-time, job-sharing, or other reduced-hours options Financial assistance with childcare (0–5 years old) nursery fees.

Ensure that the work-family policies mandated within the national laws are being followed.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research Future research should unpack whether other factors affect WFC, beyond the ones tackled in this chapter. For example, the focus here is on the Qatari context, which is different from other parts of the world. Therefore, to ensure generalizability, the study should be replicated to cover a larger sampling frame, which can include employees from industries and organizations in countries with a range of work-family policies. Research in a range of countries can provide further insights into the nature of the national laws that attempt to promote work-life balance within different countries. Future research should focus on marital and life satisfaction, aspects which were not examined here. In addition, future research should also shed light on how technology can be used to improve work-life balance; for instance, employees can be given more hours to work at home from computers provided by their companies in order to give them more time to spend with their families. Research that addresses how family-friendly policies can be properly mandated will help tackle further consequences to family cohesion.

Conclusions In summary, this chapter answered research questions related to the extent to which Qatari employees are familiar with provisions in national laws intended to support work-family balance (i.e., the Civil Human Resources Law of 2016 and the Labor Law of 2004). It has also presented the relation between WFC and job satisfaction in terms of the extent to which employers’ benefits are necessary to achieve work-family balance, according to working Qataris’ views. It is important to better understand the dynamics of the rapid socioeconomic developments occurring in societies such as those in the Gulf Region. Because only a small body of research exists, research on family life is greatly needed for Qatar and the GCC, which has undergone rapid transformations. The implications from the data presented here are profound in terms of understanding social change and international issues involving the determinants of work-family conflict. In Qatar, the insufficient implementation of the work-family provisions of national laws has created new platforms upon which society can begin to address some of its long-standing problems. While change is seemingly slow in cultural contexts such as Qatar, advancements have come about because of

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technological improvements. For instance, providing telecommuting or working from home options can enhance work-family balance. Importantly, available data show that Qatari adults have expressed the need for more benefits to be implemented in order to avoid WFC. Although fully specifying the factors relating to WFC is beyond the scope of this chapter, a number of factors have emerged, including gender, the respondent’s type of employment (public or private sector), family-related issues, and equitable employer benefits intended to support work-family balance. Despite these major factors, public interest will continue to influence policy in terms of implementing adequate provisions that promote work-life balance and increase job satisfaction. For instance, getting more benefits may require culturally sensitive policy changes that move alongside shifts in attitudes. Thus, job satisfaction is not achievable without promoting comprehensive benefits to Qatar employees. Individuals’ WFC and their level of job satisfaction are correlated. One obstacle hindering the maintenance of work-family balance is a belief that employers are not meeting expectations in terms of the support they offer. This finding is especially true for working women and regardless of whether the type of work these women do is in the public or private sector. Thus, future attempts to prevent WFC will require major support from the government.

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Sav, A., & Harris, N. (2013). Work-life conflict in Australian Muslims: Is gender important? Gender in Management: An International Journal, 28(8), 486–504. Sidani, Y. M., & Al Hakim, Z. T. (2012). Work-family conflicts and job attitudes of single women: A developing country perspective. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 23(7), 1376–1393. Stasz, C, Eide, E., Martorell, F., Constant, L., & Goldman, C. A. (2011). Post secondary education in Qatar: Employer demand, student choice, and options for policy. Doha: RAND Corporation, Supreme Education Council. Retrieved from http://www.edu.gov. qa/En/Media/News/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=1818 Statista (2018). Labor force participation rate in Qatar from 2009 to 2017, by gender. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/643644/qatar-labor-forceparticitpation-rate-by-gender/ Ueda, Y. (2010). The relationship between work-life balance programs and employee satisfaction: Gender differences in the moderating effect of annual income. Journal of Business Administration Research, 1(1), 65–74. Valcour, P. M., & Batt, R. (2003). Work-life integration: Challenges and organizational responses. In P. Moen (Ed.), It’s about time: Couples and careers (pp. 310–331). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Varedian, M. (2003). Comparing propensity score weighting with other weighting methods: A case study. In Proceedings of the Section on Survey Statistics, American Statistical Association. Retrieved from http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record. jsf?pid=diva2%3A243279&dswid=6042 Walker, L. (2016). Qatar home to highest proportion of employed women in the Gulf. Doha News. Retrieved from https://dohanews.co/qatar-home-to-highest-proportionof-employed-women-in-the-gulf Wallace, J. (2005). Job stress, depression and work-to-family conflict: A test of the strain and buffer hypotheses. Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, 60(3), 510–539. Williams, J., Bhanugopan, R., & Fish, A. (2011). Localization of human resources in the state of Qatar: Emerging issues and research agenda, education, business and society. Contemporary Middle Eastern Issues, 4(3), 193–206. World Bank. (2012). The effect of women’s economic power in Latin America and the Caribbean. Poverty and labor brief. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (2014). World Bank data: GDP per capita (current US$). Washington, DC: World Bank.

9 SOCIAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN FEMALE DOMESTIC WORKERS FROM SOUTH ASIA AND AFRICA ON GCC FAMILIES Dessislava Vassileva Ivanova

Introduction This chapter is a literature review that investigates the influence of female domestic workers from the South Asian and African regions on the receiving families in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Current theoretical conceptualizations suggest that the social impact of the foreign female domestic workers in the families would be defined as social benefits, social implications, and social problems. Similarly, theories led to investigation of the influence of the female domestic workers in the six oil-rich Gulf countries in two respects. First, positive effects have been described as greater social freedom of the female members of the families and higher social status of the families employing foreign female domestic workers. Second, negative effects have been perceived as implications on morality, language, and religion of the family members and social problems in realms of domestic conflicts, childcare, and care for elderly family members, including issues of negligence. The examination of the influence of South Asian and African domestic workers on the receiving families in GCC countries also provides a unique perspective on the concept of surplus value acquired through the most vulnerable labor of the foreign female domestic workers (FFDW). Migration flows from Asia and Africa to GCC countries are the third largest in volume worldwide. In the six oil-rich Gulf countries, some of the major sending South Asian and African countries are India, Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Sudan (Gardner, 2011; Malit & Ghafoor, 2014; Shah, Shah, Chowdhury, & Menon, 2002). During the last two decades, an expanding proportion of migrant workers are female domestic workers. For example, foreign female domestic workers are employed in

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87% of Kuwaiti families (Shah et al., 2002). Similar rates have been reported in the rest of the GCC countries. In Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE, one domestic worker is employed for every two to three nationals. Domestic workers from the Philippines are the highest paid domestic helpers in all of the GCC countries and represent the majority of employees in this sector. As of 2012, there were roughly 180,000 Filipino immigrants in Kuwait, and approximately 60% were females and employed as domestic workers (i.e., housemaids; Santiago, 2012). However, the newest trend in the larger numbers of FFDW immigration is in the noticeable shift from Asian sending countries (Philippines, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal) to African sending countries (e.g., Ethiopia, Ghana; Malit & Ghafoor, 2014), especially to Saudi Arabia and UAE. The complexity and diversity of migration have a distinct influence on the social life and cultural blending of GCC countries. The fact that disciplines such as Sociology, Economics, Political Science, Demography, and others research various aspects of migration clearly emphasizes its social relevance. This chapter analyzes the issue of the social impact of female domestic migrants from South Asia and Africa to the oil-rich Gulf countries through a review of the existing literature presenting findings from international research in comparison to empirical findings in GCC countries. The chapter also examines the concept of surplus value and its utility to the GCC region and society through the vulnerable and low-cost labor of FFDW (Saravanamuttu, 2018). Finally, the chapter explores governmental policies and strategies proposed in the literature to neutralize negative social implications of FFDW. The reasons for this review stem from the paradox that the tribal hierarchy of GCC societies, a tradition that influential governmental bodies and the rulers of the oil-rich Gulf countries are persistent in preserving, is in contradiction with the social liberties that became imminent following the sudden economic expansion of the GCC countries due to the oil-rich reservoirs found in the 1980s. Many social issues and complications have arisen since the newly found social liberty and economic wealth allowed substantial portions of GCC families and households to employ foreign female domestic workers. Their numbers dramatically increased after governmental policies for childbirth allowances facilitating families with offspring to employ more domestic help. General perceptions of GCC countries’ nationals regarding the influence of the foreign female help are negative and concerned with obstruction of family dynamics, fears of moral detriments such as adultery, negligence in caring for children and the elderly, and worries about harmful cultural impact in general (Gardner, 2011). However, systematic and objective research on the social and cultural implications of FFDWs on the receiving families in GCC countries is scarce. Most empirical evidence documents GCC citizens’ perceptions and opinions toward female domestic workers, with few cases of research encompassing the impact of FFDW caregivers on children and elderly family members. To date, the overall impact of FFDW on Gulf countries’ family life is

154  Dessislava Vassileva Ivanova

greatly under-researched and remains an area for budding examination (Shah et al., 2002). However, references to implementation of more humane governmental polies in the sending and receiving countries regarding recruitment, placement, and conditions of work of FFDW are abundant in the literature, as well as presentation of exploitation of the FFDW and the notion of additional recreational value for native families generated through the labor of FFDW (Fernandez, 2014). The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, background on immigration from an international perspective is presented. Next, the processes of modernization and globalization as the principal reasons for the influx of immigration to the GCC are discussed, along with the social and cultural implications of this immigration. The chapter then reviews research on FFDW in GCC countries, presenting the conditions of their employment and the Kafala system in receiving GCC countries, as well as FFDW work conditions and their household duties. Comparisons between the GCC and other countries are drawn with the FFDWs’ social impact in the cases of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Perceptions of GCC citizens toward FFDW and the effect of FFDW on childrearing and elderly care are discussed. The chapter then focuses on the surplus value of the FFDWs’ vulnerability and labor. Recommendations are made for policy and practice in GCC countries regarding better relationships between employers and FFDW. The chapter then suggests directions for future research and concludes.

Background on Immigration in the International Literature International migration, defined as living outside one’s country of birth for a year or more, more than doubled between 1980 and 2013 (GFMD, 2016). Approximately 60% of migrants are in industrial countries and approximately 50% are in the labor force. About 34% of migrants move from a developing country to a higher income country, and in recent decades migration has increased twice as rapidly in more developed than less developed countries. Unemployment and accelerated population growth in low-income countries contribute to rising pressures to emigrate. Migration requires resources as well as opportunities so may not be possible even if the desire to migrate is present. Women comprise about half of migrants globally, and about half of female migrants take jobs in developed countries (Pyle, 2006). Flows of female international migrants occur throughout the world and vary within each region. The largest numbers of female migrants are in Asia, North America, and Europe so it is not surprising that much of the research has focused on their life experiences in these parts of the world. Theoretical frameworks and empirical research define three levels at which female domestic workers’ decisions about migration occur (Haagen-Zanker, 2008). Micro-level decisions position individuals as decision makers with respect to migrating opportunities, their values,

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expectations, resources, and individual freedom. Meso-level decisions are based on households as the main decision-making agents, and communities, social networks, and social relationships play vital roles in perpetuating migration. Macro-level decisions focus on the economic, political, and cultural structures that induce migration and position governments of sending and receiving countries as main actors stimulating migration. In Asia and Africa, domestic work has been the main occupation for migrant women (Yamanaka & Piper, 2006). Low income female domestic workers consider migration as an attractive opportunity to multiply their productivity and earning potential simply by moving across borders. Although economic motivations are not the only reasons women migrate, in many cases, migrants undertake risky journeys because the benefits and financial returns of migration are higher than any other options they have at home (GFMD, 2016). Social networks, ease of global communications, and access to online information facilitate female domestic workers’ decision to emigrate. Sending governments often exert pressure to migrate because they rely on labor migration to contribute to growth and development and curb unemployment through transfer of remittances and development of workers’ skills. Government policies among receiving countries restrict or facilitate the flow of female immigrants depending on their current economic, political, and demographic circumstances.

Background on FFDWs in the GCC Modernization and globalization are the two pivotal processes that represent the crux of economic, political, social, cultural, and demographic changes shaping life in the GCC countries today. Since the beginning of the 1970s with the nationalization of the vast petroleum resources in the Arabian Gulf, the six GCC countries have experienced unprecedented development, industrialization, urbanization, and cultural diversity. The launch and sustenance of these processes became possible with the enormous waves of low-cost migrant labor initially from Middle East countries and later from South Asian and African countries (Kapiszweski, 2017). This type of unprecedented migration was stimulated by economic and political reasons by both sending and receiving countries, mutual benefits, and governmental policies. It also led to a very peculiar formation of the population in the GCC countries, where in Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE the expatriate population is triple the size of the citizen population, in Bahrain – double; and only in the cases of Oman and Saudi Arabia, expatriates constitute around 45% and 30% of the population, respectively. In sociology, modernization is defined as a transformation from a traditional, rural, agrarian society to a secular, urban, industrial society. Historically, modernization is an open-ended process that generally takes place gradually over the course of time, yet there are cases of intensified, rapid modernization. Intensified modernization on a large scale, as has occurred in the GCC countries,

156  Dessislava Vassileva Ivanova

brings new social and material strains, and transitional societies find themselves faced with an array of new problems whose solutions seem to evade nations’ traditional solutions. Relatively new is the process of globalization, which is defined as the process of organizing the whole world into a single integrated unit through transborder mobility of products, services, capital/finance, people, culture, and technology. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, five major types of globalization have been distinguished: economic – creation and development of global financial systems; product – trans-border free flow of products and services and manufacture of a product in several different countries with the same quality; cultural – trans-border mobility and flow of culture, including greater tourism, travel, migration, global telecommunication infrastructure, and individual access to cultural diversity; information – free trans-border flow of knowledge, information, and ideas; and ecological – global protection of the ecosystem from degradation and pollution. Both modernization and globalization have affected the achievements of the GCC countries in the last 50 years, as well as everyday life at both the individual and societal level. Government-implemented policies and visions have industrialized and urbanized the cities, countries emerged in the place of rural tribal communities, and national identities have been defined and constructed in an on-going process of adaptation. Changes on an individual and group level have occurred due to the processes of modernization and globalization so that nowadays Gulf societies present a plethora of dichotomies, for example: nationals vs migrants, modernity vs tradition, desertification (i.e., transference of traditional, tribal values from desert to the cities; Tétreault, 2001) vs urbanization, bedouin vs hadari, old money vs new money, Shiia vs Sunni, men vs women, the list can go on (Ghabra, 1997; Tétreault, 2001). It is also evident that the most substantial changes are affecting the core of the society – the family. The characteristics of the traditional Arab family model as (1) extended, (2) patrilineal, (3) patrilocal, (4) patriarchal, (5) endogamous, and (6) occasionally polygamous (Patai, 1952) are changing to nuclear families with less authority of the extended family, weakened connections between parents and children, and exposure to alien cultures at the heart of the family (Al-Thakeb, 1985; Longva, 2005). In the face of these changes, researchers have examined the social life of families in the GCC countries, the traditional Arab family model, and the extent to which relationships between family members are altered due to the processes of modernization and globalization in general and the immigration of female domestic workers, in particular. Gardner’s (2011) qualitative study based on ethnographic data in the Gulf countries of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar investigates the impact of Gulf migration on the Arab family. In addition, he utilizes the studies of Shah et al. (2002) and Longva (1997, 2005) to draw inferences about the impact of low-skilled domestic immigration labor to Kuwait. Most relevant to this literature review are the following findings. First,

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the vast number of foreign female domestic workers is a result of the process of modernization and aids in the preservation of some of the highest natural population growth rates in Gulf States. Second, foreign female domestic workers have enabled women citizens of the GCC countries to acquire greater freedom from household duties and childcare, which results in female citizens’ greater presence and visibility in public life of the society. Third, traditionally insular families in the Gulf region are exposed to a wider variety of cultural diversity due to the presence of female domestic workers from Asian and African countries. Fourth, the impact of the foreign housemaids is perceived in terms of both threats and benefits. Threats include concerns about language alteration and less participation in the cultural traditions of the children in the family, and benefits include the perception of higher social status of the family due to the employment of household help. Al-Ammari and Romanowski (2016) examined 997 Qatari families’ perceptions of particular changes in their family life and summarized these perceptions as cultural value problems arising under the pressure of expanding globalization. The authors argue that modernization and globalization initially bring about many positive changes such as massive educational reform, economic wealth, urbanization, and improved infrastructure of cities, transportation, and higher standards of living overall. After these initial benefits, however, changes can pose problems. For example, the authors point out that urbanization has replaced the traditional village system “with skyscrapers and housing compounds that neither represent nor relate to the cultural identities of the inhabitants” (Al-Ammari & Romanowski, 2016, p. 1516) contributing to a development of individual, materialistic values at the expense of collective values in Qatari society. In addition, world-class education has allowed access of the younger population to new channels of socialization that are in contradiction with the traditional family functions. Graduating female and male students pursue new professional opportunities that result in delayed marriage. Women’s participation in the workforce is changing their economic power as well as their aspirations within the family structure. Economic affluence has facilitated not only an increase in the standard of living but also provided grounds for dependency on household domestic workers, affecting the traditional roles and the structure of the family and resulting in a new generation facing problems in socialization, linguistic, moral, and cultural alterations. One notable finding from Al-Ammari and Romanowski’s (2016) work was not only the shift toward the nuclear family but also that 43.7% of the respondents agreed that it was not necessary to have children in marriage. Nearly 80% of the Qatari households employed at least one domestic worker, and 90% of the sampled women preferred to maintain their dependence on the domestic servant. Although the majority of the participants held the opinion that both the father and mother are responsible for childcare, with the prevailing role of the mother, few acknowledged that foreign female domestic workers are in fact responsible and cared for their children. The authors describe how socialization

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of young children by the foreign South Asian or African housemaid leads to alteration of children’s moral and cultural values, delays their linguistic abilities, and has negative effects on Arab children’s behavior. To add to this gloomy picture is the fact that the characteristics of the FFDW, such as education, language, religion, and age do not qualify them to raise children, and none have formal training in providing childcare. In conclusion, the authors explain that globalization creates cultural value conflicts that might be different in different countries. For example, globalization will change Gulf families in ways that may or may not be similar to ways in which globalization changes families in other parts of the world. El-Haddad (2003) focuses on major trends affecting families in Gulf countries during the processes of urbanization and globalization. The chapter provides empirical evidence of 90% urbanization in Kuwait and similar rates in the other GCC countries, and states that the transformation of housing architecture induced pervasive individualism, materialism, commercialism, and overall seclusion. Regarding changes in family structure, he observes that the trend toward the nuclear family is evident in all Gulf countries but does not match the volume of urbanization. Family functions and values are also affected by the process of modernization. Particularly, the dependence on foreign female domestic workers has had negative effects on the socialization of the children in those families. The function of the mother in childrearing is diminished and substituted by that of the FFDW, even in families where the mother is not employed outside the home. The findings are congruent with the notion of the negative implications of the presence of foreign female domestic workers in GCC families. Tétreault (2001) discusses the impact of modernization on the Kuwaiti culture, family, women, and politics. The author explores the issue of modernization in Kuwait as two contradictory processes – developed, democratic society vs “traditional, tribally organized social formation run by autocratic ruler” (Tétreault, 2001, p. 203). The traditional Arab family model is portrayed as “patriarchal, pyramidally hierarchical (particularly with respect to sex and age) and extended institution” (Barakat, 1997, p. 97). The traditional structure gives the husband and father authority over his wife and offspring, and males have authority over female family members. The traditional patriarchal hierarchy is challenged by the impact of modernization, and family values are under the process of constant alteration. A unique blend of modernity and tradition among families as well as the state culture and politics characterizes the GCC today. Sabban (2014) administered a quantitative questionnaire to 240 students and their parents about their views on the impact of globalization and modernization on UAE families. The findings of this survey can be summarized as follows. First, in relation to the traditional Arab model, UAE families are still large in size (88% have four or more children) and still connected to extended family (76% feel connected to the extended family, and 22% live with extended family), although the authority of the father/parents is declining (48% of the

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parents feel that their ability to communicate with their children is distorted), and 91% of the families believe that globalization has put many pressures on UAE families. Second, 93% of the UAE families employ FFDW according to the UAE Ministry of Labor, and 63% of the families perceive that they could not survive without domestic workers. In addition, 67% of the parents (70% of mothers and 57% of fathers) spend five hours with their children per day; the rest of children’s time is divided between housemaid care and school attendance. Third, 43% of Emirati families believe that they are losing internal cohesion due to many external factors such as work engagements and reliance on FFDW. Fourth, because of concerns about cultural values and language implications, 46% of the families discourage their children from having relationships with foreigners. Arabic is used at home by 90% of the families, and 76% of the families believe that the Arab language is declining. Fifth, 75% of the UAE families believe that they need guidance and mentoring to be able to deal with the current changes, which are overwhelming and might call for governmental provisions, policies, and interventions to preserve traditions, morals, cultural values, and Gulf family identity.

Empirical Findings on FFDW in GCC Countries The sections below stem from a literature review that screened 45 research papers and reviewed 19. Table 9.1 summarizes the number of FFDWs and nationals in each of the six Gulf countries.

Kafala System, Work Conditions, and Household Duties The discussion of the social impact of FFDW on the receiving families in the GCC countries would be incomplete without presentation of the peculiar conditions of their employment, including the encouraging policies for labor migration on the part of the sending countries in South Asia and Africa and the exploitative policies of recruitment on the part of the receiving countries. The major sending countries of South Asia and Africa (India, Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Ghana) of lowwage domestic labor to the GCC countries have very similar economic standing. They are considered developing countries with issues ranging from lack of access to clean water to low levels of education and income, on average. Women’s migration from these countries has contributed to the improvement of economic status, health, education, and other social indicators of these developing countries as women often send money, they have earned abroad, home to their families (Afsar, 2011; Clarke, 2013; De Bel-Air & Ratha, 2012; Wickramasekara, 2016). The funds sent by women are often used not just by the immediate family but also by their broader community to develop access to water, promote agriculture, facilitate education, and encourage hygiene (Mehta, 2017).

160  Dessislava Vassileva Ivanova TABLE 9.1 Foreign Female Domestic Workers (FFDWs) and National Population in

GCC Country

Total Number Year of FFDW

Bahrain

51,811

Kuwait

600,000

Oman

224,000

Qatar

84,000

Saudi Arabia UAE

120,000 750,000

Source

2011 Bahrain Labor Ministry 2014 Kuwait Ministry of Interior 2012 Ministry of Manpower 2014 Qatar Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 2014 Saudi Labor Ministry 2012 Ministry of Interior

Total Number of Nationals

Year

Source

584,688

2011

GLMM

1,275,857

2014

GLMM

2,093,000

2012

GLMM

306,948

Mid-2015 GLMM

20,702,536

2014

GLMM

253,700

2012

GLMM

Sources: Bahrain (2013), Kuwait (2014), Oman (2012), Qatar (2014), Saudi Arabia (2014), United Arab Emirates (2012), and Gulf Labor Markets and Migration – Demographics.

Governments of the sending countries induce and promote international low-cost labor migration and emigration of FFDW in particular through public and private labor agencies, media popularization, and state policies. For example, the government in the Philippines has granted their international migrant workers, the so-called OFW (Overseas Filipino Workers), the honorary status of “the new heroes” (Moors, Jureidini, Ozbay, & Sabban, 2009, p. 180). Remittances from international labor workers not only make increasingly significant contributions to Asian and African economies but also reduce the high level of unemployment and external debts. In sum, the governments of the sending Asian and African countries have high incentives and actively pursue labor emigration policies facilitating the production, distribution, and regulation of the export of their nationals as domestic workers to the GCC countries (Fernandez, 2014; Rodriguez, 2010). However, the demand for FFDWs in GCC countries is much greater than the numbers of FFDWs that the governments of sending countries can organize, and the existence of numerous illegal brokers and agents is expanding. The cost of speedy placement of FFDWs in the receiving country through illegal brokers varies between 100 US$ to 1,000 US$, and FFDWs may be given a contract that will be completely disregarded and have no legal standing in the country of arrival. In illegal channels, FFDWs are asked to present certain medical documentation related to tuberculosis, HIV, pregnancy, and other conditions. Additionally, in these illegal channels, many

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FFDWs are misinformed about their salaries and working conditions. They are not informed about the confiscation of their passport by the agency on arrival and that in some cases their names will be falsified to reflect a Muslim name. In reality, their salaries vary in the range of 100–400 US$ per month depending on their nationality, race, religion, and work skills, although higher salaries will be stated in the signed contracts of the sending countries (Bsheer, 2010; Fernandez, 2014). Most of the sending countries do not have any protective emigration policies, with the exception of India, where a FFDW must be over the age of 30 and married and cannot travel alone under the age of 40 (Bsheer, 2010). In addition to considering policies in the sending countries, it is important to take into consideration the employment policies at the receiving end. In all of the GCC countries (as well as other countries in the Middle East and 49 of 50 states in the USA), domestic workers are not included in any provisions of the Labor Law. Their working conditions, household duties, minimum wage, and working hours are not regulated, and there is no legal system in place in case of emerging problems between employer and employee. GCC countries utilize the system of sponsorship known as the Kafala system, which allows the employers or other individuals to sponsor workers to these countries for a period of (generally) two years. Sponsors often use the services of recruitment agencies to find workers. Under this system, the sponsor pays a fee to the recruiter, pays the worker’s wages, and provides the worker with airfare to and from his or her home country (Shadid, Spaan, & Speckmann, 1992). The conditions for sponsorship may vary by country. Saudi Arabia, for example, characterizes the migrant workers as “workers by contract” and requires that both the sponsor and the workers sign employment contracts in order for a work permit to be issued to workers (Human Right Watch, 2004). In other Gulf countries, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE, contracts may be written or oral (Al-Najjar, 2004). In the case of FFDWs, the sponsor/employer in the GCC countries arranges their residency permit (iqama) from the Ministry of Interior. The iqama binds FFDWs’ employers into legal arrangements that give complete legal authority of the sponsor over the FFDWs. It is in the legal power of the sponsor to terminate the contract at any time, and during the first three months of employment, the sponsor has the right not to pay wages. The employer holds possession of the FFDWs’ passports and their iqamas, so in the case of emerging problems and if the FFDWs run away from the household, FFDWs fall into the category of illegal immigration pending police investigation and deportation. Under this system, all possibilities of agency on the part of the domestic worker are expunged (Mehta, 2017; Pande, 2013; Storbeck, 2011). To summarize, the Kafala system repositions the legal responsibility of the state onto the individual sponsor/employer, setting up various conditions allowing for exploitation of FFDWs. Following is a comparative table summarizing the nationalities, working conditions, working hours, wages, and other characteristic of FFWDs across the GCC countries (Table 9.2).

Lodging *Separate room in the house *Sleeping with baby in the house *Small room adjacent to the house (annex Food provision and clothing Working hours per day Working hours can be longer during Ramadan and other festive occasions Day off per week/ month Permission to leave the household

Nationalities

15–17

no

yes 14–17

yes (monthly)

yes

15–17

yes (monthly)

yes

no

15–17

yes

no

no

yes

Saudi Arabia

UAE

no

15–17

yes

no

yes yes

yes (rare)

15–17

yes

yes

yes yes

Indian, Indian, Indian, Ethiopian, Pakistani, Pakistani, Filipina, Bangladeshi, Filipina, Sri Lankan, Filipina, Sri Lankan, Indonesian, Sudanese, Nepalese Sudanese Sri Lankan, Indonesian

Qatar

yes

Oman

yes yes

Kuwait

Indian, Pakistani, Indian, Sri Lankan, Indian, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan Pakistani, Bangladeshi, (FFDW from Ethiopia, Filipina, Indonesian, Kenya, and Senegal are Bangladeshi, Filipina, presently banned in Oman. Sudanese, Ethiopian Philippines has a ban on Sri Lankan, FFDW to work in Oman Indonesian, without valid documents) Ethiopian yes yes yes yes yes yes

Bahrain

TABLE 9.2 Comparative Review of Demographics and Work Conditions of FFDWs across the GCC

162  Dessislava Vassileva Ivanova

yes no Yes to all, excluding homework help and car washing in some families

150–410

yes yes (rare) Yes to all, excluding homework help in some cases

80–250

Kuwait

150–350

yes no Yes to all, excluding homework help in some cases

Oman

150–400

yes no Yes to all, excluding homework help and car washing in some families

Qatar

150–350

yes no Yes to all, excluding homework help and car washing in some families

Saudi Arabia

150–350

yes yes (rare) Yes to all, excluding homework help in some cases

UAE

Note. The table is a compilation of information from Al-Najjar (2004), Bsheer (2010), Godfrey, Ruhs, Shah, and Smit (2004), Kapiszewski (2017), Mehta (2017), Nagy (1998), and Sabban (2004).

*with house members *on her own List of duties: *Cleaning *Cooking *Ironing *Taking care of children *Playing with children *Transporting children to/from school with house member *Helping with homework *Taking care of elderly *Helping with grocery shopping *Car washing *Traveling with the family Wage range in USD per month

Bahrain

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Perceptions of GCC National Populations toward FFDW Shah et al. (2002) investigated Kuwaiti households that employ FFDWs. The research is based on 1,689 household surveys completed by housewives. Families with children aged under six years and older persons aged 60 years or more are more likely than other types of families to employ at least one FFDW. More affluent households were more likely to employ more domestic workers. However, because the cost of hiring domestic help is a very small percentage of the average family’s income, almost 90% of the households utilize their services. The housewives’ attitudes toward the presence of the FFDWs range from concerns about the negative influence on the marital relationship to concerns about language deviations and childcare negligence. Nagy (1994) investigated relationships between receiving families in Doha, Qatar and their household help through the prism of global and local social integration. Certain choices related to hiring different nationalities and gender guide the receiving families. Families base their hiring decisions on expectations of the domestic helpers’ skills and impact on the household. Middle and upper class wealthier families seek to employ Filipina FFDWs, who are the highest paid housemaids in Qatar, whereas less affluent families seek Indian and Sri Lankan domestic helpers. Very similar, although in different countries, are the findings of Frantz (2008) in Jordan and Moors et al. (2009) in Lebanon and Turkey. Migrant domestic workers are stratified by nationality, with Filipina domestic workers regarded as high status because of their English language knowledge, relatively high level of education, and position as among the first of migrant laborers to come to the Middle East (Frantz, 2008; Moors et al., 2009). Considering the social impact on the receiving families, similarities are drawn, too. For Qatari families social impact is discussed through the households’ physical adjustments of separation between the housemaids and the family, and the very strict regulation of interactions between housemaids and the male members of the family. For Lebanese and Jordanian families, it is considered an invasion of privacy, and the head of the household would order the FFDW to leave the physical space he enters (Frantz, 2008). Unlike in Lebanon and Turkey where blending of cultures and religions has occurred historically, Nagy discovered that in many Qatari families, interaction with the FFDW is the only condition through which the housewives and children experience diversity of culture, and in general that is considered a positive impact. Another interesting issue observed in Qatar is that families with more female offspring employ female domestic help, whereas families with more male offspring employ male domestic workers, which has no precedent in any other of the researched countries. In conclusion, implications of FFDWs for receiving families are related in part to language, religion, and culture.

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Effect of FFDW on Childrearing and Elder Care Roumani’s (2005) study of 100 Emirati and Kuwaiti families with young children was designed to mirror the population and take into account demographic, social, and economic factors. Interviews with parents showed that fathers and mothers in both countries are ill at ease with the situation where 58% of the children are cared for primarily by FFDWs. Thirty percent of the children received mainly care from their mothers with help of the FFDW, and the rest were cared for in nurseries. Despite their concerns, parents agreed that having childcare provided by FFDWs is the socially accepted norm and unavoidable due to parents’ work, lack of public nurseries, and some other factors. The employment of FFDWs to care for children led parents to have a range of concerns, including about parents’ lack of authority with the child, the lack of stimulation provided by the FFDW, children’s attachment to FFDWs, and FFDWs’ insensitivity to children’s needs. The impact of FFDWs on children’s social and emotional development has also been questioned, particularly in terms of attachment disorders, personality disorders, separation anxiety, and social phobia. Shah, Badr, and Shah (2012) reviewed the impact of FFDWs on elderly family members through the objective of understanding whether care by family members versus care by FFDWs is related to the physical, psychological, and functional health status of older men and women in Kuwait. The findings showed that the availability of domestic workers is higher among men and women aged 70 or more. A larger percentage of men and women looked after by domestic workers perceive themselves to be in worse health and rank lower in health indicators than those who were looked after by family members. Those who perceive their health to be poor are more than twice as likely to be cared for by a domestic worker. There is a greater reliance on domestic workers for the performance of routine chores such as cooking, cleaning, and personal care of the older individual while the family continues to play the major role in the older person’s interaction with the public spheres of life. Gender is an important factor associated with the care of elderly people by a domestic worker; women are seven times more likely than men to be looked after by a FFDW rather than a family member when ill.

Surplus Value of FFDW Labor Vulnerability To identify FFDW labor vulnerability, studies rely on investigation of their working and living conditions. International Labor Organization researchers in GCC countries recognize the following indicators of vulnerability: (a) low average wages in comparison with international standards; (b) non-remunerated

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overtime work and rarely provided days off; (c) high average working hours per week in comparison with the international standards; (d) presence of physical, psychological, and verbal abuse; (e) irregularities of recruitment in sending and receiving countries; and (f ) inadequate and non-existent legal systems for addressing FFDW complaints. The above-mentioned indicators of vulnerability are the result of the fact that FFDWs are excluded from all GCC countries’ Labor Laws and protection (Chammartin, 2005). At the same time, government officials of GCC countries have expressed concerns about bringing domestic workers under labor legislation because cultural values would prohibit inspection of private homes by the government (Fernandez, 2014). The consequence of this predicament leads to a possibility for the GCC countries to exploit FFDW labor, which results in surplus value. Through the Kafala system, which ensures the complete subordination of FFDW and keeps their wages artificially low, a low-cost substitute for governmental provisions is procured (such as day care for children and elder care). The FFDW labor therefore not only helps individual households but is also vital for the larger society. FFDW’s vulnerable, radicalized, socially undesired, and underpaid labor is commodified within an exploitative capitalist system that derives surplus value (Saravanamuttu, 2018). Saravanamuttu (2018) demonstrates the nature and purpose of state-constructed labor market segmentation in the Gulf that revolves around extreme exploitation and vulnerability of migrant labor for the formation and maintenance of capital. The author argues that each individual Gulf government investment of enormous amounts in state-funded social goods for Gulf nationals is integral to the maintenance of labor market segmentation, migrant labor vulnerability, and therefore to capital class formation and capital accumulation. When states participate in the import of sex and domestic workers, they both facilitate the production of their own socioeconomic and political power and that of their upper- and middle-class citizens whose status is reproduced through the exploitation of the labor and personhoods of women from elsewhere in the peripheries. They actively participate in sustaining a social order that depends on the gendered, racialized and sexualized exploitation of wage labor, that of migrant women, mostly from countries of the Third world. (Saravanamuttu, 2018, p. 31) Otherwise stated, the social impact of FFDWs is not only on individual families who employ them but also on entire Gulf societies in terms of preserving the present social stratification and social order.

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Implications for Policy and Practice Following are recommendations for policy and practice to improve relationships between FFDWs and GCC family members, as well as to protect FFDWs: 1 FFDWs should receive orientation prior to starting their jobs in GCC families in order to acquire some understanding of the social and cultural traditions and values of their employer. Labor sending and receiving countries should cooperate in producing appropriate information such as pamphlets, films, audio and video materials, radio programs, and tv dramas to raise awareness on these matters. 2 FFDWs should have training in household work and duties before arrival to the host countries. 3 FFWDs should have training in proving care for children, elders, or both. 4 FFDWs should be informed of their rights. Employing families in GCC countries should also be briefed on the rights of the domestic workers. 5 The Kafala system should be transformed so that the employers are not the sponsors of the FFDW. 6 Educational programs should be created to address the prejudged attitudes held toward FFDWs. 7 Training programs should be designed for the purpose of adequate protection of Islamic principles and how to apply them when dealing with external cultural changes and internal family changes. 8 GCC governments should eliminate all policy and legislation discriminating on the basis of gender, race/ethnicity, and other identities especially concerning FFDWs. 9 Training programs should be designed in GCC countries to improve quality of in-home care of children and the elderly. 10 Training programs should be designed to portray an understanding of alternative childcare as a partnership between parents and potential caregivers, rather than a master/servant relationship. 11 GCC countries and governments should provide viable alternatives for childcare during the early years and for elder care.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research In the years to come, in all of the GCC countries the labor migration of foreign female domestic workers is expected to increase and remain a very sensitive political, economic, and social issue. It will cause further tensions in the areas of capital accumulation of public and private sectors, efforts of the GCC governments to furnish needed social provisions, and sustain existing social

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stratification and reproduce the current social structure. Directions for future research include examination of strategies for altering GCC citizens’ perceptions toward FFDWs and promotion of deeper understanding through research of the relationships of GCC families and FFDWs.

Conclusions This chapter reviewed literature investigating the influence of female domestic workers from South Asia and Africa on the receiving families in the GCC. Through the processes of globalization and modernization it discussed the reasons for the influx of low-cost labor migration and foreign female domestic workers, in particular. It is evident that economic, political, demographic, and social factors shape the relationships of FFDWs and the Gulf receiving families. The social impact of FFDWs on family dynamics as well as cultural, language, and health implications are presented as positive and negative with an emphasis on the problematic areas related to FFDWs in childcare, children’s socialization, elder care, and cultural deviation within Gulf families. The existing juxtaposition of sponsor/employer and FFDW with the overwhelming power of the employer and complete subordination of the FFDW contributes to and aggravates the social predicaments based on differences in culture, religion, language, and social status. In addition, the migration procedures, practices, and laws implemented by the sending South Asian and African countries and the host governments of GCC countries that initiate and sustain the exploitative nature of FFDW labor deteriorate the possibilities of positive cultural integration and social impact. The low-cost labor immigration to GCC countries will continue to increase in the next decades. The sensitive nature of the existing social, cultural, political, and economic issues that characterize this phenomenon are complicated, and the need for governmental intervention is overdue. GCC governments are tasked with implementing laws and policies to restrain the current exploitation of FFDWs and society service programs to improve cultural and social life of GCC citizens.

References Afsar, R. (2011). Contextualizing gender and migration in South Asia: Critical insights. Gender, Technology and Development, 15(3), 389–410. Al-Ammari, B., & Romanowski, M. H. (2016). The impact of globalisation on society and culture in Qatar. Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities, 24(4), 1535–1556. Al-Najjar, S. (2004). Women migrant domestic workers in Bahrain. In S. Esim & M. Smith (Eds.), Gender and migration in Arab states: The case of domestic workers (pp. 24–36). Beirut, Lebanon: Labor Organization Regional Office for Arab States. Al-Thakeb, F. T. (1985). The Arab family and modernity: Evidence from Kuwait. Current Anthropology, 26(5), 575–580.

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Barakat, H. (1997). The Arab world: Society, culture and state. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Bsheer, R. (2010). Kafala politics and domestic labor in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/23509/Kafala-Politics-and-DomesticLabor-in-Saudi-Arabia. Chammartin, G. M. (2005). Domestic workers: Little protection for the underpaid. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Clarke, R. (2013). Contributions of migrant domestic workers to sustainable development. Bangkok: UN Women. De Bel-Air, P. K., & Ratha, D. (2012). Impact of remittances on household income, asset and human capital: Evidence from Sri Lanka. Migration and Development, 1, 163–179. El-Haddad, Y. (2003). Major trends affecting families in the Gulf countries. New York: United Nations. Fernandez, B. (2014). Essential yet invisible: Migrant domestic workers in the GCC. Gulf Labor Markets and Migration, GLMM-EN-No.4/2014, 3–15. Frantz, E. (2008). Of maids and madams: Sri Lankan domestic workers and their employers in Jordan. Critical Asian Studies, 40, 609–638. Gardner, A. M. (2011). Gulf migration and the family. Journal of Arabian Studies, 1, 3–25. GFMD, Global Forum on Migration and Development. (2016). Report of the ninth GFMD 2016. Retrieved from https://www.gfmd.org/meetings/bangladesh2016 Ghabra, S. (1997). Kuwait and the dynamics of socio-economic change. The Middle East Journal, 51, 358–372. Godfrey, M., Ruhs, M., Shah, N., & Smit, M. (2004). Migrant domestic workers in Kuwait. In S. Esim & M. Smith (Eds.), Gender and migration in Arab states: The case of domestic workers (pp. 41–62). Beirut, Lebanon: Labor Organization Regional Office for Arab States. Hagen-Zanker, J. (2008). Why do people migrate? A review of the theoretical literature. Maastricht: Maastricht University. Human Rights Watch. (2004). Bad dreams, exploitation and abuse of migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. New York: Human Rights Watch. Kapiszewski, A. (2017). Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. In P. C. Jain & G. Z. Oommen (Eds.), South Asian migration to Gulf countries (pp. 66–90). New Delhi: Routledge. Longva, A. N. (1997). Walls built on sand: Migration, exclusion, and society in Kuwait. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Longva A. N. (2005). Neither autocracy nor democracy but ethnocracy: Citizens, expatriates and socio-political system in Kuwait. In P. Dresch & J. P. Piscatori (Eds.), Monarchies and nations: Globalization and identity in the Arab states of the Gulf (pp. 114–133). London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic. Malit Jr., F. T., & Ghafoor, S. (2014). Domestic work legislation in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): A comparative policy review. International Gulf Organization Policy Report No. 1. Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Mehta, S. R. (2017). Contesting victim narratives: Indian women domestic workers in Oman. Migration and Development, 6, 395–411. Moors, A., Jureidini, R., Özbay, F., & Sabban, R. (2009). Migrant domestic workers: A new public presence in the Middle East? In S. Shami (Ed.), Publics, politics and participation: Locating the public sphere in the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 151–175). New York: Social Science Research Council.

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Nagy, S. (1998). “This time I think I’ll try a Filipina”: Global and local influences on relations between foreign household workers and their employers in Doha, Qatar. City & Society, 10, 83–103. Pande, A. (2013). ‘The paper that you have in your hand is my freedom’: Migrant domestic work and the sponsorship (Kafala) system in Lebanon. International Migration Review, 47, 414–441. Patai, R. (1952). The Middle East as a culture area. Middle East Journal, 6, 1–21. Pyle, J. L. (2006). Globalization, transnational migration, and gendered care work: Introduction. Globalizations, 3, 283–295. Rodriguez, R. M. (2010). Migrants for export: How the Philippine state brokers labor to the world. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Roumani, H. B. (2005). Maids in Arabia: The impact of maids as carers on children’s social and emotional development. Journal of Early Childhood Research, 3, 149–167. Sabban, R. (2004). Women migrant domestic workers in the United Arab Emirates. In S. Esim & M. Smith (Eds.), Gender and migration in Arab states: The case of domestic workers (pp. 85–103). Beirut, Lebanon: Labor Organization Regional Office for Arab States. Sabban, R. (2014). UAE family under global transformation. Abu Dhabi: Zayed University. Santiago, M. F. (May 1, 2012). Kuwait Filipinos top OAV globally. Arab Times. Retrieved from http://www.maasinreporter.com/index.php?fn_mode=fullnews&fn_id=535 Saravanamuttu, S. (2018). Women and kafala: Migrant domestic workers in the Gulf. Presented at the Western Political Science Association Annual Conference. Shadid, W. A., Spaan, E. J. A. M., & Speckmann, J. D. (1992). Labour migration and the policy of the Gulf states. In F. Eelans, T. Schampers, & J. D. Speckman (Eds.), Labour migration to the Middle East: From Sri Lanka to the Gulf (pp. 63–86). New York: KeganPaul. Shah, N. M., Badr, H., & Shah, M. (2012). Foreign live-in domestic workers as caretakers of older Kuwaiti men and women: Socio- demographic and health correlates. Ageing and Society, 32, 1008–1029. Shah, N. M., Shah, M. A., Chowdhury, R. I., & Menon, I. (2002). Foreign domestic workers in Kuwait: Who employs how many. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 11, 247–269. Storbeck, D. (2011). Indian labour migration to the Arab Gulf societies: The impact of its growing interdependence. Internationales Asien Forum, 42, 21–46. Tétreault, M. A. (2001). A state of two minds: State cultures, women, and politics in Kuwait. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 33, 203–220. Wickramasekara, P. (2016). South Asian Gulf migration to the Gulf: A safety valve or a development strategy? Migration and Development, 5, 99–129. Yamanaka, K., & Piper, N. (2006). Feminised migration in East and Southeast Asia: Policies, actions and empowerment. UNRISD Occasional Paper 11. Geneva: UNRISD.

10 PERSONAL FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AMONG HOUSEHOLDS IN RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA Masahina Sarabdeen, Ann Largey, Noreha Halid, A.C. Muhammadu Kijas, and Abad Alzuman

Introduction Over the last century, the economic development, urbanisation, and modernisation of many nations, including Gulf countries, has led to various ‘risk’ factors emerging, on which governments, communities, organisations, and individuals focus much of their day-to-day affairs. Managing and transferring risks related to property, finances, and legal issues are significant features of post-modern society in industrialised nations (Regda & McNamara, 2014). Financial risk may be amplified within dynamic economies, such as in the Gulf countries, which are undergoing social changes, economic diversification, and fiscal policy changes. These factors could potentially cause greater financial uncertainties and unforeseen financial events for individuals and families now and into the future. Large unforeseen financial risk events that affect the well-being of families include household debt, losing a job, financial loss in business, damage to property that is a source of income, loss of mortgages, and medical expenses (Deacon & Firebaugh, 1988; Xiao & Dew, 2011). Saudi Arabia is undergoing major social changes and economic diversification in the process of moving towards the Kingdom’s Vision 2030. The vision has three primary themes: vibrant society, thriving economy, and an ambitious nation. The heart of the vision is the happiness and fulfilment of citizens and residents through promotion of physical, psychological, and social well-being. In order to achieve the vision, one aspect that needs to be addressed is families’ practice of financial risk management. Sound financial risk practices should secure and strengthen the financial status of families and their well-being and contribute to a society that is less stressed by financial risks. The quick pace of social change and economic diversification within Saudi Arabia will create a degree of uncertainty in the economy, and as a result may

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increase financial risk for some households. For example, some households may be impacted by the loss of full and/or part time jobs due to structural changes of the economy in Saudi Arabia. These changes may contribute to increased household debt, reducing savings rates and disrupting employment. These events could drain a household’s financial resources, impacting the household’s way of life and undermining the household’s financial plan. Thus, the changing circumstances within Saudi Arabia suggest the need for households to consider and plan for financial risk. From a welfare policy standpoint, a social aim should be to encourage households to recognise financial risks they face and to take actions to protect themselves against adverse effects of such risks. Successful risk management should mitigate potential financial losses and ensure that households’ standard of life is less adversely affected by events outside of their control. In this transitional period in Saudi Arabia, it is of interest to understand the level of financial risk households perceive and their financial risk management practices to enjoy a good quality of life, a healthy lifestyle, and an attractive living environment in line with the Kingdom’s Vision 2030. There is also a need for the state to understand personal financial risk management practices within households to inform policy, such as by identifying “at risk” groups in society and targeting messages appropriately. Risk management refers to the identification and analysis of risks faced by an organisation, individual, or family, and the selection and implementation of the most appropriate techniques for treating exposure to any risk situation circumstances in which loss is possible (Rejda & McNamara, 2014). This chapter examines the relation between personal financial risk management practices (PFRM) and personal knowledge of financial risk management and identifies financial risk exposures, personal financial risk assessment, and personal financial risk control and monitoring among households with a range of socioeconomic characteristics in Saudi Arabia. The chapter first reviews literature on PFRMP and then describes methodology used in the current study. The chapter next presents empirical findings and explains the results. The chapter concludes with implications for practice and policy as well as providing directions for future research.

Background on Personal Financial Risk Management Practices in the International Literature Existing studies related to risk management practices include five constructs: knowledge of risk and risk management, risk identification, risk assessment and analysis, risk monitoring, and control (Hassan, 2009; Peng, 2009; Rosman, 2009; Shafiq & Nasr, 2010), regardless of whether the risk management involves organisations, individuals, or families (Rejda & McNamara, 2014). The financial risk literature has focused primarily on the risk management practices of institutions, public health services, technical practices, and environmental

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policies. These institutions and practices have all adopted strong risk management approaches and frameworks (Ali & Naysary, 2014; Ariffin & Kassim, 2012; Ghani & Mahmood, 2015; Hudin & Hamid, 2014; Miltner, 2013). Many aspects of risk management that apply to institutions also apply to households. The first factor necessary for successful risk management practice is an understanding of the aspects of risk and the micro and macro environment of the households. Understanding risk and risk management is a crucial factor in risk management practices in financial institutions (Al-Tamimi & AlMazrooei, 2007; Hassan, 2009), and is important in households, too. Risk monitoring is also essential to ensure that the risk management practices of households correspond to their personal objectives and facilitate the household’s identifying its shortcomings at an early stage. Bank risk monitoring enhances bank performance (Allen, Carletti, & Marquez, 2008; Besanko & Kanatas, 1993), which likely also extends to households. At the individual and household level, analysis of risk assessment and risk mitigation procedures has been undertaken in the area of emergency risk management relating to natural, technological, and civil risks that could affect a person or household, such as the risk of flooding or radiation (McMullan, Brown, & Largey, 2015, 2018). In relation to these risks, an associated financial loss is expected to form part of the impact of the risk, but financial risk itself has not been set explicitly as the focus for research. Literature on personal financial risk management is limited. Existing studies mainly focus on financial management behaviours such as gender differences in financial management and financial attitudes among students (Gries & Ha, 2014; Mein & Thao, 2015; Vuong & Nguyen, 2013; Xiao & Dew, 2011). Female students have been found to engage in more financial management than male students in Malaysia (Falahati & Paim, 2012). Educators who were less exposed to financial information via the media displayed lower levels of personal financial literacy in Israel (Hadar, 2015). Financial attitudes, not financial knowledge or self-control, have a substantial influence on practices in financial management among youth (Mien & Thao, 2015; Parrotta & Johnson, 1998). These findings suggest the need for educational initiatives to be more aware of the role of financial attitudes in young people’s financial behaviour when providing training programmes. The most important determinant of having a good financial position is responsible financial behaviour, not income (Zakaria, Jaafar, & Marican, 2012). In addition, responsible financial behaviour is strongly related to having sound financial knowledge. Equipping households with financial knowledge is useful in helping them avoid financial trouble.

Background on Personal Financial Risk Management Practices in the GCC The economy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is strongly connected to the global economy and has experienced many contemporary

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changes. Families’ personal financial situations are affected by social changes, economic diversification, and fiscal policy changes in GCC countries. Household debt has become a prominent issue in families’ financial situation in Gulf countries as Gulf economies have almost tripled the ratio of debt to gross domestic product since 2014 (Bloomberg, 2019). In 2016, UAE household debt accounted for roughly 67% of total household debt in the Gulf region. An average UAE resident had to deal with more than Dh 42,000 of personal debt in 2016, and more than three in five residents surveyed in 2018 had debt of some kind, most commonly from credit cards (33%) and personal loans (28%; McLaren, 2018). McLaren (2018) suggests that the high percentage of individuals with personal debts could be a direct result of inadequate financial knowledge, with 29% of respondents indicating that they did not feel well informed about lending for credit cards or loans. Similarly, the financial literacy of the respondents in investment decision making was found to be low among female investors in UAE (Al-Tamimi & Kalli, 2009). The situation is similar in other Gulf countries. For example, in Qatar the average household debt was $40,000 in 2004 and more than tripled to $143,000 by 2013. In Saudi Arabia, the household debt ratio increased from 10.22% in 2013 to 11.5% in 2018; over this same period, gross domestic saving as a percentage of gross domestic product decreased from 48% to 36%. Unemployment continues to be a challenge to the Saudi economy, with the unemployment rate for Saudis in 2017 reaching 12.8%, which might reflect the limited number of jobs created in the private sector due to sluggish economic growth (Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, 2018). Female unemployment was at 32%, significantly higher than male unemployment which was 7.4%. There is a need for in-depth research to understand households’ knowledge about financial risk and household risk management practices in the Gulf region. The literature on financial risk management practices in the Gulf has not addressed personal financial risk management. A few studies have examined financial risk management from the perspective of institutions such as banks in the GCC (Al-Khouri, 2011; Al-Tamimi & Al-Mazrooei, 2007). For example, Al-Khouri (2011) assessed the impact of banks’ specific risk characteristics and the overall banking environment on the performance of 43 commercial banks operating in GCCs over the period 1998–2008. Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei (2007) provided a comparative study of banks’ risk management for UAE National and Foreign Banks. Ali and Naysary (2014) conducted a qualitative study to understand risk management practices in Islamic banks in Kuwait through addressing risk management processes, type of risks, and measuring and mitigating risks. However, comparable studies on families’ financial risk management practices are lacking.

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Empirical Findings Methods Sample and survey. The target group for this study was the financial decision makers within households, in line with Sarabdeen, Afroz, Kijas, and Ali (2017). An online survey tool closely based on that employed by McMullan et al. (2015), adapted to the current context, was administered in May 2019 to obtain a convenience sample of households residing in Riyadh. The results presented here are based on an initial 193 responses obtained, representing around 30% of the target sample size. In terms of socioeconomic characteristics, the respondents to the survey were predominantly female (61%). They were skewed towards younger age categories: 46.3% were 19–29 years, 29% were 30–39 years, 20% were 40–49 years, 13.5% were 50–59, and 3% were 60–69 years. The majority were Saudi (78%). Of the 22% of ex-pat origin, most were Asians, with only a small fraction of other Middle Eastern origin, Europeans, and Africans. Most (78%) of the respondents were married. In terms of number of children younger than 18 in the household, 20.2% had one or two children, 20.2% had three to five children, 22.2% had six to ten children, and the remainder had none. A large proportion of respondents (78%) reported having a university degree. The largest proportion of respondents fell in the SR 8,001 to SR 16,000 income bracket (39%); 34% earned less than SR 8,000; 20.3% earned between SR 16,001 and SR 25,000; and 6.8% earned more than SR 25,000 per month. Measures. Financial risk was described for the respondents as follows: “Financial risk is defined as an unexpected occurrence of losing sources of income, financial assets, household debt, or making a loss on financial investments and any business, losing a job, damage to property that is a source of income.” This was differentiated from property risks (more in line with traditional household emergency risk management literature) and legal risks that a household may face. Within the survey, respondents were presented with nine financial risks identified from the literature: incurring a large medical bill, main earner made unemployed, loss of main household income due to retirement of the main earner, loss of main household income due to illness or death of main earner, loss of extra source of income/overtime hours, financial loss on the stock market, losing home or other property through default on a loan, not enough savings for retirement, and not enough assets for retirement. Respondents also were given the opportunity to add other risks that they felt may apply to them. For each of the nine financial risks presented to them, individuals were asked to rate the likelihood of its occurrence and its severity of impact on them and their household if it did occur. Each of these was measured on a 5-point

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Likert scale. This allowed for the calculation of standard risk assessment measures, the product of likelihood and impact. Risk assessment therefore ranges from the lowest risk level of 1 to highest of 25. To capture information on attitudes related to each risk, respondents also reported how much they worried about each risk on a 5-point Likert scale. In the analysis, average risk assessment and average worry level are used as explanatory variables. A binary indicator was used to indicate the existence or success of financial risk management. The binary response to the question, “Have you taken any action to protect you and your family from financial risks?” indicated whether the respondent has given thought to and taken action to defend against the impact of financial risks. Knowledge about personal financial risk and management at the household level was assessed by asking about participants’ knowledge about financial products, whether they have been given advice encouraging people to prepare for financial risk situations from any source, how carefully the participant considered whether an item is affordable before buying it, and whether the participant considered the risk of money involved when making an investment. Financial risk control and monitoring at a personal/household level was assessed as the extent to which an individual agrees with each of the behavioural statements: “I keep a close personal watch on my financial affairs” and “I set long-term financial goals and strive to achieve them,” whether they hold at least one insurance policy, and whether they have saved money in the last three years, regardless of whether they still hold the savings. The first two variables can be taken as measures of monitoring and the second two as control of the negative impact of a financial emergency. The degree of successful financial risk management at any given level of risk knowledge, assessment, and control may be influenced by socioeconomic characteristics. To mitigate any bias in results, the analyses control for gender, age (allowing for a potential quadratic effect), marital status, education, income, presence of children in the household, Saudi national versus ex-pat status, and employment status. Model specification. The model specification to explain personal financial risk management practices among the households is given as: PFRMP = f (KPFRM, PFRAA, PFRMC, SEC) Where PFRMP = Personal financial risk management practice KPFRM = Knowledge of personal financial risk management PFRAA = Personal financial risk assessment and analysis PFRMC = Personal financial risk monitoring and control SEC = Socioeconomic characteristics The binary dependent variable indicates whether an action had been taken to protect against a financial risk (1 = respondent took action to prepare against financial emergency, 0 = no action taken).

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Results The binary dependent variable analysed as an indicator of undertaking risk management practice is having taken an action to prepare for a financial emergency. Overall, 44% of respondents reported having taken action to protect themselves from a financial emergency risk; 56% had not taken any action. The reason for not taking action was asked of those who had taken none. Thirty-two per cent said they do not know what to do to protect them from financial emergency risk; 17% of them believe that family, friends, and other relatives would help them; 14% of the respondents feel it is too expensive; 12% believe they will cope with any emergency; 10% do not want to think about it; 4% believe any protective action would not make a difference; and 10% of the respondents attributed not taking action to other reasons. Probit analysis was used to investigate the relation between PFRMP and personal knowledge on financial risk management, identifying the financial risk exposures, personal financial risk assessment and analysis, personal financial risk monitoring and control, and socioeconomic characteristics of households (see Table 10.1). Results were corrected for heteroscedasticity using White’s correction. The results reveal no individual significance of knowledge variables, nor are they found to be jointly significant as a group. Average worry about risks is significant, indicating that, holding all other factors constant, higher worry about financial risks is associated with a lower probability that respondents have taken financial risk protection actions. This suggests that having taken no action leads to worry. Among the risk monitoring and control factors, the factor “set long term financial goals and strive to achieve them” is highly statistically significant. The positive coefficient indicates that the respondents who have a positive attitude towards financial management are more likely to have taken an action to protect against financial risk. Moreover, among the socioeconomic variables, nationality, income, and employment status are significant, whereas gender, age, marital status, presence of children in the household, and education are not significant predictors of PFRMP. The coefficients on income categories are positive and significant for all categories, indicating that a higher income level implies a respondent is more likely to have taken an action to protect against risk. This response is consistent with the existence of excessive expense in taking protective action as being a reason not to do so. Saudi nationals and individuals who were unemployed are less likely to have taken action for protection for financial risk, compared to non-Saudis and full-time employed individuals, respectively. Comparatively speaking, expatriates feel more prepared for financial emergencies than Saudis. This does not necessarily indicate a difference based on nationality. Expatriates in Saudi are a self-selected group. They are generally based in the country to

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seek work, many being economic migrants who have come with a focus on their finances and the objective of securing their financial status. Finally, retired respondents are more likely than those employed full time to have taken an action to protect against financial emergencies. TABLE 10.1 Probit Models Explaining the Degree to Which Respondents Took

Action to Prepare against Financial Emergency Variable Description Number of financial products respondent reports awareness of Has seen or heard messages encouraging people in Saudi Arabia to consider and prepare for financial risk Agrees with statement “Before I buy something, I carefully consider whether I can afford it” Agrees with statement “I am prepared to risk my own money when making an investment” Perceived risk Average worry over all stated emergencies Agrees with statement “I keep close personal watch on my financial affairs” Agrees with statement “I set long term financial goals and strive to achieve them” Gender Nationality Age Age2 Married At least one child in the household University degree Income Less than 8,000 8,000–16,000 16,000–25,000 25,000–42,000 above 42,000 Employment status Working full time Working part time Student Looking after family Retired Not in education, employment or training Number of observations (N) Pseudo R 2 Wald

Coefficient

p-value

0.087

0.104

0.328

0.252

0.003

0.982

−0.175

0.132

0.068 −0.502 −0.724

0.116 0.013 0.628

0.364

0.001

0.427 −1.100 −0.128 0.001 0.558 −0.402 −0.145

0.161 0.002 0.207 0.334 0.147 0.288 0.722

0.670 1.191 1.369 7.788

0.062 0.005 0.024 0.000

−0.469 0.171 −0.935 1.266 −5.927

0.335 0.767 0.172 0.069 0.000

139 0.336 1423

0.000

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Implications for Policy and Practice The majority of the respondents surveyed were not prepared for financial risks that could affect the well-being of their families, suggesting the importance of taking action to secure financial stability of families in Saudi Arabia. A household financial development programme, similar to that launched in 2018 for the development of the financial sector in Saudi Arabia, could be launched to promote financial awareness, increase savings, and financial inclusion to help promote financial stability among families. As a first step, families should be made aware of the need for financial risk management. Forty-four per cent of the respondents reported already seeing or hearing messages encouraging people in Saudi Arabia to consider and prepare for financial risk. Awareness of the need to consider and prepare for financial risks is a necessary condition for households to adopt effective financial risk management practices. However, advice that they should prepare for risks alone is not sufficient to bring about effective financial risk management. Families need greater knowledge and guidance about what this preparation entails in practice. A second step therefore would be to provide information to build public knowledge on how to effectively mitigate financial risks. The evidence suggests that respondents are not versed in effective risk management strategies. When those who had taken no financial risk management actions were asked why they had not, 32% said they did not know what to do to prevent financial emergency risks. In addition, 17% believed that family, friends, and other relatives would help them when they face financial risks. However, reliance on family support may itself be a risky strategy especially in times of general uncertainty in the economy. Households need to be given information on products available and how to act to prepare. On average, individuals who were not prepared for financial emergencies worried more. Vision 2030 of Saudi Arabia seeks to foster the health, happiness, and well-being of families. Preparing families for financial emergencies could be one way to reduce stress and improve well-being. Setting long-term financial goals and striving to achieve them was also related to effective financial risk management practices, suggesting that programmes could be implemented to work with families on setting financial goals and developing strategies to achieve the goals. For example, in the present survey, only 34% of the respondents reported having insurance, and 14% of the respondents who had not taken any action to protect themselves from financial risks felt it is too expensive. Creating a feasible insurance premium with affordable prices would particularly help low-income families to invest in insurance. Results in the analysis focusing on socioeconomic characteristics can be used to identify groups within the population who tend to be less practised in financial risk management and therefore more open to any negative impacts of risks amplified by economic changes. These individuals can be targeted as part

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of directed awareness and information campaigns. The results suggest Saudi nationals (as opposed to expatriates), lower income groups, and individuals who are unemployed are more at risk due to lack of financial risk management practices. Therefore, they may become susceptible to financial hardship if they are not supported by enough safety nets, such as unemployment benefits and insurance. Although the non-Saudi population within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a self-selected, possibly more financially focused group and not necessarily representative of the rest of the world generally, they could be argued to represent the level of financial risk management households and individuals should aspire to in order to promote financial resilience. Gender, age, marital status, education, and presence of children in the households were not significantly related to financial risk management practices.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research This analysis of personal financial risk management practices is a first attempt to model the processes in Saudi Arabia and can serve as a catalyst in future research in other GCC states. Due to the restrictions on entering homes and difficulties of recruiting representative samples in Saudi Arabia, we used online survey methodology, which has implications for who is being studied and generalizability. This limitation could be corrected using face-to-face and email surveys with randomly selected probability samples in future studies. One initial aspect of a risk management process that could not be included here is risk identification, the process of identifying and classifying the risks that could affect households. Efficient risk identification includes the following four mechanisms: identifying sources of risk, hazard factors, perils, and exposure to risk (Tchankova, 2002). As the survey in the current study listed nine risks for assessment, respondents were not required to identify risk sources, although they could identify additional sources to the extent that they identified risks in addition to those pre-listed for their assessment. Additional risk sources were listed by very few respondents but could be assessed by using open-ended questions in future research. The relation between average risk assessment and average worry level and financial risk management practices is unclear. It may be that a high-risk assessment and/or high worry level will promote greater effective action. However, it is also possible that greater worry and risk assessment are motivated by a lack of financial risk management practices. Future research should consider developing intensive risk assessment tools to assess the direction of effect.

Conclusions Saudi Arabia is undergoing major social and economic changes aimed at diverting the economy’s reliance on the traditional oil sector to other non-oil

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sectors. Such changes may affect the level of financial uncertainty and potential risk within households. Households’ financial resources are vulnerable to business loss, unemployment, and household debt. Successful risk management should mitigate potential financial losses and ensure that households’ standard of life is less adversely affected by events outside of their control. In this transitional period, it is of interest to understand the level of financial risk households perceive and the financial risk management practices they employ to promote a less stressful and therefore better quality of life. Because existing financial risk management literature tends to focus more on institution-based financial risk management than household risk management, this chapter extends understanding of the degree to which households in Saudi Arabia undertake financial risk management practices. PFRMP is modelled as based on the householder’s knowledge of financial risk management, level of financial risk assessed and degree of concern, personal financial risk control and monitoring, and socioeconomic characteristics of households. The results show statistically significant relations between PFRMP and worry about risk exposures, longterm financial goals, and socioeconomic variables including nationality, income level, and employment status. New frameworks for managing PFRMP among households must be explored to help households pursue their aspiration of becoming more stress-free and maintaining their living standards by guiding and stimulating innovative and sustainable ideas for managing financial risk of households.

Acknowledgement This research was funded by the deanship of scientific research at Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, Riyadh through the fast-track research-funding programme.

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11 POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO PROMOTE THE WELL-BEING OF FAMILIES IN THE GULF REGION Anis Ben Brik, Jennifer E. Lansford, and Abdallah M. Badahdah

Introduction As the introductory chapter of this volume explains, families in the Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) have experienced significant changes over the last five decades. Family life in the region continues to undergo considerable changes related to family roles, norms, and structure, to name a few. These changes have resulted from socioeconomic and technological forces such as increased urbanization; mass education; different patterns of emigration; economic, political, and social globalization; and changes in gender ideology. This book has provided a broad and detailed review and assessment of the family transformation in the Gulf region. As the chapters in the book have shown, several studies have been conducted in response to changing family life in this region. Even so, until now there has been no single volume or edited collection that brings together this impressive body of work in a way that successfully analyzes key changes in family life in the region and proposes directions for future research. This book fills that gap by providing a comprehensive, in-depth investigation of the key research issues and concerns in family life in the Gulf region. This chapter offers a general summary of the chapters in the book. This summary closely follows the organization of the book, and after each summary we provide policy and program recommendations related to the chapter’s areas of focus. As a way to consolidate the themes raised throughout this book, at the end of this chapter we provide a conceptual framework for family well-being in the Gulf region, and we propose recommendations for future research.

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Summary of Chapters and Their Implications for Policies and Programs This book, in addition to the introduction and conclusion chapters, contains nine chapters that address important transformations in family life in the Gulf region. The chapters provide comprehensive, in-depth investigations of issues and concerns in family life conducted in the fields of expertise of the contributors. Authors were able to integrate a large body of scholarship and data that deal with a variety of family life issues, from relationships within families (marital, parent-child) to the interface of organizations (parents’ work, children’s schools) with families to the influence of broader societal forces (e.g., youth independence movements, national financial changes) on families. We turn now to a summary of each chapter in turn, along with recommendations for policies and programs stemming from each chapter.

Intimate Partner Violence Todd, Jarvis, and Murad (2021) delve into the problem of intimate partner violence (IPV), with a particular focus on analyzing the impact of a crisis advocacy program in Bahrain on the perceptions of program volunteers and victims of abuse toward violence against women. They found that the program enhanced the understanding and awareness of IPV among women, and the crisis advocacy program has acted as a positive catalyst for social change for victims of abuse by providing them with services and support. For policy-makers, Todd and colleagues offered multiple prevention strategies, including women-centered support services such as (1) advocacy programs for victims in healthcare settings; (2) domestic violence helplines to provide advice and support to victims; (3) awareness-raising programs; (4) legal reforms and the enactment of legislation addressing both civil and criminal responses; and (5) multi-sectoral responses to IPV. Within this context, although all Gulf countries have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), national responses to IPV have been fragmented. Gaps in legislation on violence against women, in particular the lack of a specific law criminalizing domestic violence and marital rape, still persist in most countries. Even where legislation exists, implementation and enforcement are inadequate, and survivors of IPV often face social and legal barriers to accessing justice. Customary and informal systems of justice, which in some cases exacerbate or fail to sanction harmful practices, prevail in these settings. Factors including family expectations, economic dependence, and weak legal systems might combine to prevent women from seeking help. For most countries in the Gulf region, the CEDAW committee has some concerns including the lack of awareness and

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training on violence against women among judges, prosecutors, police officers, and health professionals and the absence of a data-collection system on cases of violence against women, on prosecution and conviction rates, and on the number, capacity, and funding of shelters, counseling, and rehabilitation services. Major challenges faced by victims of IPV across the Gulf region are underreported IPV, given that many women fear losing custody of their children, and obtaining meaningful legal remedies. The findings of Todd et al. (2021) provide evidence that could be used to inform the development of interventions in other Gulf countries. Our recommendations include economic empowerment programs, legal reforms or other system-wide approaches, multi-sectoral strategies, community-based interventions, and group-based training (Arango, Morton, Gennari, Kiplesund, & Ellsberg, 2014; Heise, 2011; Klugman et al., 2014). We propose (1) establishing a comprehensive domestic violence protection system; (2) enacting specific legislation to criminalize all forms of violence against women; (3) providing victims with adequate redress and reparation, including compensation and the means for a full rehabilitation; (4) offering victim-centered services including shelters, hotlines, crisis intervention and counseling, medical and legal advocacy, and access to community resources to help improve outcomes for survivors and mitigate long-term negative health consequences of IPV (Niolon, 2017); (5) training judges, prosecutors, and the police on the criminal nature of violence against women and on gender-sensitive procedures to identify and assist victims of domestic violence, including women domestic workers; (6) developing and implementing community mobilization and economic empowerment programs paired with gender equality training and school-based programs; (7) enhancing informal justice and rights-based responses such as public shaming or victim led mediation; and (8) acknowledging IPV as a public health issue and not only as a social and private problem. Interventions with an evidence base need local adaptation and evaluation, taking into account not only the cultural context but also national policy and legal frameworks. In addition, marital and relationship education programs have become an increasingly common intervention covering issues surrounding awareness, prevention, and treatment of violence that can decrease physical and emotional abuse, as well as isolation behaviors (Antle, Karam, Christensen, Barbee, & Sar, 2011). Negative parenting behaviors (e.g., harsh and inconsistent discipline, poor parental monitoring) and family environments that are unstable, stressful, and that lack structure are also risk factors for perpetration of IPV in adolescence and continued perpetration into adulthood (Derzon, 2010; Lundahl, Risser, & Lovejoy, 2006; Vagi et al., 2013). Thus, families are a prime target for intervention at several levels. Studies have also highlighted the important role of positive parenting practices in exacerbating or buffering the impact of IPV and have been called youths’ “greatest protective resource” against violence exposure and other forms of stress (Osofsky, 1999). Positive parenting support might

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help to promote better relationships between parents and children, as well as to reduce the intergenerational transmission of violence ( Jouriles et al., 2001; Letourneau et al., 2011). Thus, we recommend positive parenting programs designed to support positive communications and prevent the occurrence of IPV. The World Health Organization (2014) notes that home visiting programs that offer parents and caregivers support and parenting education programs that improve child rearing skills, increase knowledge of child development, and foster positive child management skills hold promise to prevent IPV. Studies that include both urban and rural areas to understand the difference in IPV prevalence and the distinctive needs of each area are necessary. Further studies are needed to identify the risk factors for IPV. Longitudinal research on IPV risk factors and outcomes is needed to inform the development of intervention programs. Qualitative studies are needed to understand the IPV experience and its context as well as IPV disclosure (Alhalal, Ta’an, & Alhalal, 2019). Also, studies on childhood exposure to violence are needed to inform parenting programs and prevent exposure to IPV. We recommend further work to synthesize data on the prevalence of IPV in the Gulf region.

Fertility Transitions Islam (2021) provides an analysis of fertility in Oman and describes the underlying causes of the rapid decline in fertility between 1988 and 2018. Islam analyzed a number of factors that have led to an increase in average age at marriage and shortened the childbearing period in Oman, including Oman’s Birth Spacing Programme, strengthening the healthcare system, promoting public education (particularly for girls), promoting women’s empowerment and job opportunities, and investment to improve quality of life in remote areas of Oman. Islam argues that future fertility trends in Oman will largely depend on the motivation of couples to have smaller families and effective use of contraception to materialize their fertility intensions. In this context, previous research indicates that population control policies involved two main elements: (1) promoting an increase in information about and availability of contraceptive methods; and (2) creating public campaigns aimed at establishing new small-family norms. Population control measures in a number of countries have included raising the minimum legal age at marriage; providing access to reproductive healthcare, including low cost, safe, and effective contraception; integrating family planning and safe motherhood programs into primary healthcare systems; and improving female education and employment opportunities. Other measures include monetary or in-kind incentives and disincentives as means of encouraging families to practice birth control. In Tunisia, for example, government family allowances were limited to the first four children; in Singapore, income tax relief was restricted to the first three children as was maternity leave, the allocation of public apartments,

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and preferred placements in schools (De Silva & Tenreyro, 2017). These measures, as well as the changes in Oman that were associated with a rapid fertility decline from 1988 to 2018, offer insights into culturally sensitive policies and programs that can reduce fertility.

Parenting Styles Aldhafri (2021) provides a review of empirical research on parenting styles over the last two decades in Oman. Authoritative parenting style, characterized by high levels of both warmth and control, is the most common style among Omani parents. The findings in Oman are consistent with previous studies on parenting styles in other Arab societies (see Dwairy et al., 2006). Smetana and Ahmad (2018) found that the most common profile for both Arab mothers and fathers was consistent with authoritative parenting – that is, low levels of harsh, punitive parenting and psychological control and high levels of support, behavioral control, and parental knowledge of activities. Aldhafri (2021) also highlights the importance of the impact of parenting styles on children’s behavior and development. Authoritative parenting style is associated with fewer internalizing and externalizing symptoms of children (Fletcher et al., 2008). By contrast, authoritarian parenting style, characterized by low warmth and high control, is related to children’s depression (Dearing, McCartney, & Taylor, 2006). Aldhafri advocates for parenting education programs targeting children’s mental health and well-being across the lifespan. To strengthen and empower families and communities in the context of family support services, we recommend promoting positive parenting, defined as “parental behavior based on the best interest of the child that is nurturing, empowering, non-violent and provides recognition and guidance which involves setting of boundaries to enable the full development of the child” (Rodrigo, 2016, p. 64). Prinz (2016) suggests that successful parenting programs have several key features in common, including being (1) Grounded in empirically derived theories about child development, family interaction, developmental psychotherapy, and change processes; (2) Action-focused with parents doing things during the interaction, rather than just talking; (3) Problem-solving oriented to address the problems parents face and work toward solutions; (4) Specific, concrete, and practical in suggesting parenting strategies; (5) Collaborative in goal setting between parents and intervention providers; and (6) Framed positively to build on parental competencies and avoid blame. Positive parenting is an essential element of children’s emotional well-being and resilience (Davidov & Grusec, 2006) and can limit the harm caused by bullying (Bowes, Maughan, Caspi, Moffitt, & Arseneault, 2010), family poverty (Flouri, Midouhas, Joshi, & Tzavidis, 2015), intimate partner violence (MillerGraff, Cater, Howell, & Graham-Bermann, 2016), and even sexual abuse (Lind et al., 2018). Evaluation studies of parenting programs have shown that these

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programs have the potential to have a beneficial impact on the well-being of families and children, reduce maternal depression, and improve relationships between spouses. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that state parties promote and implement policies for positive parenting including (OHCHR, 2013): (1) Prenatal care for expecting mothers and preparation for parenthood; (2) Provision of a child and parent friendly environment and support during the first days of life, including hospitals that allow newborns to remain with parents, promote breastfeeding, and address prevention of post-natal depression; (3) Improvement of conditions and length of parental leave and early childhood education and care. Recommendations place a prevention-based focus on the development of positive parent-child relationships as an effective way to protect children, preserve their rights, and promote their development. Governments in the region have the responsibility to create the best conditions for family well-being by providing parents with sufficient and adequate support. Therefore, governments should develop policies and strategies to overcome barriers to the development and implementation of positive parenting programs. Barriers may include lack of funding; parental engagement and participation; insufficient workforce; inadequate legal, policy, and standards frameworks; inadequate services; cultural norms and practices and their alignment with program content; quality and consistency in implementation and scale-up; and hard to reach parents, including fathers and parents with major personal issues and vulnerabilities, such as mental health problems, substance abuse, and domestic violence in their lives, all of which pose challenges for parenting programs. For example, governments in the Gulf region should provide support services for parents from a variety of family situations, but especially parents and children facing adverse circumstances (e.g., couple violence, low educational background, poverty, substance abuse). Governments and civil society organizations in the region should invest in capacity building of practitioners to deliver parenting programs including not only program content but also skills related to facilitation, parental engagement, and adult education to help overcome known barriers to participation. The above recommendations to promote positive parenting in the Gulf region are necessary because taking a preventive stance to family intervention involves a profound shift in the way the state understands its work with families, moving from a deficit approach to one based on prevention and promotion. The focus should be on the promotion of parental capacities and move toward a strengthening approach that identifies parents’ existing skills and strengths and builds on these. Promoting and developing positive parenting requires a multilevel, multi-systemic approach. Positive parenting programs should focus not only on the individual family context but consider structural (e.g., poverty and

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inequality) and cultural factors (e.g., discrimination based on disability, gender, or ethnicity) associated with harmful parenting and violence against children. We suggest strengthening the evidence on fathers and on strategies for supporting parents of children with special needs. Few positive parenting programs currently measure actual child maltreatment outcomes in the Gulf region. Further research should focus on evaluation of existing parenting programs to determine whether they are having intended effects on parents and children. Longitudinal studies are needed to measure the effectiveness of positive parenting programs in the long term, such as in preventing all forms of violence including the transmission of violence across generations.

Parental Involvement in Education Al-Hassan (2021) reviews the literature on parental involvement in education and home-school partnerships in the Gulf region. She focuses on ways in which parents can be involved with schools, such as communicating with teachers, volunteering, home learning, education-related decision-making, and community collaborating. Al-Hassan points out that although a number of public policies and initiatives have been developed to encourage parents’ involvement in schools, parents’ participation in the education of their children is not yet fulfilling its full potential. Reforms are needed in educational systems in the Gulf region. Al-Hassan also highlights a wide range of factors associated with parental involvement such as teaching quality, qualified teachers, availability of resources, community support, and parents’ education. She recommends that researchers address in the future the impact of different forms of parental involvement on students’ academic and social success in the Gulf region. For policy-makers, Al-Hassan recommends that governments in the region should (1) mandate school policies that reflect and reinforce cultural norms and expectations surrounding involvement of mothers and fathers; (2) implement school evaluation systems that consider how schools encourage parental involvement in more and less effective ways; (3) improve parent-school communication and develop strategies for parental engagement and participation such as community campaigns; (4) provide resources and support to parents, especially for parents who have children with special needs; (5) involve parents in schools’ decisionmaking processes. Perhaps the most commonly accepted framework of best practice principles is that of Epstein (2018), which is embedded in parental engagement practices in the United States as the National Standards for Parent/Family Involvement Programs: Standard I: Communicating: Communication between home and school is regular, two-way, and meaningful. Standard II: Parenting: Parenting skills are promoted and supported. Standard III: Student Learning: Parents play an integral role in assisting student learning. Standard IV: Volunteering: Parents

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are welcome in the school, and their support and assistance are sought. Standard V: School Decision-Making and Advocacy: Parents are full partners in the decisions that affect children and families. Standard VI: Collaborating with Community: Community resources are used to strengthen schools, families, and student learning. Treating parents and schools as joint contributors to more effective instruction and children’s educational achievement requires support of governments, civil society organizations, and the community. Hence, we suggest developing policies and programs to address barriers to families’ involvement in schools described by Walker and Hoover-Dempsey (2008). Family-based barriers relate to socioeconomic status and limited educational attainment that can result in parents feeling ill-prepared to support their children’s learning or to interact with schools effectively. Practical difficulties, such as lack of flexible working arrangements, can limit parents’ availability for school-based involvement. Psychological barriers relate to parents’ own experience of schooling, which may include having poor educational achievement, poor treatment at school as well as physical or mental health issues, which can result in parents feeling intimidated by the school environment and being unable to participate effectively. Cultural barriers may occur as a result of ethnic and language differences between parents and the school and a misunderstanding of the value of schools by families, as well as schools’ limited understanding of families’ values and practices. Gender barriers can play a part in discouraging the involvement of all parents, particularly fathers. Brook and Hancock (2000) point to some of the difficulties that fathers face in engaging with schools because of the gendered dimension of parent-teacher relationships. For school-family educational partnerships to be truly successful, there needs to be a robust framework for implementation that takes into account the many different needs of schools and families. All stakeholders, especially policy-makers and civil society organizations in the Gulf region, are needed to address the following challenges. First, develop public policies and laws to promote effective school-parent programs. For example, the state of Ohio in the United States has adopted the Ohio Parent Involvement Law, which requires that each Board of Education located in the state of Ohio adopt a policy to provide parents an opportunity to be actively involved in their children’s education. The law also states that parents must be informed of the importance of parental involvement in directly affecting the success of their children’s educational efforts; how and when to assist their children and support their children’s classroom learning activities; and techniques, strategies, and skills to use at home to improve their children’s development as future responsible adult members of society (Bitsko, Phipps, Roehrs, & Barnheiser, 2000). Second, stakeholders should address known barriers to participation, including parents’ lack of awareness of the benefits and roles of parents in education. An example of programs trying to address known barriers includes Parental

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Information and Resource Centres, implemented by the U.S. Department of Education, which are state organizations that provide training, information, and support to parents, state education authorities, local authorities, and other organizations that carry out parental education and family involvement programs. Third, stakeholders should consider funding. Across the Gulf region, funding for family/school programs is lacking. Governments should provide schools with financial resources for the implementation of effective family/ school programs. Fourth, human resources are important because sufficient staff are needed to operate effective programs. For example, schools could hire a family/school coordinator to connect school personnel with families. Fifth, stakeholders must attend to training. Teachers should receive preservice and inservice training if they are to implement a successful parent involvement program. For example, training for family/school partnerships should include parent training, especially related to helping parents acquire parenting ideas and leadership strategies for helping their children achieve literacy skills (Clark, 1989). Developing a resource kit, which provides planning tools, strategies, templates, and guidelines to implement family/school programs would be one idea. Another example includes Walk Right In (DET, 2011), a manual that aims to increase parents’ involvement in their children’s education and the school. The package is designed to motivate, inspire, and empower school staff to support parents’ active involvement in education and school decisionmaking. The package includes leadership strategies for principals and teachers to help them engage parents in their children’s education, some sample presentations, an audio-visual section, web links, and a comprehensive guide to relevant resources. Sixth, coordination is important, as the implementation of effective family/school programs would require a significant investment of time and funds for development and promotion of materials and for appropriate teacher and parent training. We suggest also the development of father-focused programs to increase fathers’ involvement. Such programs should schedule activities outside of business hours, offer father-specific content and services, promote positive images of fatherhood, and use male workers and volunteers. There is also great need for evaluation of existing parental involvement programs and for evidence on the role of program components in encouraging different types of involvement. Future research also is needed on the impact of different types of involvement on various categories of educational outcomes and on how these impacts vary with parent and child characteristics.

The Role of Families in Supporting Youth Employment Kabbani and Ben Mimoune (2021) investigated the role of families in supporting Qatari youth as they transition from school to work. They point out that family networks are important in helping young Qataris secure a job in

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the labor market. Kabbani and Ben Mimoune suggest that we need to learn a great deal more about families’ own priorities and circumstances in the career and employment choices of their children to help identify which families might struggle to support their young members. Kabbani and Ben Mimoune conclude that policy-makers in Qatar and other countries could mobilize families as a resource in addressing the youth employment and private sector development priorities of the state. Ben Brik (2020a) recommends the following policies for effective family involvement in young people’s transition to work. First, develop legislation and policy that explicitly require schools to promote school-parent partnership initiatives to solicit the involvement of parents in youths’ career development process. For example, in England, the Children and Young People Services Directorate of the Shropshire County Council developed a parent and careers engagement strategy to ensure a coordinated approach to involving parents across a range of services targeted at young people in schools, colleges, and the community (Morgan, 2012). Second, Ben Brik (2020a) recommends policies that develop information resources to assist parents in helping their children’s career development. Parents in the Gulf often lack sufficient information on the full range of options and are unaware of the diversity of employment opportunities available in the public sector (e.g., education, health), which is still the employer of choice in the region, as well as entrepreneurship opportunities. For example, Engaging Parents in Career Conversations (EPiCC, 2019), implemented by the state of Victoria in Australia, is an online resource that career practitioners can use to engage parents in the career development of young people. EPiCC aims to support parents to help young people prepare for the challenges ahead in the ‘new’ economies and new jobs; enhance parents’ ability to help young people develop skills and have the capability to manage their own career throughout their lives; shift perceptions by assisting parents and young people to understand the career journey young people are on from an early stage; equip parents to help young people to develop and build their preferred career futures, feel less worried about the future, and build a supportive network to assist them; and challenge outdated belief systems that can limit a young person’s potential. Another strategy is to actively involve parents in the career preparation process, education, and guidance. For example, the College Making It Happen (CMIH) program is a collaborative effort among community colleges, public and private colleges, school districts, and community and educational organizations aimed at getting middle school students and their families to plan ahead for college so students are successful throughout high school. Parents hear from representatives of colleges, universities, and local high schools about the benefits of a college education (CMIH, 2019). Developing programs targeting parents of students with emotional, behavioral, learning, or intellectual disabilities and culturally diverse families is also important for promoting parental involvement

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in ways that are sensitive to families’ needs. Career-specific parenting behavior models can be integrated in existing family life educational programs such as positive parenting programs, marital education programs, and school-parent partnership programs.

Youth Independence in Relation to Social Change in the Gulf Alekry (2021) provides an overview of how social changes in the Gulf, such as the youth bulge, modernization, and urbanization, are related to youth civic engagement, focusing particularly on the impact of increasing youth independence on their roles and relationships within their families and family formation. He argues that many of the significant challenges confronting youth and their families have become readily apparent (e.g., housing, securing jobs, or business opportunities), while some are still implicit (e.g., modern values, civil rights). Both the apparent and the implicit challenges constitute a priority list of continuing research and public policy. Alekry concludes that addressing youth independence and fostering a sense of civic engagement in the Gulf region will require bringing together a multitude of public policies – from governance of youth affairs to addressing youth aspirations in terms of modern values, civil rights, knowledge, creativity, innovation, and empowerment. Alekry maintains that approaches are needed that incorporate economic, social, and cultural factors such as youth social institutions (e.g., associations, clubs), freedom of expression and association, equality, and justice. Ben Brik (2020b) argues that despite an interest in formulating national youth strategies, governments in the Gulf have taken a piecemeal approach to implementing youth policies and programs. For example, in Oman, youth issues are tackled through sectoral development plans. Qatar has a youth development report to mainstream youth policy with the development strategy. In Saudi Arabia, the ninth development plan (2010–2014) has a youth chapter. None of the Gulf countries has a national youth policy. In the absence of youth policies, youth commitments appear to be integrated in a wide range of sectoral legislation (i.e., in legislations related to social services, healthcare, employment acts and education, or criminal justice). Ben Brik (2020b) recommended seven different interventions to promote youth active participation in community life. First, establish youth institutions such as youth councils, youth parliaments, youth boards, and other formal structures to represent the views of young people to decision-makers and to improve coordination between stakeholders. An example of this is the Council of Europe’s Joint Council on Youth where young people and government representatives jointly decide the Council of Europe youth sector’s priorities, objectives, and budgets. Second, youth dialogues and consultations should be promoted. The outcomes of such dialogues can be shared with a public authority or other body

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that has responsibility for the decision being discussed. Youth online consultations can exist alongside other forms of participation. Digital participation can be initiated by institutions seeking to reach out to young people, for example through the use of opinion polls, consultations, or crowdsourcing ideas. Digital participation can also be initiated by young people, where online tools are used to gather support for campaigns, or information from young people, which is then presented to decision-makers, for example through the use of online petitions. Third, multidimensional youth policies should be developed by (1) promoting youth-led community development and volunteering; (2) providing economic opportunity for youth by providing job counseling, skills training, and entrepreneurship; and (3) providing life skills training and legal support services for young people. Fourth, youth civic and citizenship education can be done through formal as well as informal education, integrating youth civic principles into the standard curriculum, as well as reinforcing such skills through informal programs (possibly implemented by non-governmental organizations where government services are constrained). This wider focus on the individual capacities of all young people to engage meaningfully would also assist in reducing the tendency for ‘elite capture’ of dialogue space by more privileged young people – including at the global level. A culture of participation and democracy flourishes only when citizens are informed about democratic principles and translate that knowledge into action by engaging with institutions and other public structures, community service, and leadership. UNICEF (2017) indicates that the scope of the definition of citizenship education is quite wide and not commonly understood or formalized in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Policy-makers and practitioners find it challenging to integrate life skills and citizenship education into education systems, as there are no conceptual frameworks to guide them. One barrier to the adoption of comprehensive life skills and citizenship education frameworks includes lack of awareness on the part of government officials and decision-makers about the importance and relevance of citizenship education. Furthermore, there is no responsible authority or body that organizes, regulates, and accredits life skills and citizenship education at the national level. Key sectoral ministries (e.g., women, employment, education, youth) often do not coordinate efforts related to youth civic engagement. Unstable political situations in some MENA countries shift educational priorities toward more urgent humanitarian issues and away from other areas, such as career readiness. Fifth, obstacles to youth participation should be eliminated. The youth sector in the Gulf region lacks an enforceable, recognized instrument specifying and protecting the rights of young people. In addition, the rights of young people are often ignored, diminished, or violated, because of the absence of a law. Political commitment and resource mobilization are crucial in ensuring

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meaningful youth participation yet are often lacking. Many minority groups are stigmatized and marginalized, and youth participation is often mainstreamed to cater to and represent the “average” youth. Sixth, meaningful strategies for non-tokenistic participation are important. Youths’ basic civil rights and liberties, such as their access to information, freedom of speech and expression, and right to association and assembly, must be guaranteed by the law in the Gulf region. Youth infrastructure and participation spaces, participatory budgeting for youth, a cross-sectoral and coordinated approach across governmental policy areas beyond what is commonly perceived as the youth sector, accountability mechanisms, participatory governance and transition governance, monitoring and evaluation systems, and strengthening evidence on youth issues and participation all are important. Seventh, family should be engaged in youth civic participation. Parents play a key role in developing a propensity for youth civic engagement. Youth who discuss politics and current events with their parents tend to score higher than other youth on measures of civic behaviors, attitudes, and skills (Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001). For example, the Youth and Family Civic Engagement Initiative (YFCEI) attempts to increase civic participation among youth and their families to reduce racial and socioeconomic disparities. Through evidence-based best practices, the YFCEI trains youth and family members for meaningful leadership roles and civic participation (YFCEI, 2019).

Work-Family Conflict Lari (2021) investigates implications of work-family conflict for job satisfaction and the well-being of Qatari families. She describes barriers to work-family balance and ways in which work-family balance policies can improve employees’ levels of job satisfaction as well as organizational performance. Lari notes that Qatari adults have expressed the need for more benefits to be implemented in order to avoid work-family conflict. However, meeting this desire will require culturally sensitive policy changes that move alongside shifts in attitudes. Ben Brik (2020a) shows that although Gulf countries have a leave policy agenda for the family, maternity leaves range from 6 fully paid weeks in UAE to up to 12 fully paid weeks in Qatar. Maternity leave in the Gulf countries lags behind the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average of 19 weeks. Similarly, only Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide fully paid paternity leaves (one and three days, respectively) compared to the OECD average of nine paid weeks (see Table 11.1). The imposition of a common model for policies to promote work-family balance across the Gulf countries might be futile, due to differences in institutional traditions, attitudes, and behaviors. However, achieving common denominators and guaranteeing social minima, such as a longer maternity leave,

Promoting the Well-Being of Families  197 TABLE 11.1 Leave Policies in the Gulf Region

Country

Maternity Leave (Full-Rate Equivalent in Weeks)

Paternity Leave (Full-Rate Equivalent in Days)

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE OECD average

9 10 7 8–12 5–10 6 19.10 weeks

0 0 0 0 1 3 9.28 weeks

are both a realistic prospect and a socially beneficial one in terms of the organization of family and work in meaningful, economically viable, healthy, child-friendly, balanced, and gender-equitable ways. The future development of family-friendly working arrangements in the Gulf region clearly needs to be responsive to the new socioeconomic trends and the diversity of family arrangement and their dynamic character. A more holistic policy approach is required to address both the family and work sides. Work-family reconciliation policies are beneficial not only to workers but also to their children. The parameter of culture is important in examining the different social understandings of men’s and women’s roles, which underpin the organization of family and work across different national settings. Finally, more detailed research and evaluation of the experience of and potential for development of effective work-family reconciliation practices would greatly inform the debate in this area.

Foreign Female Domestic Workers Ivanova (2021) reviews the literature on foreign female domestic workers in the Gulf region. She notes that this is a literature that ranges from documenting positive social impacts of the female domestic workers on Gulf families that include greater social freedom of the female members of the families and higher social status of the families employing foreign female domestic workers to negative social impacts including values, language, and religion. Ivanova argues that the influence of the foreign female domestic workers on Gulf families often is perceived as negative because of fears of moral detriments such as adultery, negligence in caring for children and the elderly, and worries about harmful cultural impact. Ivanova also describes hiring and employment conditions for foreign female domestic workers. Within this context, to improve relationships between domestic workers and hiring families, we suggest the following policies. First, implement mandatory pre-departure orientation programs, including education, training, and

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counseling services, to provide domestic workers with cultural awareness of work and life experience that they can expect in Gulf families as well as rights education and awareness to provide information on domestic workers’ rights and responsibilities; travel documents and procedures; laws of the host countries; caution on deportation costs, work permit conditions, workplace safety, compensation, employment agreements, personal safety, mode of communication, food, entertainment, and remittance transfers. Pre-departure orientation programs should include gender-sensitive information. In addition to a predeparture orientation for domestic workers, an orientation program also should be held for hosting families in the Gulf to provide them with information on the culture of domestic workers, as well as workers’ rights. Second, offer certified and mandatory skills development programs, including a mix of transversal (e.g., good communication skills, language) and technical skills such as using various household appliances, managing budgets, and taking care of the elderly, children, and persons with disabilities without close supervision. For example, Qatar Nanny Training Academy, the first of its kind in the Gulf region, provides a high-quality training program for Arabicspeaking Muslim nannies to become qualified childcare providers. Employees of the academy travel to nannies’ home countries and conduct interviews and exams for the candidates and select the best candidates who meet the academy standards. The academy then provides one year of training for selected nannies and issues a certificate for successful completion of the training program. The academy signs contracts with Qatari families and places nannies with families. Third, institute comprehensive protection systems for domestic workers. As domestic workers in the Gulf are still prone to human rights violations by employers and families, we suggest regular checks on working conditions of domestic workers, establishing a hotline for complaints and violations, creating a standard employment contract for all domestic workers that specifies conditions such as minimum wages, break periods, days off, paid leave, the prohibition of the retention of passports and work permission documents by employers, the right to free communication, and the right to humane treatment. Saudi Arabia created a standard employment contract for Filipino domestic workers that can be used as an example by other countries and for employment of domestic workers from other countries (Matsuo, Hosoda, Horinuki, & Ishii, 2019). In addition, national labor protections should be extended to domestic workers, with prosecution for those who abuse domestic migrant workers. To allow fair and effective access to justice and encourage enforcement of protections for domestic workers, the private sector should be monitored to prevent abuse of workers by employers. Targeted awareness campaigns addressing domestic workers’ abuse, expanded services for abused domestic workers, and improved identification of trafficking and prosecution of traffickers are also important ways to protect domestic workers.

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Fourth, improve working conditions for domestic workers. Recommendations include structural reforms of the sponsorship system, the introduction of a minimum wage for domestic workers, improved workplace monitoring, and regulation of recruitment agencies. Finally, develop and strengthen civil society initiatives in the Gulf region and increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation between countries sending and receiving domestic workers.

Personal Financial Risk Management Practices Sarabdeen, Largy, Halid, Kijas, and Alzuman (2021) explore a multitude of household financial risk management practices and examine the association between those risk management practices and household financial risk literacy in Saudi Arabia. Households’ risk management practices are associated with risk aversion, financial planning, and socioeconomic status. Successful risk management is important for ensuring households’ quality of life in the face of unexpected financial difficulties that can occur as the result of losing a job, death of a family member, or other factors. Sarabdeen et al. conclude that, within the context of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, a new framework for households’ financial risk management practices will be required. To improve families’ financial risk management, we recommend the following. First, develop a national strategy for financial and risk literacy involving relevant stakeholders. Second, develop financial education curricula in school to improve knowledge of risk diversification, using a large variety of channels and means to reach a wide audience. A financial literacy module could be combined with existing family life programs such as marital education programs. For example, the Financial Fitness for Life program (Parent Resources, 2020) and the Parents and Teachers as Wealth Coaches Project (O’Neil-Haight, 2010) include parent guides with discussion prompts and suggestions for conversations about personal finance, family activities that parallel the program curriculum, and suggested books and web links. Third, implement public awareness campaigns to inform the general public about important personal finance issues including risk, fraud, and financial resilience, delivered through social media, websites, print (leaflets, posters, and booklets), or traditional media. Financial literacy champions and role models may be used to raise the visibility of such campaigns, enhance the desirability of improving financial literacy, and encourage participating in financial education among specific target groups.

Framework for Family Well-being in the Gulf Region This book focused on social transformations of family life in the Gulf region. We have argued that in several important ways a look at the Arab Gulf countries today reveals a number of striking features and developments. These include,

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inter alia, accelerated rate of modernization and unprecedented socioeconomic, political, and demographic changes. These changes led to a decline in traditional family roles, changes in norms and attitudes toward family life, increasing rates of divorce, changing family structures, changes in gender norms, and changes in family composition. Policy-makers and academics have reflected on what has happened to Gulf families during the last five decades and how to promote family well-being in the context of many social changes. Different types of public policies have emerged. Diverse measures have been implemented to strengthen the family, and to harmonize family life with systems outside the family such as work and school. This book examined contemporary transformations in family life and state polices that attempt to address challenges raised by these transformations. In the preceding nine chapters, authors discussed an array of specific aspects of family life that we consider to be of paramount importance in depicting social changes affecting family life in the Gulf region. Figure 11.1 depicts a conceptual framework for describing family well-being in the Gulf region. The domains describe the key variables that affect family functioning and outcomes. The arrows between the domains represent the interactions in one or both directions between the domains. For example, spousal

Family Relationships - Spousal - Parent-child - Sibling - Extended family - Familydomestic worker

Interface between Families and Other Environments - Family – School - Family – Work - Family – Religious, Civic, and Other Social Institutions

FIGURE 11.1

Community Support Systems for Families - Public Awareness & Information: financial literacy, violence prevention, positive parenting, school involvement, youth career development, foreign domestic worker rights - Family Skills & Social Capital: family life programs, marital & relationships programs, parenting education programs, financial literacy programs, prevention programs (e.g., violence), family civic engagement, career education and guidance programs - Public Policies and Legislation: parental leave policies, violence prevention and protection polices and legislation, youth policies, policies regarding school-parent partnerships - Funding: child and family allowances, programs for family skills and social capital, women’s economic empowerment, monetary or in-kind incentives to promote desired outcomes - Family Services: women-centered support services, victim-centered services in case of family violence, medical and legal advocacy, reproductive health care

Family Well -Being - Family cohesion and functioning - Parent well-being - Child physical, behavioral, socioemotional, and educational wellbeing - Family and child resilience

Conceptual framework for family well-being in the Gulf region.

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relationships have an effect on the interface between families and parents’ work settings, and what happens in parents’ work settings can have an effect on spousal relationships. Community support systems for families include a range of programs, policies, and services that are important factors affecting family relationships, the interface between families and other environments, and family well-being. The conceptual framework is congruent with an ecological perspective that emphasizes strengths, health, competence, and empowerment. Research reported elsewhere validates the concepts and relations proposed in this model (e.g., Armstrong, Birnie-Lefcovitch, & Ungar, 2005). Further understanding of the role of family support systems as protective factors for family well-being can make a substantive contribution to our understanding of effective prevention and intervention programs and family policies. It would be fruitful for future research to examine issue identification and framing, agenda setting, family policy-making, strategies and reform processes for addressing family challenges in the Gulf region, and future trajectories of family policy in the region. Almost no research has been pursued along these lines, and an exploration of policies and programs at the state and civil society levels would further understanding of family challenges and policies. More work also needs to be done on theory development, particularly in the areas of issues definition, framing, and agenda building but also the politics of family policy-making in the Gulf region. Moreover, the existing literature on agenda denial, particularly on women’s and children’s rights, work-family balance, and domestic violence is quite thin, which is surprising given the frequency with which concerns in these areas arise and their importance in family policymaking. A clearer picture must be developed on other family changes such as family relationships, structure, values, care, and roles. Similarly, it would be helpful to improve our understanding of how major policy changes come about, especially given challenges specific to Gulf societies. Looking to current family policies in the Gulf region, for example, might suggest the conditions for successful policy-making and the implications of policy change over the next few decades. Chapters in this volume underscore the need to strengthen public policy and programs to enhance families’ well-being in the context of social changes. Ample evidence suggests that political, ideological, and cultural orientation, along with other factors, dictate the content of family policies and programs. Behind family policies lie different philosophies concerning the role of the state in private life, the importance of child-bearing and child-rearing, and the role of parents in families and societies. The chapters included in this volume incorporate diverse disciplinary perspectives (e.g., family studies, public policy, education, economics) and can spark creative research and policy efforts that cut across conventional disciplinary or sectoral boundaries and contribute to the well-being of families in the Gulf region.

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INDEX

Note: Bold page numbers refer to tables and italic page numbers refer to figures. Abdullah, A. G. K. 81 academic learning 81 advocacy organizations 34 advocacy training 19; WCCI 28–29, 33 Africa see foreign female domestic workers (FFDW) Afroz, R. 175 age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) 43, 44, 45 Aggregate Proximate Determinants Model 39 agricultural economy 83 Ahmad, I. 188 Ahmed, D. A. A. 21 Akhtar, R. C. 8 Al Alawi, K. 70, 71 Alawode, H. 98 Aldhafri, S. 10, 69, 70, 71, 188 Alekry, A. 11, 194 Ali, H. A. 174 Ali, Z. 175 Aljahwari, M. 71 Alzuman, A. 199 Al-Ammari, B. 157 Antonopoulou, K. 64 ASFRs see age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) Assaad, R. 98, 99 Assadi, S. 66 authoritativeness 61, 63, 64, 68, 70, 73 authoritative parenting style 65, 67, 73

Badr, H. 165 Al-Balam, N. M. 100 Barnhart, C. 63, 65 Bashir, S. 135 Batool, M. 135 Baumrind, D. 61 Becker, G. S. 40 Belwal, R. 136 Belwal, S. 136 Ben Brik, A. 193, 194, 196 Ben Hafaiedh, A. 99 Ben Mimoune, N. 11, 192–193 Bennett, L. 19 Berger, L. M. 99 Bingham, C. R. 99 Binzel, C. 98 Birth Spacing Program 10, 38, 47–49, 48–49, 55 Bluestone, C. 66 Bongaarts, J. 39, 43, 49 breastfeeding 49, 56 Bronfenbrenner, U. 66 Brook, D. 191 Buri’s Parenting Authority Questionnaire 70 Butnaru, S. 71 Caldwell, J. C. 40 career-specific parenting behavior models 194 child mortality 3

206 Index

Easterlin, R. A. 40 economic independence 124–125 economic security 13 education: fertility reduction 50, 51; IPV 35; parental involvement see parental involvement, education; parenting styles 71–72; private 121; public 121; reform initiatives 11; youth independence 123–124 Education for a New Era (EFNE) 85 El-Haddad,Y. 158 El-Hamidi, F. 98 Elstad, J. I. 66 emotional nucleation theory 40 employee-oriented human resources policies 133 employee satisfaction 134 employment see youth employment, Qatar employment status 109, 109–110 Epstein, J. L. 83, 88, 190

family support, Qatar: analytic plan 104–106; characteristics 103; data 104; employment status 109, 109–110; family connections 110, 110–111; job search 106–107, 107; logistic regression results 107–108, 108 family well-being framework 200, 200–201 female education 1, 3; labor force participation 41 female labor force participation, youth employment, Qatar 100–101 fertility see fertility transition, Oman fertility preferences level 52–53, 53 fertility reduction: Birth Spacing Program 47–49, 48–49; contraceptive use 47–49, 48–49, 56; educational development 50, 51; infant and child mortality 51–52, 52; major proximate determinants 53–54, 54; postpartum infecundability 49–50 fertility transition, Oman 10, 187–188; Aggregate Proximate Determinants Model 39; analytic model 42–43; Birth Spacing Program 38; delayed marriage 45–47, 46; fertility preferences level 52–53, 53; international literature 39–40; limitations 55; in Muslim world 41–42; OCHS 42; patterns 43–44, 44, 45; policy and practice 54–55; population control program 38; time series data 39; welfare state policies 45 financial management behaviours 173 Fishel, M. 81 foreign female domestic workers (FFDW) 4, 12, 197–199; characteristics 161, 162–163; demand for 160; employment policies 161; globalization 156, 158; governmental policies 153; international literature 154–155; Kafala system 161; labor vulnerability 165–166; limitations 167–168; migrant workers 161; migration flows 152; modernization 155, 157; national population 159, 160, 164; open-ended process 155; policy and practice 167; social impact 153, 154, 159; social life 156; trans-border mobility 156; world-class education 157 Forstenlechner, I. 100

face-to-face meetings 92 Fageeh, W. M. K. 21 family planning methods 48, 48, 55, 56 family structure 2, 8, 19, 157, 158, 200

Gadallah, M. 98 Gardner, A. M. 156 gender: disparities 122; equality 3, 5; parity 3

children: CRC 6; social behaviours 67; witness domestic violence 5–6 Civil Human Resources Law (2016) 138 Cleland, J. 40 Cohen, D. 64 contemporary families 7–8 contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) 48 contraceptive use 47–49, 48–49, 56 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) reports: on Bahrain 20–21; GCC countries 20 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 6 corporal punishment 7 Crockett, L. 99 cultural barriers 82, 191 cultural values 2, 4 cyber communication 126 Davis-Kean, P. E. 99 decision-making process 92 divorce 9, 125–126 domestic violence 18 domestic workers 5; see also foreign female domestic workers (FFDW) Dwairy, M. 66

Index  207

global business enterprises 4 globalization 4–5 Grobler, A. 64 gross domestic product (GDP) 41 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 1, 3, 117, 131, 152, 173; IPV see intimate partner violence (IPV); oil revenues 4 Al Hakim, Z. T. 136 Hailat, M. A. 98 Halid, N. 199 Hancock, R. 191 Harry, W. 101 Al-Hassan, S. 11, 190 Hassine, N. B. 98 healthcare regulatory authorities 33–34 health care system 55 Hendy, R. 98 Holloway, S. D. 99 Holzer, H. J. 99 home-school partnerships 87 Hoover-Dempsey, K.V. 191 Howard, A. 19 human rights 5 ILSAs see international large-scale assessments (ILSAs) immigrants 4 informal social protection 103 informed consent 23 Institute of Judicial Studies 21 interest-driven marriages 9 International Labor Organization 165 international large-scale assessments (ILSAs) 83–84 intimate partner violence (IPV) 5, 10, 185–187; advocacy training 19; case management 18; CEDAW reports 20–21; community education and outreach 18; crisis advocacy response 17–18; DV 18; education 35; in international literature 19–20; limitations 34–35; MENA region 17, 21–22; regional policy and practice 33–34; SCW 18; WCCI 17, 18 see also Women’s Crisis Care International (WCCI) Islam, M. M. 10, 50, 54, 187 Ivanova, D.V. 12, 197 James-Hawkins, L. 100 Jansari, A. 63 Jaradat, A. 66

Jarvis, Z. 9, 185 Jemmali, H. 98 job satisfaction 134; benefits 142; employees perceptions 142; employers percentage 144, 145; meeting expectations 143, 144; scale 142; worklife balance 145 job search 106–107, 107 Kabbani, N. 11, 192–193 Kafala system 161, 166 Khadr, Z. 42 Kijas, A. C. M. 175, 199 knowledge economy 4 knowledge revolution 126 Kopischke, A. 99 K-12 private education 86 Krafft, C. 98, 99 Kritzas, N. 64 labor force: non-Qatari females 11; participation 1, 2, 3; youth employment, Qatar 100–101 Labor Law policies 136 labor market 97, 123 language barriers 82 Largy, A. 199 Lari, N. A. 12, 196 leadership 2 leave policies 196, 197 Lee, S. 83 legislative authorities 34 Lesthaeghe, R. 40 Limam, I. 99 Longva, A. N. 156 McLaren, K. 174 McMullan, C. 175 macro-level decisions 155 Madi, M. 100 Magnuson, K. 99 marriage 4, 8–9; delayed, fertility reduction 45–47, 46, 56; index value 54; spaces, WCCI 30 maternal authoritative parenting 63 maternal education 3 Mau, W.-C. 99 Mayuri, K. 64 Al-Mazrooei, F. M. 174 micro-level decisions 154–155 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 10, 195; IPV 17, 21–22; youth employment, Qatar 96, 97, 100

208 Index

Moors, A. 164 Morris, A. 65 Al-Muftah, H. A. 134 Murad, R. 9, 185 Al Nabhani, H. 69, 71 Nagy, S. 164 National Center for Education Development (NCED) 85–86 National Center for Statistics and Information (NCSI) 42 National Education Reform Project 86 National Family Safety Program 7 Naysary, B. 174 negative parenting behaviors 186 neoclassical microeconomic theory 40 Newman, J. 64 non-consanguineous marriages 9 non-positive parenting styles 68 Noor, K. M. 134 Notestein, F. 39 nuptiality changes 47 Al Odeh, A. 69 Ohio Parent Involvement Law 191 oil revenues 4 Olivari, M. 64 1988 Oman Child Health Survey (OCHS) 42 1995 Oman Family Health Survey (OFHS) 42 2000 Oman National Health Survey (ONHS) 42 2008 Oman National Reproductive Health Survey (ONRHS) 42, 50 organizational benefits strategy 135 parental involvement, education 190–192; agricultural economy 83; doing at-home activities 88; EFNE 85; Gulf literature 91; home-school partnerships 87; ILSAs 83–84; international literature 81–83; K-12 private education 86; limitations 92; NCED 85; Parent Involvement Policy 89; PIRLS 84; PISA 84; policy and practice 91–92; preschool and kindergarten 88; reforms stress 86; Saudi educational system 85; school schedules 90; self-evaluation 85; self-sufficiency 85; social skills 80; TIMSS 84 parenting styles 10, 188–190; authoritativeness 61, 64, 68, 70; Buri’s

Parenting Authority Questionnaire 70; children’s perceptions 63–64, 69; children’s social behaviours 67; demandingness 64; demographic variables 65–66; education levels 71–72; in GCC 60, 66–67; limitations 72–73; measurement 62; non-positive parenting styles 68; paternal authoritative parenting 69; perceived by parents 62–63; perceived maternal parenting style 69; permissiveness 61, 64, 68, 71; policy and practice 72; positive child outcomes 61–62; psychological adjustment problems 69; responsiveness 61, 64; school level 71; social selfconcept 69; uninvolved parenting 61 Parent Involvement Policy 89 parent-school partnerships 11 parent-teacher partnerships 82 partner qualities 29 paternal authoritative parenting 69 perceived maternal parenting style 64, 69 permissiveness 61, 64, 68, 71 personal financial risk management (PFRM) practices 199; economy 171, 173; household debt 174; international literature 172–173; limitations 180; measures 175–176; model specification 176; policy and practice 179–180; probit analysis 177, 178; quality of life 181; sample and survey 175; socioeconomic variables 177; welfare policy 172 policies: career-specific parenting behavior models 194; cultural barriers 191; family well-being framework 200, 200–201; fertility transitions, Oman 187–188; FFDW 167, 197–199; IPV 33–34, 185–187; leave policies 196, 197; MENA region 195; negative parenting behaviors 186; Ohio Parent Involvement Law 191; parental involvement, education 190–192; parenting styles 188–190; PFRM practices 179–180, 199; population control policies 187; positive parenting programs 187; WFC 146–147, 196–197, 197; youth employment, Qatar 111–113, 192–194; youth independence 127, 194–196; youth participation, community life see youth participation, community life population control policies 38, 187 positive parenting programs 187

Index  209

Potter, F. J. 43, 49 Prinz, R. J. 188 Pritchett, L. H. 52 private education 121 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 84 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) 84 public education 121 public policies 13 Qatari Penal Code 5 Qatar Labor Law 138 Qatar Second National Development Strategy (QNDS) 136 Qatar’s family law framework 8 quality health care services 51 Qutteina,Y. 100 Ramirez, L. 81 Rashad, H. 42 Rasheed, P. 21 Raval, P. 63 Raval,V. 63 Raza, S. A. 100 Rice, J. 64 Riger, S. 19 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia see personal financial risk management (PFRM) practices Al Riyami, A. 69, 71 Romanowski, M. H. 157 Roumani, H. B. 165 Roushdy, R. 99 Al Rub, M. 66 Rudasill, K. 65 Rutledge, E. 100 Sabban, R. 158 Al Saidi, F. 69, 71 Salehi-Isfahani, D. 98 Sarabdeen, M. 12, 175, 199 Saravanamuttu, S. 166 Saudi educational system 85 Schewe, P. 19 school climate 81 Schultz, T. W. 40 SCW see Supreme Council for Women (SCW) self-assertiveness 128 self-dependence 124 self-efficacy 81 self-employment 111 self-entrepreneurship 128

self-esteem 19 self-reliance 126 Sellami, A. 100 Selwaness, I. 99 Shah, M. 165 Shah, N. M. 156, 164, 165 Al-Shammari, Z. 88 Sidani,Y. M. 136 Sieverding, M. 98 Smetana, J. G. 188 social compatibility 125 social disorganization 2 social disparity 125 social equality 2, 5 social justice 2, 5 social life 39 social media 3, 4 social self-concept 69 social services 21–22 social welfare regulatory authorities 34 socioeconomic development 40, 45, 46 socioeconomic status (SES) 66 South Asia see foreign female domestic workers (FFDW) Stefansen, K. 66 Steinberg, L. 65 Supreme Council for Women (SCW) 18, 21, 22 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 6, 112 Tam, C. 66 Al-Tamimi, H. A. H. 174 Tamis-LeMonda, C. S. 66 Tashkandi, A. A. 21 Tétreault, M. A. 158 Thomas, D.Y. 88 Thompson, W. S. 39 Todd, M.-J. 9, 185, 186 total fertility rates (TFRs) 42, 43, 48, 49 traditional families 7–8 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 84 Try, S. 99 Ueda,Y. 134 unemployment rates 11, 99–100; youth independence 121 United States No Child Left Behind Act (2001) 81 Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights 7 urbanization 1, 2, 184

210 Index

violence against women (VAW) 22 Wahba, J. 98 Walker, J. M. 191 Wasco, S. 19 welfare state policies 8, 45 Wilson, C. 40 Winsler, A. 63 Women’s Crisis Care International (WCCI) 10, 22; abuse signs, awareness 31; advocacy training 28–29, 33; analysis 23–24; coding 24; future generations qualities 30; healthy and unhealthy relationship 28; marriage spaces 30; mean post-interaction scores 27; openended questions 29–31, 33; participant characteristics 24, 24–25; partner qualities 29; safe spaces creation, women 30–31; sampling methods 23; self-reported knowledge level 26, 31; study procedures 23; test scores 32; tolerance level 23; volunteer advocates and beneficiaries 32; volunteers attitudes 25, 26 women’s empowerment 2 work-family conflict (WFC) 148, 196–197, 197; adjustment factor 140; conceptual framework 138–139, 139; data and measures 140; economic development 136; family responsibilities 131; GCC’s labor laws and policies 132; gender differences 142, 143; international literature 132–135; job satisfaction 142–144, 144–145; Labor Law policies 136; limitations 147; national laws 140–142, 141; non-Qatari and Qatari women 137; policy and practice 146–147; public awareness 140, 141; Qatar government 136; Qatari families implications 137–138; Qatar Labor Law 138; QNDS 136; sample selection probability 139; state of Qatar legislation 138; work-life policy 135

work-life balance 12, 133, 134 work-life imbalance 132, 134 Yamamoto,Y. 99 Yount, K. M. 100 youth employment, Qatar 11, 192–194; economic diversification 96; education and career choices 102; family support 101–102 see also family support, Qatar; female labor force participation 100–101; international literature, family roles 97–99; job search and family networks 102; labor market 99, 101; limitations 113; MENA region 96, 97, 100; National Development Strategies 96; policy and practice 111–113; setting expectations 103; unemployment rates 99–100 youth independence 194–196; cyber communication 126; divorce 125–126; economic independence 124–125; education 123–124; gender factor 122–123; international literature 118–119; knowledge revolution 126; limitations 127–128; marriage 125; policy and practice 127; population and work force 120, 120; post-World War II era 119; pre-oil population 119; private education 121; public education 121; remaining single 125; residential independence 126; self-assertiveness 128; self-reliance 117, 128; societal changes 117; travel and living abroad 126; unemployment rates 121;Youth Boom 118 youth participation, community life: civic and citizenship education 195; dialogues and consultations 194–195; family engagement 196; institutions 194; multidimensional policies 195; nontokenistic participation 196; obstacles to 195–196