Exploring the Stability of Deterrence 9781685855697

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EXPLORING THE STABILITY OF DETERRENCE

Monograph Series in World Affairs Graduate School of International Studies University of Denver

Series Editor, Karen A. Feste

Editorial Board Steven Brams New York University

Todd Sandler Iowa State University

James Caporaso University of Denver

Susan Strange London School of Economics and Political Science

Jerome Clubb University of Michigan Catherine Kelleher University of Maryland Robert Jervis Columbia University

Kenneth Thompson University of Virginia John Turner University of Minnesota Dina Zinnes University of

Illinois

Michael O'Leary Syracuse University New Books in the Series •

Exploring the Stability of Deterrence Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare, editors

• Nigeria and the International Capitalist System Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere, editors •

Defining Political Development Stephen Chilton

• Arms Transfers to the Third World: Probability Models of Superpower Decision-Making Gregory Sanjian

EXPLORING THE STABILITY OF DETERRENCE edited by Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare

GSIS Monograph Series in World Affairs T H E

U N I V E R S I T Y

OF

D E N V E R

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Acknowledgments The editors gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the University Research Council of Vanderbilt University for the development of the manuscript of this book.

Published in the United States of America in 1987 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 948 North Street, Boulder, Colorado 80302 © 1987 by the University of Denver. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Exploring the stability of deterrence. (GSIS monograph series in world affairs) Bibliography: p. 1. Deterrence (Strategy) I. Kugler, Jacek. II. Zagare, Frank C. III. Series. U162.G.E95 1987 355'.0217 86-27242 ISBN 1-55587-055-4

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. ©

With love, to our children Tadeusz, Catherine, Ann, and Elizabeth

Contents

List of Figures and Tables 1

Introduction

viii

Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare

1

2 The Stability of Mutual Deterrence Michael D. Intriligator

and Dagobert L. Brito

13

3 Assessing Stable Deterrence Jacek Kugler

41

4 Risk, Deterrence, and War Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare

69

5 A Darwinian View of Deterrence Christopher H. Achen

91

6 The Path to Stable Deterrence Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour

107

7 A Stability Analysis of the U.S.-USSR Strategic Relationship Frank C. Zagare

123

References Index Contributors

151 161 167

vii

Tables and Figures

Figures 2.1 Deterring and Initiating Regions in the Weapons Plane 2.2 Weapons Trajectories and Regions of Deterrence and War Initiation 3.1 Logical Structure of Deterrence 3.2 Record of Nuclear Deterrence: United States Versus Soviet Union, 1945-1985 4.1 Phases of Deterrence 4.2 Deterrence Under MAD 4.3 Dynamics Induced by Risk Propensity into the Deterrence Framework 6.1 Outcome Matrix of Chicken 6.2 Payoff of Matrix of Deterrence Game 7.1 Generalized Representation of the Superpower Deterrence Game 7.2 Three Mutual Deterrence Games 7.3 Four Unilateral Deterrence Games 7.4 The Superpower Game, Circa Late 1945

17 22 52 62 75 81 84 109 112 125 128 130 134

Tables 4.1 Preference Requirements for Stable Mutual Deterrence 4.2 Preferences, Probabilities, and Expected Utility 7.1 Mutual Deterrence 7.2 Unilateral Deterrence Vlll

73 80 132 132

ONE

Introduction

JACEK KUGLER FRANK C. ZAGARE _ Nuclear deterrence promises, concurrently, a permanent peace or a nuclear nightmare. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 demonstrated that within minutes atomic weapons could destroy the industrial fabric of a nation. Thereafter, even the most powerful nations on earth could no longer relate their national survival directly to their ability to win a war. This awesome change in the international system did not pass unnoticed. Only months after the explosion of the first atomic weapons, Bernard Brodie persuasively argued that these weapons were so destructive that they could be used to prevent, but not to wage, war. He rejected the notion that nuclear war was winnable, squarely challenging the longstanding dictum of Clausewitz that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Instead, Brodie proposed a policy of nuclear deterrence that altered dramatically the function of the military. "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose" (Brodie, 1946: 76). The key issue of nuclear deterrence, then and now, is how to preserve a peaceful and stable relationship between opponents who share dissimilar perspectives on fundamental issues. To preserve stability, nuclear deterrence directly relates the destructive capability of nuclear arsenals with credible threats of retaliation for unacceptable action. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons, first to two parties, and now

1

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JACEK KUGLER AND FRANK C. ZAGARE

to many, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has been altered several times in order to maintain the credibility of retaliation in response to changes in the size and the distribution of nuclear arsenals. The story of strategic deterrence can be traced by following this interplay between nuclear capabilities and the perceived credibility of a nuclear response. In the period of overwhelming U.S. preponderance, between roughly 1945 and 1960, stability was maintained by advocating an all-out "massive" nuclear response to any action deemed unacceptable by U.S. decision makers. Shielded by a monopoly of deliverable nuclear weapons, the early deterrence debate in the West centered on the conventional threshold that had to be crossed before a nuclear response was warranted. Few debated the level of nuclear punishment that would follow a breech of this threshold. The focus of the nuclear debate shifted with the end of nuclear preponderance and led to radical changes in strategic policy. Massive retaliation was replaced by the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which was coupled with a "flexible response" capability. This new deterrence stance postulated restraint in nonnuclear confrontations and restated the need to retaliate in kind to a nuclear attack. But this stance also allowed for limited nuclear exchanges to prevent outright escalation to an all-out conflict. Reactions to a nuclear attack would be swift but not unrestrained. Two main policies were advanced to achieve flexibility. A "countervalue" option preserved the capability to impose "unacceptable costs" in case of an attack. But instead of total destruction, the first or second strike could be targeted to destroy only preselected cities, thereby allowing for negotiations to prevent a nuclear disaster. A "counterforce" option emphasized the advantage of hitting military targets before escalating to an all-out war. Only if counterstrikes continued would population centers be exposed directly to a nuclear attack. From the outset, the counterforce doctrine was less attractive to Soviet strategists than to their U.S. counterparts because Soviet nuclear installations are based close to major cities, while U.S. silos are placed far from population centers. Yet, with improvements in accuracy and the miniaturization of nuclear warheads, counterforce tactics seemed to give new flexibility to strategic deterrence.

INTRODUCTION

3

A survey of the theoretical literature on nuclear deterrence in the mid-to-late 1970s reveals little activity and enormous consensus. Mutual assured destruction was promoted to maintain stability under balance of power, or parity, conditions. Active and passive defenses against nuclear war were evaluated but deemed infeasible (Chayes and Wiesner, 1969). The Soviet Union appeared finally to accept the U.S. conception of nuclear deterrence and, like the United States, ostensibly adhered to its principles after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In fact, although there were a few exceptions, nuclear weapons almost invariably are mentioned in the literature of this period only in the context of a retaliation against a nuclear attack. A nuclear response to conventional probes remained an almost forgotten NATO option because conventional buildups in NATO, along with an emerging superpower detente, removed the urgency for nuclear action. By 1980, then, Brodie's view of nuclear war seemed to have gained almost universal acceptance. Nuclear war was considered unthinkable and certainly not winnable. Moreover, the meaning of deterrence was narrowed to refer only to a defense against nuclear attacks. The main reason for this narrowed meaning may have been the U.S. and Soviet experiences with conventional conflict. In the period between 1945 and 1980 it became clear that nuclear weapons did not prevent conventional conflicts between nuclear and nonnuclear nations. The challenges and mixed outcomes of conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Hungary, the Middle East, and Afghanistan removed all hopes that a nuclear power could impose its will on an opponent by the mere threat of nuclear weapons. Yet, the ultimate disaster of a nuclear war among major powers seemed further removed than ever after the nerve-racking but successful settlement of the 1976 crisis in the Middle East. This apparent consensus on the viability of deterrence was not to last. Technological change was the main reason. First, tactical nuclear weapons continued to increase in sophistication, destructive capacity, and range, to the point that it was no longer possible to separate "nuclear" from "conventional" war by simply gauging the levels of destruction. As the threshold of casualties and industrial losses that had to be crossed to initiate a nuclear war continued to drop, the critical distinction between nuclear and conventional war increas-

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ingly was blurred. Thus, the need to "deter" limited as well as massive wars rose once more to the top of the strategic agenda. Second, the introduction of missiles with multiple warheads challenged, perhaps inadvertently, the reliability of a retaliatory strike. If and when this new technology and the concomitant improvements in missile accuracy were combined with the capability to detect submarines equipped with nuclear weapons, the capacity of one or both of the superpowers to respond to a massive preemptive attack aimed at its nuclear arsenal would be reduced. Both Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara, who were among the key political figures behind the development and deployment of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on land and at sea, argued belatedly in 1984, when such a reversal was no longer practical, that a return to single-headed missiles would add to the stability of deterrence by reassuring the retaliatory strike needed to preserve the "balance of terror." Thus, the dual challenge to the stability of deterrence came from the development of smaller nuclear weapons that reduced the damage threshold and from the deployment of systems that challenged the viability of a retaliatory strike. In each case, technological innovations were adopted with little concern for the fundamental changes eventually imposed on the stability of deterrence. In fact, as suggested previously, from the outset of the nuclear age the political debate has followed in the wake of technological innovation. Deterrence strategies seemingly have developed only to take account of these new discoveries. Alas, the time has now arrived to change this relationship and anticipate, prior to development and deployment, the eventual impact of new technologies on peace in the international arena. Our aim in this book, however, is not to enter, at least directly, the ongoing debate about the advantages or the disadvantages of the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the Reagan administration or other related programs. Rather, our purpose is to explore the theoretical underpinnings of the deterrence relationship in order to provide a firmer foundation for evaluating the consequences of future proposals to deploy new weapons systems. Therefore, we focus on the conditions associated with stable deterrence, which is the enduring issue that lies at the core of the controversy surrounding strategic policy.

INTRODUCTION

5

Exploring the Stability of Deterrence Strategic nuclear deterrence is unique in several important respects. First, it deals with a level and rate of destruction not experienced in previous conventional conflicts. The study of nuclear threats, therefore, requires speculation beyond the area of past experience. Indeed, the relative costs in human lives and property used to hypothesize about potential behavior in the nuclear era are so novel t h a t all empirical extrapolations are unsatisfactory. The strategy of mutual deterrence also is unique because it requires decision makers to respond to nuclear threats in a very precise way. We know that many attempts to manage crises with conventional threats have failed to prevent war in the past. Yet, a single failure of strategic nuclear deterrence could partially obliterate key members of the international system. Thus, deterrence requires an unparalleled degree of certainty about the implications of its underlying assumptions for eventual behavior and provides little room for adjustments in response to previous interactions because such training requires the very experience with nuclear conflict t h a t deterrence attempts to avoid. Nuclear deterrence is also novel in the sense that no direct proof for or against the validity of its inferences can be extracted from the historical record. Moreover, no such evidence is likely to be extracted short of the destruction of a portion of the human race. Hence, deterrence is an unlikely candidate for experimentation or direct empirical verification. Formal models provide one way to obviate the epistemological problems of nuclear deterrence. Such models can be used to provide systematic evaluations of the consistency of propositions about strategic stability; they also can be used to anticipate the logical implications of alternate defense postures or to test some aspects of the theory without a concurrent test of its ultimate implications. Although all such evaluations are indirect, they offer consistent and testable alternatives derived from a small set of critical assumptions about deterrence. This book provides important alternative perspectives from which to evaluate the stability of strategic deterrence. Each of the formal approaches presented herein attempts to explore the basis of stable deterrence. Implicit in such an

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JACEK KUGLER AND FRANK C. ZAGARE

attempt is the inevitable fact that each model also specifies the conditions associated with instability. Thus, as with all formal models, those in this book provide prescriptions for stability as well as for war. Decision makers in charge of deterrence strategy who review this material unfortunately will be able to maximize both their conflictual and nonconflictual options. We are aware that formal models can provide alternatives but cannot guarantee stability. We simply hope that the arguments advanced by these models will be utilized to further peace and stability and not to pursue those unilateral advantages that risk nuclear conflagration. Finally, let us turn to the main contributions that any formal work can make. It is sometimes assumed that if a policy is formalized, results will be similar or congruent. Nothing could be further from the truth. Formal models are simply the skeletons t h a t provide for both positive and normative evaluations; they do not determine outcomes. Moreover, small changes in parameters result in very different structures. Let us illustrate the diversity of the conclusions produced in the restricted environment of strategic deterrence. Intriligator and Brito (Chapter 2) provide a concise, hopeful summary of mutual assured destruction. They argue that as nuclear weapons are added to a conventional arsenal, the costs of conflict increase and the likelihood of challenges and war decreases. Moreover, they suggest that the instability produced by a conventional arms race is not reproduced with the buildup of nuclear arsenals because antagonistic forces are driven further and further into the "cone of stability" when their capacity to retaliate is increased. An active defense embedded in the Strategic Defense Initiative can add to stability by removing the danger of an "accidental" war initiated by a demented individual or by a small nuclear power that hopes to initiate escalation. But a truly effective SDI system would be destabilizing because one side would hold an advantage over its opponent and, hence, might assume the risk of war. The same logic holds if both were to achieve an effective active defense concurrently or if nuclear weapons were e r a d i c a t e d from t h e e a r t h t h r o u g h effective disarmament. The nation with conventional superiority again would hold an advantage over a competitor who would be unable to deter an attack because the costs of conflict would no

INTRODUCTION

7

longer be unthinkable. This logic leads both authors to argue that the selective proliferation of nuclear weapons can stabilize the international system; they therefore support the transfer of nuclear weapons to reliable allies (Intriligator and Brito, 1978; for a similar view see Bueno de Mesquita and Riker, 1982). The model proposed by Intriligator and Brito appears logically impregnable in the peace and war extremes, but the transition from conventional war to stable deterrence is vulnerable. To maintain stability, the buildup of nuclear weapons should proceed evenly, allowing potential opponents to deter each other at every step. Yet, their model does not seem to account for the lack of conflict when preponderance is present. The United States possessed nuclear superiority until the middle 1970s, yet failed to take advantage of the gap despite turbulent relations with the USSR. The Soviet Union was, and still is, a much larger nuclear power than China. The medium-range nuclear capabilities that could destroy China would not affect the deterrence of the United States. Yet, like the United States, the Soviet Union considered the use of nuclear weapons on several occasions but failed to take advantage of its temporary nuclear preponderance. The disposition of conventional weapons can be used to account in part for such restraints, but the disposition of nuclear weapons seems insufficient to account for recorded behavior. A final puzzle in this model is the desire of elites in nuclear nations to forego the advantages provided by the cone of stability. Intriligator and Brito suggest that as both sides increase the size of their nuclear arsenals, the costs of conflict far exceed the gains, and the larger the arsenals the more stable the assured destruction. Thus, leaders of nuclear nations whose arsenals are sufficient to assure a cone of stability should have every incentive to maintain rather than increase their nuclear forces. These leaders should have little incentive to threaten the capacity of their opponents because the conditions for conflict are present only if one country again seeks nuclear preponderance. Intriligator and Brito show that only in the asymmetric regions can an initiator attack and the opponent not deter. Thus, once the cone of stability has been reached, weapons that can destroy the deterrent capacity of an opponent would generate a "window of opportunity" for a potential initiator and create a temporary "window of

8

JACEK KUGLER AND FRANK C. ZAGARE

vulnerability" for the potential victim of attack. Given this logic, one wonders why nuclear nations continue to explore ways to minimize the stability that ensures stable deterrence. Kugler offers an alternate view of deterrence in Chapter 3. Building on the tradition of marginal rather than absolute gains, he concludes that nuclear parity provides the necessary, but not the sufficient, conditions for nuclear war. Although the level of losses that face each opponent are the same—that is, "unacceptable"—there is an opportunity for one of the nuclear powers to take advantage of its opponent by simply accepting the high risk of a challenge. This view is pessimistic. Nuclear parity, like conventional parity in past environments, does not lead to stability but rather provides the opportunity to challenge for high stakes (Organski and Kugler, 1980). Kugler attributes the stability of the early part of the nuclear era to the weakness of the Soviet Union. Until 1975, the USSR had to risk outright destruction in a massive nuclear exchange with the United States or a loss in a limited nuclear confrontation. But when a balance of nuclear capabilities is reached, the image of a stable deterrence "cone" is rejected in favor of a very narrow funnel of stability, where any deviation by either opponent can lead to catastrophic war. In Kugler's view, then, nuclear nations that can assure the destruction of their opponents are like ships in the eye of a storm; all is calm until a minor deviation by either one brings both into very heavy seas. The perception of a window of vulnerability is congruent with this perspective because any marginal advantage given to an opponent willing to endure the costs of conflict would generate instability. Arms competition is considered the only, albeit tenuous, insurance against risk. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is disastrous. As the number of nations that fall into this vortex increases, the likelihood of nuclear clashes increases. This model is stable only when the reasons for war are removed, but unlike Intriligator and Brito's model, the elimination of nuclear weapons or the reduction of the high costs of war does not add to instability. The structural relations that lead to stability and instability are explored further in the work of Kugler and Zagare (Chapter 4). Using the marginal payoffs from Kugler's work, the authors argue that the tactics decision makers use, and not the size of arsenals, will determine whether war or

INTRODUCTION

9

peace will follow. Under conditions of parity, the willingness to take risks is isolated as a key determinant of behavior. Stability is ensured as long as risk-neutral or risk-averse elites are in charge of national affairs. Yet, a combination of risk-prone actors or risk-neutral and risk-prone decision makers can lead to systemic instability. Empirical studies show that risk propensity is attenuated as the costs of a confrontation increase. This may account for the lack of conflict since 1975. Nevertheless, Kugler and Zagare argue, during the course of a number of interactions the stability of deterrence may become unglued when individuals fail to perceive accurately either the importance of a crisis or the resolve of an opponent. This work reminds us that credibility remains the weak link in deterrence. Achen takes a somewhat different approach to the problem of deterrence stability (Chapter 5). Like Jervis (1984), Achen wonders whether a rational theory of deterrence is a contradiction in terms. He argues that by its very nature nuclear deterrence involves situations where the price of carrying out a deterrent threat exceeds the value of the prize at stake. The tremendous costs associated with nuclear warfare leads to a "Chicken" model of strategic deterrence. Given that the outcome associated with a deterrent threat is "worst" for both players in this deadly game, neither player has an incentive to carry out its threat should the other take an undesired action. From this it follows that neither player rationally should be deterred because neither has a compelling reason to fear retaliation. Thus, deterrence theory is logically incoherent—it assumes that players are simultaneously rational—in being deterred—and irrational—in responding to a provocation. It is for precisely this reason, Achen concludes, that deterrence theory, as presently formulated, is unable to explain the absence of a nuclear conflagration in the postwar world. While Achen looks to evolutionary theory to explain the discrepancy between observed behavior (i.e., actual strategic stability) and the precepts of rationality, Brams and Kilgour (Chapter 6) argue that deterrence is both rational and stable as long as the players are able to precommit themselves to retaliate. The authors develop their analysis in terms of a "deterrence game" that, like Achen's conceptualization, is based on an underlying Chicken model but that permits the

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players to set q u a n t i t a t i v e levels of preemption or nonpreemption and of retaliation or nonretaliation. Given these choices, a deterrence equilibrium emerges in Brams and Kilgour's model in which neither player preempts but where both players r e t a l i a t e with certain probabilities. The deterrence equilibrium, moreover, is dynamically stable in the sense that neither player has an incentive to upset the status quo if he suspects that the other is going to attack first. There are several other equilibria in the game that Brams and Kilgour develop. The most pernicious, however, are the two preemption equilibria where one player preempts and the other does not retaliate. Because these two equilibria are associated with a breakdown of deterrence, Brams and Kilgour ask whether these equilibria can be avoided or, if not, escaped. Interestingly, the authors find that a rational path exists from each of these outcomes to the deterrence equilibrium. In other words, they argue that if the preempted player can credibly threaten to move from the preemption equilibrium to an outcome that is initially worse for him, a chain reaction of rational choices is set off that ultimately results in the reestablishment of deterrence. This, Brams and Kilgour argue, actually reinforces deterrence stability because the path to the deterrence equilibrium is one way—that is, rational calculations can lead to, but not from, this outcome. Zagare's contribution in effect sides with Achen in the debate about the rationality of deterrence when conflict is considered the worst outcome for both players (Chapter 7). Like Brams and Kilgour, however, Zagare argues that the stability of deterrence in Chicken is possible if the players are able to pass through mutual punishment without escalating, and hence terminating, the game. In Zagare's view, because this possibility is highly suspect in the nuclear age, mutual deterrence requires that each player establish a credible threat and convince the other t h a t he prefers retaliation to capitulation. In other words, stability rests upon transforming the deterrence game from Chicken to Prisoner's Dilemma. Thus, Zagare concludes, stable deterrence requires such hardline stances as "better dead than red" or "better a grave than a capitalist wage slave." More conciliatory policies undermine the long-term stability of this kind of strategic relationship. We hope that the exploration of the strategy and tactics of

INTRODUCTION

11

deterrence will lead others to more sophisticated structures that will allow us to test some of the contradictory conclusions contained in this book. But more importantly, we hope that this exploration of the logic of deterrence will produce a reexamination of deterrence strategies from a political perspective where, we feel, work on alternatives is truly lacking.

TWO

The Stability of Mutual Deterrence MICHAEL D. INTRILIGATOR DAGOBERTL. BRITO _ This chapter reports some of our major findings for the stability of mutual deterrence, strategy, arms races, and arms control. 1 As a result of this work we have reached certain conclusions about the stability of mutual deterrence, including the effects of arms races on stability and including an agenda for arms control, which may challenge conventional wisdom on these topics. To highlight some of our principal themes: 1. The major powers, principally the U.S. and Soviet superpowers, have since World War II constructed an elaborate mechanism to prevent a major war, particularly a nuclear war, via mutual deterrence. This mechanism, developed as a result of both the arms race and arms control initiatives, has been successful in avoiding a major war. It has led to great stability in the international system, with a very low—but nonzero—probability of nuclear war. 2. Nuclear weapons and, in particular, arms races involving nuclear weapons ironically provide a way to avoid nuclear war. Thus nuclear weapons are part of the solution as well as part of the problem of avoiding nuclear war. 3. The most dangerous aspect of the current arms situation This chapter is based, in part, on a lecture presented at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe on 30 January 1984 in Stockholm. An earlier version was published by the Swedish Economic Association as "NonArmageddon Solutions to the Arms Race" in 1984; this earlier version also was published as Intriligator and Brito (1985). Revised and reprinted with permission.

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MICHAEL D. INTRILIGATOR & DAGOBERT L. BRITO

is not the presence or the level of weapons, which, in fact, create the stability of mutual deterrence, but rather the danger of accident and especially the possibility that one or both of the superpowers has a launch-on-warning system. Thus there is scope for arms control initiatives, and the most important items on the arms control agenda should be initiatives to prevent accidents, particularly launch on warning, followed by initiatives to prevent the erosion of mutual deterrence and to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the wrong hands. These initiatives, which can be unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, constitute a new agenda for arms control. 4. There are some semantic difficulties in treating this subject. In particular, the term "arms race" suggests the existence of a winner and a loser to the "race," but both sides "lose" if the race leads to war while both sides "win" if it leads to peace. Furthermore, the term suggests a single performance measure, e.g., how long it takes to complete the course, while in fact there are many dimensions to an arms race. Another term that entails semantic difficulties is "arms control," frequently interpreted as or limited to quantitative bilaterally negotiated limits on strategic weapons, as in t h e SALT/START process. In fact, arms control can involve unilateral and multilateral, as well as bilateral, actions; it can involve qualitative as well as quantitative restrictions; it can involve in certain instances changes or even increases in weapons; and it can be based on implicit rather than explicit agreements. To elaborate on these themes, we discuss military strategy, identify deterring and initiating regions, describe arms races and war initiation, suggest a new arms control agenda, and present some conclusions.

Military Strategy To understand the implications of arms for mutual deterrence and the outbreak of war, it is necessary to understand how arms would be used in the event of war; that is, it is necessary to understand military strategy. Both the sources of the arms race and the implications for stability or instability are based on how weapons would be used. In our analytic work we have developed a formal model of

STABILITY OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE

15

a missile war in order to understand strategic choices. This model can be considered a representation not of an actual war but rather of a war simulation conducted explicitly or implicitly by defense planners, e.g., in the Pentagon and in the Kremlin. The model describes the evolution over time of a war between two countries—A and B—as a result of the initial numbers of weapons on both sides, the strategic decisions made by both countries, and the effectiveness of weapons against both enemy weapons (counterforce targets) and enemy cities (countervalue targets) (see Appendix A; also Intriligator, 1967, 1975). The strategic decisions made by both countries over time in the course of the war are summarized by two key choices, which, taken together, represent grand strategies. First, there is a choice of targets between counterforce targets of enemy weapons and countervalue targets of enemy cities and industrial capacity. (While colocation, fallout, etc. make pure counterforce or pure countervalue targeting impossible, there is a choice between primarily counterforce and primarily countervalue targets.) Second, there is a choice of rate of fire between the extreme values of a maximum rate, i.e., firing all weapons as rapidly as possible, and a zero rate, i.e., holding weapons in reserve for later use. The results of our analysis show that there are four possible grand strategy choices: First strike: Counterforce targets/maximum rate of fire. Massive retaliation: Countervalue targets/maximum rate of fire. Limited strategic war: Counterforce targets/zero rate of fire. War of nerves: Countervalue targets/zero rate of fire. The choice of grand strategy can change over time during the course of the war, and the optimal grand strategy, maximizing a payoff function dependent on terminal weapons and casualties, leads to a choice of three successive grand strategies. One of the countries, say A, starts the war using a first-strike strategy, targeting enemy weapons and firing at the maximum rate to reduce the capabilities of the opponent. Country A then switches the targets to enemy cities, entailing a massive retaliation strategy, or, alternatively,

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MICHAEL D. INTRILIGATOR & DAGOBERT L. BRITO

depending on the evolution of the war, switches to the zero rate, entailing a limited strategic war strategy. Finally, country A switches the rate in the first case or the targets in the second case, leading in either case to the last grand strategy, a war of nerves. In this final stage of the war, country A holds its weapons in reserve as a threat to enemy cities to obtain the best conditions for war termination. With this optimal switching grand strategy, the only situation in which country B suffers significant casualties is the massive retaliation stage, in which A retaliates against B cities. The war could, however, proceed via limited strategic war in which country B never inflicts significant casualties on A since by the time B switches to countervalue targets, A has already switched to the zero rate. In this case enemy cities are held hostage rather than actually hit, since weapons targeted at enemy cities are held in reserve. Deterring and Initiating Regions The optimal military strategies during a potential war developed in "Military Strategy" can be used to obtain deterring and initiating regions in the weapons plane. We stress that these regions are based on a potential war, i.e., a war as it might be simulated or analyzed by defense planners (see Appendix B; also Intriligator, 1975 and Intriligator and Brito, 1984). Country A deters country B if given a first strike by B (with B choosing counterforce targets and the maximum rate of fire). Country A can absorb this strike and have enough weapons left to inflict an unacceptable level of casualties to B in a retaliatory massive retaliation strike (with A choosing countervalue targets at the maximum rate). Solving the formal model for the number of weapons A needs to have this capability to deter B implies a linear dependence of the (minimum) number of A weapons needed to deter B on the number of B weapons. This linear dependence is illustrated in Figure 2.1 by the line marked "A deters" in the weapons plane, consisting of alternative combinations of weapons held by both A and B, shown as (MA MB), where MA is the number of A weapons ("missiles") and MB is the number of B weapons ("missiles"). Note that a certain number of A weapons is

STABILITY OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE

17

Mi ATTACKS

A ATTACKS

n«xt worst; I s worst Circled outcomes or« Nosh «quilibria

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STEVEN J. BRAMS & D. MARC KILGOUR

The shorthand verbal descriptions given for each outcome in Figure 6.1 suggest the vexing problem that the players confront in choosing between C and C—by choosing C, each can "win" but risks disaster; by choosing C, each might benefit from compromise but also could "lose." Each of the Nash equilibria shown in Figure 6.1 favors one player over the other, and the stability of these equilibria as such says nothing about which of the two—if either—will be chosen. Other concepts of equilibrium distinguish (3,3) as a stable outcome, but the rules of play that render compromise stable presume that the players act nonmyopically or farsightedly and cannot threaten each other (Brams and Wittman, 1981; Kilgour, 1984, 1985; Zagare, 1984). If threats are possible in repeated play of Chicken under still different rules, the stability of (3,3) is undermined (Brams and Hessel, 1984). The effect that threats may have in Chicken is not hard to grasp. If one player (say, Row) threatens the other player (Column) with the choice of C, and this threat is regarded as credible, Column's best response is C, leading to (4,2). Clearly, the player with the credible threat—if there is one—can force the other player to back down in order to avoid (1,1). Although Row would "win" in this case by getting his best outcome, Column would not "lose" in the usual sense by getting his worst outcome, but rather his next-worst. This illustrates that Chicken is not a constant-sum game wherein one player wins and the other player loses. That is why we have set "win" and "lose" in quotation marks here and in Figure 6.1. In nonconstant-sum games like Chicken, the sum of the players' payoffs at each outcome (if measured cardinally by utilities rather than ordinally by ranks) is not constant but variable. This means that both players may do better at some outcomes [e.g., (3,3)] than at others [e.g., (1,1)]. Outcomes, such as (1,1) in Chicken, that are inferior for both players to some other outcome(s) in a game are called Paretoinferior; those outcomes that are not Pareto-inferior are Pareto-superior, as are the other three outcomes in Chicken. The Deterrence Game is based on Chicken but adds two refinements: (a) the players can make quantitative choices of levels of cooperation (or noncooperation), not just qualitative choices of C or C; (b) once these initial choices, which we shall interpret as levels of nonpreemption (or preemption) are made, each player's choice of a subsequent level of retaliation comes

THE PATH TO STABLE DETERRENCE

111

into play, provided his opponent's initial choice was regarded as preemptive and his own was not. More formally, the Deterrence Game is defined by the following rules: 1. The final outcome will be one of the four outcomes of Chicken. The payoffs are the same as those of Chicken, except that cardinal utilities replace ordinal rankings. Thus, r 4 and C4 signify the highest payoffs for Row and Column, respectively, andcj the lowest, etc. 2. The players do not choose initially between C and C, as in Chicken, but instead choose (unspecified) actions that have associated with them a nonpreemption probability (s for Row and t for Column) and a complementary preemption probability (1 - s for Row and 1 - 1 for Column). With these probabilities, the actions will be interpreted as cooperative (C) and noncooperative (C) strategy choices, respectively. 3. If both players' initial choices are perceived as the same, the game ends at that position (i.e., CC or CC). If one player's choice is perceived as C and the other's as C, the former player chooses a subsequent action with an associated nonretaliation probability (p for Column and q for Row) and a complementary retaliation probability (1 — p for Column and 1 - q for Row). With the retaliation probability, the conflict is escalated to the final outcome CC; otherwise it remains (at CC or CO. 4. The players choose their preemption probabilities and retaliation probabilities before playing the game. Play commences when each player simultaneously chooses initial actions that may be interpreted as either C or C, with associated preemption probabilities. One player may then choose subsequent actions, according to rule 3, with the associated retaliation probability specified at the beginning of play. The Deterrence Game is represented in Figure 6.2. Note that besides the fact that the initial strategy choices of the two players are probabilities (with assumed underlying actions), rather than actions (C and O themselves, this representation differs from the Figure 6.1 outcome matrix in having expected payoffs rather than (certain) payoffs in its off-diagonal entries. This is because we assume that if one player is

112

STEVEN J. BRAMS & D. MARC KILGOUR

Figure 6.2 Payoff Matrix of Deterrence Game

Column t s

Row

1 —s

(r3,c3) p(r4,c2)

Key:

q(r2,c4) + ( 1-p) ( r , , C l ) = (p,DC2)

= (payoff r

s,t

1 -t

4'c4

t o Row,

payoff

= best; = next b e s t ; r j ,c1 = worst

= p r o b a b i l i t i e s of n o n p r e e m p t i o n ; of n o n r e t a l i a t i o n

Normalization:

0= r .1 .

< r . < r , < r, = 2 3 4

+ =

(r1,c] ) =

to

I;

(0,0)

Column)

r^/C^ p,q

(1-q)(r,.c,. (qr2,q)

=

= next

worst;

probabilities

0= c , < c , 1 2

< c, 3

perceived to preempt, the other player's (probabilistic) retaliation will be virtually instantaneous, so it is proper to include in the off-diagonal entries a combination of payoffs—reflecting both possible retaliation and possible nonretaliation—by means of an expected value. We assume, of course, that 0 < s, t,p, q < 1 because they represent probabilities. To simplify subsequent calculations, we normalize the payoffs of the players so that the best and worst payoffs are 1 and 0, respectively. Hence, 0 = rxi) results. In this case, the payoff to the United States is a ai while the payoff to the Soviet Union is b\. Implicit in a deterrence game such as the one depicted in Figure 7.1 are several assumptions about the utility functions (u) of the two players. For example, it seems safe to assume that in any deterrence game each player would like to prevent the other player from taking some unspecified action that would upset the status quo, that is:

U.S.-USSR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

125

Figure 7.1 Generalized Representation of the Superpower Deterrence Game USSR

al

U.S.

STATUS QUO

VICTORY FOR USSR (a j ,t>2)

( i V b i>

a2

MUTUAL LOSS

VICTORY FOR US.

(a2,b2)

(a,,!.,)

for the U.S.: for the USSR:

u{a\,bi) u(aubO

> >

u(ai,b2), and u(a 2 , &i).

(la) (lb)

Moreover, while the requirements expressed in equation (1) are necessary for a game to qualify as a deterrence game, they clearly are not sufficient. For the notion of deterrence to be of some salience, at least one player must have an incentive to move away from the status quo. Games wherein this minimal condition is satisfied will be termed unilateral deterrence games. When both players have an incentive to upset the status quo, a game of mutual deterrence will be said to exist. 4 Unilateral deterrence games, then, by definition, meet the restrictions of equation (1) and are characterized by two players with asymmetric motivation: a status quo player who prefers the status quo to all other outcomes and a revisionist player who prefers, unilaterally, to change it. Hence, in a unilateral deterrence game where, say the United States, is postulated to be the status quo player and where, say the Soviet Union, is postulated to be the revisionist player, the following restrictions will characterize the preference orders of the two players: for the U.S.: u{aitb{) > u(a2,bl) for the USSR: u(ai, b2) > u(ai,bi)

> u(ai,6 2 ), and > u(a2,b{).

(2a) (2b)

By contrast, in a g a m e of mutual deterrence, the preferences of the two players with respect to these same

126

FRANK C. ZAGARE

outcomes are completely symmetric: each player prefers, unilaterally, to upset the status quo and prefers that the other player not upset it. In mutual deterrence games, then, the following restrictions on the preference orders of the two players will hold: for the U.S.: u(a2, 61) > u(ai, bi) > u(ai, b2), and (3a) for the USSR: u{au b2) > u(ai,b{) > u(a2,bi). (3b) From the above, it is easy to see that once a deterrence game has been identified as either unilateral or mutual, each player's preferences for three of the four outcomes are accounted for. But to complete the ordering and hence to fully determine the nature of the deterrence game, it is necessary to specify the preference relationship of these three outcomes to (a2, b2). (a2, b2) represents the outcome that would be induced if one player upset the status quo in order to gain a unilateral advantage and the other player resisted and attempted to punish the first and deny his opponent these advantages. Put differently, (a 2 , b2) represents the threat upon which the deterrence relationship rests. Patently, each player's evaluation of this threat outcome is a function of the capability of the other; and each player's perception of the other's evaluation of this outcome depends upon the credibility of the other player's threat. Thus, if capability is defined as the ability to hurt (Schelling, 1966), each player will have a capable threat if and only if the other player prefers that, if he takes the prohibited action, the threat not be carried out. It follows, therefore, that if both players have a capable threat: for the U.S.: u{a2,b{) > u(a2, b2), and for the USSR: u(aub2) > u(a2,b2).

(4a) (4b)

By contrast, if one player has a capable threat and the other does not, the preference ranking of the opponent of the player whose threat is capable would simply reverse the restriction of equation (4). And if neither player is capable of hurting the other, the preferences of both players would be reversed. Finally, credibility. By most accounts, credibility is the "magic ingredient" of every deterrence relationship (Freedman, 1981: 96). Credibility means that the player being

U.S.-USSR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

127

deterred must believe that threat will be carried out if he takes the prohibited action. The essence of credibility, then, resides in a subjective evaluation on the part of the player being deterred of the willingness, or preference, of the other player to execute his threat. Unless the player being deterred perceives that the other prefers to resist, rather than accept, a unilateral departure from the status quo, a threat will not be seen to be credible (Fraser and Hipel, 1979: 802). Note that such an evaluation may not necessarily correspond with objective reality. A threat that is believed will be credible, whether or not the player making it intends to carry it out. Similarly, whatever the intentions of the threatener are, its threat will not be credible unless it is believed by the other player. Hence, if both players in a deterrence game have a credible threat, the following restrictions will apply: the U.S. perceives that for the USSR: u(a2, b2) > u(a2, 61), and the USSR perceives that for the U.S.: u{a,2,b2)> u(a,i,b2).

(5a) (5b)

As before, the lack of a credible threat by one or both players can be reflected by appropriate modification of the direction of the inequalities in these equations. Depending upon whether the deterrence relationship is unilateral or mutual, and whether each player's threat is capable 5 or credible, a number of structurally distinct deterrence games can be identified. In what follows, a theory of moves analysis will be used to indicate the conditions under which deterrence can be expected to succeed or fail (i.e., is stable) in each of them.

Mutual

Deterrence

In Figure 7.2, the three core games of mutual deterrence are listed. In this representation, the (ordinal) payoffs of the two players are ranked from "1" to "4," with "4" representing each player's best outcome, "3" each player's next-best outcome, and so on. Thus, when this convention is adopted, the outcome (4,1) represents the best outcome for the United States and the worst outcome for the Soviet Union.

FRANK C. ZAGARE

128

Figure 7.2 Three Mutual Deterrence Games USSR

U.S.

a

a

l

2

USSR

STATUS QUO

VICTORY FOR USSR

(3,3)

(1,4)

VICTORY FOR U . S .

MUTUAL PUNISHMENT

(4,1)

(2,2)

Game

1

(Prisoners'

U.S.

a

a

l

2

Dilemma)

STATUS QUO

VICTORY FOR USSR

(3,3)

(2,4)

VICTORY FOR U . S .

MUTUAL PUNISHMENT

(4,2)

(1,1)

Game 2 (Chicken)

USSR

U.S.

a

a

l

2

STATUS QUO

VICTORY LOR LSSR

( 3,3)

( 1 , 4 )

VICTORY LOR I'. S .

MUTUAL PUNISHMENT

(4,2)

(2,1)

(•amo Ì (Called libili)

Note that each game satisfies the restrictions of equations (3a) and (3b)—that is, each player is assumed to prefer, unilaterally, to upset the status quo and to prefer that the other not upset it. The three games are distinguished from one another only by different assumptions about the credibility of each player's threat. In game 1 (Prisoners' Dilemma), both players are postulated to have a credible threat; that is, both prefer to resist rather than accept a unilateral deviation from the status quo by the other. In game 2 (Chicken), neither player has a credible threat. And in game 3 (Called Bluff), one player (in this case

U.S.-USSR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

129

the United States) is assumed to have a credible threat while the other (i.e., the Soviet Union) is not. In two of these three games (1 and 2), deterrence can be stable, although the conditions that must be satisfied for stability to persist are somewhat different in each case. In the Prisoners' Dilemma game (1), wherein both players have a credible threat, deterrence is stable as long as each player has a second-strike capability, that is, the ability to move to the outcome associated with mutual punishment [i.e., (a 2 , ¿2)] should the other player depart from the status quo. (For a demonstration, see Zagare, 1987.) The reason for this is that in this game it is precisely each player's threat to induce this outcome that removes the incentive of the other player to seek a unilateral advantage by upsetting the status quo. Interestingly, deterrence may also be stable if both players lack a credible threat. The conditions upon which deterrence stability rests in Chicken, however, are more stringent than in Prisoners' Dilemma. In Chicken stable deterrence depends upon the ability of both players to move through mutual punishment, as in a limited war. Finally, in Called Bluff (game 3), wherein only one player has a credible threat, deterrence is not stable. Under these conditions, the player who is willing and able to punish a departure from the status quo by the other wins. These conclusions, moreover, are relatively unaffected by power asymmetries (as distinct from capabilities). 6 Only when neither player has a credible threat does a power imbalance enter into the deterrence equation. Under these conditions, deterrence is not stable since the more powerful player cannot be deterred from upsetting the status quo and inducing its best outcome as the final outcome of the game. Unilateral

Deterrence

Paradoxically, deterrence is much more difficult to achieve in the four core games of unilateral deterrence listed in Figure 7.3 than in the three games of mutual deterrence discussed above,7 since stronger assumptions are necessary to induce a stable outcome in the unilateral deterrence games. More specifically, for one outcome to be rendered stable in each of the games of Figure 7.3 (significantly, it is the status quo), the

FRANK C. ZAGARE

130

Figure 7.3 Four Unilateral Deterrence Games USSR b

U.S.

a

a

l

2

USSR b

l

2

STATUS QUO

VICTORY FOR USSR

(4,3)

(1,4)

VICTORY FOR U . S .

MUTUAL PUNISHMENT

(3,1)

(2,2)

U.S.

a

a

l

2

STATUS QUO

VICTORY FOR USSR

(4,3)

(2,4)

VICTORY FOR U . S .

MUTUAL PUNISHMENT

(3,2)

(1,1)

Game 5

Game 4

USSR

USSR b

U.S.

a

l

a2

l

b2

STATUS QUO

VICTORY FOR USSR

(A,3)

(1,4)

VICTORY FOR U . S .

MUTUAL PUNISHMENT

(3,2)

(2,1)

Game 6

b2

"l

b

U.S.

a

a

l

2

i

b2

STATUS QUO

VICTORY FOR USSR

(4,3)

(2,4)

VICTORY FOR U . S .

MUTUAL PUNISHMENT

(3,1)

(1,2)

Game 7

revisionist player must prefer the certain selection of his nextbest outcome to the lottery that contains his best and two worst outcomes. 8 As explained in greater detail in Zagare (1985a), such an assumption is more likely to be satisfied when the revisionist player is risk averse—that is, when he deflates the (cardinal) value of his best and two worst outcomes relative to the value of his next-best outcome. Thus, the success of unilateral deterrence depends less on the credibility of each player's threat than on the attitude of the revisionist player toward risk. As long as the revisionist player is risk averse, the status quo is stable in unilateral deterrence games. Otherwise, the games are indeterminate. Power asymmetries, however, may upset this conclusion.

U.S.-USSR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

131

In a unilateral deterrence game with an unequal distribution of power, a status quo power can ensure its best outcome and in the process stabilize the deterrence relationship, if it has a credible threat or the revisionist player lacks one. Still, preponderance alone is not sufficient for the success of deterrence in its unilateral variant. If a more powerful status quo player lacks credibility and the revisionist player does not, deterrence is not stable. Similarly, deterrence is also unstable when a weaker status quo player's threat is not credible. Summarizing the Model Tables 7.1 and 7.2 summarize the conclusions drawn from a theory-of-moves analysis of the strategic relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union. Each table controls for two different power configurations and the four logically possible assumptions that can be made about the credibility of each player's threat. Table 7.1 posits a game of mutual deterrence while Table 7.2 assumes a relationship of unilateral deterrence. Two important qualifications about these deductions are in order. First, all of the listed conclusions rest upon the assumption that each player has, at minimum, a second-strike capability, that is, the ability to respond should the other player move from the status quo. (When more stringent assumptions are required to generate these findings, the precise nature of the requisite assumptions is indicated in the table notes.) And second, under certain conditions, almost all of these results can be disturbed. Since both tables would be unduly complicated if every possible exception were noted, and since only a few of these disturbances are relevant to the subsequent discussion, they will be considered on an individual basis, but only when they have a bearing on the topic at hand. A Stability Analysis of the U.S.-USSR Strategic Relationship In the previous section, a model of deterrence and the conclusions drawn from it were summarized.9 In this section,

132

FRANK C. ZAGARE

Table 7.1 Mutual Deterrence Credible T h r e a t

E q u a l Power

U.S. is P r e d o m i n a n t

Both credible U.S. only USSR only Neither credible

stable m u t u a l deterrence U.S. victory USSR victory stable m u t u a l deterrence*

stable m u t u a l deterrence U.S. victory USSR victory U.S. victory

*Depends upon t h e ability of t h e players to pass through (a 2 ,6 2)-

Table 7.2 Unilateral Deterrence U.S. is a s t a t u s quo power USSR is a revisionist power U.S. is Predominant

U.S. is a revisionist power USSR is a status quo power Equal Power

U.S. is Predominant

Credible Threat

Equal Power

Both credible

stable deterrence if USSR is risk averse; otherwise indeterminate

USSR is deterred

stable deterrence if U.S. is risk averse; otherwise indeterminate

U.S. is deterred

U.S. only

stable deterrence if USSR is risk averse; otherwise indeterminate

USSR is deterred

stable deterrence if U.S. is risk averse; otherwise indeterminate

U.S. victory

USSR only

stable deterrence if USSR is risk averse; otherwise indeterminate

USSR victory

stable deterrence if U.S. is risk averse; otherwise indeterminate

U.S. is deterred

Neither credible

stable deterrence if USSR is risk averse; otherwise indeterminate

USSR is deterred

stable deterrence if U.S. is risk averse; otherwise indeterminate

U.S. victory

the overall strategic relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union will be evaluated in light of the deductions presented in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. To facilitate the subsequent discussion, the superpower strategic relationship will be divided into the following time periods: 1945-1950, the period of American nuclear monopoly; 1951-1955, the first period of U.S. superiority; 1956-1961, the period of mutual vulnerability; 1962-1966, the second period of U.S. superiority; and 1967-date, the period of essential equivalence.10

U.S.-USSR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

133

1967-date, the period of essential equivalence. 10 1945-1950: The American Nuclear Monopoly When the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, a new world order was ushered in. This new order differed in two fundamental respects from the prewar system. First, it was bipolar rather than multipolar and, second, it was nuclear. These two characteristics of the present international system have been the essential constants of the division-of-spoils games played by the United States and the Soviet Union since 1945. At the conclusion of the Second World War, both the United States and the Soviet Union started to demobilize. The Soviet demobilization, however, was gradual and partial while the American reductions were faster and more complete, creating a power vacuum in Europe. Given the dominance of Soviet conventional forces on the continent, the Soviets could, in effect, hold Europe "hostage." During the initial period of the superpower strategic relationship, then, this threat to Western Europe constituted the principal source of Soviet leverage against possible coercive threats from the United States. By contrast, only the United States possessed nuclear weapons. But because the American strategic stockpile was very small, "little military and political importance was attached to the early atomic bomb by many Western observers at the time" (Quester, 1970:1). Given these considerations, the general shape of the game played at this time took form: the superpower game would be played between one player with a monopoly of nuclear weapons and another player with obvious conventional superiority. In a game in which neither side could confidently claim preponderance, each superpower had two broad choices, either to accept the postwar status quo or to vigorously attempt to upset it. The four outcomes associated with theses choices are summarized verbally in Figure 7.4. There is little disagreement in the strategic literature about the nature of the game played by the superpowers during this period. Where differences of opinion exist, and where fundamental ideological orientations begin to intrude into strategic evaluations concerns the interpretation of the preferences of the players over the set of outcomes. Accordingly, I will now evaluate the consistency of some of

134

FRANK C. ZAGARE

F i g u r e 7.4 The S u p e r p o w e r Game, Circa L a t e 1945 USSR

Postwar s t a t u s quo maintained

S o v i e t s overrun Western Europe; B a l a n c e o f power f a v o r s USSR

U.S. dominant. ; Soviets lose c o n t r o l of Eastern Europe

Gloha1

var

these interpretations with both the deductions of the model presented herein and with the empirical record. One seldom discussed explanation for the stability of the international system for the (entire) postwar era is a preference of both sides for the status quo that evolved after 1945. Although most commentators argue that either the United States or the Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War desiring no more than the consolidation of its victory, it is possible that each side, at least initially, was content with the postwar lines of demarcation. In terms of the model outlined above, this interpretation of superpower preferences implies that both preferred (cti, bi) to any other outcome. Clearly, had this been the case, the status quo would have been the unique equilibrium outcome in this game, and deterrence would have been unnecessary. Of course, the perception by each superpower that the other was not satisfied with the existing order is also necessary to explain much of their behavior. Nevertheless, whatever steps either side took to deter the other, the hypothesis that both sides were more or less content with the postwar status quo is consistent with the empirical record and the deductions of the deterrence model presented herein. Another interpretation of the 1945-1950 superpower game posits asymmetric motivations to the players: one superpower is assumed to be a satisfied status quo player while the other is characterized as a revisionist player. Howard (1983), for instance, has argued that the Soviet Union was essentially status quo orientated at this time 11 while the United States was not. The more prevalent interpretation, at least in the Western

U.S.-USSR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

135

literature, reverses this argument (see, for instance, Brodie, 1959b; Intriligator and Brito, 1984: 82). Howard's description of the superpower relationship, however, cannot by itself explain the stability of the 1945-1950 period. Table 7.2 reveals that if power is assumed to be equally distributed, then the Truman administration must also be assumed to have been risk averse if the absence of war at this time is to be explained. Conversely, if the United States is assumed to be the only satisfied player, then Soviet risk aversion must be posited if the stability of this period is to be accounted for. The argument that the stability of the 1945-1950 era can be attributed to risk-averse behavior by the superpowers is not an uncommon one in the strategic literature. In fact, some theorists have suggested that prudent crisis management techniques have been responsible for the absence of a superpower war for the entire postwar period (Williams, 1975). This argument, however, conflicts with what is to my knowledge the only extant measure, independent of the behavior to be predicted, of the risk-taking propensities of the superpowers (Bueno de Mesquita, 1985). 12 These data indicate that the Soviet leadership was indeed risk averse vis-à-vis the United States in Europe during 1946 and 1947, but that from 1948 on, the Soviets have been risk acceptant. Bueno de Mesquita's risk measures also reveal the American leadership to be risk averse vis-à-vis the Soviets, but only through 1948. Since that time, the competition between the superpowers has truly been "a competition in risk taking" (Schelling, 1960). Thus, while it is possible to attribute the absence of a general war in 1946 and 1947 to the fact that one or the other superpower was disinclined to take risks to advance its interests, this proposition is without systematically collected empirical evidence after 1948. It is also possible that both superpowers were unsatisfied with the postwar status quo, thereby rendering the game they played a game of mutual deterrence. Manifestly, however, if both the United States and the Soviet Union were revisionist players, limits must be placed upon the extent of their dissatisfaction in order to explain the absence of a superpower war at this time. To wit, if either side was so dissatisfied that it preferred war to the status quo, deterrence is not stable. In this case, the extremely unsatisfied power's nonstatus quo strategy

136

FRANK C. ZAGARE

would have been strictly dominant since its two best outcomes would have been associated with this strategy. Thus, on both logical and empirical grounds, this interpretation, and each of its logically possible variants, can be rejected. There are, nevertheless, two interpretations of the superpower game that are consistent with the possibility that each side was unhappy with the post-1945 status quo and the observation that neither made a major effort to upset it. Table 7.1 shows that mutual deterrence is stable if each side has a credible retaliatory threat (game 1). The reason why deterrence is stable under these conditions is that while each side would prefer to replace the status quo with a more agreeable arrangement, each side also preferred the status quo to going to war to alter it. And if each player's threat is perceived to be credible, each power would anticipate that the other would resist any attempt to upset the existing order. Soviet declaratory policy at the end of World War II is particularly consistent with this interpretation of the superpower relationship. Since the United States enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear weapons, the Soviets had to convince the U.S. leadership that it did not consider this asymmetry to be decisive. In other words, given a credible American threat, stable mutual deterrence rested upon the Truman administration's perception that the Soviet threat (to Western Europe) was also credible. Clearly, such a preference could not be projected if the American nuclear monopoly was acknowledged to be decisive. Thus, whether or not the Soviets believed their own propaganda, strategic reasons existed for expecting that it would take precisely the form that it did. Table 7.1 also reveals that mutual deterrence is stable when neither player's threat is credible (game 2). The reason for this is that without a clear power advantage neither player could have been sure of inducing a better outcome by switching from its status quo strategy since the other could always respond by moving to mutual confrontation i.e., 02,62. thereby forcing the player that initially departed from the status quo to choose between its worst and next-worst outcome as the final outcome of the game. By contrast, by not moving, each player ensures its next-best outcome, the original status quo. This interpretation of systemic stability, though, requires the additional assumption that both players were able to move to and through mutual confrontation, and that neither player

U.S.-USSR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

137

possessed a clear-cut power advantage. But given the absence of a first-strike capability by either side, and the fact that only a limited number of nuclear weapons were possessed by the United States at this time, it seems safe to assume that these conditions were met. Hence, on both logical and empirical grounds, this particular hypothesis cannot be rejected. 1951-1955:

The First Period of American

Strategic

Superiority

By 1951 the first period of the superpower strategic relationship had given way to the second. What distinguished these two periods was the clear and large advantage of the United States by 1951 and the years that followed in both nuclear weapons and strategic delivery vehicles (Kahan, 1975: 27). Even though the American nuclear monopoly had been broken, an American strategic advantage was evident. Whereas previously the limited size of the American nuclear arsenal raised questions about its efficacy in a war-of-industrialattrition with the Soviet Union, now the sheer number of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States, coupled with the ability to deliver them from Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in both the United States and Europe, and the inability of the Soviets to respond in kind, ushered in an era of unquestioned American strategic superiority (Quester, 1970: 89; Hopkins and Mansbach, 1973: 384; Kahan, 1975, ch. 1; Russett, 1983: 8-11; Smoke, 1984, ch. 5). Significantly, however, while the American strategic advantage was very obvious in 1951, so was the realization that it would be shortlived (Quester, 1970: 70). Given the defining characteristics of the 1951-1955 period, and assuming that its strategic capability conferred a power advantage on the United States, several interpretations of the deterrence model are consistent with the empirical record. Three of these (see Table 7.2) require the assumption that the United States was a status quo power (games 4 to 6). As long as it has a capable threat, or a revisionist player lacks one, a status quo power with recognizable military superiority should deter a weaker revisionist state since its power advantage removes any incentive the revisionist player might have to depart from the status quo. Was the United States status quo oriented during this

138

FRANK C. ZAGARE

period or was it interested in promoting a "rollback" of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe? It is difficult to say. On the one hand, it seems plausible to argue that the United States was a satisfied power during this period. After all, its military, political, and economic position was essentially unchallenged. On the other hand, given the ephemeral quality of the American position, it also seems reasonable to suggest, as Howard (1983) does, that the Eisenhower administration was no longer attached to the certain-to-deteriorate status quo. Indeed, the idea of launching a preventive strike did surface, albeit briefly, within the American bureaucracy, indicating that at least some strategic thinkers were dissatisfied with future power projections. Are there any other interpretations of the deterrence model consistent with the assumption that a dominant United States was not self-deterred during this period? There are three. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show that deterrence remains stable, even when American preponderance is assumed, as long as the retaliatory threat of the Soviet Union is seen to be credible (games 1, 4, and 6). Is such an assumption tenable in the face of Soviet inferiority and vulnerability? Kahan argues as much when he writes that it seems certain that moral factors kept U.S. leaders from entertaining the possibility of a preventive strike. . . . But practical considerations undoubtedly influenced the decision as well—a U.S. counterforce strike could not be assured of completely eliminating the USSR's capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Even if Soviet long-range delivery capabilities could be destroyed, the United States could not be confident of preventing the USSR from inflicting substantial damage on Western Europe with its medium-range force (Kahan, 1975: 29).

Curiously, Kahan's explanation for deterrence stability during this period of American preponderance (needlessly) confuses both of the explanations offered herein. If moral considerations in fact had an impact on American decisionmakers, then the United States was self-deterred, that is, it preferred not to upset the status quo regardless of whether or not the Soviets retaliated. But if strategic considerations were paramount, then the absence of a first-strike capability,

U.S.-USSR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

139

coupled with a credible Soviet threat against Western Europe, can explain the American (non)decision. Consequently, while either of these explanations provides sufficient explanatory conditions, neither is necessary. There are, however, some problematic implications associated with each of these explanations. For example, if the strategic explanation is accepted, then one must also accept the possibility that credibility is not necessarily a function of either superiority or invulnerability since this assumption is necessary to account for systemic stability in a relationship of mutual deterrence. Moreover, the balance-of-power hypothesis is seemingly contradicted by either the moral or the strategic explanation since the superpower relationship remained stable at a time of very obvious strategic inequality. It is seemingly contradicted only because the fundamental assumption associated with the present analysis, that is, that the United States was indeed preponderant, must be accepted for this hypothesis to be rejected. Finally, if the balance-ofpower model is to be salvaged, then the argument that conventional superiority can offset nuclear inferiority must also be accepted, since a strategic balance can be said to have existed during this period only if this possibility is admitted. A further implication of this argument is that nuclear weapons cannot be considered sui generis.13 And if this extension is allowed, then the current United States deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe can also be questioned on strategic grounds. 1956-1961: The Period of Mutual

Vulnerability

During the third period of the superpower relationship, the American monopoly of strategic delivery vehicles was broken. 14 With the introduction of thermonuclear weapons into the Soviet arsenal during this period, the strategic importance of the growing number of medium-range Badger bombers was enhanced. Since the vast destructive power of hydrogen bombs rendered implausible a war-of-attrition conflict between the superpowers, the Soviet fleet of Badgers, capable of a one-way mission against the United States, now constituted a serious threat (Quester, 1970:126-129). Suddenly, the United States was vulnerable to a preemptive or a retaliatory nuclear strike by the Soviet Union. The acquisition

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of intercontinental ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union toward the end of the decade only reinforced a strategic stalemate characterized by each superpower suffering from what Schelling (1960) has called "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack." It should not be surprising that, in a world in which each superpower was vulnerable to a thermonuclear strike by the other, many analysts started to question the meaning of the term strategic "superiority." Although the United States maintained a lead during this and the subsequent period in both the number of warheads and intercontinental delivery vehicles, the Soviet arsenal was such that William Kaufmann (1956: 21) could warn at the very beginning of this period that "if we are challenged to fulfill the threat of massive retaliation, we will be likely to suffer costs as great as those we inflict." The implication was, of course, that neither side could expect to win a nuclear war. Thus technological advances had rendered obsolete Clausewitz's famous aphorism about the nature of warfare. Under conditions of mutual vulnerability, it became difficult to imagine a set of circumstances under which the costs of fighting a war would even come close to being outweighed by the potential benefits of prevailing in such a confrontation. Brodie's (1946) early observation that the only purpose of nuclear weapons was to prevent war had finally become the reality.15 Needless to say, the altered environment had important strategic consequences. Whereas in previous periods the Eisenhower administration could attempt to maintain the status quo by threatening transgressors with a nuclear attack, now such a threat against either the Soviet Union or its allies appeared to lack credibility. Since the execution of a nuclear threat also implied enormous costs for the United States, critics charged that the administration's "New Look" policy, which relied heavily on the nuclear threat of "massive retaliation," was now obsolete. And, because of the symmetric nature of the superpower relationship, if the American nuclear threat was incredible, so was the Soviets'. The strategic relationship of the superpowers increasingly came to be represented in the literature of this period by the game of "Chicken" (game 2). The analogy was compelling. In Chicken both players lack a credible threat since the outcome associated with mutual punishment is mutually

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worst. The analogy was also revealing. Deterrence is extremely unstable in thermonuclear Chicken. Under these conditions, each player has an incentive to move from the status quo in order to induce its best outcome since the other player would not rationally retaliate and thereby bring about its own worst outcome as the final outcome of the game. Clearly, this game represents in its starkest form the problem associated with mutual deterrence in the nuclear age (Zagare, 1985b). Fortunately, there are two solutions to the instability problem inherent in Chicken. The Eisenhower administration, interestingly enough, pursued the first of these for as long as it remained in office; the second was implemented as American strategic policy by the Kennedy administration toward the end of the period of mutual vulnerability. The Eisenhower administration sought to preserve the status quo and maintain deterrence stability by attempting to alter the structure of the game it played with the Soviets. Since the instability of the status quo in nuclear Chicken, and its unilateral deterrence analogue (game 5) can be directly traced to the absence of a credible threat, the Eisenhower administration sought to convince both the Soviet Union and its West European allies that it preferred nuclear war and its attendant costs to capitulating to a Soviet challenge. The administration's strategy, in essence, was to deny that a credibility problem existed. On several occasions during the 1958-1959 Berlin crisis, for example, Eisenhower suggested that nuclear weapons would be used to defend the beleaguered city. 16 Given the favorable resolution of this crisis and, more importantly, the absence of a superpower war during the Eisenhower years, it is difficult to argue that this approach failed. To sustain this argument, both superpowers must be seen as satisfied status quo players. Otherwise, if the threat of nuclear retaliation is posited to be inherently incredible under conditions of strategic vulnerability, at least one player would have had an incentive to seek a significant readjustment of the existing order. The apparent success of the New Look policy notwithstanding, critics charged that it was flawed. One problem with an almost total reliance on a nuclear deterrent was that the threat "might indeed be credible all around" (Quester, 1970: 212). Thus, in a setting like Berlin, "where any

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military initiative had to fall to the West rather than to the Soviet bloc," the Western leadership might be presented with a very unpalatable choice: either nuclear war or capitulation. In other words, given mutually credible escalatory threats, each side would be deterred at the strategic level but, somewhat paradoxically, would not be deterred from seeking unilateral advantages at the margin. A burning strategic issue at the time, therefore, was whether such untoward actions could be prevented. Stated differently, how could deterrence be established in both the Chicken game played at the substrategic level and in the Prisoners' Dilemma game played on the strategic plane? The answer to this question can be found in Table 7.1. Deterrence is stable in Chicken as long as both players have the ability to pass through mutual punishment by fighting a limited war. Whether or not two nuclear powers could engage in such a conflict without eventual escalation to a general war was, of course, a hotly debated question during the late 1950s and the early 1960s (Freedman, 1981: ch. 7 and 8). But the fact that this particular question should arise at this particular time is not at all surprising given the deductions of the deterrence model summarized in this chapter. At any rate, consistent with the model, critics of the New Look policy called for the development of nonnuclear choices in order to deter the anticipated "salami tactics" of the Soviets. Although the Eisenhower administration resisted this advice, the Kennedy administration did not. With the transfer of power to the Democrats in 1961, the New Look policy was replaced by the doctrine of "flexible response." According to Kahan, "the key objective of flexible response was to maintain forces capable of meeting conventional threats so that the United States would not be faced with the choice of either using nuclear weapons or foregoing vital interests abroad because it lacked nonnuclear options" (Kahan, 1975: 76). The difference between these two approaches to deterrence can be seen by examining the actions taken by the Kennedy administration during its own Berlin crisis. When Khrushchev revived his demands for an end to the Allied occupation of the city at the Vienna summit meeting in June 1961, Kennedy's response was largely a conventional response: the National Guard was mobilized, 40,000 American troops were transferred to Europe, and Congress was asked to

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provide nearly $3 billion for increased defense spending. The reason for all of this is clear. As Quester astutely observed, if "the Russians were again molding the contest for Berlin into a game of 'chicken,' . . . [then] . . . the buildup of N A T O forces, however widely advertised as changing the game, may in fact have amounted to the West's playing it" (Quester, 1970: 214). 1962-1966: The Second Period of American

Superiority

From 1962 to 1967, the United States enjoyed an overwhelming margin of strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. The American lead, due primarily to a strategic buildup started during Eisenhower's tenure and accelerated by the Kennedy Administration, was in fact so large that the Soviet strategic force was vulnerable to an American first strike (Quester, 1970: 216; Friedberg, 1982: 69). Moreover, since the American augmentation included both Minuteman missiles in hardened underground silos and several Polaris submarines, the American strategic arsenal was invulnerable to preemptive action by the Soviets. Interestingly, only two interpretations of the deterrence model are consistent with both the American first-strike capability and the absence of a superpower war at this time (games 4 and 6). Since both interpretations posit the United States as a status quo power with a credible retaliatory threat, both of these conditions are necessary to explain the observed stability of this period. Neither condition, though, by itself, is sufficient. Thus, even under conditions of preponderance, stability requires a credible deterrent threat. (See Zagare 1985a for an explanation.) A t the strategic level, it is difficult to argue that the American deterrent was not credible. After all, given the limited number of missiles in the Soviet arsenal, the United States would have had little to lose by responding to a Soviet attack. Nevertheless, as the Democrats themselves had pointed out in the 1960 Presidential campaign, the credibility of such a threat still remained problematic in situations of "immediate" deterrence (Morgan, 1983) at the substrategic level. The significance afforded this distinction by the Kennedy administration was evident during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Even though American strategic power was at its zenith, and even though the missiles posed a direct threat to

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parts of the United States, the administration's principal response was conventional. Thus, the blockade was hailed because it both communicated American resolve and because it lefl the Soviets with the unpalatable choice of backing down or escalating. Still, American tactics during the missile crisis were not completely conventional. As had been the case during the 1961 Berlin crisis, President Kennedy was not reluctant to rattle some nuclear sabers, promising on one occasion "full nuclear retaliation" against the Soviet Union. Thus, while it is true that the United States enjoyed conventional superiority in the Caribbean, it does not follow that conventional dominance alone determined the outcome of this crisis. Indeed, one might question instead whether, given the stakes involved, a conventional response was redundant or even unnecessarily risky since a local incident could have, willy nilly, sparked a wider exchange. Whatever the case, though, the administration had to play the game differently in Europe. Even though Western forces were increased on the continent after 1961, the Soviets continued to have the upper hand. Could not, then, the Soviets play the same way the United States had in Cuba by presenting the United States with the same hard choice between accepting an attempted fait accompli and precipitating a general war? More than anything else, it was this fear that led American decisionmakers to enunciate the doctrine of a "counterforce strategy." In contrast to the doctrine of massive retaliation, which the Democrats had publicly denigrated, the idea of a counterforce strategy discriminated among potential targets in a nuclear conflict. Instead of visualizing a single-spasm attack on Soviet society, a counterforce attack or controlled response would focus only on Soviet military targets. Such a "no cities" doctrine, it was felt, would enhance the credibility of the American deterrent since it would not involve the indiscriminate destruction of civilians. Given the vulnerability of Soviet strategic forces at the time, and the American first-strike capability, such a strategy seemed reasonable. 1967-date: The Period of Essential

Equivalence

After 1967, a counterforce strategy seemed less reasonable, or at least eminently debatable, as a massive buildup of Soviet

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strategic forces once again established a strategic balance. Understandably, with the Soviet Union approaching parity with the United States, the Johnson administration lost some of its interest in counterforce strategies and shifted its defense policy in the direction of the doctrine of assured destruction. When the Nixon administration took office in 1969, the notion of strategic "sufficiency" was resurrected to take account of the new reality. Since 1967, the configuration of both the American and Soviet arsenals has undergone considerable change. But notwithstanding the development and deployment of MIRVs, more accurate ICBMs, larger and longer-range SSBNs, and the musings of some strategic thinkers, from 1967 to date neither side has had the capability to eliminate the other side's ability to retaliate in kind in the event of a nuclear first strike. Since each side has enjoyed an invulnerable second-strike capability, the post-1967 era might be viewed as the "golden age of deterrence." In terms of Intriligator and Brito's model (Chapter 2), the superpower relationship of this period has been firmly ensconced in the "cone of mutual deterrence."17 Still, stable deterrence cannot be said to be only a function of the MAD relationship. Needless to say, since the act of war involves human choice, the assurance of destruction depends upon the perception of each side that the other would indeed retaliate if the status quo were transgressed. Thus, the rather facile conclusion is that either both sides did not need to be deterred since 1967, or that at least one side has maintained a credible threat in spite of the fact that execution of the threat implied the destruction of its own society. Some important policy expectations, however, follow from this rather obvious observation. If stability depends upon one or both states establishing the credibility of its threat, then it would not only be prudent, but also, one would predict, each superpower would go to considerable length to (1) assure the other that it intended to cooperate as long as the other also cooperated, and (2) that it would not accept a precipitous action by the other. In other words, tit-for-tat strategies are not only optimal, but necessary for systemic stability. On the other hand, if each player lacked a credible threat (and the game was indeed Chicken), then one would expect that each side would race to preempt the other by making an "irrevocable commitment" to its nonstatus quo strategy.

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Much of the diplomatic record of this period can be more easily understood if the importance of establishing credibility is kept in mind. In both the 1967 and 1973 crises in the Middle East, for example, each side went to considerable lengths to make sure that the other understood that it would not tolerate any action by the other, or the other's allies, that would significantly erode its interests in the area. The worldwide alert of American strategic forces during the 1973 crisis was merely the most obvious of these actions. On the other hand, on both occasions, since it was Israel that was dominant in the local war, the United States also made every effort to assure the Soviets that it would not permit Israel to compromise either Syrian or Egyptian sovereignty. 18 The American commitment to South Vietnam until 1973 also seems much more understandable when viewed from this perspective. Even though United States decisionmakers realized as early as 1968 that a military victory in Vietnam was not possible (Kissinger, 1969), American disengagement from this costly war was predicated upon a "peace with honor," so that American allies would not come to believe that the United States had "chickened out." Summary and Conclusion This chapter divides the strategic relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union into five periods, distinguished by the shifting strategic capabilities of the two superpowers. Three of these have been posited to be periods of overall strategic equivalence and two to be periods of American strategic superiority. Since each of the periods differs from each other in some way, they can be viewed as historical controls that permit the impact of some of the most salient characteristics of a nuclear relationship to be explored. One interesting observation that can be gleaned from this analysis is that there is no one correct explanation for the stability of the postwar period. In general, a number of logically consistent and empirically plausible configurations of player preferences exist for each period that can be used to explain the absence of a superpower war. Moreover, although these explanations contract as the superpower relationship developed, only two are consistently present throughout the

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entire superpower relationship. One is the rather innocuous explanation that both states have been satisfied status quo powers since 1945. The second posits the United States as a status quo power in a unilateral deterrence game with the Soviet Union. It is worth mentioning that for one of the periods, 1962-1966, only this latter explanation is consistent with the empirical record. To sustain this latter argument for the entire postwar period, though, one of several emendations is necessary for the years 1948 to 1950. First, one could assume that the Soviet Union was also a status quo power for these years, or that Soviet leaders were risk averse at the time, or that the United States was perceived to be more powerful and was thought to be able to successfully wage a war-of-attrition against the Soviet Union. While the last of these assumptions might be debated, the first two are without strong empirical support. Even though a number of rational choice explanations exist for the stability of the superpower relationship since 1945, several interpretations of the motivations of the two superpowers can be eliminated since they are not consistent with the empirical record. For instance, one cannot hold that the United States had a first-strike capability in the early 1960s without also accepting the position that the United States was a status quo power at the time. Also, one cannot argue, as does Howard (1983), that the United States was not a status quo power from 1951 to 1955 without also claiming that at a time of very obvious strategic inferiority the Soviet deterrent was both capable and credible. While this may in fact have been the case, then it also follows that the capability requirements for successful deterrence are much lower than are generally supposed. Similarly, Achen's argument (Chapter 5) that the costs of carrying out a deterrent threat are perceived to far outweigh evaluations of the costs that would accrue should the status quo be violated, can be rejected on empirical grounds, at least for the current period. As Achen himself points out, deterrence is unstable and peace is irrational, when this argument is accepted.19 One may, of course, view this as a paradox of deterrence as does Achen. But seen from another perspective, it is quite revealing about the nature of preferences at the leadership level. Statesmen seem to prefer, or at least are perceived to prefer to be "better dead than red" than the other way around.

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All of which suggests that the fear among some strategists that the Soviets might be tempted to eliminate the increasingly vulnerable land-based missile force of the United States seems exaggerated. If the superpowers are able to make credible their threat to retaliate, and it appears that they have, then stability follows from an invulnerable second-strike capability, regardless of whether some leg of a strategic force is susceptible to elimination. This also suggests that the key to successful deterrence resides at the level of individual decisionmakers whose preference projections and perceptions define the nature of the d e t e r r e n c e relationship. Successful d e t e r r e n c e cannot, therefore, be ensured simply by building more and more missiles and praying t h a t an accident does not occur (Intriligator and Brito, Chapter 2). Seemingly reasonable leaders who dwell upon the costs of nuclear war are likely to undermine the credibility of their nation's t h r e a t and, consequently, deterrence stability itself, whatever the objective environment may be like. Conversely, as Kugler and Zagare (Chapter 4) point out, leaders who appear to be risk acceptant may even precipitate preemption by the other side. Deterrence, then, is fundamentally a psychological relationship. As such, it is extremely fragile.

Notes 1. For the particulars of this framework and the formal deductions used to analyze the superpower relationship, see Zagare (1987). 2. Riker and Ordeshook (1973: 14) refer to this technique for constructing explanations of behavior as "revealed preference." 3. This section summarizes theoretical arguments reported in Zagare (1985a, 1985b). 4. This is a departure from conventional usage. These terms are normally used to indicate a deterrence relationship wherein either one player (unilateral deterrence) or both players (mutual deterrence) have a nuclear capability. For a discussion, see Morgan (1983). 5. To simplify the following exposition, each player will be assumed to have a capable threat. In the nuclear age, such an assumption seems warranted. 6. For the distinction, see Zagare (1987) or Kilgour and Zagare (1987). 7. For the sake of convenient exposition, the Soviet Union is listed as the revisionist player in Figure 7.3. No value judgment is implied. In

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the subsequent discussion, the ramifications of the opposite assumption will be explored. 8. By contrast, for an outcome to be rendered stable in the mutual deterrence games of Figure 7.2, the players need only be able to look ahead and consider the long-term consequences of departing from the status quo. 9. The next two sections are based on material contained in Zagare (1987). 10. Of course, this division is somewhat arbitrary. Still, it is representative of a consensus among strategic thinkers that several distinct stages, separated by different combinations of strategic capabilities, have existed in the superpower relationship. See, for instance, Quester (1970), Kahan (1975), Russett (1983), or Smoke (1984). 11. Howard characterizes the Soviet Union as a status quo power until 1955. 12. Personal communication, February 15, 1985. For a detailed discussion of this measure, see Bueno de Mesquita (1985). 13. For empirical evidence that suggests t h a t conventional superiority is more important than nuclear superiority, see Bueno de Mesquita (1982,1985), Kugler (1984), and Huth and Russett (1984). 14. There is a difference of opinion in the strategic literature about the ability of the Soviet Union to inflict significant damage on the United States during this period. (See, for example, Kugler, 1984.) If this argument is accepted, the conclusions of this section do not apply. 15. In terms of the concepts used to generate the deduction of tables 7.1 and 7.2, the concept of holding power (Kilgour and Zagare, 1987) was no longer relevant since the war-of-attrition scenario associated with it was now clearly an idea whose time had passed. 16. Snyder and Diesing (1977) depict this crisis as a Prisoners' Dilemma game. 17. This is not to suggest that future technologies are incapable of disturbing this relationship. 18. For a theory of moves analysis of these two crises, see Zagare (1981,1983). 19. Brams and Kilgour's model (Chapter 6) does not resolve the paradox. As with Achen's charge against deterrence theory in general, their model r e s t s upon the supposition t h a t each player is simultaneously rational (in deciding whether or not to attack) and irrational (in deciding whether or not to retaliate).

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Index Called Bluff; game of, 128-129. See also Chicken model; Prisoners' Dilemma Canada, 55 Capability; assessing, 60,126. See also Credibility Casualties; acceptable, 57, 58; modeling, 34, 35-36, 38; unacceptable levels, 16,17, 18,20-21. See also Costs Chamberlain, Neville, 57 Chicken model, 9,10, 73,121(n2), 146; deterrence game, 108-111,113,119,128,129, 142; superpower use, 140-141,143 China. See People's Republic of China Churchill, Winston, 57, 97 Cities; as targets, 15, 33. See also Casualties; Costs Cold war, 59. See also Berlin Command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I), 27 Communications, 27 Cone of stability, 6, 7-8 Conflicts, 3; costs, 7, 71; gains, 75, 76; initiation, 93-94. See also War Conventional weapons, 3, 23, 70, 77,133,144; disarmament, 6-7. See also Nuclear weapons Costs, 43, 76, 77,140; calculating, 49-50, 51-53, 57; deterrence and, 56, 71; gains versus, 78, 92-93; game theory,

ABM. See Antiballistic Missile Treaty Accidents, 14; arms control and, 27, 29 Agreements, 39(n9); arms control, 26,28 Aggression; inducement, 100-101 Alliances, 55, 59,141; expected utility, 60-61 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 28 Antisubmarine warfare, 28 Argentina, 53, 59 Arms control, 14, 39(n4); role, 26-29. See also Arms races Arms races, 39(n4); deterrence, 13-14; mutual deterrence, 23, 24, 30; war initiation, 21-25. See also Arms control Arsenals, 6, 60, 63, 72; destructive capability, 1,2; Soviet, 139-140; United States, 137, 143 Asymmetry, 19, 53; deterrence, 21,23; motivation, 134-135; power, 130-131,136. See also Parity; Symmetry Attackers, 34. See also Aggression Badger bombers, 139 Balance of terror, 88, 91. See also Threats Berlin; 1958-1959 crisis, 141-142; 1961 crisis, 142-143,144 Bismarck, Otto von, 49 Brodie, Bernard, 1

161

162

INDEX

117-118. See also Casualties; Gains Counterforce option, 2. See also Counterforce strategy; Counterforce targets Counterforce strategy, 144. See also Counterforce option; Counterforce targets Counterforce targets, 15, 32, 33. See also Counterforce option; Counterforce strategy Counterstrikes, 2 Countervalue option, 2, 94. See also Countervalue targets Countervalue targets, 15,16,18; choosing, 32, 33. See also Countervalue option. Credibility, 139,146; leadership, 141-142; threat, 47-18, 94, 12&-127,129,132 (tables), 136. See also Capability Cruise missiles, 28, 79(n7) C 3 I. See Command, control, communications and intelligence Cuban missile crisis, 65,143-144 Darwinian theory; political science and, 98-102 Decisionmaking, 67, 97,102; conflict, 46, 47; deterrence and, 63, 64, 86-87,148; risks and, 64-65, 81, 87-88. See also Leadership Deescalation Equilibrium, 120. See also Deescalation Game Deescalation Game, 120,121(n5) Defense, 6, 38(n3); planning, 34-35, 36-37 Demobilization, 133 Deterrence, 16, 83,148; capacity, 7-8; equilibrium, 107,113, 114,115,116,119,120; model, 49-56,124-131; needs for, 59-60; preemption, 115—119; rational choice,

92-98; stability, 5-6,10, 63-64, 66-67, 91,138; strategic, 9, 71-72; theories of, 91-92, 96-97, 98. See also Deterrence Game; Mutual deterrence; Unilateral deterrence Deterrence Game, 107,121(n4); Chicken model, 108-111,113; equilibrium, 114r-115,117, 119; preemption, 111-112, 113; superpowers and, 124-127. See also Models Disarmament, 6,19; war initiation, 21, 22, 23 Diversification, 28 Doctrines. See Policies Dominican Republic, 54 Dulles, John Foster, 43 Egypt, 146 Eisenhower administration, 138, 141 Equilibrium, 10,107-108,110. See also Evolutionary equilibrium; Parity Evolutionary equilibrium; game theory, 98-100. See also Evolutionary theory Evolutionary theory, 103, 104(n5); aggression, 100-101; genetics, 101-102, 105(n7). See also Evolutionary equilibrium Expected utility framework, 60, 74; calculations, 50-51, 61; components, 56-57; game theory, 79-80; war, 45, 46, 47 Facilities; security of, 28-29 Falklands-Malvinas crisis, 53 First strike, 15,16,18; strategy, 32, 33, 35; U.S. capability, 143-144 Fissile material, 29 Flexible response, 2,142-143

INDEX

Forced initiation, 37 Frameworks. See Game theory; Models France; arsenals, 60, 72; nuclear weapons, 39(n8), 68 Gains, 140; calculating, 49-50, 51-53, 74-75, 78, 82-84, 104(n2); and risks, 64, 76, 77; United States, 75, 76, 78, 92-93. See also Costs; Payoffs; Risks Game theoiy, 104-105(nnl, 6); deterrence tactics, 80-86; evolutionary equilibrium, 98-99; expected utility, 79-80; mutual deterrence, 127-129; unilateral deterrence, 129-130. See also Models; Theory of moves Germany; World Wars, 49, 57-58. See also Berlin Grand strategies; choosing, 15, 32-33. See also Strategies Great Britain. See United Kingdom Hitler, Adolph, 49, 57-58 Hot lines, 27. See also Communications Hungary, 53 ICBMs. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles India, 72 Industry, 15 Initiation; of war, 21-29, 34-38 Installations, 2 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 139-140,145 Intervention, 54 Iran, 119-120 Iraq, 119-120 Israel, 146

163

Japan,49 Johnson administration, 145 Kennedy, John F., 67. See also Kennedy administration Kennedy administration; policy, 141,142-143,144. See also Kennedy, John F. Kissinger, Henry, 4, 97 Korea, 53 Launch on warning, 14, 27. See also Preemption Launch under attack, 39(n5) Leadership, 138; credibility, 141-142; risk taking, 81-82, 86-87, 88(n3); strategic decisions, 144—145; threat perception, 136,142 Limited strategic war, 15, 32 Losses. See also Casualties; Costs McNamara, Robert, 4, 58 MAD. See Mutual assured destruction Malvinas-Falklands crisis. See Falklands-Malvinas crisis Massive retaliation, 15,16; choosing, 32, 35, 36. See also Retaliation Middle East, 146 Minuteman missiles, 25,143 MIRVS. See Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles "Missile gap," 67 Missiles, 4, 20, 24, 67; arms control, 27-28; groundlaunched, 28, 39(n7); strategic use, 35, 38; war use, 15-16, 31-34 Models, 65; deterrence, 5, 6, 7, 34-38, 49-56,124-131, 149(nl9); missile war, 14-16, 31-34; rational-choice, 103-104; war, 45—49. See

164

INDEX

also Game theory Monopoly; nuclear, 133-139 Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVS), 4, 145 Mutual assured destruction (MAD), 2, 3,18, 44, 64, 80, 145; capability, 72, 75-76; as deterrence, 60, 81(fig.); stability, 76-77, 79, 86-87, 88 Mutual deterrence, 5,13,18, 29, 37, 38, 73(table), 148(n4); arms races, 14,20, 23, 24, 30; cone of, 23, 24-25, 28, 38(n2); game of, 125-126,127-129; model, 55-56, 66,132(table); stability, 65,136; superpowers, 135—136. See also Deterrence; Deterrence Game; Parity; Peaceful coexistence; Unilateral deterrence MX missiles, 25 Nash equilibria, 113,121(n2) NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Negotiations, 14 New Look policy, 141-142 Nixon administration, 145 Nonnuclear confrontation, 2. See also Conventional weapons North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 3 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,

26 Nuclear weapons, 22(fig.), 23, 28, 57, 67, 68, 76, 77; arms race, 13-14; buildup, 144-145; deterrence, 16-18, 25; effectiveness, 15-19; stability, 69-70; strategic, 71, 72; U.S. monopoly, 133-139; war, 29-30,42. See also Conventional weapons

OAS. See Organization of American States Orbit on warning, 27 Organization of American States (OAS), 59 Parity, 9,64; stability, 65, 68, 74; war, 8, 44-45, 66, 67. See also Mutual deterrence; Power parity*model Payoffs, 112-113. See also Gains Pax Americana, 73(table), 80( table) Pax Sovietica, 73(table), 80(table) Peaceful coexistence, 73(table). See also Mutual deterrence; Status quo People's Republic of China, 54; arsenals, 60, 72; nuclear power, 7, 39(n8), 68 Polaris missiles, 25,143 Policy, 2, 55,136,145; deterrence, 42,59, 64,121 ¡flexible response, 142-143; strategic, 4,141-142 Population centers, 2. See also Cities Poseidon missiles, 25 Postwar era; deterrence, 135-136; stability, 133-135,146 Power, 147; asymmetry, 130-131; transitions, 64-65, 66-89(n4); and war, 44 45. See also Power parity model Power parity model, 65-66 Preemption; deterrence, 115—119, 120; probabilities, 112-113. See also Launch on warning; Orbit on warning; Preemption Equilibria; Preventive strike Preemption Equilibria, 107-108, 113,114,115,116,117,119, 120,121-122(n6). See also Preemption Preventive strike, 138. See also

INDEX

Preemption Prisoners' Dilemma, 10, 73, 99, 120,121(n5), 128,129,142 Proliferation, 1-2, 8, 39(n8), 43 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, 54 Rates of fire, 15,16; determining, 32, 33-34, 38 Rational-choice analysis; deterrence, 92-98,121; models, 103-104. See also Rationality theory Rationality theory, 97-98, 99; evolution, 101-102. See also Rational-choice analysis Reagan, Ronald, 66-67 Region of initiation, 19 Regions, 27; deterring and initiating, 16-21 Retaliation, 2,18, 60, 76,102,114, 115; credibility, 43,44; probabilities, 112-113. See also Massive retaliation Risk acceptance, 87, 88(n3) Risk aversion, 78-79, 83, 86, 87, 88(n3), 130 Risk neutrality, 83, 86, 88(n3) Risks, 9, 77, 83, 88(n3); acceptable, 58, 78; calculating, 86-87; determining, 48-49, 63, 64, 81-S2; dynamics, 84-86(fig.); mutual assured destruction, 86-87. See also Risk acceptance; Risk aversion; Risk neutrality; Risk taking Risk taking, 46, 47-18,49, 78, 88-89(n4), 135; deterrence, 50,87-88. See also Decisionmaking; Risks SAC. See Strategic Air Command bases SALT agreements, 26, 30, 39(n9) SDI. See Strategic Defense

165

Initiative Security, 27, 28-29 Self-interest, 101 Soviet Union, 2, 23, 26, 41,43, 60, 67, 72, 73(table), 132(tables), 133,147; arms buildup, 144-145; Berlin, 142-143; deterrence doctrine, 3, 56, 37; deterrence game, 125,126, 127; equivalence, 144-146; gains, 75, 76, 77; mutual deterrence, 135-136; parity, 8, 44, 64, 65; perceived threats, 138-139; policy, 59, 62-63; power, 7,147; status quo, 80-81; strategic stability, 123-124; threat credibility, 44,127; vulnerability, 139-144 SSBNs, 145 Stability, 29, 39(n8), 42, 74, 83; deterrence, 66-67,138; mutual assured destruction, 2, 3, 79, 86-87, 88; mutual deterrence, 28, 63-64, 65; nuclear weapons, 69-70; postwar era, 133-135; systemic, 136-137. See also Cone of stability START agreements, 26, 30, 39(n9) Status quo; superpower orientation, 134-135,147; United States, 137-138,147. See also Mutual deterrence; Peaceful coexistence Stockpiles. See Arsenals Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases, 137 Strategic arms agreements, 39(n9) Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 6, 67 Strategies, 104(n5), 121(n4); deterrence, 43—44; military, 14-16; missile war, 15-16,

16 6

INDEX

32-33. See also Grand strategies Submarines; as missile launchers, 25,28 Superpowers, 27; arms control, 29, 39(n4); deterrence game, 124-127,140-141; mutual deterrence, 24, 25; postWorld War II, 133,134-135; stability, 14&-147; vulnerability, 139-143. See also Soviet Union; United States Symmetry, 44,117,126. See also Asymmetry; Parity Syria, 146 Tactics; deterrence, 80-86 Taiwan, 54 Targets, 15; military, 2; strategy, 32-34 Technology; nuclear weapons, 3-4, 67 Terrorists, 28 Theory; deterrence and, 91-92, 94,96-97. See also Darwinian theory; Evolutionary theory; Game theory; Rationality theory; Theory of moves Theory of moves, 123-124,131 Threat Game, 122(n8) Threats; credibility, 47^48, 126-127,129,132( tables), 136; perception, 136,138-139 Trident missiles, 25 Truman administration, 136 Unilateral deterrence, 132( table), 147,148(n4); game, 129-131; stable, 54—55; unstable, 51-54. See also Monopoly; Mutual deterrence United Kingdom, 57; arsenals, 60, 72; Falklands-Malvinas crisis, 53,59

United Nations, 30 United States, 2, 23,25,26,41, 43, 67, 72, 73(table), 131-132, 147; alliances, 55, 59; deterrence doctrine, 3, 42, 56, 57; deterrence game, 125, 126,127; equivalence, 144-146; gains, 75, 76, 77; mutual deterrence, 135-136; nuclear monopoly, 133-137; nuclear use, 53-54, 60; parity, 8, 64, 65; perceived threats, 138-139; policy, 59, 62-63, 141-142; power, 7, 54; status quo, 80-81,137-138,147; strategic stability, 123-124; strategic superiority, 137-139,143-144; threat credibility, 94,127; vulnerability, 139-143 USSR. See Soviet Union Vietnam, 146 Vulnerability; superpower, 139-143. See also Window of vulnerability War, 47; conditions for, 41 -42, 44—45, 70; nuclear, 72, 78; predicting, 45-46; and weapons, 29-30, 42. See also Conflicts Warheads, 4, 24 War of nerves strategy, 15, 33. See also Zero rate strategy Weapons. See Conventional weapons; Nuclear weapons Window of opportunity, 7 Window of vulnerability, 7-8. See also Vulnerability World War I, 57 World War II; risks, 49, 57-58 Zero rate strategy, 15,16; choosing, 32, 33

Contributors

Jacek Kugler is associate professor of political science at Vanderbilt University. He is coauthor of The War Ledger: Birth, Death and Taxes and author of numerous articles on national security. Frank C. Zagare is associate professor of political science at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He is author of The Dynamics of Deterrence and Game Theory: Concepts and Applications. Christopher H. Achen is professor of political science at the University of Chicago. His most recent book is The Statistical Analysis of Quasi-Experiments. Steven J. Brams is professor of politics at New York University. Among his recent publications are Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy and Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know? GameTheoretic Implications of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility. Dagobert L. Brito is Peterkin Professor of Political Economy at Rice University. His research interests include economic theory, public finance, and strategy and arms control. Michael D. Intriligator is professor of both economics and political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, where he is also director of the Center for International and 167

168

CONTRIBUTORS

Strategic Affairs and of the Jacob Marschak Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Mathematics in the Behavioral Sciences. His many books include Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory, Strategy in a Missile War, and as coeditor, National Security and International Stability. D. Marc Kilgour is professor and chairman of mathematics at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Canada, and adjunct professor of systems design engineering at the University of Waterloo. His research centers on game theory and the application of mathematics to conflict modeling.