Explorations in Dynamic Semiosis (Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences) [2024 ed.] 3031470001, 9783031470004

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Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences

Elli Marie Tragel   Editor

Explorations in Dynamic Semiosis

Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences Series Editor Jaan Valsiner, Department of Communication and Psychology Aalborg University Aalborg, Denmark

Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences fills the gap in the existing coverage of links between new theoretical advancements in the social and human sciences and their historical roots. Making that linkage is crucial for interdisciplinary synthesis across the disciplines of psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, semiotics, and the political sciences. In contemporary human sciences of the 21st century, there exists increasing differentiation between neurosciences and all other sciences that are aimed at making sense of complex social, psychological, and political processes. This series serves the purpose of (1) coordinating such efforts across the borders of existing human and social sciences, (2) providing an arena for possible inter-disciplinary theoretical synthesis, (3) bringing to the attention of our contemporary scientific community innovative ideas that have been lost in the dustbin of history for no good reason, and (4) providing an arena for international communication between social and human scientists across the world.

Elli Marie Tragel Editor

Explorations in Dynamic Semiosis

Editor Elli Marie Tragel Department of Semiotics University of Tartu Tartu, Estonia

ISSN 2523-8663     ISSN 2523-8671 (electronic) Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences ISBN 978-3-031-47000-4    ISBN 978-3-031-47001-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47001-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Series Editor’s Preface

The Flow of Signs Human mind is possible only through the dynamic flow of signs that organizes the mind. And signs are made by the mind itself. That making is the borderland of human intentionality—“I want to make sense!” is a person’s burst-out of feelings to explore the unknown. Yet the expressed desire is already embedded in the web of meanings. For the sciences aimed at making sense of human beings, this unity of intentionality with reflection upon acting leads to the inevitable need to link two disciplines—psychology and semiotics—together, in the effort to gain a new look at the human cognitive processes. What would such new look entail? The crucial feature of the present book is in the focus on dynamic semiosis in the functioning of the human mind. Why this? It is often overlooked that human psychological functioning is happening in irreversible time—flowing from past towards the future. The signs that are involved in that flow organize the transition from past to the future—hence all human psyche is necessarily semiotic in its nature. This focus on dynamic semiosis as the core of human mentality is new not only for psychology, but for semiotics itself. While semiotics has traditionally treated the work of signs in the ontological frame––something represents something else in some functional role—then dynamic semiosis is built on developmental premises. Signs come into existence in the course of the mental activity, establish themselves in relative “steady state” to present what they reference as the mind is facing the future, and vanish into oblivion when no longer needed. The life of the mind and that of the signs are closely linked. Sign-making is necessary for mind-making, and the latter—for new sign-making. And this continuity covers all human life course, with the materialized results transferrable from generation to generation in the form of cultural artifacts. The beauty of the sounds of the violin or piano is re-discovered by every new generation, while the sound-affording instrument has clearly specifiable history (Boesch, 1993). Instruments are created to make sounds that become turned into meaningful melodies. v

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However, it is not enough to make claims that signs and the mind are “closely linked”—it is necessary to show how that link is organized, and how its dynamic functioning makes it possible for the cognitive system to adjust to a wide demand for adaptation within the meanings-centered human world. This is the main task for the present volume. The book is a manifold combining semiotics and psychology. Chapters in the book are authored by younger generation scholars making sense of semiosis in irreversible time from a multitude of perspectives. It was initiated during my year of visiting professorship1 in Tartu University in 2021–2022 where I had the luxury of organizing a monthly seminar on dynamic semiosis over the whole academic year. I am grateful to the Institute of Philosophy and Semiotics, and especially to Department of Semiotics for that opportunity. The central focus on the dynamics of meaning-making comes together in a variety of topics that align in the core idea of dynamic nature of human making and use of signs. These topics are prominently represented in this book as it contributes to the integration of the fields of semiotics and psychology. This is done on the basis of the classic traditions of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics (established by Juri Lotman back in the 1960s based on literary scholarship, followed by the biosemiotics turn instigated by Kalevi Kull by the end of the twentieth century). From psychology, it is contemporary cultural psychology that matches best the traditions of semiotics. In contrast to the prevailing fashion for cognitive psychology since the 1960s that emphasized the rationality of human thinking processes, cultural psychology starts from the axiom of fundamental relevance of the affective system in all human meaning construction. It is thanks to our affective relating with our environment that our cognitive processes emerge—not vice versa. By dynamic semiosis, human beings make their meaningful acts deeply affective—the process of affectivating the self is one of the crucial cornerstones for cultural psychology (Cornejo et al., 2018). This amounts to a slight change—yet a fundamental one in meaning—to an old maxim: I feel, therefore I think. Of course, this turn creates major difficulties for scientific methodologies of both psychology and semiotics as sciences. To capture the root feeling processes (in psychology) and their re-structuring by signs (semiotics) is still an unsolved problem in the human sciences. Cultural psychology has unified social sciences in the recent three decades— since early 1990s. It is a new effort on the margins of the wide intellectual landscape of all psychology with the special focus on the role of meanings. Meanings are central for our functioning as human beings—we make meanings, dispute them, and make more. The book will give examples of how new semiotic models are applied to various domains of human lives, anticipating the future and addressing its past. As such, it is a relevant read for everyone interested in the complex nature of

 Officially the väliseesti külalisprofessor at University of Tartu, Estonia. These professorships— funded by Estonian World-wide community—are set up to bring to Tartu the scholars of the World of Estonian origin. 1

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meaning-making, and inclusion of dynamics in all expressions of life, including academic research. The young contributors of this book show their deep passion for new knowledge, and the readers have an opportunity to join in in this worthwhile intellectual exploration. Remich, Luxembourg June 30, 2023

Jaan Valsiner

References Boesch, E. E. (1993). The sound of the violin. Swiss Journal of Psychology, 52(2), 70–81. Cornejo, C., Marsico, G., & Valsiner, J. (Eds) (2018). I activate you to affect me. Vol 2. In Annals of Cultural Psychology series. Information Age Publishers.

Editorial Preface

The anthology at hand is a kaleidoscope exhibiting various approaches to meaning-­ making processes that are ever-changing, yet constantly central to (human) ways of living. The book reflects upon these processes combining semiotics and psychology, following the principle that semiosis is dynamic and flexible, allowing us to create our futures in a continuous state of inevitable uncertainty. To make sense of issues both on an individual and a collective scale, and to find the most sustainable ways of existence in critical times, we need to explore, systematically, but without unnecessary delimitations, the different possibilities of how to observe and describe, model and participate in the patterns of life as they form with and without our interference. Explorations, essentially forward-oriented undertakings, open new avenues of knowledge, and on a more general level but not less importantly, they are ideal for developing a processual look at the world, which is necessary for being truly present while also carefully anticipating the next moment unfolding in irreversible time. “Explorations in Dynamic Semiosis” brings together works of young scholars investigating semiosic processes on different levels, each contributing to the book’s main gaze towards dynamics of meaning-making with a unique angle of their specific research interest. First, the book gives a comprehensive overview of relational dynamics of the sign. Overview is followed by a collection of chapters focusing on various topics relevant for humanities and social sciences, such as experience of time, (cultural) memory, musical signification, human-computer interactions, death and eternity, freedom and responsibility, authenticity, methods for practice and research in psychology, etc. Texts in Part II can be approached as individual works, and one may start reading the anthology at any chapter. However, for those not familiar with the terminology of semiotics, it would be suggested to start with Part I. Part I of the book consist of three chapters in which Erik Kõvamees is dedicated to making sense of the notion of semiosis, presenting a thorough investigation into the relational dynamics of meaning-making from various perspectives in order to explain the nature of the sign, including notions such as value, (un)limitedness, (un)predictablity, trajectory, catalysis, etc. Kõvamees also discusses the

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interconnection between semiosis and science, posing some research questions for semiotics that will in some or other form be addressed in all chapters of the book: For example, what actually happens when certain signs “mush together” or “couple up,” if this even happens at all? Is semiosis, or its acts or chains, thus somehow “multi-­dimensional,” spatially speaking, i.e., “three-dimensional,” or “four-dimensional,” if time is taken into account? Are there possible “recursions” (recursivities, iterations, regresses, hierarchizations) and/or different “hypostases” and “hyperstases” (planes, orders, “realms”) present? What is the role of spatiotemporal interaction and affordances? What about the matter of abstraction and concreteness, or the possible transitions between these two modes—abstract to concrete or vice versa—within chains of semiosis? And so on. (p. 115) 

As a result of the discussions, Kõvamees constructs a detailed model of semiosis. The chapters in Part II of the anthology are diverse in their distinct selection of research objects and combination of theories and methodologies. In the first chapter, Heidi Campana Piva explores how to make sense of energy as the language of the universe. She shows how sign systems can be understood as behaving like energy and semiosphere characterized as an open thermodynamic system that carries out work on information. As Piva points out, semiosphere, then, is also irreversible, and meaning cannot be “unmade.” The chapter proposes a complementary synthesizing framework of how thermodynamics can work with Juri Lotman’s semiosphere, and how this framework could be applied to cultural as well as natural studies. In his chapter on semiogenesis, J.  Augustus Bacigalupi also looks for ways to render existing models of semiosis more generally scientific. Continuing based on thermodynamics with an addition of information theory and neuroscience, Bacigalupi aims to ground haecceity  – “thisness”  – in a semiotic context. He discusses habits in irreversible time and in connection to the hyper-generalized affective field within each distinct organic being, and introduces a physically grounded heuristic model that exhibits semiogenetic phenomena. Next, reflecting on habits and time from the point of view of phenomenology, Oscar Miyamoto reveals the compatibility between Charles Peirce’s and Endel Tulving’s ideas about lived time. Focusing on “remembering memory” and concepts such as anoesis, noesis, and autonoesis, Miyamoto explains how memory processes make a meaningful distinction between the already-lived past and a yet-to-be-lived future. Semiotics of memory systems is yet to be developed, and he suggests that combining Tulving’s triadic class-­inclusion hierarchy with Peirce’s speculations about different types of consciousness could be one possible starting point for this undertaking. Moving on from different types of consciousness to different types of time, Oleksii Popovych in his chapter on interspecific temporalities calls out the issue of conceptualizing interspecific temporal alignment and proposes a reshuffled concept of the phenomenological moment as consisting of double decisions. Using concepts such as E-series timing and turn-­ taking, Popovych brings the concept of temporal window out of the intraspecific context of non-human animal studies. He also shows how notions of “Umwelt overlap” and “semiotic alignment” could contribute to specification of E-series timing. Questions regarding the common rhythm of communication take us to discussing musical signification in Karl Joosep Pihel’s chapter, where he addresses the issue of the listener’s experience in musical meaning-making. Taking a cue from

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Jean-Jacques Nattiez, musical meaning-making is seen as a practice of creating and destroying sign-hierarchies within irreversible time. Pihel highlights that musical meaning occurs at an individual's horizon and is not to be equated with the structure of the music. He proposes a “middle way” of seeing musical meaning-making as a constant communicative process of negotiation over the signs and objects of the signs occurring in a shared context, while having the potential to alter said context. In the next chapter, Anastasiia Bondarenko is concerned with questions regarding communication and God. Bondarenko discusses the ways in which semiosis and subjective time condition each other, and whether proving the existence of one would prove the existence of the other. Focusing on the works of St. Augustine, she philosophizes on themes such as belief, time and its role in communicating with God, death and the everlasting presence of eternity. Moving further with the questions regarding communication and temporal alignment, Keily Tammaru’s chapter models navigating on the boundary of multiple rooms in virtual and face-to-face meetings. Giving an example of a Zoom meeting scenario, Tammaru explains the differences of virtual and face-to-face communication and suggests what could be the reasons behind “Zoom fatigue.” A similar psychological consequence – social media burnout  – is also central in Daria Arkhipova’s chapter on Artificial Intelligence-mediated environments. Arkhipova highlights that meaning-making that users are involved in social media may eventually lead to various bodily states and conditions, including digital burnout, and a biosemiotic take on social media as an environment allows a much-needed closer understanding of the processes occurring in human-computer interactions. The fact that AI recommendations have a high capacity to manipulate all the stages of a semiosic process for their users can be of use for marketing, and from the perspective of marketing semiotics, Sven Anderson in his chapter proposes a method for predicting brand innovation. He claims that novelty is, to some extent, predictable, because innovation is newness that is based on a choice, and choices could be seen as practical parameters for future forecasts. Building on the case of Meta Inc. and its different social media products, Anderson exemplifies his logical model of predicting brand innovation, demonstrating its possible ways of application. However, it should be kept in mind that, as was highlighted by Arkhipova in the previous chapter, users’ choices may be manipulated, and excessive online interactions that may be positive from the perspective of brands may lead to various stress conditions for users. Further on this theme, Eleni Alexandri looks at K-Pop industry as a spectacle, which can potentially have a significant impact on the identity formation, reality perception and semiotic processes of artists and fans. Exploring secondary sources, Alexandri studies spectacular features of K-Pop and subjectivities modelled within K-pop, suggesting a theoretical framework for future analysis of similar occurrences. Continuing with questions about originality and truthfulness from the perspective of semiotics of culture, Viktoriia Yermolaieva’s chapter is dedicated to investigation of the “symmetry–asymmetry” and “authencity–inauthenticity” oppositions, and the related concepts (e.g. universality). Yermolaieva’s ideas align with central themes of Piva’s and Bacigalupi’s chapters, coming to a conclusion that the idea of symmetry–asymmetry opposition being fundamental in semiosphere of culture (Lotman) is

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interconnected with ideas about the fundamentality of the same opposition in physics and chemistry (Vernadsky). The connection of symbolic thinking and chemical elements is extended in the work of Herman Tamminen, who, taking the approach of modal semiotics, claims that “gold” is sublogically equal to “life.” Namely, by connecting the color “red,” “blood” of the living body and the metal “gold,” he shows how their relation to the “Sun” in its “rise” and “set” provides consciousness with the categories of a beginning and an end, which will further be shown to function as a driving factor in the becoming of the lust for wealth in avoidance of death. Then, Marc Antoine Campill’s chapter looks closer into “possession,” showing how despite this concept being often experienced as a physical fact connected to an object, it is rather an individual and cultural construction connected to common knowledge. Campill highlights that possession exists as long as humans construct their own versions of it because they use possession as a tool to overcome the uncertainty of future and the information overload in life. Anticipation of the future is also important in Alec Kozicki’s chapter on emergent imputative symbols. Based on his ethnographic fieldwork, Kozicki conducts an analysis on the subjective meaning-seeking and meaning-preservation for the notions of “value” and “power,” which he considers as imputations of symbol relations within a scaffolded system. In the chapter, he examines how these hyper-generalized imputations contribute to biological and cultural systems. Having here  established that expressing abstract notions such as “value” and “power” in images is a useful technique for gaining access into the ways in which subjects guide their minds, next chapter presents Ana Marić’s personal theory of imagination – phantasmagoria. An ideal model of creating and transforming images and events in the mind is proposed. Marić’s typology of phantasmagoria could function as a guideline for systematic imagination, perhaps for therapeutic applications. Possible therapeutic applications are also the motivation behind Krista Tomson’s chapter on stages of grief and free will. Tomson models the situation of “grieving free will,” modeling stages of grief in an ideal therapeutic situation as a (semi)fixed semiotic hierarchy. Based on a hypothetical case, Tomson discusses meaning-making and reframing of experiences in complicated situations and states of mind, and suggests how a cultural semiotic perspective could be useful for a more efficient process of emotional recovery. Last but not least, Roland Erich Uriko confronts current psychological methods that are centered around measurement and concludes that in order to develop a scientifically detailed system for understanding human behavior and cognition, we need “a delicate and sophisticated approach” to complex psychological phenomena. Uriko examines the correlation between the prevailing numerical system and the assessment of psychological variables. He states that the use of linear variables can result in oversimplifications and proposes a possible solution to break the status quo of psychology. As Prof. Jaan Valsiner said in our conversation in Tartu at the end of his Expatriate Estonian professorship, “What semiotics would do, ideally, is to keep the mind open in the direction of interdisciplinary real applications of ideas to phenomena, whatever they are. That is something that you don’t get almost anywhere else. In this sense, semiotics is really a mind-opening possibility. But the mind-opening has to

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be taken, not just expected to be given.” 1 This anthology is, in a way, a representation of such an endeavor in semiotics. Containing multitudes, and in its kaleidoscopic nature, it works on the principle of multiple reflections that might inspire anyone interested enough to look inside to see patterns and connections also beyond its case. Tartu, Estonia July 17, 2023

Elli Marie Tragel [email protected]

 Hortus Semioticus 10/23. Jaan Valsiner interviewed by Elli Marie Tragel, May 7, 2022, Tartu. https://www.hortussemioticus.ut.ee/hortus-semioticus-10-2023-interview/ 1

Contents

Part I A Model of Semiosis and the Relational Dynamics of the Sign Erik Kõvamees  Semiosis and the Sign��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    5 Erik Kõvamees 1 Defining Semiosis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    5 2 The Nature of the Sign��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    7 3 The Dynamism of Semiosis ������������������������������������������������������������������������    8 4 Signification and Value��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    9 5 Relationality Over Materiality ��������������������������������������������������������������������   10 6 Internal and External Relational Dynamics of the Sign������������������������������   13 7 External Signification����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   14 8 Internal Valuation ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   16 9 (Un)limitedness��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   17 10 (In)stability and (Un)predictability��������������������������������������������������������������   19 11 (In)completeness������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   20 12 In Sum: (Un)limitedness, (In)stability-(Un)predictability, (In)completeness������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   21 13 Trajectories, Ranges, Spatiotemporal Affordance ��������������������������������������   23 14 Two Scenarios of Semiosis��������������������������������������������������������������������������   25 15 Experience and Knowledge ������������������������������������������������������������������������   33 16 Trains of Thought����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   35 17 Chains and Trains����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   37 18 Spontaneity and Deliberation����������������������������������������������������������������������   39 19 Catalysis, Transitioning, and Termination of Semiosis��������������������������������   42 20 Arbitrariness and Motivation ����������������������������������������������������������������������   43 21 (Im)mutability����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   46 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   50 Semiosis and Science����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   53 Erik Kõvamees 1 Conceptualization����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   53 xv

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2 Reconstruction ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   58 3 Forms, Levels, Elements, and Narratives����������������������������������������������������   60 4 Reconstructing Semiosis: The “Justified Combination Approach” ������������   63 5 “Formal-Objective” Versus “Informal-Subjective” Reconstructions����������   66 6 Scientificity��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   68 7 The Science of Semiosis������������������������������������������������������������������������������   72 8 Semiology and Semiotic������������������������������������������������������������������������������   74 9 Traditions of Semiotics��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   83 10 Research Gaps����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   87 11 In Search of Distinctive Features ����������������������������������������������������������������   90 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   97 Semiosis and Modelling ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   99 Erik Kõvamees 1 In Search of Limits��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   99 2 Validity and Integrity ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  102 3 “Paramodelic” Considerations ��������������������������������������������������������������������  104 4 Modelling and Models ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  114 5 A Model of Semiosis ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  118 6 Influence������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  119 7 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  123 Appendix I: Signification and Value in the Example of Language��������������������  125 Appendix II: Notes on Psychology in Relation to Semiotics����������������������������  132 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  133 Part II Explorations in Dynamic Semiosis  Modelling the Semiosphere on Thermodynamic Open Systems�����������������  137 Heidi Campana Piva 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  137 2 Methodology: Some Notes on Translation and Its Relevance ��������������������  139 3 Energy and Language����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  140 4 The Semiosphere and the Thermodynamic Open System ��������������������������  141 5 Entropy and Self-Organisation��������������������������������������������������������������������  144 6 Semiosis and the Arrow of Time������������������������������������������������������������������  146 7 Final Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  148 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  149  Semiogenesis: Naturalizing Semiosic Haecceity and Temporal Irreversibility����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  151 J. Augustus Bacigalupi 1 Framing Haecceity ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  151 1.1 Similar Repetitions������������������������������������������������������������������������������  152 1.2 Generativity Via (Un)Translatability ��������������������������������������������������  152

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1.3 The Affective Field������������������������������������������������������������������������������  153 2 A Heuristic Model����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  154 2.1 Relevant Work��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  155 2.2 Complexity������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  158 3 Semiosic Haecceity and Temporal Irreversibility����������������������������������������  160 3.1 Revisiting Framing Phenomena����������������������������������������������������������  160 3.2 Naturalizing Novel Dimensions����������������������������������������������������������  162 4 Significance of Haecceity and Irreversibility for Semiogenesis������������������  165 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  167 From Mind to Memory: Bridging Charles Peirce and Endel Tulving Through Phenomenology of Time����������������������������������������������������  169 Oscar Miyamoto 1 The Peirce–Tulving Continuum������������������������������������������������������������������  169 2 Semiosis as the Crossroads of Time������������������������������������������������������������  174 3 The Looking Glass of Memory��������������������������������������������������������������������  179 4 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  183 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  185  Interspecific Temporalities: Crafting Common Rhythms����������������������������  189 Oleksii Popovych 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  189 2 Four Types of Time��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  190 3 Moment of Punctuation, Punctuation of Moments?������������������������������������  191 4 (A)synchronous Turn-Taking����������������������������������������������������������������������  193 5 Overlaps, Alignments, Assemblages������������������������������������������������������������  196 6 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  198 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  199 Beyond Structure and Chance: Listener and Irreversible Time in Musical Signification ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  201 Karl Joosep Pihel 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  201 2 Structure and Listener����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  202 3 A Flight from Structure��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  205 3.1 Nattiez’s Synthesis������������������������������������������������������������������������������  207 4 Toward a Dynamic Musical Semiosis����������������������������������������������������������  209 4.1 Musical Interpretation in Irreversible Time ����������������������������������������  216 5 Final Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  219 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  220 A Note: Semiosis and Subjective Time in the Afterlife Based on St. Augustine������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  223 Anastasiia Bondarenko 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  223

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2 A First Attempt: Proving the Existence of Semiosis by Proving the Existence of Subjective Time����������������������������������������������������������������  224 2.1 Death����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  224 2.2 Body����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  225 2.3 Activity������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  226 2.4 Eternity������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  227 3 A Second Attempt: Proving the Existence of Subjective Time by Proving the Existence of Semiosis����������������������������������������������������������  228 3.1 Human-to-Human Relations in the Supposed Afterlife����������������������  228 3.2 God and Humans as Objects in Semiotic Relations����������������������������  229 3.3 Pure Awareness������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  231 3.4 Belief as Codex and Syntax in our Communication with God������������  231 3.5 Time ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  232 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  233  Analysis of Communication in Virtual Meetings������������������������������������������  235 Keily Tammaru 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  235 2 Virtual, Physical and Mental Space in Virtual Communication������������������  237 3 Barrier����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  240 4 Interactions with Different Spaces and Intentionality����������������������������������  241 4.1 Intentionality����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  242 5 Noise, Interruption, Distraction and Misunderstanding������������������������������  243 6 Comparison of Face-to-Face and Virtual Communication��������������������������  245 7 Discussion and Conclusions������������������������������������������������������������������������  246 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  250 Semiosis in Artificial Intelligence-Mediated Environments: Exploring the Signs of Social Media Burnout ����������������������������������������������  251 Daria Arkhipova 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  251 2 Digital Environments ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  252 2.1 Platfosphere and Semiosphere: The Role of AI Recommendations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  253 2.2 From Syntax of Social Media to Semantics and Pragmatics for Their Users ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  255 3 AI Recommendations Categorisation and Users’ Umwelten����������������������  257 3.1 Affordances of AI Recommendations Within Social Media���������������  259 3.2 Scaffolding Process������������������������������������������������������������������������������  261 4 Digital Burnout as an Example��������������������������������������������������������������������  262 4.1 How Human–Computer Interactions Are Studied Today��������������������  263 4.2 HCI Methods to Address Users’ Behaviour����������������������������������������  264 4.3 Addressing Digital Burnout: Between Neuroscience and Biosemiotics����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  265 5 Future Directions toward Methodology������������������������������������������������������  269 6 Conclusions��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  270

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References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  271  Method for Deriving Brand Innovation: Example of Meta ��������������������  275 A Sven Anderson 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  275 2 Theoretical Framework��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  276 2.1 A Method for Deriving Brand Innovation ������������������������������������������  278 2.2 A Coordinate Space of Choice and Time��������������������������������������������  281 2.3 A Map of Choice ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  282 3 A Case Study: Meta ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  283 3.1 Overview of the Company ������������������������������������������������������������������  285 3.2 The First Stage: The Background System ������������������������������������������  285 3.3 The Second Stage: The Market Segments Relations to Product Services������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  286 3.4 The Third Stage: Aspect of Innovation������������������������������������������������  286 3.5 Computing Meta’s Innovation in Logic����������������������������������������������  287 4 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  288 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  289  The Illusionary World of K-Pop ��������������������������������������������������������������������  291 Eleni Alexandri 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  291 2 K-Pop as a Spectacle������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  292 3 Subjective Positions and Bidirectional Relationship ����������������������������������  297 4 Identity of Performers����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  301 5 Identity of Fans��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  304 6 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  308 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  309 Symmetry-Asymmetry in Semiosphere of Culture: The Case of Authenticity/Inauthenticity Opposition ����������������������������������������������������  313 Viktoriia Yermolaieva 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  313 2 Mirror Symmetry, Enantiomorphism, Dissymmetry ����������������������������������  314 2.1 Symmetry/Asymmetry in Culture��������������������������������������������������������  317 2.2 Symmetry/Asymmetry in Contemporary Science ������������������������������  319 3 Authenticity/Inauthenticity Opposition and Cultural Universals����������������  321 3.1 Universal Non-universals��������������������������������������������������������������������  324 4 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  324 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  325 Blood Gilded Time – Reflections on the Sublogical Bearings Between Passion, Possession, and Perish ������������������������������������������������������  327 Herman Tamminen 1 Introduction and the Project of Modal Semiotics����������������������������������������  327 2 Body Ground ‘Red’��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  329 2.1 The Signifying Body����������������������������������������������������������������������������  330

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2.2 For the Body, Exterior and Interior ‘Things’ Are Positive (-Neutral-)Negative������������������������������������������������������������������������������  333 2.3 The Sublogical Tie Between ‘Red::Blood::Emotion’��������������������������  337 3 Dual Consciousness of Space and Time������������������������������������������������������  340 3.1 Just Because It Has a ‘Beginning’ Doesn’t Mean It Has to ‘End’������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  341 3.2 Solid Light ‘Gold’ and ‘Red’��������������������������������������������������������������  343 3.3 The Never-Setting Sun������������������������������������������������������������������������  345 3.4 Golden Sun of Life������������������������������������������������������������������������������  347 4 The Valorization, Axiologization, and Subsequent Ideologization of ‘Gold’������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  349 5 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  353 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  357 Beyond Ghosts and Castles: Possession, a Cultural Tool for Transition����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  359 Marc Antoine Campill 1 Possession����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  359 1.1 The Blood-Possession Controversy ����������������������������������������������������  360 1.2 Conditions to Possess��������������������������������������������������������������������������  360 1.3 Our Blood, a Possession-Reality Diversion? ��������������������������������������  363 2 The Elixir of Life ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  363 2.1 Blood as a Symbol of Salvation����������������������������������������������������������  364 2.2 Blood as a Family Symbol������������������������������������������������������������������  365 2.3 Value of Blood and Its Role in I-Positioning��������������������������������������  366 2.4 Construction of Blood by the Dialogical Self Theory ������������������������  366 3 When Possession Loses Its Sense����������������������������������������������������������������  368 3.1 Possession as Opinion��������������������������������������������������������������������������  370 4 Transplantation and Motherhood (Milk)������������������������������������������������������  370 5 Possession: A Mirror for Human Transition Ability������������������������������������  372 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  374  Emergent Imputative Symbols: In One Word����������������������������������������������  375 Alec Kozicki 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  375 2 Semiotic Scaffolding and Imputations of Power ����������������������������������������  378 3 “In One Word, What Is the One Value in Your Life that Holds the Most Power?”: Hyper-generalized Sign Field of Power as a Value������  380 4 Symbolic Relations of Scaffolded Value������������������������������������������������������  382 5 “If You Were to Draw Power, What Would It Look Like?”: Visual Representation for the Imputation of Power������������������������������������������������  386 6 Moving Forward������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  390 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  391

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Phantasmagoria������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  393 Ana Marić 1 Phantasmagoria, Imagination, and Fantasy ������������������������������������������������  393 1.1 Imagination������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  393 1.2 Fantasy ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  394 2 Types and Divisions of Phantasmagoria������������������������������������������������������  394 2.1 Types of Phantasmagoria ��������������������������������������������������������������������  394 2.2 Division of (Un)realistic Phantasmagoria��������������������������������������������  395 3 Characters of Phantasmagoria����������������������������������������������������������������������  397 3.1 Categorization of Characters According to the Main Factors��������������  397 3.2 Categorization According to the Roles and Functions of Characters����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  398 3.3 Categorization According to the Habitation in Phantasmagoria����������  398 3.4 Categorization According to Character Relations ������������������������������  398 4 Phantasmagoria Plot������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  399 4.1 According to the Ending����������������������������������������������������������������������  399 4.2 According to Character Relations��������������������������������������������������������  399 5 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  399 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  400  Reframing Free Will in the Semiotic Hierarchy of Grief ����������������������������  401 Krista Tomson 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  401 2 Free Will Lose Between Religion and Science��������������������������������������������  402 3 Grief ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  402 3.1 Stages of Grief ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  403 3.2 Connecting Free Will and Grief Through the Semiotic Hierarchy������  404 4 Grieving Free Will: The Case of Tom����������������������������������������������������������  406 5 Discussion����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  408 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  409 Breaking the Status Quo: A Third Vision on the Relations of Numeric System and Psychological Measurement ����������������������������������  411 Roland Erich Uriko 1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  411 2 Numeric System Tailored for the Psyche����������������������������������������������������  413 3 Quasi-linear Open System ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  414 4 Open and Closed Systems����������������������������������������������������������������������������  414 5 The Utopian Nature of Psychological Measurement ����������������������������������  415 6 Quasi-linearity in Human Minds ����������������������������������������������������������������  417 7 Why Quasi-linear? ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  421 8 The Sign-Mediation Process and Its Complexity����������������������������������������  422 9 Making Psychology Person-Oriented����������������������������������������������������������  425 10 Interconnection of Information and Translation������������������������������������������  426

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Contents

1 1 The Many Faces of Probabilistic Perspectives��������������������������������������������  431 12 Assignment of Numbers Is Construction of Signs��������������������������������������  432 13 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  432 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  433 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  435

Contributors

Eleni Alexandri  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Sven Anderson  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Daria Arkhipova  University of Turin, Turin, Italy University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia J. Augustus Bacigalupi  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Anastasiia Bondarenko  Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic, Olomouc Marc  Antoine  Campill  BEF-International Centre of Excellence on Innovative Learning, Teaching Environments and Practices, Shanghai, China Università di Salerno, Fisciano, Italia Erik Kõvamees  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Alec Kozicki  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Ana Marić  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Oscar Miyamoto  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Karl Joosep Pihel  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Heidi Campana Piva  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Oleksii Popovych  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Keily Tammaru  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Herman Tamminen  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Krista Tomson  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Roland Erich Uriko  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Viktoriia Yermolaieva  University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia xxiii

Part I

A Model of Semiosis and the Relational Dynamics of the Sign Erik Kõvamees

1.1  Introduction The aim of this part of the book is to define and understand semiosis—or the abstract process which is also oftentimes referred to as meaning-making—in its microscopic aspects, and construct a model of it. Given that the sign is central to the process of semiosis, in order to complete this objective it becomes necessary to discuss what will be hereafter referred to as the relational dynamics of the sign, including both the internal relational dynamics of the sign and the external relational dynamics of the sign. Much like how physical studies may focus on the atom and biological studies may focus on the cell, semiotic studies may analogously emphasize the sign as the unit of investigation and proceed to “break it down.” Investigating semiosis is complicated because it is a process occurring at different levels, as has been pointed out by Charles W. Morris (1938, pp. 6–9). Paraphrasing Morris, one could speak about the so-called object-level or thing-level of semiosis as a phenomenon, or an empirical or operational level of semiosic (meaning-­ making) activity. There is also the so-called metalevel of semiosis as a notion, that is, a theoretical, terminological-conceptual, or scientific level of semiosic (self-) reflection. In order to define semiosis, then, the inquirer must first, methodologically speaking, position themselves on a meta-metalevel of research above both the object-level and lower metalevel(s) of semiosis. This is the approach taken here. The existence of semiosic levels—that is, the occurrence of semiosis on a variety of levels, from the object-level to various higher-order metalevels, or its involvement in both everyday life as well as scientific and metascientific endeavouring—is what Igor Chernov is describing and specifying in the following quotation: Semiotics is beyond a doubt a science without an object; the very fact of semiosis appears as secondary, as a play of the mind, as a search for ways of describing. So, semiotics is, a priori, a metascience – due to the absence of an object and the way we use semiotic models. The opposition of sign to non-sign is a privilege or a duty of the person describing, but not of the person participating. Even in the case of auto-reflection we shift from actant to reflexant (or describer). That’s why the postulating of a certain ontology is a logical mistake. All semiotic constellations are possbile [sic] only in the world of reflection. (Chernov, 1988, p. 7)

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Borrowing from Chernov, it could thus be said that, when it comes to semiosis, there exists an object-level of participating actants, a metalevel of (auto-)reflective describers (reflexants), and a metametalevel of higher-order (auto-)reflection. It should be noted that further levels are also possible, and there is relativity in the sense that lower-order metalevels begin to constitute the object-levels of higher ones. In our case, this hierarchy of semiosis represents the general difference between a research object, a science, and metascience, or, more specifically, between semiosis, the science of semiotics, and metasemiotics as such. This logical differentiation of study object and levels of semiotic study or analysis must always be kept in mind for the sake of scientific accuracy or precision; semiosis as such must be understood both “phenomenally” (as a fact of the world) and “notionally” (as a concept designated by the term “semiosis”). In the end, in taking great care to specify the methodological level at which the definition of semiosis will take place—and commenting on methodological considerations throughout—this work may be considered as attempting to adhere to correct principles of scientific research. In order to achieve its goal, this work will first provide a definition of semiosis, and then discuss the nature of the sign, which involves commenting on aspects of dynamism, relationality, and materiality, and introducing the notions of signification and valuation, respectively. Afterwards, interconnected aspects of semiosis such as (un)limitedness, (in)stability and (un)predictability, and (in)completeness, as well as the differentiation of semiosis into temporal trajectories and spatial ranges—including its reliance on spatiotemporal affordance—shall be contemplated. Thereafter, this work will use imagined scenarios to discuss aspects of semiosis such as experience and knowledge, while also introducing the idea of the train of thought, those of spontaneity and deliberation, the question of the catalysis, transitioning, and termination of semiosis, and the issues of arbitrariness and motivation and (im)mutability, respectively. All of these discussions constitute the first chapter of this work, dedicated primarily to matters of semiosis and the sign. Following, the relation between different conceptualizations of semiosis, and the problem of the general reconstruction of semiosis, will be described. When it comes to the latter, the different forms, levels, elements, and narratives of semiosis will be specified, and the so-called justified combination approach will be introduced, as well as the distinction between so-called formal-objective and informal-subjective reconstructions. These discussions curtail into those of scientificity, as well as scientific approaches to the phenomenon of semiosis, and the traditions of semiology and semiotic and others. Here, the notions of research gaps and distinctive features shall also be discussed. All of these discussions constitute the second chapter of this work, dedicated primarily to issues of semiotics and science. Nearing its conclusion, the third chapter of this work is dedicated to issues of semiotics and the model, and will speak on the limits of semiosis, validation, integrity, so-called “paramodelic considerations,” and then bring in the notions of models and modelling, culminating in a summative model of semiosis in its microcosmic perspective, taking into account everything said about the relational dynamics of the sign, as well as certain other considerations previously discussed. The notion of influence will also be spoken about. Finally, some directions for future research will be presented and commented upon.

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1.2 References Chernov, I. (1988). Historical survey of Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School. In H. Broms & R. Kaufmann (Eds.), Semiotics of culture: Proceedings of the 25th symposium of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, Imatra, Finland, 27–29 July 1987 (pp. 7–16). Arator. Morris, C. W. (1938). Foundations of the theory of signs. In International encyclopedia of Unified Science, 1(2). The University of Chicago Press.

Semiosis and the Sign Erik Kõvamees

1 Defining Semiosis Following Morris (cf. 1938, pp. 3–6), semiosis may be understood as the functional process in which the structural components of the sign enter into relations to create meaning for an interpreter. Here is how Morris describes the process of meaning-making: The process in which something functions as a sign may be called semiosis [and] has commonly been regarded as involving three (or four) factors: that which acts as a sign, that which the sign refers to, and that effect on some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to that interpreter. These three components in semiosis may be called, respectively, the sign vehicle, the designatum, and the interpretant; the interpreter may be included as a fourth factor. These terms make explicit the factors left undesignated in the common statement that a sign refers to something for someone. (Morris, 1938, p. 3)

In semiosis, signs are what mediate the world or reality to interpreters, and these interpreters are not limited to only human beings. As Morris writes: A dog responds by the type of behavior (I) involved in the hunting of chipmunks (D) to a certain sound (S); a traveler prepares himself to deal appropriately (I) with the geographical region (D) in virtue of the letter (S) received from a friend. In such cases S is the sign vehicle (and a sign in virtue of its functioning), D the designatum, and I the interpretant of the interpreter. The most effective characterization of a sign is the following: S is a sign of D for I to the degree that I takes account of D in virtue of the presence of S. Thus in semiosis something takes account of something else mediately, i.e., by means of a third something. Semiosis is accordingly a mediated-taking-account-of. The mediators are sign vehicles; the takings-account-of are interpretants; the agents of the process are interpreters; what is taken account of are designata. (Morris, 1938, pp. 3–4)

E. Kõvamees (*) University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 E. M. Tragel (ed.), Explorations in Dynamic Semiosis, Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47001-1_1

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Morris especially emphasizes the relationality inherent to the process of semiosis, i.e., its relational nature: It should be clear that the terms ‘sign,’ ‘designatum,’ ‘interpretant,’ and ‘interpreter’ involve one another, since they are simply ways of referring to aspects of the process of semiosis. Objects need not be referred to by signs, but there are no designata unless there is such reference; something is a sign only because it is interpreted as a sign of something by some interpreter; a taking-account-of-something is an interpretant only in so far as it is evoked by something functioning as a sign; an object is an interpreter only as it mediately takes account of something. The properties of being a sign, a designatum, an interpreter, or an interpretant are relational properties which things take on by participating in the functional process of semiosis. (Morris, 1938, p. 4)1

Semiosis and signs are thus inextricable from one another, but they are not one and the same. Morris’s definition of semiosis as a relational process, for example, may be further specified as a so-called sign-function, to borrow a term from Umberto Eco (1976, pp. 3–5). For Eco (1976, p. 4), signs must be distinguished from “non-­ signs”—a term also used by Chernov in the citation above—and the notion of sign itself must be “translated” into the “more flexible” notion of sign-function. However, given the convenient nature of the term “sign,” Eco also warns against abandoning its usage altogether: Even if [we] succeed in eliminating the naive and non-relational notion of ‘sign’, this notion appears to be so suitable in ordinary language and in colloquial semiotic discussions that it should not be completely abandoned. It would be uselessly oversophisticated to get rid of it. An atomic scientist knows very well that so-called ‘things’ are the results of a complex interplay of microphysical correlations, and nevertheless he can quite happily continue to speak about ‘things’ when it is convenient to do so. In the same way I shall continue to use the word /sign/ every time the correlational nature of the sign-function may be presupposed. (Eco, 1976, pp. 4–5)

Taking inspiration from Eco, semiosis may be defined as a sign-function, or as the process wherein something operates as a sign; the sign is thus the meaning-maker created in the process of semiosis and which is central to it, that is, semiosis is the process by which “non-signs” turn into signs proper via the correlation of their constituent parts. Morris (1938, p. 4) makes more or less the same point in his discussion of the scientific metalevel, when he notes that semiotics “is not concerned with the study of a particular kind of object, but with ordinary objects in so far (and only in so far) as they participate in semiosis.”

 It should be noted that Morris’s usage of the terms “sign” and “sign vehicle” somewhat interchangeably leads to a confusing or unclear discussion at certain points. 1

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2 The Nature of the Sign The understanding of semiosis formulated above involves the procedure of interpretation, which has been defined by Marcel Danesi (2002, p. ix) as unravelling “the nature of the relation X = Y.” In this formula, “X is something that exists materially. It could be a word, a novel, a TV programme, or some other human artifact” (Danesi, 2002, p. ix). Meanwhile, “Y is what the artifact means in all its dimensions (personal, social, historical)” (Danesi, 2002, p. ix). Bridging Danesi and Morris, the sign vehicle is more or less identifiable with the X of Danesi’s formula and the interpretant with its Y, while the designatum is the object2 being referred to in the semiosic process, with the interpreter being the one actually taking the sign into account in its totality and thereby evoking its meaning. In Danesi’s description, the sign vehicle or X possesses a definite artefactual existence, that is, signs as such always have a specific, particular, or concrete physical embodiment. However, it is also possible to discuss signs in terms of generalization and/or abstraction, or in purely ideational terms. Morris (1938, pp. 5–6), for example, notes that there are two possible points of view on what constitutes a sign, neither of which contradict one another. After Morris, these could be called the “behaviouristic” and the “psychological” understandings, respectively. From the behaviouristic perspective—like in Danesi’s artefactual perspective—signs are empirically observable manifestations (i.e., external behaviours, or in Danesi’s case, artefacts). Meanwhile, from the psychological viewpoint, signs remain unobservable (as in the case of thoughts or internal experiences, for instance).3 But once more, these two approaches to the sign do not contradict one another, as signs may be understood as existing according to either mode, or both. Regardless  When it comes to the notion of the object, the latter is nuanced, and may be understood in the following way: “Signs, which refer to the same object need not have the same designata, since that which is taken account of in the object may differ for various interpreters. A sign of an object may, at one theoretical extreme, simply turn the interpreter of the sign upon the object, while at the other extreme it would allow the interpreter to take account of all the characteristics of the object in question in the absence of the object itself. There is thus a potential sign continuum in which with respect to every object or situation all degrees of semiosis may be expressed, and the question as to what the designatum of a sign is in any given situation is the question of what characteristics of the object or situation are actually taken account of in virtue of the presence of the sign vehicle alone” (Morris, 1938, pp. 4–5). 3  In other words, from the psychological point of view, our thoughts (as signs) are of course not visible to other individuals existing outside of us while observing us, and the same goes for our internal experiences (as signs). But what has here been termed an “internal” experience is different from an “external” one, that is, a sign-based “experience relation” between an experiencer and a phenomenon that can be observed by others, the “external experience” as such being the sign-­ based relation of the third party to the initial relation between the experiencer and the sign (phenomenon) (cf. Morris, 1938, pp. 43–48 on the notion of experience). That is, in other terms, the meaning relation holding between an interpreter and a sign occurs at a different level than the meaning relation holding between an interpreter and a sign, when the sign in question is none other than the first meaning relation. 2

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of whether the given sign is material or immaterial, however, semiosis remains as an abstract process, with the difference being that the sign-based process of meaning-­ making either manifests itself or may do so in things that are empirically observable, or remains personal and/or introspective. Therefore, what have here been referred to as the “behaviouristic” and the “psychological” approaches to the sign also extend to semiosis proper, that is, semiosis may be considered as an abstract process that manifests itself either empirically or non-empirically, or in both ways.

3 The Dynamism of Semiosis As not only an abstract but also a relational process of meaning-making defined by the coming-together of the sign and involving such processes as mediation and interpretation, semiosis may be understood in terms of its dynamic nature, or in terms of a processuality taking place in the mentality of an interpreting organism, instead of a static statehood. As regards its dynamism, Winfried Nöth (2020) has argued that semiosis may be understood as a trajectory in the form of a time line. Nöth writes: A trajectory that goes parallel with the trajectory of semiosis is the one of the time line from the beginning to an end. The time line of the agency of the sign does not begin in the mind of a sender; it begins with the Object insofar as it determines the Sign to represent it and to create an interpretant. The sign itself, alias representamen, is the second agent in the scenario. From the sign, the message moves on to, and thirdly reaches, its destination in the interpretant. […] The Object determines the Sign, and the Sign the Inerpretrant [sic]. From the perspective of interpreting signs, the Sign comes first and the Object second. The interpreter is first faced with the Sign, not yet its Object. At this first moment, the Sign is still a mere possibility of interpretation. The Object, which the Sign represents, comes second when it is evoked in the interpreter’s mind by the Sign. The Interpretant comes third in line because it presupposes the object and the sign. In this scenario, the sign is an autonomous agent in the process of semiosis. The so-called producers and consumers of signs are their masters. After all, the signs are not theirs; not they have invented them. (Nöth, 2020, p. 187)

Specifying Nöth and borrowing his terminology, it is thus possible to propose two different “semiotic time lines” as belonging to the set of complementary sub-­ processes of the wider process of semiosis proper, the first of which describes the movement by which signs so to say emerge, and the second of which describes the movement by which signs are interpreted. These two time lines may be represented according to the following formulae (as a terminological note, the term “Object” as used here corresponds to “designatum,” “Sign” as used here corresponds to “sign vehicle” and “X” and also the term “representamen,” and the term “Interpretant” continues to correspond to “Y”): 1. Object → Sign → Interpretant. 2. Sign → Object → Interpretant. According to these formulae—derived from Nöth (2020, p. 187)—the dynamism of semiosis is the result of this kind of dual dynamism of the sign (or its parts), wherein,

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on the one hand, meaning (the Interpretant) “emanates” from an Object towards an interpreter via the intermediate of the Sign, while, on the other hand, meaning (the Interpretant) is a product of the intermediary Sign “guiding” the interpreter towards the Object. Within the wider semiosic process, then, these two sub-level processes thusly exist in a certain complementary relationship with one another.

4 Signification and Value Semiosis, however, is more than these two complementary trajectories or time lines inherent to the sign; the dynamism of meaning-making as such extends beyond what could be called the internal dynamism of the sign, as it also includes the so-­ called external dynamism of the sign. That is, the meaning of a sign is not exhausted by its internal relations, or the relations holding between its components or parts. Instead, the meaning of a sign also derives from its external relations, or the relations holding between the given sign and other signs. One way of capturing this dynamic is by invoking the distinction made by Ferdinand de Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 111–122) between the signification of the sign and the value of the sign, respectively. In the first place, Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 67) proposes the term “sign” to indicate a whole composed of a signifier and a signified, with these two terms having “the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts.” With certain reservations, the Saussurean signifier may be equated with the Sign, X, sign vehicle, and/or the representamen, while the signified may be equated with the Interpretant and/or Y; Saussure does not consider an Object or designatum within his framework. On the one hand, the signifier and the signified stand as “counterparts” one to another, “and on the other hand the sign itself is in turn the counterpart of […] other signs” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 114). It is this first relation that Saussure deems signification, and when it comes to understanding semiosis, the concept of signification can be connected to—if not more or less equated with—Morris’s description of sign-relationality, Eco’s notion of sign-function, and/or the Nöthian idea of (the duality of) internal sign-dynamics (i.e., complementary trajectories or time lines). Meanwhile, the relation designated with the term “value” is predicated on the understanding that signs exist in systems “of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 114). Formalizing the respective relations of signification and value in the form of diagrams, Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 114–115) writes that the former may be represented by the vertical unification of the signifier and the signified into a whole sign, while the latter may be represented by the horizontal relationality holding between already-unified signs. In the end, signification is based on the exchange of a thing for a dissimilar thing, while value is based on the comparison of similar things (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 115). Saussure explains:

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E. Kõvamees To determine what a five-franc piece is worth one must therefore know: (1) that it can be exchanged for a fixed quantity of a different thing, e.g. bread; and (2) that it can be compared with a similar value of the same system, e.g. a one-franc piece, or with coins of another system (a dollar, etc.). In the same way a word can be exchanged for something dissimilar, an idea; besides, it can be compared with something of the same nature, another word. Its value is therefore not fixed so long as one simply states that it can be “exchanged” for a given concept, i.e. that it has this or that signification: one must also compare it with similar values, with other words that stand in opposition to it. Its content is really fixed only by the concurrence of everything that exists outside it. Being part of a system, it is endowed not only with a signification but also and especially with a value, and this is something quite different. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 115)

Putting it another way, Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 115) also uses the example of a piece of paper in order to describe the difference between the value and the signification of a sign: “it is clear that the observable relation between the different pieces A, B, C, D, etc. is distinct from the relation between the front and back of the same piece as in A/A’, B/B’, etc.” When it comes to whole signs, then, the signifier and the signified enter into a relation that becomes as inseparable as the recto and verso of a piece of paper, and the whole sign as such exists in a system of relations with other such concurrent pieces on which it is dependent. Using different terms, the meaning of the sign created during the process of semiosis is thus determined in equal parts by the inseparability of the sign vehicle and the interpretant created during an act of signification, alongside the necessary dependencies of value (pre-)defining the unified sign as one member of a larger system.4 In analogy with the term “signification,” the value relations of the sign will be hereon referred to as those of valuation, and the pertinent systems within which signs exist during specific acts or the general process of semiosis will be called “sign systems.”

5 Relationality Over Materiality For Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 119–120), the value-based systems, sign systems, or relations of valuation within which signs exist or orientate are differential systems or systems of difference predicated on the fact that value as such “is purely negative and differential.” Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 119–120) also has things to say about the nature of the sign, noting that, in the end, when discussing signs, value relations have nothing to do with their actual materiality. For instance, using the example of a system of letters, Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 119–120) states that whether one writes the letter t in cursive or print is irrelevant, with the “only requirement [being] that the sign for t not be confused in […]  To understand all of signification, valuation (value), and their relation, it is useful to look at how Saussure describes them when treating the specific example of language. In lieu of bogging down the present discussion with a lengthy aside, Saussure’s description of these notions as applied to language is treated in Appendix I. 4

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script with the signs used for l, d, etc.” That is: “Values in writing function only through reciprocal opposition within a fixed system that consists of a set number of letters” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p.  120). One of Saussure’s (1959 [1915], p.  33) definitions of language5 also exemplifies his understanding: Language “is a system based on the mental opposition of auditory impressions, just as a tapestry is a work of art produced by the visual oppositions of threads of different colors; the important thing in analysis is the role of the oppositions, not the process through which the colors were obtained.” It should be specified that this principle of Saussure—the idea of relational systems of difference and the relative unimportance of materiality—is applicable to all signs in general. From the perspective of valuation, when it comes to signs, sign systems, and semiosis, one is always dealing in the first place with abstract systems of differential relations or “reciprocal oppositions” that are more or less fixed, and this principle holds whether one is dealing with empirical signs such as artefacts or behaviours, or non-empirical signs such as thoughts or internal experiences. It is, therefore, only in the second place—at a less abstract or generalized level—that specific considerations of the nature of the sign (such as the particulars of concreteness, physicality, or materiality) become factors in the valuation aspect of semiosis. In the end, sign systems as such are nothing but systems of value relations holding between signs, and the differential nature of these relations is one of the determinative factors of any act of semiosis, or the meaning-making process in general. An example that illustrates the value-relational aspect of semiosis is the English article system as described by Peter Master (1997). In this work, Master (1997) goes over the frequency in which articles appear in English, how they are acquired by different types of non-native users in the context of English-as-a-second-language pedagogy, how they should be taught by instructors in that same context, and also what their general functions are. But in going over these different aspects, Master (1997) also necessarily describes not only what these articles are (including what could be thought of as their signification), but also how these articles relate to each other systematically (i.e., their valuation). For example, Master (1997) describes the four different English-language articles: the zero article, a(n), the, and the null article, respectively. Crucially, both the zero article and the null article are invisible articles, but may nonetheless be considered “full-fledged” articles “equal in status to the visible articles” (Master, 1997, p. 216). Being invisible by nature, however, how could either the zero article or the null article be said to have any existence in the first place? Outside of their “manifestation” in linguistic expressions, one of the answers to this question is that both of these articles are only extant within the context of a value system also including the two visible articles, the relationality of which gives these invisible units their existence proper. In other words, it could be said that the invisible articles only gain their existence via their value relations with the visible ones. As such, the ability to

 We are here speaking about natural language, and not language in the extended sense. In this work, unless otherwise specified, “language” denotes natural language as such. 5

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turn the unseen into the seen—or give life to negative or “minus” units—thus represents a radical example of the valuation aspect of semiosis, and clearly illustrates the principle of “relationality over materiality,” as invisible units can only or primarily be spoken of in terms of their relational, non-material natures.6 As mentioned, however, Master (1997, p.  218, p.  220, p.  222) also alludes to what could be thought of as the signification aspect of the English articles, explicitly so when using descriptions such as “potential significations,” “clearly identified referent,” “potential significate,” or when discussing their reference in general. Returning to Saussure, it can be further specified that his principle concerning the relative unimportance of materiality also has relevance for the notion of signification: “The means by which the sign is produced is completely unimportant, for it does not affect the system […]. Whether I make the letters in white or black, raised or engraved, with pen or chisel—all this is of no importance with respect to their signification” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 120). Once more, what is of primary importance, as one of the determinative factors of any act of semiosis or the meaning-making process in general, is the relationality of the various components of the sign, or the ways in which the sign’s components relate to each other. That is, it is only in the second place that specific considerations of the nature of the sign—again, details of concreteness, physicality, or materiality—become factors in the signification aspect of semiosis, regardless of whether one is dealing with so-called empirical (in some cases “visible”) signs, or so-called non-empirical (in some cases “invisible”) signs.7  Although they are discrete units, Master (1997, p. 229) makes the point that a scalar understanding of what we have here described as the value relations of the English articles—as opposed to a “binary” understanding—is a more accurate conceptualization of the matter. More specifically, the English articles exist along a continuum defined by the respective notions of definiteness, countability, and number, with the zero article being the most indefinite and so on, followed by a(n), and then the, and finally the null article as the most definite etc. (Master, 1997, pp. 222–225). 7  Morris (cf. 1938, p. 50) has similar things to say about “relationality over materiality,” noting that “[n]one of the disciplines concerned with signs is interested in the complete physical description of the sign vehicle but is concerned with the sign vehicle in so far” as it participates in specific cases of semiosis as a particular. At this point, we may also follow up on the notion of the sign continuum posited by Morris as regards the designatum of the sign. Analogously, one could talk about a kind of “sign continuum” with respect to the sign vehicle, too: “It is experimentally confirmable that in a given process of semiosis various sign vehicles may be substituted for the original sign vehicle without the occurrence of any relevant change in the remainder of the process. The metronome beat to which an animal is conditioned may move faster or slower within certain limits without the response of the animal undergoing change; the spoken word ‘house’ may be uttered at different times by the same or different persons, with various tonal changes, and yet will awaken the same response and be used to designate the same objects. If the word is written, the sizes may vary greatly, the letters may differ in style, the media used may be of various colors. The question of the limits of such variation and what remains constant within this range is in a given case very difficult to determine even by the use of the most careful experimental techniques, but of the fact of variability there is no doubt possible. Strictly speaking, the sign vehicle is only that aspect of the apparent sign vehicle in virtue of which semiosis takes place; the rest is semiotically irrelevant” (Morris, 1938, p. 49). As a specific example of these ideas, Morris (1938, p. 50) notes that “house” and “HOUSE” are in a sense the same sign vehicle, but “house” and “Haus” are not. In the name 6

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In the end, as concerns the cases of both valuation and signification, respectively, and of the process of meaning-making in general, abstract relationality trumps concrete materiality. That being said, it should be duly noted that in certain cases materiality or material considerations may indeed play a determinative role—although a secondary one—in the process of semiosis, whether understood in general or according to a particular instance. For example, the same word may be printed on a page in italics, in bold type, in all capitals, with an underline, or with spacing, all of which mean the same thing: E M P H A S I S of the meaning of that particular word. Although the signified of all five signs is the same, they are nonetheless different signs, given that their signifiers differ.8 In fact, the meanings of the signs in question may not be perfect matches, each one nuanced or connoted to a greater or lesser degree depending on the method of stressing the word. However, although materiality plays a role here in semiosis, it nonetheless remains a secondary aspect of the meaning-making process, given that not only does the signifier-signified relation (signification as such) retain primacy, but the five signs—the italicized word, the bolded word, the “all-caps” word, the underlined word, and the “spaced” word—also remain in a primary relation of value in regard to one another (valuation as such), that is, they exist within a clearly specified sign system (italicization - bolding - all-capitalization - underlining spacing). The preceding discussion also implies the following considerations. First, different signs may have more or less the same meanings for multiple, different interpreters. Second, different signs may have more or less different meanings for multiple, different interpreters. Third, the same sign may have more or less different meanings for multiple, different interpreters. Fourth and finally, the same sign may have more or less the same meaning for multiple, different interpreters.

6 Internal and External Relational Dynamics of the Sign At this point, it is tempting to draw a correspondence between the internal dynamics or the internal relations of a sign and the notion of a sign’s signification. This is so because it seems, at first glance, that by introducing ideas such as dissimilarity and exchange into the conversation, the Saussurean notion of signification represents a specification or a specified understanding of sign-trajectories, sign-functioning, or the sign-relationality inherent to the process of semiosis. Similarly, it would be tempting to draw a correspondence between the external dynamics or external relations of the sign and the notion of a sign’s valuation, given that while signification

of completionism, in the future it may also be possible to formulate a notion about the sign continuum as regards the interpretant. 8  Five possibilities for emphasizing a word (as applied to the word “emphasis” itself): emphasis, emphasis, EMPHASIS, emphasis, and e m p h a s i s.

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concerns the “inside” of the sign, similarity and the basis of comparison are features existing in a systemic context “outside” of the sign. Even if these correspondences can be made in a rough way, such an approach would be nonetheless misleading: It is not the case that signification is purely an internal matter, or that valuation is purely an external matter. Instead, each of these parameters—which together constitute the relational dynamics of the sign, both internal and external—have to do with both the “insides” and the “outsides” of the sign, respectively. As such, the following typology of relational dynamics may be posited, applicable to both empirical and non-empirical signs alike: (a) relations of signification internal to the sign; (b) relations of signification external to the sign; (c) relations of valuation internal to the sign; and (d) relations of valuation external to the sign. At this point, it is beginning to become evident that semiosis is by nature and in its particular cases hierarchical. From what has been presented thus far, for instance, the process of signification-valuation may be understood as standing at a higher level than the external relational dynamics of the sign (b) and (d), the latter which stands at a higher level than the internal relational dynamics of the sign (a) and (c), with (a) standing at a higher level than the two respective formulae derived from Nöth. Therefore, it now becomes possible to retroactively reformulate the notion of semiosis in hierarchical terms, with signification-valuation constituting the meaning-­making process proper, componentially descending into levels of so-called sub-process (external relational dynamics), sub-sub-process (internal relational dynamics), and even sub-sub-sub-process (formulae), respectively. Returning to the items identified in the typology of the sign’s relational dynamics, when it comes to (a), this is really what has been discussed at length previously: One aspect of semiosis or any semiosic act as sign-relationality, sign-function, the exchange of signifier for signified on the basis of their dissimilarity, further subdivision into complementary trajectories, etc. As for (d), this has also been described at length: One aspect of meaning-making or any act of meaning-making as the existence of signs in sign systems based on the relative or comparative difference holding between somewhat-similar units, and other likewise considerations.

7 External Signification But what of the others? When it comes to (b), for example, what does it mean to have a relation of signification external to the sign? This question may be approached via the following passage of John Collier’s, who, like Nöth in his discussion of trajectories, uses the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce as the basis for his elaborations: Peirce’s semiotics […] allows for systems of signs in which one sign can serve as an icon for another sign, which then gives a further interpretant. In principle, this allows for a hierarchical network of signs, with interpretation becoming more general as we move upwards. To be more specific: a Peircean sign is an indecomposable triad of icon, object and

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i­nterpretant. The icon is the “bare feel”, or presentation; the object is selected indexically, and the interpretant brings them together in a unified context. This triad can then form the presentation for a further triad that is more general, if not more abstract. There is no reason why several signs together cannot provide the presentation for a more general sign. It does seem, however, that this regress (or perhaps “recursion” would be a better term) must come to an end somewhere in some most general sign, with its interpretant being ultimate. (Collier, 2012, pp. 175–176)

What we are faced with here is another semiosic trajectory or time line, but a higher-­ order one in which the triad of “icon” or “presentation,” object, and interpretant—or the sign as such—becomes the “icon” or “presentation” of another sign, entering into relations with different objects and producing different interpretants (or meanings). Here, the choice of the terms “icon” and “presentation”—in lieu of terms such as “Sign,” “X,” “sign vehicle,” “representamen,” or “signifier,” for instance—implies that similarity is necessary for this trajectory to operate. However, since similarity is not identity, these terms also imply the dissimilarity necessary for exchange, and thus signification. In this case, the signification in question is not concerned with exchanging a signifier for a signified, but with exchanging one whole sign with another whole sign, an exchange which this time holds between signs as wholes, and not just constituent signifiers and signifieds. To further nuance the understanding, Collier makes the point that multiple signs may somehow “mush together” to become the consolidated or joint icon/presentation for another sign. It should also be noted that while Collier frames the discussion as the movement from more concrete signs to more abstract or general ones—invoking notions such as hierarchy, regress, or recursion—there is no reason to think that the semiosic time line under discussion does not operate with signs considered to be at the same level of either concreteness or abstraction, or that it cannot move in the direction of more abstract to more concrete (that is, signs do not necessarily have to become more generalized within such trajectories of semiosis).9 In external signification, finally, everything that has been said about “relationality over materiality” also applies.

 When it comes to the question of what signs refer to—related to matters of abstraction and concreteness—Morris (1938, p. 5) makes the distinction between designation and denotation, a differentiation which also has metaphysical implications: ‘A sign must have a designatum; yet obviously every sign does not, in fact, refer to an actual existent object. The difficulties which these statements may occasion are only apparent difficulties and need no introduction of a metaphysical realm of “subsistence” for their solution. Since ‘designatum’ is a semiotical term, there cannot be designata without semiosis—but there can be objects without there being semiosis. The designatum of a sign is the kind of object which the sign applies to, i.e., the objects with the properties which the interpreter takes account of through the presence of the sign vehicle. And the taking-­ account-­of may occur without there actually being objects or situations with the characteristics taken account of. This is true even in the case of pointing: one can for certain purposes point without pointing to anything. No contradiction arises in saying that every sign has a designatum but not every sign refers to an actual existent. Where what is referred to actually exists as referred to the object of reference is a denotatum. It thus becomes clear that, while every sign has a designatum, not every sign has a denotatum. A designatum is not a thing, but a kind of object or class of objects—and a class may have many members, or one member, or no members. The denotata are 9

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8 Internal Valuation As for (c), now, what does it mean to have a relation of value internal to the sign? Once more, Saussure’s ideas—which were formulated in the context of linguistics, but can be generalized as applicable to all types of signs, sign systems, acts of semiosis, and semiosis as such—may be invoked. Firstly, in sign systems “there are only differences,” but “difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 120). This principle, however, only holds at the level of the whole sign, or at the level of external valuation: When it comes to the respective levels of signifier and signified—or at the internal level of the sign, i.e., that of internal valuation—“there are only differences without positive terms” (Saussure, 1959, [1915], p. 120). In other words, “the statement that everything […] is negative is true only if the signified and the signifier are considered separately; when we consider the sign in its totality, we have something that is positive in its own class” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 120). Or “Although both the signified and the signifier are purely differential and negative when considered separately, their combination is a positive fact” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], pp. 120–121). In short, within the Saussurean tradition, one can think of signifiers and signifieds as two series running parallel to one another within the context of whole signs, thusly possessing the possibility or potential of facilitating any and all acts of semiosis, as the way they “pair,” combine, or become articulated—i.e., internal signification as such—constitutes the creation of a sign proper (cf. Saussure, 1959 [1915], pp. 120–121). In analogy with the term “sign system,” these series of differences or differential systems may be called “signifier systems” and “signified systems,” respectively, and once more, everything that has been said about “relationality over materiality” also applies to them. That is, while whole signs are in negative relations of value as well as positive relations of signification (i.e., the aforementioned pairing of signifier and signified), within the sign as a kind of container for signifier and signified systems, it is the respective unpaired, uncombined, or unarticulated signifiers and signifieds, which constitute a series of vehicles and meanings existing in negative (i.e., differential or comparative) value relations with one another, but having no positive definition in the sense of possessing a signification. Instead, these signifiers and signifieds represent the possibility or potentiality of a signification. Signifiers and signifieds thus exist in value chains, “classes of differences,” or “series of differences,” and may combine via “cuts” effectively linking the two parallelisms (cf. Saussure, 1959 [1915], pp. 120–121). Such a “cutting” is, it could be said, an act of signification, and thus central to semiosis. But the possibility of signs “articulating” in this way also demonstrates that the relation of value holds not only members of the class. This distinction makes explicable the fact that one may reach in the icebox for an apple that is not there and make preparation for living on an island that may never have existed or has long since disappeared beneath the sea.’

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externally between whole signs, but also internally between the parts of signs, that is, between various signifiers, Signs, sign vehicles, X-s, representamens, or presentations, on the one hand, and signifieds, Interpretants, meanings, or Y-s, on the other.

9 (Un)limitedness In the end, any act of meaning-making or the process of semiosis, in general, may be thought of in terms of the relational dynamics of the sign, which divide into the internal relational dynamics of the sign and the external relational dynamics of the sign. When it comes to the former, there are both relations of signification and relations of valuation internal to the sign, and when it comes to the latter, there are both relations of signification and relations of valuation external to the sign. And as noted, these dynamics exist in a hierarchical relationship of processes. As concerns all of these relations and/or processes, further specifications may be made. Firstly, returning to the problem of the “ultimate interpretant,” Collier (2012, pp. 176–177) addresses this issue in the biological context, and according to his idea of the hierarchical networking of signs, as noted above. He writes: Suppose we have smell A (icon) of something dangerous (interpretant), then it is incumbent to avoid (object). For good biological reasons, this sort of interpretation for immediate action uses very short chains, while chains related to long-term survival are typically longer. Here, then, is a slightly longer chain: Suppose we have smell B (icon) that indicates food (interpretant) that can be eaten (object). This itself is a sign (icon) that falls under survival (interpretant) indicating it should be accepted (object). Typically there will be longer chains both for the interpretant and, often, the icon. (Collier, 2012, p. 176)

What is important to note from Collier’s description is that these “chains,” linkages, time lines, or trajectories of semiosic acts can be either shorter or longer and, hypothetically speaking, the process could go on indefinitely, or even infinitely. Collier (2012, pp. 176–177) even draws the conclusion that within the hierarchy of meanings survival as such is the ultimate interpretant of all biological signs (and by extension, it could be said, for all biological beings): “I think, then, that it is safe to say that biological interpretants are functional, that functionality ultimately implies survival, and that survival is the ‘ultimate interpretant’ for biological signs.” In connection with the idea that there are lengthier and less lengthy chains of semiosis, there is also the notion of unlimited semiosis, described here by Daniel Chandler and Rod Munday: The term coined by Eco to refer to the way in which, for Peirce (via the interpretant) […] the signified is endlessly commutable—functioning in its turn as a signifier for a further signified. In contrast, while Saussure established the general principle that signs always relate to other signs […], within his […] model the relationship between signifier and signified is portrayed as stable and predictable. (Chandler & Munday, 2011)

The idea of unlimited semiosis may be clarified in terms of the ideas of the relational dynamics of the sign, and termed the (un)limitedness of semiosis to specify both the unlimited and the limited aspects of the process.

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Firstly, it could be stated, the process of (un)limited semiosis may be seen as dividing into the respectively-complementary and -definitional processes of the (un) limitedness of internal signification and the (un)limitedness of external signification, as well as the (un)limitedness of internal valuation and the (un)limitedness of external valuation. Together, the (un)limitedness of internal signification and the (un)limitedness of internal valuation compose the (un)limitedness of the internal relational dynamics of the sign, while the (un)limitedness of external signification united with the (un)limitedness of external valuation comprises the (un)limitedness of the external relational dynamics of the sign. The idea of the unlimitedness of internal signification entails that the sign-­ relationality, sign-functionality, trajectorial complementarity, or exchange based on the dissimilarity of signifier and signified inherent to the sign, is in theory infinite, in the sense that, for example, the different components of the sign could come together in all sorts of different ways and/or produce all sorts of different meanings; at the lowest processual level thus far identified, the two respective Nöthian formulae follow this pattern. Meanwhile, the idea of the unlimitedness of external signification entails that the trajectorial exchange of one whole sign for another whole sign, their transformation into presentations or icons, and the subsequent creation of chains, linkages, or time lines could, hypothetically speaking, also go on ad infinitum or without any limits. The idea of the unlimitedness of internal valuation entails that the signifier systems and signified systems existing within the sign could also be limitless, that is, the series or sequences of these units and the relative, negative, or comparative difference holding between them could stretch out to indefinable lengths wherein the further the units are separated, the less similar they are to one another. Finally, the idea of the unlimitedness of external valuation entails the same principle at the existential level of entire signs and their corresponding sign systems. The potential of semiosis in whichever of its aspects, in particular acts, and as a total process, to go on forever stands in contrast to its limited cases. In semiosis as a whole or in particular cases, limitedness occurs when some kind of end-­ interpretant is ultimately reached, and the process of meaning-making comes to a conclusion. When it comes to the four specific sub-cases, the components of the sign either come together or become “mated” in a definite and conclusive way (the limitedness of internal signification and its formulaic sub-process), a sign does not become a new sign or the basis of a new sign or part of a new sign (the limitedness of external signification), signifiers and signifieds become definitively and conclusively delineated (probably because at some point they are too dissimilar; the limitedness of internal valuation), and whole signs also choose to remain ignorant of other far-­reaching and irrelevant signs (also likely because they eventually reach a point of too much dissimilarity; the limitedness of external valuation), respectively.

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10 (In)stability and (Un)predictability Outside of limitedness, the meaning-making process as a whole or in one of its more specific aspects can also be viewed according to the related oppositions of stability/instability and predictability/unpredictability. On the one hand, that is, semiosis as such, any of its acts, or any of its sub-processes or sub-cases may be viewed as occurring in a stable and predictable manner, or, on the other hand, as taking place in an unstable and unpredictable way. As such, we are faced with either the (in)stability and (un)predictability of the internal relational dynamics of the sign, consisting of the (in)stability and (un)predictability of internal signification alongside the (in)stability and (un)predictability of internal valuation, or the (in)stability and (un)predictability of the external relational dynamics of the sign, consisting of the (in)stability and (un)predictability of external signification alongside the (in)stability and (un)predictability of external valuation. When it comes to both internal signification and external signification—and even the formulaic level—it has been established that all these may be modelled according to the notion of a trajectory, albeit ones existing at different levels in the semiosic hierarchy. Applicable to both cases is Nöth’s idea of the “Peircean sign as a trajectory,” or more specifically, his Peircean differentiation between two different types of trajectories, which correspond to the distinction made here between stable-­ predictable and unstable-unpredictable time lines—and which could perhaps be envisioned or conceptualized as “flows,” “courses,” “chain reactions,” or “pulsings”—of semiosis: The insight that the trajectory does not connect its source and its goal in the form of the geometrically more economic straight line, but in the longer trajectory of a curve is reminiscent of Charles S. Peirce’s conception of semiosis as a process in which signs have a “final cause or end”. The final cause or purpose of a sign is to produce an interpretant in its interpreter. In contrast to an efficient cause, which operates immediately or mechanically, a final cause may reach its goal by detours. The sign’s trajectory from their source in the object to their goal in the interpretant does not need to be direct. Like God, of whom the proverb says that he writes straight with crooked lines, the path by which a sign reaches its goal may be curved or even crooked. (Nöth, 2020, p. 186)

In the case of internal signification—based on the two underlying formulae—then, the movement from Sign to Object to Interpretant, or from Object to Sign to Interpretant, for instance, may be either “efficient” (“straight,” direct, economic, immediate, mechanical, efficient, etc.) or “serpentine” (“curved,” “crooked,” detoured, indirect, inefficient, etc.), to a greater or lesser extent. That is, the way in, or the means by, which the same interpretant, result, or “end” is brought about does not fall under any predestined, predetermined, or particularized compulsion; instead, in any act of semiosis or in the general process, the effect or influence may be brought about, caused, or produced differently at different times, with the only universal being the creation of the actual effect (meaning) as such (cf. Nöth, 2020, pp. 186–187).

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Conversely, there is also the possibility that a different interpretant may be brought about by the same straight or (more or less) curved trajectory. Regardless, all that has been said about the trajectory of internal signification is also applicable to the trajectory of external signification, except this time the principles concern not inherent sign-relationality, sign-functionality, the complementarity of trajectories, or an exchange based on the dissimilarity of signifier and signified, but the exchange of one sign for another sign in their totalities, i.e., the transformation of whole signs into presentations or icons for future signs and interpretants, and the creation of the time lines that the latter transformations entail. (In)stability and (un)predictability as applied to both internal valuation and external valuation entails that for all of signifier systems, signified systems, and sign systems, the respective series and the relative, negative, or comparative difference holding between them could stretch out to undelimitable lengths wherein the further the units are separated, the less similar they are to one another. In this scenario, the chain of units involved in the respective processes is longer or shorter, with their connections being more motivated and less arbitrary or less motivated and more arbitrary, more encompassing or less encompassing, etc. In other words, the issue becomes one of how many other signifiers, signifieds, or signs—which become relatively more dissimilar the further the series is extended—are included in that specific act of semiosis, or in semiosis generally, in relation to the particular signifier, signified, or sign in question; the problem is one of determining the delineation, delimitation, demarcation, or “cut off point,” or where the “line is drawn.”

11 (In)completeness The notions of the (un)limitedness and the (in)stability-(un)predictability of semiosis are related to both each other, as well as to the notion of (in)completeness, or the (in)completeness of semiosis, or the incompleteness of any of its acts, or any of its four sub-processes or sub-cases, or even its formulae: the (in)completeness of the internal relational dynamics of the sign, consisting of the (in)completeness of internal signification in conjunction with the (in)completeness of internal valuation, and the (in)completeness of the external relational dynamics of the sign, consisting of the (in)completeness of external signification in conjunction with the (in)completeness of external valuation. Once more, as applied to both internal and external signification as linked to the idea of trajectory, Nöth’s Peircean understanding may be invoked: The trajectory of the sign has another peculiarity, its incompleteness. The purpose of the sign to represent its object remains always incomplete. A sign that reaches its goal to represent its interpretant would be a final interpretant, but no interpretant can ever aspire to being final. It can only be approached more and more closely, never really actually. This scenario describes the trajectory of the Sign as an asymptotic line[.] (Nöth, 2020, p. 188)

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Paraphrasing Nöth (2020, p.  188) (and by extension Peirce)—and also perhaps arguing against the idea of an ultimate interpretant—the notion of incompleteness as applied to internal and external signification (again, the case of internal signification is reliant on the formulaic sub-sub-sub-process) contrasts a starting-point of movement not needing an explanation of origin or derivation, with a stopping-point or end-goal wherein the movement theoretically finishes or completes. However, such starting-points and stopping-points are only ideals; in the end, the “asymptotes” never actually touch the edge of the “hyperbola,” that is, when considering the trajectories of either the parts of the sign or signs in their entireties, the process or “movement” of meaning-making cannot be said to really have either a beginning nor an end (cf. Nöth, 2020, p. 188). Incompleteness in the cases of internal valuation and external valuation corresponds to the idea that no matter what delimitation, definition, demarcation, or delineation occurs in reference to the string of value relations, the latter connections are always more or less arbitrary as concerns their scope (i.e., their relative length, how many units they encompass, and so on), and, therefore, the “cut-off line” is never fully stabilized or anchored, but is always only “metastable” or temporary (with the ever-present potential of becoming “unhooked”). This principle, as such, applies, of course, to all of signifiers, signifieds, and signs, or more specifically, to their respective series or systems. All of this being said, however, there is a certain level of completeness inherent to semiosis and all of its sub-processes proper, regardless of whether one wants to concede the existence of a final, end, or ultimate, interpretant, or not. That is, semiosic trajectories and value-chains do indeed come to a close or habitually delimit themselves at certain points, which is evident in the fact that not all time lines go on for infinity or represent in all cases “zig-zagging,” anti-linear, or (semi-)random movements, and in the fact that not all series of units stretch out to include all possible entities and may well “cut themselves off” at various different points, depending on the occasion.

12 In Sum: (Un)limitedness, (In)stability-(Un)predictability, (In)completeness In the end, (un)limitedness, (in)stability-(un)predictability, and (in)completeness are inextricably interconnected features of semiosis as the general process of meaning-­making, its particular acts, and all of its respective defining or definitional sub-processes. As such, these features are characteristics of the wider process and the more narrow processes, which interrelate externally amongst themselves, and also internally in terms of their constituent oppositions: limitedness/unlimitedness, stability/instability together with predictability/unpredictability, and completeness/ incompleteness, respectively.

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At this point, it becomes pertinent to ask for the reasons why semiosis may come to an end. In signification-valuation, does an act or wider process of semiosis conclude when some kind of logical conclusion is reached? Or are there “habits” present in individual interpreters that naturally, organically, subconsciously, or habitually cut off semiosis after, for example, three or four acts? Do individuals simply choose to end acts and wider processes of semiosis, as when a person simply chooses to stop thinking about a certain topic? Is this done in a purely “neutral” mode (logically, intellectually), or also according to “positive” and “negative” feelings (emotional responses, normativity)? Or is the delimitation of semiosis—or any acts of—determined by external factors or interruptions10? What is the relation of semiosis to behaviour? Does semiosis ever truly come to an end in the human animal or alloanimal,11 keeping in mind Collier’s thoughts regarding survival as the ultimate interpretant? Is it only death in the biological sense that truly ends semiosis? These questions—and other similar ones that could be posed—will be momentarily left aside, tabled for future research. It also becomes possible to now specify an earlier typology according to the respective categories of (un)limitedness, (in)stability-(un)predictability, and (in) completeness: • Different signs may have more or less the same meanings for multiple, different interpreters. On the hierarchical level of signification-valuation (i.e., the acts and general process of semiosis/meaning-making as such)—as determined by the respective semiosic sub-level processes—these meanings may “come about” according to different lengths (limitedness), in different ways (stability-­ predictability), and to different extents (completeness). The interplay of these factors within and between all (sub-sub-sub-)processes of semiosis, including particular acts and the process in general, determines the nature of the given sub-­ process, act, and general process as such. • The same considerations hold and may be applied with the same wording for the following scenarios: wherein different signs may have more or less different meanings for multiple, different interpreters; wherein the same sign may have more or less different meanings for multiple, different interpreters; and wherein the same sign may have more or less the same meaning for multiple, different interpreters.

 Here, one could think about the ways in which the character Walter Mitty from James Thurber’s (1939) short story has, at various points, his fantasizing or daydreaming interrupted by his wife, returning him to reality. 11  The term “alloanimal” used here and as follows in this work refers to non-human animals, but is preferred over the description “non-human animal,” because it lacks the anthropocentric connotations of the latter terminology. The term is in current usage, for example, in the University of Tartu’s Department of Semiotics. 10

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13 Trajectories, Ranges, Spatiotemporal Affordance Thus far, the semiosic sub-processes of internal signification (based on dynamic underlying formulae relating sign-components to one another) and external signification have been conceptualized as trajectories, that is, they have been defined with regard to time, or in terms of the notion of temporality. It will be argued here, meanwhile, that the semiosic sub-processes of internal valuation and external valuation may be conceptualized as ranges, that is, they can be defined with regard to space, or in terms of the notion of spatiality. In this connection, Nöth’s (2020, p.  182) project of examining “how far the model of the trajectory as a path that a moving object follows from a source to a goal is an adequate model of the sign and of semiotic processes” may be returned to. For Nöth (2020, p. 183), as we have seen, “Trajectories are in many ways at the root of signs and of processes of semiosis.” That is: One who has a goal needs to embark upon a path to reach a goal, but a trajectory is not a path. It reaches its goal in a curve projected through space, whereas a path is trodden on flat ground. Paths are trodden on the surface of a two-dimensional plane, whereas a trajectory course goes through three-dimensional space. The notion of a trajectory has clearly technological, if not military, connotations. It has the connotations of dynamics, which the word meaning does not necessarily have. […] Sign processes are dynamic processes so that their association with trajectories is no wonder. (Nöth, 2020, p. 183)

It could be said, then, that based on Nöth’s discussion, the model of the trajectory is an adequate one for the semiosic sub-processes of internal and external signification because it ascribes to them a dynamic existence, a preferable understanding over one which ascribes meaning-making, in the sense of signification, a more static nature. Furthermore, the previous passage also ascribes a spatial dimension to semiotic time lines—at whatever level of signification—given that they must travel through (semiotic) space. Chains of valuation existing at whatever level may be conceptualized in terms of spatial extensions, and in this sense they constitute ranges. However, given the relative arbitrariness of how they are demarcated in semiosis or a particular act of, and the temporariness of these demarcations, there is also a temporal dimension to valuation (at whatever level it is being considered). In both the temporally dominated cases of internal signification and external signification there is thus a spatial dimension, and in both the spatially dominated cases of internal valuation and external valuation there is thus a temporal dimension. Therefore, the internal relational dynamics of the sign are determined in equal parts by both temporal and spatial considerations, and the same goes for the external relational dynamics of the sign. The interplay between time and space is thus inherent to semiosis in general and all of its sub-processes of relational dynamics; the complementarity of space and time are, therefore, unavoidable and determinative factors in the process or processes of meaning-making. Why is it that the model of the range is an adequate one for the semiosic sub-­ processes of internal and external valuation? This question may be answered by

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paraphrasing Nöth (2020, pp. 183–184) once more.12 As he writes: “The law that like attracts like is also applicable to signs. They attract each other in semiotic processes called associations” (Nöth, 2020, pp.  183–184). The example that Nöth (2020, pp. 183–184) uses to illustrate this point is the relation between the nouns sêma and sôma as used in the writings of Ancient Greece, an example which involves discussion of what has in this work been referred to as signifier, signified, and sign systems. In the Classical Greek vocabulary or amongst the ancient Greeks, the “idea of a sign […] was narrower than the one in modern languages today”; the term sêma referred to “marks” (as in landscapes, for instance), or to indexical signs like “characteristics” and “indications,” and even to omens or portents (cf. Nöth, 2020, pp. 183–184). However, as Nöth (2020, p. 184) specifies, sêma “could also mean ‘grave,’ ‘tomb,’ or ‘gravestone,’” and that since sêma “is in a relation of consonance with the word sôma […], which means ‘human body,’” some began to call “human bodies the tomb (sêma) of their souls,” because the soul is what “indicates” to the body, while at the same time being buried inside of it, like how bodies themselves become buried in graves. In the beginning, this association constitutes a trajectory in the shape of external signification “The trajectory of the transfer reaches the meaning of the sign and enriches it with the notion of the image of a soul in a body” (Nöth, 2020, p. 184). However, once this association has been established, it now constitutes an associational range or multiple ones: “The similarity between the sounds of sêma and sôma results also in an attraction of one meaning by the other. The notion of the tomb is attracted by the notion of the sign” (Nöth, 2020, p. 184).13 In other words, when it comes to internal valuation, there is a chain of signifiers related to each other by ways of their similarity in the form of consonance, and there is a parallel chain of signifieds related to each other by ways of more or less similar meanings; in the cases of both sêma and sôma, an act of internal signification ends up connecting the two parallel-running lines of associations into a complete sign. Thereafter, there is not only a trajectorial movement of one sign to the other (external signification), but also the creation of an associational or semiosic range between

 The nature of this circumlocution is analogous to earlier paraphrasings of Saussure. Namely, in their elucidations, both authors oftentimes “mix up” discussions of what has here been called signification and valuation, and the objective of the current work is to refine their descriptions into a more nuanced framework. This “mixing up,” of course, does not entail a “mistake” on the part of the respective authors, given that the pedantic nature of the chapter at hand represents an interpretation and retroactive reformulation of Saussure and Nöth’s original ideas. On the one hand, this may be viewed as a specification of these ideas, and on the other hand, as a distortion of them, based on the critical position—epistemological and/or normative—taken by a third-party reviewer. 13  As an aside, but related to the earlier discussion of empirical versus non-empirical signs, Nöth (2020, p. 184) also notes that the “association of sêma with sôma anticipates the currently much debated issue of the embodiment of the sign, which is also a Peircean theme. […] [G]enuine indices are always embodied. A symbol is not a material object; it is an immaterial semiotic law, but one which produces bodies or has embodiments in writing or speech. […] The dynamics of embodiment implies trajectories from the bodiless to the embodied.” 12

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the two terms sêma and sôma on the level of the whole sign (external valuation). In sum, the interplay of these four processes constitutes an act of semiosis, and represents the process of meaning-making in general. Analogous to how semiosic trajectories are not static, semiosic ranges are also dynamic. In the general process of semiosis or in specific acts, the dynamism of semiosic ranges at whatever level—signifier, signified, or sign—is manifest in the temporality of their delineation points, just like how the dynamism of semiosic trajectories becomes manifest in the three-dimensional spaces they project through. As such, it could be said that temporality is what affords the spatiality of both internal valuation and external valuation, and spatiality affords the temporality of both internal signification and external signification. And this understanding, as such, reiterates the point that the interactivity of space and time—on the basis of the affordances that each offers the other—is one of the mechanisms determining the relational dynamics of the sign and all semiosic sub-­ processes, as well as any and all acts of semiosis, and the entire process of semiosis proper.14 All of these considerations—concerning ranges and trajectories, spatial and temporal interactivity, etc.—may be subsumed under the category of the so-­ called spatiotemporal affordances of semiosis.15

14 Two Scenarios of Semiosis At this point, it should be noted that—like taking either a behaviouristic or a psychological approach to the sign and/or semiosis, amongst other possible distinctions—dividing temporal trajectories and spatial ranges in the context of semiosis, acts of semiosis, and semiosic sub-processes, represents nothing but a heuristic16  A different way of putting the range and trajectory distinction is that a range constitutes a kind of momentary situation (a sort of “place,” “locus,” or “topos” afforded by time), while a trajectory constitutes a kind of situated moment, or a set of situated moments (a succession afforded by space). Ranges extend, but the “extent of their extensions” is afforded by time (how long a range is “allowed” to extend); ranges are synchronic states afforded by diachronic processes. Trajectories too extend, but the extent of their extensions is afforded by space (how much space has been “provided” for a trajectory to extend); trajectories are diachronic processes afforded by synchronic states. 15  The term “spatiotemporal” is not meant to imply the privileging of space over time, or vice versa. Other terms could just as easily have been chosen: “temporospatial,” “chronotopic,” “topochronic,” derivatives of “timespace” or “spacetime,” etc. In this context, space and time are to be understood as “equal” components existing in an inextricable interaction. 16  The idea of the heuristic is one that is central to the domain of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research, for example, and its history and the problems in defining it have been overviewed by Romanycia and Pelletier (1985). The problem begins with the fact that within AI literature, the term “heuristic” has played a central role, but different researchers have used the term differently, applying it to different aspects of their technical or research programs, for instance, or emphasizing different features of the notion as being essential to its definition (Romanycia & Pelletier, 1985, p.  47). Within a sea of sometimes-contradicting usages, what one person would call a heuristic, therefore, would not be called as such by another (Romanycia & Pelletier, 1985, p.  47). Romanycia and 14

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being used to better understand semiosis, by simplifying it or providing the basis for its modelling, from the perspective of a scientific metalevel. Juri Lotman has warned about the dangers of heuristics, specifically in the movement from the simple to the complex in scientific thinking: Such an approach adheres to the well-known rule of scientific thinking: the movement from the simple to the complex — implicitly justifying oneself at the first opportunity. However, in this there is also the danger that heuristic expediency (the convenience of analysis) comes to be accepted as the ontological character of the object, which is assigned to it by the structure derived from the simple and clearly outlined atomistic elements, in accordance with their complexity. The complex object is thus reduced to the totality of the simple. (Lotman, 2005 [1984], p. 206)

In the context of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research, Marc H. J. Romanycia and Francis Jeffry Pelletier (1985, p. 57) have provided the following definition of the heuristic: “Concisely put, a heuristic in AI is any device, […] which one is not entirely confident will be useful in providing a practical solution, but which one has reason to believe will be useful, and which is added to a problem-solving system in expectation that on average the performance will improve.” An example of a heuristic is a rule, for example, such as Lotman’s rule of scientific simplification presented above. In general, the basic definition of the heuristic given by Romanycia and Pelletier may be decontextualized from the domain of AI and modified or re-interpreted for general usage. For instance, the construction of an imagined scenario may be considered a heuristic, a “device” seen as useful, for example, in the context of a scientific article attempting to describe and provide an understanding of semiosis (“a problem-solving system”), added to it with the expectation that it will “improve the performance” of the article in question (that is, provide its readers with greater clarity). On this note, paying due attention from the perspective of the scientific metalevel, all that has been said about semiosis thus far may be summarized and exemplified via the construction of two imagined scenarios of semiosis (“semiosic scenarios”), which shall be presented as follows. Scenario one  Imagine two friends entering the reception area of a recreational swimming centre from the outside world. Upon walking into the building, they are both hit by a strong smell of the chemical chlorine.17 To both of them, as such, the Pelletier (1985, p. 47) thus make it their objective to provide a “synthesizing definition” of the notion. After providing its history, the two authors examine the idea of the heuristic according to four “dimensions of meaning” central to its definition: uncertainty of outcome, basis in incomplete knowledge, improvement of performance, and guidance of decision making, and on the back of this discussion provide their own definition (Romanycia & Pelletier, 1985, pp. 51–57). 17  In actuality, the so-called chlorine smell is in fact not the element in its pure form, but in combination with contaminates: ‘If you smell “chlorine”, coming from your pool, what you really smell are combined forms of chlorine, also called chloramines. Chloramines are chemical compounds formed by chlorine combining with nitrogen containing contaminates in the pool water. These, are still disinfectants, but they are 40 to 60 times less effective than free available chlorine. Contaminates come from swimmer wastes such as sweat, urine, body oil, etc. This is why requiring all bathers to take a warm, soapy water shower is a good idea’ (Indiana State Department of Health report). For

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smell of chlorine becomes an empirical sign that independently “initiates” semiosis in the two respective individuals. The nature of this “instigation” involves the complementary, dynamic interaction of two formulae: (1) object → sign(−vehicle)  →  interpretant, and (2) sign(−vehicle)  →  object → interpretant. That is, the smell of chlorine as a chemical element becomes a sign and creates a meaning in the minds of the interpreters, while simultaneously the sign itself refers back to chlorine as a chemical element, and in that way also creates a meaning in the interpreters’ minds. Part of the total act of meaning-making, here, thus derives from the interaction between these two complementary, dynamic sub-level (i.e., sub-sub-sub-level) processes of semiosis. Moving up the hierarchy to the sub-sub-processual level of the sign’s internal relational dynamics, in the case of internal valuation, the signifier of the chlorine-­ smell stands in a series of value relationships with other signifiers existing in not only a single signifier system, but multiple ones. In some of these, the chlorine-­ smell signifier exists in a sequence of value relations with other signifiers that are similar with it to a greater or lesser degree, such as the smell of bleach. In such signifier systems, the smell of chlorine as a signifier stands “right next to” or “immediately beside” other signifiers with which it has the most in common with, while the systemic chain stretches out more or less ad infinitum to include those signifiers with which the chlorine-smell has almost nothing in common with (like the smells emitted from scented cleaning products—perhaps lavender—for instance). In the end, such a value-relational chain based on similarity constitutes a separate signifier system that partially determines the meaning of the smell-signifier chlorine, as interpreted by the two friends at the pool. However, the smell of chlorine also exists within signifier systems—which also partially determine the meaning of the smell-sign chlorine as interpreted by the two friends at the pool—that are not necessarily based on similarity, but which are instead predicated on proximity, that is, signifier systems in which the chlorine-­ smell-­signifier stands in value relations with other signifiers very much specific to that particular time and place. For example, amongst many other possibilities, the smell-signifier of chlorine stands in relation to the smell-signifiers of the outside area (i.e., sidewalk or parking lot, for instance) from where the two friends just escaped, and thus derives its meaning from this contrast. It also exists in a valuation-­ chain of other smell-signifiers that often permeate the air of such communal recreation centres: body odour or perspiration, shoe and foot odours, shampoos and conditioners and body washes, creams and lotions, deodorants and antiperspirants, shaving creams and soothing oils and “scrubs,” perfumes and colognes and cosmetics, snacks and soft drinks and coffee, fresh paint, urine and faeces, etc. This is not to mention the possibility of the smell-signifier chlorine existing in value relations with other signifiers interpreted through the different sensory modalities (senses): a the sake of convenience, the work at hand will continue to speak of the “smell of chlorine” or the “chlorine smell,” even if it is technically or scientifically inaccurate or imprecise to do so, just like Eco’s physicists speak colloquially about “things” or semioticians about “signs.”

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buzzing fan (hearing), light shining through the window (vision), almost “tastable” cuisine emanating from the cafe (taste), and/or an uneven floor (“touch”). When it comes to signifieds and signified systems, like signifiers and signifier systems, these currently stand unpaired at the moment in which the two friends enter into the reception area of the recreation centre. Once hit by the smell-signifier of chlorine, in order for a meaning to be made, the signifier must unite with some kind of smell-signified, the possibilities of which exist in a value-relational chain of possible signifieds (meanings). For example, one of the possible signifieds is simply the presence of chlorine (in the swimming pool), while another might be the presence of urine (in the swimming pool), and another might be the presence of sweat (in the swimming pool).18 These signifieds constitute a signified system that once again is based on the criterion of proximity, in contrast to one that is based on the criterion of similarity; a different system of signifieds might involve the relation of the presence of chlorine to the signified the presence of bleach, because of the similarity of the smells. Internal signification in this case involves the “pairing up” of one these mentioned signifiers with one of the signifieds. Let us assume in this case that the sign created during the process of signifier-signified unification pairs up the smell-­ signifier chlorine with the signified the presence of chlorine (in the swimming pool). But this is only one possibility of many. For instance, any of the aforementioned signifiers could in theory pair up with any of the aforementioned signifieds, in a process that is seemingly either more “determined” and obvious, or more “stochastic” and obscure, when contemplated from a metalevel perspective, by either the actors-cum-reflexants themselves, or outside describers. On the level of external valuation—that is, moving up to the sub-processual level of the external relational dynamics of the-sign-as-a-now-fully-formed-entity—the posited chlorine-sign now exists in infinite possibilities of sign systems with other fully formed signs analogous to the previously described systems of signifiers and signifieds, whether based on criteria of similarity or proximity, respectively. To greater or lesser extents, all of these relations have an impact on this particular act of the semiosis of the chlorine-sign, and on semiosis in general. When it comes to chlorine’s external signification, this is the point where a particular act of semiosis—the “reading” of the chlorine-smell as a sign of chlorine-­ presence, for example—begins to morph into a chain of semiosis, or a more generalized and longer process of meaning-making. For instance, in the semiosis of both friends, assume that the smell of chlorine does indeed signify to both independently the presence of chlorine. Thereafter, imagine that the signified of chlorine-­ presence transforms into a signifier-cum-sign itself, signifying that the pool water is indeed chlorinated. And thereafter, let us say that, in both of the friends’ respective semioses, the interpretant/signified/meaning of chlorination or chlorinated

 Again, this is based on the understanding of the “pool smell” as being a combination of chlorine with contaminates. 18

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swimming pool becomes another new sign, signifying the killing of microbes and viruses for the purpose of mitigating the spread of waterborne diseases. The respective semioses of the two friends have thus moved from acts to longer chains, and from the sub-processual levels of the semiosis hierarchy up to signification-­valuation as a whole. In this scenario, the semioses of the interpreters were chains composed of three separate acts, and thus the sequence was a relatively short one. Assume, that is, that after reaching the interpretant of stopping disease, both friends began to independently think about something (whatever) else, for some (whatever) reason (whether motivated by internal factors such as conclusive reasoning, conscious or unconscious habits, direct or indirect choices, emotional responses, and/or normative inclinations, for instance, or external factors, such as the impingement of many possible physical or semiotic forces on the individuals, or simply practical matters, such as reaching the sign-in desk and needing to behave accordingly, by providing information, registering themselves, and paying for the processing and the service). However, if, as Collier suggests, survival as such is to be considered some kind of absolute interpretant, then the signified-meaning mitigating disease naturally forms part of a different and much longer chain of semiosis concerning self-­ preservation and potentially future reproduction, one that in theory never ends until an organism’s biological death. In this connection, the tripartite chain of “chlorine-­ semiosis” may somehow “squash together” into a single sign, representing one singular unit in the longer and potentially infinite “survival-semiosis” chain. That is, if the disease-ending interpretant is the final one in these specific cases of semiosis, their tripartite natures may be contrasted—as relatively short cases—with the very much lengthier chain oriented towards the survival interpretant, as described by Collier. The respective semioses of the two friends—examined here on the level of signification-­valuation—were thus complete in one sense (they had clear finishes), but in another sense they were also incomplete (they are clearly unfinished). Similarly, when it comes to limits, the first semiosis-chain is clearly a short one, while the second chain is very much longer and hypothetically infinite, possibly in work up to the point of death. The first chain was also very linear and logical (i.e., stable and predictable), while the longer one is of course (more) unstable and unpredictable, as all of the possible routes of semiosis both prior and to come after these particular acts and this particular chain were and could be radically different for both individuals, even if both “general semiosic life-chains” are approximating towards the end-goal of survival (that is, the same destination may be arrived at via fundamentally different means or vehicle). On the basis of this projected scenario, it also becomes evident that empirical signs may become non-empirical signs, and vice versa (if one of the friends, for instance, after thinking about chlorination, had said to her or his friend “I am glad that they chlorinate this pool!”). That is, the empirical smell-sign of chlorine, interpretable by ways of the human sensory apparatus, became various non-empirical “idea-signs” existing only in the heads of the interpreters, with the possibility of such thoughts becoming expressed, uttered, or manifested also latent. Obviously,

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empirical signs may also link to other empirical signs, if one does not one want to say that empirical signs transform into other empirical signs. For example, the smell of gas may signify an imminent explosion, which, when it comes to pass, may be construed as a new sign, predicated on the meaning of the previous one, from the perspective of the interpreter. And finally, as we have seen, non-empirical signs may develop into other non-empirical signs, as in the case of an idea becoming a new idea, which in turn becomes another new idea, etc. Generally speaking, then, signs may be empirical or non-empirical, which relate also to the idea that what matters the most when it comes to semiosis is not necessarily materiality, but relationality. In this imagined scenario, for instance, it is about the relations occurring at all levels of semiosis, much more so than the (physical) nature of the chemical element chlorine, or the “stuff” that thinking as such may be said to consist of. This hypothetical scenario also allows aspects of temporally predicated spatial ranges and spatially predicated temporal trajectories to be identified and examined. On the formulaic level, the trajectories moving through the (semiotic) space of the reception room and the heads of the interpreters, and interacting amongst themselves, are the following: (1) chlorine (element)  →  chlorine (smell)  →  chlorine (presence of), and (2) chlorine (smell) → chlorine (element) → chlorine (presence of). The process of internal signification also occurs in these same spaces: The vehicle of the smell unites with the meaning of chlorine being present (the first sign), the vehicle-smell chlorine unites with the meaning chlorination of the swimming pool (the second sign), and the vehicle chlorination or chlorinated swimming pool unites with the meaning anti-microbial/anti-viral hygiene (the third sign). In the case of the longer semiosic chain, the vehicular hygiene-signifier unites with the meaning survival. As for external signification, the movement of meaning-cum-vehicle—or the process by which the meanings become the vehicles of new signs in and of themselves—takes place also in the semiotic spaces of the mind and the empirical-­ physical venue: chlorine-presence (the meaning of the first sign) becomes the vehicle of chlorinated swimming pool (the meaning of the second sign), which in turn becomes the vehicle of hygiene (the meaning of the third sign), and which possibly becomes the vehicle of survival (the meaning of the “fourth” sign, potentially the ultimate, end, or final meaning of the biological organism). In the case of internal valuation, the temporal aspect of the semiosic act—how long the particular act of semiosis lasts—determines how far the spatial range extends. For example, how many smells more or less similar to chlorine or bleach, or how many smells more or less proximal to chlorine, become operational during that specific act, if somehow invoked at all, depends on how much time it takes for that act of semiosis to entertain its beginning and its end. Or, when it comes not to the range of signifiers, but of signifieds—and whether considered in terms of similarity or proximity—how many of the other possible meanings become relevant in terms of comparison or differentiation (i.e., how far the range proper ends up extending) is also dependent on the duration of the concrete meaning-making instance. The same considerations hold at the level of the sign system or whole

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signs, that is, in the case of external valuation: Before “time runs out,” how far does each sign “get” or “make it” within this allocated timeframe? Finally, what this constructed scenario of semiosis also exemplifies is a case of the same sign providing more or less the same meaning for multiple different interpreters (there could be slight nuances in the respective understandings of the friends, but these differences remain more or less trivial; in the end, the respective acts of semiosis and the process as a whole are more or less identical for the two individuals, at least when it comes to the shorter semiosic sequence or chain, as opposed to the lengthier one related to survival, for instance).19 Scenario two  The scenario imagined and described above stands in contrast, for instance, to imagined scenarios wherein different signs provide more or less different meanings to multiple different interpreters, as well as to those imagined scenarios wherein different signs provide more or less the same meaning to multiple different interpreters. Here, the second semiosic scenario will be formulated as one wherein the same sign provides a more or less different meaning for multiple different interpreters. Imagine the same two friends entering the same building and getting hit with the same smell of chlorine as they stand in the reception line. This time, however, imagine that, for the first friend, the smell has as its signified not the presence of chlorine, but something as seemingly unrelated as cola-flavoured and cola-bottle-shaped gummy candies. Meanwhile, imagine that, for the second friend, the chlorine smell begins to signify the name “chlorine,” i.e., the meaning of the smell is simply the lexeme (word, linguistic term) designating the chemical element as a phenomenon of the universe—and not the actual element itself—as it is formulated and found in the English (natural) language. Now imagine how these chains of semiosis develop. For friend one, the interpretant cola gummies becomes the sign-vehicle for the interpretant vending machine, with this meaning then evolving into the representamen signifying a demolished community centre. Meanwhile, for the second friend, the chlorine smell begins to signify the name “chlorine,” which as a signified turns into a signifier or new sign signifying the symbol “Cl,” which in turn becomes the presentation for the interpretant atomic number 17, which finally develops into the sign, sign-vehicle, or sign-­ carrier X that has the atomic mass 35.45 as its meaning Y. In the end, the semiosis of the first individual concludes at the demolition, while the semiosis of the second  Any and all signs can be independently examined according to any level of relational dynamics; or in terms of oppositions such as limited/unlimited, predictable/unpredictable, stable/unstable, complete/incomplete, empirical/non-empirical, and/or relational/material; or in terms of factors (whether internal or external) that lead to the conclusion of semiosis; or according to how similar or different the meanings of (identical or different) signs are for multiple, different interpreters; or how they connect to other signs within shorter and longer chains of semiosis, including the overarching biological imperative of survival; and so on. In this first semiosic scenario, the focus was on the first sign in the chain of semiosis, that of the smell of chlorine standing for the presence of chlorine, and not on the three other identified signs. In this sense, the preceding analysis may be labelled as incomplete. 19

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individual concludes at the atomic mass of the chemical element chlorine, for whatever possible reason (internal and/or external factors). These two semioses may now be compared. In the first place, the difference in meaning of the same sign for multiple, different interpreters is obviously quite great. That is, the complementary, dynamic interaction of the two sub-sub-sub-­ processual formulae—(1) object → sign(−vehicle) → interpretant, and (2) sign(− vehicle) → object → interpretant—takes the following shapes as regards the “first sign” of the semioses of the two respective interpreters: Interpreter I. (1) chlorine (element) → chlorine (smell) → candy (cola-flavoured and cola-bottle-shaped gummies), (2) chlorine (smell) → chlorine (element) → candy (cola-flavoured and cola-bottle-shaped gummies). Interpreter II. (1) chlorine (element) → chlorine (smell) → “chlorine” (term), (2) chlorine (smell) → chlorine (element) → “chlorine” (term). On the highest semiosic-hierarchical level of signification-valuation, the length of semiosis differs for the two friends. The semiosic chain of the first interpreter, that is, consists of four semiosic acts, or is composed of four separate signs: chlorine-­ smell-­sign → gummies-sign → vending-machine-sign → demolished-recreation-­ centre-sign. Meanwhile, the semiosic chain of the second interpreter consists of five semiosic acts, or is composed of five separate signs: chlorine-smell-sign → lexeme-­ sign → chemical-symbol-sign → atomic-number-sign → atomic-mass-sign. Furthermore, it could be said that, although they are of different lengths, the two respective semioses are also fairly short (i.e., limited), and in their own ways possessed of clear end-points (i.e., they are complete). However, while the semiosis that culminates in chlorine’s atomic mass is characterized by a logical linearity (i.e., it will most likely be considered as stable and predictable), the semiosis that culminates in the demolished recreation centre is characterized, in a sense, by a logic that does not seem, at first glance, all too logical, and a linearity that does not seem, intuitively speaking, altogether linear (i.e., the entire process might be considered as more or less unstable and unpredictable). Any and all of the signs identified in this scenario of semiosis could be analyzed and compared according to considerations of internal signification, internal valuation, external valuation, “relationality over materiality,” the transformations of empirical signs into non-empirical ones (or vice versa), spatiotemporal affordance and the nature of spatially predicated trajectories alongside temporally predicated ranges, relations to other signs in wider sequences of semiosis (including that of biological survival as the hypothetical “longest” semiosic series), and so forth, mutatis mutandis to the given cases. But at this point it becomes clear that the two respective semioses differ the most radically on the basis of their external signification, so, justifiably in theory, the analysis-cum-comparison of these two cases could hereafter focus on this aspect of the semiosic process(es). However, such an approach validates and concretizes a certain “bias” inherent to how semiosis is generally conceptualized or understood, namely, that semiosis is only external signification, that is, the movement/

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replacement of one sign to/with another in the form of a sequence or series. Instead, as we have seen, semiosis is a hierarchical process, wherein four levels have been identified thus far, including the highest one of signification-valuation, and the lowest one of componential formulae, with the external and internal relation dynamics of the sign in-between. Therefore, in order to “rectify” this bias, it becomes worthwhile to specify terminology, vocabulary, or metalanguage pertaining to semiosis. From this point on, then, the current work will differentiate between so-called acts of semiosis or sign-­ processing, or the process by which the structural components of the sign come together in order for the unit to function as a sign, alongside the relational-dynamic processes occurring at all hierarchical levels of the sign, including external signification; and so-called chains of semiosis, predicated on the external-significational aspect of semiosis, but referring to the sequencing of series of semiosic acts actually in action. These two notions stand in relation to the notion of the general process of semiosis, as well as the interpreter of signs as mediated reality, i.e., the participant in semiosis, the notion of the so-called meaning-maker (here, an act of semiosis or a sign-process may be thought of also as a sign-function, or the process by which a non-sign transforms into a sign for the meaning-maker/interpreter as such; any semiosic act is in a sense a sign proper, or a sign that has come together in organization and is now in operation).

15 Experience and Knowledge With linguistic considerations out of the way, for now, when it comes to the second semiosic scenario, how is it that chains of semiosis based in the first place on the very same sign can be so radically different for two different interpreters? And why is that one chain, from metalevel viewpoints, comes across as “logical” and straightforward, while the other comes across as “random” or even nonsensical? These questions may be approached by considering what lies beneath the two respective semiosic chains, that is, what the criteria are which “trigger” the given meaning-­ making processes. In the first case, the apparent “haphazardness” of the semiosis seems to be based on prior experience, while in the second case, the apparent “reasonableness” of the semiosis seems to be based on previous or preceding knowledge. The knowledge/experience distinction is of course only a heuristic one; there is a clear relativity, in the sense that knowledge is of course acquired experientially, and experiences are informed by knowledge; and, therefore, the epistemological and the phenomenological may in truth only be considered separately for the purpose of analytical convenience. That being said, the dominance of one of these factors over the other—as evidenced in the two respective chains of semiosis posited in the semiosic scenario at hand—is a determinative relation that aids in explaining why semiosis may go in one direction for one person, and in a radically different direction for another.

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In the case of the first friend, the smell of chlorine became a sign of candy based on a previous experience, perhaps from childhood. That is, the smell of chlorine triggered a specific and deeply personal memory, and thereby triggered a longer chain of semiosis. More specifically, the idea-sign of candy—incorporating aspects of shape and taste, amongst other things—came about because the candy was experienced as a treat received after swimming lessons. Thereafter, the candy-sign became the idea-sign of a vending machine, most probably because the vending machine belonged to that remembrance, and was the place from where the candy was bought. And since the vending machine was located in a community centre that was demolished years later, the chain of semiosis organically extended to include that idea-sign, as well, before its conclusion for whatever internal or external reason. As such, the chain of semiosis of the first interpreter may be considered just as “logical” as that of the second friend. When it comes to the second interpreter, the “logical” nature of the semiosis may, conversely, be considered just as “haphazard” as that of the first friend, given that there is no clearly identifiable reason that their semiosis would follow a more “technical” (as opposed to personal) mental route or pathway. In the second case, the smell of chlorine triggered a specific gnoseological set learned sometime in the interpreter’s past, and thereby triggered a longer chain of semiosis that included aspects of chemical notation (nomenclature and symbolism), followed by specific pieces of knowledge (number of protons and specifics of mass). Here, it could be said that what differentiates the two respective chains is that, in the first case, the sequence derives from a very particularized “embeddedness,” or placement within a highly personal, “sensorialized,” or “textured” memory, that is, something previously experienced. In contrast to the first chain, the second sequence derives from a “detached” or “decontextualized” classification, that is, something previously known, but the acquisition of which is not necessarily or always possible to recall. Put differently, although both cases of semiosis are predicated on the mnemonic, the first one is highly contextualized and “embodied,” while the second is not (it is decontextualized and “disembodied”). For all the knowledge that a given human being may possess, for example, recollecting when they acquired this or that bit would be extremely difficult to do, if not impossible: Humans do not, for the most part, remember the specific lesson(s) or class(es) wherein they learned the atomic mass of chlorine, for instance. Conversely, certain memories involve not parcels or packages of trivia, but are entirely oriented towards what was (“corporeally”) felt in a certain place during a certain moment in time. Of course, there are more complicated cases, and once again, one must keep in mind the heuristic and relativistic nature of the experience/knowledge differentiation. The notion of a “life lesson,” for instance, is the conceptualization of knowledge acquired on the basis of experience, while the notion of “bracing yourself for what’s to come,” for example, is the conceptualization of entering an upcoming experience primed with a baseline of preparatory knowledge.

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16 Trains of Thought Regardless, the idea that chains of semiosis may veer off into one of two different directions—based as such on the dominance of either experience or knowledge, respectively—may be complemented by invoking the notion of the train of thought, as it has been formulated by Thomas Hobbes (1915 [1651]). Also referred to as the “Trayne of Imaginations,” amongst other possibilities, Hobbes formulates the idea thusly: By Consequence, or TRAYNE of Thoughts, I understand that succession of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse. When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after, is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every Thought succeeds indifferently. But as [we] have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the life before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this. All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense. And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former comming again to take place, and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time, that in the Imagining of any thing, there is no certainty what we shall Imagine next, Onely this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another. (Hobbes, 1915 [1651], pp. 8–9)

In the Hobbesian sense, the train of thought is thus a “consequential” or successive series of thoughts occurring in the mind of a human being; when humans think, as such, they are discoursing mentally. Furthermore, this succession is never completely arbitrary, but is always to a certain extent motivated; the transition or motion between “imaginations” or “fancies” (i.e., thoughts), that is, is never (fully) “indifferent” and is always partially “guided,” even if it is never totally certain what ends up following what, and what thoughts cohere into one single definitive “movement” (of thoughts). Hobbes (1915 [1651], p. 9) further specifies that some trains of thought are different in nature from others: “This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts.” He writes: The first is Unguided, without Designe, and Inconstant; Wherein there is no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thoughts of men, that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony, as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a Discourse of our present civill warre, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the Cohӕrence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the

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E. Kõvamees delivering up of Christ; and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of tine; for Thought is quick. (Hobbes, 1915 [1651], p. 9)

Hobbes describes the second sort of train of thought in this way: The second is more constant; as being regulated by some desire, and designe. For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it ceases for a time), of quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the End, by the greatness of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this prӕcept, which is now worne out, Respace finem; this is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it. (Hobbes, 1915 [1651], p. 9)

This second type of thought-train described by Hobbes is thus something “constant” and “regulated,” a sequence of impressions that comes about via human desires-­ cum-­designs. These trains of thought, that is, involve aims and the production of results or outcomes oriented towards achieving these goals, associated with means-­ end logic and the human “power” (ability) to control their own thoughts. Instead of wandering minds, these trains of thought exemplify mind-directedness, or guided minds, or intentional or oriented minds, with the capacity or faculty to take into account where they want their thinking to go and/or end up at. Although both trains of thought are equally “busy,” to use Hobbes’s wording, these more or less controllable trains of thought are thus typologically distinct from those which may be characterized as “unguided,” “undesigned” (“unplanned”), “inconstant,” “dispassionate” (“undesired” or not guided by specific motivations), “ungoverned,” “dreamlike,” “disharmonious,” “wild,” more independent (in terms of the relations between the singular thoughts), “incoherent,” etc. These latter trains are not necessarily intentional or goal-oriented; they are not concerned with purposeful plannings or means-end reasoning as such.20

 When it comes to this constant, controlled, or regulated train of thought, Hobbes (1915 [1651], pp. 9–10) actually specifies that there are two kinds, and posits this distinction as that which separates human beings from (allo)animals: “The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds, One, when of an effect imagined, we seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In summe, the Discourse of the Mind, when it is governed by designe, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call Sagacitas, and Solerisa; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, this thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to mind: the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-conning of our former actions.” 20

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17 Chains and Trains In Hobbes’s understanding, every thought is something that has been previously sensed in some way, remaining as a “living relic” of a past perception. In other words, it may be said that trains of thought—of whatever type—are predicated on past experience(s). However, perhaps the understanding that developed when discussing chains of semiosis may also be applied here, namely, it is worth noting that trains of thought may be predicated on past knowledge, too21,.22 Hobbes even implies this in the following passage: Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run over the Alphabet, to start a rime. (Hobbes, (1915 [1651]: 10)

The examples or metaphors presented here by Hobbes exemplify or represent the idea that a human being’s train of thought may be (initially) based on the (pre-) knowledge they come supplied or armed with. Of course, since knowledge is acquired experientially, it can be argued that indeed all trains of thought are, in the end, experience-based. However, separating experience-based and knowledge-­ based trains of thought—analogous to the separation of experience-based and  There is no contradiction here, given that the relation between experience and knowledge is, again, a relativistic one. For instance, to use a handful of practical, empirical, or real-world examples, experiences may produce knowledge (as in learning that stove elements can heat up after hovering your hand over one, or that cactuses are prickly after grabbing one); and knowledge may inform experiences (as in pleasurably wriggling your toes on the sandy floor or bottom of the sea, while keeping in mind the anxiety-inducing knowledge that you only have a finite amount of seconds before you need to resurface from underwater in order to breathe). It could also be said, in converse terms, that knowledge may produce experiences (as when having knowledge of some kind of phenomenon allows one to take the steps necessary to experience it, such as hearing about a unique camping site to go visit, or knowing the way in which to enter the “secret” or hidden sections of a video game level in order to play it); and that experiences may inform knowledge, as when personal experiences (such as having seasickness on a ship) confirm—or possibly deny in certain cases—more formalized treatments of the topic (such as scientific accounts of motion sickness). Evidently, the influence of knowledge on the production and/or information of experience— and vice versa, the influence of experience on the production and/or information of knowledge—may be shorter or longer term processes, or may occur over shorter or longer timespans. 22  The so-called honeymoon effect is a notion that refers to a decrease in marital satisfaction over time, from the point of engagement to later, onward years. One can envision that newlyweds going in with the knowledge of this phase may have such knowledge inform their married experience, perhaps leading to the implementation of preventative measures. In medicine, the honeymoon phase refers to a period when, shortly after beginning treatment, those with type 1 diabetes enter into a period of more or less brief remission requiring less insulin, generally lasting only a couple of months. Here, one can envision somebody who has experienced such a scenario having this experience inform their further knowledge-acquisition concerning diabetes, if they decide to do research on the condition. For a description of the honeymoon effect/phase in marriage studies, including the possibility of implementing preventative measures, see Michael F.  Lorber et  al. (2015); for a description of the honeymoon effect/phase in endocrinology, see Magdalena Sokolowska et al. (2016). 21

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knowledge-based chains of semiosis—still proves to be a useful heuristic distinction. At the end of the day, that is, once knowledge has been appropriated, even if on the basis of an experience, remembering what has been learned (facts, skills, procedures, etc.) nonetheless forms a different mnemonic category than that of “experiential” memories (which may include positive and negative feelings or emotions, alongside bodily considerations, for example). In the triggering of a chain of semiosis, then, and its subsequent “chain reactiveness” or “speeding ahead”—just as for the “putting-into-motion” of a train of thought, which, as mental discourse, can be equated with the general process of thinking proper (verbalized to a greater or lesser extent23)—it is true that one of experience or knowledge has ascendancy over the other, but the other is always necessarily present, too, and, as such, experience and knowledge, in both cases, form not just a hierarchy, but also, in a sense, a kind of inextricable mélange or blend, or a hybridization that is impossible to completely disentangle. At this point, a question may be asked: Would it be convincing to equate—at least with regard to the human animal, and/if for the moment excluding alloanimals—chains of semiosis with trains of thought, and/or the process of semiosis with the process of thinking, and/or acts of semiosis/sign-processing/signs with thoughts, and/or the meaning-maker with the “thinker” as such? At the very least, sign- or act-based semiosis and thought-based thinking share the possibility of being approached either “behaviouristically” or “psychologically” as outlined earlier, that is, thinking is also an abstract process that has the potential of manifesting—from the perspective of an external observer, whether as “peer” or “scientist,” or from the internal, (self-)reflective perspective of the meaning-maker or thinker themselves— either “outwardly” (empirically) or “inwardly” (non-empirically), or in both ways concurrently. But equating these two theoretical, notional, or conceptual sets24—one explicitly dedicated to semiosis, the other to cognition—also finds support in the metalanguage, vocabulary, or terminology employed by Hobbes himself. That is, Hobbes (1915 [1651], pp. 10–11) argues that the wiser of two persons—“wisdom” or the relation of “being wiser than” here understood as the ability to forecast the future more accurately than another—is the one that is in possession of the most signs, which have been accumulated on the basis of experience(s). As Hobbes writes: A Signe, is the Event Antecedent of the Consequent; and contrarily, the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most ­experience in any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future time, and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent than he that is new in that

 How “logocentric” or “non-logocentric” the notion of trains of thought is or is not—which can be related to the matter of whether thinking is primarily verbal or visual—is a topic for future investigation. 24  The term “set” is understood here and within this work in the most general way, as a collection of “things” or objects, regardless of their level of abstraction or concreteness. For a definition of sets and an introduction to set theory, see Volker Halbach (2010). 23

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kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think the contrary. (Hobbes, 1915 [1651], p. 11)

In an attempt to bridge the notions of chains of semiosis and trains of thought, Hobbes’s binary typologization of the sign as described in the preceding passage may be interpreted as follows. For one, when a sign is understood as an “antecedent of a consequent,” and the subsequent process involves understanding or anticipating the possible effect(s) of a cause (which includes referring to a repertoire of knowledge or know-how), the chain of semiosis and/or the train of thought initiated by such a sign may be seen as having been triggered in an experiential situation, or via an experience functioning as a sign. For two, when a sign is understood as a “consequent of an antecedent,” and the subsequent process involves understanding or reconstructing the possible cause(s) of an effect (on the basis of a preceding experience or preceding experiences), then the chain of semiosis and/or train of thought initiated by such a sign may be seen as having been triggered by ways of appealing to pre-held knowledge, or to pre-established or -owned units of knowledge functioning as signs. Given this state of affairs, it does indeed seem possible to equate—at least on a certain level, and by utilizing the heuristic differentiation of experience and knowledge as a guiding criterion—meaning-making with cognition, or the general process of semiosis with the general process of thinking, or chains of semiosis with trains of thought, or the thinking of a thought with the “acting” or “processing” of a sign, or signs as such with thoughts as such, or the meaning-maker with the thinker, and so on.

18 Spontaneity and Deliberation Even if the correspondence is a rough one, granting the equation of chains of semiosis with trains of thought invites other similar and related questions. Namely, can the first Hobbesian train of thought be equated with the experience-based chain of semiosis, and the second Hobbesian train of thought with the knowledge-based chain of semiosis? Or should drawing such an equivalency be considered with suspicion? Would the equation of these notions be faulty or flawed, or even outright false? What would the basis or argument be for equating or analogizing these notions? Are the paired “streams” really commensurable one to another? Answering these questions satisfactorily involves consolidating the respective underlying criteria of the given notions. When it comes to the two chains of semiosis that have been identified, the underlying criterion differentiating them is that of the opposition posited between experience and knowledge, or between a semiosic chain that is predicated more on the personal and/or phenomenological, versus one that is more predicated on the technical and/or epistemological. Meanwhile, when it comes to the two trains of thought that have thus far been identified, the underlying criterion differentiating them, it

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could be said, is that of the opposition between spontaneity (as applied to the first Hobbesian train of thought), on the one hand, and deliberation (as applied to the second Hobbesian train of thought), on the other. Intuitively speaking, it seems that the experience-based chain of semiosis has much in common with the first Hobbesian train of thought, i.e., the spontaneous train of thought. For example, the imagined chain of semiosis, wherein the smell of chlorine led to a demolished community centre as its final interpretant, is very similar to the scenario that Hobbes constructs (or at least describes as one he is familiar with), wherein the thought of Civil War led to the thought of the value of a Roman penny. Conversely, it also seems that the knowledge-based chain of semiosis has much in common with the second Hobbesian train of thought, i.e., the deliberated train of thought. For instance, an imagined chain of semiosis, wherein the smell of chlorine led to the atomic mass of the element chlorine as its final interpretant, shares similarities—or can at least be construed in this way—with scenarios wherein human beings are purposefully guiding their thinking towards some desired or designed outcome (as when someone is attempting to recollect the scientific specifics of the chemical/element chlorine for some technical purpose, as in safely chlorinating a swimming pool). However, in the actual imagined scenario of semiosis that was posited earlier— wherein for one interpreter the smell of chlorine led to the atomic mass of chlorine as its final interpretant—was it not the case that the knowledge-based chain of semiosis was initiated or triggered on a spontaneous basis, just like the experience-based one? Even if the chain in question was predicated on technical and/or epistemological parameters, could it not be said that the latter was nonetheless put into motion without any deliberation (non-deliberately) on the part of the meaning-maker? Furthermore, Hobbes’s reconstruction of the “Civil War train of thought” implies that even seemingly spontaneous trains may come about via active or concentrated deliberation (that is, non-spontaneously) on the part of thinkers. The opposition of spontaneity and deliberation is predicated on the fact that both of these respective notions concern the degree of consciousness and/or intentionality behind a single thought, specific train of thought, or the general process of thinking as such, as regards the cognition of a thinker (in this case, restricted to humans); or, how aware, considered, phenomenon-directed, and/or focused, amongst other possibilities, these units are. Meanwhile, the opposition of experience and knowledge is predicated on the fact that both of these respective notions concern the degree of technical/epistemological versus personal/phenomenological mnemonic influence behind a meaning-maker’s semiosis (again, considering only human beings/human animals), whether considered in terms of a single act of semiosis or sign or sign-process, a specific chain of semiosis, or the general process of semiosis as such. The point of contention here involves debating whether or not commensurating (making commensurable) the oppos ition of experience and knowledge with the opposition of spontaneity and deliberation—as a way of further bridging the notion of chains of semiosis with the notion of trains of thought—is possible. Given what

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has been discussed, it becomes evident that the four underlying factors in play— experience, knowledge, spontaneity, and deliberation, i.e., the constitutive criteria underlying the broader notions of chains and trains—do not correspond as two perfect sets of point-to-point matches (experience/spontaneity and knowledge/deliberation, respectively), but instead, the members of the two separate sets stand as mutually exclusive independent variables combinable with the two other mutually exclusive standalone variables in a certain or limited amount of ways. What this suggests is that not only can both experience-based and knowledge-­ based chains of semiosis come about either spontaneously or deliberately, but that both spontaneous and deliberated trains of thought may themselves be predicated on either experience or knowledge. It is not, at this point, fallacious to suggest either that signs/sign-processing/semiosic acts, chains of semiosis, and/or the semiosis proper of a (human) meaning-maker, may be equated with thoughts, trains of thought, and/or the thinking/cognition of a (human) thinker as such, even in the roughest or most streamlined of senses. Such an understanding implies that thinking, trains of thought, individual thoughts, and the thinker as such represent a narrower category—the so-called cognitive set—than semiosis, chains of semiosis, acts of semiosis/signs/sign-­processing, and the meaning-maker, respectively—the so-called semiosic set—even if they are analogous in much of their specifics. The two sets, that is, are isomorphic25 with one another in the “hierarchical” or “vertical” sense, and not the “heterarchical26” or “horizontal” one. To use the simile of a physical object, the cognitive set stands in  Within this chapter, the notion of isomorphism is understood as a certain correspondence or similarity holding between objects—whether abstract or concrete—with regards to their form and relations, independent of their “substance.” For example, on an abstract level, all signs—whether considering Morris’s triadic model or Saussure’s dyadic one—may be considered isomorphic with one another, given that the same components relate in the same way in all cases, regardless of whatever content the particular or specific sign entails. Another example may be taken from entomology, or more specifically, from the study of insect morphology. That is, as has been extensively described by Isabela Rocha et al. (2020), on the object-level insects present an “extreme diversity of external form,” which is itself paralleled on the metalevel by “a massive glossary of morphological terms.” Across different types of insects, that is, there is a huge variation, and within these types the complexity of the forms may be described down to their minutiae almost ad infinitum. But a simplified view of insects sees them all as composed of three “tagmata” (sections)—head, thorax, and abdomen—which—again, on an abstract level—makes them all isomorphic one to another, allowing them all to be defined as “insects” in the first place. Indeed, if morphology in general is taken as “the branch of biology dedicated to the study of form and composition of body parts”— i.e., the Baupläne (body plans) of organisms, and how these structures connect with functions, as well as differ across species, amongst other possibilities—then it can be seen as a study domain in which the notion of isomorphism plays (or could play) a central role; for the aforementioned definition of morphology, and a thorough introduction and discussion of insect morphology, see Rocha et al. (2020). 26  In the context of archaeology, the term “heterarchy” was formalized by Carole L.  Crumley (1995) in opposition to the notion of hierarchy, defined as “the relation of elements to one another when they are unranked or when they possess the potential for being ranked in a number of different ways” (for this definition and a discussion of the concept in the archaeological context and other ones, see Crumley, 1995). 25

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relation to the semiosic set like a matryoshka27 identical in exactly every way save for its size; the former remains “embedded” within the latter, and does not stand “beside” it like two dolls exactly the same in every way including their size. Such a formulation relates to questions of the nature of semiosis in alloanimals, as well as whether or not alloanimals “think” in the same manner as humans/human beings/human animals. In the context of this work, this avenue of inquiry will be left aside for future investigation, and from this point on any and all discussions of semiosis and/or cognition should be understood as pertaining specifically to humanity.

19 Catalysis, Transitioning, and Termination of Semiosis Before continuing on with discussions about experience, knowledge, spontaneity, and deliberation, it becomes necessary to address the issues of the so-called catalysis of semiosis, the so-called transitioning of semiosis, and the so-called termination of semiosis, respectively. At this point, since the notions of chains of semiosis has been equated with that of trains of thought—in the sense of a “vertically-­isomorphic” relation that holds between them—then continued discussion will invoke the notions of semiosic acts/signs/sign-processing, semiosic chains, (the general process of) semiosis or meaning-making, and the meaning-maker as such, while assuming in doing so that everything which has been said about singular thoughts, thought-trains (the general process of) thinking or cognition, and the thinker as such, may be subsumed into the understanding of semiosis (i.e., how semiosis is understood in the context of this work, including all of its constituent units and/or sub-processes). Earlier on, various reasons for why semiosis—in its specific acts or signs or processing, as a chain, or as a general process—could come to an end in the (human) interpreter, cognizer, or meaning-maker were ruminated/speculated upon. Is semiosic conclusiveness based on logic? On habit, whether “neutral” or emotional or normative? Is it conscious, subconscious, or unconscious to a greater or lesser extent? How much choice or decision-making is involved? Does it come about “organically” or “naturally” from “inside,” or does it require some kind of (“artificial”) impulse from “outside,” whether physical, semiotic, practical, or whatever? What is the relation between semiosic conclusivity and expression(s) of behaviour? Is the line between semiosic process and true semiosic conclusion the same one as between (biological) life and death28? And so on.  Matryoshka doll, i.e., a Russian “nesting” or “stacking” doll.  The question of whether or not to attribute semiosic activity to a person in a state of “mental death” or “cognitive death”—or more or less complete mental or cognitive impairment/damage— is another topic of future research. One starting-point or entryway in this endeavour would be the examination of semiosis at the lowest level of life, i.e., the cellular. Another could be assessing results of the so-called Glasgow Coma Scale (GSC), which represents a method of assessing levels or states of consciousness on the basis of three “behavioural domains”—eye opening, motor 27 28

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Such questions and considerations pertain to how acts of semiosis/sign-­ processing/signs, chains of semiosis, and/or the general process of semiosis, within the meaning-maker, finish, conclude, or come to an end, i.e., what has been referred to as the “termination of semiosis.” One could also question and consider how acts of semiosis/sign-processing/signs, chains of semiosis, and/or the general process of semiosis, within the meaning-maker, begin, come about, or start, i.e., what has here been called the “catalysis of semiosis.” Finally, one could raise questions and considerations about how acts of semiosis/sign-processing/signs, chains of semiosis, and/or the general process of semiosis, within the meaning-maker, develop or evolve, or move sequentially between acts (with)in longer chains, i.e., what has here been termed the “transitioning of semiosis.” Analogous questions and considerations—involving possible internal and external factors in need of identification, from the anatomical and physiological level, up to the sociocultural one, amongst other possibilities—concerning the termination of semiosis can be applied to the matters of semiosic catalysis and semiosic transitioning, respectively. When it comes to the catalysis of semiosis, for instance, what is it that catalyzes a specific act or sign or processing, a chain, or the general process in the meaning-maker? What are the internal and/or external determiners of semiosic “beginnings”? Can such “instigations” or “initiations” be classified according to notions of logic, habit, emotion, normativity, consciousness, choice, behaviour, life, and so on? As for the transitioning of semiosis, what is it that determines the movement within a meaning-maker from one act/sign/processing to another within a larger chain, or the process as a generalized whole? Again, what is the role of logic, habit, emotion, normativity, consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and intersubjectivity and objectivity, choice, behaviour, life, external and internal factors (physical, semiotic, practical, biological, ecological, neurological, anatomical, physiological, psychological, sociocultural, whatever), and so forth?

20 Arbitrariness and Motivation Although all these questions and considerations cannot be adequately dealt with at the moment, one way of approaching this complex of problematics is by returning to Saussure, or, more specifically, by consulting and extrapolating his ideas concerning the so-called arbitrariness of the sign. These ideas were formulated in his discussions of what has here been designated or referred to as “internal signification,” and they begin with Saussure’s (1959 [1915], p.  65) criticism of “naive approaches” in the understanding of language. In the first place, Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 65) is critical of “people [who] regard language, when reduced to its elements, as a naming-process only—a list of words, response, and verbal activity—as it pertains to patients with traumatic head or brain injuries (for an overview of the GSC, including its history, strengths, weaknesses, and practical usage, see S.N. Agrawal, 2018).

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each corresponding to the thing that it names,” assuming “that ready-made ideas exist before words.” Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 65) is further critical of “an assumption that is anything but true,” namely, that “the linking of a name and a thing is a very simple operation,” although such a naive look at things “can bring us near the truth by showing us that the linguistic unit is a double entity, one formed by the associating of two terms.” For Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 66), the “linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image,” creating an “associative bond” within the brain.29 As a two-sided entity, the (linguistic) sign is composed of two terms of association, the sensory sound-image (in a sense “material”), and the “generally more abstract” concept (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 66). “The two elements are intimately united, and each recalls the other” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 66). Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 65–66) uses the examples of the Latin words arbor (the sound-image standing for the concept of a tree) and equos (the sound-image standing for the concept of a horse). From this understanding of the linguistic sign, Saussure is able to generalize the notion of the sign as such, returning us to the familiar terminological and conceptual territory of (“)signs(”), (“)signifiers(”), and (“)signifieds(”), respectively: Whether we try to find the meaning of the Latin word arbor or the word that Latin uses to designate the concept “tree,” it is clear that only the associations sanctioned by that language appear to us to conform to reality, and we disregard whatever others might be imagined. Our definition of the linguistic sign poses an important question of terminology. I call the combination of a concept and a sound-image a sign, but in current usage the term generally designates only a sound-image, a word, for example (arbor, etc.). One tends to forget that arbor is called a sign only because it carries the concept “tree,” with the result that the idea of the sensory part implies the idea of the whole. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], pp. 66–67).

Saussure continues: Ambiguity would disappear if the three notions involved here were designated by three names, each suggesting and opposing the others. I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by signified [signifié] and signifier [signifiant]; the last two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts. As regards sign, if I am satisfied with it, this is simply because I do not know of any word to replace it, the ordinary language suggesting no other. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 67)30

 The current overview of Saussure will purposely neglect references to what has been called the psychologism of his ideas, or the psychological understanding that Saussure has of the nature of the (linguistic) sign, which is a prevalent theme running throughout his discussion of the arbitrariness of the sign, amongst other topics. 30  It could be said that—when it comes to internal valuation and ranges of signs—the signifiers “sign,” “signifier,” and “signified” coexist within a signifier system based on similarity, while the signifieds unification of signifier with signified, sound-image, and concept coexist in a signified system that is more based on proximity, with the signifieds of sound-image and concept “brought together” or “bridged” by the signified unification of signifier with signified. That is, if the signifieds sound-image and concept do not necessarily share much in common, this lack of similarity is mitigated or overcome by the “middle member” signified unification of signifier with signified, which mediates the two other signifieds—posited as being on either “side” of it within a range— 29

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When it comes to the arbitrariness of the sign, Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 67) explicitly specifies that one of the “primordial characteristics” of the (linguistic) sign is that the “bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary,” and that since “I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is arbitrary.” Saussure writes: The idea of “sister” is not linked by any inner relationship to the succession of sounds s-ö-r which serves as its signifier in French; that it could be represented equally by just any other sequence is proved by differences among languages and by the very existence of different languages: the signified “ox” has as its signifier b-ö-f on one side of the border and o-k-s (Ochs) on the other. No one disputes the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign, but it is often easier to discover a truth than to assign to it its proper place. [This principle] dominates all the linguistics of language; its consequences are numberless. It is true that not all of them are equally obvious at first glance; only after many detours does one discover them, and with them the primordial importance of the principle. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], pp. 67–68)

Saussure summarizes the notion of the arbitrariness of the sign—relating it to the notions of signification and value (i.e., valuation)—in the following way: Not only are the two domains that are linked by the linguistic fact shapeless and confused, but the choice of a given slice of sound to name a given idea is completely arbitrary. If this were not true, the notion of value would be compromised, for it would include an externally imposed element. But actually values remain entirely relative, and that is why the bond between the sound and the idea is radically arbitrary. The arbitrary nature of the sign explains in turn why the social fact alone can create a linguistic system. The community is necessary if values that owe their existence solely to usage and general acceptance are to be set up; by himself the individual is incapable of fixing a single value. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 113)

When it comes to semiosis as has been discussed in this work, how does Saussure’s notion of the sign’s arbitrariness relate to matters of catalysis, transitioning, and termination? What are the “consequences” of the arbitrariness of the sign in the context of the preceding discussion(s)? Before delving into these questions, it is necessary to also consider the flipside or inverse of the arbitrariness of the sign, that is, what will be called the motivation of the sign. For Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 69–70), the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign is basically a universal, save for two exceptions or possible objections: onomatopoeia and interjections. However, upon closer examination, for Saussure, both of these linguistic phenomena are not as “unmotivated” (i.e., arbitrary) as one might suspect, and Saussure argues and demonstrates that they do not contradict the notion of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign: “Onomatopoeic formations and interjections are of secondary importance, and their symbolic origin is in part open to dispute” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 70).31 into a proximal tripartite relationship. On the level and range of external valuation, meanwhile, the signs signifier, signified, and sign itself could thus be said to coexist in a sign system based on both similarity of form (on the level of the signifier) and proximity of content (on the level of the signified). 31  See Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 69–70) for his refutation of both onomatopoeia and interjection.

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The use of the term “symbolic” in the above citation is notable, in the sense that it is linked to the manner in which Saussure understands arbitrariness. As he describes: The word symbol has been used to designate the linguistic sign, or more specifically, what is here called the signifier. [The principle of the arbitrariness of the (linguistic) sign] in particular weights against the use of this term. One characteristic of the symbol is that it is never wholly arbitrary; it is not empty, for there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier and the signified. The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not be replaced by just any other symbol, such as a chariot. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 68)

Furthermore: The word arbitrary also calls for comment. The term should not imply that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker ([…] the individual does not have the power to change a sign in any way once it has become established in the linguistic community); I mean that it is unmotivated, i.e. arbitrary in that it actually has no natural connection with the signified. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], pp. 68–69)

For Saussure, then, there is no such thing as the “motivation of the linguistic sign,” with the motivation of the general sign—more or less partial and/or natural—left to phenomena such as symbols (which to him are non-linguistic), for instance.

21 (Im)mutability However, all of that being said, Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 71–78) goes out of his way to describe what is seemingly an irreconcilable paradox found within language: Signs within language are both immutable and mutable at the same time. These two notions—immutability and mutability, respectively—shall be unpacked as follows, and thereafter they too will be related to the notions of semiosic catalysis, transitioning, and termination, amongst others, respectively. Immutability  When it comes to immutability, Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 71) notes that the linguistic sign cannot be controlled, and that language can no longer “be identified with a contract pure and simple, and it is precisely from this viewpoint that the linguistic sign is a particularly interesting object of study.” That is, “language furnishes the best proof that a law accepted by a community is a thing that is tolerated and not a rule to which all freely consent” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 71). In other words: The signifier, though to all appearances freely chosen with respect to the idea that it represents, is fixed, not free, with respect to the linguistic community that uses it. The masses have no voice in the matter, and the signifier chosen by language could be replaced by no other. This fact, which seems to embody a contradiction, might be called colloquially “the stacked deck.” We say to language: “Choose!” but we add: “It must be this sign and no other.” No individual, even if he willed it, could modify in any way at all the choice that has been made; and what is more, the community itself cannot control so much as a single word; it is bound to the existing language. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 71)

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Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 71–72) views language as a social institution,32 or something transmitted in a social setting, existing as an inheritance or “appearing as a heritage of the preceding period,” regardless of “what period we choose or how far back we go.” Any “particular language-state,” that is, “is always the product of historical forces, and these forces explain why the sign is unchangeable, i.e. why it resists any arbitrary substitution” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 72). For Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 72), there is a certain disproportion of freedom holding between “fixed tradition” and “the free action of society,” not only as concerns language, but also all other (social, societal) institutions; “forces of the first type carry more weight or less weight than those of the second,” and when it comes to language as such, “the historical factor of transmission dominates it entirely and prohibits any sudden widespread change.” In the end, Saussure posits many reasons for the immutable aspect of language,33 but emphasizes in particular the arbitrary nature of the sign: Above, we had to accept the theoretical possibility of change; further reflection suggests that the arbitrary nature of the sign is really what protects language from any attempt to modify it. Even if people were more conscious of language than they are, they would still not know how to discuss it. The reason is simply that any subject in order to be discussed must have a reasonable basis. It is possible, for instance, to discuss whether the monogamous form of marriage is more reasonable than the polygamous form and to advance arguments to support either side. One could also argue about a system of symbols, for the symbol has a rational relationship with the thing signified […]; but language is a system of arbitrary signs and lacks the necessary basis, the solid ground for discussion. There is no reason for preferring soeur to sister, Ochs to boeuf, etc. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 73)

Another reason that Saussure (1959 [1915], pp. 73–74) gives for the immutability of the linguistic sign and language in general is the so-called collective inertia toward innovation, which he connects explicitly with the notion of the arbitrariness of the sign.34 To begin:  Although Saussure does not really define an “institution” as such, it may be understood in this context in the most general way, as a kind of mechanism of social control. Examples of institutions would thus be phenomena such as customs, laws, natural languages, and so forth, that is, institutions could be thought of in more abstract, systematic terms than simply being (social or societal) organizations or actual physical buildings, with which they are often equated. 33  “Nothing is explained by saying that language is something inherited and leaving it at that. Can not existing and inherited laws be modified from one moment to the next? […] There are many possible answers to the question. For example, one might point to the fact that succeeding generations are not superimposed on one another like the drawers of a piece of furniture, but fuse and interpenetrate, each generation embracing individuals of all ages—with the result that modifications of language are not tied to the succession of generations. One might also recall the sum of the efforts required for learning the mother language and conclude that a general change would be impossible. Again, it might be added that reflection does not enter into the active use of an idiom— speakers are largely unconscious of the laws of language; and if they are unaware of them, how could they modify them? Even if they were aware of these laws, we may be sure that their awareness would seldom lead to criticism, for people are generally satisfied with the language they have received” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 72). 34  Besides the arbitrary nature of the sign and the collective inertia toward innovation, the two other factors that Saussure (1959 [1915], pp.73–74) posits as determining the immutability of the linguistic sign and language in general are the multiplicity of signs necessary to form any language and the over-complexity of the system, respectively. 32

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E. Kõvamees Language—and this consideration surpasses all the others—is at every moment everybody’s concern; spread throughout society and manipulated by it, language is something used daily by all. Here we are unable to set up any comparison between it and other institutions. The prescriptions of codes, religious rites, nautical signals, etc., involve only a certain number of individuals simultaneously and then only during a limited period of time; in language, on the contrary, everyone participates at all times, and that is why it is constantly being influenced by all. This capital fact suffices to show the impossibility of revolution. Of all social institutions, language is least amenable to initiative. It blends with the life of society, and the latter, inert by nature, is a prime conservative force. (Saussure, 1959 [1915]: 73–74)

He continues: But to say that language is a product of social forces does not suffice to show clearly that it is unfree; remembering that it is always the heritage of the preceding period, we must add that these social forces are linked with time. Language is checked not only by the weight of the collectivity but also by time. These two are inseparable. At every moment solidarity with the past checks freedom of choice. We say man and dog. This does not prevent the existence in the total phenomenon of a bond between the two antithetical forces—arbitrary convention by virtue of which choice is free and time which causes choice to be fixed. Because the sign is arbitrary, it follows no law other than that of tradition, and because it is based on tradition, it is arbitrary. (Saussure, 1959 [1915]: 74)

Mutability  The immutability of the linguistic sign, it could be said, is thus based on an “ontological” arbitrariness that becomes “set in stone” over time, that is, it becomes historically conditioned, determined, or motivated, and thus the linguistic sign remains unchangeable. This unchangeability (immutability), however, holds primarily at the level of individual speakers, because, as is commonly experienced and known, language as a wider intangible, institutional force does indeed undergo changes. As Saussure writes: Time, which insures the continuity of language, wields another influence apparently contradictory to the first: the more or less rapid change of linguistic signs. In a certain sense, therefore, we can speak of both the immutability and the mutability of the sign. In the last analysis, the two facts are interdependent: the sign is exposed to alteration because it perpetuates itself. What predominates in all change is the persistence of the old substance; disregard for the past is only relative. That is why the principle of change is based on the principle of continuity. (Saussure, 1959 [1915]: 74)

What is it, specifically, that changes about the linguistic sign? For Saussure (1959 [1915]: 74–75), it is not “phonetic changes undergone by the signifier” or “changes in meaning which affect the signified concept” that you are dealing with when speaking about “change.” Instead, regardless “of what the forces of change are, whether in isolation or in combination, they always result in a shift in the relationship between the signified and the signifier” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 75). Linguistic change—or the change specific to linguistic signs—is thus, for Saussure, a matter of so-called internal signification, or the unification of signifier with signified into a complete sign. Whether the movement is from Classical Latin to Vulgar Latin, from Old German to Modern German, or from Anglo-Saxon to Modern English, and so forth, the change in words may express itself in phenomena such as signifiers changing in their “material aspect” or “grammatical form” or

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both—or in a phenomenon such as signifieds changing in what they imply—but the true indicator of such change is really the “shift in the relationship” between the signifier and signified, a different correspondence that emerges “between the phonetic substance and the idea” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 75). For example: Latin necāre ‘kill’ became noyer ‘drown’ in French. Both the sound-image and the concept changed; but it is useless to separate the two parts of the phenomenon; it is sufficient to state with respect to the whole that the bond between the idea and the sign was loosened, and that there was a shift in their relationship. If instead of comparing Classical Latin necāre with French noyer, we contrast the former term with necare of Vulgar Latin of the fourth or fifth century meaning ‘drown’ the case is a little different; but here again, although there is no appreciable change in the signifier, there is a shift in the relationship between the idea and the sign. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 75)35

“Language is radically powerless to defend itself against the forces which from one moment to the next are shifting the relationship between the signified and the signifier,” which “is one of the consequences of the arbitrary nature of the sign” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p.  75). Saussure (1959 [1915], p.  75) views language as the most arbitrary and least motivated—or most unmotivated and least unarbitrary—of all human institutions, noting that “customs, laws, etc.” are, in the end, “all based in varying degrees on the natural relations of things,” and that “all have of necessity adapted the means employed to the ends pursued.” That is, “the arbitrariness of language radically separates it from all other institutions”; “Even fashion in dress is not entirely arbitrary; we can deviate only slightly from the conditions dictated by the human body”; meanwhile: “Language is limited by nothing in the choice of means, for apparently nothing would prevent the associating of any idea whatsoever with just any sequence of sounds” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], pp. 75–76). The evolution of language is, for Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 76), the most complex aspect of its institutional or social nature; as language is “a product of both the social force and time,” it is the case that “no one can change anything in it,” but at the same time, “the arbitrariness of its signs theoretically entails the freedom of establishing just any relationship between phonetic substance and ideas.” Consequently, the “result is that each of the two elements united in the sign maintains its own life to a degree unknown elsewhere, and that language changes, or rather evolves, under the influence of all the forces which can affect either sounds or meanings” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 76). In the end, the evolution of language “is inevitable; there is no example of a single language that resists it,” and after “a certain period of time, some obvious shifts can always be recorded” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 76). As was the case with immutability, it could be stated that the mutability of the linguistic sign is therefore based on the same “ontological” arbitrariness of the sign, which ends up concretizing over time, becoming “traditionally” motivated, but remaining changeable nonetheless. And these changes to language, not really  As was the case with Morris’s interchangeable use of “sign-vehicle” and “sign,” Saussure’s occasional usage of the term “sign” as opposed to “signifier” sometimes causes confusion. 35

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instantiable or implementable on the level of the individual, come about on a higher social, societal, sociocultural, or whatever level, via various determinative factors or “forces,” whether historical, social, etc. Chapter “A Model of Semiosis and the Relational Dynamics of the Sign” of this work was primarily dedicated to the interconnected notions of semiosis and the sign, respectively. To summarize, this section defined semiosis, discussed the nature of the sign and the dynamism of semiosis, introduced the notions of signification and valuation, considered the relation holding between relationality and materiality, described the internal and external relational dynamics of the sign, and also described notions such as the (un)limitedness, (in)stability and (un)predictability, and (in)completeness of semiosis, as well as characterized levels of semiosis in terms of trajectories, ranges, and the idea of spatiotemporal affordance. Furthermore, it also used imagined scenarios of semiosis in order to illustrate its points, and thereafter used this discussion as a springboard into discussions of notions such as experience and knowledge, trains of thought, chains of semiosis, spontaneity and deliberation, the catalysis, transitioning, and termination of semiosis, arbitrariness and motivation, and (im)mutability, respectively. All of these notions—and their definitions, descriptions, and/or discussions—will inform the upcoming section of this work, dedicated in the foremost to the interconnection between semiosis and science.

References Agrawal, S. N. (2018). The Glasgow Coma Scale: a breakthrough in the assessment of the level of consciousness. Journal of Traditional Medicine & Clinical Naturopathy, 7(2), 273–274. Chandler, D., & Munday, R. (2011). Unlimited semiosis. In A dictionary of media and communication (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. Collier, J. (2012). Interpretants. In D. Favareau, P. Cobley, & K. Kull (Eds.), A more developed sign: Interpreting the work of Jesper Hoffmeyer (Tartu Semiotics Library 10) (pp. 175–177). Tartu University Press. CP = Peirce, C. S. (1931–1958). Collected papers of Charles S. Peirce. C. Hartshorne, & P. Weiss (Eds., vols. 1–6); A. Burks (Ed., vols. 7–8). Harvard University Press. Crumley, C. L. (1995). Heterarchy and the analysis of complex societies. In R. M. Ehrenreich, C.  L. Crumley, & J.  L. Levy (Eds.), Heterarchy and the analysis of complex societies (Archeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association 6) (pp. 1–5). American Anthropological Association. Danesi, M. (2002). Introduction. In Understanding media semiotics (pp. vii–x). Oxford University Press. de Saussure, F. (1959). Course in general linguistics (W. Baskin, Trans.). C. Bally, A. Sechehaye, & A. Riedlinger (Eds.). The Philosophical Library. (Original work published 1915). Eco, U. (1976). Introduction: Toward a logic of culture. In A theory of semiotics (pp.  3–31). Indiana University Press.

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Halbach, V. (2010). Sets, relations, and arguments. In The logic manual (pp. 5–26). The Oxford University Press. Hobbes, T. (1915). Of the consequence or TRAYNE of imaginations. In Leviathan (pp. 8–12). The Aldine Press. (Original work published 1651). Indiana State Department of Health. How to shock the pool (chlorinate to breakpoint). Retrieved May 23, 2023. Lorber, M. F., Eckardt Erlanger, A. C., Heyman, R. E., & O’Leary, K. D. (2015). The honeymoon effect: Does it exist and can it be predicted? Prevention Science, 16, 550–559. Lotman, J. (2005). On the semiosphere (W. Clark, Trans.). Sign Systems Studies, 33(1), 205–229. (Original work published 1984). Master, P. (1997). The English article system: Acquisition, function, and pedagogy. System, 25(2), 215–232. Morris, C. W. (1938). Foundations of the theory of signs. In International encyclopedia of Unified Science, 1(2). The University of Chicago Press. Nöth, W. (2020). Trajectory: A model of the sign and of semiosis. Sign Systems Studies, 48(2/4), 182–191. Rocha, I., Hoffmann, A., & Souto, P. (2020). Insect morphology. In J.  Vonk & T.  Shackelford (Eds.), Encyclopedia of animal cognition and behavior. Springer. Romanycia, M. H. J., & Pelletier, F. J. (1985). What is a heuristic? Computational Intelligence, 1, 47–58. Sokolowska, M., Chobot, A., & Jarosz-Chobot, P. (2016). The honeymoon phase – what we know today about the factors that can modulate the remission period in type 1 diabetes. Pediatric Endocrinology Diabetes and Metabolism, 22(2), 66–70. Thurber, J. (1939). The secret life of Walter Mitty. The New Yorker, 18.03.1939.

Semiosis and Science Erik Kõvamees

1 Conceptualization To begin, what lessons can we glean from the preceding discussions concerning arbitrariness and (im)mutability? How do these notions relate to those of semiosic catalysis, transitioning, and termination? Widening our scope, how do all of these notions relate to those of spontaneity, deliberation, experience, and knowledge, as well as those of signs/semiosic acts/sign-processing, chains of semiosis, meaning-­ makers, and the general semiosic process as such? This is not to mention how all of these notions possibly relate to the understanding of the hierarchical relational dynamics of the sign in general. Much of the preceding discussion found in this work—alongside Saussure’s ideas about language and the linguistic sign—may be extrapolated and/or modified for the sake of approaching these questions. Earlier on, the oppositions of spontaneity/deliberation and experience/knowledge were posited as two separate sets, wherein the members stood as mutually exclusive—and also jointly exhaustive, it should be furthermore said1—variables that were “incommensurable” one to another, in terms of being perfectly-corresponding, point-to-point matches (of spontaneity to experience and deliberation to knowledge, respectively). Instead, the  It may now be explicitly stated that a “dichotomy” as understood in this work refers to a binary structure (such as a binary opposition) wherein the components are simultaneously mutually exclusive and yet jointly exhaustive, that is, they “cover everything” when taken together, but have no “overlap” amongst themselves. This is pretty much the definition of “dichotomy” given by György Surján (2008), who, after providing a brief history of the notion, relates dichotomy or the “dichotomy principle” to ideas of classification and formal ontology, the notion of dichotomous transformation, and the problem of multiple inheritance, and comments on it as a potential quality assessment tool. 1

E. Kõvamees (*) University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 E. M. Tragel (ed.), Explorations in Dynamic Semiosis, Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47001-1_2

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members of the two separate sets were framed as independent variables combinable—across or between sets, and not amongst themselves—in a certain or limited amount of ways. The same considerations may also be applied to the respective oppositions of arbitrary/motivated and mutable/immutable. That is, it is possible to now posit a framework of four sets, each of which consists of two members defining the set (a so-called joint exhaustiveness), but which are mutually exclusive one to another. But although characterized by mutual exclusiveness amongst themselves, the members of each set are combinable in any way or shape across or between sets, thus representing a complicated scenario of many potential combinations. On this basis, it becomes possible to construct an expansive system of types—a typology as such—predicated on the potential relations of the respective binary-opposition-­ based2 sets of experience/knowledge, spontaneity/deliberation, arbitrary/motivated, and mutable/immutable. Such type-based thinking (or semiosis) is a matter of conceptualization, a heuristic allowing for the construction of idealized types—or so-called ideal types3— related to one another in the form of a typology. Such an approach may be contrasted with so-called gradient-based thinking (semiosis) as another form of conceptualization, one which traffics in understandings of gradience, and instead of typologies, constructs continua as such. From the perspective of the metalevel conceptualizer, both of these modes of conceptualization—so-called type-based conceptualization and gradient-based conceptualization—may stand in full opposition to one another, or in more of a dialectical and/or complementary relationship.4 For example, instead of constituting a paradox, linguistic (im)mutability may be considered a matter of degree or extent, and not so much a categorical or

 In the context of this work, the compound term “binary opposition” shall not be given a formal definition, but should instead be understood in the most plain or obvious way, as nothing more than an opposition consisting of two terms. However, it should be specified that—like the earlier discussion of “spacetime” versus “timespace,” for instance—within this binarity or binarism, the order of the terms remains unimportant, in the sense that order (or any other criterion, for that matter) does not privilege one of the terms over the other (there is no hierarchy here, as such, although if the binary opposition is characterized as a heterarchy in the sense noted earlier on, then there remains the possibility of hierarchization). That is, the binary oppositions discussed here in this work are not characterized by markedness—“the asymmetrical and hierarchical relationship between the two poles of any opposition”—on the basis of any criterion whatsoever, including order, but stand as equal entities; for this definition of markedness and a discussion of the notion, see Linda R. Waugh (1982). 3  The notion of ideal types may be understood here according to how it was introduced and formalized by Max Weber (1949 [1904]; see especially 1949 [1904], p. 90). The notion was discussed within a wide-ranging overview of considerations pertaining to the nature of social science and social policy, many of which are relevant for the work at hand, but will not be examined in the current moment (see Weber, 1949 [1904]). 4  From the perspective of a higher metalevel, the conceptualizer may thus be themselves conceptualized—by another conceptualizer or by her- or himself as “meta-conceptualizers”—according to the very same modes of thinking. And in turn, this meta-meta-level may be conceptualized from an even higher one, and so on, ad infinitum. 2

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dichotomous affair. In other words, Saussurean (im)mutability may be considered a “more or less” as opposed to “either-or”—or an “analogue” as opposed to “digital,” or a “continuous” as opposed to “discrete”—phenomenon. Or it could be considered in both ways—“ideally,” in terms of types within a typology, or “gradiently,” in terms of gradients along a continuum—whether the two terms of immutability and mutability are taken independently or in relation. Indeed, the very same could be said not only about the opposition mutable/ immutable, but also about the opposition arbitrary/motivated. Saussure actually speaks on this very issue when he points out what he deems the absolute arbitrariness versus the relative arbitrariness of the linguistic sign: The fundamental principle of the arbitrariness of the sign does not prevent our singling out in each language what is radically arbitrary, i.e. unmotivated, and what is only relatively arbitrary. Some signs are absolutely arbitrary; in others we note, not its complete absence, but the presence of degrees of arbitrariness: the sign may be relatively motivated. (Saussure, 1959 [1915]: 131)

Saussure provides many examples reinforcing this understanding: For instance, both vingt ‘twenty’ and dix-neuf ‘nineteen’ are unmotivated in French, but not in the same degree, for dix-neuf suggests its own terms and other terms associated with (e.g. dix ‘ten,’ neuf ‘nine,’ vingt-neuf ‘twenty-nine,’ dix-huit ‘eighteen,’ soixante-dix ‘seventy,’ etc.). Taken separately, dix and neuf are in the same class as vingt, but dix-neuf is an example of relative motivation. The same is true of poirier ‘pear-tree,’ which recalls the simple word poire ‘pear’ and, through its suffix, cerisier ‘cherry-tree,’ pommier ‘apple-tree,’ etc. For frêne ‘ash,’ chêne ‘oak,’ etc. there is nothing comparable. Again, compare berger ‘shepherd,’ which is completely unmotivated, and vacher ‘cowherd,’ which is relatively motivated. In the same way, the pairs geôle ‘jail’ and cachot ‘dungeon,’ [etc.]. (Saussure, 1959 [1915], pp. 131–132)

Saussure (1959 [1915], p.  132) gives plenty more examples of entirely arbitrary versus relativistically arbitrary linguistic signs—those that do not “suggest” or “summon” other terms and those that do, or those that do not call up associations versus those that do not remain in complete isolation—of both nouns and verbs, as well as within languages and across them. In the end, Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 132) states that it “is not the place to search for the forces that condition motivation in each instance; but motivation varies, being always proportional to […] the obviousness of the meanings of the subunits present.5” Saussure furthermore describes: The notion of relative motivation implies […] the mechanism through which any term whatever lends itself to the expression of an idea, and is no more than that. Up to this point units have appeared as values, i.e. as elements of a system, and we have given special

 “Indeed, while some formative elements like -ier in poir-ier against ceris-ier, pomm-ier, etc. are obvious, others are vague or meaningless. For instance, does the suffix -ot really correspond to a meaningful element in French cachot ‘dungeon’? On comparing words like coutelas ‘cutlas,’ fatras ‘pile,’ platras ‘rubbish,’ canevas ‘canvas,’ etc., one has no more than the vague feeling that -as is a formative element characteristic of substantives. At any rate, even in the most favorable cases motivation is never absolute. Not only are the elements of a motivated sign themselves unmotivated (cf. dix and neuf in dix-neuf), but the value of the whole term is never equal to the sum of the value of the parts” (Saussure, 1959 [1915], p. 132). 5

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The notion of “absoluteness versus relativity”—types versus gradients; idealizations, ideal types, or categories versus degrees, extents, or scales; the “either-or” versus the “more or less”; the digital versus the analogue; the discrete versus the continuous; typologies versus continua; etc.—is also apparent in the oppositions of spontaneity/deliberation and experience/knowledge, respectively. The relativistic nature of the latter opposition was already acknowledged: Experience may produce and/or inform knowledge, while knowledge may produce and/or inform experience. This idea extends to signs/sign-processing/acts of semiosis, chains of semiosis, and the general process of semiosis itself within the meaning-maker, any of which may be idealized as either experience based (experiential) or knowledge based (“known”), depending on which of the two factors is considered dominant. However, such an understanding implies and thus acknowledges that both factors are always co-­ present, and that hegemony of one over the other is a matter of relative gradualism, grading, or gradience, instead of strict exclusion. Here, one can speak about the more experiential (the less “known”) versus the more “known” (the less experiential). Similarly, within the meaning-maker, signs/sign-processing/acts of semiosis, chains of semiosis, and/or the general process of semiosis may also be conceptualized ideally as spontaneity-based (spontaneous) or deliberation-based (deliberated) types, or conceptualized “gradiently” as more spontaneous (less deliberated) or more deliberated (less spontaneous) gradients; as arbitrariness-based (arbitrary) or motivation-based (motivated) types, versus more arbitrary (less motivated) or more motivated (less arbitrary) gradients; or as mutability-based (mutable) or immutability-­based (immutable) types, versus more mutable (less immutable) or more immutable (less mutable) gradients. These two approaches to conceptualization may be used independently in the examination of a meaning-maker’s semiosis in general, in specific chains, or in singular acts/signs/sign-processing, or they may  Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 133) concludes his discussion by clarifying how the ideas of absolute and relative arbitrariness have implications or consequences for linguistic science: “Everything that relates to language as a system must, I am convinced, be approached from this viewpoint, which has scarcely received the attention of linguists: the limiting of arbitrariness. This is the best possible basis for approaching the study of language as a system. In fact, the whole system of language is based on the irrational principle of the arbitrariness of the sign, which would lead to the worse of complication if applied without restriction. But the mind contrives to introduce a principle of order and regularity into certain parts of the mass of signs, and this is the role of relative motivation. If the mechanism of language were entirely rational, it could be studied independently. Since the mechanism of language is but a partial correction of a system that is by nature chaotic, however, we adopt the viewpoint imposed by the very nature of language and study it as it limits arbitrariness. There is no language in which nothing is motivated, and our definition makes it impossible to conceive of a language in which everything is motivated. Between the two extremes—a minimum of organization and a minimum of arbitrariness—we find all possible varieties. Diverse languages always include elements of both types—radically arbitrary and relatively motivated—but in proportions that vary greatly, and this is an important characteristic that may help in classifying them.” 6

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be used together, in conjunction or “oscillation,” depending on how the heuristic value of the approaches have been gauged, and/or what the examination itself actually entails. Furthermore, it is now possible to incorporate previous sets of oppositions into this discussion. Namely, it is also the case that, within the meaning-maker, signs/ sign-processing/acts of semiosis, chains of semiosis, and/or the general process of semiosis may also be heuristically conceptualized as unlimitedness-based (unlimited) or limitedness-based (limited) idealized types, versus more unlimited (less limited) or more limited (less unlimited) “non-idealized” gradients; as instability-­ unpredictability-­ based (unstable-unpredictable) or stability-predictability-based (stable-predictable) types, versus more unstable-unpredictable (less stable-­ predictable) or more stable-predictable (less unstable-unpredictable) gradients; or as incompleteness-based (incomplete) or completeness-based (complete) types, versus more incomplete (less complete) or more complete (less incomplete) gradients. To put it precisely, “conceptualization” is here defined as a heuristic, in the form of a kind of thinking or semiosis that allows the so-called conceptualizer to construct either a typology of types or a continuum of gradients—or some kind of combination of the two in whatever manner—for the purpose of thinking about (i.e., conceptualizing) some sort of phenomenon, including the world as a whole.7 Here, conceptualization has been applied to various dichotomous binary sets, but  The issue of conceptualization is in general a tricky one, because it poses the following question: Is how humans conceptualize the world—or any aspect of reality—a reflection of the world as it is—or any of its fragments as they are—or is it only a formulation of how the conceptualizer thinks about things? There is always a certain amount of uncertainty, ambiguity, and/or ambivalence when it comes to conceptualization, as it either individuates or synthesizes the two “polarities” of typologization versus “gradiation.” This tension is described by Saussure (1959 [1915], pp.  133–134) when he uses the ideas of absolute and relative arbitrariness for the purposes of typologization (typologizing idealized types of languages), while also noting how his idealizations do not necessarily correspond in full to the realizations of language present in actual reality: ‘In a certain sense—one which must not be pushed too far but which brings out a particular form that the opposition may take—we might say that languages in which there is least motivation are more lexicological, and those in which it is greatest are more grammatical. Not because “lexical” and “arbitrary” on the one hand and “grammar” and “relative motivation” on the other, are always synonymous, but because they have a common principle. The two extremes are like two poles between which the whole system moves, two opposing currents which share the movement of language: the tendency to use the lexicological instrument (the unmotivated sign) and the preference given to the grammatical instrument (structural rules).’ Saussure (1959 [1915], p. 134) continues: “We would see, for example, that motivation plays a much larger role in German than in English. But the ultra-lexicological type is Chinese while Proto-Indo-European and Sanskrit are specimens of the ultra-grammatical type. Within a given language, all evolutionary movement may be characterized by continual passage from motivation to arbitrariness and from arbitrariness to motivation; this see-saw motion often results in a perceptible change in the proportions of the two classes of signs. Thus with respect to Latin, French is characterized, among other things, by a huge increase in arbitrariness. Latin inimīcus recalls in- and amicus and is motivated by them; against this, ennemi ‘enemy’ is motivated by nothing—it has reverted to absolute arbitrariness, which is really the prime characteristic of the linguistic sign. We would notice this shift in hundreds of instances [and] French owes its characteristic appearance to this fact.” 7

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these are not the only phenomena to which the process, practice, protocol, and/or procedure of conceptualization is applicable.8

2 Reconstruction As such, we are now left with seven sets of binary oppositions, dichotomous by nature, given that the two members of each respective set are simultaneously both mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive in relation to one another. According to type-based conceptualization, each of the given set’s two terms stand as “either-or” units, discrete types, or “digits” within the set conceptualized as a typology. Meanwhile, according to gradient-based conceptualization, each of a given set’s two terms stand in a relative “more or less” continuity along the set, when the latter is conceptualized as a continuum established in “analogue format.” In other words, each member of a dichotomous set, although incommensurable with its partner member, may combine with any other member of any other set, in external relations that extend across or between sets, and not internally within or inside them. And with seven sets of two members each, the number of possible or potential combinations is very numerous. Heuristically speaking, any of these combinations may be considered sets in and of themselves, and conceptualized ideally as types existing within a typology, more “realistically” as gradients existing along a continuum, or in both ways simultaneously, somehow. Taken independently, each of the seven specified sets allows for the possible reconstruction of semiosis, which refers to the process by which an attempt is made to define and describe semiosis or some aspect of semiosis. On the object-level, it is akin to looking at somebody and wondering “What are you thinking about?” (i.e., “What are the meanings that you are making?”), and thereafter attempting to accurately identify and specify the form and content of their thought-process (i.e., semiosis). Meanwhile, on the metalevel(s)—whether done by an external describer or by the thinker (i.e., meaning-maker) themselves self-reflectively—reconstruction involves the use of something akin to a “scientific method” for the same purpose, regardless of what the approach is in its specifics, and whether it is undertaken in the realm of science or an explicitly scientific setting, or is not. Without a concrete methodology, it should be noted, the object-level reconstructor in all likelihood must use guesswork or logically “abduce” the semiosis of their subjects(s) (or an aspect thereof), on the basis of examining their explicit behaviours

 The general notion of conceptualization presented here—predicated on the heuristic differentiation of typology-based as opposed to gradience-based conceptualization—seems entirely commensurable with the two foundational or fundamental “modes” or “modalities” of meaning-making (semiosis) described by Jay Lemke (1999), the typological and the topological. Indeed, Lemke’s (1999) ideas may in effect be pretty much synonymous with the notion of conceptualization as it has been here transmitted or forwarded. Lemke (1999) applies the notions mentioned to many phenomena, but mainly analyzes their presence in a case study of diagnostic medical discourse. 8

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or interactions with artefacts (i.e., “behaviouristic” manifestations), or by making inferences concerning thoughts and internal experiences (i.e., psychological hypothesizations), or both. These may be thought of as object-level interpretations. On the meta-level(s), such “estimations” or “abductions” may be formulated in scientific terms as “interpretations” in the Danesian sense, or as the “scientific” method of (a systematic and argued) interpretation. When it comes to reconstructing semiosis—whether done on the object- or metalevel, by “peer,” “scientist,” or “self-reflexant,” etc.—the reconstructor may be oriented by different considerations. For example, the reconstruction may be oriented by the notion of causality: Is the semiosis or aspect in question a movement from antecedent to consequent (the search of effects from causes), or from consequent to antecedent (the search of causes from effects), or are these notions inapplicable in this case? Or, for instance, the reconstruction may be oriented by the notion of information: In terms of probabilities and either confirming or breaking expectations, what is the informational value or load of the given semiosis or any semiosic aspect, if such ideas may be invoked? And so forth, in terms of possible orientations colouring or informing the reconstructor’s reconstruction. When it comes to the reconstruction of semiosis, the seven dichotomous sets of binary oppositions may be thought of methodologically as tools, useful in answering the following question: When semiosis or an aspect of semiosis is being reconstructed, what tools may we employ in doing so, and to what ends? Each of these sets, that is, “measures” some aspect of semiosis and, therefore, has utility in the process, procedure, protocol, or practice of reconstructing semiosis proper. • When it comes to (un)limitedness—or the dichotomous set defined by the binary opposition unlimited/limited—it is the length of semiosis or some aspect of semiosis that is being measured-cum-reconstructed. • When it comes to (in)stability-(un)predictability—or the dichotomous set defined by the binary opposition unstable-unpredictable/stable-predictable—it is the efficiency and/or directness of semiosis or some aspect of semiosis that is being measured-cum-reconstructed. • When it comes to (in)completeness—or the dichotomous set defined by the binary opposition incomplete/complete—it is the open-endedness or closure of semiosis or some aspect of semiosis that is being measured-cum-reconstructed. • When it comes to mnemonics—or the dichotomous set defined by the binary opposition experience/knowledge—it is the dominance of one resource or repertoire over the other, as concerns semiosis or some aspect of semiosis, that is being measured-cum-reconstructed.9

 In this specific instance, we have an example of a binary opposition wherein one member of the structure becomes “marked” and thus dominant, turning the pairing into an asymmetrical, hierarchical one. However, this possibility was based on the fact that the opposition was inherently heterarchical. For the ability of different elements to ascend to dominancy in relative terms or in different contexts, cf. Roman Jakobson’s (1962 [1935]) notion of the dominant. 9

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• When it comes to planning—or the dichotomous set defined by the binary opposition spontaneity/deliberation—it is the “planfulness” (the planned out nature) of semiosis or some aspect of semiosis that is being measured-cum-reconstructed. • When it comes to stochastics—or the dichotomous set defined by the binary opposition arbitrary/motivated—it is the determination versus randomness of semiosis or some aspect of semiosis that is being measured-cum-reconstructed. • When it comes to (im)mutability—or the dichotomous set defined by the binary opposition mutable/immutable—it is the changeability of semiosis or some aspect of semiosis that is being measured-cum-reconstructed. In all cases, the “measurement-cum-reconstruction” of semiosis or one/some/many of its aspects may be conceptualized in terms of the gradience of gradients on a continuum, or ideally/typologically, in terms of types within a typology, or in both ways somehow. In sum, the reconstruction of semiosis refers to attempts—whether “colloquially” or “scientifically,” whether by object-level “peers” or metalevel “scientist-­ reflexants” or “self-reflexants”—to define and describe semiosis—or one, some, or many of its aspects—in terms of reconstructing the specifics of the phenomenon (semiosis or one of its aspects) in question. Whether “mundane,” “everyday,” “quotidian,” etc., as opposed to “scientific,” “scholarly,” “academic,” etc., the reconstructor of semiosis may use the approach of interpretation—the disentanglement of an X = Y relation—in their work or practice or research, and it should be noted that approaching such an unraveling may itself involve the use of many different principles, theories, terms or concepts or metalanguages, methodologies and/or methods, etc. For example, reconstructors may or may not be oriented by a specific notional agenda, paradigm, or template, and they also have the option to use different “tools” and “toolkits” in their “measurements,” of which the seven dichotomous sets presented above represent just a handful of possibility.

3 Forms, Levels, Elements, and Narratives If the question of the reconstruction of semiosis or any of its aspects has been treated, we are left with the question of what it is that is actually being reconstructed as such. What is an “aspect” of semiosis, for example? The question may be posed thusly: When it comes to reconstructing semiosis or any of its aspects, what are the possible units or objects that are actually being reconstructed? To put the cart before the horse, as the expression goes, alongside semiosis as a general process, these units of semiosis belong to the categories of semiosis that will be called, respectively, and from hereon out, forms of semiosis, levels of semiosis and elements of semiosis, and narratives of semiosis. Forms of semiosis  The three forms of semiosis that have already been identified and described are none other than (1) singular acts of semiosis, signs, or ­sign-­processings, (2) chains of semiosis, and (3) the general process of semiosis as

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such, all of which “occur,” “transpire,” or “take place” within (the mind of) a meaning-­maker. In the first case, the reconstructor is dealing with the comingtogether of single or individual signs on the basis of their internal and external relational dynamics; in the second case, with signs linking together into longer sequences or series, replacing one another, based in the foremost on external signification; and in the third case, with a general process—itself a sequence or series (i.e., chain)—consisting of a near-infinite amount of other chains, and which may be speculated as having its origination at the conception or birth of a meaning-maker, and having its denouement at the meaning-maker’s death, connecting semiosis as such with the biological imperative of organismic survival and life processes in general. Of course, every form of semiosis possesses some kind of content. However, when discussing forms of semiosis, it is precisely the form—act/sign/processuality, chain, most general process—which may be viewed as constant, with the content of any form “malleable” or “flexible,” that is, varied, uncertain, or inconstant. That being said, most attempted reconstructions of semiosis—or attempted reconstructions of any form of semiosis—will in all likelihood aim at a reconstruction of the content, too; the form may be thought of as the medium in which the content (or “substance”) sits, like water in a glass. Levels and elements of semiosis  The levels of semiosis that have thus far been identified and described are those of signification-valuation, at the highest level, composed of signification and valuation as its elements, of which the former is, spatiotemporally speaking, a trajectory, and the latter is, spatiotemporally speaking, a range. Diving downwards, this level is followed by the level of the external relational dynamics of the sign, which is composed of external signification (a trajectory afforded by space) and external valuation (a range afforded by time), which constitute the respective elements of this level and stand as its elements of semiosis, followed by the level of the internal relational dynamics of the sign, which consists of internal signification (a trajectory) and internal valuation (a range), which are the elements of semiosis of this level, followed by the lowest level, that of the two respective semiosic formulae (trajectories) sitting “underneath” internal signification as such, offering it a “perch,” and constituting its elements. Such an understanding specifies that semiosis proper is a hierarchical process. When it comes to discussing the hierarchical levels of semiosis, however, this formulation does not constitute the entire consideration set, or do the understanding of semiosic levels justice. As was formulated early on in this work and maintained throughout, there is a difference between the object-level of semiosis and the metalevel of semiosis, or, taking into account the relativistic nature of these semiosic levels, there are various metalevels (meta-metalevels, meta-meta-metalevels, and so on ad infinitum), which take the object-level as object-level proper, but also end up re-conceptioning or re-conceiving lower metalevels as object-levels. From the perspective of what is potentially a fourth-order metalevel dealing in matters of abstraction or generality versus concreteness or particularity, the hierarchico-structural

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difference holding between the general object-level, the metalevel, and the meta-­ metalevel is “vertically-isomorphic” with the hierarchico-structural difference holding between phenomena-of-the-world-as-research-objects, general science, and metascience, which are themselves in turn vertically isomorphic with the hierarchico-­ structural difference holding between semiosis, semiotics, and metasemiotics as such. The entire situation as such constitutes a vertically isomorphic hierarchical structure of wider and narrower embeddedness. Narratives of semiosis  We may now also finally return to the notions of the catalysis of semiosis, the transitioning of semiosis, and the termination of semiosis, respectively, as these constitute the three so-called narratives of semiosis. The term “narrative” may seem like a tricky one to apply in this case, but it allows for thinking about semiosic transitioning in “story” terms—more “artistically,” even, as having a “beginning,” “middle,” and “end,” or a “plot,” like a novel, or more “scientifically,” as having an “introduction,” “body,” and “conclusion,” or an “argument,” like an article, or even to think about things in terms of notions such as syuzhet and fabula, etc.—and also demonstrates a certain relativity and the interrelatedness of the three terms. That is, it is not just transitions themselves which are narratives, but a catalysis is itself a narrative (a “cosmogony” and the “ending of a beginning”) and not just a starting-point, while a termination is also a narrative (an “eschatology” and the “beginning of an end”) and not just an ending-point. As was previously stated, the “catalysis of semiosis” refers to semiosis “coming about,” the “transitioning of semiosis” to semiosis in its developmental “movement,” and the “termination of semiosis” to semiosis in its “finishing.” The notional category of narratives of semiosis explicitly relates to the matter of determinative factors of semiosis, or what Saussure deemed forces. To recall, Saussure proposed that language and linguistic signs could not really be changed by the individual on their level, but were in fact prone to the machinations of historical and social powers of a higher level. In other words, Saussure emphasized the power or forcefulness of what in this work have been discussed as possible “external factors,” as opposed to so-called internal factors. Inspired by Saussure, and building on the previously discussed, the former could now be formalized as the external determinative factors of semiosis, while the latter may now be formalized as the so-called internal determinative factors of semiosis. While Saussure emphasized external over internal forces, in this framework, both of these sets of determinative factors— of which the forces themselves are in need of identification, description, and classification, in terms of both themselves and their relations10—stand as equal possibilities with regard to the catalysis, transitioning, and/or termination of semiosis. It should be here made explicit that the differentiation of categories of semiosis and units of semiosis is, of course, a matter of heuristics. Narratives, forms,

 See, for instance, the different questions posed earlier on, regarding how semiosis can be said to catalyze, transition, and/or terminate, as regards both external and internal possibilities. 10

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levels—and within levels, their constituent elements, i.e., the two formulae, internal signification and valuation, external signification and valuation, and general signification and valuation—are in reality inextricable one from the other, operating in tandem constantly. That is, forms are constantly in narrative at all hierarchical levels on all elements; processes are always telling stories of different orders about every component; and so forth.

4 Reconstructing Semiosis: The “Justified Combination Approach” When it comes to reconstructing semiosis or any of its aspects, any of the seven sets may be applied to any of the semiosic units found in any of the semiosic categories, which leaves a great many possibilities open to the reconstructor. The current work has already demonstrated this undertaking in a piecemeal manner. For instance, the three respective sets of (un)limitedness, (in)stability-(un)predictability, and (in) completeness were discussed in relation to all of the different levels of semiosis and their elements—from formulae up to signification-valuation—and were also applied in some manner to the three different forms of semiosis (as they were posited in the imagined scenarios). More possibilities include applying each of these different sets individually to the three narratives of semiosis, an undertaking which entails many questions, not necessarily the easiest to answer.11 Meanwhile, the mnemonic set (predicated on the opposition knowledge/experience and measuring the dominance of one over the other) and the planning set (predicated on the opposition deliberation/spontaneity and measuring how “planned out” semiosis or one of its aspects is), for instance, were discussed to some extent in relation to the semiosic scenarios, as well, but were also discussed in relation to Hobbes’s imagined Civil War train of thought, i.e., chain of semiosis, i.e., one of the forms of semiosis, and also the general notion of trains of thought (i.e., chains of semiosis, in the continued equating of the vertically isomorphic semiosic and cognitive sets). Hobbes also posits another of a what we have called “semiosic scenario,” and in its description, further discusses ideas pertinent to what have here been referred to in terms of “mnemonic” and “planning” “sets,” amongst other ideas that have been more or less explicitly outlined in this work: Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another, supposing like events will follow like  Namely, these questions are: How limited/unlimited is a catalysis of semiosis? How stable-predictable/unstable-unpredictable is a catalysis of semiosis? How complete/incomplete is a catalysis of semiosis? How limited/unlimited is a transitioning of semiosis? How stable-predictable/unstable-unpredictable is a transitioning of semiosis? How complete/incomplete is a transitioning of semiosis? How limited/unlimited is a termination of semiosis? How stable-predictable/unstableunpredictable is a termination of semiosis? How complete/incomplete is a termination of semiosis? 11

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E. Kõvamees actions. As he that foresees what will become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts is called Foresight, and Prudence, or Providence; and sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the seldomer faile him. The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory onely, but things to come have no being at all; the Future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past, to the notions that are Present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most Signes to guesse by. (Hobbes, 1915 [1651], pp. 10–11)

Hobbes continues his description of somebody’s semiosis, as it concerns the concept of time, relating it to both experience and deliberation: As Prudence is a Præsumtion of the Future, contracted from the Experience of time Past: So there is a Præsumtion of things Past taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civil warre, and then to ruine, upon the sight of the ruines of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same incertainty almost with the conjecture of the future; both being grounded onely upon Experience. (Hobbes, 1915 [1651], p. 11)12

When it comes to the stochastics set (predicated on the opposition of arbitrary/motivated and measuring determination versus randomness), it can also be applied to any of the respective semiosic forms, levels, elements, or narratives. For instance, to internal valuation, or to external valuation. In either case, we return to another opposition previously invoked, that of proximity/similarity. Why is it the case that— whether considering signifier (systems), signified (systems), or sign (systems)—sometimes systems or ranges based on the proximity of entities are invoked, while other times systems or ranges based on similarity are invoked? That is, why is such invocation at certain times context-dependent, while at other points it is context-independent? Taking into account determinative factors of

 Continuing the running theme—in need of further investigation, of course—of what differentiates humans from alloanimals, Hobbes (1915 [1651], p.  11) writes: “Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast. There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten. […] There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties […] which seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living Creatures.” 12

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semiosis—internal and external, and their relation—the stochastics set potentially allows for the mapping of such considerations probabilistically. As for the (im)mutability set—which measures changeability, and is predicated on the binary opposition immutable/mutable—it can also be applied to any of the units of semiosis of the respective categories of semiosis. Take, for example, a chain of semiosis as a form of semiosis: Is it possible that a sequence of semiosic acts operates linearly, then “skips a beat” or even “flatlines” for a while, and then returns to the original chain after a shorter or lengthier pause? Can a line of reasoning be logical, have the interjection, irruption, or interruption of a “random” thought, and then change back into the original linear series? How many gaps or lacunae are possible, or “allowed”? How “schizophrenic” can chains of semiosis be, and how “stiff”? And so forth; such questions and others that could be proposed may be said to pertain to matters of change or (im)mutability. In the end, since there are seven sets of dichotomous binary oppositions, each of which constitutes a different tool of measurement for the purpose of reconstructing semiosis or any of its aspects, and there are (at least) 10 to 1413 different units of semiosis—belonging to the three categories of semiosis—to which they are applicable, the reconstructor of semiosis has a great many choices to make in their reconstruction of semiosis proper. There is a complex mathematics, that is, of possibilities existing in a combinatory matrix: One reconstruction could, for instance, apply one set to one unit; another could apply all seven sets—whether in conjunction (taking into account relations), or independently—to all 14 units separately or together; yet another could apply all seven sets—again, conjointly or individually—to one unit; and finally, one last reconstruction could apply one set to all 14 units, whether interrelated somehow or posited as standing alone. And so on. The situation is furthermore complicated by the issue of conceptualization, the fact that there are different “modes” or “modalities” that modify or “modulate” each of the respective sets according to two possibilities, either taken separately or together. These are, of course, the use of gradients along continua in the context of gradient thinking, versus the use of types within typologies on the basis of typological thinking. With all these considerations in mind,14 one reconstruction could be as seemingly haphazard, for instance, as applying the (in)completeness set together with the stochastics set in typological terms, while applying the planning set in isolation and in  For the purposes of this count, the three forms of semiosis were added to the three narratives of semiosis, which were then added to the eight elements of the four levels of semiosis (signification and valuation, external signification and external valuation, internal signification and internal valuation, and the two formulae, respectively); if the levels are not divided into their elements, there are only ten units. In this specific addition or adding, the object-level and metalevel(s) of semiosis were omitted as units, given that their “scope” or “scale” is of a higher or wider standing than the microscopic or microcosmic aspects of semiosis focused on in this work. 14  These considerations, it could be said, provide perfect fodder for the mathematical branch of combinatorics, of which its principles could be taken into account in addressing many—if not all—of the issues presented above. For an introduction to combinatorics from both theoretical and practico-pedagogical perspectives—including its relation to experimentation, the teaching and learning of probability, reasoning in general and the assessment of reasoning, etc.—see Carmen Batanero et al. (1997). 13

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gradient terms, to the hybridized units of external relational dynamics (as level-unit) and chains of semiosis. In any reconstruction of semiosis, the specific commutability or variability of the decisions involved is up to the reconstructor themselves; the “alchemy” of any and all concoctions, combinations, or permutations is a matter of the reconstructor’s personal preference; some may choose to go at it holistically versus partially, or vice versa; others may choose to approach the matter with the “softest” of heuristics, while their counterparts could employ heuristic methods as programmatic or “hard” as algorithms; and so on. Since the combinations involved in the reconstruction of semiosis or any of its aspects are a matter of choice(s) or decision(s) on the part of the reconstructor—that is, these combinations are up to the discretion of the reconstructor—then they must necessarily be justified if the reconstruction purports to be a truly scientific one. Because of this, any scientific reconstruction of semiosis that follows the ideas and/ or methodology outlined above may be referred to as the justified combination approach to the reconstruction of semiosis.

5 “Formal-Objective” Versus “Informal-Subjective” Reconstructions If for the discussion at hand the triadic vertical isomorphism (as concerns structural hierarchy) holding between the most abstract grouping of object-level, metalevel, and meta-metalevel, and the more concrete class of potential research objects (compelled from the phenomena of the world), science, and metascience, and, finally, the even-more concrete set of semiosis, semiotics, and metasemiotics, is taken into account, then the difference between a “non-scientific” versus (a more) “scientific” reconstruction of semiosis may be construed as the difference holding between object-level reconstructions and those of higher levels, if not categorically or distinctly, then at least according to continuity or continuance. Whether thought of in more rigid (strict, fixed) or fluid (loose, flowing) terms— and also keeping the relativity of levels in mind—there is a clear difference between the “lower” phenomenal, empirical, or operational level, and higher notional, theoretical, or terminological-conceptual levels, or between the everyday, practical, “non-scientific” level, and higher “scientific” and “metascientific” ones. There is the level of “peers,” i.e., meaning-making actants or participants. And there are various levels of “scientists” (some may potentially be called “metascientists”), i.e., meaning-­making reflexants (describers) and auto-reflexants (self-describers) of differing orders. Reconstructors of semiosis run the gamut up and down all of these levels; the reconstructions they proffer may be considered as being more informal (“unscientific”) versus more formal (“scientific”). For example, the interpretation—the unravelling of an X = Y relation—of somebody’s semiosis (for the purpose of reconstruction and on the basis, perhaps, of an observed behaviour or interaction with an artefact) on the part of an

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interpreter-­cum-­reconstructor may, on the one hand, be an entirely speculative affair, predicated on contemplations, hypothesizations, musings, playfulness, ponderings, the freedom of associations, etc. When presented, such an interpretation constitutes an informal-subjective reconstruction of semiosis, one that is more based on what is personal to the reconstructor and less based on scientific principles, that is, it is a reconstruction predicated on the subjectivity of an individual. Furthermore, such a reconstruction is in all likelihood based on comparison and the “guesstimational” or “guesstimative” logic of abduction as applied to the question of: “What meanings would I be making in that same situation?” On the other hand, a formal-objective reconstruction of semiosis is more based on systematic reasoning or a reasoned, methodical, “architectonic” approach. That is, in this case, the interpretation of somebody’s semiosis on the basis of how they behave or interact with an artefact, for instance, may be predicated on the invocation of what is determined, conditioned, or shared by society and/or culture, or on what is (considered to be) intersubjective. When presented, such an interpretation-cum-­ reconstruction of semiosis relates to the (attempted) objectivity of the individual (interpreter, reconstructor), minimizing the role of personal associations, and maximizing that of the so-called scientific method.15 Whether the methodology employed in interpretation-cum reconstruction—and there must be some kind of methodology employed, and also justified—is qualitative or quantitative or mixed does not really matter, but as concerns the comparative logic that is potentially used, the latter in all probability applies the logics of either induction or deduction to the problem of “What meanings would I be making in that same scenario?” The situation is complicated by the fact that the semiosis of the object-level meaning-maker under scrutiny may itself be more formal (less informal) or more informal (less formal)—or more “objective” (less “subjective”) or more “subjective” (less “objective”)—in exactly the same way as the semiosis of their scrutinizer (whether so-called peer or scientist). When it comes to a more “formal-objective” method, the degree of “formality” or “objectivity”—or “informality” and “subjectivity”—of someone’s semiosis may in theory be “measured” by the justified combination approach.16

 One very general understanding of the “scientific method” is that it constitutes a procedure that involves making observations, asking research questions, formulating hypotheses, conducting experiments, analyzing results, and reporting conclusions, for example. The author saw this on a poster in an art store during a “back to school sale” aimed at elementary-aged children. 16  Although this idea will not be further developed here, an early hypothesis—based on intuition and in need of testing—is that semiosis considered as more formal or objective is one that is also considered (more) limited, stable-predictable, complete, knowledge-based, deliberated, motivated, and immutable, while semiosis considered as more informal or subjective is one that is considered (more) unlimited, unstable-unpredictable, incomplete, experience-based, spontaneous, arbitrary, and mutable. The first of these could be called the “formal-objective set” constituted by “formalobjective criteria,” while the second could be called the “informal-subjective set” composed of “informal-subjective criteria.” Stemming from this idea, a secondary hypothesis is that between these two extremes—whether considered in typological or gradient terms—it would be possible to 15

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6 Scientificity Within the framework we are working, we are thus faced with a kind of “movement” of (in)formality—or subjectivity-versus-objectivity/objectivity-versus-­ subjectivity, depending on whether it is considered from “bottom-up” or “top-down” perspectives—between object-level and metalevels.17 And this “movement,” as such, can be gauged via the notion of scientificity as it has been proposed, developed, and discussed by Zong-Liang Xu (2005). Xu begins the discussion by questioning the notion of science in the first place: We are now living in a scientific era, in which the theory and practice of science have penetrated into all aspects of society and science is often a hot topic. However, what on earth is science? This question is largely neglected by many people, even researchers focusing on scientific studies may not have a very clear understanding of it. (Xu, 2005, p. 197)

Xu continues:18 The idea that science is value-free is quite common. This is reasonable to some extent, but is biased on the whole. In this criterion, it is hard to understand properly the relationships between science and value and between science and society, as well as the status and effect of science in modernization drive. The origin of this thought is that some people regard science as only a “knowledge system” and a theoretical form, without realizing that science actually is a kind of practical activity and also a special cultural form during the human’s exploration of the world. Taking science for static theoretical knowledge will prone to draw the conclusion that science is independent of value. However, from a dynamic, historical, and cultural angle, it will be easy to find the value-laden of science and the interaction between science and other practical activities and cultural forms of the human. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of the essence of science is indispensable. (Xu, 2005, p. 197)

And furthermore: Of course, this is only a general view on science. There remain many points for thinking and studying on the question of that what science is. For example, the original concept of “science” and its historical changes, the relationship between science and scientific theories, as well as the relationship between science and the so-called “scientificity” for judging whether a thought or achievement is scientific. There often exist ambiguous understandings of such concepts of “science” and “scientificity” that are frequently used without questionposit different types or gradients of semiosis that are either more formal and objective or more informal and subjective. Furthermore, the typological view could formalize its findings using a system of symbolic notation predicated on the signs “+” and “-”—which in mathematics stand as the “plus-sign” of addition and the “minus-sign” of subtraction, and in the study of electromagnetism are used to denote positive and negative charges, respectively—to represent the “either-or” presence and/or absence of criteria within sets, while the gradience-based view could represent “more or less” presence or absence using the mathematical symbols of “>” (“greater than”) and “