Evidentials and Modals 9004436707, 9789004436701

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Evidentials and Modals

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Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface Series Editors Klaus von Heusinger (University of Cologne) Ken Turner (University of Brighton)

Editorial Board Nicholas Asher (Université Paul Sabatier) Johan van der Auwera (University of Antwerp) Betty Birner (Northern Illinois University) Ariel Cohen (Ben Gurion University) Paul Dekker (University of Amsterdam) Regine Eckardt (University of Constance) Markus Egg (Humbolt University Berlin) Donka Farkas (University of California, Santa Cruz) Brendan Gillon (McGill University) Jeroen Groenendijk (University of Amsterdam) Yueguo Gu (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) Larry Horn (Yale University) Yan Huang (University of Auckland) Manfred Krifka (Humboldt University Berlin)

Chungmin Lee (Seoul National University) Claudia Maienborn (University of Tübingen) Alice ter Meulen (University of Geneva) Jaroslav Peregrin (Czech Academy of Sciences and University of Hradec Králové) Allan Ramsay (University of Manchester) Rob van der Sandt (Radboud University Nijmegen) Kjell Johan Sæbø (University of Oslo) Robert Stalnaker (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Martin Stokhof (University of Amsterdam) Henk Zeevat (University of Amsterdam) Thomas Ede Zimmermann (University of Frankfurt)

volume 39

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/crispi

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Evidentials and Modals Edited by

Chungmin Lee Jinho Park

LEIDEN | BOSTON

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Lee, Chungmin, editor. | Park, Jinho, (Professor of Korean linguistics), editor. Title: Evidentials and modals / edited by Chungmin Lee, Jinho Park. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2020. | Series: Current research in the semantics/pragmatics interface, 14727870 ; 39 | Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2020030424 (print) | LCCN 2020030425 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004423596 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004436701 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Evidentials (Linguistics) | Modality (Linguistics) Classification: LCC P325.5.E96 E955 2020 (print) | LCC P325.5.E96 (ebook) | DDC 415–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020030424 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020030425

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill‑typeface. ISSN 1472-7870 ISBN 978-90-04-42359-6 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-43670-1 (e-book) Copyright 2020 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

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Contents Preface ix List of Figures and Tables x Notes on Contributors xii Introduction: Perspectives and Issues 1 Chungmin Lee and William McClure

Part 1 Theoretical and Typological Perspectives on Evidentiality 1

Evidentiality and Information Source Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald

19

2

A Possible Worlds Semantics for Cuzco Quechua Evidentials Martina T. Faller

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A Matter of Taste 69 Ezra Keshet

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Evidence Type, Evidence Location, Evidence Strength Lisa Matthewson

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Testimony, Trust, and Evidentials Elin McCready

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A Hamblin Semantics for Evidentials and Evidential Questions Sarah E. Murray

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Part 2 Issues on Evidentiality from Korean 7

Korean Evidentials and Epistemic Modals Kyung-Sook Chung

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Evidential Markers as Interactional Resources in Korean Conversation 214 Mary Shin Kim

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The Nature of Evidentiality and Epistemic Modals: The Causal Event Structure 250 Iksoo Kwon

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Evidentials: Nature, Interactions and Shiftability Chungmin Lee

11

The Korean Pre-final Ending -te-: A Historical Investigation Ji-Young Lee

12

A Modal Account of ‘First Person’ Constraints on Evidential Sentences 345 Jungmee Lee

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What Kind of (Doxastic) Alternatives Does Korean Evidential -teIntroduce (If It Does)? 378 Dongsik Lim

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Evidential and/or Mirative Components of Some Verbal Endings and Periphrastic Constructions in Korean 399 Jinho Park

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Evidentiality in Korean Jaemog Song

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324

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Part 3 Evidentiality and Modality in Other Languages 16

Processing Evidentiality in Bilingualism and Aphasia: An Overview of Some Recent Studies on Turkish 447 Seçkin Arslan

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Evidentiality in African Languages Robert Botne

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Breaking the Illusion of Modality: Reclassifying Japanese darou Marisa Nagano and William McClure

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Epistemic Modality in Southeastern Tepehuan Thomas Willett

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Modal Particles Yo and Ne in Japanese Kei Yoshimoto

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Preface This volume was conceived at a time when evidentiality was drawing special attention in semantics and pragmatics. Evidentials Fest 2011 was held at osu, where Matthewson (this volume) and Murray (this volume) were given. And Aikhenvald, though invited, could not be present. In the same year of 2011, the pre-jk (Japanese-Korean Linguistics Conference) 21 Workshop on Evidentials and Modals was held at Seoul National University, where many of the chapters in this volume were presented. Around that time, several Ph.D. dissertations on the Korean direct evidential -te- were produced in North American universities, mostly exploring the function of direct perception with regards to its prejacent. McCready and Ogata (2007) took a Bayesian view of evidence as increase in likelihood due to conditional update, using Japanese sentence final particles. Since Faller (2002), beyond the traditional categorial identification and typological explorations, more and more the formal nature of evidential elements was fruitfully investigated. Whether a modal categorial claim, a ‘modal analysis’ position, or a non-modal categorial position is taken, evidentiality is constantly discussed in relation to modality because of its evidential certainty and justification. (Another nice conference “Expressing Evidence” was held in Konstanz in 2019.) Therefore, we decided on the title of “Evidentials and Modals,” to be flexible, although most chapters are more concerned with evidentials. We express our deep gratitude to all chapter authors for their patience; it took far more years than we originally expected. We apologize for this delay. Most of the chapters were already collected in 2012. The last chapter on Turkish evidential processing, however, was solicited in the summer last year. Some opted out in the meantime. We are grateful to Bill McClure for helping start the Introduction. We also express our gratitude to the series (CRiSPI) editors Ken and Klaus for their efforts. We hope that all the chapters by eminent or young and ambitious scholars in this volume will be influential to readers for years to come. Jinho Park and Chungmin Lee

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Figures and Tables Figures 1.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.10 10.1 16.1 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 17.8 17.9 17.10 17.11 17.12

The semantic range of evidentiality strategies 27 The two contributions of (7): Floyd won 146 The two contributions of (8): 3-win-dir Floyd 148 The two contributions of (9): 3-win-rpt.3sg Floyd 149 Felicitous conjunction of (2i) and (2ii) 150 Infelicitous denial in (4ii) of (4i) 152 The contributions of (10): Did Floyd win? 154 The two contributions of (11Q): q=3-win-rpt.3sg Floyd 155 The two contributions of (12Q): 3-win-int Floyd 157 FD-schema of May 258 Schematic structure of causality 259 Deontic modal 261 Epistemic modal 261 Overlap between EVs and EMs 263 EV and EM in Korean 264 EV and EM in Nanti 264 EV and EM in Imbabura Quechua 264 The causal event chain of the firsthand evidentiality 266 Schematic structure of inductive reasoning process (-napo-) 268 The signal event (acquired before UT) is mapped to the future event (e). 284 Percent source recall accuracy for items that are correctly judged as ‘old’ in the source memory task. 455 Boye’s (2012:130) semantic map of epistemic meanings 462 Mapping of Fur evidentials 466 Mapping of epistemic justification and modal support in Lega 468 Lunyole reportive evidential 469 Mapping of Maaka evidentials I 470 Mapping of Maaka evidentials II 472 Mapping of Shilluk evidentials 476 Mapping of epistemic justification in Luwo 477 Mapping of prefixes in Makhuwa-Enahara 477 Mapping of evidential/tense markers in Sukuma 478 Mapping of epistemic justification in !Xun 480 Mapping of evidential forms in Somali 482

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figures and tables 17.13 17.14 20.1 20.2 20.3

Mapping of Supyire as direst vs. indirect justification 484 Mapping of Engenni evidential complementizers 493 A plan for REQUEST 540 A plan for REQUEST with Yo to a normal addressee 541 A plan for INFORM with Yo to a normal addressee 543

Tables 2.1 4.1 4.2 7.1 7.2 9.1 9.2 10.1 10.2 11.1 11.2 12.1 12.2 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 17.8 17.9 17.10 17.11 17.12

Types of source of information 43 Classification of evidentials from nine languages 111 Classification of evidentials from nine languages 112 The result for St’át’imcets evidentials 200 The result for Korean evidentials 205 Frame elements of May 260 Frame elements of Must 260 Evidence nature and directness (from Matthewson, this volume) 295 Weakening of certainty by double occurrence 309 Past tense-aspect system in Middle Korean 325 Changes in the periphrastic constructions -e is- and -ko is- in Middle Korean 326 Correlation between anchoring patterns and the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint 352 First person effects in evidentials: Aikhenvald (2004:238) 369 Comparative chart of classification of evidential types 461 Revised chart of evidential classification 462 Fur evidential particles 465 Fur mirative markers 465 Evidential particles in Lega 468 Shilluk evidential affixes and particle 475 Evidentials in Luwo 477 Evidentials in Makhuwa-Enahara 477 Evidential particles in !Xun 480 Supyire evidential particles 484 Mupun reportive evidential 492 Engenni evidential particles 493

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Notes on Contributors Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald College of Arts, Society and Education, James Cook University Seçkin Arslan Faculty of Arts, University of Groningen Robert Botne Dept. of Linguistics, Indiana University Kyung-Sook Chung Dept. of English Language and Literature, Pusan National University Martina T. Faller School of Languages, Linguistics and Cultures, The University of Manchester Ezra Keshet Dept. of Linguistics, University of Michigan Mary Shin Kim Dept. of East Asian Languages and Literatures, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa Iksoo Kwon Dept. of English Linguistics and Language Technology, Hankuk Univerty of Foreign Studies Chungmin Lee Dept. of Linguistics, Seoul National University, The National Academy of Sciences, ROK Ji-Young Lee Dept. of Korean Language and Literature, Sogang University Jungmee Lee Dept. of English Language and Literature, Seoul National University Dongsik Lim Dept. of English Education, Hongik University

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Lisa Matthewson Dept. of Linguistics, University of British Columbia William McClure School of Arts and Humanities, Queens College, The City University of New York Elin McCready Dept. of English, Aoyama Gakuin University Sarah E. Murray Dept. of Linguistics, Cornell University Marisa Nagano Dept. of Communication Sciences and Disorders, Long Island University Jinho Park Dept. of Korean Language and Literature, Seoul National University Jaemog Song Dept. of Linguistics and Cognitive Science, Hankuk Univerty of Foreign Studies Thomas Willett Field linguist and consultant, SIL Mexico Kei Yoshimoto Institute for Excellence in Higher Education, Tohoku University

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Introduction: Perspectives and Issues Chungmin Lee and William McClure

Modals are the elements of grammar that reference a speaker’s attitude towards a given statement. Does the speaker believe what they are saying completely or are they, to some degree and for whatever reason, skeptical? Using a modal, a speaker may make clear their belief that a given statement is very likely to be true, or they may convey their belief that a given statement is most likely not supported by the facts. They may convey agreement or approval, disbelief or dismay. Unlike a statement such as Today is Tuesday, which is true or not every time it is spoken based on the facts of the world, modal statements are not true in an absolute sense. Rather, like the question of whether a bowl of soup is delicious or not (see Keshet, this volume), the truth of a modalized statement must be understood relative to an individual’s view of the world. Evidentials as grammatical elements express evidentiality. That is, evidentials are the elements of grammar that reference the nature of the evidence for a given statement. Is a speaker making an assertion based on direct sensory evidence or not? If sensory, is the nature of the evidence visual or was it gathered through some other sense? If the evidence is not sensory, an evidential can indicate that a speaker is making a statement based on his or her own conclusions reached through an internal cognitive process. Or an evidential may indicate that a speaker is simply repeating what someone else has already said. Modals and evidentials are often conflated in the linguistic literature, not the least because languages vary in how they grammaticalize (or not) these two categories of meaning. Regardless of whether this is a substantive question (questions about the nature of the evidence may be modal, but this may also depend on your definition and treatment of modality) or a linguistic shorthand (are the linguistic forms distinct or not?), it seems clear that questions about the nature of the evidence and the confidence that a speaker has in statements based on that evidence are distinct considerations. Conceptually, this should not really be a surprise. How a speaker came to know certain things and whether those things are believed to be good or bad, likely or unlikely, etc. are separate questions. More specifically, a speaker can be sure of something that they heard from a reliable source. They can equally be skeptical of something they’ve heard from an unreliable source. The fact that a statement is based on second-hand information does not necessarily say anything about its reliability (although it might be assumed to, and in some languages, does). Alternatively,

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004436701_002

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a speaker can convey that they have reached an informed conclusion, or they may wish to convey that they are making a stab in the dark. Again, the fact that a statement is based on the speaker’s own deductive process does not necessarily say anything about its likelihood of being true (although, again, in a given language, it might). Aikhenvald’s (2018) definition of evidentiality as grammaticalized marking of ‘information source’ traces as far back as to Franz Boas’ phrasing (1938: 133). As cited by her (2018:1), “while for us definiteness, number, and time are obligatory aspects, we find in another language location near the speaker or somewhere else, source of information—whether seen, heard, or inferred—as obligatory aspects” (emphasis added). She states that evidentials help us be precise. To illustrate, she gives an example from Palmer: … what a lot of breath and ink this might save us in English if we had evidential suffixes that we could use in the courtroom. Using the Wintun suffix, we might say, for example, “The defendant shoplift-be [be is a visual evidential] the compact disc,” thereby eliminating the need to ask the inevitable question: “Did you actually see her take it?” Aikhenvald 2018: 1, citing Palmer 1996: 200

In Chapter 11 of her (2004) book, Aikhenvald illustrates with many examples of what happens when speakers of languages with obligatory evidential marking encounter speakers of languages without it. Citing work by Laprade on the interaction between speakers of Andean Spanish and Jaqi (Aymara) in modern Bolivia, she writes: One of the few Aymara categories that found their way into the local Spanish is evidentiality. As a result, outsiders who speak different varieties of Spanish, or learners of Aymara who disregard the evidential system, are at a disadvantage. At best, they are perceived as unreliable and, at worst, as outright liars … ‘If a Peace Corps volunteer, reading from a book, states as personal knowledge that certain seeds yield good crops, the perception … is of someone trying to deceive’ (Silver and Miller 1997: 36). Aikhenvald 2004: 335, citing Laprade 1981: 207

Aikhenvald writes, “Evidentials are associated with different kinds of knowledge and experience, and with conventionalized ways of talking about them” (2004: 333). She has argued in several places for the hierarchy in (1) for how to choose the right (or preferable) evidential (Aikhenvald 2004: 63–64, 2018: 12, this volume; see Willet 1988 as well).

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(1) Visual evidential Non-visual evidential Inferred evidential based on visual evidence Reported evidential Assumed evidential

1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 4th choice Last choice

This is consistent with her suggestion that “visually acquired information is considered highly valuable and reliable, perhaps more so than information acquired through any other means” (2004: 338). Turning to their grammatical category, while semanticists are paying increasing attention to the nature of evidential meaning (Portner 2009), it remains a matter of debate within the field whether evidentials are a kind of modal or whether they are a distinct grammatical category. This issue is addressed from various perspectives by many of the papers in this volume. The problem is difficult not the least because languages vary in how they grammaticize (or not) these two categories of meaning. Consider the examples in (2). -s in (2a) is a reportative suffix -s in Cuzco Quechua meaning that the speaker was told something (Faller 2006); -ampó in (2b) is an evidential particle in Lega (Beya dialect) meaning that the speaker has direct sensory evidence, especially visual or auditory (Botne 1997). Soo da/desu in (2c) is a nominal form in Japanese meaning that the speaker was told something (and is therefore not necessarily committed to its truth) (McClure 2000). (2) a. Congresista-manta-s haykuy-ta muna-n congressman-abl-rep enter-acc want-3 ‘He wants to be a Congressman.’ (= p) EVIDENTIAL: speaker was told that p ísɛlɛnzi b. ampó Masúdí á-mo-mɔ́ n-ɪnɛ kw ev Masúdí 3s-3s-see-rec 17.loc brother ‘[It’s a fact that] Masudi saw him at his brother’s place.’ [speaker was told by M., who experienced it] genki da soo desu c. Tanaka.kun-wa moo already better cop ev cop Tanaka-top ‘Tanaka seems to be better. They say Tanaka is already better.’ [speaker was told this by someone] The commonly studied Indo-European languages don’t grammaticize evidentiality at all into a closed-class set of affixes. English and French have expres-

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sions such as je n’encroyais pas mes yeux or I couldn’t believe my eyes (cf. Rooryck 2001a, b), but they don’t have grammatical forms or inflectional morphology that convey a meaning such as ‘based on evidence gathered through direct sensory experience.’ From the perspective of particular semantic analyses, Faller (2002a, b) argues that modality and evidentiality are distinct. She makes the specific claim that evidentials modify or affect the speech act performed by a sentence, as a kind of performativity, while epistemic modals contribute to truth conditions. In contrast, both Matthewson et al. (2007) and McCready and Ogata (2007) take the view that evidentiality is epistemic modality, contributing to truth conditions. That “evidentiality and epistemic modality together constitute a broader class” is also consistent with suggestions found in Portner (2009). In contrast to the evidentials as grammatical ‘primitives’ approach, whether that primitive is modal or not, authors such as Fleck (2007), Kalsang et al. (2013), Koev (2017), J. Lee (2013), Lim (2014), Nikolaeva (1999), and Speas (2010) define evidentiality in terms of spatiotemporal distance between the event described by the sentence and the evidence acquisition or ‘learning’ event. Koev argues against the claim that evidential sentences in Bulgarian have modal force (pace Izvorski 1997, Smirnova 2013) and claims that his analysis correctly predicts that speakers are typically committed to the core or scope proposition described by an evidential sentence. He analyzes the not-at-issue discourse status and projection behavior of the evidential implication and suggests that this implication belongs to the broader class of ‘conventional implicatures’ (Potts 2005). Kalsang et al. apply a situation semantics approach in terms of a relation of inclusion between information (topic, reference, or witnessing) situation and evaluation (witnessed) situation for the Tibetan direct evidentials ’dug and shag. Specifically, if the former situation includes the latter, ’dug is used, if vice versa, i.e., if a broken pot pieces situation includes the pot breaking situation, shag is used. Thus, these evidentials are not reflective of truth conditions. Different authors may be different in their formal semantic/pragmatic analysis within the same latter position. From a typological perspective, Aikhenvald (2004, 2018, and this volume) and others (cf. De Haan 1999, Lazard 1999, DeLancey 2001) make clear that the linguistic forms that convey evidential meaning are distinct from those that convey modal meaning. That being said, while every language presumably allows its speakers to express both evidential and modal thoughts, not all languages bother to encode these meanings in what might be considered purely grammatical forms. Moreover, the expression of evidential meaning often overlaps or interacts with the expression of tense, aspect, mirativity, voice, etc.

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That is, it is common for categories that are not usually considered to be evidential to have (secondary) evidential interpretations. For anyone who studies tense, aspect, voice, modality, etc., this should not really be a surprise. While each of these areas of grammar might be argued to have basic categorical distinctions (e.g. past/non-past, perfective/imperfective, declarative/interrogative, epistemic/deontic, etc.) that are recognized and easily expressible in most languages, such systems usually include gaps in the mapping between meaning and form. By way of example, Korean has at least one clear case of an evidential morpheme, -te (discussed in several papers in this volume), although its interpretation interacts with tense and aspect. Specifically, it can have both direct and inferential interpretations with null tense while it is predominantly inferential under past tense. Consider the result state inference reading in (3a) and the current state reading in (3b). (3b) is equivalent to the null tense stative expression in (3b′).1 (3) a. ecey pam-ey pi-ka o-ass-te-ra yesterday night-at rain-nom come-past-te-dec ‘Last night, it rained [as I saw the wet streets and inferred this morning].’ b. mwul-i katuk cha-ss-te-ra water-nom fully full- past-te-dec ‘It was filled with water, as I saw.’ katuk-ha-te-ra b’. mwul-i water-nom full-be-te-dec ‘It was full of water, as I saw.’ To give a second example, this one from English, must might well include an evidential meaning of ‘second hand information’ even though must is generally considered a basic modal auxiliary (von Fintel and Gillies 2010: 3). Consider the contrast between (4) and (5). If you are looking out the window and you see that it is raining, (4a) is fine while (4b) is not.

1 We thank Dongsik Lim for reminding us of this stative reading. However, a genuine stative reading is obtained by the resultative aspect marker -e iss-, which can replace the past marker in (3b), as -cha-e iss-, with a telic point, whereas the process verb ‘rain’ resists the resultative marker -e iss-: ?*pi-ka o-a iss-e ‘It has rained and remains’.

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(4) [Seeing the pouring rain] a. It’s raining. b. ??It must be raining. In contrast, if you see people coming in with wet umbrellas, raincoats, etc. both (5a&b) are fine. (5) [Seeing wet rain gear and knowing rain is the only possible cause] a. It’s raining. b. It must be raining. That is, must is compatible only with a situation where the speaker has made an inference. It is incompatible with direct observation. To illustrate the level of complexity, even this inquiry probably entails two questions that might follow immediately: (i) Is has to also a modal auxiliary? And (ii) Does has to have the secondary evidential meaning as well? Must might also be contrasted with will or shall, traditionally considered to be markers of future tense, but with their own differences. The underlying lesson is that ambiguity of meaning in linguistic forms is probably the norm rather than the exception. That the forms are ambiguous, however, should not prevent us from observing and studying the distinct semantic meanings. Finally, Higginbotham (2009) proposes that a language like English might encode evidential meaning formally, in his examples on the functional head of verbs (cf. Garrett 2001) that then take the rest of the sentence as their complements. This could have the general structure found in (6), where ε is the evidential meaning. (6) A horse ran+ε through the village. Higginbotham reviews several issues raised by this proposal. For example, does the complement of the evidential quantify over propositions or events? To start to answer this question, Higginbotham considers the examples in (7) with verbs of perception (see Barwise and Perry 1983). (7) a. John saw/heard [that Mary was crying] b. John saw/heard [Mary cry/crying] In (7a), see and hear are understood epistemically and mean something like “come to know by using one’s eyes” or “come to learn that it was said or rumored” (p. 224). In (7a), it must in fact be the case that Mary was crying.

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In contrast, see and hear in (7b) are understood non-epistemically. In particular, it is possible to utter (7b) in a situation where John heard Mary crying even though he thought it was the wind in the trees (p. 225). That is, the epistemic construction includes what might be normally considered an evidential interpretation related to direct perception so that (7a) has the underlying form found in (8). (8) John saw+[direct evidential] Mary cry. As the epistemic (7a) entails that Mary actually did cry, the conclusion is that the object of the evidential must be an actual event. Higginbotham makes this particular argument in the context of the claim that direct evidentials typically originate from direct perception verbs (Botne 1997). He cites Garrett (2001) as counting one evidential form in Tibetan as encoding direct perception. He further cites Willett’s (1988) proposed hierarchy of four evidential categories: (i) personal experience; (ii) direct sensory evidence; (iii) indirect evidence; (iv) hearsay. This reminds us immediately of Aikenvald’s hierarchy of evidentials given above in (1), repeated below. (1) Visual evidential Non-visual evidential Inferred evidential based on visual evidence Reported evidential Assumed evidential

1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 4th choice Last choice

Higginbotham also claims that evidentials that signify ‘evidence’, rather than ‘source’, cannot explain cases of first-person authority such as I am hungry/ dizzy, whereas evidentials that can only characterize sources cannot explain cases of assertions (with strained interpretations) such as I must be hungry/ dizzy, which suggests that the speaker has evidence for something that normally is known without it. Similarly, ‘performatively transparent’ complementtaking verbs such as performatives (promise), acts of speech (say, ask, state, announce), and think, guess, believe, suppose, presume, be afraid, wonder have the property that ‘saying them makes them true.’ The first-person present tense use (or its accommodation) of some of those may reflect first-person authority. These performatively transparent verbs are distinct from verbs such as know, be sorry, regret, be convinced, demonstrate, which show factive presupposition. Faller (2002) discusses this difference, observing that one of the evidentials of Cuzco Quechua is like guess or believe in (9), which is not atissue:

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(9) I guess/believe I’ll do the cooking—No you don’t. [can only deny that you do the cooking, as if only the complement were uttered] (10) I know I’ll do the cooking—No you don’t. [can (only?) deny knowledge] Finally, Higginbotham also discusses certain parenthetical-like adverbials and complementalizer-less lifting constructions (e.g. A horse ran through the village, from what I saw), as further candidates for evidentials, citing Rooryck (2001a, b). He suspects that evidentials are singulary, functioning both syntactically and semantically as heads taking complements. By this, he foresaw the distinction between evidentials’ not-at-issue-ness and their complements’ atissue-ness, made clear by Murray (2017). The subjective phenomenon of taste and psych-predicates raises the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness in Korean as well (C. Lee 2013, 2016). In Korean, “I am dizzy” is fine in the 1st person present, but ??“She is dizzy” in the 3rd person present is infelicitous. Similarly, for the 1st person’s past psychological experience, … dizzy-te, with -te, is felicitous, but it is not felicitous for a third person’s past psychological experience. The person restriction with psychological predicates and the direct perceptual evidential -te occurrences are reasonably co-relational, both being subjective. With the same intuition, Korotkova (2016) argues that the matter of ‘subjectivity’, common to evidentials and psych-predicates, accounts for the “resistance to direct denials,” known as non-challengeability in discourse, seen as supporting a ‘not-at-issue analysis’ of evidentials. Finally, Aikhenvald (2004: 344–354) discusses the individualized nature of evidentials, how their understanding and usage must differ from one speaker to the next, and how their usage evolves over time. This includes how they are used when talking about subjective phenomena, the problem of selfconsciousness, dreams, and even advancing technology. For example, Aikhenvald gives examples of languages where dreams are treated as ordinary, directly observed experience and where they are not. In the former, she includes Jarawara (Dixon 2004), Turkic languages, Wanka Quechua (Floyd 1999: 64–65), Amdo Tibetan (Sun 1993: 966–967), and East Tucanoan (which she attributes to a personal communication from Janet Barnes). In the latter, she references Cree/Montagnais/ Naskapi (James, Clark and MacKenzie 2001: 243), Yukaghir (Jochelson 1905: 400), Svan (Sumbatova 1999: 75), Modern Eastern Armenian (Kozintseva 2000: 411), Macedonian (Friedman 2003: 210), and Abkhaz (Chirikba 2003: 251–252).

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Aikhenvald also reviews numerous examples of evidentials being used in innovative ways to adapt to changing technologies, e.g. reading, telephone, television, the internet, etc. (2004: 351–354, 2015). Here she again cites Boas (1942: 183), “when changes of culture demand new ways of expressions languages are sufficiently pliable to follow the needs” (p. 351). In Shipibo-Koniko, the reporting evidential is used for anything that is read or words that are heard (e.g. on the radio, on television while not watching it, on the phone), while the direct evidential is used for anything that is learned visually (e.g. from watching television, from using a map, etc.) (Valenzuela 2003: 52). In contrast, in West Greenlandic information from radio and television is treated as reported speech while information from reading a newspaper is not (Fortescue 2003: 301). Additionally, Friedman (2003: 211) reports that the evidential chosen may reflect what one thinks of the information. In the particular context of television, speakers may choose a firsthand or a non-firsthand evidential to convey their judgment that the information is reliable or not. This volume contributes to these debates a new set of theoretical and typological studies by established scholars, plus new research on lesser known phenomena in Korean and Japanese. The volume began as a set of papers selected from those given at the Workshop on Modality and Evidentials held at Seoul National University concurrent with the 21st Japanese/Korean Linguistics Conference. Its focus was therefore on Korean and Japanese at that time. Those original papers have been supplemented by a carefully selected set of papers on other languages. The specific linguistic questions addressed include a range of issues related to evidentials and modals as separate linguistic phenomena, as well as to the question of their relationship. The central concern is the direction of research into evidentials along with specific examinations of typological variation. The volume is divided into three general sections, although many papers might clearly fit into more than one section. Within each section, papers are arranged alphabetically by author, although their relationships with each other vary. These sections are: 1. Theoretical and Typological Perspectives on Evidentiality 2. Issues on Korean Evidentials 3. Evidentials and Modality in Other Languages. In the discussion that follows, the papers are grouped together in different ways to further explain how they might be understood in relation to each other. Aikhenvald (2004, in addition to this volume) uses evidence from a great number of languages to characterize the full range of evidential grammar and to argue persuasively for the distinction between evidential and modal meanings. In many respects, her work is now the starting point for research into

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evidentials. Aikhenvald’s paper is complimented by that of Botne, who provides a survey of evidentials in African languages. These include a few systems that might be considered purely evidential as well as many more systems that employ a variety of evidential strategies which overlap with other components of the grammar. Turning to Korean specifically, the chapters by C. Lee, Park, and Song all detail characteristics of the general typology and behavior of evidentials in Korean, with C. Lee’s more theoretically focused. These chapters are supplemented by that of J-Y. Lee, which is focused on the grammatical development of evidentials in Korean. Finally, many of the papers are focused on specific linguistic phenomena from particular languages. The chapters by Chung, Kim and J. Lee continue the focus on Korean. Additional chapters that cite a significant range of facts from other languages include those by Arslan (Turkish), Faller (Cuzco Quechua), Kwon (Nanti, and Imbabura Quechua in addition to Korean), Matthewson (St’át’imcets from her own field work in addition to facts cited from a number of other languages), Murray (Cheyenne), Nagano and McClure (Japanese), Willett (Southeastern Tepehuan), and Yoshimoto (Japanese). Turning from the languages that are studied or referenced and their typology, the linguistic topics addressed in the volume are roughly divided into three: (i) the discourse or conversational function of evidentials and modals, (ii) the specific question of the theoretical relationship between evidentials and modals, and (iii) the nature of evidential and modal meaning itself. In the first category, the chapter by Kim contributes to the growing body of research on the conversational role of evidentials in Korean. Kim’s chapter reviews the function of evidential markers, including a zero evidential marker, in a detailed corpus study of telephone conversations. In addition to discussing particular markers, e.g. -tamye, Kim is interested in contexts where a speaker can choose more than one evidential marker. What is the effect of shifting back and forth between, for example, zero/-tay? In contrast to the conversationbased chapters on Korean, Nagano and McClure propose a speech act theory of darou in Japanese. While darou is often translated into English as ‘probably,’ it occurs in various environments where its quantificational force is very different from the roughly 50% associated with English probably.2 In a similarly specific fashion, Yoshimoto revisits the behavior of Japanese sentence-final yo and ne, typically referred to as modal particles. Adopting a theory that mod2 Recently Hara (2017) applies an inquisitive semantic approach to darou, with up and down intonation in declarative and interrogative sentences, defining it as an ‘entertain’ modal with a shiftable deictic agent, applying Ciardelli and Roelofsen’s (2015) inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic.

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els speech acts as operators in a planning system (Cohen and Perrault 1979), Yoshimoto accounts for the basic functions of the two particles with declarative sentences, as well as for how they interact with non-declarative speech acts, intonation, and each other. In the second category, Matthewson cites evidence from a number of languages, including Willett’s paper on Southeastern Tepehuan in this volume, to argue for the overlap of modal and evidential meaning. That is, she argues that evidential forms may be semantically complex and include components related to the type (direct/indirect) and strength (the reliability of the source) of the evidence.3 This is stated clearly by Willett (this volume), “Epistemic modality reflects the speaker’s degree of commitment to the truth of what he or she is saying. This involves both the reliability and the source of his or her knowledge about the situation described.” The Faller chapter on Cuzco Quechua provides an explicit example of how a model theoretic account for evidential meaning can be subsumed into the possible worlds-based theory of modality developed by Kratzer (1981, 1987). Faller credits Izvorski (1997) with the first analysis extending Kratzer’s work to evidentials, while observing that the original proposal has since been modified by many, including by Faller herself. Working in the same theoretical context, but citing facts from Korean, Lim argues that even though both evidentials and modals might be characterized in this way, they still exhibit differences that merit a theoretical distinction (his paper is focused on the interaction of -te and the interpretation of the long distance anaphor caki). Working in a completely different theoretical context, Kwon expands the causal event structure of Sweetser (1990) to include representations of both evidentials and modals. Citing evidence from Korean, Nanti, and Imbabura Quechua, he argues that specific forms in specific languages can refer to different parts of this structure, explaining the overlap and ambiguity of so many modal and evidential forms. Focusing on Korean, Chung argues that te is not modal at all, claiming that it belongs to the deictic tense category, while J. Lee provides a modal account of various person restrictions associated with te/-ney. Finally, Lim and Lee (2012) and Lim (this volume) demonstrate that the evidential -te but not epistemic modals can license the non-de se long-distance anaphor caki. In the third category, turning to the nature of evidential and modal meaning itself, McCready’s proposal for evidentials is framed in terms of update behavior. That is, given an evidential H and a proposition φ, what is the difference

3 Matthewson also claims that evidentials may make reference to the location of the evidence, that is, whether the speaker witnessed an event first hand or only witnessed its aftermath.

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in meaning between φ and Hφ, and can we necessarily conclude φ from Hφ? (The answer to the last question is not necessarily yes, particularly if H is a hear-say evidential.) Murray (2017, this volume) offers a formal treatment of evidentials that attempts to capture what she refers to as their “core semantics [that] most, if not all, languages share.” In particular, she argues that the meaning contributed by an evidential is new, not presupposed (against Izvorski 1997), and the meaning of the basic sentence (which is defined as ‘at-issue’) can be rejected without rejecting the meaning of the evidential (which is defined as ‘not-at-issue’). See Murray (2017) for an overview and details of a compositional, cross-linguistic semantics of evidentials. She discusses such diagnostics as challengeability and commitment as practiced also by others to claim that evidentials are not-at-issue (see Korotkova’s (2016) argument above). Finally, the chapter by Keshet takes us back to a crucial feature of modals: modals reference attitudes. Just as a bowl of soup may be delicious for one person and not so much for another, a single sentence with a modal may be true for one person and false for another depending on their respective beliefs about the world. If we believe Murray that evidentials are truth conditional, the same is not so for modals. That is, that the evidence for a statement is based on hearsay or on direct visual inspection is a fact of the world and not a matter of belief. The degree to which we choose to believe that information is a separate, and much more modal, question.

Editors’ Acknowledgments The Editors of this volume would like to thank everyone who helped make this work possible patiently including those mentioned in the Preface and Lisa Matthewson, who read the Introduction carefully and made helpful comments.

References Cited Aikhenvald, Alexandra (2004). Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aikhenvald, Alexandra (2015). The Art of Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aikhenvald, Alexandra (2018). Evidentiality: The Framework. In A. Aikhenveld (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Barwise, Jon and John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Boas, Franz (1938). The Mind of Primitive Man. Boston: The Macmillan Company.

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Boas, Franz (1942). Language and culture. In Studies in the History of Culture: The Disciplines of the Humanities. Menasha: The George Banta Publishing Company. 178–184. Botne, Robert (1997). Evidentiality and epistemic modality in lega. Studies in Language, 21: 509–529. Chirikba, Viacheslav (2003). Evidential category and evidential strategy in Abkhaz. In A. Aikhenvald and R.M.W. Dixon (eds.), Word: A Cross-linguistic Typology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 243–272. Cicardelli, Ivano A. and Floris Roelofsen (2015). Inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic Synthese 192: 1643–1687. Cohen, Philip R. and C. Raymond Perrault (1979). Elements of a plan-based theory of speech acts. Cognitive Science, vol. 3. De Haan, Ferdinand (1999). Evidentials and epistemic modality: Setting boundaries. Southwest Journal of Linguistics 18: 83–101. DeLancey, Scott (2001). The mirative and evidentiality. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 369– 382. Faller, Martina (2002a). Remarks on evidential hierarchies. In D.I. Beaver et al. (eds.), The Construction of Meaning. Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 89–112. Faller, Martina (2002b). Semantics and pragmatics of evidentials in Cuzco Quechua. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University. Faller, Martina (2006). Evidentiality and epistemic modality at the semantics/pragmatics interface. Talk presented at the workshop on philosophy and linguistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, November 3–5, 2006. von Fintel, Kai and Anthony Gillies (2010). Must … stay … strong!. Natural Language Semantics 18(4): 351–383. Fleck, David (2007). Evidentiality and double tense in Matses. Language 83: 589–614. Floyd, Rick (1999). The Structure of Evidential Categories in Wanka Quechua. Dallas: Summer Institute of Linguistics and University of Texas at Arlington. Fortescue, Michael (2003). Evidentiality in West Greenlandic: A case of scattered coding. In A. Aikhenvald and R.M.W. Dixon (eds.), Word: A Cross-linguistic Typology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 291–306. Friedman, Victor A. (2003). Evidentiality in the Balkans with special attention to Macedonian and Albanian. In A. Aikhenvald and R.M.W. Dixon (eds.), Word: A Crosslinguistic Typology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 189–218. Garrett, Edward (2001). Evidentiality and assertion in Tibetan. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, UCLA. Hara, Yurie (2017). Darou as an entertain modal with a shiftable deictic agent: an inquisitive approach. Paper given at the 25th Japanese/Korean Linguistics Conference, October 12–14, 2017, University of Hawaii. Higginbotham, James (2009). Evidentials: Some preliminary distinctions. In R.J. Stainton and C. Viger (eds.), Compositionality, Context and Semantic Values. 221–235

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Izvorski, Roumyana (1997). The present perfect as an epistemic modal. In A. Lawson and E. Cho (eds), SALT 7. James, D., S. Clarke, and M. MacKenzie (2001). The encoding of information source in Algonquian: Evidentials in Cree/Montagnais/Naskapi. International Journal of American Linguistics 67: 229–263. Jochelson, Waldemar (1905). Essay on the grammar of the Yukaghir Language. American Anthropologist Supplement 7: 369–424. Kalsang, Jay Garfield, Margaret Speas, and Jill de Villiers (2013). Direct evidentials, case, tense, and aspect in Tibetan: evidence for a general theory of the semantics of evidential. Natural Language & Linguistic Theory 31.2: 517–561. Koev, Todor (2017). Adverbs of change, aspect, and underspecification. Proceedings of SALT 27: 22–42. Korotkova, Natalia (2016). Heterogeneity and uniformity in the evidential domain. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, UCLA. Kozintseva, Natalia (2000). Perfect forms as means of expressing evidentiality in Modern Eastern Armenian. In L. Johanson and B. Utas (eds.), Evidentials: Turkic, Iranian, and Neighbouring Languages. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 401–417. Kratzer, Angelika (1981). The notional category of modality. In H.J. Eikmeyer and H. Rieser (eds.), Words, Worlds, and Contexts: New Approaches in Word Semantics. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 38–74. Kratzer, Angelika (1987). Modality. In A. von Stechow and D. Wunderlich (eds.), Handbook of Semantics. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 639–650. Laprade, Richard A. (1981). Some cases of Aymara influence on La Paz Spanish. In Hardman, M.J. (ed.), The Aymara Language in its Social and Cultural Context: A Collection of Essays on Aspects of Aymara Language and Culture. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida. Lazard, Gilbert (1999). Mirativity, evidentiality, or other? Linguistic Typology 3: 91– 110. Levinson, Stephen C. (2000). Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lee, Chungmin (2013). Psych-Predicates: First person and evidentiality. In Procedia— Social and Behavioral Sciences 97: 414–421. Elsevier. 9th Int’l Conference on Cogntive Science (ICCS). Lee, Chungmin (2016). Expressing the self: psych predicates and the issue of evidentiality. Journal of Linguistics 41(4): 679–713. Lee, Jungmee (2013). Temporal constraints on the meaning of evidentiality. Natural Language Semantics 21: 1–41. Lim, Dongsik (2014). On the interation between lexical aspects of predicates and evidentiality—A situation-semantics account. Eoneohag 70: 117–140. Lim, Dongsik and Chungmin Lee (2012). Perspective shifts of Korean evidentials and the effect of contexts. Proceedings of SALT 22: 26–42.

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Matthewson, Lisa, Hotze Rullmann and Henry Davis (2007) Evidentials as epistemic modals: Evidence from St’at’imcets. The Linguistic Variation Yearbook 7. McClure, William (2000). Using Japanese. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCready, Elin. and Norry Ogata (2007). Varieties of conventional implicature, Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (2): 147–162. Murray, Sarah E. (2017). The Semantics of Evidentials. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nikolaeva, Irina (1999). The semantics of Northern Ostyak evidentials. Journal de la Societé Finno Ougrienne 88: 131–159. Palmer, Gary B. (1996). Towards a Theory of Cultural Linguistics. Austin: University of Texas Press. Palmer, F.R. (1986). Mood and Modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Portner, Paul (2009). Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Potts, Christopher (2005) The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rooryck, Johann (2001a). Evidentiality, Part I. GLOT International 5: 125–133. Rooryck, Johann (2001b). Evidentiality, Part II. GLOT International 5: 161–168. Silver, Shirley and Wick R. Miller (1997). American Indian Languages: Cultural and Social Contexts. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Smirnova, Anastasia (2013). The meaning of the Bulgarian and Turkish evidentials. Contrastive Linguistics 2/3: 205–223. Speas, Peggy (2010). Evidentials as generalized functional heads. In A.M. Di Sciullo and V. Hill (eds.), Edges, Heads and Projections: Interface Properties. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 127–150. Sumbatova, Nina (1999). Evidentiality, transitivity and split ergativity. In W. Abraham and L. Kulikov (eds.), Tense-Aspect, Transitiviy and Causativity: Essays in Honour of Vladimir Nedjalkov. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 63–95. Sun, Jackson Tianshin (1993). Evidentials in Amdo-Tibetan. Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica 63–64: 945–1001. Sweetser, Eve (1990). From Etymology to Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Valenzuela, Pilar. (2003). Evidentiality in Shipibo-Konibo, with a comparative overview of the category in Panoan. In In A. Aikhenvald and R.M.W. Dixon (eds.), Word: A Cross-linguistic Typology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 33–62. Willett, Thomas (1988). A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticalization of evidentiality. Studies in Language 12: 51–97.

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part 1 Theoretical and Typological Perspectives on Evidentiality

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chapter 1

Evidentiality and Information Source Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald

Every language has an array of ways of referring to information source.* This may be accomplished with verbs referring to reports, claims, or opinions, with adverbs, with parentheticals, prepositional phrases or with particles. In about one quarter of the world’s languages, marking information source is obligatory. These languages have a grammatical category of evidentiality. Other languages have evidential extensions of non-evidential categories—such as conditional in French, perfect in Georgian and participles in Lithuanian. Just like non-grammatical expressions of information source, evidential extensions of non-evidential categories (known as evidential strategies) share the evidential meanings and not infrequently give rise to grammatical evidentials. The term ‘evidential’ primarily relates to information source as a closed grammatical system whose use is obligatory. The term ‘information source’ relates to the corresponding conceptual category. This is akin to the distinction between the category of ‘tense’, as grammaticalized location in time, and the concept of ‘time’. Expressions related to information source are heterogeneous and versatile. They include closed classes of particles and modal verbs, and an open-ended array of verbs of opinion and belief. The term ‘lexical evidentiality’ is misleading in that it obscures these vital differences. Extra-grammatical ways of marking information source may allow more detailed specification of various degrees of assumption, inference, opinion than do grammatical evidential systems, and often reliability, and speaker’s evaluation of information.

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Information Source and Evidentiality

Every language has a way of saying how one knows what one is talking about, and what one thinks about what one knows. But the ways in which the information source can be expressed vary. Languages differ not in what one can say, * This is a substantially revised version of Aikhenvald, A.Y. 2007. Information source and evidentiality: what can we conclude?, Rivista di Linguistica 19: 1, Mario Squartini (ed.). Special issue on Evidentiality between lexicon and grammar, pp. 207–227.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004436701_003

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but in what one must say—as stated by Boas (1938), one of the founders of modern linguistics and of the study of grammatical expression of information source: ‘grammar […] determines those aspects of each experience that must be expressed’ (Boas 1938:132). One language may have a two-term gender system, while another has five genders and a third makes no gender distinctions at all in its grammar—though ‘man’ and ‘woman’, and males and females are clearly distinguished in other ways. Along similar lines, some languages have grammatical tense, and others do not. But in any language, one can talk about time (see §5, and Aikhenvald 2012: 44–45). In at least one quarter of the world’s languages, marking a limited selection of information sources is obligatory. In Tariana (Arawak), Matses (Panoan), Makah (Wakashan), Hup (Makú), Quechua and Aymara, a clause without a marker of information source would not be acceptable to a native speaker. This is grammatical evidentiality—a brief summary is in § 2. Verbal categories whose main meanings do not reflect information source can acquire evidential extensions. Giacalone Ramat & Topadze (2007) show how perfect aspect in Georgian regularly extends to cover evidential meaning associated with inference. This is an example of an evidential strategy fairly wide-spread in many languages of the Caucasus—see the summary in § 3. Every language—no matter whether it has a fully grammaticalized evidential system, or evidential extensions of other categories—has an array of further ways of describing how one knows things.1 Terminological clarity is essential in any branch of linguistics: the importance of distinguishing information source and grammatical evidentials is highlighted in §5. §6 is a brief summary.

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Evidentiality as a Closed Grammatical System: A Bird’s Eye View

As a category in its own right, evidentiality is a relatively recent ‘arrival’ on the linguistic scene—in contrast to other categories such as person, gender, number and tense which have been household concepts in linguistics for thousands of years (see, for instance, Robins 1967). This may well be the reason why the proper limits of evidentiality are still debated by some. 1 This approach was adopted in Aikhenvald (2004); also see a summary in Aikhenvald (2006a). The generalizations are based on the analysis of grammars of c. 600 languages (since the publication of Aikhenvald 2004, I have had access to further grammars). I avoid limiting myself to any artificially constructed samples of languages, since these are likely to engender skewed results (also see Dixon 2010, on the pitfalls of sampling methodology).

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The idea of obligatory marking of information source goes back to Boas, and his sketch of Kwakiutl (1911: 443; 496). ‘The source, or nature, of human knowledge (known by actual experience, by hearsay, and by inference)’ was listed by Sapir (1921:108–109) alongside other grammatical concepts, such as person, modality, number and tense. Since Boas’s work, the notion of grammatical evidentiality has made its way into many grammars of North American Indian languages. Evidentiality is a recurrent feature of South American languages (detailed discussion is in Aikhenvald 2012: 248–278). It is also prominent in Turkic, Uralic, and Tibeto-Burman languages. Evidentiality systems in the languages of Africa have only been described relatively recently (see Botne, this volume; Storch and Coly 2014; Storch 2018). But for grammarians of European languages it remained largely unknown. The term ‘evidential’ as a label for the grammatical category of information source was first introduced by Jakobson in 1957; and became established by the mid-60s (see Jacobsen 1986:4–7; Aikhenvald 2004: 10–17). Lazard (1957) was among the first French linguists to have discussed evidential meanings (‘inférenciel’), based on the material from Tajik, an Iranian language. In languages with obligatory evidentiality, a closed set of information sources has to be marked in every clause—otherwise the clause is ungrammatical, or the speaker incompetent, or even not quite right in his mind (Weber 1986: 142). Evidentiality is a category in its own right, and not a subtype of modality, tense, or mood.2 Languages with grammatical evidentials divide into a number of types depending on how many information sources are assigned a distinct grammatical marking. Semantic parameters employed in languages with grammatical evidentiality cover physical senses, several types of inference and of report. The recurrent terms in the systems are: I. Visual covers information, or evidence, acquired through seeing. II. Sensory covers information obtained through hearing, and is typically extended to smell and taste, and sometimes also touch. III. Inference based on visible or tangible evidence or result.

2 Statements to the contrary found in Palmer (1986), van der Auwera & Plungian (1998) and Willett (1988) are not borne out by the facts of languages, and are mistaken. See the arguments in de Haan (1999), Lazard (1999, 2001) and DeLancey (2001), and a summary in Aikhenvald (2004:3–10). Some scholars whose experience is limited to a handful of familiar European languages tend to assume that evidentials are a kind of modal largely because of their absence in most major European languages, thus trying to explain an unusual category in terms of some other, more conventional, notion.

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IV.

Assumption based on evidence other than visible results: this may include logical reasoning, assumption or simply general knowledge. V. Reported, for reported information with no reference to who it was reported by. VI. Quotative, for reported information with an overt reference to the quoted source. The maximum number of evidential terms in a grammatical system appears to be five. Recent studies in grammatical evidential systems have revealed the existence of further terms. For instance, Yongning Na (Mosuo), a TibetoBurman language (Lidz 2007), has a special term in its evidentiality system which covers exclusively ‘general knowledge’. Mamaindê, a Nambiquara language from Southern Amazonia, also has a special evidential for ‘general knowledge’. This language expresses secondhand and thirdhand information by using different morphological markers (Eberhard 2009, 2018). Amazonian languages may have further terms. In the Southern Nambiquara dialect complex, there is an obligatory marking on the verb for, among others (Lowe 1999): – whether a statement is eyewitness—that is, implying that the speaker had seen the action they are reporting, – whether a statement is inferred or assumed, whereby ‘the speaker’s claim … is based either on seeing an associated simultaneous action and making an interpretation therefrom, or on seeing a set of circumstances which must have resulted from a previous action and making an inference; different suffixes mark these two options’, – whether it is reported, that is if ‘the speaker is simply passing on information they have heard from another speaker’, or – whether there is ‘internal support’—if ‘the speaker reports their ‘gut feeling’ that which they assert must be so’ (Lowe 1999: 275–276). No spoken language has a special evidential to cover smell, taste, or feeling (not so in sign languages: Catalan sign language is reported to have a special evidential marking smell: Sherman Wilcox, p.c.). Evidentiality in sign languages and how it may be different from modality is a matter for further investigation. Semantic parameters group together in various ways, depending on the system. The most straightforward grouping is found in three-term systems— where sensory parameters (I and II), inference (III and IV) and reported (V and VI) are grouped together in Quechua, Shilluk, Bora (Aikhenvald 2004: 145–146; 159–166). Numerous languages of Eurasia group parameters (II–VI) under a catch-all non-firsthand evidential, as, for example, do Abkhaz or Yukaghir.

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Evidentials may not have epistemic extensions, to do with probability and speaker’s evaluation of the trustworthiness of information.3 This is frequently the case in smaller systems: for instance, the reported evidential in Estonian has strong connotations of unreliable information. Visual evidential in Quechua can refer to information the speaker vouches for. Not so in Tariana or Tucano: here visual evidential is to do with access to what one had seen rather than to certainty. A plethora of markers express doubt, certainty or lack thereof. Reported evidential in Estonian has an overtone of doubt. This is akin to how ‘they say’ in English may imply that the speaker does not really believe what is being reported, or to how the ubiquitous dizque has overtones of doubt in many varieties of South American Spanish (Kany 1944: 171; Travis 2006; Babel 2009; and Olbertz 2005, 2007). In contrast, in Quechua, Shipibo-Konibo and Tariana, the reported evidential does not have any such overtones. As Valenzuela (2003: 57) remarks for Shipibo-Konibo, the selection of reported evidential over the direct evidential ‘does not indicate uncertainty or a lesser degree of reliability but simply reported information’. These languages have a plethora of other categories which express doubt, belief, disbelief and so on. See Chapter 5 of Aikhenvald (2004) for a survey of epistemic extensions, or lack thereof, in the grammatical evidentials in the world’s languages (further information about the types of systems and their meanings can be found in Aikhenvald 2018). Just like most other grammatical categories, evidentials interrelate with mood (that is, clause types: Lyons 1977). The maximum number of evidential specifications tends to be distinguished in declarative main clauses. The most frequent evidential in commands is reported (‘do what someone else told you to’) (see Aikhenvald 2010: 138–141). Future and non-indicative modalities—conditional, dubitative and so on— (not to be confused with moods) may allow fewer evidential specifications than the indicative. The maximum number of evidential specifications is found in past tenses.

3 The presence of such extensions does not make evidentials into ‘modals’ (contrary to some assumptions). This can be compared to the gender systems: in many languages feminine gender is associated with diminution, or endearment (see numerous examples in Aikhenvald 2000), and masculine gender with augmentative; this however does not mean that gender is a type of diminutive or augmentative category. Readers should be warned against gratuitously dividing languages into those where evidentials have epistemic extensions, and those where they do not (as did Plungian 2001). As shown in Chapter 5 of Aikhenvald (2004), in the same language one evidential may have an epistemic extension, and another one may not.

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When used with a first person subject, the non-visual, non-firsthand evidentials and reported evidentials in systems of varied types may acquire additional meanings to do with lack of intention, control, awareness and volition on the part of the speaker. Verbs covering internal states may require obligatory evidential choice depending on person. For example, in Tariana (an Arawak language from north-west Amazonia) and adjacent East Tucanoan languages a visual evidential is not appropriate when talking about one’s internal states and feelings. If my tooth is hurting, I have to use a nonvisual evidential: (1) nu-e-da kai-mha 1sg-tooth-CLASSIFIER:ROUND.THING hurt-NONVISUAL.PRESENT ‘My tooth is hurting’ (nonvisual) If I am talking about someone else’s toothache, I cannot use the nonvisual marker: I cannot feel the pain someone else is feeling. If I see someone suffering from toothache, I could say (2), using a visual evidential: (2) di-e-da kai-naka 3sg.masculine-tooth-CLASSIFIER:ROUND.THING hurt-VISUAL.PRESENT ‘His tooth is hurting’ (visual: I can see that he is suffering from toothache) If the person is gone to see a dentist, I may well use the inferred evidential to talk about their toothache: this is based on my inference that a trip to a dentist can only be the result of a toothache. (3) di-e-da 3sg.masc-tooth-CLASSIFIER:ROUND.THING kai-nihka di-tapekani dalipa hurt-INFERRED.RECENT.PAST 3sg.masc-doctor towards di-a-ka-sita 3sg.masc-go-VISUAL.RECENT.PAST-ALREADY ‘His tooth is hurting (inferred), he has already gone to a doctor’4

4 I have undertaken extensive fieldwork on Tariana (see, for instance, Aikhenvald 2003). I have recorded a substantial number of texts and natural conversations. All the examples from Tariana in this paper (as in my other work) come from spontaneous discourse. In my fieldwork, I avoid elicitation as being methodologically flawed (see Dixon 2010 for further fundamentals of linguistic fieldwork).

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In examples (1)–(3), the choice of evidential correlates with person. That is, evidentials can be considered exponents of person, and have an implicit value of person markers. Evidentials typically have sentential, or clausal, scope. Dependent clauses usually cannot have an evidential value different from that of a main clause. Having an NP within the scope of a grammatical evidential is highly unusual. One of the rare well-documented examples known so far comes from Jarawara (an Arawá language from South America: Dixon 2003; Aikhenvald 2004: 88; see also Aikhenvald 2014: 16–19 and Storch and Coly 2014 on the expression of nonpropositional evidentiality).5

3

Evidential Strategies

Meanings to do with how people know things may be expressed without developing a dedicated form whose primary meaning is information source. Nonevidential categories frequently acquire evidential extensions. A conditional mood, or a perfect, or a passive can develop an evidential-like meaning as a ‘side effect’ (see the discussion in Lazard 1999). This kind of extension of a category is referred to as a ‘strategy’ (along similar lines, a language can have complementation strategies, relativisation strategies, imperative strategies, and so on). One of the best-known examples is the conditional in French (also known as ‘conditionnel d’information incertaine’) used to relate information obtained from another source for which the speaker does not take any responsibility (see Dendale 1993, and Dendale and Van Bogaert 2007). Conditional in Italian may also extend to cover reported information (see Squartini 2007). Perfect aspect is a way of expressing non-firsthand evidential meanings in Georgian (Giacalone Ramat & Topadze 2007, Hewitt 1995: 259; 93). This devel-

5 Contrary to assertions by Willett (1988) and others, an evidential may be within the scope of negation, as in Akha, a Tibeto-Burman language. An evidential can be questioned, as in Wanka Quechua. And the ‘truth value’ of an evidential may be different from that of the verb in its clause. Evidentials can be manipulated to tell a lie. One can give a correct information source and wrong information, as in saying ‘He is dead-reported’, when you were told that he is alive, or correct information and wrong information source, as in saying ‘He is alive-visual’, when in fact you were told that he is alive, and did not see him die. Two different information sources can be expressed within one clause (Aikhenvald 2004: 93; 96–98; Fleck 2007). The grammatical category of evidentiality can be expressed through any of the affixes, clitics, or auxiliary constructions. Linguists should be warned not to take seriously generalizations based on a limited sample such as those in De Haan (2005) which provides a highly inadequate coverage of formal means of marking evidentiality.

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opment is shared with many Iranian, Turkic, and Northeast Caucasian languages (also see Comrie 1976:110; Aikhenvald 2004: 289–296). Or the choice of a complementizer or a type of complement clause may serve to express meanings related to how one knows a particular fact. In English, different complement clauses distinguish an auditory and a hearsay meaning of the verb hear: saying I heard John cross the street implies that I did hear John stamping his feet, while I heard that John crossed the street implies a verbal report of the result. That is, a that-clause with perception verbs can refer only to indirect knowledge (see a concise analysis of complement clauses with verbs of perception in English in the context of complementation in general, by Dixon 2005: 270–271).6 Nominalizations and participles often develop connotations similar to nonfirsthand evidentials. In his discussion of Lithuanian, Wiemer (2007) mentions participles ‘as semi-grammaticalized means of indicating hearsay or inferential meanings’. This is consistent with Gronemeyer’s (1997) and Timberlake’s (1982) analysis of Lithuanian passive participles. According to Mathiassen (1996: 134– 135) and Gronemeyer (1997) active participles as head of predicate in Lithuanian have been reinterpreted as reported evidentials. Marking of assertion and speaker’s authority correlates with speaker’s attitudes to information and—indirectly—to its sources. As shown by Pusch (2007), enunciative particles in Gascony Occitan mark speaker’s assertion intertwined with meanings related to expression of the ways in which information was acquired. ‘Assertivity’ in Gascony Occitan is not an evidential system; in Pusch’s words, ‘it oscillates between some kind of modality […] and evidentiality proper’. Evidentiality strategies typically develop a range of meanings characteristic of reported and non-firsthand evidentials: they combine reference to inference and to verbal report. And they are not averse to having epistemic extensions to do with probability, and also expressing speaker’s attitudes to the veracity of what is being said. Non-indicative moods and modalities, and also perfects, resultatives, passives and nominalizations tend to express inference based on results and on assumption. They may extend to cover hearsay, or secondhand, information. Markers of reported speech, particles derived from ‘say’, and de-subordinated speech complements including nominalizations express primarily hearsay or secondhand information. They may extend to cover further meanings to do with inference based on results, and also assumption. 6 Also see Kirsner & Thompson (1976) on a difference between ‘direct perception of a situation’ and ‘deducing a situation’ in their analysis of complements of sensory verbs in English.

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evidentiality and information source inference based on results or assumption

hearsay

non-indicative moods and modalities, perfects, resultatives, passives, nominalizations hearsay

inference based on results or assumption

reported speech, particles derived from ‘say’, de-subordinated speech complements including nominalizations figure 1.1 The semantic range of evidentiality strategies

The range of meanings of the two groups of evidentiality strategies is summarized in Figure 1.1. No language has been found to have a special evidentiality strategy for each of the evidential meanings which can be expressed (I–VI in § 2). Most of the features outlined for grammatical evidentials in § 2 are not characteristic of evidential strategies. They qualify as ‘incipient’ evidentials-in-the-making which tend to grammaticalize into a closed system of evidentials. Over time, an evidential overtone of a non-evidential category may conventionalize as its major meaning. In other words, evidential strategies may develop into grammatical evidentials—as was the case in Lithuanian (Gronemeyer 1997). A future tense can give rise to a dedicated non-firsthand evidential, as happened in Abkhaz (Chirikba 2003: 262–264). And the enunciative particle que in Gascony Occitan (Pusch 2007) has the potential of developing into an evidential marker. Not every extension to do with information source is an evidentiality strategy. Pietrandrea (2007) shows that the ‘epistemic future’ in Italian is not really an evidentiality strategy: its connections with information source are tenuous, and its evidential extensions always depend on the pragmatic context.

4

Further Ways of Expressing Information Source

Every language can express doubt, inference, and assumption. The means vary—from open classes of verbs, adverbs and adjectives (§ 4.1), and parentheticals (§4.2) to more restricted subsets of modal verbs and grammaticalized particles (§4.3). Speech report constructions in their varied guises are another, almost universal, device (§4.4) for talking about what one learnt from someone else.

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4.1 Open Lexical Classes: Verbs, Adverbs, and Adjectives Most languages have a large number of verbs expressing meanings linked to information source. Romance and Germanic languages are particularly rich in these—a multiplicity of such expressions in French involve penser ‘think’, trouver ‘think, judge’, avoir l’impression ‘have the impression’ (also Dendale & Van Bogaert 2007, Pietrandrea 2007 and Giacalone Ramat & Topadze 2007). English also has an immense array of reporting verbs and opinion verbs like think, suppose, find, claim, state or allege, in addition to verbs to do with seeming or appearing. Each of these is semantically versatile; they vary in their subtle grammatical properties (see Dixon 2005: 202–206). One can say It looks like rain, or This idea sounds good, or I hear you are getting married—each of these ways of saying things in English can be replicated in German, Dutch, French, Italian, Spanish and Swedish. These are the ways in which familiar European languages allow us to express some of the meanings which must be expressed grammatically in languages like Quechua, Tariana, Qiang, Western Apache and Shipibo-Konibo (where they form an obligatory closed system). This does not imply that these ‘exotic’ languages are bereft of verbs of opinion, thinking, reasoning, claiming and so on. They are not—on the contrary, Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003) has a vast array of verbs to do with mental states. And one can use them to complement the restricted number of choices imposed by obligatory evidentials. Consider (4): (4) nu-hmeta-ka 1sg-feel.intuitively/think-subordinator du-ñami-sita-sika 3sg.fem-die-already-assumed.evidential.recent.past ‘She (assumed) has already died, as I intuitively feel’ (my gut feeling tells me that she is dead) By (4), I specify the fact that the use of assumed evidential is based on my intuitive suspicion (and not on a general assumption). By saying (5), I stress that the assumption—encoded in the evidential—is based on logical reasoning. (5) nu-awada-ka 1sg-think.by.reasoning-subordinator du-ñami-sita-sika 3sg.fem-die-already-assumed.evidential.recent.past ‘She (assumed) has already died, as I reason’ (that she is dead is a logical conclusion based on my reasoning)

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Tariana has no evidential to describe intuition and reasoning. The lexical ways of marking information source are much more versatile than the grammatical options. The interaction between these two is what makes Tariana discourse fascinating (similar techniques are available in other languages—see papers in Aikhenvald & Dixon 2003). And this is also what makes the study of verbs expressing information source in French, by Dendale & Van Bogaert (2007), an enticing read. There are many more options in the details one may want to express though lexical means than through grammar. Adverbial expressions in Italian express possibility, probability, doubt, and can also extend to refer to inference, assumption, validity of information and attitude to it—that is, they may be used to refer to information source (see Pietrandrea 2007). English adverbs reportedly, supposedly and allegedly and Estonian kuuldavasti ‘reportedly’ are cases in point. One can also opt to use an adjective to express a similar meaning: one hears reference to an alleged drug-dealer, or a supposedly false statement. The choices are many. Prepositional constructions may express opinion, belief, inference and so on: compare Italian secondo me ‘according to me’, Portuguese ao meu ver (lit. to my seeing) ‘in my opinion’, and noun phrases involving prepositions anot and pasak in Lithuanian (see Wiemer 2007). These are arguably more epistemic than inferential evidential—but this is a matter of approach. 4.2 Parentheticals European languages tend to have a plethora of parentheticals, such as English I think, I suppose, Spanish parece, Italian sembra and French dit-on and paraîtil ‘it appears’. A parenthetical—defined as ‘a word, phrase, or sentence which interrupts a sentence and which bears no syntactic relation to that sentence at the point of interruption’ (Trask 1991:199)—expresses more than ‘source of evidence’: it is a way of referring to one’s opinion, judgement, belief, inference, assumption, doubt, attitude and more (see Urmston 1952 and Ifantidou 1993, on their varied semantic effects). Parentheticals in English are an open class: Dixon (2005:233–238) demonstrated that verbs of ATTENTION type and THINKING semantic types can all be used as parentheticals (provided they can take a that-complement clause and have a positive meaning). So can many other verbs, and predicative adjectives. The meanings of parentheticals—just like with lexical verbs—are broader than those of grammatical evidentials. This is what one expects of an open class. Their use to express meanings to do with assumption and inference has been documented for a number of languages outside Europe (see Mihas 2014 for Ashéninca Perené, an Arawak language from Peru; Zhang 2014, for

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Ersu, a Tibeto-Burman language from China; and Forker 2014, for Hinuq, a Northeast Caucasian language). 4.3 Modal Verbs and Particles So-called ‘modal verbs’ frequently combine reference to information source with whatever other meaning they have. In agreement with Dixon’s (2005) classification, modal verbs express secondary concepts, ‘those providing semantic modification of some other verb with which they are in a syntactic or morphological construction’ (p. 96). In many languages they are a closed subclass. Secondary verbs of the same semantic group as seem (pp. 203–205), and verbs of obligation and permission often extend to cover probability, inference, and assumption. In Dixon’s (2005:204) words, seem is used when the arbiter is not fully certain whether the adjectival description is appropriate, or whether the statement of the complement clause in a construction like It seems that Mary found the body or Mary seems to have found the body is correct—perhaps when there is not quite enough evidence. Appear has the same syntactic possibilities and a very similar meaning, but may imply ‘can be observed by me’ in contrast to seem ‘can be inferred by me’. A link with information source is obvious—yet information source is an overtone of seem, rather than its only meaning. Modal verbs may share syntactic features—such as raising—and thus form a syntactically defined subclass of verbs. The choice of modal verbs in each language is limited—they are closed subclasses. This makes it difficult to treat them on a par with lexical expression of information source through verbs, and adverbs, or parentheticals. Modal verbs tend to have more restricted meanings, close to those of grammatical evidentials. As exponents of information source, they are akin to evidentiality strategies (see § 3 above; and discussion in Aikhenvald 2004:147–148). A plethora of particles referring to verbal report, or inference, or both may form a largish but closed class. For instance, Lithuanian has over twenty-five particles referring to verbal report or inference (Wiemer 2007). None of them is obligatory. They vary in their origin. The form girdì, literally ‘you hear’, used to mark reported information, comes from a depleted and reanalyzed verb of perception. The reported speech particle tariamai, a present passive participle of the verb ‘say, pronounce’, comes from a grammaticalized verb of speech. The meanings of these particles tend to be much less fine-grained and less

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specific than those of members of verbs and of nouns as open classes. This is another non-obligatory, and yet non-lexical, way of expressing information source. They can be considered a type of evidentiality strategy (see Figure 1.1). 4.4 Speech Report Constructions Every language has a way of reporting what someone else has said. This can be cast as a direct, or an indirect speech report (see Aikhenvald 2011 for a summary). Multiclausal speech report constructions can be viewed as lexical ‘paraphrases’ of meanings grammaticalized in closed evidential systems. And in many languages, speech reports acquire epistemic overtones. They are often used to transmit something one does not really believe (see, for instance, Dimmendaal 2001, on reported speech as a ‘hedging’ device). And it comes as no surprise that a speech report construction is a universal source for developing reported evidentials. One such grammaticalization path involves reanalysis of a biclausal quotation or reportative construction whereby the matrix clause with the verb ‘say’ and a complement clause of this verb become a single clause via the loss or reinterpretation of the subordinator (Aikhenvald 2004:273–274; 281–283). This is what we see in marker of reported speech, dizque, in Mexican and in Colombian Spanish. Grammaticalization is a gradual process. In Italian, grammaticalization of the speech verb has just started. As Giacalone Ramat & Topadze (2007) put it, ‘the third singular form dice is frequently used in spoken Italian mostly as a marker of direct speech, but also of indirect speech, and is morphologically invariable and positionally mobile’. Parallels to this are found in Sardinian and Rumanian. In Giacalone Ramat & Topadze’s words, ‘the parameters which allow us to describe a shift in the direction of a more grammaticalized category are: 1) decategorization (i.e. loss of inflectional distinctions), 2) positional freedom, 3) variability in scope (i.e. single constituent vs. entire clause scope), 4) semantic erosion’. And this is what we find in expressions involving diz que (literally ‘says-that’) in Latin American varieties of Spanish (Travis 2006, for Colombian Spanish; Olbertz 2007, for Mexican Spanish; Olbertz 2005 for Ecuadorian Spanish; evidence for the same phenomenon in Venezuela, Chile and Argentina come from Kany 1944), and in Brazilian Portuguese (Aikhenvald 2002, 2004). Dizque (often written as one word) has a variable scope—as Olbertz (2007) shows, the scope of dizque can be a main clause, a subordinate clause, or a noun phrase in any syntactic function. A similar phenomenon in Colombian Spanish was described by Travis (2006). In both varieties dizque extends to cover doubt and (negative) attitude to the information and its validity—that is, it goes beyond simply reporting what someone else has said. The meanings of

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dizque overlap with some of the meanings of grammatical evidentials—they may involve reported speech, quotation, inference and assumption. Dizque is on the way to grammaticalizing into a marker of a category (in the sense of Heine and Kuteva 2002)—but this mechanism is very different from employing lexical items to refer to information source. Dizque in Mexican Spanish has a greater syntactic freedom than the verb decir ‘say, speak’ it comes from, because dizque has been reanalyzed as a grammatical particle marking both speech reports and unreliable information. Dizque follows a common grammaticalization path, and is not exceptional in any way. A similar path has been documented for many other languages of the world, including Georgian. The two particles metki and -tko mark reported speech; both result from the grammaticalization of the verb tkma ‘say’ (Giacolone Ramat & Topadze 2007). Particles marking reported speech form a closed grammatical class. They cannot be subsumed under a broad umbrella of lexical expression of information source. Instead, they can be considered evidentials in the making—akin to evidential strategies. 4.5 Expressing Information Source: A Summary Meanings associated with information source can be expressed with members of open classes. The range of meanings is wider and more fine-grained than that of grammatical evidentials. Closed classes of particles and modal verbs tend to share their meanings with evidential strategies. The choice of a grammatical evidential often depends on mood or tense of the clause (see §2 above). The choice of a parenthetical or an adverb depends on what the speaker wants to say. A parenthetical, an adverb, or a modal verb can have an NP or a whole clause in its scope. For grammatical evidentials, these options are restricted. None of the means listed in § 4.1–2 forms a paradigm of any sort. In contrast, grammatical evidentials do.7 What may justify putting various verbs, adverbs and parentheticals discussed in §4.1–2 together with modal verbs and particles is the fact that they all vaguely relate to the ways in which one knows things. All these devices for marking information source combine reference to inference, assumption, and often speech reports with increasing ‘subjectification’—a ‘historical pragmaticsemantic process whereby meanings become increasingly based in the speaker’s subjective belief state, or attitude toward what is said’ (Traugott 1996:185). 7 In conventional linguistic terminology (Matthews 1997:263), a paradigm is defined as ‘the forms of a given noun, verb, etc. arranged systematically according to their grammatical features’ (italic mine: A.A.).

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This is what sets them apart from closed evidential systems—whose primary meaning has nothing to do with subjectification—and makes them similar to prototypical modalities.

5

On Terminological Clarity

Categories of grammar need to be distinguished from ‘real world’ notions. The expression of information source is akin to other conceptual notions in that they can be viewed differently, ‘in terms of their importance for the structure of the language’ (Comrie 1985:8). The first type is the set of grammatical categories. It is common knowledge that many languages have a closed set of grammaticalized expressions of location in time: these can involve present, past and future; or nonpast, recent past and remote past, etc. Along similar lines, languages with grammatical number typically distinguish singular and plural, or singular, dual and plural. These closed grammatical systems coexist with sets of lexical items which refer to location in time (e.g. yesterday, today, and so on) or to quantification (e.g. numerals and quantifiers). In addition, languages may have a potentially unlimited number of ‘composite lexical expressions’ for measuring time intervals, or for expressing quantification. In other words, a closed grammatical system offers restricted options. This is in contrast to the lexicon where the choices are potentially open. So, for grammatical tense ‘even the maximal system would have at most tens of categories, rather than the several orders of magnitude more possible in the lexicon’ (Comrie 1985:9). The analogy with number is even more instructive: in Comrie’s (1985:9) words, English has grammatically only a two-way opposition (singular and plural); lexically there are around thirty items (excluding those restricted to mathematical or scientific contexts); while for many speakers the possibilities for lexically composite [number] expressions are infinite. The terminological distinction between time as a notional concept and tense as grammaticalized location in time is very handy: it helps to keep apart a closed grammatical system of tenses and a potentially open pool of temporal expressions of other sorts.8 Such terminological clarity helps understand the nature of

8 For similar distinctions in terminological traditions other than the English, see Jespersen (1924:255).

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tense and time, and sheds light on the differences between closed grammatical systems and potentially open categories of the lexicon. Let’s follow the analogy of tense and time. In the same way as ‘tense’ refers to closed grammatical systems, ‘grammatical evidentiality’ refers to a closed set of obligatory choices of marking information source. In the same way as ‘time’ covers the potentially unlimited set of choices, ‘information source’ covers the rest. Is it appropriate to use one cover term, ‘lexical evidentiality’, to include the rest? The brief answer is ‘no’. This approach fits in with the accepted definition of grammaticalization as anchored in opposing ‘lexical’ and ‘grammatical’ notions as basic building blocks. From a diachronic perspective, grammaticalization is conceived as ‘that part of the study of language change that is concerned with such questions as how lexical items and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions or how grammatical items develop new grammatical functions’ (Hopper & Traugott 2003:1; Brinton & Traugott 2005:23–25; also see Heine & Kuteva 2002:4–5). In order to understand the diachronic and synchronic dynamics and development of the expression of information source, we need to adhere to terminological and conceptual clarity—rather than using the umbrella term ‘functional’ as a cover-up. Saying that English parentheticals, or adverbs like surely or allegedly, are ‘evidentials’ is like saying that time words like yesterday or today mark tense. Any grammarian would dismiss this. But if we say that yesterday, today, two minutes ago and further similar collocations express time, and ‘present’ and ‘past’ express tense, everyone will agree.9 Along similar lines, the term ‘evidential’ is best used for closed grammatical systems, and the term ‘information source’ for the vast body of other ways of referring to ‘knowing things’. The expression of information source which does not form a closed grammatical system and is not an extension of an existing category has been informally nicknamed ‘lexical evidentiality’. As we saw in § 4, extra-grammatical means of expressing various overtones of information source and attitude to information cover a vast ground. Some of them are purely lexical, and some belong to closed subclasses. The term ‘lexical evidentiality’ is misleading since it obscures the differences between the two types of extra-grammatical expres-

9 This is similar to how the linguistic literature on gender as a grammatical category does not discuss words for ‘man’ and ‘woman’, or ‘bull’ and ‘cow’ in each particular language. ‘Evidentiality in English’ has the same status as ‘gender in Hungarian’, or in Estonian. Of course, sex distinctions can be expressed in Hungarian and in Estonian if one wants to, but there is no grammatical category of gender. One can indicate information source in English, if necessary. But this is not grammatical evidentiality.

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sion of information source outlined in §4: open choices on the one hand (§ 4.1– 2) and closed classes (§4.3–4), on the other. The term ‘lexical evidentiality’ is confusing in yet another way. In languages with obligatory evidentials, lexical subclasses of verbs can require certain evidentiality choices. For instance, internal states and processes, felt rather than seen, are often cast in sensory (non-visual) or non-firsthand evidential. Such preferences may get lexicalized as restricted evidentiality choices for predicate types and construction types (this is a typical feature of Tibeto-Burman languages: see for instance Lidz 2007). Lexicalization of evidential choices is all too easy to confuse with ‘lexical evidentiality’.

6

Envoi

Evidentials as closed grammatical systems are different from information source marked in other ways (just like time, a real life concept, is different from tense, realized in grammar). Meanings related to information source may be expressed through open classes of verbs (of perception, opinion, speech and others), adverbs and parentheticals. These tend to be richer in their semantic range than closed systems of grammatical evidentials. Alternatively, information source may be expressed via a closed subclass of modal verbs, or via particles (often grammaticalized from verbs). These are much closer to grammatical evidentials in their nature, and their meanings. Grammatical evidentiality is highly diffusible in language contact (see Aikhenvald 2006b, and Giacalone Ramat & Topadze 2007). And so are various other means which may involve information source. The languages of Europe share a remarkable range of semantic extensions of various verbs, parentheticals and speech reports towards expressing how one knows things. In Bolinger’s (1991:26–27) words, one of the happier results of recent turns in linguistics is the search for universals and the emphasis on parallel developments in various languages. […] It is as if given certain elements from a common heritage, plus a need to communicate the same ideas, common solutions are going to be hit upon sometimes, though the element of chance still plays its part. The verb parecer in Spanish and the verb seem in English reveal just such a convergence. The etymological sources are quite different. Yet once set on a path toward the common meaning of that which is evident to the senses, their developing grammars grow more and more alike.

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These striking parallel developments—the essence of Sapir’s (1921:171–172) ‘parallelism in drift’—are what makes the typology of related languages, a fascinating enterprise, especially for the development of evidentials and other means of expressing knowledge and information source.

Abbreviations fem masc pl sg

feminine masculine plural singular

References Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2000. Classifiers: a typology of noun categorization devices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2002. Language Contact in Amazonia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2003. A Grammar of Tariana, from Northwest Amazonia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2006a. ‘Evidentiality in grammar’, in Keith Brown, ed. (2006). Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. 2nd edition. Volume 4. Oxford: Elsevier. 320–325 (article 0252). Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2006b. ‘Grammars in contact: a cross-linguistic perspective’, in Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald & R.M.W. Dixon, eds. (2006). Grammars in Contact: A Cross-Linguistic Typology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–66. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2010. Imperatives and commands. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2011. ‘Speech reports: a cross-linguistic perspective’, in Language at large. Essays on syntax and semantics, by Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald and R.M.W. Dixon. Leiden: Brill, 290–326. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2012. Languages of the Amazon. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2014. ‘The grammar of knowledge: a cross-linguistic view of evidentials and the expression of information source’, in Aikhenvald and Dixon (eds.), 1–51. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2018. ‘Evidentiality: The framework’, in Alexandra Y. Aikhen-

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vald (ed.) (2018). The Oxford Handbook of Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–46. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. & R.M.W. Dixon. eds. 2003. Studies in Evidentiality. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. & R.M.W. Dixon. eds. 2014. The grammar of knowledge: a crosslinguistic typology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Babel, Anna. 2009. ‘Dizque, evidentiality and stance in Valley Spanish’. Language in Society 38: 487–511. Boas, Franz. 1911. ‘Kwakiutl’, in Franz Boas, ed. (1911), Handbook of American Indian Languages, Part 1. Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 40, 423–557. Boas, Franz. 1938. ‘Language’, in Franz Boas, ed. (1938). General Anthropology. Boston, New York: D.C. Heath and Company. 124–145. Bolinger, Dwight. 1991. Essays on Spanish: Words and Grammar. Newark, Delaware: Juan de la Cuesta. Brinton Laurel J. & Elizabeth C. Traugott (2005). Lexicalization and Language Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chafe, Wallace L. & Johanna Nichols, eds. 1986. Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Chirikba, Viacheslav. 2003. ‘Evidential category and evidential strategy in Abkhaz’, in Aikhenvald & Dixon (2003:243–272). Comrie, Bernard 1976. Aspect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Comrie, Bernard 1985. Tense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Haan, Ferdinand. 1999. ‘Evidentiality and epistemic modality: setting boundaries’. Southwest Journal of Linguistics 18: 83–102. De Haan, Ferdinand. 2005. ‘Semantic distinctions of evidentiality’, in Haspelmath Martin et al. (eds. 2005). World Atlas of Language Structures. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 318–321. DeLancey, Scott. 2001. ‘The mirative and evidentiality’. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 369– 382. Dendale, P. 1993. ‘Le conditionnel de l’information incertaine: marqueur modal ou marqueur évidentiel?’ pp. 165–176 XXe Congrès International de Linguistique et Philologie Romanes, Tome I, Section I. La phrase, edited by Gerold Hilty. Tübingen: Francke. Dendale, P. and Julie Van Bogaert. 2007. ‘A semantic description of French lexical evidential markers and the classification of evidentials’. Rivista Italiana di Linguistica 19: 65–90. Dimmendaal Gerrit. 2001. ‘Logophoric marking and represented speech in African languages as evidential hedging strategies’. Australian Journal of Linguistics 21: 131– 157. Dixon R.M.W. 2003. ‘Evidentiality in Jarawara’, in Aikhenvald & Dixon (2003:165–187).

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Dixon R.M.W. 2005. A Semantic Approach to English Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dixon R.M.W. 2010. Basic linguistic theory. Volume 1. Methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eberhard, David. 2009. A grammar of Mamaindê (Nambiquara). Amsterdam: LOT. Eberhard, David. 2018. ‘Evidentiality in Nambikwara languages’, in Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald (ed.) (2018). The Oxford Handbook of Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 333–356. Fleck, David. 2007. ‘Evidentiality and double tense in Matses’. Language 83: 589–614. Forker, Diana. 2014. ‘The grammar of knowledge in Hinuq’, in Aikhenvald and Dixon (eds.), 52–68. Giacalone Ramat, Anne & Manana Topadze. 2007. ‘The coding of evidentiality: a comparative look at Georgian and Italian’. Rivista Italiana di Linguistica 19: 109– 128. Gronemeyer, C. 1997. ‘Evidentiality in Lithuanian’. Working Papers 46: 93–112. Lund University, Department of Linguistics. Heine, Bernd & Tania Kuteva. 2002. World Lexicon of Grammaticalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hewitt B. George. 1995. Georgian Grammar. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Hopper, Paul J. & Elizabeth C. Traugott. 2003. Grammaticalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ifantidou, Elly. 1993. ‘Parentheticals and relevance’. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 5: 193–210. Jacobsen William H. Jr. 1986. ‘The heterogeneity of evidentials in Makah’, in Chafe & Nichols (1986:3–28). Jakobson, Roman O. 1957. ‘Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb’. Cambridge: Harvard University. Jespersen, Otto. 1924. The Philosophy of Grammar. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Kany Charles. 1944. ‘Impersonal dizque and its variants in American Spanish’. Hispanic Review 12: 168–177. Kirsner, R.S. & Sandra A. Thompson. 1976. ‘The role of pragmatic inference in semantics: a study of sensory verb complements in English’. Glossa 10: 200–240. Lazard, Gilbert. 1957. ‘Caractères distinctifs de la langue tadjik’. Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris 52: 117–186. Lazard, Gilbert. 1999. ‘Mirativity, evidentiality, mediativity, or other?’ Linguistic Typology 3: 91–110. Lazard, Gilbert. 2001. ‘On the grammaticalization of evidentiality’. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 359–367. Lidz, Liberty A. 2007. ‘Evidentiality in Yongning Na (Mosuo).’ Linguistics of the TibetoBurman Area 30:45–88.

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Lowe, I. 1999. ‘Nambiquara’, pp. 269–292 of The Amazonian languages, edited by R.M.W. Dixon and Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lyons, John. 1977. Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mathiassen, T. 1996. A Short Grammar of Lithuanian. Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers. Matthews, P.H. 1997. Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mihas, Elena. 2014. ‘Expression of information source meanings in Ashéninca Perené’, in Aikhenvald and Dixon (eds.), 209–226. Olbertz, Hella. 2005. ‘Dizque en el español andino ecuatoriano: conservador e innovador’, in Hella Olbertz & Pieter Muysken, eds. (2005), Encuentros y conflictos. Bilingüismo y contacto de lenguas en el mundo andino. Madrid: Iberoamericana, 77–94. Olbertz, Hella. 2007. ‘Dizque in Mexican Spanish: the subjectification of reportative meaning’. Rivista di Linguistica 19: 1: 151–172. Palmer, F.R. 1986. Mood and Modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pietrandrea, Paola. 2007. ‘The grammatical nature of some epistemic-evidential adverbs in spoken Italian.’ Rivista Italiana di Linguistica 19: 39–63. Plungian, Vladimir A. 2001. ‘The place of evidentiality within the universal grammatical space’. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 349–358. Pusch, Claus D. 2007. ‘Is there evidence for evidentiality in Gascony Occitan?’ Rivista Italiana di Linguistica 19: 91–108. Robins, R. 1967. A Short History of Linguistics. London: Longmans. Sapir, Edward. 1921. Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Squartini, Mario. 2007. ‘Lexical vs grammatical evidentiality in French and Italian’. Linguistics 46: 917–947. Storch, Anne. 2018. ‘Evidentiality and the expression of knowledge: an African perspectve’, in Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald (ed.) (2018). The Oxford Handbook of Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 610–628. Storch, Anne and Jules Jacques Coly. 2014. ‘The grammar of knowledge in Maaka (Western Chadic, Nigeria)’, in Aikhenvald and Dixon (eds.), 190–208. Timberlake, Alan. 1982. ‘The impersonal passive in Lithuanian’. Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, 508–523. Trask, R.L. 1991. A Dictionary of Grammatical Terms in Linguistics. London: Routledge. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1996. ‘Subjectification and the development of epistemic meaning: the case of promise and threaten’, in Toril Swan & Olaf J. Westvik, eds. (1996). Modality in Germanic Languages: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 185–210. Travis, Catherine. 2006. ‘Dizque: a Colombian evidentiality strategy’. Linguistics 44: 1269–1297. Urmston, J.O. 1952. ‘Parenthetical verbs’. Mind 61: 480–496. Valenzuela, Pilar. 2003. ‘Evidentiality in Shipibo-Konibo, with a comparative overview of the category in Panoan’, in Aikhenvald & Dixon (2003:33–62).

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van der Auwera, Johan & Vladimir A., Plungian. 1998. ‘On modality’s semantic map’. Linguistic Typology 2: 79–124. Weber, David J. 1986. ‘Information perspective, profile, and patterns in Quechua’, in Chafe & Nichols (1986:137–155). Wiemer, Björn. 2007. ‘Lexical markers of evidentiality in Lithuanian’. Rivista Italiana di Linguistica 19: 173–208. Willett, Thomas. 1988. ‘A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evidentiality’. Studies in Language 12: 51–97. Zhang, Sihong. 2014. ‘The expression of knowledge in Ersu’, in Aikhenvald and Dixon (eds.), 89–107.

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chapter 2

A Possible Worlds Semantics for Cuzco Quechua Evidentials Martina T. Faller

1

Introduction*

In the formal literature on evidentiality it is often assumed that evidentials can be analyzed as epistemic modals with an evidential presupposition within Kratzer’s (1981, 1987) framework of possible worlds semantics, see, for example, the seminal work by Izvorski (1997) and subsequent work such as Ehrich (2001), Matthewson et al. (2007) and Rullmann et al. (2008). This paper explores to what extent this framework can account for evidentials that are not obviously epistemic or even modal such as the Cuzco Quechua direct and reportative evidentials. It is argued that the answer to this question has ramifications beyond the immediate technical aspects: it contributes to the question to what extent evidentials can be subsumed under the category of (epistemic) modality. This paper explores how the tools provided by this framework can be used to best capture the evidential and epistemic modal aspects of the evidentials of Cuzco Quechua (CQ). In particular, it will be discussed how differences between evidentials can be accounted for by different restrictions on the modal base and ordering source. The discussion contributes to the ongoing debate about whether evidentials can be subsumed under the category of epistemic modals. The remainder of this introduction provides background on evidentiality and epistemic modality as well as Cuzco Quechua. In section 2, the use and meaning of CQ evidentials will be described and illustrated. Section 3 summarizes the main relevant points of Kratzer’s (1981, 1987) account of (epistemic) modality, and its application to evidentials in the literature. Section 4 builds on these previous accounts and proposes modifications to capture the differences between the CQ evidentials. The main proposal is that inferential evidentials

* This paper is a slightly revised version of Faller (2011). I would like to thank the audiences at SALT XX, Vancouver, and SPINFest 2, York, for their insightful comments and questions on previous versions.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004436701_004

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rely on an ordering source, whereas non-inferential evidentials constrain the modal base. 1.1 Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality Evidentiality and epistemic modality are closely related yet distinct conceptual categories (Aikhenvald and Dixon 2003; Faller 2002; de Haan 1999). Epistemic modality marks the speaker’s degree of certainty or the necessity/possibility of the truth of the proposition expressed by p. For example, the CQ enclitic =puni in (1a) expresses that the speaker is certain to a high degree that it rained, while the English modal might in (1b) expresses that the speaker considers this a possibility.1 (1) a. Para-mu-sha-rqa-n=puni. rain-cisl-prog-pst-3=cert ‘It was certainly raining.’

(Cuzco Quechua)

b. It might have been raining. Evidentiality, in contrast, indicates the speaker’s type of source of information for p (in assertions). For example, the CQ enclitic =mi in (2a) indicates that the speaker saw that it was raining, and the German modal verb sollen in (2b) that the speaker was told that it is raining by someone else. (2) a. Para-mu-sha-rqa-n=mi. rain-cisl-prog-pst-3=bpg p= ‘It was raining.’ ev: speaker saw that p. b. Es soll regnen. it shall rain p= ‘It is raining.’ ev: speaker is/was told that p.

(Cuzco Quechua)

(German)

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the Cuzco Quechua examples were elicited in interview sessions with native speakers by the author. Abbreviations: 1,2,3: first, second, third person, abl: ablative, acc: accusative, add: additive, bpg: best possible grounds, caus:, causative, cisl: cislocative, com: comitative, cond: conditional, conj: conjectural, contr: contrastive, dim: diminutive, disc: discontinuous, ev: evidential value, excl: exclusive, fut: future, gen: genitive, impr: impressive, inch: inchoative, incl: inclusive, loc: locative, neg: negative, nx.pst: non-experienced past, pei: perceived evidence inferential, pl: plural, poss: possessive, prog: progressive, prt: participle, pst: past, refl: reflexive, rep: reportative, top: topic. Variables: p: proposition, s: speaker.

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a possible worlds semantics for cuzco quechua evidentials table 2.1

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Types of source of information

Direct

Indirect

Attested Inference Visual Results Auditory Reasoning Other Sensory

Reported Secondhand Thirdhand Folklore

Willett 1988

Cross-linguistically, the types of source of information in Table 2.1 occur. While epistemic modality and evidentiality are clearly distinct conceptually, they are also closely related as the speaker’s evaluation of the truth of a proposition will often be influenced by the way they have learnt about that proposition. Moreover, it is not always possible to establish two distinct categories empirically in a given language, as can be demonstrated with the English modal verb must. Consider (3). (3) a. Context 1: Speaker sees people coming in with wet raingear. It must be raining. b. Context 2: Speaker looks out the window and sees that it’s raining. #It must be raining. (von Fintel and Gillies 2010) Epistemic must expresses the speaker’s evaluation of p as necessarily true and it is therefore an epistemic modal. But as (3b) demonstrates, it is infelicitous when the speaker has direct evidence for p, and it can therefore also be classified as an indirect evidential. More precisely, must has been argued to “signal that the prejacent was reached through an inference rather than on the basis of direct observation or trustworthy reports” (von Fintel and Gillies 2010). From a theoretical perspective, if both evidentials and epistemic modals can be analyzed in essentially the same way, then there is arguably no reason to distinguish two categories (Matthewson 2012). The question then is which differences in their semantics warrant the recognition of two separate categories, and which ones do not. This paper concludes that, at a coarse-grained level of analysis, evidentials and epistemic modals can both be treated as quantifiers over possible worlds in a modal base. However, at a finer-grained level, important distinctions appear which warrant keeping the two categories distinct.

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1.2 Cuzco Quechua The term Quechua refers to a family of languages spoken in the Andes region. The variety studied here is Cuzco Quechua (CQ), spoken in the Department of Cuzco, Peru. The basic word order of CQ is SOV but is flexible due to case marking. There is widespread pro-drop of both subjects and objects. It is an agglutinative language and possesses a large number of enclitics as well as derivational and inflectional suffixes. Suffixes and enclitics are arranged in a template after the root as shown in (4a), with a number of slots within each category, as illustrated in (4b). (4)

2

root–derivational–inflectional=enclitics Mana=s tayta-y-ta=qa rima-ri-chi-sqa-ku=pas=chu not=rep father-1-acc=top speak-inch-caus-nx.pst-pl=add=pl ‘Reportedly, they didn’t even let my father talk.’ (Cusihuaman 2001:84)

The Cuzco Quechua Evidentials

Evidentiality in CQ is mainly expressed with a set of enclitics, paradigmatically illustrated in (5).2 (5) Para-mu-sha-n=mi/=si/=chá/=chu-sina. rain-cisl-prog-3=bpg/rep/conj/res p=‘It is raining.’ (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

Direct =mi/=n: s sees that it is raining. Reportative, =si/=s: s was told that it is raining. Conjectural, =chá: s conjectures that it is raining. Partial evidence/inference from results, =chu-sina/=(chu)-suna: s infers from available evidence that it is raining.

The evidential enclitics are a subset of the focus enclitics, and they cannot cooccur with each other in a clause.

2 CQ moreover has two past tense markers, one of which indicates that the speaker did not witness the described event. This past tense is analyzed in Faller (2004).

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2.1 Best Possible Grounds/Direct =mi The enclitic =mi indicates that the speaker has direct evidence in cases where the described event is directly observable or otherwise directly accessible, as, for example, in (6). (6) Subrina-y-wan=mi tiya-sha-n. niece-1-com=bpg live-prog-3 ‘He is living with my niece.’ ev: s has seen that he is living with her niece.

(conversation)

If the event described is not directly observable such as someone else’s future plans or emotions, =mi is felicitous when the speaker has the “the next best thing” to direct evidence, what Faller (2002) calls best possible grounds. For the examples in (7), the best possible grounds would be a report by Inés herself; reports by others or assumptions by the speaker do not license the use of =mi for such events. (7) a. Paqarin Inés Qusuq-ta=n ri-nqa. tomorrow Inés Cuzco-acc=bpg go-3.fut ‘Inés will got to Cuzco tomorrow.’ ev: Inés told s that she will go to Cuzco tomorrow. b. Inés llaki-ku-n=mi. Inés be.sad-refl-3=bpg ‘Inés is sad.’ ev: Inés told s that she is sad.

(elicited)

(elicited)

In this paper, I will only be concerned with examples involving direct evidence, and will therefore call this enclitic Direct for convenience. 2.2 Reportative =si The enclitic =si is used when the speaker has acquired the proposition expressed p via reports from others, and is found in all types of genres, including conversation, folktales and news reporting, (8). (8) a. Congresista-manta=s haykuy-ta muna-n. congressman-abl=rep enter-acc want-3 ‘He wants to be a Congressman.’

(conversation)

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b. Chaya-n=si ukuku uña=qa. Punku-ta=s taka-ku-n, arrive-3=rep bear baby.animal=top door-acc=rep knock-refl-3 ch’in. silent ‘The son of the bear arrived. He knocked on a door, silence.’ (Itier 1999:44) c. Wakin=si maqa-mu-n-ku hayt’a-mu-n-ku. some=rep hit-cis-3-pl kick-cis-3-pl ‘Some hit and kicked (him).’

(news report)

2.3 Inferentials =chá and =chu-sina CQ has two Inferential enclitics, which correspond to a cross-linguistically common distinction between Inference from Reasoning and Inference from Results (Willett 1988). The Conjectural =chá can be used for inferences from a set of premisses, (9), as well as for speculation (see examples in section 4.1). (9) a. Mana=n para kan=chu. Kunan wata=qa mana=chá allin=chu not=bpg rain be=neg now year=top not=conj good=neg kuhichu ka-nqa! harvest be-3.fut ‘There is no rain. I guess/suppose/surely, the harvest this year will be bad!’ (Cusihuaman 2001:233) Context: s knew the person referred to with ‘he’ in her childhood. b. Suqta chunka wata-yuq ka-sha-n=chá. six ten year-poss be-prog-3=conj ‘He must be sixty years (old).’

(conversation)

The enclitic combination =chu-sina,3 is often used for inferences based on some kind of observable, partial evidence such as the result of the event described, as in (10). I therefore call it here the Perceived Evidence Inferential (PEI).4 The difference between =chu-sina and =chá can best be brought out

3 The Conjectural =chá is regularly included in the set of evidentials in the literature, but =chusina is not usually discussed as part of this set. However, as this enclitic can be used for inference from results as well as from perceived evidence more generally, it also qualifies as an evidential. I adopt the spelling of this enclitic in Cusihuaman (2001:235). Another form encountered in written texts is =chus hina. 4 Note, however, that it appears from the description in Cusihuaman (2001) that =chu-sina has

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by considering their applicability in different contexts. Consultants agree that =chu-sina is preferred over =chá in a context such as (10), where the speaker has direct evidence for the premiss, but =chá is preferred in a context where there is more reasoning involved as in (9b). (10) a. Context: Marya looks very pale. Unqu-sqa=chu-sina ka-sha-n-man. sick-prt=pei be-prog-3-cond. ‘She appears to be sick.’ b. Mama-cha-suna haqay=qa hamu-shá-n. mother-dim-pei that=top come-prog-3 ‘That seems to be our mother who is coming.’ (Cusihuaman 2001: 235)

3

Previous Analyses of Evidentials within Kratzer’s Framework of Modality

Formal semantics accounts of evidentials tend to analyze them as epistemic modals, that is, as quantifiers over possible worlds, with an added evidential condition, often taken to be a presupposition.5 The first analysis of this kind was proposed by Izvorski (1997) and has been adopted (with variations) by subsequent work such as Ehrich (2001); Matthewson et al. (2007); Rullmann et al. (2008) and others. My own previous work on CQ evidentials (Faller 2002) has focussed on establishing whether or not they contribute to the proposition expressed and argues that, in this language at least, evidentials are speech act operators, adding a sincerity condition such as: Direct(p), Report(p), or Conject(p), which intuitively are to be interpreted as “speaker has direct/

wider applications, extending also to inferences based on reports. Cusihuaman (2001:235) gives the example in (i), which would seem to make most sense in a context in which the speaker was told that they would go harvest potatoes tomorrow. However, he gives no context, and it is therefore not clear what the basis for the inference actually is. (i) Paqarin=qa papa-ta-suna aysa-mu-saqku. tomorrow=top potato-acc-pei harvest-cisl-1.fut.excl ‘It seems we’ll be harvesting potatoes tomorrow.’ (Cusihuaman 2001:235) More research is needed to determine exactly what types of evidence inferences marked with =chu-sina can be based on and what the best label for this enclitic combination is. 5 Formal semantic analyses of evidentials which do not analyze them as epistemic modals are Murray (2009) and Schenner (2008).

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reported/conjectural evidence for p.” The purpose of the current paper is to explore how the truth-conditions of these evidential sincerity conditions can be captured within Kratzer’s (1981, 1987) framework of modality. 3.1 Kratzer’s Doubly-Relative Account of Epistemic Modality In Kratzer (1981, 1987), modal expressions are analyzed relative to two conversational backgrounds, a modal base f and an ordering source g, both provided by the context. A conversational background is a function from worlds to sets of propositions (Kratzer 1981, 1987). Depending on what type of modal base is assumed in the context, a modal receives an epistemic, deontic or other modal interpretation. For an epistemic, the modal base provides the set of propositions known by the speaker in w, (11). (11) Epistemic conversational background fe : For all w ∈ W, fe (w) = {p | s knows p in w}

fe (w) projects a set of worlds ⋂ fe (w) that are accessible from w, namely those worlds in which all the propositions known in w are true. ⋂ fe (w) is defined in (12). (12) ⋂ fe (w) = {u ∈ W | for all p ∈ fe (w), u ∈ p}

An ordering source imposes an ordering on the worlds in the modal base. A world v is a better world than u relative to a set of propositions A iff it verifies more propositions in A than u. (13) For all u, v ∈ W, u -es-te-myen > -es-te.lamyen.

6

Conclusion

The pre-final ending -te- has undergone numerous changes in almost all of the contexts in which it was used, except for -te- in a relative clause. The changes on -te- have resulted from the influence of the grammaticalization of -es- (a pre-final ending with past tense meaning), which was derived from -e is- (a periphrastic construction with resultative aspect meaning). This paper has investigated a number of examples from historical documents that include the pre-final ending -te- and has discussed the historical process in which the function of -te- changed from an imperfective aspect marker to a modality marker. The changes in the pre-final ending -te- were discovered in a variety of different scenarios according to the contexts in which -te- occurred. Combined with declarative endings, interrogative endings, and connective endings such as -ni, -ntey, -te- has changed into a modality marker, so it conveys ‘past perception’ meaning and person-constraint in Contemporary Korean. By contrast, the concessive ending -te.lato and the counterfactual ending -ess-te.lamyen do not show ‘past perception’ meaning and do not have any person-constraint in Contemporary Korean. Such asymmetry may be attributed to the fact that -te- of -te.lato and -ess-te.lamyen has experienced historical changes different from -te- of other contexts. Although the process of changes on -te- has been clarified in this paper, one important point remains. That is the distinction and clarification of the meaning of -te- and -ess-te-, both which denote past tense meaning, past imperfective meaning, and ‘past perception’ meaning as modality according to contexts. For now, I anticipate that this topic will be tackled in future research.

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Abbreviations ACC COMP CONC COND CONN CONT DECL GEN GUESS HON IMP INT

accusative complementizer concessive condition connective continuous declarative genitive guess honorific imperative intention

MIR MUST NMLZ NOM PL POL PST Q QUOT REL TE TOP

mirativity must nominalizer nominative plural polite past question marker quotative relative pre-final ending -teTopic

References Bybee, J., R.D. Perkins, and W. Pagliuca (1994), The Evolution of Grammar: Tense, Aspect, and Modality in the Language of the World, Chicago: The University of Chicago. Choi, Dong-ju (1995), Kwuke sisang cheykyeyuy thongsicek pyenhwaey kwanhan yenkwu (A Study on the Diachronic Change of Tense-Aspect System in Korean), Seoul National University dissertation. Dahl, Ö. (1997), The relation between past time reference and counterfactuality: a new look, in Athanasiadou, A. and R. Driven (eds.), On Conditionals Again, Amsterdam: John Benjamin Publishing Co. Gale, J.S. (1894), Korean Grammatical Forms, Seoul: Trilingual Press. Im, Hong-pin (1982), Senemal -te- wa tanceluy yangsang (Pre-final ending -te- and the dimension of a gap), in Im, Hong-pin (ed.) (1998), Kwuke Mwunpepuy Simchung (The Depth of Korean Grammar), Seoul: Tayhaksa. Kwon, YoungMin (1999), Sesa yangsikkwa Tamlonuy Kuntayseng (The Modernity of Narrative and Discourse), Seoul: Seoul National University Press. Lee, Chungmin (1973), The Korean modality in the speech act, The University of Michigan Papers in Linguistics 1–2, 87–95. Lee, Ji-Young (1999), Senemalemi -te- uy thonsicek yenkwu (A diachronical study on pre-final ending -te-), a master’s thesis of Seoul National University. Lee, Ji-Young (2002a), Sesa siceyey tayhaye: sesauy hyenceysiceylul cwungsimulo (On the narrative tense: focusing on the present tense of narrative), Coseneyenkwu 1, 147– 166. Lee, Ji-Young (2002b), Kuntaykwuke ihwu pansasilcek kacenguy paltal: -temyen, -tendul

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ul cwungsimulo (The evolution of counterfactual hypothesis expressions since Middle Korean: focusing on -temyen, -tendul), Hankwukmwunhwa 30, 33–59. Lee, Ji-Young (2008), Mwunpepsacek kwancemese pon ilcesiki eneuy myech mwuncey (A study on main topics of Korean language during the Japanese colonial era (1910– 1945) from the perspective of the history of grammar), Hankwukehak 40, 57–92. Lee, Ji-Young (2019), Congkyelhyenguy pyenhwawa kumtaycek mwunchey (Change of sentence-final forms and modern writing style of Korean narratives in the early 20th century), Emwunyenkwu 47–43, 5–27. Lee, Hyeon-hie (1994), 19seki kwukeuy mwunpupsacek kochal (A study of the Korean language in the 19th century from the perspective of the history of grammar), Hankwukmwunhwa 15, 57–81. Lee, Phil-Young (1993), Kwukeuy Inyongkwumwun Yenkwu (A Study on the Quoted Construction in Korean), Seoul: Thopchwulphansa. Park, Jaeyon (2006), Hankwuke Yangtayemi Yenkwu (A Study on Modal Ending in Korean), Seoul: Thayhaksa. Park, Jinho (2003), Hankwukeuy tonsawa mwunpep yosouy kyelhap yangsang (Combinatorial Patterns of Verbs and Grammatical Elements in Korean), The Dissertation of Seoul National University. Park, Jinho (2011), Sicey, sang, yantay (Tense, aspect, and modality), Kwukehak 60, 289– 322. Song, Jaemog (2007), Cungkesengkwa cwueceyyakuy yuhyenglon—Hankwuke, Mongkole, Tibetelul yeylo tule (Typology of Evidentiality and Subject Restriction: based on Korean, Mongolian and Tibetan), Hyengthaylon 9–1, 1–23.

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chapter 12

A Modal Account of ‘First Person’ Constraints on Evidential Sentences Jungmee Lee

1

Introduction*

This paper investigates the restrictions on evidential sentences with ‘first person’, and discusses whether a modal account is applicable to them. The empirical focus is the so-called ‘non-equi subject’ constraint on Korean evidential sentences which are realized with the postverbal affix -te or -ney (e.g. Yang 1972, Sohn 1975, Suh 1977, Gim 1980, Song 2002, Chung 2005, 2007, Lee 2011). According to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint, an evidential sentence with -te or -ney cannot occur with a ‘first person’ subject, as illustrated with simple declarative sentences below: (1) and (2) contain -te and -ney, respectively.1

* I thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. I am also grateful to Chungmin Lee for encouraging me to write this paper. Many thanks also to Jeff Holliday for his help in the preparation of the manuscript. 1 This paper is not concerned with the temporal interpretations of an evidential sentence with -te or -ney. The literature has noted the ‘past tense’ meaning of -te (e.g. Huh 1975, Sohn 1975, Gim 1980, Choi 1983, Sohn 1999, Song 2002, Chung 2005, 2007), and the ‘relative tense’ meaning of its co-occurring tense (Sohn 1995, Lee & Ramsey 2000). Lee (2011) accounts for the temporal interpretation in terms of two eventualities: (i) the eventuality of the speaker acquiring sensory evidence (called the evidence acquisition eventuality), and (ii) the eventuality described by the prejacent clause (called the described eventuality). Lee (2011) argues that the evidentials are responsible for the temporal location of the evidence acquisition time: -te locates it prior to the utterance time, and -ney locates it at the utterance time. The tense morphemes occurring with the evidentials locate the reference time of the described eventuality with respect to the evidence acquisition time. (See Lee 2011 for more details.) Throughout this paper, the temporal readings of the Korean evidential sentences are reflected in their translations as follows: (i) the evidential clause, which is represented in square brackets, is translated as past tense with -te, and as present tense with -ney, and (ii) the prejacent clause is translated as past progressive with -te, and as present progressive with -ney.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004436701_014

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(1) Context: The speaker got a call from his sister, and was asked who played tennis yesterday. Now, the speaker says: Mary/#nay-ka ecey theynisu-lul chi-∅-te-la. Mary/I-nom yesterday tennis-acc play-pres-te-decl ‘[I had evidence that] Mary/#I was playing tennis yesterday.’ (2) Context: The speaker has just gotten a call from his sister, answering her question about who is playing tennis now: Mary/#nay-ka cikum theynisu-lul chi-∅-ney. Mary/I-nom now tennis-acc play-pres-ney.decl ‘[I have evidence that] Mary/#I is/am playing tennis now.’ In (1) and (2), the one with a third person subject is felicitous, but the other with a first person subject is infelicitous. This type of a ‘first person’ restriction is not observed in non-evidential sentences, as illustrated in (3) and (4). Under the same context as (1) and (2), the non-evidential sentences in (3) and (4) are felicitous with a first person subject as well as a third person subject. (3) Context: the same as (1) theynisu-lul chi-ess-e. Mary/nay-ka ecey Mary/I-nom yesterday tennis-acc play-past-decl ‘Mary/I played tennis yesterday.’ (4) Context: the same as (2) Mary/nay-ka cikum theynisu-lul chi-(koiss)-∅-e. Mary/I-nom now tennis-acc play-prog-pres-decl ‘Mary/I is/am playing tennis now.’ This paper addresses the question as to how and why such ‘first person’ constraints are imposed on evidential sentences. I first examine whether Korean evidential sentences are necessarily restricted to the first person subject. I show that the person constraint holds with different agents in different constructions, and it is correlated to the anchoring pattern of the evidential implication. Generalizing the person constraint in terms of the notion of an evidence acquisition eventuality, I argue that the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint holds with the agent of an evidence acquisition eventuality, such as the speaker in simple declaratives, the addressee in interrogatives, and the individual(s) denoted by a matrix clause subject in embedded clauses. I reconsider the counterexamples to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint noted in the literature (e.g. Sohn

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1975, Suh 1977, Gim 1980, Chung 2005, 2007), and propose two conditions on the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint: one is concerned with what is asserted by an evidential sentence (called what-assertion condition), and the other is concerned with how an assertion is made (called how-assertion condition). Then, I account for all the observed patterns of the person restrictions on Korean evidential sentences in terms of the modal-like evidential’s weakened strength of an assertion, following Lee’s (2011, 2013) analysis. I also point out that this kind of ‘first person’ constraint has been observed for evidential sentences from other languages (Aikhenvald 2004). Through a detailed study of the ‘nonequi subject’ constraint and discussions of similar restrictions imposed by epistemic modals and evidentials from other languages, I suggest that further cross-linguistic research in this line of a modal account will shed light on the meaning of evidentiality, and especially its relationship to epistemic modality. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I consider the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint in various constructions with the Korean evidentials -te and -ney, and show that it holds with different agents in different constructions. In Section 3, I discuss counterexamples to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint that have been noted by previous authors. In Section 4, I point out the parallels between Korean evidential sentences and English epistemically modalized sentences, and discuss how the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint and its counterexamples can be accounted for in terms of the assertive strength of a sentence with modals or modal-like evidentials. In Section 5, I discuss person constraints on evidential sentences from a cross-linguistic perspective, and suggest that a modal account can be extended to evidentials in other languages. The main claim of this paper is summarized in Section 6.

2

Anchoring of Evidential Implications and ‘First Person’ Constraints

This section explores the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint in various constructions. I show that the constraint is not necessarily imposed on the speaker (e.g. Na 1971, Suh 1977, Cheong 1983), and account for the constraint in terms of the notion of an evidence acquisition eventuality. 2.1

The ‘Non-equi Subject’ Constraint in Interrogatives and Embedded Clauses The ‘non-equi subject’ constraint holds with the speaker in simple declaratives, as already discussed in (1) and (2). However, the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint is not necessarily imposed on the speaker, as noted in the literature (e.g. Na 1971,

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Suh 1977, Cheong 1983). For example, it holds with a second person subject in interrogatives, as illustrated with the evidential -te below:2 (5) Context: The speaker woke up and found many empty bottles around him. He barely remembered that he drank beer with his wife and Mary, but could not remember the details. Now, he asks his wife: Mary/nay/#ne-ka ecey pam-ey maykcwu-ul manhi Mary/I/you-nom yesterday night-at beer-acc a.lot masi-∅-te-nya? drink-pres-te-q ‘[Given your evidence] were/was Mary/I/#you drinking beer a lot last night?’ In (5), the -te sentence with a second person subject is infelicitous, but the other versions with non-second person subjects are felicitous. This contrasts with non-evidential interrogatives in which no person restrictions on their subjects are observed, as in (6): (6) Context: the same as (5): Mary/nay/ne-ka ecey pam-ey maykcwu-ul manhi masi-ess-nya? Mary/I/you-nom yesterday night-at beer-acc a.lot drink-past-q ‘Did Mary/I/you drink beer a lot last night?’ All the subjects in (6), including a second person subject, are felicitous in the same context as (5). When the Korean evidential -te occurs in an embedded clause, the ‘nonequi subject’ constraint does not hold with the speaker, either. It holds with the agent denoted by the matrix clause subject, as illustrated by the verbal complement clause with the verb of saying malha- ‘say’ in (7a) and its corresponding nominal complement clause in (7b):3 (7) Context: The speaker is talking to his wife about what Chelswu said yesterday: theynisu-lul a. Chelswui-nun [nay/ne/Yenghi/#cakii-ka ecey Chelswu-top I/you/Yenghi/(s)he-nom yesterday tennis-acc

2 The evidential -ney cannot occur in interrogatives because it encodes the meaning of a declarative marker. But the evidential -te can combine with the interrogative marker -nya. 3 See Appendix for other propositional attitude verbs that can embed the evidential -te.

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chi-∅-te-la]-ko malha-yess-ta. play-pres-te-decl-comp say-past-decl ‘Chelswui said that [hei had evidence that] I/you/Yenghi/#hei was/were playing tennis yesterday.’ theynisu-lul b. Chelswui-nun [nay/ne/Yenghi/#cakii-ka ecey Chelswu-top I/you/Yenghi/(s)hei-nom yesterday tennis-acc chi-∅-te-la]-nun mal-ul ha-yess-ta. play-pres-te-decl-pne speech-acc do-past-decl ‘Chelswui said that [hei had evidence that] I/you/Yenghi/#hei was/were playing tennis yesterday.’ In (7), the pronominal expression caki ‘(s)he’ cannot be construed as referring back to the matrix clause subject. In other words, the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint holds with the agent denoted by the matrix clause subject (not the speaker) in embedded clauses. Crucially, this anchoring pattern differs from the corresponding nonevidential clauses. The sentences in (8), which do not contain -te in the embedded clause, are not restricted in their subject realization, and thus the pronominal expression caki ‘he/she’ in the embedded clause can be construed as referring to the matrix clause subject. (8) Context: the same as (7): a. Chelswui-nun [nay/ne/Yenghi/cakii-ka ecey theynisu-lul Chelswu-top I/you/Yenghi/(s)he-nom yesterday tennis-acc malha-yess-ta. chi-ess-ta]-ko play-past-decl-comp say-past-decl ‘Chelswui said that I/you/Yenghi/hei played tennis yesterday.’ b. Chelswui-nun [nay/ne/Yenghi/cakii-ka ecey theynisu-lul Chelswu-top I/you/Yenghi/(s)he-nom yesterday tennis-acc chi-ess-ta]-nun mal-ul ha-yess-ta. play-past-decl-pne speech-acc do-past-decl ‘Chelswui said that I/you/Yenghi/hei played tennis yesterday.’ While the above pattern of the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint (except for the case of nominal complement clauses) has been noted by previous researchers (e.g. Na 1971, Suh 1977, Cheong 1983), it is left unexplained why the constraint holds with different agents in different constructions. In the next section, I account for it in terms of the notion of the evidence acquisition eventuality (Lee 2011, 2013). - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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2.2 Generalization in Terms of an Evidence Acquisition Eventuality I argue that the person restriction on Korean evidential sentences holds with the agent of an evidence acquisition eventuality; here, the evidence acquisition eventuality refers to the eventuality of the agent acquiring sensory evidence for the eventuality described by the prejacent (Lee 2011, 2013). I illustrate this in terms of the anchoring of the evidential implication m;

(9) m = ‘the agent x has sensory evidence for the truth of the prejacent.’

I show that the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint holds with the agent x that is determined by the anchoring of the evidential implication. First, in a simple declarative sentence with no embedded clause, the evidential implication is anchored to the speaker, i.e. the speaker is supposed to have sensory evidence about the truth value of the prejacent implication. This is illustrated with the following infelicitous sentences with the evidentials -te or -ney. (10) a. Context: The speaker is blind. He met Yenghi yesterday. Now, he says: #Yenghi-ka ecey ppalkan paci-lul Yenghi-nom yesterday red pants-acc ip-koiss-∅-te-la. wear-prog-pres-te-decl ‘[I had evidence that] Yenghi was wearing red pants yesterday.’ b. Context: The speaker is blind. Now, he is talking about Yenghi to her mother: #Yenghi-ka cikum palkan paci-lul ip-koiss-∅-ney. Yenghi-nom now red pants-acc wear-prog-pres-ney.decl ‘[I have evidence that] Yenghi is wearing red pants now.’ In (10), the speaker’s blindness prevents him from telling the truth about whether Yenghi was/is wearing red pants yesterday/now. Given that evidential sentences like (10) are infelicitous, the evidential implication in simple declaratives is anchored to the speaker. Unlike simple declaratives, the evidential implication is not anchored to the speaker in interrogatives, as illustrated with the infelicitous utterance in (11).

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(11) Context: While Chelswu was in Seoul for the past two weeks, Yenghi was traveling in Europe. She has just arrived in Seoul. Now, Chelswu is giving her a ride and asks: #Ecey Seoul-ey pi-ka o-∅-te-nya? yesterday Seoul-at rain-nom fall-pres-te-Q Intended: ‘[Given my evidence] was it raining in Seoul yesterday?’ In (11), the speaker knows that the addressee could not acquire sensory evidence for the truth value of the prejacent, which is the target of the interrogation. Even though the speaker himself knows the truth value of the prejacent on the basis of his sensory evidence, the evidential sentences are infelicitous in (11). This infelicity suggests that the evidential implication in interrogatives cannot be anchored to the speaker. Instead, the evidential implication is anchored to the addressee in interrogatives. In the context of (12), the truth value of the prejacent is not known to the speaker, but the addressee is presupposed to know it. (12) Context: The speaker has just returned to Seoul, and asks a question to his son who has been in Seoul for the past two weeks. Ecey Seoul-ey pi-ka o-∅-te-nya? yesterday Seoul-at rain-nom fall-pres-te-Q ‘[Given your evidence] was it raining in Seoul yesterday?’ NOT: ‘[Given my evidence] was it raining in Seoul yesterday?’ This change of anchoring in interrogatives, known as interrogative flip in the literature (Speas & Tenny 2003), is cross-linguistically attested in evidentials from other languages, e.g. Quechua (Faller 2002), St’át’imcets (Matthewson et al. 2007), and Cheyenne (Murray 2010). When -te is embedded under verbs of saying, its evidential implication is not anchored to the speaker, either. It is anchored to the agent denoted by the matrix clause subject, as illustrated with the infelicitous utterance in (13). (13) Context: Chelswu is blind. Now, the speaker is talking to Mary about what Chelswu said yesterday: #Chelswu-ka [Yenghi-ka ecey palkan paci-lul Chelswu-nom Yenghi-nom yesterday red pants-acc ip-koiss-∅-te-la]-ko malha-yess-ta. wear-prog-pres-te-decl-comp say-past-decl Intended: ‘Chelswu said that [he had evidence that] Yenghi was wearing red pants.’

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table 12.1 Correlation between anchoring patterns and the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint

Unembedded Interrogatives declaratives

Embedded under verbs of saying

The ‘non-equi subject’ constraint holds with x.

speaker

addressee

the agent denoted by the matrix clause subject

The evidential implication is anchored to x, i.e. the agent of the evidence acquisition eventuality.

speaker

addressee

the agent denoted by the matrix clause subject

In (13), the agent denoted by the matrix clause subject, i.e. Chelswu, is blind, and thus he cannot tell the truth value of whether Yenghi was wearing red pants. 2.3 Interim Summary So far I have shown that the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint does not necessarily hold with the speaker in a Korean evidential sentence, but it is correlated to the anchoring pattern of its evidential implication. In other words, the constraint holds with the agent that the evidential implication is anchored to, i.e. the agent of the evidence acquisition eventuality. Given the correlation summarized in Table 12.1, I propose the following (preliminary) generalization about the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint: (14) If the subject of an evidential sentence refers to the agent of the evidence acquisition eventuality, then it is infelicitous. However, there are some cases in which this generalization does not hold. In the next section, I discuss the counterexamples to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint.

3

Counterexamples to the Non-equi Subject Constraint

A range of counterexamples to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint have been noted in the literature (e.g. Sohn 1975, Suh 1977, Gim 1980, Chung 2005, 2007). In this section, I propose two conditions for the counterexamples, and incorporate them into the generalization about the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint:

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the first condition is concerned with what is asserted by evidential sentences (henceforth, the ‘assert-what’ condition), and the second condition is concerned with how assertions are made (henceforth, the ‘assert-how’ condition). I argue that the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint holds with the agent of the evidence acquisition eventuality if and only if he/she asserts about his/her action or state at the evidence acquisition time under normal circumstances in which he/she takes full control over him/herself. 3.1 The ‘Assert-What’ Condition The first type of counterexample to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint can be characterized in terms of what is asserted by an evidential sentence. If the asserted content is not concerned with the agent’s action or state at the evidence acquisition time, the subject can be the agent of the evidence acquisition eventuality. I refer to this condition as the ‘assert-what’ condition, and discuss the counterexamples that arise from the violation of the ‘assert-what’ condition. First, the literature (e.g. Sohn 1975, Song 2002) has noted that -te sentences involving the expression -man ‘only’ do not exhibit the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint. For example, the subject of the -te sentences in (15a) and (16a) is the speaker, but they are felicitous in the given context, contrary to the prediction of the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint. The comparable examples with -ney are also given in (15b) and (16b); they are felicitous with first person subjects, too. (15) a. Na-honca-man hakkyo-ey ka-∅-te-la. I-alone-only school-loc go-pres-te-decl ‘[I noticed] only I was going to school.’ (Sohn 1975:93) b. Na-honca-man hakkyo-ey ka-∅-ney. I-alone-only school-loc go-pres-ney.decl ‘[I notice] only I am going to school.’ (16) a. Cwuwi-lul twullepo-ni, na-man socwu-lul surroundings-acc look.around-conn I-only Socwu-acc masi-∅-te-la. drink-pres-te-decl ‘When I looked around, [I noticed] I was the only one who was drinking Socwu.’ (Song 2002:157)

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b. Na-man socwu-lul masi-∅-ney. I-only Socwu-acc drink-pres-ney.decl ‘[I notice] I am the only one who is drinking Socwu.’ In (15) and (16), the speaker does not assert what he/she is doing at the evidence acquisition time. This is because the prejacent implication, which is concerned with the speaker’s action or state at the evidence acquisition time, is not asserted, but it is presupposed. The literature (e.g. Horn 1969) has noted that English sentences with the expression only give rise to two implications which have different statuses in discourse. Korean sentences with the expression man ‘only’ are the same as English sentences with only. Consider the two different implications that arise from (15a): (17) a. Asserted content: No one was going to school except me. (exclusive implication) b. Presupposed content: I was going to school. (prejacent implication) Given that the prejacent implication is not asserted content, the ‘assert-what’ condition is violated by sentences with man ‘only’. Consequently, the occurrences of first person subjects in sentences like (15) and (16) are felicitous. When the expression ceyil ‘the most’ occurs in evidential sentences, the asserted content is not the agent’s action or state at the evidence acquisition eventuality, either. The superlative meaning of ceyil ‘the most’ is a part of the asserted meaning, and thus it violates the ‘assert-what’ condition. Consider Gim’s (1980) example with -te in (18a), and its corresponding example with ney in (18b). (18) a. Sey salam kawunteyse nay-ka ceyil chwum-ul cal three people among I-nom the.most dance-acc well chwu-∅-te-la. dance-pres-te-decl ‘[I noticed] I was dancing the best among the three.’ (Gim 1980:77) b. Sey salam kawunteyse nay-ka ceyil chwum-ul cal three people among I-nom the.most dance-acc well chwu-∅-ney. dance-pres-ney.decl ‘[I notice] I am dancing the best among the three.’

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In (18), the subject is the speaker, but they are felicitous with the evidentials -te and -ney. This is because the ‘assert-what’ condition is violated in (18): it is asserted that the speaker is the best in terms of the described property among the other contextually salient person(s), i.e. the sentences do not merely assert about the speaker’s action or state at the evidence acquisition time. Similarly, the occurrence of comparative expressions in evidential sentences also gives rise to counterexamples to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint. The simple evidential sentences in (19) are felicitous although their subjects are the speaker. ppalli talli-∅-te-la. (19) a. Nay-ka Yenghi-pota te I-nom Yenghi-than more quickly run-pres-te-decl ‘[I noticed] I was running more quickly than Yenghi.’ b. Nay-ka Yenghi-pota te ppalli talli-∅-ney. I-nom Yenghi-than more quickly run-pres-ney.decl ‘[I notice] I am running more quickly than Yenghi.’ These counterexamples with comparative expressions can also be accounted for in terms of the violation of the ‘assert-what’ condition: the speaker’s assertion is not concerned with his/her action or state at the evidence acquisition time, but with the comparative meaning such that he/she is better than the other contextually salient individual(s) in terms of the described property. This ‘assert-what’ condition also explains why the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint is not imposed on evidential sentences with past or future tenses. The evidential sentences in (20) and (21) are realized with past and future tenses, respectively. In all of these simple declarative sentences, the first person subjects are felicitous with the evidentials.4 (20) a. Context: The speaker thought that he did not attend Yenghi’s wedding ceremony 10 years ago. But while he happened to see Yenghi’s wedding photos from his old album, he realized that he had mistaken Chelswu’s wedding for Yenghi’s. Now, the speaker says:

4 If the Korean evidentials -te and -ney occur with past or future tenses, they give rise to an inferential evidential reading (Lee 2011). For example, in (20a), the speaker did not make a direct observation of the ongoing-state of the described eventuality, i.e. his attending Yenghi’s wedding ceremony. Instead, he inferred about it on the basis of a photo from the ceremony. The translations in (20)–(21) reflect the evidential interpretation.

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Nay-ka Yenghi-ui kyelhonsik-ey chamsekha-yess-te-la. I-nom Yenghi-gen wedding.ceremony-loc attend-past-te-decl ‘[I inferred that] I had attended Yenghi’s wedding ceremony.’ b. Context: The speaker thought that he did not attend Yenghi’s wedding ceremony 10 years ago. But he has just found a photo from Yenghi’s wedding ceremony. Now, he says, looking at the photo: chamsekha-yess-ney. Nay-ka Yenghi-ui kyelhonsik-ey I-nom Yenghi-gen wedding.ceremony-loc attend-past-ney.decl ‘[I infer that] I attended Yenghi’s wedding ceremony.’ (21) a. Context: When the speaker ran into Chelswu on the street yesterday, Chelswu was heavily drunk. Now, the speaker says about a boxing match with Chelswu scheduled for tomorrow: Nay-ka nayil kyengki-eyse iki-kyess-te-la. I-nom tomorrow match-at win-fut-te-decl ‘[I inferred that] I would win tomorrow’s match.’ b. Context: Seeing Chelswu heavily drunk, the speaker now says about a boxing match with Chelswu scheduled for tomorrow: Nay-ka nayil kyengki-eyse iki-kyess-ney. I-nom tomorrow match-at win-fut-ney.decl ‘[I infer that] I will win tomorrow’s match.’ The evidential sentences with first person subjects in (20)–(21) are felicitous due to their violation of the ‘assert-what’ condition; the asserted content in (20) and (21) is not concerned with the speaker’s action or state at the evidence acquisition time. In (20), the assertion is made about the speaker’s attending Yenghi’s wedding ceremony. This is not what he did at the evidence acquisition time, i.e. the time when he saw/sees the wedding photos from the album. The time at which the speaker attended Yenghi’s wedding ceremony is prior to the evidence acquisition time. In (21), the speaker’s assertion is concerned with his winning the game tomorrow; its temporal location follows the evidence acquisition time, i.e. the time at which the speaker saw/sees Chelswu drunk. 3.2 The ‘Assert-How’ Condition The second type of counterexample pertains to the cases where the agent is not under normal circumstances in which he/she can make a full assertion about his/her action or state. Contextual factors such as alcohol or a temporary faint-

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ing prevent the agent from making a full assertion about what he/she is doing at the evidence acquisition time. I discuss such cases below, and argue that they are attributed to the violation of the ‘assert-how’ condition. Consider the examples in (22)–(24). They are all felicitous with first person subjects. The -te examples in (22a), (23a), and (24a) are due to the previous authors as specified. Their corresponding examples with -ney are given in (22b), (23b), and (24b), too. (22) a. Cengsin-ul chalie-po-ni na-nun pyengsil-ey consciousness-acc recover-see-and.then I-top hospital.room-loc iss-∅-te-la. be-pres-te-decl ‘Seeing myself after recovering consciousness, [I could see that] I was in the hospital room.’ (Suh 1977:110) b. Cengsin-ul chalie-po-ni na-nun pyengsil-ey consciousness-acc recover-see-and.then I-top hospital.room-loc iss-∅-ney. be-pres-ney.decl ‘Seeing myself after recovering consciousness, [I can see that] I am in the hospital room.’ (23) a. Context: Last night Chelswu was drunk and fell asleep. When he woke up, he realized that he was in front of his ex-girlfriend Yenghi’s house. Now, he says: nay-ka Yenghi cip aph-ey Cam-ul kkay-ni sleep-acc wake.up-and.then I-nom Yenghi home front-at iss-∅-te-la. be-pres-te-decl ‘When I woke up, [I could see that] I was in front of Yenghi’s house.’ (modified from Gim 1980) b. Context: Last night, Chelswu drank a lot, and fell asleep in his car without noticing it. Chelswu has just woken up from Yenghi’s call. She asked where he is now. Looking around, he answers: Cikum nay-ka Yenghi cip aph-ey iss-∅-ney. now I-nom Yenghi home front-at be-pres-ney.decl ‘[I can see that] I am in front of Yenghi’s house.’

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(24) a. Context: Chelswu watched a very touching movie yesterday. Now, he says: Nay-ka na-to molu-key ku cangmyen-eyse I-nom I-even not.know that scene-at wul-koiss-∅-te-la. cry-prog-pres-te-decl ‘[I noticed] I was crying at the scene without even knowing it.’ (modified from Gim 1980) b. Context: Chelswu is watching a very touching movie now, and says: Nay-ka cikum na-to molu-key wul-koiss-∅-ney. I-nom now I-even not.know cry-prog-pres-ney.decl ‘I started crying without even knowing it.’ The explicit phrases like cengsin-ul chalie-po-ni ‘seeing myself after recovering consciousness’ in (22), and na-to molukey ‘without realizing/noticing it’ in (24), and the contextual information in (23) indicate that the speaker lacks control over him/herself in the given context, and his/her action or state is neither volitional nor intentional. In these situations, although the speaker asserts about his/her action or state at the evidence acquisition time, he/she cannot fully assert about it. Evidential sentences that describe the agent’s action or state in his/her dream also do not exhibit the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint. Previous authors have noted the examples like (25) as counterexamples to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint: the occurrence of the evidential -te with first person subjects is felicitous in (25).5 pwulu-∅-te-la. (25) a. Na-nun kkwum-eyto ku-uy ilum-ul I-top dream-in he-gen name-acc call-pres-te-decl ‘[I noticed that] I was calling his name in the dream.’ (Gim 1980:77) 5 Sentences with -ney cannot be constructed in a parallel way to the -te sentences in (25). This is because the described eventuality in a present tensed -ney sentence is interpreted as occurring at the utterance time, e.g. (23b) states that the speaker is in front of Yenghi’s house at the utterance time. This is illustrated in the -ney sentence in (i), which is a minimal pair with (25a): (i) #Na-nun kkwum-eyto ku-uy ilum-ul pwulu-∅-ney. I-top dream-in he-gen name-acc call-pres-ney.decl Intended: ‘[I notice that] I am calling his name in the dream.’ The evidential sentence in (i) is infelicitous because the eventuality described to occur in his dream is construed as occurring at the utterance time, which is practically implausible.

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b. Eceypam kkwum-ey nay-ka kongwen-ul honca last.night dream-loc I-nom park-acc alone kenil-∅-te-la. walk-pres-te-decl ‘(I saw) I was walking alone in a park in last night’s dream.’ (Song 2002:157) These examples describing dream situations can be accounted for in terms of the ‘assert-how’ condition, too. In (25), the speaker cannot take control over his/her action or state in the dream. Given this lack of control over him/herself, the speaker can felicitously utter evidential sentences with first person subjects. 3.3 Interim Summary In this section, I have proposed two conditions for the counterexamples to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint: (i) the ‘assert-what’ condition, and (ii) the ‘asserthow’ condition. The generalization about the constraint in (14) can be revised in terms of the two conditions, as follows: (26) If the subject of an evidential sentence refers to the agent of the evidence acquisition eventuality, then it is infelicitous except for the following cases: a. what is asserted by the evidential sentence is not the agent’s action or state at the evidence acquisition time, or b. the assertion is not made under normal circumstances in which the agent takes full control over him/herself. In the next section, I account for the above generalization in terms of the assertive strength of evidential sentences.

4

A Modal Account of the ‘Non-equi Subject’ Constraint

In this section, I present a modal account of the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint, along the same lines as Lee (2011, 2013). I first show the parallels between Korean evidential sentences and English epistemically modalized sentences, and then account for their person restrictions in terms of the assertive strength of sentences with epistemic modals and modal-like evidentials. I also discuss the person restrictions with Korean evidential sentences that contain psych predicates, and argue that the so-called ‘equi-subject’ constraint (e.g. Yang

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1972, Nam 1978, Chung 2005) is not attributed to the meaning contributions of Korean evidentials. 4.1 Parallels to English Epistemically Modalized Sentences While there is no person restriction in English non-modal sentences, the ‘nonequi subject’ constraint is imposed on English sentences with the epistemic modal must. This is illustrated in the contrast between (27) and (28). Both the first and the third person subjects are felicitous in the non-modal sentence in (27). However, the first person subject is infelicitous in the modal sentence in (28), unlike the third person subject. (27) Context: The speaker has just gotten a call from his sister. Now, the speaker is answering her question about who is playing tennis now: Mary/I is/am playing tennis now. (28) Context: the same as (27) Mary/#I must be playing tennis now. The pattern described above is exactly the same as the contrast between Korean evidential sentences and non-evidential sentences, e.g. (1)–(2) vs. (3)– (4). There are more parallels between Korean evidential sentences and English epistemically modalized sentences. As discussed in Section 2, the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint holds with different agents in different constructions: the speaker in unembedded declaratives, the addressee in interrogatives, and the agent denoted by the matrix clause subject in embedded clauses. The same pattern holds with English must sentences, as follows: (29) Context: The speaker is in a gym with Mary and the addressee. Now, he says: Must Mary/#you be playing tennis now? (30) Context: John was in a gym with the speaker, the addressee, and Mary yesterday. John talked to the speaker yesterday, and now the speaker says: John j said that I/you/Mary/hei/# j must be playing tennis. In the interrogative sentence with must in (29), a second person subject is infelicitous. The ‘non-equi subject’ constraint holds with the agent denoted by the matrix clause subject in the embedded clause in (30): the pronoun he in the embedded clause cannot refer back to the matrix clause subject.

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In addition to the same anchoring pattern, the same types of counterexamples to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint are observed in English sentences with the epistemic modal must. The first type of counterexample to the ‘nonequi subject’ constraint arises when the ‘assert-what’ condition is violated; if the asserted content is not concerned with the agent’s action or state, then must sentences with first person subjects are felicitous. When English sentences with must contain expressions of exclusive, superlative, or comparative meanings, they are felicitous with first person subjects. The a-examples in (31)–(33), which are constructed in a parallel way to the Korean examples in (15)–(19), are all felicitous. In contrast, the b-examples that simply describe the speaker’s action or state are infelicitous, as predicted by the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint. (31) Context: The speaker is on her way to school. Now, she says: a. I must be the only one going to school. b. #I must be going to school. (32) Context: The speaker is at the dance party with her friends. Now, she says: a. I must be the best dancer among the three. b. #I must be dancing. (33) Context: The speaker is working out at the gym with Mary. Now, she says: a. I must be running more quickly than Mary. b. #I must be running. The second type of counterexample to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint is also observed with English must sentences. They are concerned with the ‘asserthow’ condition: when the agent lacks control over him/herself for contextual reasons, he/she can felicitously utter a modal sentence with must. For example, (31b) is felicitous in the following context: (34) Context: The speaker has just woken up, and found himself on a school bus. I must be going to school. Similar examples can be constructed as follows: (35) Context: Chelswu got drunk and fell asleep. When he woke up, he realized that he was in his wife’s car. He said, looking at his wife: I must be on the way home now.

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So far I have shown that English sentences with must exhibit a person restriction in the same way as Korean evidential sentences. Given the parallels, I present a uniform account of the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint and its counterexamples in terms of the strength of an assertion in the next section. 4.2

Assertive Strength with English Epistemic Modals and Korean Evidentials The literature (e.g. Karttunen 1972, Groenendijk & Stokhof 1975, Kratzer 1991) has noted that an epistemically modalized sentence is assertively weaker than an unmodalized sentence. With a must sentence like (36a), the speaker expresses less certainty than a non-modal sentence like (36b). (36) a. John must have left. b. John has left. (Karttunen 1972:12) The ‘non-equi subject’ constraint can be accounted for in terms of the weakened assertive strength of a modal statement (Lee 2011, 2013). Recall that the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint holds if and only if the agent of the evidence acquisition eventuality asserts about his/her action or state at the evidence acquisition time under normal circumstances. This person restriction is also observed with English modal statements. The relevant example in (28) is repeated below: (37) Context: The speaker has just got a call from his sister. Now, the speaker is answering her question about who is playing tennis now: Mary/#I must be playing tennis now. In (37), the first-person version is infelicitous while the third-person version is felicitous. This is because the truth value about the speaker’s action or state at the evidence acquisition time is already known to him/her under normal circumstances. (Here, the evidence acquisition time refers to the time at which the speaker perceives what is going on around him/herself, and thus it is the same as the utterance time.) For instance, whether it is true or false that the speaker is playing tennis at the utterance time in (37) is already known to him/herself in normal situations where he/she can take control over him/herself. Consequently, if the asserted content is concerned with the speaker’s action or state while he/she has full control and awareness over him/herself, there is no need for him/her to make a weak claim with epistemic modals. Instead, the speaker would just make a full assertion about it.

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Interrogatives with must can receive the same explanation as the simple declaratives like (37). If the target of interrogation is what the addressee is doing at the utterance time, then he/she would be presupposed to know its truth value. Assuming this certainty on the part of the addressee, the speaker would directly interrogate what the addressee is currently doing. The use of epistemic modals in interrogatives is infelicitous because it contradicts the presupposition about the addressee’s certainty about what he/she is doing. For example, in (38), the use of must implicates that the truth value about what the addressee is doing at the utterance time is not fully known to him/her, which is pragmatically implausible under normal circumstances. (38) Context: The speaker is in a gym with Mary and the addressee. Now, he says: Must Mary/#you be playing tennis now? When the epistemic modal must occurs in the embedded clause, the ‘nonequi subject’ constraint holds with the matrix clause subject. This is because the agent denoted by the matrix clause subject knows the truth value of what he/she is doing at the matrix clause event time. For example, in (39), in normal contexts, John knows the truth value of whether he is playing tennis or not at the time of his saying, and thus he would not weaken the assertive strength with the epistemic modal must: (39) Context: John was in a gym with the speaker, the addressee, and Mary yesterday. John talked to the speaker yesterday, and now he says: John j said that I/you/Mary/hei/# j must be playing tennis. However, there are possible situations where the agent would weaken the assertive strength about his/her action or state with epistemic modals. The ‘assert-how’ condition for the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint exactly captures such situations: although the asserted content is what the agent is doing at the evidence acquisition time, lack of control over him/herself would not allow him/her to make a full assertion. Reconsider the examples below: (40) Context: The speaker has just woken up, and found himself on a school bus. I must be going to school. (41) Context: Chelswu got drunk and fell asleep. When he woke up, he realized that he was in his wife’s car. He said, looking at his wife: I must be on the way home now. - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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In (40) and (41), the contextual factors prevent the speaker from fully asserting about his/her action or state at the utterance time. Thus, the speaker can felicitously utter a modal sentence that expresses the decreased degree of certainty about its truth value. The first type of counterexample can also be accounted for along the same line. The ‘assert-what’ condition states that the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint does not hold if the asserted condition is not the agent’s action or state at the evidence acquisition time. For example, the asserted content of the modal sentence in (42a) is not merely concerned with the speaker’s action or state at the utterance time, but it is concerned with the exclusive meaning in (42b). Given this, the speaker can have a lowered degree of certainty about it. As (42b) is felicitous, (42a) is felicitous as a weak statement. (42) Context: The speaker is on her way to school. Now, she says: a. I must be the only one going to school. b. No one else (among the contextually salient person(s)) must be going to school. Now, given the parallels between English epistemically modalized sentences and Korean evidential sentences discussed in the preceding section, I argue that the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint with the latter also arises from the weakened assertive strength with Korean evidentials: in other words, the Korean evidentials -te/-ney make a weak statement just like the English modal expression must does. In each construction with the evidentials, the truth value about the agent’s action or state at the evidence acquisition time is (presupposed to be) known to him/her under normal circumstances. This leads the agent to make a full assertion or a direct interrogation without epistemic modals and evidentials. Consequently, the occurrence of an epistemic modal or an evidential with a ‘first’ person subject is infelicitous due to the conflict between (i) the linguistically-encoded assertive strength of epistemic modals and modallike evidentials, and (ii) the agent’s certainty about his/her action or state under normal circumstances. To summarize, I argue that the constraint is not a syntactic constraint against first person subjects, but it is a semantic and pragmatic constraint on what is asserted and how it is asserted. If the asserted content is the agent’s action or state at the evidence acquisition time under normal circumstances, then the agent would not utter a weak statement with modals or evidentials. But epistemically modalized sentences and evidential sentences can be felicitous with a ‘first’ person subject in some situations where the asserted content is not about him/herself or he/she lacks control over him/herself.

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4.3 The Person Restrictions with Korean Psych Predicates Chung (2020) points out that the modal account proposed in this paper cannot be extended to the so-called ‘equi-subject’ constraint (e.g. Yang 1972, Nam 1978, Chung 2005). This constraint is observed with Korean psych predicates like sulpu- ‘sad’, and oilop- ‘lonely’. (I call these psych predicates simple psych predicates in comparison with other types of Korean psych predicates that will be discussed later in this section.) When the Korean evidentials -te and -ney occur with simple psych predicates, sentences with first person subjects are felicitous, but those with third person subjects are infelicitous, as illustrated in (43) and (44). The pattern is exactly the opposite to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint that has been discussed in the preceding sections. (43) a. Nay/#Mary-ka ecey nemwu sulpu-∅-te-la. I/Mary-nom yesterday very sad-pres-te-decl Intended: ‘[I had evidence that] I/#Mary was very sad yesterday.’ b. Nay/#Mary-ka ecey nemwu oilop-∅-te-la. I/Mary-nom yesterday very lonely-pres-te-decl Intended: ‘[I had evidence that] I/#Mary was very lonely yesterday.’ (44) a. Nay/#Mary-ka cikum nemwu sulpu-∅-ney. I/Mary-nom now very sad-pres-ney Intended: ‘[I have evidence that] I/#Mary am/is very sad now.’ b. Nay/#Mary-ka cikum nemwu oilop-∅-ney. I/Mary-nom now very lonely-pres-ney Intended: ‘[I have evidence that] I/#Mary am/is very lonely now.’ According to the proposed modal analysis, whether the speaker is sad/lonely or not is already known to him/herself, so it is predicted that he/she would not make a weak statement with evidentials. In contrast, the third person subject’s state might not be known to the speaker, so it is predicted that the speaker can possibly make a weak statement with evidentials. Chung points out that this prediction is empirically incorrect, and thus raises a problem for the modal analysis. However, it should be noted that the ‘equi subject’ constraint is observed in Korean non-evidential sentences with simple psych predicates, too. The nonevidential sentences in (45) and (46) are felicitous with first person subjects, but infelicitous with third person subjects. This is exactly the same pattern as their evidential counterparts in (43)–(44).

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(45) a. Nay/#Mary-ka ecey nemwu sulpu-ess-e. I/Mary-nom yesterday very sad-past-decl Intended: ‘I/#Mary was very sad yesterday.’ b. Nay/#Mary-ka ecey nemwu oilop-ess-e. I/Mary-nom yesterday very lonely-past-decl Intended: ‘I/#Mary was very lonely yesterday.’ (46) a. Nay/#Mary-ka cikum nemwu sulpu-∅-e. sad-pres-decl I/Mary-nom now very Intended: ‘I/#Mary am/is very sad now.’ b. Nay/#Mary-ka cikum nemwu oilop-∅-e. lonely-pres-decl I/Mary-nom now very Intended: ‘I/#Mary am/is very lonely now.’ I argue that the above pattern of the ‘equi-subject’ constraint with Korean simple psych predicates does not indicate anything particular about the meaning of the evidentials -te and -ney. I propose that the equi-subject cases are attributed to the lexical properties of Korean simple psych predicates; this is because whether they occur with evidentials or not, they are felicitous with first person subjects, but infelicitous with third person subjects. This contrasts with the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint which is imposed on evidential sentences, but not on non-evidential sentences. For example, reconsider the evidential sentences in (1)–(2), and the non-evidential sentences in (3)–(4); the former is constrained not to occur with first person subjects, but the latter is not. Thus, the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint, which is observed only in evidential sentences, should be accounted for in terms of the meaning of the evidentials, i.e. -te and -ney. However, the ‘equi-subject’ constraint, which is observed with Korean simple psych predicates irrespective of their occurrence with evidentials, does not need to be accounted for in terms of the meaning of the evidentials. This proposed approach to the ‘equi-subject’ constraint receives further support from the person restriction with other types of Korean psych predicates; they are called -eha-type psych predicates because the affix -eha attaches to simple psych predicates, e.g. sulpeha- ‘be sad’, oilopeha- ‘be lonely’. They exhibit person restrictions which are exactly opposite to the simple psych predicates (but are the same as the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint): they are felicitous with third person subjects, but infelicitous with first person subjects. This pattern is observed in any sentences with -eha-type psych predicates, whether they occur

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with evidentials or not. This is illustrated below; (47)–(48) are evidential sentences with -te or -ney, and (49)–(50) are their non-evidential counterparts. (47) a. Mary/#nay-ka ecey nemwu sulpueha-∅-te-la. Mary/I-nom yesterday very sad-pres-te-decl Intended: ‘[I had evidence that] Mary/#I was very sad yesterday.’ b. Mary/#nay-ka ecey nemwu oilopeha-∅-te-la. Mary/I-nom yesterday very lonely-pres-te-decl Intended: ‘[I had evidence that] Mary/#I was lonely yesterday.’ (48) a. Mary/#nay-ka cikum nemwu sulpueha-∅-ney. Mary/I-nom now very sad-pres-ney Intended: ‘[I have evidence that] Mary/#I is/am very sad now.’ b. Mary/#nay-ka cikum nemwu oilopeha-∅-ney. lonely-pres-ney Mary/I-nom now very Intended: ‘[I have evidence that] Mary/#I is/am very lonely now.’ (49) a. Mary/#nay-ka ecey nemwu sulpueha-yess-e. Mary/I-nom yesterday very sad-past-decl Intended: ‘Mary/#I was very sad yesterday.’ b. Mary/#nay-ka ecey nemwu oilopeha-yess-e. Mary/I-nom yesterday very lonely-past-decl Intended: ‘Mary/#I was very lonely yesterday.’ (50) a. Mary/#nay-ka cikum nemwu sulpueha-∅-e. sad-pres-decl Mary/I-nom now very Intended: ‘Mary/#I is/am very sad now.’ b. Mary/#nay-ka cikum nemwu oilopeha-∅-e. Mary/I-nom now very lonely-pres-decl Intended: ‘Mary/#I is/am very lonely now.’ The above pattern can be summarized in the following way: (i) first person subjects are felicitous with simple psych predicates, and (ii) third person subjects are felicitous with -eha-type psych predicates. Crucially, this generalization is applicable to both evidential and non-evidential sentences. In other words, it is possible to express different degrees of assertive strengths with psych predi-

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cates: evidential sentences with psych predicates like (43), (44), (47), and (48) are assertively weak, but their non-evidential counterparts like (45), (46), (49), and (50) are assertively strong. This is the same in languages like English. The unmodalized sentences in (51) are strong statements, but the modalized sentences in (52) are weak statements. (51) a. I/Mary am/is sad. b. I/Mary am/is lonely. (52) a. I/Mary must be sad. b. I/Mary must be lonely. Like English, it’s possible to make both a weak evidential statement and a strong non-evidential statement with Korean psych predicates, whether they occur with first or third person subjects. Korean psych predicates differ from English ones in that they have two forms of psych predicates, and they are lexically restricted in terms of which subjects to occur with: simple psych predicates are allowed to occur only with first person subjects, and -eha-type psych predicates are allowed to occur only with third person subjects. In sum, the ‘equi-subject’ constraint with Korean simple psych predicates has nothing to do with the meaning contribution of the evidentials -te and -ney (contra Chung 2020).

5

First Person Effects in Evidentials: From a Cross-linguistic Perspective

Aikhenvald (2004) discusses the effect of first person marking with evidentials from a cross-linguistic perspective. Her research focuses on the implications that arise from the combination of evidentials and first person participants. Table 12.2 from Aikhenvald (2004:238) shows that the notions of ‘control’, ‘intention’ and ‘volition’ are important in understanding the ‘first person effect’ in evidential sentences.6

6 Table 12.2 reflects Aikhenvald’s (2004: 65) categorization of evidential systems across languages. Each evidential system employs different types of evidentials as follows: (i) a. A1: firsthand vs. non-firsthand b. A2: non-firsthand vs. ‘everything else’. c. B1: direct (or visual) vs. inferred vs. reported d. C1: visual vs. non-visual sensory vs. inferred vs. reported e. D1: visual vs. non-visual vs. inferred vs. assumed vs. reported

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table 12.2 First person effects in evidentials: Aikhenvald (2004:238)

Type of system

Evidential

Meaning

Languages exemplified

A1

non-firsthand firsthand non-visual visual non-firsthand direct (or visual)

unintentional, uncontrolled, non-volitional action opposite of the above unintentional, uncontrolled, non-volitional action opposite of the above unintentional, uncontrolled, non-volitional action accidental uncontrolled action

Jarawara, Yukaghir, Archi Tariana, Tucano Abkhaz Qiang, Amdo Tibetan

C1, D1 A2 B1

According to Table 12.2, the occurrence of evidentials with first person participants can imply that his/her action is ‘unintentional, uncontrolled, and non-volitional’ in a number of languages. In the A1, C1, and D1 evidential systems (attested in Jarawara, Yukaghir, Archi, Tariana, Tucano), the opposite meaning can also arise from first person marking: the agent is in full control over him/herself, and the action is intentional and volitional. It varies cross-linguistically which kind of evidentials can give rise to the ‘unintentional, uncontrolled, and non-volitional’ implication: such an implication arises from direct (or visual) evidentials in languages in the B1 evidential system, and from non-firsthand or non-visual evidentials in languages in the A1, C1, D1 evidential systems. The former is illustrated with the visual evidential -u in Qiang in (53a) and the direct evidential -thæ in Amdo Tibetan in (53b), and the latter is illustrated with the non-firsthand evidential -hani in Jarawara in (54): in both contexts, the speaker lacks control over what he/she is doing or what is happening to him/herself. (53) Context: The speaker has hit someone while leaning back and stretching his arms back without looking behind him. a. qɒ the: tɒ de-we-z̧-u-ɒ̱ 1sg 3sg loc or-have/exist-caus-vis-1sg ‘I hit him (accidentally).’ b. ŋə ma sæm shæ ni der tɕag=taŋ=thæ I(erg) neg think place loc dish break=aux=dir.ev ‘I broke the dish by accident.’ (literally: when I was ‘at a non-thinking place.’) (Aikhenvald 2004:229–230)

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(54) a. ito owa wasi-hani-ke bad.cold(f) 1sg.o find-1mm.p.nonfirsth.f-decl.f ‘A bad cold found me.’ (i.e. I got a bad cold.) b. amo o-waha-ni o-ke sleep 1sg.s-next.thing-1mm.p.nonfirsth.f 1sg.s-decl.f waha next.thing ‘The next thing was I fell asleep.’ (Aikhenvald 2004:221) I suggest that the combination of first person participants with the above evidentials, whether they are firsthand or non-firsthand, might make a weak statement; in other words, such evidentials might encode an epistemic modal meaning. Due to the linguistically encoded meaning of a weakened assertive strength, evidential sentences with first person marking might be construed as involving an ‘unintentional, uncontrolled, and non-volitional’ action. Taking an example from Abkhaz, Aikhenvald (2004:222) adopts Chirikba’s (2003) description about the possible situations for the use of Abkhaz evidentials with first person: ‘… situations as dreams, actions carried out under the influence of alcohol, or when the speaker’s actions have been performed without their control and come to them as a surprise’. Aikhenvald (2004:221) also points out that first person marking with evidentials can imply ‘inadvertent action over which one has hardly any control’ (Maslova 2003:229). Recall that these situations are exactly the same situations in which the ‘assert-how’ condition is violated, and thus first person marking is felicitous with Korean evidentials; see (22)–(25). Given these similarities, I propose that the modal account proposed in this paper can be extended to the ‘unintentional, uncontrolled, and non-volitional’ implication, as one of the ‘first person’ effects observed across languages. Not all evidentials across languages encode the modal meaning. It has been argued that some evidentials strengthen a statement while other evidentials weaken a statement in a particular language and across languages. Faller’s (2002) study of Quechua evidentials shows that different evidentials in a particular language can have different degrees of the assertive strength. Consider Faller’s analysis represented in (55): (55a) is a non-evidential sentence, and (55b) and (55c) are evidential sentences with the ‘best possible grounds’ evidential -mi and the conjectural evidential -chá, respectively.

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(55) a. Para-sha-n. rain-prog-3 p= ‘It’s raining.’ ill= asserts (p) sinc= {Bel(s,p)} strength= 0 b. Para-sha-n-mi. rain-prog-3-bpg p= ‘It’s raining.’ ill= asserts (p) sinc= {Bel(s,p), ev= See(s,ep)} strength= +1 c. Para-sha-n-chá. rain-prog-3-conj q= ‘It’s raining.’ p= ♢q ill= asserts (♢q) sinc= {Bel(s,♢q), Rea(s,(Bel(s,♢q)))} strength= -1 (Faller 2002:25–26) Faller analyzes Quechua evidentials as speech act operators: their meaning contributions are not specified in the propositional content (p in (55)), but in the sincerity conditions of relevant speech acts (sinc in (55)). The crucial difference among the sentences in (55) lies in the degree of strength of an assertion: while the assertive strength of the non-evidential sentence in (55a) is at the conventional level 0, those of the evidential sentences in (55b) and (55c) are at the increased level +1 and the decreased level -1, respectively. In other words, the ‘best possible grounds’ evidential -mi strengthens the assertion, but the conjectural evidential -chá weakens the assertion. A detailed analysis of the Quechua evidentials is beyond the scope of this paper. But I propose that the different degrees of assertive strength with distinct evidentials might give rise to contrasting implications about ‘control’, ‘intention’ and ‘volition’ as shown in the A1, C1, D1 evidential systems. I have shown that the ‘unintentional, uncontrolled, and non-volitional’ implication arises from the combination of first person marking and modal-like evidentials in Korean, due to their weakened strength of an assertion. Given that the Quechua evidential chá is modal-like (as shown in its propositional-level contribution represented with the necessity operator ♢ in (55c)), I suspect that

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it would give rise to the same implication as Korean modal-like evidentials. The other implication for ‘intentional, controlled, and volitional actions’ might arise from the combination of first person marking and non-modal evidentials like the Quechua ‘best possible grounds’ evidential -mi. The two contrasting implications are illustrated in the Jarawara examples in (56). They are minimal pairs with different evidentials, and give rise to different implications. (56) a. Context: The speaker woke up drunk, with a hangover and no memory of what he had done the previous night. o-ke o-hano-hani 1sg.s-be.drunk-1mm.p.nonfirsth.f 1sg-decl.f ‘I got drunk (and don’t recall it)’ b. Context: The speaker deliberately got drunk and is fully aware of what he did. o-hano-hara o-ke 1sg.s-be.drunk-1mm.p.firsth.f 1sg-decl.f ‘I got drunk (deliberately)’ (Dixon 2003:170 from Aikhenvald 2004:221) The relationship between evidentials and epistemic modals has been one of the central topics discussed in the evidentiality literature (e.g. Izvorski 1997, de Haan 1999, Garrett 2001, Faller 2002, Aikhenvald 2004, Chung 2005, Davis et al. 2007, McCready & Ogata 2007, Matthewson et al. 2007, Speas 2008, Lee 2011). While previous authors have proposed a range of diagnostic tests to determine whether a certain evidential is modal or non-modal (e.g. Faller 2002, Matthewson et al. 2007, McCready & Ogata 2007, Murray 2010), person restrictions on evidential sentences (or the ‘first person’ effect with evidentials) have not been studied in terms of the distinction between modal-like evidentials and non-modal evidentials. It is left for future research to determine whether my explanation in terms of assertive strength is applicable to the ‘first person’ effect observed in evidentials from other languages. I suggest that further research about person restrictions or effects on evidential sentences in this line will shed light on the meaning of evidentiality, especially its relationship to epistemic modality.

6

Summary and Conclusion

In this paper, I explored the person constraint in various constructions with the Korean evidentials -te/-ney and the English epistemic modal must, and showed

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that in each of these constructions the same pattern is observed. I accounted for the parallels in terms of the strength of an assertion. I argued that the Korean evidentials -te and -ney make a weak statement just like the English modal expression must does, and the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint is due to this weakened strength of an assertion: in most situations, the agent of the evidence acquisition eventuality would not weaken the strength of an assertion in order to describe what he/she is doing or what is happening to him/herself, because the truth value of the prejacent is known to the agent. I also classified the counterexamples to the ‘non-equi subject’ constraint into two types, and accounted for them in terms of the two conditions about assertions: (i) the ‘assert-what’ condition, and (ii) the ‘assert-how’ condition. If (i) asserted content is not concerned with the agent’s action or state at the evidence acquisition time, or (ii) assertion is not made under normal circumstances in which the agent takes control over him/herself, then first person subject is felicitous. Finally, I discussed implications about ‘control’, ‘intention’ and ‘volition’ that arise from the combination of first person marking and evidentials from other languages. I suggested that they can receive the same line of a modal account in terms of the strength of an assertion.

Appendix Previous researchers (e.g. Chung 2010) have argued that unlike verbs of saying, the evidential -te is not embeddable under the verbs, tanenha- ‘assert’, mit‘believe’, and sayngkakha- ‘think’. Consider Chung’s example below (the translation is from Chung, but the glosses and the square brackets are mine). phyenci-lul ssu-∅-te-la]-ko (57) #Mary-nun [ John-i Mary-top John-nom letter-acc write-pres-te-decl-comp mit/tanenha-ess-ta. believe/assert-past-decl ‘Mary believed/asserted that [she saw] John was writing a/the letter.’ (Chung 2010:940) However, I have found naturally occurring data in (58)–(60) via online searches. They illustrate that propositional attitude verbs like cwucangha‘claim’, tanenha- ‘assert’, and sayngkakha- ‘think’ can embed the evidential -te, and its evidential implication is anchored to the agent denoted by a matrix clause subject; the Bible in (58), Sam Brownback in (59), and Paul in (60).

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(58) Sengkyeng-un [kulehan mikal-ey.tayhay cwuk-nun nal-kkaci bible-top that Michal-about die-rel day-until casik-i ep-ess-te-la]-ko tanenha-n-ta. child-nom not.exist-past-te-decl-comp assert-pres-decl ‘The Biblei asserts that [iti had evidence that] Michal had no child to the day of her death.’ (available at http://atsnu.org/_chboard/bbs/board.php?bo_table=m5_1 &wr_id=67235&sfl=&stx=&sst=wr_datetime&sod=desc&sop=and&page =4) (59) Ilen kawuntey anthakkapkeyto eckucey Sam this mid heartbreakingly the.day.before.yesterday Sam sengin namca Brownback mikwuk sangwenuiwen-i [pwukhan-ui Brownback USA senator-nom North.Korea-gen adult male cingcip cekkyek choyce sincang-i 125 conscription appropriate minimum height-nom 125 seynthimithe-i-∅-te-la]-ko cwucanghay-ss-ta. centimeter-be-pres-te-decl-comp claim-past-decl ‘In the middle of this situation, the USA Senator Sam Brownbacki claimed that [hei had evidence that] the appropriate minimum height for North Korean male adults’ conscription was 125 centimeters.’ (available at http://www.kado.net/blog2/userArticleView.html?idxno=73 183) (60) Manyak Pauli-i cakii-ui kitoha-tentaylo il-i if Paul-nom he-gen pray-as work-nom toy-ess-ta-myen cakii-ka kitoha-ko ungtap-ul become-past-decl-if he-nom pray-and response-acc pata-se [hananim-ui il-i receive-because God-gen work-nom ilwueci-∅-te-la]-ko sayngkakhay-ss.ul.kes-ipnita. be.accomplished-pres-te-decl-comp think-would-decl ‘If things had worked out as Pauli prayed, then hei would have thought that [hei had evidence that] it was accomplished because hei prayed and received a response from God.’ (available at http://covenant.kimc.net/cgi‑bin/newt/read.cgi?board=r‑p gh&y_number=20&nnew=1) (58)–(60) are all interpreted as the embedded propositions being asserted by the agents denoted by the matrix clause subjects. For example, in (60),

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the pronominal expression caki ‘he/she’ in the matrix clause subject position denotes Paul, and the evidential implication is anchored to it. Due to this anchoring, each of the above utterances can be felicitously followed by an utterance like (61) in which the speaker disagrees with the matrix clause subject’s assertion. (61) Na-nun kulehkey sayngkakha-cianh-∅-a. I-top so think-not-pres-decl ‘I don’t think so’. As in the case of verbs of saying, nominal complement clauses which correspond to the above examples can be easily obtained via online searches. The example in (62) illustrates the case with the noun cinswul ‘statement’ which embeds the evidential -te. (62) Tto talun cwumin-to [sip-ye-pwun cen-ey besides different resident-also ten-around-minute before Choi-ssi-ui cip-ey cenhwa-lul kel-ess-ciman Choi-Mr./Ms.-gen home-loc phone.call-acc make-past-but nwukwunka-ka pata-se kunyang someone-nom receive-and.then without.no.reason kkunepeli-∅-te-la-nun] cinswul-ul hay-ss-ta. hang.up-pres-te-decl-pne statement-acc do-past-decl ‘Besides, another residenti made a statement that [he/shei had evidence that] he/shei called Choi’s home about 10 minutes prior, but that the person who picked up the phone just hung up.’ (available at http://www.ilyo.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=70933) In (62), the evidential implication is anchored to the agent that is denoted by the matrix clause subject, i.e. the sentence is interpreted as the resident having evidence for the embedded proposition.

References Aikhenvald, Alexandra (2004) Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cheong, Moon-su (1983) Studies of the meaning of -te, Daejeon: Daejeon University. Chirikba, Viacheslav (2003) Evidential category and evidential strategy in Abkhaz. In Studies in Evidentiality, Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald & R.M.W. Dixon, eds., Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 243–272.

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Choi, Hyun-Bae (1983) Wuli Malbon (Our Grammar). Seoul: Chungumsa, first printed in 1929. Chung, Kyung-Sook (2005) Space in Tense: The Interaction of Tense, Aspect, Evidentiality and Speech Act in Korean. Ph.D. thesis, Simon Fraser University. Chung, Kyung-Sook (2007) Spatial deictic tense and evidentials in Korean. Natural Language Semantics 15: 187–219. Chung, Kyung-Sook (2010) Korean evidentials and assertion. Lingua 120: 932–952. Chung, Kyung-Sook (2020) Korean Evidentials and Epistemic Modals. In Evidentials and Modals, Chungmin Lee & Jinho Park, eds., Leiden: Brill, 177–213. Davis, Christopher, Christopher Potts, & Margaret Speas (2007) The pragmatic values of evidential sentences. In Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 17, Masayuki Gibson & Tova Friedman, eds., Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications, 71–88. de Haan, Ferdinand (1999) Evidentiality and epistemic modality: Setting boundaries. Southwest Journal of Linguistics 18: 83–101. Dixon, Robert M.W. (2003) Evidentiality in Jarawara. In Studies in Evidentiality, Alexandra. Y. Aikhenvald & Robert M.W. Dixon, eds., Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 165– 188. Faller, Martina (2002) Semantics and Pragmatics of Evidentials in Cuzco Quechua. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University. Garrett, Edward (2001) Evidentiality and Assertion in Tibetan. Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles. Gim, Cha-Gyun (1980) Kuke sicey hyengtaysoui uimi: Hoisang hyengtayso -te-lul cwungsimulo (The semantics of tense morphemes in Korean: with focus on the retrospective -te). Hangul 169: 45–116. Groenendijk, Jeroen A.G. & Martin J.B. Stokhof (1975) Modality and conversational information. Theoretical Linguistics 2: 61–112. Horn, Laurence R. (1969) A presuppositional analysis of only and even. In Proceedings of the 5th Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, Robert I. Binnick, ed., Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 97–108. Huh, Woong (1975) Wuli yesmalbon (Korean Grammar). Seoul: Saymmwunhwasa. Izvorski, Roumyana (1997) The present perfect as an epistemic modal. In Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 7, Stanford University: CLC Publications, 222–239. Karttunen, Lauri (1972) Possible and must. In Syntax and Semantics 1, J. Kimball, ed., New York: Academic Press, 1–20. Kratzer, Angelika (1991) Modality. In Semantics: An International Handbook of Contemporary Research, Arnim von Stechow & Dieter Wunderlich, eds., Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 639–650. Lee, Iksop & S. Robert Ramsey (2000) The Korean Language. Albany: State University of New York Press.

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Lee, Jungmee (2011) Evidentiality and its interaction with tense: Evidence from Korean. Ph.D. thesis, The Ohio State University. Lee, Jungmee (2013) Temporal constraints on the meaning of evidentiality. Natural Language Semantics 21: 1–41. Maslova, Elena (2003) Evidentiality in Yukaghir. In Studies in Evidentiality, Alexandra. Y. Aikhenvald & Robert M.W. Dixon, eds., Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 219–236. Matthewson, Lisa, Henry Davis, & Hotze Rullmann (2007) Evidentials as epistemic modals: Evidence from St’át’imcets. In The Linguistic Variation Yearbook 7, J.V. Craenebroeck et al., ed., Amsterdam: John Benjamins. McCready, Elin & Norry Ogata (2007) Evidentiality, modality and probability. Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 147–206. Murray, E. Sarah (2010) Evidentiality and the Structure of Speech Acts. Ph.D. thesis, Rutgers University. Na, Jin-Suk (1971) Wulimal-uy ttay maykim yenkwu (A study of tenses in Korean). Seoul: Kwahaksa. Nam, Ki-Shim (1978) Kwuke mwunpep-ui sicey mwuncey-ey kwanhan yenkwu (A Study of Korean Tenses). Seoul: Tower Press. Sohn, Ho-Min (1975) Retrospection in Korean. Language Research 11: 87–103. Sohn, Sung-Ock (1995) Tense and aspect in Korean. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press. Sohn, Sung-Ock S. (1999) Tense and Aspect in Korean. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press. Song, Jae-Mog (2002) A typological analysis of the Korean evidential marker -te. Eoneohag 32: 147–164. Speas, Margaret (2008) On the syntax and semantics of evidentials. Language and Linguistics Compass 2: 940–965. Speas, Tenny & Carol Tenny (2003) Configurational properties of point of view roles. In Asymmetry in Grammar, Anna Maria Di Sscuillo, ed., Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 315–344. Suh, Cheong-Soo (1977) -Te-nun hoysanguy kinungul kacinunka? Congkyelpepkwa inyongpepuy -te-lul cwungsimulo (Does -te have a retrospective function? Focusing on the sentence-final -te and the -te in quotations). Ene (Linguistic Journal of Korea) 2: 97–127. Yang, In-Seok (1972) Korean syntax: Case markers, delimiters, complementation, and relativization. Ph.D. thesis, University of Hawaii, Honolulu.

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chapter 13

What Kind of (Doxastic) Alternatives Does Korean Evidential -te- Introduce (If It Does)? Dongsik Lim

1

Introduction*

One of main concerns in recent works on evidentials1 in the area of formal semantics is what kind of linguistic categories evidential morphemes in a given language belong to.2 The most widely discussed functional category is the epistemic modal. Many studies, including Izvorski (1997), Garrett (2001), Matthewson et al. (2007), McCready & Ogata (2007), and Lee (2013), inter alia, treat evidentials as a type of epistemic modals. This is mainly because both evidentials and epistemic modals are linguistic categories concerning a speaker’s state of knowledge. Evidentials are linguistic categories “whose primary meaning is source of information” (Aikhenvald 2004:3), or what kind of information source a speaker’s knowledge (and therefore his/her assertion) is based on, whereas epistemic modals are linguistic categories concerning a speaker’s confidence about his/her knowledge. Furthermore, it is generally * A preliminary version of this paper was presented in Semantics and Philosophy in Europe 4 (September 26–October 1, 2011) at Ruhr-University Bochum. Thanks to Professor Chungmin Lee and Professor Jinho Park in Seoul National University for inviting me to the pre-workshop of 21st Japanese-Korean Linguistics and encouraging me to write up this paper. I am also thankful to audiences in SPE 4 and in the workshop for questions and comments. I am also indebted to Semoon Hoe for discussions and the data regarding PRO under -te-. All remaining errors are mine, of course. This paper is partially supported by the project Estructura eventiva y ‘construcción’ léxico-sintáctica de las oraciones. Teoría y experimentación (FF2009–07114, Project leader: Professor Violeta Demonte, CCHS-CSIC). 1 I distinguish the term evidentiality from evidentials (or evidential morphemes/evidential markers), which is often disregarded in much of current literature. The former is a general term covering any indication about speaker’s source of information, and can be expressed by any linguistic category, such as verbs, adverbs, or auxiliaries. The latter is, as I will mention in this introduction, a specific class of functional morphemes in a given language whose main function is to indicate speaker’s source of information (or express evidentiality). This distinction is sometimes restated with the term ‘broad evidentiality’ and ‘narrow evidentiality’: see Lim (2010: Ch. 1) for further discussion. 2 For a summary of different formal approaches to evidential markers, see Matthewson et al. (2007: Section 3).

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accepted that a speaker’s certainty about his/her information source is related to the type of information source (this notion is usually dubbed under the term evidential scale: see de Haan 1998, inter alia). For example, an evidential marker indicating that the source of information is direct perception is regarded as expressing more certainty than an evidential marker indicating that the source of information is someone else’s assertion. Therefore, it is natural that many scholars working on evidentials—both from formal perspectives and functional/typological perspectives—try to understand evidentials in terms of epistemic modals.3 Recently, however, this common view is challenged in various ways. First, some scholars claim that different languages may encode evidentiality in linguistic categories different from epistemic modals. For example, Faller (2002) argues that evidentials in Cuzco Quechua are illocutionary operators, which do not affect the truth-condition of the prejacent,4 but only changes the illocutionary force of the assertion. Other work, such as Chung (2007), proposes that Korean -te-, which has been analyzed as evidential marker (Sohn 1994, Cinque 1999, Song 1998, inter alia) is actually a deictic past tense in the sense of Faller (2004), which not only denotes some time interval before the utterance time, but also denotes some place where the eventuality denoted by the prejacent occurred. Second, unlike what is discussed in previous literature in typology, the relation between the certainty and the type of source of information do not always correlate with each other. Faller (2002) already points out that evidentials in natural language cannot be arranged in a single linear scale of speaker’s degree of confidence (see Faller 2002: Ch. 3), and Matthewson et al. (2007) claim that evidentials in St’át’imcets show the variable degree of the speaker’s certainty. Furthermore, von Fintel & Gillies (2010) claim that English epistemic necessity modal must presupposes the indirect evidentiality, which is unexpected in the previous studies of the scale of evidentials with respect to speaker’s certainty, where indirect evidentials are claimed to express less degree of speaker’s certainty than direct perceptive evidentials. Third and finally, there are some aspects of evidentials which cannot be accounted for in terms of epistemic modals, such as a specific kind of long distance anaphor licensing triggered by evidentials (see Lim to appear, among others).

3 See von Fintel & Gillies (2010), however, for an analysis of English epistemic must as introducing a presupposition of indirect/inferential evidentiality. 4 Throughout this paper, I use the term prejacent strictly descriptively to refer to the proposition abstracted from the context of an evidential marker.

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Given this, here I will investigate the semantics and pragmatics of Korean morpheme -te- in the light of this current development of the formal studies of evidentials, epistemic modals and other intensional operators. Recent formal studies of Korean -te- mainly focus on whether it is actually an evidential marker or not. As briefly mentioned above, Chung (2007) claims that -te- is not an evidential marker but a deictic tense marker, but against Chung (2007), Lee (2013) argues that -te- is a direct evidential marker in Korean, whose semantics is that of epistemic modals. Unlike these previous studies, Lim (2010) claims that -te- is not a tense marker or an epistemic modal, but it is an evidential marker the main role of which is merely to trigger a presupposition regarding direct evidentiality. In this paper, taking it for granted that -te- is neither an illocutionary operator nor a deictic past tense (Lim 2010: Ch. 4), I will pursue a somewhat different alternative: to analyze -te- in parallel with attitude predicates. To justify this investigation, in Section 2 I will first introduce some data from Lim (to appear), where -te- licenses Korean long distance anaphor caki, which is known as de se anaphor, even when the attitude holder does not have relevant self-knowledge (or de se knowledge). I will also show that epistemic modals (at least in Korean) do not license caki when the attitude holder does not have any relevant de se knowledge. In Section 3 I make my own proposal to account for this puzzle, based on the intuition that -te- introduces vivid acquaintance (in the sense of Kaplan 1969) on some object. In Section 4 I discuss how my proposal in Section 3 can be extended to account for other phenomena regarding -te-. In Section 5 I conclude the paper and discuss some implications.

2

Puzzle: Long Distance Anaphor caki under -te-

Chierchia (1989) pointed out that some items in natural language must be interpreted as de se. Consider the following two scenarios (from Anand 2006:9, which is originally from Chierchia 1989). (1) a. Pavarotti is listening to himself singing La donna e mobile and is impressed by his own skill. He thinks, “I have to admit it: I really am a genius!” b. Pavarotti is listening to a performer singing La donna e mobile, and is impressed by his artistry. He thinks, “This performer is a genius! I could learn a lot from him.” Unbeknownst to him, he is the performer he is listening to.

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Chierchia noted that 2a, which involve PRO, is acceptable only under the scenario 1a, whereas 2b is acceptable under 1a and 1b. Given the fact that Pavarotti has de se belief “I am a genius” only under 1a, or Pavarotti has the knowledge about the self only under 1a, Chierchia concludes that PRO should be used as a de se pronoun, which can refer to the attitude holder only when he/she has the knowledge about the self (or de se ascriptions). (2) a. Pavarotti crede di PRO essere un genio Pavarotti believe-pres comp PRO to-be a genius ‘Pavarotti believes, “I am a genius”’ (Fine under 1a, but unacceptable under 1b) che gli e un genio b. Pavarotti crede Pavarotti believe-pres that he be-pres a genius ‘Pavarotti believes that he is a genius’ (Fine under 1a and 1b) Korean anaphor caki, which is commonly translated as ‘self’, is known to have de se reading when it is used as long distance anaphor. This can be shown that the example 3, where caki appears in the embedded proposition under the attitude predicate sayngkakha- ‘think’, is felicitous only under the previous scenario 1a, where the attitude holder (that is Pavarotti) knows the identity of the singer, that is Pavarotti himself. (3) Pavarotti-nun caki-ka chenjay-la-ko sayngkakha-ess-ta. Pavarotti-top self-nom genius-decl-comp think-past-decl ‘Pavarotti believes that he is a genius’ (Fine under 1a, but unacceptable under 1b) Now consider the following scenario. (4) Bill and John are close friends to each other. Their children are also close friends to each other, and go to the same school. Once Bill and John were invited to the school. In the school, when both Bill and John were looking at a class in a distance, they saw one kid making troubles during a class: walking around, yelling at other classmates, and so on. After that class, Bill, getting angry, came to Tom, the teacher, and told him to scold the kid who was making troubles in the class. However, John also found that, unbeknownst to Bill, the kid was actually Bill’s Son. John said …

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Note that, under the scenario in 4, Bill does not have any appropriate de se belief that the troublesome boy in Tom’s class was his own son. However, John may still say 5b, although he cannot say 5a felicitously (imp: imperative ending). This shows that caki can be used as long distance anaphor under the scope of -te-, although the attitude holder does not have de se belief. (5) a. #Billi -i Tom-eykey cakii atul-ul honnay-la-ko Bill-nom Tom-dat self son-acc scold-imp-comp malha-ess-ta. say-past-decl (intended) ‘Billi told Tom to scold selfi ’s son’ Tom-eykey cakii atul-ul honnay-la-ko malha-te-la. b. Billi -i Bill-nom Tom-dat self son-acc scold-imp-comp say-te-decl (intended) ‘Billi told Tom to scold selfi ’s son’ Implication: the speaker (John, in this case) saw that Bill told Tom to scold his own son If we compare two examples where caki is interpreted as de se anaphor, that is 3 under 1a and 5b under 4, we can find some crucial difference. Most of all, in 3, it is the attitude holder, Pavarotti, who has the relevant de se ascription, whereas in 5b, even though caki can be used as a long distance de se anaphor, the attitude holder, Bill, does not have the de se ascription. As far as I can see, none of the previous works on de se reading, such as Chierchia (1989) and Anand (2006), have discussed this kind of de se anaphor licensing found in 5b. Note also that Korean expressions introducing epistemic modality, such as -ey/i thullimeps‘must’, -swu iss- ‘can’ or -ulcito molun- ‘may’, do not seem to license caki when the attitude holder does not have the relevant de se knowledge, unlike -te-. To show this, consider the following scenario. (6) Bill and John are close friends to each other. Their children are also close friends to each other, and go to the same school. Once Bill and John were invited to the school. In the school, when both Bill and John were looking at a class in a distance, they saw one kid making troubles during a class: walking around, yelling at other classmates, and so on. After that class, Bill, getting angry, came to Tom, the teacher, and told him something. However, John also found that, unbeknownst to Bill, the kid was actually Bill’s Son. Being pretty sure that Bill told Tom to scold his own child, John said …

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6 is different from 4, in the sense that in 6 John, the speaker, does not directly observe that Bill told Tom to scold his own children. Under this scenario, the epistemic modal is expected to be used, because John is sure that Bill told Tom to scold his own child, but he does not directly perceive that (see von Fintel & Gillies 2010 for the indirect evidential implication of must). However, since Bill, the attitude holder, does not have the de se belief that the child who was making troubles in Tom’s class was his own son, it is infelicitous to use caki in the proposition embedded by the attitude predicate malha-, and epistemic modals do not improve the sentence, as shown in 7: Tom-eykey cakii atul-ul honnay-la-ko (7) #Billi -i Bill-nom Tom-dat self son-acc scold-imp-comp malha-n-kes-i.thullimeps-ta say-pres-thing-must-decl ‘It must be the case that Billi told Tom to scold selfi ’s son’ One might wonder that this kind of licensing of caki is related to the syntactic/semantic property of the embedded imperative ending -la (cf. Pak et al. 2007, inter alia). This is not the case, however. To see this, consider the following scenario: (8) John and Bill were watching a recording of a diving contest, where there children were participating. Seeing a boy’s performance, whose face was hardly recognizable due to the bad resolution of the recording, Bill said, “That boy will win.” Unbeknownst to Bill, John noticed that the boy was actually Bill’s son. Two examples in 9 show that the contrast we saw in 5 is also found even when the embedded clause is a declarative: only 9b, where -te- is used, is felicitous under 8, where the evidence holder (or the speaker) John, and not the attitude holder Bill has the relevant de se knowledge. (9) a. #Billi -i cakii atul-i sungca-la-ko malha-ess-ta. Bill-nom self son-nom winner-decl-comp say-past-decl cakii atul-i sungca-la-ko malha-te-la. b. Billi -i Bill-nom self son-nom winner-decl-comp say-te-decl ‘Billi said that hisi son was the winner’ Implication: the speaker (John, in this case) saw that Bill said that his son was the winner

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Summarizing this section, we saw here that -te- licenses the long distance anaphor caki even when the attitude holder—or the subject of the main clause—does not have the relevant de se knowledge. We also saw that in this respect epistemic modals behave in a different way from -te-: unlike the latter, the former does not license caki when the attitude holder does not have any de se knowledge. In the next section I will try to solve this puzzle by presenting the lexical entry for -te- different from what has been proposed by other authors.

3

Proposal: -te- as Quantifiers over Properties

Here is the intuition behind my proposal. As pointed out some authors including Lee (2013) and Lim (to appear), inter alia, -te- always requires direct perceptive evidence. In other words, even when -te- apparently introduces inferential evidential implication as we will see later (see also Chung 2007 and Lee 2013), this ‘inference’ should be based on direct perceptive evidence. Therefore, (10) is not felicitous if the speaker only has reportative evidence (for instance, the speaker has only heard from someone else that it rained yesterday, or that the ground outside was wet). (10) Ecey pi-ka o-ass-te-la. Yesterday rain-nom come-past-te-decl ‘Yesterday it rained’ The fact that -te- requires some direct perceptive evidence means that, for -teto be felicitous, the speaker should have some perception about some object (or some eventuality). Therefore, we may say that the perception required for te- corresponds to the vivid acquaintance relation in the sense of Kaplan (1969), and the object of the perception corresponds to the res in the sense of Quine (1956): in other words, by using -te-, the speaker introduces the implication that he/she has some vivid acquaintance relation with some object or some res. I propose that this vivid acquaintance relation introduced by -te- is the source of licensing de se anaphor caki: even though the attitude holder does not have that the reference of caki is he/she himself/herself, the speaker has vivid acquaintance relation about the reference of caki, that is the attitude holder, and therefore caki is licensed.5 In this proposal, therefore, caki is not directly

5 This way of analyzing the puzzle presented above implies that -te- creates a kind of anti-de se environment: that is, under -te-, caki is interpreted as de re rather than de se, with respect

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bound by the attitude holder, but receives its reference by the vivid acquaintance relation provided by the evidence holder. This idea can be formalized in various ways. For example, we may assume the res movement as in Heim (1994), or we may adopt the notion of concept generators proposed by Percus & Sauerland (2003). Here, I will follow Sharvit (2011), and assume that -te- takes two arguments. First, it takes a res argument, with which the evidence holder has the vivid acquaintance relation. Second, a ‘structured centered proposition’ of type < e, < s, < e, t >>>, where the relevant res argument and an argument corresponding to caki are replaced by variables, which are bound by -te-. Finally, let us further assume that -te- introduces a definedness condition (or presupposition), which specifies the vivid acquaintance relation on the res argument. This acquaintance relation can be formalized as functions of type < e, < s, e >>, which take an individual as its argument and returns a concept of type < s, e >. This concept further takes the world of evaluation as its argument and returns an individual. Based on the discussion above, I tentatively propose that the lexical entry for -te- should look like 11:

(11) For any res ∈ De , y ∈ De , f ∈ D , and utterance context c∗ and assignment function g∗ :6 ∗ ∗ ⟦-te-⟧c ,g (res)(< y, f >)(c)(w) is defined only if c provides a suitable function h of type < e, < s, e >> such that h(res)(world(c)) = y, and for all < w′ , res′ > ∈ Infer-Dir-Evi(world(c),res): f(h(res′ )(w′ ))(w′ )(res′ ) is defined. ∗ ∗ If defined, then ⟦-te-⟧c ,g (res)(< y, f >)(c)(w) is True iff for all < w′ , res′ > ∈ Infer-Dir-Evi(world(c),res): f(h(res′ )(w′ ))(w′ )(res′ ) is True. (Where Infer-Dir-Evi(world(c),res) is a set of alternatives where the speaker’s inference of the prejacent from direct evidence holds)7

to the attitude holder. The other way to analyze this puzzle is, as I will discuss in Section 4.2, to assume that the de se requirement of the logophor caki can be satisfied with -te- in a way different from the ‘regular’ de se interpretation. Here I will continuously pursue the former way, but see Hoe & Lim (2017) for an example of the latter way to solve the puzzle. 6 Following Kaplan (1989), a context is regarded as a triple of a world, a time, and a speaker (all of which are minimally required). I also assume that world(c), time(c), and speaker(c) are functions picking up the world, the time, and the speaker, from the given context c, respectively. 7 A careful reader may notice that the evidence indicated by -te- in 11 is inference from direct evidence, rather than the direct perceptive evidence. See the next section for the reason why I assume this.

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In 11 we assume that the attitude holder, which the anaphor caki refers to, corresponds to the res argument, which is picked up by the suitable acquaintance function h of type < e, < s, e >>. -te- first takes the res argument, and then takes another argument, < y, f >, where y is the reference of caki and f is a function of type < e, < s, < e, t >>>, which returns truth value by first combining with an argument selected by the acquaintance function h, and with a world of evaluation, and with an individual corresponding to the attitude holder (that is res). Next it takes another argument, a context c.8 This additional context introduces a definedness condition that speaker(c), the speaker in this context c—who is the evidence holder—has the vivid acquaintance regarding the res argument, which is expressed by the function h of type < e, < s, e >>. If this definedness condition is satisfied, -te- takes that context as its argument. Then -te- with the prejacent is evaluated with respect to the world of utterance, and becomes true if for all the worlds w′ where speaker(c)’s inference from direct perceptive evidence holds and for all individuals res′ corresponding to the res individual in the context c, the proposition, which is formed by applying the function f to the function h, to those worlds (w′ ), and to those individuals (res′ ) is true. Here we can see that -te- is analyzed in parallel with an attitude predicate, in the sense that it takes an additional res argument, and quantifies over (structured) centered propositions, as argued by Quine (1956) and Lewis (1979), inter alia. Now, let us see how the lexical entry in 11 explains the case where caki appears under -te-, with the example in 12, which is repeated from 9b. (12) Billi -i cakii atul-i sungca-la-ko malha-te-la. Bill-nom self son-nom winner-decl-comp say-te-decl ‘Billi said that hisi son was the winner’ Implication: the speaker (John, in this case) saw that Bill said that his son was the winner Furthermore, let us assume the following LF for 12.9 8 This additional context c is independently required to account for what Lim (2010) calls the evidential perspective shift in questions: in questions, evidentials are anchored to the perspective of the addressee, whereas other indexicals are interpreted from the perspective of the utterer (or the questioner): see Lim (2010: Ch. 4) for further details. 9 As we will see below, this LF is extremely simplified. For example, the attitude predicate said introduces its own alternatives, which is not specified in this LF. Furthermore, it is not fully specified either how the pair of the res argument and the structured centered proposition is compositionally formed. Readers should keep in mind that this LF is only to help them to understand the general idea of how the lexical entry in 11 actually works.

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(13)

Here, with the lexical entry in 11, let us assume that the attitude holder is replaced by pro with an index 1. First this index is bound by an operator, and then the world variable w3 is also bound by another operator. Finally, the index on caki is also bound by a different operator, resulting in the function f of type < e, < s, < e, t >>> (this part is not specified in 13). First this function is saturated by Bill, which is selected by the acquaintance function h, and takes the same index as caki, that is 2, by moving to the higher position. Then first -tetakes Bill (the res argument) and the clausal argument, returning a character which further needs to be saturated by a context and a world of evaluation, and 12 becomes felicitous when this context provides a relevant vivid acquaintance function h, and the definedness condition and the truth condition of 12 can be written as 14. (14) For any res ∈ De , y ∈ De , f ∈ D , and context c∗ and assignment function g∗ : ∗ ∗ ⟦12⟧c ,g is defined only if: c provides a suitable function h of type < e, < s, e >> such that i) h(Bill)(world(c)) = ⟦t2 ⟧, and ii) for all < w′ , res′ > ∈ Infer-Dir-Evi(world(c),Bill): f(h(res′ )(w′ ))(w′ ) (res′ ) is defined. ∗ ∗ If defined, then ⟦12⟧c ,g is True iff: for all < w′ , res′ > ∈ Infer-Dir-Evi(world(c),Bill): f(h(res′ )(w′ ))(w′ )(res′ ) is True.

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Other Phenomena

4.1 Temporal Semantics of -teAs thoroughly discussed in many previous studies including Chung (2007) and Lee (2013), -te- introduces the implication that speaker has direct perceptive evidence when there is no overt tense marker, and introduces the implication that speaker has inferential evidence (based on his/her direct perception) when there is overt tense/mood marker such as past -ess- or future -keyss-. Examples are given in 15: o-te-la. (15) a. Ecey pi-ka Yesterday rain-nom come-te-decl ‘Yesterday it rained’ Implication: the speaker has direct perceptive (visual, auditory …) evidence that it rained yesterday. b. Ecey pi-ka o-ass-te-la. Yesterday rain-nom come-past-te-decl ‘Yesterday it rained’ Implication: the speaker infers that it rained yesterday (by looking at the wet ground, for example) c. Nayil pi-ka o-keyss-te-la. Tomorrow rain-nom come-fut-te-decl ‘Tomorrow it will rain’ Presupposition: the speaker infers that it will rain tomorrow (by looking at the gloomy sky, for example) Here we need to answer the following two questions: (16) a. The evidential implication triggered by -te- apparently varies depending on the presence or absence of the overt tense morpheme: either direct/perceptive (without tense morphemes) or indirect/inferential (with tense morphemes). b. Without any tense morpheme, the prejacent of -te- is interpreted as denoting an eventuality before the time of the utterance. First we should note that the interpretational properties of -te- presented in 16 are just tendencies and not absolutely facts, as pointed out by Lim (to appear), inter alia. Especially, -te- without any tense marker can introduce the inferen-

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tial evidential implication, and the prejacent of -te- without any tense marker need not always denote an eventuality before the utterance time. The example in 17 (from Lim to appear) illustrates this point: (17) John-i JK-eyse nonmwun-ul palphyoha-te-la. John-nom JK-loc paper-acc present-te-decl Lim (to appear) points out that 17 is compatible with two scenarios in 18. Under 18a, the speaker has direct evidence regarding the fact that John presented a paper in the JK in the last week, and 17 is interpreted as denoting the eventuality in the past. However, under 18b, the speaker makes inference from her direct evidence that John will present a paper in the JK in the next week, and in this case, 17 is interpreted as denoting the eventuality in the future. this ambiguity is illustrated in 19a and 19b, respectively. (18) a. Scenario 1: The speaker went to the JK which held in the last week, and saw that John was presenting a paper. b. Scenario 2: The speaker saw the schedule of the JK which will be held in the next week, and saw John’s name on it. (19) a. 17 under 18a: ‘John presented a paper in the JK’ Implication: the speaker has direct evidence regarding the fact that John presented a paper in the JK b. 17 under 18b ‘John is going to present a paper in the JK’ Implication: the speaker infers that John is going to present a paper in the JK To account for this, following Lim (to appear), I assume that -te- further introduces the following presupposition (roughly formalized), in addition to the definedness condition presented in 11:10

(20) ⟦-te-⟧c ,g (res)(< y, f >)(c)(w) is defined only if (in addition to the definedness condition we saw in 11) there is a salient time interval time t < t∗ , and speaker(c) infers the prejacent from her direct evidence acquired at t ∗

10

∗

This presupposition can be formalized as a definedness condition on the context variable c introduced by -te-, just like other definedness condition regarding the vivid acquaintance relation discussed in 11: see Lim (to appear) for further details.

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With 20, the ambiguity we saw in 17-18 can be accounted for as follows. First, let us further assume that, when there is no overt tense marker, a free, covert tense pronoun is used (let us call this pronoun tnspro ), and this free tense pronoun can be assigned its value from the preceding salient time interval. Then the LF of 17 will look like 21: (21)

In the default case, tnspro can receive its value from t in the definedness condition 20. In this case, we have the past interpretation as in 19a. However, if the appropriate context is provided, such as 18b, then tnspro can receive its value from the utterance context c∗ , and the prejacent can refer to some time interval which is not past, such as 19b.11 For the direct evidential implication of -tewithout any tense marker, again following Lim (to appear), I propose that, as indicated in 11 and 20, the evidence indicated by -te- is not direct perceptive evidence, but inference from direct perceptive evidence, and apparent direct evidential implication introduced by -te-, as in 15a is due to the inference of the form P → P (or more precisely □P → P: thanks to Kyung-Sook Chung for helping me clarify this with her question): speaker(c) directly perceives P, and by using -te-, he/she further confirms that P by ‘inferring’ it from his/her direct perception of P. This analysis of -te- leads us to the following two questions. First, if the direct perceptive evidential implication of -te- is due to the result of the inference of the form P → P, why do we not seem to have direct perceptive evidential implication when -te- is used with the past tense marker -ess-? A partial answer to this question can be found in the following example: (22) Patak-i mwul-ey cec-ess-te-la. floor-nom water-loc be.wet-past-te-decl ‘The floor was wet’ (with evidential implication)

11

With this claim, I also assume that the Korean tense system only distinguishes past from non-past (including present and future), although it is obviously beyond the scope of this paper to fully justify this assumption.

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The sentence like 22 seems compatible with the scenario where the speaker actually observed that the floor was wet, but we cannot directly conclude that -te- with -ess- can introduce the direct evidential implication: the same situation can be described with the predicate hungkenha- ‘be full of water’, but when this predicate is used, -te- is not compatible with -ess-: (23) Patak-ey mwul-i hungkenha-(#ess)-te-la. floor-nom water-loc be.wet-past-te-decl ‘The floor was full of water’ (with evidential implication) This seems to indicate that there is some interaction between the lexical aspect of the predicate and the temporal property of -te-, but we cannot make any conclusion at the moment. The second question is that, is there any pragmatic effect of the inference, especially given the fact that this kind of inference is somewhat redundant? Lim (to appear) claims that because of this redundant inference, -te- may introduce what the previous literature on evidentiality calls ‘mirativity’ (Aikhenvald 2004, DeLancey 1997, DeLancey 2001, inter alia): the speaker’s unpreparedness or unexpectedness of the prejacent. This is because the inference of the form P → P is felicitous only when the speaker is not prepared to accept P, and to accept P, the speaker needs to convince himself/herself by inferring that P from P itself. However, it is unclear how to empirically test this unexpectedness implication introduced by -te- without any overt tense marker, especially every assertion a speaker makes in a conversation can be basically regarded as new information to the addressee. More investigation is required, but at least I have shown that, with the lexical entry for -te- in 11 and definedness conditions introduced by -te- in 11 and 20, we have a way to solve the well-known puzzle regarding the temporal and evidential interpretation of -te-, nonetheless to say that my proposal can solve the new puzzle about the interaction between -te- and caki we saw in Section 2. 4.2 de re Reading of caki, de te Reading of PRO, and -teIn Section 3, we analyze -te- in parallel with an attitude predicate which takes a res argument and a property (or ‘centered proposition’) as its argument. Specifically we refer to the lexical entry for convincede−re in Sharvit (2011). This means that under the scope of -te-, caki behaves like a specific kind of de re anaphor, which appeals to some vivid acquaintance relation to receive its reference. Although this approach can be regarded as a rather radical departure from previous analyses of caki as a de se logophoric pronoun (such as Byun 2008), and its

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empirical consequences must be investigated further, I think this is still plausible, especially given the context-dependency of caki. Furthermore, this analysis also gives some clues to explain the ‘first person restriction’ on -te-, according to which the first person subject can appear with -te- only when the speaker (who is also the reference of the first person subject) is not conscious of his/her action, as exemplified in 24: (24) a. ??Nay-ka hakkyo-ey ka-te-la. I-nom school-loc go-te-decl (Intended) ‘I went to school’ (with evidential implication) b. (Kkwum sok-eyse) nay-ka hakkyo-ey ka-te-la. dream in-loc I-nom school-loc go-te-decl ‘(In a dream) I went to school’ (with evidential implication) We may speculate that this is because -te- requires all pronouns under its scope be interpreted as de re: when the speaker is conscious of his/her action, as in 24a, we can say that the speaker has de se knowledge about his/her own action, and therefore the first person pronoun na(y) is used as de se, which -te- does not license. However, in 24b, we can say that na(y) is used as de re, since the speaker is not conscious of his/her own action, and therefore it is licensed under -te-. This analysis raises another question, though: if, under -te-, caki behaves as a de re pronoun whose interpretation is dependent on the vivid acquaintance relation provided by the context c in -te-, what about other expressions which are obligatorily interpreted as de se, such as PRO? To see how PRO behaves under -te-, consider 25, where in S1 John, the speaker, does not know who he is talking to, whereas in S2 he does know the identity of the addressee (from Anand 2009:2): (25) Bill is hosting a party. He hears that a certain waiter named Tom is being a nuisance. S1 : Bill tells the nearest waiter, “Tom has to go”. Unbeknownst to him, he is talking to Tom. S2 : Bill tells Tom, “You have to go.” Two examples in 26 (also from Anand 2009:2) show that PRO in the complement of the object control verb tell is licensed only under S2 , where the speaker has de te belief (or the relevant belief with respect to the addressee):

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(26) a. Bill told Tomi that hei had to leave. (Fine under S1 and S2 in 25) b. Bill told Tomi to PROi leave. (Unacceptable under S1 , but fine under S2 in 25) Now let us change the scenario S1 in 25 a little bit. In 27, now Bill, the host of a party, does not know who he is talking to, but John, a guest, knows that it is Tom. (27) Bill is hosting a party. He hears that a certain waiter named Tom is being a nuisance. Now Bill tells the nearest waiter, “Tom has to go.” However, John, a guest of the party, noticed that the waiter Bill is talking to is actually Tom. Interestingly, John can say 28b (which contains -te-) felicitously, but he cannot say 28a under 27, which shows that -te- licenses PRO, which is known to be obligatorily de te, as illustrated in 26: (28) a. #Billi -i Tomj -eykey PROj ttena-la-ko malha-ess-ta. Bill-nom Tom-dat PRO leave-imp-comp say-past-decl ‘Bill said Tom to leave’ b. Billi -i Tomj -eykey PROj ttena-la-ko malha-te-la. Bill-nom Tom-dat PRO leave-imp-comp say-te-decl (Intended) ‘Bill told Tom to leave’ Implication: John saw Bill told Tom to leave How is PRO licensed under -te-? At first glance, it seems that we may apply the same analysis as caki above to the examples in 28, since both in 28 (where PRO is licensed under -te-) and in 5b (where caki is licensed under -te-: repeated below as 29), the matrix subject does not have the relevant de se or de te knowledge: (29) Billi -i Tom-eykey cakii atul-ul honnay-la-ko malha-te-la. Bill-nom Tom-dat self son-acc scold-imp-comp say-te-decl (intended) ‘Billi told Tom to scold selfi ’s son’ Implication: the speaker (John, in this case) saw that Bill told Tom to scold his own son However, comparing two examples carefully, we find some significant differences between caki and PRO. For example, the reference of caki in 29 is the attitude holder, that is Bill, but in 28b, the reference of PRO is not the attitude

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holder but the dative-marked object. Furthermore, when interpreting PRO in 28b, it is rather irrelevant whether the reference of PRO, that is the object, has de se knowledge or not: what is crucial is whether the matrix subject, or the attitude holder, has de te knowledge or not. However, in 29, it is important whether the attitude holder has de se knowledge or not. Finally, as repeatedly pointed out above, when analyzing 29, we treat caki as a kind of de re pronoun, but PRO is strictly de se/de te. How do we account for this difference, or what is the source of this difference? Unfortunately, I do not have a decisive answer to this question yet, either, but there are several alternatives to be considered. First, there may be difference in features between PRO and caki, which is also plausible given the first/second person restriction of caki. We may further speculate that PRO and caki interact differently with the embedded sentential endings such as the imperative ending -la-, which are claimed to contain information regarding the interpretation of person features, according to some previous studies including Pak et al. (2007). The other possibility is to reformulate the semantics of de se and de te.12 According to this second alternative, -te- functions as an attitude predicate, as formulated in Section 3, but the evidence holder functions as an attitude holder of the attitude report introduced by the attitude predicate and -te-. This attitude holder/evidence holder is assumed to have vivid acquaintance relation with the antecedent of caki/PRO corresponding to the author/addressee of the attitude report context which is introduced by the attitude verb itself. Then de se / de te can be defined in terms of vivid acquaintance relation with the author / the addressee of the attitude report context: de se knowledge is that about the author of the attitude report, and de te knowledge is that about the addressee of the attitude report. In any case, more investigation is required, especially based on the thorough and detailed observation of the relevant data.

5

Conclusion and Further Implications

In this paper, I introduced a puzzle about the interpretation of the long distance anaphor caki in the prejacent of -te-, and proposed that this puzzle can be solved if we assume that -te- takes an additional res argument, and quantifies over a set of (structured) centered propositions, in parallel with attitude pred-

12

Thanks to Semoon Hoe to provide me with the idea of this second alternative. As pointed out in Footnote 5, for a further development of this idea, see Hoe & Lim (2017).

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icates. I also showed that, with some additional assumptions we can further explain many aspects of -te-, including its variability in evidential implications, as well as its temporal interpretation. I also show the differences between PRO and caki in light of their relations with -te-, and speculate how these differences should be analyzed. My proposal has interesting theoretical as well as empirical implications, among which I would like to list two. The first is about the distinction between evidentials which involve direct perceptive evidence and those which do not. Previous studies of evidentials in formal semantics simply treat the difference between evidentials with direct perceptive evidence and evidentials with indirect evidence as difference in their lexical entries (for example, difference in modal bases or difference in presuppositions). However, the relation between te- and caki suggests to us that this difference may be rather structural, not just lexical. Specifically, according to my proposal, we may formalize that evidentials with direct perceptive evidence take an additional res argument, which is the object of the speaker’s direct perception. To support this speculation, we need more cross-linguistic studies. Especially, we have to ask whether there are other languages which have long distance (de se) anaphors as well as direct perceptive evidential and show the similar phenomenon as that of Korean. This question should be answered on the empirical basis, and again it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss various cross-linguistic data. The second implication is about what linguistic category evidentials belong to. As summarized in Matthewson et al. (2007), and as mentioned in the introduction, in the area of formal semantics, evidentials are commonly classified into the following three grammatical categories: epistemic modals (Izvorski 1997, Garrett 2001, McCready & Ogata 2007, Matthewson et al. 2007, and Lee 2013, inter alia), illocutionary operators (Faller 2002 and Faller 2006, inter alia), and spatiotemporal deictic tense (Faller 2004 and Chung 2007, inter alia). However, this paper presents another possibility: evidentials whose semantics is similar to that of attitude predicates, with respect to their arguments and alternatives they quantify over. This approach is not totally unprecedented. For example, Simons (2007) discusses cases where embedding predicates, such as believe, think and say, do not seem to introduce the factive presupposition, but seem to introduce evidentiality.13

13

Note that, however, Simons’s (2007) main concern is to show that presuppositions are not parts of lexical contents, but they are pragmatically determined: see Simons (2007) for further details.

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This analysis, however, also brings about more fundamental questions: is there any significant difference between attitude predicates and epistemic modals? This question is worth asking because, since Hintikka (1962), it is generally assumed that both attitude predicates and epistemic modals are treated as quantifiers over possible worlds. In analyzing the semantics of -te-, my proposal presupposes that attitude predicates should be distinguished from epistemic modals, but much philosophical and linguistic literature diverges on this issue. One possible way to distinguish attitude predicates from modal contexts is to check the referential opacity / transparency of a proper noun: under modal contexts proper nouns are referentially transparent, but under attitude predicates (especially in belief contexts) they are referentially opaque (for example, see Quine 1956 and Kripke 1980, inter alia). However, although I should look at more data, but I am doubtful that proper nouns under the scope of -tecan be referentially opaque, given the fact that -te- requires direct perceptive evidence. Furthermore, as proposed by many philosophers supporting ‘Millianism’ (against Fregean approach to proper nouns in belief contexts), such as Salmon (1986), if a proper noun refer to the object itself even in belief contexts, the distinction between attitude predicates and epistemic modals can be undermined.14 Finally, some linguists, such as Stephenson (2007), also propose that epistemic modals can—and should—also introduce the de se center, just as attitude predicates, which may even further blur the distinction between attitude predicates and epistemic modals. At the moment, again, I am not in the position to answer all of these questions. However, I believe that careful and thorough studies of evidentials and epistemic modals, including Korean -te-, can shed some light on this issue, and I leave this for the topic of future research.

References Aikhenvald, Alexandra. 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anand, Pranav. 2006. De De Se: Massachusetts Institutes of Technology dissertation. Anand, Pranav. 2009. The cross-linguistic manifestations of de se expressions. Arché/ CSMN Mini-course and Workshop: De Se Attitudes, CSMN, University of Oslo. Byun, Hyuna. 2008. Logophoricity vs. indexical shifting of person pronouns in Korean. Handout presented at Penn Linguistic Colloquium 32.

14

For the overview of the difference between Fregeanism and Millianism, see Caplan (2006), inter alia.

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Caplan, Ben. 2006. On sense and direct reference. Philosophy Compass 1. 171–185. Chierchia, Gennaro. 1989. Anaphora and attitudes de se. In Renate Bartsch, Johan van Benthem & Peter van Emde Boas (eds.), Language in context, 1–32. Dordrecht: Foris. Chung, Kyung-Sook. 2007. Spatial deictic tense and evidentials in Korean. Natural Language Semantics 15. 187–219. Cinque, Guglielmo. 1999. Adverbs and Functional Heads: A Cross-Linguistic Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DeLancey, Scott. 1997. Mirativity: the grammatical marking of unexpected information. Linguistic Typology 1. 33–52. DeLancey, Scott. 2001. The mirative and evidentiality. Journal of Pragmatics 33(3). 369– 382. Faller, Martina. 2002. Semantics and Pragmatics of Evidentials in Cuzco Quechua: Stanford University dissertation. Faller, Martina. 2004. The deictic core of ‘non-experienced past’ in Cuzco Quechua. Journal of Semantics 21. 45–85. Faller, Martina. 2006. Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality at the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface. Talk presented at the Workship on Philosophy and Linguistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. von Fintel, Kai & Anthony S. Gillies. 2010. Must … stay … strong! Natural Language Semantics 18(4). 351–383. Garrett, Edward. 2001. Evidentiality and Assertion in Tibetan: University of California Los Angeles dissertation. de Haan, Ferdinand. 1998. The category of evidentiality. Unpublished manuscript, University of New Mexico. Heim, Irene. 1994. Comments on Abusch’s theory of tense. In Hans Kamp (ed.), Ellipsis, Tense and Questions, 143–170. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1962. Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Hoe, Semoon & Dongsik Lim. 2017. On the de se reading in the de se center shift in korean. In Olga Fernández Soriano, Elena Castroviejo & Isabel Pérez-Jiménez (eds.), Boundaries, phases and interfaces: Case studies in honor of Violeta Demonte, 255–275. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Izvorski, Roumyana. 1997. The Present Perfect as an Epistemic Modal. In A. Lawson & E. Cho (eds.), Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory 7, Ithaca: CLC Publications. Kaplan, David. 1969. Quantifying in. Synthese 19. 178–214. Kaplan, David. 1989. Demonstratives. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, 481–563. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lee, Jungmee. 2013. Temporal constraints on the meaning of evidentiality. Natural Language Semantics 21. 1–41.

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Lewis, David. 1979. Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. The Philosophical Review 88(4). 513– 543. Lim, Dongsik. 2010. Evidentials and Interrogatives: A case study from Korean: University of Southern California dissertation. Lim, Dongsik. to appear. Temporal and inferential interpretation of Korean direct evidential -te-. In Proceedings of the 47th Chicago Linguistics Society, Chicago: Department of Linguistics, University of Chicago. Matthewson, Lisa, Henry Davis & Hotze Rullmann. 2007. Evidentials as epistemic modals: evidence from St’át’imcets. Linguistic Variation Yearbook 7. 201–254. McCready, Elin & Norry Ogata. 2007. Evidentiality, modality and probability. Linguistics and Philosophy 30. 147–206. Pak, Miok, Paul Portner & Raffaella Zanuttini. 2007. Agreement and the Subjects of Jussive Clauses in Korean. In E. Efner & M. Walkow (eds.), Proceedings of North East Linguistics Society 37, Amherst: GLSA Publications. Percus, Orin & Uli Sauerland. 2003. On the LFs of attitude reports. In M. Weisgerber (ed.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 7, 228–242. Quine, Willard van Orman. 1956. Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy 53(5). 177–187. Salmon, Nathan. 1986. Frege’s Puzzle. Cambridge: MIT Press. Sharvit, Yael. 2011. Covaluation and Unexpected BT Effect. Journal of Semantics 28. 55– 106. Simons, Mandy. 2007. Observations on embedding verbs, evidentiality and presupposition. Lingua 117. 1034–1056. Sohn, Ho-Min. 1994. Korean. London: Routledge. Song, Jae-Mog. 1998. Anmaycumssikkuth ‘-te-’uy uymi kinungey tayhaye: yuhyengloncek kwancemeyse (On the semantic function of the pre-final ending -te-: from a typological perspective). Kwukehak (Korean Linguistics) 32. 135–169. Stephenson, Tamina. 2007. Towards a Theory of Subjective Meaning. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institutes of Technology dissertation.

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chapter 14

Evidential and/or Mirative Components of Some Verbal Endings and Periphrastic Constructions in Korean Jinho Park

There are numerous verbal endings and periphrastic constructions in Korean which express modal meanings and contain evidential and/or mirative components in addition. I will present some representative cases and discuss the differences in meaning among them. In so doing, I want to show the usefulness of the concepts of evidentiality and mirativity in the semantic description of modal elements in Korean.

1

Preliminary Discussion

Based on various studies on evidentiality (especially Plungian 2001 and Aikhenvald 2004), I set up the following six usages in the universal conceptual space of evidentiality. visual perception. ①,② perception. } non-visual perception. a.k.a. sensory introspection. a.k.a. endophoric reflection. inference (based on perceptual evidence). ⎫ } } } a.k.a. inferred ⑤ reasoning (based on general assumption). ⎬ } } } a.k.a. presumptive, assumptive, assumed. ⎭

① ② ③ ④

⑥ hearsay. a.k.a. quotative, reported.

⎫ } } ⎬ } } ⎭

①-③ direct evidence. a.k.a. first-hand knowledge

④, ⑤ reflected ⎫ } } evidence ⎬ ④-⑥ indirect evidence } } ⎭ a.k.a. second-hand knowledge

The above six usages/values have been well established by descriptive studies of many languages, except for ③ introspection, which appears in e.g. Tibetan languages, Central Pomo and Nambiquara languages, and expresses internal states (mental or physical) of the speaker (Tournadre 1996: 206–207, Plungian 2001: 352). These six etic categories can be lumped together to form emic categories in each language. Some examples of these emic systems are as follows:

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Number of terms

Patterns of lumping or division ①-③ direct evidence first-hand knowledge

2-term system

Languages

④-⑥ indirect evidence second-hand knowledge

①-⑤ personal evidence ①, ② perception / sensory 3-term system

4-term system

① visual

② non-visual

①, ② perception / sensory

④, ⑤ reflected

⑥ mediated evidence

Lezgian Latvian

⑥ hearsay

Quechua Shilluk

④-⑥ indirect evidence second-hand knowledge ④ inference

⑤ reasoning

④, ⑤ reflected

Balkan Caucasian Ob-Ugrian

Siona

⑥ hearsay

Shipibo-Konibo Tsafiki

⑥ hearsay

East Tucanoan Eastern Pomo

① visual

② non-visual

5-term system

① visual

② non-visual

④ inference

⑤ reasoning

⑥ hearsay

Tariana Tuyuca

6-term system

① visual

② ③ non-visual introspection

④ inference

⑤ reasoning

⑥ hearsay

Central Pomo Nambiquara

Mirativity expresses new, unexpected, unassimilated or non-internalized information (DeLancey 1997, 2001). Usually it is said that mirativity does not require the stronger notion of counter-expectation, but I think this can be a parameter of cross-linguistic variation. That is, among languages with the grammatical category of mirativity, there can be languages in which the mirative marker is used only if the information expressed in the sentence is against the speaker’s expectation. Korean does not belong to this category. In Korean, mirative markers can be used when the speaker has no expectation in relation to the information expressed in the sentence.

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401

-kwuna and -ney

The first case to consider is the so-called exclamative endings -kwuna and -ney. These have mirativity as their core semantic component, but they differ in evidentiality. (1) a. i kkoch cham yeyppu-kwuna/ney. this flower very pretty-EXCL ‘This flower is very pretty!’

(visual)

b. ne moksori cham coh-kwuna/ney. you voice very good-EXCL ‘Your voice is very good!’

(auditory)

c. i kkoch naymsay cham coh-kwuna/ney. this flower smell very good-EXCL ‘This flower smells very good!’

(olfactory)

d. kuk-i cham masiss-kwuna/ney. soup-NOM very delicious-EXCL ‘The soup is very delicious!’

(taste)

e. i os chokkam-i cham pwuturep-kwuna/ney. this clothes touch-NOM very soft-EXCL ‘This clothes feels very soft!’

(tactile)

f. (After contemplating for some time) akka nay sayngkak-i thulli-ess-kwuna/ney. (introspection) a.while.ago my thought-NOM wrong-PAST-EXCL ‘My previous judgement was wrong. (I have realized now.)’ g. (Seeing the wet road in the morning) pamsai pi-ka o-ass-kwuna/?ney. during.the.night rain-NOM come-PAST-EXCL ‘It rained during the night!’

(inference)

h. A: hapkyekca myengtan po-nikka Chelswu-to successful-applicant list see-SUBORD Chelswu-also iss-te-la. exist-TE-DEC ‘I saw Chelswu’s name in the list of the successful applicants.’ - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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B: Chelswu-to hapkyekha-yess-kwuna/*ney. Chelswu-also pass-PAST-EXCL ‘Chelswu passed the exam!’ i. (Because Chelswu plays soccer every morning) Chelswu cikum chwukkwu ha-ko.iss-*kwuna/*ney. Chelswu now soccer play-CONT-EXCL ‘Chelswu must be playing soccer now!’

(hearsay)

(reasoning)

As can be seen in (1i), neither -kwuna nor -ney can be used to express information derived through reasoning based on general assumption. This fact can be a corollary simply derived from the nature of mirativity. That is, no information derived through reasoning based on general assumption can be considered to be new/unexpected. Therefore, the mirative markers -kwuna and -ney cannot be used in (1i). However, I think this question can be answered differently language by language. There can be languages in which information derived through reasoning based on general assumption can be considered to be new/unexpected, so that it can be marked with a mirative, although Korean does not belong to this category. Putting aside (1i), -kwuna is not constrained with respect to evidentiality, whereas -ney is confined to perception and introspection (①-③). Now let’s see whether -ney can be used to express information obtained through inference. (2) (Seeing that Chelswu and his belongings are not in the room) Chelswu pelsse ka-ass-kwuna/ney. Chelswu already go-PAST-EXCL ‘Chelswu has already gone!’ (3) (Seeing the broad smile of her son who has just arrived at home after taking an exam in school) ne sihem cal chi-ess-kwuna/*ney. you exam well take-PAST-EXCL ‘You have been successful in the exam!’ The acceptability of ka-ass-ney in (2) suggests that -ney can express information obtained through inference, whereas the unacceptability of chi-ess-ney in (3) suggests the opposite. In short, ney- is much more constrained than -kwuna in expressing inference. -kwuna brings the inferential process into relief, whereas -ney suggests an immediate response without so much thinking.

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We need to pay attention to the fact that -kwuna in (3) is pronounced with a question intonation. The proposition expressed with -kwuna is a product of thinking, so can be manipulated mentally or presented to the addressee for assent. In contrast, the proposition expressed with -ney is an immediate response, so cannot be manipulated mentally nor pronounced with a question intonation. We can say ne yeyppu-kwuna/yeyppu-ney ‘You are pretty.’ to a pretty little girl. We can say ne phikonha-kwuna ‘You are tired!’, but not ne *phikonha-ney, to a tired-looking friend. From these observations, we suspect that -kwuna and -ney have additional differences with respect to the class of predicates (objective or subjective) and the person of the subject. In terms of the degree of immediacy, we can posit the following scale: kwuna < -ney < -e/-ela. When you touch inadvertently a hot thing, you can say at ttukew-e/ttukew-ela ‘It’s hot!’, but scarcely *ttukep-kwuna/*ttukep-ney. On a cold winter day, when we say chwup-kwuna/chwup-ney ‘It’s cold!’, this comes after some thinking, whereas the utterance chwuw-ela is a much more immediate response. -kwuna and -ney can be used in the past tense, whereas -ela cannot. -e which can be used in the past tense is no longer the same as the above-mentioned item expressing immediate response.

3

Hindsight / Deferred Realization

The combination of the past tense marker -ess- and the mirative marker -kwuna or -ney often results in expressing hindsight or deferred realization, which is a frequently mentioned concept in the literature dealing with mirativity. (4) a. (After looking for the addressee everywhere) ne yeki iss-ess-kwuna/ney! you here exist-PAST-EXCL ‘You are here! (I have just noticed.)’ b. Chelswu-ka pemin-i-ess-kwuna/ney! Chelswu-NOM culprit-COP-PAST-EXCL ‘Chelswu is the culprit! (I have just noticed.)’ c. Yenghui-ka Chelswu-ui tongsayng-i-ess-kwuna/ney! Yenghui-NOM Chelswu-GEN younger.sibling-COP-PAST-EXCL ‘Yenghui is Chelswu’s younger syster! (I have just noticed.)’

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The meaning ‘hindsight or deferred realization’ does not always require -ess: the sentences in (4) can express almost the same thing without -ess-. Nor the combination of -ess- and -kwuna/-ney always produces the nuance of ‘deferred realization’: when you say ne o-ass-kwuna ‘You have come!’, there is no such nuance. None the less, it is still the case that the combination of -ess- and kwuna/-ney is used characteristically to express ‘deferred realization’. In Middle Korean, the ending -tas-, which is an amalgam of -te- (past imperfective) and -os- (exclamative), was used to express ‘deferred realization’ (Hyeonhee Lee 1994: 472). (5) a. ⟨Wolinsekpo (a book about Buddha compiled in the 15th century) 21: 201a⟩ tayso kyesi-n stoh-ol wuli-tolh-i ywosozi-yey we-PL-NOM recent.time-LOC master exist-ADN place-ACC mwolo-ta-ni Twolityen-ey kyesi-tas-ta not.know-PAST-SUBORD Twolichyen-LOC exist-DR-DEC ‘We have been unaware of the master’s whereabouts recently, but he was in Twolichyen!’ b. ⟨Lotus Sutra (a Buddhist canon translated into Korean in the 15th century) 2: 5b⟩ i-non wuli hemwul-i-la syeycwon-s tas-i this-TOP our mistake-COP-SUBORD Buddha-GEN fault-NOM ani-si-tas-ongi-ta NEG.COP-HON-DR-POL-DEC ‘(We have just realized that) this is our fault, not Buddha’s.’ c. ⟨Chephaysine (a Japanese textbook compiled in the 17th century) 3: 3a⟩ (忘れまるして御座った) nic-e.is-tas-wo-ngi-ta forget-RES-DR-1p-POL-DEC ‘I have forgotten!’ Between Middle and Modern Korean, the element assuming the meaning ‘deferred realization’ has changed, but it is interesting that the internal makeup of these two elements is the same: past + exclamative.

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4

-te-

-te- expressed past imperfective in Middle Korean, forming an opposition with Ø (past perfective) and -no- (present). Subsequently, due to the emerging past element -ess-, Ø passed away, but -te- survived by absorbing more and more semantic components in addition to the past tense meaning. In adnominal forms of verbs in Modern Korean, into which -ess- failed to intrude, the above-mentioned tense-aspect system of Middle Korean is preserved up to the present-day. The semantic components which -te- obtained between Middle and Modern Korean are the matter of utmost concern here. -te- in the non-adnominal positions in Modern Korean expresses information obtained newly in the past. This meaning component can be described as mirativity in the past, which is rarely mentioned in the relevant literature. Whether any other language has a similar element is an interesting question. With respect to the point of time at which the speaker obtained the information expressed in the sentence, -te- contrasts with -kwuna: the former says that the information was obtained in the past, whereas the latter says that it has been obtained just now or a moment ago. Interestingly, these two can be combined, in which case -te- wins: -te-kwuna expresses information obtained in the past. In relation to evidentiality, -te- cannot express information obtained through inference (6g), hearsay (6h) or reasoning (6i), but can express information obtained through perception (6a–e) or introspection (6f). cham (6) a. ecey Yenghui-lul cheum po-ass-nuntey yesterday Yenghui-ACC first see-PAST-SUBORD very yeyppu-te-la. pretty-TE-DEC ‘I first saw Yenghui yesterday. She was very pretty.’

(visual)

b. Chelswu moksoli cham coh-te-la. Chelswu voice very good-TE-DEC ‘Chelswu had a good voice.’

(auditory)

c. ku kkoch naymsay cham coh-te-la. that flower smell very good-TE-DEC ‘That flower smelled very good.’

(olfactory)

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d. ney-ka ponaycu-n kimchi cham masiss-te-la. you-NOM send-ADN kimchi very delicious-TE-DEC ‘The kimchi you sent was very delicious.’ e. ku os chokkam cham coh-te-la. Those clothes touch very good-TE-DEC ‘Those clothes felt very soft.’

(taste)

(tactile)

f. akka-nun moll-ass-nuntey komkomi a.while.ago-TOP not.know-PAST-SUBORD deeply sayngkakha-e.po-ni nay sayngkak-i think-try-SUBORD my thought-NOM thulli-ess-te-la. (introspection) wrong-PAST-TE-DEC ‘I didn’t know that at first. After that I thought deeply. (And then I noticed) I was wrong.’ g. (I didn’t see the rain myself. But seeing the wet road in the morning) pamsai pi-ka *o-te-la. (inference) during.the.night rain-NOM come-TE-DEC ‘It rained during the night.’ h. A: hapkyekca myengtan po-nikka Chelswu-to successful-applicant list see-SUBORD Chelswu-also iss-te-la. exist-te-DEC ‘I saw Chelswu’s name in the list of the successful applicants.’ B: Chelswu-to *hapkyekha-yess-te-la. Chelswu-also pass-PAST-TE-DEC ‘Chelswu passed the exam!’

(hearsay)

i. (I didn’t see Chelswu in the morning. But because Chelswu plays soccer every morning) Chelswu achim-ey chwukkwu *ha-te-la. (reasoning) Chelswu morning-LOC soccer play-TE-DEC ‘Chelswu was playing soccer now!’ There can be a causal relationship between the evidential and mirative components contained in -te-. Specifically, we could consider the evidential compo-

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nent as central, and the mirative as derived from the evidential meaning. The logic underlying this position would be that the information derived based on perception or introspection is naturally seen as mirative. However, I do not find this logic convincing. Turkish has an element (-miș) which is polysemous between indirect evidential and mirative. In addition, there are many languages which have an element polysemous between inferential evidential and mirative. In contrast, -te- in Korean has direct evidential and mirative components simultaneously. The patterns of polysemy between evidentiality and mirativity and/or their co-existence in one sense of an element can be a future research topic.

5

-keyss- and -ul kes-i-

-keyss- and -ul kes-i- can express future tense or speaker’s intention. Here I focus on the sense of guessing. These two show a difference with respect to the evidence on which the speaker bases her conclusion. (7) a. (Seeing the cloudy sky) kot pi-ka o-keyss-ta. immediately rain-NOM come-PROB-DEC ‘It will rain immediately.’ b. (Judging from scientific knowledge and meteorological data) kot pi-ka o-l.kes.i-ta. immediately rain-NOM come-PROB-DEC ‘It will rain immediately.’ (8) a. (Seeing a ball which is on the edge of the table) tteleci-keyss-ta. drop-PROB-DEC ‘It is about to drop.’ b. (Judging from the location, velocity and acceleration of the ball and the laws of physics) ku kong-un tteleci-l.kes.i-ta that ball-TOP drop-PROB-DEC ‘It will drop.’

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As can be seen from (7) and (8), -keyss- expresses a conjecture from inference based on perceptual information (④ in section 1), whereas -ul kes-i- expresses a conjecture from reasoning based on general knowledge/assumption (⑤ in section 1). Chang-un Ko (1991) proposed that -keyss- is used when the evidence/ground is shared between the speaker and the addressee, whereas -ul kes-i- is used when the evidence/ground belongs only to the speaker. I think this position has some truth in it, in that perceptual evidence is visible to everybody and easy to share, whereas assumptions of reasoning on which the guess is based on are not visible and not so easy to share. However, there are data which go against Ko’s position: (9) (The speaker is a fortune-teller who lives by telling the customer his future by watching his magic glass ball, which shows the customer’s future. He does not show this ball to customers, because this is a kind of business secret.) caney olhay-ey-nun kyelhonha-keyss-e/ney/nuntey. you this.year-LOC-TOP be.married-PROB-DEC ‘You will be married this year.’ In (9), -keyss- is used in spite of the fact that the evidence belongs only to the speaker. This fact is expected on my account, because the evidence is a perceptual one, not a general assumption. -keyss- and -ul kes-i- differ with respect to mirativity also. -keyss- tends to be used to express newly obtained information, whereas -ul kes-i- is not confined to newly obtained information. We can see this also in the combinability with the mirative markers -kwuna and -ney. -keyss- can occur with either, whereas -ul kes-i- cannot. The contrast between -keyss- and -ul kes-i- can be weakened or even completely neutralized in specific genres or contexts. For instance in the weather forecast, the forecaster customarily uses -keyss-. Also in formal ceremonies, the moderator conventionally uses -keyss-. In these contexts, there is no opposition between the two, so we can see no contrast of evidentiality or mirativity between them. The usage of -keyss- or -ul kes-i- in these contexts may not be one of conjecture at all.

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6

Periphrastic Constructions

Many languages have numerous periphrastic constructions which have an aspectual or modal meaning as their central semantic component, and contain evidential and/or mirative components in addition. Resultative or perfect aspect is a grammatical category which focuses on the present state resulting from a past event. If the focus is not on the present state but on an inferential process from the present state to the past event causing it, this can be called inferential evidentiality. Therefore, resultative or perfect aspect markers often have an inferential evidentiality as a secondary semantic overlay. In contrast, progressive or continuous aspect markers tend to express the on-going event which the speaker directly perceives, so they can have a perceptual evidentiality as a secondary overlay. In Modern Korean, we cannot see such overlays so much in -e iss- or -ko iss-, but in Middle Korean, we can see a perceptual evidential overlay in -e is- combined with adjectives which expresses ‘temporary state’ (Jinho Park 2006). As the prospective aspect is a symmetric counterpart opposing with the resultative aspect, we can think an inference of future events based on the present state, as a symmetric counterpart of an inference of past events based on the present results. If we focus on the present state, we call it prospective aspect, whereas if we focus on the future events, it is called future tense or modality of guessing/probability. If we focus on the inferential process from the present state to the future events, it can be called inferential evidentiality. -keyss- resulted from the grammaticalization of the periphrastic construction key ha-yess-, which is isomorphic in its internal make-up to -key sayngky-essin Modern Korean. -key sayngky-ess- of Modern Korean and -key ha-yess- of 18th century Korean can be regarded as prospective aspect markers, whereas -keyss- of Modern Korean is a future tense marker. The form in the intermediate stage between 18th century and present-day, or the resultant form of today may well have an inferential evidentiality as its semantic component. Among numerous periphrastic forms expressing guess, -unka po- is relatively salient in its mirativity and perceptual evidentiality. It can combine with -kwuna or -ney. As a form occurs more and more frequently with mirative elements, it tends to absorb the mirative meaning from neighbouring elements. Compared with -unka po-, -un/ul tusha- seems to have almost no mirative or evidential component. It relatively rarely combines with -kwuna or -ney. -un/ul kes kath- seems to occupy a middle position between these two. Paying attention to the difference between inference and reasoning, -unka po- and -un/ul kes kath- tend to base its conjecture on perceptual

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evidence, whereas -un/ul tusha- seems not to be confined to any specific type of evidence.

Abbreviations 1p ACC ADN CONT COP DEC DR EXCL GEN HON LOC NEG.COP NOM PAST POL PROB RES SUBORD TOP

first person subject marker accusative case marker adnominal ending continuous (≒ progressive) aspect marker copula declarative ending deferred realization marker exclamative ending genitive case marker honorific marker locative case marker negative copula nominative case marker past tense marker politeness marker probability marker resultative (≒ perfect) aspect marker subordinative ending topic or contrast marker

References Aikhenvald, Alexandra (2004), Evidentiality, Oxford University Press. DeLancey, Scott (1997), Mirativity: The grammatical marking of unexpected information, Linguistic Typology 1, 33–52. DeLancey, Scott (2001), The mirative and evidentiality, Journal of Pragmatics 33, 369– 382. Ko, Chang-un (1991), ‘-keyss-’kwa ‘-ul kes-i-’ui yongpep (The usages of -keyss- and -ul kesi- in comparison), Kyerey-emwunhak 15, 595–614. Lee, Hyeonhee (1994), Cwungsey kwuke kwukwun yenkwu (A study of constructions in Middle Korean), Shinkwumwunhwasa. Park, Jinho (2006), Cwungseykwuke-eyse hyengyongsa-wa kyelhaphanun ‘-e is-’ui sangcek uimi (The aspectual meaning of -e is- combined with adjectives in Middle Korean), Kwukyel Yyenkwu 17, 223–238. - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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Plungian, Vladimir (2001), The place of evidentiality within the universal grammatical space, Journal of Pragmatics 33, 349–357. Tournadre, Nicolas (1996), Comparaison des systèmes médiatifs de quatre dialectes tibétains (tibétain central, ladakhi, dzongkha et amdo). In: Zlatka Guentchéva, (ed.), 195–213, Paris: Peeters.

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chapter 15

Evidentiality in Korean Jaemog Song

1

Introduction*

Evidentiality expresses how the speaker obtained information about what they say. Korean has four grammatical markers of evidentiality. It has a Past Sensory evidential (-te-), a Present Sensory evidential (-ney), an Inferred evidential (-keyss-), and a Reported evidential (-tay). This paper examines their semantic meanings and grammatical characteristics. Sensory evidentials in Korean are different from evidentials in other languages in that they are distinguished in terms of time reference. The Past Sensory -te- indicates that the information was obtained in the past, whereas the Present Sensory -ney shows that the information is gained concomitantly with the speech time. Non-firsthand evidentials develop mirative extensions in many languages. Though Korean evidentials show mirative extensions, it is not non-firsthand evidentials but firsthand evidentials that acquire mirativity, which is rare cross-linguistically. Using non-firsthand evidentials in first person often causes ‘first person effect’ in many languages, acquiring additional semantic overtones of lack of control or awareness. Non-firsthand evidentials in Korean also display first person effect. What is peculiar in Korean is first person effect in Sensory evidentials. Sensory evidentials in Korean do not usually occur with first person. When they are allowed with first person, they describe the speaker’s unintentional or uncontrolled activity. Evidential markers may occur more than once in a clause. Korean allows multiple marking of evidentials but not all combinations of evidentials are possible. Korean shows restrictions on evidential combinations. This paper examines possible evidential combinations and restrictions on their combinations in Korean.

* A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Pre-JK workshop on evidentials and modals 2011 (Seoul). This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004436701_017

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The evidentiality system in Korean has four terms, Past Sensory, Present Sensory, Inferred, and Reported marking (Song 1998, 2007).1 (1) Evidential markers in Korean Firsthand: Past Sensory: -tePresent Sensory: -ney Non-firsthand: Inferred: -keyssReported: -tay Korean has two firsthand sensory evidentials: the Past Sensory evidential -teand the Present Sensory evidential -ney. Sensory evidentials refer to information acquired by any sensory perception. Languages with evidential distinctions often divide sensory evidentials into visual and non-visual. Korean does not divide visual and non-visual. Sensory evidentials in Korean cover not only information visually acquired but also information acquired through other senses. Korean, however, distinguishes sensory evidentials depending on their temporal reference of when the information is acquired. Korean also has two non-firsthand evidentials to describe an event or situation that the speaker did not observe directly. The Inferred -keyss- indicates that the speaker’s assertion is based on reasoning or inference. The Reported -tay is used for information obtained from someone else.2 Evidential markers in Korean are suffixes attached to a verb stem or verbal complex. They may occupy different places in the composition of a verbal complex. In Korean, verbal suffixes can be divided into two subgroups, those which complete a verbal form (terminal suffixes) and those which cannot (non-terminal suffixes). The Past Sensory -te- and the Inferred -keyss- are non-terminal suffixes and need to be followed by a terminal suffix, whereas the Present Sensory and the Reported are terminal suffixes and complete a verbal form. Evidential marking is compulsory in some languages such as Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003b) or Jaqi (Hardman 1986). In these languages one cannot complete a sentence without expressing evidentiality. To mark evidentiality is not obligatory in Korean. One may or may not express evidentiality in a sentence in Korean. 1 The evidentiality system of Korean does not fit to any type of four term evidential classification proposed in Aikhenvald (2004:51). She presented the following three types for languages distinguishing four terms of evidentiality: i) Visual/Non-Visual/Inferred/Reported, ii) Direct (or Visual)/Inferred/Assumed/Reported, iii) Direct/Inferred/Reported/Quotative. 2 Korean also has periphrastic expressions of evidentiality such as -(u)l kesi-, -(u)l moyangi- and -na po-. This paper does not deal with these expressions. - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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Semantics of Evidentials

3.1 Past Sensory Evidential -teThe suffix -te- indicates that the speaker has firsthand sensory evidence about the statement. It expresses the information was acquired through the speaker’s physical senses and the time the speaker acquired the information is before the speech time (Song 1998, 2002).3 In the following example (2) the speaker saw John’s going to school with their eyes. (2) John-i hakkyo-ey ka-te-la.4 John-nom school-loc go-past.sens-decl ‘John went to school.’ (I saw it.)

(visual evidence)

Examples (3–6) show that -te- can be used to indicate information obtained through other senses too. (3) Yephcip-un nemwu sikkulep-te-la. neighbor-top too be:noisy-past.sens- decl ‘The neighbor was too noisy.’ (I heard their noise.) (4) Ku hyangswu naymsay-ka that perfume smell-nom coh-te-la. be:good-past.sens-decl ‘The perfume smelled nice.’ (I smelled it.)

(auditory evidence)

(olfactory evidence)

3 The suffix -te- was traditionally analyzed as Retrospective marker in the literature (Heo 1983: 244, Sohn 1999:359). Strauss (2005:442) argues that no studies considered the suffix -te- as evidential in Korean before her. But it was already analyzed as evidential (Past Sensory Observation) in Song (1998, 2002). 4 In this paper, the transcription of Korean examples follows the Yale Romanization System. The following abbreviations are used: abl (ablative), abs (absolutive), acc (accusative), adnom (adnominal), aux (auxiliary), comp (complementizer), conn (connective), cop (copula), decl (declarative), dir (directive), dir.ev (direct evidential), du (dual), erg (ergative), ev (evidential), eyewit (eyewitness), fam.sl (familiar speech level), imm (immediate), imm.past (immediate past), indir.ev (indirect evidential), infer (inferred), int.sl (intimate speech level), lig (ligature), loc (locative), nom (nominative), noneyewit (noneyewitness), nonfirst (non-firsthand), nonpast (non-past), nonthird (non-third person), nonvis (non-visual), or (orientation marker), past (past), past.sens (past seonsory), pres (present), pres.sens (present sensory), prop (proposition), propos (proposative), q (interrogative), qt (quotation marker), rec (reciprocal), report (reported), sg (singular), sub (subject), sup (suppositive), top (topic), vis (visual), vol (volitional).

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(5) Ecey sa-n swupak cham yesterday buy-past.adnom water:melon Very masiss-te-la. (gustatory evidence) taste:good-past.sens-decl ‘The water melon which (I) bought yesterday tasted really good.’ (I tasted it.) nemwu (6) Osaka-nun yelum-ey Osaka-top summer-loc too tep-te-la. (tactile evidence) be:hot-past.sens-decl ‘It was too hot in Osaka in summer.’ (I lived/stayed in Osaka and know how hot the summer was there) The Past Sensory can be used to refer to what the speaker felt psychologically or emotionally or perceived in their mind. (7) Emma-ka po-ko siph-te-la. mom-nom see-conn want-past.sens-decl ‘(I) missed mom.’ (8) Kapcaki ku cangmyen-i sayngkakna-te-la. suddenly that scene- nom come:to:mind-past.sens-decl ‘Suddenly the scene came to (my) mind.’ In examples (7–8), it is the speaker who missed mom and recalled the scene. The information conveyed in examples (2–8) is all firsthand knowledge to the speaker. Examples (2–8) are interpreted to express past situations. Since past is most natural interpretation of -te- sentences, it is traditionally characterized as Retrospective or past tense marker in the literature. It is true that -te- shows temporal meaning related with past. When we define tense as relation between the event time and the speech/reference time, however, the past meaning of te- cannot be tense. The past meaning of -te- does not indicate that the event time of the situation precedes the speech/reference time but that the speaker acquired the relevant information before the speech time. In other words, it refers to the temporal relation between the speech time and the time of information acquisition. We argue that the past interpretation of examples (2–8) comes from its evidential meaning and the context. Information gained in the past is more likely to be interpreted as relevant with past situations rather than present or future. As a result, unless there is an explicit expression saying oth-

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erwise, the suffix -te- is interpreted to describe a past situation. Since the past interpretation of -te- sentences is pragmatically obtained, it can be cancelled or altered by an explicit expression or the context. Examples (9–10) with -te- do not express a past situation (Song 2002). (9) Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-te-la. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-past.sens-decl ‘The oil price rises from next month.’ (10) John-i yocum hakkyo-ey ka-te-la. John-nom these:days school-loc go-past.sens-decl ‘John goes to school these days.’ The temporal adverbial taum tal ‘next month’ in example (9) clearly shows that the situation questioned is future, not past. Since the event in example (9) is future, the speaker cannot possibly have witnessed it. Here what the Past Sensory -te- indicates is that the speaker acquired firsthand sensory evidence before the speech moment to assume the future event. The speaker may have read a newspaper article or watched a television program dealing with the oil price rising. Example (10) is a present situation with the adverbial yochum ‘these days’. John might have been suspended from the school and the speaker witnessed him going to school in recent days. To sum up, the past temporal meaning of -te- is not the relation between the event time and the speech/reference time. It only expresses the time of the speaker’s acquiring information. The past interpretation of -te- sentences is only a pragmatic implication caused by its temporal meaning and the context. The above examples clearly show that -te- is a sensory evidential marker. What is peculiar in the Korean Past Sensory -te- is its restriction on person. Unlike sensory evidentials in other languages, it is not usually used to refer to a first person’s action, which is exemplified in (11–12) (Song 1998, 2007).5 (11) Ku-/Ney-/*Nay-ka hakkyo-ey ka-te-la. he-/you-/I-nom school-loc go-past.sens-decl ‘He/You/*I was going to school. (I saw it.)’

5 When the speaker’s action is unintended or uncontrolled, the Past Sensory -te- is allowed with first person, which will be discussed in section (4.2) in detail. For further discussion of evidential properties of -te-, see Song (1998, 2002, 2007, 2011a, 2015b) and Lee (2011).

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(12) Ku-/Ney-/*Nay-ka ppang-ul mek-te-la. he-/you-/I-nom bread-acc eat-past.sens-decl ‘He/You/*I was eating bread. (I saw it.)’ Languages with grammatical evidentials normally choose firsthand (direct knowledge) evidentials to describe the speaker’s own action/situation. The Direct evidential -ra in Shipibo-Konibo (Valenzuela 2003) and the Direct Knowledge suffix -ya in Eastern Pomo (McLendon 2003) are used to describe first person actions. Bawanixo-nko-ni-a. (13) E-a r-iki 1-abs dir.ev-cop Bawanixo-loc-lig-abl ‘I am from Bawanixo.’ (Shipibo-Konibo, Valenzuela 2003:35) (14) há· šó-hu-ya 1sg.agent east-travel-dir.ev ‘I’m going east.’ (I know which way I intend to go) (Eastern Pomo, McLendon 2003:107) Though the Past Sensory -te- in Korean is firsthand evidential, it mainly occurs with third person subject, seldom with first or second person. Languages differ in what kind of evidentiality they grammaticalize and what kind of information is covered by each evidential marker. Information scope covered by firsthand evidential differs from language to language. While languages like Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003b) or Eastern Pomo (McLendon 2003) differentiate visual and non-visual information, Ngiyambaa (Donaldson 1980:275–278, Aikhenvald 2004:34) and Korean do not separate them. As shown in examples (2–8), the Past Sensory in Korean covers information gained through not only visual sense but also other physical senses including mental perception. But its information scope does not encompass the speaker’s own activities as an intentional agent (Song 2007). The speaker’s own past action or situation is normally expressed without any evidential marker in Korean, as shown in examples (15–16). (15) Na ecey hakkyo-ey ka-ss-e. I yesterday school-loc go-past-int.sl ‘I went to school yesterday.’ (16) Na-to ku yenghwa po-ass-ta. I-too that film see-past-decl ‘I saw the film too’

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Examples (15–16) do not have any evidential marker but it is clear that the speaker has firsthand/direct knowledge about their own actions. In other words, the meaning of firsthand evidential exists implicitly in first person sentences of Korean. These examples should not be taken as evidence showing that the Past -(a)ss- or the Declarative -ta is indeed an evidential marker or carries evidential meaning in themselves. Evidential meanings in these examples are only pragmatic extensions from the context of first person sentences. Unless we are unconscious or forget what we did, we perceive our own activities through firsthand knowledge. We assume that evidential extensions of first person sentences are not restricted to Korean. It is language-universally true that unmarked first person sentences imply firsthand evidential meaning. First person sentences have a pragmatic presupposition that the speaker knows about their own activity or situation through firsthand knowledge and hence imply firsthand evidential meaning (Song 2007). (17) Pragmatic presupposition and evidential implication in a first person sentence a. Pragmatic presupposition: the speaker knows about their own activity or situation through firsthand knowledge. b. Evidential implication: a first person sentence implies firsthand evidentiality. 3.2 Present Sensory Evidential -ney Korean has another sensory evidential, the Present Sensory evidential -ney.6 Its semantic function and grammatical behavior are similar to -te- in many aspects. 6 The suffix -ney is treated as Exclamative (Yun 2000:112–123) or Present Perception (Chang 1985:80) in previous studies. It is also analyzed as evidential in Strauss (2005) and Song (2007, 2011b, 2015a, 2015b). Strauss (2005) considers -kwun as evidential too. It is true that -kwun is similar to -ney and seems to imply evidential meaning. Its evidential property, however, is not clear. It can be used not only in firsthand evidential but also in non-firsthand evidential situations. (i) Pi-ka o-nun-kuna. rain-nom come-nonpast-KUNA ‘It’s raining!’ (ii) Ney-ka John tongsayng-i-kuna. you- nom John younger:brother-cop-KUNA ‘You must be John’s younger brother.’ The speaker has firsthand knowledge about the situation in (i), whereas the assertion in (ii) is based on assumption. The speaker does not know for certain whether ‘he’ is John’s brother or not in (ii). The speaker simply expresses his assumption, for example based on the fact that ‘he’ resembles John. We cannot use -ney in the same situation. Since its evidential property is

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It has evidential meaning similar to that of the Past Sensory -te- except for its temporal connotation. It indicates that the speaker has firsthand sensory evidence about the situation. The information expressed by the Present Sensory -ney may be seen, heard, smelt, tasted, touched, felt, or perceived directly by the speaker (examples 18–24).7 (18) John-i hakkyo-ey ka-ney. (visual evidence) John-nom school-loc go-pres.sens ‘John is going to school.’ (I see him going to school now.) (19) Yephcip-un nemwu sikkulep-ney. neighbor-top too be:noisy-pres.sens ‘The neighbor is too noisy.’ (I can hear it now.)

(auditory evidence)

(20) Ku hyangswu naymsay-ka cham that perfume smell-nom very coh-ney. (olfactory evidence) be:good-pres.sens ‘The perfume smells really nice.’ (I can smell it now.) (21) Ecey san swupak cham yesterday bought water:melon very masiss-ney. (gustatory evidence) taste:good-pres.sens ‘The water melon which (I) bought yesterday tastes really good.’ (I’m eating it now.)

not clear, we do not include -kwun in this paper. Its semantic category and properties require further studies in the future. 7 Korean has a homophonous -ney expressing the familiar speech level. (i) Na onul hakkyo-ey ka-ney. I today school-loc go-fam.sl ‘I go to school today.’ (ii) Na ku yenghwa po-ass-ney. I that film see-past-fam.sl ‘I saw the film.’ According to Sohn (1999:271), this speech level is ‘typically used by a male adult to an adolescent or between two close adult friends whose friendship began in adolescence.’

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(22) Osakha-nun yelum-ey nemwu tep-ney. (tactile evidence) Osaka-top summer-loc too be:hot-pres.sens ‘It is too hot in Osaka in summer.’ (I’m staying in Osaka now.) (23) Emma-ka po-ko siph-ney. mom-nom see-conn want-pres.sens ‘(I) miss mom.’ (24) Kapcaki ku cangmyen-i sayngkakna-ney. suddenly that scene-nom come:to:mind-pres.sens ‘Suddenly the scene comes to (my) mind.’ The information conveyed in examples (18–24) is all firsthand knowledge to the speaker. If the speaker does not have direct sensory knowledge about the situations, -ney is not appropriate in the examples. Like the Past Sensory -te-, the Present Sensory -ney also gives some temporal connotation. While typical interpretation of -te- sentences is past, -ney sentences are often interpreted as referring to present situations. Examples (18–24) are all present situations. Since there is no explicit tense marker in these examples, it may be argued that -ney expresses the present tense. As in the Past Sensory -te-, however, the temporal meaning of -ney refers to the time the speaker obtains the relevant information, not the tense of the situation. While the information of -te- is obtained in the past, -ney indicates that the information is gained at the present. In the above examples (18–24), the temporal reference of the described situations coincides with that of the speaker’s gaining information so that they are interpreted as present. In the following examples (25–26), however, the situations are future and past respectively. (25) Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-ney. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-pres.sens ‘The oil price rises from next month.’ (26) John-i pelsse hakkyo-ey ka-ss-ney. John-nom already school-loc go-past-pres.sens ‘John already went to school.’ The adverbial taum talpwuthe ‘from next month’ clearly shows that example (25) describes a future situation. The speaker gains (or just gained) firsthand sensory information about the future situation of [the oil price rises]. He may be reading a newspaper article or watching a television program about oil

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prices at the speech time. In (26), the speaker did not witness John’s going to school but he has firsthand sensory evidence to believe so. He may have noticed that John’s school bag is gone. The Present Sensory -ney also shows restrictions on person. Like the Past Sensory -te-, it is not usually used with first person. In the following examples (27–28), the first person subject is not appropriate.8 (27) Ku-/Ney-/*Nay-ka hakkyo-ey ka-ney. he-/you-/I-nom school-loc go-pres.sens ‘He/You/*I am going to school. (I’m witnessing it.)’ (28) Ku-/Ney-/*Nay-ka ppang-ul mek-ney. he-/you-/I-nom bread-acc eat-pres.sens ‘He/You/*I am eating bread. (I’m witnessing it.)’ When the speaker tells about their own activity in the process at the speech time, Korean does not need any evidential marker. (29) Na hakkyo-ey ka-n-ta. I school-loc go-pres-decl ‘I am going to school.’ (30) Na-to cikum ku yenghwa po-n-ta. I-too now that film see-pres-decl ‘I’m watching the film too.’ Though examples (29–30) do not have explicit evidential markers, the speaker clearly has firsthand (direct) knowledge about their behavior. Evidential extensions of first person sentences in (17) should be remembered. The information scope of firsthand sensory evidentials in Korean does not cover the speaker’s own activities. It is cross-linguistically rare that firsthand evidential does not allow first person. We can, however, find similar examples in Amdo Tibetan. Amdo Tibetan has four evidential terms: the Direct evidential =thæ, the Indirect evidential =zəg, the quotative se and the Immediate =hkə. The Direct evidential in Amdo Tibetan is not used with first person subject (Sun 1993:956–957, Song 2007:12–13).

8 When the action is unintended or uncontrolled, Korean allows the Present Sensory -ney with first person as it does the Past Sensory -te-, which we will discuss in section (4.2) in detail.

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(31) ŋæ xabda shoŋ=nə/=*thæ/=*zəg. I(abs) deer-chase(dat) go(com)=decl/dir.ev/indir.ev ‘I went deer-hunting.’ (32) tɕhekæ xabda you:and:your:family(abs) deer-chase(dat) shoŋ=*nə/=thæ/=zəg. go(com)=decl/dir.ev/indir.ev ‘You and your family went deer-hunting.’ xabda shoŋ=*nə/=thæ/=zəg. (33) dordʑe Rdo-rje(abs) deer-chase(dat) go(com)=decl/dir.ev/indir.ev ‘Rdo-rje went deer-hunting.’ Example (31) shows Amdo Tibetan allows neither the Direct nor the Indirect evidential to describe the speaker’s volitional action.9 3.3 Inferred Evidential -keyssWhile -te- and -ney indicate firsthand knowledge of the speaker, the Inferred evidential -keyss- expresses non-firsthand knowledge. The speaker’s statement is based on reasoning or assumption. (34) Pi-ka o-keyss-ta. rain-nom come-infer-decl ‘It looks like to rain.’ (35) Ce cengto kongpwuha-myen hapkyekha-keyss-ta. that degree study-conn pass-infer-decl ‘(He) will pass the exam as (he) studies that much.’

9 Amdo Tibetan allows the Direct evidential with first person to describe the speaker’s unintended or uncontrolled actions, as Korean sensory evidentials do. Song (2015b) proposes to divide direct/firsthand evidentials into three subtypes depending on their referential scope: (i) comprehensive, (ii) periphery-oriented, (iii) center-oriented. Comprehensive direct evidentials, typologically the most common type among the three, include not only the deictic center (origo, the speaker) but also the outside, hence there is no subject restriction on it. Korean and Amdo Tibetan firsthand evidentials belong to the periphery-oriented evidential, which does not include the deictic center within its scope and is not used to describe first person events. Center-oriented direct evidentials, found in Kashaya and Central Pomo, only have the deictic center within its scope and they are not used to describe second or third person but only first person events.

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The situations described in examples (34–35) are both future situations and the speaker cannot possibly have witnessed them directly before the speech moment. The speaker in example (34) may have seen dark clouds over the sky to predict the rain. In example (35), it is self-evident what the speaker bases their assumption on. Since -keyss- sentences are frequently used to describe a future situation, -keyss- is often treated as a future tense marker in the literature (Ramstedt 1968:71–72, Martin 1992:613–616). However, the following example disproves the assumption. (36) Ne ecey manhi papp(u)-ass-keyss-ta. you yesterday very busy-past-infer-decl ‘You must have been very busy yesterday.’ (37) Seoul-un cikum tep-keyss-ta. Seoul-top now be:hot-infer-decl ‘(I guess) Seoul is hot now.’ Example (36) has the Past marker -ass-. If the suffix -keyss- were a future tense marker, it would not occur with the Past marker -ass-. In example (36) the situation was past and the speaker has non-firsthand knowledge about it. The speaker did not witness the hearer’s yesterday activity but may have seen the hearer’s schedule and guess how busy the hearer was. The adverb cikum ‘now’ in example (37) shows that the situation is present. The speaker asserts an assumption about the present weather in Seoul, possibly based on their past experience or general knowledge. We have seen in the previous sections that the Past Sensory -te- and the Present Sensory -ney do not occur with a first person subject. The Inferred keyss- is not used to describe the speaker’s own activities, either (examples 38–39). This is something often observed cross-linguistically. The speaker has firsthand knowledge about their own situations so that non-firsthand evidential sounds counterintuitive with first person.10

10

Korean has a homophonous -keyss- to express the speaker’s volition or intention, which allows first person. (i) Na-nun kh(u)-ese sensayngnim-i toy-keyss-ta. I-top grow-conn teacher-cop become-vol-decl ‘When I grow up, I want to become a teacher.’ (ii) Onul-un nay-ka sa-keyss-ta. today-top I-nom buy-vol-decl ‘It’s my treat today.’

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(38) Nayil-i-myen ku-/ney-/*nay-ka tolao-keyss-ta. tomorrow-cop-conn he/you/I-nom come:back-infer-decl ‘He/You/*I will come back tomorrow.’ (39) Ku/Ney/*Nay-ka cikum-ccum pap-ul mek-ko iss-keyss-ta. he/you/I-nom now-around meal-acc eat-conn be-infer-decl ‘I guess he/you/*I am having the meal now.’ The suffix -keyss- is often taken as an epistemic modal marker of probability, presumption or conjecture in the literature as well (Suh 1996:308–308, Sohn 1999:360–362). The speaker in examples (34–37) does not seem to commit fully to the truth of the statement. The relation between evidentiality and (epistemic) modality is controversial. Some take evidentiality as a part of modality (Bybee 1985, Palmer 2001) and others take evidentiality as a distinct category (De Haan 1999, Aikhenvald 2004). Evidential markers often have epistemic extensions and epistemic markers can have evidential extensions. Firsthand/direct evidentials acquire modal overtones of certainty or factuality by their nature, and non-firsthand/indirect evidentials imply modality extensions of probability or irrealis, which makes it difficult to identify an epistemic or evidential marker in individual languages. Especially inferred evidential and modality of probability are semantically close and difficult to distinguish. In this paper we argue that -keyss- is an inferred evidential marker and it has an epistemic extension of probability. First, the -keyss- sentences always carry the evidential meaning of inference. They indicate the speaker does not have firsthand knowledge about the situation and their assertion is based on assumption or conjecture. Since the epistemic meaning of -keyss- is a pragmatic extention from its evidential meaning, it can be nullified by explicit modal expressions or the context. pi-ka (40) Ilehkey mwutep-uni thullimepsi nayil like:this be:hot-conn certainly tomorrow rain-nom o-keyss-ta. come-infer-decl ‘Since it’s so hot, I’m sure it will rain tomorrow.’ (41) Chong-ul twu pang-ina mac-ass-uni pwunmyenghi gun-acc two shot-as:many hit-past- conn obviously cwuk-ess-keyss-ta. die-past-infer-decl ‘Since (he) got two gun-shots, (he) must be dead.’

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In examples (40–41), the modal adverbs thullimepsi ‘certainly’ and pwunmyenghi ‘obviously’ clearly express the speaker’s commitment to the proposition and deny the expected epistemic meaning of -keyss-. Nonetheless, the examples still keep their non-firsthand (inferential) evidential meaning. If the primary meaning of -keyss- is epistemicity of probability indicating lack of commitment to the proposition on the part of the speaker, how can it be used with modal adverbs of certainty as in (40–41)? Second, we saw in examples (38–39) that the evidential -keyss- does not occur in first person sentences. The assumption of epistemic cannot explain why -keyss- is not allowed with first person. In the evidentiality theory, however, it is natural why the Inferred evidential does not co-occur with first person. The speaker is supposed to have firsthand/direct knowledge about their own activities. Hence they use firsthand evidentials rather than non-firsthand evidentials such as inferred or reported to describe their own situations. Crosslinguistically it is widely observed that non-firsthand evidentials have restrictions on first person. Non-firsthand evidentials with first person develop semantic extensions such as lack of intention, awareness, control, or volition (the so-called ‘first person effect’, Aikhenvald 2004:217). The Inferred -keyss- is also allowed with first person when the situation is out of the speaker’s control or intention, which is exemplified in (42–44). (42) Na-nun cal molu-keyss-e. I-top well do:not:know-infer-int.sl ‘I do not know.’ (43) Na-nun tep-e cwuk-keyss-ta. I- top be:hot-conn die-infer-decl ‘The heat is killing me.’ (44) Na-to kot say tongney-ey ikswukhayci-keyss-ci. I-too soon new town-loc get:familiar-infer-sup ‘I’ll get familiar with the new town soon.’ In examples (42–44), the situations are out of the speaker’s control or intuition. The situation that the speaker does not know or that they find it too hot cannot be under their control or intention (examples 42–43). In example (44), the speaker expects that they get used to the new place. The process is not given as his volition but as a natural process of familiarization. Epistemic meanings of these examples, if any, are not clear. The epistemic hypothesis cannot explain

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why -keyss- is not usually allowed with first person and why it acquires such semantic extensions when it occurs with first person. In this paper we assume that the primary meaning of -keyss- is inferred evidential and that its modal meaning derives from its evidential meaning. 3.4 Reported Evidential -tay The Reported -tay indicates that the information in the statement is acquired through hearsay. Reported evidential markers often come from a grammaticalized verb of speech (Aikhenvald 2004:271). The Reported -tay in Korean comes from a construction of a matrix clause with the verb ‘say’ and its complement clause. It is a contracted form of the matrix verb of quotation and the mood suffix of the predicate of the complement clause. The Reported -tay in (45b) is derived from -ta ha-y ‘-decl say-int.sl’ of (45a).11 o-n-ta ha-e. (45) a. Nayil pi-ka tomorrow rain-nom come-pres-decl say-int.sl ‘(They) say it rains tomorrow.’ b. Nayil pi-ka o-n-tay. tomorrow rain-nom come-pres-decl.report ‘(They) say it rains tomorrow.’ Through phonological loss and syntactic reanalysis, the quotation verb of the matrix clause, ha-e (hay in a shortened form), is reanalyzed as a suffix (or part of it) of the predicate of the originally complement clause. The Reported -tay can be split into the Declarative -t- (the mood marker of the original complement clause) and the Reported -ay. In this paper we take it as a fused form of the two morphemes without dividing it further for convenience. The Reported form changes depending on the sentence type of the complement clause (examples 46–48). (46) a. Nayil hamkkey ka-ca ha-e. tomorrow together go-propos say-int.sl ‘(They) have proposed to go together tomorrow.’ 11

Traditionally it has been argued in the Korean literature that -tay developed from -tako ha-e (-decl-comp say-int.sl). Based on synchronic and diachronic evidence, Song (2018) argues that -tay developed from -ta ha-e (-decl say-int.sl). This paper follows Song (2018)’s analysis. For further discussion of the Reported evidential in Korean, see Chung (2010).

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b. Nayil hamkkey ka-cay. tomorrow together come-propos.report ‘(They) have proposed to go together tomorrow.’ (47) a. Nayil ka-la ha-e. tomorrow go-imp say-int.sl ‘(They) have asked (us) to go tomorrow.’ b. Nayil ka-lay. tomorrow go-imp.report ‘(They) have asked (us) to go tomorrow.’ ha-e. (48) a. Nayil ka-nu-nya tomorrow go-int.sl-inter say-int.sl ‘(They) have asked whether (we) will go tomorrow.’ b. Nayil ka-nu-nyay. tomorrow go-int.sl-inter.report ‘(They) have asked whether (we) will go tomorrow.’ The Reported does not indicate the exact source of the report or express the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the statement. The informant is not specified in examples (45b–48b). In the following example (49), John is the subject of the verb ka- ‘to go’ and cannot be interpreted as the informant (the subject of the original quotation verb ha- ‘to say’), unless the two are identical. (49) John-i hakkyo-ey ka-n-tay. John-nom school-loc go-nonpast-decl.report ‘(They) say John goes to school.’ The Reported -tay is not normally used with the first or second person. Since people have firsthand knowledge about themselves, it is not necessary, if not counterintuitive, to quote from someone else about their own activities/situations. (50) Ku-/?Ney-/*Nay-ka o-ass-tay. he-/you-/I-nom come-past-decl.report ‘(They) say he/?you/*I came.’

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(51) Ku-/?Ney-/*Nay-ka pap-ul mek-ko iss-tay. he-/you-/I-nom meal-acc eat-and be-decl.report ‘(They) say he/?you/*I am eating a meal.’

4

Mirativity and First Person Effect

4.1 Mirative Evidential markers often have mirative extensions of new or unexpected information to the speaker (DeLancey 2001). They are typically observed in an inferred or a non-firsthand evidential across languages and hardly in a firsthand or a visual evidential. The speaker’s lack of firsthand information (lack of awareness of what’s going on) ensues new or unexpected meanings, even surprise to the speaker (Aikhenvald 2004:195–196). The non-firsthand evidential in Northern Khanty shows a mirative extension. In the following example (52), the speaker did not think that the poles would be made of iron. The information was a surprise to the speaker (Aikhenvald 2004:196). wer-lə-ŋən pa xŏti ul-lən kurte-t (52) śi x∩t-ən so house-3du make-pres-3du and so pole-3du iron-pl ul-m-el be-nonfirst:past-3sg ‘So they are making the house, and the poles turned out to be iron.’ The non-firsthand evidential -mIs in Turkish can also have a mirative reading of new or unexpected information. The speaker of example (53) attended a piano recital of the addressee’s daughter. He did not know that she played the piano well before the event (Lazard 1999:92).12 (53) kız-ınız çok iyi piyano çal-iyor-muʂ daughter-your very good piano play-pres-nonfirst ‘Your daughter plays the piano very well!’ Korean evidential markers also have mirative meanings. It is, however, not nonfirsthand evidential that acquires a mirative extension in Korean. The Inferred -keyss- or the Reported -tay is not interpreted as a mirative reading. Instead the 12

The Turkish -mIs is taken as representing different categories in the literature such as indirect evidential (Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986), mirative (DeLancey 1997), and mediative (Lazard 1999).

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Present Sensory -ney gains a mirative extension in Korean. The -ney sentences imply that the information is new, unexpected and surprising to the speaker. It should be noted that -ney is analyzed as exclamative in some studies (Yun 2000:112–123). (54) John-i nolay-lul cham cal pwulu-ney. John-nom song-acc very well sing-pres.sens ‘John sings very well.’ (55) Sicang-i nemwu mel-ney. market-nom too be:far-pres.sens ‘The market is too far.’ The information conveyed in both examples is new and unexpected to the speaker. In example (54) the speaker didn’t know how well John sings and after hearing his songs, he realized it. In example (55) the distance to the market is farther than the speaker expected. The speaker didn’t know how far the market is. He walked (or drove) to the market for some time expecting he will see it soon, but noticed that the distance to the destination is still considerable. Mirative meaning in -ney is different from those found in other languages. In other languages, mirative meaning is derived from non-firsthand evidential meaning. When the speaker does not have firsthand information of a situation, the situation is new to the speaker and can be perceived as unexpected or surprise to the speaker. In other words, mirativity is often a pragmatic extension from an evidential marker.13 Mirativity in -ney, however, seems to be part of its meaning. The suffix -ney indicates that the speaker obtains firsthand sensory information and the information is obtained at the speech moment. It means that the speaker did not know the information before the speech time. Naturally, the information is new to the speaker and is often taken as something unexpected or surprising to the speaker. The Past Sensory -te- also indicates firsthand sensory evidentiality. While the information is obtained near the speech time in -ney, it was apparently before the speech time that the information was obtained in -te-. The information of te- was new to the speaker when it was obtained, but it is not new to the speaker any more at the speech moment. The Past Sensory -te- can, however, have the mirative meaning of unexpectedness or surprise. The situations in the follow-

13

Mirativity often intersects with evidentiality, but it can be a grammatical category distinct from evidentiality (DeLancey 2001:370, Aikhenvald 2004:195).

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ing examples can be understood as something unexpected or even surprising for the speaker.14 nolay-lul cham cal pwulu-te-la. (56) John-i John-nom song-acc very well sing-past.sens-decl ‘John sang very well.’ (57) sicang-i nemwu mel-te-la. market-nom too be:far-past.sens-decl ‘The market was too far.’ The meaning of unexpectedness or surprise in these sentences seems to have extended from the moment that he perceived the situation. Mirative extensions observed in -te-, however, are not as clear and strong as in -ney, which is unsurprising when we think about the time lag between the time of information acquisition and the speech time in -te-. 4.2 First Person Effect The evidentiality system often interacts with the person of participants. Some evidentials are preferred to others in the first person context. There is a crosslinguistic tendency to develop restrictions on the use of first person with nonfirsthand or non-visual specifications (Aikhenvald 2003a:16). If the speaker is talking about themself, he usually uses a firsthand evidential. It would be counterintuitive for the speaker to present their own activity or situation with a non-firsthand evidential. It should be remembered that first person sentences imply firsthand evidentiality in (17). Non-firsthand evidentiality contradicts with the firsthand evidential extension of first person. This semantic collision, however, does not prevent the use of first person with non-firsthand evidentiality completely. Some languages allow non-firsthand evidentials with first person, adding semantic overtones of lack of control or intention with first person, which is ‘first person effect’ in Aikhenvald (2004:220). In Aikhenvald (2004), ‘first person effect’ is dealt with in a separate chapter (ibd: 219–231), while it is discussed as a part of mirative (ibid: 195, 197). ‘First person effect’ and mirativity may be intersected with each other and evidential sentences with first person effect may further acquire a mirative meaning of unpreparedness as well (ibid: 197). In this paper we think first person effect should be separated from mirative extensions. First, they differ in their semantics. While mira-

14

Strauss (2005) takes -ney, -tela as mirative markers in addition to -kwun.

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tive refers to new or unexpected information, first person effect mainly indicates uncontrolled/unintended action or deferred realization. Second, mirative meanings ensue through the pragmatic extension of [lack of knowledge > unexpectedness > surprise], whereas first person effect emerges due to semantic conflicts between evidential implications of first person and certain evidentials. In Jarawara, if the speaker knew what he was doing when he got drunk (he deliberately got drunk), firsthand evidential is appropriate (example 58). If the speaker woke up drunk and didn’t remember what he had done the previous night, non-firsthand evidential is used (example 59) (Dixon 2003:170). (58) o-hano-hara o-ke 1sg.sub-be:drunk-imm.past.eyewit.fem 1sg-decl.fem ‘I got drunk (deliberately)’ (59) o-hano-hani o-ke sg.sub-be:drunk-imm.past.noneyewit.fem 1sg-decl.fem ‘I got drunk (and don’t recall it)’ Tucano allows non-visual evidentials with first person to refer to unintentional or uncontrolled action (Aikhenvald 2004:223). In example (60) with a nonvisual evidential the speaker did not mean to break the plate or could not see this happening, whereas in example (61) with a visual evidential the speaker broke the plate intentionally. (60) bapá bopê -asɨ plate break-rec.nonvis.nonthird ‘I have broken a plate unintentionally.’ (61) bapá bopê -apɨ plate break-rec.vis.nonthird ‘I have broken a plate intentionally.’ (e.g. I was angry or hated the plate) First person effect has been attested for non-firsthand, non-visual, inferred or reported evidentials across languages (Aikhenvald 2004:220). Korean has two non-firsthand evidential terms. We have seen in section (3.3) that the Inferred -keys- shows first person effect (examples 42–44). Though the Inferred -keyssdoes not usually occur with first person, it acquires the meaning of lack of control or intention with first person. The Reported -tay also manifests first person effect. In section (3.4) we saw that the Reported -tay is not allowed with first

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person (examples 50–51). The Reported -tay, however, can occur with first person to imply lack of control and subsequent surprise on the part of the speaker. (62) Nay-ka hakkyo-ey kapang-ul twu-ko o-ass-tay. I-nom school-loc bag-acc place-conn come-past-decl.report ‘They say I left my bag at school. (I don’t remember)’ The speaker in example (62) did not know he had left his bag at school and heard it from someone else. The Reported -tay can have overtones of irony and disagreement with what was said about the speaker too.15 In example (63), the Reported is used to mark their disagreement with what was said about them. (63) Nay-ka ku kapang-ul hwumchi-ess-tay. I-nom that bag-acc steal-past-decl.report ‘They say I stole the bag!’ Examples (42–44, 50–51 & 62–63) show that first person effect is attested for non-firsthand evidentials in Korean. What is peculiar in Korean evidentiality, however, is that Sensory evidentials show ‘first person effect’. We argued in section (3) that the information scope of Sensory evidentials covers only the speaker’s observation, what he/she witnessed (or witnesses) as a spectator, but not his own experience as an volitional/intentional agent. In other words, the quality of information described in Sensory evidentials of Korean is firsthand but their information scope does not include the speaker’s own activities. Therefore, Korean Sensory evidentials are not normally used to refer to the speaker’s own action. When they are used with first person, their actions are interpreted as non-intentional, non-volitional, lacking in control or awareness of what was/is happening, the so-called ‘first person effect’. (64) Kkwum-sok-eyse nay-ka namwu wuy-ey ollaka-te-la. dream-middle-loc I-nom tree up-loc climb-past.sens-decl ‘I was climbing a tree in a dream.’ (65) Nay-ka yangkoki-lul ta mek-ney. I-nom lamb-acc even eat-pres.sens ‘I am eating lamb.’ (I don’t usually eat lamb. I didn’t notice what I’m eating and now I see what I’m eating.)

15

Reported evidentials can often be used ironically (Aikhenvald 2004:183, 226).

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(66) Na ku chayk ilk-ess-te-la. I that book read-past-past.sens-decl ‘I read that book.’ (I didn’t realize it but I discovered it later.) (67) Nay-ka yangmal-ul twicip-e I-nom sock-acc turn:the:other:way-conn sin-ess-ney. put:on-past-pres.sens-decl ‘I’ve put on my socks inside out.’ (I didn’t notice it.) In example (64) the speaker is talking about what he did in their dream. Of course, the speaker has no control of their activities in the dream. The speaker’s action in example (65) is unintended. He usually does not eat lamb and when he started to eat it, he didn’t realize (or he didn’t pay attention to) what he ate (or would eat). In the end he has got to know that he is actually eating lamb. Examples (66–67) indicate deferred realization. In example (66) the speaker didn’t remember he had read the book but he realized it after he got some firsthand sensory evidence about it. He might have seen their handwriting on the book or have read their remarks about the book in their diary. The speaker in example (67) was not aware of the fact that he put on their socks inside out until the speech moment when he gets to realize it. On its surface, the first person effect in Korean looks different from other languages. It is usually a non-firsthand evidential in other languages that develops first person effect but it is a firsthand evidential in Korean. They are, however, the same phenomenon in their nature. The phenomenon of ‘first person effect’ is that an evidential which is inadequate for first person gains a semantic implication of lack of control or awareness when it is used with first person. Since Sensory evidentials of Korean are designed to be used with non-first person, they indicate a similar implication with first person. Though first person effect in firsthand evidentials is rare cross-linguistically, we can find similar examples in other languages such as Amdo Tibetan (Sun 1993) or Qiang (LaPolla 2003). The Visual evidential -u/-wu in Qiang and the Direct evidential -thæ in Amdo Tibetan are not usually used to describe the speaker’s own activities as a volitional agent. When they are used with first person, they have the semantic extension of unintendedness or uncontrolledness.16 16

The evidential characteristics of the Direct evidential -thæ in Amdo Tibetan is similar to Sensory evidentials in Korean (Song 2007, 2015b). Ladakhi (Koshal 1979:186–187) shows similar evientiality as well. The Visual evidential in Ladakhi is not used with first person

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(68) qa the: ta de-we-ʐ-u-a. 1sg 3sg loc or-have/exist-caus-vis-1sg ‘I hit him (accidentally).’ (Qiang, LaPolla 2003:67) (69) ŋə ma Sæm shæ ni der tɕag=taŋ=thæ I(erg) neg Think place loc dish break=aux=dir.ev ‘I broke the dish by accident’ (literally: when I was ‘at a non-thinking place’) (Amdo Tibetan, Sun 1993:963)

5

Multiple Marking of Evidentials

Evidentiality can be marked more than once in a clause (Aikhenvald 2004:87– 95). Korean also allows multiple marking of evidentiality (Song 2011b). Multiply marked evidentials help a speaker to express subtle and delicate evidential meaning related with the statement and the speaker. Korean has four evidential markers and they can co-occur in a clause. In other words, Korean allows more than one evidential marker in a verbal complex. Korean, however, does not allow every combination of evidentials. First, there are morphological restrictions on their combination. As shown in section (2), Korean evidentials do not occupy the same paradigmatic place. The Past Sensory -te- and the Inferred keyss- are non-terminal suffixes and should be followed by a terminal suffix. The Present Sensory -ney and the Reported -tay are terminal suffixes and cannot be followed by non-terminal suffixes. These morphological restrictions reduce the number of possible combinations of the evidential markers. When the morphological places of -ney and -tay are fixed at the final position of a verbal complex, possible combinations of the 4 evidential markers decrease to the following ten: -keyss-te-, -te-keyss-, -keyss-ney, -keyss-tay, -te-ney, -te-lay, -keyss-te-ney, -keyss-te-lay, -te-keyss-ney, -te-keyss-tay. Out of these ten plausible combinations, however, only the following five are actually allowed in Korean: i) Inferred followed by Past Sensory (-keyss-te-), ii) Inferred followed by Present Sensory (keyss-ney), iii) Past Sensory followed by Reported (-te-lay), iv) Inferred followed by Reported (-keyss-tay), v) Inferred followed by Past Sensory and Reported (-keyss-te-lay). In this section we will look at the possible evidential combinations in Korean, analyze their semantic connotations and explain why some morphologically possible combinations are not allowed.

subjects. If they are used with first person, they imply an accidental action (Aikhenvald 2004:232).

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The following example (70) shows the combination of the Inferred and the Past Sensory. (70) Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-keyss-te-la. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-infer-past.sens-decl ‘It looks like the oil price rises from next month.’ (I acquired some sensory evidence in the past to believe so.) In example (70), the situation is a future event and the speaker cannot possibly witness the event itself. What the Past Sensory -te- implies here is that their inference about the oil-price rising is based on some sort of firsthand sensory evidence gained in the past. He may have read a newspaper article about oil prices, seen relevant news on TV, or heard it on the radio. When the speaker newly achieves the sensory information about the inference at the speech time, instead of the Past Sensory, the Present Sensory -ney is used, which is exemplified in (71). (71) Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-keyss-ney. next month-from oil-price-nom rise- infer-pres.sens ‘It looks like the oil price rises from next month.’ (I am witnessing some sensory evidence at the present to believe so.) The Reported can occur with either the Inferred or the Past Sensory (examples 72–73).17 (72) Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-te-lay. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-past.sens-decl.report ‘It is said it looks like the oil price rises from next month.’ (73) Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-keyss-tay. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-infer-decl.report ‘It is said the oil price rises from next month.’ In the combination of the Reported and other evidentials, the observer of the latter is different from that of the former. The speaker in example (72) heard the information from someone else who had firsthand evidence about the future event, and the informant in example (73) only had non-firsthand evidence, which was passed on to the speaker. 17

Kim (2006) discusses the narrative discourse functions of -telay.

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Previous studies about multiple marking of evidentials only reported double marking of evidentials in the same clause (Aikhenvald 2004:87–95). Korean allows three evidential markers in a clause. The Inferred, the Past Sensory and the Reported may occur in the same clause. (74) Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-keyss-te-lay. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-past.sens-decl.report ‘It is said that it looks like the oil price rises from next month.’ In example (74), the speaker heard the information of the oil-price rising from an informant who had firsthand sensory information to believe their inference about the future event. Korean does not allow other than the above-mentioned five combinations of evidential. In example (74) with three evidentials in a clause, a different order of combination is not possible. In other words, when Korean has the Inferred, the Past Sensory and the Reported in a clause, they must occur in the fixed order of (74). The Inferred must precede the other two and the Reported should come last. Since the Present Sensory -ney and the Reported -tay are terminal suffixes and cannot be used together in a clause, Korean does not allow a verbal form that has the four evidentials together such as *-keyss-te-ney-tay, *-keyss-te-lay-ney, *-te-keyss-ney-tay, or *-te-keysstay-ney. Morphological restrictions, however, do not explain all disallowed combinations of evidentials in Korean. In addition to the morphological restrictions, we can observe semantic-based restrictions on their combinations. First, the Inferred -keyss- cannot follow a Sensory evidential in Korean. Examples (70–71) show co-occurrence of the Inferred and a Sensory evidential. We cannot change the order of the two in the examples. The following examples (75–76) are not acceptable because the two evidentials are reversed. The Inferred -keyss- also precedes the Past Sensory -te- in example (74). (75) *Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-ney-keyss-ta. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-pres.sens-infer-decl (76) *Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-te-keyss-ta. Next month-from oil-price-nom rise-past.sens-infer-decl The verb of example (75) is morphologically ill-formed, since the terminal suffix -ney must follow the non-terminal suffix -keyss-. In example (76), however, the two sensory evidentials -te- and -keyss- are both non-terminal suffixes and there is no morphological reason why the Past Sensory -te- cannot precede the

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Inferred -keyss-. We argue that the order between the two suffixes is based on semantics, not morphology. Verbal suffixes in Korean are syntactic markers controlling its components to its left in a head-final structure. They add semantic meaning to its grammatical scope. In the following example (77), the grammatical scope of -ass and -ta are [ John-i hakkyo-ey ka-] and [ John-i hakkyo-ey ka-ass-] respectively. The Past -ass indicates that the proposition of [ John-i hakkyo-ey ka-] is a past event. The Declarative -ta provides the situation of [ John-i hakkyo-ey ka-ass-] as a statement. (77) a. John-i hakkyo-ey ka-ass-ta. John-nom school-to go-past-decl b.

decl [past [prop

John-i hakkyo-ey ka- ] ass- ] ta ]

The grammatical structure of example (70) can be expressed as follows. (78) [decl [past.sens [infer [prop Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-] keyss-] te-] la] While the grammatical scope of -keyss- in example (70) is [Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-], and that of -te- is [Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-keyss-]. The grammatical scope of -te- encompasses that of -keyss- in example (78). The Inferred -keyss- implies that the speaker has non-firsthand evidence that the oil price rises from next month. At this stage, the nature of their inference is not clear. The Past Sensory -te- in (78) indicates that the speaker has firsthand sensory evidence which confirms their inference. In collaboration, the two evidentials mean that the speaker has some sort of sensory evidence to infer that the oil price will rise from next month. If we change the order between the Inferred -keyss- and the Past Sensory -te- as in (76), it will produce an unnatural semantic connotation. The following (79) shows the grammatical structure of example (76). (79) *[decl [infer [past.sens [prop Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-] te-] keyss-] ta] If the Past Sensory -te- preceded the Inferred -keyss- as in example (76), it would mean that the speaker had firsthand sensory evidence to believe the future event of oil-price rising and he adds that their firsthand evidence is indeed based on non-firsthand knowledge, which is contradictory to what is already addressed. Since the speaker expressed that he obtained firsthand informa-

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tion in the past, it is unnecessary or contradictory information saying that he obtained the firsthand information through non-firsthand knowledge. It is interesting to see that languages allowing the combination of the inferred and firsthand evidential show the same order of evidentials. In Qiang, the Visual evidential -u comes after the Inferred evidential -k- (LaPolla 2003:69– 70). (80) oh, the: ʐbə ʐete-k-u! oh 2sg Drum beat-infer-vis ‘Oh, he was playing a drum!’ Another restriction we can observe in the combination of evidential markers of Korean is that the Past Sensory does not occur with the Present Sensory (example 81). (81) a. *Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-te-ney. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-past.sens-pres.sens b. [pres.sens [past.sens [prop Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu- ] te- ] ney ] Placing the Present Sensory after the Past Sensory would make the statement incomprehensible. Example (81) would mean that the speaker gained relevant firsthand sensory information about the oil-price rising in the past and still say that the speaker acquires firsthand sensory information about their having gained the information in the past. One may argue that since -ney historically derived from the Non-past tense marker -nu- (originally -nʌ-), it is not allowed with the Past Sensory -te-. When we think that -ney can occur with the Past tense marker -ass- as in (82), the argument is not tangible. It cannot explain why -ney is allowed with -ass- but not with -te-. (82) John-i hakkyo-ey ka-ass-ney. John-nom school-loc go-past-pres.sens ‘(I have realized) John went to school.’ Third, the Present Sensory cannot occur with the Reported in the same clause. While the Past Sensory can occur with the Reported in the same clause (examples 72 & 74), the Present Sensory cannot (example 83).

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(83) a. *Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i next month-from oil-price-nom olu-ney-lay. rise-infer-pres.sens-decl.report b. [decl.report [pres.sens [prop Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu- ] ney- ] lay ] In the Reported sentence, the original perceiver of the information is not the speaker. In example (72), the Reported -lay indicates that the speaker obtained information about the oil-price rising from an informant and the Past Sensory -te- indicates that the informant had firsthand sensory information about the event. In the combination of -te- and -lay, the time that the informant obtained the information and the time that the speaker heard it from the informant differs. The former must precede the latter. The Present Sensory -ney indicates that the speaker obtains the information at the speech moment. One can use -ney to talk to themself in a monologue. When there is a hearer, the hearer is in the same deictic place and time with the speaker so that the hearer can also observe or confirm what the speaker observes. Therefore when the hearer passes the information on to a third person, the hearer doesn’t have to use the Reported evidential. In other words, the information conveyed in -ney can be observed by both the speaker and the hearer, the hearer also expresses it as their own firsthand sensory evidential, not as hearsay. Suppose a group of three people entered into a flower shop. Person A saw a rose and says Cangmi-ka yeppu-ney (rose-nom be:beautiful-pres.sens). Person B heard the word and saw the rose. If Person B also thinks the rose is beautiful, the information about the rose is not any more hearsay from someone else but their own experience. When Person B gives the information to Person C who is a few feet away from the two, he says the same as Person A. He says Cangmi-ka yeppu-ney (rose-nom be:beautiful-pres.sens), not Cangmi-ka yeppu-ney-lay (rose-nom be:beautiful-pres.sens-dat.report). He gives the information as their own experience, not something he heard from someone else (Person A in this situation). Therefore -ney is not followed by the Reported. Since Person B observes it with their own senses, Person B does not have to express it as hearsay.18 18

When Person B and Person C are not in a place to see the rose and Person B passes Person A’s words to Person C, Person B will say with the Reported as follows. (i) Cangmi-ka yeppu-tay. rose-nom be:beautiful-decl.report ‘(He) says the rose is beautiful.’

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Fourth, the Reported always follows other evidentials, not precede them as we saw in examples (72–73), which are given again as (84a) and (85a). (84) a. Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-te-lay. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-past.sens-decl.report [report [past.sens [prop Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu- ] te- ] lay ] ‘It is said it looks like the oil price rises from next month.’ (The informant has firsthand sensory evidence.) b. *Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i next month-from oil-price-nom olu-tay-te-la. rise-decl.report-past.sens-decl *[decl [past.sens [report [prop Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu- ] tay- ] te-] la ] (85) a. Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-keyss-tay. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-infer-decl.report [report [infer [prop Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu- ] keyss- ] tay ] ‘It is said that it looks like the oil price rises from next month.’ (The informant’s statement is based on assumption.) b. *Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu-tay-keyss-ta. next month-from oil-price-nom rise-decl.report-infer-decl *[decl [infer [report [prop Taum tal-pwuthe kilum-kaps-i olu- ] tay- ] keyss] ta ] In the combination of the Reported and other evidentials, the Reported indicates the speaker learnt the information from someone else and the other evidential(s) describe(s) what kind of evidence the informant has about the (ii)

Cangmi-ka yeppu-ta-ney. rose-nom be:beautiful-decl-pres.sens ‘(He) says the rose is beautiful. (I’ve heard it directly from him)’ The predicate of example (ii) is a contraction from yeppu-ta ha-ney (be:beautiful-decl say-pres.sens). Though the Present Sensory -ney looks directly connected to the predicate yeppu-, it does not express that the speaker (Person B) has firsthand sensory information about the situation [The rose is beautiful]. The speaker (Person B) has firsthand sensory evidence about Person A’s speaking. In other words, what -ney implies in (ii) is that Person B directly hears from Person A about the rose and he has firsthand sensory evidence about Person A’s words.

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situation. If we change their order placing the Reported before another evidential as in (84b) and (85b), the other evidential is placed outside the grammatical scope of the Reported so that the Reported cannot correctly convey the type of information gained by the informant. Restrictions observed on evidential combinations in Korean can be summarized as follows. (86) Restrictions on evidential combinations in Korean (i) The Inferred precedes Sensory evidentials. (ii) The Past Sensory and the Present Sensory cannot be used in the same clause. (iii) The Present Sensory and the Reported cannot be used in the same clause. (iv) The Reported follows other evidentials. Due to these restrictions in addition to morphological restrictions, Korean allows only five combinations of evidentials out of dozens of conceivable combinations. Some of the restrictions may be valid in other languages as well, if not universal. Korean does not allow double marking of sensory evidentials. We assume that if a language has more than two sensory evidentials, they cannot occur in the same clause. If one allows two sensory evidentials in a clause, they provide contradictory evidence for the statement. If we use two sensory evidentials in a clause in Korean, it implies that saying he gained firsthand sensory evidence for the statement in the past, the speaker also says that the information is newly achieved to them at the speech moment. It seems that languages with visual and non-visual evidentials do not allow their co-occurrence in the same clause. When a language allows double marking of evidential, it is frequently the combination of firsthand and non-firsthand evidentials. In this combination, information conveyed in the firsthand evidential provides supplementary evidence for the speaker’s non-firsthand evidence. If there is any order between their application, the non-firsthand evidential should come first.

6

Conclusion

In this paper we observed evidentiality in Korean. Korean has four evidential markers: the Past Sensory -te-, the Present Sensory -ney, the Inferred -keyss-, the Reported -tay. Korean evidentials are unusual in that they distinguish sensory evidentials in terms of their temporal reference. While the Past Sensory says that the information was gained in the past, the Present Sensory indi-

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cates it is obtained at the speech moment. Korean Sensory evidentials imply mirative meanings of unexpectedness or surprise, which is not common crosslinguistically. Korean evidentials are not usually used with first person. When they occur with first person, they have semantic extensions of non-intentional, non-volitional, or lack of control or awareness. Korean allows multiple appearances of evidential markers in one clause. Combinations of Inferred and Past Sensory, Inferred and Present Sensory, Past Sensory and Reported, Inferred and Reported, Inferred and Past Sensory followed by Reported in turn are possible. Korean, however, does not allow other combinations of evidentials. We could observe several restrictions of multiple marking of evidentials in Korean.

References Aikhenvald, Alexandra 2003a. Evidentiality in typological perspective. In Aikhenvald and Dixon, eds., Studies in Evidentiality, 1–31. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Aikhenvald, Alexandra 2003b. Evidentiality in Tariana. In Aikhenvald and Dixon, eds., Studies in Evidentiality, 131–164. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Aikhenvald, Alexandra 2004. Evidentiality. New York: Oxford University Press. Aksu-Koç, Ayhan and Dan Slobin 1986. A Psychological Account of the Development and Use of Evidentials in Turkish. In Chafe and Nichols, eds., Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 159–167. Norwood: Ablex. Bybee, Joan 1985. Morphology: A Study of the Relation between Meaning and Form. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Chafe, Wallace and Johanna Nichols 1986. Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation. Chang, Kyunghee 1985. Hyentaykwuke-uy yangsang-pemcwu-yenkwu (Modality in Current Korean). Seoul: Tower Press. Chung, Joo Yoon 2010. Toward a dynamic semantic account of Korean hearsay evidentiality. Harvard Studies in Korean Linguistics XIII: 405–416. De Haan, Ferdinand 1999. Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality: Setting Boundaries. Southwest Journal of Linguistics 18: 83–101. DeLancey, Scott 1997. Mirativity: The grammatical marking of unexpected information, Linguistic Typology 1: 33–52. DeLancey, Scott 2001. The mirative and evidentiality, Journal of Pragmatics 33(3), 369– 382. Dixon, Robert 2003. Evidentiality in Jarawara. In Aikhenvald and Dixon, eds., Studies in Evidentiality, 165–187. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Donaldson Tamsin 1980. Ngiyambaa: The Language of the Wangaaybuwan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Hardman, Martha James 1986. Data-Source Marking in the Jaqi Languages. In Chafe and Nichols, eds., Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, 113–136. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation. Heo, Ung 1983. Kwukehak- wulimal-uy onul‧ecey- (Studies on Korean: Past and Present of Korean). Seoul: Saemmunhwasa. Kim, Mary Shin 2006. Evidential Strategies in Korean Conversation: An Analysis of Interactional and Conversational Narrative Functions. PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles. Koshal, Sanyukta 1979. Ladakhi Grammar. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. LaPolla, Randy J. 2003. Evidentiality in Qiang. In Aikhenvald and Dixon, eds., Studies in Evidentiality, 63–78. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Lazard, Gilbert 1999. Mirativity, evidentiality, mediativity, or other?. Linguistic Typology 3: 91–109. Lee, Jungmee 2011. The Korean evidential -te: A modal analysis. In Bonami and Hofherr, eds., Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 8: 287–311. Lee, Pil-yeong 1993. Kwuke-uy inyong-kwumun yenku (Quotation Constructions in Korean). Seoul: Tower Press. Martin, Samuel Elmo 1992. A Reference Grammar of Korean: A Complete Guide to the Grammar and History of the Korean Language. Tokyo: Turtle Publishing. McLendon, Sally 2003. Evidentiality in Eastern Pomo with a comparative survey. In Aikhenvald and Dixon, eds., Studies in Evidentiality, 101–129, Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Nikolaeva, Irina 1999. The semantics of Northern Khanty evidentials. Journal de la Société Finno-Ougrienne 88. 131–159. Palmer, Frank Robert 2001. Mood and Modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ramstedt, Gustav John 1968. Korean Grammar. Oosterhout: Anthropological Publications. Suh, Cheong-Soo 1996. Kwuke-mwunpep (Korean Grammar). Seoul: Hanyang University Press. Sohn, Ho-Min 1999. The Korean Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Song, Jaemog 1998. anmaycumssikkuth ‘-te-’-uy uymi kinung-ey tay-haye: yuhyengloncek kwancem-eyse (Semantic functions of the non-terminal suffix -te-: from a typological perspective). Kwukehak (Journal of Korea Linguistics) 32: 135–169. Song, Jaemog 2002. A Typological Analysis of the Korean Evidential Marker ‘-te-’. Eoneohag (Journal of the Linguistic Society of Korea) 32: 147–164. Song, Jaemog 2007. Cungkeseng-kwa cwue-ceyak-uy yuhyenglon: hankwuke, mongkole, thipese-lul yey-lo tul-e (Typology of Evidentiality and Subject Restrictionbased on Korean, Mongolian and Tibetan-), Hyengthaeron (Morphology) 9(1): 1– 23.

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Song, Jaemog 2009. Insik-yangthay-wa cungkeseng (Episptemic Modality and Evidentiality), Hankwukehak (Korean Linguistics) 44: 27–53. Song, Jaemog 2011a. -teni-wa -essteni: senemalemi -te-wa-uy kwanryenseng-ul cwungsim-ulo (Korean Suffixes -teni and -essteni in relation to the Non-terminal suffix -te-). Kwukehak (Journal of Korea Linguistics) 60: 33–67. Song, Jaemog 2011b. Hankwuke cungkeseng-phyoci-uy cwungpok-silhyen (Multiple Marking of Evidentials in Korean), Pikyomwunhwayenku (Cross-Cultural Studies) 22: 355–375. Center for Cross-Cultural Studies, Kyung Hee University. Song, Jaemog 2013. Evidentiality, Past, and Person in Mongolian and Korean, Acta Koreana 16(1):67–85. Keimyung University. Song, Jaemog 2015a. Hankwuke congkyel-emi ‘-ney’-uy uymi-kinung (Semantic Functions of the Korean Sentence-Terminal Suffix -ney). Kwukehak (Journal of Korea Linguistics) 76: 123–159. Song, Jaemog 2015b. Cungkeseng-kwa inching-uy sangho-cakyong (Interactions of Evidentiality and Person). Eoneohag (Journal of the Linguistic Society of Korea) 73: 111–132. Song, Jaemog 2018. ‘-tanta’-hyeng-emi-uy hyengseng: inyong-phyoci ‘-ko’-uy sayngsengkwa kwanlyenha-ye (The development of ‘-tanta’ type suffixes—related with the creation of the quotative marker ‘-ko’). Kwukehak (Journal of Korea Linguistics) 87: 3–38. Strauss, Susan 2005. Cognitive realization markers in Korean: A discourse-pragmatic study of the sentence-ending particles -kwun, -ney and -tela. Language Sciences 27(4): 437–480. Sun, Jackson 1993. Evidentials in Amdo Tibetan. The Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology LXIII Part IV: 945–1001. Academia Sinica, Taipei. Valenzuela, Pilar 2003. Evidentiality in Shipibo-Konibo, with a comparative overview of the category in Panoan. In Aikhenvald and Dixon, eds., Studies in Evidentiality, 33–61. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Yun, Seok-Min 2000. Hyentay-kwuke-uy mwuncang-congkyelpep yenkwu (A Study on Sentence-terminal Suffixes in Modern Korean). Seoul: Cipmwuntang.

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part 3 Evidentiality and Modality in Other Languages

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chapter 16

Processing Evidentiality in Bilingualism and Aphasia: An Overview of Some Recent Studies on Turkish Seçkin Arslan

1

Introduction

Turkish marks evidentiality, the grammatical category that signals information sources via which a speaker knows the information in his statement, through its tense-aspect-mood suffixes appended to the verb. Turkish evidentials are inflectional forms that are suffixed to finite verbs and non-verbal predicates. Two evidential forms are available in Turkish: the direct evidential, whose function is to signal that information expressed in a proposition comes from a firsthand source (e.g. speaker’s own experience), and the indirect evidential, which encodes that information is based on a non-firsthand source. The direct evidential is marked with the morpheme -DI to indicate one’s direct information sources while the indirect evidential is marked with the morpheme -mIş to signal indirect information sources, which include the speaker’s inference based on ‘resultant states of an action’ and/or report from another speaker (Slobin and Aksu 1982, Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986). Evidentiality in Turkish is more commonly marked for past events and states. By default, when evidential suffixes are attached to verb stems, they express past time reference. Thus, a Turkish speaker has to select one of the two evidential suffixes in order to talk about a past event, as illustrated in (1)–(2). (1) Vasili kutuy-u aç-tı Vasili box-ACC open-DIRECT EVID-3SG. ‘Vasili opened the box’ (speaker witnessed this event) (2) Vasili kutuy-u aç-mış Vasili box-ACC open-INDIRECT EVID-3SG. ‘Vasili opened the box’ (speaker has non-firsthand information) In (1), what licences the use of a direct evidential is the speaker’s direct experience, most probably through eye-witnessing. In (2), however, the use of an

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indirect evidential signals that the speaker has either inferred the action or was reported about it by another speaker.

2

Evidentials in Turkish

2.1 Direct Evidential -DI The evidential status of the direct evidential form -DI is well-established in Turkish linguistics since the early studies. To enumerate, Underhill described the direct evidential as the definite past, the use of which is appropriate for contexts “when the speaker has personally witnessed the action that he describes” (Underhill 1976, p. 169). Aksu-Koç and Slobin defined the direct evidential marker as the “past of the direct experience” (Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986, Slobin and Aksu 1982). Marking of direct experience includes an assortment of contexts, such as visual firsthand evidence, speaker’s participation in the event and non-visual sensory evidence.1 See for examples in (3)–(5). (3) Poyraz kumsal-a koş-tu Poyraz beach-DAT run-DIRECT EVID-3SG. ‘Poyraz ran to the beach’ (the speaker witnessed him running) (4) Adam bizim-le top oyna-dı Poyraz us-INSTR ball play-DIRECT EVID-3SG. ‘The man played football with us’ (participatory firsthand evidence) (Arslan 2015) (5) Mutfak yanık kok-tu Kitchen burnt smell-DIRECT EVID-3SG. ‘Kitchen smelled burnt’ (sensory firsthand evidence) The use of a direct evidential in (3) is affiliated with the fact that the speaker has eye-witnessed the event himself while in (4) the use of a direct evidential is licenced by the speaker’s participatory firsthand evidence. That is, the speaker participated in this event. Finally, the direct evidential used in (5) encodes that the speaker has non-visual sensory firsthand evidence, possibly through

1 Note that well-assimilated events in the history, which the speaker was not involved in or witnessed directly, may also be marked with a direct evidential, see Plungian (2010) for discussions.

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smelling the smoke. Essentially, different kinds of firsthand evidence map into only one marker in Turkish, the direct evidential form. One controversy in Turkish linguistics is that, unlike the volumes of studies presented above, Johanson (2003) argues that -DI, the direct evidential form as referred to here, is an evidentiality-neutral past tense. According to Johanson, the morpheme -DI does not “consistently indicate direct experience or speaker’s direct involvement in the event” (2003, p. 275). 2.2 Indirect Evidential -mIş The indirect evidential has been defined as the expression of the speaker’s access to non-firsthand evidence about an event being described (Cinque 2001, Johanson 1971, Csató 2000), indicating that information about the event is new to the speaker’s knowledge (Underhill 1976, Aksu-Koç 2000). This evidential form functions to mark two different kinds of non-firsthand evidence: inference and reportative, as illustrated in (6). (6) Poyraz kumsal-a koş-muş Poyraz beach-DAT run-INDIRECT EVID-3SG ‘Poyraz ran to the beach’ (non-witnessed information: inference or report) It is possible that the speaker may have access to one of the two forms of nonfirsthand evidence when s/he uttered the statement in (6). First possibility is that the speaker’s use of an indirect evidential here is linked with a report of another speaker. In other words, the speaker was told about it and no stage of this event was witnessed by the speaker himself. Second possibility is that the speaker used an indirect evidential in that s/he inferred that this event happened, probably through accessing pieces of evidence based on results of the event (e.g. seeing footprints on the beach), leading the speaker to infer that the event had happened. 2.3 Time Reference and Evidentiality Interface As argued above, Turkish evidentials refer to the past, which brings us to another controversy within the theoretical approaches to Turkish evidentials: are they past tenses in the traditional sense? Conventionally, these forms are argued to be ‘past tenses’. When appended on simple verb stems, both the evidentials mark past tense/perfect aspect (e.g., Kornfilt 1997, Erguvanlı-Taylan 1997, Johanson 2003). However, temporal characteristics of evidentials have been reconsidered in recent analyses and it is proposed that evidentials may behave differently from tenses in terms of their time reference. See, for instance, Aikhenvald (2004, p. 99) who states that “time reference of an evidential

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does not have to coincide with that of the event”. This is based on the fact that an evidential may make reference to an actual event in the past but also to the time when the speaker receives information on this event, which could be different to the actual event time. When these analyses are applied to Turkish evidentials, the following arguments are obtained. The direct evidential makes past time reference as both the actual event time and the time of witnessing overlap in the past. However, the picture is more complicated for the indirect evidential -mIş, in which the actual event time is different relative to the time when information is received by the speaker. More specifically, the actual event occurs before the speaker gets to know about it. Therefore, it is conceivable that the indirect evidential shifts to non-past readings depending on when the information arrives to the speaker, where the actual event time is not relevant any more (Arslan et al. 2014), see also Enç (2004) for discussions.

3

Empirical Studies on Evidentiality

A large volume of research on evidentiality comes from theoretical and sociolinguistic studies, which primarily deal with theorizing evidentiality systems and describing these systems in world languages (e.g. Chafe and Nichols 1986, Aikhenvald 2003, Johanson and Utas 2000). The current understanding of cognitive aspects in evidentiality processing, however, at least in Turkish, mostly depends on investigations into (monolingual) children’s acquisition of evidentiality, which include pioneering seminal works of Aksu-Koç (1988). These studies showed that, in Turkish, the direct evidential is acquired relatively earlier than its indirect counterpart and that young children (i.e. aged 3–6) are not fully able to identify different information sources that are embodied in the evidential suffixes (Aksu-Koç, Ögel-Balaban, and Alp 2009, Ozturk and Papafragou 2016). Similar difficulties acquiring evidentiality have also been observed in Korean, another evidential language, showing that at very young ages (3–4) children tend to produce evidential forms correctly whereas their comprehension of these forms is unstable at this stage (Papafragou et al. 2007). In summary, the acquisition literature has shown that Turkish children acquire the indirect evidential later than the direct one, and at young ages children are less able to comprehend evidentials, possibly because, at this stage of cognitive development, children are unable to discriminate different information sources. Although, the previous literature has significant contributions to the basis of our current scientific knowledge on evidentiality processing, only a little has

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been explored on the other side of the medal, leaving gaps in knowledge on processing of evidentials in less commonly studied ‘adult’ speakers, such as persons with language disorders, or bilingual speakers. The aim of this chapter is to recap recently emerging experimental findings from studies that investigated the processing of Turkish evidentials in less commonly studied populations. In the next sections, I will provide an overview of how evidentials are affected in bilingual Turkish speakers living under heritage language conditions and how they are impaired in aphasia. 4.1 Attrition in Evidentials: Perspectives from Bilingual Processing Early studies on Turkish bilingual speakers’ attainment of evidentiality are rather restricted to narrative speech studies. For instance, (Pfaff 1991, 1993) examined child Turkish heritage speakers2 in Germany using free-speech production tasks; Aarssen (2001) investigated Turkish child heritage speakers in the Netherlands and Karakoç (2007) those living in Germany using narrative speech elicitation tasks based on stories. These studies showed that child Turkish heritage speakers make inconsistent uses of evidentiality marking when contrasted to their Turkish monolingual peers, suggesting that in childhood bilingualism stabilization of evidentiality may be delayed. Arslan, Bastiaanse, and Felser (2015) tested groups of Turkish monolingual speakers, early and late Turkish-German bilinguals using a visual-word setting in which participants’ eye-movements were monitored while they listened to sentences marked with either direct and indirect evidentiality. Their data showed that both the bilingual groups had less accurate responses and reduced proportions of looks to the target pictures for sentences with direct evidentials than those with indirect evidentials. In their processing of the direct evidential form, the Turkish monolingual speakers showed an interesting pattern: they turned their gaze toward the context picture, where an action’s in-progress version was shown, before they fixated on the target picture, which depicts the action’s end-stage. The authors interpreted this eye-movement pattern as an indication that the monolingual speakers needed to ‘verify that the action could indeed be witnessed directly’ as they were looking for evidence (Arslan, Bastiaanse, and Felser 2015, p. 12). However, such a pattern was less pronounced in the bilingual groups’ eye-movements. Arslan, de Kok, and Bastiaanse (2017), with a sentence verification task, investigated a group of adult Turkish heritage speakers living in The Nether2 The term “heritage speaker” here is referred to as early or simultaneous bilinguals who typically acquire a minority language in family settings and a dominant majority language spoken by the society.

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lands as compared to a group of monolingual Turkish speakers. The participants listened to sentences, as illustrated in (7)–(8), including a contextual support clause where the information source perspective was set to either firsthand information (7) or to non-firsthand information. The assumption was that a verb form inflected with the direct evidential within a non-firsthand information context, as well as an indirect evidential within a firsthand information context, would be counter-intuitive to Turkish native speakers. (6) Yerken gör-dü-m az önce adam yemeğ-i Eat see-DIRECT EVID-1SG. just before man meal-ACC ye-miş eat-INDIRECT EVID-3SG. *‘I saw the man eating, he ate the food.’ (firsthand information source— indirect evidential mismatch) (7) Yerken görmüşler az önce adam yemeğ-i Eat see-INDIRECT EVID-3PL just before man meal-ACC ye-di eat-DIRECT EVID-3SG. *‘They saw the man eating, he ate the food.’ (non-firsthand information source—direct evidential mismatch) The data showed that, in an offline rating task without any time constraints, Turkish native speakers evaluated both kinds of evidentiality mismatches to their corresponding information source contexts equally unacceptable. However, in an online task, for which the participants were asked to provide a button press as soon as they detect an unacceptability, the monolingual Turkish speakers were faster to respond to firsthand sources followed by the indirect evidential (7) than for non-firsthand sources followed by the direct evidential (8). Interestingly, however, the Turkish heritage speakers failed in this task: their performances in detecting evidentiality mismatches were around 32 % of the time in both the conditions and they had much longer response time as compared to the monolinguals. This implies that the heritage speakers did not notice mismatches between information sources and the evidentiality markers in which these information sources are encoded, possibly because semantic and pragmatic features of evidentiality eroded in the bilingual speakers as a consequence of heritage language conditions (e.g. low quality input, existence of a dominant society language). Arslan and Bastiaanse (In press) investigated appraisal of evidentiality in spontaneous speech production of a group of adult Turkish heritage speakers

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living in The Netherlands. The authors considered a number of bilingualism factors, including, proficiency, daily language use of Turkish/Dutch, and daily receptive exposure to these languages, in an attempt to explain why Turkish heritage speakers would show a non-target-like competence over the evidential forms. The data showed that although the heritage speakers produced equal numbers of verbs inflected with both the evidential forms as compared to monolingual peers, they made more inappropriate uses of the direct evidential in contexts where an indirect evidential would be more suitable. Furthermore, Arslan and Bastiaanse’s (In press) analyses indicated that the most significant predictor of such contextually inappropriate uses of direct evidentials was the amount of receptive exposure to Turkish. According to the authors, heritage speakers who spend more than 2.88 hours per day listening and reading Turkish are more likely to use evidentiality correctly. 4.2 Breakdown in Evidentiality Processing: Evidence from Aphasia Arslan et al. (2014) conducted one of the very first investigations on evidentiality in aphasia, an acquired language disorder that occurs due to forms of brain damage or stroke. In this study, the authors examined the production of evidential forms and the ability to discriminate information sources that map into evidentials in a group of seven Turkish persons with aphasia (PWA). A sentence completion task was used, which required participants to complete simple sentences with a verb inflected either for direct or indirect evidential in three conditions: direct perception, inferential, and reportative. In a subsequent task, participants were assessed in their ability to identify from which information sources events presented in those sentences are known. The PWA were largely unable to produce the direct evidential form for the direct perception condition with 21% accuracy while they were rather spared in producing the indirect evidential form in inferential and reportative conditions (both 83%). Interestingly, the PWA’s source identification ability was impaired in the opposite direction: they were more successful in discriminating direct perception than inferred and reported information. Moreover, they made large portions of misattribution errors in identifying reportative and inferential information sources for which they ‘thought to have witnessed’ events presented in sentences with the indirect evidentiality. These findings indicated that Turkish evidential forms are asymmetrically impaired in aphasic language production: direct evidentials are more affected than their indirect counterparts. According to Arslan et al. (2014), Turkish PWA’s difficulty producing the direct evidential is linked to an impairment in processing discourse level information. More particularly, the direct evidential is assumed to be discourse-linked (i.e. referring to the preceding discourse) to

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a past event where the event time and the speaker’s evaluation on the event overlap in the past. However, the indirect evidential is not discourse-linked, or non-specific, as the actual event time does not correspond to the speaker’s evaluation time, therefore, an event expressed with an indirect evidential is processed as new information. This line of reasoning is compatible with Bastiaanse and her colleagues’ Past Discourse Linking Hypothesis (PADILIH, Bastiaanse et al. 2011), which holds that referring to discourse-linked past events and states is more effortful for PWA than referring to the non-past. Arslan, Bamyacı and Bastiaanse (2016) investigated the appraisal of verb forms in spontaneous speech production of ten Turkish speaking PWA, using open-end interview and picture description tasks. The PWA, having produced shorter and more incorrect utterances as compared to healthy individuals, had a rather normal rate of verb inflections, including the direct and indirect evidentials and present progressive forms. However, a detailed analysis showed that there was a trade-off pattern between the number of verbs used with the direct evidential and the diversity of those verbs, as measured by the typetoken ratio. That is, some Turkish PWA produced large number of direct evidentials on only few types of verbs while some others who were able to use more diverse verbs had difficulty producing the direct evidential form. Such a pattern was not found in the production of indirect evidentials or present progressive forms. In short, the PWA produced similar amounts of evidential forms as healthy controls; nonetheless, information provided with the direct evidential was found to be reduced, as the diversity of verbs used with this form was lower than healthy controls, in line with the claims of Arslan et al. (2014). An unexpected finding was distinguishing information sources that are embodied in evidentials showed an opposite direction of impairments in Turkish PWA’s production of these evidential forms. This was addressed in Arslan and Bastiaanse (2014) who used a source-memory task to investigate Turkish PWA’s ability to attribute sources of memories in a groups of eight PWA, fifteen younger and five healthy aging individuals. In a study phase, the participants were presented with eighty inanimate objects, half of which were shown as visual objects (i.e. seen items, a picture of a balloon) and the other half were presented as spoken words (i.e. heard items). In a subsequent test phase, forty items from the study phase were mixed with another new forty items and were presented as written words. The participants were asked to make old/new judgements for each item presented, they were instructed to respond ‘old’ if an item was encountered in the study phase, if else to respond ‘new’. If an item was judged as ‘old’ participants were then asked to judge whether this was a seen or heard item.

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Percent source recall accuracy for items that are correctly judged as ‘old’ in the source memory task.

Arslan and Bastiaanse’s (2014) findings showed that the PWA performed less accurately (64%) in making old/new judgements than the healthy individuals who scored over 74% accuracy rate. For a subgroup of non-fluent PWA, identifying new items were more difficult than recognizing old items, while the healthy participants and fluent PWA did not show such a pattern. Interesting patterns emerged in the PWA’s source memory performances which indicated that the PWA were less successful in making seen/heard judgements as compared to healthy individuals (NBDs). This is illustrated in Figure 16.1. It was shown that the non-fluent PWA largely failed in recognizing ‘heard’ items with around 19% accuracy while they performed considerably better in recognizing ‘seen’ items (74%). The fluent PWA and healthy aging individuals also showed a heard-seen asymmetry in their source memory performances yet to a much smaller extent than the non-fluent PWA. These data point to a similar pattern of source identification impairments reported in Arslan et al. (2014), suggesting that Turkish non-fluent PWA’s difficulty in associating different kinds of information sources to evidential forms is partly caused by underlying source memory impairments.

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Conclusion

In this overview of recent experimental studies on evidentiality in Turkish, an aim was to recapitulate emerging findings from less commonly studied populations, including persons with aphasia, and bilingual individuals living under heritage language conditions. I have presented major findings from a number of experimental studies that used offline and online measures to investigate per-millisecond time course of evidentiality processing. On this basis, I provide discussions addressing certain controversies in Turkish linguistics regarding the nature of evidentiality marking. One of these controversies concerned whether or not the suffix -DI, which is referred to as the direct evidential here, encodes direct witnessing or firsthand information sources of the speaker. Recall that Johanson (2003) proposed that this form is an evidentiality-neutral past tense, but not a proper evidential. The experimental data reported in Arslan et al. (2015) however are at odds with this claim. This study provided clear evidence from a visual world eye-movement monitoring experiment that Turkish monolingual speakers consider the suffix -DI as the direct evidentiality marker. A group of Turkish monolingual speakers participated in Arslan et al. (2015) study, showed a bewildering pattern of eyemovements, they fixated significantly long on the picture depicting in progress version of the action in question before they turned to the target picture, confirming that they require to witness the action upon hearing a sentence marked with the direct evidential -DI. Furthermore, another set of experimental data reported in Arslan et al. (2017) showed that Turkish native speakers largely rate unacceptable the sentence stimuli that contain a direct evidential -DI used in a non-firsthand information context. Following Johanson (2003), who suggests that DI is evidentially neutral, one would expect Turkish native speakers to judge mismatches by direct evidentials as acceptable. However, this was not what the data indicate: Turkish native speakers judge evidentiality—information source mismatches unacceptable to a great extent. Thus, the data recapitulated in this chapter largely confirm the earlier theoretical work on the direct evidential, analysing this marker as an encoder of the speaker’s direct experience (e.g. Underhill 1976, Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986, Slobin and Aksu 1982). A second controversy concerns temporal characteristics of evidentiality in Turkish, as some scholars analyse both the evidentials as tenses whereas some others treat evidentiality as a modal distinction (i.e. non-temporal). Turkish inflectional morphemes are extremely multifunctional to mark tense-aspectmood (the so-called TAM system), and evidentiality marking is one of the functions of this highly complex system. I have underlined in this chapter,

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for evidentiality marking, the actual event time is not always relevant. This is very obvious for the indirect evidential in Turkish, a relevant temporal point is the moment when the speaker receives information, which can be non-past, although the actual event perhaps happened an hour before or in the previous century. In conclusion, on the basis of recent experimental data on evidentiality processing in both bilingualism and aphasia, it can be expressed with certainty that evidentiality in Turkish is a vulnerable domain in aphasia, and in bilingual individuals acquiring Turkish as a heritage language. First, in Turkish heritage speakers living in European countries, where evidentiality is not grammatically obligatory in language, the notion of evidentiality seems to erode due to lack of input. Second, individuals suffering from non-fluent aphasia often perform poorly in tasks that require comprehension and production of language structures referring to the past (see e.g. Bastiaanse et al. 2011). Turkish individuals with aphasia are more impaired in processing the direct evidential as compared to the indirect evidential, although their source memory for witnessed events are rather preserved (Arslan et al. 2014, Arslan and Bastiaanse 2014). This seems to be an interesting asymmetrical impairment which warrants wider future research.

References Aarssen, Jeroen. 2001. “Development of temporal relations in narratives by TurkishDutch bilingual children.” In Narrative development in a multilingual context., edited by Ludo T. Verhoeven and Sven Stromqvist, 209–231. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2003. “Evidentiality in typological perspective.” In Studies in evidentiality, edited by Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald and Robert M.W. Dixon, 1–32. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aksu-Koç, Ayhan. 1988. The acquisition of aspect and modality: The case of past reference in Turkish. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aksu-Koç, Ayhan. 2000. “Some aspects of the acquisition of evidential in Turkish.” In Evidentials: Turkic, Iranian and neighbouring languages., edited by Lars Johanson and Bo Utas, 15–28. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Aksu-Koç, Ayhan, and Dan I. Slobin. 1986. “A psychological account of the development and use of evidentials in Turkish.” In Evidentiality. The linguistic coding of epistemiology., edited by Chafe Wallace and Johanna Nichols, 159–167. New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation. Aksu-Koç, Ayhan, Hale Ögel-Balaban, and İ. Ercan Alp. 2009. “Evidentials and source

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knowledge in Turkish.” In Evidentiality: A window into language and cognitive development, New directions for child and adolescent development, edited by Stanka A. Fitneva and Tomoko Matsui, 13–28. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Arslan, Seckin. 2015. “Neurolinguistic and Psycholinguistic Investigations on Evidentiality in Turkish.” PhD Thesis, University of Groningen. Arslan, Seckin, Ayhan Aksu-Koç, İlknur Maviş, and Roelien Bastiaanse. 2014. “Finite verb inflections for evidential categories and source identification in Turkish agrammatic Broca’s aphasia.” Journal of Pragmatics 70:165–181. Arslan, Seckin, Elif Bamyacı, and Roelien Bastiaanse. 2016. “A characterization of verb use in Turkish agrammatic narrative speech.” Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics 30 (6):449–469. Arslan, Seckin, and Roelien Bastiaanse. 2014. “Source memory impairments in aphasic and healthy aging Turkish speakers.” 15th Science of Aphasia Conference, Ospedale San Camillo, Venice, Italy. Arslan, Seckin, and Roelien Bastiaanse. In press. “First language exposure predicts attrition patterns in Turkish heritage speakers’ use of grammatical evidentiality.” In Studies in Turkish as a Heritage Language, edited by Fatih Bayram. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Arslan, Seckin, Roelien Bastiaanse, and Claudia Felser. 2015. “Looking at the evidence in visual world: eye-movements reveal how bilingual and monolingual Turkish speakers process grammatical evidentiality.” Frontiers in Psychology 6. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg .2015.01387. Arslan, Seckin, Dörte de Kok, and Roelien Bastiaanse. 2017. “Processing grammatical evidentiality and time reference in Turkish heritage and monolingual speakers.” Bilingualism: Language and Cognition 20 (3):457–472. Bastiaanse, Roelien, Elif Bamyaci, Chien-Ju Hsu, Jiyeon Lee, Tuba Yarbay-Duman, and Cynthia K. Thompson. 2011. “Time reference in agrammatic aphasia: A crosslinguistic study.” Journal of Neurolinguistics 24 (6):652–673. Chafe, Wallace, and Johanna Nichols. 1986. Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology. New Jersey: Ablex Publishing. Cinque, Guglielmo. 2001. “A note on mood, modality, tense and aspect affixes in Turkish.” In The Verb in Turkish, edited by Eser Erguvanlı-Taylan, 47–59. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Csató, Eva A. 2000. “Turkish mis-and imis-items. Dimensions of a functional analysis.” In Evidentials: Turkic, Iranian and neighbouring languages, edited by Lars Johanson and Bo Utas, 29–46. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Enç, Mürvet. 2004. “Rethinking past tense.” In The syntax of time, edited by Jacqueline Guéron and Alexander Lecarme, 203–215. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Erguvanlı-Taylan, Eser. 1997. “The Relationship between Aspect, Tense and Modality in Turkish: the Morpheme -DI.” In XI. Dilbilim Kurultayı Bildirileri, edited by D. Zeyrek and Ş Ruhi, 1–13. Ankara: Middle East Technical University Press. - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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Johanson, Lars. 1971. Aspekt im Türkischen. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell. Johanson, Lars. 2003. “Evidentiality in Turkic.” In Studies in Evidentiality, edited by Alexandra Y.; Aikhenvald and R.M.W.; Dixon, 273–290. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Johanson, Lars, and Bo Utas (eds.). 2000. Evidentials: Turkic, Iranian and neighbouring languages. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Karakoç, Birsel. 2007. “Connectivity by means of finite elements in monolingual and bilingual Turkish discourse.” In Connectivity in Grammar and Discourse, edited by Jochen Rehbein, Christiane Hohenstein and Lukas Pietsch, 199–227. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Kornfilt, Jaklin. 1997. Turkish. London: Routledge. Ozturk, Ozge, and Anna Papafragou. 2016. “The acquisition of evidentiality and source monitoring.” Language Learning and Development 12 (2):199–230. Papafragou, Anna, Peggy Li, Youngon Choi, and Chung-hye Han. 2007. “Evidentiality in language and cognition.” Cognition 103 (2):253–299. Pfaff, Carol W. 1991. “Turkish in contact with German: Language maintenance and loss among immigrant children in Berlin (West).” International Journal of the Sociology of Language 90 (1):97–130. Pfaff, Carol W. 1993. “Turkish language development in Germany.” In Immigrant languages in Europe, edited by Guus Extra and Ludo Verhoeven, 119–146. Avon: Multilingual Matters. Plungian, Vladimir A. 2010. “Types of verbal evidentiality marking: an overview.” In Linguistic realization of evidentiality in European languages., edited by Elena Smirnova and Gabriele Diewald, 15–58. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Slobin, Dan I., and Ayhan A. Aksu. 1982. “Tense, aspect and modality in the use of the Turkish evidential.” In Tense-aspect: Between semantics and pragmatics, edited by Paul J. Hopper, 185–200. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Underhill, Robert. 1976. Turkish grammar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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chapter 17

Evidentiality in African Languages Robert Botne

1

Introduction

Grammatical coding of evidential distinctions that indicate the speaker’s justification underlying an assertion has been attested widely across the world, perhaps most prominently in the Americas and EurAsia. In Africa, however, evidence of grammatical evidentiality has been notably lacking, as noted by Aikhenvald (2014), de Haan (2013), and Plungian (2010). Some writers have suggested that this is due to the paucity of adequate research on African languages, both quantitatively (only a relatively small number have received even cursory research) and qualitatively (researchers have not investigated this aspect of the languages). The goal of this paper is to provide a brief overview of evidentiality in African languages.

2

Classification of Evidentials

In this survey and overview of African evidential systems, I will, for the most part, follow the classifications that have been proposed and refined over the past quarter century. Since Willett’s (1988) seminal cross-linguistic study of evidentiality, there has been increased and significant interest in and attention devoted to the topic, particularly in the past decade (see Boye 2012, Plungian and van der Auwera 2006, Aikhenvald 2003 and 2004, among many others). The distinctions proposed in the various studies have remained very consistent, as shown by the side-by-side comparison in Table 17.1. Typically, there is a binary distinction between Direct (or Firsthand) information and Indirect (or non-Firsthand) information, with the latter being further sub-divided into Inferential and Reportive. Inferential evidence is typically sub-divided further into Inferential, based on inference from observable results, or Assumptive, based on logical reasoning from cause and effect or on general knowledge. Several differences are of note and relevant to the discussion of African evidential systems that follows. First, Plungian and van der Auwera (2006) and Boye (2012) make explicit participation as a relevant sub-category of direct evidence. Thus, there may be a difference expressed between participating

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evidentiality in african languages table 17.1 Comparative chart of classification of evidential types

Willett (1988)

Aikhenvald (2004:65)

Plungian & van der Auwera (2006:37)

Boye (2012:19–20, 131–132)

Direct/Attested

Firsthand

Direct/personal Participatory Visual Non-visual

Direct justification Participatory Visual Auditory

Visual Auditory Other sensory Indirect Inferring (results) Inferring (reasoning)

Reported Hearsay Folklore

Visual Sensory

Non-firsthand Inference Assumption (logical reasoning)

Indirect/personal Indirect justification Inferential Inferential (tangible, observed results) Presumptive Assumptive (cause/effect) Indirect/non-personal Reported

Hearsay

Reportive Hearsay

Quotative

Quotative

(“egophoric” justification) and perceiving evidence. Additionally, Plungian and van der Auwera specify not only the mode of knowing, but also the source of knowledge: personal or non-personal, which crosscuts the direct/indirect distinction. This is consistent with Frawley’s (1992) distinction between self and other, an important distinction in how some evidential systems seem to be organized. Third, Boye (2012), following Aikhenvald (2004), and Aikhenvald (this volume) distinguish hearsay from quotative, the latter indicating overt reference to the quoted source. These categories are necessary, but not sufficient. To these categories I will add Authoritive. This category applies to reported information from a reliable, trusted, individual or authority. Thus, it can be considered to be Direct but Non-personal. Consequently, by incorporating the cross-cutting personal/non-personal and direct/indirect distinctions, we have the classification shown in Table 17.2, which will be the basis for the discussion in this study. Boye’s (2012) extensive work on epistemic systems in general reinvigorates Palmer’s (2001) principled separation of epistemic justification from epistemic

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table 17.2 Revised chart of evidential classification

Source of knowledge

Epistemic justification Direct

Indirect

Personal (self)

Participative Visual Non-visual

Inferential Presumptive

Non-personal (other)

Authoritive

Reportive

Direct Justification — Indirect Justification | | Full Support — Partial Support — Neutral Support figure 17.1

Boye’s (2012:130) semantic map of epistemic meanings

modality. As Boye notes, evidential markers may express modal qualities of degree of certainty, and often do, but need not. He analyzes epistemic modality in terms of degree of support expressed: full, partial, or neutral. Accordingly, he provides a semantic mapping relating these two types of epistemic means of expression, as in Figure 17.1. Although this study is focused on the evidential part of his mapping, there are instances in which it is both useful and necessary to consider the modal part as well. In research for this study, I have examined well over 300 grammars and articles on various African languages. Of the approximately thirty African languages identified as marking some type of grammatical evidential justification, only a small number mark more than one. Four languages—Fur (NiloSaharan), Lega (Niger-Congo, Bantu), Maaka (Afro-Asiatic, Chadic), and Shilluk (Nilo-Saharan, Nilotic)—stand out because they manifest more complex systems than other African languages examined. As the reader will note, then, there are relatively few African languages that have been identified as having significant evidential systems. Given the increasing number of good grammars on African languages, we are led to infer that evidentiality may, indeed, not be widespread in Africa. The following discussion draws on reported data and descriptions for these languages and proceeds from the most elaborate systems to those that may have only a reportive evidential or evidential strategy.

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A 4-term System: Fur (Nilo-Saharan)

Fur has a set of seven particles—kamaŋ, kaŋ, kâŋ, bâl, máŋ, mâŋ and mǎŋ— that Waag (2010:259) labels illocutionary particles. Although Waag identifies six of these as having an evidential function, they are more appropriately separated into two sets, one evidential, the other mirative. These particles appear to be optional. 3.1 Direct Epistemic Justification: kamaŋ and kaŋ According to Waag (2010), the particles kamaŋ and kaŋ are used when the speaker has direct evidence through personal experience—visual, auditory, or other—supporting the asserted proposition. Kamaŋ is more insistent or emphatic in assertion than kaŋ, as illustrated by the examples in (1) and (2). In (1), the speaker indicates that s/he has observed the actors with his/her own senses. Both particles may also add a sense of unexpectedness for the audience (Waag 2010: 259). Waag considers this a case of mirativity. In contrast, following DeLancey (1997), I consider mirativity to express information that is new or unexpected on the part of the speaker. (1) yεεŋ kaŋ k-əiŋ ʔǎl kí kᴐrᴐ k-uŋ-ɛl-ɪŋɪ 3p ev 3p.h-be_present rel 1p water 1p-draw_water-impv-pst ‘They were actually there when we drew water (from the well).’ (Waag 2010: 259) bára kamaŋ ʔέla (2) d-íí-ŋ sg-2s-gen brother ev 3s.come.pfv ‘Your brother has really come.’ [I’ve seen him (or heard him)] (Ibid. 260) 3.2 Indirect Epistemic Justification: kâŋ and bâl The formally similar particle kâŋ, unlike kaŋ, indicates indirect justification, either inferential (3) or reportive (4). According to Waag (2010), the speaker would like confirmation of his/her inference. (3) yέ kâŋ kɔrɔ ʔamí 3s ev water 3s.eat.pfv ‘He has drunk some alcohol?’ [speaker may see person staggering or behaving like drunken person, but is not sure if that is the case or the person is pretending; speaker did not see the person drinking] (Ibid. 260)

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(4) d-íí-ŋ bára kâŋ ʔέla ná paag-ɔ sg-2s-gen brother ev 3s.come.pfv con 3s.reach. pfv-cpl ‘Has your brother really come?’ [heard about, but confirming] (Ibid. 260) The particle bâl, like kâŋ, indicates indirect justification for the assertion. In fact, Waag points out that bâl could be used in place of kâŋ in (3); however, it would carry a connotation of disappointment or worry because the speaker would not have expected the individual to drink alcohol. Additionally, although Waag states that use of bâl is restricted to visual evidence—as, for example, in (5)—justification is presumptive, based on logical reasoning, rather than on observed results, as kâŋ is. The case in (3) would also be presumptive, based on relating effect (drunken state) to cause (drinking). Bâl indicates as well the speaker’s lack of confidence in the presumption, though she expects it to be the case. (5) yέ bâl j-əlu ʔǎl paal ná=s j-έll-έl 3s ev 2s-look.impv rel 3s.dance.pfv con=tr 2s-laugh-impv ‘You are laughing because you are looking at her dancing.’ (Ibid. 260) [speaker sees addressee laughing, person dancing, and addressee looking at person dancing] 3.3 máŋ, Evidential or Mirative Marker? A third particle, máŋ, though apparently associated with indirect-inferential evidence, would be more appropriately analyzed as a mirative marker. Use of this particle expresses surprise on the part of the speaker, as in (6). DeLancey (2001:376) notes that a characteristic use of a mirative marker is its use with second person actors, where it “virtually always ha[s] the sense of surprise at an unanticipated situation.” ja-nnu (6) máŋ tɔ́ ŋ ev house.loc 2s-go.pfv ‘Are you going home?’ (Ibid. 260) [speaker sees addressee is ready to leave; expresses surprise] A similar particle, mâŋ, differing only in tone, also expresses surprise and desire for confirmation, but does not indicate any justification for the assertion, as in (7).

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evidentiality in african languages table 17.3 Fur evidential particles

Particle Source of knowledge Epistemic justification kamaŋ kaŋ kâŋ bâl

Self Self Self Other Self

Direct (emphatic) Direct (non-emphatic) Indirect–inferential Indirect–reportive Indirect–presumptive

table 17.4 Fur mirative markers

Particle Epistemic justification máŋ mâŋ mǎŋ

Unexpected-Evidential support Unexpected-No evidence Expected

ja-nnɪ (7) mâŋ tɔ́ ŋ ev house.loc 2s-go.pfv ‘Are you going home?’ (Ibid. 261) [speaker has no evidence, just inquiring, but still expresses surprise] Finally, a third particle, mǎŋ, indicates the speaker’s anticipation that the proposition asserted is true (8). (8) mǎŋ=sɪ j-ɛ́la mir=tr 2s-come.pfv ‘You have brought it, haven’t you?’ (I hope you have!) (Ibid. 257) In sum, Fur can be said to have an evidential system consisting of four particles. This system represents direct, indirect1 (inferential & reportive), indirect2 (presumptive) types of epistemic justification. Table 17.3 summarizes these findings. Fur can also be considered to have a system of mirative markers, as listed in Table 17.4. The Fur evidential functions can be mapped as in Figure 17.2, illustrating the relationships among them.

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figure 17.2

4

Mapping of Fur evidentials

A 3-term System: Lega-Beya (Niger-Congo, Bantu D. 25)

Lega (Beya dialect1) has three evidential particles: ampó, έmbε, ámbo (Botne 1995, 1997). Boye (2012:74–76) argues that there are only two, proposing, rather, that έmbε is an epistemic modal and not an evidential particle. However, the primary function of έmbε is to express indirect-presumptive evidence, as will be shown below. Use of the evidential particles is optional. 4.1 Direct Sensory Evidence: ampó The clause-initial particle ampó indicates that the speaker has strong, reliable evidence to back the assertion made (Botne 1995, 1997). This evidence is of three types. First, it may be direct sensory evidence, especially visual or auditory, experienced by the speaker, as in (9). Second, it may be direct evidence from a reliable and trusted other, i.e., Authoritive (10). Third, it may be indirect and inferential in nature (11). (9) ampó mabɛlá mɛ́sɛ makóló ev 6-maize 6-be 6-mature ‘the maize is ready’ [speaker saw it] (10) ampó Masúdí á-mo-mɔ́ n-ɪnɛ kw=ísɛlɛnzi ev M. 3s-3s-see-rec 17.loc= brother ‘[It’s a fact that] Masudi saw him at his brother’s place.’ (Botne 1997:518) [speaker was told by M., who experienced it]

1 Boye (2012) uses the label Lega-Shabunda. The data (Botne 1995, 1997) more specifically come from the Beya sub-dialect of Shabunda. Whether the same facts apply to the larger dialect is not known.

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(11) ampó Mɔkέ έbilindε bónɔ Amísi έndilε ko=Pángé ev M. 3s.forget.rec that A. 3s.go. rec to=P. ‘[it’s evident, as his odd behavior indicates, that] Moke forgot that Amisi went to Pangi.’ (Ibid. 518) 4.2 Indirect Inferential Sensory Justification: έmbε The particle έmbε indicates that the grounds for asserting the proposition are presumptive; that is, they are based on cause-effect relations, whether tactile, auditory, or visual. Hence, a tactile crawling feeling on the leg may be caused by a spider (12), thunder is typically produced by a rainstorm (13), sagging posture is commonly a result of fatigue (14). (12) έmbε le-le i-kilaíkila ev 5-be 5-spider ‘It may be a spider’ [speaker feels something crawling on leg] (Ibid. 515) (13) έmbε m-bula zé-ko-lɔ́ k-a ev 9-rain 9-pr-fall-fv ‘[It appears that] it will rain.’ [based on hearing distant thunder] (Ibid. 515) (14) έmbε Mɔkέ á-ko-rw-a ev M. 3s-pr-be_tired-fv ‘Moke seems to be tired.’ [speaker appraises Moke’s posture] (Ibid. 516) 4.3 Indirect Reportive Justification: ámbo Clause-initial ámbo indicates that the speaker has indirect evidence that was reported to him either secondhand (unreliable) or third hand, as in (15) (Botne 1997). It may also be used when the evidence for assertion is grounded in general knowledge (16). (15) ámbo Másudí έ-ko-sámb-a ev M. 3s-pr-be_tired-fv ‘[I’ve heard/I’m told that] Masudi is sick’ [report from M. or someone else] (Ibid. 511) (16) ámbo Amísi έ-zi nzela ev A. 3S-know path ‘[they say/it is said that] Amisi knows the way.’ [general knowledge] (Ibid. 511)

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table 17.5 Evidential particles in Lega

Particle Source of knowledge Epistemic justification ampó έmbε ámbo

figure 17.3

Self or Trusted Other Self Self Other

Direct (visual or auditory) Indirect: inferential Indirect: presumptive Indirect: reportive

Mapping of epistemic justification and modal support in Lega

4.4 Summary In sum, there are three particles in Lega that differentiate source of knowledge and type of justification, as well as indicating degree of epistemic support, à la Boye (2012). These are summarized in Table 17.5 and Figure 17.3. The three particles in Lega thus distinguish two contrastive oppositions (Figure 17.3). First, ampó contrasts with ámbo with respect to direct-authoritive versus indirect–reportive justification. Reports from a reliable source may be treated as if the speaker had witnessed/experienced them himself; i.e., nonpersonal knowledge is treated as direct knowledge when the source is trusted as authoritive. Second, ampó contrasts with ɛ́mbɛ in type of indirect source of personal justification, inferential in the former, presumptive in the latter. Ampó, as well, indicates speaker’s full support of the assertion, whereas ámbo and ɛ́mbɛ indicate either partial or neutral support. 4.5 Lunyole (Niger-Congo, Bantu JE.35) Lunyole possesses an evidential marker—mbo—similar to ámbo found in Lega (Wicks 2006). Like ámbo, mbo marks only reported speech or hearsay, as in (17). This appears to be optional. - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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figure 17.4 Lunyole reportive evidential

(17) mbo omusaani galetire omuhasi rep son 3s.pst.bring woman ‘[I hear that] his son got himself a wife.’ (Wicks 2006:73) Wicks identifies three other particles and clitics as evidential markers. However, none of these mark evidentiality. Rather they are epistemic modal markers. One is the clitic po= (apparently borrowed from Luganda), undoubtedly related to Lega ampó, that marks a high degree of certainty. The clitic ko= seems to be comparable to po=, while the particle dala marks confirmation of an assertion that seems doubtful. Thus, Lunyole only expresses a reportive evidential. As there appears to be no systematic contrast between mbo and absence of mbo, this may be considered a case of “scattered coding”, as described by Boye (2012) and Aikhenvald (2004).

5

Two Mixed Systems: Maaka (Afro-Asiatic, Chadic) and Shilluk (Nilo-Saharan, Nilotic)

Not all languages expressing evidentiality exhibit a single evidential system. Some have multiple systems, or “scattered coding”, as Aikhenvald (2004) puts it. Maaka and Shilluk are two languages that exhibit multiple systems. 5.1 Maaka (Afro-Asiatic, Chadic) Evidential justification in Maaka is complex (Storch and Coly 2014). Maaka presents a clear case of “scattered coding” (Aikhenvald’s (2004) term), with marking occurring on nouns, verbs, and as independent particles. Although Storch and Coly discuss a dozen different items, here I will focus on those that seem to be primarily evidential in character, as opposed to others that appear to be primarily modal. 5.1.1 Evidential Justification vs. Supposed Knowledge One set of evidential markers occur as suffixes on nouns. Two of these, -mú and -diyà, occur on nouns that refer to topicalized participants and indicate that the speaker (18), or the speaker and addressee (19), have witnessed, or are witnessing, the relevant situation.

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Mapping of Maaka evidentials I

(18) yáayà círòmà-mú nín-nì gùu=ɓálɓìyà ⟨name⟩ ⟨title⟩-ev mother-poss.3s.m person=⟨toponym⟩ tà-lòwó gàamôɗí bòɲcéttí 3s.f-deliver.pfv once dem.ref ‘Yaaya Ciroma: her mother is from Balbiya town, she once gave birth there’ (Storch & Coly 2014:196) gè-gòrkù-wà (19) làa nàmáa-dìyà sáy mine-póɗí-ní must 1p-remove.tel-obj.3s.m loc-village-def child this-ev ‘this child, we must chase him from the village’ (Ibid. 196) In opposition to this evidential justification is a suffix -kà, again attached to nouns, that signals the speaker’s “strong” supposition that the situation will occur. (20) ʔáa-kè-góm gè-gòm-à-kà, … cond-2s.m-go loc-market-def-sup ‘if you go to that very market [and I know you go there], …’ (Ibid. 197) This set of suffixes, then, constitutes a system of evidential marking contrasting with suppositional marking, which can be mapped as in Figure 17.5. In this system, only direct evidentiary justification is marked, whereas -kà indicates nonjustified information, i.e., suppositional knowledge, and hence non-evidential. 5.1.2 Reportive Justification A second system of reportive justification is marked by the presence or absence of two particles, kònò and kóŋ, that Storch and Coly (2014:198–199) call complementizers, which I will refer to as particles. These particles may co-occur with the reported speech, or quotative, marker nà. Nà by itself indicates “principled

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certainty” on the part of the speaker (21a). The insertion of kònò following the quotative marker indicates reported hearsay as justification for the assertion (21b). (21) a. ʔálí nà sù-wókkó músá kò máytà ⟨name⟩ qt 3s.m-see.pfv ⟨name⟩ do vomit.intr.vn ‘Ali said he saw Musa vomiting.’ (Ibid. 198) b. ʔálí nà kònò sù-wókkó músá kò máytà rep ‘[It is rumored that] Ali said he saw Musa vomiting.’ Kònò may also occur at the head of a non-subordinate clause (22), or following a noun (23), again indicating hearsay as the source of information. (22) kònò dóoshé mineé-gòm ʔáshàakà rep tomorrow 1p.fut-go ⟨name⟩ ‘rumor has it that tomorrow we will go to the Ashaka cement factory’ (Ibid. 199) ɓà limo-wà kònò ɓà láà-n-tò (23) sə̀ -ndée 3s.m-come.nar conj camel-def rep conj child-lnk-poss.3s.f ‘he came with the [reported] camel and its calf’ (Ibid. 198) In contrast with kònò, there is the particle kóŋ, which indicates an egophoric source of information, though not the mode of knowing (visual, auditory, tactile, or hearsay). This particle may, like kònò, occur following the reported speech marker nà (24a) or following a (pro)noun (24b). It indicates that the speaker has more recent information, and that the addressee’s information is outdated. (24) a. mày-yá pór-ná-t-tò nà kóŋ zùtí-nì chief-def say-obj.1s-lnk-obj.3s.f quot ev heart-poss.3s.m dàmmbìkínà spoil.part ‘the chief told me it [the matter] that he was very angry with me [no longer the case] b. bòtkì ʔínà kóŋ nì-bòo-búrì because obj.1s ev 1s-hab-lie.intr ‘because I used to lie [no longer the case]’ (Ibid. 200) - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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figure 17.6 Mapping of Maaka evidentials II

What appears to be the case here is (1) that there exists an opposition between the presence of a particle and its absence, and (2) that absence (with nà only) expresses authoritive justification. Kònò indicates reportive (hearsay) justification, while kóŋ indicates egophoric justification, as in Figure 17.6. 5.2 Shilluk (Nilo-Saharan, Nilotic)2 As in Maaka, evidential justification in Shilluk is complex and mixed (Miller and Gilley 2007). A sentence-initial particle í indicates reportive (hearsay) justification for the statement asserted. On the other hand, direct and indirectinferential justification are intertwined with tense/aspect marking. The full three-way distinction—direct vs. indirect-inferential vs. indirect-reportive— exists only with past time reference. 5.2.1 Direct vs Indirect Epistemic Justification in the Past The past in Shilluk can be marked in either of two ways, á-ˈB̄ ` or (ʊ́ )-B̄ -ɔ̄ `, that Miller and Gilley (2007) label Past and Perfective, respectively. The á- construction is used if the speaker has direct visual evidence in support of the assertion. This is the case whether the agent in a transitive construction is identified or not (compare (25a) with (25b)). This use holds for intransitives as well, as shown in (26). yī cʊ̄ l (25) a. d̪ yàŋ áˈkwāl` cow pst.steal.t erg Col ‘Col stole the cow.’ [speaker saw it happen] (Miller & Gilley 2007:192) b. d̪ yàŋ áˈkwāl` cow pst.steal.t ‘Someone stole the cow.’ [speaker knows who; saw individual do it] (Ibid. 193) 2 See Park (this volume), who categorizes Shilluk as having a 3-term system. - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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(26) ɔ̄ d átūg house pst.crumble ‘The house crumbled.’ [speaker saw it happen] (Ibid. 195) The á- construction can be used also if the speaker is “absolutely certain of the veracity of the information and is willing to stand by it as if he or she were an eyewitness.” (emphasis in original, Miller & Gilley 192–193). This suggests an epistemic modal sense of full support, in Boye’s (2012) terms. If the speaker has not witnessed the event, but has indirect-inferential evidence for the assertion, the ʊ́ B̄ɔ̄ construction is used for transitive verbs (27), the B̄ ɔ̄ construction for intransitive (28). Such evidence for (27) might be that the “missing cow [was] found in Col’s cattle byre” (Miller & Gilley 2007: 193). (27) a. d̪ yàŋ ʊ́ -kwāl-ɔ̄ ` yɪ̄ cʊ̄ l cow pfv-steal.tr-?? erg Col ‘Col stole the cow.’ [speaker didn’t see it, but has inferential evidence] (Ibid. 193) b. d̪ yàŋ ʊ́ -kwāl-ɔ̄ ` cow pfv-steal.tr-?? ‘Someone stole the cow.’ [speaker doesn’t know who, but there is evidence justifying an inference that the event occurred] (Ibid. 193) (28) ɔ̄ d tūg-ɔ̄ house pfv.crumble.intr-?? ‘The house crumbled.’ [speaker didn’t see it, but has inferential evidence] (Ibid. 195) Neither prefix is used in the past negative (29). yɪ̄ cʊ̄ l (29) d̪ yàŋ ˈkwāl-ɔ̄ ` cow pfv.steal.tr erg Col ‘Col didn’t steal the cow.’ (Ibid. 193) 5.2.2 Transitive vs. Intransitive with Imperfective Marking The distinction between direct and indirect–inferential evidence that was observed in constructions denoting past events does not hold for transitive verbs in non-past constructions, either imperfective (30) or future (31). The source of knowledge is not conveyed; the sentence simply expresses an assertion, as in (30), or certain expectation, as in (31). - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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(30) d̪ yàŋ ʊ̀ kwàlɔ̀ yɪ̄ cʊ̄ l cow impv.steal.tr erg Col ‘Col is stealing the cow.’ (Ibid. 194) (31) d̪ yàŋ ʊ̀ ˈkwàl yɪ̄ cʊ̄ l cow fut.steal.tr erg Col ‘Col will steal the cow.’ [speaker is certain] (Ibid. 194) With intransitive verbs (of change-of-state), the source of information is also not conveyed directly. Nonetheless, there are, apparently, two possible readings, one based on direct evidence, the other on indirect-presumptive evidence. An interpretation as present arises when the speaker witnesses the event, as in (32i), while an interpretation as imminent future appears to arise when the speaker has indirect evidence, presumably presumptive cause and effect grounds; for example, one could imagine severe cracks in the structure that would lead to collapse of the building (32ii). (32) ɔ̄ d ʊ̀ tùgɔ̀ house impv-crumble.intr i. ‘The house is crumbling.’ [speaker sees it happening] (Ibid. 196) ii. ‘The house will crumble (soon).’ 5.2.3 Reportive Epistemic Justification The sentence-initial particle í indicates indirect-reportive justification for the assertion. This particle occurs with all tenses/aspects, with the exception of the á- past construction, presumably because that construction indicates that there is direct evidence supporting the assertion. Thus, it can co-occur with the perfective (ʊ́ )B̄ ɔ̄ construction (33–34), even though that construction denotes indirect-inferential evidence when not marked as reportive. Use with the imperfective ʊ̀ B̀ɔ̀ construction is illustrated in (35). yɪ̄ cʊ̄ l (33) a. í d̪ yàŋ ʊ́ kwālɔ̄ rep cow pfv.steal.tr erg Col ‘Reportedly, Col stole the cow.’ [speaker didn’t see it, but C. has been accused] (Ibid. 194) b. í d̪ yàŋ ʊ́ kwālɔ̄ rep cow pfv.steal.tr ‘Reportedly, someone stole the cow.’ [speaker has no evidence other than report] (Ibid. 194)

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evidentiality in african languages table 17.6 Shilluk evidential affixes and particle

Form

Source of knowledge Epistemic justification

Past áˈB̄ ` Self or Trusted Other Past (ʊ́ )B̄ ɔ̄` Self í Other

Direct (visual) Indirect–inferential Indirect–reportive

(34) í ɔ̄ d tūgɔ̀ rep house pfv.crumble.intr ‘Reportedly, the house crumbled.’ [based on hearsay evidence] (Ibid. 196) (35) a. í d̪ yàŋ ʊ̀ kwàlɔ̀ yɪ̄ cʊ̄ l rep cow impv.steal.tr erg Col ‘Reportedly, Col is stealing the cow.’ (Ibid. 194) b. í ɔ̄ d ʊ̀ tūgɔ̀ rep house impv.crumble.intr ‘Reportedly, the house is crumbling.’ (Ibid. 196) ‘The house will crumble.’ [hearsay] With future constructions (36), the í particle acts either to indicate hearsay concerning a future action or, as an epistemic modal, to indicate expectation that the event will occur. (36) a. í d̪ yàŋ ʊ́ ˈkwāl yɪ̄ cʊ̄ l rep cow fut.steal.tr erg Col i. ‘[It is reported that] Col will steal the cow.’ (Ibid. 195) ii. ‘[It is expected that] Col will steal the cow.’ b. í ɔ̄ d ʊ́ tūg rep house fut.crumble.intr i. ‘[It is reported that] the house is crumbling [immediately].’ (Ibid. 196) ii. ‘[It is expected that] the house will crumble.’ The difference between the reportive particle and the evidential/tense constructions suggests “scattered coding” (Aikhenvald’s (2004) term) in two separate systems. Table 17.6 summarizes the evidential use of the particle and the two past constructions. The figures in Figure 17.7 illustrate the two systems at play in Shilluk. - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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figure 17.7 Mapping of Shilluk evidentials

6

Other 2-term Systems Restricted to the Past

Three other languages—like Shilluk, located in East Africa—also exhibit 2term systems marking an evidential contrast only in the past. Luwo is NiloSaharan, hence genetically related to Shilluk; Makhuwa (P.31) and Sukuma (F.21) are both Bantu. 6.1 Luwo (Nilo-Saharan, Nilotic) Luwo, or Jur, has one evidential marker, the verb prefix -náá-, that indicates indirect evidence based on inference (37), “evidence com[ing] from a result or trace of the action” (Storch 2006:399). Use of this prefix contrasts with its absence, which indicates directly witnessed events (38). (37) á-náà-cʌ́mɔ̀ pst-ev-eat.detr ‘s/he ate/has eaten’ [speaker did not witness completion of action; indirect evidence] (Storch 2006:397) (38) a-Ø-cʌ́mɔ̀ pst-??-eat.detr ‘s/he ate/has eaten’ [speaker sure that event has occurred, witnessed] (Ibid. 397)

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evidentiality in african languages table 17.7 Evidentials in Luwo

Particle Source of knowledge Epistemic justification Ø -náá-

Self Self

Direct (witnessed) Indirect–inferential

figure 17.8 Mapping of epistemic justification in Luwo

6.2 Makhuwa-Enahara (Niger-Congo, Bantu P.31) Like Luwo, Makhuwa-Enahara has a single evidential marker for indirect inferential evidence (van der Waal 2009, p.c.). And, like Luwo, this contrast only occurs in the past. Present and past perfect(ive) forms each have two forms, one marked with the prefix -núú-. This form indicates that the justification for the assertion is based on indirect inferential evidence, as in (38a). (39) a. o-núú-lima 2s-pfv.pers-cultivate ‘you have worked the soil’ (van der Wal, p.c. [in Devos 2008]) [speaker has indirect evidence—e.g., muddy clothes] b. w-oo-líma 2s-pfv-cultivate ‘you have worked the soil’ [speaker has witnessed activity] table 17.8 Evidentials in Makhuwa-Enahara

Particle Source of knowledge Epistemic justification Ø -núú-

Self Self

Direct Indirect–inferential

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6.3 Sukuma (Niger-Congo, Bantu F.21) Sukuma is another language of East Africa that makes an evidential distinction in the past tense (Nurse 2008). In this case, the far past has two different forms depending on type of evidence justifying the assertion. If the evidence is based on direct personal experience, then the verbal prefix is -áá-, as in (40). Nurse’s (2008) consultant (B.F.Y.P. Masele) comments that this form “could be used in court”, hence a high degree of certainty and full support of the assertion. The other form has -ga- as prefix, as in (41). According to Nurse, the speaker “infers the buying from what he has heard”. It is not clear from this comment whether justification is based on actual inference or on a report. In either case, the distinction is one contrasting direct and indirect evidentiary justification. (40) d-áá-gʊl-ǎ 1p-rm DIR-buy-fv ‘we bought’ [speaker bases assertion on personal experience] (41) du-ga-gʊl-a 1p-rm IND-buy-fv ‘we bought’ [speaker bases assertion on inferred evidence]

figure 17.10 Mapping of evidential/tense markers in Sukuma

7

A Direct–Indirect System: !Xun (W2 dialect)) (Kx’a)

!Xun exhibits a two-way evidential contrast expressed by the direct evidential particle mèká and an indirect particle cālā (König 2013). Use of the evidential markers is not obligatory, nor are they restricted to the past. 7.1 Direct Evidential mèká Firsthand visual or auditory evidence is expressed with the particle mèká, which typically co-occurs with the topic marker má (42B). (42) A:

djù |xòà hȁ ndòà cú kwá ||āē? person n1 di lie. sg q die.sg ‘is that person lying [there] dead?’ (König 2013:75)

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B:

djù |xòà hȁ ŋŋ má mèká |āē person n1 pr top ev die.sg ‘this person is dead’ [as I saw it myself]

This particle may also be used to express egophoric experience by the speaker, as illustrated in (43). König considers this to be an inferential use (‘I woke up; hence, I must have been asleep’ (p. 76)). However, it seems, rather, to express direct egophoric experience—‘I know’ (her quote). (43) A:

B:

mtcē kwá bà kē ȍ what q 2s pst do ‘what were you doing?’ (Ibid. 76) mí mèká kē tcˈá 1S EV PST sleep ‘I slept’

7.2 Indirect Evidential cālā Non-firsthand evidence, either presumptive or reportive, is expressed with the particle cālā. Since the marker is not obligatory, this particle is “primarily used when the reported statement is either in contrast with the expectation of the addressee, or when the speaker wishes to clarify a statement that he only has indirect knowledge about …” (König 2013:83) 7.2.1 Presumptive Use König (2013:79) refers to this as inferential use. In the terminology being used here, it would more appropriately be considered presumptive. The example in (44) illustrates this use, in which the speaker is holding the rock in order to prevent its tumbling down and causing their deaths. (44) mí má kā ||àȅ n!ùm̀ kā ŋ̄ ŋ̀ kā-è cālā n!!áˈm̀ g!!à 1s top prog? hold rock n4 pr n4-rel ev hit lie_down.pl è-tcā 1p.ex-du ‘I hold this rock so that it cannot fall down and kill us’ (Ibid. 83) 7.2.2 Reportive Use The more typical use of cālā appears to be its reportive function. The exchange in (45) illustrates the reportive use by the first speaker, contrasted with the direct evidential use of mèká.

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table 17.9 Evidential particles in !Xun

Particle Source of knowledge Epistemic justification mèká cālā

Self Other

Direct Indirect–presumptive Indirect–reportive (hearsay)

figure 17.11 Mapping of epistemic justification in !Xun

(45) A:

B:

à dàbà cālā kwá |āē? 2s child ev q die.sg ‘[I heard] your child is dead’ (Ibid. 75) mí dàbà má mèká |xȍȁ 1s child top ev alive ‘my child is alive’ [as I saw myself]

(46) hȁ dèbē má cālā !!ȅhì N1 children top ev be_stupid ‘his children must be stupid’ [as I heard [i.e., as reported]] (Ibid. 80) The cālā particle also frequently expresses the epistemic modality of doubt, as in (47). (47) ||xāí á cālā g|è (name) q ev come ‘[they say that] ||Xai is coming’ [but speaker is not sure that is the case] (Ibid. 79) Table 17.9 summarizes the uses of the two particles, while Figure 17.11 maps the relationship.

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8

Evidentials and Nominal Tense: The Case of Somali (Afro-Asiatic, Cushitic)

Lecarme (2003) reports that in Somali the same morphological marking is used to indicate past tense and indirect evidence. This marking contrast is found on the noun, -íi marking past, -Ø marking non-past and associated with visibility of the object: past indicates invisibility to the speaker, non-past visibility. This nominal tense/evidential marking is in contrast to tense marking on the verb. The evidential past -íi must be used in all contexts where the nominal referent is not, in principle, observable. Use of the non-past form, in contrast, indicates that the speaker has visual evidence. Thus, in (48), the pen may be present, but not visible to the speaker. (48) Qálinkay-gii mée? pen.m.poss.1s-det.m.ev q.is.ms ‘Where is my pen?’ (Lecarme 2003:288) Non-past marking of nouns, as in (49), indicates that, at the time of the asserted event, there is direct visual evidence justifying the proposition. Use of the past/evidential -íi on the subject noun in (50), but lack of such marking on the object noun, indicates that inference (perhaps from presence of animal tracks) justifies the assertion, as the rhinoceros is not present, but the road is. In (51), both nouns are marked with -íi, indicating that neither the truck nor the road is visible, which indicates that the assertion is based on reported evidence. Thus, evidentiality is tied to grammatical roles of subject and object. (49) Baabúur-ku jíd-ka buu ká tallaabay. truck- det.m road-det.m f.3m.s by pass.pst ‘The truck crossed the road.’ [Direct evidence] (Ibid. 286) (50) Wiyísh-ii jíd-ka bay ká tallaabtay. rhinoceros-det.f.ev road-det.m f.3f.s by pass.f.pst ‘The rhinoceros crossed the road’ [Indirect evidence: inference] (Ibid. 286) jíd-kíi buu ká tallaabey. (51) Baabúur-kii truck-det.m.ev road-det.m.ev f.3m.s by pass.pst ‘The truck crossed the road.’ [Indirect evidence: report] (Ibid. 286)

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figure 17.12

9

Mapping of evidential forms in Somali

A Reportive vs. Non-reportive System: Supyire (Niger-Congo, Gur)

According to Carlson (1994), Supyire has two evidential markers, náhá and yaa. The former is a deictic copula of location meaning “be here”. It is also “used when the speaker has incontrovertible evidence for the information asserted”, but “may also serve in a kind of proto-evidential capacity to code higher certainty” (Carlson p. 365). Hence, it has both evidential and epistemic modal functions, following Boye’s (2012:116) semantic mapping. As evidential, it expresses direct–participatory (52), indirect-inferential (53), and directauthoritive (54) justification, i.e., the source of information is the self (or personal in Plungian and van Auwera’s terms) or trusted other. (52) Mìi nàhà na sí ɲ̀ -jà ŋwɔ̀ hɔ mu na mɛ́. I ev.neg prog fut fut-be_able fut.hide you at neg ‘I obviously will not be able to hide from you.’ (Carlson 1994:366) [speaker has just had abundant evidence of his inability to hide from the addressee: every time he tried to hide, the addressee had pointed out his hiding place.] (53) Ŋké wìì! Ka à lyɛ fó mà wwɔ̀. E, mu náhá á this look_at it pf be_old till and be_black boy you ev pf kànhà pìlàgà be_tired night ‘Look at this one! It’s so old it’s black. Boy, you sure suffered last night!’ [speaker (Hyena) has just extracted a black ball of condiment (made of néré seeds), which he mistakes for a rotten tooth, from Hare’s mouth] (54) Ɛɛ, pi náhá na ma they ev prog come.impv ‘Well, they really are coming.’ (Ibid. 367)

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[speaker had asked earlier in the conversation if migrant workers were returning to begin the cultivating season; addressee listed a number who had returned] An assertion based on unreliable hearsay is marked with yaa, derived from a verb meaning ‘create, repair, fashion’ (Carlson 1994:368). It has the sense of ‘is reputed to’ when co-occurring with a copula or the quasi-copula ta ‘find’. This use is illustrated in (55)–(56), though note that yaa appears here as yala. á nàŋkààgà pyì. (55) U à yala à ta ú he pf reputed ser find he.comp pf thievery do ‘He is reputed to have stolen.’ (Ibid. 368) (56) Bùwárá kɔ́ ná à yala à pyi Kó kwòŋi wà. B. top pf reputed sc be Kong Samogo.def indef ‘As for Buwara, he is said to have been a Samogo from Kong.’ (Ibid. 368) Table 17.10 provides a summary listing of the evidential uses of náhá and yaa. Thus, náhá contrasts with yaa as indicating both direct and personal (self) justification, as opposed to yaa indirect and non-personal (other) justification. This relationship can be observed in the mapping in Figure 17.11. This would fall under Aikhenvald’s (2004) A3 type, reported versus everything else.

10

Reportive Evidentials

A wide-spread number of African languages appear to have only a single evidential marker, one expressing reportive evidence. These range from Beja, Afar, Chimwiini and Kikae in East Africa to Laal in central Africa to Birom and Sisaala in West Africa. In Beja (Afro-Asiatic, Cushitic), the verb diy-a ‘to say’ has a grammaticalized form een (derived from ‘they said’) that serves as a reportive evidential (Wedekind et al. 2002). This reportive particle “distances [the speaker] from what he reports, disclaims authorship …” (p. 15). Two facts in particular support this claim. First, to express literally ‘they said’ a different form of ‘say’ is used: idiin (Wedekind 2006:122). Second, the grammaticalized form may follow its literal counterpart—idiin een ‘they said REP’ (Wedekind et al. 2002). The example in (57) illustrates its use.

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table 17.10 Supyire evidential particles

Form Source of knowledge Epistemic justification náhá

yaa

Self Self Other (Reliable) Other (Unreliable)

Direct–participative Indirect–inferential Direct–authoritive Indirect–reportive (hearsay)

figure 17.13 Mapping of Supyire as direst vs. indirect justification

(57) tak ii-fi een man he-was rep ‘there was a man, they say’ (Wedekind et al. 2002:15) In the related and nearby Cushitic language Afar, the particle ‘yan, derived from a cognate ‘say’ verb (’y-a-n say-IMPV-they), occurs as a sentence-final mark of unwitnessed or reported events (Longacre 1990:17). yo-k eweq,’ kaa-k (58) ‘k’ abba ko-h agdiy-e li-yo-k your father you-to pay-inf will-I-because me-from come+out him-to y-e xce ’yan he-pfv-say rep ‘‘I’ll pay you for your father, so come out of me,’ he said to him, it is said’ (Bliese & Genat 1991:316) Kikae (Niger-Congo, Bantu G.43c) and Chimwiini (Niger-Congo, Bantu G412), two varieties of Swahili, both have a similar sentence-initial reportive particle ati (derived from a-ti 3S-thus). Racine-Issa (2002:268 fn. 11) notes that, “Ati indique que le locuteur se distancie des propos qu’ il rapporte”, echoed by Kisseberth and Abasheikh (2004:34) “a way of suggesting that something is true but disclaiming or avoiding responsibility for the truth [of] the statement”.

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The examples in (59) and (60) illustrate the use of ati in Kikae. The speaker of (59) has just come from hearing subjects reporting to the king about the presence of a large snake in their village. Similarly, in (60) the king has just told the speaker that there is a fierce lion in Kirijo, which the speaker is now communicating to his wife. (59) Ati ku-wa joka iko ev 17-be snake there ‘Il parait qu’il y a un gros serpent là-bas …’ (Racine-Issa 2002:305) [‘It appears that there is a large snake over there …’] (60) E yulya mfalme alyonyitia ati kuwa jisimba Kilijo lina-lya dem DIS 1.king 2.5.1.call.app.f ev 17.be aug.lion K. 5.pst-eat wathu. 2.people ‘Le roi m’a convoqué parce qu’à Kirijo il y aurait un lion féroce qui dévorerait le gens’ (Ibid. 301) [‘The king summoned me because at Kirijo there is a fierce lion that is eating people.’] The example in (61) illustrates the reportive use of ati in Chimwiini. It also appears to have an epistemic modal sense, as in (62). (61) atí wé nakuḻawa kazi:ni rep 2s pr.come_out work.loc ‘I heard that you are quitting your job’ (Kisseberth & Abasheikh 2004:34) (62) ati Hamaḏi ilé rep H. went ‘is it true that Hamadi went?’ Laal (Unclassified), like the previous cases, has a simple reportive marker mɨ́. Boyeldieu (1982:125) states that “… par l’emploi de ce morpheme le locuteur insiste sur le fait qu’il n’engage pas sa parole dans l’ énoncé qu’ il profère, mais qu’il rapporte un bruit ou une rumeur … dont il ne peut témoigner par luimême.” [‘… by use of this morpheme, the speaker emphasizes the fact that he is not committing himself to the assertion, but that he is reporting hearsay or a rumor …’]

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(63) ʔà mɨ́ ká:w ɲàáw ɗā:r il rep construire case.con de_lui ‘il paraît que … il construit sa case’ (Boyeldieu 1982:126) This particle “… mɨ́ apparaît exclusivement à l’ intérieur d’ une proposition dépendente introduite elle-même par le jonctif mɨ́ ‘(dire) que’.” [‘… mɨ́ appears exclusively within a dependent proposition introduced, itself, by the connective mɨ́ ‘(say) that’’] (Ibid. 126) (64) mɨ́ rã:g yì mɨ́ jà:nà (dire).que pluie emph rep chaser.lui ‘(on dit) que c’est la pluie qui l’a fait fuir’ (Ibid. 127) In Birom (Niger-Congo, Plateau), what can be considered a reported speech marker, wɔ́ kɔ, introduces indirect speech as well as indicating hearsay (64). Bouquiaux (1970:455) notes that “[o]n est alors fondé à traduire wɔ́ kɔ par “on dit que, on rapporte que”, expression verbale qui se serait figée par la suite comme conjonctif.” [“One is, in that case, justified in translating wɔ́ kɔ as “they say, it is reported that”, a verbal expression that would subsequently be frozen as a conjunctive.”] (65) jɛ̀ŋ-dɛ̀ ba-sɛ kyá wɔ́ kɔ hwey hak ha-wɔ́ -gyɛŋ temps-que ils-a.trouver feu on_dit_que enfant certain il-aller-paître nyi é hey buffles dans brousse ‘jadis, on trouva le feu grâce à un jeune garçon qui était aller garder les buffles en brousse’ (Bouquiaux 1970:455) [‘once, fire was found, they say, by a young boy who had gone to graze buffalo in the bush’] (66) è.yímó rà:nɛ wɔ́ kɔ bimat bà-ká:na-ré pyɛ́ vyɛn il_y_a longtemps on_dit_que hommes ils-??-manger aliments crus ‘il y a longtemps de celà, les hommes ont mangé leurs aliments crus’ (Ibid. 456) [‘a long time ago, it is said, men ate their food raw’] Discussion and description of these reportive evidentials is not extensive or detailed in any of these cases. Whether their evidential function is the only, or primary, function is never indicated. In a different vein, Hill (1995) describes reportive marking encoded in pronouns in Adioukrou (Niger-Congo, Kwa). Thus, there is a special third person, - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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singular pronoun, in, used when reporting secondhand information. Use of an independent pronoun li instead imparts a modal quality of certainty to the information. (67) Fufuɛ in eb in ɛlu ɛl es Houphout 3s.rp took.ac 3s.rp let_go 3p.o pfv ‘(According to what they say,) Houphouet set us free.’ (Hill 1995:95) (68) Jej dad eke in b’ow in ow J. said that 3s.rp fut 3s.rp come ‘Jeji said that hej reportedly/supposedly will come.’ (Ibid. 94) And in Ga and Akan (Niger-Congo, Kwa), Ameka (2004:21) reports that there has occurred grammaticalization of specialist structures for “rumour-mongering”. These structures “… keep the source of the information vague or impersonal and attribute it to a group of unidentified people.” And they include “the denial of responsibility on the part of the speaker or reporter for what is being said.” In Ga, the construction is a-kɛ a-kɛ (69), in Akan, yɛ-se yɛ-see (70), a grammaticalized first-person plural form that means “they said; it is said”. (69) Ga a-kɛ a-kɛ … 4-qt 4-qt ‘they say [that] …’ (Ameka 2004:21) (70) Akan a. yɛ-se yɛ-see Kofi awu 1p-say 1p-said K. die.pfv ‘it is rumored that Kofi has died/is dead’ (Samuel Obeng, p.c.) b. Kofi se yɛ-se yɛ-see Yaw kɔ K. say 1p-say 1p-said Y. leave. pfv ‘Kofi says it was (being) rumored that Yaw had left’ The most detailed discussion concerning a “reportive” marker in an African language is that of Blass (1989, 1990) in describing the particle rɛ́ in the BurkinaFaso variety of Sisaala (Niger-Congo, Gur). Blass indicates that there are, in fact, two uses of rɛ́: (1) as a complementizer, and (2) as a sentence-final particle. Each has different functions associated with it; nevertheless, Blass proposes that rɛ́,

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in both cases, functions to indicate “to the hearer that the utterance … is interpretively used (Blass 1990:104).” As a complementizer, rɛ́ functions to introduce both direct and indirect speech; in fact, it is the main indicator of such reported speech. It may also be “used in constructions embedded under such verbs as ‘believe’, ‘think’, ‘hope’, ‘want’, and so on” (Blass 1989: 306). With a verb of cognition such as ‘think’, it changes the meaning to ‘assume’; with a verb of perception such as ‘see’, it changes the sense to a cognitive act, ‘come to understand’. Finally, it may occur without a verb of saying, if that verb is understood in context. Particle rɛ́ has a much different distribution and set of functions. It is sentence-final. Although it may be used to indicate hearsay (71) or general cultural wisdom (72), it may also indicate the speaker’s attitude toward a proposition expressed, but does not necessarily express a weakened commitment to it or even indicate hearsay (73B). (71) Náŋá sʊsɛ. Ɓa kaa konni yo ta rɛ́ some died they took cut throw leave im ‘Some died; they were untied and left there, it is said.’ (Blass 1990: 306) (72) Ɓa sɛ ʊ́ ká lútí é rí amá … they say it is medicine f im but ‘It is said that it [the chameleon] is medicine …’ (Ibid. 313) (73) A:

B:

Ɓa dʊla á wérí … they this_year done well ‘They have done well this year …’ (Ibid. 313) Ɓa ɓıɛ́ná á werí é rí they really done well f im ‘They have really done well.’

Two other functions associated with particle rɛ́ are its use “as a question marker, either in yes-no questions or together with question words like ‘how’, ‘what’, ‘where’, and sometimes in their answers”, and explicitly supporting an implicature from a previous utterance, as in (74). (74) A:

Ɓa nɛ́ pɔ́wɔ́ ná kaa lɛ ɓa-á kaa lí they dm gather_them there take leave they-impv take leave tá … leave

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‘They [ants] gather them [grains] and take them out and leave them there …’ (Ibid. 315) B:

E! cuŋcumó tʊŋ rɛ́! eh ants work im ‘Eh! Ants work!’

In addition to its use as a reportive (hearsay) marker, rɛ́ “may also be used in clauses based on inference rather than on perception or hearsay,” when introduced by the expression ʊ nɛhɛ́ ‘it seems’ (75). (75) Ʊ sıɛ́ nɛhɛ̃ anɛ rí Luk má kó ráŋ rɛ́. it so seems like comp L. also come here im ‘It seems as if Luc has also arrived.’ [inference drawn from visual evidence] (Ibid. 316) For these reasons, Blass labels rɛ́ an interpretive marker (IM), and not an evidential marker, following the work of Sperber and Wilson (1986), proposing that complementizer and interpretive rɛ́s constitute the same grammatical element. This seems doubtful, synchronically, even if they come historically from the same source. Yet, clearly, evidentiality is not the primary function of rɛ́. Unlike Blass, McGill et al. (1999), describing the Pasaale variety of Sisaala, analyze rɛ́ as a focus marker—“marking new information or old information in a new light”—noting that it is the third most frequent word in the language, used in a wide-variety of linguistic environments. Of relevant interest is that it does not occur as a complementizer, that role being handled by di instead. Nonetheless, there are examples in which rɛ́ appears to function like an evidential marker. However, it seems to indicate the speaker’s direct eyewitness justification rather than indirect reported information, as in the Burkina Faso variety. As an example, in (76) the first sentence would be appropriate when the speaker had just witnessed the boy hurt himself, while the second would be appropriate at some later time in reporting the event (nɛ is a phonological variant of rɛ). (76) a. Biye hu ŋmaa u naaŋ. child the beat his leg ‘The boy has hit his leg.’ (McGill et al. 1999: 179) b. Biye hu ŋmaa u naaŋ nɛ. ‘The boy hit his leg.’

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In (77), if the speaker is reporting this for the first time, rɛ must be used. If this is something both participants are aware of, then rɛ is optional. (77) Ba ko (rɛ) di i tuwo. they come re and 2s to_be_not_there ‘They came and you weren’t there.’ (Ibid. 179) Although rɛ generally only occurs in clauses that are past or present, it can also occur in a future clause, where it occurs with a modal sense of certainty, as in (78). (78) Ŋ si mu rɛ. I fut go re ‘[it is certainly the case that] I will go.’ The range of functions of particle rɛ́ in Sisaala, regardless of dialect differences, demonstrates that it is not simply a reportive evidential marker, though that clearly is one of its functions. If reportive markers are considered to have marking reported speech or hearsay (including general cultural knowledge) as their main function, then rɛ́ would not be included as an evidential, but would be more appropriately considered an evidential strategy.

11

Evidentials Encoded as Complementizers

Evidential marking is, in a number of languages, encoded in complementizers. Four languages—Shangaci (Niger-Congo, Bantu), Mupun (Afro-Asiatic, Chadic), Engenni (Niger-Congo, Edoid), and Kinyarwanda (Niger-Congo, Bantu)—exhibit this kind of strategy. 11.1 Shangaci (Niger-Congo, Bantu P.312) Shangaci (Bantu P.312), a variety of Makhuwa resulting from contact with Swahili, appears to be developing reportive evidentials as complementizers (Devos & Bostoen 2012). The quotative verb -ira (derived from the Proto-Bantu verb for ‘do’) is typically used to introduce direct quotes. However, its functions with a “speech” meaning appear to be rather limited. Rather, it occurs with a variety of other functions, one of which is “… an evidential strategy indicating that a given statement is based on reported evidence” (Ibid. 111). In a passive form with a 3rd singular prefix, eriwa indicates that the proposition is based on hearsay (79) or common cultural knowledge (80).

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(79) eriwa piíp’ aafu a-ir-iw-a pipi a-fw-u sc1-qv-pass-pfv np1a.grandmother sc1-die-pfv ‘Allegedly, my grandmother died’ (Devos and Bostoen 2012:111) (80) eriwa ngaása nisala niímuúca a-ir-iw-a ngasa ni-sal-a ni-i-mu-c-a sc1-qv-pass-pfv np1a.tortoise sc 1P-remain- pfv sc1P-cons-oc1-eat-fv ‘So, the tortoise, we should never eat it.’ (Ibid. 111) Following the verb -siila ‘hear’, there exists a contrast between the passive and non-passive forms of the infinitive of -ira acting as complementizers, the former indicating unreliable hearsay (81a), the latter more reliable (81b). (81) a. kanttósíla wiíríwá maám’ áafu o-ir-iw-a mama a-fw-u ki-a-ntto-siil-a sc1-pst-go-hear-fv np15- qv-pass-inf np1a-mother sc1-die-pfv ‘I heard it being said that my mother had died …’ (Ibid. 112) wírá khafwéeni b. masi kisili o-ir-a kha-a-fw-eni masi ki-siil-i but sc1S-hear-pfv np15-qv-inf neg-sc1-die-pfv ’ooxipírítaáli … a-aa o-xipiritali sc1-be np17- np9.hospital ‘but then I heard that she did not die; she is in hospital …’ (Ibid. 112) 11.2 Mupun (Afro-Asiatic, Chadic) Mupun has a complentizer nə that can be used with any verb of mental activity, especially verbs of saying, as well as a few other verbs (Frajzyngier 1993). In fact, it may be used without an explicit verb of saying present. Frajzynger proposes that use of the complementizer nə̄ following verbs of perception indicates that the speaker has indirect evidence for the assertion, that the event has not been directly witnessed. Thus, a sentence with matrix verb such as naa ‘see’, as in (82), indicates inference from result, whereas that in (83), without nə̄, simply describes actual seeing. wu ta n-yil (82) n-naa nə 1s-see comp 3m fall prep-ground ‘I saw that he fell down.’ [inferential evidence] (Frajzyngier 1993:452)

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(83) n-naa a can əh 1s-see 2m slaughter goat ‘I saw you slaughter a goat’ [actual seeing] (Ibid. 453) (84) n-naa nə a can əh 1s-see comp 2m slaughter goat ‘I thought that you slaughtered a goat’ (Ibid. 453) With the verb kləŋ ‘hear’, as in (85), occurrence of nə requires the sentence to be interpreted as hearsay. Without the complementizer (86), the sentence simply describes actual hearing. (85) wu kləŋ nə n-taa n-yil 3m hear comp 1s-fall prep-ground ‘he heard that I fell down’ [only hearsay interpretation] (86) wu kləŋ n-taa n-yil 3m hear 1s-fall prep-ground ‘he heard me fall down’ [actual hearing] With verbs of perception, nə indicates doubt as to the reliability of the information as a corollary of the indirect evidence. With verbs of saying, only nə occurs (Ibid. 454), which would logically follow if, in fact, it marks reportive evidence. table 17.11 Mupun reportive evidential

Particle Source of knowledge Epistemic justification Ø nə

Self (visual) Other (auditory)

Indirect–inferential (w/verb ‘see’) Indirect–reportive (w/verb ‘hear’)

11.3 Engenni (Niger-Congo, Edoid) na vs. ga The situation in Engenni is similar to that in Mupun with respect to use of a complementizer. However, in Engenni, the contrast in evidential justification is restricted to the verb syiene ‘hear’ (Thomas 1978). According to her (p. 44), “the particle ga indicates that the report is secondhand, in contrast to the clauseintroducer na … which indicates that the report is firsthand.” (87)

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evidentiality in african languages table 17.12 Engenni evidential particles

Particle Source of knowledge Epistemic justification na ga

Self Other

Direct (auditory) Indirect–reportive

figure 17.14 Mapping of Engenni evidential complementizers

(87) a. ò syiene ga o nò yìa he hear SP it INC come ‘he heard that it was coming.’ (somebody told him) (Thomas 1978:44) b. ò syiene na ạ̀ fèni nà bho he hear cock INC crow ‘he heard a cock crowing.’ (Ibid. 48) With verbs of speaking, only ga may occur, as in (88). However, its use is optional, as illustrated in (89), or the verb of speaking may be omitted, as in (90). (88) à í weì ga ò za ni ênià ga á ta na ko they seq say sp it stay cpl thus sp they should-go to call ọtwàì antelope ‘they said that, if so, they should go and call antelope’ (Ibid. 43) (89) ạ̀ libò tyi ga ọ̀ kí wu nù tortoise shout sp he die cpl ‘tortoise shouted that he was ruined’ [Lit. that he had died] (Ibid. 42) (90) ạ̀ libò ga ọ̀ kí dhị dhụ âvụ̀ àvụ̀ a tortoise sp he not_eat never one one even ‘tortoise [said] that he would never eat a single one’ (Ibid. 43) In sum, Engenni contrasts an indirect reportive complemetizer ga with a direct complemen-tizer na. The former occurs with verbs of speaking and/or hearing.

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11.3 Kinyarwanda (Niger-Congo, Bantu JE.61) Givón and Kimenyi (1974) describe three different complementizers in Kinyarwanda—ko, ngo, and kongo—associated with epistemic value. However, it is more appropriate to separate these into two elements, ko and ngo. The particle ko is a complementizer that, itself, is neutral and expresses no epistemic characteristics (91). ko a-zaa-z-a (91) a. y-a-vuze 3s-pst-say.pfv comp 3s-rmfut-come-fv ‘s/he said that s/he’ll come’ [and I have nothing to add] (Givón & Kimenyi 1974:101) kó n-dwaayé b. ba-zi 2s-know comp 1s-be_sick.pfv ‘they know that I am sick’ (Jacob 1987:231) The particle ngo can follow ko, as in (92), where it acts as a hearsay evidential as well as contributing a sense of doubt about the reliability of the proposition reported; in Boye’s terms, it indicates only partial support for the assertion. (92) yavuze ko ngo azaaza rep ‘s/he said s/he’ll come’ (Givón & Kimenyi 1974:101) [so I heard, though I have reasons to doubt it (i.e., that s/he will)] Note that ngo can contribute the reportive evidential reading, as well as doubt, without a verb of saying, as the examples in (93) illustrate. Jacob (1987: 394) states that ngo attributes the proposition “à autrui”, translated as ‘il paraît que’ or ‘on dit que’. (93) a. ngo a-ra-rwáaye rep 3s-foc-be_sick-pfv ‘il paraît qu’il est malade’ (Jacob 1987:394) b. ngo a-raa-z-a rep 3s-foc -come-fv ‘il viendra, paraît-il’ (Overdulve 1975:247)

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And ngo may occur alone without complemetizer ko, as in (94), in which case it indicates greater doubt about the reliability of the proposition asserted. It also appears to indicate Authoritive justification trusted by the speaker. (94) yavuze ngo azaaza rep ‘s/he said s/he’ll come’ [though from my own sources I doubt it (i.e., that s/he will)] (Givón & Kimenyi 1974:101) The particle ngo may also occur in a diverse variety of other constructions, much like rɛ in Sisaala. Thus, its reportive evidential function appears to be one possiblility among many. For this reason, it may be appropriate not to consider ngo a true reportive evidential, as it is not clear that evidentiality is its primary function. These cases with so-called evidential complementizers would appear, in several instances, to be cases of evidential strategies, and not truly grammatical evidential markers, for which expressing evidentiality is the primary function.

12

Evidential (Hedging) Strategies

12.1 Say Constructions as Evidential Strategies There are undoubtedly many African languages that have ‘say’ verbs used to indicate hearsay evidence, much as in English with ‘they say’ or ‘it is said’, or, for example, in So (Kuliak) (95). However, such lexical expressions do not constitute reportive evidentials. Longacre (1990:61), moreover, notes that “the use of ‘say’ as a disclaimer could be added probably to every language here mentioned.” (95) So (Kuliak) ti-ak ka-ga-u iskʷet kebe tar ija ka-nɛkɛ legtet say-imps pst-go-it long_ago girls to place pst-be type_of_fruit ‘It is said that long ago girls went to a place where there was legtet.’ (Carlin 1993:196) 12.2 Quotatives Quotative verbs, what Güldemann (2008) calls Quotative Indexes, have also been associated with evidential reportive functions in some languages. “In Africa, the evidential use of QIs is particularly common and fairly routinized in languages of the Ethiopian Plateau … representing the major genealogical

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groups Cushitic, Omotic, and Ethiosemitic …” (Ibid. 408). For example, in Ik (Kuliak) one finds “… the impersonal perfective from the quotative verb kut used as a hearsay evidential phrase …”, as in (96). However, “the primary function is to report actual speech”. (96) a kut-an-a koto taa … ?that say-1p-pfv then q ‘It is said that …’ (Güldemann 2008: 408) Güldemann (2008: 409) points out that, for example, in Kunama (NiloSaharan??) one finds “… an element nke, the 3rd-person plural perfective form of the quotative verb u, as a hearsay evidential …” and that in Tigre (AfroAsiatic, Semitic) one finds “… some form of the generic speech verb bela …, namely ləblo ‘they say’ (3rd-person masculine plural non-past) and lətbahal ‘it is said’ (3rd-person masculine singular passive non-past) as a hearsay evidential.” However, it is not clear that these constitute reportive evidentials as a grammatical phenomenon; rather, they are suggestive of general, and wide-spread, evidential strategies. 12.3 Logophoric Pronouns as Evidential Hedging Strategies Logophoric pronouns are special pronouns that are used to refer to that individual whose speech, thoughts, or perceptions are reported (Dimmendaal 2001, quoting Clements). They are found throughout the Niger-Congo and NiloSaharan phyla. These occur invariably with a reported speech marker (or complementizer) of some kind, one often derived from a verb ‘say’. Thus, we find in Moru (Nilo-Saharan, Central Sudanic) examples such as those in (97). (97) a. ndáā ɛ̀cɛ̀ yī àdrávʊ́ rʊ́ he saying log ill as ‘Hei said that hei was ill.’ (Dimmendaal 2001: 133) b. ndáā ɛ̀cɛ̀ (ndánā) ɛ̄rɔ́ he saying 3s came ‘Hei said that hej came.’ Dimmendaal (2001:135) claims, then, that “logophoricity in tandem with quoted speech marking operates as an evidential hedging strategy”. That is, although use of logophoric marking is primarily to disambiguate reference, “… evidential hedging and expression of the fact that the narrated material is attributed to another speaker being additional important motivations behind

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the use of logophoric marking in discourse” (Heath 1999:139, commenting on logophoricity in Koyra Chiini (Nilo-Saharan??, Songhay)) Logophoric markers put important constraints on the search for relevance, when the speaker presents his point of view concerning the mental state of others, e.g., in reporting on the mental activities of a third person not participating in the speech event. In this sense, they are exponents of the cognitive coding of epistemology, more specifically of evidential hedging strategies. Dimmendaal 2001:156

Speaking of Kiyra Chiini, Heath (1999:328) states, … logophoric pronouns have the function of continuously marking the narrated material as being attributed to another speaker, i.e., as hearsay for which the current speaker does not personally vouch. Of course, it is the initial quotative predication (‘Grandpa said …’) that most directly establishes this deniability, but logophoric pronouns are the only grammatical forms which sustain it throughout the narrative.

13

In Conclusion

We have observed in the preceding discussion that there are at least a few languages in Africa that can be said to have true evidential systems. Apart from those few, there is a rather large number that exhibit evidential strategies of various kinds, apart from simply saying the equivalent of “they say” or “it is said”. From these findings, we are led to infer that the grammatical category of evidentiality may, indeed, not be widespread in Africa. As there are some 2,000 languages in Africa, however, most of which are relatively undescribed, future research may find otherwise.

Abbreviations APP AUG COMP CON COND

applicative augmentative complementizer connector conditional

CONS CPL DEF DEM DET

consecutive completive definite demonstrative determiner

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498 DeTR DM EMPH ERG EV EX-DU F FUT FV GEN H IM IMPS IMPV INC INDEF INF INTR IT LOC LOG M N1, N2 NEG NP OBJ OC PASS PERS PF

botne detransitivized discourse marker emphatic ergative evidential exclusive dual feminine future final vowel genitive human interpretive marker impersonal imperfective incompletive indefinite infinitive intransitive itive locative logophoric masculine noun class negative noun class prefix object object concord passive persistive perfect

PFV PL POSS PR PREP PROG PST Q QT QV REC REF REL REP RM RmFUT RP SC SER SEQ SG SP SUP T TEL TOP TR 1S, 2S … 1P, 2P …

perfective plural possessive present preposition progressive past question quotative quotative verb recent past referential relativiser reportive remote past remote future reporting pronoun subject concord serial verb connective sequential singular speech particle suppositional transitive telic topic transitivizer first person singular, … first person plural, …

References Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2003. Evidentiality in typological perspective. In Studies in Evidentiality, A.Y. Aikhenvald (ed.), Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Pp. 15–45. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2014. “The grammar of knowledge: A cross-linguistic view of evidentials and the expression of information source.” In The Grammar of Knowl-

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edge: A Cross-Linguistic Typology, A.Y. Aikhenvald and R.M.W. Dixon (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–52. Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2015. “Evidentiality and information source.” This volume, pp. 19–40. Ameka, Felix K. 2004. “Grammar and cultural practices: The grammaticalization of triadic communication in West African languages.” The Journal of West African Languages 2: 5–28. Bamgboṣe, Ayọ. 1986. “Reported speech in Yoruba.” In Direct and Indirect Speech, F. Coulmas (ed.). Berlin, New York, and Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter. Pp. 77–98. Blass, Regina. 1989. Grammaticalisation of interpretive use: The Case of rέ in Sisaala. Lingua 79:299–326. Blass, Regina. 1990. Relevance Relations in Discourse, A Study with Special Reference to Sisaala. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bliese, Loren, and Yvonne Genat. 1991. “A discourse analysis of Afar narrative.” Journal of Afroasiatic Languages 2, 3:297–317. Botne, Robert. 1995. The pronominal origin of an evidential, Diachronica 12,2: 201–221. Botne, Robert. 1997. Evidentiality and epistemic modality in Lega. Studies in Language 21, 3:509–532. Bouquiaux, Luc. 1970. La langue birom: Phonologie, morphologie, syntaxe. Paris: Société d’Édition “Les Belles Lettres”. Boye, Kasper. 2012. Epistemic Meaning: A crosslinguistic and functional-cognitive study. Berlin & Boston: Mouton de Gruyter. Boyeldieu, Pascal. 1982. Deux études laal (Moyen-Chari, Tchad). Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag. Carlin, Eithne. 1993. The So Language. Köln: Institut für Afrikanistik. Carlson, Robert. 1994. A Grammar of Supyire. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. de Haan, Ferdinand. 2013. Coding of Evidentiality. In M.S. Dryer and M. Haspelmath (eds.), The World Atlas of Language Structures Online. Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. (Available online at http://wals.info/chapter/78, Accessed on 2014-07-07.) DeLancey, Scott. 1997. “Mirativity: The grammatical marking of unexpected information.” Linguistic Typology 1:33–52. DeLancey, Scott. 2001. “The mirative and evidentiality.” Journal of Pragmatics 33:369– 382. Devos, Maud. 2008. “More evidence for evidentialtiy in Bantu languages.” Talk presented at the Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale, Tervuren, Belgium, March 21. Devos, Maud, and Koen Bostoen. 2012. “Bantu DO/SAY polysemy and the origins of a quotative in Shangaci.” Africana Linguistica 18: 97–132. Dimmendaal, Gerrit J. 2001. “Logophoric marking and represented speech in African languages as evidential hedging strategies.” Australian Journal of Linguistics, 21,1:131– 157. - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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Frajzyngier, Zygmunt. 1993. A Grammar of Mupun. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Frawley, William. 1992. Linguistic Semantics. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. Gívon, Talmy, and Alexandre Kimenyi. 1974. “Truth, belief, and doubt in Kinyarwanda.” In Papers from the fifth Annual Conference on African Linguistics, Wil Leben (ed.) (Studies in African Linguistics, Supplement 5). Pp. 95–114. Güldemann, Tom. 2008. Quotative Indexes in African Languages: A Synchronic and Diachronic Study. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Heath, Jeffrey. 1999. A Grammar of Koyra Chiini. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Hill, Harriet. 1995. “Pronouns and reported speech in Adioukrou.” Journal of West African Languages XXV.1: 87–106. Jacob, Irénée. 1987. Dictionnaire Rwandaise-Français (Tome second). Kigali: Institut National de Récherche Scientifique. Kisseberth, Charles W. and Mohammad Imam Abasheikh. 2004. The Chimwiini Lexicon Exemplified. Tokyo: Research Institute for Languages and cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA), Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. König, Christa. 2013. “Source of information and unexpected information in !Xun— Evidential, mirative, and counterexpectation markers.” In Perception and Cognition in Language and Culture, A.Y. Aikhenvald and A. Storch (eds.). Leiden: Brill. Pp. 69– 94. Lecarme, Jacqueline. 2003. Nominal tense and evidentiality. In Tense and Point of View, J. Guéron and L. Tasmovski (eds.). Paris: Presses de l’Université de Nanterre. Leslau, Wolf. 2000. Introductory Grammar of Amharic. Wiesbaden: Harrassowicz Verlag. Longacre, Robert E. 1990. Storyline Concerns and Word Order Typology in East and West Africa (Studies in African Linguistics, Supplement 10). McGill, Stuart, Samuel Fembeti, and Mike Toupin. 1999. A Grammar of Sisaala-Pasaale. Tamale, Ghana: Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana. Miller, Cynthia L. and Leoma G. Gilley. 2007. “Evidentiality and mirativity in Shilluk.” In Advances in Nilo-Saharan Linguistics (Proceedings of the 8th Nilo-Saharan Linguistics Colloquium), D.L. Payne and M. Reh (eds.). Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag. Pp. 191– 206. Nurse, Derek. 2008. Appendix 1 to Tense and Aspect in Bantu. Downloaded from https:// www.africamuseum.be/fr/research/discover/publications/open‑access/document s‑social‑sciences‑humanities. Overdulve, C.M. 1975. Apprendre la langue Rwanda. The Hague: Mouton. Palmer, Frank. 2001. Mood and Modality. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Park, Jinho. 2015. “Evidential and/or mirative components of some verbal endings and periphrastic constructions in Korean.” This volume, pp. 399–411.

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Plungian, Vladimir A. 1988. “Resultative and apparent evidential in Dogon.” In Typology of Resultative Constructions, V.P. Nedjalkov (ed.) and B. Comrie (ed. of English translation). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Pp. 481–493. Plungian, Vladimir A. 2010. “Types of verbal evidentiality marking: An overview.” In Linguistic Realization of Evidentiality in European Languages, G. Diewald and E. Smirnova (eds.). Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Pp. 15–58. Plungian, Vladimir A. and Johan van der Auwera. 2006. “Towards a typology of discontinuous past marking.” Sprachtypologie und Universalienforschung 59:317–349. Racine-Issa, Odile. 2002. Description du Kikae, Parler Swahili du sud de Zanzibar. Leuven & Paris: Éditions Peeters. Reintges, Chris H. 2014. The inferential evidential in Sahidic Coptic. Paper presented at the Workshop on Empirical Evidence for Evidentiality (January 9–10), Radboud University, Nijmegen. Serzisko, Fritz. 1987. “The verb ‘to say’ in Ik (Kuliak).” Afrikanistische Arbeitspapiere 11: 67–91. Sperber, Daniel and Deirdre Wilson. 1986. Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell. Storch, Anne. 2006. “Aspect and evidentiality in Luwo.” In Insights into Nilo-Saharan Language, History and Culture (Proceedings of the 9th Nilo-Saharan Linguistics Colloquium), A. Abu-Manga, L. Gilley, and A. Storch (eds.). Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag. Pp. 393–402. Storch, Anne, and Jules Jacques Coly. 2014. “The grammar of knowledge in Maaka (Western Chadic, Nigeria).” In The Grammar of Knowledge: A Cross-Linguistic Typology, A.Y. Aikhenvald and R.M.W. Dixon (eds). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 190–207. Thomas, Elaine. 1978. A Grammatical Description of the Engenni Language. Arlington, Texas: SIL and the University of Texas. van der Wal, Guenever Johanna. 2009. Word order and information structure in Makhuwa-Enahara. Ph.D. dissertation. Universiteit Leiden. Waag, Christine. 2010. The Fur Verb and its Context. Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag. Wedekind, Klaus. 2006. “Beja narratives: Pursuit of participants and analysis of aspects.” Ethnorema II, 2: 101–127. Wedekind, Klaus and Charlotte, and Abuzaynab Musa. 2002. “RRG universal verb classes vs. Beja verb classifications based on morphologies and textual functions.” Paper presented at the RRG Conference, University of La Rioja, Logroño, Spain. Wicks, Douglas Allen. 2006. A partial grammar sketch of Lunyole with emphasis on the applicative construction. M.A. thesis, Biola University. Willet, Thomas. 1988. “A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evidentiality.” Studies in Language 12: 51–97.

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chapter 18

Breaking the Illusion of Modality: Reclassifying Japanese darou Marisa Nagano and William McClure

1

Interpretations of darou

1.1 Introduction The Japanese word darou (/daɺo:/) is often analyzed as an epistemic modal with a meaning roughly equivalent to English “probably.” A typical example is: (1) Noriko-ga paatii-ni kuru darou Noriko-nom party-to come darou ‘Probably, Noriko will come to the party.’ Hara (2006) defines darou with a truth-conditional modal analysis based on Kratzer (1991) (p = proposition): The modal meaning of p-darou: a. Quantificational Domain: possible worlds which are compatible with the speaker’s non-observable reasoning b. Quantificational force: more than 50 % (plikelihood > ¬ plikelihood) Hara cites a previous analysis by Masuoka (1991) giving darou a quantificational force of 50%-80% certainty, closer in line with English “probably.” However, she expands this quantificational force to > 50%, noting that darou may appear in the same sentence with the free-standing modal adverb kitto (“certainly”) and that the “probably” reading is derived from a conversational implicature. However, when darou is put into context, we find that it becomes difficult to assign it a specific quantificational force of any kind. In question-answer discourse, for example, it may be used to express any degree of uncertainty (adapted from Hara 2006: 135): (2) A:

dare-ga paatii-ni kuru? who-nom party-to come ‘Who will come to the party?’

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B:

Noriko-ga kuru darou Noriko-nom come darou ‘Noriko will come (maybe/probably/won’t she?)’

Hara (2006) explains this deviance from darou’s usual quantificational force by alluding to the focus construction involved in the answer, although she admits that the case needs to be studied closer. Takubo (2007) dismisses this same exception before going on to analyze darou as an epistemic modal, claiming that darou can be decoupled from its usual quantificational force to form a “non-epistemic” usage when the sentence contains “a wh-word or a focused constituent in the premise” (Takubo 2007: 441). He gives the following example: (3) A:

B:

Kono natsu nani-o ur-eba ii darou This summer what-acc sell-if good darou ‘What do you think we should sell this summer?’ Eakon-o ur-eba ii darou air.conditioner-acc sell-if good darou ‘I think we should sell air conditioners.’

However, even if it is “focus” resulting from a wh-phrase in the discourse that rids darou of its modality, it still must be explained why this focus would change (or even eliminate) the quantificational force of darou, and where this idea of soliciting a subjective answer (evidenced by the “think” frame), rather than a factual response comes from. Additionally, darou may also be used as tag question in which the speaker seeks confirmation from the hearer: (4) Noriko-ga paatii-ni kuru deshou?1 Noriko-nom party-to come darou ‘Noriko is coming to the party, isn’t she?’ In the context of a tag question, the question of quantificational force seems largely irrelevant. The speaker’s attitude towards the truth of the proposition in this case depends largely on her motivation for using the tag question; for

1 Deshou, the polite variant of darou, is often found in tag-questions, and is used often by female speakers in particular.

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example, reminding the hearer of Noriko’s planned attendance (100 % certain), or seeking confirmation of Noriko’s attendance from the hearer (less certain). One might argue that, when used as a tag question, darou is not being used as a modal at all. However, the fact that darou is not being used as a modal in this particular case raises the question of whether or not it should be treated as a modal in the first place, and, if so, how it escapes modality here. The “exceptions” in (2)–(4) accompany disagreement in the literature about the proper analysis of darou, with some scholars noting uncertainty even amongst native speaker judgments as to the exact quantificational force of darou (Narrog 2009). Still others note that the quantificational force of darou seems less easy to pin down than that of other modals, leading to a view that there are two “versions” of darou: a modal “speculative” darou and an exceptional “non-speculative” darou (Johnson 2003; Masuoka 2007; Narrog 2009). This confusion, as well as the data in (1)–(4), seems to suggest that if darou is a modal, its quantificational force ranges from that of English “maybe” to English “definitely,” or, roughly, 0–100% certainty. This does not make darou a very useful modal. As the exceptions in (2)–(4) all hint at the overarching discourse in which the darou-sentence appears, we intend to argue that darou is in fact not a modal, but instead has a specific pragmatic function, which falls out straightforwardly from its morphological properties. 1.2 Combinations with Modals It is common in the literature on Japanese modals to pair sentence-final modals (like nichigainai, hazu-da, and, ostensibly, darou) in sentences with freestanding modal adverbs (like tabun, or kitto) in order to determine which combinations are judged to be well-formed. It is largely through the combination of darou with modal adverbs that has led to its standard “probably” analysis, the claim being that darou can only successfully combine with modals of a similar quantificational force and not with modals that express either certainty or a high degree of doubt. However, judgments on these modal-darou combinations vary greatly in the literature, and most are made out of context. Hara (2006), for example, uses them as evidence for her semantic definition of darou, as well as its status as a non-propositional modal. Hara presents (5a) and (5b) as largely synonymous, but notes that (5c) is also perfectly allowable: (5) a. ashita kare-ga kuru darou tomorrow he-nom come darou ‘He will come tomorrow-darou.’

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b. tabun ashita kare-ga kuru probably tomorrow he-nom come ‘Probably, he will come tomorrow.’ c. tabun ashita kare-ga kuru darou probably tomorrow he-nom come darou ‘Probably, he will come tomorrow-darou.’ Following Sugimura (2004), Hara then cites the following data on the interaction of sentence-final darou with “probability adverbs.” (6) kare-wa tabun/kitto/*moshikasuruto kuru darou? he-top probably/certainly/maybe come darou ‘Probably/Certainly/*Maybe, he will come-darou.’ Since darou cannot be used with the low-probability moshikasuruto, but can be used with kitto, which expresses certainty, Hara argues that darou indicates a bias toward a proposition; that is, that it has a quantificational force of > 50 %. However, Sugimura (2004) also provides the following examples that contradict the usual “modality scale test” based on items like kitto, tabun, and moshikasuruto: (7) a. ashita-wa {kitto/tabun/osoraku} gakkou-ni iku darou tomorrow-top {certainly/probably/perhaps} school-to go darou ‘{Certainly/probably/perhaps} I/we/you/he/she/it will go to school tomorrow-darou.’ kimi-no koto-ga b. kare-wa {kitto/*kanarazu} he-top {certainly/*certainly} you-gen things-nom suki-nan-deshou like-impl-darou ‘He certainly (kitto)/*certainly (kanarazu) likes you-darou.’ Although darou does not seem to combine well with moshikasuruto (“maybe”), it does combine perfectly well with osoraku (“perhaps”). Furthermore, in (7b) while darou can combine with kitto (“certainly”), it cannot combine with kanarazu, which also means something like “certainly.” Since kitto and kanarazu have the same quantificational force, there must be some other reason why kanarazu does not work with darou in (7b). In response to these conflicting judgments, Sugimura suggests that defining modals in terms of each other is

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circular. He emphasizes that free-standing modal adverbs like tabun (“probably”) and sentence-final items like darou each have their own distinct aspects of meaning, and that these meanings must be understood before modal interactions can be fully explained. It is the interaction of these distinct meanings that causes certain combinations to be infelicitous, but the element of meaning responsible for the mismatch is not necessarily quantificational force (or any other modal element of meaning for that matter). In addition to combining with modal adverbs, darou may also be combined with sentence-final modals; however, as with the free-standing modals, judgments can be quite varied in the literature. Even within the same article, one combination may be given as bad in one sentence while the same combination may be given as good in another sentence. Sugimura (2004) at one point notes that darou, when used as a tag question, can be combined with kamoshirenai “maybe” but not nichigainai “it must be.” (8) a. ashita-wa ame-ga furu kamoshirenai darou tomorrow-top rain-nom fall maybe darou ‘You think maybe it’ll rain tomorrow-darou?’ b. *ashita-wa ame-ga furu nichigainai darou *tomorrow-top rain-nom fall surely darou ‘It’ll surely rain tomorrow, don’t you think-darou?’ Later on, however, Sugimura (2004) also gives us the data set in (9): (9) a. ano-otoko-wa supai darou that-man-top spy darou ‘That man is a spy-darou.’ b. ano-otoko-wa supai kamoshirenai darou darou that-man-top spy maybe ‘That man is perhaps a spy-darou.’ c. ano-otoko-wa supai nichigainai darou darou that-man-top spy must.be ‘That man must be a spy-darou.’ It is true that darou in (9) is not necessarily being used as a tag question, but if the combination of nichigainai and darou is bad in tag-question (8) but not in the non-tag-question in (9), then the mismatch of meaning in (8b) is most

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likely coming from the tag-question usage (or some other source), not from the interaction between the two “modals.” While we may gain some insight into the meaning of darou by looking at its interactions with both modal adverbs and sentence-final adverbs, there are certainly a host of variables at play in the interpretations of such constructions, such as tense, aspect, or specific lexical features of the predicate in question, and/or discourse context. Modal interactions seem to vary from case to case, with judgments varying among different speakers across different contextual situations, providing further evidence that “mismatches” should be examined with a context-based, pragmatic analysis.

2

Morphology of darou

Morphologically, darou is a combination of the copula da, and the bound volitional morpheme -(y)ou.2 No other Japanese modal has a morphological form that is linked exclusively to a specific conjugated verb form in the same way that darou is.3 In fact, many Japanese modals and evidentials use da itself as a vehicle for further conjugation. Hazu da (should), for example, can become hazu datta (should have), hazu janai (should not), or even hazu darou (shoulddarou). Darou, however, by its very nature, must be in the volitional form; otherwise, it is simply the “copula” da. This leaves us with the question of what kind of meaning the volitional form of a copula expresses. The examination of da and -(y)ou in this section will provide further evidence for a pragmatic (rather than modal) analysis, revealing that darou works on a non-propositional, speech act level. Da is usually analyzed as a copula and is more restricted than darou in the syntactic contexts in which it appears. For example, da can only follow predicates that are na-adjectives or nouns, whereas darou may appear after iadjective or verbal predicates as well: (10) a. Noriko-wa tafu/ichinensei da Noriko-top tough/freshman da ‘Noriko is tough/ is a freshman.’

2 Technically, it is a combination of the volitional morpheme and the copular form dearu, identical to da in meaning, but usually found in formal writing and rarely used in speech. 3 Some modals such as kamoshirenai involve verbs conjugated into the negative form, but also the addition of particles (ka, mo).

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b. Noriko-wa tafu/ichinensei darou Noriko-top tough/freshman darou ‘Noriko is tough-darou/is a freshman-darou.’ (11) a. *kono-ringo-wa takai da this-apple-top expensive da ‘This apple is expensive.’ b. kono-ringo-wa takai darou this-apple-top expensive darou ‘This apple is expensive-darou.’ ofuro-ni haitta da (12) a. *Junpei-wa mou Junpei-top already bath-in enter da ‘Junpei already took a bath.’ b. Junpei-wa mou ofuro-ni haitta darou Junpei-top already bath-in enter darou ‘Junpei already took a bath-darou.’ It seems as if there is some extra element of meaning that allows darou to appear in environments in which da cannot. Some authors argue that da, rather than always performing a simple copular function, may also be used to mark a strong assertion (Sugimura 2004; Maynard 1999); however, this “assertive” meaning is not enough of an “extra” meaning to allow the use of the plain copula with an i-adjective or a verb. However, if we adopt this “assertive” interpretation of da, and not the simple copula, as the meaning with which the volitional morpheme is interacting, darou could be considered to express the volitional form of an assertion, acting on a non-propositional, pragmatic level. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that darou almost always has wide scope over a sentence, appearing after any conjugated form of the verb/adjective/copula except for volitional and imperative forms—precisely those forms that involve separate speech acts. Furthermore, the only morphemes that may appear after darou in the linear order of the sentence are non-propositional particles, such as the question marker -ka and the “confirmation” particle ne. Furthermore, this extra-propositional function is reflected in the fact that darou may appear alongside the copula when the copula is in the past tense:

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(13) a. Junpei-wa daigakusei darou Junpei-top college.student darou ‘Junpei is a college student-darou.’ b. Junpei-wa daigakusei da-tta darou Junpei-top college.student be-past darou ‘Junpei was a college student-darou.’ In (13a), the copula da is absent. However, da resurfaces in its past-tense form datta in (13b). Since da varies with ∅ in sentences like (13a) (Sugimura 2004), it seems to be the case that da resurfaces as datta in (13b) in order to support the past tense morpheme -ta. So, in both (13a) and (13b), darou is scoping over the copula. As the volitional form of an assertion marker, darou colors the act of assertion in a way that highlights the roles and the intentions of the discourse participants, landing it firmly in the non-propositional sphere. The volitional morpheme, unlike da, may apply directly to a verb or an iadjective, but the combination of the verb plus darou yields a different meaning. (14) a. issho-ni mori-de sanpo-shi-you together forest-in walk-do-vol ‘Let’s take a walk together in the forest.’ b. issho-ni mori-de sanpo-suru darou together forest-in walk-do darou ‘They’ll probably take a walk together in the forest.’ ‘They’ll take a walk together in the forest, maybe.’ ‘They’ll take a walk together in the forest, won’t they?’ ‘We’ll take a walk together in the forest, won’t we?’ The meanings of (14a) and (14b) are hardly interchangeable. They also demonstrate an important grammatical distinction between the volitional and darou: the former can never occur with a third person subject, while the latter can: (15) a. eiga-o mi-ni ik.ou movie-acc see-to go.vol ‘Let’s go see a movie.’ ‘I shall go see a movie.’

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b. eiga-o mi-ni iku darou movie-acc see-to go darou ‘I/you/he/she/we/they (will) go to the movies-darou.’ We argue that the function of the volitional suffix, in addition to expressing the idea of intention, is to identify the subject of the sentence as first person, either singular or plural. A singular or plural reading can be forced with the addition of words such as hitori-de (“alone”) or issho-ni (“together”), but otherwise the number of the first person subject must be derived from context (16a–c). Furthermore, adding a volitional morpheme can keep a third-person topic phrase from being interpreted as a subject, as in (16d–e). (16) a. eiga-o mi-ni ik.ou movie-acc see-to go.vol ‘Let’s go see a movie.’ ‘I shall go see a movie.’ b. hitori-de eiga-o mi-ni ik.ou alone movie-acc see-to go.vol ‘I shall see a movie alone.’ c. issho-ni eiga-o mi-ni ik.ou together movie-acc see-to go.vol ‘Let’s go see a movie together.’ d. tanaka-san-wa dou suru kana tanaka-Mr.-top what do q ‘(I wonder) what Mr. Tanaka will do.’ e. tanaka-san-wa dou shi-you kana tanaka-Mr.-top what do.vol q ‘What should (we) do about Mr. Tanaka?’ In (16e), the volitional form forces an interpretation in which the subject (agent) of the verb must be the speaker and, potentially, any hearers that may be present, forcing a (null) first person interpretation for a sentence in which a third-person argument is otherwise readily available. A morpheme that forces a first person interpretation but does not specify for a number feature in essence forces an interpretation in which only the conversational participants, and not any other person or thing not present in the conversation, can serve as the

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subject (agent) of the sentence. We are still left, however, with the question of how the properties of da and -(y)ou combine when they are used together in darou. In the following section, we argue that the volitional form of the assertive marker serves to delay predication, for any reason the speaker may see fit.

3

Pragmatic Interpretation of darou

3.1 Delaying Predication Fiengo (2007) examines the use of sentence forms to ask questions in English. Fiengo claims that the forms speakers use to ask questions reflect some sort of incompleteness or a lack that is ultimately met with an answer from the hearer. In the case of English wh-questions, this “lack” is reflected in the use of a sentence-form with a wh-word—the wh-word is an information slot that needs filling. In the case of English yes/no questions, it is the inversion of the subject and auxiliary in (17b) compared to the assertion in (17a) that serves as the counterpart to the wh-word in the wh-question in creating the sense of “incompleteness” inherent to questions in general: (17) a. Jack is fat. b. Is Jack fat? The subject-aux inversion signals a lack of connection or “glue” between subject and predicate—that is, it signals that in a yes/no question, it is the saturation of the predicate itself that is in question. The questioner has the idea of “Jack” and the idea of “fatness,” and wants to know if those two can be put together to make a fully-predicated assertion (Fiengo 2007: 48). Japanese yes/no questions can be analyzed in a similar way to the English ones described above, although an explicit question morpheme rather than inversion puts the connection between argument and predicate in doubt. While darou is not used to form yes/no questions, it does, like the inversion in English questions, reflect a manipulation of an assertion form: the assertive da is morphologically modified into its volitional form. Morphologically speaking, then, a darou-sentence is not quite a yes/no question, nor is it quite an assertion. We hypothesize that darou does indeed block predication, but not in the same way as a yes/no question. Darou reflects the speaker’s intention to saturate the predicate and create an assertion—but the speaker, in using darou, has not done so yet. This use follows from a combination of properties of da and the volitional verb form:

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(i) da is used to make assertions (ii) the volitional is used to highlight the intentions of a 1st person agent; number features of this agent are not specified, so that potentially all (but only) discourse participants are available for agency (iii) darou is used to show that the speaker has the intention of completing predication of (i.e., asserting) a sentence, but is not yet fully committed to doing so, until getting confirmation from the hearer(s) With darou, the volitional aspect of the verb suffix -(y)ou has shifted from the speaker’s intention to do the activity expressed in the matrix verb to the speaker’s intention to saturate the predicate with the argument in order to make an assertion. At the same time, the speaker invites the hearer to assert the proposition as well. Hence, sentences with darou, unlike those with regular volitional verbs, are free to contain a third-person subject, since the third person in the sentence is not the one whose intention is at hand. For example, in (18): (18) ano-otoko-wa supai darou that-man-top spy darou ‘That man is a probably a spy.’ ‘That man is a spy, maybe.’ ‘That man is a spy, isn’t he?’ The intention of “that man” as to whether or not he is planning to be a spy is irrelevant. The relevant intention is that of the speaker towards saturating the predicate—toward making the assertion that “that man” is a spy. The intentionality has shifted to outside of the sentential predication. For this same reason, darou, unlike da, can occur after a verb or an i-adjective. A verb or an i-adjective does not need da in order to be completely predicated (it only needs an argument), but darou is delaying predication, something the verb cannot do on its own. In noun phrases, darou appears alongside the copula itself (both the past-tense copula datta and its zero-morpheme non-past alternation). The copula is present in the sentence in order to do the eventual predication of the proposition. Darou is present in the sentence in order to indicate the intention of that predication upon confirmation from the hearer. Once the hearer has acceded to the proposed assertion, the two parties may continue their conversation/activities as if the assertion has been made. If the hearer does not accede to the assertion, then the assertion is either dropped, or the speaker must argue his/her position more aggressively.

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3.2 The “Multiple” Interpretations of darou The varying interpretations of darou described in Section 1 all out from its properties as described in (iii) above. The “default” interpretation of darou out of context is similar to the English “probably.” That is to say, if the overarching discourse is ignored, the yet-unfilled intention to saturate the predicate comes across as the speaker expressing a modal meaning with a quantificational force of ~50–80%. However, this “quantificational force” is an illusion caused by conversational implicature. Since in using darou the speaker has deliberately chosen not to use an assertion or a question form, she is not completely uncertain about the facts at hand (which would call for a question), nor is she completely certain (which would call for an assertion). The resulting interpretation is akin to the notion in Hara (2006) that p-darou expresses the speaker’s “bias towards p.” However, once the darou sentence is placed within the overarching discourse, this implicature may disappear. For example, if we know enough about the discourse to know that we’re hearing a tag question, the speaker’s certainty towards the proposition becomes completely contextdependent, as mentioned briefly in the discussion of (4) above. Tag questions by their very nature seek hearer input towards the assertion in question, so it seems natural based on the analysis given in Section 4.1 that darou is used for this purpose. This new analysis of darou can also explain why darou may be used in cases in which the speaker’s certainty seems to be absolute, despite the fact that darou expresses the fact that the speaker is hesitant to complete predicate saturation. The key lies in the fact that the speaker may not be motivated by ignorance in his quest to gain confirmation from the hearer before continuing. The example below examines a dialogue between a student and a teacher. (19) Student: ashita, tabun gakkou-ni kimasen tomorrow probably school-to come.not ‘I probably won’t be coming to school tomorrow.’ Teacher: ikenai yo. ashita-wa shiken darou (falling intonation) go.not emp tomorrow- top test darou ‘That’s no good! Tomorrow’s the test-darou.’ The teacher is of course certain about the date of the test, as all test-date decisions lie squarely within his authority. However, he delays saturation of the predicate (test) and argument (tomorrow) so that the student must be the one to put the two together. In this way, the teacher not only reinforces the proposition that the test is tomorrow, but also the fact that the student should have

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remembered as much before deciding to miss class. This analysis of darou also explains its ritualized use in weather forecasts, in which case it is sometimes analyzed (i.e., in introductory Japanese textbooks) as a straightforward future tense: (20) ashita, ame-ga furu deshou tomorrow rain-nom fall darou ‘It will rain tomorrow-darou.’ Because the weather reporter, due to human limitations, may be mistaken despite what the radar is telling him, he delays predication, inviting the audience to make the final conclusion that rain is coming. In doing so, he distances himself from responsibility for what the (unpredictable) weather actually does. We also saw in Section 1 that darou can be used to both ask and answer a question, as in the example from Takubo (2007), repeated here: (3) A:

B:

ur-eba ii darou Kono natsu nani-o This summer what-acc sell-if good darou ‘What do you think we should sell this summer?’ Eakon-o ur-eba ii darou air.conditioner-acc sell-if good darou ‘I think we should sell air conditioners.’

Sentence (3A) is in darou form rather than a question form, despite the fact that it contains a wh-word. In this case, the darou-sentence reads like a selfquestion: “I wonder what we should sell this summer” (or as Takubo glosses it in his paper, “What do you think we should sell this summer”?).4 In this case, the speaker is doing two things: he is seeking an item to “fill in” the wh-word, and he’s delaying assertion until getting some sort of confirmation from the hearer. In doing so, he’s letting the hearer know that he is searching for an answer, but also letting the hearer know that he has no firm expectations of receiving an answer. In this particular case, the hearer provides an answer, but also delays assertion of that answer by once again using darou. When darou is used to answer a question, the speaker may be expressing any degree of cer4 Japanese does not have a single lexical item that corresponds to English “wonder,” and Japanese uses very different strategies to form self-questions. In addition to darou, English “wonder” self-questions may be translated with another sentence-final item kana or by embedding a “whether”-question under “I don’t know.”

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tainty, putting his answer out for evaluation, whether he’s completely unsure (answering A’s self-question with another self-question) or completely certain (“I’ve told you a million times we should sell air conditioners, why don’t you listen?”). In the context of a question-answer dialogue, the “probably” implicature melts away, and the speaker’s certainty becomes a function of the overarching (linguistic and non-linguistic) context. The pragmatic interpretation of darou given in this section unifies all of the “versions” of darou by dismissing the idea that darou is a modal and relegating degree of certainty to context; the degree of certainty may also be further specified linguistically by the addition of an actual modal word or phrase. The fact that darou can be used with a wide range of modals reflects the fact that it is not a modal itself, and as such does not interfere with the quantificational force of any other lexical item. Alleged “mismatches” of modality can be explained by interactions among other sentence variables besides quantificational force, especially context (or lack thereof).

4

Further Evidence

4.1 Use as a Politeness Marker Darou, in its morphologically “polite” form deshou may be used as a marker of politeness; for example, in Kamio (1997)’s Territory of Information Theory, darou is used when the information falls into both the speaker and the hearer’s territory of information, but further into one than into the other. This use easily falls out of the pragmatic analysis of darou given above: the speaker delays predication for fear of being too presumptuous in strongly asserting information over which the hearer also has some authority. In his theory, Kamio (1997) connects evidentiality to politeness by claiming that both overlap partially with territory of information, with evidentiality and territory of information contained completely and politeness contained partially within the heading of modality. How far a piece of information falls into an interlocutor’s territory is determined at least in part by factors associated with evidentiality: internal experience, hearsay, etc. Based on these territories, a speaker decides which forms are used to defer (or not defer) to the hearer, which is a matter of politeness. This mapping is useful in analyzing darou, since in the literature darou usually falls somewhere in between modal and evidential.

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4.2 Darou and Evidentials We have already argued that darou is not a modal, but the connection between darou and evidentials remains to be explored. While darou does not produce consistent grammaticality judgments when combined with other modals, it is almost universally disfavored with evidentials. For example, in Sugimura’s series of examples presented in (21), sentences that attempt to combine darou with an evidential (as opposed to a modal) are marked as unequivocably bad (i.e., given stars instead of question marks, consistently judged to be bad): (21) a. *ano otoko-wa supai-no you darou that-man-top spy-gen seem darou ‘It seems that man is a spy-darou.’ b. *ano otoko-wa supai rashii darou that-man-top spy seem darou ‘It seems that man is a spy-darou.’ There are two ways to analyze this data in light of our interpretation for darou. Either such combinations are bad because darou is an evidential, and mixing two evidentials results in a conflict, or they are bad because the meaning of darou and the meanings of the evidentials youda and rashii result in conflict. When darou is classified as an evidential, it is usually said to mark the speaker’s lack of evidence (Hara 2006; Sugimura 2004). However, the speaker may have several reasons for using darou besides lack of evidence (and, as we have seen, the speaker may not lack evidence at all). The conflict, therefore, must arise from some other aspect of meaning besides an incompatible mixing of “evidentiality.” Johnson (2003) attempts a consensus of previous sources, defining rashii as an evidential “used to represent a speaker’s presumptive judgment that is derived from outside information” (77), and youda as an evidential “used to express a speaker’s supposition based on visual evidence and sensory impressions” (85). In attempting to combine darou with the hearsay-based rashii, we run into an immediate problem. Speakers use rashii to note that the embedded proposition has come from a source outside the speaker. The speaker cannot delay predication of the proposition because the proposition has already been asserted by someone else. This analysis makes the prediction that youda, which is based on the speaker’s own observations, should fare better with darou than rashii. This is, to some extent, true. With youda, the speaker is expressing a conclusion they have reached based on observable evidence. Youda expresses that this conclusion may be wrong, but it is the best conclusion that the speaker

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has at this point. In using youda, the speaker is working his or her way towards expressing a fact. Adding darou at this point weakens this process—the speaker is delaying assertion of a conclusion based on their observable evidence that they hope to assert. However, there is an additional use of you-da used to express metaphors, with which darou seems to be more than compatible. (22) forces different readings of youda with the addition of the adverbs douyara (observational reading) and marude (metaphorical reading) (Johnson 2003, citing Teramura 1984): (22) a. douyara iki-ta sakana-no you-da seems.likely live-perf fish-gen you-cop ‘It looks like a live fish.’ b. marude iki-ta sakana-no you-da as if live-perf fish-gen you-cop ‘It looks as if it were a live fish.’ A quick internet search yields millions of examples of darou combined with metaphorical youda, two of which are cited below: (23) a. sakuranbo-no you-deshou5 cherry- gen you-cop ‘They look like a cherries, don’t they?’ b. mone-no e-no you-deshou6 Monet-gen painting-gen you-cop ‘It looks like a Monet painting, doesn’t it?’ (23a) is accompanied by a photograph of cherry-sized apples; (23b) describes a photograph of a green Japanese-style bridge over a pond full of lily pads. Delaying predication of this metaphorical observation, unlike like delaying predication of the presentation of evidence in (22a), can be useful, for any of the reasons that using darou is useful. The speaker may wish that the hearer make the same metaphorical connection between objects—but wants the hearer to arrive at that connection on his/her own in order to reinforce its impact. Or the speaker may doubt their metaphorical connection and may be looking for con-

5 http://www.tamura‑jcp.info/column/081113‑103637.html. 6 http://blog.goo.ne.jp/petteakiko17/e/a255a7f14cb1f4d018132a94b5a781ce.

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firmation from a second party. In this case, the speaker is making a somewhat subjective statement about what an object resembles, not attempting to arrive at a factual conclusion based on observable evidence.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, we have seen that darou: (1) although commonly analyzed as a modal, is not; rather, it can simply be classified as a conjugated form of the copula/assertion marker da; (2) as the volitional form of the assertion marker da, operates on the nonpropositional level; (3) involves a “deformed” version of the assertion marker, creating a sentence form (and a speech act) that is neither a question nor an assertion, but something in between; (4) delays the predication intended by the speaker until receiving feedback from the hearer.

References Aoki, Haruo (1986). Evidentials in Japanese. In W.L. Chafe, & J. Nichols (Eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Pub. Corp. Fiengo, Robert (2007). Asking questions: Using Meaningful Structures to Imply Ignorance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hara, Yurie (2006). Grammar of knowledge representation Japanese discourse items at interfaces. Unpublished dissertation, University of Delaware. Johnson, Yuki (2003). Modality and the Japanese Language. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan. Kamio, Akio (1997). Territory of Information. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Kratzer, Angelica (1991) The notional category of modality. in Formal Semantics: The Essential Readings. Portner, P., & Partee, B.H., ed. Oxford: Blackwell. Masuoka, Takashi (1991). Modariti no bunpo [The Grammar of Modality]. Tokyo: Kurosio Shuppan. Masuoka, Takashi (2007). Nihongo modariti tankyuu [ Japanese Modality Research]. Tokyo: Kurosio Shuppan. Masuoka, Takashi & Yukinori Takubo (1993). Kiso nihongo bunpo [Fundamental Japanese Grammar]. Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan. Maynard, Senko K. (1999). Grammar, with Attitude: On the expressivity of certain da sentences in Japanese. Linguistics, 37(2), 215.

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Narrog, Heiko (2009). Modality in Japanese: The Layered Structure of the Clause and Hierarchies of Functional Categories. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Sugimura, Yasushi (2004). Gaizensei o arawasu fukushi to bunmatsu no modality keishiki [adverbs of probability and sentence-final modality expressions]. Gengo Bunka Ronshuu, 25(2). Takubo, Yukinori (2007). Two types of modal auxiliaries in Japanese: two directionalities in inference. In Japanese/Korean Linguistics. Volume 15. McGloin, N.H., & Mori, J. (eds.). Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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chapter 19

Epistemic Modality in Southeastern Tepehuan Thomas Willett

1

Introduction

In this paper I discuss the morphology and semantics of modal particles in Southeastern Tepehuan.1 These particles are all used to express two specific kinds of epistemic modality: evaluations and evidentials. First I summarize the formal properties of these modal particles (section 2). Then I explain their meanings, both in isolation and in combination with other particles in the light of cross-linguistic tendencies (section 3). Last I give a summary of this form-meaning covariance and offer some conclusions from this study (section 4).

2

Formal Properties

Southeastern Tepehuan is a poly-synthetic language in which most propositional meaning is conveyed through the verb (Willett, 1991, 2002). It is a verbinitial language, since nouns occur after verbs when not focused or topicalized by fronting. Linking particles, such as interjections and conjunctions, occur at the beginning of the clause, as shown in (1). (1) Linking (Focus VERB particles position) PHRASE

Noun phrases

Adverb phrases

The verb phrase in Southeastern Tepehuan consists of a verb word plus modifying particles, as shown in (2), where a plus sign separates free forms and an equals sign separates bound forms. Particles occur after the verb word except when in focus. 1 Southeastern Tepehuan is spoken by the approximately fifteen thousand inhabitants of the Community of Santa María Ocotán, located in the Municipio of El Mezquital in the State of Durango in northwestern Mexico. Field work was done there from 1975 to 1980, and in nearby Durango City from 1980 to 2008. A bibliography of this research is available at: https://www .sil.org/resources/search/language/stp.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004436701_021

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(2) prefixes = STEM = suffixes + particles Verb stems are composed of a root which can be modified by reduplication, truncation, suppletion, and the addition of stem-formation suffixes. To the stem are bound numerous affixes which augment the meaning of the stem for tense, aspect, and person-number. The verbal particles all have modal meanings, as I explain in section 3. I use the term particle in the same sense as Bybee (1985). That is, it is a grammatical form that is freer, or less grammaticalized, than an inflectional affix, but not as free as those that occur in periphrastic expressions. It has one, uninflected form; it belongs to a closed class of similar forms; and it occurs in a fixed position relative to the stem it modifies.2

3

Meanings

Modality as a notional domain can be divided into three broad areas (Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca, 1994): (a) the modes of speech, or the interactional role the utterance plays in the speech act; (b) agent-oriented modality, or the conditions under which the agent carries out the situation described; and (c) epistemic modality, or how the speaker views the factuality of his or her description of the situation. In Southeastern Tepehuan there are four modes of speech: indicative, interrogative, imperative, and conditional. Whenever the other two areas of modality are expressed, they operate within these modes (Willett, 1991). Agentoriented modality involves the deontic notions of obligation and permission, as well as those of ability, desire, and intention (Bybee, 1985).3 Epistemic modality reflects the speaker’s degree of commitment to the truth of what he or she is saying (Willett, 1988). Southeastern Tepehuan, like most of the world’s languages, expresses agentoriented modality primarily by periphrastic means, rather than by the use of 2 This is in contrast to clitics which, although also members of a closed class of grammatical morphemes, have several forms of inflection and whose position is fixed in relation to a major constituent rather than to a stem in that constituent. Thus a clitic is more fused than a particle; it occurs between an inflectional affix and a particle on a continuum of the means of grammatical expression (Willett, 2002). The only clitics in Southeastern Tepehuan are the subject clitics, which are bound to the first constituent of the clause, i.e. linking particle, focused noun or adverb, or the verb (Willett, 1994). 3 In Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca (1994), permission is part of a smaller set of speaker-oriented modal meanings.

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affixes or grammatical particles (Willett, 1996). Epistemic modality, however, also like most other languages, is represented by grammatical morphemes in Southeastern Tepehuan. In fact, all epistemic contrasts are encoded in the verbal particles of this language. Several cross-linguistic studies (e.g. Palmer, 1986; Willett, 1988; Bybee, Perkins and Pagluica, 1994) have shown that the speaker’s judgment as to the epistemic value of the proposition involves both the reliability and the source of his or her knowledge about the situation described. For ease of reference, I refer to these as evaluation and evidence respectively. 3.1 Evaluation First, I illustrate the varying degrees of evaluation on the part of a Southeastern Tepehuan speaker about the probability that his or her description of a given situation is accurate. The seven evaluation particles are listed in (3), where they are ranked on a continuum from strong to weak.4 (3) Strong Evaluation Certainty Emphasis

Uncertainty

ji gu(i)Ꞌ jia ji Affirmation ku gi Disclaimer moo Doubt chi

Weak Evaluation The strongest of the evaluations, signaled by varying forms of the particle ji, signals a categorical assertion by which the speaker signals full commitment to the truth of the statement made. This assertion, which I call emphasis, can take one of four forms, the strongest of which, ji guiꞋ, is the lengthiest and the least strong of which, ji, is the shortest. Two of these are illustrated in (4).5 4 Examples cited in this paper are written using the alphabet approved by the bilingual Tepehuan teachers in 1990. The following phonemes are distinguished: voiced stops and affricates bh [b], d, dh [ʤ], g; voiceless stops and affricates p, t, ch [ʧ], k,Ꞌ [ʔ]; spirants b [β], s, x [ʃ], j [h]; nasals m, n, ñ [ɲ]; liquids r [ɾ], lh [ɣɮ]; semi-vowel y; and vowels a, e, ɇ [ɜ], i, ɨ, o, u. Glottal stops are not written word-initially. Accent falls on the second syllable of the stem when it is long, i.e. when it is closed or contains a long vowel or diphthong; otherwise accent falls on the first syllable. 5 Abbreviations used in examples are: 1p ‘first person plural’, 1s ‘first person singular’, 2p ‘second person plural’, 2s ‘second person singular’, 3p ‘third person plural’, 3s ‘third person singular’, adv ‘adversative’, aff ‘affirmative’, conf ‘confirmative’, cont ‘continuative’, dbt ‘dubative’,

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(4) Mummu na-t giꞋbok pu tukaam ji guiꞋ, gɨi, miꞋ pup over.there sub-prf fell there merely tremble simply lay Emph miꞋ pup muukix ooras gu gagox, na-t guꞋ-x ioꞋm gɨi there merely dead awhile the dog sub-prf adv-is hard fell jia. emph ‘The dog just lay trembling for a while there where it fell, as if it were dead, because it had fallen so hard onto the ground.’ The longest forms of emphasis are also the least common forms. Instances of ji guiꞋ and its pronunciation variant ji guꞋ are infrequent, while instances of jia are more frequent. But ji is by far the most common form of emphasis used. Examples of the use of ji alone are given in (5) and (6). (5) Jix juuk ji mu jaꞋp tatsab, na guꞋ-r bɨptaꞋn. is warm emph there area hot.clime sub adv-is lowland ‘It’s warm in hot country, because it’s lowland.’ dhiꞋ. ChaꞋ-p miꞋ pɨx dhaa ka-Ꞌ. (6) Jugi-aꞋ ap ji eat-fut 2s emph this not-2s there just sit sta-fut ‘Eat this. Don’t just sit there.’ Approximately half of the known occurrences of ji are in combination with other particles. Three of these are the complex conjunctions listed in (7), all of which involve the adversative particle guꞋ ‘but’. (7) guꞋ ji na guꞋ ‘but (stronger)’ ku ji guꞋ ‘but (weaker)’ dai ji na guꞋ ‘but; it’s just that’ A fourth common combination with ji is illustrated in (8), where it is fronted in coordination with the interrogative alternative particle kaꞋ.

dir ‘direction’, disc ‘disclaimer’, dst ‘distal’, emph ‘emphasis’, enab ‘enablement’, ext ‘extension’, fut ‘future’, hort ‘hortative’, inf ‘inference’, pe ‘perceived evidence’, prec ‘precisely’, prf ‘perfective’, rek ‘reported evidence known’, res ‘resultative’, reu ‘reported evidence unknown’, rfl ‘reflexive’, rlz ‘realized’, sta ‘non-present state’, sub ‘subordinator’, tag ‘tag question’. See Willett (1991) for details.

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(8) MiꞋ puiꞋ ba bhɨi-x ka-Ꞌ aa dhi alamri, kaꞋ-ch ji there thus rlz pass-res sta-fut conf this wire or-we emph tɇꞋkob iam bhɨi-ch-dha-Ꞌ? high a.bit.more pass-cause-apl-fut ‘Is this where the wire should go, or should we put it up a little higher?’ The emphatic particle jia is often used to signal rhetorical questions or tag questions. These meanings point to the probable origin of the particle, namely a combination of ji and the interrogative confirmation particle aa. Depending on the amount of question intonation used, jia can mean anything from simple emphasis, as in (4), to an overt request for confirmation, which begins with jia, as in (9). (9) ¿Jia na-t yaꞋ ɇɇk takab? emph sub-prf here came yesterday ‘Isn’t it true that he came here yesterday?’ Other uses of jia are somewhere between these two extremes. In (10), for instance, it is used rhetorically where the answer is obvious and no response is necessary. (10) JɨɨꞋ, dai na ba-x jɨpdhar jia. yes just sub already-is cold emph ‘Yes, hasn’t it gotten cold, though?’ But in (11) it is used as a tag question, requiring a conversationally appropriate response. (11) Chakui bhai jia dhi turasno. not.yet ripe emph these peaches ‘These peaches aren’t ripe yet, are they?’ When jia is used as a request for confirmation, it can combine with ji in which case both emphasis and a degree of questioning are clearly present, as in (12). (12) ¡Aa guꞋ muiꞋ juruñ jap-ich ji jia! oh but many stay 2s-prf emph tag ‘Oh, so you stayed a long time, didn’t you?’

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The next strongest degree of evaluation used by Southeastern Tepehuan speakers is signaled by ku gi. This particle is used to affirm the certainty of a statement with an average degree of commitment, as illustrated in (13). (13) Intonsis, aach bhai-Ꞌ ba tɨɨtɨs ku gi, ba jii ch-ich. so we up-prec rlz ascended aff rlz left 1p-prf ‘So we got on (the train) and left.’ This particle most likely derives from the enablement conjunction ku plus the interrogative clarification particle gi. Although the sum of the meanings is somewhat anomalous, the combined meaning of affirmation is constant across all occurrences. Thus the interrogative meaning of gi has apparently been affected by the close causal relation of ku, so that together they constitute a definitive clarification. This analysis seems further justified by the fact that the particle ku gi occurs most often in frozen phrases of positive response, such as those listed in (14). (14) jix bhaiꞋ ku gi ‘that’s good/fine/great’ ea ku gi ‘OK; fine; agreed’ ‘fine; good; all right’ puiꞋ ku gi Whereas the first two evaluations express degrees of relative certainty, the second two express degrees of relative uncertainty. Moo is a type of disclaimer signaling that the content of the utterance is probably true, as shown in (15). moo-m oꞋñxidha-Ꞌ. pɨx oirɨ dhi-m kabaiꞋ. Dhi-Ꞌ (15) GanaiꞋ back.forth just walks this-2s horse this-prec disc-2s lose-fut ‘Your horse is pacing back and forth. He might get away from you.’ In contrast, the use of the particle chi expresses only marginal certainty, or doubt, on the speaker’s part, as in (16). (16) MiꞋ chi pa-iꞋ oirɨ. there dbt where-prec walks ‘Perhaps he’s around there somewhere.’ To qualify more overtly what he or she believes to be possibly true, Southeastern Tepehuan speakers have two choices: either they can present the description of the situation as the complement of the verb think, as in (17), or they can combine moo with a negative adverb to preface the statement, as in (18).

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Both of these signal an unwillingness to definitely commit oneself to the truth of the situation. (17) Aañ ɨlhiꞋñ na bhammu-ni dhaa kiaꞋmi-Ꞌñ. 1s think sub way.up-prec sits house-3s ‘I think he’s up at his house.’ (18) Cham moo bhai-Ꞌ dhaa. not disc up-prec sits ‘He’s probably up there.’ The meaning of moo varies a bit depending on the mode of speech in which it occurs. In the indicative mode, as in (15), it indicates probability. In the imperative mode, it often softens a request by emphasizing its subjectivity, as in (19). (19) Moo pim tɇ kɇkɇꞋ na-m jaroiꞋ ji aaga-Ꞌ na-r jix kaiꞋ disc 2p ext listen sub-3p who start say-fut sub-is judge ka-Ꞌ. sta-fut ‘You (all) should listen to see who they say will be the new tribal authority.’ In both the conditional and interrogative modes, it indicates surprise or incredulity that the situation is likely to occur, as in (20) and (21). duuk jaꞋk gɨxi-aꞋ, noꞋ p-ich moo ma (20) ¿Pa-p where-2s is.sun dir return-fut if 2s-prf disc dst paxiara-m? visit-purpose.prf ‘When will you return if, in fact, you go visiting?’ (21) ¿Moo-x ooꞋ aa dhi ubii na baꞋ giilhim sarbak disc-is strong conf this woman sub then very thick mootoꞋ gu kuꞋaꞋ? carry.on.head the firewood ‘Is that woman strong, or what? She’s carrying thick pieces of firewood on her head!’ As with the markers of certainty described above, moo also occurs frequently with other modal particles. Two common such combinations, listed in (22), are

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dho guꞋ moo, which is used to introduce statements in an unassuming manner, and ee koñ moo,6 which is used to introduce statements of intention, where the probability of accomplishing the intended action is not certain. (22) Dho guꞋ moo … ‘Well, ah …’ Ee koñ moo … ‘I think I will …’ The doubt particle chi is much less frequent than moo, and often occurs with other particles, including moo. This latter combination is used as an interjection signaling moderate uncertainty, somewhere between the meanings of the particles in isolation, as in (23). (23) Cham bhaiꞋ bopgɨ dhi-ñ mataimaꞋn. Moo chi cham ka kaak not good soften this-1s boiled.corn disc dbt not still tastes dhi matai. this lime ‘My boiled corn won’t get soft. Maybe the lime has lost its taste.’ Examples of chi with two other particles are given in (24) and (25), the former with the sequential particle baꞋ and the latter with the adversative particle guꞋ. (24) Xib cham. Jumai tanolh chi baꞋ. now not another day dbt then ‘Not now. Perhaps another day.’ (25) Ɨɨ gu jiil damdɨr. GuꞋ chi xiꞋ-x kumaalhik dhi broke the thread on.top but dbt too.much-is thick this jannulh, piam ku-r ardiꞋch dhi jiil. cloth or enab-is thin this thread ‘The top thread broke. Perhaps the cloth is too thick, or else the the thread is too thin.’ 3.2 Evidence The second major meaning of epistemic modals is that of the type of the evidence the speaker has for the statement he or she makes. It is a meaning less often expressed grammatically in the world’s languages.

6 Also pronounced ii kuñ moo, where =ñ is the first person singular subject clitic.

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Elsewhere (Willett, 1988) I show that in those languages that grammaticize the source of the speaker’s information, three major types of evidence are distinguishable: (a) that which is perceived by the speaker, for which first-hand knowledge is claimed; (b) that which is reported to the speaker, for which only second-hand or third-hand knowledge is claimed; and (c) that which causes the speaker to infer the situation described from the circumstantial evidence at his or her disposal. Southeastern Tepehuan speakers distinguish these three types of evidence by the four grammatical particles shown in (26). (26) a. Perceived by speaker b. Reported to speaker: Unknown to hearer Known to hearer c. Inferred by speaker

dho sap saak bak

Perceived evidence, or evidence that is personally attested to by the speaker via one or more of the physical senses, is signaled by dho. This particle is normally used in response to a question or a declaration to show that the speaker can personally vouch for the validity of the statement. For instance, (27) is appropriate as a response to either the question ‘What are you doing?’ or the informal form of greeting ‘You’re working, are you?’. (27) Tujuan iñ dho. work 1s pe ‘I’m working, all right.’ The particle dho follows the verb, as in (28), whenever it is the entire situation that is attested by the speaker. (28) Jiñ kapiasa dho gu kabai takaab na-ñ ka ulhiis. 1s kick.prf pe the horse yesterday sub-1s while unsaddle.prf ‘The horse kicked me yesterday while I was unsaddling it.’ If, however, only a part of the situation is the focus of the response that asserts perceived evidence, then dho follows the fronted noun or adverb, as in (29). (29) Kabuimuk jañ dho miꞋ aaya-Ꞌ. tomorrow 1s pe there arrive-fut ‘I will definitely arrive there tomorrow.’

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The exact nature of the perceived evidence is unstated when it is assumed to be visual—the so-called eye-witness. If challenged to state the means by which he perceives the situation described, however, the speaker can make it explicit, as in (30). na-r piasta (30) NɨiꞋñ iñ dho, na-ñ guꞋ aañ bɨɨx jim-da-t saw 1s pe sub-1s adv 1s also go-cont-past sub-is festival ka-t. sta-past ‘Yes, I saw it, because I too went to the festival.’ The particle dho can also be used at the beginning of the clause as an interjection, either alone or followed by the coordinating particle guꞋ ‘but’, as in (22). This is an extension of the meaning of perceived evidence, since an interjection expresses the speaker’s opinion. Two types of reported evidence can be expressed grammatically in Southeastern Tepehuan: that which the speaker assumes was previously known to the hearer and that which was not. The latter of these, reported evidence previously unknown to the hearer, is expressed by the particle sap. This particle is common both in everyday conversation and in folklore. In conversation it is used to repeat what the speaker heard someone else say. This report can be either second-hand, i.e. from a direct witness, as in (31); or it can be third-hand, such as from a rumor, as in (32). (31) OidhaꞋ ap gu-m taat. Jimi-aꞋ sap Boodamtam jaꞋk kabuimuk. accompany 2s the-2s father go-fut reu Mezquital dir tomorrow ‘You should go with your father. He’s going to El Mezquital tomorrow.’ BhaꞋ-ñi pa-iꞋ sap (32) Maik jach tubiñ-poꞋ gu junboꞋ. hort 1p suck-go the sugar.cane up.there-prec where-prec reu ba-m aich. rlz-rfl deliver.prf ‘Let’s go eat some sugar cane. Some supposedly was delivered up there.’ This conversational use of sap is extended in folklore to mean that the story being told is not original with the speaker, but comes from oral tradition. In this use it occurs frequently, about once per clause. In conversation, sap normally occurs pre-verbally, and this is often the case in folklore as well, as in (33), which is a typical beginning for a folktale.

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(33) MaaꞋn sap mu pa-iꞋ kio ka-Ꞌ gu maaꞋnkam. one reu there where-prec live sta-fut a person ‘It is told that there once lived a man in a certain place.’ But sap also gets put to extensive use in folklore as a conjunction, usually in combination with the additive particle baꞋ, in which case it occurs at the beginning of the clause as in (34). (34) Sap baꞋ-r poobhri ka-Ꞌ gu-iꞋ na bha-iꞋ puiꞋ-r reu then-is poor sta-fut the-prec sub up.there-prec thus-is kɨɨkam. holy.one ‘Now he who was the Holy One was very poor.’ A more common use of sap in folklore is in the quotative formulas listed in (35). The first two are used to report the action of speaking, one intransitive and the other transitive. The third reports the action of thinking to oneself. (35) jaꞋp sap kaiꞋch ‘thus s/he said’ ‘thus s/he told him/her’ jaꞋp sap tɨtda jaꞋp sap jum aaꞋ ‘thus s/he thought’ If part of the description reported about the situation was, in the speaker’s estimation, previously known by the hearer, this is marked by the particle saak. This is a much less frequently used marker of reported evidence. It is only used when the speaker reminds the hearer of information that either the speaker considers to be common knowledge, as in (36); or that the hearer has previously said to the speaker, as in (37). These examples also illustrate the fact that saak normally occurs pre-verbally. (36) Aañ miꞋ-ñi dhɨr jaꞋk jim na saak jir Jaarax Cham. 1s there-prec from dir come sub rek is crab place ‘I’m coming from a place over there called Crab Place.’ (37) Ba jɨɨpir gu-m bhii na-p saak tujugi-aꞋ. rlz got.cold the-2s food sub-2s rek eat-fut ‘The food you were going to eat is already cold.’

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If the speaker wishes to indicate that the situation described is only inferred, instead of directly observed, he or she does so by means of the particle bak.7 This informs the listener that the causing situation is being inferred on the basis of observable results, as in (38), where the evidence motivating the inference is also mentioned. (38) Daaman darat bak dhi turasno. PuiꞋ kut baꞋ iaꞋrai shallow planted inf these peach.tree thus that then knocked.down gu jɨbɨlh. the wind ‘These peach trees must have been planted shallow. That’s why the wind blew them over.’ The inferential particle bak is infrequently used, and it seldom occurs alone. It most often occurs in combination with one of the emphatic particles. The idea of emphasis combines easily with that of inference, since the speaker who makes an inference often will emphasize it to make the assertion of truth stronger, as in (39). (39) KiaꞋpɨx ba-x kooxim ka-t iñ na-t Jir baꞋ ba xiaꞋ. barely now-be sleepy sta-past 1s sub-prf then rlz dawned is ɨlhiꞋch tukaaꞋ bak jia. little night inf emph ‘I just got to sleep and it was morning. It must have been a short night.’ But bak also occasionally occurs with the perceived evidence particle dho, which at first seems contradictory. Several of the instances of this cooccurrence, however, are of dho in its use as an interjection. Those that are not are utterances where the speaker makes an inference based on information he has just received. For instance, immediately preceding the utterance given in (40), the hearer informed the speaker that it takes a day and a half to walk to his ranch from where they are now talking. (40) Uu, jir mɨk dho bak. wow is far pe inf ‘Wow, it is a long way!’

7 Some speakers pronounce this particle tak.

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Another thing all cooccurrences of dho and bak have in common is that they all describe states. In fact, all inferences in Southeastern Tepehuan are either based on existing states or on past actions, the results of which are still observable; no inferences are known to be made about present actions or about future states or actions.

4

Conclusion

Like most other languages of the world, Southeastern Tepehuan expresses epistemic modality by means of grammatical morphemes rather than by periphrasis. However, unlike many languages, all epistemic contrasts in this language are encoded in the verbal particles. Specifically, the speaker’s judgment as to the reliability of his or her knowledge about the situation described in the utterance is expressed by evaluative particles, and his or her judgment about the source of that knowledge is expressed in evidential particles. The seven evaluative particles cover the full range of reliability judgments from strong certainty to strong uncertainty. Similarly, the four evidential particles cover the full range of source judgments from direct, reported or inferred knowledge of the situation. These epistemic modal particles can combine in both predictable and unpredictable ways. There are other known coocurrences of these particles which have not yet been fully investigated. The subtleties of meaning of the various combinations of meanings may be difficult to determine by non-native speakers, since these particles have become highly grammaticized. However, those that I have described here are the most common and serve to illustrate the meaning of each particle in various contexts.

References Bybee, Joan (1985), Morphology: A Study of the Relation Between Meaning and Form, John Benjamins, Amsterdam and Philadelphia. Bybee, Joan, Perkins, Revere and Pagliuca, William (1994), The Evolution of Grammar: Tense, Aspect, and Modality in the Languages of the World, University of Chicago. Palmer, F.R. (1986), Mood and Modality, Cambridge University, Cambridge. Willett, Thomas (1988), “A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evidentiality”, Studies in Linguistics, Vol. 12, pp. 51–97.

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Willett, Thomas (1991), A Reference Grammar of Southeastern Tepehuan. Summer Instutute of Linguistics and University of Texas at Arlington, Dallas, TX. Willett, Thomas (1994), “Los morfemas gramaticales de persona y número en el tepehuán del sureste”, in Estrada Fernández, Zarina (Ed.), Memorias del Segundo Encuentro de Lingüística en el Noroeste, pp. 351–366, Universidad de Sonora, Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico. Willett, Thomas (1996), “Acciones con propósito en el tepehuán del sureste”, in Estrada Fernández, Zarina, Figueroa Esteva, Max and López Cruz, Gerardo (Eds.), Memorias del Tercer Encuentro de Lingüística en el Noroeste, Vol. 2, pp. 555–571, Universidad de Sonora, Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico. Willett, Thomas (2002), “Cuando una partícula no es una partícula”, in Estrada Fernández, Zarina and Ortiz Ciscomani, Rosa María (Eds.), Memorias del Sexto Encuentro Internacional de Lingüística en el Noroeste, Vol. 1, pp. 231–250, Universidad de Sonora, Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico. Willett, Thomas and Willett, Elizabeth (2015), Diccionario tepehuano de Santa María Ocotán, Durango, Instituto Lingüístico de Verano, Mexico City.

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chapter 20

Modal Particles Yo and Ne in Japanese Kei Yoshimoto

1

Introduction

So-called sentence-final particles in Japanese are postpositions that can occur at the final position of the sentence. They are attached to the content of the sentence denoted by the left-hand side of the sentence and express illocutionary forces or the speaker’s attitudes toward the hearer. Their typical uses as speech act operators are question (ka), prohibition (na), and exclamation (nā and wa). This paper discusses yo and ne, which have been considered as the most representative particles involved with contextual meanings related to the speaker’s attitudes in the traditional study of Japanese. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches relevant previous studies on sentence-final particles. Section 3 outlines problems that remain to be solved. Section 4 explains a theoretical framework we rely on, i.e., a plan-based approach to speech acts. Section 5 applies this to utterances attached with modal particles. Section 6 attempts to build up lexically complex speech acts based on lexical sources. The last section summarizes.

2

Previous Studies

Based on ‘the theory of territory of information’, Kamio (1994) suggests that it essentially influences the usage of yo and ne whether the information conveyed in the sentence falls within the speaker’s/hearer’s territory of information. For instance, when a given piece of information falls completely within the hearer’s territory and it also falls within the speaker’s territory completely or to a lesser degree, ne obligatorily appears within an utterance. There are also cases in which ne is used optionally. Yo may occur if either information falls completely within the speaker’s territory and completely outside that of the hearer, or information falls within neither the speaker’s nor the hearer’s territory of information. Likewise, Kinsui (1993) proposed that yo appears when the speaker, but not the hearer, knows information; ne is used when both the speaker and hearer know information. See also Masuoka (1991) for the same kind of discussion.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004436701_022

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This line of argument has been neatly summarized by Katagiri (2007, p. 1315) (caution: here, mutually contradictory details among the proponents are neglected): (1) a. ‘yo’ is used to express the speaker’s information, that is, use of ‘yo’ indicates that the sentence expresses what the speaker knows or believes, whereas b. ‘ne’ is used to express the hearer’s information, that is, use of ‘ne’ indicates that the sentence expresses what the speaker believes that the hearer knows or believes. Advocating ‘Mental Space Theory’, Takubo and Kinsui (1996) attempt to give an account of the particles yo and ne based on the speaker’s knowledge model. They adopt a special principle according to which the speaker’s knowledge cannot embed that of the hearer. Since this idea restricts the scope of explanation by the theory drastically, we will not discuss it any more in this paper. Katagiri (2007) points out two difficulties involved with the information attribution account. In contradiction to this account, ne can be used to express what is unknown to the hearer. Furthermore, ne can be used to tell what is known only to the speaker. In the next section, we discuss these problems at length. In order to deal with linguistic data including these, Katagiri proposes ‘the dialogue coordination account’, according to which ‘the Japanese sentencefinal particles contribute to dialogue coordination by indicating to the hearer the speaker’s state of acceptance about information (Katagiri 2007, p. 1317).’ Here is the essence of his account: (2) a. ‘yo’ presents the propositional content of the utterance preceding it as something the speaker has accepted, while b. ‘ne’ presents the propositional content as something the speaker has not yet wholeheartedly accepted. Since this account does not refer to the hearer’s knowledge, at least it does not contradict with ne sentences with a content unknown to the hearer or known only to the speaker. In the next section, we look into problems concomitant with Katagiri’s (2007) theory in order to establish an account that optimally accounts for data in Japanese. McCready (2006) adopts a dynamic semantic theory to explain the usage of yo as update of information. According to him, the meaning of yo consists of two components. As presupposition, it indicates that the speaker believes the

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hearer doesn’t believe the content of the utterance. As propositional semantics, it indicates that the speaker believes the hearer should believe the content of the utterance. Thus, he proposes a formal account that reflects both the information attribution account and the traditional theory that emphasizes the speaker’s attitude. Similarly to McCready (2006), Davis (2009) applies a version of dynamic semantics to an account of yo. According to him, yo contributes a pragmatic presupposition that the hearer’s response will be optimal if he/she accepts updating the context as suggested by the utterance. His theory deals with both directives (i.e., requests and imperatives) and assertives. In case of an assertive sentence, the new information meaning is derived from development of common grounds before and after the update. A remarkable characteristic of Davis’ (2009) theory is that it attempts to explicate the combination of the particle and rising/falling intonations in terms of monotonic and non-monotonic update of the speaker’s public beliefs expressed by different intonation patterns.

3

Remaining Problems

This section discusses problems that have been left unsolved by the previous studies, including those that have received little attention. 3.1 Information Attribution Account and the Counter-Argument Katagiri (2007) makes arguments against the information attribution account. First, he points out that ne can be used for cases in which the hearer does not possess the knowledge or belief: (3) A:

B:

ka? Tsugi no kaigi wa doko desu next ADNM meeting TOP where COPL-POLT QUEST ‘Where will the next meeting be held?’ Kaigi wa roku-gō-shitsu desu ne. meeting TOP No.6-room COPL-POLT NE ‘The meeting will be held in Room 6.’

Since A asks the question, he does not know where the meeting room is. Therefore, the content of B’s answer is obviously not shared by A, thus violating the information attribution account. As is suggested by Katagiri (2007), it is implicated that B is getting the information from outside, e.g., by a computer or by an activity-location list. - 978-90-04-43670-1 Downloaded from Brill.com11/16/2020 06:24:45AM via University of Cambridge

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Second, ne can be attached to a sentence with a content known only to the speaker: (4) Ginkō e it-te ki-masu ne. bank GOAL go come-POLT NE ‘I am going to go to the bank.’ This sentence can be uttered in a situation where the speaker explains his intention abruptly without the hearer knowing it in advance. Since Katagiri (2007) restricts his theory to the speaker’s mental state, it seems to offer better accounts for some linguistic data than the information attribution account. (3) cited above is one of such examples. By contrast, sentence (4) cannot be perfectly explained by his theory, although this is by far better than the other account. However, Katagiri’s (2007, p. 1318) claim that ‘the speaker is asking confirmation of acceptance on the part of the hearer to their tentative joint plan including her future action’ does not always hold. Asserting this sentence, the speaker may rush to the door without waiting for the addressee’s confirmation. What is essential to the usage of yo and ne and is missing from Katagiri’s theory is that the major effects of these particles are targeted at the addressee. For instance, (4) is typically uttered when the speaker transmits his request to the hearer for looking after his office in his absence, e. g., taking a telephone message. To conclude, we need to admit that the modal particles have two usages, one used to appeal to the addressee and the other to represent the speaker’s mental state. Obviously, the best theory is the one that can derive one usage from the other. However, if this is hard, we must set up a spectrum of different uses for each of the particles. 3.2 A Unified Account of Heterogeneous Speech Acts It is clear that the information attribution account can explain only assertive utterances among a variety of speech acts. Request, order, question, among others, are beyond its scope, since sharing or absence of knowledge/belief is not important for them. As has been pointed out above, an appeal or consideration to the hearer constitutes the foundation of the use of these particles. Katagiri’s (2007) dialogue coordination account is insufficient in this respect too. It is noteworthy that Davis (2009) attempts to give an account of the usage of yo in directive sentences.

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3.3 Yo vs. Polite Attitudes A full consideration has not been given to the fact that, depending on the context of utterance, yo may be taken as impolite or may even offend the addressee owing to its strong effect. Because of this, the particle tends to be avoided when speaking to a person to whom proper respect needs to be paid. Thus, we need a mechanism that checks if conditions are satisfied to accept what is implied by the particle. 3.4 Compositionality Yo and ne can be combined to form yo ne that behaves like an independent sentence-final particle: (5) Densha ga ki-masu yo ne. train SBJ come-POLT YO NE ‘The train is coming.’ A difficulty is caused by most of the previous studies here, since they assign mutually incompatible functions to the two particles. According to the information attribution account, yo and ne indicate what is known/believed by the speaker and what is known/believed by the hearer, respectively. Then, does the combination yo ne mean what is shared by the speaker and the hearer? In fact, sentence (5) is more like one with ne than with yo. It asks the addressee if he can see the object together with the speaker. It never implicates, as with yo used alone, that the recognition is exclusive to the speaker. In distinction from ne standing alone, however, yo ne has a nuance that emphasizes the speaker’s actual recognition. Thus, the information attribution account cannot give a systematic explanation on the usages of yo, ne, and yo ne. Katagiri’s (2007) dialogue coordination account cannot provide a better explication since it supposes the speaker’s acceptance of the propositional content with yo and no wholehearted acceptance with ne. We attempt to provide a theory that accounts for the usage of yo ne on the basis of yo and ne as are used alone. Furthermore, we explain major uses of these particles as combination of functions of the particles and those of different intonation patterns. Thus we pave a way for a compositional account of sentence final particles and intonations.

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4

Speech Acts as Planning

As a theoretical foundation we adopt a theory that models speech acts as operators in a planning system (Cohen and Perrault 1979). Taking the initial state of the world and the desired goal as inputs, a planner generates a sequence of actions that lead from the former to the latter. The ultimate goal is often decomposed into subgoals. Speech acts are regarded by Cohen and Perrault (1979) as operations that transform the conversation participants’ mental states and can be formalized as a process of planning. The felicity conditions, which must be met for a speech act to be appropriate in the context (Austin 1962, Searle 1969), are specified as preparatory conditions in each plan. The example below is Cohen and Perrault’s (1979) plan for the action MOVE: (6) MOVE(A, L, G) cando.pr: LOC(A, L) want.pr: BEL(A, WANT(A, MOVE(A, L, G))) effect: LOC(A, G) The first two lines, as equivalents to preparatory conditions in the speech act theory (Searle 1969), state the preconditions for the action to be successful. The first one, the ‘cando’ precondition, says that an agent must be located at a SOURCE location for him to be able to move from there. The second, the ‘want’ precondition, specifies that the agent has to want to execute the action. The last line, the effect, prescribes the agent’s new location that results from the action. The next example is a plan for request. (7) REQUEST(S, H, A) cando.pr: CANDO(H, A) want.pr: BEL(S, WANT(S, REQUEST(S, H, A))) effect: BEL(H, BEL(S, WANT(S, A))) In order for a request to be appropriate, it must meet two preconditions: that the hearer can do the action and that the speaker has to want the action to be done. The effect is a state in which the hearer believes that the speaker wants the action to be done. While (6) can be embedded within (7) to represent a request for movement, this is not sufficient to lead to the action as a result. This is because the effect in (7) just mentions the hearer’s recognition about the speaker’s intention and an

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MOVE(H, INROOM, OUTROOM) ⇓ want.pr ii. BEL(H, WANT(H, MOVE(H, INROOM, OUTROOM))) ⇑ effect iii. CAUSE-TO-WANT(S, H, MOVE(H, INROOM, OUTROOM)) ⇓ cando.pr iv. BEL(H, BEL(S, WANT(S, MOVE(H, INROOM, OUTROOM)))) ⇑ effect iv. REQUEST(S, H, MOVE(H, INROOM, OUTROOM))

i.

figure 20.1 A plan for REQUEST

essential change with the hearer’s mental state has not occurred yet. For this, we need the following plan that bridges the gap between understanding the speaker’s intention and accepting it as the hearer’s own intention. (8) CAUSE-TO-WANT(S, H, A) cando.pr: BEL(H, BEL(S, WANT(S, A))) ∧ BEL(H, CANDO(H, A)) effect: BEL(H, WANT(H, A)) Note that the first half of the ‘cando’ precondition can be satisfied as the effect of a request. See Figure 20.1 for how plans are chained to model the understanding of a request for movement and a reaction to it. In the following section, we modify Cohen and Perrault’s (1979) theory to formalize the contributions by the sentence-final particles.

5

Plan-Based Formalization of Modal Particles

The essence of our extension of Cohen and Perrault’s (1979) approach lies in assigning each speech act plan an additional numeral argument indicating the intensity of the speech act: (9) REQUEST(S, H, A, D) cando.pr: CANDO(H, A) want.pr: BEL(S, WANT(S, REQUEST(S, H, A, D))) effect: BEL(H, BEL(S, WANT(S, A)) ∧ APPEAL(S, H, D))

In this revised plan for REQUEST, the new argument D stands for the intensity of the illocutionary force being performed. The D unifies with the last argument

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i. ii. iii. iv.

v.

MOVE(H, INROOM, OUTROOM) ⇓ want.pr BEL(H, WANT(H, MOVE(H, INROOM, OUTROOM))) ⇑ effect CAUSE-TO-WANT(S, H, MOVE(H, INROOM, OUTROOM), +1) ⇓ cando.pr BEL(H, BEL(S, WANT(S, MOVE(H, INROOM, OUTROOM))) ∧ APPEAL(S, H, +1)) ⇑ effect REQUEST(S, H, MOVE(H, INROOM, OUTROOM), +1)

figure 20.2 A plan for REQUEST with Yo to a normal addressee

of APPEAL on the last line—it is percolated to indicate the extent to which the appeal is made by the speaker to the hearer. A further revision is necessary for CAUSE-TO-WANT that bridges the effect of REQUEST and the change in the addressee’s belief: (10) CAUSE-TO-WANT(S, H, A, D) cando.pr: BEL(H, BEL(S, WANT(S, A)) ∧ APPEAL(S, H, D)) ∧ BEL(H, CANDO(H, A)) effect: if d1 ≤ D ≤ d2 , then BEL(H, WANT(H, A)) else ¬BEL(H, WANT(H, A))

Within the last component ‘effect’ in this version of the plan, the value for D is compared with constants d1 and d2 which might vary from one hearer to another and are used to decide whether the hearer should change his mind, accepting the speaker’s request. Figure 20.2 shows how a request utterance with yo successfully leads to a wished action by the hearer. In this case, D works by being larger than d1 and, thanks to the hearer’s modesty, not surpassing d2 . See how +1, the value for D, percolates from the REQUEST (v) to its effect (iv), and then to CAUSE-TOWANT (iii). However, for some addressees, a yo-marked utterance is so strong (D > d2 ) that it does not result in his/her acceptance of the speaker’s intention. In this case, the effect of CAUSE-TO-WANT is ¬BEL(H, WANT(H, A)). Since a precondition for an action MOVE is not satisfied, the whole plan ends up with the hearer’s remaining in the room. Suppose the same kind of request is attached with ne. If the value for D given by the particle (−1) is between d1 and d2 , it results in the addressee’s moving out of the room without being offended.

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Next, let’s see how an assertive speech act INFORM is dealt with. This is the plan for an INFORM: (11) INFORM(S, H, P, D) cando.pr: MOD-BEL(S, P, D) want.pr: BEL(S, WANT(S, INFORM(S, H, P, D))) effect: BEL(H, BEL(S, P) ∧ APPEAL(S, H, D))

Like in the plan for REQUEST in (9), the fourth argument D is percolated to the APPEAL within the effect. We interpret the ‘new information’ meaning often involving with yo to be derived from strength of the appeal by the speaker to the hearer. Yo, by strengthening the assertive force, emphasizes Grice’s (1975) maxim of Quality that usually makes the content of assertion unknown to the hearer. Furthermore, the ‘cando’ precondition for the speech act says that for this to be appropriate, the speaker must have a modalized belief about a proposition. The degree of probability for this belief is given by D. Since the particle yo calls for a high degree, this means that, as a ‘cando’ precondition, the speaker must believe that the proposition necessarily holds. This is equivalent to saying that yo indicates that the speaker is certain of the content of the proposition (see Katagiri’s account illustrated in Section 2). As a CAUSE-TO-WANT is necessary for the REQUEST plan, we now need a CAUSE-TO-BELIEVE that links the effect of an INFORM and a change in the speaker’s mental state: (12) CAUSE-TO-BELIEVE(S, H, A, D) cando.pr: BEL(H, BEL(S, P) ∧ APPEAL(S, H, D)) effect: if d1 ≤ D ≤ d2 , then BEL(H, P) else ¬BEL(H, P)

Figure 20.3 illustrates how a speech act INFORM in a yo-marked sentence (Densha ga kuru yo ‘The train is coming’) is processed to bring about the hearer’s accepting what is uttered, in case he/she is modest. If he/she is too proud and D is higher than d2 , the utterance will not be accepted. An assertive sentence marked by ne is assigned a low degree for D within both MOD-BEL and APPEAL. The low value of D within the former speech act indicates the speaker’s uncertainty about the content of the proposition, similarly to Katagiri’s (2007) account that ‘the speaker has not yet wholeheartedly accepted [it].’ Furthermore, the low intensity in APPEAL, in contrast to yo, makes the assertion a peripheral one to which Grice’s (1975) maxim is

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BEL(H, COME(TRAIN)) ⇑ effect ii. CAUSE-TO-BELIEVE(S, H, COME(TRAIN), +1) ⇓ cando.pr iii. BEL(H, BEL(S, COME(TRAIN)) ∧ APPEAL(S, H, +1)) ⇑ effect iv. INFORM(S, H, COME(TRAIN), +1) ⇓ cando.pr v. MOD-BEL(S, COME(TRAIN), +1) i.

figure 20.3 A plan for INFORM with Yo to a normal Addressee

not applied. Since the assertive speech act is not completed, it induces the addressee’s positive contribution in the following dialog, as has often been pointed out. Thus, the functions of each of the particles yo and ne are specified twofold as a ‘cando’ precondition and an effect. This makes possible wider coverage of linguistic data in Japanese.

6

The Last Problem—Compositionality

Lastly, we must face the remaining problem—How can we build up the discourse function of a speech act that is composed of multiple lexical sources? First, let’s challenge the complex particle yo ne. We propose to solve this problem by supposing that each particle makes only a partial contribution to the particle yo ne’s meaning: (13) a. yo: cando.pr: MOD-BEL(S, P, +1) b. ne: a part of effect: APPEAL(S, H, −1)

Since the discourse function of yo ne is a sum of both, when attached to an assertive sentence, the complex particle indicates the speaker’s certainty about the content (this derives from yo) and an addressee-oriented meaning eliciting his/her response, contributed by ne, deriving from the low intensity in APPEAL (see the previous section). In this way, we can construct yo ne’s discourse function quasi-compositionally, based on parts of its components. Note that the approach proposed above explains only the speech act INFORM. Actually, yo ne can suffix directive sentences including a REQUEST. We leave it an open question how the approach can be applied to a REQUEST.

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A full explanation on the combination of the sentence-final particles and different intonation patterns needs to address complicated factors. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the most basic patterns, i.e., rising and falling intonations occurring in sentences marked with ne. An assertive sentence with rising intonation (indicated by the symbol ↗ in this paper) involves a question toward the speaker. See (14a) cited from Katagiri (2007). By contrast, when the same sentence is pronounced with a falling intonation (indicated by the symbol ↘), it is an assertive sentence involving with the speaker’s uncertainty, losing an interrogative meaning. See sentence (14b) below (also from Katagiri 2007): (14) a. Kaigi wa roku-gō-shitsu desu ne↗. meeting TOP No.6-room COPL-POLT NE ‘The meeting will be held in Room 6.’ b. Kaigi wa roku-gō-shitsu desu ne↘. meeting TOP No.6-room COPL-POLT NE ‘The meeting will be held in Room 6.’ Speech act plans presented in the previous section need a little bit more flexibility so that the observation above can be made compatible with it. This we attain by partly adopting a default specification. For instance, here is a revised version for a plan INFORM: (15) INFORM(S, H, P, D) cando.pr: MOD-BEL(S, P, D) want.pr: BEL(S, WANT(S, INFORM(S, H, P, D))) effect: BEL(H, BEL(S, P) ∧ APPEAL(S, H, /D))

The argument D on the last line is a default value, i.e., a value provided if no specific condition is imposed but which can be replaced by an implicitly given one, as indicated by the symbol /. Since ne assigns it a low value ‘−1’ as accounted for in the previous section and a rising intonation gives APPEAL a low D value, as a result (14a) has an INFORM plan in which all of the D arguments are set to ‘−1’. For (14b), however, the falling intonation assigns the D argument of APPEAL a higher value ‘+1’ in contrast to its default value ‘−1’:

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(16) INFORM(S, H, P, −1) cando.pr: MOD-BEL(S, P, −1) want.pr: BEL(S, WANT(S, INFORM(S, H, P, −1))) effect: BEL(H, BEL(S, P) ∧ APPEAL(S, H, +1))

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This leads to the sentence meaning with a strengthened assertive force.

7

Conclusions

We have proposed to apply a plan-based approach to an account of modal particles in Japanese as modification of speech act intensity. The degree of illocutionary force is percolated chiefly to two places, the degree of the speaker’s appeal to the addressee and that of the speaker’s belief probability. Since the contributions by the particles are distributed, our model can cover wider linguistic data than ever. We leave it as a task to be carried out in future whether one intensity specification can be derived from the other on a more general principle.

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Searle, John R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Takubo, Yukinori and Satoshi Kinsui. 1996. Fukusū no Shinteki-Ryōiki ni yoru Danwa Kanri. Ninchi Kagaku vol. 3, no. 3, 59–74.

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