European Public Leadership in Crisis? 9781783509027, 9781783509010

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EUROPEAN PUBLIC LEADERSHIP IN CRISIS?

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT Series Editors: John Diamond and Joyce Liddle Recent Volumes: Volume 1:

Emerging and Potential Trends in Public Management: An Age of Austerity

Volume 2:

Looking for Consensus?: Civil Society, Social Movements and Crises for Public Management

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT VOLUME 3

EUROPEAN PUBLIC LEADERSHIP IN CRISIS? EDITED BY

JOHN DIAMOND Edge Hill Business School, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UK

JOYCE LIDDLE IMPGT Institute of Public Management and Territorial Governance, Aix-Marseilles Universite´, Aix en Provence, France

United Kingdom North America India Malaysia China

Japan

Emerald Group Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2014 Copyright r 2014 Emerald Group Publishing Limited Reprints and permission service Contact: [email protected] No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. Any opinions expressed in the chapters are those of the authors. Whilst Emerald makes every effort to ensure the quality and accuracy of its content, Emerald makes no representation implied or otherwise, as to the chapters’ suitability and application and disclaims any warranties, express or implied, to their use. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-78350-901-0 ISSN: 2045-7944 (Series)

ISOQAR certified Management System, awarded to Emerald for adherence to Environmental standard ISO 14001:2004. Certificate Number 1985 ISO 14001

CONTENTS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

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PUSHING IT! AUSTERITY URBANISM AND DISPERSED LEADERSHIP THROUGH ‘FLEET-OF-FOOT’ MECHANISMS IN TIMES OF CRISIS Lee Pugalis, Alan Townsend and Lorraine Johnston

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HOW PUBLIC LEADERSHIP IS ADDRESSING THE NEED TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE IN LIVERPOOL CITY Paul Joyce and Ged Fitzgerald

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LIVERCHESTER/MANPOOL? THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE LACK OF INTRA-URBAN LEADERSHIP IN THE TWIN CITIES OF THE NORTH-WEST Nicola Headlam

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LEADERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPEANIZATION CRISIS AND AUSTERITY Kerry E. Howell and Rory Shand

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ITALIAN CITY MANAGERS: CAGED LEADERS? Alessandro Sancino, Marco Meneguzzo and Daniela Cristofoli v

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DO ENGLISH LOCAL AUTHORITIES STILL HAVE THE MEANS OF THEIR PERFORMANCE? A FRENCH VIEW ON A LOCAL PUBLIC ACTION IN CRISIS Emmanuel Auber, Elodie Chabaud, Automne Chabernaud, Cle´ment Le Bras-Thomas, Etienne Longueville and Elena Suzat

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LEADERSHIP IN NOT-FOR-PROFITS AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: VALUES AND COMPARATIVE CONSIDERATIONS Alex Murdock

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MICHAEL GOVE, CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RADICAL REORGANISATION OF ENGLISH SCHOOL SPORT Elesa Zehndorfer and Chris Mackintosh

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CONCLUSION

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Emmanuel Auber

Communaute´ d’Agglome´ration de Mantes-En-Yvelines, Magnanville, France

Elodie Chabaud

Communaute´ d’Agglome´ration Valenciennes Me´tropole, Valenciennes, France

Automne Chabernaud

Ile-de-France Regional Council, Paris, France

Daniela Cristofoli

Universita` della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano, Switzerland

Ged Fitzgerald

Liverpool City Council, Liverpool, UK

Nicola Headlam

Heseltine Institute, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK

Kerry E. Howell

Graduate School of Management, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK

Lorraine Johnston

Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

Paul Joyce

Birmingham City University Business School, Birmingham, UK

Cle´ment Le Bras-Thomas

De´partement de l’Essonne, Hoˆtel du department, Evry, France

Etienne Longueville

Saint-Brieuc Agglome´ration, Saint-Brieuc, France

Chris Mackintosh

Faculty of Health, Education and Community, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK

Marco Meneguzzo

Universita` della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano, Switzerland vii

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Alex Murdock

London South Bank University, London, UK

Lee Pugalis

Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

Alessandro Sancino

Open University Business School, Milton Keynes, UK

Rory Shand

School of Government, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK

Elena Suzat

Communaute´ urbaine de Strasbourg, Centre administratif, Strasburg, France

Alan Townsend

Durham University, Durham, UK

Elesa Zehndorfer

International Federation of American Football (IFAF), London, UK

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Graeme Chesters Bradford University, UK

Muiris MacCarthaigh Queens University Belfast, UK

Ricardo C. Gomes University of Brasilia, Brazil

Ivan Maly Masaryk University, Czech Republic

Olivier Keramidas Aix-Marseilles University, France

Duncan McTavish Glasgow Caledonian University, UK Margaret Stout West Virginia University, USA

Alan Lawton Monash University, Australia

Dina Wafa The American University of Cairo, Egypt

Mike Macaulay Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to thank those colleagues who have contributed to this third volume in the series. We are very pleased that Emerald has continued to support the series and we would like to thank Tom Dark and Kim Chadwick for their support, advice and guidance. Last year we invited colleagues to join the newly established Editorial Advisory Board and their support and help has been invaluable. Please do contact us with ideas and suggestions for future volumes.

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INTRODUCTION The impact of the global finance and banking crisis following the collapse of Lehmans in the fall of 2008 continues to shape social, economic and political decision making at all levels within public policy and management. We can observe how international institutions (from the IMF and World Bank to the European Union) have had to reassess their priorities and their strategic policy objectives. The longer term impact and consequences of the collapse of 2008 still remain unclear. Whilst there are some signs of economic recovery in North America and Europe growth remains fragile and vulnerable to drops in levels of confidence. The slowing down of growth in China and in other BRIC nations is indicative too of the overall weaknesses in the global economy. The economic crises were overtaken by political and institutional crises too. In the United States post 2008 the rise of the Tea Party and the election of Barrack Obama illustrated the ideological and political differences in the United States. These differences took a number of forms but, perhaps, the most significant was the institutional conflict between the White House and the Republican controlled House of Representatives over the budget and Obama’s health care reforms. In Europe the impact of the recession and the financial collapse weakened the Euro Zone countries and the austerity measures introduced in Ireland, Italy, France, Greece, Spain and Portugal weakened also the legitimacy of the ruling parties. These weaknesses were evident in the rise in parties who were explicitly opposed to the European Union and the social and economic model promoted by EU ‘leadership’. On the whole those parties from the Right (in France the National Front or in the United Kingdom the UK Independence Party) were the ones who gained electorally from their opposition to the austerity measures which were introduced or imposed. The electoral success of the Left was much less evident. Their presence was much more explicit in the street demonstrations and resistance to the cuts in public spending which took the form of opposition from trade unions or ant cuts organisations. The most popular (for a short while) was the Occupy Movement.

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In a number of European and North American cities camps were set up in the heart of financial and banking districts to highlight opposition to the austerity measures being introduced. It is difficult to assess the long term impact of the Occupy Movement. As Chesters (2013) in our previous volume argued it is possible to see the Occupy Movement as an embryonic social movement with the potential to develop a long term social and political base. The political and trade union movements in the 1930s in both Europe and the United States expressed their opposition to the cuts in social spending during the Depression by setting up camps in cities to highlight the human cost of the economic policies of governments. These forms of opposition of discontent with the institutional or parliamentary responses to the banking collapse illustrate a broader (and perhaps even more significant) consequence of the crisis. They demonstrate an important (and different) set of crises for those in a leadership position at a national or even local level. The rise in the Far Right has the potential to represent a much more challenging response to the crisis. We can argue that the global financial crisis and its political set of crises were also being played out in the Arab Spring and in the rise of nationalism more broadly. At the time of writing there are a series of separate (but potentially linked) developments within those states which make up the former Soviet Union. There remains ‘unfinished business’ following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the expansion of the EU to the borders of Russia and the internal reforms within Russia itself which have accentuated global insecurity not reduced it. We can observe, therefore, a number of real and serious challenges for those occupying leadership roles at a national, local or institutional setting. These challenges are, also, profound ones too for those who have been appointed to senior public leadership roles in the administrative systems and structures of nation states or the institutions of civil society. The changes we are experiencing require those in a leadership role to engage with a number of discrete yet connected disruptions to the status quo which have the potential to alter radically the policy making and decision making infrastructure which hold together the institutional networks and structures which the state relies. The crises we can observe (and experience) are not, therefore, abstract and external to our personal, professional or political senses. As we have suggested in this annual series the changes are profound, serious and represent (in our view) long term change. In this volume we want to examine the different ways in which the ‘leadership’ has been understood and conceptualised in different places and situations and what we learn from these different explorations and examinations of ‘leadership’.

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CONTEXT AND THEMES We have identified a number of core themes which are examined in this volume. These themes are: the ways in which urban leaders and agencies defined the austerity crisis and looked for or gave themselves permission to act. We think that there is scope to revisit both the literature on urban regeneration management and leadership and the experiences of those who occupy decision making roles at a city level and to reflect on how those experiences informed the actions of such individuals. We have chosen to organise this discussion around a series of separate case studies of urban decision making and decision makers. There is a rich literature to draw from on urban leadership and decision making whether in the context of regeneration or urban management. The case studies we have selected for inclusion in this volume locate their examples within the context of city leaders acting as relatively autonomous decision makers. We wanted to frame our discussion within this paradigm so that we could reflect on how the different leaders acted or indeed framed their scope for action. There are six papers included here which address some aspects of this discussion. The opening paper of the volume ‘Pushing it! Austerity Urbanism and Dispersed Leadership through ‘Fleet-of-Foot’ Mechanisms in Times of Crisis’ (Pugalis, Townsend and Johnston) sets the conceptual and policy framework. In their paper they examined the extent to which we can imagine or re-imagine a different model of leadership which is responsive to change. The extent to which urban leaders (not only in the United Kingdom) can be seen as anticipating change rather than reacting to it is usefully explored here. There are some core questions to examine in terms of the extent to which urban/city leaders have acted thoughtfully during the current crisis. The challenges are not only financial or policy led. It is important to examine the organisational structures and models of decision making too. Across all cities we need to place these forms of analysis and discussion alongside an awareness of the political structures too at a local level and the vitality or not of political parties and civil society networks or organisations. This links to a secondary set of themes: local vitality and discretion in decision making. There are two separate but linked papers which examine city leadership in two UK northern cities (Liverpool and Manchester). In the paper on ‘How Public Leadership Is Addressing the Need to Bring about Change in Liverpool City’, Joyce and Fitzgerald offer a series of

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fascinating insights into the management and leadership of an important city. The history of Liverpool provides a rich set of examples of how urban cities have responded to the challenge of de-industrialisation, political conflict with national government, rising levels of poverty and a declining economic base to support social and welfare policies. There are parallels here between Liverpool and Detroit and any large urban centre which loses its economic base and which is perceived as ‘ungovernable’. This paper reflects on how the City of Liverpool moved from that place to enjoy a form of urban renaissance. The second linked paper ‘Liverchester/Manpool? The Curious Case of the Lack of Intra-Urban Leadership in the Twin Cities of the North-West’, Headlam examines the extent to which urban policy and city leadership is predicated on some form of competition and rivalry. As the paper illustrates historical rivalries from a soft base (football/culture) are one thing but hard competition (placing of an airport, economic investment in key infrastructure a new rail link to London) can represent something quite different. The absence of a shared leadership approach between two strategically, culturally and politically city regions in the United Kingdom would appear to disempower both. The third set of themes learning from outside our experience and the capacity of leaders to reflect are contained within three separate papers. Howell and Shand (Leadership in the European Union), Sancino, Meneguzzo and Cristofoli (Italian City Managers) and Auber et al. (French perspective on UK local authorities) all offer different insights and analysis but there is a shared approach here too. We wanted to look for examples where there was evidence of cross cultural or cross organisational analysis and learning. These papers offer examples of both and they illustrate some important themes and questions for reflection too. We think that these themes include the following: the need to situate our analysis in an institutional context as well as political, cultural and temporal one. Each of the three papers included here acknowledge these factors and their analysis of them offers insight and understanding of these aspects interconnect and shape (or are shaped) by time and culture too. We think that a key learning point for an informed understanding of the political consequences or reactions to the crises lies in the extent to which we are able to stand back from an immediate response and can locate our analysis in this multi-layered form. The final two papers focus on different aspects of leadership but ones which sit neatly alongside the overall focus of this volume. Murdock draws

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on his work on the not for profit sector in the United Kingdom and examines the extent to which faith and /or profit motives shape models of leadership and decision making. In the final paper Zehndorfer and Mackintosh use the example of a UK political leader to explore how the concept of charismatic leadership can be used to ensure organisational change.

SUMMARY These different papers provide insights and opportunities for discussion on how political and institutional leaders have responded to the economic crises. We are less confident (perhaps) than we were three years ago that institutional actors and key decision makers would be able to create the space for reform and change. The lessons explored in the papers that follow suggest that innovation , autonomy and the capacity as well as the willingness to act as ‘leaders’ are all highly contingent on the capacity to create political space and support; the ability to see opportunities and propose new solutions; and the willingness to cede power and authority. John Diamond Joyce Liddle Editors

PUSHING IT! AUSTERITY URBANISM AND DISPERSED LEADERSHIP THROUGH ‘FLEET-OF-FOOT’ MECHANISMS IN TIMES OF CRISIS Lee Pugalis, Alan Townsend and Lorraine Johnston ABSTRACT Purpose The form of crisis-governance responses to austerity urbanism that is the focus of this paper is ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnerships. These non-statutory mechanisms which champion dispersed forms of leadership are crafted in policy discourse as lean, mean, crisis-tackling fighting machines. Their perceived agility and entrepreneurialism are often lauded, yet empirical evidence for these traits remains sparse. This paper investigates this concern through the lens of the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) in England, which are deemed by some to exude some of the defining characteristics of ‘fleet-of-foot’ mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach A mixed method approach was utilised, including analysis of socio-economic datasets and qualitative policy analysis of primary and secondary material. The quantitative

European Public Leadership in Crisis? Critical Perspectives on International Public Sector Management, Volume 3, 1 25 Copyright r 2014 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420140000003001

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element includes analysis of employment and journey-to-work data, whereas the qualitative material originated from a review of LEP proposals, and narrative analysis of transcripts of interviews undertaken since 2010, together with other textual artefacts. Findings The findings reveal that dispersed public leadership is problematic as a mode of crisis-governance. LEPs were adopted as a crisisgovernance fix. These loose (or looser) constellations of many, varied actors, are considered to be more flexible, responsive and deliveryorientated than more traditional and statutory democratic-administrative mechanisms: lean, mean, crisis-tackling fighting machines. Flexibility is a primary trait of ‘fleet-of-foot’ configurations and perhaps the defining feature of LEPs. Research limitations The programme of research remains on-going, which reflects the continual shifts in the form and configurations of LEPs. Practical implications Detecting some of the primary weaknesses of ‘fleet-of-foot’ public leadership arrangements, the research draws attention to some of the dangers of pushing austerity down and through ‘fleet-of-foot’ formations. The practical implications are highlighted by examining the limits of LEPs to achieve efficient outcomes or to open up a shared leadership space. Originality/value Through an engagement with current conceptual and policy debates where austerity ‘blows out’ across Europe, it is observed that austerian politics may be pushing partnership bodies too far, thus risking the danger of overburdening and under-resourcing the very distributed leadership mechanisms that are expected to reconcile local economic crises and stimulate local growth. This paper also contributes to the literature on dispersed public leadership, which runs counter to traditional command and control leadership constructs. Keywords: Economic strategy; austerity urbanism; Local Enterprise Partnerships; local public leadership; dispersed leadership

INTRODUCTION This paper is set within a context of ‘austerity urbanism’ and the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crises which manifest in different ways across different places. One far-reaching trend is the propensity for central

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governments to ‘push’ the burdens associated with fiscal crisis down towards local public leaders. Consequently, across Europe leaders from diverse sectoral backgrounds are joining forces to ‘share’ dispersed public leadership challenges as fleeting forms of cooperation are mobilised to help urban areas muddle through crisis. The purpose of this paper is to examine these trends. Austerity politics are ‘push’ politics … [that] involve pushing the costs, risks and burdens of economic failure onto subordinate classes, social groups and branches of government. (Peck, 2013, p. 4)

Increasing attention in neoliberal austerity politics is concerned with what Jamie Peck identifies as a subtle but far-reaching process of responsibility switching: ‘pushing it’ down and across the boundaries of dispersed local public leadership. These practices, entangled with other neoliberal tactics and repertoires, are producing conditions of ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 2013). As Peck argues this involves ‘every-city-for-itself’ (2013, p. 4, original emphasis). For those cities that are unable to swim, the possibility exists for them to be left to sink! Such a crisis, symptomatic of unforgiving austerian politics, has afflicted some cities in the United States and forced them into a vicious circle of debt. Detroit is perhaps the most infamous, but there are countless others. In recognition of such experiences and episodes, Blyth (2013) considers the notion of ‘austerity’ to be a ‘dangerous idea’. Thus, it could be contended that austerian politics is also dangerous; with inherent risks. Austerity urbanism, it has been argued, could produce a paradigm shift from market-based to austerity-based urbanism strategies. Understood as a form of ‘mismanagement’; the process is driving European local public leadership into crisis (cf. Peck, 2013), as austerity measures have increased the burden of vulnerability (Beck, 1992; Boin & t’Hart, 2003, p. 545) and jeopardise the future of entire cities. This unleashes a monumental challenge for local actors, which has been characterised by some, such as Boin and t’Hart, as ‘mission impossible’ in light of the cumulative and incapacitating effects brought about by ‘several modernization processes’ (2003, pp. 544 545). It is a challenge that has ‘thrust the private sector to the forefront of leading ‘places’ (Liddle, 2012). Peck (2013, p. 4) observes that austerity is synonymous with ‘redistribution’. In this vein, the redistribution of austerity is framed in the expressive language of ‘muddling through’, ‘leaner states’, ‘budget deficit’, ‘burden’, ‘crisis’, ‘fiscal stress’, ‘state failure’, ‘risk-shifting’, ‘political mismanagement’, ‘public asset stripping’, ‘bankruptcy’ and ‘pressure’ (Peck, 2013).

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While such a lexicon is illustrative rather than exhaustive, a key concern in this paper is how constructs of contemporary European politics appear to be pushing austerity onto cities and the urban scale more broadly, and cajoling local urban actors to take a collective share in ventures through cooperation in public-private partnerships. Austerian politics is ‘pushing’ responsibilities down onto ‘others’ and making ‘others pay’, which is rooted in the ‘costs and risks of economic stagnation, deregulatory failure and financial overreach’ (Peck, 2013, p. 3). Peck also observes that ‘how others pay’, is likened to ‘displacement’ of the national state and the ‘… consequences of the Wall Street crisis from the market to the state, from elites to the marginalised and from the federal government to state and municipal authorities’ and of the ‘… responsibility, indeed the blame, for macroeconomic failure and political mismanagement’ (Peck, 2013, p. 3). Push politics and push policies raise concern for dispersed local public leadership embedded in the governance of partnership working. Furthermore, Peck argues that: … austerity must be discursively pushed, since its necessitation appeal is far from selfevident. Even if the language of ‘belt-tightening’ and ‘living within our means’ does appeal to a certain utilitarian common sense. Austerity, in this respect, entails a concerted renarration of the financial crisis in the form of new homilies of (local) state failure, in the service of this effort to redistribute both the costs of and the responsibility of the crisis. (2013, p. 3)

The form of crisis-governance responses to austerity urbanism that is the focus of this paper is what is known in the practitioner community and referred to by some research participants as ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnership arrangements (Pugalis, 2011a). These loose (or looser) constellations of many, varied actors, are considered to be more flexible, responsive and delivery-orientated than more traditional and statutory democraticadministrative mechanisms: lean, mean, crisis-tackling fighting machines. Their perceived agility and entrepreneurialism are often lauded, yet empirical evidence for these traits remains sparse (Olesen, 2012; Pugalis, 2011a). Strategies of austerity urbanism embrace a wide range of interventions and endeavours comprising of leaner local states, rollback redux, fire-sale privatization, placebo dependency, risk-shifting rationalities and austerity governance (Peck, 2012, pp. 648 649). Moreover, austerity strategies include rebalancing the burden of extreme public deficiencies and increased sovereign debts, participation in competitive public funding to overcome a deficiency of income and distributing expenditure cuts, and coming up with more innovative ways to raise taxes and reduce spending in rebalancing budget deficits.

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Since the late 1990s, less-formal, ‘looser’ cross-boundary, partnerships have risen in prominence, sometimes promoted by central states, at other times via bottom-up mobilisation, but often through more messy, spatially situated interpretations of centralist and localist policies. Confirming their fleeting nature, fleet-of-foot partnerships have often been superseded after only a few years of existence as part of a continual search for efficacious policy instruments (Healey, 2007; Olesen, 2012). The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, we reconceptualise public leadership in the context of urban austerity. Second, we construct a theoretical scaffold which relies on new ‘fleet-of-foot’ entities and present a critical examination of the policy preference for these lean, mean, crisis-tackling fighting machines. Our analysis highlights some of the key implications which they carry for urban austerity strategies and in particular how they are being pushed onto local public leadership, through the empirical case of English Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). To support this analysis a mixed method approach was utilised, including analysis of socio-economic datasets and qualitative policy analysis of primary and secondary material. The quantitative element includes analysis of employment and journey-to-work data, which is known to have informed the government’s approval processes for LEPs. The qualitative material originated from a review of LEP proposals including local deliberations involved in the submissions made to government for LEPs, and narrative analysis of transcripts of interviews undertaken since 2010, written material and reported speeches, including evidence to select committees, ministerial statements and press releases. Thus, this paper examines the crucial features of a shared public leadership approach in contemporary ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnerships, together with emergence of what might become known as austerian-inflected economic strategies. In the final section, we conclude with a synthesis of core findings and primary arguments. Providing an empirical analysis of dispersed leadership in times of crisis, the finding from this research draw attention to some of the dangers of pushing austerity down and through ‘fleet-of-foot’ formations. Detecting some of the primary weaknesses of ‘fleet-of-foot’ public leadership arrangements, the paper concludes by highlighting the limits of LEPs to achieve efficient outcomes or to open up a shared leadership space (i.e., for a richer constellation of actors to participate in governance forums across flexible and functional geographies). In contributing to the current debate where austerity ‘blows out’ across Europe we observe that austerian politics may be pushing partnership bodies too far, thus risking the danger of overburdening and under-resourcing the very distributed leadership mechanisms that are expected to reconcile local economic crises and stimulate local

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growth. It is hoped that the analysis and discussion that ensue below will be of interest to policy makers and public sector leaders operating in England and further afield as the paper contributes to the literature on urban austerity strategies and contemporary trends in European public leadership more broadly.

RE-CONCEPTUALISING ‘PUBLIC LEADERSHIP’ The question of ‘public leadership’ continues to be debated and some have argued the idea holds ‘curious connotations’ (Kellerman & Webster, 2001, p. 485). Equally, the public leadership phenomenon has begun to generate renewed interest from academics and policy makers, yet the term is devoid of meaning. It is for this reason that we conceptualise ‘public leadership’ as being more embracing than that of ‘civic leadership’, with the latter having particular connotations with elected politicians. In practical terms as well as theoretical debates, as Kellerman and Webster (2001, p. 485) note, the ‘lines between the public, private and non-profit sectors have been blurred; and the words “leader” and “leadership” … diminished’. Similarly, public leadership is increasingly implicated in risk-shifting and in deciding how to make financial cuts, and presenting nation states and governments with anxiety of how to deal with the challenge of pushing austerity (Hacker, 2006; Peck, 2013). In this sense, the challenge for public leadership lies in demonstrating that they can force through more innovative means in grappling with multifaceted austerity strategies. While the current crisis is complex and appears to be a ‘mission impossible’ it offers a unique challenge for policy makers to innovate in new models of public-private partnerships. Boin, Hart, Stern and Sundelius (2006, p. 2) signalled that in contemporary governance debates, the politics of dealing with crisis is unimagined. Experiments and push tactics appear to position public leadership under an enormous burden: creaking from the stresses and strains of year-on-year budget cuts. In dealing with debt the burden is rationalized and expenditure reshuffled through a process of dispersion. However, once dispersed to cities, local government and local communities, there is no further body to push it to (Peck, 2012). Therefore, there is an onus on civic, business and community leaders to cooperate, as through public leadership partnership frameworks, often brought together and then formalised through various forms of incentive structures. In contrast to out-dated command and control leadership styles, austerity push tactics are ‘nudging’ local public

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authorities in the direction of adopting shared leadership models, albeit models where they tend to retain individual statutory, legal and accountability responsibilities as well as a significant share of the liability of risk. Hence, the challenge for public leadership, Boin et al. (2006, p. 1) claims: [Is in] times of crisis, citizens look at their leaders: presidents and mayors, local politicians and elected administrators, public managers and top civil servants. We expect these policy makers to avert the threat or at least minimize the damage of the crisis at hand. (Boin et al., 2006, p. 1)

Traditional conjecture constructs public leadership as a distinctive and learned behaviour. Alternatively, some suggest that public leadership is underpinned by heroic or charismatic action (Parry & Kempster, 2014). Boin and t’Hart (2003, p. 545) draw attention to the idea that expectations of public leadership are intensified in times of crisis. Prevailing models of leadership present crisis as an opportunity for enterprising and innovative behaviour (Borins, 2000, 2002), as well as requirements to manage increasingly complex issues, systems of governance and legislation. Further, Boin and t’Hart (2003, p. 551) caution that: Leaders should not push reform without considering opposite arguments. If they use the crisis to ignore critics, they will mobilize their own opposition at a time when their performance is already under scrutiny.

Such jeopardy brings forward the view that not paying attention to counter-strategies is disadvantageous, and exemplifies the position that contemporary urban challenges lie beyond the purview of any single heroic leader (or indeed organisation). Yukl (2008) argues that dispersed leadership rejects the notion of heroic leader as impractical. It is recognised that more cooperative and collaborative styles of public leadership can ‘add value’ to new forms of networked governance through utilising selective expertise and skills appropriate to a given situation (Friedrich, Vessey, Schuelke, Ruark, & Mumford, 2009; Liddle, 2012). More nuanced forms of dispersed leadership are interrelated and at the same time hold diverse responsibilities. Accordingly in times of heightened uncertainty a public leadership style is symbolic of dispersed leadership in which leadership processes are distributed throughout the social structure (Spillane, 2012; Yukl, 2009). A key aspect of dispersed leadership is the capability to draw human capital and facilitate knowledge, creativity and productivity (Storey, 2004). In this sense innovation is translated through institutional frontiers both horizontally and vertically across multiple scales

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of governance. This type of dispersed public leadership is a shift away from transactional towards more transformational leadership (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Burns, 1978). As Grint (2005) argues, transformational leadership calls for ‘tough love’, a resolute but caring approach which surpasses selfcentredness. Thus, transformational leaders are deemed to be charismatic and transcend organisational boundaries. A key aspect of transformational leaders is ‘learning to learn’ through creating a shared vision through inspiring others (Bass, 1991; Bass & Avolio, 1994). In particular, while dispersed leadership contrasts with traditional command and control forms of public leadership, the latter is fixated on performance. The success of dispersed forms of collaborative leadership is predicated on the strength of ‘voluntaristic linkages’ (Liddle, 2012), and this applies at the point now where this paper will soon move on to urban terrains sub-regional areas comprised of more than one set of local authorities. Liddle ‘argues that in the future, leaders must continually move beyond their own organisational boundaries into “collaborative leadership spaces” and act on behalf of the city region for the public interest’, whereby ‘entrepreneurial leaders move beyond existing frames of reference to innovate and transform co-produced and experimental new angles on traditional problems’ (Liddle, 2012). One commonality of dispersed leadership amongst researchers, however, is the acceptance that mutual decision-making is slower. Fundamentally, Grint reminds us of the merit residing in individual leadership, and that ‘we cannot achieve coordinated responses to collective wicked issues by turning our backs upon individual leadership’. It is in this sense, for example, that previous work on public leadership progresses the view of ‘doing more with less’ through outsourcing (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000). From this view, dispersed public leadership can provide the two approaches in a multifaceted approach which is reliant on individual leadership to make decisions.

THE ENGLISH RESPONSE TO CONTEMPORARY CRISES: LOCAL ENTERPRISE PARTNERSHIPS AND AUSTERITY URBANISM This paper has so far started to help reconceptualise public leadership in the context of urban austerity. In this section, we now illustrate the greater emergence of shared public leadership in England, in particular through

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the emergence of LEPs which are led by business leaders as well as local authority leaders. The most recent opportunity for ‘fleet-of-foot’ entities followed the UK change of government of 2010. The orientation and administration of urban policy and economic interventions in England entered a state of considerable flux following the general election in 2010, which resulted in the formation of a Coalition Government between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats (see, for example, Pugalis & Bentley, 2013a; 2013b). The Coalition embarked on a brief review and subsequent reconfiguration of governance apparatus to help contend with austere urban conditions. This involved some blunt changes to policy, which included the dismantling of regional structures of governance and termination of ring-fenced sources of funding, which saw the winding-up of numerous area-based initiatives, including the well-resourced Working Neighbourhood Fund, urban and city development companies, Multi-Area Agreement partnerships, and the pan-regional Northern Way growth strategy. Whilst the Coalition administration’s anti-regional discourse in local government policy was evident, their economic policy framework had created space across the sub-national terrain for some ‘new’ configurations in the shape of joint partnerships. Befitting an age of austerity, LEPs, which have been described by some policy actors as exuding ‘fleet-of-foot’ characteristics, were promoted. The subsequent development of 39 LEPs has formed a new map of geographically defined entities of urban austerity crisis-governance which began to emerge from October 2010 onwards (HM Government, 2010b). As voluntaristic public-private partnerships comprised of business, local government leaders and other actors crucially working together (Liddle, 2012), LEPs were adopted as a crisis-governance fix, operating somewhere above the local but below the national tier of government (HM Government, 2010a). Their broad strategic remit of stimulating local growth was encouraged to take a locally distinct form, with government refraining from prescribing roles, although LEPs have since been encouraged to bid for national funds and initiatives, including Enterprise Zones and the Regional Growth Fund and, from 2014, distribution of EU Structural Funds and, from 2015, the Single Local Growth Fund (HM Treasury & Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), 2013). Although there was considerable uncertainty regarding their role and status in the early stages of their formation (Bailey, 2011; Pugalis, 2010, 2011b; Theobald, 2010), as quasi-delivery and governance arms of the central state LEPs have emerged as crucial entities for collaborative leadership (Liddle, 2012). The next section conceptualises and unpacks the notion of

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‘fleet-of-foot’ partnership constellations, before we apply this theoretical framework to an empirical analysis of the nature of LEPs.

CONCEPTUALISING ‘FLEET-OF-FOOT’ PARTNERSHIP CONFIGURATIONS The definition of ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnerships used in this paper derives from an implicit narrative in regular usage among practitioners (Pugalis, 2011a) and as a term explicitly referred to by some interview participants, which continues to spread through different groups of policy actors and leadership networks. The term has emerged from such dispersed leadership formations, operating without a statutory basis either in an Act of Parliament or through the decisions and actions of elected politicians, and employing only a small core of staff. ‘Fleet-of-foot’ arrangements may decide on the use of joint funds, or make recommendations or decisions for the use of external funding streams and grants, but are unlikely to provide the ‘accountable body’. The context is one of a dominant political narrative in which hierarchical structures of government (i.e. command and control systems) are represented as unsuitable for mobilising the diverse resources necessary to contend with urban crises. Dispersed leadership networks that transect traditional policy domains and sectoral interests are often required, especially those that bring together or ‘place’ actors from different authorities, which are dispersed through ‘multi-level’ or ‘multi-scalar’ forms of governance (Bache & Flinders, 2004; Kokx & van Kempen, 2010). Concomitantly, the normal ‘formal’ types of government authority have been represented as ‘bounded spaces’ (and often inward-facing), that on their own lack the resources to efficiently perform crisis-governance. These formal spaces of government, including democratically elected arenas of governance, have been criticised for their lack of agility. Some of the most prominent shortcomings relate to matters concerning participation, functionality and efficiency. Formal organs of government, especially those operating across subnational terrains, have been criticised for inserting an unnecessary bureaucratic layer that can impede local democratic interests, business actors and civic society from engaging in urban governance. Contrasting with such bureaucracies of the (central and local) state, proponents of fleet-of-foot partnerships contend that they ‘open up’ space for a richer constellation of public, private and non-profit actors to meet and participate in the

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distributed leadership of particular places: ‘there to solve problems and move bureaucracy out of the way not add to it’, according to one LEP chair, which is entirely consistent with the Community Secretary, Eric Pickles’ provocative statements about the need ‘to tear down the culture of delay in local government circles that’s paralysed action and growth’ (April 2012). The ethos of partnerships generally suggests that they countenance hegemonic views and interests, although fleet-of-foot partnerships tend to share a preference for commercial acumen, private sector experience and business skills. Hence, purported private business attributes are most favoured. A key argument of the supporters of these forms of partnerships is that they can better reflect local issues, as they are intended to ‘work with’ the flexible contours of functional geographies (as part of working with prevailing market conditions). In addition, ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnerships are seen to evade the domination of a single organisation and retain the flexibility to combine and recombine key partners according to shared goals and emerging priorities. Fleet-of-foot partnerships are often put forward as offering more flexible geographical configurations that may benefit from ‘fuzzy’ borders and extended geographies of influence. These partnerships have thus been referred to as ‘soft spaces’ in contradistinction to the ‘hard spaces’ of government and regulation that they often seek to influence (Haughton, Allmendinger, & Oosterlynck, 2013). The Coalition Government considers ‘functional’ or what they refer to as ‘real’ or ‘natural’ geographies to be the most appropriate scale for devising economic strategies (Cable & Pickles, 2010; HM Government, 2010b; HM Treasury & Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), 2013), whereas austerity measures have been pushed towards local government. Yet, for all the emphasis on geographies of flows (that reflect relational sensibilities of space), in practice fleet-of-foot partnerships tend to be firmly anchored in place and are actively engaged in territorial politics (Macleod & Jones, 2007). Lastly, fleet-of-foot partnerships have been promoted as more efficient than formal spaces of government or state agencies (HM Government, 2010b). Such configurations are propounded to mobilise different actors, resources and powers in well organised and competent ways. They can derive from business leaders not only clearer vision and determination in decision-making but also greater freedom from the bureaucratic rules, checks and procedures that often restrict public sector actors. Loose groupings of leaders reflect an opportunity to achieve economies of scale in administration. The search for economic efficiency, whilst persistent, is particularly prevalent in an era of austerity.1

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Proponents of fleet-of-foot partnerships, including some interviewees, have argued that they can operate effectively without the need for large secretariats or multimillion pound running costs. For example, one LEP chair, who has since resigned, argued that ‘Where Regional Agencies failed is that they thought waving a magic wand of money would cure all ills … LEPs know better’. Fleet-of-foot mechanisms are thus expounded to be cost-effective potentially financially self-sustaining and useful entities that can respond to opportunities. Government ministers have also been dismissive of the ‘army of bureaucrats’ hindering private enterprise and business growth. ‘Doing more with less’ is based on the assumption that resources are already available, thus the partnership acts as a mechanism for bringing disparate interests together to deliver specific priorities and projects. Mackintosh (1992) has referred to this as the logic of ‘budget enlargement’, which has proved to be a key motive guiding the formation and durability of partnerships, as in the case of demonstrating private sector leverage in order to unlock public finance. The hypothetical nimbleness of ‘fleet-of-foot’ arrangements is also expected to speedup decision-making processes, guided by ‘business-like’ practices and pro-growth ideologies. In view of their streamlined structures, flexibility and agility; ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnerships are claimed to be efficient. It can be asserted that the initiation of fleet-of-foot partnerships is particularly favourable during periods of crisis, when constructing urban austerity strategies is consistent with neoliberal worldviews and political practices, in liberalising market conditions. Although the implementation and actualisation of these broad brush tendencies are spatially diverse, some defining associated features include (1) the shrinking of state infrastructure and social services, (2) the promotion of competition and privatisation of services, (3) pro-growth, pro-business policies that place a premium on private sector expertise and business leadership, (4) functional and flexible geographies, (5) incentives and economic inducements over redistributional grant funding and (6) their representing informal vehicles that can be reshaped to respond to new agendas or else rapidly dissolved to be replaced with a new partnership configuration, in the current conjuncture; LEPs.

THE EMERGENCE OF LOCAL ENTERPRISE PARTNERSHIPS’ FUNCTIONS LEPs were promoted by the Coalition Government as a mechanism for providing for a style of distributed and collaborative economic leadership

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that might wish to engage in a fairly open ‘menu’ of policy pursuits and activities related to engendering economic growth, so long as they can resource it (Liddle, 2012). These new partnership arrangements can be seen as a policy response to a depleted public sector, one that might help to temper the shrinking of state infrastructure and social services as well as promote the competition and privatisation of services. The open menu of policy pursuits that LEPs could perform included transport, planning, housing and tourism, as well as economic development, enterprise and business support. Yet, in practice the apparent ‘local choice’ and ‘freedoms’ were curtailed by a lack of funding and legislative-policy levers that directed LEPs, certainly in their initial years of operation, towards a laissez-faire approach to championing growth that made use of a limited neoliberal toolkit, such as Enterprise Zones (Pugalis & McGuinness, 2013). Little guidance on the scope and formation of LEPs was forthcoming from government, although there was an implicit recognition that they should be based on new spatial imaginaries distinct from those of the redundant administrative regions of England, together with an explicit preference for partnership configurations to reflect ‘natural economic geographies’ (Cable & Pickles, 2010). However as it transpired, the lack of guidance created a space that was quickly filled by a politics of place. The result was frenzied activity by those bargaining and forming territorial alliances (Pugalis, 2011a). By the end of 2011, a total of 39 LEPs had been approved, covering every part of England while some local authorities remain members of multiple LEPs. This resulted in ‘fuzzy’ geographies from a process of selfdefinition (see Fig. 1). Contrary to original ministerial guidance, some proposals comprised of a single upper-tier authority were accepted at this stage (e.g., Cumbria), while some overlapping rival proposers settled to enter one LEP. The new government context was not necessarily one where old alliances, networks and horizontal relations would be rendered redundant in favour of new national political priorities. Analysis of the negotiation of spatial coalitions behind new LEP submissions indicates that the legacy of cordial relations from earlier collaborative projects and/or disbanded units such as former Metropolitan Counties performed an instrumental role. This is consistent with the theorisation of fleet-of-foot arrangements, which suggests that these ‘softer spaces’ can be reshaped to respond to new agendas, with several interviewees referring to ‘rebadging’ and ‘rebranding’ extant entities. Alternatively, fleet-of-foot partnerships can be just as easily disbanded and entirely new configurations set-up. The next section

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Fig. 1.

The Geography of Local Enterprise Partnerships.

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examines the extent to which LEPs reflect the theoretical principles associated with ‘fleet-of-foot’ distributed leadership entities.

AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEPS AS ‘FLEET-OF-FOOT’ DISTRIBUTED LEADERSHIP ENTITIES The organised opportunity in effect to react against formal spaces of government/governance has had different qualities of political and economic outcome in distinct parts of England, but some LEPs can be considered to be the next stage in the evolution of fleet-of-foot arrangements. Taking three strands of a ‘fleet-of-foot’ analytical framework in turn, the nature of LEPs can be assessed. To ‘Open Up’ Space for a Richer Constellation of Public, Private and Non-Profit Actors to Navigate Urban Crisis through Distributed Public Leadership Some LEPs were set up as business-led entities, typically with majority private sector boards, and others as multi-sector entities, typically with a prominent leadership role for local authorities. Alternatively, LEPs can be described as quasi-public organisations in the sense that they were initiated by the state and relied on the state for the majority of their funding, or ‘techniques of government’ to invoke Foucauldian terminology (Pugalis & Townsend, 2012). Indeed, government decided which proposals for LEP status would be granted and which would be rejected, so they are in effect creatures of government; prone to ‘command and control’ tactics. This view was supported in the interviews carried out as part of the research for this paper, as with private sector board members (‘followers’), who look to central government to set out substantive functions for LEPs to undertake (see also HOC, 2013). These partnerships can be considered to be ‘private sector’ in the sense that each of the 39 LEPs has a chair leader appointed from industry, and most have a private sector majority board. This calls into question the merits of business leadership under the present configuration. What private sector leadership actually means in practice and the roles performed by business actors’ warrant further research. LEPs are also consistent with the notion of multi-sector entities as they are private-public partnerships between business and local authorities, with

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many of them including representatives from higher/further education and to a much lesser degree charitable and broader sector interests, such as social housing providers. With the role, governance and constitution of LEPs continuing to evolve especially between 2013 and 2015 in the light of their impending responsibilities of developing Strategic Economic Plans and European Structural Fund Investment Strategies the challenge for LEPs to ‘open up’ space for a richer constellation of actors (and decisively those representing social and environmental interests) will remain a moving target and on-going challenge. However, while some research participants described their respective LEPs as ‘a network of networks’ and ‘partnership of partnerships’, the claim that LEPs, as manifestations of the ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnership concept, are inherently open should be treated with caution. Across the landscape of LEPs some display the elitist tendencies of operating as ‘closed shops’ (Pugalis, 2012), which are compounded by the fact that most private sector board members are appointed in an individual capacity, and therefore LEPs are not necessarily symbolic of their local business communities. Interviews with some LEP officers and board members revealed that extending the remit of LEPs from ‘core economic development’ concerns was ‘not what we signed up for and didn’t ask for’ adds weight to the view that LEPs are creatures of government. To Represent Functional Geographies Some LEPs’ areas enjoy a degree of functional integrity and economies of scale that broadly correspond with notions of ‘functional economic geographies’, as the removal of regional apparatus provided some localities with the opportunity to construct new spatial imaginaries, and arguably more ‘functional’, spatial alliances. Nevertheless in general, it was possible (as described above) to detect local government ‘politicking’ which has produced a reversion towards the smallest politically workable intermunicipal territory available. In most city regions, exemplified by Greater Manchester, the process has simply confirmed and/or augmented existing institutional arrangements. The concept of ‘functional areas’ has been used and abused in policy-practice to serve a variety of interests. In the words of one LEP chair: The LEP boundaries and sizes seemed sometimes to be politically driven under the camouflage of functional economics insufficient strategic consideration was given to the LEP coverage of the country; and little serious consideration seemed given to the confusing

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impact of allowing overlapping LEP areas. This has resulted in an overcomplicated network of massively different LEPs based perhaps more on political geographies, rather than sub-regional economic areas. Localism is an interesting innovative concept but if applied to my car, if all four wheels were allowed to be different sizes, shapes and positions, it wouldn’t aid the car much in its progress. (Pratt, 2013, Ev 55, original emphasis)

Nevertheless, it appears, most importantly, that the internal interactions of many LEPs are more harmonious than the spatial politics that were performed across many of the preceding large administrative regions, such as the South West of England beset by conflict between Devon, Cornwall and the rest. It remains unclear whether other aspects of cohesiveness of some LEPs outweigh their lack of functional integrity. Some policy proposals since the initiation of LEPs (Heseltine, 2012; HM Treasury, 2012, 2013; HM Treasury & Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), 2013), including the task of devising Strategic Economic Plans, suggest that the ‘softer’ roles of LEPs may be gradually ‘hardening’. This is evidenced in the rise of groupings of local authorities intending to establish Combined Authorities that could provide a firmer democratic and legalistic basis for crisis-governance across urban scales. It is the addition of policy responsibilities such as a role in housing, local transport and European funding from 2014 onwards, as brought together in the government’s response to Lord Heseltine’s proposals for devolution of powers, which will provide the acid test of the functionality of LEPs. The key questions are: Will flexible geographies persist or might some ‘fuzzy’ borders in the overlapped areas adopt harder edges? What will be the implications of local authority dual LEP membership in terms of funding allocations and legal duties? Will alternative spatial imaginaries undermine the cohesiveness of some LEPs? Thus, while the large number of LEPs provides for more cohesive units, the resulting greater number of boundaries can lead to fresh division as well as sometimes to useful new forms of cross-boundary working. Consequently, the search for improved ‘natural’ economic geographies persists as England’s fixation with functional and flexible crisis-governance arrangements appears set to continue.

Are LEPs Providing More Efficient Urban Austerity Response Strategies than Formal Spaces of Government? Until early 2013, the role of LEPs in mobilising substantive economic strategies was rather ad hoc, reactive and opportunistic. Assessments of

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effectiveness to date have been critical of the pace of decision-making and impact in LEPs (Bolton & Coupar, 2011; Ward & Hardy, 2012). However, this can be explained in part by the lack of policy clarity, tangible functions and financial resources/incentives provided by central government (Pugalis, Shutt, & Bentley, 2012). Their relative ‘fleet-of-foot’ speed is shown by the ability of some LEPs to produce Strategic Economic Plans in a matter of months in the second half of 2013 and early 2014, whilst also putting in place systems of governance and establishing back-office functions (which compares favourably with the years that it took many Regional Development Agencies to reach maturity). Each LEP is organised differently, with around half of LEPs taking on a legal personality as others are configured as the nodal point of networks. Structural characteristics of dispersed leadership operating in some LEPs demonstrate a labyrinth of ‘action groups’, ‘task and finish groups’, ‘investment panels’, ‘task forces’, ‘area committees’, ‘thematic groups’, ‘rapid response units’ and other committees that support the primary shared ‘leadership board’. These are typically supported by a secretariat that varies considerably in terms of size, skills and competencies, which often wear multiple ‘hats’ as they switch roles, for example, from a local government officer to an officer of a LEP as is the case in North Yorkshire. In these instances, the leadership board is the focal point and external face, potentially providing a degree of visible collective leadership but may not necessarily be driving the LEP’s economic strategy. Other LEPs, such as Buckinghamshire Thames Valley, emerged via the dispersed leadership of a group of entrepreneurs and have contracted the Buckinghamshire Business First membership organisation to provide secretariat services. Views vary significantly about what LEPs are ‘there to achieve’. For example, several interviews were conducted with public and private members of one particular LEP and each actor described the role of the LEP and even ‘what the LEP is’ in different ways. It is not uncommon for some to view a particular LEP as a ‘dispersed leadership’ group, with others referring to the roles of ‘governance’ or ‘strategy-making’, some drawing attention to programme management of several related activities, others lobbying, or ‘driving local growth’. One research participant cogently summarised the views expressed by an overriding number of interviewees through the statement that ‘every LEP is different, is organised differently, and has got a different philosophy’. Flexibility is a primary trait of ‘fleetof-foot’ configurations and perhaps the defining feature of LEPs. Nevertheless, assessing the efficiency of a LEP is contingent on the particular roles and tasks that form part of the complement of activities that

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a LEP may actually be engaged in. Whether each LEP is deemed to be competent is a matter of debate that would benefit from more individual and comparative case study research. Some LEPs have helped to drive through the pooling of specific public sector (especially local government) resources, which is a complex process requiring agreements between various layers of government. Many more LEPs have made greater strides in terms of sharing of softer resources including knowledge, economic intelligence, staffing and accommodation between partners, and have benefited from in-kind support. With financial resources restricted, many LEPs’ shared leader networks have concentrated on where efficiency savings can be made. This has involved making public sector systems ‘leaner’ but also ‘business proofing’ local government services. The challenge of non-statutory partnership mechanisms providing efficiencies via cajoling partners, rather than relying on the enhanced controls that a statutory body may be able to rely on, should not be underestimated. The competency of some LEPs has been undermined by a legacy of territorial disputes, political rivalries and partner suspicion. One interviewee revealed that ‘too many [local authorities] actually want the LEP to fail’, which highlights the misguided assumption that LEPs are composed of partners of the willing. It is such animosity that prompted Eric Pickles, Communities Secretary, to call for business leaders on LEP boards to ‘name and shame’ local authorities that obstruct their plans for growth. Whether this would engender partner trust is doubtful, but serves to highlight one of the prime weaknesses of the ‘fleet-of-foot’ dispersed leadership model. In the sense of crude financial costs, LEPs in early 2014 are significantly cheaper than some of the administrative machinery that they have partially replaced. Simply put, they have less employees and a smaller amount of over-heads, but they also have fewer responsibilities and delivery capabilities. Hence, at present there is no evidence to substantiate the claim that LEPs are more efficient (Bentley & Pugalis, 2013). The efficiency of LEPs is further mired by a situation in which there is no standard monitoring framework and the accountability of many LEPs also remains shrouded in mystery. Until each LEP settles on substantive dispersed leadership roles, which extends beyond the rhetoric of providing ‘strategic economic leadership’, it will be difficult to assess their efficiency and effectiveness (Boin & t’Hart, 2003). Such a situation is likely to require in-depth analysis of individual LEPs or groupings of them, such as a comparative analysis of the 39 Strategic Economic Plans that were finalised and approved by government in summer 2014, as it would be too simplistic to identify a single LEP model.

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In April 2013, Vince Cable, Business Secretary, conceded that ‘There is a genuine concern about [LEPs]’, referring to ‘a capacity issue’ as well as ‘an accountability issue’. He cautioned against ‘hand[ing] over large chunks of public money, with limited controls, into [a ‘fleet-of-foot’ LEP] kind of structure … [of] five, six, or seven business people on the board’. Involving ‘leaders of business’ was intended to instil commercial acumen, provide business intelligence and ‘cut through’ local political infighting. If the efficiency of some LEPs is causing ministers ‘concern’, then it is, in part, an outcome of the weaknesses that were designed-in by these same ministers. Broader questions concerning local public leadership in partnerships continue to preoccupy those with an interest in LEPs, as they do other ‘fleet-offoot’ configurations outside of England (Liddle, 2012; Olesen, 2012; Pemberton & Morphet, 2014; Pugalis, 2012). Whilst some LEPs claim to be a ‘partnership of equals’, the power relations are rarely so uniform in politically charged partnership arenas. Those shared business interests that have financially contributed to a LEP’s core running-costs, or provided in-kind back-office support, have often been accused of ‘buying votes’ or ‘trading influence’. Yet 100 percent public funding of LEPs generates alternative dilemmas. Some LEPs are de facto economic development vehicles of the local state, whether acting on behalf of a single County or a grouping of local authorities, albeit an austere version. Such vertical, horizontal and sectoral power imbalances have already resulted in some board resignations, and local authorities threatening to withdraw funding support.

CONCLUDING NOTES Developing the argument that measures of austerity urbanism and rising debt have pushed greater socio-economic responsibilities onto dispersed leadership formations whilst concurrently squeezing their resource base, this paper has investigated this concern through the lens of the LEPs in England characterised as ‘fleet-of-foot’ formations tasked with finding more innovative, shared methods of public leadership and decision-making. Based on the concept of fleet-of-foot partnerships as defined, this paper assessed the opportunities that they can provide under an austerity urbanism framework that can be used to assess them: • To ‘open up’ space for a richer constellation of public, private and nonprofit actors to navigate urban crisis through distributed public

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leadership better reflecting local issues, for example, opportunities to work collaboratively with universities. • To represent functional geographies flexible and responsive dispersed leadership that may benefit from ‘fuzzy’ borders and multiple geographies of scope. • To ask whether they are more efficient urban austerity response strategies than conventional spaces of government well organised and competent, cost-effective and effective and useful. Empirical analysis has been presented which has drawn attention to the primary weaknesses of ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnership arrangements. This leads us to conclude that there are inherent limits to the present configuration of partnership working in LEPs. Through this paper we have begun to reconceptualise public leadership to account for the experiences of urban austerity pushed onto it, as expounded by Jamie Peck. A critical challenge for public leadership in times of crisis and austerity is that of reconciling the risk-shifting tendencies and accountability dilemmas associated with dispersed forms of leadership, governance and decision-making. It is clear that some fundamental concerns remain. International examples of the devastating effects of urban austerity include failed and bankrupt cities (as in the case of Detroit in the US) and the precarious fiscal state of countries in Europe requiring ‘bailouts’ from supranational agencies (as in the case of Greece). Whilst recent economic crises have been less pronounced in England, austerity politics presents some serious challenges for traditional modes of local public leadership. LEPs were promoted as ‘fleet-of-foot’ crisis-governance mechanisms intended to lead longer-term sustainable economic growth. The genesis of LEPs to date has involved a messy, spatially situated inter-penetration of centralist and localist policies. Or put another way, LEPs are the product of entangled interests, including the central and local state and business interests as well as other actors that combine territorial politics and relational networks. Thus, inherited legacies of working relations, cultural affiliations and relatively stable understandings of austerity have combined to influence the overall shape of LEPs in terms of groups of actors, geography and efficient modes of practice. It is apparent that the theoretical principles underpinning the notion of ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnership configurations display some of the difficulties inherent in modes of dispersed leadership and collaborative governance that rely more heavily on cooperative tendencies than they do on control mechanisms. In the case of LEPs, they only partially or superficially

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operationalise each of the three strands above of ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnerships, namely: opening up space through distributed public leadership to ensure that the functional geography is flexible and structurally agile to be deemed capable. First, to date the LEP experiment has failed to engender participatory forms of urban crisis-governance and dispersed business leadership that is radically different from what has gone before. Nevertheless, there is a consensus amongst research participants and media reports that businesses are now more actively involved in urban crisis-governance than at any phase over the past decade. However, this raises other dilemmas such as those of hegemonic business outlooks (e.g., automatic views that ‘growth is always good’). Second, the opportunity for LEP geographies to more closely resemble dynamic and multidimensional functional areas was always likely to be more compromised in practice than in theory. The internal coherence exhibited by some LEP geographies could be undermined by a lack of ‘scale’, leaving many LEPs geographically deficient in respect of transport matters, the tourism offer, open innovation systems, and international patterns of trading and global outlook. A redeeming feature of ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnerships is their intended flexibility: the looseness of LEPs confers the ability to combine and recombine key partners according to core goals and emerging priorities in a business-like manner, which could result in rapid reviews of governance and shifts in dispersed leadership. Third, whether individual LEPs or the network of 39 LEPs can be judged to be more efficient than more formalised structures of governance is unclear. Their competencies, cost-effectiveness and usefulness are highly subjective, being mediated by particular historical geographies and broader economic conditions, amongst other factors. The efficiency of a particular LEP is also influenced by the nuanced stakeholder understanding of what such a partnership ‘is there to do’ its role and remit.

NOTE 1. Organisations such as the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) that had a combined budget of just over £1.4 billion in 2010/11 (which had been reduced from £2.3 billion in 2007 2008), were quickly identified by the Coalition Government for closure, in order to make some short-term budget savings, although transitional costs have proved to be substantial (National Audit Office, 2012).

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This paper is updated and adapted from the paper by Pugalis and Townsend, ‘Trends in place-based economic strategies: England’s fixation with ‘fleet-of-foot’ partnerships’, published in Local Economy, 28(7 8), 693 714.

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HOW PUBLIC LEADERSHIP IS ADDRESSING THE NEED TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE IN LIVERPOOL CITY Paul Joyce and Ged Fitzgerald ABSTRACT Purpose The purpose of this paper is to advance the understanding of the choices and difficulties at a city level that faced public leaders who were trying to pursue economic regeneration while at the same time coping with austerity policies introduced by national government. Design/methodology/approach We are using a case study approach to assess both the type of strategic leadership being offered and the public governance issues faced by Liverpool City. Findings In terms of leadership, the mayor fitted what we describe in the paper as the pragmatic type of strategic leader (long-term perspective providing foresight, and inclusiveness in formulating strategy and plans). The directly elected mayoral system seemed to have a number of advantages, perhaps the key one being that the mayor, acted for the entire city, rather than being the leader of the city council as he was

European Public Leadership in Crisis? Critical Perspectives on International Public Sector Management, Volume 3, 27 46 Copyright r 2014 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420140000003011

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before. New channels of social dialogue had been opened up, especially with the business community. The major difficulties in governance were the overstretched entrepreneurial and strategic capacity of the centre of the council and a lack of coherence in terms of multi-level governance. Social implications The approach to public leadership in Liverpool represents a major break from the past; it was a widening of political inclusiveness to embrace people with a range of political perspectives. It was also a major break from the past in terms of building good relations between public leaders and business leaders. The prize was economic regeneration to create a better platform for social and economic inclusiveness. Keywords: Strategic leadership; public governance; social dialogue; multi-level governance; strategic capacity

INTRODUCTION In this paper a case study is used to look at public leadership responses at a city level to problems of unemployment, austerity and poor national economic performance. These responses are also put in the context of changing ideas about public governance systems. Our analysis of the case suggests that the challenges faced are leading to attempts to develop new forms of public leadership and new forms of public governance. It would be understandable to assume that the financial crisis of 2007 2009 which struck Europe automatically indicates the existence of a public leadership crisis. The view taken here, however, is that the quality of leaders and their effectiveness are judged by how leaders act in difficult times as well as good times, and the judgement about their actions in turn requires that attention is paid to the consequences of their actions. Because of the financial crisis the public throughout Europe became concerned about economic matters; opinion polling showed that the top concerns most widely held by Europe’s citizens were unemployment, the economy generally and price rises. Politicians and civil servants, at the European level, attempted to develop a strategic response to the problems of unemployment and other issues created by poor competitiveness, and this response involved plans for new economic governance arrangements in the European Union (European Commission, 2010).

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Public sector responses were also required at national, regional and local levels. In this case study, we focus on the actions of a city leader who, at the same time as dealing with unprecedented reductions in government funding for local services, prioritised the areas of employment growth, skills training, investment and business opportunities in his attempts to lead one of the major cities of Britain to more prosperous times. He did this as a new directly elected mayor. In meeting the twin challenges of resource reductions and constrained opportunities for local economic growth, the new mayor had to develop innovative, entrepreneurial, pragmatic, dynamic and flexible solutions to satisfy local residents and stakeholders expectations while also negotiating effectively with a national government generally unsympathetic to the challenges of local areas and whose priorities focused exclusively on reducing the size and cost of the state at the same time as seeking to promote economic growth through the private sector. Moreover, this national level approach sought growth to offset austerity but lacked the economic sensitivity of differentiated strategies or solutions for different areas of the country, a factor exacerbated by the dominance of London as an economic and government centre.

PUBLIC LEADERSHIP AND THE NEW GOVERNANCE AGENDA Ideas about government and governing have been changing for over two decades. One of the most important changes in the ideas was the judgement that good government made a difference to national development. This emerged after a long period in which leading politicians in Europe (and elsewhere) were elected because of their opposition to the costs of the welfare state and the rising direct personal taxation rates on income. In a number of countries in the 1970s the anti-welfare state political parties made electoral progress; this can be seen in the cases of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK. In Denmark, for example, the Progress Party made advances in electoral popularity with a manifesto that included reductions in the state bureaucracy and taxation. During the 1980s governments, such as the one led by Margaret Thatcher in the UK, seemed intent on first, privatising nationalised industries, second cutting the size of the state because it was crowding out the private sector, and third reducing the number of civil servants dramatically. At its most extreme, this political mood saw any action by governments as

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less efficient than the private sector and saw the best way of improving national development as being to reduce the role of the state. The negative attitude towards government reversed in the 1990s and the agenda became one of reforming governments to make them more effective. Reformers wanted governments to recognise their limitations in terms of capacity and therefore to be more selective and more focused; they wanted government to do less service delivery but to do more to catalyse action by social partners and civil society and to enable problem solving by non-governmental stakeholders (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development & The World Bank, 1997; Kooiman, 1993; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). The need for a critical look at the effectiveness of existing public governance arrangements in European countries appeared to be underlined during and especially after the financial crisis. There was probably an issue prior to the crisis about how well public governance had been working in relation to the economic sector and especially in respect of the poor productivity record prior to the crisis (although less so for the UK which had an improved record on productivity from the mid-1990s until 2007). But additionally, in some countries (such as the UK) neither the politicians nor the top civil servants had been paying attention to the economy and were surprised when the financial crisis developed. After 2009 it was clear that the European countries were not keeping up with the global economy (see Table 1). Furthermore, poor economic performance after 2009 within Europe led not only to problems for its citizens and its governments, it also

Table 1.

Average Annual Percentage Change in GDP per Capita (Constant 2005 US$).

Country

1996 2006 Change (%)

2006 2012 Change (%)

France Germany Italy Spain UK US Brazil Russia India China

1.76 1.53 1.17 2.89 3.03 2.36 1.19 7.43 6.37 12.33

−0.08 1.30 −1.42 −0.98 −0.67 0.10 2.90 2.98 6.47 12.05

Source: www.databank.worldbank.org

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meant that outside observers could more easily argue that the liberal democratic governments of Europe were not very effective. It could be argued, in fact, that countries that did not have liberal democratic institutions were doing better because they did not have them (Khondker, 2011). The elements of the existing European model of public governance could be summed up as follows: a parliamentary democracy, a professional and impartial civil service, and liberal democratic freedoms such as free speech, freedom of association and a free media. New ideas about good government and public governance, which continued to develop in the last decade, did not necessarily replace these elements in the governance model with new ones so much as suggest that they needed to be supplemented with public management capabilities. Drawing on the work of the OECD, which has been conducting public governance reviews in European countries, and also drawing on the 2010 ideas of the European Union to improve its economic governance arrangements, we can characterise the emerging model of public governance as follows. The first key feature of the new public governance is the importance of developing a whole-of-government long-term vision and setting and achieving long-term strategic goals that flow from that vision. Second, there is stress placed on clarity and coherence about who does what at the ‘centre’ of a government, for example, in the case of Europe, this means establishing the necessary and complementary integration and coherence of functions and responsibilities of the European Council, the Commission etc. Third, there is a requirement to achieve good horizontal collaboration between government ministries and to ensure strategic planning addresses cross-cutting issues and overlapping mandates. Fourth, there needs to be capabilities which ensure, first, effective linkages between strategy and budgeting (i.e., ensuring that the strategy is underpinned by aligning the spending of a government with its strategic goals) and, second, effective reporting and monitoring of progress towards delivering long-term strategic plans using performance indicators. Fifth, there is a focus on multi-level coordination, meaning a need to get all levels of government working together in an integrated and coherent way. One example of this multi-level governance requirement would to be ensure that sector strategies prepared by individual government ministries are consistent with the whole-ofgovernment strategic plan. Another example would be coordination of national, regional and local government strategic plans and actions. Finally, and sixth, there is a concern for developing what the OECD called ‘social dialogue’ between governments and civil society and social partners (business and trade unions).

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As will have been seen, this new thinking on the capabilities required by governments that are more strategic puts a lot of emphasis on the need for integration, coordination and coherence. This does not mean that integration, coordination and coherence are easy to achieve, merely that there is an assumption that government effectiveness increases as they increase. Among experienced senior civil servants this assumption may seem obvious; Barber (2007), for example, a UK civil servant who led the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit for a while, wondered how much more might have been achieved in terms of improvements in public service delivery in health, education and criminal justice if the UK’s machinery of government had been more integrated. Public leadership does not take place in a vacuum. Importantly, public leadership operates in a public governance structure, and will be affected by it. As public governance evolves, so might public leadership. Some support for the assumption of interdependence between governance and leadership in the public sector can be found in the arguments of Osborne and Gaebler (1992) who not only contrasted the old and new conditions of government, and the old and new types of government, they specifically suggested that ‘command and control’ belonged to the past whereas in the new form of governance leaders led by ‘persuading’ and ‘incentivising’. This is summarised in Table 2. Table 2.

‘Command and Control’ in the Old Governance and ‘Persuading and Incentives’ in the New Governance.

Old Conditions Slower paced society Mass markets Society of people who worked with their hands Age of hierarchy Strong geographic communities

Bureaucratic government Civil service system (written tests to enter service) Services delivered with fairness and equity Standardised and no-frills service Top-down command and control Reduced influence of politicians

New Conditions Era of breath-taking change Global market place that put competitive pressure on economic institutions Information society: people get access to information almost as fast as leaders do Workers bridle at commands and demand autonomy Niche markets: customers accustomed to quality and extensive choice Entrepreneurial government Flexible and adaptable Services delivered are high quality services and higher productivity is achieved Services are responsive to customers: offered choices of non-standardised services Led by persuasion and incentives Empowered citizens

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Leadership is Addressing the Need to Change in Liverpool City

The contrasting of leadership based on command and control with leadership based on persuading and incentivising can be extended into the characterisation of two forms of strategic leaders, which we will label as ‘command and control’ and as ‘pragmatic’. They broadly reflect a changed understanding of the nature of leadership comparing the 1960s and 1970s with more recent times (Ansoff, 1987; Hamel, 2002; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Heifetz, 1994; Heifetz & Linsky, 2002). We think these two types of strategic leaders can be discriminated in at least six ways and these are shown in Table 3. Table 3.

Two Types of Strategic Leaders in the Public Sector.

Dimensions Leader’s understanding of their decision making role Approach to change management

Command and Control Leaders Leader’s role is to make key decisions

Pragmatic Leaders

Leader’s role is to makes sure organisation has intellectual leadership Change is best done by topChange is partly by design down design and subsequent based on foresight and partly implementation of change it is the result of learning (change is seen as (change is seen as programmable) experimental) What leader expects of Employees are expected to Employees are expected to employees in the implement the changes as have their own interests and organisation designed priorities therefore the leader consults and seeks an inclusive approach to decision making if possible What leaders think of Leader thinks planning There has to be some flexibility planning as a practice involves firstly an analysis in the plan, in part to benefit and decision stage followed from learning and in part to by implementation accommodate stakeholder/ partner negotiations if necessary What leaders think of The organisation should Horizon scanning is required chance events and prepare contingency plans so to create organisational agility but surprise events surprises as to be prepared can also be strategic opportunities Leader’s approach to Use the strategic plan to create Need to create receptivity to developing the framework for changing change and to energise organisational capacity operational plans and people for change as well as needed by strategic plans budgets build organisational capabilities

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In the case study that follows we attempt as much as possible to assess both the type of strategic leadership being offered and the public governance issues faced by Liverpool City in the very recent past. Not every aspect of leadership is covered, but there is enough case study material to draw some tentative conclusions. It should also advance our understanding of some of the choices and difficulties at a city level that faced public leaders who were trying to pursue economic regeneration and employment growth while at the same time coping with austerity policies launched by national government.

PUBLIC LEADERSHIP IN LIVERPOOL CITY Liverpool City is one of just over 300 local councils in England. It has a population of 460,000 people and is part of a city region with a catchment of around 1.3m people. In 2012 it became part of a small select group of local authorities with a system of governance based on a directly elected mayor. In February of that year, Joe Anderson, a Labour politician, who was the Leader of the council by virtue of leading the ruling Labour group of councillors, persuaded the council with the requisite majority to voluntarily change the system of governance from a traditional “Leader with Cabinet” to an elected mayor model. In the mayoral election in May of 2012, Joe Anderson was elected mayor by a majority of 60% of the first preference votes. The next highest share of the vote, with under 10%, went to an independent candidate. What type of strategic leadership was Joe Anderson offering? We examine the city’s public leadership in terms of its intellectual leadership and attitudes to planning and the future. We also look at some of the public governance issues that confronted the new mayor. Leadership Joe Anderson described himself as not only a member of the Labour Party but also as a socialist. He also emphasised that he was a realistic and pragmatic person and was ready to think and act in radically new ways. He distanced himself from any idea that he would be prepared to take up purely ideological stances in defending public services he would defend public services but he wanted to see them run effectively and serving the public of Liverpool. In so doing, he created a clear differentiation between

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the response of the Militant ruling group in the city during the 1980s and the progressive, pragmatic response of the 2010s. He recognised that the country was going through a period of austerity, and he would lead on that basis, but he argued that austerity had to be fairly applied. He consistently challenged the national government on its assertion that ‘We are all in this together’, demonstrating that the application of significant reductions in local government financial support was unevenly applied. This was because of the national government formula for distribution of resources which favoured prosperous areas of the country relative to poorer areas. Above all he was committed and passionate about Liverpool, a city he loved. Although these were clearly tough times to be in a leadership role, his summing up of his situation was: ‘One of the best jobs in the world is being the leader of the city in which you were born’ (interview notes). Towards the end of 2012, just months after being elected Liverpool’s mayor, Joe Anderson had identified three top priorities for Liverpool: 1. To manage the budgetary situation and the impacts on public services (i.e., austerity) 2. To develop Liverpool as an entrepreneurial city and to bring about economic regeneration, more jobs, more training and apprenticeships, and more opportunities for people to live in improved housing and to be taught in improved school buildings 3. To set a vision for Liverpool’s long-term future as a global city, to exploit its brand identity and to begin the development programme to deliver that future The main issue in the first priority, managing the budgetary situation and services, was the unprecedented scale of cuts in funding by national government. Strategically it was a challenge because the cuts made the attempt to focus on the second priority quite difficult. It also posed a major issue in terms of multi-level governance (more on that below). One of the critical issues in meeting the twin challenges of austerity and promoting growth was in ensuring that the city and the council had sufficient capacity and resources to achieve budgetary sustainability whilst having the financial wherewithal to exploit opportunities for economic growth. The second priority for Joe Anderson was to develop the entrepreneurial nature of Liverpool and it involved working closely with the business community in the city to make that come about. The mayor said: We are being more entrepreneurial as a city. We are approaching things radically different in everything we do. That is why the schools’ building programme, the house

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PAUL JOYCE AND GED FITZGERALD building programme, we undertake not as a social need, but as a regeneration opportunity, creating jobs, apprenticeships, making sure that local suppliers are used. So, it sustains the local economy. We also provide opportunities for young people by connecting schools to businesses. Looking at areas of growth in the city making sure the kids are skilled up. And motivated to take those opportunities. So we do things radically different. That’s why we took on the new mayoral form of governance. It’s the right thing to do. It is about being a modern city. It is raising the bar. (Interview notes)

First as the Leader of the City Council and subsequently as mayor he was interested in the public leadership being much more entrepreneurial to ensure that limited funding and resources available to the council were optimised and exploited for the benefit of the city’s residents. He was also very keen for the city to have a more entrepreneurial spirit to sustain itself in the 21st century global economy. Joe Anderson recognised that the mentality and culture of too many people in the city was dependent on the ‘corporation’ (or the state) to provide money or solutions to people’s issues whilst also knowing that the economy of the city still needed more and deeper diversification away from the historic dependency on traditional industries, with the city having too few businesses to support its population. His push for greater public sector entrepreneurism was being taken forward through various schemes and developments. These included: the creation of a cruise liner terminal, the development of a super-port, the creation of more exhibition space, the expansion of hotel space, enterprise zones and a massive development along the riverside by Peel Holdings. The latter was estimated to be worth £5.5 billion but would take 30 years to develop fully. The last development was controversial because it risked loss of world heritage status for the area but this had to be weighed against the investment and jobs that would be created; in the mayor’s view the economic regeneration and job creation benefits justified the assessed risk of potentially losing the world heritage status. The city was also being entrepreneurial in attracting conferences and other big cultural events with the aim of attracting tourists and business and in looking for ways to create revenue streams from capital investments. The feasibility of the entrepreneurial strategy, especially the ideas of using events to boost tourism and visitors and of increasing private investment, looked feasible in the light of the successes and advances of the city in recent years. Liverpool One, a large new shopping district in the heart of Liverpool, had been opened successfully, attracting shoppers from inside and outside of Liverpool. The European Capital of Culture events in 2008 had been extremely successful, attracting visitors and giving a major boost to the confidence and civic life of Liverpool. The Council investment in the new Echo Arena and the BT Convention Centre in the docks was paying

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off as shown by the extra visitors being attracted to the city. So, Joe Anderson was recognising existing successes and seeking to build on them with his strategic intentions for the city. The strategic thinking behind undertaking entrepreneurial development projects was to use them to create economic regeneration, and thereby grow employment. Many new jobs were expected from the various projects, and these were needed partly to offset the significant reduction in public sector employment in the city arising from the austerity programme, as well as to offset the impact of the changes in the welfare system introduced by national government. Furthermore, these economic benefits were intended to create opportunities for radical changes socially and culturally in the city. It was envisaged that coming out of these changes would be a changing mind-set among young people in Liverpool. The mayor put it as follows: We don’t want kids coming through the educational system thinking they’ve got to leave Liverpool to go and get a job somewhere else because there are no jobs in the city. We can work with the private sector on infrastructure projects to grow the stock of jobs. But the other part of this is encouraging young people to grow businesses of their own. Entrepreneurship. That’s the kind of change of mind-set that is needed. (Interview notes)

The public sector leadership of Liverpool, aware of the city’s socioeconomic profile, aware of its communities living in areas of deprivation, were focused on attracting more people to live in the city who were employed, getting more people to participate actively and formally in the economy and, as the mayor explained, reducing the need for younger people to leave the city to search for employment opportunities. The aim was to reduce a culture of dependence, in which people living in sink estates got by on the basis of welfare benefits and public services. With the third of the priorities, he demonstrated he saw the importance of developing strategic foresight. He was ready to talk about Liverpool, and how it would be, in 20 or 30 years’ time. And he was also conscious of the history of Liverpool. One hundred years ago, he said, Liverpool was the second city not just in the UK but of the British Empire. He believed the past glory of Liverpool could return and be sustained. Although he saw Liverpool as a global city now, he thought it could become a more important and significant global city. Joe Anderson was intent on positioning Liverpool City in the long term as a major global city. Joe Anderson did not believe it was sensible that he provided intellectual foresights by himself. One of the first things he did in 2012, as the new mayor of Liverpool, was to set up a number of commissions which included one on health, one on education, one on Europe and one on fairness and diversity. In the case of The Mayoral Health Commission he was able to get Professor

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Sir Ian Gilmore to chair it. The Education Commission was chaired by former Secretary of State for Education, Estelle Morris. The use of mayoral commissions showed that the mayor saw his responsibility as ensuring there was intellectual foresight to guide the development of Liverpool and not that he had to personally produce it. The health commission, for instance, he suggested would look at how to create a health service that built on the world class infrastructure present in the city but which really worked at community level as well, improving the life chances of local people as well as offering first class treatment when needed. He believed achieving this vision would require getting various organisations and various parts of the health service to work together differently, breaking down professional and institutional barriers preventing that being the case to date. The Mayoral Health Commission had been asked to determine how best to support and improve the health and well-being of the people in Liverpool. For a year the Commission consulted and analysed data. Its report in January 2014 concluded that the key partners in Liverpool should formally sign up to the principle of creating a pioneering integrated health and social care system, that prevention and self-care became the primary focus in the transformation of health outcomes for people of Liverpool, and that there be a major new initiative to integrate out of hours services (The Mayoral Health Commission, 2014). The mayor was clearly taking an inclusive approach to developing strategic foresight, bringing together people with expert knowledge and with a shared commitment to improving Liverpool’s prospects. This reflected his assessment that within Liverpool there were people with professional expertise, with talent and with a passion and a love for the city. It seemed obvious to him that they needed to be engaged with the work of making the city better, and to not do so would be to waste energy and resource. He was, therefore, mobilising and marshalling intellectual resources that he did not own but which the city could benefit from. Notably, he reported that many people from the private sector were joining the work of making the city better. He had found that there were many in the private sector who were prepared to do this civic work for him as mayor on the basis that they too, like him, loved Liverpool.

Public Governance Turning to governance issues, a very immediate constraint on a strategic and entrepreneurial approach to the public governance of Liverpool was the overstretched capacity and specialist expertise in the centre of the city

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council administration. In 2013 the required strategic and entrepreneurial capability in the centre of the council was lodged in very few people: The expertise is very thin, is the truth of it. [The chief executive has] got it … We’ve got some capacity in Liverpool Vision, [an economic development company] which is 100% owned [by Liverpool City Council]. Then we have got some good technical people in finance, but a limited number of experienced deal makers, and then one or two around the planning regime … Because you know the type of person you need, it’s the equivalent of entrepreneurship, business thinking, in a public sector context … then it’s about due diligence and the right combination of people that are proactive about trying to push an agenda, and people who challenge it from a risk point of view, typically where our finance and legal people play a role … it is very stretched, that capacity … it’s not embedded in the organisation. (Interview notes)

This is a complex multi-dimensional challenge as the mayor is seeking to drive change in culture and attitude at the same time as the size and overall capacity of the organisation is reducing. This is compounded further by the challenge of the key leadership roles in the organisation getting more and more difficult. Entrepreneurial skills are in short supply generally in the public sector and Liverpool had a deficit of those at the time the austerity measures began to bite. This meant that the skills became ever more stretched without the luxury of replenishment as funding changes meant new people would not be able to be recruited or rewarded given the national political and media climate. More positively in terms of the public governance of the city, the mayor and the broader public leadership of the city were doing well in talking to ‘civil society’ and ‘social partners’ (especially the business community). There appeared to be real capability and commitment in this respect. In fact, the mayor really emphasised communication as the key capability for delivering all three of the top priorities he identified. He was clear that communication with citizens was important in relation to the spending cuts caused by the national government’s austerity programme. It was critical, he thought, that the public leadership of the city communicated the reality of where the city was in relation to the austerity programme. It was important to communicate in such a way that citizens understood the difficult choices needing to be made about which services to protect and which to cut. Then there was the communication with the business community, particularly around the mayor’s work on Liverpool as an entrepreneurial city. The mayor wanted to convince them about the authenticity of the public leadership’s passion and desire to create opportunities and develop opportunities. This communication was not simply with the business community in general but with investors and developers in particular. Working with

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the business community, the mayor wanted to build the city’s infrastructure and he wanted to mobilise private investment, knowing that it is the activities of the private sector that will yield the employment and business growth the city needs. The mayor was also conscious that there was a legacy of poor relations between local government and business that needed to be overcome. This involved convincing the business community of Liverpool that there really was a better understanding of their needs. Organisational changes to support this had been made as well, changing the council’s planning culture, and changing the council’s style to becoming more business friendly. Some of this effort had been managed through the council’s economic development company, Liverpool Vision, which predated the arrival of the directly elected mayoral system. Liverpool Vision presented itself as being for business: This is a global city, one that’s proud of its heritage and culture but also passionate about looking to the future. That makes it an exciting, inspiring and exhilarating place to do business. With a global perspective and exceptional economic strengths, Liverpool is recognised as one of the UK’s leading business destinations. Blue-chips, start-ups, entrepreneurs and emerging talent are attracted to Liverpool by investment opportunities, business benefits and an outstanding quality of life. … Liverpool Vision is the city’s economic development company which integrates economic development and business and enterprise support designed to accelerate the city’s growth and build a sustainable economy. We have played a pivotal role in co-ordinating the delivery of the city’s economic and physical renaissance over the last decade, working within the strategic leadership of the City Council and the Mayor of Liverpool Our business is helping your business. (Source: www.liverpoolvision.co.uk; accessed on 26 February 2014)

The mayor also saw the communication to young people as important. As has already been noted, this was important so young people would choose to stay in Liverpool and see that Liverpool had a future to offer them. The decision not to simply continue being the Council Leader and to introduce the mayoral form of governance in Liverpool was made partly to kick start a better relationship with the business community: What I think it did was, it said to the private sector, look this guy means business. This is a guy that is somebody we can go to and say we want to do this and if he backs it, it will happen. That’s what we do. That’s why we get on with the private sector. Because we are straight. We will say, that ain’t going to happen, but if we think it’s a goer, and its bringing in investment, bringing jobs, we will back it. (Interview notes)

The effort at dialogue and mutual understanding with the business community also manifested itself in the council doing a budget presentation to the Chamber of Commerce, which the council was obliged to do but

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instead of just describing the problems being faced in terms of cuts in government funding, the mayor took the opportunity to go further: But, more importantly, the level of commitment by us to support business and our vision and our desire and passion. They actually get it. You know they not only get it, but buy into it. (Interview notes)

Similar styles of engagement have been used with all key stakeholder communities in the city, including the third sector, educationalists, the health sector and the arts and culture sector. One of the challenges of delivering the three priorities was an issue of multi-level governance, that is, specifically, Liverpool city needed the support of national government. Some 80% of Liverpool’s day to day funding was provided by central government in 2011 and austerity measures were reducing that funding by around 56% in real terms over a five year period (figures provided by Liverpool City Council). While the mayor shared national government’s agenda to reduce a culture of dependence, and also accepted that austerity measures were unavoidable, he also had to manage the reality that there were major social problems in deprived areas within Liverpool. The mayor also was concerned that the poverty trap, which people used to talk about, still existed. For example, there were people living on benefits, bringing up children, having to pay rent and so on. They were not going to be keen to take on poorly paid work. But if they could receive training so that they could enter better paid employment they would have an incentive to re-enter the labour market. The problem is that this approach to reintegrating people back into employment required cash up front, from national government, and could be justified as an investment that would save public money in the longer term. It would help people to be more independent and not reliant on welfare benefits. So, while working hard to catalyse private sector investment and to bring money in to help with economic regeneration, the mayor saw a continuing need in the short term for the national government to support the efforts of local government to transform the situation locally. The mayor said that there was a job to be done convincing ministers and civil servants at national level about the need to support people to become independent and move out of welfare dependency. Despite several efforts over the past two years to secure a pilot programme of risk and reward around changing how welfare benefits are administered, challenging the national “one size fits all” system, the mayor has not been able to get past the senior civil servant gatekeepers of The Department of Work and Pensions. He argued that it was partly a matter of breaking down the

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barriers of mistrust between the national level and the local government level. The main cause of friction in terms of multi-level governance centred on a felt unfairness. While Liverpool’s public leadership accepted there was no option to some form of austerity, they felt the cuts were not being allocated fairly. They felt that Liverpool City was being hit by more cuts than was fair, the situation being so acute that in the budget process for 2014/15, the council was £17m short of the funding it required to meet its mandatory (i.e., those services it has to provide and at a certain standard) and this would have meant there was no money for the city to use for discretionary activity (e.g., cultural activities, leisure centres, upkeep of parks) as well as its activities to promote Liverpool’s economic regeneration and its longterm development into a more prosperous and internationally recognised global city. We’re trying to lift the city and promote the city, bringing the jobs, bringing opportunities. We can’t be doing that and at the same time fund the support for people to get those jobs, to get those opportunities. There is a disconnect. And if the disconnect remains you can’t break that poverty cycle. (Interview notes)

The mayor’s case that funding was unfair was based on an analysis of the funding figures. In Liverpool the belief was that the city was going to suffer cuts of 56% over a five year period. The Prime Minister did not agree and the difference of opinion became a public row in early 2014. The Prime Minister referred to a reduction of 1.3% reduction in its annual grant which was said to be in line with the average for English local authorities. On 10 January 2014 he criticised the Liverpool mayor as follows: “I think we have got a problem when Joe Anderson just does so much to try and just play politics with these issues. The taxpayer, the government, puts a lot of money into Liverpool city council,” he said. “I don’t think Joe does his city any favours by just endlessly talking down the money that Liverpool gets. Yes, we want Chinese investment and I’ll help Joe to get that Chinese investment but I don’t think he helps himself by endlessly saying that somehow the rest of the country isn’t supporting Liverpool.” (Source: http://www.theguardian. com/uk-news/2014/jan/10/david-cameron-liverpool-mayor-city-cuts-anderson; accessed on 25 February 2014)

Yet another analysis of the figures not only suggested that Liverpool was facing substantial funding cuts but also suggested the cuts were larger for more deprived places like Liverpool. This time the figures were based on a six year period: Councils in the 10 most deprived areas of England are facing cuts averaging 25.3% in the financial years 2010 11 to 2015 16, compared with 2.54% in the 10 least deprived

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areas. The figures were drawn up by Paul Woods, the veteran treasurer of Newcastle city council. Woods took government figures on the level of cuts to the 326 local authorities in England and compared them with the multiple indices of deprivation issued by the Department of Communities and Local Government. Liverpool city council, with the highest deprivation score of 43.45, is suffering cuts of 27.1%. Hart district council, with the lowest deprivation score of 4.47, is facing cuts of 1.5%. (Source: www. theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/30/local-government-cuts-poorest-areas; accessed on 25 February 2014)

The council’s cabinet received a report on the budgetary situation in the autumn of 2013 showing (as noted already) that it would be difficult to fund mandatory activities, let alone activities that were discretionary. The mayor was going to have make some very tough decisions, and they would contain value judgements: People expect me to make those value judgements. But we do engage with people; talk to, for instance, the voluntary sector, to the business sector. We do talk to people. We do listen to people’s views. I’m out every day talking to people. Leadership is about tough times as well as good times, Sometimes you have to make tough choices. The bottom line is they will be made. We have to do them. (Interview notes)

CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS Public leaders are the same as everybody else in one key respect like everybody else, they have to make choices and act in the circumstances they find themselves in. The circumstances obviously influence how much leaders can achieve and how they provide strategic leadership. The current generation of European public leaders have mostly inherited a dire set of circumstances. Some of them, at least, are acting with courage, creativity and passion in trying to create a better future for the communities they live in. Joe Anderson, as the mayor of Liverpool, was one of these and he was resolved to make a positive difference to the future of the city. In the case of Liverpool, the directly elected mayoral system seemed to have a number of advantages, perhaps the key one being that the mayor, Joe Anderson acts for the entire city, rather than being the leader of the city council as he was before. This means that it appeared to make the social dialogue with the business community easier. The new governance system meant there was now one person who was highly visible and highly accountable and someone who therefore could lead the ‘deal-making’ with business but also act as the convenor for the whole city, building strategic partnerships and alliances as well as deal-making. In part the new

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mayoral system seemed to be working because of the personality of the mayor, and because of his experience and his way of approaching the role. What we saw in the case study is that the actions of the mayor and Liverpool City Council are reasonably congruent with the ideas of the pragmatic strategic leader type and with new ideas of public governance. From the case study it was evident that new channels of social dialogue had been opened up, especially with the business community. And we need to distinguish, for example, between inclusiveness in respect of the planning of the reforms (to deliver a regeneration strategy, better health, etc.) and social and economic inclusiveness more generally. In the case of Liverpool, the mayor was using mayoral commissions to increase inclusiveness in the city’s decision making, which he was doing as a deliberate attempt to mobilise all of those who shared the vision of making Liverpool prosperous and a long-term success as a global city. This approach to inclusiveness in decision making in Liverpool represents a major break from the past, it was a widening of political inclusiveness to embrace people with a range of political perspectives. It was also a major break from the past in terms of building good relations between public leaders and business leaders, which also had a benefit in providing the mayor with the ability to ‘address’ key resources for enhancing intellectual leadership. Arguably this inclusiveness has built a stronger power base for economic regeneration and helped with mobilising scarce resources, but it has not been an attempt at grass-root community involvement in strategic planning of reforms and economic investment. As we have seen, the public leadership thinking in Liverpool city, by the Mayor, was that the critical goal was to foster economic regeneration, economic growth, jobs, training and business opportunities and that as a result of these outcomes there would be a prospect that Liverpool could build both economic and social inclusiveness for the wider communities of Liverpool, including those living in ‘sink estates’ on benefits. It should be noted when considering the Liverpool strategy for inclusive decision making and social inclusion that this may prove to have been a pragmatic assessment of what was feasible in terms of direct inclusion in decision making. After all, English local government had been experimenting with direct participation and with consultation for nearly 30 years. In the 1980s a number of councils pursued decentralisation of town hall services, most notably, for example, Walsall Council, Cambridgeshire county council, and, in London, the London Borough of Islington. In the latter case, Islington Council, it developed a policy for direct participation called ‘Going Local’ in the mid-1980s which it evolved in the early 1990s to include neighbourhood management to break down departmental silos.

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This policy was specifically aimed at generating much more popular involvement by citizens and for a while the Council managed to involve approximately 600 citizens in neighbourhood forums on a regular basis. Islington Council even hoped that the citizens could be empowered to make decision about their own local services through neighbourhood action plans. In the 1990s, especially in the later years of the 1990s, there was extensive experimentation with all manner of channels for public engagement. Lewisham Council enjoyed a good reputation for the scale and diversity of its experiments in forging closer links with its citizens; it used large-scale surveys, a citizen jury, e-democracy, focus groups and many more things. Ipswich Council, Bradford Council and others experimented with community planning. Looking back over three decades of experimentation by English local government, can it really be claimed that there has ever been a fundamental breakthrough in achieving direct democratic involvement of citizens? Probably not. We have seen that the mayor of Liverpool worked hard at a pragmatic and inclusive agenda on planning for a better future for Liverpool, and intended to rely on economic regeneration, employment growth, training and more business opportunities as the key way of developing the city’s culture and creating a more inclusive life in the city in both economic and social terms. It was a distinct strategy for a public leader who wanted to develop a successful form of public governance in the circumstances prevailing in a city needing a step change in economic success in the immediate wake of the financial crisis.

REFERENCES Ansoff, H. I. (1987). Corporate strategy. London: Penguin. Barber, M. (2007). Instruction to deliver. London: Politico’s. European Commission. (2010, March 3). Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Communication from the Commission. Brussels. Hamel, G. (2002). Leading the revolution. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. (1994). Competing for the future. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Heifetz, R. A. (1994). Leadership without easy answers. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Heifetz, R. A., & Linsky, M. (2002). Leadership on the line. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development & The World Bank. (1997). World development report 1997: The state in a changing world. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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Khondker, H. H. (2011). Many roads to modernization in the middle east. Society, 48, 304 306. Kooiman, J. (1993). Modern governance: New government-society interactions. London: Sage. Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. The Mayoral Health Commission. (2014). All change The platform to a Healthier Liverpool. Liverpool City Council.

LIVERCHESTER/MANPOOL? THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE LACK OF INTRA-URBAN LEADERSHIP IN THE TWIN CITIES OF THE NORTH-WEST Nicola Headlam ABSTRACT Purpose This is a paper about the soft and hard drivers for English sub-national governance. It posits that the recurrence of claims for interurban linkages across the two distinct conurbations of the North-West of England have been bedevilled by entrenched differences in the leadership cultures of the city-regions. Design/methodology/approach It contrasts the highly localised forms of ‘soft power’ or the ways in which leaders mobilise brands, plans and strategies to tell stories about place arguing that there is a considerable divergence between the way that this symbolic capital has been deployed within and across the two city-regions. Whilst this is striking it is still true that ‘Hard powers’ fiscal, legislative or regulatory mechanisms are

European Public Leadership in Crisis? Critical Perspectives on International Public Sector Management, Volume 3, 47 61 Copyright r 2014 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420140000003012

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elusive for both Manchester and Liverpool notwithstanding recent moves towards combined authorities for both places. The only model of English urban governance with statutory powers covering transport, economic development and planning is located in Greater London, a legacy of the post-RDA institutional landscape in England. Findings This paper argues that it would be extraordinary if forms of leadership capable of meaningfully connecting the two cities cannot be found but that this must be seen within a sclerotic English context where there is a huge disconnect between desirable form and functions of urban governance, and the effect this has on regional economic performance. It concludes that local government austerity has had a negative effect on the sort of ‘soft power innovations’ necessary in both cities and that rhetorics of English localism have provided neither a propitious context for inter- nor intra-urban governance innovation. Value/originality This paper seeks to describe some of the ways in which collaborations within the city-regions of Manchester and Liverpool have been achieved, making the case that there have been divergent governance experiments which may hamper the aspiration for extensions beyond their border and for intra-urban leadership and governance which combines the two great cities and their areas of influence. Keywords: Intra-urban leadership; twin cities; Manchester; Liverpool; leadership cultures; soft powers; hard powers

INTRODUCTION TO THE TWIN CITIES OF THE NORTH-WEST Manchester is all hard edges and rationality, Liverpool has in innate sense of the intangible.1

Spring 2014 saw a flurry of headlines greeting the BBC’s business editor journalist exploring the possibilities for a northern mega-city running from Liverpool through Manchester to Leeds and Sheffield. Mischievously Evan Davies posited the UK’s second city for the future as Hebden Bridge, a small market town as an extra-urban form, whereby a green heart was supported by ‘suburbs’ called Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool.2 The radical possibilities of such trans-pennine collaboration has long antecedents in

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European spatial planning circles which posits the E20 as a line which links west to east across the country linking Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds and Hull together. The logic of the European spatial development perspective, however sound meets a reality that ‘transpennine’ collaborations, or genuine links between adjacent cities have proved highly problematic not least because urban policy in recent decades has emphasised competitiveness for cities.3 This is most often couched in international terms ‘our competition isn’t local but the other cities in Europe and beyond’4 but serves nevertheless to emphasise collaboration within city-regions in order for competition between them to flourish. This paper argues that spatial imaginations must broaden to link the cities of the North-West together, describing some of the peculiarities and features of the local polities, but acknowledges the risks for those suggesting that novel forms of urban governance might simplistically follow (functional?) economic rationales. Herein, we demonstrate that processes of institutional innovation start with informal processes of institutionalisation: soft approaches are used to re-interpret and to re-combine the established patterns of thought and action. It is argued that despite the limitations of decentralisation policy at the current time that there are path dependencies within the leadership of the city-regions of the North-West of England which have been performed and articulated in quite divergent ways. In exploring how and how far city leaders have used the ‘soft drivers’ of ‘spatial idiom’ as articulated through brand, plan and strategy these strategies connect with the ways in which leadership has been embodied within Manchester and Liverpool and their extended conurbations. We explore Greater Manchester and the Halton, Knowsley, Liverpool, St Helens, Sefton and Wirral Combined Authority in the context of the current UK sub-national governance heterodoxy of the core cities of the north of England and seek to make some contribution to understanding contemporary urban governance as a precursor to developing policy approaches to inter-urban disparities. It is important to point out at the outset that the famed divergence between the trajectories of Manchester and Liverpool is reflected only in the performance of the urban elites. Data regarding pockets of deprivation in the two conurbations reflect persistent and untackled area effects masked by the activities of the city leaders. In examining the peculiarities of these divergent city-regional spatial idioms we posit how competing visions for and of the city-region is mobilised. It is important to focus on the use of semiotics and symbolic capital by elites how imaginaries are built, sustained and circulated particularly within the competitive city circuits of/for the city and introduce a cast of actors, cliques within .

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this elite network who we describe as variously: (1) politicians and their urban bureaucrats, officials of mandated government entities; and (2) the qualgae, ‘quasi local governance actors and entities’ populated by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Mintrom & Norman, 2009) and ‘pragmatic localists’ (Coaffee & Headlam, 2008) or qualgaecrats. (3) ‘Imagineers’ leaders of the city imagination’ (Interview data, 2008) whose institutional basis and visibility shifts according to circumstance. The ways in which this is achieved and how novel-seeming scales emerge out of the ‘policy primeval soup’ can be described (following the Disney Corporation) as one of ‘imagineering’ combining the activities of mandated, formalized local government with networks of technocrats and further, linked to the experimental spectacles orchestrated by activist philanthro-capitalists with ‘an excess of civic pride’.5 These networks, and the ways in which such ‘Soft power’ disrupts established patterns and scales of action in advance of the orchestration of more formalized, mandated ‘harder’ institution-building. In this paper we seek to combine the deployment of city-regional spatial idiom as a soft driver for urban change with its very much ‘harder’ cousin, the flow of private capital and to seek to explore/explain the ways in which the two are related at the city-regional/metropolitan scale. The former is about semiotic and notional ‘urban brand equity’; and the latter about stretching urban hierarchy and the increasingly savage sorting processes of winners and losers (the spiky and the flat) which re-produce uneven spatial development in complex and dynamic ways which must be urgently addressed by urban policy. We use the notion of ‘City-regional Spatial Idiom’ to explore the motivating metaphors, buzz-words and policy wrappers and how they concretise into tactics and strategies deployed by city-regional elites. Studying the symbols, metaphors and the ways in which these become reified in highly specific ways either within the relative confines of the spatial planning system or as part of urban strategy for urban competitiveness and entrepreneurialism. ‘The upsurge of branding in urban planning is not only related to the penetration of practices from the private domain into the public domain, but also to the increased competition between regions and cities to attract people and resources’ (Eshuis & Edelenbos, 2008, p. 273). This paper concludes that a much-vaunted Manchester-Liverpool concordat is not only overdue but urgently necessary but that any attempts to unite the cities without a due consideration of the ways in which they have sought to innovate around leadership and governance will struggle to gain a foothold no matter how noble the intention.

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THE MANCHESTER MEN Whatever the game is winning.6

in terms of sub-national governance

Manchester are

The behaviour of ‘Great Men’ has always been important in influencing the trajectory of Manchester’s political, economic, social and cultural development. This is evident in the literature on the activities of the ‘Manchester men’ and their role in propelling the rapid development of industrial capitalism and associated urbanisation in nineteenth century Manchester (Peck & Tickell, 1995). Here, we describe the inter-relationships between the elected members, their officials, populating the qualgae of quasi-local actors and entities in combination with a set of more free-wheeling ‘imagineers’ drawn from creative class industries such as music, art, marketing and property development. This clique, it is argued make up a stable manchester view of the world which is crucial in underpinning Robson’s discussion of ‘Mancunian Ways’ in the politics of regeneration wherein ‘conspicuous victories’ and image-making directly in contributes towards the ‘boosterism’ of a bullish Manchester City Council. Robson talks of ‘a welter of promotional materials many badged with the photography of Len Grant flowing from the Town Hall’s Economic Initiatives Department’. It was in association with the selling of their beloved airport that the city fathers were first described as ‘entrepreneurial’ in their approach. In their work on the historical background of the airport (Caruna & Simmons, 2001) state that it has been integral to the selfconcept of the political elite, who (over the period 1929 1982) planned and delivered the new Ringway airport in the south of the conurbation. They write ‘despite the failure of early attempts to establish scheduled air services in Britain in the 1920s Manchester corporation inclined to the view that there was a market for such and set about making it’ (Caruna and Simmons, 2001, p. 121). This research makes clear that the development of both the airport and the urban policy elite are closely connected. From the beginning of the period in which entrepreneurial approaches to urban development began to dominate policy (Harvey, 1989), Manchester embraced the idea of ‘selling’ the contemporary attractiveness of city. This often involved capitalising assets such as the city’s footballing and pop cultural heritage. But it also involved harnessing external assets, particularly Cheshire’s desirable countryside and villages, as particularly Mancunian assets. Whereas previous efforts to develop metropolitan governance had

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been founded on a desire to enhance the city’s fiscal integrity by annexing its affluent peripheries, contemporary approaches sought to claim the ‘quality of life’ assets prevalent in the suburbs but in short supply in the core city. Manchester’s leadership was prominent in entrepreneurial networks such as the Core Cities group, but as interviewees noted it has been a careful role, outwardly cooperative but predicated on an instrumental ‘do anything that makes us look bigger and better’, focused on real outcomes for Manchester. Manchester: Knowledge Capital (M:KC) was established soon after Manchester Enterprises in order to advance thinking in the university boroughs about the role of the knowledge economy in contributing to the development of the city. This built upon renewed interest in the role of universities in the knowledge economy. ‘A knowledgebased economy is defined by the systematic and permanent mobilisation of knowledge in order to analyse the result of actions and to design new actions to be undertaken … Learning and innovation meaning the design and implementation of new technical solutions and/or new products and services are not intermittent or occasional as is the case in traditional industry, but are on-going processes’ (Crevoisier & Jeannerat, 2009, p. 1223; emphasis added). Manchester has made much of its potential re-invention as an ideopolis, following on from its past role as cottonopolis in the nineteenth century. Research carried out by the Work Foundation concluded that: ‘Outside world cities, the ideopolis is one of the most successful urban forms around. Strikingly, many cities that were formerly in decline have used the ideopolis framework to regenerate and thrive [through] knowledge creation (world class universities and technology transfer infra-structure), good skill levels throughout the workforce, cluster(s) of growing knowledge industries, transport links (especially with airport connectivity) to and within the city, quality of life (good service/cultural industry presence), effective local leadership, [and an] appropriate degree of political autonomy’ (Nathan et al., 2006). There have been a number of organisations within the ‘Manchester family’ who promote this version of urban economic development: ‘At the heart of an ideopolis is a core dynamic, a mixture of self and external image, which acts as a centripetal force drawing in the creative, the innovative, the talented and binding together all those groups who make the ideopolis the place where those who can choose where to work and live, choose to work and live’. ‘You have to think of the city as a body, those policy nerds and wonks (The Commission for the New Economy) are the brains and the “cool” kids (Tom Bloxham and Peter Saville) are the heart’. Q. ‘What about the

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politicians?’ ‘Hmmmm … I guess you’d have to say that Richard Leese, and by extension Howard (Bernstein) are the balls’.7 This image making intensified in the New Labour years and the elastic brand of Manchester has extended itself whereby the whole city region is offered a bit of ‘Manchester magic’ in marketing itself to the world. Even academics have not proven immune to reporting on the ‘manchester miracle’. The integration of the imagineers into the brand, plan and strategy of the city region is a remarkable feature of the Manchester governance story of recent years. Despite sporadic contractual arrangements with the formal institutions of the city and city-region, the imagineers retain an independence and ‘outsider’ status an anti-establishment. In studying the development of governance and policy-making, it is, of course, easy to overemphasise the importance of key policy actors and formal policy initiatives. But there is an argument that alongside policy influentials (Howard Bernstein, Richard Leese) and policy initiatives (from City Pride to the MAA), the imagineers play a pivotal role in constructing the story that accompanies city-regionalism, and in publicising it. Anthony Wilson, Peter Saville, Tom Bloxham and Dave Haslam all bring a bit of ‘Madchester stardust’ to bear on the city about which they are all passionate, linking their causes predominantly to the cultural organisation of the city. ‘Peter Saville is working very closely with the city and I think congratulations are due to the city fathers who are actually organising the people who have got a key role to play’.8 There are those less excited about the role of the imagineers, who grudgingly acknowledge their usefulness in the external image of the city. ‘They are in your face, sometimes laughable, grandiloquent and vainglorious but do not underestimate them as ‘twats in hats’ they are a vital ingredient of the city’s success’.9 The biannual Manchester International Festival (MIF) performs a similar function combining creativity and commerce with publicly subsidised art and spectacle. Despite criticisms that the first MIF demonstrated only a weak connection to the art produced within the city at the expense of promoting high culture at the expense of mass participation. As ever though, through the city (and AGMA’s) patronage of the arts there is a pragmatism in play ‘this isn’t art for arts sake it is the serious business of projecting the city as a global player’ said a local politician10 emphasising the playful, and creative notion of the city (and even serving a critique of their operations back up to them) is as much about marketing it as the mainstream conventional economic development and inward investment activities of Marketing Manchester and MIDAS.

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The cultural opinion-formers of the ‘imagineer class’ have been very important in influencing the content of city-regional policy. They have helped bolster the role of culture, and promulgate awareness about its economic benefits. They have also provided a bridge to a form of identity politics which emphasises Manchester as lively, diverse and intense (connecting with the Jane Jacobs view of the city cited above). The imagineers are thus critical to the projection and self-concept of the city. Their focus on cultural industries and regeneration offers a kind of identity politics for the city which contributes to its self-image as well as how it presents itself to the outside world: When I say that that all the cultural and creative community require is space and an opportunity, I don’t just mean physical space, the buildings, but also, for the dreamers, the creators, a space in their lives and time to create. There’s a case for individual grants, grass roots subsidies, mentoring, arts and culture training. Then we’ll be moving towards cultural regeneration. (Dave Haslam)11

Whilst it is tempting to focus to too great a degree on urban elites, whether they be policy actors within the qualgae or ‘imagineers’ it is also important to look at those excluded from these circuits. Acknowledging the role of non-elite actors is especially important given the criticism that, as the thesis has already highlighted, the city-regional project has evolved within the confines of the black box of decision-making, with very little connection with either participative or representative forms of democracy. Moreover, the inter-relationships between the various cliques of the urban elite is imagineers excepted is done imperceptibly to citizens and who in the Manchester case fit the model of ‘Manchester Men’, civically minded philanthro-capitalists. The natural habitats of these groups are spread variously across from democratic mandate, through mechanisms, plans, brands and strategies and into the territory of display and spectacle. We also discuss how and why some city-regional spatial imaginaries become privileged (to take on the mantle of idiom), and are elevated and circulated while others founder. We argue that the strength of the internal cohesion of the GMCR model (its bonding capital) has been achieved somewhat at the expense of its bridging capital and further that close study of these processes and actor networks offers some clues as to how the city-regional spatial idiom becomes a reality. In the context of the Manchester City Region Tom Bloxham (in the following quote) emphasises that the spatially extended product has to at some point connect to a material reality: Marketing has developed so much over the last ten years, that all sorts of products, good and bad, are using good covers and good logos. Therefore it’s very important

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nowadays not to judge a book by its cover or by its packaging. Peter (Saville’s) point very, very strongly was never mind the brand, the first thing we’ve got to do is think about the product it’s offering. I think that’s very astute. Of course there’s still a lot of work to do. (Tom Bloxham)12

This quote is intriguing as it moves beyond the superficiality of brand offer (the USP) and into the content of the place itself. We are competing for investment worldwide, so the message is if we come together under the Manchester brand we are stronger than if we were trying to do it alone.13

Whilst anxious to refer to the fact that in the commodified city Manchester competes, not regionally but internationally there is a residue of these regional stereotype to be founding within the adopted actor strategies of the urban elite; the paradox in self-concept of the city which gave the world both the trades union movement in the form of the first meeting of the TUC and the free trade hall is still perceptible within the oscillation between the cliques that we are seeking to expose herein. Not that any of this is carried out in a way that is perceptible to the citizenry. The accommodations, contestations, power struggles, little victories, and the rise and fall of policy entrepreneurs, elected representatives and the representatives of private capital (all of whom may appear in different hats at different times) occur within carefully constructed ‘black boxes of governance’. The Greater Manchester governance project is coherent but it is not inclusive. A final point on the manchester men: In a decade of research on the character of the governance project it was rare to hear any references whatsoever to the ‘twin city’ of Liverpool, a mere 30 miles to the west. Insofar as the policy elite expressed interest in connectivity beyond the 10 boroughs it was to suggest strategic liaison should be sough with Leeds, quite on the contrary in researching Liverpool. The policy elite are borderline obsessed by the ways in which Manchester operates offering a far more nuanced critique of the model than heard from within it. The sense of collaboration, so key to extending the city into the city-regional heft of the 10-boroughs does not extend to working with Liverpool which was the only UK city except London to have a presence at the 2010 expo in Shanghai. We were open to going as a Liverpool-Manchester team … negotiations were well advanced … but in the end we went it alone.14

It is tempting to see such abortive attempts as the rule rather than the exception as regards working between or across the two city-regions. The sense of shared mission was not much clearer in the days of the

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North-West Regional Development Agency either, where a plan to work across the two cities was never operationalised. It may well be that in order to understand some of this antipathy historical dimension is necessary. There was a saying that lingers in Liverpool today the Liverpool gentleman and the Manchester man. Manchester was an industrial city that made things, its workforce stable, drawn from the Lancashire hinterland, dedicated to progressive causes such as the industrial revolution and the campaigns that grew out of it for trade unions and socialism. The Manchester mill-owner had dirt under his finger nails. The Liverpool gentleman engaged in commerce sat in an office in a white collar.

LIVERPOOL MAYOR In Liverpool everyone has political capital but no one person has it … the paths of the past are what shape the place not the personalities of the present.15

Merseyside occupies a special place within the UK political imaginary with a politics, an economics and a civic culture which is distinctive. Michael Heseltine first called for a mayor of Liverpool in 1991 when minister for Merseyside, a call repeated in the Heseltine/Leahy report of 2012,16 and in the review on local growth ‘no stone unturned’.17 The core city of Liverpool is frequently referred to as ‘a basket case’ in terms of governance and leadership and compared unfavourably with the coherent image of harmonious (and boosterist) partnership presented by its neighbouring conurbation of (Greater) Manchester. The vexed questions of ‘who governs Merseyside’18 has led to a number of governance/leadership innovations and there has been considerable churn both political and in terms of innovations within the more recent institutional history of the city from the successful capital of culture year in 2008 and to the decision of the city council to connect the establishment of a mayor for Liverpool, with the negotiation of a city deal, and to forgo a referendum on this question. Greater Merseyside or, the Liverpool City Region is a far harder ‘sell’ to partners than the GMCR. Arguably the political leadership in Manchester have spent far more political capital on de-politicising their actions and strategies. However, a distributed, collective model for leadership, and the co-option of imagineers to help has been very difficult in the Liverpool context. Notwithstanding the role of people like Phil Redmond in Capital of Culture

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there has been a real challenge for Liverpool vision in crafting a sense of shared purpose and narrative which extends beyond the city and beyond the city council. This poses a particular challenge to the Mayor in crafting, with the other LAs, a city region arrangement that encompasses Liverpool’s strategic importance as the central city and world brand with the strengths and assets of the surrounding areas. It was suggested, for example, that this was particularly manifested in the lack of agreement about using Liverpool as the ‘attack brand’ for marketing purposes. This was captured in the comment that ‘Merseyside has never been seen as Greater Liverpool’.19 There is a lack of trust at the heart of city-regional arrangements around the ability of Liverpool’s leaders to seek to share responsibility between the constituent local authorities in terms of strategic and policy area leadership. The relationship between the local authorities has been branded as ‘dysfunctional and characterised by internecine strife’20 and a view that this leads to being held back by the ‘lowest common denominator’.21 With commentators not hopeful that the Mayor was encouraged to do ‘that bit where you fundamentally care about your city but your orbit is bigger because you recognise that your destiny is linked to all these other guys’.22 This is further bedevilled by the lack of institutional capture of the combined arrangements the local enterprise partnership for the combined authority area is seen as very much an independent agent whereas in Manchester the LEP has been entirely subsumed into the functioning of the combined authority in a very manchester fashion. There are even those who argue that the combined authority model is a manchester export so it stands to reason that it site better within their governance model, however, in the wider Liverpool ‘There is a little too much of local authorities putting the interests of their own slightly artificial local authority boundaries beyond the interests of the city region as a whole’.23 Arguably the insertion of an executive mayor for liverpool city is a further move away from functioning distributed networks as found in manchester. In examining the options for revising the governance of the LCR consideration was given to a Metro Mayor model but it was viewed as unfeasible. Whilst Manchester conducted a low-profile referendum on the question of whether to adopt a Manchester mayor covering only the core city borough and not the wider authorities. Liverpool delivered the mayoralty as part of the negotiation of the city deal. Arguing, at the time that it was absolutely core to the agreeing of a city deal with the Treasury. As it

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has transpired city deals have been underwhelming in both cities as urban policy instruments, and their effects hugely overshadowed by austerity measures meted out to the budgets of the constituent authorities. The ‘2012 batch’ of directly elected mayors (DEMs) were viewed as very important to the sub-national urban and devolution agenda of the coalition government. Notwithstanding the long debates concerning executivisation in local government as Kevin Orr so punchily put it ‘if mayors are the answer what was the question’ and to frame the structures and operation of the Liverpool mayoralty as local response to a specific set of circumstances. The type and structures of the networks of power and authority in the city (and city region) and seeks to argue that against the backdrop of disproportionate disinvestment to the northern cities that the prospects for the liverpool mayor are challenging. There is some significant bad feeling within the city-region about the establishment of the mayoralty in Liverpool, the most damning of which is that ‘liverpool mistook a visible leader for a competent family of leaders’;24 however, this quotation may be overly optimistic about the ability of any form of leadership to unite a liverpool family. It is evident that the Mayor is fully aware of the importance of the LCR agenda and has been promoting the CA model. Indeed he has contended that one of the reasons for going for the City mayor model was that no progress was being made in refashioning the LCR governance arrangements. there’s a much clearer focus on, in Manchester particularly at the moment than I ever see in Liverpool or Merseyside. I think the second way in which this is unhelpful is that I think to a degree y’know the mayor is saying right I’m the mayor, these are my responsibilities. Part of which are economic development even though it doesn’t particularly interest him.25

This position has now been partially addressed by the Cabinet of local authority leaders (Liverpool, Halton, Knowsley, St. Helens, Sefton and Wirral) who have undertaken a Governance Review designed to strengthen the delivery of strategic economic development, regeneration and transport. establishing of a Combined Authority. This would formalise the existing informal arrangements and probably be in a better position to draw down powers and resources from central government. This is potentially a major step forward for the city region and undoubtedly sends a message to the Government that the journey towards functional governance has been given a significant impetus. In short, then a move on Merseyside towards a strong executive leader for Liverpool alone may serve to undermine the development of a nascent

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political community able to operate as more than the sum of its parts in developing messages about Liverpool as a wider spatial imaginary than the city itself. It lacks much of the capacity for the mobilisation of the unofficial imagineers in support of a city brand, plan or strategy. And this ‘creative class’ on Merseyside remains disorganised and not able to be mobilised by the city elite, which is personified by the incumbent and first mayor of Liverpool, Joe Anderson.

CONCLUSIONS: EVIL TWINS? This paper has sought to describe some of the ways in which collaborations within the city-regions of Manchester and Liverpool have been achieved, making the case that there have been divergent governance experiments which may bedevil the aspiration for extensions beyond their border and for intra-urban leadership and governance which combines the two great cities and their areas of influence. It argues that greater Manchester has presented a clearer and more coherent form of leadership within the combined arrangement so the re-invented Greater Manchester council area the 10-borough spatial fix of the association of AGMA greater Manchester authorities. And further that his has been achieved via a uniquely distributed, yet neither inclusive nor open set of arrangements whereby the ‘Manchester Family’ has been highly effective in branding, planning and strategizing with the edgy design and attitude of the Imagineering class backed up by the specific take of the MIER and unfolding governance arrangements. This, comparative success is embodied in the hard edged city of (Greater) Manchester typified by a highly organised policy elite and quite specifically at odds with the governance trajectory of Merseyside in which Liverpool has seen the recent establishment of a mayoralty intended to supplant a ‘disaster narrative’ about the city’s recent fortunes. Here a simple tale about the re-invention of the greater Merseyside council is not one which the constituent boroughs are comfortable, as demonstrated by their lack of ability to some to a collective view on using either Liverpool or Merseyside as the label for the Combined Authority. The missing ingredient in the Liverpool case has been a set of imagineers content to ‘use and be used by the city leaders’, arguably due to the much more central role of politics with a ‘big P’ in the circuits of Liverpool Labour. It remains a hope that more networked forms of intra-urban leadership may extend at both

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ends of the ship canal to include environmental or social dimensions to link with the economic development rationales which have been so obvious in the recent past. It is clear, however, that attempts in this area would need to be incredibly sensitive to the divergent performances of the city elites in recent times, as soft power approaches and spatial idiom that extends beyond Greater Manchester and to Greater Liverpool and towards flexible forms of inter-urban collaboration. One final point is that the cuts to local government have led to a lack of resource for soft power innovations in both cities and that localism has not provided a propitious context for inter- or intra-urban governance innovation as it has focused city leaders on the narrow concerns of their statutory responsibilities rather than local geo-political engineering of any kind.

NOTES 1. Attributed to Anthony Wilson. 2. BBC link to mind the gap. 3. ESDP link. 4. Quotation from Interview (2010). 5. Quotation Interview data (2008). 6. Quotation from Interview data (2013). 7. Interview data quoted in Headlam (2011). 8. Interview data (2009). 9. Interview data (2009). 10. Interview data (2010). 11. Source: Dave Haslam, website article. 12. Source: GM imagineer, Interview data (2008). 13. Interview data (2010). 14. Interview data (2011). 15. Interview data (2013). 16. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/32080/11-1338-rebalancing-britain-liverpool-city-region.pdf 17. http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/BISCore/corporate/docs/N/12-1213-no-stoneunturned-in-pursuit-of-growth.pdf 18. Democratic audit. 19. Interview data (2013). 20. Interview data (2013). 21. Interview data (2013). 22. Interview data (2012). 23. Interview data (2013). 24. Interview data (2013). 25. Interview data (2013).

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REFERENCES Caruna, V., & Simmons, C. (2001). The development of Manchester airport, 1938 1978: Central government subsidy and local authority management. Journal of Transport Geography, 9(4), 279 292. Coaffee, J., & Headlam, N. (2008). Pragmatic localism uncovered: The search for locally contingent solutions to national reform agendas. Geoforum, 39(4), 1585 1599. Crevoisier, O., & Jeannerat, H. (2009). Territorial knowledge dynamics: From the proximity paradigm to multi-location milieus. European Planning Studies, 17(8), 1223 1241. Eshuis, J., & Edelenbos, J. (2008). Branding in urban regeneration. Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal, 2(3), 1752 9638. Harvey, D. (1989). From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. Geografiska Annaler, 71(1). Mintrom, M., & Norman, P. (2009). Policy entrepreneurship and policy change. Policy Studies Journal, 37(4), 649 667. Nathan et al. (2006). Retrieved from http://www.theworkfoundation.com/Download Publication/Report/60_60_Ideopolis_Complete.pdf Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (1995). Neoliberalizing space. Antipode, 34(3), 380 404.

LEADERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPEANIZATION CRISIS AND AUSTERITY Kerry E. Howell and Rory Shand ABSTRACT Purpose Europeanization involves institutional development as well as the adaptation of Member States policy and regulation towards EU directed expectations and transformations. Design/methodology/approach Europeanization provides a means of mapping, analysing changes and enables a starting point for developing leadership strategies within the EU. Findings Through discourse, leaders in the EU and Member States continue to consider issues relating to late capitalism, democratic accountability and the efficiency and effectiveness of socio-economic models and problems regarding these when assessing the changing role of the nation-state in a transforming global environment. Research limitations/implications Even though a transformation in leadership and discourse became apparent to ensure the continuation of the Eurozone the research does not clearly map how far treaty amendments will enable closer fiscal and political integration.

European Public Leadership in Crisis? Critical Perspectives on International Public Sector Management, Volume 3, 63 74 Copyright r 2014 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420140000003013

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Originality/value Europeanization is conceptualised on a number of different levels; initially it may be considered as an extension of ideas relating to civil constitution and international law through recognition and dialectical or transformational discourse. Second, Europeanization may be seen as the means by which EU polity provisions affect Member States or as an important mechanism for the development of EU structures/institutions and cultural transformation. Through transformations in discourse propagated by the leadership an intensification of Europeanization in terms of content, mechanism and processes became apparent. Keywords: Governance; Europeanization; leadership; culture; European integration

INTRODUCTION This paper assesses the relationships between member states and the European Union (EU) and the implications this has for leadership and cultural issues regarding governance, policy development and implementation within the supranational structure. To achieve this objective a number of areas relating to Europeanization, leadership and culture requires exploration in terms of who initiates European integration, the mechanisms that underpin or facilitates leadership of the EU institutions and consequent culture and discourse prevalent at a given time. Consequently, different aspects of Europeanization will be explored in terms of process, mechanisms and content as well as democratic leadership theories and authority. Following the banking crisis and austerity measures implemented because of balance of payment difficulties with certain Member States this paper investigates which level (Member State or EU) provided leadership during the crisis. This study assesses relationships between member states and the EU and the implications this has for leadership and cultural issues regarding governance, policy development and implementation within a supranational structure.

EUROPEANIZATION: PROCESS, MECHANISMS AND CONTENT Europeanization 1 (En1) entails downloading or top-down Europeanization and is based on conceptualizations forwarded by Buller and Gamble (2002),

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Dyson and Goetz (2002), George (2001) and Ladrech (1994, 2009). These commentators provided analysis of wider perspectives of Europeanization but emphasised En1 because of its clarity in terms of explanatory power and determination of cause and effect. Europeanization 2 (En2) incorporates up-loading or bottom-up Europeanization and is based on conceptualizations indicated by Bo¨rzel (2002), Bulmer and Burch (2001), Dyson (1999) and Risse, Green Cowles, and Carporosa (2001). In most instances, these conceptualisations emphasise the development of EU policy-making institutions, which provide definitions of European integration, rather than the mechanism of micro and macro up-loading or intermediation mechanisms between interest groupings, member state governments and the EU polity. Indeed, there have also been studies of specific sub-national interests and their interactions with EU policy-making institutions (see Camerra-Rowe, 1996; Coen, 1997, 1998; Greenwood, 1995, 1997; Greenwood & Cram, 1996; Greenwood, Grote, & Ronit, 1992; Howell, 2000, 2004; Mazey & Richardson, 1993; McLaughlin, 1995; McLaughlin & Greenwood, 1995; McLaughlin, Jordan, & Maloney, 1993). Europeanization is conceptualised in the context of ‘situation’; downloading (En1), up-loading (En2) and cross-loading (En3). When examining cross-loading (En3) and policy transfer (two forms can be identified); vertical (explicit Europeanization; policy transfer initiated through EU legislation and subsequent regulatory outcomes) and horizontal. Horizontal Policy Transfer (HPT) may not involve Europeanization and when it does it is an opaque form of En3, this is because policy and consequent lessondrawing is not explicitly based on EU legislation. For HPT lessons are normally based on national regulation and or structures and policy transfer is undertaken from one state to another. However, policies that are transferred in this fashion may become the norm and dominate throughout Member States and consequently be macro or micro up-loaded into the EU domain. Such illustrates mechanisms employed by Europeanization processes that bring about change at Member State level (Howell, 2004, 2004a, 2004b, 2005). To provide empirical reliability and validity and the ‘interwoven relationships’ at work in the EU, Europeanization needs to identify aspects of fit and misfit and see the interaction between En1, En2 and En3 as an example of ‘process’ and mechanisms (lesson-drawing, policy transfer and convergence) implied in this (Bennett, 1991). There is now some agreement that ‘a range of ideas … explain the realities, dynamics and complexities of European integration’ (Greenwood, 1997, p. 242). With the renewed emphasis on integration many realised that the EU was in the process of metamorphosis and that this would have

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‘major implications for the actors, the processes and the outcomes of policymaking at all levels in Europe: supranational, national and sub-national’ (Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter, & Streeck, 1996, p. 14). As situation and process Europeanization can clearly identify differences between policy transfer and/or convergence in terms of up-loading, downloading and cross-loading. However, what is actually happening in terms of content (discourse, policy change, beliefs and values) is more problematic. Content can take the form of discourse and the formulation of shared beliefs. Europeanization discourses may reflect changed values and beliefs in relation to those that exist at the member state level and the impact of the EU in terms of formulating shared beliefs as these become polity. Foucault (2002) identified that humanity becomes apparent in relation to discourse or discursive practice. In relation to Europeanization discourse encompasses an interactive process (the interplay between policymakers and policy formation in relation to political communication) and a set of ideas, beliefs and values (means by which individuals make sense of the world; in this instance the EU and relationships with member states). Furthermore, discourse acts as the point of resistance to prevailing ideas through the formulation of counter discourses. In terms of a single market in the EU and means of transformation in member states one may pinpoint the idea of competent authorities and regulatory convergence in terms of monetary, fiscal and political integration as part of this process. Such is developed through leadership within the EU and Member States; the prevalent ideas regarding culture and discourse are developed through interaction between actors in institutions and policy decisions derived from this.

LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE Williams (1981) argued that as leaders ‘cultural producers’ organise or are organised in social institutions. He considered that institutions existed in specific cultural environments and as ‘cultural producers’, had an impact on wider social structures. Schein (1996) considered leadership and culture to be elements of an institutional process through which behaviour is transformed and refined over time. Behaviours were passed on through the organisation and provided accepted values and norms for new recruits and on-going decision-making as well as daily interaction. Consequently, leadership and culture were intrinsic for an institution because it defined or

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influenced norms and behaviour (ibid.). Schein (1996) argued that ‘we must not confuse the individual assumptions of the leader with the shared assumptions that define the concept of culture. Culture only arises when those individual assumptions lead to shared experiences that solve the group’s problems of external survival and internal integration. Culture is created by shared experience, but it is the leader (or leaders) who initiates this process by imposing his or her beliefs, values and assumptions at the outset’ (p. 225, author’s brackets). However, one of the main difficulties when using or assessing leadership is identifying exactly what it is. When assessing leadership it is important to recognise that there is no single definition or formula and that numerous commentators and academics have posited definitions (Adams, 2007; Adorno, 1950; Barnard, 1948; Bass, 1990; Fromm, 1965; Lewin, 1987; Stoghill, 1950). This paper concentrates on democratic leadership theory but recognises that other areas exist. When identifying the concept of leadership it is necessary to outline where such an activity takes place. Leadership takes place in groups and organisations and/or institutions may be understood as a particular kind of group. In this way, leadership is directly related to the organised group and its objectives and is a process that involves influence to ensure goal attainment in an organisational context. This given leadership requires followers and leaders and followers are different sides of the same coin. One is unable to understand leadership without followership and in a political context a relationship between the people and their representatives. There is an abundance of literature describing, discussing and providing definitions of democracy but little on the notion of democratic leadership. Lewin (1987) called for social science to develop a more in depth comprehension of democratic leadership and followership. Indeed, the central element of democratic leadership has been identified as accountability; so how is this relationship distinguishable in the EU?

LEADERSHIP IN THE EU Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballanchey (1962) argued that the main function of the democratic leader was to ensure participation in the decision-making processes and disperse rather than concentrate responsibility. Nagel (1987) goes further than this when he considered that democratic leadership should not simply ensure authority dispersion but remind people that they have ‘collective responsibilities’. Democracy requires a politically competent

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membership. The membership needs to be skilled in terms of organisational capability, have self-esteem in speaking and thinking as well as engender political efficacy; fundamentally, citizens must be capable of engaging in the political process. The leadership base should continually be broadened. ‘Good leaders can expand their ranks by becoming role models to change novices from followers to leaders’ (Baker, 1982, p. 325). Democratic leaders must ensure productive, effective democratic policy-making and facilitate a deliberative process to ensure these objectives. This means listening to ideas, values and identifying solutions by providing a voice that most appropriately reflects collective interests. In this context, leadership may be considered a process or act of influencing organisational and or group activity. So leadership is directly related to organised groups and their objectives. Leadership cannot exist unless differentiated responsibility (division of labour) is apparent, which is a manifestation of organised group activity. Responsibility is the obligation to pursue an objective and for someone to assign the objective to the group or individual. In its broadest context, responsibility indicates the objectives for which a group is accountable and the group’s status within the structure. This leads to a number of definitions of leadership which involve process, power relationships, influence, goals and groups. In short, leadership involves levels of influence that pursues goal attainment or transformations in an organisational context. This given, leadership requires followers. Consequently, if one is unable to understand leadership without followership, from where should leadership in the EU emanate? Should leadership come from the EU supranational institutions or Members States? It is apparent that democratic processes and relationships require reform if the EU and/or Member States are able to influence goals and groups in an effective manner; leadership in the EU is a process and contingent so should adapt to reflect on-going development and evolution. Indeed, the theoretical frameworks for understanding these developments in relation to practical policy-making and leadership techniques are required. Following economic disasters, stagnation and austerity, we are witnessing a shift in discourse that redefines and re-emphasises the EU and European integration as a supranational democratic institution. Subsequently, Europeanization is developing a much deeper meaning and incorporates not only policy change but also cultural transformation and democratic policy-making procedures being accepted that are above and beyond the nation-state. Ideas are taking on different reproductions and transformations and our subsequent set of practices in terms of leadership and policy implementation provide different meaning for our ontological perspectives. For example, what could be said

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regarding economic, monetary, fiscal and political integration in the EU was different following the Single European Act, Single European Market, the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) and the recent eurozone crisis. Social relations and discourses embedded in the narratives that relate to our understanding of the structure of the EU and wider world have transformed. The EU incorporates a new form of organisation which is neither nation-state nor international structure. It is this new form that provides the basis for a different discourse regarding leadership in the EU not a completely new discourse but a synthesis of existing ideas in relation to future possibilities and changing rationales. Europeanization provides a means of mapping, analysing and assessing these changes; it enables a starting point for developing sound leadership strategies within the EU. Through discourse leaders in the EU and Member States continue to consider issues relating to late capitalism, democratic accountability and the efficiency and effectiveness of socio-economic models in relation to the free market, third-way, technocracy, corporatism, pluralism and problems regarding these areas when assessing the changing role of the nation-state in a transforming global environment. Such have implications for policy options and empowers certain actors in the political realm. Furthermore, discourse acts as the point of resistance for prevailing ideas through the formulation of counter discourses. Regarding the policy-making in the EU and means of transformation in member states one may identify regulatory convergence in terms of the single market and monetary union as well as (given crises in the EU) the emerging discourses relating to fiscal and political integration.

THE CASE OF THE CREDIT CRUNCH AND AUSTERITY During 2007 the EU and member states faced the beginnings of the credit crunch and initially national leaderships focused on national-level responses to the crisis. However, they quickly realized that co-ordination beyond the member states alone would be required. In certain areas unified responses were problematic however co-ordination was not rapid monetary policy proved an exception to the rule; not only in the Eurozone but also between the ECB and EU national central banks in general. That said, within the Eurozone, the lender of last resort was undertaken through national central banks. Leadership involved a joint programme of Europeanization where

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central banks and governments were focusing on cutting interest rates and providing cash to liquidity-starved banks and consumers. However, the real question was how could the EU and member states ensure that such a crises did not occur again? At a Brussels summit in 2008 EU leaders agreed that the responsibility deal with the financial difficulties was primarily the responsibility of the banks and mortgage lenders that caused the crisis. However, they also indicated that if necessary European governments and EU were prepared to take regulatory and supervisory actions. The main common principles outlined by Ecofin in 2007 include: prevention of bank failures primarily through private sector solutions. Public money can never be taken for granted and will only be considered as a solution for serious disturbances where overall social benefits exceed the cost of ‘recapitalization at public expense’. Cross-border crisis management is a matter of common interest. Crisis management and crisis resolution solutions will be consistent with the arrangements for supervision and crisis prevention. Furthermore, EU competition policy will be adhered to at all times and global variables taken into consideration. During this period banking and financial regulation and supervision was mainly controlled through member state central banks; in the Eurozone the ECB is responsible for managing monetary policy. The main aim for the ECB is to ensure price stability through controlling inflation. Furthermore, the ECB also has a responsibility to help ensure the stability of the financial system, which may include influencing banking regulation policy or providing liquidity to the financial system. However, until recently the role of the ECB regarding financial stability was more problematic than in the case of a national central bank working with the national finance ministry. The Eurozone does not have a political dimension of this kind (only the Ecofin Council consisting of EU finance ministers and informal Euro-group of Eurozone finance ministers). This meant that the ECB had no more than an advisory/coordinating role regarding EU banking supervision, and did not encompass a lender of last resort. However, the ECB is able to provide liquidity to the markets, for example, in August 2007 when liquidity in the interbank market obfuscated. Indeed during 2007, defaults in the US subprime mortgage sector cast doubts over the financial health of those banks holding securities backed by such assets and the banks became wary of lending to each other; the ECB responded by injecting h95bn of liquidity into the market bring about a decrease in interbank borrowing rates and alleviate a credit crunch; an intervention that was by far the most substantial of any central bank. ‘Policy actions were prompt and co-ordinated when one or both of two conditions were satisfied: (a) the existence of a

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robust institutional framework for co-ordination and (b) the presence of a shared analytical framework (or policy some paradigm). Both conditions seem to have been satisfied in the area of monetary policy’ (Quaglia, Neuvonen, Miyakoshi, & Cini, 2009, p. 84). Indeed, certain actions were automatically dealt with through the EU and co-ordination between the ECB and other central banks was facilitated by a shared cultural perspectives, policy transfer and lesson-drawing. However, there is little evidence that these conditions were satisfied in other policy areas, for example, fiscal policy (ibid.). The Larosiere Report (2009) assessed the existing EU regulatory structures and in the light of recent developments critically analyses the problems that transpired in a post-credit crunch environment. The panel investigated present provision in relation to future requirements and aimed at ensuring: (a) Sound regulatory structure (i) Risk reduction (ii) Risk management (iii) Transparency (iv) Clear rationale for incentives (b) Effective supervisory co-ordination (i) Restructure existing provisions and build on these (ii) Clear coherent co-ordination throughout EU (iii) Equivalent standards throughout SEM (c) Coherence between supervisors (i) Re-establishment of trust Discussions regarding the future of financial regulation in the EU went hand in hand with consideration about the fate of financial supervision. The report proposed the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council and a European System of Financial Supervision with a view to transform committees of national supervisors into EU authorities. The European Systemic Risk Council would be elected by the General Council of the ECB and increase the supranational dimension of EU financial market policy as well as expanding the Bank’s own area of competence. Given the limitations, the ECB passed the test of leadership and re-established a level of trust during the liquidity crunch which at the time provided an indication of the growing maturity of eurozone institutions and shift towards closer Europeanization in terms of process, mechanisms and content. But the crisis nonetheless highlighted a wider range of financial instability issues for European policymakers regarding regulatory structures within the EU. Indeed, the initial steps taken during the credit crisis

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were burgeoned through the budgetary imbalance crisis. Furthermore, the financial crisis in terms of sub-prime mortgages and real estate bubble engendered the EU financial crisis and Member State inability to re-pay or re-finance national debt was based on austerity measures in terms of how they dealt with imbalances between revenues and expenses as they bailed out failing banks and bond holders. Indeed by 2009 fears regarding a sovereign debt crisis developed which involved government debt downgrading in certain EU Member States. Furthermore, the lack of fiscal union exacerbated decision-making and hampered a response from EU leaders.

CONCLUSION A change in discourse became apparent and to ensure the continuation of the euro it was considered that the fiscal compact, which constitutes the cornerstone of the EU or the Eurozone economic policy should be incorporated into the treaties as fast as possible. Furthermore, democratic control should be exercised by elected parliaments and not by the European Council and the national governments; to achieve these objectives treaty amendments are imperative and discussions and debates shifted towards closer fiscal and political integration. Indeed, through a shift in discourse propagated by the leadership an intensification of Europeanization content, mechanism and processes became apparent.

REFERENCES Adams, A. (2007). Developing leadership wisdom. The International Journal in Public Services, 3(2), 29 50. Adorno, T. (1950). Democratic leadership and mass manipulation. In A. W. Gouldner (Ed.), Studies in leadership (pp. 418 435). New York, NY: Harper and Bros. Baker, A. (1982). The problem of authority in radical movement groups: A case study of Lesbian-Feminist organization. The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 18, 323 341. Barnard, C. (1948). Organization and management. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bass, B. M. (1990). Leadership and performance beyond expectations. New York, NY: Free Press Collier Macmillan. Bennett, C. J. (1991). What is policy convergence and what causes it? British Journal of Political Science, 21(2), 215 233.

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Ladrech, R. (1994). Europeanization of domestic politics and institutions: The case of France. Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(1), 69 87. Ladrech, R. (2009). Europeanization and political parties. Living Reviews in European Governance, 4(1), 1 21. Larosiere, J. (2009). High level group on financial supervision in the EU report. Brussels: European Commission. Lewin, M. (1987). Kurt Lewin and the invisible bird on the flagpole: A reply to Graebner. Journal of Social Issues, 43, 123 139. Marks, G., Scharpf, F. W., Schmitter, P. C., & Streeck, W. (Eds.). (1996). Governance in the European Union. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Mazey, S. P., & Richardson, J. J. (1993). Interest groups in the European community. In J. J. Richardson (Ed.), Pressure groups. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McLaughlin, A. M. (1995). Automobiles: Dynamic organisations in turbulent times? In J. Greenwood (Ed.), European casebook on business alliances (pp. 172 183). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall International. McLaughlin, A. M., & Greenwood, J. (1995). The management of interest representation in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 33(1), 143 146. McLaughlin, A. M., Jordan, G., & Maloney, W. A. (1993). Corporate lobbying in the European community. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(2), 192 221. Nagel, J. H. (1987). Participation. New York, NY: Prentice Hall. Quaglia, L., Neuvonen, M., Miyakoshi, M., & Cini, M. (2007). Europeanization. In M. Cini (Ed.), European Union politics (2nd ed., pp. 405 420). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Risse, T., Green Cowles, M., & Carporosa, J. (2001). Europeanization and domestic change. In Europeanization and domestic change: Transforming Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Schein, E. H. (1997). Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Stoghill, R. (1950). Leadership, membership and organisation. Psychological Bulletin, 47, 1 14. Williams, R. (1981). Culture. Glasgow: Fontana New Sociology Series.

ITALIAN CITY MANAGERS: CAGED LEADERS? Alessandro Sancino, Marco Meneguzzo and Daniela Cristofoli ABSTRACT Purpose This paper aims to explore the behaviour of city managers in the ongoing context of city leadership in Italy where there are high levels of political, economic and social turbulence. Design/methodology/approach A survey was administered to 140 Italian city managers, with a response rate of 56%. The main research questions were the following: Who are the Italian city managers? How do they spend their time? Are their actions influenced by political, administrative, management and/or governance-related pressures? Findings The results depicted Italian city managers as caged leaders. They feel like they are capable of soaring to great heights outside the boundaries of their organisations, but they are constrained by their day-to-day organisational activities. Originality/value This paper offers new empirical insights into the different leadership activities carried out by Italian city managers

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discussing the differences between the time devoted to some activities and the perception of their leadership style. Keywords: City manager; city leadership; Italy; local government; leadership style; local governance

EVOLVING CITY LEADERSHIP The world of local government is constantly evolving and coming under more and more turbulent and changing political, economic and social pressure (Benington, 2012). Several different trends of change can be noted on the political front, including the crisis of representative democracy and the emergence of new kinds of democracy (such as deliberative, participative, online and monitory democracy); the decreasing electoral turnout and the loss of confidence in the government and the growing competition between territories both at a global and local level (glocalization sums up the push towards globalism and localism). From an economic point of view, the financial crisis and the period of austerity have driven local governments to promote managerial reforms such as spending reviews, retrenchment and downsizing. The idea is to do more with less. In terms of social aspects, there are several changing patterns in people’s values and lifestyles, thereby having an impact on city leadership. These include the following: the internet revolution, which is not only changing approaches to service delivery but also changing interpersonal and social relationships (Corte´s, 2008); a greater scrutiny by the ‘tabloid society’ and the rising expectations among citizens about the level of accountability and the quality of public services; an ageing society and a decrease in the proportion of the population that is economically active; a trend towards realigning the balance between paid work, household work and leisure time and, more generally, a greater focus on the quality of life and a greater reluctance among citizens to pay higher rates of tax in order to fund for public services, resulting in a ‘fewer resources, more needs’ situation (Bovaird & Loeffler, 2009). The relevant point of our analysis is that the changing circumstances have several implications on city leadership, in terms of both policy making and service delivery; according to Bovaird (2007, p. 846), policy making is

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now the negotiated outcome of many interacting policy systems, while other actors (such as users and stakeholders) are becoming even more relevant in the delivery and management of public services. In this respect, Nalbandian, O’Neill, Wilkes, and Kaufman (2013) identified three main challenges for city leadership today: working more actively at the intersection between political and administrative arenas; synchronizing city and county boundaries with problems that have no jurisdictional homes and connecting engagement initiatives to traditional political values. Nowadays, city managers are expected to manage both within their organisations (in order to achieve higher efficiency and quality in public service delivery) and outside (in order to develop new collaborative relationships with different community actors and produce outcomes of public interest together). In other words, they are expected to act at the crossroads between multiple sources of pressure management and administrative issues on one side, and policy and governance matters on the other. In the ongoing context of city leadership, this paper aims to explore the behaviour of city managers in Italy where there are high levels of political, economic and social turbulence. Who are the Italian city managers? How do they spend their time? Are their actions influenced by political, administrative, management and/or governance-related pressures? To investigate the matter, a survey was administered to 140 Italian city managers, with a response rate of 56%. The results depicted Italian city managers as caged leaders. They feel like they are capable of soaring to great heights outside the boundaries of their organisations, but they are constrained by their day-to-day organisational activities. This paper is structured as follows: the next section gives an overview of the main characteristics of Italian city managers, the section ‘Method’ describes the study method, the section that follows presents and discusses the findings and the last section gives a brief summary of the conclusions.

ITALIAN CITY MANAGERS: FROM THE ORIGINS TO TODAY City managers were introduced in Italy in 1997, by Italian law no. 127/1997. The legislation allowed provinces and municipalities (with over 15,000 inhabitants) to appoint a city manager at the top of their organisational and administrative structures to deal with managerial issues (such as designing

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the organisational architecture, implementing policy programmes, and setting targets and measuring organisational performance). In the 1990s, multiple factors led to the introduction of city managers in Italy (Panozzo, 2006): • When law no. 127/1997 was drafted, the Italian political scene was overwhelmed by the ‘Tangentopoli’ bribery scandal. Widespread corruption in Italian politics had been revealed by the ‘Mani Pulite’ (‘Clean Hands’) judicial investigations in the 1990s. Against this backdrop, the idea was for the city managers to introduce managerial skills into local government and promote a new mission and vision for local governments based on managerial values, after a series of scandals. • From an institutional point of view, the introduction of city managers served to complete the reforms at the top of local government structures that began in 1993 (with Italian law no. 81/1993) with the introduction of directly elected mayors. In this respect, city managers were viewed as the executive officers of the mayors, and it was hoped that they would improve the efficiency of the Italian local governments. • From a socio-economic point of view, the introduction of city managers was promoted by the growing recognition of citizens as ‘customers’ of public services (with consequent expectations in terms of quality and efficiency of services) and by the economic globalisation of markets, which produced competition between regions and cities, with a resulting need to sustain the competitiveness of each territory. • From a managerial point of view, the introduction of city managers may be seen as one of the main consequences of the New Public Management (NPM) reforms (e.g. Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gaebler, 1995) in Italy. Italian legislators wanted the city managers to promote the spread of typical private management principles, approaches and tools in the public sector in order to respond to the higher expectations of customers in terms of efficiency and quality of service. Accordingly, city managers were expected to act as change management agents in charge of managerial tasks. Another distinctive feature of Italian city managers is that they are appointed by the mayor and the executive cabinet for a fixed term that cannot exceed the length of the political term (five years). Therefore, city managers are part of the spoils system.1 This has led to public criticism, with opinion leaders and politicians arguing that city managers are under the sway of political parties, which use the positions to reward people rather than appointing competent personnel. The concept of city managers

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gained momentum in the main reforms carried out by several Italian governments in an attempt to cut costs in the public sector. Accordingly, the Italian legislators introduced a new law (no. 42/2010) such that only cities with over 100,000 inhabitants could appoint city managers. On the basis of this summative analysis, it seems clear that Italian city managers are expected to act as leaders in the evolving context of local governments and move them towards a new, results-based and governanceoriented kind of administration. The characteristics and history of the Italian public sector mean that city managers are subject to multiple sources of pressure at the same time. This includes pressure of a political, administrative, managerial and governance-related nature. Can Italian city managers negotiate the crossroads between these sources of pressure or are they influenced by one or more of the forces?

METHOD In order to answer the questions above, a survey was conducted among Italian city managers between 2009 and 2010. In total, 140 city managers were surveyed and 78 of them completed the questionnaire, giving a response rate of 56%. Table 1 shows the characteristics of the respondents. The questionnaire was divided into five sections: data about the municipality served; biographical data of the city managers; nature of the city managers’ work; the city managers’ leadership style; and ideas and suggestions about the future of city management. The section about the nature of the city managers’ work was based on the studies conducted by Mintzberg (1973) and Dargie (1998) concerning the time devoted to different activities such as telephone calls, meeting people, emailing and working alone. The studies carried out by Mouritzen and Svara (2002), Svara (1985) and Newell and Ammons (1987) were used to distinguish between bureaucracy-oriented activities (i.e. giving advice on bureaucratic and administrative issues), policy-oriented activities (i.e. formulation of policy proposals to be submitted to politicians), management-oriented activities (such as strategic planning, people management and activities coordination) and governance-oriented activities (i.e. networking with citizens and external stakeholders). The questionnaire was sent by email, with a short presentation of the research aims and an endorsement of the study by the President of the Italian City Managers’ Association.

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Before the survey was conducted, several city managers from the Italian City Managers’ Association were interviewed directly in order to pre-test the questionnaire. In the following section, we will focus on the city managers’ biographical data, the nature of their work and their leadership style.

FINDINGS The average age of Italian city managers is 54. The majority of them are men (87%), and women make up just 13% of the total. As far as their qualifications are concerned, they mostly have backgrounds in economics and management. This is in keeping with their duty of introducing managerial principles and practices in the public sector. The more traditional qualifications in law (25%) and political science (22%) are also well represented. Similarly, 67% of the city managers have previous experience in the private sector, while 54% of them have experience in politics. Regarding the positions held before their appointment as city managers, 36% of them were managers in the same local government. These data seem to be in contrast with the idea of city managers as drivers of innovation who can introduce new values and practices to the public sector, importing them from the private sector. The fact that they come from the same organisation means that the new leaders are in danger of being subject to the same old political and bureaucratic pressures. See Table 1 for the main characteristics of Italian city managers. Table 1.

City Managers’ Biographical Data.

Age Gender Qualification: type of university degree

Previous experience in private sector Previous experience in politics Previous role (before being appointed as a city manager)

54 Male (87%), female (13%) Economics and management (29%), law (25%), political science (22%), engineering (10%), other (8%), no degree (6%). Yes (67%), no (33%) Yes (54%), no (46%) Manager in the same local government (36%) Manager in other local government (31%) Public manager in central government and/or regional government (12%) Private sector manager (21%)

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City managers also seem to be in an ambiguous position when it comes to the nature of their work. When they were surveyed about the time devoted to activities such as telephone calls, meeting people, writing and replying to emails and working alone in their offices, city managers seemed to be largely dedicated to networking activities (Table 2). Only 23% of their time is devoted to working alone, whereas 56% is spent on meeting people. This is in keeping with their roles as intermediaries between politics and management both outside and inside the organisational boundaries and between the old and new models of public administration. However, when they were asked to state on how much time they devoted to different categories of stakeholders, such as politicians, managers and employees, and citizens and external stakeholders, Italian city managers seemed to be largely devoted to internal stakeholders, with local government managers and employees taking up not less than 59% of the city managers’ time (Table 3). Similarly, as far as the time devoted to bureaucratic, policy, management and governance activities is concerned, Italian city managers seem to be focused on activities related to the internal organisation. Together, bureaucratic and management activities take up 83% of the city managers’ time. In contrast, just 7% of the city managers’ time is spent on governance activities (Table 4). Last but not least, interesting data emerged when the city managers were asked to state whether their leadership style was focused on bureaucratic, policy, management or governance issues (Table 5). The main focus among Italian city managers in their leadership styles is on managerial issues (43%). However, 24% of the city managers consider themselves to be Table 2.

Time Devoted to Working Activities.

Telephone calls Meetings Email Working alone

11% 56% 10% 23%

Table 3. Politicians Management and employees Citizens and stakeholders

Time Devoted to Different Actors. 28% 59% 13%

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Table 4.

Time Devoted to Different Categories of Activities.

Bureaucracy-oriented activities Policy-oriented activities Management-oriented activities Governance-oriented activities

Table 5.

36% 10% 47% 7%

Perception of Leadership Style.

Bureaucracy-oriented Policy-oriented Management-oriented Governance-oriented

29% 4% 43% 24%

focused on governance issues and on managing interaction with external stakeholders. These figures are particularly interesting when compared with the time actually devoted to governance-oriented activities, as reported in Table 4 (7%). Although Italian city managers feel that they are ready to operate outside the organisational boundaries, they still seem to be absorbed by internal and organisational issues.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION When city managers were introduced in Italy, they were expected to bring a wind of change with them. They were supposed to lead local governments towards new values, principles and practices. More specifically, their goal was to transform local governments from bureaucratic organisations to results-oriented organisations, which is in accordance with the NPM guidelines (Hood, 1991). Our results seem to suggest that city managers have mainly focused on bureaucratic and managerial issues and practices. However, as a new model of administration appears to be emerging at a local level, it would seem that city managers are claiming to address new challenges. New democratic practices (such as citizens’ juries, consensus conferences and deliberative opinion polls see for example Bobbio, 2002, p. 2) are reliant on city managers creating organisational conditions that foster the contributions of public, private and non-profit actors, so that together they can generate and activate new social capital and consolidate current social capital (Bovaird, Parrado Diez, & Loeffler, 2002; Putnam, 2005).

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More specifically, whenever local governments are required to perform new functions and roles, the work of city managers needs to be updated. The biggest factor in the size of the change brought about by the evolution from government to governance seems to be how city managers modify their working approaches. City managers are increasingly expected to focus on local stakeholders and their interests, resources and power. There is also a growing demand for them to analyse the external social and economic environment and forge alliances with the local media in order to raise awareness and build consensus around the local government’s activities. Indeed, public managers are expected to have the following features: to adopt a more holistic strategic thinking and a more strategic shaping and ‘meta-planning’ role rather than strategic planning (Bovaird, 2008); to take charge of social mediation and govern interdependencies; to be social entrepreneurs who build relations and social capital; to interpret the interactions, needs and the potential of a territory and to motivate middle managers and street-level bureaucrats to adopt and understand this new governance role since leadership involves not only transformational charisma but also distribution of wisdom across a network (Baddeley, 2008, p. 189; Sancino, 2010). Italian city managers appear to be ready to perform these activities. They seem to see themselves as leaders of networks of internal and external stakeholders, but they appear to be constrained by their day-to-day activities. Are they caged leaders?

NOTE 1. The spoils system may be described as a human resources recruitment model that in contrast with the merit system uses public appointments and/or patronage (see Flinders, 2009, for a distinction between public appointments and patronage) to recruit personnel such as board members for public bodies, auditors, city managers and managers with fixed-term contracts related to the political mandate.

REFERENCES Baddeley, S. (2008). Political-management leadership. In K. James & J. Collins (Eds.), Leadership perspectives: Knowledge into action (pp. 177 192). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Benington, J. (2012). Leadership, governance and public value in an age of austerity, guest lecture for New Zealand Treasury. Retrieved from http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/ mediaspeeches/guestlectures/pdfs/tgls-benington-slides.pdf. Accessed on February 8. Bobbio, L. (2002). Le arene deliberative. Rivista italiana di politiche pubbliche, 3, 5 29. Bovaird, T. (2007). Beyond engagement and participation: User and community co-production of public services. Public Administration Review, 67(5), 846 860. Bovaird, T. (2008). Emergent strategic management and planning mechanisms in complex adaptive systems. Public Management Review, 10(3), 319 340. Bovaird, T. & Loeffler, E. (Eds.). (2009). Public management and governance (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. Bovaird, T., Parrado Diez, S., & Loeffler, E. (2002). Finding a bowling partner: The role of stakeholders in activating civil society in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Public Management Review, 4(3), 1 21. Corte´s, O. (2008). Politics, administration and citizens: Towards a new sort of relationship. ESADE IDGP Newsletter, December 17. Dargie, C. (1998). The role of public sector chief executives. Public Administration, 76(Spring), 161 177. Flinders, M. (2009). The politics of Patronage in the United Kingdom: Shrinking reach and diluted permeation. Governance, 22(4), 547 570. Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? Public Administration, 69(1), 3 19. Mintzberg, H. (1973). The nature of managerial work. New York, NY: Harper and Row. Mouritzen, P. E., & Svara, J. H. (2002). Leadership at the apex. Politicians and administrators in Western local governments. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Nalbandian, J., O’Neill, R., Wilkes, M. J., & Kaufman, A. (2013). Contemporary challenges in local government: Evolving roles and responsibilities, structures, and processes. Public Administration Review, 73(4), 567 574. Newell, C., & Ammons, D. N. (1987). Role emphases of city managers and other municipal executives. Public Administration Review, 47(3), 246 253. Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1995). Dirigere e governare: Una proposta per reinventare la pubblica amministrazione. Milan: Garzanti. Panozzo, F. (2006). Politici e manager nelle trasformazioni del governo locale. Atti del convegno “Quale dirigenza per i governi locali?”, Naples, Italy. Putnam, R. (2005). A new movement for civic renewal. Public Management, 87(July), 7 10. Sancino, A. (2010). Community governance as a response to economic crisis. Public Money & Management, 30(2), 117 118. Svara, J. H. (1985). Dichotomy and duality: Reconceptualizing the relationship between policy and administration in council-manager cities. Public Administration Review, 45(1), 221 232.

DO ENGLISH LOCAL AUTHORITIES STILL HAVE THE MEANS OF THEIR PERFORMANCE? A FRENCH VIEW ON A LOCAL PUBLIC ACTION IN CRISIS Emmanuel Auber, Elodie Chabaud, Automne Chabernaud, Cle´ment Le Bras-Thomas, Etienne Longueville and Elena Suzat ABSTRACT Purpose Great Britain is a laboratory for new techniques of public management; it is therefore an interesting place to look at for people willing to get involved in large public organisations. The French ‘institute for local studies’, trains future professionals, selected after graduation or after a working experience, in order to take high positions in local authorities nationwide. Three pairs of trainees belonging to the 2012 2013 group spent two weeks in three local authorities in England, with the purpose of analysing the performance management in these organisations.

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Design/methodology/approach British and French scholars dedicated to public organisations provided the six trainees with a global view of local government and reforms in the United Kingdom. After that, each pair exchanged information with the local authority they would visit; during the two weeks they spent there, an officer followed their works. They interviewed numerous professionals, elected members and unionists, attended meetings and events. Back in France, they presented their findings in several documents. The original subject was measuring and managing performance; in fact, the three pairs went farther and looked over many aspects of the organisations’ functioning. Findings Local authorities are facing important budget reductions and appear fragile; they put forward the idea of resilience to express the necessity of using all their resources to deal with a difficult situation. Elected members have a role of political initiative, but they also focus a lot on control, which is much more developed in Britain than in France; managers experience a very difficult period, with a lot of threats on their jobs, teams and projects. In this context, professional networks are very important; peer review is an interesting example of the role of professional exchanges in the search for new solutions. At last, unions don’t seek conflicts but try to accompany changes, lessening their negative consequences on people. Originality/value This work is not an academic one but an approach of the reality of organisations analysed by professionals or future professionals of the public sector, in a kind of ‘peer review’ between different countries. This international dimension is interesting, seeing that few in-depth comparisons between local authorities are made, especially between France and Britain. Keywords: Comparative Local Government; Improvement and Performance; Managing change; Fiscal Policy

FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY Six trainee administrators of the Paul Eluard class of the Institut National des Etudes Territoriales (the National Institute for Territorial Studies (INET)), in three two-person teams, spent two weeks in three unitary authorities in the north-east of England.

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This immersion period enabled us to closely observe English local public management. The on-site study particularly focused on the system of performance management. In effect, it was within the framework of a comparative study on the management of performance in European local authorities carried out in partnership by the research groups PILOTE and the INET, respectively. We also carried out more than 70 interviews of varied actors: elected officials, general managers, executives, trade unionists and so on. In order to be able to retain our freedom of tone and respect for them, we have decided not to name in this report the three local authorities which welcomed us. In addition to a detailed description of the performance management tools which were subject to monographs for each authority, we felt it was worth sharing, through this report, the observations which could be of interest to the French local public managers.

INTRODUCTION In the current context of financial constraint, the French public authorities are encouraged to question their habits and their ways of doing things by finding innovative means to give them room to manoeuvre. The study of the practices of foreign authorities may, in this regard, be an interesting source of analysis, on the condition that we take a step back to examine the concepts and philosophical directions on which public action of different countries are based. The study of local authorities in England appears particularly relevant. The concepts of public affairs in France and in England are, of course, radically different, but the two countries now face similar challenges to reduce the public deficit. England has placed the local authorities in the front line to meet this challenge; not only are they facing a significant decline in State funding, but they are also losing legitimacy in their interventions. The flagship concept of Big Society, which aimed to reinforce the intervention of the civil and private society in the provision of local public services, has also had the effect of competing with the action of local authorities. However, the relationship between the English authorities and the public sector is characterised by multiple and sometimes divergent influences. Therefore, the principle of accountability, which takes root in the politicoadministrative history of the country, remains a very great force in the

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public sphere. It can also be described as a duty to report. It is about justifying in a comprehensive manner the use of public funds; the administration brings together all the elements enabling to precisely document its action and to regularly report to the public and to the elected representatives, with the latter, in a logical manner, only being accountable towards the public. Therefore, accountability is not an option, but a duty. It applies to all hierarchical levels. The approach goes well beyond the concept of responsibility, which consists of individuals or institutions pursuing the general interest in answering for their acts, and only in reality those which may have had negative consequences, by resigning or by undergoing a jurisdictional or political sanction; accountability, permanent and more wider reaching is not part of a specific moment of truth but is part of an approach which is both spontaneous and ongoing, which explains in an extremely detailed manner the public action and all the processes underlying it, an approach which could lead a person holding a term of office to resign, if he does not give satisfaction. It is perhaps not going too far to liken accountability to the French notion of public service, to the extent that each of these two principles constitutes for this system a structuring priority, at a global level such as for the day-to-day functioning of services, which reflects a deep and sincere commitment to the quality of the activities and services rendered by the local public sector. The purpose of this report is to present the modalities of English territorial management, characterised by the culture of results and now shaken by radical budgetary choices (I), in the light of its political, philosophical and cultural heritage (II), before proposing several guidelines for the conduct of the local public action in France, linked in particular to the management of the increasing scarcity of resources (III).

THE ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL FACED WITH THE BUDGETARY CONSTRAINT The territorial organisation in England can be characterised as an ‘a` la carte’ model, because of the freedom of choice which the numerous reforms over the past 20 years have left to local actors. It appears far more heterogeneous and changing than that of France. The ‘traditional’ organisation of the English territory has therefore been partially remodelled. There co-exist counties, whose territorial jurisdiction is smaller than that of a

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French department, districts and 8,700 civil parishes, represented by an elected town Council or a city Council. The counties intervene in many areas: education, social services, road and transport infrastructures, waste treatment, land management, fire services and libraries. The districts are primarily concerned with town planning, accommodation, waste collection and delivery of building permits. Two notable developments took place in the years 1990 2000; on the one hand, the creation of ‘unitary’ authorities assuming, on a sometimes fairly small territory, the whole local public action. The unitary authorities therefore have both the competences of counties and of districts and on the other hand, the calling into question of the territorial State. Its presence via regional zoning, the regional government offices and the position of Director General for local government have disappeared. Now, the presence of the State is reduced to health and employment administrations, which are undergoing far-reaching reforms, the results of which are still uncertain. The intervention of the State in the territories is therefore carried out from London, with performance objectives imposed on local authorities by national level and through tools of contractualisation.

Presentation of the English Performance Management Model A Results-Based Performance Management Since the beginning of the 1980s, the British local authorities have been subject to a process of evaluation of their performance. The demand for profitability in public expenditure (the value for money concept) forces them to develop a series of figured indicators and targets to be reached to measure the results of the public intervention. Performance management in England is based on three types of data: inputs, outputs and outcomes (Fig. 1). The performance comparisons are carried out via the outcomes. The local authorities are therefore subject to obligations to achieve the given results rather than of means. Insofar, as other actors may also positively or negatively act on the social environment, the local authorities are encouraged to focus on their interventions on a few sectors of activity, in order to create a real impact. The British approach therefore allows to review the traditional, administrative and managerial practices by a clear description of the public policies and their effects. In fact, the quantitative evaluation is essential to measure whether public policies are producing results. It must allow a greater

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Processes

finances HR information

Management of services, systems

Inputs

Fig. 1.

What the services produce

Outcomes The socioeconomic impact

Outputs

Performance Management Main Items.

productivity of services and control of expenditure by allocating it in the best possible way, within the framework of a performance clinic. Above all, it increases the legitimacy of managers who may no longer just apply the rule according to a pyramid logic. They must find ways to improve the management of their service by boosting teams by means of a leader approach rather than by a manager approach. Finally, in spite of a weakness in the synthesis and sometimes in the strategic analysis of the quantitative data collected, the profusion of dashboards denotes a significant degree of professionalism: the administrative and financial technique permeates the entire ‘production chain’ (calls for tender with very detailed criteria, use of evaluation, control, management techniques, etc.).

Commissioning, Strategic Management of the Public Services? Commissioning is the strategic activity which consists of organising the project management of the services provided by the local authority. It is about defining what the external effects (outcomes) are which the local authority wishes to produce in its social environment, reflecting on how to best meet this requirement, deciding whether this answer must be found internally, jointly along with other local authorities or externally. If the external option is chosen, the strategy of public contracts (tendering) must be defined in order to reach the objective set at the lowest cost. Commissioning is organised around a circle which comprises ‘analysis’, ‘planning’, ‘action’, and ‘evaluation’, which is the internal operational model of the authority (Fig. 2).

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eg: Single Needs Assessment

eg: Performance reviews, Peer reviews

Community

Fig. 2.

eg: Health & well being strategy

Associations For-profit Sector

Public sector

The Commissioning Cycle.

Given the difficult budgetary context, commissioning contributes to strategic thinking. The management therefore carries out a study for each service of the local authority, asking itself: ‘what service do we wish to offer?’ (what effect do we wish to produce); ‘who is the best actor to offer this service?’ (internal or external management) and ‘how can we improve the service?’ (issue of efficiency).

As for the French administration, it is permeated with notions of public service Commissioner Corneille, in his conclusions on the Astruc decision of 7 April 1916, defined public service as ‘a legal process by which satisfaction is given by the administration to a need of general interest’, of equal access to public assets and sustainability of the service rendered while striving for long-term effects. The local French administrations are driven by a logic of public interest, seek proactively to improve the living conditions of inhabitants, and by the development of their territory, by allocating in the best way the means of local public policies. Although British local authorities do not ignore the search for the common good, they more readily use notions of efficiency and accountability as principles of action. They rely on issues of rationalisation, transparency, competition, mixed economy, quality/price ratio, evaluation, flexibility, mobility, best practice, delivery, leadership, empowerment and pragmatism. Ultimately, the individualised client must get value for money in his act of

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consumption which explains the urgent need for evaluation, and in particular that of customer satisfaction. The individualised client substitutes the community of users. However, at the same time, the final recipient or ‘consumer’ is no longer protected by the guarantees which the user benefited from.

The Vitality of the Peer Review At a national level, the practice of the peer review started in 2008. During the financial years 2012/2013, 170 peer reviews were carried out. This peer review is proposed by the Local Government Association (LGA), every three years, to its local authority members. It may relate to different subjects: the corporate dimension (the overall administration of the authority, including the management and the sustainable financing of the public action) or sectors of public action (social action, waste management, etc.). The peer review is supposed to provide an external eye based on a relatively well-meaning approach of ‘friendly criticism’, marked by fair play. Its mission is to look for possible ways of improvement, not to criticise the management, as did the Audit Commission, but which has now been abolished. A peer review challenge team is composed of five senior territorial managers (an executive manager such as a council leader, a chief executive and members of the LGA) from a national pool of 400 500 persons. The rule is that the operational organisation of the team depends on the chief executive member of the team. The composition of the group is proposed by the LGA, it being noted that the elected official of the team is generally of the same political leaning as the majority of the authority analysed. It remains that the local authority may refuse certain members on its own grounds (former agent of the authority, an elected official who is not appropriate for the role of head of the executive, etc.). Be that as it may, the presence of an elected official in the peer review challenge team is perceived as giving credit to this exercise. A peer review consistently seeks to determine the means to strengthen the political and managerial leadership and to promote the development of good relations between elected officials and agents and a robust assessment of performance management. Beyond this, the authority may request the team to examine additional dimensions, by interrogating it, for example upon managerial

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improvements since the last peer review or the best way to organise itself to meet the governmental budgetary cuts, taking the local context into account. To accomplish its mission, the members of the team carry out interviews with the agents, most often with three or four agents facing two or three members of the team, on three recurring questions: What are the agents most proud of? Why do they enjoy working in this administration? What would they like to change? Following four days of analysis of the authority, the peer review challenge team organises a presentation for the elected officials and for the top management; within 15 days, the final report is transmitted to them after the testimonies are rendered anonymous. Most authorities decide to publish the report, including any reservations, even if this means replying to it on their website.

The Limits of the Performance Management System As much as the British institutional model is capable of apprehending the reality of territories in a logic of territorial pluralism, it barely integrates, with respect to the steering of the activity, the territorial complexity, which yet appears inherent to the management of the local authority. Indeed, in the local authorities studied, an ‘ideological’ approach of the performance models is observed: the same concepts and tools (e.g. customers’ service) imported from the private sector are applied in local administrations by taking more or less into account the characteristics specific to each territory. It has to be admitted that this quest for results reached according to objectives predetermined by the national level gives precedence to management practices in a more ‘political’ state of mind. This placing local authorities in competition with one another, with the setting of benchmarks which is consubstantial to comparing performance, leads to a defensive rather than a learning practice. However, although quantification should be a tool for making political decisions, it appears to be substituted for it. In fact, the search for savings and the frenzied number crunching which accompanies it, affects everyone up to the elected representatives who tend to examine primarily the performance of managers instead of seeking to promote an ambitious vision of the development of a territory. After having so insisted on the managerial performance, one feels that this is the only criteria for success in the implementation of a public policy.

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However, the quality of a public policy relies just as much, if not more so, on its effects on the environment and the process of deliberation which gave rise to it. In the final analysis, the political level no longer appears to be totally in charge, faced with the triumph of these regulating logics on politics, of the communication on the territorial vision. We can estimate that this approach encourages a short-term vision and provokes a lack of interest for the objectives of the authority taken at a global level. One can only notice the cost of such an exacerbated steering of the activity. This is due to the working time necessary to elaborate and fulfil the performance indicators, which may rapidly become obsolete following a low correlation between the indicators established on a given date and the reality of a service rendered at a later date. Also, the agents rapidly identify the few aspects of their work, which they must emphasise before their evaluating superiors during the semi-annual evaluations. Consequently, certain aspects on which reflection would be more useful to the overall improvement of service (e.g. internal training of new arrivals to the team, development of negotiation capacities with the actors of the territory, etc.) are not expanded on by the agent, as they are not taken into account in the individual criteria of evaluation. All these ‘costs’ relating to the deployment of a cumbersome evaluation mechanism means less resources are available for local public policies, in particular, the redistribution policies. Finally, individual autonomy seems constrained, in particular, by the excessive number of indicators, which would tend to reduce the commitment of agents in their work and therefore the general productivity of the authority.

Management in a Collectivity in Crisis: From Evidence-Based Management to ‘Wicked Issues’ The role of managers in English local authorities is traditionally based on an evidence-based approach and training for leadership. In a system which includes much quantified data, this management of directors and assistant directors is essential; they are the guardians of the respect of the targets to be reached, and they ‘challenge’ their teams in order to understand why an indicator is not performing as expected. The manager must also train the intermediate managers in taking on responsibilities. In one of the local authorities studied, among the managers and directors were former teachers and social workers, who had gradually assumed new responsibilities.

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With the crisis and the reinforcement of difficulties to perform well, the managers must now concentrate on the ‘wicked issues’. The added value of the directors is low when issues respond to procedures which are already established. It must therefore focus its action on complex, cross-disciplinary issues, which require the expertise of several services in a short period and in a context of uncertainty.

The Local Consequences of National Austerity The Priorities of the Cameron Government Appointed Prime Minister in May 2010, in the rather unusual context of a conservative-liberal democrat coalition, David Cameron has since sought primarily to restore the accounts of the country, to once more place to the fore, with a modern face, the Thatcher heritage and has come back on the achievements, but not necessarily the spirit, of the previous New Labour governments. Reducing the Deficit, against all Odds. For three years, the government has given itself a priority objective: to reduce the deficit in the short-term. Indeed, the British public deficit has soared since the 2008 crisis, reaching a level of −11.5% of GDP (i.e. −163 Bn GBP) for the tax year 2009 2010 (April 1 March 31), before dropping by levels of almost 2% each year under Cameron’s government, to reach −5.6% in 2012 2013. As for the public debt, it has steadily increased from 73.9 % in 2009 2010 to 90.7 % in 2012 2013.1 It is this trend in the public debt which led the agencies Moody’s (February) then Fitch (April) to deprive the country of its AAA rating. This budgetary effort initially resulted, as the Spending Review forecast as of 2010, in a drastic decrease in public spending. Indeed, it decreased from 51.3% of GDP in 2009 to 48.5% in 2012 (as compared to 56.6% in France). Public revenues have seen changes too, however, with an increase of 2.3% in the same period to reach up to 42.2% (51.7% in France). In autumn of 2012, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, announced that the austerity measures would be extended by one year, to 2018. Therefore, this is only the beginning of austerity in Great Britain. The IMF even requested the coalition government to slow down the rhythm of the austerity policy which caused sluggishness in private demand, with no reaction from London.

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The consequences on the quality and the quantity of services, benefits and investments which the public actors may provide have therefore taken a back seat. Moreover, this reduction affects more particularly the territories and local authorities of the North of England, which have not yet recovered from the collapse of industry and which depend more on public employment than the South of the country. The divide between these ‘two Englands’ therefore continues to worsen, both economically and socially. On a political level, the second place obtained by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Euro-sceptic and anti-immigration, during the by-election in the constituency of South Shields, labour since 1935, perhaps reveals the start of an oppositional turnaround. It is, however, important to further explain this analysis as it is the Counties of the well-off South (East & West Sussex, Devon, Essex, Kent, Cornwall, etc.) who offered the greatest number of local seats to UKIP during the Counties’ elections of May 2 of this year. The ‘Big Society’ Policy. The conservatives have sought to find their public spending reduction policy on a renewed philosophical concept. Their Big Society concept, as opposed to the ‘Big government’ concept and developed by the conservative think tank Policy Exchange, consists of placing public actors, associations and businesses on the same level in the provision of services to the public, with the stated objective of repairing a ‘broken society’. This concept reveals a real lack of confidence in the new elites in power vis-a`-vis the State and more widely the public sector. Underlying this challenge is ideal of a locally self-administered democracy, where the charity of individuals and communities make up for the shortcomings of impersonal and costly public solidarity. At the same time, each one is urged to act in a responsible manner, in a movement which seeks to encumber associations, mutual companies, local communities, charitable or religious organisations and families with the charges hither to incumbent on the local authorities. This revitalisation of the civil society which was supposed to be the spearhead of the new ideology of the conservative party has not met with great success, so much so that the term is becoming increasingly rare in official speeches. The fragility, in particular financial, of the British associative sector, accentuated by the budgetary reductions and the VAT increase in 2011, compromises the project2 in spite of the creation of the Big Society Capital bank in April 2012. Indeed, according to the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO), the negative shock due to

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the austerity measures amount for the sector to 3.3 Bn GBP for the period 2011 2016.3 A Simplification of Local National Relations?. At the same time as this policy of budgetary austerity, the current government calls into question the national framework established by New Labour, with the aim of simplifying relations between the State and local government. This gave rise to the successive abolition of bodies (Audit Commission for Local Authorities) and tools (Local Area Agreements, which justified the Partnerships, National Indicators Set, comprehensive performance assessment), although ‘accountability’ vis-a`-vis citizens remains one of the main objectives of Big Society. The effect of the latest measures is, however, ambiguous: although it appears that there are more possibilities of adaptation for the local authorities, mainly national reference frameworks remain (National Outcomes Frameworks for health, childhood, social action, etc.), seen as new burdens. In their study carried out in 2000, Pollitt & Bouckaert4 considered that the United Kingdom presented the characteristics of a State in the phase of marketisation of its public sector. It now appears that the choices of the Cameron government are subjecting the country to a phase whereby its public sector is being minimised. This government pushes to its extreme the logic of public interest (minimal State and guarantor of freedoms) as opposed to the ‘Reichstaat’ (a structuring and strategist State). Backlash at the Local Level: Radical Choices Imposed on Local Authorities The first observation that can be made is that of the brutal nature of the impact of national choices, in particular budgetary but also in terms of systems and transfers, on the local authorities both in organisational and in human terms. Financial Resources and Personnel under Pressure. The three local authorities studied, which rely heavily on their budgetary structure, as is the case for the entire British local sector, on national allowances, have seen massive reductions in their budgets, as much as −30% in two years. The margins for manoeuvre with respect to tax have also been reduced by the government, with the cap rate of land tax having been brought to 2%. To increase it, the local authorities are required to present two budgets by referendum to the citizens, one of which respects the cap rate, which is a politically risky option.

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The Impact of the Crisis on the Financial Management of Local Authorities In one of the local authorities studied, there was a shortfall of £14 million to balance the budget. The sudden reduction in the allowances, which the authority benefited from, is mainly explained by the implementation in 2013 of the business rates retention scheme at a national level, which modifies the distribution of allowances over the territories. In order to encourage the local authorities to create growth, approximately half the allowances of the State are paid according to the creation of activities in a territory. This antiequalising reform has the effect of redistributing the greater part of State allowances from the territories of the North which have become mainly residential after de-industrialisation to the affluent territories in the South. Now, any departure of a business may cause a reduction in allowances. This reform has financial effects which are very similar to those of the former professional tax in France. The usual budgetary process takes place from September to March. In September, the dialogue begins between the Directorate of Finances and the assistant directors (AD). On the basis of diagnosis, the AD present their objectives, the level of service that they want to allocate and the proposed expenditure. They also explain how they will be able to make efficiency gains, in particular through the use of new technologies. The AD for finance makes forecasts on the level of the State subsidy (known by the end of December) and offers a level of local tax (land tax) in accordance with the national ceiling. The work of the services escalates to the executive level (the Cabinet). This body submits the budget to the Council’s vote towards the end of February/beginning of March. A document on the impact of the budget is drawn up (quality impact assessment). In 2013, the local authority modified its agenda. The budget cuts will result in the abolition of several services. First, the authority is committed to the painstaking work of defining the minimum service level required for its mandatory competences and which falls within the scope of the local initiative. To inform the citizens and associate them in the choices of the priority services to maintain, a budget advisory panel has been set up. The choice to begin the budgetary process in March 2013 for a vote in February 2014 also falls within the scope of legal precaution. With regard to the budgetary constraint, difficult choices of cuts will be made and the authority expects a high risk of

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recourse before the courts. Therefore, all appropriate information measures should be taken to prevent this risk. In its internal organisation, the authority has brought back together its financial services, previously devolved within the organisation. Instead of having an AD for finance per pole, there is now a single AD for finance, joined with the human resources, in the Resources Direction, who manages the budget under the direct supervision of the Chief Executive. The internal organisation of the finance department remains, however, marked by the previous organisation, with three heads of service out of four within the finance department, in charge of relations with the departments and specialising in the optimisation of expenditure in each one of them. Although they were localised within each department and rarely interacted, these services are now going to be brought together in a single building in order to apprehend finances in a more general way (corporate approach). The financial situation has therefore had the effect of reinforcing the weight of the resources functions in the organisation, in a system where the inputs are usually less monitored than the outcomes.

The local authorities have also been forced to give up many agents (example of a local authority studied: 425 fewer agents, including 124 redundancies, 169 voluntary departures and over 100 retirements). These redundancies, facilitated by the absence of status for English local public agents, were sometimes carried out using radical methods: agents with chronic diseases were classified at the top of the list of those to be dismissed; several agents currently employed are placed in competition against one another and only one will be kept; the local authorities studied reduced the number of their executives and carried out reorganisations, focusing on recentralisation of services, with frequent regrouping of a service in a single office, or even the creation of an open space for an entire department. The Unions in England Example of a major union in a labour authority having axed 425 jobs in two years In England, the rate of union membership is approximately 25% but this percentage reached 80% in one of the local authorities studied. It is a unionism of service, with the trade unions only defending their

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members. There is no election within the authority to measure the representativeness of the trade unions. The elections of representatives are carried out within each union with very low rates of participation (less than 5%). In this authority of 2,800 agents, the majority union has 1,500 members (including the volunteers of charitable organisations or associations who work for the authority) and only has one representative who benefits from a union discharge. The other representatives must juggle their work in the local authority and their union activity, with no discharge. The majority union, close to Labour, said it was ‘very satisfied’ with the management of the situation by the authority. As the national decisions to reduce subsidies were taken by the conservative party, Labour councillors are not held accountable for their application at a local level. It does, however, regret that the authority did not seize the opportunity to ‘fatten’ the budget by increasing taxes when it was free to do so; it also considers that the appropriateness of axing one service rather than another has not always been demonstrated, but does not interfere in this choice. The union is associated in two ways with the decisions relating to budget cuts: • On the one hand, the proximity with Labour means that trade unionists are invited for meetings of the majority political group. There are therefore informed of the major issues facing the authority and of the political orientations, which will have administrative implications. • On the other hand, it works with the administration. Trade unions meet managers in working groups of the organisation of the local authority (the joint consultative committee meetings) and have meetings with the human resources department (trade unions’ consultative group meeting). The rules and procedures are decided in consultation. The unions are informed of the services or jobs ‘at risk’, which present a high probability of soon being made redundant. With respect to individual situations, the agents can ask the trade unions to represent them to plead their case before the administration, sometimes to the detriment of another agent who is not a union member in case of the merger of two jobs. In order to avoid selfinterested memberships, the trade union refuses to represent agents who have not been members for at least four weeks.

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Finally, the trade union wants to be open to negotiations but does not participate much in demonstrations. The ‘low rate of membership’ of agents to this trade union (50% of agents) and the fairly nonmilitant character of the members constitute risks which are too big for the union, according to its representative. He fears that a call to demonstrate would only be taken up by part of the members, which could potentially create a division in the union. To avoid this pitfall, the number of calls to demonstrate is very low.

However, in the face of these redundancies and reorganisations, the teams appear to wish to move forward and maintain the quality of the service rendered, but it is hard to believe that agents state of mind is completely unconcerned. The frequent service reviews tend to engender ill feelings and the resignation of many agents, who become aware that they are interchangeable. In certain local authorities, many agents no longer appear to perceive the meaning of their commitment in favour of a public service whose scope is increasingly reduced and are evidently tired of completing statistical tables and getting accustomed to softwares which are entirely disconnected from their core activity. At the end of the chain, this context of professional insecurity and the absence of vitality at work increases the risk of occupational diseases, and this is reflected in particular in the increase of nervous breakdowns. The increase in workload, particularly for certain executives taking over the work of colleagues, who have been made redundant, risks leading to burnouts. The employees of English authorities do not enjoy the protection of employment that the status of civil servant offers in France. Their employment contracts may therefore be easily terminated, and the obligations take precedence over the rights. This weakens all the more the role of trade unions in collective bargaining. As they have a customer approach, they only defend the interests of members who have contributed for a long time, without really criticising the overall approach of the authority.

Example of HR Management in a Context of Crisis in One of the Local Authorities Studied Remuneration The remuneration is fixed on the basis of an objective evaluation of jobs (job evaluation scheme) carried out by a dedicated team within

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the HR department (job evaluation team). When a new job is created, this team examines a series of criteria: • • • • • •

What is the complexity of the job? What are the physical constraints of the job? What is the emotional burden of the job? What are the intellectual capacities necessary for the job? What level of management? What financial management? and so on.

Each criterion is evaluated on a scale of 1 5, and the total gives a mark corresponding to the scale. Each scale includes three or four indexes. With seniority, the agents pass from one index to another within a scale, on the condition that they obtain a positive evaluation during their performance review. However, the agents rapidly reach the ceiling of their scale. Mobility is then the only option to be able to have one’s salary increased. Contrary to what is generally believed, there is no individual performance bonus for the executing agents or for the executives. Given that the managers must be ‘performing at the highest level possible’ in any case, no additional individual remuneration is provided to reward their performance. Collective performance bonuses exist in some services (including waste collection), but the authority is in the process of calling them into question; it was noted that it was mostly services consisting largely of male agents which benefited from service bonuses. Payroll and Management Dialogue The management of human resources is the subject of an appropriation by each director, manager of his budget which includes the wage bill. Every three months, the directors report on their data before their department managers during a management forum (performance clinics). Several indicators are discussed in detail, for example the number of overtime hours worked by the agents of the department. It is about examining the trends rather than the figures, with the most important factor not being the facts but the way they are perceived by the director or as put by the department manager: ‘what’s the story?’ The HR Faced with a Decrease in the Budget In the face of the financial situation, jobs are being axed in three ways: • the non-replacement of vacancies, • voluntary departures and • forced departures (redundancies).

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With regard to non-replacements, the executive committee made up of the Chief Executive and Directors examines the vacancies each week. Each manager must explain what is needed, what the duration of this need is and what the estimated cost is. On this basis, the executive committee decides whether or not to re-open a job. With regard to the forced departures, the authority works with the unions and tries to adopt written rules so that they are as objective as possible. The lack of status of civil servants of the English territorial agents renders them vulnerable. The political choice was to protect as far as possible the executing agents and to reduce the number of managers. Therefore, in one of the local authorities studied, the number of managers had dropped from 24 to 12 in two years. When the local authority considers stopping a service, it declares this service as being ‘at risk’, in order to enable the agents to anticipate as soon as possible the possible elimination of their jobs. Prevention of Psycho-Social Risks Each manager must establish a stress risk assessment in order to identify the situations which may cause a danger to the agents and to be able to anticipate and plan the measures to avoid them. The authority therefore enables agents to benefit freely from support from occupational psychologists in the services who are the most exposed. It also organises training courses on how to handle change (management of change session), in order to reassure the agents and to help them to be active in the evolution of their job.

Transfer of Competence and Reorientation of Policies. This study was being carried out at a time when a new competence was being transferred to the local authorities: public health. In effect, on 1 April 2013, the department which had hither to been attached to the National Health Service was attached to the Councils. The Primary Care Trusts were abolished and replaced by Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG); the responsibility of distributing tasks (between the various establishments and between public and private) lies with the General Practitioners (GPs). A ring-fenced grant for health has compensated the transfer but fears exist within local authorities as to the perennial nature of this grant. The question now is: how to fully integrate this competence in the system of measurement and performance management?

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Beyond this transfer, it was also possible to observe the impact of other reforms driven by the Cameron government. We can cite, for example, the ‘troubled families programme’, a new governmental prioritisation in the social field with a logic of ‘payment by results’. The criteria of classification are criticised, along with the perverse effects of payment on the basis of the results that drive some organisations to concentrate on the least difficult cases of the ‘troubled families’ in order to show a good performance and thus to obtain funding. In the same way, the privatisation of primary education (academies, sponsored by private sectors), thereby reduces the impact of the local authority on these structures. The Emergence of a Culture of Scarcity in Public Local Action. Faced with this budgetary constraint, the management wishes to breathe a new culture into public action and spending, which is that of a ‘one-bullet gun’, according to the expression of one Director we met: rather than varied and farreaching activities, targeted and efficient actions are now being developed. For example, in one of the local authorities studied, the youth clubs, which had not shown any evidence of having limited the amount of ‘antisocial behaviour’, were simply closed. The authority considered that these structures welcomed mainly young people, who did not adopt anti-social behaviour and that the private structures (associations, churches) could set up similar centres. To meet its objective, the authority focused its resources on funding a team of mediators who intervene in the streets on Friday and Saturday evenings, when anti-social behaviour of young people is most notable. An important distinction is now made, in parallel to the system of performance management, between compulsory expenditure (the legal) and the margins of manoeuvre remaining once these have been paid (the initiative). Therefore, once the authority has clearly established the list of what it is required to do, it endeavours to find out what the voluntary competences saved by the budgetary cuts will be by asking: 1. if the policy actually produces socio-economic effects? 2. if it cannot be handled by other actors? and finally 3. if it is maintained, how to improve its efficiency? In this extremely constrained and uncertain financial context, the British local authorities might have to accept that the social demand exceeds the capacity of public response. It is in fact quite possible that authorities are forced in the future to privatise some of their equipment (municipal swimming pool, canteens, etc.).

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ANALYSIS OF THE ENGLISH LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE LIGHT OF THE BRITISH POLITICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY An Administrative and Political System Marked by the Neo-Liberal Approach The Continuing Influence of New Public Management Theories and Neo-Liberal Practices An initial theoretical base founded in neo-liberalism has been shared by the British governments for over 30 years. Following the ‘Trente Glorieuses’ and the post-war consensus, characterised by the triumph of Keynesian theories in British politics, a severe electoral but, above all, intellectual defeat was inflicted on those supporting Labour by a new neo-liberal vision of the world. This approach was inspired by the works of Friedrich Von Hayek and Milton Friedman, which were relayed in politics by Margaret Thatcher. The neo-liberal theories define themselves by what Mrs. Thatcher called a ‘hate of the nanny State’, that is the rejection of any public intervention in the economy and the social world. Privatisation and deregulation, in particular that of the labour market in order to break the monopoly exercised by the trade unions and the massive withdrawal of the State from the social field constitute the political strategy implemented by the conservative governments as of 1979. Great Britain was thus transformed in less than 10 years. The Blairite variations have not called the neo-liberal heritage into question.5 The principles of neo-liberalism have influenced, although never expressly cited, the neo-labour definition of the roles of the State and of the markets. The ‘Third Way’ conceptualised by the sociologist Anthony Giddens6 defines itself in opposition to the rhetoric of old Labour, marked by Marxist or trade unionist vernacular. In practice, Tony Blair perpetuated the work of Margaret Thatcher: several weeks after coming to power, his government decided to grant only to the Bank of England the final decision in the fixing of interest rates, thereby introducing monetarist precepts in the country’s monetary policy; neither the tax heritage of the conservatives nor the anti-union legislation was called into question and the deregulation, privatisation, flexibilisation of the labour market and a disciplinary policy towards the poor constituted the strategy of New Labour as of the modernisation of the party by Tony Blair. According to a close collaborator of Blair, Peter Mandelson, ‘Now we are all Thatcherites’. Several social

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reforms have nevertheless been introduced (consequent increase in the number of teachers and judges, qualitative performance criteria, etc.). The theory of the ‘Big Society’ only perpetuates Thatcherism today. For the government of David Cameron, it is about developing the mixed economy, in particular with the third sector (‘social business’). At the present time, the ‘Community right to challenge’ therefore enables communities of citizens to apply to take over certain competences of a Council, on a voluntary basis. Much distrust of public authorities and their interventions remains against the ‘Big State’.

The Economic Consequences of the Axing of Public Jobs in the North-East The permanent calling into question of local public services has provoked a reduction in public jobs with the departure of devolved administrations and of certain services of local authorities. The effect of these reforms has been to weaken the residential economy, which is very dependent on public employment. In certain English territories, which have at the same time undergone massive deindustrialisation, these reforms have had significant impacts on territorial development, with several ghost streets in the town centres, which now mainly consist of pubs and casinos.

A Local Public Sector Imbued with Thatcherism The Local Public Administration Is Constantly Called into Question. The local public administration is always required to justify its interventions. The neo-liberal theories constantly cast a suspicion of illegitimacy and incompetence on the public service, which is seen as an obstacle to the market or even as the root of the ills of society. Therefore, the need to assert the legitimacy of its existence and of its interventions is strong for public action. That is exactly what is implicitly at the heart of the matter for the performance management systems, which we had the opportunity to observe in the north-east of England. The attention paid to results and the constant measurement of the effectiveness and the performance of public policies constitute a way for the English local authorities to justify themselves and to prove their social and economic usefulness. A widely used system reflects this need for self-justification in a context of suspicion vis-a`-vis the public sector: that of the ‘complaints office’ (or

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‘claims and compliments office’, according to the authorities). This system has existed for over 10 years. The objective is both to prevent users’ complaints and to quickly find solutions in order to ensure a quality public service. The possibility to contact the local authority is made public in the flyers or on the Town’s website. Although such systems may be useful and are generally appreciated by the population, they reveal a tendency towards the loss of credibility of the public sector. The new Labour episode at the beginning of the century did not reverse this trend: in July 1999, Tony Blair, taking as witnesses ‘test groups’ of public opinion, violently attacked the employees of the public sector, who were suspected of wishing to put a brake on the evolution towards greater efficiency. The local administration is systematically placed in competition with the private sector. Privatisation is indeed a central element of the Thatcherite strategy of the transformation of the economy and the British society. After Margaret Thatcher denationalised the industry, but also partly health and education, Tony Blair accentuated the movement, via a massive reduction in the stock of social housing, the introduction of the logic of profit in the health services, the privatisation of prisons and air traffic control and the transfer of certain municipal services to the private sector. In the current extremely constrained financial climate, everything suggests that the authorities will be forced to continue this movement. A movement of privatisation of the primary school is indeed under way, making authorities service providers of ‘academies’ (pay and restaurant services, in particular). The practice of commissioning has reflected this neo-liberal orientation at a local level. A revealing example, the procedure described earlier masks only the evolution of authorities towards a role of contracting authority and commissioner. It should nevertheless be pointed out that this practice is not entirely free of problems. On the one hand, the definition of the framework of performance with clear objectives is sometimes missing when the authority calls upon the private sector. On the other hand, insofar as the operator chooses itself the actions to be carried out to obtain results, only the outcomes can be studied. Finally, the distribution of responsibilities between the services in charge of operational policies and those in charge of commissioning within the authority is not always clear with respect to the control and study of the performance of satellites. The systematic use of competitive procedures within private sectors may, however, be qualified, in particular in cities with a strong working class and union tradition, closer to ‘old school’ Labour than to New Labour. In certain cities, there is a genuine willingness to preserve the public prerogatives as well as a feeling shared by both the elected representatives and the

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executives and agents, according to which certain competences cannot be carried out by the for-profit sector as they do not reply to the same logics of profitability and performance but reply rather to the values of general interest and the common good.

Freedom of Delegatees and Conflicts of Interest The Performance Contracts The British local authorities conclude most of their contracts by detailing the outcomes. These contracts weigh the risk on the private operator, part of the remuneration of which depends on obtaining a given result. Inversely, no obligation to use public policy instruments is established: the private operator intervenes as it wishes to achieve the expected result. The government uses the same process vis-a`-vis the local authorities. This model, which is very attractive for the client, includes a serious limit. The operator may concentrate its resources on the ‘easiest’ part of the sample transmitted in order to obtain significant results. Inversely, the rest of the sample does not benefit from any support system. This applies to the national ‘troubled families’ programme. It concerns families that are facing a significant number of difficulties (unemployment of parents, mental health problems of the children, dropping out of school, delinquency, etc.). The local authorities are under a performance obligation, which is measured by a drop in the percentage of the number of these families in their perimeter of intervention. Part of the national allowance is paid only if the performance level is reached: 20% in 2013, 40% in 2014 and 60% in 2015. Therefore, it is in the interest of local authorities (or their service providers in the case of delegation) to concentrate all their resources on the portion of families which have the least problems within the sample, for which the results will be easier to reach. Consequently, the most vulnerable families of the sample will not benefit from this public money. Conflicts of Interest The British local authorities interact with the private sector in several areas: • In the design of territorial and public policy projects; the private sector is largely associated as a ‘partner’ (local partnerships). These may be associations, neighbouring authorities or businesses, which are present in the territory.

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• The private sector sometimes intervenes jointly with the public sector as commissioner, defining the public policy instruments to be implemented to reach the objectives. This is the case in the area of health: the public health department and the CCG organise the public action together. • The private sector frequently takes part in the implementation of public policies. Once the commissioning has been carried out, the public policy is implemented directly by the services of the local authority (in-house) or managed in a delegated way by a service provider. • Finally, with respect to evaluation, the private sector sometimes sets itself the measures of performance that it must reach as a delegatee. Therefore, to take the case of a general practitioner, he may intervene as a partner, a commissioner (in the CCG), a service provider and as an evaluator. This confusion becomes problematic when the public officials do not know if they are addressing a partner or a client.

The Management Methods Are Largely Inspired by the Business World and by the New Public Management. This ideological movement, which began in the 1970s, is based on the principle that there is no fundamental difference between public and private and minimises the characteristics of public service as compared to those of businesses. Citizens are firstly and foremostly clients or consumers. The public authorities must provide them with a service or benefit which offers the best possible quality/price ratio. We were able to observe that the local authorities studied fit this logic perfectly: management by results, internal and external audits, budgetary cuts, customer logic, strong separation between politics and the administration, managerial practices from the private sector. The terminology used by the administration is that of the business world (customer, commissioning, business plan, corporate plan, business manager, etc.).

The Contact Centres A typical example of the importation of marketing methods is that of a public authority call centre. The contact centre is a call centre which provides information to the population. Its 36 agents, seven of whom

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work by means of telework, reply to 300,000 questions each year on the most varied issues: social benefits, anti-social behaviour, floods, and so on. The organisation of this customer service is very much inspired by the marketing techniques of a private sector. The three team managers and the head of service exercise a tight control on the agents who work as telephone receptionists (count of the call time, daily calculation of number of callers, identification of the topics covered with them, etc.). The agent must reply within 20 seconds, and the team leader may access the telephone conversation of the agents in his team whenever he so wishes. At the end of the chain, customers chosen at random are periodically called to give their opinion of the service an excellent way of receiving feedback. The calls are recorded and kept for five years. Once a month, the employee has a meeting with his manager, and the centre is part of a good practices exchange group (Customer Care Commitment).

The Rhetoric of the Managers of Local Administrations Is Marked by the Primacy Given to Individual Responsibility and Not Collective Responsibility. For example, the management of long-term illnesses clearly refers to the obligations of agents to fulfil their part of the contract. In one of the cities visited, the number of days of absence due to illness is one of the criteria for evaluating the performance of agents. This criterion may be taken into account in redundancy plans. Whatever happens, beyond a certain quota of days off due to a long-term illness, the contract is terminated by the local authority, and the agent is made redundant. A similar arrangement existed in another city visited: if the performances of the agents are below the required level (‘lack of capability’), in particular because of absences related to the illness, a refocusing plan of action is implemented by his manager, which may, ultimately, result in his forced resignation, even before the end of the contract. The Elected Representatives Themselves Are Confined More to a Role of Evaluation than of Conception. Their role is in effect one of scrutiny; they are an additional filter in the control of public action, and bear the responsibility therefore vis-a`-vis the public. This raises question on the democratic values and the role of the citizen: does he vote to influence the orientation of the policies carried out by the local authority or to check that the administration does not exceed its prerogatives and acts in compliance with the rules?

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The Absence of Direct Election of the Mayor or the Fear of the Personification of Power In the framework of its legislation on local authorities (Localism Act of 2011), the British government provided for the organisation of local referendums to allow citizens to vote again on the method of election of their mayors. These elections were held in November 2012 and saw voters voting overwhelmingly against direct election. In some local authorities, this referendum led to the early termination of the term of office of the mayor elected directly by the citizens, to make way for a mayor chosen by the Council and mainly with a honorary role. The result of this referendum bears witness to the fear of personification and of concentration of local political power which exists in England. Among the arguments put forward by the opponents of direct election, whether they are Labour or Conservative, appears again and again the inordinate power that this gives to a single person and the cost for the local authority linked to the remuneration of the mayor. It is another example of the Thatcherite legacy of suspicion vis-a`-vis public authorities, whose influence one is endeavouring to limit.

The End of the Welfare State Confirmed Great Britain was the country of Beveridge and of the first great western laws building a universal Welfare State. The Welfare State, and in particular its health system based on tax contribution, and its network of social protection created after the Second World War are built on social rights: the right to work, the right to social protection in case of illness or unemployment, the right to healthcare regardless of income. For about 30 years, this new social organisation was the subject of a consensus because it represented undeniable social progress in the eyes of most people. Still today, despite the attacks it has had to face, the health system remains popular with the English population. This historic return allows us to avoid the pitfall of the essentialisation of the relation between the British and the public intervention. When undertaking an in-depth study of the construction of the public administration in Great Britain, it is possible to see that there is no English model by nature but many modalities of public governance are influenced by the political, social, economic and cultural context.

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However, the Welfare State is struggling to survive in a country where the neo-liberal theories have become widely accepted across the political spectrum, both nationally and locally. In this regard, one can find in the north-east of England and elsewhere a public sector comprising a residue of collectivisation of certain social functions (road maintenance, cleaning services, etc.), but the social services are significantly reducing their interventions. Thus, in terms of social intervention, is strengthened the liberal regime described by G. Esping-Andersen:7 benefits subject to resources, the public sector encouraging the private initiative, etc. The budget cuts up to now had resulted in productivity gains in the communities of the north-east: one did just as well or better with less, and it was possible to enhance these good results in a marketing perspective. However, the reductions in credits are such now that the Councils are reaching a tipping point, beyond which certain public services are going to have to be abolished. It is no longer a question of a change in the level of the services rendered by the Welfare State but rather a modification in its very nature. This gives rise to dramatic consequences for the most vulnerable people. Social inequalities are widening, and the society is becoming divided. This situation can also cause in the years to come substantial human problems in the local authorities. Many of their agents are starting to feel the effects of a wide-spread lack of motivation and growing pressure, which may lead them to burnout.

A Resilience Linked to the Plasticity of the National Administrative Culture In this context of budgetary cuts, job losses and restructuring, the consequences of crossing the tipping point, which has just been described, will depend on the resilience of the affected structures. This concept is about the ability to face a traumatic event before going on to rebuild by relying on core values; the local authorities sometimes highlight this concept. The Healthy Adaptability of the Traditional Stabilising Principles The historic principles which permeate the public action in Great Britain are not cast in stone. No text defines or regulates the principle of accountability, which reaches deeply into the functioning of the public authorities. This unwritten character, while rendering the principle relatively unclear, guarantees its adaptability to circumstances: today, accountability is therefore mainly turned towards the very precise characterisation of the effects of public

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policies, more so than towards the search for adequacy between them and the means which have had to be implemented to reach them. In these conditions, the link between accountability and performance is strong, and the public authorities must justify that they have reached the expected level of service, with performance being perceived in Great Britain in a particular comprehensive way: it appears almost to be the raison d’eˆtre of the public sphere; the term ultimately covers nearly all that the public sector must do and the services it renders. Accountability implies a contact between the public sphere and the society, which cannot be reduced to a communicative approach. The principle relates to the structuring, in the pedagogy of ‘face-to-face’, which brings the public actors closer to citizens: the first must constantly turn to the second to explain their action. By requiring public authorities to be accountable, it prevents them, in principle, from pursuing ends, which could be unacceptable: in effect, acts which can be publicly and fully assumed are, in principle, legitimate. It should be noted that transparency, although it is similar, is not to be confused with accountability; the latter implies a developed pedagogy (public meetings held by elected representatives or administrative managers, replies to questions posed by citizens during territorial meetings, publication of documents analysing and justifying the results of the choices of public actors, hearings, investigations) and may lead those responsible to draw on the consequences of their shortcomings. As for transparency, it is simply to show, to render data public, without analysis or justification. It constitutes a major trend in Britain, where the authorities develop open data and must also publish all their expenditure which exceeds £500. Furthermore, the principle of due process requires that the persons concerned by a decision or a process are entitled to expect a minimum standard in terms of procedural guarantees. This level is high: one of the interlocutors we met explained that on the basis of that principle alone and in the absence of any national regulations, the authority had, to award a public contract, followed an extremely demanding process, which presented far more guarantees than those prescribed by the European regulations which apply in the same area. The principle adapts once again to the circumstances, the level of requirement of the authority depending here on the size of the contract, which related to the operation for 20 years of five sports centres. The idea of due process is linked to the broader concept of Rule of Law, a principle of submission to law close to the French idea of ‘Etat de droit’. The host authorities are in effect inspired by legalism. However, it is not a question of legalism. Moreover, the grasp of the law does not pass through

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State or jurisdictional control or sanction mechanisms: there is nothing comparable to the control of legality; the French separation of ‘ordonnateur’ (the officer authorising expenses) and the ‘comptable’ (controlling and paying) would be inconceivable in Great Britain. Finally, there is little litigation around the administrative action (due in particular to the high legal costs, which any court action implies), which does not prevent the existence of a certain paradoxical aversion to the litigation risk in the local authorities. The force of law has more to do with the interiorisation of rules, even if they are not mandatory. This legalistic sensitivity, rather conservative, is a counterweight to the management perspective which inspired the governmental reforms. In general, the three major historical principles that permeate the British public life accountability, due process and Rule of law are devoid of any specific ‘programmatic’ content. It is a common point with the French concept of public service, which takes on the evolution of social needs according to the place and time. On the other hand, unlike the public services which focus on the fundamental purpose of the public sector, the British regulating principles do not at all concern all the purposes of the public action. They prescribe the ways of proceeding the procedural rules. The fact that these principles focus on the methodological aspects makes them flexible and adaptable: whatever the socio-historical context and the objectives aimed for, the public action will follow these rules. It is possible to attempt here a brief counterpoint by referring to the legal system, to highlight the preference of British institutions for the flexibility of procedural guarantees: English law, though liberal, includes very few general formulas on freedom but builds specific protections, such as habeas corpus, or the prohibition of arbitrary detention. Similarly, the English trial, rich in ‘formal’ safeguards the thorough hearing of arguments, respect of the principle that all sides must be heard and of precedent, popular juries, magistrates recruited after a career as a lawyer is a method to reach a fair solution. It is also, traditionally, the first instance of normative production, through the construction by the judge of Common law: the safeguards offered by the proceedings involve more than solutions, which are variable and temporary. On the contrary, the French law gives precedence to the substantive rules that secure the texts. English law itself, which often defines the options, shows the possible paths more than it prescribes. The regulatory principles discussed earlier are based on a moral and cultural foundation, without any legally sanctioned constraint being necessary to enforce them. They cannot be abolished, unless there is a radical change in mentalities. These checks and balances to the purely

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managerial perspective, which the successive budgetary cuts could give rise to, are vital factors of continuity in the current destabilising and worrying context. There are others, more difficult to identify, which relate to professional practices. The Professional Practices: Competence, Team Spirit and Benchmarks As a general rule, the pairs carrying out a mission in the three local authorities revealed that the agents took a very serious approach when facing a situation which has drastically deteriorated. Of course, they ask themselves many questions but these appear above all to be an expression of a professional conscience, which is still intact, although often mistreated. More specifically, the agents have varied profiles and are well trained; for example, the finance departments employ numerous chartered accountants. In addition, the executives are better paid in England than in France. These very advantageous individual situations, the most extreme of which are known to all due to the legal obligation to publish the highest salaries, do not prevent team spirit: the collaboration between colleagues appears natural and well organised. Similarly, cross-divisional work is often carried out, with inter-service projects or working groups being usual. The overall level of competence and involvement is high.

The ‘Rising stars’ Programme One of the host authorities has started a programme to select and train talented people. It involves identifying in the services the agents of all levels or occupations having a potential for leadership. Then, for a year, they are collectively trained, follow classes at the local university, are immersed in other local authorities of the country, carry out missions in services of their local authority and to finally evolve towards managerial positions. It is an original way of conceiving and organising internal promotion, which brings together the principle of the French internal competitive exams (‘Concours’) but with very different modalities.

As indicated above, the setting of benchmarks is very common, with the local authorities permanently seeking the best practices: when faced with difficulties, the local public actors, far from remaining passive, increase their imagination and proactive cohesion. There are also a certain number

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of associations, bodies or cooperation projects with various statuses, local, regional or national, for example in the areas of waste or sport, or even more specialised, such as ALARM (‘Association of local authorities for risk management’, which gathers the risk management services of local authorities). Participation is not mandatory, but the exchanges are rich, and the quality and the variety of initiatives are quite remarkable. The local authorities develop for example, on a more or less wide territorial basis, joint audits or surveys (‘joint scrutiny’: the elected officials of several councils examine the organisation of a service or the response to crises that can affect all their territories). These groups reinforce solidarity and mutual understanding within the local public sector and even beyond it. There is certainly a risk of competition and a risk of alignment with standards which are less high, but in the current state of affairs, these approaches develop above all curiosity, exchange and the search for solutions to problems, which all appear as factors of resilience. If we properly analyse the testimonies of those who run them, these groups are impregnated with a spirit of openness and fair play: between colleagues, the debate is free but objective; criticism, which everyone accepts, is respectful and constructive, with the common aim being the improvement of local practices. This balanced and benevolent state of mind is found, of course, in the peer review, which has already been mentioned earlier. The development of means of communication and the current challenges of local authorities seem to have intensified these regulatory practices within the local institutional fabric. Innovation and the search for improvements constitute an important trend. It affects the technical elements of public action and its principles of organisation. It is possible to mention here the collaboration that the three local authorities studied intend to put in place as a joint structure for the management of the social action. Another interesting approach from this point of view is the procurement group, which the five local authorities in the zone are to create to outsource the treatment of household waste, with this initiative combining technical innovation and the pooling of efforts to achieve optimal efficiency. Ultimately, the British public sector evokes the famous image that the philosopher Pascal used to describe the human condition: it bends but does not break, although the breaking point is sometimes very close. This flexibility of the administrative culture is paradoxical: the open and almost exclusively procedural character of the guiding principles leaves the field open to sometimes abrupt reform experiments, such as New Public

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Management, which has greatly influenced the administration; on the other hand, these characteristics allow the great principles to continuously adapt to the circumstances, which helps to explain the permanence of the style of exercise of power, which remains, despite the violence of the ideological waves, always profoundly democratic and respectful.

THE LESSONS OF THE OBSERVATION OF THE ENGLISH MODEL FOR THE FRENCH LOCAL PUBLIC DECISION-MAKER Public action is not understood in the same way on the two sides of the Channel. Whereas, in England, public and private are placed on an equal footing, the French vision of general interest remains carried by the public sector and is guaranteed by its elected officials and administrations. Whereas, in England, 30 years of Thatcherite political inspiration has undermined at the very roots of the legitimacy of public action, the legitimacy of the French public service does not need to be continuously demonstrated. Now, there are two opposing visions of public service. Attached to the specificities of the French public action, we rejected the carbon copy. However, the principle of mutability of the public service leads us to take an interest in all good practices of the local management.

Objectives-Based Strategic Management In England, strategic management focuses on the effects produced by public policies in their economic and social environment. The local authorities define the targets to be reached within their territory and concentrate their performance system on monitoring the results in relation to these targets. This choice has the effect of turning the public officials in the direction of their mission and not to make public intervention a goal in itself. When the achievement of the objective is not based on the competence of the local authority, then it is explicitly indicated to the agents that they must act by influence. To operate, this type of strategic management must be simple, understandable and remain connected to the financial stakes to avoid a dissociation of political choice and administrative management. The costs of the system both financial and temporal must not be greater than the gains

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in efficiency that it allows. Most importantly, the figures need to generate discussion to help in decision-making; they do not constitute an end in themselves. In France, management is turned more towards outputs, that is the activity produced by the services. Example: number of users having visited the pool in a week. This management method does not make the link between the action carried out and the impact desired in terms of the final end, often because the final end itself is not defined. Example: what is the purpose of a municipal swimming pool? To provide citizens the pleasure of swimming or to improve the health of the population? If the elected officials opt for the second purpose, then it must be ensured that the activity produced responds to the final purpose. Also, the pool must be accessible to people with disabilities or in poor health, and the municipal equipment must not benefit only people who are already in good health.

Guideline n° 1: To strengthen the capacity for decision-making of elected officials on the impacts that the public policies produce on the territory, by focusing evaluations on the outcomes, while also taking the question of resources (financial and human) into account.

Guideline n° 2: To ensure the simplicity of the architecture, by choosing a limited number of indicators, with information which is easy to obtain to calculate them and which really assists in the decisionmaking process at each level of the hierarchy.

The Budgetary Constraint and Its Managerial Consequences A reduction in resources and an increase in demand: we cannot speak of a ‘scissors effect’ as the public sector is no longer able to meet the increasing needs of the population and is in fact reducing its interventions, both nationally (Welfare Reform, the capping of social benefits, reduction of rent

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subsidies in the social housing sector) and locally, due to the decrease in allowances (the closure of associative premises, reduction in the opening hours of public facilities, limitation of the size of flowerbeds, etc.). Therefore, the English local authorities are no longer able to be high performing; they must organise themselves as best as they can in these hard times. It is about minimising the effects of budgetary cuts. The increasing workload on a declining number of agents gives rise to a lesser quality of service. In France, the pace of reduction of the budget deficit is less intense, and the local authorities still have room for manoeuvre. It is a question of anticipating decreases in allowances by public policies which are better targeted to the needs of citizens and by a more efficient production of activity. The margins for manoeuvre freed up must allow the local authorities, in spite of the budgetary constraint, to continue to be innovative in their policies and attentive to new needs.

Guideline n° 3: To have a proactive and forward-looking positioning vis-a`-vis the new needs of citizens and the budgetary constraint, by reorienting the appropriations of ineffective policies.

Guideline n° 4: To reconcile the preservation of agents and the adaptation of public services to new needs by anticipating and adapting training plans to promote reassignments.

Guideline n° 5: To mobilise agents around objectives concerning the performance of the public service, by valuing their efforts and emphasising that they are the condition of sustainability of public action.

Territorial Governance The Presence of the State in the Territories The presence of the State in the English territories has become gradually restricted. Without decentralised administration, a ‘remote’ government

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was set up, through the obligations to achieve results imposed on the local authorities at a central level and the contractualisation between the levels of government. The now optional character of performance objectives and the abolition of local area agreements mark a new withdrawal of the State. However, the regulation of local authorities has never been so strong. Simply put, it is materialised through legal constraint (the local authorities must implement their obligatory competences and respect standards) and financial constraint (decline in revenue). To a lesser extent, France is subject to a disengagement of the State, with the loss of strategic vision and resources of the decentralized services since the RGPP (general review of public policies). State regulation therefore risks being confined to the same legal and financial spheres, to the detriment of equality between the territories and the imperatives of development of the regions. The strategic vision should not be carried out ‘remotely’. The failure of the English ‘audit commission for local authority’ model is patented. It created complexity without any benefits to the territories. The performance objectives imposed on the local authorities encouraged them to intervene in the methods of calculating indicators to obtain the best results. To be appropriate and effective, a steering system must be designed for the driver and not for the traffic controller.

Guideline n° 6: To maintain the presence of a strategist State on the territory, in addition to the action of local authorities.

The Existence of a Single Level of Authority The three local authorities studied evolve in their territory as a single level of local authority. This organisation presents certain advantages: limited structure costs, a global and integrated vision of the project for the territory, a greater understanding of the public action for the citizen, political responsibility, which is more easily identifiable. However, this organisation also presents several weaknesses. The authorities must manage all their local competences on a territory of a big ‘intercommunalite´’ (approximately 100,000 inhabitants). Public policies are, therefore, not necessarily carried out on a proper scale. In economic matters, the local authorities examined are too small to be able to exercise a strong influence on growth and no higher level promotes their implementation in a regional network. With respect to social matters, the three local authorities are contemplating merging their social services, in order to

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evolve towards a scale considered more relevant and to reduce redundant costs. In other words, they seek to create a shared structure which would resemble a French department! It therefore seems desirable to take into account the positive aspects of the British model in France (overall project for the territory, greater understanding for the citizen) without however giving way to the siren calls for a single local authority.

Guideline n° 7: To define on the relevant scale for the urban and suburban area, an overall and integrated project for the territory, associating all levels of authorities and then distributing its implementation at various levels according to their competences.

The Development Strategies The English local authorities studied appear to be rather lacking in their development strategy. Not only do they evolve in a territory which is too small to benefit from endogenous growth but they are also territories which are fairly dependent on the residential economy. The calling into question of the local public services and the absence of a strategic vision at a broader level renders joint action complex. The authorities are therefore obliged to compete to attract business in a zero-sum game. A number of French territories very dependent on the public economic base must be vigilant of this dependency and diversify their economy in order to save their populations from the social consequences that the British territories have gone through, if the French public services were to be called into question.

Guideline n° 8: To diversify the local economy, particularly when the latter rests largely on a public base by developing procedures suitable to the territories, including in the market services.

Public Private Relations The Association of Private Sector in the Implementation of Public Services In England, the private sector is involved in all stages of public action (overall strategy, definition of public policies, implementation and

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evaluation), which entails the risk of conflicts of interest. The confusion of a same interlocutor sometimes as a partner, sometimes as client, raises a question. Public Contracts Public contracts often give rise to performance contracts. The serviceproviding companies commit themselves to achieve an objective, and they are free to define the modalities for reaching it. This system has a perverse effect as the operator focuses on the more easily attainable target, leaving the public sector with the more complex cases. This effect also exists in France, for example the support of job seekers by private agencies. They concentrate the majority of their efforts on the more qualified job seekers, when the National Employment Agency must manage all job seekers. By focusing on the most employable job seekers, these agencies have high levels of performance but neglect those who have less access to jobs. The Effects of Public Private Substitution The government seeks to avoid the public sector carrying out actions that the private sector (associations, neighbourhood communities or businesses) would better conduct. It is a question of mobilising the civil society, restricting the scope of the public sector and making budgetary savings. However, the associative sector, a symbol of the vitality of the society, should be strengthened, in particular, financially. Businesses can accompany this movement in their CSR approach by allowing their employees the time to engage in associative or neighbourhood actions.

Guideline n° 9: To show vigilance in performance contracts which have the double risk of a loss of the definition of public policies by the public sector and the development of a model of privatisation of profits and socialisation of losses preventing the effects of compensation.

Guideline n° 10: To systematically ask if the Third sector or interpersonal solidarity cannot be more effective if given the means.

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The Transparency and the Exchange between Peers The English local authorities are characterised by extreme transparency. From the publication of high salaries to the systematic dissemination on their internet site of minutes of meetings and strategic documents, everything is done to show that they have nothing to hide. This is a cornerstone of accountability. The Councils studies opened their doors wide to the French trainee administrators, providing them with numerous internal documents and replying freely to their questions. This opening up to the outside allows them to benefit in return from the data and good practices of other local authorities. Several exchange platforms have been organised for this purpose, in particular the LGA. Following the same logic, they are open to critical and constructive reviews by their peers via the practice of peer reviews, thereby hoping to be able to identify areas for improvement. Transparency is therefore a win-win approach, which is particularly useful in a context of draconian rationalisation. In France, the local authorities are more cautious and wish to strictly control the dissemination of information. The benchmark and the exchange of good practices, although increasingly frequent, are derived from ad hoc and sectoral initiatives. The systematisation of the sharing of data and practices must be encouraged, in order to widely disseminate the tools of good management and to limit recourse to consultancy firms, which are particularly costly. More generally, it is about realising that in a context of financial constraint, sharing is more efficient than withholding of information and that an external opinion, on the condition that it is sufficiently benevolent, can be a source of improvement.

Guideline n° 11: To develop a network of control between peers, enabling local authorities at their request to obtain a critical but non-prescriptive review of their practice.

Guideline n° 12: To facilitate the sharing of experience by forming a platform for the exchange of data and practices between authorities of all levels, carried out on a voluntary basis.

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NOTES 1. Eurostat, April 2013. 2. Jean-Philippe Fons, ‘United Kingdom . David Cameron’s Big Society fails to convince’, Greater Europe, no. 35, August 2011 La Documentation franc¸aise. 3. J. Clark, D. Kane, P. Bass and K. Wilding, The UK Civil Society Almanac 2012, London, NCVO, 2012. 4. Public management reform, a comparative analysis. 5. Keith Dixon, a worthy heir: Blair and Thatcherism, Reasons to act, 1999. 6. The Third Way: the renewal of social democracy (1998). 7. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to warmly thank the teaching team of the INET for having given us this opportunity (more particularly Nicolas Beauchef, Gise`le Geyer, Martine Goeury and Isabelle Lombardo) as well as Je´roˆme Dupuis and Marcel Guenoun for their support. We also thank the agents of the host authorities for their hospitality, their time and their trust and the reviewers of our report for their critical vigilance.

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APPENDIX 1: STANDARD ORGANISATIONAL CHART OF AN ENGLISH UNITARY AUTHORITY

LEADERSHIP IN NOT-FORPROFITS AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: VALUES AND COMPARATIVE CONSIDERATIONS Alex Murdock ABSTRACT Purpose The paper examines aspects of not-for-profit leadership and in particular the importance of values in such leadership. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on the literature for leadership in charities, not-for-profits and social enterprise, the paper also uses two detailed case studies to illustrate dilemmas and challenges specific to the not-for-profit sector. These examples are the Salvation Army and Emmaus, both of which are found across many countries. Findings The paper identifies the importance of value sets in not-forprofits in particular the voluntarist element that especially distinguishes these organisations from those in the private and public sectors. However, it also identifies common ground between some aspects of not-for-profit leadership and those other sectors.

European Public Leadership in Crisis? Critical Perspectives on International Public Sector Management, Volume 3, 127 146 Copyright r 2014 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420140000003016

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Originality/value The paper furnishes a composite of literature on leadership reinforced by detailed case studies as well as observations on characteristics that both link and separate leadership in the different sectors. Keywords: Leadership values; not-for-profit charities; social enterprise; The Salvation Army; Emmaus

THE NATURE OF LEADERSHIP IN DIFFERENT SECTORS The nature of civil society organisations (and civil society movements!) is both fascinating and complex. There is an argument for boundaries between what is described as the ‘third sector’ and the public and private sectors. This argument draws strength from a number of characteristics seen as possessed by third sector organisations. They are not subject to the political dimensions typically found in the public sector (including accountability to electorates, at least in the democratic context). Neither are they constrained by national boundaries in that the national government of a country does not other than through invasion or substitution for the existing government control another country. In comparison with the private sector, civil society organisations are expected to exist for reasons other than pursuit of profit (or maximised shareholder/owner value, to use the current vernacular). There are also legal and governance aspects that flow from these perceived differences. Though governments (often including local governments) are able to effect laws, these laws, once effected, restrict as well as enable the government to carry out its functions. Especially in democratic settings, this may mean that a public leader may find themselves not able to act in ways they would wish. The current UK coalition government, for example, has created a fixed date for the next election. This may come back to haunt it if that date is seen as ‘inconvenient’ in the light of political developments. Public leaders may be able to ‘make laws’, but they are not above the law they must adhere to rules of due process and accountability. The leader of a private company is able to pursue profit maximisation, but only within the context of laws that, for example, may accept tax avoidance that exploits the cracks and crevices in the laws but that frown on (and penalise) tax evasion, which is regarded as unacceptable.

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If a private sector company has shareholders, its leader is also accountable to them for his or her stewardship of their assets. Unlike the government leader, however, the private sector leader can choose, for example, whether to find a country with more amenable laws in which to base their organisation, and what products and services to provide (or not to provide!) and to which customers, without being held directly accountable by electorates. In this respect the civil society leader and the private sector leader find interesting common ground. They possess choices that are not automatically restricted by political boundaries or by the judgement of a wider electorate able (through the ballot box) to pass judgement and exercise effective control over their actions. Public sector, private sector and civil society leaders function in typically different legal and regulatory contexts. In England and Wales a charity is subject to the oversight of the Charity Commission, which has Standards of Recommended Practices (SORP). This means that the accounts are presented in a fashion that is different from that of a private company or of a government department. Significantly, this is a consequence of the perceived different stakeholder environment within which such organisations operate (Connolly, Hyndman, & McConville, 2013). Typically many civil society and private sector organisations also set up a legal persona separate from the individuals who make up their governance. In the UK this may take the form of a company limited by guarantee. However, they do not have to and (at least in the UK) both private and civil society leaders can decide to have direct legal accountability for their activities, which means that they are personally liable for any losses incurred (Marr & Gillman, 2014). The political leader (whether the elected politician or the salaried public manager), so long as he or she does not transgress the law of the land, usually does not incur personal financial liability for the actual cost of policy failure rather the penalty is simply loss of office (which may include a loss of pension rights associated with loss of office).

DIFFERENCES IN LEADERSHIP BETWEEN THE NOT-FOR-PROFITS AND THE PUBLIC SECTORS It is important, indeed essential, to grasp the key differences between the domain of public leadership and that of the civil society/not-for-profit and how these impact upon the nature of leadership in the two settings. A key

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aspect lies in the nature and origins of organisations in the respective sectors. A question the author asks of UK public managers to establish their level of awareness of the not-for-profits sector is how many people would be employed by a randomly chosen UK registered charity (there are some 160,000)? The response is typically an estimated 50 100 staff. The actual answer is fewer than five (Probably less than one pain member of staff). A public manager/leader running an organisation employing only a handful of staff would be the exception. Even small local authorities employ hundreds of staff. A small primary school with just one class per year (equalling about six classes of students) would probably employ at least 10 fulltime equivalent staff. A larger secondary school may employ over 100 staff (not just teachers but all those necessary to make the school work). Scale is a factor in determining the style and nature of leadership. Charles Handy, who has written extensively on management and leadership, notes that up to about 100 staff is about the maximum with whom a leader can exercise direct contact (Handy, 1996). When the numbers get larger than this the ability of the leader to have direct and regular interaction typically is constrained. In the public sector organisational size is typically substantial and few ‘leaders’ are able to radically change the focus and direction of their organisation. Even the chief executive may be constrained over the range of decisions possible. This has an impact on the ability of a leader to determine a radical change of direction. The head of a local government social services department, for example, cannot decide to stop doing social services and instead run transport services. In the case of not-for-profits, within the remit of their articles of association, significant shifts in focus may be possible and indeed may be required of them. In the UK, for example, a major charity providing guide dogs for blind people had accumulated large reserves it was unable to spend on guide dogs because it had provided dogs to all those seen as needing them. The regulator urged the charity to broaden its objectives in order to utilise the resources it had accumulated beyond its ability to expend on its headline objective.1

SIMILARITIES IN LEADERSHIP BETWEEN THE NOT-FOR-PROFITS AND THE PUBLIC SECTORS The differences discussed above are accompanied by areas of similarity. Some of these are relatively self-evident. Public sector leaders are typically

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expected to adhere to a set of values in which the public interest is placed above personal gain. In the UK these have been encapsulated formally in what have been described as the Nolan Values for Public Life.2 These values are set out below.

The Seven Principles of Public Life Selflessness Holders of public office should take decisions solely in terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends. Integrity Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might influence them in the performance of their official duties. Objectivity In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit. Accountability Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office. Openness Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands it. Honesty Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interest. Leadership Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and example.

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In terms of common ground in leadership, it is significant that these principles have been accepted by some of the major not-for-profit umbrella organisations in the UK third sector as relevant in the exercise of their responsibilities. In the UK the Nolan principles represent a base set of guidelines that can be referred to in this context as the ‘rules of behaviour for managers and leaders as well as for their organisations’. The acceptance of these principles (in the view of the author) by these representative bodies involves more than simply guiding their relationships with government in respect of public service delivery (especially where contracts and grant based relationships are concerned). It implicitly also affects the expectations of behaviour by leaders whose organisations may have little or no contact with the public sector. Hudson indicates that these principles are explicit in the governance of charitable bodies and in particular with respect to the board members (trustees) of such organisations. Selflessness, integrity, accountability, honesty and objectivity are enshrined in the legal expectation of how trustees of charities will conduct themselves. Openness and leadership are implicit (Hudson, 2009). The social focus that typically distinguishes not-for-profits (especially if they espouse a charitable form) is also a unifying element with the general perception of the public sector. The leaders of both not-for-profits and the public sector share a common concept that their actions and motivations are inspired by a general commitment towards a ‘public good’ often encapsulated formally in a mission or vision that sees a better world as a consequence of their activities. The aims of ‘for-profit’ organisations and leaders that may prioritise maximisation of returns (or increased market share) would feel uncomfortable if headlined as ultimate goals by not-forprofits or public sector organisations (though such aims may very well play a part in their operational decisions).

DIFFERENCES IN LEADERSHIP BETWEEN THE NOT-FOR-PROFITS AND THE PRIVATE SECTORS These have been touched on above but are worth some further exploration. The for-profit organisation is rarely solely motivated by profit to the exclusion of all other objectives. The force of public opinion and indeed the legal and regulatory powers of the state arguably represent a restraining force to the naked pursuit of profit without regard to any other

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consideration. However, leaders of such organisations (unless they are also the owners) owe an obligation to those who are the beneficial owners. In most advanced countries where such beneficial owners are shareholders who either directly own shares or who indirectly have an interest through financial intermediaries, there is an agreed mechanism for placing a monetary value upon the enterprise. For such a value to have current and realistic meaning there needs to be a means by which ‘the market’ can operate to enable beneficial owners to realise the value of their holding. Typically it operates through a share price mechanism. Where such a mechanism exists, any leader who is indifferent to it could arguably be failing in his or her responsibilities to the beneficial owners. Most not-for-profits have no directly equivalent share price mechanism. Here the word ‘most’ is pertinent because there are hybrid forms where, for example, a not-for-profit may derive much of its income through trading and may set up a trading arm. However, if the not-for-profit decided to go the full route to being a listed company on a stock market and raised money through shares sold on the open market then arguably its leaders would face being judged in the same way as the for-profit equivalent.

SIMILARITIES IN LEADERSHIP BETWEEN THE NOT-FOR-PROFITS AND THE PRIVATE SECTORS The similarities between the not-for-profits and the private (for-profit) sectors are surprisingly underexplored. Historically, writing comparing the sectors in respect of leadership and strategic management have sought to link the public and the not-for-profit (Nutt & Backoff, 1992). While generic management and leadership texts are readily found, the author is not aware of any text entitled along the lines of ‘for-profit and not-for-profit management (with the express exclusion of the public sector)’. However, the emergence of a focus upon social business and the social economy has given rise to an acceptance that not-for-profit (as a term) does not exclude the relevance of business-driven approaches in the not-for-profit sector. This encompasses literature in the USA, the UK and Europe (Dees, Emerson, & Economy, 2001; Defourny & Nyssens, 2008; Spear, 2006). A rapidly growing literature around the terms ‘social enterprise’ and ‘social entrepreneurship’ explicitly accepts that a commercial orientation may not only exist but may also be actively developed (Borzaga & Defourny, 2001; Nicholls, 2006).

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This has major implications for the concept of leadership in such organisations. It introduces a strong element of commercial orientation that sits alongside the social mission. John Elkington in the early 1990s promoted the phrase ‘triple bottom line’ to describe corporations that sought to balance social, environmental and business objectives.3 Arguably the concept of ‘not-for-profits’ having a business or commercial dimension is not new. The Salvation Army from its early beginnings had some commercial aspects with the Match Factory, which it set up to compete with commercial firms that were making matches with phosphorous (which had horrific effects on the workers in the factory). This will be picked up later in the Salvation Army example. Social enterprise and the social economy represent a merging of social and economic elements that present particular challenges for leaders in the not-for-profit sector. In a purely for-profit setting the leaders’ priority is fairly straightforward namely to focus upon a leadership stance and decision that maximises the value of the company to its beneficial owners (usually through a measure of market value typically represented by a share price, if available). In the ‘pure’ voluntary or charity context the leadership focus is upon the social mission, with any commercial aspects coming a clear (often distant) second. A characteristic of not-for-profits that is also substantially shared with private companies is found in their origins and development. While a government department is typically created and emerges with a substantial size and salaried staff, the background of most if not all not-for-profit and private organisations lies with small origins and often, initially, with an individual who gives their time without immediate recompense. Hewlett Packard, the computer company, started with two individuals working out of a domestic garage in Palo Alto, California, and Baden Powell, in his initial Scout Camp on Brownsea Island in the UK, would very probably have identified with their enthusiasm and shoestring beginnings. Both grew to be worldwide in nature and both maintained traditions held from the beliefs of their founders long after the founders had ceased to play significant roles in the organisations. In this respect there is the common ground of a founder (or sometimes founders) who starts with an idea and few tangible resources and through often charismatic leadership overcomes the birth pangs of the early years of the organisation. They even share the common problem arising from the growth of an organisation with a driven founder, which is that the organisation outgrows the ability of the founder and encounters a crisis often leading to a transition of leadership.

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WHAT MAKES LEADERSHIP IN NOT-FOR-PROFITS DIFFERENT FROM BOTH THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE SECTORS? There are aspects of the not-for-profit sector that substantially distinguish it from both the private and the public sectors. These aspects are not normally found in private and public organisations. One aspect is the voluntary and volunteer commitment typically found in many not-for-profits. In both the public and the private spheres reliance is placed on paid staff (the recent expansion of ‘unpaid’ interns has generated considerable concern about a perception of unpaid and, by implication, exploited labour.) However, many of the best known not-for-profits rely extensively upon volunteers who give their time and skills without any monetary reward. Indeed often the volunteers incur costs to volunteer. Such organisations as the Scouts and Guides (in the US called Girl Scouts) are totally dependent upon the freely given time of the leaders and others who assist without any expectation of monetary reward. A key consequence of this for leadership in such organisations is that a prime motivating mechanism is thus absent. A Scout leader is not going to be driven either by the offer of a cash incentive or for that matter by the threat to remove or reduce it. The thoughtful reader may ponder whether volunteering is restricted to the rich, or at least well off, who are able to work unpaid. This raises a second aspect of the voluntarist dimension of not-for-profits namely that the people who give their time, talents and energy are typically people who do it on a part-time basis, or do it for a limited period of time, or are in a position (perhaps through being students or retired) to give time without need for an immediate income.

THE IMPORTANCE OF VALUES-BASED LEADERSHIP IN NOT-FOR-PROFITS The voluntary nature of many not-for-profit organisations along with the absence of the primary financial drivers of the private sector and the career structure of the public sector raise an obvious question as to what the ties are that hold people to the organisation; the importance of an organisational mission and overriding values that are shared by all organisational participants whether they are paid or unpaid.

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In this section we will consider the importance and impact of values for leadership in the not-for-profit sector. Values-based leadership is not a recent phenomenon and can be traced back through both private and public sector literatures on leadership (Kraemer, 2011; Selznick, 1957). In part, values-based leadership was encouraged by a greater concern with ethical standards following scandals and leader behaviours seen as unacceptable in both private and public settings (such as Enron and Watergate). In respect of values, this section of the paper draws upon two not-forprofit organisations that are found in many countries across Europe. Both are organisations in which leadership is a critical factor, and both organisations seek to help people in need and address issues of poverty and deprivation. However, they also have differences that serve to illustrate that leadership in not-for-profits is not to be regarded as possessing the same characteristics. We furnish detailed accounts of both these organisations (though the term ‘organisation’ may not, for reasons that will become obvious, be the most suitable.) The first organisation is Emmaus, a social enterprise and movement founded in France but that has grown and extended its reach to many European countries including the UK. The second organisation is the Salvation Army, which, though founded in the UK, has become a global not-for-profit. It is formally a religious organisation (in contrast to Emmaus) and is also uniformed, with a ranking system akin to that of the military format whose name it carries.

Example: Emmaus Emmaus is a social enterprise and social movement founded by Abbe´ Pierre, a charismatic French priest and former resistance leader, after World War II. From its early beginnings it has expanded to have over 300 communities in over 30 countries around the world. The majority are in France, but Emmaus communities are found in most countries of Europe with over 20 in the UK and significant numbers in Holland and Germany as well as Eastern Europe. The communities typically involve accommodation for homeless people (called companions) who live together and earn a living mainly through recycling second-hand goods. The communities involve a management structure of salaried community leaders (called ‘responsables’) in France with governance by a board. However, each community is a legally separate entity operating under the laws of the country in which it exists. The legal form taken can vary

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within the country, and in Spain the Emmaus communities have taken a range of legal forms. There is an aspect of a social franchise model, with expectations as to how each community will behave and a strong sense of shared values. Emmaus represents a particularly interesting example of both valuesbased and not-for-profit leadership. The values aspect is viewed as critical but the mode of leadership can vary both between and within countries. The author undertook an analysis of Emmaus in respect of its activities globally and the following observations about leadership are drawn from this work. On account of the structure of Emmaus there is potential for considerable variation and innovation in the way the leadership operates. This can happen both between countries and within counties. A key factor is that Emmaus is a social enterprise with a strong social mission but also has a need to raise resources through trading. Generally it does not function in a traditional charitable format through resources raised from fund-raising, though fund-raising does play an important role in the initial set-up of an Emmaus community and can serve to augment resources raised through trading. In France the salaried leaders of Emmaus communities are generally more centrally recruited and trained, though their primary focus is upon the Emmaus community in which they work. There is a sense of collective leadership in many communities, with salaried leaders working together as opposed to being in a traditional organisational hierarchy. However, there is a clear distinction between the salaried leaders and the ‘companions’. Movement from being a companion to being a salaried leader is uncommon. The leaders have a strong sense of belonging to the movement and acknowledge their role as part of this. They subscribe to the ethos of the movement, which, for example, includes its campaigning role to remove national borders and allow free movement of migrants. This has even, on occasion, involved Emmaus communities in implicitly breaking French law in respect of illegal migrants. There have been examples of French police raiding Emmaus communities. However, the tradition of Emmaus leadership is taken from the founder, Abbe´ Pierre, who chained himself to railings to protest against injustice. In the UK there is a significant difference in the perception of how leaders should behave. The founder of Emmaus in the UK had a background as a successful businessman, and indeed significant business influence is found in both national and local Emmaus boards. The general view is that Emmaus is a social enterprise and that business and commercial acumen is an

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important attribute of its leaders. However, the social aspects and in particular the need to support vulnerable adults in a communal setting also require a set of leadership skills. In the UK a number of Emmaus communities have recognised that this might mean that roles are to some extent separated, with a business leader and a community leader. In the UK it is generally recognised that leaders may emerge from among the companions themselves, and many communities have created a role of ‘assistant leader’ sometimes unsalaried as a stepping stone for a companion to move into a leadership role. Unlike in France, where this is less common and leadership is seen as more distinctly separate from the clients/beneficiaries, a number of the senior UK Emmaus staff came through this way.

Example: The Salvation Army The Salvation Army is a long established and much admired not-for-profit organisation that has become worldwide in nature, operating in well over 100 countries. It is openly Christian and owes this to its origins, but it is also a church with uniformed members professing a clear religious faith and being guided by Bible teachings. However, the Salvation Army does not function simply as a religious missionary organisation. It is a major provider of social welfare in the broadest meaning including education, housing and disaster relief. Though Christian, it seeks to operate in countries and settings of all faiths or none. It seeks to establish itself in countries in a legal fashion and when (as happened in both Russia and China) it encounters problems with governments it seeks to resolve these openly through the courts and legal structures of the countries involved as opposed to ‘going underground’ as some other missionary organisations may have done. The Salvation Army (like Emmaus and indeed many not-for-profits) owes its origins to an inspirational leader. William Booth began work as a Methodist minister who founded a mission in London. The early mission offered basic schooling, literacy, soup kitchens and financial assistance. All this focused on the destitute, and from the outset women played an important role. Booth decided to expand the model using an ‘army metaphor including uniforms and ranks’. He became the first General. The origins, Christian focus and military imagery are critical to understanding the nature of leadership in the Salvation Army. The magazine is called The War Cry and even children are described as ‘young soldiers’. In addition to the concept of service and ‘Christian battle’ the early origins

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shaped the values of the organisation and in particular what was regarded as ‘the enemy’. The effects of alcohol and gambling were regarded by Booth as especially pernicious and this has dominated the ethos to the current time. The Salvation Army is a popular charity (one of the most admired in the USA) and attracts donations from a wide range of sources and industries. However, its early strong beliefs about the causes of poverty still shape attitudes about gambling and alcohol. Money from these sources is generally regarded with askance (an interesting view that the Salvation Army would share with Islam). The wide range of activities across a large part of the world creates some interesting leadership issues. During World War II the Salvation Army provided food relief and comfort to both sides in Europe. The nomination of the Salvation Army as a key agency in the USA in respect of response to threats after the Twin Towers destruction raised issues of political neutrality. There are some interesting leadership and coordination issues, too. In a case study Murdock found that little evidence of widespread coordinated strategic planning (Murdock, 2008). The Global Leadership of the Salvation Army meets a few times a year and the Army is organised into ‘Territories’, which sometimes raises political issues. Ireland and the UK are regarded as one territory, for example. The environment it confronts is complex and the wide range of services and challenges it meets multiplies this complexity. The strong sense of shared beliefs and values represent both a leadership strength and a challenge. Uniformed staff are probably paid less than in almost any similar organisation in any sector. The salary of the (uniformed) head of the Salvation Army Social Services the largest such entity in the UK is probably less than that of a care worker in a residential home. Yet the non-uniformed (civilian) staff who make up a substantial part of the workforce are paid something akin to the market rate for their work. Leadership in the Salvation Army has to function in a setting of both strongly held belief systems and paradoxes of pay and reward. Unlike Emmaus, which is a federation of small organisations, the Salvation Army operates on a large scale with a military/ecclesiastical hierarchy. The contrasts in the nature of leadership challenges and leadership possibilities are possibly more stark than would exist, for example, between not-for-profit, private and public organisations that were all running schools or health facilities. The issue is not simply associated with the faith base of the Salvation Army but is also a function of the size and structural differences, with Emmaus generally made up of very small entities often

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with only a handful of paid staff. The Salvation Army, with its complex array of social service and educational provision, is made up of larger entities that operate within a reporting structure embracing a more centralised territorial hierarchy. The two examples illustrate some key aspects of the nature of leadership found in not-for-profit organisations. The key importance of shared values stands out and, though reference is often made to values in public and private organisations, such values function in a setting where staff may possess and acknowledge more pressing values such as professional values (with nurses and doctors in public sector settings) and self-serving values (e.g., that monetary reward or promotion may override organisational loyalties). Typically managers and leaders in not-for-profits are less well paid than their equivalents in the other sectors. For a leader to be effective in such a not-for-profit context he or she has to embed the values of the organisation or movement to a degree not usually expected in other sectors. In particular where a substantial proportion of the people who work for the organisation are unpaid (are volunteers), the leader has to appreciate and live a reality in which material reward is explicitly devalued or even in some cases seen as unacceptable by a substantial part of those involved in the organisation. This can be illustrated simply by comparing the boards of public sector and private organisations with those of typical not-for-profits. The directors of private and public sector organisations will normally be paid sometimes very well paid. The typical director (or trustee) of a not-for-profit serves unrewarded even though the organisation may be very large and have complex and challenging issues the board has to resolve. In the UK there has been some debate about whether board members should be remunerated. Perhaps significantly, the argument for remuneration is often not about attracting well-qualified applicants with rare skill sets (though this argument is advanced). Rather the argument is that remuneration enables people who are financially challenged (such as disabled people and single parents) to be able to afford to pay for child care and other costs to enable them to attend a board meeting. Such arguments would hold little weight in justifying payments to members of private sector boards. Robert House has extended the usual view of such value-based leadership, viewing it as the ability to create a vision that is anchored in a moral context. The importance of a moral and ethical dimension is particularly important in most not-for-profits (House, 1996). Leadership has to be authentic and consistent with the values espoused by the organisation. It is not simply the actions of the leader in the work context but sometimes the

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way they live their life. The Salvation Army requires that its uniformed members are practising Christians, and in Emmaus communities often the leader is expected both to live on the premises with the companions and to eat the same food at the same dining table. The author, as a chair of an Emmaus community, has even witnessed staff sharing bedrooms with companions at organisational events. This is something that would have been unacceptable in the public sector settings the author had managed previously. However, in the context of Emmaus the view of senior staff is that sharing a room with a companion is justified because the companion might feel frightened at night and need the reassurance of another adult. Espousing the values of a particular not-for-profit is thus more than ‘ticking particular behavioural boxes’ for the leader. It is often demonstrating a commitment to a ‘lived-in culture’ and the leader may not be able to switch off when not in the work setting. Like the parish priest, the leader may need to acknowledge that their door is liable to receive a knock at any time. Such value-based leadership is drawn from a composite of organisational values, individual values and a set of moral/ethical standards. These have to be mutually consistent and supportive. Leadership involves both anchoring and reinforcing these values often in situations where there is potential conflict between value sets. The Salvation Army in the UK encountered such a conflict when it budgeted to spend a certain amount on poverty relief based on the expected results of a fund-raising initiative. The initiative came significantly short of the required figure. The Salvation Army resolved to spend the amount planned and to make good the shortfall by removing and reducing headquarters facilities for its paid staff (including closing a well-regarded staff restaurant). This almost certainly represented a loss for the staff, the uniformed members being already (in relative terms) very modestly paid. However, when the Salvation Army leadership measured the problem against the overarching mission of the organisation the decision can be understood. The author who was conducting research in the organisation at the time encountered no resistance to the cuts in staff provision. In a public or private setting such reductions would have been resisted unless the professed aim was to avoid staff reductions. Values are typically embedded in different ways in not-for-profits. As we have seen, the value set of the founder may serve to drive the organisation long after the founder has stood down or died. In Emmaus it is said that the walking stick of Abbe´ Pierre is brought into important meetings and laid on a chair. The symbolic significance of this is obvious. In a public sector organisation it is hard to think of a personal item of a departed chief executive being used in this fashion. But values can also represent an

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obstacle to progress. An organisation that clings on to values and beliefs that are no longer appropriate would, in the private sector, confront the reality of market pressures. Cars have replaced horse-drawn carriages despite deeply held traditions around carriage builders. A not-for-profit leader needs to understand the different ways that values can become embedded and recognise the difficulty in challenging and changing organisational value sets. One major not-for-profit in the UK had to deal with the reality of the founder (who was frail and living in accommodation run by the organisation she founded) summoning the press to openly criticise and undermine the chief executive and board when they sought to make changes. The chief executive felt unable to contradict the views expressed by the founder and rather focused her comments to the media on how much affection they all felt for the founder. If this had been a public or private sector setting it is unlikely that a former employee (even if they had been the first chief executive) would have been allowed to openly undermine the organisational management without at least being challenged.

DEALING WITH CHANGE The not-for-profit leader often confronts a different set of circumstances when confronting a need for change. The voluntaristic nature of many such organisations and the lack of a direct market or political impetus make for a different set of drivers and levers. The use of financial incentives and performance-based pay, which is found in much of the private sector and indeed in some of the public sector, often sits uneasily in not-for-profits. Where the core resource of the organisation is volunteers who are perforce unpaid, changing the focus of the organisation to be more professional, for example may arouse resistance from such volunteers who perceive it as a threat to the voluntaristic ethos that attracted them in the first place. Growth seen as ‘desirable’ in other contexts may be viewed with suspicion by some not-for-profits who fear that concepts such as managerialism represent undesirable development. Typically organisations delivering services will stress the low proportion of funds spent on administration. The increasing move towards outcome and impact factors (often associated with the growth of public sector contract funding of not-for-profits) presents a leadership challenge. The concept that good intentions were sufficient justification was part of the civil society ethos charity is seen as something ‘good in itself’. The move towards measurement of the effects of

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charitable activity is seen as both complex and inimical to the essence of voluntary activity. One account relates the experience of a charity providing dogs for disabled people. The chief executive discovered that there was a high failure rate in training the dogs in one part of the country. Further exploration revealed the cause, which was that certain wealthy donors who had been given dogs to look after while the dogs were being trained, were spoiling the dogs (e.g., feeding them inappropriate food that rendered the dogs overweight). The local manager knew this was happening but did not want to upset the donors by challenging their treatment of the dogs. Transformational leadership in not-for-profits has to work with value sets that usually cannot be easily cast aside as no longer relevant to the organisational environment. Typically the leader seeking to transform such an organisation has to assess what aspects of the value set can be challenged, what aspects are core to the organisation and can only be challenged at peril to the very nature of the organisation (or the leader!) and what value sets lie in between. In the private sector transformational change can and does happen owing to the realities of the market. In the public sector a radical change in government or government policy can bring about change in organisations (e.g., through privatising services).

THE NATURE OF SELF-LEADERSHIP IN NOT-FOR-PROFITS A factor that arises from the small size of the majority of not-for-profits links them to aspects of small enterprises. The implication of being a leader is that there are ‘followers’. Was Robinson Crusoe ‘a leader’ on his desert island? Some would argue that only the arrival of a second individual enabled him to acquire that status. However, there are arguments that self-leadership should be understood as a concept that is relevant to those who possess independent action to make their own choices. In larger and formalised organisations there are governance mechanisms, including boards of trustees, that restrict the freedom of action of the leader. However, in many cases leaders of small or start-up not-for-profits have considerable personal choice. In the UK the founders of a campaigning organisation for fathers deprived of access to their children publicised their cause by donning Superman outfits and scaling the walls of the Houses of Parliament before occupying a large building crane. In the first instance they were at significant risk of being shot by

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armed police alerted to a possible terrorist incident. No private or public sector leader would have ventured to take such a step to attract media attention to a perceived injustice. The determination and resolve needed to found and grow a not-for-profit carry with them a clear need for such selfleadership. It is also found in professional contexts where a person (such as an architect in their own practice) needs to be self-driven and motivated.

CONCLUSIONS The nature of leadership in not-for-profits is complex and has some aspects that mark it out from leadership in the other sectors. The voluntary aspect with often a high proportion of the labour being undertaken without payment is a key factor. Indeed, in many not-for-profits there may be no paid staff or leaders. This encompasses not-for-profits regardless of which country they are founding. The founding of a not-for-profit also brings with it a concept of leadership that requires self-motivation, and in some respects this links aspects of not-for-profits and the private sector (in the shape of small start-up enterprises). Areas of common ground are found and sometimes too much is made of the boundaries between the sectors. Large formal organisations are found in all sectors delivering services such as education and social care. There are significant common factors in the leadership of such organisations, and indeed leaders may readily move between sectors. However, the value aspects of many not-for-profits stand out in the way that they are both shaped by leadership (especially by the founder) and also in the way that they may restrict the freedom of action of a leader to make transformational change. The absence (in many cases) of a market or political imperative to drive change in not-for-profits places them in a context in which values can be crucial. The presence of faith (in the shape of religious beliefs) also accompanies a value set that both drives the organisation and is also resistant to change.

Note on the Case Studies The two case studies are produced from published information and the personal knowledge of the author. They are provided to illustrate leadership issues in the not-for-profit sector and do not seek to represent the views of the organisations concerned. They are illustrative in nature only.

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NOTES 1. See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/inquiry-into-guide-dog-charitys-sparepounds-160m-1443347.html. Accessed on 10 May 2014. 2. See http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc04888.pdf. Accessed on 10 May 2014. 3. See http://kmhassociates.ca/resources/1/Triple%20Bottom%20Line%20a% 20history%201961-2001.pdf. Accessed on 10 May 2014.

REFERENCES Borzaga, C., & Defourny, J. (Eds.). (2001). The emergence of social enterprise. London: Routledge. Connolly, C., Hyndman, N., & McConville, D. (2013). UK charity accounting: An exercise in widening stakeholder engagement. The British Accounting Review, 45(1), 58 69. Dees, G., Emerson, J., & Economy, P. (2001). Enterprising nonprofits: A toolkit for social entrepreneurs. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. Defourny, J., & Nyssens, M. (2008). Social enterprise in Europe: Recent trends and developments. Social Enterprise Journal, 4(3), 202 228. Handy, C. B. (1996). Gods of management: The changing work of organizations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Hudson, M. (2009). Managing without profit: Leadership, management and governance of third sector organisations. London: Directory of Social Change. Kraemer, H. M. (2011). From values to action: The four principles of values-based leadership. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Marr, N., & Gillman, C. (2014). Run a successful charity: Teach yourself. London: Hachette. Nicholls, A. (Ed.). (2006). Social entrepreneurship: New models of sustainable social change. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Nutt, P., & Backoff, R. (1992). Strategic management of public and third sector organisations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass. Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration. New York, NY: Harper & Row. Spear, R. (2006). Social entrepreneurship: A different model? International Journal of Social Economics, 33(5 6), 399 410.

SOURCES SPECIFIC TO THE CASE STUDIES The Salvation Army Drucker, P. F. (1989). What business can learn from nonprofits. Harvard Business Review, 67(4), 88 93. Hazzard, J. W. (1998). Marching on the margins: An analysis of the Salvation Army in the United States. Review of Religious Research, 40(2), 121 141.

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Murdock, A. (2008). Belief in action: The Salvation Army. In G. Johnson, K. Scholes, & R. Whittingdon (Eds.), Exploring corporate strategy (8th ed., pp. 667 677). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Watson, R., & Brown, B. (2012). Leadership secrets of the Salvation Army. eChristian, Mission Books USA.

Emmaus Bretherton, J., & Pleace, N. (2012). New growth for Emmaus. York, UK: University of York Press. Retrieved from www.whiterose.ac.uk Demaree-Raboteau, J. (2010). Emmaus house and orthodoxy: Living with the poor. In Philanthropy and social compassion in eastern orthodox tradition: Papers of the Sophia Institute academic conference (December 2009) (pp. 327 331). New York, NY: Theotokos Press. Glemain, P., Meyer, M., & Murdock, A. (2011). De l’entreprise en e´conomie sociale a` l’entreprise sociale: Quel mode`le e´conomique? Economies et Socie´te´s, 21(4), 641 656. Murdock, A. (2012). Using a residential work based social enterprise model to address challenges of poverty: The Emmaus model with particular reference to the UK (2012). In C. Parra & C. Ruiz (Eds.), Instrumentos solidarios en tiempos de crisis (pp. 141 164). Barcelona: Bosch.

MICHAEL GOVE, CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RADICAL REORGANISATION OF ENGLISH SCHOOL SPORT Elesa Zehndorfer and Chris Mackintosh ABSTRACT Purpose This paper analyses the radical reorganisation of English school sport by the coalition government, a move that led to the emergence of a significant discourse of dissatisfaction amongst school sport advocacy coalition groups. Design/methodology/approach This paper utilises Sabatier’s (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999) Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to identify how the coalition government’s decision to abolish the successful Physical Education School Sport and Club Links (PESSCL) programme has specifically weakened the power of formerly influential advocacy coalitions within the school sport arena. Weber’s (1947) conceptualisation of charisma, in particular, the concept of charismatic rhetoric, is used to explain how these historically extensive policy changes were communicated by the coalition government, and particularly, by Michael Gove, the Secretary of State.

European Public Leadership in Crisis? Critical Perspectives on International Public Sector Management, Volume 3, 147 163 Copyright r 2014 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420140000003017

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Findings Locating the government’s rhetoric within the charismatic literature allowed the exploration of how a disempowerment of advocacy coalition groups and centralisation of power towards the state might have been partly achieved via the use of charismatic rhetoric (Weber, 1947). Originality/value Javidan and Waldman (2003) identified a lack of rigorous empirical study of the role of charismatic leadership and its consequences in public sector leadership, a critique that has been addressed by this paper. Keywords: Michael Gove; charismatic rhetoric; advocacy coalition framework

INTRODUCTION This paper utilises Sabatier’s (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999) Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to identify how the coalition government’s decision to abolish the successful Physical Education School Sport and Club Links (PESSCL) programme has specifically weakened the power of formerly influential advocacy coalitions within the school sport arena and argues that despite a rhetoric of decentralisation and freedom being espoused, it is in fact a strategy that has led to greater centralisation and dependency on the state for all advocacy coalitions involved in the delivery of school sport outcomes. Specifically, Weber’s (1947) conceptualisation of charisma, in particular, the concept of charismatic rhetoric, is used to explain how these historically extensive policy changes were communicated by the coalition government and, particularly, by Michael Gove, the Secretary of State, using the rhetoric of charisma as a means of seeking acceptance for a radical and disempowering policy change.

PESSCL: A BRIEF BACKGROUND The development of the PESSCL strategy reflected a Blairite government’s goal that ‘all children, whatever their circumstances or abilities, should be able to participate in and enjoy physical education (PE) and sport’ (DfES/ DCMS, 2002, p. 1). The PESSCL Sports Strategy (PE, School Sport and Club Links) implemented by the Labour Government in 2002 led to

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outcomes that were ‘internationally envied’,1 that exceeded targets,2 and that were welcomed by the education sector. The £1.5bn funding for the PESSCL programme supported the delivery of school sport and PE via the implementation of eight programmes: Specialist Sport Colleges, School Sport Coordinators, Gifted and Talented programme, QCA PE and School Sport Investigation, Step into Sport, Professional Development and School/Club Links and Swimming from 2003 to 2008 (Bardens, Long, & Gillie, 2012). It also included the provision of 450 School Sport Partnerships across England. The PESSCL strategy aimed to increase the percentage of school children participating in 2-hour sport per week to 75% by 2006. The PESSCL programme was extended in 2008 until 2011 with the provision of £755m to continue to increase child participation in school sport over the original 75% goal and to extend provision from 2 to 5 hours per week. A 2009 Ofsted report (‘Physical education in schools 2005/2008: working towards 2012 and beyond’ cited in Bardens et al., 2012, p. 3) stated that the PESSCL strategy had achieved a significant impact on school sport participation, noting a ‘major impact’ on not only school sport but also on afterschool sports activities. Particular success was noted at the key stages 1 3, and it was recommended that the programme be continued after 2012. The PE and sport survey published by the DfE in September 2010 (DfES, 2010) echoed Ofsted’s findings, reporting significant success of PESSCL. Major findings included the fact that • 84% of school children in the academic year 2009/2010 spent at least 120 minutes participating in sport, a 40% increase in figures from prePESSCL 2003/2004; • 90% of school children in the academic year 2007/2008 (years 1 11) spent at least 120 minutes per week participating in high-quality sport3 (PE and after school). Given that this target had been achieved, a new target was set to increase participation to 180 minutes a week. This led to 57% of the school children (years 1 11) meeting this target in 2009/2010; • 78% of school children (years 1 11) participated in intra-school competitive sport in the academic year 2009/2010, a 10% increase since the previous academic year; • 21% of school children (years 3 13) competed against other schools in the academic year 2009/2010, an increase of 2% since the previous year. In October 2010, 5 months after entering office, Michael Gove, the Secretary of State for the coalition government, announced the discontinuation

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of the School Sports Partnership (SSP) programme, which had been implemented as part of a broader £1.5bn PESSCL strategy by the previous administration in October 2002. Such a move was perhaps unsurprising, given the use of school sport as a political tool, which has been relatively well documented and which has historical form (Evans & Penney, 1995; Fisher, 1996; Giddens, 1998; Phillpots, 2012). It is clear that policy shifts within the English school sport system since 1992 (Table 1) occurred as a result of the replacement of one political party (and ideology) with another (i.e. a focus on competitiveness under the Tories from 1992 to 1997 replaced with a focus on participation under Blair from 1997 to 2010 and a renewed focus on competitiveness from 2010 under the coalition government led by Cameron). Given that the analytical framework of this paper utilises the ACF, this paper considers policy shifts in school sport over a period from 1992 to 2014. Table 1. Date

Outline of the Key Public Policy Changes from 1992 to 2012 in England. Public Policy

Key Features

1992 National Curriculum for Physical Education launched 1995 Sport: Raising the Game published

1997 2002 2003

2010

2011

2012

Standardised NCPE and stressed importance of competitive team games Continued focus on traditional team sport, competition and a narrative of nationalism UK New Labour elected Refocus on sport for social good over ‘sport for sports sake’ UK New Labour publish Game Plan Argues for a redevelopment of the infrastructure of English sport PE, School Sport and Club Links School Sport Partnership (SSP) and Strategy (PESSCL) launched Specialist Sports College system put in place Initial removal of whole SSP system Michael Gove (education minister of followed by partial u-turn to part fund New Coalition government) announces 1 day of PE teacher release until 2013 partial dismantling of SSP system 2012 School Games system established Refocus on competitive opportunities in Localism Bill (2011) school setting to run 2011 2015 as a direct 2012 Olympic legacy. Localism Act (2012) launched August New Coalition Bill establishing Big Society 2012 David Cameron (prime minister) public policy vision for the public sector announces compulsory competitive and civil society sport in primary school

Source: Mackintosh and Liddle (2014). Reprinted by permission of the publisher Taylor & Francis Ltd, http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals.

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The swift and the final nature of the dissolution of PESSCL surprised many. Vocalised eloquently by Phillpots and Grix (2012), ‘The rapid and unexpected decision by the coalition government to abandon its ring fenced funding of school sport partnership in 2011 is a very clear case of (political) ideology over reason and highlights politicised nature of policy-making for PESS. Indeed, the abandonment of the PESSYP strategy by the government in favour of a new Competitive School Games Competition is further evidence of centralised decision making systems and policy delivery through tightly managed structural arrangements and fiscal control’ (p. 16). Discontinuation of the PESSCL programme was announced via the press release Refocusing sport in schools to build a lasting legacy of the 2012 Games and via an open letter to the Chairman of the Youth Sport Trust (Baroness Sue Campbell) in October 2010. The rationale for discontinuation, which ended the £162m DfE funding (including ring-fencing for School Sport Partnerships), was attributed to the need to encourage a greater level of competition in school sport, to improve participation in traditionally competitive sports such as rugby and to reduce the bureaucracy associated with delivering it.

The New Strategy Following a January 2011 curriculum review, the Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport had announced in February 2011 that Lottery funding had been provided for the creation of a new ‘Olympics Style’ school games, forming part of a broader youth sport strategy that was announced in January 2012. The press release that detailed the jewel in the crown of the PESSCL’s replacement constituted a letter, written by Michael Gove to Baroness Sue Campbell. An excerpt is provided below: ‘I firmly believe that the ideals of the Olympic and Paralympic Games can be an inspiration to all young people, not only to our most promising young athletes. Indeed, they embody the ethos of achievement and self-improvement which the best schools manifest in their sport provision for all pupils.’ … ‘I have concluded that the existing network of school sport partnerships is neither affordable nor likely to be the best way to help schools achieve their potential in improving competitive sport’.

Gove also stated that the ‘5-hour offer’ was no longer required for schools and that schools were no longer required to collect sports participation data from individual pupils. Furthermore, schools were no longer required to report termly to the Youth Sports Trust or to gain permission from the

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Youth Sport Trust or Department to use their funding flexibly. Gove did state, however, that he expected the good practice, developed as a result of the PESSCL programme, to be maintained despite its discontinuation. Ultimately, the emphasis remained firmly on the wish to provide schools with greater freedom and flexibility, and to prioritise competitiveness between schools as part of an Olympic legacy as the most important goal. Mackintosh (2012) reflects on the move from SSP to the 2012 school games within the context of the big society mantra and a concomitant vocalisation of the Coalition for the need to increase autonomy and control for individual schools. House and Howell (1992) identified the articulation of an ideological vision as one of the causes of successful outcomes for charismatic leaders. They also identified the tendency for goals to be distal, as opposed to proximate, in nature. David Cameron memorably voiced his intention that the 2012 London Games would ‘inspire a generation’, a classically distal goal, as it is the wider ‘Big Society’ concept under whose banner Cameron’s reorganisation of school sport is situated. Gove’s statement was accompanied by the announcement of a youth sport strategy, which was announced by Jeremy Hunt, the Culture Secretary and which was based on the idea that every secondary school should host a community sports club (via engagement with national governing bodies) and make their facilities available to the public as part of a £1bn 5-year strategy, which would form part of Lord Coe’s Olympic legacy-despite the fact that the concept of school sport as a vehicle to realise legacy goals of the London 2012 games has been hotly contested (Boardley, 2013; Devine, 2013; Mackintosh & Liddle, 2014). Directly addressing teachers at a 2011 Sports Colleges Conference at Telford (Bardens et al., 2012, p. 14), Hunt voiced his intention to ‘… harness the energy, enthusiasm and commitment you have shown over many years to help move school sport to the next level in this critical year of opportunity’. Sport England was assigned with the task of assessing the impact of games over a 4-year period. This coincided with an announcement by the government that school sport would be ‘slimmed down’. The Youth Sports Trust voiced their approval that school sport would remain a core part of the national curriculum. The strategy included funding for further education colleges and universities (e.g. further education colleges would receive funding for the employment of one full-time sports professional, named ‘College Sport Makers’, and a sum of £50m was pledged to them to boost participation). The strategy also included the aforementioned Olympic-style ‘School Games’

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in 2012 at the Olympic Park, with an ambition for competition to be held in the ensuing years. Mackintosh and Liddle (2014) reported dissonance amongst practitioners regarding the dissolution of PESSCL and in its intended replacement, with 50% of respondents in their research identifying school sport as one area in which the London 2012 legacy was being limited. One key weakness perceived was the lack of communication and network building prevalent in the new system, the disparity in standards between sports that the new programme and entailed. Phillpots and Grix (2012) argued that the UK government had employed changes in school sport provision as part of a wider goal to reduce autonomy and increase dependency on a centralised state. The removal of reporting requirements also arguably removes the power that advocacy coalition groups wield in criticising the efficacy of the new programme. Furthermore, it has been subsequently argued that ‘the abandonment of the PESSYP strategy by the government in favour of a new Competitive School Games Competition is further evidence of centralised decision making systems and policy delivery through tightly managed structural arrangements and fiscal control’ (Phillpots & Grix, 2014, p. 91) Within this body of growing research examining the physical, educational and school sport development policy sub-sector in England, the theme of centralised decision-making is a common one (Mackintosh, 2012; Mackintosh & Liddle, 2014; Phillpots & Grix, 2014). However, a current gap in existing knowledge is the role of public sector leadership in the policy process. Most recent work has examined senior policy decision-makers, NGB staff and regional school games coordinators. But it could be argued that a critical examination of central government leadership around this policy sphere is currently missing. It is to this question that this study will now turn.

CHARISMATIC RHETORIC Studies on leadership in European public sector sport are limited (Girginov & Sandanski, 2008), with studies on the impact of styles of governance and organisational change on actors and stakeholders in public sector sports organisations limited generally to non-European contexts (Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2005; Parent, Olver, & Se´guin, 2009; Phillips & Newland, 2013). Javidan and Waldman (2003) identified a lack of rigorous empirical study of the role of charismatic leadership and its consequences in public sector leadership. The authors contended that the

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complex social and economic challenges faced by public sector organisations provide ‘… fertile ground for charismatic leadership within the public sector executive ranks’ (p. 233). Locating the government’s rhetoric within the charismatic literature allows the exploration of how a disempowerment of advocacy coalition groups and centralisation of power towards the state might have been partly achieved via the use of charismatic rhetoric (Weber, 1947), and its inclusion as a basis for analysis within this study is subsequently justified. The charismatic rhetoric in Gove’s announcement is evident. In the excerpt of Gove’s speech provided earlier, Gove clearly explained the three hallmarks of charisma (Eatwell, 2006): the communication of a vision, a symbiotic hierarchy (rhetoric that implied Gove sought to be seen as being of and above the people) and a certain demonisation of the previous policy (despite statistical evidence of its success). Gove’s open letter also employed a reference to history and tradition, emphasis of a collective identity, reinforcement of a collective efficacy and communication of a vision that would lead to hope for a better future (all hallmarks of charismatic rhetoric; Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993; Shamir, Arthur, & House, 1994). The alignment of school sport policy with the London 2012 Games (via the creation of a 2012 school Games) allowed the coalition to develop a better level of charismatic, inspirational rhetoric, effectively tapping into the assumed national pride that Great Britain experienced via the successful hosting of the Games. The distal nature of the goals voiced by Gove are characteristic of a charismatic leader. Distal goals can cloak a disparity between the inspirational style of the leaders’ message and the substance of the policy itself (perhaps allowing the message, subsequently, to appear inordinately inspirational despite its inherent flaws). There is certainly evidence of a disparity in the case of dissolution of PESSCL and the policy that replaced it. Firstly, despite the DCMS (2012) calling for ‘a more rigorous, targeted and results-oriented way of thinking about grassroots sport’ (p. 1), the discontinuation of PESSCL entails a lower requirement on reporting participation data and a significant reduction of funding and development for grassroots sport. This move to end substantive data collection of school sport participation is likely to disempower advocacy coalitions (such as the Youth Sport Trust) in their ability to remain a key, informed voice in the assessment of the quality of the school sport provision. Secondly, Gove’s press release identified a requirement for agents involved in the delivery of PESSCL to continue to deliver the same high standards of delivery. A disparity appears to exist between the message and the reality of delivering

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the same high-standard characteristic of outcomes under PESSCL when funding and the networks on which PESSCL depend had been removed. For example, Mackintosh (2012), in his study on reactions to SSP dismantling in Nottinghamshire, found a strong resistance to proposed changes and questionable ability of practitioners to maintain standards of delivery without funding. Thirdly, Gove’s statement is situated under the mantra of Cameron’s Big Society, an inherently vague concept (Mackintosh & Liddle, 2014) that is characterised by its grand, highly distal goals. Fourth, the removal of the requirement to report key benchmarking data (to which PESSCL was subjected) facilitates a higher level of ongoing rhetoric as it reduces the likelihood of proximal goals to be set and monitored closely and allows the continuation of inspiring rhetoric even in case of (unreported) failures of the policy. Fifth, the rhetoric of better freedom attributed to actors within school sport appeared to directly contradict the reality that the new programme would actually be more likely to increase centralisation and state dependence of advocacy coalitions. As quoted by Scott (1981, p. 33), charisma constitutes ‘… an unusual form of normative social structure that emerges in times of crisis, when people look upon charismatic individuals who are ‘perceived as possessing extraordinary gifts of spirit and mind’ to lead them through the crisis with ‘radical reorganisations’. Mackintosh talks of a ‘… rhetoric of policy’ (2012, p. 4) and ‘… potential vacuum’ (2012, p. 3) that have followed dismantling of PESSCL, itself a radical reorganisation in school sport, and draws further attention to the nature of the coalition’s treatment of school sport policy in 2010. The danger of such a vacuum being created is that the charismatic rhetoric has been shown to be particularly effective in periods of uncertainty or as quoted by Klein and House (1995) that ‘crisis breeds charisma’ (p. 185). The authoritarian way in which PESSCL was disbanded (reflected in the immediate and vociferous critiques of the change), the apparent removal of power of advocacy coalition groups, and the way that evidence of the success of PESSCL was ignored, suggests that there may be a ‘shadow side’ of charisma evident under Gove’s leadership (Conger & Kanungo, in Bass, 1985). School sport remains by nature dependent on a system of centralised state governance, a dependence that has been increased considerably as a result of the dissolution of the core advocacy framework upon which PESSCL was based. The move to disband PESSCL seems, interestingly, to have been designed (whether explicitly or implicitly) to increase centralisation and state dependence.

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One of the most powerful legacies of path goal theory (House, 1971) remains its foundational influence on House’s subsequent development of his 1976 theory of charismatic leadership (House, 1977), a theory that draws inspiration from McClelland’s Three Needs Theory. Charismatic leadership was first conceptualised by the sociologist Max Weber in 1924, who remarked that: Charisma is self-determined and sets its own limits. Its bearer seizes the task for which he is destined and demands that others obey and follow him by virtue of his mission. If those to whom he feels sent do not recognize him, his claim collapses; if they recognize it, he is their master as long as he ‘proves’ himself. (Weber, p. 1113)

Certainly, the immediate and vociferous criticism of agents, following Michael Gove’s announcement, demonstrates both the power of advocacy groups and the immediate collapse of Gove’s claim and vision. Andy Burnham, the Shadow Education Secretary, had commented on 30th November 2010 that ‘What we are struggling with is having to accept the Secretary of State’s decision to remove 100% of their funding and demolish an entire infrastructure and proven delivery system that is improving children’s lives here and now. I cannot understand why he has done that’.4 Burnham’s sentiments were echoed nationally, with national media and the Association for Physical Education (afPE) stating concern, via the Youth Sport Trust voicing their deep disappointment, and via the fact that SSPs had not only exceeded their targets but were internationally envied and had also helped to improve participation in competitive sport. Criticisms led to a significant and swift climb down by the government. By the following month, and in response to these critiques, Gove had revised his plan to provide an additional £47m funding in order to extend SSP funding to August 2011 (an additional 5 months) and to provide £65m of funding (available for 2 years) to allow secondary school PE teachers to spend 1 day per week out of their classroom encouraging intraschool and inter-school competitive sports participation (PE Teacher Release Funding). The new revised approach included initiatives such as invitation for Dame Kelly Holmes and a network of other sports advocates to promote sport across the country, to extend the Young Ambassadors programme and to work with Sport England to ‘get more volunteer sports leaders and coaches into our schools’. The Youth Sport Trust welcomed these revisions, although their legitimate power had diminished considerably. Gove’s charismatic dialogue surrounding the dissolution of PESSCL is situated in a wider rhetoric that encapsulates reform of the educational

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system as a whole. During a speech at the London Academy of Excellence,5 for example, Gove defended his decision to end the requirement for qualified teacher status (QTS) in free schools and academies,6 referring to the quality of English state education as ‘bog standard’, invoking George Dangerfield’s classic work ‘The Strange Death of Liberal England’, using a metaphor of the ‘Berlin Wall’ to explain the chasm he felt existed between state and private education, and turning to the populist media for anecdotal support in his statement that ‘… when even Tatler publishes a guide to the best state schools you know tectonic plates have started to shift’. Gove’s rhetoric positioned him as a visionary; ‘Top private schools can recruit research scientists, academic experts or other people at the top of their career who want to switch to teaching without forcing them to go back to the bottom of the ladder, start over at university and take out a student loan for a year’s study before they can benefit pupils’ whilst demonising a significant other; ‘Savvy schools are using School Direct to increasingly demand that universities conduct research which supports teachers’ professional development rather than satisfying academics’ pet passions’. This rhetoric relies on the assumption that individuals who had achieved brilliance in one field would naturally be able to teach, an assumption that again caused widespread discord amongst practitioners. The National Association of Head Teachers, for example, referred to the removal of QTS as ‘a significant backwards step’. Furthermore, the results of a recent 2013 NUT-commissioned YouGov survey (referred to by the NUT as ‘a damning indictment of Michael Gove’s time as Secretary of State for Education’7) found that 74% of teachers reported a decline in morale since the last general election and only 4% of those surveyed believed that the coalition government had made a positive difference to the education system since coming to power.8 It subsequently seems possible to argue that the immediate dissolution of a successful school sport policy was facilitated by the heavy use of charismatic rhetoric. Advocacy coalitions were not consulted or included in the decision-making process, and the use of an open letter by Gove, as opposed to the choice of private communication, to Baroness Sue Campbell, suggests the communication of disempowerment of Campbell (and the YST) as a key power broker. The removal of the requirement for the reporting of data appears to be (whether explicitly or implicitly planned) a move towards facilitating the continuation of charismatic rhetoric. Overall, it appears that the manner in which Gove and other key power brokers designed and communicated the policy shift reflects to a far greater extent the need to achieve and protect wider political goals of coalition, as

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opposed to reflecting a need to achieve societal (participation-based) goals (that would have been achieved via the continuation of PESSCL). Within the context of charismatic leadership literature, the nature of charismatic leadership demonstrated here could be argued to be personalised (selfserving) as opposed to socialised (De Vries, Roe, & Taillieu, 1999; House & Howell, 1992; Howell, 1988; Howell & Shamir, 2005). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Pinto and Larsen (2006) argued that the charismatisation of politics should be recognised as posing a serious challenge to democracy.

ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK The shifting of power between and from advocacy coalitions remains a central element of the paradigm shift that has appeared to have occurred in school sport policy in recent years. The concept of shifting of power can be analysed effectively using the ACF (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). The ACF has been referred to as one of ‘the most promising theoretical approaches in the analysis of policy processes’ (Phillpots, 2012, p. 6) and reflects the theory that policy change remains a function of the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions (PE teachers, Youth Sport Trust), which exist within policy sub-systems and which together influence policy change. The ACF focuses on the role of agency (e.g. PE teachers), structure (e.g. central government) and centrality of ideas in the policy process (Phillpots, 2012). Sabatier (1998) suggested that when a considerable discord exists within a policy sub-system, based on the threat to that subsystems’ values that conflict becomes intense. The advocacy coalitions that exist within these sub-systems are bound together by collective values and act collectively to compete for control over public policy. It is argued that in case of PESSCL, it was instead a disempowerment of advocacy groups via strategy policy implementation that led to the shifting of power across the advocacy coalition landscape and a resulting greater dependence on the state. The development of PESS involved a number of advocacy groups: the DfES, the DCMS and the YST (in particular, the advocacy power of the YST was significant in its influence over SSP-related DfES and DCMS’s decision-making). Other agencies included the NGB’s, LEA’s, local authorities (LA’s), Association for PE (AfPE) and OFSTED. Disbanding PESSCL and its network of stakeholders, removing the requirement for systematic reporting of key data and ending funding meant that the

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advocacy coalition network upon which school sport (via PESSCL) was based was fundamentally altered. This led to a far greater level of power in the hands of the state, most notably in the hands of key policy brokers (Prime Minister David Cameron and Michael Gove, the Secretary of State). Whilst Baroness Sue Campbell remains an influential voice, her role as power broker had been sidelined considerably as a result of the cessation of the YST’s involvement with the key elements of the new school strategy.

CONCLUSIONS The objectives of this study were twofold. Firstly, it explored the use of charismatic rhetoric by the coalition in the communicated dissolution of what was (arguably) one of the most successful school sports programmes of modern times, at least within the English sporting landscape (Mackintosh, 2012; Mackintosh & Liddle, 2014). Secondly, it sought to identify and consider ways in which advocacy coalitions and power brokers were affected by the dissolution, particularly with regard to the role of central political leaders in what is becoming an increasingly centralised decision-making fulcrum of power in the coalition government of England (Philpotts & Grix, 2014). Given the focus of centralisation and power relations within this case study, it is particularly interesting that centralisation has been closely related to bullying via its effect on heightening the power distance between a leader and his followers, a theorised antecedent of bullying (Einarsen & Skogstad, 1996). The emergence of a ‘dark side’ or ‘shadow side’ of charisma bears a close similarity to the concepts of toxic and destructive leadership, of which bullying is a constituent part (Padilla, Hogan & Kaiser, 2007; Schyns & Schilling, 2013), and it has even been claimed (Ironside & Seifert, 2003) that the nature of organisational change taking place within the public sector can lead to increased bullying by managers in order that organisational goals and targets are achieved. Many authors (Maccoby, 2000; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006; Sankowsky, 1995) have also identified links between charismatic and narcissistic leadership, and the transient and unstable nature of charisma itself has been well documented (Weber, 1947). Subsequently, greater investigation of the prevalent use and potentially powerful ramifications of charismatic rhetoric by the central government in the public sector sphere is warranted, particularly in the context of recent changes that have taken place in the school sports sector.

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As Grix and Phillpots (2011a, 2011b) have argued convincingly, the era of ‘new public governance’ (Osbourne, Radnor, & Nasi, 2013) in England may not be perhaps quite so valid in the case of the school sport sector. Whilst other authors have argued that leadership has become a staple feature of government language in health, education and local government (Spicker, 2012), few studies have critically examined the sport policy sector leadership in any detail, hence its central focus here. This in itself constitutes a considerable void in the literature, one that arguably, given the period of change currently shaping the austerity-led measures of the current political administration (Mackintosh, Darko, Rutherford, & May-Wilkins, 2014), leaves a significant vacuum in our understanding. The implications for how leadership is undertaken and for how policy actors and coalitions negotiate the changes that are thrust upon them clearly need to also recognise and explore the relevance of central government leaders within this process. Key findings from this study show that the ACF illuminates the sector well but also demonstrates the over-riding power that exists within a subsystem of centralised leadership and which drives forward ideological change (Phillpotts & Grix, 2014) as a counter balance to the rhetoric of evidence-led policy decision-making. Whilst a growing understanding and body of knowledge concerning the role of sub-regional and national policy actor level in national governing bodies, county sport partnerships and local government continues to emerge, the concomitant understanding of the role of central government in sport policy (that has arguably driven changes in PESSCL and the existing Creating a Sporting Habit for Life youth sport strategy) remains largely unexamined. It is argued that a new research agenda, embedded within the theorisation of public sector leadership paradigm, is subsequently required.

NOTES 1. A comment made by the Youth Sports Trust. 2. Ninety per cent of school children in the academic year 2007/2008 (years 1 11) spent at least 120 minutes per week participating in high-quality sport (PE and after school). Given that this target had been achieved, a new target was set to increase participation to 180 minutes a week. This led to 57% of school children (years 1 11) meeting this target in 2009/2011. 3. High-quality sport as defined by the previous government: ‘High quality PE and school sport produces young people with the skills, understanding, desire and

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commitment to continue to improve and achieve in a range of PE, sport and health enhancing physical activities in line with their abilities’. 4. Andy Burnham’s School Sports Speech. Labour list archives, 30 November 2010. Retrieved from http://labourlist.org/2010/12/andy-burnhams-school-sportsspeech/. Accessed on 25 January 2014. 5. Michael Gove’s speech on improving schools Full text and audio. The Spectator, 3 February 2014. Retrieved from http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/the-spectator/2014/02/michael-goves-speech-on-improving-schools-full-text/. Accessed on 4 February 2014. 6. Michael Gove’s speech on improving schools Full text and audio. The Spectator, 3 February 2014. Retrieved from http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/thespectator/2014/02/michael-goves-speech-on-improving-schools-full-text/. Accessed on 4 February 2014. Ibid. 7. Teachers’ New Year Message. First published: Thursday 2 January 2014 Teacher voting intention figures updated 10 January 2014, NUT. Retrieved from http://www.teachers.org.uk/node/20237. Accessed on 4 February 2014. 8. NUT/YouGov survey of teachers 2013. Retrieved from http://www.teachers. org.uk/node/20172. Accessed on 4 February 2014.

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CONCLUSION REVISITING THE THEMES This series was intended to provide researchers, practitioners and activists with an opportunity to engage in critical reflection on the key issues facing those of us engaged in the conceptualisation of international public sector management. We published Volume 1 in the wake of the global financial crisis. Whilst the language of ‘austerity’ and cuts in social and welfare spending has varied from state to state there has been (we suggest) a shared discourse on the need to cut. This process of legitimising the austerity measures adopted and implemented by national governments or multi-national agencies demonstrates both the ‘politics’ of austerity and, in addition, it highlights key questions over ‘leadership’ and ‘localism’. We want to argue that the ‘politics’ of austerity reveals profound and important debates and contestation over the scale and pace of the cuts. It, also, highlights a much more fundamental set of questions which relate to who loses in these process and who gains. There is no doubt (as contributors to all three volumes in this series have shown) that the global financial crisis has been about much more than failing banks. There are core structural problems in the governance and decision making systems adopted by banks and financial sector. There are quite sharp and profound ideological differences over the role of the state between some regulatory and banking agencies (Federal Reserve, Bank of England, World Bank, IMF and the Euro Zone nations) liberal democratic parties of the centre left. The failure to address the structural causes of the weaknesses in the banking system exposed the tensions not just between regulators and bankers but between political and ideological differences too. Indeed, we can observe these tensions and disagreements being played out at a local level as well as at the national or supra-national state levels too. At a broader level the cause(s) of the crisis were perceived to be a combination of poor state/government regulation following significant de-regulation (especially in the United States and the United Kingdom) and a systemic failure of corporate governance within the banking sector. In the specific context of public management we can argue that both 165

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the conventional theoretical frameworks of public administration as well as those associated with either ‘new’ public management of ‘new’ public governance failed both to anticipate the crisis or to provide a conceptual map through which to navigate. As the papers in this volume illustrate there is a further analytical level with which we need to engage the apparent failure too of political leadership (especially) at the city or regional level to provide a coherent alternative voice. There is a risk that as we reflect on the ways in which city institutions responded to the crisis that we assume a particular form of civic leadership will be present. On one level such a set of expectations is over simplistic. The extent to which elected civic leaders (as mayors or city managers) can establish independent spheres of influence at the local level is highly contested. We do know, however, that there are some key global cities (New York, London, Chicago, Paris or Istanbul) where city leaders (usually elected mayors) can occupy influential roles in urban or city regeneration and development. These cities (in some cases) often exhibit rates of economic growth and development which are ahead of the nation state. These key urban leaders find themselves (at times) in opposition to their national parliaments and/or their respective political parties too. These elements suggest that it may be possible to observe a much more nuanced and subtle expression of localised forms of political leadership than might be assumed. The policy implications of this are significant. We might anticipate differentiated models of leadership which are rooted in the particularities of place and space. We might, also, anticipate leadership networks or organised forms of leadership development and support which sit outside more formalised institutional structures or party systems. We think it is important to note that the potential of these key urban leaders in the core global cities to exert authority and influence is also linked to the local alliances they are able to construct from business, universities and other key leadership groups and interests. This model of ‘leadership’ across different sectional or institutional boundaries but located within highly specific localised structures and networks is one we need to revisit in the context of austerity. As we reflect on the key themes we set out in the introductory section to this collection we remain open to this proposition that localised and variegated forms of leadership in times of austerity are evident on the basis of the empirical evidence. We think that this is an area we want to examine further and we invite colleagues to engage with us in this project.

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REFLECTING ON THE KEY THEMES • The ways in which urban leaders and agencies defined the austerity crisis and looked for (or gave themselves) permission to act We think that the introductory paper by Pugalis, Townsend and Johnston sets the context very well. As they suggest we can interpret the ‘austerity crisis’ as an opportunity by the neo-liberal state to redefine significantly the role of the state in relation to public welfare and social and economic policies in general. The imposition of the austerity programme needs to be situated in a context of a pre-existing reform and change agenda. In the United Kingdom this had taken shape through the creation of complex public/private/not-for-profit ‘partnerships’ often linked to urban (or rural) regeneration schemes. Political, institutional and administrative changes too had been introduced (in the United Kingdom) over a period of nearly 30 years. These changes have shaped, in part, what the authors describe as the ‘fleet-offoot’ partnerships. As they suggest these loose organisational actors (their institutional bases are often weak or in the early stages of development) appear to represent a new agile, more entrepreneurial form of leadership which is focussed on the crises of austerity. The paper examines in detail the extent to which the claims associated with this model are evident both in practice but also through a systematic literature review. As they suggest (and we agree) the issues are not that the claims are not substantiated for these new forms of leadership but rather the extent to which there is a shared intellectual acceptance of the crisis and as a consequence local leaders/decision makers do not give themselves permission to act differently. In other words they do not exhibit the leadership qualities and capacities which their advocates claim. • Local vitality and discretion in decision making The paper on Liverpool and Manchester (both urban cities in the North West of England) illustrate the themes and questions raised above. Both cities have rich industrial histories and there are deep social and cultural expressions of competition between the two cities as well as competing economic strategies and objectives too. Both cities have quite different histories of political leadership and governance too (even though both cities have been led by the same political party at the same time the competitive elements remain). The differences between the two cities in terms of political leadership and public administration are important to note. In the 1980s Liverpool was seen as

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the centre of urban city hall opposition to the Conservative Government. The Thatcher Administration introduced a number of far reaching reforms to local public authorities in the United Kingdom during this period (and afterwards) which significantly reduced the extent to local discretion in budget setting and service delivery. At the same time as the political leadership in Liverpool was challenging the power of the Thatcher Government in Manchester (by the late 1980s) City Hall had come to an accommodation along with a number of other local authorities. The paper by Joyce and Fitzgerald sits neatly (we think) alongside the work of Headlam. The perspective offered by Joyce and Fitzgerald suggests that over time city or urban leaders can construct models of practice and organisation which shape city governance rather than being shaped by external factors. The model offered here provides a fascinating counter point to that offered by Pugalis et al. and Headlam too. The analysis set out by Headlam is important because she sets out a sophisticated set of insights into the ways in which the tensions between the two cities reveal much more than cultural differences or sporting success. She argues that the context of austerity has accentuated the gaps between constructing mutually beneficial strategic relationships to link Manchester and Liverpool. The absence of a coherent economic framework to support close strategic planning and collaboration to link the two cities has reduced (and is reducing) the capacity of local leaders to respond to the crisis in a mature way. The central point that Headlam makes is that the current crisis is exactly the context where close collaboration is required. The absence of an institutional architecture to support and enable such joint planning highlights some of the immediate weaknesses of the UK local state. As she suggests these weaknesses have the potential to reduce the scope for local economic development to influence positively the broader regional needs of the economy. These weaknesses are likely, over time, to accentuate the different rates of growth between the two cities and the extent to which they remain dependent upon promoting a form of civic competition. • Learning from outside our experience and the capacity of leaders to reflect • The need to situate our analysis in an institutional context as well as a political, cultural or temporal one The overall rationale of this annual series has been to encourage learning and reflection across national borders and organisational or institutional

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boundaries. The extent to which urban/city leaders or key strategic administrative decision makers are encouraged or are willing to engage in such critical reflection is hugely variable. We can see that the development of new forms of institutional structures to promote such learning or the revitalisation of existing agencies has taken on a new urgency since the changes in Eastern Europe following the end of the ‘Cold War’ and in the current context of the ‘Arab Spring’. The pattern of organisational development and support for innovation has been (to a significant extent) been dependent on the creation of new forms of leadership education and development. In both settings these innovations have been created by drawing upon pre-existing institutional frameworks. In some cases these are, themselves, based upon the former European colonial linkages (in France or the Netherlands or the United Kingdom) or in the US-based public administration networks and agencies. We are aware that in both of these papers (Howell and Shand) and Sancino et al. there are limited examples of how learning has influenced local political decision making. The value of both papers lies in the ways in which they identify trends and patterns in decision making and models of leadership. In the context of the United Kingdom there remains ambiguity about the extent to which we can observe styles and models of leadership which have been informed by cultural or political patterns outside the United Kingdom itself. We want to suggest that this limits the potential from cross boundary learning. • The extent to which faith and/or profit motives shape models of leadership and decision making The contribution to reflection and analysis of leadership models or governance arrangements at the local level from the not-for-profit sector has real potential to add to our understanding. As Murdock shows in his work there are points of intersection between the not-for-profit/private sector which offer more insights than those between the public and notfor-profit sector. The growth of charitable based agencies in the United Kingdom and philanthropic organisations in the United States over the past 10 20 years exhibit (as we might expect) the social, cultural and organisational characteristics of private sector companies. In a context of global neo-liberalism we should expect nothing else. The framing of the analysis offered by Murdock does provide an additional lens with which to make sense of the crisis in leadership caused by or shaped by the austerity crisis. We can trace important ideological as

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well as political convergence between the private and not-for-profit sector through the developments of ‘brand’ and corporate identity, fund raising strategies, commissioning and procurement strategies and the processes of developing a managerial or leadership cadre. These developments are not new in either the United Kingdom or the United States and we can see their development in the impact of NGOs in Eastern Europe and in Africa too. Through these processes we can see the emergence of a new form of leadership. Their development was always part of the colonial relationship but over the past 20 years a new and younger generation of leaders are emerging but into a very specific political and economic context. • The application of charismatic leadership and organisational change The final paper (Zehndorfer and Mackintosh) draws on a highly specific English context to explore the relationships between ‘charismatic leadership and organisational change’. We think that this paper adds some thoughtful insights into these discussions. In the UK political context (as well as the organisational context too) the interventions by senior political figures to stimulate change are well documented. In this paper we invite readers to see the intervention less in terms of the political figure but much more in terms of the potential for leaders to be change agents. We think this paper does add to that framing of analysis very well.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS Throughout this edited collection we have attempted to examine the responses of local leaders at a civic level to the crisis of ‘austerity’. There are no clear shared patterns of how local leaders have engaged with the fiscal and ideological manifestations of the ‘Age of Austerity’. Indeed, there is a risk that a shared sense of what is meant by the language and terminology of austerity has already reduced the potential for debate and difference of meaning. The discourse of austerity is itself, a way of shaping and defining the limits of the public conversation. We have observed how these developments need to be situated in a much broader political context. At the local level or in city hall political leaders are, themselves, shaped and frame the choices open to them in particular ways. The leadership cadres within city hall are, also, part of broader decision making elites who subscribe to the notion that alternative

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social and economic policies are not possible. In volume two of this series published last year we looked at the roles and contributions of social movements and street protests to the austerity crisis. We see these two collections as linked and enabling a broader debate to be heard and examined. As part of our commitment to facilitating this debate we will be posting short reflections on our respective web sites. We welcome contributions to them and we actively encourage proposals to for this series. Whilst the crisis goes back to 2007 and there appears to be signs of some economic recovery we need to remind ourselves that the financial and budgetary cuts will still be in place in North America and Europe until 2020. The crisis is still far from over.