Europe in the Global Space Economy (SpringerBriefs in Space Development) 3031366182, 9783031366185

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SpringerBriefs in Space Development Patrizia Caraveo · Clelia Iacomino

Europe in the Global Space Economy

SpringerBriefs in Space Development Series Editor Michael K. Simpson, Institute of Space Commerce, ISU Space Policy and Law, Boulder, CO, USA

The SpringerBriefs in Space Development series unpacks trends in space exploration and its impact on society. Under the auspices of the International Space University, it features interdisciplinary contributions from space experts and rising professionals about this rapidly expanding field. The Briefs are concise and forward-looking, ranging from 50 to 125 pages (25,000-45,000 words). They broach topics such as: • • • • •

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Patrizia Caraveo · Clelia Iacomino

Europe in the Global Space Economy

Patrizia Caraveo INAF Milan, Italy

Clelia Iacomino SEE Lab-SDA Bocconi Milan, Italy

ISSN 2191-8171 ISSN 2191-818X (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Space Development ISBN 978-3-031-36618-5 ISBN 978-3-031-36619-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36619-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Andrea Sommariva, to Nanni Bignami, and to all the People Who Believe that Space is the Future of Humankind

Preface

This book is the brainchild of Prof. Andrea Sommariva, who was an international economist but also a space visionary, with a particular interest on space mining and solar-based power systems. Andrea built his knowledge of space through many interactions with Prof. Giovanni Bignami, “Nanni” to all his friends, who was President of the Italian Space Agency, of the National Institute for Astrophysics, and of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR). Both firmly believed in the power of space to foster growth of humankind from an economic and cultural perspectives. Together they wrote four books where the exploration drive is intertwined with the economical and financial perspectives.1 They were convinced of the need to develop public–private partnerships with Space Agencies leading the way for private investors to make it possible the flourishing of an appealing and diversified space economy. After the sudden death of Prof. Bignami, Andrea Sommariva decided to carry on his legacy and in 2018, within the SDA Bocconi School of Managment, founded the Space Economy Evolution Lab, the first multidisciplinary research centre dedicated to the study of the space economy.2 As Director of the SEE Lab Andrea Sommariva authored several studies, one of the most important considers the use of lunar material as a new frontier of in situ mineral resource supply on the Moon. He always stated that “space resources are a means, not an end”. The development of a vibrant space resource value chain is dependent on constraints on the supply side of resources on Earth and upon the ability to exploit useful resources available in space to tackle problems and limitations of conventional space operations. For instance, using water ice for propellant production was identified as a resource able to substantially reducing the costs of space transportation for which a potential demand already exists. To exploit these 1

Bignami G., Sommariva A. (2013). A Scenario for Interstellar Exploration and its financing. Springer. Bignami G., Sommariva A. (2015). Oro dagli asteroidi e asparagi da Marte. Mondatori. Bignami G., Sommariva A. (2016). The future of human space exploration. Palgrave Macmillan. Bignami G., Sommariva A. (2017). L’economia dello spazio. Le sfide per l’Europa. Castelvecchi. 2 SEE Lab website: https://www.sdabocconi.it/en/faculty-research/research/innovation-and-transi tion-knowledge-platform/see-lab. vii

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resources, one should create space logistics that could pave the way of new and important international projects such as the development of the space solar power systems and orbital propellant depot for the refuelling of the future commercial space stations and other important infrastructures. Confronted with the macroscopic differences in the space economy approaches carried out in the USA and in Europe, Andrea Sommariva came up with the concept of this book with the objective to underline the need to have a European space governance that could overcome the current institutional fragmentation which is impacting heavily on the space market. He thought that, through a common foreign and defence space policy, Europe could better defend its own interests in a world that is increasing dominated by very though international competition. Indeed, considering the overwhelming presence of the new private actors, today, the space sector is becoming even more strategic at international level. Moreover, the economic effects of the various space activities are increasingly relevant, also thanks to the reduction of the launch costs which allows for an easier access to space, and technological innovations (such as satellites constellations) which increase the number of end users of the space services. In the medium term, and going beyond the Earth’s orbit, the identification and “sustainable” exploitation of some natural space resources will possibly contribute to the solution of the problems created by the combination of world population growth and the limited access to the raw materials. In addition, the development of the space economy beyond Earth’s orbit can lead to the improvement of energy production processes both on Earth and on space with important economic and environmental consequences. Currently, only a few countries have developed an industry covering the entire supply chain of the space activities. These countries compete with each other, but they cooperate in the case of important investments that require international collaborations. The major space powers, such as the USA, Russia, Japan, India, and China, have a space government system centralized at Head of State level which guides the action of national space activities for both civil and military uses through a common space vision. For this reason, we need, in Europe, a space governance able to overcome the current institutional fragmentation and to define a common strategic vision with long-term impact, paving the way a more competitive European market. This book began as a joint effort with Andrea, but unfortunately, due to his untimely passing, we could not finish the project. Initially, we contemplated cancelling it altogether, but eventually, we made the decision to persevere and share his message with the public. Although we take full responsibility for the book’s content, we sincerely hope that we have faithfully conveyed his vision as well. To conclude, we thank Andrea and Nanni for having been exceptional mentors able to convey their passion for space to the young generation and to their collaborators. Their contagious enthusiasm convinced their audience that the development of interplanetary outposts together with their economical benefits is not science fiction, but rather the future of our society. Certainly, to build all this, we need to go beyond the national borders and to start talking about global governance and transnational public–private collaborations for long-term investments in the space sector. These mechanisms can facilitate the development of complex space infrastructures in order

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to address the upcoming global challenges, such as the green energy and digital transition, the climate change issues, and the need to have new sources of knowledge and technological innovation. Both Nanni and Andrea had known the Cold War, and they did fully appreciate the need and the power of international collaboration. As former President of COSPAR, Prof. Bignami would have found the current international conundrum very hard to believe and he would have tried his best to foster new possibilities to collaborate since in space there are no borders. We hope that this book will be useful for those looking beyond who are preparing to benefit from the realm of opportunities offered by space. Milan, Italy April 2023

Patrizia Caraveo [email protected] Clelia Iacomino [email protected]

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to express their gratitude to the space researchers for their valuable contributions in the completion of this work. It has been a great pleasure to collaborate with each of them, and we are extremely grateful for their dedication, enthusiasm, and professionalism. Their unwavering support and expertise have helped to make this book a comprehensive contribution for the European Space Governance studies. We appreciate their hard work, commitment, and passion in making this work a worthy accomplishment. Their insights, studies, and dedication have been instrumental in bringing this project to fruition. In particular, we thank the following space researchers: – Marco Borghi: Senior Strategy Consultant for the Space Sector at SpaceTec Partners – Simone Gavioli: Lawyer at Streathers Solicitors – Mihaela Esanu: President of SEDS (Students for the Exploration and Development of Space of Bocconi University) – Stefano Brunelli: Founder’s Associate at Illuminem.

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Introduction

Space has a different meaning depending on people’s interests and vision. For scientists, the vastness of space challenges measure and insight. Understanding of the cosmos and most of what drives it is still a puzzle, yet it contains everything that scientists can ever hope to verify. For political scientists, space is power. Mastering space enables border control and resource monitoring as well as communication and localization, but also intimidation and dominance from afar hardly imaginable few years ago. Indeed, nations that belong to the small but influential space farers club are known as space power. When military talk about space, they refer to the means to deter, defend, destroy, and, if warranted, to deny adversaries access to space for their own military or civilian purposes. For entrepreneurs, on the contrary, space offers possibilities for fruitful business developments. This is the subject of our book that focuses mostly on the economic dimension of space. The space economy definition from OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) refers to “the full range of activities and the use of resources that create and provide value and benefits to human beings in the course of exploring, understanding, managing, and utilizing space”.3 Our analysis starts from two pillars of modern economic science. First, nations get richer—that is attain higher living standards—when they become more productive through an increase in knowledge. Second, technology can advance if it rests on a set of institutions involved in the discovery, definition, and communication of scientific knowledge. However, to appreciate the role of space economy, investigators must first understand the reasons why humans are willing to devote significant resources to going into space. In other words, what do people “demand” that going into space can “supply”? The geopolitical competition between the USA and the Soviet Union during the space race (which we will consider as the first phase of humanity’s conquest of space, lasting from 1950–1969) was based on governmental space programmes, both civilian and military. The second phase (1970–2000), instead, was marked by the gradual entry of private actors who could take advantage of changes in technology and policy strategies that, through deregulation of the space market, opened 3

OECD. (2018). Measuring the economic impact of the space sector. Full report. xiii

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the way to new companies. On a global scale, an increasing number of countries joined the space market. In particular, European countries realized that their national projects would have not been able to compete with the other major superpowers. Hence, in 1975, the European Space Agency (ESA) was established with the aim of promoting—for exclusively peaceful purposes—the cooperation between European States in space research and technology. The third phase (from 2000 to date) saw a growing participation of private companies in all space activities. This was made possible by technical innovations in satellite industry, yielding to smaller and cheaper satellites, and the deregulation of the launcher sector opening the way to more competition which resulted in a reduction of the costs of access to space. Given the limited budgets dedicated to space, NASA benefitted from these policies and was able to focus on what a space agency is better at doing: science, space exploration, and development of space infrastructure. While providing a global picture of the current status of the space economy sector, this book also points to a new economic revolution the world is facing based on the advancement of artificial intelligence, robotics, and in situ space resource utilization. Space is not a magical place where somehow everybody is friendly, but the use of vast space resources may also foster the development of a more peaceful environment on Earth and, maybe, a more responsible approach to the many uses of space. This book analyses the present structure of the European space governance, and the necessary reforms needed to face the challenges posed by the evolution of the space economy, and the way Europe can contribute to the incipient economic revolution. Indeed, our consideration on the role and the future of Europe in space cannot ignore the destructive turmoil due to the invasion of Ukraine which has shaken longstanding international agreements which have been cancelled or, at best, put on hold. The troubles on the geopolitical scene reverberate in space with the interruption of all international programmes involving Russia, but the International Space Station. Considering the long tradition of collaboration in space, the current situation is both sad and deeply concerning since it brings us back by many decades in a Cold War scenario which is certainly providing good business opportunities while hampering scientific investigations.

Contents

1 The Development of the Space Economy (1950–2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Space Race Marks the Beginning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Many Space Agencies Enter the Space Arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The US and Soviet Government Satellites’ Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Dawn of Commercial Satellite Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Open Sky Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Earth Observation Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 The State of the Art at the End of the Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Third Phase of the Evolution of the Space Economy (2000-Today) and Its Foreseeable Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Space Economy as a Rapidly Growing Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Commercial Space Infrastructure and Support Industries . . . . . . 2.3 The Global Satellite-Manufacturing Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The Global Satellite Services Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Space Economy Tomorrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1 Constellations to Offer Planetary Internet Connectivity: Promises and Drawbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2 On Orbit Servicing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.3 Commercial Space Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.4 Moving Beyond Earth Orbit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Space Economy in Today’s Evolving Panorama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 7 8 9 11 12 14 17 19 19 21 24 26 28 29 31 32 33 40 41

3 On the Reasons of European Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.2 Overview of Global Institutional Space Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

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3.3 European Institutional Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 European Space Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Space and Security: Space as Strategic and Reliable Asset . . 3.3.3 The European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4 The European Space Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 National Space Agencies at European Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 French Space Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 German Space Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Italian Space Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.4 Evolution of Public Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45 45 46 50 53 58 59 61 62 64 67

4 On the Consequences of European Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Institutional Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 Coordination of Member State Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 Consequences on the Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3 Earth Observation Lack of an International Regulatory Framework and the European Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.4 Consequences on Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.5 Consequences on Industrial and Programmatic Efficiency . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71 71 71 73

5 Does Europe Need a Space Revolution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 When Numbers Cannot be Ignored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Challenges Facing Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Political Benefits from a Space Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89 90 94 96 96

76 83 84 86

Chapter 1

The Development of the Space Economy (1950–2000)

To follow the space economy evolution over more than a half century, one should consider the different involvement of public and private actors. While the first phase (1950–1969) was characterized by both civilian and military government space programs, culminating with 1969 Moon landing and the development of a satellite telecommunication and navigation systems, the second phase (1970–2000) was marked by the gradual entry of private actors who became predominant in the third phase.

1.1 The Space Race Marks the Beginning The dawn of the space economy can be traced to the beginning of the space race and thus to the Cold War and the geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. After the end of the war in Europe, rocket and missile development became a national priority in the Soviet Union. For this purpose, a new institute was created under the military control of Dmitri Ustinov, with Korolev serving as a chief designer.1 In 1947, Korolev’s group began working on more advanced designs, the R-2 rocket that was able to double the range of the V-2, carrying a separate warhead. This was followed by the R-3, which had a range of 3000 km, and thus could reach England. Under Korolev leadership, the Soviet Union produced the R-7 Semyorka, the world’s first true intercontinental ballistic missile. It was a two-stage rocket with 1

Initially, Korolev’s team oversaw German specialists—including Helmut Gröttrup and Fritz Karl Preikschat—captured in Peenemunde and Mittelwerk. With blueprints produced from disassembled V-2 rockets, the team began producing a working replica of the rocket. Eleven rockets were launched with five hitting the target. This was similar to the German hit ratio, and demonstrated the unreliability of the V-2. The Soviets continued to utilize the Germans’ expertise on V-2 technology for some time. However, in 1950 the Ministry of Defense decided to dissolve the German team and repatriated the German engineers and their families.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Caraveo and C. Iacomino, Europe in the Global Space Economy, SpringerBriefs in Space Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36619-2_1

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a maximum payload of 5.4 tons, sufficient to carry the Soviets’ bulky nuclear bomb to an impressive distance of 7000 km. The United States could exploit the expertise of a large number of captured German rocket scientists, including von Braun. They were transferred (together with their blue prints and hardware) to the United States as part of Operation Paperclip. Under von Braun leadership, the V-2 evolved into the American Redstone rocket, designed as a surface-to-surface missile for the US Army.2 The Redstone program proved to be a cause of disagreement between the Army and Air Force due to their different ideas of nuclear warfare. The Army favored using small warheads on missiles launched from mobile platforms as tactical battlefield weapons, while the Air Force, responsible for the ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) program, wanted large cross-continental missiles that could strike Soviet targets and rapidly cripple the USSR’s infrastructure and ability to wage war. The early fifties were particularly frustrating for Von Braun because of the lack of interest of the United States government in space exploration.3 As early as 1953, Korolev envisioned using the R-7 to launch a satellite, and suggested to the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union the idea of sending a dog into space, but the Communist Party was uninterested at that time. After Stalin death in March 1953, Nikita Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1957, Korolev asked Khrushchev permission to use a modified R-7 rocket to launch a satellite (Sputnik 1) into orbit. He argued that the international prestige of the Soviet Union would rise by launching a satellite before the United States. In fact, the United States had announced a satellite launch for the International Geophysical Year. Although Khrushchev was not initially supportive, the spirit of Cold War competition secured approval for the project. In less than a month, the Russians designed and built the satellite. Korolev personally managed the assembly at a hectic pace; and the satellite was placed in orbit on Oct 4th 19574 using a rocket that had been successfully launched only once before. 2

It was the first large American ballistic missile and a direct descendant of the German V-2 rocket. Redstone was capable of flights from 93 to 323 km. It consisted of a thrust unit for powered flight and a missile body for overall missile control and payload delivery on target. The missile body separated from the thrust unit 20–30 s after the termination of powered flight, as determined by the preset range to target. The body continued on a controlled ballistic trajectory to the target impact point. The thrust unit continued on its own uncontrolled ballistic trajectory, affecting short of the designated target. 3 Von Braun developed a fascination for interplanetary flight since he was at school in Germany. During the war and in the late 1940s, he used his spare time to write a book on a manned mission to Mars. He based his story on comprehensive engineering diagrams and calculations, included in the appendix to the manuscript. The German space flight journal Weltraumfahrt published the appendix in a special edition in 1952. Later that year, Umschau Verlag in West Germany published the book as Das Marsprojekt. Henry J. White translated it into English. The University of Illinois Press published it under the title The Mars Project in 1953. This book and a series of articles on Colliers Weekly were his contribution to space exploration during this period. 4 Sputnik 1 was a simple polished metal sphere with 80 cm diameter, containing batteries powering a transmitter using four external communication antennae. Nikita Khrushchev was pleased with this success, and encouraged the launch of a more sophisticated satellite in time for the 40th anniversary

1.1 The Space Race Marks the Beginning

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After gaining approval from the government, a modified version of the R-7 was used to launch into orbit Yuri Alexeevich Gagarin on 12 April 1961. The first human in space described one orbit and returned to Earth via a parachute after ejecting at an altitude of 7 km. More Vostok flights followed the Gagarin one, culminating with 81 orbits completed by Vostok 5 and the launch of Valentina Tereshkova as the first woman cosmonaut in space aboard Vostok 6. International response to these accomplishments was electrifying, and political echoes continued for decades. The successful launch of the Sputnik satellite and of an orbiting capsule with a cosmonaut (Gagarin) created serious concerns in the United States. Although Sputnik did not represent an immediate threat to the security of the United States, it witnessed the advanced technological capabilities of the Soviet Union. In response to such challenges, the American military establishment proposed to take the lead, but President Eisenhower, fearing a military escalation, decided instead, “space was to be used only for peaceful purposes.“ He proposed the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to the Congress that promptly approved it. NASA mission was to foster research into the problems of flight within and outside the Earth’s atmosphere and to develop space science. All existing space programs, including the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, joined NASA, which, thus, became the symbol of the United States space programs. In May 1961, few weeks after Gagarin accomplishment, President Kennedy made one of the most inspired and visionary speeches5 in the history of space exploration. In that speech, President Kennedy outlined a very ambitious 10-year program. The main targets were landing men on the Moon (in the ticket there was also a return trip to Earth), the deployment of telecommunication and earth observation satellites and the exploration of the solar system. For sure, the Moon project captured the imagination of the public and the interest of the lawmakers. The Moon project raised America’s spirits in the face of the perceived Soviet space competition. However, neither the President Kennedy nor NASA knew how to achieve that goal. The staff at NASA was in a complete panic, but the pride inherent in fulfilling their president’s commitment was a potent stimulus. Although at first President Eisenhower was critical of von Braun because of his Nazi party’s membership, his undeniable leadership made him the central figure of the Apollo program. Under his guidance, assisted by engineer Rocco Petrone, NASA developed the Saturn V rocket,6 a modified version of the Jupiter rocket. Von Braun later called it "an infant Saturn". of the October Revolution on November 3, 1957. This new Sputnik 2 had six times the mass of the Sputnik 1, and carried the dog Laika as a payload. There was no plan to bring the dog back to Earth. Indeed, Laika died from heat exhaustion after 5 h in space. 5 See www.archive.org/details/jfks19610525. 6 Saturn V became the cornerstone of the Apollo program, and, up to the recent launch of NASA’s SLS (and the future SpaceX Starship) has been the most powerful rocket ever built, and the only one to have carried humans beyond Earth orbit. At first, von Braun thought to assemble the Command/ Service Module (CSM) and the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM), each launched with its own rocket, in Earth orbit. However, using two Saturn V rockets for each mission increased the overall costs possibly causing delays in the program. NASA engineer John Houbolt suggested the lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) mission mode. With LOR, one Saturn V rocket would first insert the modules into low Earth orbit and then propels them into lunar orbit using the last stage of the rocket. In this

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To meet the schedule imposed by Kennedy, NASA lowered the safety standards of the missions. This eventually caused headaches. During the first lunar landing mission, the on-board computer failed. With Armstrong manually piloting the landing module, he set it down on the Moon with only a few seconds of fuel to spare. Even more serious was the case of the Apollo 13 mission, which took place a year later: an oxygen-tank explosion made the service module unusable during the cruise phase to the Moon. The astronauts instead occupied the lunar landing vehicle, uncomfortable but serviceable, and so returned safely to Earth. In retrospect, it was only thanks to a considerable good luck that, between July 1969 and December 1972, twelve American astronauts set foot on the Moon. In the wake of the Kennedy Challenge, the Soviet Union created its own program for landing cosmonauts on the Moon. However, the Soviet program suffered from three disadvantages. The first one was that all space programs were under the classified umbrella of the military, isolating the Soviet technological culture internationally. The second one was the slow development of the computer industry in the Soviet Union. A third disadvantage resulted from the division of work among several institutions (design bureaus) which competed with each other, unlike the Apollo program, which had one coordination center, NASA. However, Korolev’s design bureau enjoyed a privileged position due to its successes with both Sputnik and the first manned space capsule. Korolev’s Moon plans envisioned two missions: a cislunar one and a manned lander.7 However, the premature death of Korolev led to internal fighting among the design bureaus, which resulted in a series of catastrophic launch failure of the N-1 rocket. Thus, the Soviet Union canceled the first program in 1970 and the second one in 1974. Space programs were popular both in the US and in the Soviet Union enjoying a high level of support among their respective populations and receiving large funding. Opinion polls conducted in the United States showed a consensus of over 60% of the population. Because of the closed nature of Soviet society, we have only anecdotal evidence on consensus among the Soviet population. However, this evidence revealed deep and genuine support. The United States spent $25.8 billion on Project Apollo between 1960 and 1973, or approximately $257 billion when adjusted for inflation to 2020 dollars. Adding Project Gemini and the robotic lunar program, both of which enabled Apollo, the U.S. spent a total of $28 billion ($280 billion adjusted). Spending peaked in 1966, 3 years before the first Moon landing (see Fig. 1.1) and the total amount spent on NASA during this period was $49.4 billion ($482 billion adjusted).8 It accounted for around 4.5% of the total expenditures of the federal government. While there are way, each lunar mission would use one rocket instead of two. It was a more risky, but definitely cheaper, approach and was the one used for the Apollo program. 7 The first program foresaw space capsule Soyuz 7 K-L1 launched by the UR-500 K rocket (Proton). The second one was based on the same space capsule launched by N-1 rocket. 8 The planetary society. Retrieved from: https://www.planetary.org/space-policy/cost-of-apollo#: ~:text=The%20United%20States%20spent%20%2425.8,for%20inflation%20to%202020%20doll ars.i.

1.1 The Space Race Marks the Beginning

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NASA expenditure as % of federal Expenditures 5.00% 4.50% 4.00% 3.50% 3.00% 2.50% 2.00% 1.50% 1.00% 0.50% 1980

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0.00%

Fig. 1.1 Source: US Office of Management and Budget

no official statistics of costs incurred by the Soviet program, American and British intelligence services suggested figures close to those of the Apollo program. However, the economic benefits of these costly endeavors were large and long lasting. In the short term, the multiplier effect stimulated the United States economy: for every dollar spent in the Apollo program, at least three dollars were fed into the economy. Many inventions emerged as mere by-products of the Apollo missions, and the economic impacts of technological innovation was overwhelming over the medium-long term. The Apollo spacecraft required light, compact and powerful computers. Therefore, NASA and MIT Instrumentation Lab made a bold decision. They built the Apollo Guidance Computer with a promising although still not tested technology, namely the integrated circuit, which used multiple transistors on a single silicon “chip.” The Apollo programme did not invent the microchip, rather secured a huge initial market: in 1963, the Apollo project used up to 60% of the US chip supply. The Apollo programme played a role in accelerating the silicon chip revolution, at the pace predicted by Gordon Moore’s famous law of accelerating computing power (Fig. 1.2). “You probably still would have had integrated circuits,” said John Tylko, a scholar who thought at the MIT course called Engineering Apollo. “ You probably still would have had Moore’s law. However, you might not have had Moore’s Law in 1965. You might have it a decade later.”9 Another technical innovation introduced by the Apollo program was the digital fly-by-wire. Neil Armstrong was an exceptional pilot who had “the right stuff” to get NASA to the Moon. However, even a pilot of his caliber could not control the lunar module’s 16 thrusters and 2 rocket engines alone. Instead of a manual system 9

Moore [1].

6

1 The Development of the Space Economy (1950–2000)

Fig. 1.2 Moore’s Law. The number of transistors on microchips. Source: Ritchie and Roser (Moore’s Law. Retrieved from: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/00/Moore% 27s_Law_Transistor_Count_1970-2020.png) through Wikipedia

of pulleys, cables and hydraulics connected to the pilot’s control stick and pedals, the Lunar Module had a digital fly-by-wire system. The pilot’s controls fed into a computer. This computer used software to translate those commands into electrical signals sent to the components that control the spacecraft’s movement. Since then, digital fly-by-wire technology has helped drive the space shuttle, commercial jets like the Boeing 777 and Airbus 320, and a fleet of fighters and bombers. Despite the obvious technological and economic benefits, human space exploration came to a halt after the American astronauts’ landings on the Moon. There are several reasons behind the lack of support in Congress and the vanishing interest of the public in large space programs. First, winning the technological competition with the Soviet Union was the main goal of the Apollo program. Once achieved, policy makers and opinion leaders raised tough questions: what were the long-term goals of human space exploration and the benefits resulting from these missions? Since there were no compelling comprehensive answers, political support vanished. Second, the Vietnam War and the following civil unrest caused the vanishing interest in large space programs among the public, particularly among the young population. They viewed large federal programs with distrust. These groups protested against the space program. Although they were a minority, they were very vocal and made an impact on later decisions to cut back funding to the space programs.

1.2 Many Space Agencies Enter the Space Arena

7

1.2 Many Space Agencies Enter the Space Arena During the 1950s and early 1960s, Europe and Japan were rebuilding their economies after the catastrophes caused by Second World War. Consequently, they were absent from the space exploration activities. However, European countries looked enviously at the American space exploration program and its effects on technological innovation. In 1961, France establishes the National Centre for Space Studies (CNES). France was the third space power to achieve access to space after the USSR and US, sharing technologies with Europe to develop the Ariane launcher family. Early Italian space efforts during the Space Race era were built around cooperation between the Italian Space Commission (a branch of the National Research Council) and NASA supported primarily by the Centro Ricerche Aerospaziali, the aerospace research group of the University of Rome La Sapienza. This plan, conceived by Luigi Broglio, led to the San Marco program of Italian-built satellites beginning with the launch of Italy’s first satellite, San Marco 1, from Wallops Island. With this launch Italy became the third country in the world to operate its own satellite. Since 1967, the San Marco project focused on the launching of scientific satellites by Scout rockets from a platform located close to the equator. This station, composed of three oil platforms and two logistical support boats, was installed off the Kenya coast, close to the town of Malindi. Finally, in 1988, the Italian government established the Italian Space Agency to coordinate space exploration activities in Italy. The agency cooperates with numerous national and international entities active in aerospace research and technology. In 1975, a group of European countries created the European Space Agency (ESA) as an intergovernamental organization.10 The main goal of the ESA is to enable Europe to become and stay competitive in space technology, and to carry out scientific research. ESA coordinates space programs of the participating European countries. Arianespace operates the main European spaceport managing the launches of the Ariane family rockets together with the smaller Vega ones, with ESA sharing in the costs of launching and of developing launch vehicles. The European spaceport is located in the Guiana Space Centre at Kourou, French Guiana where, thanks to an agreement with the Russian space agency ROSCOSMOS, a total of 23 Soyuz rocket were also launched. This successful collaboration came to a halt in February 2022, owing to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the late 1962, Japan also entered in realm of space exploration. The Japanese government created three agencies: The National Space Development Agency (NASDA); the Japanese Aerospace Laboratory (NAL); and the Institute of Science Astronautics (ISAS). Promoting space research and technological innovation in 10

ESA is the first example of international cooperation on a regional level. Its activities are grouped into two categories: mandatory and optional programs. The programs carried out under the general budget and scientific programs are mandatory. These programs are funded by member states in proportion to the size of their gross domestic products. Member countries are free to decide on their participation in optional programs. Optional programs include projects such as Earth observation, telecommunications, space transportation, and manned space flight. For example, the International Space Station and research in micro gravity are funded under optional programs.

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1 The Development of the Space Economy (1950–2000)

Japan was the main goals of these institutions. The government of India founded ISRO in 1969 within the Department of Atomic Energy. Promoting space technologies and their applications was the goal of this organization which developed two rockets: the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle for launching satellites into polar orbits; and Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle for placing satellites into geostationary orbits. These rockets have already launched several communications and earth-observation satellites. China’s space program began in 1956 as part of the Sino-Soviet cooperation when China began a rudimentary ballistic missile program in response to perceived American threats. After the 1960 Sino-Soviet crisis, China continued its space program independently from the Soviet Union. The Central Military Commission controlled this program to meet national defense needs. Over the years, other nations-initiated space activities, although with smaller programs.

1.3 The US and Soviet Government Satellites’ Programs The Defense Department was interested in satellites for securing communications between their various units stationed around the world. They gave contracts to AT&T, Space Technology Laboratories, and Hughes Aircraft to do the job. Courier 1B was the world’s first active repeater satellite. A division of Loral Space & Communications built it. Courier 1B was launched on 4 October 1960. Proposed by the U.S. Army Signal Corps, Courier used approximately 19,000 solar cells and was the first satellite to use nickel–cadmium storage batteries. It had an effective message transmission rate of 55,000 bits per second. In October 1957, two physicists at Johns Hopkins University decided to intercept microwaves coming from the Sputnik. They used a twenty MHz receiver to capture microwaves. They transformed them into sound through an amplifier and calculated the satellite’s speed by using the Doppler Effect. This is possible due to the satellite first approaching the stationary receiver and then receding while emitting at a fixed frequency. By analyzing the Doppler shift slope, they calculated the satellite’s position. As in any university network, the news spread. The laboratory’s deputy director asked if, knowing the satellite orbit and speed, an object’s position on the ground could be determined. The following week, they delivered theoretical calculations on this problem. However, they did not know that the United States Navy was already interested in how to position its submarines for continuous navigation and had asked the deputy director to inquire about the problem. Five years later, the United States Navy had five satellites in orbit performing the job. Their research was the forerunner of the Global Positioning System (GPS). A vast majority of satellites that the Soviet Union launched during the 1960s carried out military missions. It is, however, difficult to disentangle military and civilian satellites in the Soviet Union. Publicly the Soviet Union denied the very existence of the military space program. At the beginning of the 1960s, in order to provide a public “camouflage” for its expanding military space program, the Soviet government adopted a policy of assigning Kosmos names to all military satellites

1.4 The Dawn of Commercial Satellite Activities

9

reaching orbit. In addition, all non-military payloads, whose mission was supposed to remain secret, were also included in the Kosmos series. At first, also failed missions were included since the Kremlin could not publicly admit any failure in the prestigedriven space program. As in the United States, the Soviet Union armed forces used these orbiting satellites to research battlefield information, locate known or missing troops, ensure communication, and take pictures. In addition, they developed the equivalent of the American Defense Support Program11 for detection of ballistic missiles.

1.4 The Dawn of Commercial Satellite Activities The first person to evaluate the various technical options in satellite communications and their financial prospects was John R. Pierce. In a 1954 speech followed by an article in 1955,12 he elaborated on the utility of a communications passive satellite in low earth orbit, a medium-orbit passive satellite, and a 24-h-orbit (geosynchronous) active satellite. He compared the communications capacity of a geosynchronous satellite, which he estimated at 1000 simultaneous telephone calls, with the one of the first transatlantic telephone cable, which, for an investment of 30–50 million dollars, could carry 36 simultaneous telephone calls. Pierce wondered if a satellite would be worth a billion dollars. By the middle of 1961, NASA had awarded a competitive contract to RCA to build a medium-orbit (6437 km high) active communication satellite. NASA also awarded a contract to Hughes Aircraft Company to build a geosynchronous satellite. From that moment on, private companies entered into a potentially profitable market outlined by Pierce and capitalized on the vast research and development programs led by NASA and the military.13 By 1964, four satellites, two by each company, operated successfully in space. In 1964, the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) was formed on the wake of the Communications Satellite Act signed by President Kennedy in august 1962. The primary goal of Comsat was to serve as a public, federally funded, corporation intended to develop a commercial and international satellite communication system. Although the corporation was government 11

The Defense Support Program (DSP) is a program of the U.S. Air Force that operates the reconnaissance satellites. The Defense Support Program replaced the 1960s space-based infrared Missile Defense Alarm System (MiDAS) whose first successful launch took place on 24 May 1960. It was followed by twelve more launches before the DSP program replaced it in 1966. The first launch of a DSP satellite was on 6 November 1970 and since then it has become the mainstay of the United States ballistic missile early warning system. 12 See Pierce (1955). 13 Bell Telephone Laboratories assisted in the NASA Echo 1 project. Knowledge gained working on Echo 1 helped Bell to develop Telestar, an experimental satellite that relayed television signals. AT&T built Telestar that NASA launched in 1962 on a cost-reimbursable basis, providing also some tracking and telemetry support. In the six months following the launch, stations in the United States, Britain and France conducted about 400 transmissions with multi-channel telephone, telegraph, facsimile, and television signals.

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regulated, some major communications corporations and independent investors were shareholders. Comsat’s initial capitalization of 200 million dollars was considered sufficient to build a system of dozens of medium-orbit satellites. In 1965, an international global satellite consortium (Intelsat) was formed. It was an intergovernmental organization,14 which owned and managed a constellation of communications satellites providing international broadcast services. On 6 April 1965, Intelsat’s first satellite, nicknamed Early Bird, was placed in geostationary orbit above the Atlantic Ocean by a Delta D rocket. Hughes Aircraft Company designed and built it. Early Bird was the first operational commercial satellite providing regular telecommunications and broadcasting services between North America and Europe. Near complete Earth coverage (excluding polar areas) was achieved with the launching of satellites into geosynchronous Earth orbit over the Pacific (1967), and Indian oceans (1969). Controlled by more than 130 governments and international organizations, Intelsat, along with Inmarsat used in international shipping, can be used by all nations. The Intelsat consortium owned the satellites, but each nation owned its ground stations. Global satellite commercial services era had begun. In 1964, the European Conference on Satellite Communications (CETS), originally created to coordinate a European position in the INTELSAT negotiations, began to focus attention on a possible European satellite program. The objective of this work was to give Europe, and in particular, its industry, technical capability in this area based on an experimental satellite program. 1966 saw the birth and the first meeting of the European Space Conference (ESC), designed to harmonize the work of the different European bodies dealing with space activities. The European satellite program under study was originally conceived for the provision of Eurovision television programs for the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) as well as some telephony in Europe and the Mediterranean basin. In August 1970, a European telecommunications satellite-working group (SET) was established to collaborate with ESRO/ ELDO (the two organizations later merged in the European Space Agency, ESA) in carrying out studies in this area. At the December 1971 ESRO/ELDO Council meeting, this was approved and work on the experimental satellite, to be known as the Orbital Test Satellite (OTS), started at the end of 1972. Satellite telecommunications were of primary importance also for the Soviet Union. After the successful launch of the Sputnik, the Soviet Union continued to develop satellite technology with the Molniya series of satellites launched in a highly elliptical orbit to enable them to cover the northern regions of the country.15 The primary use of the Molniya’s orbit was for the communications satellite series, primarily for military use. Some Soviet spy satellites, with the apogee point over

14

In 1973, the name was changed into Intelsat, and there were 80 signatories. Intelsat provides service to over 600 ground stations in more than 149 countries, territories and dependencies. By 2001, Intelsat had over 100 members. 15 To broadcast to these latitudes from a geostationary orbit (above the Earth’s equator) would require considerable power due to the low elevation angles. A satellite in a highly elliptical orbit is better suited to communications in these regions because it looks directly down on them.

1.5 Open Sky Policy

11

the continental United States, also used the same orbits, with slight adjustments.16 The first satellite in this series, Molniya 1, was launched on April 23, 1965. By 1967, six Molniya satellites provided coverage throughout the Soviet Union. In 1971, the Intersputnik International Organization of Space Communications was formed by the Soviet Union along with Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Cuba. It was the Eastern Bloc’s response to the Western Intelsat organization and it had the same objectives. Although the United States and the Soviet Union proceeded separately in the development of the space economy due to their political and ideological differences, in 1963 they initiated an international collaboration. Like radio-frequency spectrum, the geostationary orbit around Earth is a limited natural resource and both need to be shared fairly avoiding interferences. In 1963, the International Telecommunication Union17 (ITU) held an Extraordinary Administrative Conference for space communications, which allocated frequencies to the various services.

1.5 Open Sky Policy During the early 1970s, the United States and Soviet Union dominated satellite communications. Until 1970, long-distance communications in the United States were government-protected monopolies—the Bell System for telephones, and the three broadcasting networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) for television and radio. In 1970, radical changes took place in the United States. New technologies were cropping up, such as cable television, mobile cellular telephones, microwave transmission, but were treated as appendages to the old system. Whitehead, a young staffer in the Nixon White House, saw things differently. He realized that the new technologies could supplant rather than supplement the status quo. He proposed an “Open Sky” policy. Whitehead’s simple idea was that any firm with the technical and financial wherewithal should operate and launch its own communications satellite. The proposition foresaw no central planning; no pilot projects; no restrictions, taxes, subsidies, or guarantees; and no requirements that anyone do anything. If a firm mounted a satellite that failed technically or commercially, the financial losses would be all its own. The economies of scale that justified the Bell System monopoly seemed not to apply to satellites, so entry and price controls would be unnecessary. In 1970, The White House established the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP). The OTP worked to unfreeze and deregulate the cable industry and implement the “Open Skies” policy. OTP took a strong interest in supporting cable industry, 16

Although geostationary orbits are useful for observing the continental United States, Soviet sensor technology sometimes required high-contrast observing angles, which could only be achieved from higher latitudes. 17 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) coordinates standards for telecommunications. The standardization efforts of ITU started in 1865 with the formation of the International Telegraph Union (ITU). ITU became a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1947.

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1 The Development of the Space Economy (1950–2000)

because Whitehead saw that cable promises a revolutionary diversity and a fundamentally new system of communication. In summary, OTP deregulated the American market allowing the entry of many companies, and launched a commercial space race. By the early 1980s, several firms, such as RCA and Hughes (as well as Bell), were operating satellites, leasing transmission channels to the broadcast networks and also to cable upstarts such as HBO, Turner, and CNN. Cable TV had sealed its arrival as an independent force by establishing its own public-service station, C-SPAN. AT&T lost its market power even before the 1984 antitrust break-up of its landlinestelecommunications monopoly. Competition and innovation produced lower costs, higher quality, endless variety of services, and a sheer ubiquity that would have been inconceivable before the 1970s. Globally, an increasing number of countries entered the market in the 1970s, helped by the growing number of space agencies who invested in technological innovation. There were six companies providing geosynchronous satellite service to the United States: GE Americom, Alascom, AT&T, COMSAT, GTE, and Hughes Communications. They operated 36 satellites with a net worth of over four billion dollars. The numerous ground stations, which which were needed to communicate with these satellites, may have had a similar net worth. Since Canada began domestic satellite service in 1972, that country has been joined by the Italy (1974), Indonesia (1976), Japan (1978), India (1982), Australia (1985), Brazil (1985), Mexico (1985), and many others. During the period under analysis, satellite communications and broadcasting represented the most important space-related commercial market. In 2000, revenues of satellite communication and broadcasting was 100 billions dollars. Revenues of satellite operators were mainly generated by sales of capacity (i.e. leasing of satellite’s transponders: data links and bandwidth) and benefit from services. The bulk of the satellite communications business came from television. In 2000, the number of households around the world with direct-to-home (DTH) satellite dishes was 82 million. The number of direct broadcast satellite (DBS) subscribers outnumbered the numbers of terrestrial and cable broadcast viewers. Nowdays, DBS has already penetrated the mobile market particularly in Japan and Korea, as users can subscribe to satellite services and watch TV programs using a mobile handset.

1.6 Earth Observation Satellites Earth observation (EO) began shortly after the invention of photography. In 1858, Gaspard Felix Tournachon (known as “Nadar”) captured the first recorded aerial photograph from a balloon. He quickly realized the potential his images could have, offering his services to the French military. Inspired by balloon photography, in the late 1880s, Arthur Batut pioneered the use of kites for the same feat. He managed to produce stunning aerial photographs by attaching timed cameras to kites. People at the time were not accustomed to seeing their towns from above, so his work received

1.6 Earth Observation Satellites

13

considerable media attention. With the invention of the airplane, aerial photography became commonplace. The launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957 changed Earth observation forever. For the first time we had the ability to look back at our planet from orbit. Satellites that followed carried increasingly sophisticated instruments to observe the Earth, not only in visual light as the early photographers had done, but also in other wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum. TIROS (Television Infrared Observation Satellite) was NASA’s first program to test the viability of satellites for Earth observation, to help make decisions on the ground. For example, whether to evacuate an area due to an impending hurricane. The program produced the first accurate weather forecasts based on satellite data, and in 1962, TIROS began providing continuous coverage of Earth’s weather. In the period between the 1960s and the early 1990s, high-resolution space imagery was the exclusive domain of the United States and the Soviet Union. Both used military reconnaissance satellites to gather strategic intelligence with film-based shooting systems and film re-entry capsules. On March 1955, the United States Air Force officially ordered the development of an advanced reconnaissance satellite to provide continuous surveillance of selected areas of the Earth in order to determine the status of a potential enemy’s war-making capability, and to monitor the Earth’s surface using sensors for detection of ballistic missiles. The first-generation reconnaissance satellites, called Corona, started operations in 1960. They took photographs, and then ejected canisters of photographic film that descended to Earth. The film was retrieved in mid-air as they floated down on parachutes. The Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Science & Technology produced and operated the Corona program. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union utilized military reconnaissance satellites (Zenit) similar to the one used by the United States. The basic design of the Zenit satellites was similar to the Vostok manned spacecraft, sharing the return and service modules. It consisted of a spherical re-entry capsule 2.3 m in diameter with a mass of around 2400 kg. This capsule contained the camera system, its film, recovery beacons, parachutes and a destruct charge. In orbit, it was attached to a service module that contained batteries, electronic equipment, an orientation system and a liquidfueled rocket engine that would slow the Zenit for re-entry, before the service module detached. Unlike the American CORONA spacecraft, the return capsule carried both the film and the cameras and kept them in a temperature-controlled pressurized environment. This simplified the design and engineering of the camera system but added considerably to the mass of the satellite. However, in such a way, the cameras could be reused. The introduction of new technologies and the gradual elimination of restrictions on the military use of these technologies in the second half of the 1980s changed the overall situation of the EO market. Historically, optical technologies have been the most widely adopted sensors in the EO industry. Humans can easily interpret the data generated by optical sensors. However, it is dependent on cloud coverage in given areas. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) systems have emerged to complement optical ones, which allows capture of images in all weather conditions and building

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of precise 3D profiles of the earth’s surface called digital elevation models. During the 1990s, the commercialization of EO services begun, but remained a small part of the market. Institutional applications dominated the market as represented 85% of total applications. Government space agencies were the only prominent players providing satellite images from their satellites.

1.7 The State of the Art at the End of the Century The dominance of government activities in space characterized the period from 1970 to 2000, although private commercial activities took off strongly in the satellite telecommunications and, to a smaller degree, in the earth observation market. Public administrations engage in space activities since they believed that fundamental research would produce new knowledge essential to the health, security, and quality of life of their citizens. Since the start of space efforts, national governments in the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe have given high priority to the support of science done in and from space. From modest beginnings, space science has expanded under government support to include multibillion-dollar exploratory missions in the solar system and beyond, and space infrastructure. Space agencies’ main activities have concentrated on robotic solar system exploration, universe exploration through space telescopes, R&D programs, and building of space infrastructure. The main goals were: a better understanding of the solar system, including the search for life forms; understanding the many objects and phenomena in the universe that are better observed from a space perspective; and using for human benefit the resources of the space environment. After the end of the Apollo program, human space exploration has been limited to Earth orbit with shortand-long-term permanence of astronauts and cosmonauts on Skylab and the MIR space station, while the Shuttle was used to build the International Space Station. A SCIENTIFIC ASIDE By the year 2000, space agencies of major spacefaring nations have sent robotic probes to most of the planets and moons of the solar system as well as to comets and asteroids. Mercury remains the least explored of the inner planets. Venus was the first target of interplanetary flyby and lander missions and, despite being one of the most hostile surface environments in the Solar System, has welcomed several landers which, however, survived only for a short period of time sending just few pictures. Its thick atmosphere traps heat in a runaway greenhouse effect. Radar images gathered from NASA Magellan mission showed that Venus has evidence of volcanism, and impact craters, but no plate tectonics, which may contribute to its runaway greenhouse effect.

1.7 The State of the Art at the End of the Century

Mars has been visited several times. Orbiters, landers, rovers and now even a drone have yielded a dramatic increase in knowledge about the Martian environment, focused primarily on understanding its geology, past evolution, and habitability potential. Probes have now visited several asteroids and comets. The asteroid’s missions studied the asteroids’ shape, spin, topography, color, composition, density, and history. Asteroid missions are important for our understanding of how the solar system evolved. However, the analysis of their physical characteristics is important for future human visits to these space rocks to extract water and metals. Probes and fly-by allowed to study the moons and the rings of the outer planets and discovered previously unknown moons orbiting them. In the case of Jupiter, the Galileo orbiter contained a small atmospheric probe, which separated from Galileo and entered the Jovian atmosphere. After using a heat shield to brake, it popped open a parachute and descended through the clouds of Jupiter’s upper atmosphere for 58 min, allowing an analysis of Jupiter atmosphere. The planet is now being imaged by the Juno mission which is sending stunning images of its turbulent atmosphere. Unmanned spacecraft launched by NASA explored Saturn. These missions consist of flybys in 1979 by Pioneer 11, in 1980 by Voyager 1, in 1982 by Voyager 2. After having visited Saturn successfully, NASA decided to continue and fund further explorations by Voyager 2 to Uranus and Neptune. In 1997, NASA sent a probe (Cassini mission) to study the planet Saturn and its system, including its rings and natural satellites. The Cassini spacecraft released the ESA Huygens probe which descended into the atmosphere of the planet biggest moon, Titan, gathering very important data during its journey and finally landing on its surface. Most of the information about the universe comes in the form of electromagnetic radiations. Stars are studied in a relatively narrow band covering the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum to which our atmosphere is transparent. To access the vast stretches of the spectrum which are absorbed by the atmosphere, instruments should operate in space above the opaque curtain. Space telescopes, such as the veteral Hubble Space Telescope (HST), the more recent James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) and the recently luanched Euclid, solve those difficulties. They are in essence large satellites, which allow astronomers to answer many questions. A prime question concerns the composition of the universe, i.e. the relative abundance of different atoms18 but also the stunning contribution from dark matter and dark energy in our current vision of cosmology. Second, a unique window on the Universe, enabled by space telescopes, allows creating images of small patches of sky that are the deepest ever obtained at optical wavelengths. The images reveal galaxies billions of light years away. They have generated a wealth of scientific papers, providing a new window on the early Universe. Space telescopes allow also to measure distances to Cepheid variable stars more accurately than ever before, and thus constrain the value of the Hubble constant, the measure of the rate at which the

15

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1 The Development of the Space Economy (1950–2000)

universe is expanding, which is also related to its age.19 Finally, space telescopes are used in the discovery of extra solar planets in the Milky Way. During the Cold War, major scientific and engineering breakthroughs took place in different parts of the world, often in isolation, as military research and development, and industrial secrecy forced the super powers to preserve their own technological advances. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, there was an increase in collaboration and dissemination of scientific advances, knowledge flows and dual-use technological transfers from OECD countries and the Russian Federation to other parts of the world. Joint institutional space programs provided an excellent way to develop and use national expertise and scientific capabilities, while sharing financial burdens in common large-scale projects that would have been impossible to launch by individual countries. The International Space Station (ISS) is a case in point. ISS is a project jointly owned by NASA (US), ROSCOSMOS (Russia), ESA, JAXA (Japan), and the Canadian space agency. Intergovernmental treaties and agreements establish ownership and use of the space station. After the Soviet Union’s demise, Russia adopted a relatively cooperative foreign policy with the West. Despite economic turmoil, Russia retained advanced technical knowledge of, and capabilities in, space operations. Since NASA was happy to work with Russia’s space agency, politicians on both sides jumped on that wonderful opportunity. In 1993, Al Gore and V. Chernomyrdin signed an agreement to design, develop, and use a permanently inhabited civilian space station for peaceful purposes.20 Since ISS’s overall costs amount to around 150 billion dollars,21 tough questions have been raised about the ISS’s usefulness. On the space exploration side, it is an inefficient base for launching spaceships to explore the solar system because of high 18

The most abundant elements in the universe are thought to be the lighter ones. Unfortunately, their strongest spectral lines are in the far ultra violet region of the radiation spectrum, which can never be observed from the surface of the earth, but they can be observe by space telescopes. 19 While helping to refine estimates of the age of the universe, they also cast doubt on theories about its future. Astronomers from the High-z Supernova Search Team and the Supernova Cosmology Project used ground-based telescopes and HST to observe distant supernovae and uncovered evidence that, far from decelerating under the influence of gravity, the expansion of the universe may in fact be accelerating. 20 The inevitable price for the United States to pay to work with Russia was to build ISS in an orbit inclined 51° on the equator. To transfer from one orbit to another, a spaceship has to spend energy, i.e., had to burn more fuel. Celestial mechanics stipulates that it is easier to transfer from an orbit inclined by 28° to one inclined by 51° than the reverse. A spaceship can move from orbit “Cape Canaveral” to orbit “Baikonur”, but the reverse process is inefficient. This meant that the shuttle would require more energy, but NASA thought they could afford it. 21 This includes NASA’s budget of 58.7 billion dollars; Russia’s 12 billion dollars; Europe’s 5 billion dollars; Japan’s 5 billion dollars; Canada’s 2 billion dollars; and the cost of 36 shuttle flights to build the station, estimated at 1.4 billion dollars each, or 50 billion dollars total. Assuming 20,000 person-days of use from 2000 to 2015 by two to six-person crews, each person-day costs 7.5 million dollars totaling around a half billion dollars.

References

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inclination on the ecliptic plane.22 On the scientific side, its impact is limited and certainly not enough to justify the large investments as politicians tried to make the world believe since the Reagan presidency. This has resulted in the justifiable critical reaction of the global scientific community. In other realms, ISS is a useful laboratory to test 3D printing23 in weightlessness, as printing can be important in future space operations. It is relevant to building in-space infrastructure, plus equipment and other products using raw materials from space. Over the long run, the ability to deliver components on demand without the need of launch vehicles can redefine how space-mission strategies work. ISS has proven useful as a training ground for further human space flight. As of 30 May 2023, 269 people from 21 countries have visited the space station. It enables on-going studies on the effects on the human body of extended periods in space. However, these experiments take place in low Earth orbit, i.e., above the atmosphere but within the Earth’s magnetic field. The magnetic field blocks the cosmic radiation that otherwise would be hitting the vehicles and the astronauts within. The most serious problems for human interplanetary flight are due to exposure to ionizing cosmic radiation. Although its scientific usefulness is open to discussion, the ISS represents a monument to Space Diplomacy. As we already mentioned, alter the invasion of Ukraine, it remains the only examples of a successful international collaboration involving Russia. While everything else has been either cancelled or frozen, the activities on the ISS continue with a business as usual attitude showing that, also in difficult times, when there is a will there is a way.

References Moore, G. E. (1965). Cramming more components onto integrated circuits (PDF). intel.com. Electronics Magazine. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2019-03-27. Retrieved April 1, 2020. Pierce, J. R. (1955). Orbital Radio Relays, Jet Propulsion April 1955

22

If the sun’s path is observed from the Earth’s reference frame, it moves around Earth in a path tilted 23.5°. This path is called the ecliptic. Observations show that other planets, except for Pluto, orbit the sun in the same plane. The ecliptic plane thus comprises most of the objects orbiting the sun. A spaceship leaving ISS for interplanetary missions will have to move from an orbit inclined by 51° to one inclined by 23.5° and so require higher fuel consumption. Hence, it is clear the inefficiency of ISS as a staging point for interplanetary missions. 23 Recently, SpaceX’s CSX-4 vehicle brought to the space station a 3D printer, built by the company Made in Space. It started the first 3D printing in space. It took over an hour to finish the job. More experiments will follow in the following months.

Chapter 2

The Third Phase of the Evolution of the Space Economy (2000-Today) and Its Foreseeable Developments

2.1 The Space Economy as a Rapidly Growing Reality The third phase (from 2000 to date) saw a progressively higher participation of private companies in space activities. It is a mixed economy, comprising the commercial space sector as well as government space activities. The commercial space sector is a high-technology niche with a complex ecosystem. It has distinguishing features such as the use of innovative technologies and longer terms for both projects’ development and return on investments. It encompasses: the commercial space services, including satellite broadcasting, telecommunication, Earth observation, geo-location, global internet coverage, and global navigation equipment and services; and commercial space infrastructure and support industries, including satellite and rocket manufacturing, launch services, ground stations and related equipment. In 2021, the revenue of the space economy reached $470 billion, up 9% from 2020, the highest recorded growth since 2014.1 However, the value of the space economy estimated by different sources, such as Space Foundation and Bryce, does not yet cover all the downstream value. Indeed, the latter is most complex to evaluate as the increasing involvement of non-space players in the value chain, such as companies specialized in information processing, modelling, artificial intelligence, machine learning and big data, is opening up to new commercial markets. For this reason, we can state that the current revenues of the space sector could be worth much more that the current space economy value quoted by Space Foundation or Bryce (Fig. 2.1). Commercial applications hold the highest share of the turnover, although institutional orders still represent a significant share of the total profit (Fig. 2.2). The global commercial space industry has grown steadily since 2006 at an average annual growth rate of ten per cent. In 2019, it reached about 337 billion dollars. According to SIA (Satellites Industry Association), in 2021, the turnover of the 1

The Space Report 2021 (Q2 and Q3), Space Foundation, 2021.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Caraveo and C. Iacomino, Europe in the Global Space Economy, SpringerBriefs in Space Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36619-2_2

19

20

2 The Third Phase of the Evolution of the Space Economy (2000-Today) …

Total turnover of the Space Economy (US$-Billions) 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Fig. 2.1 Source The Space Report 2021 (Q2 and Q3), Space Foundation, 2021

Downstream, Upstream and government shares of the space economy (US$-Billions)

119 219 18.3

90.2 Government Space Budgets

Commercial satellites and launches

Ground stations and equipment

Space products and services

Fig. 2.2 Source The Space Report 2021 (Q2 and Q3), Space Foundation (2021)

commercial space services, that include satellites services revenues (i.e. consumer and enterprise) as well as ground equipment revenues (i.e. consumer equipment, network equipment), represent the largest share of the space economy. The dominant branch of this economic activity is direct-to-home television, which both reports estimate just under $90 billion (Fig. 2.3).2

2

Satellite Industry Association (2022).

2.2 The Commercial Space Infrastructure and Support Industries

21

Turnover of the commercial space sector by segments 2021 (US$-Billions) 13.7

5.7

118

142 Satellite services revenues

Ground Equipment revenues

Satellite manufacturing revenues

Launch Industry revenues

Fig. 2.3 Source Satellite Industry Association (2021)

2.2 The Commercial Space Infrastructure and Support Industries Commercial space infrastructure and support industries include satellite and rocket manufacturing, launch services, ground stations and related equipment. In the early decades of the Space Age, the space agencies of the Soviet Union and United States pioneered launchers’ technology, in collaboration with affiliated design bureaus in the Soviet Union and with commercial companies in the United States. All rockets were designed and built explicitly for government purposes, and the launching industry operated under government procurement contracts. When, in the ’70, more countries entered in the launch business they followed one of two different approaches. The European Space Agency largely replicated the United States model. Other national space agencies, Japan JAXA, China’s CNSA and India’s ISRO, also financed the indigenous launchers’ construction of their own national designs. Launches of non-military commercial satellites began to increase in volume in the 1980s, but launch services were supplied exclusively with launch vehicles originally developed by various national civil and military programs, with higher cost structures. In the following period up to approximately 2010, only nine had the technology and facilities to carry out an orbital space launch, or to maintain a fleet of operational launchers: the United States, the Russian Federation, the European Space Agency, China, Japan, India, Israel, Iran and Korea. There were six companies able to launch satellites to geostationary orbit. They included the European Arianespace company,

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the Russian Federation’s International Launch Services, the United States’ Lockheed Martin and Boeing, China Great Wall, and Sea Launch, an international consortium (Norway, Russian Federation, Ukraine, and United States). Several other companies could launch satellites in lower orbits. One of the main limiting factors to the growth of the space economy was the high cost of accessing space. In the past, NASA tried to reduce the cost of accessing space with the space shuttle. During early shuttle’s R&D program, there was great debate about the optimal shuttle design to best balance capability, and operating costs. Ultimately, a design was chosen, using a reusable winged orbiter and solid rocket boosters, and an expendable external fuel tank. However, early expectations of reducing the costs of accessing space did not materialize. The total cost of the actual 30-year service life of the shuttle program through 2011, adjusted for inflation, was 196 billion dollars (in 2010 dollars). Costs per-launch are measured by dividing the total cost over the life of the program by the number of launches. With 135 missions, this gives approximately 1.5 billion per launch. Such high costs together with several accidents were the main reasons for abandoning the shuttle programs. Without a launch vehicle fit to transport humans, as well as material, into orbit, NASA had to buy Soyuz services to carry American astronauts and supplies to the ISS handling over to the Russian space agency Roscosmos the monopoly for in orbit transportations. Since then, NASA has transitioned from a government owned and operated delivery system to a privately owned and operated one involving several new companies which could compete with, the historical ones such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing. The target was for the United States to become again independent in space flights thereby being able to send both cargo and astronauts into Earth orbit. Meanwhile, NASA has also changed the way of negotiating contracts with companies. Back in the early days of the Space Race, people had no idea how rockets would cost. So NASA used what it called “cost-plus” contracts that paid companies the cost of making a rocket, plus either a fixed fee or a percentage. This was a sweet deal for companies like Lockheed Martin and Boeing, although they did not own the rockets or the technology they use to build them, but NASA did. Nowadays, the agency uses “fixed-price” contracts. The companies quote NASA a price, and the space agency does not have to pay any extra cost if they end up overspending. With the fixed-price contracts, NASA has less ability to dictate the design or the way the companies operate as long as NASA requirements are met. Now, the companies own the design as well as the vehicles and NASA is just one costumer, buying rides to the International Space Station. In addition, since the companies retain their intellectual property, they have the opportunity to commercialize their rockets domestically and internationally and eventually sell tickets to commercial passengers. NASA policies stimulated the entry of new companies in the launch business. These start-ups have made progress in designing and constructing efficient and cheaper launch vehicles. Their cost advantages derive from their system design and vertically integrated production, efficient supply chains, and operations’ efficiency. This is an example of entrepreneurs changing, and even revolutionizing, the pattern

2.2 The Commercial Space Infrastructure and Support Industries

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of production by reorganizing an industry to cope with the problem of high launch costs. The results achieved by SpaceX stands out in the international panorama (as shown in Fig. 2.4). SpaceX is an American aerospace manufacturer and space transport services company. SpaceX started with the smallest useful orbital rocket3 (Falcon series), and later enlarge the rocket design to augment its launch capability. In order to reduce the launch costs, SpaceX developed methods for reusing the primary stage of the rockets. Previously, the primary stage of the rockets, responsible for the initial thrust through Earth’s atmosphere, simply detached after launch and fell into the ocean as waste. On the contrary, SpaceX land and reuse several times the rocket first stage. Moreover, it was the first privately funded company to successfully launch, orbit, and recover a spacecraft (Dragon4 in 2010), to reach the International Space Station with a cargo supply (2012) and to bring two astronauts to the International Space Station (2019). Falcon Heavy is the world’s most powerful commercial rocket in operation. Using a cluster of three Falcon 9 first stage cores, Falcon Heavy is capable of lifting 63,957 kg to LEO (Low Earth Orbit) and 26,700 kg to GEO (Geostationary Orbit). In 2022 NASA successfully launched Artemis I with its powerful Space Launch System (SLS). Although “new” SLS is a classical expandable (and very expensive) rocket which, in the market of the super-heavy launchers, will have to compete with SpaceX Starship, a fully reusable rocket and capsule which promises to lower the launch cost to 200 $ per kg. Competition is producing pressure on other aerospace companies in the United States to review their technologies and reduce costs. Facing direct market competition from SpaceX, which in May 2015 was certified by the United States Air Force to compete to launch many of the satellites considered essential to US national security, the large US launch provider United Launch Alliance (ULA) announced strategic changes to restructure its launch business. Europe, on the contrary, has remained tied to the old model, characterized by government procurement contracts and a monopolistic launching industry. Presently, the only company in Europe producing mediumheavy rockets (Series Ariane) is Arianespace. Moreover, as already mentioned Arianespace, through a joint venture with Roscosmos, managed equatorial launches of the Soyuz rockets, as well as the Vega ones, thus offering small-medium-heavy rockets for the launch of commercial satellites. 3

The Falcon rocket series is a family of multi-use rocket launch vehicles developed and operated by SpaceX. The rockets in this family include the flight-tested Falcon 1 and Falcon 9. The Falcon 1 is a small, partially reusable two-stage rocket capable of placing several 100 kg into low earth orbit. The Falcon 9 v1.2 is an upgraded of Falcon 9 v1.1 with a larger liquid oxygen tank, loaded with subcooled propellants to allow a greater mass of fuel in the same tank volume. The second stage was extended for greater fuel tank capacity. These upgrades brought a 33% increase to the previous rocket performance. 4 Dragon is a reusable spacecraft. It consists of a nose-cone cap that jettisons after launch, a conventional blunt-cone ballistic capsule, and an unpressurised cargo-carrier trunk equipped with two solar arrays. The Dragon capsule is equipped with 18 Draco thrusters. It can transport about 3 tons of cargo.

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Fig. 2.4 Cost of space launchers. Sources Visual capitalist (Venditti, 2022)

Unfortunately, this successful joint venture was terminated in February 2022 at the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. This has been one of the reasons of the 2022 plummeting in the number of successful European launches which went from 15 in 2021 to 5. This sudden decrease is all the more remarkable when one considers the astounding achievements of SpaceX which reached the record number of 61 launches, accounting for more than ¾ of the 78 US launches in 2022. The European position will be somehow eased when Ariane 6 will enter the market. Indeed, several launches have already been bought by Blue Origin, Jeff Bezos Company eager to start its own Kuiper constellation, to offer internet service. However, the lack of a reusable European launcher is a fact and, although the EU commission decided to invest on this strategic sector, it will take time to develop this technology and the delay with reference to the American reusable launchers will be very hard to overcome.

2.3 The Global Satellite-Manufacturing Sector The global satellite’s manufacturing sector is composed of satellite and their subsystems manufacturers. The global satellite manufacturing industry growth shows an increasing trend, with year to year fluctuations. Several factors are contributing to the expansion of the global satellite manufacturing market. The primary driver was the rising demand and application of commercial communications satellites, due to increasing penetration worldwide. The United States has the largest share in the revenues of the satellite manufacturing. It enjoys dominance in the market partly owing to strong US government demand, with many institutional satellites. Europe is coming second. Although the European space industry has seen constant revenue growth, the European manufacturing industry is dependent on exports for almost half of its revenues, as compared to other industries in Asia and North America. Throughout this period, technology innovation and lower costs of manufacturing and deploying satellites continued to increase the value and the importance of the

2.3 The Global Satellite-Manufacturing Sector

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Satellite puposes 2.50% 1.80% 6.60%

20.40% 65.90%

Communications

Earth Observation

Technology

Navigation

Space Science

Fig. 2.5 Satellites purposes as of May 1st 2022. Source Union of Concerned Scientists Database

commercial satellite industry. Digitalization is creating new opportunities, thanks to the introduction of lean manufacturing processes, vertical integration of end-toend products and services (e.g. from satellites all the way to ground terminals), as well as with the first assembly lines for the mass production of small satellites. The development of 3D printed components for satellites and rockets are also becoming the norm for both large and small aerospace manufacturers. Today, satellites cannot only do more than ever before, but space segment deployment’s costs continue to decline. So, as the New Space decade begins, only the satellite industry is in a position to deliver the truly ubiquitous, high quality and reliable communications, broadband, broadcast, radio, next-generation GPS navigation, tracking, weather data, imaging and remote sensing services that consumers everywhere need and demand (Figs. 2.5 and 2.6). The use of space data affects almost every aspects of our daily life and represent an essential support to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nation Agenda 2030. Space data are of paramount importance to manage all kinds of emergency situations, such as natural disasters or wars’ distructions. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and considering the last update of their website that dates back to Dec. 31st 2022, there a more than 6718 operational satellites currently in orbit around the Earth. Of these satellites, 4529 belong to the U.S, 590 to China, 174 to Russia and 1425 to others. Many of these satellites are placed in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) which is populated by a total of 5900 satellites, 141 satellites are in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), 580 satellites in Geostationary Orbit (GEO) and 59 satellites in Elliptical.5 In 2021, 2022 and early 2023, numbers regarding the LEO broadband constellations have confirmed the solid upward trend already seen in the previous years, with the main operator companies that continue to be strongly dedicated to their plans: As 5

Union of Concerned Scientists. UCS Satellite Database.

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2 The Third Phase of the Evolution of the Space Economy (2000-Today) …

Satellite Users 1.80%

1.40% 7.80% 9.60% 2.80%

74.10%

Government/Commercial

Military/Commercial

Military

Government

Civil

Commercial

Fig. 2.6 Satellite users as of May 1st 2022. Source Union of Concerned Scientists Database

of May 2023, the Starlink constellation consists of over 4000 mass-produced Starlink satellites in LEO, which communicate with designated ground transceiver.6 In total, nearly 12,000 Starlink satellites are planned to be deployed, with a possible later extension to 42,000. SpaceX announced reaching more than one million subscribers in December 2022. OneWeb is catching up with its objective of a first-generation satellite fleet made up by 648 satellites. As of early March 2023, there are 584 OneWeb satellites in orbit and the recent joiner Amazon Web Services (AWS) with its Project Kuiper7 has definitely entered the game with a $10bn investment8 on its first LEO constellation, which will count over 3000 satellites. In particular, Amazon plans to launch its first internet satellites to space in the first half of 2024 and offer initial commercial tests shortly after.

2.4 The Global Satellite Services Market The satellite services market is segmented into type and end-user industry. Considering type, the market is divided into consumer services, fixed satellite services, mobile satellite services, remote sensing, and space flight management services. The 6

McDowell (2022). Project Kuiper is an Amazon’s initiative to launch a constellation of LEO satellites that will provide low-latency, high-speed broadband connectivity to unserved and underserved communities around the world. 8 Sheet (2020). 7

2.4 The Global Satellite Services Market

27

consumer services type is further bifurcated into satellite TV, satellite radio and satellite broadband. The fixed satellite services are bifurcated into transponder agreements and managed network services. Considering the end-user industry, the market is bifurcated into media and entertainment, government, aviation, defense, aerospace, retail and enterprise, and others. Considering the geographical location, the market is based across North America, Europe, Asia–Pacific, and LAMEA. The global satellite communication market size was valued at USD 71.6 billion in 2021 and is expected to expand at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 9.5% from 2022 to 2030.9 The rapid growth of the satellite services was due to numerous factors. In particular, the increase in demand for earth observation services in numerous sectors drive the market. Efficiency and productivity gains derived from the use of space applications are becoming more visible across very diverse sectors of the economy and society, although experiences in estimating impacts vary across countries. In particular, earth observation services had an impact on different sectors from agriculture to transportation and energy, from routine surveillance to timing of financial transactions. Institutional actors and private companies are increasingly using satellite data and signals making it a potential source of economic growth, social well-being, and sustainable development. Until the early 2000s, government space agencies were the only prominent players providing satellite images from their satellites. However, from the past two decades, the privatization of space applications in countries and regions such as the US, China, and Europe has encouraged the growth of private players in the space industry. Three factors favored these developments. First, NASA and other space agencies policies to transition the domain of earth orbit to commercial space industries have favored these developments. Second, the progress in artificial intelligence has allowed increasingly advanced activities deriving from satellite signals and data, contributing to new economic activities often far from the initial investments in infrastructure. Furthermore, thanks to the introduction of small satellites and the reduction of launch costs, it has been possible to reduce the costs of satellite services, thus expanding their demand. These developments allow access to satellite data for many small and medium-sized companies, as well as government and research institutions. Third, the increase of private investments has favored the development of the commercialization of the space initiatives encouraging the emergence of competitive markets in the in-Earth orbit economy. Recently, a massive influx of private capital has been provided, among others, by two types of investors that are angels and venture capital funds. This can be attributed partly to the increasing number of private competitive small- and medium-sized enterprises whose business model is in contrast to the traditional large space contractors and companies. This trend highlights a departure from the historic approach to space investment and financing driven by government initiatives and signals the search for and utilization of new design and development processes, new technologies and skills, and new business practices. According to Space Capital, Figs. 2.7 and 2.8 show how the private investments are still concentrated in satellites development and application services. 9

Grand View Research (2022).

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2,50,000

4,500 4,000

2,00,000

USD million

3,000 1,50,000

2,500 2,000

1,00,000

1,500

Number of deals

3,500

1,000

50,000

500 0

Satellites

Launch

Stations Logistics

Aggregate deal value

Lunar

Industrials

0

Number of deals

Fig. 2.7 Venture capital investments in the space sector by segment and technology ($US-Millions), 2013–2022 (Q3). Source Space capital

8,616

Fig. 2.8 Equity Investment by Tech Layer (USD millions), 2013–2022 (Q3). Source Space capital

54,778

2,04,530

Applications

Infrastructure

Distribution

2.5 Space Economy Tomorrow In the next 5–15 years, many changes will occur in the space economy both in Earth orbit and beyond. In the short term, connectivity and in orbit services, together with the commercialization of the ISS and possibly the construction of new private space

2.5 Space Economy Tomorrow

29

stations to meet the demand of space tourists eager to spend few days in orbit, will be the main driver of the space economy, while human space exploration to the Moon, the asteroids and Mars will drive the grow of the extraterrestrial space economy in the medium-long term.

2.5.1 Constellations to Offer Planetary Internet Connectivity: Promises and Drawbacks Some companies have proposed very large constellations (sometimes referred to as a mega constellations) operating in low-Earth orbit (LEO) to provide lowlatency, high bandwidth (broadband) internet service. OneWeb (OneWeb constellation), SpaceX (Starlink), Amazon (Project Kuiper), Samsung, Boeing, and China (Hongwan) plan internet satellite constellations, among others. More than 18,000 (and possibly many more) new satellites will be placed in LEO orbits before 2025. This is more than ten times as many satellites as the sum of all active satellites in space as of March 2018. These companies are looking to provide a multitude of potential applications such as: • Better connectivity for the transportation industry (ships, trains, planes); • Communication backbones for IoT devices for processes such as fleet management and remote maintenance; • Infrastructure or mobile backhaul for other communications companies • Services for the direct-to-consumer market, including rural and other areas with poor or no service; • Government services, such as education and emergency response. The potential profit is evident. Connecting those in currently unserved and underserved areas can create millions of new customers and enable new business models. The potential market is vast: the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) says that only about 51% of the world’s population was using the internet as of the end of 2018.10 Even many developed countries do not have universal internet access or at least access at an acceptable speed. A US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) report11 states that 21.3 million Americans lack access to a broadband internet connection that is, one with a download speed of at least 25 Mbps and an upload speed of at least three Mbps. There is a lot of potential revenue for companies that can connect them. Morgan Stanley12 estimates that the satellite broadband market could be worth as much as 400 billion dollars by 2040, a fully 40% of the estimated 1 trillion dollars of the global space industry that year. 10

ITU (2018). Federal Communications Commission (2019). 12 Stanley (2020). 11

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Apart from being a source of revenues, orbital internet connectivity is a powerful political asset. This has been eloquently shown in the course of Ukraine war, when Starlink services provided much needed connectivity when land services were destroyed. While Starlink ground stations have been bought by a number of states and donated to Ukraine, SpaceX (not withstanding complains via Twitter by Elon Musk) is providing the service free of charge. The fact that such an important political asset is in the hand of the owner of a private company is a matter of concern, but this is not the only worry linked to the internet constellations which are literally filling the low Earth orbital space creating a potentially threatening environmental problem. Putting too many satellites in the same orbital shell increases the collision danger resulting in the production of very dangerous space debris clouds. Indeed, the number of avoidance maneuverers is already worrisome and it grows exponentially. Moreover, critics have objected that so many satellites are poised to create a new form of light pollution for astronomy. The true threat these mega-constellations pose to the astronomy community is just beginning to be understood (as described by Caraveo, 2021). A report13 recently released by the American Astronomical Society concluded that they will “fundamentally change astronomical observing” for optical and near-infrared investigations. Astronomers calculate that, at a site like Cerro Tololo, Chile that hosts several major telescopes, six to nine of these satellites would be visible for about an hour after sunset and before dawn each night. Most telescopes can deal with that, says Olivier Hainaut, an astronomer at the European Southern Observatory (ESO) in Garching, Germany. Even if more companies launch mega constellations, many astronomers might still be okay, he says. Hainaut has calculated that if 27,000 new satellites were launched with orbit not higher than 600–800 km, ESO’s telescopes in Chile would lose about 0.8% of their observing time near dusk and dawn. However, there are other impacts beyond losing observing time. Bright satellite streaks can saturate the camera’s sensors, creating false signals. The problem would be worse in summer, when satellites are visible for longer—introducing a seasonal bias that would harm studies that require building up statistical significance over time, including studies of dark matter and dark energy. There are ways to manage these issues, says Paul Dabbar, the undersecretary for science at the US Department of Energy, which funds the Legacy Survey of Space and Time (LSST) camera which will be installed on the Vera Rubin Observatory. Companies operating the satellites could provide astronomers with detailed information on where they are in the sky at any given time so that observers could schedule around the expected satellite trails. For sure, the Earth-facing surfaces of satellites should be as low reflectivity as possible. Unfortunately, there is no international law to regulate this aspect (nor the orbital occupation), but Starlink has shown good will and it is trying to cooperate with the astronomical community. Astronomers fear that mega constellations could disrupt radio frequencies used for astronomical observation. Astronomers observe the Universe at radio wavelengths

13

See https://aas.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/SATCON1-Report.pdf.

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used also for satellite communications. The use of such frequencies is strictly regulated, but the huge number of planned satellites complicates the situation. As satellites communicate with ground stations, their signals could interfere with radio-astronomy observations, rendering the astronomy data useless. Astronomers are talking with SpaceX and OneWeb about the frequencies that those mega constellations will use for their broadcasts. Companies might decide to shift the frequencies at which they broadcast away from those used for radio astronomy. Another idea is for satellites to switch off temporarily their communications as they pass over radio-astronomy facilities. It looks simple, however this solution appears difficult to implement.

2.5.2 On Orbit Servicing In orbit servicing is part of a major shift in the space landscape. In orbit servicing will be offered in three areas: maintenance and inspection services of telecommunication satellites in geostationary orbit; refueling of satellites in GEO and LEO orbits; and active removal of space debris to ensure the sustainability of space around the Earth. Although the technology underlying on orbit servicing has been around for decades as shown by the Space Shuttle program, only now has the market evolved to the point where it is economically viable as a commercial activity. The convergence of lower launch costs and shifting priorities for GEO satellite operators has made the idea of on orbit servicing more attractive. As the industry sees a decline in the price of bandwidth (and therefore in the revenues generated by a satellite), operators are exploring new ways to make the most of their obsolete resources. Refueling is most likely to develop first. Refueling extends the operational life of a satellite. The concept of satellite refueling is defined by different critical phases, starting with launching the servicer spacecraft into an initial quiescent/parking orbit. The next step is to locate the client spacecraft and to insert the servicer spacecraft into the client orbit, which for the majority of client satellites, will be GEO orbits. The following phase, defined rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), is highly critical, assessing the status of the client spacecraft e.g. through visual inspection and verification of client spacecraft identity, resulting finally in the docking of the two spacecraft. After docking, the servicer spacecraft is set-up to provide its services, which in the case of a satellite refueling servicing mission again entails a high level of complexity. First, the microgravity environment of space asks for specialized technologies to ensure a correct transfer of the fuel. Second, not all satellites were designed to be modified retroactively and, therefore, fuel valves typically are not easily accessible after launch thus requiring robotic autonomous systems. Of these critical phases, national space agencies have already acquired a lot of experience in the past decades with respect to maneuvering and mating in space using (optical) sensors and docking systems.14 14

An early example for this is e.g. the Japanese ETS-VII mission from 1997, carrying out several docking missions with a chaser and target system. Missions displaying robotic satellite refuelling on

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There were a few studies focused on potential servicing missions involving satellite refueling and its feasibility. A major demonstration was NASAs Robotic Refueling Module (RRM) installed on the ISS in 2011, focusing on a number of experiments but most significantly demonstrating how 1.7 L of ethanol could be transferred to a hypothetical spacecraft in orbit without the liquid escaping into space.15 While the importance of research and initiatives conducted by national space programs cannot be overstated, commercially backed research and initiatives are equally important for the development of a commercially viable OOS market. One of these recent success stories is Northrop Grumman’s Mission Extension Vehicle-1 (MEV-1) launched in 2019. MEV-1’s goal was to extend the servicing life of communication satellite Intelsat-901 for 5 years by using MEV-1’s propulsion system for altitude control before boosting Intelsat IS-901 back into a graveyard orbit for retirement. Due to safety reasons, IS-901 was transferred to a graveyard orbit before MEV-1 started RPO. After successful docking and relocation into a geostationary orbit in April 2020, MEV-1 became the first Commercial Servicing Vehicle that has successfully started its service to another commercial spacecraft, displaying the commercial viability of OOS. In order to determine appropriate strategies in areas such as market opportunity, market penetration and market development for both OOS providers as suppliers and satellite operators as customers, it is important to understand the environment of a potential OOS market. One important characteristic of the “New Space Economy” is the large-scale usage of terrestrial technologies and mass production of components with the so-called “Commercial-of-the-Shelf” (COTS) approach, away from a low volume high specialization development and production in the past. The COTS approach leverage standard commercial terrestrial hardware lowering the costs and increasing the production of space objects. In combination with the ongoing miniaturization of electronics, it provides the basis for the large-scale usage of so-called “cube-satellites”. These developments can explain the unprecedented surge in CubeSat demand in the last years, especially from emerging markets.

2.5.3 Commercial Space Stations NASA plans to de-orbit the ISS sometime in January 2031. It will not be the first time a space habitat has decommissioned. The Russian Mir space station was deorbited in March 2001, and most of the structure’s surviving fragments fell over the southern Pacific Ocean. More recently, space-faring nations are engaging in the other hand have only been carried out in the near past, especially with respect to commercially backed initiatives. 15 The mission highlighted the usage of the DEXTRE robotic system to cut securing wires for “tertiary caps” protecting the main fuel valve, removing the safety cap and connecting a nozzle tool to transfer the fluid from RRM to the hypothetical spacecraft. Upon disconnection leaves behind a so called “quick disconnect” fitting that provides a secondary seal to the fuel valve and allows for a simpler connection in the future.

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independent efforts to assert their dominance in Earth-LEO endeavors: the US has granted multiple firms the opportunity to create designs for private space stations, Russia has unveiled the Russian Orbital Service Station (ROSS), and China is making strides with its Tiangong infrastructure. Therefore, while governments are investing in private space stations to obtain strategic infrastructure to serve for civil and scientific purposes, private companies are required to commercialize services and technologies to make the space infrastructure economically sustainable. It implies that private companies receiving public funding must convert the strategic value of space infrastructure into economic value appraised by the market. At U.S. level, NASA awarded three companies with contracts to develop private space stations. In particular, Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman, and Nanoracks were awarded a total of nearly $416 million under NASA’s Commercial LEO Destinations (CLD) project. Nanoracks won the largest individual award with an $160 million, while Blue Origin and Northrop Grumman received $130 million and $125.6 million, respectively. The fourth company, Axiom, received a $140 million awards from NASA in 2000 with the objective to develop a module to dock at the ISS in 2024 to serve as a precursor for a stand-alone station.16 However, from the NASA point of view, the CLD program represents an effort to turn to private companies for new space stations. Rather than build and own hardware, NASA has increasingly turned to public–private partnerships as a way to achieve its goals in space trying to keep costs at bay while supporting the development of space companies. In order to achieve ambition goals, space agencies are applying this modern procurement contracts in order to support innovation, demonstration and validation of technology, but with the intention of incentivising private counterparts to evaluate and acquire potential commercial opportunities deriving from space infrastructures. Despite the underlying benefits of public–private collaboration, the construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure is subject to multiple risks, responsible for unforeseen changes in the ability to repay potential creditors and claims. To conclude, commercialization of LEO remains a prerogative of NASA. After the launchers, the transport of goods and people (i.e. SpaceX), the private space stations represent the next node to complete the chain.

2.5.4 Moving Beyond Earth Orbit The return to the Moon is nowdays on the agendas of the major space agencies. If the long-term goal is the construction of a permanent human base on the Moon, building the infrastructures necessary are the medium-term goals. Such infrastructures are linked to the orbital station around the Moon (Gateway project), the development of critical technologies (telecommunication and Earth-Moon navigation), and the exploration of lunar resources such as ice at the lunar south pole.

16

Foust (2022).

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The Lunar Gateway is a planned space station in cislunar orbit intended to serve as a solar-powered communication hub, science laboratory, short-term habitation module, and holding area for rovers and other robots. NASA engineers and their colleagues from other space agencies have been working on the design of the new station since few years. For supporting the first crewed mission to the station initially planned for 2024, the Gateway will be a minimalistic mini-space station composed of only two modules: the Power and Propulsion Element (PPE) and the Habitation and Logistics Outpost (HALO). The Canadian Space Agency, the European Space Agency and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency plan to participate in the Gateway project, contributing a robotic arm, refueling and communications hardware, as well as living quarter and research capacity. All modules will be connected using the International Docking System Standard. The Gateway will play a major role in NASA’s Artemis program. The Artemis program is a United States government-funded program that has the goal of landing “the first woman and the next man” on the Moon, specifically at the lunar South Pole region, and to explore the south pole of the Moon for space resources, particularly ice. While NASA is leading the Artemis program, international partnerships will play a key role in achieving a sustainable and robust presence on the Moon while preparing to conduct a historic human mission to Mars. The Artemis Accords are based on several principles including peace, transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, and minimizing resource conflict. As of June 2023, the Artemis Accords have 27 party nations and the international cooperation on Artemis is intended not only to bolster space exploration but to enhance peaceful relationships between nations. Therefore, at the core of the Artemis Accords is the requirement that all activities will be conducted for peaceful purposes, per the tenets of the Outer Space Treaty (Fig. 2.9). The principles of the Artemis Accords are: • Peaceful Exploration: All activities conducted under the Artemis program must be for peaceful purposes. • Transparency: Artemis Accords signatories will conduct their activities in a transparent fashion to avoid confusion and conflicts. • Interoperability: Nations participating in the Artemis program will strive to support interoperable systems to enhance safety and sustainability. • Emergency Assistance: Artemis Accords signatories commit to rendering assistance to personnel in distress. • Registration of Space Objects: Any nation participating in Artemis must be a signatory to the Registration Convention or become a signatory with alacrity. • Release of Scientific Data: Artemis Accords signatories commit to the public release of scientific information, allowing the whole world to join us on the Artemis journey. • Preserving Heritage: Artemis Accords signatories commit to preserving outer space heritage.

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Fig. 2.9 Countries that participate in Artemis Accords. Source NASA (as of June 2023) (Artemis Accords)

• Space Resources: Extracting and utilizing space resources is key to safe and sustainable exploration and the Artemis Accords signatories affirm that such activities should be conducted in compliance with the Outer Space Treaty. • Deconfliction of Activities: The Artemis Accords nations commit to preventing harmful interference and supporting the principle of due regard, as required by the Outer Space Treaty. • Orbital Debris: Artemis Accords countries commit to planning for the safe disposal of debris.

Close-up on the ARTEMIS ACCORDS17 On 13 October 2020, eight States signed the Artemis Accords (‘AA’), which are a deed with thirteen provisions aiming to “establish a common vision via a practical set of principles, guidelines, and best practices to enhance the governance of the civil exploration and use of outer space.” The Artemis Accords stems from the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer space, including the Moon and Celestial Bodies (1967) (the ‘Outer Space Treaty’ or ‘OST’), and commit to comply with its provisions. Nevertheless, the AA take some significant distance from the OST, as it will be hereinafter analysed.

17

Deplano (2021) and Tronchetti (2008). See Stern (1996), Jenks (1965), Pop (2000), Danilenko (2016) and Freeland and Jakhu (2009).

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First and foremost, the AA represent an atypical legal instrument; first, they are legally not binding; secondly, unlike Treaties, they are not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Recent scholarly opinions, which seems appropriate to take into consideration, believe that not only the AA would transpose provisions from OST, but also, they would implement certain provisions from the OST adding details and clarity by mean of interpretation, and that they would even introduce new legal concepts. Although the AA are committed to respect the OST boundaries and general principles, some of their provisions offer such an extensive interpretation of the OST, that they can be considered on the edge of bending international law and principles. Taking into consideration the unavoidable vagueness of the provisions of the OST, due to the historical time the treaty was drafted, and the several interpretation stemming therefrom, even at this early stage of our analysis it can be observed how a deviation from the Treaty could cause subsequent fragmentation in domestic and European law. Taking into consideration the AA provisions differing from the OST principles, it can be noted that Sect. 10 of the AA take some distance from Article II of the OST, which can be generally considered a cornerstone in international space law. Article II OST: “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” By stating that the space is not subject to national appropriation, the OST settles an old dispute within the International legal community as to whether the Outer space were to be considered res nullius or res communis omnium. However, due to the scientific development which see private actors investing and progressing space activities, the OST is of no help in assessing whether ‘national’ is referred just to States or if it can be applied also to non-governmental actors. Although this still seems to be a grounded interpretation of the OST, it can be also observed how outdated it appears. To this extent, scholars are currently developing interpretations as to the legal nature of space activities which aim to still be consistent with the OST provisions as to non appropriation, yet allow scientific exploration and activities, encouraging investments from the private sector. It is therefore apparent the need for more specific and detailed rules, but the introduction of the AA seems to cause even more questions amongst the legal community (hence fragmentations in applicable policies as to space activities). Particularly, Sect. 10 of the AA is controversial, since at paragraph 2 it provides that:

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“[…] The Signatories affirm that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, and that contracts and other legal instruments relating to space resources should be consistent with that Treaty.” Deplano affirms that the wording “extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty” (emphasis added) represent just one of the possible interpretations of the OST provision, which might even be acceptable, although lacking specificity as well as precedents. In fact, Sect. 10, paragraph 2 AA would impliedly state that the specific arrangements for extraction of natural resources will be the determining factor for the lawfulness of the activity as per the OST. Furthermore, since the AA does not provide with any provision as to how conduct such extractions, it appears wiser to adopt a conservative interpretation of the AA, seeking compliance with the OST. Hence, such extractions would be lawful just in case they are carried out to sustain in situ to support scientific operations whose findings will be shared with the public and the scientific community. Then, one could wonder whether in the light of the AA, the non-appropriation principle would apply to the land only, or also to stones, minerals and other objects actually extracted from the soil, on the base that they would constitute Common Heritage of Mankind (‘CHM’). However, once again this answer is to be reached through rules of interpretation, as the AA nothing add to the OST. It seems hence possible to agree with those sustaining that the AA, although being a significant attempt to update the OST, little they do to remedy to the international law’s gaps and uncertainties. Such a failure could provoke even more fragmentation in domestic policies, especially considering the low numbers of signing States and that the AA are not a treaty, but a multilateral political commitment. Even disregarding the AA as a legal instrument, thus continuing to consider the OST as the only main applicable source of law, the Treaty alone does not provide with enough specificity or clarity of provisions to face the current legal fragmentation. The Artemis project is an immense effort to return U.S. astronauts—including the first woman—to the Moon. Returning to the Moon, developing, and testing the capabilities needed to go to Mars are critical for the continuation of civil space exploration. Large government-led initiatives like Artemis spur innovation, develop new commercial markets, and inspire generations of new leaders. However, the 2024 deadline to land the next Americans on the Moon—set by the Trump administration18 —is now considered unrealistic and the first Moon landing is foreseen with 18

Trump increased NASA’s budget steadily over the course of his 4 years in office, from $19.65 billion in 2017 to $23.3 billion in 2021. That still represents relative pan scrapings, however, with space agency funding making up just 0.4% of the national budget compared to 4% back in the mid-1960s. What’s more, the Trump Administration requested $3.2 billion in the 2021 budget for

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Artemis III in 2025. At this time the Gateway will not be ready and the current mission architecture is based on the Human Landing System provided by SpaceX. Once in lunar orbit, the astronauts will have to dock and to transfer the HLS which will be already there waiting for them. While Congress has been supporting the Artemis effort , as requested by the Trump administration, the return to the Moon program has been ensorsed (and funded) also by the Biden administration. This is good news since space programs are complex and require long lead times: as such, their budgets need to remain constant despite politics; otherwise, they will simply never get off the ground. To limit expenses and to foster international collaboration, NASA is partnering with other space agencies. Indeed, budgetary constraints faced by space agencies make international missions more appealing for sharing costs. ESA and NASA have already signed a MoU that will see ESA Member States contribute a number of essential elements to the Gateway, the first human outpost in lunar orbit. The Memorandum of Understanding does not cover operations beyond the lunar Gateway, such as those taking place on the surface of the Moon covered by the Artemis Accords. A number of ESA member states are part of the Artemis Accords. Intriguingly Germany and France are absent, although Germany is clearly an indirect partner in NASA’s Artemis program through its role in making Orion’s main engine. Their position may be due to a preference for the Moon Agreement and a desire to see a properly negotiated treaty governing lunar exploration. The US promotion of the accords outside of the “normal” channels of international space law—such as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space—is a cause of concerns for these states. However, it would be wise not to hide behind anachronistic (and unsigned) space treaties but rather consider the evolving geopolitical situation. In parallel, China and Russia have signed a memorandum of understanding to build what the two countries call an “International Lunar Research Station” (ILRS). The facility would conduct a number of activities on the lunar surface and on lunar orbit, and would be “open to all interested countries and international partners.“ The two countries have formed a collaboration in competition with the Artemis Alliance formed by NASA and by the signatories of the Artemis Accord. Apparently, China and Russia have challenged the United States and the rest of the world to a new race to the Moon. With the Biden administration having endorsed the Trump-era Artemis program, it looks like two credible, rival return-to-the-moon programs are now ongoing. The very definition of a race to the moon has developed, without fanfare, without brave speeches throwing down gauntlets. Is this a good thing or a bad thing? On the positive side, nothing like competition focuses the mind and ensures that the Artemis program remains on track and on a sensible schedule. The Apollo program succeeded because the winner of the race to the moon would have bragging rights development of the Human Landing System (HLS), the Artemis project’s crewed lunar lander—but the House of Representatives agreed to just $600 million. You can hardly touch down on the moon without a vehicle to take you there, and there is no particular reason to see greater funding for one forthcoming given the current makeup of the House.

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Fig. 2.10 Propellant mass and ΔV. Source George Sowers (2019)

for being the more technologically adept superpower. On the negative side, what will determine which side “wins” the modern space race? During the Apollo-era, the answer was easy. President John F. Kennedy declared the goal of sending a man to the moon and returning him safely to the Earth before the end of the 1960s. In July 1969, the mission was accomplished. What must happen for the winner to be declared in the new moon race? Who is first to return to the moon is not as important as what happens next. The south pole of the moon is replete with water ice in shadowed craters; thus providing an important reservoir of water which can be used to help sustain a lunar base, but can also be refined into rocket propellant, making the moon a refueling stop for spacecraft headed to other destinations in the solar system, such as Mars or an interesting metallic asteroid. Since the cost of most space activities is dominated by transport costs, making fuel in situ would be a major cost-saving breakthrough. For the 60+ years since the first human mission to space, all space missions originated on Earth with all propellants brought from Earth. If one solves the rocket equation for the mass of the propellant in terms of ΔV, the curve is exponential.19 In other words, the farther you want to go into space (increasing ΔV ), the higher the mass of the required propellant (Fig. 2.10). Volatiles such as water and methane are therefore crucial for the sustainability of space exploration. The moon also has a number of other resources ranging from rare earths, to platinum-group metals, to industrial metals such as titanium, iron and aluminum. 19

In astrodynamics and aerospace, a delta-v budget is an estimate of the total delta-v required for a space mission. Delta-v is a scalar quantity dependent only on the desired trajectory and not on the mass of the space vehicle. As input to the Tsiolkovsky rocket equation, it determines the required propellant for a vehicle of given mass and propulsion system.

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Helium-3, an isotope embedded in lunar soil, could serve as fuel for future fusion power plants. Industrial metals can be used for the construction of a permanent human base on the Moon. Other Moon resources, such as rare earth and Helium-3 could be exported to Earth, although the economic revenues for these activities are expected in the longer term.20 In short, those who will be the first to exploit lunar resources will win the Moon race, while creating a space-based industrial revolution enabled by lunar resources. With many human and robotic missions planned in the near future, lunar navigation and communication will become a priority. That’s why Europe is investing in the Moonlight program devoted to lunar navigation and communication.

2.6 Space Economy in Today’s Evolving Panorama This chapter gave some insight on the evolution of the space economy. First, major space faring nations enjoyed the advantage of large single markets. Second, in the United States approved policies to encourage the participation of private companies to develop commercial space activities through deregulation of the space market paved the way to new players. The last deregulation concerned the launcher sector where competition yielded a significant reduction of the costs of access to space. Given the limited budgets dedicated to space, NASA benefitted from these policies being able to concentrate on what a space agency is better doing science, space exploration, and development of space infrastructure. This chapter also indicates that the world is facing a new economic revolution based on the advancement of artificial intelligence, robotics, and in situ space resource utilization. Space is a common good of humankind and, as such it should not be polluted or exploited, but the use of vast space resources may lead to more peaceful environment on Earth and, maybe, to a non-delusional peaceful uses of space. Although there will be strong competition in space between the Sino-Russian sector and the Artemis Alliance, there are areas of collaboration, as shown by the continuation of the American-Russian partnership on the ISS. Some of the principles on the uses of space resources established by the Artemis Accord can constitute the basis of an agreement between the two competing groups with a mutual advantage. 20

Rare earths are used to produce everything from electric or hybrid vehicles, to wind turbines, electronic devices and clean energy technologies. Currently, global supply and demand for these elements are balanced. However, in the next 20–30 years, the demand for rare earths could increase exponentially as the share of electric vehicles in the total automotive market could reach over 50% at the end of the period. Recent estimates indicate that the solar wind has deposited more than 1 million tons of helium-3 (3He) on the surface of the Moon. The lunar surface contains helium-3 in concentrations estimated to be between 1.4 and 15 parts per billion (ppb) in sunlit areas, and can contain concentrations of up to 50 ppb in permanently shaded regions. For comparison, helium-3 in the Earth’s atmosphere is found in concentrations around 7.2 parts per trillion (ppt). However, the demand for the Moon helium-3 depends on the development of nuclear fusion, which is not yet there.

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In time, they can constitute the starting point for a general reform of the Outer Space Treaty. The rest of this book will analyze how the European space sector is organized; the necessary reforms in managing the European space economy facing the challenges posed by the future evolution of the space economy; and the way Europe can contribute to the incipient economic revolution.

References Caraveo, P. (2021) Saving the Starry Night, Springer. Danilenko, G. M. (2016). International lawmaking for outer space’ 37 space Policy 179. In Deplano, The Artemis Accords: Evolution or Revolution in International space Law? Deplano, R. (2021) The Artemis accords: Evolution or revolution in international space law? In International and comparative law quarterly (forthcoming 2021) (p. 3). SSRN. https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3822590 Federal Communications Commission. (2019). Broadband deployment report. Retrieved from https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports?page=2 Foust, J. (2022). Additional funding unlikely to accelerate commercial space station projects. Retrieved from https://spacenews.com/additional-funding-unlikely-to-accelerate-commercialspace-station-projects/ Freeland, S., & Jakhu, R. (2009). ‘Article II’. In S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd, & K. Schrogl (Eds.), Cologne commentary on space law vol I (Verlag 2009) 44, 60 para 67. In Deplano, The Artemis Accords: Evolution or Revolution in International space Law? George Sowers. (2019). https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2020.0045 Grand View Research. (2022). Satellite communication market size, share & trends analysis report. ITU. (2018). ITU releases 2018 global and regional ICT estimates. Retrieved from https://www. itu.int/en/mediacentre/Pages/2018-PR40.aspx Jenks, C. W. (1965). Space Law. F.A. Praeger. McDowell, J. (2022). Starlink launch statistics. In planet4589. Retrieved December 18, 2022. Pop, V. (2000). Appropriation in outer space: The relationship between land ownership and sovereignty on the celestial bodies, space Policy 16, no. 4 (pp. 275–82). Satellite Industry Association. (2021). https://sia.org/news-resources/state-of-the-satellite-industryreport/ Satellite Industry Association. (2022). State of the satellite industry report. Retrieved from https:// brycetech.com/reports Sheet, M. (2020). Amazon will invest over $10 billion in its satellite internet network after receiving FCC authorization. CNBC. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/30/fcc-authorizesamazon-to-build-kuiper-satellite-internet-network.html Space Foundation. (2021). https://www.spacefoundation.org/2022/01/18/space-foundation-rel eases-the-space-report-2021-q4-reflecting-on-record-breaking-year-in-space/ Stanley, M. (2020). Space: investing in the final frontier. Stern, T. (1996). Preliminary jurisprudential observation concerning property rights on the moon and other celestial bodies in the commercial space age. In Proceedings of the thirty-ninth colloquium on the law of outer space (p. 50). Tronchetti, F. (2008). The non-appropriation principle as a structural norm of international law: A new way of interpreting Article II of the outer space treaty. Air and Space Law, 277–305 Venditti, B. (2022). The cost of space flight before and after SpaceX. Visual Capitalist. Retrieved from https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-cost-of-space-flight/

Chapter 3

On the Reasons of European Fragmentation

3.1 Introduction The ever-increasing strategic and economic potential of space has long been recognised at the global level, with the US leading the pack of spacefaring nations in its military and civil expenses for space applications as well as its support for private investments into the space industry. Europe has not been idle; the multitude of European actors involved in space have followed suit. However, the fragmented nature of European space has become apparent, its consequences ranging from lesser diplomatic weight, to reduced or inefficient knowledge sharing and technology transfer across the continent, and further still to the duplication of programmes. In this context, a disruptive, commercially driven, approach to space has emerged by ambitious initiatives and endeavours aiming to engage in space markets with innovative schemes and business models. This new ecosystem has seen in recent years the rise of a significant number of new space-faring nations (i.e. countries that have developed access to space capabilities, or more likely, launched their first satellites) and private actors who are investing in space programmes pursuing space business independently from governments. In the medium and long term, the space sector will face two important challenges at global level, namely the increase of space debris in the LEO environment and the commercial missions on the Moon. The space debris issue derives from significant changes occurring in the launch traffic to LEO. In the past five years, numerous commercial companies have proposed, funded, and, in a few cases, begun the deployment of large constellations of small satellites in LEO for remote sensing and for providing low-latency, broadband internet connectivity also in view of the Internet of Things applications. The intensifying commercial use of LEO and international debate regarding the stability of the space environment is a growing concern among policy makers. Another main challenge for the space sector regards space exploration activities, as the major space agencies, such as NASA, ESA, CNSA and ROSCOSMOS, have © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Caraveo and C. Iacomino, Europe in the Global Space Economy, SpringerBriefs in Space Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36619-2_3

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in their agendas to bring humans (and, in particular, the first woman and person of colour) back to the Moon by 2025. Over the next ten to fifteen years, the use of space resources will be crucial for the success of expeditions to the Moon and to other planets. Indeed, lunar resources may provide propellant for the refuelling of spacecrafts, thus reducing overall mission costs, as well as oxygen and water needed by the support systems of the future space stations around the Moon. In the field of space exploration, a new form of public–private partnership is rising. At first, governments will provide an initial support to the exploration and advancement of critical technologies (e.g. telecommunications and Moon-Earth navigation), and to the construction of space infrastructures. The private sector will then take the lead in creating new markets and expanding the presence of humanity in space. The exploitation of lunar resources will open the opportunity to develop a lively and sustainable market based on the Moon, which may provide services and applications targeted both to a lunar demand (e.g. scientific activities carried out on the Moon or the preparation for the exploration of Mars) and to a terrestrial demand (e.g. space tourism or the exploitation of the Sun power collected in space and transmitted to Earth). Based on such expectations, Europe will have to face several challenges. Reduced costs of access to space and competition from other nations might marginalize Europe in the launching activities business. In the carrier sector, Europe has in fact remained tied to the old model, characterized by burdensome governmental tenders and monopolistic-industry approaches in a fragmented European space market. This fragmentation due to the presence of different intergovernmental institutions causes also different and uncoordinated national security policies, which further penalizes the European space industry compared to those of other nations, such as the United States and China. Moreover, European space market must face the overarching fragmentation of national markets as well as barriers in exploiting synergies between civil and military use of satellite technologies. The existence of many public stakeholders and the implementation of different national and ESA’s space industrial policies, often without the necessary coordination, creates a very fragmented institutional panorama. Indeed, Europe’s institutional fragmentation is splintering the competences to define a European space policy primarily between the EU, ESA, EUSPA and their member states. Their differing approaches to the key sectors of defence and security, their contrasting procurement policies and industrial development strategies, as well as dissimilar level of memberships, put a severe strain on Europe’s capability to formulate a coherent space policy. Mitigation efforts to lesser the impact of the fragmented nature of European space governance are urgently needed. The objective of this chapter is to analyse the European space framework and to highlight the consequences of the institutional fragmentation upon coordination of Member States activities, such as Earth observation, diplomacy, industrial and programmatic efficiency.

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3.2 Overview of Global Institutional Space Budgets In most countries, institutional space budgets have supported a large portfolio of activities ranging from space research to manufacturing and applications in both civilian and defence domains. In 2022, the global value of the space industry reached $469 billion. Compared to the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the space sector accounted for 0.35% in 2022. Historically, governments have had a significant influence on the dynamics of the space sector, acting as the main financiers of private companies responsible for developing strategic technologies. In 2022, public funding for the space sector amounted to $103 billion, with nearly 60% coming from the United States and approximately 15% from Europe. The growth in the space industry, particularly in the defense sector, has been remarkable, surging by 16% in 2022 and setting a new record at $48 billion. Current geopolitical tensions have reinforced the importance of space as a strategic operational domain for hybrid warfare tactics. Consequently, governments are prioritizing investments not only in ‘traditional’ space applications like Telecommunications, Navigation, and Earth observation but also placing a greater emphasis on Space Security & Early Warning systems to safeguard their space assets. On the civil side, in parallel to institutional research programs, government expenditures are increasingly being driven by Human Spaceflight missions, attracting a rising number of new entrants enticed by the socioeconomic benefits and prestige associated with such programs. Interestingly, though civil expenditures have historically exceeded defense spending, the gap between the two is steadily narrowing. Euroconsult’s projections suggest that by 2031, the expenditures in both sectors are expected to achieve a 50/50 parity (source Euroconsult). Recently, with a shift in the operational context of space, space companies have been encouraged by governments to pursue incremental innovations in processes, products, and organization to reduce costs, which has stimulated private capital investments in the space sector. Globally, the cumulative inflow of venture capital into space companies reached about $272 billion between 2014 and 2023 (Q1), with 46% of the investment in the United States and 8.7% in Europe.

3.3 European Institutional Fragmentation 3.3.1 European Space Governance The European space governance debate started in the beginning of 2000’s, when the political relevance of outer space became more evident to decision makers. Europe is still largely shaped by national policies that lead toward a vertical and horizontal fragmentation in which space activities are pursued by various nations with their space agencies, and by different European organisations and institutions, with an overlap of skills, management and programs.

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In addition, this fragmentation tendency is amplified by: (i) the fragmentation of defence market with differences in Member States’ contributions to European defence, (ii) diverging membership, (iii) difference in industrial policies, (iv) different procurement procedures and (v) deficiency of overall vision because of the lack of a top-down perspective. For these reasons, the vulnerability of the current system acts as a brake to a more competitive European space strategy limiting the incentives for disruptive market solutions, innovative industrial approaches, new start-ups and the investments of business ventures. In particular, the space institutional fragmentation is reflected by the rise of EU as Europe’s second major institutional actor in space besides ESA. Along with these two main platforms on which the European space policy is based, there are intergovernmental organizations whose scope is more limited such as EUMETSAT (Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites) SATCEN (European Union Satellite Centre), European Defence Agency (EDA) or EUSPA (European Union Agency for the Space Programme). Without a clear leadership, or, at least, a clear coordination scheme, the coexistence of different actors represent a challenge to develop and manage space programs through an efficient interaction. Despite a strong focus put on ESA/EU relations, the Member States are the centre of space activities and the main decision-making actors. The Member States play a key role in both ESA and EU. Particularly, when one considers that the majority of EU members state are also members of ESA, a better cooperation to reduce overlap of management in space programs has to be seen as an important step to assure a more efficient development of their space activities. In addition, each Member States has its own particular needs and priorities depending on their motivations and national objectives creating different space strategies. Indeed, National space programmes are sometimes in competition with each other and multiply single national missions rather than moving towards a European constellation of satellites (e.g. the Italian COSMO-SkyMed vs. the German TerrSAR-X or the French Pléiades vs the Spanish Deimos). Moreover, in order to bring together different institutional frameworks, the European space governance has to take into account the intertwining between space and defence. Most space technologies, infrastructure and services can be used for civilian and defence objectives. In a number of European countries, the space agencies are also actively coordinating and working alongside the relevant Ministry of Defence for the development and operation of dual-use or military-specific space systems, to support relevant national security priorities and objectives.

3.3.2 Space and Security: Space as Strategic and Reliable Asset The increasingly interconnected nature of space with security and defence sectors has highlighted the fragmentation of the European landscape. Despite mitigating

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attempts carried out by the EU, further discussed below, states remain the central actors in the security from space and security in space realms. The definition of military strategies remains an almost entirely national affair, and the development and use of resources for space security are managed by governments and defence ministries. States in Europe are thus a main actor in European space governance and the definition of space policies. Space has become increasingly instrumental in a wealth of ‘terrestrial’ industries, and with the multi-faceted integration between space and defence, member states of the EU have been increasingly looking to maintain sovereignty over key aspects of the space industries. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) established the shared (or parallel) competences of the EU and its member states in space activities, thus allowing each individual state to invest and develop its own space capabilities outside of a union-wide framework. This has been most obvious in the development of space defence capabilities which have been buttressed by Article 346 of the TFEU, allowing each member state to take measure deemed “necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security.”1 Two clear examples of states wishing to retain their full sovereign control over space defence are provided by France and Italy. The former has developed a Space Defence Strategy in order to ensure its “strategic autonomy”, thus looking to further its space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities, as well as developing active defences of its space assets. Recognising an increasing militarisation of outer space carried on by all major space-faring states, the French Minister of Defence Florence Parly announced in 2019 an increase of e700 million to the Air Force’s budget for space activities between 2020–2025.2 Similar policies have been planned by Italy, which, in July 2019, announced its “National Security Strategy for Space”, with a goal of strengthening national space capabilities and allowing for the prevention, deterrence and defence from attacks against its space infrastructures. The implementation of this national strategy will follow “lines of action of an operational, procedural, and legal nature.”3 As early as 2003, a duality between an integrated common approach in civilian activities and a nationalistic one for space defence policies and activities was identified; this duality has clearly survived despite

1

Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—Protocols, Annexes to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on December 13th, 2007, OJ C 202, published June 7th, 2016, . (Hereinafter TFEU). 2 Florence Parly, speech at Air Base 942 Lyon Mont-Verdun, July 26th, 2019, . The total budget for space activities granted to the Air Force was thus brought to e4.3 billion. 3 “National security strategy for space”, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, July 18th, 2019, available at .

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efforts by the EU for better integration, and is thus highly relevant for an accurate understanding of European space governance.4 Different approaches to international cooperation in the space security industry have strengthened the focus on national sovereignty furthering the fragmentation of Europe. European states have predominantly followed three different types of intergovernmental cooperation in space security activities: capacity sharing, delegation, and partnerships. Capacity sharing mechanisms have been a common approach to inter-state cooperation in Europe, entailing the exchange of satellite data and services amongst states with independent ground segments and infrastructures. Capacity sharing schemes have predominantly been either bilateral or minilateral in nature, with larger initiatives often suffering from states’ concern over the devolution of control to foreign or international entities. For instance, under the supervision of the EDA, a capacity sharing procurement cell (European Satellite Communications Procurement Cell—ESCPC) for satellite military telecommunications was set up in 2012. The ESCPC’s goal was to pool demand for commercial Ku, Ka, and C-band satellite bandwidth in order to reduce costs, promote ease of access, and improve efficiency to deliver a better connectivity to armed forces of EU member states. While a total of eight states join the initiative, the ESCPC saw limited success as key states, such as Germany as well as Spain, refused to join, and the EDA was later forced to drop plans for further integration of resources due to the states’ concern over losing the full control over national space activities. A second degree of collaboration is that of delegation, wherein a state assumes the tasks of developing, managing, and operating a system with support from other co-operators, usually in the form of financial contributions. Delegation is thus an effective way of achieving some access to satellite data and services in the realms of intelligence, surveillance, or communications without having to bear the full cost of developing an independent national programme. The third echelon of European cooperation takes this model one step forward, as partnerships are characterised by a greater degree of equality amongst the partners in terms of their financial and programmatic contributions. Much like the capacity sharing schemes, European delegation projects and partnerships have been overwhelmingly bilateral or minilateral due to the much greater ease of negotiation and control over the design and development of the satellite systems. France has been particularly active with Italy in their developing of shared satellite systems, such as Sicral 2 satellite, borne of a joint undertaking between the Italian Ministry of Defence and the French defence procurement agency DGA (Direction Générale de l’Armement, part of the Ministry of Defence).5 Finally, the security and defence of Europe through space assets is also carried out within the framework of NATO, especially after the organisation’s recognition of space as an operational domain on par with air, sea, land, and cyberspace, in late 2019.6 The cooperation between NATO and its member states has been structured 4

Becher et al. (2003). Thales Group (2015). 6 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2020a). 5

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through a Memorandum of Understanding between France, Italy, the UK, and the US, as well as a Service Level Agreement. The memorandum “enables the four Allies to provide space capacity from their military satellite communications (SATCOM) programmes to NATO”, in order to promote the deterrence and defence from space of the Alliance. Further, it has been devised to encourage “political-military consultations and information sharing on relevant deterrence and defence related space developments.”7 Moreover, the Service Level Agreement has been struck in order to establish NATO’s space policy, thus coordinating the use of NATO allies’ space assets (which account for about 60% of the global total). While the organisation is not expected to develop independent space capabilities, it has encouraged the sharing of services and information amongst its member states through the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI). Not only did the NCI coordinate the agreement between the service-providing nations, but is also tasked with the delivering of services derived from satellites communications to NATO entities.8 However, the space sector is assuming a more strategic role at international level that go beyond purely space issues. In recent years, we have had two important global events that have also involved the space sector as the world pandemic and the war in Ukraine. First, the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the role of space as a reliable asset to manage crisis and implement important security measures. Precise navigation, secure communication and satellite imagery were indispensable for the European institutions in order to provide critical services. The Commission through the Galileo Green Lane project launched a crucial initiative that aimed to support national authorities to manage the emergency. This project provided information on the impacts on the crisis at environmental and socio-economic level, gathering data in a dashboard with over eighty indicators. In this way, the pandemic has advanced the public appreciation of the added value of satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence for general security and defence needs. The war scenario in Ukraine has clearly shown how important orbital services can be. The crucial role played by Starlink to provide connectivity represents the first example of a one-man-show in space whereby Starlink owner can decide how and when to provide or to deny internet connectivity. While this situation is certainly worth a deeper analysis, the war is Ukraine also saw the cyberattack on ViaSat’s KASAT satellite network by Russia. This raised an international debate regarding the cybersecurity of space systems and the protection of critical infrastructures. This was a concrete example of the use of cyber operations in conjunction with conventional military operations usually applied on land, sea and air. For sure, as they are becoming more critical, space systems are also becoming more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, in particular for the growing integration of satellites into the global digital infrastructure. Some issues and gaps need to be explored and improved by public institutions. First of all, the cyber-attacks threats are relatively cheap to develop compared to other anti-satellite technologies. In addition, cyber-attacks can have a large attack 7 8

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2020b). Ibid., and NCI Agency (2019).

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radius, targeting an entire constellation of satellites. Considering the peculiar nature of the orbital environment, it is unlikely that operators physically access the system in orbit to repair it. The cyber threats on space systems have long been not accounted for properly in space, defence and public policies. Surely, the KA-SAT cyberattack is a clear example of the evolution of the cybersecurity in the commercial space sector as well as a representative case of the evolution of the militarization of outer space. The KA-SAT cyberattack and the war in Ukraine raise many outstanding questions regarding the role and the control of space services as well as of space infrastructure cybersecurity from an industrial, political, legal, and military perspective. However, space and cyberspace are becoming more and more transversal in different domains, alongside land, sea, and air and they have been progressively recognized in defence, public strategies and programs. The consequence is that there is not a strictly separation between space and cyberspace since they can be integrated into different domains but also link domains together in joint operations.9 To conclude, space and cyberspace are considered potential enablers toward a creation of interdependent networks in order to strengthen coordinated operations in several domains. These latest events, namely the war in Ukraine and Covid-19, have led to further considerations on how to harmonize European governance in spite of the central role each state plays in the security and defence sector. Such harmonization should be accomplished taking into account the wide variety of bilateral cooperation schemes as well as the distinct nature of the EU and NATO, each possessing the competence in defining its independent space policy. The consequences of states’ concern in retain full sovereignty and control over their security strategies, both in space and in other domains, necessarily reduces the synergies which may arise from wider collaborations, as well as hindering knowledge sharing and technology transfer processes throughout the European continent. For a meaningful mitigation or alleviation of the institutional fragmentation of Europe to take place, a more profound interdependence and harmonisation in the member states’ activities in space security is warranted.

3.3.3 The European Union The current competences and operational structure in the space governance of the EU is derived mainly from the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) of 2009.10 Specifically, Article 4 (3) established the shared competences in the areas of research, technological development and space, meaning that while the EU possess competence “to carry out activities, in particular to define and implement programmes; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member

9

ESPI Short Report (2022). TFEU, supra, note 1.

10

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States being prevented from exercising theirs.”11 Furthermore, Article 189 established the EU’s competence in drawing up a European space policy promoting scientific and technical progress as well as industrial competitiveness. Significantly, harmonisation of the laws and regulations of Member States is specifically excluded in the possible measures which the European Parliament and the Council might employ to attain the goals of the European space policy.12 Within the scope of the EU, the European Commission (EC) is the primary actor for the definition of its space policy and of its programmes. The overarching goals of global competitiveness and non-dependence from third parties have been long identified as key aspects of European space governance; programmes such as Galileo and Copernicus, as well as the support to the European launcher industry led by Arianespace, are thus born from the EU’s willingness to establish autonomy in both the access and the use of space for activities such as Earth observation and navigation. Amongst the most relevant EU documents for the definition of the European space policy is the Space Strategy for Europe published in 2016. The document, recognising the individual member states, ESA, EUMTSAT, and the EU itself as key actors in their own right, stated the need for collective actions “to promote [Europe’s] position as a leader in space.”13 Four overarching strategic goals are thus identified: 1. Maximising the benefits of space for society and the EU economy; 2. Fostering a globally competitive and innovative European space sector; 3. Reinforcing Europe’s autonomy in accessing and using space in a secure and safe environment; and 4. Strengthening Europe’s role as a global actor and promoting international cooperation. In order to achieve the above goals, the EU has set a number of clear objectives, such as supporting R&D and fostering private investments, ensuring European launch capabilities and access to radio spectrum, as well as reinforcing synergies between civil and security space activities.14 This last goal is of particular relevance to the mitigation of the European institutional fragmentation, due to the central role still played by individual states in designing and developing space security activities. The integration of member state defence capabilities into a coherent security strategy is one of the objectives of the new Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS). The latter’s establishment in late 2019 was borne of the EU’s decade-long recognition of the deep interdependence between space and defence. The criticality of space for the defence of the Union was identified in Article 42 (3) of the Treaty on the European Union, which established the European Defence Agency 11

Ibid., Article 4 (3). Ibid., Article 189 (1) and (2). 13 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the REGIONS: Space Strategy for Europe”, COM(2016) 705, October 26th, 2016, available at , p. 3. [Hereinafter Space Strategy for Europe]. 14 Ibid., pp. 3–10. 12

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and identified the satellite component as a critical element to the continent’s defence and security. With its responsibilities carved out from DG GROW, the main objectives of DG DEFIS are the implementation of the European Defence Fund, the fostering of a resilient European space industry, the furthering of the EU’s autonomous and unfettered access to space as well as improving the critical link between space, defence and security. The market integration of the defence and space industries had been tackled in 2009 with directives concerning the procurement and transfer of defence products, albeit with limited success.15 The Member States, looking to retain their full sovereignty over key national industries, regularly invoke Article 346 of the TFEU allowing them “to take such measure as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security.”16 DG DEFIS is thus charged to alter this dynamic by favouring a deeper integration in Europe. Together with the enhancement of competitiveness and autonomy, defence considerations have become a core aspect of European space policy. This can of course be identified in the implementation of the EU’s flagship programmes, Galileo (and EGNOS) and Copernicus. The former not only ensures non-dependence from navigation services operated by foreign powers (mainly the US’s GPS), but has a notable security aspect with its Public Regulated Service, restricted to government-users and having robust and secure anti-jamming mechanisms. Moreover, security is among the six key areas tackled by Copernicus. This can be further divided into border security (with operations delegated to Frontex), Maritime security (delegated to EMSA) and support to EU External Action (delegated to SatCen). In addition to these established programmes, the EU has identified two future plans for the enhancement of security capabilities in Europe. The first is an umbrella concept named Space Situational Awareness (SSA), encompassing aspects for Space Surveillance and Tracking as well as Space Traffic Monitoring/Management. This will serve to ensure an unfettered access to space for the Union, as well as aiding in the tracking of potential threats to EU assets in space. The second is GovSatCom, a secure satellite communications system, which has become one of the elements for the EU’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy. In the statement by the Commission the lack of a “structural link between civil and military activities in space” was identified, with the EC stating that it represented an “economic and political cost that Europe can no longer afford.”17 The development and maintenance of GovSatCom, envisioned to be used in security and safety critical missions, will require a high degree of non-dependence from third states to ensure European autonomy. 15

Besch (2019). See also “The impact of the ‘defence package’: Directives on European defence”, Directorate-General for External Policies, EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2013-08/Lot6/01, 2015. 16 TFEU, supra note 1, Article 346. 17 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector”, COM(2013) 542, July 24th, 2013, last accessed December 12th, 2020. Available at .

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GovSatCom and SSA form the new key components of European Space Programme, which is carried out by the EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) in collaboration with ESA and with a large number of other EU agencies and actors. The budget for the new EU Agency was proposed as being e 9.7 billion for Galileo, e 5.7 billion for Copernicus and e 500 million for SSA/GovSatCom. In essence, the EUSPA Programme will expand upon the work of GSA, which is responsible for the management of the EU’s Galileo navigation system, including the design and supervision of improvements to GNSS infrastructures and services. The EUSPA will thus be charged with the implementation of the European space programme, including activities concerning the development of downstream applications.18 Recently, EUSPA launched a e32.6 million space-focused Horizon Europe call. The call has the objective of supporting the development of downstream applications that leverage data from the Galileo, EGNOS, and Copernicus programmes. In this regard, funding recipients will be expected to stimulate the EU Space Programme and develop commercial value-adding solutions that contribute to the EU’s policies and priorities.

3.3.4 The European Space Agency The European Space Agency holds, together with the European national agencies, the technical expertise for European space activities. Thus, not only does ESA carry out its mandatory and optional missions, but is also responsible for the technical implementation and operation of the EU’s Galileo and Copernicus missions. However, far from being a purely technical agency, ESA has competence in defining and promoting its vision for a European space policy, derived from Article II of the ESA Convention. Specifically, paragraph (a) established that the purpose of ESA shall be to promote cooperation in space by elaborating and implementing a long-term European space policy, by recommending space objectives to the Member States, and by concerting the policies of the Member States with respect to other national and international organisations and institutions.19 Constructed as an intergovernmental organisation comprising 22 member states, 19 of which are also members of the EU, ESA has been the primary actor in the development of the continent’s industrial space capacities. In addition, through its Council ESA has looked to promote a coherent European space policy taking into account the national space policies of its members.20 Resolutions taken at ESA’s ministerial 18

The role of the Agency is set out in Article 30 of the EU proposal for the Agency’s establishment. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the space programme of the Union and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013, (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision 541/2014/ EU, COM(2018) 447, June 6th, 2018. 19 ESA Convention and Rules of Procedure, ESA SP-1317, December 2010, 7th edition, signed May 30th, 1975, Article II. 20 Sagath et al. (2019).

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conferences have often echoed the EU’s policy goals, such as for instance the need to maintain an autonomous access to space through Ariane and Vega launchers.21 However, while cooperation between ESA and the EU has been long established, with the 2004 Framework Agreement reinforced by Article 189 (3) of the TFEU, the differences in memberships and regulations of the two international organisations have given rise to two distinct entities and voices in the governance of the European space industry. Thus, while both endorse the furthering of European industrial competitiveness and non-dependence for critical technologies as fundamental policy goals, the interfacing with their respective member states, most obviously in the organisations’ industrial policies, is different. Specifically, ESA functions through the unique industrial policy of geo-return, wherein the Agency procurement contracts to companies of a given nationality are dependent upon that country’s contribution to the ESA budget. In essence, the geographical distribution of industrial contracts is defined by “the ratio between its percentage share of the total value of all contracts awarded among all Member States and its total percentage contributions.”22 The policy of geo-return is thus at odds with the European Union’s focus on spurring competition amongst European industrial actors driving innovation and development. This discrepancy between the two major players defining European space policy necessarily feeds the institutional fragmentation of the region, and has long been recognised as problematic due to ESA’s unwillingness to abandon one of its core characteristics in favour of harmonisation with EU practices. Furthermore, ESA has historically steered clear of defence applications of space technologies. The Convention, entered into force in 1980, set “exclusively peaceful purposes” as a foundational tenet of the agency. Those familiar with international space law will recognise a similarity with the language used in the Outer Space Treaty which called for “peaceful purposes” in outer space activities in its preamble, and will also be cognizant of the difficulties in settling a clear definition of what “peaceful purposes” entail. Despite the similar language used, ESA’s understanding of space used for “exclusively peaceful purposes” has been largely identical to nonmilitary, whereas the peaceful purposes espoused to by the Outer Space Treaty have been mostly understood as non-aggressive.23 Nevertheless, in recent years ESA’s avoidance of security applications has seemingly relented; although Galileo and Copernicus provide a wide array of services, they have a clear security application for EU member states, and the future development of GovSatCom will also require ESA’s technical expertise. 21

See for instance the Resolutions passed at the Ministerial Conference in Seville of 2019, ESA, November 28th, 2019, last accessed December 12th, 2020, . 22 ESA Convention, supra, note 8, Article IV. 23 This interpretation of the OST principle was set forth by the US Ambassador to UNCOPUOS Goldberg. A clear distinction between “space” and the moon and other celestial bodies is made in Article IV OST which establishes that “the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes”, thus banning any military installations, weapon testing, or military maneuvers.

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Today, the government and industrial activities are not limited only within their borders but are expanding globally, driven by the development of an increasing number of governmental space programmes around the world with the multiplication of commercial actors in the value chains. The current initiatives are characterized by the peculiar interaction between these space and non space actors belonging to different industrial sectors, new business models and development of innovative process and product technologies (from launchers to satellites). In this context, the ESA’ role is transforming toward the adoption of commercial procurement, moving away from the traditional method with implications for the roles, responsibility, and levels of autonomy of private actors, in additional to the extent of financial investment. In practical terms, in recent years ESA has diversified its relationship with industry on a variety of programmes, crafting innovative partnerships models on top of traditional procurement. The objective is to create a more competitive market at European level and to stimulate the connection between supply and demand through faster time to market and customer satisfaction. In addition, ESA is developing a service contract in which the agency acts purely as an initial customer in order to stimulate the industry to enter in new commercial market and to stimulate additional customers, attracting in this way also private funding and mitigating the market uncertainty.

3.3.4.1

EU-ESA Relationship

The legal framework defining relations between ESA and the EU is contained in the Framework Agreement of 2004, which effectively identified two aims: a coherent development of a European Space Policy, and the establishment of practical arrangements to facilitate joint operations and activities for the benefit of European citizens.24 In order to work towards the achievement of these objectives, the European Space Council was set up in 2004 to integrate the efforts of ESA and the EU towards common goals. However, while the council met annually until 2011, no further meetings were scheduled for eight years. It was only revived in May 2019, after the Romanian Presidency of the EU pushed for the reestablishment of the forum recognising the need for integrated policies to face increasing international competition and militarisation of space. The growing budgets for space activities of the two organisations certainly played a role in the resuscitation of the European Space Council, as did the revival of the National Space Council in the US in 2017 and the creation of the US Space 24

“First ever ‘Space Council’ paves the way for a European space programme”, ESA Press Release, November 25th, 2004, last accessed December 27th, 2020, , and “Framework Agreement between the European Community and the European Space Agency”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 261/64, August 6th, 2004, available at .

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Force. Indeed, Commissioner Bie´nkowska, at the time EU Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, acknowledged the need to discuss a “European Space Force” shortly before the Council met, not only in reaction to the US but also as a response to the proliferation of the concept throughout some member states of the EU.25 The Council’s outcome was contained in the resolution “Space as an Enabler”, acting as a joint statement highlighting the importance of strengthening European competitiveness, the strategic value of an independent access to space, and the relevance of space to the security and defence of Europe.26 In addition to evincing the key features of the European space industry, the resolution stressed the need for greater and more meaningful cooperation and coordination. Thus, it encouraged “European stakeholders to avoid any unnecessary duplication of efforts and to promote a coherent and persistent implementation of activities”, furthering Europe’s space power and competitiveness on the global stage.27 Within the scope of security, defence, and the critical issue of European nondependence, efforts to mitigate the European institutional fragmentation have also pushed for an incremental cooperation between ESA and the European Defence Agency (EDA) on a number of key issues. The coordination was formalised in 2011 with the Administrative Agreement, which provided “a structured relationship and a mutually beneficial cooperation between ESA and EDA through coordination of and cooperation on dedicated activities.”28 The coordination of research and exploration of synergies between ESA and EDA programmes favours a reduction in the duplication of efforts, especially in key areas such as surveillance, intelligence, and satellite communications. Furthermore, with the identification of critical technologies guaranteeing the non-dependence of Europe in space, the EC, ESA, and the EDA have looked to enhance their cooperation and alleviate the fragmentation of the European landscape thus favouring an integrated and resilient European space industry.29 The enhanced participation of the EU in space activities has created the need to amend the Framework Agreement of 2004 with which its relationship to ESA was formalised. Indeed, with the signing of the TFEU in 2009, the Union was tasked to

25

Teffer (2019). It may appear telling that due to administrative constraints the resolution was not published as a common text but as two separate ad-hoc documents (the EU Council Conclusions and ESA Resolution) containing identical texts. See “Space as an enabler”, Council conclusions adopted on May 28th, 2019, 9713/19, available at . 27 EU-ESA Space Council Revival (2019). 28 Papadimitriou et al. (2019). For the ESA-EDA Agreement, see “Administrative Agreement between the European Defence Agency and the European Space Agency concerning the establishment of their cooperation”, signed June 20th, 2011, available at . 29 See “Technologies for European non-dependence and competitiveness”, Version 1.2 of November 5th, 2019, available at . 26

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establish “any appropriate relations with the European Space Agency.”30 Accordingly, in 2012, a Commission communication identified several issues feeding the institutional fragmentation of the European landscape due to asymmetries between ESA and EU, such as those in their memberships, security and defence matters, and financial rules.31 Four options for the way forward were described. Option 1 effectively entailed no change in the situation, with the EU and ESA remaining two separate entities with no mechanisms in place to ensure greater coherence and coordination. Despite some mitigation efforts and the revival of the Space Council, this would appear as the best description of the current situation and of how the European institutional fragmentation in space evolved (or, rather, did not evolve) in the past decade. Option 2 envisioned an improved cooperation under the contemporary status quo, with greater interfacing between the two organisations based upon amendments to the EU/ESA Framework Agreement of 2004. Under this scenario, policy and mission objectives would be set jointly through coordination and the establishment of a new agreement. Option 3 suggested the establishment of a “programmatic structure solely dedicated to the management of EU programmes”, also termed as ESA/EU pillar, looking for greater operational efficiency and symmetry in defence and security matters. Finally, Option 4 pushed for ESA to become an EU agency while maintaining some of its intergovernmental features such as optional programmes funded directly by member states. These ambitious options for the greater integration of ESA and EU involvement in space activities were ultimately unsuccessful in mitigating European institutional fragmentation.32 Indeed, the Commission’s efforts to “review and enhance the functioning of the relationship between the EU and ESA in view of the changed political context” only led to the publishing of the “Joint statement on shared vision and goals for the future of Europe in space by the EU and ESA” of October 2016.33 In this 30

TFEU, Article 189 (3). “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Establishing appropriate relations between the EU and the European Space Agency”, COM(2012) 671, November 14th, 2012, available at . See also “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a space strategy for the European Union that benefits its citizens”, COM(2011) 152, April 4th, 2011, available at . 32 It is telling that in ESA online archives under “ESA and the European Union” the most recent documents available date back to November 2010. While this could be due to lack of upkeep, it is a strong indication (together with the eight-year hiatus of the Space Council meetings) of the difficulties plaguing the institutional and regulatory rapprochement between ESA and the EU. See “ESA and the European Union”, ESA—European Centre for Space Law, last accessed December 28th, 2020, . 33 “Report from the Commission: Progress report on establishing appropriate relations between the European Union and the European Space Agency (ESA)”, COM(2014) 56, February 6th, 2014, 31

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statement, the two organisations recognise space as a critical strategic sector and set out to ensure European competitiveness and autonomy, though without envisioning any amendment to the Framework Agreement or other formal regulatory developments. Thus, while the revival of the Space Council coordination and harmonisation of efforts have been supported, the EU and ESA remain distinct entities with their respective competences, financial rules, memberships, and policy agendas, greatly contributing to the institutional fragmentation within the European space industry. Furthermore, the establishment of the EUSPA sparked some concern on ESA’s side, and the new agency’s broader mandate was interpreted by some in the European space community to represent “the EU encroaching on ESA’s turf.”34 Notwithstanding, the EU recognised the criticality of ESA for a European space activities guaranteed by its unique and long-standing technical expertise.35 Indeed, the EUSPA’s role and competence is primarily focused upon the operations of EU space programmes, while ESA remains in charge of their design and development. The governing of these roles and responsibilities was negotiated with the Financial Framework Partnership Agreement (FFPA) that was officially signed on 22 June 2021. In particular, the FFPA agreement defines the roles and responsibilities of all partners: European Commission, ESA and EUSPA. The new EU space programme reinforces flagship programs such as Galileo, Copernicus and Egnos, that were designed by ESA.

3.4 National Space Agencies at European Level Prior to delving deeper into the consequences of the institutional fragmentation of the European space landscape, some mention of the major trends in the European space industry and the evolution of European national space agencies is warranted. The following sections thus provide a brief overview of the shift towards public– private partnerships characterising the European industry, and the evolution of the Italian, French, and German space agencies. These three states, not coincidentally representing half of the founding members of what later became the EU together with the Benelux countries, are both the three largest contributors to ESA’s budget and the European states with the three largest independent budgets for space.36 available at , and “Joint statement on shared vision and goals for the future of Europe in space by the EU and ESA”, signed on October 26th, 2016, available at . 34 Foust (2021). 35 Ibid. 36 ESA contributions for the 2020 budget are as follows: Italy e 665.8 million (13.7% of state contributions), Germany e 981.7 million (20.1%), France e 1311.7 million (26.9%), for a total of over 60% of ESA’s 2020 budget derived from states (thus discounting the funds derived from

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All three of the major European national space agencies have undergone a similar transition to acting in support of their respective industries, very much in line with the primary goal of both the EU and ESA to establish a non-dependent, resilient, and competitive European space industry. In addition, while all space agencies have a long history of international collaboration, especially with NASA, their involvement in ESA missions has increased substantially throughout the decades, especially concerning ESA’s optional missions which now represent almost 80% of the activities carried out by the ESA. These include Launchers, Earth observation, telecommunications, and manned spaceflight, which are clear areas of interest for Italy, France, and Germany.37 Further, these three states are the primary European participants for the maintenance and support of the International Space Station. Only 10 states within ESA are part of the ISS Intergovernmental Agreement, wherein it is stated that ESA owns an 8% share in the programme. Germany, France, and Italy collectively contribute about 90% of ESA’s ISS expenditures.38 In particular, Italy has provided several key components of the ISS, such as the Columbus module, the Cupola, as well as the Harmony and Tranquillity nodes (designed and assembled by Alenia Spazio). Differences do exist between the three institutions, the most important being the significant focus of the French space agency on the military applications of space, though the national agendas of the three major contributors to the ESA budget have increasingly aligned in past years. While each state has acted to support its private actors as well as stimulating new investments into the national space industry, cooperation between the three largest space agencies in Europe has been a relevant factor throughout the history of European space exploration. The further mitigation of fragmentation of the European space industry will require an even deeper collaboration between ASI, CNES, and DLR, maximising synergies and ensuring efficient technology transfer to European public and private actors.

3.4.1 French Space Agency The French Space Agency, officially the National Centre for Space Studies (Centre National d’Études Spatiales, CNES) was established under Charles de Gaulle in 1961, and is therefore the oldest space agency in Europe. Research into space applications in the 1960s was not only exclusively state-led, but was necessarily military in nature, and the establishment of CNES was no exception. After the 1956 Suez Crisis, during which France’s impotence vis-à-vis the superpowers was made apparent, the European Union). Taking into account the full five-year period, Germany leads ESA funding with e 3.3 billion (22.9%), followed by France with e 2.66 billion (18.5%), and Italy with e 2.28 billion (15.9%). For a full breakdown see European Space Agency (2020). last accessed January 11th, 2021, . 37 ESA—Business Opportunities (2014). 38 The contributions amount to 41% for Germany, 28% for France, and 20% for Italy.

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great investments were made by President de Gaulle in order to develop independent nuclear capabilities. This was done to obviate French vulnerability against American economic and political pressure, as “it was felt that a nuclear weapons capability would reduce France’s dependence on the US and her vulnerability to Soviet blackmail.”39 It was in this context that CNES formed, as President de Gaulle’s objective of obtaining an independent nuclear deterrent in order to salvage France’s fading international prestige was necessarily linked to its launching capabilities. While Britain abandoned its research into launchers in the early 1960s, opting instead to rely on the US for its nuclear deterrent, France was successful in developing its launching capabilities. With the launch of Berenice in 1962 and later Diamant in 1964, France became the third country after the USSR and US with an independent access to space (and by extension a fully independent nuclear deterrent). The development of launchers begun in the early 1960s has very much informed the place which France and CNES occupy today in both the European space industry and its governance, as the European autonomous access to space periodically identified as critical for European non-dependence relies upon the Arianespace and its Ariane launchers. Furthermore, CNES was instrumental in the development of the French Guiana Space Centre in Kourou acting as its parent agency on par with ESA. The centre has been operational since 1968 and continues to act as ESA’s spaceport, strategically placed due to its proximity with the equator and it being surrounded by empty land or sea to the North and East, guaranteeing safe launches should the need arise to abort during ascent. The activities carried out by CNES are wide-ranging and are of course not only limited to the launcher business, as it is also active in civil applications of space such as Earth observation, science and technology research, as well as operations pertaining to security and defence. The latter include the development of the EC’s Galileo navigation system and photo-reconnaissance satellites such as Helios. In addition, CNES operates dual-use satellites thus meeting the needs of both civil and military users. Syracuse 4 is an example of these satellites, developed by Thales Alenia Space and Airbus Defence and Space for the French Ministry of the Armed Forces. Complementing these activities is CNES’s long list of civil collaborations with European and major non-European partners such as China, Russia, and India. Like many European and indeed global space agencies, one of CNES’s most significant partners has of course been NASA, with which the French space agency signed a cooperative agreement renewing their longstanding collaboration in 2017.40 CNES has pursued a close relationship with various private actors reflecting a continent-wide effort supporting the European industry and promoting investments. 39

Yost (1985). The “Suez fiasco” greatly strained the Franco-American relationship, which was later exacerbated by American criticism of French colonial struggles in Algeria. It also significantly stimulated the growing desire within the political elite and a “public acquiescence” towards possession of the nuclear bomb, which would revitalise French prestige and independent influence in world politics. See Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The French Nuclear Energy Program’, January 28th 1960, in National Security Archive (NSA) Electronic Briefing Book (EBB) 184, ‘U.S. Intelligence and the French Nuclear Weapons Program’, Doc.12. 40 Thomas (2017).

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This has been necessarily influenced by the presence in France of many of Europe’s Large System Integrators, such as Airbus, Arianegroup, and Thales Alenia Space. The French’s government expenditure for space program is around e 4,204 billion in 2022.41

3.4.2 German Space Agency The German national space agency, officially the German Aerospace Centre (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt, DLR) was founded in 1969, though its modern iteration was born in 1997 with the merger of its predecessor, the DFVLR, with the DARA. DLR carries out research and development in a wealth of sectors. Effectively, DLR’s research portfolio includes aeronautics, space, transportation, and energy.42 It thus acts as the national space agency of Germany, with its focus primarily rooted in civil science projects. Its main activities range from astrophysics to planetary exploration, Earth observation, manned spaceflight, as well as electric propulsion. Examples of contributions by DLR to flagship mission include the High Resolution Stereo Camera HRSC for ESA’s Mars Express mission, a number of subsystems for the Philae lander in the Rosetta mission, as well as operating the Columbus Control Centre for the European module on the ISS. While DLR’s focus is primarily placed upon civil applications of space exploration, it does carry out defence technology research both in support of the Bundeswehr, the unified armed forces of Germany, and as a means to support technology transfer and discovering of potential synergies. These have most frequently entailed communication and reconnaissance satellites such as SAR-Lupe. However, in September 2020 DLR developed GESTRA (German Experimental Space Surveillance and Tracking Radar), a system designed to track space debris ensuring the safety and security of space assets.43 This is only the latest addition to the EU’s Space Surveillance and Tracking service initiated in 2014, which currently is fed by data from 51 sensors from eight European states. Most recently, rapid progress has been made by DLR in its construction of a new research observatory in Empfingen, which specialises in “fast and precise determination of trajectories and properties of object in near-Earth orbits”, in order to further ensure the safety and security of space assets.44 As has been the case with most Western national space agencies, DLR has developed meaningful connections and cooperation procedures with the German industry, allowing for research outcomes to be transferred into applications efficiently. DLR has not only established partnerships with large system integrators, but also with small 41

Euroconsult (2022) Facts and Figures (DLR) (2021). 43 GESTRA will be operated by the recently-inaugurated Air and Space Operations Centre, set up by the German Ministry of Defence. See DWNews (2020). 44 Nüssle (2021). 42

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and medium-sized innovation businesses. As the national space agency of Germany, DLR is in charge of carrying out the government’s policies, both in terms of its space agenda as well as its industrial development; DLR is effectively the umbrella organisation for Germany’s largest project management agency.45 The German space agency is thus looking to aid the development of a technological basis, keeping Germany competitive vis-à-vis other international actors. The DLR has also established a long-standing collaboration with NASA through bilateral agreements, the most recent of which was concluded in December 2020 extending this partnership for a further ten years. Numerous research activities have been carried out jointly by the two space agencies in a diverse array of fields, including astronautically spaceflight, climate research, remote sensing, and space exploration.46 Key private actors in the German (and European) space sector have benefitted greatly from this enduring collaboration. One such instance is provided by the development of the European Service Module for NASA’s Orion spacecraft, a key milestone for the furthering of exploration missions to the Moon and Mars, manufactured in Europe “under the leadership of Airbus in Bremen.”47 DLR also has a long and successful bilateral collaboration with the Russian Space agency ROSCOSMOS which was abruptly terminated on March 3rd 2022 after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a result of this decision, DLR decided to put on hold the operations of the X-ray telescope e-ROSITA, whose data were jointly exploited by scientists from Russia and from Germany, in collaboration with many other institutions. E-ROSITA was put in safe mode and is not taking data ever since. As regard the national space budget, the German’s government expenditure for space program is around e 2,527 billion in 2022.48

3.4.3 Italian Space Agency The Italian Space Agency (Agenzia Spaziale Italiana, ASI) represents the third largest space agency in Europe. It was founded as a government agency in 1988 in order to coordinate, fund, and regulate national space activities. Despite the relatively late establishment of ASI, Italy had been active in space research and operations from the early 1960s. Indeed, through a collaboration with NASA, Italy became the third country in the world to operate its own satellite, San Marco 1, launched from Wallops Flight Facility by a Scout X-4 managed by the Italian team, on December 15th, 1964.49 Italy’s status as part of the select few states engaging in space exploration resulted in it becoming a founding member of both the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO), 45

ESA—Enabling & Support (2018). Jochemich (2020). 47 Ibid. 48 Euroconsult (2022). 49 Harvey (2003). 46

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established in 1962. These two distinct institutions effectively acted as precursors to the European Space Agency, formally created in 1975 with the merging of ELDO and ESRO. While Italy had been active for more than two decades, its national space agency was formally established only in 1988, borne of the need for a coherent procedural effort in the coordination of national efforts as well as the strengthening of international collaboration. Since its creation, ASI has taken part in a number of large-scale international efforts, both as member of ESA and as an independent actor. One such instance is the Cassini-Huygens mission to Saturn, developed jointly by NASA, ESA, and ASI, wherein the Italian space agency supplied the high-gain antenna and radar sub-system. Another significant contribution to space exploration was the work carried out on the Rosetta mission, which orbited and landed a probe on the comet 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko.50 Furthermore, ASI has been highly active in both Earth observation missions as well as in human spaceflight, for instance coordinating the manufacturing of three cargo containers now on the ISS (Leonardo, Raffaello, and Donatello) by Alcatel Alenia Space, now Thales Alenia Space.51 Responding to the ever-increasing development of the private space industry, ASI has also looked to pursue its institutional and programmatic goals by acting as either minority or majority shareholders in a number of companies. Specifically, ASI controls the Centro Italiano Ricerche Aerospaziali (CIRA), and has minority shareholdings in Aerospace Logistics Technology Engineering Company (ALTEC), SpaceLab, and e-GEOS. Furthermore, ASI has increasingly acted to improve its relationships with private companies, both within and outside of Italy. This has taken the form of both public–private partnerships as well as invitations to tender and procurement contracts. In 2018, Roberto Battiston, then ASI President, stated that “a new frontier of space exploration is now open, and private companies will be leading actors together with space agencies”, further recognising the central role played by private entities in the NewSpace era.52 Italy’s largest investment in Earth observation satellite systems, COSMOSkyMed, is a clear indication of the state’s goals of supporting industrial development within its borders. The dual-use 4-spacecraft constellation, in full operation since 2010 carrying out surveillance activities, was conceived and managed by ASI, with Thales Alenia Space Italy as prime contractor, leading a consortium of smalland medium-sized companies. Telespazio was charged with the development of the constellation’s control centre, and acts as the project’s Ground Segment contractor as well as being responsible for the user’s segments for acquiring, processing, and distributing data.53

50

Amongst the Italian contributions to Rosetta are the VIRTIS instrument, the SD2 system responsible for the Philae Lander’s sampling and drilling. 51 In addition, Alcatel Alenia Space also manufactured the ISS modules of Harmony, Tranquillity and the Cupola for observation on the ISS. 52 Roberto Battiston in Campo (2021). 53 Kramer (2021).

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ASI has thus actively encouraged private investment into the space sector. In addition to direct procurement, the space agency has been instrumental in the establishment of the Primo Space fund in 2020, dedicated to the facilitation of international public and private investments into the Italian space sector managed entirely by Primomiglio SGR. This was defined by ASI as a significant step towards the support and development of the Space Economy, one of the agency’s founding principles.54 Moreover, an extremely relevant contribution to European space capabilities is found in the launcher business, wherein ASI jointly developed the Vega launchers with ESA, acting as leading contributor investing 65% of the budget. Vega launchers, developed by Avio, are designed to launch small payloads thus complementing the Ariane launchers. The support of the Space Economy has been delineated by ASI in the “Document on the Strategic Vision for Space, 2020–2029”, which identified three pillars upon which to renew Italy’s position in the international arena.55 The first recognises the need to support the space sector through ventures and new capital streams. Italy has been successful in obtaining contracts for the development of ROSE-L and CIMR, two high-priority Earth observation missions to be developed by Thales Alenia Space Italy, OHB Italy, and Leonardo, as well as IHAB, the International Habitation Module for the Lunar Gateway.56 The second pillar is the strengthening of effective R&D infrastructures, allowing for competitive advantages to be created for Italian private actors, while the third and final pillar is the enhancement of Italy’s space diplomacy capabilities through increased international collaboration and a renewed focus on dual-use systems. In 2022, Italy allocated 3,083 million euros to the European Space Agency Ministerial, ranking third after Germany and France for mandatory programs and first for optional programs. Apart from its contributions to the European Space Agency, Italy has also made approximately 4,275 million euros available, with 1,487 million euros from the resources of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan. The total public allocation in the national space sector for the upcoming years is estimated to be around 7,360 million euros.57

3.4.4 Evolution of Public Procurement Historically, public funding has been the major source of investment for the space ecosystem, but the subsequent commercialization of the sector has been characterized by a divergence in how public institutions place themselves w.r.t the rest of the market. These differences are evident when comparing public procurement policies in the US with those in the European Union. 54

See ASI (2020). Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (2020). 56 Gili and Fanciulli (2020). 57 MITD (2022) 55

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Before diving into the differences, common background assumptions and dynamics must be highlighted. Firstly, nowadays more and more activities focused on the downstream utility of space technologies are implemented, in addition to midstream infrastructures and services. Then, there is a growing need to show the socio-economic value of the investments in space innovation, supposed to be able to respond to global social challenges, like climate change. In addition, budgetary limits, rising competition, interconnection between the industries and the already mentioned social challenges are some of the most important current and future concerns that nowadays are shaping new procurement policies. Indeed the two players under analysis are confronting these issues in different ways, or at least seem to be at two different stages of the same desired future path. Today, fostering the involvement of private actors in public programs is a dominant strategy of governments and space agencies that are increasingly eager to explore new mechanisms to take advantage of private contributions to engage in future programs and achieve challenging space strategies goals. In addition, their effort to involve the non-space actors in the space value chain would allow the creation of a competitive market not only at national level but also at international level, enhancing the supply of services, applications and products to new and strategic markets. In this context, the global space industry has experienced a steady increase in the relevance of private enterprises, to which public entities and national space agencies responded by adapting their long-established position as the only relevant actors in space. Specifically, there has been an evolution of public procurement schemes financing research and development as well as an increased focus upon cost and risk sharing through public–private partnerships (PPPs). This trend aims at incentivising private investments into the national space industry as well as encouraging the privatisation and even democratisation of access to space. States have thus adapted to the rise of private actors supporting their growth, both through subsidies and partnerships. Indeed, while governments have looked to retain control over key space capabilities, there has been a clear recognition of the potential of the private sector in developing and operating space activities in a wealth of realms, including communications, navigation and Earth observation. PPPs have thus become common in order to expand national space capabilities “at reduced cost and risk.”58 An example of new procurement approach in U.S. was the establishment Commercial Orbital Transportation Service (COTS) and Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) programs managed by the NASA Commercial Crew and Cargo Program (C3PO) office.59 This approach aimed to break the oligopoly of space transport services by encouraging production and efficiency through the application of the Space Act Agreements (SAAs) in COTS and CCDev. This approach was based to the transfer of control of design and development to the contracted firms. In this way, the key milestones and the associated price are defined by the private contractor, which means they must deliver on time in order to receive the payment.60 In addition, with the transfer of ownership and 58

Jones (2018). Mazzuccato (2019). 60 Mazzuccato (2019). 59

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risk to the private actor, NASA purchased transportation services (anchor customer) with the objective to support new private entrants and stimulate the investments of private capital. This emerging approach is so far most evident in U.S. Such a tangible shift in U.S. procurement policy is leading towards a new innovation and competitive ecosystem, characterized by an increased engagement of private actors, thereby changing “NASA’s role from one of orchestrating/directing, to a more facilitating one driven by commercialization needs”. Thus, the major shifts in NASA’s policies resulted in the creation of new markets, a strong support to R&D activities in the downstream sector to develop innovative services and applications, and in the reduction of costs of launcher manufacturing. Major changes in NASA’s policies have resulted in: the privatization of transportation capabilities from Earth to low earth orbit (crew and cargo) and supporting the development of private companies that require high-risk space agency investments. The initiatives encouraged and disseminated the commercialization of innovation in the private sector leading to a significant reduction in operational costs and technical risks, stimulating entrepreneurial investment in commercial applications of space technology and the intervention of private capital, encouraging the increase in non-governmental demand for space applications by reducing the costs of accessing space, changing the traditional contractual approach. The new contractual approach has become a key formula for agreements between NASA and the private sector, with the shift much of the control and design of the technology to the private company (therefore, transfer of risks but also of benefits). The success of US firms (such as SpaceX, Blue Origin and Sierra Nevada) is attributed to a change of paradigm of innovation policies, based mainly on public anchor tenants model which has been applied by NASA, opening the path to multiyear contracts as an anchor tenant for commercial space venture. The anchor tenancy can reduce risk and allow private sector investment combined with public funding when the commercial demand is less strong. Instead, where there is developed commercial demand, private investments are more easily mobilized. While, is case of absence of commercial demand, the fully-public funds should be considered. The commercialisation of space and the central role played by industry in Europe has been supported by both national space agencies as well as ESA. Indeed, the larger space agencies have historically acted as catalysts for the rise of new commercial operators, as was the case with the French space agency’s development of the SPOT Earth observation satellites spawning the creation of the “first commercial operator and dealer for space imagery, the company SPOT Image.”61 Since the 2000s, and indeed with greater intensity after the economic crisis of 2007–2008, the interactions between public and private actors in space has shifted from the traditional public procurement model, wherein a national space agency would assign contracts while retaining complete control of the project’s design and development as well as fully incurring risks and costs, to PPPs. In the latter, private partners are permitted a higher degree of autonomy (as well as retaining intellectual property rights), while 61

Tugnoli and Wells (2019).

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public entities partly transfer development risks to the private sector. Despite the “spectacular failure of the Galileo concession project in 2004–2007”, PPPs progressively became a mainstay for large European projects in Earth observation as well as military and civil satellite communications.62 With increased budgetary limitations on national space activities due to the 2007–2008 economic crisis, “increased outsourcing has been an attractive alternative to public entities and, similarly, as the market and potential for revenue for private companies have grown, so too has commercial viability.”63 The greater focus on PPPs common throughout European states carries clear benefits if the conditions of market maturity and private capability are met. These include a significant increase in cost-efficiency for governments and the continued support for the development of resilient and competitive industrial actors.64 However, one challenge for European space governance is presented by the different set of rules characterising ESA’s geo-return policy and the EU’s public procurement focused on creating a “market that is competitive, open, and well-regulated.”65 With the establishment of the EUSPA, the EU will certainly look to continue taking advantage of the increasing expertise and maturity of European private actors, thus transferring risks and responsibilities while supporting the industry’s further development and increasing cost efficiency.

References Agenzia Spaziale Italiana. (2020). Documento di visione strategica per lo spazio: 2020– 2029 (pp. 2–4). https://www.asi.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/DVSS-2020-2022-Finale_com pressed_compressed.pdf ASI. (2020). Primo Space, il Primo Fondo per l’Economia Spaziale. In ASI. Retrieved January 11, 2021, from https://www.asi.it/2020/07/primo-space-il-primo-fondo-per-leconomia-spaziale/ Becher, K., et al. (2003). Space and security policy in Europe. In Istituto Affari Internazionali (pp. 11–15). Retrieved December 12, 2020, from http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/2003_s pace-and-security-in-europe.pdf Besch, S. (2019). The European Commission in EU Defence Industrial Policy. In Carnegie Europe. Retrieved December 11th, 2020, from https://carnegieendowment.org/files/9-23-19_Besch_ EU_Defense.pdf Campo, A. L. (2018). Battiston: la prossima frontiera dello spazio è la collaborazione con le società private. In La Stampa. Retrieved January 11, 2021, from https://www.lastampa.it/tuttoscienze/ 2018/10/03/news/battiston-la-prossima-frontiera-dello-spazio-e-la-collaborazione-con-le-soc ieta-private-1.37443506 Defence Industry and Space—European Commission (2017). Public procurement. Retrieved January 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/funding-and-grants/publicprocurement_en

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DWNews. (2020). German military launches space junk tracking system. Retrieved January 13th, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/german-military-launches-space-junk-tracking-system/a55002401 ESA—Business Opportunities. (2014). Funding of ESA activities. Retrieved January 14, 2021, from https://www.esa.int/About_Us/Business_with_ESA/Business_Opportunities/ESA_an_int ergovernmental_customer ESA—Enabling & Support. (2018). Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR). Retrieved March 17, 2021, from https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Engineering_Technology/ Deutsches_Zentrum_fuer_Luft-_und_Raumfahrt_DLR ESPI Short Report. (2022). The war in Ukraine from a space cybersecurity perspective. EU-ESA Space Council Revival. (2019). First step toward a European Space Council? In ESPI Briefs (p. 33). Retrieved December 23, 2020, from https://espi.or.at/news/espi-executive-brief33-reflections-on-the-9th-eu-esa-space-council Euroconsult. (2021). Space budgets. https://www.euroconsult-ec.com/press-release/governmentspace-budgets-driven-by-space-exploration-and-militarization-hit-record-92-billion-invest ment-in-2021-despite-covid-with-1-trillion-forecast-over-the-decade/#:~:text=over%20the% 20decade-,Government%20space%20budgets%20driven%20by%20space%20exploration% 20and%20militarization%20hit,trillion%20forecast%20over%20the%20decade Euronsult. (2021). Space economy report (9th ed.). An outlook of the key trends in the global space market. Euroconsult. (2022). https://www.euroconsult-ec.com/press-release/new-record-in-governmentspace-defense-spendings-driven-by-investments-in-space-security-and-early-warning/ European Space Agency. (2020). ESA budget 2020. Retrieved January 11th, 2021, from https:// www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Images/2020/01/ESA_budget_2020 Facts and Figures (DLR). (2021). Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt. Retrieved March 15th, 2021, from https://www.dlr.de/EN/organisation-dlr/media-and-documents/facts/ facts-and-figures.html Foust, J. (2021). ESA and EU mend relations. In SpaceNews. Retrieved January 22, 2021, from https://spacenews.com/esa-and-eu-mend-relations/ Gili, A., & Fanciulli, D. (2020). A strategy for the EU and Italy in the space. In ISPI. Retrieved January 21, 2021, from https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/strategy-eu-and-italy-space28632 Harvey, B. (2003). Europe’s space programme: To ariane and beyond (pp. 110–118). Springer Science & Business Media. Jochemich, M. (2020). NASA and DLR strength cooperation. In Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt. Retrieved March 17, 2021, from https://www.dlr.de/content/en/articles/news/2020/ 04/20201217_nasa-and-dlr-strengthen-cooperation.html Jones, K. L. (2018). Public-private partnerships: Stimulating innovation in the space sector. In The aerospace corporation (p. 3.). https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/Partnersh ips_Rev_5-4-18.pdf Kramer, H. J. (2021). COSMO-SkyMed. In eoPortal. Retrieved March 17, 2021, from https://dir ectory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/c-missions/cosmo-skymed Mazzuccato, M. (2019). The evolution of mission-oriented policies: Exploring changing market creating policies in the US and European space sector. Research Policy MITD. (2022). https://innovazione.gov.it/notizie/articoli/spazio-siglate-le-convenzioni-pnrr-conesa-e-asi/ Nardon, L., & Venet, C. (2011). The development of public-private partnerships in the European sitcom sector. In Actuelles de l’Ifri (p. 1). Retrieved January 21, 2021, from https://www.ifri. org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/europeandspaceseries4ppps.pdf NCI Agency. (2019). NCI Agency provides critical support to development of new NATO space policy. Retrieved January 20, 2021, from https://www.ncia.nato.int/about-us/newsroom/nci-age ncy-provides-critical-support-to-development-of-new-nato-space-policy.html

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North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. (2020a). NATO’s approach to space. Retrieved January 20, 2021, from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_175419.htm#:~:text=In%2020a19% 2C%20Allies%20adopted%20NATO’s,as%20communications%2C%20navigation%20and% 20intelligence North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. (2020b). NATO begins using enhanced satellite services. Retrieved January 20, 2021, from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/173310.htm?selectedL ocale=en Nüssle, D. (2021). DLR research observatory takes delivery of telescope and dome. In Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt. Retrieved March 17, 2021, from https://www.dlr.de/content/ en/articles/news/2021/01/20210305_dlr-research-observatory-takes-delivery-of-telescopeand-dome.html Papadimitriou, A., et al. (2019). Perspective on space and security policy, programmes and governance in Europe. Acta Astronautica, 161, 189 (183–191) Sagath, D., et al. (2019). Development of national space governance and policy trends in member states of the European Space Agency. Acta Astronautica, 165(2019), 43–53. Teffer, P. (2019). EU commissioner floats idea for European space force. In EUObserver. Retrieved December 22, 2020, from https://euobserver.com/foreign/143981 Thales Group. (2015). Sicral 2, the French-Italian defence and security telecom satellite, reaches Guiana space centre launch site. Retrieved January 20, 2021, from https://www.thalesgroup. com/en/worldwide/space/press-release/sicral-2-french-italian-defense-and-security-telecomsatellite-reaches Thomas, K. (2017). NASA signs cooperative agreement with CNES”. In NASA leadership. Retrieved March 17th, 2021, from https://www.nasa.gov/image-feature/nasa-signs-cooperative-agreem ent-with-cnes Tugnoli, M., &Wells, L. (2019). Evolution of the role of space agencies. In ESPI (p. 2). https://espi. or.at/news/new-espi-report-evolution-of-the-role-of-space-agencies (Report 70) Yost, D. S. (1985). France’s deterrent posture and security in Europe, part I: Capabilities and doctrine. In Adelphi paper no.194 (p. 4). International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Chapter 4

On the Consequences of European Fragmentation

4.1 Institutional Fragmentation The fragmented nature of European space governance has caused political and technical inefficiencies throughout the years, owing to the fractured, biased and unilateral space vision of the actors involved as well as to duplication of programmes. Despite the further integration of the European space industry being amongst the main goals of the EU as well as ESA, and despite the recognition of the need for meaningful international cooperation in space amongst their member states, European space governance and policy remain fragmented.

4.1.1 Coordination of Member State Activities Mitigation efforts tackling the institutional fragmentation between the European space institutions and their member states have also been established. Indeed, both ESA and especially the EU have set up mechanisms promoting a more profound integration and pooling of capabilities between different European states and their private actors. The recognition of the need for integration of activities was a key feature of the 2007 European Space Policy, endorsed by the Fourth Space Council and thus supported by both ESA and the EU. In order to strengthen Europe’s position in the global space industry, the resolution of the council not only invited the EC, ESA, and their respective member states to pursue a joint strategy and establish coordination mechanisms, but also call for an increase in “synergy between national,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Caraveo and C. Iacomino, Europe in the Global Space Economy, SpringerBriefs in Space Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36619-2_4

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ESA and EU contributions to [space] programmes leading progressively to an integrated programmatic approach.”1 Thus, European Space Policy since the mid-2000s has looked to foster better coordination of (civil) space activities between the EU, ESA and their member states, “to maximise value for money and avoid unsustainable duplication, thus meeting shared European needs.”2 While historically the defence sector had been left untouched by the EU’s attempts to foster market integration, the Commission has recently looked to “counter the problems of fragmentation, duplication, and protectionism that beset the European defence market.”3 Indeed, through the European Defence Fund (EDF) created in 2017, the EU has attempted to promote research and development on defence capabilities through a more efficient cooperative approach, with a clear spillover effect on the military space sector. The EDF provided sufficient momentum for the creation of the Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS), which is not only in charge of the implementation and oversight of the EDF, but has also been tasked with the fostering of a resilient and autonomous European space industry. The uncoordinated national security policies and the lack of a unified defence policy, borne of the institutional fragmentation in Europe, have necessarily caused the fragmentation of the European space market, further assessed below.4 DG DEFIS has been set up to tackle the segmentation of funds, capabilities, and expertise across the EU member states both in space as in defence. In addition, as stated in the Space Strategy for Europe, DG DEFIS will foster a higher degree of integration by promoting procedures at national and regional level supporting standardisation measures and roadmaps established by the EU.5 Whether DG DEFIS will successfully promote meaningful coordination in defence space activates among the EU’s member states remains to be determined, though it is clear that the EU has set this as one of its primary goals to be carried out in tandem with the EDA within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy.6

1

“Outcome of proceedings of the Council (Competitiveness) on 21–22 May 2007—Resolution on the European Space Policy”, Council of the European Union, ST 10037/07, May 25th, 2007, available at . 2 “N° 21–2007: Europe’s Space Policy becomes a reality today”, ESA Press Release, May 22nd, 2007, last accessed December 30th, 2020, . 3 Besch, supra, note 4, p. 1. 4 See Sommariva (2020). 5 Space Strategy for Europe, supra, note 12. 6 See Kolczy´ nski (2018).

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4.1.2 Consequences on the Market 4.1.2.1

Earth Observation Case

The institutional fragmentation of the European space sector detailed above carries noticeable consequences on the levels of cross-border integration in various segments of the space industry. Earth observation (EO) as well as the sharing of and access to remote sensing data provides an example of market fragmentation in Europe, which is discussed in detail in this section. EO encompasses together with Galileo and EGNOS the primary focus of European space, in terms of both investment and its potential profitability through downstream services and applications in diverse industries.7 On the one hand, EO activities are fundamentally related to security and defence operations, which as is argued below has profound effects on the national and international legislations in Europe. On the other hand, remote sensing activities have the potential of significantly bolstering the diplomatic prowess and soft power of the operating states, which has played a key role in shaping the EU’s interest and approach to Copernicus, one of its flagship programmes. Whenever working with data, several questions arise, such as what is a data, who “owns” such information, how they can be retrieved, how can data be used, who can access to them and how, and many others. Unfortunately, there is no unique answer to such questions, as there can be as many solutions as number of legislations. It is generally observed that the international community requires open access of data collected through remote sensing activities and in line with the OST general principles contained in Article I (“The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development […]”).8 However, it is mandatory to counterbalance such principle of freedom with the terrestrial legislations on use of personal information, especially when dealing with EO, since the acquired data might interfere with privacy rights of individuals. Some Countries adopted legislations governing the use of data collected through EO activities, attempting to regulate what currently appears to be a major legislation gap; however, the vast majority of Countries still does not have appropriate laws. From an international point of view, non-governmental space actors dealing with data do not have to comply with International legal principles, since they bind only States. However, pursuant to Article VI of the OST, States will have to provide with an authorisation and control mechanism over non-governmental activities and shall be responsible for them before the international community. It can be seen how this affects private actors, since a State could adopt a legislation which, further to regulating their space activities, provides a compensation mechanism, in case their 7 e5.8 billion out of the total e14.8 billion on the EU’s space budget are allotted to Copernicus, and EO activities received the largest backing from ESA’s member states at the Seville Ministerial conference in late 2019. 8 Harris and Baumann (2021).

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actions caused the State to breach international obligations and held internationally liable.9 However, Article VI of OST does not provide with specific guidance as to their implementation, meaning that Countries can be relatively free to adopt provisions as they think it is best. For example, amongst those State adopting a national legislation as to the use of data from EO activities, just the US, Canada, Japan and Germany have a system of authorisation and control through a licensing framework over non-governmental activities. Differently, in France there is no authorisation system, instead a private actor is required to simply notify the State of any planned activity before effectively undertaking it. Nevertheless, scholars identified red threads behind the existing national initiatives governing EO.10 First, it has been observed that few Countries adopted legislations on data policies; this number is believed to increase in the next few years, since more States have now access to Earth observation systems. Furthermore, due to the novelty of the matter as well as of the questions stemming from the phenomenon, it has been observed that a Country drafting a new bill will tend to look at what has been previously done by other States;11 this can be regarded as beneficial and should be encouraged, since it promotes homogeneity amongst national legislations. A third red threat is represented by tech development, as the more advanced the instruments and resources available to and within a certain Country, the more its legislation needs to be sophisticated. Furthermore, it is believed that the involvement of private actors will play an important role in shaping a State position. Since a lot of freedom is left by the OST to States when drafting bills about EO data, the following part of the paragraph will concentrate on two fundamental choices States will have to make: (1) the access to data, and (2) privacy rights. As to the first aspect, legislations will probably have to assess whether to put conditions on access to data or not. For the purpose of this analysis will be taken into consideration the United States Geological Survey (‘USGS’), which in 2008 adopted a Landsat free and open data policy.12 It has been observed that such a measure encouraged access from users, allowing all the economic sectors to benefit from data.13 Scholars identified several benefits from an open access data policy; in the first place, no access costs mean open door to competitivity within the communities, since even actors from a less rich background can access to data and take part in scientific and economic advancement. Generally, no costs also mean more engagement with

9

Ibidem. Ibidem. 11 For a detailed analysis of national legislation as to EO data and general legal principles applicable to data and privacy see Kozuka and Terada (2020a) and Harris (2021). 12 Woodcock et al. (2008) in Zhu et al. (2019). 13 Roy et al. (2014), Wulder et al. (2012) and Wulder et al. (2018) in Zhu et al. Benefits of the free and open Landsat data policy. 10

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Fig. 4.1 Benefits of the free and open Landsat data policy. Table extracted from Wulder et al.

data, hence more publication and higher literature production, as it is shown by Fig. 4.1.14 From a practical point of view, free access to Landsat data favoured the activity of the US Landsat Global Archive Consolidation, whose mission is to collect Landsat data not in the US archive from international cooperation stations, so making historical data accessible at no cost.15 Furthermore, open access policy has been taken as a reference by other International projects, such as the European Copernicus; the subsequent spreading of data and variety of users stimulated the need of data from different providers able to interoperate though standard policies and requirement,16 which scholars sustain to be impossible to realise without free access data policies. Although it seems reasonable to conclude that open access data policies would be extremely beneficial for the scientific as well as economic community, since it creates a collaborative network of data, it also appears important that the use of data be regulated by States, in order to balance free market, information and scientific developments with privacy rights of individuals. Issues as to privacy and sensible data arising from EO activities can be managed in two ways: either a State passes a legislation regulating privacy and EO data complying with the its fundamental principles and international obligation, or—lacking any national legislation—EO data are to be treated as any other data pursuant to the laws already in force in the jurisdiction. This paragraph will focus only on the second scenario, due to the peculiarities likely to arise. Although the current images resolution from EO does not allow to identify a person yet (but it might in the future), some scholars think that the current images can be 14

Table extracted from Wulder et al., Opening the archive: how free data has enabled the science and monitoring promise of Landsat in Zhu et al., Benefits of the free and open Landsat data policy. 15 Zhu et al., Benefits of the free and open Landsat data policy. 16 Ibidem.

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enough to elaborate big data, whose interpretation could indeed identify and profile an individual.17 This represents a major issue, since local data legislations discipline the profiling each in a different way; it could mean that a data user will have to deal with a huge variety of laws on privacy and will have to comply with them all.18 As a way of example, in the European Union19 the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’) declares that individuals’ privacy rights are a human fundamental right pursuant to Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and pursuant to Article 16 TFEU; also, the GDPR provides for an elaborate distinction of personal data and automated decisions including profiling, whose rightful use by data processors, or data controllers, and third parties must depend on a data subject’s consent. This might mean that a data user who did not obtain a data subject’s consent would be prevented from using data for certain purposes, so some of the user’s activities might be impossible to undertake as to GDPR. While in the EU personal data and privacy are humans fundamental rights by mean of GDPR, in the US personal data are not considered as such, they are instead an economic good suitable to be purchased and which generally depend on contractual clauses and provisions between the parties. A further difference is that the US has not a unified legislation as to personal data, instead several federal legislations which need to be considered, and such different perspectives might be of some detriment to, or at least might slow down, the interoperability of data collected through EO activities.

4.1.3 Earth Observation Lack of an International Regulatory Framework and the European Approaches Earth observation activities have a long history, with the first operations being carried out by the US with CORONA satellites for security and surveillance during the early 1960s, while the first commercially available satellite images came with the launch of SPOT 1 in 1986.20 Despite a half a century long saga, an international regulatory framework legislating on EO practices and operations has never been agreed upon, thus giving rise to a multitude of national regulations adopting diverse approaches and definitions. The most relevant soft law document which set out to provide some direction in EO activities is the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth 17

Kozuka and Terada (2020b). Ibidem. 19 The GDPR is part of the retained legislation in the United Kingdom with no substantial amendments, hence the UK can be considered as falling under the EU umbrella for the purposes of this specific example. 20 SPOT 1, developed by the French government and CNES, first used a commercial model for image distribution, thus making detailed images available worldwide. Amongst the most significant were the 10-m resolution images taken by SPOT 1 of Reactor 4 at Chernobyl nuclear power plant after the meltdown. See Denis et al. (2017). 18

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from Outer Space, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1986.21 Here, useful, yet not universally accepted, definitions distinguishing between “primary data”, “processed data”, and “analysed information” are provided in Principle I. Essentially, the first term refers to the raw data collected through remote sensing; they then undergoe processing allowing usability (transforming raw into processed data), and finally become information once “an interpretation of the processed data” is carried out.22 While the UN Remote Sensing Principles are not legally binding, they have served to influence the normative definitions and approaches used in national legislations, such as the US Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 as well as the Canadian Remote Sensing Space Systems Act of 2005.23 Indeed, both of these have adopted a similar distinction between data and information based upon the degree of processing. While these may appear as semantic differences, the accurate codification and identification of the degree of processing of data has far-reaching consequences in terms of its copyright ability and therefore ease of access and dissemination.24 Amongst the three primary European spacefaring states, France, Germany, and Italy, the former two have approached the issue of the dissemination of EO data with their own national legislation, while Italy has no specific legislation on EO data nor any Space law. Notably, the French national law of 2008 does not follow the UN Principles on Remote Sensing in the identification of datasets based upon their level of processing. French legislators chose not to provide a definition or a distinction between data and information, and indeed only focussed upon the obligations of “primary space data operators”, defined as “any individual or legal entity programming a satellite system for Earth observation or receiving Earth observation data from space.”25 Under French law, EO activities possessing technical characteristics concerning “the resolution, the accuracy of location, the observation frequency bands and the quality of the Earth observation data” must declare such activity to the relevant administrative authority.26 This authority must then assess the sensitivity of the data (and information) produced in relation to the “fundamental interests of the Nation, in particular to national defence, to the foreign policy, and to the international undertakings of France.”27 Should the activity be judged as prejudicial to such issues, restrictions and limitations may be placed upon the operators. 21

UNOOSA (1986). Ibid. 23 “Land Remote Sensing Policy Act”, passed into law October 28th, 1992, Congress.Gov, H.R.6133, , last accessed May 25th, 2021, and “Remote Sensing Space Systems Act”, assented to on November 25th, 2005, Canada—Justice Laws Website, S.C. 2005, c. 45, , last accessed May 25th, 2021. 24 See Borghi (2021a). 25 “LOI no 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales”, translated by Bernhard and Arnold (2008). 26 Ibid., Article 24. 27 Ibid. 22

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The approach undertaken by France was very much in line with the German national law on remote sensing data, adopted in 2007 and abbreviated as SatDSiG.28 On the one hand, in an effort to foster the “civil use and commercialisation of remote sensing” through the maximisation of the data flow to scientific and commercial users as well as establishing legal certainty, the German legislation disregards qualitative differences between the definitions of raw or processed data and information as proposed in the UN Remote Sensing Principles.29 EO data is thus as “signals from one or more sensors […] and all products derived from them, regardless of the degree of their processing and the way in which they are stored or displayed.”30 On the other hand, the law’s primary purpose is to preserve the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany and protect against the security risks arising from the dissemination of “high-grade Earth remote sensing data”.31 In essence, limitations are placed upon the dissemination of data (or information) categorised as sensitive through the application of an algorithm. This process assesses six criteria listed below in order to determine whether dissemination might lead to security or foreign policy risks. The evaluation examines: • • • • • •

Information content of the individual data product Target area represented/surveyed by the data product Time period between data generation and supply to the customer Time of the data generation Ground segments to which the data are to be transmitted Individual customer.32

The application of the German law is limited only to first-level dissemination carried out by primary data distributors as opposed to remote sensing service providers, value-adding firms, or data resellers, though some indirect effects on downstream customers such as delays and limited access are inevitable.33 In contrast to France and Germany, Italy has not yet passed a law directly regulating the dissemination of EO data. However, Italy was amongst the first states to adopt an “open by default” practice in its dissemination of government-owned or –produced data, including but not limited to EO activities. Thus, Italian national agencies are required to disseminate data openly and without limitations unless justified by verifiable motivations as to why relevant data is restricted. “Open by default” was set as a core tenet for Italian public administrations by Article 52 of the 2005 Digital Administration Code, with the access and reutilisation of publically-held data 28

“Gesetz zum Schutz vor Gefährdung der Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland durch das Verbreiten von hochwertigen Erdfernerkundungsdaten (Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz— SatDSiG)”, issued on November 23rd, 2007, Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, BGBI. IS. 2590, , last accessed June 9th, 2021. [Hereinafter SatDSiG]. 29 Schneider (2010). 30 SatDSiG, supra, note 9, author’s translation. 31 See Gerhard and Bernard (2008). 32 Schneider, supra, note 10. 33 See von der Dunk (2009).

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and information regulated by the Legislative Decree No. 36 of January 24th, 2006.34 The principle was further reinforced first by the 2014–2020 Digital Transformation Strategy and later by the 4th National Action Plan for Open Government, which set out to further Italy’s Open Data capabilities by “simplifying the way users can access information on key issues such as the environment” by “developing and promoting evolved web services to facilitate the use of the [Freedom of Information Act] and other forms of citizen access (i.e. access to environmental information).”35 Accordingly, Italy (together with France but not Germany) was amongst the original signatories of the International Open Data Charter, formed in 2015 and pushing the principle of “open by default” as well as full and open access to timely, comprehensive, and interoperable government-owned and –produced data.36 The national approaches of these three states to the issue of EO data dissemination and restrictions thereof share some similarities as well as differences with the policies of the two major European space institutions, the EU and ESA. Indeed, at least until the deployment of Copernicus, the legislative power of the EU in regards to EO data was limited to activities which were covered by primary or secondary European Community law, thus in other words “all economic activities proper.” By extension, and unsurprisingly, the scope of EU policies could not override national interests, such as those related to military or foreign policy considerations.37 However, the last two decades saw the EU become also directly involved in space activities, first through Galileo and later with Copernicus. Consequently, the data policy for the EO activities carried out under Copernicus was drawn up at European level by the Commission in 2010, later supplemented with an EU regulation in 2013.38 Thus, on the one hand the principle of free and open access to data was established in EU law, with no limitations on use or users, both amongst member 34

“DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 7 marzo 2005, n. 82, Codice dell’amministrazione digitale”, March 7th, 2005, Gazzetta Ufficiale Della Repubblica Italiana , last accessed June 9th, 2021, and “DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 24gennaio 2006, n. 36, Attuazione della direttiva 2003/98/CE relativa al riutilizzo di documenti nel settore pubblico”, January 24th, 2006, , last accessed June 9th, 2021. 35 “4th National Action Plan for Open Government”, June 2019, Governo Italiano—Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri—Dipartimento della Funzione Pubblica, , p. 12, last accessed June 9th, 2021. See also “Strategia per la Crescita Digitale”, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, March 3rd, 2015, , last accessed June 9th, 2021. 36 See ODC (2015). 37 Von der Dunk, supra, note 14, p. 410. 38 “Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1159/2013 of 12 July 2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 911/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Earth monitoring programme (GMES) by establishing registration and licensing conditions for GMES users and defining criteria for restricting access to GMES dedicated data and GMES service information”, Official Journal of the European Union, , last accessed June 14th, 2021.

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states of the EU as well as third countries and international organisations.39 On the other, restrictions to the dissemination of data are envisaged. Similarly to the national approaches of France and Germany, restrictions may be applied by the Commission upon the dissemination of data presenting an “unacceptable degree of risk to the security interests of the Union or its member states” based upon the system’s technical capabilities.40 Furthermore, the Commission may also restrict access to Copernicus data and information services wherein their open dissemination may give rise to conflicts with international agreements or the protection of intellectual property rights […] or would affect in a disproportionate manner the rights and principles recognized in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, such as the right for private life or the protection of personal data.41 Earth observation activities play an undoubtedly pivotal role in the European space industry, and have therefore been a focus of EU policy for many years. Specifically, amongst the EU’s primary goals was and continues to be the establishment and maintenance of a level playing field in Europe, in other words protecting the Internal Market. In the early-to-mid 1990s, the potential of intellectual property rights over EO data to be used as “anti-competitive tools” became a cause for concern for the Commission, as exclusive access to data could be bought and sold by individual European companies. This could result in the carving up of “the Internal Market into nationally separated markets in contravention of relevant EU principles.”42 Thus, in order to limit the possibility where the protection extended to commercial operators would differ amongst the member states due to diverse approaches to the copyright ability of EO data and its by-products, a sui-generis database protection was implemented in 1996.43 The Directive essentially extended protection of those datasets whose individual components could not be copyrighted individually. In other words, copyright law in civil law systems usually functions through the originality criterion; the collection of raw data does not meet the minimum requirement of human creativity in order to be covered by the scope of copyright.44 The different jurisdiction of the Internal Market, not to mention the common law approach of the UK, would thus present an unacceptable danger to the homogeneity of the EU. Thus, the sui-generis database protection sought to harmonise the rights of Earth observation operators throughout Europe, seeking to level the intellectual property rights playing field.45 39

See Borghi, supra, note 5, pp. See EU Regulation No. 1159/2013, Article 12, supra, note 19. The technical specifications which may cause data to be classed as sensitive are listed in the regulation’s annex. 41 Ibid., Article 11. 42 Von der Dunk, supra, note 14, p. 429. 43 “Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases”, March 11th, 1996, Official Journal of the European Communities, , Article 7, last accessed June 15th, 2021. 44 See for instance World Intellectual Property Organization IP Portal (1996). 45 See Gaudrat and Tuinder (1997). 40

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Notwithstanding the EU’s recent interest in EO activities and related data policies, European approaches had been previously carried out by both ESA as well as EUMETSAT. Indeed, ESA has been active in EO activities since as early as the 1980s with the deployment of the two European Remote Sensing Satellites (ERS-1 and ERS-2). In line with the key non-discriminatory tenets included in the UN’s Remote Sensing Principles, access to data from these two satellites was to be open to states though, importantly, ESA held full rights over the data through copyright and could therefore restrict dissemination should it so wish. Non-discriminatory access was thus ensured through licensing system requiring states to pay fees in order to receive data. In 1998, with the advent of ESA’s Envisat program, a new data policy was drawn up which, while compliant with the principles established by the UN Remote Sensing Principles, allowed for categorisation of uses for the data required. In essence, “Category 1” uses included research and applications development support, while “Category 2” included everything else, such as commercial uses. Thus, while access to data for the former category would only require a fee “at or near the cost of reproduction of the data”, ESA reserved itself the right to “fix the price of data at which it will be sold to distributing entities who are then allowed to set their own (higher) prices when selling the data further on.”46 After ad-hoc policies focusing on specific projects, ESA established a unified data policy in 2010 for the dissemination of EO data and information deriving from ESA missions, specifically Envisat, ERS-1, ERS-2, GOCE, SMOS, CryoSat, and Explorer.47 The foundational principle of this new approach was the full and open access previously established in the Sentinel Data Policy adopted as part of Copernicus in 2009. Under this revised data access policy, the differentiation between “data” and “information” present in the UN Remote Sensing Principles is dropped in favour of the establishment of two EO datasets: the “free dataset” available online and the “restrained dataset” which includes collections not available online such as “on-demand products or on-demand data acquisition.”48 While both are free of charge, access to the latter requires a project proposal submitted to ESA in order to justify specific user requests or access to SAR data from ERS and Envisat (not made available online due to technical constraints).49 Finally, a third European approach to EO data dissemination and distribution is encompassed by EUMETSAT’s data policy. Since the establishment of the first EUMETSAT data policy in 1991, there have been numerous amendments and alterations, with the most recent coming into force in January 2019.50 The policy establishes that access to meteorological data and information (referred to 46

Von der Dunk, supra, note 14, pp. 424–425. See also Harris (2002). European Space Agency (2011). 48 Ibid. 49 “ESA Data Policy for ERS, Envisat and Earth Explorer missions”, unclassified version of October 2012, European Space Agency, , last accessed June 16th, 2021. 50 “EUMETSAT Data Policy”, EUMETSAT, last amended on 1st January 2021, , last accessed June 16th, 2021. [Hereinafter 47

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as “products”) is to be provided on a non-discriminatory basis as set out in the UN Remote Sensing Principles and recalled in the Oslo Declaration of 2009 adopted by EUMETSAT.51 More specifically, in this most recent iteration, EUMETSAT data and products are divided into “essential” and “non-essential”. The former category include EUMETSAT’s “Hourly Meteosat Data, all Derived Products, and Advance Image Products”, which are to be made available “to all users world-wide on a free and unrestricted basis.”52 In contrast, the “non-essential” category includes all other data and products, to be made available through licensing mechanisms dependent on which users request access to data.53 Thus, three users with different rights to various datasets and services are identified: National Meteorological Services (NMSs) of member states, NMSs of nonmember states, and all other users. Member states receive EUMETSAT data free of charge for their “Official Duty use”, defined as “all activities which take place within the organisation of a NMS and external activities of a NMS resulting from legal, governmental or intergovernmental requirements relating to defence, civil aviation and the safety of life and property.”54 On the contrary, member states wishing to access data for commercial activities will be required to pay fees, as will non-member states for any data or services which are not included in those made available to their NMSs for their Official Duty use.55 The fragmentation of European approaches to the dissemination of EO data should be apparent considering the different approaches taken not only by the most active states (France and Germany), but also by the three most important international institutions carrying out Earth observation activities in Europe. While harmonisation efforts have been attempted by the EU through its Copernicus programme pushing forth the principle of free and open access as well as through the sui-generis database protection, the different memberships of the EU, ESA, and EUMETSAT necessarily dampens the integration attempts, instead favouring a fragmented and complex system of national and international policies. Furthermore, each approach to the distribution of EO data reveal the political, economic, and strategic priorities of their entities. On the one hand, the EU’s focus is placed upon the construction and maintenance of a level playing field in Europe, and is coupled with the benefits to the diplomatic and soft-power capabilities of the Union through their adoption of Open Data practices for Copernicus (despite the potential for restrictions on security grounds). On the other, the national laws of France and Germany suggest that the increase in quality and resolution of commercial EUMETSAT Data Policy] All EUMETSAT resolutions and relevant declarations are collected in an open online document. See “Council Resolutions and Declarations”, EUMETSAT, July 2020, , last accessed June 16th, 2021. 51 “Oslo Declaration”, March 27th, 2009, , June 16th, 2021. 52 EUMETSAT Data Policy, supra, note 31, Article 4. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., Principle I. 55 Ibid, Principles III and V.

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EO products has spurred regulators’ willingness to ensure that any dissemination of data will not be against the state’s interests. Specifically, both states have highlighted the security concerns arising from unchecked access to EO, and have thus acted to maintain undiluted sovereignty over their individual security interests through legislations. It is thus not surprising that limitations and restrictions within the market for EO data have been largely spurred on by the practice of “shutter control” – describing (mostly regulatory) means through which the collection and distribution of sensitive EO data is monitored by states.56 Indeed, as evinced by Harris and Baumann, shutter control regulations are common factors in fostering access restrictions. Other than intellectual property rights, limitations to the dissemination of EO data usually arise from considerations regarding international relations and foreign policy, national security, defence, and national legislation.57 While this aspect is not unique to Europe, and despite European efforts to spur a more meaningful integration of defence policies, EU member states have historically determined “their own policies, policy directions, and approaches, and may also determine whether such a policy or policy direction is better served by implementing it on a domestic level.”58 On the one hand, domestic defence policies continue to place a damper on European integration, favouring fragmentation in space both at the institutional and commercial level. On the other, it appears clear that some progress has been made towards a more unitary visions for European space. Prior to the EU’s interest in pushing forth European EO activities and practices, member states were more likely to take unilateral action in sectors not solely related to defence: the development of SPOT 1 by France and more specifically their unilateral decision to privatise SPOTImage’s downstream activities, thus making EO data commercially available, is but one example.

4.1.4 Consequences on Diplomacy Indeed, each actor influencing European space policy is represented separately in international for a; this diplomatic incongruence is clearly borne of the “governance triangle” and institutional fragmentation between the EU, ESA, and their member states.59 For instance, at UNCOPUOS each individual European state is represented by its own delegation, while ESA and the EU are permanent observers. However, while ESA has been an observer since 1975, the EU had not enjoyed the same rights until 2018, when it succeeded in its goal of “upgrading its participation”, thus also becoming a permanent observer.60 The Union was effectively granted rights similar 56

Fleur (2003) and Waldrop (2004). See also Borghi (2021b). Harris and Baumann (2015). 58 Von der Dunk, supra, note 14, p. 412. 59 See Wouters and Hansen (2013). 60 Ibid. 57

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to those it holds in the UN General Assembly, wherein it is distinguished from normal observers due to its right to speak early amongst other regional organisations, propose amendments during sessions, circulate communications as well as exercise the right of reply.61 At UNCOPUOS, the presentation of EU activities is carried out after coordination with the member states “in the framework of the competences of the EU and will not affect the work of the EU member states and the ESA in the work of COPUOS.”62 Within the scope of wide-raging policy statements on topics such as the need to support multilateralism, international cooperation, and sustainability, the lack of a unitary vision is less apparent as the EU representatives have spoken on behalf of the EU and its member states.63 However, the institutional fragmentation within Europe becomes clear when assessing the behaviour of the three main actors on more specific and controversial aspects. One such example is provided by the issue of space mining. There appears to be little agreement between European states as to the best approach and timeliness of international discussions for the establishment of an international regime, with countries such as Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy all displaying very different goals. The signing of the Artemis Accords by some EU or ESA members underscored “the current lack of a joint European space diplomatic posture. Actually privileging their sovereignty, European actors act individually according to their own interests, […] affecting internationally the perception of Europe as the coherent, unified space power.”64

4.1.5 Consequences on Industrial and Programmatic Efficiency Institutional fragmentation has necessarily lessened the industrial and programmatic efficiency of the continental industry, resulting in the duplication of programmes and stunted potential for technology transfer. Doubtlessly the most blatant example of duplication of services and efforts is the result of the failure of the United Kingdom to reach an agreement with the EU for their continued participation in the Galileo programme after their withdrawal from the Union. While with the Brexit deal signed 61

The EU holds “enhanced participatory rights” in the UNGA, gained in 2011. See “Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on May 3rd, 2011: Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations”, A/RES/65/276. 62 “UNISPACE + 50: Thematic Priority 1, Future roles of COPUOS and UNOOSA and EU status as permanent Observer within COPUOS”, Council of the European Union, Item Note 5684/18, February 1st, 2018. 63 See for instance “Statement on the occasion of the fifty-seventh session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”, European Union, February 3rd–14th, 2020, last accessed December 13th, 2020, available at . 64 ESPI (2020).

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in December 2020 the UK retained the right to participate in Copernicus, their participation in Galileo ended.65 Until September 2020, the UK was planning the development of a national Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), as Brexit and the lack of an agreement resulted in their inability to use the Galileo’s secure navigation service (Public Regulated Service). While the project was mothballed due to the extremely high costs involved, the British government has announced the pursuit of “new and alternative ways” to deliver independent satellite navigation to the UK.66 Thus, while the country remains an active member of ESA with a significant increase in funding announced at the Space19 + Ministerial Council of 2019, their withdrawal from the EU has clearly increased the institutional fragmentation of the European space governance as well as reduced the continent’s programmatic and industrial efficiency.67 Similar processes have been especially common in the defence sector throughout Europe, where the willingness to retain full sovereignty over national programmes has inevitably led to duplication of capabilities. Thus, lacklustre expenditures throughout the member states of the EU spurred efforts aimed at furthering integration, as well as to “advocate more coherent and interoperable military capabilities, and avoid further duplication in the research and development of weapon systems.”68 Due to the increasing criticality of space systems for defence, as well as the 2019 NATO declaration recognising space as an operational domain of warfare, this inefficiency is reflected in the development of national satellite and ground component related to security in and from space. Thus, while the EU looks to further its Common Security and Defence Policy with space-based systems becoming increasingly important, duplication in security activities amongst individual states abounds. One clear example is in surveillance and intelligence-gathering satellites operated by France (Helios), Italy (COSMO-SkyMed), the UK (TopSat and Carbonite-2) amongst others.69 Furthermore, industrial inefficiency borne of the institutional fragmentation of the European space landscape is also dependent upon the differing financial rules of the EU and ESA. On the one hand, the EU consistently argues in favour of competitive bidding in order to develop a resilient and globally competitive European industry. 65

It should be borne in mind that Galileo is financed in its entirety by the EU, as opposed to the mixed participation characterising Copernicus with ESA funding the initial satellites. See Foust (2020). 66 Press Release of September 24th, 2020, “Government to explore new ways of delivering ‘sat nav’ for the UK”, last accessed December 14th, 2020, available at . 67 The UK is the fourth largest funder of ESA, having agreed to contribute £374 million per annum for 5 years in 2019, a 15% increase from the previous round of funding. See Hollinger and Parker (2019). 68 Csernatoni (2020). 69 An attempt was made to develop a unified system guaranteeing mutual access between national defence observation systems in 2006 with MUSIS (Multinational Space-based Imaging System), through this was short-lived. The project has been continued on a bilateral basis between France and Italy, with little success in overcoming the widespread duplication of satellite surveillance systems.

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On the other, ESA’s geo-return industrial policy, stipulating that government funding in ESA will effectively be returned to the respective national industries by way of procurement contracts, is used not only as an incentive for investment but as a tool to further development throughout all member states. Thus, it is clear why smaller member governments are fearful of the abandoning of geo-return as the Italian, French, and German large system integrators would likely win most ESA contracts. While the support of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is a policy goal for both ESA and the EU, the competitiveness of the national industries to which contracts are awarded must be ensured so as to avoid multinational duplication in capabilities and expertise.

References Bernhard, S.-T., & Arnold, I. (2008). The French Act relating to space activities from international law idealism to national industrial pragmatism. ESPI, ESPI Perspectives 11 (Original available at Legifrance, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT0 00018931380, Article 23). Borghi, M. (2021a). Towards full and open access: challenges and opportunities for the legal interoperability of earth observation data. Journal of Space Law, 45(1), 2021. Borghi, M. (2021b). The world below: The need for free and open data in earth observation activities. SpaceNews Magazine. April 2021b Issue. https://spacenews.com/op-ed-the-world-below-theneed-for-free-and-open-data-in-earth-observation-activities/ Csernatoni, R. (2020). EU security and defence challenges: Toward a European defence winter? Carnegie Europe. Retrieved December 14, 2020, from https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/11/ eu-security-and-defense-challenges-toward-european-defense-winter-pub-82032 Denis, G., Claverie, A., Pasco, X., Darnis, J.-P., de Maupeou, B., Lafaye, M., Morel, E. (2017). Towards disruptions in Earth observation? New earth observation systems and markets evolution: Possible scenarios and impacts”, Acta Astronautica, 137, 417. ESPI. (2020). Artemis accords: What implications for Europe? In ESPI Briefs (No. 46). Retrieved December 13, 2020, from https://espi.or.at/news/espi-brief-46-artemis-accords-what-implicati ons-for-europe European Space Agency. (2011). Envisat and ERS missions: Data access guide (p. 8). Retrieved June 16, 2021, from https://earth.esa.int/documents/10174/13019/Envisat_ERS_Data_Access_ Guide.pdf/5447a93c-844b-4293-80e5-27f2645a896d?version=1.0 Fleur, J. L. (2003). Government, media focus on commercial satellite images. In The news media & the law (Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 36–38). Foust, J. (2020). Brexit deal allows UK to continue participation in Copernicus. SpaceNews. Retrieved December 30, 2020, from https://spacenews.com/brexit-deal-allows-uk-to-continueparticipation-in-copernicus/ Gaudrat, P., & Tuinder, P. H. (1997). The legal status of remote sensing data: Issues of access and distribution. In Outlook on space law over the next 30 years (pp. 351–360). Essays published for the 30th anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty, A 98-30551 07-84. Kluwer Law International. Gerhard, M., & Bernard, S.-T. (2008). Germany enacts legislation on the distribution of remote sensing satellite data. In Proceedings of the fiftieth colloquium on the law of outer space (pp. 411– 415). Harris, R. (2002). Earth observation data policy and Europe (pp. 13–14). CRC Press. Harris, B. (2021). Satellite earth observation and national data regulation. Space Policy, 56, 101422. 10.1016/j.spacepol.2021.101422

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Harris, R., & Baumann, I. (2021). Satellite earth observation and national data regulation. Space Policy, 56, 101422. ISSN 0265-9646 Harris, R., & Baumann, I. (2015). Open data policies and satellite earth observation. Space Policy, 32, 52. Hollinger, P., & Parker, G. (2019). UK increases funding to European Space Agency more than 15%. Financial Times. Retrieved November 27, 2019, from https://www.ft.com/content/649 26e9e-108c-11ea-a225-db2f231cfeae Kolczy´nski, P. (2018). The new European Union space policy in order to maintain Europe’s position among space leaders (Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 343). CES Working Papers (pp. 341–356). Kozuka, S., & Terada, M. (2020a). Data law of commercial satellite remote sensing: new challenges for the new opportunities. In 71th International Astronautical Congress (IAC). IAC-20-A.1.2.3 (paper code 57993). Kozuka, S., & Terada, M. (2020b) Data law aspects of commercial satellite remote sensing: New challenges for the new opportunities. In 71st International Astronautical Congress (IAC)—The cyberspace edition. IAC-20-A1.2.3 (Paper Code 57993). ODC. (2015). Open data charter. Retrieved June 9, 2021, from https://opendatacharter.net Roy, D. P., Wulder, M. A., Loveland, T. R., Woodcock, C. E., Allen, R. G., Anderson, M. C., Helder, D., Irons, J. R., Johnson, D. M., Kennedy, R., Scambos, T. A., Schaaf, C. B., Schott, J. R., Sheng, Y., Vermote, E. F., Belward, A. S., Bindschadler, R., Cohen, W. B., Gao, F., … Zhu, Z. (2014) Landsat-8: Science and product vision for terrestrial global change research. Remote Sensing of Environment, 145, 154–172 Schneider, W. (2010). German national data security policy for space-based earth remote sensing systems. In UNOOSA. BMWi, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. Retrieved June 9, 2021, from https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/lsc2010/tech-02.pdf Sommariva, A. (2020). The evolution of space economy: the role of the private sector and the challenges for Europe. In ISPI—Italian Institute for international political studies. Retrieved December 30, 2020, from https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/evolutionspace-economy-role-private-sector-and-challenges-europe-28604 UNOOSA. (1986). Principles relating to remote sensing of the earth from outer space. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 41/65. Retrieved May 25, 2021, from https://www.uno osa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_41_65E.pdf [Hereinafter UN Remote Sensing Principles]. von der Dunk, F. G. (2009). European satellite earth observation: Law, regulations, policies, projects, and programmes. Creighton Law Review, 42, 434–435. Waldrop, E. S. (2004). Integration of military and civilian space assets: Legal and national security implications. The Air Force Law Review, 55, 157–158 and 204–206. Woodcock, C. E., Allen, R., Anderson, M., Belward, A., Bindschadler, R., Cohen, W., Gao, F., Goward, S. N., Helder, D., Helmer, E., & Nemani, R. (2008). Free access to Landsat imagery. Science, 320, 1011. World Intellectual Property Organization IP Portal. (1996). WIPO Copyright Treaty. Retrieved June 15, 2021, from https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/295157 (Articles 2 and 5). Wouters, J., & Hansen, R. (2013). The other triangle in European space governance: The European Union, the European Space Agency and the United Nations. Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 130, December 2013. Wulder, M. A., Coops, N. C., Roy, D. P., White, J. C., & Hermosilla, T. (2018). Land cover 2.0. International Journal of Remote Sensing, 39 (12), 4254–4284. Wulder, M. A., Masek, J. G., Cohen, W. B., Loveland, T. R., & Woodcock, C. E. (2012). Opening the archive: How free data has enabled the science and monitoring promise of Landsat. Remote Sensing of Environment, 122, 2–10. Zhu, Z., Wulder, M. A., Roy, D. P., Woodcock, C. E., Hansen, M. C., Radeloff, V. C., Healey, S. P., Schaaf, C., Hostert, P., Strobl, P., Pekel, J. -F., Lymburner, L., Pahlevan, N., & Scambos, T. A. (2019). Benefits of the free and open Landsat data policy. Remote Sensing of Environment, 224, 382–385. ISSN 0034-4257. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rse.2019.02.016

Chapter 5

Does Europe Need a Space Revolution?

Considering the global space economy panorama, Europe’s standing appears far less prominent that it should be. Undoubtedly, the many fragmentations we have discussed in the previous chapters do play a role, but the heart of the matter lies in the risk averse attitude of European Companies and Institutions. This is a consequence of the governance configuration and public procurement model. The criteria of ESA are the maximization of performance and minimization of risks. But, if ESA would decide to be more commercial oriented, it would need a different procurement mechanisms that stimulate competition. In such a way, there will be a different approach based on market customer satisfaction and quick return on investment. The current European space panorama features plenty of technical capability and expertise coupled with the lack of entrepreneurs like Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos who have both the capability to dream big and the money to support their vision. According to the list of the 10 richest people in the world, published by Forbes on April 2023, they were ranked second and third, after Bernard Arnault, the French chairman of LVMH which owns Dior and other luxury brands.1 While certainly not lacking the money, Arnault does not dream to travel to Mars or the built a space station able to support a human colony. At best, his companies could provide cosmetics to protect the astronauts’ skin and the same could apply in the case of Francoise Bettencourt Meyers, the other European (and the only woman) in the list. The remaining 8 super rich are all American and, apart from Warren Buffet, they have thrived in fields related to technologies developing products and companies that have changed our lives. Moreover being the owners of their companies, Space billionaires can decide when and where to take risks, if they so wish. On April 14th, 2023, SpaceX announced to be ready to launch its Starship prototype 7 min after receiving the approval from the Federal Aviation Administration, which took 500 days to examine all the material 1

While, according to Forbes, in April B. Arnaud was the richiest man in the world, tha vagaries of the stock marked downgraded him to the second position in July, according to Investopedia (2023)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Caraveo and C. Iacomino, Europe in the Global Space Economy, SpringerBriefs in Space Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36619-2_5

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related to the new launcher. Clearly, they were eager to try their innovative and fully reusable launcher which, in the company plans, should become the workhorse of the space exploration, but their rapidity is noteworthy even if the Starship launch was not successful. The European public companies, on the other hand, are more conservative and, certainly, their attitude is more risk averse. CEOs must always refer to their Board of Directors who are concerned about the immediate revenues and will turn down forward-looking, potentially rewarding but somewhat risky decisions. While the difference between a one-man show and a public company is true all over the globe, European Space companies have evolved within a collaborative ecosystem based on contracts sharing which results in very little competition. While this approach can produce commendable results, it does not provide an adequate drive to pursue innovative solutions. This is particularly evident when looking at the European launchers marked which remains tied to the fully expandable philosophy, while the reusable rockets are revolutionizing the scenario by driving down costs. Many European companies rely on public funds and, for this reason, they are not very motivated to be competitive. The contracts awarded by ESA are already guaranteed as a geographical return based on the budgets allocated by each Member State to ESA programs. As public institutions’ financing represents the bulk of available funding, there is a common feeling that public entities can provide sufficient funds for the development of space technologies and that private capitals lag behind. However, such circumstances could cause an overdependence of the space industry on public resources, hindering space companies’ commercial development.

5.1 When Numbers Cannot be Ignored Indeed, while 2022 has been a record year for space with 180 successful launches performed worldwide, Europe’s total plummeted to just 5, an embarrassing record low, specially so when considering that New Zealand did 9 launches thanks to US company Rocket Lab which operate from there.2 While it is certainly true that New Zealand rockets are small ones, the numbers cannot be ignored. This situation is partly due to the war in Ukraine that has shaken the foundation of long-standing international collaborations between Europe and Russian Institutions grounding the EXOMars mission, just to name one of the many sad outcomes, but also bringing to a sudden end the joint venture between Arianespace and ROSCOSMOS, thus stopping Soyuz launches from Kourou. This, together with the delays in Ariane 6 development and the failure of Vega C, has brought the launch number from Kourou to an historical minimum which is all the more apparent when one considers the growing launch capability in US, championed by the remarkable and unprecedented launch rate achieved by SpaceX which performed 61 launches out of a total of 78 US ones. 2

Nature 613, 426 (2023).

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The failure suffered by Virgin Orbit in January 2023 in the first trial to launch from a plane taking off from UK, is just another blow. Although the company is registered in California, thus it should not count as a European failure, the launch should have marked the entering of UK in the space launcher business, which, instead, proved to be unforgiving. The failure, unfortunately, had far-reaching consequences and Virgin Orbit did not survive. The paucity in European launches is characterizing also 2023. The first launch from Kourou took place on April 14th and featured a flawless performance from Ariane 5 which inserted the very heavy Juice mission in its complicated trajectory to Jupiter. This accomplishment was vastly, and rightly, acclaimed by the European press. However, on the same day SpaceX performed its 24th launch of 2023. 1 to 24 is not an impressive score also considering the dominant position European launchers enjoyed up to few years ago. Confronted with the disrupting innovation pursued by new aggressive players, European space industries are unable to compete, thus losing ground. All this is happening despite the plan announced on January 13, 2021 by Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for Internal Market, to invest 1 B e into the Cassini European Space Fund to build a European Launcher alliance with the goal to help European industries to remain competitive in the global market.3 On that occasion, the commissioner said that he planned “to initiate the European Launcher alliance to jointly define, with ESA, the Member States, the European Parliament, the industry, a common roadmap to the next generation of launchers and technologies relevant to ensure an autonomous access to space” to foster “a more offensive and aggressive strategy”. Indeed, making the European Space Industry more competitive was seen as an urgent endeavour, essential to realize the commissioner’s vision based on 4 pillars such as (1) consolidating Galileo and Copernicus with a second Galileo generation in 2024 and six new Copernicus mission, (2) the “rapid” development of an infrastructure for broadband connectivity, (3) achieving autonomy in launchers and considering Space Traffic Management, (4) positioning Europe as a hub for space entrepreneurship. This 4-pillars’ approach was repeated in January 2022 in a speech at the 14th EU Space conference, which featured the imminent launching of the European Launcher alliance as the first priority of the Commissioner.4 Thus, one has to conclude that, although the Commissioner had remarked that “time is the essence”, the “offensive and aggressive strategy” was put on hold for 1 year mainly because the players were unconvinced that the planned partnership would be beneficial. To appreciate the challenge one should consider that, now, the only company in Europe producing medium-heavy rockets is Arianespace which provides medium-heavy rockets for the launch of commercial as well as scientific satellites. It has a close relationship with the European Space Agency and EU for the launch of earth observing satellites and scientific missions. Ariane 5 has been a very successful launcher dominating the market for geostationary satellites, while also performing launches of exquisite precision with JWST (in Dec 25 2021) and Juice (in April 14th, 2023). However, 3 4

Space Watch (2021). European Commission (2022).

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the market for geostationary launches is changed with competitors taking advantage of the lack of European launchers, while offering cheaper services. Currently, after its last successful launch on July 5th, 2023, Ariane 5 is out of production while the successor Ariane 6 is experiencing serious delays. Indeed, during the same conference on January 2022, ESA DG Josef Aschbacher expressed his concerns on the shortage of European launchers. While we wish Ariane 6 all the best, we have to note that it is an expandable rocket, designed using an incremental approach rather than a radically innovative one. When competition is producing pressure on other aerospace companies forcing them to review their technologies and reduce costs, Europe is standing still. Thus, breaking the European monopolistic approach is an essential step which certainly could benefit from new policies to increase competition while fostering innovative solutions. In the same speech, the Commissioner announced the signature of the Cassini Space Investment fund with the European Investment Fund (EIF) featuring an investment capacity of at least 1 B e in support of space start-ups. However, transforming good ideas into reality, shaking-up industries accustomed to collaborate rather than to compete, takes time and coordination amongst several players, which should share the same vision as well as the same objectives. Unfortunately, in spite of the soundness of the 4 pillars, little has been accomplished so far. Indeed, confronted with its domestic shortage for launchers, ESA, as well as EU, European companies and member states are buying launch services from American companies, such as SpaceX as was the case for the launch of ESA’s Euclid mission on July 1st, 2023. While there is nothing wrong in searching for the best and most convenient service provider, Europe’s marginalized position is the global arena is clearly shown by the recent (April 2023) news based on leaked document where the EU commission is asking authorization to negotiate launch services for its flagship Galileo program with American providers. We are talking about the first Breton’s pillar focused on the consolidation of Galileo, which is a point of pride for the EU as it was conceived to make Europe less dependent on foreign services and technologies. With satellites ready to start their orbital life in 2024, EU has no choice but negotiating “an ad-hoc security agreement” with US rocket companies to “exceptionally launch Galileo satellites”. The world exceptionally is revealing since Galileo satellites where meant to be launched from a European spaceport for security reasons. If the requested authorization will be granted, and it’s hard to imagine it will not, this will put a dent in the EU’s idea of strategic autonomy.5 The analysis of the European launch capability is also the starting point of a high visibility independent report commissioned by ESA and presented to the 315th session of the ESA Council at ESA Headquarters in Paris on 23 March 2023. The report, entitled Revolution Space, focusses on the need for a European independent human access to space; however, it addresses “Europe’s lack of ambition” on a more general terms remarking that “ongoing race for geopolitical influence and future economic gain is unfolding at an unseen pace and further accelerating. 5

Politico (2023).

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Heightened tensions around the world underscore the fact that Europe’s security and prosperity increasingly rely on our ability to access and act in space”.6 Indeed the strategic importance of space is clearly spelled out “In the war in Ukraine, for the first time in history, space-based capabilities significantly changed the balance of the conflict. European efforts to secure its space assets and its space services are still—even after the Russian attack on Ukraine—far too limited. All actors, the EU, ESA and their Member States have to face these security challenges and have to contribute to joint efforts and capabilities for Europe”.7 Indeed achieving joint efforts is the key point we have discussed in the previous chapters showing how European fragmentation makes it extremely difficult. This report goes on to discuss the paucity of European investment w.r.t. the U.S one. “Currently, the overall private investment in Europe is dwarfed in comparison to the U.S. Furthermore, the average size of European deals is significantly smaller. Consequently, companies will usually fail to attract the high level of private funding typically required in visionary space developments”.8 While one could or could not share the outmost concern expressed in the report on the need to launch European Astronauts using European rockets, it is certainly true that Europe should strengthens its presence in the global, very competitive, launch market, as already outlined by Commissioner Breton. Before considering the human launch situation, we must acknowledge that, right now, Europe must launch its own missions using SpaceX for lack of better or just comparable European choices. To address the launch bottleneck, the report advocates for a new procurement model: “rather than designing, developing and operating space infrastructure a commercially-oriented procurement policy needs to be adopted: The public sector, through space agencies like ESA, shall define the requirements for large-scale infrastructure or missions, for example, a crew capsule, and encourage the private sector to propose the most innovative and cost-efficient solution. The public agency will be an anchor customer buying a service or product. In parallel, it will also develop technology building blocks to enable private companies to mature technologies needed to fulfil the services”. All this is needed if Europe wants to be geopolitically relevant since “space already touches every aspect of society, from entertainment and communications to navigation and commerce”. This is possible if there will be a transformative turn involving both innovation policies and the role of public institutions. Again, in the European ecosystem there is a predominant presence of public institutions that are continuing to finance technologies that are already on the market, without taking risks. This mechanism is generating a dependency by European companies on public funding that does not allow them to innovate as they rely on the continuous support of space agencies. On the contrary, in the U.S. ecosystem, the policy measures have facilitated the

6

Revolution Space (2023). Ibid. 8 Ibid. 7

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connection among the many actors that are rising along the space value chain, stimulating the development of a self-sustained market where the leading entrepreneurial force came from the private actors rather than the public institutions. This attitude underlines some evidences: the public institutions are not always on the driving seat, private sector’s intervention is influencing the direction of technological change and the paradigm shift from top down’s innovation strategy to bottom-up’s innovation strategy where the public institutions are just acting as an observer and a facilitator, taking up the opportunity arising from the innovative technologies proposed by the emerging private actors.

5.2 Challenges Facing Europe Several challenges face Europe. In the short term, reduced costs of accessing space and competition from other space faring nations risk marginalizing Europe in the launching business. Europe has remained tied to the old model, characterized by state procurement contracts and a monopolistic launching industry. Changing this situation is one of goals of Commissioner Breton, however, the European institutional fragmentation looms over these efforts. This problem is clearly spelled out both in Breton’s speech and the independent commission report. While Breton says “we should set up a new governance for our space programme”, the Space revolution report wonders: “whether the present institutional set up in Europe is adequate to face the challenges coming from developments in other space faring nations. At the core of the discussion are the relative roles of governments and markets in these dynamic adjustments, and the role of institutions in advancing or retarding them. Such dynamic adjustments involve advancement in science, modifications in technology, organization, and the introduction of new rules of behaviour. Europe must overhaul its approach and processes, otherwise, a reinforced ambition is unlikely to be deliverable. Such transformation must include private sector co-investment, new innovative financing structures, institutional challenge-based or service-based procurement, alleviating procurement constraints, and optimization of public–private financing models to stimulate private investment and industrial competitiveness.”9 The argument here is that space exploration would be achieved through the mobilization of both public and private resources. Governments will provide initial support in exploration and science, in advancing critical technologies, and in building space infrastructure. The private sector would then take the lead in creating new markets and in expanding humanity’s presence in space. In recent years, the allure of space has once again captured the minds of a generation who see possible the expansion of Earth’s economic sphere. Within the last decade, wealthy individuals and private companies have demonstrated commitment to space exploration and development. 9

Revolution Space (2023).

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These companies are seeking the best path to commercial success and aggressively leading the way beyond LEO. One cannot help but wonder whether the many institutions in Europe provide the best approach to face these challenges. This question revolves around the suitability of the present institutions (ESA plus EUSPA plus national space agencies) which are always in need of coordination versus a new federal institution for space exploration at the European level. It could be a brand new entity created to absorb and replace the current agencies, or a super-agency coordinating all the existing ones. The latter option, less destructive with reference to the status quo, could be easier to implement, with the goal to improve and strengthen coordination of all European space institutions. This new body should act as a competitor and partner with other space faring nations in the conquest of space. Fifty years ago, European countries understood that they did not have a critical mass to operate alone in space and created ESA. ESA is an intergovernmental organization independent from the European Union. In the last 50 years, ESA succeed in numerous space programs pushing the frontier of knowledge and the development of a European space industry. But it is doubtful that an intergovernmental institution could break the monopoly in the heavy launcher sector. This new federal institution should consider designing new policies to increase competition as a decisive step towards the European space sector’s independence. A federal space agency would also be better suited to develop new technologies and to stimulate industrial collaboration among European space industries. It could also facilitate bringing together flight crews, multiple launch vehicles, operations, training, engineering, and development facilities; communications networks; and the European scientific community. A federal agency with its own budget approved by the European Parliament would also have a better bargaining position in seeking partnerships with other space faring nations. International partnerships will certainly be necessary in building space infrastructure and in human space exploration of the solar system. The new federal space agency’s main tasks would be to propose space policy guidelines to be approved by the European Parliament, and to coordinate and govern the implementation of the resulting Federal Space Programme. It should also manage the state property in the space infrastructure and be responsible for negotiating international partnerships with other space faring nations. Participating nations in the new federal space agency may consider transforming their own national space agencies into regional offices of the new institution. This federal agency will be able to further pursue human solar system exploration and scientific research in space, to increase competition, and to stimulate European space industries and private sector activities in space.

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5.3 Political Benefits from a Space Revolution Establishing a federal agency with the mandate to explore space and to enlarge the space economy beyond Earth orbit will certainly change the perspectives of the public and corporations. The creation of a European federal space agency and a space program intended to compete and collaborate with other space faring nations would send an important massage to private investors and financial markets in Europe. The most important message is that space activities will return economic, technological, and qualityof-life benefits in Europe. It would create the right incentives for private capital to enter into space activities. Moreover, a coherent vision of space policies and their implementation would avoid the risks of Europe being marginalized in a sector that will be crucial for innovation and economic growth. To conclude, we can only echo the opinion of the Revolution Space panel: “As with the Internet 20 years ago, space today stands at an inflection point. Together with AI, it will affect all domains of life. Europe cannot afford to, once more, miss out. Even more so, as the scale of necessary investment to develop autonomous exploration capabilities is small when compared with R&D budgets of other industries”.10 In order to thrive in Space, Europe does, indeed, need a revolution.

References European Commission. (2022). https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_22_ 561 Forbes. (2023). https://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2023/04/04/the-25-richest-people-inthe-world-2023/ Investopedia. (2023). The 10 richest people in the world. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/ investing/012715/5-richest-people-world.asp#toc-10-francoise-bettencourt-meyers Politico. (2023). Brussels is looking to negotiate a ‘security agreement’ with US to keep its space program running. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-elon-musk-replace-stalled-france-rocketgalileo-satellite/ Revolution Space. (2023). Report of the high-level advisory group on human and robotic space exploration for Europe. ESA. https://esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/corporate/h-lag_brochure.pdf Space Watch. (2021). Breton launches European launcher alliance and Cassini fund. https://spa cewatch.global/2021/01/breton-launches-european-launcher-alliance-and-cassini-fund/

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Revolution Space (2023).