Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence 9781685852894

Citation preview

ETHIOPIA ^CHALLENGE 0F INDEPENDENCE

HAGGAI ERLICH

ETHIOPIA ^CHALLENGE «INDEPENDENCE

LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS • BOULDER, COLORADO

Published in the United States of America in 1986 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 948 North Street, Boulder, Colorado 80302 ®1986 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Erlich, Haggai Ethiopia and the challenge of independence. Bibliography: p. Includes index. I. Ethiopia—History—Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Ethiopia—Politics and government—Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Title. DT386.E75 1986 963 85-30055 ISBN 0-931477-48-4

Distributed outside of North and South America and Japan by Frances Pinter (Publishers) Ltd, 25 Floral Street, London WC2E 9DS England. UK ISBN 0-86187-633-4 Printed and bound in the United States of America

To my children, Ori, Shiri, and Yoav

Contents Illustrations

ix

Preface

xi

Part 1 The Scramble Halted 1

Ethiopia and the Challenge of the West

2

The Ethio-Egyptian Conflict, 1872-1883

18

3

Alula, the Son of Qubi: A King's Man in Ethiopia, 1875-1897

27

4

1885 in Eritrea: "The Year in Which the Dervishes Were Cut Down"

43

A Contemporary Biography of Ras Alula: A Geez Manuscript from Manawe, Tamben

81

5

3

Part 2 The Abyssinian Crisis, Fascism, and Britain 6

Tigre in Modern Ethiopian History

129

7

Tigrean Politics, 1930-1935, and the Approaching ItaloEthiopianWar

135

"Tigrean Nationalism," British Involvement, and Haile Selassie's Emerging Absolutism—Northern Ethiopia, 1941-1943

166

Ras Alula, Ras Seyum, Tigre, and Ethiopia's Integrity

202

8 9

Part 3

Revolution and Middle Easternization?

10

The Eritrean Autonomy 1952-1962: Its Failure and Its Contribution to Further Escalation

213

11

The Ethiopian Army and the 1974 Revolution

225

12

Ethiopia and the Challenge of the Middle East

249

Index

260 vii

Illustrations Map 3.1

Northern Ethiopia—Historical Abyssinia

28

Map 4.1

The Future Eritrea Between Ethiopia and Mahdia, 1885

44

Map 4.2

Eritrea and Tigre, 1885

45

Map 5.1

Northern Ethiopia, 1885

82

Figure 5.1

Leaves from the Geez Manuscript

86

Preface

Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence is a collection of articles written d u r i n g the past few years, which addresses the following questions: How did Ethiopia, an ancient nation, a Christian African kingdom between the Black Continent and the Muslim Middle East, manage to survive to modern times, when other local civilizations crumbled in the face of European imperialism? What were the reasons for, and the consequences of, Ethiopia's victories in this long and multi-dimensional struggle for survival? And what are the implications of this unique history on Ethiopia's contemporary struggle to survive the combined challenge of internal revolution and external threat? T h e first and the last chapters analyze the two m o d e r n historical challenges to the country: that of European imperialism, and that of the Muslim-Arab Middle East. These chapters serve as an introduction to the role played by the external actors. T h e main thesis of the volume, however, is that Ethiopia's strength and survival stem f r o m its unique internal sociopolitical flexibility, rather than f r o m the attributes and behavior of foreigners. T h u s each of the other chapters studies a historical case in which Ethiopia's sociopolitical texture was tested by crisis and existential challenge. T h r e e periods throughout m o d e r n times have been marked by such challenges, and the volume is divided accordingly. Part 1, " T h e Scramble Halted," deals with the formative period in which the country faced the triple threat of Khedivial Egyptian expansionism, Mahdist Jihadism, and Italian late nineteenth century imperialism. This period ended with Ethiopia emerging stronger, bigger, and more united by virtue of these trials. T h e five chapters included in this part, like those throughout the book, d o not necessarily focus on all the central issues of the time, but they do illustrate the thesis of the book. xi

xii

PREFACE

(My more extensive discussion of the period, Ethiopia and Eritrea during the Scramble for Africa, was published by Michigan State University in 1982.) Part 2, "The Abyssinian Crisis," again deals with a period of great significance to both Europe and Ethiopia, but it does not present the crisis as a Western prelude to World War II. These four chapters concentrate on the historical dynamic of Ethiopian sociopolitics, as they lead to both defeat and recovery. Focusing on the strategically pivotal province of Tigre, these chapters analyze the fundamental, local Ethiopian reasons for the Fascist conquest, the consequent liberation, and the successful emergence of Haile Selassie's selective modernization and effective centralization. Part 3, "Revolution, and Middle Easternization?" deals with three aspects of the contemporary situation in the Horn that, combined, constitute a threat to Ethiopia's integrity and survival. First, the failure of Eritrea's autonomy in the 1950s, an experiment with formative implications for the most crucial problem in the contemporary context, is discussed. (My fuller descriptive analysis, The Struggle over Eritrea 1962—1978, was published in 1983 by The Hoover Institution, Stanford.) Another chapter deals with the 1974 revolution, an event which may well be considered another crucial turning point. Has the revolution shattered that sociopolitical flexibility which for centuries secured Ethiopia's continuity? This, we maintain, is the key question for the country's future. It is emphasized by a potential third factor: an Arab or Muslim challenge to "Middle Easternize" the Horn of Africa, at the expense of Ethiopia's integrity. Ethiopia's history, like other histories, is not likely to repeat itself. It does, however, offer a fruitful lesson to those wise enough to study it, for there is no constructive way to build Ethiopia's revolutionary future without continuing and strengthening the flexible sociopolitical pragmatism which, for so many decades, proved its durability in the face of challenge. All but two of the articles published in this volume have appeared in professional journals or as chapters in books. (The spelling of names, however, has been standardized throughout.) I take pleasure in thanking the editors of the following works for so generously permitting republication: Journal of African History; Asian and African Studies; Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies; Armed Forces and Society; Zmanim; G. Goldenberg (editor) Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Tel Aviv); S. Rubenson (editor) The Seventh Conference (Lund), and T. Tamrat (editor) The Eighth Conference (Addis Ababa); and Y. Dinstein (editor) Models ofAutonomy. I am also grateful to Dubi Ben-Ami for toiling on the technicalities, and to Lynne Rienner, Dianne H. Ewing and Margret Hamilton for seeing the volume into press. Haggai Erlich

PART

I

The Scramble Halted

CHAPTER

I

Ethiopia and the Challenge of the West

Often in the history of nations confrontation with a rival—both the confrontation experience and its practical consequences—becomes a central factor in shaping domestic affairs. Such an external challenge can act to promote unification or fragmentation. While victory in confrontation is rewarding, the experience of defeat is always of greater impact. Every student of a civilization that experienced the agony of defeat is conscious of its pivotal importance. If that defeat does not end the civilization's history, it is surely a major watershed channeling consequent affairs in new directions. T h e history of the Middle East and of Africa has, throughout modern times, been characterized by the centrality of the defeat experience. During the previous century the various peoples of this region confronted the challenge of western imperialism; the encounter by Muslims and Africans with the material and cultural might of Europe was marked by their growing sense of weakness, and resulted in comprehensive defeat. T h e pace and specific problems of the historical processes that affected the participants in these encounters were of course varied. Yet the general outcome of the defeat experience of Orientals and Africans seems to have been the same: the emergence of an urge to modernize. With the failure of the old values as the guardian of freedom, the concept of innovation was adopted and implemented as a key both to independence and to progress. Indeed, the twentieth century history of modernization and change in Africa and the Middle East derives basically from the defeat experience. In the geographical center of the African and Muslim worlds, on the Reprinted, with changes, from Zmanim, 1980, no. 4, 70-80, with the permission of the publisher.

3

4

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

junction between the Middle East and the Black Continent, on the border of Islam and animism, the Semitic and Hamitic languages, lies a civilization whose major modern experience was victory over the West. Ethiopia, its ancient state and culture, did not crumble before Europe. In the late nineteenth century, Ethiopia managed not only to survive imperialistic aggression at its peak, but also to strengthen its authentic sociopolitical institutions and concentrate successful resistance around them. In the decades when most Africans f o u n d no response to the overwhelming European challenge, and when Orientals had to "admit" their "inferiority," Ethiopia met fire with fire. T h e confrontation between Ethiopia and modern imperialism took place during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. T h e opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 marked the beginning of active global interest in the Red Sea, and this in turn engendered competition by European powers—led by Khedivial Egypt—for domination of its shores. T h e occupation of coastal zones of the Red Sea led inevitably to encroachment on Ethiopia's territory, interference in its domestic affairs and, ultimately, to efforts to conquer and control. Ethiopia's ensuing twenty-year war for survival was punctuated by frequent change in intensity, and by few changes of the guard on the imperialistic side. Its parameters in time were defined by two decisive Ethiopian victories: in March 1876 an Egyptian invading army of some twenty thousand men, commanded by Europeans and Americans, was shattered at Gura in Eritrea. Twenty years later, in March 1896, a larger Italian army, heavily reinforced by local recruits, was crushed at Adwa in Tigre. T h e Ethiopian emperors of the period, Yohannes IV (1872-1889) and especially Menilek II (1889-1913), managed u n d e r this pressure to assert leadership at home, while conducting a confident and largely effective foreign policy. While rebuffing imperialism successfully in its north, Ethiopia managed to practice it to the south. During these two decades—and in fact as part of its mobilization effort against the existential challenge presented by Europe—the kingdom itself participated in the "scramble for Africa." By conquering and annexing huge territories to the south, which were inhabited by Muslims and animists of various ethnic and linguistic origins, Ethiopia more than doubled its size. Its territorial integrity and sovereignty within these new borders were recognized and legitimized in a series of treaties signed with European powers after the Adwa victory. T h u s Ethiopia emerged f r o m this historic trial against western imperialism not only independent, but a stronger, richer and more respected state. Why did Ethiopia win in its struggle with late nineteenth century imperialism? What were the implications of this victory for f u t u r e developments? While a comprehensive reply to these questions is beyond the

ETHIOPIA AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE WEST

5

scope of this study, the following remarks are intended to indicate both the uniqueness of this victory in the Afro-Middle Eastern context, and the central role played by this victory experience in shaping Ethiopia's twentieth century history.

FLEXIBILITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND VALUES Few historians have dealt with this formative period in a professional and scholarly manner. 1 Modern research on Ethiopia suffers in general from that country's linguistic, cultural and historical uniqueness, and often falls between the disciplines of oriental and African studies. Most historians who have referred to Ethiopia's victories did so by way of discussing European affairs, and neglected local aspects. Their explanations of this "abnormal phenomenon" focused on mistakes of western generals; the stupidities of politicians; the geography of the region; and on the fact that it was mainly the relatively weak Khedivial Egypt and Italy, rather than Britain and France, that pressed the challenge of Europe here. An understanding of Ethiopia's own history affords a better-balanced explanation. For example, in facing the challenge of modern imperialism, Ethiopia could rely on a system of flexible and pragmatic sociopolitical institutions. This system for centuries had stood the test of external threats, as well as of internal fragmentation, and had enabled Ethiopia to mobilize in times of crisis hundreds of thousands of fighters under a generally unified leadership. But nearly all European observers of the period failed to discern in Ethiopia anything but stagnant backwardness. The old institutions of emperorship, nobility, and church appeared to be feudal because of the cloak of legitimacy provided by dozens of hierarchical titles. The nobility controlling territories and people, the ignorant and superstitious priests of a land-owning church, the general agricultural and technological backwardness, all created the superficial impression of eleventh century European feudalism. Yet a detailed study of any chapter of the country's long annals (which date from the thirteenth century) contradicts this image of stagnancy. Ethiopia was always a place of political fluidity and dynamism characterized by constant power struggles and ups and downs in the relative importance of persons, dynasties, and regions. Indeed, behind the misleading curtain of a fossilized, backward class-society, there existed the reality of sociopolitical dynamism. Titles and position in Ethiopia were hardly a matter of family inheritance, but rather of almost free competition. Longentrenched customs of land inheritance and title-enactment, as well as the country's topograhy, were factors in the creation of a political culture

6

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

which offered even the ambitious son of an anonymous peasant a good chance at climbing to both legitimacy and power. This flexibility enabled persons of strong character to join the system rather than revolt against it. Born leaders of deprived background could well make their way without necessarily resorting to new ideologies—ethnic, religious or social. T h e leading positions were grasped by those who stood the tough test of a power struggle. Ethiopian Christianity was also characterized by this flexible pragmatism. T h e monophysitism brought to the country in the Fifth century was not accepted outright as an exclusive dogma, but was modified to absorb diverse local customs and beliefs. Later innovations or imported values had to stand the test of practicality before being assimilated into the cultural system of the national religion. T h e flexibility of values and institutions contributed to their own continuity. It made possible a constant and intense power game, but prevented revolutions. Lacking class leadership (for who will lead a class if he can succeed alone?) the country never experienced significant ideological politicization of its ethnic or linguistic diversity. Politics was shaped into a field of ceaseless struggles for power, but was practically deprived of ideological dimensions. T h r o u g h o u t the ages this system of values and institutions underwent no change, yet was capable—due to its sociopolitical flexibility—of providing Ethiopia with tested leadership. It was under this leadership structure that permeated all ranks, that Ethiopian society could be recruited and mobilized, raising nationalist armies of great numbers rather than crumbling whenever faced with an existential challenge. EXTERNAL CHALLENGES Ethiopia's late nineteenth century victory over western imperialism stemmed, like most significant historic phenomena, from a variety of factors. T h e central reason for the victory, however, was undoubtedly the capacity of Ethiopian society for allowing born leaders to move into leadership positions. This was especially true at times of external challenge, for then those who achieved power were those who had proved themselves in reallife tests. For internal politics intensified especially at times of external challenge, and the winners competed for positions and titles, including even the emperorship, by recruiting and mobilizing followers and soldiery, and by excelling in the service of successful superiors. Individual triumphs worked for both unification and mobilization. As a result of this comprehensive flexibility, throughout the ages Ethiopia rarely if ever experienced internal challenges to its political system. Veteran institutions were either strong enough to withstand the new,

ETHIOPIA AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE WEST

7

or flexible enough to absorb it. External challenges of an existential nature were quite rare prior to the emergence of modern western imperialism. Indeed, with the notable exception of a sixteenth century Muslim invasion and the ensuing Oromo tribal immigrations, medieval Ethiopia never even tasted defeat. It is a commonly accepted fallacy that Islam both as a religion and an empire constituted the most enduring historic threat to Ethiopia. In reality, Islam's attraction as a comprehensive conceptual approach to all areas of life failed in penetrating Ethiopia, because the locals already had such a value system in their unique national Christianity. Ethiopians also rejected Islam for being, by its universal nature, a negation of their independent sovereignty. The leaders of the Middle Eastern Islamic empires, in turn, refrained for their own reasons (military and other) from crossing the Red Sea and challenging mountainous Ethiopia with Jihad. In the Horn of Africa the Christian kingdom enjoyed superiority over the local Muslims. Indeed, in the local context Islam was reduced to a tribalist religion, for it was adopted in the Horn mostly by nomads, peripheral tribes and merchants who desired to escape the state grasp of Christian Ethiopia. Hence the existential threat of Islam in pre-modern Ethiopia was nearly negligible. With the single sixteenth century exception of the Imam Ahmad Gragn invasion, it presented no significant military or cultural challenge, nor did it offer cause for Ethiopians to initiate changes in their way of life. On the contrary, Islam's main contribution was to practically isolate Ethiopia for more than a millenium from the centers of Christianity in the East and West, thus contributing to the preservation and strengthening of its traditional continuity. Contact with Europeans prior to the emergence of modern imperialism also constituted no significant threat to Ethiopia. The first relevant episode was the sixteenth century Portuguese-Muslim struggle over the Red Sea. A Portuguese diplomatic mission (1520—1526) tried, in vain, to establish solid relations with the Christian kingdom (whose legendary name, "The Kingdom of Prester John," had spread throughout Europe during the Crusades). Somewhat later, however, when the Ethiopians were defeated by the invading Muslims of Ahmad Gragn (1529—1543), contact was reestablished. A four hundred-strong Portuguese expedition led by Christopher da Gama landed at Massawa (1541) and helped Ethiopia's emperor to regain independence. T h e event was followed by the arrival of Jesuit missionaries, who remained into the next century and worked to convert Ethiopians to Christianity. When their activities were exposed as subversion they were expelled (1632) in a humiliating ceremony. (From that moment onward, and mainly in modern times, Catholic missionaries have been far less respected in Ethiopia than their Protestant counterparts.)

8

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

The Jesuit affair reflected the ambivalence of the Christian connection between Ethiopia and the West. Ethiopia's unique Christianity was a nationalist-cultural set of values; the two concepts, "a Christian" and "an Ethiopian," were in fact identical in both consciousness and speech. Sincere or not, the missionaries' efforts at catholization were tantamount to outright subversion of the very foundations of the Ethiopian nation and state. Hence when imperialism presented itself later in the shape of diplomats and armies, Christianity failed to bridge the conflict. Indeed, the missionaries and their local disciples only widened gaps and aggravated antagonisms. From the expulsion of the Jesuits until the arrival in 1786 of the Scottish traveller James Bruce, the country saw few white faces. Bruce heralded the resumption of steady contact, though the might of European imperialism was not yet presented to Ethiopia. T h e number of visitors increased after Bonaparte's conquest of Egypt (1798) and the ensuing reemergence of the Red Sea as a strategic artery. But those Europeans who visited the country were travellers, missionaries, emissaries, traders and the like, who as defenseless visitors could hardly convey western superiority to the locals. Rather, they proved to be occasionally useful. T h e Ethiopians bought from them firearms, though not in quantities that might risk upsetting the existing order; and they used missionaries as doctors, though not at the expense of local medical methods, witchcraft and talismans. TEWODROS AND THE WEST

The first serious attempt to grasp the real significance of European might for Ethiopia's backward reality was made by Emperor Tewodros II (1855-1868). An impatient revolutionary of extraordinary vision, he dreamed of building a western-equipped central army supported by a modern bureaucratic infrastructure and a developing communications system. He was therefore anxious to build constructive and intense relations with the western powers and believed naively that he could do so on the basis of a common enmity toward Islam. He was of course to be bitterly disillusioned. So immersed was he within the comprehensive nature of Ethiopian nationalist Christianity that he could not understand why the British and the French would fight to save the Ottomans in Crimea and invest enormously in Egypt, but fail totally to respond to his modernization initiative. His dream of becoming an equal and proud partner of Europe degenerated into suspicion and bitterness. He told the French Consul

ETHIOPIA AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE WEST

9

I know the tactics of European governments when they want to seize a country in the Orient. First they send missionaries, then consuls to support the missionaries, then battalions to sustain the consuls. I am not a rajah from Hindustan to be made a fool like that: I prefer to engage the battalions at once.2 Frustrated with European indifference, he imprisoned a group of missionaries and humiliated them in public. However, Tewodros's failure at rapid modernization stemmed primarily not from European indifference but from Ethiopian reaction. His efforts to implement innovations, reorganize and centralize his government and develop the country's infrastructure met with stiff opposition and near-total rejection. Exhausted and isolated by wars against provincial coalitions, he finally faced the British punitive mission of "Lord Napier of Magdala" (Tewodros's capital), which had been aided extensively in its march inland by Tewodros's Ethiopian rivals. Defeated in April 1868, he took his own life. Tewodros's failure was by no means a victory , for Europe over Ethiopia. On the contrary, it was a failure of an attempt at Europeanization. Tewodros had failed to impose modernization, and Europe had remained indifferent. T h e combined result was to prevent any massive penetration to Ethiopia of European tools and concepts—a penetration which, in the contemporary Middle East and in some other parts of Africa was already presenting the challenge of western supremacy with all its implications.

VICTORY OVER IMPERIALISM T h e opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 initiated a new chapter in the history of Ethiopia's relations with the West. The emerging importance of the Red Sea attracted active European interest. The pioneer of the new trend was Khedive Ismail Pasha, the "impatient Europeanizer" of Egypt (1863-1879), who heralded the later appearance of the Italians as the main challengers to Ethiopian independence. Their ensuing inevitable conflict with Ethiopia, lacking the background of earlier economic or cultural penetration, became an outright military-political challenge. Thus threatened by the military might of modern armies, Ethiopian society managed, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, to revive its traditional institutions. The period witnessed the growing hold over society of the emperors and their chiefs—all men of proven ability rather than hereditary titleholders—an intensive increase in the import of firearms, and the simultaneous massive expansion in the South. Consequently

10

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

Ethiopia was able to mobilize some one-quarter of a million riflemen under a largely united leadership, to repel invaders. True, these defeated representatives of imperialism, the armies of Ismail and the Italians, were weaker than the British or the French. But the latter had purposely refrained from dealing directly with Ethiopian reality: Twice during modern times, in 1868 and in 1941, British armies conquered Ethiopia's capitals, but on both occasions they preferred to evacuate them and restore local independence. Khedivial Egypt and Italy, in contrast, were prepared to invest less in strategic calculations and more in imperial prestige. During their conflicts with Ethiopia both came to be motivated by revenge. Indeed in Gura and in Adwa Ethiopia's enemies presented full-sized and fully equipped national armies of the kind mobilized to conquer and inflict exemplary punishment. From the Ethiopians' standpoint, their modern victories were a natural continuation of a millenium-long history of superiority over rivals. Their concept of their country as defended by Saint George on horseback, assigned by the "God of Ethiopia" to protect the country and its internal order, was reassured and strengthened. The Adwa victory did guarantee Ethiopia's independence, but far more significantly, it served as proof of the validity of the existing order. Out of such a challenging trial there emerged a society confident of its values and institutions, and free of inferiority complexes of the kind which motivated other Orientals and Africans to change. Victory further worked to solidify in Ethiopia an already-existing poor image of Europe and Europeans—an image which, deep into the twentieth century, would still present neither threat nor positive model for imitation. Ethiopian emperors and chiefs of the last quarter of the nineteenth century were consciously aware of the strength of European powers, with some of whom they corresponded. But European strength was conceived in nearly abstract terms (similarly perhaps to the medieval European concept of the unknown Ethiopia as the "Kingdom of Prester John"). It was only in 1889 that the first prominent Ethiopian politician, Ras Makonnen, the father of the future Emperor Haile Selassie, visited the West. The example of this remarkable prince would not be followed by another Ethiopian of political prominence (his son) until thirty-five years later. Europe and Europeans, as presented to the Ethiopian eye in the fields of the Horn of Africa at the end of the nineteenth century, were far from reflecting superior might. After the Adwa victory, Emperor Menilek ordered a march to Addis Ababa of his 1,800 Italian prisoners. (The local Eritrean recruits among the prisoners were set free immediately, after having their right hand and left foot amputated.) The release of the prisoners required papal inter-

ETHIOPIA AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE WEST

11

vention and developed into a lengthy and humiliating affair for Italy. For the Ethiopians however, the sight of the bound, marching Europeans was not startling; the memory of missionaries chained in public by Emperor Tewodros thirty-two years earlier was still fresh. Yohannes, Tewodros' successor (1872—1889) was basically attempting to bring about a fundamental, religious revival of Ethiopian selfawareness. Although he tried at some points to obtain military and diplomatic aid f r o m Britain, he was essentially scornful of whites. His policy included systematic persecution of missionaries and occasional burning of missions (which created a crisis with his potential European ally, France). His military commander in Eritrea, and the man responsible t h r o u g h o u t the period for defense against the Egyptians, the Italians, and neighboring Mahdist Sudan, was Ras Alula (1847—1897). Alula first became known in Italy as a horrible enemy, in January 1887, when he chained three Italian travellers and made their release conditional u p o n Italian evacuation of a disputed well near Massawa. An Italian battalion of some 500 men sent later that month to reinforce the garrison there was ambushed at Dogali by Alula and annihilated. (Piazza dei Cinquecento, in the center of Rome, is named after the victims of the Battle of Dogali.) After this humiliating disaster the government in Rome clandestinely sent Alula a thousand rifles with nearly as many boxes of ammunition, to ensure the liberation of the three Italians. T h e image of the European as a defeated soldier, a chained missionary, a polite, cautious diplomat or merchant, was formed at that time in many similar cases. Naturally, as earlier acquaintance developed into open conflict, that image took on an added dimension of subversion. A student of the late nineteenth century may find Ethiopian references to Europeans expressed as follows: The "Faranje" (European) and Qunqun are the same. Qunqun is the smallest of insects but it eats up a large tree, causes it to dry up and fall down. 3 They, the Italians, are not serious people, they are not of good faith, they are intriguers. The Italians have not come here because they lack pastures and fat in their own country, but they came from ambition to better themselves, because there are many of them and they are not rich. With the help of God they will depart again, humiliated and disgraced in the eyes of the world. 4 After this many powerful and conceited pagans [the Italians] came from Jerusalem intending to exterminate the religion of our Lord Jesus Christ, to construct their temples and destroy our churches. 5

Five days prior to his humiliating destruction of the Italian battalion at

12

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

Dogali, Alula warned the Italian general in Massawa: In order to avoid war you stayed in the middle of the sea like fishes. Later you came out and like rats you have dug trenches inside which you established yourselves. You who are sad for the bad fate of Salimbeni [one of his three prisoners], what will happen to you and your troops?"

And a song of the time went Alula Abba Nagga go soon to Massawa I do not like people beyond the Sea Bad weeds grew in lowland Massawa Get rid of it before it is multiplied 7

Italians are abundantly referred to as mad dogs, sons of the devil, godless, subversive, hysteric, weak, pagans, Muslims, rats, and insects. Other Europeans, too, who happened to arrive at this time in Ethiopia, were received with contempt, e.g., Emperor Yohannes' treatment of the proud British Colonel, C. Gordon. "THE BEST OF ALL EMPIRES" Following the Adwa victory and the ensuing treaties with the powers, Ethiopia's sovereignty and integrity within its newly expanded boundaries were solidified. T h e independent state was not to be exposed to an external threat of significance until Mussolini's invasion of the mid-1930s. T h e period of hostile collision with Europe was over for the time being, and the white man's image was improving gradually. One important factor in this context was the transfer of Ethiopia's capital from the northern Tigre to the now-central Shoa and Addis Ababa; this facilitated the establishment of a strategic modus vivendi with the western powers occupying the Eritrean coast immediately to the north, and the Somali coast. It also meant the reemerging dominance in Ethiopia of the Amhara people, reputedly far more flexible and moderate toward strangers than the Tigreans of Emperor Yohannes. Yet in spite of a substantial change in style, the fabric of the relationship between proud Ethiopia and the West remained essentially the same. Instead of emissaries there were now ministers and ambassadors, instead of captive missionaries there were now doctors, financial advisors and the like—but none was in a position to impress his hosts as superior. T h e European remained, as in the past, an inventful individual at best, one who could be used in a variety of ways to strengthen the power of the rulers, and thus to solidify the existing order. Thus, unlike other Afro-Asian civilizations which were defeated and conquered, and whose leaders had to admit failure and adopt concepts of

ETHIOPIA AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE WEST

13

c h a n g e , Ethiopia r e m a i n e d p r o u d l y c o n f i d e n t of its values. C h a n g e a n d innovation were to b e initiated a n d i m p l e m e n t e d exactly in a c c o r d a n c e with its rulers' interests. T h e existing institutions of society, e c o n o m y a n d politics w e r e to b e s t r e n g t h e n e d using a selective a n d limited dose of E u r o p e a n technology (especially in c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , m o n e t a r y t r a d e a n d arms). T h u s t h e centralization of p o w e r achieved by the g r e a t u n i f i e r a n d m o d e r n i z e r , Menilek I I , was not based o n t h e r e f o r m i s t establishment of a new administration, o r i n d e e d o n the r e f o r m of any b r a n c h of t h e state m a c h i n e r y . R a t h e r , it derived f r o m the t i g h t e n i n g a r o u n d Menilek of the existing "Shoan nobility" loyalties, the s p r e a d i n g of control over t h e newly c o n q u e r e d S o u t h , a n d t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of indirect i n f l u e n c e over the N o r t h . T h e p o w e r a n d weight of t h e traditional administrative-military S h o a n elite was f u r t h e r increased by the extensive acquisition of f i r e a r m s , a n d by c h a n n e l i n g t h e t r a d e of t h e newly a n n e x e d territories t h r o u g h Addis Ababa to t h e coast. A f t e r Menilek's d e a t h in 1913, however, even that thin f a c a d e of m o d ernization d i s a p p e a r e d . A g e n e r a t i o n of w a r l o r d s raised o n t h e heritage of t h e A d w a victory held p o w e r . T h e y r e m a i n e d in a position to b o r r o w concepts a n d tools f r o m t h e West very selectively, with n e i t h e r p r e s s u r e n o r haste, a n d at a scope sufficient to solidify t h e i r traditional o r d e r . I n 1923 the British tried in vain to condition Ethiopia's admission to t h e L e a g u e of Nations u p o n "liberal r e f o r m s , " o r at least s o m e token antislavery c a m p a i g n . T h e British minister to A d d i s Ababa, w h o was f o n d of paternalistic l a n g u a g e , evaluated Ethiopia's e n t r y into t h e family of f r e e nations as follows: I would rather compare the case to that of a man with misgivings as to his presentability, who finds himself unexpectedly reassured by his election to an exclusive club. Few Abyssinians are afflicted with doubts as to the pre-eminence of their nation, and those who may have been now feel that their mistrust was unfounded. They regard the admission of their country to the League of Nations as an acknowledgement of its merits, and a tribute to the sufficiency of Abyssinian c u l t u r e . . . . We know by the records of early travellers that the policy and social life of Abyssinia have not changed in the past 300 years. I see no reason to anticipate that a period of upheaval is at hand, or even an age of transition. 8 A year later h e s u m m a r i z e d his " A n n u a l R e p o r t " with bitter h u m o r : Nothing of major political importance has occurred here since . . . 1917. In the past year there is no internal event to record of even minor note. Nor, apart from events, was any moral manifestation apparent in the country; no symptom of social change, no whisper of new ideas, no stirring among the people. No new figure, no novus homo, appeared upon the scene. T h e heads of the nation are the same of whom I wrote last year. They pursue the tenor of their way, content in the conviction that all is for the best in the best of all empires. Even death seemed to be less

14

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

busy here than elsewhere. N o o n e died last year in Abyssinia—no one, that is, o f any consequence. 9

In that same 1924 there took place for the first time an official visit to European capitals by a group of Ethiopian princes and officials (led by Ras Tafari, who was the future emperor, Haile Selassie). When the group was having tea at a garden party hosted by King George V of Britain, the monarch is said to have turned to Ras Hailu Takla-Haimanot, the ruler of Godjam, and asked him through an interpreter: "Can you speak English?" When the Ethiopian replied in the negative the King asked: "French? Arabic?" but received the same reply. Exasperated, he asked, "Well, what do you speak?" Ras Hailu retorted: "Can you speak Amharic? Gallinya? Gurage?" When George V admitted he could not, Hailu commented: "I am glad to see that we are both equally ignorant!" Whereupon George V laughed so much that Queen Mary came to speak to him.10 The following decade, however, was to see change, both at home and in Ethiopia's relations with the West. In October 1935 the armies of fascist Italy stormed the country from Eritrea and Somalia. Equipped with the best military technology, they crushed the Ethiopian provincial forces. These forces were led by the old warlords who, sticking to the proven methods of the Adwa days, refrained from even attempting to pursue their only half-valid option—a modern guerrilla war. Instead, they assembled their forces for massive traditional frontal battles in which they were wiped out." In May 1936 the capital of Addis Ababa fell, and Ethiopia was for the first time in modern days to experience defeat, and shoulder the yoke of imperialism. The global role of this "Abyssinian crisis" as the beginning of the escalation toward World War II needs no elaboration here. Notably, though, the image of Ethiopia in the West played a central role in the making of the crisis. The abnormality, to the European eye, of this semi-barbarous yet proudly independent nation evidently contributed to the European community's disastrous willingness to compromise in the Abyssinian context the very principles upon which rested the entire concept of European collective security. While we are not dealing here with the subject of Ethiopia's image in the West, a brief reference to that image—as it was analyzed by one western scholar 12 —adds another pertinent dimension to our analysis. Ethiopia's image underwent many contrasting changes from the period of Homer to that of Mussolini: "a far off place," "Ethiopia the pious," "a magnificent kingdom," "savage Abyssinia," and "a bastion of African independence." During the period under discussion, the image in Europe of "savage Abyssinia" grew closely parallel to that of "a bastion of African independence." In other words, the joint images of "barbarism" and "abnormality" were the product of Ethiopia's victory. Hence,

ETHIOPIA AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE WEST

15

the ideology behind Mussolini's "civilizing mission" was hardly in contrast with the spirit, if not the letter, of the British "Annual Reports" quoted above. Returning to the main line of our argument, Ethiopia's defeat in the 1930s was evidently not traumatic enough to reverse the trend created by its earlier formative victories. The Fascists did try to destroy Ethiopia's statehood and civilization—they went so far as to erase its name from maps (they rearranged the entire region and named it "Africa Orientale Italiana"). But their conquest lasted only five years, and was in that sense too short to enable the emergence of a modern Ethiopian nationalist ideology and movement. Seen from this perspective the main significance of Italy's conquest of 1936—1941 was to facilitate the implementation of Emperor Haile Selassie's platform. H Al LE SELASSIE AND WESTERNIZATION One can hardly evaluate properly the historical role played by Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930—1974) without the background of the argument made in this article. He began his career as an ambitious prince—Ras Tafari—who managed to become heir to Empress Zawditu (1916-1930). In that capacity he distinguished himself by pursuing stronger relations with the western powers, and by reforming education and administration. By the time he came to power he was already motivated by the notion of European superiority. He was in fact the only prominent Ethiopian of his pre-war generation who seems to have grasped Ethiopia's situation vis-àvis the outside world in a broad, balanced perspective. The reforms he initiated in the decade prior to the Fascist invasion were admittedly far less impressive than the reforms of the two great Europeanizers of the time—Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, and Reza Shah Pahlevi of Iran. But these were societies already dominated by entire generations aware of European might and the inescapability of change. Haile Selassie tried in the 1920s to imitate the Young Turk movement that produced Ataturk. He established a kind of "Young Ethiopians" group, but with negligible success; he was acting in a totally different environment. Seen from this viewpoint, the Ethiopian defeat and conquest of 1936-1941 worked to pave his way. In the sphere of politics and power it brought about the military destruction of decentralized, provincial Ethiopia. In the sphere of concepts it helped spread the notion that a wider and deeper adoption of western tools and methods was inescapably vital. Until his decline in the 1960s, Haile Selassie's regime was indeed characterized by revolutionary modernization of the armed forces, bureaucracy, and education. But the more effective his modernization in

16

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

these fields, the stronger the paradox inherent in his program. For he resorted to partial and selective westernization in order to develop modern arms in the service of a medieval political concept of divine emperorship. Using western arms, Haile Selassie came the closest ever to the fourteenth century Ethiopian ideal of an all—powerful emperor. The uniqueness of the Ethiopian process of modernization in comparison to other third world societies was that the local ruler was in a practical position to execute it selectively. Consequently, modernization, such as it was, was carried out without politicization or ideologizing of Ethiopia's social and ethnic diversity. On the contrary, the building of a new military and bureaucracy through modern education was well in line with the old sociopolitical game. In the 1950s and 1960s, as in the traditional past, ambitious young individuals of any background could work their way up the heirarchy, without having to challenge the system. Haile Selassie's modernization widened the channels of social mobility; hence westernization of the state machinery in the post-war period went along with a depolitization of the provinces, and with the creation of an intelligentsia deprived of political initiative and confused by the paradox it was trained to preserve. The 1974 revolution derived to a considerable extent from the failure to maintain the stabilizing and broadening stream along the entire length of these socioeconomic channels. They were twisted and weakened in the early 1970s by drought and inflation, and became overcrowded at the top. Those waiting in frustration along these clogged arteries—army junior and medium officers, students and others, who in any case could hardly compromise with the paradox they were expected to serve—launched a protest movement. This spontaneous gesture quickly turned into a new reality of rapid politicization, and thus the first revolution in Ethiopia's long history came into being. 13 Conventional thought holds that Ethiopia's late nineteenth century victory over western imperialism was costly in the sense that it deprived the country of the benefits of direct European rule. Indeed, Ethiopia enjoyed no infrastructural or bureaucratic development, nor did it "benefit" from foreign oppression as catalyst of a modern nationalist movement. Of no lesser significance, however, was the price paid by Ethiopia for its historic victory in conceptual terms. This was most visible on two occasions: First, during the Italian Fascist invasion, Ethiopia was not really ready to fight anything more sophisticated than another nineteenth century Adwa battle. The second occasion was the 1974 revolution—the beginning of a very painful decade. For, indeed, Ethiopia's current enormous difficulties stem primarily from the fact that the country's first revolution occurred so late in our century. T h e 1974 revolution and its regional consequences have led to the

ETHIOPIA AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE WEST

17

e m e r g e n c e o f a n o t h e r e x t e r n a l c h a l l e n g e to E t h i o p i a . T h e M i d d l e East, f o r t h e first t i m e in m a n y c e n t u r i e s , s e e m s to b e s t r e t c h i n g its a r m s o v e r t h e R e d S e a a n d a t t e m p t i n g to " M i d d l e Easternize" t h e H o r n o f A f r i c a . W e s t e r n p o w e r s a r e also v e r y m u c h i n v o l v e d in t h e v a r i o u s s t r u g g l e s in t h e H o r n . E t h i o p i a is a g a i n s t r u g g l i n g f o r its v e r y e x i s t e n c e , a n d a p p a rently will c o n t i n u e to d o s o f o r s o m e t i m e to c o m e . B u t it is d o i n g so, f o r t h e first t i m e , f r e e o f t h e h e a v y f e t t e r s o f its h e r i t a g e o f historical victory o v e r t h e c h a l l e n g e o f t h e West. 1 4

NOTES 1. A m o n g t h e m : H a r o l d Marcus, Life and Times of Menelik II ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n , 1975). Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, Yohannes IV of Ethiopia ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n , 1975). Sven R u b e n s o n , The Survival of Ethiopian Independence (Lond o n : H e i n e m a n n , 1976). Haggai Erlich, Ethiopia and Eritrea during the Scramble for Africa, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1982). 2. Q u o t e d in S. R u b e n s o n , Survival, 231. 3. A n Ethiopian priest w a r n i n g Ras Alula by letter f r o m Massawa, 18 J a n u ary 1887; as q u o t e d in G a r i m a T a f f e r e , Yemakara dawal, A s m a r a 1963 EC, 8. 4. E m p e r o r Y o h a n n e s to N e g u s Menilek in A.S. MAI (Archivio Storico del soppresso Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Rome) 3 6 / 3 - 2 8 , Antonelli to Robilant, 26 N o v e m b e r 1885. 5. A Geez Chronicle of Yohannes, A k s u m , written by Abba Haila-Mariam. T r a n s l a t e d by T e s f a y o h a n n e s Fessehaye. 6. Alula to Gene, 20 J a n u a r y 1887, in G e n e to Robilant, 21 J a n u a r y 1887, Etiopia e Mar Rosso (A series of edited d o c u m e n t s ) , ed. C. Giglio, (Rome: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1959) 6:11. 7. A s o n g f r o m a n A m h a r i c c a l e n d a r book, Qedus Abreha, Addis Ababa 1963 EC. 8. F O 371/9993 Russel to MacDonald (6 F e b r u a r y 1924) " A n n u a l R e p o r t , 1923." 9. F O 371/10874, Russel to C h a m b e r l a i n (7 J a n u a r y 1925), "Annual Report, 1924." 10. R. G r e e n f i e l d , Ethiopia, A New Political History ( L o n d o n : Pall Mall Press, 1965), 158. 11. See C h a p t e r 7, " T i g r e a n politics 1930—1935 a n d the A p p r o a c h i n g ItaloEthiopian W a r . " 12. See D. Levine, Greater Ethiopia, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974), C h a p t e r 1, "Conventional Images of Ethiopia." 13. See C h a p t e r 11, " T h e Ethiopian A r m y a n d the 1974 Revolution." 14. See C h a p t e r 12, "Ethiopia a n d the Challenge of the Middle East."

CHAPTER j L m

The Ethio-Egyptian Conflict, 1872-1883

INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia and Egypt, two of the most ancient civilizations in the world, have had political relations since the beginning of recorded history. Though lacking a common border, the two have always had problems of mutual interest which bridged the geographical distance. One such problem is the Egyptian fear, first recorded in 1093 and most recently in 1980, in a speech by Sadat, that Ethiopia would construct a dam on the Blue Nile. Another problem was the Ethiopians' affiliation with the Coptic patriarchate of Alexandria, which created political issues from the fifth century tojust after World War II. Other problems—like contemporary tensions in relations between the two countries—have been created because of Egypt's continuous strategic interest in the affairs of Sudan and the Red Sea. In the 1870s however, the indirect nature of these relations was temporarily replaced by a direct and frontal collision.1 The conflict which developed between these Middle Eastern and African states took place on the eve of the "scramble for Africa," but already the two countries were experiencing relations and conflicts with the Powers. In facing these European challenges the Egyptian Khedive Ismail (1863—1879) and Ethiopia's Emperor Yohannes (1872-1889) adopted entirely different policies. A comparison of these policies is essential for understanding the background as well as the outcome of the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia.

18

THE ETHIO-ECYPTIAN CONFLICT, 1872-1883

19

REASONS FOR THE CONFLICT T h e Ethio-Egyptian confrontation was the result of two simultaneous processes. First was the Africanization of Egypt's nineteenth century expansionism. Following the failure of M u h a m m e d Ali in the first half of the century to establish a Middle Eastern empire, Ismail diverted the energies of modernizing Egypt to Africa. By 1866 he had renewed control over the Sudan, a n d by 1870, following the opening of the Suez Canal, he had occupied towns and positions along the African Coast of the Red Sea. Ismail's d r e a m , in the words of Douin, was "to make the Nile an Egyptian river, a n n e x to his country all the geographical area of its basin . . . [and] to extend the limits of Egypt as far as the equatorial lakes, the shores of the Indian Ocean, the frontiers of the black kingdom of Chad. . . ."2 In the first stage, however, Ismail aimed at connecting his Red Sea posts, especially the port of Massawa, with the Sudan. T h u s by 1872, large portions of today's Eritrea, including territories inhabited by Tigrinya-speaking Ethiopians, had been occupied by the Egyptians—notably, the town of Keren and the surrounding country of Bogos. T h e second process, which took place simultaneously, was the transfer of Ethiopia's political center to the north, to an area bordering on Eritrea and Tigre province. This process culminated in 1872 with the acession of Emperor Yohannes to the throne. In essence the ascent of the n o r t h e r n province to military superiority within Ethiopia stemmed f r o m the nineteenth century revival of international commerce and arms trade in the Red Sea. 3 Furthermore, in 1868, Dadjazmach Kassa Mircha, a leading chief in Tigre, helped the Napier expedition to destroy E m p e r o r Tewodros; the British rewarded him with arms and a military adviser, enabling him to crown himself Yohannes IV. 4 Thus, contrary to a millenium-old pattern, Ethiopia's political center moved to the north, precisely at the time of the emergence of an Egyptian presence in nearby Eritrea. Whatever Ismail's plans concerning Ethiopia were—full destruction of its sovereignty, according to one historian, or a mere defense of his new Eritrean possessions, as concluded by another—the clash was inevitable. An Egyptian African empire including the Red Sea Coast and Eritrea could not co-exist with an Ethiopia centered in Tigre. Ismail obviously sought the destruction of Yohannes. He declared that he was ready to recognise Menilek of Shoa as emperor, and indeed was probably prepared to compromise with a semi-independent, land-locked and Egyptianencircled Ethiopia centered on this southern province.

20

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INSOLVABLE MILITARY SITUATION In November 1875 and March 1876, inGundetand Gura on Eritrean soil, two battles took place between the armies of Yohannes and Ismail. In both clashes the Egyptian military expeditions were defeated. Descriptions and analysis of these events have been provided by various historians, and are outside the scope of this chapter. 5 What is of relevance for our purposes is that the Ethiopian military victory in these frontal battles did not determine the outcome of the conflict. As was proven on many other occasions, Eritrean geography hardly facilitates decisive solutions of this nature. Instead there developed a sort of continuous cold war along an undemarcated, disputed border. The conflict, which lasted for the next eight years, was determined not in disputed Eritrea, but by the major political processes of the time in Ethiopia as well as in Egypt. From the strictly military point of view the situation created in Eritrea after the battle of Gura was insolvable. Egyptian garrisons were left in fortified positions which the raiding Ethiopians could not overcome. Massawa, defended from battleships, could be threatened by the Ethiopians by words only. The main bone of contention, the region of Bogos and the town of Keren, was protected by the then-invincible fort of Sanhit. But, in the face of massive Ethiopian raids, forts could not protect the countryside. From his headquarters in neighboring Hamasen, Yohannes' military commander for Eritrea, the famous general Ras Alula, systematically raided Egyptian-occupied territories in the harvest seasons, when the local tribesmen could not flee. 6 The Egyptian soldiers had to watch from their shelters as the Ethiopians helped themselves to everything removable. The Egyptians had imported into the region the European concept of a border as a demarcated line. The Ethiopians on the other hand went on conceiving of a border in the traditional fashion—as a distant region exposed to long-range raids. The two concepts, much to the misery of the local tribesmen, clashed during this period of struggle over Eritrea. The Egyptians for their part retaliated for the Ethiopians' seasonal raids by harboring and supporting Tigrean Ethiopian chiefs who opposed Yohannes' and Alula's regime. Prominent among these during the period under discussion were Ras Walda-Mikael Solomon, Dadjazmach Bahta Hagos, and the Fitawraris Kifle Iyasus and Dabbab Araya. They were raiding Ethiopian territories and undermining Ethiopian control over Hamasen and Akalla-Guzay no less effectively than were the Ethiopians devastating Bogos.7

THE ETHIO-EGYPTIAN CONFLICT, 1872-1883

21

T H E FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY While these hostilities went on, diplomacy tried and failed to solve the basic problems. Brief negotiations held just after Gura brought about the release of Egyptian prisoners in return for an understanding, later to be ignored, that Ethiopian caravans could go freely to the Eritrean coast. Meanwhile the major problems—sovereignty over Bogos and the coast, b o r d e r hostilities, and the Ethiopian d e m a n d for bishops f r o m Alexandria—remained unsolved. They were the issues a r o u n d which Colonel G o r d o n , Ismail's new Governor of the Sudan, made a diplomatic e f f o r t to reach a modus vivendi in Eritrea. But Gordon's two missions to Yohannes' court in 1877 and in 1879 failed. Yohannes, (and Alula, who was in charge of conducting b o r d e r policy) wanted British mediation. Yohannes retained positive memories of the Napier expedition and naively believed that Queen Victoria would execute justice in the dispute between him and Ismail. But British policy of the time was based on the assumption that any Red Sea coastal strip controlled by Ethiopia was liable to fall u n d e r French control. T h u s London p r e f e r r e d Egyptian, and later Italian occupation of Eritrea. In any case G o r d o n himself was a great believer in the Egyptian African Empire and was an Egyptian official. T o both Yohannes and Alula he presented himself as such, emphasizing the point bluntly by stating that he would rather be considered a Muslim than an Englishman. As he offered no restoration of Ethiopian control over Bogos, he was dismissed undecorously. Simultaneously, in 1879, another Englishman, the vice-consul at J e d d a , the famous traveller Augustus Wylde, launched an unauthorized initiative for an Ethiopian-Egyptian Pax Britannica. He was subsequently dismissed f r o m H e r Majesty's service and was never forgiven by Whitehall. With a diplomatic deadlock prevailing, b o r d e r hostilities gained m o m e n t u m in 1883. Egyptian local commanders strengthened and expanded their chain of forts, and this brought about renewed direct confrontation between Ethiopian and Egyptian troops. In October, the Egyptians tried to fortify Sahati, a position controlling the road to Massawa (which three years later was the site of an Italian-Ethiopian battle leading to the Dogali massacre). Ras Alula reacted by storming the site and destroying a company of Egyptian irregulars, while Yohannes was reportedly preparing an imperial army to threaten Massawa. T h e event however was a storm in a tea cup, and was covered by the London Times in no more than a few lines. In spite of this temporary escalation, such an episode was much in line with the previous eight years of border hostilities, and in no way heralded a turning point in the conflict. Indeed, this sort of b o r d e r conflict could have followed the same pattern

22

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

for decades to come. It was the major internal developments in both Egypt and Ethiopia, not the sideshow of their confrontation in Eritrea, that determined the conflict. 8

ISMAIL AND WESTERN IMPERIALISM—"THE IMPATIENT EUROPEANIZER" At the time, both Egypt and Ethiopia were facing the challenge of European imperialism. Each however, adopted an entirely different policy in coping with it. Ismail's way, to put it very roughly, was "to join the enemy." Dubbed by a modern historian "the impatient Europeanizer," Ismail spared no effort in forcing comprehensive Europeanization, indeed westernization, of his country. 9 Almost obsessively he adopted or imitated everything European, and treated with near-contempt everything local, Egyptian, or Muslim. T h e bureaucracies for administration, education, communication, urbanization and, most important, everything related to Egypt's economy, were rebuilt around hastily introduced European concepts and models. T h e Suez Canal, in whose construction Ismail was the moving spirit and main investor, tied Egypt most strongly to Europe. It also made Egypt a vital link between Europe and the imperial targets waiting in Africa. "My country is no longer an African state—Ismail declared in 1878— she is an integral part of Europe." Thus he expressed the instinct that was to move many European politicians: that an African empire was a great asset and a source of much prestige in European politics. The empire which Ismail wanted to build in Africa was not a mere continuation of the Egyptian expansionism revived earlier by Muhammed Ali.10 Rather, it had a particular European thrust, and as such was a prelude to the European occupation of Africa. Muhammed Ali had tried to build a selectively modern Middle Eastern version of the Muslim Ottoman empire. For this purpose he had employed European tools and methods in the service of traditional oriental ideas and concepts. But Ismail diverted his attention from the Middle East to Europe on the one hand, and to Africa on the other. His African empire was an obvious reflection of his general orientation. It was built and organized by European and American soldiers and administrators, sometimes missionaries, such as Baker, Gordon, Schnitzer, Munzinger, Dye and Loring. These representatives of Europe's might and ideologies helped build an Egyptian African empire on Christian concepts like abolition of slavery. According to Ismail's vision, an African empire would make Egypt an integral part of Europe's culture, economy and politics.

THE ETHIO-EGYPTIAN CONFLICT, 1872-1883

23

YOHANNES AND WESTERN IMPERIALISM—THE CONSERVATIVE REACTIONIST From this standpoint Yohannes was almost a negative copy of Ismail. Ethiopia's nineteenth century "impatient Europeanizer" had been his predecessor, Tewodros, and Yohannes had apparently studied carefully the reasons for Tewodros' failure. All that Yohannes wanted from Europe was political recognition, arms, and mediation with Egypt. Otherwise, he sought to unite Ethiopia and build his state according to the old patterns of Ethiopian continuity. Unlike his predecessor, or his successor Menilek, Yohannes avoided even the beginning of urbanization, or any kind of centralization, which are preconditions to modernization. His regime was based on the restoration and unification of Ethiopian Christianity, combined with revival of the ancient institution of emperorship, and recognition by the various provincial warlords of his military superiority. By emphasizing a revival of the old values of Ethiopian uniqueness, Yohannes was essentially rejecting Europe and Europeans. So strong was his Ethiopian-tradition orientation that he did not refrain, on several occasions, from destroying the few existing bridges Ethiopia already had to European culture. The most striking example was his systematic harsh treatment of missionaries, an attitude which presented the establishment of a political alliance with France, a natural strategic partner." The few European envoys who managed to find his roving court, wrote extensively of an emperor who treated them with a mixture of suspicion and contempt. Some western observers took him to be a mere xenophobe. A serious study of his policy, however, reveals that he was a pragmatic statesman with a developed sensitivity to human affairs. His rejection of Europeanization and his persistence in reviving traditional values and institutions, stemmed, then, from a well-defined and thought-out policy rather than from emotional reaction.

YOHANNES'VICTORY AND THE DEFEAT OF EGYPT The ultimate test of the effectiveness of the two contrasting approaches of Yohannes and of Ismail to the challenges of Europe, took place in 1882. In September, Egypt, already under the full and direct economic control of Europeans, was invaded by a British army; it would remain occupied for the next seven decades. Simultaneously, in October Yohannes' regime in Ethiopia reached a peak of stability and power. Menilek of Shoa, the

24

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

stubborn and patient contender to military superiority in Ethiopia, offered his final submission, and married his daughter to Yohannes' son and heir. At the same time Yohannes' religious policy culminated successfully; having finally obtained four bishops from Alexandria, the emperor forced dogmatic unification upon the church. The next five years in Ethiopia would be marked by stability at home and expansion and victories along the borders. 12 Ismail's rapid Europeanization had led to the destruction of Egypt's political independence. It had also brought about the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan, which was in essence a reaction of traditional forces to coerced westernization.' 3 What determined the Ethio-Egyptian conflict was therefore the strengthening of Yohannes' regime, Egypt's occupation by Britain and the Mahdist revolt. The rest of the story has been fully described elsewhere. When Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan came under Mahdist siege the British concluded, in late 1883, that only Yohannes' army could save them. They forced Egypt to sign an Anglo-Egyptian pact with Yohannes, the so-called Hewett Treaty of June 1884. Ethiopia regained the disputed Bogos and Keren in return for fighting the Mahdiyya and rescuing the besieged Egyptians. By 1885 Egypt had evacuated all territories it had occupied in the Horn of Africa. Some of these, notably Massawa, were captured by Italy, Egypt's imperialist successor, thus initiating a new chapter in the history of the region. 14

CONCLUSIONS—A VICTORY FOR CONSERVATISM?

Studying the Ethio-Egyptian conflict from this vantage point, it is apparent that Ethiopia was successful because, under the leadership of a cautious and conservative ruler, it revived old values and institutions, and was able at a time of crisis to make them a source of strength. Egypt in contrast was led by a revolutionary who was too hasty in cutting loose from tradition, and too impatient in forcing new ideas upon an old reality. Is there a general lesson to be derived from this story? It is tempting to draw from it far-reaching conclusions about continuity and change. But such a temptation should be resisted, for there is here no one general lesson and truth. What holds for one historical situation is not necessarily applicable to another. For example, the Mahdist state in neighboring Sudan, in facing the same challenges of the period, adopted a fully rejectionist line regarding modernization and change yet led itself to destruction. Yohannes, in further pursuing his policy, eventually reached isolation and defeat, and the emperorship was transferred in 1889 to Menilek, a person by far more compromising with Europe and Europeanization. 15

THE ETHIO-EGYPTIAN CONFLICT, 1872-1883

25

If we have discussed reasons f o r victory a n d defeat, we must conclude by noting that the same Ethio-Egyptian story teaches us how relative a r e these two terms. T w o y o u n g and promising officers excelled in the battle of G u r a . T h e Egyptian A h m a d Urabi r e t u r n e d f r o m the battlefield with t h e bitter taste of defeat. Back h o m e in Egypt he felt f u r t h e r humiliated by foreign penetration a n d control. I n early 1881 he led a protest movem e n t of y o u n g officers which f o r m e d the nucleus of the m o d e r n nationalist movement which has been leading the modernization of Egypt ever since. O n t h e Ethiopian side at G u r a t h e r e excelled a y o u n g " c o m m a n d e r of a t h o u s a n d " n a m e d Alula. A f t e r the victory h e was p r o m o t e d to ras. During t h e next twenty years he led his country f r o m o n e military victory to a n o t h e r , culminating in the historic victory over Italian imperialism at Adwa (March 1896). But, in comparison to Urabi, Ras Alula was hardly a m o d e r n i z i n g figure. H e a n d the o t h e r m e m b e r s of his generation, while f e e d i n g on victories, r e m a i n e d essentially past-oriented. T h e old values having proven valid, t h e r e was no u r g e to change a n d modernize. I n d e e d , t h r o u g h o u t the twentieth century a n d to this day, Ethiopia has been paying t h e price of its late nineteenth century victories.

NOTES 1. For most detailed descriptions of the conflict consult: G. Douin, Histoire du Regne du Khedive Ismail (Cairo, 1933—1941), especially volume 3; W. M. Dye, Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia (New York, 1880); Muhammed Rifat Bek,Jabr al-kasr ft al-khilas min al-asr, Cairo 1314 H; Hesseltine and Wolf, The Blue and the Gray on the Nile, Chicago 1961. Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Indepen-

dence, (London: Heinemann, 1976). 2. Douin, Khedive Ismail, vol. 3, preface, p. ix, quoted by Rubenson, Independence, p. 311.

3.

3. See M. Abir, The Era of the Princes, (London: Longmans, 1968), Chapter

4. On Yohannes' life and role in Ethiopian history, see Zewde GabreSellasie, Yohannes IV ofEthiopia (Oxford, 1975). 5. See modern summaries in Rubenson, Survival, 318—329; Zewde, Yohannes, 68-72; Hesseltine and Wolf, The Blue and the Gray, 194-211. 6. See Haggai Erlich, Ethiopia and Eritrea During the Scramble for Africa, A

Political Biography of Ras Alula 1875—1897, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1982). 7. For details and sources see Erlich, Alula, 9-30. 8. For details and further analysis see Erlich, Alula, Chapters 1-4. 9. See an analytic summary in P.J. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, from Muhammad Ali to Sadat, (London: Widenfeld ef. Nicolson), Chapter 5. 10. As contended by G. Talhami, Suakin and Massawa Under Egyptian Rule

1865-1885 (Washington: University Press of America, 1979). 11. For further details and analysis see Erlich, Alula, 25, 33—34, 44, 89, 91-

26

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

9 2 , 9 4 , 103-104, 106, 108, 111-112. 12. For Menilek II a n d his relations with Y o h a n n e s IV consult also: H . Marcus, The Life and Times of Menilek II, Ethiopia 1814—1913, ( O x f o r d , 1975). 13. See P. M. Holt, The Mahdist Stale of the Sudan, 1881-1898, (Oxford: C l a r e n d o n , 1970). 14. For details a n d f u r t h e r analysis, see Erlich, Alula, C h a p t e r s 5—7. 15. Erlich, Alula, C h a p t e r 12.

3 CHAPTER

J

Alula, The Son of Qubi: A King's Man in Ethiopia, 1875-1897

D u r i n g the period between the Egyptian invasions of 1875 a n d 1876 and the Italian d e f e a t at Adwa in 1896, the history of n o r t h e r n Ethiopia was m u c h influenced by the r e m a r k a b l e career of a son of a peasant, Ras Alula. His career sheds light on t h e interaction of social b a c k g r o u n d a n d political power in late nineteenth-century Ethiopia. It also illuminates o n e of the i m p o r t a n t historical processes of the time: the rise a n d fall of Tigrean h e g e m o n y . W h e n Alula died on 19 F e b r u a r y 1897, he was f a m o u s e n o u g h to be l a m e n t e d by a c o n t e m p o r a r y British historian in the following (exaggerated) words: " T h e greatest leader that Abyssinia has p r o d u c e d since the d e a t h of the E m p e r o r T h e o d o r e in 1868."' Yet only a few people in the small village of Manawe in the district of T a m b e n , T i g r e , now r e m e m b e r his father's n a m e : E n g e d a Qubi, a h u m b l e peasant. 2 Alula was b o r n in the 1840s in the n e i g h b o u r i n g Zuqli 3 and soon gained the reputation of a d o m i n a n t a n d aggressive child. O n e day—so goes a story well known t h r o u g h o u t Tigre 4 —a g r o u p of people were going to a w e d d i n g c e r e m o n y carrying baskets full of b r e a d . O n the way, they m e t the children of Manawe led by the y o u n g Alula. " W h e r e are you going?" d e m a n d e d the little leader, a n d the people mockingly replied: " T o the castle of Ras Alula W a d d i Qubi (the son of Qubi)." T h e r e a f t e r , his f r i e n d s a n d the people of Manawe nicknamed him Ras 5 Alula. It was a good e x a m p l e of h u m o r based o n the absurd. T h e T i g r e a n leading families derived their political power a n d status f r o m the combination of h e r e d i t a r y ownership of land (Rest) a n d such tiReprinted from Journal of African History 15 (1974): 261-274, with the permission of the publisher.

27

28

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

Map 3.1

Northern Ethiopia—Historical Abyssinia.

ALULA, THE S O N OF Q U B I

29

ties and ranks as ras and the lesser dadjazmach orfitawrari. 6 In the second half of the nineteenth century, three closely intermarried families shared between themselves these sources of power and monopolized the holding of offices in Tigre. The first were the descendants of Ras Mikael Seul who had governed the province for about forty years before he died in about 1780. The most prominent member of this family by the later 1860s was Dadjazmach Kassa Mercha of Tamben. The second group were the descendants of Ras Walda Sellase who had governed Tigre till 1816. They were headed by Ras Araya Demsu whom the emperor Tewodros had imprisoned in 1855 because of his great influence in the districts of Endarta and Akkala Guzay. The third family were the descendants of Dadjazmach Sebagadis of Agame who had ruled in Tigre from 1818 to 1831. After 1875 this family was led by a grandson of Sebagadis, Shum Agame7 Sebhat Aragawi. 8 Kassa Mercha was Ras Araya's sister's son. Both Araya and Kassa's mother were the children of one of Sebagadis's sisters. Such close relationships linked many lesser office holders within these three families. In the face of this agrarian élite, the ambitious Alula, apparently destitute of hereditary rights or landed property, had but the few rungs in the local social ladder accessible to him. He started as a follower (Ashkar) in the court of Ras Araya Demsu, 9 where presumably he served as a tax collector or a house servant. In the late 1860s he was transferred to Araya's successful nephew Dadjazmach Kassa whom he served as Elfegh Kalkay (A chamberlain and door keeper), later as an Aggaffari (the organizer of meals in the court), and then as the head of Kassa's personal guard. 10 On 11 July 1871, the ambitious Dadjazmach Kassa defeated Tewodros's successor, the Emperor Takla Giyorgis, and many of Kassa's loyal followers were promoted. Alula was given his first military rank of a Shalaqa, "commander of a thousand." A Geez manuscript asserts that following the coronation ceremony in which Kassa became Emperor Yohannes IV (21 January 1872) the trusted "Shalaqa Alula became a Ligaba."" This was the office of introducer and master of ceremonies at the court; the holder was also in charge of the king's personal domain. 12 Significantly, this administrative rank, ligaba, though superior to the military rank of shalaqa appears only once again in the literature. 13 Nineteenth century Ethiopia was very much a military society, and Alula distinguished himself principally as a warrior. Alula's rank or function of ligaba was probably the highest accessible rung in the local agrarian social ladder for a man of such humble origin. This office, of no visible political importance, might well have been the top of "Waddi Qubi's" career, had not a new ladder been created especially for Tigreans by the coming to power of Kassa as Emperor Yohannes IV ( 1872-89), which meant that Tigre became the power base of Imperial government. Though Yohannes, ever roving to face Ethiopia's external

30

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

and internal problems, failed to establish permanent headquarters and a central administration, his court and Imperial military requirements created an opportunity for Alula to escape from the limitations of provincial, agrarian society. During the next five years Ligaba Alula was forgotten on the local ladder, and Shalaqa Alula started climbing the Imperial one, where good service could well overcome the lack of hereditary rights. Furthermore, ever suspecting the Tigrean nobility were unfaithful to him, Yohannes had good reason to promote a man of humble origin to a high position in his court.14 "The Negus," it was later observed by the Egyptian governor of Massawa,'5 "has more confidence in him [Alula] than in any of his chiefs, for the reason that he is of low birth and has no pretensions of himself with the royal family." The need to defend the Empire soon created new occasions for the shalaqa to distinguish himself among Yohannes's devotees. In the two battles fought against the invading Egyptians (Gundet, 16 November 1875 and Gura, 7—9 March 1876),16 many of Yohannes's prominent vassals refrained from coming to his aid, but Shalaqa Alula proved to be his master's right hand. As one chronicler, after recounting the story of Yohannes's two great victories in 1875—6, comments: "He [Yohannes] did all this with only one Tigrean, no one from those over whom he ruled helped him.'" 7 A contemporary biographer of Alula18 starts the narrative of his career with a description of his role at Gura: 19 In the fourth year o f the reign o f Yohannes, king o f kings, Muslims came and arrived in the land o f Hamasen [the central district o f today's Eritrea]. . . . He [Alula] took up his spear, and girded his sword, and fought with them. . . . This man [Alula] returned with much spoil and prize of war, and did homage to the king. He cried out and said, "I am your servant, the son of your maidservant." T h e king said to him, "My son, live for me for a long time" because he saw that the grace o f the holy spirit rested on him. He [Yohannes] said to his nobles: "Do you not see that favor follows this man, who showed promise from his childhood?" And he [Yohannes] said to him [Alula], "I give you this land which flows with milk and honey."

This "land of milk and honey" comprised the districts of Hamasen and Saray, outside Tigre proper and beyond the Marab River (Marab Mellash, the future Eritrea), over which Yohannes appointed Alula in October 1876 and promoted him to the rank of a ras.20 During the next five years Alula spent each rainy season (JuneSeptember) in his new province21 and the rest of the year in his master's roving court, helping him to maintain his predominance in Ethiopia. Up to 1883, Yohannes hardly took a step in the Ethiopian domestic arena without summoning Alula to his aid. Among the most important cam-

ALULA, THESONOFQUBI

31

paigns were two against Negus Menilek of Shoa.22 In Yohannes's court, Alula managed to establish a prominent position for himself. Some time between March 1877 and February 1878, he was officially given a status superior to the others in the Tigrean court. An anonymous writer thus represented Yohannes's thoughts: "With what name shall I magnify him, for this man is faithful after my own heart. . . and he does not hold back from doing my commands. . . ." T h e king and the echage2* met a second time and it was said: "Behold, we have found an honorable name and a high rank which is fitting for the elect and blessed Ras Alula" and saying this they named him Terkwe Basa, saying "There is nothing which is greater than this name, and there is nothing which is better than this rank."24

The title of a Turk Basha was connected with the introduction of firearms in Ethiopia. In previous centuries it had been given to the functionary in charge of the imperial stores of firearms and ammunition and commander of the fusiliers. It seems, however, that during the "Era of the Judges" the title lost its importance and became rather an honorific one. Yohannes's former turk basha had been killed in the battle of Gura. 25 Apparently he was a man of secondary importance. Yet the revival of the title as an addition to Alula's rank of ras was significant. In the future Alula did his best to stress that it was a sign of his precedence before others who held the title ras, and he always signed his letters, "Ras Alula who is a Turk Basha."26 He [Yohannes] adorned him [Alula] with all adornments. . . . He did nothing like this for the other nobles. When Yohannes, King of Kings, had completed the ceremony of appointment for the Ras, he said to him: . . . Let your authority be under me. Do all that you wish, and there will not be found one of the princes or nobles who will be honoured above you. And for me, there is nothing with which I could make you greater, except only the throne of my Kingdom."27

At about the same time, Alula divorced his wife, Bitwata, the daughter of a peasant from Tamben and the mother of his three daughters. 28 He then married, apparently following the instructions of Yohannes, the nineteen-year-old daughter of Ras Araya Demsu, Amlasu Araya (Amlasu was a sick woman 29 and died in 188330). But this marriage brought no social power nor did it secure allies among the notables. As will be shown below, Alula failed in his efforts to join the Tigrean aristocracy." Dabbab Araya, Amlasu's brother, was to be his most bitter personal enemy. In the emperor's court, on the other hand, the "king's man" went from strength to strength. In 1879, members of an Italian geographical and commercial mission to Ethiopia, and Gordon's envoy, W. Winstanley, described Alula's position in the court as "very superior" to the other rases.32 They

32

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

described him as the King's intimate friend and even expected him to become a negus.3® But the need to protect the Marab Mellash f r o m external enemies (the Egyptians u p to 1884, the Mahdists u p to September 1885, and the Italians in Massawa f r o m February 1885) was growing constantly. Yohannes realized that he had to deprive himself of his ablest general in the internal arena in order to let him control his province and face the external threat. His hesitation before taking that decision was thus described in the Manawe manuscript: Yohannes, having heard this matter from Ras Alula [the rebellion of Ras Walda-Mikael in the Marab Mellash and his cooperation with the Egyptians in 1878], was silent for a long time while he thought in his heart, and he said: "If this Ras Alula is separated from me and goes to where that man [Walda-Mikael] is . . . who will uphold for me the house of my kingdom. . . . But if he stays with me, who can fight this . . . [Walda Mikael] for there is not to be found a man faithful like him [Alula] who does my will."34

T h u s Alula had the responsibilities and opportunities of commanding the most dangerous frontier. As governor of the Marab Mellash, Ras Alula managed to develop (mainly during the period of 1883—7), besides his position in Yohannes's court, an additional and relatively independent basis of power. As this province was the gateway to T i g r e and also, in that period, to the whole of Ethiopia, Alula soon played a major role in Ethiopia's relations with its African neighbors and with the European powers. These activities culminated in Alula's being the architect of the Egyptian peace treaty (3 J u n e 1884), in his defeating the Mahdist forces of U t h m a n Diqna (23 September 1885), and in his ambushing and annihilating an Italian battalion near Massawa at Dogali (26 J a n u a r y 1887).35 T h r o u g h o u t Ethiopian history, borders were spheres of raids and counter-raids, rather than lines of demarcation. This created a situation in which the misgoverned borderlands frequently served as a basis of power for centrifugal elements. In the Marab Mellash, local leaders had co-operated with the T u r k s (and later the Egyptians) at Massawa since the late sixteenth century. Such alliances helped them to maintain their autonomy f r o m the emperors and f r o m ambitious Tigrean chiefs. Ras Walda Mikael Solomon was the last local ruler to d o so successfully by cooperating with the Egyptians in Massawa and Bogos. He was arrested in late 1879 by Ras Alula. 36 Fitawrari Dabbab Araya, the son of Ras Araya Demsu (and brother of Amlasu), was too ambitious to remain a provincial nobleman in Tigre and took to the life of a borderland outlaw (shefta). He started by contacting the Egyptians in Massawa in 1882" and co-operated with them, later with the Mahdists, and then with the Italians in whose name he took Asmara f r o m Alula in 1889.38 Others followed the time-

ALULA, THE S O N OF QUBI

33

honoured career of borderland outlaws, allying from time to time with Yohannes's enemies at Massawa. Like Dabbab, Bahta Hagos of Akkala Guzay and Balambaras39 Kifle Iyasus of Dambalas came into prominence as local allies of the Italians after spending some time as shefta. Appointed over this borderland in order to face external threats and fight the successful shifta, Ras Alula, the loyal "king's man," did not fail to exploit the chance to make it a source of economic, social and political power for himself. Alula had no landed property in the Marab Mellash. Yet there, as in Tigre, hereditary ownership of land (rest) constituted the main source of economic power and social prestige.40 He therefore, it seems, began to create a new centralized regime in his province. By establishing the remote village of Asmara as his new capital, late in 1884 or early in 1885,41 the ras turned it into a commercial, military and administrative center. He settled newcomers in the town, most of whom—the salaried Tigrean troops and Muslim traders—were little attached to the agrarian society. Alula's centralized regime 42 in Asmara was economically based on the trade with Massawa, especially the profitable arms trade. This necessitated close relations with the Italians, the powerful newcomers in Massawa. The safety of the trade could be achieved by liquidating the rival outlaws (like Dabbab) who often robbed the caravans to Massawa45 and by obtaining the goodwill of those in control of the port. This could be achieved, to some extent, by allowing the Italians to occupy parts of the turbulent borderland, such as the countries of the Assawurta and Habbab tribes. But Alula had also profited from seasonal raids on these Muslim peoples. He wished to continue to exploit the borderland as a sphere of raids, even though he wanted commercial relations with the Italians in the port who so eagerly desired that borderland as a hinterland. Alula's tough and inflexible policy44 towards the Italians' slow advance into those remote areas45 resulted in a military victory at Dogali, but it created open enmity between Italy and Yohannes. This contradiction in Alula's policy seems to have been a main factor in the fall of his own two sources of power: the provinces of the Marab Mellash and the Tigrean Emperor. During 1889, while the Italians advanced to the river Marab, Emperor Yohannes shifted his attention to the Mahdist front, where he met his death in Matamma on 10 March 1889.46 Negus Menilek of Shoa allied himself with Italy by the treaty of Ucciali (2 May 1889) and proclaimed himself Emperor on 3 November. Ras Alula participated in the battle of Matamma, and Mahdist sources falsely claimed to have sent his head to the Sudan. 47 Alula did not in fact lose his head in that battle, but he lost almost everything else. Once back in Tigre, as patron and adviser to Yohannes's adopted son and heir, Ras Mangasha, Alula found himself alone. With the death of Yohannes, Alula lost his only source of power

34

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

outside his province. T h e Tigrean leading families could never stomach the fact that the "Waddi Qubi" became "the moving spirit of that country.' M8 It was frequently reported that Alula had many enemies a m o n g t h e Tigrean notables, 49 and his standing a m o n g them was reflected in the fact that he was also nicknamed harastay, "farmer." 5 0 With the fall of his provinces, which the Italians declared their colony, Eritrea, on 1 J a n u a r y 1890, Alula lost his source of economic power. In the years immediately following the death of Yohannes IV and t h e Italian occupation of Eritrea, the undermining of Alula's position was a major factor affecting the course of events in Tigre and its relations with the new e m p e r o r based in Shoa. Alula apparently realized that preserving the supremacy of Yohannes's house over the quarrelsome Tigrean notables and establishing the position of Ras Mangasha as at least an independent ruler of northern Ethiopia was his only way to regain political prominence. With almost no property in Tigre proper (save for the tiny village of Manawe and houses in Aksum and Adwa5l)> returning to the scale of local politics would mean disappearing f r o m the political scene altogether. Only a king could make him again a "king's man" and enable him to avoid such a return. With Mangasha as an independent ruler, Alula would again be the most influential turk basha, but with Mangasha as a vassal of Menilek, Alula's best choice seemed to be to enter a monastery, as he himself was quoted as saying. 52 It was for that reason, and because of Alula's loyalty to Yohannes's will,53 that Alula became d u r i n g the next f o u r years the champion of Tigre's independence against Menilek, while many of the notables in Tigre accepted the Shoan as emperor. M During the period of 1889—93 Alula had no substantial economic support. His only known financial source was the customs of Adwa donated to him by Ras Mangasha, 55 but with the stoppage of the trade with the other side of the Marab and the famine, 56 Alula was unable to maintain more than a few h u n d r e d soldiers. 57 His real sources of power were his enormous prestige as an invincible warrior, the fact that he was regarded as the guardian of Yohannes's heir, and his ceaseless efforts to conduct an independent Tigrean policy by exploiting the deteriorating relations between Shoa and the Italians. 58 In spite of partial successes, Alula's activities d u r i n g this time did not result in a united or independent Tigre. T h e combination of the "Waddi Qubi" and the hesitant Ras Mangasha failed to provide undisputed leadership for the Tigrean elite. For the leading notables, Alula was still an outsider. 59 His main strategic plan of encouraging the Italians to regard T i g r e as a b u f f e r against Menilek 60 was r e n d e r e d a failure by a sudden change in Italian policy, in 1892, and by the fact that Italian policy makers could not forgive Alula for what was called the massacre of Dogali.61

ALULA, THE S O N OF Q U B I

35

Late in 1892 Alula lost his final source of power: the favour of Ras Mangasha. The heir of Yohannes was sufficiently realistic to be willing to go to Addis Ababa and seek a settlement with Menilek whose prominence and superiority were undisputed. Alula, in order to prevent Mangasha from taking the road to the capital, revolted twice—in December 1892, and in February-May 1893.62 In May 1893, Alula was finally defeated by Mangasha's troops. He was humiliated in public and his career seemed to be at an end. 63 Ironically enough, at this stage, when the champion of the Tigrean cause had been brought so low in Tigre, the position he had so long desired of a "king's man" was to be given to him by the Shoan Emperor. 64 Menilek was shrewd enough to realize that if he enlisted the services of Alula this would symbolize the final fall of Tigre, and help him to unite the Empire. Moreover, as Alula's name was still identified with Dogali, he might prove useful in any anti-Italian move. Alula himself could not have failed to understand that the opportunities closed to him in Tigre by the death of Yohannes might be open at the court of the new emperor, and that the recovery of his provinces of the Marab Mellash (Eritrea) was possible only with Menilek's help. Thus, when in June 1894 the Tigrean Rases came to the Imperial capital to renew their submissions,65 Alula was the only one of them who preferred to remain there as Menilek's man. "The rivalry of Ras Alula to the Shoan hegemony," wrote an Italian observer, 66 was overcome by his hatred of the Italians, and by the desire to gain any support for the fulfilment of his aspirations to a government on the right bank of the Mareb. T o this one can add disgust of staying any longer with Mangascia in a position by far inferior to his past and to his pretensions.

On 21 June 1896 A. B. Wylde, as a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, interviewed Alula in Aksum: He much regretted the death of King John [Yohannes] and said it was "God's work," but now, he added, Menilek was a good man, and had forgiven him for the attacks the Ras had made on him in the old days by King John's orders. He said: "I have been to see Menilek, and he was very kind to me." . . . He then added: "I then returned to King Menilek as the only man who could restore order, and since that time I have thrown all my influence on his side, in order to unite Abyssinia once more."67

Menilek, it seems, used his new "King's man" as a balance to prominent figures in his court, 68 and a threat to Mangasha in Tigre 69 but mainly as a reminder to the Italians of their previous defeat at Dogali.70 Alula, totally dependent on his new master, was kept inactive in the capital,71 then placed in command over a large Imperial army, but once again kept inactive and frustrated in Shoa,72 and on a farm donated to him in Menjar. 73 His moment, however, was to come in the great battle of Adwa on 1 March

36

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

1896. Alula, described as Menilek's "Chief of Staff,"74 played a major role in the great national victory.75 It was Menilek, previously so bitterly opposed by Alula the champion of the Tigrean cause,76 who now put Alula in charge of a large part of Tigre. Yohannes had been unwilling or unable to impose "Waddi Qubi" directly over Tigrean nobles and had been reluctant to donate him gulf—land in Tigre proper. Alula's biographer stresses this hesitation by portraying the emperor asking himself: "If I gave my possessions to Ras Alula because of the love with which I love him, would not any of the princes or rulers, or any of the troops utterly scorn it?"78 Menilek, on the other hand, aiming to tighten his control over the Tigreans, appointed Alula, an outsider to the Tigrean nobility, as ruler over the heart of Tigre. Alula was given the government of the areas north of the Weri River including Adwa and Aksum. 79 Thus this consistent fighter for Tigrean independence, though not a member of the local élite, was for the first time in his career put in charge of government in Tigre proper because he had become Menilek's man. In his province, the grateful Alula accepted Menilek's policy of appeasement towards the Italians (which meant letting them have the Marab Mellash) and helped the Shoan Emperor restrain Ras Mangasha, who was corresponding with European powers.80 But on 15 February 1897 Alula died, after being wounded in a minor clash with Ras Hagos, an old rival of his and a member of the Tigrean elite.81 As remembered by the Ethiopians and reflected in their literature, "the famous and brave Ras Alula"82 was a great warrior. "Since he was feared and well known for his bravery," an Ethiopian statesman and writer explained to a new generation in the 1920s, "he always defeated and drove away the external enemies who came from the side of Hamasen."83 Alula's European contemporaries also tended, quite naturally, to see only his role in Ethiopia's relations with the outside world. Yet his role in the internal history of his country was no less significant. In the main process of the decline of Tigre and the rise of Shoa, Alula was the only prominent Tigrean who survived throughout the whole period as an active leader. He started as one of the main builders of Tigrean power and was among the last and most famous to fight for its independent existence. It may even be presumed that Alula was consciously among those northerners who not only thought but also acted according to an obvious Tigrean nationalist concept. 84 It is perhaps the familiar story of the outsider being the greatest patriot. While others had their territorial domains and had their interest in traditional local rivalries among notables, Alula had only the general Tigrean cause to belong to. In retrospect, it is clear that the Tigreans had but little chance to maintain the military supremacy in Ethiopia which they obtained during

ALULA, THE SON OF QUBI

37

Yohannes's reign. The northern part of the Empire was constantly threatened by foreign powers. Costly battles were fought by the northerners throughout the two decades following the Egyptian invasion of 1875. The trade routes through the north were damaged and the famine of 1889—92 decimated the population. With the sudden death of Yohannes the proud, hereditary Tigrean chiefs were left without a strong unifying figure. Victims of their own conflicts, they could not successfully face the rising power of Menilek. Alula's failure to unite Tigre and the Tigrean notables under Mangasha was inevitable. His subsequent recognition of Menilek's hegemony (his only way to maintain his own prominence) may be regarded as a fatal, if not the final, blow to Tigrean independence and as an important step towards the unification of Menilek's empire.

SUMMARY Ras Alula played a significant role in the political history of northern Ethiopia during the period between the Egyptian invasion in 1875 and the Italian defeat at Adwa in 1896. Alula became well-known in Ethiopia and Europe for his role in shaping his country's relations with its African neighbours and with European powers. But his role in the internal history of Ethiopia was no less significant. This son of a peasant managed to avoid the restricted local agrarian social ladder by becoming the best general of the Tigrean emperor Yohannes IV (1872—89). As the "king's man," Alula's power was based on his position in the court and on the province (Eritrea) over which he was appointed. But the leading Tigrean families rejected him. When Yohannes died and Eritrea was lost to the Italians, Alula became the most powerful champion of Tigrean independence from the new Shoan emperor, Menilek II. A Tigrean court seemed to be his only opportunity to maintain his position of a "king's man," without which he would have to return to the local agrarian social ladder. After four years of resistance to the new Shoan hegemony, Alula submitted to Menilek and was rewarded with the long-desired position of the "king's man." His recognition of Menilek may be regarded as a fatal blow to Tigrean independence.

NOTES The author would like to express his warm gratitude to Mr. Roger Cowley who has translated the Geez biography of Ras Alula cited herein. 1. G. F. Berkeley, The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menilek (London, 1902: new edition, London, 1935), 13!

38

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

2. A collective interview in Manawe, February 1972. Interview with the Fitawrari Bayyana Abreha, a descendant of Alula; Aksum, February 1972. For Alula's humble origin see a m o n g many other written sources: C. Conti Rossini, "Canti popolari tigrai," Zeitschriftfur Assyriologie (Strassburg, 1906), song 155, note I ; P. De Lauribar, Douze ans en Abyssinie (Paris, 1898), 693; F. Martini, IlDiario Eritreo (Florence, 1946), 11,411; V. Mantegazza, Gl'Italiani in Africa (Florence, 1896), 349; The Daily News, 10 February 1887. 3. Many sources are contradictory concerning Alula's date of birth. Hill's suggestion of 1847 seems to be most likely. R. Hill, A Biographical Dictionary of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (Oxford, 1951; London, 1967). 4. Interview with Dr. Abba Gabra Iyasus Haylu, Addis Ababa, J a n u a r y 1972. Also his article, "Selaras Alula" in Yazareyitu Ityopya Hedar 6th 1955 E. C.; Tesfai Seyoum, "Ras Alula Abba Nega" (B. A. thesis. Haile Sellassie I University, Addis Ababa [HSIU] 1970), 2, citing other informants in Tigre. 5. T h e most senior title, just below that of negus (king)—comparable to duke (and like it given only by the emperors). For this title and others see Glossary in E. Ullendorff, The Ethiopians (London, 1960). 6. All formally military titles which unlike ras and negus might also be awarded by other officials; see Ullendorff, The Ethiopians, for definitions. 7. Ruler of the sub-province of Agame. 8. See also C. Conti Rossini, Italia edEtiopia (Rome, 1935), 26. 9. "Epistolario Africano," Italiani in Africa (Rome, 1887), 247-50; A. Bonacucina, Due Anniin Massaua (Fabriano, 1887),40; The Daily News lOFebruary 1887; F. Fasolo, L'Abissinia e le Colonie Italiane (Caserta, 1887), 204—5. For the Ethiopian local court and local hierarchy see D. Levine, Wax and. Gold (Chicago, 1965; second edition, 1972), 158. 10. Fasolo, L'Abissinia, 204—5; interview with Fitawrari Alame Tafari, Maqale, February 1972. According to Puglisi, Alula was a Naggadras, i.e. chief or trader of the customs and organizer of caravans: G. Puglisi, Chi e dell'Eritrea (Asmara, 1952), 14. 11. A Geez manuscript in the church of Dabra Berhan Sellase, Adwa. T h e relevant paragraph is "Seyumana beta Mangest." This was sent to me by a school teacher, in Adwa. 12. Interview with a descendant of Yohannes IV, Dadjazmach ZawdeGabraSellase, Ph.D., Addis Ababa, March 1972. 13. Fasolo, L'Abissinia, 204—5. T h e distinction between the military and administrative spheres is rarely a clear one in Ethiopia, although in principle most informants are eager to point it out. 14. According to recorded oral tradition, Yohannes visited Alula in H a m a sen in 1884. Alula ordered his talented lieutenant, Belatta Gabru (also of humble origin) to leave his court, because he suspected that if the e m p e r o r saw him he might take him to his court. See J. A. Kolmodin, Traditions de Tsazzega et Hazzega (Rome, 1912-16), no. 271. See Levine, Wax and Gold, chapter 5 and especially p. 163: "Outstanding personal properties of various sorts often enabled Ethiopians of low birth to rise to high positions. T h e emperors a n d great lords c o n f e r r e d honours on those who served especially well in military expeditions, whatever their origins. Menilek's promotion of two Galla prisoners to rank as his highest generals is a famous case in point." 15. F. O. 78/3806, Egerton to Salisbury, 26 July 1885 (quoting Mason Bey, the Egyptian-employed American). 16. For the Egyptian invasions see G. Douin, Histoire du Règne du Khédive Is-

ALULA, THE S O N OF QUBI

39

mail (Cairo, 1 9 3 3 - 4 1 ) , I I I , 3° fasc. A a n d B; Ilyas e l - A y u b i , Tarikh misr fi ahd al khidiw Ismail basha (Cairo, 1923); T a k l a S a d e q M a k u r y a , Yaityopya tank ( A d d i s A b a b a , 1 9 6 0 E. C.); W . M. Dye, Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia ( N e w Y o r k , 1880); B. H e s s e l t i n e a n d H . W o l f , The Blue and the Gray on the Nile ( C h i c a g o , 1961); G o r d o n ' s l e t t e r s in B. M. A d d . MSS. 5 1 2 9 4 a n d F. O . 7 8 / 3 0 8 3 . 17. A l a q a L a m l a m , " Y a a s e T a k l a G i o r g i s e n n a Y a a s e Y o h a n n e s t a r i k , " MSS. E t h i o p i e n s n o . 2 5 9 f. 2 0 bis, B i b l i o t h è q u e N a t i o n a l e , Paris. (A c o p y is with D r . R. Caulk, HSIU.) 18. A G e e z m a n u s c r i p t o f 9 5 p a g e s by a n u n k n o w n a u t h o r in t h e c h u r c h o f M a n a w e . T h e p r i e s t s t h e r e w e r e k i n d e n o u g h t o let m e p h o t o c o p y it in M a q a l e , in F e b r u a r y 1972. A d d i t i o n a l p a g e s w e r e f o u n d l a t e r in Abiy A d d i . It was t h e n t r a n s l a t e d by M r . R. C o w l e y of M a q a l e . 19. Alula's o r i g i n is n o t r e f e r r e d t o in this d e t a i l e d m a n u s c r i p t . 20. D o u i n , Histoire du Khédive Ismail, 1085. 21. K o l m o d i n , Traditions, n o . 2 6 8 . See also M i n i s t è r e d e s A f f a i r e s E t r a n g è r e s [ M A E ] (F) Mass. 4. R a f f r a y to M A E , 16 M a r c h 1880. 22. I n F e b r u a r y 1878 (see M a n a w e MS.; L. G e n t i l e , L'Apostolo dei Galla ( T o r i n o , 1916), 3 4 5 ; P i e t r o Valle, "Abissinia, schizzo s t o r i c o , " Rivista Militare Italiana, J u n e 1887) a n d a g a i n in J u l y 1882, M A E (F) Mass. 4. Alula to R a f f r a y , W a r e Illu 14 H a m l e 1874 (20 J u l y 1882). T a k l a S a d e q M a k u r y a , Yaityopya, 58. F o r Alula acc o m p a n y i n g Y o h a n n e s to r a i d t h e Galla see B M . A d d . MSS. 5 1 3 0 4 . W i n s t a n l e y t o G o r d o n , 2 0 M a r c h 1870. 23. P r e m i e r m o n k of t h e r e a l m . T h i s was E c h a g e T e w o f l o s . 24. M a n a w e MS. 25. L a m l a m , Yaase Takla Giyorgisenna, f. 2 0 bis. 26. S e e A l u l a ' s v a r i o u s l e t t e r s in, L'ltalia in Africa; Etiopia-Mar Rosso, C. Giglio, e d . ( R o m e , 1966), vol 5. 27. M a n a w e MS. 28. I n t e r v i e w with Wayzaro Y a s h a s h w a r q B a y y a n o f Abiy A d d i , a g r e a t g r a n d d a u g h t e r o f A l u l a , F e b r u a r y 1972; Fitawrari B a y y a n a A b r e h a , a d e s c e n d a n t o f A l u l a , A k s u m , F e b r u a r y 1972. 29. P. M a t t e u c c i , In Abissinia (Milan, 1880), 2 3 3 . 30. F. O . 4 0 6 / 1 , H e w e t t t o A d m i r a l t y 7 - 1 0 J a n u a r y 1884. 31. L e v i n e , Wax and Gold, 163 : "A s e l f - r e s p e c t i n g m a n o f n o b l e f a m i l y w o u l d resist m a r r y i n g his d a u g h t e r t o a c o m m o n e r o r p e r s o n o f d u b i o u s p a r e n t a g e n o m a t t e r h o w h i g h a r a n k t h e l a t t e r o b t a i n e d ; f o r t h e A b y s s i n i a n nobility d i d f o r m a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s s t a t u s g r o u p with a c e r t a i n h e r e d i t a r y b a s e . " 32. W i n s t a n l e y t o G o r d o n , 2 2 May 1879, B M A d d . MSS. 5 1 3 0 4 ; W . W i n s t a n ley, A Visit to Abyssinia ( L o n d o n , 1881), 2: 2 2 4 - 5 ; M a t t e u c c i , In Abissinia, 2 3 1 , P. Vxgoni, Abissinia ( M i l a n , 1881), 181. 33. M a t t e u c c i ' s letters in Cosmos, v (1879), 189, 2 5 8 . 34. M a n a w e MS. 35. F o r d e t a i l s s e e H . Erlich, Ethiopia and Eritrea during the Scramble for Africa—A Political Biography of Ras Alula, 1875—1897. (East Lansing: Michigan Slate University Press, 1982), 39-129. 36. S e e E r l i c h , Ras Alula, 1 0 - 1 1 ; 1 2 - 1 6 ; 2 0 - 2 1 ; 2 2 - 2 3 ; 25, c i t i n g inter-alia K o l m o d i n , Traditions, nos. 2 3 8 - 6 5 ; T a k l a S a d e q M a k u r y a , Yaityopya, 57, 58. 37. A b i d i n A r c h i v e s [A. A.], S o u d a n 3—6, in S. R u b e n s o n ' s collection, Instit u t e o f E t h i o p i a n S t u d i e s [IES]: D a b b a b t o T a w f i q , 1882, N . D.; s e e T a k l a S a d e q M a k u r y a Yaityopia, 5 8 , 59; A. B. W y l d e , '83 to '87 in the Soudan ( L o n d o n , 1888), 1 : 51 passim.

40

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

38. Ministero della Guerra, Storia Militare della Colonia Eritrea (Rome, 1935), 192. Dabbab was killed by Alula in a battle near Adwa on 29 September 1891. 39. Military title of intermediate seniority. 40. T h e Eritrean land system was analysed in S. F. Nadel, "Land T e n u r e on the Eritrean Plateau," Africa, 16 (1946), 1-21, 99-109. 41. Kolmodin, Traditions, no. 271; Annates de la Congregation de la Mission (1885), 250. 42. See Erlich, Ras Alula, 139-54. 43. See an example in Wylde, '83-87, 1 : 5 1 , 3 3 7 . 44. In November 1887, Alula told the British envoy Portal, " T h e Italians should come to Sahati [a water point on the Massawa-Asmara route] only if he [Alula] could go as Governor to Rome." G. H. Portal, My Mission to Abyssinia (London, 1892), 81. 45. "With you," Alula told the Italian officer Mulazzani in July 1896, "I have made a great problem over a small piece of land, arid, sandy a n d of no value." Archivio Storico del soppresso Ministero dell'Africa Italiana [A. S. MAI] 3/17136: Mulazzani Report, 26 July 1896; Conti Rossini, Italia, 465. 46. For the historical developments see R. A. Caulk, "Yohannes IV, the Mahdists, a n d the colonial partition of northeast Africa," Transafrican Journal of History, 1, 2 (1971), 25 ff.; idem, "Firearms a n d Princely Power in Ethiopia in the Nineteenth C e n t u r y , " / . Afr. Hist. 13 (1972), 4: 6 2 2 - 2 3 ; Erlich, Ras Alula, 110143. 47. N a u m Shuqayr, Tarikh as-Sudan al-qadim wal-hadith (Cairo, 1903), 486—7; also J. Ohrwalder, Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp (London, 1892), 268. 48. F. O. 406/1. Hewett to Admiralty 7 - 1 0 J a n u a r y 1884. 49. F. O. 403/91, Portal to Baring, 1 J a n u a r y 1888; Portal, My Mission, 85; A. S. MAI 3/7-47. Memo on Bahta Hagos 1 J a n u a r y 1895. MAE(F) Mass. 4. Coulbeaux to Soumagne, 30 J u n e 1884; Giglio, Etiopia, 5, no. 257, p. 359. Gene to Rabilant 8 October 1886. Alula's main enemies were leading figures in Ras Araya's family, Ras Gabra Kidane and Dadjazmach (later Ras) Hagos. 50. A. S. MAI 3/7-47. Memo on Bahta Hagos, 1 J a n u a r y 1895. 51. A. B. Wylde, "An Unofficial Mission to Abyssinia," Manchester Guardian, 14 May 1897. 52. N. Corazzini, "La pace—Ras Alula—Un banchetto ad Axum," La Tribuna, 3 J u n e 1890; C. Zaghi, Crispi e Menelich (Torino, 1956), 74. 53. According to the Manawe MS. Yohannes, on his dying bed, thus o r d e r e d Alula: " O my beloved and faithful one, behold your son, this Ras Mangasa. Protect your trust which I have h a n d e d over to you." And to his son [Mangasha] he said: "My son, behold your father, Ras Alula, d o not reject his counsel, nor transgress his commands." 54. On 28 November 1889, Sebhat Aragawi wrote to that effect to the Italians. (A. S. MAI, "Diarii Informazioni" Sebhat to Baldissera 28 November 1889). Sebhat then joined hands with an envoy of Menilek (Seyum "Abba Gubaz") and f o u g h t against Alula and Mangasha in December 1889 (see Erlich, "Ras Alula," 149—151). Mangasha himself submitted to Menilek in March 1890 when the new e m p e r o r came to Maqale (Conti Rossini, Italia ed Etiopia, 27) though Alula fiercely opposed this step (Manawe MS.); see below, note 76. 55. A. S. MAI 3/6-72 Baratieri to MAE, 12 March 1890. 56. See Conti Rossini, Italia, 17, n. 2; R. Pankhurst, " T h e Great Ethiopian Famine of 1889-1892," University College Review, 1969,90-103; idem, Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935 (Addis Ababa, 1968), 217 ff; L. Mercatelli, "Nel

ALULA, THE SON OF QUBI

41

paese di Ras Alula," Corriere di Napoli, 13-14 May 1891. 57. According to many reports in "Dairii Informazioni," 1889. 58. "As a matter of fact," wrote an Italian visitor, "Tigre is but a corpse that only the strong character of Alula makes walk." Mercatelli, "Nel paese." 59. Early in September 1891, Dabbab Araya managed to persuade Mangasha to abandon Alula. He thus wrote to the Italians, "The conditions of peace between me and Mangascia were that Ras Alula must remain our servant, as we are sons of Kings." A. S. MAI Archivio Eritrea 55/A, Debeb to Gandolfi, 6 September 1891. 60. Erlich, Ras Alula, 161-178. 61. Ibid. 172-174. 62. Ibid. 180-183. Also various reports by Baratieri in A. S. MAI 3/6-42. 63. A. S. MAI 3/6-42, Baratieri to MAE 23 May 1893,30June 1893 (quoting Mangasha to Baratieri, 19 May 1893). 64. A. S. MAI 3/6-42, Baratieri to MAE 23 May 1893. Luca dei Sabelli, Storia d'Abissinia (Rome, 1936), 3: 386. 65. A. S. MAI 3/6-46, Salsa to MAE, 30 July 1894: Diario Informazioni del mese di guglio, 1894; Conti Rossini, Italia, 99. 66. A. S. MAI 3/6-46, Baratieri to MAE, 5 July 1894. 67. A. B. Wylde, "An Unofficial Mission to Abyssinia," Manchester Guardian, 14 May 1897. 68. In April 1895 it was rumoured (though hardly to be credited) that Alula would replace Makonnen as the governor of Harrar. (F. 0.403/221, J o p p to India Office, 24 April 1895). Late in March 1895 it was rumoured that Ras Mikael and Wag-shum Berru would participate in a military expedition commanded by Alula. (Capucci to MAE, late March 1895, in C. Zaghi "L'Italia e l'Etiopia alla vigilia di Adua," Gli Annali dell'Africa Italiana, 1941, 545; A. S. MAI 3/7-49, Cappucci to MAE, 28 April 1895). 69. A. S. MAI 3/6—46, Salsa to MAE, 9 October 1894, "Diario del mese di settembre." 70. "It is exactly for that," wrote Capucci from Addis Ababa, "that the King keeps him in case he should need him. They are all convinced here that Ras Alula is a kind of a great bogey to us." A. S. MAI 36/17-168, Capucci to Traversi, 17 October 1894. 71. A. S. MAI 36/17-164, Traversi to MAE, 4 September 1894. 72. "Keen on active life Alula started being tired of the easy life in Addis Ababa . . . but Menilek wants to keep him close by" (Traversi to MAE, Ibid.). 73. E. Di Gennaro in La Tribuna, 15 December 1895. 74. A. B. Wylde, "An Unofficial Mission to Abyssinia," Manchester Guardian, 20 May 1897. 75. For Alula's role in Adwa see Erlich, Ras Alula, 192-193. 76. In 1890, when Mangasha went to submit to Menilek, Alula's reaction was thus described by the author of the Manawe MS.: "When Ras Alula heard that he [Mangasha] had gone into the throne-room of the King [Menilek], spiritual zeal seized him and he sorrowed greatly . . . and he said, 'Where is the country of Yohannes, and where is his resting place? Where will be found the traces of his path?' He further said, 'I will not pay homage to him [Menilek], and I will not bow down to the glory of his kingship, because he is . . . house of the King."' 77. Territorial fief; land held free of tribute (Ullendorff, The Ethiopians, Glossary). 78. Manawe MS.

42

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

79. A. S. MAI 3/17-136, Mulazzani Report, 26July 1896. 80. A. S. MAI 3/17-136, Lambertini to M. d. G., 22 September 1896; A. B. Wylde, "Unofficial Mission to Abyssinia," Manchester Guardian, 21 May 1897. 81. LaTribuna, 2 7 J a n u a r y 1897; F. Martini,ilDiarioEritreo(Florence, 1946), 2: 412; Conti Rossini, Italia, 463. A. S. MAI 3/17-229. V. Governatore to M. d. G„ 2 February 1897. 82. Takla Sadeq Makurya, Yaityopia tank, 48. 83. Heruy Walda-Sellase, Yaheywat tank (Addis Ababa, 1914 EC), 47. 84. According to an Italian journalist sent to Tigre in March 1891 to make contact with Alula, the Ras told him in their meeting at Manawe, "This country is ours, and if we submitted to Menilek this is because we became very few after Metemmah. . . . I have my master who is the son of King Giovanni [Yohannes], why should I look for another in Scioa? . . . Tigre cannot be a servant of Scioa, because our people are soldiers, while the Shoans fight only against people armed with spears," L. Mercatelli, "Nel paesedi Ras Alula," Corriere di Napoli, 13-14 May 1891.

CHAPTER

T

1885 in Eritrea: "The Year in Which the Dervishes Were Cut Down"

By 1873 Khedive Ismail's empire in eastern Africa had been expanded to include what is today the northern part of Eritrea—the territories between the Egyptian garrisoned towns of Massawa, Keren and Kassala. Ismail's subsequent efforts to penetrate deeper into Ethiopia resulted in humiliating defeats by Emperor Yohannes IV at Gundet (Nov. 1875) and Gura (March 1876). Yet, the Egyptians remained entrenched in Eritrea (then called Marab Mellash1), governing the Muslim populated coastal lowlands, the Bogos country and its western marches. The central mountainous Christian-populated district of Eritrea (especially Hamasen), regarded now as strategically vital for Ethiopian defence, were deprived in 1878-9 of their semi-autonomous local rulers 2 and were put under the firm hand of the Emperor's best general. The following period of 1879— 84 was marked by continuous tension in Eritrea, the Ethiopians raiding the Egyptian protected local Muslim tribes and the Egyptians, still occupying Ethiopian-claimed territories, blockaded the kingdom's main outlet to the sea. Following the Mahdist rebellion in the Sudan, which partly spread into Eritrea, the Egyptians, guided by the British, had to ask Ethiopia's aid in relieving their Mahdist-besieged garrisons in Eritrea and the eastern Sudan (Treaty of Adwa, 3 June 1884). The Ethiopians were promised in return the restoration of almost the entire area of today's Eritrea, including a free port at Massawa, to be held and managed by the British. But the British, for their own reasons, encouraged the Italians to land in that town in early 1885. British, Egyptians, local Eritrean tribesmen, ItaReprinted from Asian and African Studies, ed. G. Warburg (Haifa: Israeli Oriental Society, 1975), vol. 10: 282—322, with the permission of the publisher.

43

1885 IN ERITREA

45

46

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

Hans, Sudanese Mahdists, and Ethiopians were the participants in the ensuing drama of 1885, which turned out to be a decisive chapter in the history of Eritrea.

1. THE COMPLEX OF ETHIOPIAN, ANGLOEGYPTIAN, ITALIAN A N D MAHDIST INTERESTS IN ERITREA Egyptian evacuation of eastern Sudan provokes an anti-Ethiopian Mahdist jihad T h e year 1885 is remembered in Ethiopian history as the year in which the Italians occupied Massawa, thus opening a new period of European direct imperialist threat to the independent kingdom. Yet for the people of Eritrea, 1885 was "the year in which the Dervishes were cut down." 3 Further research into the history of that crucial period seems indeed to lead to the conclusion that a Sudanese-Mahdist threat to northern Ethiopia was a major issue in the complex of conflicting Ethiopian, Italian, Anglo-Egyptian, and Mahdist interests created then by the Egyptian collapse in the Sudan. Only a costly but decisive Ethiopian victory in the battlefield of Kufit (mid-way between Asmara and Kassala, on 23 September 1885), prevented a Muslim-Sudanese occupation of at least Eritrea with possible f u r t h e r disastrous consequences to Ethiopia. It has been rightly said that in the Treaty of Adwa of 3 J u n e 1884 (the so-called Hewett Treaty between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Britain) 4 Ethiopia traded one weak enemy (Egypt) for two strong ones. 5 Emperor Yohannes IV (1872-89) was promised the restoration of extensive areas in Eritrea but got no guarantee about the (still Egyptian-held) port of Massawa which was soon to be occupied by the Italians (on 5 February 1885). He also committed himself to help relieve the Mahdist-besieged Egyptian garrisons in the eastern Sudan, 6 thus openly provoking the Mahdists. Indeed, the Treaty of Adwa did not only confront Ethiopia with direct European involvement in her affairs. It also opened a new period in her relations with the neighboring Mahdist state. As analyzed by P. M. Holt, "warfare against the Abyssinians aroused some repugnance among Sudanese Muslims because a Tradition ascribed to the Prophet excepted them from the jihad, on account of the asylum granted by the Negus to the Prophet's Companions." 7 But this repugnance disappeared following the Ethiopian activities in fulfilling their share of the Treaty of Adwa. 8 "When Yuhanna (Yohannes) ascended to the throne of Abyssinia," wrote a Mahdist historian

1885 IN ERITREA

47

he became proud, extravagant and insolent. . . . and looked to the land of Islam. And he sent his troops to the Red Sea coast [i.e. the eastern Sudan] where he took from the Turks [the Egyptians] several cities and put on the frontier the best of his men who are famous for cunning, bravery and steadiness such as Ras Alula and others. 9

This point was later (in January—February 1887) clearly stated to Emperor Yohannes by the Mahdist Khalifa: We were watching you in accordance with the saying of the Lord of the Apostles, "Leave the Abyssinians alone, while they leave you alone." So we did not allow the army of the Muslims to raid your land until from your side serious aggressions repeatedly took place against the weak Muslims who are near your country."'

This motive of a newly-created anti-Ethiopian Mahdist jihad should neither be overlooked nor overestimated. Political developments and in particular the struggle over the Eritrean territories (which the Egyptians were evacuating in 1884 and 1885) were the factors that brought the armies of the Mahdiyya and of Ethiopia to the battlefield. February-June: The Italian landing at Massawa: Ethiopian Eritrea between Mahdists and Italians Ras Alula, Emperor Yohannes' right arm and the Ethiopian governor of Eritrea," was the man in charge of fulfilling the Ethiopian commitments regarding the besieged Egyptian garrison in the town of Kassala. His projected expedition to relieve this garrison had not yet been launched by February 1885. At first the British governor of the still-Anglo-Egyptian Massawa, Colonel Chermside, had been reluctant to let the Ethiopians march into the Muslim-populated areas of western Eritrea, and considered organizing a "tribal Muslim front" there as a countercheck to the Mahdiyya.' 2 This "front" was supposed to be centred on the power of the Mirghaniyya 13 in the eastern Sudan, and to be led spiritually by Shaykh Uthman al-Mirghani and militarily by the Shaykh of the Banu Amir tribes. Ras Alula himself was busy constructing his new capital of Asmara, 14 and in re-establishing Ethiopian government in the Bogos country which had been restored to Ethiopia with the evacuation of the Egyptians in September 1884. In late 1884 and early 1885, the British failed in their "Muslim policy." T h e Banu Amir warriors aided by the garrison were heavily defeated in early January near Kassala,' 5 and the situation of the besieged Egyptians in the town continued to deteriorate. 16 Following this failure the British finally decided to ask the Ethiopians to relieve the Egyptians. On 8 February 1885, Colonel Chermside wrote to Emperor Yohannes urging

48

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

him to send Alula to Kassala. Simultaneously he started sending a lonf series of letters directly to Ras Alula asking him to decide on a relief expedition. 17 Ironically enough, three days earlier the Italians had landed at Massawa. For Yohannes and Alula the Italian landing at Massawa was a most surprising development. 18 T h e Italian Naretti, then staying with the Emperor and his ras at Maqale, testified that Yohannes' first reaction was: "But why did England not warn me?"19 Alula was immediately sent to camp at the new fort of Asmara facing the coast, and lost no time in sending troops to the outskirts of Massawa. Seven Egyptian soldiers were killed by the Ethiopian raiders 20 whose mission was undoubtedly to collect more information about the newcomers. In fact, it seems as if Alula was not overwhelmingly alarmed by the arrival of the Italians. Though surprising, it was not contradictory to the Hewett Treaty, and it could make no practical difference to him if the port, as a free one, was to be run by other Europeans, he was also busy constructing his new capital and was mainly concerned with the Mahdist danger in Bogos and in the coastal lowlands. There, it was admitted by Colonel Chermside, "reaction in favour of the Mahdi has swept almost to the gates of Massawa."21 On 18 March 1885, Ferrari, the official Italian envoy to Yohannes, was well received by Alula in the new Asmara. Together with Nerazzini, who joined him four days later, he explained to the ras the circumstances leading to the Italian landing and assured him of its friendly disposition towards Ethiopia. Alula then raised the subject of the Hewett Treaty and was assured by the envoys that "what was concluded between H. M. the King of Abyssinia and the representatives of the British Government will not be changed by our government." 22 Alula seemed to be convinced and according to the Italians he sent a reassuring letter to the worried Emperor. 23 Having other priorities, especially in facing the Mahdists, the ras was undoubtedly relieved to understand from the Italian envoys that their government would function in Massawa as the long-desired European neighbour. In the meantime, the negative implications of the past British "Muslim and diplomatic" policy became more obvious as pro-Mahdist, or rather anti-governmental, tendencies 24 among the tribes in the stillEgyptian-held territories were strengthened. T h e Ad-Tamaryam tribe was most turbulent, especially after its Shaykh Umar was replaced by Shaykh Abd al-Qadir, 25 the more energetic ex-qadi of Sawakin. He was a faithful follower of Uthman Diqna, the famous leader of the Mahdiyya movement in the eastern Sudan who was then campaigning against the British in the Sawakin area. Shaykh Abd al-Qadir organised a substantial force which threatened the Egyptians in Keren and actually cut the road

1885 I N ERITREA

49

from Asmara to Massawa. He initiated friendly terms with the Kantiba Hamid, hitherto known as Alula's man among the Habbab tribes. Though Abd al-Qadir did not succeed in persuading Hamid to openly join the Mahdist camp, he strengthened the latter's disinclination to join his traditional rivals, the Banu Amir or his Ethiopian master, Ras Alula. T h e new British approach, envisaging a future Ethiopian expedition to Kassala, necessitated a total shift from the "Muslim policy" towards encouraging cooperation between the Muslim tribes and the Ethiopians. T h e promise to hand over Sanhit (Keren), it was thought, might persuade Alula to march, but, without the aid of the Banu Amir and other tribes, he might be unsuccessful. Thus, simultaneously with the letters to Alula in early February, Chermside instructed the mudir (i.e. the governor of an Egyptian mudiriyya—a province) in Kassala, Izzat Bey, and Sayyid Uthman al-Mirghani in Daqqa (the headquarters of the Banu Amir) to organize the loyal tribes and prepare them for future common action with Alula.26 Chermside also advised the mudir to apply to Alula and Yohannes authorising him to offer them money, arms and the buildings in Kassala once they had occupied her. From his headquarters in Daqqa, Shaykh Uthman al-Mirghani succeeded in convincing several shaykhs to join the new line. He distributed money, used his religious and political influence and described the power that would be created from the combination of British arms and Ethiopian troops. 27 On 18 April 1885 he arrived at Massawa with five of these tribal leaders. 28 "The Sheiks," wrote al-Mirghani to Chermside in Sawakin, "are quite satisfied with the arrangements made by the government to put them under Abyssinian protection to which they thankfully agreed." 29 Such a declaration, however, made by representatives of Muslim tribes, which hitherto as inhabiting Egyptian-occupied territories had been continuously raided by the Ethiopians under Alula, sounded very strange, and so indeed it was. But it was soon learnt that only Shaykh Musa al-Fil of the Banu Amir and Shaykh Ali Nurin of the Sabdrat were key figures.30 As the Sabdrat were known to be siding with the Mahdiyya31 it was only the strong Banu Amir whose cooperation colonel Chermside could really promise to Ras Alula. Alula must have been pleased with the new developments. On 10 April 1885, the Egyptian garrison of Sanhit (Keren) and of Amidib left for Massawa and Belatta32 Gabru, Alula's lieutenant, occupied the longdesired invincible fort of Sanhit. 33 Alula demonstrated his goodwill by warmly receiving in Asmara the Egyptian Major Sad Rifat who had supervised, together with Shum Dahna Fanta, the relief of the Egyptian garrison of al-Qallabat (Matamma): "He ordered that we [the relieved garrison] were to have everything necessary for our c o m f o r t . . . his music

50

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

played to welcome our arrival. He gave us hospitality for three days and showed true friendship . . ,"34 In the meantime the growth of pro-Mahdist tribal power in all the territories of Eritrea, save for Hamasen, Saray and Akkele Guzay, had become a threatening fact. In order to transfer the Egyptian refugees to Massawa, Alula had to clash with the pro-Mahdist Habbabs led by Abd al-Qadir. In a battle near Aylet in late April, Abd al-Qadir was defeated but managed to escape. The Mahdist leader then wrote to Uthman Diqna in Sawakin and was subsequently strongly reinforced by new warriors.35 Worried about Mahdist power on the Asmara-Massawa road, Alula had to face new developments in the Italian-held Massawa itself. Contrary to Alula's hopes the Italians had no intention of merely staying in town, and their commanders there were not closely supervised by Rome. The correspondent of L'Opinione in Massawa expressed the feelings among the local Italian commanders. "And here I must ask . . . are we, because we have a robber [i.e. the Ethiopian ras] for our neighbour, to be suffocated in that furnace Massowah?"36 On the same 10 April 1885, when the fort of Sanhit was finally restored to Alula, the Italian commander, Colonel Saletta, sent his troops to occupy Arafali. Alula, returning from Sanhit where he had inspected the taking over of the fort, advanced to Aylet and proceeded to Arafali and Wia. From Wia, Alula, on 20 April, sent his lieutenant Shalaqa37 Araya to raid Harkiku and returned to Asmara. 38 Back in his capital Ras Alula must have had his first doubts about the new European neighbors. As he undoubtedly understood the agreement with the Anglo-Egyptians, Massawa and its port had to be governed by the British, but only as protectors. The Italians, however, were quick to reveal their intention to march inland and inherit at least the territories hitherto disputed between Alula and the Egyptians. On 21 April 1885, while Alula was still heading back to Asmara, Saletta occupied Harkiku with Italian troops. On 26 April 1885, the Italian wrote to the Ras announcing his intention to take over the spring of Sahati from the Egyptians.39 Alarmed, Alula did not even reply to Saletta but hurriedly wrote to Emperor Yohannes, then in Amba Chara. 40 Sahati was clearly claimed by Alula as Ethiopian territory. 41 The place was occupied during the time of the Hewett Mission by Egyptian irregulars with the permission of Alula. After the return of Hewett, Alula agreed that the Egyptians would remain there to secure the newly opened commercial route. 42 Worried about Alula's possible reaction, the British Colonel Chermside, then working to appease Alula, refused to let the Italians replace the Egyptian irregulars in Sahati.43 The bitter dispute over that remote little spring was but temporarily postponed. 44 From the Anglo-Egyptian point of view the Italian advance from Mas-

1885 IN ERITRfcA

51

sawa was poorly timed. With Keren already in his hands, but quite seriously threatened by Mahdist forces, and the very suspicious and dangerous developments in the more important coastal areas, Ras Alula was really losing interest in going to relieve the besieged Egyptians in far-off Kassala. The British, the mudir from Kassala, and the influential Mirghani promised Alula arms, money, property and the cooperation of the tribes,45 but he now had no reason to hurry. On the contrary, it was the Anglo-Egyptians who were now losing precious time as the situation in Kassala became extremely serious.46 "Every step I could think of with Abyssinia, Musulman tribes and religious shaykhs was taken months since," complained Chermside on 31 May 1885. "I have made liberal offers to King John [Yohannes] and Ras Alula and so did the Commandant of Sinhit and the Mudir." 47 Alula, however, was not in a position to reject such offers of money and arms, but he could not leave his more urgent sphere of interest. He was also fully aware that his bargaining position was strengthened by the passage of time. In spite of those developments, the Ras' attitude to the Italian presence at Massawa was still far from hostile. T h e Mahdist threat in the Asmara-Massawa-Keren triangle seemed to be much more acute and the Italians did their best to persuade him that they themselves were fighting that very enemy. On 9 May 1885, Saletta sent a company of irregulars to occupy Amba but they were defeated the next day by the Mahdist forces of Shaykh Abd al-Qadir, Shaykh Umar and Balambaras Kifle Iyasus.48 Kifle, a Habbab-based old rival of Alula (as a prominent member of the deprived local elite of Hamasen), was said to have been nominated as the future Mahdist governor of Bogos.49 From Aylet, on 11 May 1885, Alula wrote to Saletta that he was going to fight that pro-Mahdist group. 50 Heading some 5,000 troops, on 12 May 1885, near Amba, Alula encircled the 1,000 followers of Shaykh Abd al-Qadir and annihilated a third of them. 51 Happy with his victory, Alula then wrote to Saletta: "Those who call themselves Dervishes were destroyed and annihilated by me. I am very pleased with that and hope that you will share my pleasure." Simultaneously, Alula asked the Italian officer to facilitate the passage of a new consignment of arms which he expected to be brought to Massawa by his Greek agents. 52 Saletta agreed to Alula's demand about the arms (the customs were in any case still in Egyptian hands), but repeated his request to be permitted to occupy Sahati. T o this Alula replied on 14 May with a diplomatic but quite clear denial. "I have sent Scialaka Arhaia to Sahati to receive the rifles, and the Italian soldiers [who accompanied them] can return from Sahati."53 During the rest of May and the first three weeks ofJune the Ital-

52

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

ians remained passive and Alula seemed to be less suspicious of their intentions. Ferrari and Nerazzini, who returned f r o m Yohannes, were cordially received by Alula on 11 J u n e 1885 in Asmara. They reported that the ras was happy about his good relations with Saletta. 54 He also permitted an Italian detachment to proceed to Aylet in order to escort the envoys back to Massawa. 55 Two Italian journalists, Belcredi of La Tribuna and Colaci, were permitted to come to Asmara where they were well received by the ras on 17 J u n e 1885. Alula refused their request to proceed to Keren but they were allowed to stay in Asmara as long as they liked. 56 June-August: Italian encroachment and AngloEgyptian pressure on the Ethiopians to march against the Mahdists O n 11 J u n e 1885 Alula replied to Chermside's letter, "I received your letter concerning Kassala . . . I am ready to do what you require. T h e cause of my delay is my waiting for rains to fall." 57 This explanation, repeated several times by Alula, 58 was well u n d e r stood in Sawakin, Cairo and London as it was known that it was impossible to lead thousands of troops such a long distance without the khawrs being full of rainwater, and especially in the western Eritrean plains in which Ethiopian highland warriors always suffered f r o m the heat. But the situation in Kassala continued to deteriorate and Chermside did his best to persuade Alula to move immediately to the besieged town. Alula's d e m a n d to release f r o m the customs of Massawa an additional 1,015 rifles, which he had purchased f r o m his Greek sources, were instantly met by the Egyptian sub-governor Izzat Bey.59 T h o u g h Chermside undoubtedly r e m e m b e r e d the Emperor's d e m a n d f r o m Rear-Admiral Hewett not to let arms f r o m Massawa pass into Ethiopia unless they were o r d e r e d personally by himself, 60 he instructed Izzat: Do everything according to Alula's request.. . ask him [Alula] whether he wants any ammunition for rifles and supply. In case of your making sure of his advance to Kassala you may supply him also with rifles and ammunition if he asks for the same.61

Beside the problem of the rains and the determination to obtain more arms, Alula's delay, or rather his loss of interest in the proposed expedition, was d u e to the constant deterioration of the situation in the coastal plain and the areas east and north of Asmara. Many of the Ad-Tamaryam and the Habbab warriors were fully cooperating with Uthman Diqna's envoys, headed by Shaykh Abd al-Qadir, and in early J u n e they were reported preparing to mobilize 12,000 men. 62 They not only survived their defeats by Alula in April and May, but also dared to renew their attacks on

1885 IN ERITREA

53

Ethiopian caravans to Massawa.63 Their ability to achieve a real success was entirely dependent on the hitherto wavering Habbabs and on supplies which could be brought only through the Habbabs' area. Alula, who had every reason to be angry with his nominee among these tribesmen, the Kantiba64 Hamid, had demanded from the Egyptian authorities in Massawa not to trade with him.65 The wavering Kantiba, afraid of Alula, of the Banu Amir,66 and of the Mahdists, contacted the Italians in Massawa and in early June was allowed to purchase food there. 67 Extremely annoyed, Alula wrote to Saletta: The Muslims are encouraged and they all say they are Dervishes. T h e people of Habbab provide the rebels with supplies. Why do you permit them to purchase it there? . . . Hereafter do nothing of the kind and have the greatest hatred for them. 68

T h e Italian step, though it might have been justified as a measure taken in order to prevent Hamid from joining the Mahdists, was a strong factor in Alula's growing suspicion. This suspicion was well nourished by the Italian occupation of Sahati on 26 June 1885.69 In the meantime Chermside was still doing his best to persuade Alula to march westward. Following his instructions, Shaykh Musa al-Fil, Shaykh Ali Nurin and some other shaykhs arrived in June at Alula's camp in Asmara. 70 They were warmly received by Alula, the man whom they had hitherto considered their bitterest enemy. 71 Responding to these steps, Alula wrote to Colonel Chermside, on 6 July 1885, 8 July 1885 and in mid-July, and also to the Italian, Colonel Saletta, on 10 July 1885, promising them he was about to move to Kassala, from where he had just received a new plea for assistance.72 At the same time, the Mudir wrote to Chermside to the effect that it was finally raining in the Kassala area, 73 and the British in Sawakin were convinced that "Ras Alula's [future] advance in the plains [to Kassala] is difficult but [now] perhaps practicable [and] . . . it is not too late to stimulate Abyssinian attention by immediate subsidy."74 But in fact it was too late, as on 30 July 1885 Kassala finally fell into Mahdist hands. The expectation of Alula's arrival was the only thing that had given hope to the starved garrison during the last six months. By 9 June 1885 the Mudir had already written four letters to Alula and received no answer.75 Finally, after a fierce battle which took place on 13 June, 76 the mudir was ready to surrender, when on 23 June 1885 a messenger arrived from Ras Alula saying: "Take courage, I am coming to help you soon."77 The starved and exhausted garrison went on fighting and Ras Alula was again petitioned. 78 According to the unknown author of a Geez contemporary biography of Ras Alula who saw the whole affair as a pure ChristianMuslim conflict, the people of Kassala wrote to the ras, "If you get us out

54

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

of this trouble and affliction and great pain, will we not give you much gold and silver without measure?" He [Alula] said to them, "I do not want your much gold and silver, but I desire your faith. If you worship the Word [Christ] and bow down to Him, I will get you out of this amazing trouble." 79 This could hardly have encouraged the Egyptian garrison. When the Mudir surrendered, the town was plundered but, in contrast to all expectations, there was no bloodshed. Furthermore, fierce quarrels began among the various elements of the victorious besiegers which lasted till Uthman Diqna's arrival at the town in late August. Though "the usual severities were practised on the officers to extract booty,"80 the garrison and inhabitants were allowed to live in peace,81 and thus the problem of Kassala was actually solved. However, more than three weeks had passed before the first news of the new development reached Sawakin. Was it really the problem of the rains which prevented Ras Alula from marching on the besiegers of Kassala? T o answer that question one must quote the following passage written by A. B. Wylde, who met Alula and had many talks with him eleven years later: The ras has repeatedly told me that he informed the Egyptians that the majority of his army is always disbanded in the month of June to enable the men to go to their villages to plant their crops, and it is only on Holy Cross day, in September, that they come back to headquarters, when all planting has been finished. 82

Wylde was kept ignorant by British officials of their correspondence with Alula,83 but the existence of such contradictory evidence cannot but lead to the conclusion that the whole matter was merely an excuse or a polite and "diplomatic" refusal by Alula to undertake the Kassala expedition. Sitting in high Asmara, observing the developments on the coastal plain, in the newly restored Bogos country and the Shoho district, facing in this arena both new Mahdist and Italian threats, no wonder the ras was reluctant to shed the blood of his soldiers far away in Kassala in order to save a few hundred of those who not long ago had been his enemies. On the other hand, it seems that Alula perfectly understood that he could not afford to reject the offer by which he could gain arms and money and reestablish the Ethiopian hegemony in western Eritrea. He was in a dilemma, but he was not in a hurry. From early June onwards until after the battle of Kufit, Emperor Yohannes' name was not mentioned at all in the correspondence concerning the Kassala issue.84 It was solely Ras Alula who was approached by the British and Egyptians, and actually he was conducting an independent policy. Yohannes was said to have authorized Alula to decide on such an expedition, 85 but it was rumoured that he promised Alula a kingdom in

1885 IN ERITREA

55

Kassala if he managed to occupy her. 86 "Ras Alula might possibly carve a principality for himself, under the suzerainty of King John" wrote Mason Bey, "if he could once get hold of Kassala and its neighbourhood." 87 But Colonel Chermside and his superiors well understood that in the new circumstances Alula's eyes were fixed on the coast. In late July, Chermside suggested that he promise Alula to hand over the coastal village of Zula to Ethiopia as the price for an immediate move to Kassala.88 T h e idea, which could have been most attractive to Alula and a great blow to Italian ambitions, was dropped. In order to entice Alula to move to the besieged town and abandon his more important "eastern front," on 24 July 1885, Chermside instructed Izzat Bey "to do everything in your power to induce him to start as soon as possible." An Egyptian envoy, Marcopoli Bey, was to be sent to Asmara "to use every persuasion to get him to move quickly." This envoy was ordered to hand Alula a sum of 50,000 thalers "payable on condition of his really advancing" and to promise the ras expenses up to 300,000 thalers for the expedition. Alula was to be promised arms, ammunition and supplies.89 Marcopoli Bey reached Asmara on 11 August 1885 and was very kindly received by Alula "who showed a great desire to be agreeable to the government by assisting Kassala."90 Alula was given the sum of 50,000 thalers and was told that some 800 to 1,000 Remington rifles were expected to reach his camp from Massawa.91 The next day, on 12 August 1885, Alula summoned the envoy and in sharp contrast to the cordiality he had demonstrated the day before he accused the Anglo-Egyptian authorities at Massawa: "Why do you not turn out the Italians from Massawa? What business have they to remain there? . . . Why have you allowed them to camp at Sahati, this is a neutral ground they must abandon the place! . . ." and the ras—Marcopoli described—growing rather excited, rose on his angareb exclaiming, "No, I will not march to the relief of Kassala before I $ee what the authorities at Massawa shall do on these matters."92

While the ras was still unmoved about the expedition, Shaykh Uthman al-Mirghani left on 8 August 1885 for the Banu Amir centre in Daqqa in order to prepare the neighboring tribes for the expected expedition of Alula.93 He sought to threaten the pro-Mahdist tribes "with the Abyssinian sword" and, on the other hand, to move Alula by creating a convenient anti-Mahdist atmosphere in the Kassala area. He was most successful in the first part of his mission: his envoys were spread among the al-Jadin, Sabdrat, Baraka and Baria tribesmen, telling them about the enormous forces of Ethiopians aided by Banu Amir warriors and supplied with British arms.94 He instructed them to prepare cattle to feed the expedition and the garrison. 95 This caused panic among the neigh-

56

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

bouring tribesmen 96 and the victorious besiegers in Kassala. T h e head of the Hadendowa warriors, who constituted the main element among the Mahdist forces in and around the fallen town, Shaykh Musa Sadiq, hastened to consult the mudir about the situation. Consequently, Musa declared he would deny any plunder from Uthman Diqna, and he sent a letter of conciliation to Ras Alula in Asmara. 97 T h e Hadendowas' revolt against the Mahdist official leaders really created a new situation, much more critical than Shaykh Uthman al-Mirghani, or his British employers, had expected.

2. THE BATTLE OF KUFIT: ETHIOPIANMAHDIST STRUGGLE OVER ERITREA May we tell you the accounts of Kufit? The Dervishes came like clouds, Can it be that they had not heard of Abba Nagga? 98 August: Mahdist threat to invade Eritrean territories

Ethiopian-held

On 12 August 1885, Uthman Diqna was informed of the Ethiopians' military preparations and the new developments in Kassala. By that time he had already planned and made preparations to shift his struggle towards the Massawa coast and fight the non-Mahdist Muslim tribes and the Ethiopians. 99 He already had, as mentioned above, a nucleus of an army in that arena commanded by Shaykh Abd-Qadir. Uthman had reason to believe that he might be much more successful there, where, he probably thought, the Egyptian evacuation had created a sort of vacuum, than in the Sawakin area (where the British blockade on Red Sea trade was causing starvation to his followers 100 ). Furthermore, as can be safely concluded f r o m the following developments and from documents quoted below, Uthman Diqna's move was also motivated by the new anti-Ethiopian j ^ a d spirit. Leaving his headquarters of Tamai on 13 August 1885, Uthman sent the troops he had u n d e r his lieutenant Khadr to reinforce Shaykh Abd al-Qadir near Keren 101 and he himself, with only a few followers, hastened to Kassala. On 21 August 1885, Uthman Diqna entered the occupied town, granted security to the inhabitants and garrison, urging them to join the Mahdiyya, recruited the frightened tribes of al-Halaniqa and Shukriyya and caused the disobedient Hadendowas to flee northward to Filik.102 A few days later he heard that Mirghani's envoys were confiscating cattle only a few miles from the town. 103 Having undoubtedly read Marcopoli Bey's letter to the Mudir in which it was promised that Alula

1885 IN ERITREA

57

would capture Kassala by 18 September 1885,104 Uthman Diqna declared war on the Ethiopian ras. In late August he collected his warriors and left Kassala for the Baria country, from where his commander in chief Mustafa Hadal' 05 wrote to Ras Alula on 29 August 1885: From the slave of God and faithful Mustafa Hadal to the King of Infidels, to Ras Alula his devil, and to Mussa Mohammed [al-Fil] . . . This is to tell you that I know you said you would bring English troops to fight against the servants of the Prophet. But all your sayings are a delusion. They have not come, and now you say you will fight me with an Abyssinian army; but in this you cannot succeed. The emir of emirs, Osman Abu Bakr Diqna, has now decided to conquer every province; he came to Kassala, where all the inhabitants joined him, and now we have come down to the hills in your neighbourhood. Therefore come out and meet us. Do not delay, but if you cannot come and are afraid, then let me know by the bearer of this and I will come to you with my "ansar" and will fall upon you and utterly exterminate and destroy you and all those who do not believe in God and His Prophet, and all your souls shall go down straight away to hell.106

Did Uthman Diqna really intend to invade Ethiopia? Somehow this question, which is no doubt vital to an understanding of the period, has been neglected. A study of Uthman Diqna's correspondence with the Khalifa leads however to the clear conclusion that he did mean to invade.107 The Khalifa wrote to Uthman Diqna: We heard the news of your advance to Ethiopia . . . but my beloved, things should be arranged according to their importance and we have heard that the problems in Kassala are still unsettled . . . and so is the situation in Sawakin . . . and the desired need is that you will pay attention to what is the more important. 108 Do not attach great importance to the Ethiopian affair . . . leave the Ethiopians and do not enter their country now . . . return to Sawakin, that is what we want.109

Uthman Diqna could not of course act according to the Khalifa's advice, as these letters reached him two months after his defeat. It is clear, however, that he had written to the Khalifa about an intention to divert his military efforts from the Sawakin area to a new arena inside Eritrea, probably the Bogos country and the Massawa coast. Arriving at the Baria's tribal area Uthman Diqna hoped to mobilize the various neighbouring tribes to join his campaign. Shaykh Aray of the Baria disappeared with his cattle and warriors and so did the tribesmen of al-Jadin, Sabdrat Hamran, and others." 0 Thus, due to the fear of Alula's army, Uthman Diqna was unable to mobilize the powerful Hadendowas, hitherto the backbone of Mahdist power in the Kassala area, nor the warriors of the Baria, Sabdrat, Hamran or al-Jadin. His army was therefore made up of the Jaaliyyin tribesmen, al-Halaniqa, a few Hadendowas 1 "

58

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

a n d some of the Bashibazuks of the Kassala garrison. It was estimated variously as n u m b e r i n g between 6,000 to 12,000 warriors. 112 T h e fact that U t h m a n stayed m o r e t h a n three weeks in this tribal area and could not proceed to the battlefield with a stronger army took Alula midway to victory, t h o u g h the ras himself, seated in faraway Asmara, could not know this. U t h m a n Diqna, however, must have either underestimated Alula's power or, m o r e probably, overestimated the power of his followers in Bogos u n d e r Shaykh Abd al-Qadir. U t h m a n left f o r Kufit on 12 Sept e m b e r 1885, o r d e r e d his troops to e n t r e n c h there, and wrote to Ras Alula in Asmara " t h r e a t e n i n g him [again] with invasion."" 3 T h e spirit of this new anti-Ethiopian j i h a d is well reflected in the Khalifa's letter to U t h m a n Diqna written on 9 Safar 1303 H/18 November 1885: We want to inform you, my beloved, that your entertaining letter of 20 Muharram [30 October 1885] reached us in which you told us how you had gone to the Sabdrat and al-Jadin and others because they became enemies of God, and how they positively responded to you and joined your army, and that you advanced to Kufit in order to spread the real faith and thus reached the country of the Ethiopians, the enemies of God, and that you invited them to join the God to which they refused. You therefore, fought them the war of the victorious God . . . 114 New British interest in an Ethiopian anti-Mahdist Eritrean campaign By mid-August a combined force of Banu A m i r warriors and Ethiopians was concentrated n e a r Keren. It consisted of about 2,000 fighters comm a n d e d by the g o v e r n o r of Keren a n d Alula's lieutenant, Belatta G a b r u . It seems that, at least at that time, this force had the u r g e n t task of facing the newly reinforced Mahdist c a m p of Shaykh Abd al-Qadir, stationed in the A d - T a m a r y a m area, not f a r f r o m Keren, representing a real threat to the Bogos country. 1 1 5 It was probably only in late August that Alula began to consider this force as a potential advance g u a r d . O n 24 August 1885, U t h m a n alMirghani's envoy, Khalifa al-Sufl, who had come to Alula's c a m p f r o m Sawakin two days earlier, left Asmara to j o i n it in o r d e r to act as mediator with the o t h e r tribes." 6 O n 26 August 1885 Alula o r d e r e d Belatta G a b r u (in the presence of Marcopoli Bey and possibly in o r d e r to please him) to organize the force in p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a m a r c h to the Banu Amir c e n t r e of Daqqa, 117 b u t in fact h e was told not to move b e f o r e Alula himself m a r c h e d with the main a r m y o n 13 September 1885. Gabru's force had been sending occasional reconnaissances towards Kassala, o n e of which was annihilated a r o u n d m i d - S e p t e m b e r , " 8 but his main function remained that of facing the immediate threat a n d , later, of collecting cattle and transporta-

1885 IN ERITREA

59

tion of animals for Alula's projected march." 9 On 20 August 1885, the British authorities in Sawakin received information that the town of Kassala had already fallen and that the lives of the Egyptians had been spared. 120 If the purpose of Ras Alula's projected expedition was only the relief of the Kassala garrison, this had now become pointless from the British point of view. Had Kassala fallen a little earlier the Ethiopians would most likely not have been asked to organize such a mission. But now, when Uthman Diqna was known to be moving his headquarters there and to be making efforts to revive the Mahdist power, possibly through a renewed march towards the Massawa area, the question of mobilizing Alula against him became much more important to the British policy makers. Subsequently, neither the Ras nor his sovereign were informed and they probably did not know121 about the fall of the town which they were being importuned to save. Colonel Chermside was confident of his own ability to cancel any future march of Alula to the west. "Even now," he said on 21 August 1885, "they are absolutely dependent on the tribes for camel transport, this transport is not even with Ras Alula, but assembled on his flank. A word from the government and Mirghani and all this melts into the air . . . The Abyssinian advance on Kassala, unsupported by us, would partake more of the nature of a raid."122 But Chermside and his superiors had now no other power to face Mahdism in the eastern Sudan. "I have no wish to stop him," wrote Chermside on the same day to his envoy in Alula's camp, Marcopoli Bey, "Alula's advance may prove of great assistance."12'' On 25 August 1885, Marcopoli Bey received in Asmara a new consignment of arms and, meeting Alula, he handed him 640 Remington rifles. Alula reacted warmly, thanked the British and Egyptian governments, and reemphasized that "what he was doing for Kassala is for the greater glory of God and not for presents and rewards." "Alula," reported Marcopoli Bey, "said he had many preparations and could not leave before his new year's day, 8 September 1885." Alula also informed the Egyptian official that he was expecting the arrival of troops who would have to guard the frontier, 124 in anticipation of any Italian move.125 Ras Alula made this step not without reason, as his next day's interview with Marcopoli revealed. "Alula," Marcopoli reported, "read the letter" which he had received from Saletta . . . asking permission to build huts on Saati heights . . .126 and the answer he had given to Saletta. He refuses the authorisation . . . then Alula said to me: What are the Italians doing at Massawa? It is not their country. Let them go home and the sooner the better. . . . There is no necessity to have a garrison at all at Saati. Tell England and Egypt that Abyssinia is not pleased at the presence of the Italians at Massawa and other places on the coast.127

60

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

Upon receiving this report, Colonel Chermside really had good reason to believe that, in spite of the arms and the money, the Ethiopian ras would not move from his position facing the coast to the Sudanese town. He therefore wrote on 4 September to his delegate at Alula's camp and ordered him to promise Alula that he would do his best to catch Dabbab, an Ethiopian outlaw and a sworn personal enemy of Alula who was then living among the Assawurta tribesmen. 12S But Ras Alula undoubtedly did not calculate his moves according to such assurances or according to the state of the Egyptians in Kassala. The Ethiopian Ras had been seriously threatened with invasion by Mahdist moves and words and he planned his military expedition in accordance with Ethiopian interests. The temptation to take Kassala was now accompanied by the need to respond to Uthman Diqna's challenge. He had a short period of hesitation as to the risk of abandoning his "eastern front" during which, luckily enough, the British (and Egyptians), motivated by their own interests, supplied him with some of the means he needed for the future struggle on both his fronts.

Ras Alula's imperial army

Ras Alula could not afford a long period of hesitation. A further delay could cause the wavering tribes to side with Uthman Diqna129 and probably enable him to cooperate with Abd al-Qadir's force. In such circumstances even the Banu Amir, encircled by Mahdist forces, would be in a very bad situation, while the Habbab would inevitably join the enemy camp. Thus Alula might soon find himself facing both the Italians and the "dervishes." His option of marching westward would soon lapse, as "in about mid-October the water in khors dries up and there is a malaria in the plains which afflicts the Abyssinian hill men very heavily."130 Convinced, however, that he should march away from the "eastern front," Alula did not want to confront the Italians at that stage and, on the eve of his departure from Asmara, on 13 September 1885, he warmly replied to Colonel Saletta about the newly formulated Italian intention to send an official mission to the emperor for the signing of a treaty of friendship. 131 A strong anti-Italian feeling in his camp, no doubt stirred by Alula himself, was however convincingly described by both an Egyptian132 and an Ethiopian visitor to Asmara.133 The Ethiopian visitor, Haile, an interpreter employed by the Italians, stayed in Alula's camp during the last two days before the army moved to Kufit. He was deeply impressed by the strength of Ras Alula's army and estimated it as numbering 10,000 troops "all armed with Remingtons."134

1885 IN ERITREA

61

"Thousands of Remington rifles and abundance of ammunition," described a British official, "have been conveyed during the last months from Massawa up to Alula's headquarters . . . the Abyssinian expeditionary force is now all armed with breech loaders.'" 35 There are several different estimates as to the number of troops that Alula had at his disposal but they are not necessarily contradictory. During the march Ras Alula's imperial army was constantly reinforced (as well as supplied) by further troops who had been recruited by local chiefs and sent to wait along the route. This was no doubt carefully executed as the Ras and his Emperor proclaimed heavy penalties for defectors. 136 "He (Alula)," wrote the author of the Manawe manuscript, 137 "sent round a herald, who said, 'Every man who goes here and there at the time of battle, I will kill with a cruel death, and he will have no hope of life in the Kingdom of Heaven.'" Thus, Marcopoli Bey, who stayed in Asmara up to the beginning of September, estimated the army as numbering 8,000 troops." 8 Italian sources, based probably on Haile's evidence of 13 September 1885, put the number at 10,000,139 and sources based on Mahdist evidence taken in the battlefield quoted a number as high as 20,000.140 This was actually the first time Alula was leading such an imperial army on the northern frontier and the first time he led such an army without the direct guidance and command of the Emperor. Yet, apparently not a single prominent Tigrean leader joined that army.141 Belatta Gabru, Alula's lieutenant, was the only known leader whose name was mentioned by the relevant sources as serving under the command of Alula in the forthcoming battle. Praising Alula's ability as an organizer and his diplomatic success in combining the Ethiopians and the Muslim tribes, a British official concluded, "Everything there promises success, and in all probability we are on the eve of the most remarkable and extraordinary episode in the history of the rebellion in the Sudan." 142 But for Ras Alula, the coming battle was not a chapter in Sudanese history. On 14 September 1885, he received Uthman Diqna's threatening letter,143 which was probably the final argument in favour of beating the "Nagarit" drums and ordering the army to march. "I will not trouble you to move from your place," he wrote on the same day to Uthman Diqna in Kufit, "make ready all your preparations, and I will come to you."144 The contemporary biographer of Alula quoted the Ras's letter to Uthman Diqna as a Christian reply to the Mahdist challenge: "How have you dared to come against me, O evil and troublesome man? Do you not fear the Lord God who made heaven and earth and all that is in them?"145 But according to other sources, Alula's reply was not that dry: "I heard that you came to Kufit and your aim is to penetrate Ethiopia. Wait for me three days and God willing I shall send you soon to hell."146

62

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

September: The Ethiopian-Mahdist clash Not a single European took part in or witnessed the fierce battle which took place in Kufit on 23 September 1885 between Ras Alula and Uthman Diqna. 147 Mahdist sources neglected the subject for obvious reasons, 148 and the fragmentary evidence can provide only an incomplete picture. Arriving at Keren f r o m Asmara, Ras Alula sent ten horsemen to the country of the Baria who brought him the information that about 3,000 "dervishes" were entrenched in the khur of Kufit. 149 This underestimation proved to be very dangerous. Subsequently, the ras divided his army into three columns: Belatta Gabru and his horsemen in the front, Alula with the infantry in the rear, while another column of riders was in the wing accompanied by the camelmen with the commissariat. By 19 September 1885, the Ethiopian army had left Keren and arrived at Kufit three days later. On 22 September 1885, the Mahdist troops commanded by both U t h m a n Diqna and Mustafa Hadal 150 were well entrenched along the steep banks of the khur, the bed of which was broken and full of bush. 15 ' They were reported to be confident that the Ethiopians would not attack them as they thought their enemies were still celebrating their feast, 152 but it was soon to be proved that it was impossible to surprise them in such a good position. Ignoring the nature of the terrain and Alula's order to outflank the enemy 153 and probably underestimating Mahdist power, Belatta Gabru decided to try and overwhelm the entrenched enemy by direct assault. He had been promised by Marcopoli Bey a sum of $ 1,000 "if he could assist Kassala before the arrival of Alula . . . [and] he promised to do his best."154 Sad Rifat reported that The forces of Belatta Gabru were in front of the force of Ras Alula and they hastened their advance, hoping to encounter the dervishes in order to take the glory from Ras Alula. His troops met those of Uthman Diqna and fighting began between them. The dervishes won the victory while Belatta Gabru and his troops were defeated. T h e only persons to escape from that fearful engagement were those who brought the news.155

Gabru's attack was a disastrous mistake. T h e bush and the broken terrain created a trap for his Ethiopian and Banu Amir horsemen, 156 the latter probably wearing their clumsy armour. 157 Even in better conditions he had only a slim chance as the Mahdists were entrenched on higher ground, 3,000 of them armed with rifles. In such circumstances there was no chance of a direct assault and Belatta Gabru paid for the mistake with his life. T h e remnants of his force "rallied when they f o u n d themselves some way in the rear of the Dervish position and only camp followers to oppose them, and reformed." 1 5 8 T o the discredit of Ras Alula it must be said that his first move was to

1885 IN ERITREA

63

follow his lieutenant's mistake: "When the news reached Ras Alula who was in the rear of the army," Major Sad continued with his colourful description, "it filled the hearts of his troops with fear and they didn't wish to advance and fight. When they reached the battlefield Uthman Diqna met them with firm hearts and sharp swords and high spirit. Fighting took place. T h e troops of Ras Alula were defeated and dispersed. His horse was killed and threw him. His nephew 159 brought him his steed and they fled in disguise and stopped on a high mountain at four hours' distance from the battle field. He beat his drum to muster the fugitives as it was rumored in his country that Ras Alula was slain".'60

Slightly wounded161 and leading a defeated army, the Ras had to reorganize his troops and do what should have been done before, namely to force the Mahdists out of their trenches. He subsequently formed two detachments which he instructed to outflank the enemy position simultaneously from both sides. This movement completely surprised the dervishes, who were prepared only for a frontal attack.162 The Mahdists, either forced by Alula's maneuvre or encouraged by their recent success (or, probably running out of ammunition) decided to launch a counterattack163 and marched towards Alula's centre. In the meantime, the ras had arranged his main force "in phalanx formation."164 Sad Rifat reported as follows, probably overemphasizing the role of the Egyptian trained Banu Amir horsemen: He set his forces in order by means of Musa al-Fil, Nazir of the Banu Amir. T h e cavalry surrounded the infantry and he ordered that anyone who avoided the battle should be killed by the cavalry. By this means he kept them steady and they advanced until they reached the headquarters of Uthman Diqna on the morning of 23 September 1885. T h e two armies met and the battle lasting four hours took place on that day. T h e cavalry were only employed in keeping watch on the infantry. When the Abyssinian troops realized that they had fallen between the two enemies, their hearts were strengthened. They stood firmly in the battlefield and slaughtered the dervishes.165

The wounded Ras Alula was reported heading his men shouting: "We must conquer or die."166 Soon the clash was no longer a battle but a massacre, and the religious contemporary biographer of the ras described it as follows: There was a great killing from sunrise until sunset, and Ras Alula conquered and killed off the wicked and apostate men who brought division on the name of Christ and who made arguments over the Messianic law. There was not one of them left.167

In fact, about 3,000 "dervishes" were reported killed in the confrontation,168 and almost all the rest were massacred while trying to escape by the

64

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

reorganized cavalry of the advance guard and the hitherto passive Baria warriors. The Barias had arrived near Kufit, headed by their Shaykh Aray, on the evening of 22 September 1885 when the battle was in progress. They anticipated the result of the fight and later began to kill the fleeing Mahdists and their camp followers.169 The al-Jadin warriors, hitherto also passive, intercepted a Mahdist reinforcement column consisting of al-Halaniqa tribesmen which was approaching the battlefield from the Kassala area.170 A total estimate of the Mahdist casualties was made by an Ethiopian officer, claiming 5,050 killed.171 Only 150 of the Mahdists were said to survive the battle in which no prisoner was given quarter. Other sources claimed the number of casualties to be as high as 10,000.172 The Mahdist leadership in the eastern Sudan suffered heavily as almost all the shaykhs and commanders were identified among the dead. 173 Uthman Diqna himself was thought dead for a relatively long period,174 but he had actually managed to escape. His defeat, however, "had a cooling effect on the ardour of the local tribes" and Uthman Diqna began to find difficulties in maintaining an adequate fighting force even in the Sawakin area, to which he subsequently returned. 175 Ethiopian casualties were not small either. No less that 1,500 warriors were reported killed and 300—500 were wounded. Besides Belatta Gabru some forty officers did not return from the battlefield.176 (The fact that their names were not known or referred to by any of the sources is indicative of the fact that prominent Ethiopian leaders from outside Eritrea did not join Alula's expedition as this general of humble origin was never accepted by the nobility.177 They probably preferred to send only their followers.) It was then recorded in Manawe,178 From his troops many faithful died, those called Belatta Gabru, Assallafi,179 Hagwas Warrata. . . . For the rest no one knows their names, but their names are written in Heaven, in the book of life . . . for they became martyrs for the faith . . .

Concrete historical facts, however, convincingly show that it was a united Christian-Muslim effort which frustrated Mahdist ambitions in Eritrea.

3. MAHDIST THREAT TO ERITREA REMOVED: THE SCENE IS OPEN FOR ITALIAN-ETHIOPIAN STRUGGLE Ras Alula's retreat and its effect on western Eritrea

The fact that Alula's army suffered relatively heavy casualties in battle, that the ras himself was wounded and his exhausted troops suffered from

1885 IN ERITREA

65

sickness180 were cited by contemporary British officials as the cause of Alula's not proceeding to Kassala after the Mahdists' defeat.181 Others suggested that the rains prevented him from doing so,182 or that he could not proceed because the retreating "dervishes" could still be easily reinforced by neighbouring tribes.183 On the other hand, it was suggested that "he believed that such a signal victory as he had gained must enable the garrison to retire without further help on his part."184 The Egyptian Marcopoli Bey who witnessed Alula's pre-Kufit period did not attribute the retreat to the result of the fighting: Ras Alula was exceedingly nervous as to the possible hostile action of the Habbabs, supported by or co-operating with the Italians . . . solicitude as to Italian action was one of the principal reasons which decided Ras Alula not to advance after Kufit.' 85

T h e real reason must lie in the inevitable conclusion that Ras Alula never intended to go to Kassala: he did not consider the operation as a relief expedition but as a defensive measure against the Mahdist threat. Had Uthman Diqna not come to Kassala and advanced to Kufit, threatening Ethiopia by words and deeds, Alula would probably have simply sent an expedition similar to Belatta Gabru's advance guard to demonstrate his goodwill towards the British. Had the Italians not come to Massawa, Ras Alula would surely have been delighted to establish Ethiopian hegemony over Egyptian evacuated Western Eritrea and even annex the town of Kassala. But in the circumstances he could not afford to stay even in the Kufit-Keren area, a fact which proved to be very important in the long run. Deciding to return to his "eastern front," Ras Alula still tried to use the effect of his victory as a base for an anti-Mahdist tribal front in the western marches. On the morning of 14 September 1885, Alula sent a letter to the Mudir in Kassala informing him of Uthman Diqna's defeat and asking him what he wished the Ethiopians to do on his behalf. The next day he began his march to Keren. 186 Arriving at the capital of Bogos, the Ethiopian ras issued a proclamation to the various tribes around Kassala instructing them to assist its garrison and provide it with supplies or else they would be destroyed by his forces.187 He promised the tribesmen he would soon be back and ordered the Baria and the al-Jadin to make the appropriate preparations, including the digging of new wells.188 A new but rather small detachment consisting of the remnants of the advance guard with their Banu Amir companions was told to be ready to move back to the tribal country.189 Ordering the various shaykhs to come to Keren, Ras Alula announced that he had appointed the local Shaykh Musa al-Fil of the Banu Amir as shaykh, umumi (i.e. general chief)190 making him a sort of unofficial Ethiopian governor instead of an Egyptian nazir.

66

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

Shaykh Aray of the Baria who attacked the Mahdists only after their defeat had become obvious, and who had previously disobeyed Alula's instructions to collect cattle for the expedition, hastened now to appease Alula by bringing with him to Keren a consignment of 100 oxen as a present.191 Alula, however, did not forgive the wavering Barias and took his revenge a year later, when it suited his political and strategic aims.192 The loyal Shaykh Ali Nurin, whose return to his tribe caused his warriors to join Alula's side by intercepting pro-Mahdist reinforcements, came to Keren with the captured shaykh of al-Halaniqa, Shaykh Muhammad b. Awad. The shaykh, a former Egyptian nominated nazir,193 who had become one of the important Mahdist amirs in the eastern Sudan, 194 was accompanied by his lieutenant Shaykh Nafi al-Halaniqi and sixteen of his followers. Ordered by Ras Alula, the Egyptian irregulars' commander Abd al-Qadir Bey hanged the pro-Mahdist tribesmen publicly in the centre of Keren.195 The bodies of Shaykh Muhammad and Shaykh Nafi "were later brought to Asmara where on 17 March 1886 Harrison Smith, a visiting British envoy, saw them hanging 'as a warning to the Musulmans . . . not to join the cause of the Mahdi.'"196 But Alula's idea of creating such a buffer zone on the "western front" by forming an anti-Mahdist tribal front proved to be a failure similar to that of the previous year's "Muslim policy" of Colonel Chermside. 197 The various Muslim tribes of northern Eritrea and eastern Sudan proved to be too weak to maintain such an independent role and Alula's failure to return to their area damaged the credibility of his promises and threats. The many shaykhs who still remained in his camp in Keren (and later in Asmara) and whose personal status was dependent on Alula, did their best to persuade him to return to their country, but were unsuccessful. The tribesmen themselves demonstrated their anti-Mahdist line through helping many Egyptian refugees from Kassala to cross their country and reach Alula's capital of Asmara, from where they were transferred by the ras to Massawa.198 However, facing the immediate threat from the Mahdists and lacking Alula's support, the tribes in the Kassala area who had deserted Uthman Diqna in the first months after the battle, were obliged to submit themselves to him by the end of the year.199 Many of the other tribes, fearing Mahdist revenge and lacking Ethiopian support, hastened to ask for Italian protection. October: Alula's return to Asmara to face the Italians Ras Alula stayed in Keren for more than a week before returning to his new headquarters in Asmara. He told Marcopoli Bey that he was very anxious to receive a letter from the Mudir of Kassala so that he could decide his future action.200 A more likely explanation of his delay is that

1885 IN ERITREA

67

Alula was busy trying to create the above-mentioned tribal front. Indirectly, his promise to return to that arena proved to be critical to the fate of the Egyptian functionaries in Kassala. On 5 October 1885, Uthman Diqna returned to the town and immediately arrested the Mudir who, he was told, had tried to regain control and had written to Ras Alula informing him of the weakness of the Mahdist force at Kassala. Uthman's soldiers—it was suggested—found on Kufit's battlefield evidence of correspondence between Izzat and Alula,201 and the Mahdist leader had very good reasons to be afraid of a possible Ethiopian advance. The fear that the Egyptian mudir might persuade Alula to renew hostilities was described by the secretary of Izzat Bey, Ghabriyyal Effendi Jarallah, who fled from Kassala on 25 September 1885 trying to reach Massawa through the Hamran tribe and Ethiopian territory. On his way he heard that Uthman Diqna's envoys were looking for him "as some of the rebels accused me of carrying letters to Ras Alula to call him to destroy them."202 In order to minimize this danger Uthman Diqna, on 30 October 1885, ordered the execution of the mudir and six of the most important Egyptian functionaries. 203 Thus in retrospect it could be seen that for the Egyptians in Kassala, Alula's expedition was a mistake, and even a disaster. As a senior Egyptian officer said, referring to the possibility of renewal of the expedition: "If Ras Alula went now to Kassala, it will be an excuse to slaughter the remaining soldiers and officers there . . . and it is the same with the Arabs204 and their chiefs who say they write to him about his coming to them with his army to relieve them." 205 But the Ras probably did not even consider for a moment the idea of an advance and especially not in order "to save" a few Egyptians206 after so many Ethiopians had been killed. Inevitably his thoughts were directed to the "eastern front" where in the meantime the Italians were taking advantage of the situation. Their activities were indeed becoming dangerous for Alula. Colonel Saletta strengthened his relations with the chief of the Habbabs, Kantiba Hamid, and officially granted him protection. 207 The ras, who "was exceedingly nervous as to this possibility," preferred, therefore, to stay in Keren which was the natural springboard to the Habbab's country. He had, however, another reason not to hasten to Asmara. The army was really exhausted after the bloody fight and the long marches. Alula himself suffered from pains in his chest and stomach208 and probably did not want to reveal this weakness to the Italians.209 He was already in a state of "cold war"210 with them and needed to make a show of power: on 6 October 1885211 "Ras Alula made a triumphal entry into Asmara at the head of his army, and preceded by priests in full canonicals, while the victorious troops carrying the captured arms and banners, 212 shouted out songs of victory. Alula himself was directly preceded by a raised dais, on which lay the banner of Osman Digna."213 T h e contemporary Ethiopian

68

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

chronicler testified: And the men of the land of Hamasen said: "Praise to you, O Ras Alula, who protected us. . . . For you saved us from sudden death and took us out of bitter bondage, that is, bondage to the Dervishes . . ." The priests and monks praised and sang, melodious song, saying: "Blessed is Ras Alula, who comes in the name of God."214 Emperor Yohannes probably knew nothing about the battle of Kufit and Alula's retreat before the middle of October. In late September he eagerly wrote to Queen Victoria promising her that he would soon join Alula to fight the besiegers of Kassala,215 and evidently he started preparations by sending the governor of Adwa (Dadjazmach 216 Hagos) in the direction of Kassala.217 It was only on 12 October 1885 when Yohannes, then in Dabra Tabor, received Alula's letter written (probably in Keren) on 29 September 1885: 2 ' 8 Behold, our foes and enemies, who heaped boasting and pride upon us . . . became before me like wax before the face of the fire and like smoke blown by the wind. All the Muslims whom they call Dervishes, were destroyed.219 T h e biographer of Alula said When the written message, filled with joy and gladness, reached Yohannes, king of kings, he . . . assembled all the chief officers. . . . The officers and troops, having heard this written message and seen the weapons of the enemy Dervishes, were amazed and astonished, and blessed God saying: "Power to you . . . who have made Ras Alula great . . ." As will be seen by his reply, the emperor was undoubtedly satisfied with Alula's success at Kufit and probably had to accept the ras' explanations for his return to the Hamasen. T h o u g h he wanted him to take Kassala, he either did not want to press Alula or was persuaded by his arguments. His reply to Alula, a letter kept by one of the ras' descendents, went as follows: Letter of the elect of God, Yohannes. . . . Let this reach the honored Ras Alula, who is a Turk Basha,22" a faithful man after my heart. Peace to you! . . . your pleasant and clear letter which was written on the 20th of Maskarm [1878 E. C.] reached me on the 3rd of Teqamt. . . and when we opened it and read it. . . then our mouth was filled with joy and our tongue rejoiced. . . . And all those who have been killed and have fought against those pagans let God pour his mercy over them and give them the merits of their toil. . ,221 As for the British, they preferred now to remain passive: "The Abyssinians should no longer be pressed to advance to Kassala," wrote Egerton to Salisbury, "but left to act as they think best."222 Apparently it had become clear now in Sawakin, Cairo and London that a renewed trial to divert Alula again from his "Italian front" would be both futile and destructive

1885 IN ERITREA

69

to their relations with the Ethiopian ras, who had proved to be "a man of considerable judgement and ability and has behaved well."223 T h e British were also afraid that Alula's anger over the Italian advance would lead to Ethiopian revenge on Egyptian refugees, those of the al-Jira garrison still held (because of the rains) in the Walqait province, and those who continued to escape from Kassala through Ethiopian territory.224 But the Ras was friendlier than ever to the Egyptians. Faraj Eff. Bey, a commander of irregulars who had fled from Kassala, reported W h e n w e came to Asmara, Ras Alula gave us permission to proceed to Massawa and treated us with great honor and respect. W e reached Massawa in early N o v e m b e r 1885.225

T h e relieved garrisons of Al-Qallabat and Al-Jira and the refugees from Kassala were so far the only ones in the entire Sudan to be saved from falling into Mahdist hands, and it was realized in London that "it is owing in no small degree to the ability of Ras Alula that the operation of the Abyssinian forces led to a successful result."226 Ras Alula, however, was fully aware of the fact that, while supporting Italian ambitions on the Eritrean coast, the British were doing their best to use him as an anti-Mahdist weapon. H e was actually pleased with this as it helped him finally to implement his own policy, but he absolutely lost his naive belief in the Europeans. T h e ras, who for years had wanted a signed treaty with England,227 met A. Wylde again eleven years after Kufit and six months before his death. . . . T h e ras turned all his followers out o f the room, and said, " N o w I want to have a talk with you. W h y d o you f o r g e t your old friends? What does England mean by destroying Hewett's treaty and allowing the Italians to take my country f r o m me?" Pulling f r o m underneath his pillow a copy o f Hewett's treaty o f June, 1884, he unfolded it b e f o r e m e and went on: " W h a t single article o f that treaty have you kept? L o o k at the first article. . . . Y o u gave Massawa away to the Italians. A r m s and ammunition could not be imported by the king. . . . As to the second and third articles," the Ras went on, "did I not relieve the Egyptian garrison in the Bogos country? Did I not fight at Cassala when it was too late? H a v e I not d o n e everything I could? Y o u English used us to d o what you wanted, and then left us."22fl

Alula's statement did some injustice to the British. Though it was true that they used him as an anti-Mahdist weapon while supporting Italian ambitions in Massawa, it was also obvious that they had helped him in arms and diplomacy to face the Mahdist threat to Eritrea. Whoever reads the relevant British documents cannot deny that these representatives of "perfidious Albion" were after all motivated also by Victorian highmindedness which drove them to do their utmost to save the Egyptian

70

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

troops and their families from Mahdist atrocities. In the long run it was the Italians who won in the battle of Kufit. While the Ethiopians and the Sudanese were so heavily engaged in Eritrea the Italians gained precious time in establishing themselves in Massawa and launching their inland offensive. Local Eritrean tribes, such as the Habbab and the Banu Amir began to see the European newcomers as their best ally in the struggle to maintain tribal independence in a sea of conflicting international interests. In less than four years after Kufit, the Italians, profiting from the bitter and active Mahdist-Ethiopian rivalry (diverted now to the areas neighbouring Lake Tana), would become the masters of Eritrea.22!l For the Mahdiyya movement in the eastern Sudan, Kufit was a serious setback. The movement lost its chance of gaining the support of the Eritrean Muslim tribes and possibly also the hope of gaining access to the Red Sea. Never again would Mahdism challenge the Mirghaniyya sect among the local Eritrean population. 230 In spite of their defeat in Eritrea, the Mahdiyya, motivated by the growing element of anti-Ethiopian jihad of which Kufit was undoubtedly a major cause, became openly hostile to Emperor Yohannes. The Gondar-Matamma region saw many bloody Ethiopian-Sudanese clashes and raids throughout 1886—9. It was a Mahdist bullet which mortally wounded Yohannes in the battle of Matamma (Al-Qallabat) on 9 March 1889.23' As for Ethiopia, the battle of Kufit was fought too far from its Christian population centres to be well recorded in its annals. Nevertheless, it was an important chapter in Ethiopian history. This victory over the Mahdiyya came in a period of major internal Muslim-Galla disturbances 2 ' 2 and probably helped to further check such threats. In Eritrea the victory helped the Ethiopians to reestablish their government, though only temporarily, in the Bogos country. Given a peaceful period, the Christian-Muslim cooperation attempted in the pre-Kufit period could possibly prove successful in establishing an Ethiopian-dependent stable government in Eritrea. In the short run, Kufit was a significant Ethiopian victory. While in the Adwa Treaty one weak enemy was traded for two strong ones, Alula's military and diplomatic skill forestalled the threat of an immediate Mahdist invasion and supplied some of the arms needed to thwart the Italian ambitions. But there were also other consequences: the battle of Kufit put Ras Alula in the highest position in the Tigrean court of Emperor Yohannes IV. The successful ras and governor of Eritrea (the Mareb Mellash) was now partly authorized by his busy master to deal with the Italians. His subsequent uncompromising and over-confident diplomatic and military policy towards them would result in disastrous consequences to Yohannes

1885 IN ERITREA

71

IV and to the T i g r e a n h e g e m o n y over the Empire. 2 ' 3 In 1889, following Yohannes' death, Menilek o f Shoa was to e m e r g e as u n d i s p u t e d Emperor. O n 1 January 1890, the Italians, having advanced to the River Marab, established their colony of Eritrea. E u r o p e a n historiography has almost totally neglected the battle o f Kufit. W h e n the event has been referred to, it has generally b e e n described as an Ethiopian military victory which c a m e too late to achieve its p u r p o s e — t h e relief o f the Kassala garrison. 2 3 4 Further research, however, s e e m s to lead to the conclusion that both the circumstances and the implications of the e p i s o d e were n o t that simple.

NOTES 1. Marab Mellash, i.e. beyond the (River) Marab, was the Ethiopian name for the areas which on 1 January 1890 were named by the Italians Eritrea. T h o u g h in the period discussed in this article the name Eritrea had not been introduced, I preferred to use it for the sake of convenience. 2. For historical background on Eritrea consult: S. H. Longrigg, A Short History of Eritrea, Oxford, 1945; R. Perini, Di qua dal Mareb, Firenze, 1905; J . A. Kolmodin, Traditions de Tsazzega etHazzega, Rome, 1912—16. 3. E. Littmann, Publications of the Princeton Expedition to Abyssinia, (Leyden, 1910), 2:196. 4. For a discussion of this treaty, see S. Rubenson, "The Adwa Peace Treaty of 1884," Third International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, (Addis Ababa, 1966), 225-36. 5. S. Rubenson, "Some Aspects of the Survival of Ethiopian Independence." University College Review, (Addis Ababa, 1961). 6. T h e Egyptian garrisons besieged by the Mahdists in the eastern Sudan were those in al-Qallabat (Matamma), al-Jira and Kassala (Amidib and Sanhit were not actually besieged). See also P. M. Holt, The Mahdist State of the Sudan 1881— 1898, (Oxford, 1970; 2nded.), 166-7. 7. Holt, The Mahdist State, 150. 8. T h e garrisons of al-Qallabat and al-Jira were relieved in early 1885 by Ethiopian forces accompanied by a brilliant Egyptian officer, Major Sad Rifat. See Major Sad's long report in SO AS (School of Oriental and African Studies, London University) M.518. An English translation was made and is kept by Prof. P. M. Holt (hereafter: Sad Report). See also P. M. Holt, The Mahdist State, 167-9. Also many documents in FO (Foreign Office, PRO, London) 78/3799,407/63,407/66. T h e Ethiopian leader who relieved the al-Qallabat garrison was Shum Dahna Fanta. See: Heruy Walda-Sellase, Yaase Yohannes tarik, Addis Ababa, 1901 EC (Ethiopian Calendar), 5. 9. Ismail b. Abd al-Qadir: Al-tiraz al-manqush bibushra qatl Yuhanna malik alhubush ("The Painted Embroidery on the Good News of the Destruction of Yohannes, King of the Abyssinians"). MS. at the library of the School of Oriental Studies, Durham, 33-4. 10. Holt, The Mahdist State, 150, quoting, Naum Shuqayr: Tarikh al-Sudan alqadim wal-hadith wa-Jugrafiyatuhu, Cairo, n.d. [1903] pp. 467-9.

72

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

11. For Ras Alula see: E. Erlich. Ethiopia and Eritrea During the Scramble for Africa—A Political Biography of Ras Alula, 1875—1897 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1982). 12. FO 78/3799, Chermside to Izzat Bey, Mudir of Taka, 29 J a n u a r y 1885. 13. O n the Mirghaniyya in Eritrea see J. S. T r i m i n g h a m , Islam in Ethiopia, London, 1952(1965). 14. T o establish the date of Alula's moving his headquarters to Asmara see Annates de la Congregation de la Mission, 1885, 250, Paillard's letter of 25 December 1884, and J . A. Kolmodin, Traditions de Tsazzega, Rome, 1912-16, no. 271. For Asmara as the new Eritrean capital see Erlich, Ras Alula, 81—87. 15. "Sad Report," FO 78/3801, Chermside to Watson, 21 February 1885; SO AS M. 518, Reel 8: "Report on the Fall of Kassala" by Ibrahim Eff. Khayrallah. 16. FO 78/3800, Baring to Granville, 3 February 1885; Baker to Baring, 4 February 1885. 17. FO 78/3804, Baring to Granville, 31 May 1885. 18. LV ("Libro verde"—Ministero degli Affari Esteri (MAE), Rome), 17, Ferrari to MAE, 23 March 1885. 19. A. S. MAI (Archivio Storicho del soppresso Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Rome) 2/2-13, Naretti to Lucardi, 17 February 1885. 20. FO 78/3801, Chermside to Watson, 21 February 1885. T h e Egyptian garrison remained at Massawa till December 1885. 21. FO 78/3805, Chermside to Baring, 28 J u n e 1885. For Mahdist influence over the Habbab and others, see E. Littmann, Princeton Expedition, vol. 2 (Tales, Customs, Leyden, 1910) 194, 195. For Alula raiding the Asawurta in JanuaryFebruary 1885 see FO 403/83, Chermside to Baring, 18 J a n u a r y 1885; FO 78/ 3801, Chermside to Watson, 21 February 1885. 22. LV, 17, Ferrari to MAE, 23 March 1885. 23. LV, 17, Ferrari to MAE, 25 May 1885. 24. It would be a mistake to attribute pro-Mahdist tendencies solely to religious motives and especially so in Eritrea, where even several Christian or semipagan tribes occasionally sided with the Mahdi cause. It should rather be attributed (in Eritrea) to centrifugal tendencies. 25. F. R. Wingate, Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan, (London, 1901), 247,254; FO 78/3805, Chermside to Baring, 28 J u n e 1885. 26. FO 78/3805, Chermside to Mudir, 8 February 1885; FO 78/3805, Chermside to Baring, 28 J u n e 1885. 27. FO 78/3806, Mirghani to Chermside, n.d.; FO 78/3805, Chermside to Izzat Bey, 7 May 1885; FO 78/3804, Baring to Granville, 31 August 1885; FO 78/ 3805, Chermside to Baring, 28 J u n e 1885. 28. FO 78/3806, Mirghani to Chermside, 18 April 1885. 29. FO 78/3806, Mirghani to Chermside, n.d. (translation f r o m Arabic m a d e by Marcopoli Bey is dated Sawakin 2 July 1885). 30. F0/3805, Chermside to Baring, 28 J u n e 1885. 31. A. Pollera, /Baria e i Cunama, (Rome, 1913), 46. 32. A title of a senior official. For futile Ethiopian efforts to capture the fort in 1879,1880, see Erlich, Ras Alula, 24-25; 34. 33. For details about the evacuation of Keren (Sanhit) and Amidib see Shuqayr, Tarikh, 330; FO 78/3803, Baker to Baring, 10 April 1885 a n d 14 April 1885. Since the garrison of Keren (and also of Amidib) was not really besieged, it is definitely wrong to attribute to Alula the relief of that garrison, o r of al-Qallabat and al-Jira which was conducted by other Ethiopians. For such a view see, a m o n g

1 8 8 5 IN ERITREA

73

others, A. B. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia, (London, 1900), 35. 34. "Sad Report." 35. "Sad Report"; FO 78/3805, Chermside to Baring, 28 J u n e 1885; Depretis to Ricotti, 1 August 1885 in, L'ltalia in Africa, Serie Storica, Etiopia—Mar Rosso, ed. C. Giglio, 5, no. 17,0. 12. 36. Extract from L'Opinione, 15 February 1885, in FO 407/65, Lumley to Granville, 22 May 1885. 37. "A commander of a thousand troops." 38. A. S. MAI 2/2-13, Maissa to MAE, 25 April 1885. 39. Ministero della Guerra, Storia militare delta colonia Eritrea, (Rome, 1935), 92, 94; Maissa to Mancini, 14 May 1885, Giglio 3: No. 493, 181. 40. FO 78/3808, Marcopoli to Chermside, 26 August 1885. 41. In October 1883, Alula annihilated an Egyptian company of some 70 troops who tried to entrench themselves in Sahati. See The Times, 26 November 1883; G. Branchi, Missione in Abyssinia (1883), (Rome, 1889), 51. 42. Marcopoli to Chermside, 26 August 1885. 43. FO 403/90, Chermside to Portal, 22 August 1887. 44. On 10 January 1887, the Italians occupied Sahati with regular troops and artillery. After futile negotiations Ras Alula massacred an Italian battalion at Dogali on 26 January 1887. He thus opened a period of military hostilities between Yohannes and Italy which shortly led to the fall of Tigrean military hegemony in Ethiopia, and the conquest of Eritrea by the Italians. 45. FO 78/3805, Chermside to Yohannes; FO 78/3813, Baring to Granville, 31 May 1885. 46. On 3 May 1885, the famous suburb of Kassala and the centre of the Mirghanis, al-Khatmiyya, fell into the hands of the besiegers—"Sad Report," Shuqayr, Tarikh, 339. 47. FO 78/3813, Baring to Granville, 17 J u n e 1885. 48. A. S. MAI, 2/2-13, Maissa to MAE, 14 May 1885. Balambaras—"a commander of a mountainous citadel," a title of intermediate seniority. 49. M. Savelli, La Spedizione, (Rome, 1886), 162. Kifle Iyasus was the son-inlaw of Ras Walda-Mikael, the hereditary prince of Hamasen whom Alula had imprisoned in 1879. Later in 1889, Kifle took Keren in the name of the Italians but was soon sent by them to die in prison at Assab. 50. A. S. MAI, 2/2-13, Alula to Seletta, 11 May 1885. 51. Savelli, Spedizione, 162. 52. A. S. MAI 2/2-13, Alula to Saletta, 13 May 1885. 53. A. S. MAI 2/2-13, Saletta to Alula, 5 May 1885; Alula to Saletta, 14 May 1885. 54. A. S. MAI 36/3-23, Ferrari's report, 14 September 1885. 55. Maissa to Mancini, 15 J u n e 1885; Giglio, 3: No. 504, 191. 56. C. Belcredi in La Tribuna Illustrata, 26 J u n e 1890. Savelli, Spedizione, 163. They were later expelled following the Italian occupation of Sahati. 57. FO 78/3806, Alula to Governor of Massawa, 11 J u n e 1885. 58. FO 78/3805, Chermside to Baring, 28 J u n e 1885; FO 78/3806, Baker to Egerton, 20 July 1885. Similar letter by the Muslim shaykhs in Alula's camp, FO 78/3807, Egerton to Salisbury, 15 August 1885. 59. FO 78/3806, Ras Alula to Izzat Bey, 7 J u n e 1885,11 J u n e 1885. As mentioned above, Egyptian officials remained at Massawa till December 1885. 60. FO 407/62, John to Speedy, 13 August 1884. This had been carefully executed up to now. See: FO 407/62, Egerton to Granville, 5 August 1884; Speedy

74

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

to Egerton, 27 July 1884; MAE (F) (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris), Mass. 4, Coulbeaux to Soumagne, 30 J u n e 1884; Alula to Abba Yohannes, 23 September 1884; Bajerond (Lawte) to Abba Yohannes, 27 September 1884. 61. FO 78/3806, Chermside to Izzat Bey, 12 J u n e 1885. 62. Ricotti to Depretis, 8 August 1885, Giglio, Etiopia—Mar Rosso 5, no. 20. 63. Alula to Saletta, Asmara, n.d.; Saletta to Alula, 11 July 1885; Giglio, Etiopa V, no. 20,14, 15, 16. 64. Kantiba—mayor, governor. 65. FO 78/3811, Egerton to Salisbury, 10 November 1885. 66. FO 78/3811, Egerton to Salisbury, 10 November 1885. 67. Ricotti to Depretis, 8 August 1885; Giglio, 5, no. 20: 13, 14. 68. A. S. MAI 4/1-2, Alula to Saletta, n.d.; Saletta to Alula, 11 July 1885. 69. In late November 1885 the Italians evacuated their troops from that spring and substituted them with irregulars. See Ricotti to Saletta, 21 November 1885, in A. Bizonni L'Eritrea nel passato e nel presente, (Milano, 1897), 138. T h e return of regular troops to Sahati on 10 January 1887 was the main reason for the Italian defeat at Dogali. 70. Ricotti to Depretis, 8 August 1885; Giglio, 5, no. 20: 14; C. Conti Rossini, "Documenti per lo Studio della lingua tigre," Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana, (Firenze, 1903), 16: 26. 71. FO 78/3808, Marcopoli to Chermside, 26 August 1885. 72. FO 78/3806, Baker to Egerton, 20 July 1885. 73. Ibid. 74. FO 78/3806, Baker to Egerton, 20 July 1885; FO 78/3813, Egerton to Salisbury, 29 July 1885. 75. Shuqayr, Tarikh, 398; FO 78/3806, Izzat Bey to Chermside, 9 J u n e 1885. 76. "Sad Report"; Shuqayr, Tarikh, p. 398; FO 78/3806, Baker to Egerton, 20 July 1885. 77. Shuqayr, Tarikh, p. 398; "Sad Report"; SO AS M. 518, Ibrahim Khayrallah Report. 78. FO 78/3808, Marcopoli to Chermside, 12 August 1885. 79. A contemporary chronicle describing Ras Alula's life up to 1891, a Geez manuscript of ninety-five pages by an unknown author, kept in the Church of Manawe, Alula's birthplace, 25 kilometers south of Abbi Addi, the capital of Tamben, Tigre. T h e priests in Manawe were kind enough to let me photocopy it in Maqale in February 1972. A few additional pages were later found by Ato Alamayhu Fessahaye of Abbi Addi. T h e manuscript was translated into English by Mr. Roger Cowley of Maqale. I wish to express my deepest gratitude to him. A copy is available at the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, HSIU (Manawe MS.) 80. Holt, The Mahdist State, 169. 81. Details in Shuqayr, Tarikh, 339; "Sad Report"; SOAS M. 518, Reel 8, Khayrallah's Report. 82. A. B. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (London, 1900), 36. 83. T h o u g h A. B. Wylde was undoubtedly a prolific writer, an excellent observer, and most sympathetic to the Ethiopian cause, one must bear in mind that he was a private merchant who in 1879 was disgracefully barred from official British diplomatic service (FO 78/3005, Malet to Salisbury, 29 December 1879; FO 407/14, Wylde to Zuhrab, 16 December 1879). Rear-admiral Hewett asked him to accompany his mission but not in an official capacity. Wylde's hostile relations with the British policy makers are well reflected in his interesting books and articles. 84. During the period of March-November 1885, Yohannes stayed in the

1885 IN ERITREA

75

province of Bagemdir (north of Lake Tana). See [Dadjazmach] Zewde GabraSallasse, The Process of Reunification of the Ethiopian Empire 1868-1889, D. Phil, thesis, (Oxford 1971), 433. 85. FO 78/3806, Egerton to Salisbury, 26 July 1885. 86. F. Fasolo, L'Abyssinia e le colonic Italiane, (Caserta, 1887), 206. 87. 78/3806, Egerton to Salisbury, 26 July 1885. Mason Bey was an Egyptianemployed American who had served as a governor of Massawa. 88. Ibid. 89. FO 78/3807, Chermside to Izzat Bey, 24 July 1885. 90. FO 78/3808, Marcopoli to Chermside, 12 August 1885. 91. Ibid. 92. FO 78/3809, "Marcopoli Diary" in Egerton to Salisbury, 2 October 1885. 93. FO 78/3807, Cameron to Egerton, 11 August 1885. 94. As might be concluded f r o m Mustafa al-Hadal's letter (see below) he probably told them also that British troops would come too. 95. A. Pollera,/Baria e i Cunama, (Rome, 1913), 46. 96. For evidence f r o m local informants of fear a m o n g the tribes a r o u n d Kassala concerning Alula's f u t u r e advance, see FO 78/3807, Egerton to Salisbury, 23 August 1885. 97. FO 78/3813, Egerton to Salisbury, 15 August 1885; 18 August 1885. 98. A song f r o m a manuscript written in the monastry of Dabra Bizen, f o u n d by Ato Mamo W u d n a h of Asmara whom I thank f o r this information. For Alula's "horse-name" Abba Nagga, see Mahtama-Sellasse Walda-Maskal, "Che Balaw," JES, vol. 7, no. 2. 99. FO 78/3806, Egerton to Salisbury, 4 August 1885. 100. For his failure in Sawakin, see Holt, The Mahdist State, 186—7. 101. FO 78/3806, Egerton to Salisbury, 4 August, 1885, Chermside to Watson, 30 July 1885; FO 78/3808, Egerton to Salisbury, 23 August 1885, Depretisto Ricotti, 1 August, 1885, Giglio, Etiopia 5, no. 17: 12. 102. "Sad Report"; FO 78/3807, Egerton to Salisbury, 20 August 1885; Holt, 169: Shuqayr, Tarikh, 400 (according to Shuqayr it was on 26 August 1885). According to Wingate, Mahdism, 249, U t h m a n came to Kassala "about the middle of August." 103. Shuqayr, Tarikh, 400. 104. FO 78/3809, "Marcopoli Diary," Egerton to Salisbury, 2 October 1885. 105. T h e other Mahdist Amirs were: al-Hasan Wad Hashi, Bilal al-Awad and Abd al-Karim Kafut. 106. Wingate, Mahdism, 250. Wingate's belief that this letter was sent f r o m Kufit is definitely false as the Mahdists had not reached Kufit by that date. 107. See also Littmann, Princeton Expedition, vol.2, (Leyden, 1910), 194,195. 108. Mahdia Y80,1. MSS Letter Book of U t h m a n Diqna. SO AS 101491 (collection of the Mahdi's a n d Khalifa's letters to U t h m a n Diqna 1881-1888), 48, Khalifa to Uthman Diqna, M u h a r r a m 1303H/ October 1885. 109. Ibid., Khalifa to Uthman Diqna, 21 M u h a r r a m 1303 H/ 31 October 1885. These letters of the Khalifa indicate that according to the Mahdist spirit of jihad fighting the English and even the Egyptians had priority to fighting the Christian Ethiopians. In practice, political developments aroused the antiEthiopian jihad and U t h m a n turned against the Ethiopians. 110. Pollera, /Baria, 46-7. 111. FO 78/3811, Egerton to Salisbury, 17 November 1885. 112. FO 78/3810, Egerton to Salisbury, 12 October 1885; FO 78/3811, Eger-

76

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

ton to Salisbury, 10 November 1885; Shuqayr, 401; a n d H. C. Jackson, Osman Diqna, (London, 1926), 112, estimated the army at 10,000; Wingate,Mahdism, 250, at 8,000-10,000; "Khayrallah Report," at 9,000; Shaykh Musa al-Fil in FO 78/ 3813, Egerton to Salisbury, 25 October 1885, at 6,000-9,000. 113. "Sad Report." 114. MS. Letter Book of U t h m a n Diqna, SO AS 101491,50. 115. FO 78/38806, Chermside to Watson, 30 July 1885; FO 78/3807, Egerton to Salisbury, 24 August 1885; FO 78/3807, Egerton to Salisbury, 20 August 1885. 116. FO 78/3809, "Marcopoli Diary" in Egerton to Salisbury, 2 October 1885. 117. Ibid. 118. "Sad Report." 119. Ricotti to Depretis, 23 September 1885; Giglio, Etiopia5, no. 55: 64; FO 78/3810, Egerton to Salisbury, 12 October 1885. 120. FO 78/3807, Egerton to Salisbury, 20 August 1885. 121. According to Marcopoli Bey, Ras Alula said on 29 August 1885 that he did not believe Kassala had fallen: "We are only six or seven days distance f r o m Kassala, how could we not have heard of such a capitulation?"—FO 78/3809, "Marcopoli Diary," Egerton to Salisbury, 2 October 1885. 122. FO 78/3808, Egerton to Salisbury, 1 September 1885. 123. FO 78/3808, Chermside to Marcopoli Bey, 21 August 1885; FO 78/ 3813, Egerton to Salisbury, 19 August 1885. 124. FO 78/3808, Marcopoli Bey to Chermside, 26 August 1885. 125. FO 78/3811, Egerton to Salisbury, 10 November 1885. 126. Sahati had been occupied by the Italian irregulars on 24 J u n e 1885. 127. FO 78/3803, Marcopoli Bey to Chermside, 26 August 1885. 128. FO 78/3808, Chermside to Marcopoli, 4 February 1885. Dabbab was a son of Ras Araya Demsu, Yohannes' uncle, who had been living as an outlaw since 1882. In 1889 he took Asmara in the Italians' name, a n d was killed by Alula and Ras Mangasha Yohannes in September 1891. See Takla-Sadeq Makuriya, Yaityopya tank, Addis Ababa, 1960 EC (fifth ed.), 56,59; Erlich, Ras Alula, 9 , 3 9 - 4 0 , 53-54, 118-119, 131-134, 140-146, 161- 169. For Anglo-Egyptian attempts to catch Dabbab, some of them admittedly false, see Depretis to Ricotti, 20 September 1885; Giglio, no. 50: 47; Zerboni to Depretis, 22 September 1885, Giglio, Etiopia 5, no. 53: 55; FO 78/3810, Marcopoli to Chermside, 20 September 1885; Egerton to Salisbury, 21 October 1885. 129. According to Luca dei Sabelli, Uthman Diqna intended to make the alJadin, Sabdrat and the Baria the advance guard of the Mahdiyya. Luca dei Sabelli, Storia d'Abissinia, (Rome, 1936), 3: 339. 130. FO 78/3809, Chermside to Egerton, 16 September 1885. 131. Zerboni to Depretis, 8 September 1885. Depretis to Ricotti, 20 September 1885, Giglio, Etiopia V 39, 50: 32, 33,46. 132. FO 78/3809, "Marcopoli Diary," Egerton to Salisbury, 2 October 1885. 133. Zerboni to Depretis, 23 September 1885; Report of the interpreter H a i l u o n his visit to Alula's camp, 11-13 September 1885, Giglio, Etiopia 5, no. 54: 58-62. 134. Ibid. 135. FO 78/3808, Cameron to Egerton, 9 September 1885. 136. FO 78/3808, Cameron to Egerton, 8 September 1885. 137. ManaweMS.

1885 IN ERITREA

77

138. FO 78/3813, Egerton to Salisbury, 2 October 1885. Wingate, Mahdism, 250, estimated the whole army, including the advance guard, as 10,000 men. 139. Sabelli, Storia d'Abissinia, 3: 339; Pollera, I Baria, 46: 12,000 (including advance guard). 140. Shuqayr, Tarikh, 401. 141. For Alula's role in Ethiopia's internal politics, and his position as a man of humble origin vis-à-vis the Tigrean nobility, see chapter 2. 142. FO 78/3808, Cameron to Egerton, 9 September 1885. 143. "Sad Report." 144. Ibid. 145. Manawe MS. 146. Shuqayr, Tarikh, 401 ; see also Jackson, 113. 147. The idea that a British officer would accompany the mission was dropped after it was ascertained that Kassala had fallen. 148. T h e only Mahdist description of the battle of Kufit is a false description based on a report from Uthman Diqna. On 9 Safar 1303 H/18 November 1885, the Khalifa wrote to Uthman Diqna: "We want to inform you, my beloved, that your entertaining letter of 20 Muharram [30 October 1885] reached us and in which you told us . . . that you advanced to Kufit in order to spread the real faith. . . . You therefore fought them (the Ethiopians) the war of the victorious God, destroyed, and defeated them . . . so we became happy . . ." MS. Letter Book of Uthman Diqna, SO AS 101491, 50. 149. FO 78/3810, Egerton to Salisbury, 12 October 1885. 150. Some sources claimed the Uthman Diqna was the commander and others Mustafa Hadal. Uthman was reported as not taking active part in the fighting as he was wounded in 1883. It seems therefore, that Mustafa was in charge of combat actions and Uthman was present on the battlefield, or somewhere in the neighborhood, in order to encourage his followers and influence the wavering tribes. 151. Pollera, I Baria, 47; Wylde, Modern Abyssinia, 36. 152. Report of Muhammad Al-Fil in Zerboni to Robilant, Giglio, Etiopia 5, no. 71: 77. 153. Ibid. 154. FO 78/3809, "Marcopoli Diary" in Egerton to Salisbury, 2 October 1885. 155. "Sad Report." T h e report of Major Sad Rifat written in 1889 and based on evidence given by some participants in the most detailed account of the battle. 156. Wingate's version that Gabru attacked with infantry (Mahdism, 251) seems unlikely. 157. They were reported as carrying such an armour in their fight against Alula's lieutenant Lidj Fanta in August 1884. "Abyssinia out of its treaty obligations", The Daily News, 27 December 1884. 158. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia, 36. 159. According to Muhammad al-Fil, he who gave Alula the new horse and thus saved him was Shaykh Musa of the nabtab (sub-tribe) of the Banu Amir. See Zerboni to Robilant, 9 October 1885, Giglio, Etiopia 5: 76. 160. "Sad Report." T h e fact that Ethiopian troops were accustomed to cease fighting once their leader was killed has been referred to by many observers, the most striking event being, of course, the battle of Matamma ( Al-Qallabat) of 9-12 March 1889, where Yohannes was killed by a Mahdist bullet. 161. Pollera, I Baria, 47.

78

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

162. Ibid. 163. Ibid.; Shuqayr, Tarikh, 401. 164. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia, 36. 165. "Sad R e p o r t . " 166. Wingate, Mahdism, 251. 167. Manawe manuscript. 168. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia, 37; Wingate, Mahdism, 251; FO 78/3813, Egerton to Salisbury, 7 October 1885. 169. Pollera, 47. 170. F O 78/3813, Egerton to Salisbury, 7 October 1885; F O 78/3810, Egerton to Salisbury, 14 October 1885. 171. F O 78/3811, C a m e r o n to Egerton, 25 October 1885. 172. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia, 38. Wylde explained his estimate, c o m m e n t i n g that "nearly all the w o u n d e d that escaped died a f t e r w a r d s f r o m want of f o o d . " 173. For a list of their n a m e s see Zerboni to Robilant, 9 October 1885, Giglio, Etiopia 5: no. 71: 77. 174. Ibid., Depretis to Ricotti, 5 October 1885; Giglio, Etiopia 5, no. 62: 69; FO 78/3813, Egerton to Salisbury, 7 October 1885. 175. A. Paul, A History of the Beja tribes of the Sudan (Cambridge, 1954), 114. 176. Wingate, Mahdism, 251; seven according to Zerboni to Robilant, 7 October 1885, Giglio, Etiopia 5, nos. 71, 77; F O 78/3811, M e m o r a n d u m by C h e r m s i d e , 10 N o v e m b e r 1885. 177. See above. 178. Manawe manuscript. 179. An officer in c h a r g e of setting the troops in o r d e r d u r i n g the battle. 180. F O 78/3811, C a m e r o n to Egerton, 15 October 1885. For the Ethiopian soldiers s u f f e r i n g f r o m the heat in the plains see " O u r Abyssinian allies," The Daily News, 15 July 1884. 181. F O 78/3811, Egerton to Salisbury, 10 N o v e m b e r 1885. 182. See Wingate, Mahdism, 252. 183. Pollera, I Baria, 47. 184. Wingate, Mahdism, 251; FO 78/3811, Egerton to Salisbury, 10 N o v e m b e r 1885. 185. FO 78/3811, M e m o r a n d u m by C h e r m s i d e , 17 N o v e m b e r 1885. 186. FO 78/3813, Egerton to Salisbury, 7 O c t o b e r 1885; 25 October 1885; F O 78/3811, Egerton to Salisbury, 10 N o v e m b e r 1885. 187. Ibid.; FO 78/3811, M e m o r a n d u m by C h e r m s i d e , 10 N o v e m b e r 1885. 188. FO 78/3813, Egerton to Salisbury, 7 O c t o b e r 1885; 25 October 1885; F O 78/3811, Egerton to Salisbury, 10 N o v e m b e r 1885. 189. Ibid. 190. Ibid. 191. Pollera, I Baria, 47. 192. For the raid on the Baria which took place in N o v e m b e r - D e c e m b e r 1886 a n d in which, as it was estimated, two-thirds of t h e cattle a n d many of the people of the Baria a n d K u n a m a were destroyed, see Pollera, I Baria, 50—52; A. S. MAI 2 / 2 - 1 3 various r e p o r t s ; MAE(F), Mass. 5, S o u m a g n e to MAE(F), 30 Dec e m b e r 1886; Manawe MS. 193. At t h e time of the battle al-Halaniqa nazir was Shaykh Abd al-Qadir, w h o r e m a i n e d loyal a n d accompanied Alula's camp. 194. For his activities see "Sad Report"; Shuqayr, Tarikh, 401; MS. U t h m a n Diqna Letter Book, SOAS 101491 p. 49; SOAS M. 518, Reel 8, Ibrahim Khayral-

1885 IN ERITREA

79

lah R e p o r t o n t h e Fall of Kassala; J a c k s o n , Osman Digna, 114. 195. F O 78/3811, E g e r t o n to Salisbury, 10 N o v e m b e r 1885; 22 N o v e m b e r 1885; S O AS M. 518, Reel 8, R e p o r t of Abd a l - Q a d i r A g h a . 196. F O 403/87, H a r r i s o n Smith's Diary in B a r i n g to Rosebery, 21 May 1886; see also H. Smith, Through Abyssinia ( L o n d o n , 1890). 197. See above. 198. S O AS M. 518 Reel 8, contains m u c h evidence to this e f f e c t . See R e p o r t s of F a r a j E f f e n d i , Ghabriyyal Eff. J a r a l l a h . Issa Ismail A g h a a n d o t h e r s . 199. "Sad R e p o r t . " 200. F O 78/3811, E g e r t o n to Salisbury, 10 N o v e m b e r 1885. 201. "Sad R e p o r t . " F a r a j E f f e n d i : " R e p o r t o n t h e Fall of T a k a . " S O A S M. 5 1 8 ; S h u q a y r , Tarihh, 401. 202. Ghabriyyal E f f . R e p o r t , SOAS, M. 518. T h e Egyptian secretary fled subsequently to Walqayt p r o v i n c e w h e r e he j o i n e d t h e r e f u g e e s of al-Jira garrison with w h o m h e r e a c h e d Massawa in F e b r u a r y 1886. For details o n al-Jira g a r r i s o n , see S h u q a y r , Tarihh, 328—9. 203. "Sad R e p o r t . " 204. T r i b e s m e n , in t h e t e r m i n o l o g y of t h a t p e r i o d . 205. " R e p o r t o n t h e Fall of T a k a , " S O A S M. 518. 206. Most of t h e S u d a n e s e a n d s o m e o f t h e Egyptian t r o o p s of t h e g a r r i s o n j o i n e d t h e Mahdiyya a n d f o u g h t against Alula in Kufit. A b d a l - Q a d i r Bey, S O A S M. 518. 207. See Zerboni to Robilant, 9 O c t o b e r 1885, Giglio, 5: no. 72: 80, 81; G. Puglisi, Chi e? dell Eritrea, (Asmara, 1951), 161, 174. 208. K. Winqvist, En lilen aterblick, (Stockholm, 1908), 10. 209. T h i s was also t h e r e a s o n f o r his ill-treating an Italian medical mission (initiated by Macropoli Bey). H e p r e f e r r e d t h a t his w o u n d e d soldiers be t r e a t e d by t h e Swedish missionary Winqvist. 210. R. A. Caulk, " T h e origins a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e f o r e i g n policy of Menilek II, 1 8 6 5 - 1 8 9 6 , " u n p u b l i s h e d Ph.D. thesis, SOAS, ( L o n d o n University, 1966), 137. 211. F O 78/3810, E g e r t o n to Salisbury, 18 O c t o b e r 1885. 212. " T h e Abyssinians b r o u g h t to A s m a r a s o m e w h a t o v e r half t h e Rem i n g t o n s s u p p o s e d to be in t h e h a n d s of t h e dervish f o r c e . " F O 78/3811, E g e r t o n to Salisbury, 10 N o v e m b e r 1885. 213. W i n g a t e , Mahdism, 252 (the d a t e in Wingate's text is 22 O c t o b e r 1885). 214. M a n a w e MS. 215. F O 78/3810, E g e r t o n to Salisbury, 2 O c t o b e r 1885. 216. Dadjazmach, " C o m m a n d e r of t h e D o o r , " a s e n i o r g e n e r a l o r a g o v e r n o r . 217. Zerboni to Robilant, 7 O c t o b e r 1885, Giglio, Etiopia, 5: no. 71: 78. 218. T h e dates a c c o r d i n g to Y o h a n n e s ' letter of 14 O c t o b e r 1885, see n o t e 221. 219. M a n a w e m a n u s c r i p t . 220. A traditional title of t h e f u n c t i o n a r y in c h a r g e of t h e imperial stores of firearms a n d t h e c o m m a n d e r of t h e fusiliers. F o r its significance, see c h a p t e r 2. 221. Y o h a n n e s to Alula, T e q a m t 5th, 1878 E. C., written at S a m e r a ( D a b r a T a b o r ) , was k e p t by t h e late Fitawarari ( c o m m a n d e r of t h e A d v a n c e G u a r d ) Asbeha A b r a h a of A k s u m , a g r a n d s o n of Alula, a n d was given to an E t h i o p i a n s t u d e n t of Dr. R. Caulk of H . S. I. U. My sincere a n d w a r m e s t g r a t i t u d e goes to Dr. C a u l k f o r his c o n t i n u o u s h e l p a n d advice. 222. F O 78/3811, E g e r t o n to Salisbury, 10 N o v e m b e r 1885; also F O 78/3811,

80

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

Chermside M e m o r a n d u m , 11 October 1885. 223. FO 78/3810, Egerton to Salisbury, 10 November 1885. 224. FO 78/3811, Chermside M e m o r a n d u m , 11 October 1885. 225. "Report on the Fall of Taka," SOAS M. 518. Also " T h e F a l l o f S e n n a r , " SOAS, M. 518. 226. FO 1/31, Salisbury to Treasury, 30 December 1885. 227. See H. Erlich, Ras Alula, 1 7 - 1 8 , 2 4 , 3 0 - 3 2 , 4 3 - 4 9 . 228. A. B. Wylde "An unofficial mission to Abyssinia." The Manchester Guardian, 14 May 1897 (one of 17 long articles published between 10 May a n d 1 July 1897). 229. For the Ethiopian-Italian struggle over Eritrea, 1885-1890, see H. Erlich, Ras Alula, 88-151. 230. For the Mighaniyya in Eritrea, see J . S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, (London, 2nd ed., 1965), 244-5. 231. For Yohannes and the Mahdists see R. A. Caulk "Yohannes IV, the Mahdists, and the colonial partition of northeast Africa," Transafrican Journal of History, I, 2 (1971); H. Erlich, Ras Alula, 127-139. 232. Yohannes' son, Ras Araya-Sellasse, was then hopelessly facing an overwhelming Galla rebellion. See FO 403/87, Smith to Baring, 12 March 1886; L'Informatore Ghermai Arcu to Genè, 21 January 1886, in Genè to Robilant, 21 J a n u ary 1886, Giglio, 5: no. 165: 205. Yohannes had to go himself to the Galla Country. MAE (F), Mass. 5, Soumagne to MAE(F), 26 February 1886. 233. See Erlich, Ras Alula, 88-126. 234. See a m o n g others: R. Hill, A Biographical Dictionary of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, (London, 1967), 2nd ed., 53; Jackson, OsmanDigna, 112; S. H. Longrigg, A short history of Eritrea, (Oxford, 1945), 112; Pollerà, / Boria, 46; G. H. Portal, My Mission to Abyssinia, (London, 1892), 6—7; Paul, Beja, 114; Puglisi, Chi è?, 14.

CHAPTER

5

A Contemporary Biography of Ras Alula: A Geez Manuscript from Manawe, Tamben INTRODUCTION European contemporaries regarded Ras Alula, Emperor Yohannes's general, as one of the most prominent leaders of Ethiopia in the crucial period of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This was a period in which the country was struggling to remain independent during the "scramble for Africa." The ras was referred to as "the best native general and strategist that Africa has perhaps produced in modern times,"1 and "undoubtedly" the "greatest leader that Abyssinia has produced since the death of the Emperor Theodore in 1868."2 His Italian adversaries thought in 1885 that "Ras Alula is the most serious, the most influential, and the strongest personality in today's Abyssinia. The word of Alula is heard with enthusiasm and confidence by the King."3 A Sudanese Mahdist historian wrote that "Ras Alula was one of the famous and brave men in war, very experienced in the tactics of battles. He was a bone in the throat of the British, Italian, and Turkish [Egyptian] empires." 4 A British soldier and diplomat was of the opinion that "the Abyssinian generalissimo" was "apparently the moving spirit of that country." 5 As remembered by the Ethiopians and reflected in their literature, "the famous and brave Ras Alula"6 was a great warrior whose bravery and military skill contributed greatly to important victories over Ethiopia's enemies. "Since he was feared and well known for his bravery," a statesman and a writer told a new generation in the 1920s,7 "he [Alula] always defeated and drove away the external enemies who came from the side of Reprinted from the Bulletin of the School of Oriental and. African Studies (London: London University, 1976), Part 1, vol. 39 and Part 2, vol. 34, with the permission of the publisher.

81

82

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

Map 5.1

Northern Ethiopia, 1885

A C O N T E M P O R A R Y BIOGRAPHY OF RAS ALULA

83

Hamasen [i.e. the central district of Eritrea]." Indeed, Ras Alula is regarded today by many Ethiopians as a national hero. On 7 February 1974, the Haile Selassie I Theatre staged the historical drama Alula Aba Nega8 by Mamo Woudineh. The drama described Ras Alula's victory over the Italians at Dogali on 26 January 1887.'' Ras Alula's role in Ethiopia's internal history was significant. He was the son of a mere peasant who managed to become Emperor Yohannes's right-hand man. 10 As such he was one of the main builders of Tigre's military superiority and political hegemony in Ethiopia during the reign of his master." After Yohannes's death Alula became the champion of Tigrean parochialism 12 before submitting to Menilek II in 1894.':f But it was as a fighter for his country's independence that Alula gained his position in his country's history. He helped Yohannes to face the Egyptian Khedive Ismail's imperialist aspirations by fighting under his direct command in the decisive battles of late 1875 and early 1876.14 He was then nominated governor of the future Eritrea and so became "the warden of the northern frontier," and went on fighting the Egyptians in a continuous series of border clashes lasting till 1884.15 From early 1885, the Emperor being occupied in internal affairs, Alula had to face simultaneously a Mahdist threat to conquer Eritrea and Italian encroachment inland from Massawa. In a crucial battle at Kufit, on 23 September 1885, Ras Alula defeated the Amir Uthman Diqna, thus ending the Mahdist aspirations to at least the Muslim populated areas of Eritrea.' 6 His resistance to Italian encroachment culminated in a famous clash at Dogali (some thirty kilometers from Massawa) in which an Italian battalion was annihilated. 17 Alula took part in the battles against the Italians in early 188818 and against the Mahdist army at Matamma (al-Qallabat) in March 1889, where Yohannes his master met his death.' 9 In the following four years, reputed as an old invincible warrior, Alula took a major part in the many clashes among the desperate leading Tigreans, 20 before he accepted Emperor Menilek's hegemony. Considered by this emperor as "a great bogey" to the Italians,21 Alula finished his colorful military career by playing a significant role in the great national victory over the Italians at Adwa on 1 March 1896. He died 11 months later of wounds he had received fighting a local rival in Tigre. 22 He was undoubtedly a key figure in the context of both the two major processes of his time: the survival of national independence, and the fall of Tigrean internal hegemony and the rise of Shoa. From the historical point of view this Geez contemporary 23 biography of the ras contributes much. Though it always tends to praise its hero (silhouetted against a selection of villainous rivals),24 to underemphasize internal conflicts,25 to disregard delicate questions such as Alula's origin,

84

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

and sometimes to be inaccurate in quoting facts and figures,26 the text triumphantly survives the test of cross-checking with European and other documents. T h e period of 1875-90 is coherently narrated and one cannot avoid concluding that the anonymous writer 27 was an eyewitness to almost everything he put into writing. But the author's greatest contribution is not that he provides additional information, valuable as it may be, but that he authentically reflects the spirit of the Tigreans in a period which saw their finest hour and their political collapse. T h e Tigreans' Ethiopian religious nationalism, their proud and even hostile attitude to European and African rivals, their uncompromising approach to the Muslim Galla, their military skill and bravery, together with internal rivalries and jealousies a m o n g their leading figures, are all here. T h e history of Tigre in the modern period is still a wide field for research. O n e can be encouraged by the assumption that similar biographies and other documents still exist, as in other places in Ethiopia, to be f o u n d and studied. Translator's note (translator: Rev. Roger Cowley. See note 28.) This Geez manuscript, 2 8 18 by 12.5 centimeters, consists of: 1. O n e leather cover and twenty-eight parchment leaves, sewn in three sections(l—8,9—18, and 19—28). Leaf la has the n u m b e r 1 atitshead, 2a has 3 , 9 a also has 3, 19a has 5, and 22a has 4. 2. Nine double leaves and one single leaf, all loose, which the translator arranged in o r d e r and numbered 29—35, 36-45, and 46—47. 31 is the single leaf. Folio 29a has the n u m b e r 4 at its head and 36a has 2. T h e manuscript is written by several hands. 1. Leaves 1, 8, and 2 9 - 3 5 are very well written. 2. Leaves 2—7, 9—28, and 36—47 are in a clear but undistinguished hand, with many minor scribal errors. 3. T h e head of 15b has a pencil annotation, and 19a, 28a, and 36a have ink annotations in similar hands. T h e annotator twice mentions a Qanyazmach Chewa, and is perhaps a relative of his. 4. 28b has an illiterate ink annotation. 5. A few alterations and erasures have been made, mostly concerning Dadjazmach Walda-Mikael. T h e annotations have been enclosed in square brackets in the translation below. T h e translator's conjectures and editorial headings appear in italics. Hiatuses in the text where it was evidently intended to fill in names in red ink are represented by continuous lines. Parts of the text which are completely illegible are represented by pecked lines. Examination of the text shows that leaves 1—28 were sewn in the

A C O N T E M P O R A R Y BIOGRAPHY OF RAS ALULA

85

wrong order. T h e annotations on 19a and 36a have evidently been added after the dislocation, in an attempt to mend breaks. T h e translation below attempts to reconstruct the original order. It seems that the narrative falls into the following parts: 1. Leaves 1, 29-35, 8 - 1 8 , 2 - 6 , 27, 19, and 7, a continuous narrative dealing mainly with Alula's appointment as T u r k Basha, his conflict with Dadjazmach Walda-Mikael, the death of Wayzaro Amlasu, a battle with Dervishes, and a battle with Italians. It lacks a conclusion, as 7b has no continuation. 2. Leaf 20, leaf 28, leaves 22, 23, 21, 46-7, 26, 24-5, concerning Yohannes and the kings of Shoa and Godjam, a battle with Italians, and a visit of Yohannes to Aksum. 20b, 28b, and 25b lack continuation, so it is not possible to link these three pieces together, though f r o m their contents they appear to belong together. 3. Leaves 36—45, concerning the death of Yohannes and subsequent events. 45b may not have been the original end of the manuscript. T h e Geez text is reproduced here in the order of leaves given above; leaves 1 and 29 have been reproduced f r o m handwritten copies of photocopies of the original leaves. T h e English translation is literal and follows the o r d e r of the Geez closely. As the punctuation of the manuscript is haphazard, the translator has introduced his own punctuation and paragraphing in the English.

PARTI

Introduction 1a

[In the name of God the Father , and in the name of God the Son] , who f r o m the holy virgin became man, [the Son of Man], and in the name of God the Holy Spirit, who has existed since before all times [and ages], we are writing all the glories and victoriousness of the elect and blessed man of God, Ras Alula, chief of the nobles, true to the Orthodox faith, by the grace of o u r Lord Jesus Christ, to whom h o n o u r and praise are due. May the riches of the help of o u r Lady the virgin Mary, mother of God, o u r mother of the heavenly Zion, save him f r o m the evil day, and protect him f r o m all trouble for ever and ever. 29

1875,1876: Gura50

Alula's role in the battles of Gundet and

In the f o u r t h year of the reign of Yohannes, king of kings, 31

86

THE SCRAMBLE HALTED

A CONTEMPORARY BIOGRAPHY OF RAS ALULA

e

"

I

¿

¡

A {

*

:

#

? •

.

1

i

5

*

r

f

i

¿

¿

¿

•«

< I rr