Eschatological Hermeneutics: The Theological Core of Experience and Our Hope for Salvation 9780567682314, 9780567682338, 9780567682321

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ESCHATOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS

T&T Clark Studies in Edward Schillebeeckx Series editors: Frederiek Depoortere Kathleen McManus O. P. Stephan van Erp

ESCHATOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS

The Theological Core of Experience and Our Hope for Salvation Daniel Minch

T&T CLARK Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, T&T CLARK and the T&T Clark logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2018 Paperback edition first published 2020 Copyright © Daniel Minch, 2018 Daniel Minch has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-0-5676-8231-4 PB: 978-0-5676-9393-8 ePDF: 978-0-5676-8232-1 eBook: 978-0-5676-8235-2 Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

CONTENTS Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction Chapter 1 THE END OF TRADITIONAL ESCHATOLOGY—VATICAN II AS CATALYST FOR FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY 1.1 Preconciliar Rumblings: Renewal of Christian Eschatology 1.1.1 Eschatology in the Run-Up to the Council 1.2 Eschatology and Theology of Hope: The Impact of Schema XIII 1.3 The “Church” and the “World”: Unity of Creation and Salvation in Gaudium et Spes 1.3.1 Gaudium et Spes and Traditional Eschatology 1.4 Decisive Commentary and the New Image of Humanity 1.4.1 A Conciliar Theological Anthropology 1.4.2 Defining and Engaging the World 1.5 New Image of Humanity, New Image of the World: Other Approaches to Hope 1.5.1 Moltmann’s Theology of the Promise 1.5.2 Metz’s Eschatological Development Conclusion Chapter 2 HERMENEUTICS, ESCHATOLOGY, AND CRITICAL THEORY 2.1 Hermeneutics and History in Shifting Philosophical Horizons 2.1.1 History and Hermeneutics 2.1.2 Gadamer’s Tradition Hermeneutics 2.2 Critical Theory and Critical Reactions to Hermeneutics 2.2.1 Habermas: The Pressure of Language and the Unity of History 2.2.2 Praxical Responses to Concrete Oppression 2.3 Schillebeeckx between Gadamer and Habermas 2.3.1 A Critical Future-Oriented Theology 2.3.2 The Decisive Role of Hope 2.3.3 Eschatology as the Foundational Concept for Interpretation 2.3.4 Eschatology as Theological-Philosophical Critique Conclusion

viii x 1

11 12 18 23 28 28 33 34 37 40 41 43 46

49 52 54 58 61 63 67 70 72 74 77 80 84

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Contents

Chapter 3 THE DEFINITIVE TURN TO EXPERIENCE—HERMENEUTIC MEDIATION AND PRAXICAL ANTICIPATION OF SALVATION 3.1 Universal History? Partial Wholes and Meaningful Holes 3.1.1 Fragmented Narratives and Views of Truth 3.1.2 Modern Philosophy and Influence of De Petter 3.1.3 The “Clear Break”: Questioning Schillebeeckx’s Relationship to De Petter 3.2 In Search of a New Point of Contact 3.2.1 The Unavoidable Mystery of Suffering 3.2.2 The Persistence of Sin in Human Structures 3.3 Contrast Experience and Its Structural Elements 3.3.1 Critical Negativity and the Humanum 3.3.2 The Structure of Negativity 3.3.3 Raising the Question of Pre-Linguistic Experience 3.4 Narrative Historicity, Praxical Anticipation 3.4.1 Hermeneutics and Alterity 3.4.2 A Narrative Revelation: The Calling of Zacchaeus Conclusion Chapter 4 UNIFYING EXPERIENCE AND ANTHROPOLOGY—THE ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTION 4.1 Problematizing Negative Contrast Experience 4.1.1 Universality, History, and Context 4.1.2 The Intimacy of Suffering 4.2 Contrastive Epistemology and Negative Dialectics 4.2.1 Intersecting Elements of Experience 4.2.2 Subject and Object 4.2.3 Positive Aspects of Negative Experiences 4.3 Reaching the “Absolute Limit” 4.3.1 Preconditions for a Hermeneutical Anthropology 4.3.2 Seven Anthropological Constants 4.3.3 The Transcendental Movement—One Ontological Constant Conclusion: The Absolute Limit—Hermeneutics as Eschatology, Eschatology as Ontology Chapter 5 SECULARIZATION AND THE SUBVERSION OF CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY 5.1 Secularization, and the Rise and Fall of Modern Master Narratives 5.1.1 Lyotard’s Account of Modern Narrativity and Hegemony 5.1.2 Modern Shift from Conservative to Progressive Utopia 5.2 The “New Image of God” and the Future of Transcendence 5.2.1 Reconfiguring “Transcendence” 5.2.2 Flight from the World, Flight from the Future

87 88 89 94 96 99 100 103 106 107 109 111 113 114 116 118

121 121 123 125 127 128 130 132 137 138 142 147 149

153 157 160 163 165 166 168

Contents

5.3 The New Economic Master Narrative 5.3.1 The Digital Idealized Self and Coercion of the Market 5.3.2 The Content of the Market Narrative 5.3.3 The Goal of the Market Narrative and the Digital Idealized Self Conclusion

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170 172 175 177 178

Chapter 6 GOD, EXPERIENCE, AND ECONOMIC APOCALYPTICISM 6.1 Experience Pointing to the Mystery of God 6.1.1 Human Question, Divine Answer? 6.1.2 Human Transcending Toward the Future 6.2 Apocalyptic and Eschatological—Postmodern Market Christianity 6.2.1 The Contemporary Understanding of Apocalyptic 6.2.2 Economic Apocalypticism 6.3 Christian Eschatology Must Be Realized Eschatology 6.3.1 Hominization and Humanization of the World 6.3.2 Self-Legitimation of the Market Narrative Conclusion

181 181 182 185 187 188 190 193 194 198 201

CONCLUSION

203

Bibliography Subject Index Name Index

209 222 225

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am very grateful to my friends, loved ones, and family, for all of their support and care for my well-being and for the advancement of my work. I want to thank my teachers, mentors, and colleagues for their help and advice over the years. They include Francis J. Caponi, O.S.A., Paul L. Danove, Jakob Deibl, Heather DuBois, Joris Geldhof, Anthony J. Godzieba, Isabella Guanzini, Jennifer Herrick, Martin Laird, O.S.A., Terrence Merrigan, Bernard P. Prusak, and Peter Spitaler. Special mention must be made of the late Gary S. Meltzer and Thomas F. Martin, O.S.A., who were great inspirations to me, and both of whom helped to cultivate my love and appreciation for the ancient world. I wish to thank my colleagues in the research groups Theology in a Postmodern Context and Fundamental and Political Theology at KU Leuven, as well as acknowledge the financial and institutional support of the Internal Funds of the Research Council at KU Leuven (PDM), the Fund for Scientific Research– Flanders (FWO), the Erasmus+ program, the Research Platform Religion and Transformation in Contemporary European Society (University of Vienna), and the GOA Research Project “The Crisis of Religion and the Problem of Roman Catholic Self-Definition.” I am especially grateful to Lieven Boeve, for all of his guidance. I thank him for having confidence in me and for allowing me to become a part of this project on Edward Schillebeeckx. Likewise, Leo Kenis and Stephan van Erp have given me a tremendous amount of support, especially in the final phases of my writing. I also express my gratitude to Kurt Appel, who was so generous in hosting me as a guest researcher in Vienna. Express thanks go to Erik Borgman, Yves De Maeseneer, and Vincent Miller, for their diligence, their careful input, and their critiques of my text. Many of my friends and colleagues in Leuven have provided comments, ideas, and support, especially Christiane Alpers, Jake Benjamins, Lindsey Bryant, Patrick Eldridge, Joel Hubick, Trevor Maine, Sean O’Dubhghaill, Robyn Penny, Lee Solotki, Cody Staton, Tom Uytterhoeven, Sean Winkler, and Derrick Witherington. I am especially grateful to Chris Cimorelli for his friendship, for the opportunity to have shared an office together for three years, and for the collaboration that we have developed. Many thanks also go to Sean O’Dubhghaill for proofreading my text and for his excellent suggestions. Leuven itself is quite unique. It is difficult to describe and even more difficult to understand. There is a certain vibrancy and feeling of activity that I have only ever encountered there. The scholarly merits of KU Leuven, its Faculties, and its libraries are well known, but it is the more intangible aspects of the town that have made it home for so many of us. We have all been so lucky to have experienced this special time and place together.

Acknowledgments

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My warmest thanks go to Caroline Ayasse for her generous love and encouragement. It is impossible to adequately express how much you have been there for me during this process and how much your support has meant to me. Finally, I extend my deepest and most heartfelt gratitude to my parents, Daniel and Nancy, without whom none of this would have been possible. You provided me with so many opportunities, and it is your faith, hope, and love that have allowed me to come this far. I dedicate this book to you.

ABBREVIATIONS Listed below are the standard citations and abbreviations for the Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx, edited by T. Schoof and C. Sterkens (London/ New Delhi/New York/Sydney: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), in eleven volumes. Due to the large amount of secondary material that refers to the older editions and translations of Schillebeeckx’s work, the original page numbers will be cited in brackets […] after the page numbers used in the Collected Works (CW). Full bibliographic information for the volumes is listed below in the bibliography. Christ

Christ: The Christian Experience in the Modern World

Christ the Sacrament Church CW Essays GFM IR Jesus RT UF WC

Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God Church: The Human Story of God Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx Essays: Ongoing Theological Quests God the Future of Man Interim Report on the Books Jesus and Christ Jesus: An Experiment in Christology Revelation and Theology (volumes I and II) The Understanding of Faith: Interpretation and Criticism World and Church

Standard Abbreviations for Additional Publications: ANL

Annua Nuntia Lovaniensia

BETL Council Notes

Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium The Council Notes of Edward Schillebeeckx 1962–1963. Edited by Karim Schelkens. Instrumenta Theologica 34. Leuven: Peeters Press, 2011. Summa Theologiae—Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. Complete English ed. Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981. Tijdschrift voor Geestelijk Leven Tijdschrift voor Theologie Theologisch woordenboek, 3 volumes. Edited by H. Brink, G. Kreling, A.H. Maltha, and J.H. Walgrave. Roermond: J. J. Romen & Zonen, 1952–58.

ST TGL TvT Theol. woordenboek

Abbreviations

xi

The Documents of Vatican II: All quotations from the documents of Vatican II: Flannery, Austin, ed. Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, The Basic Sixteen Documents. Northport, NY: Costello Publishing, 1996. DH DV GS LG NA

Dignitatis Humanae Dei Verbum Gaudium et Spes Lumen Gentium Nostra Aetate

All other quotations from Vatican Documents come from the official English translations available at: http://w2.vatican.va/content/vatican/en.html. All biblical quotations come from the NAB, found in: Senior, Donald, and John J. Collins, eds. The Catholic Study Bible: The New American Bible, Including the Revised New Testament and Psalms, Translated from the Original Languages with Critical Use of All the Ancient Sources. Oxford/ New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. The translations of biblical texts have been amended in light of the Greek text of the New Testament, where appropriate, using: Aland, Barbara, Kurt Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, and Bruce M. Metzger, eds. The Greek New Testament. 4th rev. ed., 2nd print. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994.

INTRODUCTION

This book is the fruit of several years of academic research devoted to the work of the Catholic theologian, Edward Schillebeeckx. It was developed within the context of a larger research project entitled “A Future for the Hermeneutical Turn in Theology? A Historical- and Systematic-Theological Investigation of the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx (1914–2009) and Its Contemporary Reception,” funded by the Fund for Scientific Research—Flanders (FWO). In order to determine whether or not there is a “future” for “hermeneutical theology,” the hermeneutics of Edward Schillebeeckx in particular, the future needs to be almost the last element considered. It is the past that needs to be taken into account first, before any significant construction of structures or methodologies for the future can begin. This is, in fact, one of the most pressing problems of our age: the unwillingness to look at, and actually learn from, the past before building something for the present and the future, whether it be political programs, education initiatives, or economic reforms. Recently, a kind of “mythical” version of the past has emerged in political discourse that incorporates all of the technological newness in the world, but without any of the inconvenience of having to deal with people whom, or realities with which, we disagree. A balanced hermeneutical worldview should take a different position: the past is normative for us, and we can learn a great deal about the present and future from it, but at the same time, genuine newness is also possible and even necessary. Schillebeeckx described the “new” hermeneutics that he came into contact with in a way that makes this dilemma quite tangible: The “new hermeneutics” seeks to expose the ontological structures of the theological understanding of reality as a totality. It is an attempt to clarify the presuppositions of the theological quest for reality in a situation wherein man [sic], estranged from history and nature, raises the question of the meaninglessness of a world which he himself [sic] has created by technical and scientific ingenuity and is inclined to regard as the only relevant reality.1

Edward Schillebeeckx’s hermeneutics are necessary for theology, and for the church today, precisely because Schillebeeckx does not give in, either to a blind nostalgia or to a pure progressivism for Christianity. To embrace either would be to deny

1. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Towards a Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” GFM, CW vol. 3 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 2 [4].

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a fundamental part of the Christian message, heritage, and mission in the world. This entails knowing something about the Christian tradition, including the many failures and abuses that have occurred in the two millennia since Christ. Knowledge and the continued transmission of the tradition have become threatened, and some of the symptoms and causes of this threat will be examined in this book’s later chapters. Schillebeeckx is known as a “modern” theologian, belonging to the group of so-called progressive theologians who were especially active and influential following the Second Vatican Council. These theologians, including Karl Rahner, Gregory Baum, Hans Küng, Johann Baptist Metz, and many others, have at times been regarded as more or less irrelevant for the twenty-first century. Either “modern theology” was too optimistic about the world, and gave birth to a failed project of the wholesale adaptation of the church to the world, or they were too traditional and were unable to cope with the wave of postmodern criticism that swept through Western intellectual life in the 1980s and 1990s. Again, both extreme positions miss the more nuanced reality that remains to be recovered in the lives and works of the modern theologians. This work is one such effort to recover a part of the modern theological project for our own time, and it starts with the experiencing human subject. The “subject” is essentially a philosophical cipher for the human person, usually with greater emphasis being placed on the intellectual or noumenal elements of human life, and sometimes with all or most experiential and lived components of life stripped away. The phenomenological tradition, particularly after Maurice Merleau-Ponty, will also add the embodiment of the human being as an intrinsic and irreducible element of human subjectivity. One of my main lines of investigation was to examine how the human subject, in the sense of the historical human person, becomes itself in the world. The essential hypothesis is that this “becoming” is an active and hermeneutical process—it occurs through both a process of application and interpretation. Certainly “hermeneutics” is not really of much use to anyone without being applied, if that is even possible. The very existence of the discipline, as the “art of interpretation,” implies that something is there to be interpreted and that this interpretation is being carried out to a particular end. “Hermeneutics” never occurs in a vacuum and, hence, we generally see it in combination with another qualifier: theological hermeneutics, literary hermeneutics, legal hermeneutics, ontological hermeneutics, and so on. I originally began by examining the philosophical roots of Schillebeeckx’s hermeneutic theory, but it soon became clear that the actual origin of his interest and adoption of such a “philosophical” methodology was more explicitly theological. Theology is always the “senior partner” in Schillebeeckx’s work, and he remained focused on the problem of Christian praxis and faithful action in the world in the service of human salvation. Salvation is a gift of grace, but the church gives salvation a historical character, as the site of salvation in the world and as a mediator of grace. Every attempt to understand and discern a history of salvation must take place from within a finite place in history. The whole of history is inaccessible to human beings by default, and this says something about how we are able to interpret the world, especially the past. The past that we know and understand is, after all, always a projected past cobbled together from various narratives and pieces

Introduction

3

of information, as well as a specific expectation of what the future will be like. So, human knowledge of history is always partial, mediated, and interpreted, and therefore human self-knowledge—the full picture of our place in history—must also be incomplete. From the Christian perspective, the question about humanity’s place in history and about the fullness and meaning of history is essentially an eschatological question. This also leads to further questions about the place and purpose of human efforts to shape and to create the world around us, and the extent to which these efforts are graced. Eschatology is the starting point and the ending point of this discussion, since it is the overarching principle of human existence. I will argue that Schillebeeckx’s interest is primarily eschatological. This eschatological impetus leads to a recovery of the ontological structure of the human subject, which serves as the basis for Schillebeeckx’s later theology. Essentially, the way that the human being becomes itself in the world is based on a particular ontology, and I believe that this structure is extremely valuable at present. This structure will be utilized to examine the contemporary experience of the subject, under the influence of economic narratives, and the need to recover a futureoriented eschatological horizon. I believe that the “eschatological imagination” can be a genuine Christian contribution to the world, and an opportunity for dialogue. The reintroduction of the future as an eschatological horizon into contemporary discourse also necessitates discussions about the need for action in the present in terms of poverty, climate change, and social justice within our economic systems. A genuine, “contemporary” understanding of time is really what is needed, both in order to approach the world as it is and to be able to have anything of substance to say to the world. Eschatology provides an understanding of time from the Christian perspective. Proclaiming an eternally deferred judgment says little to people, as does the idea of a return to an idealized past. Or rather, the latter option speaks too loudly to people, especially on one side of the political spectrum and can encourage a retreat into a mythical, culturally homogenous, and “pure past.”

Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P. and His Context Although Schillebeeckx was, for several decades, viewed as the quintessential representative of “Dutch theology” after Vatican II, he was, in fact, Belgian. Edward Cornelis Florent Alfons Schillebeeckx (1914–2009) was born in Antwerp on November 12, 1914.2 He was born into a solidly middle-class Flemish family, and his father, Constant Schillebeeckx, was a public servant.3 The family went through hardship and forced migration at the outbreak of the First World War, moving from Kortenberg to Antwerp, then to the Netherlands, and back to

2. Erik Borgman, Edward Schillebeeckx: A Theologian in His History, trans. John Bowden (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), 2. 3. Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 24–25.

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Antwerp.4 After Edward’s birth, the family returned to Kortenberg in February of 1915.5 He attended a Jesuit boarding school as an adolescent, during which time he struggled, despite his intellectual talents, because the language of the school was French and he was a native Dutch speaker.6 This was a time at which the Belgian elite, the intelligentsia, and the workings of government were entirely French speaking. It was only after the Great War that the Flemish movement began to take hold.7 Schillebeeckx entered the Dominican Order in 1934, partially in reaction to the rigidity that Schillebeeckx perceived as a part of the Jesuit charism, and partially because of his attraction to the spirit of St. Dominic.8 He took the religious name “Henricus,” as this was still a custom among Flemish Dominicans at the time, and he published under this name during the early stages of his career. His commitment to the spirituality and the communal “story” of the Dominicans is evident in a homily given nearly half a century later on St. Albert the Great. Schillebeeckx speaks reverently of Albert, while also contextualizing him, for “a man only has full possession of himself in nature and society as a human being in the very act of his living community with God.”9 Schillebeeckx began his priestly formation in 1935, including four years of philosophical studies, followed by four years of theology.10 Naturally, this training took place along the Thomistic lines that were allowed at the time, but he did receive a wider education, especially in the tradition of modern philosophy during his studies in Ghent. In 1945, Schillebeeckx went to Paris to study at the famous Dominican school, Le Saulchoir. He also attended the lectures of Marie-Dominic Chenu (1895–1990) in Paris. Chenu had been removed from his position at Le Saulchoir in 1942 at the behest of the Roman authorities. He was forced to move to the Priory of Saint-Jacques in Paris.11 Despite being forbidden to teach or publish, Chenu did both in Paris until his subsequent “exile” in 1954 for his support of the worker priest movement.12 Schillebeeckx came into contact with some of the founders of nouvelle théologie at the same time at which he was exposed to French existentialism. He then returned to Belgium and took up a position as a lecturer in dogmatic theology to the Dominicans in Leuven. His doctoral thesis, De sacramentele heilseconomie on the sacramental theology of Thomas Aquinas,

4. Ibid., 19. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., 25–26. 7. Ibid., 20–21. 8. Ibid., 30–35. 9. Edward Schillebeeckx, “A Saint: Albert the Great,” God Among Us: The Gospel Proclaimed, trans. John Bowden (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 230. 10. Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 37. 11. Ibid., 108; Thomas F. O’Meara and Paul Philibert, Scanning the Signs of the Times: French Dominicans in the Twentieth Century (Adelaide: ATF Theology, 2013), 23–28. 12. Ibid., 29–30.

Introduction

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was accepted in 1952.13 In the tradition of nouvelle théologie, his Thomistic work was both a retrieval and a renewal of aspects of the Catholic faith and history that had been either neglected or forgotten.14 In 1957, Schillebeeckx was chosen to become the next chair in dogmatics in Nijmegen, the Netherlands.15 He took up his appointment in January of 1958, after some objections from the Flemish provincial and a final decision in Schillebeeckx’s favor made by the Master General and future cardinal, Michael Browne (1887–1971).16 Schillebeeckx held this chair in Nijmegen for the next twenty-five years, retiring in 1982. He remained active in Catholic theology for another decade as an emeritus professor, and even continued to publish sporadically for another decade after that.17 The Second Vatican Council looms large in the life of Schillebeeckx, as would be expected for any theologian of his generation. Schillebeeckx was called upon to serve the Dutch church during the Council as an advisor, although not in an official capacity. During preparation for the Council, the Dutch bishops issued a pastoral letter in January of 1961 that made the importance of the coming Council clear, for the clergy as well as for the laity. This letter was largely written by Schillebeeckx—as he would put it later—“from a to z.”18 He was even thanked by name by the bishops in a postscript.19 It had the effect of generating attention among the laity, and it presented a vision of the church that was united as the People of God, not divided into an active clergy and a passive laity. It was quickly translated into German, French, English, Polish, Spanish, and Italian, and was therefore influential prior

13. Henricus Schillebeeckx, De sacramentele heilseconomie. Theologische bezinning op S. Thomas’ sacramentenleer in het licht van de traditie en van de hedendaagse sacramentsproblematiek (Antwerpen and Bilthoven: ‘t Groeit & H. Nelissen, 1952). 14. Stephan van Erp, “Tussen traditie en situatie: Edward Schillebeeckx voor een volgende generatie,” Trouw aan Gods toekomst: de blijvende betekenis van Edward Schillebeeckx, ed. Stephan van Erp (Amsterdam: Boom, 2010), 10–11. 15. Erik Borgman, “Edward Schillebeeckx—Theologiseren te midden van de cultuur,” Zo de ouden zongen . . .: leraar en leerling zijn in de theologie-beoefening (tussen 1945 en 2000), ed. Jurjen Beumer (Baarn: Ten Have, 1996), 183–98. 16. Borgman, “Edward Schillebeeckx—Theologiseren te midden van de cultuur,” 286–87. 17. Schillebeeckx’s last major article was “Naar een herontdekking van de christelijke sacramenten: Ritualisering van religieuze momenten in het alledaagse leven,” TvT 40 (2000): 164–87. This was part of his preparations for what was to be a new book on the sacraments, which was not completed before his death in 2009. The English translation of this article can be found as “Towards a Rediscovery of the Christian Sacraments: Ritualising Religious Elements in Daily Life,” Essays, CW vol. 11 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 183–210. 18. Edward Schillebeeckx, I Am a Happy Theologian: Conversations with Francesco Strazzari, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1994), 17. 19. Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 316–19. The letter with the postscript mentioning Schillebeeckx can be found in published form as, “De Bisschoppen van Nederland over het Concilie,” Katholiek Archief 16 (1961): 369–84.

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to the Council.20 The Italian version also had the unintended and unfortunate consequence of guaranteeing that Schillebeeckx could not be appointed as an official advisor, a peritus, during the Council itself. The translated document was banned by Rome and Schillebeeckx’s involvement earned him the ire of Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani (1890–1979), the head of the Holy Office and a major voice for the minority during the Council.21 This was only the beginning of decades of controversy and clashes with Roman authorities. Even today, Schillebeeckx is accused or suspected of holding unorthodox positions, but most of all he is said to have been “too optimistic” about the state of the modern world and its ability to meaningfully contribute to Christian faith. As we will see in our discussions below, I do not believe this to be the case. Schillebeeckx was, if anything, quite realistic about “the world” and its sinfulness, but he was also aware of the fact that the church cannot be absolutely separated from “the world”—it exists in and from it. Even if Schillebeeckx was too “optimistic” about the world outside of the cloister walls, the authorities of the church were clearly too optimistic about the sinfulness of the church. They had effectively forfeited that same authority in their attempts to preserve the authority of the institution by shutting out the media, by silencing theological voices, and through a rigidly enforced silence. Schillebeeckx was eerily prescient in 1989, when he wrote: The church never exists for its own sake, although it has often forgotten this (as have many religions). . . . We need a bit of negative ecclesiology, church theology in a minor key, in order to do away with the centuries-long ecclesiocentrism of the empirical phenomenon of “Christian religion”: for the sake of God, for the sake of Jesus the Christ and for the sake of humankind. And these three—God, Jesus Christ and humankind—are one in the sense that they may never be set over against one another or made into rivals.22

The State of Schillebeeckx Research Here I would like to speak in a general way about the state of research on Edward Schillebeeckx’s thought, and about current developments in this field.23 Between 1971 and 2009, over eighty dissertations have been completed on Schillebeeckx’s work or have included significant aspects of his thought.24 Robert Schreiter has

20. Borgman, “Edward Schillebeeckx—Theologiseren te midden van de cultuur,” 187. 21. Ibid. 22. Edward Schillebeeckx, Church: The Human Story of God, CW vol. 10 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), xxvii [xix]. 23. For an assessment of the recent literature, see Christiane Alpers and Daniel Minch, “Edward Schillebeeckx in de hedendaagse theologie,” TvT 54, no. 4 (2014): 398–409. 24. Robert Schreiter, “De invloed van Edward Schillebeeckx—De dissertaties over zijn werk,” Trouw aan Gods toekomst: de blijvende betekenis van Edward Schillebeeckx, ed. Stephan van Erp (Amsterdam: Boom, 2010), 154–55.

Introduction

7

pointed to Schillebeeckx’s embeddedness in the discussions of his own time, and, as a result, his theology may lose its relevance as the context changes.25 Schillebeeckx himself saw this as a possibility, but he did not seem to regard it as being a shortcoming, and he himself encouraged others to take his theology as a starting point “for doing theology in the twenty-first century—but only as a starting point.”26 The fact of Schillebeeckx’s pervasive influence in academic theology in some ways threatens his relevance for scholars today—if the basic principles of his work and his most important insights become common currency among theologians, then the need to read his works in their entirety may diminish. Certainly, Schillebeeckx has changed the theological landscape, and has rewritten the list of presuppositions that Catholic theologians start from, to some extent. I often noticed that during my early theological education, certain phrases or ways of expressing biblical or dogmatic principles would come up during lectures. It was only later that I recognized these axioms or turns of phrase in the works of Edward Schillebeeckx, sometimes buried within a seemingly marginal chapter in one of his Jesus books. Schillebeeckx’s methodological and even the exegetical works remain important in-and-of-themselves, not as historical markers of what theology was like in the 1970s. Despite advancements in the fields of theological anthropology, hermeneutics, sacramental theology, and exegesis, there is something valuable to be rediscovered in Schillebeeckx’s work, and the continued flow of research projects and dissertations partially testifies to that. Schillebeeckx, some twenty-five years after the publication of his last major work, still has the power to reach us, and to shake our presuppositions. Whatever intangible quality that Schillebeeckx has in this regard will not be dissected and put on display here, as if such a thing were possible. This book is an effort to examine the underlying structure of the human subject that is operative throughout Schillebeeckx’s work, and to apply that ontological view of humanity to our contemporary context.

Thinking with Schillebeeckx, and Thinking Further Schillebeeckx never strictly remained in one area of theology. His exegesis is also fundamental theology, and his methodological works contain Christological insights. I will mainly address the problem of contemporary human subjectivity under the guiding principle of Schillebeeckx’s hermeneutics; however, we will also touch on elements of his Christology and theology of creation. The

25. Schreiter, “De invloed van Edward Schillebeeckx—De dissertaties over zijn werk,” 160. 26. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Letter From Edward Schillebeeckx to the Participants in the Symposium ‘Theology for the 21st Century: The Enduring Relevance of Edward Schillebeeckx for Contemporary Theology,’” Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology, ed. Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp (London: T&T Clark, 2010), xiv.

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discussion will be restricted within appropriate limits, but the wider theological implications will be made apparent wherever necessary. Methodologically, I have attempted to both think with Schillebeeckx, and to think further with Schillebeeckx. A basic, systematic way of approaching Schillebeeckx’s work is still needed, and this should be considered an attempt at a systematic reading. It is not a fully comprehensive or exhaustive reading, but it starts from eschatology and reads his work through the lens of the human subject, which acts as a nexus point for the micro and macro aspects of tradition, as well as the church’s ad intra and ad extra dimensions. Salvation is the goal of human beings, from the Christian perspective, and the reincorporation of this-worldly human experience into that goal already places the subject within an eschatological framework. It is through this lens that I will attempt to “systematize” Schillebeeckx—not by way of a meticulous explanation of his entire corpus, but by providing a specific reading key for his post-Vatican II writings that is appropriate for our own context. The “human expectation for the future on earth” is very much a pressing question now in economic, social, and ecological terms. Schillebeeckx follows the lead of Gaudium et Spes in two respects: the ultimate end of humanity is both a spiritual and worldly matter, and the need for a “new image of humanity” in light of contemporary experience. Essentially, the new questions about humanity’s ultimate end lead us to a “new view of humanity.” I want to elaborate on this “new view” as an ontological structure, something foundational to human beings at their very core, from the starting point of human finitude. The finitude of humanity makes it subject to the “eschatological-hermeneutical” movement of history. Ultimately, a “new view” of humanity is related to a new way of relating to the world and to nature. These changes must also lead to a new view or image of God, one based on the essential shift in how human beings relate to God and how we conceive of God’s transcendence. I will begin by framing his work in the preconciliar era, specifically in terms of eschatology, and will proceed to follow his engagement with hermeneutics and delve into his mature theology’s structural elements. I will then use the “eschatological-hermeneutical” structure as a way to explicitly engage with our contemporary context. One of my goals is to correct certain misapprehensions about Schillebeeckx that have crept into the usual discourse about him and about his work; namely, that he was unconcerned with tradition, or that he was more of a philosopher than a theologian. The point of Schillebeeckx’s use of “new” philosophies and historical-critical studies was always in the interest of the continuation and rejuvenation of Catholic tradition, without losing continuity with the past. He firmly believed, and I have also come to agree, that the literal repetition of propositions or statements of faith does not guarantee orthodoxy, and can even endanger orthodoxy, by removing the aspect of lived human life from the life of faith. If faith is reduced to merely rational assent to propositions that, from an analytic perspective, may or may not say anything meaningful to me, then that faith is clearly at risk—it is endangered by its own orthodoxy. The central place of eschatology for Schillebeeckx, both before and after Vatican II, illustrates

Introduction

9

that change is necessary for any continuity to be maintained with the past, and that there is always a possibility that a new element will emerge in history. Humanity’s attitude toward the world has changed in the modern period, but Schillebeeckx’s reading of the world “is a forceful theological reading of reality.”27 Eschatology changed a great deal before, during, and after Vatican II. Schillebeeckx, in particular, was at the forefront of efforts to revitalize this important part of Catholic life that had fallen into disrepair during the first decades of the twentieth century, thanks to the manualist tradition’s one-sided emphasis on the “state of the soul” after death. Schillebeeckx was one of the early Catholic proponents of a theology of hope that located eschatology not in abstract speculations about the nature of heaven, hell, and purgatory, but in the in-breaking of the Rule of God in history. By reframing eschatological discourse in this manner, the fundamental question of the church’s relationship to the “world” is also brought into play. A church that is a separate, perfect society does not need eschatological hope for the near-future, but that church was increasingly difficult to find after John XXIII’s program of aggiornamento took hold in the early 1960s. Gaudium et Spes was instrumental in reordering the “church/world” relationship during the Council. It was in this period, and in the context of Schillebeeckx’s contemplation of Vatican II, that he began to speak of a “new image of humanity,” which also implied a new “image” or understanding of the world and of creation. This led to an “eschatological-hermeneutical” view of the human being as an experiencing subject, embodied in the world and within a social environment; therefore, the turn to experience was a significant development for systematic and dogmatic theology. After exploring the content and structure of experience, I will lay out the ontological implications for human subjectivity. Ultimately, human finitude will be the entry point for a quasi-universal “anthropology,” as well as being the ontological constant that makes experience possible. There is an essential unity of hermeneutics, ontology, and eschatology for Schillebeeckx’s thought. I will present this as an explicit structure of the experiencing human subject, hermeneutically embedded in the historical interplay of experience and interpretation and oriented toward the (eschatological) future. Later chapters will explore the role played by narratives in human selfunderstanding and, by extension, human becoming in the world. The rise and fall of modern narratives of progress, as well as the influence of secularization on the West, is the subject of the first section. The narratives of modernity were oriented toward utopian views of the future, and sacrificed massive amounts of resources and human lives in the service of achieving that future. These narratives have been abandoned or discredited in recent decades, and have essentially

27. Lieven Boeve, “Introduction: The Enduring Significance and Relevance of Edward Schillebeeckx? Introducing the State of the Question in Medias Res,” Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology, ed. Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 21.

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been replaced by a neoliberal capitalist narrative of market exchange. I will use Schillebeeckx’s eschatological-hermeneutical framework to investigate the effects of this market-centered narrativity on the human subject, as well as its effects on Christianity. The marketization of the life-world has separated us from the future horizon, making us obsessed with “the present.” This narrative, driven by economic interests and practices primarily, has led certain forms of Christianity to adopt a kind of “economic apocalypticism” that works within the contemporary economic framework. I will try to highlight the importance of this eschatology precisely as a form of human self-understanding that is outside of the market narrative and which presents meaningful, noneconomic possibilities for the future of humanity on earth. A purely apocalyptic approach makes everything into a crisis of equal proportions, such that nothing can really be a crisis. The Christian view of humanity, as future-oriented and as always “in process” or in a state of flux, makes room for the “new” in history and breaks open the possibilities for the future as salvific. The “back-and-forth” movement between part and whole, sense and nonsense is the site of our dialogue with God through creation.

Chapter 1 THE END OF TRADITIONAL ESCHATOLOGY—VATICAN II AS CATALYST FOR FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY

In this first chapter, I want to begin by examining the “evolution” of Edward Schillebeeckx’s thought in the realm of Christian eschatology which occurred roughly between the years 1956 and 1969. Such a critical examination will help us to situate the overall shift in the doctrine of the “last things”—eschatology—that also occurred during this time and how this coincided with, and was in fact part and parcel of, the shift in Catholic Church’s relation to the world at large around the time of the Second Vatican Council. While this first chapter will mainly follow the historical development of Schillebeeckx’s eschatology, some elements of his later thought will also be brought to bear in order to demonstrate this particular issue’s foundational aspect.1 The point is not to attempt a step-by-step, perfectly historical reconstruction of Schillebeeckx’s life—that is a task for biographies—but to bring us into the overall discussion of Schillebeeckx’s hermeneutical theology by [1] placing it within its historical context, [2] illustrating some of the instances in which Schillebeeckx’s original thought was influential for the wider discussion in systematic theology, and [3] to ground the overall premise that the motivation for Schillebeeckx’s later engagements with non-theological sources have their origin in Christian faith, and not merely in a fascination with new philosophies. There is an unfortunate tendency within systematic theology to occasionally assign opinions to a thinker without looking more closely into the evolution of their ideas, or what they in fact have actually said in different contexts. It is as though a scholar, who is also a historical, human person, were to suddenly come to a realization or to always have held to a particular opinion. Equally present is the problem of assuming that particular disciplines in theology have always been centered around specific points and debates. This is part of the nature of theology, as a discipline, given its reliance on tradition, as well as our own general reliance

1. Material from Chapter 1 was previously published in an abbreviated form as Daniel Minch, “Eschatology and Theology of Hope: The Impact of Gaudium et Spes on the Thought of Edward Schillebeeckx,” The Heythrop Journal 59 (2018): 273–85. Grateful acknowledgments to Trustees for Roman Catholic Purposes Registered and Blackwell Publishing.

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on popular and cultural tropes that organize our thought. Received opinions and impressions can often permeate very deeply without being critically examined. I want to try to address this shortcoming with regard to Edward Schillebeeckx, particularly in terms of his methodological “innovations” and the underlying theological reasons for them. The first aspect to be closely examined is the preconciliar approach that Schillebeeckx took to eschatology, and how this was different from the prevalent teachings of the 1950s and 1960s. The development of “hope” as the basic category of eschatology would help Schillebeeckx in his work at Vatican II and give him a way to format his theology for the church ad intra, making it communicable and intelligible to students and advisees, most of whom were members of the clergy. I will then examine the impact Schema XIII and the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World had upon Schillebeeckx’s thought, especially regarding the relationship between the categories of “church” and “world.” His commentaries on the Pastoral Constitution, along with other articles from the time, will help to discern the impact these works had, especially in terms of the new images of humanity, the world, and later of God which emerged from this time period. Finally, I will further situate Schillebeeckx in a context in which a “theology of hope,” the revised eschatology of the 1960s, was becoming commonplace in philosophy and theology. By taking these steps, I hope to arrive at a position from which the eventual integration of “hermeneutics” will become more intelligible, and the blurring of the lines between these two areas—hermeneutics and eschatology—will begin to occur.

1.1 Preconciliar Rumblings: Renewal of Christian Eschatology The prominent position given to “eschatology” in modern theology is the outcome of several shifts in scholarship and in Christian attitudes toward traditional doctrines. The biblical scholarship of liberal Protestantism gave rise to a new emphasis in the early twentieth century, particularly concerning the “apocalyptic” dimensions of early Christian preaching, that is the “epoch-ending” work of God who, through apocalyptic action, would end the world. The challenge of Marxist thought in European nations, as well as the rediscovery of biblical, Patristic, and medieval sources through the efforts of the proponents of nouvelle théologie also resulted in a new awareness of history, and the development of differing theologies of history.2 In a short article from the first volume of the Dutch-language dictionary of Catholic theology, Theologisch woordenboek, entitled “Eschatologisch” (translated as “Eschatological”) Schillebeeckx outlines three trends in this essentially

2. James M. Connolly, The Voices of France: A Survey of Contemporary Theology in France (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), 146–48.

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“apocalyptic eschatology” that arose from modern biblical scholarship: the opinion that Jesus expected the end to come very soon, but was mistaken on that account; the interpretation that Jesus referred to a purely supra-historical reality as the Rule of God (which he associates with Karl Barth);3 and, finally, the notion that Jesus always already assumed that there would be a longer amount of time for the church and its historical work.4 In Catholic theology, Schillebeeckx points to two different tendencies: the “eschatological” (i.e., transcendent) and “incarnational” tendencies, which came out of differing theological views of history.5 He views the divergence of these two strands of eschatology to be a postwar development in theology, and he reserves any judgment in terms of privileging one over the other; instead, he hints that new attempts ought to be made to achieve some sort of synthesis of the two.6 It is interesting to note that there is no explicit entry for “eschatology” (eschatologie) in Theologisch woordenboek; the subject is treated in various other entries, such as Schillebeeckx’s article on the resurrection (vol. 3, cols. 4741–48) or Andreas Maltha’s entry for grace (vol. 2, cols. 1772–1815). The entry for grace is a more “traditional,” neoscholastically structured piece, listing the “types of grace” (cols. 1809–14), and is very much concerned with “nature” and “supernature.” Eschatology, as an independent topic, is handled under the heading of “uitersten” as in “de leer van de uitersten,” the teaching on the last things or the “limits.” “Uitersten” is a Dutch word that is akin to “extremities,” “last” or “ultimate things,”7 and is a traditional (Dutch) formulation of the different extremities of being in a way that could be construed as relating to the Greek eschata, “last things”; this sense also includes that of the beginning and end. Professors serving the Augustinian and Dominican congregations in Nijmegen, A. Hulsbosch O.E.S.A. and I.W. Dreissen O.P., wrote the article for “de uitersten.” They note that the term means “eschatology,” and traditionally “has to do with death and the subsequent special judgment that follows, and then with the states in which the soul of the human being will be [after death], and concluding with the end of the world, the general resurrection and the last judgment.”8 These are the traditional “limit areas” discussed by eschatology, and Hulsbosch, who was

3. I translate the Greek phrase “βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ” as “rule” of God (or synonymously “heavens” as in Matthew), rather than “kingdom” to emphasize the active nature of God’s ruling activity, not a static, spatial kingdom. See Jesús Peláez, “The Definition of the Lexeme βασιλεία and Cognate Words in the New Testament” (paper presented at the annual International Meeting for the Society of Biblical Literature, Amsterdam, Netherlands, July 22–26, 2012). 4. Schillebeeckx, Theol. woordenboek, vol. 1, s.v. “Eschatologisch,” col. 1399. 5. Connolly, The Voices of France, 149. 6. Schillebeeckx, Theol. woordenboek, cols. 1399–1400. 7. As Philip Kennedy translates it. See Kennedy, Schillebeeckx (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993), 23. 8. A. Hulsbosch and I. W. Dreissen, Theol. woordenboek, vol. 3, s.v. “Uitersten,” col. 4627. My translation.

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responsible for the biblical part of the article (cols. 4627–34), goes on to say that there is very little written in the bible about these topics explicitly (i.e., the nature of hell, the existence of purgatory, the existence of an intermediate state for souls in heaven, etc.); what has been written on these topics comes from theological, prophetic, apocalyptic, and folkloric elements of an ancient worldview that we no longer share.9 Therefore, eschatology has been the realm of both a long process of development and a great deal of speculation in the matter of the details, of, for instance, “hell fire” and whether it should be understood as actual fire or “a suggestive image for a psychological pain in a solely spiritual sense,” or the exact understanding concerning purgatory and that concept’s evolution.10 The sections of the article show that the authors took care, both in presenting the traditional as well as the scholastically appropriate information on eschatological topics. The second half of the article, subtitled “further developments” and written by Dreissen (cols. 4634–48), also speculates on the contemporary meaning of the dogmas at the end of each section or specific issue, and especially the section on purgatory. The division of Dreissen’s article into the second coming of Christ, the resurrection, hell, the beatific vision, and purgatory helps to illustrate that at the time “eschatology” was primarily conceived in terms of judgment, the essence and destination of the soul, the nature of purgatory, the meaning of “hell fire,” and whether or not it should be considered to be eternal. From 1946 to 1957, Schillebeeckx taught courses on fundamental theology at the Dominican study house in Leuven.11 These focused on accepted dogmatic issues, although Schillebeeckx also made an attempt, relatively early on, to bring out at least some of the scriptural and historical origins of Christian eschatology, especially those coming from Jewish apocalypticism and elements of the New Testament expectation.12 The integration of such sources into fundamental theology likely came from his training under Chenu in Paris, and his integration of nouvelle théologie as well as his own studies. Eschatology, as a theological discipline, would move from these marginalia to a position of prominence in the 1960s, partly because of a trend that Schillebeeckx had already picked up on in his 1952 entry for Theologisch woordenboek; namely, the “eschatological” and the “incarnational” directions or tendencies of eschatology. In 1956, Schillebeeckx published an article in Kutuurleven that addressed the problem of Christian hope, as a theological question, for the churches in the

9. Ibid., col. 4627. 10. Ibid., col. 4641. In fact, the section on purgatory (cols. 4643–47) takes up more room than either the second coming of Christ (cols. 4636–37) or the resurrection of the dead (cols. 4636–40), although both “resurrection” and “second coming of Christ” have their own entries as well, the latter was also written by Hulsbosch and Dreissen (cols. 4913–18), with the former having been cited above and written by Schillebeeckx. 11. Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 117. 12. Kennedy, Schillebeeckx, 23; Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 241–42, 244–45.

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post–Second World War era.13 This essay, “De hoop kernprobleem der christelijke confessies,” (“hope, the core problem of the Christian confessions”) illustrates that Schillebeeckx was engaged with “hope,” as a main theological concept, well before it was a general topic in the theological and philosophical discourses in the 1960s.14 In fact, “De hoop kernprobleem der christelijke confessies” presents a remarkably detailed, and well-worked-out, theology of hope that is quite consistent with his later writings from the 1960s and 1970s, even though the language he uses is markedly “preconciliar” in tone. Schillebeeckx takes the official statement of the 1954 meeting of the World Council of Churches in Evanston, Illinois, and uses it as an occasion to relate a Catholic theology of hope after his discussion of the joint statement of the ecclesial communities gathered at the WCC. Many theologians and philosophers only became involved with the topic a few years later, particularly after the full publication of Ernst Bloch’s magnum opus Das Prinzip Hoffnung between 1954 and 1959. The most well-known and influential theological appropriation of Bloch’s insights was Jürgen Moltmann’s Theologie der Hoffnung, which appeared in 1964. In his analysis of the WCC’s statement, “L’espérance chrétienne dans le monde d’aujourd’hui” (“Christian hope in the world today”), Schillebeeckx notes the biblical direction of the document in its treatment of the Rule of God,15 as well as the relation of the Christian hope for the Parousia to the various humanist efforts at renewing the world in the present time.16 On the latter point, there is a tension that Schillebeeckx detects between a “pure eschatologisme,” especially espoused by the European groups, in which there is no relation between earthly efforts and Christian hope, and the “incarnational tendency,” which reverses the dynamic. These are the same lines that he had picked up on in his earlier entry for the theological dictionary, but here he is able to work out their application and influence more thoroughly.17 The central object of Christian hope for the incarnational variety predominant in America, is the Rule of God as it is present in the world now, and not merely as an anticipation of the end of history.18 Schillebeeckx concludes, however, that “one can hardly claim that, according to Evanston, there is a stimulus for Christian hope in the this-worldly commitment.”19 The concessions made to the Adventists allowed the Evanston Congress to steer closer to the “eschatological” pole of the discussion, rather than to the more

13. See Edward Schillebeeckx, “De hoop kernprobleem der christelijke confessies,” Kultuurleven 23 (1956): 110–25. All translations from this article are my own. 14. Erik Borgman points this out quite clearly in his biography. See Schillebeeckx, 189; Leo Kenis, “God in de wereld ervaren. Het cultuurtheologisch project van Edward Schillebeeckx,” Kultuurleven 67, no. 1 (2000), 82. 15. Schillebeeckx, “De hoop kernprobleem,” 111–13. 16. Ibid., 113. 17. Schillebeeckx, “Eschatologisch,” col. 1399. 18. Schillebeeckx, “De hoop kernprobleem,” 113. 19. Ibid., 114.

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incarnational end of things.20 Even so, Schillebeeckx sees clear progress in the ecumenical movement and a swing away from the more “individualistically conceived” picture of salvation that focuses on the soul and its personal relation to God at the moment of death, and toward a social-communal vision of the Rule of God that must be worked for together and in the present world.21 This moves him into his discussion of the Catholic eschatological vision, and theology of hope, to which it is intrinsically related. Schillebeeckx remarks that a “theology of hope” is not worked out in the theological manuals that made up the core of official theological education at that time.22 Instead, it is increasingly discussed among a diverse group of Catholic publications (both in French and Dutch).23 For previous generations the question of hope was treated in a very analytical manner, and along the lines of scholastic polemics. Hope belonged to the dogmatic domain of the omnipotence of God’s promises, what Moltmann later called “a loosely attached appendix that wandered off into obscure irrelevancies,” but as something which, in recent times, was shifting to a position of prominence in Christology, eschatology, and ecclesiology.24 Modern biblical scholarship helped to raise “hope” in theologians’ esteem, as the immanent expectation of the Parousia was a central aspect of the early Christian communities and their faith, which is still reflected in the creed (“Et exspecto resurrectionem mortuorum et vitam venturi saeculi”).25 This hope for the coming of Jesus also finds its basis in the “rediscovery” of human historicity, specifically the history of salvation as a still-unfolding reality. This has implications for the way that dogmas are interpreted, since they exist within a constantly evolving framework, rather than as a set of preexistent and eternally unchanged (and unchangeable)

20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., 115. 22. See Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 241–42: “According to Schillebeeckx, the problem of eschatology was that its origin had been lost sight of in the course of the history of theology. Scholasticism had turned the doctrine of ‘the last things’ into speculation about heaven, hell and purgatory as independent realities, and had paid no attention to the origin of these ideas.” 23. Schillebeeckx, “De hoop kernprobleem,” 115–16, n. 15. Among those cited are: J. van der Ploeg, “L’Espérance dans l’Ancien Testament,” Revue Biblique 61 (1954): 481–507; S. Pinckaers, “L’Espérance de l’Ancien Testament est-elle la même que la nôtre,” Nouvelle Revue Théologique 77 (1955): 785–99; W. Grossouw, “L’éspérance dans le Nouveau Testament,” Revue Biblique 61 (1954): 508–32; Schillebeeckx, “Het hoopvolle Christusmysterie,” TGL 7 (1951): 3–23. 24. Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and Implications of a Christian Eschatology, trans. James W. Leitch (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 15. Johann Baptist Metz says something similar concerning eschatology as lacking an essential relationship to theology as a whole. See Metz, “The Church and the World,” The Word in History: The St. Xavier Symposium, ed. T. Patrick Burke (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966), 77. 25. Schillebeeckx, “De hoop kernprobleem,” 116.

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propositions. This also means that the Rule of God cannot be purely seen as an extrinsic, other-worldly “place” or as a state of being after time. The Jewish people’s hope in YHWH as savior, even after death, came into being over the course of a long, reflective process. Similarly, the Christian hope for the Rule of God has been, and continues to be, historically shaped based upon manifestations of God’s salvific work within history, constituting a salvation history. The Catholic notion of hope takes on a special ecclesial dimension because of the church’s sacramental nature. There were, at the time, two theological opinions: an “eschatological tendency” and “incarnational tendency” that are manifested in affirmations of continuity and discontinuity.26 In that era, “incarnationalist” referred to those such as Henri de Lubac and Teilhard de Chardin who emphasized the transformative mission of Christ and the church in history. The “eschatologists,” on the other hand, more radically disassociated Christianity from the world based on the uniqueness of revelation. This group, which included Louis Bouyer and Jean Daniélou, considered the revelation of Christ as the definitive transfiguration of history and emphasized the urgency of the “end times” such that collaboration with the goals of “the world” is not desirable; the world must be converted to the gospel without remainder.27 Schillebeeckx acknowledges that there is a fundamental discontinuity between the eschaton and earthly life and human progress, but at the same time there is also a continuity between earthly cultural activity and the “new heaven and earth.”28 He attempts to present a Catholic position that preserves both extremes in a dynamic tension, rather than by ordering one over the other as Evanston had done. He is also clearly mediating the incarnational/eschatological debate that was taking place in France and Belgium at the time. First, Christian hope needs to be seen as being primarily religious, not merely as a cultural construction that can be achieved, while acknowledging that “[o]ne is no better an engineer or doctor because one is Christian.”29 Rather, Christendom has often had a negative influence on the this-worldly reality. The eschatological position is graced and acknowledges that the expectation of the Parousia is an active hope of constant conversion.30 “The Christian hope is therefore not so much a hope in culture, but a hope of the human being who shapes culture in the fullness of Christ’s grace.”31 Culture acts not merely as a neutral or secular framework for a supernatural or extrinsic “descent” of grace; instead, it is the place in which Christians are shaped and where their hope is enacted.32 We cannot forget that in the envisioned eschaton, the “new earth” is still earth, and not a mystical realm unrelated to what has existed throughout history. There is continuity in the perfection of creation. In fact, the

26. Ibid., 118. 27. Connolly, The Voices of France, 149–53. 28. Schillebeeckx, “De hoop kernprobleem,” 118. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., 118–19. 31. Ibid., 119. 32. Ibid.

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eschaton calls to us so that we might move toward it in our earthly lives, which implies a basic incarnational continuity. The discontinuity remains, however, in the intrinsic and radical newness that is contained in the encounter with Christ, achieved fully in the eschaton.33 An early articulation of Schillebeeckx’s later interest in the relation between theory and praxis is given in terms of Christian hope: “But this hopeful final vision therefore stimulates our actual devotion, also in relation to the up-building of a Christian culture which also hopes in its transcendent final realization.”34 It is the “coming God” (an early version of what he formulates later as “God the future of humanity”) alone who can bring the transformation of broken, earthly history into the gracefilled Rule of God to earthly culture. The “theoretical” hope espoused by Christians is practiced imperfectly within culture, within society, in the building up of a more just and humanized world. Sin impedes human efforts, but should not completely dissuade us from continuing this work. Schillebeeckx sees the postwar European culture and the formation of the modern welfare state as being reflections of a collective will to improve the world, especially after the devastation wrought by the Second World War. Christian hope is not coterminous with secular hope for a better, more human society, but it does influence it through Christian communities’ political engagement.35 Christian hope, as both transcendent and this-worldly, must in some respects also be distinct from purely secular efforts: “spes contra spem, a theological, Christian, and ecclesial hope against all human hope! And yet a ‘spes mundi.’”36 1.1.1 Eschatology in the Run-Up to the Council After Schillebeeckx took up his professorship in Nijmegen in 1958, he gave lectures on Christian eschatology following the model of his previous courses in Leuven. In 1961, however, the theme changed to “Christology in an Eschatological Perspective.”37 The resulting lectures were more biblically based, but also integrated contemporary philosophical anthropology derived from existentialism.38 By broadening the topic of “eschatology,” Schillebeeckx laid the groundwork for his later writings, especially by moving outward from Christology and by identifying Christ as the entry point for a theology of creation. Creation, under the rubric of divine freedom and grace (where grace is always related to the work of Christ as logos and as savior), includes both the “beginning” and the “end” of created reality, thus encompassing the traditional topics of “de leer van de uitersten” while approaching them from a different direction. Essentially, Schillebeeckx is here

33. Ibid., 121. 34. Ibid., 122. Emphasis original. 35. Ibid., 110, 114–15. 36. Ibid., 124. 37. Ted Schoof, “E. Schillebeeckx: 25 Years in Nijmegen,” Theology Digest 37, no. 4 (1990): 318. 38. Schoof, “E. Schillebeeckx: 25 Years in Nijmegen,” 319.

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building an eschatology without having to be bogged down by lengthy speculations on the nature of heaven, hell, purgatory, or the beatific vision. In June of 1962, just prior to the opening of the Council, Schillebeeckx published “De zin van het mens-zijn van Jesus, de Christus,” or “the meaning of the being-human of Jesus, the Christ” in the newly formed journal Tijdschrift voor Theologie. This article is a clear forerunner of his later work particularly in terms of the interrelation of eschatology and Christology. Schillebeeckx’s longtime assistant, Ted Schoof, O.P. noted that Schillebeeckx regarded this as being his “best article” at the time, and Schoof believed “that he had achieved an insightful breakthrough.”39 The theology of grace and forgiveness elaborated here is based upon the Incarnation, not as an afterthought or remedy for sin, but as the foundation of creation itself. Christ is “the intrinsic meaning of the entire creation” and, therefore, already bears a relation to Adam, even prior to the temporal arrival of Jesus of Nazareth, since humanity “as created through the Son has a relationship to the Son, who became human in our history.”40 For Schillebeeckx, the creation of humanity is itself a “messianic prophecy of the ‘coming messiah,’” making the “first Adam” already the anti-type of the second Adam who is to come, and not the other way around.41 This conclusion leads to further anthropological observations; namely, that the human being is a complex of social, cultural, and ethical-religious influences within history, and that this gives human beings a certain self-making freedom regarding their own history. This freedom for historical creativity should, in fact, be seen as being a form of grace coming from God. “The Christ-mystery as it appeared historically is therefore the fruit of a dialogue,” Schillebeeckx contends, “an action and reaction between God and humanity.”42 The dialogical schema of revelation is an important development in Schillebeeckx’s theology, and is one that will remain present throughout his later work, at least on an implicit level. He elaborates this in terms of God’s judgment concerning the fate of human beings, which is always punctuated by grace, God’s responses to human failure in the great historical dialogue, and which culminates in the last judgment. As a historical person, Jesus is also, to an extent, formed by the dialogue, and it is in fact human sinfulness that helped to shape who and what Jesus is: “the one murdered by us was brought to life by God.”43 The sins of human beings against Jesus were integrated and transcended by Christ through his love for humanity and his love for the Father. Notice that Schillebeeckx’s Christology places the onus for Jesus’s death on human beings, and not on God—given that the execution of Christ was a sinful action, a murder, on the part of human beings that is overcome through the divine dialogue of historically mediated grace. Here

39. Ibid., 330, n. 11. 40. Schillebeeckx, “De zin van het mens-zijn van Jesus, de Christus,” TvT 2, no. 2 (1962): 158. All translations from this article are my own. 41. Schillebeeckx, “De zin van het mens-zijn van Jesus, de Christus,” 159. 42. Ibid., 160. 43. Ibid., 161.

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we find an early formulation of what will be worked out later by Schillebeeckx: “Sin is (either explicitly or implicitly) a ‘no’ to our inclination towards Christ who is himself God’s ‘yes’ to humanity.”44 This echoes what he will say in 1974, in Jesus: An Experiment in Christology: “In Jesus’ death and resurrection men’s [sic] total rejection of God’s offer of salvation and the ongoing offer extended in the risen Jesus converge.”45 God nullifies the human rejection of Jesus’s life and message, creating both continuity and discontinuity between history and the new creation.46 Following the publication of his first two Jesus volumes, Schillebeeckx similarly states that “to dare to create humanity is, on God’s part, a vote of confidence in humanity and its history without there being posited on humanity’s part any condition or guarantee as to what pertains to this vote of confidence.”47 He goes on, What we confess in the Creed, in which faith in God the creator is essentially tied to faith in the man Jesus—the definitive or eschatological salvation of humanity—is that we declare ourselves ready to accept that fact that we are gratuitously and unconditionally loved by a God who takes the side of humanity: the very being human of humanity.48

The consistency between these three works is remarkable, and it is clear that the development of Christology within the field of eschatology was a key component of the “mature” theology that was presented by Schillebeeckx in the 1970s and 1980s, especially after the postconciliar influence of hermeneutics and critical theory on his work. Many elements of Schillebeeckx’s later theology are certainly present, including his insistence on placing the consequences of sin and finitude squarely on the human side since, “human freedom is a risk for the human being itself, not for God.”49 This echoes his insistence on humanity’s finitude as a key component of any attempt at a Christian anthropology or theology of creation.50 The speculations of the older forms of theology are also mentioned in places, but at least one of these is rebutted as a “pseudo-problem.” For example, is Jesus Christ “as he actually appeared among us primarily the sanctifier or primarily the savior?”51 The debate between Scotists and Thomists is, to a certain extent, hopeless in its finer details, since Schillebeeckx asserts that both sides forget that God is and

44. Ibid. 45. Schillebeeckx, Jesus: An Experiment in Christology, CW vol. 6 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 603 [641]. 46. Ibid. 47. Edward Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth: The Christ, The Son of God, The Lord,” The Journal of Ecumenical Studies 17 (1980): 19. 48. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth,” 20–21. 49. Schillebeeckx, “De zin van het mens-zijn van Jesus, de Christus,” 164. My Translation. 50. Kennedy, Schillebeeckx, 80–81. 51. Schillebeeckx, “De zin van het mens-zijn van Jesus, de Christus,” 163. My Translation.

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remains absolute, even in God’s partnership with humanity.52 It is only from a very narrow, scholastic perspective that such a question could be asked, and the need for such distinctions disappears in Schillebeeckx’s attempts to widen the field of dogmatic theology (and recasting it as foundational or systematic theology in the process) by rethinking the very “meaning of the being-human of Jesus.” After the Second Vatican Council, Schillebeeckx’s renewed efforts in contemporary philosophy, and later his extensive attention to biblical and historical studies, would contribute greatly to deepening the insights already gained during this important period. Even so, the core insights were already beginning to take shape: creation is Christologically centered and historically grounded by the Christ-event; eschatology is more than mere speculation about extra-biblical worlds in which disembodied souls reside; human beings are themselves more than just “souls” in need of saving. Where “earlier the faithful merely thought in their hope about the ‘salvation of souls’: the soul is redeemed, the contemporary Catholic thinks in broader terms: the human being is redeemed,” and this includes the complex of social relations that go into being human.53 The expansion of eschatological thinking, from the fully transcendent realm of eternal souls to the whole human being, contributes to the possibilities of identifying social and historical change with “eschatology” properly understood. Christian social and political commitments must be rethought in the light of a renewed understanding of eschatological hope. The church itself contributed to this tendency by moving away from the “perfect society” ecclesiology of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and from the identification of the church (rather than the Eucharist) as the mystical Body of Christ. These ecclesiological models had characterized the church as a juridical body rather than as a sacramental one.54 The switch from the Eucharist as mystical body to the church as mystical body (and the Eucharist as “real Body of Christ”) occurred in the context of the controversy surrounding Berengar of Tours in the eleventh century, but the melding of Robert Bellarmine’s “perfect society” ecclesiology with the mystical body ecclesiology was most prominent during the early twentieth century. This culminated in Pius XII’s encyclical Mystici Corporis Christi.55 The encyclical, promulgated in 1943, explicitly joins the two ecclesiologies and presents the church’s purpose as being the instrument of salvation in the world as well as presenting a condemnation of euthanasia, eugenics, racism, and war (§§94–97). It proclaims the church to be a society, “perfect of its kind and containing all the juridical and social elements” (§65). The designation “mystical,”

52. Ibid., 168. 53. Schillebeeckx, “De hoop kernprobleem,” 125. 54. Bernard P. Prusak, The Church Unfinished: Ecclesiology Through the Centuries (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2004), 248–49. Cf. p. 232. 55. Prusak, The Church Unfinished, 230–33. Karim Schelkens, John A. Dick, and Jürgen Mettepenningen, Aggiornamento? Catholicism from Gregory XVI to Benedict XVI. Brill’s Series in Church History vol. 63 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 99. Pius XII, Mystici Corporis Christi, Vatican Website, June 29, 1943, http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/ documents/hf_p-xii_enc_29061943_mystici-corporis-christi.html.

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“in its correct signification gives us to understand that the Church, a perfect society of its kind, is not made up of merely moral and juridical elements and principles. It is far superior to all other human societies; it surpasses them as grace surpasses nature, as things immortal are above all those that perish (§63).”56 Such an ecclesiology removes much of the Christian “incarnational” impetus, to use Schillebeeckx’s terminology. If the church is already a “perfect society,” superior to and separate from civil society and analogous to a supernatural reality when compared with other societies, then very little motivation can be presented for engaging in “culture” at large or in its preservation or betterment. Creation as a whole need not be considered if the fullness of the mystery of Christ’s salvation is to be found in the church and if its sacraments and salvation are conceived of in purely transcendent, spiritual terms. Although Pius XII gives a nod to the Catholic Action movement (§98),57 we should also see the encyclical in the context of the stinging condescension and condemnation of theological inquiry in 1950 by Humani Generis,58 the definitive denunciation and dismantling of the worker priest movement from 1953 to 1959, as well as the policies of suspicion and accusation that were established in response to dynamic, historically grounded figures like Chenu. It is therefore not difficult to see why “eschatology” would be a difficult concept to apply within a social or global framework. Connections to new ways of thinking were considered to be suspect by Roman authorities, as were any changes to fundamental principles or philosophical perspectives, including the inclusion of non-Christian social

56. The full text of Mystici Corporis §63 runs as follows: Hence, this word [“mystical”] in its correct signification gives us to understand that the Church, a perfect society of its kind, is not made up of merely moral and juridical elements and principles. It is far superior to all other human societies; it surpasses them as grace surpasses nature, as things immortal are above all those that perish. Such human societies, and in the first place civil Society, are by no means to be despised or belittled; but the Church in its entirety is not found within this natural order, any more than the whole man is encompassed within the organism of our mortal body. Although the juridical principles, on which the Church rests and is established, derive from the divine constitution given to it by Christ and contribute to the attaining of its supernatural end, nevertheless that which lifts the Society of Christians far above the whole natural order is the Spirit of our Redeemer who penetrates and fills every part of the Church’s being and is active within it until the end of time as the source of every grace and every gift and every miraculous power. Just as our composite mortal body, although it is a marvelous work of the Creator, falls far short of the eminent dignity of our soul, so the social structure of the Christian community, though it proclaims the wisdom of its divine Architect, still remains something inferior when compared to the spiritual gifts which give it beauty and life, and to the divine source whence they flow. 57. Schelkens, Dick, and Mettepenningen, Aggiornamento? 97. 58. Connolly, The Voices of France, 184–87. Pius XII, Humani Generis, Vatican Website, August 12, 1950, http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_pxii_enc_12081950_humani-generis.html.

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philosophies in Christian praxis. This can be seen in the literature of the time, which speaks of contemporary society as something to be overcome, where “nothing less than a truly Christian society can provide a real solution” to worldly problems.59 Advances in philosophy are written off as being “like the flowers of the field, [they] are in existence today and die tomorrow,” since they are only an expression of a desire for novelty and disobedience to true authority.60 Marxism in particular is treated like a contagion or disease capable, at the slightest contact, of infecting priests to the point where they begin to mistake “purely political issues for apostolic ones,” (as if the two could ever be separated!).61 One conclusion that could be drawn from this policy of isolation is that the church is self-sufficient and of a supernatural order, just as the encyclical appears to argue. If that is the case, then the only reasonable conclusion would be that, outside of missionary activity, contact with “the world” is meaningless and even detrimental; after all, what do Christians have to learn from non-Christians? Salvation is a personal, spiritual reality, and the church has no concept of apocalyptic expectation because the juridical and sacramental structures are already in place to guarantee that salvation. Earthly crises are obstacles, but not major calamities for the faithful, since their material needs are not a primary factor in their salvation. In fact, contact with “the world” and its complexities and “novelties” can really only be a source of spiritual confusion and danger. Within the Catholic Church, it is precisely this mentality that would promote the dilemma of “the church and the world” as two separate realities, and it was this mentality that Schillebeeckx was already beginning to challenge in his repositioning of the doctrine of eschatology during the preconciliar period.

1.2 Eschatology and Theology of Hope: The Impact of Schema XIII As one of the most influential Catholic thinkers of the twentieth century, it almost goes without saying that Schillebeeckx was influential at Vatican II. However, it is equally true that he, like the other theologians who shaped the Council, was likewise shaped by it. The Council was essentially a catalyst for the overall development of his theology.62 Here, we need to examine the specific impact of the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes,

59. John S. Sieger, “Problems of the Catholic Scientist,” The Catholic World 176, no. 1054 (January 1953), 285. 60. See Humani Generis §17. 61. Borisz de Balla, “The Marxist Influence in Catholic France,” The Catholic World 176, no. 1056 (March 1953): 417. Emphasis original. 62. I agree to an extent with Erik Borgman that “the Council has a less central place in [Schillebeeckx’s] theology between 1958 and 1970 than is often thought,” since Schillebeeckx’s postconciliar theology is certainly “in the line” of the work that he had done in Leuven. See Erik Borgman, “Van cultuurtheologie naar theologie als onderdeel van de cultuur,” TvT 34 (1994): 342. My translation. Schillebeeckx’s work was, indeed,

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on his thinking. Many of Schillebeeckx’s writings, and his famous Jesus trilogy particularly, utilize important elements of Vatican II, such as his discussion of Lumen Gentium in contrast with Mystici Corporis in Church: The Human Story of God.63 The Pastoral Constitution, however, was uniquely formative regarding Schillebeeckx’s eschatology and the critical strides that he made in dialogue with contemporary philosophy in the late 1960s. This turn to philosophical inquiry, specifically to hermeneutics and critical theory, set the stage for his Jesus books as an epistemological Grundlegung. Thus, it was not just an appropriation of historicalcritical research that allowed for those first two pivotal Christological volumes. It was an essential concern with the contemporary understanding of tradition and a productive critique of that tradition’s elements that pushed Schillebeeckx to look for the historical and kerygmatic roots of Christian experience. These points are, however, still tied up in what occurred at Vatican II, not in the sense that Schillebeeckx’s thinking reversed course, but that the pace of his work accelerated considerably and the direction he took was altered under the influence of the Council in general, and the Pastoral Constitution in particular. In order to examine the influence of Vatican II more fully, we have to first discuss the origins of Gaudium et Spes, at least in a cursory way. At the beginning of the Council, it was hardly self-evident that a document on “the church and the world” would be prepared, discussed, or that such a thing was even needed at all. The preparatory commissions had provided schemas that many expected would merely be voted on and confirmed by the bishops in what was to be a relatively short and uneventful Council.64 After all, the pope had approved of the preparatory schemas and Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, speaking for what became the minority at the Council,65 had even stated that the schemas could in fact not be rejected

remarkably consistent throughout his career, but the Council both accelerated the pace of his progress and changed the trajectory of his work to a certain degree. For the theology of Schillebeeckx’s “Louvain Synthesis,” see Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 216–69. 63. Schillebeeckx, Church, 185–205 [187–207]. 64. John O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II (Cambridge, MA and London: The Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 101–02. 65. Schillebeeckx calls them the “essentialists,” who regarded the real intent of the Council to be to formulate the unchangeable essence of the faith in an exact manner for all time. The language of faith was problematic for what Schillebeeckx calls the “open wing,” or the majority at the Council, who recognized the need for a pastoral, timely, and meaningfully formulated message. The essentialist position regarded the “essence” of faith to be unchangeable, like the concept of numbers. See Schillebeeckx, “The Second Vatican Council,” Vatican II: A Struggle of Minds and Other Essays, trans. M. H. Gill and Son Limited (Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son Limited, 1963), 1–32. This essay is a combination of two articles written after the first session of the Council and published in De Bazuin: Schillebeeckx, “Indrukken over een strijd der geesten: Vaticanum II,” De Bazuin, January 5, 1963; “Misverstanden op het concilie,” De Bazuin, January 19, 1963.

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because of this explicit papal approval.66 His opinion was manifestly not shared by the Council Fathers and, on November 14, 1962, one month after the opening of the first session of the Council on October 11, the dam broke, so to speak.67 Multiple attacks were launched against the schema on the sources of revelation, De fontibus revelationis, spelling the end of the prepared theological schemas, which were assailed on the grounds of being inadequate, un-pastoral in tone, un-biblical, and triumphalistic.68 Ottaviani, who was the head of the Theological Commission responsible for much of preparatory work and was the Prefect of the Holy Office, complained that “alternative schemas” were being circulated among the Council Fathers.69 In fact, several commentaries had been widely circulated, including one by Schillebeeckx (Animadversiones in primam seriem schematum constitutionum et decretorum de quibus disceptabitur in Concilii sessionibus) in Latin, French, and English at the request of Bishop W. M. Bekkers of ‘s-Hertogenbosch in the Netherlands.70 Karl Rahner and Joseph Ratzinger also composed commentaries that were distributed before the discussion on the schema on the sources of revelation.71 All of these widened the scope of the bishops’ expectations for what could be achieved, despite the Holy Office’s attempt to prevent an Italian translation of the Dutch commentary from circulating.72 One result of the Dutch commentary, in fact, was the increased demand to hear from its “author,” Edward Schillebeeckx, and by November 14 he had “already given twenty-three lectures and his views had in this way been heard by over fifteen hundred bishops.”73 On the day before the debate opened, Schillebeeckx and Rahner had been derided as “modernists” at a meeting of the delegates from each episcopal conference, but the damage had already been done.74 It is well known that the schema was roundly attacked, and that the result of the oddly worded vote precipitated an intervention from John

66. O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II, 141. 67. O’Malley quotes the Protestant observer Douglas Horton to this effect. See O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II, 141. 68. Karim Schelkens, Catholic Theology of Revelation on the Eve of Vatican II: A Redaction History of the Schema De fontibus revelationis (1960–1962), Brill’s Series in Church History vol. 41 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 269–73. O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II, 141. 69. O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II, 141. 70. Schelkens, Catholic Theology of Revelation on the Eve of Vatican II, 266–67. Cf. Henri Cardinal de Lubac, Vatican Council Notebooks, vol. 1, trans. Andrew Stefanelli and Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 255. Mathijs Lamberigts and Leo Declerck, Het Concilie Vaticanum II (1962–1965) (Antwerpen: Halewijn N.V., 2015), 53–54. 71. O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II, 146. 72. Brendan J. Cahill, The Renewal of Revelation Theology (1960–1962): The Development and Responses to the Fourth Chapter of the Preparatory Schema De Deposito Fidei, Tesi Gregoriana Serie Teologia 51 (Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1999), 152–57. 73. Ted Mark Schoof, A Survey of Catholic Theology, 1800–1970, trans. N.D. Smith (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2008), 240–41. 74. O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II, 146.

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XXIII. The result was a new “mixed commission,” a new schema, and an elevated position for Cardinal Augustin Bea and his Secretariat for Christian Unity. This also produced the appearance of an opening among the bishops and their theologians: the schemas could be rejected and new documents could be drafted that would make a difference in the life of the faithful. The next schema to be introduced would be the schema on the church, De ecclesia, but it was provided to the Council Fathers in its entirety only one week prior to its discussion on December 1.75 As with the schema on revelation, Schillebeeckx and Rahner immediately composed critiques (although Schillebeeckx’s was not available in print until the next day, December 2).76 Gerard Philips of the Catholic University of Leuven was asked by Cardinal Léon-Joseph Suenens to compose an alternative.77 Suenens was the archbishop of Mechelen-Brussels and a former vice-rector in Leuven. Apparently, Philips, who was also a member of the official Theological Commission, was already at work on this “alternative” schema even before the debate on De fontibus revelationis had opened.78 The actual debate on De ecclesia began with an introduction from Ottaviani that could be described as cajoling and aggressive, as it was by Congar, or as Schillebeeckx’s diary tells us, “affable and witty,”79 such that he even garners some applause and gained, at least at this early stage, a reputation as “a good loser.”80 Ottaviani essentially berates the emerging majority for their responses, which he can already anticipate: the schema is not biblical, not pastoral, and too scholastic. From Ottaviani’s perspective, teaching the eternal truths of the faith is the primary task of a pastor.81 Much later, Schillebeeckx would nuance this sentiment in his own considerations on the Magisterium and ideology in the church—the primary task of the teaching authority is pastoral.82 It was within this debate that one of the most forceful and decisive interventions of the Council was made by Cardinal Suenens on December 4.83 He drew a distinction between the

75. Ibid., 153; Edward Schillebeeckx, The Council Notes of Edward Schillebeeckx 19621963: Critically Annotated Bilingual Edition, ed. Karim Schelkens, Instrumenta Theologica, XXXIV (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), 27–28. 76. Schillebeeckx, Council Notes, 28–29. 77. O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II, 117, 154; Schelkens, Catholic Theology of Revelation on the Eve of Vatican II, 267. 78. Lamberigts and Declerck, Het Concilie Vaticanum II (1962–1965), 85–86. See also Schillebeeckx, Council Notes, 45 n. 239. 79. O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II, 154; Schillebeeckx, Council Notes, 28–29. 80. Schillebeeckx, “The Second Vatican Council,” Vatican II: A Struggle of Minds, 13. 81. Schoof, A Survey of Catholic Theology, 242. 82. Edward Schillebeeckx, “The Magisterium and Ideology,” The Authority of the Church, ANL vol. 26, ed. Piet F. Fransen (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), 14: “Because the Church’s official teaching authority is pastoral in nature and not an institution for discovering truth, a purely theological teaching authority is necessary along with this pastoral, proclaiming teaching authority.” 83. O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II, 157.

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church ad intra and the church ad extra, introducing the idea that the church can be of assistance to the world outside of its walls, into the aula of the Council.84 There are, for Suenens, two tasks at hand for the church: to find its own message for itself, and to find its footing within the modern world concerning what the church is to say about poverty, war, atheism, and social justice.85 The theme of the church’s message to the world was now on the Council’s agenda, and it laid the groundwork for Gaudium et Spes which Suenens would continue to develop in the period between the first and second sessions.86 There is, however, another relevant detail of this early “church and world” debate. On October 19, just after the opening of the Council, a “limited commission” of theologians met under the leadership of several French and German bishops. The minutes of the meeting that we have from Schillebeeckx’s diary tell us that there was unanimous agreement among the nine bishops and fifteen theologians present that “the entire Theological Schema is no good,” and they then proceeded to make practical suggestions to move the Council forward.87 Rahner and Schillebeeckx agreed that the existing schemas could not merely be “tinkered with” because they were composed as a unity.88 At this point, Schillebeeckx made the suggestion to “draft a kerygmatic piece in which the Council addresses the Church and the World in a proclamatory fashion,” including central themes from each of the first four theological schemas.89 Rahner was in favor of presenting this to the Council’s Presidium as a sort of prooemium, or preface and program for the Council’s activity. This would render the existing schemas redundant. Gerard Philips appeared to concur with this plan of action, and preparations were made to draft such a document jointly with Jean Daniélou, Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, and Schillebeeckx.90 Obviously, this plan did not move beyond the planning stages, especially after the events surrounding De fontibus revelationis, but the idea of a separate schema on the “church and the world” was introduced here as being a viable option and it is at least possible that this was picked up by a number of important figures at Vatican II, including Gerard Philips.

84. Ibid. 85. Ibid, 158. Schoof, A Survey of Catholic Theology, 244–45. 86. George Bull, Vatican Politics: At the Second Vatican Council 1962–5, Chatham House Essays 11 (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1966), 111. 87. Schillebeeckx, Council Notes, 44–45. 88. Ibid., 45. 89. Ibid. 90. Congar’s Council diary does not include Schillebeeckx on this list. Instead he lists Joseph Ratzinger, Michel Labourdette, O.P., and Flemish Jesuit, Piet Fransen. Congar also does not include de Lubac. The reason for the discrepancies is unknown. De Lubac’s Council diary is silent on the issue, saying only that “a Dutchman” was present, which likely refers to Schillebeeckx. See Yves Congar, My Journal of the Council, ed. Denis Minns, trans. Mary John Ronayne and M. Cecily Boulding (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012), 98–100; de Lubac, Vatican Council Notebooks, 165.

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1.3 The “Church” and the “World”: Unity of Creation and Salvation in Gaudium et Spes The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern world is not, at least at first glance, automatically related to “eschatology.” Its four chapters deal with the intrinsic dignity of the human subject, the social dimension of humanity, human activity in the world, and the role of the church within the modern world. Both the preface and the introduction make it very clear, however, that the document’s main concern is the salvation of humanity as the content of the gospel message, and that this message is directed to all people, not just those “who call upon the name of Christ” (GS 2). Some clarity is also offered on the issue of salvation in another respect: “It is the human person that is to be saved, human society which must be renewed. It is the human person, therefore, which is the key to this discussion, each individual human person in her or his totality, body and soul, heart and conscience, mind and will” (GS 3). By identifying salvation as the goal for all of humanity in its individual and social aspects, as well as its bodily and spiritual dimensions, Gaudium et Spes is leaving an older form of eschatology behind. By addressing the question of human hope, even secular human hopes for a better life, and the mysteries of suffering and death as a real human reality, the church is moving away from what “eschatology” had become by the late 1950s; namely, “de leer van de uitersten.” We have already seen in Schillebeeckx’s work from the 1950s that he was moving away from traditional formulations, toward a newer “hope”-eschatology. There is a clear preference in his work for socially oriented action, toward renewing the world, and a wellworked-out understanding of the incarnational aspect of Christian hope as part and parcel of human life in the world. The Rule of God cannot be purely seen as an extrinsic, other-worldly “place” or state of being after time. In 1961 he taught a course entitled “Christology in an Eschatological Perspective,” which was an important step in integrating biblical criticism and contemporary philosophical anthropology derived from existentialism.91 Above all, the change in anthropology that Schillebeeckx effects here is important for how he will read Schema XIII, and later Gaudium et Spes. 1.3.1 Gaudium et Spes and Traditional Eschatology In an article from September 1964, Schillebeeckx addressed the meaning of “Schema XIII” directly.92 Schillebeeckx does not mince words, but declares emphatically that “the meaning of the Second Vatican Council for the whole

91. Schoof, “E. Schillebeeckx: 25 Years in Nijmegen,” 318–19. 92. The published version came a few months after it was originally given as a speech on September 16, 1964, at the opening of the new Dutch Documentation Center in Rome, just after the opening of the Council’s third session.

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world stands or falls on the outcome of Schema XIII.”93 The English version often replaces “Schema XIII” with some variation on “the church’s social teaching,”94 which does not necessarily change much of the text’s point, but does remove it from its historical context as a piece that was produced in support of a crucial Council document at a time when its fate was still uncertain.95 Schillebeeckx exhorts his readers not to accept an easy dualism between the “church” and the “world,” and not to slip back into a ghettoized mentality where the church treats the “world” as something unholy and entirely separate.96 Schillebeeckx’s reasoning on this point is essentially Christological, and is likely part of his turn toward Christology in general. The hypostatic union itself is the model for the church, since this doctrine “teaches us that the whole of the history of mankind [sic] is contained in the love of God.”97 The being-human of Jesus actualizes God’s love for humanity historically and validates history as such. The very substance of Christianity cannot be found apart from everyday life, illustrating God’s acceptance of all human history through grace. This does not allow us to conceive of the world as something that is static, like an unchanging or perfect divine order, but as something autonomous, working under its own power, and most importantly, given to humanity to humanize.98 Nature and history are meaningful on their own, that is, apart from the structures of the church, but that does not make them unrelated to the church as such. The reason that they are meaningful in and for themselves is because both history and nature are also created and fulfilled by God.99 Schillebeeckx is very wary of any creeping dualism, even in Cardinal Suenens’s distinction between the church “ad intra” and the church “ad extra,” which is at once technically correct and misleading, especially by unconsciously identifying

93. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Kerk en Wereld: de betekenis van ‘Schema 13,’” TvT 4 (1964): 386. My translation. This sentence is left out of the English version, “Church and World” in the collection World and Church, CW vol. 4 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 73–87 [96–114]. 94. Once, “Schema 13” is even replaced by “the magisterium.” See “Church and World,” World and Church, 82 [109]: “The magisterium [Dutch: ‘schema 13’] has therefore to provide the believing members of the church with a fundamental Christian inspiration for their tasks within this world and not with a concrete policy, an economic or social pattern or a concrete position which they are to take up with regard to international planning for a better world.” Cf. “Kerk en Wereld,” 395. By the time the translation appeared, Gaudium et Spes was, in fact, “magisterium.” 95. The reprinted version in the Dutch edition of World and Church does not make this substitution. See Edward Schillebeeckx, Wereld en kerk, Theologische peilingen 3 (Bilthoven: Nelissen, 1966), 127–42. 96. Schillebeeckx, “Church and World,” World and Church, 73 [96–97]. 97. Ibid., 75 [99]. 98. Ibid., 76 [100–101]. 99. Ibid., 85 [112–113].

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“the church” with the hierarchy.100 Schillebeeckx refuses to uncritically identify the church with the Rule of God, especially when recent centuries have shown that much of the commitment to humanization and social progress has come from outside of or alongside the church. It is not only the church that has been engaged in these tasks, and the world qua world has its own legitimacy. The church should not seek to sacralize the world, that is, to try and make it a part of the internal reality of the church, but should seek to help sanctify the world. Schema XIII has something to say to the world; namely, the church brings with it the religious and ethical principles of revelation, but it also needs to listen to what the secular reality has to say. As Schillebeeckx says, A church in monologue with herself is not a partner. If she does not listen to the world, she will disregard as much human knowledge, influenced by anonymous grace, as there are people outside her institutional boundaries or outside the hierarchy.101

Schillebeeckx proposes to do away with the old distinction between nature and supernature as a starting point for the discussion.102 In his analysis, this distinction had caused more problems in the recent past than it solved: either “the church” was identified with “the hierarchy,” or exclusively with the sacral and cultic ritual functions of the institution. The starting point for Christian engagement must be the lived experience of lay Christians whose everyday lives are caught up in the world and who are trying to formulate a way of living out their religious faith. Only by approaching the problem, from the aspect of “lived experience,” can the church both affirm its relative separation from the world, and the secular holiness of the world, or apostolic secularity, which is itself nourished by the church’s sacramental life.103 Schillebeeckx cautions against stressing the “transcendence of grace at the expense of its immanence,” since this is “always a depreciation of transcendence, or at least a one-sided limitation of this immanence to the sacral, set-aside forms of grace within the church.”104 The world is not just a “springboard to higher spheres” in which God is praised and virtue is perfectly practiced, but is itself a locus theologicus.105 Hence, Schillebeeckx can say that the world and its history are not, and ought not to be, “sacralized [gesacraliseerd], because the world retains its specific character, but it is made holy [geheiligd], and therefore included in the absolute and gratuitous presence of the Mystery.”106 This idea came largely

100. Ibid., 79 [104]. 101. Ibid., 79 [105]. 102. Ibid., 84 [110–111]. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid., 84 [111]. 105. Ibid., 74 [97]. 106. Schillebeeckx, “Kerk en Wereld,” 388. My Translation.

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from Schillebeeckx’s teacher, and one of the main influences on Schema XIII, Marie-Dominique Chenu.107 According to Chenu, religion determines itself in Christianity from the witness of faith and lived experiences, and not the reverse.108 Christianity as a religion and religious tradition does not exhaustively control the form and character of the witness of faith or faith experiences in the world. This recognition gives the future a dynamic character as a place for God’s “novum” to intrude upon the present, saving, elevating, and validating, while never abnegating, the already present human meaning within history. Schillebeeckx insists on retaining the secular meaning of history for Christological and incarnational reasons: the hypostatic union is the model for the church’s relation to the world and validation of human history as a part of creation and a recipient of grace. Connected to that, however, is the eschatological perspective. The task to humanize the world is a distinctly Christian task, but not a task exclusive to Christians, and it is only in the light of God’s grace that “the deepest final meaning and value of these activities” are illuminated.109 The eventual consummation of the world, the eschaton, is gratuitous and transcends all attempts to build it, bring it about, or envision it, which should not cause Christians to withdraw from the world, but, precisely because of the incarnational model, their commitment must be even more radical.110 Schema XIII must show that the church understands itself as an eschatological community of salvation, because the gift of grace is available pneumatologically here and now, and does not wait for that final consummation. Schillebeeckx wants the consideration and debate around Schema XIII to follow the course set by Dei Verbum: just as there is a development of dogma in the church’s tradition, so too can the church’s attitude towards the world evolve recognisably in the course of history. The church does not, after all, perceive all the implications of redemption from the very beginning.111

The fact that the church does not and cannot predict outcomes ahead of time makes eschatological hope something of paramount importance; it allows for an essentially realized eschatology to take hold in the church as a part of the world, as a community within the world, committed to the humanization of the world. These considerations show the importance that Schillebeeckx attached to Schema XIII and would later attach to the Pastoral Constitution. In the months

107. Christian Bauer, “Heiligkeit des Profanen: Spuren der „école Chenu-Schillebeeckx” (H. de Lubac) auf dem Zweiten Vatikanum,” Edward Schillebeeckx: Impulse für Theologien im 21. Jahrhundert/ Impetus Towards Theologies in the 21st Century, ed. Thomas Eggensperger, Ulrich Engel and Angel F. Méndez Montoya (Ostfildern: Grünewald, 2013), 79. 108. Bauer, “Heiligkeit des Profanen: Spuren der „école Chenu-Schillebeeckx” (H. de Lubac) auf dem Zweiten Vatikanum,” 79. 109. Schillebeeckx, “Church and World,” World and Church, 80 [105–106]. 110. Ibid., 78 [103]. 111. Ibid., 85 [112].

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and years after the closing session of the Council, his eschatological imagination continued to grow. We have seen an acceleration in his thought up until this point, but no dramatic change thereto. In 1966, Schillebeeckx gave a speech at an international conference of theologians on the theology of Vatican II in Rome. His contribution centered on the church as “sacrament of the world.”112 It is clear that Schillebeeckx has eschatology in mind when commenting on both the Council documents and the legacy of the Council itself. The church as the “sacrament of the world” is not an automatic concept or identification, especially within the older neoscholastic frame of thought. First, this concept presupposes that “church” and “world” are not merely separate from one another, but that there is some kind of deep, ontological relationship between the two that involves the activity of God, which, as we have discussed above, Schillebeeckx believes was already present in Schema XIII. What kind of activity is implied, though? First, God acts as creator. Creation is the precondition for any sacramental relation between “church” and “world,” since it places God’s activity at the beginning—the connection is intrinsic. Second, God is Salvator. God actively wills the universal salvation of creation, and the church is an effective sign of that salvation. Citing Gaudium et Spes (45), Schillebeeckx begins by trying to unpack how the church can, in fact, be such a sign. The Pastoral Constitution does not oppose the church to non-Christian religions, as “a religion and a non-religion, but a relationship between a fullness and something that simply does not possess this fullness.”113 The essential problem is how to conceive of the church as both necessary for salvation and not in exclusive possession of that salvation. He perceives a tension in the documents of Vatican II on this point, since those who are in fact outside the visible church are also acknowledged as sharing in God’s grace (e.g., LG 2.16; NA 2–4; DH 14). As the sacrament of the world, the church makes this into a dialectical tension, not just a binary opposition. The church is the visible appearance of God’s work in the world as an effective sign—it does what it signifies, and signifies what it does, primarily through its sacramental and liturgical life. The church acts prophetically, engendering “spes mundi, hope for the whole world.”114 This does not mean that Schillebeeckx retreats to the “perfect society” ecclesiology of the previous era. Instead, using the language of the Council and drawing quite explicitly on the inspiration of John XXIII, he refers to the church’s task, along with Gaudium et Spes, as “ceaselessly renewing and purifying itself under the guidance of the holy Spirit” (GS 21). In Schillebeeckx’s words, the church is “sanctified and yet failing” precisely because the origin of salvation and holiness, which can be accessed through the church, has its origin in Christ, and not in the church as an institution.115

112. Edward Schillebeeckx, “The Church, the ‘Sacrament of the World,’” The Mission of the Church, trans. N.D. Smith (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 43–50. 113. Schillebeeckx, “The Church, the ‘Sacrament of the World,’” 47. 114. Ibid., 49. 115. Ibid., 50.

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As a sacrament, the church retains that sacramental character of elusiveness and evanescence. Its meaning cannot be pinned down or exhaustively defined, and its historical character means that there is no perfectly fixed position from which the whole of its meaning can be grasped. The result is that even in the relation of the church to the world, as that of “a fullness” to “something that simply does not possess this fullness,” there is room to say that the church itself is not fully or perfectly in possession of that fullness. The fullness of truth, and salvation, is present within the church only eschatologically; that is, in the manner of a sacrament— visible at some moments, and obscured at others, especially if we consider that grace itself is something that can be accepted or denied, even by the members of the church or whole structures that make up essential organs of the church. It is, therefore, under an eschatological framework that Schillebeeckx can correctly call the church the sacrament of the world, and it is in this way that he is beginning to move outward toward the world in his theology. While “World and Church” was certainly concerned with both aspects of its title, it was still clearly coming from a standpoint within the hierarchical church—Schillebeeckx is a Catholic priest, speaking to the world about salvation and the source of that task.116 Here, just after the Council, we see signs of clear theological development.

1.4 Decisive Commentary and the New Image of Humanity Schillebeeckx’s most important commentary on Gaudium et Spes, “Christian Faith and Man’s Expectation for the Future on Earth”117 from 1967, also followed hot on the heels of the Council’s closure and in the midst of Schillebeeckx’s other attempts to appropriate the fruits of the Council. Some of his efforts were directed at “scanning the signs of the times” in contemporary philosophy, hermeneutics, and critical theory particularly. At the same time, he was also studying the historical reception and appropriation of the Council of Trent, especially in terms of the dogmas on the Eucharist, seemingly for clues as to how to similarly appropriate Vatican II.118 The commentary begins with a section concerning the history of

116. Schillebeeckx, “Church and World,” World and Church, 80 [105–106]. 117. Originally published as, “Christelijk geloof en aardse toekomstverwachtingen,” in: De kerk in de wereld van deze tijd. Schema dertien. Tekst en commentaar, Vaticanum II vol. 2 (Hilversum: Antwerp 1967), 78–109. Republished in volume 4 of his Theologische peilingen seires: De zending van de kerk (Bilthoven: Nelissen, 1968), 46–72. 118. Edward Schillebeeckx, The Eucharist, trans. N.D. Smith (London and New York: Burns & Oates, 2005). For his methodological appropriation of Trent, see Daniel Minch, “Language, Structure, and Sacrament: Reconsidering the Eucharistic Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx,” Approaching the Threshold of Mystery: Liturgical Worlds and Theological Spaces, ed. Joris Geldhof, Daniel Minch, and Trevor Maine (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet), 98–119.

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Gaudium et Spes, but Schillebeeckx places it in a systematic perspective. One of the main reasons for the failure of previous drafts of the schema was an inadequate view of anthropology. Humanity’s social, historical, and ecological situatedness were not included and the overall picture of “Christian anthropology” was oldfashioned and individualistic.119 The first draft “threw no light whatever on the relationship between man’s [sic] expectations for the future on earth and the christian [sic] expectation for the future.”120 Even the immediate predecessor to the final working draft “remained basically medieval and Augustinian in its inspiration—the ‘world’ seemed in it to be no more than an opportunity for christians [sic] to practise charity.”121 Schillebeeckx had already complained, in “Church and World,” that there was a “certain Augustinianism,” that was apt to reinforce the perceived dualism between “church” and “world,” and this was a trend that needed to be resisted, by retrieving authors like Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great particularly who had a more nuanced understanding of humanity’s role in the natural world and the meaning of “second causes.”122 This brand of “Augustinian pessimism” toward the world must not be allowed to dominate. Schillebeeckx is not denigrating all “Augustinianism” here, and certainly not Augustine himself, but he is calling out a specific strain of interpretation that is particularly pessimistic toward “the world.” He believes that an affirmation of “apostolic secularity” is needed, and not a flight from the world that does not take human history seriously. The world cannot be conceived of as merely an opportunity for Christians to do good to those who have no concept of virtue; it is the place in which human life occurs, including the lives of the Christian faithful.123 It is in this context that Schillebeeckx lays out the two basic tasks of the Pastoral Constitution: an essential Christian anthropology and the relation between the church and the world. This approach, that is through anthropology, is something that will mark Schillebeeckx’s thinking for the rest of his career. 1.4.1 A Conciliar Theological Anthropology We have already seen that human experience is the primary way of accessing the Christian tradition in the present time and this means that if our vision of the world has changed, then our understanding of the human person must also have changed. This calls for a renewed anthropology, one which Schillebeeckx believes that Gaudium et Spes provides, but in a qualified manner. The Pastoral Constitution declares that it is God who reveals humanity to itself through God’s self-revelation

119. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Christian Faith and Man’s Expectation for the Future on Earth,” The Mission of the Church, trans. N.D. Smith, (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 52. 120. Schillebeeckx, “Christian Faith and Man’s Expectation for the Future on Earth,” 52. 121. Ibid. 122. Schillebeeckx, “Church and World,” World and Church, 83 [110]. 123. Schillebeeckx, “Man’s Expectation for the Future,” The Mission of the Church, 52.

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of Godself as love (GS 22, 38, 40, 41). This leads Schillebeeckx to perhaps the most important foundational insight of this period in his work: all theological statements about God are simultaneously also statements about humanity.124 He continues to draw from chapter 41 of the Constitution, which proclaims that God is both creator and savior, and that these functions cannot be separated.125 It also declares that it is God who is the absolute, final destiny of humanity (GS 41). The reciprocal relationship between God and humanity is revelatory—revelation about God is also a revelation about humanity—but it is based on the Incarnation and the sanctification of human history by Jesus’s becoming a part of it. For Schillebeeckx, this gives humanity, “the image of God,” the task to humanize the world through human control of nature, and through just, social, and political relationships, which are an intrinsic part of being human.126 The social aspect changes according to the context, however, as does the human relationship to nature. Technological advancement is one part of that equation, but the other part is simply how we see nature: Is it a divine order, unchangeable in its substance and structure? Or is it something with an intrinsic dignity that must still be molded in some ways to make human life more livable? Those are different attitudes that depend, to a large extent, on how it is that we see ourselves as human beings. In other words, the process of becoming who we are requires a reflexive anthropology, and this is something that has changed in the past and will continue to change. Gaudium et Spes regards “the world” as a humanized world but, nevertheless, no one anthropology is perfectly normative, and this is why the Pastoral Constitution does not, in contrast with earlier drafts, give a “fully elaborated anthropology.”127 Whatever humanity is and is to be, it is included in the mystery of God thanks in equal parts to the Incarnation and to Creation, both of which are functions of God’s salvific Word. In history, humanity discovers itself through self-understanding and self-disclosure within being and this is a process that occurs in each new context.128 “Anthropology” can only be cobbled together from experiences of the world. Even revelation does not give us a concrete anthropology; the bible certainly gives us several, but no one picture of humanity is normative, since as a historical document, the bible was written over the course of many ages and within many different social, economic, and temporal contexts. Similarly, Hebrew and Greek cosmologies change and intermingle over time, giving no perfectly clear picture of a biblical “natural philosophy.” Anthropology is therefore both reflexive and performative. Instead of a ready-made anthropology, revelation places us within the “call-answer” structure of creation as a dialogue between God and humanity. Schillebeeckx had already begun to think of revelation as dialogical in 1962, saying

124. Ibid., 54. 125. Ibid., 64. 126. Ibid., 56. 127. Ibid. 128. Ibid., 79.

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that the “historical manifestation of the Christ-mystery is therefore the fruit of a dialogue, of an action and reaction between God and humanity.”129 Revelation says something to humanity about the mystery of the salvation-creation complex and calls upon humanity to enter more deeply into these mysteries through the encounter with the other in our concrete life.130 Schillebeeckx gives the impression that humanity’s understanding of itself is “increasing,” which may have been true within that specific milieu, and alongside the postwar acceleration of economies and scientific knowledge.131 There is, however, no constant increase throughout history, as though “more history” were to equal greater notional clarity about what “humanum” is. Each new datum or shift in our cosmology implies an obstacle to how we understand ourselves. This may also constitute a real insight, as well being an answer to a contemporary difficulty with our own self-understanding, but it will always register first as a moment of nonrecognition—a gap between traditional knowledge, images and what has been presented. What this does tell us is that humanity is not static and our self-understanding must not be perfectly fixed and motionless.132 Schillebeeckx is essentially working with a rudimentary set of “anthropological constants,” such as the social character of humanity, the essential historicity of the human subject, and the environmental and natural existence of humans. These will be expanded upon throughout the next decade, but we can see them beginning to emerge even at this early point, and in response to the questions about humanity posed by the Pastoral Constitution. What is also evident is a kind of Thomistic “exitus-reditus” structure: the question began with theological statements about God who is the final destiny, that is, the future of humanity, which leads us to the question of what humanity in fact is as a historical being in the world. This question must then lead us back to the return of all creation to God through the humanization/divinization of the world by human action and grace. Schillebeeckx also wants to guard against “false optimism,”133 or overconfidence in human abilities. All efforts at humanizing the world are impaired by sin, which lies at the root of social injustice.134 The commitment of Christians to the humanization of the world, demanded by Gaudium et Spes (34–35), as with all efforts by humanity, is also crippled by sin, to the point where the increase in control over nature becomes dangerous.135 One of the church’s duties, as a force for humanization and salvation, is to remind humanity of its sinfulness and inability to complete the change that is sought in the world.

129. Schillebeeckx, “De zin van het mens-zijn van Jesus, de Christus,” 160. 130. Schillebeeckx, “Man’s Expectation for the Future,” The Mission of the Church, 79. 131. Ibid., 80. 132. Ibid. 133. Schillebeeckx, “Church and World,” World and Church, 86 [113–114]. 134. Schillebeeckx, “Man’s Expectation for the Future,” The Mission of the Church, 62. 135. Ibid., 65.

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1.4.2 Defining and Engaging the World “The world” itself as a concept is considered in relation to the fourth chapter of Gaudium et Spes, which attempts to overcome the older dualism between “world” and “church.” The Constitution regards the world as both “the community of all people who are not explicitly members of the church and as the sphere of life and activity within this world of all those who are explicitly members of the church.”136 Essentially, “the world” is the life-world of everyday experience, of which the church is also a living part. Through the church’s particularity, it achieves some degree of separation from the larger whole. It is not just one community among others, although it is that as well, but is a sacramental community that makes the salvific presence of God present in an eschatological manner. The push toward this “sacrament of the world” ecclesiology, which goes hand-in-hand with the recovery of the “People of God” ecclesiology of Vatican II, places the church in a reciprocal relationship with the world—both sides have room to speak to, exhort, aid, critique, and praise the other, and mutual cooperation is no longer a last resort, but the condition of possibility for the church’s existence at all (GS 40).137 No “church” can be conceived of as a possibility without the gathered community of historical people whose lives make up the “world.” The historicity of the church as a subject is also not to be forgotten. Even if it was present as a sign in the history of Israel, and the salvific and creative work of God in history, the factual presence of the church is a historical, contingent manifestation of a community of believers who came together after the resurrection. As a sacrament, the church transcends its merely historical aspect by being taken up into the eternity of God’s salvific activity, but again, this is an eschatological relationship that always returns to the contingent and finite. Sacraments are intrinsically oriented toward the future because of their eschatological character.138 They are not fully present when they are preformed because they enact the salvation that we do not yet have full access to in history. The church is the sacrament of the world, and as such an effective sign of salvation in and for the world (GS 42).139 Schillebeeckx’s reading of the Pastoral Constitution is an essential reorientation of the church’s focus on the past, exemplified by a dualistic anthropology, an extrinsic view of grace, and the “perfect society” ecclesiology, to a focus on the future. The church, as sacrament, has its goal in the future consummation of human salvation. The world is, likewise, oriented toward the future—from the Christian perspective,

136. Ibid., 67. 137. The recovery of a “People of God” ecclesiology began prior to the Council, and is indebted to the work of the post–Second World War German school of canon law. See Bernard P. Prusak, “The Theology of the Local Church in Historical Development,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America Annual Convention, vol. 35 (Bronx, NY: Catholic Theological Society of America, 1980), 304–06. 138. Schillebeeckx, “Man’s Expectation for the Future,” The Mission of the Church, 73–74. 139. Ibid., 74.

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God’s universal salvific will is the agent of this movement toward the eschaton when God will be all in all (1 Cor 15:28), a new heaven and new earth. From another perspective, the drive toward the humanization of the world also has its goal in the future, even if this is a utopian future that never arrives. When human activity aims to make the world a better place for others, then it acts in accordance with this goal, which is not to say that the church automatically has the same aims as social and political movements, only that they can have the same orientation. It is no longer possible to think in terms of a “flight from the world,” which occurs when believers attempt to avoid any worldly responsibility because of the church’s commitment to building up the world of human experience, thereby fulfilling its symbolic function.140 This self-imposed “flight” is as bad as the forcible removal of all religious elements from social discourse, as in totalitarian communist regimes, or to a lesser extent through modern France’s reactionary ideal of “laïcité.” Within the church, the “watchword is no longer flight from the world, but flight with the world towards the future, a taking of the world itself with us in our christian [sic] expectation of the future, which is already transforming the earth here and now.”141 The Christian hope for the future is the most important impetus for Christian action in the present. All of this is only possible, however, because a “new image of humanity” has emerged and taken hold within the world at large and within the church, as confirmed by the Pastoral Constitution. This new anthropology, the question about humanity, allows for the change in relations between the “church” and the “world.” Humanity’s world is “basically a project for the future. Man’s [sic] aim is to build a new world. Paradise, the ‘golden age,’ is no longer in the past. It lies ahead, in the future. . . .”142 This is not a static openness to the future, but a radical one, that God must complete. Hence, “eschatology” and theology in general can no longer be concerned merely with distinctions between nature and supernature: grace in here, corruption out there. The primary expectation of humanity for a better future brings the relationship between humanity’s “expectation for the future here on earth and the eschatological kingdom” into play.143 Schillebeeckx is clear that the major theme of Gaudium et Spes is the question of what Christian eschatological hope can mean for modern humanity, a humanity which is also trying to realize a better future and for this reason: “Theology has become eschatology in confrontation with the building of the ‘city of man.’”144 Functioning on an incarnational principle, the new questions about anthropology, which came to a head around the time of Vatican II, fueled a dramatic reorientation within the church toward the world at large, as a community of human beings who are longing for a new and more just reality, and ultimately for final salvation. We can question how this important shift played out in practice, because

140. Ibid., 69. 141. Ibid., 71. 142. Ibid., 81. 143. Ibid., 82. 144. Ibid. Emphasis added.

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the fifty years since the closure of the Council have not exactly yielded perfect results, and in some aspects the attempts to engage with the world have ended in abject failure. In other avenues, the church never even began this task, retreating into an older anthropology, shored-up by modern communications technology,145 and a more firmly centralized hierarchy that seems to have bought into its own press too earnestly. The papacy of John Paul II, for example, could be seen as a magnificent example of the engagement of the church in the social ills of the times; his commitment to battling communism allowed for a coordination between people of faith and people of good will. But this same structural commitment also actively discouraged theological discussion and dissent,146 shielded dictators in South America from scrutiny, and engendered the secretive policies that allowed the sex-abuse crisis to fester behind closed doors before exploding into the public eye. These instances remain examples of a continued “flight from the world” and its demands, and both show that the hierarchy was willing to place the juridical institution ahead of the concrete needs of the faithful—essentially the sacralizing function was counted over-against the sanctifying and symbolic functions. The “smaller and holier” ecclesiology of Benedict XVI was very similar, finding its paradigm for “the world” in a one-sided interpretation of medieval structures. There is a picture of humanity at work in our history that has been, and remains, detrimental; it neither lives up to the hopes and expectations of the Council Fathers, nor stands up under the pressure of history. Schillebeeckx, on the other hand, stood firm on the work that went into Schema XIII and the Pastoral Constitution.147 He took the impetus for change and ran with it in his theology, by noting that although no explicit Christian anthropology is given, it is our duty to find one in every age. Hence, his later preoccupation with hermeneutics and critical theory was not an attempt to undermine traditional formulations, or a mere intellectual fascination, but a real attempt to formulate a workable foundation for human experience in the world that would continue the evangelical mission of the church in the modern world—an anthropology that is both reflexive and performative.148 Toward the end of his commentary, Schillebeeckx makes what will become a rather programmatic statement: “The christian [sic] does not flee from the world, but flees with the world towards the future. He takes the world with him towards the

145. Anthony J. Godzieba, “The Magisterium in an Age of Digital Reproduction,” When the Magisterium Intervenes: The Magisterium and Theologians in Today’s Church, ed. Richard R. Gaillardetz (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012), 140–53. 146. Bradford E. Hinze, “A Decade of Disciplining Theologians,” When the Magisterium Intervenes: The Magisterium and Theologians in Today’s Church, ed. Richard R. Gaillardetz (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012), 3–39. 147. See his comments on ethics and “human nature” based solely on scholastic, Aristotelian rationality in Schillebeeckx, I Am a Happy Theologian, 69–71. 148. Ibid., 79.

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absolute future which is God himself for man [sic].”149 If every question about humanity is simultaneously a question about God, thanks to the incarnational principle Schillebeeckx starts with, then a new image of humanity must also engender a new image of God. This “new image of God” will be the subject of much of Schillebeeckx’s theology for the decades that followed, from God the Future of Man to his Christological trilogy.

1.5 New Image of Humanity, New Image of the World: Other Approaches to Hope Schillebeeckx’s search for a new image of humanity, a contextually plausible anthropology, did not occur in a vacuum. There were certainly other thinkers at the time concerned with similar efforts, especially in terms of a philosophy and theology of hope. Ernst Bloch is often credited with being the initiator of this movement and traces of his “secular eschatology” are already visible in his early work, The Spirit of Utopia, which appeared just after the First World War and then again in a new edition in 1923.150 Of course, the works of Franz Rosenzweig and Walter Benjamin were also important for this “eschatological” line of thought, but it was the publication of Bloch’s Das Prinzip Hoffnung that proved most influential for many theologians in the 1960s. The leading Catholic “theologians of hope” were Schillebeeckx and Johann Baptist Metz, both of whom were colleagues and longtime editorial collaborators on the journal Concilium. The Protestant theologian Jürgen Moltmann was perhaps most explicitly affected by Bloch, with his own Theology of Hope appearing in 1964. There was even an active conversation between Bloch and Moltmann throughout the mid-1960s.151 Metz was, likewise, in conversation with Bloch through the Internationale Paulusgesellschaft, which hosted a number of conferences between Christian and Marxist thinkers in the 1960s.152 As we have seen, Schillebeeckx had already been thinking in terms of a theology of hope, as well as a revised eschatology, for some time before Bloch began to exert his influence in this area (especially in the period of 1963–66), but sketching some of the major developments that occurred here remains an important task.

149. Ibid., 89. 150. Ernst Bloch, The Spirit of Utopia, trans. Anthony A. Nassar (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 212–18, 267–78. 151. See Jürgen Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann über Ernst Bloch: ‘Atheismus im Christentum’: und die Bibel ist doch Links,” Der Spiegel, September 30, 1968, http://www. spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46056054.html; “Hope and Confidence: A Conversation with Ernst Bloch,” Dialogue: A Journal of Theology 7 (1968): 42–55. 152. Steven M. Rodenborn, Hope in Action: Subversive Eschatology in the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx and Johann Baptist Metz (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), 40–42, 288–92.

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1.5.1 Moltmann’s Theology of the Promise Part of the premise of Moltmann’s Theology of Hope is that the rediscovery of biblical eschatology helped to undo the trend in German liberal Protestantism that accommodated the Christian message to the militaristic culture of the pre– First World War period.153 He criticizes the liberal views of eschatology that equated it with history as it had been interpreted. The identification of God with history, espoused by ideologies of progress, must be rejected just as much as the projection of the eschaton to a wholly separate, other-worldly realm.154 There is, in Moltmann’s writing, a tangible polemic against “Greek thought” and cosmology, which he describes as essentially ahistorical. An awareness of history is only possible from the Hebrew perspective of time; that is, with an awareness of “mission” and of a promise.155 He follows Karl Barth, to some extent, in asserting that eschatology and the promise that comes with it is the origin of history as we understand it today.156 Greek logos merely presents an epiphany of eternity in the present moment—the eternal origin is contemporaneous with the “now moment.”157 Time is cyclical, and regenerative “by means of the periodic return to the time of the first beginning.”158 So-called Greek thinking is concerned with this eternal return of “the same,” while Israelite religion, by contrast, is bound to a linear view of time with an open future. The God of Israel is the God of the promise, and the revelation of God’s fullness lies in the future, orienting the whole people on that future. From this perspective, it is possible to think “historically” and reinterpret events in the past as a part of a larger and unfinished whole.159 The threat is that the present will slip out of joint with the eternal beginning, shifting the onus of action onto human beings who “strike out in hope towards the promised new future.”160 For the first time, history becomes a real possibility for humanity, as does the possibility of universal history—the whole of human doings can become meaningful in an ultimate sense based on the future that lies ahead. Further, since the revelation of God is Godself, then “the goal and the future of his [sic] selfrevelation lies in himself [sic].”161 Hope can only really operate and exist in the “flux”

153. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 37. Cf. Douglas John Hall, “‘The Great War’ and the Theologians,” The Twentieth Century: A Theological Overview, ed. Gregory Baum (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 5–6. 154. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 38–40, 246–54. 155. Ibid., 89. 156. Ibid., 51. 157. Ibid., 98–99. 158. Ibid., 98. 159. Ibid., 104. 160. Ibid., 100. 161. Ibid., 46.

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of history, when history is not seen as something settled or static.162 Only times of upheaval can make room for hope for history and open up possibilities for the future. If the world is perfectly self-contained, as with mechanistic explanations of cause and effect, then the world is already the fulfillment of hope, or hope belongs to an extrinsic reality unrelated to the world except by an apocalyptic event. A world without possibilities or alternatives for the future is “threatened with the loss not only of its future but of its own historic character as well.”163 Moltmann makes much of this opposition between Hellenism and Judaism, without much attention being paid to the complexities of Hellenism and the varieties of Judaism in the Roman Empire. Ancient Judaism did, of course, have distinct characteristics and concepts, including that of an open future to be fulfilled by God. We should, however, be wary of separating “Greek” and “Hebrew” so surgically, since they are quite ambiguous historically.164 Moltmann’s use of Bloch is apparent, especially with the concept of the “Novum,” that which is radically new in the future and exists precisely as its own potential to exist.165 According to Bloch, we have inherited a historical legacy from Hegel and Goethe who reversed the eighteenth-century problem of humanity and the world: world is now the question, and humanity, having come into its own, and begun to make itself, is the answer.166 It is from here that he arrives at an “anticipatory model” of history and metaphysics. The “unknown humanum” comes into play as the possibility of humanity and as the answer to the question of the world expressed through universal history.167 This coming “whole,” which is anticipated, is constantly threatened but we must, “[k]eep faith with the beginning, whose genesis is still to come.”168 Bloch asserts that YHWH, the God of a migrant people, had an effect on how Israel’s understanding of the divine formed over the centuries. The biblical God as the “God who is coming,” and is “un-Present” is entirely strange to the Greek gods. God is and is not yet Godself, placing the focus of Israelite religion in the hoped-for future.169 Even in terms of

162. Ibid., 92. 163. Ibid., 93. 164. Such an opposition was and remains quite common. See Rudolph Bultmann’s Gifford Lectures from 1955: Bultmann, History and Eschatology, The Gifford Lectures 1955 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975), 12–22. Bloch also presents an opposition between “Greek” and “Hebrew” concepts in Ernst Bloch, Atheism in Christianity: The Religion of the Exodus and the Kingdom, trans. J.T. Swann (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 94–95. 165. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 227. 166. Ernst Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 77. 167. Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, 82. 168. Ernst Bloch, “Incipit vita nova,” Man on His Own, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 92. 169. Bloch, Atheism in Christianity, 94–96.

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“the promise,” Israel’s self-understanding would change: coming out of the desert, Israel understood that “Canaan was not really Canaan.”170 The promised kingdom has not arrived in worldly form. Finally, the influence of the prophets on Israelite religion can be seen through bringing the Novum close, “at hand,” and emphasizing the freedom of the people over-against fate. This gives the future its potency. It does not exist as “an immutable category but hypothetically, as a changeable, chooseable” future.171 Moltmann opines that “the new” has been, and remains, the central point of true history and the possibility of “universal history.”172 From this line of thinking, Moltmann can be quoted to the effect that “all thinking in history” is revealed as having an eschatological orientation and an “eschatological provisionality.”173 The eschatological character of thought is intrinsic to thought itself, and not something added from outside. The Novum is so radical for Bloch that it can never truly enter history. As soon as the beginning of the Novum is hoped for, “it becomes a concept of time far-off in the future.”174 The “beginning” exists to make something whole—the Novum that cancels out all suffering accumulated in history. The Novum is the space and substance of salvation that never arrives but only exists as possibility. As soon as it begins, it has been compromised and it begins to end; the potential of the Novum is wiped out by its actuality, even as a beginning. 1.5.2 Metz’s Eschatological Development Johann Baptist Metz’s early work follows a “transcendental-linear theology of history,” which began as a positive way for Metz to deal with the process of secularization.175 This transcendental approach, however, ends up being inadequate to the task of modern theology, especially in terms of Christian political engagement and praxis. Metz begins with Christology and protology as the two factors that anchor human beings in the world, albeit transcendentally, in accordance with his theological training under Karl Rahner.176 Metz presupposes the autonomy of the secular; that is, the non-sacral world. He even goes further in this direction such that the “modern process of secularization should be understood, consequently,

170. Ibid., 99. 171. Ibid., 103. 172. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 263. 173. Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung: Untersuchungen zur Begründung und zu den Konsequenzen einer christlicher Eschatologie, 5th ed. (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1966), 28. The English translation is weaker than the German original expression—thinking itself has an “eschatological provisionality” (“eschatologische Vorläufigkeit”) to it, and is not “eschatologically stamped as provisional.” Cf. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 33. 174. Bloch, “Incipit vita nova,” Man on His Own, 76–77. 175. Rodenborn, Hope in Action, 23. 176. Ibid., 31.

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as the historical continuation of the incarnation.”177 History is determined by its beginning, making eschatology the transcendental confirmation of protology.178 Here, we are not far from the reading of Barth given by Moltmann: “According to Karl Barth the future of Christ is mainly only a matter of unveiling.”179 The end is like the beginning. This position begins to change however, where, in a text dating from 1960, he is already distancing himself from any “pre-established harmony,” whether metaphysical or religious.180 Metz also comes down on “Greek thought” and “metaphysics” along the same lines as Moltmann and Bloch, and with clear references to Martin Heidegger.181 Metz is here still speaking along transcendental lines, especially regarding metaphysics, as “man’s [sic] refined understanding of himself from his transcendental origin,” while theology is the historical and reflexive understanding of that origin.182 He locates “an epochal turning point in metaphysics” in the theology of Thomas Aquinas because Thomas changes the essence of human self-understanding from being contained within a static “nature” to being situated within a dynamic “history.”183 The transition “from nature to history” is part and parcel of the rediscovery of human historicity through what would later be expressed in contemporary hermeneutics. The shift away from “nature,” or cosmos, means that the pre-given whole in which humans have a defined place can no longer be maintained.184 In light of the historicity of humanity, that is the essential limitations of human life as well as its possibility, we cannot merely predetermine our own self-understanding. The social interactions that shape human consciousness show that human beings are partially determined by their context while also possessing the reflexive freedom to shape that context. By 1966, Metz had definitively changed his course, partially due to the influence of Bloch, and he attempted to take on Bloch’s “Novum” as a radically open future that is not determined by the beginning.185 History itself has to involve more than just the run of things up to present events, which does away with the essential continuity in history that Metz and others had posited previously.186 He began to define the future as a rupture with the continuity of history, and as the in-breaking of the “wholly new” in history as well as the necessity of action and

177. Ibid., 32. 178. Ibid., 36. 179. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 228. 180. Johann Baptist Metz, “The Theological World and the Metaphysical World,” Philosophy Today 10, no. 4 (1966), 253. 181. Metz, “The Theological World and the Metaphysical World,” 255–58. 182. Ibid., 154. 183. Ibid., 259. 184. See Francis Fiorenza, “The Thought of J. B. Metz,” Philosophy Today 10, no. 4 (1966), 248. 185. Metz, “The Church and the World,” 71–72, 75; Rodenborn, Hope in Action, 49. 186. Ibid., 57.

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“orthopraxis.”187 Metz makes God the partner of history, from the point of view of the future, essentially echoing Moltmann’s understanding of the God of the promise and Bloch’s “God who is coming.”188 However, Bloch does not conceive of a transcendent point of reference for this Other or for his utopia. His “transcending without transcendence” cannot have an “Up-there,” since this would serve to reestablish a static metaphysics based on the power of a ruling class over-against the democratic forces at work “below.” “Transcending” comes from the future establishing Bloch’s ontology of the not-yet wherein the beginning can never really arrive or else the end will also become present, circumscribing the possibilities of the future and closing it off prematurely.189 The process would collapse, as would history. For Bloch, “S is not yet P; no subject already has its adequate predicate. The history of being itself is the experimental attempt to identify its impulse and origin; the impulse and origin of that history which it is man’s task to illumine.”190 So, hope is moving and movement in history—the “transcendent” goal is considered while the short-term, praxical goals are held firmly in view. Hope should not despair, or become complacent in what is. Metz locates “transcendence” exclusively in the future, as the God of the promise.191 Perhaps, more importantly and more originally, theology is properly identified with eschatology.192 Metz agrees that God’s promise is what grounds the very concept of “history” and makes it possible.193 He also draws the same line of contrast between Greek and Hebrew thought, where the Greek concept of history is “only the indifferent return of the same within the closed realm of the eternal cosmos.”194 Both Moltmann and Bloch have pointed this out as well, but such a distinction is rather uncritical. First, it assumes a binary opposition between “Hellenism” and “Judaism” that is impossible to maintain historically, and it assumes that “Greek” or Hellenistic thought was a unified whole and not a complex of cultures spread geographically across several continents and temporally across nearly a millennium.195 The “Greek” concept of history is not merely the “return” of the same, but a predetermined progression—it is “fate” that is the decisive factor for humans beings in Hellenistic cosmology, and the belief in the unavoidability of fate for Hellenistic thought that denies history a true future. Even so, the notion of “fate,” as problematic, is consonant with the faith of the New Testament and the Hebrew Scripture in terms

187. Schillebeeckx himself took over the term “orthopraxis” around 1966 from Metz. See Erik Borgman, “Theologie tussen universiteit en emancipatie,” TvT 26 (1986), 250. 188. Bloch, Atheism in Christianity, 94–95. 189. Bloch, “Incipit vita nova,” Man on His Own, 88. 190. Ibid., 90. 191. Rodenborn, Hope in Action, 62. 192. Metz, “The Church and the World,” 70. 193. Ibid., 75. 194. Ibid., 76. 195. See Shaye J.D. Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987), 37–46.

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of clashing with any notion of the God who is coming and the God of the promise. The openness of the biblical God remains a defining and important characteristic for Christian self-understanding. Furthermore, the “cosmocentric” view of the nature as an unchangeable order goes along with this notion of fate, as it does with the maintenance or recovery of an eternal present—there is no open future for the cosmocentric world if it is all predetermined and the order is unchangeable. All that can be done is to wait for the drama to play out to its conclusion. The old theological cosmology is unusable because it considers the world to be static, essentially holding a cosmocentric rather than an anthropocentric view of creation.196 For the former, the cosmos, as a divine order, is central and change is not really a possibility without upsetting God’s work. The latter conceives of the world as the place in which humanity receives grace and lives out its eschatological calling, as a free and acting subject, not merely as substance, and “the world as concrete history rather than abstract and universal nature.”197 Metz avers that “[n]ot a flight out of the world, but a flight with the world ‘forward’ is the fundamental dynamism of the Christian hope in its renunciation of the world.”198 This is remarkably close to Schillebeeckx’s own assessment, based on the Pastoral Constitution, that the Christian “does not flee from the world, but flees with the world towards the future.”199 Schillebeeckx was in attendance when Metz’s text, “The Church and the World” was given at a symposium entitled “The Theological Task Confronting the Church Today,” held at St. Xavier College in Chicago from March 31 to April 3, 1966. On this, his first trip to the United States, Schillebeeckx found himself alongside other theological luminaries, including Rahner, Metz, de Lubac, George Lindbeck, Alexander Schmemann, and others, sharing ideas and no doubt mutually influencing one another.200

Conclusion In an important essay from 1969, “The Interpretation of the Future,” Schillebeeckx further develops his eschatological position with respect to the essential historicity of humanity. Even in this short essay, many nuanced elements are present, particularly the attention to hermeneutics and the need for interpretation in Christian life and tradition. He acknowledges that our self-understanding is fundamentally different than that of the world of the bible, but that a translation between the texts formed in such an alien context are accessible to us in part because

196. Metz, “The Church and the World,” 83. 197. Fiorenza, “The Thought of J. B. Metz,” 248. 198. Metz, “The Church and the World,” 80. Emphasis original. 199. Schillebeeckx, “Man’s Expectation for the Future,” The Mission of the Church, 89. 200. T. Patrick Burke, “Introduction,” The Word in History: The St. Xavier Symposium, ed. T. Patrick Burke (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966), xi.

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“the ancient self-understanding of man [sic] is one of the elements that has shaped our modern self-understanding.”201 The pluralism encountered in history is never an absolute difference and communication remains possible, given a sufficient level of self-understanding and historical criticism. He continues the eschatological interpretation of God as “He who comes,” associating God with humanity’s future in light of modern self-understanding. The nuance that Schillebeeckx adds, which really is crucial for his hermeneutical position, is that the God of the promise whose fullness is yet to come is also the God of the covenant.202 The promise is not a zero-point for history; it has a history as well, and Israel only gradually came to understand itself in relation to this promise, and therefore as being in a relationship with the God who makes and keeps that promise.203 It is not just a transcendent point in the future that allows for meaningful “history” to emerge over-against an abstract Greek logos of eternal presence. It is a remembered past that can be associated meaningfully with what occurs in the present that opens up the way for a future as the “gradual fulfillment of a divine promise.”204 The future is already “an intrinsic dimension of the present,” but its shape and contours are not yet visible for us to theoretically map out or predict.205 Against Moltmann, and perhaps against the emphasis of Metz’s argumentation, Schillebeeckx is clear that the real historicity of humanity means that the future starts from the present, “and therefore from the past” as well.206 Potentiality is already contained in the actuality of history precisely as potential, as a negativity built into the actual that compels us to move forward, toward the desire that can never be achieved.207 The present is the necessary link between the “immanent” future and “transcendent eschaton.” The “reactualisation of the past in the present with an eye on the future” has the effect of both increasing the tension between the expectation of future salvation and the lived present, as well as giving space for that which is “wholly new” to come into being. Based on these rational “hermeneutical principles” we

201. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, CW vol. 5 (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 2 [2–3]. The volume The Understanding of Faith is the English translation of Geloofsverstaan: Interpretatie en kritiek, (Bloemendaal, Nelissen, 1972). The chapters were originally published articles, and will be cited by their title as well as included in The Understanding of Faith (UF). The first chapter in the Dutch edition, “Towards a Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” is included in GFM instead. The Understanding of Faith is, by far, one of Schillebeeckx’s most important (and most often overlooked!) works wherein he lays out his theological method. 202. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 5 [5]. 203. Ibid., 5 [6]. 204. Ibid., 6 [6]. 205. Ibid., 6 [7]. 206. Ibid., 7 [7]. 207. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 7 [7]; Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, 71.

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can start a dialogue with other interpretations of the world; we have a meaning to give to the world and can communicate it to others. There is a new image of the world at work in the essentially “hermeneutical” self-understanding, the new image of humanity, presented by Schillebeeckx. The shared self-understanding inherent in this context was the anthropocentric one outlined by Moltmann and others with the primary emphasis being placed on the dynamics of history and a still open future. The cosmocentric view that held the universe to be a permanent, divine order was fading away, or had already been obliterated everywhere in the West except within ecclesial circles by the progress of technology, the reorientation of philosophy around the human subject, and the new preoccupation with methodology as the way to objective understanding of history. Schillebeeckx, consonant with his contemporaries, is also motivated to find new criteria for interpreting the Christian faith and communicating it within this changed position: the world exists for itself, and the human being is a subject in history. Within this changed context, however, the question of meaning, and specifically of the meaning of history outside of an objectively ordered metaphysics inherited from neoscholasticism, becomes extremely pressing. Motivated by an essentially eschatological concern, and encouraged by the experience of the Second Vatican Council, Schillebeeckx made a full turn to hermeneutics as a way of reformulating a Catholic theology of hope for his contemporary context. This move would ultimately lead him to greater heights by means of Christology, but it would also reveal an essential unity between hermeneutics as an ontological position and eschatology, with serious implications for the ontological structure of human subjectivity. In the following chapter, we will outline Schillebeeckx’s position in the debate between the foremost proponents of hermeneutics and neoMarxist critical theory in order to bring us to a place from which we can discuss that structure more clearly. This will involve some historical explanation, but it will ultimately give way to a more fundamental and systematic analysis.

Chapter 2 HERMENEUTICS, ESCHATOLOGY, AND CRITICAL THEORY

In the period immediately prior to the publication of Schillebeeckx’s famous Jesus trilogy, he was greatly concerned with the ability to intelligibly communicate the content of Christian faith to human beings living within a modern, secular culture. In the context of the postconciliar church, Schillebeeckx was an integral part of the Catholic methodological renaissance where theologians were able to explore the various approaches to biblical criticism, history, and philosophy that had been developing during the twentieth century. He was particularly influenced by the hermeneutical philosophy that followed Heidegger through the work of HansGeorg Gadamer, but he also read Protestant theologians who had already been in dialogue with hermeneutics for some time, including Rudolph Bultmann, Gerhard Ebeling, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Jürgen Moltmann. This movement, “the New Hermeneutic,” had become quite established, and it involved a collaboration between American and German Protestant theologians.1 Upon returning to the Netherlands after a lecture tour of the United States in 1967, Schillebeeckx began to turn toward neo-Marxist critical theory as a dialogue partner for Catholic theology.2 He believed, in contrast to some of his contemporaries, that Marx’s appeal to resistance against suffering in the world was correct and that elements from the Marxist tradition could be successfully integrated within Catholic thought as a way of recontextualizing the gospel message of hope and salvation to the poor and suffering.3 As a so-called modern theologian, Schillebeeckx pioneered methodologies that adapted contemporary hermeneutics to a notion of tradition development. Such an adaptation remains a necessity for Catholic theology. Tradition, as the history of the

1. Werner G. Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance, Library of Philosophy and Religion (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 148–49; James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb Jr., eds., The New Hermeneutic, New Frontiers in Theology 2 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). 2. Ted Schoof, “Introduction to the New Edition,” GFM, CW vol. 3 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), xiii–xv. 3. Gregory Baum, “The Impact of Marxist Ideas on Christian Theology,” The Twentieth Century: A Theological Overview, ed. Gregory Baum (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 173–81.

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interpretation of the Christ event within the church, is an expression of revelation, but not revelation-proper, which is only contained in the person of Jesus Christ, “who is himself both the mediator and the sum total of revelation” (DV 2). Because of this distinction, Catholic theologians cannot hold to a 1:1 correspondence between doctrine and revelation; between the revelatory event and its recorded, propositional form in Catholic doctrine. This was a departure from the previous approaches of neoscholasticism to the truth content of doctrine. The separation of the event and interpretation, even to a small degree, was one of the most important results of the fierce debates surrounding the failed schema on revelation that was created in the Second Vatican Council’s pre-preparatory phase.4 By opening up some distance between revelation as an event and that which bears witness, interprets, or codifies that event, a new field was opened up for theology. This area lies primarily in thinking about the authority of tradition and the active interpretation of a past tradition for Christians living in the present. Schillebeeckx sought to critically engage with contemporary philosophical hermeneutics in order to meet the challenge posed to the Christian tradition by contemporary culture. It seems appropriate that modern hermeneutics arose out of a need to critically study and faithfully understand the Scriptures, and was later turned back to its original task, albeit from the opposite perspective. A moreor-less “secular,” philosophical hermeneutics was tasked with becoming a guide to the faithful interpretation and application of the Christian tradition. Schillebeeckx did not purely confine himself to hermeneutics. He qualified his appropriation of philosophical hermeneutics with the critiques of critical theory and the neo-Marxist emphasis on praxis.5 It was in this period, of the late 1960s and early 1970s, that he produced a number of articles dealing with these subjects and essentially laid the methodological groundwork for the Jesus trilogy that would follow. This trilogy spanned two decades and provided a more fully elaborated, hermeneutically grounded Christology, a hermeneutical-critical Soteriology, and a “negative” ecclesiology based on radical hermeneutics and the theological method of interrelation.6 The method that he developed drew heavily upon the works of both Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas, from hermeneutics and critical theory, respectively.7 While other thinkers

4. Schelkens, Catholic Theology of Revelation on the Eve of Vatican II, 165–98. 5. See Edward Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory,” UF, CW vol. 5 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 89–107 [102–123]. Cf. William Portier, “Schillebeeckx’ Dialogue with Critical Theory,” The Ecumenist 21 (1983): 23. 6. See Edward Schillebeeckx, Jezus het verhaal van een levende (Bloemendaal: Nelissen, 1974), ET: Jesus: An Experiment in Christology, CW vol. 6 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014); Gerechtigheid en liefde: genade en bevrijding (Baarn: Nelissen, 1977), ET: Christ: The Christian Experience in the Modern World, CW vol. 7 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014); Mensen als verhaal van God (Baarn: Nelissen 1989), ET: Church: The Human Story of God. These volumes will be cited as Jesus, Christ, and Church, respectively, except where direct reference is made to the original Dutch text. 7. William Portier, “Edward Schillebeeckx as Critical Theorist: The Impact of NeoMarxist Social Thought on His Recent Theology,” The Thomist 48, no. 3 (1984): 353.

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were certainly involved, this chapter will concentrate on the central role played by these particular philosophers and the elements that Schillebeeckx took from them. Although there have been several important analyses of Schillebeeckx’s work from late 1960s through the 1970s, I feel that, on the whole, the complementarity of hermeneutics and critical theory in his thought has been insufficiently recognized. There are a number of articles that assess Schillebeeckx’s interactions with neoMarxism.8 Likewise, authors have dealt with Schillebeeckx’s use of hermeneutics, but the two strands of philosophy are largely considered to be phases in his development that are discrete from one another.9 By artificially separating the two philosophical schools, the resultant evaluation of Schillebeeckx’s understanding of metaphysics and ontology is usually skewed toward one or the other.10 This chapter will illustrate the importance of critical theory for Schillebeeckx’s theological hermeneutics, and show that Schillebeeckx sees the two as being complementary and even necessary for Christian theology. I will then begin to link hermeneutics explicitly to the “new” eschatology of hope laid out above. My approach in Chapter 1 was much more of a historical reading of sources and articles. Here, I will adopt a more “synoptic” view of Schillebeeckx’s work. This chapter will closely examine what I consider to be the “hinge” section of Schillebeeckx’s transition into his mature, hermeneutical work, which consists of the two essay collections God the Future of Man (1968) and The Understanding of Faith (Dutch, 1972; English, 1974). Other elements from his later works, in particular the Jesus trilogy and articles from the 1970s and 1980s, will be brought together to sketch a more unified view of his project as a whole, and not merely as isolated articles.

8. See Portier, “Schillebeeckx’ Dialogue with Critical Theory,” 20–27; Portier, “Schillebeeckx as Critical Theorist”; Elizabeth K. Tillar, “The Influence of Social Critical Theory on Edward Schillebeeckx’s Theology of Suffering for Others,” The Heythrop Journal 42, no. 2 (2001): 148–72. 9. Dennis Rochford, “The Theological Hermeneutics of Edward Schillebeeckx,” Theological Studies 63, no. 2 (2002): 251–67; Portier, “Schillebeeckx’ Dialogue with Critical Theory,” 22–24; Portier, “Schillebeeckx as Critical Theorist,” 362–63. Portier in particular considers Schillebeeckx’s use of Heidegger to be something of a “phase,” without a sense for how this initial hermeneutical work continues in Schillebeeckx’s later studies as a consistent structure. Steven Rodenborn’s assessment in Hope in Action seems to follow this pattern. See Rodenborn, Hope in Action, 181–83, 320–22. 10. Notably, Philip Kennedy holds both schools of thought together, but he does not fully develop the link between them. See Philip Kennedy, Deus Humanissimus: The Knowability of God in the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx (Fribourg: University Press Fribourg Switzerland, 1993), 174, 199. Perhaps the best presentation in this area comes from Daniel Speed Thompson, The Language of Dissent: Edward Schillebeeckx on the Crisis of Authority in the Catholic Church (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 22–46.

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2.1 Hermeneutics and History in Shifting Philosophical Horizons Hermeneutics is of primary importance in elucidating Schillebeeckx’s understanding of the experiencing human subject and in the underlying ontological foundation of the subject. Furthermore, a hermeneutical ontology can only be said to function if it is also critical, making the insights drawn from critical theory intrinsic to the original task and not a different mode of inquiry altogether. A major point that we will endeavor to develop here is the extent to which Schillebeeckx viewed Christian eschatology as the point of contact between hermeneutics and critical theory, such that both philosophies are able to be sufficiently critical of one another, while still fitting together in a wider ontological matrix. This is only true, however, if a “wider matrix” is available or accessible, which is not necessarily the case for philosophy. As a theologian, Schillebeeckx provides a basis for such a “critical hermeneutics” from the perspective of Christian eschatology. We will proceed by examining specific elements of Schillebeeckx’s theology in relation to both what he took from Gadamer and Habermas, based on the linguistic and hermeneutic outlook inherited from Heidegger (the so-called linguistic turn), and the use of hermeneutics in interpreting history. We will begin by very briefly looking at Gadamer’s main forerunner in hermeneutics and the philosophy of history, Wilhelm Dilthey. This will act as necessary background for the so-called Gadamer-Habermas debate, and furnish initial criteria for thinking about history and, ultimately, of the historicality of the human subject. By examining Gadamer’s attempts to revise a philosophy of history through hermeneutics, we will come to the problem of language and its function for human beings as hermeneutical entities. The “unified” interpretation of history, taken up by Habermas, according to a particular hermeneutical worldview, attempts to bridge the gap between the theoretical analysis of history (hermeneutics) and world-making praxis through critical theory. The problem of interpretation is also a problem of ideology since, as Gadamer shows, a united horizon of tradition is necessary for interpretation, but this can easily become ideological and oppressive if the horizons of the past are absolutized as being fully normative for history. Habermas will offer a solution, based again on language and with an appeal to praxis, but this will also prove problematic from the standpoint of ideology critique. Schillebeeckx will ultimately incorporate a great deal from both authors, while also showing where their methodologies are either insufficient or counterproductive. He also provides a specifically Christian solution to the problem of ideology and human interpretation. Schillebeeckx is clear in his work that the first meaning of “ideology” is essentially positive: “a totality of images, representations and symbols which a particular society creates in order to justify its identity.”11 The derivative, and more common meaning which will be used here, is that

11. Edward Schillebeeckx, “The Role of History in What is Called the New Paradigm,” Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for the Future, ed. Hans Küng and David Tracy, trans. Margaret Kohl (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), 314.

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of a “pathological” or distorted use of founding symbols and language to manipulate the social fabric for the gain of those in power.12 I will show here that Schillebeeckx occupies a unique mediating position in the Gadamer-Habermas debate, and his perspective as a theological reader of both the hermeneuticallinguistic and critical theory schools of contemporary philosophy has not been widely recognized for its own merits. Schillebeeckx’s readings are based primarily on his own experience of the need for Christian faith to be credible and intelligible in contemporary culture as well as a renewed understanding of God’s transcendence, eschatological and future-oriented.13 The new image of humanity, along with the shift from a cosmocentric to an anthropocentric cosmology, engenders a new image of God. It is these “new,” recovered images of God “who is our future” that will open the way for a different type of Christian eschatological hermeneutics that can be deployed productively in current theological discussions, especially regarding to the human subject.14 In order to fully reach this eschatological notion, this chapter will begin by using the Gadamer-Habermas debate as a foundation upon which to construct a hermeneutically grounded view of the human subject. It is necessary to examine the debate around language first before working to expand our understanding of the “linguistic turn” and its ontological implications for the human subject and for human experience in subsequent chapters. While we are beginning with philosophy, I am not attempting to style Schillebeeckx as a “Christian philosopher.” Instead, Schillebeeckx’s starting point is faith in the gospel message of Jesus Christ as the one who brings salvation to humanity, and the person of Jesus who has, “for believers, a significance for universal history.”15 The link between Christology and eschatology, as well as creation, that he began with in the early 1960s continues to play a major role in Schillebeeckx’s mature work.16 Christology is, for Schillebeeckx, a concentrated and intensified form of creation. It is “creation as God wishes it to be,” not in its threatened form, subject to human sin and failure, but as the “supreme manifestation of being eternally new and at the same time constant and faithful.”17 Philosophy poses a question to us from the side of creation, while Christ questions us from the side of God.18 In thinking about the human subject we are therefore confronted with questions about being that generate in us a particular critical consciousness, or a self-understanding that

12. Schillebeeckx, “The Role of History in What is Called the New Paradigm,” 314–15. 13. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, CW vol. 3 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 101–102 [169–171], 108–109 [180–181], 112–113 [186–187]. 14. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 109 [181]. Emphasis original. 15. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth,” 23. 16. See Philip Kennedy, “God and Creation,” The Praxis of the Reign of God: An Introduction to the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx, ed. Mary Catherine Hilkert and Robert J. Schreiter, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 37–58. 17. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth,” 20. 18. Ibid., 23.

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does not retreat from the very real questions posed by contemporary society.19 This is in line with the message of the International Theological Commission, which asserts that “without philosophy, theology cannot adequately critique the validity of its assertions nor clarify its ideas nor understand different schools of thought.”20 By situating Schillebeeckx within the debate between hermeneutics and critical theory, what emerges is a distinctly theological anthropology, one that is sufficiently able to both answer and criticize philosophical movements from within the Christian narrative of salvation. 2.1.1 History and Hermeneutics One of the most important contributions of Heideggerian hermeneutic philosophy has been the rediscovery of the historicity of human beings. As Gadamer recognized, the incorporation of this essential historicity has changed the way that we conceive of history altogether, contrary to the legacy of idealism and romanticism in the nineteenth century, and historicism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.21 There is no point outside of history from which the “whole” of history can be seen and, therefore, the meaning of a past historical horizon cannot be fixed absolutely insofar as history is still unfolding and the meaning inherent in it continues to evolve.22 The time-bound, historicality of human beings also bars them from claiming absolute knowledge from within history. “To be historically,” claims Gadamer, “means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete.”23 Schillebeeckx understood this at a very basic level when he recognized that if the past can only be seen in part, then the very partial nature

19. See Lieven Boeve, “Theology, Recontextualisation and Contemporary Critical Consciousness. Lessons from Richard Schaeffler for a Postmodern Theological Epistemology,” Théologie et Philosophie. Festschrift Emilio Brito, ed. E. Gaziaux, BETL 206 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007), 455–83. 20. International Theological Commission, “Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles and Criteria,” Vatican website, November 29, 2011, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_doc_20111129_teologia-oggi_en.html, §72; see also cf. John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, Vatican website, September 14, 1998, http:// w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091998_ fides-et-ratio.html, 66. 21. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed. trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York and London: Continuum, 2011), 245–54. 22. Paul Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990), 309: “The second theme [of Gadamer’s] in the idea of historical efficacy is this: there is not overview which would enable us to grasp in a single glance the totality of effects.” See also, Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976). 23. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 301.

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of this past horizon places our own emphasis on the future in terms of action.24 “Instead of a pre-existing meaning,” therefore, “we have here the expression of the ‘still open’ meaning of history; meaning still has to be created.”25 Gadamer here acknowledges the failure of modernity and its myth of perpetual progress, a myth espoused by many of the major metanarratives of the industrial age from the vantage point of hermeneutics. The metanarratives of technology and of emancipation did not deliver what they promised, in the form of increased freedom and wealth for all people. These narratives sought to accomplish what religion had failed to deliver and they proclaimed humanity as the universal subject of emancipation from economic, social, and political bondage.26 The two consecutive world wars, however, convinced many, especially in Europe, that the modern project was deeply flawed.27 The rationalistic thinking that enabled it conflicted directly with experience, showing that nature and reason were not coterminous after all.28 Progress was not inevitable, and the human being was not infinite, nor a universal, experiencing subject who could mechanistically control the natural and social environment.29 In his critique of theories of history, and the work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833– 1911) particularly, Gadamer was precisely singling out the objectivist notions of a “how historical experience can become a science.”30 Dilthey’s “life philosophy” fundamentally mistakes the kind of “being experienced” in a specific tradition or stream of ideas for a sense of “life [Erlebnis] itself ” held in common with other historical beings.31 The next step toward objectively valid knowledge, if “life” is

24. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 3 [3]. 25. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 654 [664]. 26. Schillebeeckx, Jesus in Our Western Culture, trans. John Bowden, (London: SMC Press, 1987), 1. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: Blackwell Verso, 1997), 143; the authors will call the modern project an “unshaken belief in the future: things would remain as they were and even improve.” 27. See Hall, “‘The Great War’ and the Theologians,” 3–8; Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 257–60. 28. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 83: “Thinking that does not make system and perception accord conflicts with more than isolated visual impressions; it conflicts with practice. The expected event fails to occur, yes, but the unexpected event does occur: the bridge collapses, the crops wither, or the drug kills.” 29. Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 244–45. 30. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 216; Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 176–78. 31. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory, 178; Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 152–60.

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a given datum, is to proceed in search of “scientific certainty” via the inductive method; doubting everything in order to establish what is universally valid in history as is done in the natural sciences.32 This experience of “life itself ” being held in common becomes, for Dilthey, the basis for his account of the possibility of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) in general, and of a universal philosophy of history in particular.33 In fact, the human sciences are really only possible because of the unique relationship between experience, expression, and understanding where “experience” is explicitly this common experience of life as a given.34 Life is “that which is known from within, that behind which we cannot go,” and it undergirds history as a connective tissue for historical events.35 It is ontologically prior, as a given, and is that which introduces the possibility of meaning. Dilthey recognized, however, the limited nature of human interest such that specific areas of interest or investigation limit the scope of what can be given over into understanding.36 This is important in that it also limits what can be raised to the level of objective history, insofar as from the perspective of the historian, “history can be seen as a coherent whole of distinguishable parts, there is one [point of view] from which a series of events can be recaptured as it happened.”37 There is, however, an interesting relationship between the “parts” of history and the whole that becomes objective or universal history. The historian constructs the whole from its parts, while the whole mediates meaning back to the part based on its place within the whole. In fact, there is no guarantee that the part will have meaning for the whole, but this meaning must emerge from the whole of history.38 History, then, produces universal truths by illuminating the meaning that is already contained in life. Meaning is recognized through the experience of history. This is not, however, a purely intellectual process, but is instead a manifestation of what is present in the totality of life itself.39

32. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 232–33. 33. Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History: Thoughts on History and Society, ed. H.P. Rickman (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), 72; Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Life-Expressions,” The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present, ed. Kurt MuellerVollmer (New York: Continuum, 2006), 152–64. 34. Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History, 71–72. 35. Ibid., 73. 36. Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Rise of Hermeneutics,” The Hermeneutic Tradition from Ast to Ricoeur, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 102–03. 37. Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History, 73. There is an allusion here to Leopold van Ranke. Even so, Dilthey remains a follower of Schleiermacher where the, “ultimate goal of the hermeneutic process is to understand an author better than he understood himself.” See Dilthey, “The Rise of Hermeneutics,” 113. Cf. Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 48–49 [67–68], 58–59 [79]. 38. Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History, 73–74. 39. Ibid., 74–75; Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics, 51–52.

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This is only analyzed a posteriori as “history” from an intellectual standpoint through which the historian derives universal values.40 The traditional distinction between the observing subject and the observed object is broken down by Dilthey based on his reading of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology.41 As he describes it, “Understanding is the rediscovery of the I in the Thou; the mind rediscovers itself at even higher levels of connectedness,” allowing a “sameness of mind” between individuals, cultures, systems, and “the totality of mind and universal history.”42 Here, Dilthey is primarily concerned with the historian’s appropriation of a written text, but again the commonality between subject and object is based upon his life philosophy. Interestingly, Dilthey diverges from Husserl in denying any transcendental or universal subject of history.43 Instead, “all people possess a historically contingent, changeable, and revisable phenomenological horizon of meaning which he termed a ‘life world’ (Lebenswelt).”44 This is an important point in moving forward, toward a contemporary theory of history, and ultimately the historical subject as hermeneutical. The will to produce a method of deciphering objective validity from history ultimately subverts historicity because it separates the observing, historical subject from what is observed in a rather surgical way. Despite Dilthey’s later incorporation of phenomenology, his attempt to break down a strict subject-object relationship, and his reconfiguration of the concept of historicity from historicism, his use of an “inductive procedure, borrowed from the natural sciences” undermines his own advances.45 By ascribing an objectivity to historical values that are derived scientifically from “life,” an objectivity equated with that derived from the natural sciences, the nature of historical events as historical is not respected.46 There is an implicit claim to universality, that is, supra-historical knowledge of history—an

40. We can see this in relation to Dilthey’s distinction between the natural sciences and human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). He considers the knowledge produced by the natural sciences, while valuable, to be ultimately esoteric and detached from “our practical contact with the external world; but, in the human studies, a connection between life and science is retained so that thought arising from life remains the foundation for scientific activity. . . . Thus, the starting point from life and the constant connection with it forms the first fundamental feature in the structure of the human studies; for they rest on experience, understanding and knowledge of life.” See Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History, 79–80. 41. Bradley H. McClean, Biblical Interpretation and Philosophical Hermeneutics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 73. 42. Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History, 67–68. 43. For a summary of Husserl’s concept of the transcendental subject and its intentional relationship to object of intuition, see Matheson Russell, Husserl: A Guide for the Perplexed (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 79–97, 144–61; Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics, 58–60. 44. McClean, Biblical Interpretation and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 74–75. 45. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 234. 46. Ibid., 234, 245.

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all-encompassing standpoint outside of history, or a universal philosophy derived from the methodology of the natural sciences that provides objectively valid knowledge.47 Gadamer rightly criticizes this view of history and the experience of the subject, replacing it with a view of history or “tradition” as a stream whose “paradigm is not the [scientific] discovery of facts but the peculiar fusion of memory and expectation into a whole.”48 He also critiques the notion that the scientific method produces objective knowledge for the human sciences, which at the same time questions the suitability of the definition of hermeneutics as merely a method or set of rules for evaluating good or bad, true or false interpretations.49 2.1.2 Gadamer’s Tradition Hermeneutics Following Heidegger, Gadamer conceives of human subjects as being radically historical, meaning that the act of understanding history cannot be methodologically separated from the specific conditions in which one lives and has been educated. Humans are “experienced” in a tradition, giving them a situational view of a past “horizon,” or a “range of vision that includes everything that can be seen” from that vantage point; this point of view is, by its nature, limited and contingent upon what has brought the subject to that position in time.50 A horizon is not a static boundary, but a moving one. It moves with us as we transcend toward it.51 The past and present, therefore, become interwoven as what has been experienced is integrated into an expectation horizon for new experiences; the whole of one’s being historically situated is constituted by particular experiences that shape how we conceive of and react to experiences in the present. The future is present in understanding as that which is already implied in the “expectation” of experiences to come.52 Understanding is effected in the moment of fusion, between experience and expectation, in the act of judgment. The hermeneutical horizon, and the movement that it entails, adheres to a structure of “question and answer.”53 To ask a question is to already take a stand and to adopt a point of view upon what is questioned. In the case of a historical event, the meaning of the event is sought through interpretation. We seek to understand an event, and in order to do so we ask a question about its meaning.54 The question, however, does not come from nowhere, nor is it the product of a purely “scientific” or objective historical consciousness. It is generated in and from the particular point of view of the interpreter who stands in a specific historical tradition. The meaning and “concepts of the historical past”

47. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory, 178–79. 48. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 217. 49. Ibid., 293–94. See also Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory, 54–65. 50. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 301. 51. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 106. 52. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 305–06. 53. Ibid., 363. 54. Ibid., 367.

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are gained, therefore, “in such a way that they also include our own comprehension of them.”55 By coming out of a particular past, the act of understanding answers a question about meaning, but it also reflects back upon the way in which we have asked the question. If the past lays a claim on us, as to how we are able to formulate our questioning (our eventual understanding) of the world, then tradition lays claim to authority, an authority “that has power over our attitudes and behavior.”56 It is here that Gadamer introduces the importance played by “prejudice” (Vorurteil), literally as “pre-judgments,” which are produced by an inherited framework for interpretation from a tradition. These prejudices are not to be discarded as something to be overcome automatically, as with the negative connotation as “unfounded judgments” given to them by the Enlightenment.57 Instead, prejudgments about reality are the very precondition of understanding. In terms of the question-answer dynamic, it is only because we already hold a view of history that we can ask questions about it. The function of prejudices is to make this questioning possible without precluding the possibility that we might hermeneutically reexamine our prejudices in light of a new understanding. Submission to the authority of tradition is not then, as with premodern thought, a matter of automatic obedience, but instead is a matter of knowledge.58 A tradition lays claim to authority based on the free subject’s discernment of the truth inherent in the interpretive framework that it seeks to pass on. The understanding of history and the fusion of horizons is also an essentially linguistic process, since humans are also “caught up in the linguisticality of being (Sprachlichkeit des Seins),” which is an extension of Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics in which being itself is the understanding of being, the working out in history of the fundamental givenness of beings to be, and is therefore linguistic.59 “Language,” claims Gadamer, “is not just one of man’s [sic] possessions in the world; rather on it depends the fact that man has a world at all.”60 There is, in fact, an “essential connection between understanding and language.”61 Understanding an event requires that it be interpreted and this interpretation, and subsequent expression of the event, are always linguistic; therefore the understanding of being which occurs in time is linguistic. Gadamer explains: language has no independent life apart from the world that comes to language within it. Not only is the world world only insofar as it comes into language, but

55. Ibid. 56. Ibid., 281. 57. Ibid., 273–78. 58. Ibid., 281. 59. Georges De Schrijver, “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” The Authority of Tradition, ed. Piet F. Fransen (Leuven: Peeters, Leuven University Press, 1983), 33; cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 436–52. 60. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 440. Emphasis original. 61. Ibid., 402.

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Eschatological Hermeneutics language, too, has its real being only in the fact that the world is presented in it. Thus, that language is originally human means at the same time that man’s [sic] being-in-the-world is primordially linguistic.62

Language transmits history as the record of the past, not simply in dates and facts, but in the saying of those dates and facts there is a moment understanding affected in the recipient, who also receives the means by which these (linguistic) things are transmitted. There is a return here to the hermeneutic circle, in which the whole is only known and interpreted through its parts, and the parts are known and interpreted in light of the whole.63 Gadamer points to the hermeneutic principle of the “fore-conception of completeness” that allows the subject to understand a text based on the implicit assumption that it is understandable as a “whole.”64 The expectation of a “whole” is the expectation of the adequacy of what is being interpreted, and essentially of the expectation of meaning. Understanding, because it is based upon interpretive frameworks passed on in tradition, is linguistic. Meanwhile, interpretation is also linguistic as understanding effected in language, such that “language functions as a kind of lens through which we symbolize our world in terms of degrees of similarity and difference.”65 Essentially, “[u]nderstanding occurs in interpreting,” and the fusion of horizons that occurs in understanding, “is actually an achievement of language.”66 Here we have been thinking in terms of history, or in terms of the understanding and interpretation of a historical text. As a structure, however, this hermeneutic movement between part and whole can be applied to the way in which the human subject experiences the world.67 The horizon of expectation of the world and the theory used to interpret it comprise a whole, while specific, individual experiences are the parts. For something to be understood in experience, language must already be present such that there is a horizon prepared by linguistically constituted knowledge in order to receive what is new and different and then to understand it (a fore-

62. Ibid., 440. 63. Ibid., 365. Cf. Emilio Betti, “Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften,” The Hermeneutic Tradition from Ast to Ricoeur, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 165–66. Betti, whose opinion on hermeneutics is, in many ways, diametrically opposed to Gadamer’s, also agrees on this principle. 64. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 292–93. Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 2008), 188–95 (para. 32). 65. McClean, Biblical Interpretation and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 176. 66. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 390, 370. Emphasis original. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, rev. 4th ed. (Chichester, West Sussex and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 113e: “When I think in words, I don’t have ‘meanings’ in my mind in addition to the verbal expressions; rather, language itself is the vehicle of thought.” 67. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 453, 459.

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understanding).68 This fore-understanding, present in language and the language provided by a tradition, carries with it a specific horizon as well as the prejudices that go along with such a worldview. “Misunderstanding and strangeness are not the first factors,” for experience and the experience of what is new and different.69 Instead, it is “the support of familiar and common understanding [that] makes possible the venture into the alien . . . and thus the broadening and enrichment of our own experience of the world.”70 We can recognize in this something of Dilthey’s appeal to “life” as the universal ground of a common understanding that allows for experience of the world. Here, Gadamer places a similar concept on firmer ground through the transmission of a linguistic horizon of tradition. The “familiar” is constituted by prejudgments made on the basis of past experiences, which are then subject to reevaluation under the pressure of what is new. The whole organizes the parts by giving it a foundation, while the new parts reorganize the whole: it expands both as more experience and as different experience, and this newness changes the character of the whole. The expectation of the whole, or a unity of experience is what forges disparate events into a “single” remembered past, or a personal history. This allows the subject a unified point of view from which it will undertake the task of interpretation. New experience is always grounded in the expectations inherited from a horizon of tradition where understanding “is language-bound.”71 Instead of traditional, inherited language placing limits on experience, however, the opposite is the case. The historicity of the experiencing subject necessitates that new experiences be incorporated into the whole of one’s interpretive framework, making experience of the world the condition for the change and expansion of that framework. This is why Gadamer can make the credible claim, “that knowledge of oneself can never be complete.”72 Self-knowledge, and knowledge of a situation, is subject to a constantly shifting horizon and grounded by a given history that continues to unfold.

2.2 Critical Theory and Critical Reactions to Hermeneutics In the 1960s, Jürgen Habermas engaged in an important critical reflection on Gadamer’s work from the perspective of neo-Marxist critical theory. Habermas

68. Ibid., 268–73. 69. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem,” The Hermeneutic Tradition from Ast to Ricoeur, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 156. Avoiding “misunderstandings” is the primary task of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics. See Betti, “Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften,” 165–67. 70. Gadamer, “The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem,” 156. 71. Ibid. 72. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 301.

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seeks to move beyond this linguistic model, and to critique the formulation of “tradition” that Gadamer takes for granted. In the tradition of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Benjamin, Habermas was severely critical of the power structures that he saw at work in society as being inherently oppressive. The problem with Gadamer, according to Habermas, is that the past horizon, and the fusion of horizons described, appears too harmonious and too theoretical. The reality of human life, and the freedom of human beings, occurs in situations dominated by structures that are already at work in shaping the individual person.73 The communication of a past horizon always occurs under specific conditions, some of which can inhibit the freedom of that communication by limiting or constraining what is given in language.74 We need only think of the various examples of propaganda in the contemporary period that produce a nationalistic or regionalistic outlook on the world and especially of the past where the region in question is given as the single organizing factor of the history that is presented (the most extreme contemporary example is the alternate history of the world which exists in North Korea, in which even the calendar is a propaganda tool centered on the cult of the Kim family). Even an earnest attempt to teach history “honestly” and well will usually focus on the country or region in which that history is taught, unintentionally skewing the view of the past that is presented and, therefore, the inherited tradition that is given over in the “fusion of horizons.” What Habermas advocates is a kind of mindfulness of the prejudices inherent in the transmission of language. Gadamer also promotes this mindfulness as a critical-hermeneutical consciousness, but for Habermas there is more of a teleology involved, since he is ultimately informed by his own neo-Marxist tradition.75 As a critical theorist, Habermas is attempting to construct the basis for a praxis of “unconstrained communication” that will lead to building a better world for emancipated human beings.76 This relies on the evolution of humanity toward the use of “a reason which is fully aware of the interest in the progress of reflection toward adult autonomy,” and which can “gain transcendent power from

73. Edward Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, CW vol. 5 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 111 [126]; “The Magisterium and Ideology,” The Authority of the Church, ANL vol. 26, ed. Piet F. Fransen (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), 8; De Schrijver, “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” 37. 74. As a critique of the Enlightenment, Habermas has taken this over directly from his predecessors. Adorno and Horkheimer call the literature of the Enlightenment and contemporary period a utilization of “the history of thought as an organ of domination.” See Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 117. 75. Gadamer explicitly uses the term “prejudice,” precisely because of its negative connotation in contemporary speech, claiming that it is not until the Enlightenment that “prejudice” became a negative term. In fact, he says that the “fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power.” See Truth and Method, 273, 297. 76. De Schrijver, “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” 37.

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the awareness of its own materialistic involvements.”77 The interest expressed by subjects, and which organizes their thought, must be aware of its entanglements in order to transcend them and the violence contained within them. This applies to situations of repression or an inherent tendency toward violence or repression within the language and, therefore, the past horizon (constituted by language) that is handed on. The dialectic of reason and enlightenment is a negative one, since the realization of historical conditions of emancipation is always flawed and calls for constant rejection of oppressive circumstances. Habermas, then, advocates that reason always be dissatisfied with what is at hand; the recoil against experiences of oppression is a call to change the conditions under which this oppression or suffering is felt.78 Even language itself, insofar as it is institutionalized and used to legitimate violent power-relations, is also a “medium of domination”; language is already ideological.79 This is perhaps the most difficult critique of Gadamer who, with Heidegger, defines being linguistically. 2.2.1 Habermas: The Pressure of Language and the Unity of History To take up the linguisticality of being once more, the critique of critical theory in this context does not nullify it, but only modifies it. First, the fact that language is not merely a medium but is also the substance of ideology speaks to the ontological function of language itself. It does not simply transmit power relationships as a neutral material but is, instead, a material whose potential is already determined by its being. The authority of tradition must be rejected on the grounds that it will inevitably produce ideological oppression. Second, the protest of human beings against oppression is also linguistic: a “no,” or resistance to oppressive forces that is felt and expressed is itself an interpretation of an experience and an understanding that has been reached through interpretation. The function of this protest against oppression is foundational for Habermas and has consequences for his view of history. This is a sentiment already expressed by Adorno and Horkheimer, but is taken up by Habermas in greater detail. Immanuel Kant is invoked by naming “Enlightenment” as the progression of humanity from self-imposed immaturity into an age of reason and maturity.80 Furthermore, the Enlightenment conceives of thinking as the “creation of unified, scientific order and the derivation of factual

77. Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974), 281. See Ernst Bloch, On Karl Marx, trans. John Maxwell (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 121–22. 78. De Schrijver, “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” 38. 79. Jürgen Habermas, “A Review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method,” The Hermeneutic Tradition from Ast to Ricoeur, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 239–40. Cf. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 86. 80. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 81. See Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is Enlightenment, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press, 1959), 85.

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knowledge from principles, whether the latter are elucidated as arbitrarily postulated axioms, innate ideas, or higher abstractions. Logical laws produce the most general relations within the arrangement, and define them. Unity resides in agreement.”81 Habermas develops two important ideas from this observation, the first being that the subjugation of all thinking to a universal, a priori scientific order of certainty is the source of the Enlightenment’s turn toward positivism at the end of the nineteenth century. This is also the root of the great ideological systems of the twentieth century, in which the language of the (meta)narrative serves the goal of the narrative, and passes it on as tradition, under the rubric of scientific certainty in the narrative’s progress toward its goal. The logic involved is self-legitimating, since the language of the narrative is made into a unified system in reference to the narrative as well as its goal (emancipation, liberation of the proletariat, universal understanding, etc.) such that all instantiations within that language game can be made to validate the conclusions of the narrative.82 Rather than language serving to construct a narrative, the narrative has already given the language its meaning and defines what can and cannot be “true” insofar as it is meaningfully in step with the narrative. The opportunity for oppression and for abuse is clear from this assessment of the transmission of language according to the Enlightenment view of thought and science, which presumed to tear down traditional prejudices and presuppositions in search of presuppositionless science. For the critical theorists, and for their successors, this is a situation that still needs to be remedied, as this is precisely the view of reason (especially in Kant’s view) that was deemed to be ambiguous and ultimately oriented toward a kind of utopia of universal understanding based on the dominance of the system. The second point that Habermas develops from this critical reading of the Enlightenment is that a modern philosophy of history must understand itself as one; there is a history of one single world.83 In a way, this follows on from the previous point because, in Enlightenment thinking, all history can be understood from the point of view of the narrative that organizes its thought. We can certainly think of this point in terms of idealism: Hegel’s Geist working itself out in the world and using human beings to constitute one universal subject with an objectively valid meaning.84 Even in the backlash against idealism and positivism, Dilthey also ascribes to a kind of universal history, wherein he upholds the separation between the knowing of history and the historical acts as occurrences in the past that can then be objectively known. There is a value to distanciation, or being “removed” as

81. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 81–82. 82. Lieven Boeve, Lyotard and Theology: Beyond the Christian Master Narrative of Love (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 21–24. These metanarratives, or modern master narratives will be dealt with more extensively below. 83. Habermas, Theory and Practice, 249–50. 84. For a similar example taken from Marxism, see Jean-François Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 171–72, no. 237–38.

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it were, from historical events that allows these events to be described “as history reveals them,” that is to say somewhat objectively and in the unity of the age and history as a whole, rather than subjectively and with regard to personal feelings.85 Dilthey’s distinction between biography and autobiography would be a key example of this principle at work: autobiography is considered as literary expression, while the critical distance of the historian allows biography to reach the level of science.86 The unity of history actually undermines historicity by taking the historian out of the stream of events, having been elevated by virtue of the historian’s relationship to the narrative; events are not allowed to define themselves because the end of the narrative has already written it in advance. The teleology implicit in universal history is, as Habermas observes, taken over from Christianity where the eschaton is the uniting and elevating goal of history, as we discussed in the previous chapter.87 Schillebeeckx traces this development from the interpretation of the Christ event as a renewal of history, which “led to a religious conception of the whole of history: the unity of the divine plan, counsel or divine dispensation which is developed in and through history by men [sic].”88 The secular event comes to replace the religious event as the endpoint of history, but remains as that which organizes it and makes a philosophy of history possible.89 The second condition of possibility is that this history can be humanly constructed, since the human intellect, using reason, has deduced the order of the universe (conceived of teleologically in the modern metanarratives), and also has the power to bring about this end within history. This would be the fulfillment of humanity and the completion of history through the use of reason. For Habermas, this assumes a kind of communicative action where those who claim to know the narrative linguistically dominate others; their mastery of the language of “history” makes them the best-suited to lead others, allowing some of what Nietzsche advocated as being the old virtue of power to exist in modernity. Here, again, is the critique leveled against Gadamer: if language is determined ahead of time by those in power who direct the course of people’s actions toward an end, then by being linguistically constituted in a world in which language is tightly controlled, humans are necessarily subjected to oppressive conditions.90 Therefore, humanity

85. See Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History, 142–55; Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, 180–81. 86. Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History, 89–90. 87. Habermas, Theory and Practice, 249. 88. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 49 [63]. 89. Habermas, Theory and Practice, 250. 90. Habermas, “Review of Truth and Method,” 220; cf. Johann Baptist Metz, “The ‘One World’: A Challenge to Western Christianity,” Radical Pluralism and Truth: David Tracy and the Hermeneutics of Religion, ed. Werner Jeanrond and Jennifer Rike (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 209–10.

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“has never before been confronted so sharply by the irony of a capability to make its own history, yet still deprived of control over it.”91 Is history, therefore, “one”? Habermas begins to break down this notion, in that the historicity of the idea of universal history itself contradicts its claim to retroactive applicability to the whole of recorded history. The realization of this unity is itself historical and is a claim made by an observer within a historical horizon that makes this realization possible; it is not a property intrinsic to history itself.92 Any anticipation of the end of history must be purely “hypothetical” and the political players do not act according to reason, with conscious awareness of their contribution to that end, but instead act in their own interests.93 The unity, then, disintegrates insofar as it does not follow any universal course of reason that has been present from the beginning of history. It remains only as long as its structures are still configured to reflect a belief in this rationality, but as a phantom, the irreality of the modern teleology is supremely oppressive when its power structures pursue their own ends, but which justify them under the guise of contributing to general human emancipation. There is another side to this “unity of history” that the Enlightenment correctly observed. The installation of the metanarratives of progress were co-constitutive of the forging of a single world history through sheer force. Colonialism, because of its relentless belief in its own righteousness, united the world under national or international banners of a universal, common destiny (especially in terms of ecology).94 However wrong the European and American powers were about the nobility of their programs, the de facto unity of the world is undeniable as it was twice plunged into global conflict in the first half of the twentieth century, and the economic “global market” now has the power to reach nearly every corner of the world. There is “one world” and one global history for human beings who inhabit the earth and this is an embodied history of finite beings. People are aware of the inescapable unity that is now present in the world, even as the traditional forms of the power structures that originally proclaimed this unity are breaking down. Recently, the universal narratives are said to have broken into smaller, more local or individualized narratives, even though they maintain their global character

91. Habermas, Theory and Practice, 251. 92. Ibid. While the unity of history was taken over from theology, this methodological separation of the observer from what is observed has since been taken up by theology. See Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 77. See also Lieven Boeve, God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval (New York: Continuum, 2007), 42–45. The objection from an Enlightenment perspective would be that there was a necessary tipping point at which humanity became capable of seeing its own, inevitable course, conditioned by the natural progression of reason, and once humanly aware of this the self-actualization of emancipation in history becomes possible. 93. Habermas, Theory and Praxis, 252. 94. Marx universalized economic crises into a view of history as a history of class struggle and continual, cyclic crises. See Habermas, Theory and Practice, 249.

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albeit in a fragmented, marketized way.95 Here, Gadamer really was correct about the inheritance of tradition: in our current fusion of horizons (our place in the Wirkungsgeschichte, the history of effects) includes the de facto awareness of the unity of the world and of its peoples (even from the standpoint of division) and this contribution to the current zeitgeist is owed to the blind willfulness of modernity. This is not to say that the problem of domination in society has been solved— far from it. The democratization of social communication through digital media is only one form of linguistic communication, and it is one that can increasingly be manipulated by relatively small groups with specific political agendas, from governments to individual hacktivists. The economy remains the domain where traditional power structures retain most of their influence, with the economic model of marketization becoming the primary model of social domination; this is in spite of its claims to be the primary means of social liberation. In this sense, marketization has taken over the role of the modern metanarrative as a logic of the free market that legitimates itself by generating wealth (or promising to generate wealth). The new transcendental goal is emancipation through wealth and status; esteem and admiration are the holiness and piety of our contemporary context, replacing the saints of pure reason and the religious saints of the past, which would go a long way toward explaining the current cult of celebrity that so saturates entertainment media and to a disturbing degree, news media. Poverty remains, as do racism and violence, in modernized societies that embrace the market narrative as well as in those that do not have or want access thereto. Against suffering, Habermas will take over the fundamental task of critical theory, which is resistance against those structures that cause situations of misery and suffering. Hermeneutics alone cannot end these conflicts through mending breakdowns in communication, especially where the breakdown is willful and violent, and not simply mis-communication or (recalling Schleiermacher) misunderstanding. 2.2.2 Praxical Responses to Concrete Oppression Where hermeneutics is insufficient to correct unwarranted suffering, Habermas advocates an ideal situation of communication that is free from domination, theoretically anticipated as an ideal.96 This presupposes some basic elements from critical theory, namely, that there is a utopian aspect to the anticipation of an ideal that manifests itself as a “no” felt in oppressive situations. The utopian ideal, then, produces a rejection of the situation at hand.97 Rather than “prejudices,” Habermas

95. See Chapters 5 and 6 in this book. 96. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Critical Theories and Christian Political Commitment,” Concilium 4, no. 9 (1973), 52. 97. Schillebeeckx, “Critical Theories and Christian Political Commitment,” 51. This is the basic idea of “negative dialectics” articulated by Adorno, although negative dialectics is a much broader term, including experience in general and not only specific instances of suffering. Cf. Ernst Bloch, On Karl Marx, 100; Bloch, Philosophy of the Future, 86–92.

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engages with the concept of “interest.”98 His claim is that science and technology forms the modern ideology under the influence of technical-instrumental interest. In contrast, emancipative interest leads to critical social sciences, and it is this type of interest that sustains the utopian regulative ideal.99 Secondly, it presupposes a refusal to participate in the (language) structure that engenders repression, but it is on this point that Habermas moves beyond his predecessors by enjoining practitioners of critical theory to a commitment to praxis, not simply a praxis of refusal. To separate theory from praxis, or to adhere to a strict separation would rob critical theory of any power that it might have otherwise claimed.100 He gives a very high status to critical reflection for unmasking and neutralizing prejudices, while objecting to Gadamer’s position that adherence to authority is a matter of cognition rather than pure obedience.101 However, Habermas has problems with actualizing his connection between theory and praxis at this stage in his thinking, maintaining a strict separation between political action and scientific analysis, where the latter is not a direct preparation for the former.102 Essentially, the structural differences between the two blurs the potential purity of theory when it is brought into the sphere of politics; the realities of the situation, the context and historical contingencies, will turn the openness of the critical “no” into a qualified and closed “yes.”103 The “no” is open because, as a protest against domination and ideological coercion, the future is opened to possibilities that will correct the situation and dispel the ideology. The praxical “yes,” however, is problematic because it gives a specific direction, closing off some possibilities in favor of others and is guided by an idea of correctness and the conviction that by carrying out a specific action, the situation will be ameliorated. Therefore, the “yes” of praxis, as guided by a transcendent point of reference which dictates good and bad, even within a specific situation, is more easily given over to ideology. We are justified in asking, therefore, to what extent has Habermas (in this period of his work) genuinely made the transition from pure theory to critical theory?

98. Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” 312. There are three types of interest: technical-instrumental, practical, and emancipative. We will deal briefly with only the first and third here. 99. Ibid., 314–16. 100. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory,” UF, 92 [105]. 101. Habermas, “Review of Truth and Method,” 236–37. Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 350. One who is “experienced in” a tradition is considered by Gadamer to be the least dogmatic and open to new experiences. 102. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory,” UF, 105–107 [121–123]; “Critical Theories and Christian Political Commitment,” 52. 103. Nicholas Lash, “Conversation in Gethsemane,” Radical Pluralism and Truth: David Tracy and the Hermeneutics of Religion, ed. Werner Jeanrond and Jennifer Rike (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 54–55.

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Ideology is Habermas’s problem, both in his thinking and in that which underlies his own solutions to the ideological problem. By holding the relationship of theory and praxis open indefinitely, Habermas shows that he remains beholden to the idea of emancipation from the coercion of authority and, in so doing, wishes to radicalize rather than to abandon Enlightenment thinking.104 He seems to genuinely believe that (pure) reason serves emancipation when it is not co-opted by a system of rationality that directs reason ideologically toward totalitarianism and domination; essentially, emancipative interest must remain pure.105 While he wants there to be a conscious choice on the part of humanity to freely make history at “a higher stage of reflection” in the service of emancipation, this is out of step with his hesitation to actually prescribe specific actions, which are no longer reflective, but reflexive acts within history.106 Without actions that critically reflect on the presuppositions inherited from tradition, the only option is a systematic nonsystem of “no,” which itself becomes ideological if it is the only response to the historical conditions that are possible within critical-theoretical thinking.107 There really appears to be an element of inevitability at work in Habermas’s understanding. There is a “pure reason” which can transcend its own historical position once its full maturity is achieved.108 He does recognize that it is not inevitable that human beings reach this state of mature autonomy, but nevertheless once the insight is achieved then the communication functions similarly to a rational utopia that can be worked for, but never attained. It is precisely here that Gadamer has not been taken seriously enough, since he has demonstrated that, on the basis of his hermeneutics, there is no positivistic escape from the context or from the tradition in which situations have emerged; there is no ultimate insight into the “real” mechanics of reality. Further investigation into his types of “interest” shows that if they were empirically verifiable, then even emancipative interest, by holding it open as theoretical, would be subject to technical-instrumental interest.109 Furthermore, Habermas’s espousal of critical “reflection” can border on idealism. He makes it transcendent in a way that empowers the act of self-reflection such that it can expose or render prejudices so transparent that they “can no longer function

104. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory,” UF, 106–107 [122]. Admittedly, this discussion of Habermas applies only to the specific time period of his work within the context of his debate with Gadamer in the 1960s through the early 1970s. This period is most directly related to Schillebeeckx’s theology. 105. Habermas, Theory and Practice, 275. 106. Ibid. 107. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 112 [127–128]. 108. Habermas, Theory and Practice, 281. 109. Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” 328: “All Forschung is governed by an interest that establishes a prejudicial frame of reference for its field of meaning.”

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as a prejudice,” which risks positing a supra-historical position of reflection that perfectly comprehends and disarms prejudices—a perfectly self-reflexive consciousness.110 Indeed, he posits that in self-reflection, knowledge and interest are unified, seemingly overcoming the problem of historically affected consciousness.111 This argument should appear specious in light of the preceding presentation of hermeneutics and historical being. It should also make us question the extent to which Habermas was able to break down the ideological “one world” presented by metanarratives, or differently presented by hermeneutics as the “fore-conception of completeness,” the expectation of a meaningful whole. If prejudices inherited from tradition are what form the shape of that expectation, then the standpoint from which the subject interprets the world can be criticized as being ideological for subsuming all experiences under a subjective unity. Even so, Habermas’s appeal to emancipative reason seems to establish a similar, but less philosophically sound, transcendental point, albeit one projected into the future. At this point, it is appropriate to make the transition to the theological appropriation of this debate and to apply principles taken from both hermeneutics and ideology critique.

2.3 Schillebeeckx between Gadamer and Habermas If the “unity of the world” in the philosophy of history was taken over from theology, it also returned to theology in the hermeneutical turn that occurred within Catholic circles after the Second Vatican Council. Included therein, is the finitude and embodiment of the human being as a truly historical being. This was a “rediscovery” in terms of the true historicity of humanity as a finite creature, inescapably determined by its context and time.112 The finitude and historicity of humanity was rediscovered and appropriated in a secular context, along with the unity of the world, whereas it had once served as “the starting point for arriving at God.”113 The crossing of theological and philosophical lines fuels Schillebeeckx’s conviction that in order to be credible, Christian faith must be intelligible (although not purely rational!).114 Meaning must logically precede truth, because only a meaningful statement—a statement that can be intelligibly interpreted against a horizon of understanding—can prove to be true. Experience conditions the terms of intelligibility, and this includes being

110. Habermas, “Review of Truth and Method,” 236–37, 239. 111. Cf. Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” 328. See also Gadamer, Truth and Method, 336–71. 112. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 3 [3]; cf. Church, 76 [78]. 113. Schillebeeckx, Jesus in Our Western Culture, 4. 114. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Correlation between Human Question and Christian Answer,” UF, CW vol. 5 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 74 [84]. Hereafter “Correlation.”

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experienced in a tradition from which meaning is received and then appropriated in particular experiences.115 With Gadamer, Schillebeeckx affirms the fusion of horizons and even the special significance of the past horizon for interpretation. This hermeneutic observation relates to the “unity of the world,” in that the unity described and criticized by Habermas is that of a universal unity of history, extending backward into the past as well as forward into the future toward the fulfillment of that history, which is an illusory notion. It is equally true that human beings’ ability to freely make history is not to be retroactively universalized, as though people have always and everywhere acted in full consciousness of their own self-determination. The capacity for self-determination and the free creation of (global) history is a principle that, according to Habermas, stems from the Enlightenment.116 Schillebeeckx identifies the beginning of this phenomenon in the twelfth century, with the rise of the ars mechanica and the humanization of the world through technological means.117 The humanization of the world is the use of technology and human effort to make the world more hospitable to human life, rather than accept the present state of things as being “natural” and, by extension, divinely ordained and unchangeable.118 This human impetus to change the world is at the root of the free creation of history and is a part of the “new image of the world” of modernity. There is, other than the de facto unity of the world forged by communications and technology, the possibility of assigning a total meaning to the world and even to history, starting from the present, as what can be freely made by human beings. By affirming that the future can be made and freely shaped by human beings (only thinkable after modernity), Schillebeeckx is not saying that there is an unanchored or anarchic freedom and openness to the future.119 The freedom of human beings within history is that of a “situated freedom,” where it is not as though anything is possible, but only those possibilities that are allowed for by the contingencies of history or the historical past horizon of understanding that have shaped human understanding of the

115. Edward Schillebeeckx, “The Context and Value of Faith-Talk,” UF, CW vol. 5 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 13–16 [15–17], 31–34 [34–37]; cf. Church, 14–20 [15–21]. 116. Habermas, Theory and Practice, 250. According to Habermas, this is a symptom of the commodification of human existence and the creation of a bourgeois society characterized by autonomous actions that serve the interests of the market and a marketized rationality. 117. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, CW vol. 3 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 31–37 [54–61]. Schillebeeckx traces the process of secularization through four phases, the last of which begins with the Enlightenment. 118. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 31–33 [54–55]. 119. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory,” UF, 100 [115]; Habermas, Theory and Practice, 249–52.

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present and the future.120 The finitude and historical nature of human beings does not allow them to transcend every historical limitation with impunity, although there is a certain kind of transcendence of time that occurs from within the circumscribed horizons themselves.121 2.3.1 A Critical Future-Oriented Theology As a Catholic theologian, Edward Schillebeeckx was concerned with a specifically Christian view of history and the ways in which human beings think about the future. What he gained from the so-called Gadamer-Habermas debate must be put into theological terms. Schillebeeckx does not purport to do philosophy, but in his work he applies both tradition hermeneutics (Gadamer’s fusion of horizons) and critical theory (the critique of ideology) within the field of Catholic fundamental theology. Following Heidegger and Gadamer, the linguisticality of being must be taken into account; understanding being is wrapped up in the language that has been inherited, but a language constituted by the past is ultimately part of a particular worldview, contingent on its own history of transmission.122 The past is a story and a coherent way of seeing how objects are related, not merely a collection of facts. Language is referential and it shows both what things are as well as what they are not. Experience creates a moment that opens up a window for difference and nonrecognition that leads to investigation and identification. In this sense, even the nonrecognition of an object is a form of identification. This negative aspect of experience allows for the inclusion of new elements within the language, whether it is the personal horizon of a human subject’s interpretive framework or a new word added to a spoken language. The narratives of modernity had a past as well as a future goal, which legitimated the whole of the story, and acted as a regulative ideal state of being. Adherence to an ideal can become forced conformity to a totalitarian standard, closing off future possibilities for the narrative because the fulfillment of history is already claimed or definitively predicted. This utopia is a situation of universal, cooperative communication: all people understand one another because they all act rationally according to the natural outcome of the narrative, which is itself the logical result of human progress—the progress of pure reason. Schillebeeckx points out here that ideology is in fact ahistorical, because it makes events necessary or even changes the reality of events to fit the narrative.123 The facts of the past are made to fit, or

120. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 111 [126]. 121. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 3–4 [4–5.] 122. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Linguistic Criteria,” UF, CW vol. 5 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 33–36 [37–39]. See Gerhard Ebeling, Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language, trans. R.A. Wilson (London: Collins, 1973), 158–80. 123. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 124– 125 [142].

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simply excluded, because of their dissonance with the tale that is being told about the direct link between the past and its necessary future. Elements of suffering and the criticism of authority are precisely the types of events that are often left out of official histories or are simply rewritten to fit them, because to take them seriously would open up the possibility of changing or invalidating the narrative. If the past is different, then the future could be as well.124 A great deal of emphasis is placed on the future orientation of an ideal, while Habermas would attempt to short circuit the critique of the past by disconnecting from it entirely. The practical level of communicative praxis that forms a past horizon must be disconnected from the ideal that is projected into the future (“unconstrained communication”). We might ask, however, from where can human beings plan or work for the future if not from a present situation in light of a past? Concrete history, even when it is an oppressive past tradition, is important for evaluating the future. A view of a universal history is, therefore, always based on a particular and finite view from the present, in light of the past, in expectation of a future.125 People “internalize the past not in order to make it present here and now, but rather to save for the future certain values which might otherwise have been lost in the past.”126 The fusion of horizons has to be preserved, as does the narrative that is taken from the (contingent) past for there to be a point in the future, a regulative ideal, that can be aimed at. The unity of a worldview, or the unity of the world as a hermeneutical principle, is already implied in the hermeneutical enterprise: there is a unified and meaningful language of being constituted by a past tradition that finds its point of unity in the end that we expect to be written for the future, and it is that end that we presume to write when we act in our “situated freedom.” To anticipate a future also means to have created a coherent picture of the world from the fragments that are available from that finite vantage point.127 The de facto construction of a worldview, from such limited fragments, is precisely why a philosophy or theology that takes humanity’s true historicity into account should not allow itself to become ideological. Ideology takes over when someone from “inside” of history claims the position of the impartial observer or absolute perspective.128 Ideological views of history are those narratives that elevate one signifier to a position of transcendence, such that it conditions and legitimates all of the actions within a narrative, and that creates a universal, secular (i.e., immanent) subject of history that has a total meaning and “can be embodied in a system or programme of action.”129 The master narratives of modernity made transcendental ideals immanent to history and in so doing created

124. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory,” UF, 105–106 [120–121]. 125. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 2–5 [3–5]. 126. Schillebeeckx, “Critical Theories and Christian Political Commitment,” 57. 127. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 78–79 [90]. 128. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 117 [133]. 129. Ibid.

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the conditions for abuse and oppression in service of the goal of the narrative. There are no Christian grounds for making ultimate claims concerning the total meaning of reality, from creation until the eschaton, except from a perspective that no human being can claim without becoming idolatrous. Anticipating a future, then, is not so much a matter of making a statement about the whole of reality but more directly concerns asking a question about that reality.130 This rules out creating a utopia out of the past as some kind of “golden age,” a practice present in human narratives since at least Gilgamesh and Homer (a “traditionalist” utopia with a positivistic hermeneutic), but this also excludes the modern “futuristic utopias” that presuppose merely “that everything should be changed.”131 2.3.2 The Decisive Role of Hope For Schillebeeckx, our access to the whole, the universal meaning of history, is only given through the parts, but while people claim that history must have meaning on the basis of those parts, and only then can one ask after the content of that meaning, Christians have a slightly altered perspective.132 The Christian tradition, and the fragments of meaning that make up a unified worldview for Christian interpretation, says that history will have meaning in light of the Christian hope for salvation in God, “but without man’s [sic] “must have,” the Christian “will have” would be unintelligible.”133 The negative function of critical theory that protests against situations of domination, which we have called utopian, witnesses the impulse to look for meaning in the world. It emphasizes that in contrast to suffering that seems purposeless there must also be a positive, meaningful possibility for human life that is not present, but which could be. Critical theory presupposes that the will to emancipation is a kind of anthropological constant proceeding from a progressive and emancipative reason, but this can also be critiqued as a particular philosophical anthropology, which has tacked a compulsion to protest or revolutionary action onto the more fundamental hermeneutical movement between sense and nonsense.134 Critical theory cannot, therefore, be seen as the de jure metanarrative of the structure of reality in itself, but as one narrative about reality that has emerged historically

130. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 78–79 [90]; Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363 ff. 131. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 653–655 [663–664]. See Nestor’s speech to the assembly, where he claims that the men of generations past were “a match for the immortals,” and “none of the men who walk the earth these days/ could do battle with those fighters.” References to Nestor and his youth are meant to evoke a golden age when men were stronger, hardier, and more divine. See Homer, The Iliad, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 1.247–74. 132. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 85–86 [98–99]. 133. Ibid., 86 [98]. 134. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 109– 110 [125].

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based on an ethical perspective originating from an interpretation of the world. The critical interpretation of the world must be recognized as arising only recently in terms of human history. Furthermore, we can only call for something to be changed when it has been “seen as” something, or when a question (“How can this situation be different?”) is asked of the future.135 The Christian can legitimately ask, “What do I hope for from the future?” Based upon the Christian principle of hope, and not just the philosophical one (although these two are deeply intertwined), the Christian must to some extent find the answer to this question in the past.136 More properly, the Christian finds the expectation of the answer to this question in the past as something given from the past and carried into the future by (situated) free human actions to further that goal. Implicit in this view, is a critique of the type of utopia espoused by Habermas and an acknowledgment of the importance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics: religion inherently needs to maintain a continuity with a specific past, which affirms the fusion of horizons of past and future in the present.137 The concepts and thought that are used in the present have “an original relationship to” what is given through the Wirkungsgeschichte, “through tradition in the form of meaning already acquired.”138 Habermas’s search for a society of unconstrained communication, a dominationfree society, is based on the Enlightenment belief in human emancipation from authority. The uncritical rejection of authority in favor of autonomy, relies on a presupposition whose first prejudice is against “prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power.”139 This would require something like a ‘reset’ or fresh start for human communication and, by extension, the language that makes up both being and communication. In order for language to be completely noncoercive, it would also have to be free of the baggage of the past. It would somehow have to become ahistorical, entirely without a past and, therefore, able to condition history universally from the point of its inception as an emancipated history. Schillebeeckx, in contrast, proposes that critical theory and hermeneutics ought to be rightly understood as fitting together. As a historical entity, the Christian already transmits some meaning from the past and an expectation of the future, but a Christian understanding of the past is always also a reading of tradition against tradition: the fundamental elements of the Christian narrative (for Schillebeeckx this is the experience and belief in salvation coming from God) are read against the past and present experiences that

135. Ibid., 109–110 [124–125]. 136. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 107–109 [179–180]; cf. Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, vol. 2, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, Paul Knight (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 496–515. 137. De Schrijver, “Hermeneutics and Tradition,” 41. 138. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 112– 113 [128]; “The New Image of God,” GFM, 103 [172]. 139. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 273; Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” 316.

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constitute that narrative to hermeneutically (re-)constitute the expectation of future salvation.140 Tradition is read against tradition in two senses: first, contemporary self-understanding within a tradition is always against the background of how the tradition has been interpreted in the past. Second, where strands of a tradition (and in this sense “tradition” is a synchronic phenomenon, including many smaller elements that grow up and develop in an interrelated manner, while also parallel, to one another) become alienating or oppressive, there are other strands and elements that can critically mediate and refocus the narrative toward emancipation. Unlike modern narratives, the Christian faith, “refuses to postulate a secular or universal subject of history,” whether that is the state, the free and unfettered human being, or the universal proletariat.141 A universal subject of history that unifies and validates a human history of emancipation, but is also fully accessible in history, cannot be a universal signifier for history, precisely because it confuses participating in history with becoming the ultimate judge of history.142 This is one of the roots of Habermas’s ideal of free communication, because it gives a negative relief image of a utopia that is inaccessible within history without divesting human beings of their specific histories and languages. Here, we have the human “will” toward a meaningful history: history will be perfectly meaningful and rational, without any unmerited suffering when given conditions are finally met. The Christian has a different interpretation of the meaning of history because God, as the subject of history, is not fully accessible within history. God is confessed as the universal subject of history, its source, judge, and signifier, through a faith that is the human response to Jesus Christ as the definitive self-revelation of God in history.143 God is, therefore, inaccessible as a benchmark for utopia, but is still accessible in tradition and the tradition of experiences of salvation coming from God through faith in Christ. These faith experiences give meaning to the Christian story, since they instantiate the positive hope, the Christian “must,” for a meaningful (personal or communal) history. There is something of the “objective” positive hope of Ernst Bloch in Christian salvation that stands out over-against the “subjective” hope that is experienced by the resistance to suffering advocated by critical theory.144 For Bloch, the structure of being itself is in the form of the “not yet,” wherein the absolute truth of being, in its “utopian” aspect, remains undeveloped but open.145

140. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 114– 115 [130–131]. 141. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 81 [93]; Christ, 748–752 [753–756]. 142. Habermas, Theory and Practice, 244. 143. Schillebeeckx, “Linguistic Criteria,” UF, 37 [41]; “Correlation,” UF, 81 [93]. 144. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 83 [95]; cf. “The New Image of God,” GFM, 108 [180]. See also Francis P. Fiorenza, “Dialectical Theology and Hope, II,” The Heythrop Journal 9, no. 4 (1968), 397. 145. Bloch, “Incipit vita nova,” Man on His Own, 88–90.

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There is a “dynamic substratum of the dialectical process of reality, the source of the objective possibilities of reality.”146 The subjective aspect is grounded in a phenomenology of hope, as humanity’s “anticipating consciousness” reflected by “those images of man’s [sic] hope which are reflected in his literature and history.”147 The dialectic of the objective and subjective aspects demonstrates that reality is open to, and is even structured by, what appears as new and unprecedented, and that this is manifested as hope.148 The need to articulate the positive possibilities for human beings can be experienced, but not absolutely and only in fragments. The God who is “other” and cannot be encapsulated by time or space, epistemologically transcendent, and is not an “object” of experience in the same way as other objects is essentially a “hidden God” (Isa 45:15).149 Even in being revealed as the man Jesus Christ, God is “hidden,” given that by being particularized in the immanent human being, God’s transcendence as “beyond being” is not visible. What is visible, however, is a praxis of God in Jesus who engendered experiences of salvation in those who knew and met him, “in and through his own fragmentary actions” of good works, not from a well-defined idea of final salvation but from an anticipation of the final, invisible, end in what was visible.150 By taking on humanity, Jesus also took on our human view of history and how it can become meaningful. “Even Jesus,” however, “does not just reveal God, but also conceals” God by being a particular, historical individual whose praxis and existence needs to be interpreted hermeneutically.151 This is an extension and elaboration of Schillebeeckx’s relatively early attempt to conceive of the revelation as a dialogue between humanity and God.152 2.3.3 Eschatology as the Foundational Concept for Interpretation The final meaning of history, or of the Christian assertion that history will finally and ultimately be meaningful, is an eschatological claim on temporality. The Christian concept of God, furthermore, must not be used as a stopgap or as an explanation for natural phenomena that can be known scientifically. The belief in God does not start from a standpoint of either absolute certainty

146. Fiorenza, “Dialectical Theology and Hope, II,” 397. 147. Ibid. This nuance is missed entirely in Terry Eagleton’s glib assessment of Bloch: “In this resolute ontologising of the virtue, there is hope in the world almost as there is uranium.” See Terry Eagleton, Hope without Optimism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 95. 148. Bloch, “Incipit vita nova,” Man on His Own, 90–91; Fiorenza, “Dialectical Theology and Hope, II,” 397–398. 149. Schillebeeckx, Church, 55–56 [55–57]. 150. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 787 [791]. Emphasis original. 151. Schillebeeckx, Church, 9 [9]. 152. Schillebeeckx, “De zin van het mens-zijn van Jesus, de Christus,” 160–61.

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or from a standpoint of absolute doubt with the goal of empirically proving God’s existence by systematically removing that doubt until God stands as an observable, verifiable datum.153 Christian hope and belief is always already fragmentary, pieced together from a tradition of experiences of salvation that reveal something about God’s character to humanity, expressed fundamentally in the liberating power of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth and recorded in the Scriptures. Christianity forms a worldview in which God is the unifying point of reference for interpreting the world temporally in terms of an inherited past and an expectation of future salvation. This worldview could, of itself, become ideological without a proper understanding of God’s transcendence as a corrective. What has changed in the past century and a half is the function of God as the guarantor of the physical cosmos, a stopgap solution for our own lack of empirical knowledge, as a recovery of the absolute transcendence of God as a living God (not a “God of life and death”), who is also the God of “yesterday, today and tomorrow.”154 The former is a God who, as guarantor, orients human beings toward the past and even an ideological concept of the past whose content is known and can be read in the histories of the church and in the bible. The latter is indicative of the present historical situation, and its renewed emphasis on the future, indicated by the modern tendency to idolize the future as achievable and inevitable through the development of reason.155 However, the Christian interpretation of the contemporary situation, and its orientation toward the future, must be qualified precisely by the normativity of the Christian tradition, which rules out making an absolute of the notion of progress toward a utopian future. God’s transcendence must be rethought and, rather than “almost automatically” projecting God into the past, “transcendence” itself can be transformed.156 It is from here that we should look for an authentically Christian, and nonideological, understanding of the term. “Transcendence” is a “flexible” concept, open to multiple meanings and is also affected by the cultural emphasis upon the future, such that transcending the present can take the form of the future: For, if divine transcendence really transcends and embraces, from within, man’s [sic] past, present and future, the believer will choose, as soon as man [sic] has come to recognize the primacy of the future in temporality, to associate God’s transcendence with the future, and he will be right in doing this. He will associate God with man’s [sic] future, and . . . the future of mankind [sic] as a whole.157

153. Schillebeeckx, Church, 11 [11]. 154. Schillebeeckx, Church, 32 [33]; “The New Image of God,” GFM, 108 [180]. Cf. Bloch, “Biblical Resurrection and Apocalypse,” Man on His Own, 98: “‘Into thy hands I commend my spirit’—no Greek could say this to one of his gods.” 155. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 143. 156. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 106–109 [177–181]. 157. Ibid., 109 [181].

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God as the future of humanity, as the final salvation for creation, which is otherwise a mixture of meaningful events and nonsensical suffering, provides the ground for a total meaning of history given that the “individual, society and history” cannot have this ground in themselves.158 While this does not solve the problem of ideology for the Christian narrative wholesale, it does provide a strong standpoint from which to tackle the issue. The concepts of both God and of Christianity, given by Schillebeeckx, are essentially eschatological-hermeneutical ones. The hermeneutical problem of the interpretation of a “whole” (the meaning of history) in light of its “parts” (contingent, finite histories of experience) have elements of a realized eschatology where some signs of the final meaning are already seen in history and these “parts” illuminate the shape of the “whole.”159 God is known through a tradition of interpretative experience that reveals God’s character as well as God’s salvific will for human beings. The eschaton is the goal and point at which humans can see (interpret) the “unity of the world” as a reality, but the content of the human salvation contained in the eschaton as the goal of history is constantly changing and transcending itself because God is not fully available as an object of experience within history; the infinite cannot be wholly apprehended by finite creatures. Unlike the necessary utopias promised by modernity, this future is “not a prefabricated reality but is coming into being as an historical process of acting-in-faith in this world.”160 Christian eschatology remains anticipatory and hypothetical, manifested in negative contrast experiences of suffering.161 Positive expressions of the ideal state of humanity (what Schillebeeckx calls the “threatened humanum”) are pluralistic, “fragmentary and mutually contradictory.”162 The very fact that these positive expressions all have, in Christian terms, their reference point of unity outside of history, that is, in God who cannot be objectified, somehow (potentially), validates them according to their fittingness in reference to the Christian tradition as a specific, contingent, and contextual instantiation of grace and salvation. The eschatological character of the in-breaking of God’s Rule is nonlinear and does not adhere to the Enlightenment principle of an evolution of reason: there is no correlation between the “stage” of history and its proximity to the fullness of God’s salvation, or any supposed “progress” of God’s plan. Indeed, to use a spatial

158. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 117 [133]. 159. Schillebeeckx, Church, 58 [59]. Schillebeeckx sees traditions of religious experience as essential to future experiences of God’s saving presence for human beings. 160. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 10 [11]; cf. Church, 172–173 [174]. 161. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 813–815 [818–819]; “Correlation,” UF, 80ff. [92ff.]. 162. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Theological Criteria,” UF, CW vol. 5 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 58 [65]; “Correlation,” UF, 80–82 [92–94]; Church, 131–132 [133].

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image for eschatological time is already inappropriate if taken too seriously by assigning conceptual limits to God. A modern, unified, philosophy of history is progressive and marches with increasing density toward its fulfillment at its telos; eschatological time is punctuated by grace and is possessed of a unity that cannot be logically unified or quantified, only recognized through a posteriori interpretation of experiences of salvation or suffering (places where salvation is actively looked for and hoped for) and within a specific tradition of experience. 2.3.4 Eschatology as Theological-Philosophical Critique Finally, we come to two distinguishing marks of the Christian framework of interpreted reality, both of which contain critiques of the two secular dialogue partners already treated in this chapter. First, the utopian element is not a logically progressive realization of theoretical reason in the practical sphere, as it is for critical theory (“History does not evolve logically!”).163 In contrast to Habermas and the neo-Marxists, there must be an ethical dimension to praxical action, related to faith, which is not only a manifestation of theoretical reason.164 Schillebeeckx observes that in such a system it is insight that replaces ethics and “decisions of personal conscience” are superseded by being subordinated to reason.165 The logical, rational development of history has one specific and univocal end (determined by the party, the elite, or the blueprint for revolutionary praxis) that can be made actual simply by understanding it and assenting to it in praxis.166 The universalization of Marxism, that it is supposed to be valid for all human beings if only they would accept the insight of the Marxist dialectic of emancipation, takes away the particularity of specific human actions by making them into only particular instantiations of the ideal goal, which has been predetermined. Habermas recognizes that the goal of communication, one which is free of domination, is only a hypothetical reality, but it still presupposes the same logic of giving away particularity in favor of agreement with the one goal of a very

163. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 660 [669]. 164. This recalls the separation between practical interest and emancipative interest that creates precisely such a disjunction between theory and praxis. See Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” 315–17, 329–30. 165. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 658–659 [668]. Cf. Bloch, On Karl Marx, 124–30. Even Bloch extols the virtues and superiority of “scientific Marxism,” which, although it never arrives as a pure and immanent reality, uses its power as a pure science to point the way toward critical, revolutionary action. There is an imaginary perfection here that resists being pinned down along with forms of “vulgar Marxism” that exist in opposition to the scientific, pure Marxism. If only scholars and politicians had the correct insight, or interest, they would act rationally, purely, and scientifically. 166. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 658–659 [668].

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specific and technocratic form of emancipation, and one that is in fact governed by technical-instrumental reason.167 Traditions that have different “languages,” or horizons of expectation, cannot enter the universal harmony of communicative action because they will always understand emancipation (if they value this at all!) on their own terms. Habermas lapses back into the very dialectic of Enlightenment he wished to criticize: the knowledge-based scientific/technological one.168 Insight into the liberating praxis of communicative action absolutizes generic purity over specific identity and, in so doing, really does share the Enlightenment’s prejudice against prejudice. This kind of “insight” into the structure of the real is no different from the oftencriticized static “metaphysics” of a cosmocentric worldview, since both tend to become ideological, based on the presumption that knowing the structure gives us a privileged or even final view of the whole. Christian ethics, on the other hand, retains its personal dimension, and by extension its contextual, limited, and historical character. This is both a limitation of Christianity’s claim to universal status and the condition for it to be carried through contingent history as a meaning-giving value system. From this perspective, if we would affirm the ethical nature of Christianity, in opposition to the rational insight of modern narratives, then this limits the extent to which we can label Christianity as being universal, albeit in a nuanced way. Christianity is not universal in the same way as the modern metanarratives, in that Christianity is in no way inevitable. The history of Christianity is a contingent series of events and interpretations of those events. The view of God that has emerged and changed over the centuries has itself been shaped and challenged by culture and context, and the constant stumbling in search of the Rule of God has nothing that is inevitable about it, from the human perspective.169 Instead, it is a graced history of failure and interpretation—a blessed mediocrity. History is eschatological and so is constantly “already” being made present while also “not yet” reaching its fullness. We can read the Christian history as a providential history, but also as a history of God working always in a salvific way with human failure, just as God did with Jesus. Jesus of Nazareth was a human being, finite and with a human will, whose Godlike life led him to a cross that was prepared for him by other humans.170 The human failure to recognize God in Jesus did not keep God from vindicating Jesus’s life and message through his resurrection, an event that was not expected and had no interior, hidden rational evolution in it (for prophecies are often the enemies of rational systems), but only God’s universal salvific will and grace. “Ethics,” therefore, “needs a God who is more than ethics,” and no amount of insight into anthropology, psychology, or the physical sciences will provide perfect recipes for

167. Ibid. 168. Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” 314. 169. Schillebeeckx, Church, 6–9 [7–9]. 170. Ibid., 32 [33]; Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth,” 25.

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the conduct of ethical action without becoming ideological.171 If orthopraxis is a matter of simply “knowing better” than others, then the ideal ethical situation can be made wholly immanent and possessed by one group over-against others. The contingent nature of Christianity as a narrative, and the transcendent nature of God as other to God’s creation, means that the possession of an ultimate position of “knowing better” is de facto impossible since the context will always be theologically indispensable. The universality of Christianity, and its claims about God, are themselves culturally transmitted, giving Christianity a “trans-cultural” character because it is not “bound to one culture,” but open to cultures other than those in which it originally took root.172 The historicity and openness of Christianity gives the gospel a kind of potential for universality in the sense of the de facto “one world” forged by modernity, in that it could be actualized anywhere through historical means. At the same time, the gospel is also addressed to all human beings and has universal significance for humanity, but it is a universal address of God to creation that requires a graced response; there is nothing inevitable or perfectly rational (and therefore humanly universal) about the gospel and, given that it requires faith, it can only be made more or less plausible, never fully rational.173 Plausibility, in this sense, does not refer to a quantifiable likelihood or burden of proof, but rather to the degree to which something is understandable within a given context as well as to the limitations of that context. The future, therefore, “cannot be theoretically interpreted, it must be done,” meaning that critical-ethical action must be present, rather than logical insight for instance.174 The course of history does not evolve logically, as “an illumination of existence,” but through human self-determination and a linguistically constituted being that is always confronted with a new situation and must find a new way of speaking.175 This brings us to the second critique illuminated by Schillebeeckx, this time focused on Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Schillebeeckx has shown the necessity of the past for hermeneutical interpretation of the present, the lack of a logical structure in history against Habermas’s emphasis on emancipation from past linguistic structures of domination, and an intrinsic prejudice in favor of emancipation from tradition. Past tradition, however, must not only function as a horizon for reading history like a classical text in order to understand it in the present context. Gadamer has a future expectation horizon but lacks the kind of dynamic future that calls on human beings to change the present.176 The dimension of the future, the salvation experienced as coming from God in fragmentary forms in the past and present, has given Christians the expectation of a full, eschatological salvation

171. Schillebeeckx, Church, 31 [32]. 172. Ibid., 35–36 [36]. 173. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 71–74 [81–84]. 174. Schillebeeckx, “Theological Criteria,” UF, 59 [66]. 175. Ibid., 59 [66]. 176. Ibid., 59–61 [66–68].

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that will become manifest, not as a regulative ideal but as a transcendent promise of salvation.177 A hermeneutics of tradition is also not merely an “illumination of existence,” but the condition for a concrete “renewal of existence.”178 Hermeneutics cannot stand alone, therefore, but necessitates ethical praxis based on a hope for the future that is pieced together from those meaningful fragments of the past that are illuminated by rereading tradition. For this eschatological hermeneutics of reality to continue to function, it cannot remain as something merely retrieved from the past and applied to the future, but it must also somehow be present in Christian communities and in the world as it exists in the present. This necessity does not place a condition on God, and it is not “asking for a sign” (Mt 4:9-12; Deut 6:16), but it does place a condition on human beings. Those who see God as the point of “unity” for interpreting the world, and above all the future, also have the responsibility to carry out the task given to them by Christ, making them a part of the Christian tradition. If they do not do the hard work of discipleship, then it is reasonable to expect that others who do not (or sometimes those who still do) share that tradition will find their claims incredible by positing a God who can only effect salvation “later,” and “if it is in no way apparent from the activity of those who hope . . . that [God] is already beginning to make everything new now.”179 Eschatology must be realized eschatology, and perhaps here it can be seen that without faith, God’s salvific activity can be limited by the human refusal of grace. I do not argue here that God is powerless without human cooperation, but that, because God acts in history and is encountered in concrete and experienced reality with other humans, we can thwart God’s salvific will by refusing the offer of grace. It is not controversial to say that the offer of grace can be refused by not accepting Christ or by not believing for oneself, but this act can also have consequences for others who would otherwise encounter grace through us. “Precisely because God’s grace is meditated,” Schillebeeckx reminds us, “and goes through man [sic] and the world, man has the possibility to resist it.”180 Grace can, in this way, never be merely private, but will also be present to others in and through an encounter and through Christian action. There is significant biblical precedent that illuminates the limits of God’s activity to places where humans actively refuse faith, most notably the Gospel of Mark, in which Jesus is unable to any perform significant works without the faith of others.181 The limitations of grace are on the side of humanity and on the side of their cooperative activity and not on God’s side, especially God’s through pneumatological activity and presence.

177. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 118–119 [194–195]; cf. Lash, “Conversation in Gethsemane,” 58–59. 178. Schillebeeckx, “Theological Criteria,” UF, 59–60 [66–67]. 179. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 110–111 [182–183]. 180. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 767 [770]. 181. Especially Mk 6:1-6; see also, Mk 2:5; 4:40; 5:34, 36; 7:29; 10:52; 11:20-26.

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Conclusion By shutting off the avenues of Christian praxis, human beings demonstrate that they do not truly have faith in the eschatological future promised by God as “the one who is to come,” but instead already have an idol of “God” ready at hand. A critical and hermeneutical eschatology must have a praxical element inherent to it, effecting emancipation and bringing healing to those who are suffering and can be a force that at least seems capable of renewing the world.182 This element does not “make” Christianity true, but makes the truth of Christianity apparent, although in a provisional and highly fragmented way. The reality of sin, fully entwined with history and the finite nature of creation, limits the possibility of fully achieving the Rule of God in history, but that makes it a more powerful unifying point for creating a meaningful history. The provisional nature of our understanding of the Rule of God precludes one culture, language, type of praxis, or philosophical school from gaining a permanent hegemony in history, and elements of the tradition can be read against others that have become oppressive. This plurality can prove powerful and hermeneutical faithfulness to the past can also prove that present reinterpretations of that tradition are not authentically Christian if their “identity with the gospel cannot be discovered.”183 As a final evaluation, hermeneutics alone is not enough, because the Christian message demands that the world be changed for the better with the full realization that this reality will never be wholly achieved. If it could be, then human beings would too easily take God’s place and declare a definitive truth to be present on earth. Perhaps more dangerous still, humans could and are apt to declare one way to the transcendent truth to be a definitive and progressive path that will eventually make it immanent, as though once humanity reaches a certain stage of development or certain conditions are met, then God will have to complete the process. There is nothing that human beings can do to hasten the coming of God’s Rule, and indeed even the Son did not know the Father’s timetable (Mk 13:32; Mt 24:42-44). These trends have the tendency to close the possibilities too early and to hubristically claim to know the end of the story before it has been written. So far, we have spoken of hermeneutics and the Christian tradition in terms of history and as being something which stems from the debates concerning the crises of historicism and metaphysics in the twentieth century. The kind of critical hermeneutics developed by Schillebeeckx relies on more than a view of history or upon the interpretation of historical texts exclusively. What occurs in the theological appropriation of this type of “hermeneutics,” is a radicalization of the term from being a method by which to judge between good and bad interpretations of a text, to a general ontology. The role played by language in this view must be fundamentally reexamined, since hermeneutics functions in and

182. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 119–120 [196]; Baum, “The Impact of Marxist Ideas on Christian Theology,” 180. 183. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 111 [184].

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through language, as do human subjects as historical entities. The place in which we encounter and can analyze this ontology is not on the level of the universalhistorical, nor is it the place of the metanarrative, although these elements are always present. It will be through an examination of the structure of experience that we can reach the heart of the experiencing subject—this subject is really only a philosophical cipher for the concrete human being, whose condition and future are our main concern. In order to more fully map out the structure of the subject, we will proceed by looking at Schillebeeckx’s concept of “universal history” and the related concept of total meaning of history, which will be revealed as an extension of the personal expectation of “wholeness” within the hermeneutical “part-whole” relationship. From there, we will look at the underlying operation of Schillebeeckx’s epistemology through the structure of experience. Finally, the “new image of humanity” will be rounded out with a reconsideration of the “anthropological constants” elaborated upon by Schillebeeckx in 1978. Reinterpreting his approach to anthropology will help us to better understand Schillebeeckx’s “new image of God” and the temporal implications associated with it.

Chapter 3 THE DEFINITIVE TURN TO EXPERIENCE—HERMENEUTIC MEDIATION AND PRAXICAL ANTICIPATION OF SALVATION

Thus far, we have examined the development of Schillebeeckx’s thought on eschatology and Gaudium et Spes, and how he developed a unique, eschatologically based approach to hermeneutics. Up until this point, the analysis of his hermeneutics has centered primarily on the period from 1968 to 1972, especially in the context of the Gadamer-Habermas debate. This was an incredibly prolific period for Schillebeeckx, where he published numerous articles, but no monographs. I have leaned heavily on the two essay collections that bookend this period: God the Future of Man and The Understanding of Faith. Schillebeeckx was motivated by his earlier scholarship and his engagement with new philosophical sources after the Council to write articles on diverse topics, from sacraments and liturgy to more abstract philosophical and linguistic analysis. There is an overall consistency in his writings that he applies to these topics, however, since they ultimately served as a preparation and methodological foundation for his first Christological volume that appeared in 1974. Moving forward, I will continue to rely on the methodological studies from 1968 to 1972, but I will also include more and diverse writings, including his third Jesus volume from 1989, in order to construct a better overview of his hermeneutics and to distill a structure that can be employed in later chapters. In this chapter, I want to return to the question of “universal history” as a possibility, a historical entity, and an epistemological necessity. Some of Schillebeeckx’s later reflections on this subject will help us to situate the hermeneutic problem in terms of the necessity of interpretation and the conditions of possibility for meaning to emerge in history. This “universal” level of meaning is directly related to the human subject’s experience of meaning in the world, as a function of human historicity. We will highlight the shift that Schillebeeckx made in his epistemology, the “clear break,” with the philosophical method of his teacher, Dominicus De Petter, O.P., and its implications. The category of “negative contrast experience” will help to clarify the nature of this “clear break” in methodology and the real import of Schillebeeckx’s metaphysical and ontological assumptions that become apparent through the structure of the human subject. That structure, as fundamentally eschatological-hermeneutical, is the point that needs to be reached in order to begin to move outwards to a more developed theological anthropology.

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Essentially, although we have already given some indication of the “new image of God” Schillebeeckx is after, we are still concerned with mapping out the “new image of humanity” and its foundations.

3.1 Universal History? Partial Wholes and Meaningful Holes The de facto universal history, which is now being forged by globalization and the ecological crisis caused by climate change, certainly calls for some reflection. Coming out of modernity, there has been at least some idea, particularly in the great narratives of modernity, of a “universal history,” and a final, universal meaning to that history. This ideal from the nineteenth century received teeth in the twentieth century within the context of the two world wars and the Cold War as ideological struggles over the ultimate meaning of history. According to Schillebeeckx, both universal history and a universal humanity are historically derived concepts that are constantly taking on new forms based on the context.1 He argues that early human claims to “total meaning” would have to do with the meaning that emerged through a clan community’s self-understanding over-against outside groups: whatever it means to be “us” is diametrically opposed to what it means to be “them.”2 Here, out-group members are considered to be “non-persons” by the in-group and there is a basic presumption of discontinuity and unknowability between social groups.3 This is something of a theoretical construction of traditional societies, but modern societies certainly continue the trend of making the “other” into a nonhuman, especially when tensions between societies are high, as with wartime propaganda.4 The presumption is that we know what it is to be human—it means being like us, and out-groups are something else. As societies grew in diversity and complexity, this kind of rigid “human/non-human” logic became more difficult to maintain, but not impossible. Chattel-slavery in the American South, and European colonialism retained this type of logic at the level of social discourse far longer than we might feel comfortable admitting, and it is not an exaggeration to say that it persists to this day in our own context where right-wing nationalism and international terrorism appear to be on the rise. The question of the meaning of all human life, however, is something of a constant throughout human history. The size and shape of what “human” means has certainly changed, but not the idea of the meaning of a specific whole. In fact, the idea of a meaningful whole is what grounds any understanding of “human” or universal history at all, and it is the content of that whole which changes. This has

1. Schillebeeckx, Church, 170 [171]. 2. Ibid., 170 [171–72]. 3. Ibid. 4. Think, for example, of allied propaganda during the First World War portraying German soldiers as barbarians and “Huns.”

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to do with the fact that humanity “is an historical idea, not a natural species.”5 So the presumption of “wholeness” is more basic for humans than even the concept “human” itself, at least on an ontological level. What comes together with a presumption of wholeness, is the attempt to construct a whole out of various parts, or that various parts should fit together to form a whole. Stepping back, we see that this movement is starting to look like the hermeneutic circle: the presumption of meaning allows for the integration of new experience into my image of reality, which changes the nature of that image. There is an appeal to the hermeneutic principle of the “fore-conception of completeness,” as espoused by Gadamer as the basis for all understanding.6 Based on experience, we put together a narrative of what the world is, and how it came to be, and even where it is going through the circular process of understanding. This process “describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter.”7 Neither is absolute in the equation, but instead is a mediation of one through the other. The circular movement of understanding is “not a ‘methodological’ circle, but describes an element of the ontological structure of understanding.”8 The human subject’s being-in-the-world always proceeds in this way, operating on the “prejudice of completeness,” becoming what it is through constant mediation and interpretation: The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. But this commonality is constantly being formed in our relation to tradition. Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves.9

The assumption of a unity of meaning, and a completeness in what is perceived is the foundation of human narrativity, since it allows for the possibility of building and extending that narrativity at all. 3.1.1 Fragmented Narratives and Views of Truth This narrativity is fragmentary, since all we ever encounter are fragments— understanding is never complete. Even personal encounters are never total mediations of another human being, but only partial mediations through which we must then extrapolate and fill in the gaps. No relationship, no matter how intimate, reveals

5. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes (London: Routledge, 2012), 174. 6. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 364. 7. Ibid., 293. 8. Ibid., 294. 9. Ibid., 293.

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everything about a person’s being to another, since we are all ultimately finite, and not capable of either communicating or receiving everything of another. For history, the experiencing human subject can only take in so much information, and can only put together a narrative about the world from its own perspective—bracketing out all aspects of my own life is as impossible as it is undesirable. We cannot return to the fiction of historicism, nor can we return to claims of “objective knowledge of history.” The kind of historicity that I possess, as a subject, allows me to provisionally project a “whole” story about the world that will continue to change and grow as long as I continue to experience the world as a living being—a narrative historicity. The meaning that I take from this story does not need to be an explicit datum or maxim about life (e.g., the meaning of life is . . . love, the accumulation of wealth, raising children, forty-two, etc.), but it will consist of a basic way of seeing the world and will involve extrapolating connections between data. The linking of events, one to another, occurs in a specific way that is partially determined by our outlook on the whole. From here, something like a “universal history” is distilled, but it is not as though every person writes a definitive history book for themselves. Such a history can be found in the meaning that we assign to our experiences and how we react to it. The sheer multiplicity of experience, and experiencing subjects, makes this question both inevitable and insoluble. As long as history continues, there can be no final answer, because that would require a final, fully actualized subject of history. Such a view of historical meaning attempts to block the abstraction of truth from history altogether. Since the Enlightenment, the tendency has emerged to form a “truth-in-itself,” like a universal subject of history without historical subjects.10 This is just as dangerous as the theoretical immanentization of truth in one particular historical form or institution. Schillebeeckx is trying to avoid extreme positions of either denying the possibility of truth altogether or locating it in one historical “essentialist” form. God as infinite, the other of history, is mediated in the finite through dialogue. With this as the baseline assumption about reality, the move toward a hermeneutical ontology is not a far leap. Even as early as 1966, he points toward a conception of being as hermeneutical by rejecting the opinion that dogmas are merely “dressed” in different wording, in the manner of clothes that can just be changed: “They give the impression that we can “dress” and “undress” a dogma with the ease with which children play with dolls.”11 The essentialist view of dogma that he is critiquing underestimates the real danger of holding onto a severely outdated anthropology, since it assumes that

10. Schillebeeckx, Church, 171 [173]. 11. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Faith Functioning in Human Self-Understanding,” The Word in History: The St. Xavier Symposium, ed. T. Patrick Burke (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966), 56. Schillebeeckx was already using a similar formulation in 1963. See Schillebeeckx, “The Second Vatican Council,” Vatican II: A Struggle of Minds, 23: “To give new, contemporary expression to a truth does not mean that we can first strip the truth of all human conceptions and associations, so that we can then, as it were. Look it straight in the face and, after that, dress it up in its ‘new look’ attire.”

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both dogmatic and anthropological assertions are merely a matter of changing the outward form without affecting the content, since statements about God are also statements about humanity. Attempts at this type of “accommodation” imply that we are already have the “Truth” in linguistic form and are merely waiting for people to return to the “true” or “original” understanding of the human being and we must humor them with timely analogies until they do so. What is worse, it breeds a kind of dualism between those who think that they have some secret knowledge, because they operate on older or different presuppositions, and those who do not. There is an “essentialism” at work here that says that the real is merely veiled, or that we can bracket out our own contemporary self-understanding in order to reach the truth that was perfectly expressed in a previous age. On the contrary, human existence cannot be charted and mapped out in all of its detail. It cannot be “X-rayed,” as Schillebeeckx puts it.12 Humanity is, and will remain at its core, a mystery to itself, and not “simply a provisional mystery which, given time, might become fully clarified.”13 Scientific advancement does not solve all of the problems or answer all of the questions, but that fact does not provide a warrant to stop the search for answers (scientific, religious, philosophical, or otherwise), nor for continuing to assume that by building a better microscope or mousetrap all will be revealed. The fact that we find meaning in the world also drives the need for meaning in our encounter with what is new. The inability to grasp total meaning has not annulled the human search for it thus far, but this search has, in different times and places, stalled or even become stuck in a fixed position particularly with regard to cosmology. The metaphysics of the medieval age, based on reinterpretations of Hellenistic categories were not a priori ideological, even if they contained ideological elements. This was an expression of the human understanding of the world, and of human self-understanding in an essentially cosmocentric manner: reality stands under the immutable will and order of God and beings receive their being from God, who is both source and ground of all being. The break within such a system occurs where it loses an intrinsic connection between human experience and proclaimed truth. The neoscholastic understanding of truth and language was taken over from the medieval interpretation of Aristotelian natural philosophy, what we would now call natural science, where theology is a science that draws conclusions from founding principles and then deductively arrives at certain knowledge.14 Concepts depend both upon foundational principles, and proper definitions that narrow down the subject matter at hand, giving any question a common starting

12. Ibid., 48. 13. Ibid., 48–49. 14. A key proponent of twentieth-century neoscholastic methodology was the Dominican theologian, Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange O.P., whose thought was paradigmatic of such an inherited model of knowledge. See Richard A. Peddicord, “Another Look at the Theological Enterprise of Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange,” Angelicum 82 (2005), 843. Cf. Schelkens, Catholic Theology of Revelation on the Eve of Vatican II, 49–50.

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point and a predecided course of inquiry.15 This type of epistemology assumes a common pre-understanding of reality in terms of explicit concepts, but it was also essentially a modern interpretation of the medieval synthesis that did not recognize itself as modern. Prior to Vatican II, ecclesiastical dogmas and quotations from the Scriptures were often used as ahistorical, linguistic propositions, wherein a proposition could be equated with reality as such.16 This “philosophical realism” was used to combat Modernism and to defend the Catholic Church’s claims to possess absolute truth, in the form of the deposit of faith as a unified body of doctrines. The truth value of doctrines was based on a deductive process from foundational principles, which resulted in knowledge that could be considered “rationally certain.” The neoscholastics condemned the Enlightenment, but at the same time, they adopted the fundamental epistemological presupposition of “pure reason” that allowed for the presentation of (true) reality as a “logically consistent system of related truths.”17 Expressions of doctrine line up with absolute truth in a one-to-one correspondence, perfectly and exhaustively illuminating the truth or an aspect of that truth of revelation. Truth was revealed and is contained in its entirety in Revelation, and any doctrinal development was attributed to “pure logical deduction” of one related element of truth from another.18 What was necessary was merely to bring out all of the aspects of that truth, and the more defined doctrines that the church proclaimed, the more exhaustively that truth would be illuminated.19 This is counterproductive for Christian action. By assigning truth to a theoretical ideal that can be correlated (adequatio) to linguistic formulations, it is ultimately more suitable to being thought, rather than done in terms of ethical action.20 This notion of truth makes the statements that are used to express “truth” essentially ahistorical, since they can be removed from their context without losing any of their authority. There is, as it were, little separation between content and form, and it comes very close to calling certain linguistic formulations self-identical, objectively true statements that uncritically transcend their own linguistic construction. Schillebeeckx points out that the biblical conception of truth is fundamentally different from later neoscholastic formulation that “contains the fatal distinction that

15. Peddicord, “Garrigou-Lagrange,” 842. 16. Schelkens, Catholic Theology of Revelation on the Eve of Vatican II, 49–50. 17. Erik Borgman, “Retrieving God’s Contemporary Presence: The Future of Edward Schillebeeckx’s Theology of Culture,” Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology, ed. Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 247. 18. Borgman, “Retrieving God’s Contemporary Presence,” 247. 19. This neoscholastic theory of truth is known as the “propositional-historical” model. For its effect on the development of doctrine, see Christopher Cimorelli and Daniel Minch, “Views of Doctrine: Historical Consciousness, Asymptotic Notional Clarity, and the Challenge of Hermeneutics as Ontology,” Louvain Studies 37, no. 4 (2013): 327–63. 20. Peddicord, “Garrigou-Lagrange,” 843; cf. Schelkens, Catholic Theology of Revelation on the Eve of Vatican II, 49–50.

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it makes, in spite of all the careful shades of meaning with which it is used, between theoretical and practical reason.”21 We can enumerate examples in the Johannine formulation “to do the truth,” and the related synoptic parallels: “In this way, every good tree does good fruit” (Mt 7:17a: οὕτως πᾶν δένδρον ἀγαθὸν καρποὺς καλοὺς ποιεῖ).22 In the Gospel of John (3:21a), this is phrased as “But the one doing the truth comes to the light” (ὁ δὲ ποιῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔρχεται πρὸς τὸ φῶς). The “doing” of truth is a very different notion altogether from the correlation of statements. Rather than circumventing history, by trying to get above it and to purify statements of all historical baggage, or to surgically separate form from content, as with a kind of Wesen-Hermeneutik, it is here that truth appears only insofar as it manifests itself incarnationally in history. Truth is, therefore, co-constituted by the context in which it arises, in both its form and its expression because of the radical way in which “form” (language) impacts content.23 This is very much a hermeneutical notion of truth, and one that is operative in the ontological structure taken over by Schillebeeckx from Gadamer and Heidegger, wherein truth as “deconcealment” “is the disclosure of being that is given with the historicity of Dasein.”24 The Second Vatican Council proclaimed that it is Jesus Christ who is both the “mediator and the sum total of revelation,” not a book, and not a proposition or set of defined doctrines (DV 2). These latter elements are, instead, witnesses to the supreme divine revelation in the human person Jesus of Nazareth called the Christ (DV 8, 17–19). This reveals the existence of a distinction between word and event, interpretation and occurrence, and therefore calls into question any notion of a pregiven whole of revelation that merely needs to be illuminated. Essentially, this also calls into question a Neoplatonic “recollection” theory of truth or meaning where truth is something that has to be recalled and illuminated through contemplation or experience, because it assumes that Truth exists in its finished form “someplace else,” but it is not really, ontologically “something else.” The mediation of any absolute in history changes both its expression and its meaning based on the context of mediation. The positing of eidetic or speculative truth, which can be reached through notional knowledge, is a kind of dualistic idealism, and exactly what

21. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 112 [185]. 22. See Jn 3:21; 1 Jn 1:6; cf. Mt 3:10, 7:19; Lk 3:9. 23. Lieven Boeve, “Orthodoxy, History and Theology: Recontextualisation and its Descriptive and Programmatic Features,” Orthodoxy, Liberalism, and Adaptation: Essays on Ways of Worldmaking in Times of Change from Biblical, Historical and Systematic Perspectives, Studies in Theology and Religion vol. 15, ed. Bob Becking (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2011), 186. 24. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Hermeneutics and Historicism (1965),” Truth and Method, 2nd ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York and London: Continuum, 2011), 526; cf. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus, trans. Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2002), 53–57; David Tracy, “The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method, Modernity, and Postmodernity,” Theological Studies 50 (1989): 561.

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Schillebeeckx wants to avoid. This would mean that ultimate truth is an unchanging total order, into which we need to be conformed by knowing the shape and structure of reality. Ultimately, the participation in a pre-given whole of knowledge carries the same assumptions as the Enlightenment’s ideal of universal reason: the end is decided ahead of time, and we only need to have the right starting point and have the correct insight in order to transcend history and to take it all in. 3.1.2 Modern Philosophy and Influence of De Petter In 1934 Schillebeeckx entered the Dominican Order and was placed under the tutelage of Dominicus De Petter.25 De Petter was a professional philosopher as well as the master of studies at the novitiate of the Flemish province in Ghent. He greatly influenced Schillebeeckx, especially by encouraging him to read widely in philosophy, outside the strict boundaries of approved neoscholastic handbooks.26 De Petter’s nontraditional approach to philosophy and his teaching methods made him a target in the ecclesial climate of the day. He was sanctioned and removed from his teaching duties in 1942, the same year that Chenu was also removed from his post at Le Saulchoir.27 By then, however, Schillebeeckx had already learned a great deal from his mentor about how to engage and dialogue with essentially nonChristian philosophy particularly, even books that were on the Index including the works of Kant, Hegel, and Freud, as well as the phenomenological tradition stemming from Husserl.28 Consonant with the attitudes of the time, these authors were read through the all-encompassing lens of Thomism, but still within the context of a burgeoning neo-Thomist revival, as was also seen in the work of Congar, Chenu, Maréchal, and Rahner. De Petter’s own philosophy was also formative for Schillebeeckx. His theory of “implicit intuition” was an attempt to move away from the kind of conceptualistic, propositional-realism of the neoscholastic era by incorporating phenomenology and neo-Kantianism (of the ontological variety) into theological epistemology as an apparatus for gaining reliable knowledge of reality.29 Essentially, the intellect, in its mental operations, carries a fore-conception of unity and wholeness that acts as a precondition for all knowledge apart from abstract concepts that

25. Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 37–48; William J. Hill, “A Theology in Transition,” The Praxis of the Reign of God: An Introduction to the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx, ed. Mary Catherine Hilkert and Robert J. Schreiter, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 11–13. 26. Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 48, 122–23; Kennedy, Deus Humanissimus, 8–9, 20–23, 144–47. 27. Kennedy, Deus Humanissimus, 43–45. 28. Ibid., 43–44. 29. Dominicus De Petter, “Implicite Intuitie,” Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 1, no. 1 (1939): 84–105; Kennedy, Deus Humanissimus, 144–45.

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are explicitly thought out.30 The concepts are, then, the result of the attempt to grasp the whole of ultimate reality, making them contingent expressions that never reach the fullness of what they aim for, but they are still vital components of the task. The unity of reality is latent, or implicit, in the intellect and makes itself felt in the partial acquisition of knowledge through mental acts, expressing the nonconceptual foundation of being through the grasping of actual concepts in the act of thinking.31 Neoscholastic thought had based itself on deduction from abstract principles, applying them in concrete reality—if the foundations are certain, then the conclusions will be as well. This movement only works if there is a surgical separation between subject and object. An ob-ject as exterior to the subject is processed conceptually, categorized, and formatted as a matter of objective knowledge and judgment, or “right judgment” (and therefore as something which is not merely “interpretation”). Once the correct starting point is found, it will yield the proper result. This corresponds to the scholastic theory of truth as correspondence, or adequatio rei et intellectus, the adequation of the thing and the intellect as lining up a proposition with its corresponding object; truth as correctness or correlation.32 De Petter clearly opposes the naïve realism of previous models, utilizing the intellect’s faculty of judgment to reach a provisional concept of transcendental unity that is already present in the thinking subject. Thinking as “judging” has to do with the joining of a subject with its predicate (S is P), which is not the same as knowing, since knowledge involves the interplay of sensation and apperception with the concepts via representation.33 It is not the content of knowledge, however, that is described, but the fore-conception of wholeness that grounds the operation of judgment altogether. This unity is God, for De Petter, and not a pure transcendental ego, or pure self-consciousness.34 The nonconceptual aspect of being was foundational for Schillebeeckx’s early work, because it allowed for a transcendental starting point for the common experience of God, and common experience in general for all human beings. There is the possibility of a “direct” experience of reality, not mediated through concepts or notional knowledge, and it is ultimately the subject’s participation in the total meaning of reality, the universal

30. Stephan van Erp, “Implicit Faith: Philosophical Theology After Schillebeeckx,” Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology, ed. Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere and Stephan van Erp (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2011), 214–15. 31. Van Erp, “Implicit Faith,” 215. 32. Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 6. 33. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft, 5th ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 81, 104–06. De Petter’s ideas are similar to Heidegger’s ontological reading of Kant, especially in that for Heidegger none of this foundational apparatus of self-consciousness is accessible without the being of the subject being actualized. A subject needs time and space in order to reflect on preconditions of understanding. 34. Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 123.

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element, that underlies all human experience.35 This allows us to have access to the “real,” and it allows there to be something like a universal human nature that is grounded in the real, and a universal meaning of history which derives its meaning from this implicit connection. The intending subject is already oriented toward apprehension of God by virtue of its precognitive participation in the logos of God. There is, therefore, a universal aspect in experience that is accessible through reflection on that experience, and therefore a license for talking meaningfully with other people about God, self, and world. All concepts are inadequate to the reality of God, since all concepts fall short of the true apprehension of the infinite, so although notional knowledge is always flawed, the implicit knowledge retains a link to the “real” at all times.36 The essence of De Petter’s project was to break down the absolute way in which abstract concepts were said to mediate all knowledge and experience, or “essentialistic Thomism” which surgically separated “nature” and “supernature.” Philip Kennedy calls this neoscholastic ontology an essentially “godless” ontology, because the human subject is considered in isolation, from its intellectual powers alone, and entirely unrelated, except by a miracle, to the infinite reality of God. He sees this “pure human nature,” which begins not from our fundamental created relationship to God, but from the standpoint of the solitary “natural” subject, as the root of modern atheism.37 We have already seen that Schillebeeckx and De Petter have a more relational approach to creation, and that there is something of an implicit, nonconceptual knowledge of “wholeness” inherent in human subjects. The question remains, why did Schillebeeckx turn away from his mentor? 3.1.3 The “Clear Break”: Questioning Schillebeeckx’s Relationship to De Petter It is necessary to ask if Schillebeeckx really turned away from his mentor. Several prominent scholars have, to greater and lesser degrees, opined that Schillebeeckx never really left De Petter’s metaphysics behind, and that his insights remained in fundamental continuity with his neo-Thomistic training.38 The switch in Schillebeeckx’s thinking from “participation” to “anticipation,” regarding total meaning and salvation, is taken mostly to be a shift in terminology and in emphasis, and not in the actual structure

35. Philip Kennedy, “Continuity Underlying Discontinuity: Schillebeeckx’s Philosophical Background,” New Blackfriars 79, no. 828 (1989), 267; Borgman, “Theologie tussen universiteit en emancipatie,” 245–47. See also, Edward Schillebeeckx, “The NonConceptual Intellectual Dimension in our Knowledge of God According to Aquinas,” RT, CW vol. 2 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 207–238 [II 157–206]. 36. Kennedy, “Continuity Underlying Discontinuity,” 268–69; Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 131–32. 37. Kennedy, Deus Humanissimus, 19–21. 38. See Kennedy, “Continuity Underlying Discontinuity,” 264–77; van Erp, “Implicit Faith,” 218–19; Rodenborn, Hope in Action, 180–83.

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or content of his theology.39 I am not entirely convinced, however, and I will argue that not only is this shift significant, but it is the structuring element of all of his later theology.40 “Anticipation” will lead us to the root of the ontological structure of the subject in a way that is much more than just a matter of terminology. First, it is crucial to note that both De Petter and Schillebeeckx reject a shared concept of “being” between humanity and God such that human beings possess being, while God is being, breaking down into categories of Absolute and Relative Being.41 The essentially Neoplatonic, cosmocentric structure relies on different gradations of being up until the fullness of being, which is God. This kind of metaphysical structure implies a cosmology of divine order and the unchangeability of the universe as a whole. It is exemplified by Origen of Alexandria’s dictum that the “end is like the beginning,” placing the consummation of the world into the category of restoration of an eternal beginning.42 This eternal, absolute beginning is to be reinstated at the eschaton, wiping away what came in between; namely, the history of human sin. Rejecting this metaphysical schema and its subsequent degradation of the concept of truth into propositions that describe the eternal realm makes way for experience to enter into consideration. De Petter and Schillebeeckx are both convinced that lived experience must be taken into account for any truth claims to be seriously evaluated. We have seen that for De Petter it is experience that mediates the universal making one of his philosophy’s central categories that of “encounter,”43 but it is ultimately intellectual experience that affirms the truth value of concepts by linking them to a presupposed “whole” implicit in the operation of thinking.44 The intending subject is already oriented toward the apprehension of God by virtue of its participation in the whole, through God’s immediate presence to the subject.45 It would appear that Schillebeeckx adopts a similar concept, and he in fact does up until after his synthesis of hermeneutics and critical theory. In his first Jesus volume, the “break” is made clear: This tradition [including De Petter] (not without solid grounds in Thomas Aquinas’s worldview) brilliantly analyses the participation of total meaning in every particular experience of meaning. Thomas could blithely—and rightly,

39. See especially Rodenborn, Hope in Action, 183. 40. Here I am more in agreement with Thompson, The Language of Dissent, 84–94. 41. Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 226; See R.M. Berchman, “The Categories of Being in Middle Platonism: Philo, Clement, and Origen of Alexandria,” Brown Judaic Studies 304 (1995): 98–140. Berchman details the integration of Peripatetic and Stoic thought into what is often merely referred to as middle or neo-“Platonism.” This synthesis had a significant effect on later Christian developments. 42. Origen, On First Principles, trans. G.W. Butterworth (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 1.4.2, 3.4.3–5. 43. Hill, “A Theology in Transition,” 11. 44. Borgman, Schillebeeckx, 225–27. 45. Kennedy, “Continuity Underlying Discontinuity,” 267–68.

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It is the common presupposition of total meaning, and human participation therein, that has become a problem. Implicit intuition is ultimately too speculative, and too “Thomistic.” That is to say, it is grounded in a cosmology and an epistemology we no longer share. This epistemology has no real connection to historicity, and it does not really need one if knowledge is already derived, even on an implicit, unthematic level, from an eternal whole and pre-given logos.47 De Petter attempted to create a bridge to experience, but because it was primarily “thinking” and the operations of reason that constituted experience, the conditions of lived experience and the various starting points of historically conditioned human beings did not come into play. De Petter still presupposes, in Schillebeeckx’s estimation, a single starting point of all people and a single goal—seeking salvation in Christ through the church. The “experience” of wholeness, described by De Petter, is also called an implicit manifestation of the real, implying both that the Christian God can automatically be invoked as the author of that experience and that contact with God is found in the mental operation of thinking with concepts, even if these concepts are inadequate to the task. Actions in the world, insofar as they are not explicitly undertaken in contemplation of this or that truth of the faith, are not really a productive source of that faith, except upon reflection. This places acts of faith in the realm of speculation, not praxis. The most important difference comes when Schillebeeckx acknowledges something that very few theologians of his era, or of any era, would readily admit: an ultimate meaning of history may not actually exist in a rational-theoretical manner.48 The participation of the subject in total meaning presupposes a total meaning as an actual fact, rather than as a narrative possibility. There is a whole that we connect with, or are integrated within, or from which we receive our being. If this whole is actual then it is actualizable, or is even fully actualized already in some form that exists and merely needs to be tapped into, more fully described, or seen from a better vantage point. This is a subtle point, but Schillebeeckx is correct in pointing out that positing the question of meaning is not the same as positing the

46. Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 580–581 [618–19]. Emphasis original. 47. Kennedy, “Continuity Underlying Discontinuity,” 270. 48. Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 579 [616–17]: “Particular experience of meaning, it has been argued, is logically possible only if based on an inevitable implicit demand for total meaning because of the logical implication of a potential total meaning. Hence the meaning of historical events becomes fully and definitively evident only in the perspective of the universal, ultimate meaning of history as a whole—if that actually exists.” Emphasis added.

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existence of meaning in the question-answer structure of human interpretation. The implicit total meaning that gives a ground to all experience and connects us to reality must move to an “implicit demand for total meaning”; it is a question that demands an answer.49 Likewise, this demand is not to be automatically equated or correlated with the Christian claim to identify meaning in the world through our own narrative. This is a possibility, but it is not a necessary or automatic assumption. It is a hypothesis that has to be tested historically.50 Schillebeeckx’s theoretical question about the existence of total meaning also contains the more basic question: “What if we are wrong about our interpretation of reality?” This is, of course, always a possibility, we can never say with perfect rational certainty that our worldview, our religiously motivated convictions, and our images of God and humanity are true, especially given the elements of ideology that are already inherent in any tradition or language. Schillebeeckx condemns any attempt to move religious discourse to a “storm-free zone” bereft of critical inquiry. Critical inquiry, faith seeking understanding, must always also include this element of questioning, even and especially about the fundamental beliefs of the Christian faith. This is part and parcel of his Christological inquiry and his use of historical-critical research: there must be some agreement between the Jesus of history and our kerygma about Jesus identified as the Christ, or else our faith is in-credible.51 Merely starting from a dogmatic or essentially theoretical conception of the world and of what the world means, and then continuing to carry out that vision regardless of experience is the essence of ideology.52 Hence, there must be an intrinsic connection between theory and praxis, otherwise we fall into a kind of idealism where what we do does not matter as much as what we think we believe in, or what we merely say that we believe on the internet.

3.2 In Search of a New Point of Contact The epistemological problem posed by experience, led Schillebeeckx down a different path than that of his predecessors and teachers. This turn is not selfevident, however. After all, a “turn to experience” in philosophy was nothing new,

49. Ibid., 579 [617]. Emphasis added. 50. Ibid., 579–580 [617]. 51. Ibid., 51 [70]: “If, for instance, Jesus either did not exist (as was sometimes argued) or was quite different from what faith affirms of him (e.g., a sicarius or a guerrilla, a Zealot or Jewish nationalist resistance fighter), then the faith or kerygma is obviously implausible. A radical disparity between the knowledge imparted by faith and that imparted by history about what after all is a single phenomenon, namely Jesus and his first believing disciples, in untenable.” See Terrence Merrigan, “Faith in the Quest: The Relevance of the First and Third Quests to the Understanding of the ‘Christ-Event,’” Louvain Studies 32, no. 1 (2007): 153–63. 52. Schillebeeckx, “The Role of History,” 314–16.

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and in theology there had been some emphasis on feeling and experience of the world that was certainly even felt in Catholic circles, at least since the time of Schleiermacher. If Schillebeeckx was to find a “universal” point of reference or interpretation, to come to grips with the emerging new image of humanity and the new image of God, then something manifestly different was needed in order to take diverse starting points into account, and not to automatically assign one Christian preconception of being to all people. What was different for Schillebeeckx was that experiences of suffering needed to be accounted for, and not merely intellectual experience or the contemplation of rational universals. Suffering shakes the foundations of any sure theory about reality and its total meaning. Radical experiences of suffering threaten to break all transcendent truth claims. Radical experiences of suffering are also a window or a point of access to a universal humanity as a “transcultural” entity. The Christian message, the essence of the gospel as the universal salvific will of God, has at least the potential to touch all people who experience suffering as something that should not exist, or as something that can be resisted.53 During the Enlightenment there was something of an “ontological optimism” informed by the “enlightened reason,” which essentially used insight as the criteria for true understanding of nature, even in the realm of theodicy.54 God, and even the watchmaker god of deism, is an intelligent creator who makes the best possible world, relativizing evil to merely a misapprehension of the larger good.55 The cosmos is all-consuming, and historical instances of suffering are really only perceived as being evil because of our limited perspective. This is not a historical horizon of being with a past, present, and coming future. There is a pre-given harmony, even in suffering, because the reconciliation of the world is already given from eternity and only needs to be accepted by “liberating insight” and a turn away from human short-sightedness.56 The 1755 earthquake in Lisbon, however, shook this “ontological optimism” and exposed the limits of historical reason.57 Such a pre-given harmony of the world devalues humanity as merely a means to the realization of the greater whole, continuing the cosmocentric view of the universe while also recasting it in terms of “progressive” actualization. 3.2.1 The Unavoidable Mystery of Suffering Schillebeeckx characterizes the “problem of suffering” not as a “problem,” but as an impenetrable mystery.58 Problems can be objectified and abstracted while

53. Edward Schillebeeckx, “The Mystery of Injustice and the Mystery of Mercy: Questions Concerning Human Suffering,” Stauros Bulletin 3 (1975): 27. This article was later reworked and included in Christ, particularly in Part 4, Chapter 2, 663–714 [670–723]. 54. Schillebeeckx, “The Mystery of Injustice,” 5. 55. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 695 [704]. 56. Ibid., 696–697 [705]. 57. Ibid., 696 [705–706]. 58. Schillebeeckx, “The Mystery of Injustice,” 11.

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suffering cannot. The suffering of others can be written off, but my own suffering and ultimate death will at some point become a problem and a question without an adequate answer. The answers we give are ideological attempts to assign meaning to everything—it was all God’s will. Extremists, terrorists, and ideologues do this, but so do well-meaning human beings who are simply searching for answers and find them within a given ideological system. The unintelligible excess of suffering in the world resists codifying the world into a meaningful totality.59 We cannot place the Holocaust meaningfully within God’s plan of salvation, except through violently twisting suffering and victimization into something else, and something other than what it is that has redeeming value. It becomes a “problem” that merely has to be solved. By placing suffering and evil in the realm of mystery, we also place “the world” and its total meaning closer to God than to ourselves in the equation. The world cannot be thought out and predicted rationally, except through symbols, because it so far exceeds the human capacity of understanding. Where can we place responsibility for evil then? It is not something assigned to God, either as an intrinsic property of God’s goodness or as merely privation of a possible goodness. The former makes God into an executioner in the service of a greater goal, and the latter allows suffering to accumulate like “the sawdust of history, which most theories of history try to ignore in their search for meaning.”60 The ultimate responsibility for evil comes from humanity, but in a qualified way. Suffering is not itself totally incomprehensible, at least in one of its varieties. Once Israel had begun to assign significance to suffering, taken on for the sake of others, the traditional association between sin and suffering that had persisted began to loosen.61 The “suffering servant” of Deutero-Isaiah is the touchstone for a new perspective in which suffering can take on a positive role, and furthermore, suffering and even death are not the final end of human life.62 Prior to that, suffering could be viewed as divine punishment for sin; those who suffered deserved it. The slow progression toward the Israelite belief in the resurrection is founded upon one insight: even death cannot separate humanity from the love of God.63 The resurrection itself does not start as a solution to the problem of suffering, but the belief in God’s faithful presence, even in death, makes sacrifice on the behalf of God (and of the People of God) a “sensible” option. One can suffer for others, safe in the knowledge that it is for a good cause and not because one is a sinner. This type of suffering was comprehensible, much like suffering brought about by sin, but the acknowledgment that not all suffering was self-inflicted opens up a gap from which the concept of unmerited suffering emerges. Jesus definitively shatters the notion that sin is manifested as physical suffering, although this biblical

59. Ibid., 10. 60. Ibid., 4. 61. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 668–671 [675–679]. 62. Ibid., 671–672 [679–80]. 63. Ibid., 672 [680]; Jesus, 477–482 [518–23]; “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 10–11 [12–13].

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precedent has sadly not kept Christians from continuing to claim that such an intrinsic link exists.64 The emphasis on that break, seen especially in the Gospel of Mark, Hebrews, and 1 Peter, presents unmerited suffering as a clear category that can be taken on for the sake of others, just as Jesus did within the context of his life and message.65 To some extent, this validates suffering as a reality to be taken seriously, not merely explained away (“He deserved it!”), or rationalized as a part of a divine plan (“It was all for a greater good!”), because the cause is something external and not a predetermined internal logic. The Christian understanding of suffering, insofar as it is understood at all, recognizes that it is destructive, that it is real and significant but, finally, that it “does not have the last word.”66 According to the Christian faith, God corrects what has been done in history without undoing that history. The execution of Jesus was never anything but an unjust and barbarous act, and yet for the Christian, death is sublated by Jesus’s resurrection into something other than what it was before: absolute separation from God.67 Jesus conquers death and declares that we can no longer be separated from God, in spite of what occurs through human sin. The finite is held together with the infinite, even after the finite expires, because of its inclusion in the life of the infinite through the negation of the negating power of death. Essentially, “we have to say that we are not redeemed thanks to the death of Jesus but despite it.”68 This sentence may well encapsulate the most significant recovery of biblical Christology made by Schillebeeckx. The medieval practice of identification with the suffering of Christ had important didactic and catechetical functions within that context, by placing the believer in a position of solidarity with all those who suffer.69 The unintended effect of the preoccupation with the suffering, the wounds, and the cross of Christ was, however, an overall interiorization of suffering, detaching it from the social aspect of suffering for a cause, as though suffering could become an end in itself.70 Schillebeeckx sees this as the root of a pernicious “satisfaction theory” of the crucifixion, where the cross begins to be disassociated from its historical context (Jesus’s life, message, and liberating praxis), and by extension Christian resistance to suffering could be subverted.71 If suffering could be seen as a virtue, then there would be no reason to remove it. It can be theorized, theologized, and rationalized away as part of God’s plan for humanity—suffer now and be rewarded later. This type of logic has too often contributed to and perpetuated abusive structures. The

64. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 686 [695]. 65. Ibid., 687–688 [696–97]. 66. Ibid., 690 [699]. 67. Schillebeeckx, “The Mystery of Injustice,” 19. 68. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 722 [729]. Emphasis original. 69. Ibid., 690 [699]. 70. Ibid., 690–691 [699]. 71. Ibid., 691–692 [699–701]. Schillebeeckx does not attribute this meaning to Anselm of Canterbury’s original intention, but to the reception of his work.

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real possibility of suffering for others or for a cause, this sacrificial love which is at the heart of the gospel, cannot exclude the reality of unmerited suffering. Even the act of suffering for a cause implies that an external and unjust actor provides an opportunity. Resistance to oppression already implies that oppression is there. In our time, we can no longer interiorize suffering, and we cannot make it to be a virtue “in itself ”: there is an excess of suffering and evil in our history. There is a barbarous excess, for all the explanations and interpretations. There is too much unmerited and senseless suffering for us to be able to give an ethical, hermeneutical and ontological analysis . . . suffering which is not even suffering “for a good cause,” but suffering in which men [sic] without finding meaning for themselves, are simply made crude victims of an evil cause which serves others. Furthermore, this suffering is the alpha and omega of the whole history of mankind; it is the scarlet thread by which this historical fragment is recognizable as human history: history is “an ecumene of suffering.”72

The examples of these instances of “non-sense” appear in innumerable occasions in our contemporary world. They buck every attempt to theorize a total meaning of history, and they block any passage to a perfectly explainable meaning of the “whole” that we quest after in life. We do not get to give these instances meaning in some rational whole, for to do so is to both de-eschatologize our concept of history and to deny the full reality of sin and evil, and therefore of the suffering that has been experienced. 3.2.2 The Persistence of Sin in Human Structures Following Paul Ricoeur, sin, and therefore evil, is something that already exists within us, outside of us, and before us as an entity that we discover in our encounter with an other.73 Sin precedes us within our social structures, our experiences, and ultimately our language. The historical location of evil as a possibility is at least partially built into the structures of human becoming, as an “initiative of finitude,” or is a possibility engendered by the situated freedom in which human beings find themselves.74 They are free to make the world, but they are already placed in a received, hermeneutically mediated historical situation with regard to received linguistic structures, which come from the past and have a future expectation horizon.75 The linguistic character of being is not supremely ours to

72. Ibid., 718 [725]. 73. Paul Ricoeur, “‘Original Sin’: A Study in Meaning,” The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 1974), 284. 74. Schillebeeckx, “The Mystery of Injustice,” 17. 75. Schillebeeckx, “The Magisterium and Ideology,” 8.

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manipulate, but it gives elements over to us that need to be uncovered, criticized, and illuminated.76 Here, we see sin as a structural-linguistic reality and, therefore, “not only a state . . . sin is a power which binds man and holds him captive.”77 So, are sin and evil hereditary? Yes, in part. They precede us, and live and move within us and our societies, concepts, and language, and are passed down within these constructions. Sin and evil are capable of being brought to life through specific human actions. Sin is an act of the will in individual instances, and is, therefore personal, as well as corporate insofar as it inheres in the social reality in which we already partake. The corporate, structural, and preexistent nature of this sin allows us a second observation: the interruptive force of an other is necessary for unmasking it. The solitary subject cannot be supremely accountable before itself, something that Abba Pachomius was already well aware of in the fourth century. The de facto communal dimension of being, the contingency and historicity of humanity as inseparable from one another and from history, makes sin a communal reality. Christianity should, through its anticipation of the Rule of God, correct these places eschatologically and sacramentally shine a light on human claims to know and to perfectly execute the will of God or to have supreme insight into the structure of reality. So, mediated history will always also include the other as a part of our search for the total meaning of that history, and Christianity does presume there is total meaning, ultimate salvation in Christ coming from God. As the “other of history,” it is God who confronts humanity with its own sin at places in which our finite actions fail our fellow human beings. Present in every instance of suffering is the witness of God’s silence, eating away at the explanations we have crafted for ourselves that make us feel secure. It is always easier to see the other as an accused, rather than as the accuser, however. This is the historical “underdog” mentality, especially present in the industrialized West today. Even people working to make the world better very often blame the other, and only the other, as the real cause of suffering.78 The other is always really in control, but just barely, making a breakthrough eminently possible.79 The flaws in the system are the result of not doing things properly and of not adhering to the real structure of reality—if we just adhered to the theoretical structure more perfectly, then suffering would not be a problem. It is very easy to slip back into such an idealist approach and to, thereby, absolve ourselves of our responsibility for suffering. Even if we do acknowledge that the responsibility is certainly human, it is always someone else’s ultimate responsibility. We are back to seeing the other as “non-human,” insofar as humanity should conform to an ultimate ideal. Deviation from that ideal would be acting “inhuman.” There is a lack of insight regarding the nature of the change or revolution that is hoped

76. Ibid., 8. 77. Ricoeur, “Original Sin,” 283. 78. Schillebeeckx, “The Mystery of Injustice,” 8. 79. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 714 [722–23].

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for inherent in the perpetual shirking of responsibility, or of shifting of blame to a “dominant other,” which we should see as a particular symptom afflicting the major political options in the industrialized West.80 Namely, the “great restoration (of the nation),” the coming revolution, or the “great alternative” society which is “just as much a “beyond” for the generations now alive as was heaven for the oppressed in the pre-critical period.”81 If suffering throws into doubt, or at least problematizes, all human attempts at positive constructions of meaning, then Schillebeeckx is close to reaching a zeropoint for the building up of his own critical theology. First, certain observations need to be made about the Christian role in history in light of the mystery of suffering and the fact that Christianity is in no way immune to ideological distortion, even if it contains the intrinsic possibility of resistance to such distortion as a part of the core of the gospel message. The tendency of human beings to attempt to justify themselves, or to lay the blame on an other when confronted with the fact of suffering is lamentable, but it also demonstrates something positive. It shows that human beings are actively searching for meaning, and actively do presume a “whole” in their perception of the world. De Petter’s philosophy would affirm that the already given total meaning allows this provisional search, but that that itself is already a leap of rational certainty that such a whole exists at all. I would side with Schillebeeckx, who can only go so far as to affirm that there is always a demand for total meaning coming from the subject in experience, even where the subject already presumes to possess or project that meaning. The fragments of experience that contradict this projection must be actively subverted, so the search goes on, but in such a way that it is already closed and circumscribed by the subject’s own unexamined ideology. Maintaining a closed view of truth in the face of unmerited suffering is hard work, but it provides some comfort against the possibility that there really is no ultimate meaning of history. So, has Schillebeeckx rejected his mentor’s philosophical presuppositions? Not entirely. What he has done is moved the search for a universal basis, to speak about faith in the ultimate meaning of reality (i.e., faith in God), back into the structure of the subject, and not leaving it at the level of perception. This, to Schillebeeckx’s mind, allows for people with diverse pre-understandings of reality to dialogue meaningfully, without imposing the Christian horizon on the other, a priori, for the simple reason that what Christians perceive as being unjust suffering has not always historically lined up with what non-Christians have experienced. Even different classes of people in “Christendom” have felt the force of this difference, and will continue to feel it in the church as long as those in power can use their position to rationalize away the suffering of the poor, of lay persons, of women, or of children in favor of the “good” of the institution. Ultimately, an “other” is necessary for confronting sin, but this means that an actual other has to be able to be perceived. This problem calls for a reevaluation of

80. Ibid., 714 [723]. 81. Ibid.

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the subject-object relationship in experience, but it also calls for us to look more closely at the concept for which Schillebeeckx is most famous: negative contrast experience. Saying that all human beings suffer, and that the barbarous excess of suffering disqualifies our attempts to systematize it, is helpful only up to a point. It is not necessarily a constructive observation, since it does not help with the actual project with which humanity is tasked—the humanization of the world. Christianity does not provide an explanation for suffering, but it confronts it in praxis.82 What is it that makes such a resistance to suffering meaningful? What makes resistance possible? Negative contrast experience helps to explain both of these questions from the standpoint of epistemology.

3.3 Contrast Experience and Its Structural Elements Schillebeeckx first presented his ideas for a basic “contrast experience” in the context of his studies of contemporary hermeneutics and critical theory in the late 1960s, which we have examined in Chapter 2.83 After turning to critical theory, as a critique of Gadamerian tradition hermeneutics, Schillebeeckx took over the term “negative dialectics” from Theodor Adorno as an operative concept for his theology.84 This allows him to move beyond De Petter’s ultimately “Thomistic” viewpoint, and the more blithely contiguous view of literary hermeneutics.85 This does not mean that he fundamentally left Thomas behind altogether, however. Certainly the form of his thought retained a fundamentally Thomistic character. Schillebeeckx’s conception of the relation between God and humanity, the autonomy of creation, and God’s nature as absolute freedom remained fundamentally Thomistic.86 Kathleen McManus has even argued that Thomas’s elaboration of “original justice” or the state of original Edenic goodness that was lost through original sin is the source of negative contrast experience. The “original justice” provides humanity with a model, or an expectation of the potential goodness of being in contrast to real situations of suffering. Thomas, with his medieval, participatory epistemology found this “image” in an irretrievable, but real past. Schillebeeckx instead merges it with the

82. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 690 [699]. 83. Erik Borgman pinpoints it as a distinct concept in 1968. See Borgman, “Theologie tussen universiteit en emancipatie,” 255. 84. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 79–83 [91–5]; “The New Critical Theory,” UF, 111– 113 [127–28]; “The New Image of God,” GFM, 115–116 [191]. Schillebeeckx’s use of this concept is decidedly theological, and it does not imply a direct application of Adorno’s work. 85. Kennedy, “Continuity Underlying Discontinuity,” 271. See Kathleen McManus, O.P., Unbroken Communion: The Place and Meaning of Suffering in the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 47–74. 86. See Schillebeeckx, Church, 86–87 [89–90], 136–137 [138–39]; Schillebeeckx, I Am a Happy Theologian, 55–56. See also Kennedy, “God and Creation,” 42–43, 54–57.

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future-oriented utopian impulse of consciousness (engendered by the hermeneutic fore-conception of completeness). The departure from earlier “metaphysical” forms of Thomism has nothing to do with iconoclasm or the unqualified rejection of authority. It is about hermeneutically retrieving the intention of that theology— to orient people in a proper relationship with God—without being beholden to presuppositions about ourselves and the world that, because of our own historicity, we can no longer share.87 3.3.1 Critical Negativity and the Humanum Schillebeeckx first parses this term as “critical negativity,” or the “universal preunderstanding of all positive views of man [sic],” which is based on the idea that “resistance to inhumane situations reveals, if only indirectly, at least an obscure consciousness of what must be confessed positively by human integrity.”88 In other words, the resistance of human beings to suffering reveals that there is something positive beneath the negativity that is immediately at hand. The universal, but constantly threatened, humanum is the seldom-glimpsed “ideal humanity” and what human beings have the potential to become but never actually achieve because of the realities of human sin and the misuse of human freedom.89 This humanum cannot be expressed positively “without reverting to many different, fragmentary and mutually contradictory views,” and is, therefore, an attempt to hold onto a “universal meaning” of humanity, and to stave off the establishment of theoretical or conceptual boundaries that would attempt to regulate what that meaning would be.90 History is unfinished, so no decision can be made about the limits of the humanum from a historically limited vantage point. The humanum is, at least partially, related to Bloch’s “unknown humanum” that comes with an anticipatory model of history.91 For Bloch, it is not necessary to know the full content of the humanum to decide on what is inhuman.92 The practice of making negative statements runs contrary to religious traditions of positive moral statements, but such positive statements often neglect actual conditions in favor of a predetermined ideal. Bloch advocates for a “primacy of ‘practical reason’” taken from his reading of the Enlightenment tradition—the humanization of the world

87. See Schillebeeckx’s praise for Aquinas on “the Rule of Christ,” in Church, 220–221 [222]. 88. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 80 [92]. 89. Mary Catherine Hilkert, O.P., “Hermeneutics of History in the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx,” The Thomist 51, no. 1 (1987): 107–08. 90. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 80 [92]. 91. Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, 82. Cf. Bloch, On Karl Marx, 74–80. Adorno has also referenced this as a “generic” concept of humanity, since all appeals to merely particular or hypostasized persons must presuppose a generic concept. See Theodor W. Adorno, “Subject and Object,” The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O’Connor (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 139. 92. Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, 108–09.

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through active resistance to what is inhuman.93 For Schillebeeckx, the humanum is an expression of the desire for total meaning in history and is manifested partially in the concrete attempts to live out whatever it is that humanity is theorized to be. The contradiction arrives in the practical application of those ideas, whether they are traditional, technical, political, or economic in nature, since every society will have competing claims on having grasped the “whole” of that meaning. As a concept, it is not a matter of “looking back on” something that was lost, recalling a hidden image, or finding the right “insight” into the structure in order to bring the humanum about. Instead, it is something theoretically postulated as an open concept subject to correction through experience. In Schillebeeckx’s attempt to deal with a pluralistic environment, in which positive notions of the “good of/for human beings” are so often defined in terms that are at odds with one another or in direct competition with one another, he has attempted to reformulate the question. Rather than starting from a positive and particular instantiation (and thus historically and hermeneutically problematic) that can be universalized as the universal element for humanity, Schillebeeckx begins with what is “evil.” Whenever human beings face existential threats to their life or safety, there is an innate tendency to resist it, proclaiming a “no” in the face of suffering: The human experience of suffering and evil, of oppression and adversity, lies at the base and is the source of a fundamental no that the human being proclaims, and often cries out, with respect to the actual shape of our world.94

The identification of suffering and evil in our remembered history can give over to a basic forgetfulness of victims, or it can give rise to particular “imperatives” to act and to correct the sources of injustice. Experiences that lead to change are: negative or “contrast” experiences which evoke the protest “No! It can’t go on like this; we won’t stand for it any longer!” Such negative experiences make us realize the absence of what things ought to be like. Thus “what should be here and now” is to a certain extent, though incipiently and still vaguely, already perceived. Protest is possible only where there is hope. A negative experience would not be a contrast-experience, nor could it excite protest, if it did not somehow contain an element of positive hope in the real possibility of a better future.95

93. Ibid., 109. 94. Edward Schillebeeckx, Theologisch testament: Notarieel nog niet verleden, 2nd ed. (Baarn: Nelissen, 1995), 128. Emphasis original. The most complete presentation of Schillebeeckx’s mature theology is present in his final Jesus volume, Church: The Human Story of God. The second half of his later book, Theologisch testament, has been translated in volume 11 of the CW, as Chapter 6, “Theological Quests,” pp. 111–61. All translations presented here are my own, from the original Dutch version. 95. Schillebeeckx, “The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue,” GFM, CW vol. 3 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 83 [136].

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The human subject experiences suffering, and an overwhelming feeling of impending negation, and recoils from it because the experience is identified as suffering and as being negative. The subject as self-transcending goes beyond itself in experience, but recoils from this particular experience, exercising a veto on the suffering it undergoes in the form of the recognition that the affliction should be replaced with something else. There was, prior to this recoil, an expectation (perhaps only vague in nature) of the good, but what was encountered was unexpected, and the expectation horizon of the subject breaks under that pressure. Within the expectation of the good, of meaning, lies the question of the possibility of meaning itself. Once contact is made with a provisional answer to the question, posed by the subject, the subject’s expectation horizon now includes the resistance to what caused its suffering in the form of a protest. It is the “actual shape” of the world that we need to keep in mind here. There is a conflict between reality as conceptualized and reality as it is encountered. This also reveals that the “open yes” and the hope for the good in some way precede the negative contrast. Even when suffering can be reasonably “expected” at the conscious level, it is still recognized as detrimental and as being bad. 3.3.2 The Structure of Negativity There is a distinct advantage to using negativity as a starting point for a theological anthropology. The experiencing subject is (negatively) affected from without by an other that has a direct, formatting impact upon the subject. There is an “other-directedness,” or drive toward self-transcendence, that is presupposed. Schillebeeckx’s experiential framework has an intrinsic openness to the other, but does not relinquish a distinct identity or dissolve into total openness that negates the self entirely. I would postulate that here we see the impact of Schillebeeckx’s long history in sacramental studies, from his dissertation, De sacramentele heilseconomie, to his tentative work on the Eucharist in the mid-1960s.96 He developed a particular view of experience as being essentially sacramental.97 Every object, in and of itself, has its own priority, and its own direction for interpretation

96. Schillebeeckx’s studies of phenomenology and hermeneutics also contributed to this sensitivity and to his sacramentology. This is especially evident in the second part of his 1967 book, The Eucharist, pp. 89–151. 97. Schillebeeckx, The Eucharist, 128: “In what they are, things are, through God’s creative will, really saving values and divine revelation, revealing and veiling at the same time.  .  . . In this sense, it is therefore possible to say that the entire world has a general quasi-sacramental significance.” See also, Bradford E. Hinze, “Eschatology and Ethics,” The Praxis of the Reign of God: An Introduction to the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx, ed. Mary Catherine Hilkert and Robert J. Schreiter, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 168–75.

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that precedes and helps to condition the formatting undertaken by the subject.98 This position between the strong, “Kantian” modern subject that gives meaning, and the postmodern decentered subject who is subjected to the irreducible other which it encounters, places Schillebeeckx in a unique position. Neither subject nor object is entirely dominant in his view of experience.99 The object retains a certain priority and in-and-for-itselfness, but the meaning-giving subjective perspective is also not done away with. There is an ontological dimension to the moment of negative contrast or, rather, there are several moments that reveal something about human ontology. First, the recognition of suffering as something inflicted and coming from “without” also shows that there is a link between the subject’s perception and their external reality. Suffering is not “imagined,” even if it is mediated. Mental anguish, likewise, presupposes a real connection to external reality, be it the circumstances that cause the subject to be in pain or even physical or psychological trauma or stress. The latter could be especially prone to being “spiritualized away,” but this should instead point us toward a mind-body connection, not a dualism. Mental health is tied up with the physiology of the organism, and does not exist as a purely separate psychical realm. The initial “no” that is proclaimed in the face of suffering is said to be universal—all human beings resist suffering with “an overwhelming veto against the inhumanity in our history” and a “persistent and unbroken indignation.”100 The “transcendental” element is here opened up as the “recoil,” but this in itself is not enough, for we could just as easily reduce this recoiling from pain to a purely biological dimension: organisms avoid pain. Schillebeeckx takes this one step further, however, in a move that both reveals his indebtedness to the philosophy of Ernst Bloch as much as it speaks to his grounding in Thomas Aquinas.101 In the midst of suffering and inhumanity, there is a distinct and unwavering hope that the situation can and, indeed, must be changed. This hope and ill-defined vision of “something better” is the evidence that human beings are already oriented toward “the good,” so to speak, and rooted in a prior expectation of goodness and wholeness, or the experience of salvation.102 These experiences are personal experiences of suffering, and as subject-centered, refer primarily to those instances in which the human subject suffers, recoils from

98. Schillebeeckx, The Eucharist, 129: “The fundamental meaning for me is a gift of the reality itself, which is originally not my reality, but is nonetheless given to me for me to give meaning to it.” 99. Bernadette Schwarz-Boenneke, “Die Widerständigkeit der Wirklichkeit als erstes Moment der Erfahrens,” Edward Schillebeeckx: Impulse für Theologien im 21. Jahrhundert/ Impetus Towards Theologies in the 21st Century, ed. Thomas Eggensperger, Ulrich Engel and Angel F. Méndez Montoya (Ostfildern: Grünewald, 2013), 102. 100. Schillebeeckx, Theologisch testament, 129–30. 101. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 82–83 [95]; Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, 84–92. 102. Schillebeeckx, Theologisch testament, 130.

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it, and recognizes it as negative in that recoil. Furthermore, not all experiences of negativity are automatically “contrast experiences.” A hopeful element has to be present that manifests itself as a protest—essentially that something that has occurred should not have occurred and should not have been allowed to exist. This protest does not need to be verbalized or actualized in the sense of action, since in actual situations of suffering this is often not possible, but as a mental activity it must be there. What Schillebeeckx proposes bears the marks of both the Thomistic “exitusreditus” and natural desire for God, as well as the vision of hope espoused by Bloch.103 Bloch observes that in the work of art, “sorrow and anguish never remain unilluminated—just as they are; and joy always dawns as a fore-glow,” which, for Bloch, holds the meaning of a work of art open indefinitely, even in a depiction of suffering.104 This is a major parallel to Schillebeeckx’s own emphasis on contrast experiences, and it is in this “still open” meaning that is yet to come but already anticipated that he identifies what is truly universal and transcendental for humanity; this is because “[t]he ‘open yes’ really grounds, legitimates and makes possible that resistance” against human suffering.105 This two-stage grounding of the transcendental openness of the human being lies in the [1] negative experience of suffering and [2] the orientation toward a positive view of what could be present in history is ultimately about the humanum. There is an ideal of humanity that is “universal” insofar as it is discernable in the places in which it is already being radically denied. 3.3.3 Raising the Question of Pre-Linguistic Experience In the 1990s, Schillebeeckx claimed that this experience of contrast is “prereligious” and universal for human beings.106 This is different from, but is essentially a development of, the “pre-reflexive or unthematic self-understanding” that he presupposed in 1966, when he was still more inclined toward the implicit participation in universal meaning coming from De Petter.107 Such a formulation, coupled with the quasi-universal status given to contrast experience in general, raises the question of whether or not it counts as “pre-linguistic” experience. In his mature theology, Church: The Human Story of God, Schillebeeckx is a bit more

103. See Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q.12, a.1; I–II, q.3, a.8. 104. Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, 97. Cf. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 116–117 [191–92]. 105. Schillebeeckx, Theologisch testament, 130. He distinguishes here a “human no” and an “open yes.” 106. Ibid., 128. 107. Schillebeeckx, “Faith Functioning,” 44. Here he was talking about the pre-reflexive, “natural” attitude of the human subject toward the world, considering itself to be “oneself ” in the world. Essentially, the presumption of wholeness that comes from subjectivity and is applied outward in the subject-object relationship.

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nuanced, calling critical negativity “the universal pre-understanding of all positive views of man [sic].”108 Religious and ideological views are built on such a preunderstanding, just like various and sometimes mutually contradictory responses to a call. The “call to the humanum” is not pre-linguistic, but basic and prereligious, in the same sense that Schillebeeckx calls Christianity “trans-cultural.” Christian faith is not transcultural because “there is a substance of faith which is timeless” and can be transplanted into various different cultures that are then added “on top” of faith like a superstructure. Rather, it is transcultural in the very concrete sense that it is not bound to one culture alone.109 This experience is pre-religious because it is not contingent upon religious interpretation to experience the contrast and the calling out for something better, nor is it bound exclusively to one particular religious tradition. The utopian element in human experience is manifested in many (qualitatively) different forms, from technocratic or technological (modern) utopias, to idealizations of the past or a projected future, as well as in the vague but spontaneous recoil against instances of suffering.110 Schillebeeckx speaks of a very nuanced “pre-linguistic aspect” of experience in one place,111 but only in the sense that the lived moment of experience and its interpretation are incorporated into a “whole” unity, yet both that “lived moment” and the interpretation are really only distinct from the point of view of reflective analysis. It is significant that, for Schillebeeckx, the pre-understanding of Christian experience of suffering is revealed in an experience that must already be interpreted as oppressive and unjust. “Christian revelation,” he says, “presupposes a sphere of understanding, an explicit or implicit understanding of what the manifestation of being in the word really means.”112 This makes the ontological aspect of language the precondition for any Christian interpretation and understanding of the world (but this criterion could just as easily apply to any confessional understanding of the world, even an atheistic or scientistic one). This is why the notion of the “prelinguistic” for Schillebeeckx cannot mean “prior to language” in either the dualistic or chronological senses. It can only refer to the subjective linguistic formatting of experience, and the fact that beings exist for themselves prior to subjective experience of them as ob-jects. Meaning is given as well as received, and it is in this complex of revealing and concealing that human experience tries to assign a meaningful “text” to the history that we are caught up in. The “pre-linguistic” element is, therefore, only such insofar as it is not merely our interpretation, but has its own autonomous significance that cannot but be linguistic as it appears to us in being. The identification of a “pre-linguistic” element is misleading, and

108. Schillebeeckx, “Correlation,” UF, 80–81 [92]. 109. Ibid., 80–82 [92]; Church, 35 [36]. 110. Schillebeeckx discusses the various types of utopian thinking that are prevalent in philosophical, political, and religious systems in Christ, 619–625 [661–70]. 111. Schillebeeckx, Church, 37–38 [38]. 112. Schillebeeckx, “Linguistic Criteria,” UF, 35–36 [39].

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should be better termed “pre-subjective,” as the force an object has in-and-foritself. Objects exist as entities for themselves, and not merely as “things-for-us.” There is no necessity that human subjects will correctly interpret an object, despite its autonomous force. This also means that our interpretation of an object is not completely arbitrary, and owes itself in some measure to otherness that directs our efforts, albeit to varying degrees. Because the fragmented elements of the humanum will be different, based upon the context in which it appears, there cannot be a “pre-linguistic” element in any absolute sense, even in contrast experience. What is concretely hoped for will be different because it will always come from a different narrative historicity, with a past, present, and imagined future. Suffering itself will be experienced differently, but what is “universal” is that it is experienced. The “non-sense,” in the initial encounter, shows the interpretive priority of experience and the fact that human beings are already always interpreting. By recoiling from what was not expected, the underlying structure of our interpretations is temporally broken. Within the “open yes” itself, we also have to identify two moments. First, the question about meaning: Is there meaning at all? Next, the question receives a provisional answer: there must be total meaning because of the partial meaning extrapolated from the “parts,” which come from an already experienced and narrated past. All of this occurs within a horizon of interpretation, and when the element of nonsense breaks in, it shows us that the projections of meaning, that we attempt to display, are inadequate. In radical instances, these are life-negating and threaten to stamp out all that we think we know about the meaning of the whole, and about history. Why, then, does the “yes” remain open?

3.4 Narrative Historicity, Praxical Anticipation Critical negativity must be applied within a narrative framework, because Schillebeeckx is concerned with the meaning of history and with the problem of suffering in relation to history. Human narrativity, what Schillebeeckx refers to most often as both personal and communal histories, is founded upon the apprehension and interpretation of a meaningful whole.113 It is, I would argue, essentially a “narrative historicity.” Such a historicity allows people to “tell what has happened to them” and to integrate diverging experiences into one theory/ narrative about reality.114 A narrative historicity is constitutive for human beings

113. Church, 14–16 [15–16]. See also pp. 20–21 [21]: “Experiential competence—and here the Old and New Testament are models—therefore has a narrative structure; it is a testifying life-story.” 114. Ibid., 20–21 [21]; Lieven Boeve, “Experience According to Edward Schillebeeckx: The Driving Force of Faith and Theology,” Divinising Experience: Essays in the History of Religious Experience from Origen to Ricoeur, ed. Lieven Boeve and Laurence P. Hemming (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2004), 202–03.

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who, by their very being human, “live by their own stories.” Narratives are given shape within a specific horizon of tradition, complete with the “prejudices” that come with that horizon, which cannot just be bracketed out of the horizon of human experience. Prejudices are in fact essential for interpreting the present, since “the authority of experience is therefore an authority from experiences and for new experiences.”115 3.4.1 Hermeneutics and Alterity The fusion of the horizons of tradition and contemporary experience (of an other) creates a hermeneutical “third” moment in interpretation (different from the “present” and “past” horizons, but interrelated with them) in which the subject becomes “conscious of the other as different within the fusion of the two spheres . . . that is understanding the past.”116 Here, the other as objecting itself and for-itself must be taken seriously, which changes the way that the subject must see its own past. In the encounter with the other, therefore, human narratives can be changed, both with regard to the (re-)interpretation of the past and in the expectation of, and attitude toward, the future, which is the content of human narrative historicity. The “contrast” element in experience opens up human structures, and on this level, the hope for the future elimination of suffering and its causes is “a knowledge which looks for the future and opens it up.”117 Here, Schillebeeckx has moved beyond Gadamer by affirming the essential role of alterity in the hermeneutic movement itself. The Gadamerian fusion of horizons concentrates on “bridging” the pastness of the past, and making it available in the present. The emphasis, in this reading of tradition hermeneutics, is on the making-present of an otherness from the past. This can also apply to expectations of the future, since these are also applied within a present-centered framework, that attempts to limit the otherness of the non-contemporaneous in favor of understanding mediated now. In contrast experience, the critical expectation of the good contrasts with the experienced present evil, while that evil is experienced as out-of-joint with the prior expectation of the good. There is a dialectical movement here, that runs from present to past and future. Each element is essential, but so is the preservation of that alterity that each temporalexperiential element brings with it. Schillebeeckx conceives of a hermeneutical-critical consciousness that, because of its experiences of otherness in the present, reorients human expectations of the future and, by extension, the course of the action that humans will take. In this way interpretation is a means to an end, and not an end in itself, where “orthopraxis,

115. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 24 [38]; Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Problem of SelfUnderstanding,” Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 49. 116. Schillebeeckx, “Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” GFM, 19 [29]. 117. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 814 [818–19].

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making everything new by virtue of God’s promise” is the primary focus of the future for believers, in light of the critical pressure of the past.118 Preserving the alterity of different time factors yields an understanding that is future-oriented. In narrative terms, this means that the changing nature of the “whole” of the narrative, and especially of the “part” that is already written, compels human beings in their situated freedom to work toward writing out the ending that they envision, one which corresponds with the utopian character of the human hope that has been revealed through experiences of contrast.119 Critical negativity, therefore, provides “a positive power which continues to exert pressure in order to bring about a better world, without humanity itself being sacrificed in the process.”120 The positive steps that are taken in search of the humanum, then, are also necessarily part of the “open yes” that grounds the critical “no” that compels people to act and alter unjust situations. The fact that the humanum is never reached should remind people (through still more experiences of negative contrast) that any claim to have found the “last word” on human emancipation is already a closing off of the “open yes” and an ideological formulation with the potential to become oppressive and violent. The dialectical interplay of “open yes” and the “critical no” gives rise, in Schillebeeckx’s later reflections, to an “ethics of indignation”: we experience that something in reality is not in order that calls out to be made right.121 Human history may not come out on the side of good. Even so, there remains a positive element in human experience of reality. This is manifest in the “refusal to acquiesce in the existing situation” of suffering and disorder.122 There is an “unknown” that cannot be perfectly or positively identified: “a new and better world which so far has never actually existed.”123 The very possibility that this world exists points toward the human openness to another reality. This can be found in “an unspecified, open ‘yes,’ and unshakable as the human ‘no’—actually more cogent, because an open ‘yes’ justifies and permits rebellion.”124 Christian orthodoxy, therefore, is grounded in and expressed by a liberating orthopraxis, not a purely theoretical anticipation of universal meaning, or an “ideology of no” that eschews any positive actions in the world in favor of a merely theoretical criticism of actual social conditions.125 The history of suffering, recognized by means of hermeneutic illumination, propels people toward the use of practical reason in the service of definitive, liberating

118. Schillebeeckx, “Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” GFM, 25–26 [37–38]. 119. Schillebeeckx, “New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 110–111 [126]. 120. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 115–116 [191]. 121. Schillebeeckx, “Liberating Theology: Reflecting on J.-B. Metz’s Political Theology,” Essays, CW vol. 11 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 78–79. 122. Schillebeeckx, “Liberating Theology,” Essays, 78. 123. Ibid., 79. 124. Ibid. 125. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory,” UF, 103–105 [119–21].

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praxis.126 Above all, this is the case because the origin of the “yes” is not to be found in pure transcendence or in a logical concept. It can only be found, and indeed founded in history: specifically in the “recognisably human face of that transcendence that appeared among us in the man Jesus, confessed as Christ the Son of God.”127 3.4.2 A Narrative Revelation: The Calling of Zacchaeus For Schillebeeckx, there is an essential difference between “theoretical anticipation,” and praxical anticipation, and it has to do, at least partially, with critical negativity. In Schillebeeckx’s valedictory lecture, given on the occasion of his retirement in 1982 and published in the next year, he gave an assessment of “theoretical anticipation” by examining a pericope from the Gospel of Luke concerning the conversion of the tax collector Zacchaeus (Lk 19:1-10). Tradition is not “primarily a disclosure of theoretical meaning,” it is “a narrative revelation of meaning” that is always accompanied by reflection, and in the case of Christianity, theological reflection.128 The narration of the content of the tradition is something that has to have “transformative, innovative, liberating, ultimately redemptive power.”129 The content needs to be liberative, or else it is not authentically religious. What constitutes “liberation” will be different depending upon the context, but this impulse toward liberation is tied up with God’s universal salvific will. Declaring that “God loves you,” or asking people whether they are “saved” is ultimately an expression of something theoretical and idealistic, which is not intrinsically connected to praxis.130 It is as though merely repeating a formula brings with it the apprehension of the truth or the privileged status as “saved.” That is not religion, it is magic. Citing Jesus’s calling of Zacchaeus, Schillebeeckx points out that Jesus does not merely repeat proscriptions of the law that Zacchaeus clearly already “knows.” Eidetic repetition of concepts says nothing to Zacchaeus, whose life as a public sinner is already quite comfortable. What Jesus does is come into the man’s home, “and his behaviour and dealings with his fellow man demonstrate to Zaccheus [sic] the truth of God’s love for Zaccheus.”131 This prompts Zacchaeus to change his way of dealing with others and to make amends for what he has done in the past.

126. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Erfahrung und Glaube,” Christlicher Glaube in moderner Gesellschaft, ed. Franz Böckle, vol. 25 (Freiburg, Basel and Wien: Herder, 1980), 106–08. 127. Schillebeeckx, “Erfahrung und Glaube,” 79. 128. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Theological Interpretation of Faith 1983,” Essays, CW vol. 11 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 45. The essay “Theological Interpretation of Faith 1983,” is a recent translation of Schillebeeckx’s valedictory lecture, published as Theologisch geloofsverstaan anno 1983 (Baarn: Nelissen, 1983). 129. Ibid., 55. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid.

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Theoretical anticipation merely takes the participatory schema of ultimate meaning and shifts its center of gravity from the past to the future. Simply put, to “participate” in total meaning tells us that total meaning already exists as a finished whole somewhere in the past and we are in the process of playing it out and are moving toward a prerecorded ending. We are part of the whole without having much, if any, significance to it; hence, the cosmocentric preoccupation with this view and the overall concern with order. History plays out like a sequence of events. Theoretical anticipation makes the same basic assumption: total meaning already exists in a finished form, and we need to find it by moving into the future. The “unfolding” of history will reveal more and more fragments of meaning that allow us to eventually grasp that whole which waits for us in the future. How is “praxical anticipation” any different? First, it assumes that “total meaning” is unfinished, not merely because of our historical perspective but because of history itself. What it means to be human cannot be finished off until history ends, until the general resurrection. The mystery of the Incarnation places God in the midst of this problem— as a human being, Jesus’s “meaning” is also unfinished insofar as we are still discovering what salvation is. When situations change, salvation must also be different. As a dialogical movement, history really is being written, and not just allowed to play out, like a player piano. The situated freedom of human beings, and their ability to make the world, necessitates a divine response in ever-new situations. Furthermore, a “situation” is not a uniform or even a definable concept in terms of exhaustively mapping out what a “situation” is or could be.132 There is no theoretical anticipation of what “the situation” can be if we take the future seriously. The unfinished nature of history, as an autonomous reality given by God to become what it will be, is what holds open the door to the ultimate meaning of that history and the people whose stories comprise it. An authentic hope for newness and future salvation means respecting this openness, and not closing the door to future possibilities because we have reached a momentary synthesis. As Philip Kennedy puts it, God has not “predetermined the course of human history . . . God does not expect human beings to implement a preordained divine blueprint for shaping the future, but has established humankind as the principle of its own action.”133 Returning to Zacchaeus, both he and Jesus have “theoretical” ideas about meaning and what it means to be truly human, to be a true Jew/Judean, and about the meaning of their lives. Zacchaeus is not confronted, however, with another theory, but with another person. He encounters a fragment of Jesus’s life and personal history that becomes a part of his own, and he runs up against places where his understanding of reality is inadequate because Jesus exceeds it. Here, “[t]he salvation that is founded in Christ as a promise for all becomes universal, not through the mediation of an abstract, universal idea,” but from its being

132. Ibid., 56. 133. Kennedy, “God and Creation,” 50.

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enacted in a personal encounter, a “praxis of the Rule of God.”134 God is a person, not a universal concept or an abstract notion of the highest good, or of universal reason. Mediation with another person is always a process of disclosure, discovery, and dialogue. Dialogue with a person is also a matter of both revealing and concealing. Relationships evolve and change over time, so the longer the amount of time that I know someone does not guarantee that I would know someone better. Interpersonal relationships are not predetermined. For this reason there can be no merely theoretical determination of who Jesus is, or a participation in his predetermined universal meaning—this relationship needs space and time to unfold. So, praxical anticipation means the enacting of the Rule of God through personal encounters with the other and the active identification and correction of suffering. It is not as though theory is not involved in this process. Narrative historicity implies that a theoretical worldview is already operative, but it needs to be open to correction. The liturgy and sacraments offer helpful insights into how this can function. They are essentially “anticipatory symbols” and not just theoretical projections. They explicitly mediate a personal encounter with God, not just an abstract idea. The liturgy is the place in which a prophetic vision of the world, and the accusation of the faults of the world, also takes place, making it an important site of actual theological action.135

Conclusion To sum up, we have recourse to the “performance hermeneutic” of Christian tradition as an illustration of this kind of praxical anticipation. Identifying perfect examples of praxical versus theoretical anticipation is difficult, since any praxis involves a serious element of theoretical mediation. At the same time, those who depend upon “theoretical anticipations” of reality often act in the world, but their actions are meant to confirm their preconceived projections of reality. In this respect, Anthony J. Godzieba’s “performance hermeneutic” captures what I want to say very well. Godzieba nods at Gadamer, in saying that understanding and interpretation are ontological because they “have to do with the interpreter’s historically-situated possibilities-for-being,” based on presupposed narrative historicity.136 He speaks of the unfolding and development of Christian tradition as being analogous to a performance of a musical work. The performance itself is not identical to the “score,” or to the textually transmitted tradition, and nor

134. Schillebeeckx, Church, 175 [176]. 135. Schillebeeckx, “The Mystery of Injustice,” 270. 136. Anthony J. Godzieba, “Ut Musica Christianitas: Christian History as a History of Performances,” The Shaping of Tradition: Context and Normativity, ed. Colby Dickinson, Annua Nuntia Lovaniensia 70 (Leuven, Paris and Walpole, MA: Peeters, 2013), 91–99; Anthony J. Godzieba, “‘. . . And Followed Him on the Way’ (Mark 10:52): Unity, Diversity,

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is it identical to the subject who performs it. The performance is “an interactive encounter between the freedom of the person and form of the structure” of a specific tradition that becomes, in musical terms, “style.”137 Style is a genuinely new element that arises from the praxical application of elements of a tradition by a subject in space and time. It is a “genuinely new and unprecedented reality” that has the capacity to break open previous expectation horizons, and to set a “new norm of expectation.”138 The interpreting subject draws upon traditions and sources of self-understanding from the surrounding culture including religious elements, scientific worldviews, popular culture, spoken language, and “high” culture, all of which form a language that is then performed through the subject’s active engagement in the world. As a religious tradition, Christianity provides “prototypical practices,” but not a set of prescriptions or an exhaustive lifeplan.139 In this way, an anticipatory performance hermeneutic is somewhat like a performer who still wants to remain faithful to the score: there are guidelines and a basic continuity, but the free moment of interpretation guarantees that we never merely “repeat” what is given from the past.140 In Godzieba’s words, “the moment of understanding is the moment of interpretation is the moment of application.”141 This short illustration of a “performance hermeneutic” demonstrates a Christian understanding of historically situated freedom that is conscious of its embeddedness in a tradition, but that does not allow the “text” of the tradition to circumscribe what each future performance will be. The parallel to musical performance is a visceral example of praxical anticipation. The church, the ecclesia, “is simultaneously its past, the appropriation of this past through performances in the present, and its eschatological liberative praxis.”142 Having reached this point, we must now ask whether contrast experience is, in fact, universal for human beings, and in order to do this, we must delve more deeply into the structure of that experience, the structure of experience in general, and by extension the structure of the human subject itself. This will help to illuminate the way that “praxical anticipation” can be made to function as an eschatological task. However, in order to examine this aspect we will be leaving

Discipleship,” Beyond Dogmatism and Innocence: Hermeneutics, Critique, and Catholic Theology, ed. Anthony J. Godzieba and Bradford E. Hinze (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2017), 228–54. 137. Godzieba, “Ut Musica Christianitas,” 95–96. 138. Ibid., 96. 139. Ibid., 98. Prototypes differ fundamentally from “archetypes,” in that a prototype does not exhaustively determine the content of what something can be, merely the base form, or starting point. See Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Bread Not Stone: The Challenge of Feminist Biblical Interpretation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 8–15. 140. Godzieba, “Ut Musica Christianitas,” 98. Cf. Gadamer, “On the Problem of SelfUnderstanding,” 45. 141. Godzieba, “Ut Musica Christianitas,” 92. 142. Godzieba, “. . . And Followed Him on the Way,” 248.

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the realm of strictly exegetical and historical excavation of Schillebeeckx’s work. In order to pull together a more comprehensive overview of human subjectivity and Christian anthropology—the new image of humanity—we will need to be more constructive in uncovering the foundation that Schillebeeckx himself never made explicitly clear in his works. This will involve engaging with some of the more prominent critics and commentators on his work from recent decades, while forming a coherent response. It will also necessitate that we draw closer connections between hermeneutics, ontology, and Christian eschatology.

Chapter 4 UNIFYING EXPERIENCE AND ANTHROPOLOGY— THE ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTION

Having examined the nature of contrast experience, as well as the praxical anticipation of the future as an eschatological position, we need to investigate whether or not “negative contrast experience” really does provide a universal pre-understanding for experiences of salvation coming from God. In short, is the resistance to unjust suffering described by Schillebeeckx in the dialectic between condemnation and “open yes” actually a universal human experience? Some theologians have disputed this “universality of suffering” in various ways. We will examine some of the objections to Schillebeeckx’s assertions in the service of coming to a better understanding of contrast experience as a theological and anthropological concept. Contrast experience does not, after all, stand entirely on its own; it depends on other structures active in the human subject. It is important for understanding Schillebeeckx’s overall theological enterprise, however, and will act as a window into the general structure of experience that he has described throughout his hermeneutical writings. I contend that experiences of contrast are an extreme form of general experience, and general experience is a category that can include revelation. Experience is also the source of human self-understanding that, as will be demonstrated, operates on an essentially “hermeneutical” model. We will see how the experiential dimension informs his anthropological considerations and the structure of experience. Any contemporary image of humanity must be connected to contemporary experience, and so Schillebeeckx provides us with a set of “anthropological constants” that we will examine and even augment. At the base of these constants lies an actualizing element for the human subject that grounds experience and makes it possible: radical finitude. By extension, the finitude of the human subject makes anthropological considerations possible through experience. Finally, all of these threads will be woven back together from an eschatological perspective.

4.1 Problematizing Negative Contrast Experience There are several critiques of Schillebeeckx’s category of contrast experience, and about the “universality” of it for humanity in particular. Mary Catherine

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Hilkert has raised questions based in part upon the critiques of traditional “universal anthropologies” coming from feminist and liberation theologians. It has been the case in the past that more traditional approaches “gloss over radical differences such as sex, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation.”1 Hilkert also notes that many of these same scholars are themselves searching for “some common basis for defending the dignity and rights of those persons who are most vulnerable.”2 The main critique of Schillebeeckx’s approach is that human apathy and bias often overwrite experiences of another person’s suffering to such an extent that we do not recognize it as being suffering at all.3 Rodenborn delivers a similar critique, based mostly on Metz’s work, that characterizes the contemporary age as an “age of apathy” in which people do not in fact stand up for others in the face of unjust suffering.4 The careful repression of guilt through bureaucracy is the hallmark of the modern era, which means continued distanciation between subjects.5 “Bureaucracy” is a good description, in fact, since most glib uses of “bureaucracy” entail “compartmentalizing” and the reorganization of the functions of governance and responsibility such that all the actors involved are only responsible for their own specific task. The tasks of others might as well be unrelated to my own. This gives rise to a cultural apathy, where subjects are unconcerned with suffering and evil, so long as it does not touch them personally. Rodenborn builds on this insight, saying that Schillebeeckx was unable to “account sufficiently for the crisis of hope that emerges with modernity that I have suggested unduly limits his eschatological project.”6 Finally, LaReine-Marie Mosely describes contrast experiences as beginning “with individual or communal awareness of evil and suffering.”7 Mosely notes that implicit or unconscious bias, especially racial bias, “clouds the human ability to say, ‘This should not be.’”8

1. Mary Catherine Hilkert, O.P., “The Threatened Humanum as Imago Dei: Anthropology and Christian Ethics,” Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology, ed. Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 129. See also Helen Bergin, “Edward Schillebeeckx and the Suffering Human Being,” International Journal of Public Theology 4, no. 4 (2010): 466–82. 2. Hilkert, O.P., “The Threatened Humanum as Imago Dei,” 129. She cites the critiques of Metz, M. Shawn Copeland, and Bernard Lonergan. 3. Ibid., 132–33. 4. Rodenborn, Hope in Action, 231–32, 323–26. 5. Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology, trans. James Matthew Ashley (New York: Crossroad, 2011), 46–59, 80–81. 6. Rodenborn, Hope in Action, 325–26. 7. LaReine-Marie Mosely, “Negative Contrast Experience: An Ignatian Appraisal,” Horizons 41, no. 1 (2014): 79. 8. Mosely, “Negative Contrast Experience: An Ignatian Appraisal,” 84.

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4.1.1 Universality, History, and Context Thus, there are two arguments: [1] contrast experience cannot be universal because all people, times, and cultures experience suffering differently, and [2] contrast experience is not universal because people so often ignore, or are unconsciously blinded to, the suffering of others and do not actually protest against that suffering. I want to respond to these critiques one at a time, but the answers will be interrelated. First, is it the case that Schillebeeckx glosses over the particularity of different instances of suffering? While he does not particularly emphasize this aspect, or the different possible experiential horizons of some specific social groups, the long section in Christ that looks at the suffering in different cultures and religions seems to contradict any assertion that he is not at least aware of the problem.9 Here, he looks at interpretations of Manichaeism, ancient Judaism, Greco-Roman cultures, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, the Enlightenment, and Marxism.10 Also, given the overall hermeneutical thrust of Schillebeeckx’s theology, it would be difficult to say that he does not recognize particularity or diverse pre-understandings, since that was one of the sources of his “break” with De Petter’s epistemology in the first place. Although the Greeks thought of suffering as being “inevitable,” they still suffered. The question of whether or not contrast experiences also existed in such a culture is somewhat different, however, since not all experiences of suffering are automatically contrast experiences. The underlying evidence would have to entail some protest against unjust suffering and the will to change things. It would be hard to deny that this was not the case in ancient cultures, since there have always been critically motivated movements in some form or another. These movements include the reforms of the Grachii in the Roman Republic, or the slave revolt of Spartacus. Perhaps most telling is the more mundane fact that slaves in the ancient world could and often did buy their own freedom. Recorded history is rife with social revolts against oppression on different scales, from Thomas Müntzer and John Huss, to Rosa Parks and Woody Guthrie. Even the millennia-old Epic of Gilgamesh includes the titular hero’s grief at his friend Enkidu’s death and protest at the prospect of his own impending demise in the form of a quest for eternal life. Gilgamesh ends his quest in resignation and acceptance of his own mortality, but his initial revolt against suffering and mortality, and his attempt to change his fate, was nevertheless etched into the cuneiform tablets and woven into the consciousness of early civilizations. The possibility of negative contrast experience, as a universal “pre-religious”

9. See Christ, 663–714 [670–723]. 10. Louis Dupré sees little merit in this part of Schillebeeckx’s work. Regardless of the accuracy of the content, which is better and more solid than Dupré would give him credit for, we cannot deny that Schillebeeckx is aware of the question of contextuality. See Dupré “Experience and Interpretation: A Philosophical Reflection on Schillebeeckx’s Jesus and Christ,” Theological Studies 43, no. 1 (1982), 46.

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response to suffering, also presupposes that suffering itself is universal. This necessitates that suffering be seen as suffering. To assess that “seeing as” aspect, we have the problem of written history which was too often a “history of the victors” and has so often easily written out the suffering of many. Even so, the fact that cultures and religions seem to always need to find a way to explain human suffering at all, or to explain it away, shows that is has been seen as a problem. Why write it into a metaphysical system, or a rational theory? Why spill so much ink telling us why suffering is either deserved, explainable, illusory, or ultimately just part of the “system” if it is so ordinary? Joy and meaning are problems to be explained in literature because they are incomplete, and they are fleeting. They contrast with other parts of life that are unpleasant, and that are undesirable. It is unlikely we can ever find a satisfactory final answer on the subject, but I think it probable that suffering, and protest against it, exists as a distinct universal possibility. We also need to expand our idea of what the “protest” part of contrast experience looks like, or can look like. The openness of the future horizon precludes any exhaustive description, but we cannot merely define the reflexive protest against suffering as social activism, or political engagement, or even a verbalized objection. The protest needs to occur at the level of mental activity for it to be counted. Externalized expression is something extra, which results from the initial contrast experience, and which can take many forms. Refugees fleeing their homes are clearly reacting to suffering, and by leaving they are saying “no” to the world as it is and gambling on the possibility of a better life. Calling them “economic migrants” does not mitigate this point, and in fact our willingness to label some refugees as “more worthy” than others says a great deal more about our indifference to suffering than it does about the realities of migration. The Western conception of so-called economic migrants as undeserving is a clear case of downplaying historical instances of suffering by relativizing the realities of crushing poverty in contrast to violent conflict. The fact that people do not always remain where they are to effect social change should bolster the case for contrast experience. Such migration shows that the situation is so grim that the only way to find fragments of the threatened humanum is to flee. Slaves cannot rebel against their masters, and wage-slaves continue to work in sweatshops, not because they do not have an understanding of “contrast” but because there is often no other conceivable option. For others, the best option is merely to join the side of the oppressors—anything that could potentially end the suffering and provide a better life.11 Realism does not necessarily indicate an absence of hope, but it does hint at

11. The various reactions to violence and extremism in the Middle East (especially under the so-called Islamic State), from outright flight, to capitulation to terrorist organizations in hopes of receiving better treatment have begun to be chronicled. For many, once reaching Western countries and obtaining residency, the very next step is to set up ways of raising money and supplies for those still suffering in their home countries. See Azadeh Moaveni, “ISIS Women and Enforcers in Syria Recount Collaboration, Anguish and

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the implicit goodness of being through the ferocity with which humanity, even in terrible situations, can cling to life. 4.1.2 The Intimacy of Suffering Schillebeeckx’s category of contrast experience is clearly meant to be something personal, as subjective experiences of suffering on the personal level. This is not to say that societies and groups do not suffer collectively, or that the contrast experience cannot be broadly applied, but that this requires something additional. Contrast experience is more problematic with regards to the interpretative framework that makes up an individual’s expectation horizon, since no two people, even if they are raised in the same culture, locality, or even family, will have the same expectation horizon. They might both experience suffering from the same event but, as we have said, these experiences will still differ. The specificity of a contrast experience, however, does not really lie in the question of whether or not groups can experience them. The history of the twentieth century is a history of suffering groups, ethnic cleansing, and genocide from Namibia and the Congo, to the Shoah and Rwanda in the more recent past. The real point is that no one can have a contrast experience on someone else’s behalf—the observation of others’ suffering does not lead automatically to my own suffering, and since the contrast itself emerges out of suffering, it must be a personal experience. So, seeing others suffer on television may lead me to have such an experience, but it may not, just as feeling pain may also lead to an experience of contrast in suffering, but this is also contingent upon the context. The key here is that “suffering” and “pain” are not automatically synonymous, but are instead interrelated. The long distance runner experiences pain in trying to win a race, pushing herself harder and at a faster pace, but to call this suffering or “unjust suffering” would be impossible. The runner is not being made into a victim, and is not being subjected to something unjust and beyond her control. This element of “beyond” is crucial to grasping the structure of contrast experience, but also of experience in general. The praxical force of contrast experience is something that occurs in the lived matrix of the experience itself. It is deeply personal. It is my experience of suffering that reveals my fundamental hope for something better, in dialogue with the question about the reason behind my suffering. Even so, this does not exclude the possibility of suffering with others.12

Escape,” The New York Times, November 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/ world/middleeast/isis-wives-and-enforcers-in-syria-recount-collaboration-anguish-andescape.html; Alice Su, “Is There a Link Between Refugees and Extremists?” Pulitzer Center, accessed December 2, 2015, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/there-link-betweenrefugees-and-extremism. 12. Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen/ Philosophical Investigations, 108e: “If one has to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I don’t feel on the model of pain which I do feel.”

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We need to be careful in making the distinction between suffering with others and recognizing the very personal aspect of suffering that occurs in the self. When Mosely says that it depends on “individual or communal awareness of evil and suffering,” that is not entirely accurate.13 It depends on individual or communal experience(s) of suffering, coupled with the fact that people in fact perceive suffering as suffering. Mere “awareness” is not enough for the “prereligious” aspect, since my awareness of suffering in others is not intrinsically related to whether or not I care about that other at the epistemic level. This is something that can only be achieved at the explicitly narrative level. Of course, “noticing” something entails a type of experience of it at the intellectual level. Gaining knowledge is a form of experience, but this is not what Schillebeeckx means in this instance. What he is talking about are direct experiences of suffering wherein the subject is the one placed under pressure and subjected to pain. Only narrative formatting from being formed in a tradition can give human subjects deeper awareness of the suffering of others, and so Christianity as a narrative tradition needs to cultivate this empathic aspect in order to better address the excess of suffering in the world. We lose the thread of Schillebeeckx’s argument in saying that it begins “when people notice evil and injustice in the world.”14 Again, we do not just notice it, we must actually experience it in an active sense, or else we reduce “contrast experience” to merely intellectual experience and we are, once more, back on a path toward idealism. Mosely points out the implicit biases present in linguistically mediated consciousness to show that human beings’ ability to be empathetic, to suffer with others, is impeded.15 She never makes the explicit link to the examination of prejudices, inherent in the hermeneutical method of interpretation taken over from Gadamer, or to the power of “reflection” taken from Habermas, but she does take an interesting step by presenting Ignatian spiritual practices as fulfilling a similar role.16 Scientific studies lend credence to this theory—implicit biases, ideological prejudices inherent in linguistic structures, do have a profound effect on human decision-making at the subconscious level.17 Even so, the hermeneutical-critical identification and correction of these biases can still be undertaken, and the fact of their existence says very little about

13. Mosely, “Negative Contrast Experience,” 79–80. 14. Ibid., 84. Emphasis added. 15. Ibid., 84–90. 16. Ibid., 91–95. 17. See Yara Mekawi and Konrad Bresin, “Is the Evidence from Racial Bias Shooting Task Studies a Smoking Gun? Results from a Meta-Analysis,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 61 (2015): 120–30. Especially p. 128: “In summarizing a decade of research on racial shooter biases, we found that across all studies, there were significant effects for reaction time and shooting threshold biases. Compared with White targets, participants were quicker to shoot armed Black targets, slower to not shoot unarmed Black targets, and were more likely to have a liberal shooting threshold for Black targets.”

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the impossibility of reacting against experienced suffering. It does tell us that conditions can prevent us from seeing the suffering of others as being a problem. In order to act as a “universal” starting point for talking about ultimate meaning, the potential must exist for contrast experience to be universal, such that it can occur in anyone confronted with personal, unmerited suffering. In order for this to be the case, it must rely upon a deeper, epistemology and, ultimately, upon an ontological structure inherent in the human person that allows it to function as a “basic” experience.

4.2 Contrastive Epistemology and Negative Dialectics The foundation and the basic movement between the negative and the positive in contrast experiences presupposes an essentially “negative epistemology.” Knowledge of the world is acquired and built based on difference and contrast with what is already known. Schillebeeckx worked out the structure of experience throughout many publications, mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, but there is broad continuity with his methodological work from the 1960s as well. In 2004, Lieven Boeve published an article on Schillebeeckx’s theory of experience and the interpretation of experience entitled “Experience According to Edward Schillebeeckx: The Driving Force of Faith and Theology.”18 The treatment of Schillebeeckx’s theology and theoretical framework is admirable and largely correct in its identification of a hermeneutical model of experience and of “experiencing” as an interpretive process performed by a human subject. I will use the “elements of experience” enumerated by Boeve to examine the different aspects of experience, before placing them all together to get a picture of the whole and of the overall connection with contrast experience. Boeve’s essay highlights how the “turn to hermeneutics challenged Schillebeeckx to highlight the notion of experience” as a source for theology.19 Boeve enumerates three basic elements of Schillebeeckx’s theory of experience. First, there is the so-called lived element or the interpretandum, “that which must be interpreted.”20 This is the emotion, deeds, words, or event that causes the interpretive process to begin. It is the ob-jective element of experience. Secondly, there are the interpretaments, or the “concrete images, concepts and narratives” used to give expression to the interpretandum.21 These linguistic elements of expression are not really secondary in nature to the

18. Boeve, “Experience According to Edward Schillebeeckx,” 199–225. 19. Ibid., 201. 20. Ibid., 202–03, 206. 21. Ibid., 207. These terms are explained in Jesus, 645 [746]. While interpretandum is a cumbersome term, I will primarily use it in conjunction with “lived element” of experience, since there is no ready alternative and it is inappropriate to refer to something like a pure or raw experience. Schillebeeckx himself acknowledges this in the short book, Interim Report

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event being expressed, but instead are the precondition for its expression at all. Furthermore, the network of interpretaments that human beings use are all held within an all-encompassing “theory,” interpretive framework, or a model that arises from, and also contains, the linguistic elements of interpretation.22 We will first deal with the theory aspect before moving to the interpretaments and the interpretandum. 4.2.1 Intersecting Elements of Experience There is some confusion over the definition and role of the terms “model” and “theory” in Schillebeeckx’s work. Boeve treats them as being essentially interchangeable,23 as does Schillebeeckx in some places.24 At least once, however, Schillebeeckx does differentiate, placing models between theories and the interpretaments utilized by the subject. Models correspond to particular functions in thought and experience, so the subjects possesses particular models (e.g., a heliocentric cosmos, atomic structure, the human vascular system, etc.) that inform the interpretaments used in interpretation, and they pertain to a more-orless specific area of knowledge, be it cultural, scientific, aesthetic, or otherwise. By definition, models are insufficient to their own tasks, but that is how they function.25 They mediate between theory and empirical experience. They interpret experiential data and help to form a “theory” that, although never explicitly stated, is an overall understanding of the world possessed by the subject. The theory or theoretical framework is essentially the narrative historicity of the subject that is always changing. Theology also uses models in interpreting experience; thus, it makes more sense to think of a “model of satisfaction” to explain the event of the crucifixion in Anselmian terms, than it does a “theory of satisfaction.”26 Models can and often are shared within a specific temporal and cultural horizon. Models cannot be made into dogmas; what is “dogma,” in the strict sense, is only what has occurred “in the history of Jesus’ life and which through [a particular] model is being put into words.”27 Dogmas are the expressions of thought about an event by means of a particular model. Thus, the elements of experience are the “lived experience” or objective element (interpretandum), the images, signs, and cultural elements used to express and interpret that lived experience (interpretaments),

on the Books Jesus and Christ. See Schillebeeckx, IR, CW vol. 8 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 15 [18]: “Naively trusting in so-called immediate experiences seems to me, therefore, to be a form of neo-empiricism.” 22. Boeve, “Experience According to Edward Schillebeeckx,” 207. 23. Ibid. 24. Schillebeeckx, IR, 14–15 [17]; Church, 18–19 [19]. 25. Schillebeeckx, “The Role of History,” 307–08. See also Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 537–544 [575–582]. 26. Schillebeeckx, “The Role of History,” 308. 27. Ibid., 308–09.

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the models that organize what has been experienced, and the overall narrative historicity, or theory, that makes up the subject’s horizon of self-understanding. Herein lies a version of the hermeneutic circle: linguistic elements are used to give expression to something, but those elements come from a preexisting framework culled from previous experiences; meanwhile, any new experience needs to be formulated differently, thus changing and expanding the theory used by an interpreting human subject.28 Models are constantly changing because they are based partially upon empirical experience and received knowledge. We can rightly ask, however, does the lived element, the interpretandum, lie inside or outside of this circle? Or must we think of it as being altogether different? In Schillebeeckx’s third Jesus volume, Church: The Human Story of God, he both clarifies and muddies the way that we can see the “lived” element of experience. He does this in terms of experiences of “revelation,” both sacred and profane. Schillebeeckx responds to two of his critics by saying that both have missed his point concerning interpretation. First, Louis Dupré accuses Schillebeeckx of downplaying the “objective” element of revelation and of attaching too much importance to the linguistic elements, such that the “lived element” already carries an interpretation that precedes and conditions human interpretation.29 On the other side, Ellen van Wolde has accused him of regarding the “lived element” as a kind of “substance” that is accessible and can be known directly.30 To clarify, Schillebeeckx actually wants to take a middle position between these two approaches in claiming that there is certainly a “direction of interpretation” (“een eigen interpretatierichting”) already present in an experience.31 This aspect means that the experience itself is no empty cipher, although the specific content of this “direction” is not “objectifiable” (in the common use of “objectify,” to make something exhaustively available to intellection)—it cannot be known with certainty as though it were something to be grasped. Instead, this “direction” contributes substantially to the resulting interpretation, without determining it fully, because it is only one factor among many, including of course the linguistic elements and the interpretive (linguistic) models. The linguistic elements (interpretaments) essentially come from “outside,” as inherited pieces of a contextual and cultural horizon. They are incorporated into an interior “model,” created by the human being that selectively chooses some things over others, affiliation or distance from certain traditions, power structures, media outlets, or faith traditions. The interpretandum touches the interpretive framework (models and theory) by means of the interpretaments, and

28. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 17 [31–32]. 29. Schillebeeckx, Church, 37 [38]. See Dupré, “Experience and Interpretation,” 42–47. 30. Schillebeeckx speculates that the confusion stems from the use of the traditional formulation “substantia fidei,” which could be misleading given its scholastic/Aristotelian connotations. Cf. Church, 38 [39], n. 30. 31. Schillebeeckx, Church, 37–38 [38]; Mensen als verhaal van God, 57. Emphasis original.

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in this sense they are invaluable to human experience—images, cultural symbols, and language (all linguistic elements) are the “stuff ” that experience is made of, although they can be reconfigured in many different directions. For example, contemporary American English has been reciprocally shaped by particular Western artistic representations, and especially by a constellation of American television programs. The generations of Americans growing up between roughly 1960 and 1998 were exposed to a remarkably similar list of “classic” television shows, creating a self-referential system that penetrated all aspects of culture and language, and generated new content. This more-or-less homogenous horizon is beginning to fade away now that many programs from the 1960s and 1970s (to say nothing of the Warner Brothers cartoons of the 1930s–1950s) are no longer widely available or commonly viewed, whereas they were once nearly ubiquitous points of reference. This is not a “clearly defined inside and outside,” as though the elements of a theory could be separated surgically from the theory and the experience it interprets, as some have thought. Rather, the elements all exist as inherited pieces of a linguistically constituted contextual worldview. Schillebeeckx has been greatly misunderstood if he is taken to be saying that the interpretaments and the theory, or even models, can be perfectly separated from one another, or even from the interpretandum. Schillebeeckx insists that experience is in no way simply a product of the cultural-linguistic elements, as a “projection” and neither is it something purely determined by the interpretandum.32 Instead, what we are left with is a much richer and more complex picture achieved by Schillebeeckx’s response to his critics and the ruling out of the “from above” and the “from below” views of experience. 4.2.2 Subject and Object Schillebeeckx resists collapsing the subject-object relationship in any way by maintaining the independence of that which ob-jects itself and the interpreting subject, but the relationship is neither a smooth nor a clear dualism. What appears as an ob-ject is always already within the theoretical model of those who perceive it. Schillebeeckx recognizes that since the time of Kant: the insight has grown that a theory or model has a certain primacy above the experience, at least in this sense, that, on the one hand there are no experiences without at least an implicit theory and, on the other hand, that theories cannot be derived from experiences by induction, but are the human spirit’s own creative initiative.33

The models have a determining effect upon the interpretandum, giving some form to what it can be interpreted as being, after having been reflected upon.

32. Schillebeeckx, Church, 19 [19–20]. 33. Schillebeeckx, IR, 14–15 [17].

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The process of reflection also affects the “real content of experience.”34 Here, the question of whether or not believers and nonbelievers experience differently, or simply interpret differently, can be raised. Is the phenomenon observed actually different? Or is it just being interpreted differently? First, this raises the question of the overall theoretical structure of interpretation (theory and models) that constitutes the subject. Structure and form are not “added” to thinking from the outside, as a post factum element of experience. We add to our interpretive framework through new experiences and reflections, but this framework is also the form in and through which we think. The form of our thought is part of experiencing and perception, down to the roots. There is no “objective perspective” from which we begin to experience, thereafter adding models, linguistic elements, and other interpretive symbols thereto.35 There is no neutral point of experience or interpretation, since it all relies on thinking in models; so, to ask whether the experience of faith is not “merely” an interpretation presumes that [1] religious faith is an impediment to seeing reality as it is, and [2] reality is somehow perfectly accessible from another human perspective, given enough insight. We can never really say with “rational certainty” how and what “the world” is and will be, and therefore also the “true interpretation” of reality is one which is not accessible in experience simply by possessing the correct theory; this is because of the eschatological openness of the future. This is true, even if the experiencing subject does not believe himself to possess a “theory”; there is no such thing as purely descriptive language, uncontaminated by theory and interpretation.36 What gives the interpretandum its power, if it is not to be seen simply as being an empty cipher or already fully determined through the projection of subjective elements, is precisely that it is something new—an element that comes from outside of a human subject and is not necessarily beholden to the expectations or models of that subject: “Reality is always different from and more than had been thought.”37 The direction that an interpretandum brings with it is precisely here in what is new and surprising or what “we ourselves had never thought of and never produced occurs to us as a gift.”38 We cannot say that experience occurs against the background of unalterable patterns of thought and merely confirms our previous thought patterns because our theoretical picture of the world is always changing, as the models used to interpret reality are modified in light of new experiences. Reality offers resistance to our predictions, showing where it is independent of us, through the “resistance and refractoriness of reality, which will not always fit in with these rational anticipations.”39

34. Schillebeeckx, Church, 20 [19]. 35. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 39 [53]. 36. Ibid., 39–40 [53–54]. 37. Ibid., 20 [35]. 38. Schillebeeckx, Church, 21 [22]. 39. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 20 [34].

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The contradiction or challenge presented to our thought structures and expectations is what makes all of our plans, constructs, and patterns possible. We live by “guesses and hypotheses, projects and constructs, and therefore by trial and error.”40 However, there remains the possibility to affirm or deny that such an experience has occurred, because interpretive frameworks are freely made and when this is denied we are present to a moment of ideological suppression. Hence, ideologies (in the negative sense) are those narratives that do not allow for correction or flexibility, but react against all external pressure. Even preventing change is itself a form of change. The narrative that we tell ourselves about the past appears so strongly to us as being true, that evidence to the contrary must be blocked out and denied. On this point, Schillebeeckx recognizes the danger of “traditions” in influencing interpretive models in terms of ideological bias. As we have seen, he takes up Habermas’s critique against Gadamer to show that pure hermeneutics, as an “illumination of existence,” is not enough.41 Even so, for Schillebeeckx one of the greatest proofs of the authority of the newness of experience is the fact that institutions and structures so often attempt to manipulate and de-claw them in order to make them fit pre-established, ideological ways of thinking.42 4.2.3 Positive Aspects of Negative Experiences The appearance of an object in experience consists in its ob-jecting on the subject’s field of perception, “experiences of opposition and the intractability of the reality in which we live.”43 This formulation suggests something that occurs entirely independently of the subject’s will or initiative. It occurs, or happens to us. In Dutch, the formulation is “weder-varen.” Bernadette Schwarz-Boenneke has critiqued Dupré and Boeve on the point where both speak about the “experience” and the “interpretation,” with a correlation between the two, implying a correspondence or adequation of “object of experience” (interpretandum) and “interpretation.”44 “Experience” is used to denote interpretandum as a “non-linguistic” or prelinguistic moment. “Experience” then takes on a different meaning as the result of the process of interpretation, forming a complex whole but in which “experience” in the proper sense is the pre-reflexive contact of subject and object.45 Schwarz-Boenneke’s attempt to differentiate between “opposition,” or “occurrence” (the German translation of the Dutch wedervaren here is widerfahren, which could be creatively rendered in English as “opposition”—

40. Ibid. 41. Schillebeeckx, “Theological Criteria,” UF, 59–60 [66–67]; Church, 16–18 [17–18]. 42. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 22 [37]. 43. Schillebeeckx, Mensen als verhaal van God, 47; Church, 28 [27]. 44. Schwarz-Boenneke, “Die Widerständigkeit der Wirklichkeit,” 104–05. Cf. Boeve, “Experience According to Edward Schillebeeckx,” 206–07, 215–17; Dupré, “Experience and Interpretation,” 42–44. 45. Schwarz-Boenneke, “Die Widerständigkeit der Wirklichkeit,” 104–05.

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something comes to the subject from the outside and opposes it as an other) as the first moment of experiencing, and “the experience” as the cognitive process and progress of recognition is supposed to avoid a terminological confusion.46 In fact, this just draws the same line between linguistic/nonlinguistic aspects by separating the “pre-linguistic moment” of contrast, as though this “pre-linguistic moment” was not in fact already a part of “experience” as a complex of movements. What Schwarz-Boenneke points us to, and which is extremely significant, is that “[e]xperience stands open in its structure to and for what occurs [widerfahren].”47 Something is perceived against a background, or a horizon of expectation, that is constituted by our theoretical framework. That “something,” or object “occurs” and is not understood. This is also an inner moment of interpretation. The moment of identification is in the experience itself, because we can think different perspectives at the same time—nonrecognition and identification come to us together, even if it is only in the sense that nonrecognition is a form of identification. From this perspective, experience gives us access to reality.48 In the further analysis, however, Schwarz-Boenneke makes the same basic “mistake” as both Boeve and Dupré do by artificially breaking up “experience” into a prelinguistic “something happens to the subject,” and the linguistic interpretation of it, which really seems to constitute “experience.” This would make experience much more subjective than it really is. Such a mistake is, however, also Schillebeeckx’s mistake, or at least a problem in his descriptions of experience. In his own words, experience “is not to be reduced to interpretation,” and “[i]n this sense there are pre-linguistic aspects in the unitary complex of experience and interpretation, but that moment of experience never comes to expression without interpretation.”49 This is a misleading formulation insofar as the “moment of contrast” or “occurrence,” contact with the ob-jecting object, is also a moment of interpretation. The “given” element of reality is also an intrinsic part of experience as a complex whole. “Reality remains independent of the perceiver, something we cannot manipulate or change,” but as a “given” phenomenon it is also connected to the experiencing human subject.50 In experience, the subject and object are both connected and held apart. Even in an experience of “non-recognition,” it is no less linguistic than the eventual identification through cognitive processes. Both are a part of experience as a whole, and every interpretandum is already an interpretans. There is no “pre-linguistic” moment except in the phenomenological sense of the

46. Ibid., 105. 47. Ibid., 99. My translation. 48. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 20 [34]. 49. Schillebeeckx, Church, 38 [38]. Emphasis added. In Theologisch testament, Schillebeeckx speaks only of contrast experience as “pre-religious, and therefore accessible to all.” See Theologisch testament, 128–29. 50. Mary Catherine Hilkert, O.P., “Experience and Revelation,” The Praxis of the Reign of God: An Introduction to the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx, ed. Mary Catherine Hilkert and Robert J. Schreiter, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 63–64.

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object, as existing in-and-for-itself, apart from subjective perception, formatting, or projections. Even the pre-reflexive recognition of an object as something perceived is already dependent upon linguistically constituted and calibrated structures of interpretation: “Experience is traditional experience.”51 Pure, unmediated experience is, “[i]llusory, because all experiences, even mundane experiences, are theoretically mediated.”52 Because of the transcendent nature of reality—it always exceeds our grasp, and yet our grasping at reality is prompted by contact with that reality—all experience has the same essential structure as contrast experience. Every experience, no matter how mundane or repetitive, is in some aspect different, and so adds to and reshapes our expectation horizon and our theoretical framework. Our narrative historicity changes through each and every experience. The negative aspect is milder, and when our expectation horizon “cracks” under the weight of reality, the “suffering” we experience is not pronounced; it cannot even really be named as suffering in the same way as that of unmerited suffering of victims of violence and oppression. Still, the break in our understanding, fleeting though it may be, produces an essential “negative” moment and a contrast with what was expected. The hermeneutical character experience functions at the very core of the experiencing human subject, moving from the “whole” it anticipates, and the whole of the subject’s self-understanding, to elements or fragments that do not entirely confirm what was once there. The whole changes in light of the parts, and more and more breaks occur with every experience, only to be reconstituted in the process of interpretation. All experience is contrastive, while extreme instances that cause the subject to react against what is presented invoking a good, or vision of wholeness that should have been present more forcefully than mundane experience. As Mary Catherine Hilkert says, “we learn by way of discovery.”53 The essential difference is that contrast experiences indicate existential threats to the subject’s well-being, while contrastive experiences are less extreme and merely require a mental adjustment of expectation horizons. Does this “contrastive” epistemology negate the Gadamerian fore-conception of completeness? Ultimately no, because there must already be a narrative historicity possessed by the subject (for Gadamer this is “tradition”) for new elements to contrast with. The wholeness anticipated by the subject is provisional, not absolute, “and only when this assumption proves mistaken—i.e., the text is not intelligible—do we begin to suspect the text and try to discover how it can be remedied.”54 The experience of reality is an experience of limits. Such an epistemological model entails a slow and steady process of linguistic differentiation, not just in the sense that all things are known with respect to what they are not—this structuralist position is too simplistic since it removes the possibility of identifying objects and

51. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 23 [38]. 52. Schillebeeckx, “Theologie der Erfahrung—Sackgasse oder Weg zum Glauben?” Herderkorrespondenz 92 (1978), 392. My translation. 53. Hilkert, “Experience and Revelation,” 63. 54. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 294.

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signs in and through other objects and signs that accompany them. The liturgy, for example, is a context in which signs are known based on their association with other signs. The communal celebration of the Eucharist especially highlights the necessity of “co-signifiers” in order to recognize what something is. Without the liturgical and communal context, the Eucharistic elements of bread and wine can really only be just bread and wine, ordinary food and drink, and not signs that make Jesus Christ present in a particular way.55 Linguistic differentiation is, then, not just negative, but it does presuppose a certain negativity or a gap in understanding that needs to be bridged through the complex of experience, including our pre-understanding and post-evental interpretation—contrastive experience. Thus, hermeneutical distanciation remains a critical part of the process of interpretation, even if it is also characterized by resolving ambiguities and provisionally interpreting “something that appeared odd and unintelligible: we have brought it into our linguistic world.”56 In each experience, the negative element is encountered as a break in the subject’s narrative framework, which needs to be reconstituted to include the object of experience. By reconstituting itself, the subject is revising its own selfunderstanding, hence Gadamer’s assertion that “[a]ll human self-understanding is determined in itself by its inadequacy.”57 We can recognize here the same basic structure of subjective striving toward the world, contact with an object, recoil from that object because of its irreducible difference, and then a reoriented striving. All experience relies on contrast at its most basic level. All experience searches for continuity in the overwhelming face of difference. When this continuity is frustrated, the “pain” of the break in our interpretive horizon throws us back upon ourselves and our expectation of meaning is thwarted in favor of a confrontation with an otherness that does not yet have a meaningful place within the whole of our narrative historicity. Understanding involves a moment of “loss of self,” or of the realization of a break in my interpretive horizon that helps to constitute the boundaries of the self.58 There is a back-and-forth relation between discovery and concealment, partially represented by spiritual freedom. So, self-understanding is a negative understanding of oneself through being called into dialogue with an other, whether it is an inanimate object, a text, or another subject. This point of contact with an object involves the destruction of the “self,” if only for an instant. Schillebeeckx broadly calls certain experiences “revelatory”; those experiences which cause people to change their actions and to rethink their interpretive models. These experiences produce a self-reflective moment, “in which we recognize the

55. See Minch, “Language, Structure, and Sacrament: Reconsidering the Eucharistic Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx,” 109–12. 56. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Scope and Function of the Hermeneutic Problem,” Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 32. 57. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Nature of Things,” Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 80. 58. Gadamer, “On the Problem of Self-Understanding,” Philosophical Hermeneutics, 51.

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deepest of ourselves” because they force us to consciously think about the models that we use in interpretation—in some cases these moments even force us to consciously change our interpretive models.59 In an extrapolation from Gaudium et Spes 41, Schillebeeckx observes that “[t]heology is not anthropology, but a theological statement is at the same time an anthropological statement.”60 This, as part and parcel of God’s revelation of humanity to itself, gives us license to look for divine revelation in historical human experience. An event calls for metanoia, and an essential reevaluation of a person’s stance in life “through disintegration, to a new reintegration with a different orientation.”61 Even if we do not consciously change, though, there is still a change that occurs. Even the decision to ignore an experience or “revelation” is a change in the model, or a reaction against what cannot be un-experienced. Thus, there is always an aspect of subjective freedom that can affirm or deny what occurs, and it is the duty of a religious tradition to foster openness to areas in which the divine in-breaking of grace occurs. The grace of revelation “comes over individuals, and yet it is their own act.”62 Hence, the moment of dissolution of the self in experience is also the moment of self-understanding. Interpreting and experiencing, then, are both wrapped up into a single whole, and can be separated from one another only in theory. Practically speaking, each experience relies upon the linguistic interpretive frameworks that precede it in order to be experienced at all, and to be expressed. Therefore there is no such thing as “raw experience” or a pre-linguistic experience. Rather, the lived interpretandum, is something independent of the linguistic theory (horizon of past experiences) of the subject, but which can only be experienced because that theory exists and will eventually impact and change this theory in order to be given expression by the newly formed framework that the subject creates in response thereto. Each new lived element has the power to alter the character of the whole, but these elements cannot be received without the whole already being in place for them to affect it in the first instance. Experience, according to Schillebeeckx, and experiential competence or what we might call “being experienced (in a tradition)” has a narrative structure.63 This structure is not static, but a constant back-and-forth between interpretive frameworks from the past that form a narrative understanding of the past and new lived elements of experience that force these narratives to change. As a historical being, the human subject has a narrative historicity, but one that can remain openended because the end of that narrative has not been written, and each “revelation” can potentially change the direction the narrative might take in the future while simultaneously rewriting the past entirely. Furthermore, the contrastive aspect of experience is not “merely” negative in the sense that it reveals positive aspects of reality to us. Joy, hope, grace, and other positive experiences of life are also

59. Schillebeeckx, Church, 22 [22]. 60. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 42 [56]. Emphasis original. 61. Schillebeeckx, Church, 22 [22]. 62. Ibid., 23 [23]. 63. Ibid., 21 [21]. Cf. Boeve, God Interrupts History, 63–74.

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“contrastive” in the sense that they are not just projections of our expectations, culled from preconceived notions of experience.

4.3 Reaching the “Absolute Limit” Schillebeeckx emphasizes that “[r]eality is always more and different from what we imagine it to be.”64 This is important to grasp, and to repeat, because it is so often forgotten in the course of human attempts to plan out and master the world. It also speaks to humanity’s inability to ground its own existence in itself—we are always dependent upon something that precedes us for our being, given the ontological function of language in the process of understanding. Each person has their own linguistic being, but because the structure is so fluid and dynamic there is no necessity, or even possibility, for people to become in the same way, which would require everyone to have precisely the same language and narrative historicity. While the object has a certain priority in experience, how we experience it matters. Some narratives are more attuned to it than others, or are differently attuned. Here is where openness and “closed” ideological narrativity differ fundamentally. The assumption of plurality and openness to what will come next, especially when it is unknown or cannot be predicted, is to make a choice for how that object will be received. Schillebeeckx opened this field as a “thinker of difference” but in an applied way, that is, with regard to personal suffering. Though suffering, we have reached a universalizable point through human suffering as a window into the common structure of human experience. This is essentially a universality via historically particular mediation—the humanum cannot exist without historical, particular people since the universal concept of humanity “remains ambiguous.”65 Even pre-reflexive experience, the experience of suffering, or the perception of the interpretandum as contrastive experience, does not give us much in the way of answers—instead, it is the source of many of our questions.66 This, in itself, is a useful insight, but we will not find any recipes for action in the world at this level, as was once hoped. Christianity, as a narrative that variously impacts how human beings become themselves in the world, avoids a “pure eschatologism,” or imaginary other-worldliness because it is rooted in the historical event of Jesus of Nazareth.67 As a historical reality, Christianity must ascribe importance to hermeneutical experience as a place where something theologically relevant can be learned; experience

64. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 32 [47]. Material from Section 4.3 was previously published as Daniel Minch, “Re-Examining Edward Schillebeeckx’s Anthropological Constants: An Ontological Perspective,” Salvation in the World: The Crossroads of Public Theology, ed. Stephan van Erp, Christopher Cimorelli, and Christiane Alpers, T&T Clark Studies in Edward Schillebeeckx (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 113–30. 65. Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 552 [591] 66. Schillebeeckx, “Theological Criteria,” UF, 45 [50]. 67. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 38 [52].

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is a locus theologicus, and as such it is also revelatory for the content of the humanum. A metaphysical structure of the world, or of the supernatural world, does not reveal much about humanity without it being grounded in experience, and in reality all metaphysics is an a posteriori extrapolation. What has been called metaphysics in the past is an organizing system through which we interpret reality, and through which we come to an understanding of the world and its ordering principles—that is, the analysis of our stories to find the structuring elements in them that make us experience the world as we experience it. Every metaphysical system is a “model” in interpretation, as we have defined models above. This view is fundamentally different from thinking that speculation brings us to automatic, rational, a priori building blocks through the use of which we can then filter out experience. There is a “regulation” of our view of reality, because we have an expectation of the future, but neither our view of the past nor of the future is entirely fixed. Criticism can force us to change our stories, which alters our structures. The cosmocentric trend of “insight” over ethics must be subverted. In order to make this step in Catholic theology, Schillebeeckx proposed a set of “anthropological constants” that should be kept in mind whenever considering the possibilities of human personal identity within particular social cultures.68 Essentially, they constitute his attempt at a general (philosophical) anthropology, which came after the bulk of his hermeneutical studies had been completed. We will examine these “seven” anthropological constants in the following paragraphs. Just as our investigation of contrast experience revealed something deeper about Schillebeeckx’s overall epistemology, this current investigation will show a more basic fundamental insight that grounds his anthropology. Ultimately, we will be able to show that the “one” constant that grounds all of the others is both an ontological constant as well as the very ground of human experience. This will not subvert what has been said above about the inability of the human subject to ground its own existence in itself, but will help to justify it. 4.3.1 Preconditions for a Hermeneutical Anthropology From the outset, Schillebeeckx is careful to avoid the idea that one particular view of humanity, based on sociological or cultural observations, will create one normative and universalizable portrait of humanity suitable to Christian theology. Humanity itself, he says, is “a dynamic, cultural concept; it is a cultural, not a natural concept, however much it may be tied up with nature. Culture shapes people and people shape culture.”69 This is why he shifted to negative experiences of suffering in looking for ways of naming the threatened humanum. He also does not begin with a purely ontological approach. Instead, and by utilizing a phenomenological approach, Schillebeeckx begins from the point of embodiment.70 “In his very

68. Ibid., 728 [734]. 69. Schillebeeckx, “Liberating Theology,” Essays, 74. 70. In particular, following the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. See Kennedy, Schillebeeckx, 42.

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essence,” Schillebeeckx writes, “man [sic] is a narrative, a historical event rather than a pre-determined fact.”71 He goes on to sketch the “anthropological constants” as a system of coordinates related directly to humanity’s embodiment in the world. These are meant to be broad, but essentially “universal” elements of human experience that point the way toward a more human future that is consonant with Christian salvation, but is not necessarily coterminous with it. By the publication of Schillebeeckx’s second Jesus volume in 1977, he had come a long way from the position of his inaugural lecture at Nijmegen in 1958, in which he asserted that salvation, at least as it is realized within lived history, is consonant with human attempts at the “humanization” of the world, arguing that Christian values have become “secularized” and have so penetrated Western culture that they now find expression in human efforts.72 Such a strong position had already faded by the start of the Second Vatican Council, as a result of his engagement in a renewed study of eschatology. Even so, Schillebeeckx never stopped believing in the importance of praxis and of Christian action in the world; he also no longer assumed broad or easy continuity between Christian salvation and secular efforts.73 In fact, he states clearly that “as a Christian I have less confidence in this political reason, even within a state system which works in a very democratic way.”74 Schillebeeckx takes a phenomenological route in terms of looking for “constants” that span cultures, national boundaries, and contextual limitations. This does not mean, however, that the essential position that these constants are built upon do not rest on more fundamental philosophical principles. In fact, a careful archaeology of the foundations of Schillebeeckx’s thought reveals a whole world of work going on just beneath the surface, just as was the case with negative contrast experience. Schillebeeckx has, with his “system of coordinates of man and his salvation,” left a corner of this foundation uncovered. From here, we can see that Schillebeeckx actually made the so-called transcendental move much earlier in his work than he would let on, and that the true universal element of his theology is buried just below the surface. The answer lies in Schillebeeckx’s turn to

71. Schillebeeckx, “Questions on Christian Salvation of and for Man,” Toward Vatican III: The Work That Needs To Be Done, ed. David Tracy with Hans Küng and Johann Baptist Metz (New York: Gill and MacMillan, 1978), 30. Hereafter: “Questions.” 72. Schillebeeckx, “The Search for the Living God,” Essays, CW vol. 11 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 35–38. See p. 36: “…what was formerly Christian charity is now known as social justice.” 73. I directly dispute the alleged “optimism” of Schillebeeckx with regard to modernity and contemporary culture. His writings simply do not support facile optimism or an uncritical “overlap” between Christian salvation and human efforts, but instead they reveal a thoroughly Christian hope informed by eschatology. See Edward Schillebeeckx, “God, Society and Human Salvation,” Faith and Society/ Foi et Société/ Geloof en maatschappij: Acta Congressus Internationalis Theologici Lovaniensis 1976, BETL 47, ed. Marc Caudron (Gembloux, Belgium: Éditions J. Duculot, 1978), 87–99. 74. Schillebeeckx, Jesus in Our Western Culture, 80.

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hermeneutics, and his subsequent methodological shift, including his engagement with critical theory. As far as we can tell, Schillebeeckx transitions from speaking about seven (or eight) constants to primarily referring to one around 1978, but the thread had been in his work since at least his turn to hermeneutics, expressed in “Towards a Catholic Use of Hermeneutics” in 1967.75 Part of what has made Schillebeeckx such an important thinker has, in fact, been his commitment to hermeneutics while keeping in mind that this is “not proposing a method; [it is] describing what is the case.”76 In other words, the hermeneutical worldview taken over by Schillebeeckx from Gadamer and Heidegger, does not merely judge between competing interpretations of the world, a posteriori. It is a thoroughgoing examination of the very foundations of being itself, and therefore has ontological import. Understanding is not simply of language, but it actually occurs by means of language.77 There is no mediation without medium, and therefore no content can be given without form, which as the form of expression is also co-constitutive of meaning of what is expressed.78 Truth is co-constituted by the context in which a statement arises, in both its form and its expression, because of the radical way in which “form” impacts upon content.79 This is also true for the experiencing human subject, who is formed by the active process of understanding the world, in and by means of language. “Language” does not merely mean spoken languages, or written texts, or some combination of discrete signs that phonetically or pictorially represent words. Instead, a “language” is an open set of images, patterns, themes, as well as the written and spoken word that human beings use to organize our perception of reality (and which conversely influences how our reality can be organized). Furthermore, linguistic expression does not merely “presuppose” thought by translating it into speech. Something like “pure” thought would, in this case, be “reduced to a certain emptiness of consciousness and to an instantaneous desire.”80 Speech and gestures actually accomplish thought.81 The human subject must understand both from what is given, as well as what is given; the difference is as follows: understanding from what is given is the default mode of understanding in the world. We are

75. See Edward Schillebeeckx, “Ik geloof in God, Schepper van hemel en aarde,” TGL 34 (1978): 5–23. Translated as, “I Believe in God, Creator of Heaven and Earth,” God Among Us: The Gospel Proclaimed, trans. John Bowden (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 91–102. 76. Gadamer, “Hermeneutics and Historicism (1965),” 512. Emphasis original. 77. Ebeling, Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language, 119, 126; cf. Betti, “Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften,” 178. 78. In contrast to the mistaken view of hermeneutics taken by Leo Scheffczyk in “Christology in the Context of Experience: On the Interpretation of Christ by Edward Schillebeeckx,” The Thomist 48, no. 3 (1984), 404–05, 407. 79. Boeve, “Orthodoxy, History and Theology,” 186; Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen/ Philosophical Investigations, 98e, 106e. 80. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 189. 81. Ibid., 182–92.

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initially given language, and “no one is sovereign over his or her own speech. As a beginning, we can say that the speaker appeals to a language which he or she did not invent, but which was already given to the speaker.”82 This constitutes a way of “being experienced” in a particular linguistic tradition. One adopts the language, the structures of meaning, given over by the context and utilizes this as a means for organizing and understanding the world. Understanding what it is that is already given, however, is a process of examining our prejudices, our linguistic, and by extension our socio-temporal situatedness, and what this predisposes us to believe. The hermeneutical moment of self-examination of our own prejudgments about reality is of fundamental importance to human existence, and to our continued extension in the world. The hermeneutical movement between part and whole, which is also the movement between past horizon and present experience, is centered in the experiencing subject. There is an interplay of negative contrast and positive extension that goes into experience. The contrastive nature of all experience, which we have already sketched out, comes into play in looking for the ultimate ground of all experience. The initial moment of contrast (wedervaren) is inseparable from the positive reconstitution of our interpretive horizon, given that perceptions are formed to include the object in question. Again, even a response of “non-understanding” is a form of perception, and we now know “object X” as something that is not well understood. What allows for this structure of question-answer, or call and address, is only really articulated by Schillebeeckx in his final Jesus volume, although the fundamental insight runs throughout much of his earlier work. At its base, ontological finitude is the precondition for all knowledge, all experience, all revelation, and the foundation of the experiencing human subject. Schillebeeckx calls this foundation the “absolute limit” (absolute grens), and this can be demonstrated to be the root of all of the anthropological constants that he enumerates in his earlier work. Experience provides the link between the phenomenological and the ontological structures of Schillebeeckx’s theology and allows us to access the deepest foundations of being as the point at which we can make a truly “transcendental” move in the search for what is “universally human.” “The absolute limit,” writes Schillebeeckx, “is thus the basic condition of our whole human existence.”83 The experience of this “absolute limit” is extrapolated from experiences of our various relative limits, or those places where we come up against a reality that is other than what we have imagined or expected. This makes it a mediated experience in and of itself, but through it we “experience that we are neither lords nor masters of ourselves, [and] far less of nature and of history.”84 Technically, we reach this barrier in each and every experience, since the process of understanding itself requires that our previous interpretive

82. Schillebeeckx, “The Magisterium and Ideology,” 8. 83. Schillebeeckx, Church, 77 [79]. 84. Ibid., 76 [78].

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framework “crack” in response to objective stimuli—contrastive experience. “We ourselves are this limit,” Schillebeeckx contends, whether we view ourselves as created beings in relation to an infinite God or not.85 Attempts to do away with this limit, through claims to total mastery of nature, or “absolute openness to the future” are equally ideological. Human beings “do not want to accept their finitude or contingency; they hanker after that which is not finitude, after immortality and omniscience, so that they can be like God.”86 By being posited as finite beings, this limit, along with our experience thereof, constitutes a universal human foundation that grounds the possibility of all experience by providing a relief against which new experiences can occur. Finitude can be interpreted in many different ways, but its facticity remains. The projection of wholeness is a direct expression of the absolute limit because it is through testing this projection against the challenge of experience that we run up against our relative limits in understanding, prompting the subject to create a new vision of wholeness. This is the basic hermeneutical-epistemological interplay of positive grasping and negative contrast. 4.3.2 Seven Anthropological Constants The anthropological constants elaborated by Schillebeeckx, in several places, all circle around the ontological finitude of the human subject without ever quite coming to the point.87 His desire to find a universal point of entry into the human person is tempered by his engagement with hermeneutics and critical theory, which are painfully aware of the problems of ideologically informed “universals.”88 The purpose of giving a “system of coordinates” is to furnish ways of speaking kataphatically about humanity and human values, particularly in terms of social culture. The constants themselves are not perfect a priori truths or concepts, but historically observed characteristics.89 There is a great deal of sensitivity given to the fact that any concrete norms for human life must be filled in with due regard given to their context. Each of the seven anthropological constants is somehow reducible to, and built on, the one ontological one:

85. Ibid., 76 [79]. 86. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in God,” 92. 87. These are seen in Christ, pp. 725–737 [731–43] and in his 1978 contribution to the volume Toward Vatican III, as “Questions on Christian Salvation of and for Man,” pp. 27–44. I will follow the latter here because of some additional material added to the beginning and end of the section, which is interesting and relevant to our current discussion. In 1976, he enumerated the first five constants in a slightly different form. See “God, Society and Human Salvation,” 89–90. 88. Schillebeeckx, “Questions,” 30–31. 89. Roger Haight, S.J., “Engagement met de wereld als zaak van God: Christologie en postmoderniteit,” Trouw aan Gods toekomst: de blijvende betekenis van Edward Schillebeeckx, ed. Stephan van Erp (Amsterdam: Boom, 2010), 92.

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finitude, or the absolute limit. We will enumerate the seven and their respective relationships to finitude here. The first constant is, in some ways, the most obviously related to finitude: human corporeality. The human being “both is and has a body,” and this embodiment ties humanity to ecology in a particular way.90 Specifically, we see this in the human need to create a “meta-cosmos” to inhabit the given world, making it more hospitable to humanity. Embodiment means that human existence is finite, both in time as organic beings oriented toward death, as well as in the fact of physical limitations. Secondly, the nature of humanity as both being and having a body speaks to the very rootedness of the human condition in ontology, “since the thinker only ever thinks beginning from what he is.”91 The double-sided movement between inner and outer, perception and understanding, is modeled in embodiment. The interior life of the human subject is not the whole of life, and the exterior manifestation of the human subject is more than just the expression of the inner life. In fact, inner consciousness, that which has a body, is affected and enriched by what comes from beyond itself, although this is not reducible to mere epiphenomena and as such the person is more than just a body. The interior-exterior movement between mind and world mirrors the hermeneutical movement of experience. The second and third constants are related to one another, since they are both fundamentally about the intersubjectivity of human beings. First, the existence of human beings is always coexistence, which follows from the previous constant insofar as we can refer to ecology. This point goes further, however, because it is about the coexistence of human beings with one another, such that the human face is always an image for others. Intersubjectivity is also subject to essential limitations, since an encounter with the other is always a moment of contrast and a realization of what is not also a part of my own subjectivity. Schillebeeckx also points out the basic fact that no one, “can enter into a relation of real encounter with all people,” due to our embodiment and, therefore, also due to our finitude.92 The third constant follows closely behind the second: the human relation to institutional and social structures. This is a more extended view of human intersubjectivity that includes structural forms of interactions and the fundamentally social being of humanity.93 What it really contributes to the aforementioned point is in the realization that social relations are not merely tacked on to our identity as experiencing subjects as if through addition, but are really already a dimension of our identity.94 This is an affirmation of the phenomenological insight into the intrinsic relation between subject and object, as well as an expression of the hermeneutic-linguistic

90. Roger Haight, “Engagement met de wereld als zaak van God: Christologie en postmoderniteit,” 31. 91. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, lxxxiii. Emphasis added. 92. Schillebeeckx, “Questions,” 34. 93. Ibid., 34–35. 94. Ibid.

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character of being.95 Ontological finitude is what makes the encounter with an “other” possible at all. Without contrast, there is no recognition and no process of understanding; no hermeneutical movement can occur without some degree of otherness and contrast, and this depends upon finitude. Finitude is “the defining characteristic of both human beings and the world.”96 This delivers a fundamental critique of the Hobbesian view of social anthropology and its contemporary political heritage, namely, libertarianism. Human beings as finite creatures are dependent on others for their own self-becoming. The fourth constant is the time-space element of both person and culture. The facticity of temporal existence is a direct condition of finitude at the ontological and ontic levels, and it is certainly impossible to remove the socio-temporal context even if they have optimal norms, values, or social structures.97 Here, death is the ultimate “limit situation” through which humanity’s relative limits are experienced, since even this is not a “direct experience” of the absolute limit, but a mediated form of it.98 The impossibility of escaping the limitations of space and time also makes humanity subject to suffering. Through suffering, and especially unwarranted suffering, existence is “also experienced as a hermeneutical enterprise,” such that we are both able to understand and critically unmask what is oppressive in our social existence; we both illuminate existence as well as engage in its critical renewal.99 Furthermore, the individual, society, and even history are all contingent and not purely autonomous or grounded in themselves.100 The real threat to human existence is not its finitude, but its refusal of that finitude in favor of the will to absolute mastery over self, society, and history; in short, to fail to understand death and finitude as a feature of human existence rather than as a flaw to be overcome.101 Fifth, the intrinsic relation between theory and praxis is put forward as a constant, where this refers to the fact that human beings always act from a specific standpoint. We need a place, a specific spatial-temporal situation at which point a certain interpretive theory exists, and where we stand in a certain relationship to particular traditions, in order to be able to act at all.102 Theory always implicitly

95. The empirical sciences have, to some degree, supported this interrelatedness particularly in a study conducted in 2009 on the linguistic “prosody,” or melody, of infant’s cries. This study shows a correlation between the melody of an infant’s cry and the mother tongue of the parents. This conditions the infants even before their birth to perceive and eventually more easily understand the surrounding language. See Birgit Mampe, Angela D. Friederici, Anne Christophe, and Kathleen Wermke, “Newborns’ Cry Melody is Shaped by Their Native Language,” Current Biology 19, no. 23 (2009): 1994–97. 96. Kennedy, “God and Creation,” 48. 97. Schillebeeckx, “Questions,” 35. 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid., 36; Schillebeeckx, “Theological Criteria,” UF, 59–60 [66–67]. 100. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory,” UF, 117 [133]. 101. Schillebeeckx, “Questions,” 36; “I Believe in God,” 92. 102. Schillebeeckx, “Theologie der Erfahrung,” 394.

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or explicitly precedes praxis, although this says nothing about the truth content of either theory or praxis, since a worldview can be well-practiced but untrue and unjust as well as the reverse.103 Again, the hermeneutical movement is invoked here, where the finite subject first acts from its theory and then must reform its theory in light of experience. The basic orientation of the finite subject toward the next experience leads to the sixth constant, which Schillebeeckx calls the “parareligious” consciousness of humanity.104 He has partially derived this from Ernst Bloch’s “secular” eschatology and utopian consciousness, or the vision of what the future will or should look like. In many cases, this is expressed as an attempt to escape finitude and contingency, or at least many of its symptoms such as suffering and death. This “utopian” impulse is built upon the principle of “wholeness,” given in the hermeneutical movement, and the implicit trust that the subject has in its own vision of the meaning of reality. Elsewhere, Schillebeeckx himself affirms that the vision of wholeness and the meaning of reality is an anthropological constant, giving us a seventh, but more basic “constant” that is only one step removed from the absolute limit.105 The Basisvertrauen that life has, and will have, meaning can only emerge in the interplay of negative and positive elements of life, or in the contrast experiences that reveal the human expectation of goodness as well as the orientation toward praxis that drives us to create a more human world.106 Faith in the presence of meaning, or at least the ability to make sense of what is given is the basis of hope in the future.107 Schillebeeckx counts a seventh constant in the irreducible synthesis of the other six. Each of these constants is linked to the others and their coexistence and codependence underpins human culture as an autonomous reality, quite apart from any “proofs” for the existence of God.108 What the synthesis tells us is that the creation of concrete norms for human societies will result in a necessary pluralism, precisely because they are built on the absolute limit. No experience is ever exactly the same because we are finite and exist in time and space and this gives rise to a plurality of interpretation, even within a single person’s experience. Pluralism becomes the default mode of being human. As such, anthropological pluralism should also be counted as an anthropological constant that we would do well to remember in our political life.109 This pluralism comes from the irreducible synthesis, and we should think of this as an eighth coordinate. In one sense, Schillebeeckx is echoing Origen who long ago sought to explain the unequal state of humans in the world, but could only conceive of it as stemming from a flaw in human will. Schillebeeckx still locates most unwarranted suffering in the realm of

103. Schillebeeckx, “Questions,” 37. 104. Ibid., 38. 105. Schillebeeckx, “Theologie der Erfahrung,” 393. 106. Ibid.; Haight, “Engagement met de wereld als zaak van God,” 80–81. 107. Schillebeeckx, “Questions,” 38; cf. “I Believe in God,” 98. 108. Schillebeeckx, “Questions,” 39. 109. Ibid., 40.

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human sin, but pluralism itself, built on the absolute limit, is not a flaw in creation but is its very possibility. The point of the system of coordinates is to act as a guide, not a recipe, to forming “a modern, livable humanity.”110 Schillebeeckx already pointed to an irreducible theological pluralism in an essay from 1969.111 The days of a universal Christian worldview and philosophical framework are over, and even unrecoverable now that there is truly a “global church.” The differentiation of the sciences and pluralization of philosophical standpoints, as well as the rise of contextual theologies and philosophies “from the margins,” has contributed to this, but so has the fact that bishops in former European colonies are now chosen from the indigenous populations and not sent as “missionary” bishops. Furthermore, the “modern sciences” are no longer “determined in any way by philosophy,” meaning that a ruling Aristotelian framework no longer guides what “science” is or can be.112 Certainly there are “philosophies of science” implicit in every scientific method and experiment. The essential finitude of human beings, and therefore the limited scope of one person’s experience, precipitates a plurality of perspectives, since all people, and indeed all theologians, have a different starting place. By acknowledging this as a fact, and opening myself to the limitations of my own perspective, it is possible to take in the perspective of the other as being complementary to my own view of reality. Just in the sense of theology as a discipline, the specialization of the four traditional areas of theology (practical, systematic, historical, and biblical) in various subdisciplines means that there will likely never be another Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, or Joseph Ratzinger. No one can “do it all” anymore, in terms of synthesizing the results of multiple areas of theological expertise, in part thanks to the sheer volume of data and the amount of the requisite specialized training. Thus, the default mode of the theologian should be collaborative and synoptic: willing to listen and to work with others to present a more coherent theological view. But, this pluralism is not confined to theology. It is really “an aspect of the historical reality of man [sic] and cannot be overcome.”113 An essential pluralism of viewpoints is an additional anthropological constant, coming from the ontological finitude of the subject, but the religious person should take this as a challenge and a praxical task to be met by faith, and not as a source of despair. There is, after all, no absolute pluralism, and “translation” and communication are always at least possible within the sphere of lived humanity. The essential commonality of “being human” also evinces the possibility of translation, so that plurality is never absolute, but at the same time it is never overcome because the process of interpretation through experience is never finished in history. The basic pluralism of philosophical approaches is not something to be overcome with one, bigger,

110. Ibid. 111. Schillebeeckx, “Theological Criteria,” UF, 41–68 [45–77]. 112. Ibid., 45 [50]. 113. Ibid., 48 [54].

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better meta-system or by proving all of the other approaches to be wrong.114 Pluralism is an irreducible aspect of humanity and of the plural nature of reality. The “world” is not reducible to one theoretical projection or interpretation. There are, therefore, seven “anthropological constants” when pluralism is included, and eight when we count the irreducible synthesis of the other seven. 4.3.3 The Transcendental Movement—One Ontological Constant Finitude, Schillebeeckx explains, is “really the definition of all secularity,” that cannot be totally secularized.115 Finitude allows humanity to be creative, but it is also supported by the insight that we are not merely locked up in our finitude, nor are we absolutely free to create and make the universe in every respect as though we were the masters of reality.116 God’s creative freedom is seen in the fact that salvation is an experiential reality that cannot be made into a purely immanent and easily understandable concept.117 The new and salvific relationship of humanity to God, which is the Rule of God, is perhaps for this reason always expressed in parables and metaphors that broadly approximate what it is and will be.118 This relationship is always shifting and changing, and must be always maintained and renewed as we respond to God’s call, because we continue in time as finite subjects and through great traditions of experience. Creative activity on the part of the People of God is certainly always a response, but it is a response in and from our situated freedom and mediated through our categories. Jacques Derrida once expressed that all understanding is predicated upon misunderstanding, and to the extent that no experience can be directly repeated, this is true. Each individual process of “coming to understand” something new, and God is ever ancient but ever new, requires that we are at first not able to understand and then that we forge a new, flawed, and provisional expression of what has been revealed to us. Epistemology is a “negative epistemology” based on contrast. This is the root of experience, including our experience of God. The limit is always on our side, confirming Schillebeeckx’s phrase “mediated immediacy” as the mode of God’s presence.119 God is infinite, and infinitely present to a creation that can only experience God in the places where we reach our real, ontological limits, since “to be finite means to be a being who is limited by non-being.”120 These are the places where we run up against what was not produced by us, but

114. Kennedy, Deus Humanissimus, 153. 115. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in God,” 101. 116. Ibid.; Schillebeeckx, Church, 78–80 [80–83]. 117. Schillebeeckx, “Questions,” 41. 118. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in the Man Jesus: The Christ, the Only Beloved Son, our Lord,” God Among Us, trans. John Bowden (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 107. 119. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in the Man Jesus,” 110; Church, 77 [79]. 120. Calvin O. Schrag, Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of Finitude (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1961), 73.

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which come to us from the other. An experience of divine revelation challenges our narrative structures, which we use to interpret the world to change, sometimes radically, by showing us what is new and unexpected but thanks to the clues given to us through tradition can still be named, if only provisionally as salvation coming from God. The limit is drawn on our side, since we are finite and historical beings. God is not constrained by our limitations, but draws close to us in every historical context and in the encounter with other human beings who are also made in God’s image (Gen 1:27).121 God approaches us where we are, and where we can understand, but this is always at the edge of our abilities. Revelation engages us at the limits of our interpretive abilities and pushes us to change the categories, models, and frameworks that we have used in the past, which are revealed as no longer being adequate to the task of humanizing the world. The dialogical aspect of revelation is important, because history is not yet closed and so humanity must be reached in ever different ways and called back to its task and divine orientation. In conjunction with this notion of salvation and this ontological foundation, the Christian idea of politics must reach further than pragmatism or Realpolitik; it must at least begin to reach for the realization of present-day salvation for humanity. The epistemic force of suffering necessitates that Christians respond to the suffering other, since all understanding of reality through a projection of total meaning, especially a religious one, must also include a critical element in our attempts to avoid ideological manipulation and that serves both humanity in a specifically Christian and humanly universal way.122 This makes Christian political involvement different from those driven by purposive knowledge of science and technology, exemplified today in our contemporary economic systems. The need for Christian salvation to be political is seen precisely in the fact that it must also be salvific for those who interpret reality differently, while keeping in mind that the total meaning of reality, or final salvation is eschatological and, ultimately, rests in God’s hands. The specific motivation of Christian practice and expectation of salvation cannot be universalized to the point of broad secularization, even if its effects are broadly felt beyond the Christian community.123 To do this would be an attempt to “secularize” finitude, to the point of cutting off God’s relationship to creation, deleting the eschatological piece of the praxical equation. Christian praxis, therefore, must come from a specifically Christian tradition to avoid falling under “purposive” interest that narrows either the field of what is possible, or which does away with finitude altogether and returns us to a closed master narrative. Schillebeeckx gives us a glimpse into how the human being functions through the “anthropological constants,” while also showing that these constants are not perfectly absolute. They are also built upon something prior, namely human finitude as the ontological precondition for being in the world in an active manner. A century of anthropological and sociological examination of

121. Schillebeeckx, Church, 74 [76], n. 13. 122. Schillebeeckx, “Questions,” 42–43. 123. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in God,” 101.

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society and unfettered belief in specific Western visions of “humanity” has skewed the way that we think of what is universal. The foundation that Schillebeeckx espouses does automatically disqualify all of our positive models and values— it qualifies them by placing them in a constant state of movement, flux, and uncertainty. It is only from our finitude, our specific, yet fluid and uncertain stance, in the world and in tradition that we are empowered to act in an eschatologically responsible way in pursuit of the Rule of God.

Conclusion: The Absolute Limit—Hermeneutics as Eschatology, Eschatology as Ontology This chapter has moved rather quickly, and through dense material, in order to come, insofar as it is possible, to the root of human experience. We have traced the underlying structure of negative contrast experience by showing that the possibility of contrast experience rests upon the general nature of experience. All experiences are, to a degree, “contrastive” experience, and this allows us to make a judgment about the “universality” of contrast experience. The verdict that we should reach is that, yes, the contrast experience is universal, but not in and of itself. Contrast experiences are potentially universal with regard to suffering, and actually universal because they are actuated through the same mechanism as ordinary experience. Revelation, whether divine or secular, also follows the same structure. In building a contemporary image of humanity, and on the way to a contemporary image of God, we cannot rely on the positive constructs of a static human nature used throughout previous centuries, nor can we utilize theoretical absolutes from contemporary social and political philosophies. This is not to say that traditional and contemporary concepts and models are not helpful to us, only that they do not provide an exhaustive picture of humanity. The “anthropological constants” we have outlined can send us in reasonable and positive directions for working out what it means to be human now. These are also built, however, on the structure of human experience and self-understanding. In 1984, Schillebeeckx claimed that experiences of contrast, which he had previously recognized as “important human experiences” should be radicalized because “they form a fundamental human experience.”124 Erik Borgman rightly recognized this development, but he also felt that contrast experience had already implicitly held the central place in Schillebeeckx’s understanding of human existence, at least since 1977.125 Experience is the place in which human subjects become themselves. Experience occurs in history, in society, and in a body, and so it is never pure thinking or

124. Schillebeeckx, “Theolgie als bevrijdingskunde: Enkle noodzakelijke beschouwingen vooraf,” TvT 24, no. 4 (1984): 396. My translation. 125. Borgman, “Theologie tussen universiteit en emancipatie,” 255–56.

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contemplation. Experience is hermeneutical, as it is the essential movement between interpretation of fragments in light of a projected whole, and the critical correction of that whole in light of the fragments. The process of human becoming through self-understanding is never finished, as the arrival of the definitive total meaning of reality as we experience it is always “not-yet” present, but it is at the same time “already” somehow available, even as a negative relief image of what could or should exist. This is the end of a static metaphysics and an acknowledgment of an ontology of the “not-yet-being.”126 The hermeneutical ontology of the human subject is an ontology of the not-yet—it is constantly moving, and the totality of its meaning is not yet decided upon. The meaning of history remains only at the level of a basic human question, and a Christian hope. Christianity does not “explain” this aspect, or fill in all of the gaps left by “mere” human interpretation of the world. It presents a narrative about that world that includes elements of meaning and extrapolates from these that there is a total meaning present in the human, historical person of Jesus Christ. So the bounds of reality are constantly in motion. What anchors and grounds us in this fluid movement is the fact that even in the most extreme experiences of human limitations, negative contrast experience and revelation, the hermeneutical subject “returns” to itself. As an “I,” as a subject, I come into contact with concrete limitations, breaking apart my self-understanding and my picture of what reality is like, but I also then reconstitute myself around a new understanding and a new synthesis. The absolute limit, our limit, is the ground of this movement. It is what separates us from what is “outside” and what allows us to transcend ourselves at all by giving external reality something with which to come into contact. As finite beings, we are able to touch and be touched by another finite being which is not just a projection or piece of ourselves, but which is a real other. The self needs to be opposed by an other in order to begin the movement of transcendence. For this to happen, the self must in fact be a self, and therefore finite as a determinate embodied ego with real limits. To be human is to be finite. To be finite is to be able to transcend finitude from within. This occurs in our linguistically structured and mediated experience. Thus, the absolute limit is the ontological condition for all experience as what allows there to be an “inside” or “outside” and as what conditions all fore-conceptions of completeness—the breaking of relative limits reveals the fact that there are limits at all, and gives us an intimation of an ultimate limit from which total understanding is possible. Humanity is present, to itself, as the multiplicity of concrete human subjects. The contact with the absolute limit is also contact with an other, placing us in a relationship to other beings from the first moment of consciousness. Selfconsciousness is, therefore, primarily something social. It is being-with-others as a concrete self; an embodied creature whose life is a constant dialogue with others. The conception of a monadic or a self-sufficient subject is a dangerous myth whose political form is continuing to affect our societies through neoliberal and

126. Bloch, Atheism in Christianity, 66–69.

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libertarian ideologies. What these ideologies deny is that an “other” is necessary at all for humanity to become itself, thus espousing an essentially static notion of human nature: we become ourselves by ourselves and any creation of boundaries for the self is a limitation of its freedom. No person becomes fully actualized in solitude, and those humans who do live entirely apart from society do not become “noble savages,” they become developmentally disabled, incapable of speech and unable to participate in common life. This does not mean that the other is always “good” for us. In a critique of Emmanuel Levinas, Schillebeeckx points out that the other can also be a threat and a source of violence, not just an image that implores me for mercy.127 The real embodied contact with otherness is ambivalent, and not automatically good, but the fact of contact and the underlying structure of all contact through experience is a goodness: the goodness of being as opposed to nonbeing. Contact with an other subverts the negation presented by that other to the subject’s self-understanding, but then also occasions the reconstitution of the subject within newly redrawn boundaries. On the ontological level, the negativity presented by the other is good, but on the level of lived experience, the other can present an existential threat. Pulling back a bit from this very “close-up” examination of the subject, we should see that the hermeneutical selving of the subject works on the structure of elements of “already” realized meaning, and the “not yet” complete meaning that is anticipated, based on previous experience. If the whole of creation is gifted by God to become itself as an autonomous entity, in dialogue with God through the gracious mediation of God’s universal salvific will in history through Jesus, then eschatology is not just a fundamental principle of the Christian narrative about reality, or of Christian theology. It is the very fabric of created reality itself. The most original “other” is God—God is the other of history and the real subject of that history. The humanism of God, “a God concerned for humanity,” is found in the man Jesus who identified himself with God, and with humanity: “[h]umanity’s concern is God’s concern and God’s concern is also humanity’s concern.”128 As the fullness of God’s self-revelation, Jesus mediates the infinite in the finite, but in a personal way such that the finite is not destroyed, it is transformed. As historical, Jesus both manifests salvation and conceals the presence of God. Just as with any experience, and because of our finitude, there can be no total grasp but the limit here remains on our side. The infinite appears in the finite, concealed in images and “it reveals itself in a veiled form in such a way that the holy cannot be attained outside these manifestations,” while never being coterminous with them.129 The work of the Spirit in history and the continuation of a tradition of salvific experience continue to bear witness to what is being accomplished by God in history and what has been accomplished in Jesus. It is always a hermeneutical-

127. Schillebeeckx, Jesus in Our Western Culture, 58. 128. Schillebeeckx, “The Role of History,” 316–17. 129. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 773 [776].

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eschatological movement—fragments of salvation here, anticipations of the Rule of God there. The principle movement of human becoming, and also of all human history as it is conceived, is hermeneutical insofar as it is fluid, linguistic, unfinished, and provisional. It is eschatological, insofar as it has its ultimate end and final meaning in the mystery of God, and there is therefore “a necessary identity between manifestation and concealment.”130 The bounds of reality are in motion; the eschatological promise of salvation breaks open the possibilities of what creation is and can be. The eschaton, however, cannot be a mere repetition of the beginning, or a return to original purity. It is something new and, as such, it is different from the beginning. History changes what will be because history is not yet finished. The freedom of creation does not negate the role of Christ as the principle and savior of that creation, however. The Alpha and Omega are the same Person, but not the same “where the reality of the event is concerned.”131 The end is not entirely like the beginning because humanity has changed, and it has already been changed by the resurrection. The future is not merely unveiled, it comes about; it comes to fulfillment, and this involves an element of human agency and of divine transformation. So we “do not have a pre-existing definition of humanity,” as humanity is “not only a future, but an eschatological reality.”132 Our insight into the structure of the human subject via experience is not the kind metaphysical insight claimed by other systems—an insight that explains reality perfectly and subverts ethics in favor of the application of universal rules. What this structural picture of humanity gives us, is some notion of human striving, human limitations, and the necessity of thinking from the point of embodiment and embeddedness in society. It also places the future as the primary ontological direction for human striving. As hermeneutical-eschatological subjects, human beings are fundamentally oriented toward the future while also being rooted in the past and present. Whether or not this structure is optimized in practice is another question. Ideological systems can and often have subverted aspects of humanity’s potential, in favor of easier answers and more palatable images of the divine, especially when confronted by the disturbing images of our present and past tendencies toward violence. It is easier to justify our shortcomings with an ideological image or a system that fits them than to act as a witness to God’s condemnation of human sin: “It is illuminating that the man who does not worship a divine God automatically prostrates himself before a non-divine God.”133

130. Ibid. Emphasis original. 131. Ibid., 229. 132. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 725 [731]. 133. Ibid., 44 [58].

Chapter 5 SECULARIZATION AND THE SUBVERSION OF CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY

In the previous chapter, the goal was to continue to follow the thread of experience in Schillebeeckx’s work to a point that provides its ground. The “turn to experience” came relatively late in Catholic theology, and partially for this reason, it avoided some of the subjectivism in liberal Protestantism, and the psychologism that creeped into historicism as a result of the concern with mental states and subjective experience. Schillebeeckx explicitly opposes the experience of absolute contingency, the “absolute limit,” to Schleiermacher’s “feeling of absolute dependence.” The hermeneutical recognition of the real contingency and finitude of humanity is not a cause for concern, but the condition of possibility for all knowledge. In other words, it should not give us pause over the impossibility of exhaustive knowledge of God, or the nature of dogmatic statements relative to their object of knowledge. The finitude of humanity is the possibility of knowing anything at all, including God, and this should be counted as a form of grace. The experiencing human subject is the locus of all active understanding of others and of God as the absolute other of humanity. The absolute limit is the starting point for human activity in the world, and as such it is also the entry point for grace in the form of revelation and merciful mediation with the other. It is also the point of contact with that which causes human suffering: the introduction of non-sense and pain into human experience. At one level, this is necessary— the contrastive nature of all experience places our interpretive frameworks under constant pressure. At another level, however, it presents us with an overwhelming excess of inhumanity. At this point God can only be present as a silent witness, and a condemnation of what has been done with God’s gift of being. The Christian narrative does not leave things at the point of unconscionable suffering, however. The historical root of Christian hope is the life of Jesus of Nazareth, called the Christ who was executed by an occupying military force at the behest of his own religious leaders. We should not think that this is because the religious leaders misunderstood his message, however, as is often the case. It is easy to think that with the right insight anyone would recognize Jesus as the Truth, and his way of life as salvific. The fact is that the religious authorities

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understood his message all too well, and what it meant for them.1 Dostoyevsky’s parable of “The Grand Inquisitor” presents this rather clearly, and rightly puts the words of condemnation in the mouth of the Grand Inquisitor. Dostoyevsky’s fictional religious leader recognizes the danger that the messiah represents: it is not to the well-being of others, or the mediation of grace in the world; the messiah endangers personal and structural forms of power that have become ideological and malicious. Any social structure or source of tradition has the possibility to become ideological, usually at the point where a tradition becomes alienated from its own self-understanding.2 A possibility is not, however, a necessity. It is an essential tendency of human beings, as beings who craft and create structures to organize and interpret reality, to close off and truncate every new view of reality. Ideology is simply more manageable in the same way that heresy in the history of the church has very often been the more “logical” or convenient course. It is easier to think of Jesus as a good man adopted by God, or as a transcendent God who just has a human appearance or avatar. These concepts are thinkable in a way that the Christological doctrine of Chalcedon is not—Chalcedon relies on a constant tension that cannot be undone. Authentic mediation of tradition, and by extension, authentic Christian self-understanding is always a tension-filled process of avoiding extremes and openness to the revelation of reality. The possibility that things will be different than we expect is barely manageable from a historical perspective, but it is what an authentic eschatology demands. It is also what a hermeneutical anthropology demands: the being of the human subject is always new, and always becoming in the process of self-understanding and experience. There is no point of rest or static observer’s post. For this reason, I have done my best to bring the subject down to its most basic level: contingency and finitude. From the Christian perspective, this also implies, however, a whole world of other aspects. It does not mean that humanity is alone, or shut up inside the limit, since contingency opens the way to communion. The most fundamental relationship is our relationship with creation. The fact that we see the created world as created, and therefore also as given to humanity, makes human conduct in the world different than bare existence. The givenness of creation as something crafted by God also brings us to Christology. As God’s creative Word, Christ is the font of all that is, establishing creation as the original grace, circumscribed in God’s creative activity. God determines in all freedom what, who, and how God will be “in his deepest being.”3 God freely becomes the God of humanity and the God of creation first by creating, and then by being present to creation. God’s absolute nearness is immediate, but mediated for us—thus mediated immediacy. The boundary is on our side, not God’s, and so mediation is all-important for us, and this includes the work of the church in history.

1. See Mk 11:12-22; 12:12. 2. Schillebeeckx, “The Role of History,” 315. 3. Schillebeeckx, Jesus in Our Western Culture, 25.

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The church is a mystery, but not something that is “behind or above reality as it is concretely visible. One can define the church in an idealistic way, but if one does one must then keep silent about its relation to history and it is this that marks the churches out as a contingent event in our history.”4 No single church is historically one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. This is not meant as a description, but as a call to repentance. It also looks ahead to an eschatological situation, and it calls on the church to reflect critically on how it proceeds in the world in which it exists. There can be no absolute church/world distinction, and even in times when there was such a presumed separation, the church still utilized the thought patterns and models of its age. Christology is necessary to talk meaningfully about God, and pneumatology is necessary to speak about Christ.5 The inspiration of the Spirit functions in our ecclesial communities by opening us up to an encounter with the other, and to be able to experience the revelation of grace that is mediated in community. Certainly, other people can mediate grace just as much as they threaten our existence, but the potential threat does not negate the call to service and participation in God’s universal salvific will, no matter how partial or how imperfect the efforts. The human subject is structured in a particular way, with a situated freedom and the possibility of transcendence. It is important to see how this structure plays out in our contemporary context. Whatever it is to be human is not pre-given, so human becoming will always be different since “everything is also contingent in man in the sense that this human way of existing is not guaranteed to each human child through some essence acquired at birth.”6 Ultimately, the structure we have uncovered does not necessitate a specific “human nature,” only a set of possibilities within the boundaries of the anthropological constants. Schillebeeckx himself said that “for the most part people live by stories. I myself live by my own story.”7 Here he was referring to his vocation as a Dominican friar, but also to the wider contours of his biography. Lieven Boeve is more explicit and “philosophical” in saying that “human beings . . . do not live from reflexive structures but from the [specific cultural-religious] narratives themselves.”8 The hermeneutical structure of the subject grounds these narratives and makes them possible, but it does not decide what they are precisely, or what they can become. The narrative aspect of the subject’s being, what I have referred to as “narrative historicity,” configures and reconfigures how the subject experiences reality and shapes that reality. While I do agree with Vincent Miller that “the social power of belief depends upon a range of interpretive habits, shared practices, and communal structures,” I would argue that narrativity is an essential element of normative,

4. Ibid., 44. 5. Ibid., 41. 6. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 174. 7. Edward Schillebeeckx, “Dominican Spirituality,” God Among Us: The Gospel Proclaimed, trans. John Bowden (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 232. 8. Boeve, God Interrupts History, 52.

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societal structures.9 In the proceeding analysis, I will consciously follow a more narrative line. Miller is certainly correct that sticking to a narrative or meta-analysis alone would risk overlooking the role played by practice in forming behaviors, but I think that it is also appropriate to examine narrative structures as well as practices. Even if there is no clear cause-effect relationship between narrative and practice, theory and praxis, and the two sides are often mutually reinforcing, people do tend to justify their actions on narrative grounds.10 Practices emerge from a complex of different factors, but they are often motivated and perpetuated by the stories we tell about ourselves and about others. The shift from a premodern to a modern story about humanity is responsible for what we are and have become in the last few centuries. This shift from a cosmocentric view to an essentially anthropocentric view is bound up with human self-understanding—the story we tell ourselves about ourselves—and there is no way to reverse this or forget that the change has occurred. The church has, rather unfortunately, not always embraced reality of this change and has, especially in the papacies of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, projected a kind of nostalgia for a world and a worldview that has gone by, or perhaps never really existed.11 The process of “secularization,” even if it takes a form different from that originally posited by Max Weber, is real and needs to be dealt with and not merely railed against or wished away.12 We need to understand how the experiencing human subject functions within the new view of the world that has emerged from several centuries of secularization, and how the Christian narrative, specifically its eschatological aspect, can and should function. We live by our own stories, and to that end the “human story of God” continues in the world. Every narrative needs space to change and to grow, and the following chapters of this work will examine the character and quality of that space. What is the contemporary context like and how does it affect Christianity? In order to do this I will begin by examining the rise and fall of modern master narratives of progress within the context of secularization. The work of Lieven Boeve and Jean-François Lyotard will be helpful in grounding our own analysis and providing a starting point for explicating the shift from premodern to modern consciousness in more

9. Vincent J. Miller, “Consuming Religion: Thinking About an American Argument in Europe,” ET Bulletin 17 (2006): 13; Vincent J. Miller, Consuming Religion: Christian Faith and Practice in a Consumer Culture (New York: Continuum, 2004), 15–23. 10. My hope is that in a future work I can more completely evaluate both the narrative and praxical sides of this “theological-anthropological problem,” especially in terms of economic practice and the prevailing view of humanity as homo oeconomicus, “economic man.” 11. Harvey Cox, “The Myth of the Twentieth Century: The Rise and Fall of ‘Secularization,’” The Twentieth Century: A Theological Overview, ed. Gregory Baum (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 138–39; Lieven Boeve, “Conversion and Cognitive Dissonance: Evaluating the Theological-Ecclesial Program of Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI,” Horizons 40, no. 2 (2013): 242–54. 12. Cox, “The Myth of the Twentieth Century,” 135–37.

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detail. Lyotard’s critique of modernity will be used to posit a similarity with Christian eschatology, in line with the future orientation of the human subject. The explicit narrative recognition of this orientation led, in part, to a recovery of God’s transcendence—the “new image of God” that emerged after Vatican II. Schillebeeckx’s recovery of God’s transcendence—God the future of humanity—is important to retaining a balanced eschatological vision that includes meaningful praxical anticipation of the Rule of God. It is the relative loss of our future horizon that is now a problem for the human subject and for Western society. The loss of that future transcendence through a truncation of time will lead us to an examination of a new phenomenon: the rise of a kind of “economic apocalypticism” both in secular and Christian narratives. At its core, this study is concerned with our contemporary experience of time and of God in light of the ontological foundation of humanity. If that foundation is essentially hermeneutical-eschatological as I have argued above, then the possibility exists to reopen that dimension through a recovery of the future orientation of humanity within the context of the Christian narrative. This entails real encounter with an other and praxical participation in society, in contrast to the narrative of market exchange that underlies our contemporary world. Certainly, a more human, more compassionate, and more just world does not come about automatically. But just as with negative contrast experience, the narrative conditioning—being experienced in a tradition—is necessary for us to be able to recognize the revelation of the other and the potential mediations of grace that such an encounter brings with it. I will not experience “contrast” when I see suffering on television unless I have been conditioned to experience suffering with and for others. This will be the challenge for Christianity in the twenty-first century: to cultivate such sensitivity and empathetic resonance in the world, and to foster the humanization of the world in response to critical suffering.13

5.1 Secularization and the Rise and Fall of Modern Master Narratives In 1784, Kant rhetorically asked, “do we live in an enlightened age?” His response to his own question was essentially, no, “but we do live in an age of enlightenment.”14 His prediction was that “if only freedom is granted, enlightenment is almost sure to follow.”15 We have recently passed from one century into another, and are still

13. Material from Chapters 5 and 6, and the Conclusion has been published previously in a much abbreviated form as Daniel Minch, “The Fractured Self and the Primacy of the Future: Edward Schillebeeckx and the Eschatological Horizon,” Horizons 43, no. 1 (2016): 57–85. Grateful acknowledgments to the College Theology Society and Cambridge University Press. 14. Kant, “What Is Enlightenment?” 90. 15. Ibid., 86.

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dealing, in many ways, with Kant’s prediction and with the force with which it has gripped Western consciousness. The idea that the free use of universal reason would eventually emancipate or “enlighten” humanity was behind the great myth of progress that emerged out of the eighteenth century. Some contend that it was the Great War in 1914 that ended the modern “myth” of progress.16 Certainly, the Great Depression also had its influence, as well as the cataclysm of the Second World War. We should not, however, neglect the fact that well into the Cold War, the twin ideas of perpetual progress and of technological emancipation were still present in popular consciousness.17 It is no coincidence that the DuPont Company’s slogan was “Better things for better living . . . through chemistry,” from 1935 until 1982. The widespread confidence in the future (especially in the North American context), which can be broadly counted as characteristic of modernity and the narratives of modernity, persisted through several crises, each of which changed the character of the narratives. In the mid- to late twentieth century, there was the massive struggle of economic and ideological systems: communism versus capitalism and liberal democracy. The two types of master narratives of the eighteenth century, those of knowledge and emancipation, based themselves upon their presumed empirical character as sciences, and it was the scientific method that gave them authority and an aura of rational certainty. Narratives of knowledge were later merged under those of emancipation, since true knowledge must necessarily lead to human emancipation, either through technological means or through the use of reason and liberation from illegitimate authority.18 The freedom of the pure market might also be compared to the freedom of pure reason: its uninhibited use in all spheres of life will lead to the gradual, yet inevitable emancipation of humanity from suffering. The technological narrative of emancipation joined this narrative as well, forming the master narrative par excellence.19 The explicit purpose of the narratives of emancipation as well as the narratives of technological and scientific progress was the realization of an ideal state of humanity. We see this clearly in Kant’s vision as a removal of humanity’s self-imposed “immaturity” (Unmündigkeit).20 His vision is distinctly forward-looking and presupposes that the world is changeable through human efforts, and that “reality was open to manipulation.”21 This idea has an unexpected history, however, and is one that

16. Cf. Michael J. Scanlon, O.S.A., “The Postmodern Debate,” The Twentieth Century: A Theological Overview, ed. Gregory Baum (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 228. 17. This is especially true of the United States, perhaps because the mainland of the nation itself was untouched by anything approaching the kind of ravages and devastation experienced in Europe, North Africa, and Asia. 18. Lieven Boeve, Interrupting Tradition: An Essay on Christian Faith in a Postmodern Context, Louvain Theological & Pastoral Monographs 30 (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2003), 41. 19. Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 74–76 20. Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” 85; Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 81. 21. Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 40. Emphasis original.

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Edward Schillebeeckx has highlighted in terms of the humanization of the world. The natural world, such as it is, is experienced by humanity as a largely inhospitable place, requiring human modification of ourselves and of our environment for the purposes of survival. We see this in the most basic adoption of clothing, the keeping and tending of fires, and the manipulation of grain and other plant life through selective breeding processes to make it edible, or more palatable. Even so, Schillebeeckx points to the Christian view of God as “causa prima et ultima, the ‘first and last cause,’ following the Augustinian world-view.”22 He cites the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as being pivotal for humanity, not because the twelfth century was the pinnacle of theological achievement, but because it represented a new turn in humanity’s selfunderstanding.23 The previous medieval theology, based on an Augustinian synthesis, also implied a cosmocentric order in which God’s creation was inviolable. A compelling example of the continued influence of this cosmology can be found in the Hapsburg monarch, Philip II of Spain, whose government rejected a proposal for making two rivers on the Iberian Peninsula (the Tajo and Manzanares) navigable by ship. Such a project would have also connected isolated communities of people. Schillebeeckx notes that the government recognized these benefits, but decided that “if God has so willed that these rivers should be navigable, then he would have made them so with a single word, as he did formerly when he said ‘fiat lux.’”24 What was done, had already been done in the past, and could not be unmade without violating God’s rights as creator and first and last cause. According to Schillebeeckx’s reading, it was Scholasticism that began the work of “secularization” as “the natural consequence of the discovery and gradual widening of man’s [sic] rational sphere of understanding,” chiefly by bringing in a view of human nature based on natural law and by placing it between divine law and the human conscience.25 Thus, Christian “secularization” was an attempt to assert the place and role of human beings within God’s creation and the acknowledgment that humanity is in some way responsible for the humanization of the world.26 This is an interesting thesis, and it represents a very gradual shift in human thinking, from maintaining or restoring a status quo or a pax deorum, and toward a different and more human future. We can, indeed, invoke the pax deorum of Rome as a prime example, if not one source of the ancient/medieval thought process: Rome should be as it was when it was founded, and this relied on the favor of the gods, whose peace and good will were guaranteed by tribute to the ancient traditions (mos maiorum) that allegedly went back to the foundation of the city. The best thing for a senator to say was that he had found “a very old idea”

22. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 31 [54]. 23. Ibid., 33–34 [56–57]. 24. Quoted in, Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 32 [55]. Cf. Schillebeeckx, Church, 227–228 [229–30]. 25. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 34–35 [57–58]. 26. See also Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Herder and Herder/Crossroad, 1998), 105–15, 127–39.

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that would help restore something lost from the past through the shuffle of time or the incursion of some barbarous otherness or innovation. In other words, the legitimation for such a way of thinking, always resides in the past and its fulfillment is directed toward the restoration or perpetuation of that past. Schillebeeckx identified this as a type of utopian thinking, a “conservative utopia”; that is, as a return to a selectively remembered, mystified, or a mythical past confirmed through the existing social order.27 5.1.1 Lyotard’s Account of Modern Narrativity and Hegemony In the twentieth century, the two most influential master narratives both promised emancipation based on a form of universal reason. Communism was founded on the belief that universal reason would lead to a classless society of human cooperation, while capitalism placed its trust in the rationality of citizens acting in a free market of ideas. Each of these embraced all of the smaller narratives within its sphere of influence as being subject to its authority and the universal message of the narrative. Each claimed universal validity for humanity as a whole, since they were both the products of scientific reason and strove toward realizable goals in history—a history that would become a universal history for all human beings. David Tracy has pointed out that this narrative about reality is based on a logic of “sameness” and, at its core, is a resurgent positivism.28 The French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard made this logic explicit through his language pragmatics, which describe the problem of ideology from a narrative perspective. We will follow the line drawn by Lyotard’s language pragmatics and description of narrativity, with the help of Lieven Boeve’s careful work in this area. This will help to illuminate some of the essential characteristics of modern narratives that have a direct influence upon the fate of Christian eschatology. A narrative is made up of particular instances, or “phrases” that occur as a matter of course throughout the life of that narrative.29 These are governed by the rules of a specific “phrase regimen,” or the rules that govern phrases, and are categorized as “descriptive, interrogative, prescriptive, declarative, exclamatory and so on.”30 Each phrase that “happens” is followed by another phrase. The linking of phrases, however, one to another, is entirely contingent such that there is no necessity for one type of phrase to follow another.31 For example, another interrogative, descriptive phrase, or any other type of phrase can follow an interrogative phrase.

27. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 652–654 [662–63]. A mythical past should not be equated with a mythological past. The productive power of mythology and mythopoeic language is meant to be applied in the present, rather than as a picture of an ideal to be returned to at all costs. Mythology has a critical-productive power for the present and for the future. 28. David Tracy, “On Naming the Present,” Concilium no. 1 (1990), 70. 29. Lyotard, The Differend, 66–67, no. 104; Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 15. 30. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 15. 31. Lyotard, The Differend, 80, no. 136; Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 15.

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What regulates the linkage of phrases is the genre of discourse, or the essential goal of the discourse that forms rules and, “a unity of rules that connect heterogeneous phrases to each other with the aim of realizing a specific finality.”32 We can think of broad categories that form discourse genres like prayer, argumentation, apology (in the classical sense), seduction, or humor. Despite the rules of a discourse genre, the linking of phrases is still contingent, and when one phrase follows another, it could always have been otherwise: a different phrase could have been used; silence could have prevailed (which is itself a very special sort of phrase; when “nothing” happens, it is still something). For Lyotard, this creates a conflict of discourse genres whereby the winner dictates the linkage patterns. This irreducible conflict and the expectation that something will occur produces a “differend” (French: différend) and the recognition of the possibilities of the event.33 This is distinct from “litigation,” which predetermines the rule of one discourse genre over others in order to achieve the genre’s goal. There is no conflict because there is no contingency, and the happening of phrases can no longer be considered an “event” proper, but something more or less inevitable.34 Referencing Lyotard’s account in The Differend (Le Différend), Boeve describes the phenomena in this manner: The ruling discourse hegemonically arranges the linkage as if no real expectation was opened up, as if no event was to happen (D188). As such, the other parties cannot tell their story, their complaint is not heard and their witness is not relevant because it is always set forward in an “unsuitable” idiom (D12). Denied the possibility of speaking, they are condemned to silence (D13–16).35

The narrative appears as a special discourse genre that very easily forgets the differend, since these narratives are told with an ending in mind. The world of the story makes the linking of phrases necessary in order to further the plot, and stepping outside of the narrative is anathema because it breaks the rules of the narrative itself. Narratives are essentially self-legitimating.36 Narratives are often dependent upon other, larger, and more encompassing phrase universes within which they rearrange similar elements to tell a story. Lyotard identifies this with a “universe of names,” through which stories are narrated and identities can be conferred upon individuals who live and move in the universe.37 It is at this point that we can begin to identify two essential types of narratives and their attributes. Lyotard enumerates four characteristics, two of which are

32. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 16: “A genre of discourse is that which is at the service of a specific goal, and through which the linking of a phrase with a specific other phrase is formed within the strategy of the genre of discourse in order to achieve that goal.” 33. Lyotard, The Differend, 12–14, no. 21–24; Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 17–18. 34. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 18. 35. Ibid., 18. 36. Ibid., 19–20. 37. Ibid.; Lyotard, The Differend, 152–56, no. 220–23.

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exclusively modern. He asserts that premodern, mythical narratives exist within a universe of names and that they narrate an origin, or from an origin. All the smaller narratives that are interwoven within this universe receive their meaning by participating in that origin and using a common grammar.38 The second type of narrative is the modern master narrative. Both types claim [1] to depict the truth of reality, giving them a cognitive pretension. They also [2] regulate the linking of phrases, or rather legislate the linking of phrases in a hegemonic way and in order to further the goal of the narrative. We can link these two characteristics together at a fundamental level: if a narrative claims to describe reality, it must then proceed to do so. The evaluation and legislation of phrases occurs in evaluating reality according to the prejudices of the narrative. The distinction between modernity and premodernity comes with the following two characteristics whereby, [3] modern master narratives are composed of a “grand narrative of history,” legitimated by its final goal.39 Since these essentially seek to present a “universal history,” the master narrative [4] also claims to apply to all of humanity and, therefore, claims regulative power over all particular narratives, which are really only individual instantiations of the one metanarrative.40 Previously, we identified the human maintenance of a status quo with the Roman theo-political concept of the pax deorum. This is very much a concept of a premodern narrative that claimed its authority from its foundation and emerged out of a universe of smaller narratives. The Roman claim to dominance, by the will of the gods, was certainly a hegemonic, cognitive pretension, but it did maintain a certain particularity. The Romans respected the Jewish religion precisely because it was old, and did not claim to speak for all of humanity, nor for all of the gods, maintaining only that their religion be observed and acknowledged as being the strongest. Other nations and peoples could keep their gods, but also needed to submit to the Roman state whose gods were more powerful.41 This is not the same as the universal pretension that Lyotard attributes to modern master narratives. The legitimation from the end, from the telos of the narrative, is an especially troubling modern phenomenon that Lyotard describes in terms of the regulating ideal.42 The Kantian notion of the idea in its conceptual function is invoked, “as [ideas] assist in conceiving reality through the mediation of a universal concept.”43 The key turn for modernity, however, is the point at which the idea ceased to function as a regulative sign on the conceptual level, as it had with Kant. Instead, the idea becomes

38. Lyotard, The Differend, 152–55. 39. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 21. 40. Lyotard, The Differend, 156–58, no. 225–29. 41. See E. Mary Smallwood, The Jews Under Roman Rule: From Pompey to Diocletian: A Study in Political Relations, Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity vol. 20 (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 128–43. 42. “Ex causa finali”; see Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins (Indianapolis and New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), 57, §IX. 43. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 22.

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immanent in history, giving the idea a cognitive function rather than a conceptual one, making individual instantiations and events proofs of the idea’s reality and inevitability.44 The power of the narrative as a cognitive force is increased, when any and all events can be written into the narrative from the end, potentially legitimating whatever happens without regard for its particularity. The smaller narratives of the premodern universe of names maintain their relationship to one another, but are not automatically written into one another without regard for their particularity, since it is only in their telling that they can be known at all. For the modern master narrative, standing outside of the narrative still entails being determined by the logic of that narrative—one is robbed of any power to speak, since the narrative which claims to apply to all of humanity at all times and in all places, has spoken for you and determined the significance of your story ahead of time. Your history will be meaningful, but according to (someone else’s) predetermined criteria. The linking of phrases is automatic, and the violence of this process forgets, or indeed obliterates the differend that should remind us always: “This could be otherwise!”45 5.1.2 Modern Shift from Conservative to Progressive Utopia The key aspect of a narrative’s legitimation returns us to the tension between the past and the future. Schillebeeckx highlights the gradual shift in Western culture to look to one or the other in what he identifies as the human “utopian consciousness” that is intrinsically bound up in our view of the past as either a golden age or a history of suffering and failure. Either the past is viewed as the legitimation for continuing things as they are, or it is the call to action through critical remembrance, and the call to change for the future. Either one, Schillebeeckx points out, is a “selective remembrance of the past” and is in no way a neutral exercise of historicist “research” into the objective value of history.46 The linking of phrases in our historical narration occurs in a particular way, and according to the idea of the utopian narrative. The process of secularization, or the realization that human beings can change their habitat and alter society, is primarily responsible for shift from premodern to modern narrativity. Legitimation in light of the past came to be seen as nonsensical—if the past was a place of suffering, repression, and illegitimate authority, then the future must necessarily be different!47 Legitimation for human activity thereby switched to a position of futurity: confidence in the future as better and more human (or even fully human and perfect!) is the legitimation for any suffering experienced on the way. The problem, according to

44. Ibid., 22–23; cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 520–24, A508/B536–A515/B543; 551–559, A/567/B595–A583/ B661. 45. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 17–19; Lyotard, The Differend, 12–14, no. 21–24. 46. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 654–655 [664]. Emphasis added. 47. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory,” UF, 90–91 [104].

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Lyotard and Schillebeeckx, is that modern master narratives traded the regulative/ conceptual function of the idea for a cognitive/legislative one, meaning that the modern narratives of progress and emancipation went from being ideals to be achieved to concrete ideologies. The violence of a revolution can be rewritten to fit the narrative because it is in service of a greater goal, and even more radical: violence and suffering are themselves concrete instantiations of the idea becoming immanent. They are the result of a claim to a universal subject that contains its own course of development and directs it to completion. It is the idea that “history is governed by a secular [immanent, man-made] universal subject and that a total meaning, which can be embodied in a system or programme of action, is contained in an individual, in human society or in history itself.”48 Nevertheless, Schillebeeckx asserts that as a condition of humanity’s rediscovery of its true historicity, the future makes a serious claim on us as a matter of our own ontological constitution.49 We have seen that the orientation toward the future is an intrinsic aspect of the human subject’s ontological structure. If both past and future utopias are based on a selective reading of the past, then the past, coupled with humanity’s utopian consciousness, plays a role in the human subject’s orientation toward the future. The hermeneutical movement of being is in the fusion of horizons between past and present. This movement of “fusion” (the moment of understanding, interpretation, and application) is effective in the present as the correction of prejudices and reformulation of the past, but it is also the point at which a new expectation horizon for the future is formed.50 Further, in the hermeneutical movement itself, we also have the fore-conception of wholeness and of meaning that what is interpreted will be meaningful, revealing the future orientation of understanding in its innermost character. The human subject’s hermeneutical self-transcendence is fundamentally oriented toward the future possibilities, and this is at the root of the shift in human narratives to value the open possibilities of the future, over the “closed” events of the past. If we are serious in our commitment to a hermeneutical-eschatological image of humanity, however, we should recognize that the past as “closed” is a false construction. Through our confrontation with the past we read it as a still-open tradition out of which we interpret the world and can correct or alter our inherited prejudices.51 Schillebeeckx affirms this in saying: It belongs to man’s [sic] very being to be within a tradition while re-activating it, and there is a living tradition only if, in the light of the present that is orientated towards the future, what has already found expression is reinterpreted towards the future.52

48. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 117 [133]. 49. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 3 [3]. 50. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 304; Godzieba, “Ut musica christianitas,” 92–93. 51. Schillebeeckx, “Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” GFM, 17–18 [26]. 52. Ibid., 18 [27].

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It is the aspect of looking “resolutely towards the future” that occupies humanity in the modern period as “the exponent of the whole process of change” expressed in the natural, technological, and behavioral sciences and their concern with future orientation.53 This is a mode of “conceiving both the present and the past as openended, orientated towards a new reality—what is still to come.”54 If the orientation toward the future is necessary for human beings as historical, finite, and hermeneutical beings, then the problem of ideology will return again from the perspective illuminated by Lyotard. We are within our rights to ask, how shall we proceed, and what is the ground from which Christians can engage with narrativity and the primacy of the future for practical action? Any projection of a “beginning” in utopian terms must “make something whole,” and as Ernst Bloch reminds us, “it must compensate for anguish; and anguish piles up only in the course of history.”55 Although his analysis has been extremely valuable, we cannot follow Lyotard in simply “remembering the differend” and the contingency of the linking of phrases as a moment of self-reflection or recognition of the transcendental and conceptual nature of ideas, nor can we stop at unmasking the hegemonic character of the master narratives. The recognition of human finitude, or even the search for an “impossible phrase” that bears witness to the event are conceptual games that may speak to us now. We must actualize the demand of the future to renew the world, not merely to interpret or illuminate it.56 The impetus for this task will be found in the new image of God and God’s transcendence that Schillebeeckx builds based on his hermeneutical ontology of the human subject and a distinctly biblical picture of God as the future of humanity.

5.2 The “New Image of God” and the Future of Transcendence For Christianity, the focus on the future is ultimately about faith. Religion and religious faith expresses itself in its own context, “in concrete human life and will always form a community that is incarnate in the world.”57 This makes religion, and the faith that enables it, a social experience. Formerly, Christianity was directed toward the past and was intent on perpetuating that past as an order that was divinely ordained. Furthermore, in a culture that is oriented toward the past, “whenever we thought or spoke of God’s transcendence we used, almost automatically, to project God into the past.”58 Eternity was a notion of the unchangeable, eternalized past,

53. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 103–104 [172–73]. 54. Schillebeeckx, “Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” GFM, 24 [36]. 55. Bloch, “Incipit vita nova,” Man on His Own, 77. 56. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 112–113 [186]; “Theological Criteria,” UF, 59–60 [66–67]. 57. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 104 [173]. 58. Ibid., 108–109 [180]; “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 3 [4].

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making transcendence primarily a matter of a pure return to a state of grace, a Garden of Eden, original justice, or a state of contemplation and unity with God. Transcendence is part of the hermeneutical character of human ontology in the self-transcending of past horizons of interpretation through the human subject’s experiences and reinterpretive activity. The concept of “transcendence,” however, is malleable and can be reworked in light of contemporary culture and with respect to our hermeneutical self-understanding. Previously, Western Christian culture understood itself in light of the “transcendent past,” and positioned itself accordingly in relation to the future. But changing the “horizon” of expectation changes this fundamental orientation. 5.2.1 Reconfiguring “Transcendence” The use of the image “horizon” indicates something that is always moving, receding, and this image indicates that the human subject is in a position of striving through the process of understanding. This does not remove the insights of an older theology, or the meaning of transcendence in light of the past, but opens up “transcendence” to an authentic plurality of meanings and applications. The orientation of human subjects toward the future shows their character as transcending toward the future, linking the two through the ecstatic movement of the human subject beyond itself and its own limitations.59 Human transcendence is grounded in God’s transcendence, as that which calls humanity beyond itself, being both wholly present with creation while also other to it as a transcendental horizon. The human experience of salvation coming from God associates God positively with the future of humanity, as the God who makes all things new. The human subject is able, “by virtue of the divine transcendence within him [sic] to transcend the ‘already’ and strive towards the ‘not yet.’”60 This is the eschatological nature of God’s promise and presence among humanity. God acts in history and resides with beings, while also being beyond being and transcendent of God’s own creation. This hermeneutical movement between revealing and concealing, immanent expression and transcendent ineffability, takes on a sacramental character as instantiations of grace through signs that make an absent reality truly, intentionally, and phenomenologically present.61 What Schillebeeckx is driving at, with this reconfiguration of transcendence, is a new image of God forged by a contemporary social understanding of where salvation is to be found. This concept is based on his notion of secularization as the increased responsibility of humanity for the humanization of the world, which

59. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 3–4 [4–5]. 60. Schillebeeckx, “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” UF, 133 [152]. 61. Seen above all in the life of the church, the sacraments, and the liturgy. See Edward Schillebeeckx, “Church, Magisterium and Politics,” GFM, CW vol. 3 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 97–99 [161–164]; Christ, 796–797 [800–01], 806–807 [811], 831–834 [836–39]; “God, the Living One,” New Blackfriars 62, no. 735 (1981), 366–68.

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is itself related to the “new image of humanity” that came out of his reflections on Vatican II.62 The reconfiguration of the ethos of modernity and the scientific study of the world has removed the possibility, for Catholic theology at least, of a “God of the gaps” who acts as the guarantor of the physical universe. The quest to prove or to disprove God’s existence is as old as the disciplines of philosophy and theology themselves, but in recent decades the possibility of disproving God’s existence has taken on the desperate character of a race for particular branches of scientistic thinking. This type of thinking assumes that God belongs to a cosmological order held in the past while simultaneously assuming a newer, and radically different view of physics; here we do not respect the ontological difference between creator and creation, where God is both “wholly Other” and “wholly new.”63 Belief in God is categorically different from believing in what is empirical and immanent, but has not yet been experienced, like the belief “in a distant solar system.”64 God is not a stopgap solution for explaining the physical world, as was often the case prior to the twentieth century where “God served, in those bygone days, as a substitute for the powers which man himself [sic] lacked.”65 A God of this type, would only be God insofar as we can attribute what is empirically observed to God’s activity, and in a sense by reducing faith in the gratuitous grace of God’s creation and our own creaturely freedom to a God who is logically necessary and whose will can be “divined” from the physical world—particularly from social structures prematurely ordained as absolute manifestations of God’s will. This God would remain a being “within the rational sphere of understanding.”66 The other extreme, the concept of God as “wholly Other” whose being is so ungraspable as to preclude any comprehensibility of faith as an option for human beings, projects an impossible transcendence onto God, such that we “can no longer see what possible influence this stranger can have on our lives.”67 Each of these concepts subverts the fundamental and definitive action of God: becoming a part of history in order to save it, and remaining with creation as sign and cause of salvation. “At any rate,” Schillebeeckx reminds us, “no one prays to some ‘condition of possibility’ or another.”68 The trinitarian interplay between transcendence and immanence warrants identifying God with the future of human beings, insofar as God is the creator, savior, and principle of (radical) change for created reality. This “new image of God,” developed by Schillebeeckx, aims to recover God’s transcendence and to align it with the future of human beings. Schillebeeckx

62. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 33 [56]. 63. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 109 [181]. 64. Schillebeeckx, Jesus in Our Western Culture, 6–7. 65. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 104 [173]. 66. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 35 [59]. 67. Ibid., 42–43 [70–71]; cf. John Marsden, “Bloch’s Messianic Marxism,” New Blackfriars 70, no. 823 (1989): 37–38. 68. Schillebeeckx, Jesus in Our Western Culture, 5.

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also argues that this image is actually a recovered image based on strong biblical foundations. This is the “God of promise,” from the Hebrew Scriptures, who delivers God’s people from slavery and death into new life.69 The Israelite selfunderstanding of divine promise developed out of its reinterpretation of Israel’s own past, finding in that past an affirmation of God’s faithfulness and applying this as an expectation of God’s continued fidelity to the covenant.70 The image of God can also be cultivated from an eschatological expectation of the Rule of God as a promised reality whose first fruits are being felt in the present, first and foremost in the Christ event as well as in a history experienced as graced.71 Faith in God and hope in the future go hand-in-hand at this juncture as the impetus for human action in the world, and Schillebeeckx has, in effect, presented a philosophically robust, ontologically grounded, and profoundly biblical image of God that he has also cultivated in the modern “turn” toward futurity. 5.2.2 Flight from the World, Flight from the Future The ontological orientation of human beings toward the future should not, however, be read in any way as being a guarantee or a “glorified optimism about progress.”72 The freedom of human beings within reality is neither of such a character where we are totally chained to a specific way of viewing the world, but nor are we so radically free as to be able to posit infinite possibilities. Ontological foundations only bring us so far in the way that we act in the world, and it is possible to act against the freedom given to us. That freedom is, itself, a situated freedom, or freedom within a specific spatial-temporal situatedness. Human freedom is not, as it has sometimes been imagined, “suspended in a vacuum—it is both in a tradition and situated in contemporary experience.”73 Schillebeeckx in no way suggests that achieving a fully human future is possible, like a kind of politically active neoPelagianism, but neither is it “an object of purely contemplative expectation.”74 The performative burden of human beings in their freedom is a heavy one, and Schillebeeckx recognized, in a quasi-prophetic way, that “human freedom is so heavily burdened by [a self-made future] that there is real danger, no longer of a flight from the world, but of a flight from the future, and in many different forms— the ‘world’ has become the future.”75

69. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 111 [184]; Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 143–54. 70. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 5–6 [6]. 71. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 111 [184]. 72. Ibid., 106 [177]. 73. Schillebeeckx, “Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” GFM, 23 [34]. 74. Schillebeeckx, “Theological Criteria,” UF, 59 [66]. 75. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 106 [177]. He repeats this analysis twenty years later, but as an observed fact rather than a projection or a theory in Church, 232–234 [235–36].

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Similarly, he points out that the “twentieth century is experiencing the bankruptcy of all systems, including Christianity as a monological system.”76 This last observation was quite prescient, and is in line with Lyotard’s declaration about modernity and its master narratives. In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Lyotard contends: “The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation.”77 The historical results of the narratives were exactly the opposite of what was promised: salvation and emancipation yielded war, worldwide depression, the gulag, and the Holocaust.78 Lyotard follows Adorno in declaring the symbolic power of Auschwitz as the final word on modernity’s possibilities. Auschwitz is not just a paradigmatic example; it is modernity’s logical outcome. The nature of the hegemonic master narrative, legitimated from its end, is fundamentally linked to what it has produced.79 The war and the genocide were inevitable due to the rigged interior logic of the dialectic of enlightenment.80 If Lyotard is somewhat obtuse in his characterization of Auschwitz,81 Adorno is crystal clear: All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage. In restoring itself after things that happened without resistance in its own countryside, culture has turned entirely into the ideology it had been potentially . . . . Whoever pleads for the maintenance of this radically culpable and shabby culture becomes its accomplice, while the man who says no to culture is directly furthering the barbarism which our culture showed itself to be.82

The performativity of the narratives shows them to be a fraud at their most fundamental level: the linking of phrases in a quasi-automatic way in service of

76. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 40 [66]. 77. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 37. 78. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 25–26. 79. Lyotard, The Differend, 87–91, no. 152–154; cf. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 144–45, note 32. 80. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 26; Theodor W. Adorno, “Why Philosophy?” The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O’Connor (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 46. Adorno identifies an intrinsic relationship between the “equivocal superiority implied in [Heidegger’s] notion of being” (partially in his refusal to attribute any moral agency or value to the Good, and partially from his inability to think of a God who is both beyond being and with being) and “Heidegger’s absorption into Hitler’s Führerstaat.” 81. Lyotard, The Differend, 97–106, no. 155–60. 82. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 367. See especially the chapter entitled “Meditations on Metaphysics: After Auschwitz,” 361–65.

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the goal of the narrative. If these master narratives have been discredited, then we must question the ontological futurity of humanity as well as the implications for Christianity. Schillebeeckx, well aware of the suffering produced by Buchenwald, Auschwitz, and Vietnam, would not accord these instances a place in the divine plan or as part of a history that is a matter for God’s mysterious and inscrutable design.83 Futurity should be experienced as being an imperative and an orientation, but it may be that a “flight from the future” is the real condition postmoderne, or perhaps something else, something new that has supplanted postmodernity, and is most indicative of our contemporary context.

5.3 The New Economic Master Narrative What has emerged from the wreckage of the modern master narratives appears to be a reconfiguration of the modern structure. The postmodern situation has a modified attitude toward the “small narratives,” those that present otherness and appear to produce a confrontation between competing narratives. Schillebeeckx called the phenomenon associated with the breakdown of hegemonic master narratives deculturization, while Boeve has named it detraditionalization, wherein the predominant narrative traditions break down, in terms of their influence over people, through the confrontation with other traditions.84 For Boeve, the end result is not a pure secularization, but a pluralization, or a process by which many smaller narratives share the same social space and exercise overlapping spheres of influence.85 As Boeve describes it: In contrast to a secularization paradigm, detraditionalization and pluralization sharpen our awareness that to be Christian implies an identity construction rooted in particular narratives and practices, with its own specific truth claims in a context of dynamic plurality and often-conflicting truth claims.86

On the face of it, it would seem that this is a return to the situation of a “universe of names,” but on a wider scale there is something different at work in the interplay between sameness and difference, and something far more sinister. The logic of “marketization” appears to have taken the place of the master narratives of

83. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 717–718 [724–25]. 84. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 105–106 [175–76]; Boeve, God Interrupts History, 22–23. Each of these is intended as a corrected and more nuanced name for what is commonly known as “secularism,” and both authors seek to refute the “secularization thesis” in the way that it is normally understood: the more rational people become over time, the less religious they will be. 85. Boeve, God Interrupts History, 24–26. 86. Boeve, “The Enduring Significance and Relevance of Edward Schillebeeckx?” 7.

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modernity, uniting all of the previous narratives under a prevailing logic based on economic transactions.87 Under this logic, difference and authentic otherness are converted into commodities; they are options to be consumed in an everincreasing market of options. Pluralization becomes the ally of marketization because it provides ever-newer opportunities that can be packaged, advertised, and sold as opportunities to create and cultivate the perfect “self.”88 The rise of information technology and social communication has only intensified the reflexive selving of human subjects. Reflexivity in this context is not the kind of self-reflection advocated by Habermas, or the embodiment of the Delphic maxim, “γνῶθι σαυτόν,” “know thyself.” Instead, the form of “reflexivity” is a looking-over-my-shoulder, and a glance cast at my neighbor whose gaze I must meet with an appropriately constructed image of myself. Never before have human beings been able to so artificially construct themselves and their own image than through social media and instant communication—the digital idealized self. This is not to condemn technology or its proliferation and the accumulation and codification of data: that would be to make a fundamental category error in the distinction between the tool and its user. The way that it is being used continues the trend that affirms, “to do is to buy,” but modifies it: to be is to buy, to buy is to be.89 One’s existence is being reduced to the momentary consumption and curation of a personality, an image of a self, and a carefully manicured “soul.” All of this speaks to the fulfillment of Schillebeeckx’s “prophecy” concerning the burden of human freedom. The break we experienced at modernity’s end was a severe trauma, and a true failure of the human belief in the future. Now, like the victim of our own weapons, human beings have retreated into themselves, and retreated into the now. This now is a moment that serves itself and seeks the achievement of itself and its own gratification, and is paralyzed with regard to the future and the radical responsibility of human freedom as well as the profound and rich inheritance of the past. In Metz’s assessment of modern subjectivity, modern people’s “awareness of their identity” is weakening, and becoming more fragile.90 This hardly sounds like an honest evaluation in the twenty-first century, unless we associate “identity” solely with what is conferred through traditional

87. Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 73–74. 88. Ibid., 75. 89. Ibid. Attention and adoration gained on social media is a kind of currency for instant gratification. We see this especially in the “meme culture” of many websites where particular images, combined with text that is designed to provoke a response (in the form of either “likes” or comments), are prevalent. Making “confessions” or culturally and racially insensitive statements through memes serves the purpose of generating attention, and focusing on conflict generated as an end in itself. These memes do not further debate or bring about self-reflection, as with Augustine’s confession. In contrast, they are a point of self-affirmation. They are the very opposite of the Delphic maxim, since they proclaim a predecided answer, rather than asking a serious and reflexive question. 90. Metz, Faith in History and Society, 26.

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narratives. Today, we have very little room to say that our “awareness of identity” has weakened. In fact, the opposite is the case. So-called identity politics has been blamed for increasing political polarization. We are constantly aware of our identity, reminded of it by status updates, “friend requests,” and by digital culture in general. We are constantly asked to reaffirm the digital identity that we project, and the self-limiting nature of social media reinforces that identity. Concerning the fragility of our identity, that is perhaps more debatable. In moving forward, we must examine the “fractured self ” and decide if what postmodern philosophy has dubbed the “de-centered” subject is not merely a shell-shocked subject. We should make a determination on whether or not the fracture of the self into parts is a cultural phenomenon, or a condition of ontology. If the former is the case, then the decentering of the self and its orientation would appear to be something different entirely from Augustine’s “interior intimo meo.”91 We will also need to examine the viability of the Christian message in this context, and whether it provides us with an eschatological answer to the failures of modernity. 5.3.1 The Digital Idealized Self and Coercion of the Market Postmodern philosophy has widely been known for its “dethroning” of the modern subject, whose evolution from romanticism and German idealism was once seen as one of modernity’s greatest achievements. The autonomous, selfcontained, and sovereign subject of historicism and romanticism should come to mind here, as an entity that finds its own ground in itself (extending from Kant), and whose radical freedom allows it to transcend its own historicity in order to understand and reclaim the past.92 In the modern master narratives, this extends to the future as well, where the subject is made both individual and universal: humanity itself is the universal, the secular subject of history and is moving toward its own universal emancipation through technological and economic means. This is, above all, manifested in the individual whose autonomous participation in the narrative furthers the growth of that narrative, and spurs it on toward completion. The subject is a “center,” or “centered” around itself and is grounded in its own autonomy and in its ability to master its environment through knowledge. It is, above all, “free, active, autonomous and self-identical,” perfectly suited to classical modernity.93

91. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 62–62; St. Augustine, The Confessions, The Works of Saint Augustine 1, trans. Maria Boulding, O.S.B. (New York: New City Press: 1997), 82–83, Bk. III.11. 92. McClean, Biblical Interpretation and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 55–79. See especially pp. 55–57. McClean uses the David Caspar Friedrich painting, Wanderer above a Sea of Mists (Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer, 1818), as a vivid illustration of the modern subject: “. . . an isolated, solitary figure, a single point of consciousness, who observes the world around him from afar.” 93. Terry Eagleton, “Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism,” New Left Review 152 (August 1958): 71.

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This human being penetrates nature and masters it through an exercise of the will. We can rightly associate this understanding of the human subject with the semiautomatic linking of phrases in Lyotard’s language pragmatics: sovereignty and mastery of an environment depend upon one’s knowledge and the ability to manipulate that environment. In the modern master narrative, this manipulation occurs by drowning out or rewriting all voices that would run counter to the narrative and its telos. The differend, the possibility that things could have been otherwise and the arbitrary character of the narrative, is covered over. Instead, “the way things are” is called inevitable, natural, and self-perfecting. This is equally true in the self-legitimating logic of the proletariat, as the universal selfemancipating subject, as well as in the idolatry of the self-regulating market whose unchecked autonomy guarantees progress and prosperity for all. In each case, the narrative becomes metaphysics. Outside of the narrative there is only a “nothing”—that is, something that does not participate in the system and, therefore, exists only as a “non-being” in contrast to the reality present in the being of the narrative. The trauma engendered by the end of this system of master narratives has not, in any way, dismantled the metaphysical character of economics, however. In fact, it has absolutized our understanding of economics as the Being of beings. We exist only insofar as we participate in the market, and the system has expanded to include the counter-narratives as well, such that they are no longer “non-beings,” but a functionalized, commodified “other” and ultimately just another consumer like us. The other’s ability to speak is merely a reflection of its market share, and a coercive form of participation in the market system. In fact, since the 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled consistently that spending money constitutes a form of political speech, and therefore cannot be limited according to the US Constitution. Similar decisions have been reached that voided limits being placed on campaign finance spending or anonymous campaign contributions in the recent cases Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014). This is a startling trend, and should be recognized as being incredibly dangerous to society, or indeed for humanity because it redefines human rights in terms of monetary power. The implication is that if money is increasingly understood as the primary form of political speech, then those without money do not simply have less ability to speak, they also have less of a right to speak. Late-market capitalism functions like a caricature of Plato, wherein the Good is pure capitalism, which we are striving to instantiate. Once this occurs, then God will be in heaven, and all will be right with the world, but this is achieved through a supreme emphasis on the now moment. The production of wealth through consumption is an incredibly short-sighted goal, and produces a paralysis on any long-term decision-making. We can see this rather clearly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crises, which was itself caused by the drive for short-term profits at the expense of long-term sustainability. This pattern has continued and even been strengthened by the crisis, rather than being curbed, which negates the thesis that

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what drives the logic of the market and legitimates it is its own performativity, the question of “Does it work?”94 Lieven Boeve has argued that: Knowledge is currently legitimated by its performativity. Knowledge is first and foremost characterized by the fact that it works, that it makes things possible. The optimization of its performativity is realized through a constant revolutionizing of the existing scientific discourse, breaking it open with newness.95

I depart from Boeve’s reading of the situation here. He sticks to the criteria of “performativity,” which may have been true of the situation in the recent past, but it no longer functions as an explanation. The legitimation of the market narrative is “shifty” at best, and precisely when it cannot be demonstrated as “performative,” we often see its advocates cast the failures of the system in the light of unfulfilled potential, shifting the burden to a purer (utopian) future. There is something concealed in the logic of the market and exchange. If modernity were to be characterized by a phrase it might be, “It will work (at any cost!),” then postmodernity could instead be a question, albeit a duplicitous one: “Does it work now?” or “Is it working (for me)?” I am somewhat convinced that “Is it working?” is also a question of being convincing and persuasive, as though the actions undertaken were constantly under suspicion or in a fog of insecurity. There is a distinct need for affirmation that the illusion is being kept up. The “flight from the future” occurs in the almost exclusive emphasis on this “now” moment as what matters, and indeed as all that matters. The postmodern fracture between future and present, which absolutizes the present precisely as a representative of the future, is the source of great anxiety for us, and is temporarily alleviated by engaging in commerce. Each transaction affirms the picture of the self that we wish to project, but there is a slippage between the “I” that is projected and the “I” that projects. The unity is disjointed and above all, detemporalized. There is even a way in which consumption assuages the contemporary anxiety about the past and future: shopping in a store, or online, relieves the pressure of temporality by creating a false present. There is no scary future or traumatic past when the entire experience is engineered to prolong the sense of gratification achieved in the now. William Cavanaugh is correct in showing that consumerism is not at all about the desire for a particular thing, but it is about perpetuating desire itself, “for pleasure is not in possessing objects but in their pursuit.”96 It is the endlessness of shopping and consumption, and not buying itself (and by extension our use or enjoyment of a thing) that keeps us mired in the artificial present.

94. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 12, 42–46; Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 74–77. 95. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 12. Emphasis original. 96. William T. Cavanaugh, Being Consumed: Economics and Christian Desire (Grand Rapids, MI and Cambridge: W.B. Eerdmans, 2008), 91.

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5.3.2 The Content of the Market Narrative The goal of the narrative, however, should be in question. What exactly does it do? We must distinguish between the commodification of the world and production of wealth as an end in itself, and the universal adherence to a narrative of marketization (really radical capitalism) in the service of universal emancipation. It appears that these two ideas are operating at the same time: wealth is sought after because wealth itself is good, and wealth is sought after because wealth produces good results for all, in the form of greater material wealth. The logic of performativity invalidates the second claim, but people go on accumulating wealth while causing immense harm to large portions of the population through pollution, unsafe and unjust labor practices (justified through an appeal to the human being’s “right to work,” that is, to buy and sell its own labor as a commodity), predatory financial practices, or the creation of entire economies based on debt. In any case, performativity seems to only apply to the creation of wealth in se, with little concern for humanity as a universal subject of history.97 The essential moral-anthropological narrative of the market that has restructured our values and our self-understanding around the pursuit of economic gain, is traceable in various forms to the ways in which Adam Smith conceived of social relations. He famously asserted that all people are motivated in society by self-love, and not by benevolence toward others, and therefore all forms of cooperation are fundamentally self-centered. Standing in the tradition of Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, Smith gave his social philosophy an

97. The case of Linda Almonte is particularly illuminating here. Almonte is currently suing JP Morgan Chase as a whistleblower, alleging that the company sold between $200–250 million in credit card debt to a debt collection agency. Almonte discovered that a large percentage of the debts were either inflated amounts, or entirely nonexistent (and in some cases JP Morgan Chase actually owed money). Legal procedures had been omitted in many cases and essential parts of necessary litigation were being willfully ignored. Almonte refused to sign off on the deal because it was illegal, and was allegedly fired as a result. The deal would have netted nearly a quarter of a billion dollars for JP Morgan Chase, as well as money for the collection agency while hurting those whose debt was being sold. Almonte alleges that the concern was for earnings reports to be posted in that year, 2009, and not for long-term consequences or the overall legality of the work. Short-term profits and personal bonuses were the determining factor. See Robert Evans and Linda Almonte, “5 Terrible Things I Learned as a Corporate Whistleblower,” Cracked.com, last modified April 7, 2014, http://www.cracked.com/ article_21043_5-terrible-things-i-learned-as-corporate-whistleblower.html; Jeff Horwitz, “OCC Probing JPMorgan Chase Credit Card Collections,” The Banker, March 12, 2012, http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_49/chase-credit-cards-collections-occ-probelinda-almonte-1047437-1.html?pg=1; Jeff Horwitz, “How a Whistleblower Halted JPMorgan Chase’s Card Collections,” The Banker, March 15, 2012, http://www.americanbanker.com/ issues/177_52/jpmorgan-chase-credit-card-collections-1047573-1.html?pg=1.

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economic and a moral character that has helped to shape our contemporary world.98 Duncan K. Foley has pointed out that the central narrative that Smith argues for is that “capitalism transforms selfishness into its opposite: regard and service for others. Thus by being selfish within the rules of capitalist property relations, Smith promises, we are actually being good to our fellow human beings.”99 Essentially, self-interested behavior is rational, because all people are motivated by it. By pursuing selfish interests, we actually build up society and in the long run everyone will experience better and more just social relations.100 We are asked to endure or even perpetuate short-term “concrete evil” (selfish behavior for our own material benefit) in order to contribute to an “abstract” good for all. However, no one has been able to conclusively demonstrate how “private selfishness turns into public altruism.”101 The mechanism is usually only seen as the mysterious “invisible hand” of the market which guides a large number of transactions toward an aggregate good for all. Essentially, there is a kind of faith in the goodness of the market and of market outcomes, making the economic narrative around self-interest moral, metaphysical, and to some extent, religious. If we think back to the four characteristics of modern master narratives, Smith’s core economic narrative about self-interested behavior fulfills all four criteria. It is [1] a cognitive claim on the truth of reality as essentially constituted by economic laws and economic self-interest; it [2] makes a hegemonic legislative claim on the essential linking of “phrases,” since all social relations and “stories” must be understood from the perspective of economic interest; it allows for [3] a “grand narrative” of universal history as a history of progressive emancipation through economic social relations (either in a Marxist sense of class struggle, or a capitalist sense of increasing liberty through the free market); and finally, it [4] is universal for humanity as a basic story about how humans are. All people are, at their core, economic agents who should be freed from traditional social constraints to pursue their own interests. If we do this, the narrative says, we will all somehow be better off. Because all forms of “interest” are essentially economic, and therefore quantitative, it makes sense that the “performativity” principle of postmodernity has been converted into a purely monetary type of “emancipation.” If everything can only be measured economically, or quantitatively, then money makes a totalizing claim on human life.

98. Luigino Bruni, Civil Happiness: Economics and Human Flourishing in Historical Perspective (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 30–39; Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers, Rev. 7th ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 41–50. 99. Duncan K. Foley, Adam’s Fallacy: A Guide to Economic Theology (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard, 2008), 2. The jump from “self-love” to “self-interest” is, after all, not very far in a market society. 100. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, 55–56. 101. Foley, Adam’s Fallacy, 3.

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5.3.3 The Goal of the Market Narrative and the Digital Idealized Self There is a fracture, therefore, in how we perceive the world and how we pursue our goals. The logic of the market has severed the necessary connection between the goal of the narrative and the linking of phrases, while maintaining an ultimate legitimating goal. The modern master narratives could, indeed, write off suffering and injustice because it was a stage of growth on the way to a state of utopia. The current narrative of economic exchange dictates that even if what we do does not seem to produce good results, it is still good, and is often in fact the only thing that can be done. The idealistic goal of wealth as emancipatory never needs to arrive, but we should still consume even if it produces suffering and inequality on a massive scale. If the only measure of value is “economic,” then we have no real way of criticizing outcomes beyond “less” and “more.” This same fracture is to be seen in the cultivation of the contemporary self. Reflexive selving with an eye toward the observer is constantly creating its own ideal (an ideal self) in order to become itself. This concept of selving is not at all new, but what is new about it is the central aspect of consumption as a way to reach this goal. The self is improved upon through augmentation and the addition of products, including experiences as tokens of the self, which we see in eco-tourism or in the proliferation of an instant photo-sharing culture. Documented experience is only real insofar as it is shared and added to a collection of tokens that represent a self, focused in the present. This represents a new development in the “culture of the kick,” or limit experiences that are meant to define and directly confirm self-consciousness with a sudden encounter with boundaries and with alterity.102 Anything that pushes a person “beyond him/ herself,” an ek-static experience helps to both affirm and confirm that person’s selfhood. By posting photos, comments, or memes online a person creates a carefully managed “kick” experience in the call to others for affirmation, admiration, and ultimately confirmation that the “self ” that is presented is both good and real. William Burroughs had it right when he wrote: “Kick is seeing things from a special angle. Kick is momentary freedom from the claims of the aging, cautious, nagging, frightened flesh.”103 The hermeneutical movement between past and present, oriented toward the future (a better and different future) is inverted, such that both the past and future only serve as proof of the reality of the present.104 Documenting our

102. See Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 85–87. 103. William S. Burroughs, Junky: The Definitive Text of Junk, ed. Oliver Harris (New York: Grove Press, 2012), 150. 104. The popular essayist and satirist, David Sedaris, inadvertently captures this sentiment perfectly in speaking about his practice of journaling: “It’s not lost on me that I’m so busy recording life, I don’t have time to really live it. I’ve become one of those people I hate, the sort who go to a museum and, instead of looking at the magnificent Brueghel, take a picture of it, reducing it from art to proof. It’s not ‘Look what Brueghel did, painted

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consumption has become the ultimate proof-positive of being—a fact testified to by the popularity of the “haul” and “unboxing” video genres on the internet, which among many, many other adjectives, should certainly be described as alarming.105 The result is indeed a fractured subject, and the fracture lies precisely along the axis that uncouples the future horizon qua future from the actions undertaken in the present. “Does it work?” truly becomes “Is it working for me now?” And above all, “Is what I am doing convincing to myself and to others now?” It is no accident that the “promotional” section of the social media app Snapchat’s website answers the question of why “13 to 34-year-olds Love Snapchat” with three different headings. Under the heading “Get Perspective,” the site tells us that “Snaps [instant picture or video messages] provide a personal window into the way you and your friends see the world.” “Be Here, Now,” proclaims to us that the “stories” are updated in “real-time and expire after 24 hours.” Most alarmingly, “Express Yourself ” screams at us that “Snaps reflect who you are in the moment— there is no need to curate an everlasting persona.”106 Every attempt to cultivate a persona must also be convincing to the one who projects that persona, but without continual affirmation the identity is lost.

Conclusion Having to ask the question “Am I convincing myself?” gets at the heart of the matter of postmodern subjectivity. Boeve shows that Lyotard recognized something in the human subject that illustrates this fracture: “according to Lyotard, it was Augustine (with Paul) who first pointed to this internal division of the self by the presence of another which cannot be contained by the self.”107 Lyotard, along with other contemporary philosophers (e.g., Alain Badiou, Giorgio Agamben,

this masterpiece’ but ‘Look what I did, went to Rotterdam and stood in front of a Brueghel painting!’” David Sedaris, “Day In, Day Out,” Let’s Explore Diabetes with Owls (London: Abacus, 2013), 233. 105. As of this writing, a search for “haul” and “unboxing haul” on YouTube yields “about 28,000,000” and “about 8,830,000” results, respectively. The “haul” videos depict people showing off what they have just bought, while the “unboxing” variant consists of videos of a product slowly being taken out of its packaging. Many of these videos have tens, and even (more than) hundreds of thousands of views. Thanks to Michael Swaim and his web series, Does Not Compute, for pointing out the strange video types that proliferate online. See Cracked, “6 Types of YouTube Videos That There Are Waaaay Too Many Of—Does Not Compute,” YouTube video, 8:26. June 23, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lleVT_ ZJqs. 106. See “Overview and FAQ,” Snapchat, accessed on September 10, 2015, https://www. snapchat.com/ads/. 107. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 61.

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John D. Caputo) want to claim both Augustine and Paul as the originators of the “modern turn to the subject.” The colonization of a “philosophical Augustine” occurred in the 1990s, while the same phenomenon happened with Paul around a decade later. While there is a strong Pauline element in Augustine’s thought, an easy identification of the two thinkers too easily glosses over three centuries of history and Christian theological and ecclesiastical development. We cannot uncritically place Paul and Augustine together in the same breath as though there were no one in between and as if the several hundred intervening years were of no consequence. We might just as easily call Martin Luther the originator of the modern subject because he read Paul and Augustine, and protested against the prevalent authority of the time. While an abstract “historicity” is a concern for postmodern philosophy (and theology), historical accuracy and sensitivity is rarely given much attention. As is often the case, however, with postmodern authors, there is an important point to be found in their work despite the lack of historical and theological finesse. The identification of an interior otherness and internal division in ancient thinkers can aid us in dealing with this same fracture in our own context. Augustine called this other who was interior intimo meo, God, and in naming the Other writes it into a narrative and makes some sense of the event.108 Lyotard claims that Augustine has discovered the interior otherness within the human subject itself and “[t]he ‘I’ never succeeds in coinciding with itself; there always remains an original distance which cannot be preceded or overcome.”109 Both Lyotard and Augustine name this phenomenon, although in different ways. Augustine calls this breach “God.” Lyotard, meanwhile, sees an “unnamed” non-confession, and a central aspect of human experience: otherness and the differend. There is a sense of the human being not fully coinciding with itself, but there is also the question of what is the source of that breach.

108. Ibid., 68–69. 109. Ibid., 68–70.

Chapter 6 GOD, EXPERIENCE, AND ECONOMIC APOCALYPTICISM

The God of Christian faith must be distinguished from the God of religion, and Schillebeeckx posits that the process of deculturalization has killed the latter. By this, he means that the God who had previously been proclaimed as the guarantor of the physical universe, and whose will had determined the state of both the earth and human society, is no longer credible. This is a God who was proclaimed as the immanent and universal signifier for the Christian narrative, or at least was part of the hegemonic functioning of the narrative since God Himself, in neoscholastic theology, took on a wholly transcendent character, with the space between heaven and earth being filled by a supreme logic of rules that interconnected various points of dogma. On the other hand, there is the tendency to make God into the “wholly other,” “of whom we can know absolutely nothing within the rational sphere of understanding.”1 These are two extreme positions, and postmodern philosophy has often criticized fundamentalism of being guilty of the former tendency, reducing God to a “God of the gaps,” and to violently assert its possession of absolute Truth.2 Postmodern philosophy has taken over the opposite tendency, by making God (or G-d, or “the Event”) so radically transcendent, that God has become merely a cipher, or a trendy way of naming the experience of interior otherness within the human subject. In industrialized Western nations, both tendencies represent not the God of Jesus Christ, but a legitimation of bourgeois society either through philosophical sophistication (with the implication that others are ignorant in contrast), or presenting God as a pseudo-scientific principle that rewards the economically privileged through the working of his “invisible hand.”

6.1 Experience Pointing to the Mystery of God In one prominent trend in postmodern philosophy, God becomes something that is named and then negated, not out of reverence for the ineffable nature of God in

1. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 43 [71]. 2. See John D. Caputo, On Religion, Thinking in Action (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 101–08.

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the mystical hope for union, but out of a desire to “confess” something radically un-representable. God becomes something that does not properly exist, but holds open all of our assertions about reality through not naming that difference. Boeve has questioned whether the postmodern “confession” really does “constitute a more radical confession than the one of Augustine, due to not naming God, not determining otherness, because of its being agnostic, and literally atheistic,” as thinkers like John Caputo assert.3 Schillebeeckx would not only agree with Boeve, but fire back at Caputo that his assertion about the “event,” the “Secret,” the God who is love, and the love that is God, if this is really that which grounds reality and has an “insistence” (as opposed to a transcendence, although the Christian notion of transcendence is not really opposed to what Caputo means), then this God is a part of our experience, and human experience has a real reference to God.4 Therefore, any “humanly meaningful faith in God is only possible within a rational sphere of understanding” as something rationally intelligible for human beings who are themselves finite, linguistic creatures.5 Essentially, to indefinitely hold open the breach in the human self for difference, for an utterly transcendent and indeterminate event that cannot be named, makes no sense in terms that humans can experience, interpret, and understand. We know God in the same way that we know finite reality: in and through historical mediations of meaning and through the human process of interpretation. The particular and historical character of experience does not negate God’s radical transcendence in accordance with the Thomistic dictum: “Actus credentis non terminatur ad enuntiabile, sed ad rem.”6 In other words, we cannot a priori deny the truth of a narrative or an experience merely because a narrative is a historical construct, and is therefore limited in nature.7 There may be no final grasping the ultimate meaning of history, or universal Truth, but that does not preclude a historical and admittedly contingent mediation of that truth. 6.1.1 Human Question, Divine Answer? The question of the human being, the breach at the core of the human subject that confronts the self with otherness already contained within itself, must therefore be answered in a human way. The answer needs to be historical, linguistic, contingent, and be able to be understood before it can be evaluated in terms of its

3. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 69. 4. Caputo, On Religion, 17–23, 26, 31; John D. Caputo, “The Sense of God: A Theology of the Event with Special Reference to Christianity,” Between Philosophy and Theology: Contemporary Interpretations of Christianity, ed. Lieven Boeve and Christophe Brabant (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 35–36; Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 43–44 [71]. 5. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 43 [71]. 6. Schillebeeckx, “Faith Functioning,” 54; cf. Thomas, ST, I-II, q.1, a. 2, ad 2. 7. Cf. Caputo, On Religion, 20, 59.

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truth content. We must wonder why it is that, from the side of fundamentalism, it is often supposed that an infinite God cannot communicate “the same” truth (the self-revelation of Godself) in a multitude of ways, given humanity’s finitude. Why does fundamentalism need to posit unalterable, literal truth as the content of revelation, when even the biblical witness shows that God has communicated Godself differently throughout the history of revelation? Certainly, this was not for God’s benefit, but for humanity’s. With the reconfiguration of the world by “secularization,” in the sense that Schillebeeckx means it, the distinction between the God of religion and the God of faith has become very difficult to describe. The contemporary view of the world does not recognize a category outside of itself, beyond immanence, and this is perhaps either a symptom or cause of the functionalization of otherness by the market narrative and the legacy of positivistic science. If the “secular” is the human capacity to shape the world and human history, then with this as the ruling paradigm, it becomes increasingly difficult to think of God as coming from an “outside,” or a vertical view of the ordering of the world as an emanation of God’s being. Schillebeeckx asks whether there is something in human experience itself that points to absolute mystery, and therefore creates a reference point to the infinite in and through secular experience.8 Schillebeeckx observes that if there is no reference to the transcendent in human experience, then even the secular itself, the human capacity to create history, would be structured as an ideology “which would sacrifice the human person to a better future and thus result not in humanization but in dehumanization.”9 Every injustice could be justified in the pursuit of an immanent goal, while the transcendent referent refuses to justify human failure, but rather stands as a judgment on the present and challenges us to make the future different. This transcendent point (or “insistent” point), recognized as something that comes from the outside (ab extra) and not only something that moves toward the outside or the other (ad extra) from within the self, has been one of the turning points of postmodern philosophy, as well as comprising one of the keys to Edward Schillebeeckx’s theology.10 It really is a rupture from within that carries us beyond ourselves, splitting the single subject into a decentered, but not a pluralized, experiencing subject. If we take seriously the hermeneutical ontology that we have been exploring, then we must return to the notion that human beings exist through their selfunderstanding as hermeneutically mediated in the fusion of horizons—past tradition and future expectation. The decentered subject operates with difference at its core. Its restless heart moves it to search for rest and for a center, or a foundation from which the world can be seen as meaningful. The transcendent point of knowledge and mastery over the world is something sought for, because this is the point at which the human being is made “whole,” and the breach in itself would be covered over. The ontological structure of human beings, however,

8. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 43–44 [71]. 9. Ibid. 10. Scanlon, “The Postmodern Debate,” 231–32.

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is focused toward the future and the future is essentially unknown, even if it can be anticipated. The implication is that there is an authentic mode of being human that accepts the alterity presented by the future horizon, and an inauthentic one that has already decided what that will consist of and how it will appear. The latter is represented in modern master narratives. The former is what concerns us here, and according to Schillebeeckx is represented by the Christian narrative. A self-understanding that involves the real finitude and historicity of humanity is a self-understanding that is constantly being pulled beyond itself. When the “absolute limit” of interpretation is reached, human beings experience radical finitude because their interpretive frameworks fail.11 They are inadequate as they are, and must be reformed. This is the hermeneutic movement as it plays out in the human subject, which also reveals the decentering of the subject whose interpretive framework is never adequate. Future expectations, culled from past experience, are always being reformulated such that identity is a shifting ground, rather than a firm foundation. Instead of a single, monadic identity, a hermeneutical ontology reveals something fluid in the form of a foundation based on movement. The foundation of the subject is its finitude, which allows for its self-transcendence. “Identity” is not irrevocably lost or radically denied, however, because any transcending movement and any self-surpassing comes out of a remembered past and a conception of the “whole.”12 This does not preclude the notion that our understanding of the past can change, but it affirms that having a past and an interpretive framework makes reinterpretation possible: The past belongs essentially to our human condition which in its present is oriented towards the future. And the interpretation of old testament history shows that the past only becomes clearer in the present when again and again it is seen in the light of the future. In the bible the interpretation of a past event always coincides with the announcement of a new expectation for the future.13

The question of God must, for Schillebeeckx, touch human experience or else there can be no functional difference between the God of religion as a human construction and the God of faith as a saving reality. The hermeneutical question is a question about humanity itself: What is it that is “fully human”? What can humanity become? Human self-understanding is both presupposed and sought after in this question, since it rests on a hermeneutical ontology that is already expecting an answer to the question that is posed. We expect something about humanity, while also questioning what that will be, revealing a fundamental “trust” that, despite all evidence to the contrary, the future has meaning. The impossible—being fully human—is still anticipated as

11. Schillebeeckx, Church, 75–77 [78–79]. 12. Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 87. 13. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 5 [5–6]; see also Christ, 824 [828].

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being possible, even when it is under threat from historical forces, and in fact it is most acutely felt when it is directly threatened. A question like this about the future is really a question about the meaning of history (both universal and private), since the future is the reference point for our interpretation of the past.14 Once a provisional present has been reached, we look back and organize the past in light of what we know now, and therefore the question about humanity’s ultimate meaning is one about the final meaning of history. The Christian answer to this human question comes in two movements: the first is based on the implicit and interpretive framework of hermeneutical expectation, while the second is a reflective moment that examines this very structure. 6.1.2 Human Transcending Toward the Future Schillebeeckx couches the fundamental trust in the meaning of human history in terms of a promise of salvation.15 We can line this up with the hermeneutical expectation of wholeness, the healing of a breach in the self, and the rest of a restless heart. There are no longer experiences of suffering or contrast to be encountered from within or without. We can either accept human salvation as a promise that transcends concrete experience, or deny that such a thing exists. A wholesale denial, however, is either a rejection of the being of humanity or already an interpretation built thereupon. What would it look like to simply reject the meaning of the future even as a possibility? It would have to be a condition of pure despair or a complete loss of consciousness, since this does not merely imply that there will only be a positive meaning to that future. Any vision of completeness is already an affirmation of the hermeneutic movement. Even suicide is an act that envisions closure, completeness, and a future in death—an end to the movement of the self in the world and within itself. A complete denial or negation seems to also presuppose that there is something to be denied and some orientation that must be violently, unnaturally negated.16 It would appear that this element, the futurity of human hermeneutical ontology is inescapable, and at least on a certain level, is pre-reflexive.

14. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 4 [5]: “.  .  . the believer will preferably and rightly link God’s transcendence with the future as soon as man [sic] has recognised the primacy of the future in our own time-bound condition. So he [sic] will link God with the future of man and, since man is a communal person, with the future of mankind [sic] as a whole.” 15. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 45–46 [74–75]. 16. See William Desmond, Ethics and the Between (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), 21–23, 163–67. For Desmond there is an “ethos of being” that is given, and in being given is given in surplus. This ethos, when directed from its pre-subjective/pre-objective givenness, forms an anticipation of the good (of being) that is given from its origin. This has much in common with Schillebeeckx’s category of “contrast experience.”

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“Reflexivity” comes in a second movement, where human beings ask themselves an explicitly religious question through the conscious process of interpretation.17 This is not merely a matter of structure, but of the self-construction of a human subject through its own self-understanding (its own givenness “to be” actualized in being), which can only occur by being committed to a view. That view is a history, and a specific narrative informed by the interpretive framework taken over from tradition, which human beings are free to decide for or against, but Schillebeeckx’s point is that it is the Christian narrative that offers a promise of salvation, a promise of the impossible humanum to be realized, and a distinct way to commit oneself to that promise.18 Now, it must be said that there is a middle point between these two movements, and that the experiencing of the subject, is also already a mode of interpreting. Ontologically, however, there is a movement toward wholeness that is prior to the experience and its first and second-order interpretations. This movement is pre-reflexive in the sense that “reflexivity” is an interpretive movement that looks backward. Because experience and, therefore, interpretation always occur from a specific point (with a past horizon and expectation horizon), the pre-reflexive movement is an interpretive action undertaken and oriented forward, toward the future. Those who participate in the Christian narrative will experience God as the source of human transcendence. Becoming fully human “is attained only in selftranscendence, and in the sense that what is more than human is involved, through the gift of God.”19 The question of becoming fully human, fully what “I” wish myself to be, will be placed in Christian terms and therefore projected beyond a future that is immanent and achievable. The Christian narrative speaks about the impossible, and not only in terms of the historical goals of men and women, or the actualization of a regulative idea, but “an unthreatened, final, perfect salvation applying to all.”20 The paradigm for this, as well as its connection to human experience, must be found within human history and continue to be found in the histories of men and women who experience and interpret the world, or else it will become, as we have seen, decontextualized and essentially “meaningless.” The act of transcending occurs in the basic movement of a human’s being, and this requires that “something happens” (as Lyotard might put it), and that alterity intrude upon the space of subjectivity. What we have seen, however, is that the alterity present within means that self-transcendence is present, even in solitary contemplation. The reality of human beings as embodied creatures certainly precludes any purely solitary subject (in accordance with the anthropological constants examined above), and it is even the case that we seek out communities because of this interior otherness. The human subject is predisposed to be communal and social

17. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 46 [75]. 18. Ibid., 46, 47 [75, 77]. 19. Ibid., 50 [82]. 20. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 788 [792]. See Pope Francis, On Care for Our Common Home: Laudato Si’ (Washington DC: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2015), sec. 243.

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in its search for itself and for meaning. The parallel between the alterity present in the self, and in the otherness we encounter in the world, has the Christ event as its paradigm. Here, Schillebeeckx is perfectly correct in saying that Christology is “creation underlined, concentrated, and condensed: faith in creation as God wishes it to be.”21 Jesus reveals the being of God in the only way to which human beings can relate: in and through experienced history. The constant hermeneutic retrieval of Jesus’s life and message in the sacramental community of the church is a history of recontextualized experiences. The church as a body practices its own hermeneutical self-understanding by reactualizing the salvific message of Jesus in and through new experiences of salvation experienced as coming from God, and this gives the church its sacramental character: it makes what is absent really present in our everyday Christian practices. In Jesus, “we are not only confronted by God, but indeed questioned by him: God confronts us in Jesus with his own divine Being.”22 This makes him “not only the interpreter of humanity, someone who shows by word and deed how to realize in a true sense what a human being is, but who in so doing is also the interpreter or the exegete of God.”23 The Christian narrative, therefore, lays claim to be able to ultimately interpret humanity’s character and destiny as selftranscending and hermeneutical. This eschatological structure is, however, under threat in the present context. What keeps this narrative from being a master narrative of love, as Lyotard has asserted?24 Again, the answer will lie in Jesus as the paradigm of humanity’s relationship with God and with God’s role as the source of human transcendence.

6.2 Apocalyptic and Eschatological—Postmodern Market Christianity The Christian promise of salvation has become so ubiquitous in contemporary culture that it would be almost surprising if it were not heavily distorted, simply through the process of transmission via different media. The unfortunate situation that we have now is that even Christian sects and denominations have lost any sense of the eschatological, and have traded it in for a “new” apocalypticism. Part of this loss has to do with the ubiquity of the market narrative and its ability to penetrate and transform any system of thought into a commodity through the collapse of meaningful content into quantity and form. It has been easier for the popular imagination to trade the more hermeneutical view of tradition development and eschatological fulfillment for an apocalyptic sensibility as a substitute, partially due to the loss of a robust understanding of tradition and history required by Christian

21. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth,” 20. Emphasis original. 22. Ibid., 23. 23. Ibid., 24. 24. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology, 54.

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eschatology. There are stark differences between eschatology and apocalypticism, at least as the apocalyptic imagination exists in contemporary culture, and not all of them are particularly new. This tendency is dangerous for society in general, and for the Christian faith in particular. Here, I will present some of the main features of an “economic apocalypticism,” its impact upon the development of the human subject and on tradition, and finally, present Schillebeeckx’s elaboration of eschatology as a counterpoint thereto. Apocalyptic is properly understood as a specific literary genre pertaining to biblical and extra-biblical texts produced by various Jewish, Christian, and gnostic writers in antiquity.25 Even so, what we refer to as “apocalyptic” texts (e.g., Daniel, Ezekiel, and Revelation) are more typically eschatological than they are apocalyptic in the sense that we will use the term here. Karl Rahner draws a clear distinction between the two: . . . we may say that biblical eschatology must always be read as an assertion based on the revealed present and pointing towards the genuine future, but not as an assertion pointing back from an anticipated future into the present. To extrapolate from the present into the future is eschatology, to interpolate from the future into the present is apocalyptic.26

Rahner goes so far as to call this type of present-centered apocalyptic “false apocalyptic.” Schillebeeckx also follows Rahner very closely in his understanding of eschatology, even directly quoting the second half of the above citation in Schillebeeckx’s own essay “The Interpretation of the Future” from 1969. Here I will maintain this distinction between “apocalypticism” and “eschatology,” in contrast to Boeve and Metz who prefer the term “apocalyptic.” Despite the terminological preference, Boeve and Metz both define “apocalypticism” as establishing an intrinsic relation between God and temporality—or something much closer to what I mean here by “eschatology.” 6.2.1 The Contemporary Understanding of Apocalyptic The contemporary, popular understanding of apocalypticism as “false apocalyptic” is precisely in line with Rahner’s definition: the present events are taken as being direct evidence of a future that is known “prophetically”; that is, through an overtly biblicist reading of the Scriptures. Apocalyptic texts are taken as referring to a future cataclysmic event that is presented “prophetically,” and which draws “on future events, accessible because God is “already” contemporary to them, in a metaphysical doctrine of the being and knowledge of God, and so [we] can already

25. For a description of the literary genre and its historical background, see Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 99–106 [118–26]. 26. Karl Rahner, “The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions,” Theological Investigations, trans. Kevin Smyth, vol. 4 (London and New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 337. Emphasis added. See Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 9 [10]; Boeve, God Interrupts History, 194–202.

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speak of them.”27 Such a view no longer considers the historical genesis of a text as “prophetic” in its ancient usage: drawing on past events to critique injustice, which is experienced in the present, and extrapolating upon what kind of future will likely follow. The current misuse of the term has taken us far from any idea of a renewed heavens and new earth. Instead, there is a dualistic notion of earth and evil “here,” and a coming heaven that is wholly good “out there,” insisting on separation rather than mediation. Popular readings of the Book of Revelation now feature the “rapture,” where the faithful are transported to another realm, leaving the wicked behind on earth.28 Instead of a critique of contemporary Roman society, and the churches within the Empire, John of Patmos’s Revelation is now seen as an explicit preview, a kind of guidebook or play-by-play prediction of the events that will occur at the end of time. Predictions of the end of the world have always been a feature of human society, but in recent years and with the increasing use of mass media these have taken on a damaging and even desperate character. Harold Camping’s failed predictions in May, and then again in October of 2011, followed several months of sustained radio and internet advertising campaigns that convinced some people to sell their homes, quit their jobs, and in a few cases to commit suicide or to attempt to kill their families to avoid the “tribulations” of the end times.29 Not only is there a sense that God will simply end human history, by destroying the world, but that the explicit cause has very little to do with God, or even God’s will for universal human salvation.

27. Rahner, “The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions,” 334. 28. Karl Rahner astutely explains the distortion of Christian eschatology in popular consciousness in the following way: The content of the assertions in the various eschatologies of Scripture, the meaning which they intend to convey and express, can of course be made consistent. But this is not true of the imagery as such by means of which the matter is described. There are many popular eschatologies of later Christian times which start with the silent presupposition that the eschatological images (coming on the “clouds of heaven,” the sound of trumpets, opening of graves, gathering in the valley of Jehosophat, being carried up in the air to meet Christ, the stars falling on the world, the general conflagration, etc.) are indications of the actual phenomena of the future eschata and hence the account given by a spectator of these future events. The phenomena are made to fit in with one another by the silent omission of part of the data or by ranging the events arbitrarily one after the other. (See Rahner, “The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions,” 335, n. 12. Emphasis added) 29. See Robert D. McFadden, “Harold Camping, Dogged Forecaster of the End of the World, Dies at 92,” The New York Times, December 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/ us/harold-camping-radio-entrepreneur-who-predicted-worlds-end-dies-at-92. html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Scott James, “Seeking to Unplug the Voice of Doomsday,” The New York Times, July 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/us/01bcjames.html. Camping had predicted the end of the world several times, starting in 1988.

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This is the “religious” side of secularization gone quite awry; the actions of humanity not only shape the world, but because of their sinful nature, they are actually provoking God to come and to destroy it. Theories posed by popular televangelists, such as Pat Robertson, speculate that the widespread acceptance of homosexuality by contemporary culture, among other social evils (in their view including, but not limited to, legalized abortion, banning prayer in public schools, the women’s rights movement, and decolonialization), are the cause of natural disasters and signs of the “End.”30 It is humanity’s sinful activity, not God’s universal salvific will, that is the focus of this kind of “new apocalyptic,” and in some cases there are groups that believe that either by allowing human sin to pile up or by taking specific actions to reestablish the Temple cult in Israel, we can cause the “second coming” of Jesus.31 In the late 1990s, ultra-orthodox Israeli Jews and certain American Evangelical Christians even attempted to breed a “red heifer” to fulfill the requirements of Numbers 19:1-10.32 The goal would be to restart Temple sacrifices by using the cleansing ritual from Numbers 19 once the Temple has been rebuilt on the original Temple Mount. Some Evangelical Christians in the United States believe that the reestablishment of Israel as a political state is the fulfillment of a specific prophecy concerning the end of the world. The reconstruction of the Temple and the recommencement of Temple practices are necessary ingredients to speed up the “second coming” of Christ. This would actually require the destruction of the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, two of the holiest sites for Islam. Any such attempt would almost certainly precipitate a violent confrontation with Muslims in the Middle East and vehement protest from around the world. None of these actions would be seen from the “apocalyptic” perspective as being a negative consequence of human actions, but instead as a positive sign of the coming of the Rule of God, in spite of any actual human suffering that would be caused through deliberately insensitive and provocative actions. 6.2.2 Economic Apocalypticism The logic involved in this particular Christian reading of human agency, seems to be that human beings can so provoke God through sinful actions that God will either decide to intervene, or indeed be compelled to intervene by destroying cities and, eventually, the entire world. Human action can also compel Jesus to return by placing the correct puzzle pieces in the correct places, performing the right sacrifices, and provoking wars with the right kinds of people. There is a

30. Robertson alone is enough of an example. See, Frank James, “Pat Robertson Blames Haitian Devil Pact For Earthquake,” NPR.org, accessed December 13, 2015, http://www.npr. org/sections/thetwo-way/2010/01/pat_robertson_blames_haitian_d.html. 31. We should note that “second coming” as a phrase makes little biblical sense. Jesus was born, he did not drop down from heaven as in gnostic or docetist versions of Christianity. 32. Ira Glass, “Apocalypse,” Episode 125, This American Life, podcast audio, April 2, 1999, http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/125/apocalypse.

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decided outcome to history that is already known through a quasi-gnostic reading of the Scriptures, and it can be deliberately brought closer to completion. It must be said that in the United States, this same demographic also widely denies that human beings are the cause of climate change, and that human actions could have long-term effects on the health of the planet, or are the cause of the endemic and miserable poverty afflicting two-thirds of the world. Natural resources are something for humanity to use because they are a gift from God, while late-market capitalism is a metaphysical system that rewards the virtuous and hard-working, and punishes those who are lazy and sinful. There is a direct relationship here to the “prosperity gospel” preachers who teach, essentially, that the American Dream is also Jesus’s promise for Christians, and that virtue is rewarded by the market. This point of view is, unfortunately, not without its Catholic adherents.33 It is a natural outgrowth of Oral Roberts’s patently unbiblical, but perfectly marketable catchphrase, “Something good is going to happen to you!” This runs contrary to the biblical witness, especially of the Gospels, where repeatedly it is bad things that happen to God’s friends at the hands of other human beings. Jesus’s assertion that “the cup that I drink you shall drink; and you shall be baptized with the baptism with which I am baptized,” is hardly a comforting thought to the disciples, where the cup can be directly identified through a sophisticating rhetorical strategy with suffering and baptism with a violent death in the narrative frames present in Mark’s Gospel (Mk 10:39; 13:9-11).34 Even more disturbingly, the logical extension of the “prosperity gospel” is that those who are poor or marginalized are, and remain so, because of their wickedness or at least relative lack of Christian virtue, effectively damning those who do not equate material wealth or social status with God’s blessing. Schillebeeckx, on the other hand, takes position that is more readily identifiable with Mark’s Gospel: “To take the part of the oppressed is to follow God himself, God who has shown his profoundest compassion for humanity in Jesus.”35 The Christian sloganeering exemplified by Roberts and continued today by others is certainly not a “new” problem for contemporary Christianity. We can safely say that the current crisis of apocalypticism is both relatively “old” and “new.” It is something that endures as a problem for Christians, since maintaining the authentic eschatological tension

33. One example is the highly selective and, frankly, bizarre pro-market assessment/ criticism of Pope Benedict XVI’s encyclical Caritas in Veritate by George Weigel in The National Review: George Weigel, “Caritas in Veritate in Gold and Red,” National Review, July 7, 2009, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/227839/caritas-veritate-gold-and-redgeorge-weigel; cf. Michael Sean Winters, “New Heights of Hubris from George Weigel,” America Magazine, July 8, 2009, https://www.americamagazine.org/content/all-things/ new-heights-hubris-george-weigel. 34. See Paul L. Danove, “The Narrative Rhetoric of Mark’s Ambiguous Characterization of the Disciples,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 70 (1998), 27–28, 33. 35. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth,” 31; see also Jesus, 267–279 [298–312]; Christ, 818–821 [823–25].

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between the “already” and “not yet” aspects of salvation has been a challenge since the very beginning. What is distinctly absent in the contemporary “new apocalypticism” is a sense of how human agency can actually foster or further the salvation of humanity in a way that does not end with the destruction of the world. “Salvation” means being taken out of the world. The best human beings can do is to speed this process along, and like the sacrificial formulas of the Greco-Roman religions, God can actually be compelled to take action, as long as certain conditions are met. In light of our discussion above, apocalyptic is described in the same terms as the modern ideologies, and even acts as a kind of modern gnosticism. The knowledge possessed by “apocalyptic” Christians proclaims to have “let us into the secret and we already possess the ultimate and the real” as a distinct knowledge of the end of history, presupposing an ultimate, objective, and prior state of “nature.”36 Such a God is “not Salvator, Saviour, as Christians call him, but Conservator, as the Roman Hellenistic religions called him.”37 This is a falsification of any genuine faith in creation, to the point where the only “salvific” option is the return of the world to its objective form, either through genetic, preprogrammed, and inevitable development or through supra-historical logical processes. Either view of salvation is a type of “thinking from the end,” wherein the End of Days, the objective state of the world, acts as the epitome of the modern master narrative: we have seen the end of the world through (misreading) the Scriptures, and can use those Scriptures to objectively evaluate the present. Any claim made from this point of view will be subservient to an ideological view of the world, which is very evident in contemporary events and the degree to which the Christian message has been co-opted to serve “conservative” or “liberal” agendas, or worse still, the hidden machinations of the market. A genuine eschatology requires a different kind of thinking, and a different view of the world to keep it from becoming ideological. Schillebeeckx and Rahner both agree that eschatology involves thinking from the present to the future, and in effect, exercising a hermeneutical pattern of thought. Eschatology “is the view of the future which man [sic] needs for the spiritual decision of his freedom and faith,” and this future is still very much something that is yet to come, transcendent, and open to what is unexpected, what has not been produced or projected from within.38 As with the expectation of the future horizon in hermeneuticalontological self-understanding, the “end,” whether we interpret this as being the end of history or as the Rule of God, or the “end” that is expected regarding the meaning of a subject’s personal history (the whole expected from the interpretation of the parts), it retains “a character of hiddenness which is essential and proper to

36. Rahner, “The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions,” 342. 37. Schillebeeckx, Church, 228 [230]. 38. Rahner, “The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions,” 334; see Schillebeeckx, Church, 20–22 [22–23], 27 [28]; “Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” GFM, 22–25 [33–37].

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it and effects all its elements.”39 Furthermore, “the revelation of the eschatological shows it precisely as a mystery.”40 Were the future dictated in advance, then it would act as a perfect legitimation from the “end,” making the Christian narrative, and the personal narrative of the individual Christian, an ideological construction through and through.41 A realized eschatology has an element of the present, that which has occurred and is known. It also has an element of mystery and of a future not yet fully revealed but whose shape can be anticipated, albeit provisionally. “In fact,” Schillebeeckx tells us, “only the ‘already’ allows us to say anything meaningful about the still unknown future.”42 If it is the ineffable God who is our future, then we must admit that whatever this future will be, it will surprise us.

6.3 Christian Eschatology Must be Realized Eschatology A realized eschatology, one where the “not yet” of the future is read through the “already,” must be based on the structure of God’s promise to humanity. The content of this promise is “already realized in Christ (realized in fact, but nonetheless still really a promise), a promise-for-us, with the result that interpretation becomes a ‘hermeneutics of praxis.’”43 God, whose salvific will is for the “complete liberation of man [sic],” makes this promise and has kept it in the resurrection of Jesus.44 As risen, Christ has defeated death and inaugurated the new messianic age, but insofar as that age or aeon is experienced only fragmentarily, it is still a hidden reality and an aspect of the “God who is to come,” the God recognized as humanity’s future.45 The presence of Christ in history and the personal history of Jesus of Nazareth is, in itself the paradigm of the eschatological Rule of God. God’s transcendence is made available in history where it can be seen, known, and understood as salvific truth, but in the same movement this transcendence is made immanent and therefore subject to all of the same historical and contextual limitations as humanity. Jesus as the God-man reveals and conceals, discloses and hides the truth of God in history.46 It is this historical experience that founds the Christian tradition as a

39. Rahner, “The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions,” 330. 40. Ibid. Emphasis original. 41. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 10 [11]. 42. Ibid., 7 [8]. This is why the Old Testament uses familiar imagery to describe the idealized future, albeit in a new way. We rely on a known past for interpretation of the future. 43. Schillebeeckx, “Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” GFM, 25 [37]. 44. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 810 [814]. Emphasis original. 45. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and the Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 50 [81]. 46. Schillebeeckx, Church, 99 [101]: “The human face of Jesus not only reveals the face of God in very clear contours, but at the same time veils the face (because it is a revelation of the inexpressible God through Jesus’ real-human, historical, and thus contingent and limited expression).”

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“handing on” and reactualization of the original experience of salvation found in Jesus. If we take Alfred Loisy’s dictum that Jesus preached God’s Rule and it was the church that emerged historically, then we should regard it not as a challenge to the authority of the church, but a confirmation of its eschatological-sacramental character.47 Through its continuous reactualization and recontextualization of the gospel, the church makes the transcendent immanent, the ineffable is interpreted, albeit in a provisional and contingent way (it could have been otherwise!). The in-breaking of the Rule of God cannot be known absolutely because that would imply that we as historical beings have a fully transcendent grasp of it, rather than partial knowledge through experience of what will always be greater and always appear as unexpected. Further, the Rule of God cannot be known absolutely because we ourselves as historical beings are not yet complete, and as long as we continue in history, what our salvation will look like will be somehow dependent on how we exist as finite creatures. The divide between creature and creator is, after all, on our side, and God approaches us where we are. 6.3.1 Hominization and Humanization of the World If God wills the salvation of humanity, then humanity must be committed to this salvation as well. Because of the transcendent nature of God’s Rule, we cannot claim that our actions either fully constitute it (an essentially utopian/ Pelagian argument), or that our actions can bring about its full realization in a necessary way. Either claim would be a totalizing and hegemonic claim on reality and a denial of God’s transcendence. It would be a claim that we ourselves are the Lord of history, and not God, since we are able to coerce God or force God’s hand in our own matters and to act on our behalf. While it is true that everything in human terms “is decided in our history,” and not elsewhere, since even God acts in history, it is also that case that “the last word is not with history, but with the God who lives with us.”48 Essentially, it is human beings who make history, but it is God who saves it. Anything less fails to acknowledge the gratuity of grace and would make it a product of human action, despite any lip service to the contrary. With regard to human agency, Schillebeeckx is correct in saying that “[t]he rule of God will come, despite the abuses that humanity makes of its power and in refusing that rule.”49 This does not, however, leave humanity powerless or without any mandate for action. If God works in and through history, then God will not allow God’s people to “withdraw from earthly history, because only in the depth of this history can eternity begin to take shape.”50 If the Christian narrative is to be credible, then something of the promise of the narrative should be able to be seen in

47. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 831–833 [836–37]. 48. Ibid., 827 [831]. Emphasis added. 49. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth,” 25. 50. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 9 [10].

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our concrete history as part of the “already,” otherwise there is no meaningful basis for the hope in the “not yet” that is not merely a projection or wishful thinking. If secularization is to be recognized as the human ability to constitute the world, to make a meaningful history, and as a natural consequence of an increased human self-awareness in the world, then it cannot automatically be dismissed as atheistic or as a negative aspect of humanity. Rather, it should be treated as a tendency to be nourished as well as a basic source for theology. Free human action in the world can and has, to varying degrees, taken the historical form of attempts to fashion a world that is hospitable to human life. The great emancipative movements of the West have claimed the liberation of humanity from different forms of suffering and oppression as their cause. The history of these movements is, however, a history of failure. What has been repeatedly demonstrated is that “[h]ominization is not yet humanization.”51 Not all human manipulation of the world has proven to be good for humanity. Even religious motives in the service of “salvation” become slaves to immanent concepts and begin to dictate what salvation can be or become. The modern apocalyptic versions of the Christian narrative epitomize this by cherry-picking pieces of the bible to fit their own visions of the future, and using religion combined with technology (whether it be genetic engineering or mass-media advertising) to implement these predecided future trajectories. The so-called postmodern narrative of the market is something else, something that is capable of subsuming and weaponizing different versions of the Christian narrative in service of the present for short-term economic gain. Bringing the “future” to pass in the present becomes subject to the rules of the market, and the same logic wherein the virtuous benefit monetarily and the wicked suffer. What we are witnessing is really no future at all, but a hollowing out of the ontological temporal structure of being through willful disregard and mechanistic reconfiguration.52 All that matters will be what occurs now, and what can be controlled; anything new or unexpected will be called subversive or, more likely, commoditized and written into the narrative, again as one option among many. Such a standpoint really removes any possibility of failure in a substantive sense. Suffering and injustice are not symptoms of the failure of structures and the fundamental injustice of the narrative, but instances of individual failure to live up to the metaphysical structure of the world. That structure is essentially capitalist economics, which recasts our view of “good” and “evil” quantitatively, in terms of degree of prosperity within the system and one’s market share. This makes God immanent as the one who approves of economic hegemony, and not as the one who exalts the lowly or raises up the widow and the orphan. The atheistic side of secularized humanity, along with a large portion of professed Christians, can “safely” identify the Absolute with the “metaphysics of the market” so long as

51. Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and the Christian Belief in God,” GFM, 38 [64]; see also Church, 234 [236]. 52. See Metz, Faith in History and Society, 156–62.

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there is no significant challenge. While the postmodern assertion that this system works according to “performativity,” or whether or not the system works, we have seen that the ideology is so strong that this performativity is no longer even a legitimate indicator. Despite widespread failure, governments are willing to pay large sums of money to prop-up financial institutions, impoverishing or otherwise harming large portions of their own population because there is no thinkable alternative.53 There is no sense that sin can exist at such a structural level, or indeed no real concept of sin at all in certain sectors: “The only sin is for [modern man] to live otherwise than he has lived.”54 Ignoring structural sin shows a fundamental tendency of humanity to create absolutes and to prematurely decide the meaning of our own history.55 Even institutions that have a concept of sin, like the Catholic Church, have problems with structural sin, and are therefore extremely vulnerable to the postmodern emphasis on the present and disregard for the future. The influence of consumer culture and the practices contained therein loosen the connections between symbols within a tradition, lead to unfairly emphasizing particular aspects of tradition in isolation as if they were the only “essential” markers of identity.56 We can see a prime example of this danger in the sexual abuse crisis in the church, where the immediate needs of the institution were placed above any long-term efforts to deal with the structural problem of clergy sex abuse, and these short-term solutions to the problem went on for decades before becoming too big to hide. The emphasis on obedience to authority took the day, aided by increased centralization and modern digital media that projected a ubiquitous, immediate, and seemingly absolute message all over the world. This managerial use of the power of mass media “replicates a contemporary business model that ignores history and is oriented towards short-term gains.”57 The church failed at all levels to come to terms with the reality at hand, the past that engendered it, and the future implications. Church leaders claimed for much too long, and in some cases continue to claim, that the problems either did not exist, were exaggerated, localized, or the result of a conspiracy long after the accusations were all too credible. The phrase, “Is it working now?” was certainly

53. Cf. L.-J. Lebret, O.P., cited in Paul VI, Populorum progressio, Vatican website, March 26, 1967, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_ populorum_en.html, 15: “We cannot allow economics to be separated from human realities, nor development from the civilization in which it takes place.” For Lebret’s work an influence, see O’Meara and Philibert, Scanning the Signs of the Times, 70–78. 54. Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, 58, §IX. 55. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 827–28 [832]. 56. Vincent J. Miller, “When Mediating Structures Change: The Magisterium, the Media, and the Culture Wars,” When the Magisterium Intervenes: The Magisterium and Theologians in Today’s Church, ed. Richard R. Gaillardetz (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012), 158–59. 57. Godzieba, “The Magisterium in an Age of Digital Reproduction,” 152–53.

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at play here, in the failure to turn inward and to confront the presence of God in the negative image: the face of the victim, seeing it only in itself and in what was known, and what could be controlled. In short, the presence of God was seen in an ideological image of the church, rather than in the faces of the crucified victims of the narrative. Schillebeeckx saw something along these lines in writing: There is a great difference here between liberation from physical oppression (e.g. sickness, hunger and poverty), psycho-somatic oppression (e.g. pathological alienations) and socio-political oppression on the one hand, and liberation from sin and guilt on the other. In the first instances people can intervene enough to heal either person or society, but in the latter case no direct human intervention can bring liberation. For in the last resort what we have here is a guilty failure (which is perhaps something quite different from just failure).58

Any and all attempts at liberation, even honest ones that exist within a sinful metaphysical structure can only be partial. Christian eschatology, and by extension Christian action in the world, must inherently involve risk. Eschatology is, after all, an operative view of the world and part of the Christian interpretive framework, structuring how human beings see, experience, and interpret the world. The fundamental trust in God that leaves the future open in this manner, and that leaves one open to surprise (to revelation!) places us at risk, because God “is not the ideological foundation of tradition and status quo, but represents a threat to them: he is a God of ‘change for the good’ and therefore judgment and grace, albeit in utter faithfulness.”59 By working in the world, we place our identity at risk, because we wager that our actions will be correct and that our understanding of God, and that of God’s will, will be fruitful for human salvation. Despite humanity’s finitude and tendency to fail in its attempts at self-liberation, human action remains indispensable, for an essential part of the Christian message is that Christians take the example of Jesus and go and do likewise (Lk 10:37). But the Christian message would be incredible to contemporary preunderstanding if some of the fruits that it promises are not already apparent in history.60 A realized eschatology that fits the Christological pattern means that the particular and historical events in human history must somehow point at the absolute fulfillment of that history. Believers have this responsibility to renew the world now in accordance with and in light of the past, and in the hope of a better, more human future. There can be no reality of salvation “without at least some revelation!”61 Being committed to a view, however, also involves selfreflection and the possibility of admitting that we have been wrong, either in our

58. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 829 [833]. 59. Ibid., 804 [808]. Emphasis original. 60. Schillebeeckx, “The New Image of God,” GFM, 110 [182]. 61. Schillebeeckx, “God, the Living One,” 366. Emphasis original.

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actions in the past or our interpretation of what has been required for the future. In that sense, a hermeneutical-eschatological identity really is at risk since God is always able, through historical experience of the other (in whom we see the threatened humanum), to show us where it is that we have been wrong.62 This is the critical movement involved in hermeneutics, where even (or especially) in a religious context, human beings must be able to ask this question about our deepest-held beliefs from time to time and hold them up to the critical light of the past, as well as the future. It is important to be able to see “both the present and the past as open-ended, oriented towards the future as a new reality—what is still to come.”63 This eschews a perfectly stable, univocal identity for human subjects, but it does not deliver us over into equivocity either. Rather, it canonizes the movement of history (and personal, narrative historicity) as a way of living critically within a tradition, to act in service of what is hoped for, rather than to decide to bring about what is considered certain. The differences are stark between these: apocalypticism never has to question if it has been wrong, or if, in seeking to bring about its ideal ends people have been sacrificed and suffering has been caused. This creates victims in the service of a goal who are unidentifiable as victims, since it is God’s will that is being carried out. Eschatology, however, should explicitly seek out victims and tend to their needs, because salvation in the future must begin in the present. 6.3.2 Self-Legitimation of the Market Narrative By thinking from the future to the present, adherents to Christian “apocalypticism” present the basic characteristics of the modern master narrative; they universalize all instances of their phrase universe and effect semiautomatic linkages between phrases (historical events) to fit a predetermined narrative trajectory. As a result of the transition from modernity to the contemporary situation in which the legitimation of the market narrative is supposed to be grounded in its performativity, the temporal emphasis is placed upon the present moment. Marketization subsumes other narratives, allowing people to pick and choose between “options,” such that a number of ideological narratives, or even just elements thereof, are available for consumption. This goes partway toward explaining the strange mix of evangelical Christianity and liberal capitalist economics that has come to represent a large cross-section of the American religious landscape. The modern master narratives are supposed to place an almost exclusive emphasis upon the future for their legitimation, but today the basic experience of time is a central concern with the present, or at least short-term and short-sighted reference, to the future. It seems that “postmodernity” was a transition period that delegitimized master narratives, but in the process also delegitimized notions of history and

62. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 804 [808]. 63. Schillebeeckx, “Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” GFM, 24 [36].

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tradition, while also prioritizing space and quantity over content and temporality.64 Having passed through this “postmodern” period, we are now experiencing a new crystallization of the economic master narrative and its temporal and performative aspects, both of which are connected to Christian apocalypticism. The temporal aspect of apocalypticism is based upon a reduction of real transcendence into an immanent reading of the times: the future comes into being in the same manner as a recipe. A future is not hoped for; it is known and implemented through discrete steps, making it little more than a logical extension of the present. We are experiencing a short-circuited utopianism that is simultaneously unconcerned with the real-world implications of present actions (especially when we consider social justice and our treatment of the environment), while always invoking allegedly certain knowledge about the objective order of the world. An objectively known future, coupled with an overly idealized past, constitutes the perfect worldview for apocalypticism to play a constitutive role within the market, since without any ability or will to selfcriticism there is little or no possibility of effectively critiquing the market itself. World-making action is, for this type of Christian narrative, limited only to ways of bringing about the apocalypse, rather in than seeking out where God is already at work in the world and by actively renewing human history. There is a fundamental difference between seeking God, in and through suffering or service to others, and attempting to dictate the date and time of God’s arrival on earth as though God were a stranger thereto, and not its principle foundation and source. Those who proceed according to the “prosperity gospel,” or a strict apocalyptic view, are not applying situationally appropriate ethics, but are instead applying an economically structured insight into the metaphysical constitution of the universe to achieve the objective order of things. The ideological power of the market narrative of salvation/emancipation, as well as its short-sightedness, works to manipulate believing Christians into seeing economics as a rigid metaphysical system that is in total continuity with Christian values. We know what a perfect market would look like in the same way in which we understand the objective order of creation from “the bible.” What is left is only to apply the right steps under the mantra “do ut des” in order to get there.65 In this case, the adage “caveat emptor” should just as readily apply, since the performative aspect of the market narrative does not need to be realized for such a narrative to continue: we never need to get to the ideal state of the market, and its alleged positive effects never need to be seen historically by the broader population. It continues of its own accord, producing short-term wealth for a limited number of people without due regard for longterm consequences, and when it fails on a large scale, as it did during the 2008 financial crisis, the response from many sectors has not been to doubt the essential core: economic emancipation through wealth generation itself. Instead, it has been to claim that we have not instituted a pure-enough form of capitalism, despite all evidence to the contrary.

64. See Eagleton, “Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism,” 66–68. 65. Cf. Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 74–76.

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There is a striking resemblance to false apocalyptic: the future is certain and we only need to bring it about by taking predetermined steps. All those who are denied access to the benefits of the narrative must have somehow betrayed that narrative, and their stories are rewritten to fit the description of that narrative’s enemies. They are unbelievers who fit into the universal plan insofar as they exist to legitimate the virtue of the true believers. The true Christians are raptured to heaven, the infidels remain behind or are consigned to hell. True capitalists rise to the top, while the lazy and unprincipled get the poverty that they deserve. Any narrative that allies itself with this logic, or is co-opted by it, will also adopt a short-circuited view of time, and as a result become self-centered and unable to see beyond the present moment.66 After all, it is in reflection on the past, and in hard consideration of the future, that the fracture within the subject, the interior otherness, arises. When we agonize or wonder over the questions, “What have I done?” and “What shall I do?” we are confronted with real questions that hold open the breach within ourselves and that allow the exterior other to come in. When these questions do not arise, or are not allowed to be asked, the result is dangerous for humanity. It is precisely this problem of time, in perception and self-perception, which makes the resurrection such a “dangerous memory,” to use a concept from Johann Baptist Metz.67 The resurrection, and the whole of the Christ event, takes the form of God’s promise to creation. The memory of the event that is operative in the Christian community is also part of Christian expectation for the future, giving it a transcendent character with respect to time.68 “The resurrection is,” according to Schillebeeckx, “consequently, not only the basis of the future but also reconciliation with the past. Salvation does not concern the future alone but also the ruins of the past. No human ideology can rival Christianity on this point! For God, no human being is lost.”69 The claim of Christian eschatology must be different, and must find a way to challenge the nonargument of “performativity,” because the effects of the resurrection and of the Christ event as a whole are felt in history, albeit only in a partial way. The essential claim of the free market is “it is working,” but for vast sections of the population it is not generating wealth or emancipation; for them, that “it is working” means something darker and more sinister. It means economic

66. Without recognizing or taking steps to confront the present moment itself! We cannot adequately deal with the crises of our own time without at least some recognition of the past and future horizons, since these are essential to the ontological structure of human experience. In this sense, hermeneutics is a method to be followed for ensuring “good” interpretations, but only insofar as it pertains to genuine attempts to do justice to the underlying hermeneutical-ontological structure of human subjectivity. 67. Metz, Faith in History and Society, 182–85. 68. This does not in any way disregard other universal or transcendental characteristics and aspects of the doctrine, but only enumerates one facet among a multitude. Indeed, it would be a mistake to believe that we might ever interpretively exhaust the meaning given in divine mystery. 69. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth,” 28.

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enslavement in the service of increasingly abstract (metaphysical) forces whose justification has become a matter of fact rather than any de jure claim to achieve a more human world. Certainly, the logic of the market is creating a hominized world, but not one that is more human.

Conclusion The transition from modernity has taken several forms, the first stage of which was the failure of the master narratives of progress. Of course, this did not all occur at once, in a neat “cause-effect” process. The failure has been gradual, and the development of a “postmodern” situation of plurality set in, often without warning, or without a clear period of transition. It is likely that there was never anything like a “pure plurality” of smaller narratives, though, and the underlying market narrative of economic exchange always supported what is known as postmodernity, which was most likely a transitional phase in something larger. The dismantling of any real criteria of legitimation has been the most recent change—a change in the nature of “the contemporary” itself. First, the future horizon was lost as a mode of legitimation, leading to a larger-scale abandonment of the project of the future altogether, in favor of an eternal present. The fragmentation of the postmodern era, in the temporal sense, continues to thwart our attempts to provide global solutions to what are increasingly globalized problems: international terrorism, economic crises, and the ecological crisis. We are fighting for unity within diversity, but this is a diversity that has become fractured, or worse, compromised and sold as packaged “parts” in a greater, but ultimately artificial, “whole.” This occurs amidst competing national interests, regional fragmentation, personal selfaggrandizement, and narcissism. The whole that is the human being, and that ultimately will be human history in terms of a hermeneutical-critical whole, is not to be marketized and cannot even be fully known. There is a certain urgency to the contemporary situation, but it has become an exhaustive urgency, accelerating in every moment. Everything has become a crisis, skewing our perspective of what may in fact be a crisis for the whole of humanity or the potential whole of the humanum. Every crisis is equally marketable when we have no future or past horizons against which we can measure events—when everything is collapsed into a moment of self-presentation: “Immediacy equals authenticity equals authority.”70 The subject is no longer given a place in which to become itself through concrete traditions, but must instead choose traditional aspects from many, and it is the “must choose” that has become the new ground or narrative about anthropology. The logic of economic exchange functions in the manner of an ideological form of metaphysics: failure is the result of personal responsibility, and those who do not prosper have not voluntarily

70. Godzieba, “The Magisterium in an Age of Digital Reproduction,” 147.

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adhered closely enough to the mandates of the market or to the structure of reality itself. We must nuance this, of course, by acknowledging that older models of society, in which one’s identity was almost entirely determined by tradition and social status, were marked by the absence of choice, even to the point of coercion. For this reason, I will not go so far as to say, with Cavanaugh, that “to make a tradition the subject of choice, however, is to kill it as tradition.”71 It is the evaporation of any kind of middle ground that has become troubling, and even distressing to the great narrative traditions, and for humanity as a whole. The primacy of the present is a problem in terms of our contemporary experience of time. If we are to find a way to subvert this view of temporality, then we cannot just swap it with an older model developed by theologians in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, this does not mean that Schillebeeckx’s work is altogether unhelpful. On the contrary, by looking at his “new image of humanity,” and to the “new image of God” developed in the context of secularization, and in the context of the church’s validation of contemporary culture as a place in which God speaks to humanity—a locus theologicus—we can continue his line of thought in a manner consonant with our own experience. We still need a contemporary understanding of time in order to account for this new experience of time. We can only enter the future dimension, or reopen that dimension, by stepping through the door offered by the present, since this is the frame of reference for contemporary people.

71. Cavanaugh, Being Consumed, 68.

CONCLUSION

This work has made good progress in both interpreting Schillebeeckx’s hermeneutical theology and in interpreting aspects of the contemporary context through the eschatological-hermeneutical framework provided by Schillebeeckx. I believe that we are allowed to access a historically effective way of formulating a number of theological topics by seeing hermeneutics as a fundamentally ontological category for the human subject. These certainly include theological anthropology, epistemology, and our understanding of history and salvation history. A great deal of work remains to be done, however, particularly in terms of the contemporary experience of time and the challenges presented by the economic “market narrative” and its accompanying anthropological assumptions. In moving forward, we must recall Schillebeeckx’s observation that “the Christian creed is no ‘system’ but a fundamental existential encounter with Jesus of Nazareth, an experiential encounter, the import and relevance of which had to be realized in ever new and changing circumstances.”1 We are invited to reopen and renew the relationship between Jesus the Christ and ourselves; this always occurs in a new time period and in different circumstances. As a presupposition, a “realized eschatology” needs to be brought with us to any interpretation of the “signs of the times” (GS 4). Our conception of a realized eschatology also entails the hard work of discipleship. The speculative work that has been done here was meant to investigate the possibilities for human subjectivity. This is, of course, only true if Christianity does not already merely adopt the structural presuppositions provided by the market narrative. One of the most important means of resistance is an emphasis on the eschatological horizon and a praxical manifestation of our attempts to realize the eschatological vision that it provides. However, this entails something different from a fundamental or systematic-theological investigation. It entails a decidedly political-theological orientation for Christian communities and for the church as a whole. For this reason, “political theology” may in fact prove to be the most appropriate way of doing “fundamental theology” in the coming decades.2

1. Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 368 [402]. 2. See the suggestions in this direction made by Stephan van Erp, “World and Sacrament: Foundations of the Political Theology of the Church,” Louvain Studies 39, no. 2 (2016): 102–20.

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We are facing a crisis over the role of crises, which is also a crisis of possibility. Without the possibility of a new and different future, then a “crisis” cannot have any lasting effect on popular consciousness, since every new crisis will be of more or less equal value. This has the effect of paralyzing decisionmaking and the ability to deal with the structures that produce these crises in society and the economy in the first place. The constant stream of crises guarantees that popular attention can only be focused on one thing for short periods of time, which precludes the possibility of sustained public debate. The church, with its long and rich tradition and memory of the various narratives of meaning and meaninglessness coming from the past, could be in a unique position to provide some of what is lacking in contemporary public discourse. The eschatological hope for the future must play a major role in this task, both in a secularized form as the goals and possibilities for the humanization of society, as well as in the “new image of God” who is the ultimate end and future for humanity.

Re-Placing the Eschatological Horizon: Four Proposals for Our Contemporary Context The loss of the future’s primacy for interpretation implies the impoverishment of humanity’s ability to interpret the world and to make decisions about how to proceed within it. A temporalized existence is one that carries within itself the very possibility of self-transcendence, a kind of transcendence of the present moment from within time itself.3 The consciousness of lived-time should bring both the past and future into view, and open up questions about the relative meaning of both—given that they are related to one another—and how that relationship is held together, altered, or negated in the present. An exclusive emphasis, however, “whether on future, present or past runs the risk of narrowing or crippling truly human existence.”4 An eschatological view of human temporal existence is valuable to our context, over-against what we experience as the primacy of the de-temporalized “present” that is necessitated by the dominant market narrative. It will not, however, overcome our contemporary situation hegemonically, nor will it violently supersede it, at least not in its Christian form. We can hope and reasonably expect that a gradual transformation of the horizon of action can be accomplished from within the postmodern situation, leading us cautiously toward something different, and a situation that might reclaim some of the better aspects of the past. The plurality of the present, the aspect of choice in human identity formation certainly has a particular value for contemporary life. The emphasis on the world-making action of the modern era, when balanced with a healthy respect

3. Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” UF, 3 [3]. 4. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 803 [807].

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for legitimate plurality, would be an attitude worth adopting. Plurality in this sense would mean contextualized plurality and an awareness of historical realities, rather than a commodified and decontextualized plurality for personal augmentation and consumption. The very particular Christian vision of eschatology offers four distinct advantages when dealing with our contemporary situation. First, it offers an authentic way of tapping into the very ontological structure of human givenness. The finite and historical human subject is, at its core, a critical-hermeneutical being, and although our ontological foundation is important, the contextual narratives that are built upon it present their own possibilities. The movement between temporal horizons, coupled with self-reflection and critique, should be respected. If we are seeking the humanum, then it makes sense to begin with the already given ontological foundation, rather than placing an undue emphasis on only one part thereof. Contained within this givenness is the communal aspect of human becoming, since a past horizon is always a matter of being conditioned in and by traditions and language games. A critical awareness of our temporality is crucial to integrating and placing the competing influences of traditions into a present context and to deploying our interpretive powers in a meaningful way. This awareness also alters how “meaning” itself is perceived: future-oriented meaning has the potential for striving and for selftranscendence. De-temporalized, self-understanding places the emphasis on self-presentation, which is epitomized in the digital idealized self. The selfpresentation of social media is nearly effortless, and allows us to present an ideal version of ourselves through a manicured image and selectively edited memory. The present reality does not need to be dealt with when an idealized, de-temporalized version of the self can be presented so easily for the approval of others. This is a phenomenon that should be fought against by the great religious traditions, and by Christianity in particular, but in a way which does not purely reject technological advancement. If the problem is a highly nuanced one, then so too must any provisional solutions proposed. Second, the Christian narrative is a mixture of experiences that meaningfully cohere together under the rubric of the Rule of God, along with many that do not. A distinct temporal awareness on the part of humanity should shift its interpretive weight toward the future horizon, based on our understanding of God. The “new image of God” developed by Schillebeeckx based upon his account of God’s transcendence, is now over forty years old but remains essential for Christian self-understanding. It retains a balanced view of God as immediately present to creation in a mediated and historical way. It is really God who, on God’s own initiative, comes “immediately near” as a “divine absolute nearness,” in and through historical events, which are indispensable from the human perspective.5 Truly, “extra mundum nulla salus” is the most correct formulation of God’s salvific activity: creation and salvation are inextricably linked together

5. Ibid., 811 [815]. Emphasis original.

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and are both manifestations of God’s overflowing love as well as the total freedom of God to be God.6 The link between creation and salvation is seen from the human side in history, finite and historical creatures that we are—it only makes sense that God approaches us when and where we are able to understand God. It is historical experience and the hermeneutical mediation of experience, through tradition, that must be given priority because God is experienced in this way, even at the ontological level, rather than metaphysics, such that “it becomes clear that ‘man’s [sic] cause’ is in fact ‘God’s cause’” expressed as human salvation in the Rule of God. Third, Christian eschatology presents, from the believer’s perspective, a view of temporality and history that is radically open. The openness is that of the process of human interpretation: the present and the past are open-ended, in terms of their meaning, as is the future.7 Being “open” to the conflict of interpretations, and indeed to critical reflection on our own pre-understanding thereof is, from the Christian perspective, also an openness to the saving reality of God: “The interruptive event of grace.”8 Jesus, as the paradigm of God’s mediation, as the eschatological prophet who reveals and conceals the Father, really can be described as “God’s interrupter,” as Boeve claims through his theological category of interruption.9 The grace of God encountered in the revelatory event, one which both disjoints and continues a narrative from within, shows itself to be structured eschatologically: a transcendent “in-breaking” of grace (experienced as salvation or of God’s silent presence and condemnation of suffering) is immediately immanentized in the world, at which point it must be interpreted in and through the experiencing subject’s hermeneutical-critical consciousness. For the Christian narrative, these are revelatory experiences that reveal God’s character as Salvator, breaking open human constructions and expectations that fall short, that are unjust, and inadequate. Lieven Boeve’s model of the “open narrative” could be considered an eschatological model for Christianity because it is an attempt to hold “open” the possibilities of the Christian narrative for God’s future self-revelation and of salvific activity through concrete praxis and a particular hermeneutical-critical consciousness.10 God does not represent the “ideological foundation of [closed] tradition and status quo, but represents a threat to them: he is a God of ‘change for the good’ and therefore judgment and grace, albeit in utter faithfulness.”11 In a fourth, but related move, the eschatological openness of temporality not just refuses to close off the possibilities of the narrative for the future, but this openness also extends to our interpretation of the past. The realized eschatological future is a future that is more than the future. It also contains elements of the

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Schillebeeckx, “God, the Living One,” 366. Schillebeeckx, “Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” GFM, 24 [36]. Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 143. Ibid., 145. See especially Ibid., 147–62. Schillebeeckx, Christ, 804 [808]. Emphasis original.

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present and is infused to its core with elements from the past. It calls for us to live authentically in the world in a way that has consequences for all of history, and not just consequences for the present either, or for the distant future. The Christian can raise a serious objection to Artsybashev’s Sanin, because it is God who will ultimately justify, raise up, and save our history in a final way. “Why,” asks Sanin’s eponymous character, “should I get myself hanged so that the workers in 3200 A.D. can have as much food and sex as they want?”12 Ernst Bloch notes that this attitude toward praxis is wrong, but is difficult to prove, because the basic difficulty involved with “abstract utopianism” is its inapplicability to the present moment, and therefore its inability to become a force for inspiration.13 For the believer, death does not have the final word: “believers entrust the absurdity [of death] to God, the source of pure positivity and the transcendent foundation of all ethics; the mystical source of any ethical commitment, which still gives hope to the actual victim.”14 The Christ event, with special attention being paid to the resurrection, is God’s answer to the problem of human failure and to the life and praxis of Jesus, the praxis of the Rule of God which “bears within itself the germ of the resurrection.”15 The work that God performs in history is the transformation of human failure into divine salvation and all of history is affected by God’s salvific work and in the promise of the Christ event: “For God, no human being is lost.”16 Christ is neither an afterthought nor is he a remedy for an original sin that only became necessary later; Christ is the very foundation of creation. “Extra mundum nulla salus”: creation presupposes salvation, and, thus, God holds open the promise of resurrection for those who have “fallen asleep” (1 Cor 15:6, 16-23), because the eschatological event is one that must pertain to all of history and not merely to a correlation between “present event” and “final event.” Ultimately, despite the work of Christians in whom God’s grace renews the face of the world now, the final word and work rests with God’s forgiveness of sin, liberation from guilt, and failure. Modernity has focused all too one-sidedly upon the future; the contemporary homo oeconomicus knows only the present. The temporalized existence of humanity cannot do without any of these, and it must, if it is to live out its being faithfully, place a particular emphasis and trust in the future, although, “historically we can never say this is the promised future.”17 It is supremely necessary that we begin to make the world in God’s image, creating opportunities for a meaningful, more human future history, but always recognizing that despite the human responsibility to make history, only God will save it.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Quoted in Bloch, “Incipit vita nova,” Man on His Own, 85. Ibid., 85–86. Schillebeeckx, Church, 94 [97]. Ibid. Schillebeeckx, “I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth,” 28. Schillebeeckx, “Church, Magisterium and Politics,” GFM, 94 [157].

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This “eschatological imagination” is vital for the church and Christian communities, especially if democratic majorities in “modern” nations remain staunchly in favor of a self-defeating economic system. The tools and the cultural memory necessary to protest against the abuses of such a system could be drawn from the churches, precisely because of their eschatological imagination. Such an imagination is not automatically beholden to how things are or have been, but always belongs to what is yet to come. Christian dissent, even against the majority opinion, should not be interpreted as an attempt to “undermine democracy but to perform a service for true democracy.”18 Schillebeeckx suggested this political turn for Christian activity, but because the underlying structures of political and economic life have been broadly accepted as given, the churches have largely fallen prey to the same economic logic of the market. There is, therefore, more work that remains to be done. The “new image of God” and of humanity are both valuable tools for the church in this regard. None of these are necessarily self-evident concepts for the secularized West, and for this reason the church must “join in social discussion not with confessions but with arguments.”19 These arguments can only be fashioned by individual people who have been formed by confessions and by experience; it is from such people that the church can begin to argue and to act: After Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Bergen-Belsen and so on, and the strangulating grasp on our ecological environment (as symbols of what is “demonic” in our history), one can no longer theologize and make church pronouncements in the same old way. We need a new productive mediation between the gospel and our political sphere.20

We can so easily swap out Sudan, Iraq, and Syria for the evils named above. The “new” productive mediation between gospel and politics is always still necessary for every generation, every decade, and in every situation.

18. Schillebeeckx, Jesus in Our Western Culture, 81. 19. Ibid., 82. 20. Ibid., 83–84.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works by Edward Schillebeeckx (A) The Collected Works of Edward Schillebeeckx (by volume number with individual essays cited) Schillebeeckx, Edward. Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God. Translated by Paul Barret and N. D. Smith, CW vol. 1. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Revelation and Theology. Translated by N. D. Smith, CW vol. 2 London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014. ●

“The Non-Conceptual Intellectual Dimension in our Knowledge of God According to Aquinas,” 207–38 [II 157–206].

Schillebeeckx, Edward. God the Future of Man. Translated by N.D. Smith, CW vol. 3. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014. ●

● ● ● ●

“Towards a Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” = “Catholic Use of Hermeneutics,” 1–29 [2–44]. “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” 31–54 [52–88]. “The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue,” 71–84 [118–138]. “Church, Magisterium and Politics,” 85–99 [142–164]. “The New Image of God, Secularization and Man’s Future on Earth,” = “The New Image of God” 101–125 [168–203].

Schillebeeckx, Edward. World and Church. Translated by N.D. Smith, CW vol. 4. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014. ●

“Church and World,” 73–87 [98–114].

Schillebeeckx, Edward. The Understanding of Faith: Interpretation and Criticism. Translated by N.D. Smith, CW vol. 5. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014. ● ● ● ● ●

● ●

“The Interpretation of the Future,” 1–11 [1–13]. “The Context and Value of Faith-Talk,” 13–18 [14–19]. “Linguistic Criteria,” 19–40 [20–44]. “Theological Criteria,” 41–68 [45–77]. “Correlation between Human Question and Christian Answer,” = “Correlation,” 69–88 [78–101]. “The New Critical Theory,” 89–107 [102–123]. “The New Critical Theory and Theological Hermeneutics,” 109–135 [124–155].

Schillebeeckx, Edward. Jesus: An Experiment in Christology. Translated by John Bowden, CW vol. 6. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014.

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Schillebeeckx, Edward. Christ: The Christian Experience in the Modern World. Translated by John Bowden, CW vol. 7. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Interim Report on the Books Jesus and Christ. Translated by John Bowden, CW vol. 8. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Church: The Human Story of God. Translated by John Bowden, CW vol. 10. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Essays: Ongoing Theological Quests, CW vol. 11. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014. ● ● ●

●

“The Search for the Living God,” 35–50. “Theological Interpretation of Faith in 1983,” 51–68. “Liberating Theology: Reflecting on J.-B. Metz’s Political Theology” = “Liberating Theology,” 69–84. “Towards a Rediscovery of the Christian Sacraments: Ritualising Religious Elements in Daily Life,” 183–210.

(B) Primary Works by Edward Schillebeeckx Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Christelijk geloof en aardse toekomstverwachtingen.” In De Kerk in de wereld van deze tijd. Schema dertien. Tekst en commentaar, 2: 78–109. Vaticanum II. Antwerp: Hilversum, 1967. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Christian Faith and Man’s Expectation for the Future on Earth.” In The Mission of the Church, translated by N. D. Smith, 51–89. New York: Seabury Press, 1973. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “The Church, the ‘Sacrament of the World.’” In The Mission of the Church, translated by N. D. Smith, 43–50. New York: Seabury Press, 1973. Schillebeeckx, Edward. The Council Notes of Edward Schillebeeckx 1962–1963. Edited by Karim Schelkens. Instrumenta Theologica 34. Leuven: Peeters Press, 2011. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Critical Theories and Christian Political Commitment.” Concilium 4, no. 9 (1973): 48–61. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Dominican Spirituality.” In God Among Us: The Gospel Proclaimed, translated by John Bowden, 232–48. New York: Crossroad, 1983. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Erfahrung und Glaube.” In Christlicher Glaube in moderner Gesellschaft, edited by Franz Böckle, 73–116. Enzyklopädische Bibliothek 25. Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 1980. Schillebeeckx, Edward. The Eucharist. Translated by N. D. Smith. London and New York: Burns & Oates, 2005. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Faith Functioning in Human Self-Understanding.” In The Word in History: The St. Xavier Symposium, edited by T. Patrick Burke, 41–59. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Geloofsverstaan. Interpretatie en kritiek. Theologische peilingen 5. Bloemendaal: Nelissen, 1972. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Gerechtigheid en liefde: genade en bevrijding. Bloemendaal: Nelissen, 1977. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “God, Society and Human Salvation.” In Faith and Society/ Foi et Société/ Geloof en maatschappij: Acta Congressus Internationalis Theologici Lovaniensis 1976, edited by Marc Caudron, 89–99. Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 47. Gembloux, Belgium: Éditions J. Duculot, 1978. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “God, the Living One.” New Blackfriars 62, no. 735 (1981): 357–70.

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Schillebeeckx, Edward. I Am a Happy Theologian: Conversations with Francesco Strazzari. Translated by John Bowden. London: SCM Press, 1994. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “De hoop kernprobleem der christelijke confessies.” Kultuurleven 23 (1956): 110–25. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Het hoopvolle Christusmysterie.” Tijdschrift voor Geestelijk Leven 7 (1951): 3–23. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “I Believe in God, Creator of Heaven and Earth.” In God Among Us: The Gospel Proclaimed, translated by John Bowden, 91–102. New York: Crossroad, 1983. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “I Believe In Jesus of Nazareth: The Christ, The Son of God, The Lord.” The Journal of Ecumenical Studies 17 (1980): 18–32. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “I Believe in the Man Jesus: The Christ, the Only Beloved Son, Our Lord.” In God Among Us: The Gospel Proclaimed, translated by John Bowden, 103–15. New York: Crossroad, 1983. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Ik geloof in God, schepper van hemel en aarde.” Tijdschrift voor Geestelijk Leven 34 (1978): 5–23. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Indrukken over een strijd der geesten: Vaticanum II.” De Bazuin, January 5, 1963. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Jesus in our Western Culture: Mysticism, Ethics and Politics. Translated by John Bowden. London: SMC Press, 1987. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Jezus: het verhaal van een levende. 9th ed. Baarn: Nelissen, 1982. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Kerk en Wereld: de betekenis van, Schema 13.” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 4 (1964): 386–99. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Letter From Edward Schillebeeckx to the Participants in the Symposium ‘Theology for the 21st Century: The Enduring Relevance of Edward Schillebeeckx for Contemporary Theology.’” In Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology, edited by Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp, xiv–xv. London: T&T Clark, 2010. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “The Magisterium and Ideology.” In The Authority of the Church, edited by Piet F. Fransen, 5–17. Annua Nuntia Lovaniensia 26. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Mensen als verhaal van God. Baarn: Nelissen, 1989. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Misverstanden op het concilie.” De Bazuin, January 19, 1963. Schillebeeckx, Edward. The Mission of the Church. Translated by N. D. Smith. New York: Seabury Press, 1973. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “The Mystery of Injustice and the Mystery of Mercy: Questions Concerning Human Suffering.” Stauros Bulletin 3 (1975): 3–31. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Naar een herontdekking van de christelijke sacramenten: Ritualisering van religieuze momenten in het alledaagse leven.” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 40 (2000): 164–87. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “The Second Vatican Council.” In Vatican II: A Struggle of Minds and Other Essays, translated by M. H. Gill and Son Limited. Dublin: M. H. Gill, and Son Limited, 1963. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Questions on Christian Salvation of and for Man.” In Toward Vatican III: The Work That Needs To Be Done, edited by David Tracy, Hans Küng, and Johann Baptist Metz, 27–44. New York: Gill and MacMillan, 1978. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “The Role of History in What Is Called the New Paradigm.” In Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for the Future, edited by Hans Küng and David Tracy, translated by Margaret Kohl, 307–19. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989.

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Schillebeeckx, Edward. “A Saint: Albert the Great.” In God Among Us: The Gospel Proclaimed, translated by John Bowden, 225–31. New York: Crossroad, 1983. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Theolgie als bevrijdingskunde: Enkle noodzakelijke beschouwingen vooraf.” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 24, no. 4 (1984): 388–402. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Theologie der Erfahrung– Sackgasse oder Weg zum Glauben?” Herder Korrespondenz 92 (1978): 391–97. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Theologisch geloofsverstaan anno 1983. Baarn: Nelissen, 1983. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Theologisch testament: Notarieel nog niet verleden. 2nd ed. Baarn: Nelissen, 1995. Schillebeeckx, Edward. Wereld en kerk. Theologische peilingen 3. Bilthoven: Nelissen, 1966. Schillebeeckx, Edward. De zending van de kerk. Theologische peilingen 4. Bilthoven: Nelissen, 1968. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “De zin van het mens-zijn van Jesus, de Christus.” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 2, no. 2 (1962): 127–72. Schillebeeckx, Henricus Edward. De sacramentele heilseconomie. Theologische bezinning op S. Thomas’ sacramentenleer in het licht van de traditie en van de hedendaagse sacramentsproblematiek. Antwerp and Bilthoven: ‘t Groeit & H. Nelissen, 1952. Schillebeeckx, Edward. “Eschatologisch.” Edited by H. Brink, G. Kreling, A.H. Maltha, and J.H. Walgrave. Theologisch Woordenboek. Roermond: J. J. Romen & Zonen, 1952.

(C) Secondary Works on Edward Schillebeeckx Alpers, Christiane, and Daniel Minch. “Edward Schillebeeckx in de hedendaagse theologie.” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 54, no. 4 (2014): 398–409. Bauer, Christian. “Heiligkeit des Profanen: Spuren der „école Chenu-Schillebeeckx” (H. de Lubac) auf dem Zweiten Vatikanum.” In Edward Schillebeeckx: Impulse für Theologien im 21. Jahrhundert/ Impetus Towards Theologies in the 21st Century, edited by Thomas Eggensperger, Ulrich Engel, and Angel F. Méndez Montoya, 67–83. Ostfildern: Grünewald, 2012. Bergin, Helen. “Edward Schillebeeckx and the Suffering Human Being.” International Journal of Public Theology 4, no. 4 (2010): 466–82. Boeve, Lieven. “Experience According to Edward Schillebeeckx: The Driving Force of Faith and Theology.” In Divinising Experience: Essays in the History of Religious Experience from Origen to Ricoeur, edited by Lieven Boeve and Laurence P. Hemming, 199–225. Leuven: Peeters Press, 2004. Boeve, Lieven. “Introduction: The Enduring Significance and Relevance of Edward Schillebeeckx? Introducing the State of the Question in Medias Res.” In Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology, edited by Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp, 1–22. London: T&T Clark, 2010. Boeve, Lieven, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp, eds. Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology. London: T&T Clark, 2010. Borgman, Erik. Edward Schillebeeckx: A Theologian in His History. Translated by John Bowden. London and New York: Continuum, 2003. Borgman, Erik. “Edward Schillebeeckx – Theologiseren te midden van de cultuur.” In Zo de ouden zongen..: leraar en leerling zijn in de theologie-beoefening (tussen 1945 en 2000), edited by Jurjen Beumer, 183–98. Baarn: Ten Have, 1996. Borgman, Erik. “Retrieving God’s Contemporary Presence: The Future of Edward Schillebeeckx’s Theology of Culture.” In Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary

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Theology, edited by Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp, 235–51. London: T&T Clark, 2010. Borgman, Erik. “Theologie tussen universiteit en emancipatie.” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 26 (1986): 240–58. Borgman, Erik. “Van Cultuurtheologie Naar Theologie Als Onderdeel van de Cultuur.” Tijdschrift Voor Theologie 34 (1994): 335–60. Dupré, Louis. “Experience and Interpretation: A Philosophical Reflection on Schillebeeckx’s Jesus and Christ.” Theological Studies 43, no. 1 (1982): 30–51. Eggensperger, Thomas, Ulrich Engel, and Angel F. Méndez Montoya, eds. Edward Schillebeeckx: Impulse für Theologien im 21. Jahrhundert/ Impetus Towards Theologies in the 21st Century. Ostfildern: Grünewald, 2012. Galvin, John P. “The Death of Jesus in the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx.” Irish Theological Quarterly 50, no. 2–4 (1983): 168–80. Haight, S.J. Roger. “Engagement met de wereld als zaak van God: Christologie en postmoderniteit.” In Trouw aan Gods toekomst: de blijvende betekenis van Edward Schillebeeckx, edited by Stephan van Erp, 73–94. Amsterdam: Boom, 2010. Hilkert, O.P., Mary Catherine. “Experience and Revelation.” In The Praxis of the Reign of God: An Introduction to the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx, edited by Mary Catherine Hilkert and Robert J. Schreiter, 2nd ed., 59–77. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002. Hilkert, O.P., Mary Catherine. “Hermeneutics of History: The Theological Method of Edward Schillebeeckx.” The Thomist 51, no. 1 (1987): 97–145. Hilkert, O.P., Mary Catherine. “The Threatened Humanum as Imago Dei: Anthropology and Christian Ethics.” In Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology, edited by Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp, 127–41. London: T&T Clark, 2010. Hilkert, Mary Catherine, and Robert J. Schreiter, eds. The Praxis of the Reign of God: An Introduction to the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx. 2nd ed. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002. Hill, William J. “A Theology in Transition.” In The Praxis of the Reign of God: An Introduction to the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx, edited by Mary Catherine Hilkert and Robert J. Schreiter, 2nd ed., 1–18. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002. Hinze, Bradford E. “Eschatology and Ethics.” In The Praxis of the Reign of God: An Introduction to the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx, edited by Mary Catherine Hilkert and Robert J. Schreiter, 2nd ed., 167–83. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002. Kenis, Leo. “God in de wereld ervaren. Het cultuurtheologisch project van Edward Schillebeeckx.” Kultuurleven 67, no. 1 (2000): 78–83. Kennedy, Philip. “Continuity Underlying Discontinuity: Schillebeeckx’s Philosophical Background.” New Blackfriars 79, no. 828 (1989): 264–77. Kennedy, Philip. Deus Humanissimus: The Knowability of God in the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx. Fribourg: University Press Fribourg Switzerland, 1993. Kennedy, Philip. “God and Creation.” In The Praxis of the Reign of God: An Introduction to the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx, edited by Mary Catherine Hilkert and Robert J. Schreiter, 2nd ed., 37–58. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002. Kennedy, Philip. Schillebeeckx. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993. McManus, O.P., Kathleen. “Suffering, Resistance, and Hope: Women’s Experience of Negative Contrast and Christology.” In Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology, edited by Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp, 111–26. London: T&T Clark, 2010. McManus, O.P., Kathleen. Unbroken Communion: The Place and Meaning of Suffering in the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003.

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Minch, Daniel. “‘…Dat jullie dan als God zullen zijn’: Erfzonde en ideologiekritiek.” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 54, no. 4 (2014): 350–63. Minch, Daniel. “Eschatology and Theology of Hope: The Impact of Gaudium et Spes on the Thought of Edward Schillebeeckx.” The Heythrop Journal 59, no. 2 (2018): 273–85. Minch, Daniel. “The Fractured Self and the Primacy of the Future: Edward Schillebeeckx and the Eschatological Horizon.” Horizons 43, no. 1 (2016): 57–85. Minch, Daniel. “Language, Structure, and Sacrament: Reconsidering the Eucharistic Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx.” In Approaching the Threshold of Mystery: Liturgical Worlds and Theological Spaces, edited by Joris Geldhof, Daniel Minch, and Trevor Maine, 98–119. Theologie der Liturgie 10. Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2015. Minch, Daniel. “Re-Examining Edward Schillebeeckx’s Anthropological Constants: An Ontological Perspective.” In Salvation in the World: The Crossroads of Public Theology, edited by Stephan van Erp, Christopher Cimorelli, and Christiane Alpers, 2: 113–30. T&T Clark Studies in Edward Schillebeeckx. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017. Mosely, LaReine-Marie. “Negative Contrast Experience: An Ignatian Appraisal.” Horizons 41, no. 1 (2014): 74–95. Portier, William. “Edward Schillebeeckx as Critical Theorist: The Impact of Neo-Marxist Social Thought on His Recent Theology.” The Thomist 48, no. 3 (1984): 341–67. Portier, William. “Schillebeeckx’ Dialogue with Critical Theory.” The Ecumenist 21 (1983): 20–27. Prusak, Bernard P. “Reconsidering the Quest Boundaries in Response to N.T. Wright.” Louvain Studies 32, no. 1 (2007): 134–52. Rochford, Dennis. “The Theological Hermeneutics of Edward Schillebeeckx.” Theological Studies 63, no. 2 (2002): 251–67. Rodenborn, Steven M. Hope in Action: Subversive Eschatology in the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx and Johann Baptist Metz. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014. Scheffczyk, Leo. “Christology in the Context of Experience: On the Interpretation of Christ by Edward Schillebeeckx.” The Thomist 48, no. 3 (1984): 383–408. Schoof, O.P., Mark. “Masters in Israel: VII. The Later Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx.” The Clergy Review 55, no. 12 (1970): 943–60. Schoof, O.P., Mark. “E. Schillebeeckx: 25 Years in Nijmegen.” Theology Digest 37, no. 4 (1990): 313–32. Schreiter, Robert. “De invloed van Edward Schillebeeckx – De dissertaties over zijn werk.” In Trouw aan Gods toekomst: de blijvende betekenis van Edward Schillebeeckx, edited by Stephan van Erp, 153–65. Amsterdam: Boom, 2010. Schwarz-Boenneke, Bernadette. “Die Widerständigkeit der Wirklichkeit als erstes Moment des Erfahrens.” In Edward Schillebeeckx: Impulse für Theologien im 21. Jahrhundert/ Impetus Towards Theologies in the 21st Century, edited by Thomas Eggensperger, Ulrich Engel, and Angel F. Méndez Montoya, 94–109. Ostfildern: Grünewald, 2012. Tillar, Elizabeth K. “The Influence of Social Critical Theory on Edward Schillebeeckx’s Theology of Suffering for Others.” The Heythrop Journal 42, no. 2 (2001): 148–72 Thompson, Daniel Speed. The Language of Dissent: Edward Schillebeeckx on the Crisis of Authority in the Catholic Church. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003. van Erp, Stephan. “Implicit Faith: Philosophical Theology After Schillebeeckx.” In Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology, edited by Lieven Boeve, Frederiek Depoortere, and Stephan van Erp, 209–23. London: T&T Clark, 2010. van Erp, Stephan, ed. Trouw aan Gods toekomst: de blijvende betekenis van Edward Schillebeeckx. Amsterdam: Boom, 2010.

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SUBJECT INDEX apocalypticism 10, 12, 14, 23, 42, 157, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 195, 198, 299 biblical 12 economic apocalypticism 10, 188, 190 false apocalyptic 187, 188, 190, 200 Metz on 188 Moltmann on 41–3 Rahner on 188 Schillebeeckx on 188 atheism 27, 96 Augustinianism 34, 159 Augustinian synthesis 159 and metaphysics 34 pessimism 34

experience 8, 9, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 48, 53, 55, 56, 58, 61, 63, 75, 76, 77, 79, 87, 95, 96, 105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 147, 149, 150, 153, 157, 179, 182, 183, 186, 203, 208 contrast experience 79, 87, 95, 98, 99, 106, 108, 111, 112, 114, 115, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 129, 132, 133, 149, 157, 179 elements of 127, 128, 129, 130, 136, 139

contrast experience. See experience, contrast creation 7, 9, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 28, 31, 32, 35, 36, 46, 53, 74, 79, 82, 84, 96, 106, 146, 189 and Adam 19 and eschatology 20, 74 and the secular 183

Gaudium et Spes 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 87, 136, 203 Schema XIII 9, 12, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 39 Genesis 148 Gilgamesh, Epic of 74, 123

Dei Verbum xi, 31, 50, 93 detraditionalization 170 Differend 161, 173, 179 ecclesiology 16, 21, 22, 32, 37, 39, 50 mystical body 21 People of God 5, 37, 37 n.137, 101, 147 Perfect Society 21, 22, 32 and salvation 22, 37 and Vatican II 37 The Enlightenment 59, 62 n.75, 63, 64, 66, 69, 71, 75, 79, 81, 90, 92, 94, 100, 107, 123, 157 Eucharist 21, 33, 109, 135

Fides et Ratio 54 n.20

Hellenism 42, 45 hermeneutics 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 12, 20, 24, 33, 39, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 67, 69, 70, 72, 75, 83, 84, 87, 97, 106, 114, 120, 127, 132, 140, 142, 198, 203 hermeneutic circle 60, 89, 129 and history 50, 52, 84 and ideology 48, 70 and interpretation 54, 58 and literature 2 and metaphysics 84 and revelation 116, 136, 141, 150 historicism 54, 57, 84, 90, 153, 172 history 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52,

Subject Index 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 69, 71, 72, 73, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 123, 124, 128, 144, 146, 150, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158, 160, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 172, 176, 179, 182, 183, 185, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 203, 206, 207 and the church 4, 13, 154 and hermeneutics 44, 52, 53, 54, 55, 85 and language 47, 60, 65, 66 of God’s promise 9, 10, 18, 20, 29, 47, 80, 85, 102 salvation history 2, 17, 39 unity of 42, 44, 56, 57, 65, 88 hominization 194, 195, 201 Humani Generis 22 humanization 30, 31, 36, 38, 71, 107, 139, 157, 159, 166, 183, 195, 204 ideology 26, 52, 63, 69, 70, 73, 79, 99, 105, 115 154, 160, 165, 183, 196, 200 Iliad 74 n.131 Imago Dei 122 nn.1, 2 interruption 104, 206 Isaiah 77, 101 Jesus 7, 13, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25, 39, 50, 51, 53, 76, 78, 81, 83, 93, 97, 101, 102, 116, 117, 118, 135, 150, 151, 153, 154, 181, 187, 190, 191, 197, 203 John, Gospel of 93, 93 n.22 language 47, 52, 53, 59, 60, 65, 66, 72, 82, 103, 104, 111, 113, 129, 134, 141, 143, 144 n.95, 150 152, 182 and experience 111, 113, 129, 134, 135, 136, 137, 141, 143, 144 n.95, 150 and history 47, 60, 65, 66 and philosophy 52, 53 ‘pre-linguistic’ 111, 113, 133, 136 and ontology 53, 59, 60, 61, 65, 72, 82, 103, 104, 152, 182

223

Le Saulchoir 4, 94 Leuven (Louvain), Belgium viii, 4, 14, 18, 23 n.62, 26 liberal Protestantism 12, 41, 153 liturgy 87, 118, 135, 166 n.61 Luke, Gospel of 93 n.22, 116, 197 Mark, Gospel of 83 n.181, 84, 102, 118 n.136, 154 n.1, 191 the market 10, 67, 173, 174, 175, 177, 187, 191, 192, 195, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 208 marketization 10, 67, 170, 171, 175, 198 as master narrative 67 and postmodernity 174, 177, 195 Marxism 23, 51, 80, 123 and ideology critique 52, 70 master narratives 73, 148, 158, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 169, 170, 172, 173, 177, 184, 187, 192, 198, 199, 201. See also metanarrative characteristics of 198 market narrative 67, 157, 158, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 183, 187, 191, 192, 195, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208 modern 73, 162 premodern 156, 162, 163 Matthew, Gospel of 83, 84, 93, 93 n.22 metanarrative 55, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 74, 81, 85, 162. See also modern master narratives metaphysics 42, 44, 45, 48, 51, 81, 84, 91, 138, 150, 173, 195, 201, 206 anticipation 42 participatory 106, 117 Schillebeeckx on 96 modernism 25, 92 modernity 9, 55, 65, 67, 71, 72, 73, 79, 82, 88, 122, 157, 158, 162, 167, 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 198, 201, 207 and Christianity 79, 82, 157 ideology 79, 162 and Marxism 12, 23, 62, 66, 66 n.94, 80, 80 n.165, 176 and progress 55, 167 and secularization 171, 201 money 124 n.11, 173, 175 n.97, 176, 196 Mystici Corporis Christi 21

224

Subject Index

narrative historicity 90, 113, 114, 118, 128, 129, 134, 135, 136, 137, 155, 198 negative dialectics 67, 106, 127 neoplatonism 93, 97, 97 n.1 neoscholasticism 32, 48, 50, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 181 New Testament xi, 45 apocalyptic in 14 discipleship 14 Nijmegen, the Netherlands 5, 13, 18, 139 nouvelle thé ologie 4, 5, 12, 14 Old Testament 45, 168, 184, 193 n.42 apocalyptic in 184 Pelagian, Pelagianism 168, 194 phenomenology 57, 77, 94 politics 68, 172 and Christianity 148 political action/engagement 208 political speech 172 political systems and reason 208 Populorum Progressio 196 n.53 postmodernity 170, 174, 176, 198, 201 and Christianity 201 and the market 174, 177, 195 and performativity 176 recontextualization 194 revelation 17, 19, 25, 26, 30, 34, 35, 36, 41, 50, 76, 77, 92, 93, 109, 112, 116, 121, 129, 136, 141, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 157, 183, 193, 193 n.46, 197, 206. See also revelation and hermeneutics Revelation, Book of 188, 189 Roman Empire 42, 189 Pax deorum 159, 162 sacraments 5 n.17, 22, 37, 87, 118 second coming of Christ 14, 15, 16, 17, 190 Second Vatican Council 21, 28, 48, 50, 70, 93, 139

secularism 170 n.84 secularization 9, 43, 148, 156, 159, 163, 166, 170, 195, 202 sin 6, 18, 19, 20, 36, 53, 84, 97, 101, 104, 105, 106, 113, 114, 146, 152, 190, 191, 196, 207 Ricoeur on 103 Snapchat 178 suffering 43, 49, 73, 74, 79, 84, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 137, 138, 144, 145, 148, 149, 153, 157, 163, 164, 177, 185, 190, 191, 195, 198, 199, 206 and experience 63, 67, 102, 104, 105, 112, 115, 122, 126 problem of 28, 76, 79, 80, 101, 103, 106, 118, 122, 124, 126, 148, 153, 157 Supreme Court of the United States 173 teleology 62, 65, 66 telos 80, 162, 173 Thomism 4, 5, 20, 34, 36, 44, 94, 96, 97, 98, 106, 107, 111, 182 truth 33, 50, 70, 76, 84, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 100, 105, 116, 140, 145, 162, 176, 181, 182, 183, 193 correspondence 92, 140 deconcealment 93 and hermeneutics 50, 59, 70 and history 56, 182 theological 84, 90, 116, 153, 182 World Wars 55, 88 First World War 3, 4, 40, 41, 88 n.4, 158 Second World War 15, 18, 37 n.137, 158 Utopia 112, 115, 163, 164, 165, 174, 175, 207

NAME INDEX Adorno, Theodor W. 55 n.28, 62, 62 n.74, 63, 67 n.97, 106, 107 n.91, 169 Almonte, Linda 175 n.97 Artsybashev, Mikhail 207 Augustine 34, 171 n.49, 172, 178, 179, 182 Barth, Karl 13, 41, 44 Bea, Augustin Cardinal 26 Bekkers, Wilhelmus Marinus 25 Bellarmine, Robert 21 Benedict XVI 39, 156, 191 n.33 Benjamin, Walter 40, 62 Berengar of Tours 21 Betti, Emilio 72 n.63, 61 n.69, 140 n.77 Bloch, Ernst 15, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 63 n.77, 67 n.97, 75 n.136, 76, 80 n.165, 107, 110, 111, 145, 165, 207 Boeve, Lieven viii, 54 n.19, 66 n.92, 93 n.23, 127, 128, 132, 133, 155, 156, 160, 161, 170, 174, 178, 182, 188, 206 Borgman, Erik viii, 15 n.14, 16 n.22, 16 n.23, 106 n.83, 149 Bruni, Luigino 176 n.98 Bultmann, Rudolph 42 n.164, 49 Burroughs, William S. 177 Caputo, John D. 179, 182 Cavanaugh, William T. 174, 202 Chenu, Marie-Dominique 4, 14, 22, 31, 94 Cimorelli, Christopher viii, 92 n.19 Cobb Jr., John B. 49 n.1 Congar, Yves 26, 27, 27 n.90, 94 Copeland, M. Shawn 122 n.2 Danié lou S.J., Jean 17, 27 Danove, Paul L. viii, 191 n.34

de Lubac S.J., Henri 17, 25 n.70, 27, 27 n.90, 46, 159 n.26 De Petter O.P., Dominicus 87, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 105, 106, 111, 123 Derrida, Jacques 147 De Schrijver S.J., Georges 59 n.59, 62 n.73 Desmond, William 185 n.16 Dilthey, Wilhelm 52, 55, 56, 57, 61, 64, 65 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor 154 Dreissen O.P., I. W. 13, 14 Dupré , Louis 123 n.10, 129, 132, 133 Eagleton, Terry 77 n.147, 199 n.64 Ebeling, Gerhard 49, 140 n.77 Evans, Robert 175 n.97 Foley, Duncan K. 176 Francis (Pope) 186 n.20 Fransen S.J., Piet F. 27 n.90 Garrigou-Lagrange O.P., Reginald 91 n.14 Geldhof, Joris viii Godzieba, Anthony J. viii, 39 n.145, 118, 119 Habermas, Jü rgen 50, 52, 53, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 87, 126, 132, 171 Haight S.J., Roger 142 n.89, 143 n.90 Heidegger, Martin 44, 49, 51 n.9, 52, 54, 58, 59, 63, 72, 93 n.33, 140 Heilbroner, Robert L. 176 n.98, 176 n.100 Hilkert O.P., Mary Catherine 122, 134 Hill, William J. 94 n.25 Hobbes, Thomas 175 Homer 74

226

Name Index

Horkheimer, Max 55 n.28, 62, 62 n.74, 63 Hulsbosch O.E.S.A., A. 13, 14 n.10 Hume, David 175 Husserl, Edmund 57, 57 n.43, 94 John XXIII (Pope) 9, 25–6, 32 John Paul II (Pope) 35, 156 Kant, Immanuel 63, 64, 94, 95 n.33, 130, 157, 158, 162, 172 Kennedy, Philip 13 n.7, 51 n.10, 96, 96 n.38, 117 Lebret O.P., Louis-Joseph 196 n.53 Levinas, Emmanuel 151 Loisy, Alfred 194 Lonergan S.J., Bernard 122 n.2 Lyotard, Jean-Franç ois 64 n.84, 156, 157, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 169, 173, 178, 179, 186, 187 McManus, Kathleen 106 Maltha O.P., Andreas 13 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 2, 138 n.70 Merrigan, Terrence viii, 99 n.51 Metz, Johann Baptist 2, 16 n.24, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 122, 122 n.2, 171, 188, 200 Miller, Vincent J. viii, 155, 156 Minch, Daniel 92 n.19, 135 n.55, 137 n.64, 157 n.13 Moltmann, Jü rgen 15, 16, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49 Mosely, LaReine-Marie 122, 126 Nietzsche, Friedrich

162 n.42

Origen of Alexandria 97, 145 Ottaviani, Alfredo Cardinal 6, 24 Paul VI (Pope) 196 n.53 Philips, Gerard 26, 27

Pius XII (Pope) 21, 22 Portier, William 51 n.9 Prusak, Bernard P. viii, 21 n.55, 37 n.137 Rahner S.J., Karl 2, 25, 26, 27, 43, 46, 94, 146, 188, 189 n.28, 192 Ratzinger, Joseph 25, 27 n.90, 146 Ricoeur, Paul 54 n.22, 69 n.109, 80 n.164, 103 Roberts, Oral 191 Robinson, James M. 60 n.64 Rodenborn, Steven M. 51 n.9, 122 Scheffczyk, Leo 140 n.78 Schelkens, Karim 50 n.4, 91 n.14 Schleiermacher, Friedrich 56 n.37, 61 n.69, 67, 100, 153 Schoof O.P., Ted Mark 18 n.37, 19, 25 n.73 Schreiter, Robert J. 6 Schü ssler Fiorenza, Elisabeth 119 n.139 Schü ssler Fiorenza, Francis 44 n.184, 46 n.197 Schwarz-Boenneke, Bernadette 132, 133 Sedaris, David 177–8 n.104 Smith, Adam 175, 176 Suenens, Lé on-Joseph Cardinal 26, 27, 29 Swaim, Michael 178 n.105 Thomas Aquinas 4, 34, 44, 96, 97, 110 Thompson, Daniel Speed 51 n.10, 97 n.40 van Erp, Stephan viii, 5 n.14, 95 n.30, 96 n.38 Van Wolde, Ellen 129 Weigel, George 191 n.33 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 60 n.66, 125 n.12