Ernst Troeltsch and the Spirit of Modern Culture: A Social-Political Investigation 9783110654653, 9783110650976

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Christopher Adair-Toteff Ernst Troeltsch and the Spirit of Modern Culture

Troeltsch-Studien Neue Folge

Herausgegeben von Reiner Anselm, Jörg Dierken, Georg Pfleiderer und Friedemann Voigt

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Christopher Adair-Toteff

Ernst Troeltsch and the Spirit of Modern Culture A Social-Political Investigation

ISBN 978-3-11-065097-6 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-065465-3 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-065173-7 ISSN 1866-9638 Library of Congress Control Number: 2021933493 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; Detailed bibliographic data are available in the internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Preface My introduction to the thinking of Ernst Troeltsch came in 1995 when I was asked to review George Yamin’s In the Absence of Fantasia: Troeltsch’s Relation to Hegel. From doing that review, I learned two things which still seem relevant. First, in the Anglo-American world Troeltsch is almost exclusively regarded as a theologian and second, he continues to be overshadowed by the powerful reputation of Max Weber. Yet, reading and writing about Troeltsch made me realize that his interests went far beyond theology and his thinking was often just as penetrating as Weber’s. Those ideas were present when I began the research for my Sociological Beginnings (2005). This book covered the initial conference in 1910 of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie and among the dozen speakers, five stood out: Georg Simmel, Ferdinand Tönnies, Werner Sombart, Max Weber, and Ernst Troeltsch. Each of their papers were on some aspect of culture and the authors, with the exception of Sombart, were involved with establishing the new journal Logos, which was the international journal for culture. Yet, all five scholars approached the concept of “culture” from differing perspectives. For Tönnies, “Kultur” meant “community”. For Simmel, “Kultur” meant “modernity.” For Sombart, it meant “technology.” And, for Weber, “Kultur” meant “social-economics.” But for Troeltsch, “Kultur” meant much more: it included the other four areas, but it encompassed philosophy, religion, politics, law, and even education. By 2016, I had published two books on Max Weber’s sociology of religion and had been editor of the Anthem Companion to Ferdinand Tönnies when I concluded that Troeltsch was worthy of his own Anthem Companion. I brought the case for such a volume to the series editor, Bryan Turner who, along with Anthem’s publisher, readily agreed. I had a certain expectation that I could find sufficient contributors and I did; what I did not expect was that almost all of them were theologians. The fact that they were theologians who tended to specialize on Troeltsch contributed to the high quality of that volume, but it also meant that Troeltsch’s other cultural interests were not extensively covered. The introduction was lengthened in part to make up some of these deficiencies, but it also reinforced my conviction that there should be a book devoted to his philosophy of culture. The present book is a result of that conviction. I do not claim that this volume covers all of Troeltsch’s ideas about culture and I readily admit that there are other aspects of his philosophy and politics which have not been addressed. But it is my hope that this book will prompt its readers to realize that Ernst Troeltsch should not be left to languish in Max Weber’s shadow, and that while there is no doubt that Troeltsch was one of the

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preeminent Protestant theologians, he was also a significant philosopher of modern culture. It is an honor for this book to be the first English-language volume in the Troeltsch-Studien series. And, my list of thanks includes Professors Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, Friedemann Voigt, and Mark D. Chapman. It also includes Katrin Mittmann and Alice Meroz, and especially Dr. Albrecht Döhnert, all of Walter de Gruyter. As always, special thanks go to the “other Professor” Adair-Toteff— Stephanie. Traunstein, 1 December 2020

Table of Contents Preface | V Introduction | 1 Chapter One The “Spirit of Modern Culture” | 7 Introduction | 7 The “Spirit” of the “Modern World” | 8 Conclusion | 28 Chapter Two Troeltsch and Schleiermacher: A Cultural Dialogue | 29 Troeltsch on Schleiermacher Scholarship: 1900−1910 | 30 “Glaubenslehre”: Troeltsch and Schleiermacher 1910−1920 | 39 Conclusion | 45 Chapter Three The Cultural Relationship Regarding Church and State | 46 Introduction | 46 Some Historical Context | 48 “Staat und Kirche” 1872−1906 | 51 Troeltsch’s “Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche” | 55 Conclusion | 60 Chapter Four Natural Law and Culture | 62 Introduction | 62 Troeltsch’s Concern with Natural Law Prior to 1910 | 62 Troeltsch’s Preoccupation with Natural Law in 1910 | 67 Troeltsch’s Continuing Interest in Natural Law: 1911−1923 | 73 Concluding Comments | 78 Chapter Five The Problem of Historicism and Culture | 79 Introduction | 79 A Brief History of Historicism | 80 Troeltsch’s Historismus | 82

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Troeltsch’s “Overcoming” Historicism | 91 Troeltsch’s Critics | 92 Hintze | 95 Meinecke | 96 Mannheim | 97 Heussi | 98 Concluding Remarks | 99 Chapter Six War and Revolution | 100 War | 100 Revolution | 120 Chapter Seven Modern Pessimism and Culture: Troeltsch’s Criticisms of Spengler | 124 Introduction | 124 Oswald Spengler and Der Untergang des Abendlandes | 125 Troeltsch’s Review of the First Volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes | 127 First Intermezzo: Troeltsch’s “Der Untergang des Abendlandes” | 130 Second Intermezzo: Troeltsch’s “Gefährlichste Zeiten” | 132 Troeltsch’s Review of the Second Volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes | 134 Troeltsch’s Criticisms of Spengler in Historismus | 136 The Aftermath and Concluding Comments | 136 Concluding Comment | 140 Bibliography | 141 Index of Names and Subjects | 151

Introduction The year 2020 has been marred by many crises—ecological, economical, and social-political, not to mention the pandemic’s threat to health. While each of these crises are individually threatening, taken as a whole, they are a threat not just to each of us as individuals, but collectively to us as citizens of the world. Futhermore, they undermine norms and distort values; hence, they are threats to our specific cultures. Thus, these crises demand the type of person who can provide a clear diagnosis of the problems and offer possible solutions. Specialists may be competent to focus on particular crises, but what is also necessary are people who transcend disciplines and can provide a general cultural account. One hundred years ago much of the world was confronting a similar situation with economic collapses, social-political unrest, and a deadly pandemic. Granted, there are fundamental differences between 1920 and now: the First World War had finally come to an end, the defeated countries were suffering, and there were revolutionary movements in some of those states. There were a number of specialists who attempted to confront those crises, but there were also some others who took a different and a more general approach to diagnose the cultural problems and to provide ideas for solutions. Among these, was Ernst Troeltsch. Ernst Troeltsh has long been regarded as one of the leading Protestant theologians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. And, there is no doubt that this reputation as the significant Protestant theologian is well deserved. After all, Troeltsch had spent much of his scholarly life devoted to a number of theological issues, including the history of the early Church, the role and impact of early Protestantism, and to the social developments in religious life. Thus, there are no grounds for questioning his impressive theological reputation. However, the focus on just his theological writings overshadows and obscures a second and an equally important part of Troeltsch’s scholarly life—that is his role as one of the leading German philosophers of culture. Between 1894 and 1915, Troeltsch was Professor of Systematic Theology at Heidelberg, but when he moved to Berlin in 1915, it was to take up a professorship in philosophy. And, while he was always interested in the history of philosophy, as indicated by his studies on Kant, Leibniz, and other philosophers, he was even more concerned with the general problems of culture in Europe and especially in Germany. He had been concerned with these issues throughout much of his life, but his preoccupation with modern culture began to increase after 1900. In particular, he sought to understand and to explain the concept of the “spirit of modern culture”. And, it is in his writings between 1906 and 1923 that this concept became most pronounced. Troeltsch wanted not just to understand this particular “spirit of modern https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654653-001

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culture”, he wanted to indicate the ways in which it was altering many cultural forms—in theology, in law, in politics, in education, and in social relations. To him, this was not only a philosophical issue, but was a moral and practical one. Walther Köhler, who had been Troeltsch’s student, suggested that one could use the phrase “all is teetering” (“es wackelt alles”) to be used as the motto of Troeltsch’s theology and philosophy (Köhler 1941: 1). Writing fifty years later, another biographer maintained that the move to Berlin had practical consequences. Hans-Georg Drescher relays the observation that Troeltsch had announced more than once that “I have come to Berlin in order to overcome the anarchy of values” (“ich bin nach Berlin gekommen, um die Anarchie der Werte zu überwinden”) (Drescher 1991: 421). Drescher noted that Troeltsch was making a reference to Wilhelm Dilthey’s earlier claim about the “Anarchismus der Werte”, but he also mentioned Max Weber’s “Polytheismus der Werte.” Both Dilthey and Weber were writing about the modern conflicts within and about values; Troeltsch believed that it was necessary to end these conflicts. The war and its revolutionary aftermath only reinforced Troeltsch’s conviction for the need for stability, and that stable foundation could come only through the fostering of new ideas. Writing just over a decade later, one of the main editors of the Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Gangolf Hübinger maintained that Troeltsch’s efforts after the war were intended to offer “ideas on the new orientation of Germans” (“Ideen zur Neuorientierung der Deutschen”) (Hübinger in Troeltsch 2002: 1−2). And, Hübinger emphasized that these ideas had to be German; neither the French nor the American revolutionary ideas would be appropriate for Germany (Hübinger in Troeltsch 2002: 20). For Troeltsch, German culture differed from both the far western Europe and the far eastern Europe; it had its unique past and its own traditions. Troeltsch sought direction and stability in values and he thought he could find this in Germany’s historically enlightened culture. Thus, Troeltsch was not referring to novel modes and passing trends; rather, his was the search for the fundamental values of intelligence, tolerance, education, and piety. These as well as others were the enlightened cultural values that he sought to understand and to promote. Thus, Troeltsch should be regarded as being one of the foremost philosophers of culture, especially because of his continued preoccupation with the “spirit of modern culture”. Ernst Troeltsch was not alone with this preoccupation about life in modern culture. Many of his friends and colleagues were also concerned with the various social-economic and political ramifications of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. These included the philosophers Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, the social thinkers Ferdinand Tönnies and Werner Sombart, and the theoreticians Max Weber and Georg Simmel. However,

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these thinkers were primarily concerned with theoretical issues: Windelband and Rickert sought to provide a theoretical foundation for history; Tönnies and Sombart strove to explain how modern capitalism was transforming society; and Weber and Simmel tended to explicate the fundamentals of modern society.1 In contrast, Troeltsch was just as concerned with the practical effects of modern society as he was with the historical and theoretical contexts. This inclination towards the practical implications of the “spirit of modern culture” may have been prompted as much by his own personal inclination as it was by his religious convictions. In any case, Troeltsch’s thoughts on modern culture occupy a major portion of his writings. The writings themselves may have been prompted by some specific occasion; however, they embody his general ideas regarding modern culture. Troeltsch was a philosopher of culture as much as he was a Protestant theologian, and as with his writings on theology and religion, his philosophical writings on the “spirit of modern culture” deserve to be examined—which is the focus of this book.2 Chapter One is devoted to explaining what various terms meant in general to Troeltsch and his contemporaries and in what manner Troeltsch sought to appropriate them for his own use. In particular, the German terms for “spirit” (“Geist”) and “culture” differ from the general Anglo-American uses; therefore, it is beneficial to devote some time to explaining the fundamental differences between these two terms. It is also helpful to set out Troeltsch’s notion of the “modern world” and how he believed its origins were more recent than what most of his contemporaries had maintained. Troeltsch was often criticized for minimizing the impact of the Reformation; yet, he was perfectly willing to grant the importance of Martin Luther and other Reformers to the development of Protestantism. || 1 The claim that these thinkers prioritized theory over practice should not be read as a rejection of practical concerns. Sombart and Tönnies were very concerned about modernity’s implications for everyday life. However, Sombart’s concerns varied depending on his theoretical leanings and Tönnies often considered issues through his distinction between the traditional, rural “Gemeinschaft” (“community”) and the modern, urban “Gesellschaft” (“society”). 2 This book is aimed primarily at the Anglo-American reader because it is in this area that Troeltsch is regarded primarily as a theologian. This was driven home to me when I sought contributors for the Anthem Companion to Ernst Troeltsch. The response came almost exclusively from theologians and contributed to the domination of socio-religious issues in that collection. Adair-Totefff 2018. In Germany, aspects of Troeltsch’s philosophical-political thinking has been recognized and documented by Gangolf Hübinger, especially in his introductions to a number of volumes in the new critical edition of Troeltsch’s works (Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe). In his “Einleitung” to volume 15, he emphasized Troeltsch’s concern with culture. Hübinger in Troeltsch 2002: 9, 15−19. If there is a difference in approaches and emphasis, it is mostly because Hübinger is primarily a historian, whereas I am primarily a philosopher.

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What he was less willing to do was to agree with the claim that the modern world originated in the sixteenth century. That was because he was convinced that the modern world really began with the Enlightenment in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Chapter Two is focused on Troeltsch’s reception of Schleiermacher’s thinking, both in terms of his religious writings and his more philosophical texts. Schleiermacher is not usually regarded as an Enlightenment thinker, but Troeltsch and others have considered him one of the founders of modern thought. There is no question that many theologians today regard Schleiermacher as the founder of modern Protestantism—Troeltsch certainly did. However, Troeltsch was convinced that Schleiermacher attempted to address many cultural issues. Troeltsch was engaged in a “dialogue” with Schleiermacher—not just about systematic theology and religious belief but on how the church and the state could, and should, provide a foundation for modern life. Chapter Three is addressed to one of the key concerns that Troeltsch and Schleiermacher shared—the particular relationship between church and state in the nineteenth and then the twentieth century. This involves providing some historical context because the general conflict between church and state mirrored the specific historical conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany. Thus, some effort is devoted to a brief account of the “Kulturkampf”, which Bismarck initiated in order to counterbalance the increase in Catholic influence in politics and to help ensure allegiance to the newly founded German “Reich”. It also involves examining a number of writings by some of Troeltsch’s theological and philosophical predecessors. Doing so will help locate Troeltsch’s own thinking about the relationship beween church and state within a much wider perspective. Furthermore, this is not simply a theological issue nor a political one; rather, it is also a cultural one. If the Church can no longer be regarded as providing the secure foundation for the state, then what can serve as the basis for the state and for law? Chapter Four is devoted primarily to a discussion of natural law. Unlike his friend and colleague Max Weber, Troeltsch was not trained in law. However, he recognized the crucial role that law had played throughout civilization and he believed that natural law could be a counterpart to modern positive law. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that natural law was a “red thread” through Troeltsch’s writings and he was fascinated by its various forms in history. It did not seem to matter to him whether it was the Stoic version or a medieval Catholic version, natural law served as a type of culture glue. And, it did not seem to matter to him whether natural law was founded upon the heavenly authority of God or the earthly authority of human reason. What did matter to Troeltsch was

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that natural law was the foundation for the tribunal for disputes. Troeltsch may have been an idealist of sorts, but he fully recognized that humans are often in conflict. And, he was completely convinced that natural law was the best means to adjucate those conflicts. But if the Church is no longer the basis for the state and natural law is no longer regarded as the basis for legal reasonings, then is not the end result a type of relativism and the “anarchy of values”? This is the problem of historicism. Chapter Five is devoted to the philosophical notion of historicism. Troeltsch admitted that historicism was difficult to define, but he recognized that with the collapse of an absolute authority that relativism was gaining ground. He was determined not only to try to define historicism; he was also determined to be clear in his warning about relativism. Just as Troeltsch had devoted a number of years to the investigation into the social and economic factors that were found in Christianity, he dedicated a number of years to determing what historicism meant and how it impacted modern culture. Although his Historismus and his Soziallehren are devoted to two entirely different topics in two different disciplines, they both represent Troeltsch’s most sustained investigations into the theological and philosophical factors that help shape the “spirit of modern culture”. Chapter Six is on war and revolution and while it may seem that these two topics are more appropriate for an investigation into Troeltsch’s practical politics, they are relevant here. That is because Troeltsch regarded the First World War as primarily a war between two different cultures. In this, Troeltsch was not much different from many German thinkers. What makes Troeltsch’s writings so important was his willingness to accept that Germany’s enemies were not the evil states that many people believed. Troeltsch recognized the importance of countering Allied propaganda, but he also realized that the war would be over sometime and that Germany and England would need to try to resume its pre-war relationship. Painting Germany’s enemies as blood-thirsty tyrants would just impede such a reapproachment. Troeltsch was convinced that it was crucial to offer an account of the differences between cultures and to provide an indication of what they shared. Troeltsch attempted a similar approach to the revolutionary changes that came after Germany’s defeat; and while he became increasingly pessimistic about Germany’s future, he was convinced that he had to offer a defence of German culture. Chapter Seven is focused on post-war Germany and its culture of pessimism. Oswald Spengler had published his famous book on the decline of the West. Troeltsch devoted considerable effort in countering Spengler’s pessimism and nihilism. Specifically, he published two major reviews; one on each of Spengler’s two volumes that compose Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Troeltsch recognized

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that Spengler’s philosophical pessimism was striking a chord within a defeated and increasingly nervous Germany. He acknowledged that the political and economic situation was unstable and untenable but he sought to give hope to people about a better future. Troeltsch’s letters in his “Spectator” series indicate his struggle with his own concerns and the loss of some of his closest friends. It will be left to theologians to determine how much faith played a role in Troeltsch’s final years, but it is evident that he had an abiding faith in his fellow Germans as well as in people in general. Each of the chapters has contributed to Troeltsch’s examination of the “spirit of modern culture” but this chapter may be able to capture that spirit in a more trenchant light. This brief overview of the chapters should serve to provide a sufficient indication of the focus of this book: Troeltsch’s role as a philosopher of culture and his attempts to deal with the problems of the modern world. The focus is of course on Troeltsch’s work but Friedrich Schleiermacher’s thinking plays a prominent role. This is because Troeltsch regarded Schleiermacher as his philosophical and theological predecessor and because both shared similar concerns and hope about Germany’s future. And, both believed in the critical importance of the combination of intellectual ability and unwavering faith. Having indicated what the book is about, it may be worthwhile to mention what this book is not about. As much as Troeltsch was concerned with practical considerations, they have been mostly neglected here for two reasons. First, the primary focus has been on Troeltsch as a philosopher of culture and second, a consideration of them would warrant an extensive examination of his actual political involvement, both during his time in Heidelberg and later in Berlin. This has not been done here for several reasons: One, I am a philosopher and neither a political thinker nor a historian. Two, such an examination would certainly make this book much longer and possibly less focused. And three, the relevant volumes of the Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe have not yet been published. It is my hope that sometime in the not too distant future, someone competent will take up the challenge of providing an account of Troeltsch’s practical politics: looking at his political speeches and his political activities, both those while he was in government as well as outside of it. Perhaps that future investigation would be fruitfully read alongside my account of Troeltsch as a philosopher of culture. My overall intention with this book is to demonstrate how important Troelsch’s philosophical and political contributions were in his own time and to argue that they are certainly of interest in our time. A century has passed since he wrote these specific books and articles; however, we might find that his philosophical reflections regarding the “spirit of the modern world” can give us a clearer understanding and a more secure foundation for us to confront the crises which we face today.

Chapter One The “Spirit of Modern Culture”3 Introduction Ernst Troeltsch spent a major portion of his scholarly life focused on examining the “spirit of modern culture.” While his interest in this notion is evident in his earlier writings, his concern with it began to increase after 1900. And, it is in his writings between 1907 and 1923 that it became most pronounced.4 And while it would seem that the phrase the “spirit of modern culture” would be easily understood, it is not. The difficulty stems largely from two sources: first, the general differences between the specific German terms and the attempts to render them into English and second, Troeltsch’s particular use of the German phrase “Geist der modernen Kultur”. The phrase “the spirit of modern culture” contains three parts: “spirit”, “modern”, and “culture”. The term “modern” is perhaps the easiest to define but even then, there is some general disagreement. In Troeltsch’s case, he never offers a specific time-frame but one can deduce it from his various writings. “Spirit” is a relatively easy term to understand in English because it appears to refer to two types of things. One is intangible: a “spirit” that someone or some group has as in “team spirit” or the “spirit of the game”. The other is slightly more real: a “spirit” or ghost or apprehension. In German “spirit” (“Geist”) is more difficult to define and far broader. One only need to think of the two English translations of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes—J.B. Baillie translated it as Phenomenology of Mind whereas A.V. Miller rendered it as Phenomenology of Spirit. Moreover, “Geist” covers more areas, as will be discussed below. Finally, there is the term “Welt”. It is usually taken to refer to the physical world but it often refers to something less tangible. Troeltsch does occasionally use the word “Welt” to refer to the earth but more often it refers to a state of mind or a “world

|| 3 In the “Einleitung” to Troeltsch’s correspondence from 1894 to 1904, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf notes that when Troeltsch wrote about the modern world or modern spirit, he did not do so like many literary or artistic types who thought that the modern age was a nervous age. Graf points out that Troeltsch contended that the modern age or modern world referred to the previous two centuries. Graf in Troeltsch 2014: 13. 4 This chapter does not follow the order of Troeltsch’s writings; instead, it follows the chronological order beginning with early Protestantism and ending with the Enlightenment. This explains why some of Troeltsch’s early writings are dealt with at the end of the chapter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654653-002

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view” (“Weltanschauung”). Often it refers to culture, but as I show, the term “Kultur” offers its own set of difficulties. However, Troeltsch did not usually use either the term “Welt” or “Kultur” alone; rather, he tended to speak more often about “modern world” or “modern culture.” That is not to minimize his interest in the culture of the older world. His writings on Augustine, Luther, and Calvin attest to his concern with pre-modern figures. There is no doubt that Troeltsch was exceptionally interested in history; however, it was never simply just for history’s sake. Rather, he almost always employed history in order to understand the present, because as much as studying the past is rewarding, it is far more rewarding to understand the present.5 The focus of this chapter is first on Troeltsch’s idea of “spirit” and then on his conceptions of “modern culture” and the “modern world.”

The “Spirit” of the “Modern World” Scholars may think of two specific German classical works in which the term “Geist” played a large and prominent role. Georg Friedrich Hegel published the Phänomenologie des Geistes in 1807, a book in which the “Absolute” manifests itself throughout history. Almost a century later, Max Weber published the two parts which made up the original 1904/1905 article of the Protestantische Ethik und der “Geist” des Kapitalismus. Although he dropped the quotation marks from Geist in the 1920 revision of the work, the word still represented a special and distinctive quality; that is, the “spirit” of capitalism in the modern world. Ernst Troeltsch also used the term “Geist”, perhaps not as memorably as either Hegel or Weber did, but certainly more frequently. That is because, like Hegel and Weber, Troeltsch recognized the enormous power that “Geist” has in German. The term “Geist” has played an extraordinary role throughout German history and that is clearly indicated by the fact that in the Brother Grimm’s Deutsches Wörterbuch there are approximately fifty pages devoted specifically to the single word “Geist”.6 There are a total of eighteen classifications of definitions and only a few will be offered here. “Geist” can mean something like “godly spirit”, a “worldly spirit”, or a “spirit of the elements” (Grimm und Grimm 1984: 2642, 2649). It can mean a human’s “living spirit” or an “appearance” (“Erscheinung”) || 5 Troeltsch is primarily concerned with the present and the near future; his interest in the past is readily understandable. In contrast, Troeltsch seemed unconcerned about the distant future; he believed that it was not a matter for humans but should be left to God. 6 Grimm und Grimm 1984. Columns 2623 to 2741. This count does not include an additional 50 columns devoted to variants of “Geist”. Columns 2741 to 2791.

The “Spirit” of the “Modern World” | 9

(Grimm und Grimm 1984: 2625, 2628). And, “Geist” can mean “essence” (“Wesen”) (Grimm und Grimm 1984: 2663−2665). In fact, Hegel wrote of “geistiges Wesen” (Hegel 1952: 314). Weber rejected not only Hegelian metaphysics; he seemed to object to the notion of “essence” (“Wesen”). However, Weber did choose to use the term “Geist” and he was unusual in his dislike concerning the discussion about “essence”. In fact, the noted theologian Adolf (von) Harnack had begun a major discussion about the “essence” of Christianity. His Wesen des Christentums was a series of lectures that he gave at the university in Berlin in 1899/1900 and was published later that year (Harnack 1903: III−IV). Harnack sent a copy of the book to Troeltsch and Troeltsch replied with a post card dated July 10, 1900. In it, he expressed not only gratitude for receiving it; he wrote that he had eagerly read through it and that he believed the manner in which Harnack had discussed the essence of Christianity was a model to emulate (Troeltsch 2014: 274). Troeltsch himself tended to employ the term “Geist” even in his early writings. For example, in the volume of the Kritische Gesamtausgabe containing the writings from 1888 until the end of 1902, not only is “Geist” listed some hundred times but that there are an additional seventy variations of “Geist”. (Troeltsch 2009: 1036−1037). However, as Troeltsch turned to more cultural and political matters, his use of “Geist” also changed. This is shown specifically by the title of his posthumously published Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa. While Troeltsch apparently did not choose the title, the editor Hans Baron was familiar enough with Troeltsch’s writings that the use of “Deutscher Geist” undoubtedly reflects Troeltsch’s own thinking. Baron also edited the fourth volume of Troeltsch’s Gesammelte Schriften and in his prefatory comments he noted in 1913 that Troeltsch had written that the third volume of his collected works would be titled Aufsätze zur Entstehung des modernen Geistes (Troeltsch 1925b: V; Troeltsch 1913: VIII). Troeltsch regarded Germany as having a special “spirit” and as such held a particular place in the history of the world. That is because he believed that Germany differed significantly from most of the great European powers, not to mention the fundamental differences between it and the rest of the world. Troeltsch frequently used the term “Welt” as the subject index of any of the Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe indicates. Consider the “Sachregister” to Band 1 where there are dozens of references to passages in which Troeltsch employed “Welt”. Then there are several dozens of modifications of “Welt” as well as even more combinations (Troeltsch 2009: 1087−1090). However, Troeltsch did not tend to use it as a description of a place but of a condition. That is why he tended to use “Welt” and “Kultur” interchangeably. This is further confirmed by his use of “modern”; hence, “moderne Welt” and “moderne Kultur”.

10 | The “Spirit of Modern Culture”

“Kultur” is an interesting word because it encompasses much more than the Anglo-American word “culture.” For the British and the Americans, “culture” was usually reserved for the arts but as the arts became less elite, the term “culture” expanded to cover more than the arts. In contrast, “Kultur” is larger than either the original meaning of the word “culture” or its larger modern usage. Instead, it is more like the term “civilization” in that it encompasses the entirety of the German “Geist”. Perhaps the closest term that compares with this type of expansion is the German term “Bildung”. “Bildung” is often translated as “education” but it covers more than schooling; rather, it means something closer to “molding” the individual as part of the community. In other words, Germans as a rule do not tend to share the English, and even more the American, belief in the self-sufficiency of the rugged individual. This German rejection of the emphasis on the individual underlies Ferdinand Tönnies’ preference for the organic, rural, traditional community (“Gemeinschaft”) over the arbitrary, cosmopolitan, capitalistic society (“Gesellschaft”) (Tönnies 1883). While Troeltsch and Tönnies did not always agree—Troeltsch was more of a Christian and less of a socialist than Tönnies—they tended to agree that Germany had always emphasized, and should continue to stress, the priority of the welfare of the general community over the preferences of the single individual. And, this emphasis points to Troeltsch’s notion of the “modern world.” Troeltsch’s most sustained discussion of the “modern world” is found in “Das Wesen des modernen Geistes” which was published in 1907. After acknowledging the difficulty of determining historical periods, he suggested that there were four in Europe: the ancient world, the early Christian world, medieval Christianity, and the modern age. He traced the modern age to specific historical developments: The Renaissance, the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and finally and most importantly, the “Aufklärung” (Troeltsch 2014: 43−437). As he had done previously, Troeltsch credits the English, the Americans, and the French for providing much of the structure of the modern world and he points specifically to those three revolutions. They provided the contrast between the old otherworldly order of the Church with the modern sense of the “here and now” (“Diesseitigkeit”) of the state (Troeltsch 2014: 440, 442, 446, 448, 456, 466−467). This meant the emphasis on rationality, not just in the state, in its law, its technology, and its organization (Troeltsch 2014: 438–440). The modern state also stressed the importance of the individual, the belief in equality, and the sense of optimism, which contributed to the modern capitalistic economy. Another mark of the modern world is the introduction of doubt and criticism. While Troeltsch credited Descartes for the introduction of doubt, he was thinking of Kant with respect to element of criticism (Troeltsch 2014: 452−458). This meant the breaking

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of the bonds between church and state (Troeltsch 463−466). Troeltsch was of mixed opinions regarding the development of the modern world. While he applauded the modern notions of equality and the sense of optimism which led to the modern state and modern natural sciences, he wondered how long the optimism of the modern world would continue (Troeltsch 2014: 472−473). Troeltsch discussed when the beginning of the modern world actually began and he insisted that it was not with Martin Luther. In Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit, Troeltsch differentiates between what he called “Old Protestantism” (“Altprotestantismus”) and “New Protestantism” (“Neuprotestantismus”). The former encompassed the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and included Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin but also Lutheranism and Calvinism. The latter began in the eighteenth century and continued into the nineteenth. Troeltsch hints that during the modern period there were no theological figures with a similar statue to that of either Luther or Calvin. In this work Troeltsch repeats what he had written earlier in his encyclopedia articles about the Reformation being a continuation of the medieval Church. But here, he expressly argues that this is in large measure because of Martin Luther. Troeltsch does not deny that Luther was the religious genius of the time and that his theology was a return to the ethics of the early Church and a rejection of dogma (Troeltsch 2004: 145). However, that did not mask how medieval Luther’s thinking was. As a naïve individual and a peasant’s son he put no trust in philosophy and he rejected humanistic learning as superficial and religiously weak. Aristotle and Scholasticism were rejected; the only thing that mattered was the Bible and faith. In a sense, he never left the monastery because he always sided with faith and mysticism, and never with reason and understanding (Troeltsch 2004: 147–148). Troeltsch insisted that Luther was instinctively drawn to Augustine’s theology with its twin kingdoms (Troeltsch 2004: 148, 159−162). Luther was conservative and passive and lacked the hardness and activity that was found in Calvin (Troeltsch 2004: 162−163). This did not mean that Troeltsch considered Calvin a revolutionary figure. Instead, Calvin was naturally conservative as were all of the Reformers (Troeltsch 2004: 199). In effect, Lutheranism continued the Catholic dogma of being a part of the state; the difference was that the state was Prussia (Troeltsch 2004: 217, 227, 235). Calvinism provided a completely different world despite the theological affinities (Troeltsch 2004: 241). Unlike Lutheranism, Calvinism was radically antiCatholic and it tolerated if not endorsed, resistance against tyrants (Troeltsch 2004: 245, 247). Rather than passive obedience to the state, Calvinism fostered the notion of an independent and free Church (Troeltsch 2004: 254−257). It was this spirit that spread throughout northern Europe and then to America

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(Troeltsch 2004: 260−263). Its spirit was primarily utilitarian and that was manifested in its notion of the state and its idea of economy (Troeltsch 2004: 281−283). This spirit would lead to the spirit of the modern world. Before turning to Troeltsch’s account of that, it is important to note why Troeltsch’s account of Luther and Lutheranism prompted a major reaction. In order to understand why Troeltsch’s portrait of Luther aroused so much criticism it is necessary to consider Luther’s role in Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century. In the first edition of the Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, the article “Luther, Martin” is almost fifty pages in length (Köstlin 1857: 568−617). It was written by Julius Köstlin who revised it slightly for the second edition of the Realencyklopädie (Köstlin 1881: 38−74). It was changed slightly again for the third edition of the encyclopedia (Köstlin 1902: 720−756). He also wrote two lengthy works on Luther: Luther’s Theologie and Martin Luther, sein Leben und seine Schriften, which have continuing value; thus, Köstlin can be regarded as the leading Protestant expert on Luther at the time (Eck 1912: 1580). As Köstlin’s works show, Luther was highly regarded, if not venerated, by Protestants. Perhaps the clearest indication of the Protestants’ reverence for Luther was demonstrated by some of the many speeches given in honor of Luther’s four hundredth birthday in 1883. Four have been singled out here because they represented some of the clearest expressions of what German theologians and scholars thought about Luther’s role in history. Julius Köstlin and Albrecht Ritschl were two of the most influential German theology professors of the time. And, Heinrich von Treitschke was one of the most famous German professors of history as well as one of the leading political thinkers while Adolf von Harnack represented the new generation of university professors. Julius Köstlin was one of the most important speakers and he impressed upon his listeners three critical points about Luther. First, Köstlin noted that Luther was the embodiment of the German people’s simple humanity. Second, Köstlin pointed out that Luther was a man of conviction and conscience. When he was asked to recant his teachings, Luther refused. In his view, it was not a matter of external Church authority but an internal conviction based upon his own reading of the Bible. Third, Köstlin reminded his audience that Luther warned people not to be his disciples but to be followers of Christ (Köstlin 1883: 3−4, 23−25, 70−74). Albrecht Ritschl was another major theologian to praise Luther. In his “Festrede am vierten Seculartage der Geburt Martin Luthers”, Ritschl stressed that Luther’s greatness rested on his historical contributions and that the Enlightenment would be unthinkable without him. Furthermore, Ritschl claimed that Luther’s emphasis on the importance of work and for freedom of conscience were

The “Spirit” of the “Modern World” | 13

among his major contributions to modern German culture. And, Ritschl insisted that Luther was a patriot and a defender of German values. To make his point about Germany more clearly, Ritschl mentioned the historical as well as the current struggles between Germany and the “Ultramontanists”. This was a clear reference to the “Kulturkampf” (Ritschl 1887: 6, 16−17, 25). The “Kulturkampf” occurred between roughly 1872 and 1878 and it was predicated on Bismarck’s decision to counteract the growing influence of the Pope on Germany’s Catholic citizens. On the one hand was the doctrine concerning the Pope’s infallibility while on the other hand was Bismarck’s need to defend the Protestant roots of the newly established German nation. Hence, Bismarck believed that there was a cultural struggle between the Catholics who owed allegiance to Rome, hence the term “Ultramontane” (“over the mountains”) and the Protestants who owed allegiance to Bismarck’s state.7 Although the “Kulturkampf” basically ended in 1878 with Bismarck’s apparent defeat, the tensions that were so evident in it continued to plague Germany for the next several decades. It is this historical context which one needs to keep in mind with respect to all of the Protestant speakers—and not just those, like Ritschl, who expressly cited the “Kulturkampf.” Adolf Harnack was the third theologian to give a public lecture in honor of Luther’s birthday. Harnack would become as famous if not more so than Köstlin and Ritschl, but in 1883 he had not yet established himself as the leading Protestant Church historian. Indeed, his speech “Martin Luther, in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und der Bildung” was the earliest of the eleven addresses collected in the first volume of Harnack’s Reden und Aufsätze. If Köstlin emphasized Luther’s piety and humility and if Ritschl stressed Luther’s claim that all types of work were important to God as Luther’s contributions to German culture, Harnack underscored Luther’s importance for scholarship and science (Harnack 1904: 143−145). Harnack admits that the Renaissance was crucial for the development of Western culture but he emphasized that Luther’s contribution to the Reformation was more than artistic license. He argued that Luther rejected empty emancipation and questionable subjectivity. Instead, Luther fought for the right of the individual to be free in his beliefs and to justify one’s actions by the appeal to one’s convictions. And, these were firmly based upon the word of God (Harnack 1904: 151−159). Harnack distinguished between the Renaissance, which partially worked within the old system, and the Reformation, which was really revolutionary. It was revolutionary because Luther

|| 7 Ruppert 2002: 5–11. For a carefully written account of the “Kulturkampf” see the volume in Thomas Nipperdey’s Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918 entitled Machtstaat vor der Demokratie. Nipperdey 364–381.

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combined freedom and responsibility, understanding and faith, as well as recognizing the importance of the individual and the group. Harnack summed up his thoughts about Luther by suggesting that what is in Luther’s greatness and powerfulness is a model for us for all time. For Harnack “He was the Reformation” (“Er war die Reformation”) (Harnack 1904: 166−169). Ritschl’s reference was not the only one to the struggle between the Catholics and the Protestants. Heinrich von Treitschke also mentioned it in the speech that he gave in Darmstadt in 1883. At the time he gave it, von Treitschke was at the height of his fame. The five volumes of his Deutsche Geschichte had been in print for some time and students flocked to hear his university lectures at Berlin. In “Luther und die deutsche Nation”, von Treitschke extolled Luther’s greatness but he bemoaned the fact that the entire nation could not celebrate his many important contributions to Germany. There were millions of Germans who remained passive during these celebrations, yet they also benefited from Luther’s work. Von Treitschke did not name the Catholics, but he pointed out that, like the Protestants, they also benefited by the progress in “state and society, in house and in science” (“Staat und Gesellschaft, Haus und Wissenschaft”) (Treitschke 1905: 136−137). Von Treitschke referred to Luther as the “leader of the nation” (“Führer der Nation”) who was ready to fight for the rejuvenation of the Church, if not in every nation, then at least in Germany. Von Treitschke quoted Luther’s claim that he had been born for his Germans and he would serve them (“für meine Deutschen bin ich geboren, ihnen will ich dienen”) (Treitschke 1905: 139−140). Von Treitschke claimed that this was no mere reformation, but was actually a revolution. Luther broke with centuries of traditional obedience to the Church when he insisted that one should trust in the power of God’s word (“Mit kindlichem Vertrauen baute er auf die Macht des göttlichen Wortes allein.”) (Treitschke 1905: 144). Von Treitschke insisted that the history of modern man did not begin either with Petrarch or with any of the artists of the fourteenth century. Instead, it began with Martin Luther. And, it was Luther who first paved the way for Kant and Goethe (Treitschke 1905: 145−146). As much as Luther fostered German philosophy and poetry, his biggest contribution was to German politics. Von Treitschke opined that no other people needed to be freed from the Church’s domination as much as the German people. He insisted that while Luther was no political thinker, he was the individual who brought forth the German state. In addition, Luther gave the Germans their own language, their own poetry, and their own science. More importantly, Luther gave Germans their ethics which was based upon the “autonomy of the conscience” (“Autonomie des Gewissens”) (Treitschke 1905: 150−153). Furthermore, the “autonomy of conscience” was not only for men, but also for women. Von Treitschke insisted that

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Luther’s views on marriage meant that women were no longer to be regarded as inferiors but should be treated as equals (Treitschke 1905: 154−155). Von Treitschke concluded with the plea to his fellow Germans that they should not give up hope and that someday all Germans will honor Luther. For justification, he pointed to the unification of the Lutheran Church with the Reformed Church and suggested that the day would come when each and every German would honor Martin Luther as the hero (“Held”) and the “teacher” (“Lehrer”) that he was. However, von Treitschke ended with a reminder that the Pope’s claim to infallibility had caused considerable pain to many Germans and led to an even greater riff between Protestants and Catholics. Yet, it was Martin Luther who expressed the need for freedom from the mystical and abstract Church and for living in the real Christian world of the state (Treitschke 1905: 157−158). Von Treitschke spoke for almost all Protestants in his reverence for Luther. Even allowing for some hyperbole for the speech, Luther represented the best in Germans and was regarded as the founder of not just Protestantism but as the founder of every aspect of German culture. Given that Luther continued to be regarded as the thinker who started modern culture, it is understandable that anyone who questioned Luther’s importance was bound to be greeted with skepticism if not derision. Accordingly, when Troeltsch began to put forth his claim that modern culture began with the Enlightenment, many Protestants regarded this claim as nothing less than an attack on Martin Luther and an intentional devaluation of the Reformation. It is possible that Troeltsch wrote “Luther und die moderne Welt” as a reaction to some of the criticism regarding his claim that the modern world began with the Enlightenment and not with the Reformation. Rather than repeating that claim, Troeltsch emphasized four key points in which Luther contributed to the conditions which made the modern world possible (Troeltsch 2001: 83). They were 1) his emphasis on faith, 2) his individualism, 3) his ethics, and 4) his positive view of the world. Troeltsch contrasted Luther’s emphasis on faith and grace in contrast to the hierarchical authority and the Sacraments of the Catholic Church (Troeltsch 2001: 70−72). He emphasized Luther’s “religious individualism” which was manifested in his single-minded devotion to the Bible as the Word of God. Luther knew only one authority—God, and not the Church (Troeltsch 2001: 73−74, 94). Connected to this was Luther’s ethics of conscience which was an “ethics of conviction” (“Gesinnungsethik”) (Troeltsch 2001: 73−74, 85, 89). Finally, Troeltsch stressed that Luther was comfortable in the world as indicated by his belief in the dignity and worth of every vocation—not just the ecclesiastical callings (Troeltsch 2001: 75−76, 87). Thus, Troeltsch granted that Luther was responsible for a number of beliefs which were important for the

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development of the modern age while not retreating from his claim that the modern world began with the Enlightenment. Troeltsch wrote “Luther und die moderne Welt” in 1908 but two years earlier he had made some of the same points in “Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt”. This was a paper that he had presented at the meeting of the Stuttgart Historians Day (“Stuttgarter Historikertag”) in April of 1906. Max Weber had been scheduled to deliver a paper but he decided against it and suggested Troeltsch take his place instead (Troeltsch 2001: 184−185, 201). The paper was published in book form later that year and then Troeltsch revised and expanded it for the second edition in 1912. It was this second edition that served as the text for the English translation which carried a simpler title Protestantism and Progress. However, its subtitle captured more of Troeltsch’s sense: A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World (Troeltsch 1912: iii). Troeltsch reminds his audience that the culture of medieval Christianity was fundamentally a “culture of authority” (“Autoritätskultur”) whereas the essence of modern culture is autonomy (Troeltsch 2001: 209−213). Instead of a single absolute of the medieval Church, modern culture has numerous and relative interests and values (Troeltsch 2001: 219). Much of this is because of the modern emphasis on natural science and Troeltsch refers to Treitschke’s famous speech in 1883 for the claim that Luther was responsible for all that was great and noble in the modern world (Troeltsch 2001: 223). Troeltsch repeats his claim from his work in Hinneberg’s encyclopedia that Protestantism is divided into old and new Protestantism and that while Luther and Calvin shared some fundamental ideas about the role of Protestantism, they differed significantly about their approaches to the world (Troeltsch 2001: 225, 231). This is evident in the different types of asceticism: Luther’s asceticism was a continuation of the Catholic monk and was “world-fleeing” whereas Calvin’s was an “inner-worldly” type of asceticism. Troeltsch notes that he was following Weber’s distinction from the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Troeltsch 2001: 241−242). Furthermore, Troeltsch indicates that while Luther recognized the importance of the family, he did not appreciate the importance of state and the law like Calvin did. Instead, Luther’s version of natural law was both minimal and conservative whereas that of Calvin was critical and radical (Troeltsch 2001: 250−259). It was not through Luther but through Calvin that the notion of human rights was discovered and propagated. And, the notion of human rights lay at the foundation of the American and French revolutions (Troeltsch 2001: 264−265). It was this emphasis which led to the issue of the separation of church and state and the resulting emphasis on individual freedom within the modern state

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(Troeltsch 2001: 266−270). And, it was this individual freedom which led to the development of modern capitalism. Again, Troeltsch refers to Weber’s thesis about Calvinism (Troeltsch 2001: 272−277, 285). Finally, Troeltsch points to the immense changes in science and in art and he suggests that it was not during the time of “old Protestantism” but later when these changes really became manifest (Troeltsch 2001: 300−304). Luther was concerned with faith and God, not so much as with reason and the world (Troeltsch 2001: 306−312). Troeltsch remained quiet about his thesis regarding the importance of the Enlightenment for the modern world just as he refrained from making any value judgments about the worth of the modern world. The question whether the development of economic capitalism, the expansion of the military, and the building of the administrative state is a good thing is not addressed. That was because Troeltsch’s goal was not to judge, but to understand (Troeltsch 2001: 315−316). In the “Vorbemerkung” to the work Troeltsch insisted that the study of history is not simply for its own sake but also for its results. The understanding of the present is always the final goal of all history (“So ist das Verständnis der Gegenwart immer das letzte Ziel aller Historie”) (Troeltsch 2001: 205). That Troeltsch did not make the claim that the Enlightenment was the beginning of the modern world late in life is clearly indicated by the opening sentence in his 1897 article “Aufklärung”. This article on the Enlightenment was an entry in the third edition of the Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. The first edition of the encyclopedia was published between 1854 and 1866 while the second appeared between 1879 and 1888. The initial volume of the third edition was published in 1896 and the second volume which contained Troeltsch’s article appeared the following year. Despite the fact that Troeltsch was not yet thirty three years old, the editor Albert Hauck had entrusted him with writing a lengthy and important piece on a somewhat controversial topic.8 Troeltsch himself was not intending to write a conventional article as shown by this initial sentence: “The Enlightenment is the beginning and the foundation of the specifically modern period of European culture and history in contrast to the previously dominating church and theologically determined culture…” (“Die Aufklärung ist Beginn und Grundlage der eigentlich modernen Periode der || 8 The article “Aufklärung” found in the first edition of the Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche is only three pages. Tholuck 1854: 599–602. The article in the second edition is not quite five full pages. Kahnis 1877: 667−772. In comparison, Troeltsch’s is sixteen pages in length. Also, Tholuck was 55 years old while Kahnis was 63 when their articles were published. Both had had lengthy carreers as Protestant professors; Tholuck at the university at Halle and Kahnis at the one in Leipzig. In contrast, Troeltsch had been at Heidelberg for fewer than three years.

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europäischen Kultur und Geschichte im Gegensatz zu der bis dahin herrschenden kirchlich und theologisch bestimmten Kultur…”) (Troeltsch 1897: 225). This shows that he was convinced at an early age that it was neither the Renaissance nor the Reformation that heralded the beginning of the modern age; but that it had begun with the Enlightenment.9 Troeltsch explained that the “Aufklärung” ushered in a new age because it broke with the past with respect to a number of issues. First, it replaced the supernaturalism of the medieval world and even much of the Reformation with reason. Rather than an order which was divinely based, the “Aufklärung” had an order founded upon reason. Second, rather than stressing being a member of a religious community, the “Aufklärung” emphasized the importance of the individual. Third, the “Aufklärung” promoted a sense of optimism and a belief in progress, in opposition to tradition and pessimism. Fourth, the “Aufklärung” not only continued the process of discovery in the natural sciences, but expanded it to include other investigations. Finally, instead of the eternal tribunal of the Churches, the “Aufklärung” replaced it with the historical individual (Troeltsch 1897: 225−226). These were Troeltsch’s general remarks about the Enlightenment and he spent the remainder of the entry spelling out its importance in different fields. Troeltsch particularly emphasized how the Enlightenment changed politics. Both the Catholic and the Protestant Churches held to the belief that the eternal realm of heaven was far superior to the transitory earthly world. Thus, the Catholic Church and the Lutheran one not only had no real interest in worldly politics but insisted that the state should be subordinate to heavenly matters. This changed with the Enlightenment because now the state was founded upon reason and not upon God. Furthermore, rather than a single ecclesiastic theory of the state, there were many different approaches. Troeltsch offered differing theories of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes in England, those of Jean Bodin in France, Hugo Grotius in the Netherlands, and Samuel Pufendorf in Germany. What they all shared was the belief that the state was an independent entity and was not founded upon the theological culture. How ever much they believed in differing degrees in the separation between church and state, they all held that all humans had certain rights and that included the right to the freedom of conscience (Troeltsch 1897: 226−227).

|| 9 In “Theologie und Religionswissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts” Troeltsch repeats his insistence that the point of departure of modern science of religion and theology lies neither with the Renaissance nor with the Reformation. However, rather than naming the Enlightenment as that which produced the “modern intellectual world” (“moderne geistige Welt”), he looks back into history and to the religious wars of the seventeenth century. Troeltsch 2009: 899.

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The second shift between the old theological order and the new order of the Enlightenment was demonstrated in the areas of economics and social development. The old order was not much different from the feudal hierarchy. However, England and the Netherlands broke with that and emphasized the freedom that came with the increasing desirability for world trade. In the cities, the limitations needed for old order were being broken down by the increasing equality. Thus, there was the increase in the belief in natural economy and the need for the universal right for “unlimited work and capital freedom” (“Unbeschränkte Arbeits- und Kapitalfreiheit”) (Troeltsch 1897: 228). Third was the replacement of the pessimistic mood by optimism. The older belief that the world was the place of struggle between man and devil and that sin leads to eternal damnation was replaced by a “milder, cosmopolitan, philanthropic” (“milderer, kosmopolitischer, philanthropischer”) sense. This was also accompanied by a “reformation of manners” (Troeltsch 1897: 228−229). This was another extension of the replacement of the supernatural order by the natural one—natural morals, natural law, natural religion—and an innate morality instead of one based upon questionable miracles (Troeltsch 1897: 229). Fourth were the effects of the new natural sciences which contributed to a new understanding of the world. Not only did the “Aufklärung” produce a “new mathematical-mechanistic natural science” (“neue mathematisch-mechanistische Naturwissenschaft”) but gave a new method of discovery. Instead of the old Nominalism, the new science was produced by experience and induction. Mechanics, machines, and mathematical clarity produced not only modern optics and acoustics, but chemistry, geology, zoology, physiology, and medicine. And, the discoveries in these new fields pale in comparison with those in the new physics and modern astronomy (Troeltsch 1897: 230). Troeltsch’s fifth point was about the new interest in history. This differed significantly from the old church history with its emphasis on tradition and dogma. Instead, it broadened to encompass a larger portion of humanity and it emphasized how tentative and open it was to revision. In emphasizing history Troeltsch broke with the dominant view about the “Aufklärung” being indifferent to history. Troeltsch’s concern with Kant and history will be an outgrowth of this early position (Troeltsch 1897: 231). The sixth point drew a connection between philosophy and the natural sciences. While most of the Continental philosophers believed in reason, the English stressed the importance of empiricism. Ideas were important but the English philosophers emphasized that the senses were more reliable. It is not clear why Troeltsch did not make more of Kant’s attempt at a synthesis between

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English empiricism and Continental rationalism; perhaps, he believed that he lacked a sufficient understanding of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Troeltsch had no such hesitations about referring to Enlightenment literature from England, France, and Germany. He cited Pope and Swift as well as Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and others. From the French authors he singled out Montesquieu and Voltaire as well as Rousseau. From Germany, he noted Goethe, Schiller, and Humboldt as among the most important. In terms of philosophers, Troeltsch discussed the Enlightenment Deists in England and the Materialists in France. And, he wrote about Shaftsbury’s contributions regarding the English state as well as Rousseau’s ideas about the French state (Troeltsch 1897: 235−236). In Germany, he pointed to Kant, Wolff, and Lessing, and to Nicolai and Mendelssohn. However, the contributions by these philosophers were not just philosophical, but they had practical consequences. Troeltsch emphasized that these consequences could be found in the reforms in politics and on education. Politics was no longer interested in abstract theories but sought practical solutions; education was no longer some esoteric exercise but provided real solutions. One saw this at the lower educational levels but also at German universities. Finally, Troeltsch delved into the effects that the “Aufklärung” had on theology. He stressed that the effects that it had were mixed and he pointed to those thinkers who he referred to as supernatural rationalists and he named Clarke, Butler and Paley as being the most well-known. He also pointed out that there were Germans who tried to find a compromise between reason and faith and he singled out Leibniz as the most notable philosopher (Troeltsch 1897: 238−239). Thus, while the “Aufklärung” ushered in a new period, Troeltsch allowed that it was not always as revolutionary as it had appeared. Troeltsch closed by suggesting that the “Aufklärung” ended in different ways and in differing times in different countries. And, while Romanticism and Catholicism became more pronounced in Germany, they did not extinguish the rational and individualistic fires of the “Aufklärung”. Supernaturalism cannot compete with natural science and natural politics, the main products of the Enlightenment (Troeltsch 1897: 240−241). Troeltsch’s article on the “Aufklärung” was an important if not critical contribution to the understanding and appreciation of the Enlightenment in Germany. As an indication of how much Troeltsch was regarded as an expert on the Enlightenment and its issues, the author of the article “Aufklärung” for the encyclopedia which was replacing the one in the Realencyklopädie cited Troeltsch’s “Aufklärung”. In his article on the Enlightenment for Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Heinrich Hoffmann also cited two more of Troeltsch’s encyclopedia articles as well as an essay and a major work (Hoffmann 1909: 788).

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The “Aufklärung” article is an early crucial one for understanding Troeltsch’s notion of the development of the modern world. However, it is not the only one. Troeltsch wrote several others for the third edition of the Realencyklopädie. The article “Deism” is directly tied to the one on the Enlightenment: in the introductory section on the literature, Troeltsch specifically lists his article “Aufklärung” as the first source (Troeltsch 1898: 532). More importantly, Troeltsch insisted that “Deism is the philosophy of religion of the Enlightenment and with that was the origin of the modern philosophy of religion in general…” (“Der Deismus ist die Religionsphilosophie der Aufklärung und somit der Ursprung der modernen Religionsphilosophie überhaupt…”) (Troeltsch 1898: 533). Troeltsch emphasized how important the sense of “naturalism” was in Deism and he pointed to the connection with the natural sciences. Newton had demonstrated that the world was not ruled by some mysterious entity but that nature was governed by definitive and universal laws. Furthermore, these laws held predictive value; rather than accepting things as they are, Newton and others gave scientists methods to indicate how they will be. In other words, rationalism replaced miracles. Troeltsch showed how the Deists rejected the idea that religion was based upon miracles and they substituted reason. Similarly, morality was no longer based upon theology but was founded upon reason. In fact, Troeltsch maintained that the notion of “natural theology” was nothing more than a less scholarly form of “natural law” (“lex naturae”) (Troeltsch 1898: 534, 543). He also emphasized the importance of Locke’s “theory of knowledge” (“Erkenntnistheorie”) and how that critique undermined supra-naturalism (Troeltsch 1898: 535−537). Locke substituted a modern “empirical utilitarian ethic” (“empiristisch-utilitarische Ethik”) for the old system of “teleological metaphysic” (“teleologische Metaphysik”) and this meant that reason and not God was the basis for law. Thus, “natural law” (“lex naturae”) or “rational law” (“lex rationis”) replaced “Mosaic law” (“lex Mosis”) (Troeltsch 1898: 539). The Deist movement was not content to reform the dominant theology; instead, the Deists struggled to rid politics of a “state religion” (“Staatsreligion”) (Troeltsch 1898: 540). Again, the foundation for law and morality was to be universal reason and not an elite theologian (Troeltsch 1898: 541). The “Locke-Newtonian philosophy” (“LockeNewtonische Philosophie”) was empirical and sensible, and Troeltsch claimed that the significance of the Enlightenment was not just in its opposition to the old Scholastic, Cartesian, supra-naturalism but that it reflected the “entire technical, industrial and commercial culture of the age” (“ganze technische, industrielle und commerzielle Kultur des Zeitalters”) (Troeltsch 1898: 553). There is also a third article that Troeltsch wrote which was published in the thirteenth volume of the Realencyklopädie. Entitled, “Moralisten, englische”, it

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was Troeltsch’s account of the British moral philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Troeltsch names Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville, Samuel Clarke, John Locke, Earl Shaftesbury, and David Hume as the most prominent of the English Moralists. Troeltsch praised Hobbes for breaking the link between earthly politics and heavenly spiritual authority and he developed a new doctrine of the state that relied solely on human beings. As a result, his notion of natural law differed significantly from the previous doctrine. Whereas “lex naturae” and “lex divina” overlapped, Hobbes showed that natural law was no longer a sacred matter but was a profane issue.10 However, Troeltsch noted that Hobbes’ emphasis on secular authority and civil society loosened the foundation for Christian politics and society and helped create some of the problems of subjectivism in the modern world (Troeltsch 1903: 453). Troeltsch recognized Mandeville for understanding the limitations in Hobbes’ ethics and he lauded Clarke for his common sense and the belief in the ethics of the “plain man” (Troeltsch 1903: 452−455). Troeltsch thought that Locke’s rejection of innate ideas might mean problems for objective ethics but that he was crucial for his emphasis on moral autonomy (Troeltsch 1903: 457). Troeltsch stressed Hume’s importance for moral philosophy rested on a number of factors. Hume was an empiricist, or as Troeltsch clarified, a positivist, because he rejected not only the doctrine of innate ideas and speculative psychology and instead embraced the natural desires and needs. However, Troeltsch clarified that Hume’s moral theory was not completely driven by individual needs but that he had a larger, and more objective, sense of the community. He believed that “training, education, tradition and law” (“Erziehung, Bildung, Tradition und Gesetz”) help individuals reach the communal ideal (Troeltsch 1903: 459). Adam Smith is regarded as the father of modern economics but Troeltsch reminded his readers that he was also the author of a book on moral sentiments. Rather than being remembered for his notion of the “invisible hand” in capitalism, Smith should be recognized as continuing Hume’s theory about altruism in the community. As with Hume, Smith placed emphasis on the theory of sympathy and he believed that he could and should govern both our individual interactions and our community’s goals, (Troeltsch 1903: 460). Smith, Hume, Locke, Clarke, Hobbes, and others contributed significantly to the development of “modern scientific ethics” (“moderne wissenschaftliche Ethik”) by which Troeltsch meant an ethical theory that was founded on human

|| 10 Tröltsch 1903: 452. The notion of natural law is one that runs throughout Troeltsch’s thinking, but his most important treatment of it is found in his 1910 address to the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie. See chapter four below.

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nature rather than superstition (Troeltsch 1903: 460). He maintained that this ethic was founded on the idea of autonomy and individual authority in contrast to the earlier ethics based upon obedience to ecclesiastical rule 436−437). Troeltsch emphasized how much the English Moralists had learned from the early Protestants and he singled out the Protestant ethic of work. He recognized that Luther and Calvin agreed upon the importance of work but that the Lutheran and Calvinist theologies differed in other respects: Luther was passive and pessimistic whereas Calvin was active and optimistic. Luther believed in the grace of God and awaited His judgment; Calvin was convinced that he was among the Elect and actively worked to praise God (Troeltsch 1903: 438−439). This activity led to the secularization of the state and the individualization of ethics. It also led to a revision of the notion of natural law; natural law was no longer identified with God but with reason. As a result, Luther’s natural science conservatism and his economic and political indifference were replaced by Calvin’s preference for progressive laws and an active economic and political life (Troeltsch 1903: 444–445). It was not the Lutheran but the Calvinist doctrines which influenced the English conception of economics as well as politics (Troeltsch 1903: 446−447). It was this emphasis on the mundane world that prompted the development of the modern secular ethics. The Continent had given Calvinism to England and it was the English Moralists belief in the psychological foundation for ethics that gave the impetus to scientific innovation and moral autonomy back to Germany and helped produce the German “Aufklärung” (Troeltsch 1903: 450−451, 461). The philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher would probably not have existed as they do without Calvinism, but they would not have been as they are without the influence of the English Enlightenment. Troeltsch claimed that the English Moralists provided the modern scientific ethic. Troeltsch admitted that Bayle and Pascal, Spinoza and Leibniz contributed to this process, but he insisted that it was the English Moralists who replaced the supernaturalism of Christianity with the empirically psychological as the foundation for modern ethics. Thus, the “lex divina” was superseded by “lex naturae” and contributed to Kant’s formal ethics as well as Schleiermacher’s personal ethics (Troeltsch 1903: 460−461). The English Moralists were only one part of the English Enlightenment but Troeltsch stressed the impact that they had on German ethics. Troeltsch concluded the final section by moving his discussion about the English Moralists to the influence they had on German philosophers. He suggested that Gottfried Leibniz had taken over the British thinkers’ emphasis on the individual and the development of the idea of the self. It was Immanuel Kant who

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emphasized the formal role of the individual in determining morality (“Sittlichkeit”). But it was Friedrich Schleiermacher who gave this individual morality its content; with his emphasis on humanity’s morality and the impact of culture (Troeltsch 1903: 460−461). In the final paragraph of “Moralisten, englische” one finds a number of themes that are important to this book because they are recurring themes throughout Troeltsch’s lifetime of thinking about the spirit of the modern world. These themes include Schleiermacher, culture, natural law, and ethics. If the “Aufklärung” was so crucial for Germany, then there are two questions: One, why did Germany’s Enlightenment occur much later than in England and France and two, how did it arise in Germany? Troeltsch provided answers to both questions in an article on Leibniz published in 1907. Troeltsch noted that German lands were largely impoverished by the Thirty Years War and that it was unable to develop its own sense of Enlightenment. Instead, it was not until the aftereffects of the war began to subside that it was possible for Germany to begin to become more rational, more secular, and more tolerant. And, Troeltsch specifically singles out Leibniz for pushing Germany to accept what Troeltsch referred to as “western culture” (“westliche Kultur”) (Troeltsch 2014: 619, 622−623). For Troeltsch, Leibniz was an extraordinary individual: he belonged to the older “confessional church” (“konfessionell-kirchlichen”) age and to the new “scientific rationalism” (“wissenschaftlich-rationalen”) culture (Troeltsch 2014: 619). And, he was extraordinary in his ability to synthesize and to understand both universal theories as well as individual facts. As a result, he was able to promote a new philosophy that combined the best of the mechanical philosophies of Descartes, Newton, and Galileo with the more spiritual philosophies of Spinoza and Malebranche (Troeltsch 2014: 620, 628). In addition, Leibniz had an innate sense of optimism and an incredible yearning for innovation and discovery. He looked upon the new scientific societies in England and in France as harbingers for the future and he utilized the Royal Academy in London and the Academie Française in Paris as templates for developing a similar institution in Berlin. As much as Leibniz knew the past, his heart was set on reform and development; he was a man of “plans and hopes” (“Pläne und Hoffnungen”) (Troeltsch 2014: 620−621). Yet, Troeltsch insisted that Leibniz was not a scholar and philosopher in the usual sense of the words—Leibniz disregarded the “narrow and small drives” (“enge und kleinliche Treiben”) of the traditional German universities and intended to concentrate on reforming the understanding of reality. This meant moving Germany from a tradition-bound past to a new reforming culture and he strove to accomplish this by writing numerous pamphlets and articles. These were not only intellectual but political and were designed to reform

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Germany in order to make it part of the “new intellectual world” (“neue geistige Welt”) (Troeltsch 2014: 623−626). Although Troeltsch did not mention it, without Leibniz, there would likely have been a rather different Kant. And some of that would have been because of Leibniz’ relationships with such Enlightenment thinkers as Newton, Clarke, and others. Troeltsch was not the only German scholar who recognized the important influence that the English Enlightenment had on Germany’s development. The historian Erich Marcks had argued in a work that Troeltsch would later use during the war that English thinkers exerted considerable influence on Prussian thinking during the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Marcks argued that English philosophy and politics as well as the “Geist” of English natural sciences influenced not just Germany but much of Europe. Yet, Marcks noted that the relationship between England and Germany differed substantially from the one between England and its “deadly enemy” (“Todfeindin”) France (Marcks 1900: 21, 27−28). The same year that Troeltsch published his article on Leibniz, he also published one on Kant. Its title was “Kant bleibt im Ansatz” and it was a specific reply to an earlier piece in which the author Ernst Daniel asked “where is Kant?” In Troeltsch’s opinion, Kant is still present and is still relevant (Troeltsch 2014: 479−481). If one were to compare “Kant bleibt im Ansatz” with “Gottfried Leibniz”, one may not realize that as much as Troeltsch appreciated Leibniz’ extraordinary contributions to the “Aufklärung”, he appreciated Kant for much more. A brief examination of Troeltsch’s other writings on Kant will help reveal this dependence and appreciation. In 1904, Troeltsch, Max Weber, and other invited German scholars traveled to the United States to present papers at the International Congress of Arts and Sciences. It was a major international event which was held in St. Louis. And, it was one in which Troeltsch intended to make serious use of—both by listening to the other speakers as well as ensuring the high quality of his paper. Troeltsch’s paper carried a lengthy title and an even longer subtitle: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft. Eine Untersuchung über die Bedeutung der Kantischen Religionslehre für die heutige Religionswissenschaft.” The title and subtitle indicate that Troeltsch’s topic is not merely about Kantian philosophy but also about what role his philosophy of religion could play in contemporary religious scholarship. Troeltsch defined “Religionsphilosophie” as a “science of religion” (“Religionswissenschaft”) or a “philosophy of religion” (“Philosophie über die Religion”) (Troeltsch 2014: 215−216). And, he contrasted “subjective religious consciousness in itself” (“subjektives religiöses Bewußtsein selbst”) of modern philosophy of religion with church and rational dogma of the

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past. The contrast between rationalism is not to be taken as a slight against it; rather, it is to emphasize the empiricism and psychological analysis of the present (Troeltsch 2014: 216−222). In case anyone was likely to miss the emphasis on empiricism and psychology, Troeltsch referenced William James (Troeltsch 2014: 222−230). Troeltsch noted that James and Kant shared a similar interest in religion and a belief in the necessity of psychology for the theory of knowledge (Troeltsch 2014: 234). The question for Kant was how to synthesize empiricism and rationalism. Without going into the philosophical details, suffice it to say that Troeltsch’s conception of the philosophy of religion is not to be regarded as a substitute for religion itself. The former is a theory whereas the latter is “fresh and living” (“Frische und Lebendigkeit”)—the one is dependent on reason but the other is based upon faith (Troeltsch 2014: 254−256). The same year Troeltsch published a lengthy work devoted to Kant’s philosophy of religion. It appeared as a regular article in Hans Vaihinger’s KantStudien and then as a separate book. In “Das Historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie” Troeltsch addressed a number of issues. One was to situate his understanding of Kant along with other notable Kantian scholars, among them was the famous Heidelberg professor Kuno Fischer as well as the young Albert Schweitzer. This was not only to demonstrate his familiarity with the literature but to show that there were differing opinions about Kant’s attitude towards religion. Another issue was Kant’s specific notion about the relationship between faith and knowledge (Troeltsch 2014: 883). A third, and even less researched topic was the role that history played in Kant’s philosophy of religion and this is the issue that Troeltsch intended to focus on (Troeltsch 2014: 887). Troeltsch made several crucial points about Kant: first, that he was not, as often alleged, indifferent to history and that underscored his approach to religion. Troeltsch specifically takes issue with Otto Pfleiderer who insisted that Kant was a “true son” of the “Aufklärung” because of his lack of interest in history. Troeltsch specifically counters Pfleiderer’s claim about Kant and more generally the idea that the Enlightenment was unconcerned with history (Troeltsch 2014: 901, note 71, 905). Second, Kant was firmly entrenched in the German “Aufklärung” (Troeltsch 2014: 889, 898, 902). This is shown by the third point, which was Kant’s repudiation of Luther’s anti-rationalism as well as the rejection of traditional historical authority (Troeltsch 2014: 890, 901). Finally, Troeltsch insisted that it is the combination of psychology and history which is the key to understanding Kant’s philosophy of religion (Troeltsch 2014: 910–913). The remainder of the work is primarily focused on a detailed investigation of Kant’s views about religion and morality and is not germane to this study. What is important is how Troeltsch emphasizes Kant’s reliance on Hume’s theory of natural religion and

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his criticism of the possibility of miracles (Troeltsch 2014: 990−999, 1005). He concludes with the observation that Kant parts way with the Deists and moves towards a more modern investigation of the history of religion and he does so by stressing ethics and by insisting that Kant differentiated between “religious faith” (“Religionsglauben”) and “Church faith” (“Kirchenglauben”). Only the former has “unconditional truth, validity, and necessity” (“unbedingte Wahrheit, Gültigkeit und Notwendigkeit”) and is intimately bound up with history. Thus, rather than being indifferent to history, Kant recognized its general importance and especially the necessary role that it played in religion (Troeltsch 2014: 1042, 1061). However, Kant was acutely aware of history’s limitations and that is why Troeltsch repeats Kant’s claim that “the historical serves only to illustrate, not to demonstrate” (“Das Historische dient nur zur Illustration, nicht zur Demonstration” (Troeltsch 2014: 1062, 1065). Only reason can demonstrate but Kant showed that history was an integral part of the human life. There are many things to take away from Troeltsch’s writings on Kant but the most important is his insistence on Kant’s role in the Enlightenment. Indeed, it was Kant himself who said best what the “Aufklärung” was. In the 1784 work “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” he wrote that it was the process of emancipation, to learn to think for one self rather than relying on the authority of others. This was a process of maturing, one which demanded that one have the courage to use one’s own faculty of thought: “Sapere aude! Habe Muth dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen!” That is the motto of the “Aufkärung.” (Kant 1923: 35). Relying on one’s own understanding is freedom, tolerance, and the reliance on one’s conscience (Kant 1923: 36, 38, 40−41). If one asked whether Kant lives in an enlightened age, Kant’s response was that he was living in an age of enlightenment.”11 Despite many political, social, and economic setbacks, the age of Enlightenment continued with its emphasis on reason, toleration, and individual freedom. These ideals were the ones which Troeltsch embraced and which prompted him to explore the cultural challenges which had occurred since the end of the eighteenth century, and which were still occurring in the early decades of the twentieth century.

|| 11 “Wenn denn nun gefragt wird: Leben wir jetzt in einem aufgeklärten Zeitalter? So ist die Antwort: Nein, aber wohl in einem Zeitalter der Aufklärung.” Kant 1923: 40.

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Conclusion As this chapter has demonstrated, Troeltsch was involved in investigating the spirit of the modern world for much of his life. As it also has been shown, his interest was more than purely historical; he intended to diagnosis the ills of modern life. In doing so, he was not unique—Max Weber had done something similar. What set Troeltsch apart from Weber and others is that he was not content with a diagnosis—he wanted to find cures for the modern ailments. Yet, Troeltsch was not a tradition-bound conservative who wished Germany would return to an idyllic, pastoral past. While he sympathized with Ferdinand Tönnies’ objections to the heartless individualism of modern capitalism, he recognized that time could not be reversed. While Troeltsch is often portrayed as an individual who always sought compromises, this picture, which is largely the one promoted by Marianne Weber, is not fully accurate. There is no doubt that Troeltsch attempted to find a moderate solution where one was applicable. That was part of Troeltsch’s natural inclination and a result of his Christian beliefs. However, Troeltsch could also be just as resolute as anyone when he thought that a stand was warranted. In light of this, Troeltsch’s investigations of the “spirit of modern culture” are worthy of study: his intelligence, his perspective, his tenacity, and his humanity, combine to provide a clear and objective view of the modern world. While Troeltsch died almost one hundred years ago, the modern world continues. His reliance on Schleiermacher, his investigations into the nature of the state, law and politics, and his study of modern culture continue to resonate today.

Chapter Two Troeltsch and Schleiermacher: A Cultural Dialogue In “Schleiermacher yesterday, today, and tomorrow” Terrence N. Tice noted that “Schleiermacher contributed substantially to the birth of the modern age” and suggested that Schleiermacher remained unappreciated throughout most of the nineteeth century. It was only with the beginning of the twentieth century that his reputation began to be secured by scholars such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Adolf Harnack, and Ernst Troeltsch (Tice 2005: 307, 310). More recently, Johannes Zachhuber begins his Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany with Schleiermacher and he ends it with Troeltsch (Zachhuber 2013: 2, 295). Thus, he apparently regards Friedrich Schleiermacher and Ernst Troeltsch as an important “set of bookends”. While critics may counter that Schleiermacher’s Über die Religion first appeared in 1799 and Troeltsch continued writing well into the twentieth century, Zachhuber is correct in his placing the one at the beginning and the other at the end of the nineteenth century. In addition, he is right in his assessment of the importance that these two thinkers had in making nineteenth century German theology into a discipline worthy of genuine scholarly investigations. However, Zachhuber does not devote much attention to Troeltsch and he underestimates the role that Schleiermacher played in Troeltsch’s thinking. Yet, Troeltsch was more important than Zachhuber suggests and Troeltsch himself acknowledged Schleiermacher’s great influence on him. Instead of regarding them as a type of “bookends”, I suggest that Troeltsch was engaged in a lengthy dialogue with his famous predecessor. While theology is the dominant issue, Troeltsch shared with Schleiermacher many concerns with cultural issues. Zachhuber also seems to minimize the fact that Troeltsch not only had an extremely good understanding of Schleiermacher’s thinking, but also that he regarded himself as following in his predecessor’s footsteps. Given all of these points, it is remarkable that not many scholars have devoted much time to investigating the similarities between Troeltsch and Schleiermacher.12 Yet, at first sight the neglect appears somewhat warranted because Troeltsch wrote only one || 12 Hans-Georg Drescher mentions Schleiermacher numerous times but he mentions Adolf Harnack, Julius Kaftan, and Wilhelm Herrmann even more frequently. And, the one instance that he spends more than a few lines on him is in connection to Troeltsch’s discussion of Herrmann’s book on ethics. Drescher 1991. It is similar with respect to Walther Köhler, but with him Herrmann is mentioned usually along with Albrecht Ritschl, Kant, and Hegel. Köhler 1941. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654653-003

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work in which he dealt explicitly with Schleiermacher and that was his “Schleiermacher und die Kirche” (Troeltsch 2014: 681). However, looking through his book reviews and his lectures reveals that he was quite preoccupied with Schleiermacher’s thinking, both before and after this 1910 publication.13 The purpose of this chapter is to investigate Troeltsch’s relation to his famous predecessor and to highlight the similarities as well as to note the differences Troeltsch had with him in regards to philosophy and culture. This examination will lead to the conclusion that Troeltsch mostly agreed with Schleiermacher on most theological and philosophical issues; hence the emphasis of this chapter on the dialogue between the two great “philosophers of faith.” However, the emphasis will be far greater on “philosopher” than on “faith” because the concern here is with the state, law, and culture; not on theology.

Troeltsch on Schleiermacher Scholarship: 1900−1910 One might suggest that a real Schleiermacher “renaissance” began in 1899.14 That was the hundredth-year commemoration of his Über die Religion and it was marked by Rudolf Otto’s edition of that work. Otto was to gain considerable fame as the author of Das Heilige and other works but in 1899 he was regarded simply as a promising scholar. In his introduction Otto noted that he was indebted to Wilhelm Dilthey, Albrecht Ritschl, and others for their insights into Schleiermacher’s life and thought. But he also reminded his readers of how powerful an impact Schleiermacher’s book had in 1799 and he suggested that it was time to see how relevant that work was a century later (Schleiermacher 1899: V−VIII). Otto answered in the affirmative, and his edition of Über die Religion was very successful (Schleiermacher 1984: LXXVIII). Whether Otto was the impetus does || 13 Walter E. Wyman is not correct when he maintained that “Many of Troeltsch’s extensive discussions of Schleiermacher are to be found in essays stemming from the 1890s.” Wyman 1983: xiii. While Schleiermacher’s name does come up in these early works, he is frequently mentioned along with others like Kant, Hegel, and Ritschl. This is similar to what is found in Troeltsch’s letters during this period: Schleiermacher is often listed with Ritschl or Kaftan (Troeltsch 2013: 280, 160, 222) with Kant and Hegel (Troeltsch 2013: 160). His concern is mostly with the “Reden” but he does mention that he spent two semesters in Berlin studying Schleiermacher. Troeltsch 2013: 172, 244. 14 In the introduction to his 1910 edition of Schleiermacher’s Kurze Darstellung des Theologischen Studium Heinrich Scholtz contended that the “turn” to Schleiermacher was “doubtless one of the most important movements in the field of systematic theology since the death of Albrecht Ritschl.” Schleiermacher 1910: V. Since Ritschl died in 1889, we can place this “turn” to have occurred between 1889 and 1909.

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not really matter, but a number of works devoted to Schleiermacher appeared in the years after 1899. Beginning in 1903, Troeltsch reviewed a significant number of these and from his reviews we can gain a rather good impression of what he thought about Schleiermacher and how he rated contemporary Schleiermacher scholarship. Two years after Rudolf Otto’s edition of Über die Religion, Emil Fuchs published Schleiermachers Religionsbegriff und religiöse Stellung zur Zeit der ersten Ausgabe der Reden (1799−1806). Fuchs appreciated Otto’s careful edition and as with Otto, Fuchs is responding to some of Dilthey’s comments and especially to the work by Albrecht Ritschl’s son, Otto Ritschl (Fuchs 1901: 2−5). His main focus is on Schleiermacher’s employment of the term “intuition” (“Anschauung”) and while it is interesting in its own right, it is not especially relevant here. What is relevant is that Fuchs’ book is one of many that the Ricker firm (Alfred Töpelmann) published on Schleiermacher in the years between 1900 and 1910. Troeltsch did not review this particular book, but a few years later he would review another of Fuchs’ books on Schleiermacher. The same year that Fuchs’ Schleiermachers Religionsbegriff appeared, another book devoted to Schleiermacher’s conception of religion was also published. Entitled Die Entwicklung des Religionsbegriffs bei Schleiermacher, it was reviewed by Troeltsch. He had been asked in 1902 by the editors of the Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen to review it but he declined. They approached him again the following year and this time he agreed. Troeltsch submitted his review in the summer of 1903 and it appeared the following year (Troeltsch 2004a: 326). Troeltsch begins his review by noting that a number of scholars have examined Schleiermacher’s concept of religion but none as thoroughly as Eugen Huber. Unfortunately, Huber seems to have found numerous terminological inconsistencies and he appeared not to allow for the fact that Schleiermacher’s conception changed over many years (Troeltsch 2004a: 326−327). Troeltsch suggests that Huber follows in the best of Schleiermacher philology but he believes that it may not be as good as the current Kant philology. The connection here is with Wilhelm Dilthey because earlier he had been regarded as one of the leading Schleiermacher scholars of the time. Furthermore, he was a major proponent of philology and was the driving force behind the new critical edition of Kant’s works. Kant also figures in the review because Troeltsch faults Huber for overlooking the theory of knowledge that is in Kant and to some degree in Schleiermacher (Troeltsch 2004a: 327−329). While Troeltsch is critical of Huber, he praises him for his expertise and he hopes that Huber would soon take up two other important subjects—Schleiermacher’s philosophy of history and to Enlightenment theology (Troeltsch 2004a: 328).

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In 1903 Ferdinand Kattenbusch published the third edition of his Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl. Zur Orientierung über die Dogmatik des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts. It began as a lecture and was first published in 1892, with a second edition appearing the following year. The third edition was not a reprint but was rewritten and expanded. Kattenbusch allowed that much had transpired during the twelve years since 1891, the year he had given this as a lecture and he admitted that his own view of Schleiermacher had altered during this time (Kattenbusch 1903: VII−VIII). In his review, Troeltsch commended Kattenbusch for the earlier versions and praised him for being a guide through the somewhat tortuous history of nineteenth century German Protestant theology. Then Troeltsch began his critical comments. He mentioned that Kattenbusch preferred Luther, because he was “anti-intellectual” and “anti-metaphysical”, and as a result, was the leading light of Protestantism. In contrast, he considered Melanchthon inferior because he was an intellectual who was metaphysically inclined. Troeltsch noted that these two perspectives opposed each other for several centuries. It was Schleiermacher with his emphasis on feeling that opened up a new path for theology and one that persisted throughout the century (Troeltsch 2004a: 288). He then discusses the three types of theology that unfolded: the “liberal”, the “confessional”, and the “reconciling” and he places all three under the name of “Romantic theology”. Troeltsch grants that Kattenbusch’s account is “very pretty” (“sehr hübsch”) but he thinks that Kattenbusch is mostly incorrect. He insists that Kattenbusch’s opposition between Luther and Melanchthon is “thoroughly wrong” (“durchaus irrig”) and the claim that all three types are Romantic to be “entirely impossible” (“ganz unmöglich”) (Troeltsch 2004a: 289). However, what Troeltsch really objects to, is some passages in the “Nachtrag” that Kattenbusch added to the third edition of his book. In this afterword, Kattenbusch takes stock of the recent work of a number of younger theologians and he singles out Troeltsch for comments. He regards Troeltsch as the leader of systematic theology but complains that he is neither very systematic nor very theological (Kattenbusch 1903: 75). He also accuses Troeltsch of not understanding the differences between natural science and history and he objects to Troeltsch’s repeated insistence that modern culture begins with the Enlightenment instead of with the Reformation (Kattenbusch 1903: 76). But what he really complains about is Troeltsch’s claim to understand Schleiermacher as a theologian because Troeltsch really seems to focus on Schleiermacher as a philosopher (Kattenbusch 1903: 79). Kattenbusch simply remarks that Troeltsch’s interpretation is found in a number of articles, but does not indicate which ones. The editors of Volume One of the Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Ausgabe helpfully provide the references.

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In the second chapter of Geschichte und Metaphysik Troeltsch does indeed maintain that Schleiermacher’s theology is based upon his ethics, meaning upon his philosophy of history but his concern is not so much to discuss Schleiermacher’s theology as it is to show his views on the development of theology (Troeltsch 2009: 641−642). Similarly, Troeltsch repeats his emphasis on the importance of ethics in Schleiermacher’s theology in “Grundprobleme der Ethik” (Troeltsch 1913: 565). This is not surprising given that Troeltsch wrote this work in response to Wilhelm Herrmann’s book on ethics (Troeltsch 1913: 552). Returning to the review, Troeltsch suggests that Kattenbusch has so much antipathy that he cannot understand Troeltsch’s points. This is true for a number of points, but what really seemed to rankle him the most was Kattenbusch’s misinterpretation of Troeltsch’s own assessment of Schleiermacher. Kattenbusch opined that Troeltsch believed that among theologians, only he had the best understanding of Schleiermacher.15 To which Troeltsch replied that he never implied this and that he had said only that one should always consider Schleiermacher as “a whole” and not merely as a representative of particular theological doctrine of faith. Troeltsch added that all too often scholars had too little appreciation for Schleiermacher’s contribution to science. Troeltsch concluded by suggesting that Kattenbusch’s “little writing” (“Schriftchen”) seemed to him to be the latest proof for this lack of appreciation.16 Emil Fuchs published a book in 1904 devoted to Fichte, Schelling, and Schleiermacher and Troeltsch’s review appeared two years later. Troeltsch pointed to Fuchs’ promise in his earlier Schleiermacher book to provide an account of Schleiermacher’s relationship with Fichte and Schelling, but in his opinion, Fuchs did not do so (Fuchs 1901: 87; Troeltsch 2014: 485). It is evident that Troeltsch’s main interest in this book is Fuchs’ extensive discussion of Schleiermacher and he notes with some appreciation that Fuchs is in agreement with Dilthey that the most important philosophical influence on him was Kant (Troeltsch 2014: 487). Unfortunately, Fuchs did not appreciate Kant’s psychology and its relationship to religious thinking (Troeltsch 2014: 488−489). Of course, Troeltsch had been working on just this topic for several years so it is reasonable that he recognized its importance. What may not be so reasonable is his con|| 15 “Am liebsten betont Tröltsch, daß er unter Theologen doch bei Schleiermacher schon gutes Sachverständnis gefunden habe.” Kattenbusch 1903: 79. 16 “Ich habe nur gesagt, dass Schleiermacher stets als Ganzes und nicht bloss als Vertreter seiner kirchlichen Glaubenslehre genommen werden muss, und dass die Gesamtkonzeption Schleiermachers selten mit Sympathie für seine prinzipielle Auffassung der Wissenschaft gewürdigt wird. Und dafür scheint mir dieses Schriftchen von Kattenbusch ein neuer Beweis.” Troeltsch 2004a: 290−291.

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viction that anyone who does not share this conviction is guilty of a major omission (Troeltsch 2014: 489−491). Nonetheless, Troeltsch placed the main value of the book on Fuchs’, “Schleiermacher-Studie” and he believed that Fuchs’ main contribution was to show that it was Kant, and not Fichte, or Schelling, who was so influential for the young Schleiermacher (Troeltsch 2014: 492). Troeltsch reviewed two short works on Schleiermacher that were part of a series called Studien zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus. Both were by Hermann Mulert who, at the time was a Privatdozent at the University of Kiel, and would go on to become one of the leading experts on Schleiermacher. The first work was Schleiermachers Sendschreiben über seine Glaubenslehre an Lücke and it was an annotated edition to Schleiermacher’s work (Mulert 1908). Troeltsch commented on it in a short review of three books and he was especially pleased that this important commentary that Schleiermacher wrote regarding his own work finally had a proper context (Troeltsch 2004a: 562). The second of Mulert’s short writings on Schleiermacher had appeared a year earlier and was a part of the same series. However, it was also the first volume of the new series Schleiermacher-Studien and it was entitled Schleiermachers geschichtsphilosophische Ansichten in ihrer Bedeutung für seine Theologie. Mulert’s work was a good choice for the initial volume of the Schleiermacher series. And, it fit well with the emphasis that the Studien zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus had on the “Aufklärung.” This was announced in the unnumbered initial pages of Mulert’s book (Mulert 1907). It also fit well with Troeltsch’s emphasis on the crucial importance of the “Aufklärung” and his belief in the fundamental importance of history in Schleiermacher’s thinking (Mulert 1902: 87−88). Troeltsch begins his review of Mulert with the observation that Mulert’s topic is a theme that has warranted treatment for some time. Troeltsch sees this theme as Schleiermacher’s philosophy of history and he agrees that it impacts much of his entire theology (Troeltsch 2004a: 564). The question is really about the significance of history for theology—history is the unfolding of events; theology is the revelation of divine truth. The issue is: how does Schleiermacher deal with changes in historical facts in regards to theological truths? (Mulert 1907: 2−7, 10−11). Thus far, Troeltsch thought that Mulert has asked the right question (Troeltsch 2004a: 565). But, Troeltsch also sees this question as having two parts. First, how far and in which sense has Schleiermacher drawn the consequences of history in relation to the validity of Christianity? And, second, to what extent has he recognized the tension between the historical Jesus and the Biblical account of him? Troeltsch maintains that these are not minor issues but go to the heart of Schleiermacher’s philosophy of history (Troeltsch 2004a: 565). These questions are even more important when one compares the early “Reden” with the later

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Glaubenslehre (Troeltsch 2004a: 566). What Troeltsch sees is the real break between Schleiermacher’s development from his philosophy of religion to his church theology, a break that Mulert apparently wishes to ignore (Troeltsch 2004a: 566). Troeltsch describes the tension in Schleiermacher’s thinking as being between the theological proof for its divine and universal truth and the historical investigations into Christianity’s earthly and contingent development. Troeltsch complains that Mulert apparently wishes to avoid addressing the difficulties and tensions between theology and philosophy (Troeltsch 2004a: 567). Troeltsch also criticizes Mulert for suggesting that the tension simply does not exist and he objects to the claim that he is merely following in the theological footsteps of Ritschl and Hermann (Troeltsch 2004a: 569). Troeltsch’s review is somewhat perplexing; he praised Mulert for focusing on the complex questions but he also faulted him for his superficial answer. Yet, Troeltsch himself was well aware of the difficulty in formulating the right answer. Schleiermacher not only employed different terminology at different times, but he changed his theological positions as well. Finally, one would have thought Troeltsch would have been more kindly disposed towards a scholar who had praised him in the book (Mulert 1907: 8, 15). And, it is not as if Troeltsch was more successful in finding answers to these questions. Troeltsch’s disappointment regarding Mulert’s book continued for several more years. Georg Misch was Wilhelm Dilthey’s son-in-law and upon Dilthey’s death in 1911 turned to Troeltsch for advice on who should edit a new edition of Dilthey’s Leben Schleiermachers. Troeltsch offered three possibilities: Rolf Ünger, who turned Misch down, Hermann Süskind (who will be discussed later), and Mulert. Troeltsch mentioned Mulert’s book and suggested that Mulert had not learned very much from Dilthey. Troeltsch still thought the book was lacking and but he did admit that Mulert’s work had improved quite a bit since 1907. Ultimately Mulert was chosen as editor and the new edition of Leben Schleiermachers appeared in 1922 (Troeltsch 2004a: 564). Mulert would also publish an edition of Schleiermacher’s correspondence, an introduction into his theology, and a book arguing for Schleiermacher’s relevance. It seems Troeltsch’s appraisal of Mulert’s early work may have been justified but Troeltsch apparently did not appreciate Mulert’s potential, because Mulert went on to become one of the most important editors and educator of Schleiermacher’s life and thought. If Troeltsch had serious reservations about Mulert’s interpretations of Schleiermacher, he had no such misgivings regarding that of Hermann Süskind. Süskind’s Christentum und Geschichte bei Schleiermacher was his second book on Schleiermacher. The first was an investigation into Schellings’ influence on Schleiermacher and despite Paul Siebeck’s explicit request that Troeltsch review

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it, he declined (Troeltsch 2004a: 559). In contrast, this second book was devoted specifically to the philosophical foundations of Schleiermacher’s theology and as a result Troeltsch readily agreed to review it. In the “Vorwort”, Süskind acknowledges three individuals who prompted him to investigate this topic: Georg Wehrung and his book on Schleiermacher’s friendship with the Romantics and Mulert with his 1907 Schleiermacher volume. However, Süskind maintained that it was Troeltsch who was the most motivating and he titled the first volume of his proposed two-volume book Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsphilosophie. It was not just Süskind’s adopting Troeltsch’s own Absolutheit des Christentums that reveals the similarity between Troeltsch and Süskind, nor is it that both works were published by J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), but it is also that Süskind calls Troeltsch’s critical review of Mulert “a highly informative review” (“eine höchst lehrreiche Besprechung”) (Süskind 1911: V, 4). Whereas Süskind is highly critical of Mulert; he is highly appreciative of Troeltsch. Although he cites Troeltsch’s Absolutheit des Christentums a number of times, he also draws on several of Troeltsch’s other writings, including “Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert der theologischen Wissenschaft”, “Schleiermacher und die Kirche”, and “Über die Möglichkeit eines freien Christentums” (Süskind 48−52, 64, 163−164, 197−198). If Schleiermacher posed the question about the relationship between philosophy and theology, Süskind concludes his book by suggesting that it is Ernst Troeltsch who comes closest to answering it. Troeltsch is unstinting in his praise of Süskind’s book. The only recent work that compares with this is Wehrung’s Standpunkt Schleiermachers zur Zeit seiner Freundschaft mit den Romantikern. Süskind’s investigation is outstanding because of its penetration into the problem as well as its circumspection, its clarity, and its maturity. “Everything essential is clarified with this investigation” (“Alles Wesentliche ist mit dieser Untersuchung klargestellt”) (Troeltsch 2004a: 662). What is essential is a two-fold contradiction that Süskind lays out. The first part of the contradiction is one between philosophy of religion and theology. This is the contradiction between real scientific investigations into the nature of religion, which are done with scholarly facts, and the theological faith in the universality and eternality of Christianity. As long as there was no real competitor to Christianity all investigations were either unimportant or irrelevant. This was mostly the case when Schleiermacher wrote; his historical knowledge was relatively limited and the only competing religions appeared to be Judaism and Islam. Thus, one could maintain the belief in the immutable essence of Christianity while investigating its history. When Schleiermacher wrote, the East had not been “discovered”, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche did not yet exist, and David Strauß had yet to write his Leben Jesu. However, Troeltsch insists that “for us”,

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things have radically changed: either one must move forward with the philosophy of religion or move backward to the “defense of miracles” (“Wunderapologetik”). That Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre was a compromise was the result and he gave great significance to Süskind’s book (Troeltsch 2004a: 664). The second part of the contradiction is found within the philosophy of religion itself. This is the tension between the universality of reason and the study of historical individuals. As long as one either adheres to Hegel’s “doctrine of dialectical development” (“dialektische Entwicklungslehre”) or Kant’s rationalism, there is no problem. However, if, one rejects both, as Schleiermacher did, then one is confronted with contradiction and difficulties. Troeltsch praises Süskind for his “excellent” (“vortreffliche”) illumination of these difficulties and he does not complain that Süskind has not provided an answer. As Troeltsch insisted, that was not Süskind’s task and he suggested that one can be anxiously awaiting the second part of his Schleiermacher investigations. Unfortunately, Süskind was unable to complete the second part. He died in 1914, the first year of the war, and his death deeply affected Troeltsch. In a letter Troeltsch admitted that technically Süskind had never been his student, but he was the scholar who appeared to be the best suited to continue Troeltsch’s line of thinking. He had hoped that Süskind would be able to write on things that Troeltsch did not have the time to do; unfortunately, those hopes died along with Süskind (Troeltsch 2004a: 661). In 1910 a book appeared which was entitled Schleiermacher. Der Philosoph des Glaubens and it was a collection of six essays devoted to Schleiermacher. It was introduced by Friedrich Naumann and the essays were by Paul Natorp, Paul Hensel, Martin Rade, Samuel Eck, Arthur Titius, and Troeltsch. Natorp and Hensel were well-respected philosophers and Rade and Eck were well-regarded theologians, only Titius seems not to have the reputation that the other five scholars had. The book was intended as a commemoration of Schleiermacher’s connection to the founding of the university in Berlin. There was no question of Schleiermacher’s importance in theology, but this collection was intended to remind people that Schleiermacher also belonged to philosophy (Schleiermacher 1910: 5−6). Troeltsch’s essay was the first in the collection and was entitled “Schleiermacher und die Kirche”. In “Schleiermacher und die Kirche” Troeltsch claimed that the great religious crises of the present rest upon the question of doctrine, of dogma (Troeltsch 2014a: 684). However, the question was not so much one of teaching as it was an issue of what the church stood for and what it should be. For the Catholics, there was little doubt what it was and what it would always be: a central, hierarchical authority with the Pope as head and who has absolute domination over all

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Catholics. In a real sense, Church and State were one (Troeltsch 2014a: 685−686). With Luther and even more so with Calvin, the Protestant Church promoted the separation of the two, and the sects, especially in America, ensured that education was supported by the state and not by the church. The modern religious question is two-fold: the “dogmatic” and the “social” and while they are not the same, there is a real connection between the two (Troeltsch 2014a: 687−688). Troeltsch points to modern Protestantism with its emphasis on “personal conviction” (“persönliche Überzeugung”) and “individual intuition” (“individuelle Anschauung”) and notes that the older importance of dogma has faded (Troeltsch 2014a: 687−688). It was Schleiermacher who recognized the dual problems and while he did not solve them, he set them out “with great clarity and sharpness” (“mit großer Klarheit und Schärfe”) (Troeltsch 2014a: 689). He recognized the importance of the individual and the need for scholarly independence and he understood the need for the separation of Church and State (Troeltsch 2014a: 689). Troeltsch accounts for some of Schleiermacher’s views by noting that Schleiermacher did not belong to any of the larger state or county churches. Instead, he was part of the Herrnhuter brotherhood community, one which placed a major emphasis on religious feeling. And, the Herrnhuter community did not regard members as individual “atoms”, but considered them part of an “organic” community which grew out of the powerful love of Jesus (Troeltsch 2014a: 690). Troeltsch recognizes the powerful impact that Schleiermacher’s Reden had but in that early work he focused on the religious feeling (Troeltsch 2014a: 691−694). But, Troeltsch’s concern is not so much with Über die Religion as it is with the Glaubenslehre. It was here that Schleiermacher focused primarily on the sociological community, that is, the church. However, this concept of the church is not the same as the old, Catholic one; in fact, Troeltsch insists that Schleiermacher’s “Kirche” is “something completely new” (“etwas völlig Neues”) (Troeltsch 2014a: 698). Troeltsch acknowledges that this is part of the reason that the Glaubenslehre is difficult to understand, but he also suggests that in contrast to the Reden it is a “visibly technological-theological book” (“sichtlich technisch-theologisches Buch”). Accordingly, it is not enjoyable for lay people (Troeltsch 2014a: 697). But, the biggest difference between the two books is the latter’s preoccupation with the “dogma of Christ” (“Christusdogma”). This was not a dry, technical teaching, but was a new sociological concept of the church. Instead of the “supernatural, institutional character” (“supranaturaler Anstaltscharakter”) of the Catholic Church, Schleiermacher’s conception of the church was the religious community. Like the Herrnhuter, Schleiermacher believed in the organic community. What Troeltsch regards as new, is Schleiermacher’s new concept of the religious spirit of this religious community (Troeltsch 2014a: 700). Schleiermacher himself

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recognized that this was a new conception and towards the end of his life he realized that reactionary forces were already undermining this notion. The question for Troeltsch was whether such a conception could be rescued for the present. That meant a conception of a church community that was separate from the state, was tolerant of other beliefs and confessions, and emphasized the freedom of the individual and the importance of scientific investigation (Troeltsch 2014a: 701−702). It is evident that Troeltsch endorsed Schleiermacher’s notion of the church and all that it entailed. It is little wonder that Troeltsch regarded Schleiermacher as the “greatest religious genius of Protestantism since Luther” (“größte religiöse Genius des Protestantismus nach Luther”) (Troeltsch 2014a: 688−689). Perhaps it was his work on this essay that prompted Troeltsch to consider offering a course on the “Glaubenslehre”.

“Glaubenslehre”: Troeltsch and Schleiermacher 1910−192017 Prior to 1911, Troeltsch had focused on Schleiermacher’s philosophy and its cultural importance. But, by 1911 Troeltsch was more concerned with his theology and its relevance. Yet, this is not totally correct, because in his Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit Troeltsch referred to Schleiermacher as “the great master of theology of New Protestantism” (“großer Meister der Theologie des Neuprotestantismus”). Furthermore, he was devoting a course to Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre (Troeltsch 2004b: 483). My purpose here is neither to provide a full explication of Troeltsch’s doctrine of faith nor to offer a complete contrast between Troeltsch and Schleiermacher on their Glaubenslehre because both topics would require substantially more discussion than can be offered here. Instead, I will confine my investigation to Troeltsch’s explicit references to Schleiermacher, of which there are more than twenty. Most of these are contained within the first five sections; however, Schleiermacher’s spirit infuses Troeltsch’s entire Glaubenslehre. This is because Troeltsch believed that he was closer to

|| 17 This is where the lack of commentary is most perplexing. Both Walther Köhler and Wyman recognize the importance of Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre for Troeltsch’s writings. Köhler devotes thirty pages to this topic and Wyman wrote an entire dissertation on it, yet Köhler discusses his own theology more than his mentor’s and Wyman seems to believe that Schleiermacher was more of a Hegelian than he would have liked to have admitted. One of the most useful discussions thus far was one that I had written, but that was in 2000 and was intended more as an indication of the state of Schleiermacher scholarship than a commentary on Schleiermacher’s philosophy. See Adair-Toteff 2006.

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Schleiermacher in many respects than any other contemporary theologians and because he regarded Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre as a specific forerunner to his own (Troeltsch 1925: 130; Köhler 1941: 163). Schleiermacher published the first edition of his Der christliche Glaube in 1821 and a second edition appeared in 1830 (Schleiermacher 1960: XII). This was a volume of lectures, the history of which went back several years. In 1805 Schleiermacher had first given a series of lectures that was entitled “Christliche Glaubenslehre” and in 1824 he indicated that a book would be forthcoming with the title Der christliche Glaube (Schleiermacher 1960: XIX). While some scholars used the formal title of the book, many preferred to refer to it as Glaubenslehre. While many scholars approved of Schleiermacher’s book and thought it one of the most important theological treatises of the time, a number objected to it on various grounds (Clemen 1905: V−IX; Schleiermacher 1960: XXXI−XL). Shortly after it first appeared, Schleiermacher recognized that he would have to clarify his positions. In two letters to Lücke, he noted that while many of the misinterpretations were because his critics refused to read him carefully, he admitted that some of the misunderstandings arose because of his own lack of clarity. He intended to rectify this in the second edition (Schleiermacher 1908: 13, 30). While he thought of his Glaubenslehre as a type of “dogmatic”, it was really his “Christology”. Salvation was its central point (Redeker 1964: 188−189). During 1911 and 1912 Troeltsch gave his lectures on “Glaubenslehre” at the university in Heidelberg.18 He evidently never considered publishing them but shortly after his death, his wife Marta decided to have them published. By 1925, Troeltsch’s reputation was well-secured as a man of scholarship and politics, but Marta was afraid that Troeltsch’s reputation as a theologian was being eclipsed. She believed that the “Glaubenslehre” lectures were important not only to help secure his fame as theologian but also that they revealed Troeltsch as a “born speaker” (“geborene Redner”) who talked about the most important problems in life—the “‘last things’” (“‘letzten Dinge’”) (Troeltsch 1925: V).19 The Glaubenslehre was put together from notes taken by Gertrud von Le Fort and while not a stenographic record it was faithful enough to Troeltsch’s lectures. The Glaubenslehre is divided into six chapters and is composed of 36 sections. Each segment has two parts, the “dictation” and then Troeltsch’s explanation of that. The last two

|| 18 In a March 1899 letter to the Baden ministery of education, Troeltsch indicated that he intended to offer a course on the later sections of Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre. Troeltsch 2014b: 242–243. 19 The use of single quotation marks reflects Troeltsch’s wording.

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chapters are fragments so that §§ 29–36 are “Diktat-Entwurf”; that is, a working draft. That Troeltsch intended for his Glaubenslehre to be compared to Schleiermacher’s is evident from numerous passages. In the first paragraph of the first section Troeltsch noted that it was Schleiermacher who fundamentally created modern theology (Troeltsch 1925: 1). Not only did Schleiermacher accomplish this, but he also rejected both the older Protestant dogma and the Pietistic one, and instead brought forth a new one based upon the fact that humans seem to require some form of religion (Troeltsch 1925: 8). The basis for Schleiermacher’s Reden is his investigation into religion and religious consciousness. From these, he concluded that the essence of religion was neither thinking nor acting; but rather, it was the feeling of absolute dependence upon God (Schleiermacher 1984: 211; see Troeltsch 1925: 8). However, as Troeltsch commented, many religions appear to emphasize man’s dependence upon a divinity or divinities, so the question then becomes, what is so special about Christianity. Some of Troeltsch’s answer to this reflects his earlier views, but here his concern is more with Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher affirmed that Christianity is the “highest religion” (“höchste Religion”). By this he meant that Christianity was “‘teleological or ethical’” (“‘teleogische oder ethische’”) but Troeltsch prefers to place it in quotation marks and calls it the “‘personal salvation religion’” (“‘personalistische Erlösungsreligion’”) (Troeltsch 1925: 9). This difference is mostly terminological but both conceptions reflect the shared conviction that the Bible is not an eternal document but a historical one, one which reflects the historical conditions of the time. Troeltsch’s second point is equally important and it concerns Schleiermacher’s rejection of the term “dogmatics” and his replacement of “Glaubenslehre”. Schleiermacher’s point was that the Bible should no longer be the “inspiration” for “dogma” and instead we should be asking about the essence of religion and in particular Christianity. Troeltsch is rather dismissive of those theologians who tried to use Schleiermacher as a point of departure for their own theological views. He has in mind Albrecht Ritschl and Wilhelm Herrmann and he refers to their attempts as “mixed forms” (“Mischformen”). He regards them as such because they are composed of the “Biblical-authoritative” (“biblizistisch-authoritativer”) and the “modern-historical-religion-philosophical dogmatic” (“modern-historisch-religionsphilosophischer Dogmatik”) (Troeltsch 1925: 10). After briefly discussing his predecessors, Troeltsch returns to Schleiermacher’s claim that Christianity is the “highest religion”. And, once again this means the return to the question about the essence of religion. Troeltsch does not say much other than to remind his students that much of what he had said about this grew out of

42 | Troeltsch and Schleiermacher: A Cultural Dialogue

his earlier dispute with Harnack. But, if there are those who subscribe to the authority of the Pope and the Church on one side and those who believe in the authority of the Bible on the other, then Schleiermacher wished to find a different authority. Troeltsch says that this is clearly manifested in Schleiermacher’s famous definition: “‘The essence of Christianity is monotheism in its moral salvation form’” (“‘Das Wesen des Christentums ist der Monotheismus in seiner sittlich erlösenden Form’”). It is unfortunate that Troeltsch neither cites his source nor explains this definition but instead briefly discusses the definitions as given by Hegel and Harnack. What becomes important for us again is Troeltsch’s affiliation with Schleiermacher in rejecting the Old Protestant theory of dogma with the new doctrine of faith (“Glaubenslehre”). And, that leads to the crucial notion of the church (Troeltsch 1925: 14). As noted above, Troeltsch had maintained that for Schleiermacher, the church is “something completely new” (Troeltsch 2014a: 698). Here, Troeltsch suggests that Schleiermacher did not envision “something like an Auxiliary-Church, but rather the true Church” (“nicht etwa eine Nebenkirche, sondern die wahre Kirche” (Troeltsch 1925: 15). Troeltsch insisted that the old dogmatics often invited ridicule when it was announced as an “Apology”, because that implied that it was too often a ridiculous, lazy, artifice. However, Schleiermacher showed that an “Apology” could and should be a spirited defense, and Troeltsch suggests that in this case, Schleiermacher again serves as a model (“Auch hier wird Schleiermacher vorbildlich sein”) (Troeltsch 1925: 19). What Troeltsch could have emphasized is how personal Schleiermacher’s “Apologies” were, whether in the Reden, the Glaubenslehre, or elsewhere. This would have helped explain Troeltsch’s close connection to Schleiermacher—the shared emphasis on the personal. Instead of the impersonal dogmatics, Troeltsch emphasizes the personal and ties it to the great “personality”. This is not intended to echo any “great man” theory, but is intended to stress the individual. Troeltsch specifically cites Schleiermacher because his theology rests “entirely on the personal” (“gänzlich auf dem Persönlichen”) (Troeltsch 1926: 26, 71). If Catholicism rests upon hierarchical authority and Old Protestantism rests upon Biblical authority, then New Protestantism rests upon the personal. This is true especially regarding Schleiermacher’s concepts of God and humans—they are personal and they are in effect, one (Troeltsch 1925: 30). In section 3 Troeltsch speaks about revelation and faith and the tension between “science” (“Wissenschaft”) and theology. He suggests that it is the task of a “Glaubenslehre” to draw the boundary between theology and science; it is neither philosophy nor science, but remains theology. Its matter is an “unscientific given” (“unwissenschaftliche Gegebenes”) and its representations are “atheoretical” (“atheoretisch”). Troeltsch cites Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre

“Glaubenslehre”: Troeltsch and Schleiermacher 1910−1920 | 43

as being particularly worthy of emulating, even if it is a difficult but classical work (Troeltsch 1925: 55−56). In the next section Troeltsch again indicates the similarities between his and Schleiermacher’s conception of the relation between philosophy and theology. Yet, he also suggests that unlike himself, Schleiermacher was under the major influence of Spinoza and Schelling and was inclined to pantheism. Troeltsch clarified that he is not interested in Schleiermacher’s philosophy per se, but wanted to clarify the differences between, say the “pure” philosophy of Kant, and that of Schleiermacher. What Troeltsch meant by this was that Kant was and remained a philosopher whereas Schleiermacher, like Leibniz, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, was concerned with questions which went beyond philosophy (Troeltsch 1925: 69). Besides the shared emphasis on personality, Troeltsch followed Schleiermacher’s notion of personal salvation and he links this in part to his predecessors’ notion of “God-humanity” (“Gottmenschheit”). Troeltsch says that he can follow Schleiermacher only so far with this idea, and that is because of Schleiermacher’s inclination to pantheism, which Troeltsch does not share.20 In a similar way, Troeltsch can appreciate but not totally accept Schleiermacher’s quoted claim that all of these things are “‘reflections based upon a pious consciousness’” (“‘Reflexionen auf das fromme Bewußtsein’”) (Troeltsch 1925: 80). Troeltsch returns to both of these ideas later in §8 where he discusses the pantheistic significance of Jesus and that the notion that there is “the total unity of the divine and the human” (“die völlige Einheit von Göttlichem und Menschlichem”). But, he emphatically rejects that because there is nothing stranger than to make Jesus into a symbol of this pantheistic unity.21 Yet, Troeltsch seems to suggest that Schleiermacher retreats from this type of pantheism when he talks about Jesus as “person” and when he bases much of his faith upon the “‘the complete power of the God consciousness of Jesus’” (“‘die vollendete Kräftigkeit des Gottesbewußtseins Jesu’”).22 What Troeltsch seems to be claiming here is that Jesus and God are separate entities. And, while the significance of Jesus is primarily “historical-psychological”, God remains the sole granter of salvation (“Erlöser bleibt Gott”) (Troeltsch 1925: 115).

|| 20 “Here we deviate from Schleiermacher.” (“Wir weichen hier von Schleiermacher ab.”) Troeltsch 1925: 77. 21 “Nichts aber ist den Tatsachen fremder, als Jesus zum Symbol dieser pantheistischen Einheit zu machen.” Troeltsch 1925: 114. 22 Troeltsch 1925: 114. Troeltsch again places the phrase in quotation marks.

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Troeltsch mentions Schleiermacher three more times, twice in §11 and once in §14. In the first, he makes his claim that no one is closer to Schleiermacher’s method than he and no one is in greater agreement with him.23 The single point of contention between the two is Schleiermacher’s determined attack on monism coupled with his embrace of pantheism (Troeltsch 1925: 130). Yet, what Troeltsch does accept is Schleiermacher’s emphasis on the subject. We can never see objects as they are, but only through a “veil of our inner life” (“Schleier unseres Innenlebens”); what we can recognize is “the subjective is thought as imbued by God” (“das Subjektive ist als das Gotterfüllte gedacht”) (Troeltsch 1925: 132). Troeltsch’s final comment is on the problem of evil and the difficulties that it causes for modern thinkers. Kant may have believed that it was actually an indication of the triumph over evil but “the newer dogmaticians” (“Die neueren Dogmatiken”) are silent on this issue—and Troeltsch explicitly mentions Schleiermacher. For Troeltsch, the problem of evil and suffering in the world was a major issue and he devoted considerable energy to discussing the notion of theodicy. Troeltsch’s writings are well worth considering; unfortunately, this is not the place. The question remains, what did Troeltsch mean when he said that he was closer in “method and sense” to Schleiermacher than any other theologian. The answer to this question would require far more than can be offered in this chapter and that was his relationships with Ritschl and Herrmann. However, what can be suggested here is the following: in terms of sense, Troeltsch believed that he was closer to Schleiermacher than any of his contemporaries because he believed in the great importance of personality for Christianity. He also believed that they shared the same focus on Christianity as the “highest level” of religion, but not in the Hegelian sense of the spirit unfolding in history. Rather, it was not determination but freedom that marked both of their theologies and linked them directly back to Luther. The final similarity lies in their method; unlike the old dogmatics of the earlier Protestants, Schleiermacher inaugurated a new type of doctrine of faith, one which stressed the individual’s subjective faith with one’s consciousness of the dependence on God. The point of the new “Glaubenslehre” is to bring history and philosophy closer to theology. While there will always be the opposition between reason and faith, both Troeltsch and Schleiermacher believed that this opposition need not be one of dislike or even hatred. When Martin Rade chose the title Philosoph des Glaubens for that collection of essays on Schleiermacher, he could have applied the title “philosopher of faith” equally || 23 “…keiner der gegenwärtigen Theologen hält sich so eng an Methode und Sinn Schleiermachers und fühlt sich so in innerer Übereinstimmung mit ihm.” Troeltsch 1925: 130.

Conclusion | 45

well to Troeltsch. Terrence N. Tice suggested that Schleiermacher’s “philosophical mindedness” consisted of four principles: 1) the intention to know, 2) to think historically, 3) openness to dialogue, and 4) that knowledge should have a pragmatic orientation. (Tice 2002: 79). The following chapters will try to demonstrate that Troeltsch would no doubt approve of Tice’s assessement of Schleiermacher’s philosophy and that he tried to employ them in his own philosophy of culture.

Conclusion As this chapter has tried to demonstrate, Troeltsch had a remarkable command of many aspects of Schleiermacher’s thinking. Although he never appeared to have commented on either Schleiermacher’s dialectics or his translations of Plato’s dialogues, and although he seemed not to have been very impressed with the Reden, Troeltsch believed that he was following in the footsteps that Schleiermacher had left regarding philosophy, theology, and the issue of the separation of church and state. This last topic will be the subject of the next chapter, so the conclusion here is that Troeltsch had engaged in an almost life-long dialogue with Schleiermacher. While it is undoubtedly correct to maintain that he had a particular “dialogue on the Glaubenslehre”, Troeltsch’s “dialogue” with Schleiermacher encompassed far more than just that (see Adair-Toteff 2006: 281, 293). Schleiermacher apparently never regarded himself as a philosopher of culture, but Troeltsch certainly seemed to regard him as one. In his view, Schleiermacher had confronted a number of issues; issues that Troeltsch believed were central to the “spirit of modern culture”. Troeltsch’s respect for Schleiermacher’s philosophical and theological acumen was considerable, and he believed that he was following in Schleiermacher’s footsteps. This is seen in much of Troeltsch’s thinking but it is especially prominent in Schleiermacher’s conception of the separation between church and state.

Chapter Three The Cultural Relationship Regarding Church and State Introduction The relationship between the church and state24 has been revived in the United States but for most of the twentieth century there had been a truce between the two institutions. That truce came as a result of a process of secularization that occurred in both North America and in Europe. This process was the separation between church and state. As Troeltsch had indicated, this separation was one of the major results of the Enlightenment and he attributed it to a number of Enlightenment thinkers. However, he was more concerned with the results at the end of the Enlightenment period and he looked especially at Schleiermacher regarding the separation between church and state. It will become evident that Troeltsch regarded this issue as one of the most important issues in the modern world. It was not just a theological issue or a political one. Rather, it embodied many aspects of modern culture, including social interactions, education, and law. In the first decade of the twentieth century, it seemed a difficult problem to address but not impossible. By 1919, he still regarded it as a critical issue to address, but by that year he realized that it was far more complicated than he had previously held and that was almost impossible to solve.25 In “Schleiermacher und die Kirche” Troeltsch discussed the thorny issue of the relationship regarding church and state in three different passages, and in two of these he specifically mentioned Schleiermacher.26 In the first passage,

|| 24 In English, the phrase is usually “church and state” but in German it is often “Staat und Kirche”. When quoting the German, it will be rendered “state and church” but in English it will be “church and state”. 25 In this chapter I focus mostly on his earlier thoughts and postpone an examination of his later thinking until Chapter Six. 26 In his book from 1923 Günther Holstein emphasized how important the idea of the state always was for Schleiermacher and he did a masterful job demonstrating that this was true throughout his life. Unfortunately, Holstein almost completely ignored Schleiermacher’s views on the relationship between state and church. Holstein 1923: 1–6, 140–142. In contrast, in her recent Schleiermachers Staatslehre Miriam Rose addresses Schleiermacher’s conception of the relationship between state and church. However, because her primary focus is on Schleiermacher’s lectures on the state, this issue plays a rather minor part in her overall investigation. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654653-004

Introduction | 47

Troeltsch suggested that America could serve as a possible example for the solution to this “religious-political problem” (“religionspolitisches Problem”) and it could do so because of its strict separation between church and state (Troeltsch 2014a: 686). In the second, Troeltsch pointed to the fact that Schleiermacher “saw the new relationship of state and church with all of the resulting problems” (“sah das neue Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche mit allen Folgeproblemen”). One of the most critical of these problems was the one which revolved around the fundamental issue of education.27 The question was: was education part of the responsibility of the church or of the state? (Troeltsch 2014a: 689). In the third passage, he again referred to America, but again his major point is more about Schleiermacher. Troeltsch emphasized that Schleiermacher’s conviction was about necessity for the freedom of the church and maintained that this freedom depended largely upon the separation between church and the state (Troeltsch 2014a: 701). Troeltsch did not attempt to address these problems in “Schleiermacher und die Kirche”, and to identify his attempts to do so one needs to return to some of his earlier writings. Before doing so, some context needs to be provided because the issue has a long and bitter history and that helps explain why Troeltsch thought it so important and also why he was even more careful than usual in discussing this topic.

|| Nonetheless, her discussion is quite valuable because on the one side she stresses Schleiermacher’s insistence on the need to keep state and church separate, but on the other she underscores his own ambivalence about this separation. It is important to keep in mind that Schleiermacher’s lectures predate the major fights in Germany over this issue by many decades, and that his hope for an accommodation between the two was premature if not politically unrealistic and theologically naïve. Rose 2011: 189–200. 27 It is important to recall that one of Schleiermacher’s major areas of interest was education and that he was one of the major founders of the new university in Berlin in 1810. It is also important to realize that the founders did not want to create another “university” but something new—a “‘universal teaching institution’” (“‘Allgemeine Lehranstalt’”) which would be devoted to research and scholarship as well as to teaching. Harnack 1904: 161. The single quotation marks are in the original. Simon Gerber indicated that Schleiermacher recognized that the relationship between state and church was the one in which Christian principles are confronted with alien ones and that history shows that the state wants the church to submit to its rule. Unfortunately, this also leads to the conflict about the function of education. Gerber 2015: 133.

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Some Historical Context In the introduction to his Kirchenrecht und Kulturkampf Stefan Ruppert begins by referring to a short work entitled “Die Fromme Helene” by the noted German satirist Wilhelm Busch (Ruppert 2002: 1). For most non-German readers, this would seem to be a rather curious way to begin a book on Church law; to most German readers, this is a great way to indicate the massive impact that the “Kulturkampf” had in Germany in the early 1870s. Busch represented the large number of Germans who were anticlerical and he satirized the ostensibly pious in a number of sketches. However, the “Die Fromme Helene” is, perhaps, even more representative of the Busch’s stories which depict how individuals used and especially misused their “faith” (Ruppert 2002: 1). “Die Fromme Helene” is the story of Helene’s checkered life. Helene appears to be a proper and pious young lady just wishing to make her way in the world; but in reality, she is mean-spirited and money-hungry. It does not seem to matter whether she torments her aunt and uncle or various animals; she delights in inflicting pain on others. She marries the rich old man Herr Schmöck; however, she has always been in love with her equally pious-appearing cousin. Together they go on a long religious pilgrimage during which she becomes pregnant with twins. There was little question that Schmöck is not the father, but that her cousin Franz is. Schmöck soon chokes to death on a fish bone, after which Helene turns to Franz for comfort. Unfortunately, Franz has his eye on the kitchen maid and when her husband catches Franz trying to kiss her, he breaks a bottle over his head which kills Franz. Now totally despondent, Helene continues to move between praying and drinking, and finally in a drunken stupor she knocks over the oil lamp and burns to death. She is dragged to hell by the devil and finds that Franz is already there (Busch 1982: 203−284). Busch’s point was to make fun of all pious-seeming people, but most of his readers understood that his real satirical focus was on the Catholics. Written in 1872, Busch used “Die Fromme Helene” to draw attention to the problems of religious life and show the impact that they had on contemporary society. While politics are not an explicit part of “Die Fromme Helene” they lurk in the background. These are probably some of the reasons why Ruppert began his Kirchenrecht und Kulturkampf by introducing “Die Fromme Helene”. It undoubtedly helped to provide some of the context for the problem regarding the relationship between church and state. The question of whether and how church and state should be connected was contested throughout much of the nineteenth-century, but it became an even more pressing issue for Germany after 1870. During the seventies and eighties, numerous German scholars vociferously discussed it, but it reached another

Some Historical Context | 49

critical point just after the turn of the century. Troeltsch gave voice to his position on several occasions, but it was the focus of his entire “Prorektoratsrede” of 1907. As it will become clear, this topic was not some dry, academic dispute, but went to the heart of the conflict between the government and the church as well as between scholarship and theology.

The History behind the Conflict In the beginning paragraph of his article “Staat und Kirche” Otto Mayer noted that the Christian community is found within the human communities and that this raises the question of the relationship between state and church.28 The phrase “the relationship between state and church” (“Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche”) was employed by Troeltsch numerous times; however, he was not the originator of that phrase. In fact, the phrase had been in use for some time and especially during the 1870s as the “Kulturkampf” was beginning to heat up.29 Because this “cultural conflict” was so important and influenced Troeltsch’s discussion of the relationship between state and church, it is worthwhile to reconstruct its outlines.

The “Kulturkampf”30 Those who remember the re-unification of Germany in 1990 may also tend to forget that the unification of Germany was a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to 1871 the area that makes up present-day Germany was composed of many principalities including Prussia. When Bismarck and his army defeated Austria in 1866, he set the stage for the unification of Germany (Nipperdey 1998b: 11−12, 17). However, it was the Franco-Prussian war of 1870−1871 which led to the formal unification on January 1, 1871 (Nipperdey 1998b: 55, 75, 80). Thomas Nipperdey

|| 28 “Die Gemeinde Christi stellt sich dar in äußerlichen Menschengemeinschaften.” Mayer 1906: 707. 29 The phrase “Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche” continues to be used to describe this dispute. See Zeller, 1873: III, 1, 3, 5, 7, 19; Sohm 1965: 28; 52; Hinschius 1889: 189, 191−192, 216, 231; Köhler 1903: 4; Ruppert 2002: 4, 12, 19, 44, 74, 155, 193−194. 30 This is a very brief account of the “Kulturkampf” and a discussion of many of the political fights has been intentionally left out. They are fascinating for those interested in politics but not particularly relevant here. For informative discussions of these conflicts see Nipperdey 1998b: 380−394 and Ruppert 2002: 84−87.

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was criticized by many for beginning his history of the nineteenth century with the sentence “In the Beginning was Napoleon” (“Am Anfang war Napoleon”). However, he did not expect a similar reaction when he began the second volume of his Deutsche Geschichte with “Am Anfang war Bismarck”, and that was because it was indisputably true (Nipperdey 1998b: 11). Bismarck was the driving force for much of Germany’s history from 1866 until his dismissal in 1890. When one uses the term “Kulturkampf” one is speaking specifically about a German cultural conflict that occurred during the 1870s. However, one should keep in mind that this conflict was part of the much larger conflict that affected most of Europe from 1870 until 1914 (Ruppert 2002: 15; Nipperdey 1998b: 365). The end of the overall conflict is not so easy to determine but 1914 is often chosen because of the outbreak of the First World War. The beginning is much easier to determine—most scholars point to July 18, 1870 because that was when Pope Pius IX announced his decree concerning Papal Infallibility (Schmidt-Volkmar 1961: 386). This was the latest in the decrees concerning the primacy of Catholic faith and it was the most challenging to many European nations.31 The modern state was primarily secular and tended to be neutral with respect to religious issues, but the Pope’s decree was regarded by many statesmen as being a direct assault on it (Nipperdey 1998b: 364). In effect, the Pope was not only claiming that the Church was the authority in all matters but he was also declaring the Church could not make any mistakes, unlike human beings and their earthly institutions. Even after the “Kulturkampf” had ended, opinions on both sides remained hardened. Writing shortly before his death in 1889, the Catholic theologian and politician Paul Majunke insisted that the goal of the “Kulturkampf” was the destruction of Catholic authority in order to develop Protestantism as a “state church”. In his view, the “Kulturkampf” was only “so-called” and was totally biased against the Catholics. He claimed that the main goal was “Away from Rome” (“Los von Rom”) (Majunke 1890: Vorwort, 5, 30, 282, Ruppert 2002: 45). For many of the Protestants, this move away from Rome was necessary because, as Heinrich von Treitschke insisted, the “highest order was the state”, and it was certainly not some church (Bußmann 206−207, 298−299). During the two years after the founding of the Deutsches Reich, Bismarck and his followers managed to pass a number of laws which both strengthened the

|| 31 The earlier decrees included one regarding the Virgin Mary from 1854 and another one from a decade later. See Ruppert 2002: 12. Ruppert also claims that the origins of the German “Kulturkampf” go back even farther—into the eighteenth century. Ruppert 2002: 55. Whether this claim is accurate is not really important here, but Ruppert’s larger points about not focusing solely on the Infallibility Decree are well worth keeping in mind.

“Staat und Kirche” 1872−1906 | 51

new nation and attempted to reduce the influence of the Catholic Church, at least in respect to national matters.32 The highpoint was reached in 1878 when the Jesuits were mostly banned and many priests were in jail (Schmidt-Volkmar 1962: 138−142; Ruppert 2002: 81, 182). Christopher Clarke noted that in the first four months of 1875, 241 priests were either imprisoned or fined and by the end of 1878 more than half of Prussia’s Catholic bishops and almost two thousand priests were in prison or in exile (Clarke 2007: 568). However, the emotional toll on both sides was large and slowly the struggle began to die down. The results of the “Kulturkampf” were mixed both for Bismarck and the state on one side and for Pius IX and the Church on the other.33 Both sides achieved some positive results; Pius had managed to strengthen the old Church just as Bismarck had managed to strengthen the new state. However, there were negative results for both sides. When Pius IX died on February 7, 1878, his political legacy was not very good (Schmidt-Volkmar 1962: 151−152). Bismarck had also failed—the Church was not going to submit to the state and the Catholic central party had grown even stronger (Nipperdey 1998b: 381). What increased was the mistrust on both sides and more stigmatization of the opposing groups (Nipperdey 1998b: 380). While the “Kulturkampf” had for all intents and purposes ended in 1878, its effects would continue to be felt within Germany for several more decades.34

“Staat und Kirche” 1872−1906 It is also worthwhile to consult some of the writings published between 1872 and 1906, which was the year in which Troeltsch gave his “Prorektoratsrede”. It is worthwhile in large part because these writings help provide the historical context for his speech. The four works discussed here have been chosen for several reasons: first, the two by Zeller and Sohm were written in 1873 and thus reflect the debate during the early stages of the “Kulturkampf”. The one by Hinschius

|| 32 For a list of the laws that were passed during 1873, 1874, and early 1875 see Schmidt-Volkmar 1962: 386−387. 33 Ruppert 2002: 188−189. However, Clarke insisted that “Bismarck’s campaign against the Prussian Catholics was a failure.” And, he supports his claim by noting that Bismarck’s hope that he could form a permanent Protestant-liberal body did not occur and that he was “unnerved” by the anti-clerical and the pro-secularization forces that he had released. Clarke 2007: 570−571. 34 The “official” end did not occur until May of 1887 when Pope Leo XIII announced that the “Kulturkampf” was ended. Schmidt-Volkmar 1962: 345.

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was first published in the early 1880s, while the one by Köhler was published in 1903. All four were by Protestant professors and the last two were published by the Siebeck firm, that is, Troeltsch’s own publisher. Finally, all four were cited by Troeltsch. Rudolf Sohm has a reputation as being both a fine legal scholar and a church historian.35 In point of fact, much of his entire life’s work is devoted to the intersection of the two. This is evident in his Kirchenrecht, which Max Weber explicitly praised, but it is also present in his much earlier and much shorter work Das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche.36 Sohm claimed that his writing was not a polemical piece, but was a scholarly investigation (Sohm 1965: 5). Yet, it is immediately clear that he does not doubt that there is a “conflict” (“Streit”) between state and church. However, this conflict demands a different type of weapon; it requires not the “sharpness of swords, but rather the sharpness of concepts” (“Schärfe des Schwertes, sondern die Schärfe der Begriffe”) (Sohm 1965: 9). Conceptually, the state is legal power; in contrast, the church is not (Sohm 1965: 13, 19−21). Conceptually, the state is founded upon a constitution and law; the church lacks both. The purpose of the state is the physical safety of its citizens; the purpose of the church is the salvation of the souls of its believers (Sohm 1965: 24−25). The fact that the basis and the purpose of the two differ fundamentally does not imply that the church should be separate from the state, as the Catholic Church insists. Rather, the concept of law requires that there is a connection between state and church (Sohm 1965: 42−43). Furthermore, the Church does not insist that its demand for its “‘freedom’” (“‘Freiheit’”)37 is simply the demand that its “force” (“Kirchengewalt”) be subordinated to that of the state (“Staatsgewalt”), but that its force be over that of the state. Sohm believed that “The final goal of the Catholic Church is not simply to be the ‘Universal church’; but rather, to be the universal state” (“Das letzte Ziel der katholischen Kirche ist, nicht bloß Universalkirche, sondern Universalstaat zu sein”) (Sohm 1965: 48). Yet, this contradicts its own “essence” because it is an “institution for salvation” (“Heilanstalt”) not an “institution of power” (“Machtanstalt”) (Sohm 1965: 49). The church is, without question, ethically equivalent to the state, but it is and must be legally subordinate to it (Sohm 1965: 54). It is evident that Sohm brought his formidable legal || 35 Ruppert suggests that some legal scholars considered Sohm one of the finest legal scholars of the nineteenth century—along with Otto von Gierke and Georg Jellinek. Ruppert 2002: 154. 36 It was first published in 1872 in Band 11 of the Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht but the reception was so powerful that Sohm decided to publish it as a separate booklet the following year. The publisher was H. Laupp in Tübingen, a forerunner of Mohr Siebeck. The edition cited is the unchanged photographic reprint from 1965. 37 The use of single quotation marks is in the original.

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knowledge to the question about the relationship between state and church and it is clear that his main focus was on the different legal bases for the two. However, it is equally clear that despite Sohm’s insistence that his work was not a polemical piece, it clearly was one. As Andreas Bühler noted in his Kirche und Staat bei Rudolph Sohm, das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche was Sohm’s “contribution to the Kulturkampf” (“Beitrag zum Kulturkampf”) (Bühler 1965: 1). Eduard Zeller is primarily remembered because of his writings on Greek philosophy and his articles on the theory of knowledge which helped provide the foundation for Neo-Kantianism. However, he became a professor of philosophy after having been rejected for theology at Marburg because of his liberal leanings and his interest in historical accuracy. So, his 1870s Berlin lectures on the relationship between state and church not only reflect his scholarly inclinations but also his impressive theological knowledge. In his Staat und Kirche Zeller discussed numerous topics, including the roles that the state and the church play in issues regarding income and property as well as marriage and family life. For the most part, Zeller suggested that the state and the church could peacefully coexist as long as each respected each other’s spheres of influence. However, as the nineteenth century wore on, civil society became more independent while the Church grew increasingly more authoritarian. Zeller contrasted the increase in objective scientific inquiries with the Church’s decrees concerning the Virgin Mary and Papal Infallibility (Zeller 1873: 95, 121, 138). He pointed in particular to the fundamental differences in the roles of education between the Catholic and Protestant schools. The former based its educational principles upon theological dogma; the latter was founded upon free investigations (Zeller 1873: 227−236). Since the Catholic Church wanted to rule over the state, the time of peaceful coexistence had come to an end. Accordingly, the state must become the highest authority in the land (Zeller 1873: 16−17). In 1887 the Freiburg firm “Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.C.B. Mohr” republished Paul Hinschius’ book-length article that had previously appeared in Marquardsen’s Handbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts. This book was composed of two parts: Allgemeines Staatsrecht by Carl Careis and Staat und Kirche by Hinschius. While Careis’ title was carried over in the actual volume; Hinschius’ full title was “Allgemeine Darstellung der Verhältnisse von Staat und Kirche” (Hinschius 1887: 187). As with Zeller and Sohm, Hinschius provided an historical account beginning with the initial opposition between the Christians and the Roman State. However, this opposition was soon overcome and the state became a theocracy. The theocratic state existed until the Reformation and was based upon the Augustinian doctrine that held that the state was the visible embodiment of the Church and that the state’s domination was legitimate

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because it was derived from God (Hinschius 1887: 213−214). The separation of state and church came about with the Reformation, and Hinschius relied on Zeller and on Sohm for some clarification of its justification (Hinschius 1887: 232, 251, 282). For Protestants, it was imperative that they have the “freedom of conscience” (“Gewissensfreiheit”) and the belief in tolerance (Hinschius 1887: 189, 233−234). Moreover, the state and the church should be separate because the primary function of the state is to maintain peace and order and the state does not have the duty or the capacity to care for Christian beliefs—that is the province of the church (Hinschius 1887: 237−238; 244−245). The former is public and the latter is private; and it is the state and not the church that has sovereignty; that is, legal domination (Hinschius 1887: 269). Hinschius devoted lengthy sections to the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church and to that between the state and the Protestant churches. Although Hinschius offered a rather scholarly account, it is evident that his preference was for the Protestant belief that the state should be separate from the church. The final book to be considered here is Walther Köhler’s Die Entstehung des Problemes Staat und Kirche, and it has an additional reason which makes it crucial to include it in this account; that is, there is a direct connection between this work and Troeltsch’s work. Troeltsch was Köhler’s major professor at Heidelberg and he dedicated Die Entstehung des Problemes Staat und Kirche to Troeltsch: “Ernst Tröltsch. Meinem hochverehrten Lehrer” (Köhler 1903: V). In this work Köhler provided a brief history of the relationship between the state and the church from its beginnings to the present day (1903). He maintained that for most of history there was no problem between state and church because the church was above the state, both figuratively and literally. Köhler draws attention to a fresco in a fifteenth-century church in Florence and notes that the church is painted as being triumphantly above heaven and earth and that the state sits on one of the lowest steps. The implication is clear, the church is everything important and the state is nothing (Köhler 1903: 1). It would seem that the command to “Render to Caesar” would pose a problem for this interpretation but Köhler pointed out that what was due to Caesar was rather minimal. In part, because the early Christians believed that the end of time was close and in part because people had little to think about in terms of the state. That is because the state was, and continued to be a rather minor part of life (Köhler 1903: 9–20). During the Middle Ages it seemed that perhaps the end was not so close; however, the state continued to play a relatively small part in people’s lives. Thus, there was no problem regarding the relationship between state and church (Köhler 1903: 23−31). Even Luther had no problem with the state because it was still subordinate to the church (Köhler 1903: 33). The problem arose with the Calvinist

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doctrine; to solve it either the church would remain above the world or the church would have to become part of the world (Köhler 1903: 35). It was clear that the Catholic Church chose the former, but it was not yet evident what the Evangelical Church would do—hence the continuing problem of the relationship between state and church (Köhler 1903: 37).

Troeltsch’s “Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche” Troeltsch gave this speech on November 22, 1906 in Heidelberg and it was part of his official obligations as “Prorektor” of the University (Troeltsch 2014a: 319, 342). Troeltsch chose the theme of the separation of state and church in part because of his previous work on Protestantism (Troeltsch 2014a: 320). However, he chose it also because of its continuing importance for German education. This is shown both by his utilization of the writings from many of his predecessors, but also by his choice of introducing his theme with the announcement of two related questions. The first one was the question of whether “theology was a science?” (“Ist die Theologie eine Wissenschaft?”), and had been the source of contention for some time (Troeltsch 2014a: 343). Troeltsch does not wish to dwell on this question but notes that there is a response to those who claim that it cannot be a science because it is not “pure” but deals with practical matters as well. The response is to point out that there are many disciplines within universities which are regarded as sciences but which are also not “pure”. He lists medicine, law and philology as three that are both “pure” and “practical” (Troeltsch 2014a: 343). He would not have needed to point out to his audience that the four original disciplines there were medicine, law, theology, and philosophy, and only the last one was regarded as being “pure”.38 Troeltsch maintains that this is a complex matter that cannot be resolved within an hour but would require further inquiries, including one into the entire concept of science (Troeltsch 2014a: 344). Troeltsch instead turns to the question of the relationship between theology and the university and that, he claims, is based solely on the related issue of the “relationship between state and church” (“Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche”) (Troeltsch 2014a: 344−345). That Troeltsch relied on his predecessors is apparent by his use of the same phrase and the same historical context and especially by his citations from Hinschius, Mayer, and Zeller (Troeltsch 2014a: 314, Troeltsch’s

|| 38 Now there are many people who believe that philosophy derives its major worth from being applicable and hold that modern applied philosophy is more important that classical philosophy.

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note 1). His discussion of the Catholic Church’s notion of absolute truth and the supremacy of the Church over the state is historically interesting (Troeltsch 2014a: 353, 353, 359), but it is not as relevant to his theme as is his discussion of “Altprotestantismus” (Troeltsch 2014a: 361). What is important is Troeltsch’s emphasis on Luther and especially on his critical “doctrine of the freedom of faith” (“Lehre von der Freiheit des Glaubens”) (Troeltsch 2014a: 362). Briefly, this was Luther’s demand that one must follow the Bible and one’s conscience and not the Church or some other external authority. It is here that Troeltsch bases much of his account on that of Walther Köhler (Troeltsch 2014a: 363, Troeltsch’s note 9; see also Troeltsch 2014a: 364, notes 31−32). While Troeltsch maintained that the modern era began with the Enlightenment and not with the Reformation, he did not deny that was a time of fundamental changes. Not only was it the beginning of the struggle between state and Church; it was the beginning of the changes in ideas regarding community and businesses. It was also the time during which the fundamental presuppositions of the Church’s “world view” were shaken. Not only did a new cosmology and anthropology begin to be developed, but also a new and critical science of history, as well as an ethics that was humanitarian (Troeltsch 2014a: 367). Finally, the total dominance of the Church over all aspects of life was being radically challenged, and the private life was slowly being separated from the public life. Perhaps the most important change was the transition from the objective stance of the Church to the subjective one of the individual. The religious spirit was no longer to be found only in the institution of the Church, but in small groups such as the Baptists, the mystics, and the spiritualists (Troeltsch 2014a: 369). The universal authority of the Church was being replaced by the individual’s faith in his reading of the Bible. Troeltsch had begun the second part of his speech by discussing the issue of state and church throughout history; in the third section he compared the ways in which the Americans, the British, and the French each managed to separate the state from the church. The Americans accomplished this primarily by having many different types of churches, by combining faith with social and political issues, and especially by believing that while church membership was extremely important, religious faith was really a personal matter. The British managed to keep state and church separate through a number of factors; first, English history had provided enough examples of the dire consequences of maintaining the close connection between state and church, and second, by having a tradition of enlightened tolerance. The French also recognized the importance of separating the state from the church and Troeltsch suggests that the French Revolution showed both the positive and negative consequences of this. However, his further concern was to show how each of these countries also managed the relationship

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between church, state, and education. For the Americans neither the state’s nor the city’s public schools had responsibility for religious instruction; that was the responsibility of churches and Sunday schools (Troeltsch 2014a: 374−377). Regarding the French, there was the slow dissolution of the Catholic influence in schools, but that as with the Germans, there were continuing difficulties between state education and Church influences (Troeltsch 2014a: 378−384). For the English, education was primarily secular and whatever religious influence there was, was tolerated as long as it was undogmatic and religiously neutral (Troeltsch 2014a: 388). Troeltsch did not draw any fixed conclusions from these comparisons, but instead he moved to discuss the situation in Germany. Troeltsch noted that the situation in Germany was radically altered after 1816 and he mentioned the writings of Sohm, Zeller, Hinschius, and Mayer who had discussed some of the recent changes.39 He also noted the Lutheran domination of German politics and suggested that the recent formation of the Catholic political party was designed to help offset some of this domination (Troeltsch 2014a: 393). He admits that it sounds somewhat paradoxical to say that Germany does not have a state church. Nonetheless, Protestantism and more so, “Altprotestantismus” had a theology that was fundamentally founded on the “preaching of the word”.40 He believed this helped ensure that Germany tended to respect one’s freedom of conscience as well as the freedom for scholars to investigate without concerns about undue religious influences (Troeltsch 2014a: 396−397). It is in the fifth and final section of his speech that Troeltsch takes up the crucial issue that is fully relevant to the university—what is the connection, if any, between the university and theology as a scholarly discipline? Troeltsch wondered if one insisted on the strict separation between state and church then would the state’s involvement in all matters regarding religious education fall away? And, if this occurred, would the theological faculty not lose its justification for existence within the university? (Troeltsch 2014a: 412). Given Germans’ basic religious inclinations, he makes it clear that neither the American nor the French attempts at determining the separation between state and church would work in Germany. That makes this issue about religious education an even larger problem for Germany (Troeltsch 2014a: 414). In Germany, Christianity is not just one || 39 Troeltsch 2014a: 392. Several pages later Troeltsch again drew on Hinschius as well as Otto Mayer. Troeltsch 2014a: 397−399, 402, Troeltsch’s notes 33, 34, and 37 and notes 99, 100, and 104. It is not just that Troeltsch relied on his predecessors, but that he thought that they had a fine understanding of the problem of the relationship between state and church, even if they were more polemical than he thought they ought to be. 40 “Predigt des Wortes”. Troeltsch pointed particularly to the Augsburg Confession. Troeltsch 2014a: 393 and see note 91.

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religion among several, nor does it play a minor role in public life. Instead, it was a central fact of German life and as such must continue to play a major role in education. As he puts it, “The separation between state and church cannot be a separation from state and Christianity; consequently, there cannot be an unchristian or a neutral school.”41 What Troeltsch does offer as a solution is an attempt at a compromise: the strictly religious instruction should be done by the Sunday schools and Churches, whereas the scholarly investigations into the nature and function of religion should remain within the province of the state’s schools. The first would be concerned with faith, while the second would be concerned with knowledge. However, both would still be concerned with the truth—and that is a fundamental tenet of Christianity.42 Despite Troeltsch’s optimism about resolving the issue about the relationship between state and church, he occasionally provided a more or less realistic assessment. Towards the end of the fourth section he wrote “The relationship between state and church is in its essence irrational” (“Das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche ist in seinem Wesen irrational”). Troeltsch immediately clarified the reason for his pessimistic assessment: “It is the relationship between two sovereignties” (“Es ist das Verhältnis zweier Souveränitäten”) (Troeltsch 2014a: 410). What he did not address was the fact that despite their fundamental differences, countries do often function. However, that is because they primarily respect each other’s territorial integrity. This does not apply in the case of the state and the church, because in this case both claim sovereignty over the same land and the same people; thus, one must yield to the other. As Sohm, Zeller, and others had forcefully argued, the state needed to prevail; Troeltsch had too great of an understanding of and too much sympathy for the Catholic side for him to adopt such a position. However, his moderate stance was not likely to be persuasive for either side. At least, it did not seem to be at the time. Gangolf Hübinger noted in the “Einleitung” to Troeltsch’s writing on politics and philosophy of culture that the speech did not generate much interest but that it increased during the next decade with over 400 copies during the winter of 1918/1919 (Troeltsch 2002: 20). The speech may not have been urgent in 1907, but its topic was considered far more pressing during the crisis years of 1918 and 1919. Shortly after Troeltsch gave his speech “Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche” he began writing a piece on the relationship between Catholics and Protestants.

|| 41 “Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche kann keine Trennung von Staat und Christentum sein und daher auch keine unchristliche oder neutrale Schule zur Folge haben.” Troeltsch 2014a: 415. 42 Troeltsch 2014a: 420−425. Troeltsch referred his audience to his earlier writings on “presuppositionaless science”, which were dealt with above.

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The background to this is extensively discussed by Trutz Rendtorff and Katja Thörner in their “Editorischer Bericht” to Troeltsch’s “Katholizimus und Reformismus”. The issue was whether Catholicism could be a modern religion and the question was prompted by Pope Pius X’s “Pascendi dominici gregis” from 1907 in which he maintained that the Catholic “reformers of the Church” were fundamentally “enemies of the Church”. Many journals became involved in the dispute, and Paul Hinneberg, as the editor of the Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, asked Troeltsch to write an article on this issue (Troeltsch 2014a: 633−636). Troeltsch obliged and the article appeared in the issue for the first week in January, 1908 (Troeltsch 2014a: 642). The topic about Catholic reform was not a new one for Troeltsch. In 1901 Troeltsch had reviewed a book by Josef Müller entitled Der Reformkatholizismus for the Archiv für Religionswissenschaft. Troeltsch noted that Müller attempted to reconcile Catholic dogma with modern philosophy but without giving up the belief in the strict principle of Papal Infallibility. However, at best it seems as if it is the spirit of the Protestant union in a Catholic version and at worse it is a variation on “Ultramontaner Katholizismus”. Müller and those like him can think of religion only as “dogma, authority, Church and discipline” (“Dogmen, Autorität, Kirche und Disziplin”). While the book is somewhat interesting overall, it is “on the purely scientific side” (“nach der reinen wissenschaftlichen Seite”) “overall poorly written and poorly corrected” (“übrigens schlecht geschrieben und schlecht korrigiert”) (Troeltsch 2004: 113−114). Essentially, such books do not have much to offer. Troeltsch began his lecture by referring explicitly to the “Pascendi dominici gregis” and noted that it was not only a matter of the destiny of Catholicism but that it affected the whole of the European spiritual life (Troeltsch 2014a: 643). Troeltsch noted that there was the continuing effort on the part of a number of European Catholics to maintain the Pope’s claim to absolute infallibility. However, Troeltsch also pointed out that there was a growing movement in America, England, France, and even Italy which wished to emancipate Catholicism from the medieval outlook and wanted to move the Church towards greater accommodation to modern life (Troeltsch 2014a: 643−645). He insisted that the adherents to this new movement had the “warmest personal piety” and the “strictest morality”, just as the enforcers of the older Catholic tradition had. However, the new adherents combined those traits with a great sense of optimism and they wanted to build a new type of “cultural education” (“Bildung”) (Troeltsch 2014a: 647). Again, Troeltsch seeks a middle path—he condemned the dogmatic Catholics but he also condemned the Protestants who did not believe that there were progressive Catholics. These Protestants were just as ignorant as the Catholics who

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instinctively recoiled from the modern world (Troeltsch 2014a: 648−649). Now the question was, what would happen to this new Catholic movement? Would it wither because of “this piece of paper” (“mit diesem Stück Papier”)43 and return to the ideas of the Middle Ages? Or would it succeed in maintaining some degree of independence, and would modern Catholic scholars like Hermann Schell prevail?44 Troeltsch acknowledges that he did not know the answer, but he added that even someone with more specialized knowledge would also not have wanted to wager an answer (Troeltsch 2014a: 651). What he can maintain is a strict separation between state and church, as in America and France, cannot be considered in Germany because of the higher degree of religious influence in everyday life. Nonetheless, there must be some degree of separation between the two. Troeltsch is optimistic in at least one sense, that Christianity’s “eternal religious force” (“ewige religiöse Kraft”) will not disappear (Troeltsch 2014a: 655). But he does hope that instead of this type of deadly struggle, that both sides would approach the issue with a sense of justice and the understanding for the religious life (Troeltsch 2014a: 656).

Conclusion Unlike many of the disputants on both sides of the Confessional divide, Troeltsch did not regard the issue of the relationship between state and church as a simple one, or one which could be easily solved. He had as good of an understanding as most of the participants but he was far more attuned to the nuances on both sides than they were. Although his personal sympathies lay on the side of the Protestants with their emphasis on freedom of conscience and modern scholarship, he had a good enough understanding of, and appreciation for, the Catholic side with its insistence on authority and tradition. One wonders how much influence his close friendship with the British Catholic Baron von Hügel influenced his

|| 43 Troeltsch repeats his phrase “a piece of paper” (“ein Stück Papier”) and he explicitly ties it to the Papal degree. Troeltsch 2014a: 652. 44 Herman Schell was an influential modern Catholic scholar, but he is also important for other reasons. Troeltsch referred to Schell in several works, not only here implicitly in “Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche”. Troeltsch 2014: 652 and note 16, and 355, note 18. Furthermore, on the first page of his Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus Max Weber cites Herman Schell’s book Der Katholizmus als Prinzip des Fortschrittes; it is highly likely that Weber heard about Schell and his book from Troeltsch. Weber 2014: 124.

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position.45 Furthermore, Troeltsch regarded the dispute over the relationship between state and church as being more than either a theological or an academic issue; it was also fundamentally a political one. As such, this dispute provides an indication for Troeltsch’s long-term involvement in the search for a moderate solution to many political issues, and it sets the stage for the topic of some later chapters—Ernst Troeltsch as political observer and politician.

|| 45 Hans-Georg Drescher emphasized how important this friendship was for both Troeltsch and von Hügel. He also stressed how von Hügel was one of the leading figures of the modernist movement within Catholicism and that he was regarded by many as the “lay bishop” of this movement. Drescher 1991: 169, note 135.

Chapter Four Natural Law and Culture46 Introduction Unlike his close friend and colleague Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch was not a trained jurist and he did not devote a considerable portion of his life to the understanding and interpretation of law. However, like Weber, Troeltsch recognized the cultural significance of law and he devoted a number of his writings to the particular importance of natural law. For him, natural law was not just a legal theory; but rather, it expressed some of the most fundamental principles of Christian theology and accordingly, it was a significant component of German culture. Although Troeltsch did not concentrate on the notion of natural law until around 1910, it is found in a number of his writings prior to that year.47 However, by 1910 it became a major focus of his interest and it continued to be for almost five years. Even after the notion of natural law seemed to have lost its prominent place in Troeltsch’s thinking, it remained a life-long theme in his writings. Unlike Weber, who was interested in natural law only from a legal standpoint, Troeltsch was concerned with it because of its moral and cultural importance. While most of Troeltsch’s work on natural law is found in his monographs and his books, much of it is also present in his book reviews, his speeches and lectures, and in an encyclopedia article. Consequently, in many cases Troeltsch was responding to others’ views on the history and significance of natural law.

Troeltsch’s Concern with Natural Law Prior to 1910 In Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Johann Gerhard und Melanchthon Troeltsch takes up the general notion of law. In doing so, he discusses the relationship between

|| 46 The concept of natural law is not easy to define; both proponents and critics cannot agree among themselves what it stands for. Added to this is the problem of whether natural law is fundamentally a theological concept or whether it is secular. Nonetheless, most every interpretation of natural law suggests that it is fundamentally teleological and that human life is purposeful and that it is the function of reason to uncover what that purpose is. See Adair-Toteff 2005: 733−735. 47 Klaus Tanner maintained that the notion of natural law ran through Troeltsch’s “entire works like a red thread”. Tanner 1993: 123. Whether that is an overstatement is questionable; what is not is that Troeltsch was often preoccupied with the concept of natural law. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654653-005

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law and reason and stresses the universality of law (Troeltsch 2009: 274−276). He briefly mentions the Stoic doctrine of natural law, and while it is not important here, it becomes a crucial theme in his later thought. Troeltsch contributed a number of entries to the third and final edition of the Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. All of them are important, but perhaps the most important one is the one on “Aufklärung”. It is not very long but it contains some of Troeltsch’s more important contributions to the explanation of European culture. While many scholars recognized the importance of the Enlightenment for European thinking, Troeltsch held it in especially high regard. He argued against the prevailing view that the Reformation stood at the beginning of the modern period, and instead, he credits the Enlightenment with the beginning of the modern age. While he does not explicitly insist that the Reformation was confined to being an exclusively theological reformation, he makes it clear that the Enlightenment involved much more that just ecclesiastical issues. That is why Troeltsch insisted that the Enlightenment was the beginning and the foundation of the modern period and why he maintained that it was not merely a scientific movement (Troeltsch 1897: 225). Instead, it encompassed religion, economics, science, and politics. It provided the final victory for reason in the opposition between reason and revelation and it allowed economics to break free from the dominance of religion. It also ensured that theological considerations would no longer be able to dictate or influence the goals and methods of scholarship. Above all, it meant the development of a new theory of the state. The state was no longer aligned with the Church and it no longer shared the goal of furthering the Church’s interests. Instead, the state had its own interests and these included the notion of toleration and the furtherance of science (Troeltsch 1897: 227−231). This is especially true regarding the approach to history. Instead of the Church’s appropriation of history for its own supranatural purposes, history was now considered something universal, worldly, and philosophical. Troeltsch recognized that the new mathematical and natural sciences involved universal and objective notions and he realized that the Enlightenment philosophers tended to minimize the importance of history because it was singular and subjective. However, he also insisted the Enlightenment introduced history as a scholarly pursuit; while history did not follow the laws of nature, it did have its own philosophical method. This pertained particularly to the notion and the history of natural law (Troeltsch 1897: 231). This is partially because natural law was no longer regarded as a theological matter, but as a moral issue. To underscore the importance of natural law for morality Troeltsch emphasized the influence of the English and French Deists on the literature regarding state, church, and society (Troeltsch 1897: 234−235).

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Troeltsch’s entry on “Deismus” is a lengthy account of the major figures in England and France. Troeltsch notes the importance of Voltaire and Rousseau for tolerance and freedom, but he reserves greater emphasis for Locke and several others. His primary concern with Deism is that it is the “philosophy of religion” of the Enlightenment and that it is the foundation for modern philosophy of religion in general (Troeltsch 1898: 533). Unlike the older philosophy of religion which emphasized the supernatural, the Enlightenment’s philosophy of religion was based upon the natural world (Troeltsch 1898: 536). That meant the rejection of miracles and revelations and the acceptance of reason and naturalness; hence, the emphasis on natural law (Troeltsch 1898: 539). Troeltsch explained that the older conception of natural law was founded on the related notions of sin and damnation, whereas the new conception is founded on reason and morality (Troeltsch 1898: 538−539). For Locke, Samuel Clarke, and for other English Enlightenment figures knowledge of what is right will promote doing what is right. Doing what is right is doing what God wants us to do; hence, natural religion is the same as natural law (Troeltsch 1898: 543). Troeltsch took up many of the same themes in another lengthy entry in the Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Entitled “Moralisten, englische” Troeltsch maintained that the English Moralists did for ethics what the Deists had done for the philosophy of religion; that is, to break the power of the Church and allow the individual to become an autonomous moral agent (Troeltsch 1903: 436). The old ethic held that true morality was identical with faith, but the English Moralists broke this connection and provided ethics with a “fully new method” (Troeltsch 1903: 450−451). Morality was no longer based upon the authority of the Church but was now founded upon reason. While the Catholic Church had claimed its authority was universal because it was based upon God, the new ethics was also objective but was founded upon universal reason (Troeltsch 1903: 438−439). This also meant that the old identity of the Mosaic Law and natural law was also severed (Troeltsch 1903: 438−439, 455). Now, natural law was connected to the individual’s power and purpose. Troeltsch credits the English Moralists for accomplishing this but he was not blind to some of their problems. In particular, he faults some of the English revolutionaries for attempting the utopian combination of Christian freedom and natural law (Troeltsch 1903: 441). However, he also credits the English Moralists for placing modern ethics upon the foundation of empirical psychology (Troeltsch 1903: 450−451). He especially singles out Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hume for developing a theory of moral sentiments (Troeltsch 1903: 457−460). Instead of ethics being based upon a supernatural authority, morality was natural. Of course, this gave rise to different interpretations—for Kant it was the universal moral law, but for

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Schleiermacher it was subjective moral sense (Troeltsch 1903: 461). While Troeltsch appears to have nothing but praise for the English Moralists and those two Germans, it seems he was rather disappointed that neither group apparently had sufficient appreciation for the importance of natural law. Troeltsch’s complaint about the lack of importance given to natural law is a recurring complaint. It is found in his lengthy review of the second volume of Reinhold Seeberg’s Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. Troeltsch had been asked by the editors of the Göttingischen gelehrten Anzeigen to review the book in 1898 but the review itself did not appear until 1901.48 Troeltsch believed that Seeberg continued to rely too heavily on Adolf Harnack’s three-volume Dogmengeschichte but he also thought that the second volume of the Lehrbuch was more interesting and was better written than the first volume (Troeltsch 2004: 88). On the one hand, Seeberg’s volume suffers from being too oriented towards theology and not independent enough in his historical thinking. On the other hand, Seeberg’s discussion of dogma is an improvement over Harnack and others because of its precision, its focus on what is essential, and its documentation for its claims. Moreover, Seeberg’s accounts of the scholastics, Luther, as well as Calvin, are so impressive that Troeltsch regrets that they are so short (Troeltsch 2004: 95−96). There are, however, certain drawbacks and the one Troeltsch focused on is Seeberg’s lack of appropriate treatment of natural law (Troeltsch 2004: 97). Troeltsch acknowledged that most scholars have also lacked an appreciation of the concept of natural law, and in contrast Seeberg has been one of the very few who had tried to draw more attention to this notion (Troeltsch 2004: 98). Troeltsch also seems to appreciate Seeberg’s historical account and he notes that while natural law is often associated with the medieval Catholic Church, its roots are found in the Stoic popular doctrine (Troeltsch 2004: 99). Then there is the famous opposition between “law and grace” (“Gesetz und Gnade”), that is between the Old and the New Testament (Troeltsch 2004: 100−101). Thus, one can speak of natural law, Mosaic Law, and Christian Law. But the earliest Christian law differed from others by being indifferent, or even hostile, towards the state and culture (Troeltsch 2004: 102−103). However, as Seeberg acknowledged, the Church was identical to the state, and he insisted that God’s law (“lex dei”) is the same as natural law (“ius naturae”) (Seeberg 1898: 155). However, Troeltsch complained that Seeberg virtually ignored the concept of natural law and when he did discuss it he was mistaken in his interpretation. In Troeltsch’s view, Seeberg’s contention that the identification of divine law and natural law had occurred in the late Middle Ages was wrong because it occurred much earlier (Troeltsch 2004: || 48 Troeltsch 2004: 88. It was, however, dated June 5, 1900. Troeltsch 2004: 87, 111.

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105, 107). Not only did Seeberg miss the opportunity to get this right, he also missed the opportunity to examine the relationship between Luther and Melanchthon regarding dogma (Troeltsch 2004: 107). Finally, Seeberg was mistaken to think that the concept of natural law was a return to speculative Scholastic metaphysics when it was a return to the sober and cautious connection between the natural moral consciousness and a protection of the legal and societal orders (Troeltsch 2004: 110). Troeltsch would take up this last theme a short time later. Natural law becomes more important in Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit where Troeltsch again takes up the general notion of law. Like he did in Vernunft und Offenbarung he concentrates on the conception of natural law in early Protestantism He emphasizes once more the connection between law and reason. And, he suggests that this is present in Mosaic and Catholic law, it is also found in Luther. What distinguishes Luther’s is his view that the individual and the community need to take over the governing by virtue of natural law from the Church and they do so by placing the emphasis upon the individual’s conscience. Yet, Troeltsch suggests that Luther is not a progressive thinker and notes that his conception of natural law is “instinctively” antidemocratic and conservative (Troeltsch 2004: 153−159). Troeltsch mentions natural law numerous times in Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen and in his first comment on it he appears to claim that natural law was a originally conservative doctrine. Yet, he also traces its origins to the Stoics and their emphasis on reason (Troeltsch 1912: 51−54). Both the Stoics and the early Christians believed that natural law could be the foundation for a community “without slavery, without force, without possessions” (“ohne Sklaverei, ohne Gewalt, ohne Besitzgegensätze”) (Troeltsch 1912: 162−164). However, that is utopian and he points to the nature and right to force and he suggests that with the state it belongs actually to the “Kaiser” (Troeltsch 1912: 167). However, he also suggests that natural law and Christian law are similar and he bemoans the lack of recognition that Protestant theologians give to natural law. He specifically singles out Seeberg and mentions his complaint regarding that omission in his review of Seeberg’s book (Troeltsch 1912: 173−174). Troeltsch continues to insist that Luther is conservative and his notion of natural law serves as a defense of the status quo. Since the worldly power is sanctioned by God, there can be no justification for rebellion and revolution (Troeltsch 1912: 532−540). In contrast, Calvin is more radical and more reasonable (Troeltsch 1912: 661−666). Since Calvin did not share Luther’s passivity and obedience to many tenets of the Catholic Church, he emphasized the importance of the individual doing God’s will in the world. Since all humans are sinners, they are equally guilty, it is only because of God that some are chosen (Troeltsch 1912: 671). But it

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is this equality and the need to do God’s will that provides Calvin with the justification to rise up against tyrannical earthly power (Troeltsch 1912: 687−691). These points are found in the later installments of the Soziallehren so Troeltsch draws attention to the paper that he presented on natural law in 1910 (Troeltsch 1912: 702, 765).

Troeltsch’s Preoccupation with Natural Law in 1910 On January 3, 1909 a small group of scholars met in Berlin to discuss the formation of a society devoted to the scientific study of society. There were several societies that were devoted to society, but they tended to be normative rather than investigative. The Verein für Socialpolitik had been formed in the early 1870s with the expressed intention to affect the German government’s approaches to social problems. Many of those who formed the new Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie had been part of the Verein but had grown increasingly irritated at the blending together of scholarly investigations with value judgments. Although most of the small group believed that value judgments should be kept separate from scholarly inquiries, the main proponent of this was Max Weber. He ensured that the first rule (§ I.) of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie emphasized the scientific direction of the society and expressly rejected all practical goals. That meant that any ethical, religious, political, or aesthetic goal was eliminated (VGS 1910: V). The first conference of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie began on October 19 and ended on October 22, 1910. Nine papers were presented: Georg Simmel spoke on the sociology of society, Ferdinand Tönnies spoke on the methods of sociology, and Werner Sombart spoke about technology and society. Alfred Plötz dealt with race, Eberhard Gothein spoke about the sociology of panic, and Weber talked about the sociology of newspapers. But Weber wanted to ensure that a major focus of the conference was on law so he helped arrange to have three speakers with papers that were specifically devoted to various legal topics. A. Voigt spoke on economy and law, Hermann Kantorowicz discussed law and sociology, and Troeltsch addressed the topic of natural law. Troeltsch gave his speech in the afternoon on Friday, October 21, and the session chair was Georg Simmel (VGS 1911: 166). Troeltsch entitled his speech “Das stoisch-christliche Naturrecht und das moderne profane Naturrecht” and in it he provided more than a concise history of natural law. In addition, he briefly discusses his earlier division of church, sect, and mysticism, and he talks about

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the difference between the ancient world and the modern one.49 He tackles the problem of conflating the search for scholarly answers with the value judgments. His point is that one of the most important issues in sociological investigations is the differentiation between sociological natural laws and ideal laws (Troeltsch 2014b: 723−724). Troeltsch noted the opposition between these two “laws” with one being descriptive and real and the other being normative and ideal. Sometimes this conflict ends in the latter submitting to the former and sometimes the former leads to the latter. Sometimes the emphasis on natural law leads one to have hope only for the future, or “to a resigned pessimism or to a mystical indifference” (“zu einem quietistischen Pessimismus oder einer mystischen Indifferenz”) (Troeltsch 2014b: 724). He suggests that the philosophical attempt to unify the opposition or the Hegelian attempt to bring them together in a higher, third position fly in the face of historical realities (Troeltsch 2014b: 724−725). That is because both natural laws and ideal laws belong to the larger realm of culture and its history (Troeltsch 2014b: 724). This concludes the general context for Troeltsch’s specific topic; which is the history of the “social ideal” (“Sozialideal”) (Troeltsch 2014b: 725). If describing the general context was rather difficult, Troeltsch insisted that setting out the “social ideal” in its original “Christian-religious idea” (“christlichreligiöse Idee”) is “simple and easy” (“einfach” und “leicht”) (Troeltsch 2014b: 725). “It is the radically religious individualism of a faith that submits with moral obedience to the will of God, and through which the individual is simultaneously metaphysically anchored and made indestructible.”50 This is not merely the submersion of the individual in God’s will, but is instead the meeting with God in which all of the human oppositions, competitions, self-seeking, and self-determining are resolved and altered into a mutual relationship of love based upon the will of God (Troeltsch 2014b: 725−726). Ideally, this love should eliminate the need for laws, power, and force, but until such time arrives, new social forms needed to be developed. Troeltsch repeats the three forms that he had examined in greater detail in his Soziallehren: Church, sect, and mysticism. The Church was and is the most important sociological formation of the Christian idea. Its importance rests upon the institution which determines salvation. It does so by

|| 49 For the comprehensive examination of Troeltsch’s church, sect, mystic distinction, see Molendijk 1996. For a shorter account in English, see Molendijk 2018. 50 “Es ist der radikale religiöse Individualismus einer Gott sich im sittlichen Gehorsam hingebenden und dadurch das Individuum zugleich metaphysisch verankernden und unzerstörbar machenden Gläubigkeit.” Troeltsch 2014b: 725.

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maintaining a hierarchy, producing dogma, and by providing the sacraments (Troeltsch 2014b: 727). The second type of this Christian sociological form is the sect and it differs fundamentally from the Church. Whereas the Church encourages compromise, the sect strictly and completely rejects it. It bases its uncompromising position upon the ethics from the Gospel and particularly upon the “Sermon on the Mount” (Troeltsch 2014b: 728). The third type is mysticism and it rejects the communal aspects of both the Church and the sect. Instead, it is the personal and immediate meeting with God. It is the approach that attempts to bring out the “spark” (“Funke”) that is the essence of God (Troeltsch 2014b: 729). But mysticism is the most individualistic and in contrast it is the church which is the most social. It was the Roman Church which adopted and modified certain aspects of the worldly society. Troeltsch posed the question regarding how the Church reacted to the external factors of social life. His short answer was by means of the doctrine of natural law. The longer answer is how the doctrine of natural law has changed throughout history. Troeltsch locates the origins of natural law in antiquity and specifically with the Stoa. The Stoics believed that there had been an original golden age in which people acted according to reason and lived in harmony. Unfortunately, that golden age was destroyed. Early Christianity adopted these ideas, but rather than regarding them as applying to the past, they adapted them to the future. One of the central ideas shared by both was the belief in natural law, or as Troeltsch clarifies, the “moral law of nature” (“sittliches Naturgesetz”) (Troeltsch 2014a: 731). Based upon natural law both groups believed in universal equality and an order based not on force but on reason. Both emphasized the importance of freedom for the individual and the rejection of sinful impulses (Troeltsch 2014a: 732−733). However, the Stoics did not connect natural law with any church, but for the Christians it was intimately bound to the Church. The dual notion of humans became more relevant as the Church extended its reach over more aspects of daily life—despite Augustine’s two “cities”, the Church and the state together regulated law, property, and marriage. In fact, both controlled power, laws, and maintained order (Troeltsch 2014a: 734−735). As much as natural law was connected to the Catholic Church, Troeltsch insisted that it also belonged to Protestantism. Unlike the hierarchy of the Catholic Church with its doctrine of “double morality”, Luther rejected the distinction between the different privileges and duties. But he also recognized that the state grew out of a “position of sin” (“Sündenstand”) and he acknowledged the need for the regulation of property and trade along with power and punishment (Troeltsch 2014a: 736−737). But, if Luther’s social ethic was ideal and

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passive, Calvin’s was realistic, if not radical and aggressive. It was primarily Calvin’s social ethic that generally prevailed and became the foundation for the Protestant sects (Troeltsch 2014a: 738−741). Accordingly, natural law was most dominant in the Church and less so with the sects, and it had the least to do with the “radical organization-less individualism” of the mystic. But, it is the mystic’s emphasis on the individual light that leads to the modern notion of profane natural law that is first found in the Enlightenment (Troeltsch 2014a: 741−744). Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke separated natural law from its Christian roots and placed it on a profane foundation. Yet, both the Christian notion of natural law and the modern profane one share the social ideal; the difference is that the latter rejects sin as the impetus of natural law and substitutes modern social problems. Troeltsch concluded his lecture with the observation that the modern profane natural law faces the same struggles and difficulties as the Stoic-Christian doctrine faced in earlier times (Troeltsch 2014a: 745−748). Ferdinand Tönnies, Max Weber, Eberhart Gothein, Georg Simmel, Martin Buber, and Hermann Kantorowicz commented on Troeltsch’s paper. Tönnies was the first to speak and he praised Troeltsch for his extensive understanding of the history of natural law. Tönnies did, however, want to address the issue of the modern philosophical concept of natural law and he drew from his earlier study of Thomas Hobbes. Yet, in his comments Tönnies spoke about natural law in antiquity and the Middle Ages and he tended to agree with much of what Troeltsch had said about it. In particular he agreed with the claim that the early Protestant movement was “rebellious” (Troeltsch 2014a: 749−751). But he emphasized that the real shift came with the development of “civil natural law” and its emphasis on the rights of the individual, especially with regards to property. Furthermore, he stressed the importance that modern physics played in political thinking and he pointed particularly to the belief that only the individual is real. Thus, the state is only a conceptual abstract. However, he returns to Hobbes and his cardinal thought that the state was absolutely necessary because without it there could be no safety or security (Troeltsch 2014a: 752). Max Weber was the next to speak and he began his lengthy remarks by focusing on the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the doctrine of natural law. But he also delved further into the past by making remarks on Roman law and then on the Reformation with its rejection of Catholic policies regarding money. These last comments reflect Weber’s continual concern regarding the intersection of religion and economics. Weber drew on Tönnies’ remarks about the English as well as the French and the Scottish before returning to Troeltsch’s speech (Troeltsch 2014a: 754−755). However, Weber spoke extensively about Russia and its Church before making the point that

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Russian religiosity rests upon a specific form of natural law. This form is similar to the older German form and finds its expression in Tönnies’ notion of the older, organic, rural community (“Gemeinschaft”) (Troeltsch 2014a: 757). Simmel was the next to speak and he wanted to draw attention to a tangential point which was whether Christianity had any social or sociological significance. He was not totally convinced that it did, and he pointed to a spatial analogy between two individuals. They are related in space but that was all. Simmel continued in this vein and while his comments are quite informative, they really had little to do with natural law. It was somewhat similar with Martin Buber, who focused on Troeltsch’s discussion of mysticism. He questioned whether mysticism could be regarded as a sociological category if it was really just a psychological one. Since mysticism is solipsistic, Buber questioned whether it had anything to do with natural law. Since the mystic’s relationship is with God and not with other men, and since natural law provides the regulation of relations with other men, then it appears that mysticism as “the pure type of religiousness” (“der reine Typus der Religiosität”) has nothing to do with natural law (Troeltsch 2014a: 764−765). Gothein noted that Troeltsch did not intend to provide a complete historical account of natural law, but wished to focus on certain important segments (Troeltsch 2014a: 759). Gothein also observed that Troeltsch emphasized the ideal at the expense of the material and that this led to some unfortunate results regarding the Marxist materialist explication of history. In particular, the belief that “law is exclusively law” (“Recht ist schließlich Recht”) and the belief in the “pure development of law” (“reine Rechtsentwicklung”) contributes to the extraordinarily strong path to natural law. Gothein also believed that this emphasis on purity led Troeltsch to concentrate on the religious factors for his account of natural law. Gothein spoke briefly about the Greek basis for natural law but he moved quickly to the great system of law that was found in the “Roman law of the Middle Ages”. It was this systemization that led to the abstract mathematical and natural sciences but especially to the abstract character of the sixteenth and seventeenth century versions of natural law (Troeltsch 2014a: 760). Unfortunately, that led to the diminishing influence of religion in natural law. Grotius was indeed radical, but he was a religious one; Hobbes was not so radical but he was not as religious. Hobbes had talked about natural law in more secular terms but it was Wolf who had finalized the mechanical basis for natural law. However, the triumph of the artificial natural science over the religious in natural law was at the same time the end of natural law (Troeltsch 2014a: 760−761). Kantorowicz agreed with Gothein that Troeltsch was right to emphasize the ideal as opposed to the material side of the issue about natural law and that this

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emphasis unfortunately leads to the polemical rejection of the materialistic conception of history without recognizing that it has some important scholarly points (Troeltsch 2014a: 759). As a trained jurist Kantorowicz knew the history of natural law and by and large he agreed with Troeltsch’s historical delineation. However, Kantorowicz claimed that Troeltsch was incorrect in maintaining that the Eighteenth century was the classical time for natural law; but, rather the Seventeenth century. Troeltsch interrupted to insist that he had only misspoken (“Habe mich nur versprochen!”) (Troeltsch 2014a: 765). If anything, Troeltsch agreed with Kantorowicz that it was Hugo Grotius who should be regarded as the father of natural law. But, Kantorowicz meant the father of modern natural law because he dealt with an earlier type that was divinely inspired and can be traced back to the Old Testament. He suggested that Troeltsch could have perhaps emphasized the religious nature of this type of natural law. But, the other type of natural law is the worldly type and by this Kantorowicz was suggesting that this law would apply even if there were no God (Troeltsch 2014a: 765−766). This is the type of natural law that is often talked about in contemporary discussions. Kantorowicz noted that this is what non-Catholics mean by natural law; Catholics still focus on the older theological-based notion of natural law. Kantorowicz also seems to agree with Troeltsch that natural law cannot be based upon sociology or the philosophy of law, but only upon a metaphysics of law (Troeltsch 2014a: 767). Troeltsch was reluctant to respond and did so only when Weber suggested that the devil would drag him to hell if he did not speak. Troeltsch responded that against such an authority he had to comply. Whether by such an authority Troeltsch meant Weber or the devil was not clear. He did make it clear that most of the issues that were raised in the debate were significant and deserved careful consideration. Unfortunately, he was unable to do that at this time and he concluded by the observing that part of the reason the sociological association was founded was to investigate such questions about the social significance of Christianity and its various sociological forms (Troeltsch 2014a: 769−772). By all accounts Troeltsch’s speech was well received. Newspaper accounts claimed that his speech was “without doubt” the “highpoint of the conference” (Troeltsch 2014a: 716−717). And, Max Weber, who had been critical of most of the other speeches, indicated that it was “excellent” and that it was entirely value free. Moreover, he wrote that the debate was the best of the day.51

|| 51 Weber wrote a letter to Franz Eulenburg shortly after the conference in which he rated many of the speeches. In his opinion, Sombart’s speech was a “feuilleton”, Gothein’s was “superficial”, Voigt’s was “solid” but that he was grief-stricken because his wife had died eight days

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Troeltsch’s Continuing Interest in Natural Law: 1911−1923 Troeltsch’s views regarding natural law can be found in a number of book reviews that he wrote between 1911 and 1913. The first was a review of Otto Dreske’s Zwingli und das Naturrecht but as Troeltsch pointed out Dreske’s account was primarily historical and was focused on Zwingli rather than on natural law. Nonetheless, Troeltsch believed that the book was important because it underscored the connection between ethics and natural law. Troeltsch concluded his review by applauding Dreske for understanding the significance that natural law had for the Protestant Reformers; something that Troeltsch was convinced that most of his fellow Protestant scholars could barely recognize and hardly understand (Troeltsch 2004: 700). The second review was of Johannes Meyer’s Das Soziale Naturrecht in der christlichen Kirche. This book is more than a historical overview of the notion of natural law; it is also a theological pamphlet that sets out the contention that the Protestant Church is the institution that can solve social problems. It is also a dialogue with Troeltsch; Meyer frequently cites Troeltsch and he applauds him for bringing the concept of natural law into focus (Meyer 1913: 1; 12−16; 29; 47 note 1; 47−48 note 2; 49 notes 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 23; 50 notes 25, 28, 29, 34, 36; 51 note 47). However, he faults Troeltsch for underestimating the importance that the notion of natural law had for Augustine and he complains that Troeltsch believed that Luther was a legal positivist (Meyer 1913: 13, 27−28). But Meyer had two larger complaints; one, that Troeltsch ended his Soziallehren in the middle of the Eighteenth century and two, that he only hinted at how the Protestant Church could solve social problems (Meyer 1913: 48, note 2). For Meyer, natural law was only one means that religion had to dissolve the social divisions and to solve the social problems. Troeltsch notes that Meyer’s book grew out of a “vacation course” (“Ferienkurs”) for theologians and, as Meyer himself wrote, he altered his lecture in order to make it more accessible for non-theologians (Troeltsch 2004d: 752; Meyer 1913: III, 1). Troeltsch commends Meyer for understanding that the notion of natural law stemmed from the Stoics and for realizing the importance that the concept had for the Roman Catholic Church (Troeltsch 2004d: 752−753). However, this

|| before. Only Kantorowicz came close to Troeltsch—Weber noted that it was “very good”. Weber 1994: 655. As an additional indication of its worth, Troeltsch’s speech was published both in the proceedings of the conference as well as in the journal Historische Zeitschrift (Troeltsch 2014a: 721). A version is also found in volume four of Troeltsch’s Gesammelte Schriften but Hans Baron slightly altered a few passages.

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also limits Meyer’s vision for the employment of natural law. Troeltsch contended that Meyer restricted the usefulness of natural law to the Middle Ages and he refused to grant that the more modern liberal and rational natural law lacked the power to affect sociological ideals (Troeltsch 2004d: 754). Furthermore, Meyer “plants the flag of Christian socialism high” (Meyer 1913: 44; Troeltsch 2004d: 754). However, Troeltsch objected that this is not a Christian version, but one derived from Thomas Carlyle and the cult of the hero (Troeltsch 2004d: 755). That is, Meyer does not believe that natural law can provide a corrective for modern social problems. Instead, Meyer appears to believe that by modeling our lives on the most outstanding examples, we can achieve justice and equality. Of course, Troeltsch faults Meyer for engaging in such wishful thinking and for avoiding the actual task of dealing with injustice and inequality (Troeltsch 2004d: 755). Perhaps the biggest complaint that Troeltsch had regarding Meyer was the latter’s accusation that he had underestimated the significance of Augustine (Troeltsch 2004d: 757). However, Meyer was not the only one to lodge this complaint; Troeltsch’s own friend Paul Wernle had also voiced this complaint (see Troeltsch 2004d: 757, note 14). Nonetheless, this objection clearly stung Troeltsch and prompted him to address this in his Augustin (Troeltsch 2004d: 757, and see note 16). What Troeltsch does here is to complain that Meyer’s sources for his interpretation are totally wrong and that he is basing his investigation of Augustine on the recent and solid scholarship of the brothers Robert and Alexander Carlyle (Troeltsch 2004d: 757 and note 15). If Troeltsch had been critical of Meyer’s treatment of natural law, he was far more critical of Otto Schilling. Perhaps that was to be expected because he had a rather low opinion of one of Schilling’s earlier books. In 1909 Troeltsch published a review of Schilling’s Reichtum und Eigentum in der altkirchlichen Literatur. Ein Beitrag zur sozialen Frage. Troeltsch mentioned that Schilling offered a selection of the economic ethics of the earlier Church leaders but he believed that it was not complete. In damning with faint praise Troeltsch opined that what Schilling offered was “interesting enough” (Troeltsch 2004e: 570). But, Troeltsch took issue with a number of points. First, Schilling did not seem to sufficiently appreciate that the earlier Church was not concerned so much with social conditions and reforms as with minimizing of poverty (Troeltsch 2004e: 571). But what made Schilling’s work less than helpful were the numerous gaps in his account. Schilling failed to address the fact that much of the earlier Church developed out of the Stoic and Cynic doctrines. He failed to take up the related issue of their doctrine of “Lex naturae” and how that was the basis for the Christian-social ideal of communism. But, Troeltsch’s biggest complaint was that while Schilling noted that the Church eventually moved from caring only about the poor and the sick

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to being concerned about fostering a real “Christian social ideal”, he never addressed the questions of how and why the Church was motivated to do this. Troeltsch concludes this rather negative review by mentioning that he had just addressed this last issue in his Soziallehren. Troeltsch figured prominently in the development of the new theological encyclopedia, Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Paul Siebeck, the publisher of J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), had decided that his firm should provide a replacement for the third and last edition of the Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche and he secured the services of many of Germany’s leading scholars. The three main editors were Hermann Gunkel, an expert on the Old Testament and religions from the Ancient Orient, Otto Scheel, a scholar who focused on early Christianity and a Luther expert, and Friedrich Michael Schiele, who was an expert on Schleiermacher and on German faith. Troeltsch was assigned to the editorship of the section on dogmatics, but what is relevant here is his entry on natural law. Troeltsch begins his article by noting that the Christian doctrine of natural law owes its origins to the Stoics and was adopted by the early Christians. He adds that while Jesus predicted the coming of the Kingdom of God, for now the matter of legal order belongs to the earthly powers. Yet, Troeltsch insisted that the Christian community was a community within the worldly community and the Christian “state” was a “state” within the legal state (Troeltsch 1913: 697−698). As with his lecture on natural law at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie, Troeltsch differentiates between the absolute and the relative types of natural law. The former was present in the beginning of mankind but the latter is applicable now. Troeltsch also insists that while positive law may be gaining adherents, it lacks the emphasis on ethics that is found in Christianity (Troeltsch 1913: 699). He suggests that a major focus of Christian natural law was found in Augustine but Troeltsch developed this thesis a few years later in his book on the Catholic saint. While Augustine will claim there is the earthly state and the divine one, Troeltsch maintains that the two co-existed for centuries. Indeed, the Catholic theocracy existed until the late Middle Ages (Troeltsch 1913: 700). However, he noted a fundamental tension within the Church; on the one hand it was conservative and endorsed the use of force, but on the other hand it was progressive in its emphasis on the rights for the individual (Troeltsch 1913: 700). It was Luther, with his insistence on the worth and dignity of every individual, who contested the hierarchical authority of the Church. While Luther insisted that people had the duty to obey the authority of the state, he also suggested that the state had a limited right to force and that when necessary, the people had the right to object to the illegitimate domination by the state (Troeltsch 1913:

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701−702). Calvinism was an outgrowth of Luther’s doctrines but Calvin went much farther than Luther in many respects. Calvin contended that in many respects Luther’s thinking was still infused with Catholic influences and he insisted that the true believers needed to break totally with Catholic dogma. This is evident with Calvin’s notion of trade and borrowing, and it is especially evident in Calvin’s stand toward the state (Troeltsch 1913: 702). Yet, Calvin’s harsh stance against the Church and the state is also reflected in his stance against tolerance; and it is not until much later that the notion of tolerance gains much influence. Troeltsch points to various Enlightenment figures for their advancement of toleration but he singles out John Locke for particular admiration. Locke emphasized the rights of the individual and he stressed the importance of reason and liberty. Locke’s influence was great in England but it seemed even greater in America (Troeltsch 1913: 703). It is also in America where the sects gained the most prominence. There they adhered to the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount and rejected the state’s claim to have the right to employ force and its support for private property. Instead, they believed in love and equality and they were convinced that they could return to the original state with its emphasis on absolute natural law (Troeltsch 1913: 703). However, America turned away from the sects and their ideals and like many in Europe had turned either to modern capitalism or to modern socialism. Thus, while there are many who believe in freedom and social equality, there are those who believe in money and private property (Troeltsch 1913: 704). Troeltsch concluded that the Christian doctrine of natural law and the modern secular notion of natural law share a common origin but that the latter emphasizes its individual ethical basis whereas the latter focuses on social justice. It may have been a coincidence that three of the seven reference sources are Troeltsch’s or that he believed that he spells out more fully the points that he makes here, but he believed that natural law is basically Christian. While he agrees with the arguments that the adherents to profane natural law foster social justice, he is convinced that they replace the importance of reason and harmony with fervor and abstractions (Troeltsch 1913: 704). The question whether it was Troeltsch’s reviews of a number of books on Augustine prompted him to revisit Augustine’s philosophy or his own realization that he had not done justice to him remains open to debate. What is not subject to debate is that Troeltsch was determined to rectify this deficiency and the result of his several years of study was his Augustin. Die Christliche Antike und das Mittelalter. This is a remarkable book which has not received the study that it deserves. This is not the place to try to rectify that; but it is important to point out

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how crucial he regarded Augustine’s attempt to link ethics and natural law.52 Troeltsch insisted that Augustine’s ethics was the first great cultural ethics of Christianity and that his notion of natural law served to govern the earthly realm by providing order and justice in a world of chaos and injustice (Troeltsch 1915: 154, 159–165). Rather than regarding Augustine as simply the end of the antique period, Troeltsch insisted that one could not understand such thinkers as Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Kant, and Schleiermacher without understanding Augustine’s philosophy (Troeltsch 1915: 172−173). Troeltsch’s book on Augustine is remarkable for revealing his comprehensive understanding of Augustine’s philosophy but also because it was indicative of Troeltsch’s readiness to correct his own shortcomings as well as an eagerness to learn from a Catholic thinker. Troeltsch returned to the theme of natural law in a lecture that he gave on at least two occasions. The first time he gave “Naturrecht und Humanität in der Weltpolitik” was in Kiel on September 7, 1922 and the second time was in Berlin on October 24, 1922. The first was part of the “Kieler Herbstwoche für Kunst und Wissenschaft” and the second was in connection with a major celebration for the “Deutsche Hochschule für Politik” (Troeltsch 2002: 488). Troeltsch’s emphasis in the speech at first seems to be mostly on world politics, then on humanity, and less so on natural law. He begins by noting that during the war both sides were fully engaged in propaganda and both sides were equally insistent that their side was the moral one (Troeltsch 2002: 493). These timely themes are interesting practical ones but his concern was with a continuing theoretical one; namely, how the German’s “political-historical-moral thinking” (“politisch-geschichtlich-moralisches Denken”) differs from that of Western-European-American thinking (Troeltsch 2002: 495). He traces these differences to the differences in the connections between the conceptions of natural law and humanity. It may appear that the German conception appears more conservative and less progressive but part of this may be because of the opposition between conservative and revolutionary (Troeltsch 2002: 495). To some, there is little question that revolutions determined the English, French, and American paths whereas conservatism dominated in Germany. To those who do believe in the “eternal holy natural law” (“ewiges göttliches Naturrecht”), the particular German version may seem to be an unusual combination of mysticism and brutality; to those who see in history an “abundance of individualities” (“Fülle der Individualitäten”), the Western European version may appear as “empty rationalism and egalitarian atomism” (“kahler Rationalismus und egalitärer Atomismus”) (Troeltsch 2002: 496). However, Troeltsch suggests that the two || 52 This is now partially rectified—see Adair-Toteff 2019.

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views regarding the ideas of natural law, humanity, and progress are more similar than they might appear. Both groups believe in the significance of reason and the importance of the individual and he traces much of this back to shared Christian roots of the modern profane natural law. Furthermore, he points to the shared rediscovery of antiquity and the new discoveries of natural science. And, he points to the shared belief in the importance of the separation between the Church and state and the emphasis on the individual and his or her conscience (Troeltsch 2002: 498−499). Much of these came as a result of Luther’s rejection of Catholic dogma and the later thinking of many Enlightenment figures. Furthermore, the notion of the ideal of the autonomous individual is shared by both Germans and Anglo-Americans (Troeltsch 2002: 506). Troeltsch is careful in his analysis and he relied heavily on both German and Anglo-American authors. He cites Wolff, Kant, and Nietzsche, but also John Stuart Mill, George Peabody Gooch, and Harold Laski. Nor is Troeltsch inclined to excuse the Germans from their less than stellar writers. He has in mind the “skeptical, amoralistic, pessimistic, cynical” thought that is found in the unfortunately highly influential “Untergangsbuch”, meaning Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West (Troeltsch 2002: 511). These contemporary issues of world revolution and humanity cannot be solved by such thinking or by economic materialism; they need to have carefully thought out answers. Troeltsch concludes by suggesting that these are old questions but to answer them requires a new approach with the hope to arrive at new answers (Troeltsch 2002: 512).

Concluding Comments Unlike Weber, Troeltsch was not a trained jurist and unlike Weber, he believed in the importance of natural law. Whether this was because Weber was not religiously inclined and Troeltsch was, or whether Weber was more sober-minded about the human condition, whereas Troeltsch believed more in ideals does not matter. What does matter is that Weber dismissed the doctrine of natural law but Troeltsch dedicated much of his scholarly life to understanding it. He uncovered its origins and traced its history. To him, it was not simply a legal doctrine that had historical importance, but rather, it was an ethical approach to social and political problems. It embodied some of the best values of European culture and the highest ideals of Western Christianity. Social justice was certainly something to work for, but Troeltsch was convinced that it would be rather empty if it lacked the ethical foundations which are found in the Christian doctrine of natural law.

Chapter Five The Problem of Historicism and Culture Introduction In the “Introduction” to this volume it was asserted that Troeltsch was not just a theologian, but he was also a sociologist, a political observer, and a philosopher. In fact, he held professorships in two disciplines—first in theology and then in philosophy.53 In the early 1900s Troeltsch published a number of writings on two aspects of philosophy—the theory of knowledge and on ethics; later in the decade and into the next, he published on another part of philosophy; namely, the philosophy of law. He also wrote several works in the area of the history of philosophy, concentrating primarily on certain members of the rationalist school, like Leibniz and Malebranche, and on the English moralists, like Locke and Hume. But Troeltsch’s most extensive work was in the area of the philosophy of history and his second massive book was devoted to this topic: Historismus und seine Probleme.54 If, as Austin Harrington has correctly observed, “Troeltsch has been a neglected figure in sociology” (Harrington 2004: 479), then Troeltsch has been an even more neglected figure in philosophy. This chapter cannot cover Troeltsch’s contributions to the various aspects of philosophy, but it can draw much needed attention to his work in one important area—the philosophy of history and its cultural implications. And, it will do so by concentrating on Der Historismus und seine Probleme. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section offers a brief history of historicism; the second provides a lengthy examination of Historismus, the third is a discussion of Troeltsch’s five lectures that he was to give in England, and the fourth is a survey of some the most important reviews of Troeltsch’s books on historicism.

|| 53 In “Die Stellung des Christentums unter den Weltreligionen”, which was the lecture that Troeltsch intended to deliver at Oxford, he claimed that it was his early need for contemplation and action that led him equally to theology and philosophy. See Troeltsch 1924: 62. 54 Jörg Dierken maintained that the philosophy of history stood at the center of Troeltsch’s scholarly life. The only other philosophical topic that begins to approximate this centrality was his interest in the philosophy of law. See Adair-Toteff 2005. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654653-006

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A Brief History of Historicism “Historicism” is a term which is often difficult to define and is one which is often easy to criticize. This is not the place to catalogue the complaints against the concept, but it is the one in which to attempt to provide a definition.55 Historicism can be roughly defined as the belief that there is no grand abstract theory of historical occurrences but that “history” is seen differently by different cultures and ages. Or, as Troeltsch provisionally defines it in Historismus: “the fundamental historicizing of our knowing and thinking”.56 As a result, there are no universal laws in history; instead, there are only accounts of individuals and individual times. Thus, there cannot be a “science” of history in the same way that there are sciences of physics, astronomy, chemistry, and other natural sciences. There can only be stories, and while they may be interesting and edifying, history is still composed of stories. Thus, while Herodotus and Thucydides wrote histories of ancient Greece, history as a discipline did not really exist until the nineteenth century. That is when two philosophers began thinking about a philosophy of history, namely, Schleiermacher and Hegel.57 While Schleiermacher’s reputation is primarily in theology, he was a firstrate philosopher. And while Hegel’s reputation is primarily in philosophy, his educational background and early interest were in theology and his theological interests are often present in his philosophical works. Schleiermacher’s translations of Plato’s dialogues and his extensive work on the history of religion prompted him to appreciate the importance of cultural nuances for our ability to understand. There is no doubt that he had learned much from Kant; however, his own work prompted him to develop his type of hermeneutics. When Hegel talked about history, he still regarded it as teleological; but, instead of leading to the Christian end of times, it was simply the unfolding of “spirit” through time. Nonetheless, Hegel was the one who insisted that history

|| 55 In “Krisis des Historismus” Troeltsch mentions that “Historismus” is a term of abuse (“Scheltwort”) and that it is an indication of an attack against complex historical science and a sign of the contemporary “general rebellion against science in general”. Troeltsch 2002: 437. 56 “…der grundsätzlichen Historisierung unseres Wissens und Denkens”. Troeltsch 2008: 177. 57 In his “Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Historismus und des Schleiermacherschen Individualitätsgedankens” Friedrich Meinecke allows that Hegel was crucial for the development of the importance of history, but he places more emphasis on Schleiermacher. He explains that Hegel’s concern was with reason but Schleiermacher’s was with the individual. Accordingly, in Meinecke’s estimation, Schleiermacher was more important for the study of history because it is the study of the human individual and not some type of philosophical absolute. See Meinecke 1965: 344−345, 354.

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was crucially important and he helped set the stage for the philosophical accounts of history which were promoted later in the century. Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Georg Simmel each offered theories regarding the philosophy of history and each of them play a role in Troeltsch’s Historicism. But it is a mistake to think that his book was merely a response to his three friends and colleagues, just as it is a mistake to think that he became preoccupied with the conception of history late in life. As Friedrich Wilhelm Graf observed in his extensive introduction to Der Historismus und seine Probleme, indications that Troeltsch was concerned with theories of history can be found in his writings from around 1900 (Graf 2008: 5−7). The difference is that those writings were primarily responses to others, whereas in Historismus Troeltsch intended to offer a positive account—one that could reconcile the conflict between actual events and normative judgments. Before turning to Historismus it is helpful to provide some contextual background. Since one of the fundamental tenets of historicism is that the historical circumstances help determine historical thought, it is appropriate to locate Troeltsch’s Historismus within the time frame during which he wrote it. The years range from 1916 until 1922 and during which time Germany was experiencing both severe political and economic disruptions. In terms of politics, Germany had been under an almost continuous state of emergency since the beginning of the war in August 1914 and its defeat in 1918 was followed by the revolutionary aftermath. In terms of economics, not only did Germany suffer the economic consequences of losing the war but also the financial burden from the costs of reparations. Thus, not only did the old German government collapse but Germany underwent an economic and even a cultural revolution as well (see Mommsen, 2001, especially chapters one through five). Germany was still a stable and prosperous country in 1903 when Wilhelm Dilthey referred to something like an “anarchy of values”.58 When Troeltsch spoke of the “anarchy of values” in 1922, Germany was reeling politically and economically. Thus, the “anarchy of values” indicated a far more immediate and a much more pressing problem than it had been for Dilthey.59

|| 58 Troeltsch mentions the “anarchy of values” (“Anarchie der Werte”) twice in Historismus. Troeltsch 2008: 196 and 314 and Note 20. See also Dierken 2000: 254. The actual phrase was “Anarchie der Überzeugungen” (“anarchy of convictions”) but the context of Dilthey’s comment makes it clear that his concern was about the historical flow and that it meant that nothing was stable. Thus, the “anarchy of convictions” , threatened to cause further instability and more confusion. Dilthey 1964: 9. 59 Christoph Schwöbel draws attention to the observation from one of Troeltsch’s students that Troeltsch had written Historismus during the troubling times of the war and its revolutionary aftermath. Schwöbel 2000: 261 and note 2.

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Troeltsch’s Historismus Troeltsch’s Der Historismus und seine Probleme is similar to his Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen in that both are massive works—the former is 777 pages while the latter is 994.60 He wrote Historismus as he did with Soziallehren—by publishing it first in sections and then putting it together with additions into a single volume.61 Unlike Soziallehren, which initially appeared in sections in one journal, the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Historismus was published as separate articles in a number of journals, including Historische Zeitschrift and Kant-Studien. In a letter to Paul Siebeck, his publisher, Troeltsch wrote that he had experimented with the process of publishing individual portions and then revising in accordance to comments and criticism, and that he felt that this process was worthwhile (quoted in Drescher 1991: 487). In “Meine Bücher” Troeltsch also drew attention to several important points regarding his Historismus book. He noted that his interest in historical conceptions was kindled in large measure by his reading of Friedrich Schleiermacher and his concern with the modern methodologies of historical investigations was prompted in large part by his reading of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert (Troeltsch 1925: 13–14). He also suggested that this was to be a two-volume work, with the first one focused on logical and epistemological issues. Graf noted that Troeltsch provided a concise account of his goal in Der Historismus und seine Probleme in a note. Paul Siebeck, Troeltsch’s publisher, had asked Troeltsch to write this note and it was published as part of the “new works” from the Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Troeltsch wrote that the book attempts to find a means to overcome the conflict between the strictly scientific investigations which make up history and the more general philosophical accounts that deal with what history is intended to be.62 || 60 See the first editions: Soziallehren (Troeltsch 1912) and Historismus (Troeltsch 1922). 61 Friedrich Wilhelm Graf suggested that Historismus was composed from twelve different works; some of which were published previously and some of which were not. See Graf 2000b: 14. In the “Editorischer Bericht” Graf and Schloßberger explain that Historismus was composed of twelve essays and other writings which Troeltsch published between summer 1916 and fall 1922. Graf and Schloßberger 2008: 83−84. A detailed account of what, when, and where Troeltsch published these essays and speeches is found in the “Editorischer Bericht”. Graf und Schloßberger, 2008: 86–124. Graf noted that Troeltsch’s piecemeal approach accounts partially for the fragmentary style and the apparent lack of unity of Historismus. However, Graf also indicates that it was also partially caused because Troeltsch was overworked from his teaching duties, his lecture obligations, as well as his political duties. Accordingly, he was forced to write late at night and needed to be fortified by strong coffee and cigars. Graf 2000b: 14. 62 Troeltsch 1925: 14−15. The note is in Graf 2000b: 9 and it was dated November 30, 1922.

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Troeltsch cites numerous thinkers; many of them he cites approvingly, and a number of them he simply criticizes. This applies to historical figures but perhaps more so to his contemporaries.63 The ones he appears to share ideas with include Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Windelband, and Wilhelm Dilthey. In fact, Troeltsch dedicated the book to the memories of Dilthey and Windelband (Troeltsch 1922a: V). The contemporary that Troeltsch appears to criticize the most was Oswald Spengler, who had just published his two-volume book chronicling the decline of the West.64 All four thinkers play large parts in Historismus. Der Historismus und seine Probleme is divided into four chapters. In the 1922 edition, three chapters are just around one hundred and ten pages and one which is just under five hundred pages. Given the size of Historismus it is impossible to provide a complete account of the work; but it is possible to offer an indication of some of the major points which Troeltsch made in each of the chapters.65 This is not an original approach to Troeltsch’s book; Friedrich Meinecke maintained that that was what he was primarily doing in his review of it (Meinecke 1965: 368). The first chapter lays out the problem of historicism but it is much more than a normal introduction. In it, Troeltsch discusses how the current crisis in history developed and he suggests that it began in part because of Nietzsche’s criticism of history and Marx’s replacement of the traditional historical investigations with new methods and new goals,. However, the crisis really developed with the impact of losing the war and its revolutionary chaos (Troeltsch 2008: 172–174). Troeltsch insists that the fundamental issue of modern life is what he terms “historicism” and he defines it as the “fundamental historicizing of our knowledge and thought” (Troeltsch 2008: 176–177). By historicizing knowledge, he

|| 63 Drescher maintained that Troeltsch’s investigation of historicism in general and his examination of “Geschichtslogik” in particular must be understood in the context of the new philosophy of history. Drescher used the term “Geistesgeschichte”. Drescher 1991: 493. Trutz Rendtorff insisted that Troeltsch’s work must be understood not only within the contemporary scholarly world, but also within the contemporary political stage. Rendtorff 2006: 286−287. 64 In his “Vorwort” Troeltsch declares that it is perhaps necessary to mention the relationship of his Historismus to Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes. In Troeltsch’s opinion, Spengler is the latest and the most extreme representative of the “organic” theory and he places Spengler together with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as atheists and critics of culture. It is evident that Troeltsch is declaring that his work in no way resembles that by Spengler and in his later remarks about him, it is evident that Troeltsch has little tolerance for the philosophical nonsense that Spengler promoted. Troeltsch 2008: 165. 65 To do full justice to Troeltsch’s Historismus und seine Probleme would require something comparable to Reinhard Laube’s Karl Mannheim und die Krise des Historismus. Laube’s book is 676 pages; a commentary on Troeltsch’s book would likely need to be even longer. See Laube 2004.

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meant a type of relativization, thus contributing to the growing gap between the universality of the natural sciences and the individuality of the historical sciences. Troeltsch maintains that unlike many of the natural sciences, philosophy of history is a modern creation, “a child of the 18th century” (“ein Kind des 18. Jahrhunderts”) (Troeltsch 2008: 179). He acknowledges that history predates that by thousands of years and he recognizes that it is found in the ancient Greeks and especially in the works of Herodotus and Thucydides (Troeltsch 2008: 181–182). Nonetheless, the study or science of history began to be developed by Leibniz and then by Kant, but it was not until Schleiermacher and Hegel that it was regarded as a genuine part of philosophy. Of course, Troeltsch allows that Schleiermacher and Hegel approached the philosophy of history differently; the former was influenced by the Romantics whereas the latter saw it as the embodiment of Reason (Troeltsch 2008: 189). But it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that scholars started investigating the philosophical presuppositions of history. Troeltsch names a dozen people, including Windelband and Rickert, but also Simmel and Weber (Troeltsch 2008: 194−195). Troeltsch also names Dilthey, who had a great sense of history, and whose perspective gave rise to what is called the “anarchy of values” (“Anarchie der Werte”) (Troeltsch 2008: 196). Troeltsch suggests that there are two ways for the philosophy of history to develop: first, by the “formal historical logic” (“formale Geschichtslogik”) and second, by the “substantial construction of process” (“inhaltliche Konstruktion des Prozesses”) (Troeltsch 2008: 197). Troeltsch distinguishes between elementary logic and formal historical logic by briefly indicating that the former employs judgments and conclusions and works with the principles of identity and contradiction (Troeltsch 2008: 199). He spends most of this section discussing what formal historical logic is. It is based upon logical presuppositions; namely, the selection and the principles of formulation and connection (Troeltsch 2008: 201). These presuppositions differ radically from those in the natural sciences; they are not abstract and universal, but deal with what he calls the “category of the individual totality” (“Kategorie der individuellen Totalität”) (Troeltsch 2008: 205). He differentiates his category from the “collective individualities” (“Kollektivindividualitäten”) of the seventeenth century. His differs from those of “state” (“Staat”) and “people” (“Volk”) and embody the concepts of “originality and uniqueness” (“Ursprünglichkeit und Einmaligkeit”) (Troeltsch 2008: 207, 210). It employs a process of “selection” (“Auslese”) aimed at what is “essential” (“wesentlich”) (Troeltsch 2008: 212). Troeltsch notes the similarity to Tönnies’ “Gemeinschaft” and “Wesenwille”, but he notes that it is closer to the “great man theory” (Troeltsch 2008: 216−218, 223−224). More

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important is the fundamental concept of the “historical individuality” (“historische Individualität”) which is an attempt to develop an account of the individual as formed by historical forces (Troeltsch 2008: 227, 231−234). Troeltsch insists that this account is not intended to be an accurate reflection of an actual historical individual in historical occurrences as it is a process of explanation; thus, he cites the similarity with Max Weber’s doctrine of “ideal types”.66 Troeltsch insists that this is a great deal but he allows that this does not exhaust the discussion. In the next section he examines the second way, the “material philosophy of history” (“materiale Geschichtsphilosophie”) (Troeltsch 2008: 241). It is perhaps an overstatement to say that Troeltsch was disappointed in the emptiness of the formal philosophy of history just as it is probably an overstatement to suggest that he had a more favorable opinion of the materialist philosophy of history. In this section he says very little about Marx and Marxist philosophy, but he does indicate his preference for those thinkers who connect history to ethics and see history as progressing to some final end. Troeltsch believes that the “purposelessness” of the formal philosophy of history is a major deficiency and that the materialistic philosophy rectified it (Troeltsch 2008: 242−243). For the logicians, history is formal and meaningless, but for the materialistic it has content and meaning. In other words, it employs imperatives (“Sollen”) and it involves having a “final value” (“Endwert”) (Troeltsch 2008: 248−249, 252). It may be similar to a “science”, but it is closer to ethics. That is why Troeltsch invokes the ethical treatments of history by Schleiermacher and by Hegel (Troeltsch 2008: 254, 256−257). Troeltsch maintains that “naturalism” and “historicism” are the two greatest scientific creations of the modern world and he suggests that the former looks “outward” whereas the latter looks “inward”. He traces the importance of the analysis of consciousness of modern philosophy to Descartes (Troeltsch 2008: 283). However, this larger difference between the “natural philosophy” (“Naturphilosophie”) and “historical philosophy” (“Geschichtsphilosophie”) is found in the “logical methodological foundation” (“logisch-methodische Begründung”) of the former and the “factual-philosophical connection” (“sachlich-philosophische Zusammenfassung”) of the latter (Troeltsch 2008: 286). He noted that some of the Neo-Kantians appear to have a preference for the certainty of the natural sciences, but that many of them trace their devotion to history back to Hegel and Dilthey. Troeltsch names Ernst Cassirer as a member of the former group and he

|| 66 Troeltsch 2008: 238−239. Weber’s notion of “ideal types” is frequently misunderstood, but he intended them to be heuristic devices which can be employed to explain. He never suggested that ideal types can actually be found; rather, they were epistemological aids to understanding.

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lists Rickert as a representative of the latter. As much as Troeltsch admires the rigor in the natural sciences, his affinity is with the historical ones. Accordingly, he praises Rickert for his path-clearing work (Troeltsch 2008: 291). The second chapter is Troeltsch’s discussion of certain key points in the history of the philosophy of history. However, despite its being composed of more than one hundred pages, it is not the fullest examination. He begins by distinguishing between the teleology that has a “final eternal goal” (“letzter ewiger Zweck”) and the type that has a sense of progress (Troeltsch 2008: 299). He then notes that there is a progression in the approaches to history; beginning with the traditional “empirical history”, progressing to the modern formal logic of history, to the material philosophy of history (Troeltsch 2008: 303). Once again, he credits the Romantic thinkers with prompting this final type because of their preoccupation with ideals and possibilities (Troeltsch 2008: 306). Troeltsch contends that one of the most important challenges is to attempt to connect the “historical individual” (“Historisch-Individuelles”) with the “universally valid” (“Allgemeingültiges”) (Troeltsch 2008: 306). As he did earlier, he allows that he is building upon Rickert’s work with the rejection of Ranke’s conception of history as the “showing how it really happened” (Troeltsch 2008: 308). But, Troeltsch also looks back to Schleiermacher and also to Dilthey; he credits the former for treating the national spirit as connected to God, and he praises Dilthey for again describing the modern situation as an “anarchy of values” (Troeltsch 2008: 314). He briefly discusses the treatment of history by Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche and he notes how history is initially regarded as being important by Hegel but that by Nietzsche’s time, it is more or less despised (Troeltsch 2008: 330−331, 339). Troeltsch again returns to Rickert and he praises him for the “most remarkable and most informative” (“merkwürdigste und lehrreichste”) doctrine and for attempting to fight skepticism by developing a “system of values” (“Wertsystem”) (Troeltsch 2008: 342−346). Unfortunately, Rickert’s system is too abstract and too pure; it is too “alien to life” (“lebensfremd”) and “antagonistic to life” (“lebensfeindlich”) (Troeltsch 2008: 347−348). Troeltsch’s conclusion seems to be that it is misguided to follow Rickert’s attempt to connect the historical individual to a system of universal values. Thus, Troeltsch’s next endeavor is to try to connect the historical individual to “ethical universals” (“zum Ethisch-Allgemeinen”) (Troeltsch 2008: 349−350). He claims that only by proceeding in this manner of emphasizing ethics can the historical individual be connected to an universal standard, and that this universal standard in a “cultural synthesis” (“Kultursynthese”) that displays “apriority” and “objectivity” (Troeltsch 2008: 371). Troeltsch insists that in regards to history, “apriority” and “objectivity” does not mean, and cannot, mean “timelessness,

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eternity, universal validity and the absoluteness of measurement” (“Zeitlosigkeit, Ewigkeit, Allgemeingültigkeit, und Absolutheit der Maßstäbe”) (Troeltsch 2008: 375). Those properties can be found in the laws of the natural sciences, but it is inappropriate to expect to discover the same types of laws in the historical sciences. Instead, Troeltsch suggests that we focus our investigation on the concept of “humanity” (“Menschheit”/“Humanität”) and that also implies a type of development (Troeltsch 2008: 378, 388). However, he does not mean a single, rigid, teleological type of development like that found in Marxist theory, and this is made evident by Troeltsch’s invocation of comparatives. He writes of “comparative art”, “comparative legal history”, and of Weber’s “comparative sociology” (Troeltsch 2008: 383, 390). In the final section of this chapter Troeltsch turns to the discussion of “history and the doctrine of values” (“Historie und Wertlehre”) (Troeltsch 2008: 393). It is here that Troeltsch looks to Friedrich Meineke for some answers about the doctrine of values and especially to Meinecke’s book Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat. (Troeltsch 2008: 394−395, 408−411). What Troeltsch appears to derive from Meinecke is the process by which the universal can be connected to the individual, for Meinecke it apparently is the connection between being a citizen of the world and a citizen of a nation state. For Troeltsch, it is the doctrine of values which connects the realm of facts with the realm of the ideals (Troeltsch 2008: 404, 410). Troeltsch does not clarify or expand upon his account, but devotes the next chapter to an historical investigation of the philosophy of history. The third chapter is almost 600 pages in the Kritische Gesamtausgabe and in it Troeltsch examines the views of more than three dozen thinkers. These thinkers are mostly from the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, and represent a wide range of philosophies from German Idealism to Marxism to Nietzsche to Positivism to Neo-Kantianism. Rather than attempting to offer a discussion of all of these, there are two major thinkers who should be treated here and that is because Troeltsch spends much time on Rickert and Hegel. Troeltsch makes it clear that he finds much to like in Rickert’s philosophy of history. He approves of Rickert’s distinction between the universal laws of natural sciences and the individual values of the historical sciences. In this, he also approves of the earlier distinction that Wilhelm Windelband had made between the nomothetic natural sciences and the ideographic historical ones.67

|| 67 Sometimes Troeltsch writes “Windelband-Rickert” and sometimes he simply writes Rickert. It is sometimes difficult to ascertain why he chooses one or the other, but it is clear that he often thinks of Rickert as simply following his former teacher and sometimes thinks that Rickert was wrong in departing from him. There are at least two instances in which Troeltsch believed that

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Troeltsch focuses on two of Rickert’s books, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft and Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. The former is a much shorter and a more popular version of the latter, and both went through a number of editions. Rickert’s major point was that we can never know reality in its objective totality and like Kant, believes that we subjectively select parts in order to create an historical individual (Troeltsch 2006: 426−427). Unfortunately, Rickert was too indebted to Kant’s epistemological psychology and that was reflected in his over-reliance on psychology in developing his concept of historical sciences. The other problem that Troeltsch finds in Rickert’s work again can be traced back to Kant’s influence and that is the emphasis on the static and the minimizing the importance of the dynamic in history (Troeltsch 2006: 426, 428). Thus, Rickert failed to appreciate the notion of “development” in history and it also contributed to his “anti-metaphysical” approach (Troeltsch 2006: 431, 433). Fortunately, there was someone who rejected Kant’s similar “anti-metaphysics” and who appreciated movement in history—Hegel. Troeltsch is not particularly interested in either Hegel’s philosophy of religion or his philosophy of history, but he is rather concerned with Hegel’s employment of dialectic. Troeltsch looks back to Leibniz and his preoccupation with reason, system, and unity but in his mind, it was Hegel who not only successfully employed each of these philosophical concepts, but also added the notions of dialectics and dynamics (Troeltsch 2006: 443). Troeltsch acknowledges that Hegel had learned much from Kant about abstract metaphysics and much from Herder about the living individual, but he is convinced that Hegel developed the notion of the “historical life” (“historisches Leben”) on his own (Troeltsch 2006: 446−447). And, it was Hegel who was convinced that each individual contained his or her own entire history. The question was how to combine the single and irreproducible individual with the universal and striving of reason? Troeltsch insisted that Hegel’s answer was through the concept of dialectic and power of dynamic (Troeltsch 2006: 448−451). Troeltsch notes that Hegel has been frequently misunderstood and this is particularly true regarding his notion of dialectic. Hegel never thought that dialectic could be predictive; rather, he always maintained that total understanding can come only with the completion of

|| Rickert was wrong and Windelband was right: 1) in the contrast between Windelband’s more cautious and relativistic approach and Rickert’s more rationalistic and dogmatic one. 2) That Rickert remained too indebted to Kant while Windelband grew to appreciate Hegel. Troeltsch 2006: 416−417, 422, 431.

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history. That is why Hegel insisted that the “owl of Minerva” flies only at dusk.68 This does not imply that Hegel was a quietist or that he believed that causality plays a role in history. Instead, Hegel believed that one actively lives one’s life and that it is dialectic and not causality that informs it (Troeltsch 2006: 460). Troeltsch concludes with some observations on Hegel’s notion of the state. While Hegel insisted that the state embodied “objective reason” (“objektive Vernunft”), it did not mean that the state was somehow determined. Rather, the state provided the conditions which allow for the “progress in consciousness of freedom” (“Fortschritte im Bewußtsein der Freiheit”) (Troeltsch 2006: 466 and Editors’ Note 58). This freedom is found in Europe and it is here that one finds the “spirit in history”. Hegel insisted that one can know only one’s self; thus, European history can only be known by Europeans (Troeltsch 2006: 473−478). But, Hegel’s most important contribution was the “idea of the historical dynamic” (“Idee der historischen Dynamik”) (Troeltsch 2006: 482). The fourth chapter is, like the first one, much more than the typical conclusion. This is due to two reasons; first, its comparatively long length, and second, its conclusions are mostly negative—with Troeltsch only hinting at the positive account that was to follow in the second volume of Der Historismus und seine Probleme. However, it was not totally negative and the title suggests the positive direction: “Ueber den Aufbau der europäischen Kulturgeschichte”. Kittsteiner reminds us that Troeltsch’s use of the term “Aufbau” refers us back to Dilthey’s “Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften” and Troeltsch utilizes the reference to remind us that the Hegelian attempt at setting out a world history is no longer possible (Kittsteiner 2006: 24). What Troeltsch wants to do is to set out two mutually related theses of his material philosophy of history: the “present cultural synthesis” (“gegenwärtige Kultursynthese”) and the “universal history” (“Universalgeschichte”) (Troeltsch 2006: 1008, 1111). Troeltsch regards this as circular, thus the notion of the “history of development” (“Entwicklungsgeschichte”) becomes problematic (1017). Before turning to that discussion, Troeltsch wants to clarify what he means by “Europeanism”. Troeltsch is not to be accused of being “Eurocentric” because he does not believe that all of history is European (Kittsteiner 2006: 26; Troeltsch 2006: 1023). This is not because of an issue of values, but of an issue of knowledge. We can only have a “world history” (“Weltgeschichte”) of Europe. That is because we can know only our world and Troeltsch emphasizes that his term of “world history” is far more modest that its historical usage (Troeltsch 2006: 1025). Thus, Troeltsch || 68 “Nur am Ende malt die Philosophie ihr Grau in Grau, nur mit Dämmerung erst beginnt der Vogel der Minerva seinen Flug.” Troeltsch 2006: 457.

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takes issue once again with Spengler for his Romantic notion (and the title of the second volume) of the all-encompassing “world historical perspectives” (“Welthistorische Perspektiven”) (Troeltsch 2006: 1030). Troeltsch also rejects the traditional notion of the steps of historical development (Troeltsch 2006: 1042). He rejects it in its various forms, whether it is economical (like Weber and Schumpeter), historical (like Eduard Meyer), philosophical (like Hegel), or theological (like Harnack) (Troeltsch 2006: 1042−1046, 1050). Troeltsch praises Hegel for emphasis on history and his acute sense of it, but he faults him for having a “purely ideological” (“rein ideologische”) periodization.69 His objection is similar to his objection to the traditional notion of “world history”; because just as there cannot be a truly universal history, there cannot be a truly objective periodization (Troeltsch 2006: 1070, 1080). Before attempting to conclude his book, Troeltsch posits two questions. The first is what type of cultural periodization is possible? and the second is when does modernity begin? (Troeltsch 2006: 1082). Troeltsch admits that the first question is difficult to answer while the second is slightly easier (Troeltsch 2006: 1082, 1087). Regarding the first, a possible solution would likely require not only “new presuppositions and new goals,” (“neue Voraussetzungen und neue Zielpunkte”) but also some “faith” (“Glaube”) (Troeltsch 2006: 1083). Troeltsch insists that the modern age began with the break with absolutism and confessionalism (Troeltsch 2006: 1088). However, he also maintains that the beginning of the modern age can be regarded in a larger and a narrower sense. It began in the larger sense in the fifteenth century with the introduction of the new military and official states and in the narrower sense it began later with the English Revolution and the Enlightenment (Troeltsch 2006: 1088–1089). However, Troeltsch identifies four key periods that help give raise to the modern world: 1) the early Grecian period and with it the Hebraic Prophets, 2) the classical Greek period, 3) the Greco-Roman period of imperialism and finally, 4) the great expanse between antiquity and modernity, the occidental Middle Ages (Troeltsch 1090−1092). Troeltsch suggests that his examination results in a philosophical account of history that is unitary and substantial, one that does not contain superfluous material. However, he states that it cannot be set out here but will be in the second volume (Troeltsch 2006: 1093). The final paragraph of Historismus contains one of Troeltsch’s most repeated (and most misunderstood) phrases: “The idea of the construction means history through history….” (“Die Idee des Aufbaues heißt Geschichte durch Geschichte….”) (Troeltsch 2006: 1098; Rentdorff 2006: 285). But, what Troeltsch actually meant by that will never be known with certainty, because all we have regarding this is || 69 Troeltsch faults Spengler for the same reason. Troeltsch 2006: 1054−1055, 1062.

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the volume of speeches which Troeltsch was scheduled to give. How much they reflect his considered views will also never be known.70

Troeltsch’s “Overcoming” Historicism Troeltsch had long established his reputation in countries outside of Germany and one in which he was considered a major thinker was in Great Britain. For his part, Troeltsch had long been impressed with much of Britain’s cultural heritage and had long been interested in visiting it. The war made it impossible and it was not until 1920 that he would be able to visit Britain. The visit was arranged by Friedrich von Hügel, one of the leading Catholic scholars in Britain and one who had corresponded with Troeltsch beginning in 1901 (von Hügel, 1924: V−VI). Troeltsch was scheduled to give five lectures in Great Britain during March of 1923. The first three were to be given in London, the fourth in Edinburg, and the final one back in London. Unfortunately, he died unexpectedly on February 1, 1923. Von Hügel arranged for the publication of Troeltsch’s lectures under the now contested title Der Historismus und seine Überwindung. It is contested because the work’s title in English is Christian Thought and its Application which reveals that Troeltsch’s topic is on theological issues and not on philosophical ones. Furthermore, a glance at the titles of two of the five lectures indicates this reading: “Die Stellung des Christentums unter den Weltreligionen” and “Politik, Patriotismus, Religion”. Furthermore, while the title of the three related lectures suggests a connection to historicism “Ethik und Geschichtsphilosophie”, the individual titles do not: “Die Persönlichkeits- und Gewissenmoral”, “Die Ethik der Kulturwerte”, and “Der Gemeingeist”. It is only when one examines these lectures closely that one finds hints about Troeltsch’s views regarding historicism. In “Die Persönlichkeits- und Gewissensmoral” Troeltsch repeats his claim that the “central theme” of his recent thinking is the relationship between “the endless movement of the historical stream” and the general human need for fixed norms (Troeltsch 1924: 1). For Troeltsch, the need for fixed norms can only be found in ethics, or as he refers to it, the “ethical consciousness” (Troeltsch 1924: 5, 7). This is one’s “conscience” (“Gewissen”) and Troeltsch briefly traces its role for Socrates, the Stoa, and Christianity, and he claims that it is the “divine commands” (“göttliche Forderungen”) to do one’s duty (Troeltsch 1924: 9). It is by listening to one’s conscience that one is able to limit the impact of historical

|| 70 Christoph Schwöbel noted that no one has been able to discover any papers that would indicate Troeltsch’s thoughts regarding the projected second volume. Schwöbel 2000: 261.

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relativism (Troeltsch 1924: 20). In “Die Ethik der Kulturwerte” Troeltsch returns again to the Greeks and claims that Plato’s famous doctrine of morals contains four cardinal virtues. Two of them deal with knowledge and coordination: “Sophia” for knowing and “Dikaiosyne” for harmony. But, two of them are connected to conscience,: “Andreia” (“courage”) and “Sophrosyne” (“moderation”). Troeltsch again links Stoic morality to “moral conscience” (“Gewissensmoral”) and to natural law (Troeltsch 1924: 23−24). However, his major theme is to connect conscience to theology; while “cultural values” are based upon temporal foundations, “Gewissensmoral” is timelessly valid (Troeltsch 1924: 29, 33). It is the sense of responsibility that is found in “Gewissensmoral” that actually allows us freedom (Troeltsch 1924: 40−41). Yet, in “Der Gemeingeist” Troeltsch seems to be both doubtful that a solution can be given for the problem of historical relativism and yet he remains hopeful. There cannot be “A radical and absolute solution” (“Eine radikale und absolute Lösung”) for “overcoming” history because we are bound by it, and the Kingdom of God and Nirvana lie beyond history (Troeltsch 1924: 60). It appears that in this life we are helpless to find a solution to the problem of values in history, and it is only in the next that we can have hope to find it (Troeltsch 1924: 61). In light of this, anyone hoping to find Troeltsch’s “solution” in the second volume is likely to be disappointed. For those who read and reviewed the first volume, there was criticism, but rarely was there disappointment.

Troeltsch’s Critics There were more than 120 reviews of Historicism, either on it as the book or on some of its prior publications as articles. Reviewers included theologians, such as Adolf Harnack, Walther Köhler, and Paul Tillich, historians, such as Georg von Below, Friedrich Meinecke, and Otto Hintze, philosophers, such as Paul Barth, Benedetto Croce, and Arthur Liebert, and sociologists, such as Ferdinand Tönnies, Alfred Vierkandt, and Siegfried Kracauer.71 These reviewers did not always agree, either with Troeltsch or with each other, but almost all of them praised Troeltsch for his impressive diagnostic skills. In contrast, most of his critics remained relatively silent about his positive account. Some of this was because he had yet to provide anything more than a few hints, while some of it was because of the direction that these hints indicated. Troeltsch was convinced that the answer to the problem of historicism could not be found in history,

|| 71 See the extensive list in Graf und Nees (2000): 285−288.

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philosophy, or sociology; but, as Kittsteiner indicated, he believed that it could be found only in religion (Kittsteiner 2006: 21). Furthermore, since the first volume was primarily a critical account and the (unwritten) second volume was intended to contain the positive account, it is understandable that they would have focused primarily on Troeltsch’s diagnosis of the problems with historicism. The critics considered here are Tillich, Tönnies, Hintze, Meinecke, Mannheim, and Heussi. Paul Tillich had not yet achieved the worldly fame at the time that he wrote his review of Troeltsch’s Historismus, but by 1924 he had already published a significant number of books and articles and had established such a reputation that he was appointed to a professorship in Marburg.72 In the same year Tillich published two pieces on Troeltsch; the one in Kant-Studien was an evaluation of Troeltsch’s work and influence, while the one in the Theologische Literaturzeitung was the review of Historismus. And, he published another short work on Troeltsch in 1923; taken together, all three reveal Tillich’s great respect for Troeltsch as a scholar and as a leader. In “Zum Tode von Ernst Troeltsch” (1923) Tillich admitted that he had never heard Troeltsch lecture but that he was under Troeltsch’s influence for twenty years (Tillich 1980: 175). He described Troeltsch as a pathfinder and in different areas, but especially in the area of the philosophy of history. In Troeltsch’s first hour of lecturing at Berlin, he reminded his audience that he was lecturing on the philosophy of history for the first time since Hegel— almost a hundred years (Tillich 1980: 177). In 1924 Tillich offered a fuller account of Troeltsch and in this “Ernst Troeltsch. Ein Versuch einer geistgeschichtlichen Würdigung” Tillich divided Troeltsch’s interest into three types of philosophy: philosophy of religion, social philosophy, and the philosophy of history. For Tillich, as for Troeltsch, all three were important, but Tillich believed that the first two culminated in the third (Tillich 1980d: 171). Tillich observed that it is in the Historismus book that Troeltsch takes up the critical issue of relativism. But he also noted that this was not so much a polemical book but one which was mostly a scholarly book. Tillich praised Troeltsch for remaining faithful to his task and he extolled the book for being filled with rich historical accounts (Tillich 1980d: 171−172). He discussed how Troeltsch destroyed the old belief in the various kinds of “absolute” and he wrote about how Troeltsch was able to discredit the Hegelian kind (Tillich 1980d: 172). But Tillich noted that Troeltsch not only provided a destructive account but that he also provided a rather positive one—in his emphasis on the “dynamic” in history. Unfortunately, despite the immeasurable || 72 Troeltsch actually cites Tillich and his 1922/1923 article “Kairos” in the final chapter of Historismus. Troeltsch 2008: 1015 and 1016 editors’ note 14.

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fullness of material, Troeltsch was doomed to fail. It was the tragedy of not just Troeltsch, but of Troeltsch’s generation, to seek to find some solid footing in the dynamic stream of history. It was to Troeltsch’s credit that he not only tried but in doing so, showed that it is critically important to combine the striving for historical knowledge with the striving for improving the world. Tillich concluded by observing that this was Troeltsch’s notion of “knowing” (“Erkennen”) and that it served “equally [in] life and deed” (“zugleich Leben und Tat ist”) (Tillich 1980d: 174). In “Der Historismus und seine Probleme. Zum gleichnamigen Buch von Ernst Troeltsch” Tillich noted that it had been a year since Troeltsch “was taken from us” and that we cannot expect the promised second volume. However, Tillich announced that the fourth volume of Troeltsch’s Gesammelte Schriften would be appearing shortly and suggested that would contain much of Troeltsch’s work on the philosophy of history (Tillich 1980d: 204). Unfortunately, that was not to be the case. Tillich’s extensive review essay is composed of two parts; in the first he provides a concise and accurate overview of each of the seven chapters and in the second he provides his evaluation. The first is worth reading in its own right, but it is the second which is important here. Tillich describes how Troeltsch takes Rickert’s opposition between the individualizing and the generalizing methods as his point of departure but that he impressively builds upon Rickert’s theory by stressing that the historian is not interested in the individual as such, but in the individual as totality (Tillich 1980d: 207). Troeltsch improves upon Rickert in a second way and that is by stressing the form or group. Tillich points to Troeltsch’s (life-long) concern with biology as that which informs Troeltsch’s notion of form.73 Tillich also notes that Troeltsch’s emphasis on the “historic dynamic” was nothing less than a breakthrough, and that the historical concept looks both backwards and forward in time (Tillich 1980d: 208). Nonetheless, Troeltsch failed, not because he wanted to reintroduce metaphysics but that he was unwilling to accept metaphysics as the foundation for his philosophy of history. Tillich believed even by insisting on metaphysics Troeltsch’s philosophy of history still lacked the necessary foundation and that the “entire building” (der “ganze Bau”) was “floating in the air” (“schwebt … in der Luft”) (Tillich 1980d: 209). Despite this negative conclusion, Tillich closed on some mostly positive notes. Troeltsch was correct to maintain that we can understand ourselves only as far as our cre-

|| 73 In “Meine Bücher” Troeltsch wrote about growing up in his parents’ house where his physician father approved of Troeltsch’s early interest in natural sciences and encouraged his son to become a physician as well. Troeltsch. 1925: 1.

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ative powers will take us, and he was also right to insist that we can know ourselves within European culture (Tillich 1980d: 209−210). However, Tillich ends by again insisting that Troeltsch’s account could never be complete without accepting that we need a “metaphysical history” (“Geschichtsmetaphysik”) but that he again commends him for combining the scholarly with the normative (Tillich 1980d: 210−211). Whether one agrees with Tillich’s criticisms of Troeltsch’s historicism, it is clear that Tillich had a complete and accurate account of Troeltsch’s philosophy of history. The same thing may not be said about Ferdinand Tönnies. Tönnies and Troeltsch had known each other for a long time; they were both founding members of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie. And, while they had different opinions regarding the role of mystics and sects in the sociology of religion and the role of sociology in general, they had a fairly high regard for one another. Several years after Troeltsch had died, Tönnies wrote a review of Der Historismus und seine Probleme. Entitled “Tröltsch und die Philosophie der Geschichte” it was more than just a review of one book; rather, it was also a review of Troeltsch’s approach to scholarship. On one hand, Tönnies applauded Troeltsch’s book because it was addressing the “crisis of history” and for writing it at the “right time”. Like Tönnies, Troeltsch believed the “crisis of history” was identical to the “crisis of the modern world”. Like many other critics, Tönnies appreciated Troeltsch’s diagnostic acumen, but he was less certain about his suggested solutions. That is because Troeltsch was both a Christian theologian and a university professor, and was inclined to compromise. Like Marx, Tönnies disliked and disapproved of compromising, and he doubted that one could even be found regarding the “crisis of history”. Nonetheless, Tönnies expressed regret that Troeltsch never lived to write the second volume of Historismus (Tönnies 1925: 381−382, 404, 416−418, 429). Like Tönnies, Otto Hintze and Friedrich Meinecke knew Troeltsch both professionally and personally. They knew him professionally because of their positions at the university in Berlin and they knew him personally because they lived in close proximity to each other and met on a regular basis.

Hintze As with many others, Otto Hintze believed that historicism was a particularly German phenomenon which roots were found in its philosophy but which burst onto the general scene because of the loss of the war and the accompanying political, social, and economic disasters (Hintze 1964: 323, 329). He notes that its

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rise can be found in two, related strains; one was the strain that Troeltsch represented, which grew out of the rationalism of Leibniz and then Hegel and Ranke. The other was the one that Spengler represents, which developed from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Both seemed to lead to skepticism and relativism, although Troeltsch’s type was more optimistic while Spengler’s was more pessimistic (Hintze 1964: 324−326). Hintze focused primarily on Troeltsch and while he appeared to think highly of his diagnosis of historicism, he also made it clear that he thought that Troeltsch was often wrong. One of Hintze’s complaints was that Troeltsch was too quick to condemn psychology, whereas Hintze believed that it could generally play an important role in science, and particularly in historical investigations (Hintze 1964: 333, 350, 364). Hintze also lauded Troeltsch for following Rickert and his emphasis on values (Hintze 1964 336, 339, 343, 360−362). However, Hintze believed that Troeltsch really erred in his insistence on finding a “standard” (“Maßstab”), which Hintze did not believe could exist, and in Troeltsch’s fear of relativism, which he believed was overly exaggerated (Hintze 1964: 363−365). Finally, Hintze contended that Troeltsch tended to try to “spiritualize” history, by which he believed that Germany was somehow more Godly and was spiritually superior to Russia and to the United States (Hintze 1964: 357, 367). This led Troeltsch to minimize the importance of the state as well as economic factors, which Hintze found troubling not only because Troeltsch did that, but that he apparently ignored the crucial views of his friends Friedrich Meinecke and Max Weber (Hintze 1964: 331, 349, 370). Troeltsch’s preoccupation with his “idea” of the “individual totality” and his insistence on the primacy of German values prevented him from understanding the natural flow of historical events and developing a more realistic philosophy of history.

Meinecke Friedrich Meinecke was not only a friend and colleague of Troeltsch but also shared many of his scholarly and political views. This latter view is revealed in Meinecke’s introduction to Troeltsch’s Spectator-Briefe where he wrote that Troeltsch was not, like Luther, inclined towards a passive type who sought peace in God, but was, like Calvin, a fighter for God. He was, in Meinecke’s opinion, a truly political man. For Troeltsch as a political thinker and as a scholar, the relativism of historicism was one of the most difficult challenges of modern culture (Meinecke 1965: 379−380). In his review of Historismus Meinecke suggested that Troeltsch’s book could be summed up in two phrases—one from Heraclitus and the other from Archimedes—“everything flows” and “give me a point upon which I can stand” (Meinecke 1965: 369). Meinecke pointed out that

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Troeltsch’s philosophy differed from most others; it lacked their universal abstraction and instead was concretely historical (Meinecke 1965: 368). In this, Troeltsch differed from Hegel, Ranke, Marx, and others. His study of these thinkers showed him how German historical thinking led to the precariously present. It was Troeltsch’s real fear about the “Wertanarchie” that prompted Troeltsch to become more of a philosopher (Meinecke 1965: 370). For Troeltsch, the central concept of his “doctrine of value” (“Wertlehre”) was the individual. However, “individual” did not simply mean a single person, but rather a “collective picture”, whether it was of history, nation, or religion (Meinecke 1965: 374, 376). What Meinecke counts as one of Troeltsch’s greatest gifts, was the ability to recognize the antinomy that exists between the “demands of science” (“Forderungen der Wissenschaft”) and the “entire life” (“Gesamtleben”) (Meinecke 1965: 378). Nonetheless, Meinecke also contended that one of Troeltsch’s greatest failures was his inability to resolve this antinomy. Meinecke’s review is not just a review of Historicism, but it is also a lament for the loss of a great friend and a great man. Not only was Troeltsch taken from the close circle of friends, but the world was denied knowledge of Troeltsch’s fixed Archimedian point from which to survey and to judge the flow of history (Meinecke 1965: 367).

Mannheim Karl Mannheim’s “Historismus” is a lengthy article which was published in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik in 1924. It is a discussion of the problem of historicism, which Mannheim insists, cannot be avoided whether one wishes to or not (Mannheim 1964: 246). Mannheim’s essay is worth reading in its entirety, but the focus here is only on the section that Mannheim devotes to Troeltsch’s Historismus. Like Max Weber, Mannheim employs “ideal types” in that he uses Troeltsch as a representative of a certain type of philosopher of history (Mannheim 1964: 262). Like Meinecke, Mannheim believes that Troeltsch’s central concept is the “individual totality” (“individuelle Totalität”) (Mannheim 1964: 265, 274). Mannheim notes the contrast between the notion of “truth” for the non-historical philosopher and the historically oriented one. The former believed the truth was a time-less abstract truth that was universal; the latter holds that truth is chronologically and culturally dependent (Mannheim 1964: 266). He also notes that Kant helped challenge this, not by valuing history, but by proving that objectivity is not given by the object but is determined by the cognitive subject. Troeltsch follows Kant in this but he also insists on the importance of becoming, thus one of Troeltsch’s major concepts is the “concepts of

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development” (“Entwicklungsbegriffe”) (Mannheim 1964: 264−265, 273, 275). Troeltsch’s further contribution is to show that historical truths cannot be separated by historical values, and that both are bound up with the flow of history. If there is to be a “stand point” (“Standort”) it will have to be both inside and outside of this flow (Mannheim 1964: 271, 273). Like the rapid stream of history, Troeltsch’s philosophical approach is equally fluid; Mannheim praises Troeltsch’s approach because it is passionate and immediate, and it is not a disinterested and peaceful observation. Mannheim noted that because of Troeltsch’s premature death, his work would remain a torso. But, in looking at the speeches which were collected in Historismus und seine Überwindung, Mannheim was convinced that even if Troeltsch had lived long enough to write the second volume of Historismus, he would not be saying anything essentially new. This is partially because the core of Troeltsch’s thinking about historicism can be found as early as 1904. In Mannheim’s opinion, this is not necessarily a bad thing, and he concludes by praising Troeltsch as one who was able to provide the key diagnosis of the problems of historicism (Mannheim 1964: 275−276).

Heussi Karl Heussi was not an historian like Hintze and Meinecke, or a sociologist like Mannheim; rather, he was a theologian like Tillich. Unlike Tillich, Heussi was at the height of his distinguished career; yet, his Krisis des Historismus seems like the final shot from the older generation. Heussi wanted to resurrect the faith in absolute truth and he needed to try to counter the role that historicism played in its destruction. Heussi observed that the term historicism was rarely heard in 1913, but a decade later it was frequently used. While Heussi did not explicitly place the blame on Troeltsch, it is clear that he thought that he was largely responsible (Heussi 1932: 5). Like Mannheim, Heussi believed that Troeltsch’s concept of historicism had not undergone much of a change, and like him he locates the origin of it around 1904. Heussi insists that Troeltsch’s definition of historicism “is the fundamental historicizing of our knowledge and our thoughts” (“die grundsätzliche Historisierung unseres Wissens und Denkens”) and he maintains that Troeltsch is preoccupied with “becoming” (Heussi 1932: 13). It is this preoccupation with “becoming” that is a mark of most scholars who were writing about history beginning around 1900. However, its importance was not felt until after the war (Heussi 1932: 21). Heussi blames not just Troeltsch but others; in particular, he singles out Spengler and Stefan George (Heussi 1932: 30, 75, 90). These two writers have led directly to relativism (Heussi 1932: 66−68).

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But, Heussi believes that it was Troeltsch who, drawing from Dilthey, introduced the notion of the “anarchy of values” (Heussi 1932: 73). It was Troeltsch who followed Dilthey who suggested that “The pure light of truth is only to be seen in various broken streams” (“Das reine Licht der Wahrheit ist nur in verschieden gebrochenem Strahl für uns zu erblicken”) (Heussi 1932: 74). And, he suggests that Troeltsch may be caught up in this “faith in the future” (“Fortschrittsglaube”) (Heussi 1932: 79). Heussi’s answer is to reject the process of historical thinking which began with Schleiermacher and leads to Troeltsch and to return to the belief in tradition and absolutes that was found prior to that time (Heussi 1932: 85). It is time for a new orientation, one rejects the thinking from 1900 and returns to an earlier time where history and systematic thinking were not held as a dualism, but were regarded as one (Heussi 1932: 104). Heussi had a relatively good grasp of Troeltsch’s notion of historicism, and one wonders had Troeltsch lived, whether his own view would not have become closer to that of Heussi.

Concluding Remarks Der Historismus und seine Probleme was not an easy book to understand and not everyone agreed with the manner in which Troeltsch laid out the problem about historicism and even fewer were convinced that his suggestions regarding the answer to the problem were workable. Nonetheless, as the extensive reviews by Tönnies, Tillich, Hintze, and Meinecke demonstrate, his account was received with considerable respect, if not admiration. In addition, the ways in which Mannheim and Heussi attempted to build upon Troeltsch’s book also serve to indicate that most scholars believed that he had provided a foundation upon which to build. It is unfortunate that Troeltsch died before he was able to write the second volume. It is also unfortunate that the lectures which he had intended to give in Great Britain only hinted at the positive account and did not provide a clearer sense of what Troeltsch had envisioned. Nonetheless, Der Historismus und seine Probleme is a masterful work and a significant contribution to the handful of works by other great German scholars who had also attempted to develop a satisfactory philosophy of history as Meinecke had suggested, one which could provide the fixed point of reference to consider the continually changing flow of historical events.

Chapter Six War and Revolution The years from 1914 until early 1923 encompassed three significant periods in German history: the war from 1914 until November 1918, the revolutionary period of 1918 and 1919, and the beginning of the Weimar period: 1919 until 1933. Most Germans seemed to have been initially enthusiastic about the war and they believed that it was one that was justified. They also tended to believe that it would end rather quickly with a victory for Germany. That sense of optimism faded and many believed that it would be a lengthy war but one that they believed that Germany would prevail. The end of the war ushered in a revolutionary period; uprisings were staged in Berlin, München, and other cities. Eventually, many people began to believe that the Weimar Constitution would bring a better future; however, civil strife was joined by worsening inflation. Thus, each of the three periods contained its own problems, and Troeltsch was only one person who sought to address them. Yet, his voice was one of the most perceptive ones because he chose to discuss the problems from a holistic point of view—he did not want to be seen as a defender of one class or simply as a German nationalist. He wanted Germany to regain its place on the world stage as an equal, but insisted that since it has a special culture, it would also make a major contribution to the world of the future.74

War There had always been wars and Prussia had won many and lost some. However, the First World War differed from almost all others. While many politicians focused on the number of countries involved, Troeltsch looked at it from a modern cultural standpoint. He would refer to it as a “Kulturkrieg” but he will mean more than a battle over culture. It was a fight for existence, but Troeltsch would not begin to understand that for some time into the war. August 1914 was the month in which the First World War began and it was life-changing for many millions of people throughout most of Europe. This was || 74 The fifth and final volume of Troeltsch’s correspondence was just published and covers the time 1918 to 1923. In his letters he reveals his private despair for Germany’s future and they indicate the physical hardships the Troeltsch family endured. Troeltsch frequently alluded to his wife’s ill health and his own sense of despondency. See Troeltsch 2020, especially 61−64, 124, 191, 211, 222−224, 266, 413, 460. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654653-007

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certainly true for Troeltsch; during 1914 he not only had to contend with what the war entailed, he entered Germany’s political capital when he moved to Berlin. Furthermore, he was soon friends with some of his more politically inclined colleagues, including Otto Hintze and Friedrich Meinecke. However, many of his colleagues approached the war from a political or a military standpoint. In contrast, Troeltsch seemed uninterested in either of these standpoints; instead, he viewed the war as primarily a struggle between cultures and that is why he frequently referred to it as a “cultural war” (“Kulturkrieg”). Troeltsch gave the speech “Der Kulturkrieg” in Berlin on the first of July of 1915 and it was fundamentally a defense of Germany against England, France, and America. His main thesis was that this war was a “Kulturkrieg”, a term he used twenty times in the thirty-five pages of his text. This was a war of cultures with Germany being forced to defend itself from most of the rest of the world. England was the leader in this war against Germany but France was a willing partner. Troeltsch insisted that the French were still smarting from their defeat in 1870 but that was added to their sense of loss of their major status as a worlddominating country. England was more concerned about its practical role in the world. But both England and France were united in denigrating Germany by painting the country as being a menace to the world. Troeltsch begins by noting two things: that the initial euphoria of August 1914 had disappeared and that a weird sense of timelessness had descended on Germans. Furthermore, the sense of optimism that the war would be quickly won had been replaced by a continual sense of gratitude towards the soldiers stationed at the fronts (Troeltsch 1916a: 1−2). By “Kulturkrieg” Troeltsch means not only the war about cultures but that this is something far more sinister and far more dangerous. It is sinister because of the distortions and lies that the British and the French say about Germans and it is dangerous because England and France do not want to defeat Germany; they are intent upon its complete and total destruction. If it had been a matter of political differences, the diplomacy would have been sufficient. Instead, Germany’s enemies seek its economic destruction and the starving of its populace. The entire British system appears arrayed against Germany. It is not just England’s political leaders who propagandize against Germany; it is also the elite press and the common newspapers who are poring “oil on the fire”. In addition, they are all exporting this picture of evil Germany to neutral nations as well as the allied ones (Troeltsch 1916a: 5−6). In other words, Germany needed to confront not only the enemies’ armies but the press; it is also a matter of confronting a “false and wrong idea” (“falsche Idee”) (Troeltsch 1916a: 6, 10). The French pride themselves on having the “rational democracy of equality” (“rationalistische Demokratie der Gleichheit”) and the

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English pride themselves on the “practical democracy of personal independence” (“praktische Demokratie der persönlichen Unabhängigheit”). In contrast, Germany is painted as being an “unchristian” and an “immoral” country and its people are regarded as “frightening, superhuman, horror” (“unheimlich, übermenschliches Grauen”) and that they are “raw, deceitful, dangerous men of force” (“rohe, schlaue, gefährliche Gewaltmenschen”) (Troeltsch 1916a: 8). In other words, Germany’s enemies are trying to discredit Germany morally. Troeltsch clarifies that he does not believe that “The world is today also no insane asylum, at least not much more than it otherwise usually is” (“Die Welt ist auch heute kein Narrenhaus, wenigstens nicht viel mehr, als sie das sonst auch ist”) (Troeltsch 1916a: 11). Troeltsch suggests that much of this propaganda stems from the various wars which Germany fought between 1864 and 1870 but that its enemies omit that these were legitimate wars of independence. The world war is not a defensive war for England and France; thus, they need to make it seem like one in order to have public opinion on their side. In reality, the English and the French want to reestablish the previous world dominance, with the help of Russia. England objects to Germany’s naval fleet because it is a threat not to peace but to England’s traditional dominance of the seas. The French want to relive the glory of its earlier years when it was a dominant force in all of Europe. Russia wants to show that the country is not backward and poor but is progressive and wealthy; Italy intends to recall the splendor of its golden years when it was the center of arts and learning (Troeltsch 1916a: 14−16). That is why Germany’s enemies invoke the German “egoism” and the Nietzschean “antichristian overmanly” (“antichristliche, übermenschliche”) individual (Troeltsch 1916a: 19). Yet, it was English navalism and not German militarism that threatened the world order; it was the English fleet which engaged in world domination. Granted, the English couched this is great words such as a “moral outreach with freedom and civilization” (“moralische Sendung, Freiheit, und Zivilisation”). The English were happy to use the humane Christian argumentation to make its case. And, it was just as eager to cast the Germans as immoral military monsters (Troeltsch 1916a: 20−23). Troeltsch admits that Prussia and Germany take pride in its military and its bureaucracy and he allows that Bismarck was not exactly fond of democracy (Troeltsch 1916a: 28). However, Germans also want peace and prosperity and to take its rightful place on the world stage. It wants the common recognition of the “world of the good and the true” (“Welt der Guten und Echten”). In August 1914, Germany was a “single people of brothers” (“einiges Volk von Brüdern”) and Troeltsch would like Germany to remain as one as it confronts “new questions of life” (“neue Lebensfragen”) (Troeltsch 1916a: 35).

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In 1916, four major German scholars published a second edition of a twovolume work entitled Deutschland und der Weltkrieg. The editors were Otto Hintze, Friedrich Meinecke, Herman Onken, and Hermann Schumacher and the essays collected in these volumes were intended to spell out German’s role in the First World War. The volume has five sections: “Germany’s Place in the World” (“Deutschlands Stellung in der Welt”), “Germany’s Federal Colleagues” (“Deutschlands Bundesgenosssen”), “The Power Politics of our Opponent” (“Die Machtpolitik unserer Gegner”), “Prehistory, Outbreak and Continuation of the World War” (“Vorgeschichte, Ausbruch und Ausdehnung des Weltkrieges”), and “The Spirit of War” (“Der Geist des Krieges”). Hintze’s “Germany and the World States System” (“Deutschland und das Weltstaatensystem”) was the lead essay and in it he discussed the situation that Germany found itself among nations. He insisted that most countries had an inaccurate understanding of what Germany was and that Germany was handicapped because it did not have many countries as friends. Furthermore, it was at a disadvantage because England was able to construct a picture of Germany that was false but was persuadable (Hintze 1916: 3−7). Hintze allowed that Prussia was a military power and it placed a major emphasis on the power of the state. However, he insisted that it was only by the state having so much power was it able to safeguard its citizens and secure their well-being (Hintze 1916: 8–10). There was more to Germany than just military might; Hintze reminded his readers of the intellectual life in Weimar and in Berlin and he asked them to remember the days of Humboldt, Fichte, and Schleiermacher (Hintze 1916: 11). And, he noted that in Germany, an appreciation for political and military strength is conjoined with a “cosmopolitan idealism” (“kosmopolitischer Idealismus”) (Hintze 1916: 15). Hintze turned his attention to Germany’s place in the modern world and he noted that both France and England had most of their glory in the past. Thus, it was regrettable but understandable that France and England resented Germany becoming a major industrial and political power (Hintze 1916: 21−25). He also reminded his readers that Germany was not a major imperialist power, in contrast to England, France, and Russia (Hintze 1916: 27−32). And, he pointed out that the imperialism of England and of Russia directly impacted Germany, especially since the unification of 1871. He added that the English-Russian agreement during the 1900s about the Balkans caused an even greater impact (Hintze 1916: 39–48). In response, Germany was entitled to strengthen its army in reaction to the threat from Russia and that it was justified to develop its fleet in response to the movements of England (Hintze 1916: 51−52). Friedrich Meinecke’s “Culture, Power Politics, and Militarianism” (“Kultur, Machtpolitik und Militarismus”) was one of the final essays in this series. In his

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concluding essay, Meinecke took up Hintze’s attempt to explain Germany’s place in the modern world, but he made several points that Troeltsch would also make. In particular, Meinecke quoted from an Oxford professor who had the memorable name of Walter Raleigh who insisted that the Germans were a stupid people and that they reminded him of an Irish officer who commanded his troops to “shoot them all dead” because that was the only thing they understood (Meinecke 1916: 750). Meinecke noted that the English tended to regard three individuals as representative of Germany: Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardi. Meinecke readily admitted that Germans respected Treitschke because of the way that he illuminated Germany’s past but he insisted that did not blind them to his “onesidedness and passion” (“Einseitigkeit und Leidenschaftlichkeit”) (Meinecke 1916: 754−755). And, he pointed out that Nietzsche did not regard himself as a German but as a European. As to General Bernhardi, Meinecke insisted that he should not be named in the same breath with Treitschke and Nietzsche (Meinecke 1916: 754−755). Germany’s enemies would prefer that it would go back to the time when it did not have political power and was harmless (“frühere politische Machtlosigkeit und Harmlosigkeit’) (Meinecke 1916: 759). The English consider that there are “two Germanys”—the older, cultural one and the newer aggressive one (Meinecke 1916: 751, 761). He observed that the English believe that the new Germany has two major traits: “cunning and force” (“List und Gewalt”) (Meinecke 1916: 763). And, he noted that the French speak so highly of intellectual and moral richness of humanity, but they do not acknowledge that these are the beliefs of the “German spirit” (“Deutscher Geist”) because they stem from the time of Herder, Fichte, and the German Romantics (Meinecke 1916: 770−771). Everyone refuses to acknowledge German idealism but all emphasize German militarianism. And, they do not accept that Germany wants its army for protection; not for aggression (Meinecke 1916: 772−773). Returning to what Hintze had written earlier, Meinecke suggests that Germany may not be able to alter the opinion of its enemies, but it should try to influence the views of the neutral countries. Meinecke insisted that England is not justified in its struggle against the modern spirit; its conviction that it alone should be the world power is unbecoming a country of a “cultured people” (“Kulturvolk”) (Meinecke 1916: 776). Germany has its claim to its rightful place among world powers. Troeltsch’s contribution was entitled “Der Geist der deutschen Kultur” and was one of the lengthiest at just under 50 pages. It was also one of the most judicious of the contributions because he refused to demonize the enemy; instead, it was one of many of his attempts to explain and justify German culture. Troeltsch began by noting that historically one side tended to classify its enemies as being culturally inferior and he notes that that began when the Greek heroes

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regarded others as barbarians. He insisted that a change in this type of attitude occurred during the Middle Ages when the knights regarded their enemies as worthy opponents. Troeltsch also maintained that that type of attitude was seen in the modern army’s “Ehrenkodex” and the rules of engagement. Unfortunately, the war was undermining that civil attitude and was replacing it with not just regarding the enemy as inferior but as a menace. Troeltsch contended that the modern press was instrumental in promoting the idea that the enemy was evil and contributed to the English people’s hatred of Germans. He cited two works, one German and the other English, but both demonstrated this English attitude towards Germans. In “Deutsche Kultur im Spiegel englischer Urteile” Carl Dietz provided numerous letters which contained criticisms of German culture. These ranged from denying that Germans had ever contributed to the natural sciences to the claim that Germany had never had a significant invention (Dietz 1915: 100−108). Troeltsch also cites C.K. Chesterton’s “amusing” pamphlet The Barbarism of Berlin. There, Chesterton claimed that it would be one thing if Germany was wrong about a few countries when in fact Germany was wrong about all countries (Chesterton 1914: 21). He further contends that when the Prussians regard the Russians as “barbarians” what they mean is that the Russians are a backwards people. They are, an “imperfect civilization.” But, when the English and the French call the Prussians “barbarians”, they do not mean that Prussian is an “imperfect civilization” because the English and the French could live with the Prussians. However, Chesterton insists that the Prussians are a danger because they are the “enemy of civilization” (Chesterton 1914: 28). If a Russian peasant beats his wife, it is because that is a long tradition; if a Serbian knifes someone, that is because that is what Serbians have been doing for centuries. What makes the Prussians so dangerous is that they believe that they have discovered the future, but that they are destroying the present. They are destroying the present because they are destroying the twin pillars of modern society: promise-keeping and reciprocity (Chesterton 1914: 32−33). According to Chesterton, the Prussian is a “spiritual barbarian” because he is not bound by promises but acts according to his “mood”. He is like a child, but not innocent but is dangerous because he acts “because I want to” (Chesterton 1914: 40−41). Then there is the problem of reciprocity, or “give and take”. Throughout history nations have inflicted damage on each other, but Prussia thinks that it has the right to conquer and destroy other states but cries foul if another state dares to fight back (Chesterton 1914: 44−45). He again contrasts Russia and Prussia; the former has oppressed nations but has freed others from foreign domination. In contrast, Prussia has only sought to dominate others (Chesterton 1914: 69). Prussia is against liberty and is intent on

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destroying democracy (Chesterton 1914: 74−75, 79). But Chesterton was not content to malign Germany in general; he singled out Adolf von Harnack and Ernst Haeckel and accused them of being willing dupes (Chesterton 1914: 86−87). The only positive thing that Chesterton can say about Germans is that they have a good tradition of popular music; something that England lacks. However, even this is a half-hearted compliment because he likens the Germans to the Welsh (Chesterton 1914: 89). He concludes with a litany of faults: Germans cannot be embarrassed because they are stupid, egomaniacs who have “an actual itch for tyranny and interference.” To add a final insult, he insists that the German soldiers are “underrated” but the German professors are certainly “overrated”. (Chesterton 1914: 90, 94−95). These complaints, insults, and slurs are what prompted Troeltsch to refer to the war as a “Culture war” (“Kulturkrieg”). (Troeltsch 1916a: 53, 56). He noted that the Germans are depicted in the “most grotesque” (“groteskeste”) and “most coarse” (“gröbste”) manner—Germans are barbarians, “murderers of children” (“Kindermörder”), and cannibals (Troeltsch 1916a: 54−55). This gruesome depiction is not just in the press, but in pictures and films. Furthermore, as Dietz’ letters and Chesterton’s book reveals, it is not just the lower and uneducated people who believe these things, but university professors and eminent authors. Troeltsch listed a half dozen English authors who write much the same—that Germany is a warring nation with evil intentions. But, Troeltsch noted that the popular press and the scholars share the same misunderstandings and the similar exaggerations but that the latter group has a somewhat better understanding of German culture and science. It is just that they are also willing to overlook Germany’s contributions in order to justify its persecution (Troeltsch 1916a: 57). Troeltsch believed that the English, French, and others were defending their traditional positions of power against the new power of Germany. And, he also believed that their notion of “European culture” (“europäische Kultur”), meaning the old and Christian peoples, was not as “unitary” (“einheitlich”) as they thought. Despite the shared belief in reason and faith, the English differed from the French and the Italians differed from both. (Troeltsch 1916a: 58). What Troeltsch did not mention was the centuries-long dispute between the English and the French or that both countries regarded Italy as an inferior. But what he did mention was that the English and the French were imperialist competitors and that attempted to impose their own cultures on their colonies. In an extensive footnote, Troeltsch mentions a number of English works. One was by J.W. Allen and was entitled Germany and Europe. Troeltsch cites Allen’s claim that “The German mind is at once powerful and dull” and that it has a “will to war” (Troeltsch 1916a: 55−56, note 3). Troeltsch will come back to Allen’s book

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again. Troeltsch mentions Germany and England written by J.A. Cramb. Troeltsch observed that Cramb who died in 1913 was a thoughtful and knowledgeable professor but that even he was subject to “almost fantastic errors” (“beinahe phantastischer Irrtum”). And, that was before the war when the hysterics only increased. Troeltsch does not specify which passage contains these but he does indicate Cramb’s near obsession with Treitschke (Troeltsch 1916a: 5g, note 3). Like Allen, Cramb is preoccupied with Treitschke’s pernicious influence. Allen mentioned Treitschke dozens of times, and often linked him to Nietzsche (Allen 1914: 3−4, 10, 15, 38, 43, 46−47, 50−52, 58). Allen insisted that Treitschke “glorified the state” and believed that “Might makes right.” (Allen 1914: 33, 15). Yet, Troeltsch does not spend much time on Allen whereas he does on Cramb. That in itself would make it worthwhile to explore Crambs’ thinking. However, the reason that Troeltsch was concerned with Cramb’s writing is because he showed an immense understanding of Germany and was particularly focused on Treitschke.75 Cramb devotes his third lecture to “Treitschke and young Germany” and in it he sets out his attack on Treitschke. Cramb does not minimize Treitschke’s greatness or his influence. He noted that none of Treitschke’s seventeen volumes of collected writings have been translated into English, which is unfortunate because it makes it difficult to convey Treitschke’s status and influence. He suggests that influence began in 1858 and continued until his death in 1895. He adds that influence has not waned since then but continues to play a dominant role in German politics. Cramb insists that Treitschke was a politician and his political principles were about acting heroically and doing great deeds. Above, all it was the glorification of war; of Germany against its enemies and particularly England (Cramb 1914: 84−85). Cramb also suggests that Treitschke’s anti-English sentiments stem from the Boer War and had not subsided. Rather, they seem to have increased and that Treitschke believed that a war between Germany and England was inevitable if not welcomed (Cramb 1914: 75−77). He claims that Treitschke was responsible for all of the “scorn, antipathy and hatred” that the Germans have for the English and that he was the “enemy of England” (Cramb 1914: 77−78). As a historian, Cramb insisted that Treitschke was inferior to Macaulay and as a poet he was inferior to Nietzsche. Unlike many English authors who regarded Treitschke and Nietzsche as representing the same ideas, Cramb maintained that Treitschke’s dislike of Nietzsche meant that he would never learn

|| 75 Towards the end of his book, Cramb noted that he has “lived amongst Germans and knows something of the temper of Germany’s manhood” (Cramb 1914: 146). He had studied at Bonn. As a recognition of Treitschke’s great stature Cramb favorably compared Treitschke’s Deutsche Geschichte to Georg Henrich Pertz’ life of Freiherr von Stein. Cramb 1914: 79, note 1.

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anything from him (Cramb 1914: 83−84, note 1). Treitschke’s influence grew when he began his history of Germany and Cramb insists that his influence is still dominant in Germany today. Cramb compares Treitschke with Carlyle in that they have had a similar amount of influence and he notes that the two historians resembled each other with their “high seriousness, sincerity, downrightedness and deep moral strength”. However, Treitschke lacked Carlyle’s humor which led Cramb to observe that “In all Treitschke I doubt that there is a single laugh.” In Cramb’s telling, Treitschke was too earnest and too dedicated to his work. And, his work was intended to justify the German State and glorify war (Cramb 1914: 84, 93−94, 100). Cramb concludes his lecture on Treitschke by suggesting that he was not the first to hate the English; others had done so as well. However, Treitschke raised it to a real contempt—a hatred that the English could be regarded as superior to the Germans. And, with it is Treitschke’s belief in the old German “Religion of Valour” (Cramb 1914: 103). Treitschke is the embodiment of the German belief that it is spiritually suited to world domination and that all cultures are inferior to the German. Cramb noted that he had lived in Germany and understood the German sense. Unfortunately, he believed that in 1913 Germans believed that there is “one great adversary” and that is England (Cramb 1914: 124−125, 141, 146). Troeltsch’s beginning point is an important one; rather than citing the claims in the press about child killers, he cites knowledgeable scholars. In other words, he will not stoop to address the issue about the differences between Germany and England. He wanted to offer a defense for Germany in this essay and in the opening paragraphs he indicated that he was going to approach this issue with the degrees of accuracy and seriousness that it deserved. That is why he objected to the English opponents who speak of “nonsensical trinity” (“unsinnige Trinität”) of Treitschke–Nietzsche–Bernhardi. Instead, Troeltsch spells out many of the conditions which led to England’s greatness. These include its isolated geography, its political unification under the Tudors, its special Church relationship, the Puritan revolution, and its contemporary turn towards trade and manufacture (Troeltsch 1916a: 60−61). He cites several authors with approval for their interesting delineation of the English “spirit” (“Geist”). This includes Cramb and Matthew Arnold as well as the “very fine” study by Erich Marcks (Troeltsch 1916a: 63, note 8). His reference is to Deutschland und England which was a lecture that Marcks had given in London. Marcks’ lecture was an historical one—he began by comparing Germany with England at the beginning of the Reformation and he noted that at that time the German states were relatively prosperous and powerful. In contrast, England was less so; however, England’s fortunes began to rapidly improve under the Tudors and by the 1600s England was in ascen-

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dency. Germany suffered massively during the Thirty-Years War, in terms of numbers killed or maimed, in terms of territory loss, and in terms of sheer devastation (Marcks 1900: 15−17). By the 1700s France was England’s enemy while Austria was Germany’s; both France and Austria were Catholic whereas England and Germany were predominantly Protestant (Marcks 1900: 21). But it was not a rejection of Catholicism but Napoleon which united Germany and England at the beginning of the 1800s. Marcks argued that the period between 1815 and 1870 was significant for England: the growth of larger cities prompted social change and the emphasis on the individual created greater wealth. Newton’s theories revolutionized the natural sciences and Adam Smith’s conception of the free market place caused a major rethinking in economics. Both were influential on German thinkers (Marcks 1900: 28−29). However, things shifted significantly starting in 1870 with Germany’s unification. Germany was becoming a major power, both militarily and economically and England began to be threatened (Marcks 1900: 34−36, 40−41). Marcks admitted that as a historian he had no advice on how to solve this growing animosity and he left it to politicians to work out a peaceful solution. His overarching point was that for centuries England and Germany were mostly on very friendly terms and that he hoped that that history would help prevent a war. The fact that Marcks provided a fair and accurate history of the relationship between Germany and England was bound to appeal to Troeltsch and that is largely the reason why he relied so heavily on Marcks’ London lecture. Troeltsch recognized that part of the growing antagonism between Germany and England was being caused by Germany’s growing interest in colonization. England had been the dominant imperialist force for centuries and her empire covered parts of several continents. Furthermore, her maritime fleet and her navy were the envy of the world; so how could England passively accept Germany’s growing presence in the world (Troeltsch 1916a: 58−59)? Turning to the present war, Troeltsch noted that the English and many Americans apparently shared the conviction that the Anglo-American civilization was superior to the German culture and an American professor attempted to use statistics to prove Germany’s inferiority (Troeltsch 1916a: 60). And, Troeltsch complained that such claims of inferiority were common in the general “lower” press. In a lengthy footnote he contrasted the two cultures: the Anglo-American civilization emphasized the individual’s rights for one’s freedom to choose, freedom of religion, and the freedom from the state. Its culture is “logical-necessity, rationalistic” (“logischnotwendig, rationalistisch”) and is progressive and humane. In contrast, German culture is regarded as “Romantic-individualistic-irrational” (“Romantisch-Individualistisch-Irrational”) (Troeltsch 1916a: 61, note 7).

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Troeltsch moved to discuss Germany’s second opponent—France. And he began by discussing the modern French culture with its secularization and rationalization and its breaking away from church and monarchy. This culture demanded social justice, freedom, and equality. It emphasized progress and humanity and it insisted that there be a “clear and strong scholarship and science” (“klare und strenge Wissenschaft”). He suggested that it built upon the classical aristocracy and was found in salons and in society. It became what he called a “democratic aristocracy” (“demokratisierte Aristokratie”) (Troeltsch 1916a: 64). Troeltsch turned to Germany’s third opponent, which was Russia. He noted that Russia was unlike the two great cultural powers, England and France, but nonetheless had an ideal in which it could combine orthodox religion with western European capitalism and rationalism. Troeltsch pointed out that this “dream picture” (“Traumbild”) played an important role in the Russian spirit. Yet, Russia continued to be ruled by the Czar and it believed in pan-slavism. Also, the Russian Orthodox Church was set against the “godless, Catholic and Protestant West” (“gottloser, katholischer und protestantischer Westen” (Troeltsch 1916a: 67). Given this, he maintained that Russia’s participation in the cultural war against Germany is senseless and that its relationships with England and France are simply political and militarily, and not cultural (Troeltsch 1916a: 67– 68). While Troeltsch readily admits that the Russians have contributed to literature and culture, he thinks that the English who believe that Russia will become a western-like democracy with the emphasis on progress, freedom, and reason are simply mistaken (Troeltsch 1916a: 68, 69 and note 11). Troeltsch begins a defense of Germany and its culture by noting that it has to defend itself against these international slights and the superficially moralizing doctrines. He noted that Germany can align itself with Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria without making it seem like a shared culture. But, “the deciding fact” (“die entscheidende Tatsache”) is that England, France, Italy, and to some extent Russia simply resent the fact that Germany is a rising power and is regarded as a challenger to the traditional world order. Add to that the fact that Germany is in the middle of Europe and the threat seems even greater to the oldworld powers (Troeltsch 1916a: 70). Troeltsch contrasts the dynamism of unified Germany with the past—“the chaos, the faith-splitting, the poverty, and the small states” (“das Chaos, die Glaubensspaltung, die Armut, und die Kleinstaaterei”) of the Thirty-Years War is gone. It has been replaced with three major powers: 1) the Prussian military discipline and prowess which gives Germany a new “power of life” (“Lebenskraft”). 2) the education reforms. Modern Germany is built upon the work in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries of German litera-

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ture, poetry, philosophy, and science. It is found in the German “spirit of German education” (“Geist der deutschen Bildung”) which came with the radical school and university reforms that Wilhelm von Humboldt instituted. And, these changes produced an educated citizenship that embraced liberalism and the peaceful revolution of 1848. These led to the unification of Germany in 1870. 3) the economic prosperity. Troeltsch means the customs association (“Zollverein”) and the economic unity. These three led to Germany’s growing strength, and to its increase in being perceived by the traditional powers as a threat (Troeltsch 1916a: 71−72). It is in the conflict among these three powers that is a problem for Germany. It is not, Troeltsch maintained, simply the opposition between the Prussian military spirit and those who reject it. In fact, most of Germany readily adopted the Prussian spirit which allowed Germany to leave its past behind. Germany had changed in many ways; it was the rapid increase in population and the attendant need to feed everyone. Finally, Troeltsch reminds the reader of the lower class and peasants and how their natural instincts and culture served as the “original source” (“Urquelle”) for Germany (Troeltsch 1916a: 72). This kind of major class was absent in England and it suffered a retreat in France. He insisted that in England and France there were originally the noble poets and thinkers who were joined by the officer, business man, technician, and teacher; in effect, these two countries did not know the masses in the way that Germany did. Furthermore, the masses have played an increasingly significant role since August 1914. Germany lacked the rigid class structure; hence, it also lacked the “unified life-style” (“einheitlicher Lebensstil”) that is present in Germany’s opponents (Troeltsch 1916a: 73). Troeltsch was adamant that Germany was and will be a monarchy. This is not because the Kaiser carries the symbol of German unification but because of the state’s necessity. This is necessary because it provides the real unity of the various people and allows him to lead it. It provides the cohesiveness which joins the “old Prussian noble land-owner” (“alt preußischer Grundadel”) to the industrial worker and farmer. This cohesiveness is necessary as Germany transforms itself from a rural, agrarian community into an urban, industrial society (Troeltsch 1916a: 74−75). However, Troeltsch is just as insistent that Germany be a parliamentarian government because it fosters the political talent of many people and it helps secure the military and political cohesiveness which is necessary in a young country. It ensures that there is no plutocracy, no intellectual elite, and no worker syndicalism. But, Troeltsch insists that the bulwark against these things is the monarchy. He suggests that it is irrelevant whether the German need for a strong monarchy stems from reason or from emotion; it is

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simply a fact that Germany needs a strong monarchy. Furthermore, he insists that personal freedom and individual worth is in no degree minimized under this political arrangement. And, he maintains that the bureaucrat has more independence and a more secure position through bureaucratic law than in a democracy. In sum, he insists that Germans feel that they are more independent and have a greater degree of freedom than many people living in a democracy (Troeltsch 1916a: 75). Troeltsch associates the desire for a monarchy with the German military character. He maintains that this military character is rooted in the ancient German warring character which did not allow aestheticism, Puritanism, or commercial philosophy. He qualifies this by adding that not all Germanic people share this military inclination; rather it is primarily a Prussian one, and that it has been steadily increasing over the past century. Troeltsch believes that it stemmed originally from Friedrich the Great and was found in Scharnhorst’s “peoples’ army” (“Volksheer”). This character has a concept of honor (“Ehrbegriff”) and a “corps spirit” (“Korpsgeist”) which contributes to Germany’s sense of unity as much as the notion of the monarchy does (Troeltsch 1916a: 76). But he insists that the Prussian military spirit is inseparable from its idealism and its emphasis on education (“Bildung”). This is why the German character is antithetical to the English claim to world dominance (“Weltherrschaft”). Germany wishes only to safeguard its people, its industry, and its trade (Troeltsch 1916a: 76−77). Troeltsch briefly discusses German education and then moves to administration in Germany. He commends Germany for its discipline and order in administrating. Troeltsch indicates that it is difficult to determine whether this inclination for self-administration is something originally found in Germans or whether it is a product of historical education. For him, the source is irrelevant. But there is no difficulty in recognizing that Germans have a firm conviction to do one’s duty. He suggests that it is the ruler’s duty to the ruled that prompted the saying that the ruler is the “first servant of the people” (“erster Diener des Volkes”) and the call from one of Germany’s greatest thinkers to remark “duty, you lofty name” (“Pflicht, du erhabener Name”). Troeltsch enumerates what he takes to be some of Germany’s fundamental characteristics of the bureaucrats, the associations, and the fraternity clubs, the large and small businesses, the unions. These are “order and duty, solidarity and discipline” (“Ordnung und Pflicht, Solidarität und Disziplin”). Method and system are the leading features in scientific work and in technical matters, in education and in social politics. This does not mean that Germans lack imagination and fantasy, but that these qualities are fundamental to Germans. Of course, non-Germans do not understand these traits and they seem to dismiss them. Troeltsch notes that to the English they seem pedantic

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and doctrinaire, to the Russians they indicate a single life’s goal which is identical to infinite boredom, to the Italians it indicates that method renders insight superficial (Troeltsch 1916a: 82). Germans seek order and unity simply because of their “metaphysical-religious spirit” (“metaphysisch-religiöser Geist”). This conception of order and unity does not serve any material or social purpose; rather, it seeks order and law out of its “sense of duty” (“Pflichtgefühl”) and an “ideal picture” (“Idealbild”). It seeks order in the human world to match that in the universe (Troeltsch 1916a: 84). Troeltsch cautions against believing that this idealism is dominant. Rather, it is a goal which is accompanied by Germany’s “new German realism” (“neudeutscher Realismus”), its modern economic methods, its organization, its social work, the political calculations. Germany’s idea of the state owes much to Plato, Luther, and Hegel and is not comparable with that of France or of England (Troeltsch 1916a: 84−85). That is partially because Germans combine disciplined methodologies with idealistic goals. Troeltsch acknowledged that Bismarck’s politics were “pure, principle-free power politics” (“reine, prinzipienfreie Machtpolitik”) but he insisted that it was only the means and not its goal. Its goal was determined and limited by the German idea and “values of feeling” (“Gefühlswerte”). Unfortunately, most people focus only on Bismarck’s realistic means and ignore his idealistic goals. Troeltsch again emphasizes the German duality of realism and idealism and he sums it up by announcing that “The German is the worker of the idea and the thinker of work”. (“Der Deutsche ist der Arbeiter der Idee und der Denker der Arbeit”.) (Troeltsch 1916a: 85−86). Furthermore, he supports this claim by pointing to the new German idealism and the socialidealistic movement as well as the neo-Romantic individualism and the economic-state’s utility. What serves as this combination of realism and idealism is the religious foundation of the German “spirit” (“Geist”). And, it is found in German history and even now. He traces its modern form to the Eighteenth century and the spiritual renewal of German thinking with the conflict between the old churches and the modern spirit. This modern spirit is found in the scientific and critical theology, with realistic intellectualism and moral idealism. And, he contrasts the German approach with the Anglo-Saxon Puritan emphasis on the individual. Rather than the complete separation of Church and State Troeltsch emphasizes that they belong together (Troeltsch 1916a: 87−88). Troeltsch again discusses the German combination of realism and idealism in music, in art, and in philosophy and he notes that unlike the secular French and English philosophies, German philosophy still carries its religious roots (Troeltsch 1916a: 90−91). He insists that Hegel’s philosophy also is related to the moral philosophies of state that are

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found in Plato and Aristotle, and he notes that Ranke’s history is revered because it is an objective history. Troeltsch contrasts Ranke with von Sybel and von Treitschke, who he thinks were more political publicists than they were historians. He names Theodor Mommsen, Ulrich von Wilamowitz, Eduard Meyer, Adolph von Harnack, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Gustav von Schmoller as the great German historians who have helped make Germany the “school master of the world” (“Schulmeister der Welt”) (Troeltsch 1916a: 93). Troeltsch’s final point involves the German idea of freedom and he contrasts it with the French and English conceptions. The French believe in a completely rational and secular notion and the English believe in one which is individualistic. The German idea is not totally rationalistic or completely secular; rather it is one which combines feelings and faith with a sense of community. More importantly, the German idea of freedom is complete in the sense that Germany has no inclination towards world domination, either in the materialistic or in the spiritualistic senses (Troeltsch 1916a: 98). That is why he concludes with the claim that only Germany believes in the “world principle of the freedom of different national spirits” (“Weltprinzip der Freiheit der verschiedenen Nationalgeister”) and that Germany’s goal in this war is to develop its “cultural powers” (“kulturelle Kräfte”) (Troeltsch 1916a: 99). “Der Geist der deutschen Kultur” differed from most of the contributions in Deutschland und der Weltkrieg in that Troeltsch tried to avoid purely political points of view and to concentrate on Germany’s special “Kultur”. Because he regarded the war as a war of cultures, he offered a vigorous defense of the uniqueness of German culture and its right to exist. He may not have been correct in his belief that Germany did not seek to annihilate other nations, but he seemed immensely justified in asserting Germany’s right to its own survival. Troeltsch elaborates upon his idea about German freedom in the first of the two works contained in his Deutsche Zukunft. It has the title “Die deutsche Idee der Freiheit” (“The German Idea of Freedom”). While much of this work is specifically addressed to the problems with France, England, and Russia, Troeltsch does discuss how Germany’s idea of freedom differs from others. Once again, he insists that the First World War is a “cultural war” (“Kulturkrieg”) and that the English, French, and even Russian powers have been “masking” their naked “power war” (“Machtkrieg”) as a “moral culture war” (“moralischer Kulturkrieg”) in defense of the freedom of the small states, the sanctity of contracts, and the democratic principle of freedom. However, Troeltsch insists that this mask now lies on the ground. England has shown that it has no regard for contracts or people’s rights; France has revealed that it cares only for prestige; and Russia has demonstrated that its concern for democracy is an illusion (Troeltsch 1916b: 8–

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10). It is not enough to try to counter the enemy; Troeltsch insists that Germans need to gain universal recognition that German culture (“Kultur”) is one of the great human cultural creations (Troeltsch 1916b: 11−12). Troeltsch notes that Germany is different from other countries and he provides the reasons why. First, it is a new country but one which has an agrarian past; second, its history and geographical location; and third, its particular spirit and essence (Troeltsch 1916b: 18). These three reasons help differentiate Germany’s idea of freedom from the West’s. This leads to several points. One, Troeltsch contrasts Germany’s idea of freedom is not just freedom for the individual but is for the people as a whole. If only a few individuals are free then the whole is not free. His point is that the English are too preoccupied with individual liberty that they overlook the fact that the state must be concerned with everyone’s liberty. Second, Germany’s history has shown that it has developed differently then the West; Bismarck had learned during 1848 that what worked in other countries failed in Germany (Troeltsch 1916b: 20−24). Troeltsch specifies each country’s idea of freedom. For the English, it is above all the freedom of the individual. Its origins are found in Puritanism which gave the English the emphasis on the individual and on economics (Troeltsch 1916b: 31–34). For the French, its origins lie in its revolution which promoted an anticlerical movement and secularized science (Troeltsch 1916b: 34−37). He then turns to Germany and he does not dispute that the English and French ideas influenced Germany. He readily admits that Locke and Rousseau impacted German ideas about freedom but he insists that German figures and ideas contributed more (Troeltsch 1916b: 39−40). He recognizes how much Friedrich the Great impacted German ideas in the eighteenth century and how much they fostered German power of organization. Troeltsch maintains that Germans have a “dedication to a matter, an idea, an institution” (“Hingabe an eine Sache, eine Idee, eine Institution”) (Troeltsch 1916b: 42). It is in the German sense of belonging to the state, the army, the university, the party, and the association (Troeltsch 1916b: 42−43). In other words, the German idea of freedom is neither the individualistic English one nor the French secular one. Rather, it is an “organic freedom” (“organische Freiheit”) (Troeltsch 1916b: 43). He insists that this does not mean that the individual is subsumed by the whole; he notes that here one can see the English influence of the individual and the French influence on human rights (Troeltsch 1916b: 45). One can compare the English and French ideas of “humanity, progress, and civilization” (“Humanität, Fortschritt, und Zivilisation”) with “German humanity and cosmopolitism” (“deutsche Humanität und Kosmopolitismus”) but only up to a degree. That is because of the deep inner sources for the German idea of freedom—one which is not restricted to applying

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only to Germans but to others. Troeltsch emphasizes with some degree of pride that Germans wish for others to have freedom. He suggests that part of the source lay in the past, specifically during the war with Napoleon and contributed to the German sense of patriotism (Troeltsch 1916b: 46−49). Troeltsch maintains that there is one further reason why Germany differs from the West and that is its religious roots. Whereas in England, the idea of a state Church is a relict of the past; in Germany there is a continuation of the relationship between Church and state. Now, this is not to suggest that Troeltsch has begun to disavow his earlier views about the separation between the two. Rather, now he believes he needs to clarify the relationship and to stress the complimentary relationship instead of emphasizing their independence (Troeltsch 1916b: 49−51). Troeltsch begins to conclude, first by noting that underneath the English idea of freedom is “raw egoism” (“roher Egoismus”) and under that of the French is “anticlerical hatred” (“antiklerikales Spießertum”) (Troeltsch 1916b: 52). The English and French ideas belong to the past: with Puritanism, with the rational Enlightenment, with the emancipation, and with the first period of capitalism. But, the German idea of freedom has a later birth: with German idealism, the political reconfiguration of Europe after Napoleon, and the later stage of capitalism (Troeltsch 1916b: 52−53). This resulted in a unified Germany, both in the political and spiritual senses. Troeltsch ends with an acknowledgement that England’s domination of the sea had its good side; that without it the oceans would have been chaos. And, he wishes that the current war would end and that freedom and peace would dominate for the foreseeable future (Troeltsch 1916b: 59−60). “Die deutsche Idee der Freiheit” may not be one of Troeltsch’s best essays. It seems less organized and more repetitive than most of his writings. It also seems less clear and coherent. Nonetheless, it is a forceful defense of Germany’s uniqueness and a passionate claim for the specialness of the German idea of freedom. Furthermore, it is a clear instance of Troeltsch’s ability to synthesize; in this case, the need for the individual’s autonomy and the people’s need for unity and cohesiveness. Rather than the Western ideal of the rugged individual who is struggling to survive, Troeltsch argues from the ancient Greek point of view that the individual can live a fulfilling and prosperous life only as a member of good community. Many of the same ideas found in “Der Geist der deutschen Kultur” and “Die deutsche Idee der Freiheit” are also found in “Der metaphysische und religiöse Geist der deutschen Kultur.” This is unsurprising given that it was also written during 1916. These ideas include the one which explained how the German belief

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in order and discipline is represented in the monarchy, army, administration, and economy. It is in the idea that the ruler is the “first servant of the people” (“erster Diener des Volkes”) and in the claim that “The German is the worker of the idea and the thinker of work” (“Der Deutsche ist der Arbeiter der Idee und der Denker der Arbeit”) (Troeltsch 1925b: 59, 65). This is the German “spirit” (“Geist”) and Troeltsch traces it directly to the German religious foundation. These include late medieval Catholicism, the Reformation and the splitting of the church. It is also found in the reconciliation in the Eighteenth century and in the tensions between the churches and science in the Nineteenth century (Troeltsch 1925b: 65−66). The German “spirit” is also founded on the German inclination towards metaphysics. At first, he does not have in mind philosophers as much as artists and musicians. He mentions Bach, Handel, and Gluck and he notes how they can combine opposites: “childlikeness and heroism, lightness and melancholy, faith and struggle for life, problematic and intuition” (“Kindlichkeit und Heroismus, Heiterkeit und Melancholie, Glaube und Lebenskampf, Problematik und Intuition”) (Troeltsch 1925b: 67). However, it is also found in the German philosophical oppositions: “nature and spirit” (“Natur und Geist”) and “individual and community” (“Individuum und Gemeinschaft”), and reason and feeling. These are found in Kant and Fichte but took on a more practical sense after the reforms of 1813. The modern sense is found throughout German culture: in language, art, religion, politics, and even in economics. However, Troeltsch insists that German philosophy is rooted in classical Greek philosophy. He points particularly to Hegel’s use of Plato and Aristotle (Troeltsch 1925b: 72). He hints that this is found in German politics and its rejection of the dictum “power precedes law” (dass “Macht vor Recht gehe”) (Troeltsch 1925b: 73). Troeltsch suggests that classicism and Romanticism are not in direct opposition but are actually united in their goal of self-education. They differ only in the means to achieve that. Troeltsch concludes by again referencing the German idea of freedom that conjoins religion and politics, with the Kantian notions of autonomy and independence with enlightenment and duty. And, with a second notion of German freedom; that being part of the group and the state. The German idea of freedom differs from the French belief that rational science can solve everything and it differs from the English conviction that morality is the salvation. Troeltsch emphasizes once more that the German idea of freedom is applicable to all but that Germany does not wish world dominance in any form (Troeltsch 1925b: 75−79). Towards the end of 1916 Troeltsch gave a lecture “Humanismus und Nationalismus in unserem Bildungswesen”. A German would have little difficulty in understanding Troeltsch’s topic but an American would. That is because many of the terms he uses do not have any American equivalent. Some have already been

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explained, like “Bildung” and “Geist”, but some need explaining. The word “Wesen” has many different meanings including “essence” but in “Bildungswesen” perhaps it could be rendered “educational form”. His particular focus is on the German “Gymnasium” which has nothing to do with the American notion of a gymnasium as a place for sports. Rather, it is the highest level of academics prior to a university and is often regarded as the educational path needed to be prepared for the university. It is an institution of higher learning. In Troeltsch’s opinion the Gymnasium has two special features: one, it is the school that best exemplifies science and scholarship. Two, it is the school that is most representative of the classical Greek education (Troeltsch 1925c: 212). Although the Greeks gave us science and methodology, they also gave us humanism and ethical ideals. These are all reflected in the German Gymnasium, but in addition there is philology. Troeltsch indicates that the interest in philology came from Christian theologians but that in the Gymnasium philology is applied to other literary texts. He puts it succinctly by suggesting that the past has given us “the theology of humanism” (“die Theologie des Humanismus”) (Troeltsch 1925c: 215). Troeltsch admits that history has undermined the belief in absolute truths and that historicism leads to relativism. Yet, it was Goethe and Humboldt who gave us an appreciation of history and humanism and a “humanistic educational ideal” (“humanistisches Bildungsideal”). In other words, Germany has replaced Greece: “a north-German humanism [has taken] the place of an ancient-southern [one]” (“ein nördlich-deutscher Humanismus an Stelle des antikisch-südländischen”) (Troeltsch 1925c: 217, 219−220). Troeltsch does not deny that classical Greek humanism is not the only influence on modern German humanism. He readily acknowledges that Medieval Christianity, the Italian Renaissance, and the Enlightenment have played major roles. What he does insist upon is that the German humanism has managed to absorb these influences without losing its uniqueness (Troeltsch 1925c: 225−229). Again, he emphasizes the German Romanticism that was found in Hamann, Herder, Goethe, and Jean Paul and it is reflected in Germany’s “state construction” (“Staatsbildung”) and in its “social ideals” (“Sozialideale”). And, its uniqueness stems from its particular religiosity. Furthermore, this German spirit is revealed by contemporary scholars; Troeltsch specifically points to Wilhelm Dilthey and Ernst Cassirer. Dilthey had an extraordinary ability to understand German culture and Cassirer has recently traced the contrast between freedom and form from Leibniz through Goethe until the early Twentieth century (Troeltsch 1925c: 230−235). He insists that the German humanistic Gymnasium is necessary to German education although he allows that it may need to change in order to adapt to the future. However, just as the Greek education was determined by its time and situation, so is Germany’s

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humanistic education bound by its time and circumstances Troeltsch concludes by indicating that Germans must remain Germans and that is secured through its educational process (Troeltsch 1925c: 239−243). In December of 1915 the philosopher and sociologist Johann Plenge published a lengthy opinion piece in the Frankfurter Zeitung. The response was so overwhelming that Plenge turned his newspaper piece into a book of almost two hundred pages. He entitled it 1789 und 1914. Die symbolischen Jahre in der Geschichte des politischen Geistes.76 His main focus was to indicate the opposition between the spirit of those two years. The spirit of 1789 was the French revolution based upon the ideals of brotherhood, freedom, and equality. The spirit of 1914 was the German belief in the superiority of its organizing powers found in the military and in the bureaucracy. If 1789 was the beginning of individual freedom, 1914 was the beginning of the end of it. What was replacing freedom was the emphasis on the community. Whereas Kant had been the philosopher of the individual, Hegel was the philosopher of the state. And, as Plenge had argued earlier, Hegel paved the way for Marx and socialism. Troeltsch could not allow Plenge’s attack on Germany go unanswered: Plenge was not some English adversary engaging in diatribes against Germans. Plenge was a respected German intellectual and his arguments amounted to an attack on the best of the German spirit. Troeltsch had read some of Plenge’s earlier writings and he seemingly approved of most of them. In particular, he agreed with Plenge’s complaint that theory played an oversized role in economics and he supported his insistence on the importance of practicality in that discipline. He also acknowledged Plenge’s philosophical writings, even if he did not always agree with his opinions on Hegel and Marx. Troeltsch had been asked to review Plenge’s 1789 und 1914 in March of 1916 but he spent almost a year studying the book and reading some of Plenge’s earlier writings. Troeltsch’s review finally appeared in late 1917 and it was extensive. In the volume in the Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe it takes up thirty-six pages. Troeltsch may have been satisfied with his review; Plenge was not. Plenge believed that Troeltsch had misunderstood him and that might have been the case (Troeltsch 2010: 271). However, it was clear that Troeltsch had grave reservations about Plenge’s approach to the problems of modern culture and especially about his proposed solutions. Troeltsch acknowledged the difficulty of Plenge’s task and allowed that he had spent almost a year of study before writing his review of Plenge’s book. He || 76 Plenge included his newspaper piece as an appendix and he quoted from it often in the text of his book. See Plenge 1916.

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also praised Plenge for his concentration on practical matters. Finally, Troeltsch commends Plenge for his empirical approach and for his keen insights into social-economic conditions (Troeltsch 2010: 274). However, Troeltsch takes issue with Plenge’s use of Hegel and his misuse of the notion of “organization”. Moreover, Troeltsch faults Plenge for his insistence that “Gemeinschaft” (“community”) is preferable to “Gesellschaft”.77 Troeltsch’s main criticism lays in two areas. First, he objects to Plenge’s use of dialectic and suggests that because his is “empirical” it no longer resembles Hegel’s speculative dialectic (Troeltsch 2010: 294−297, 301−302). Second, Troeltsch complains about Plenge’s excessive optimism and insists that the goal of a socialist community is based on nothing more that sheer faith—it is as likely as finding a “white raven” (“weißer Rabe”) (Troeltsch 2010: 306−308). Troeltsch was too much of a realist to believe in such prophecy and the casualities of the War had made him more of a pessimist. But he preferred to deal with reality as it was, not the future as it might be.

Revolution In October of 1918 Troeltsch returned to the topic of German education and he made this abundantly clear with the simple title “German Education” (“Deutsche Bildung”) (Troeltsch 1925d). But, in a footnote, he clarifies that he made some changes to reflect the revolutionary activity of the previous months (Troeltsch 1925d: 169, note 1). What is missing is Troeltsch’s sense of optimism which had been replaced by a more questioning tone. He begins like he often did by recounting Germany’s history from Friedrich the Great through the reform year of 1813 and then to the Paul’s Church meetings of 1848. He notes that that year may not have immediately changed Germany, but that it did lay the foundation for Bismarck and the liberalism of the 1870s. However, both Bismarck and liberalism had disappeared and in its place are two competing movements. On one side there is the “military-conservative-imperialism” and on the other side is the “class struggles” with its “economic dialectic”. Given the loss of the war and this tension, Troeltsch asks whether it is even possible to talk about a single “German spirit” (Troeltsch 1925d: 170−172). Troeltsch declines to address this general question, but he turns his attention to the specific issue of “German education.”

|| 77 This is a clear reference to Ferdinand Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft which had appeared in a second edition in 1912. Plenge had asked that Tönnies review this book but Tönnies had turned the request down. Troeltsch 2010: 270. Tönnies was usually very receptive to reviewing books; one wonders whether he thought the book was not worth reviewing.

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In light of the past several months and years, he believes it important to address it again. He notes that foreign countries have adopted new approaches and he lists the Danish peoples’ “high school” (“Volkshochschule”), the English Toynbee-Hall, and the American university-extension. His inclination is that Germany must adapt to the changing times and that that includes education. In 1919 Friedrich Thimme and Ernst Rolffs published a collection of essays entitled “Revolution und Kirche” with the subtitle “Zur Neuordnung des Kirchenwesens im deutschen Volksstaat” (On the New Order of the Church-form in the German Peoples-State). It contained nineteen essays written by some of the most notable German theologians, including Otto Baumgarten, Wilhelm Bousset, Rudolf Otto, and Martin Rade. Troeltsch provided an essay on religious education and the separation between state and Churches (“Der Religionsunterricht und die Trennung von Staat und Kirchen”). As the title suggests, it has two parts but he begins by addressing the issue of the separation between church and state. Troeltsch acknowledges that the revolution has unleashed forces which threaten the church and that the issue of the separation between church and state is important because it is one that affects the community and is not simply an individual issue (Troeltsch 1919a: 301). Furthermore, it is a critical issue because it has long been a valid concern as a democratic and socialistic program. However, he maintains that the issue is a complicated one, if for no other reason than the manner in which the issue is named is misleading. That is because it is not the separation between “State and Church” (“Staat und Kirche”) but between “State and Churches” (“Staat und Kirchen”) (Troeltsch 1919a: 302). He explains that the issue is not so complicated in areas where there is only one dominant church; however, it is rather complicated in areas where there are several churches. That is because different churches have differing approaches to the issue of the relationship between state and church. Troeltsch adds a second matter that clouds the issue and that is the difference between socialist and democratic approaches to almost every issue. The socialist approach is to consider the issue from the standpoint of the “organization of the entire life” (“Organisation des Gesamtlebens”) and that means the entire community. Furthermore, socialism is a matter of faith in a future ideal (Troeltsch 1919a: 302−303). Troeltsch grants that the differences between the socialist approach and the democratic one may not seem to be vast and he notes Rousseau’s notion of the “general will”. This singular approach makes democracy much like a “state religion.” Troeltsch adds that this is primarily theoretical and in practice that does not actually occur. He draws on his 1904 visit to the United States and explains that religion is an important element for both Republicans and Democrats. He also invokes Norway and Denmark and notes how their religion is closely

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aligned with the pietistic-religious movement. Thus, in many states there is no real enmity between state and church; thus, the belief that must lay in some other cause or causes (Troeltsch 1919a: 304−305). In fact, he offers four grounds for the belief in the complete separation between state and churches. First, where there are many different churches there is often a rivalry among them. Yet, they often view the state as an opposing organization; one which demands the citizen’s entire allegiance. The church which appears as the “state’s” church manages to modify this claim by associating itself with the state, thereby reducing the tension between the two organizations (Troeltsch 1919a: 305). Second, there is the belief that the proletariat is set against the church and that is because it has its own “metaphysics and ethics” (“Metaphysik und Ethik”) which amounts to a “new religion” (“neue Religion”) (Troeltsch 1919a: 307). Third, there is the use of the church for political purposes and this is shown by the dominance by the ruling classes. Hence, the church is regarded by the lower classes to being the “black police” (“schwarze Polizei”) (Troeltsch 1919a: 308). Fourth, there is the reason that derives from the peculiarities of the “German military and official state” (“deutscher Militär- und Beamtenstaat”). In part, the rise of Prussia and then Germany and its military and its officials which prompted the belief in progress and democracy (Troeltsch 1919a: 309−311). This is especially true in socialist parts of Germany. Previously, the socialist ideal had been based upon Christian values, but Marxism was predicated not on religion but on the metaphysics of Hegel and the philosophy of Feuerbach (Troeltsch 1919a: 312). Troeltsch turns to the issue of religious education and the question whether it is appropriate in the classroom or should be restricted to the “Sunday School” (“Sonntagsschule”) (Troeltsch 1919a: 314). Once again, he returns to his experiences in the United States and finds that in Chicago’s schools there is no religious instruction. Not only is religion not taught but neither is ethics. He adds that this situation is found not just in the larger cities but also in towns and villages (Troeltsch 1919a: 314−315). Something different is found in the French schools; while they have eliminated religious instruction in public schools, they do mandate that there is a “civic instruction” and a “universal moral doctrine” (“allgemeine Morallehre”) (Troeltsch 1919a: 318). Troeltsch concludes by acknowledging the difficulty in attempting to solve the issue of the relationship between church and state. It seems that he has rejected his earlier views and as a result of the war and the revolution he has recognized the need for them to co-exist. Modern culture embraces “religious freedom of conscience” (“religiöse Gewissensfreiheit”) but he insists that schools must avoid a “war of faith” (“Glaubenskrieg”) and insist that ethics and values

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be taught. If they are not, then the school will be turned into being nothing more than a vocational training school (“Fachschule”) (Troeltsch 1919a: 324−325).

Conclusion It should be evident that the war and its aftermath severely affected Troeltsch. He was never one to embrace the war, but clearly sought to defend Germany’s place in the world. Germany’s defeat and the revolutionary aftermath prompted him to rethink many of his social and political views. The old aristocracy and the “Beamtenstaat” had disappeared and it was unclear what was going to replace them. While he would welcome the Weimar Constitution and he had some hope that the future might be better, he had serious doubts about the coming months and years because of the political unrest, the collapse of moral values, and the rise of cynicism and nihilism.

Chapter Seven Modern Pessimism and Culture: Troeltsch’s Criticisms of Spengler Introduction The previous chapters have shown Troeltsch’s concern with the philosophy of law and with the philosophy of history; but this chapter will focus specifically on Troeltsch’s philosophy of culture. Troeltsch had indicated a strong interest in philosophical questions regarding culture for most of his life and that he had taken up the professorship in philosophy at Berlin in order to pursue these types of issues. What may be surprising is the intensity that Troeltsch displayed in dealing with issues of European culture and especially when he believed that German culture was under attack. This is demonstrated particularly well by his continued, spirited response to Oswald Spengler. Troeltsch criticized Spengler for his pessimism and his cynisim and he believed that Spengler was more than a problematic thinker. Troeltsch admitted that Spengler was a gifted writer and he allowed that his book Der Untergang des Abendlandes was highly successful, but in Troeltsch’s opinion, Spengler’s particular talents and his impressive successes actually made him an even more dangerous threat to Germany’s culture. As a number of commentators have noted, the name Oswald Spengler is closely connected to the title of his two-volume work Der Untergang des Abendlandes.78 While Spengler is now mostly remembered as the author of this book, the work itself is rarely read today. Yet, the numbers of copies that were sold during Spengler’s lifetime were astronomical, and can only be “dreamed of” by authors who have recently written works on the philosophy of history.79 Not only

|| 78 For example, see Gerald Diesener’s “Geleitwort” in Conte 2004: 6. Dominco Conte maintained that Spengler’s name has been long closely connected with the title of the book. Conte 2004: 13. 79 See Conte 2004: H. Lübbe wrote of the “massive success” (“Massenerfolg”) and of the “massive effect” (“Massenwirkung”) of Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Ludz 1980: VII−VII. Jürgen Naeher wrote that Spengler’s book found an “extraordinary resonance” in Germany and that the book’s “unexpected success” was regarded by Spengler’s readers as “epoch-making.” Naeher 1984: 7, 20. It was, as Naeher wrote, a “Best-seller”. Naeher 1984: 55. Some of Spengler’s opponents admitted that they were also impressed by his success and Spengler himself indicated that he was surprised by the book’s reception. Naeher 1984: 55. The first and second editions were published by Wilhelm Braumüller in Linz and Vienna, but the editions that appeared after the beginning of the Fall, 1919 were published by C.H. Beck in Munich. See Troeltsch 1919: 174, note 6. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654653-008

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did the various editions run into the hundreds of thousands but that many of the chapters were made into separate books which also sold exceptionally well.80 Many people flocked to Spengler’s ideas, but many others found them problematic. Troeltsch was in the second group and he knew that he needed to respond to Spengler’s appeals. He rejected Spengler’s skeptical and pessimistic view of the “Decline of the West”, but Troeltsch recognized that Germany, and indeed Europe as a whole, urgently needed to find a new direction (see Köhler 1941: 329). Thus, Troeltsch wrote responses to Spengler in a number of places: these included his rather focused comments in his lengthy reviews of each of the two volumes of Der Untergang des Abendlandes as well as in Der Historismus und seine Probleme. Then, there are his remarks in a number of other writings which are on politics, culture, and on Germany’s future. Unfortunately, many commentators on Troeltsch have minimized or simply ignored Troeltsch’s criticisms of Spengler; nonetheless, these remarks are important especially because they reflect Troeltsch’s continuing preoccupation with Germany’s future. In addition, they underscore his continuing concerns with the faulty ideas, and ideals, that many popular people were continually promoting—especially those by Oswald Spengler.81

Oswald Spengler and Der Untergang des Abendlandes Oswald Spengler was thirty-two when he began writing Der Untergang des Abendlandes. The year was 1912 and it would take Spengler five more years to complete the first volume.82 It was published in the following year, and the second volume was published in 1922. The revised version of the first volume appeared in 1923. By then, a veritable “Spengler-Streit” had erupted; on one side, there were the huge numbers of people who were simply enthralled with Spengler’s ideas, if not || 80 These included Der Staat (1924) from Volume One and Die Wirtschaft (1924) from Volume Two. 81 This is somewhat understandable if those scholars who have written on Troeltsch were theologians, and most of the commentators on him were, and are, scholars of theology. It is less understandable when the commentators who are historians and political observers have neglected Troeltsch’s comments and criticisms. That is because they have overlooked Troeltsch’s strong conviction for the genuine need to oppose Spengler’s type of thinking. 82 Naeher 1980: 71, 141; Conte 2004: 18. In the “Vorwort” to the first volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes Spengler wrote that he first thought about writing the book in 1911 and that the first draft was completed when the war broke out in August, 1914. He added that he revised and expanded it in reaction to the war and that it was more or less completed by the spring of 1917. Spengler 1919: VII.

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the books themselves.83 On the other side, there were the numerous scholars who attacked Spengler personally and were highly critical of his volumes.84 Troeltsch was one of those who refrained from commenting on Spengler the man and restricted his criticisms solely to Spengler’s writings. Before taking up Troeltsch’s objections to them, it is worth the effort to try to summarize some of the main ideas in Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes.85 Although Spengler always insisted that he had conceived the ideas behind his book and had written the draft of the work before the war broke out, Der Untergang des Abendlandes is Spengler’s own view of the war and his own vision for Germany’s future following its defeat (Naeher 1984: 51). The total number of pages of the two volumes exceeds 1200 and the number of different topics that Spengler addresses is close to a hundred. The number of topics for only the first volume is extensive and include the many different aspects of art, culture, geography, mathematics, music, mythology, philosophy, physics, psychology, and various religions. The second volume suffers from a similar lack of structure and from a large number of topics. These include the city and the state, race and culture, economics and politics, and money and technology. They also include discussions about Pythagoras, Mohammed, and Cromwell. While Spengler thought of his work primarily as a type of metaphysics, it is much more than that. It is also more than a book about the past or the future; it is about human time in its entirety. It is also more than a book about the “West”; Spengler discusses at least eight different cultures. In light of these points, it is exceptionally difficult to provide a clear and concise overview of either volume. However, the major focus of the first volume is the nature of history (Conte 2004: 36; Naeher 1984: 60−61). Spengler sets out many of his major points regarding history in the lengthy “Einleitung”. Here, he states that his thesis is to determine history and he claims that he is the first to try to do so. He asks whether there is logic to history and he questions whether there is

|| 83 The “Spengler-Streit” erupted shortly after the appearance of the first volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes and continued after the publication of the second volume and the revision of the first, that is, until 1923. It ended around 1925. See Conte 2004: 94, 108. 84 In his “Vorwort” to the collection Spengler Heute Hermann Lübbe remarked that one can argue about the book’s literary quality and in his essay in this volume he insisted that Spengler is no classic (“Spengler ist kein Klassiker”). Ludz 1980: VII, 1. Conte complained that Der Untergang des Abendlandes lacked structure and that Spengler’s ideas were often unclear. Conte 2004: 19. Naeher insisted that even the title was subject to misinterpretation and that his notions were frequently misconstrued. Naeher 1984: 50−52. 85 As others have pointed out, this is an almost impossible task. In 1920/1921 Edmund Mezger insisted that “It is difficult, it is almost impossible, to speak briefly about this book” (“Es ist schwer, es ist fast unmöglich, über das Buch in Kürze zu sprechen.”) Mezger 1920/1921: 260.

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something beyond the arbitrariness and the un-calculability of single events (Spengler 1919: 3). His answer is neither particularly clear nor very positive and that is partially because he provides such a wealth of individual examples and partially because he does not seem to believe in any particular answer. He acknowledges that mathematics and physics are important sciences; he admits that he likes mathematical theories, and he confesses that he loves the actual and historical products of physics (Spengler 1919: 61). However, he complains that the causal laws which explain nature are taken as templates with which to construct a similar science by which one can explain history (Spengler 1919: 9, 35). Furthermore, he objects even to the idea that there is “world history” (“Weltgeschichte”), which he calls a “phantom” (Spengler 1919: 20, 22). And, he rejects the historical classification of “ancient-medieval-modern” (“Altertum-Mittelalter-Neuzeit”) (Spengler 1919: 20, 24, 29, 32). Finally, he dismisses the notion that “humanity” has any kind of goal, idea, or plan; in fact, “‘humanity’ is an empty word.” (“‘Menschheit’ ist ein leeres Wort.”) (Spengler 1919: 28). Spengler dislikes many professions but he singles out modern philosophers for particular disapproval. He objects in general to the idea that there could be “eternal truths” (“ewige Wahrheiten”) because there can only be things that are true at a particular time and place (Spengler 1919: 58, 65). But he objects in particular to modern philosophers because they lack any sense of “real life” (Spengler 1919: 59). Spengler identifies the beginning of the decline of the West to have occurred around 1800—this was the end of systematic philosophy (Spengler 1919: 23, 36). The “decline of the West” is nothing less than the “problem of civilization” (Spengler 1919: 43). What this seems to mean is that philosophy has failed, and that what Spengler has to offer in its stead is a type of “‘unphilosophical philosophy’” (“‘unphilosophische Philosophie’”), one that is primarily negative and that is overwhelmingly skeptical (Spengler 1919: 63). This is evident in Spengler’s own brief description of his two books: he maintains that the first one surveys various problems while he suggests that the second one provides analyses of historical phenomena. Thus, in his most famous work, Oswald Spengler never promised any real or realistic answers to the pressing question regarding the “decline of western culture” (Spengler 1919: 70−71).

Troeltsch’s Review of the First Volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes The first pre-publication copies of Der Untergang des Abendlandes appeared in late April 1918, with the copies of the actual first edition appearing in the early part of August. The editors of the Historische Zeitschrift asked Troeltsch to review

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the book and Troeltsch obliged. Unlike many times in the past, this time Troeltsch reviewed the book right away and delivered his review to the journal in early July 1919. However, because of various delays, his review did not appear until September of that year (Troeltsch 2010: 445−446). During this time, the second edition of Spengler’s book was published, and Troeltsch noted this in the first paragraph of his review. He also noted that the book had sold out quickly, and with good reason, because it demonstrated both considerable “intellectual individuality” (“geistige Selbständigkeit”) and displayed great knowledge. However, Troeltsch also indicated that it suffered from considerable dilettantism and from the rejection of both cool, critical rationalism and of strict philological applications (Troeltsch 2010: 446). He suggested that it indicated a rejection of the older, more scholarly approach and was instead, representative of the younger, more impressionable style of writing. Nonetheless, Troeltsch regarded it as a significant “cultural document” (“Kulturdokument”) which was Spengler’s response to the modern crises (Troeltsch 2010: 446). Troeltsch noted that Spengler was familiar with natural sciences, including biology and physics, and he was well acquainted with the historical sciences, including history and philosophy. How ever much Spengler appreciated the former, his dissatisfaction with the latter was quite apparent. This clear disdain for philosophy was joined with a clear reliance on some of the most prominent contemporary philosophers—Spengler relied heavily on Bergson and Simmel, and even quoted them without specifically citing their writings (Troeltsch 2010: 447). Troeltsch has much larger criticisms to offer and one has to do with Spengler’s frequent use of jargon; Troeltsch objects that these terms generally do not mean much and in Spengler’s use they seem to mean even less (Troeltsch 2010: 448). Troeltsch’s larger complaint revolves around Spengler’s attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and here Troeltsch has two objections. First, Spengler departs from most of the theoreticians of knowledge in that his focus is on symbols. It is important to point out that Troeltsch has no particular objection to novel theories of knowledge or against symbolic knowledge —witness his praise for Ernst Cassirer.86 In contrast to Spengler, Troeltsch praised Cassirer’s presentation as being one of “clarity, carefulness, and objectivity” (“Klarheit, Sorgfalt, || 86 Troeltsch reviewed Cassirer’s Freiheit und Form which he thought was one of the finest books written on the history of theories of knowledge. Troeltsch 2010: 330. He also reviewed the third volume of Cassirer’s Das Erkenntnisproblem und Wissenschaft der neuen Zeit which he calls “the monumental work” (“Das monumentale Werk”) and praised it for being one of the most important works on the history of modern philosophy and he compares it favorably to the “classical book” (“klassisches Buch”) by the older Neo-Kantian Alois Riehl. Riehl had published his threevolume Der philosophische Kritizismus und seine Bedeutung für die positive Wissenschaft in

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und Objektivität”) (Troeltsch 2010: 502). Second, Troeltsch objects to Spengler’s mixing together so many different disciplines that it is hard to tell what his point is; but, he has the impression that it has more to do with philosophy in general than with any type of epistemology.87 And, he objects to Spengler’s de-evaluation of the individual; the individual plays no role save for a type of material. Troeltsch noted that Hegel also often used the notion of the individual, but that he did so in a far more positive and a much more useful way (Troeltsch 2010: 448, 455). For both Hegel and Goethe, the individual personality can offer insights into the human condition. Unfortunately, Schopenhauer introduced the tragic worldview into philosophy and that was later developed by some theoreticians of modern art (Troeltsch 2010: 457). Troeltsch himself generally approved of much of the literature on modern art, but he did find some of it extremely poor. He quotes one passage from Spengler and suggests that it is reminiscent of the “most terrible example from the modern art literature.”88 This and other passages prompted Troeltsch to believe that the book was hastily put together. Troeltsch also believed that it was quickly written because Spengler was often mistaken about particular historical points. These included Spengler’s claims about Descartes’ notion of mathematics, to which Troeltsch stated that “every word is wrong,” his insistence that Aristotle had “no clue about modern causality,” and his attributing to Luther a peculiar characteristic that no one would have ever suggested (Troeltsch 2010: 450−451). Troeltsch’s catalogue of complaints about the first volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes include the charge that the contents of the book have almost nothing to do with the “sensational main title” (“sensationeller Haupttitel”) and that the book is filled with false assertions, fantastic claims, and questionable

|| 1886−1887. See Troeltsch 2010: 500−501. Troeltsch and Cassirer were colleagues at Berlin, and Troeltsch regarded Cassirer as having one of the best minds of the “younger generation.” Troeltsch 2010: 329. 87 Troeltsch complained that Spengler not only synthesized but that he “over-synthesized” (“übersynthetisiert”). Troeltsch 2010: 449. Later, he complained about the “scarcely understandable cultural connection” (“kaum zu verstehende Kulturzusammenhänge”) Troeltsch 2010: 455. 88 “Schlimmstes Beispiel aus der modernen Kunstliteratur.” Spengler’s phrase was “Die Seelengeschichte der Säule ist noch nie erzählt worden.” Troeltsch 2010: 449−450. An approximate translation of this could be: “The history of the soul of the column has never been told.” The Editors of this volume of Troeltsch’s reviews indicate that in the original it was a complete sentence and they point to page 302 in Spengler’s work. Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate the passage in either of the two editions that I have used.

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analogies. Furthermore, it lacks any regard for truth and facts. On a second reading, the book seemed “very much more unpleasant, more arbitrary, more fantastical, and more contradictory than it had on the first” (“sehr viel unangenehmer, willkürlicher, phantastischer und widerspruchsvoller als beim ersten [Lesen]”). (Troeltsch 2010: 452). Yet Troeltsch allowed that the book was occasionally interesting and that it had some flashes of good ideas. He suggested that it was reminiscent of some of the works by Hamann or Herder but that it lost some of its appeal by the rejection of rationality for emotions. Troeltsch concluded by objecting to Spengler’s skepticism, which Troeltsch maintained was Spengler’s overall view of the end and the goal of philosophy. And he objected to Spengler’s pessimism and nihilism, and he complained that despite Spengler’s claim to follow Goethe and Hegel, he certainly did not. Neither Goethe nor Hegel rejected reason and neither were skeptics; and certainly, neither Goethe nor Hegel could ever be regarded as nihilists. Troeltsch objected to Spengler’s misappropriation of two of Germany’s greatest thinkers. Troeltsch did allow that the West was facing cultural crises of the greatest magnitude, but he insisted that to follow Spengler’s lead was to give in to despair. Instead, Troeltsch advised his readers (and Spengler himself), to follow Spengler’s acknowledged master (“Meister”) Goethe and to confront the crises directly and honestly rather than to give in to Spengler, his pessimism, and his “theory of decline” (“Untergangstheorie”).89

First Intermezzo: Troeltsch’s “Der Untergang des Abendlandes”90 Troeltsch’s review of the first volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes appeared in September 1919 and the following month Troeltsch published “Der Untergang des Abendlandes” as one of the “Spectator-Briefe.” Although signed “Spectator”, it is relatively clear that the author was Troeltsch. Not only did many readers generally suspect Troeltsch as being “Spectator”, but the specifics of this “letter” matched some of the points in the review that Troeltsch had just published. There are, however, some fundamental differences between the review and this “Brief” || 89 Troeltsch 2010: 458−459. Troeltsch especially dwells on Spengler’s invocation of his “master.” He refers to the term “master” (“Meister”) twice, and he mentions Spengler’s admiration for him several other times. Troeltsch 2010: 447, 457, 459. Spengler invokes Goethe many times. Spengler 1919: 35, 41, 89, 101, 125 note 1, 137−139, 141 and note 1, 143, 145, 159−160 note 1, 191−192, 212, 218, 280, 298, 430 note 1, 446, 485, 488, 490, 583, 605, 607. 90 Troeltsch placed “Der Untergang des Abendlandes” in quotation marks; hence, the use of both double and single quotation marks in the following segment.

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and not just that Troeltsch was listed as the author of the first but remained anonymous for the second. Mostly, it is in the differences of objectivity and in tone; in his review Troeltsch attempted to focus on the book itself and tried to refrain from making too many value judgments. In contrast, in the “SpectatorBrief,” Troeltsch felt free to make plenty of subjective evaluations. This began with the first paragraph where he complains about the contemporary efforts to seek parallels in world history and especially in trying to compare the decline of the West with the decline of antiquity. Regarding the first, “Spectator” takes issue with the nationalists and the conservatives who wish to draw a parallel between the events at the beginning of the twentieth century and those at the beginning of the nineteenth. Prussia (and Germany’s) defeats on the battlefields at Jena and at Tilsit were later followed by victories at Leipzig and Waterloo. But, Germany’s defeat in 1918 was not to be followed by any victories. Furthermore, there were no great national voices similar to those of Fichte and Schleiermacher. And, Germany itself had changed; before it was made up of numerous areas and was primarily agricultural; but now it was unified and had taken its place on the world stage as one of the leading industrial states. Finally, the recently ended war fundamentally differed from the Napoleonic wars—while that one took place over most of an entire continent; this one was the first actual “world war.” Moreover, “Spectator” emphasized that “Entire Europe has lost its world-power character” (“Ganz Europa verliert den Weltmächtecharakter”) and as a result the focus of the world has shifted (Troeltsch 2015: 171−172). On the other side, many progressives seek to find parallels to America and hope that Europe will have a revolution like America did. However, Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century is radically different than America towards the end of the eighteenth and any attempts to find parallels are quickly dashed (Troeltsch 2015: 174). Then, there are those who see Europe as simply declining, like the “sinking antiquity” (“sinkendes Altertum”), and he suggested that one of the best examples of this type of thinking is Spengler and Der Untergang des Abendlandes. “Spectator” complained about Spengler’s erroneous specific facts but praised his efforts and suggested that his book was the most significant book which had been written during the war (Troeltsch 2015: 174). However, “Spectator” insisted that Spengler was mistaken with his general theme regarding the “decline of the West” by pointing out that the “Untergang” of America and of Britain is “unthinkable”. Thus, “It is not so simple with the decline of the West.” (“Es ist nicht so einfach mit dem Untergang des Abendlandes”) (Troeltsch 2015: 176−177). “Spectator” concludes with the observation that history is not always open to parallels and

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that we really cannot be certain whether our culture is in decline or actually progressing, and that, he insists, is one particular secret of all of history (Troeltsch 2015: 178).

Second Intermezzo: Troeltsch’s “Gefährlichste Zeiten” The time between Troeltsch’s review of the first volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes and his review of the second volume, many things had happened in Germany, most of which had severe consequences. In his “Berliner Brief” from July 1922 Troeltsch wrote about the implications of the Versailles Treaty and the issue of reparations. Both were bad enough, but Troeltsch insisted that the conflicts, within the German government and the continuing economic crises were adding to the considerable problems facing Germany. These “difficult defeats” (“schwere Niederlagen”) were severely testing Germany’s moral qualities and Troeltsch feared for his country. Troeltsch appended some remarks to his conclusion; during the process of page corrections, he was informed of Walther Rathenau’s assassination and he recalled what Rathenau had said to him only days before his murder. Rathenau told Troeltsch that he never went out without a gun and that he considered that he could be murdered was a distinct possibility. After Rathenau was actually assassinated, Troeltsch asked in the “Brief”— “Who will be the next?” (“Wer wird der Nächste sein?”) and “How will the German Mark respond?” (Troeltsch 2015: 557). There was no immediate answer to the first question but there was to the second. In May 1922, one U.S. dollar equaled 290 Marks, in June, one dollar equaled 317, after Rathenau’s murder at the end of June, the dollar continued to rise against the Mark—in July it went from 493 to 540 (Troeltsch 2015: 560, note 9). In his speech “Dem ermordeten Freunde” which he dedicated to Rathenau’s memory, Troeltsch spoke about his friendship with Rathenau. He granted that Rathenau was not a simple person or one easy to know. Troeltsch added that Rathenau also made mistakes; however, he was a brilliant writer and a dedicated reformer who devoted his considerable talents to securing Germany’s future (Troeltsch 2002: 469−471). Although he suffered because of his Jewish-ness, Rathenau used his knowledge of the world to Germany’s benefit. Rathenau combined idealism and realism in one and he fought against those who were immoralists and defeatists (Troeltsch 2002: 474−475). During his speech, Troeltsch did not need to actually say Spengler’s name in order for his audience to know whom he meant. In “Gefährlichste Zeiten” Troeltsch spelled out the contrast between Rathenau and Spengler. Troeltsch began by contrasting the Left with the Right—the

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Social Democrats of the Left were uninterested in governing because they preferred their old method of confrontation politics (Troeltsch 2015: 561). Those on the Right were not interested in governing but in having power, thus the actual government was being challenged politically from both sides while trying to deal with the basic collapse of the market and the staggering increase in inflation. As Troeltsch put it: “Politics is more and more a question of life and of food!” (“Die Politik wird immer mehr eine Frage des Lebens und der Lebensmittel!”) (Troeltsch 2015: 563). Standing in the center of all this terribleness was Rathenau—whom Troeltsch called a brilliant member of the government who was representative of the highest spiritual and financial aristocracy. But, Troeltsch added that at the same time Rathenau also represented the highest grade of the social-progressive movement (Troeltsch 2015: 563). As a Jew, Rathenau knew how difficult his life was, but he was committed to fulfilling his rather hopeless ministerial job because as a true patriot, he believed that it was his moral and patriotic duty to fulfill it (Troeltsch 2015: 564). Troeltsch declared that Rathenau was “a social-idealist and a moralist” (“Er war in letzter Linie Sozialidealist und Moralist”).91 Troeltsch contrasted this with the “nakedly-brutal lack of moralizing” (“nackt-brutale Moralinfreiheit”) of the new Nietzschean immorality and he pointed to Spengler’s second volume as one “main position” (“Hauptstelle”) of this “new Testament” (Troeltsch 2015: 565). Spengler idealized Nietzsche’s “new morality” and he embraced his notion of the “noble race” (“vornehme Rasse”). Like Nietzsche, Spengler believed that the sense of history reflects “struggle, blood, and war” (“Kampf, Blut, Krieg”) and he was convinced that Germany was fulfilling its “great destiny” (“großes Schicksal”). Like Pontus Pilatus, the “noble race” was entitled to ask “what is truth” because they were the ones to answer this. Troeltsch condemned this, just as he condemned Spengler for ridiculing Jesus and all of his true followers for “his realm is not from this world” (“sein Reich nicht von dieser Welt sei”) (Troeltsch 2015: 565). Troeltsch singles out a passage in the second volume where Spengler suggests that Pilates’ real question was “what is reality?” (“Was ist Wirklichkeit?”), and he suggests that religion is a

|| 91 Troeltsch 2015: 565. Troeltsch’s earlier review of Rathenau’s Von kommenden Dingen is instructive here because many of Troeltsch’s comments are previews of his later remarks about Rathenau and his work. Troeltsch noted that Rathenau’s book was brilliantly written and he agreed that morality in life is absolutely necessary. Troeltsch did voice concerns about Rathenau’s notion regarding freedom—that is, “the social organization of freedom” (“die soziale Organisation der Freiheit”). For Rathenau, this type of freedom was not freedom from the state or the radical freedom of the individual; but rather, was the freedom of the individual to flourish in society. This type of freedom was in opposition to what Rathenau referred to as the “mechanization” of life. See Troeltsch’s “Idealstaat oder Notstaat”. Troeltsch 2010: 262−263.

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type of metaphysics: in particular, a type of absurd metaphysics.92 Furthermore, Spengler had Rathenau in mind when he insisted that “every moral action is in the deepest foundation a piece of asceticism and the destruction of being.”93 Troeltsch does not specifically accuse Spengler of inciting Rathenau’s murder, but he makes it plain that he thinks that the idea that someone like Rathenau should be forced to leave this world of reality stems from Spengler. Troeltsch furthermore bemoans the high cost that we must pay for such an idea—the high cost being Rathenau’s life (Troeltsch 2015: 566−567).

Troeltsch’s Review of the Second Volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes Troeltsch’s review of the second volume of Spengler’s book appeared in 1923 and it was the second to the last book review that he wrote.94 Troeltsch’s review of Neumann is of interest here because it shows that Troeltsch did not dislike modern literature or art; but rather, often thought highly of them. According to Troeltsch, Neumann’s book had “brilliant analyses” (“glänzende Analysen”) and it offered much to theories of modern art. Yet, Troeltsch acknowledges that he thinks that Neumann may have oversimplified Rembrandt’s art and that he notes the differences in approach between Neumann and Georg Simmel’s recently published book on Rembrandt. Nonetheless, Neumann’s book is an “exemplary and masterful performance” (“Muster- und Meisterleistung”) of comparative art (Troeltsch 2010: 649, 657). Accordingly, one can take Neumann’s book as a marked comparison to Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Troeltsch does not explicitly criticize the second volume for its continued lack of clarity and originality; what he does state is that the book is a slight clarification and expansion of the ideas found in the first volume (Troeltsch 2010: 636). In this review, Troeltsch focuses even more on Spengler’s “philosophy” although he acknowledges that Spengler has suggested that he has yet to publish

|| 92 Spengler 1922: 262−263; Troeltsch 2015: 565−566 and note 16. Tracy Strong pointed to Spengler’s claim that history was not a science and was not concerned with truth. Strong also pointed out that truth was unimportant to Spengler; what mattered to him was only whether one was “inwardly” convinced of the matter. Strong 1980: 75−76. 93 “Jede moralische Handlung ist im tiefsten Grunde ein Stück Askese und Abtötung des Daseins.” Spengler 1922: 424. Troeltsch 2015: 565−566. 94 The final review was on the third edition of Carl Neumann’s book on Rembrandt and was published in 1924.

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it. Troeltsch objects to Spengler’s overall approach to philosophy and history, because, for Spengler, philosophy is more important for history than any historical investigation. Similarly, Troeltsch complains that, for Spengler, philosophy is not any type of traditional philosophy but is instead a type of pragmatism that is really an “anti-intellectual vitalism” (“antiintellektualistischer Vitalismus”). Furthermore, Troeltsch decries Spengler’s repudiation of traditional philosophy with its “inner truth” (“innere Wahrheit”) and its inner “necessity” (“Notwendigkeit”). And, he rallies against Spengler’s substitution of instinct and emotion for intellect and reason (Troeltsch 2010: 636−637). Finally, he accuses Spengler of simply appropriating some ideas from Schopenhauer and especially from Nietzsche, without acknowledging the importance of Nirvana for the first and for not appreciating the positive in the second. Instead, what Spengler offers is skepticism and pessimism and the belief that all aspects of life are “accidental”— “‘accidental man’” (“‘Zufall Mensch’”), “‘accidental culture’” (“‘Zufall Kultur’”), and even “‘accidental life’” (“‘Zufall Leben’”) (Troeltsch 2010: 637). Everything that Spengler seems to believe in is shrouded in mysticism; everything is a matter of race and blood. Instead of performing investigations in anthropology and ethnography and instead of delving into issues which are part of the disciplines of politics, economics, and religion, Spengler relies only on his own feelings and surmising—what the soul receives (Troeltsch 2010: 639). This distrust and disdain for the past and the present shows itself in Spengler’s “system of values” (“Wertsystem”). Like Nietzsche, Spengler despises Christianity and its culture. Again, Troeltsch suggests that Spengler lacks originality, because Spengler’s ideas are just like those promoted by the “Stefan George School” of poetic and mystical thinking, without the hate that is found in Nietzsche (Troeltsch 2010: 640−642). At least Nietzsche was trained as a serious scholar and as such he knew the differences between facts and assertions. Troeltsch complains that Spengler has little understanding of the Pelagian conception of Christianity or much of a comprehension of Augustine’s doctrine of predestination (Troeltsch 2010: 643). In Troeltsch’s considered opinion, it was bad enough that Spengler misunderstood religion, but that this misunderstanding would likely result in many serious repercussions. However, Troeltsch was convinced that Spengler also misinterpreted politics, and it was this misinterpretation which prompted Troeltsch to believe that Spengler was mounting a struggle against democracy. And, Troeltsch was convinced that that would ultimately lead to a large number of very bad consequences (Troeltsch 2010: 645). The issue is not whether Spengler was a proto-Nazi, which he probably was not; but whether his ideas helped propel the Nazi’s rise to power, which they probably did. Troeltsch did not live long enough

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to see the rise of Hitler, but he was wise enough to envisage the type of world that Spengler’s type of thinking would likely lead.

Troeltsch’s Criticisms of Spengler in Historismus The fuller discussion of Troeltsch’s conception of historicism was undertaken earlier so the discussion here will be restricted to Troeltsch’s comments and criticisms of Spengler’s ideas as they are found in his book. There are passages in which Troeltsch praises Spengler; for example, he singles out Spengler’s discussion in the second volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes regarding race as an example of a good account of a difficult topic (Troeltsch 2008: 1079). Another example is where Troeltsch suggests that Spengler’s comments about the “Faustian soul” contains the “deepest truth” (“tiefste Wahrheit”) and is “the most beautiful in his book” (“das Schönste in seinem Buch”) (see Troeltsch 2008: 1092). However, there are also places in which he criticizes Spengler. One such passage is where Troeltsch complains about Spengler’s misuse of periodization; instead of attempting to define different time periods by some “real type” of measurement like many scholars, or by some “ideal type” like Max Weber, Spengler seems to want to merge together all periods of history (Troeltsch 2008: 1083−1084, 1087). Another passage is where Troeltsch complains about those who embrace emotions and poetry and reject reason and science—he includes Spengler along with the “Stefan George School” (Troeltsch 2008: 1090). Overall, Troeltsch is rather measured in his comments on Spengler in his “Historismus” book, but much of that is because he is attempting to examine the entire notion of historicism and its effects and is not trying to provide a critical account of Spengler’s book.

The Aftermath and Concluding Comments Troeltsch was not the only philosopher of culture to recognize some fundamental problems with Spengler and his book. The journal Logos devoted the entire second issue of volume nine (1920/1921) to Spengler’s work; some of the leading thinkers critically examined Spengler’s use (and misuse) of mathematics, art, music, and ancient cultures, but the most critical were the philosophers.95 They || 95 Logos carried the subtitle Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur and its corresponding editors included Heinrich Rickert, Paul Natorp, Edmund Husserl, as well as Troeltsch. Troeltsch published several works in Logos as did Max Weber and Georg Simmel. The

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ridiculed Spengler for his claim to have developed a fully new philosophy and they chastised him for claiming to follow Goethe. (Mezger 1920/1921: 260). Mezger complained that despite Spengler placing Goethe’s words at the beginning of his book, there is little of Goethe’s spirit to be found in it (Mezger 1920/1921: 278). Karl Joël also complained about Spengler’s illegitimate use of Goethe; “But with what right?” (“Aber mit welchem Recht?”) Joël asked incredulously. And, he pointed out that while Spengler loved mathematics and despised the ancient Greeks, Goethe was the most unmathematical of all thinkers and the most Greek (Joël 1920/1921: 145−146). Furthermore, Joël condemned Spengler for misusing Goethe and Hegel for his deterministic ends, because for both the “ideal of history” (“Ideal der Geschichte”) is “freedom” (“Die Freiheit”) (Joël 1920/1921: 165). Joël also complained that Spengler misused some of the ideas of many contemporary philosophers, and he specifically mentioned Dilthey and Simmel. He also condemned Spengler for his attacks on some of the others, and he mentioned Windelband, Rickert, and Troeltsch (Joël 1920/1921: 137). Mezger and Joël were just some of the many philosophers who took issue with Spengler’s book and a number of their criticisms echoed those leveled by Troeltsch. Spengler did have a number of defenders, and perhaps the most significant of them was Manfred Schroeter who published a book defending Spengler in 1922. It carried the title Der Streit um Spengler, but what was perhaps more important was its subtitle: Kritik seiner Kritiker. Schroeter claimed that he was speaking for himself and insisted that Spengler first knew about his book when it was being printed. Therefore, he maintained that he was in no way speaking merely on Spengler’s instructions.96 Schroeter’s book is remarkable not only because of its similarity to Spengler’s book, because it is also wide-ranging and interdisciplinary as well as also unclear and polemical. One might think that in his catalogue of hundreds of critics that Schroeter might have considered that their criticisms were possibly justified; however, this consideration apparently never occurred to him. Instead, Schroeter felt justified to attack many, if not most, of the leading scholars in many different fields. The comments here will ignore many of Schroeter’s attacks on experts in music, art, mathematics, and physics,

|| first volume was published in 1910/1911 under the editorship of Georg Mehlis. This is the complete list of co-editors from that initial volume: Rudolf Eucken, Otto von Gierke, Edmund Husserl, Friedrich Meinecke, Heinrich Rickert, Ernst Troeltsch, Max Weber, Wilhelm Windelband, and Heinrich Wölfflin. 96 Schroeter insisted “Nichts wäre falscher, als unserer Schrift einen heimlichen Unterton ‘ex cathedra Spengleriana’ heraushören zu wollen.” Schroeter 1922: VII.

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and will be restricted to his criticisms of philosophers. Schroeter leveled criticisms at members of almost every variation of Neo-Kantianism, including Heinrich Rickert, Johannes Volkelt, Benjamin Nelson, and Richard Kroner, among others. Schroeter singled out Rickert for numerous particular criticisms, but he also repeatedly attacked Troeltsch. Some of Schroeter’s criticisms were general, in that he simply included Troeltsch in a group of particularly nefarious opponents of Spengler. These were the professors who dared to speak about the German essence or the philosophers who generally did not have a sufficient appreciation of history (Schroeter 1922: 2−3). Schroeter recognized Troeltsch’s importance as a theologian, he referred to Troeltsch’s massive work in the “Kultur der Gegenwart” as “monumental”, and he even praised him for his work in the philosophy of culture (Schroeter 1922: 118, 82 note 1). Schroeter also noted approvingly that Troeltsch had discussed Spengler’s writings a number of times and that he appeared to move from a fully negative assessment to a more appreciative stance. However, Schroeter noted that Troeltsch was too rooted in traditional philosophy so was unable to appreciate Spengler’s book or any similar type of thinking. To make his point, Schroeter made reference to Troeltsch’s lack of appreciation of Max Scheler’s writings in three different places (Schroeter 1922: 106, 35, 161). In Schroeter’s opinion, like most others, Troeltsch clearly did not really understand Spengler’s ideas and he certainly did not sufficiently appreciate Spengler’s genius. In the new “Vorwort” to the 1923 edition of Der Untergang des Abendlandes Spengler himself made a slight attempt to justify his book. Against the suggestion made by Troeltsch (and by others) that he rushed to put it together, Spengler again insisted that his book was the fruit of ten years work. He did admit that his original introduction was neither as clear nor correct as it should have been; nonetheless, he continued to be pleased with what he had written there and in rest of the book. He insisted that he was a product of his times and that determined what and how he wrote. He maintained that his philosophy was not some crude pessimistic one but was one that was carefully thought out. Furthermore, he attempted to justify his book by claiming that he had learned much from Goethe and from Nietzsche. From Goethe, he had learned his method of dealing with the history of philosophy and from Nietzsche, he had learned how to ask the right questions about culture, history, and life. From Nietzsche, he had also learned to take a “perspective” (“Überblick”) from a “vantage point” (“Ausblick”) and from Goethe, he had learned more about how to approach philosophy. Spengler insisted that Goethe was a “student” (“Schüler”) of Leibniz, without really knowing it; and Spengler places himself within this history of philosophy; as a student of Goethe, and of Leibniz, he now states that his thinking should be

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regarded “as his German philosophy” (“als seine deutsche Philosophie”). It is remarkable that Spengler proudly says this, whereas his entire book is basically a denunciation of German philosophy.97 It is quite evident that Troeltsch believed Spengler’s ideas to be a major threat to any possibility that Germany in particular and Europe in general could be put back onto a path which would lead towards peace and prosperity. It was not just Spengler’s pessimism and skepticism which troubled Troeltsch; it was Spengler’s wholesale rejection of some of the defining traits of the entire history of the Western civilization. The West had been built on reason and regulations and this sense of rationality and the belief in laws helped form its stable foundation. Spengler simply rejected this history as being misguided and he merely dismissed the belief in laws and norms. Then, there was the matter of truth—Troeltsch believed that truth was something that existed and should be revered; Spengler did not believe that there was such a thing and he mocked even the notion of it. With Spengler’s insistence on feelings and his belief in nihilism, Troeltsch was convinced that Spengler was helping to undermine the entire intellectual and moral structure of the West. And, he believed that it was his duty to counteract Spengler’s disruptive influence and provide a counter narrative to Spengler’s pessimistic message. Spengler’s message may have reflected the German despair about modernity, but Troeltsch believed that his own view was a far more accurate reflection of the true “spirit of modern culture”.

|| 97 Spengler 1923: VII–IX. It may be that Spengler’s disregard for accuracy and for facts has been continued by his adherents. The copy of the 1923 version of Der Untergang des Abendlandes that I am using is considered to be that which was published in 1923. It carried the page detailing the publication information from 1923 (“76. bis 81. Auflage [125. bis 135. Tausend]. Copyright by C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung [Oscar Beck] München 1923. Druck: C.H. Beck’ sche Buchdruckerei, Nördlingen”) and it was sold to me as a 1923 edition. However, there is a page inserted by H. Kornhardt where he writes of the new and revised index—but, there is no index and the date on the page is “9. März 1950”.

Concluding Comment The preceding chapters were intended to demonstrate Ernst Troeltsch’s role as a philosopher of culture and to show his approach to a number of critical issues that faced almost everyone in the modern world. These included the roles of the philosopher and theologian and how they can confront the issues of church and state and to distinguish the proper spheres of faith and reason. These also include how one can intellectually promote various forms of natural law in order to safe guard the state and to adjucate disputes. These also include how to explain and defend against the relativism of historicism and how to defend reason against propaganda in modernity. And, they also include an examination of the role that Germany should play in the modern world. Finally, they include an idea on how to promote reason and community in an age of increasing irrationality and isolation. Troeltsch may not have been able to provide answers to every type of modern problem, but he was able to provide both an accurate analysis of many of them and offer a path towards a solution for some of them. In sum, Ernst Troeltsch has proven himself to be one of the best diagnosticians of modern culture as well as one of the better providers of the means to cure those modern cultural illnesses. Each of these chapters represent a possible beginning for fuller exploration and this book as a whole is only a first attempt at drawing attention to Troeltsch’s role as the thinker who examined the “spirit of modern world”. It may be objected that our times are not Troeltsch’s times and that our problems are different than his. And, indeed, this objection does have some legitimacy. However, the fact that the crises of 2020 are different from those of a hundred years ago, we are still fundamentally the same types of human beings. Thus, we have the choice to simply succumb to despair and end up not struggling to survive. Or, we can choose to confront the crises by identifying their probable causes and then establishing plans that seem likely to solve those crises. Troeltsch chose the latter course and in his successes and even in his failures, he continues to serve a model individual as well as a significant philosopher of culture.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654653-009

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Index of Names and Subjects acoustics 19 age 7, 10, 16, 18, 21, 24, 27, 29, 63, 69, 90, 140 Allen, J.W. 106 America 11, 38, 46, 47, 59, 76, 101, 131 anarchy of convictions 81 anarchy of values 2, 5, 81, 84, 86, 99 antinomy 97 antiquity 69, 70, 78, 90, 131 Archimedes 96 aristocracy 110, 123, 133 Aristotle 11, 114, 117, 129 Arnold, Matthew 108 asceticism 16, 134 astronomy 19, 80 audience 12, 16, 55, 58, 93, 132 Augustine 8, 11, 69, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 135 Austria 49, 109, 110 Austria-Hungary 110 authority 4, 5, 12, 15, 16, 22, 23, 26, 27, 37, 42, 50, 53, 56, 59, 60, 64, 72, 75 autonomy 14, 16, 22, 23, 116, 117 Bach, Johann Sebastian 117 Baden 40 Balkans 103 Baptists 56 barbarians 105, 106 Baron, Hans 9, 60, 73 Barth, Paul 92 Baumgarten, Otto 121 Bayle, Pierre 23 Below, Georg von 92 Bergson, Henri 128 Berlin 1, 6, 9, 14, 24, 30, 37, 47, 53, 67, 77, 93, 95, 100, 101, 103, 105, 124, 129 Bernhardi, Friedrich 104, 108 Bible 11, 12, 15, 41, 56 Bismarck, Otto von 4, 13, 49, 50, 51, 102, 115, 120 Bodin, Jean 18 Bousset, Wilhelm 121 Buber, Martin 70, 71 Bulgaria 110

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654653-011

Busch, Wilhelm 48 Bußmann, Walter 50 Butler, Samuel 20 Caesar, Julius 54 callings 15 Calvin, Jean 8, 11, 16, 23, 38, 65, 66, 67, 70, 76, 77, 96 Calvinism 11, 17, 23, 76 capitalism 3, 8, 17, 22, 28, 76, 110, 116 Carlyle, Thomas 74, 108 Cassirer, Ernst 85, 118, 128, 129 Catholic 4, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 38, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 73, 75, 77, 78, 91, 109, 110 Catholicism 4, 20, 42, 59, 61, 109, 117 causality 89, 129 century 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 27, 29, 30, 32, 46, 48, 50, 53, 54, 71, 72, 73, 80, 81, 84, 87, 90, 112, 113, 115, 117, 118, 131 character 38, 71, 112, 131 chemistry 19, 80 Chesterton, G.K. 105 Christianity 5, 9, 10, 16, 23, 34, 36, 41, 44, 57, 69, 71, 72, 75, 77, 78, 91, 118, 135 church 4, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 35, 37, 39, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 63, 67, 68, 69, 110, 117, 121, 122, 140 claim 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 26, 27, 32, 35, 41, 43, 44, 51, 59, 70, 76, 104, 105, 106, 109, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 122, 129, 130, 137 Clarke, Christopher 20, 51 Clarke, Samuel 22, 25, 64 Clemen, Carl 40 colleagues 2, 81, 101, 129 colonization 109 community V, 3, 10, 18, 22, 38, 49, 56, 66, 71, 75, 111, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 140 competitor 36 compromise 20, 37, 58, 69, 95

152 | Index of Names and Subjects

conflict 4, 5, 47, 49, 50, 52, 68, 81, 82, 111, 113, 132 conscience 12, 14, 15, 18, 27, 54, 56, 57, 60, 66, 78, 91, 92, 122 consciousness 25, 41, 43, 44, 66, 85, 89, 91 Conte, Domenico 124, 125, 126 contradiction 36, 37, 84 conviction V, 2, 12, 15, 34, 38, 41, 47, 104, 109, 112, 117, 125 convictions 3, 13, 81 Counter-Reformation 10 Cramb, J.A. 107, 108 crisis 58, 83, 95 criticism, 10, 12, 15, 27, 82, 83, 92, 120 Croce, Bendetto 92 Cromwell, Oliver 126 culture V, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 24, 28, 30, 32, 45, 46, 58, 62, 63, 65, 68, 78, 83, 95, 96, 100, 104, 106, 109, 110, 111, 114, 117, 118, 119, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 132, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140 Darmstadt 14 Deists 20, 21, 27, 63, 64 dependence 25, 41, 44 Descartes, René 10, 24, 85 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie V, 22, 67, 75, 95 development 3, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 33, 35, 37, 63, 70, 71, 75, 80, 87, 88, 89, 98 devil 19, 48, 72 dialectics 45, 88 Dierken, Jörg 79, 81 Dietz, Carl 105 dignity 15, 75 dilettantism 128 Dilthey, Wilhelm 2, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 99, 114, 118, 137 disciples 12 discipline 29, 57, 59, 80, 110, 112, 117, 119 discovery 18, 19, 24 document 41, 128 dogma 11, 19, 25, 37, 41, 53, 59, 65, 69, 76, 78

doubt V, 1, 8, 10, 28, 37, 45, 52, 72, 80, 108 Drescher, Hans-Georg 2, 29, 61, 82, 83 education 120 England 5, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 59, 64, 76, 79, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 116 Enlightenment 4, 7, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 32, 46, 56, 63, 64, 70, 76, 78, 90, 116, 118 equality 10, 19, 67, 69, 74, 76, 101, 110, 119 ethics 11, 14, 15, 22, 23, 24, 27, 29, 33, 56, 64, 69, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 85, 86, 91, 122 Eulenburg, Franz 72 Europe 1, 10, 11, 25, 46, 50, 76, 89, 100, 102, 106, 110, 116, 125, 131, 139 Europeanism 89 experience 19 faith 6, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, 26, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 43, 44, 48, 50, 56, 58, 64, 68, 75, 90, 98, 106, 110, 114, 117, 120, 121, 122, 140 family 16, 53, 100 feeling 32, 38, 41, 113, 117 Fichte, Johannes Gottlob 33, 34, 103, 104, 117, 131 Fischer, Kuno 26 Friedrich the Great 112, 115, 120 friends 2, 6, 81, 96, 97, 101, 103 Fuchs, Emil 31, 33, 34 future 5, 6, 8, 24, 68, 69, 99, 100, 105, 116, 118, 120, 121, 123, 125, 126, 132 Galileo 24 geology 19 George, Stefan 98, 135, 136 Gerber, Simon 47 Germany 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 47, 48, 49, 51, 57, 60, 77, 81, 91, 96, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 124, 125, 131, 132, 133, 139, 140 goal 17, 22, 50, 52, 63, 67, 82, 83, 86, 90, 113, 114, 117, 120, 127, 130

Index of Names and Subjects | 153

God 4, 8, 13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23, 41, 42, 43, 44, 54, 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 86, 92, 96 Goethe, Johannes Wolfgang von 14, 20, 118, 129, 130, 137, 138 Gospel 69 Gothein, Eberhart 67, 70, 71 Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm VI, 7, 81, 82, 92 Grimm, Brothers 8 Grotius, Hugo 18, 71, 72 Gunkel, Hermann 75 Gymnasium 118 Haeckel, Ernst 106 Halle 17 Harnack, Adolf von 9, 12, 13, 29, 42, 47, 65, 90, 92, 106, 114 Harrington, Austin 79 Hauck, Albert 17 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich V, 7, 8, 23, 29, 30, 37, 42, 43, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 93, 96, 97, 113, 117, 119, 120, 122, 129, 130, 137 Heidelberg 1, 6, 17, 26, 40, 54, 55 Hensel, Paul 37 Heraclitus 96 Herder, Johann Gottfried 88, 104, 118, 130 hermeneutics 80 hero 15, 74 Herodotus 80, 84 Herrnhuter 38 Heussi, Karl 93, 98, 99 hierarchy 19, 69 Hinneberg, Paul 16, 59 Hinschius, Paul 49, 51, 53, 55, 57 Hintze, Otto 92, 95, 98, 99, 101, 103, 104 historicism 5, 79, 81, 83, 85, 91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 118, 136, 140 history 1, 3, 4, 8, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 40, 44, 47, 50, 54, 56, 62, 63, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 105, 108, 109, 113, 115, 118, 120, 124, 126, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134,135, 136, 137, 138, 139 Hobbes, Thomas 18, 22, 70, 71

Holstein, Günter 46 Hübinger, Gangolf 2, 3, 58 Hügel, Friedrich von 60, 61, 91 humanity 12, 19, 28, 77, 87, 104, 110, 115, 127 humans 5, 8, 18, 41, 42, 66, 69 Humboldt, Wilhelm 20, 103, 111, 118 Hume, David 22, 64, 79 humility 13 Husserl, Edmund 136 Hutcheson, David 20 idea 8, 12, 21, 23, 26, 43, 46, 68, 89, 90, 96, 101, 105, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 127, 134, 140 ideal types 85, 97 identity 64, 84 imperialism 90, 103, 120 impulses 69 individual 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 38, 42, 56, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70, 75, 76, 80, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 94, 96, 97, 102, 109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 119, 121, 127, 129, 133, 140 induction 19 infallibility 13, 15, 50, 53, 59 Italy 59, 102, 106, 110 James, William 26 Jena 131 Jesus Christ 12, 34, 38, 43, 75, 133 Joël, Karl 137 Kahnis, Karl Friedrich August 17 Kaiser 66, 111 Kant, Immanuel 1, 10, 14, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 43, 44, 64, 77, 78, 80, 82, 84, 88, 93, 97, 117, 119 Kantorowicz, Hermann 67, 70, 73 Kantorowicz, Hermann 71, 72 Kattenbusch, Ferdinand 32, 33 Kiel 34, 77 knowledge 21, 26, 31, 36, 45, 53, 58, 60, 64, 79, 83, 89, 92, 94, 97, 98, 128, 132 Köhler, Walther 2, 29, 39, 40, 49, 52, 54, 55, 56, 92, 125 Köstlin, Julius 12, 13 Kracauer, Siegfried 92 Kulturkampf 4, 13, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53

154 | Index of Names and Subjects

language VI, 14, 117 Laski, Harald 78 Laube, Reinhard 83 law V, 2, 4, 10, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 30, 35, 46, 48, 52, 55, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 92, 112, 113, 117, 124, 140 Le Fort, Gertrud von 40 leader 14, 32, 93, 101 Leibniz, Gottfried 1, 20, 23, 24, 25, 43, 79, 84, 88, 96, 118, 138 Leipzig 17, 131 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 20 Liebert, Arthur 92 life 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 17, 23, 27, 28, 30, 35, 39, 40, 44, 45, 48, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 62, 69, 78, 81, 83, 86, 88, 92, 94, 97, 100, 102, 103, 110, 111, 116, 117, 121, 124, 127, 133, 134, 135, 138 Locke, John 18, 21, 22, 64, 70, 76, 79, 115 logic 84, 86, 126 Lübbe, Hermann 124, 126 Ludz, Peter Christian 124, 126 Luther, Martin 3, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 23, 32, 38, 39, 44, 54, 56, 65, 66, 69, 73, 75, 77, 96, 113, 129 Lutheranism 11 Macaulay, Thomas 107 machines 19 Majunke, Paul 50 Malebranche, Nicolas 24, 79 Mandeville, Bernard 22 Mannheim, Karl 83, 93, 97, 98, 99 Marcks, Erich 25, 108, 109 Marx, Karl 83, 95, 119 Marxism 87, 122 master 39, 114, 130 materialism 78 Mayer, Otto Friedrich 49, 55, 57 medicine 19, 55 Meinecke, Friedrich 80, 83, 87, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 103, 104, 137 Melanchthon, Philipp 32, 62, 66 men 14, 71, 102 metaphysics 9, 66, 72, 88, 94, 117, 122, 126, 134 Meyer, Eduard 90, 114

Meyer, Johannes 57, 73 Mezger, Edmund 126, 137 Mill, John Stuart 78 Misch, Georg 35 modernity V, 90, 139, 140 Mohammed 126 Mommsen, Hans 81, 114 monarchy 110, 111, 112, 117 monastery 11 money 48, 70, 76, 126 monism 44 morality 19, 21, 24, 26, 59, 63, 64, 69, 92, 117, 133 Mulert, Hermann 34, 35 München 100, 124 mysticism 11, 67, 68, 69, 71, 77, 135 Naeher, Jürgen 124, 125, 126 Natorp, Paul 37, 136 Naumann, Friedrich 37 Netherlands 18, 19 New Protestantism 11, 16, 39, 42 Newton, Isaac 21, 24, 25, 109 nihilism 5, 123, 130, 139 Nipperdey, Thomas 13, 49, 50, 51 Nirvana 92, 135 Nominalism 19 Old Protestantism 11, 16, 42 Onken, Hermann 103 optics 19 optimism 10, 18, 19, 24, 58, 59, 100, 101, 120 order 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, 18, 19, 25, 50, 54, 69, 73, 75, 77, 88, 102, 106, 110, 112, 113, 117, 118, 124, 132, 140 organization 10, 70, 113, 115, 120, 121, 122, 133 Otto, Rudolf 30, 31 owl of Minerva 89 Oxford 79, 104 Paley, William 20 pantheism 43, 44 Pascal, Blaise 23 patriot 13, 133 personal 3, 23, 38, 41, 42, 43, 56, 59, 60, 69, 102, 112 pessimism 5, 6, 18, 68, 124, 130, 135, 139 Pfleiderer, Otto 26

Index of Names and Subjects | 155

philology 31, 55, 118 philosopher VI, 3, 6, 20, 24, 30, 32, 43, 44, 45, 79, 80, 97, 119, 136, 140 philosophy V, 1, 11, 14, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 53, 55, 58, 59, 64, 72, 76, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 111, 112, 113, 117, 122, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 134, 137, 138 physics 19, 70, 80, 126, 128, 137 physiology 19 piety 2, 13, 59 Plato 45, 80, 92, 113, 114, 117 Plenge, Johannes 119, 120 Plötz, Alfred 67 poetry 14, 111, 136 politician 50, 61, 107 Pontus Pilatus 133 pope 15 Pope 13, 20, 37, 42, 50, 51, 59 Positivism 87 poverty 74, 110 progress 14, 18, 78, 86, 89, 110, 115, 122 propaganda 5, 77, 102, 140 Protestant VI, 1, 3, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 23, 32, 38, 41, 42, 51, 52, 53, 54, 59, 66, 70, 73, 109, 110 Protestantism 1, 3, 4, 7, 15, 16, 17, 32, 38, 39, 50, 55, 57, 66, 69 Prussia 11, 49, 100, 102, 103, 105, 122, 131 Puritanism 112, 115, 116 Pythagoras 126 Rade, Martin 37, 44, 121 Ranke, Franz Leopold von 86, 96, 97, 114 Rathenau, Walther 132, 133, 134 reason 4, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 37, 38, 44, 54, 58, 62, 63, 64, 66, 69, 72, 76, 78, 80, 88, 90, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 116, 117, 121, 122, 128, 130, 135, 136, 139, 140 Redeker, Martin 40 Reformation 3, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 32, 53, 54, 56, 63, 70, 108, 117 Reformers 3, 11, 73 Reich 4, 50, 133

relevance 35, 39 Renaissance 10, 13, 18, 118 Rendtorff, Trutz 59, 83 revolution 5, 10, 14, 16, 56, 66, 77, 78, 81, 90, 108, 111, 115, 119, 120, 121, 122, 131 Rickert, Heinrich 2, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 94, 96, 136, 137, 138 Riehl, Alois 128 Ritschl, Albrecht 12, 13, 14, 29, 30, 32, 35, 41, 44 Ritschl, Otto 31 Rolffs, Ernst 121 Rome 13, 50 Rose, Miriam 46, 47 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 20, 64, 115 Ruppert, Stephan 13, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52 Russia 70, 96, 102, 103, 105, 110, 114 Sacraments 15 salvation 41, 42, 43, 52, 117 Salvation 40 Scheel, Otto 75 Schell, Hermann 60 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 33, 43 Schiele, Friedrich 75 Schiller, Friedrich 20 Schleiermacher, Friedrich 4, 6, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 65, 75, 77, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 99, 103, 131 Schmidt-Volkmar, Erich 50, 51 Schmoller, Gustav von 114 Scholasticism 11 Schopenhauer, Arthur 36, 43, 83, 86, 96, 129, 135 Schroeter, Manfred 137 Schumacher, Hermann 103 Schumpeter, Joseph A. 90 Schweitzer, Albert 26 Schwöbel, Christoph 81, 91 sciences 11, 18, 19, 21, 25, 55, 63, 71, 80, 84, 85, 87, 94, 105, 109, 127, 128 sect 38, 67, 68, 69, 70, 76, 95 secularization 23, 46, 51, 110 Seeberg, Reinhard 65, 66 Sermon on the Mount 69, 76

156 | Index of Names and Subjects

Siebeck, Paul 36, 52, 75, 82 Simmel, Georg V, 2, 3, 67, 70, 71, 81, 84, 128, 134, 136, 137 Smith, Adam 20, 22 society 3, 10, 14, 22, 48, 53, 63, 67, 69, 105, 110, 111, 133 sociology V, 67, 72, 79, 87, 93, 95 Socrates 91 Sohm, Rudolph 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58 Sombart, Werner V, 2, 3, 67 Spengler, Oswald 5, 83, 90, 96, 98, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139 Spinoza, Baruch 23, 24, 43 spirit 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 24, 28, 38, 39, 44, 45, 56, 59, 80, 86, 89, 104, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 137, 139, 140 state 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 30, 38, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 75, 78, 81, 84, 87, 89, 96, 103, 105, 107, 109, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 126, 133, 134, 140 Stoic 4, 63, 65, 70, 74, 92 Strong, Tracy 134 struggle 6, 13, 14, 19, 51, 56, 60, 101, 104, 117, 133, 135 Stuttgart 16 subjectivism 22 Süskind, Hermann 35, 36, 37 Swift, Jonathan 20 Sybel, Heinrich von 114 Tanner, Klaus 62 teacher 15, 87, 111 technology V, 10, 67, 126 Testament 65, 72, 75, 133 theologian V, 1, 3, 9, 12, 13, 21, 32, 40, 44, 50, 79, 95, 98, 138, 140 theology V, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 18, 20, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 53, 55, 57, 62, 65, 79, 80, 92, 113, 118, 125 Thimme, Friedrich 121 Tholuck, Friedrich 17 Thucydides 80, 84

Tice, Terence 29, 45 Tillich, Paul 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99 Tilsit 131 Tönnies, Ferdinand V, 2, 3, 10, 28, 67, 70, 71, 84, 92, 93, 95, 99, 120 trade 19, 69, 76, 108, 112 Treitschke, Heinrich von 12, 14, 15, 16, 50, 104, 107, 108, 114 Troeltsch, Marta 40 Tröltsch, Ernst 22, 33, 54, 95 truce 46 Turkey 110 tyrants 5, 11 Ultramontanists 13 unification 15, 49, 103, 108, 111 United States 25, 46, 96, 121, 122 values 1, 2, 13, 16, 78, 86, 87, 89, 92, 96, 98, 113, 122, 123, 135 Verein für Socialpolitik 67 Versailles Treaty 132 Vierkandt, Alfred 92 vocation 15 Voltaire 20, 64 war 2, 5, 24, 25, 37, 49, 77, 81, 83, 91, 95, 98, 100, 101, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 114, 116, 120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 131, 133 Waterloo 131 Weber, Marianne 28 Weber, Max V, 2, 4, 8, 16, 25, 28, 52, 60, 62, 67, 70, 72, 78, 84, 90, 96, 97, 136 Weimar 100, 103, 123 West 5, 78, 83, 110, 115, 116, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 139 Wilamowitz, Ulrich von 114 Windelband, Wilhelm 2, 3, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 137 Wolff, Christian 20, 78 women 14 worth 15, 17, 44, 55, 75, 94, 97, 112, 126 Wyman Jr., Walter E. 30, 39 Zachhuber, Johannes 29 Zeller, Eduard 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58 zoology 19 Zwingli 11, 73