Epigrams of Epicurus

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Epigrams of Epicurus Translated from the anonymous French version by Tolga Yalur

I. Whatever is blissful and immortal does not bother with anything, it does not tire others. Anger is not worthy of its greatness, and benefits are not in the character of its grandeur. All these things are only the characteristic of frailty. II. Death is nothing in our sight. What is dissolved once has no affection, and this deprivation of feeling means that we are nothing anymore. III. All that is the most charming is nothing but deprivation of pain. No evil, nothing sad. IV. When the body is attacked by violent pain, it soon ceases. If, on the contrary, the pain becomes languid by the time of its duration, the body undoubtedly gets some pleasure from it. Most illnesses which are long have intervals that flatter us more than the ailments which we endure worry us. V. Living pleasantly is not possible without prudence, without honesty and without justice. Whoever practices these virtues always spends life in pleasure. Whoever is wretched enough to be neither prudent, nor honest, nor just, is deprived of all that could lead to happiness. VI. Inasmuch as reputation shelters from the human evil intentions, they are well in nature, no matter how they may be attained. VII. Numerous people imagined that reputation could guarantee friends. If they have realized the calmness and safety in their lives by this route of true wellness, they have undoubtedly attained it via the nature's teaching. If, on the contrary, they have always agitated in pain, they have fallen from this same conformable wellness. VIII. No pleasure is evil in itself, but only when followed by the pain much more violent than the pleasure. IX. If the pleasure could contain itself and the perfection of delights in its duration, it would be at ease all the time. Then, pleasures would never differ. X. If what flatters humans in their lasciviousness at the same time tears out of their minds the conceived terror, fear of the gods and the alarms of death, they unfold the secret of knowing how to desire what is inevitable to live well. I would be wrong to rebuke them, since they would be at the height of all pleasures, and nothing would in any way disturb the tranquility of their situation.

XI. The study and speculation of physics would be useless if all that we regard in gods as miracles were not terrible, if we could reflect enough not to fear death because it concerns nothing, and if our knowledge eventually went as far as to know what is the true end of the evil and the good. XII. Whoever trembles at the sight of the wonders of nature, awakened by all the events of life, can ever be free from fear and must filter through the vast expanse of objects and to heal of the irrational impressions of tales: one cannot, without the discoveries of physics, enjoy true pleasures. XIII. What is the use of fear, if we do not suspect the way in which everything is conducted in the heavens, on the earth and in the immensity of this great whole? XIV. Humans could offer a tolerable safety only when it is born out of the force of mind and the renunciation of troubles. XV. Wellness in nature is few and easy to obtain, but vain desires are insatiable. XVI. The wise would not always have a very mediocre wealth. If the wise does not consider the good depending on the wellness, the elevation of mind and the excellence of its advice would upset above the others. They are the incentives behind the most famous events of life. XVII. Whoever lives without trouble and disorder is righteous; the unjust, on the contrary, is in agitation all the way along. XVIII. The pleasure of the body is nothing other than the result of the pain which occurs because of lack, which could never be increased but varied in different conditions. XIX. The mind suggests this voluptuousness for the end of its happiness, which depends totally on the way in which we get rid of these illusional opinions. Everything has some affinity with these for they cause disturbance to the mind. XX. If humans could live forever, the pleasure of this would not be greater than that which they enjoy in limited spaces of life, elevating the human logic well enough to keep in mind these limits. XXI. If corporeal pleasure were to be limitless, so would the time to enjoy it. XXII. Whoever imagines the corporeal ends and the limits of corporeal duration, and frees oneself from fears of the future, makes life perfectly happy. Enjoying life as such does not mean to be deprived of pleasure. One does not need the infinite time for happiness, although mortality leads imperceptibly to the tomb, where the journey happily ends.

XXIII. Whoever discovered the nature's limits on life has known the means of banning the pain which is felt in the body when something is missing, and made the happy secret of regulating the course of life well, with no need to search for happiness, which is full of uncertainties and dangers. XXIV. There must a principle of evidence to make judgments, otherwise there will always be confusion. XXV. If you reject all senses, you will have no way of discerning truth from lies. XXVI. If you reject someone, and not distinguish between what you believe with doubt and what is real to the senses, the moves of the soul and the ideas, you will have no character of truth and you won't be able to rely on the other senses. XXVII. If you admit what is doubtful as certain, and not reject what is false, you will be in perpetual uncertainty. XXVIII. If you do not report everything to the end of nature, your actions will contradict your reasonings. XXIX. Among all the things that wisdom gives to live happily, none is as meaningful as a true friend that gives the most peace in mediocrity. XXX. Whoever is strongly convinced that there is nothing in life more solid than friendship has known the art of strengthening his mind vis-a-vis the fear from the eternity of pain. XXXI. There are pleasures that nature inspires, and there are superfluous pleasures. Other pleasures, although natural, are nevertheless of no use. Some do not conform to the natural inclination, pleasing only the illusions that opinion forms. XXXII. The natural pleasures that do not relieve pain are not necessary. If we do not have these, then we must correct the envy keeping in mind the trouble that they cost to obtain. XXXIII. Indulging in violent desires is not because of their nature but our vain opinion of them. XXXIV. The right is nothing but the utility acknowledged by consent for the just cause of humans. Through rights, without offending and without being offended, humans lived sheltered from insult. XXXV. Humans and animals have been unable to live without violence. The same goes for nations that have been unable to contract an alliance to prevent offenses. XXXVI. Justice is nothing in itself. The human society made use of it by agreeing on the conditions to live without offending and without being offended.

XXXVII. Injustice is not an evil in itself. The only evil of it is to keep the human society in continuous fear by the remorse with which the human conscience is disturbed, and which the crimes will be acknowledged by whoever has the right to have them punished. XXXVIII. Whoever secretly violates the conventions that were made to prevent harm, cannot guarantee that the crime will always be secret. Even if the crime is not disclosed for a thousand occasions, no one could ensure that it would last forever. XXXIX. Everyone has the same right everywhere, based upon utility, though there are countries where the very same utility does not pass for just. XL. All that experience demonstrates to be useful to the republic for common use in life and advantageous for everyone must be considered just. Whoever makes a law which subsequently brings no utility is not naturally just. XLI. If the established law is of no use sometimes but advantageous to the republic on other occasions, it will nevertheless be evaluated just by whoever judges for greater use, and whoever does not like to confuse anything with vain speech. XLII. Keeping everything the same, if something believed to be just does not correspond to the idea of just, it is not just. When, on other conditions, it ceases to be useful, it is not just any more. XLIII. Whoever cautiously demands help for any foreign thing is limited to what is possible, but does not stop the search for the impossible, neglecting what could be had, and rejecting the useless pleasure. XLIV. Whoever lives with the like-minded would be safe in society. This disposition of moods and minds is the solid guarantee of society, which would make life a joy with close friendship without regarding their separation as deplorable.