Epicureanism and Scientific Debates. Antiquity and Late Reception: Language, Medicine, Meteorology (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy–Series 1, 64) 9789462703735, 9789461665164, 9462703736

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ancient and medieval philosophy · series 1

Epicureanism and Scientific Debates Antiquity and Late Reception Volume 1 Edited by Francesca Masi Pierre-Marie Morel Francesco Verde

Leuven University Press

EPICUREANISM AND SCIENTIFIC DEBATES: ANTIQUITY AND LATE RECEPTION VOLUME I. LANGUAGE, MEDICINE, METEOROLOGY

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

DE WULF-MANSION CENTRE Series I

LXIV, 1

Editorial Coordinator Russell Friedman Editorial Board Lisa Devriese Pieter d’Hoine Jan Opsomer Andrea Robiglio Carlos Steel Gerd Van Riel

Advisory Board Brad Inwood, Yale University, USA Jill Kraye, The Warburg Institute, London, United Kingdom John Marenbon, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom Lodi Nauta, University of Groningen, The Netherlands Timothy Noone, The Catholic University of America, USA Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA Martin Pickavé, University of Toronto, Canada Pasquale Porro, Università di Torino, Italy Geert Roskam, KU Leuven, Belgium

The “De Wulf-Mansion Centre” is a research centre for Ancient, Medieval, and Renaissance ­philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the ku Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein, 2, b-3000 Leuven (Belgium). It hosts the international project “Aristoteles Latinus” and publishes the “Opera omnia” of Henry of Ghent and the “Opera Philosophica et Theologica” of Francis of Marchia.

EPICUREANISM AND SCIENTIFIC DEBATES: ANTIQUITY AND LATE RECEPTION Volume I. Language, Medicine, Meteorology

Edited by Francesca Masi, Pierre-Marie Morel and Francesco Verde

LEUVEN UNIVERSITY PRESS

© 2023 by the De Wulf-Mansioncentrum – De Wulf-Mansion Centre Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain/ Universitaire Pers Leuven Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven / Louvain (Belgium) All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated data file or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers. ISBN 978 94 6270 373 5 eISBN 978 94 6166 516 4 https://doi.org/10.11116/9789461665164 D/2023/1869/20 NUR: 732 Cover: Geert de Koning Typesetting: Crius Group

Contents Introduction Francesca Masi, Pierre-Marie Morel and Francesco Verde Thinking or Speaking: The Paradoxes of the Epicurean Theory of Language Julie Giovacchini

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Language Theory, Scientific Terminology, and Linguistic Controversies in Epicurus’ On Nature Francesca Masi

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Epicurus and His Meteorological Lexicon in the Letter to Pythocles: Some Remarks Dino De Sanctis

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The Fragments of Epicurus’ Letters: Scientific Debates and New Perspectives Margherita Erbì Lucretius’ Epistemological Language Chiara Rover Medicine and Responsibility: Hippocratic and Democritean Influences on Epicurus’ Περὶ φύσεως Book XXV? Enrico Piergiacomi

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Medicine and Atomism: Asclepiades of Bithynia and Epicurean Science David Leith

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Patterns of Reception of Epicureanism in Galen’s Writings Vincenzo Damiani

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Gravity and the Shape and Location of the Earth David Konstan

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The Method of Multiple Explanations Revisited Voula Tsouna

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The Explanation of Meteorological Phenomena in the Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda Jürgen Hammerstaedt

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Gassendi’s Interpretation of Epicurus’ Method of Multiple Explanations: Between Scepticism and Probabilism Frederik Bakker

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Observation, Probabilism, and Humanist Methods of History in Pierre Gassendi’s Meteorology Craig Martin

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About the contributors

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Index of Ancient Names

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Index of Modern Names

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Introduction Francesca Masi, Pierre-Marie Morel and Francesco Verde According to a historiographical ‘stereotype’,1 the Hellenistic Age witnessed a progressive separation between science and philosophy.2 This split would be due to the radical political changes that occurred: following the establishment of Alexander’s kingdom and then those of his Diadochi, the old institutions of the poleis had a merely nominal existence. This situation gave rise to a new conception of political engagement and hence to a downplaying of philosophy, which essentially lost its political role. Within this context, on the one hand one would witness a specialization of the various sciences, with significant advances in medicine, astronomy, geometry, mathematics, music (and the arts more generally), as well as literature and philosophy. On the other hand, philosophical speculation, which was chiefly concerned with outlining an ethics for the pursuit of individual happiness, would have remained foreign to the methodology and outcomes of such research. Furthermore, this split would also find visible, concrete expression in the geographical distribution of the institutions in charge of the spread of scientific and philosophical thought: the former were located in Alexandria (as in the case of the famous Library and especially the Musaeum), while the latter continued to be concentrated in Athens (at least up until Sulla’s sack of the city in 87 BC, during the Mithridatic Wars, when philosophy looked to Rome as the new ‘capital’ of philosophical research).3 Particularly revealing, in this respect, is the case of Epicurus and the Epicureans, who on several occasions explicitly and provocatively displayed an anti–scientific attitude. These philosophers were openly critical of the use of scientific instruments (organa), of the aspiration to attain epistemic accuracy in fields beyond empirical observation (such as the study of celestial phenomena), of the principles of geometry, of encyclopedic culture, and of every form of knowledge except ones of a purely practical kind. Not least on account of this, Epicureanism has been accused of being a dogmatic and impoverished philosophy that essentially ignored the major scientific achievements of its day. Previous philosophical traditions – from the Platonist and 1  It manifests a stereotype that has taken hold starting with the research on Hellenistic history conducted by Johann Gustav Droysen in the nineteenth century (on which see Canfora 1995 for an initial survey). On the political statute of Hellenistic poleis, the recent secondary literature is very rich. Obviously, the polis does not disappear in the Hellenistic period, but it is certainly not comparable to the polis of the Classical Age. The relationship of citizens to institutions and politics changes radically. Particularly in the democratic poleis, it is mainly the elites that retain economic and moral power. On these points see the miscellaneous volumes by Börm–Luraghi 2018 and Canevaro–Gray 2018; see too Mari 2019. 2  See on this point Giannantoni 1984. 3  See the classic study by Sedley 2003.

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Aristotelian ones forward (and, in the Hellenistic period, with the Stoic School) – had assigned to philosophy a specific purpose, methodology, and object of enquiry, yet had still sought to engage with the other sciences and attempted to integrate different forms of knowledge. By contrast, Epicurean philosophy is said to have established itself as a system revolving around ethics by foregoing, downplaying, or manipulating various other fields of research and, more generally, by redefining epistemology in purely utilitarian terms. Two closely related factors have contributed to the perpetuation of this stereotype. The first factor is the literary form of those Epicurean texts (chiefly letters and epitomes) known to the non–specialist public as transmitting Epicurus’ thought. The second factor is the aversion that many people already felt in the Hellenistic Age for a ‘secular’ and mechanistic materialist theory that was regarded as incapable of explaining the complexity, regularity, order, and beauty of the cosmos in all its various aspects: celestial, physical, biological, and anthropological. The only complete writings by Epicurus to have reached us are his three letters to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus (respectively on physics, meteorology, and ethics) and his Principal Doctrines, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius in Book 10 of his Lives of Eminent Philosophers. These texts are compendia, addressed to readers with varying levels of education, and chiefly conceived as handbooks designed to encourage a more in–depth study of Epicurean atomism and a way of conduct suited to the attainment of the ethical ideal.4 While on a close and detailed reading they will appear difficult, complex, and full of insights, in the eyes of uncharitable scholars they might give the idea of a superficial form of knowledge, subordinated to the pursuit of a practical, categorical, and unquestionable goal. Moreover, the pithy style of these writings does not help the reader seeking to infer the theoretical assumptions on which individual doctrines are based, or their possible implications and applications. To these works we must no doubt add certain secondary sources, the main one being Lucretius’ De rerum natura. These other sources chiefly consist in testimonia from exponents of rival schools (Cicero and Plutarch). On account of its exhaustiveness and detail, Lucretius’ work to this day constitutes an essential point of reference for anyone wishing to study Epicurean philosophy in depth. The literary form of the poem, however, and its specific cultural function – namely, to transmit and promote Epicurean atomism in the intellectual milieu of first–century BC Rome while remaining faithful to the teachings of the School – as well as its generous use of images designed to illustrate, liven, and embellish certain doctrinal aspects contribute to the rhetorical efficacy of the work, often to the detriment of its underlying theoretical reasons. The other secondary sources are instead clearly influenced by a polemical attitude; they inevitably tend to focus on the limits of Epicurean theory and to provide a partial or distorted view of it. 4 

A reference monograph on the Epicurean Kompendienliteratur is now Damiani 2021.

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In recent decades, however, research on Epicurean philosophy has made considerable strides forward, allowing us to move beyond this stereotype. The publication of new editions of the Herculaneum Papyri, of fragments and testimonia of Epicurus’ Letters, and of the stone inscription from Oinoanda has brought to light a theoretically more solid and better–argued Epicureanism, which finds a more prominent place in the philosophical and cultural debates of the Hellenistic and post–Hellenistic periods. Knowledge of this philosophy can contribute to broadening and deepening our historical and theoretical knowledge of Hellenistic and late–antique thought. Within this context, it is worth recalling, first of all, the extensive research work first begun and promoted by Marcello Gigante, and then carried on by his collaborators, at the ‘Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi’ (CISPE) – a centre established in Naples in 1969 and now named after this eminent scholar. The work of the CISPE ‘Marcello Gigante’ has made it possible to identify some new books of the Peri physeōs, Epicurus’ masterpiece in 37 books, thereby expanding the available text and providing increasingly accurate philological editions. The publication of Book 2 on the doctrine of simulacra;5 Book 11 on celestial phenomena and the issue of what position to adopt with regard to the use of astronomical instruments;6 Book 14 on the physical doctrines of philosophers before Epicurus (‘monists’ and ‘pluralists’, most prominently including the Plato of the Timaeus);7 Book 15 on Anaxagoras’ doctrine; Book 25 on the nature and origin of mental states;8 Book 28 on the nature and origin of language and empirical reasoning;9 Book 34 on mental representations and, in particular, on the deceptions that illusory states can engender;10 and – finally – the liber incertus (PHerc. 1413) on time, has significantly broadened and deepened our knowledge of Epicurean doctrine and of his method of research and argument. In this extensive work, Epicurus explored the key themes of his atomistic philosophy, pertaining to physics, psychology, epistemology, and ethics – the very themes addressed in the letters and secondary sources. However, Epicurus also touched upon more specific issues, emerging from particular doctrinal points through a constant critical engagement with interlocutors both within and outside the School. The work in question, therefore, differs from the other texts that have reached us on account of its markedly theoretical and speculative character, the technical nature of its lexical and conceptual apparatus, the solid and complex arguments it expounds, and its underlying ambition: to make atomism a doctrine philosophically and theoretically suited to explaining the manifold 5 

6  7 

8 

9 

10 

Leone 2012. Sedley 1976. Leone 1984 and 1987. Laursen 1995 and 1997. Sedley 1973. Leone 2002.

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aspects of nature and to provide the foundations for our knowledge of the world. Finally, in 2020 an important collection entitled “Epicuro, Lettere. Frammenti e testimonianze”, with text, translation, and commentary was edited by Margherita Erbì (Pisa: Serra) and constitutes now an important source to reconstruct Epicurus’ philosophy through what remains of his other correspondence, often preserved again in the papyri from Herculaneum. The papyrological investigations conducted by the CISPE have also brought to light works by later Epicureans, such as Philodemus, Hermarchus, Polystratus, Carneiscus, Polyaenus, Zeno of Sydon, and Demetrius Laco.11 These texts illustrate the later development of Epicureanism, as well as the efforts of these authors to adapt atomism to the theoretical expectations and challenges of their day. Secondly, since 2007 the site of Oinoanda in modern Turkey has been the object of a new excavation campaign directed by Martin Ferguson Smith, Jürgen Hammerstaedt, and Martin Bachmann (unexpectedly deceased in August 2016) for the Istanbul Department of the German Archeological Institute. In 1841 archaeologists discovered the philosophical inscription that the Epicurean Diogenes (2nd cent. AD) had inscribed on a portico in the city. This inscription, which is in a fair state of conservation, is the most extensive epigraphical document surviving from the ancient world. The ongoing excavation campaign has brought to light new fragments and, through interdisciplinary research combining archaeology, history, epigraphy, philology, and history of philosophy, has had the merit not only of elucidating the topographical and cultural context in which the inscription was commissioned, but also of significantly broadening our knowledge of Graeco–Roman philosophy. The peculiar feature of this inscription is that it constitutes a valuable source for reconstructing and better understanding various aspects of Epicurean philosophy, such as its epistemology, physics, and ethics; not only that, but the inscription also gives us an idea of the lively philosophical debates in which the Epicureans were engaged from the founding of the Kepos to the Imperial Age. The advances made in the retrieval and reconstruction of primary sources have translated into significant steps forward in historical–philosophical research. One might mention two important international conferences that took place in 2014. The first, entitled ‘Epicuro Sulla natura: novità e confronti’, was hosted by the Venice Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage and organized by Carlo Natali, Francesca Masi, and Stefano Maso, within the framework of the project ‘Aristotele: Scienza e metodo’, to mark the publication of a new edition of Book 2 of the Peri physeos, edited by Giuliana Leone for Bibliopolis. The aim of this conference was to launch a debate concerning the new textual contributions to our understanding of the doctrine of simulacra, based on the atomistic theory of 11  A complete list of the publications dedicated to the later Epicureans for the series ‘La Scuola di Epicuro’, edited by the publisher Bibliopolis (Naples), can be found in the CISPE website at the following link: https://cispeorg.callatech.it/la–scuola–di–epicuro/ [13.12.2022].

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vision and the imagination. Participants included: Aurora Corti, Dino De Sanctis, Tiziano Dorandi, David Konstan, Giuliana Leone, Pierre-Marie Morel, Emidio Spinelli, Francesco Verde, and Cristina Viano. The conference proceedings were brought together in the volume Epicurus on Eidola, Peri phuseos, Book II, Update, proposals and discussions, edited by F. Masi and S. Maso (Hakkert, Amsterdam 2015). This book examines specific aspects of the theory of eidola, its relevance for the theory of knowledge, the polemical framework in which Epicurus’ discussion unfolds, and the philosopher’s mode of exposition and argumentation. The volume was well received by the scholarly community (see the review by Elizabeth Asmis in ‘Revue de philosophie ancienne’ 34/2016: 91–96). The second conference, entitled ‘Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates’, was organized by Jürgen Hammerstaedt, Pierre-Marie Morel, and Refik Güremen. It was held in Istanbul, Muğla, and Oinoanda. The raison d’être of this conference was the discovery of 70 new fragments by Diogenes, which were made available to the scholarly community through the editorial effort of Hammestaedt and Smith. In these new fragments we find the author polemically engaging with rival schools and then outlining, defining, and sometimes redefining the Epicurean take on a specific topic. Therefore, these fragments offer a glimpse of a ‘dynamic’ Epicureanism, so to speak, that is perfectly at home with the philosophical and scientific debates of the past, along with those of its day. Participants included: Martin Bachmann, Michael Erler, Alain Gigandet, Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, Giuliana Leone, Francesca Masi, Philip Mitsis, Dirk Obbink, Geert Roskam, Voula Tsouna, and Francesco Verde. In 2017 the conference proceedings were brought together in a prestigious volume published by Leuven University Press (Diogenes of Oinoanda / Diogène d’Œnoanda: Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates / Épicurisme et controverses).12 This volume, the first publication to provide a historical–philosophical reconstruction of Diogenes of Oinoanda’s thought, was very well received at an international level. Moreover, in the early months of 2019, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the CISPE, an international conference was dedicated to Book 34 of On Nature, edited by Giuliana Leone, in 2002. This event was jointly organized by the Department of Human Studies of the University of Studies of Naples ‘Federico II’, the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage of Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, and the Department of Philosophy of Sapienza University of Rome. The aim of the conference was to reconstruct Epicurus’ theory of the imagination on the basis of the surviving fragments of On Nature and other sources, with a special focus on those deviant forms of cognition – such as fantasies, illusions, and dreams – which in the eyes of Epicurus’ opponents could undermine his doctrine of representation and Epicurean empiricism more generally. The proceedings of the conference were published in 2021 in a volume edited by G. Leone, F. Masi, F. Verde for the series Cronache Er12 

For a thorough review of this volume see Bakker 2018.

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colanesi, Sesto Supplemento, with the title ‘Vedere’ l’invisibile. Rileggendo il XXXIV libro Sulla natura di Epicuro (PHerc. 1431). Finally, in addition to these events, over the last few years significant studies have been published on Epicurean physical theory (Frederik A. Bakker’s 2016 volume on Epicurean meteorology; Francesco Verde’s 2013 volume on the doctrine of atomic minima, in addition to his recent commentary to the Letter to Pythocles); on Epicurean epistemology (e.g., Attila Nemeth’s 2017 monograph on Epicurus’ philosophy of mind, Andree Hahmann’s contribution on the epistemological relation between Aristotle and Epicurus, and Verde’s work on the influence of Plato’s Theaetetus on Epicurus’ doctrine of perception); and, again, Pierre-Marie Morel’s book on natural philosophy and anthropology in Democritus and in Epicureanism in 2021. These works show how the new textual discoveries can contribute to outlining an Epicureanism in which science – understood as a physical theory and theory of knowledge – constitutes a crucial foundation for developing a philosophy consistently oriented towards a certain kind of praxis and happiness: a philosophy in which atomism, as a cosmological conception, is strengthened by an explicit engagement with other ontologies and epistemic fields. Within the context of this kind of research, the editors of the present volume developed a research project implemented over the last three years entitled Science and philosophical debates – A new approach towards ancient Epicureanism (SPIDER) funded by University Ca’ Foscari of Venice (Scientific Board: Francesca Masi, PI; Pierre-Marie Morel; Francesco Verde).13 Its guiding theme has been science understood, in Epicurean terms, both as epistemology (canonics) and as the science of nature (physiologia). The aim was to explain how Epicurean atomism – through its deep and constant dialogue with other philosophies (Academic, Aristotelian, Sceptic, and Stoic) and sciences (in particular, astronomy and medicine) – is capable of accounting for the most peculiar and complex cognitive and natural phenomena in a way that is pertinent to ethics. To this end, we set up a network of internationally renowned scholars working in Epicurean and Hellenistic philosophy at a national and international level, so as to coordinate the research of the various participants in a harmonious and fruitful way. The theme of the project was therefore explored according the different methods of research adopted by the participants, on the basis of the new textual discoveries that, while fragmentary, are crucial to ensuring an innovative historical reconstruction of Epicureanism and of its polemical engagement with the other philosophical schools of its day. The expected outcome was the outlining of a ‘new’ Epicureanism that, in terms of its complexity and articulation, is compatible with – yet at the same time different from – the texts transmitted by Book 10 of 13  More general information on the project can be found at the following link: https://www.unive. it/pag/39014 [23.01.2023].

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Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers: an Epicureanism whose defining feature is a commitment to debate, and which allows us to repair the fracture between science and philosophy that is supposedly typical of the Hellenistic Age within a unitary and coherent framework. * * * The present volume – which will be followed by a second dedicated to the later developments and outcomes of the project and expected in 2024 – collects the first results of this complex research work, originally presented during a series of international conferences. The first was the workshop entitled Epistemology and Meteorology: Epicureanism and Scientific Debates, held online on October 22–24, 2020; organized for Sapienza University of Rome by F. Masi, P.-M. Morel, F. Verde; and attended by F. Bakker, R. Chiaradonna, D. De Sanctis, T. Dorandi, M. Erbì, M. Erler, J. Hammerstaedt, A. M. Ioppolo (unexpectedly passed away in December 2020), D. Konstan, D. Leith, G. Leone, C. Martin, P. Mitsis, E. Spinelli, M. Tulli. The second was the workshop entitled Theory of Language and Scientific Lexicon in Epicureanism – Théorie du langage et lexique scientifique dans l’épicurisme, held online on May 25–27, 2021, and organized for Université Paris 1 – Panthéon– Sorbonne, in collaboration with the research team Gramata (UMR 7219 Sphere) by F. Masi (P.I.), P.-M. Morel, F. Verde, and by S. Marchand. Participants further included F. Cacciabaudo, D. Delattre, A. Gigandet, J. Giovacchini, J.–B. Gourinat, A. Laks, G. Leone, S. Maso, A. Peralta, C. Rover, E. Piergiacomi. The third meeting was the workshop entitled The Epicurean Texts. History of Studies and Research Perspectives, held online on July 5, 2021; organized by J. Hammerstaedt, F. Masi, P.-M. Morel, G. Leone, M. Tulli, F. Verde; and also attended by D. De Sanctis, T. Dorandi, M. Erbì. This volume is divided into three parts. The first part, focusing particularly on epistemology, is devoted to the theory of language and meaning, philosophical linguistic practice, scientific terminology, and the controversies in which Epicurus and the Epicureans were engaged in the elaboration of their philosophical language. Julie Giovacchini’s article, which opens the section, examines the Epicurean theory of language through an anthropological approach. In particular, through the study of some sources related to the origin of law and human social organization, the author interprets the semantic functioning of language in terms of a technology that requires a learning context and an expertise. The meanings of words, expressed by preconceptions (prolēpseis), initially derive from the common experience of speakers, yet later turn out to be susceptible to refinement through the speaker’s interlocution with the social context of reference. Specifically, the relationship

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between words and preconceptions is understood in an open and continuous dynamic way, meanings being the provisional traces of the subject’s interaction not only with the natural environment, but also and especially with the cultural and social horizon in which he or she is situated. A pragmatic and political approach to Epicurean semantics of this kind thus enables the author to better understand how Epicureans are able to account for linguistic differences among speakers and to explain the possibilities for the emancipation of philosophical language from the constraints, limitations, and ambiguities of ordinary language. Francesca Masi’s article focuses on some epistemological issues related to the use of language addressed by Epicurus in Book XXVIII of On Nature. In what is still extant from this volume, Epicurus seems to be interested, on the one hand, in dealing with the problem of errors that can emerge from the use of ordinary language in the philosophical sphere and, on the other, in indicating the most suitable tools and methods to justify this use, as well as to verify its correctness. Moreover, he seems to be engaged in a double dialectical confrontation: firstly, he directly addresses his pupil Metrodorus, in a work of revision of previously held theories; secondly, he attacks the theories and linguistic practices of some non–Epicurean opponents. In her article, Francesca Masi examines this confrontation in light of a broader examination of the various linguistic polemics present in other extant parts of On Nature. Dino De Sanctis’ article focuses on the scientific language and terminology used by Epicurus in the Letter to Pythocles. Through the analysis of some significant passages and some key technical terms, the author analyzes the relationship between Epicurus’ language and the reference tradition. The purpose of the paper is to show the function attributed by the philosopher to certain rhetorical stylistic effects and to highlight the rationalistic experimentalism that shines through the careful use of technical and scientific expressions in the study of celestial phenomena. Margherita Erbì’s article investigates the contribution of Epicurus’ so–called private letters to the understanding of Epicurean scientific vocabulary and provides an important repertoire of information through translation and analysis of texts little known to the public. The letters are known to address themes explicitly related to the Letter to Moeneceus and to have been used to convey and facilitate knowledge of ethics. In this paper, the author endeavours instead to explain whether and to what extent these so–called private letters can help clarify aspects of epistemology and physics. In particular, Erbì focuses on some fragments related to the lexicon of vision and imagination to clarify the meaning of some key terms and their relationships, such as eidolon, phantasma, and phantasia. Chiara Rover’s article deals with some issues of Lucretius’ epistemological language. The aim of this essay is to show that the poet’s lexical choices prove to be particularly significant for any attempt to assess and, consequently, to appreciate Lucretius’ reception of the Epicurean theory of knowledge in the light of a com-

Introduction

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parison with Aristotle’s theory of the soul and perception. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the terminology the Latin author uses to theorize and designate (1) visual sensation (and, more specifically, the potestas of sight), (2) prolēpsis (which Lucretius renders by means of the words notitia/notities), (3) the ‘impetus’ of the soul (animi iactus/iniectus, inice mentem) and, in the semiotic sphere, (4) the very concept of ‘sign’ (signum, uestigium, indicium). Keeping always in the background a comparison with the writings of Epicurus and some of the Epicureans (Philodemus, above all), as well as taking advantage of the comparison with testimonies external to the Epicurean tradition (from Aristotle’s De anima to some Ciceronian passages), this chapter tries to bring out the precision with which Lucretius weighs and selects the technical terms he employs, not only moved by the need to present, in Latin, the epistemological teaching promoted by his master, but also with the primary objective of defending Epicurus against objections and invectives (coming from schools and philosophical directions other than the Garden) that aimed to undermine its validity and, above all, its scientific relevance. The second part of the volume, devoted to the science of nature (physiologia), mainly examines the relationship between Epicurean physics and medicine, that is, both how Epicurean physics – at least in part through the mediation of Democritean atomism – may have been influenced by Hippocratic medicine. It additionally observes how later medical theorists appropriated Epicurean physics and scientific methodology, both in an attempt to recover it and readapt it to a different disciplinary field (as in the case of Asclepiades of Bithynia) and in an attempt to criticize it (as in the case of Galen). This section opens with a contribution by Enrico Piergiacomi, who looks at how Epicurus and the early Epicureans may have been influenced by medical doctrines. He begins by gathering the clues that make it possible to establish such an influence, and he argues that Epicurus may have read some Hippocratic treatises, which may have inspired some Epicurean medical tenets. He then considers a possible dialogue between Book XXV of Epicurus’ Peri Physeōs and Hippocrates’ treatise On Airs, Waters, Places. This hypothesis suggests that medical doctrines may have contributed to the Epicurean theory of moral responsibility and to its physical background. The complexity of the issue is further due to the fact that Democritus may also have been behind Epicurus’ interest in physiological issues – a complexity that is further reinforced by the fact that there are striking concurrences between Democritus and some Hippocratic treatises. Piergiacomi also argues that it is possible to trace some Lucretian evidence for the study of medicine back to Epicurus himself. In his contribution, David Leith focuses on Asclepiades of Bithynia and his influential and innovative medical theory in Rome during the first century BC. According to Leith, Asclepiades’ medical system is a case study in the later reception of Epicurean science. Although Asclepiades’ relationship to Epicurus is com-

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plex, his doctrine offers a good example of the ways in which Epicurean scientific principles, methods, and explanations could be extended, altered, and differently applied in new, specifically medical, contexts. For instance, Asclepiades was using Epicurus’ treatise Peri Physeōs directly, in the sense that he was borrowing Epicurean arguments, at least for some of the most fundamental physical doctrines. The proximity between Asclepiades and Epicurus is first of all methodological and epistemological. In fact, Asclepiades’ basic epistemology seems to have been very similar to Epicurus’. Leith even argues that Epicurus’ empiricist approach provided Asclepiades with his general epistemological framework. Comparisons can also be made with Lucretius, in particular, as concerns the connection between medicine and meteorology. All the same, Leith’s conclusion regarding a positive influence from Asclepiades on later Epicureanism remains very cautious. Vincenzo Damiani deals with the reception of Epicureanism in Galen’s writings. He takes into account his main philosophical interests – namely: teleology, element theory, theory of perception, and moral philosophy – and examines how Galen criticized Epicureanism, at which specific theoretical points he directed his criticism, and through which rhetorical strategies he presented it . In this contribution, Damiani gives an overview of the reception of Epicureanism during the Imperial period and shows that it is not simply a matter of doxographic treatment but also one of substantial influences and debates. As for Galen himself, in Damiani’s view, despite a deliberate polemical ‘flattening’ of the differences between both Epicurus himself and other Epicurean philosophers (Asclepiades and Erasistratus in particular), his criticism of Epicurus is based, on an in–depth knowledge of Epicurus’ philosophical work. Finally, Damiani argues for a positive, albeit implicit, pattern of appropriation of certain elements of Epicureanism in Galen’s work, for instance, to some extent, on the mortal nature of the soul. This second part of the volume also includes an article by David Konstan devoted to cosmology, marking the transition from the methodological–physical section to the methodological–meteorological section. Primarily, Konstan examines Epi­ curean ideas about gravity, the shape, and the location of Earth. In his first part, he offers a new reading of sections 88 to 91 of the Letter to Pythocles, where Epicurus discusses the formation of the cosmos and of stars. Konstan shows that the formation of stars cannot occur in the space unoccupied by cosmoses but, rather, only within a cosmos that is already in the process of development; this could be explained by the fact that there are no freestanding stars beyond the cosmos. He also deals with the famous issue of the size of the sun and the stars. As far as gravity is concerned, objects heavier than air drop to the surface of Earth and stay there, unless they are forced to move upward – a phenomenon which cannot be explained by the downward motion of atoms in itself. Indications of this are to be found in Lucretius’ poem. One of the most intriguing issues is the relative stability of Earth, which Lucretius explains by referring to the connection with the surrounding air.

Introduction

11

Accordingly, Konstan argues that the effect of gravity (as opposed to atomic weight) only manifests itself after the last phase in the formation of the cosmos is completed and Earth is grounded on the layer of air beneath. The third part is devoted to an analysis of the method of multiple explanations, Epicurean meteorology, and its reception from late antiquity to the Early Modern Age. Voula Tsouna’s chapter offers a general reconsideration of Epicurus’ method of multiple explanations. Tsouna firstly points out the epistemological differences between the monachos tropos and the pleonachos tropos: the former is an epistemological method referring to a single causal explanation, whereas the latter method refers to specific phenomena such as the meteōra. According to Tsouna, the pleonachos tropos is not understood by Epicurus as a compromise based on purely ethical grounds. Rather, Tsouna shows that this is a genuinely scientific method, whose theoretical foundations are first of all ontological and epistemological. This quality does not mean that the pleonachos tropos does not also have ethical aims. Thanks to this method, however, Epicurus succeeds in proposing a new scientifically coherent meteorology and astronomy that also have beneficial ethical consequences, namely, the liberation of the false belief that celestial and atmospheric phenomena depend on the will of the gods. Jürgen Hammerstaedt (together with Martin Ferguson Smith) is a recognized expert on Diogenes of Oinoanda’s huge inscription, which is the most important and complete Epicurean source of the Imperial era (second century BC), together with Diogenes Laertius’ Life of Epicurus. In his article, as a leading connoisseur of Diogenes and Oinoanda itself, Hammerstaedt proposes a thorough cultural–historical re–examination of the prominence of meteorological phenomena in the inscription. According to the author, the motivations that prompted Diogenes to deal with ta meteora cannot be reduced only to epistemological and philosophical requirements; they can be understood by referring to the concrete local reality of Oinoanda, too. Hammerstaedt emphasizes that the correct knowledge of ta meteora is useful not only for agricultural production (the main source of the wealth of certain aristocratic circles in Oinoanda), but also for the daily life of all inhabitants in a mountainous area exposed during the year to very strong climatic changes. Furthermore, Hammerstaedt shows that there is a very close connection between specific divine powers and such meteorological phenomena in popular religion and in the cults of Oinoanda. The chapters by Frederik A. Bakker and Craig Martin, which close the volume, are devoted to the figure of Pierre Gassendi and the crucial role he played in the fortunes of Epicureanism in the modernity. In his article, Bakker – who devoted an important and original monograph to Epicurean meteorology in 2016 – examines Gassendi’s reception of the method of multiple explanations. Bakker’s aim is not to assess whether Gassendi correctly understands Epicurus’ pleonachos tropos but

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only to indicate how Gassendi, especially in his Animadversiones (1649), may have read and plausibly interpreted the ancient texts concerning the method of multiple explanations. Interestingly, although there is no lack of texts in which the pleonachos tropos is related by Gassendi to Pyrrhonism, Bakker believes that Gassendi’s interpretation of this method is essentially consistent with Epicurus’ texts. However, it also shows significant variations. The most substantial modification concerns Gassendi’s probabilistic view of the pleonachos tropos, which is not confirmed by Epicurus’ own writings: in all likelihood Gassendi bases this interpretation on indirect and ambiguous evidence from Lucretius and Seneca. If Bakker’s chapter focuses on Gassendi Animadversiones, Craig Martin – who has provided contributions to Renaissance meteorology (2011) and Early Modern science (2014) – concentrates on the Syntagma philosophicum (1658). The main purpose of Martin’s article is the examination of meteorology and the role it plays in Gassendi. Martin emphasizes that one of the fundamental theoretical cores of Gassendi’s meteorology is the criticism of Aristotelian meteorology. However, the originality of Martin’s article especially lies in the careful historical contextualization of Gassendi’s meteorological interests. Martin shows that Gassendi’s interest in meteorology not only has an ethical value (as in Epicurus) but is also based on his determination to assess the reality of phenomena. To do so, Gassendi uses the methods of historians to interrogate the reliability of beliefs about meteorological phenomena, assigning attribution to the empiricism typical of the seventeenth– century humanistic approach to historical research: history and humanistic erudition are not only the basis of knowledge of ancient theories, but they also provide the methodological tools to verify and establish the facts of nature and eliminate the false beliefs also contained in the writings of antiquity. By virtue of this volume we hope to have provided a better understanding of some relevant aspects of possibly the most challenging and consistent materialistic philosophical system of antiquity, in light of some duly contextualized scientific debates and polemics in which Epicurus and his school were engaged.14

14  The editors of this volume would like to thank very sincerely the contributors and reviewers who made the publication of this first volume possible. Much gratitude is also due to James Warren for his helpful suggestions and linguistic check of this introduction, and to Chiara Rover for her assistance in preparing the indexes of the volume. The editors are also grateful to all those who in various respects took part in the scholarly activities of the Spider Project.

Introduction

13

References Bakker, F. A., 2016, Epicurean Meteorology: Sources, Method, Scope and Organization, Leiden–Boston: Brill. Bakker, F. A., 2018, “Review of J. Hammerstaedt–P.-M. Morel–R. Güremen (eds.), Diogenes of Oinoanda: Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates / Diogène d’Œnoanda: Épicurisme et controverses, Syzetesis 5: 113–122. Börm, H.,–Luraghi, N. (eds.), 2018, The Polis in the Hellenistic World, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Canevaro, M.,–Gray, B. (eds.), 2018, The Hellenistic Reception of Classical Athenian Democracy and Political Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Canfora, L., 1995, Ellenismo, Rome–Bari: Laterza. Damiani, V., 2021, La “Kompendienliteratur” nella scuola di Epicuro: Forme, funzioni, contesto, Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter. Erbì, M. (ed.), 2020, Epicuro: Lettere. Frammenti e testimonianze, Pisa: Serra. Giannantoni, G., 1984, “Su alcuni problemi circa i rapporti tra scienza e filosofia nell’età ellenistica”, in G. Giannantoni–M. Vegetti (eds.), La scienza ellenistica, Atti delle tre giornate di studio tenutesi a Pavia dal 14 al 16 aprile 1982, Naples: Bibliopolis, 39–71. Hahmann, A., 2017, Aristoteles gegen Epikur: Eine Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der hellenistischen Philosophie ausgehend vom Phänomen der Bewegung. Berlin–New York: De Gruyter. Hammerstaedt, J.,–Morel, P.-M.,–Güremen, R. (eds.), 2017, Diogenes of Oinoanda: Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates / Diogène d’Œnoanda: Épicurisme et controverses. Leuven: Leuven University Press. Laursen S., 1995, “The Early Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book”, Cronache Ercolanesi 25: 5–109. Laursen, S., 1997, “The Later Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book”, Cronache Ercolanesi 27: 5–82. Leone, G., 1984, “Epicuro, Della natura, libro XIV”, Cronache Ercolanesi 14: 17–107. Leone, G., 1987, “La chiusa del XIV libro Della natura di Epicuro”, Cronache Ercolanesi 17: 49–76. Leone, G., 2002, “Epicuro, Della natura, libro XXXIV (PHerc. 1431)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 32: 7–135. Leone, G. (ed.), 2012, Epicuro, Sulla natura: Libro II, Naples: Bibliopolis. Leone, G.,–Masi, F.,–Verde, F. (eds.), 2021, ‘Vedere’ l’invisibile. Rileggendo il XXXIV libro Sulla natura di Epicuro (PHerc. 1431), Cronache Ercolanesi: Sesto Supplemento. Mari, M., 2019, “Città vecchie e nuove”, in Ead. (ed.), L’età ellenistica: società, politica, cultura, Rome: Carocci, Ch. 7. Martin, C., 2011, Renaissance Meteorology: Pomponazzi to Descartes, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Martin, C., 2014, Subverting Aristotle: Religion, History, and Philosophy in Early Modern Science, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Masi, F.,–Maso, S. (eds.), 2015, Epicurus on Eidola, Peri phuseos, Book II, Update, Proposals and Discussions. Amsterdam: Hakkert.

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Morel, P.-M., 2021, Le Plaisir et la nécessité. Philosophie naturelle et anthropologie chez Démocrite et Épicure, Paris: Vrin. Németh, A., 2017, Epicurus on the Self, London–New York: Routledge. Sedley, D., 1973, “Epicurus, On Nature, Book XXVIII”, Cronache Ercolanesi 3: 5–83. Sedley, D., 1976, “Epicurus and the Mathematicians of Cyzicus”, Cronache Ercolanesi 6: 23–59. Sedley, D., 2003, “Philodemus and the Decentralisation of Philosophy”, Cronache Ercolanesi 33: 31–41. Verde, F., 2013, Elachista: La dottrina dei minimi nell’epicureismo. Leuven: Leuven University Press. Verde, F., 2020, “L’epistemologia di Epicuro e il Teeteto di Platone”, Historia Philosophica: International Journal 18: 13–44. Verde, F. (ed.), 2022, Epicuro: Epistola a Pitocle, In collaborazione con M. Tulli–D. De Sanctis–F. Masi, Baden–Baden: Academia Verlag.

Thinking or Speaking: The Paradoxes of the Epicurean Theory of Language Julie Giovacchini

1. Introduction The problem I propose to tackle is a recurrent one and has been vigorously dealt with in the historiography of ancient Epicureanism.1 It is at the crossroads of philological and philosophical difficulties, within the philosophical doctrine itself, at the intersection of cardinal questions pertaining to physics, anthropology, noetics, and epistemology. The Epicurean theory of language is indeed based on ethical, political, and pedagogical purposes that are not always explicit. The nature of language is directly linked to its social use, which explains the tensions and possible contradictions within the Epicurean doctrine. I will thus discuss these contradictions, so as to show how an anthropological approach can allow us to address this problem differently and in a slightly less aporetic way. In particular, I propose to show how taking into account certain sources dealing with Epicurean hypotheses concerning the origin of law and the organization of human societies can provide valuable information concerning the actual semantic functioning of language, understood as a technology in the true sense of the word (i.e., involving a learning context as well as an expertise). This approach will allow me to show how Epicureanism can assume, on the one hand, that the meaning of words proceeds from an initial experience common to all but, on the other hand, that it is also susceptible to learning and to varying degrees of precision and truth according to the capacities of the speakers within a society.

1  It is quite impossible to propose an exhaustive bibliography about the question of Epicurean theory of language and the epistemological issues I am going to deal with in the following pages. I will mention several recent and former publications as far as they constitute stepping stones in Epicurean studies; I will certainly neither analyze nor even mention all the relevant papers about the subject.

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2. The three-layered problem of Epicurean theory of language When we approach the problem of language in Epicureanism, we cannot but be struck by the glaring contrast between the scarcity of the texts and the abysmal problems they raise.2 Some texts approach language through questions of logic or dialectics; it is, for example, the case of Diog. Laert. X 31 (= 1), Epicur. Nat. XXVIII (PHerc. 1479) fr. 13 col. V sup Sedley (= 2), or Epicur. Hrdt. 37-38 (= 3). 1. As for dialectics, they dismiss it as useless; for it is enough that physicists progress according to the words that come from things. 3 2. I know very well that you will quote many, whom you [Metrodorus] could observe, who spoke giving to words grotesque meanings and even in any other sense than the one to which one mentally associates it in the usual language; but as for our own practice, we do not use anything instead of the habits of the language and we do not change the names when it is a question of obvious realities.4 3. First of all, therefore, dear Herodotus, we must grasp the realities placed under the words, so that we have by referring to them something to evaluate what is supposed or sought or doubted, and that everything is not undecided for us, who would go back to infinity in the demonstration, and that we do not have empty words. It is indeed necessary that the first notion according to each word be perceived directly and that it does not require a demonstration, if we really find ourselves in the case of possessing what to which to relate what is sought or doubted or supposed. 5

2  For the Epicurean doxography by Diogenes Laertius, I usually quote from Dorandi 2013. For Epicurus’ Letters themselves, I use Marcovich 1999; for Lucretius, Martin 1969. For more peculiar texts, I mention my source in the relevant footnote each time. 3  Diog. Laert. X 31: Τὴν διαλεκτικὴν (fg. 36 Us.) ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν· ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τοὺς φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους. 4 Epicur. Nat. XXVIII (PHerc. 1479) fr. 13 col. V sup Sedley (= Trismegistos 59760; for the edition of the source, see http://papyri.info/dclp/59760): πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαί| σε πολλὰ ἂν ἔχειμ προε[ν]έγ-| κασθαι ἃ ἐθεώ̣ ρ̣εις γελοίως [π]ώ[ς] |τ̣ι[να]ς ̣ ἐγδεξαμένους ̣ καὶ π̣[άν-]| τ[α] μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ νοούμενον| κατὰ τὰς λέξεις, οὐκ ἔξω τῶν| ε]ἰθισμένων λέξεων ἡμῶν |χρω̣ μένων οὐδὲ μετατιθέν-| των ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῶμ φανε-| [ρ]ῶν. For a more detailed explanation about the context of this quotation, see Masi in the present volume. 5 Epicur. Hrdt 37-38: Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, δεῖ εἰληφέναι, ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀναγαγόντες ἐπικρίνειν, καὶ μὴ ἄκριτα πάντα ἡμῖν ᾖ εἰς ἄπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ κενοὺς φθόγγους ἔχωμεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ’ ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἕξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ’ ὃ ἀνάξομεν.

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These texts contemplate what are the rules of a true discourse, how one can evaluate the value of a statement; for this set of texts the conclusions seem to be: – first, that a true or non-empty discourse (whether truth and density are indeed synonymous, which is another difficulty6) is the one that speaks about an empirically verifiable reality; – second, that there are criteria of evaluation of this discourse which are different from the traditional dialectical criteria (maybe this difference is only apparent) but which exist nonetheless (there is indeed a rule or a canon of true discourse); the main rule being to come back to “what is under the words” which, according to the texts, can be interpreted either as a rule of physical foundation (physics, and not dialectics, is what gives its rules to the discourse), or as a rule of common or first use, or finally, in a lighter way, as the rule of an obvious starting point which is not itself subject to explanation or clarification; – third, that the philosophically correct discourse does not, or as little as possible, depart from language as it is immediately understood and usually practiced (what is sometimes called ordinary language); but from one text to another it is difficult to determine if this practice of ordinary language is based on the idea that this language would be closer to reality or to the nature of things, or on the fact that for methodological reasons we have to start from what is usually said (what is best understood and therefore clearest, but not necessarily the most accurate or closest to nature). Some texts deal, or at least seem to deal, more specifically with semantics, that is, the theory of meaning: under what conditions is a word or a sentence signifying (and not only true, which distinguishes this question from the previous one and perhaps allows us to introduce a nuance of meaning between empty discourse and false discourse). We can read such attempts, for example, in Epicur. Nat XXVIII (PHerc. 1479) fr. 12 col. III Sedley (= 4), Diog. Laert. X 33 (= 5), Polystratus, Περὶ ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως (PHerc. 336/1150) col. VIIIb Indelli (= 6), Plut. Adv. Col. 1119 E-F (= 7). 4. We said in the explanations then stated that all error in men has no other form than that which is produced from preconceptions and appearances through the multitude of linguistic habits, and…7 6  We can find a very interesting attempt about the distinction of semantic and syntactic application of the logical principle of bivalence, in relation with the specific Epicurean conception of causality, in Bown 2016a. 7 Epicur. Nat XXVIII (PHerc. 1479) fr. 12 col. III Sedley: … ἐλέγομεν κατὰ [τ]ὴν [ἐ]κ-| κειμένην ἑρμηνίαν τῶι| ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ ἁμ[α]ρτία ἐ̣στὶν| τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἕτε-| ρον ἔχουσα σχῆμα ἢ τὸ ἐπὶ| τῶμ προ̣λήψεων γιγν̣[ό-]| μενον καὶ τῶμ φαιν̣[ομ]ένων| διὰ τοὺς π̣ολυτρόπους ἐ̣[θι-]| σμοὺς τῶν λέξεων, καὶ …

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5. About preconception, they say that it is like a conscious grasp, or a right opinion, or a notion, or a general concept stored, that is to say the memory of what has often appeared to us from the outside, for example when we say: “that is a man”. Indeed, at the same time that we pronounce “man”, immediately according to a preconception we think of the image of the man, from previous sensations. And therefore, for any name, what is first placed below is obvious. And we would not have undertaken to look for what we are looking for, if we had not first had it in mind; for example when we say: “this is a horse or an ox”; it is necessary according to a preconception to have first had in mind the shape of the horse or the ox. And we would not have named anything either if we had not previously learned its image according to a preconception. So the preconceptions are obvious. 8 6. … those who, in their very words, draw every conclusion from deductions or first principles which they do not apply in life, and to which they do not conform; and consider also those who, in order to obtain the favor of those around them, or to deceive the crowd by immediately obtaining its assent and seducing it, construct a multifaceted discourse which tends neither to the amendment of their own existence, nor to the betterment of life, either for themselves or for their hearers…9 7. The scandal, Colotes, is not the refusal to say that a man is good, or even that horsemen are innumerable, but the refusal to say and even to believe that the god is god, which you do, you, by not consenting to recognize that Zeus is “Generator”, Demeter “Lawgiver” and Poseidon “Nourisher of the shoots”. It is this separation of terms that is perverse and fills life with an atheistic contempt and audacity, every time you tear off the names that are closely associated with the gods, making sacrifices, mysteries, processions and feasts disappear in the process. [ … ] In fact, these considerations touch on the most important and serious subjects, because it is in the heart of realities that they bring deception, and they are not limited to words or to an assembly of sayable, or even to a habitual use of terms. For if these considerations are really enough to turn life upside down, are there people who offend language more than you, who simply do away with the genre of sayables, 8  Diog. Laert. X 33: Τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος, οἷον ‘τὸ Τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος’· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ‘ἄνθρωπος’ εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρώτως ἐπιτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτό· οἷον ‘ Τὸ πόρρω ἑστὼς ἵππος ἐστὶν ἢ βοῦς’· δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ πρόληψιν ἐγνωκέναιποτὲ ἵππου καὶ βοὸς μορφήν· οὐδ’ ἂν ὠνομάσαμέν τι μὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προλήψεις· 9 Polystratus, Περὶ ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως (PHerc. 336/1150) col. VIIIb Indelli (= Trismegistos 62661, see https://papyri.info/dclp/62661): ἤδη [ἰδ]ὲ ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς | φ̣ωναῖς τοὺς μὲν διὰ συλ-|λογισμῶν καὶ ἀξιωμά-|των ἕκαστα περαίνον-|τας, οἷς οὐδ’ [α]ὐτοὶ ἐπὶ|(col9a) [τοῦ βί]ου χρῶνται οὐδ’ ἀκο-|λουθοῦσιν, * τοὺς δὲ ἕνε-|κα τῆς πρὸς τὸν πλησίον|ἀ̣ρ̣εσκείας ἢ ἀπάτης πρὸς|τ̣ὴν ἑαυτο[ῖ]ς παραυτίκα ἐπίνευ-|σι[ν] καὶ ψυχαγωγίαν τῶν|πολλῶ̣ ν μηχανωμένους|παντοδαπήν τινα λαλι-|ὰν οὐθὲν οὔτ’ αὐτοῖς οὔ-|τ̣ε το̣ῖς ἀκ̣ού̣[ο] υσιν εἰς ἐ-|[πα]νό̣ρ[θω]σιν καὶ τὸ βέλ-|[τιο]ν ζ[ῆν σ]υ[ντ]είνου-|[σαν ……..]α̣[…]α …

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attributing true being to discourse, and admitting only words and contingent facts, while the intermediate realities signified, which make possible learning, teaching, anticipations, thoughts, impulses, assent, you claim that they don’t even have the slightest existence?10

This second set of texts seems to indicate that the meaning of words is complex. It is at the same time common to all and person-specific; indeed it refers to a singular affect of the utterer but this affect is supposed to be shareable and always referring to a material external reality which is at the origin of this affect.11 The semantics involved is indeed a direct semantics in the sense that it does not suppose a third party between the signifier and the signified, like the Stoic lekton for instance.12 These texts indicate also that language is sufficiently natural for ordinary language to be privileged in most cases and sufficiently conventional for shifts in meaning or language plays to be authorized from time to time, particularly to talk about complex or non-immediately obvious realities. Finally, some texts question language as a human technology, from an anthropological,13 historical, or genealogical point of view (around the question of the invention of language), as well as from a political point of view (how does language act as an instrument of socialization); language is described, in a rather ambivalent 10 Plut. Adv. Col. 1119 E-F: οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, ὦ Κωλῶτα, μὴ λέγειν ἀγαθὸν οὐδ’ ἱππεῖς μυ(E) ρίους δεινόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν μὴ λέγειν θεὸν μηδὲ νομίζειν, ὃ πράττετε ὑμεῖς μήτε Δία γενέθλιον μήτε Δήμητραν θεσμοφόρον εἶναι μήτε Ποσειδῶνα φυτάλμιον ὁμολογεῖν ἐθέλοντες. οὗτος ὁ χωρισμὸς τῶν ὀνομάτων πονηρός ἐστι καὶ τὸν βίον ἐμπίπλησιν ὀλιγωρίας ἀθέου καὶ θρασύτητος, ὅταν τὰς συνεζευγμένας τοῖς θεοῖς προσηγορίας ἀποσπῶντες συναναιρῆτε θυσίας μυστήρια πομπὰς ἑορτάς. […] ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπτεται τῶν κυριωτάτων καὶ μεγί(F) στων ἐν πράγμασιν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀπάτην, οὐ περὶ φωνάς τινας οὐδὲ λεκτῶν σύνταξιν οὐδ’ ὀνομάτων συνήθειαν. ὡς εἴ γε καὶ ταῦτα τὸν βίον ἀνατρέπει, τίνες μᾶλλον ὑμῶν πλημμελοῦσι περὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, οἳ τὸ τῶν λεκτῶν γένος οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ παρέχον ἄρδην ἀναιρεῖτε, τὰς φωνὰς καὶτὰ τυγχάνοντα μόνον ἀπολιπόντες, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ σημαινόμενα πράγματα, δι’ ὧν γίνονται μαθήσεις διδασκαλίαι 1120. (A) προλήψεις νοήσεις ὁρμαὶ συγκαταθέσεις, τὸ παράπαν οὐδ’ εἶναι λέγοντες; My translation is much inspired

by J. Boulogne’s. 11  There is an important confrontation between a Fregean reading of Epicurean semantics, which tries to save Epicureanism from the accusation of psychologism and to restore to logic its primacy, and others’ readings which, on the contrary, insist on the irreducibly psychological dimension of Epicurean semantics, in which the state of thinking must necessarily precede the linguistic formulation; a good example of this quarrel can be found in Everson’s 1994 synthetic article on the question, as well as in the works of Sedley 2018, Barnes 1996, and the analytical readings of Epicureanism in general. 12  See again Bown 2016a but also Hammerstaedt 1996: 228-229 who interprets the harsh critics of Sextus and Plutarch against Epicurean assumptions about direct reference as a straw man: Plutarch and Sextus would have refused to see in preconceptions a functional analogue of the Stoic lekta. See also Manetti 1996: 174-175. 13  As far as the anthropological side is concerned, attention has been historically focused on the opposition between conventionalism and naturalism (see Goldschmidt 1977 and to some extent Brunschwig 1995; see also Manetti 1996: 177ff, Gensini–Vitali 2018, and Taylor 2020); this focus has led to questioning the direct or indirect nature of Epicurean semantics, by confronting it most of the time with the Stoic model, which seems to be its most direct opponent (see Bown 2016b and Atherton 2020), yet also with the Aristotelian model as summarized in the Peri hermeneias (see Everson 1994 and Sedley 2018), or with the Platonic model of the Cratylus (see Milanese 1996, Goodman–Aikin 2017, in addition to Berg 2007 and Gensini–Vitali 2018). We will not discuss these different kinds of readings here.

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way, as a spontaneous technology; it is a skill naturally shared by all but which, like any technical procedure, also supposes a stage of rationalization and optimization; and, especially, it is a technology necessary for social life; the best-known is probably Epicur. Hrdt 75-76 (= 8). 8. But it is also necessary to make the hypothesis that nature was instructed and forced in multiple and varied ways by the very realities; and that reasoning in a second time specified what it had caused and added its own discoveries, either more quickly or more slowly, and according to the periods of time [scholia: from a portion of the unlimited] *** or less. And from there the names at the very beginning were not imposed by convention, but the very natures of the men, who felt according to each people singular affects and received singular representations, have, in a singular way, projected the air sent back by each of the affects and representations, so that at a moment the difference emerged according to the geographical situations of the peoples. And then in common, according to each people, the particularities were instituted to make the reciprocal designations less ambiguous and more concise; and for the realities that are not immediately visible, those who perceived them, reporting them, proposed certain words, being forced to utter them or choosing them by reasoning according to the privileged cause that made them express themselves in such a way.14

From one set of texts to another, one can have the impression that there are inconsistencies or at least shifts, which sometimes lead to paradoxes, particularly when one tries to apply the rules or the hypotheses found here and there to the specific case of philosophical language. I would summarize these problems with the following set of questions: – Does philosophical language have any particularities? – Is it a technical language or an ordinary language? – Are the realities described by this philosophical language sayable or assessable in the same way as other realities? At first sight, one might think that philosophical language is mainly concerned with the first aspect (the rules of true speech); but insofar as these rules seem in fact to derive from the second (the semantic rules), that is to say, to the extent that 14  Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι, τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν ἐν μέν τισι θᾶττον, ἐν δέ τισι βραδύτερον καὶ ἐν μέν τισι περιόδοις καὶ χρόνοις [ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου] ἐν δέ τισι κατ’ ἐλάττους. Ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν στελλόμενον ὑφ’ ἑκάστων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων, ὡς ἄν ποτε καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἐθνῶν διαφορὰ ᾖ· (76) ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς δηλώσεις ἧττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέρως δηλουμένας· τινὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ συνορώμενα πράγματα εἰσφέροντας τοὺς συνειδότας παρεγγυῆσαί τινας φθόγγους τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ ἑλομένους κατὰ τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν οὕτως ἑρμηνεῦσαι.

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it is difficult to see in the texts what concerns all language and what applies only to true speech, the first and the second aspects mutually encroach on each other. – Is philosophical language a technical language? The density of vocabulary is very high in Epicurean texts; but in this case we have a problem with what is said by Polystratus, since it is supposed not to be the case.15 – The realities described by philosophy are complex and for some of them hidden; can we speak about them, and under what conditions? how, then, can we bring “what is under the words” to the forefront when it comes to these realities? Is it an allusion to preconceptions?16 If for instance I talk about atoms to someone who has not read the Letter to Herodotus, without making definitions (since it is a well-known prohibition of the Epicurean scientific method), what will they understand? Let’s rephrase this last question: is the vocabulary of the Letter to Herodotus understandable by someone who does not already have an Epicurean philosophical basis? Can we really argue that the Letter to Herodotus is a pedagogical and even propaedeutic text ? This problem applies more generally to all Epicurean epitomai, for example, to the Ratae Sententiae whose obscurity nobody will deny in the absence of a solid Epicurean education; is there not also a form of contradiction with some testimonies about the ‘straightforwardness’ of Epicureanism?17 How can we combine these different aspects of the Epicurean theory of language and resolve this apparent contradiction between the conditions of intelligibility (which involve contextualization and relationalization) and the nature of meaning (which seems to derive from a direct semantics in which words and things are linked spontaneously without intermediary)? At stake is the possibility of a philosophical language accessible to all – speaking not just to speak but to teach and understand.

3. Back to basics: The connexion between language and preconceptions The difficulty we have to confront is the overlap between epistemological questions (the conditions of possibility and intelligibility of a true philosophical discourse) and specifically linguistic questions (how one speaks, what one speaks about, where 15  The fact that the Epicurean notion of truth is rather far from the ordinary understanding of the word truth is, for example, well explained in Bown 2016a: 475. 16  See Milanese 1996: 281ff. 17  See for example Braicovich 2017 and Giovacchini 2019. Masi proposes a subtle and relevant way to explain how a non-technical language could express complex and hidden realities, based on the hypothesis that the objective referent of a name is the “distinctive property of a class of objects”; see Masi: 43 ff. in the present volume.

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language comes from); at the heart of this ambiguity, preconception attracts all attention, and one does not know how to handle its double nature, both conceptual (but of a strange and ambiguous conceptuality, that of an acquired individual notion which is at the same time a criterion of truth18) and linguistic;19 one will find this difficulty in all studies on preconceptions.20 The usual identification of preconception with the vehicle of meaning induces a major difficulty:21 if we push this hypothesis to its extreme, do we not end up with the idea that, just as sensation is always true, language properly based on prenotion itself always and univocally says what is true? In other words, did the Epicureans adopt a maximalist posture consisting in supposing the possibility of an ideal philosophical language which neither says the false nor the non-existent? Did they fall into the paradox of the Sophist? This hypothesis is tempting in view of the reproach made against them for renouncing referentiality by refusing to make the signifier an independent reality – just like the Stoic lekton. And this is what can be concluded from the excerpt 18  Several interpretations clash around the battlefield of the plurivocal nature of preconception. First of all, we can find a confrontation around the question of referentiality between some radical materialist readings (of which a good representative could be Glidden’s; see Glidden and Mitsis 1992 for the article of Glidden and Mitsis’s critical recovery of Glidden, in which Mitsis reintroduces the notion of representation in order to understand the semantic mechanism. See also Hammerstaedt 1996: 223ff. Sedley 2018, Morel 2008 and Konstan 2008, and Tsouna 2016 also question this aspect, in particular by concentrating their readings on the prenotions and the projections of thought; Voula Tsouna proposes a distinction between a Lockean conception (radically empiricist) and a Kantian conception of preconceptions, which she identifies in Morel’s interpretation and which gives conceptualization a remarkable importance in the noetic process described in the preserved elements of the Epicurean Canon; in the Lockean conception, preconceptions derive their evidence from the effective empirical rooting in sensation; in the so-called Kantian conception, their association with a mental focus, which is implied by the association that the Canon makes between preconceptions and vocabulary, also plays a part in the process. Voula Tsouna assumes that the first conception alone secures the intrinsic truth and reliability of preconception – and notes that preconception is an Epicurean answer to the paradox of the Meno, which would not be so well solved by the Kantian approach. It is a path that has been opened by the very important study by A. A. Long (Long 1971) and that is regularly re-explored as a fertile one – a more recent example should be perhaps Gensini–Vitali 2018. 19  On Epicurean preconceptions, I mainly refer to Asmis 2009, Hammerstaedt 1996, Morel 2008 and Konstan 2008, Giovacchini 2012: 19-27, and Tsouna 2016 as recent syntheses; within the framework of the present paper, I will not discuss the different hypothesis about the constitution of preconceptions in the human mind, in addition to their innate nature; I basically agree on that point with the Lockean conception described by Tsouna. A detailed explanation of the nature of preconception based on the most recent state of the art and particularly on the analysis of Epicur. Nat. XXVIII can be read in F. Masi’s article in this volume. 20  The difficulty has clearly been alluded to by A. A. Long in the conclusion of his key paper of 1971 (Long 1971); in fact I assume that everything written since is an attempt to address the programmatic hypothesis of Long about the preconception being at the same time a vehicle for meaning and a criterion of truth. 21  As a matter of fact, it might be possible to develop the whole empiricist epistemology on which is based the hypothesis of preconceptions and the nature of their evidence, without alluding to the theory of language; it is the approach for example of Asmis 2009. A good synthesis can be found in Verde 2010: 78-80.

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of Plutarch’s Against Colotes, in which the Epicureans are accused, among other things, of not having understood the dialectical criticisms addressed to predication, and of having concluded that it was necessary to abolish reference in order to restore the truth of discourse.22 It is in fact the same difficulty as the epistemological one, which comes from the general choice of sensation as the absolute criterion of truth: in theory, for a consistent Epicurean it would be possible to never be misled by following only sensations even though sensations seem to regularly push us to it – which is properly the subject of the beginning of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura IV. And yet, supposing I still concede this to him, here is what I will ask him: since he has never seen anything true in things before, from where does he know what it is to know and not to know, and vice versa; what thing gave rise to the notion of true and false; and what thing made it clear that the doubtful differs from the certain? Lucret. IV 473-47723

We then arrive at two new subsequent questions: – Is it true that every word is naturally based on a preconception? – Is it possible to conceive a word for which this is not the case, either totally or partially? It would seem that Epicurus himself asked himself this question if we are to believe the fragments preserved in Nat. XXVIII (= 3) of his discussion with Metrodorus, in a text which remains very difficult to understand. The most likely hypothesis is that Metrodorus supported a radical conventionalism at a time when Epicurus himself was hesitating about the kind of validation that would be effective for statements and was probably tempted by a clearer demarcation between ordinary language and technical language, so as to avoid some ambiguities and purify philosophical language. If we consider, as we often do, that the Letter to Herodotus is prior to Nat. XXVIII,24 perhaps we should be aware that the doctrine has evolved on this question… And that therefore there is indeed an obscurity and a complexity to be deciphered in the Letter to Herodotus, an obscurity which would have been adopted by Epicurus himself in a later state of the doctrine. Yet we can also be reassured by 22  Barnes 1996 has proposed an elegant but incomplete solution, arguing that in fact the insistence about the direct referentiality appears in contexts where the question which has arisen is specifically the question of meaning (for example in Adv. Col.); it has to be distinguished from the epistemological question of the nature of truth (as it is addressed in Hrdt. 37); preconception is thus for Barnes the condition, at the same time for true speech and meaningful speech. Even so, this solution does not explain at all how we can say something obviously wrong but understandable. 23  Et tamen hoc quoque uti concedam scire, at id ipsum / quaeram, cum in rebus veri nil viderit ante, / unde sciat quid sit scire et nescire vicissim, / notitiam veri quae res falsi que crearit / et dubium certo quae res differre probarit. My translation is much inspired by J. Pigeaud’s. 24  See, for example, Sedley 1973.

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the words of Epicurus in Nat. XXVIII, who himself underlines on several occasions that if his doctrine has evolved, there is no contradiction.25 What we will keep is the idea that there is indeed a link between preconceptions and meanings and that this link is obviously not a univocal one or one that guarantees the relevance of the discourse.26 In that case, though, my aporetic questioning bounces back: if prenotions all come from the most immediate sensible experience, if they are natural, how is it that we do not all have the same prenotions, or at least that we do not all have an equal access to them – how is it that we are not all equally intelligent and wise and fully free-minded? Additionally, therefore, as it is obviously not the case, how do we share preconceptions? – which is the condition of a common language, if language indeed supposes a sharing of meaning. We will note that for example the existence of various languages which are incomprehensible from one people to another is precisely a usual argument, taken up again in Sextus, against the hypothesis of the natural origin of language: if language were natural, we would all understand each other.27 It seems to me, however, that unintelligibility can also play out quite well within the same language – and I take as an example, here again, the complexity of philosophical texts such as the Letter to Herodotus, for which I myself have a hard time coming up with clear preconceptions identical to those of my colleagues. We always find behind these different questions the same dense ambiguity between a theory of meaning and a theory of science or of true discourse. To rephrase the problem in another way: if words have a meaning because they are spontaneously associated with preconceptions, and if preconception is a criterion of truth because of its deeply empirical structure: – where does this association of word and prenotion come from, is it immediate, is it discursive? – how is it possible to speak to say nothing or to say a falsehood?28 – what happens when someone speaks to me and I understand what they are saying (there is therefore a meaning and even a common meaning) but I consider it to be false? 25  Epicurus was deeply concerned with the problem of clarity and precision with scientific vocabulary, as well as the difficulty to reconcile both accuracy and use of ordinary language. See Angeli 1985, as well as Erler 1993 and Verde 2010: 22, 223, Tsouna 2021: 192, Giovacchini 2003. 26  See also Nat. XXVIII (PHerc. 1479) col. III Sedley. 27 Sextus AM I.145. Blank 1998: 179 sees here a merely anti-Epicurean argument. Spinelli 1991: 62 proposes a much more cautious reading, focusing on the idea of a diachronic building of meaning, which I will use later in my own proposition. 28  Bown 2016a: 497-498 proposes that Epicurus has in mind always two meanings for true: in a first acceptance, true means that a thing of the world is “real” or “genuine”; in a second acceptance, “true” is said of “presentations, judgements or statements” and evaluates the correctness of what is said, not of the realities themselves. This suggestion is pretty efficient for understanding the case of judgements about future and past events, but Bown concludes in a sort of hyper-realist position that remains highly doubtful and not necessary in my opinion.

Thinking or Speaking: The Paradoxes of the Epicurean Theory of Language 25

Let us try, for example, to reinterpret, keeping this problematic network in mind, Hrdt. 37 and “what lies beneath the words” by trying to better understand this expression in context; we see quite quickly that it is really difficult to understand what is talked about in this passage, that indeed all the interpretative options seem possible. The preconception can have its criterial meaning; but also, and maybe even more, a weaker meaning, like the one Sextus seems to take up: For, according to the wise Epicurus, there is neither research nor doubt without a preconception.29 Since there is neither research nor doubt, according to the wise Epicurus, without preconception…30

Here, preconception is for the meaning of what we have to start with, within the framework of a progressive (and pedagogically progressive) philosophical exposition; we would then find here a simple resumption of a weak version of the program of Analytica Posteriora,31 asking for a point of departure beyond which we cannot go back, and which would be: a clear and immediately understandable language.32 Let’s look at what follows Hrdt. 37: the first thing that is introduced is an extremely hypothetical ontology for which it seems very difficult to invoke a preconception in the mind of the reader, since it is certainly not about realities accessible through simple experience. The text indeed deals with principles that correspond to complete physical laws, which are explained in an almost demonstrative way; the atomon is not immediately introduced, nor is it clearly understandable; on the contrary, the goal of the text is to introduce for the principles, both the word and the thing, which can be done only from a general ontology based on very encompassing physical principles. A general solution to this problem has long been to assume that for Epicureans, language is a bad philosophical tool – and that it must necessarily be rectified by recourse to non-linguistic procedures: analogy and empirical reasoning; in other words, language is by nature a distorting medium, and one would have to recover immediate interaction with nature and things themselves in order to avoid the pitfalls of lexical ambiguity and overinterpretation.33 In doing 29 

Sextus Empiricus, AM XI.21: κατὰ γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὔτε ζητεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε ἀπορεῖν

30 

Sextus Empiricus, AM. I.57: Ἐπεὶ οὔτε ζητεῖν οὔτε ἀπορεῖν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἄνευ

ἄνευ προλήψεως. προλήψεως,… 31 

See Milanese 1996: 271-272. See, for example, Sedley 2018: “Every word has a primary notion naturally underlying it, and provided that that notion is kept in focus, transparency will be maintained in any discussion, without the dialectical requirement that the parties start by agreeing a definition. Whether or not this primary notion is thought to serve as the word’s meaning, it amounts to a safe starting-point, one that in turn enables collaborative discussion.” 33  See, for example, Giovacchini 2003 and Giovacchini 2012: 122-127. 32 

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so, Epicureans would include language and judgment as part of the same mistrust, considering that its referential nature makes language suspect and that it is necessary to reach things without this intermediary. Still, we should reconsider this somewhat binary distribution. I think that we have at least one set of texts, from the very first origins of Epicureanism, that can help us understand differently how language should be approached, because these texts confront the question of reference and the relationship between words, references, and realities.

4. Processual semantics, or language in context I now propose to question, on the one hand, two Ratae Sententiae of Epicurus and, on the other hand, the beginning of Hermarchus’s genealogy, transmitted by Porphyry in the De Abstinentia, and to confront them with what can be read in Hrdt. 75; and to highlight with them the temporality and the incompleteness of the symbolic process. This approach will lead me to defend the hypothesis that Epicurean semantics is above all a processual semantics: at the heart of the Epicurean theory of meaning is the idea that what is said in language is not the relation of word and thing once and for all, but the actual relation, at the moment of speaking and likely to modify in time, in the minds of each of the speakers, between singular affects, preconceptions, and words. Thus, what governs language as a technical rule is not so much its truth as its collective dimension; language is first of all a political technique and as such it is not evaluated only according to its truth value, but also according to its intelligibility and adaptability.34 RS 31 What is naturally right is that which allows us to identify what is useful in order not to harm others and not to be harmed. 35 RS 37 What is established as useful in the customs of the community of men among themselves, among the acts which the laws say are right, occupies the place of what is right, whether or not it is the same for all. And if anyone enacts a law which does not result in anything useful in the mutual community, < that law > will no longer 34  This proposition owes a lot to the also been very important for my reflexion, particularly his analysis of the analysis of Spinelli 1991: 62-63; if I am correct, my proposition could be a new piece of evidence in the puzzling issue of the proximity between Epicureanism and some skeptical positions. Some aspects of Bown 2016a have apparent rejection of the principle of bivalence, for which he very clearly shows the relationship with a complex semantic theory involving an important distinction between syntactic disjunction of propositions and metaphysic contradiction between two opposite states of affairs. 35  Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

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have the nature of what is right. And if what is useful becomes opposed to what is right, and takes a moment to adapt itself to the preconception, it is no less right during that moment for those who do not allow themselves to be troubled by empty sounds, but who focus only to realities. 36 Hermarchus (in Porphyri De Abst. I.7-8) Those who follow Epicurus say, developing what looks like a vast genealogy, that the ancient legislators, having closely observed the community of life of men and their conduct towards each other, denounced as impious the murder of a man and attached to it very specific punishments; first of all they quickly identified a certain appropriation of men with men, because of their resemblance of form and soul, and concluded that this kind of living being should not be recklessly immolated, confusing it with the living for which it is admitted; nevertheless < they say > according to these legislators the main reason that this was considered unbearable and denounced as ungodly was that it was disadvantageous for the general organization of life. From this principle, those who understood the advantage of this decision needed no other but those who could not have a sufficient sense of it, fearing the magnitude of the punishment, refrained from recklessly killing one another. Even today, both attitudes are observed. And indeed those who have the intuition of the advantageous character of the convention described above hold to it zealously, but those who are not able to apprehend it fear the threats of the laws, which have been fixed because of those individuals lacking the understanding of the useful, this having been accepted by most < men >. For no rule, written or unwritten, among those which have subsisted until now and which by nature will subsist, was instituted as just by violence, but yielded to it by those who had the use of it. For it was by the wisdom of their souls, not by the force of their bodies or the power of their tyranny, that those who brought such rules to the masses distinguished themselves from the masses, leading to the empirical reasoning of the useful those who before felt it without reasoning, and often forgot it, and frightening the others by the magnitude of the punishments. For there was no other remedy against the ignorance of the useful than the fear of the punishment prescribed by the law.37 36  Τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων ἔχειν τοῦ δικαίου χώραν δεῖ, ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό· ἐὰν δὲ νόμον μόνον θῆταί τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει· κἂν μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον, χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττῃ, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν. 37  Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου ὥσπερ γενεαλογίαν μακρὰν διεξιόντες φασὶν ὡς οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθέται, ἀπιδόντες εἰς τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινωνίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράξεις, ἀνόσιον ἐπεφήμισαν τὴν ἀνθρώπου σφαγὴν καὶ ἀτιμίας οὐ τὰς τυχούσας προσῆψαν, τάχα μὲν καὶ φυσικῆς τινος οἰκειώσεως ὑπαρχούσης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀνθρώπους διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς μορφῆς καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ μὴ προχείρως φθείρειν τὸ τοιοῦτον ζῷον ὥσπερ ἕτερόν τι τῶν συγκεχωρημένων· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τήν γε πλείστην αἰτίαν τοῦ δυσχερανθῆναι τοῦτο καὶ ἀνόσιον ἐπιφημισθῆναι τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν εἰς τὴν ὅλην τοῦ βίου σύστασιν ὑπολαβεῖν. Ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς οἱ μὲν παρακολουθήσαντες τῷ συμφέροντι τοῦ διορίσματος οὐδὲν προσεδεήθησαν ἄλλης αἰτίας τῆς ἀνειργούσης αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν αἴσθησιν ἱκανὴν τούτου τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ζημίας δεδιότες ἀπείχοντο τοῦ κτείνειν προχείρως ἀλλήλους. Ὧν ἑκάτερον φαίνεται καὶ νῦν ἔτι συμβαῖνον. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν θεωροῦντες τὸ συμφέρον τῆς προειρημένης διατάξεως ἑτοίμως ἐπ’ αὐτῆς μένουσιν, οἱ δὲ μὴ δεκτικοὶ τούτου τὰς ἀπειλὰς φοβούμενοι τῶν νόμων, ἃς ἕνεκα τῶν ἀσυλλογίστων τοῦ χρησίμου διώρισάν τινες, παραδεξαμένων αὐτὰς τῶν πλειόνων. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς βιαίως κατέστη

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These texts deal with the same linguistic procedure as Hrdt. 75; in Hermarchus, it is a question of naming a crime by identifying it, which is indicated by the verb epiphemizein; what is described in each case is what Verlinskij38 calls a “cultural” process, or more simply: a technological process.39 This intuition will guide my reading of these texts: if what we understand about language does not apply to other technologies, and if we do not have a clear perception of the fact that what is described in Hermarchus’ text as well as in Letter to Herodotus is a technological process, it seems to me that we have missed something in our understanding of the phenomenon. Moreover, it is always a matter of using a complex technology that is not equally controlled by all; we always find a hierarchy between a spontaneous or “natural” use and a complex or expert use, allowing us to produce an understanding of distant or hidden realities.40 RS 31 uses the notion of sumbolon, obviously to describe a system of reference; this is remarkable because sumbolon is an hapax in the first Epicurean corpus41: I reckon that one can detect both a deviation from what Aristotle says about linguistic symbolism in the Peri Hermenias, as well as a proximity. In Aristotle’s Peri Hermenias we can find a tripartition between words, states of the soul, and realities; words symbolize the states of the soul, which themselves play the role of signs for the pragmata; this is a much-commented passage. I am going to follow Di Mattei’s reading;42 Di Mattei insists on the non-equivalence of symbols and signs, on the one hand, and on the fact that precisely in Aristotle’s case the word is not its meaning: sumbolon does not designate the semantic relation (which is always designated by Aristotle as semeion) but describes parallel relations between pragmatic levels: what happens within words happens in parallel within impressions and concepts.43 We use words as symbols to reason, as we use figures as symbols to calculate. The word itself does not say anything about the meaning, which will rather be correctly expressed by, for example, a definition; yet there is in Aristotle a pact of meaning which stipulates that if linguistic symbolism respects rules (grammatical νόμιμον οὔτε μετὰ γραφῆς οὔτε ἄνευ γραφῆς τῶν διαμενόντων νῦν καὶ διαδίδοσθαι πεφυκότων, ἀλλὰ συγχωρησάντων αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν χρησαμένων. Φρονήσει γὰρ ψυχῆς, οὐ ῥώμῃ σώματος καὶ δυναστευτικῇ δουλώσει τῶν ὄχλων διήνεγκαν οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰσηγούμενοι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν τοῦ χρησίμου καταστήσαντες ἀλόγως αὐτοῦ πρότερον αἰσθανομένους καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιλανθανομένους, τοὺς δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἐπιτιμίων καταπλήξαντες. Οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἑτέρῳ χρῆσθαι φαρμάκῳ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀμαθίαν ἢ τῷ φόβῳ τῆς ἀφωρισμένης ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου ζημίας (Porph. Abst I.7-8 Nauck). 38 

See Verlinskij 2005: 65, 97. See on that point Tsouna 2021: 198. 40  Giovacchini 2020: 50. 41  Sumbolon is usually synonymous for sunthèkè which means any type of contract or convention (see Gusmani 2009); but in the Greek Epicurean corpus, we can notice that the use of sunthèkè is prominent, though sumbolon is very rarely used; see also Asmis 2008: 142; if sumbolon had a juridical meaning in RS 31, it would be a very remarkable exception in Epicurean vocabulary. 42  Di Mattei 2006. 43  As has been stressed by Irwin 1982: 256 n. 15, the distinction between semeion and sumbolon here does not overlap a nature vs convention distinction. 39 

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and dialectical), language can be a vehicle of the correct meaning and thus correctly express states of the soul and realities themselves.44 In RS 31, there is a symbolism between what is right, according to nature, or naturally, and the usefulness immediately identified with the protection of oneself and of others (thus the social usefulness, which is: security); it is clear that what is right is not a sign of the usefulness – the relation would in fact function better in the other direction: when there is social utility, when one feels protected or in security in society, one can consider that there is justice. The explicit mention of a symbol invites us to understand it as a parallel relation; but, and this is the great difference with Aristotelianism, this symbolic relation would be at least partly natural or spontaneous and not strictly conventional.45 “What is right according to nature” – which in the RS 37 is explicitly identified with a preconception – would thus play the role of an equivalent, in another dimension of existence, for what is useful. The prenotion of what is right is what one handles in a social situation with respect to an individual stable feeling of security or insecurity (i.e., usefulness in the political sense). The notion of symbol insists on the referentiality of the preconception: it is not the thing, but it is not the affect or the sensation either; it is something else, which is linked to it, which can be put in common, and which relates to it by a natural link. Yet if what is right as a preconception can indeed play the role of starting point of political and legislative work, what exactly is the status and role of usefulness? Is usefulness a preconception? If it is the case, would what is right be then a preconception of a preconception? There is something which could help us in Lucretius in that regard: Moreover, if others had not also used words among themselves, where did the notion of usefulness come from, where was he given this first ability to know what he wanted to do and to see it in spirit? In the same way a single individual could not constrain many others, overcome them and keep them tamed, so that they would be willing to start learning the names of things.46 Lucret. V 1046-1054 44  Hudry 2011 does not accept the idea that language could have a logical syntactic structure, but as he establishes a strict distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic meanings, he nevertheless stresses the fact that it is the symbolic nature of language that makes him significant: “Non-linguistic meanings for Aristotle are mental contents, which are unable to be expressed by a conventional language, since language is never syntactic, but always meaningful by convention. Nevertheless, meaningful spoken sounds are correlated with mental contents, in the sense that the linguistic meanings of language are the conventional symbols of (non-linguistic) mental contents” (275); see also Lo Piparo 2005 about the distinction between the Aristotelian notion of sumbolon as a substitute for the natural orthotès of words described in the Cratylus, in addition to its critique by Gusmani 2009, who insists on the specific technical signification of the Aristotelian sumbolon. 45  On that point, Polansky and Kuczewski 1990 and Giovacchini 2020: 44. 46  Praeterea si non alii quoque vocibus usi | inter se fuerant, unde insita notities est | utilitatis et unde data est huic prima potestas, | quid vellet facere ut sciret animo que videret? | cogere item pluris unus victos que domare | non poterat, rerum ut perdiscere nomina vellent.

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Here, Lucretius is making a reductio ad absurdum. Lucretius indeed argues that if we were to consider a linguistic educator of humanity – a nomothetos – we would have to suppose in him a special notion of usefulness, which would lead to two questions: where would it come from, and why would it not come to others as well? It seems to me perhaps an indication that the usefulness, insofar as it is common to all and absolutely spontaneous, is prior to any preconception47 – and that it is why the feeling of usefulness is at the principle of absolutely all technological inventions, including and especially those that are common to all human communities. Let us draw from this an initial, important conclusion: there is indeed in any referential mechanism implying a preconception something beside or beyond the preconception itself, which roots it in the spontaneous, and such is the meaning of what is right according to “nature”: what happens by itself, what is not mediated by something else; semantic processuality here means the dynamic and variable relation between an affect or a sensation – punctual and immediate, what is seized at the same time as it is felt, thought, spoken – and preconceptions. Usefulness in itself is an affect or a sensation, what I feel when something gives me comfort, relief, pleasure. What will become a true concept, what will be fixed in a preconception, like what is right or any meaningful word, are structures, categories, or regular types taught by experience and shareable, but which must permanently be actualized by confrontation with a subjective affect of the useful. In RS 31 and 37, what is right is shareable by means of laws whose role is to share this preconception with all, including those who do not understand it; the role of the law is to pool and fix usefulness in common institutions, to build what is useful for all in conformity with what is useful for each. The role of the preconception is to verify for oneself the conformity of the useful for all (the law) and of the useful for each (the personal feeling of usefulness); the fact that this verification is not once and for all is clearly expressed by the RS 37.48 This flexibility of the preconception justifies in return the use of the symbol to designate the relation of affect and preconception: it is indeed a system of provisional equivalence, the difficulty lying in the capacity to update the equivalence as it goes along.49 The preconception of what is right is then the personal, lucid, and actual relation between the feeling of what is useful (preservation and security) and the political concepts set up to provide this usefulness to the greatest number. What is right is what satisfies the need within the social group. However, it turns out that not everyone equally understands what is right. The law then acts as the punctual embodiment, the fixing of this preconception once it has been validated by a community. There is thus a double mediation which takes place in the legislative technology: a 47 

Contra Everson 1994. See Giovacchini 2020: 42-43. 49  Gensini–Vitali 2018: 124 proposes an interpretation of Epicurean naturalism, where “natural” is an equivalent for the active relation between words and preconceptions. 48 

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symbolic mediation between the feeling of usefulness and the prenotion of what is right, and a technological mediation between the legislation of a community and the prenotion of what is right.50 More generally, we can consider that for any technology, and in particular for linguistic technology, we will have individual preconceptions which are effective and up-to-date relationships between needs (feeling of usefulness) and concepts or inventions shared by artifacts (the law is an artifact, language another one).51 To speak is to provide for our need for communication by using words. Preconceptions alone, without technological mediation, would probably validate the truth of the speech itself but not necessarily its understandability to others. If my preconception of gods is great but I associate it with a word that nobody takes in this sense here and now, my language is not empty but it is not understandable. And in the linguistic pooling the preconception can only play this role if it is the same for everyone. So we have the same double mediation in the case of language as in the case of justice: symbolic mediation between affect and prenotion and technological mediation between prenotion and spoken and shared language. Thus we understand that the preconception does not come to fill language, but that language is to share the preconceptions, to share knowledge and information. We do not need language to think, but we do need it to be with others and share our thoughts52. I see an example of this processual semantics in an excerpt from Demetrius Laco which outlines the different meanings of “by nature”: It is said that man has “naturally” an aptitude to feed himself, since it is not unhealthy; “naturally” he bears pain, since it is necessary; “naturally” he looks for virtue, since it is useful; and “by nature” took place the first utterances of the words we say…53

It is clear here that meaning is always contextualized and that the important thing is not to fix a meaning in itself but a meaning in relation to other meanings and in relation with a speaker. We can also perhaps use this reading grid to refine the understanding of the famous passage of Plutarch’s Adv. Col. (= 7), which seems to 50  Taking into account this double mediation should perhaps alleviate the gap which has been seen and well described by Atherton 2005 and Reinhardt 2008, both in the Lucretian and Epicurean narrative about the origin of language, between the first moment of “vocalization” and the second moment of real linguistic communication. 51  For the link between origin of language and utilitas, as well as a discussion about the respective dimension of need and usefulness in utilitas, see, for example, Atherton 2005 and Tsouna 2021. 52  This semantic capacity to plastically adapt language to a situation or an audience is probably directly correlated to the Epicurean conception of voluntary movement and, in particular, of voluntary mental movement. An examination of this aspect would take us far from the subject of this article, but it deserves to be developed. See Masi 2007 and 2015, Maso 2015. 53  Dem. Lac. Op. inc. (PHerc 1012) col. XXXVII Puglia (source: Trismegistos 59506, see https:// papyri.info/dclp/59506) — φύσει γὰρ λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ποριστικὸς εἶναι |τρο] φῆς|, ἐπειδήπερ ἀδιαστρό|φως, φύσει δὲ πόνων εἶ-|ναι δεκτικός, ἐπειδὴ κα-|τ{ατ}ηναγκασμένως, φύ-|σει δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν διώ-|κειν, ἐπεὶ συμφερόντως,| φύσει δὲ τὰς πρώτας τῶν| ὀνομάτων ἀναφωνήσεις| γεγονέναι λέγομεν…

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attribute to the Epicureans a very naive direct semantics. I am struck by the fact that what is really aimed at is above all the political – and in this case religious – consequence of this semantics.54 If Epicurean semantics did not affect social interactions – because the designations of the gods imply beliefs that have practical consequences, for example – it would not be subject to this virulent criticism. More precisely, the criticism of Epicurean semantics is that it has practical consequences, because it constructs meaning from a reference that is both collective (shared by all) and rooted in the personal affects and beliefs of individuals. This processual semantics presupposes two mediations, which are highlighted in a three-stage description of the linguistic invention; these three stages correspond to different levels of intellection within a given social group; for if language as well as law are first of all techniques implying progressive sharing and pooling, not everyone masters these techniques equally. – The first stage is a spontaneous or natural stage: each individual at their level can produce meaningful sounds in accordance with their preconceptions. – The second stage is a collective step of conventional mapping to fix the referentiality of each preconception. – The third stage is a stage of refinement and complexity that will involve experts and specialists. Mackey55 suggests that the third stage in Hrdt. 75 is specifically that of philosophical language, and he raises a very good question about the meaning of the phrase sunorwmena pragmata: is it about what is seen by thought, or is it about what has not yet been seen? Does this stage describe the conventional invention of new words more suitable to describe realities already known, or does it suppose that some individuals, endowed with a finer sensitivity, will perceive realities that others do not and thus create new words to describe them, the meaning of which they alone would finally grasp? Another question, related to the previous one: is this a stage of linguistic invention (are new words created?) or of reusing words that already exist in new meanings? Mackey assumes, probably rightly, that it is indeed a matter of reusing words, as it seems to be explained in an excerpt from On poems by Philodemus. As far as legal technology is concerned, there are also three stages, perfectly described by Hermarchus, but which are described not in a chronological but in a genealogical way, in order to explain retrospectively the different understandings of the laws by different social groups, classified according to their capacity to deal with the symbolic mediation and the technological mediation: 54  This passage should be read in conjunction with Lucret. II 643-660; on the difficult question of the materialist use of divine antonomasia, see Gigandet 1998: 337ff. 55  See Mackey 2015.

Thinking or Speaking: The Paradoxes of the Epicurean Theory of Language 33 –

those who understand and can update the preconception at any time; this is the highest level, these individuals have accessed both mediations and are capable of creativity – they can shape the law’s evolution to adapt it to the modifications urged by the preconceptions; – those who have frozen the preconception once and for all, who can deal with technological mediation (they believe that the law expresses what is right and useful for everyone), but not with symbolic mediation (they cannot update their preconceptions); – those who have no relevant preconceptions at all and are thus subjected to their individual affective point of view; for them, no symbolic mediation is possible, but the pharmakon of fear acts to oppose their affect with another affect and to rectify it. If we now apply this scheme to philosophical language itself, understood as a particular application of the general technology of communication that is language: its accuracy thus always depends on both the intelligence of the speaker and the intelligence of the addressee; it supposes not the univocal recourse to fixed preconceptions, but the almost plastic capacity to modify the symbolic mediation as we understand it – to play with signifiers as well as with meanings. Hence, for example, the overabundant use of metaphor in Epicurean texts, which imitates the flexibility of the relation of preconception to affect, as well as the use of varied discourses.56 We can then understand that technical or philosophical language does not take the place of ordinary language, but that it is a reformulation of it; and that therefore the work on words consists in operating transfers (giving a new conception a name which already existed but did not apply to it, for example), that is to say, in constantly rebuilding and updating the symbolic mediation (from affect to preconceptions) then the technological mediation (from preconceptions to language), in order to make right associations between words and preconceptions, associations that will never be unique nor definitive because the associations between preconceptions and affects will never be themselves. The language is a flexible signifying technique that allows us to associate – in an original way when it is necessary – perceived, felt, or inferred realities with expressions of common language, through the intermediate symbolic way of preconceptions.

56  I believe Epicureans don’t use metaphors in a poetical way, but as useful devices to make them understood in some technical contexts where usual vocabulary can not be efficient; it is really similar to what Davidson explains in Davidson 1978: ‘My disagreement is with the explanation of how metaphor works its wonders. To anticipate: I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise.’ (33)

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Conclusion: A pragmatic and political theory of language This reading invites a different approach to the question of the Epicurean theory of language, coming back to the purpose of the semantic hypotheses expressed in the few sources at our disposal; these objectives are always ethical and political and, more particularly. educational: the correct language indeed does not serve so much to think, nor to understand, but to transmit and socialize knowledge; as several testimonies make us aware, if everybody had a correct use of the preconceptions or a totally isolated life, we would not need language more than laws. Society constitutes a first response to the needs of humanity lost in nature, and it gives rise to a new need for communication. What is the language of philosophy? Is it the language of thought? This question permeates Epicurean pedagogy,57 which constantly reformulates and tries to solve the difficulty of transmitting discursively (with logos) what is experienced empirically (through sensation). It is an obsession that runs through the whole Epicurean corpus. It appears that this pedagogical obsession is based on a political conception of philosophy defined as emancipatory – and that Epicureans must confront the question of the possible intellectual inequality of individuals.58 There is a tension between a popular vocation for Epicurean philosophy and elements of permanent elitism based on a taxonomy of human beings, the consequences of which are important for Epicurean noetics. In this context, language is in itself a tool of education and transmission, and the open question is whether it is able to overcome this difficulty – or not. This is also an internal paradox of the Greek notion of technè which supposes both an expertise, a talent, or at least a superior experience for the one who masters it, which opposes it to tribè or, more simply, to chance.59 Yet the survival of humanity supposes that technical skills are necessarily – at least in part or for the most crucial of them – equally distributed to all so that something like a society is possible. At the end of this overly long journey, here are some provisional conclusions that I think I can suggest. If we link language to preconceptions in a univocal way, we have to attribute to the Epicureans a naive and problematic semantics – which I think is unnecessary. On the contrary, we can understand this relation of language to prenotions as a dynamic relationship and understand meaning as a never-ending process. For this relationship, meaning is the provisional and partial trace in a given context and situation of interlocution. This allows us to reflect on Epicurean anthropology and on the relationship not only between humankind and nature but also between people within societies, as well as on the possibilities of emancipation offered to them by philosophical language.

57  The best synthesis about the influence of pedagogical purposes on Epicurus’ writing is MacGillivray 2015. 58  See Giovacchini 2020. 59  See Tsouna 2021: 194, Morel 2016: 16–19.

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Giovacchini, J., 2019, “La tetrapharmakos, formule authentique ou résumé simpliste de l’éthique épicurienne?”, Philosophie antique. Problèmes, Renaissances, Usages 19: 29–56. Giovacchini, J., 2020, “La confusion du juste chez Épicure, Hermarque et Lucrèce: une inégalité intellectuelle des citoyens?”, ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 5: 39–59. Glidden, D. K.,–Mitsis, P. T., 1992, “Epicurean Thought, VI / With a Commentary by Phillip Mitsis”, in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, VI, Lanham (Md.): University Press of America, 413–454. Goldschmidt, V., 1977, La doctrine d’Épicure et le droit. Paris: Vrin. Goodman, L. E.,–Aikin, S., 2017, “What did Epicurus Learn from Plato?”, Philosophy 92: 421–447. Gusmani, R., 2009, “A proposito della semantica di σύμβολον”, Incontri Linguistici 32: 159–172. Hammerstaedt, J., 1996, “Il ruolo della πρόληψις epicura nell’interpretazione di Epicuro, Epistula ad Herodotum 37 sg.”, in G. Giannantoni–M. Gigante (eds.), Epicureismo greco e romano, Atti del congresso internazionale: Napoli, 19-26 maggio 1993, Naples: Bibliopolis, 221–-237. Hudry, J.-L., 2011, “Aristotle on Meaning”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93: 253–280. Konstan, D., “Commentary on Morel”, in J.J. Cleary-G.M. Gurtler (eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. 23, 2007, Leiden-Boston (MA): Brill, 49–55. Long, A. A., 1971, “Aisthesis, Prolepsis and Linguistic Theory in Epicurus”, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 18: 114–133. Irwin, T. H., 1982, “Aristotle’s Concept of Signification”, in M. Schofield-M. C. Nussbaum (eds.), Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 241–266. Lo Piparo, F., 2005, “Platone e Aristotele sui nomi: dall’orthotes al symbolon”, in G. Casertano (ed.), Il Cratilo di Platone: struttura e problematiche, Naples: Loffredo, 201–214. MacGillivray, E. D., 2015, “Epitomizing Philosophy and the Critique of Epicurean Popularizers”, Journal of Ancient History 3: 22–54. Mackey, J. L., 2015, “New Evidence for the Epicurean Theory of the Origin of Language: Philodemus, On Poems V (PHerc. 403, fr. 5, col. I)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 45: 67–84. Manetti, G. (ed.), 1996, Knowledge Through Signs: Ancient Semiotic Theories and Practices, Turnhout: Brepols. Marcovich, M. (ed.), 1999, Diogenis Laertii Vitae philosophorum, Stuttgart: Teubner. Martin, J. (ed.), 1969, Lucretius. De rerum natura, Leipzig: Teubner. Masi, F. G., 2007, “La natura del moto volontario: ut sit in nostra potestate”, Lexis 25: 151–162. Masi, F. G., 2015, “Dagli occhi alla mente: il cammino tortuoso degli eidola”, in F. Masi–S. Maso (eds.), Epicurus on Eidola: Peri phuseos Book II : Update, Proposals, and Discussions, Hakkert: Amsterdam, 107–134. Maso, S., 2015, “Images and Truth”, in F. Masi–S. Maso (eds.), Epicurus on Eidola: Peri phuseos Book II : Update, Proposals, and Discussions, Hakkert: Amsterdam, 67–82. Milanese, G., 1996, “Aspetti del rapporto tra denominazione e referenzialità in Epicuro e nella tradizione epicurea”, in G. Giannantoni–M. Gigante (eds.), Epicureismo greco e romano, Atti del congresso internazionale: Napoli, 19-26 maggio 1993, Naples: Bibliopolis, 269–286.

Thinking or Speaking: The Paradoxes of the Epicurean Theory of Language 37 Morel, P.-M., 2008, “Method and Evidence: On Epicurean Preconception”, in J. J. Cleary–G. M. Gurtler (eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 23, 2007, Leiden–Boston (MA): Brill, 25–48. Morel, P.-M., 2016, “Travail et émancipation dans l’épicurisme antique: Prométhée revisité”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 278: 451–467. Nauck, A. (ed.), 1886, Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta, Leipzig: Teubner (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1963). Polansky, R. M.,–Kuczewski, M., 1990, “Speech and Thought, Symbol and Likeness: Aristotle’s De interpretatione 16a 3-9”, Apeiron 23: 51–63. Reinhardt, T., 2008, “Epicurus and Lucretius on the Origins of Language”, Classical Quarterly 58: 127–140. Sedley, D. N., 1973, “Epicurus, On Nature Book XXVIII”, Cronache Ercolanesi 3: 5–83. Sedley, D. N., 2018, “Epicurus on Dialectic”, in K. Ierodiakonou–T. Benatouïl (eds.), Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle, Cambridge–New York: Cambridge University Press. Spinelli, E., 1991, “Sceptics and Language: phōnaí and lógoi in Sextus Empiricus”, Histoire Épistémologie Langage 13: 57–70. Taylor, B., 2020, Lucretius and the Language of Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tsouna, V., 2016, “Epicurean Preconceptions”, Phronesis 61: 160–221. Tsouna, V., 2021, “The Epicureans on Technê and the Technai”, in T. Kjeller Johansen (ed.), Productive Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy: The Concept of Technê, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 191–-225. Verde, F. (ed.), 2010, Epicuro: Epistola a Erodoto, Introduzione di E. Spinelli, Rome: Carocci. Verlinskij, A. L. 2005, “Epicurus and His Predecessors on the Origin of Language”, in D. Frede (ed.), Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age: Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, Cambridge–New York: Cambridge University Press, 56–100. Westman, R. (ed.), 1959, Plutarchi moralia, vol. 6.2, Leipzig: Teubner.

Language Theory, Scientific Terminology, and Linguistic Controversies in Epicurus’ On Nature Francesca Masi In Book XXVIII of On Nature,1 Epicurus deals with epistemological issues related to the use of language. More specifically, he seems to be interested, on the one hand, in addressing the problem of errors that can emerge from the use of ordinary language in the philosophical sphere and, on the other, in indicating the most suitable tools and methods to justify this use, as well as to verify its correctness. The author, moreover, seems to be engaged in a double dialectical confrontation: firstly, he directly addresses his pupil Metrodorus, in a work of revision of previously held theories; secondly, he attacks the theories and linguistic practices of some non-Epicurean opponents. The aim of the present article will be to examine the nature and purpose of this confrontation in light of a broader examination of the various linguistic polemics present in other extant parts of On Nature. In his admirable and still unsurpassed edition of the work, David Sedley has reconstructed the historical and theoretical context of the surviving fragment, clarifying its content and purpose.2 It is worth briefly reviewing here Sedley’s main points in order to better define the issues that will be dealt with in the present work. In the Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus outlines his theory of the origin and development of language, indicating three fundamental stages. [T 1] We must take it that even nature was educated and constrained in many different ways by actual states of affairs, and that its lessons were later made more accurate, and augmented with new discoveries by reason – faster among some people, slower among others, and in some ages and eras, owing to , in others by smaller leaps. Thus names too did not originally come into being by coining, but men’s own natures underwent feelings and received impressions which varied peculiarly from tribe to tribe, and each of the individual feelings and impressions caused them to exhale breath peculiarly, according also to the racial differences from place to place. Later, particular coinings were made by consensus within the individual races, so as to make the designations less ambiguous and more concisely expressed. Also, the men who shared knowledge introduced certain unseen entities, and brought words for them into usage. men gave utterance under compulsion, and other chose words rationally, and it is thus, as far as the principal cause is concerned, that they achieved self-expression. 3 1  The text is transmitted by Herculaneum papyri 1417 and 1479 and has come down to us in fragmentary form, like all the surviving parts of On Nature. 2  Sedley 1973. 3 Epicur. Hrdt. 75-76 (Sedley’s translation).

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According to this passage, therefore, in a first stage, human beings uttered sounds as a reaction to the sensations and affections produced by the sense organs’ interaction with external objects; not having enough sounds available to refer to single objects, they used symbolic sounds. Language, therefore, originated as a physiological response by individual subjects to sensory and affective stimuli coming from external objects. Moreover, linguistic differences result from environmental differences and speakers’ biological characteristics. In a second stage, as natural language was found to be ambiguous and uneconomical, human beings proceeded to rationalizing it, by introducing conventional expressions to refer to objects. Finally, in a third stage, philosophical language was developed: human beings began to use expressions taken from ordinary language and referring to perceptible objects in a metaphorical sense, in order to designate also concepts and/or realities that cannot be perceived. The third stage proves to be particularly problematic: in philosophical language, the direct correspondence between names and things is lost and the chances of error multiply. Hence, Epicurus feels the need to outline a theory capable of justifying the use of ordinary language in the philosophical sphere and to provide an adequate means to verify the expressions used.4 Book XXVIII primarily responds to this need. Yet a more in-depth linguistic investigation is also made necessary, for Epicurus, by the need to reconsider some theories previously held both by himself and by his pupil Metrodorus. In this book, Epicurus seems to support the possibility of using, in a philosophical way, expressions taken from ordinary language, on the basis of an individuation of the distinctive characteristics of the objects to which they refer, as well as in light of an empirical evaluation of the correspondence between each term and its ultimate natural referent. In the past, however, in order to avoid the false opinions conveyed by ordinary language, both Epicurus and his pupil had promoted different solutions. Epicurus, in particular, is said to have attempted a reform of ordinary language, going so far as to modify certain names. Metrodorus is instead said to have subscribed to a more radical, conventionalist conception of language, by introducing a private philosophical language, based on the conviction that any term can designate anything and that what makes it possible to avoid ambiguities and errors is only the explication of the speaker’s intentions. The review of these doctrines, moreover, gives Epicurus the opportunity to distance himself from some of his opponents, who support theories and linguistic practices similar to those attributed to Metrodorus. According to Sedley, these opponents are to be identified as the Megarians of Diodorus Cronus’ circle, who were accused of using any name to refer to anything, of changing names, of using empty ones, of holding incoherent opinions, and of exploiting the ambiguity of

4 

On the origin and evolution of language according to Epicurus, see Sedley 1973: 17-19.

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the terms used by their opponents to assign them ridiculous meanings and refute their theories. With regard to the dialectical dimension of Book XXVIII, Sedley supports two main claims. First, we should not overestimate the importance of Epicurus’ controversy with his opponents for the development of his arguments. Second, the references to Metrodorus in the framework of the evolution of the theory of language and knowledge within the Epicurean school should be read as references to different phases of theoretical development by Epicurus and Metrodorus, probably attested by works that are now lost: It cannot be assumed that these past discussions were in an early book of the Peri physeos, especially as the text contains references to two other works of Epicurus on related topics. Nevertheless, the revision of past doctrines on language is clearly a primary aim of the book. This book should not be seen as polemical in character. 5

This approach was confirmed and supplemented by Adele Tepedino Guerra’s research. Tepedino Guerra stressed Epicurus and Metrodorus’ joint effort to develop a correct philosophical linguistic practice against that of their opponents. She further hypothesized that these opponents had attempted to refute Epicurean doctrine by exploiting the difficulties related to the use of ordinary language in philosophy that Metrodorus himself had highlighted in one of his lost works. For this scholar too, therefore, the reference framework of Book XXVIII is a work other than On Nature, one probably written by Metrodorus himself and focusing on language.6 A different perspective on Book XXVIII, however, was suggested by Giuliana Leone. First of all, Leone proposed a new interpretation of the book’s purpose, based on a reading of the first columns, the least preserved ones, which had remained untranslated. Leone highlighted how terms taken from both physics and epistemology appear here. On the basis of this, she hypothesized that the focus of the book is the possibility of using ordinary language to refer to non-visible objects, such as atoms, and, therefore, the problem of the terminological rendering and knowability of Epicurean physical principles.7 Secondly, Leone suggested some connections between the polemical and dialectical references contained in Book XXVIII and the terminological linguistic controversies in which Epicurus engages in other books of On Nature, as attested in particular by the fragments of Books II and XIV.8 In light of the research path already traced by Leone and of the progress made with the publication of Herculaneum papyri pertaining to On Nature in the decades following Sedley’s pioneering work, it is possible to reread the polemical and dialectical confrontation that runs through Book XXVIII in a slightly different way, so as 5 

Sedley 1973: 12-13. Tepedino Guerra 1990: 25. 7  Leone 2003. 8  Leone 1987, 1996, 2012. 6 

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to rethink its general aim and reconsider Epicurus’ theory and linguistic practice. One can interpret the columns of Book XXVIII, in which Epicurus is engaged in a dialectical confrontation with Metrodorus and above all in polemics with his adversaries, not so much – or, at any rate, not only – in light of works that have been lost or of phases of development different from the one presented in the book, but also – and above all – in light of the linguistic polemics already undertaken in the previous parts of On Nature. The present contribution will therefore be articulated in three parts. In the first one (section 1) we will examine some columns of Book XXVIII in which Epicurus engages in a dialectical confrontation with Metrodorus and his opponents. In the second part we will analyze some passages from other books of On Nature, namely II (section 2), XIV (section 3) and, above all, XXV (section 4), which report other linguistic polemics in which Epicurus was involved. In the third part (Conclusions) we will try to show that a comparison with the other parts of On Nature helps to clarify the object, aim and nature of the polemic that runs through Book XXVIII. As we will try to show, this investigation can contribute to a more precise delineation of Epicurus’ theory of language and linguistic practice in the philosophical sphere, while perhaps also clarifying some notoriously problematic and widely debated aspects of his semantic theory.

1. The linguistic controversy in Book XXVIII of On Nature As we have seen, in Book XXVIII of On Nature the debate is developed according to two closely connected aspects: the confrontation with Metrodorus and that with Epicurus’ opponents. This articulation of the polemic is typical of Epicurus’ main work as a whole, as on other occasions, too, the philosopher exploits the questions posed by outside interlocutors to clarify, investigate, and redevelop certain doctrinal points and related explanations together with his pupils, in order to consolidate their theoretical preparation and philosophical orthodoxy.9 As far as the engagement with Metrodorus is concerned, we are here interested in examining two passages in which Epicurus acknowledges some intrinsic difficulties in his own theory to which his pupil had drawn attention. The first of the two texts is the following: [T 2] 1) … Of the analogic reasoning (?) [ἀναλογισμοῦ] … What you were doing in those days I now see, although I did not at that time. And I also now see, although I did not at that time, the particular difficulties, with regard to this class, of using the 9  This practice very clearly emerges from some passages in Book XXV of On Nature, for which we will refer to Masi 2006: 66-157.

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correct names for individual things. And nothing would be consistent with them or doubting it, I now think I see vividly. 2) For, as I have said, a person would be correct to make the same choices of vocabulary in the exposition of philosophy, provided that we would count on his seeing that these are classes resulting from the same distinguishing characteristic (ταῦτα … ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γε ἰδίου εἴδη), in order that he should avoid the pitfalls of major qualitative changes. The fact that there was no factual refutation of someone who [was ensnared] by major qualitative changes…10

To try to at least partly understand the meaning of this difficult passage, it is worth breaking it down into two parts. 1) In the first, Epicurus acknowledges three points of which he had previously been unaware. Of these, only one can be deduced from the text, namely, the difficulties that arise from using correct names to refer to each of the things belonging to a given class. 2) In the second part, Epicurus seems to admit that the same lexical choices can be made in teaching as in ordinary language. However, Epicurus specifies a condition that should be respected in order to avoid implying qualitative changes: one must recognize that given classes derive from the same distinctive property.11 Although the passage is quite obscure, three issues can be identified, to which we will return. The first is what kind of thing or class Epicurus is talking about. The mention of the analogical procedure in the first surviving line of the column may suggest that Epicurus is thinking of a class of non-perceivable objects and is expressing the difficulty of using terms correctly to refer to the individual objects belonging to this class.12 The second problem concerns the interpretation of the distinctive property. It is evidently a property that makes it possible to discriminate one class of objects from another. It is also likely that, for Epicurus, this property serves as the objective referent of a word. If this is plausible, the distinctive property mentioned in the fragment inevitably leads us back to the expression “the things which underlie words” mentioned in the Letter to Herodotus and to the problem of its interpretation: [T 3] First, then, Herodotus, we must grasp the things which underlie words, so that we may have them as a reference point against which to judge matters of opinion, inquiry and puzzlement, and not have everything undiscriminated for ourselves as we attempt infinite chains of proofs, or have words which are empty. For the primary concept corresponding to each word must be seen and need no additional proof, if we are going to have a reference point for matters of inquiry, puzzlement and opinion.13

10 Epicur. Nat. XXVIII, fr. 13 coll. III inf.-IV sup., Sedley 1973: 46-47 (Sedley’s text and translation). 11 

For a detailed commentary, see Sedley 1973: 61. As Sedley 1973: 62, rightly notes. 13 Epicur., Hrdt. 38. 12 

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As is well known, the question of what actually underlies words has been the focus of an intense debate between so-called extensionalist interpreters and intensionalist ones. The former hold that, for Epicurus, words refer to things through a mental notion that represents their meaning and that, in turn, refers to an objective property. They thus contend that this notion is to be identified with prolepsis, of which the primary concept, mentioned in the passage, would represent an embryonic version. Intensionalist interpreters instead maintain that, for Epicurus, words directly refer to the real properties of things, without the need for a medium.14 In this respect, one may ask whether Epicurus conceives of the reference of a word to a distinctive property, mentioned in the passage, as indirect or direct or, more generally, whether or not there is a relationship between this distinctive property and prolepsis and if so, of what kind. The third problem concerns the reference to qualitative changes. Epicurus seems to imply that, in transferring a term from ordinary language to philosophical language, it is possible to change the quality of the class of objects to which the term refers. It is unclear, however, what this means. As we will try to prove later, a comparison with other passages of On Nature can help to partly answer these questions. For the moment, let us consider a second passage from Book XXVIII, in which Epicurus reports some difficulties he had raised about the possibility of adapting ordinary language to philosophical inquiry, and which may have been invoked to attack his school. In Tepedino Guerra’s revised version of the text edited by Sedley, we read: [T 4] 1) I too have often reflected on this, namely that since I was raising difficulties which someone might turn against us, 2) if that person were to attribute to us the use in the written work of what is usually assimilated by ordinary language as the same thing, 3) to many it might seem as though a false opinion was implied in those words either through an empirical or conceptual or representation-based procedure or a theoretical or non-empirical one, not according to one of our current divisions, 4) (this being a false opinion) which simply arises from an intrinsic movement; 5) but now, since the terminology has also adapted to other objects, (it might seem) as though on the basis of distinctions an orientation toward truth occurs. 6) Nevertheless, may no one, attempting to equal you, ever extend this suspicion to you, (but rather turn) to the whole possibility of reasoning empirically …15

14  The terms of the comparison between extensionalists (cf. Long 1971, Sedley 1973: 21; see also Verde 2013: 66) and intensionalists (among others, see Glidden 1983) have been well outlined by Atherton 2009 and Piergiacomi 2020. 15 Epicur. Nat. XXVIII, fr. 13 coll. VI inf.-VII sup., Sedley 1973: 49-50, Tepedino Guerra’s translation. However, we will also refer to the commentary by Sedley 1973: 62-66.

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In this fragment – again, a very complicated one – six fundamental passages can be distinguished, each of which poses one or more particular problems that can be examined as follows. 1) First of all, Epicurus refers to some difficulties or weaknesses in his own doctrine that he himself had noted, and which someone (tis) may have turned against the school. With respect to this section, it is therefore a matter of understanding what difficulties are raised and whether it is possible to identify the person whom Epicurus is addressing. 2) The philosopher then considers the hypothesis that someone may have accused the Epicureans of using terms from ordinary language in a written work, as if they were referring to the same thing. The question here is which written work is being referred to. Interpreters tend to think that it is a lost work from the Epicurean school. In particular, Sedley maintains that it is a work on the theory of language.16 According to Tepedino, it is a work by Metrodorus.17 3) Epicurus raises a further problem: many may believe that in the past Epicurean philosophical terminology conveyed false opinions underlying ordinary language. In particular, they may believe that such false opinions resulted either from one of the mental procedures – by which, according to the Epicureans, mental notions of things are formed and their correspondence with reality is verified and/or justified – or from the use of a purely theoretical method and the failure to use the empirical method. The greatest difficulty in this passage, to which we will return, concerns the explanation of the various procedures mentioned. 4) Epicurus then reminds us that false opinion arises from a voluntary motion. This poses the problem of understanding in what sense false opinion is a motion ex heautou, that is, a motion that is not merely intrinsic but autonomous;18 5) Furthermore, Epicurus points out that in the current practice of his school, terms taken from language are adapted to designate other objects on the basis of a distinction that orients one toward the truth. It is unclear, however, what kind of distinction Epicurus is referring to and in what way this procedure should lead to the truth.

16 

See Sedley 1973: 65. Tepedino Guerra 1990: 25. 18  We will not dwell on this question here. We will only note that, in order to resolve it, it is not sufficient to refer to paragraphs 50-51 of the Letter to Herodotus, which discuss the origin of error and explain that it arises from a doxastic motion of the mind that is added to perception, but that we must look above all at column XV of Book XXXIV (cf. Leone 2002), where Epicurus establishes the voluntary origin of the doxastic motions of the mind that are the source of error and emotional disturbance (cf. Masi 2020). 17 

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6) Finally, the philosopher advises his pupil to rely on empirical reasoning in order to avoid that someone, in order to equal him, might extend this unexplained suspicion to him. In this regard, it would be necessary to explain in what sense and how Epicurus’ opponent can aspire to be equal to Metrodorus, in addition to what suspicion his pupil could be accused of harbouring. In spite of all the problems it poses, the passage, when analyzed in this way, proves particularly interesting. Epicurus here declares that he himself had raised certain difficulties, most probably related to the use of words taken from ordinary language in his philosophical writing. It is plausible that these difficulties had to do with the fact that such terms also conveyed opinions he did not share. Moreover, Epicurus admits that his opponents took advantage of these weaknesses. He explains that, in order to counter the risk that his philosophical language might imply the false beliefs conveyed by ordinary language, in current linguistic practice he uses a method based on distinction. As will be shown, a comparison with other parts of On Nature can shed light on the meaning of this passage. In particular, it can clarify what the distinction consists in, and how a method based on distinction contributes to the search for truth. Before proceeding in this direction, however, it is necessary to examine the polemical part of the treatise devoted to Epicurus’ confrontation with his opponents. The dialectic with external interlocutors is articulated in various points. Firstly, Epicurus accuses those who share the same language as the Epicureans of attributing unsuspected and false connotations to certain terms in order to challenge the Epicurean use of words: [T 5] For it was so necessary to point out that we, by observing that those who speak the same language as us were, in contrast to our own use of words, assigning some unsuspected false connotation in addition to those meanings…19

The philosopher also accuses some people of understanding words in various ridiculous ways or in any sense other than that expressed by current linguistic usage: [T 6] … I am convinced that I see them clearly in the way in which we used to distinguish them, as you took the meaning, and not in the senses in which certain people would understand them. Perhaps, though, you might say that it is inappropriate to lengthen the discussion by citing these cases. Quite so, Metrodorus. For I do not doubt that you could cite many

19 Epicur.

Nat. XXVIII, fr. 6 col. I, Sedley 1973: 39-40.

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cases, from your own past observations, of certain people taking words in various ridiculous senses, and indeed in every sense in preference to their actual linguistic meaning, whereas our own usage do not flout linguistic convention, nor do we alter names with regard to the objects of perception. For another absurdity is when…20

Furthermore, when considering the case of someone who changes the meaning of names, Epicurus refers to someone who uses a word but has an opinion opposite to that conveyed by the term: [T 7] [When it suggested that a word has changed its meaning, always bear in mind that] the man trying to prove this would have been more persuasive at a time when someone was either acting, or not acting, in a certain manner, then at a time when the distinction, that by using a certain word, he means one thing, but used to hold the opposite opinion, was not analogically reasoned.21

Finally, Epicurus recommends checking whether the opinions conveyed by changes in the meaning of words currently in use, while not directly affecting one’s actions, might not have negative consequences from a practical point of view: [T 8] As for those opinions which do not concern actions (by which I mean those which are not included among empirical opinions, but belong to the theoretical side), these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either because some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action.22

The main points in the controversy discussed in Book XXVIII of On Nature, thus outline23 – as well as the issues that emerge from Epicurus’ confrontation with Metrodorus – also find precise parallels in the previous books, particularly Books II, XIV and XXV, as we will now attempt to show.

20 Epicur.

Nat. XXVIII, fr. 13 col. IV inf.-fr. 13 col. V sup., Sedley 1973: 47-48. Nat. XXVIII, fr. 13 col. VII inf., Sedley 1973: 50-51. 22 Epicur. Nat., XXVIII, Fr. 13 col VIII inf. – 13 col. IX sup., Sedley 1973: 51-52 23  On the general content of Book XXVIII, see also Giovacchini in the present volume. 21 Epicur.

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2. The distinctive property, the method based on distinction, and the practice of Epicurus’ opponents As Leone has clearly explained in the introduction and commentary in her edition of the text,24 in Book II Epicurus appears to be engaged in a polemic revolving around the term “subtlety” and in an attempt to clarify its use within the doctrine of simulacra. This word, adapted from ordinary language, in which it normally refers to perceptible substances such as fire, air, and wind, is widely used by Epicurus in Book II to describe the peculiar constitution of simulacra: the latter are three-dimensional, have the thickness of an atom, contain a lot of internal void, and are rather cohesive in their conformation, meaning that they are able to grow narrow, contract, and change shape only within certain limits.25 In the last columns, more specifically, the author finds himself responding to those who think that they can attribute the characteristics of perceptible substances to simulacra, such as the ability to pass through walls. In his response, Epicurus accuses his opponents of having formed a false opinion on the basis of the homonymy of the term and of having failed to grasp what distinguishes the different objective referents of the word. On the basis of Epicurus’ own use of the word – and taking advantage of the fact that it refers to both simulacra and perceptible substances – his opponents attribute the characteristics of perceptible substances to simulacra. By contrast, Epicurus distinguishes the two in terms of their properties and argues that, in the case of simulacra, thinness, which is due to the large internal void enclosed by a compact structure, is not compatible with the property of passing through solid objects; whereas, in the case of substances such as fire, air, and wind, thinness indicates a flexibility and morphological adaptability compatible with the ability to pass through the pores of more solid objects. [T 9] For in no way could something that is very empty on the inside, but similar by nature to this (scil. to the solid object), which is not very empty, preserve its position in succession with respect to a solid object when passing through walls. This is not inherent, I say, in this particular morphological configuration (existing) by nature, but in many different ones, now in one way and now in another – I mean, for example, in fire and wind and bodies of this kind: for these can pass through solid natures insofar as they have subtlety in their parts in a different way from natures that are connected on the outside but are very empty on the inside. Therefore, I say to those 24 

Leone 2012. For an effective summary of the Epicurean doctrine of simulacra in Book II of On Nature, see also Leone 2015 and Leone 2022. On the doctrine of the homogeneity of the simulacrum with the object of origin, see also Corti 2015. On the shrinking capacity of simulacra, see also Masi 2015: 120-121. 25 

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who, in regarding this same capacity as also proper to images, are about to conceive a false opinion precisely on account of the homonymy of subtlety, without observing, moreover, the difference of those […]26

This text is very useful to clarify some of the aforementioned passages from Book XXVIII. First of all, it helps to clarify what Epicurus means by the distinctive property of a class of objects and in what sense it constitutes the objective referent of a name. A name can have several meanings, that is, it can refer to several categories of objects. For example, the word ‘subtlety’ can refer both to simulacra that are not visible and to observable natural substances. However, these objects are distinguished from each other on the basis of a particular property. Simulacra are subtle because, as has been said, they have an atomic structure that is internally empty but externally cohesive. The natural substances mentioned are subtle because their structure is rarefied and flexible. Knowing how to distinguish the properties which connote the various classes of objects allows one to appropriately refer linguistic terms to their objective counterparts and, therefore, to avoid expressing false beliefs. In the case of simulacra, the expression “thinness” refers to the hollowness and compactness of simulacra. In the case of the other substances mentioned, “thinness” refers to their being thin and flexible. The passage therefore also explains what the method of distinction is on the basis of which a word from ordinary language can be adapted to the philosophical sphere. The method probably coincides with the procedure by which the distinctive property of a certain thing is identified through repeated experience – and probably also with the help of empirical and analogical reasoning – and then referred to by a specific term. In the case of simulacra, for example, this means: 1) repeatedly observing that, in the presence of solid surfaces that interpose themselves between the percipient subject and the perceived object, the object is not visible; and 2) comparing this experience, 2.1) on one hand, with the experience of other substances that are not able to cross solid surfaces because of their density and, 2.2) on the other hand, with the experience of rarefied and flexible natural substances that, instead, by virtue of these characteristics, cross them. By doing so, it is possible (via empirical reasoning) to attribute the property of compactness to the simulacra and, therefore, to interpret their thinness as a void within a cohesive surface rather than as rarefaction (as one might via analogical reasoning). Moreover, one can perhaps understand in what sense such a method leads to truth, since it allows one to establish the correct and exact correspondence between a word and its objective counterpart. Once the property of simulacra has been identified and distinguished from that of other substances, the word “subtlety” can be correctly referred to in different cases. 26 Epicur.

Nat. II, coll. XXIV–XXV, Leone 2012: 481-485 (based on Leone’s translation).

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Finally, the passage testifies to Epicurus’ commitment to fighting opponents who, by exploiting words used by him and taken from ordinary language with the intention of refuting his doctrine, attribute false meanings and beliefs to these linguistic expressions. In particular, in Book II Epicurus opposes those who, exploiting the ambiguity of the term thinness, attribute the property of flexibility to simulacra and insinuate that, on the basis of a thinness thus conceived, the simulacra should be able to cross solid surfaces in the same way as other flexible substances.

3. Terminological ambiguity, the attempt at emulation and the confusion made by Epicurus’ opponents Another interesting parallel with the issues discussed in Book XXVIII is found in the closing part of Book XIV. In the final passage of Book XIV we read: [T 10] But here let us put an end to this argument. Instead, I want a few things to be said against those who presume – if one of them by chance names a substance – to emulate those who use these terms (in an appropriate way) and again – if one of them has found it necessary to structure the expression in a certain way – to emulate those who practice sophistry on the basis of the use of such terms. For they say that those who change their minds… The correct way of practicing philosophy seems to be (proper) to him who unites what is in agreement with himself and consequent, but is alien to him who mixes in a muddled way a doctrine that is in some way correct with inappropriate doctrines, even if by chance he happened to come across it previously. For a muddler is not someone who brings back to identity his doctrine sprinkled with other doctrines foreign to him, but rather someone who puts together doctrines that are mutually irreconcilable, whether they come from himself or from others; even if someone states this doctrine of Empedocles’ in a discerning way, but without discernment joins this other doctrine at random… For the wise man does not (absolutely) put together (conflicting doctrines): neither will he praise someone and then someone else who holds an opposite opinion, nor will he praise a thing which a certain fellow asserts, for example, and then an opposite assertion made by someone else; but when he praises someone’s correct conclusion and then that of another fellow, he will not praise a conclusion which is contrary to that of the former fellow, but one which is in agreement with it – and he will behave like this on every occasion. As I have said, he does not deem it right at all to give credit to certain remarks by some people, but not to do so at all for others, thereby not quoting poets, sophists and rhetoricians, who do not… everything that contains the right conclusion… Of those who cause tumults in the form of enthymemes and judgments to those who listen to them; and in general those who do not connect anything coherent solecize in their doctrines; nevertheless also those who, having proposed to proceed

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in the footsteps of such and such a fellow, suddenly begin to follow someone else, one after another; but not those who absolutely do not intend to make use of the reasoning of such and such a fellow, but only in some way adopt it by altering it and reintegrating it into their own doctrine. … Indeed, it is right to say that these solecize and are muddlers, inasmuch as they have ruined even the correct – though accidental – kind of conclusion proper to their nature. And therefore may they rest absolutely assured who, because of ambiguity, of an undifferentiated name or designation – ambiguity which occurs by calculation and by chance – no longer perceive the difference.27

In this passage Epicurus explicitly refers to those who: 1) use expressions to emulate someone else, who uses certain terms appropriately; 2) emulate those who practice sophistry; 3) are muddlers, because they put together different doctrines in a haphazard and random way, unlike the sage, who knows how to integrate elements coming from other schools of thought into his own theory in a consistent, coherent, and systematic way; 4) no longer perceive the difference because of the ambiguity of their denominations and their indifference. The first point recalls the idea of someone intent on being equal to Metrodorus, in the context of the adaptation of ordinary language to the philosophical sphere. In light of what has been examined above and of a comparison with this text, one might think that in Book XXVIII Epicurus is referring to someone who, using the same words as Metrodorus while insinuating meanings other than those intended by the latter, introduces false beliefs into Epicurean doctrine. This would be the suspicion extended to Epicurus’ pupil, if he did not pay attention to the method of the distinction of meanings and to the empirical reasoning that assesses the correspondence between words and objects. The second point makes it possible to associate the interlocutors of Book XIV with those of Book XXVIII. They, too, are accused of emulating sophistry and of using dialectics to refute their opponents. In XXVIII the Sophists’ practice is explicitly recalled, and the sophism of the veiled father is mentioned.28 The third and fourth points allow us to clarify what the linguistic practice of these opponents consists in: these are interlocutors who exploit ambiguous or polysemic terms used by the Epicureans themselves; who do not distinguish their objective referents (for this is how one can understand the accusation of not perceiving the difference), that is, who do not refer to the distinctive property that discriminates 27 Epicur.

28 Epicur.

Nat. XIV coll. XXXIX-XLIII, Leone 1987: 50-55, as Leone 1987: 56-57. Nat. XXVIII Fr. 13 col. IX sup. e col. IX inf., Sedley 1973: 52-53.

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one class of objects from another; who attribute to a word any meaning among the possible ones, either by reason or by chance; and who, in doing so, introduce, false beliefs into the doctrine. Such opponents undoubtedly recall those who in Book XXVIII are accused of attributing unintended connotations and ridiculous meanings, different from their actual ones, to the same terms used by the Epicureans. Also, based on this passage, it would seem as though the difficulties faced by Epicurus and his pupil in the effort to develop an epistemically reliable philosophical language, on one hand, and the opponents’ practice, on the other, can better be understood in light of a comparison with other points made in On Nature. To further confirm this position, we will set out to show that some of the terms used in the dialectical confrontation and polemic laid out in Book XXVIII – as highlighted above – are in fact also clearly exemplified by Book XXV. The latter, compared to the other texts examined so far, allows us to better address the question of the relation between prolepsis and the distinctive property of a class of objects.

4. Names, prolepsis, and distinctive properties As anticipated, in Book XXV the linguistic controversy is framed in the context of a dialectical confrontation with some students, whom the author addresses in the second person, stimulated by criticism from some unspecified opponents who are intent on deriving fatalist, deterministic, and reductionist implications in the psychological and ethical field from Epicurean atomistic doctrine. Once again, dialectical confrontation offers Epicurus the opportunity to clarify and develop certain aspects of his doctrine through terminological clarification. The linguistic controversy in this book is articulated in four points: 1) Epicurus accuses his opponents of interpreting ambiguous or polysemous terms in a way that is inappropriate to the context in which they appear. 2) He then accuses them of modifying the name of things, without thereby modifying their meaning, thereby actually introducing empty names, lacking objective referents. 3) He reproaches them for contradicting themselves 4) for being ineffective in their reasoning and 5) for emptying ordinary language of meaning. With regard to the first point, we will recall two passages. In the first, Epicurus undertakes to refute those who, for the sake of dialectical contention, maintain that mental properties depend on atoms, implying that the plural term “atoms” is to be interpreted in a distributive sense as meaning “individual atoms”, and, in order to do this, he instead specifies that the properties by which the mind can be moved rather

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derive from the multiple and varied activities that the atoms perform in virtue of their reciprocal relations, that is, that the term “atoms” should be understood in its collective sense of “atoms as a whole”. [T 11] τῶν [σ]υμβεκότω[ν δυ-] να[μέν]ης τῆς δ̣[ιανοί-] ας κινεῖσθαι {\γ[   ̣ ̣]ω̣ ναιαι/} (ἃ πρὸς τῶν ἀτόμω̣ [ν οὐ]κ̣ ἂν εἴπαιμεν ἀ[μφισβη]τ̣οῦν̣τες) ἐ̣κ τῶν̣ π̣ρώτων πολυτροπωτέρ[ως κι]νουμένων κ̣[αὶ π]ο[ικιλωτ]έ̣ρως […] The mind being able to be moved by the properties, which we would not say were moved by the atoms merely for the sake of argument, on the basis of the first elements being moved in a more manifold and varied way.29

In the second passage, the philosopher, perhaps in order to make his position more explicit, undertakes to clarify the meanings of the words he uses and in particular the way in which the expression “atoms” is to be understood. He first states that a given thing which manifests itself at the phenomenal level, a τόδε τι, can be referred to by the terms “compound” and “atoms”; then he explains that by “atoms” he means “moved atoms” or “atoms in a compound”; finally, he specifies that atoms are not only said to be “the same moving downwards”: [T 12] [νο]ν ἧ\ι/ ἄθροι ̣σμα τόδε τ̣[ι] [ἂ]ν̣ προσαγορ̣εύσαιμ[ε]ν̣ ἀλλὰ καὶ ᾗ ἀτόμους καὶ

ᾗ ἄθροισμα καὶ μὴ{ι} μό-

νον αὐτὸ τὸ κα[τα]κινεῖσθαι λέγοντ̣αι.

We would call this particular thing not only qua a compound body but also qua ‘atoms’ and qua ‘atoms in movement’, in as much as they are spoken of as a compound body and not only the downwards movement itself …30

These texts are particularly interesting for the present investigation for several reasons. Firstly, Epicurus is again intent on preventing the move of someone who, for the sake of opposition, might not distinguish the meanings of a polysemic term and understand it in a sense that is inappropriate for the context. Epicurus thus 29 Epicur.

30 Epicur.

Nat. XXV, 1056, 2, 1, Laursen 1995: 101 = [34.10] Arr. Nat. XXV, 1056, 2, 2, Laursen 1995: 102 = [34. 11] Arr.

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distinguishes the referents of a term by referring to different distinctive properties. Secondly, the term in question in the quoted passages is the key term of Epicurean physics, “atoms”. In ordinary language the term “atom” in the singular means uncuttable. In the adaptation of the term to philosophical language, the word comes to indicate a material element that is not physically divisible into any further parts. The passages cited above show how the use of the plural clearly posed a problem for Epicurus: for, as the plural of “atom”, it clearly refers to individual atoms. However, the plural term can also be used to refer to the elements of an aggregate as a whole. The two meanings are different. In the former case, the term refers to unmodifiable entities endowed with a single type of movement. In the latter, the word refers to modifiable atomic relations characterized by more varied motions of collision. This, perhaps, is why the philosopher felt the need to distinguish the two meanings of the term and to refer them to the correct objective counterparts, so as to avoid misunderstandings or, worse, distortions of his doctrine on the part of his opponents. By distinguishing the two meanings of “atoms”, Epicurus probably intends to prevent those who – by interpreting the word polemically on the basis of its distributive meaning as “various atoms” or “single atoms” – end up drawing wrong conclusions about the relationship of dependence between the aggregate and its components – particularly between the mind and atoms – and unacceptable consequences on the psychological and ethical level. By relating the properties of the mind to those of atoms and understanding these as “individual atoms” characterized by the fact of “moving downwards”, they end up considering the properties of the mind to be as unchangeable as those of individual atoms. Conversely, Epicurus believes that mental states depend on atomic interrelationships, which, unlike individual atoms, can change through the intervention of various factors – biological, environmental, and educational – as well as through a process of self-determination intrinsic to dianoia itself.31 The passages from Book XXV mentioned above clearly illustrate the operation of distinguishing the meanings of the term atomoi that is necessary to clarify the various objective referents of the word and the most appropriate way of understanding them in the various contexts. Another interesting passage concerning the appropriate use of a polysemic word is a fragment dealing with the origin and formation of mental states for the purpose of establishing the presence in the acting subject (i.e., in his mind) of a principle of self-determination of his own psychological development and moral progress. The word at issue here is physis, another key term in Epicurean physiology:

31  For a more detailed and articulated discussion of this issue, see especially Sedley 1983, Annas 1993, Bobzien 2000, O’Keefe 2005, Masi 2006: 158-218, Masi-Verde 2017, and Németh 2017: 70-132.

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[T 13] It makes no difference whether we attribute responsibility (αἰτιᾶσθαι) to nature (φύσιν) or to this [subject] (τοῦτον) but we refer both names (ὀνόματα) to the same thing and, accusing nature, we similarly accuse him τοῦτον, when … this language (διάλεκτον). It is when in accordance with the first constitution (πρώτην σύστασιν), i.e., the flesh and the elements that compose it …32 (gap of about 30 letters) nature having been predicated and not having been named in terms of ‘it’ (κατ’ αὐτό) or ‘he himself’ (αὐτός)33

Here Epicurus is committed to preventing those who, by exploiting the polysemy of the term physis, attribute responsibility for psychological development and moral progress to nature rather than to the individual agent. In particular, in this fragment Epicurus considers the case of subjects who develop evil dispositions and behaviours.34 As is widely known, physis has various meanings for Epicurus. In Book XXV it is used as a synonym for the original atomic constitution, πρώτη σύστασις or ἐξ ἀρχῆς σύστασις,35 that is, the psycho-physical atomic complex with which the human being is endowed from birth36 and which up to a certain point evolves in a necessary way. Yet physis is a term very dear to Epicurus, who also uses it in a much more generic sense, to refer to any substance or to the essence of a thing.37 In this context, it is plausible to think that he is taking issue with someone who uses the term in its meaning of “original constitution”, as indeed Epicurus himself does, in an attempt to bring the results of an individual’s psychological and moral development back to the original psycho-physical constitution and to deny the subject any responsibility. Against this attempt, Epicurus points out that the term can also refer to the acting subject who has developed his rationality and is therefore responsible for his own dispositions and actions, not only to the original atomic constitution. In the sentence at the end of the passage that we have quoted, he seems to distinguish between the meaning of “nature” as “it” (αὐτό) – a meaning perhaps referring to the human being as an atomic aggregate – and its meaning as “he” (αὐτός), that is, the human being as a responsible rational agent.38 As for the second point in the controversy of Book XXV (2), it is possible to recall a more famous passage in which Epicurus is engaged in refuting an advocate of universal necessity. It is, in other words, someone who believes that everything, 32 Epicur.

Nat. XXV, 1191, 7, 2, 3 = – 17 inf./1191, 8, 1, 1 = – 16 sup.; 697, 3, 2, 2, Laursen 1997: 26.

33 Epicur. Nat. XXV, 1191, 7, 2, 3 = – 16 inf./ 1191, 8, 1, 2 = – 15 sup., Laursen 1997: 28 = [34.24] Arr.;

697, 3, 2, 3; 1056, 6,1. 34  See Annas 1992: 133; O’Keefe 2005: 95; Masi 2006: 85. 35  See Laursen 1988: 10. 36  Annas 1993: 57ff.; Masi 2006: 90. For other interpretations, see Laursen 1995: 43 (stable disposition of mind); Bobzien 2000: 318; and O’Keefe 2002: 180 (atomic composition of mind). 37  Cf. Epicur. Hrdt. 69, where physis indicates the set of permanent properties of a body. 38  Cf. Masi 2006: 88-94.

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including subjects’ psychological dispositions and actions, are the necessary outcome of the interaction of the original atomic constitution – whose growth is necessarily preordained – with the mechanical necessity of what penetrates from the environment.39 The philosopher first of all reproaches this person for changing the name of things, that is, for calling “necessity” what the Epicureans conceive of on the basis of the proleptic notion of responsibility, without being able to refer the name to another prolepsis or to show that the prolepsis to which the Epicureans refer is defective. [T 14] … [and we can oppose those who maintain that everything derives from the original constitution and from the accidental necessity of the stimuli that penetrate from the environment, of which] there never cease to be affections, [by invoking the fact that they also] blame and oppose and correct each other, as if they had the causal power in themselves also and not only in the original constitution and accidental necessity of what penetrates from the environment. For if someone were to attribute the action of blaming and being blamed also to the accidental necessity proper to whatever happens at a given time …blaming and praising; but if he did so, he would be admitting the kind of action which, as far as we ourselves are concerned, we think of according to the preconception of ‘responsibility’ (κατὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας πρόληψιν), whereas by changing the name …40 [T 15] Calling by the name of ‘necessity’ what is called ‘by ourselves’, he [scil. the necessitarian] only changes the name. He must [instead] prove that we call such a thing ‘the cause by ourselves’ (τὸ δι᾽ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν αἴτιον) by forming a preconception (προειληφότες) which has defective delineations (μοχθηροί τύποι and not)…41

These passages are important because Epicurus suggests a correspondence between a specific word and the prolepsis of the thing to which it refers. In the passages previously considered, Epicurus strove to indicate the correspondence between a singular word and a precise aspect of external reality, that is a distinctive property of the thing. The above passages allow us to specify that, for Epicurus, in order to be used correctly a name must first of all refer to a prolepsis, which constitutes its primary meaning. The philosopher, moreover, conceives of this prolepsis as the mental representation of a distinctive property of the thing, to which the word ultimately refers. The prolepsis therefore ultimately refers to the distinctive property of the thing. In this case, the prolepsis in question is the notion of the cause by ourselves. 39  For a more detailed analysis I refer to Sedley 1983, Laursen 1988, Annas 1992 and 1993, Sharples 1991-1993, Bobzien 2005, O’Keefe 2002 and 2005: 65-109, Masi 2006: 94ff., Németh 2017: 45ff. 40 Epicur. Nat. XXV, 1191, 8, 2, 1 = – 10 sup.; 697, 4, 1, 2; 1056, 7, 1, Laursen 1997: 35 = [34.27] Arr. = 20C 2-4 Long-Sedley. 41 Epicur. Nat. XXV, 1191, 9, 2, 2 = – 9 inf./ 1191, 8, 2, 3 = – 8 sup., Laursen 1997: 37 = [34.28] Arr. = 20C 8 Long-Sedley.

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This notion is referred to a certain expression in Epicurean philosophical language that the necessitarian opponent contests, namely, “the cause by ourselves”. This expression, for Epicurus, refers to an objective cause of human action which – compared to other causes of human behaviour that are “of necessity”, having their origin in something else (e.g., the original atomic constitution of the subject and the surrounding environment) – has as its distinctive property that the fact of being, precisely, through ourselves, namely, of having its origin in the acting subject himself. Epicurus does not linger here to explain how prolepsis is formed from the distinctive property. However, the reference to delineations in the second passage suggests that, for Epicurus, prolepsis is the mental representation or image of a distinctive property, that is, the outcome of a process of mental typification of a characteristic belonging to the same class of objects. This process, in turn, can be understood as the progressive schematization (i.e., selection and synthesis) of the repeated perceptual experience of an objective counterpart.42 This experience has a precise physiological basis in the impressions left by perceptual residues43 generated by sense perception, which flow into the mind in a filtered form and are stored in the mental aggregate as stable atomic patterns.44 If what has been argued is correct, two conclusions can be drawn that are relevant to Epicurus’ semantic theory and, more specifically, to his conception of prolepsis. Firstly, one might suggest that, compared to the fragments of Book XXVIII and other books on distinctive properties, these passages provide evidence for the extensionalist interpretation of Epicurus’ theory of meaning. Indeed, the meaning of the expression “cause by ourselves” is here clearly identified in prolepsis, which in turn refers to a precise aspect of reality or to a distinctive property of a cause. Secondly, as a semantic notion that underlies a name and is based on a distinctive property of reality, Epicurean prolepsis recalls the Aristotelian notion of nominal definition.45 We cannot dwell on this aspect here, as it would require a separate study, beyond the scope of the present investigation. We shall merely note that the Aristotelian nominal definition, too,46 like Epicurean prolepsis, is the notion

42  On this process, see Németh 2017: 38 and 46. On the notion of prolepsis, see Long 1971, Manuwald 1972, Hammerstaedt 1996, Verde 2013: 64-71, Tsouna 2016 and Giovacchini in the present volume. 43  On the notion of perceptual residue, see Verde 2016. 44  A reference to this physiological process can be found in Epicur. Nat. XXV, 1191, 6, 2, 2, 3; 1420, 2, 2, Laursen 1995: 91 = [35.10] Arr. Cf. Masi 2015, Konstan 2020, and Masi 2022. 45  I owe this suggestion to Carlo Natali, whom I wish to thank. 46  Cf. Arist. APo. II 10. We know that Epicurus was familiar with Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Nor can we exclude that Epicurus conceived of the notion of prolepsis in the same terms as Aristotle conceived of the nominal definition in the context of a rigourous empiricism consistently based on an atomistic materialist psychology, so as to overcome some of the aporias concerning the possibility and nature of knowledge raised by Plato in the Meno (see Shorey 1901 and Verde 2013: 67) and, especially,

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immediately associated with a name, based on the observable properties of a given entity, the starting point for all research.47 Let us now consider the other aspects of the polemic that emerge from Book XXV and that can be compared with Book XXVIII. On account of their practice of changing the names of things without identifying alternative meanings, those opponents of Epicurus’ who support a necessitarian interpretation of human behaviour are accused of contradicting themselves both from a theoretical and a performative point of view (3):48 [T 16] […] of so great an error. For such a thesis is self-refuting (περικάτω … ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος), and [he who holds it] never succeeds in proving that all things are the same as those we call necessary, but [rather] he opposes someone [scil. his interlocutor] on this particular matter as if [his interlocutor] were acting foolishly on his own account. And even if he were to go on endlessly repeating from speech to speech that he does this necessarily, he would not take into account [what he says], continuing to connect the causal responsibility of having reasoned correctly to himself and that of having reasoned incorrectly to his opponent. And if he did not merely [connect] to himself but attributed necessity, not even […]49

Furthermore, Epicurus notes that anyone who changes the name of what the interlocutor does into “necessity”, calling the cause “through ourselves”, without changing its meaning (i.e., without finding an alternative objective counterpart), is reasoning ineffectively (4): [T 17] Defining all the things we now propose to do in terms of the ‘necessity of context’, by calling [us] their cause ‘through ourselves’ (καλοῦντες δι ᾽ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν), will only change the name, and will in no way alter our action, as is instead usually the case when, in certain situations, someone, who understands what things are necessary, forces those intending to do something in spite of compulsion to desist.50

Now, both the accusation of performative self-refutation and that of ineffectiveness are likely to be found in Book XXVIII, where Epicurus explains how to evaluate his opponents’ linguistic practice of changing the meanings of words and to refute in the Theaetetus against an empiricist perspective (for a comparison between the Epicurean canon and the Theaetetus, see Verde 2020). 47  For example, see Aristot. EN I 2, 1095a 16-20, where the search for the essence of the ultimate good begins with the name (eudaimonia) and the notion immediately associated with it (living well and succeeding). 48  On the history, logic, and relevance of the Self-Refutation Argument in antiquity, see Castagnoli 2010. 49 Epicur. Nat. XXV, 1056, 7, 2; 697, 4, 1, 3, Laursen 1997: 37, = [34.28] Arr. = 20C 5-7 Long-Sedley. 50 Epicur. Nat. XXV, 1191, 9, 2, 2 = – 8 inf./1191, 8, 2, 4 = – 7 sup.; 697, 4, 1, 4; 1056, 7, 3, Laursen 1997: 39 = [34.29] Arr. = 20C 9-11.

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the false opinions that arise from it. Indeed, as mentioned above, in that context the author recommends checking whether these opponents might not contradict themselves by actually holding opinions contrary to the changed meanings of the words they use and assessing what actions they take based on the opinions conveyed by the words they use.51 Finally, it is possible to quote a passage from Book XXV in which Epicurus considers the case of someone who, by reducing the fully developed condition of the mind and the original psycho-physical atomic constitution to a single thing, ends up exonerating the former from all responsibility and refusing to blame it or modify it.52 In the context of such a theory of the mind, which does not distinguish between the developed product and the original atomic constitution, Epicurus points out that the conventions of ordinary language – on the basis of which expressions such as “responsibility”, “blame”, and “modify” can be used in reference to mental states – would be meaningless: [T 18] […] but by making this developed product and the constitution one single thing, we likewise clear it of all responsibility, or at least we do not blame it, and, in many cases, do not modify it – not even according to some regular yet meaningless linguistic conventions (κατὰ τινας ἐθισμοὺς ἄνευ νοῦ λέξεως). 53

This passage is interesting for its explicit mention of linguistic conventions (ἐθισμοὺς λέξεως). In Book XXVIII, Epicurus pointed out that the use of words does not violate the conventions of ordinary language. Here he refers to a theory which, by not distinguishing things, ends up emptying the conventions of ordinary language of their meaning. We must therefore try to understand why the violation of language conventions is problematic for Epicurus. The reason is probably twofold. On one hand, linguistic conventions constitute a fact of reality. Given the Epicurean epistemological perspective, one may infer that an adequate theory of language (i.e., one in accordance with phenomena) should account for such conventions, not contradict them. On the other hand, a theory that questions linguistic conventions actually makes ordinary communication between speakers impractical. The passage therefore clearly exemplifies how an opinion can be considered false because of its theoretical consequences, which are themselves practically disadvantageous. That is to say, it illustrates exactly the case examined in T 8 of Book XXVIII. Having completed the analysis of the linguistic controversy traceable in Book XXV, as a final step it is now necessary to explain how this book, together with

51 

As already suggested by Sedley 1973: 68. For a more detailed examination, see Masi 2006: 82ff. and Németh 2017: 109ff. 53 Epicur. Nat. XXV, 1056, 6, 2, Laursen 1997: 29 = [34.25] Arr. 52 

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Books II and XIV, can help to clarify the aim and content of XXVIII, or, more generally, the Epicurean theory of language and linguistic practice.

Conclusions In Book XXVIII of On Nature, expressing the conviction that it is possible to adapt ordinary language to philosophical teaching, Epicurus acknowledges the difficulties encountered in this operation and the fact that his opponents might take advantage of such difficulties to falsify his own doctrine. The philosopher is particularly concerned about those who use his linguistic expressions but distort their meanings by exploiting their homonymy, polysemy, or ambiguity. He therefore recommends following the method of distinction and using empirical reasoning to verify the correct objective correspondence of words. The controversies that run throughout the preceding books allow us to better understand what the difficulties raised by Epicurus are about and what exactly they consist in; what form his opponents’ linguistic practice took; what kind of method of distinction he introduced to counter their criticism; what it means to say that this procedure directs one toward the truth; and, last but not least, what it is that actually underlies words according to Epicurus. Books II and XXV testify to Epicurus’ effort to apply terms taken from ordinary language to non-perceivable aspects of reality, as in his use of “subtlety” to refer to the peculiar structure of simulacra and “atoms”. The difficulty arises from the polysemy of these terms, which can refer to different categories of objects. Clearly, it is necessary to distinguish the objective referents of a polysemic word such as “subtlety” or “atoms” in order to prevent people from associating the term – either by chance or deliberately – with a meaning other than that required by the context, thereby inserting a false thesis into Epicurean doctrine. The method of distinction consists in identifying a property capable of discriminating one class of objects from another and in associating the name with the correct distinguishing property in each context. Book XXV also suggests that the name properly refers to a prolepsis. Perhaps, in light of the comparison between Book XXV and Book XXVIII, it is conceivable that – as Sedley already suggested – prolepsis grasps the distinctive property or consists in a typification of the distinctive property of a class of objects. If this is true, a comparison between the contents of Book XXVIII and other parts of On Nature seems to support the so-called extensionalist interpretation of Epicurean semantic theory and to provide interesting insights into a possible comparison between the Epicurean notion of prolepsis and the Aristotelian one of nominal definition. The method of distinction, moreover, leads to a veridical use of ordinary language in the philosophical field, in the sense that it allows and guarantees the correspondence

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of each word to a precise objective referent, verifiable through empirical reasoning. Book XXV also clearly illustrates how one can refute those who modify the names of things without changing the objective referent, and who therefore introduce empty names into language that have no semantic correspondences. Finally, the presence of evident connections between Book XXVIII and other books of On Nature – particularly one as close to it in terms of the order of composition as XXV – cannot but suggest that in XXVIII Epicurus sought to take stock of the situation with regard to the use of ordinary language in the philosophical field. After having repeatedly engaged in linguistic polemics and terminological clarifications in the preceding books, Epicurus here felt the need to sum up the insights he had gained in various areas of investigation and to systematize them into a more general theory. It is perhaps true, as Sedley has already argued, that we find no clear evidence of Epicurus’ attempts to reform ordinary language or to introduce a private language of his own in the other surviving parts of On Nature. However, the books before XXVIII shed light on the importance of linguistic controversy for the development of Epicurus’ argumentation, on the nature of the problems faced by the philosopher and his pupil Metrodorus, and on the extent of the former’s efforts to adapt ordinary language to his own philosophical doctrine based on invisible principles.

References Annas, J., 1992, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Berkeley–Los Angeles: University of California Press. Annas, J., 1993, Epicurus on Agency, in J. Brunschwig and M. C. Nussbaum (eds.), Passions and Perceptions. Studies on Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the Fifth Hellenisticum Symposium, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 53–71. Atherton, C., 2009, Epicurean Philosophy of Language, in J. Warren (ed.), A Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 197–215. Bobzien, S., 2000, “Did Epicurus discover the free will problem?”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19: 287–337. Castagnoli, L., 2010, Ancient Self-Refutation: The Logic and History of the Self-Refutation Argument from Democritus to Augustine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Corti, A., 2015, ‘Ομοιοσχήμων e ὁμοιόμορφος. Alcune riflessioni sulle proprietà degli εἴδωλα, in Masi–Maso: 83–105. Giannantoni, G.,–Gigante, M. (eds.), 1996, Epicureismo greco e romano, Atti del Congresso Internazionale Napoli 19-26 maggio 1993, Naples: Bibliopolis. Giovacchini, J., in the present volume, “Thinking or Speaking: The Paradoxes of the Epicurean Theory of Language”, 15–37. Glidden, D. K., 1983, “Epicurean Semantics”, in AA.VV., ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ: Studi sull’epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante, Naples: Macchiaroli, 185–226.

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Hammerstaedt, J., 1996, “Il ruolo della ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ epicurea nell’interpretazione di Epicuro, Epistula ad Herodotum 37 sg.”, in Giannantoni–Gigante: 221-237. Laursen, S., 1988, “Epicurus On Nature XXV (LongSedley 20, B, C, and j)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 18: 7–18. Laursen, S., 1995, “The Early Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book”, Cronache Ercolanesi 25: 5–109. Laursen, S., 1997, “The Later Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book”, Cronache Ercolanesi 27: 5–82. Leone, G., 1987, “La chiusa del XIV libro Della natura di Epicuro”, Cronache Ercolanesi 17: 49–76. Leone, G., 1996, “Questioni di terminologia filosofica: una chiave di lettura delle polemiche epicuree”, in Giannantoni–Gigante: 239–259. Leone, G., 2003, “Rileggendo il XXVIII libro Della natura di Epicuro: riflessioni e proposte”, Cronache Ercolanesi 33: 159–164. Leone, G. (ed.), 2012, Epicuro, Sulla natura: Libro II, Naples: Bibliopolis. Leone, G., 2015, “Nuovi spunti di riflessione sulla dottrina epicurea degli εἴδωλα”, in Masi– Maso: 35–53. Long, A. A., 1971, “Aisthesis, Prolepsis and Linguistic Theory in Epicurus”, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 18: 114–133. Long, A. A.,–Sedley, D. N. (eds.), 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Konstan, D., 2020, “Epicurean Phantasia”, ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 5: 1–18. Manuwald, A., 1972, Die Prolepsislehre Epikurs, Bonn: Rudolf Habelt. Masi, F. G., 2006, Epicuro e la filosofia della mente. Il XXV libro dell’opera Sulla Natura, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. Masi, F. G., 2015, Dagli occhi alla mente: il cammino tortuoso degli εἴδωλα, in Masi–Maso: 107–134. Masi, F. G., 2020, “L’origine dell’errore e del turbamento emotivo nei sogni”, Cronache Ercolanesi 50, Sesto supplemento: 59–70. Masi, F. G., 2022, “Immagine e illusione nel De rerum natura di Lucrezio”, in F. Aronadio–E. Di Iulio–F. G. Masi (eds.), La natura corporea dell’immagine da Empedocle a Lucrezio, Naples: IISF Press, 227–256. Masi, F. G.–Maso, S. (eds.), 2015, Epicurus on Eidola, Peri Physeos, Book II. Updates, Proposals, and Discussions, Amsterdam: Hakkert. Masi, F. G.–Verde, F., 2017, Mind in an Atomistic World, in J. Sisko (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity, The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1, New York: Routledge, 236–256. Németh, A., 2017, Epicurus on the Self, New York: Routledge. O’Keefe, T., 2002, “The Reductionist and Compatibilist Argument of Epicurus’ On Nature, Book 25”, Phronesis 47: 152–186. O’Keefe, T., 2005, Epicurus on Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Piergiacomi, E., 2020, “Language”, in P. Mitsis (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epicurus and Epicureanism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 308–332. Sedley, D. N., 1973, “Epicurus, On Nature, Book XXVIII”, Cronache Ercolanesi 3: 5–83.

Language Theory, Scientific Terminology, and Linguistic Controversies 63 Sedley, D. N., 1983, Epicurus’ Refutation of Determinism, in AA.VV., ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ: Studi sull’epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante, Naples: Macchiaroli, 11–51. Sharples, R. W., 1991–1993, “Epicurus, Carneades and the Atomic Swerve”, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies: 174–190. Shorey, P., 1901, “Plato, Lucretius, and Epicurus”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 12: 201–210. Tepedino Guerra, A., 1990, “Il contributo di Metrodoro di Lampsaco alla formazione epicurea della teoria del linguaggio”, Cronache Ercolanesi 20: 17–25. Tsouna, V., 2016, “Epicurean Preconception”, Phronesis 61: 160–221. Verde, F., 2013, Epicuro, Rome: Carocci. Verde, F., 2020, “L’epistemologia di Epicuro e il Teeteto di Platone”, Historia Philosophica 18: 13–44.

Epicurus and His Meteorological Lexicon in the Letter to Pythocles: Some Remarks Dino De Sanctis In the chapter that Hans Widmann devoted to the Variation in the “Beiträge zur Syntax Epikurs”, the German scholar defined Epicurus’ style thus: Nur im dritten Brief können wir von bestimmter Absicht reden, weil ja hier Epikur mit ausgesprochen rhetorischen Kunstmitteln arbeitet.

As the lapidary nur highlights, Widmann attributed the use of recognizable “rhetorische Kunstmitteln” only to the Letter to Menoeceus, the third letter handed down by Diogenes Laertius, which is considered by scholars as an indisputable literary text and manifesto of Kepos.1 At the same time, however, in reading the phrase that follows this apodictic judgment, one immediately feels the need for a not insignificant attenuation: Widmann is correctly forced to recognize that in other cases of what remains in Epicurus’ production, it is possible to glimpse a deliberate, an explicit desire to search for formal elements that are regulated by programmatic choices both on a syntactic and lexical level. Widmann’s meritorious analysis, suited to the philological research developed in the 1930s, started from clear requirements, well expressed in the preface of the work, so much so that his judgments still represent a fundamental starting point for those who want to approach, on the grammatical level, the fascinating and complex language of Epicurus, a language with respect to which precise points of reference are often lacking for an overall evaluation.2 Today, however, a more balanced and untroubled judgment on Epicurus’ style is made possible thanks to new approaches to the author, facilitated by the essential editions of Graziano Arrighetti and Giuliana Leone regarding the περὶ φύσεως, as well as the definitive new edition of the monumental Βίοι of Diogenes Laertius by Tiziano Dorandi.3 For all this I believe it is right, if not necessary, to extend Widmann’s judgment to the whole of Epicurus’ production and always recognize the intentional presence of “rhetorische Kunstmitteln” that Widmann, with proper 1  See Widmann 1935: 237ff. Widmann’s judgment is certainly influenced by the negative view on Epicurus’ style expressed in Norden 19183: 135ff. On the same topic, see also De Sanctis 2021: 7ff. A lucid analysis of Epicurus’ prose in the Letter to Menoeceus is offered by Heßler 2014: 34ff. Verde 2010: 65ff. also dwells on some aspects of Epicurus’ physical argumentation in the Letter to Herodotus. Leone 2012: 68ff. offers a detailed picture of Epicurus’ expressive strategies in Book 2 Περὶ φύσεως. Recently Erbì 2020: 35ff. draws a stylistic overview of the so-called minor letters. Crucial remarks on hiatus in Epicurean works are in McOsker 2017: 145ff. 2  A comprehensive study of Epicurean works, in the stylistic field, is outlined by Capasso 1988: 83ff. 3  I am referring to Arrighetti 19732, Leone 2012, Dorandi 2013.

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perspicacity, in a still nascent phase of studies on Epicureanism, identified only in the Letter to Menoeceus. In this regard a field of particular interest, in my opinion, is offered, for example, by the Letter to Pythocles with a phantasmagoric harvest of technical language, often new and extraneous but always powerfully visual, built on the rhythms of an exuberant and descriptive prose, which is characterized by a didactic tone in relation to heavenly phenomena, τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φαινόμενα.4 Whoever approaches the heterogeneous horizon of Epicurus’ prose and language in relation to meteorological problems is immediately presented with a series of problems that are difficult to ignore. On the one hand, the vocabulary used to bring everything happening above humanity or the Earth back to scientific clarity and rationality poses questions to be solved with bona fide commitment; on the other hand, this close and programmatically revealed link, in both form and practice, is essential to the tradition that Epicurus always views as an inescapable point of reference. Moreover, it is no coincidence that one of the first anecdotes from Diogenes Laertius (in the Book X of his Vitae) traces the formation of Epicurus’ debt in this particular direction. Here, in fact, Diogenes mentions a decisive circumstance where a young Epicurus appears as interested and zealous for as much as curious and dissatisfied with the school of his masters in Samos (2): Ἀπολλόδωρος δ’ ὁ Ἐπικούρειος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου βίου φησὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτὸν

ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν καταγνόντα τῶν γραμματιστῶν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδυνήθησαν ἑρμηνεῦσαι τὰ περὶ τοῦ παρ Ἡσιόδῳ χάους.

Apollodorus the Epicurean says in Book I of On the Life of Epicurus that he came to philosophy after giving up on his teachers because they were unable to explain to him the account of chaos in Hesiod.

This anecdote in Diogenes dates back to an authoritative source: Apollodorus the Epicurean, the so-called Kepotyrannos, scholarch of the Kepos, in the first half of the second century BC. Having authored a multi-volume biography of the Master, Apollodorus – as it seems legitimate to deduce from Diogenes – perhaps elaborated an anecdotal justification for the qualification that Epicurus gives of himself in terms of being a philosopher αὐτοδίκακτος.5 In order not to draw a univocal διαδοχή, Apollodorus inserts a basic element into the biographical profile of Epicurus: the contempt for his masters, an anonymous group of men who cannot guarantee any valid interpretation, as revealed by the technician ἑρμηνεύειν, for Hesiod’s cha4 

See Delattre 2004: 149ff., for the didactic style in the Letter to Pythocles. This anecdote clearly shows how, in the biographical context, Epicurus is seen as a philosopher who has no recognizable background regarding his thought. On the image of Epicurus as αὐτοδίδακτος, see Erler 2011: 14ff. For others anecdotes on Epicurus, in Book 10 of Diogenes’ Vitae, see Balaudé 1999: 1149ff. 5 

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os. Of course, the request from Epicurus seems to coincide with an exegesis that goes beyond the mere poetic datum, while entering the dense jumble of disparate ζητήματα typical of Hellenistic scholarship.6 Epicurus does not seem convinced of the explanation he receives for the primordial chaos that opens the Hesiodic Theogony, for its mechanisms and, above all, for its causes: hence the inexhaustible desire to seek the truth that underlies the reality that surrounds man. Yet even in the face of this pedagogical disappointment, it is unlikely that Epicurus did not seek out dialogue; as unlikely would be the hesitation to confront the cornerstones of that Ἑλληνικὴ παιδεία which, in this case, bears the authoritative name of Hesiod. That authority stemmed from the roots of the cosmogonic constructions offered by the Archaic creation, then destined to condition the powerful reflection advanced on reality, starting with the Presocratics. Moreover, what we have preserved of Epicurus’ work bears a clearly opposite testimony. Confining Epicurus to a deaf thinker – one isolated in his research, unaware or insensitive to the developments that the sciences achieved in the Hellenistic period – corresponds to a gross error that has often distorted the interpretation offered for Kepos. Rather, Epicurus elaborates a salvific system of thought for the benefit of humanity, turning his gaze also to the sky and to everything that happens παρ’ ἡμῖν. In thus opening the portarum claustra of the universe – according to the sublime image of Lucretius I 71 – a solid literary tradition has by now been consolidated, equipped with its own scientific language and indispensable forms of communication. For all this, not surprisingly, even the meteorological lexicon of Kepos, which arises from an evident need for experimentation, is firmly anchored to that inaugurated by Archaic poetry nd the Presocratics up to Aristotle, so as to explain the φαινόμενα.7 As I said, my field of investigation will be supplied by the dense chapters into which the Letter to Pythocles is divided: I will proceed by sections in the reading of this letter, selecting the points that I consider most significant both with regard to the relationship between the Epicurus’ language and the reference tradition and with regard to the novelties that are highlighted here. Doing so, I also hope to show an additional aspect: the preponderant function that Epicurus assigns to recognizable stylistic-rhetorical effects, especially emphasized by central technical terms. In the following pages I will leave out the numerous philosophical problems of the passages of analysis: for these problems I refer to the rich and persuasive essay, La

6  Lapini 2015: 1041ff. offers a persuasive analysis on the forms of philological research in Alexandria, which are inherited from Kepos. Mansfeld 1994: 36–37 rightly points out that Epicurus takes from Peripatetic reflection the concept of scientific and philological πρόβλημα, which is also attested in the Letter to Pythocles referring to purification, … ἢ τοῖς περὶ βίων λόγοις ἢ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν προβλημάτων κάθαρσιν (86). 7  Verde 2022a: 27ff. offers a fundamental study of celestial phenomena in the Kepos. See, on this point, Taub 2018: 248ff. and Bakker 2016: 66ff. Decisive observations regarding Epicurean physics and meteorology are also in Morel 2009: 28ff.

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realtà del possibile, by Francesco Verde.8 I must, moreover, preface the following research with a premise. I am aware that a stylistic analysis requires comparison with other texts contemporary with respect to the author, texts which in Epicurus’ case may be few in number. However, I am sure that this kind of analysis is necessary for Epicurus’ work at a time when Herculaneum texts now warrant increasingly faithful and advanced editions. Let us proceed in order, however, starting from a section of the Letter to Pythocles in which the methodological and teleological assumptions of the research that motivate the drafting of this breviary are exposed: the proem.

1. The proem The letter, a διαλογισμός, that Epicurus sends to Pythocles is proposed to be a summary agile in its form and exhaustive in its explanation of phenomena, so that the young student always has in mind the complex doctrines that his Master has exposed on the μετέωρα.9 Gradually, however, the intent that Epicurus sets is itself no longer limited to the exclusive advantage of his pupil alone.10 It is clear, in fact – as already happens in the opening of the Letter to Herodotus and as it becomes an acquired fact for the parenesis offered to Menoeceus – that the words of Epicurus take on the tone of those who want to impart a universal teaching and communicate a beneficial message to all people, “especially to those who have recently been enjoying the true science of nature and to those who have been entangled in one of the too tiring daily occupations” (85, 1000-1002 Dorandi).11 The second part of the proem retraces the methodological aspects of the research. Epicurus emphasizes here that, despite having to do with physics, meteorology has indisputable peculiarities, such as to make inadmissible in his analysis the application of the μοναχὸς τρόπος. For all this, it is necessary to recall and discover the many plausible causes that justify the φαινόμενα surrounding us in order to dispel erroneous opinions in the sign of

8 

I am referring to Verde 2022b: 145ff. Letter to Pythocles is presented by Epicurus as a διαλογισμὸς σύντομος and εὐπερίγραφος (86). This careful definition frames this work as an epitome: Damiani 2021: 75ff. reconstructs the role of the epitome in the educational and communicative system of the Kepos starting from Epicurus. 10  De Sanctis 2012: 95ff. shows in this proem the tension towards a universal perspective in the intentions of Epicurus’ salvific teaching. The universal tone of Epicurus’ protreptic works is emphasized by Arrighetti 2013: 315ff. See, on this point, also Erbì 2020: 29ff. 11  Cf. Epic. Pyth. 84, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς νεωστὶ φυσιολογίας γνησίου γευομένοις καὶ τοῖς εἰς ἀσχολίας βαθυτέρας τῶν ἐγκυκλίων τινὸς  ἐμπεπλεγμένοις. In De Sanctis 2022b: 131, I translate “… e soprattutto a coloro che da poco stanno gustando la genuina scienza della natura e a coloro che sono rimasti impigliati in una delle troppo faticose occupazioni della vita quotidiana”. For the meaning of ἀσχολία, “occupation”, in this section, see Erbì 2020: 191 n. 7. 9 The

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a πλεοναχὸς τρόπος12 – but not only for this intent. Rather, in the concluding part of the proem, the clarification of the purpose that leads Epicurus to reflect on the celestial φαινόμενα occurs: the need for a peaceful life, a life not agitated by the tensions that produce fear and that are capable of arising suddenly in the face of the glow of lightning or the roar of the thunder.13 In this long methodological section that Epicurus composes following the rules of the epistolary genre, the argumentative and lexical compactness that characterizes the author’s style is not overlooked. I would like to dwell, for example, on a section of particular importance. Here Epicurus introduces the teleological function of research (85-86): Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μὴ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ μετεώρων γνώσεως εἴτε κατὰ συναφὴν

λεγομένων εἴτε αὐτοτελῶς νομίζειν εἶναι ἤπερ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν βέβαιον, καθάπερ

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. [86]  μήτε τὸ ἀδύνατον [καὶ]  παραβιάζεσθαι, μήτε ὁμοίαν κατὰ πάντα τὴν θεωρίαν ἔχειν ἢ τοῖς περὶ βίων λόγοις ἢ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν προβλημάτων κάθαρσιν […]

First, do not suppose that knowledge of celestial things, whether treated in connection with other issues or on its own, has any other goal than peace of mind and secure conviction, just as in everything else. [86] The goal is neither to be forced to accept anything impossible, nor to have a theory entirely like our accounts either of how to live or of how to resolve other problems in physics […]

In a peremptory clause – characterized by the compact succession of infinite jussives, νομίζειν … παραβιάζεσθαι … ἔχειν – Epicurus clarifies the purpose of the investigation he is about to conduct. He is now interested in the clarification proposed regarding the type of knowledge, the γνῶσις, which derives from celestial phenomena: these can be discussed both κατὰ συναφήν and αὐτοτελῶς, that is to say with very broad modalities on the theoretical level. The term συναφή, connection, is not new in Greek prose: its first appearance, as far as we can see, dates back to Aristotle who exploits its etymological potential.14 Epicurus places this technicality, with syntactic variatio, in parallel 12  See Verde 2022a: 51ff. Useful discussion of the problem is now in Masi 2022: 263ff. Corradi 2016: 217ff., identifies in the Aristotelian reflection the origin of πλεοναχὸς τρόπος. See, in this regard, also Bakker 2016: 269ff. 13  Anyone who does not admit the existence of innumerable scientific causes to motivate the φαινόμενα on the level of rationality will fall, defeated, slipping into the ridiculous and harmful coils of the myth, ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλῃ ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὂν τῷ φαινομένῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ (87). Myth here and elsewhere in Epicurus amounts to superstition: this fact therefore does not imply an absence of respect towards the gods in the Kepos. See Konstan 2011: 53ff. and Piergiacomi 2017: 119ff. 14 In De partibus animalium, for example, συναφή indicates the hinge or point of contact of the bivalves in which the liver is located (680a24), while in De spiritu the same term recalls, in union with σύγκλεισις, the connection and the closing of the bones (484b22) – even if the recent editors of the treatise accept a different lesson of the term, ἐπισυναφή, attested in a branch of the tradition, which would appear more syntactically congruent in the period. Bos, Ferwerda 2008: 157 accept in text ἐπισυναφή respect to the betrayed συναφή in the codes.

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with the adverb αὐτοτελῶς – attested for the first time in the Letter to Pythocles in reference to the τέλος in the section – to explain that the research on μετέωρα must be developed both with the identification of causes that are concomitant with each other and with the focus of a single problem. In any case, the result that follows will always be realized in the ἀταραξία and in the πίστις βέβαιος, the supporting concepts clearly underlined by an emphatic hyperbaton with respect to τέλος, the noun around which the clause is regulated.15 The συναφή, therefore, indicates here an internal cohesion of opinions and causes in phenomenal research, which finds its rhetorical expression in this letter most often in the form of a catalog of causes to organize the αἴτια of the μετέωρα. Of course, on the lexical level, the fact that συναφή is not an isolated expression or a learned recovery from Aristotle but represents a recognizable Epicurean vox also appears of particular value. It is no coincidence, for example, that at the end of the XI book Περὶ φύσεως (the cosmological-meteorological book), Epicurus employs the term again (PHerc. 1042, col. XIII 1-6 Leone).16 Similarly, another section of the XXVIII book relates to the δόξαι that do not concern actions (here Epicurus refers to those δόξαι which are not included among the empirical opinions, but belong to the theoretical side). In this passage it is argued that these will be refuted, if they are false and if the cause of their error is irrational; or because some opinion different from the theoretical one expressed on the basis of them is not true; or if it is indirectly linked to the action so as to lead to a disadvantageous action, εἰς πράξεως συνα|φήν (PHerc. 1479, fr. 13 col. IX 6-7 Sedley).17 The cases now evoked as a whole allow us to highlight that the term συναφή in Epicurus emerges in contexts that are sometimes removed from each other, ranging from meteorology to canonical.18 If we remain in the proem, the importance given to the φυσιολογία – recognized in the opening of the letter as γνήσιος φυσιολογία (85) – is not overlooked, namely, in a programmatic and very instructive reference to its semantic field. After having clarified the need to resort to the method of multiple explanations in scientific research because there are multiple causes underlying meteorology and multiple, according to the sensation, are the determinations of the phenomena themselves, Epicurus proposes a lapidary consideration that has a gnomic tone (86): οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίας φυσιολογητέον, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται.

For the study of nature must be conducted not on the basis of empty statements and stipulations but as the appearances proclaim. 15  De Sanctis 2020: 129ff. analyzes the use of the hyperbaton in the prose of Epicurus. See Giovacchini 2012: 131ff., for Epicurean τέλος in meteorological searches. 16  This new interpretation of the column derives from Leone 2020: 24ff. 17  In this case, within a strong emphasizing anacoluth – as Usener 1977 Glossarium: 745 already pointed out – with the nexus εἰς πράξεως συναφήν Epicurus indicates the logical connection of the opinions to the πρᾶξις that originates from them. See Sedley 1973: 66ff. 18  For Arrighetti 19732: 221, the term συναφή serves to “porre fra due elementi uno stretto e conseguente rapporto di interdipendenza”.

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To those who look at these lines of the letter taken out of context, the typical trend of the γνώμη is immediately clear, as I said.19 It is not difficult to hypothesize, in fact, that the practices through which the Εpicurean gnomic corpora are formed also depend very much on the style of the author who employs the mechanical selection of single sequences in which, as in a flash, a universal teaching is condensed and fixed in one or more periods. In line with what we are observing, primarily the syntactic variatio is evident between the link κατὰ ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίας and the proposition ὡς τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται, a parallelism that is repeated in the subsequent period, οὐ γὰρ ἤδη ἀλογίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἔχει χρείαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀθορύβως ἡμᾶς ζῆν, between the genitive κενῆς δόξης and the infinitive structure τοῦ ἀθορύβως ἡμᾶς ζῆν, referring to the central concept of χρεία. Both κατὰ ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίας and ὡς τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται, moreover, are governed by the verbal adjective φυσιολογητέον, the crux of the argumentation regarding the science of phenomena: the science of nature cannot be conducted in the axiomatic light of doctrinal impositions but on the basis of phenomenal evidence that always accords with sensation.20 Beyond the polemic that most likely animates this section, it should be noted that Epicurus at the end of the section shows the condition of those who break this precept by again resorting to the semantic field of φυσιολογία (87): ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλῃ ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὂν τῷ φαινομένῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ. 

But if someone accepts one view and rejects another that is equally compatible with the appearances, then clearly they are abandoning the study of nature entirely and descending to storytelling.

Whoever does not admit the existence of all plausible explanations – without any hierarchy within them though always valid as long as they respect a strict criterion of verisimilitude – dangerously moves away from every φυσιολόγημα, from any correct scientific statement: it is like an inability to practise a correct form of reflection and to gain solid knowledge. The φυσιολόγημα now represents a new term, a hapax legomenon with which Epicurus – in closing the methodological section in the Letter to Pythocles, through an icastical image to indicate error – intends to explain the aspects and results of the complex theory of nature, one that is opposed to the irrationality of myth. In this case also the novelty and centrality of the term 19 

Gagliarde 2011: 69-87 emphasized the lightning-fast nature of the prose present in Epicurus’ Sententiae. This is a technique intended for easily memorizing Epicurus’ teaching, as suggested by Tulli 2000: 109ff. 20  Verbal adjectives are typical of Epicurus’ style in both the major Letters and Περὶ φύσεως and Sententiae: this kind of adjective reinforces the “catechistic” message of the school: see Widmann 1935: 183ff. Well-studied is Epicurus’ interest in the semantic field of φυσιολογία in this section: rare verbal adjective φυσιολογητέον, e.g., is also attested in Sextus Empiricus Pyrrh., παραπλήσια δὲ λέγομεν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν εἰ φυσιολογητέον τῷ σκεπτικῷ (I 18, 2 Bury), and in Psellus Op., ἀρκτέον οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς πάχνης καὶ περὶ ταύτης πρῶτον φυσιολογητέον (19, 45 Dussy).

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are deliberately emphasized on the stylistic level due to an evident functional hyperbaton ἐκ παντὸς … φυσιολογήματος, which seems to give plastic emphasis to the dramatic action of ἐκπίπτειν, which is in turn accompanied in a sort of chiasmus by the mad leap into myth, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ.21

2. Defining the κόσμος The considerations relating to the terms συναφή and φυσιολόγημα show Epicurus’ ability to exploit linguistic legacies in order to adapt them to the context of a new discussion as much as to create functional novelties on the lexical level. In this sense I would like to turn my interest to a difficult section, both on the textual and on the argumentative level, in which Epicurus defines the cosmos. In this passage, the variegated whole of the φαινόμενα is articulated (88, 1033-1048): κόσμος ἐστὶ περιοχή τις οὐρανοῦ, ἄστρα τε καὶ γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα περιέχουσα,

ἀποτομὴν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ καταλήγουσα ἐν πέρατι ἢ ἀραιῷ ἢ πυκνῷ – καὶ

οὗ λυομένου, πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ σύγχυσιν λήψεται – [καὶ λήγουσαν] ἢ [ἐν] περιαγομένῳ ἢ [ἐν] στάσιν ἔχοντι, καὶ στρογγύλην ἢ τρίγωνον ἢ οἵαν δήποτε περιγραφὴν ·

A world is an enclosure in the sky enclosing stars and earth and everything appearing in it, containing a section cut off from the limitless expanse [outside it] and terminating at an outer limit either thin or thick, at the destruction of which [sc. limit] there will occur the dissolution of everything inside it. And this terminus is either revolving or stationary, and round or triangular or any other shape…

I set aside here the complex problems of the constitutio textus of these lines.22 It was pointed out that starting with this significant chapter of the letter, Epicurus tends more often to underline the crucial term where his attention is focused, by way of the studied and recognizable positio princeps of the term itself.23 Here, then, is the meaning of the didactic incipit κόσμος ἐστὶ περιοχή, typical of an ὁρισμός. In this passage, the first aspect of the κόσμος on which Epicurus intends to reflect is related to an insightful and representative definition of the term that takes shape in a real etymological study. To explain the nature of a κόσμος, Epicurus uses the substantive περιοχή, attested in classical Greek prose only in one of the προβλήματα of the corpus Aristotelicum. In that Aristotelian context, however, περιοχή indicates 21  Worth mentioning here is also the strength of the verb καταρρεῖν, which indicates the fatal fall of the ignorant, the elapsi, a free flight in a moral fault such as ignorance. See, on this point, Taub 2009: 110–111. The underlining of the preverb κατά- now has the evident flavour of an unstoppable descent, of sliding relentlessly towards the bottom of the error on a journey from which any possible anabasis does not seem to be granted. For κατά in Epicurus, see Widmann 1935: 200ff. 22  For the textual problem in this section, see De Sanctis 2022a: 115. 23  Tulli 2022: 11ff. identifies this stylistic strategy of Epicurus.

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the envelope that it guarantees to the human body in relation to sweat in front of a source of heat (870a10).24 The terminological choice of Epicurus in this chapter of the letter, therefore, can be read in clear continuity with the tradition on the lexical level, even if at the same time the author’s innovative power emerges in the creation of a technicality that is as icastic and descriptive. The underlining of the action expressed by the specific and traditional περιέχειν, however, is further emphasized by the etymological figure that Epicurus constructs with the explanation of περιοχή through the participle περιέχουσα. It is a choice that in the period marked by recognizable syntactic parallels gives rise to a series of refined assonances: from περιοχή … περιέχουσα or from ἀποτομὴν … ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου up to the sequence of participles περιέχουσα … ἔχουσα, which, reverberating through the homeoteleutus, distinguish and delimit the main functions assigned to the κόσμος itself.25 Epicurus tends to confer an indubitable technical value to terms that refer to the semantic field of περιέχειν.26 Τὸ περιέχον, in Book XXXIV (col. 19, 5 and 21, 5 Leone), for example, occurs in the sense of “surrounding environment” with regard to the doctrine of the εἴδωλα. In the Letter to Herodotus (46) and (48), ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι indicates the environment surrounding man in which the concretions ἀπαστάσεις and συστάστεις occur, effluxes and concretions of atoms; not surprisingly, a very incomplete passage of Book XI alludes to the πυκνότης of the surrounding environment, τοῦ περιέχοντος (26 col. 15, 11 Arr.2]). Finally, it seems to me important to underline also the permanence of the term περιοχή from which we started in the texts of Kepos, in reference to the cosmos in the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda. In the epitome περὶ τῶν παθῶν καὶ πράξεων of the inscription, Diogenes offers an image of powerful strength to indicate the possibility granted to all men to benefit from the advantages that come from Epicurus’ φιλοσοφία (fr. 30 ΙΙ 3-11 Smith). He recalls first that the preparation of the great inscription is due to the need to enjoy happiness everywhere, so that everyone can also stay at home to care for it. Philosophy, he says, can also be advantageous for foreigners. Yet Diogenes then corrects himself: no one on earth is foreign, because while it is visible that every division of the Earth is different among the homelands for single individuals, according to the whole complex of our universe, κατὰ δὲ | τὴν ὅλην περιοχὴν | τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου, the world and the whole Earth represent the only house from which every man

24  For the hapax legomena and language in the Aristotelian Problems, see Ferrini 2002: XVI-XX. In the cosmological-meteorological context, the semantic field to which the term περιοχή is anchored has a vast tradition. It is no coincidence, for example, that it ranges starting from Plato’s Timaeus (e.g., 31a4, 33b2) in order to define the content action exercised by the κόσμος on sensory and phenomenal reality. 25  Epicurus explains the possibility of the plurality of κόσμοι, on both a physical and logical level, already in the Letter to Herodotus (45 and 74). For the connection with this section of the Letter to Pythocles, see Warren 2004. 26  Leone 2002: 120 analyzes this semantic field in the edition of the Book 34 Περὶ φύσεως.

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can benefit.27 In this case we have an affirmation of universalizing humanism that characterizes the eudaimonistic perspective of Kepos. At the same time, on the linguistic level, the superb image offered by Diogenes – even in the initial ethical context of the inscription – seems to recall a model almost, if not to quote with unequivocal terms the theοrization of the κόσμος which, at least as far as we know, Epicurus posited in the Letter to Pythocles.

3. Primum dicta or hapax legomena? The ability to construct refined effects in the prose of the Letter to Pythocles is not isolated to this section. Many passages in this letter demonstrate Epicurus’ desire to convey a recognizable phenomenal aspect through new words, capable of evoking it in light of the action that characterizes it.28 In this regard, it is possible to identify the tendency to coin new technical words starting from a verb that was often used by the previous tradition in order to indicate, in the scientific-meteorological field, the occurrence of an action.29 Immediately after the definition of the cosmos, for example, Epicurus deepens the processes that act here. In his style of continuous argumentation, the syntactic-grammatical concatenation of the periods seems to imitate the dynamism and concatenation of atomic aggregations, as well as their continuous creation and dissolution (89): ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτοι κόσμοι εἰσὶν ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος ἔστι καταλαβεῖν, καὶ ὅτι καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος

δύναται κόσμος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ  μετακοσμίῳ, ὃ λέγομεν μεταξὺ κόσμων διάστημα, ἐν πολυκένῳ τόπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν μεγάλῳ εἰλικρινεῖ καὶ κενῷ,  καθάπερ τινές φασιν, ἐπιτηδείων τινῶν σπερμάτων ῥυέντων ἀφ’ ἑνὸς κόσμου ἢ μετακοσμίου ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ πλειόνων, κατὰ μικρὸν προσθέσεις τε καὶ διαρθρώσεις καὶ μεταστάσεις ποιούντων ἐπ’

ἄλλον τόπον, ἐὰν οὕτω τύχῃ, καὶ ἐπαρδεύσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐχόντων ἐπιτηδείως ἕως τελειώσεως καὶ διαμονῆς ἐφ’ ὅσον τὰ ὑποβληθέντα θεμέλια τὴν προσδοχὴν δύναται ποιεῖσθαι. 

Also that a world of this sort is able to come about either within a world or in an interworld, which is what we call an interval between worlds, in a region that is mostly void – but not completely void over any great area, as some claim – when suitable seeds stream together from one or more worlds or interworlds and gradually 27 

See, on this point, Smith 1993: 478–479. In Diogenes Laertius (X 13, 8), Aristophanes of Byzantium defines the style of Epicurus as very personal, κέχρηται δὲ λέξει κυρίᾳ κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἣν ὅτι ἰδιωτάτη ἐστίν. Arrighetti 2010: 21–22 showed that the next κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων indicates the correspondence of the Epicurus’ language with the reality that it recalls. See, on this point, also Milanese 1989: 45ff. 29  In recent decades there have been numerous studies dealing with hapax legomena in Epicurus and in the Kepos. In this regard, see Acosta Méndez 1995: 279ff. Interesting recent observations on hapax legomena in Philodemus’ works, e.g., are in Longo Auricchio 2009: 103ff.; De Sanctis 2010: 199ff.; Indelli, Longo Auricchio 2020: 119-132; and IID. 2021: 93ff. 28 

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produce accumulations, articulations, and transpositions, as it so happens, and also a continuing influx from things in suitable conditions, until it reaches full development and permanence to the extent its underlying foundations are able to attain.

After having demonstrated the logical necessity of postulating infinite κόσμοι, as well as the existence of metacosmia, the διαστήματα that are created between cosmos and cosmos, Epicurus describes the formation of these κόσμοι in relation to the movements of the σπέρματα.30 Beyond the recognizable debt of this page with the περὶ φύσεως, I believe that it is equally significant to observe the set of terms used by Epicurus with which not every direction or atomic action is referred to. The movements of suitable σπέρματα, in fact, occur in precise spaces in which both προσθέσεις, additions – both διαρθρώσεις, connections, and μεταστάσεις, displacements – are produced, little by little, on the basis of a principle of randomness, as well as ἐπαρδεύσεις, scents, deriving from bodies suitable for this function that contribute to achieving fulfillment and stability of the process so that each addition does not damage the foundations of the cosmic system at its bases and does not compromise its formation and maintenance.31 The terms that Epicurus inserts in a catalog of actions, typical of scientific language, here concur to specify minimal but significant actions and movements with a precision that can sometimes appear almost obsessive, though so as to ensure a capillary exhaustiveness with respect to which not one can arise on its own.32 Ἐπάρδευσις, for example, represents an Epicurean coinage of particular charm. Modeled on the technical verb, born in the koinè, ἐπαρδεύω–ἐπάρδω, the noun ἐπάρδευσις usually indicates a watery downpour which in the meteorological field is equivalent to a rain shower. This concrete and etymological meaning is attested in another passage of the Letter to Pythocles (100) in relation to the winds that can develop by emanations from suitable places or by the movement of air, though also if a too violent downpour occurs from agglomerations capable of causing these emissions. The actual meaning of downpour becomes more nuanced in the section relating to the cosmos: here it is not a simple aqueous precipitation but an atomic effluvium with which Epicurus seems to indicate the agile, almost liquid movement of the atoms that disperse and travel in infinity. In this case, ἐπάρδευσις would represent a characteristic Epicurean hapax legomenon.33

30 

See Verde 2022b: 153ff. See, for cosmogony and infinity of worlds, Leone 2012: 53ff. Morel 2009: 40ff. examines atomic properties. 32  Leone 2015: 159ff. offers an important examination of this plasticity of Epicurus’ prose. 33  See Usener 1977 Glossarium: 268. 31 

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In this respect one can also observe πρόσλαμψις, a noun with which Epicurus introduces one cause of rainbow formation (109): Ἶρις γίνεται κατὰ πρόσλαμψιν [ὑπὸ] τοῦ ἡλίου πρὸς ἀέρα ὑδατοειδῆ, ἢ κατὰ πρόσφυσιν ἰδίαν τοῦ τε φωτὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος, ἣ τὰ τῶν χρωμάτων τούτων ἰδιώματα ποιήσει εἴτε

πάντα εἴτε μονοειδῶς, ἀφ’ οὗ πάλιν ἀπολάμποντος τὰ ὁμοροῦντα τοῦ ἀέρος χρῶσιν

ταύτην λήψεται, οἵαν θεωροῦμεν, κατὰ πρόσλαμψιν πρὸς τὰ μέρη. τὸ δὲ τῆς περιφερείας τοῦτο φάντασμα γίνεται διὰ τὸ τὸ διάστημα πάντοθεν ἴσον ὑπὸ τῆς ὄψεως θεωρεῖσθαι,

ἢ σύνωσιν τοιαύτην λαμβανουσῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τόμων ἢ ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ

αὐτοῦ ἀέρος [προσφερομένου πρὸς τὴν σελήνην] ἀποφερομένων [ἀτόμων] περιφέρειάν τινα καθίεσθαι τὴν σύγκρισιν ταύτην.

Rainbows come about by the sun shining on watery air; or by a distinctive synthesis of light and air, which will produce the distinctive characteristics of those colors, either all of them or one uniformly; when it then shines back, the regions adjacent to the air will in turn acquire the observed sort of coloring from the light shining on their parts. [110] Its apparent curvature comes about because it is observed by our sight at an equal distance from all its parts; either when the atoms in the air are compressed in that way, or when atoms in the clouds are carried away from the same air, this accretion projects a certain curvature.

For the birth of the rainbow, Epicurus introduces two main causes: the first is the πρόσλαμψις τοῦ ἡλίου πρὸς ἀέρα ὑδαταειδῆ, namely, the reflection of light exerted by the sun on the moist air; the second is concentrated in the πρόσφυσις ἰδία τοῦ τε φωτὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος, namely, in a conjunction of sun and air that gives rise at particular junctures to the coloring of the rainbow.34 In other words, at the basis of this discussion, as is evident, are two fundamental aspects in the formation of the phenomenon: the light of the sun and the humidity of the air, causes that in the section of the celestial phenomena presented in the letter are evoked with frequent tendency.35 A second problem investigated in the letter is then related to the shape of the rainbow, owing to the vision from the Earth of this phenomenon or to the effect of the pressure that is exerted by atoms on the air. So, for Epicurus, at the base of the rainbow we identify either a πρόσφυσις or a πρόσλαμψις. While πρόσφυσις, attachment or point of attachment, is part of the technical language of Aristotle (GA 745b24 and IA 710a4) and Theophrastus (HP III 16, 4), πρόσλαμψις, shining on, seems to be an Epicurean primum dictum.36 34  In this section of Letter to Pythocles I read κατὰ πρόσλαμψιν τοῦ ἡλίου instead of the betrayed κατὰ πρόσλαμψιν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου in and I consider προσφερομένου πρὸς τὴν σελήνην and ἀτόμων as glossae.

See, on this regard, De Sanctis 2022a: 117. 35  A detailed analysis of the same phenomenon is outlined by Aristotle in Meteorologica (III 2-6). See Merker, 2003: 317ff. and Wilson 2013: 236ff. 36  Crucial observations on the technical terminology of the rainbow in Greek meteorological reflection are in Verde 2018: 383ff. This noun πρόσλαμψις, which is built on the verb προσλάμπω, is attested in other texts subsequent to Epicurus, always in connection with the sun. See, e.g., for use

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Similar considerations can also be developed within a group of nouns representative of this icastical style in the codification of meteorological phenomena we can place in the category of hapax legomena or primum dicta: I refer, for example, to: a) πρόσκρισις, accretion, increase or growth by assimilation (90 and 109); b) συγκύρησις, concurrence or coincidence (96 and 98); c) προσθήτεσις, interposition or occultation (94). These terms are innovative and representative of specific μετέωρα. In the Letter to Pythocles, for example, προσθέτησις appears as a “lunar” term, related only to the treatment of σελήνη, attested only here, coined from the verb προστίθημαι, which Epicurus frequently uses in περὶ φύσεως.37 We find the first occurrence of the term in relation to the section devoted to the phases of the moon (94): κενώσεις τε σελήνης καὶ πάλιν πληρώσεις καὶ κατὰ στροφὴν τοῦ σώματος τούτου

δύναιντ’ ἂν γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ σχηματισμοὺς ἀέρος ὁμοίως, ἔτι τε καὶ κατὰ προσθετήσεις καὶ κατὰ πάντας τρόπους, καθ’ οὓς καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται εἰς τὰς τούτου τοῦ εἴδους ἀποδόσεις …

waning of the moon and again its waxing would be able to come about both by its own body turning round, and similarly by configurations of air, and yet again by interpositions, and in all the ways the appearances around us proclaim for producing this visible shape…

Inserted as the third house of the phases of the moon, the προσθετήσεις here seem to be a kind of occultation of the image that occurs for those who observe the satellite from the Earth. This concealment is evidently due to the presence of particular configurations that the air takes on and that are in the way in front of the moon. It is not surprising that Epicurus consistently plays, so to speak, with this noun always about the moon, perhaps because it seems to be suitable to express visually the behavior of this astral body in the sky, including its aspects that most attract the interest of man when he observes it from the Earth. Not surprisingly, in the next section, devoted to the ἔμφασις of the moon, Epicurus imputes its changing appearance either to παραλλαγή, the diversity of its parts, or to the interposition of another astral body in front of the moon itself. In this case the partial concealment of the face of the moon is indicated by a compound ἐπιπροσθέτησις which strengthens and specifies the technical term of departure.38 of same word Claud. Ptol. Synt., ἡλιακὴ προσλάψις (I 1, 267, 14), Theon Math. Comm, ταῖς τοῦ ἡλίου προσλάμψεσι (956.10), and Papp. Synag., τῆς προσλάμψεως ἡλίου (VI 554, 26). 37  See Usener 1977 Glossarium: 587. 38  Beyond Epicurus, ἐπιπροσθέτησις is attested also in Definitiones of Heron of Alexandria, τούτων δ’ αἱ μὲν ἀκριβέστεραι διὰ τῶν ἀκτίνων τοῦ ἡλίου λαμβάνονται ἢ δι’ ὀπτήρων ἢ τῶν ἐπιπροσθετήσεων ἐκλαμβανόμεναι (135, 8, 15-17, Vol. IV Heiberg). Acerbi, Vitrac 2014: 59ff., analyze Heron’s scientific language, which appears rich in hapax legomena.

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Conclusion I am aware of having offered only a partial picture of the richness that distinguishes the language of Epicurus in the Letter to Pythocles, a richness which I hope can also be understood, however, as an unquestionable proof of the validity and importance of Epicurus in the field of scientific prose and, in general, of Hellenistic prose. The continuous dialogue of Epicurus with the texts of reference, with the authors who preceded him, represents the best test to understand the rationalistic experimentalism that transpires in the language and in the pages of the letter, as a result of continuous links and an interest always supported by the inescapable need of expression in the exact investigation of celestial phenomena: in this aspect, too, I believe the fascination for this text and, above all, its value consist.

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Sulla natura di Epicuro (PHerc. 1431), Naples: Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi “Marcello Gigante”, 121–134. De Sanctis, D., 2022a, “Nota critica”, in F. Verde (ed.), Epicuro. Epistola a Pitocle, In collaborazione con M. Tulli, D. De Sanctis, F. G. Masi, Baden Baden: Academia, 109–124. De Sanctis, D., 2022b, “Testo e traduzione”, in F. Verde (ed.), Epicuro. Epistola a Pitocle, In collaborazione con M. Tulli, D. De Sanctis, F.G. Masi, Baden Baden: Academia, 127–144. Delattre, D., 2004, “Un modèle magistral d’écriture didactique: la Lettre à Hérodote d’Epicure”, in S. Cerasuolo (ed.), Mathesis e Mneme: Studi in memoria di Marcello Gigante, Vol. I, Naples: Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II, 149–169. Dorandi, T., 2013, Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Erbì, M., 2020, Epicuro, Lettere: Frammenti e testimonianze, Pisa–Rome: Serra. Erler, M., 2011, “Autodidact and Student: on the Relationship of Authority and Autonomy” in J. Fish–K. R. Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 9–28. Ferrini, M. F., 2002, Aristotele. I Problemi, Milan: Bompiani. Gagliarde, G., 2011, “L’Epicuro breve”, Appunti Romani di Filologia 13: 69–87. Giovacchini, J., 2012, L’Empirisme d’Épicure, Paris: Classiques Garnier. Heßler, J. E., 2014, Epikur Brief an Menoikeus. Edition, Übersetzung, Einleitung und Kommentar, Basel: Schwabe. Indelli, G.,–Longo Auricchio, F., 2020, “Hapax legomena in Filodemo”, Cronache Ercolanesi 50: 119–132. Indelli, G.,–Longo Auricchio, F., 2021, “Hapax legomena in Filodemo (2)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 51: 93–107. Konstan, D., 2011, “Epicurus on the Gods”, in J. Fish–K. R. Sander (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 53–71. Lapini, W., 2015, “Philological Observations and Approaches to Language in the Philosophical Context”, in F. Montanari–F. Matthaios–A. Rengakos (eds.), Brill’s Companion to Ancient Scholarship, Leiden–Boston: Brill, 1012–1056. Leone, G., 2000, “Epicuro fondatore del Giardino e l’opera sua conservata nei papiri”, Cronache Ercolanesi 30: 21-27. Leone, G., 2002, “Epicuro, Della natura, libro XXXIV (PHerc. 1431)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 32: 7–135. Leone, G., 2012, Epicuro. Sulla natura. Libro 2, Naples: Bibliopolis. Leone. G., 2015, “Epicuro e la forza dei venti”, in D. De Sanctis–E. Spinelli–M. Tulli–F. Verde (eds.), Questioni epicuree, Academia Sankt: Augustin Verlag, 159–177. Leone, G., 2020, “«Connessioni» scorrette e «connessioni» insospettate nell’XI libro Sulla natura di Epicuro”, Cronache Ercolanesi 20: 15–26. Longo Auricchio, F., 2009, “Su alcuni ἅπαξ nella Retorica di Filodemo”, Cronache Ercolanesi 39: 103–106. Mansfeld, J., 1994, “Epicurus Peripateticus”, in A. Alberti (ed.), Realtà e ragione: Studi di filosofia antica, Florence: Olschki: 29–47 [rist. in D.T. Runia (ed.), 2010, Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, Leiden–Boston: Brill, 237–254].

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Masi, F. G., 2022, “L’indeterminatezza ontologica dei meteora”, in F. Verde (ed.), Epicuro. Epistola a Pitocle, In collaborazione con M. Tulli, D. De Sanctis, F. G. Masi, Baden Baden: Academia, 259–276. McOsker, M., 2017, “Hiatus in Epicurean Authors”, Cronache Ercolanesi 47: 145-162. Merker, A., 2003, “La théorie de l’arc-en-ciel dans les Météorologiques d’Aristote (3,2–5)”, in C. Cusset (ed.), La météorologie dans l’antiquité: entre science et croyance, Saint-Étienne: Publications de l’Université de Saint-Étienne, 317–330. Morel, P.–M., 2009, Épicure. La nature et la raison, Paris: Vrin. Norden, E., 19183, Die antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance, I, Leipzig–Berlin: Teubner [Ital. transl. Rome: Salerno Editrice, 1986]. Piergiacomi, E., 2017, Storia delle antiche teologie atomiste, Rome: Sapienza Università Editrice. Sedley, D., 1973, “Epicurus On Nature Book XXVIII”, Cronache Ercolanesi 3: 5–83. Smith, M. F., 1993, The Epicurean Inscription, Naples: Bibliopolis. Taub, L., 2009, “Cosmology and Meteorology”, in J. Warren (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 105–124. Taub, L., 2018, “Science after Aristotle: Hellenistic and Roman Science”, in A. Jones–L. Taub (eds.), The Cambridge History of Science, Volume I: Ancient Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 248–277. Tulli, M., 2000, “L’epitome di Epicuro e la trasmissione del sapere”, in M. Erler (ed.), Epikureismus in der späten Republik und der Kaiserzeit, Stuttgart: Steiner, 109–121. Tulli, M., 2022, “L’epitome per la conquista della serenità: la forma e lo stile delle pagine a Pitocle”, in F. Verde (ed.), Epicuro. Epistola a Pitocle, In collaborazione con M. Tulli, D. De Sanctis, F. G. Masi, Baden Baden: Academia, 11–26. Usener, H., Glossarium 1977, Glossarium Epicureum, edendum curaverunt M. Gigante et W. Schmid, Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo & Bizzarri. Verde, F., 2010, Commento, in F. Verde (ed.), Epicuro: Epistola a Erodoto, Introd. di E. Spinelli, Rome: Carocci, 65–230. Verde, F., 2018, “L’iride e la Trinità: Osservazioni sulle fonti di Basil. Epistula 38,5”, Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 22: 383–399. Verde, F., 2022a, “Commentario: La realtà del possibile”, in F. Verde (ed.), Epicuro. Epistola a Pitocle, In collaborazione con M. Tulli, D. De Sanctis, F. G. Masi, Baden Baden: Academia, 145–258. Verde, F., 2022b, “La meteorologia epicurea”, in F. Verde (ed.), Epicuro. Epistola a Pitocle, In collaborazione con M. Tulli, D. De Sanctis, F. G. Masi, Baden Baden: Academia, 27–108. Warren, J., 2004, “Ancient Atomists on the Plurality of Worlds”, Classical Quarterly 54: 354–65. Widmann, H., 1935, Beiträge zur Syntax Epikurs, Stuttgart–Berlin: W. Kohlhammer. Wilson, M., 2013, Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica: A More Disorderly Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Fragments of Epicurus’ Letters: Scientific Debates and New Perspectives Margherita Erbì Within the epistolary of Epicurus, critics usually distinguish the so-called private or personal letters, transmitted in fragments, from the three doctrinal ones, the Epistula ad Herodotum, the Epistula ad Pythoclem, and the Epistula ad Menoeceum, which we know thanks to Diogenes Laertius.1 These three letters summarize Epicurus’ teachings and represent the sum of his investigation on physics, celestial phenomena, and ethics.2 Epicurus himself explains and clarifies the details of his philosophy and claims the usefulness of these letters for the broader public. The methodological details included in the three letters reveal Epicurus’ full awareness of determining, with an obviously protreptic aim, what is essential for everyone to know and to memorize in order to achieve a happy life and the salvation of the soul.3 In the letters to Herodotus, Pythocles and Menoeceus, Epicurus renews his continuous dialogue with his φίλοι, exhorting and guiding them through their continuous philosophical research, from physics to ethics.4 Therefore, to those who showed 1  Unlike the three doctrinal letters that are reported completely, Diogenes Laertius (X 4–8; 11; 13–4; 22) offers only excerpta of the other letters that are intertwined with Epicurus’s biography; see Gigante 1986: 93ff. A distinction between Epicurus’ letters is already offered by Luc. Laps. 6 who identifies ‘the three most elaborate letter epitomes’ (ϲπουδαιοτέραι ἐπιϲτολαί) and the other ‘letters sent to dear friends’ (πρὸϲ πρὸϲ τοὺϲ φιλτάτουϲφιλτάτουϲ). Usener 1887: LIV–LV associates these letters to the genre ad familiares and distinguishes between ‘doctrinal letters’, those extant in their entirety, and ‘ordinary letters’ and ‘daily letters’, those now extant in fragments, which Diogenes Laertius would have found in anthologies; see Militello 1997: 66ff. He cautiously offers a reflection on the distinction between ‘epistles’ (litterae pubblicae) and ‘letters’ (litterae privatae) in relation to the production of Epicurus; see Spinelli 2012: 147ff. starting from Deissmann 19234: 116 ff.; also see Stowers 1986: 17ff. 2  On the importance of the compendium as a literary genre for Epicurus in teaching and dissemination of knowledge, Angeli 1988: 37ff. remains fundamental; see also Leone 2000: 21ff. Tulli 2000: 109ff dedicates his contribution to Epicurus’ practice of transmitting knowledge in epitomes. The letter with its direct appeal to the addressee allows Epicurus to insert a brief, though comprehensive, synthesis of his philosophical principles into the framework of the daily personal exchange between teacher and disciple; see De Sanctis 2011: 217ff; Spinelli 2010: 9ff; Arrighetti 2013. For general remarks on the letter as a kind of Kompendienliteratur, see Untersteiner 1980: 87ff. Evidence of the same practice can also be seen in Epicurus’ efforts to summarize his thought in maxims; see Gagliarde 2011: 69ff. For an overview of the production and use of summaries in the Kepos, see Damiani 2016: 259–260. On the forms and functions on Epicurus’ Kompendienliteratur, see Damiani 2021: 75ff. 3  Epicurus’ effort to integrate the contents of the three letters into the framework of a personal conversation shows his intention to underline the importance of his message and the protreptic purpose of his communication; see recently Heßler 2018: 161ff. On the Epistula ad Menoeceum as protreptic, see Heßler 2014: 40ff. 4  According to Campos Daroca–De La Paz Lòpez Martinez 2010: 21ff, the practice of letter communication in the Kepos responded well to the needs of that geographically dispersed community; also see Clay 2009: 18ff. A consequence of the profoundly ecumenical nature of Epicurus’ message is the dissemination of his portraiture, the function of which has been well explained by Frischer 1982: 87ff. as proselytism.

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themselves willing to adhere to his philosophy, Epicurus offered his salvific words, to be used by the reader whenever necessary; the three letters must have been received by all his φίλοι as authoritative texts worthy of being followed and trusted because of their contents’ broad validity and their apparent guarantee of success. Fragments and testimonies of the so-called private letters show a more different situation. From a first glance, it is evident that Epicurus offers assistance in these letters to the φίλοι deprived of the ϲυνουϲία with the teacher, giving essential indications for putting the principles of ethics into practice and pointing to the best behaviour in school life. These fragments are indispensable in reconstructing the thought of Epicurus: they concern in particular traditional education, the commitment of the wise man to political life, the respect of oaths, religious festivals, Epicurus’ veneration by the φίλοι, wealth and poverty, frugality, pleasure, fame, the usefulness of friendship, old age, disease, pain, and death. The relationship between the contents of these letters and the teachings contained in the Epistula ad Menoeceum is evident: in the Epistula ad Menoeceum, Epicurus expounds the principles of Epicurean ethics, while in the private letters come down to us in fragments Epicurus offers personalized teachings to live happiness day after day. Regarding the contents of these fragments, I think it is necessary to consider whether and how Epicurus also employed the so-called private letters for the transmission of knowledge on physics and the canon and to involve the far away φίλοι in the scientific debate developed in the school. This question can be addressed thanks to the fact that we know more fragments and testimonies than in the past: there are 121 passages in the section Ἐπιϲτολαί of Hermann Usener’s Epicurea, while 97 fragments are found in Graziano Arrighetti’s Epicurus, to which he offers text, translation, and commentary. Overall, the number of fragments and testimonies that we now attribute to 146 letters are 2045. It is well known that the letters to Herodotus and to Pytocles are the canonical texts where every Epicurean could find, summarized and easily available, the scientific foundations of the Epicurean doctrine, indispensable for participating actively in the scientific debate developed in the Kepos.6 Epicurus, though, dealt with aspects of his scientific thought not only in these two letters, as these few but precious fragments and testimonies of the so-called private letters prove. Inside the epistolary of Epicurus, for example, are also preserved: two fragments, probably from the letter to his mother, containing an explanation on φανταϲίαι; a fragment 5  Usener 1887: 131ff., Arrighetti 19732: 421ff. The fragments and testimonies of the so–called private letters were recently collected in Erbì 2020. The increase in the number of fragments has been possible mainly thanks to the accessions received from the papyri that have revealed steps sometimes unknown, certainly improved with militant commitment through innovative methods of reading. In the present paper, the fragments and the testimonies will be cited with the number they have in this edition. 6  Cf. On Epicurus’ scientific doctrines see at least Asmis 1984: 227ff. and Verde 2013a: 43ff.

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quoted by Plutarch (Non posse 1105D 10-E 7) in relation to εἴδωλα and φαντάϲματα; fragments concerning the relations between the Kepos of Lampsacus and the school of Eudoxus at Cyzicus; a fragment about the canon and mathematics preserved by POxy 5077; and also the testimony of a letter sent with a διαλογιϲμόϲ on φαινόμενα not perceivable by the senses.

1. The φανταϲίαι in the Letter to His Mother (50 F1-F2) Ιn the Letter to His Mother (50 F1-F2)7, after an accurate explanation about the

images of distant people, Epicurus develops a series of ethical considerations and then reviews, albeit quickly, the fundamental precepts of Epicurean philosophy: divine bliss, death, and self-sufficiency of the sage.8 In these fragments, Epicurus follows the same path from physics to ethics. The first, an indispensable premise for the second, is also proposed in the letters to Herodotus and Pythocles. 50 F1 I - - - δεῖ ϲε πε]ρ̣ὶ αὐτῶν ἀκρειβῆ τε καὶ] π̣ιϲτὴν ϲκέψιν ποιεῖϲθαι]. αἱ μὲν γὰρ φανταϲίαι] τ̣ῶν ἀπόντων ἀπὸ τῆϲ ὄψε]ωϲ ἐπι- 5 οῦϲαι τῇ ψυχῇ] τ̣ὸν μέγιϲτον τάραχο]ν παρέχουϲιν. ἂν δὲ τὸ ὅ]λ̣ον πρᾶγμα ἀκρειβῶ]ϲ̣ διαθεᾷ, μαθήϲει ὅτι ἄν]τ̣ικρυϲ 10 II ε̣ἰ ̣ϲι το̣ιαῦται καὶ μὴ

παρόντων οἷαι καὶ πα-

ρόντ̣ων.v ἁπταὶ γὰρ οὐκ οὖ̣ϲαι, διανοηταὶ δέ,

τὴν̣ αὐτήν, ὅϲον ἐφ’ ἑαυ- 5 7 

72 Arrighetti. The fragments came down to us carved into the monumental inscription of Oinoanda: cf. Diog. Oen., Frr. 125–126 Smith. The terms of the debate developed by criticism on the authenticity of the letter are discussed in Erbì 2020: 165–166. Here, however, I would at least like to stress that the personal tone of the letter, the absence of a reason for its sending, the contacts between the text of the letter and the production of Epicurus suggest for our letter a high dating and, therefore, support the hypothesis of the attribution of the letter to Epicurus. Yet even if the letter was a product of Kepos – perhaps the outcome, as part of the criticism argues, of an adaptation of one of the master’s writings – it remains a relevant text in the Epicurean community. For this text, in fact, it cannot be ruled out as being, if not a derivation from a letter of Epicurus, then at least the revival of an exemplary writing diffused in the Kepos. 8 

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Margherita Erbì τα[ῖ]ϲ, ἔχουϲι δύναμιν

πρὸ̣ϲ τοὺϲ παρόνταϲ τῇ ὅτε καὶ παρόντων ἐκεί ̣ν̣ων ὑφειϲτήκε-

ϲαν.v π̣ρὸϲ οὖν ταῦτα, 10

III

ὦ μῆτερ, [θάρρει· μ]ὴ̣

γὰρ ἐπιλ[ογίϲῃ τ]ὰ̣ φά-

ζματα ἡμ[ῶν κακά]. τ̣ί-

θει δ’ αὐτ[ὰ ὁρῶϲα] κα-

θ’ ἡμέρα[ν ἀγαθ]όν τι 5 ἡμᾶϲ π[ροϲκ]τ̣ωμέ-

νουϲ εἰϲ [τὸ μακρ]οτέ-

ρω τῆϲ ε[ὐδαιμ]‹ο›νίαϲ

προβαίν[ειν. ο]ὐ̣ γὰρ μει-

κρὰ οὐδέ[ν τ’ ἀνύ]τ̣οντα 10

IV

περιγείνεται ἡ[μ]ε̣ῖ ̣ν̣

τάδ’ οἷα τὴν διάθ̣εσ ̣ ̣ιν̣ ἡμῶν ἰϲόθεον ποιεῖ

καὶ οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν θνη-

τότητα τῆϲ ἀφθάρτου 5 καὶ μακαρίαϲ φύϲεωϲ λειπομένουϲ ἡμᾶϲ

δείκνυϲιν.v ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ζῶμεν, ὁμοίωϲ

τοῖϲ θεοῖϲ χαίρο̣μ̣εν 10

50 F2 I λυ||π]ή̣ϲ[ετα]ι ̣ τὴν ἴϲη̣[ν, ἄν [γ’] ἀ̣ντιλάβηται τῆϲ ἐλαττώϲεωϲ· ἂν μὴ

αἰϲθάνηται δέ, πῶϲ

ἐλαττοῦται;vμετὰ 5 δὴ τοιούτων ἡμᾶϲ ἀγαθῶν προδόκα, μῆ-

τερ, χαίρονταϲ αἰεὶ καὶ ἔπαιρε ϲεαυτὴν ἐφ’ οἷϲ

π̣ράττομεν.v τῶν 10

II μ̣[έν]τ̣οι χορηγιῶν φείδου, πρὸϲ Διόϲ, ὧν ϲυνεχῶϲ ἡμεῖν ἀποϲτέλλειϲ.v οὐ

γὰρ ϲοί τι βούλομαι 5

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85

λείπειν, ἵν’ ἐμοὶ περιττεύῃ, λείπειν δ’ ἐ-

μοὶ μᾶλλον, ἵνα μὴ

ϲοί, καίτοι γε ἀφθό̣-

νωϲ κἀμοῦ διάγ[ον- 10

III

τοϲ ἐν πᾶϲιν, δι ̣ὰ̣ τ̣[οὺϲ

φίλουϲ καὶ τὸ ϲυνεχῶ[ϲ τὸν πατέρα ἡμεῖν πέμ-

πειν ἀργύριον,v προϲφά-

τωϲ δὲ δὴ καὶ διὰ τοῦ Κλέ- 5 ωνοϲ τὰϲ ἐννέα μνᾶϲ

ἀπεϲταλκότοϲ. οὔκουν

ἑκάτερον ὑμῶν ἰδίᾳ δεῖ

βαρεῖϲθαι δι’ ἡμᾶϲ, ϲυν- 10 χρῆϲθαι δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τ̣ὸν ̣ || ἕτερον]

[… you must carry out a careful and] sure [inquiry] into them. [For when images] of persons who are far away [from our sight invade our mind, they cause the greatest disturbance. But if you examine the whole matter carefully, you will learn that] the images of persons who are not present are of precisely the same kind as those of persons who are present. For although the images are perceived not by the senses, but by the mind, they have the same power, as far as in them lies, for persons who are present as when they existed with those other persons present also. Therefore, with regard to these matters, mother, [be of good heart: do not reckon] the visions [of us to be bad]; rather, [when you see them], think of us daily [acquiring] something [good] and advancing [further in happiness]. For not small [or ineffectual] are these gains for us which make our disposition godlike and show that not even our morality makes us inferior to imperishable and blessed nature; for when we are alive, we are as joyful as the gods, [knowing that death is nothing to us; and when we are dead, we are without sensation …] [Some fear death because it involves loss of the good things of life. But this fear is vain: each man, when he has been deprived of good things, will be] equally [distressed if] he perceives his loss; but if he does not perceive it, how does he suffer loss? Think of us then, mother, as always joyful in the midst of such good things and show enthusiasm for what we are doing. But in heaven’s name, do not be so generous with the contributions which you are constantly sending us. For I do not want you to go without anything so that I may have more than enough; I should rather go without anything so that you may not, although in fact I am living in plenty in all respects, because of our friends and because of father constantly sending us money, and recently also through Cleon sending nine minas. Therefore, neither of you should be distressed individually on our account, but you should make use of one another. (trans. by M.F. Smith)

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Epicurus addresses his mother and describes himself as a young man who consciously follows the path to happiness, gaining, day after day, a divine διάθεϲιϲ, a guarantee of bliss and incorruptibility. The profile of the recipient, a mother concerned for the fate of her son, the comforting tone, the sincere exhortations to be happy for his successes, the affectionate interest in the economic condition of parents, helps to personalize the message of the letter and, at the same time, to make it valid for all.9 Not only does Epicurus reassure his mother in these fragments that the path of research he has undertaken leads to a blessed existence without perturbations, despite death, but he is able to comfort anyone who, still deceived by false beliefs, doubts the feasibility of the Epicurean ideal life. The protreptic aim of the letter is clear: the exhortation to bliss, which is achievable through investigation, is explicit.10 Although the text of the first column is the result of additions, it nevertheless suggests the general meaning: the mother is urged to examine very carefully the whole issue in order to eliminate any cause of worries and perturbations.11 It is plausible that Epicurus already considered at I (3-8) the visions (φανταϲίαι) of those who are far from sight: these visions provoke the greatest turmoil in the soul of those who perceive them.12 The nature of these visions and the effects they produce are the subjects of reflection developed in the following columns. The description proposed by Epicurus, based on the principle of analogy, is precise and rigorous. The images that we perceive of an absent person are exactly of the same type as the images that we perceive of a present person (ε̣ἰ ̣ϲι το̣ιαῦται καὶ μὴ παρόντων οἷαι καὶ παρόντ̣ων). Although these images are not perceptible through the senses (ἁπταὶ γὰρ οὐκ οὖϲαι) but only through the mind (διανοηταὶ), they have the same power over those to whom they appear as the images of the present person. This is the meaning of the sequence of lines 5-10 of the second column: τὴν̣ αὐτήν, ὅϲον ἐφ’ ἑαυτα[ῖ]ϲ, ἔχουϲι δύναμιν πρὸ̣ϲ τοὺϲ παρόνταϲ τῇ ὅτε καὶ παρόντων ἐκεί ̣ν̣ων ὑφειϲτήκεϲαν. Such a sequence, which is improved by the negation (7), presents 9 

For a wider analysis of the two fragments, see Erbì 2020: 160ff. Stowers 1986: 114ff., examines this letter in the chapter «Protreptic letters (exhortation to a way of life)». Cf. Heßler 2018: 172–173. 11  On the significance of ἀκρίβεια as “scientific and exact knowledge” in the production of Epicurus, the contribution of Angeli 1985: 63ff. is fundamental. About Epicurus’ scientific method, cf. Asmis 1984: 9ff. 12  The physical phenomenon of visions is known to us from Diog. Oen. Frr. 9–10; 43 Smith that offers a valuable testimony of the Epicurean interpretation of dreams as εἴδωλα. On Diogenes of Oenoanda’s testimony on φάϲματα, Clay 1998: 215ff. is still fundamental; see also Hammerstaedt 2006 (= 2014: 225ff.). Cf. also Güremen 2017: 187ff. Epicurus discussed φάϲματα or φαντάϲματα in On Nature, mainly in the thirty-fourth book; see Leone 2002; Leone 2012: 68ff.; Arrighetti 2013: 326–327; Damiani 2021: 287ff. On Epicurus’ summary of this theory in Hrdt. 49–52, see Verde 2010: 107ff. Lucretius, too, is emphatic about the formation of images in the context of dreams (Lucret. IV 92–103; 722–993); see Sedley 1998: 148ff. A reflection on the Epicurean theory of simulacra as it emerges from the writings of Lucretius and Diogenes is offered by Gigandet 2017. 10 

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the same scheme of the previous period and proposes, thanks to the choice of the same lexicon, the analogy between the effect that arouses the view of the people present (οἱ παρόντεϲ) and the effect that arouses the view of people not present (οἱ μή παρόντεϲ).13 Here, Epicurus intends to eliminate, through the illustration of the phenomenon with scientific rigour, the disturbance caused by these visions. The explanation that Epicurus offers of the images of distant or deceased people that appear in dreams finds its foundation in the theory of εἴδωλα. Immediately after this reflection, Epicurus (II 10-III 10) renews the invitation to his mother to be courageous and not to consider the visions evil. Such visions, in fact, are rather a sign of progress towards happiness. Then Epicurus (III 10-IV 8) gives an explanation: achievements in the daily investigation of the phenomena of nature allow the sage to make his own intimate disposition (διάθεϲιϲ) like the divine one (ἰϲόθεοϲ), therefore incorruptible and blessed (ἡ ἄφθαρτοϲ καὶ μακαρία φύϲιϲ). The positive results of this philosophical research shows that, despite our mortal condition, we are not inferior to the immortal and blessed nature of the gods. A spatium vacuum (IV 8) indicates a fundamental moment in Epicurus’ reflection: during his life, the sage enjoys a happiness equal to that of the gods (ὅτε μὲν | γὰρ ζῶμεν, ὁμοίωϲ | τοῖϲ θεοῖϲ χαίρο̣µ ̣εν). Epicurus declares how this is possible in the Epistle to Menoeceus (125): man achieves happiness not through an infinite life but through the absence of the desire for immortality. After a gap of at least one column, of which only a few letters remain, at the beginning of col. 52 F2 (I 1-5), we read a reference to what men lose with death.14 The echos between our text and the reflection on death developed by Epicurus in the Epistle to Menoeceus (124-125) are clear: every good and every evil are in the senses (ἐν αἰϲθήϲει), which vanish when you die.15 Epicurus therefore exhorts his mother to be happy for him, not to worry about him, and not to send the money (χορηγίαι) she usually gives to him (I 10-II 4). Finally (II 4-III 7), Epicurus declares that what he receives from his father and friends allows him to live in abundance.16

13  The addition of ‹µὴ› (II 7) in the text is due to Usener 1892: 427, who thinks of a stonemason’s omission. Cf. also Diano 1948: 68, Arrighetti 19732: 438, Hammerstaedt 2006 (= 2014: 256ff.). The lesson handed down without μή is defended by William 1907: 101 and accepted by most of the critics. Cf. Smith 1993: 312. 14  The contiguity of the fragments is supported by Barigazzi 1977: 108–109. Cf. Smith 1993: 126. It is now certain that Diog. Oen. Fr. 127 Smith does not belong to the letter. Cf. Longo Auricchio 2013: 8–9. Cf. Barigazzi 1977: 109. 15  Cf. Heßler 2014: 195ff. The same topic is also considered in brief by Epicurus in the RS II. Cf. Warren 2000: 248–249 and Erler 2020: 46ff. 16  The importance of this text for reconstructing the donation system in Kepos is considered in Erbì 2016.

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2. Φάϲματα and εἴδωλα Epicurus seems to allude to φάϲματα as εἴδωλα also in a fragment of letter (144 F)17 quoted by Plutarch (Non posse 1105D 10-E 7): Εἰ τοίνυν ἡδὺ πανταχόθεν ἡ φίλου μνήμη τεθνηκότοϲ, ὥϲπερ Ἐπίκουροϲ εἶπε, καὶ ἤδη νοεῖν πάρεϲτιν ἡλίκηϲ ἑαυτοὺϲ χαρᾶϲ ἀποϲτεροῦϲι φάϲματα καὶ εἴδωλα

τεθνηκότων ἑταίρων οἰόμενοι δέχεϲθαι καὶ θηρεύειν, οἷϲ οὔτε νοῦϲ ἐϲτιν οὔτ’ αἴϲθηϲιϲ,

αὐτοῖϲ δὲ ϲυνέϲεϲθαι πάλιν ἀληθῶϲ καὶ τὸν φίλον πατέρα καὶ τὴν φίλην μητέρα καί που γυναῖκα χρηϲτὴν ὄψεϲθαι μὴ προϲδοκῶντεϲ.

If then, in every respect it is a pleasant thing to remember a loved person who has died, as Epicurus said, one can well understand that the Epicureans deprive themselves of a great joy, when they perceive and seek out the simulacra and images of loved friends, who no longer have either intellect or perception. Therefore they (scil. the Epicureans) deny themselves the hope of being in their own company again and of seeing their dear father, dear mother and, perhaps, good wife.

Plutarch mentions Epicurus’ suggestion that we consider the memories of deceased loved ones to be pleasant: he may well here quote Epicurus’ words from a letter in which the reflection on the pleasure of remembering deceased friends is intertwined with the explanation of the phenomenon of simulacra and visions.18 Plutarch’s point of view is to emphasize the contradiction into which the Epicureans fall when admitting the pleasure of the simulacra and the visions of dead friends and, at the same time, denying the immortality of the soul. There is no doubt that the terms εἴδωλα and φάϲματα are in the text of Plutarch and not in the excerptum taken from the letter of Epicurus, but it cannot be ruled out that Plutarch wants to take up precisely the words of Epicurus here. In this fragment, as in the letter to the mother, Epicurus would also have connected the reflection on the pleasure of the memory of deceased friends with the explanation of the phenomenon of simulacra and visions that such memory fed. Through his letters, Epicurus perhaps intended to support the φίλοι in understanding a phenomenon that, if not supported by a deep knowledge of Epicurean physics, appeared to contradict the claims on the immortality of the soul and cause turmoil.

17 

18 

213 Usener, 258 Arrighetti. Cf. Erbì 2020: 269–270.

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3. The school of Eudoxos at Cyzicus The fragments of letters give us very valuable information about the debate within the Kepos on the doctrinal contacts that some members of the Epicurean community of Lampsacus had established with the school of Eudoxus at Cyzicus.19 This debate, as we shall see, is also closely connected to a reflection on astronomy and geometry. In the second book of De Epicuro (XX 1-11), Philodemus cites an excerptum (79 F) from a letter sent by the master collectively to Archephon, Idomeneus, and Leonteus to show that Epicurus held a moderate attitude toward adversaries and slanderers. πε]||ρὶ Κυζικηνοῦ τινοϲ ἀϲτρολογογ[ε]ωμέτρου παρίϲτηϲιν [Ἀ]ρκεφῶντι καὶ

τοῖϲ π[ερ]ὶ τὸν Ἰδομενέ-

α καὶ [Λ]ε̣[ο]ντέα πο͙ρρω- 5 τέρωι προβαίνουϲ̣ι πε-

ρὶ [τῆ]ϲ ἀναιρέϲεωϲ τῆϲ Ἀπολ̣[λ]ω̣ ν[̣ ί]δ̣ου.[….

… [……]..νο.ϲ̣ [ὀκ]⌈νη⌉[ρ]οὺ̣ϲ φαί[ν]εται ⌈δυϲχε⌉- 10 ρ]αίν[ω]ν·v Concerning a certain Cyzicenus, a geometrical astronomer, (scil. Epicurus) points out to Archephon, Idomeneus, Leonteus and their followers that they go too far in their refutation of Apollonides […] he appears annoyed at their hesitation, but that in general of an offence.

Philodemus quotes Epicurus’ words in relation to ἀϲτρολογογεωμέτροϲ, an astronomer and surveyor who attended the school of Eudoxus at Cyzicus. Epicurus points out to his recipients that they are refuting Apollonides in an inappropriate manner.20 We do not know the identity of the ἀϲτρολογογεωμέτροϲ (1-2), but we can assume that the hapax ἀϲτρολογογεωμέτροϲ defines someone who had been trained at the school of Eudoxus, whose teaching was devoted to mathematics, geometry, and astrology.21 We know little more about Apollonius’ identity: he is the recipient

19  On the relationship between the school of Eudoxus in Cizicus and the Epicurean school in Lampsacus, see Barbieri 1959: 73ff., Liebich 1960: 45ff., Tepedino Guerra, Torraca 1996: 127ff., Verde 2013b: 266ff., Verde 2016: 21ff. 20  The text has been improved by Barbieri 2017: 94. Cf. Vogliano 1928: 60, Sedley 1976: 28, Tepedino Guerra, Torraca 1996: 127ff. 21  For Apollonius, cf. Barbieri 2020: 206ff. Angeli 1981a: 48ff. does not believe that within the Epicurean circle of Lampsacus there were episodes of dissidence, influenced by the school of Cyzicus. Cf. also Sedley 1976: 38. On Epicurus’ use of hapax in the letters, see Erbì 2020: 39–40.

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of an exemplary rebuke by Epicurus (7 T), contained in a letter addressed to him of which Philodemus gives us a testimony (Lib. dic. 73, 1-9 Konstan). [νουθετεῖν, ἐπε̣ιδὴ [μετρί]ωϲ̣ διατίθεται, καθάπ̣ερ ̣ ὁ Επίκουροϲ ἐπ̣[ιφο]ράϲ τ̣[ι]ν̣[αϲ] πρὸϲ Ἀπο̣[λλ]ωνίδην ἐπ̣όη ̣ ϲεν, 5 ὥϲτε καὶ τοι[αῦτ’] α̣[ἰ]τ̣ιώμε[νον, ἐ]άν [γ’ ἀλη]θινὸϲ ἦ̣ι, π[είθειν], ἄ̣[λλουϲ] δ’ οἰκειῶϲαι.v […] to admonish, since he has a measured attitude, in the same way that Epicurus addressed some reproaches to Apollonides so that, even accusing him of such things, in case he is truthful, he persuades him, while others recognize (these) as being addressed to them as well.

In Epicurus’ attitude towards Apollonides, it is possible to discern the principle that regulates the practice of παρρηϲία: to establish a relationship between the usefulness that the teacher’s warning has for the individual recipient of the corrective intervention and the paradigmatic value that this warning can take for others.22 Unfortunately, neither the fragment cited in the De Epicuro nor the testimony given in the De libertate dicendi allows us to derive further data on the error committed by Apollonides. Nevertheless, I think we can try to reconstruct a context from the data that we do know. Epicurus’ reference to the relationship between Apollonides and the ἀϲτρολογογεωμέτροϲ of Cyzicus seems to suggest that Apollonides was mistaken for having attended the school of Eudoxus, perhaps driven by interests in mathematical sciences derived, plausibly, from his master Polyaenus. Archephon, one of the three recipients of the letter from which Philodemus quotes 79 F, perhaps played an active role in the story. Archephon may have even had contact with the school of Cyzicus, allowing him to have a good knowledge of the thought of his opponents and, therefore, to assume a supervisory role in the Kepos of Lampsacus. The texts we have considered suggest a double corrective action of Epicurus: according to the principles of his παρρηϲία, Epicurus would have, at once, reproached Apollonides – probably responsible for an unorthodox contact with the opposing school – and criticized those of Lampsacus’s φίλοι who had been too strict in correcting him. Thanks to the fragment of the letter sent by Epicurus to Archephon, Idomeneus, and Leonteus, we can still draw one detail from the story. The sequence τοῖϲ π[ερ]ὶ 22 

118 Usener. Cf. Konstan 1998: 76–77, Erbì 2020: 122–123.

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τὸν Ἰδομενέ|α καὶ [Λ]ε̣[̣ ο]ντέα (4-5) proves that Epicurus, addressing Idomeneus and

Leonteus as guides of the Kepos of Lampsacus, intended to send his message to the whole community. All this suggests that the story of Apollonides had to be very well known and had to present traits of exemplarity in order to make it a paradigm in Kepos: the episode well describes the limits within which it was appropriate for the φίλοι of Lampsacus to establish a relationship with the school of Eudoxus. Another fragment of the letter (86 F)23 cited by Philodemus in his Memoria Epicurea (VII 2-11) confirms that the relationship between the two schools was a theme dear to Epicurus. - - - ]ϲ̣ εν κατὰ τὰ ἐν ⌈Κυ⌉[ζί κωι . . . . .]ε.[. . .]ωϲ ἐπιμεληθείϲ. ἐπ’ Εὐθ[ίου] δὲ περὶ τῆϲ αἱρέϲεωϲ αὐτοῦ διαϲαφεῖ τοῖϲ ἐν Λαμψάκωι φίλο̣[ιϲ ἐπι]ϲτέλλων· ἠκούϲα- 5 μεν γὰρ [ὅτι] δὴ Λεοντ[εὺϲ] πάντ[α απ . [ - - - ] . . [ . . ]ο̣[ . . . . . . .] ὥϲτε π[ . . . . . ]η[ . ] . α . νη . [. . . . ⸏μενα, ϲυ[να]χθόμεθα τῆι παρὰ τἀνδρ[ὸϲ . . . . . .]ν . [. . . 10 […] for not having fully realized it, we will let it remain in place; but what (he wrote) rather to the friends of Lampsacus under the archon of Philip (291/290) we will accept entirely; and indeed he said that not only poverty, but difficulties and states of slavery […]

This excerptum is taken from the letter sent by Epicurus to the friends of Lampsacus under the archon of Eutius (283/282). Most of the criticism translates αἵρεϲιϲ (3) as “school” and interprets the reference to Cyzicus in relation to Leonteus’ interest in Cyzicus or a rivalry between the two schools, but it cannot be ruled out that here αἵρεϲιϲ has the meaning of “choice”. Unfortunately, it is difficult to understand which choice Epicurus refers to. The sequence κατὰ τὰ ἐν ⌈Κυ⌉[ζί]|κωι (1-2) restored by Vogliano, although it appears syntactically unrelated to our excerptum, seems to suggest that Epicurus alludes to the contacts of the Epicureans of Lampsacus with the school of Eudoxus. The subject of ἐπιμεληθείϲ (2) is probably Epicurus, who would have dealt with Leonteus in relation to the facts of Cyzicus. It is difficult to interpret the reconstructed text in lines 5-6. The paragraphos under the first letters of line 9 probably marks the end of the quote.

23  109 Usener, 97 Arrighetti. Cf. Diano 1946: 29, e Spina 1971: 51; 69ff., Angeli 1982: 425. But, cf. Militello 1997: 202ff.

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On the other hand, it is not possible to determine whether Epicurus argued against the school of Eudoxos in the letter, known in Kepos as λαμπρά ἐπιϲτολή (45 T), of which Philodemus (Lib. Dic. 6, 4-12 Konstan) offers a testimony.24 [τὸ μὲν ἁ̣μάρτη[μα, παρρηϲιάϲ[ε]ται τῶιδε τὰ̣[ϲ] ϲ̣ιν[ότηταϲ ἀποδιδόντι· διὸ

καὶ Ἐπί ̣κ̣ου ̣ ροϲ, Λε[οντ]έ̣ωϲ 5 διὰ Πυθοκλέα πύϲ[τιν] θε-

ῶ[ν] ο̣ὐ̣ παρέν̣το[ϲ], Πυθοκλεῖ μὲν [ἐ]π̣ι ̣τ̣ιμᾶι μετρίωϲ,

πρὸϲ δὲ τὸν γράφει [τ]ὴν̣ ̣

λα̣μπρὰν καλουμέ̣νη ̣ ν 10 ἐ̣πι ̣ϲ̣[τολ]ήν, λ̣α̣βὼ ̣ [ν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ] Πυ̣θ[̣ οκλ . . .

(the wise man) will speak frankly (to those who make) mistakes, who behave wrongly: therefore Epicurus too, due to the fact that Leonteus, through the influence of Pythocles, had not neglected investigating the gods, mildly reproaches Pythocles and to him writes the letter called splendid, beginning with Pythocles […]

Unfortunately, nothing is known about this letter sent to Leonteus. Still, it must be pointed out that Philodemus links the sending of this letter to the episode in which Epicurus admonished Pythocles as being responsible for excess attention given by Leonteus to investigating the gods, against the theological indications of Epicurus. It is only one of the hypotheses advanced by critics that Epicurus developed here a reflection on the condition of the gods about which Python and Leonteus would have kept an unorthodox behaviour under the influence of the school of Cyzicus.25 From these texts, we can deduce that, through Epicurus these letters also intervened, corrected, guided, and supported the φίλοι of Lampsacus in the scientific debate about the themes that were influenced by the nearby school of Eudoxus. I think that it cannot be ruled out that, thanks to these letters, Epicurus had the goal to polemicize with the rival school, both to develop precise doctrinal aspects and to criticize the doctrine of the school of Cyzicus based on the study of μαθήματα.

24 

152 Usener, 69 Arrighetti. Diano 1946: 29 does not believe that there is a relationship between 45 T and 86 F1. Cf. also Angeli 1982: 425. 25 

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4. On the canon (?) We can probably read a reflection on canon and mathematics (131 F) in POXY 5077 (2 I-II), a papyrus that preserves the letter sent by Epicurus to his friends of Samos.26 I ± 11 ἑ]καϲτο . [ ± 11 ]να ἀκούω ± 12 ἀ]ρ̣ετὴν ± 8 ]ϲ̣ γαρ . [.]ει ̣δε̣ ± 10 ]δενι ε̣λ[̣ ± 11 ]ν̣αναιμα ± 11 ]. . . . .ου ± 4 ] προ̣[. .]καιη. . ειϲ ± 4 ]. . . . . [± 9 ± 2 ἀγ]νοοῦντ̣[εϲ κ]αὶ μω- ροὶ ± 11 ]οποτ[ ]. . .[ II περχ[ ± 14 νατο.[ ± 13 δικαιοϲυνη[ ±9 τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ϲχ[ημάτων ἐνάργημ̣α, ὥϲπε[ρ λέγω, τοῦ δὲ τε- τραγώ]νου ϲχή[ματοϲ …. ….]τι καὶ ἡ τοῦ̣ [δι]κ̣[αίου καὶ ἄλλ[α] ἔ̣ϲτι ϲχήμ̣ατα τ̣[ῆ]ι αὐτῆ̣ι [μ]ωροϲο̣φία‹ι›, πό[τερον κατὰ ϲυνή̣θειαν τ[ῆϲ φωνῆϲ̣ αὐτῆϲ̣. ἂν μὲν ε̣[ἴπη‹ι› τιϲ τὸ τετ̣ρ̣[άγωνον ϲχῆμα ἢ Ϲ̣ωκ̣ρ̣ά̣το ̣ [̣ υϲ ± 8 . .[ ±2].[.].[ ± 11 τ[±2 ἄ]λλο[υ ϲχήμ]α̣τοϲ .[ ±3 τετρά]γω̣ [νον ± 2 ] δε λευκο. 4 ]ρ̣.[ ± 6 ] δ’εἴπωμε(ν) ± 10 ϲ]χήματι ̣ ± 17 ]το μ[ ± 7 ]α[ ± 8 ].υ το[± 3].το[± 4 λε]υκὸϲ τ[. π[± 3]δ̣α ἀλ̣λ[± 6]το δ̣. δ̣ι[± ̣ 2]τ̣ου ἄλ̣λο νομιζο⸏μ[± 5 ο]ὕ̣τω λέγοντ̣ι ̣ τω[ ± 5] λευκὸν ἄλλα 26 

Cf. Erbì 2020: 256ff.

5

10

5

10

15

20

25

94

Margherita Erbì ϲυν[± 5]…ο . `ύ̣´ λ[έ]γειν αλπου̣[± 2]τηϲ τῆϲ διαλέκτου

± 12 ] ἀκολουθ[ ±10 ] τετράγων]ο̣ν. [ ±8 ] ϲχήματ̣ι 30 .]ω.[ ± 7 λέ]γοντεϲ .]..[ ±10 ]εν καὶ τὸ ±12 ]α εἶναι ±11 ϲχή]ματι ±16 ].[ 35 ±15 ]και … listening … virtue … ignorant and foolish … justice … the vividness of figures as I say … of the shape of the square … both the form of justice and other forms are such by this foolish wisdom, perhaps according to the linguistic habit of using the same sound, if one says form of the square or of Socrates … … of other shape … square … white … but we say to a shape … white … but so to one who says … white but … say … of language … square … to a shape … those who say … e … be … to a form …

The text is very incomplete, but what remains offers important clues for reconstructing at least the general sense. The first publishers believed that the fragment developed a critique of mathematics and the application of geometric figures to virtue.27 However, they also speculated that a reflection on mathematics can be put in relation to the principles of canonical Epicurean, for example, to demonstrate the inadequacy of language to express sensory perceptions and reality. Here, Epicurus first takes the point of view of the adversaries only in order to refute their thesis directly afterwards. The letters preserved in the first column are few: one is likely a reference to virtue (I 3 ἀ]ρετήν) and another to ignorant and foolish people (I 10-11 ± 2 ἀγ]νοοῦντ̣[εϲ κ]αὶ μω|[ροί). There is no doubt that the reflection that began in this column continued in the next column. Based on the technical value of the noun ἐνάρ]|γηµα (ΙΙ 4-5) for Epicurus, Anna Angeli reconstructs lines II 1-7 as follows: εἰ γὰρ ἡ φύϲιϲ ] | δικαιοϲύνη[ϲ μή ἐϲτι κατὰ] | τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ϲχ[ημάτων ἐνάρ]|γημ̣α, ὥϲπε[ρ λὲγω, τοῦ δὲ τε|τραγώ]νου ϲχή̣[ματοϲ….|….]τι καὶ ἡ τοῦ̣ [δι]κ̣[αίου (2-7). Epicurus would offer a definition of justice in accordance with the immediate evidence of the forms in which it is structured and concretized. Our fragment is to be put in relation to the RS 33 where Epicurus declares that justice is not something that exists independently, but only in reciprocal relations and that, moreover, it always depends on the places where the agreement is estab27  For an analysis, see Obbink–Schorn 2011, 45ff. and further Angeli 2013: 9ff. On Epicurean philosophy of language, see at least Atherton 2009: 197ff., Verde 2013a: 136ff.

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lished not to cause nor to receive damage.28 The text of these first lines is incomplete, and the additions are uncertain. Even so, Epicurus recalled the concept of the evidence of forms expressed by the words ἐπὶ τῶν ϲ[χημάτων ἐνάρ]|γηµα (II 4-5) as a criterion for defining justice on the basis of the process of knowledge that leads from the multiplicity of empirically verified forms of justice. It is difficult to reconstruct the text of lines II 2-3, but I think it is correct to assume that here, with ὥϲπε[ρ λέγω (II 5), Epicurus relates his thought. Gaps at the end of line I 6 and the beginning of line 7 preclude syntax reconstruction. However, ἡ τοῦ [δι]κ[αίου (II 7) recalls δικαιοϲύνη in the previous column (I 1). The hapax [μ]ωροϲο̣φία‹ι› (II 9) is an oxymoron that indicates the vain wisdom of those who are the target of Epicurus’ criticism.29 With τ̣[ῆ]ι | αὐτῆ̣ι [μ]ωροϲο̣φία‹ι› (II 8-9), Epicurus refers to the doctrine that will be subject to refutation soon: perhaps these theories are based on a mathematical reflection developed in relation to reality. The material damage of the papyrus requires caution in the reconstruction of the text, but it is plausible that Epicurus recalls his principle of evidence and criticizes the foolish wisdom that establishes a connection between the shape of the square, the pattern of justice, and other forms. Lines II 9-13 preserve the words with which Epicurus refutes the position of the adversaries: recognizing the validity of foolish wisdom (μωροϲοφία), on the basis of linguistic custom (κατὰ ϲυνή̣θειαν τ[ῆϲ | φωνῆϲ̣ αὐτῆϲ̣), means to admit that the expressions “form of the square” (τὸ τετ̣ρ̣[αγώνον ϲχῆ|μα) and “form of Socrates” (1213) are equivalent in terms of meaning. Epicurus perhaps intends here to describe the polysemy of the word ϲχῆμα, which assumes a meaning of “form” about the square and “attitude” in relation to the movements of the body. The following text is also very damaged. What can be reconstructed in lines 15-36 only suggests that Epicurus continues his argument about figures, shape, and colour, perhaps still in relation to the inadequacy of language. Unfortunately, it is impossible to understand the function of the paragraphos at the beginning of line 24. The content of the fragment is doctrinal and has to do with a reflection on the canonical. No indication in the text allows us to understand the recipient of the letter. Despite its fragmentation, the exceptional nature of this text is immediately evident. It is, in fact, the only fragment among the letters of Epicurus that retains an exclusively scientific reflection. We cannot, however, rule out that, as with the letter to the mother, Epicurus has intertwined scientific reflection with considerations on the canonical reflections 28  On the Epicurean theory of laws, see Goldschmidt 1977: 25ff. For the notion of law and justice in Epicurus, see Alberti 1995: 161ff., Armstrong 1997: 324ff., Morel 2000: 393ff., Brown 2009: 191ff. 29  As in 79 F, Epicurus here employs a hapax to define those to whom he addresses his criticism. Cf. note 21.

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on ethics even in this circumstance. The fact remains, however, that the text does not offer any indication of this direction.

5.

Φαινόμενα not perceivable by the senses

In the corpus of fragments and testimonies, an excerptum of a letter (108 T)30 can also be found, of which Epicurus is the likely recipient. This fragment is a relevant testimony for our analysis. Philodemus (Mem. Epic. XXIX 2-16 Militello), referring to the episode of Mitre’s imprisonment, cites a fragment of a letter whose recipient is in turn indicated as the author of a letter and a διαλογιϲμόϲ. . . . [. ] . [ . . ] ⌈Μιθρῆν πον͙οῦ⌉[ντα] ἢ τῆ[ϲ μνή]μηϲ ὑ[- – ἐκ ⌈Πε͙ι͙ ρ⌉[α]ιέωϲ καὶ [- – ἀναγγελλοντ[ - - - ]ην ο[ὐ]κ ι[̣ . . . ]η[ . . ]α[ . . . ]θεϲ[ . . . . ]ε . φέρων τὴν ἐπιϲτολὴν πα-

5

ρὰ ϲοῦ καὶ τὸν διαλογιϲμὸν

ὃν ἐπεπόηϲο περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώ-

πων ὅϲ⌈ο͙ι⌉ μήτε τὴν ἀναλογίαν

τὴν κατὰ τὰ φαινόμενα [ἐν] τοῖϲ ἀοράτοιϲ ο[ὖϲα]ν ἠδύναντο

10

ϲυνιδεῖν μήτε τὴν ϲυμφωνίαν τὴν ταῖϲ αἰϲθήϲεϲι ὑ-

πάρχουϲαν πρὸϲ τὰ ἀόρατα

καὶ πάλιν̣ ἀντιμ[α]ρτυ⌈ρ⌉[οῦ]ϲ̣ιν.

15

… Mitre who is in trouble … of remembrance … from Piraeus … bringing your letter and the treatise you composed on those men who are unable to understand either the analogy between what is the object of perception and what is invisible, or the correspondence that is established between the data of sensation and what is invisible and are again in contradiction.

Unfortunately, the understanding of the context is compromised by the difficulty of reconstructing lines 1-5, and whether the first five lines contain the introduction by Philodemus to the excerptum will remain a hypothesis.31 The sender offers a summary of the content of the διαλογιϲμόϲ: the writing considers the opinions of those who are unable to distinguish between what is the 30 

212 Usener, 137 Arrighetti. Cf. Erbì 2020: 233–234. The epistolary extract was to begin at least at line 6, as suggested by both the long sequence contained in lines 6–15, which must depend on a verb in the infinite mode and the sign written at line 6, which could indicate the beginning of the excerptum. 31 

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object of perception and what is not. Moreover, it aims at establishing a correspondence between the data of sensation and what is not perceived by the senses.32 In line 6, the word ἐπιϲτολή refers to a letter of the same type accompanying the books sent to the φίλοι by Epicurus.33 The necessity of an analogical explanation for phenomena that do not fall under our senses, that is, the heart of the problem faced in διαλογιϲμόϲ, is one of the fundamental aspects of Epicurus’ reflection on knowledge. Indeed, ἀναλογία (9), τὰ φαινόμενα (10), τὰ ἀόρατα (11 e 14), ϲυμφωνία (12-13), αἴϲθηϲιϲ (13) are words that belong to the lexicon used by Epicurus to express the results of the investigation on nature.34 The verb ἀντιμαρτυρέω refers to those who deny knowledge based on the analogy between phenomena and invisible reality.35 Therefore, there is no doubt that the expression ἀντιμ[α]ρτυ⌈ρ⌉[οῦ]ϲ̣ιν has a technical value and belongs to the Epicurean methodology of attestation. This text attests, at least, that the private correspondence could be simultaneously personal and universal in Epicurean circles. Remarkable is the presence of Ψ on the left margin at line 11, probably placed there to draw attention to ἀόρατα, a term that also returns to line 14.36 A writing dedicated to the analogy between the visible and the invisible is absent from the catalogue of the works of Epicurus preserved in Diogenes Laertius (X 27, 332-28, 372), but it is plausible that the διαλογιϲμόϲ and its accompanying letter mentioned in our excerptum are to be attributed to Epicurus.37 So, if Epicurus is the author of the διαλογιϲμόϲ and of the letter accompanying it, Epicurus can only be the recipient of the letter from which Philodemus cites the excerptum. Unfortunately, the sender of that letter is not known. Still, the name of Mitre (1) and the 32  The term διαλογιϲμόϲ (7) defines a script in the form of a treatise. The διαλογιϲμόϲ, the dialogue held within the school, is capable of developing an effective dialectic between teacher and disciple and can also take the form of a closed long–distance communication. Not accidentally, in Epicur. Pyth. 84–85, διαλογιϲμόϲ is the result of dialectic reasoning in a concise discussion; see De Sanctis 2011: 218ff., De Sanctis 2012: 104ff., Tulli 2014: 67ff. 33  Cf. Diano 1946: 37, Liebich 1960: 96, e Spina 1977: 77. 34  Diog. Laert. X 32 explains that for Epicurus the knowledge of things that we are not able to perceive with senses comes from phenomena through induction that also uses analogy to get from sensations to notions. The unavoidability of the analysis of the phenomena to arrive with an analog process to the knowledge of what is not evident is repeated on several occasions by Epicurus: Hrdt. 38–39, 58–59, Pyth. 88, 104 e Nat. XXVIII (PHerc. 1479/1417) col. XI Sedley. Cf. Sedley 1973: 59, Asmis 2009: 91ff., Verde 2010: 80ff., Verde 2013a: 58ff., Damiani 2021: 282ff. In particular on the notion of sensation, αἴϲθηϲιϲ, the first truth criterion of the canon of Epicurus, see Verde 2018: 79ff. 35 On ἀντιμαρτυρέω, used by Epicurus to express a false criterion, cf. Asmis 1984: 142ff. 36  It is a caudate φ, also recorded by the disegno oxoniense. Militello 1997: 100–101; 271 rules out, with good reason, that it may be a sticometric indication. 37  Steckel 1968: 617, thinks that the διαλογιϲμόϲ had a gnoseological and cosmological content, and could even coincide with the Pronosticus cited by Diog. Laert X 28. Striker 1974 (= 1996: 45–46) believes that in this treatise the concepts of ἐπιμαρτύρηϲιϲ and οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρηϲιϲ were deepened. Militello 1997: 270 considers it plausible that this διαλογιϲμόϲ was the basis of the script On the Signs of Philodemus. From the arguments developed by Philodemus, we know that the validity of the analogy method was supported against that of the antithesis method proposed by the Stoics. Cf. De Lacy–De Lacy 1978: 206ff.

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reference to Piraeus (3) suggest at least two possibilities:38 the sender could be Mitre or Metrodorus, who was involved in the liberation of Mitre. Very little is derived from the fragment on the content of the letter, but I think we should rule out that the letter contained a brief reflection on the same topics investigated in depth in the διαλογιϲμόϲ. Perhaps Epicurus’ letter contained a concise exposition on the analog explanation for phenomena we do not perceive with our senses, similar to what we read in the fragment sent to him.

Conclusion From the fragments and testimonies of letters analyzed in this paper, it is clear that Epicurus has developed reflections of a scientific nature not only within the so-called doctrinal letters. The explanations of the φανταϲίαι present in the letter to the mother and in the fragment quoted by Plutarch, as well as the attitude held by Epicurus towards the event that saw Apollonides in contact with the school of Eudoxus at Cyzicus (which we derive from our fragments), all prove that Epicurus, through the so-called private letters, intervened on questions of scientific nature in order to help the distant φίλοι whenever they found an obstacle in putting into practice the principles of ethics. In fact, Epicurus’ guide is essential both to comfort the mother frightened by visions and for the community of Lampsacus concerning the best attitude towards Apollonides. It is more difficult to establish a relationship between scientific reflection and ethics. I believe, however, that even for these two cases, Epicurus’ intervention was personalized, as required by the laws of the genre.39 The texts we have considered in 7 out of 8 cases come from Epicurean sources. The Epicureans are in fact Philodemus and Diogenes of Oinoanda, but the origin from an Epicurean context environment in Egypt is also more than a plausible hypothesis for the collection of letters preserved in the POxy 5077. Moreover, there is another remarkable fact: of the 84 fragments and testimonies of letters cited by Philodemus, only the texts analyzed here reflect a scientific nature. Philodemus seems to have made a real selection within the corpus of letters of the master. This selection is, in fact, harmonious with the themes treated by Philodemus, whose production emerges a prevalent attention to the reflection on mathemata and ethics and to the life of Kepos. Even the letter accompanying the

38  The two terms, no longer legible in the papyrus, are recovered on the basis of a disegno oxoniense. Cf. Diano 1946: 37 and Militello 1997: 138. 39  Arrighetti 2013: 315ff. indicates that Epicurus discussed his teachings in a personalized way because the epistolary genre seemed the most promising tool for transmitting his message.

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sending of the διαλογιϲμόϲ according to the criticism would have based the drafting of the treatise De signis precisely on that διαλογιϲμόϲ. The other two texts retaining what remains of a scientific explanation come from two Epicurean contexts removed from each other in time and space: Oinoanda and Egypt. From all this, it can be said that what remains of the corpus of letters of Epicurus depends on the events of the transmission and on the criteria for selecting these letters. It is plausible, therefore, that even in the so-called private letters, the presence of scientific interventions was much higher than what the fragments document. Now, it is perhaps possible to suppose that while in the doctrinal letters Epicurus has transmitted scientific knowledge to a selected audience, though still broad and varied, in the so-called private letters he has to transmit the same knowledge adapting it to the context and the according to the principle of personalized teaching. This teaching method allowed Epicurus not only to respond to the different needs of all those who followed his instructions but also to define, through the identification of paradigms of behaviour, various levels of adherence to his philosophical project. If in the doctrinal letters Epicurus wanted to fix the pillars of scientific thought by addressing certain categories of recipients – as he admits in the incipit of Herodotus and Pythocles – in the so-called private letters, he seems to focus only on some aspects of his doctrine in order to satisfy the needs of the individual recipients through a personal teaching, which could also be valuable for all those who shared with the recipients some personality traits, a particular position in the school, or experiences of life.40 Scientific debates and theories have their place in private letters and discussions, even when they serve as personalized teaching.

40  The collection of Epicurus’ letters is the first for which wide diffusion is documented; see Trapp 2003: 12. In the Kepos, Epicurus’ letters became the object of study, attention, and care after his death; his students preserved, ordered, and epitomized them in a way that was unique, but certainly explainable for a school based on the master’s presence as felt through his writings and on a well-organized continuity of memory. This is proven especially by the activity of Philonides of Laodicea (2nd century B.C.): see Tepedino Guerra 2010: 39. Philonides, however, was certainly neither the only nor the first to engage with these letters. For an overview of Epicurus’ collection of letters, see Eckstein 2004: 166ff. Yet even before Epicurus’ φίλοι undertook this task, the origin of the letter collection can be traced back to the master himself, who found in the letter the form best suited to conveying his thought in a personal way, which provided immediate comfort for the recipient and at the same time was generally effective and, therefore, authoritative. It is no coincidence Epicurus’ exceptional practice of dating his writings, including his letters, so that they could be stored in the Metroon proves his determination to preserve his writings, just like decrees and laws, in an authoritative and unalterable form for wider dissemination. On this issue, see recently Spinelli 2019: 283; also see Clay 1998: 43ff. For a different position see Cavallo 1984 (= 2005: 131ff.). The same fragments, moreover, testify to the fact that Epicurus intended his letters to be read not exclusively by the addressees: about this see analysis in Erbì 2023 (forthcoming).

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References Alberti, A., 1995, “The Epicurean Theory of Law and Justice”, in A. Laks–M. Schofield (eds.), Justice and Generosity. Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 161–190. Angeli, A., 1981, “I frammenti di Idomeneo di Lampsaco”, Cronache Ercolanesi 11: 41–101. Angeli, A., 1982, “Eterodossia a Lampsaco?”, in La regione sotterrata dal Vesuvio. Studi e prospettive, Atti del Convegno Internazionale 11-15 novembre 1979, Naples: Università degli Studi di Napoli, 416–426. Angeli, A., 1985, “L’esattezza scientifica in Epicuro e Filodemo”, Cronache Ercolanesi 15: 63–78. Angeli, A., 1988, Filodemo. Agli amici di scuola (PHerc. 1005), Naples: Bibliopolis. Angeli, A., 2013, “Lettere di Epicuro dall’Egitto (POxy LXXVI 5077)”, Studi di Egittologia e Papirologia 10: 9–32. Armstrong, J.M, 1997, “Epicurean Justice”, Phronesis 42: 324–334. Arrighetti, G. (ed.), 19732, Epicuro: Opere, Turin: Einaudi. Arrighetti, G., 2013, “Forme della comunicazione in Epicuro”, in M. Erler–J. E. Heßler (eds.), Argument und literarische Form in antiker Philosophie. Akten des 3. Kongresses der Gesellschaft für antike Philosophie, Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter, 315–338. Asmis, E., 1984, Epicurus’ Scientific Method, Ithaca–London: Cornell University Press. Asmis, E., 2009, “Epicurean Empiricism”, in J. Warren (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 84–104. Atherton, C., 2009, “Epicurean Philosophy of Language”, in J. Warren (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197–215. Barbieri, A., 1959, “Epicuro e le conquiste matematiche-astronomiche. Significato di una polemica”, in M. Untersteiner (ed.), Epicurea in memoriam Hectoris Bignone. Miscellanea philologica, Genoa: Istituito di Filologia Classica, 73–88. Barbieri, G., 2017, “PHerc. 1289. Filodemo, Περὶ Ἐπικούρου β (coll. X, XIV, XVII, XXV Tepe­ dino)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 47: 87–100. Barbieri, G., 2020, Il Περὶ Ἐπικούρου di Filodemo (PHerc. 1232 e PHerc. 1289), Tesi di dottorato in ‘Scienze dell’Antichità e Archeologia’ XXXII ciclo, a.a. 2019/2020, Pisa. Barigazzi, A., 1977, “Sui nuovi frammenti di Diogene di Enoanda”, Prometheus 3: 1–20 and 97–111. Brown, E., 2009, “Politics and Society”, in J. Warren (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 179–196. Campos Daroca, F. J.,–de la Paz López Martínez, M., 2010, “Communauté épicurienne et communication épistolaire. Lettres de femmes selon le PHerc. 176. La correspondance de Batis”, in A. Antoni–G. Arrighetti–M. I. Bertagna–D. Delattre (eds.), Miscellanea Papyrologica Herculanensia, Volumen I, Pisa–Rome: Serra, 21-36. Cavallo, G., 1984, “I rotoli di Ercolano come prodotti scritti. Quattro riflessioni”, Scrittura e Civiltà 8: 5-30 = Cavallo, G., 2005, Il calamo e il papiro. La scrittura greca dall’età ellenistica ai primi secoli di Bisanzio, Florence: Gonnelli: 129–149.

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Clay, D., 1980, “An Epicurean Interpretation of Dreams”, American Journal of Philology 101: 342–356 = Clay, D. 1998, Paradosis and Survival. Three Chapters in the History of Epicurean Philosophy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 211–231. Clay, D., 2009, “The Athenian Garden”, in J. Warren (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 9–28. Damiani, V., 2016, “Le epitomi di Epicuro: un modello di strategie comunicative per il De rerum natura”, in M. Tulli (ed.), Testo e forme del testo. Ricerche di filologia filosofica. Ricerche di Filologia Classica VII, Pisa–Rome: Serra, 257–279. Damiani, V., 2020, La «Kompendienliteratur» nella scuola di Epicuro. Forme, funzioni, contesto, Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter. De Lacy, P. H.,–De Lacy, E. A. (eds.), 1978, Philodemus. On Methods of Inference, Naples: Bibliopolis. De Sanctis, D., 2011, “Ὦ φίλτατε: il destinatario nelle opere del Giardino”, Cronache Ercolanesi 41: 217–230. De Sanctis, D., 2012, “Utile al singolo, utile a molti: il proemio dell’Epistola a Pitocle”, Cronache Ercolanesi 42: 95–109. Deissmann, A., 19234, Licht vom Osten. Das Neue Testament und die neuentdeckten Texte der hellenistisch-römischen Welt, Tübingen: Mohr. Diano, C. (ed.), 1946, Lettere di Epicuro e dei suoi nuovamente o per la prima volta edite, Florence: Sansoni. Diano, C. 1948, “Lettere di Epicuro agli amici di Lampsaco, a Pitocle e a Mitre”, Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica 23: 59–68. Eckstein, P., 2004, Gemeinde, Brief und Heilsbotschaft. Ein phänomenologischer Vergleich zwischen Paulus und Epikur, Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder. Erbì, M., 2016, “Χρεία e φιλία: la prassi delle donazioni nel Κῆποϲ”, in M. Tulli (ed.), Testo e forme del testo. Ricerche di filologia filosofica. Ricerche di Filologia Classica VII, Pisa– Rome: Serra, 281–315. Erbì, M. (ed.), 2020, Lettere. Frammenti. Testimonianze. Epicuro. Introduzione, testo e commento, Pisa–Rome: Serra, 2020. Erbì, M., 2023, “The Letters of Epicurus as Authoritative Texts in the Kepos”, in M. Erler–J.-E. Heßler–F. Petrucci (eds.), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Epicurean Tradition. Epicurea V, Basel: Schwabe Verlag, (forthcoming) Frischer, B., 1982, The Sculpted Word. Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press. Gagliarde, G., 2011, “L’Epicuro breve”, Appunti Romani di Filologia 13: 69-87. Gigandet, A., 2017, “Diogène, Lucrèce et la théorie épicurienne de l’imaginaire”, in J. Hammerstaedt–P.-M. Morel–R. Güremen (eds.), Diogenes of Oinoanda, Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 207–220. Gigante, M., 1986, “Biografia e dossografia in Diogene Laerzio”, Elenchos 7: 7–102. Goldschmidt, V., 1977, La doctrine d’Épicure et le droit, Paris: Vrin, 1977. Güremen, R., 2017, “Diogenes of Oinoanda and the Epicurean Epistemology of Dreams”, in J. Hammerstaedt–P.-M. Morel–R. Güremen (eds.), Diogenes of Oinoanda, Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 187–206.

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Hammerstaedt, J., 2006, “Zum Text der epikureischen Inschrift des Diogenes von Oinoanda”, Epigraphica Anatolica 39: 1–48, repr. in J. Hammerstaedt–M. F. Smith (eds.), The Epicurean Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda. Ten Years of New Discoveries and Research, Bonn: Habelt Verlag, 215–262. Heßler, J. E., (ed.), 2014, Epikur: Brief an Menoikeus, Basel: Schwabe. Heßler, J. E., 2018, “Protreptic and Epistolography: Epicurus”, in O. Alieva–A. Kotzé–S. Van der Meeren (eds.), When Wisdom Calls. Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity, Turnhout: Brepols, 161–170. Konstan, D. (ed.), 1998, Philodemus. On Frank Criticism, Atlanta: Scholars Press. Leone, G., 2000, “Epicuro. fondatore del Giardino e l’opera sua conservata nei papiri”, Cronache Ercolanesi 30: 21–27. Leone, G., 2002, “Epicuro, Della Natura, libro XXXIV (PHerc. 1431)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 32: 7–135. Leone G., (ed.), 2012, Epicuro Sulla natura libro II, Naples: Bibliopolis. Liebich, W., 1960, Aufbau, Absicht und Form der “Pragmateiai” Philodems, Berlin: Steglitz. Longo Auricchio, F., 2013, “Osservazioni e precisazioni su Ermarco”, Cronache Ercolanesi 43: 7–16. Militello, C. (ed.), 1997, Memorie epicuree (PHerc. 1418 e 310), Naples: Bibliopolis. Morel, P.-M., 2000, “Épicure, l’histoire et le droit”, Revue des Études Anciennes 102: 393–411. Obbink, D.,–Schorn, S., (eds.), 2011, “Epicurus (et al.), Epistulae ad familiares, no. 5077”, in D. Colomo–J. Chapa (eds), The Oxyrhynchus Papyri LXXVI, London: The Exploration Society: 37–50. Sedley, D., 1973, “Epicurus On Nature Book XXVIII”, Cronache Ercolanesi 3: 5–83. Sedley, D., 1976, “Epicurus and the Mathematicians of Cyzicus”, Cronache Ercolanesi 6: 23-54. Sedley, D., 1998, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, M.F., (ed.), 1993, Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Epicurean Inscription, Naples: Bibliopolis. Spina, L., 1971, “Eudosso e i Ciziceni nei papiri ercolanesi”, Cronache Ercolanesi 1: 69–72. Spina, L., 1977, “Il trattato di Filodemo su Epicuro e altri (PHerc. 1418)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 7: 43–83. Spinelli, E., 2010, “Breviari di salvezza: comunicazione e scienza in Epicuro”, in F. Verde–E. Spinelli (eds.), Epicuro. Epistola a Erodoto, Rome: Carocci. 9-24. Spinelli, E., 2012, “Epistola”, in P. D’Angelo (ed.), Forme letterarie della filosofia, Rome: Carocci, 147–174. Spinelli E., 2019, “Philologia medicans. The Epicurean Road to Happiness”, in L. Castagnoli–P. Ceccarelli (eds.), Greek Memories. Theories and Practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 278–291. Steckel, H., 1968, “Epikuros”, in Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft Suppl. 11: 579–652. Stowers, S. K., 1968, Letter Writing in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

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Striker G., 1974, “Κριτήριον τῆϲ ἀληθείαϲ”, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, I. Phil. Hist. Klasse, 2: 48–110, = Striker G., 1996, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge–New York: Cambridge University Press, 22–76. Tepedino Guerra, A., 2010, “Le lettere private del Κῆποϲ: Metrodoro, i maestri e gli amici epicurei (PHerc. 176 e PHerc. 1418)”, in A. Antoni–G. Arrighetti–M. I. Bertagna–D. Delattre (eds), Miscellanea Papyrologica Herculanensia, Volumen I, Pisa–Rome: Serra, 37–59. Tepedino Guerra, A., Torraca, L., 1996, “Etica e astronomia nella polemica epicurea contro i Ciziceni”, in G. Giannantoni–M. Gigante (eds), Epicureismo greco e romano. Atti del Congresso Internazionale Napoli, 19-26 maggio 1993, II, Naples: Bibliopolis, 127–154. Trapp M., 2003, Greek and Latin Letters. An Anthology, with Translation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tulli, M., 2000, “L’epitome di Epicuro e la trasmissione del sapere”, in M. Erler (ed.), Epikureismus in der späten Republik und der Kaiserzeit. Akten der 2. Tagung der Karlund-Gertrud-Abel-Stiftung vom 30. September-3. Oktober 1998 in Würzburg, Stuttgart: Steiner, 109–121. Tulli, M., 2014, “Epicuro a Pitocle: la forma didattica del testo”, in M. Tulli (ed.), Φιλία. Dieci contributi per Gabriele Burzacchini, Bologna: Pàtron, 67–78. Untersteiner, M., 1980, Problemi di filologia filosofica, Milan: Cisalpino–La Goliardica. Usener, H. (ed.), 1887, Epicurea, Leipzig: Teubner. Usener, H., 1892, “Epikureische Schriften auf Stein”, Rheinisches Museum 47: 414–456. Verde, F. (ed.), 2010, Epistola a Erodoto, Introduzione di E. Spinelli, Rome: Carocci. Verde, F., 2013a, Epicuro, Rome: Carocci. Verde, F., 2013b, Elachista: La dottrina dei minimi nell’Epicureismo, Leuven: Leuven University Press. Verde, F., 2016, “Ancora sulla matematica epicurea”, Cronache Ercolanesi 46: 21–37. Verde, F., 2018, “I pathe di Epicuro tra epistemologia ed etica”, Elenchos 39: 205–230. Vogliano, A. (ed.), 1928, Epicuri et Epicureorum scripta in Herculanensibus papyris servata, Berlin: Weidmann. Warren, J., 2000, “Epicurean Immortality”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18: 231-261. William, I. (ed.), 1907, Diogenis Oenoandensis Fragmenta, Leipzig: Teubner.

Lucretius’ Epistemological Language* Chiara Rover

1. Introduction The topic I have chosen to discuss – namely, Lucretius’ epistemological language – would require more space than what the present article affords in order to be fully investigated. Therefore, I have decided to focus exclusively on four issues (visual sense perception, prolepsis, the ‘throwing’ of the mind, and the concept of ‘sign’) in which the poet’s lexical choices prove to be, at least in my opinion, particularly significant for any attempt to assess and, consequently, appreciate Lucretius’ reception of the Epicurean theory of knowledge.

2. The potestas of sight The first point to which I would like to draw attention concerns the potestas of sensus1 and, more specifically, of visual perception. Diogenes Laertius’ account of Epicurean canonic (X 31–32 = part. 36 Usener) informs us that, according to the founder of the Garden, all sense perception (πᾶσα αἴσθησις) is ἄλογος (which is to say devoid of λόγος) and does not participate in memory (μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτική, *  The present contribution is a revised version of the paper I discussed on 27 May 2021 at the SPIN–SPIDER workshop Theory of Language and Scientific Lexicon in Epicureanism/Théorie du langage et lexique scientifique dans l’épicurisme (25–27 May 2021, Zoom platform/Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne; Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia), upon invitation from Prof. Francesca G. Masi, Prof. Pierre–Marie Morel, and Prof. Francesco Verde, whom I thank. My sincere thanks go to Prof. Francesco Verde for reading – and discussing with me at length – an early version of this paper, providing some crucial observations. My gratitude also goes to Prof. Francesca G. Masi, Prof. Stefano Maso, and Prof. Emidio Spinelli for their valuable and timely suggestions. Finally, I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for her/his remarks. I would like to point out that the writing of this essay also falls within the scientific activities related to the university project Il criterio di verità: Dalla filosofia antica all’epistemologia contemporanea (Sapienza University of Rome/2019–2021–P.I. Prof. Francesco Verde). For the Latin text of De rerum natura (DRN) reference will always be made to the Teubnerian edition by Deufert 2019. Unless otherwise indicated, for the English translation I will refer to Smith 2001. The verse numbering of the translation will conform to that established in the Latin text printed by Deufert, so sometimes the sequence of verses followed by Smith will be modified. 1  In Lucretius, the term sensus does not designate a specific element of the Epicurean canonic, such as αἴσθησις, but a wide range of entities, closely related to the sphere of sense perception, including: αἴσθησις itself (cf., e.g., II 19, 399, 403, 904); the αἰσθητήρια, understood both as the five senses (cf., e.g., I 303, 447, 600, 689, 700; II 139, 406, 432–433, 435) and as perceptual organs (cf. e.g. II 407, 429, 470, 911); the πάθη (uoluptas and dolor, when considered together and as mere, yet necessary, counterparts to sense perceptions, which in turn are never neutral – cf., e.g., II 19, 399, 403); and, finally, the capacity or faculty to feel and perceive in general, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι (cf., e.g., I 962; II 312, 652, 915, 938; III 98, 101, 352), sometimes rendered using the verbal form sentire (cf., e.g., II 910). Similar terminological considerations are also made by Glidden 1979: 155.

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X 31).2 These features allow us to distinguish it from the second criterion of the canonic, πρόληψις. Moreover, there is nothing capable of refuting sense perception (οὐδὲ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμενον αὐτὰς διελέγξαι, X 32),3 for its veracity (τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀλήθειαν, ibid.) is guaranteed by its being real (τὰ ἐπαισθήματα δ’ ὑφεστάναι), that is, by its being a motus (Lucret. III 352)4 caused by the impact of the external εἴδωλα (simulacra) that constantly strike our sensory organs. For this reason, Diogenes adds (X 32), a homogeneous sense perception (ἡ ὁμογένεια αἴσθησις) is incapable of refuting another homogeneous one:5 since both are real (cf. ὑφεστάναι) and since one cannot be more real than the other, the two possess the same value (διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν). Nor can a heterogeneous sense perception (ἡ ἀνομογένεια) refute a heterogeneous one,6 since the two are not criteria for the same object (literally, they are not “critical” of the same things: οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσι κριτικαί).7 All the same, not even reasoning is capable of rebutting sense perception, since all reasoning depends on it (πᾶς γὰρ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἤρτηται).8 Lucretius takes care to clarify in what way the senses (and sense perceptions) cannot be contradicted (cf. neque sensus posse refelli, v. 479) in Book IV, at the heart of his so-called anti-sceptical polemic. After declaring that the senses are what provides the foundation for the notities ueri (478–479), he proceeds to ask the following rhetorical question: how could reason, which is born of a fallacious sense perception (ab sensu falso … orta), “be competent to impeach them [scil. the senses] (dicere eos contra), when it is itself entirely dependent upon the senses? (tota ab sensibus orta est). If they are not true, all reason also is rendered false” (IV

2  In the absence of λόγος, αἴσθησις is completely deprived of any ability to process and, consequently, conceptualize the data coming from perception. Therefore, Epicurus’ αἴσθησις is totally confined to what is recorded by the senses hic et nunc, in the present moment. 3  Cf. also Epicur. RS 23–24. On Diog. Laert. X 32, see esp. Striker 1996 (1977): 77–91 and Verde 2018: 88–89. 4  In other passages within the third book of the DRN, motus is qualified as sensiferos, cf. vv. 240, 245, 272, 379, 570, 924. Cf. also Diog. Laert. X 32, where the reality of the φαντάσματα of the insane and of the oneiric φαντάσματα is established on the basis of their producing a perceptive motion (κινεῖ), since what does not exist cannot produce any motion at all (τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν οὐ κινεῖ). 5  The adjective ‘homogeneous’ – at least as I understand it in this context – applies to sense perceptions of the same object that are equal to each other, as when subject A has the same sense perception of object x as subject B. 6  ‘Heterogeneous’ sense perceptions are those which, while relating to the same object, are different from each other, as when A’s sense perception of object x differs from B’s sense perception of the same object. 7  On the value to be attached to this occurrence of the adjective κριτικός, see infra: 116. 8  See Tsouna 2016: esp. 168–169. In relation to this point, it is interesting to recall a testimony provided by Galen (Med. Exp. 15, 7, fr. Schöne 1259, 8 = 27 D23a Laks–Most = 68 B 125 Diels–Kranz), in which Democritus imagines that the senses take the floor and address the following words to reason: “Poor mind, you receive from us all your certainties, and then you overthrow us? That overthrow is your downfall” (τάλαινα φρήν, παρ’ ἡμέων λαβοῦσα τὰς πίστεις ἡμέας καταβάλλεις; πτῶμά τοι τὸ κατάβλημα; transl. by Laks–Most). On this testimony, see Lee 2005: 217–251, esp. 242–246.

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483–485).9 Moreover, the poet continues, the senses cannot refute each other, nor can they refute themselves: [T1] an poterunt oculos aures reprehendere, an aures tactus? an hunc porro tactum sapor arguet oris, an confutabunt nares oculiue reuincent? non, ut opinor, ita est. nam seorsum cuique potestas diuisast, sua uis cuiquest, ideoque necesse est 490 et quod molle sit et gelidum feruensue seorsum et seorsum uarios rerum sentire colores, et quaecumque coloribus sint coniuncta uidere. seorsus item sapor oris habet uim, seorsus odores nascuntur, seorsum sonitus. ideoque necesse est 495 non possint alios alii conuincere sensus. nec porro poterunt ipsi reprehendere sese, aequa fides quoniam debebit semper haberi. proinde quod in quoquest his uisum tempore, uerumst. (emphasis added) Or can sight be corrected by hearing, or hearing by touch? Can the evidence of touch be challenged by taste, refuted by hearing, or invalidated by sight? Not so, in my opinion. The fact is that each sense has its own special sphere, its own separate function. Thus the discernment of softness, cold, and heat must be the province of one particular sense, while the perception of the various colors and everything connected with colors must be the business of another. Taste too has its own distinct function; smell is produced separately, and so is sound. It necessarily follows therefore that one sense cannot refute another. It is also impossible for any sense to correct itself, since it must always be considered equally reliable. Therefore all sensations at all times are true. (Lucret. IV 486–499)10

A similar stance to the one expressed by Lucretius can be found in another text regarded as Epicurean, namely the treatise on sense perceptions (Περὶ αἰσθήσεων)

9  Note the similarity between Lucretius’ formulation and the one we find in the testimony on Democritus quoted in the previous footnote. 10  Cf. Lucret. I 298–303: Tum porro uarios rerum sentimus odores, / nec tamen ad naris uenientis cernimus umquam, / (300) nec calidos aestus tuimur, nec frigora quimus / usurpare oculis, nec uoces cernere suemus; / quae tamen omnia corporea constare necessest / natura, quoniam sensus inpellere possunt. (“Then again, we smell the various odors of things, even though we never see them approaching our nostrils; we do not observe seething heat, nor can we discern cold with our eyes, nor do we see sounds; and yet all these must be of a corporeal nature, since they have the power to act upon our sensory organs”).

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contained in PHerc. 19/698, whose attribution to Philodemus of Gadara11 seems less doubtful now than in the past.12 Columns XX to XXIX Monet of this work are entirely devoted to the issue of sensibles (τὰ αἰσθητά), which, in the wake of Aristotle, are divided into sensibles that are proper to each sense (τὰ ἴδια) and sensibles “common” to several senses (τὰ κοινά).13 The problem faced by the author in this section of the papyrus is to reconcile the principle that each sense only receives its own sensibles with the existence of “common” sensibles. From col. XX A Monet we learn that: [T2] …Τὴν μὲ[ν] γὰρ ὄ|ψιν ὁρατὰ κατα[λ]αμβ[ά]|νειν ἡγούμεθ[α, τ]ὴν δὲ | ἁφὴν ἁπτά, κα[ὶ] τὴν μὲν |5 χρώματος, τὴν δὲ σώ|ματος, καὶ [τ]ὴν ἑτέραν | τοῦ τῆς ἑτ[έ]ρας [κρ]ίμα[τος] | μηθὲν π[ολ]υπραγμ[ο]|νεῖν· ἐπειδήπερ εἰ συ[ν]|10 έβαινε τὴν ὄψιν σώμα|τ̣ος μέγεθος καὶ σχῆμα | κ[α]ταλαμβάνειν, π[ολὺ]|π[ρό]τερον ἂν καὶ σῶμα | ⟦κ[ατ]ελάμβανεν ἢ πολὺ |15 πρότερον [ἂν] καὶ [σῶ]μα⟧ | κα[τ]ελάμ[βανε]ν καὶ | τ[αῦτα ― ― ]τη|[ ― ― ] μα| [ ― ― (emphasis added)

11  Assuming he is an Epicurean, the author of the text must have belonged not to the first-generation Epicureans, but to a later one: besides Metrodorus (col. VI 13–14 Monet = 2 Körte), Epicurus (col. XXII A 5 Monet), and Polyaenus (col. XXII A 3 Monet = 20 Tepedino Guerra); in the surviving columns we find the names of Timasagoras (col. XXII A 2–3 Monet), who lived in the 2nd century BC, and an Apollodorus (col. XXIII A 6 Monet), identified as the schoolmaster who led the Garden from 150 BC onwards. The name of Zeno Sidonius is excluded from the potential authors’ list, since there is no evidence that he wrote about the issue of sense perception; on the other hand, the name of Demetrius Laco – who instead surely dealt with the problem of sense perception, at least according to some fragments of PHerc. 1055 (sense perception in relation to divinity; the papyrus, edited by Santoro, contains a text in all likelihood by Demetrius) and of PHerc. 1012 (esp. LXXII–LXXIII Puglia) – is ruled out, too, since the style of PHerc. 19/698 seems much more in line with that of Philodemus and, in particular, with that of his works De signis, De musica, and Poetica (for a more detailed overview of this matter, see Monet 1996: 55–71). 12  See Del Mastro 2014: 41. 13  The distinction between proper sensibles and common sensibles brings us back to the distinction between the two types of per se sensibles (καθ᾽ αὑτό) made by Aristotle in De an. II 6, 418a 8–25. After splitting τὰ αἰσθητά into per se sensibles (καθ᾽ αὑτό) and accidental sensibles (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), Aristotle divides the first category into proper per se sensibles (τὰ ἴδια) – which cannot be perceived with any other sense and with respect to which error is impossible (μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι), as in the case of colour for sight – and common per se sensibles (τὰ κοινά), which can be perceived by several senses. The latter, Aristotle subsequently explains, in De an. III 1, 425a 14–20, do not require the existence of any special sense or special sensory organ beyond the canonical ones, but are perceived (αἰσθανόμεθα) “by movement (κινήσει); for instance we perceive magnitude by movement (κινήσει), and shape also; for shape is a form of magnitude. What is at rest is perceived by absence of movement; number by the negation of continuity, and by the special sensibles; for each sense perceives one kind of object (ἑκάστη γὰρ ἓν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις)” (transl. by Hett). That common sensibles are perceived κινήσει means that, as has been clarified by Zucca (2015: 163), they are perceived by means of “il mutamento dello stimolo percettivo in ingresso negli organi propri, dunque nei sensi individuali […] la variazione, registrata dall’organo/capacità, da un λόγος all’altro entro un certo genere percepibile”. More generally, on the types of perception in the De anima, see the studies by Grasso–Zanatta 2003: 127–141, Lamedica 2010, and Zucca 2015: 119–197.

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… En effet, nous pensons que la vision saisit les visibles alors que le toucher saisit les tangibles, et que la vision est vision de la couleur, le toucher toucher du corps, et qu’aucune de ces deux ‹sensations› ne se mêle absolument pas de ce qui est l’objet du discernement de l’autre, puisque, s’il arrivait que la vision saisisse la grandeur et la forme d’un corps, elle saisirait à plus forte raison le corps aussi …14 ([Philod.] [Sens.] (PHerc. 19/698) col. XX A Monet)

My understanding of this column is that, properly speaking, there are no “common” sensibles at all, since it is impossible for the “object of judgement/discrimination” (κρῖμα) of one αἴσθησις to be mixed with (more precisely, “to be busy about”, πολυπραγμονεῖν, 8–9) that of another.15 The resulting sense perceptions are therefore completely independent of each other. What is striking in comparison to Lucretius’ argument in [T1] is the insistence with which the Epicurean (?) author of the treatise on sense perceptions employs the term κρῖμα in relation to the senses,16 which are recognized as having the capacity to κρίνειν – albeit in a non-propositional sense17 – at least their proper sensibles. In order to appreciate Lucretius’ position on this matter and how he actually understands the potestas of the senses (particularly sight), it is interesting to consider verses 379–386 of the fourth book. These occur immediately after the discussion about the optical illusion whereby the shadow projected by our body appears to be moving with us and to be always the same (364–378): [T3] Nec tamen hic oculos falli concedimus hilum. nam quocumque loco sit lux atque umbra tueri 380 illorum est; eadem uero sint lumina necne, 14 

Transl. by Monet. On this passage, see also Sedley 1989. According to the author of the papyrus, figure (σχῆμα) and size (μέγεθος) are indeed objects of discernment common to sight and touch, though only by analogy (κατ’ αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν, col. XXV A 2 Monet), since the number of atoms that sight is able to perceive differs from the number of atoms perceivable through the sense of touch. This matter is also investigated by Lucretius in IV 230–236, where we are told that the figura (σχῆμα) is perceived, of course, both by sight and touch (which, therefore, must be stimulated by a consimilis causa, IV 233), but from two different “perspectives” (for there is no mixing), since the respective sense organs – as characterized by different atomic structures – are susceptible to the corpora coming from outside in different ways (otherwise we would be able to perceive objects even in the absence of light). The view endorsed by the author of PHerc. 19/698 is not so different from Aristotle’s position. Even according to the latter, τὰ κοινά, while possessing direct causal power over the sense organs, like τὰ ἴδια (cf. De an. III 1, 425a 27–28), in no way imply a “mixture” between proper sensibles. Rather, they presuppose a kind of “synergy”, so to speak, between the five canonical senses, namely a deep unity of perception, referred to as κοινὴ αἴσθησις (425a 27). As far as we know, κοινὴ αἴσθησις is made possible by φαντασία (cf. De an. III 3), which allows us to be aware of the variations of the stimuli due to τὰ ἴδια, by means of the retention of a stimulus even when the object that generated it is no longer present (cf. III 3, 429a 4–5; on this issue, see Zucca 2015: 196–197 and 229–234). 16  See also [Philod.] [Sens.] (PHerc. 19/698) col. XXVIII A 5–6: τῆς τῶν κρινομέ|νων ἐπαισθήσεως, as well as coll. XX A 7; XXV A 3; XXVI A 3, 13XXIX B 2–3, 5, 7; XXX A 9–10, 13 Monet, etc. 17  Sedley 1989: 126. 15 

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umbraque quae fuit hic eadem nunc transeat illuc, an potius fiat paulo quod diximus ante, hoc animi demum ratio discernere debet, nec possunt oculi naturam noscere rerum. 385 proinde animi uitium hoc oculis adfingere noli. (emphasis added) However, in this connection we do not allow that the eyes are in any way deceived. Their business is to observe the areas of light and shadow. But the question of whether the light is the same or not, and whether it is the same shadow passing from place to place, or whether the position is rather as I have stated it above – this can be decided only by the reasoning of the mind: the eyes cannot take cognizance of the real nature of things. Refrain, then, from foisting on the eyes the shortcomings of the mind. (Lucret. IV 379–386)

In accordance with one of the fundamental tenets of Epicurus’ epistemology,18 in the text just quoted Lucretius is assigning the task of naturam noscere rerum to the animi ratio. Indeed, the source of error is to be identified not with the senses, but with the animus’ judgement on the data provided by sense perception. Now, the above-quoted verses echo, in some respects, two passages from Aristotle’s De anima, to which, although much caution is advised, we cannot exclude Lucretius (and perhaps already Epicurus) meant to respond.19 The first one reads as follows: [T4]

ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθής ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος. δεύτερον δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι· καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι εσθαι· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευκὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται.

The perception of proper objects is true, or is only capable of error to the least possible degree. Next comes perception that they are attributes, and here a possibility of error at once arises; for perception does not err in perceiving that an object is white, but only as to whether the white object is one thing or another.20 (Arist. De an. III 3, 428b 18–23)

This passage is part of a wider section (De an. III 3, 428b 18–30) in which Aristotle summarizes, in a not entirely slavish way, some remarks made in De an. II 6 18 

Cf. Epicur. Hrdt. 50–52; RS 23–24. Regarding the doctrinal relationship between Epicurus (and the Epicureans), Aristotle, and, more generally, the Peripatetic tradition, see Gigante 1999; Verde 2015, 2016a, 2016c, 2022: esp. 3–40, 70–73; and Corradi 2021. More specifically, on the Aristotelian traces in Lucretius’ poem, I will refer to Schrijvers 1997 and Tutrone 2006, both particularly focused on the zoological and biological sections of the DRN; see also Montarese 2012: esp. 15–16, 49. 20  Transl. by Hett. 19 

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concerning the possibility of error in relation to the three kinds of sensibles.21 The context is different this time and the philosopher is connecting his observations to the occurrence of φαντασία. Not unlike Aristotle, Lucretius, while denying the senses the capacity to discriminate particular lights or shadows, seems to acknowledge that they at least have the power to grasp whether what is seen is a light or a shadow. Now let us look at what we are told in De an. II 6, where a significant difference from [T4] arises: [T5] ἀλλ’ ἑκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπατᾶται ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ’ ὅτι ψόφος, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἢ ποῦ, ἢ τί τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ ποῦ. (emphasis added) Each sense has its proper sphere, nor is it deceived as to the fact of colour or sound, but only as to the nature and position of the coloured object or the thing which makes sound.22 (Arist. De an. II 6, 418a 14–16)

Compared to what emerged from [T4], where the perception of the proper sensibles is acknowledged to be liable to error, albeit to a minor extent, in [T5] the same type of perception is treated as absolutely infallible: sight never deceives us as to the fact that there is white (or another particular colour, and not merely colour in general),23 but rather as to what and where the specific white object is. With reference to what we read in [T5], the “adjustment” made by Aristotle in [T4] could be explained, at least in my opinion, by taking into account the fact that, whereas in De an. II 6 the core of the discussion is the sensitive soul (τὸ αἰσθητικόν) as the difference that defines the animal, in III 3 the philosopher is now approaching the treatment of the soul that defines the rational animal, namely the νοῦς. Moreover, in the light of Aristotle’s strongly unitary conception of the soul, according to which ultimately the soul of man as a whole is rational, the lower functions, starting from sense perception, are themselves already imbued with reason, so it will never be possible to find, in the human being, a perception completely free from error. The reason for this is that, in the human being, sense perception inevitably takes on a propositional 21 

On which see supra: n. 13. Transl. by Hett. 23  According to Marmodoro (2011: 19), in [T5] the argument for the infallibility of perception would only apply to the generic content, not “to the identity of the sensible form – which colour or which sound one is perceiving. The reason is that different colours can stimulate the sense organ of sight and so the agent can perceive infallibly colour, and yet be mistaken about the hue or shade of it”. However, I fully agree with Zucca (2015: 151–152 n. 88) when he argues that if Marmodoro’s view were true, “nemmeno la percezione di un percepibile comune a più sensi sarebbe detta fallibile; non erro nemmeno sul fatto che ci sia una figura o una grandezza, ma solo su quale sia”. As a result, I assume that in [T5] Aristotle is thinking about a specific colour and a specific sound. 22 

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form, and our seeing the colour red already amounts to formulating the thought “I see red” (whether it is expressed or not is of little importance). To return to [T3], it is important to note that Lucretius seems to be newly presenting the views expressed in the two passages from Aristotle’s De anima quoted above ([T4] and [T5]), while introducing some far from secondary changes. In the first place, the verb employed is different: κρίνειν in Aristotle’s texts (although, at least in [T5], with a non-propositional value), tueri in Lucretius, who applies the verb discernere exclusively to the activity of the animi ratio (384). This difference is not all, however. According to Aristotle, even in [T5], αἴσθησις is able to discern the white (as white) – probably thanks to the intervention of φαντασία, which alone makes perceptive discrimination possible, be it intramodal (as in this case) or intermodal;24 what lies beyond the power of αἴσθησις is only the capacity to discern what and where the white τι is. For Lucretius, on the other hand, sense perception is able to grasp light and shadow wherever (quocumque loco) they are found, while it is unable to make comparisons between different lights and shadows. Not only does the poet never bring the white quid (or a quid of any other specific colour) into play, but – properly speaking – he does not even mention colours, as he merely talks about lights/shadows. Being ἄλογος (Diog. Laert. X 31 = part. 36 Usener), αἴσθησις is unable to grasp that what strikes sight is a colour, or that what strikes hearing is a sound (and for this very reason it is always infallible), an operation for which the intervention of πρόληψις would be required. Indeed, it is by means of πρόληψις that we are able to store and synthesize the data of perception. In order to understand that what we see is a colour, we must have formed the concept of colour in the first place.25 Dealing with the problem of “metaperception”, – that is, of “perceiving we perceive” – in De an. III 2, 425b 12–25 Aristotle argues that we see/distinguish lights and shadows, but not in the same way (οὐχ ὡσαύτως, 425b 22) in which we see/distinguish colours: for only when we discern the latter are we properly seeing (thanks to the reception of a form – a colour, in this case – without matter, in our organ: cf. II 12, 424a 17–24); instead, the perception of light and shadow – consisting, respectively, in the presence and absence of chromatic stimuli – is not, strictly speaking, a seeing, but an awareness of seeing through concrete perceptive acts. In this sense, it is possible to distinguish light and shadow even when we are not seeing. Indeed, light, which is referred to as the actuality of the diaphanous (φῶς δέ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια, τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές, De an. II 7, 418b 9–10), is the very condition for seeing, since it enables us to see the colour of objects that are in the medium.26 For Lucretius too, light is the condition for colour (II 795) – whereas shadow is air empty of light (IV 368–369) – but in his view, in contrast to what we 24 

Cf. Aristot. De an. III 2, 426b 8–427a 14. See Verde 2018: 86. 26  Only when a colour is in the light – i.e., as first actuality – does it become visible (even in the absence of a subject able to see it). If it is then seen, its being seen is the second actuality, which is 25 

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read in Aristotle,27 light possess a corporeal nature (II 389–390: luminis corpora). Leaving aside the metaperceptive question, which does not fall within Lucretius’ interests, at least in this context, it seems to me not entirely far-fetched to say that, in mentioning only lights and shadows, the poet presents what we might define as the status of Epicurean αἴσθησις tout court: visual perception is not even able to distinguish a colour as a colour; it merely grasps a chromatic stimulus, so to speak, which it is then up to the ratio animi to decipher. It is no coincidence that most of the (alleged) visual illusions listed in Book IV involve the light-shadow dyad.28 In this regard, a passage from Plutarch’s Adversus Colotem (1110C–D = part. 30 Usener) proves quite significant. We learn from it that Epicurus, in the second book of his work Against Theophrastus,29 stated: πολλάκις ἀέρος ὁμοίως σκοτώδους περικεχυμένου οἱ μὲν αἰσθάνονται χρωμάτων διαφορᾶς οἱ δ᾿ οὐκ αἰσθάνονται δι᾿ ἀμβλύτητα τῆς ὄψεως· ἔτι δ᾿ εἰσελθόντες εἰς σκοτεινὸν οἶκον οὐδεμίαν ὄψιν χρώματος ὁρῶμεν, ἀναμείναντες δὲ μικρὸν ὁρῶμεν.

(emphasis added)

[It] often happens that when objects are enveloped in air of the same degree of darkness, some people perceive a distinction of colour while others whose eyesight is weak do not; again, on first entering a dark room we see no colour, but do so after waiting a short time. 30 (Plutarch. Adv. Col. 1110C–D = part. 30 Usener)

According to what we read in this passage,31 Epicurus acknowledged that the senses have the capacity to perceive (αἰσθάνεσθαι) χρωμάτων διαφοραί. In De anima III 2, numerically identical with the second actuality of sight – i.e., with the exercise of the visual capacity, which is the first actuality. See Aristot. De an. III 2, 425b 27–28 and 426a 16–17. 27  Cf. Aristot. De an. II 7 418b 13–17: τί μὲν οὖν τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τί τὸ φῶς, εἴρηται, ὅτι οὔτε πῦρ οὔθ’ ὅλως σῶμα οὐδ’ ἀπορροὴ σώματος οὐδενός (εἴη γὰρ ἂν σῶμά τι καὶ οὕτως), ἀλλὰ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ δύο σώματα ἅμα δυνατὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι (“We have thus described what the transparent is, and what light is: it is neither fire, nor in general any body, nor an emanation from any body (for in that case too it would be a body of some kind), but the presence of fire, or something of this kind, in the transparent; for there cannot be two bodies in the same place at the same time”; transl. by Hett). 28  See e.g. Lucret. IV 337–352, 364–378, but also 324–331, 447–452, 453–461, etc. 29  On Epicurus’ Against Theophrastus, a work consisting of at least two books (for Plutarch states that he found his information ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν πρὸς Θεόφραστον, Adv. Col. 1110C), see Gigante 1999: 52–53. 30  Transl. by Einarson–De Lacy 31  We know nothing about the context of this quotation. But Plutarch also informs us that, shortly after it, Epicurus reported his doctrine according to which “colours are not intrinsic to bodies (οὐκ εἶναι … τὰ χρώματα συμφυῆ τοῖς σώμασιν) but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye (ἀλλὰ γεννᾶσθαι κατὰ ποιάς τινας τάξεις καὶ θέσεις πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν)”, as if to say that “the body is no more colourless than coloured. Earlier in the work he [scil. Epicurus] writes word for word as follows: ‘But even apart from the discussion on this head, I do not see how one can say that these objects in the dark have colour …’” (Adv. Col. 1110C; transl. by Einarson–De Lacy). As has been suggested (Sedley 2020: 65), it is plausible that the section of the work Against Theophrastus alluded to by Plutarch dealt

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426b 9–12, Aristotle had noted that each sense, being a kind of medium (μεσότης τις, cf. II 12, 424a 1–6),32 and serving, because of this, as a standard, “discerns the differences in its sensible subject–matter (κρίνει τὰς αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου); e.g., vision discriminates between white and black, and taste between sweet and bitter; and similarly in all other cases”.33 Although similar, the Epicurean testimony and the Aristotelian passage diverge firstly on account of the fact that the former only concerns perceiving (αἰσθάνεσθαι, cf. Lucretius’ tueri, used with the same meaning), not κρίνειν. Secondly, for Epicurus, as for Lucretius, sense perception in itself does not allow us to distinguish white from black – that is, to operate perceptual discrimination tout court – but only to distinguish darkness from chromatic differences, as we read in the following passage: E tenebris autem quae sunt in luce tuemur for this reason, cum propior caliginis aer ater init oculos prior et possedit apertos, insequitur candens confestim lucidus aer, qui quasi purgat eos ac nigras discutit umbras aeris illius; nam multis partibus hic est mobilior multisque minutior et mage pollens. qui simul atque uias oculorum luce repleuit atque patefecit, quas ante obsederat aer 〈ater〉, continuo rerum simulacra secuntur quae sita sunt in luce, lacessuntque ut uideamus.

315

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When we are in the dark, we can see objects that are in the light. This is because, when the black murky air, being nearer to us, has invaded our open eyes first and occupied them, it is followed instantly by the bright and luminous air that as it were purifies the eyes, dissipating the shadows of the dark air; for the bright air is far more mobile, far more subtle, and far more powerful. No sooner has it filled the ocular passages with light, and cleared those that previously had been blocked by the black

with an issue – the colourless nature of atoms – that would later be addressed by Philodemus (Sign. [PHerc. 1065] col. XVIII 3–10 De Lacy–De Lacy) and Lucretius (II 737–756). Moreover, “[i]t is presumably no accident that it should have been in a work against Theophrastus that Epicurus argued for the colourlessness of bodies in the dark. An Aristotelian would be likely to say that such circumstantially hidden colour remains present, as a first actuality” (Sedley 2020: 65 n. 17). According to Aristotle, the existence of colours (like that of all other sensible qualities) depends on their being perceived. Indeed, colours are objective physio-chemical determinations of the surfaces of objects, which, in the light, become perceivable by entities endowed with sight (first actuality). Their capacity to be seen is actualized (as second actuality) together with the actualization (again, in the sense of second actuality) of the perceptive capacity (i.e., first actuality) of a perceiver. Cf. Aristot. De an. III 2, 425b 27–28 and 426a 16–17. On Plutarch’s quotation from Against Theophrastus see also infra: n. 39. 32  That is to say that every instance of sense perception takes place in a sensory organ characterized by a physiological balance which makes it suitable to act as a selective discriminator of environmental properties. 33  Transl. by Hett, slightly modified. See also Aristot. Sens. 4, 442b 14–15.

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air, than it is followed by the images emanating from objects situated in the light, and these provoke our vision. (Lucret. IV 312–322)

This does not mean, of course, that colour is, as for Democritus, a quality of macroscopic bodies linked to the observer’s peculiar conditions and consequently marked by an ineliminable dose of subjectivity and unreliability.34 For both Epicurus and Lucretius, colour is an objective, essential, and inseparable attribute of aggregate bodies (indeed, it is one of the four συμβεβηκότα/coniuncta which are predicated of a body, cf. Hrdt. 68 and Lucret. I 445–458),35 an attribute that we experience through the simulacra detaching themselves from bodies.36 Indeed, εἴδωλα are ὁμοιοσχήμονες37 with respect to the objects from which they originate (Hrdt. 46);38 34  Cf. Sext. Emp. M VII 135–136 = 27 D14–15 Laks–Most = 68 B 9 Diels–Kranz; cf. also Gal. Med. Exp. 15, 7, fr. Schöne 1259, 8 = 27 D23a Laks–Most = 68 B 125 Diels–Kranz; Hipp. Elem. I, 417–418 Kuhn = 27 D23b Laks–Most = 68 A 49 Diels–Kranz; Diog. Laert. IX 72 = 27 D24 Laks–Most = 68 B 117 Diels–Kranz; cf. also Plutarch. Adv. Col. 1110E–F. According to Sedley (2020: esp. 69), the meaning of νόμῳ/νομιστί in these testimonies on Democritus must have been the following: “[W]hen, following convention, we speak of colour as such, or of this or that colour, we are not speaking the language of reality. Such a language, if we could ever learn to speak it fluently, would not include colour terms at all, replacing them with talk of atoms and void: the various arrangements of these in external atomic structures, and their interactions with atomic structures in our sense organs”. According to this scholar (70), Democritus’ distinction between the language of ‘reality’ and the language of ‘convention’ should be interpreted as an integral part of Parmenides’ legacy (see also the following footnote). On the ‘subjective’ character of sense perception according to Democritus’ theory of knowledge, see Sassi 1978: 207–213. On Democritus’ conception of colours, see esp. Aristot. De gen. et corr. I 2, 316a 1; 27 D72 Laks–Most = 68 A 123 Diels–Kranz; Aët. Plac. I 15, 11, Dox. 314, MR 534 = 68 A 124 Diels–Kranz; Aët. Plac. I 15, 8, Dox. 314, MR 534 = 68 A 125 Diels–Kranz. From these testimonies we learn that Democritus, while considering colour a νόμῳ quality, strove to objectively ground its reality. The question is actually very problematic, and the remarks made by Sassi (1978: 138–149, 207–235) prove most useful. 35  See also Polystr. De cont. (PHerc. 336/1150) coll. XXIII 26–XVI 23 Indelli. 36  Concerning the issue of the ontological status of sensible properties in Democritus and Epicurus, particularly the debate on the position of the former, I will refer – in addition to the aforementioned Sassi 1978 (specifically devoted to Democritus) and Sedley 2020 – to Sedley 1988 (according to whom the genesis of Democritus’ ‘scepticism’ about sensible qualities should be ascribed to his underlying reductionism: “In current jargon, Democritus is an eliminative materialist, who holds that phenomenal states are nothing over and above physical states, and infers that they are unreal”, 298–299); Furley 1993 (who, emphasizing Democritus’ Eleatic heritage, argues that what makes the secondary qualities unreal, according to the Abderite, is their changeability, 93); O’Keefe 1997 (who criticis\zes the positions of Sedley 1988 [“it is because secondary qualities cannot be identified with physical states that Democritus infers that they are unreal”, 123–124] and Furley 1993 [to whom he objects that for Democritus it is not the changeability but rather “the relativity of perceptible qualities – e.g., that honey tastes sweet to some and bitter to others – that makes Democritus declare the honey no more sweet than bitter, and hence neither sweet not bitter”, 122], in the firm belief that “it is his [scil. Democritus’] negative O[ntological]-dogmatism on sensible qualities that leads to his E[pistemological]-skepticism”, 121; for this position, see also O’ Keefe 2005: ch. 4); and, more recently, Castagnoli 2013, who especially focuses on Plutarch. Adv. Col. 11108D–1111E. 37  On the adjective ὁμοιοσχήμων, as well as the related term ὁμοιόμορφος, see Epicur. Nat. II, col. 38, 2ff. Leone, together with their commentaries; on the same subject, see also Corti 2015. 38  See also Epicur. Hrdt. 48 and Lucret. IV 68–69. It should be noted that the adjective ὁμοιοσχήμων also appears in Epicur. Nat. XXV (PHerc. 1420) corn. 2 z. 2 Laursen 1995: 91 (where we are told that

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and since colour is directly connected to (and dependent on) the σχῆμα of aggregates (cf. Lucret. IV 243; Hrdt. 54, where, however, colour is not explicitly mentioned; Hrdt. 44 [scholion] and Sext. Emp. M VII 206 = part. 247 Usener), the outlines (οἱ τύποι) that reach us from things maintain the same colour as the στερέμνια (Hrdt. 49).39 Colour, in short, is an objective datum transmitted by the simulacrum, which sense perception is only capable of recording (sense perception records the existence/occurrence of a colour or colours), not of discerning (sense perception is incapable of ‘realizing’ whether the colour it registers is red or green). It could be argued that in Diogenes Laertius’ account of the Epicurean canonic (X 32) – discussed at the beginning of this paper – the adjective κριτικαί is employed in connection to sense perception. On closer inspection, however, what the doxographer is saying is not that sense perceptions are κριτικαί of the differences between sensible qualities, but simply that when two different observers (or the same observer at two different moments, let us say t1 and t2) have (has) two different sense perceptions of the same object, one must consider these sense perceptions as if they referred to (= were critical of) two distinct objects. At this point, I believe it is worth briefly returning to PHerc. 19/698. Column XX A Monet, discussed above, seems to reveal a conception of the veridical status of sense perception that, while setting out from some fundamental assumptions of Epicurean physiology, approaches a position close to the one we found in Aristotle’s De anima. In order to clarify this matter as far as possible, it will be useful to examine column XXVIII A Monet of the Epicurean (?) text, which reads as follows: the simulacra penetrating the mental aggregate are ὁμοιοσχήμονα with respect to those that penetrate the other sensory organs), as well as in Aët. Plac. IV 19, 2, Dox. 408 = Aët. Plac. IV 19, 4, MR 1688 = 321 Usener (where ὁμοιοσχήμονα are the parts into which the flow of sound is fragmented on its way from the sound source to the hearers’ sensory organs). 39  The testimony provided by Plutarch in Adv. Col. 1110C, which I have quoted above in footnote 31, is rather problematic in my opinion. According to O’Keefe (1997: 129–131), this testimony supports the hypothesis that colour, like other sensible qualities, is a ‘relational property’ for Epicurus, since “[i]t’s hard to see why Epicurus would say this if he thinks that colors are intrinsic properties, which would still be present in the object even if there were never anybody to perceive them”. In my view, the σώματα to which colours are not connected, according to Epicurus, are not aggregate bodies (συγκρίσεις), but rather – we might say – bodies as bodies. For Epicurus, it is corporeity as such that has no colour, and in relation to it colour cannot be defined as συμφυές. But I think it is possible to say that colour is an intrinsic property (ἀίδια/ἀεὶ συμβεβηκότα, see Epicur. Hrdt. 68–69) of the συγκρίσεις in light (see also Sedley 2020: esp. 65). Any aggregate, which necessarily has a specific σχῆμα, for this very reason also has a specific colour, in the sense that colour is one of the ways in which the σχῆμα shows itself in the light. After all, colours nequeunt sine luce (Lucret. II 795, and, more generally, 795–798, 808–812), which is why not even aggregates have any colour in the darkness, even if they possess a σχῆμα allowing us to detect them whenever they re-emerge from the shadow (cf. Philod. Sign. [PHerc. 1065] XVIII 3–10 De Lacy–De Lacy). What is not entirely clear to me, however, is the role played by light. It is certainly an essential requirement for vision (Lucretius explains this clearly in verses 312–322 of Book IV, quoted supra: 114–115). Yet how does light interact with the σχῆμα of an aggregate body? And how do different light conditions affect the colour of the aggregate? What does it mean that colours are produced by a certain striking of light (quodam gignuntur luminis ictu, Lucret. II 808)?

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ἐξακριβοῦμεν, ὥστε | τῶν αἰσ[θ]ήσεων προσ|υπομνῄσ{ω}μεν ὃ προσ|φέρεται ἴδιον ἑκάστ̣η χω|5ρὶς τῆς τῶν κρινομέ|νων ἐπαισθήσεως. ἡ | μὲν τοίνυν ὅρασις ἰδιώ|τατον ἔ[χ]ει παρὰ τὰς ἄλ|λας χωρ[ὶ]ς τῆς τῶν [χ]ρω|10 μάτων καὶ τῶν πε[ρ]ὶ ταῦ|τα κρίσεως, τὸ

ἐν ἀποσ|τάσει κα[τ]αλαμβάνειν | τὰς μορφὰς ἐπαισθα|νομένην καὶ τοῦ με|15ταξὺ ἐαυ[τ] ῆς τε κἀκει|[νων δια]στ[ή]ματ[ος (…)

(emphasis added)

nous étudions avec exactitude, de telle sorte que nous mentionnerons en outre ce que chacune des sensations, indépendamment de la perception des objets discernés, apporte en propre. La vue a donc la particularité singulière, à la différence des autres sensations, indépendamment du discernement des couleurs et de ce qui est relatif à celles-ci, de saisir les formes à distance, tout en percevant également l’intervalle qui se trouve entre elle-même et celles-ci (…) ([Philod.] [Sens.] (PHerc. 19/698) col. XXVIII A 1–16 Monet)

In this column, τὰ κρινόμενα are connected, properly speaking, not to αἴσθησις but to ἐπαίσθησις, a concept that replaces that of αἴσθησις in several passages of what remains of the treatise (see e.g., coll. XI A 5, 10; XII A 9, 12, 14; XIV B 8; XXVIII A 6 Monet). Epicurus mentions ἐπαίσθησις in the second section of paragraph 52 of the letter to Herodotus, which is devoted to an analysis of hearing, but he never talks about it in connection with sight.40 One has an ἐπαίσθησις when the flow of the simulacra is arranged in order to ensure the continuity and unity of the sound, voice, or noise. In this sense, ἐπαίσθησις seems to designate a more elaborate and refined degree of perception than αἴσθησις, since ἐπαίσθησις is not reduced, like αἴσθησις, to the mere recording of the external presence of an object.41 By emphasizing the intentional aspect of the perceptive process, the very term ἐπαίσθησις conveys the idea of some application (ἐπί) by the perceiver (perhaps a first kind of decoding) on the material provided by sense perception. In essence, when there is maximum conformity (συμπάθεια) between the flow of the simulacra and the object of origin (the sound source in the case of hearing) that lies at the basis of the perceptual mechanism, a clear and elaborate perception follows: a perception that cannot be reduced to the status proper to αἴσθησις, but which at the same time is not strictly 40 Epicur. Hrdt. 52: τὸ δὲ ῥεῦμα τοῦτο εἰς ὁμοιομερεῖς ὄγκους διασπείρεται, ἅμα τινὰ διασῴζοντας συμπάθειαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἑνότητα ἰδιότροπον, διατείνουσαν πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖλαν καὶ τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν τὴν ἐπ’ ἐκείνου ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ποιοῦσαν, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὸ ἔξωθεν μόνον ἔνδηλον παρασκευάζουσαν (“This flow

is broken into small masses which are homogeneous with the whole which at the same time preserve an harmonious set [of qualities] relative to each other and also a unique kind of unity which extends back to the originating source and, usually, produces the perceptual experience occasioned by the flow; and if not, it only makes the external object apparent”, transl. by Inwood–Gerson). Cf. Nat. XXV (PHerc. 1056) corn. 4 z. 1, 10 Laursen 1995: 106 = [34] [16] Arrighetti; Nat. XXV (PHerc. 697) corn. 4 pz. 2 z. 2, 2 Laursen 1997: 43 = [34] [31] Arrighetti 41 On ἐπαίσθησις, see Masi 2006: 45–46; Verde 2010b: 141–143; Cavalli 2012; Verde 2013: 111–112; Németh 2017: 17–24.

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dependent on the intervention of λογισμός.42 The idea of a kind of sense perception that participates in reasoning, and can be modified by it, is completely unacceptable for Epicurus and the Epicureans, as we can see from the fourth book of Philodemus’ De musica. Here the philosopher criticizes the hypothesis put forward by Diogenes of Babylon (Philod. Mus. IV col. 34, 1–22 Delattre = SVF III 61),43 and derived, in turn, from the Academic philosopher Speusippus (Sext. Emp. M VII 145–146 = F 1 Isnardi Parente = F 75 Tarán), who admits the existence of a kind of αἴσθησις that is ἐπιστημονική, “scientific”.44 What is interesting to note, in my opinion, is that, in criticising Diogenes, Philodemus seems to ‘amend’ his doctrine, by distinguishing not between different kinds of sense perception, but between different δυνάμεις of sense perception (which in itself remains one). More precisely, Philodemus suggests we distinguish between an αὐτοφυὴς δύναμις of sense perception – from which reason is absent (ἀλ]όγου) and whose power of discerning (κρ⟦ε⟧ίνεται) is limited, for each sense, to the respective proper sensible (Mus. IV col. 115, 35–37 Delattre) – and an ἐπιστημονικὴ δύναμις – which enables sense perception to discern what pertains to the intellect ([τ]ο̣ῦ̣ | γε] νοῦ, 37–39), provided that we add (ἔ̣π̣εσ̣ ̣[τί]) to the immediate evidence (τ] οῖς ἐναργέσι […] προχειροτά[τ]οι ̣ς) something (τι)̣ ̣ accompanying it (παρε[πόμε|ν̣ον, 39–41).45 Only if something (probably some sort of opinative content) is added to sense perception – which in itself is of a single kind and is always and exclusively αὐτοφυής – can the latter discern the διαφοραί, or “differences”, between sensibles. Sense perception/αἴσθησις inevitably remains ἄλογος, and judgement on sense perceptions is exclusively up to διάνοια: it is not the task of αἴσθησις to grasp the difference between different musical genres (col. 116, 15ff.), just as it is not the task of αἴσθησις to “diagnosticare (διανο[ῆσ]αι) se un verso o una strofa abbiano un buon ritmo, o, alla stessa guisa, se non ce l’abbiano” (Po. II [PHerc. 994] Tr. A col. b 7–13 Sbordone, transl. by Sbordone).46 Aἴσθησις, however, even when considered in itself – that is, independently of διάνοια – still benefits from a δύναμις (the αὐτοφυὴς δύναμις), which manifests itself as a capacity to κρίνειν the proper sensibles (albeit 42 

Masi 2006: 45–46. Diogenes of Babylon distinguished between three different kinds of αἴσθησις: 1) the αὐτοφυὴς αἴσθησις and 2) the ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις, both of which are directed towards the qualities of objects; and 3) an anonymous sense perception, generally not disjointed from the second kind of αἴσθησις and capable of determining the subjective response in terms of pleasure or pain. Different from the αὐτοφυὴς αἴσθησις – which, in so far as ἄλογος, is shared by man and other animals –, the ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις designates a more sophisticated form of perception, strictly connected to the exercise of a certain τέχνη. The ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις is, therefore, a ‘modified’ αἴσθησις – in comparison to the αὐτοφυής one – in which “l’elemento del πάσχειν è strettamente intrecciato a quello del ποιεῖν, anzi del πράττειν” (Rispoli 1983: 93). On this subject, see also the recent studies by Klavan 2019, Verde 2021 and 2022: 51–62. 44  Regarding this testimony by Sextus Empircus, see especially Klavan 2019: esp. 911. 45  Rispoli 1983: 99–101. 46  Transl. by Sbordone. 43 

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in a non-propositional sense). In such cases, at least in my opinion, αἴσθησις is, properly speaking, an ἐπαίσθησις, which does not merely record the existence of something external, but provides a more precise focus on it, which is why its being ἄλογος seems to present itself in a less ‘definitive’ and ‘absolute’ way than in the case of αἴσθησις tout court. Be that as it may, what is worth emphasizing, in light of the above remarks, is the fact that the terminology employed by Lucretius to define the potestas of sight faithfully restores the meaning (and paradoxical nature) of Epicurus’ αἴσθησις, which can do so little that, in the little it does, it is absolutely infallible.

3. Notitia/notities47 The second terminological issue I would like to draw attention to concerns the terms notitia and notities, which occur several times in the DRN. In paragraph 46, 142 of the Lucullus (245 Usener), Cicero – almost literally translating the Laertian quotation from Epicurus’ Canon (Diog. Laert. X 31 = 35 Usener)48 – reports that according to the founder of the Garden omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in uoluptate constituit. He calls notitiae what in Diogenes’ account were referred to as προλήψεις,49 thus supporting the hypothesis that behind Lucretius’ notitia/notities there lies the second Epicurean canon of truth, πρόληψις. More controversial, however, is the question of how faithfully Lucretius conceives of what had been a peculiar and rigorously defined technical concept for his master, to the point of requiring the introduction of a hitherto unattested word (πρόληψις; cf. Cic. ND I 17, 44 = part. 255 Usener). What is particularly difficult to determine is whether, when the terms notitia and notities are brought into play in the DRN, Lucretius ‘extends’ the scope of Epicurus’ πρόληψις in the direction of Stoic ἔννοιαι50 (as distinct from φυσικαὶ ἔνννοιαι, identified with προλήψεις),51 that is, concepts 47 

For a more in-depth version of this paragraph, I would refer the reader to Rover 2022. Striker 1996 (1974): 30. 49  In fact, it should be noted that in ND I 17, 43–45 (part. 255 Usener) Cicero explicitly states that he is translating what Epicurus designates as πρόληψις using the Latin terms anticipatio (which also appears as antecepta informatio) and praenotio. Further confirmation of the fact that the term notitia refers to πρόληψις can be found, at least in my opinion, in Cic. Lucull. 7, 21–22, where Lucullus, speaking of those concepts (notitiae rerum = φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι?) that are imprinted upon us (nobis inprimuntur) and stating that these cannot be false, points out that “you seemed to use the term ‘conception’ [notitia] for ἔννοιαι”, since “[i]n that case there’s no room left at all for memory (memoria)” (transl. by Brittain). 50  This is also the direction taken by Cic. Lucull. 10, 30, where it is said that the notitiae of things were sometimes called ἔννοιαι by the Greeks, sometimes προλήψεις. However, the possibility that, as in Lucull. 7, 21–22 (see note above), the word ἔννοιαι refers here to φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι cannot be ruled out (see also the following footnote). 51  Cf. Diog. Laert. VII 54 = SVF II 105: ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. Cf. also Plutarch. fr. 215F Sandbach = SVF II 104, from which we learn that the Stoics – like the Epicureans (see also Diog. Laert. X 33 = part. 255 Usener) – introduced the φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι in order to cope with the 48 

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that – as we learn from Cic. Varro 11, 42 (SVF I 60) – (necessarily) derive from the criterion of comprehensio (κατάληψις), yet have ultimately lost their original link with sense perception.52 By briefly reviewing the occurrences of notitia/notities in the DRN,53 it is possible to appreciate that Lucretius remains absolutely faithful to the second criterion of the Epicurean canonic. On most occasions, this is exploited by the poet in order to refute the position of his opponent(s) on a given subject, thus bringing out and corroborating the truth of the Epicurean view.54 Let us think, for instance, of the insita notities hominum we find in verse 182 of Book V, (probably) in conflict with the creationist paradigm deployed in Plato’s Timaeus (29e–30c):55 there can be no prolepsis of what does not yet exist – for example, of man prior to his creation by the gods. The meaning of the term notities, which is juxtaposed to those of exemplum and specimen, evokes the memory of something that has often appeared from outside (cf. Diog. Laert. X 33). If we choose to adopt the ‘creationist’ paradigm (according to which it is the gods who have created the world and, consequently, man), this memory cannot in any way be imprinted (inherent, Lucret. V 182 and 1047) in the minds of the gods, in the absence of a prior and repeated presentation of the image of man from outside. Man is not an a priori (Platonic) form. From an epistemological point of view, the gods are subject to the same restrictions as us, and their understanding too is a posteriori.56 The same remarks apply to the insita notities utilitatis of language referred to in verse 1047 of the fifth book. Without going into the details of Lucretius’ polemical target, it is sufficient to underline how here, too, what is unacceptable to the poet is the hypothesis of the existence of a priori models of reality which provide the Menon’s paradox (Pl. Men. 80d–e; cf. also Euthyd. 277e–278a, and Theaet. 188a–b), without resorting to the doctrine of the ἀνάμνησις. 52  According to Chrysippus, ἔννοια – strictly speaking – is any conceptual knowledge defined as a πρόληψις διηρθρωμένη (‘articulated prenotion’): see Plutarch. Comm. not. 1059B–C = SVF II 33; cf. Plutarch. fr. 215F Sandbach = SVF II 104. In this sense, ἔννοιαι can be defined as “technical notions” (cf. Diog. Laert. VII 51 = SVF II 61: τεχνικαὶ νοήσεις), formed through teaching, practice and dedication (Aët. Plac. IV 11, Dox. 400, M–R 1591–1592 = SVF II 83). 53  There are eight occurrences of the term notitia/notities in Lucretius’ poem: II 124, 744–745; IV 476, 479, 853–854, V 124–125, 181–182, 1047. 54  This occurs especially in Lucret. IV 474 and 479 (anti-sceptical polemic), 853–854 (against natural finalism); V 124–125 (against Platonic and Aristotelian astral/cosmic theology), 181–182 (against the creationist paradigm of Plato’s Timaeus), and 1047 (against the hypothesis of the νομοθέτης). For a more detailed analysis of Lucretius’ opponents and of doctrinal polemics based on the criterion of prolepsis, see Rover 2022. 55  Although it is possible that, in composing his critique, Lucretius had other works in mind besides the Timaeus, I am quite persuaded by the hypothesis that Lucret. V 156–234 mainly draws upon the cosmology of the Timaeus, especially because the poet’s arguments follow a scheme which closely matches the one found in Plato’s dialogue. The bibliography on this question is quite vast; this is not the place to discuss it in detail, so I shall only refer to the useful overview provided by Galzerano 2019: 133–161. 56  See Sedley 2007: 140–141. Just like human beings, moreover, in order to live the gods must possess sense perception. The latter, in turn, is exclusively possible through bodily appendages, which makes the hypothesis of a deity infinitely extended in space impossible. See also Sedley 2007: 149.

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archetypes not only of the components of the sensible world, but also of their names (especially revealing, in this respect, is the expression τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος57 in Pl. Cra. 390a 5–6). No one, not even a hypothetical νομοθέτης, could have had the concept of the utilitas of language, “unless our natural vocal noises had turned out to serve a labeling function”.58 With regard to the two occurrences of notities just mentioned, it is particularly noteworthy that in both cases the adjective insita appears:59 for every prolepsis, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, is a καθολικὴ νόησις ἐναποκειμένη (X 33 = part. 255 Usener),60 a τύπος “implanted”61 (in the material sense of the term) in our minds via the repeated impact of a certain kind of object. Lucretius also refers to the notitia utilitatis in his attack on the teleological perspective in Book IV (esp. verses 853–857). Here he draws attention to all those things – the various parts of the body – which were engendered early on, yet only came to be associated with a notion of usefulness (notitiam utilitatis) at a later stage, on the basis of humanity’s repeated experience of them. The poet’s argumentative strategy, which is consistent with his criticism of the ‘creationist’ paradigm and the νομοθέτης hypothesis, seems to take up – for polemical purposes – the already Empedoclean thesis that the individual parts of the body (hands, eyes, etc.) have always been designed to serve specific purposes.62 Again, in Book IV, at the beginning of the so-called anti-sceptical polemic, the expressions notities ueri and notitia ueri falsique appear, in verses 476 and 479, respectively: Denique nihil sciri si quis putat, id quoque nescit an sciri possit, quoniam nihil scire fatetur. hunc igitur contra mittam contendere causam,

470

57  It is precisely to the Platonic εἶδος that Lucretius seems to be polemically alluding in II 378–379, in which we read that the rerum primordia “are natural formations and are not modeled by hand after a single, fixed pattern” (natura quoniam constant neque facta manu sunt / unius ad certam formam primordia rerum). 58  Sedley 2007: 154. 59  This adjective also appears in Cic. ND I 17, 44 (part. 255 Usener) in relation to the prolepsis of the gods, defined by Velleius as a cognitio insita and innata. 60  The hypothesis that insita represents the Latin translation of the Greek participial form ἐναποκειμένη, employed by Diogenes (X 33), has been advanced by Verde 2016b: 357. 61  Konstan (2011: 68) suggested that the cognitio of the divine (see previous footnote) is innata not because it is literally innate – which would entail that “we are from birth programmed to acquire it”, independently from our experiences (Sedley 2011: 41) – but in the sense that it is ‘implanted’, i.e., that it constitutes a kind of knowledge which can be acquired by anyone, anytime, and anywhere, regardless of race. And the reason for this is that the simulacra detaching themselves from the gods convey their main features to everyone, giving all human beings a way to understand what the nature of the divine really consists of (cf. also Cic. ND I 19, 49 = 352 Usener). See also Miloš 2012: 251–253. In support of the translation of innata as ‘implanted’, cf. Cic. Tusc. III 1, 2, wherein Cicero claims that “the seeds of virtue are native to our character” (sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum, transl. by King) and that, if they are allowed to develop, then nature itself will lead us to a blessed life. 62  See 31 B 35 Diels–Kranz = 22 D75, R70 Laks–Most; 31 B 84 Diels–Kranz = 22 D215 Laks–Most; 31 B 86 Diels–Kranz = 22 D213, R70 Laks–Most; 31 B 87 Diels–Kranz = 22 D214, R70 Laks–Most; 31 B 95 Diels–Kranz = 22 D217, R70 Laks–Most (first stage of Love’s zoogony).

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qui capite ipse sua in statuit uestigia sese. et tamen hoc quoque uti concedam scire, at id ipsum quaeram, cum in rebus ueri nihil uiderit ante, unde sciat quid sit scire et nescire uicissim, 475 notitiam ueri quae res falsique crearit, et dubium certo quae res differre probarit. Inuenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam notitiem ueri neque sensus posse refelli. (emphasis added) Moreover, if people suppose that knowledge of anything is impossible, they do not even know whether knowledge of the impossibility of knowledge is possible, since, on their own admission, they know nothing. Against such people, who have planted themselves with their head in their own footprints, I disdain to argue. However, if I were to concede that they do have this knowledge, I would put the following questions to them. Since they have never before encountered anything true, how do they recognize knowledge and ignorance? What has given them their conception of truth and falsehood? What proof have they that the doubtful differs from the certain? You will find that our conception of truth is derived ultimately from the senses, and that their evidence is unimpugnable. (Lucret. IV 469–479)

In the light of the affinity between these verses by Lucretius and what we read in paragraphs 10, 31–11, 33 of Cicero’s Lucullus – where Lucullus, the spokesman of Antiochus of Ascalon, makes use of the notio/regula ueri et falsi in order to show the untenability of Academic scepticism (cf. Lucull. 7, 22, where the notitia ueri et falsi appears) – I would argue that, in the passage just quoted, Lucretius is in some way ‘reformulating’ Lucullus/Antiochus’ speech,63 by relying on the second canon of truth of Epicurus’ theory of knowledge. What is more, Lucretius could also rely on the fact that Epicurus had already deployed a very similar strategy in Book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως.64 As Lucretius’ sceptical opponent could easily undermine Epicurus’ notion of αἴσθησις (bearing in mind that, on the epistemological level, Arcesilaus would have found it superfluous to refute the first criterion of the Epicurean canonic, deeming it sufficient for him to oppose the Stoic καταλεπτικὴ φαντασία),65 63  This hypothesis was already suggested by Lévy 1997 and 1998. With regard to the interpretation proposed by Lévy, I would also refer to Rover 2020. 64  Cf. Epicur. Nat. XXV (PHerc. 1191) corn. 8 pz. 2 z. 1 = – 10 sup.; (PHerc. 697) corn. 4 pz. 1 z. 2; (PHerc.1056) cor. 7 z. 1 Laursen 1997: 35 = T 8 c Masi 2006 = [34] [27] Arrighetti, and Nat. XXV (PHerc. 1056) corn. 7 z. 2; (PHerc. 697) cor. 4 pz. 1 z. 3 Laursen 1997: 37 = T 8 d–e Masi 2006 = [34] [28] Arrighetti. 65  A clue as to this situation is provided by Plutarch’s Adversus Colotem (esp. 1121E–1124C), from which we know that the controversy between Arcesilaus and the Epicureans was played out on an ethical level. If we restrict the dispute to the epistemological level, however, then we find that Arcesilaus’ only opponent was the Stoic school. By demolishing the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, the Stoic criterion of truth, Arcesilaus at the same time also rejected the first criterion of the Epicurean canonic, since

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Lucretius may have found it preferable to oppose the Sceptics through the criterion of πρόληψις. The latter, owing to the intervention of λογισμός, would have been a more refined criterion and, perhaps, a more appropriate one for a philosopher eager to participate in the Hellenistic debate on the existence and possibility of knowledge. The poet’s argument seems to be the same as in the previous cases: how is it possible to have the prolepsis (notitia/notities) of something never experienced before? In the above-quoted text, in particular, Lucretius seems to be ‘playing’ with the two meanings of truth we find in Epicurean philosophy. On the one hand, we have the truth associated with the reality/existence of simulacra that strike our sense organs – that is, the truth proper to αἴσθησις – and as the veracity of judgement.66 On the other hand, truth on the propositional level is inevitably bound up with perceptual truth and relies on it. If we do not put our full trust in the senses, there will be nothing from which to derive and process the notitia of the true (and, conversely, that of the false), just as, without having repeatedly perceived a certain kind of object, it is impossible for διάνοια to process – and form the prolepsis of – the object in question.

4. Animi iactus/iniectus In the previous section we established that by the terms notitia and notities Lucretius probably – and contrary to what has been argued by many scholars, even quite recently67 – aims to designate the second criterion of truth theorized by Epicurus, to which he seems to remain strictly faithful. Closely connected to the topic of prolepsis are two further and epistemologically relevant expressions that emerge from the verses of the DRN. The phrases animi iniectus and animi iactus – which I Epicurean αἴσθησις – which is always true insofar as it is a mere recording of an external impact on the sensory organs – is much less ‘qualified’ and rigorous than the Stoic καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, whose requirements are quite strict. According to the Stoics, not all perceptual impressions are criteria of truth, whereas for the Epicureans sense perceptions all equally and without exception convey truthful content. The reason for this, as will soon become clear, is that the Epicurean concept of truth at stake here must be considered a synonym of ‘real’. Consequently, if not even the Stoic criterion succeeds in being a ‘reliable messenger’ of external reality, then it is all the more unlikely for Epicurean αἴσθησις to play this role. On this point, see Corti 2013 and 2014: esp. 115–123, in addition to Kechagia 2011: 111–112, 126. 66  On the two meanings (or levels) of truth (the truth of sense perception and the truth of judgement) to be found in Epicurean philosophy, see esp. Dem. Lac. Op. inc. (PHerc. 1012) coll. LXXII–LXXIII Puglia; cf. Epicur. Hrdt. 50–51; Sext. Emp. M VII 203 (part. 247 Usener), VIII 9 (244 and part. 247 Usener); Cic. Lucull. 14, 45 = 223 Usener. On this issue, as well as on the passages just mentioned, see especially Verde 2018. 67  Robitzsch (2021: 613) states, without further argument, that “Lucretius uses notitia and notities multiple times in On the Nature of Things, but it is not clear that he is always rendering the same Greek technical term and so whether all instances of the term translate the Epicurean technical term πρόληψις”.

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consider to be synonymous – are usually interpreted by contemporary scholars as the Lucretian equivalent of the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας (inicio and iacio being the Latin equivalents of ἐπιβάλλω). Not least on the basis of an occurrence of animi iniectus in the second book of the DRN (v. 740), some scholars have argued that the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας must be understood as an integral component of preconception, which would otherwise be reduced to a kind of passive memory of past sense perceptions, ultimately losing its status as a criterion of truth (since it would not be capable of “grasping in advance” [πρό + λαμβάνειν]).68 In the passage in question, after stating that primordia are devoid of colour, Lucretius adds: In quae corpora si nullus tibi forte uidetur posse animi iniectus fieri, procul auius erras. nam cum caecigeni, solis qui lumina numquam dispexere, tamen cognoscant corpora tactu ex ineunte aeuo nullo coniuncta colore, scire licet nostrae quoque menti corpora posse uorti in notitiam nullo circumlita fuco. denique nos ipsi caecis quaecumque tenebris tangimus, haud ullo sentimus tincta colore. (emphasis added)

740

745

If by chance you think that the mind is unable to become cognizant of such particles, you are wandering far astray. Blind-born people, who have never discerned the light of the sun, recognize by touch objects that they have never connected with colour from the moment of their birth. It is evident therefore that our minds too can form a conception of particles not painted with any colour. In fact, when we ourselves touch objects in blinding darkness, we do not feel that they are imbued with any colour. (Lucret. IV 739–747)

In the light of these verses, it has been suggested that the “throwing” of the mind (animi iniectus) that makes us capable of conceiving of bodies without colour is to be identified with the notitia, or, at least, with the ‘active’ aspect of the notitia that we possess of such bodies.69 It seems to me, however, that the two concepts in this passage designate two distinct elements: notitia refers to the prolepsis of colourless bodies, which in the case of aggregate bodies arises through the memory and 68  This view, which Tsouna (2016: 167–168) refers to as the ‘Kantian’ view, is endorsed by Goldschmidt 1978, Glidden 1985, and Morel 2008. The appellative ‘Kantian’ is due to the fact that, as emphasised by Goldschmidt (1978: esp. 157), for both Epicurus and Kant our sense perception and conceptualisation of the world is always mediated by the mind. On the contrary, the label ‘Lockean view’ is employed for those who support the entirely passive character of πρόληψις, such as Long–Sedley 1987: vol. I, 89. 69  Glidden 1985: 191–194, and Morel 2008. 39. For a comprehensive analysis of the various sources invoked by the followers of the so–called ‘Kantian view’ to corroborate their interpretation of the relationship between πρόληψις and ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, see Tsouna 2016: 186–193.

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synthesis (involving the intervention of λογισμός,70 which preserves the essential characteristics)71 of repeated tactile experiences of a certain object, whilst occurring via analogy in the case of primordia. On the other hand, animi iniectus refers to the act, separate from prolepsis, by which the mind becomes aware of a fundamental truth (e.g., the corporeity of atoms).72 The fact that, in the DRN, the animi iniectus designates a component of the theory of knowledge that does not coincide with the second canon of truth73 is clear from the occurrence of the same expression (in the form animi iactus) in verse 1047, again in Book II. When about to disclose an extraordinary truth to his reader (noua species rerum, II 1025), namely, the thesis of an infinite number of worlds, Lucretius writes: quaerit enim rationem animus, cum summa loci sit infinita foris haec extra moenia mundi, 1045 quid sit ibi porro quo prospicere usque uelit mens atque animi iactus liber quo peruolet ipse. (emphasis added) 70  Something similar is also found in Aristotle regarding φαντασία. At first, φαντασία is presented by Aristotle as the mere retention of perceptions (αἰσθήσεις) in the sensorium in the form of αἰσθήματα, which, in turn, become/cause φαντάσματα, thus making memory possible (μνήμη: De insomn. 3, 460b 29 and 461a 18–19; see also the actual definition of φαντασία in De an. III 3, 428b 30–429a 6). In human beings, however, φαντασία is not reduced to the mere retention of perceived contents, but consists in the use and manipulation of the φαντάσματα mentioned above, implying a noetic and dianoetic capacity (cf. De an. III 9). See especially Zucca 2015: 227–228, and, more generally, 227–266 (I refer to Zucca’s study also for an exhaustive bibliography on the subject). 71  For a clear explanation of the role of Epicurean prolepsis as a criterion of truth separate from sense perception, see Miloš 2012 (contra Furley 1967: 206, Glidden 1985: 186, and, at least partly, Rist 1972: esp. 29–30). Miloš aims to clarify, on the one hand, that the main epistemological role of prolepsis is the conceptualisation of the (raw) perceptual material provided by sense perception, and, on the other hand, that the truth of all προλήψεις is guaranteed by the fact that the various mental processes connected to them (reasoning by analogy, similarity or combination, cf. Diog. Laert. X 32) inexorably proceed from what is evident (ἐναργές). 72  A different view is held by Robitzsch (2021: 613), according to whom this occurrence of animi iniectus is employed “in the general sense of thought”. 73  Recently, this position has also been defended by Robitzsch (2021: 609–612); this scholar dwells on the only evidence that seems to suggest an overlap of πρόληψις and ἐπιβολή, namely, the testimony by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. II 4, 157, 44 = part. 255 Usener), in which we read: πρόληψιν δὲ

ἀποδίδωσιν ἐπιβολὴν ἐπί τι ἐναργὲς καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναργῆ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπίνοιαν· μὴ δύνασθαι δὲ μηδένα μήτε ζητῆσαι μήτε ἀπορῆσαι μηδὲ μὴν δοξάσαι, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐλέγξαι χωρὶς προλήψεως (“He [scil. Epicurus]

expounds ‘preconception’ as a close attention directed to a clear object and a clear concept of the object. He said that it is impossible to conduct an investigation or pose a problem or even have an opinion, or even refute another, without this ‘preconception’”, transl. by Ferguson). Elsewhere (Rover 2022: 306–307 and n. 100) I have argued that, in the passage in question, Clement – a source hostile to Epicureanism – is tendentious and offers a rough, and therefore not necessarily reliable, description of Epicurean prolepsis, in which different elements of Epicurean canonic are combined. On his part, Robitzsch argues, rather convincingly, that “even if the words used in Clement are Epicurus’ own, one might also argue that in the passage in Clement ἐπιβολή is used in a general sense, as a generic term for thought. […] Accordingly, the claim that a preconception is an ἐπιβολή understood as a general thought is compatible with the claim that there are ἐπιβολαί as criteria of truth that are distinct from the entities that Clement is referring to in the above passage” (2021: 610–611).

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For, since the totality of space out beyond the ramparts of our world is infinite, my mind seeks the explanation of what exists in those boundless tracts which the intelligence is eager to probe and into which the mind can freely and spontaneously project itself in flight. (Lucret. II 1044–1047)

In this case, I believe, the “throwing” of the animus is not directed at a particular object, but is “unrestricted”74 and “free” to roam infinite space. And the reaching out (prospicere, v. 1046) of the animus in which it consists allows us to mentally grasp the infinity of the universe (cf. Cic. ND I 20, 53–54 = 352 Usener).75 Now, in Book I of Lucretius’ poem, the one who dares to march “far beyond the blazing battlements of the world” (extra … moenia mundi) is Epicurus, “the first to burst the bolts and bars of nature’s gates” (70–73). In these cases, the impulse of the soul seems to serve as a criterion of truth in itself. Similar to what has been defined as “a major intellectual breakthrough”,76 the animi iactus allows us to reach important truths, which, in turn, are such as to contribute significantly to the tranquillity of the soul.77 Thus understood, the ἐπιβολή seems to acquire autonomous epistemological and ethical value, which is confirmed, among other things, in the conclusion of the fourth book of Philodemus’ De morte ([PHerc. 1050] col. 118, 15–25 Delattre = col. 39, 15–24 Henry). Here we read that at the moment of death good Epicureans are able to retrace with extreme acuity the past enjoyment of every good and to think of the perfect lack of sensibility that they are about to ‘experience’, as if they had never abandoned the ἐπιβολή even for a moment (ὡς εἰ μηδὲ τὸν ἐλάχιστον χ[ρ]ό|ν[ο]ν ἐγλείπουσαν ἔσχον τὴν ἐπιβολήν, 24–25 Delattre).78 This ‘application’, in my opinion, is reminiscent of that κυριωτὰτη ἐπιβολή by which Epicurus, in paragraph 36 of his Letter to Herodotus, seems to designate a sort of ‘supreme’ or ‘superior’ application directed towards the truth of things79 and formed by continuously recalling the set of the main Epicurean doctrines in one’s memory (τῶν ὁλοσχερωτάτων τύπων). Finally, a third occurrence of the expression animi iniectus can be found, again in Book II, in verse 1080, provided we accept the emendation suggested by Lipsius, 74 

See Bailey 1947: 55. In Cic. ND I 20, 53–54 Velleius states that if we were able to project the mind and turn it (se iniciens animus et intendens) towards the boundless and infinite extension of space in every direction, we would easily realize that there is no need to postulate the existence of a divine craftsman in order to justify the occurrence of our world. 76  Tsouna 2016: 213. 77  Ibid. See also Sedley 2018: 115. 78  On this passage, see Armstrong 2004: esp. 49–54. For a survey of the most relevant occurrences of the term ἐπιβολή in Philodemus’ works (particularly De dis, besides the aforementioned section of De morte), see Robitzsch 2021: 614–616. 79  Cf. the ἀθρόα ἐπιβολή, the ‘overall application’, mentioned in Epicur. Hrdt. 35. The same expression is found in several passages of Plotinus’ Enneads (see, e.g., III 7, 1; IV 4, 1), where it seems to serve the very function ascribed to it by Epicurus (from whom, perhaps, the Neoplatonist philosopher inherited it). 75 

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who corrects the indice mente reported by our codices to inice mentem.80 In a further attempt to demonstrate to his addressee the existence of an infinite number of worlds and, therefore, the infinity of the universe, Lucretius urges him to turn his animus towards animals: … in primis animalibus inice mentem: 1080 inuenies sic montiuagum genus esse ferarum, sic hominum geminam prolem, sic denique mutas squamigerum pecudes et corpora cuncta uolantum. quapropter caelum simili ratione fatendumst terramque et solem lunam mare, cetera quae sunt, 1085 non esse unica, sed numero magis innumerali; (emphasis added) To begin with, inice mentem81 to living creatures: you will find that this is true of the race of mountain-prowling wild beasts, the double breed of human beings, the dumb shoals of squamous fish, and all creatures that fly. Therefore, in accordance with the same principle, you must admit that the sky and the earth and the sun, the moon, the sea, and the rest, are not unique, but rather of numberless number. (Lucret. II 1080–1086)

As we learn from some of the key terms in these verses (inuenies, simili ratio), we are dealing with an application of what Lucretius considers the main means of access to the invisible, namely inference by analogy: the observation of a phenomenon occurring at the level of living beings makes a ‘leap’ possible, that is, the passage (μετάβασις) to τὰ ἄδηλα82 (pertaining, in this case, to the cosmological level). Nothing in our experience is ever ‘unique’: everything belongs to a particular class, which in turn includes innumerable specimens. The same holds true for the sun, the moon, and the sky, of which there must necessarily be other specimens elsewhere:83 the same laws apply to the cosmos and to the entities that inhabit it,84 since – Lucretius emphasizes – they are governed by a similis ratio (1084). So what applies to animal species must also apply to the sun, the moon, the earth and the sky (and hence to all 80 

n. 75.

Incidentally, this expression echoes iniciens animus in Cic. ND I 20, 54, on which see supra:

81  I prefer to keep the Latin expression because, as I will clarify shortly, the operation it describes is not reduced to the simple act of ‘directing one’s attention’, as suggested by Smith’s translation (“direct your attention”). 82  Cf. Sext. Emp. M VII 24–26, 396; VIII 140, 319; PH II 96. 83  It is not difficult to see, in these verses, the application of the principle of ἰσονομία, “distributive equality” (Bailey 1947: 969–970), whose origin goes back to Democritus (see Mugler 1956). On the principle of ἰσονομία in Epicureanism, see Isnardi Parente 1977, 289–293, and Sedley 2007: 155–166. 84  What is at stake here is the so-called μακράνθρωπος model, whereby the world (be it ours or another one among the countless worlds in existence) is structured and functions as a human being. On this topic, see esp. Schiesaro 1990: 72–83, and Segal 1998: 112–134.

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existing worlds).85 As I have tried to show in my doctoral dissertation,86 and as I will concisely illustrate in the next section of this paper, in the study of realities that our perception cannot directly grasp, phenomena – if carefully selected and screened, primarily through the operation of ἐπιλογισμός87 and some fundamental tenets of Epicurus’ teaching – are able to provide a correct and cogent ‘view’ of τὰ ἄδηλα, enabling us to see the invisible.88 The act of inicere mentem to the animal kingdom is not, therefore, a mere act of ‘considering’;89 rather, it is already the grasping of a truth (the infinity of worlds) related to a dimension that cannot be known otherwise than by analogy (not unlike what we read in II 740, where the animi iniectus becomes aware of the corporeity of atoms by analogy). As we learn from this last case, Lucretius’ animi iniectus/iactus does not merely refer to an act of mental focusing such as that outlined in verses 802–815 of Book IV: here the poet explains that, given the many images available at any one time, the animus displays the capacity to select and concentrate on some specific content, bringing it into sharp focus. This act would appear to be quite similar to the sharpening of sight that takes place when the eyes “endeavor to perceive minute objects”, and “strain themselves and prepare themselves”, for “unless they do this, we cannot see distinctly” (807–810, as well as Epicur. Hrdt. 38 and Cic. ND I 19, 49).90 Thus understood, the mental focusing remains inevitably linked (συνημμένη) 85  The emphasis on the similis ratio, moreover, underlines the poet’s attention to the use of the model and the removal of all potential ambiguities in the comparison between animate beings and worlds (see Schiesaro 1990: 77.): to be valid and necessary, the semiotic inference must be restricted to the essential features of the two realities/entities between which the analogy is established. This means that the races of wandering beasts, the bloodlines of men, the species of birds, etc., are not to be considered in their particularity, but as classes containing several specimens, whose distribution is regulated by the principle of ἰσονομία. What is similar between the explicans and the explicandum is the ratio by which they are governed. 86  Rover 2021 (Part Three), to which I refer for a more detailed discussion and bibliographical references. 87  On which see also infra: 131–132. 88  This, at least in my opinion, is reminiscent of a passage from Book XXXIV of the Περὶ φύσεως ([PHerc. 1431] col. XI 1–7 Leone) in which we read: … ὥστε καὶ | [π]ά[σας φ]ύσεις τὰς | [ἐ]κ [τῶν ἐπι] βολῶν | [τῶν ἐπὶ τ]ὸ ἀόρατον | ἥδ[η βαδ]ιζουσῶν ὀ|[ψ]όμ[ε]θ᾽ ἂ[ν] εἰς ὁμοιό|[τ]ητα[ς] ἰδῶμεν … (“… cosicché anche tutte le nature che sono colte dagli atti di applicazione che immediatamente procedono verso l’invisibile noi le vedremo, qualora guardiamo alle somiglianze che …”; transl. by Leone 2020). 89  Robitzsch (2021: 613) takes a different view, according to which the inice mentem “refers to any act of attention to something”. 90  This is the meaning of the expressions ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ and [ἐπιβλητικῶς] τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις that we find in Epicur. Hrdt. 50, 5–6, if I understand them correctly. On this passage, see also Verde 2016c: 56, Konstan 2018, and Hahmann 2015: 164, who states that “there are two different kinds of epibole that are employed by Epicurus. He distinguishes between an epibole of the mind and an epibole of the sense organs”. A different interpretation of Epicur. Hrdt. 50, 5–6, is provided by Konstan 2020, esp. 11–12, according to whom “it is possible to take ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ with φαντασίαν alone and not also with τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις; on this reading, Epicurus states that we receive a phantasia either by way of an epibolê of thought or else by the aisthêtêria, without the element of projection in the latter case”. Contra Konstan, I will mention Epicur. Hrdt. 38 and 51, in which ἐπιβολαί are referred both to the mind (τῆς διανοίας) and the other criteria (τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων), where the latter, in my view, should

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to error91 – without coinciding with it – as we learn from Epicurus’ own words in Hrdt. 50–51. Here the φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολή is presented as the condicio sine qua non for the development of a ὑπόληψις that may turn out to be false. It was for this very reason, perhaps, that Epicurus did not count the ἐπιβολή among the canons of truth. On the other hand, where in Lucretius’ poem the expression animi iniectus/iactus appears – namely, in the three occurrences under investigation – the “throwing” of the mind seems to serve as a criterion of truth in its own right. This means that it remains distinct from πρόληψις and very close to a kind of ‘global’ understanding – sometimes on an analogical basis, as in Lucret. II 1080 and II 740, sometimes even going beyond the support provided by inferential procedures – followed by the achievement of truths concerning τὰ ἄδηλα, which are essential for ἀταραξία and the attainment of happiness. In my opinion, this is the meaning of the expression which serves as the common denominator of the three above-quoted and investigated occurrences (which in many ways do not entirely overlap), a meaning that seems sufficient to guarantee the status of fully-fledged criterion of truth to the animi iactus/iniectus. Besides once again revealing the meticulousness of Lucretius’ terminological choices, the remarks made in this last section find confirmation in the well-known testimony from Diogenes Laertius according to which the Epicureans92 (not Epicurus) added the φανταστικαὶ ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας as a fourth criterion of truth (Diog. Laert. X 31).93 In adding the animus iniectus/iactus as a fourth criterion of truth, Lucretius did not ‘betray’ his master’s doctrine (in which there is already a use of ἐπιβολή that mirrors what we have encountered in the DRN);94 rather, he possibly sought to standardize its vocabulary, by reserving the term animi iactus/iniectus exclusively for cases in which it took on the meaning of criterion of truth in the full sense, as opposed to the mere act of mentally focusing on some perceptual content.95

5. Uestigia, signa, and indicia Finally, it is worth briefly dwelling on the terminology related to the concept of ‘sign’, referred to by Lucretius by means of three different Latin words: uestigium, signum, and indicium. In the DRN, uestigia are the footprints of animals in the ground (cf. II be identified with the five canonical senses (see also Verde 2010b: 138). Since διάνοια is a corporeal sense organ just like all the others, there is no need to postulate the existence of two different kinds of ἐπιβολή, as Hahmann suggests. 91  On this point, see Masi 2020. 92  Cf. Philod. Sign. (PHerc. 1065) fr. 1, 6–15 De Lacy–De Lacy. 93  See also Tsouna 2016: 214–215 and Sedley 2018: 113–115. 94 See supra: 126. 95  See, for example, supra: 128.

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356: pedibus uestigia; III 389: pedum uestigia).96 In a passage from Book III (vv. 307– 322), the term is used to indicate those traces of our natural character that cannot be completely eradicated through education, but whose exiguity does not prevent us from living a life worthy of the gods. Such uestigia are a consequence of the disposition of the soul that characterized us before we embarked on the educational path, a disposition which is still to be observed (and, therefore, known) in our inclination towards anger, for example, or fear, defeatism, and so on.97 In Book VI (vv. 421–422), uestigia ignis are the still visible effects of the damaging action of lightning (which is no longer visible) on mountain peaks. As we can infer from these occurrences, whenever Lucretius talks about uestigia, we are dealing with an inexorable causal/ ontological link between a sign and the reality it signifies. What is interesting is that uestigium is precisely the term employed by Lucretius in at least some of the several instances of sign-inference by analogy we find in the DRN.98 Thus, in Book I, verses 402 and 406, uestigia are those visible phenomena that justify the existence of void, of which there can be no direct perceptual experience. What links the existence of void to that of movement (334–345), of the porosity of bodies (346–359), and of differences in their specific weight (360–367) – as witnessed by phenomenal observation – is a cause-effect relationship. In Book II, verses 114ff., uestigia are the specks of dust swirling in the air, and on the basis of these, by analogy, we acquire

96  Cf. also Lucret. IV 364–365: Umbra uidetur item nobis in sole moueri / et uestigia nostra sequi gestumque imitari (“Our own shadows, moreover, appear to move with us in the sunlight, following our footsteps and mimicking our gesture”); VI 756–759: in Syria quoque fertur item locus esse uideri, / quadripedes quoque quo simul ac uestigia primum / intulerint, grauiter uis cogat concidere ipsa (“In Syria too, so it is reported, one can see a place which, the moment quadrupeds have entered it, by its own natural power causes them to fall heavily”); cf. also IV 705 (errant saepe canes itaque et uestigia quaerunt), e 1002 (uestigia …ferarum) (emphases added). 97  The same applies to the uestigia of verse 673, again in the third book of the poem. 98  As is well known, when it comes to investigating realities which are ἄδηλα and which, for different reasons, elude the power of perception, the poet resorts to the construction of inferential arguments based on analogies with παρ’ ἡμῖν phenomena and on the signs (τὰ σημεῖα) that these phenomena provide. For Usener, the method adopted by Lucretius – whose key elements had already been identified and theorized by his master Epicurus (let us think of the notions of ἀναλογία [cf. Epicur. Nat. XXVIII (PHerc. 1479/1417) fr. 11, col. I 1–7 Sedley: ἀναλογίσματ[ί], 7], κοινότης [cf. Epicur. Hrdt. 58] and ὁμοιότης [cf. Epicur. Hrdt. 51]) – is also affected by the development of the Epicurean notion of σημείωσις after Epicurus and by the systematization provided by later Epicureans with respect to the ‘method according to similarity’ (ὁ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τρόπος). Philodemus’ De signis (whose only surviving book is contained, in a fragmentary way, in PHerc. 1065) is the main source about this method. Unlike De Lacy–De Lacy (1978), who translate the Greek κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τρόπος as ‘method according to analogy’, I prefer the more literal translation ‘method according to similarity’, which allows us to keep the concepts of ὁμοιότης and ἀναλογία separate (a distinction quite clearly highlighted in fr. 3 De Lacy–De Lacy of the De signis): there is similarity in an inference that proceeds from the mortality of men in our experience to that of all men, including those of whom we have no direct experience. On the other hand, there is analogy when similarity is established, for example, between the atomic minimum and the sensible minimum – that is, between the properties of perceptible bodies and those of atoms. On this issue, see also Sedley 1982: 156–157.

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the notitia of the motion of atoms in the infinite void.99 Even though these specks are extremely small, they are still concilia (i.e., made up of atoms) and therefore a consequence of the latter; however, they stand in a causal (even before analogical) relationship with the rerum primordia. They are what remains, the still visible trace of the secret and invisible motions (clandestinos caecosque, 128) of the atoms. Since, just like the wind – which especially in Lucret. I 271–297 is mentioned as evidence of the existence of invisible bodies – specks of dust exist on the verge of invisibility and are the perceptible thing closest to the world of atoms, they exhibit secondary qualities (euenta)100 that are not too conspicuous. Therefore, such qualities are not to completely prevent the possibility of discerning in the specks – albeit in a residual form, and with two important caveats101 – the features and behaviour of the primordia from which they have originated. Wind, then, is a trace/effect of the corporeity of atoms that can still be perceived (if not by sight, at least by touch), just as the specks of dust swirling in the air are a trace/effect of the motion of atoms in the infinite void that can still be perceived (even by sight). Corporeity constitutes, so to speak, the substratum of the atoms-aggregates continuum, and it increases in proportion to the sum of the atoms in a specific concilium (cf. Lucret. I 435–436).102 Proceeding along the continuum, what varies is not corporeity as such, but its size. The same happens in the case of movement: it characterizes the whole continuum; what changes is its speed (cf. Lucret. II 133–141).103 It is up to ἐπιλογισμός – which, while not designated through a specific Latin term in the DRN, clearly remains in the background of Lucretius’ verses – to discriminate between the essential features 99 

As we learn from Diogenes Laertius, the close connection between sense perceptions and

προλήψεις occurs either through actual contact (κατὰ περίπτωσιν) or by analogy, resemblance, and

composition (cf. also Sext. Emp. M VII 267, and Clem. Alex. Strom. II 4 16 3 = part. 255 Usener). Note that in this passage προλήψεις are referred to as ἐπίνοιαι, a term that is also used, for example, in Epicur. Hrdt. 45 to designate concepts related to the nature of things (τῶν ὄντων φύσεως), formed through the imprint (τύπος) due to the constant recollection Epicurean teachings; in fr. 93, 6–7 Arrighetti, which speaks of ἐπίνοιαι τῶν θεῶν; and, again with reference to the question of the divine, in fr. 134, 19–20 Arrighetti, where we find the ἐπίνοια of the higher natures of the gods. On Diog. Laert. X 32, and particularly the notion of περίπτωσις, see Warren 2019: esp. 14–19. Cf. Philod. Sign. (PHerc. 1065) coll. XX 30–XXI 3 De Lacy–De Lacy. 100  On the distinction between euenta and coniuncta, cf. Lucret. I 449–458; see also the equivalent Epicurean distinction between συμπτώματα and συμβεβηκότα in Hrdt. 68–71, as well as the related distinction between κοινότητες and ἰδιότητες we find in Philodemus’ De signis ([PHerc. 1065] cf. e.g. col. XXIII De Lacy–De Lacy) 101 The corpora of which the wind is made up are still aggregates, i.e., concilia – just like the specks of dust. Similarly, the motion of the specks of dust does not take place in an absolute void, as happens in the case of the motion of the primordia rerum (per inane… vacuum, 158), which occurs in an absolute void, where there is no external force capable of hindering their movement. 102  Lucret. I 435–436: (435) cui si tactus erit quamuis leuis exiguusque, / (434) augmine uel grandi uel paruo denique, dum sit, / (436) corporis augebit numerum summamque sequetur (“and if it is susceptible of even the lightest and faintest touch, its very existence ensures that it will increase the aggregate of matter by an amount either great or small and augment the total sum”). 103  In II 133–141 Lucretius clearly states that motion arises (ascendit motus) from the principles (a principiis), ascending (exit) little by little to our senses (paulatim nostros ad sensus, 138–139).

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(coniuncta, which ultimately coincide with the proleptic features: uestigia > τύποι) of the continuum (i.e., those present at all levels of the continuum: form, size, weight and, consequently, movement) from the merely accidental ones (euenta). Uestigia are also mentioned at the end of Book V, in relation to traces of the past from the time preceding the spread of writing: therefore, what is the first act of respecting aetas? nostra nequit, nisi qua ratio uestigia monstrat. Consequently our age cannot look back to earlier events, except insofar as reason reveals their traces. (Lucret. V 1446–1447)

For the earliest stages in the history of humanity and the earth we have no direct sources, and the only way to investigate them is ‘by subtraction’: a procedure very similar to that outlined in the first two books of the poem. What provides uestigia in the case of the earth’s prehistory is the figure of the mother (Lucret. V 783–836); in the case of humanity’s prehistory, it is wild beasts or, better, life more ferarum (the so-called θηριωδῶς ζῆν, Lucret. V 925–1010). These uestigia do not merely offer an analogical model for the knowledge, respectively, of the earth and of primordial humanity, but have an ontological (even before analogical) link with them – or, rather, an analogical link firmly based on an ontological one. From Lucretius’ point of view, civilized man is nothing but the early man to whom various cultural characteristics have been added over time: by subtracting them, the early humans’ way of life will be disclosed. By removing technological skills, social structures, language and, more generally, any form of civilization and culture, man is brought back to his animal state.104 Similarly, the earth today presents itself “like a woman worn out by lapse of years” (Lucret. V 827). As a mother (for all creatures originate from the earth: Lucret. V 793–796, but also 821–825), it was characterized by a period of maximum fertility in the past, followed by a progressive drying up of its generating capacity. The possibility of using the present (which is ἐναργές) as a sign of what happened in the distant past (which remains ἄδηλον to us) is ensured and proven by the fact that nature – at all levels – has always followed fixed laws ( foedera naturae, cf. Lucret. I 586, II 302, V 57 and 924),105 which are not subject to change and make the 104  For a somewhat similar perspective, see also the testimony on Hermarchus provided by Porphyry (De abst. I 7–12; 26, 4 = 34 Longo Auricchio), which should further be compared with Lucretius’ account of the origin of laws and justice (V 1136–1160). 105  I am thinking here of the prosopopoeia of Nature in Book III of DRN, in which Nature herself, by acquiring a voice and putting man on trial (mittere uocem, 931–932; iustam intendere litem / naturam et ueram uerbis exponere causam, 950–951), states that “all things are always the same” (eadem sunt omnia sempre, 945; cf. also 947: eadem tamen omnia restant). Cf. III 964–965: cedit enim rerum nouitate extrusa uetustas / semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest (“The old is ever ousted

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world the ordered reality we are used to. Contrary to what much of the literature suggested until recently,106 the Epicurean universe is marked by an order and a regularity that leave no room at all for sheer chance.107 In this perspective, the analogical-inferential arguments employed in meteorology can be explained as well: the foedera naturae assure us that a given παρ’ ἡμῖν phenomenon can be regarded and employed as a uestigium for the knowledge of the causes of a given μετέωρον.108 Indeed, all natural phenomena, including those occurring in the supralunar regions (which, according to Aristotle’s De caelo, are materially constituted by aether – the so-called fifth [or first] element – and characterized by uniform circular motion),109 are constituted by the same four elements (in their turn atomic aggregates), and all of them are consequently subject to the same physical laws. Thus, the flash arising when a stone strikes another stone – or an iron object – becomes a uestigium of the lightning that is produced when two or more clouds collide (Lucret. VI 160–163). The shaking we feel when the cold penetrates our limbs becomes a uestigium of the shaking of the earth when air and wind enter gaps in the subsoil (Lucret. VI 591–595). The fact that these παρ’ ἡμῖν phenomena are uestigia is exactly what ensures the incontrovertibility of inferences aimed at the knowledge of phenomena which are ἄδηλα – such as, precisely, μετέωρα. As for the other two terms related to the concept of sign found in the DRN, namely signum and indicium, the following remarks may be made. Besides designating, in the majority of cases, the stars110 and, on two occasions, statues,111 the term signa is also used to refer to the signa mortis that appeared in the exhausted bodies ravaged by the plague (λοιμός) that struck Athens in 430 BC (Lucret. VI 1182) – for example, mental alteration, shrunken eyelashes, a distorted and grim face, ringing in the ears, sweat pouring down the neck, and so on (1183–1195). In this case, the signs serve as omens that are not necessarily related to death (for some of the sick people displaying them eventually survived). It seems to me that the same holds true for the

and superseded by the new, and one thing must be repaired from others”). Epicurean φύσις proceeds according to fixed causal patterns, and this is clearly highlighted by Lucretius’ emphatic use of concepts such as foedera naturae, ordo certus, fines, and leges; see, e.g., II 294–302. 106  See, among others, Guyau 1910, 70–102; Bailey 1964: 326, and Bailey 1947: 840; Rist 1972: 52. For an exhaustive critical survey of the interpretations provided by these scholars, see Long 1977: 68–74. 107  See Sallmann 1962 and Long 1977, the first scholars to abandon the thesis that in the Epicurean system every aspect of reality is characterized by pure chance. 108  It should be noted that Lucretius never uses the term uestigium in relation to μετέωρα. Nevertheless, I consider it plausible that the signs provided by phenomena occurring παρ’ ἡμῖν may serve as uestigia for the knowledge of phenomena that are too distant or complex for us. 109  Cf. Aristot. De cael. I 2, 268b 11–269b 16. 110  See, e.g., Lucret. I 2, 1089; IV 444; V 518, 532, etc. 111  See Lucret. I 316–317 (aena signa, bronze statues) and V 1451 (daedala signa polita, skilfully crafted statues).

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term indicium, which is used either as a warning (cf. II 556: indicium mortalibus) or as an alleged sign of the divine will (cf. VI 382: indicia occultae diuum … mentis).112 One last interesting aspect is the fact that the term signa (not uestigia) is also mentioned in verses 816–817 of Book IV. After describing the process of selection of the simulacra by the animus, and after explaining that the animus is able to see only those images it focuses on (IV 797–815), Lucretius touches upon a question of crucial importance: Deinde adopinamur de signis maxima paruis ac nos in fraudem induimus frustraminis ipsi. (emphasis added) After that, we base sweeping opinions on slight indications and so involve ourselves in the error of self–deception.113 (Lucret. IV 816–817)

The verb adopinari – which, to my knowledge, only appears in Lucretius and exclusively in this passage – is in all likelihood, as a calque of the Greek προσδοξάζεσθαι, employed by Epicurus in paragraphs 50 and 62 of his letter to Herodotus. It comes from the merging of the terms addimus and opinatus which we find in Book IV. Here, after listing a series of ‘illusory’ phenomena (the case of the towers, etc.), the poet explains that most of these apparent illusions deceive us because of the opinions which our mind adds (propter opinatus animi, quos addimus ipsi), to the point of making us believe that we are seeing things which are not actually perceived by the senses (pro uisis ut sint quae non sunt sensibus uisa, 463–466).114 Similarly, in 112  The occurrence of the word at II 433 (indicio nobis est tactus uterque) – instead, like that of the verb indicare at I 803 (‘At manifesta palam res indicat’), III 693 (morbus ut indicat et gelidai stringor aquai), and IV 396 (solque pari ratione manere et luna uidentur / in statione, ea quae ferri res indicat ipsa, 395–396) – refers to a certain sense perception that directly confirms or denies a certain δόξα, without, however, any ontological link between the sense perception and the fact which is confirmed or denied. 113  Transl. by Smith, slightly modified. 114  It is interesting to note that this passage, along with the case of the (alleged) sensory illusion of the eye crushed by the hand reported in Lucret. IV 447–452, finds a close parallel in the position ascribed, in Cic. Lucull. 25, 80, to Lucullus and, through Lucullus, to the Epicurean Timasagoras, who “denies that he has ever had the impression of [literally: denied seeing] doubled flames from a candle when he pressed his eyes” (Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam cum oculum torsisset duas ex lucerna flammulas esse uisas; transl. by Brittain; cf. also Lucull. 14, 45). Most scholars have taken the view attributed here to Timasagoras to ‘diverge’ from the Garden’s orthodoxy and hence to constitute evidence of so-called Epicurean dissidence (see, e.g., Brittain 2006: 46–47 n. 117; contra Verde 2010a, esp. 306–307, to which I will also refer for further bibliographical references). On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that Timasagoras is basically describing what Lucretius summarizes in IV 464–466: it is not the perception of two flames that the two Epicureans are denying, but rather the claim to perceive such flames. It is not the sensory organs that are wrong (if I squint my eyes and have the sense perception of two flames, this sense perception is inexorably true), but it is the claim about the existence of what appears to us that is wrong. Significantly, Cicero (the spokesman for the Sceptical

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the passage we are dealing with (Lucret. IV 816–817), Lucretius separates the evident/real content coming from perception (the signa) from the falsehood or error residing in the added opinion (cf. ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ, Epicur. Hrdt. 50). The signa in question are the real/evident data connected to the images seen by the animus. Especially during sleep, when the senses are incapable of confirming or denying anything, the animus is naturally inclined to interpret them by formulating beliefs that, in the absence of the necessary scrutiny based on phenomenal experience, eventually lead us into the deception of illusion (in fraudem frustraminis, 817). In the above-quoted verses, Lucretius speaks of parua signa, not of parua uestigia, perhaps because of the fact that, in the absence of a properly functioning ἐπιλογισμός (as in the case under scrutiny), the possibility of recognizing those signa as uestigia – that is, of using those signa as the basis for the construction of an incontrovertible semiotic inference – vanishes too. Indeed, the point is not that some signs function better as signs than others: phenomena, in themselves, all possess the same value. It is the animus’ activity of selecting and using them in each circumstance that makes our reasoning and semiotic inferences valid or not. On each occasion, it is up to the animus to detect and identify uestigia, or ‘trace’ phenomena.

Conclusions Through these pages, I hope to have shown that Lucretius pays meticulous attention to his terminology. The precision with which he weighs the terms he employs, in order to newly present and defend his master’s teaching in the best possible way, testifies to a deeply philosophical spirit, which is reflected in the considerable scientific worth of his verses. And while it is certainly true that Lucretius is a poet, and that great caution is advised when attempting to systematize his language, it is also undeniable that it is very useful to examine his lexical choices, at least in the epistemological field, in order to shed new light on the reception of Epicurus’ doctrines in the history of the Garden.115

Academy) is critical of Timasagoras’ thesis, since for the Academic Sceptics the problem was precisely the (Epicureans’ and Stoics’) claim to go beyond what presents itself to the senses, thereby shifting the attention from what is to what appears (quasi quaeratur quid sit, on quid uideatur, Lucull. 25, 80). 115  Pace Robitzsch 2021: 613, according to whom “as far as Epicurean vocabulary is concerned, Lucretius is not always a reliable source”.

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Glidden, D. K., 1985, “Epicurean Prolepsis”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3: 175–217. Glidden, D. K., 1979, “Sensus and Sense Perception in the De rerum natura”, California Studies in Classical Antiquity 12: 155–181. Goldschmidt, V., 1978, “Remarques sur l’origine épicurienne de la « prénotion »”, in J. Brunschwig (ed.), Les Stoïciens et leur logique, Actes du Colloque de Chantilly, 18–22 septembre 1976, Paris: Vrin, 155–169 (2nd ed. 2006). Gourinat, J.–B., 2018, “L’épistémologie Stoïcienne”, Lexicon Philosophicum, Special Issue 2018: Hellenistic Theories of Knowledge (F. Verde–M. Catapano, eds.): 123–144. Grasso, R.,–Zanatta, M., 2003, La teoria aristotelica della percezione, Milan: Unicopli. Guyau, J.–M., 1910, La Morale d’Épicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines, Paris: Alcan (1st ed. 1878). Hahmann, A., 2015, “Epicurus on Truth and Phantasia”, Ancient Philosophy 35/1: 155–182. Hammerstaedt, J., 1996, “Il ruolo della πρόληψις epicurea nell’interpretazione di Epicuro, Epistula ad Herodotum 37 sg.”, in G. Giannantoni–G. Gigante (eds.), Epicureismo greco e romano. Atti del Congresso Internazionale, Napoli 19–26 maggio 1993, vol. I, Naples: Bibliopolis: 221–237. Ioppolo, A. M., 1986, Opinione e scienza. Il dibattito tra Stoici e Accademici nel III e nel II secolo a.C., Naples: Bibliopolis. Isnardi Parente, M., 1977, “La isonomia epicurea”, Studi classici e orientali 26/2: 287–298. Kechagia, E., 2011, Plutarch Against Colotes. A Lesson in History of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Klavan, S. A., 2019, “Hearing the λόγος. Diogenes of Babylon and the ἐπιστηµονικὴ αἴσθησις”, Mnemosyne 72/6: 908–929. Konstan, D., 2008, “Commentary on Morel [= Morel 2008]”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 23: 49–54. Konstan, D., 2018, “Epicurus”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/). Konstan, D., 2020, “Epicurean Phantasia”, in E. Malaspina–J. Wildberger (eds.), Axiological Confusion and Its Causes, Π Η Γ Η / F O N S Revista de estudios sobre la civilización clásica y su recepción 5, Madrid: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto de Estudios Clásicos “Lucio Anneo Séneca”, 1–18. Laursen, S., 1995, “The Early Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book”, Cronache Ercolanesi 25: 5–109. Laursen, S., 1997, “The Later Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book”, Cronache Ercolanesi 27: 5–82. Lamedica, E., 2010, “L’aisthesis di Aristotele. Analisi della teoria della sensazione nel De Anima”, Studi Urbinati B 80: 45–67. Lee, M.–K., 2005, Epistemology After Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leone, G., 2002, “Epicuro, Della natura, Libro XXXIV (PHerc. 1431)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 32: 7–135. Leone, G. (ed.), 2012, Epicuro, Sulla natura, libro II. Edizione, traduzione e commento, Naples: Bibliopolis.

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Leone, G. (ed.), 2020, “Appendice: Epicuro, Sulla natura XXXIV”, in G. Leone–F. G. Masi–F. Verde (eds.), ‘Vedere’ l’invisibile. Rileggendo il XXXIV libro Sulla natura di Epicuro (PHerc. 1431), VI Supplemento a Cronache Ercolanesi, Naples: CISPE, 163–173. Lévy, C., 1997, “Lucrèce avait-il lu Enésidème?”, in P. H. Schrijvers–M. H. Koenen–K. A. Algra (eds.), Lucretius and His Intellectual Background, Amsterdam–New York: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 115–124. Lévy, C., 1998, “Lucrèce et le scepticisme”, Vita Latina 52: 2–9. Long, A. A., 1977, “Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism”, Phronesis 22: 63–88 (repr. in Id., 2006, From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 157–177). Long, A. A.,–Sedley, D. N. (eds.), 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. I: Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Markovič, D., 2008, The Rhetoric of Explanation in Lucretius’ De rerum natura, Leiden– Boston: Brill. Marmodoro, A., 2011, “Aristotle on Complex Perceptual Content. The Metaphysics of the Common Sense”, Philosophical Inquiry 34/1–2: 15–65. Masi, F. G., 2006, Epicuro e la filosofia della mente. Il XXV libro dell’opera Sulla natura, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. Masi, F. G., 2020, “L’origine dell’errore e del turbamento emotivo nei sogni”, in G. Leone–F. G. Masi–F. Verde (eds.), ‘Vedere’ l’invisibile. Rileggendo il XXXIV libro Sulla natura di Epicuro (PHerc. 1431), VI Supplemento a Cronache Ercolanesi, Naples: CISPE, 59–70. Miloš, A. G., 2012, “Epicurus on the Origin and Formation of Preconceptions”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy 35: 239–256. Monet, A., 1996, “[Philodème, Sur les sensations], PHerc. 19/698”, Cronache Ercolanesi 26: 27–126. Montarese, F., 2012, Lucretius and His Sources: A Study of Lucretius, De rerum natura I 635–920, Berlin–New York: De Gruyter. Morel, P.–M., 2008, “Method and Evidence: On the Epicurean Preconception”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 23: 25–48. Mugler, C., 1956, “L’isonomie des atomistes”, Revue de philologie, de littérature et d’histoire anciennes 30: 230–250. Németh, A., 2017, Epicurus on the Self, London–New York: Routledge. O’Keefe, T., 1997, “The Ontological Status of Sensible Qualities for Democritus and Epicurus”, Ancient Philosophy 17/1: 119–134. O’Keefe, T., 2005, Epicurus on Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rispoli, G. M., 1983, “La «sensazione scientifica»”, Cronache Ercolanesi 13: 91–101. Rist, J. M., 1972, Epicurus: An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Robitzsch, J. M., 2021, “ Ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας: Reflections on The Fourth Epicurean Criterion of Truth”, The Classical Quarterly 71/1: 601–616. Rover, C., 2020, “La polemica antiscettica nel IV libro di Lucrezio. Un’eco antiochea?”, Ciceroniana On Line 4/1: 157–183. Rover, C., 2021, Fedeltà senza dogmatismo. L’epistemologia di Lucrezio, PhD Dissertation defended on July 21, 2021 at Sapienza University of Rome/Department of Philosophy.

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Rover, C., 2022, “Lucretius’ Prolepsis”, Elenchos 43/2: 279–314. Sallmann, G., 1962, Die Natur bei Lukrez: Natura und der Naturbegriff, Bonn: Bouvier. Sassi, M. M., 1978, Le teorie della percezione in Democrito, Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice. Schiesaro, A., 1990, Simulacrum et imago. Gli argomenti analogici nel De rerum natura, Pisa: Giardini. Schrijvers, P. H., 1997, “L’homme et l’animal dans le De rerum natura”, in P. H. Schrijvers–M. H. Koenen–K. A. Algra (eds.), Lucretius and His Intellectual Background, Amsterdam– New York: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 151–161. Sedley, D. N., 1982, “On Signs”, in J. Barnes–J. Brunschwig–M. Burnyeat–M. Schofield (eds.), Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, Cambridge–New York: Cambridge University Prass/Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 239–272. Sedley, D. N., 1988, “Epicurean Anti–Reductionism”, in J. Barnes–M. Mignucci (eds.), Matter and Metaphysics, Naples: Bibliopolis, 295–327. Sedley, D. N., 1989, “Epicurus on the Common Sensible”, in P. Huby–G. Neal (eds.), The Criterion of Truth. Essays Written in Honour of George Kerferd, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press: 123–136. Sedley, D. N., 1998, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sedley, D. N., 2007, Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity, Berkeley–London: University of California Press. Sedley, D. N., 2011, “Epicurus’ Theological Innatism”, in J. Fish–K. R. Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 29–52. Sedley, D. N., 2018, “Epicurean Theories of Knowledge: From Hermarchus to Lucretius and Philodemus”, Lexicon Philosophicum, Special Issue 2018: Hellenistic Theories of Knowledge (edited by F. Verde–M. Catapano): 105–121. Sedley, D. N., 2020, “Why Aren’t Atoms Coloured?”, in U. Zilioli (ed.), Atomism in Philosophy. A History from Antiquity to the Present, Part. I: Atomism in Ancient Philosophy, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 61–74. Segal, C., 1998, Lucrezio. Angoscia e morte nel De Rerum Natura, transl. F. Citti, Bologna: Il Mulino (orig. ed.: 1990, Lucretius on Death and Anxiety: Poetry and Philosophy in De rerum natura, Princeton: Princeton University Press). Smith, M. F. (ed.), 2001, Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, Indianapolis–Cambridge: Hackett. Striker, G., 1977, “Epicurus on the Truth of All Sense–Impressions”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 59: 125–142 (repr. in Id., 1996, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 77–91). Tsouna, V., 2016, “Epicurean Preconceptions”, Phronesis 61: 160–221. Tutrone, F., 2006, “Lucrezio e la biologia di Aristotele”, Bollettino della Fondazione Nazio­ nale Vito Fazio Allmayer 35: 65–104 (repr. in Id., 2012, Filosofi e animali in Roma, Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 295–328). Verde, F., 2010a, “Ancora su Timasagora epicureo”, Elenchos 31/2: 285–317. Verde, F. (ed.), 2010b, Epicuro: Epistola a Erodoto, Introduzione di E. Spinelli, Rome: Carocci. Verde, F., 2013, Epicuro, Rome: Carocci.

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Verde, F., 2016a, “Aristotle and the Garden”, in A. Falcon (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, Leiden: Brill, 35–55. Verde, F., 2016b, “Epicuro nella testimonianza di Cicerone: la dottrina del criterio”, in M. Tulli (ed.), Testo e forme del testo: Ricerche di filologia filosofica, Pisa–Rome: Fabrizio Serra editore, 335–368. Verde, F., 2016c, “Percezione, errore e residuo percettivo in Aristotele, Epicuro e Alessandro di Afrodisia”, Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana 12: 44–62. Verde, F., 2018, “Ancora sullo statuto veritativo della sensazione in Epicuro”, Lexicon Philosophicum, Special Issue 2018: Hellenistic Theories of Knowledge (edited by F. Verde–M. Catapano): 79–104. Verde, F., 2020a, “I Kanonika di Antioco di Ascalona e Asclepiade di Bitinia (Sext. Emp. M VII 200–202)”, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 163: 241–270. Verde, F., 2020b, “L’epistemologia di Epicuro e il Teeteto di Platone”, Historia Philosophica 18: 13–44. Verde, F., 2021, “Il piacere della musica nell’Epicureismo”, La Cultura 59/1: 45–71. Verde, F., 2022, Peripatetic Philosophy in Context: Knowledge, Time, and Soul from Theophrastus to Cratippus, Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter. Warren, J., 2019, “Epicurus on The False Belief that Sense–Impressions Conflict”, Philosophie antique 19: 7–28. Zucca, D., 2015, L’anima del vivente. Vita, cognizione e azione nella psicologia aristotelica, Brescia: Morcelliana.

Medicine and Responsibility: Hippocratic and Democritean Influences on Epicurus’ Περὶ φύσεως Book XXV? Enrico Piergiacomi {Α.} Ἐπικούρου δέ με / ὁρᾷς μαθητὴν ὄντα τοῦ σοφοῦ, παρ’ ᾧ / ἐν δύ’ ἔτεσιν καὶ μησὶν οὐχ ὅλοις δέκα / τάλαντ’ ἐγώ σοι κατεπύκνωσα τέτταρα. (…) / διόπερ μάγειρον ὅταν ἴδῃς ἀγράμματον / μὴ Δημόκριτόν τε πάντα διανεγνωκότα, / μᾶλλον δὲ κατέχοντα [καταγέλα ὡς κενοῦ] / καὶ τὸν Ἐπικούρου κανόνα, μινθώσας ἄφες / ὡς ἐκ διατριβῆς. (…) / παρὰ δ’ ἐμοὶ τρέφει / τὸ προσφερόμενον βρῶμα, καὶ λεπτύνεται / ὀρθῶς τε διαπνεῖ. τοιγαροῦν εἰς τοὺς πόρους / ὁ χυμὸς ὁμαλῶς πανταχοῦ συνίσταται. / {Β.} χυμός; {Α.} λέγει Δημόκριτος, οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα τὰ / γινόμενα ποιεῖ τὸν φαγόντ’ ἀρθριτικόν. / {Β.} καὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς τι μετέχειν μοι δοκεῖς. / {Α.} καὶ πᾶς ὁ φύσεως ἐντός [A] In me you see a disciple of the sage Epicurus, in whose house, let me tell you, I “condensed” four talents in less than two years and ten months. (…) Wherefore, when you see an illiterate cook, one who has not read the whole of Democritus or, rather, does not know him by heart, spurn him as empty fool; and if he knows not the Rule of Epicurus, dismiss him with contempt, as being outside the pale of philosophy. (…) But with my cooking, the food that is eaten nourishes, is properly digested and – exhaled. Hence the juices are distributed evenly in all the passages. [B] The juice? [A] Says Democritus. It causes no trouble and it is what occurs that makes the eater gouty. [B] It looks to me as if you knew something about medicine also. [A] Yes, and so does anyone else who penetrates nature.1

This fragment comes from the lost play Σύντροφοι by the comic playwright Damoxenus, who makes an interesting claim about Democritus and Epicurus. According to character [A], probably a cook, both were philosophers interested in medicine, more precisely in the knowledge of nature that provides some skills in this discipline. Although it has been suggested that Damoxenus may be mocking the medical art or the atomists,2 it seems plausible that the comic playwright is providing a trustworthy piece of evidence.3 Democritus and Epicurus were scholars not only of physics but also of medicine. The claim that Democritus was indebted to the medical art is hardly new. Recent contributions have stressed this point and argued against the reverse reading that the atomist influenced the doctors of his time. Damoxenus’ reference to juice (χυμός) is one of the Democritean notions (cf. Thpr. De sens. 82 = 68 A 135 Diels– 1 Damox. Σύντροφοι fr. 2, vv. 1–4, 12–16 e 26–34 Kassel–Austin ap. Athen. III 60 (= Usener 1887: 104 partim, Democr. 0.5.8 Leszl); trans. Gulick 1972: 439–441, modified. 2  On the former perspective, cf. Dohm 1964: 163–169 and 187–189, Gallo 1981: 84–118. On the latter, cf. Belardinelli 2008: 81–91. 3  Doubts in Arenson 2019: 149–151.

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Kranz, 27 R65 Laks–Most) that may have been derived from some ancient Hippocratic treatises.4 Many scholars have also claimed that Epicurus and his followers presented their ethics as a form of therapy (philosophia or philologia medicans).5 Moreover, starting from an interesting parallel between § 1 of the Παραγγελίαι and the Epicurean description of the inventiveness of human nature (Hrdt. 75), Giovacchini demonstrated that there probably existed a “communauté d’idées forte entre l’épicurisme et certains médecins représentés dans la Collection Hippocratique”.6 Conversely, while the study of the Epicurean reception of certain medical doctrines has received a lot of attention as far as Lucretius, Demetrius Laco, and Philodemus are concerned,7 there has been less of a focus on Epicurus and the early Epicureans in this regard. In this contribution, I address this issue and analyze some sources that might support the claim that these philosophers studied medicine, in the light of their general ethical-physical framework. The essay is divided into three parts. Part 1 collects the proofs of a possible reception of medicine by Epicurus and the early Epicureans. Each topic that I will mention might deserve a paper of its own. I will provide here just a summary, which serves the limited goal of showing just how extensive these philosophers’ interest in the medical art was. Part 2 argues that Epicurus may have read some Hippocratic treatises, which in turn may have inspired some Epicurean medical tenets. Finally, part 3 presents the highly speculative case study suggested in the title of the essay: a possible dialogue between book XXV of Epicurus’ Περὶ φύσεως and Hippocrates’ treatise Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων. Even though this hypothesis does not find exact textual confirmation, and must therefore be approached with extreme caution, I believe it suggests that medical doctrines may have contributed to the Epicurean theory of moral responsibility and to its physical background. From a methodological point view, Epicurus’ case is much more difficult to handle than that of the early Epicureans. It has been argued that Lucretius’ De rerum natura relied completely, or at least extensively, on the 37 books of the former’s Περὶ φύσεως.8 If we accept this interpretation, then it would be possible to trace some Lucretian evidence of the study of medicine back to Epicurus himself. However, 4  Cf. Orelli 1996, passim, and Gemelli Marciano 2009: esp. 142–145, and Sassi 2018. The hypothesis that Democritus influenced doctors is instead advocated (i.a.) by Wellmann 1929 and López Férez (1974–1975, 1975, 1981–1982). 5  Cf. especially Duvernoy 1984, Gigante 1975, Erler 1993, Kilpatrick 1996: 83–88, Tsouna 2009, Nussbaum 2009: 102–138, Erbì 2020: 24–25 and 40, together with SV 54, 64, and Porph. Marc. 31 = 221 Usener. 6  Giovacchini 2006: 456–466, cit. 458. 7  Moritz 1935: 1–20, Pigeaud 1980, Phillips 1984, Roselli 1988, Renna 1992, Kilpatrick 1996, Debru 1998, Filippetti 2008, Nervi 2011, Fiorillo 2012, Giovacchini 2013: 55 and 59, Kazantzidis 2021. Philodemus’ knowledge of medicine is reflected (e.g.) by the famous notion of the τετραφάρμακος, see Adversus (PHerc. 1005) col. V 9 Angeli, and might depend on the teaching of his master Zeno of Sidon (Gigante 1975: 55–61). 8  Sedley 1998b: 62–133 and Montarese 2012.

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since it is also possible that the medical doctrines of Lucretius depended on different sources, or even that they were the poet’s own addition, I will only turn to the De rerum natura if we can find other ancient sources that suggest an Epicurus’ explicit interest in the topics covered in the poem. Even in this case, certainty is out of the picture. Nothing guarantees that what we read in Lucretius is a complete poetical translation of Epicurus’ original theories.

1. Evidence of the study of medicine in early Epicureanism A sign that the early Epicureans were interested in the study of medicine is that Diogenes Laertius lists some works with a medical pedigree. For Epicurus,9 we can safely include the Συμπόσιον (l. 349), since its medical contents were known to the doctor Zopyrus (Plut. Quaest. conv. III 653E 10–654B 3), as well as the Προγνωστικόν (l. 356) and the Περὶ νόσων δόξαι 10 πρὸς Μίθρην (l. 368), the medical focus of which clearly emerges from their titles. It is also possible to add the Περὶ φύσεως and Περὶ κριτηρίου ἢ Κανών (ll. 331, 341) – since both are alluded to in Damoxenus’ above-quoted comedy11 – and at least one of the five books Μητρόδωρος (l. 366). After all, nothing rules out that this last work of Epicurus reflected on how his beloved Metrodorus had bravely faced the disease that killed him.12 Yet even this pupil of Epicurus’ wrote about medicine. Again, Diogenes Laertius (X 24, ll. 281 and 285) lists Metrodorus’ three books Πρὸς τοὺς ἰατρούς and one Περὶ τῆς Ἐπικούρου ἀρρωστίας: an analysis of Epicurus’ illness. This topic was also studied in Hermarchus’ Ἐπιστολαί.13 Moreover, Epicurus recognized good health as one of the goals of his ethics, in relation to both the body and the soul.14 It is plausible that this admission was the premise for a praise of the medical art. Indeed, according to Diogenes of Tarsus (ap. Diog. Laert. X 138) and to the Epicurean Torquatus (ap. Cic. Fin. I 13 42), Epicurus considered medicine to be an instrumental good, insofar as it brings us health. This tenet is echoed by Metrodorus, who argued that health should pursued (albeit with some nuances),15 and probably by Hermarchus too. The latter may be the source of Porphyry’s claim that some ancient lawgivers organized life in such a way as to 9 

Diog. Laert. X 27–28. The following lines refer to the edition of Dorandi 2013. This emendation was proposed by Gigante 1975: 55, starting from the parallel with Dem. Lac. Op. inc. (PHerc. 1012) col. XXXVII 3–5 Puglia (= [18] Arrighetti), where we read the title Περὶ νόσων καὶ θανάτου. 11  Gallo 1981: 108. 12  42 and 46 Körte. 13  Diog. Laert. X 19 = 42 Longo Auricchio. 14  Men. 122 and 127–128. On the distinction between bodily and psychic health/illness, cf. Torquatus ap. Cic. Fin. I 12 41, 18 59, Porph. Marc. 27 (= 471 Usener). Arenson 2019: 94–107 believes that there is no difference between the two. 15  13 Körte = Phld. Oec. (PHerc. 1424) col. XIII 11–15 Tsouna. 10 

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guarantee a healthy condition for human society (De abst. I 12 = Ἐπιστολικὰ περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους εἴκοσι καὶ δύο, 34 Longo Auricchio). However, Diogenes Laertius apparently attests to the existence of a debate within the Epicurean school. Some have argued that being healthy is a good, others that it is an indifferent.16 The term ἀδιάφορον is suspiciously Stoic and health is explicitly considered to be such in ancient Stoicism.17 Moreover, Seneca (ep. 66 47 = 449 Usener) argued that Epicurus distinguished two kinds of goods: those appreciated per se, like the absence of pain in the body or soul, and those that one would prefer to avoid but are nonetheless laudable, such as the courage to endure painful illnesses. The latter seems quite close to the Stoic definition of health as an ἀδιάφορον. If we consider that Marcus Aurelius, too, interpreted Epicurus’ indifference to his deadly illness in Stoic terms,18 two interpretations of the evidence from Diogenes Laertius are possible: either Diogenes recorded a Stoic interpretation of the Epicurean wise man (= health as an indifferent), opposed to the genuine reading of Epicureanism (= health as a good); or he recorded the opinion of some Epicureans that approached the Stoic opinion, insofar as they saw that in his letter to Idomeneus their master Epicurus (the wise man par excellence) declared to be dying happy, despite his poor health in the last days, and that the wise man better endures illnesses.19 Moving on now to the technical knowledge of medicine, one can firstly focus on some passages from Galen’s Περὶ χρείας μορίων, which apparently preserves some anatomical knowledge of the human body on Epicurus’ part. The philosopher is compared to Asclepiades, since both argued for an anti-teleological explanation of the formation of tendons, nerves, and teeth (I 21, VII 14, XI 8 = 373 and 381–382 Usener). Serangeli has convincingly demonstrated that Galen’s source is historically trustworthy, even though the doctor omits to explain some key doctrinal details that we instead find in the anti-teleology of Lucretius (IV 822–857).20 A topic for which we have considerable evidence is nutrition. Epicurus studied it from both a physical and an ethical perspective. He tried to explain how food is digested, excreted, and vomited under the effect of certain drugs.21 From the ethical point of view, instead, we have evidence that Epicurus praised a frugal diet/simple 16 

Diog. Laert. X 120b: καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν τισὶ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τισὶ δὲ ἀδιάφορον. See Giusta 1967, 173–175 and 179–181. 18  Ad se ipsum IX 41 = 116F Erbì. 19  Cf. the texts collected in 26 F2, 29F and 56F Erbì (possibly 95 F1). Cicero (Fin. II 30 96 = 12F Erbì) traces these determents back to a letter to Hermarchus (= 5 Longo Auricchio). Cf. also the Epicurean claim preserved by Plut. Suav. 1088B 10–C 2, 1090A 2–5 (= 600 Usener). One may incidentally note that Epicurus’ letter to Idomeneus resorted to medical terms for describing his illness, such as στραγγουρικά and δυσεντερικά (Notaro 2002: 163–164; Erbì 2020: 40). 20  Serangeli 2019, esp. 105: “[Galen’s notes] seem to refer to some fundamental aspects of the Epicurean zoogony and to give account of their application within medicine.” 21  Συμπόσιον ap. Plut. Quaest. conv. III 654A 6–8 (= 61 Usener) and Gal. De nat. fac. I 14 (= 293 Usener), with Pigeaud 1980: 192–193. Cf. also the Epicurean Xenocles in Plut. Quaest. conv. III 635B 10–C 3, who analyzes that autumnal fruits give an appetite. 17 

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foods as conducive towards the healthiest state and gave advice on how to avoid bad digestion.22 Moreover, in his Συμπόσιον, the philosopher analyzed with his pupil Polyaenus the potentially harmful effects of wine.23 This analysis allows to suppose that Lucretius (III 476–483) may follow his Greek master when he describes the evils generated by wine and by drunkenness more generally. Epicurus also accepted the medical theory of pores. This point has actually been recognized indirectly by those scholars who argue that Asclepiades – who had himself developed a theory of πόροι – followed the philosopher with regard to certain points: for instance, he may have recovered his atomistic description of organic processes.24 Nothing rules out that this interest was also due to an acknowledgment of the fact that atomism presents some important similarities with medical knowledge. It should further be noted, though, that Epicurus’ ipsissima verba attest to the use of the physics of the symmetry of pores,25 which goes back to Empedocles and Democritus.26 It also seems as though Epicurus analyzed the phenomenon of sleep (cf. schol. Hrdt. 66) in reference to health. The doctor Zopyrus, who summarizes the medical reasoning of the Συμπόσιον, mentions the quietude (γαλήνη) that sleeping brings to the body. It is possible that in this work Epicurus explained how one should secure the best sleep. Moreover, the Συμπόσιον gave instructions on how to avoid fevers,27 showing that Epicurus was interested also in the problem of preventing illness. However, owing to the lack of evidence, we have no way of ascertaining whether the medical reasoning of the Συμπόσιον contained some theories that were taken up in the final section of Lucretius’ De rerum natura, namely, the famous reflection on the cause of illnesses and contagion.28 Finally, the medical framework of the Epicurean perspective on sex is well documented. Once again, this topic received both a physical and ethical analysis. Epicurus resorted to physics to defend the embryological theory of pangenesis, namely the idea that semen is ejaculated from the whole body (schol. in Hrdt. 66) after a very 22  Men. 131, Diog. Laert. X 10, the texts collected in 181 and 459–467 Usener, especially 459 (= Cic. Tusc. V 54 97) and 464 (= Porph. De abst. I 52–53), and the addendum to Usener discovered by Indelli 2003: 101 (= Plut. Dem. 34 2). On bad digestion, cf. Herodicus the Cratetean ap. Athen. V 12 (= 57 Usener; 13 Düring). 23 Plut. Adv. Col. 1109E 11–1110B 9 e Quaest. conv. III 652A 5–B 1, 653F 4–5, 654A 6–8 = 58–61 Usener and [21] [1–3] Arrighetti; 22 Tepedino Guerra. 24  Leith (2009, 2012) and Verde 2019, for references and analysis. Contra Polito 2006. 25  Hrdt. 47 and 61, Pyth. 107–108 and 110–111, Nat. II (PHerc. 1149/993 and 1010) coll. CXV–CXVI Leone. The theory of pores also appears in Lucret. IV 348–352 and 615–672. 26  For the former, cf. Thpr. De sens. 12–15 (= 31 A 86 Diels–Kranz, 27 D229 Laks–Most); for the latter, see the mention of πόροι in Damoxenus’ fragment and Stob. I 50 22 (= 437 Luria). 27  57 Usener = Herodic. 13 Düring ap. Athen. V 12. 28  Lucret. VI 1090–1286, on which cf. i.a. Pigeaud 1988: 224–228, Segal 1990: 228–237, Rosa 2007, Kazantzidis 2021: 122–160.

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violent motion, which according to the paraphrase of his Συμπόσιον by the doctor Zopyrus was envisaged as an extreme increase in the atomic vibration (παλμός: see Hrdt. 43) innate to the organism.29 What is probably also of medical origin is the belief that the σπέρμα is a detached particle (ἀπόσπασμα) of the soul and σῶμα, emitted not only by males but also by females. Epicurus believed that even women ejaculate semen during intercourse, and that this explains why they desire sex, just like men (Aet. V 3 5 and 5 1 = frr. 329–330 Usener). Other sources (collected in 331–333 and 373 Usener) also point out that the philosopher studied the formation of the fetus and the behaviour of the newborn child that searches for its mother’s breast – another topic pertaining to the sphere of medicine. Finally, Censorinus (De die nat. 4 9 = 334 Usener) reports that Epicurus analyzed the phenomenon of the spontaneous generation of some animals from the earth and argued that primitive humanity was generated in a similar way, namely, through the heating of mud mixed with water. All this analysis agrees with what we read in Lucretius.30 As regards the ethical dimension, the connection with health is much more explicit. The moral maxim συνουσίη ὤνησε μὲν οὐδέποτε, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ καὶ ἔβλαψε that most sources attribute to Epicurus, but which also appears in Metrodorus’ letter to Pythocles and as a general Epicurean saying on the wise man, has clear medical import.31 This is acknowledged (e.g.) by Galen (Art. med. 24) and Cicero (Tusc. V 33 94). The latter adds the Epicurean principle that, if one really must engage in sexual intercourse, one must do so according to beauty, age, and physical constitution, thus implying that one must carefully decide depending on many personal factors. Without any reference to this moral maxim, Torquatus (ap. Cic. Fin. I 14 47) and Zopyrus (cf. again Epicurus’ Συμπόσιον in Plut. Quaest. conv. III 653B 7–654A 9) describe how to find the occasion to enjoy sex, in order to avoid some harmful side-effects or illnesses (see similarly SV 80). All this bulk of evidence could potentially be used to reflecting on a widely debated issue: the authorship of PHerc. 1390/908, containing what is usually described as an Epicurean treatise on procreation. Some scholars – like Puglia – claim that this work might be an incertum liber of Epicurus’ Περὶ φύσεως.32 Corti, Giorgianni, and Ranocchia argue that it is more plausible to think that it is the work of a more recent Epicurean, probably Demetrius Laco, whose interest in medicine is well attested.33 29 Plut.

Quaest. conv. III 653E 10–654A 5 (= 61 Usener), Piergiacomi 2019: 209–217. IV 1037–1062, IV 1192–1277, V 805–820, Landolfi 2013: 147–203, Pope 2019. 31  Cf. the texts collected in 62 and 440 Usener, and Diog. Laert. X 118. Metrodorus’ letter to Pythocles has been edited by Dorandi 1989 (PBerol inv. 16369v, col. II 1–12). On this topic, cf. especially Brown 1987: 62–87, Bels 1986: 454–457, Konstan 2007: 96–98, Nussbaum 2009: 140–191, Landolfi 2013: 11–23, and Cerasuolo 2016: 11–25 and 45–86, Kazantzidis 2021: 51–60. Pace Arenson 2019: 140–147, who claims that sexual pleasures are intrinsically good from an Epicurean perspective, because she never examines this maxim. 32  Puglia (1989 and 1992). 33  Corti–Giorgianni–Ranocchia 2019: esp. 45–50. 30 

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Finally, Tutrone and Nijs acknowledge that the treatise on procreation finds some parallels both in the doctor Soranus (Gyn. I 34) and in Lucretius (IV 1240–1247); therefore, they seem to prefer a late authorship, yet leave the question open.34 Although the topic remains controversial, I think that Puglia’s opinion that PHerc. 1390/908 may contain a book of the Περὶ φύσεως could be advocated precisely by referring to Epicurus’ contributions to embryology and procreation. The fact that Lucretius and Soranus report doctrines that are similar to those contained in the papyrus may not necessarily support the theory of its late authorship. This similarity could also be explained by assuming that all these texts draw upon an Epicurean work based on the Περὶ φύσεως,35 or on Epicurus’ opus maius itself.

2. Epicurus – a reader of the Hippocratic treatises? The previous section collected sources unequivocally proving that Epicurus and his early followers were acquainted with medical reasoning. In this new section, I will now focus on only Epicurus and defend the hypothesis that he may have had at least indirect knowledge of some Hippocratic treatises, which may be the potential source of some of his medical claims. I will point out in advance that there is no evidence to directly confirm this supposition; therefore, even the most plausible parallel will not be compelling. The argument will start from the most likely parallels and end with the least plausible ones. 1. We have seen that Epicurus wrote a Προγνωστικόν, for which unfortunately we have no fragments or testimonies. Now, such a title is also found in the group of the earliest Hippocratic treatises. The hypothesis that the two works titled Προγνωστικοί were related is based on the similarity between Epicurus’ RS IV and a passage from the latter medical text: Χρὴ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς προγιγνώσκειν τοὺς περιεσομένους καὶ τοὺς ἀποθανουμένους,

ὅσοισί τε ἂν μέλλῃ πλέονας ἡμέρας παραμένειν τὸ νούσημα καὶ ὅσοισιν ἂν ἐλάσσους,

τὰ σημεῖα ἐκμανθάνοντα πάντα δύνασθαι κρίνειν, λογιζόμενον τὰς δυνάμιας αὐτέων πρὸς ἀλλήλας

He who would make accurate forecasts as to those who will recover, and those who will die, and whether the disease will last a greater or less number of days, must understand all the symptoms thoroughly and be able to appreciate them, estimating their powers when they are compared with one another (Hipp. Progn. 25; trans. Jones 1923: II 55) 34  35 

Tutrone 2016: 781 and 792–793, n. 13; Nijs 2021. One may think of Zeno of Sidon ap. Soranus (Gyn. III 3 =28 Angeli–Colaizzo).

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Οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει· αἱ

δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν

The feeling of pain does not linger continuously in the flesh; rather, the sharpest is present for the shortest time, while what merely exceeds the feeling of pleasure in the flesh lasts only a few days. And diseases which last a long time involve feelings of pleasure which exceed feelings of pain (Epic. RS IV; trans. Gerson–Inwood 1994: 32)

At the end of the maxim Epicurus explicitly refers to disease, which suggests that also the references to pain in the previous lines must taken to describe painful reactions to illnesses. At the very least, it is Seneca’s plausible interpretation of RS IV (ep. 78 6–7 = 446 Usener). It may follow that Epicurus is here instructing on how to manage pain during three kinds of diseases: (1) those that are very painful; (2) those that limit certain pleasures we get from the flesh; (3) those that are not very painful. None of these should be feared and the reason is their duration. Indeed, (1) last very little, (2) must be endured only for few days, and (3) exist for long but are easy to endure and even admit of some pleasures in between. Now, Epicurus’ RS IV seems to apply the general method that is described in the above-quoted excerpt from the Hippocratic Προγνωστικόν. This text instructs the doctor to study the symptoms displayed by patients, in order to forecast the duration of the disease and its final outcome. Epicurus does precisely this: he infers from the scale of pain (intense, average, or slight) the duration of the disease and if/when pleasure will supervene.36 Nothing rules out that this line of reasoning was employed in his lost Προγνωστικόν, in the footsteps of his Hippocratic precedent. Of course, there is also an important difference between the texts. While the Hippocratic Προγνωστικόν aims to diagnose whether the patient will die or survive, Epicurus’ RS IV urges the reader to endure pain that will eventually go away, or that allows him to enjoy happiness despite the difficult situation. This difference only proves, though, that the Epicurean maxim adopts medical reasoning for the sake of moral improvement. Epicurus may have transformed Hippocrates into an ally for the achievement of well-being. It is also worth noting that Democritus, too, wrote a work on prognosis (Diog. Laert. IX 49) and that the Hippocratic Προγνωστικόν was read by Demetrius Laco37 and probably by Lucretius as well.38 Although the latter references are not decisive, 36 

On time, cf. especially Verde 2008. This is at least true if we grant that col. II of PHerc. 831, which quotes Progn. 7, was written by this Epicurean. Cf. Roselli 1988: 55, and Gigante 1990. 38  Filippetti 2007: 128–130. The scholar supposes some parallels between Progn. 2, 5–6, 14 and Lucret. VI 1182–1196. 37 

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they suggest at the very least that this medical text circulated within the Epicurean school. 2. The second Hippocratic parallel that I am going to propose requires a brief digression. We must start from PHerc. 1012, which contains a work now safely ascribed to Demetrius Laco that, at one point, examines the seat of the leading part of the soul: …φαμένων ὡς ἐπιβάλ[λε]ι ̣ν δεῖ ἐ̣ν τῶι λογίζεσθα[ί] τ̣ι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι· ποῦ μάλισ– θ’ ἡ κείνησις καὶ τὸ πάθος ἕλκει; Φανερῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν 5 θώρακα ἡ ὁλκὴ γεί ̣νεται.̣ Μετὰ ταῦτα δ’ ἀντιπρ̣ο̣φέ– ρεται τὴν σημήωσιν, ἧι χρῶνται πολλοὶ τῶν ἰα– τρῶ[ν ὑ]πὲρ το[ῦ τὸ]ν λογισ– 10 μὸν ἐ̣ν κεφα[λῆι ἐστηρ]ίχθαι, καὶ ἐπιτίθησιν τῆ[ι δυνά–] μει λέγων ὡς κατά τινας

ἐκ τῶν παθῶν κ[αὶ π]αρ̣α–

κοπῶν ἔστιν σημ̣[ηώσασθ]α̣ί 15 ̣ τ[ι]νων μερῶν, ἔ[στιν δ’ ἐν κε– φαλῆι ὁ λο]γισμὸς … ̣

[He asks] those who say that it is necessary to make a movement in thinking about something and in grieving: where does the movement of affection drag most? Clearly the pulling force occurs in the chest. After this, however, he gives in reply that inference which many doctors use to demonstrate that reason is located in the head and establishes it by essentially saying that, according to some, it is possible to infer from the affections and delusions of some parts that reasoning is found in the head… (Dem. Lac. Op. inc., PHerc. 1012, col. XLVII Puglia; my own trans., based on Puglia 1988: 193)

What is clear about this extract is that ll. 1–6 restate the orthodox Epicurean view that the leading part of the soul or the intellect is in the chest, because it is here that reasoning (λογίζεσθα[ί] in l. 2) and sorrow (λυπεῖσθαι in l. 3) occur. The statement is in accordance with Lucretius, who provides the examples of pavor and laetitia (III 136–160) but, more importantly, it seems to present an argument that was constructed by Epicurus.39 Confirmation of this claim comes from the immediately

39 Schol. Hrdt. 66. On this problem, cf. von Staden 2000: 80–86, Konstan 2007: 21–40, and Verde 2017: passim and with bibliography.

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preceding columns of the text (coll. XLIV–XLVI). Indeed, Demetrius explicitly refers to Epicurus and his method in order to locate the leading part of the soul. However, this orthodox piece of evidence is followed in ll. 7–17 by a reference to the opposite view stated by many doctors (cf. πολλοὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν in ll. 9–10), namely, that the seat of the intellect is the brain. They establish this position by the same method as Epicurus, namely: inference from the passions (l. 14: ἐκ τῶν παθῶν). More precisely, these doctors use the example of mental delusions (ll. 14–15: παρ̣ακοπῶν), which evidently do not occur in the chest, but in the brain. Now, who is the subject that makes this objection? Puglia argues that the objector must be a doctor resorting to the knowledge that he and his colleagues possess. This unknown person first summarizes Epicurus’ view in ll. 1–6, then – in ll. 7–17 – objects that the philosopher is wrong and uses the delusions of the mind as a key example to raise doubt. Persuaded by this hypothesis, Puglia supplies the damaged ll. 18–20 with the doctor’s conclusion, namely, that if we follow the method of inference from passions, then we must conclude the opposite of what Epicurus claims.40 Conversely, Verde supposes that the subject is Epicurus. Firstly, the philosopher summarizes his psychological view, then he takes into consideration the objection that some doctors may raise against him. Finally, in ll. 18–20, he admits that, if the latter are right, it follows that the brain is the seat of the intellect.41 I believe that both scholars could be right and, therefore, that the impossibility to identify the real speaker of col. XLVII should lead us to suspend judgment. However, if we accept Verde’s reconstruction, then there is room for another hypothesis. Epicurus may have mentioned the doctors with the aim of confuting them. After all, the fact that Metrodorus wrote three books Πρὸς τοὺς ἰατρούς (cf. the beginning of part 1) may suggest that this polemic occurred in early Epicureanism and that the inspiration to enter into a battle of ideas came to him from the parallel activity of his teacher. Evidence that Epicurus engaged in such a polemic may arguably be found in Tertullian’s chapter 15 of the De anima. The Church Father mentions here the view that there is no leading part of the soul, a view endorsed by the philosopher Dicaearchus and the doctors Andreas/Asclepiades.42 Immediately afterwards, he adds that this theory was challenged by Epicurus (§ 2, om. Usener). Now, Andreas must be identified with the personal physician of Ptolemy IV Philopator and the pupil of Herophilus. The latter was in turn a doctor who argued precisely that the intellect is located at the base of the brain; Tertullian contrasts this perspective with

40 

Puglia 1988: 265–267. For the textual supplement, cf. Id.: 172: καθὸ κα[τ’ αὐτ]ήν, | ὥ[ς φησι]ν,

41 

Verde 2017: 47–52, esp. 52. § 1 = fr. 20 Fortenbaugh–Schütrumpf 2001.

ἀπολο[γίζοιτ’] ἂν | το̣[ὐναντίον ἢ Ἐπίκουρος]. 42 

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Epicurus’.43 Now, since Andreas comes after Epicurus, the latter may have attacked not Andreas, but his teacher Herophilus. If plausible, we have evidence that the philosopher sought to confute Herophilean encephalocentrism. I will admit that this interpretation is weak. Andreas’ view that there is no leading part of the soul is patently different from his teacher Herophilus’ encephalocentrism. Therefore, it is more prudent just to suppose that if Epicurus really is the subject who refers to those doctors locating the seat of the intellect in the brain, then he may have identified the Herophileans as a group of opponents. Providing that we accept this hypothesis, what remains to be explained is the reference to mental delusions, which cannot be found in Herophilus and his school. I believe that here the most plausible candidate would be the Hippocratic treatise the Περὶ ἱερῆς νούσου, which in § 17 reports that: Εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἡμῖν αἱ ἡδοναὶ γίνονται καὶ αἱ εὐφροσύναι

καὶ γέλωτες καὶ παιδιαὶ ἢ ἐντεῦθεν, καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἀνίαι καὶ δυσφροσύναι καὶ κλαυθμοί.

Καὶ τούτῳ φρονεῦμεν μάλιστα καὶ νοεῦμεν καὶ βλέπομεν καὶ ἀκούομεν καὶ γινώσκομεν τά τε αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀηδέα, τὰ μὲν νόμῳ

διακρίνοντες, τὰ δὲ τῷ ξυμφέροντι αἰσθανόμενοι, τῷ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἀηδίας

τοῖσι καιροῖσι διαγινώσκοντες, καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀρέσκει ἡμῖν. Τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ τούτῳ καὶ μαινόμεθα καὶ παραφρονέομεν, καὶ δείματα καὶ φόβοι παρίστανται ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν νύκτωρ,

τὰ δὲ μεθ’ ἡμέρην, καὶ ἐνύπνια καὶ πλάνοι ἄκαιροι, καὶ φροντίδες οὐχ ἱκνεύμεναι, καὶ ἀγνωσίη τῶν καθεστεώτων καὶ ἀηθίη καὶ ἀπειρίη

Men ought to know that from the brain, and from the brain only, arise our pleasures, joys, laughter and jests, as well as our sorrows, pains, griefs and tears. Through it, in particular, we think, see, hear, and distinguish the ugly from the beautiful, the bad from the good, the pleasant from the unpleasant, in some cases using custom as a test, in others perceiving them from their utility. It is the same thing which makes us mad or delirious, inspires us with dread and fear, whether by night or by day, brings sleeplessness, inopportune mistakes, aimless anxieties, absent–mindedness, and acts that are contrary to habits (trans. Jones 1923: II 175)

This dense passage lists many passions or πάθη and mental delusions to prove that the brain is the seat of the mind. It is followed (§ 20) by a confutation of the idea that we think through the heart, because we experience pain and joy in the chest. The author of the Περὶ ἱερῆς νούσου replies that this organ is only contracted (σπᾶται) by passions, but a contraction is clearly not sufficient to claim that any cognitive processes occur there, and hence that the heart is the seat of thought. If the subject who speaks in Demetrius’ column is a doctor, it makes complete sense for him to be quoting this treatise. If the speaker is instead Epicurus, however, it follows that 43  Cf. §§ 2 and 4–5 (= 312 Usener, Heroph. 139 von Staden and An. 6 von Staden 1989, with von Staden 2000: 87–91).

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he was a reader of the Περὶ ἱερῆς νούσου and that he sought to confute the rival view of encephalocentrism by attacking the claim made by Hippocrates himself. To reinforce this last claim, one could refer to an apparent maxim by Epicurus, who compared (wrong) opinion to the sacred disease (οἴησιν ἱερὰν νόσον = 222 Usener). However, not only is the meaning of this text uncertain, but it may not reflect any knowledge of the Hippocratic treatise: for it may be a reference to a popular belief or an allusion to Heraclitus.44 It is instead more useful to remember that this Hippocratic treatise was apparently known to Lucretius. On the one hand, in a single passage he acknowledges that the brain could be affected by something, without however concluding that this organ is the leading part of our soul.45 On the other hand, he proves the mortality of the soul through a description of the damage that the mind suffers during an epileptic attack, a description which in turn is a reminiscence of another section of the Περὶ ἱερῆς νούσου, as well as of Hippocratic treatises (e.g., the Περὶ φυσῶν). In the footsteps of both Hippocrates and Epicurus, Lucretius also describes epilepsy as a mere physiological movement, thus confuting the popular belief that this disease is god-sent.46 As in the case of the Προγνωστικόν, this description could support the hypothesis that Hippocratic treatises circulated in the Epicurean school – or, if we accept the view that Lucretius expounded the contents of Epicurus’ works, that this knowledge of epilepsy came from Epicurus, who had read Hippocrates. 3. Another text that could be used to support the hypothesis of Epicurean knowledge of the Hippocratic treatises is Galen’s commentary on § 1 from book III of the Ἐπιδημιῶν and the related polemic against the doctor Sabinus.47 The bone of contention consists in the symptom of the tremor (τρόμος) to the hands that affects the patient Pythion. According to Galen (17–18), Sabinus argued that this symptom is a small convulsion (μικρὸς ὢν σπασμός) that can be caused by the movements of either filling or emptying (ὑπὸ πληρώσεως καὶ ὑπὸ κενώσεως). Pythion’s case depends on motion of the first kind. Sabinus apparently argued that the man had abstained from sex for a long time, with the consequence that an abundance (πλῆθος) of semen had accumulated in his brain and generated a mental delusion, the external symptom of which consisted in τρόμος of the hands (24–25). Now, to strengthen his claim, the doctor also mentioned Democritus and Epicurus. More precisely, he (25, 137–138) quoted the former’s statement that an orgasm is a small epileptic fit (μικρὰν ἐπιληψίαν εἶναι 44  Diog. Laert. IX 7 (= 22 B 46 Diels–Kranz, 9 R108 Laks–Most). On the Epicureans’ judgment on Heraclitus, cf. Capasso 1987. 45  Cf. Lucret. VI 802–803, which describes the pain that is caused when the smoke of embers reaches the cerebrum of a person who has not drunk any water. 46  Morb. sacr. 10, Lucret. III 487–502, Segal (1970; 1990: 133–135), Jouanna 1999: 181–209. More Hippocratic parallels in Galmarini 2008: 133–143, Kazantzidis 2021: 76–120. 47  I am quoting this work from the Wenkebach 1936 edition. The following quotations from Galen preserve frr. 11b, 11e–f and 29b of Sabinus (ed. Raiola 2018).

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τὴν συνουσίαν) from which a man bursts out (ἐξέσσυται) from another man (= fr. 68

B 32 Diels–Kranz, 27 D163 Laks–Most), as well as cited Epicurus’ aforementioned maxim συνουσίη ὤνησε μὲν οὐδέποτε, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ καὶ ἔβλαψε (= 62 Usener). Galen rightly recognizes that this association entails a contradiction. Democritus and Epicurus describe the harmful effects of sex, not of abstinence (25). However, it is possible that Sabinus resorted to atomism with the more limited goal of explaining that sexual activity produces tremors and convulsions that are responsible for delirium. If so, there is ground for another hypothesis. Democritus and Epicurus knew the Hippocratic book III of the Ἐπιδημιῶν and the notion of τρόμος, which was also regarded as one of the physical symptoms that should discourage human beings from engaging in sex. This notion, in turn, aroused Sabinus’ interest in the atomistic physical–ethical analysis of sexual activity. Yet since it is also possible that the doctor simply drew a personal connection between Democritus/Epicurus and Hippocrates, this possibility remains questionable. 4. Possible knowledge of the Hippocratic treatises may also be proven by taking a second look at embryology. We have seen in part 1 that according to some sources Epicurus defended the pangenesis theory and the genealogy of humanity from fetuses sprung up from the earth. These doctrines have both Hippocratic and Democritean precedents. The pangenesis theory appears in three texts attributed to Hippocrates: § 2 of Περὶ ἱερῆς νούσου, § 14 of Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων, § 2 of Περὶ φύσεως παιδίου, § 3.1 of Περὶ γονῆς, and § 22.1 of book IV of Περὶ νούσων. These passages also add that, according to Hippocratic doctors, semen is formed by fragments from all parts of the body, but is assembled within the brain and/or the spinal cord. Moreover, the Hippocratic theory of pangenesis aims to explain how diseases and pathological dispositions are transmitted.48 Democritus basically makes the same argument. Indeed, he claims that semen is emitted by the whole body and that the brain is somehow responsible for the process of formation. Conversely, his interest in the theory is not limited to an explanation of the disease, but apparently extends to a broader clarification of how human beings are generated.49 It is historically difficult to ascertain whether the Hippocratic doctors or Democritus were the inventors of this theory. Morel argued for the latter’s dependence on the former, while Orelli and Jouanna claim that they made separate discoveries.50 I will leave this problem aside and simply acknowledge the close similarities between the two accounts.

48 

Jouanna 1999: 271–272. Cfr. Aet. V 3 6 (= 68 A 141 Diels–Kranz, 27 D165 Laks–Most) and other sources analyzed by De Ley 1980 and 1981. 50  De Ley 1981: 197, who speaks of “philosophical pangenesis”; Morel 1996: 161–167, 172–173, esp. 162 n. 113; Orelli 1996: 38–65; Jouanna 1999: 274. 49 

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To be sure, Epicurus’ pangenesis theory may depend on a reading of the Hippocratic treatises, but it may also derive from Democritus – and the same can be said about Lucretius.51 It is impossible to settle for one of these two alternatives. What can be said is that if it is plausible that Epicurus attacked the encephalocentrism of the Περὶ ἱερῆς νούσου, then he may have known at least the version of the pangenesis theory mentioned in this treatise. Despite the lack of evidence, it could be further suggested that the philosopher possibly rejected the Hippocratic and Democritean claim that the brain plays an important role in the formation of semen. After all, we have seen that Epicurus claimed that the σπέρμα is a fragment of the soul (Aet. V 3 5 = 329 Usener), which is the leading part of the organism and is located (as we have seen) in the cardiac region. It is therefore possible that the Epicureans defended the belief that semen is the product of the concoction of blood, similarly to Aristotle (GA I 17, 721a 26–727b 30),52 and that they made this theory compatible with the Democritean/Hippocratic one of pangenesis. Turning to the spontaneous generation of humanity from the earth, the same Censorinus who attributes this theory to Epicurus also claims that it is not so different from Democritus’ view that human beings were originally generated from the mixture of water and mud (68 A 139 Diels–Kranz, 27 D128 Laks–Most = De die nat. 4 9). It is possible that this Democritean explanation is paraphrased by Diodorus Siculus, who claims that according to some ancient physiologists the putrefaction of mud heated by the sun generated fetuses that gave birth to everything.53 The proof that it is an early doctrine lies in the parallel with Plato’s Phaedo, where Socrates alludes to some who argued that living beings were first generated by a putrefied mixture of hot and cold (96a 10–b 3). Yet the explanation is also attested by philosophers like Parmenides and Archelaus (Diog. Laert. II 17, IX 22), as well as by the Hippocratic Περὶ σαρκῶν. In turn, the latter posited putrefaction as the cause of life on earth (§ 3). Once again, this last piece of evidence may suggest that Epicurus was a reader of the Hippocratic corpus, but it cannot demonstrate it. It is also plausible that he looked only (or also) at the Presocratic precedents. In any case, it seems clear now that Epicurean physics has a strong connection with the medical tradition, if only indirectly. 5. For the sake of completeness, I wish to conclude this second part of the essay by dismissing one last piece of evidence that might seem to prove Epicurus’ knowledge of the Hippocratic treatise. I am referring to Usener’s proposal that the philosopher was inspired by Aph. II 46, where we read that a pain of lesser magnitude is obscured 51 

Blayney 1986: 231–233. Cf. the reference to maternal blood in Lucret. IV 1214 (materno sanguine crescunt), with Brown 1987: 326–327, who, however, sheds some doubts. 53  Diod. Sic. I 7 3–4 (= 68 B 5 Diels–Kranz, 27 D129 Laks–Most) and Cole 1967. 52 

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(ἀμαυροῦσθαι) by a greater one. His contention is that Epicurus had this statement in mind, when (according to Cic. Fin. IV 12 29) he argued the reverse principle that microscopic pleasures (minimae voluptates) are often obscured (saepe obscurari) by greater ones. Usener adds that Plutarch knew this argument, for – ironically – he used the same Hippocratic statement against Epicurus (Suav. 1099D 2–4), and that Galen (De propr. libr. 19 1) attests to have written a lost work called Περὶ τῆς κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον ἀμαυροῦ ἡδονῆς δύο.54 Unfortunately, this very interesting supposition cannot rely on this last (and decisive) textual confirmation. In her edition of De propr. libr. 19 1, Boudon-Millot has reconstructed that Galen’s title does not in fact present the adjective ἀμαυρός, but rather ἁλμυρᾶς, since it is the word that best corresponds to the Arabic version. Therefore, the real title of the work was The two books against Epicurus’ exciting [i.e., not “obscured”] pleasure.55 Without this textual element, the passages by Cicero and Plutarch are not sufficient to prove that Epicurus had Hippocrates’ ‘Αφορισμοί in mind.

3. Epicurus and the Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων: A silent dialogue? Starting from the premise that it is historically possible that Epicurus read at least some Hippocratic treatises, it is now time to consider the last and most speculative thesis. There may be clues as to the philosopher’s engagement with the Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων in book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως56 and, more specifically, in the discussion of three major topics: environmental influences, the emergence of character traits that are independent from nature, and the criterion. From a methodological point of view, I will begin with a summary of Epicurus’ arguments, without making any claim to originality, and then compare them with the Hippocratic treatise. Although book XXV of the Περὶ φύσεως attempts to demonstrate that within us there is a principle of causation of our actions, characters, and thoughts, the text does not completely negate that these are also the outcome of environmental influences. Epicurus recognizes that our natures contain σπέρματα that can gradually lead to certain kinds of dispositions. From a certain moment onwards, this development depends on us. Yet before we achieve a degree of autonomy, and even 54 

Usener 1887: 289. The Greek reads: Δύο πόνων ἅμα γινομένων μὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, ὁ

σφοδρότερος ἀμαυροῖ τὸν ἕτερον. 55 

Boudon-Millot 2007: 171. PHerc. 1191/697/1056. I use the editions by Laursen 1995 and 1997, though refer to the text through Arrighetti’s collection and the numeration in Masi 2006: 35. On this occasion, I will focus only on this work and ignore its problematic relationship with Lucretius’ clinamen. On this point, cf. Pigeaud 1980: 179–183, Englert 1987: 119–151, Morel 1996: 273–291, O’Keefe 2005: 26–47 and 110–142, Masi (2006: 218–254; 2013: 229–234), Schmidt 2007: 91–117, Johnson 2013: 125–129, Hunter 2014, Németh 2017: 92–99 and 133–165, Mitsis 2019: 185–192. 56 

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partly after we do, act, behave, and think in accordance with the influence of the external environment (περιέχον) – more precisely, the necessity of the context ([34] [29] Arrighetti, T8f Masi: κατὰ χώραν ἀνάγκην). In turn, this may coincide with the simulacra of objects that necessarily (κατ’ ἀνάγκην̣ ) enter us through the pores of the body.57 The idea that external stimuli are inescapable and somewhat responsible for what we become is confirmed by Hrdt. 75–76, which shows that the first human nations were forced to make certain discoveries (language, among other things) due to the different places they inhabited and their peculiar passions.58 The idea in question finds further confirmation in external sources. Diogenes Laertius (X 117) reports that not all physical dispositions and nations (οὐδ’ ἐν παντὶ ἔθνει) can give rise to wise men, while Clement of Alexandria (Strom. I 15 67 1 = 226 Usener) specifies that the Greeks alone can achieve wisdom. If even the σοφός – or the moral character with the highest control of life – cannot completely detach itself from the environment, it is plain that ordinary people are more subjected to the latter. The Hippocratic treatise Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων stresses just as emphatically that the περιέχον and the context (χώρη, ἐπιχώριος, and cognate terms) are relevant factors for the formation of human characters and dispositions. The text provides the interesting case study for the differences between Asian peoples and European nations (§§ 12, 16, 26). The former are gentler, more good-tempered, but also more prone to pleasure than to acts of courage and hard labor; the latter display the opposite traits. The reason lies in the fact that the environment is very different and causes two different motions in the inhabitants. Since Asian regions are bigger and more uniform than European ones, Asian people are far less likely to experience the sudden violent movements of the mind (ἐκπλήξιες πυκναὶ τῆς γνώμης) and the strong alteration of the body (μετάστασις ἰσχυρὴ τοῦ σώματος) that is likely to stir passions and fortify the organism, thereby generating a courageous and resistant moral character.59 Both the Hippocratic text and Epicurus therefore acknowledged a powerful necessity that stems from environment. At the same time, neither of them is committed to determinism or fatalism. Epicurus stresses that this initial influence can be gradually transformed through reason, moral correction, praise, blame, and education, so as to make us capable of acting responsibly and even change our natural or innate dispositions. Our nature can thus be refashioned for better or for worse.60 The outcome is dialectic, so to 57  Nat. XXV [34] [4], [34] [17], [34] [24], [34] [26–27], [34] [31] Arrighetti (= T7a, T7f, T8a, T8c, T10 Masi); Masi 2006: 102–104, 191–194; Németh 2017: 75–80, 118–122. 58  Cf. here especially the keywords ἀναγκασθῆναι and the expression of Hrdt. 76: ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν στελλόμενον ὑφ’ ἑκάστων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων, ὡς ἄν ποτε καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἐθνῶν διαφορὰ εἴη. On the theory of language, cf. Piergiacomi 2020 and the literature discussed here. 59  Cf. Jouanna 1999: 211–221. 60  Nat. XXV [34] [21], [34] [24–25], [34] [31], [35] [10] Arrighetti = T1b and T2 Masi. Cf. at least Diano 1974: 210–252, Englert 1987: 136–146, Sedley 1988a, Hourcade 2006, Masi (2006: passim, but

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say. Nature contains many seeds of our developments, and the environment or our biological limits influence how we progress. However, the power of self-determination that is located within us can shape the ultimate disposition of our soul and allow us to find rational ways to act independently in life. A similar idea of dialectic progress is detectable in the Hippocratic Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων. If only seldom, the treatise mentions that human lifestyles (δίαιται) and customs (νόμοι) cannot be reduced to the influence of the external environment.61 The nomadic Scythians (§§ 18–19) are said to eat boiled meat accompanied by mare’s milk and to live in wagons, because they have decided not to live in houses and to move to a different place as soon as the fodder for their animals becomes insufficient. The inhabitants of hollow regions of Europe (§ 24) are described as not naturally inclined to display courage and resistance, contrariwise to other European people, but also as human beings that can produce these virtues through the imposition of law (νόμος δὲ προσγενόμενος ἀπεργάσοιτ’ ἄν). However, even Europeans who are thus characterized by nature can reinforce their disposition through customs (§ 23). Finally, a most important and very original claim can be found in § 14, which discusses the race of the Longheads: Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν ὁ νόμος αἰτιώτατος ἐγένετο τοῦ μήκεος τῆς κεφαλῆς, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἡ

φύσις ξυμβάλλεται τῷ νόμῳ· τοὺς γὰρ μακροτάτην ἔχοντας τὴν κεφαλὴν γενναιοτάτους

ἡγέονται. Ἔχει δὲ περὶ νόμου ὧδε· τὸ παιδίον ὁκόταν γένηται τάχιστα, τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτέου ἔτι ἁπαλὴν ἐοῦσαν, μαλακοῦ ἐόντος, ἀναπλήσσουσι τῇσι χερσὶ, καὶ ἀναγκάζουσιν

ἐς τὸ μῆκος αὔξεσθαι, δεσμά τε προσφέροντες καὶ τεχνήματα ἐπιτήδεια, ὑφ’ ὧν τὸ μὲν

σφαιροειδὲς τῆς κεφαλῆς κακοῦται, τὸ δὲ μῆκος αὔξεται. Οὕτω τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ νόμος κατειργάσατο, ὥστε ὑπὸ βίης τοιαύτην τὴν φύσιν γενέσθαι· τοῦ δὲ χρόνου προϊόντος, ἐν

φύσει ἐγένετο, ὥστε τὸν νόμον μηκέτι ἀναγκάζειν. (…) Νῦν δὲ ὁμοίως οὐκ ἔτι γίγνονται ὡς πρότερον· ὁ γὰρ νόμος οὐκ ἔτι ἰσχύει διὰ τὴν ὁμιλίην τῶν ἀνθρώπων

Originally custom was chiefly responsible for the length of the head, but now custom is reinforced by nature. Those that have the longest heads they consider the noblest, and their custom is as follows. As soon as a child is born they remodel its head with their hands, while it is still soft and the body tender, and force it to increase in length by applying bandages and suitable appliances, which spoil the roundness of the head and increase its length. Custom originally so acted that through force such a nature came into being; but as time went on the process became natural, so that custom no longer exercised compulsion. (…) At the present time long-headedness is less common than it was, for owing to intercourse with other men the custom is less prevalent (trans. Jones 1923: II 111)

esp. 158–208; 2013: 227–229), Németh 2017: 72–92, Mitsis 2019: 166–185. Contra Bobzien 2006: 310, 317–319, 323–333, and O’Keefe 2005: 10–25. 61  Here it is useful to refer to Jouanna 1999: 221–231.

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One can see here that the custom of considering a long head a sign of nobility led to of the alteration of people’s heads. The process began by compulsion or force, but gradually it became a natural acquisition and a physical trait transmitted via sexual reproduction.62 Eventually, intercourse (ὁμιλίη) with other peoples changed even this ingrained custom. We thus have an important piece of evidence suggesting that, according to the Hippocratic doctor, the Longheads had not acquired their defining trait simply as a reaction to environment factors. It is true that this last example focuses on a physical trait, not on moral character, and therefore cannot serve as an exact parallel to the other two passages from the Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων and even less so to Epicurus’ reflection. However, I believe that the process just described may be implicitly at work in the argument that the lifestyle and customs of a people generate something for which the environment is not completely responsible. If we look beyond this treatise, we find the idea that δίαιται and νόμοι are independent factors, if not elements that lead a doctor to presuppose that the patient will cooperate in the fight against disease and, hence, to assign him/her responsibility.63 It is therefore possible that the Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων provided an implicit anthropology that sees human beings as autonomous transformers of nature. Finally, we may note the similarity between Epicurus and the Hippocratic treatise from a methodological point of view. Judging from the final section of book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, it seems as though in the previous parts of the work the philosopher attempted to find a criterion to distinguish between the role played by natural causes or the environment, on the one hand, and that played by the principle responsible for the formation of our character, on the other. In order to do so, Epicurus distinguished a παθολογικὸς τρόπος and an αἰτιολογικὸς τρόπος, which may be interpreted as “due aspetti diversi e complementari di una medesima ricerca, in cui all’osservazione di una particolare condizione o attività della mente segue un’analisi più precisa della sua natura e dei fattori che la hanno determinata.”64 Now, at the beginning of the Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων, its author claims that anyone wishing to practice the medical art effectively (Ἰητρικὴν ὅστις βούλεται ὀρθῶς ζητέειν) should distinguish the external factors that influence a given patient (= seasons, the properties of the winds and waters, etc.) from those stemming from his/her way of life (τὴν δίαιταν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὁκοίῃ ἥδονται). In other words, the Hippocratic author – just like Epicurus – wishes to distinguish the environmental 62 

The textual part that I have omitted describes the pangenesis theory described above. Epid. I 11 and 23; VI 6 2 and 8 23. Cf. also Morb. sacr. 17, quoted in full above (§ 2.2.), where the author claims that we (independently) determine – in accordance with our customs – what is shameful or beautiful, good or bad, pleasurable or non–pleasurable (γινώσκομεν τά τε αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀηδέα, τὰ μὲν νόμῳ διακρίνοντες, τὰ δὲ τῷ ξυμφέροντι αἰσθανόμενοι). More evidence and an interesting analysis in Holmes 2013: 303–321. 64  Nat. XXV [34] [32–33] Arrighetti (= T1c–d Masi), Masi 2006: 52–60, cit. 56. A similar reading is provided by Németh 2017: 11–27, although he does not quote Masi. 63 

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cause behind the behaviour of a given individual or group from the independent contribution of their lifestyle. There are enough similarities, then, to draw the very hypothetical conclusion that Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων may have influenced the composition of book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, not only in relation to the physical description of the environment’s role. The references to customs and lifestyle are probably indicators that this Hippocratic treatise was used to support the idea of the formation of human character based on a dialectic between the inner self and the external world. Epicurus may therefore have applied his knowledge of medicine to the problem of moral responsibility. Of course, I do not wish to go too far and claim that the Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων was the crucial (or even only) source of influence for the three topics that I have briefly analyzed in this essay. Epicurus’ book is a complex work that cannot be explained as a simple update or implementation of previous Hippocratic reflections. Moreover, these three topics may be indebted to a positive engagement with Aristotle65 and Democritus. This final claim may seem strange, since book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως famously describes Democritean physics as a menace, stressing that one must refute its dangerous tendency to reduce everything to necessity.66 However, it should also be borne in mind that there is at least one passage in which Democritus appears to be invoked as an ally. When Epicurus acknowledges that evidence in support of the existence of a principle of causation dependent on us is to be found in the practice of blaming and correcting each other, he uses the verb μεταρυθμίζειν ([34] [27] Arrighetti, T8c Masi), which appears to be a significant Democritean allusion. It can be read as a reference to Democritus’ 68 B 33 Diels– Kranz (= 27 D403 Laks–Most), which states that teaching can atomically transform (μεταρυσμοῖ / μεταρυσμοῦσα) or reassemble the atoms (ῥυσμὸς, according to the language preserved by Simpl. In Arist. Phys. 28 = 68 A 38 Diels–Kranz, 27 D71 Laks–Most) that compose a human being, giving rise to a new nature. This outcome would not be possible, if the atomist believed that necessity cannot be avoided, changed, or dominated by reason.67 In book XXXIV, moreover, Epicurus seems to take the Democritean notion of φλεβοπαλίη as referring to a physical motion that is independent from external influences;68 therefore, Epicurus appears to be using his predecessor’s discovery to study moral responsibility.

65  Cf. here especially Englert 1987, 35–41 and 75–116, Diano 1974: 223–232 and 249–250, O’Keefe 2005: 48–64, Masi 2013: passim. 66  O’Keefe 2005: 65–109, Masi 2006: 124–139. Democritus and the Democriteans are probably the investigators (αἰτιολογήσαντες) who reduce everything to necessity and spontaneity (Nat. XXV [34] [30] Arrighetti = T8g Masi; Dem. 68 A 69 Diels–Kranz, 27 R63 Laks–Most). 67  Cf. esp. Vlastos 1993. See also the ἀμειψιρυσμεῖν of 68 B 139 Diels–Kranz, 27 D38 Laks–Most. 68  Nat. XXIV (PHerc. 1431) coll. XX–XXI Leone 2002, and fr. 68 B 120 Diels–Kranz (= 27 D181 Laks–Most). For further references, see the recent study by Morel 2020.

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Against the objection that this is impossible, because Epicurus believed that his predecessor was a determinist or even a fatalist, it can be said that, in his polemic, Epicurus acknowledges at least once that even his adversary is inconsistent and that he sometimes forgets his own opinion about necessitarianism, thus admitting in words the responsibility that his theory actually negates.69 Nothing rules out that Democritus’ 68 B 33 Diels-Kranz is an example of this form of inconsistency and forgetfulness, which would have allowed Epicurus to occasionally use his predecessor’s moral philosophy in support of his own personal arguments. Even so, if we hypothetically admit a Democritean influence, then we cannot exclude that Democritus is responsible for what I have presented as Epicurus’ likely knowledge of Hippocrates. In other words, Democritus may have acted as an intermediary between ancient medicine and Epicureanism, as has been argued (e.g.) by Giovacchini in her essay devoted to the similarities between the Hippocratic Παραγγελίαι and Hrdt. 7570 – which, as we have seen, presents some interesting similarities with the Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων. Once again, due to the fragmentary nature of the evidence, one cannot affirm or exclude anything. The influence of the Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων could just be supposed as a possibility.

Conclusions In this essay, I have tried to examine Epicurus’ indebtedness to medicine, starting from a collection of more objective pieces of evidence and progressing to more speculative hypotheses. I began by summarizing sources suggesting that the philosopher and his early followers wrote medical treatises, resorted to medical arguments in physics and ethics, and struggled to maintain or recover good health. I then turned to examine some meager evidence possibly suggesting that Epicurus read the Προγνωστικόν, Περὶ ἱερῆς νούσου (whose encephalocentric theory he may have attacked), book III of the Ἐπιδημιῶν, Περὶ φύσεως παιδίου, and other embryological treatises, but especially Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, τόπων. The idea of Epicurus’ possible knowledge of this last treatise allowed me to draw some parallels between it and book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως. In the light of such parallels, I then argued that medical reasoning helped Epicurus to distinguish the principle of causation dependent on us from environmental influences. The second and third theses may not be wholly convincing, due to their highly speculative nature. I trust, though, that my gathering of objective evidence of 69  Nat. XXV [34] [30] Arrighetti = T8g Masi: καὶ εἰ μὴ λήθη τις | ἐπὶ τῶ̣ ν ἔργων τῆς δόξης ἐνε|γείνετο. ̣ Laks 1981: esp. 21, makes the same claim in his reading of the expression μεγάλα κουφίσαντες (ibidem), while Hourcade 2007 posits this and other similar Democritean parallels. Finally, an attempt to demonstrate how Democritus can distinguish freedom from necessity may be found in Johnson 2009. 70  Giovacchini 2006: 466–469. See also Gemelli Marciano 2009: 146–152.

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medical knowledge on the part of Epicurus and the early Epicureans will at least prove useful to support the general research hypothesis of the SPIDER project. Epicureanism developed a science and a philosophy of science, within which medicine may well have played a part, also in relation to the acquisition of some ethical goods conducive towards a happy life: certainly pleasure and health, possibly moral responsibility and freedom.

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De Ley, H., 1981, “Beware of Blue Eyes! A Note on Hippocratic Pangenesis (AER., ch. 14)”, L’antiquité classique 50.1–2: 192–197. Diano, C., 1974, Scritti epicurei, Florence: Olschki. Dohm, H., 1964, Mageiros. Die Rolle des Kochs in der griechisch–römischen Komödie, Munich: Beck. Dorandi, T. (ed.), 1989, ”Metrodorus Epicureus: Epistula ad Pythoclem”, in AA.VV., Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini. Parte I: Autori Noti, Vol. 1**, Florence: Olschki, 474–476. Dorandi, T. (ed.), 2013, Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Düring, I. (ed.), 1941, Herodicus the Cratetean: A Study in Anti-Platonic Tradition, Stockholm: Wahlstrom & Widstrand. Duvernoy, J.-F., 1984, “Le modèle médical de l’éthique dans l’épicurisme”, in AA.VV., Justifications de l’éthique, Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 171–177 Englert, W. G., 1987, Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action, Atlanta: Scholars Press. Erbì, M. (ed.), 2020, Epicuro: Lettere, Pisa–Rome: Serra. Erler, M., 1993, “Philologia medicans. Wie die Epikureer die Texte ihres Meisters lasen, in W. Kullmann–J. Althoff (eds.), Vermittlung und Tradierung von Wissen in der griechischen Kultur, Tübingen: Narr, 281–303. Filippetti, A., 2007, “Ippocrate e Lucrezio: i colori della facies”, AION 29: 127–134. Fiorillo, M., 2012, “Il medico, il timoniere e il retore in Filodemo, Retorica VII (PHerc. 1004)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 42: 193–208. Fortenbaugh, W.,–Schütrumpf, E. (eds.), 2001, Dicaearchus of Messana. Text, Translation, and Discussion, New Brunswick–London: Transaction. Gallo, I., 1981, Teatro ellenistico minore, Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo. Galmarini, A., 2008, “Lucrezio, Ippocrate e Platone: analisi lessicale di De rerum natura 3,526–547”, Paideia 53: 125–153. Gemelli Marciano, M. L., 2009, “«Evidentemente il sapiente ha studiato medicina». Per una revisione dei rapporti fra i cosiddetti presocratici e la medicina ippocratica. L’esempio di Democrito”, Medicina & storia 17/18: 129–156. Gerson, L. B.,–Inwood, B. (eds.), 1994, The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia, introduction by D.S. Hutchinson, Indianapolis: Hackett. Gigante, M., 1975, “Philosophia medicans in Filodemo”, Cronache Ercolanesi 5: 53–61. Gigante, M., 1990, “Distrazioni su Demetrio Lacone”, in M. Capasso et alii (ed.), Miscellanea papyrologica in occasione del bicentenario dell’edizione della Charta borgiana, Florence: Edizioni Gonnelli, 1–2. Giovacchini, J., 2006, “Sur une concordance textuelle entre Épicure et la collection hippocratique”, Revue des études anciennes 108.2: 453–469. Giovacchini, J., 2013, “Scepticisme et thérapeutique: le cas de conscience du dogmatisme épicurien”, in S. Marchand–F. Verde (eds.), Épicurisme et scepticisime, Rome: Sapienza Università Editrice, 45–62. Giusta, M., 1967, I dossografi di etica. Vol. II, Turin: Giappichelli. Gulick, C.B. (ed.), 1972, Athenaeus: The Deipnosophists in Six Volumes. Vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Hammerstaedt, J., 2003, “Atomismo e libertà nel XXV libro Περὶ φὐσεως di Epicuro”, Cronache Ercolanesi 33: 151–158. Holmes, C., 2013, “Causality, Agency, and the Limits of Medicine”, Apeiron 46.3: 302–326. Hourcade, A., 2006, “Le problème de la responsabilité chez Épicure”, Studi classici e orientali 52: 107–139. Hourcade, A., 2007, “Transformation de l’âme et moralité chez Démocrite et Épicure”, Philosophie Antique 7: 151–178. Hunter, H. 2014, “Lucretius on Swerves and Freedom”, Dionysius 32: 71–81. Indelli, G., 2003, “Addenda agli Epicurea di Usener”, Studi italiani di filologia classica 20: 95–103. Johnson, M. R., 2009, “Spontaneity, Democritean Causality and Freedom”, Elenchos 30.1: 5–52. Johnson, M. R., 2013, “Nature, Spontaneity, and Voluntary Action in Lucretius”, in D. Lehoux–A. D. Morrison–A. Sharrock (eds.), Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 99–130. Jones, W. H. S. (ed.), 1923, Hippocrates: Voll. I–II, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jouanna, J., 1999, Hippocrates, trans. by M.B. De Bevoise, Baltimore–London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Kazantzidis, G., 2021, Lucretius on Disease. The Poetics of Morbidity in De rerum natura, Berlin–New York: De Gruyter. Kassel, R.,–Austin, K. (eds.), 1986, Poetae comici graeci. Vol. 5, Berlin: De Gruyter. Kilpatrick, R. S., 1996, “Amicus Medicus: Medicine and Epicurean Theory in De rerum natura”, Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome 41: 69–100. Konstan, D., 2007, Lucrezio e la psicologia epicurea, trad. di I. Ramelli, Milan: Vita & Pensiero. Körte, A. (ed.), 1890, Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta, Lipsia [Leipzig]: Teubner. Laks, A. 1981, “Une légèreté de Démocrite (Epicurus, De natura liber incertus = 34. 30, 7–15 Arrighetti2)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 11: 19–23. Laks, A.,–Most, L. (eds.), 2016, Early Greek Philosophy, 10 vols., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Landolfi, L., 2013, Simulacra et pabula amoris. Lucrezio e il linguaggio dell’eros, Bologna: Pàtron. Laursen, S., 1995, “The Early Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book”, Cronache Ercolanesi 25: 5–109. Laursen, S. 1997, “The Later Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book”, Cronache Ercolanesi 27: 5–83. Leith, D., 2009, “The Qualitative Status of the onkoi in Asclepiades’ Theory of Matter”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 36: 283–320. Leith, D., 2012, “Pores and Void in Asclepiades’ Physical Theory”, Phronesis 57.2: 164–191. Leone, G., 2002, “Epicuro, Della natura, libro XXXIV (Pherc. 1431)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 32: 7–135. Leone, G. (ed.), 2012, Epicuro: Sulla natura. Libro II, Naples: Bibliopolis. Leszl, W. (ed.), 2009, I primi atomisti. Raccolta dei testi che riguardano Leucippo e Democrito, Florence: Olschki.

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Medicine and Atomism: Asclepiades of Bithynia and Epicurean Science1 David Leith Asclepiades of Bithynia had a lasting and significant impact in Rome following his arrival there in the later second century BC, so much so that the renowned ancient historian Elizabeth Rawson has described him as arguably “the most influential Greek thinker at work in Rome in the first century BC”.2 His status as the first major authority in Greek theoretical medicine to be based in Rome was commended by later Roman writers such as Celsus, Scribonius Largus, Seneca, Pliny the Elder, and Apuleius.3 Members of his sect continued to be associated with the highest levels of Roman power, with his followers Marcus Artorius and Antonius Musa, for example, both being personal doctors of Augustus, and both believed to have saved his life.4 Asclepiades’ fame was due in part to an influential and innovative medical theory, which posited that the human body is composed of invisible particles named anarmoi onkoi, which move about in the body through void gaps: health is maintained by their balanced flow, while disease arises principally from blockages of onkoi in different parts of the body.5 In philosophical contexts, he was perhaps better known for his denial that the soul’s hēgemonikon is located in a particular part of the body.6 In this paper, I shall focus on Asclepiades’ medical system as a case study in the later reception of Epicurean science. Asclepiades’ relationship to Epicurus is complex, as we shall see, but his doctrine offers a fascinating example of the ways in which Epicurean scientific principles, methods, and explanations could be extended, altered and differently applied in new, specifically medical, contexts.

1. Asclepiades and Epicurus First, a few general remarks about Asclepiades’ attitude to Epicurus are necessary, since there has been considerable debate about how much Asclepiades actually owed to Epicurus, with a major strand of scholarship on him denying any actual 1  I am very grateful to the organizers of the conference for inviting me and, in particular, to Francesco Verde for very helpful discussions on Asclepiades’ links with various philosophical traditions. I would also like to thank the audience at the conference for constructive feedback on the paper. 2  Rawson 1985: viii. 3  See, e.g., Cels. pref. 11, Scrib. Larg. pref. 7-8, Sen. Ep. 95.9, Plin. NH 7.124, Apul. Flor. 19. 4  For Marcus Artorius, see recently Leith 2020: 130-2; for Musa, Michler 1993. 5  For Asclepiades’ theory of matter and pathology, see esp. Vallance 1990, Asmis 1993, Casadei 1997, Leith 2009, Leith 2012. 6  E.g., S.E. M. 7.201, 380; Tert. DA 15; Calc. In Tim. 214-215.

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influence at all.7 I believe it is evident from detailed and precise doctrinal parallels that Epicurus was Asclepiades’ main intellectual inspiration, in his physics generally, but also, and equally significantly, in his epistemology and his psychology. As regards his theory of matter, for instance, Asclepiades’ onkoi share a range of basic properties with Epicurean atoms. Like atoms, the onkoi are imperceptible, they are in constant and everlasting motion, and they differ from one another in size and shape, but are devoid of secondary, phenomenal qualities such as colour and temperature.8 They move around in void space and are not the product, or subject to the influence, of any divine intelligence or goal-directed natural system.9 Such features are so fundamental and distinctive that they can only be explained as the result of a direct and conscious adoption of atomist physics on Asclepiades’ part. This direct relationship with Epicureanism in general is also explicitly and repeatedly asserted by Galen.10 It is important, from this point of view, to emphasize that Asclepiades spent at least some of his career in Athens, probably in the mid- to later second century BC, where of course he could have had access to the best Epicurean philosophers of the age.11 On the other hand, there are some very fundamental departures from atomism. The single most striking difference is Asclepiades’ belief that his particles were not atomic at all, but physically breakable into pieces. This belief also extended to a denial that there were minimal magnitudes in nature: there is evidence indicating that Asclepiades thought his particles were infinitely divisible, presumably in the sense that they were at least potentially divisible at any point.12 It is differences such as these which have led scholars to deny Epicurean influence outright, but the underlying correspondences in their theories show that these differences should be understood as modifications or corrections of an Epicurean framework that was not adopted wholesale.13 We are also told that Asclepiades specifically affirmed that “everything occurs through necessity and nothing occurs without a cause”, which certainly looks like an implicit attack on the doctrine of the swerve, given 7  Vallance 1990 makes the fullest case denying Epicurean influence. I argue against this conclusion esp. in Leith 2009 and 2012; see also Asmis 1993 and Casadei 1997. 8  See esp. Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-6; Gal. Hipp. Elem. 2.9-11 [i.416-17 K. = 60.1-8 De Lacy CMG V 1,2]; S.E. PH 3.33 and M. 10.318; with Leith 2009. 9  For Asclepiades as a void theorist in Epicurean vein, see Leith 2012; Casadei 1997 emphasizes the importance of Asclepiades’ anti-teleological outlook in assessing his intellectual heritage. 10  E.g., Gal. Nat. Fac. 1.14 [ii.45 K.]; SMT 1.14 [xi.405 K.]; Hipp. Epid. VI 4.11 [xviiB.162 K.]; see also the contemporary treatise ps.-Gal. Ther. Pis. 11 [xiv.250 K.]. 11  Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 2.22.129 shows that Asclepiades spent some of his medical career in Athens. For Asclepiades’ dates, see Rawson 1982 and most recently Flemming 2012 and Stok 2019. Assuming, as our sources suggest, that Asclepiades spent his later career in Rome, the scholarch whom he would most likely have encountered in Athens is Apollodorus, rather than Zeno of Sidon, who took over the position perhaps around the last decade of the second century BC: on the Epicurean school in this period, see Dorandi 1999, 44-45; and, more generally, Sedley 2009 . 12  Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105, with Leith 2009: 312-313. 13  See in general Leith 2009.

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that the impossibility of uncaused motion was the principal objection levelled by the Epicureans’ opponents.14 So the relationship between Asclepiades and Epicurus, and Epicureanism more generally, is undoubtedly complex. Part of this complexity is due to the intricate relationship between medicine and philosophy in the first place, but the modifications are so significant that we must wonder how exactly Asclepiades represented them in his speeches and written works. In particular, the denial of atomism itself would seem to imply an eagerness to correct or criticize even quite fundamental features of Epicurus’ physics. This suggests that Asclepiades may not have presented his revisions merely as minor modifications: they were certainly not just cosmetic, which raises doubts about how far Asclepiades might have recognized Epicurus’ authority at all. Close relationships of this kind can generate an emphasis on polemic, with the later thinker deliberately attempting to distance themselves from the earlier. One of the main problems here is that we lack any evidence for how Asclepiades himself presented or characterized his debts to Epicurus. His attitude has to be reconstructed from the content of his attested doctrines, and from the remarks of later, hostile sources such as Galen. At times, it suits Galen to de-emphasize differences between them, in particular when he wishes to subject both to a common refutation.15 At other times, he attempts to construct a conflict between them, in a way which suits his own immediate polemical purposes.16 Yet it remains very unclear from such dialectical manoeuvres what he thinks Asclepiades’ attitude actually was. This general picture of profound doctrinal influence, but rejection and modification of specific details, of course invites comparison with Epicurus’ attitude to Democritus, which could apparently combine admiration and acknowledgement of debt with at least occasional direct criticism and even denigration.17 Whatever the case may be, it is important to be as clear as possible about the way Asclepiades was using his Epicurean sources. For present purposes, we may look at one example of an indication that Asclepiades was using Epicurus’ treatise On Nature directly, in the sense that he was borrowing Epicurean arguments, at least for some of the most fundamental physical doctrines. One of the most important sources for Asclepiades’ basic theory of matter is Caelius Aurelianus, a Methodist physician working probably in the fifth century AD, who produced Latin versions of two earlier treatises by his predecessor Soranus of Ephesus, who was working around AD 100. Caelius provides an indispensable summary of Asclepiades’ doc14  Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.115, omnia praeterea fieri necessitate et nihil sine causa. Cf., e.g., Cic. Fat. 22, quam declinationem sine causa fieri, si minus verbis, re cogitur confiteri (‘that this swerve occurs without a cause he is forced to admit in practice, even if not in so many words’), trans. Long–Sedley (20E). 15  Cf., e.g., Gal. Hipp. Elem. 2.9-11 [i.416–17 K. = 60.1–8 De Lacy CMG V 1,2]. 16  See, in particular, the section below on magnets. 17  Sedley 1976, esp. 134-135; Huby 1978; Warren 2002: 24-26, 193-200.

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trine, which seems to be based on a selective reading of a range of his books.18 He records part of Asclepiades’ argument establishing that his onkoi have no secondary, phenomenal qualities, such as colour, temperature, and the like, and aiming to show that this is consistent with our experience: quae rursum eundo sibi adiecta vel coniuncta omnia faciant sensibilia, vim in semet mutationis habentia aut per magnitudinem sui aut per multitudinem aut per schema aut per ordinem. nec, inquit, ratione carere videatur, quod nullius faciant qualitatis corpora. aliud enim partes, aliud universitatem sequetur: argentum denique album est, sed eius affricatio nigra, caprinum cornu nigrum, sed eius alba serrago. When in their course they (sc. the onkoi) are thrown together or combined they generate all sensible things, having in themselves the power of change either through their size, number, shape or arrangement. And it does not seem to be unreasonable, (sc. Asclepiades) says, that bodies with no quality should generate (sc. all sensible things). For one thing follows the parts, another follows the whole: so silver is white, but the filing from it is black; goat’s horn is black, but the shaving is white. Caelius Aurelianus, On Acute Diseases 1.14.105-6

This argument is also Epicurean, and likely borrowed directly from Epicurus’ On Nature, for Lucretius uses the same basic argument to establish the same conclusion. In the course of his own argument that atoms have no secondary qualities such as colour, smell, and so on, Lucretius likewise argues as follows: tum porro quae ducit et inlicit ut tribuamus principiis rerum nonnumquam causa colores, occidit, ex albis quoniam non alba creantur, nec quae nigra cluent de nigris sed variis ex. quippe etenim multo proclivius exorientur candida de nullo quam nigro nata colore aut alio quovis qui contra pugnet et obstet. Then further, the reason that leads and attracts us sometimes to attribute colours to the first-beginnings of things falls to the ground, since white things are not made from white, nor what are black from black, but from diverse colours. The fact is that white things will arise much more easily from no colour than from black or from any other colour that fights against it and thwarts it. Lucret. II 788-94, trans. Rouse–Smith

18 

Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-115.

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I have also argued elsewhere that one of Asclepiades’ arguments for the existence of void gaps in the body was also derived from Epicurus’ On Nature, as Lucretian parallels again show.19 Asclepiades’ more narrowly medical focus is evident in the specific use he makes of such arguments, but I think their Epicurean origin is clear. In general, it seems likely that Asclepiades was familiar with a range of Epicurean writings, and again I would emphasize that his attested stay in Athens will have been crucial here, in terms of the opportunities it must have afforded him to engage with Epicurean philosophers directly and to gain access to relevant texts.20 It is also worth emphasizing that Asclepiades’ interest in elemental theory was itself a highly unusual topic for a doctor in his time: he is the only doctor we know of in the Hellenistic period who thought that knowledge of the elements of things had any relevance to medicine at all. His predecessors and successors (at least before Galen) were united in believing that knowledge of the elements was irrelevant to medicine and belonged properly only to natural science.21 These physicians were not sceptical about the inquiry into the elements; they merely believed it did not properly fall within the domain of medicine as a discipline. Asclepiades’ striking deviation from his rivals in this regard is, I think, largely thanks to the deep influence of Epicurean science. So there are many avenues by which we could approach the question of Asclepiades’ reception of Epicureanism. Here, though, I want to focus on a few issues that seem most relevant to the theme of this volume, connected especially with his scientific method and his possible interests in meteorology. One question, too, which seems worth asking is whether Epicurus’ method of multiple explanations left any trace in Asclepiades’ theory.

2. Scientific method In terms of his basic epistemology, Asclepiades was, like Epicurus, an empiricist – an empiricist with a small ‘e’, that is, not one of the medical Empiricists, a sect that developed in Alexandria in the mid-third century BC. Indeed, many of the testimonia on Asclepiades’ epistemological position derive from his extensive attacks on the medical Empiricist sect, where he attempted to show, contrary to their view,

19 

See Anon. Lond. xxxix 10-15 and Lucret. I 346-7, 354-7; with Leith 2012: 174-177. See above n. 11. 21  For Herophilus’ and Erasistratus’ position in this regard, see Leith 2015. The Pneumatist physician Athenaeus of Attaleia clearly had a broadly similar approach to the elements: see Gal. Hipp. Elem. 6 [i.457-73 = 102-18 De Lacy CMG V 1,2], with Leith 2015: 487 n. 57. The Empiricists of course had no interest in any kind of dogmatic speculation. 20 

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that the use of reason was fundamentally required for any technical inquiry.22 Asclepiades’ basic epistemology, though, seems to have been very similar to Epicurus’. The key evidence is a quotation from Antiochus of Ascalon preserved by Sextus Empiricus, within the broader context of a doxography of dogmatist views on the question of the criterion of truth. Asclepiades is thus counted among those who maintain that the criterion of truth lies in ‘self-evidence’ (ἐνάργεια), as opposed to reason; along with Asclepiades in this category are also found Epicurus and the Cyrenaics. οὐκ ἄποθεν δὲ τῆς τούτων δόξης ἐοίκασιν εἶναι καὶ οἱ ἀποφαινόμενοι κριτήριον ὑπάρχειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὰς αἰσθήσεις. ὅτι γὰρ ἐγένοντό τινες τὸ τοιοῦτο ἀξιοῦντες, προῦπτον πεποίηκεν Ἀντίοχος ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν Κανονικῶν ῥητῶς γράψας

ταῦτα· “ἄλλος δέ τις, ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, ἁπτόμενος δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας,

ἐπείθετο τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι, λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλως ἡμᾶς καταλαμβάνειν”. ἔοικε γὰρ διὰ τούτων ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν προειρημένην τιθέναι στάσιν καὶ

Ἀσκληπιάδην τὸν ἰατρὸν αἰνίττεσθαι, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον αὐτῷ γενόμενον. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τούτου φορᾶς ποικιλώτερον καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς ἰατρικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διεξήλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν ἀνάγκην παλινῳδεῖν.

Not far off their view appear to be those who assert that perceptions/the senses are the criterion of truth. The Academic Antiochus has made it clear that there were some who thought this when he wrote the following explicitly in the second book of his Canonica: “But someone else, in medicine second to none, but who tried his hand also at philosophy, believed that perceptions are apprehensions in reality and in truth, while we apprehend nothing at all with reason.” With these words Antiochus seems to be putting forward the position mentioned and to be hinting at Asclepiades the doctor, who abolished the hēgemonikon and lived at the same time as him. But we gave a more detailed and specific treatment of his views in our medical writings, so that there is no need to go over them again. Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.201-202

There are various interpretative difficulties with this passage, and there is not space to go into them properly here. One thing to note is that Asclepiades is not likely to be rejecting reason altogether here (that would scarcely be consistent with his particulate theory, with its onkoi and pores ‘perceptible by reason’, or his anti-Empiricist polemics), but only reason as a criterion of truth.23 Yet the key point for present purposes is that the claims attributed to Asclepiades correspond in various ways to Epicurus’. In particular there is a clear statement of the truth content of perceptions, expressed using Epicurean language.24 Not only this, but it seems clear that 22 

See, e.g., Gal. Med. Exp. 1-4, trans. Walzer in Walzer–Frede 1985; Gal. SI 5 [i.75 K.]. Polito 2006, however, develops a radical interpretation of Asclepiades’ epistemology. 24  For the importance of the connection between the reality and the truth (ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς) of sense perceptions, see, e.g., Diog. Laert. X 32, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐπαισθήματα δ’ ὑφεστάναι πιστοῦται τὴν τῶν 23 

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Antiochus (and Sextus) were conscious of this similarity between Epicurus’ and Asclepiades’ epistemology, and that this is precisely why Asclepiades’ views were recorded by them in the first place. In Sextus’ doxography, Asclepiades is explicitly said to be among those who “assert that perceptions are the criterion of truth”; and Epicurus is duly listed as the next authority who, like Asclepiades, upheld ‘self-evidence’ (ἐνάργεια) as the criterion.25 Francesco Verde has also recently argued that Antiochus – in the original context of his Canonica, from which Sextus took the quotation – was concerned to avoid a charge made by his sceptical opponents that he was adopting a fundamentally Epicurean epistemology; hence he deliberately chose to address Asclepiades’ views here as a sort of proxy for Epicurus’.26 To have done so would clearly imply that Antiochus saw a close similarity between Epicurus’ and Asclepiades’ basic epistemological views, and that he expected his audience to be aware of and accept this (note, too, how Antiochus omitted Asclepiades’ name). Whatever the precise context, however, this testimonium from Sextus indicates in various ways that Asclepiades’ views on the criterion of truth were basically those of Epicurus, which is of course unsurprising given his adoption of Epicurus’ underlying physics. Even so, from the point of view of the impact of Epicurean meteorology on Asclepiades, and in particular the question of multiple explanations, it is more interesting to observe that Asclepiades’ scientific methodology in general seems to be built on Epicurean foundations. For in various ways the form and nature of his arguments seem to reflect the fundamentals of Epicurus’ doctrine of contestation and non-contestation in the case of hidden and obscure phenomena. In the passage from Caelius Aurelianus quoted above, we have already seen an example of an Asclepiadean argument which establishes non-contestation with observable phenomena, one which in fact was likely to have been taken directly from Epicurus’ On Nature.27 As Asclepiades argued, the phenomena associated with goats’ horns and silver filings show that it is possible that wholes have different properties from their parts.

αἰσθήσεων ἀλήθειαν (‘And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses’, trans. Hicks); S.E. M. 8.8-9, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔλεγεν ἀληθῆ καὶ ὄντα. οὐ διήνεγκε γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναί τι λέγειν ἢ ὑπάρχον (‘Epicurus said that all perceptibles are true and real. For it makes no difference

to say that something is true or that it is existent’). See further Verde 2020: 251, who also notes the Epicurean pedigree of the term ἀντίληψις. 25 S.E. M. 7.202-203. 26  Verde 2020; cf., e.g., 266: “In breve: se Antioco avesse fatto sostenere a Epicuro quello che, invece, fa dire ad Asclepiade – ossia che le sensazioni sono apprensioni reali e veritiere – avrebbe favorito l’attendibilità dell’accusa che gli muovevano i suoi avversari scettici. Per questa ragione l’uso di Asclepiade da parte di Antioco non solo non è affatto casuale, ma risponde a precise ragioni di carattere filosofico”. I have benefitted from discussing these issues with Francesco Verde and wish to record my thanks. 27  See above, 170

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Caelius Aurelianus records other comparable arguments, such as the following: In the book he wrote On Common Remedies Asclepiades declares that wine [both suppresses sweating and causes it]. He compares the action of wine with that of rennet. Rennet, he tells us, both thickens and rarefies milk, cheese being formed from the milk by a thickening process, while the remaining matter thereby becomes thinner and more liquid. […] He holds that in the same way we perceive that wine by virtue of its penetrating quality causes a condensation and coagulation of a large part of our nourishment and, at the same time, a dissolving, thinning-out, and rarefaction of another large part. Thus we see that Asclepiades, led astray by a poor comparison, actually holds that opposite effects may arise from identical conditions. Caelius Aurelianus, On Acute Diseases 1.15.151-152, trans. Drabkin

Here, similarly, Asclepiades’ comparison with rennet is clearly not intended to prove that wine must have a parallel effect: the fact that rennet produces opposing effects is not meant to entail that wine necessarily does likewise (even though this is how Caelius seems to take the force of his argument). Rather, it is intended to demonstrate that the inference that wine both suppresses and causes sweating is not contested by observable phenomena: rennet can be directly observed both to thicken and to thin milk; therefore it is open to us to believe that wine can have opposing, thickening and thinning, effects on the body in a parallel manner. Conversely, too, Asclepiades is regularly found rejecting his opponents’ views because of their constestation by observable phenomena. For example, his medical predecessor Erasistratus of Ceos had maintained that digestion consists in the grinding down of food in the stomach. In response, Asclepiades argued that this is contested by the phenomena: “Asclepiades, like Erasistratus, selects his premisses from experience and says, ‘We see that many kinds of food are easily ground and pounded, notwithstanding which they are difficult to digest, and herein is a proof that digestion does not take place through food being ground and pounded’.”28 Asclepiades’ famous claim that there is no localized hēgemonikon was based, at least in part, on the observations that various animals continue to perform sophisticated psychic functions after their heads or their hearts have been removed.29 There is clear evidence, as we have seen, that Epicurus’ empiricist approach provided Asclepiades with his general epistemological framework, so it is entirely to be expected that his method of scientific inquiry followed naturally from this approach. Therefore, it ought to have given Asclepiades at least the necessary basic apparatus for Epicurus’ method of multiple explanations. However, it is perhaps

28 Gal.

Med. Exp. 12.11, trans. Walzer, in Walzer–Frede 1985. In Tim. 216, Tert. DA 15.

29 Calc.

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unsurprising that there is no sign of such a method in the Asclepiadean testimonia. For one thing, the competitive nature of ancient medicine would seem to make the notion of multiple explanations rhetorically ill-advised: it would hardly be helpful for a doctor to tell prospective patients that there are many possible causes for their medical condition, all of which have equal claim to being the actual cause in their case. It is also important to observe that ethics specifically, in contrast to physics and canonic, does not seem to have been of any particular interest to Asclepiades or to any other physician of his time. It was not the doctor’s job to teach people how to live the best life, and so the ethical context of Epicurus’ multiple explanations does not seem to be applicable for Asclepiades. Perhaps more importantly, too, the human body and its diseases are not epistemically distant in the way that meteorological phenomena are, so it seems plausible that the relevance of multiple explanations never arose for Asclepiades from this point of view as well. However, it is not the case that Asclepiades could have had little interest in meteorology simply because he was a doctor. After all, Lucretius’ discussion of meteorological phenomena culminates dramatically in his account of the causes of disease and, in particular, with his Thucydidean description of the plague of Athens. Perhaps more to the point, there was also a very strong tradition in Classical Greek medicine that emphasized the role of climatic and atmospheric phenomena such as the winds, seasons, and geographical location in producing disease. This tradition is exemplified most obviously by the pseudo-Hippocratic text Airs, Waters, Places, but the basic idea is also well represented in various medical treatises that later made their way into the Hippocratic Corpus, such as the various books of the Epidemics, On the Nature of Man, and so on. As I shall argue in the next section, though, Asclepiades, in line with a general trend in antiquity, seems to have ignored or suppressed this meteorological approach to disease causation, such that his lack of engagement with Epicurean meteorology seems to have a deeper, more interesting background.30

3. Meteorological connections We know that Epicurus wrote a work entitled Opinions on Diseases, to Mithres, which has unfortunately not survived.31 The principal source for Epicurean views on the cause of (some) diseases, therefore, is the closing section of Lucretius’ poem. I shall leave aside the difficult question of whether Epicurus was Lucretius’ source

30  See Nutton 2021 on the relative lack of medical attention paid to the environment and atmosphere, and to epidemic and endemic disease in general, in antiquity after the Classical period. 31  Diog. Laert. X 28.

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for his discussion of diseases and treat his explanations as Epicurean in a general sense.32 The opening lines of the relevant section are as follows: Nunc ratio quae sit morbis, aut unde repente mortiferam possit cladem conflare coorta morbida vis hominum generi pecudumque catervis, expediam. primum multarum semina rerum esse supra docui quae sint vitalia nobis, et contra quae sint morbo mortique necessest multa volare. ea cum casu sunt forte coorta et perturbarunt caelum, fit morbidus aer. atque ea vis omnis morborum pestilitasque aut extrinsecus, ut nubes nebulaeque, superne per caelum veniunt, aut ipsa saepe coorta de terra surgunt, ubi putorem umida nactast intempestivis pluviisque et solibus icta. Nonne vides etiam caeli novitate et aquarum temptari procul a patria quicumque domoque adveniunt ideo quia longe discrepitant res? nam quid Brittannis caelum differre putamus, et quod in Aegypto est qua mundi claudicat axis. Now I will explain the reason of diseases, and from what place the force of disease can suddenly gather together, and blow together a storm of deadly destruction for mankind and for flocks and herds. Firstly, I have shown above that there are many seeds of things which support our life, and on the other hand there must be many flying about which make for disease and death. When these by chance or accident have gathered together, and thrown the heavens into turmoil, the air becomes diseased. And all these diseases in their power and pestilence either come from without down through the sky, like clouds and mists, or often they gather together and rise from the earth itself, when through damp it has become putrescent, being smitten out of due time by rains and suns. Do you not see also that novelty of climate and water affects any who travel far from home and country, just because there is a great difference in these things? For what difference must we suppose to be between the climate of Britain and that of Egypt where the world’s pole leans aslant? Lucret. VI 1090-1107, trans. Rouse & Smith

It seems clear firstly that Lucretius is thinking about pestilence in particular here, that is, diseases which affect large groups of people at once. It is indicated firstly 32  Sedley 1998, esp. ch. 3, makes a persuasive case for Lucretius’ unmediated dependence on Epicurus’ On Nature for the philosophical and scientific content of the DRN; Bakker 2016, esp. ch. 3, emphasizes aspects of Lucretius’ approach to meteorology in particular, such as his interest in marvellous local phenomena, which may not derive from Epicurus.

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by his reference at the beginning to livestock as well as humans being afflicted, which echoes literary descriptions of pestilence.33 It also makes sense given the general context of explaining atmospheric phenomena, since the question of disease causation is addressed principally in relation to that topic. Of course the ultimate purpose of the whole discussion is to alleviate fear, and in the Greek tradition it was paradigmatically pestilence, among diseases, that mortals had to fear from the gods – from the plague sent by Apollo at the beginning of the Iliad, to that afflicting Thebes thanks to Oedipus’ pollution in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. On the other hand, it seems that Lucretius is not only thinking of pestilence. In the second paragraph of the quotation above, he turns to the effects of different climates more generally, along with the different qualities of water in different geographical areas. He also refers to the different winds in different places shortly afterwards.34 His commentary clearly suggests that he is engaging with the influential medical tradition, discussed above, that emphasizes the decisive impact of the environment on health. The treatise Airs, Waters, Places in particular explores broadly similar themes to Lucretius’ outline here, with its emphasis on winds, water quality, and the ethnic differences between people who live in different climates. This medical tradition is not confined to explaining pestilence, but was thought to be an important determinant for different kinds of disease in general. So even though Lucretius’ account is certainly focused on pestilence, he appears to be drawing on broader medical ideas as well.35 Lucretius argues that there must be combinations of atoms that are harmful to our bodies, presumably deriving ultimately from their particular shapes and sizes, just as there are those which are beneficial. When such harmful atoms happen to amass together in an area, they can render the air in general noxious. The origins of these conglomerations are either from the sky, in the form of clouds and mists, or from the earth when it becomes damp: here the reference to rain and sun suggests that he may be thinking of humid, marshy areas, which we might class as malarial. There seems to be an emphasis on disturbance and disorder here, whereby the harmful atoms cause corruption in part by causing harmful commotions in the air. The harmful atoms make their way into our bodies either through inhalation 33 E.g.,

Il. 1.50, S. OT 26; cf. Thuc. 2.50. Lucret. VI 1111, 1119-1124. 35  Bakker 2016: 112-113 and 124-125 suggests that the distinction between diseases arising from the sky and those arising from the earth corresponds to the distinction between epidemic diseases (i.e., those affecting various areas on an occasional basis) and endemic ones (i.e., those affecting a specific area on a more or less permanent basis). It seems to me, however, that Lucretius’ description is more general, revealing how atmospheres may be causally relevant in various, different ways. There is nothing in the text to suggest that the discussion of peculiar diseases, such as elephantiasis, associated with a particular locale (VI 1103-1118) is supposed to be an amplification of the reference to earth-sourced atoms (VI 1100-1102). Indeed, the etiam at 1103 would normally signal the beginning of a distinct argument within this section. While the epidemic/endemic distinction may well be recognized here, it does not seem to me to structure Lucretius’ account. 34 

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directly from the air, or by settling on water sources or on food crops, and so forth. This explains also how livestock are often affected by the same pestilence. From the point of view of the present paper, a key point is that all of this analysis seems to differ fundamentally from Asclepiades’ approach to disease. His pathology was, unsurprisingly, derived from his theory of matter. His atom-like particles, the onkoi, which make up the human body, were also conceived as travelling through the body’s void interstices, which he also called πόροι (‘pores’). Caelius Aurelianus gives the following short synopsis of Asclepiades’ pathology: fieri etiam vias ex complexione corpusculorum intellectu sensas, magnitudine atque schemate differentes, per quas sucorum ductus solito meatu percurrens si nullo fuerit impedimento retentus, sanitas maneat, impeditus vero statione corpusculorum morbos efficiat. fit autem eorum statio aut magnitudinis aut schematis aut multitudinis aut celerrimi motus causa … . (He says) that pores, too, are created out of the combination of the onkoi, and are perceptible by reason and differ in size and shape. The flow of liquids travels through these with its usual motion, and if it is not held back by any impediment, health is maintained, but when it is impeded by an obstruction of onkoi it produces diseases. The obstruction of these (sc. onkoi) occurs either through their size, shape, number, or very swift motion … . Caelius Aurelianus, On Acute Diseases 1.14.106-107

This condition is the most common cause of disease in general, but specific disease types vary according to the location of this obstruction within the body or are caused by certain other physical circumstances such as a general disturbance of the body’s fluids.36 Hence the focus of his pathology is on the individual malfunctions that occur within the body of each sufferer. A proper balance has to be maintained in the body’s physical structure, as well as in the motion of its constituent particles, in order for health to prevail. Disease in general is caused by disturbances to this balance. In contrast to Lucretius’ account, there is no question for Asclepiades of inherently harmful types of particle: the onkoi which cause disease in the body are one and the same as those which maintain its health; they become harmful due to their motion and the ways in which they interact with, and can become obstructed in, the body’s void spaces. Nor is there any indication of external dangers: while we have plenty of evidence for the idea of onkoi entering the body as part of natural processes in Asclepiades’ system, our sources are silent on this process as a cause

36  See also the immediately subsequent summary in Caelius Aurelianus, at Cel. Pass. 1.14.107-108; for fuller discussion of Asclepiades’ pathology, see Vallance 1990: 93-122.

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of disease.37 In his pathology, attention is directed towards individual sufferers and the specific internal conditions which produce disease. Given that the average doctor was mostly faced with individual, non-epidemic conditions, this general focus on individual diseases is not particularly surprising. However, we know that Asclepiades certainly addressed the phenomenon of pestilence and plague as well. In fact, he wrote a treatise On Pestilence (De lue), as Caelius Aurelianus records.38 This record is a remarkable fact in itself, since we know of no other treatise from the Hellenistic or Roman periods devoted to this topic.39 So Asclepiades’ attention was not solely devoted to individual diseases, but also covered pestilential phenomena of the sort that Lucretius was especially concerned with. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the content of Asclepiades’ treatise is extremely limited. Caelius tells us that it included critiques of earlier authorities’ treatments: tacuit enim frigidum dandum, culpans denique libris quos De lue conscripsit Cleophanti sectatores vinum frigidum dantes. For [Asclepiades] did not say to give [the wine, in cases of cardiac disease,] cold, and in fact blames Cleophantus’ followers, in the books he wrote On Pestilence, for giving wine cold. Caelius Aurelianus, On Acute Diseases 2.39.231

We are also told elsewhere of some of Asclepiades’ own treatments for pestilence, presumably deriving from the same treatise and suggesting a therapeutic approach that was closely aligned with his treatment of fever: sed in his, qui periodicis typis afficiuntur, vomitum praeponit clysteri. item lue aegrotantibus vomitum et lavacrum probat, typicis vero clysterem et vomitum. But for those who are affected by cyclical types of fever, he puts vomiting before the clyster. He approves of vomiting and bathing for those suffering from pestilence, but clysters and vomiting for fever types. Caelius Aurelianus, On Acute Diseases 1.14.110

37  Asclepiades of course gave a detailed account of the physiology of respiration, summarized at Aëtius, Placita 4.22.2, according to which pneuma enters the body and plays a crucial role in its proper functioning (see also Calc. In Tim. 214). See also Anon. Lond. col. xxxvi 43-55 [86 Manetti], which records some of Asclepiades’ argumentation concerning the existence of invisible emanations leaving our bodies and the corresponding invisible influxes into them. 38  Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 2.39.231. 39  Nutton 2021: esp. 369-370.

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Yet we also possess Asclepiades’ definition of pestilence, which is of considerable interest for the issue we are considering: denique luem diffiniens, “lues”, inquit, “est qualitas insueta in his ubi est locis consistentium animalium, qua ex communi causa facilius morbis et interfectivis adficiuntur”. In defining pestilence, [Asclepiades] says, “pestilence is an uncustomary quality of the animals which dwell in the places where it exists, through which shared cause they are more easily40 affected by diseases, including deadly ones”. Caelius Aurelianus, On Acute Diseases 1.pref.12

At the beginning of the definition, Asclepiades defines pestilence as “an uncustomary quality” that belongs specifically to the animals affected: this quality does not belong to the places in which the animals dwell, otherwise the genitive animalium does not seem to make sense. In other words, there is no question of an external cause for pestilence: it is a peculiar quality, whatever that might be, which arises internally and renders sufferers more susceptible to disease. This peculiar quality, or internal defect, can be found in a whole community or population, but each is, as it were, individually the cause of their own vulnerability: hence the pestilence has a cause which is described as “common”, in the sense that it is shared by a variety of individuals at the same time. So even when Asclepiades is considering pestilence directly, there is still no place in his medical system for the idea of external, atmospheric causes which bring about a pathological condition directly. Indeed, it seems to be important to Asclepiades that there are no external causes, except generally indirect, antecedent causes.41 Any case of disease will have its direct genesis in the internal, quasi-atomistic configuration of the body. There is no place either for our own concept of contagion or of more general notions of miasma or pollution. The sufferer and the sufferer alone is the site of disease, even where a whole community appears to be similarly affected. This perspective is a quite different to Lucretius’, which appealed to a general notion of ‘harmful atoms’ in the atmosphere. Of course, it is hardly surprising that Asclepiades would wish to take an innovative approach in such a medical context: here more than anywhere we would expect him to have introduced a distinctive theory and marked out his independence. Still, as we have seen, Lucretius him40  I have emended here the transmitted adjective ‘facilibus’ to the comparative adverb ‘facilius’, which seems to offer clearer sense. 41  Asclepiades certainly recognized that the weather and seasons were potentially relevant as antecedent causes of disease, in the sense that excessively hot or cold temperatures could affect the body (see Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.2.32-33), but in contrast to Lucretius they were not the central causes of disease (later to be labelled ‘cohesive causes’, synektikai aitiai), which for Asclepiades were always internal to the body and based on the configurations of its particulate structure.

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self seems to have been influenced by a prominent medical tradition that put the principal emphasis on the importance of environment, climate, and geography for health, exemplified by the pseudo-Hippocratic treatise Airs, Waters, Places, which Asclepiades himself will surely have known.42 So it is not just the philosophical background that Asclepiades was innovating on, but also a medical one.

4. Problēmata literature I would also like to draw attention to another way in which Asclepiades’ theory connected with attempts to explain various meteorological phenomena. A rich source for Asclepiades’ physical theory is a collection of Problēmata associated with the name of Cassius the Iatrosophist. Almost nothing is known about this figure, although he seems to have been active in the second century AD.43 This collection of Problēmata was evidently drawing on a range of sources and traditions, but one of these was certainly Asclepiades and his followers. In fact, it is one of the more important sources for understanding how Asclepiades’ medical theory was actually used in explaining various physical processes, not just confined to human physiology. A large number of the 85 surviving problems use distinctively Asclepiadean terminology (such as ὄγκοι, πόροι, ἔνστασις, λεπτόμερεια, etc.), and refer to his theories as we know them from elsewhere. He is also referred to twice explicitly.44 I draw attention to it here because some of the problems touch on meteorological phenomena in a way that allows us to compare Epicurean explanations with corresponding Asclepiadean ones. Problem 65 asks the question “Why does sea water, which is salty, become sweeter when it is boiled to a high degree?” One of the answers in the text assumes Asclepiades’ theory, in stating that the water is ultimately composed of onkoi of a certain type. As the explanation states, “One should say that sea water, which is composed of large onkoi, is made fine by being divided by the fire. Therefore, when it has undergone an alteration because of its being rendered fine from being thick, by throwing off its previous quality, (sc. the seawater) becomes sweet instead of salty.”45 Here we appear to have a process by which fire is able to 42  Asclepiades wrote commentaries on a selection of Hippocratic texts, including In the Surgery, Aphorisms, and Epidemics 1; see Leith 2021 also for general discussion of Asclepiades’ approach to the Hippocratic Corpus. 43  For the dating of Cassius, see Manetti 2012. The collection mentions the doctor Soranus of Ephesus, who was the source for Caelius Aurelianus’ Latin treatises that we have been discussing already, and who was working during the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian. Section 40 of Cassius’ Problemata, containing the mention of Soranus, is not found in Ideler’s old edition of the text, but is restored in the newer edition by Garzya–Masullo 2004. 44 Cass. Probl. 1 [35-36 Garzya–Masullo = 144-145 Ideler]; 41 [55 Garzya–Masullo = Probl. 40 Ideler 157-158]. 45 Cass. Probl. 65 [= §  64 Ideler], διὰ τί τὸ θαλάττιον ὕδωρ ἁλμυρὸν τυγχάνον, ἑψηθὲν ἐπὶ πολύ, γλυκύτερον γίνεται; … ῥητέον ὅτι τὸ θαλάττιον ὕδωρ ἐκ μεγάλων ὄγκων συνεστὸς λεπτύνεται

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divide large onkoi and thereby turn them into smaller, finer onkoi. The property of saltiness is associated with the composition of a substance out of large onkoi, while the property of sweetness is associated with its being composed of fine onkoi. We learn more from the previous problem in the collection, which asks: “Why is rain water sweet, even though it is evaporated from the sea?” Similarly, the Asclepiadean answer is that “(one should say) that, even if it is the sea water itself that is evaporated, the pneuma moves it with great force, and, having been moved, it becomes finer. For what is moved is always naturally disposed to rarefaction. What is fine is also sweet, since it is composed of large onkoi. This is why rain water is sweet.”46 As discussed above, Asclepiades’ onkoi, unlike atoms, were physically breakable.47 This is one of the major modifications he made to the Epicurean theory of matter. What is most striking about this passage from Cassius is that it is a very rare case in which we can observe this modification in action. Asclepiades seems to have explained the qualitative difference between seawater and rainwater in terms of variation in the sizes of their constituent particles: when seawater is boiled, its constituent particles are broken into finer onkoi by the action of the fire; similarly, when seawater is evaporated into the atmosphere, it is apparently the action of pneuma that makes its particles finer. This process of breaking the onkoi results in a sweeter quality to the water. Asclepiades’ modification of the underlying Epicurean theory is brought out more clearly through comparison with Lucretius’ corresponding account of the same phenomenon. Lucretius, by contrast, focuses on the shapes of the constituent atoms: seawater is said to be composed partly of rough atoms and partly of smooth ones. When the seawater is filtered, these two types are separated, so that only the smooth, round atoms remain as the constituents of the sweet water.48 Unlike Asclepiades, Lucretius could not appeal to changes in the size and shape of the particles over time; rather, both shapes had to be present already in the original mixture, and one had to be filtered out from this. It seems clear that Asclepiades’ modification could have afforded him a more flexible and elaborate account of qualitative change. The alteration of matter could occur not just through the rearrangement or restructuring of its constituent particles, as in Epicurus’ system, but also at a quite different level, through alterations in the size and shape of those constituent onkoi themselves. Whether or not this particular explanation was given by Asclepiades himself is not entirely clear, since there are one or two indications in the text that some of his καταδιαιρούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρός. μεταβολὴν τοίνυν ἐσχηκὸς διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ παχέως εἰς λεπτὸν καταστῆναι, τῷ ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν προτέραν ποιότητα, γέγονεν ἀντι ἁλμυροῦ γλυκύ. 46 Cass. Probl. 64 [= § 63 Ideler], διὰ τί τὸ ὄμβριον ὕδωρ γλυκύ, καίπερ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἀνιμώμενον; … ἢ ὅτι τὸ πνεῦμα τῇ βίᾳ τῇ σφοδρᾷ, κἂν αὐτὸ τὸ θαλάσσιον ἀνιμήσηται, κινεῖ τοῦτο, κινηθὲν δὲ αὐτὸ λεπτότερον γίνεται; ἀεὶ γὰρ τὰ κινούμενα εὐφυῆ πρὸς λεπτυσμόν. τὸ δὲ λεπτόν, καὶ γλυκύ, ὡς ἐκ μεγάλων συνεστὼς ὄγκων. διὸ γλυκὺ τὸ ὄμβριον ὕδωρ [μὴ add. Gesnerus]. 47 

48 

See above 168 Lucret. II 464-477.

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followers were a source for Cassius.49 Even so, the explanation is certainly Asclepiadean in the sense that it applies his theory to this particular issue. So this is another example of how a modified Epicurean framework could be re-used in a new context of scientific inquiry. Asclepiades’ theory is still at its core recognizeably Epicurean, but it has undergone alterations and has been applied afresh to similar problems.

5. Magnets It is probably also worth noting briefly the possible relevance of the phenomenon of magnetic attraction in this context. Immediately before his discussion of atmospheric disease causation, Lucretius sets out his famous explanation of the lodestone or magnet.50 This reasoning is of relevance for Asclepiades, too, because the Epicurean account of magnetic attraction drew the attention of Galen. Galen constructs a dialectical opposition between Epicurus and Asclepiades to the effect that, while Epicurus recognized the phenomenon of attraction, though devised a thoroughly implausible account of its working in the case of the magnet, Asclepiades saw that it was incompatible with his physics and simply denied its existence. As Galen says in his treatise On the Natural Faculties: “But Asclepiades, recognizing the unpersuasiveness of [Epicurus’] explanation, but discovering no persuasive alternative based on the elements he posits, had recourse to the shameless claim that nothing is attracted by anything else at all. If he did not agree with what Epicurus said but had nothing better to say, he should have turned his back on his hypotheses and announced that Nature is skilful …”.51 However, there is little reason to take Galen at his word here concerning Asclepiades’ response to Epicurus on the magnet: more likely, it had simply never occurred to Asclepiades to give an explanation of magnetic attraction, and his failure to offer one had nothing to do with any overt disagreement with Epicurus.52 49  Cf. Cass. Probl. 74 [=§ 73 Ideler], which explains hydrophobia as an enstasis/obstruction of the onkoi in the oesophagus and stomach. Apparently Asclepiades did not discuss hydrophobia himself, but his followers were involved in a dispute amongst themselves over whether the enstasis/obstruction that caused it was located just in the oesophagus or in both the oesophagus and the stomach, with each side citing Asclepiades’ views on relevant topics: see Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 3.14.113. 50  Lucret. VI 906-1089. 51 Gal. Nat. Fac. 1.14 [ii 45f. K.], Ἀσκληπιάδης δὲ τό τε τῆς εἰρημένης αἰτίας ἀπίθανον ὑπιδόμενος καὶ μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἐφ’ οἷς ὑπέθετο στοιχείοις ἐξευρίσκων πιθανὴν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδ’ ὅλως ἕλκεσθαι λέγειν ὑπὸ μηδενὸς μηδὲν ἀναισχυντήσας ἐτράπετο, δέον, εἰ μήθ’ οἷς Ἐπίκουρος εἶπεν ἠρέσκετο μήτ’ ἄλλα βελτίω λέγειν εἶχεν, ἀποστῆναι τῶν ὑποθέσεων καὶ τήν τε φύσιν εἰπεῖν τεχνικὴν …’. 52  There are also telling inconsistencies in Galen’s criticisms here and elsewhere: here in Nat. Fac. 1.14 [ii.44-52 K.], Epicurus is said to have acknowledged the existence of attraction, though this recognition was in conflict with his principles, whereas Asclepiades adhered to his principles and was therefore forced to deny the evident fact of attraction. However, at PHP 7.7.10-12 [5.639-640 K. = De Lacy CMG V 4,1,2, 472.3-16], Galen charges Asclepiades with illegitimately speaking of attraction when he realized the unpersuasiveness of his principles, which is exactly what he criticised Epicurus for in

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6. Lucretius and Philodemus? Given the focus of the SPIDER project on the development of Epicurean science over time, I should at least raise the question of whether Asclepiades in turn may have influenced some later Epicureans who came after him; whether, that is, there may have been a kind of feedback loop by which Asclepiadean medicine had an impact on Epicurean science as it later developed. This possibility has seemed appealing to several scholars, especially in connection with Lucretius and Philodemus.53 Without being able to go into any of this in detail, however, I find it very unlikely that there was any positive influence from Asclepiades on later Epicureanism. David Sedley seems to me to have effectively countered the various suggestions that Lucretius may have adopted some of Asclepiades’ physiological and medical views.54 A recent attempt has also been made by Lee T. Pearcy to argue that Philodemus was drawing on Asclepiades’ medical theory in order to bolster his defence of Epicurus’ psychology, but it is unfortunately based on a misunderstanding of Asclepiades’ theory of matter.55 Although various philosophers – Antiochus of Ascalon being a notable example – might certainly take an interest in what Asclepiades had to say at times, I think it unlikely that contemporary philosophers were looking to him to supplement or amend their own doctrines, and perhaps least of all the Epicureans. Perhaps most importantly, given the obviously critical stance towards Epicurus that Asclepiades must have taken, it seems implausible in general terms that he would have looked like an appealing authority for Epicureans.

Nat. Fac. 1.14. Moreover, Epicurus’ account of magnetic attraction as Galen himself describes it at Nat. Fac. 1.14 [2.45-48 K.] does not in fact count as attraction according to Galen’s own criteria; in fact, according to Galen’s description, it appeals primarily to atomic shapes, and hence to the same sorts of mechanical processes that Asclepiades invoked in his corresponding accounts. Unsurprisingly, Galen does not mention in this context Plato’s parallel denial of the phenomenon of attraction (ὁλκή) at Tim. 80B-C. For Galen’s polemics against Asclepiades in general, see Leith (forthcoming); for his dialectical strategies in comparable contexts, see, e.g., Allen 2001, Tecusan 2004: 29-36. 53  For the medical interests of later Epicureans, discussed by Plutarch, see now also Piergiacomi 2019, esp. 197-201 on possible links with Asclepiades. 54  Sedley 1998: 68-72, esp. 72 n. 51 and 69 n. 40. 55  Pearcy 2012. Pearcy’s argument relies in large part on understanding a reference to τὰ μ[έρη τ]ῶν ζώ[ιων] at Philod. De Morte col. 8 l. 9 as representing a type of particle that Philodemus borrows from Asclepiades’ medical system. Yet this position involves a misinterpretation of both Philodemus and Asclepiades. Philodemus is clearly just speaking generally of ‘the parts of animals’ in terms of the parts of their bodies (indeed we should probably follow Henry’s reading of μ[όρια). On the other hand, Asclepiades did not distinguish between one level of particle which he called μέρη and another which he called ὄγκοι (see Leith 2009); in S.E. M. 3.5, which Pearcy relies on, the ‘parts of liquid and pneuma’ (ὑγροῦ μέρη καὶ πνεύματος) merely refers to liquid and pneuma, though emphasizing their particulate and divisible structure.

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Conclusion In conclusion, Asclepiades offers an example of an application of Epicurean method to a distinct, though closely related, scientific discipline, namely medicine. There are many areas of overlap here, but Asclepiades consistently shows a readiness to innovate, to offer new kinds of explanations, and to reject some key aspects of the tradition he was drawing on. In some respects, Asclepiades might be seen as applying atomistic theory more systematically to explaining the phenomenon of disease. As far as we can learn from Lucretius, an Epicurean model of disease explanation had appealed to a general notion of ‘harmful atoms’ dispersed in the atmosphere. Asclepiades, by contrast, shifted attention to the internal structure of the body and developed a new model, but one that was clearly based on the fundamental tenets of atomism. He moved a long way from Epicurus in minimizing environmental and meteorological factors from his analysis. All the same, Asclepiades’ epistemology and scientific method remained firmly grounded in Epicureanism. Whether it was explicitly acknowledged by him remains rather unclear, but whatever the case, Asclepiades offers a richly detailed case study in the wider impact and powerful influence that Epicurean science had in the late Hellenistic and early Roman periods.

References Allen, J., 2001, “Galen as (Mis)informant about the Views of his Predecessors”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83: 81–89. Asmis, E., 1993, “Review Article: Asclepiades of Bithynia Rediscovered?”, Classical Philology 88: 145–156. Bakker, F. A., 2016, Epicurean Meteorology: Sources, Method, Scope and Organization, Leiden–Boston: Brill. Casadei, E., 1997, “La dottrina corpuscolare di Asclepiade e i suoi rapporti con la tradizione atomista”, Elenchos 18: 77–106. Dorandi, T., 1999, “Chronology”, in K. Algra et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 31–54. Flemming, R., 2012, “Antiochus and Asclepiades: Medical and Philosophical Sectarianism at the End of the Hellenistic Era”, in D. Sedley (ed.), The Philosophy of Antiochus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 55–79. Garzya, A.,–Masullo, R. (eds.), 2004, I problemi di Cassio Iatrosofista. Naples: Giannini. Huby, P., 1978, “Epicurus’ Attitude to Democritus”, Phronesis 23: 80–86. Ideler, I. L. (ed.) 1841, Physici et medici graeci minores. Vol. I, Berlin: Reimeri. Leith, D., 2009, “The Qualitative Status of the Onkoi in Asclepiades’ Theory of Matter”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 36: 283–320. Leith, D., 2012, “Pores and Void in Asclepiades’ Physical Theory”, Phronesis 57: 164–191.

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Leith, D., 2015, “Elements and Uniform Parts in Early Alexandrian Medicine”, Phronesis 60: 462–491. Leith, D., 2020, “Notes on Three Asclepiadean Doctors”, in L. Totelin–R. Flemming (eds.), Medicine and Markets. Essays on Ancient Medicine in Honour of Vivian Nutton, Cardiff: Classical Press of Wales, 127–141. Leith, D., 2021, “Asclepiades of Bithynia as Hippocratic Commentator”, in P. Pormann (ed.), Hippocrates East and West: Commentaries in the Greek, Latin, Syriac and Arabic Traditions, Leiden: Brill, 28-50. Leith, D., (forthcoming), “Galen and Hellenistic Medicine”, in J. Laskaris–R. Rosen–P. N. Singer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Galen, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Manetti, D. (ed.), 2011, Anonymus Londiniensis: De Medicina, Berlin–New York: De Gruyter. Manetti, D., 2012, “I Problemi di Cassio Iatrosophista: difficoltà di datazione e scoperte preziose”, Medicina nei secoli 24: 423–440. Michler, M., 1993, “Principis medicus: Antonius Musa”, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II 37.1: 757–785. Nutton, V., 2021, “Epidemic Disease in a Humoral Environment; from Airs, Waters and Places to the Renaissance”, in C. Thumiger (ed.), Holism in Ancient Medicine and its Reception. Leiden–Boston: Brill, 357–376. Pearcy, L. T., 2012, “Does Dying Hurt? Philodemus of Gadara, De Morte and Asclepiades of Bithynia”, Classical Quarterly 62: 211–222. Piergiacomi, E., 2019, “Gli Epicurei romani sulla medicina: Senocle, Alessandro, Zopiro e Lucrezio”, Ciceroniana On Line 3: 191–228. Polito, R., 2006, “Matter, Medicine, and the Mind: Asclepiades vs. Epicurus”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 30: 285–335. Rawson, E., 1982, “The Life and Death of Asclepiades of Bithynia”, Classical Quarterly 32: 358–370. Rawson, E., 1985, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic, London: Duckworth. Sedley, D., 1976, “Epicurus and his Professional Rivals”, in J. Bollack–A. Laks (eds.), Études sur l’Epicurisme antique, Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 121–159. Sedley, D., 1998, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sedley, D., 2009, “Epicureanism in the Roman Republic”, in J. Warren (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 29–45. Stok, F., 2019, “Quando Asclepiade arrivò a Roma?”, Technai 10: 13-22. Tecusan, M., 2004, The Fragments of the Methodists. Volume One: Methodism outside Soranus, Leiden–Boston: Brill. Vallance, J., 1990, The Lost Theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Verde, F., 2020, “I Kanonika di Antioco di Ascalona e Asclepiade di Bitinia (Sext. Emp. M. 7,200-202)”, Rheinisches Museum 163: 241-270. Walzer, R.,–Frede, M. (eds.), 1985, Galen: Three Treatises on the Nature of Science, Indianapolis: Hackett. Warren, J., 2002, Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Patterns of Reception of Epicureanism in Galen’s Writings* Vincenzo Damiani

1. Galen, physician and philosopher Galen’s philosophical allegiance is not easily defined. Scholars tend to place his attitude towards contemporary philosophies within the horizon of a Platonic-Aristotelian κοινή, albeit with substantial Stoic influences.1 Nevertheless, it remains difficult both to discern a unique Galenic allegiance2 and to isolate any of his philosophical contributions that might be regarded as wholly original.3 The far-sighted initiative of his father, Nikon, in the flourishing Pergamum of the second century AD, resulted in an adolescent Galen associating with representatives of the main philosophical schools of the time, a diversity of philosophic contact which is reflected in his thought. Galen’s theoretical scepticism (which does not wholly lead to a complete ἐποχή) about problems of a purely speculative nature, such as the generation of the cosmos or the substance of the soul, can certainly be traced back to an attitude acquired through his medical profession.4 Similarly, his clinical background also underpins his position on issues of epistemology, logic, and gnoseology,5 supporting a broader project of ‘re-founding’ the theoretical basis of medical science which Galen pursued throughout his lifetime.6 A key characteristic of his thought is the attention to the formal rules of scientific argumentation and to the critical judgment of empirical data, based on which he proudly proclaims equidistance from any school or sect in philosophy, as well as in medicine.7 Provided they conform to both logic and empirical data, the different philosophical languages prove to be ‘translatable’ into one another.8 Yet logical ex*  The abbreviations of Galen’s works and the Corpus Hippocraticum follow the repertories in Hankinson 2008: 391–397 and Pormann 2018: 384–389, respectively. An earlier version of this article was published in Italian in Corsi 2022: 77–105. I would like to thank Alitsia Ast for her careful review of the first draft. 1  Cf. Barnes–Jouanna 2003; Boudon-Millot 2019. 2  See Hankinson 1992: 3507. 3  See Singer 2014. 4  Cf. Gal. Propr. Plac. 2 and 15 [172–173 and 188–190 Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli]; Donini 1992: 3498 and 3501; Hankinson 1992: 3510; Singer 2014: 16; Chiaradonna 2014 and 2017; Damiani 2019: 527; Nutton 2020: 78–79. 5  Donini 1992: 3502; Tieleman 1996: xviii. 6  Vegetti 1995 and 2015 (now in Vegetti 2018: 149–195 and 357–398). 7  Pecc. Dig. 5 and 7 [CMG V 4,1,1, 61 and 67 = 5,91–93 and 101 Kühn]; cf. Damiani 2018: 313–314. 8  Vegetti 2018: 271–277.

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amination and empirical observation are also boundaries beyond which, according to Galen, philosophy has nothing more to offer to medical science: the inextricable disputes of metaphysics escape the criteria of λόγος and πεῖρα, and therefore they remain outside the field of interest for the physician-philosopher. Through such reflections, Galen takes a stand on the very structure of philosophical knowledge.9 Nevertheless, adherence to a brand of Platonism, filtered through the doctrines of Aristotle, is evident in the teleological structure of much of his anatomo-physiology.10 A central text is Περὶ χρείας μορίων (De usu partium), which remains strongly indebted both to the idea of the demiurgic φύσις introduced in Plato’s Timaeus, not to mention the teleology of Aristotle’s De partibus animalium.11 Galen’s aim – to demonstrate that nature acts in a direction that is never random, but continuously adapts bodily structures and processes to their respective functional ends – is undoubtedly ambitious.12 Correspondingly, an unreserved criticism of the mechanistic, atomistic, and anti-providentialist conceptions of natural processes represented by Epicurus (with or without Democritus), Erasistratus, and Asclepiades runs through Galen’s work with impressive consistency. This finds its theoretical foundation in Plato’s and Aristotle’s teleologism, as well as through engagement with Epicureanism itself. Indeed, the evidence to suggest that Galen also met with an exponent of Epicureanism in his youth now comes to the fore:13 ἐν τούτῳ δέ τις καὶ ἄλλος ἧκε πολίτης ἡμέτερος ἐξ ἀποδημίας μακρᾶς, Ἀσπασίου τοῦ

Περιπατητικοῦ μαθητής, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἄλλος Ἐπικούρειος, ὧν

ἁπάντων ὁ πατὴρ δι’ ἐμὲ τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τῶν δογμάτων ἐξέτασιν ἐποιεῖτο σὺν ἐμοὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀφικνούμενος.14

In the following pages, I foreground some of the rhetorical and philosophical features of Galen’s critique of atomistic physics and, in particular, of Epicureanism. I also argue that something like a positive appropriation of genuine Epicurean content can be discerned in Galen’s writings. Galen hardly ever mentions this aspect openly – and it is therefore all the more worthy of investigation.

9 

Cf. Boudon-Millot 2019: 124. Cf. Hankinson 2016; Grimaudo 2008: 235. 11  Vegetti 2018: 380; cf. Damiani 2019: 532–533. 12  Van der Eijk 2017. Galen’s teleology has recently been the object of renewed attention. See Petit 2018: 163–209 and Nutton 2020: 81–83; Wakelnig 2018 focuses on the Arabic reception. 13  Aff. Dig. 8 [CMG V 4,1,1, 28 = 5,41–42 Kühn]; cf. Alexander 1994: 68–71; Singer 2013: 273. 14  “In the meantime, another fellow-citizen had returned from a long stay abroad, a disciple of Aspasius the Peripatetic; after him another, from Athens, an Epicurean. For my sake, my father carefully examined the lives and doctrines of all these men and joined me in listening to them.” Where not otherwise indicated, translations are by the author. 10 

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2. The reception of Epicureanism in the Imperial Age Recent contributions have attempted to address the controversial Nachleben of atomistic theory in the Corpus Galenicum, with a view to restoring the due distinctions Galen deliberately obliterates between authors and systems that are certainly related but not mutually reducible.15 However, a broader examination of both the refutation strategies and possible intersections for Galenic reception of Epicureanism beyond merely open conflict on the principles of physics remains necessary. Understandably, it is not a task that can be reasonably accomplished within the span of a single article; what I propose here is, therefore, an analysis limited to a few exemplary cases. The history of Epicurus’ school can be retraced from the end of the fourth century BC to around the fourth century AD, albeit with frequently interspersed bleak and conspicuous gaps.16 Following Usener’s synthesis in the praefatio to his Epicurea,17 several studies have reconsidered the material available on the circulation of Epicureanism in the Imperial Age from different perspectives.18 The most recent contributions include the work of K. J. Fleischer, which identifies argumentative similarities between the fragmentary Περὶ φύσεως of Bishop Dionysius of Alexandria († 264/265 AD) and the critique of atomistic anti-providentialism that Galen deploys especially in De usu partium.19 Another particularly pertinent case that has been recently addressed is the question of the reception of Epicurus in Plotinus’ work: the fact that the critical attitude towards Epicureanism there can be linked to the indictment against the Gnostics, who also deny demiurgic providence (cf. Enn. II 9,15),20 seems to correspond to a recurrent polemical form, whereby Epicurus’ doctrine (or aspects of it) is placed alongside teachings perceived as analogous, and, consequently, equally fallacious. This is the case with Asclepiades’ physiology, which Galen systematically associates with Epicurus’ atomistic physics.21 Indeed, studies on the reception of Epicureanism in the Imperial Age have progressively moved away from an interest in doxographic reconstruction and the spirit that animates Usener’s collection to focus instead on strategies of polemics, reuse of formal patterns, and doctrinal contents. Claims have rightly been made about a “positive Epikurrezeption”,22 something which is often implicit and therefore not 15 

Cf. Polito 2006; Leith 2009, 2012 and 2014; Serangeli 2017 and 2019. Cf. Fleischer 2016: 147. 17  Usener 1887: lxxiii–lxxvi. 18  See Schmid 1962, Ferguson 1990, Erler 2000 and 2009, Fletcher 2012, Fleischer 2016, Longo–­ Taormina 2016. The contributions of Leone 2014 as well as Dorandi 2015 and 2016 specifically investigate the diffusion of the treatise Περὶ φύσεως. 19  Fleischer 2016: 353–354 and 361. 20  Longo–Taormina 2016: 4–5. 21  See Casadei 1997: 91. 22  Erler 2000: 11. 16 

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easy to define, although it is frequently detectable in contexts distant even from those in which the original Epicurean material belongs. The following paragraphs are intended as a further contribution to this line of research.

3. Galen and Epicureanism Galen’s position towards Epicureanism can generally be characterized, in its explicit manifestations, as one of open criticism. This criticism is most evident where the irreconcilability between the Platonic-Aristotelian paradigm and atomism is at its strongest, that is, in the science of nature and cosmology. Indeed, it is possible that Galen was familiar with at least some Epicurean texts directly. De libris propriis, the autograph catalogue of his works, mentions the titles of several Epicurean treatises not extant today,23 which does suggest a degree of familiarity with Epicurus’ writings.24 Galen also mentions the two books Περὶ τοῦ κατ’ Επίκουρον εὐδαίμονος καὶ μακαρίου βίου – a subject that had already been an object of criticism by Plutarch;25 a book on the use of the science of nature for ethics; two writings on dreams and the purpose of philosophy according to Epicurus, both titles of which are known in the version of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq.26 Three further writings are devoted to the doctrine of pleasure: on the ἡδονὴ ἁλμυρά (the “inflaming pleasure”, according to Boudon-Millot, who draws on the Arabic tradition);27 on Epicurus’ inadequate description of the factors that cause pleasure (τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς); and on what Galen indicates as ἡδονικὴ αἵρεσις (the “hedonistic sect”).28 The inclusion of a work on Metrodorus’ Πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστάς29 also implies that Galen had access to some of the texts of the so-called Epicurean ἄνδρες.30 Though the content of the Letter against the Epicurean Celsus and of the Letter of the Epicurean Pudentianus is unknown, the use of the epistolary form – a major means of private and doctrinal communication within the Κῆπος31 – within texts which likely had a polemical content may not be accidental.32 23  One of the possible reasons for this could lie, with respect to the fortune of Galenism as a medical paradigm, in their lack of clinical relevance: see Vegetti 2013: 11. 24  Lib. propr. 19 [172–173 Boudon-Millot = 19,48 Kühn]: Περὶ τῆς κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον εὐδαίμονος καὶ μακαρίου βίου δύο· ‹…›· περὶ τῆς κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον ἁλμυρᾶς ἡδονῆς δύο· ὅτι τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐλλιπῶς

Ἐπικούρῳ λέλεκται ἕν· περὶ τῆς Ἡδονικῆς αἱρέσεως· εἰ ἡ φυσιολογία χρήσιμος εἰς τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἕν· περὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστὰς ἐν‹ νέα› Μητροδώρου· ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Κέλσον Ἐπικούρειον· ἐπιστολὴ Πουδεντιανοῦ Ἐπικουρείου. 25 

Cf. Corti 2014: 21–28, Schneider 2021. Boudon-Millot 2007: 232. 27  See Boudon-Millot 2007: 232–233 on the text. 28  Galen’s skepticism towards the Epicurean theory of pleasure clearly emerges, albeit in a cursory lash, in PHP IV 4 [CMG V 4,1,2, 256 = 5,388 Kühn]. 29  Cf. Diog. Laert. X 24. 30  On this term, cf. Longo Auricchio 1978. 31  See Erbì 2015 and 2020. 32  See Boudon-Millot 2007: 173 n. 3. 26 

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Owing to the recent discovery of the MS Vlatadon 14 and to the recovery of the complete Greek text of Περὶ ἀλυπίας,33 a further work may be added to these titles. In the context of a criticism of the conception of ἀοχλησία as the supreme good, a writing is mentioned there whose title can be reconstructed (the lesson κατ’ Ἐπικούρω of the Vlatadon is certainly corrupted) as either Κατ’ Ἐπικούρου or Κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον. In the latter case,34 it may have been an abbreviated reference to the Περὶ τοῦ κατ’ Επίκουρον εὐδαίμονος καὶ μακαρίου βίου already mentioned in the De libris;35 in the former, the title would be translated as “Against Epicurus”, perhaps a separate treatise, now lost. In response to an Epicurean Ἀντώνιος, an otherwise unknown author of the treatise Περὶ τῆς τοῖς ἰδίοις πάθεσι ἐφεδρείας (On the Control of One’s Affections),36 Galen conceived the work De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione at the request of a friend. Antonios’ text, which Galen criticizes most strongly for its lack of adequate conceptual distinctions between the ‘observation’ (παραφυλακή), ‘diagnosis’ (διάγνωσις), and ‘rectification’ (ἐπανόρθωσις) of affections, as well as between ‘affection’ (πάθος) and ‘error’ (ἁμάρτημα), is the starting point for an examination of the recognition and treatment of the passions that trouble the human soul (infra, 3.2).37 3.1. Natural philosophy To the αἵρεσις of the ‘atomists’, Galen assigns not only Democritus and Epicurus, but also philosophers and physicians such as Anaxagoras, Erasistratus, Asclepiades, and exponents of the Methodical School.38 Criticism against them runs through his entire oeuvre and has recently received increased scholarly attention.39 There are two doctrinal principles on which Galen’s polemic focuses: 1) that matter is made up of immutable, minimal, and ever-reassembling particles, themselves devoid of any perceptive faculty or properties: these are located in empty space, that is, space not occupied by matter; 2) bodies and their properties are formed from random, decomposable aggregates of such particles. The existence of a predetermined, providential plan is therefore excluded. Both assumptions are at odds with the principles of natural philosophy and teleology to which Galen fully adhered by embracing the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition.

33 

Boudon-Millot–Pietrobelli 2005a and 2005b; Kaufman 2014. Boudon-Millot–Jouanna–Pietrobelli 2010: 265. Cf. Nutton 2013: 63 and 95 n. 108. 35  Vegetti 2013: 301. 36  Cf. Singer 2013: 208. 37  Cf. Olivieri 1910. 38  Cf. Gal. SMT V 25 [11,783 Kühn = fr. 207 and 568,28–31 Tecusan]; see Grimaudo 2019, Gal. MM IV 4 [10,268 Kühn]. 39  Leith 2009, 2012, and 2014; Kupreeva 2014; Serangeli 2017, 2019, and 2020; Verde 2019; Damiani 2020. 34 

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3.1.1. Teleology The theory of στοιχεῖα, as Galen receives it, dates back at least to Empedocles.40 It recognizes four simple elements – water (ὕδωρ), air (ἀήρ), earth (γῆ), and fire (πῦρ) – which arise from the union of matter devoid of qualities (ὕλη), with the specific qualities (ποιότητες) accompanying each of the elements respectively: wet (ὑγρόν), cold (ψυχρόν), dry (ξηρόν), and hot (θερμόν).41 In living bodies, the mixture (κρᾶσις) of the στοιχεῖα and/or of the respective qualities (ποιότητες) determines the constitution of humours (μέλαινα χολή, ξανθὴ χολή, αἷμα, φλέγμα) and simple tissues (e.g., bone, skin, cartilage), which in turn constitute the organic complexes (spleen, liver, etc.). Galen inherits the idea of a threefold level of composition of matter (elements-tissues-organs) from Aristotle’s biology.42 The physical universe in which nature is a ‘skilful craftsman’ (τεχνικὴ φύσις) is a place where nothing is left to chance. It is a Demiurge acting according to reason (νοῦς) that pre-determines the natural processes with a view to the functions assigned to each part of the body. His work can be seen – even in the (apparently shapeless) details of the single anatomical structures – by those who know how to discern it:43 ὡς, ὅστις γε ἐλευθέρᾳ γνώμῃ σκοπεῖται τὰ πράγματα, θεασάμενος ἐν τοσούτῳ βορβόρῳ σαρκῶν τε καὶ χυμῶν ὅμως νοῦν, ἰδὼν δὲ καὶ ζώου κατασκευὴν ὅτου δή (πάντα γὰρ ἔνδειξιν ἔχει σοφοῦ δημιουργοῦ), τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐννοήσει κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν νοῦ. 44

Despite the doubt Galen seemingly professes in some of his clinical writings where the fragility of the body facing disease comes to the fore,45 his finalistic belief remains firm in the face of the theoretical threat posed by atomistic physics. Galen’s criticism in De naturalibus facultatibus (written after 169 AD during his second stay in Rome) of the notion of an imperceptible τριπλοκία of nerves, arteries, and veins constituting the visible vessels, as put forward by Erasistratus,46 rests on the equally firm rejection of both atomism and anti-providentialism:47 ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἕν τι καὶ συνεχές ἐστι, τὸ κενούμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἄδηλον ὑπὸ τῶν

ἰατρῶν ὀνομαζομένην διαπνοὴν οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καταλείψει χώραν κενήν. οὕτω γὰρ 40  Fr. 31 B 6 and 71 Diels–Kranz = 22 D57 and 61 Laks–Most; cf. also 31 B 17 and 23 Diels–Kranz = 22 D73 and 60 Laks–Most. 41  See Nutton 2020: 83. 42 Aristot. PA II 1, 646a 8–647a 1; cf. Gal. Opt. med. 3,6 [290 Boudon-Millot = 1,60 Kühn]; Hipp. Elem. 8 [CMG V 1,2, 126 = 1,479–480 Kühn]. 43  UP XVII 1 [447 Helmreich = 4,360 Kühn]. 44  “Thus, whoever observes the facts with impartial judgement, and sees that such a mud of flesh and juices is after all imbued with an intelligence, and also considers the structure of each animal – for they all bear the mark of a wise Demiurge – will understand the excellence of the heavenly intelligence.” 45  An observation made by Mario Vegetti, who recognizes here the implicit admission of the fallibility of a natura peccans: Vegetti 2018: 37 and 46–47; cf. Damiani 2019: 533, Di Piazza 2016. 46  See Garofalo 1988: 32–33. 47  Nat. Fac. II 6 [SM 172 Helmreich = 2,98 Kühn].

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οὐχ ἓν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ γενήσεται, διειργόμενα δήπου ταῖς κεναῖς χώραις. εἰ δ’ ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκειται, τῇ κηπαίᾳ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πρὸς Ἀσκληπιάδην ἀπεχωρήσαμεν ἄναρμά τινα στοιχεῖα τιθέμενοι. πάλιν οὖν ἄτεχνος ἡμῖν ἡ φύσις λεγέσθω· τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις στοιχείοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦθ’ ἕπεται. 48

The accusation of falsely rejecting the work of a φύσις τεχνική recurs at several points in De usu partium. In I 21, Galen defines the shape and size of the tendons as naturally dependent on the function assigned to them, that is, in terms of proportion and not with distinctions of age or bodily constitution. Epicurus and Asclepiades, on the other hand, understand the form of the tendons as dependent only on use (ἐνέργεια) and exercise (γυμνάζεσθαι), while nature, in their opinion, acts randomly, sometimes even in vain (ματαιοπονία τῆς φύσεως).49 Similar arguments – this time referring to the configuration of the teeth – recur in Book XI.50 Here, the paromology (συγχωρήσας … ταῖς τ’ Ἐπικουρείοις ἀτόμοις καὶ τοῖς Ἀσκληπιαδείοις ὄγκοις) towards the assumption that anatomical structures are the result of a ‘lucky’ connection of atoms (εὐτυχὴς κίνησις), is intended to corroborate its untenability. On closer investigation, however, it becomes clear that Galen’s counterattack is at least tendentious: εὐτυχὴς κίνησις implies a value judgement (εὐ-) which is incompatible with a fundamentally mechanistic view, wherein neutral intervention of τύχη governs the physical processes. Furthermore, no reference is made here to the almost ‘proto-evolutionist’ theory mentioned before (UP I 21), according to which the repeated ἐνέργεια modifies the anatomical structures according to the function exercised. Otherwise, Galen’s counterargument would have been inextricably weakened. In this case, Galen concedes that the harmonious and perfectly functional arrangement of the teeth is indeed the result of the random motions of atoms: but, he then observes, how likely is it that these motions could have led to the same results without exception – not only in humans but in all animal species? To posit this would be tantamount to attributing to atoms a sort 48  “But if it (scil. the nerve) is one and continuous, that which disperses from it – according to that process which physicians call ‘invisible exhalation’ – will not leave any empty space in it. For (if this were so,) the nerve would not be one, but manifold, i.e., (internally) divided by empty spaces. But suppose it is composed of many parts: In that case, we shall then fall into the theory of Asclepiades ‘by the back door’, as the saying goes, and postulate the existence of certain elements which form unstable aggregates [on the interpretation of ἄναρμα see Damiani 2020: 49]. And again, we shall call Nature ‘unskillful’ – for this is the necessary consequence of such assumptions.” 49  54–57 Helmreich [= 3,74–79 Kühn = fr. 373 Usener]. But elsewhere (Foet. Form. 6 [4,688 Kühn = CMG V 3,3, 92 = fr. 381 Usener]) Galen asks: how is it possible that a completely random action can trigger, as in the case of embryological development, a transmission of movements (διαδοχὴ κινήσεων) which accomplishes the visibly perfect end ( χρηστὸν τέλος) of the foetus and its parts? For Galen, the results of such physiological processes exclude any origin κατὰ τύχην. 50  XI 8 [134–140 Helmreich = 3,873–880 Kühn = fr. 382 Usener]. Cf. also XVII 1 [440–441 Helmreich], where the empirical observation of the symmetry of the parts would reveal the unlikeliness of the hypothesis of a random composition of ἄτομοι or ἀμέριστα σώματα (in the latter, the reference to the atomists is anonymous).

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of “mnemonic faculty” (χαρίζεσθαι … τὰ τῆς μνήμης ἔργα), a principle of ‘recording and repeating’ certain dispositions, implying a quasi-intelligence. Neither Epicurus nor Asclepiades would allow this (φρένας γὰρ αὐταῖς καὶ νοῦν οὐδ’ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν τολμῶσι χαρίζεσθαι). Instead, Galen continues, it would be better to embrace the Mosaic creed, which at least traces genesis in nature back to the action of a θεός (even with the error of attributing to him an unpredictable arbitrariness), and not, as Epicurus does, to matter (ὕλη) itself.51 Epicurus – as well as Anaxagoras, and the atheist Diagoras who dared to profane the mysteries of Eleusis52 – appears again at the beginning of Book XII as a denier of the final cause, also being a profaner of the ‘mysteries’ of nature (βλασφημήσας). Here Galen compares this adverse party to those who are unable to accept the message of a revelation (βέβηλοι, ἀμύητοι) out of ignorance: the Demiurge, nevertheless, orders the cosmos regardless of the ingratitude (ἀχαριστία) of those who do not recognize him. Galen himself, however, does not hesitate to reveal and spread the “most true” (ἀληθέστατος) λόγος, which praises the wonderful work of the divine intelligence. He acknowledges that his words may fall prey to malevolent sacrileges, like a defenceless orphan in the hands of drunks (οἷα παῖς ὀρφανὸς ἐμπεσὼν χερσὶ μεθυόντων) – and yet, Galen concludes, it will have been worth it for the few who will know how to keep them.53 A seemingly different attitude can be seen in De naturalibus facultatibus Book I: Galen admits that the theses of his opponents are still supported by rational, if questionable, arguments (τὴν ἀκολουθίαν … διαφυλάττουσιν). Here, he appears to give the impression of setting aside his polemical zeal in order to offer a sort of exposition in utramque partem: his reference to the principles of what might be called Epicurus’ and Asclepiades’ ‘atomistic κοινή’ is formulated with a claim to objectivity, which, in some places, is convincing enough to suggest an illusion of impartiality. Sensible bodies are formed by the random aggregation of “impassible” and “simple” bodies (ἀπαθῆ, ἁπλᾶ); living beings orient themselves based on sensation (αἴσθησις), representation, and memory (φαντασίαι τινες καὶ μνῆμαι); the gods do not care about us (τοῖς θεοῖς οὐδὲν ἡμῶν μέλει), and the soul does not possess any natural notion of logical coherence or contradiction, of analysis or synthesis, of Right and Wrong, or of Beautiful or Ugly (a concealed hostility is implicit in the climax). In the same way, the soul does not possess faculties (δυνάμεις) of its own: it does not possess virtues of courage, prudence, wisdom, or continence by nature. Taking a step back, the decision to accept or reject these teachings, Galen shrewdly concludes, will be up to the reader: ἔνεστι δὲ τῷ βουλομένῳ … σκοπεῖν.54 51 

XI 14 [158 Helmreich]. Schol. Ar. Av. 1073 = T 7A Winiarczyk. 53  XII 6 [196 Helmreich = 4,21 Kühn]. 54  Nat. Fac. I 12 [121 Helmreich = 2,29 Kühn]. 52 

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3.1.2. Theory of elements The atomists’ denial of a final cause follows directly from their mechanistic physics. Galen, however, recognizes a kind of agreement between them and the exponents of the elemental theory (which passes from Empedocles and Hippocrates, through Plato and Aristotle, to Theophrastus and the Stoics), based on the idea of συμμετρία underlying both of their respective definitions of health (ὑγίεια). All agree on the notion that a balance between the primary constituents and whatever στοιχεῖα underlie man’s nature, determines the health of the body.55 The rest of the atomistic theses, however, remain rejected by Galen. His strategy of refutation now shifts from the empirical observation of anatomical structures and their functions to the level of logic (after all, the arguments of Democritus, Epicurus, Asclepiades, and Erasistratus all concern entities that cannot be perceived by the senses [λόγῳ θεωρητά]). Here a syllogistic argument substantiated by Hippocrates, “most powerful and pregnant”, comes into play.56 This demonstration, which I call argument from impassibility, is reiterated across a number of instances, and can be formulated as follows: The elements posited by the atomists [a generic designation that includes here the authors refuted en bloc by Galen]57 are bodies unique to the species (ἕν τι τὴν ἰδέαν/τῷ εἴδει, μονοειδὴς φύσις), devoid of quality (ἄποια, χωρὶς ποιοτήτων), impassible (ἀπαθῆ), and not subject to change (ἀμετάβλητα, ἀναλλοίωτα). On the other hand, experience shows that human beings do perceive the sensation of pain (ὀδυνᾶται, ἀλγεῖ). A body perceiving pain undergoes a change (ἀλλοίωσις) – a break in its structure (συνεχείας λύσις), or an influence by other (internal or external) factors – since it passes from a state of indolence to an opposite one. However, the particles identified by the atomists as constituent elements of nature are impassible, immutable, and indivisible and, as such, cannot explain a fundamental physiological phenomenon like physical pain. It is, therefore, not possible to consider them as primary constituents of φύσις. In order to explain the evidence (i.e., the sensation of pain), it is therefore necessary that the elements at the basis of φύσις are both multiple in species and susceptible to change.58

By underlining the fact that the first elements posited by the atomists are one according to the species, Galen effectively attributes to them the properties of the Eleatic ‘Being’ – which is nonetheless one both εἴδει and ἀριθμῷ.59 This decisive 55 Gal. PHP V 3 [CMG V 4,1,2, 308 = 5,449–450 Kühn]; cf. San. Tu. I 5 [CMG V 4,2, 9 = 6,15 Kühn]. 56 CH Nat. Hom. 2 [6,34–36 Littré]; cf. Gal. HNH I 6 [CMG V 9,1, 21 = 15,36 Kühn]: ἰσχυροτάτῳ … καὶ βραχυτάτῳ λόγῳ. Cf. Moraux 1981: 90–91. 57  Cf. Gal. Hipp. Elem. I 2 [CMG V 1,2, 58 = 1,416 Kühn = fr. 288 Usener]: ἰδέᾳ δὲ καὶ δυνάμει δύναιτ’ ἄν τις ἓν εἶναι λέγειν τὰ πάντα, καθάπερ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρόν τε καὶ Δημόκριτον τὰς ἀτόμους. ἐκ ταὐτοῦ δ’ εἰσὶν αὐτοῖς χοροῦ καὶ οἱ τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἄναρμα ἀμερῆ τιθέμενοι στοιχεῖα. 58 Gal. CAM 7 [CMG V 1,3, 72–74 = 1,246–247 Kühn = fr. 288 Usener]; MM XII 7 [286 Johnston = 10,852 Kühn]; HNH I 6 [CMG V 9,1, 21 = 15,37 Kühn]; cf. Phil. Aet. Mund. 600,22–23 Rabe. 59  Leuc. 67 A 7 Diels–Kranz = 27 D30 Laks–Most [= Aristot. GC 325a–b]. Cf. Tassinari 1997: 17–18.

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difference alone would be weighty counter-evidence to the whole argument from impassibility. One could object that what is lacking at the level of individual elements (perceptive faculty and mutability) is instead manifested at the level of compounds, where a multiplicity of atoms identical in species aggregates to form bodies that are endowed, in turn, with quality and perception, and are subject to change to the extent that they acquire or lose atoms. Yet Galen understands this change exclusively with respect to the substance (τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν πᾶσαν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι) and, consequently, does not accept the process of aggregation and disintegration of the first bodies (διάκρισις τε καὶ σύγκρισις) as a form of change sufficient to justify the evidence of physical pain.60 The perception of pain – and so also the alternation of morbid (τὸ νοσεῖν) and healthy states (τὸ ὑγιαίνειν) – implies that the constituent elements of bodies are themselves susceptible to increase and decrease (δέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον). This is not the same way in which, for instance, a house, built by juxtaposing stones, can be demolished or enlarged by undoing or adding to the aggregate of which it is constituted; instead, it is by virtue of a change that affects the very substance of the elements (δι’ ὅλων ἑαυτῶν). Further arguments which refute the atomistic theses come from pharmacology. In Galen’s view, the continuous alteration of elements (στοιχεῖα) and their respective qualities (ποιότητες) explains not only the physiology of bodies but also the characteristics and effects of drugs: both cases entail a κρᾶσις (temperament or mixture) between elements/qualities which induces a certain psychophysical constitution or, in pharmacology, implies a range of specific properties.61 Just as in the perception of pain, a physiological phenomenon is impossible should the substance of bodies be considered unique in species (ἄτομοι φύσεις or ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι is a merely nominal distinction). This same premiss would contradict the changes that the elements undergo when the drugs, as empirically observable, have different effects, or lose their efficacy altogether, under different circumstances.62 Nor would the use of different drugs be necessary if the substance of the body were unique and simple: in this case (although even here experience indicates otherwise) the cure should also be a simple one (τὴν ἴασιν ἁπλῆν ἔσεσθαι).63

60 Gal. Hipp. Elem. I 9 [CMG V 1,2, 128–130 = 1,483–484 Kühn = fr. 292 Usener]; cf. Hipp. Elem. I 3 [CMG V 1,2, 70 = 1,428 Kühn]; MM XIII 7 [286 Johnston = 10,852 Kühn]: φαίνεται γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἁπλῶς ψαυόντων ὀδυνηρόν· ἁπλῶς δ’ ἀλλήλων ψαύει τὰ τοιαῦτα σώματα. See Damiani 2020: 50–51. In QAM 5 [SM II 46 = 4,785 Kühn] the representatives of atomism are not mentioned expressis verbis, but the reference to the opposition between a conception of nature as a homogeneous substance (ἡνῶσθαι τὴν … οὐσίαν πᾶσαν) and one (to be rejected) which implies the existence of vacuum is clear: for a refutation of the latter, Galen himself refers to De elementis ex Hippocratis sententia. 61  Cf. Alex. Aphr. de An. XXIV 23–25. 62 Gal. Ther. Pis. XI 1, 52 Boudon-Millot [14,250 Kühn]. 63 Gal. HNH I 6 [CMG V 9,1, 21 = 15,37 Kühn].

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3.1.3. Theory of the soul and perception In the disenchanted balance Galen traces in De propriis placitis, he admits not to have achieved that certainty with regard to the substance (οὐσία) of the soul. This certainty is guaranteed by the synergy of λόγος and πεῖρα/ἐμπειρία and characterizes genuine scientific knowledge (supra, 1). In Quod animi facultates corporis temperamenta sequuntur – a short treatise essential to understanding how Galen posits the investigation on the psychophysical dynamics, most likely written after 193 BC64 – a fundamentally materialistic psychology is evident between the lines of the argumentation. The soul is here defined as εἶδος τοῦ σώματος, the “form” of the body in the Aristotelian sense:65 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τρία τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν εἴδη καὶ ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων βούλεται ταῦτα, δι’ ἑτέρων

ἐπιδέδεικται, καθάπερ γε καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐν ἥπατι, τὸ δ’ ἐν καρδία, τὸ δ’ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ

καθίδρυται· […] ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὲ περὶ τῆς κοινῆς οὐσίας ἁπάντων σωμάτων, ὡς ἐκ δυοῖν ἀρχῶν ἡμῖν ἐδείχθη σύνθετος ὑπάρχειν, ‹ὕλης τε καὶ εἴδους›, ὕλης ‹μὲν› ἀποίου κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν, ἐχούσης δ’ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ποιοτήτων τεττάρων κρᾶσιν, θερμότητος ψυχρότητος,

ξηρότητος ὑγρότητος. […] καὶ μὴν εἴπερ ἐξ ὕλης τε καὶ εἴδους ἅπαντα συνέστηκε τὰ

τοιαῦτα σώματα, δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτῷ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει τῶν τεττάρων ποιοτήτων ἐγγιγνομένων τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ φυσικὸν γίγνεσθαι σῶμα, τὴν ἐκ τούτων κρᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ τίθεσθαι τὸ εἶδος, ὥστε πως καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία κρᾶσίς τις ἔσται τῶν τεττάρων εἴτε ποιοτήτων

ἐθέλεις λέγειν, θερμότητος τε καὶ ψυχρότητος ξηρότητος τε καὶ ὑγρότητος, εἴτε σωμάτων, θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ ξηροῦ τε καὶ ὑγροῦ. 66

The form (εἶδος) of physical bodies lies in the mixture (κρᾶσις) of the properties/ elements that reside in matter (ὕλη). Yet the soul is the εἶδος of the body and is therefore identical with the κρᾶσις of the elements. In addition, the three canonical parts of the soul can be located, as indicated by Plato’s Timaeus,67 in three bodily organs: the ἐπιθυμητικόν in the liver, the θυμοειδές in the heart, and the λογιστικόν in the brain. For Galen, the bodily location of these parts of the soul implies a consequence that Plato had circumvented for reasons of coherence: the fate of the soul, removed from the domain of the incorporeal (ἀσώματον), is directly intertwined with the physiology of the body. A balanced mixture of the primary elements in 64 

Boudon-Millot 2012: 360. QAM 3 [SM II 36–38 = 4,772–774 Kühn]. 66  “That there are three forms of the soul and that this is Plato’s opinion I have shown in other writings, as well as the fact that one resides in the liver, one in the heart, and one in the brain. […] In relation to the substance common to all bodies, let us remember – as has already been shown – that it consists of two principles, namely matter (ὕλη) and form (εἶδος), whereas matter is conceptually devoid of properties, but bears within itself a mixture of four properties, namely heat and cold, dry and wet. […] But if all such bodies are made up of matter and form, and Aristotle himself maintains that the physical body arises out of the four properties inherent in matter, then it is necessary that the mixture of these properties should represent its form, so that the substance of the soul will also be in some way a mixture of the four properties – heat, coldness, dryness, and wetness or, if you like, the four (first) bodies: heat, cold, dry, and wet.” 67 Pl. Tim. 69d–72d. 65 Gal.

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each of the organs will guarantee, not only the proper performance of their various somatic functions (e.g., haematopoiesis in the liver, pulsation in the heart, and the processing of sensory stimuli in the brain), but also of the related psychic functions: reason, desire, anger, and the many individual dispositions that derive from these functions.68 On the other hand, the corruptibility inherent in the bodily parts will also affect the soul directly linked to them, qua εἶδος.69 The idea of a soul that is as mortal as the organs in which it is located is put forward by Galen with the same air of caution as one who knows he cannot produce empirical evidence accordingly (the fate of the hegemonic part of the soul is the greatest element of uncertainty here). Nonetheless, his rejection of an incorporeal ψυχή is clear.70 Even if the conclusion that the soul, following the fate of the body, is mortal71 adumbrated by Galen is the same as that reached by Epicurus, the premisses that lead to it remain quite different: on the one hand, we have a soul made up of atoms that leave their aggregate and recombine; on the other, a soul as the κρᾶσις of the primary elements inherent in certain organic structures. This confluence, limited only to the results of the reasoning, could be due to a common intention to bring psychic phenomena down to the level of physiology, as well as to the effort both to observe and explain phenomena empirically without resorting to metaphysical hypotheses (such as that of an incorporeal and immortal soul).72 An entirely instrumental praise of the Epicurean doctrine of the εἴδωλα is to be found in the seventh book of De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis. Here Galen argues that the organ of sight uses the air as an instrument through which it can perceive objects, by participating in its luminous nature. In the same way, the nerves are an instrument of tactile perception: just as nerves transmit the perceptive faculty to each part of the body from the hegemonic, so does air behave when illuminated by sunlight.73 Though Galen’s theory employs the individual doctrines of its illustrious predecessors, it does not spare them criticism nonetheless: whilst agreeing with Aristotle on the idea that a change caused by sensory objects on the surrounding air is thus transmitted to the organ of sight, Galen does not accept his thesis of a refraction (ἀνάκλασις) of qualities other than colour (such as form, size, and position) through the air.74 Instead, Galen prefers (though it is clearly hyperbolic) to believe 68 

Vegetti 2018: 312–313 and 328–329, Damiani 2019: 534. Cf. Alex. Aphr. de An. XXI 22–24. Moraux 1981: 92–93 and 97–98. 70 Gal. QAM 3 [SM II 36 and 38–39 = 4,773 and 776 Kühn]. Cf. Nemes. nat. hom. II 23–26. 71  On the doctrine of the soul in Epicurus, see Long–Sedley 1987: II 64–75. 72  It is not to be implied here, however, that Galen’s empirical stance can be traced back to a direct influence of the Epicurean φυσιολογία. In this respect, instead, the Aristotelian model is likely to have played a decisive role for Galen. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me. 73 Gal. PHP VII 7 [CMG V 4,1,2, 472–474 = 5,642 Kühn]. 74 Gal. PHP VII 7 [CMG V 4,1,2, 470–474 = 5,639–643 Kühn = fr. 319 Usener]. See Moraux 1981: 96; Ierodiakonou 2014. 69 

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in the Epicurean theory of εἴδωλα, although this theory in itself is wrong (ἐν τοῖς ἐσφαλμένοις). The Stoics, like the Epicureans, are also in error when they compare sight to a staff (βακτηρία) that extends directly to the perceived object, though the Epicureans, at least, do not exclude an influence of the object on the organ of sight. This instrumental praise of Epicurean doctrine is not the only instance of the rhetorical device of ‘transversal polemics’, in which the objections addressed to the primary target become a means of addressing adversaries who are not directly involved in the discourse. The endorsement given to Epicurus and his theory of perception is similar to that given to Judaism on the subject of teleology (see 3.1.1 supra): it is better to support the action of a god who, although fickle, remains a single principle, as opposed to leaving explanations of the world to the unpredictability of chance and a multiplicity of atoms.75 In either case, Galen’s preference remains, ironically, faute de mieux for those theses that are untenable regardless. 3.2. Moral philosophy On questions of moral philosophy, Galen does accept tenets that can be traced back to the Peripatetic and Stoic traditions. Still, he elaborates his own theory of individual behaviour on a physiological basis. The bibliographical survey in the De libris propriis attests to his interest in Epicurean ethics: several titles are dedicated to the doctrine of pleasure, to the choice of the correct βίος, and to the relationship between morality and the science of nature. In particular, the twin treatises De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione and De animi cuiuslibet errorum dignotione et curatione offer an interesting picture of Galen’s reception of Epicurean ethics. As mentioned previously, the two treatises are written versions of a reply to the lost Περὶ τῆς τοῖς ἰδίοις πάθεσιν ἐφεδρείας by the Epicurean Antonios.76 Galen briefly reports the main features of this lost writing: 1) it discussed, possibly under the heading ἐφεδρεία, the three aspects of control (παραφυλακή), recognition (διάγνωσις), and correction (ἐπανόρθωσις) of the πάθη; 2) one of the arguments put forward there was based on the recognition of one’s own errors as well as the errors of others; 3) at some points the author dwelt on the diagnosis of individual errors; 4) it also contained indications on how to avoid making such errors. Apparently absent from Antonios’ treatment was a conceptual distinction between πάθος (‘affection’) and ἁμάρτημα (‘error’), which Galen defines, respectively, as what is generated κατὰ τίν’ ἄλογον ἐν ἡμῖν δύναμιν ἀπειθοῦσαν τῷ λόγῳ (Aff. Dig. 1,3, 4 De Boer) and what is generated κατὰ ψευδῆ δόξαν. Interestingly enough, a distinction between δόξα – which, whether false or not, still implies the contribution of reason – and an 75 

Cf. Walzer 1949: 12 and 26. See Verde 2018: 206 and n. 6. On the two treatises, see the contributions collected in Manuli–Vegetti 1988. 76 

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irrational motion or state (ἄλογός τις παράστασις; cf. κατὰ τίν’ ἄλογον … δύναμιν ἀπειθοῦσαν τῷ λόγῳ) had already been drawn by Epicurus in his letter to Herodotus, specifically concerning the fear of death (Epicur. Hrdt. 81).77 It is difficult to say whether Antonios either passed over or withheld this distinction for some reason. Galen’s reply to Antonios’ text is articulated in two steps: 1) the recognition and correction of one’s own passions through the guidance of a mentor, who acts as a benevolent but frank censor (De affectuum dignotione); 2) the prevention of decisional errors in moral action through a conscious use of the demonstrative method (ἀποδεικτικὴ μέθοδος), which leads to the choice of what is good/avoidance of what is evil for us (De errorum dignotione).78 One could draw a parallel between the work of this moral supervisor – which consists of objectively judging whether the subject under observation acts under the influence of an irrational affection, as well as specifying which affection – and the role played by the master and the contubernales in the exercise of παρρησία in the Epicurean Garden.79 Here, unreservedly, albeit benevolently, pointing out personal errors to pupils and fellow students is part of a paideutic and therapeutic programme of character correction conducted through the recognition, and subsequent elimination, of errors and passions.80 The importance of this practice in Epicureanism makes the hypothesis plausible that Antonios mentioned it in his own writing. That Galen is referring to parrhesia, although he does not use this term explicitly, is clear from the preamble regarding the thoughtful choice of a suitable mentor: one who accompanies the rich and powerful with profit should be excluded. In the philosophical discourse of the early Imperial period, the practice of flattery (κολακεία) represented the exact opposite of παρρησία and its prerequisite, φιλία.81 In chapter 5 of De affectuum dignotione, the figure of the mentor is qualified with adjectives that belong in Epicurean vocabulary (Aff. Dig. 5,6 [CMG V 4,1,1, 17 De Boer = 5,24–25 Kühn]): σωτῆρα ἐκεῖνον καὶ φίλον μέγιστον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν μηνύσαντα τῶν πλημμελουμένων ἕκαστα.82 In the second treatise, Galen investigates the connection between logical reasoning and moral choice. Those who know how to conduct a methodically correct analysis of the elements involved in decisions will also be protected from possible 77 

See Verde 2010: 226–228. See Donini 1988. 79  On the Epicurean παρρησία, see McOsker 2020: 312–314; King 2020: 135–141; Mas Torres 2018: 287–309; Albornoz 2016; Konstan et al. 1998: 3–8. For Galen, Singer 2013: 215. 80 Phld. Ira col. XIX 14–27 Armstrong–McOsker; Lib. fr. 13,7–8; fr. 22; col. XIVb 9–11 Olivieri. 81  Cf. Phld. Adul. (PHerc. 1082) col. II 1–14; Plu. De adulatore et amico 5, 52b–d; Konstan et al. 1998: 4. 82 For σωτήρ/σωτηρία, see Epicur. [10] 4 and [33] Arrighetti; Epicur. GV 80; Diog. Oen. fr. 3 col. V 14–VI 2 Smith (I owe the reference to this last passage to Federico Giulio Corsi). For φίλος/φιλία, see Epicur. RS 28; GV 23 and 52. In [40] Arrighetti = F4 Erbì appear both the verb (employed as an epistolary greeting) ὑγιαίνειν – quite similar to σώζεσθαι in reference to the health of body and soul – and the noun φίλος (the addressees of Epicurus’ epistles are often called φίλοι: cf. Erbì 2020: 16–17 and 350). 78 

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errors, which are generally a result of the interference of irrational motions. This idea is already anticipated in the passage cited above (Aff. Dig. 5,6), where λογισμῷ χρῆσθαι is opposed to πάθεσι δουλεύειν. The Epicurean doctrine notoriously offers an ad hoc procedure going by the name of ἐπιλογισμός for the evaluation of the possible consequences of a practical choice.83 Plutarch, one of Galen’s sources in relation to many ethical issues, also speaks of the ἐπιλογισμός in similar terms.84 Genuine Epicurean vocabulary also recurs in other passages of the treatises De affectuum/errorum. For Galen, progress in moral behaviour requires recognizing and eliminating the insatiability (ἀπληστία) that feeds desire without ever quenching it. It is this “desire without limit” (ἀόριστος ἐπιθυμία) that ever makes us poor and leaves us always in search of what is not yet in our possession. Freedom from this condition makes us immune to every loss (οὐκέτ’ ἀνιάσει σε τῶν ἀπολλουμένων οὐδέν), free from pain (μὴ λυπεῖσθαι), and perfectly happy (μακάριος).85 Assonance with the maxim 59 of the Gnomologium Vaticanum, in which not the belly but the false opinion (δόξα ψευδής) is ἄπληστος about its ‘indefinite capacity’ (ἀορίστου πληρώματος) is also evident here, as well as with fr. [238] Arrighetti from Porphyry’s consolatio to Marcella, in which unhappiness is a direct consequence of a failure to limit the desires: ἢ γὰρ διὰ φόβον τις κακοδαιμονεῖ ἢ δι’ ἀόριστον καὶ κενὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, ἅ τις χαλινῶν δύναται τὸν μακάριον ἑαυτῷ περιποιεῖσθαι λογισμόν. 86

In the letter to Menoeceus, only the lucid reflection (ἀπλανὴς θεωρία) on the limitation of desires leads to a blissful life (μακαρίως ζῆν), which means the health of the body (σώματος ὑγίεια) is accompanied by the imperturbability of the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξία). Though Galen’s use of ἀλυπία, a term synonymous with ἀταραξία,87 is certainly extraneous to Epicurus’ prose, the noun λύπη and verb λυπεῖσθαι are frequently used as part of the technical vocabulary of Epicurean ethics.88 Epicureanism is also the manifest origin of the maxim “μὴ πεινῆν, μὴ ῥιγοῦν, μὴ διψῆν”, which Galen proudly attributes to his father’s precious teachings.89 The triad occurs not only in De affectuum dignotione, but also in several other writings in the Galenic corpus.90 The only advantage that the possession of material goods brings – as Galen 83  Cf. Phld. Ira col. IV 11–12 Armstrong–McOsker. See Schofield 1996, Erler 2003, Striker 2020: 56–57. 84  Xenophontos 2018, Erler 2020: 517. 85  Aff. Dig. 9,11–18 [CMG V 4,1,1, 33–34 = 5,49–51 Kühn]. 86  “One is unhappy either out of fear or out of intemperate and empty desire; he who is able to curb these will acquire a serene reason.” 87 Epicur. Hrdt. 82; Epicur. Pyth. 85 and 96; [7] and [208] Arrighetti. 88 Epicur. Men. 125; RS 3 and 10; [46] Arrighetti. = 80F1 Erbì; [212] Arrighetti. 89  Aff. Dig. 8 [CMG V 4,1,1, 27–30 = 5,40–45 Kühn] (esp. 8,10); cf. De indol. 78b [23–24 Boudon-Millot–Jouanna]; Nutton 2020: 10. 90  For an analysis of individual occurrences see Boudon-Millot 2011.

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warns on several occasions – is safe relief from hunger, cold, and thirst. Indeed, the maxim had some success in Greek moralistic literature,91 but a reference to the Sententia 33 of the Gnomologium Vaticanum seems intentional:92 Σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν κἂν ‹Διὶ› ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο.93

The arguments of De affectuum/De errorum dignotione et curatione are based on the distinction between πάθος and ἁμάρτημα, which was apparently not sufficiently clear in Antonios’ exposition. As mentioned above, Epicurus distinguishes between δόξα and ἄλογος παράστασις, that is, between rational opinion and irrational motion. Whereas the δόξα, as rational, is susceptible to error, and the ἄλογος παράστασις is, by definition, irrational, the concept of πάθος assumes, in Epicureanism, multiple meanings. πάθος is rational insofar as it represents a truthful criterion, irrational insofar as it represents an emotional motion depending on the αἴσθησις.94 In the fourth book of De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, Galen unleashes an extensive indictment of Chrysippus’ contradictions in his treatises on πάθη (Περὶ παθῶν, Θεραπευτικόν/ Ἠθικόν, Περὶ ψυχῆς). Here he calls into question Epicurus’ position several times. Galen interprets the discussion on affections as structured around three mutually exclusive theses:95 the affections are either (1) rational judgements (κρίσεις); (2) irrational motions (κίνησις ἔκφορος τῆς ἐπιθυμητικῆς δυνάμεως); or they constitute (3) irrational motions that are added to the rational judgement (κρίσεσιν ἐπιγιγνόμενον). The main shortcoming of Chrysippus’ work lies in having argued for at least one of these three different theses at different places.96 Moreover, Galen observes that it is not entirely clear whether Chrysippus considers affections (πάθη) as arising from the λογιστικόν or rather from an irrational instance. On the one hand, he defines desire (ἐπιθυμία) as an ἄλογος ὄρεξις, an “appetite without reason”; on the other, he leads the ὄρεξις itself back to the λογιστικόν, calling it ὁρμὴ λογική. He also conceives of pain as a “diminution” (μείωσις) of the soul in the presence of that which is to be avoided, and pleasure as a “rising” (ἔπαρσις) in the presence of that which is to be pursued. Yet the very ones described as μείωσις and ἔπαρσις constitute irrational motions that are added to the δόξα (τῆς ἀλόγου δυνάμεως παθήματα ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιγιγνόμενα), and it is Epicurus’ thesis, as well as Zeno’s, that that is the nature of the πάθη:97 91 

Boudon-Millot 2011. Cf. fr. 200 and 602 Usener. 93  “The flesh cries out: Do not hunger, do not thirst, do not feel cold; whoever has these things and hopes to have them could even compete with Zeus in happiness.” 94  See Verde 2018: 211–214. Cf. Delattre–Pigeaud 2010: 1427–1428. 95  PHP IV 1–2 [CMG V 4,1,2, 238 = 5,365–366 Kühn]. 96  PHP IV 3 [CMG V 4,1,2, 248 = 5,377–379 Kühn]. 97  PHP IV 2 [CMG V 4,1,2, 240 = 5,367 Kühn = fr. 410 Usener]. 92 

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ἐν μέντοι δὴ τούτοις τοῖς ὅροις ὁρμὰς καὶ δόξας καὶ κρίσεις ὑπάρχειν οἴεται τὰ πάθη,

κατὰ δέ τινας τῶν ἐφεξῆς Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ Ζήνωνι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ δόγμασιν ἀκόλουθα γράφει.98

Here is a reference to the Epicurean tenet on the irrational nature of the “mental disturbance” (τάραχος): this follows from the (rational) assent that some people give fallacious opinions such as belief in divine intervention in human affairs99 or regard for death as something which directly affects us (Epicur. Hrdt. 81). A criticism of Chrysippus’ inconsistency in defining the nature of πάθη in relation to the λογιστικόν is also found in Book V of De placitis.100 Here, the primacy of the rational part, sometimes supported by Chrysippus, is identified for its shortcoming of being a unilateral perspective compared to the ‘correct’ Platonic tripartition and is therefore insufficient to explain the origin of affections, let alone to set up an effective therapy. On the other hand, Galen considers the normative preponderance granted by Epicurus to the other μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς – the “worst” one (χείριστον), that is, the ἐπιθυμητικόν – to be as unilateral as Chrysippus’ interpretation. The triadic structure of the soul explains the “affinity” (οἰκείωσις) that each individual shows towards both the achievement of pleasure and the satisfaction of pride, but also towards acting in accordance with virtue. These οἰκειώσεις are already observed, in this order, from childhood, when the inclination to pleasure, the flight from pain, as well as the tendency to impose one’s will on others, emerge as characteristic behavioural traits. The disposition to virtuous action, however, manifests itself later in time (ἐπειδὰν προβαίνῃ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν). Epicurus’ view represents, in Galen’s opinion, a form of permanent degradation of man to the infantile, and therefore prerational, stage. Resorting to a well-established dialectical strategy, Galen strikes Epicurus with his own weapon:101 the so-called cradle argument belongs (not exclusively, to be sure) to hedonistic ethics’ inventory of argumentation.102 According to this reasoning, the propensity to seek pleasure and avoid pain, as inherent in human beings from birth, would be sufficient to justify its value as a principle of conduct. Faithful to the data of experience, Galen does not challenge a general observation on human behaviour but rather criticizes its absolutization by Epicurus in an axiological sense: the ‘cradle argument’ explains only one of the οἰκειώσεις corresponding to the parts of the soul. Although biased, such a refutation nevertheless presupposes an in-depth knowledge of the argumentative arsenal supportive of the hedonistic theory in its various forms: should the pages of 98  “And precisely in such definitions Chrysippus considers affections as ‘motions’, ‘opinions’, and ‘judgements’, and so he writes things that would suit some followers of Epicurus and Zeno, rather than being in accordance with his own doctrines.” 99  Cf. [114] Arrighetti = 129 F1 Erbì. 100  PHP V 5 [CMG V 4,1,2, 316–318 = 5,459–460 Kühn]. 101  See Schneider 2021. 102  Cf. Cic. fin. I 29–30; see Tsouna 2020: 146–149, with related bibliography.

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the anti-Epicurean Galenic pamphlets ever come to light, it would not be surprising to find these same objections developed more extensively there.

Conclusions Galen often gives his assent to the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, especially to the teleological theories of Timaeus and De partibus animalium. This perspective represents the main theoretical background of Galen’s vigorous criticism of the materialistic-atomistic system of Epicurus, who is often mentioned together with Erasistratus and Asclepiades in a manner reducing their thought to a common theoretical matrix. Where it is not explicitly professed, Galen’s aversion is concealed behind a screen of rhetorical concessions to adversary positions – reductions ad absurdum or indirect polemics – where the theses of the ‘atomists’ appear as minus malum in the face of other, even less plausible, theories. However, there are also instances of positive reception, particularly in the case of Epicurus’ doctrine. Several of Galen’s writings dealt with Epicurus’ work in the form of merciless refutation. Nonetheless, even if he appears to repeatedly reject the idea that nature operates by chance, not according to a plan, and of a matter composed by imperishable elements here, he does seem to agree with his adversary to some extent on the mortal nature of the soul. This congruity remains the case even if he was led to admit it in another way, drawing the logical consequences of the anatomical dislocation of the μόρια ψυχῆς as suggested by Plato in the Timaeus with rigour. Ethical works, such as the De affectuum/errorum dignotione, show, beyond the occasional polemic, a clear borrowing of lexical terms, in addition to elements that can be traced with sufficient certainty back to Epicurus’ writings. These include the paideutic and psychagogic function of παρρησία, the satisfaction of the necessary needs, the importance of a preliminary logical examination of the consequences of each action, and imperturbability in front of the blows of fortune. In the few exemplary cases I presented here, I have implemented a close reading of the refuting strategies employed by Galen in order to undermine his image as a priori, inveterate anti-Epicurean. Despite being a harsh and sometimes deliberately partisan censor of the thought of Epicurus and his followers, Galen showed himself as a very well-informed censor. This paper suggests that the same profound knowledge of his adversaries’ writings led him to enter – consciously or not – into a positive debt with some Epicurean doctrines: despite divergence, the doctrines Galen interacts with could not have been dispensed with altogether.

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Corsi, F. G. (ed.), 2022, L’epicureismo in età imperiale. Tra filosofia, retorica, medicina e teologia. Nuove prospettive e ricerche, Rome: Lithos. Corti, A., 2014, L’Adversus Colotem di Plutarco. Storia di una polemica filosofica, Leuven: Leuven University Press. Damiani, V., 2018, “Protreptic and Medicine: Galen”, in O. Alieva–A. Kotzé–S. van der Meeren (eds.), When Wisdom Calls. Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity, Turnhout: Brepols, 299–317. Damiani, V., 2019, “Tra scienza e filosofia, epistemologia e società: Mario Vegetti sulla medicina antica”, Syzetesis 6: 519–535. Damiani, V., 2020, “The Reception of Atomism in Ancient Medical Literature”, in U. Zilioli (ed.), Atomism in Philosophy. A History from Antiquity to the Present, London: Bloomsbury: 39–60. Delattre, D.,–Pigeaud, J. (eds.), 2010, Les Épicuriens, Paris: Gallimard. Di Piazza, S., 2016, “The Uncertainty of Medicine: Galen on the Notion of τέχνη στοχαστική”, Filozofia 71: 779–790. Donini, P., 1988, “Tipologia degli errori e loro correzione secondo Galeno”, in Manuli–Veget­ ti 1988: 65–116. Donini, P., 1992, “Galeno e la filosofia”, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II 36,5: 3484–3504. Dorandi, T., 2007, Nell’officina dei classici. Come lavoravano gli autori antichi, Rome: Carocci. Dorandi, T., 2015, “Modi e modelli di trasmissione dell’opera Sulla natura di Epicuro”, in D. De Sanctis–E. Spinelli–M. Tulli–F. Verde (eds.), Questioni epicuree. Epistemologia, fisica, etica e le loro tradizioni, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag: 15–52. Dorandi, T., 2016, “The School and Texts of Epicurus in the Early Centuries of the Roman Empire”, in Longo–Taormina 2016: 29–48. Erbì, M., 2015, “Lettere dal Kepos. L’impegno di Epicuro per i philoi”, in De Sanctis–Spinelli–Tulli–Verde 2015: 75–94. Erbì, M. (ed., transl., comm.), 2020, Epicuro. Lettere, Pisa–Rome: Serra. Erler, M. (ed.), 2000, Epikureismus in der späten Republik und der Kaiserzeit, Stuttgart: Steiner. Erler, M., 2003, “Das Bild vom „Kind im Menschen“ bei Platon und der Adressat von Lukrez De rerum Natura”, Cronache Ercolanesi 33: 107–116. Erler, M., 2009, “Epicureanism in the Roman Empire”, in J. Warren (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 46–64. Erler, M., 2020, Epicurus. An Introduction to His Practical Ethics and Politics, Basel: Schwabe. Ferguson, J., 1990, “Epicureanism Under the Roman Empire”, Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II 36.4: 2257–2327. Fleischer, K. J. (ed., transl., comm.), 2016, Dionysios von Alexandria, De natura (περὶ φύσεως), Turnhout: Brepols. Fletcher, R., 2012, “Epicurus’s Mistresses: Pleasure, Authority, and Gender in the Reception of the Kuriai Doxai in the Second Sophistic”, in B. Holmes–W. H. Shearin (eds.), Dynamic Reading: Studies in the Reception of Epicureanism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 52–88.

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Gargiulo, T., 2019, “Fundamentos epistemológicos de la doctrina galénica de las enfermedades del alma”, Alpha 48: 9–20. Garofalo, I., (ed., comm.), 1988, Erasistrati fragmenta, Pisa: Giardini. Garofalo, I.,–Lami, A. (ed., transl., comm.), 2012, Galeno. L’anima e il dolore: De indolentia, Milan: Rizzoli. Grimaudo, S., 2008, Difendere la salute. Igiene e disciplina del soggetto nel De sanitate tuenda di Galeno, Naples: Bibliopolis. Grimaudo, S., 2019, “ Ὄγκοι atomici? Ancora sulle particelle di Asclepiade di Bitinia”, Galenos 13: 9–15. Hankinson, R. J., 2016, “Galen’s Reception of Aristotle”, in A. Falcon (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, Leiden–Boston: Brill, 238–257. Hankinson, R. J., 1992, “Galen’s Philosophical Eclecticism”, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II 36,5: 3505–3522. Hankinson, R. J. (ed.), 2008, The Cambridge Companion to Galen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ierodiakonou, K., 2014, “On Galen’s Theory of Vision”, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 114: 235–247. Johnston, J. (transl., comm.), 2006, Galen. On Diseases and Symptoms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaufman, D. H., 2014, “Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of Emotional Therapy”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47: 275–296. King, F. J., 2020, Epicureanism and the Gospel of John: A Study of Their Compatibility, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Konstan, D. et al. (ed., transl., comm.), 1998, Philodemus. On Frank Criticism, Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press. Kotzia, P.,–Sotiroudis, P., 2010, “Γαληνοῦ Περὶ Ἀλυπίας”, Hellenica 60: 63–150. Kupreeva, I., 2014, “Galen’s theory of elements”, in Adamson–Hansberger–Wilberding 2014: 153–196. Leith, D., 2009, “The Qualitative Status of the ogkoi in Asclepiades’ Theory of Matter”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 36: 283–320. Leith, D., 2012, “Pores and Void in Asclepiades’ Physical Theory”, Phronesis 57: 164–191. Leith, D., 2014, “Galen’s Refutation of Atomism”, in Adamson–Hansberger–Wilberding 2014: 213–234. Leone, G., 2014, “Osservazioni sui papiri ercolanesi di Epicuro”, Studi di Egittologia e di Papirologia 11: 3–109. Long, A. A.,–Sedley, D. N. (eds.), 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Longo Auricchio, F., 1978, “La scuola di Epicuro”, Cronache Ercolanesi 8: 21–37. Longo, A.,–Taormina, D. P. (eds.), 2016, Plotinus and Epicurus. Matter, Perception, Pleasure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. López Férez, J. A., 2018, Galeno: preparación y constitución de textos críticos, entrega y publicación de obras propias o ajenas, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas. Manuli, P.,–Vegetti, M. (eds.), 1988, Le opere psicologiche di Galeno. Atti del terzo colloquio galenico internazionale. Pavia, 10–12 settembre 1986, Naples: Bibliopolis.

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Mas Torres, S., 2018, Epicuro, epicúreos y el epicureísmo en Roma, Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia. McOsker, M., 2020, “The Medicine of Salvation: Epicurean Education as Therapy”, in K. Arenson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy, London–New York: Routledge, 307–318. Mitsis, P. (ed.), 2020, The Oxford Handbook of Epicurus and Epicureanism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moraux, P., 1981, “Galien comme philosophe: la philosophie de la nature”, in Nutton 1981: 87–116. Nutton, V. (ed.), 1981, Galen. Problems and Prospects, London: Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine. Nutton, V., 20132, Ancient Medicine, London–New York: Routledge. Nutton, V., 2020, Galen. A Thinking Doctor in Imperial Rome, London–New York: Routledge. Olivieri, A., 1910, “Osservazioni sopra un’opera morale di Galeno”, Atti della Reale Accademia di Archeologia, Lettere e Belle Arti 1: 95–109. Petit, C., 2018, Galien de Pergame ou la rhétorique de la Providence. Médecine, littérature et pouvoir à Rome, Leiden–Boston: Brill. Petit, C. (ed.), 2019, Galen’s Treatise Περὶ Ἀλυπίας (De indolentia) in Context, Leiden–Boston: Brill. Polito, R., 2006, “Matter, Medicine, and the Mind. Asclepiades vs. Epicurus”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 30: 285–335. Pormann, P. E. (ed.), 2018, The Cambridge Companion to Hippocrates, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Raiola, T., 2015, Nel tempo di una vita. Studi sull’autobiografia di Galeno, Pisa–Rome: Serra. Rocca, J., 2008, “Anatomy”, in Hankinson 2008: 242–262. Schmid, W., 1962, “Epikur”, Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum 5: 681–819. Schneider, M. T., 2021, “‘Wounding the Offender with His Own Spear’ – Plutarch on the Epicurean School in His Polemical and Non-Polemical Writings”, in M. Erler–J. E. Heßler–M. McOsker (eds.), Authority and Authoritative Texts in the Epicurean Tradition, Basel: Schwabe (forthcoming). Schofield, M., 1996, “Epilogismos: An Appraisal”, in M. Frede–G. Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 221–237. Serangeli, A., 2017, “Significato e retroterra filosofico degli ὄγκοι di Asclepiade di Bitinia”, Technai 8: 33–46. Serangeli, A., 2019, “The anti-teleologism of Asclepiades and Epicurus in Galen’s De Usu Partium”, Technai 10: 91–117. Serangeli, A., 2020, “Teleologia versus teoria evolutiva del corpo vivente: Galeno, l’epicureismo e Nemesio di Emesa”, in Ch. Horn–D. P. Taormina–D. Walter (eds.), Körperlichkeit in der Philosophie der Spätantike, Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag: 291–313. Singer, P. N. (transl.), 2013, Galen. Psychological Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Singer, P. N., “Galen and the philosophers: philosophical engagement, shadowy contemporaries, Aristotelian transformations”, in Adamson–Hansberger–Wilberding 2014: 7–38. Striker, G., 2020, “Epistemology”, in Mitsis 2020: 43–58.

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Tassinari, P. (transl.), 1997, Galeno. Gli elementi secondo la dottrina di Ippocrate. I tempera­ menti, Rome: Edizioni Paracelso. Tieleman, T., 1996, Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul. Argument and Refutation in De placitis books II-III, Leiden–New York–Cologne: Brill. Tsouna, V., 2020, “Hedonism”, in Mitsis 2020: 141–188. Usener, H. (ed.), 1887, Epicurea, Leipzig: Teubner. van der Eijk, P., 2017, “The Place of Disease in a Teleological World-view Plato, Aristotle, Galen”, in J. Rocca (ed.), Teleology in the Ancient World: Philosophical and Medical Approaches, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 217–241. Vegetti, M., 1995, “Galeno e la rifondazione della medicina”, Acta Hispanica ad medicinae scientiarumque historiam illustrandam 15: 67–101. Vegetti, M. (transl., comm.), 2013, Galeno. Nuovi scritti autobiografici, Rome: Carocci. Vegetti, M., 2015, “Galeno, il ‘divinissimo’ Platone e i Platonici”, Rivista di storia della filosofia 2: 447–471. Vegetti, M., 2018, Scritti sulla medicina galenica, Pistoia: Petite Plaisance. Verde, F. (ed., transl., comm.), 2010, Epicuro. Epistola a Erodoto, Rome: Carocci. Verde, F., 2018, “I pathe di Epicuro tra epistemologia ed etica”, Elenchos 39/2: 205–230. Verde, F., 2019, “Asclepiade tra Epicuro e Stratone di Lampsaco”, Technai 10: 45–67. Wakelnig, E., 2018, “Medical Knowledge as Proof of the Creator’s Wisdom and the Arabic Reception of Galen’s On the Usefulness of the Parts”, in Bouras-Vallianatos–Xenophontos 2018: 131–149. Walzer, R., 1949, Galen on Jews and Christians, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Xenophontos, S., 2018, “Galen’s Exhortation to the Study of Medicine. An Educational Work for Prospective Medical Students”, in Bouras-Vallianatos–Xenophontos 2018: 67–93.

Gravity and the Shape and Location of the Earth1 David Konstan In this chapter, I consider two matters relating to the shape and position of the world, by which I mean the planet we inhabit, as opposed to a cosmos or the entire universe – matters that Frederik Bakker did not, I think, discuss in his excellent chapter on the topic (Bakker 2016: 162-263). The first has to do with the size of the cosmos, which, I argue, is rather small. In this connection, I examine sections 88 to 91 of the Letter to Pythocles, where Epicurus discusses the formation of the cosmos and of stars. Remarkably, Epicurus maintains that the formation of stars cannot occur in the intermundia or space unoccupied by cosmoses, but only within a cosmos that is already in the process of development. In the process, I also raise the question of the size of the sun and the stars. This part of the Letter to Pythocles occupies the first, it appears, of three distinct kinds of meteorological phenomenon, namely those phenomena that admit of only a single explanation. The section is marked off by the phrase, “and every objection to this part will easily be resolved, if one attends to the things that are evident, as we demonstrate in the books On Nature” (καὶ πᾶν δὲ τὸ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἔνστημα ῥᾳδίως διαλυθήσεται, ἐάν τις τοῖς ἐναργήμασι προσέχῃ, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ φύσεως βιβλίοις δείκνυμεν, 91). After this passage come those phenomena for which there are alternative but mutually exclusive causes, for example, that “the sun is either extinguished at sunset or it is not, and the moon’s light is either borrowed or its own,” as Bakker observes (2016: 11). If both are valid, it is because they occur in different cosmoses. Finally, although there is no clear demarcation or indication of a new topic in the Letter, Epicurus turns to phenomena that really have multiple causes. An example is thunder, which may be produced by several different atmospheric conditions, sometimes independently, other times in conjunction with one another. The second topic to be treated in this chapter concerns the Epicurean explanation of gravity. By “gravity” I do not mean the tendency of atoms to fall, on account of the property called “weight”, which is inherent in atoms (and is apparently an Epicurean innovation in respect to Democritus’ theory). Rather, I refer to the readily observable fact that objects heavier than air drop to the surface of the earth – by “earth” I mean the ground or planet on which we stand, as opposed to the entire cosmos – and stay there, unless they are forced to move upward. The downward 1  I wish to thank the participants in the colloquium, “Epistemology and Meteorology: Epicureanism and Scientific Debate”, held in Rome (virtually) in October 2020, for comments and suggestions. The colloquium was sponsored by SPIN-SPIDER: “Science and Philosophical Debates: A New Approach towards Ancient Epicureanism” (Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia, 2019-2021). I am especially grateful to Frederik Bakker, who gave me detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper. He is not to be held responsible for any errors of interpretation, which are mine alone.

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motion of atoms in itself does not explain this phenomenon. What is needed is an explanation of why objects heavier than air fall to the ground, even though their component atoms are no different in respect to weight than those of the world as a whole and move at exactly the same speed (the principle of atomic isotakheia). The explanation that I have proposed in the past is that the earth on which we stand is descending, in relation to absolute space, more slowly than the objects on or above its surface.2 For this relation to be so, it must be the case that the atoms that compose the earth move less, on average, in a downward direction than the atoms of objects above it. That is, more of the atoms that constitute the earth are moving in lateral or other directions (including upward) than is the case for ordinary objects, and so the downward vector (to represent it in such terms) is shorter. The reason for this difference between the earth and other objects, I have suggested, is that the earth floats on a cushion of air, which slows its descent through the cosmos in which it is located, thanks to the earth’s broad shape. I now think there may be some problems with my interpretation. In what follows, I unpack these claims and relate them, to the best of my ability, to Epicurean texts. We may begin with the formation of cosmoses and stars. That the universe is unbounded, or that there is an infinite number of cosmoses, is, as I have said, in the class of indisputable truths. So, too, is that fact that cosmoses cannot grow so large as to collide with one another (Pyth. 90). I presume that cosmoses, like all compound objects, can only grow to a certain size before they begin emitting more material than they absorb. As Epicurus says, a cosmos develops “up to its completion and persistence, to the extent that the underlying foundations can admit of reception” (ἕως τελειώσεως καὶ διαμονῆς ἐφ’ ὅσον τὰ ὑποβληθέντα θεμέλια τὴν προσδοχὴν δύναται ποιεῖσθαι, Pyth. 89). Epicurus then asserts that the sun, moon, and stars cannot form in the intermundia and subsequently be embraced by the cosmos, but are created by accretions and whirlings [δινήσεις] of lighter substances such as air and fire, presumably already constituted as elements in an emerging cosmos (there is no such thing as an “air atom” or “fire atom” in itself, although elements maybe composed of only certain kinds of atoms – for example, round or smooth ones). Epicurus adds that perception suggests (ὑποβάλλει) this composition. Why, though, does Epicurus insist that this must be true, rather than allow for multiple explanations? And how does perception support the thesis? It seems odd that he should be so sure about it. Now, it may be that, on Epicurus’ view, there is simply not enough matter in the interspaces to allow individual stars to form. The concentration of elements they 2  See Konstan 2020: 74-75; Konstan 2022. Seneca, in the course of a discussion of comets, observes that some people, when they can find no reason to explain why the earth’s weight should stand still in the air, argue that it falls continually, but it does not seem to because the space into which it drops is infinite (hoc quidam de terra dixerunt, cum rationem nullam inuenirent propter quam pondus in aere staret. fertur, inquiunt, semper, sed non apparet an cadat, quia infinitum est in quod cadit; Quaestiones naturales VII 14, 4). I am grateful to Frederik Bakker for this reference.

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require for genesis is only found in an already bounded cosmos. Yet cosmoses themselves, according to Epicurus, may come into existence both within another cosmos and in intermundial space (ὁ τοιοῦτος δύναται κόσμος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ μετακοσμίῳ), provided that it is not absolutely empty (οὐκ ἐν μεγάλῳ εἰλικρινεῖ καὶ κενῷ). Why should it be different in the case of stars? To anticipate, I venture to say this much: Epicurus does not acknowledge freestanding stars beyond the cosmos. Let us move on, then, to the following paragraph on the size of the sun and stars: “the size of the sun and stars in respect to us is as large as it seems. {This is also in the 11th book On Nature: ‘for,’ he says, ‘if it decreased in size because of the distance, it would do so much more in brightness.’} For there is no other distance more commensurate with this” (τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἡλίου τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρων κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τηλικοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡλίκον φαίνεται· {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ ια’ Περὶ φύσεως· “εἰ γάρ,” φησί “τὸ μέγεθος διὰ τὸ διάστημα ἀποβεβλήκει, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν τὴν χρόαν.”} ἄλλο γὰρ τούτῳ συμμετρότερον διάστημα οὐθέν ἐστι, Pyth. 91, text as in Dorandi).3 What is the antecedent of “this” (τούτῳ) in the final sentence? One solution, proposed by Gassendi and adopted by Usener (and in turn by Gerson and Inwood in their translation), is to include the whole phrase in the scholion. Gerson and Inwood render it: “for there is no other distance more symmetrical with this [degree of brightness]” (21, n. 13). I can make no sense of what this phrase is supposed to mean, though. Epicurus’ point, as he makes clear a little further on, is that brightness (or colour) does not vary with distance. So how can one particular distance be commensurate with brightness? For this reason, I prefer to follow Dorandi and treat the phrase as part of the letter itself. In this case – assuming there is no lacuna – the antecedent to τούτῳ must be the entire clause that affirms that “the size of the sun and stars in respect to us is as large as it seems.” What distance is most commensurate with this observation? Presumably, one that is neither too short nor too long. For if the sun and stars were very close, they would look large, even if they were not; and if they were very far away, they would not be visible at all. Note the gar: the most commensurable distance explains why the size of the sun and stars appears to us as it does.4 So far, Epicurus has said nothing about how large the sun and stars are in their own right. That comes in the next sentence: “In itself, it [sc. the size of the sun and 3 

Cf. Sedley 1976: 48-49 for a defence of the text adopted by Dorandi. Sedley 1976: 49 takes the expression σύμμετρον διάστημα to refer to “an appropriate distance for viewing an object clearly, neither too near nor too far.” Sedley understands Epicurus in our passage to mean that “you cannot get a better vantage point for viewing the sun’s size by moving towards it or away from it.” This feature of the sun – that it remains the same apparent size even if you travel a hundred miles east or west, to its rising or setting, shows that “the sun is peculiarly exempt from the laws of optics.” I see no such challenge to optics as such, but rather a statement concerning the distance of sun and stars from us. They may be exceptionally bright and, therefore, visible at a greater distance than an ordinary bonfire, but they cannot be very far away. Philodemus De signis X 34-XI 2 (cited by Sedley 1976: 51) seems to indicate that the sun has different properties than terrestrial objects, particularly in respect to bright things that look larger or smaller. 4 

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stars] is either greater than it is seen or slightly smaller or just the same” (κατὰ δὲ τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἤτοι μεῖζον τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἢ μικρῷ ἔλαττον ἢ τηλικοῦτον). Here again, Epicurus offers a reason why, indicated by gar: “for in this way too fires among us that are seen from a distance are seen by the senses [literally, by perception]” (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν πυρὰ ἐξ ἀποστήματος θεωρούμενα κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν θεωρεῖται). Now, the size and brightness of ordinary fires, to which Epicurus appeals as evidence, do seem to vary little over relatively short distances, but even a large pyre is only visible within certain limits. No one would have imagined that one could see the flames of a bonfire a hundred miles away (correspondingly, a flame very close to one’s eyes appears very large). If the analogy is to apply to heavenly bodies, which to the naked eye are either small, as in the case of the sun, or tiny, as with the dimmer stars, then they cannot be very far away, and certainly not – to return to the earlier point – in the intermundia. It is not just that a cosmos cannot grow to the dimensions at which it would collide with another; its maximum size, Epicurus seems to suppose, is relatively modest, and all the stars are contained within it.5 Epicurus affirms, to be sure, that we cannot perceive where the cosmos leaves off: the perimeter (περιοχή) “ends either in something that spins or that has a position and a spherical or triangular or whatever kind of circumference. For it is possible in all these ways. For nothing in the phenomena testifies against it in this cosmos, in which it is impossible to perceive it ending” (λήγουσα ἢ ἐν περιαγομένῳ ἢ ἐν στάσιν ἔχοντι καὶ στρογγύλην ἢ τρίγωνον ἢ οἵαν δήποτε περιγραφήν· πανταχῶς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται· τῶν γὰρ φαινομένων οὐδὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ, ἐν ᾧ

λῆγον οὐκ ἔστι καταλαβεῖν, 88).6 These are very dense passages, but if I understand

Epicurus rightly, then the termination of our particular cosmos is imperceptible, not, I imagine, because it is very far away but simply because the circumference is rarefied (ἀραιός) or in some other way transparent. If it were dense (πυκνός), as the limit of a cosmos may also be, Epicurus says (περιοχή τις … καταλήγουσα ἐν πέρατι ἢ ἀραιῷ ἢ πυκνῷ), then perhaps it would be visible. If that inference is legitimate, then again, it suggests that cosmoses in general must be rather compact.7

5  Algra 2001: 18 n. 57 argues that Epicurus did not maintain that the sun is in fact very small, although Epicurus may have believed that it is relatively close by, and hence not as large as the astronomers hold (17). On the sun’s size Algra cites the similar interpretation by Gassendi (19), who in 1642 published a treatise under the title De apparente magnitudine solis humilis et sublimis; see Piergiacomi 2022: 55, 59-60. See also Romeo 1979 on Demetrius of Laconia’s defense of Epicurus’ thesis (if indeed the papyrus is by him), as well as Verde 2016 on the text of Epicur. Pyth. 91. 6  On rendering καταλαβεῖν as “perceive” rather than “conceive,” I note that when Epicurus means the verb to refer to a mental process rather than perception, he makes this clear, as at 78 in this same letter: καὶ τοῦτο καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς εἶναι. The specification “with the mind” distinguishes καταλαβεῖν from ordinary perception. 7  Frederik Bakker takes all three variations as possible in this world, that is, a rare but also a dense boundary. I think, rather, that these are alternatives for different cosmoses, each having its own type of περιοχή.

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This is the main point I wish to make concerning the formation of cosmoses and stars. It means that the claims concerning the visible size of fiery objects at a distance are not meant to prove that the stars and sun are very far away, despite the fact that their apparent size is small. Rather, it is part of a general argument about cosmoses, the upshot of which is that they are diminutive rather than immense. Thus, if the stars and sun seem to be about the size they really are, it is not terribly surprising. The atmosphere and celestial objects that surround the earth or indeed any planet within a cosmos constitute a fairly condensed environment. Any assumptions about the world’s position in such a cosmos, as well as its shape, need to take this fact into account. Before leaving the Letter to Pythocles, let us look briefly at the following section (92), in which Epicurus points to two possible explanations for the rise and setting of the sun and moon. One is that they drop below the earth at night and reappear in the morning; the other is that they wink out each evening and reignite the next day. What is noteworthy, however, is a cause that is not offered, namely the rotation of the earth. This idea was not unknown at the time of Epicurus. Heraclides of Pontus certainly defended it,8 and it was apparently maintained by Hicetas in the fifth century BC, if we can trust the report in Cicero’s Lucullus: “Hicetas of Syracuse, as Theophrastus says, judges that the sky, sun, moon, stars, and, in a word, all heavenly bodies stand still, nor does anything in the cosmos move except the earth. Since it rotates and twists around its axis at great speed, all these things happen as though the heavens moved and the earth stood still (Hicetas Syracosius, ut ait Theophrastus, caelum solem lunam stellas supera denique omnia stare censet, neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri; quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia quasi stante terra caelum moveretur, Academica II 39, 123).9 The speaker asserts that, according to some, Plato maintained the same view in the Timaeus, though less clearly. He goes on to pose the rhetorical question to Epicurus: “And you think the sun is tiny?” (putas solem esse tantalum?). Why would someone so eager to accept multiple explanations ignore this one? The answer is surely that a rotating earth would inevitably require that some things adhere to the sides or bottom, and this Epicurus did not accept. Instead, he proposed that either the entire sky rotates or it is still and the stars pursue their own courses (τάς τε κινήσεις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδύνατον μὲν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου οὐρανοῦ δίνην, ἢ τούτου μὲν στάσιν, αὐτῶν δὲ δίνην κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῇ γενέσει τοῦ κόσμου 8 

See Todd and Bowen 2017: 155-184 for the sources and commentary; also Wehrli 1969: frs. 104-108. The report in Diogenes Laertius VIII 85 on Philolaus and Hicetas may mean that the earth moves in a circle rather than that it rotates: τὴν γῆν κινεῖσθαι κατὰ κύκλον πρῶτον εἰπεῖν [sc. Philolaus]: οἱ δ᾽ Ἱκέταν Συρακόσιόν φασιν; cf. Aristot. Cael II 13, 293a 15ff. See also Aëtius Plac. III 13, 3: “Heraclides Ponticus and Ecphantus the Pythagorean make the earth move, not, however, by changing its place but by rotation on an axle like a wheel, from west to east, around its own center” (Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἔκφαντος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος κινοῦσι μὲν τὴν γῆν, οὐ μήν γε μεταβατικῶς ἀλλὰ τρεπτικῶς, τροχοῦ δίκην ἐνηξονισμένην, ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀνατολὰς, περὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς κέντρον). 9 

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ἀνάγκην ἀπογεννηθεῖσαν, 92). Either way, the rotation would have to take place at

an immense speed if the stars were very far from the earth – another reason to restrict the size of the cosmos.10 We may now turn to the problem of gravity, which also has a bearing on the size of the cosmos. To begin with, we know from the conclusion to the first book of Lucretius’ De rerum natura (in spite of the defective text) that the antipodes of the earth cannot be inhabited, since people there, and any freestanding objects, would fall off (I 1058-1064): et quae pondera sunt sub terris omnia sursum nitier in terraque retro requiescere posta, ut per aquas quae nunc rerum simulacra videmus. 1060 Et simili ratione animalia suppa vagari contendunt neque posse e terris in loca caeli reccidere inferiora magis quam corpora nostra sponte sua possint in caeli templa volare; (scil. Opponents of Epicurus’ view hold the absurd view that) heavy things that are beneath the earth strive upward and lie placed upon the earth upturned, as we now see images of things in water. And with similar reasoning they argue that animals move upside down and that objects below cannot fall from the earth into the space of the sky any more than our bodies can, of their own, fly up to the regions of the sky.

This view of gravity renders impossible any hypothesis on which the transition between day and night depends on the rotation of the earth, whether the earth is regarded as spherical or drum-shaped. Even if the rotation is round the polar axis 10  Gellar-Goad (2023), following Sedley 1976: 49, understands the passages in Epicurus to imply that “The sun is too remote — and roughly equally remote from all parts of the world — for us to be able to change our perspective on it.” Gellar-Goad notes (171) that, in Lucretius’ treatment of the topic in Book V, “A key addition … is the emphasis on the sun’s heat” (cf. ardor, V 564; calor, V 570). A propos the verses, tantulus ille queat tantum sol mittere lumen…, et calido perfundat cuncta uapore (591, 593), Gellar-Goad observes (172): “The standard of comparison for tantulus is not expressed in the text, and I follow Algra’s interpretation, namely that the sun is small when compared to the size of the cosmos” (the reference is to Algra 2001: 34-35 n. 57). But Gellar-Goad sees an aporia here: “So regardless of the sun’s true size, the Epicureans seem not to have contended seriously that it was so small as twelve inches in diameter”; he argues that “the one consistent message the Epicurean sources themselves communicate is that this question [is] perhaps indeed irresolvable (176)”. He takes this to be a “didactic challenge”: “The persistence of Epicureans in this formulation is not so much the result of reflexive dogma or pseudo-intellectual obscurantism as it is a passphrase, a litmus test. Think like an Epicurean, and you will figure out that the sun’s appearance and the sun itself are two related but distinct things with two different sizes.” Gellar-Goad (178) further cites Diogenes of Oenoanda: “[Some people] suspect indeed that the sun is just as low in the sky as it appears, even though it is not just as low in the sky. For if it were just as low, then the earth and all things upon it would have to be burned up” (τὸν γοῦν ἥλιον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὕτως εἶναι ταπεινὸν ὥσπερ φαίνεται, μὴ ὄντα οὕτως ταπεινόν. εἰ γὰρ ἦν οὕτως, ἐνπυρίζεσθαι τὴν γῆν ἔδει καὶ τὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς πάντα πράγματα, fr. 8 Ch.). This does not necessarily imply, however, that the distance to the sun is in fact extremely great. I am most grateful to Ted Gellar-Goad for sending me a copy of his paper in advance of publication.

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and the orbits of the sun and moon are more or less on the same plane as the earth’s equator, they will rise and set only for those on the longitudinal circumferences, and since they will be roughly perpendicular to “down”, they, too, will drop off the surface. The rejection of a natural centripetal motion toward the earth requires that the Epicureans dismiss the theory that the movement of astral bodies is caused by the rotation of the earth. We have not yet explained why heavy objects on the bottom of the earth should fall off the surface, whereas those on top adhere to it. As I mentioned, I have hitherto assumed that the reason is that the earth floats on the air beneath it. It may be compared to a falling leaf, which, because of its flat shape, sinks slowly through the atmosphere. More tapered or streamlined objects on top of the leaf, such as a pin or small insect, would not be equally affected by the resistance of the air, and so would rest on its surface, whereas similar items on the underside of the leaf would fall away. That the earth floats on air is, as Bakker notes, “explicitly attributed to Epicurus in a scholion to his Letter to Herodotus 73 (τὴν γῆν τῷ ἀέρι ἐποχεῖσθαι – ‘that the earth rides on air’)” (2016: 235). Yet that is not precisely what Lucretius says. Rather, he explains that the earth is interconnected with the air atoms that surround it, which support it as the body does the head (Lucretius V 534–549). We may note that celestial objects, or else the entire rim of the sky, must be in theory free to revolve, according to one of Epicurus’ hypotheses about the movement of sun and stars. Wherever that option obtains, the earth or the air beneath it cannot be closely interwoven with the upper atmosphere. The passage precedes Lucretius’ discussion of the size of the sun and stars, which is an indication that Epicurus may have joined them as well in his Peri phuseôs.11 Lucretius specifies that the earth was never a freestanding entity that somehow found its way into our cosmos, but was integrated into it from the beginning: sic igitur tellus non est aliena repente allata atque auris aliunde obiecta alienis, sed pariter prima concepta ab origine mundi certaque pars eius, quasi nobis membra videntur. So then the earth is not suddenly brought in as some alien body, nor cast from elsewhere on alien air, but it has been begotten along with it from the first beginning of the world, a determined part of it, as our limbs are seen to be of us (trans. Bailey) (V 546-549)

In this respect it is just like the sun and stars, as Epicurus described their origin. Lucretius, to be sure, invokes the connection with the air to explain the stability of the earth, rather than as an explanation of gravity. Precisely the fact that it does not 11 

See Sedley 1998: 83-85 on Lucretius’ fidelity to Epicurus’ Peri phuseos here.

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sink, however, supplies the needed distinction between the earth’s situation in the middle of the cosmos (in media mundi regione quiescat, V 534), where, supported as it is, it loses weight (decrescere pondus, 535), and that of other objects (not that its atoms lose this property, of course). The circumambient pressure of the air causes the atoms of the earth to ricochet permanently, in a way that is not true for other objects, which, though likewise surrounded by the atmosphere, are not bound to it in the same way. This is one revision I am inclined to make to my earlier argument about the floating earth. What must remain true, however, is that the average motions and vibrations of the atoms composing the earth must cancel each other out in such a way that it is relatively stable in respect to the cosmos, whereas this is not the case for objects that are less embedded in the surrounding air. The tendency of their atoms to move downward as they emerge from collisions (if I am right about this condition) will be less impeded than in the case of earth itself. A world enmeshed in its ambient atmosphere and stable on this account is not likely to rotate freely, as the stars or sky may do. Must such a world also be conceived of as flat or drum-like? That description followed from my earlier view, which had the earth floating in its atmospheric bath, rather than entangled with it. The Epicureans would still, I think, want a world that does not slope down so sharply that things would start slipping off it. There may be a clue to its shape in a passage that Bakker cites as suggesting an alternative, centrifocal view in Lucretius’ poem. As he writes (2016: 228), “The clearest indication that Lucretius’ cosmogony must be interpreted centrifocally is found right at the beginning of the relevant section”: Quippe etenim primum terrai corpora quaeque, propterea quod erant gravia et perplexa, coibant in medio atque imas capiebant omnia sedes.

450

For, first of all, in fact, all bodies of earth, because they were heavy and entangled, came together in the middle and all took the lowest seats (trans. Bakker) (V 449–451)

Bakker explains: “The most natural interpretation of these lines is to take ‘came together in the middle’ and ‘took the lowest seats’ as two equivalent statements, expressing one and the same process…. If the bottom of the cosmos is to be identified with its centre, so the periphery must be identical with the top” (229). Bakker sees this passage as inconsistent with Epicurus’ view, which Lucretius follows elsewhere in the poem; it is, as Bakker puts it, “a Fremdkörper” (234). I believe, however, that these verses admit of a different interpretation, one that is consistent with Epicurus’ view that natural motion is downward. The heavy earth atoms gather in the middle of the cosmos, that is, midway down, understood as a cross-section rather than a midpoint. They drop because of their weight, but they settle in the middle, I venture

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to suggest, because they are intertwined (perplexa). Hence, their atomic motions will largely take the form of rebounds and vibrations among each other, reducing the downward vector. Once at the middle plane, they then extrude the lighter atoms, and so they end up at the bottom relative to them, as they drive the lighter elements of air and water upward. As Lucretius goes on to explain: quae quanto magis inter se perplexa coibant, tam magis expressere ea quae mare sidera solem lunamque efficerent et magni moenia mundi; omnia enim magis haec e levibus atque rutundis seminibus multoque minoribus sunt elementis quam tellus.

455

The more they came together, entangled with one another, the more they drove out those [bodies] which produced the sea, stars, sun, moon, and the walls of the great cosmos. For all these are made of lighter, rounder, and much smaller seeds than the earth. (V 452-457)

Were these lighter elements extruded in all directions? Lucretius seems to indicate that they were rather forced upward, in the phrase, primus se sustulit aether / ignifer et multos secum levis abstulit ignis (“first the fire-bearing ether rose up, and, being light, it bore along many fires,” 458-459). The analogy with evaporating dew suggests as much (460-466; cf. sursum, 465). To be sure, the lighter elements then spread out: sic igitur tum se levis ac diffusilis aether corpore concreto circum datus undique saepsit et late diffusus in omnis undique partis omnia sic avido complexu cetera saepsit.

470

Thus the light and diffusive ether, when its elements had condensed, was set round and enclosed on all sides and, diffused widely in every direction, enclosed all other things in its eager embrace. (V 467-470)

This stage is distinct, though, and not produced by extrusion as such.12 Ether and air are found both above and below the earth (and presumably to the sides of it as well), but the initial ekthlipsis is upward, due to the primary effect of atomic mass. There are 12  As Bakker 2106: 230 observes, this interpretation comes close to Giussani’s view of two (or more) distinct stages (Giussani 1896–1898: note on v. 449–494, 1st observation; note on v. 496). Bakker’s criticism of Giussani does not take account of the effect of the entanglement of the earth atoms, as I propose here; but his discussion, here and elsewhere, is acute, and the reader is referred to it (esp. 231). See also Bakker’s critique of Bailey’s view (Bailey 1947) on 231-232.

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thus three phases in the formation of the cosmos, not just the two that Giussani and Bailey posited (in different ways and for different reasons). We may conclude, then, that the effect of gravity (as opposed to atomic weight) only manifests itself after this third stage is completed, and the earth is grounded in the layer of air beneath. This is not quite enough to prove that the surface of the earth is flat, and still less so that the nether part is so. All in all, nevertheless, it seems likely that this picture is what Lucretius had in mind, which has the merit (to the extent that it is right) of rendering his treatment of Epicurean cosmology consistent in itself and with the conception of the founder.

References Algra, K., 2001, Epicurus en de zon: Wiskunde en fysica bij een Hellenistisch filosoof, Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Bailey, C. (ed.), 1947, Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura, with Prolegomena, Critical Apparatus, Translation and Commentary, 3 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bakker, F. A., 2016, Epicurean Meteorology: Sources, Method, Scope and Organization. Leiden: Brill. Gellar-Goad, T. H. M., 2023, “Lucretius on the Size of the Sun”, in G. Davis–S. Yona(eds.), Epicurus in Rome: Philosophical Perspectives in the Ciceronian Age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 168–185, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aopcambridge-core/content/view/82521F308E2A75674125F98E25FE8624/9781009281393AR. pdf/Epicurus_in_Rome.pdf?event-type=FTLA [25.01.2023] Giussani, C. (ed.), 1896–1898, T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex. Revisione del testo, commento e studi introduttivi, 4 vols., Turin: Ermanno Loescher. Konstan, David. 2020. “Atomism”, in P. Mitsis (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epicurus and Epicureanism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 59-80. Konstan, D., 2022, “Epicurus”, in E. N. Zalta–U. Nodelman (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/epicurus [25.01.2023] Piergiacomi, E., 2022, Amicus Lucretius: Gassendi, il De rerum natura e l’edonismo cristiano, Berlin: De Gruyter. Romeo, C., 1979, “Demetrio Lacone sulla grandezza del sole (PHerc. 1013)”, Cronache Ercolanesi 9: 11–35. Sedley, D., 1976, “Epicurus and the Mathematicians of Cyzicus”, Cronache Ercolanesi 6: 23-54. Sedley, D., 1998, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Todd, R. B.–Bowen, A. C., 2017, “Heraclides on the Rotation of the Earth: Texts, Contexts and Continuities”, in W. W. Fortenbaugh–E. E. Pender (eds.), Heraclides of Pontus: Discussion. London–New York: Routledge, 155-184. Verde, F., 2016, “Epicuro e la grandezza del sole: sul testo di Pyth. 91”, Méthexis 28: 104–110. Wehrli, F., 1969, Herakleides Pontikos: Die Schule des Aristoteles, Vol. VII, 2nd ed., Basel: Schwabe & Co.

The Method of Multiple Explanations Revisited Voula Tsouna My aim in this paper is to reconstruct and defend, in so far as this is possible, the Epicurean variant of the method of the pollachos tropos or method of multiple explanations. Its core assumption is that certain types of phenomena, notably the so-called meteôra (conventionally rendered as celestial phenomena), can be accounted for in several different ways, all of them acceptable in the absence of counter-evidence.1 As such the pollachos tropos invites comparison and contrast with the monachos tropos: a standard mode of explanation according to which there is only one correct causal account of the explananda – things, processes, events, or states of affairs in the world. Epicurus does not generally object to the monachos tropos. In fact, he argues that the primary function of the science of nature is to discover the real cause and provide the single correct explanation of kyriôtata or “most important things”, that is, the fundamental truths of atomic physics.2 What Epicurus and his followers reject is the idea that each of the phenomena belonging to the class of meteôra can have only one cause and correspondingly can be adequately explained in only one way. Rather, on his view, the method suitable to the study of the meteôra is the pollachos tropos (Pyth. 86), which takes for granted that each of the meteôra can be produced by several different causes and therefore allows for several different or even competing explanations to stand, if they are not precluded by empirical evidence. In what remains extant of his works, Epicurus defends his preference for the pollachos tropos on ethical grounds. Famously, he argues that our understanding of the possible causes of the meteôra is necessary for attaining tranquillity (Hrdt. 80) and essential to our well-being (Hrdt. 78). Variations of these claims are interspersed in his own physical writings (e.g., Pyth. 97, 104), and they are also found in Lucretius’ poem (Lucret. V 1204-40, VI 379, 422) and the monumental inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda (notably, NF 182). There can be no doubt, I think, that the pollachos tropos was part of the canonical doctrine, was highly valued for its contribution to the moral end, and was practised routinely by Epicureans of all periods. Something similar holds, I wish to stress, for the monachos tropos as well. But it is largely the former method, not the latter, that has come under attack. 1  The secondary literature on the Epicurean pollachos tropos is of very high quality. Notably, see Bakker 2016, Bénatouïl 2003, Bollack and Laks 1978, Corsi 2017, De Sanctis 2012, Hammerstaedt in this volume, Hankinson 2013, Leone 2017, Masi 2014, Morel 2015, Sedley 1976, Taub 2009, Verde 2013, 2018, 2022a and 2022b, and Wasserstein 1978. 2  According to Verde 2013: 129, Hrtd. 78 and Nat. XI suggest that the κυριώταται αἰτίαι, the cardinal causes relevant to the “most important things”, are the fundamental principles of Epicurean materialism (see also Philodemus De elect. XIII 17-19).

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First, it is alleged that the method of multiple explanations is arbitrary and violates scientific norms. Even within the context of the Epicurean system, it is not prima facie clear why this method is uniquely apt to explain the celestial phenomena. Nor is it clear why to endorse the assumption that the meteôra have multiple possible causes. More generally, one might add, Epicurus does not determine the criteria according to which some things admit of only one explanation, while others admit of many. Second, critics have noted that earlier and later Epicureans have different views regarding the epistemic standing of multiple explanations. These tensions must be resolved on pain of incoherence. Third, one can easily form the impression that the Epicureans are awfully casual about the quality and consistency of their explanations. For instance, in the Letter to Pythocles, Epicurus frequently ends his analysis of a celestial or an atmospheric phenomenon by saying that, in addition to the explanations that he has given, there are many others. This sort of remark has been taken to suggest that virtually any explanation would do, provided that it is psychologically effective. If so, the value of the pollachos tropos is limited and merely instrumental; it cannot be treated as a proper scientific method aiming at the discovery of the truth. Further objections concern the ethical contribution of the pollachos tropos. Why accept that this method bears on happiness? Why assume that the search for many possible causes contributes to tranquillity rather than anxiety and restlessness? More generally, how does the pollachos tropos fit within the framework of Epicurean ethics and the rational pursuit of the supreme good? To confront these challenges and defend the scientific function of the pollachos tropos in Epicureanism, I propose to extend the textual basis of the investigation and try to reassess it with an open mind. Part One of the paper traces the historical trajectory of the method from the fifth century to the end of the fourth century BCE. Part Two identifies the principal objects of pollachos tropos, reconstructs the dialectical context in which it is originally applied, and highlights its metaphysical basis. Part Three focuses on the epistemic considerations that make the pollachos tropos uniquely appropriate for the explanation of the meteôra. It shows how the application of the method relies on central aspects of Epicurean epistemology and scientific methodology, and traces the steps by which the method is supposed to work. Part Four entertains a criticism attested in a papyrus and attributed to Zeno of Sidon, and then considers the variations of the method developed by Lucretius and Diogenes in order to assess their consistency with the canonical doctrine. Part Five turns to the ethical importance of the Epicurean study of the meteôra. I argue that, even though the pollachos tropos does have an overarching ethical intent, it is neither a mere device for averting superstition nor a ‘second best’ alternative to scepticism.3 Epicurus and his school advance it as a serious scientific method whose basic intuition, I submit, is defensible and finds parallels in contemporary philosophical thought. 3 

See Vuillemin 1984: 204, and Bénatouïl 2003: 25 n. 28.

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I Epicurus is neither the first nor the last ancient philosopher to use the pollachos tropos – far from it. The core idea of different possible accounts of the same thing or the same type of thing can be traced back to authors of the Archaic period,4 notably Hesiod, while the conception of the pollachos tropos as a proper scientific method probably has its roots in the atomism of Democritus (Seneca, QN V 2.1, VI 20.1; Aristot. Meteor. II 7, 365b1-6) and, from a different perspective, in Plato’s Timaeus.5 Aristotle standardly uses the pollachos tropos to account for phenomena such as shooting stars, which he explains in multiple ways and by reference to multiple causes (Meteor. I 4, 341b36-342a33). Arguably, he justifies the use of that method to explain meteorological and astronomical phenomena by pointing to a distinct evidential standard applicable to these latter, namely that of being eulogon (plausible) or kata logon (reasonable) or ouk alogon (not unreasonable).6 Importantly, he thinks that the main reason for treating “plausible” or “reasonable” explanations7 as the right explanations in such cases is the distance of meteorological and astronomical phenomena from us (De cael. II 3, 286a3-7). He suggests that admissible explanations merely need to be possible (Meteor. I 7, 344a5-7). And he seems to take for granted that one of the principal methodological tools for investigating the aforementioned phenomena is analogy – a key feature of both the Meteorology and the De caelo. This heritage is appropriated and expanded by Theophrastus, whose use of the pollachos tropos is both systematic and exceptionally influential for posterity.8 Indeed it is now well known that Theophrastus’ Meteorology and the view that it implies about God and nature have left a deep impression on later philosophers, from Strato of Lampsacus (Theophrastus’ successor in the Lyceum), to the author of the De mundo, to the Stoics and especially Posidonius and Seneca, the Epicureans, Arius Didymus, Pliny, Plutarch, and Galen, and the tradition of the commentators (notably Alexander, Proclus, Philoponus, and Olympiodorus).9 At the outset, therefore, a few remarks seem in order about Theophrastus and his reception by later authors. They will give a sense of the application of the method of multiple explanations to account for certain phenomena in the atmosphere and beneath 4 

I am grateful to Stefano Maso for this suggestion. I reserve my defence of this claim for another occasion. 6  See Bolton 2009, Falcon and Leunissen 2015, and Verde 2022b: 5-14. I am grateful to Thomas Slabon for his comments on Aristotle’s use of the pollachos tropos. 7  On no account should such explanations be viewed as mere eikota, i.e., likelihoods that may or may not involve deception. See n. 15. 8  On this issue see Daiber 1992, Gottschalk 1998, Kidd 1992, Mansfeld 1994, and Verde 1998b. Verde 2022b: 5-17 offers an informative account of the Peripatetics’ approach to multiple explanations, especially focusing on the role of sense-perception in multiple explanations. 9  See, e.g., Mansfeld 1992 and Daiber 1992: 282-293. 5 

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the ground, and thus will provide some context for the Epicurean conception of multiple explanations. The surviving parts of Theophrastus’ treatise On Meteorology and Meteorological Phenomena10 – whose shortened Syriac version was translated in Arabic by Bar Bahlûl and by Ibn al-Khammar (tenth century) and whose text has now been completed on the basis of extensive excerpts found in the newly discovered Hexaemeron by the Nestorian Moses Bar Kepha (ninth century) – establishes the centrality of the method of multiple explanations in Theophrastus’ natural philosophy. As Daiber convincingly argues,11 the Meteôrologika do not belong to Theophrastus’ doxographical works but are part of the collection of unpolished treatises summarily called Peri Physikôn and containing aspects of his natural philosophy. When he enumerates the causes responsible for each of the meteôra, he is not merely citing different opinions without mentioning their authors, but gives all the causes that he himself considers possible. For instance, he draws analogies with phenomena “close to us” in order to show that thunder may have its origin in one of seven causes (Metarsiology [1] 1-23 Daiber). In the case of thunder, each of these causes has the same result, whereas in the case of winds, for instance, the variety of causes (the place in which a wind arises or the quality of the air of which it is composed) may result in different sorts of winds.12 Generally, in his physical works, Theophrastus does not hesitate to mention a plurality of causes where he deems it appropriate. Some of them come from older Presocratic material, others derive from Aristotle, others from contemporary science, yet others from commonplaces also found in Classical literature.13 Whatever the provenance of the different causes, they are accepted in so far as they can be integrated in Theophrastus’ own physical system, and multiple explanations are articulated accordingly.14 It is important to stress that the latter are not presented as mere eikota, namely likelihoods aiming to produce conviction. They are advanced 10  The work is entitled Τῆς μεταρσιολεσχίας καὶ μεταρσιολογικῶν, and it survives abridged in Syriac and Arabic translation: see Daiber 1992. Its authorship is controversial. Following Daiber 1992, Mansfeld 1994, and Sedley 1998, I assume that the author of the treatise is Theophrastus. A different view is defended by Bakker 2016 (see esp. 70-73, 145-153), who contends that the work in question is a compendium based largely (but not exclusively) on Epicurus’ meteorology. Verde 2022b: 29-34 also suggests that the aforementioned text is at least partly influenced by Epicurean meteorology. 11  Daiber 1992: 285. 12  Theophrastus uses the method of multiple explanations in other scientific writings as well, e.g., botany. On this practice, see Daiber 1992: 285, n. 141. 13  For instance, Aristophanes’ Clouds mention collision and the splitting up of clouds as causes of thunder. See Daiber 1992: 288. 14  For instance, new elements with regard to Aristotle have been discerned in Theophrastus’ accounts of thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, and winds, but also (and more so) in his account of earthquakes and of the halo around the moon. Regarding the latter, Theophrastus leaves aside Aristotle’s explanation of the halo as a reflexion of the visual rays; he claims that the moon-rays work an effect on the thick air which surrounds the moon, and he defends this view by means of an analogy with the waves caused by a stone thrown into water.

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as scientific accounts that can be true of a certain token or type of atmospheric or subterranean event.15 In connection with his use of the pollachos tropos, Theophrastus attacks the view that lightning, thunderbolts, earthquakes, and other such phenomena are caused by God (Metarsiology [14] 14-29 Daiber). God, he argues, can never be the source of disorder or harm and hence cannot be the cause of the meteôra. This source must be sought in nature, which is capable of displaying purposeless activity, disorder, and destruction. In the text of the Meteorology, the irregularity of the relevant atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena is tightly linked to multiple causation. It is especially interesting that, according to this picture, the pollachos tropos supports rather than undermines Theophrastus’ teleological worldview. On the one hand, the distinction between God and nature ensures that there is no diminution to God’s divine power and its invariably good effects.16 On the other, it renders nature solely responsible for irregular phenomena above and below the earth and makes room for the explanation of such incongruities in terms of multiple causes. Thus, by the time that Epicurus composes his treatise On Nature, the pollachos tropos is a scientific method that carries a very respectable philosophical pedigree. It has been employed by Aristotle17 and extensively used by his successor in the 15  On the notions of eikasia, eikota, eikotes logoi, and other related concepts, see notably Kalligas 2003. As he correctly points out, from the Archaic period onwards, the semantic connotations of these words or expressions include persuasiveness, verisimilitude, convincingness, and also deceptiveness. Forensic orators use eikota when direct access to the facts is impossible and, on many occasions, prefer arguing the case on the basis of eikota even when hard evidence could be used instead. Naturally, eikota are circumstantial and chosen according to the needs of the case. They are often supported by endoxic commonplaces, rely on subjective acceptability as well as objective possibility, and their effectiveness in the argumentation chiefly depends on the structure of the speech and the tree-like logical relations between its parts. Importantly, this sort of argumentation must give the impression that all possibilities have been exhaustively considered and all but one have been discarded (e.g., π occurred either because of ε1 or because of ε2; but neither ε1 nor ε2; therefore π did not occur). This kind of pattern aims to create a sense of logical necessity, which, typically, is deceptive and has a practical aim: to convince the jury or the audience that such-and-such must be the case or, alternatively, cannot be the case. If truth enters the picture, it is tailored to the reality internal to the logos and woven through it. In my view, none of the above features characterizes the method of multiple explanations. The views put forward are treated as possibly true of the phenomenon under examination; analogies with “things close to us” are used instead of endoxa; the enumeration of causes is horizontal, not tree-like; multiple causes may be consistent or inconsistent with one another and are not connected, logically or otherwise; the assumption is that one or more of them are true of corresponding states of affairs; the lists of multiple causes are open-ended; and elimination of causes is effected not on the basis of logic but on the basis of empirical fact. 16  Daiber 1992: 290. 17  I wish to mention, without pursuing it here, a suggestion that I deem important and that was addressed to me by David Charles. On the basis of Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 17, 99a1 – II 18, 99b14, one might attribute to Aristotle the view that there would be different types of any phenomenon which turned out to have different types of causes in different conditions, even if, e.g., two types of a phenomenon appeared somewhat similar or were generically the same. If Aristotle held that view and, moreover, if the Epicureans thought that the very same phenomenon could have different types of cause in different conditions (as I argue in this paper), it follows that the Epicureans made a decisive

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Lyceum. It is firmly associated with investigations of the world of experience. And it is specifically applied to certain kinds of celestial or atmospheric events summarily called meteôra. There is no doubt that Epicurus made use of the lists of explanations already available in Theophrastus in order to compose On Nature XI-XIII.18 Nor can it be contested that Theophrastus has an indirect influence on Lucretius’ discussion of the meteôra in DRN V-VI, which largely draws from the aforementioned books of On Nature.19 I wish to suggest, however, that when it came to the metaphysics and epistemology of the pollachos tropos, Epicurus drew inspiration and materials from Democritus more than from anyone else. Not only does the latter defend the infinity of atoms and void and the existence of countless worlds, that is, doctrines that are crucial to the Epicurean version of multiple explanations. He also explained winds in terms of the atomic theory (Seneca QN V 2.1) and offered multiple explanations for earthquakes (QN VI 20.1, Aristot. Meteor. II 7, 365b1-6). Epicurus was more at home in Democritus’ mechanistic universe than in the world of Theophrastus. And he proved able to discern the potential of atomism for the purpose of explaining irregularities in nature. In any case, Epicurus is the first philosopher known to us to situate the pollachos tropos in a polemical context, compare and contrast it with the monachos tropos or method of a single explanation, and argue in favour of the former and against the use of the latter in astronomy and meteorology. Moreover, he analyses in some detail the elements of the method, indicates how it is supposed to work, and defends it on metaphysical and epistemological as well as ethical grounds. I shall address these topics in turn, beginning with the paradigmatic objects of the pollachos tropos, namely, the meteôra.

move away from Aristotle’s line of explanation. An interesting question to pursue is what might explain that move. 18  Indeed, close parallels have been drawn between Theophrastus and Epicurus in respect of their conception of the pollachos tropos, the sequence of the phenomena that they respectively treat, the specific explanations that they respectively offer and, importantly, the theological dimensions of their approaches. This becomes obvious if we place Lucretius’ order of exposition next to the order of exposition found in Aëtius (whose doxography has been traced back to Theophrastus) and compare both of them with the order of exposition in the compendium of Metarsiologica (which many believe to be authored by Theophrastus). See the table in Sedley 1998: 158, and the discussion in Sedley 1998: 152-185. On Theophrastus in Aëtius’s doxography, see Mansfeld 1990, 1992a and 1992b, Runia 1997, and of course Mansfeld and Runia 1997-2020. On Epicurus, Theophrastus, and Aëtius see also Mansfeld 1994 and Runia 2018. 19  Sedley 1998: chapter 6.

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II Traditionally, the term meteôra is rendered by “celestial phenomena”, but in Epicurus it covers much more. Following the sequence of cases in the Letter to Pythocles, we encounter multiple explanations of a variety of items. In the first place, there are accounts of the boundary and shape of worlds (88), their place of formation (89), aspects of their creation and constitution (91), the risings and settings of the heavenly bodies (92), their motions and tropics (92-93), the phases, light, and face of the moon (93-96), the eclipses of the sun and the moon (96) as well as the periods of the heavenly bodies (97), the length of nights and days (98), and weather signs (99). Also, multiple explanations are provided for meteorological phenomena: clouds (99), rain (99-100), thunder (100), lightning (101), the reason why the former temporally follows the latter (102-103), and thunderbolts (103-104). Next, Epicurus uses the same method to explain various atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena: cyclones (104), earthquakes (105-106), volcanic explosions (106), hail (106-107), snow (107-108), dew and frost (109-109), ice (109), the generation and shape of the rainbow (109-110), and the halo of the moon (110-111). Then he returns to the region of the heavens to explain comets (111), fixed stars (112), planets (113), differences in the way that stars move and the speed in their orbits (113-114), and falling stars (114-115). He ends with a brief reference to weather signs supposedly coming from animals (116). As this list reveals, the meteôra include not only events and phenomena in the heavens but also in the atmosphere and on the earth, and they range from cosmic events, such as the world’s formation and shape, to trivial occurrences like weather signs.20 Some of these phenomena are spectacular while others are not; some have regularity but others do not; some occur frequently but others very rarely; some are catastrophic for living beings whereas others are harmless, beneficial, or pleasant to behold. Epicurus’ assumption seems to be that, regardless of their family resemblances or differences, all of these phenomena share something in common and admit of multiple explanations by virtue of that fact. Nonetheless, what such commonalities might be is a matter of speculation. One hypothesis is this: the meteôra belong to the genus of adêla, non-evident things. They remain hidden from us in their own proper nature but can become known in some ways through signs or proofs (Sextus, Math. VIII 316-319).21 However, in addition to the fact that some of these phenomena have perceptible by-prod20  Epicurus and his followers do not specify whether the meteôra constituting the objects of the pollachos tropos are types or tokens. However, on the theory of infinite worlds, every token corresponds to a type as well. Within our own world there are token explananda, e.g., the stability of the Earth, but the surviving Epicurean texts give no indication that these are differentiated from types, e.g., thunder, earthquakes. I am grateful to David Sedley and Raphael Woolf for their comments on this issue. 21  As Verde 2018a: 529 argues, the meteôra do not belong to the class of ta prosmenonta, i.e., things that await confirmation (Diog. Laert. X 34), for they do not admit of decisive confirmation or disconfirmation regarding their cause.

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ucts while others do not, the class of the meteôra is by no means coextensive with the class of generically non-evident things. Atoms and void are also non-evident, but they do not belong to the meteôra, nor are they objects of multiple explanations. Another hypothesis could be that the common feature of the objects of the pollachos tropos is that they occur in the heavens. Yet this is unsatisfactory as well. In the first place, the meteôra comprise terrestrial as well as celestial phenomena. Also, even though Epicurus reserves the method of multiple explanations mainly for the meteôra, he occasionally employs it in other contexts as well. For example, he offers multiple explanations about the formation of simulacra, all of them operative at the same time: some films of atoms are formed in the air, others derive from bodies, others are generated “in other ways too” (Hrdt. 48). The suggestion that what the meteôra share in common is that they are physically very distant from us is also inadequate. While distance does play a role in Epicurus’ thinking, it cannot explain on its own the close connection that he draws between the meteôra and the pollachos tropos. The question, then, remains: why did Epicurus choose to make the meteora the objects par excellence of the pollachos tropos? It is widely recognised that Epicurus’ ultimate motivation is psychological and ethical. For instance, he says that we must not suppose that any other object is to be gained from the knowledge of the phenomena in the sky … than tranquillity and firm belief, just as it happens in all other branches of study (Pyth. 85).

Likewise, he remarks that our mode of life has now no place for irrational thinking and empty belief; rather we should live peacefully and without disturbance. And indeed everything happens without causing any disturbance in so far as it concerns all these events that are explained in accordance with the method of multiple explanations and in agreement with the phenomena, when one accepts what is plausibly said about them as one ought to do (Pyth. 87).

I shall return to this topic in the last section of this paper. At present, however, I wish to suggest that these are not the only reasons why Epicurus favours the method of multiple explanations; he also values the latter as a scientific method whose use he justifies on metaphysical and epistemological grounds. If so, then the fact that Epicurean meteorology has an overarching ethical aim does not entail that the latter has no intrinsic value22 from the scientific point of view.23 I propose therefore 22  A similar remark applies, in my view, to Pyrrhonism: the fact that the proto-Sceptic’s ultimate objective is ataraxia (Pyr. I 4), freedom from disturbance, does not necessarily imply that his enquiry is insincere or that he has given up the search for truth. 23  Compare the following passage from Seneca, which suggests a way of reconciling genuine interest in meteorology with its overarching ethical aim. “We marvel at none of these phenomena (sc.

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that we look at the evidence regarding Epicurus’ polemic against the astronomers of the school of Cyzicus: excerpts from the Letter to Pythocles and the Letter to Herodotus along with, most importantly, the surviving fragments of Epicurus’ On Nature XI,24 where he targets a model of mathematical astronomy probably developed by Eudoxus and still predominant in Epicurus’ time.25 In the Letter of Pythocles (86-88), Epicurus points to two interrelated mistakes that one can make and, as he mentions later on, the astronomers do make in trying to account for phenomena in the heavens. They fail to realise that some things can have only one cause of generation, whereas other things can have many. And correspondingly, they do not distinguish between things that admit of only one explanation and things that admit of many (cf. Pyth. 86).26 Both these failures are due to epistemic inadequacy and both can be traced back to the astronomers’ fascination with their own theories and their disregard for perception, observation, and empirically grounded reasoning. In connection with his explanations of the phases of the moon, Epicurus comments that the wanings and waxings of the moon “may be accounted for in all the ways in which phenomena on earth invite us to such explanations of these phases, if only one does not fall in love with the method of a single explanation and groundlessly disapproves of others, without having contemplated what it is possible for a human being to observe and what it is not and, for this reason, desiring to observe things that cannot be observed” (Pyth. 94). In Book XI of his treatise On Nature, Epicurus has more to say on the astronomers’ way of thinking. While the astronomers endeavour to work out the mathethe meteôra) without fear. And since the cause of fear is ignorance, is it not worth a great deal to have knowledge in order not to fear? It is much better to investigate the causes and, in fact, to be intent on this study with the entire mind. For nothing can be found worthier than a subject to which the mind not only lends itself but spends itself ” (QN VI 3.4: my emphasis). Here, Seneca suggests that there is no tension between seeking meteorological knowledge for the sake of ethics and pursuing it in its own right. In fact, he appears to think that focusing on the study of the meteôra “with the entire mind”, i.e., with genuine interest and total concentration, is a constituent of a fear-free life. 24  There is no need to linger on the details of that debate, since there is excellent secondary literature about it. Notably, see the classic study by Sedley 1976, in addition to Taub 2003 and Bakker 2016. I use the text and translation by Sedley 1976 and am greatly indebted to his commentary as well. 25  Pythocles, the addressee of Epicurus’ letter, was a prominent member of the Epicurean school of Lampsacus, and there is evidence of interaction and rivalry between the Epicureans of Lampsacus and the mathematical astronomers of the neighbouring town of Cyzicus. See Sedley 1976: 26-30. 26  Epicurus’ position can be ramified further. Namely, there is textual support for the suggestion that there are three categories of things: things that have one cause and admit of only one explanation; things that can have many causes and admit of many explanations compatible with each other; and things that have alternative and mutually exclusive causes and, correspondingly, admit of alternative and mutually exclusive explanations. Another distinction cuts across the latter two categories: of things that can have many causes, some admit of a relatively restricted scope of explanations (consider, for instance the explanations of the size of the sun or its distance from the earth), whereas others admit of a vast range of explanations as well as of vastly different explanations, compatible or incompatible with each other. Even though Epicurus does not draw these distinctions explicitly, a plausible case can be made that he makes them implicitly in the course of his argument. I am grateful to David Konstan for his remarks on this topic.

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matics of the motions of the celestial bodies and offer a single model for them, it is simply not feasible from the human viewpoint. “Why after all should you declare the measurement from here, or the one from here, or the one from here, or this one a more reliable guide of the risings and settings (of the sun)?” (Nat. XI PHerc.1042 Ia 11-19 Sedley). Objectively valid calculations, Epicurus contends, cannot be made from any point on the surface of the earth. Eudoxus’ geometrical model of interconnecting concentric spheres is simply unable to account for the variations and irregularities that we can actually observe in the motions of the heavenly bodies.27 On Epicurus’ understanding of the matter, what Eudoxean astronomers do is to construct mental models (homoiômata: IIa1) and base their reasoning (syllogizesthai: IIa2) on instruments (organa IIa17-8) that they construct. But this, Epicurus argues, is wrong. For the indications of the instruments cannot serve as a basis of an analogy with the meteôra that we actually see in the heavens. The astronomers do not realise that when they talk about the indications of the instrument they are talking about the intrinsic properties of an object, whereas when they talk about a meteôron they are talking about a certain appearance or image (phasma) arising from certain symptômata, accidental properties, and stored in our soul (IIIa 1-21, IIIb 5-12). While the arbitrarily constructed instrument is concrete and its properties determinate, there are indeterminacies (aoristeiai: IIa 14) in the appearances (phasmata: IIa8) of the celestial bodies. This is as it should be, since an astronomical instrument is an object whose properties are observable and known, whereas a meteôron is an image whose causes are unobservable and their nature unknowable.28 As things stand, Epicurus continues, the instruments of the astronomers are deceptive. Perhaps the most important way in which they can mislead us is that they represent as regular the motions of the stars (IIa17-19). I shall return to this point in the last section of the paper. For the moment we should retain this: the astronomers’ use of the monachos tropos, the method of a single explanation, is motivated by theoretical presuppositions regarding the nature of celestial phenomena and ascribing to them regularity and indeed perfection. And it is part and parcel of a way of doing astronomy traced back to Plato’s Academy and bringing to our mind the higher-level education of the Guardians in Republic VII – an education intended to turn the Guardians away from the world of experience and towards the eternal and immaterial Forms. Epicurus’ critique against the astronomers constitutes an adequate basis for exploring his own alternative proposal further. In the next section, I wish to comment 27 

See Sedley 1976: 36-7. On the correct kind of mental image, see the comments by Sedley 1976: 40. In brief, we get the correct mental image only if we realize that to argue about celestial phenomena is to argue about a “seeming” derived from certain chance properties of the appearances. Consider the Epicurean distinctions between, first, the hypokeimenon (Hrtd. 72, Philodemus De sign. IX 38-10.4) and the phenomenon and, second, intrinsic properties (symbebêkota) and accidental properties (symptômata) (Hrtd. 68-71). 28 

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on the metaphysical grounding of the pollachos tropos, its epistemic virtues, and the intrinsic value that, on my view, is attributed to the knowledge imparted through the method of multiple explanations in so far as it satisfies relevant epistemic norms.

III In the long programmatic section of the Letter to Pythocles (85-88), Epicurus elaborates the two aforementioned modes of explanation and their respective objects: accounting for certain features of the world and of human life monachôs, in only one way, and explaining other categories of phenomena or types of phenomena pollachôs, in several different ways. We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor must we have with regard to every subject the same theoretical approach (theôria), namely, the one concerning the modes of life or the solution of the other physical problems – for instance, that the universe consists of bodies and the intangible, or that the elements are indivisible – and all such claims that we make where there is only one explanation in accordance with the phenomena. This does not hold in the case of the meteôra. Rather, these events have both a cause of generation that can be diverse (pleonachên aitian) and multiple accounts of their nature (ousias) that accord with sensation.29 For we must not conduct our physical enquiries on the basis of groundless assumptions and arbitrary principles, but as the phenomena invite us to do. Our mode of life has now no place for irrational thinking and empty belief; rather, we should live peacefully and without disturbance. And indeed everything happens without causing any disturbance in so far as it concerns all these events that are explained in accordance with the method of multiple explanations and in agreement with the phenomena, when one accepts what is plausibly said about them (pithanologoumenon) as one ought to do. But when a person retains one explanation but rejects another, although it is equally in agreement with the phenomena, it is evident that he abandons completely scientific research and recurs to the realm of myth” (Pyth. 86-87). 30

The first thing to emphasise is that Epicurus does not reject the monachos tropos altogether. On the contrary, he posits that the fundamentals of nature and of human life can be explained correctly in one way only. Namely, there is a single theoretical account (theôria) which is true of first principles constituting the universe, the indivisibility of atoms, the way to live our lives, and also, as he indicates in other texts (Pyth. 116, Hrtd. 78, 82), the articles of the Fourfold Medicine, the criteria of truth, the affections of pleasure and pain, and a handful of other issues. These are 29  ταῦτά γε πλεοναχὴν ἔχει καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίαν καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι σύμφωνον κατηγορίαν (Pyth. 86). 30  I take it that “myth” here has the sense of epistemological fabrications. I am indebted to André Laks for discussion on this point.

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the kyriôtata or principal elements of the Epicurean system. And the single explanations accounting for them hold absolutely and universally and are not negotiable. The correlation between the kyriôtata and the monachos tropos is less arbitrary than it might seem. Every such account is corroborated by empirical observation and argument and by the systematic refutation of competing alternatives. Taken together the kyriôtata established through the monachos tropos constitute the very framework into which the multiple explanations of celestial and other such phenomena must be integrated (Hrtd. 78).31 Epicurus does not specify how exactly these latter are related to the aforementioned framework.32 Yet he does stress that the two modes of explanation and their respective objects must remain distinct and separate in our mind (Hrtd. 78). On the one hand, the application of pollachos tropos to the principal doctrines would undermine the very foundations of Epicurus’ system. On the other, it is imperative to avoid the type of confusion that the astronomers suffer from: in studying celestial phenomena, we must free ourselves from the theological assumptions embedded in the monachos tropos. Consider Epicurus’ remarkably strong claim that anyone following that path “abandons scientific research completely and recurs to the realm of myth” (Pyth. 87). I think it suggests not merely that the pollachos tropos is acceptable or ‘second best’ for the study of the meteôra, but that it is necessary for that purpose. Why so? What is it about these phenomena that makes the pollachos tropos uniquely apt to explain them? In the first place, this question appears to be answered on ontological and causal grounds. Epicurus has enough of a distinction between explanation and cause33 to posit a sort of isomorphism between the number of causes that may be responsible for the generation of a phenomenon and the number of explanations that may be offered for that phenomenon. Relatedly, he contends that the number of possible causes should determine one’s choice of the mode of explanation. Things that have a single cause and cannot be otherwise require a single explanation (Pyth. 86-87), whereas things that can have multiple causes and can be otherwise require multiple explanations (Hrtd. 78).34 What determines the appropriate mode of explanation, then, are causal features of the world, not arbitrary theoretical assumptions. The method must accommodate reality, not the other way around.35 31 

On this point, see Verde 2018: 525. Hrtd. 78-80 appears to touch on this matter, but it is notoriously obscure and difficult to interpret. 33  Whether Epicurus has a sufficiently sharp distinction between explanation and cause is under debate. On this point, see O’Keefe 2005: 105, Verde 2013: 129, and Masi 2014. As Francesca Masi points out, a cause is a fact in the world, whereas an explanation is an account that we, humans, give of a thing or an event by referring to its cause. 34  Hankinson 2013: 78 remarks that each of the multiple explanations of a phenomenon offers a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the occurrence of that phenomenon. 35  Seneca as well as, in all probability, Posidonius and Chrysippus hold a similar view. According to Seneca, there are physical reasons on account of which the meteôra consitute a special category of 32 

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We can now better understand why Epicurus considers the meteôra the prime object of pollachos tropos or dynatos tropos. Since, as he assumes, they have many causes, they must also receive multiple explanations. In every such case, the multiple explanations represent causal possibilities, each of them sufficient to account for the occurrence of the corresponding event. We can only speculate about the reasons why he takes for granted that the phenomena in question have multiple causes. He may be following Theophrastus, or he may share the Stoic assumption that the lower region of the atmosphere is especially unstable and prone to being affected by the same or different factors in various ways. In any case, he probably considers the hypothesis of a multiplicity of causes consistent, or indeed congenial, to certain aspects of the atomic theory and, in particular, the infinity of the basic constituents of the universe and the doctrine of infinite worlds. A further issue is whether Epicurus would subscribe to the so-called principle of plenitude36 or, as I prefer to call it, the actual multiplicity thesis, that is, the thesis that all possible causes are also actual causes in some world. On the one hand, Epicurus’ multiple account of the different phases of the moon precludes that all the explanations that he gives obtain in our world, which after all is finite; we may therefore infer that each of them is true of an event somewhere in the universe. On the other hand, the modalities related to the Actual Multiplicity Thesis are strikingly absent from Epicurus’ extant remains. He conspicuously does not refer to infinite worlds in connection to the pollachos tropos. Therefore, it seems to me that, as far as we know, his position is under-determined: he does not tell whether the multiple explanations accounting for a celestial event all hold true of that event, synchronously or asynchronously, in this world or in different worlds, now or in the infinity of time or both.37 In his polemic against the astronomers, Epicurus suggests that there is also another ontological reason why the pollachos tropos is especially suitable to explain phenomena in the heavens. Namely, he remarks that the risings and settings of the sun have indeterminate elements (aoristeiai) and these cannot be captured by a objects to be explained in a special way. In the first place, the meteôra are mainly atmospheric phenomena, and the lowest region of the atmosphere is variable and unstable; it is exposed to many factors and is affected by terrestrial causes in different ways (QN II 11.10). In the second place, the atmosphere is affected by celestial causes as well. The sun, the moon, and other heavenly bodies operate on the atmosphere and are responsible for different sorts of ‘disturbances’, such as changes in temperature, rainfalls, the alternation of seasons and other meteôra (II 1.1-2). Seneca suggests that, given the variety of causal factors, the pollachos tropos is the aptest method of explanation of meteoric phenomena. He avows: “I am afraid to either mention or omit a theory established by our Stoic friends … There are only a few theories without counterargument. The others are pleading in court, even though they eventually may win their case” (IV B 5.1). 36  On the so-called principle of plenitude see A. Lovejoy 1936: 99-182. It can be controverted whether Lucretius’ actual multiplicity thesis exactly corresponds to the principle of plenitude in Lovejoy. I am indebted to Paul Kalligas and Doukas Kapantais for discussion on that point. 37  I am grateful to Rupert Sparling for his input on this topic.

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single explanation, whereas they are adequately captured by multiple explanations (Nat. XI PHerc 1054 IIa 1-21 Sedley). His intuition seems to be that there is a certain indeterminacy inherent in the pollachos tropos which makes that method especially suitable to account for the indeterminacies in the meteôra. Epicurus does not tell us exactly what he means when he is talking about aoristeiai in the meteôra. Given his physical theory, he is probably referring to the indeterminacies of atoms and compounds, which allow for multiple possibilities in multiple worlds, or, alternatively, multiple causal possibilities in this world.38 This multiplicity leads us to a number of epistemic considerations that Epicurus advances in support of the pollachos tropos as the only suitable method for the study of the meteôra. Beginning with the aoristeiai, indeterminacies, inherent in these phenomena, our sources mainly focus on three features, all of which bear on the relation between the meteôra and the human viewpoint: 1) the meteôra are at a great distance from us and thus we do not have the capacity to perceive them fully; 2) what we perceive is not their natures and causes but mere appearances; and 3) these appearances can be misleading. These elements are interrelated and call for brief comment. 1. Epicurus does not explicitly assert that the nature of the meteôra is indeterminate because things in the heavens and under the earth are at a great distance from us. Even so, he strongly implies that distance makes it impossible for us to have perceptual access to anything other than mere appearances segregated from the factors that brought them about. Consider the following passage. When we reason about the causes of celestial phenomena and all that is imperceptible to the senses, we must carefully consider in how many ways a similar phenomenon is produced on earth. And we must despise those people who do not recognise either what exists and is generated in one way only or what may occur in several ways in the case of things which can be seen (only) as appearances coming from a great distance (ek tôn apostêmatôn: Hrtd. 80).

The idea that the appearances of the meteôra can be misleading and that therefore we need to entertain multiple explanations occurs also elsewhere in meteorological writings. Seneca, for instance, compares such appearances to mirrors that distort the object reflected on them. Namely, some mirrors reflect the image of the viewer deformed, others magnify the appearance of one’s physique beyond human proportions, others show only one side of the face, yet others twist and invert it (QN I 40).39 Epicurus probably defended the deceptiveness of meteoric appearances on the basis of the theory of simulacra. Namely, films of atoms travelling from afar tend to represent inaccurately the properties of the object from which they have been 38 

39 

I thank Francesca Masi for her comments on this point. Seneca uses this analogy in the context of his explanation of the rainbow.

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emitted. Presumably, this inaccuracy is very much the case regarding the images of the meteôra apparent to us. While our perceptions are true of these segregated images (cf. phas[matôn]: Nat. XI PHerc 1054 IVa 21-22 Sedley; phantasian: Hrtd. 80; phantasma: Hrtd. 88), they cannot be trusted to reveal the true nature of the event or its cause. Hence the desire to know the latter in the same way that we know, for instance, the facts of experience or the cardinal principles of atomism is an empty desire, for the simple reason that its object is impossible for humans to attain (adynata theôrein epithymôn: Pyth. 94). In this regard, too, Epicurus’ position seems under-determined: we cannot tell for certain whether single explanations of the meteôra are precluded because of the nature of things, or because of certain features of our perceptual and cognitive apparatus, or both.40 Assuming, then, that we accept the pollachos tropos, on what epistemic basis should we proceed? What criteria should we take as our guides? Epicurus’ general guideline is that we must determine the multiple causes of the meteôra as well as their permanent attributes in accordance with sensation and as the phenomena suggest (Pyth. 86).41 In other words, we should attend to the fundamental criterion of aisthêsis and rely on observation and evidence. Moreover, in order to circumvent the difficulties raised in points 2 and 3 – that is, that the perceptible by-products of the meteôra are mere appearances and these appearances can be misleading – we need to mobilise the conceptual and methodological apparatus of Epicurean epistemology and science. In particular, we need to rely on signs, follow the standard practice of drawing appropriate analogies between the meteôra and things “close to us”,42 apply the verificatory procedure of non-contestation, conduct a comparative and simultaneous survey of different explanations of a phenomenon, and attend to the epistemic feature of precision. Let us examine these features in turn, starting with signs: We can obtain signs (sêmeia) of what happens in the meteôra from some of the phenomena close to us (tôn par’hêmin), for we can observe how they occur, whereas we cannot observe how the phenomena in the meteôra occur; for there are several possible ways in which they may have happened. However, we should retain (in our mind) the image (phantasma) of each and, moreover, regarding what is associated with it, we must distinguish those things whose generation from many different causes is not contested (ouk antimartyreitai) by the phenomena close to us (Hrtd. 87-88).43 40  According to Morel 2011: 143 and n. 6, multiple explanations in Epicurus do not have to do with the weakness of our senses but with objective processes operating in nature. Even though I believe that Epicurus’ position is under-determined, I think that, on balance, the evidence lends support to Pierre-Marie Morel’s claim. 41  ὡς τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται. 42  Such analogies occur in Theophrastus, are likely to have been used by Chrysippus and Posidonius, and are especially striking in Seneca. Notably, the latter draws many analogies between the meteôra and processes in the human body (e.g., QN III 15.1-6) in order to suggest that the relevant phenomena have multiple causes. 43  This is the sequel to Pyth. 86-87 quoted above.

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A striking feature of this passage is that, according to Epicurus, the signs that serve as the basis of inferences about the meteôra should not come from the meteôra themselves, but from objects or events in our own vicinity. Since no details are given, we can only speculate as to how this procedure is supposed to work. That is, since we do not know anything about the nature of the meteôra, we need to establish the analogical relation between the meteôron and the corresponding nearby event on the basis of the similar content of the appearances accompanying, respectively, the meteôron and the nearby event. By observing the appearance of the event near us and by using it as a sign, we can infer its cause. Then, on the basis of the similarity between the appearance of the nearby event and the appearance of the meteôron, we can reason analogically: since the appearances are similar and since the appearance of the par’hymin signifies a particular type of cause, it is likely that the meteôron also has an analogous type of cause. Why, one might wonder, do we need to follow that tortuous path? Why may we not infer thunder from lightning? Or why may we not rely on weather signs in order to predict an eclipse? Such signs, however, are merely commemorative (Sextus, Pyr. II 100-101) and tell us nothing about causes. Epicurus’ point is, I think, that we cannot trust the appearances of the meteôron to signify that of which they are signs “by virtue of their own nature and constitution” (Pyr. II 101). To put it differently, the observable manifestations of a meteôron are unreliable as indicative signs of the hidden causes that have brought that meteôron about. Why so? Not only because they are very distant from us, but also because they are indeterminate, isolated episodes whose transient and fleeting character bears no necessary relation to their respective causes. While, as we shall see, the pollachos tropos must take these images, too, into account (Pyth. 88), they cannot do the work that inductive signs are expected to do in respect of generically non-evident things. Things “close to us” (par’ hymin), however, can play that role roughly in the way indicated above. Namely, they can give us a tracking device towards possible causes responsible for the generation of each of the meteôra. For they are not mere appearances of some unobservable nature far away from us, but earthly realities whose causes we can readily observe and whose generation we can readily explain by reference to those causes (Pyth. 87). The choice of such signs is effected on the grounds of relevant similarities with the corresponding celestial phenomena. Their epistemic function is peculiar, however. Unlike straightforward analogical arguments involving inductive signs, analogical inferences from the causes of things “close to us” to the causes of the meteôra do not aim to establish the correctness of a single explanation, but to bolster the diversity of several ones44 (more on this below). Is this kind of analogical reasoning respectable? In the context of ancient meteorology, very much so. As indicated, it constitutes standard practice for several 44 

See Sedley 1976: 41.

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authors, including Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the Stoics. As for Epicurus and his later followers, they consider analogy and inference by similarity (kath’homoiotêta tropos) fundamental and prior to other modes of reasoning, including deduction. Of course, not every analogy will do. Indeed, Epicurus’ criticisms of the astronomers show, precisely, that the analogues for the meteôra must be chosen carefully and without being prejudiced by theory. On the one hand, as mentioned, the things “close to us” are causal processes that are relevantly similar to the meteôra and that we can observe as they come to pass. On the other hand, the planetaria of the astronomers are artefacts constructed on the basis of arbitrary theoretical assumptions and cannot provide useful analogues for the study of the stars in the heavens. It is well known that the scientific methodology of the Epicureans employs four basic procedures of verification or falsification: attestation (epimartyrêsis), contestation (antimartyrêsis), non-attestation (ouk epimartyrêsis), and non-contestation (ouk antimartyrêsis). A scientific proposition is falsified if it is contested or unattested by experience, whereas it is verified if it is attested or non-contested by empirical data. The latter of these procedures, namely ouk antimartyrêsis or non-contestation, is a tried-and-tested method of verification widely applied by the Epicureans in order to draw inferences about non-evident things. Roughly speaking, it is based on the principle that scientific theories and explanations about things that do not fall within our immediate experience are acceptable or even true if there is no evidence against them.45 We can see why Epicurus considers it uniquely suited to the study of the meteôra, to the exclusion of every other method: since the meteôra are remote from our immediate experience and their causes are hidden, no direct verification or falsification is possible on empirical grounds. Nor are we entitled to reject a proposed explanation for the reason that it is not confirmed by experience, for this is not available to us. On the other hand, from the perspective of Epicurean empiricism, no explanatory hypothesis can be accepted if it is inconsistent with the phenomena. It follows that ouk antimartyrêsis, non-contestation, is the only legitimate procedure of evaluating competing explanations of celestial and meteorological phenomena.46 The application of the latter makes it very likely that we shall end up with multiple explanations. For while attestation confirms a hypothesis to the exclusion of all others, non-contestation considers valid every explanation so long as there is no counter-evidence against it. Epicurus’ explanation of the size of the sun (Pyth. 91) illustrates how non-contestation works.47 The sun appears to have the same size 45  It is debated whether non-contestation amounts merely to the absence of counter-evidence and consistency with the phenomena, or whether it is a matter of entailment. On this point, see the commentary by Long and Sedley 1987: vol. II, 95. 46  Non-contestation is not practised only in the context of the method of multiple explanations, but is an independent method of Epicurean science. 47  See Sedley 1976: 49-50.

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at any distance. Regarding its nature, it can be bigger or the same size or smaller than it appears. Its appearance, therefore, is only an approximate indication of its real size. We cannot measure the diameter of the sun and hence, in Epicurus’ own words, “we are limited to saying that its true size is more or less what it appears to be”. Corroboration comes from a phenomenon close to us: this is how terrestrial fires seen from a distance appear in our perception. As the sun’s apparent size does not much change with distance, so the appearance of terrestrial fires does not much change with distance. In neither case is there any counter-evidence against the inference that the object is approximately as big as it appears. A further feature of Epicurean epistemology and science is put to work in connection with the pollachos tropos: following the multiple explanations of eclipses, Epicurus says that “we should consider together (syntheôrein) the causes that are akin to one another and realise that it is not impossible that some should coincide at the same time” (Pyth. 96). Epicurus’ phrasing suggests that multiple causes of the same phenomenon can be consistent and operative at the same time. If so, then the phenomenon would have resulted from joint and simultaneous causation; but it need not be always (or frequently) the case. Correspondingly, multiple explanations of a phenomenon may be consistent and mutually supportive or, alternatively, they may not.48 There is no suggestion that, other things being equal, consistency of multiple explanations is a desideratum. Presumably, if the hypotheses concerning the multiple causes of a phenomenon are inconsistent with one another, we cannot “consider them together” (syntheôrein), for their comparative examination is fruitless or impossible. As indicated, inconsistent explanations can be true in this world at different times or places, or they can be true in different worlds either now or in the infinity of time. Epicurus’ surviving writings do not reveal his position regarding this point. A final epistemic feature is worth noting. According to Epicurus, investigations conducted through the pollachos tropos have an adequate degree of akribeia, precision. For this reason, even if we discover several causes for turnings and settings and risings and eclipses and the like … we must not suppose that our enquiry into these things has not reached sufficient accuracy and precision (akribeia) to contribute to our tranquillity and happiness (Hrtd. 80).

While the content of the above passage is ethical, the virtue of the explanations of the meteôra that helps us attain the moral end is epistemic: despite the indeter48  See also David Konstan’s chapter in this volume. He distinguishes between phenomena for which, according to Epicurus, there are alternative but mutually exclusive causes (e.g., the sun is either extinguished at sunset or it is not) and phenomena that “really have multiple causes”. For instance, Konstan remarks, thunder may be caused by several different atmospheric conditions, sometimes independently, other times in conjunction with one another.

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minacies associated with the possible causes of these phenomena and their corresponding accounts, the latter are sufficiently precise to contribute to our peace of mind. This effect, I maintain, does not mean that any sloppy account will do. Nor does it entail that the enquiry into the meteôra has only instrumental value. Epicurus’ point is, I think, that we should not have the wrong expectations from the study of the meteôra. They are not the kinds of things that could be explained in only one way and with perfect accuracy. This truth is crucial for ethics, and it is also important for science. In fact, one might suggest that a correct preliminary understanding of the scientific limitations of meteorology is a step or aspect of the process towards the moral end. Significantly, Epicurus compares the level of accuracy concerning the celestial phenomena with the accuracy of one’s knowledge of the “most important things” (Hrtd. 78). We must believe that to discover the cause of the most important things49 is the function of the science of nature, and that blessedness for us in the knowledge of the celestial phenomena lies in this, and in understanding what are the natures that become apparent when we contemplate these phenomena, and in attaining every other knowledge akin to the precise knowledge (akribeia) that contributes to happiness (Hrtd. 78).

In the case of the meteôra the cognitive achievement is gained through the pollachos tropos, whereas “the precise knowledge that contributes to happiness” presumably consists in the cardinal principles of Epicureanism defended by means of the monachos tropos. In both cases, however, the suggestion seems to be that, notwithstanding the different epistemic constraints set by their respective subject-matter, the precision that can be attained satisfies the demands of reason (more on this below). Taking stock, I shall attempt to trace the steps by which the pollachos tropos is supposed to work. On my interpretation, we are to proceed as follows: 1. We observe the appearance of a given meteôron and retain it in memory.50 For even though this appearance is only an image and cannot reveal the nature or cause of the meteôron, Epicurus suggests, I think, that it can have a corrective function. For instance, obvious irregularities in the heavens can undermine one’s misplaced confidence in the results of the planetaria. 2. Then we look for causal processes in our immediate experience which are relevantly analogous to a given (type of) meteôron and which will be used as signs in order to infer possible causes of the meteôron. Interestingly, this method would seem to imply that we can grasp something of the nature

49  50 

τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν.

See Bénatouïl 2003: 32.

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of the meteôron after all, namely that it can have multiple causes and that none of them derives from supernatural powers.51 3. The analogies with things close to us will help us circumscribe the terrain in which a number of causal stories can obtain. Our next step is to test these stories in light of counter-evidence and retain only those that are consistent with the phenomena: primarily the phenomena that we observe near us but also, I submit, the images of the meteôron that we have retained in mind. 4. We compare side-by-side the explanations that have passed the test in order to discover if they are mutually consistent or incompatible and, presumably, we entertain the implications in each of these cases.52 5. The set of explanations must remain open-ended within the relevant epistemic parameters. While in abstracto there are infinite possibilities in the infinite universe, there are not infinite causal possibilities for any given celestial or atmospheric event. There are, however, more than one such possibilities, even though we cannot decisively tell how many. Epicurus underscores this fact: in several cases, after enumerating multiple explanations of a celestial phenomenon, he adds that it can occur also in many other ways (Pyth. 99, 102, 104, 106, 108, 112).53 In sum, I hope to have shown that Epicurus’ conception of the pollachos tropos is rich, nuanced, fairly coherent, and strongly motivated by methodological and scientific considerations and not only ethical ones. Its core remains the same throughout the history of the school. However, Epicurus’ later followers also introduce new elements that exercise some strain on the canonical version of the method. The next section of the paper will be devoted to this topic.

51 

My thanks to Rupert Sparling for raising this issue. De Sanctis 2012 argues that the incompatibility of multiple explanations can be explained by reference to the ethical aim of the method, while Bakker 2016: 163 is inclined to attribute it to the fragmented nature of events in the cosmos. Verde 2018a suggests that incompatibilities such as, e.g., the incompatibility of different causes intended to account for the risings and settings of the sun can plausibly be explained as a “third path” (see Pyth. 92 jointly with Pyth. 94-5). If I understand him correctly, his idea is that of two incompatible explanations, one is necessary (hypothetical necessity), the other not. See Verde 2018a: 526: if the cause of the rise of the sun is due to a cause F, then, inevitably, the moon must shine because of its own light; but if the rise of the sun has some other cause, then it is possible that the moon shines owing to the light of the sun and not its own. On the other hand, as mentioned, Epicurus’ claim that the causal explanations of a meteôron can be examined in relation to each other (Pyth. 85) suggests or implies that these explanations can be compatible with each other. 53  Obviously there are restrictions on what might count as additional items to the list of possible explanations. The Epicureans would not accept Zeus as a possible cause of the thunderbolt nor Poseidon as a possible cause of earthquakes. The last section of the paper is relevant to this point. 52 

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IV Zeno of Sidon,54 the brilliant and influential scholarch of the Garden in the late second century BCE, is the author of the only attested criticism that, arguably, could affect the pollachos tropos. In the context of an argument against Dionysius of Cyrene, a Stoic mathematician and pupil of Diogenes of Babylon,55 he objects to the fact that the latter defends the view that the sun is much larger than it appears on the basis of analogical comparisons with things in our vicinity (cf. Philodemus De sign. X 1-XI 8). Since such analogies are crucial to the application of the pollachos tropos, Zeno’s objection to Dionysius might be taken to target the method of multiple explanations as well. The relevant passage from Philodemus’ On Signs runs as follows: Let it be granted that things in our experience which are slow to reappear either move slowly or occupy large areas. What necessity is there that the sun also, when it reappears slowly, does so for these reasons? Its emanations may be the result of another cause that is peculiar to it and different from things in our experience. Is it not true that all bodies in our experience that have colours bright to the eye have the distinctive property of being able to change to a greater or lesser brilliance, but the sun does not have this distinctive property? Is it not the case also that objects which reappear slowly in our experience will be able to do so by virtue of the two causes, but the sun will be able to have this character not through those causes but through another cause different from those in our experience? (De sign. X 26-XI 8).56

Zeno’s point is that the thesis that the sun must be very much larger than it seems cannot be established on the basis of analogies with things “close to us”. For the causes accounting for the size of the sun may be different from the causes accounting for the size of things in our experience. While his argument is dialectical and does not question analogies between the meteôra and things “close to us” in any general way, nonetheless it might be interpreted as undermining the pollachos tropos in so far as it expresses a degree of scepticism about a central aspect of this latter. However, there is no textual evidence that Zeno occupied himself with the explanation of celestial phenomena or that his pupil Philodemus did. Perhaps, in addition to scoring a dialectical point against Dionysius, Zeno also intended to recommend epistemic caution to fellow-Epicureans who used the pollachos tropos, even if Zeno did not do so himself. Unlike Zeno, Lucretius devotes considerable space to the meteôra in Books V and VI of DRN. On the one hand, he follows closely Epicurus’ exposition in On Nature XI-XIII and reflects the Founder’s preoccupation to attack literalist and 54 

See Hankinson 2013: 86. De Lacy and De Lacy 1978: 98 n. 28. 56  Translation by De Lacy and De Lacy 1978, slightly modified. 55 

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creationist interpretations of Plato’s Timaeus—notably, the thesis that the world is animated, created by a benevolent Demiurge and, therefore, good. Thus, Lucretius interjects the astronomical section of DRN V (509-770) between the formation of the cosmos and the development of human civilization.57 He patterns the section on atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena in DRN VI on Epicurus’ On Nature XIII (which, as mentioned, probably consisted in a topic-by-topic engagement with Theophrastus’ collection and survey of physical doctrines58 preserved by Aëtius59). He examines the meteôra roughly in the sequence followed by Epicurus and, before him, by Theophrastus. And, it seems, he uses the lists of multiple explanations cited in Epicurus’ treatise.60 On the other hand, Lucretius’ principal target is different from Epicurus’ own. His aim is not so much to refute the theories of the astronomers as to combat popular theology and superstition (e.g. Lucret. V 1204-40, VI 50-91). Even though he occasionally concerns himself with astronomical theories (Lucret. V 82-9, VI 58-65), this is more a tribute to Epicurus, and perhaps also to contemporary scientific developments, than a genuine interest of his own. I shall now explain how furious storms of winds arise and how they are calmed so that all is once more what it was, changed and with its fury appeased, and all else that men see happening in earth and sky, when they are often held in suspense with frightened mind – events that abase their spirits through the fear of the gods, keeping them crushed to the earth because their ignorance of causes compels them to attribute events to the power of the gods and yield to them the place of kings … As for those who have been taught correctly that the gods have a carefree life but still wonder all the while how things can go on, especially the phenomena perceived up above in the ethereal regions, they revert again to the old superstitions and take to themselves cruel masters whom these miserable men believe to be omnipotent … (Lucret. VI 48-64).

As in Epicurus, so in Lucretius the multiple accounts of the meteôra are inscribed in an overarching ethical framework. Yet also, I contend, as in the former case, so in the latter the ultimate ethical purpose of the enterprise does not compromise the scientific credentials of the pollachos tropos or its adequacy for the task at hand. I shall not dwell on the explanations of specific phenomena, but rather confine my remarks, first, to the rationale underlying Lucretius’ use of the method of multiple explanations61 and, second, to the novel elements of his approach and the tensions that they may cause to the canonical doctrine.

57  As Sedley 1998: 152 notes, this closely parallels the place that the motions in the heavens and earth occupy in the Timaeus, i.e. after the origin of the world and before the origin of mankind. 58  See again Sedley 1998: chapters 5 and 6. 59  See previous note as well as nn. 18 and 19. 60  While many of the explanations proposed by Epicurus were initially advanced by other thinkers, it is likely that Epicurus also added explanations of his own. On this point see Bakker 2016: 58-62. 61  See the analysis by Hankinson 2013: 90.

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At the outset, it is worth noting that Lucretius offers multiple explanations not only as accounts of a given phenomenon but also as illustrations of the pollachos tropos. For instance, after he gives multiple explanations of clouds (VI 451-494) and rain (VI 495-523) and after a brief account of the rainbow (VI 524-526), he suggests to his Epicurean readers62 to figure out for themselves the explanations of snow, winds, hail, frosts, ice, and generally every phenomenon produced in the region above. Multiple explanations, then, are advanced both as causal possibilities for the occurrence of an atmospheric or meteorological phenomenon and as exemplifications of a method that people familiar with the fundamentals of Epicurean atomism are able to use to good effect. Consider a programmatic passage from DRN V: Which of these causes holds in our world it is difficult to say for certain. But what may be done and is done through the whole universe in the various worlds made in various ways, that is what I teach, proceeding to set forth several causes which may account for the movements of the stars throughout the whole universe; one of which, however, must be that which gives force to the movement of the signs in our world also. For which may be the true one is not his to lay down who proceeds step by step (Lucret. V 526-533).

While, on my reading, Epicurus leaves under-determined the question whether one of the multiple causes of a meteôron is true or all of them are true and also does not overtly connect multiple explanations with different worlds, Lucretius states explicitly his position on both counts. Namely, he claims that, although there are many possible causes of every meteôron, it is necessary (necessest: 531) that only one of them be the operative cause of such an event in this world. The other causes listed for that event cannot be true of it, although, according to the actual multiplicity thesis, they are true of corresponding events in other worlds. What is possible, then, is also actual somewhere in the infinite universe and the worlds in it. As for our own world, multiple explanations are causal possibilities that remain alive in so far as they are uncontested by facts. Another striking element of Lucretius’ approach is his reference to the progrediens, the Epicurean disciple who is making gradual progress. The progressor simply cannot know the true cause of a celestial phenomenon in our world: neither his perceptual ability nor his epistemic condition entitle him to claim that one of the possible explanations is true to the exception of all others. Generally, throughout his treatment of the meteôra, Lucretius does not tire to emphasise that it is extremely difficult to judge which explanation holds true of our world. For this reason it has sometimes been thought that Lucretius presents the pollachos tropos merely as an alternative to scepticism.63 However, his explanations of, for instance, the size of 62 

63 

I.e., “readers who have fully understood what qualities belong to their elements” (Lucret. VI 534). See again Vuillemin 1984.

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heavenly bodies, the light emitted from the sun, the risings and settings of the stars, the varying length of day and night, the source of the moon’s light, and the eclipses (V 564-771), clearly, are not advanced in that spirit, but represent possibilities actualised in different worlds. Specialists in the history of ancient science are in a position to assess whether or to what extent these multiple accounts of the meteôra reflect scientific views advanced in Lucretius’ time or earlier. An intriguing and controversial analogy is intended to convey Lucretius’ rationale regarding the method of multiple explanations. There are a number of things for which it is not enough to name one cause but many, one of which is however the true cause – just as, should you yourself see a man’s body lying lifeless at a distance, you may perhaps think proper to name all the causes of death in order that the one true cause of the man’s death may be named. For you would not be able to establish that he had died by the sword, from cold, from disease, or by poison; but we do know that what happened to him was something of that sort. And likewise in many other matters we are in a position to say the same (Lucret. VI 703-11).

According to this passage, as we cannot know the true cause of a man’s death when we see his lifeless body lying at a distance from us, so we cannot know the true cause of a celestial phenomenon when we see the appearance of it in the sky. In neither case are we able to identify the precise factor(s) responsible for the event, mainly because we are at a distance from it but perhaps for other reasons as well. The best thing to do, Lucretius suggests, is to enumerate several causes that can reasonably account for what has happened. Philosophically, the aforementioned analogy leaves open, I think, a range of options: of the causal possibilities listed for a given event, one of them will be true in this world; more than one can be true in this world (in which case the event is overdetermined); or all of them are true of some such event somewhere. Is Lucretius’ approach heretic? On the face of it, it seems unlikely that Epicurus would accept the claim that there must be only one true cause of an event in a given world (V 531: una causa necessest) or the idea that, if per impossibile we could observe the meteôra closely, we would discover what brought them to pass.64 Nonetheless, in the first place, we saw that the Founder’s position is ambiguous in these regards and, in the second place, there is evidence that it evolved over time at least in respect of the doctrine of infinite worlds. For, according to Diogenes, Epicurus restructured and clarified that doctrine as a result of debates within his own school (fr. 63 II 10-V 1; frs. 64-67 Smith). And together with these revisions, Epicurus may also have modified his view regarding multiple explanations. In any case, Lucretius could argue that his version of the pollachos tropos falls within the canon. He could 64  On the issue of Lucretius’ deviations from the canonical doctrine, see Verde 2018a: 531 and elsewhere.

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contend that, since Epicurus posits infinite worlds, he is also committed to the actual multiplicity thesis; if so, he would naturally find attractive the idea that, of all possible explanations of a celestial phenomenon, precisely one holds true of a given world. Even if this sort of argument appears somewhat self-serving, it is not unusual. And it removes some of the grounds on which Lucretius could be accused of being unorthodox. Even so a critic might insist that, while Epicurus considers the pollachos tropos the best or indeed the only method suited to the nature of the meteôra, Lucretius recommends it faute de mieux. Turning to Diogenes of Oinoanda we find that, although he draws his material on the meteôra from Epicurus and although his approach occasionally resembles that of Lucretius, nonetheless he has different targets and is motivated by partly different philosophical concerns. First, Diogenes concentrates his attention on philosophers belonging to the Socratic tradition. Near the beginning of the inscription, he mentions that one of the main reasons why he had it engraved was to free people from the fear of death and of the gods, and to restore in them tranquillity and joy by teaching them the truths of physics (fr. 2 III 1-14 Smith). He also says that he intends to refute those who consider natural science useless, notably Socrates and his entourage.65 They claim that pursuing natural science and busying oneself with investigation of the meteôra is superfluous and unprofitable, and they do [not even] deign to [concern themselves with such matters] (fr. 4 II 1-9 Smith). 66

However, Diogenes’ primary targets are not the Socratics but the Stoics. We are fortunate to have some of its details in the recently discovered NF 182, brilliantly edited and translated by Martin Ferguson Smith and Jurgen Hammerstaedt and discussed in detail by Giuliana Leone. (Fr. 20 II 11) If therefore the divine nature shall be deemed to have created things for its own sake, (fr. 20 III + NF 182 I)67 (there result) all these absurdities; and if for the sake of humans, there are yet other more absurd consequences. Let us divide the discussion into two (the world and humans themselves), and first let us speak about the world (and ask) whether it has all things well arranged for humans and (whether) we have nothing on which to fault them, as they have been prepared by a god. But first let mention be made of the (NF 182 II) occurrences in the meteôra. Let anyone say in what ways a thunderbolt benefits life (how does it not even harm?), in what way flashes of lightning do and in what way clasps of thunder, in what way fall of hail, in what way blasts and gusts of violent winds, in what way the irregular 65  The expression οἱ περὶ Σωκράτην probably refers to Socrates as well as his immediate associates and their schools. On this point, see Smith 1993: 440, and Leone 2017: 95. 66  I use the translation of Smith 1993, with occasional slight modifications. 67  As Hammerstaedt and Smith 2010 point out, NF 182 fills part of the gap between fragment 20 and fragment 21.

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orbits of the stars and their differing sizes, in what way eclipses of the sun and the moon their spiral-shaped and oblique courses, in what way night, (NF 182 III) when we can [as well rest throughout the] day, in what way the alternating [lengths] of days [and] nights? For of these phenomena some are useless, others even harmful. The meteôra do have that character. [But of what kind are matters on earth?] How much of Libya is uninhabitable? How much of the land beyond the Skythians, [how much] of the [region] beyond Asia, how much of India? How many other …? (tr. Hammerstaedt–Smith).

Here, Diogenes pursues his attack against the Stoic thesis that the world is divinely created, purposeful, and the best possible. In fact, he argues, both the natural world and human beings have so many features that are bad or purposeless that the world cannot have been created by the gods either for their own sake or for the benefit of humans. The meteôra68 enter the discussion at just that point as prime illustrations of the contention that nature is neither teleologically oriented nor always good to us. The list of these phenomena overlaps with the ones in Epicurus and Lucretius and, judging from Diogenes’ enumeration on the causes of hail (fr. 14.1-10 Smith) and his mention of risings and settings in connection to the pollachos tropos, we may plausibly attribute to him the view that all the meteôra mentioned in fr. 13 constitute objects of that method. Generally, Diogenes follows Epicurus in placing the study of the meteôra squarely within the domain of natural science and in highlighting its ethical dimension.69 In addition, however, his analysis of celestial phenomena has distinctive features. Some of them also occur in Epicurus’s extant remains but are more fully spelled out in Diogenes, while one idea that he introduces in connection to the pollachos tropos is (so far as we know) original and in tension with the canonical doctrine. The emphasis on differences and irregularities in the motions of the heavenly bodies illustrates the category of features also suggested by the canonical writings, whereas the claim that one explanation of a given phenomenon is more plausible than the others appears like an innovation or even a breach with Epicurus. Consider fr. 13 of the inscription, which contains, first, the elaboration of Epicurus’ assumption that the causes and motions of the meteôra are not entirely regular and uniform and, next, the articulation of a criterion for choosing one explanation over others. This passage is the excerpt concerning the movements of the stars: [The heavenly bodies, when the whirls of air] cause [such strong motions], are all [violently] tossed about, but some crash into one another while others do not; some pursue a straight course up to a certain point, others, for instance the sun and the 68  Diogenes does not use meteôra in this context, but elsewhere appears entirely familiar with its use. 69  On this point, see Smith 1993: 508, as well as the very informative study on Diogenes and the polemic regarding the meteôra by Leone 2017.

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moon, an oblique one, and others, like the Bear, revolve in the same place; again, some move in a high orbit, but others in a low one. Also, here is a fact that most people are ignorant about: they suppose the sun to be as low as it appears to be, whereas it is not as low; for if it were so, the earth and everything on it would necessarily be set ablaze. So, it is its image (apophasin) which we see low, not the sun itself. But this is a digression (fr. 13 I 1-II 12 Smith).

Here Diogenes’ purpose is, I think, to undermine the idea that there is perfect regularity in the motions of the stars in the heavens. I shall say more about this in the next section, but here suffice it to note that the Eudoxean astronomers make a similar assumption, and that the latter is also present in philosophical creationism of all sorts. In sharp contrast, the picture that Diogenes sketches out consists of non-uniform, fragmented events in the celestial sphere: tossings and turnings, violent encounters, irregular trajectories, orbits that are high or low. The whole thing appears quite chaotic and, to the religiously minded, irreverent. As they believe, god is a principle of order, regularity, harmony, and perfection; and nowhere are these features more uniformly present than in the heavenly realm. In the second part of our text, we encounter the by now familiar Epicurean distinction between the nature of the meteôron itself, which is unobservable, and its appearance, which can be observed but also can mislead us about its cause. Diogenes refutes the belief that the sun is as low as it appears to be by adducing counter-evidence: if the sun were as low as we take it to be, everything would be on fire; but this is not the case and, therefore, the sun is not as low as it appears. Recall that this method of verification is used to test multiple explanations and reject those of them that disagree with the facts. In the sequel of the passage, however, Diogenes makes a programmatic statement that has no exact equivalent in other surviving Epicurean writings. Let us now discuss risings and settings and related matters after making this preliminary point: if one is investigating things that are not directly perceptible, and if one sees that several explanations are possible, it is reckless to make a dogmatic pronouncement concerning any single one; such a procedure is characteristic of a seer rather than a wise man. It is correct, however, to say that, while all explanations are possible, this one is more convincing (pithanôteron) than that (fr. 13 II 12-III 13 Smith).

Assuming that fragments 13 and 14 are parts of a longer section on the subject of the meteôra,70 Diogenes appears to introduce the pollachos tropos at the outset, as an essential preliminary feature of his analysis. He takes for granted Epicurus’ 70  I follow the order defended by Smith. An alternative is entertained by Leone 2017: 96-97. As it seems, Diogenes discussed, first, certain astronomical phenomena and, subsequently, meteorological phenomena. The sequel seems to be roughly the same as in Epicurus’ Letter to Pythocles and in Lucretius’ poem.

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distinction between things that are directly perceptible and others that are not, as well as between non-evident things that have a single explanation and others that admit of several possible accounts. Yet while, according to Epicurus, all possible accounts must equally be accepted as true in the absence of counter-evidence, Diogenes allows for a comparative criterion of selection of one explanation over others. Namely, he considers unobjectionable the practice of running a comparative survey of all possible explanations, assessing their respective plausibility, and favouring the one that seems more convincing. Although Diogenes does not phrase the latter view in a strongly normative manner, he seems to endorse it on his own account. For example, in the case of the formation of hail, he entertains a hypothesis that he deems worthy of acceptance on the grounds that it is “not unreasonable” or “not implausible”. We can accept, he says, not unreasonably,71 that hail is produced by a fine, loose conglomeration, which is due to the [self-moving energy] of what surrounds it and [is formed] either by a wind [that is cold] but high in the air or by filmy snow (fr. 14.2-10 Smith).

Admittedly, there is no close precedent for this view in Epicurus. Regardless of Diogenes’ own motivation,72 the view in question may appear to constitute not merely a development but a deviation from the canonical doctrine. Nonetheless, a case can be made, I think, that Epicurus does not preclude opting for the explanation that seems more pithanê, convincing or plausible, than other possible explanations of the same phenomenon. In fact, he seems to have some such thought in mind when he says that multiple explanations in accordance with the phenomena do not disturb us, provided that we accept, as we ought, to pithanologoumenon, that is, a plausible or probable account of the phenomena (Pyth. 87). And other passages, too, point in that direction.73 Moreover, he frequently appeals to what seems reasonable or plausible in order to draw inferences about non-evident things.74 The crucial thing, however, is that we endorse the core assumption of the pollachos tropos, namely, that the celestial and the atmospheric phenomena have multiple causes and are accountable in multiple ways. If we accept this principle and the world-view associated with it, our psychological preference for one explanation over others will not make any difference to our tranquillity (cf. Hrtd. 79-80).75 Viewed in this light, 71 

72 

οὐκ ἀ-/[πει]κότως (fr. 14.2-3 Smith).

According to Bakker 2016: 74, this is due to the fact that Diogenes is trying to reconcile orthodox doctrine with the astronomical advances of his time. See also Bakker 2016: 36-42. 73  Leone 2017 finds a precedent in nuce of Diogenes’ view in Pyth. 87, Hrdt. 80, and Nat. XIV col. XXXV 13-15 and XI [24] [44] Arrighetti. 74  See the incisive remarks by Leone 2017: 104. 75  The meaning of the closing sentence of Hrdt. 80 is obscure. According to Verde 2013: 130, it is this: we can opt for one explanation, provided that we know that there are many possible explanations of a phenomenon; and it is important to make sure that the one explanation that we opt for be compatible

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Diogenes’ addition to the canonical doctrine causes no tension at all. We should now move on to the final section of the paper. It concerns the ethics of the pollachos tropos and revisits the issue of its epistemic value.

V Even though, as I hope to have shown, the pollachos tropos is treated by the Epicureans as a valuable tool of scientific research, it serves also and primarily an overarching ethical purpose: to contribute to our tranquillity and happiness. But why is it so important to acquire a correct understanding of the meteôra in order to attain peace of mind? And why are multiple explanations especially conducive to that goal? Consider again the sorts of phenomena that the Epicureans call meteôra and their impact on human life. Whether they happen regularly and periodically, like the risings and settings of the sun and the moon,76 or randomly and unpredictably, like thunderbolts and earthquakes and falling stars, several of them are spectacular grand-scale events that could arouse strong emotions: delight, marvel, astonishment, perplexity, awe, fear. Some of them are sources of grave danger, capable of destroying crops, cattle, buildings, individuals, and even entire cities. And many of these phenomena are associated with the myths forming the foundation of institutional religion and filling the heart of humans with terror of the gods. Several passages in Lucretius capture these ideas. Examples include the following excerpts from DRN V: For when we look upwards to the celestial regions of the great firmament, to the ether studded with glittering stars, when we think of the ways of sun and moon, into our hearts already crushed with other woes a new anxious care awakening begins to lift up its head, whether by any chance we have to do with some immeasurable power of the gods, able to make the bright stars revolve with their different movements (V 1204-1210) Besides, whose mind does not shrink up with fear of the gods, whose limbs do not crawl with terror, when the scorched earth quakes with the shivering shock of a thunderbolt and rumblings run through the mighty sky? Do not nations and peoples with the many other causes that could generate the phenomenon in question. I am inclined to agree with this reading. 76  See, e.g., Lucret. V 76-90: “I shall explain by what force pilot nature steers the courses of the sun and the goings of the moon; lest by any chance we think that these between heaven and earth traverse their yearly courses free, of their own will, and obliging for the increase of crops and of animals, or deem them to revolve by some plan of the gods. For if those who have been rightly taught that the gods lead a life without care, yet wonder all the while how things can go on, especially those transactions which are perceived overhead in the regions of ether, they revert back again to the old superstitions and take to themselves cruel taskmasters, whom the poor wretches believe to be almighty, not knowing what can be and what cannot, in a word how each thing has limited power and a deep-set boundary mark.”

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tremble, do not proud kings huddle up their limbs smitten with fear of the gods, lest for some base deed or proud word the solemn time of punishment be now brought near at hand? (V 1218-1225) Then, when the whole earth trembles beneath our feet, when cities are shaken and fall or theaten to fall, what wonder if the sons of men feel contempt for themselves, and acknowledge the great potency and wondrous might of gods in the world to govern all things? (V 1236-1240).

These verses and many others, including notably the proems of the fifth and the sixth book of the poem, jointly convey a strong theological message: failure to understand the meteôra leads to a total misconception of divinity.77 And people who misconceive the nature of the gods are incapable of approaching their shrines with peaceful heart and receive divine images. Hence they lack moral exemplars and are bound to live bad lives. Epicurus’ remarks in the Principal Doctrines (X-XIII) point in the same direction. He claims that suspicion (hypopsia) and fear (phobos) about the meteôra, as well as the fear of death, are among the chief factors that make us vulnerable to superstition (KD XII), shatter our sense of safety, and disturb our peace of mind. Consider, for instance, KD XIII: There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-men so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.

As I have argued, however, Epicurus’ polemic is chiefly directed at a dominant scientific approach to the meteôra, which was practised by the mathematicians of Cyzicus and which could be traced back to Plato’s Academy. I wish now to underscore what was at stake in that debate. In the historical and dialectical framework in which this latter takes place, Epicurus views the astronomers’ assumption that every celestial phenomenon has a single cause as tightly connected to the belief that the world was created by god for the sake of man, and that its divine origin is especially manifest in the perfect regularity of the motions of the stars in the heavens.78 It is terribly important to realise that, in rejecting the methods of the astronomers in favour of the pollachos tropos, Epicurus also rejects the theological doctrines that underlie it. Indeed, he appears 77 

See Sedley 1998: 154. However, one could rely on the monachos tropos for the explanation of the meteôra without necessarily endorsing a creationist theology. Conversely, one could use the pollachos tropos to explain the meteôra and, nonetheless, subscribe to creationism. This is the case of several Stoics. For instance, Chrysippus accounts for snow in more than one way (Arius Didymus fr. 35 Diels = SVF II 701), Posidonius borrows from the meteorology of Theophrastus, and the pollachos tropos is omnipresent in Seneca’s Natural Questions – a work that heavily relies on Posidonius and is informed by Aristotle’s as well as Theophrastus’ treatment of the meteôra. 78 

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to assume that creationism, providentialism, and the method of single explanation stand or fall together. And the same holds, conversely, for the atomic composition of the universe, the mechanistic nature of all its workings, and the method of multiple explanations. In the end, the controversy is not merely about method but about two competing world-views. Moreover, these are not only about physics and astronomy, but about one’s way of thinking and of living one’s life. This, I believe, is the real point of Epicurus’ preliminary remarks in the Letter to Pythocles (85-88), which have commonly been taken to imply that the knowledge of the meteôra is solely instrumental and the pollachos tropos a mere shortcut to tranquillity. The Letter to Herodotus (81) points, precisely, to the major flaw marking the approach of the Eudoxean astronomers of Cyzicus. We must grasp this truth, that the principal disturbance in the mind of men arises because they believe that these celestial bodies are blessed and immortal, and yet have wills and actions and motives inconsistent with these attributes; and because they are always expecting or imagining some everlasting misery, such as is depicted in legends, or even fear the loss of feeling in death as though it would concern them themselves (Hrdt. 81).

On Epicurus’ view, the traditional approach to astronomy is scientifically ineffective as well as psychologically frustrating. And its theoretical advocates may be even more vulnerable to disturbance and fear than mere laymen (Hrdt. 79). Why so? In the Letter to Pythocles, Epicurus addresses that question, highlighting the connection between the epistemic shortcomings of Eudoxean astronomy and the unhappiness that they necessarily cause. To wit, the astronomers under criticism are driven by an empty desire, the desire for something impossible: to know in a certain way – that is, through the discovery of a single explanation – things that are impossible to know in that way (Pyth. 94) because, by their very nature, they cannot admit of a single explanation. Thus they get into a situation that is adianoêton, inconceivable or irrational: they are unable to consider together and assess (syntheôrein) the relevant phenomena (Pyth. 94-95), refuse to entertain evident possible truths,79 and find themselves in conflict with enargêmata, evident facts. Often they favour the monachos tropos just in order to show off. And, typically, they become epistemically arrogant, fanatic, or even insane (Pyth. 113). In sharp contrast, the application of the pollachos tropos in the study of the meteôra is supposed to avoid or remove these scientific and ethical disadvantages (Hrtd. 79-80). It exhibits epistemic modesty, combats fanaticism, and cultivates an open mind. Epicurus makes sufficiently clear, I submit, that the pollachos tropos could not have such benefits if it did not have the aforementioned epistemic virtues. He seems to believe that these are necessary for the proper exercise of the art 79 

See Hankinson 2013: 85.

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of astronomy and for the good ethical consequences that the latter can bring. A stronger claim is defensible as well, namely, that the pollachos tropos is an important constituent of the Epicurean Gestalt: the frame of mind and the way of thinking tantamount to happiness. To conclude: I have argued that the pollachos tropos does not represent an epistemic compromise that the Epicureans made for the sake of ethics. The Epicureans defend it on independent grounds, both ontological and epistemic, and highlight its scientific appropriateness as well as its ethical contribution. They propose a new astronomy and meteorology, firmly situated in the framework of Epicurean philosophy, conducted through the method of multiple explanations and aiming to satisfy the demands of rationality.80 This method, in their view, is the true science of the meteôra – a science that is empiricist, pragmatic, intellectually honest, emotionally comfortable, and ethically beneficial. Historically, Epicurus’ conception of the pollachos tropos pursues and develops a mainstream approach to the meteôra probably initiated by Democritus and operative for approximately a millennium. However, the Epicurean version of that approach is of unique historical value because it is original, coherent, detailed, and defended on theoretical grounds. Philosophically, the Epicurean pollachos tropos relies on an intuition that persists under different guises in the philosophy of science to this day. Namely, scientific theories are to be accepted or rejected depending on their empirical adequacy. In principle, there can be multiple empirically adequate theories which may be inconsistent in their unobservable posits but equivalent in their empirical effectiveness, for instance, their predictions or their explanatory power. And each of them is left standing, unless or until decisive counter-evidence is brought against it. This intuition is, I believe, powerful and has significant philosophical vitality and potential. It is worth attending to, both within the Epicurean system and independently, in its own right.81 80  See Hankinson 2013: 94, who argues that multiple explanations are intended to satisfy the claims of reason and also serve as bulwarks against human frailty. 81  I presented the earliest version of this study at the first conference of the project SPIDER on Epicurean science and meteorology, which was held virtually at La Sapienza University in Rome (October 2020). I would like to express my warm thanks to the organizers of the conference (Francesca Masi, P.-M. Morel, and Francesco Verde) as well as the audience for their critical remarks. Since the three organizers of the conference are also the editors of the present volume, it is apposite to express here my gratitude to them for their editorial work and to the anonymous readers for their input. To return to the gradual development of the paper, after the SPIDER conference I presented an improved version at the Institute of Classical Studies in London (November 2020), and I wish to thank Raphael Woolf, who organized this virtual event, as well as all the participants for their input. After revising the paper once more, I presented it at the British School of Athens (April 2021). I am grateful to John Bennett (director of the BSA at that time), Alexander Nehamas, and Maria Protopapas for that invitation. I gained much from their comments and from the reactions of the audience. Many thanks to Robert McIntyre for our correspondence on that stage of the process, to Michael Augustin, Caterina Pellò, and Sara Diaco for extensive discussion on the topic of multiple explanations, and to Gabor Betegh, Paul Kalligas, Vasso Kindi, André Laks, Alex Long, and David Sedley for reading and commenting on aspects of earlier drafts. I read the penultimate version of the paper at a conference on Knowledge

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References Asmis, E., 1984, Epicurus’ Scientific Method, Ithaca–London: Cornell University Press. Bakker, F., 2016, Epicurean Meteorology: Sources, Method, Scope and Organization, Leiden–Boston: Brill. Bénatouïl, T., 2003, “La méthode épicurienne des explications multiples”, in T. Bénatouïl–V. Laurand–A. Macé (eds.), L’épicurisme antique, Les Cahiers Philosophiques de Strasbourg 15: 15–47. Bollack, J.,–Laks, A., 1978, Épicure à Pythoclès. Sur la cosmologie et les phénomènes météorologiques, Cahiers de philologie de l’université Lille III, vol. III, Lille: Publications de l’Université de Lille III. Bolton, R., 2009, “Two Standards for Inquiry in Aristotle’s De Caelo”, in A. C. Bowen–Ch. Wildberg (eds.), New Perspectives on Aristotle’s De caelo, Philosophia Antiqua 117, Leiden–Boston: Brill, 51–82. Carnap, R., 1950, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4: 20–40. Corsi, F. G., 2017, “Il metodo delle molteplici spiegazioni in Diogene di Enoanda”, Syzetesis 4: 253–284. Daiber, H., 1992, “The Meteorology of Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic Translation”, in W. Fortenbaugh–D. Gutas (eds.), Theophrastus. His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings, New Brunswick–London, 166–293. De Lacy, Ph.,–De Lacy E.A. (eds.), 1978, Philodemus. On Methods of Inference, La Scuola di Epicuro, Naples: Bibliopolis. De Sanctis, D., 2012, “Utile al singolo, utile ai molti: il proemio dell’ Epistola a Pitocle”, Cronache Ercolanesi 42: 95–109. Falcon, A.,–Leunissen, M., 2015, “The scientific role of eulogos in Aristotle’s Cael. lII 12”, in D. Ebrey (ed.), Theory and Practice in Aristotle’s Natural Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 217–40. Gottschalk, H. B., 1998, “Theophrastus and the Peripatos”, in J. M. van Ophnijsen–M. van Raalte (eds.), Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources, New Brunswick: Routledge, 281–298. Hammerstaedt, J., in the present volume, “The Explanation of Meteorological Phenomena in the Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda”, 257–275. Hammershaedt, J.–Smith, M. F., 2010, “Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Discoveries of 2010 (NF 182-190)”, in Epigraphica Anatolica 43: 1–29. Hankinson, R. J., 2013, “Lucretius, Epicurus, and the Logic of Multiple Explanations”, in D. Lehoux–A. D. Morrison–A. Sharrock (eds.), Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 69–97. Kalligas, P., 2003, “Ἀπὸ τὴν εἰκασία στὴ διαλεκτική”, Δευκαλίων 21/2: 141–169. and Value held at Stanford University (22-24 April 2022). I am greatly indebted to the audience for their remarks, to David Charles, Sara Magrin, and Thomas Slabon for written comments on specific issues, and to Rupert Sparling for extensive discussion and three sets of critical comments which led to substantial revisions and improvement of the argument. Also, warm thanks to Salvador Escalante Diaz Barreiro for his help with the final revisions.

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The Explanation of Meteorological Phenomena in the Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda Jürgen Hammerstaedt This paper is not an investigation of the relationship between meteorological and epistemological discourses in the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda with its Epicurean doctrine.1 Instead, I wish to consider the possible reasons as to why Diogenes discusses such meteorological phenomena in his inscription, which was primarily, though not exclusively, addressed to his fellow citizens in Oinoanda in the second century AD. I believe that a deeper understanding of Diogenes’ intent can be reached if two aspects closely linked to these phenomena are taken into consideration: firstly, the importance of the various meteorological phenomena not only for agricultural production – considered by scholars as the main source of the wealth of certain aristocratic circles in Oinoanda and also of the common well-being of the entire population of this town2 – but also for the daily life of all inhabitants in a mountainous area subjected during the year to very strong climatic changes. Secondly, there is the very close connection between specific divine powers and such meteorological phenomena in popular religion and in the cults of Oinoanda. This inquiry will confirm that Diogenes, by treating meteorological phenomena, is aiming actively to help his fellow citizens achieve an adequate attitude regarding the most important factors influencing their life and prosperity, rather than to present them with philosophical or scientific speculations. The first section will illustrate how Diogenes’ inscription reflects the important role of meteorological phenomena for agriculture and for everyday life. The next section will deal with the deities worshipped the most at Oinoanda, the widely visible signs of their veneration in the landscape of Oinoanda, and the expression that religious ideas find on coins and inscriptions. The third section will present what Diogenes recommends as the right attitude towards the gods, their visions, and supposed manifestations. The last section will show that Diogenes does not leave his readers alone with these insights but, by describing a concrete event, he demonstrates how the only means of reducing risks in a world devoid of divine agency is a consistant application of hedonistic calculus. 1  Important aspects of this question have recently been investigated by Leone 2017, and in the present volume by Voula Tsouna. Her contribution “The Method of Multiple Explanations Revisited” explicitly deals with the most important fragments of Diogenes’ inscription where meteorology is concerned. The famous consideration by Diogenes in fr. 13 of multiple explanations is also considered by Frederik Bakker here in his pages devoted to Pierre Gassendi. In addition, Dino De Sanctis takes Diogenes into account in his contribution to the meteorological lexicon of Epicurus. Federico Giulio Corsi 2022 has offered a very detailed and extensive investigation of how Diogenes adopts, interprets, and develops meteorological doctrine and Epicurean epistemology. 2  On the economic resources of Oinoanda, see Laufer 2017: 356.

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1. The role of meteorological phenomena for agriculture and for everyday life in Diogenes’ inscription Due to the research carried out in the last 50 years, the monumental philosophical inscription published by Diogenes of Oinoanda on a public stoa of his Lycian hometown in the first half of the second century AD has aroused strong interest among philologists, historians, and historians of philosophy.3 The author of this unique inscription probably never imagined that his texts – still only partially rediscovered today – would receive worldwide attention. However, when analyzing the inscription, one has to be aware of the fact that it was set up at a certain time in a carefully chosen place. The intended readership certainly included, as Diogenes himself wrote, foreigners and future generations.4 Even so, Diogenes primarily offered it to his fellow-citizens, explicitly addressed as πολεῖται,5 instead of accepting a political office6 during which more common donations, such as public baths, games, and feasts, would have been expected from him.7 Diogenes adapts both the style and the intellectual level of many of his arguments to the expectations and needs of the population of his rural hometown.8 Such specific local ties occasionally appear, albeit in a transitional manner, as in the following exclamation: Diog. fr. 47 III 7–9 τί οὖν, | [π]ρὸϲ τῶν δώδεκα θε|ῶ̣ ν, ἐνταῦθα δεινόν; What then, in the name of the twelve gods, is terrible about that? (text and translation of Smith 1993)9

This invocation, convincingly considered by scholars as referring not to the Twelve Olympian Gods but to the Twelve Gods of Lycia,10 clearly demonstrates Diogenes’ effort to relate his considerations to the beliefs and values of his local readership. 3  On earlier research up to 1990, see Smith 1993: 59–75; overview of more recent activities in Hammerstaedt 2017. Authoritative editions of the Diogenes fragments are found in Smith 1993, 1996, and 2003. Publications on later finds and some improved readings are collected in Hammerstaedt– Smith 2014, together with a first continuous edition of the Theological Physics-Sequence and with a chapter (ibid.: 4–6) on “Finding and Citing the Latest Edition of a Diogenes Fragment”. For later finds see Hammerstaedt–Smith 2016 and 2018. Hammerstaedt–Morel–Güremen 2017 collect contributions by various authors on philosophical issues in Diogenes presented at the first international colloquium on Diogenes, held at Istanbul and Muğla in 2015. 4  Diog. fr. 3 IV 13 – V 8. Cf. fr. 30 I 12 – III 11. 5  In Diog. fr. 29 III / NF 207 I 7–8 and (mostly restored) in fr. 3 I 3–4. 6  Diog. fr. 3 I 4–5 οὐ πολ̣[ει]|τευόμενοϲ. 7  Diog. fr. 2 III seems to allude to such donations. 8  See Roskam 2017. 9  All translations of Diogenes are, unless indicated, by Smith or Smith–Hammerstaedt. 10  See Smith 1993: 497 ad loc.; on the Twelve Gods of Lycia see Frei 1990: 1830–1833 and 1849; Petzl–Freyer-Schauenburg 1994. From the 3D-scans it has emerged that the block inscribed with fr.

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The population of the local regions, especially those living in the mountains in and around Oinoanda, were expected to be impressed by Diogenes’ reasoning at the end of the continuous “Theological Physics-sequence”, which aims to reject the divine creation of our world by means of arguments concerning meteorology and extraterrestrial phenomena: Diog. Theol. XIII 10 – XVI 14 (Diog. Fr. 20 II + NF 182) εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑαυτῆϲ χά|ριν ἡ θεία φύϲιϲ δεδη|μιουργηκέναι δόξει | τὰ πράγματα, ταῦτα ||XIV πάντα τὰ ἄτοπα· v εἰ [δὲ] | τῶν ἀνθρώπων, v ἄλ[λα] | πάλιν ἀτοπώτερα. v τ̣έ|̣ μωμεν δ’ εἰϲ δύο τὸν λ̣ό|5 γον v (εἴϲ τε τὸν κόϲμον | καὶ τοὺϲ ἀνθρώπουϲ αὐ|τούϲ) v καὶ περὶ τοῦ κό[ϲ]μ̣ου | πρῶτον εἴπωμεν, v εἰ | πάντ’ ἔχει τοῖϲ ἀνθρ̣ώ|10 ποιϲ κατάλληλα κα[ὶ] μη|δὲν αὐτοῖϲ ἐνκαλεῖν ἔ|χομεν ὡϲ ὑπὸ θ̣εο ̣ ῦ [κ]α|τεϲκευ̣αϲμ̣ένοιϲ. ῥ̣η|θήτω δὲ̣ πρότερον [τ]ὰ ||XV [ἐν] τ̣ο[ῖ]ϲ̣ με̣τε̣[ώ]ρ̣οιϲ ϲ̣υν̣ |̣ πτώματα· v τί κεραυνὸϲ | ὠφελεῖ τὸν βίον, εἰπάτω | τιϲ (πῶϲ δ’ οὐχὶ καὶ βλάπτει;), |5 τί δ’ ἀϲτραπαί, v τί δὲ βρον|ταί, v τί δὲ χάλαζαι, τί δ’ ἀ|μέτρων πνευμάτων | ἐνβολαὶ καὶ καταιγίδεϲ, | τί δ’ ἀνώμαλοϲ ἀϲτέρων |10 φορὰ v καὶ διαφέροντα | μεγέθη, v τί δ’ ἐγλείψειϲ | ἡλίου καὶ ϲελήνηϲ 〈καὶ〉 ἑλι|κοειδεῖϲ τε καὶ πλάγιοι | δρόμοι, v τί δὲ νύξ, δυνα||XVIμένων ἡμῶ̣ [ν εὖ δι’ ἡμέ]|ραϲ διαναπ[αύεϲθαι,] | τί δ’ ἡμερῶ[ν μήκη καὶ νυ]|κτῶν παρα̣[λλάττοντα;] |5 τούτων γάρ ἐ̣[ϲτι τὰ μὲν] | μάταια τὰ δ[ὲ καὶ βλα]|πτικά. v τὰ μ̣[ὲν μετέωρα] | τοιαῦτα, τὰ [δ’ ἐπὶ γῆϲ ποῖα;] | πόϲα τῆϲ Λι[βύηϲ ἐϲτὶν] |10 ἀοίκητα, v πό̣[ϲα τῆϲ ἐπέ]|κεινα Ϲκυθῶ̣ [ν γῆϲ, πόϲα] | τῆϲ ὑπὲρ Ἀϲ̣[ίαν χώραϲ,] | πόϲα τῆϲ Ἰν[δικῆϲ; πό]|ϲα ἄλλα τὰ με[- - - ] If therefore the divine nature shall be deemed to have created things for its own sake, (XIV) (there result) all these absurdities; and if for the sake of humans, there are yet other more absurd consequences. Let us divide the discussion into two (the world and humans themselves), and first let us speak about the world (and ask) whether it has all things well arranged for humans and (whether) we have nothing on which to fault them, as they have been created by a god. But first let mention be made of the (XV) occurrences [involving] celestial phenomena. Let anyone say in what way a thunderbolt benefits life (how does it not actually harm?), in what way flashes of lightning do, in what way claps of thunder, in what way falls of hail, in what ways blasts and gusts of violent winds, in what way the irregular orbits of the stars and their differing sizes, in what way eclipses of the sun and the moon spiral-shaped and oblique courses, in what way night, (XVI) when we can [well rest throughout the] day, in what way the alternating [lengths] of days [and] nights? For of these phenomena some are useless, others actually harmful. Celestial phenomena have that character. [But of what kind are matters on earth?] How much of Libya is uninhabitable? How much of the land beyond the Scythians? [How much] of the [region] beyond Asia? How much of India? How many other […]?

It is worth noting that the symptoms concerning what belongs to the sky are clearly chosen for their importance for agricultural and daily life: in Theol. XV 2 harmful 47 III–IV (inventoried as YF [=Yazı Felsefi] 085) cannot physically be combined with that containing fr. 47 I–II (YF 096); see Hammerstaedt–Hinzer-AlHasan 2013: 64–65; Hammerstaedt–Smith 2014: 273–274; Hammerstaedt 2018: 309.

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lightning is mentioned, followed in XV 5-6 by lightning and thunder; secondly, we read of hail (XV 6), a known cause of damage to the harvest; subsequently, the winds of storms (XV 6-8) were perhaps most deleterious for travellers on the sea, but certainly also bore damaging effects for the roofs of the buildings in the mountains around Oinoanda, which are extremely exposed to all changes of weather. Diogenes then passes to astronomical phenomena, adopting a systematic arrangement that progressively extends from the sublunar to the cosmic zone (but, without doubt, also taking account of the minor importance for the daily life of the recipients of this inscription): XV 9-11 deals with the irregular paths and the different sizes of the planets, commonly identified with the most well-known divinities, such as Mercury/Hermes, Venus/Aphrodite, Mars/Ares, Jupiter/Zeus, and Neptune/Poseidon, celestial bodies which in direct human experience have no measurable effect on daily life. Then (XV 11-14) Diogenes places eclipses and the paths of the sun and the moon in the same category of movements without usefulness for human beings, the effects of which are, at worst, to be regarded as harmful. I doubt whether Diogenes was aware of the theory, formulated in the second century BC by Seleucus of Babylon and Posidonius of Apameia,11 according to which the alternation of the low and high tides of the sea is caused by the movements of the moon – and, if he was, whether as a follower of Epicurus he would have been willing to approve it. The tides are mentioned by Diogenes in fr. 21, which had its place not many columns after the “Theological Physics-sequence” dedicated to the disadvantageous arrangement of terrestrial realities (XVI 8ff.). Here the harmful effect of the tides on the agricultural fruition of the land by human beings is highlighted: Fr. 21 II 10 – III 8 ἡ μέντοι καλουμέ|νη νεκρὰ θάλαϲϲα, καὶ ἀ|ληθῶϲ οὖϲα νεκρά – πλεῖ|ται γὰρ οὐδέποτε –, καὶ προϲ|αφαιρεῖταί τι τῶν ἐνγὺϲ|III [ἀνθρ]ώπων ἧϲ νέμονται | γῆϲ· v ἐγδιώκει γὰρ αὐτοὺϲ | ἐπεμβαίνουϲα ἰταμῶϲ | πάνυ μέχρι πολλοῦ καὶ ἀ|5 ναδυομένη πάλιν ἐπικλύ|ζει, ὥϲπερ παραφυλάττου|ϲα μή τι τῆϲ γῆϲ ἀρότρῳ | τέμωϲιν. Moreover, the so-called Dead Sea, which is really and truly dead (for it is never sailed), even deprives the local inhabitants of part of the land which they occupy; for it drives them away to a very considerable distance with its impetuous attacks and again floods their land as it withdraws, as though being on its guard lest they may do any cleaving of the earth with a plough.

Diogenes looks at the alternation of high and low tides in the North Sea, interpreting it as an impediment to agriculture, from the narrow viewpoint of the local farmers who were meant to constitute his main readership. Let us go back, then, to Theol. XV 14-XVI 4. The section dedicated to meteorological phenomena closes by playing down the usefulness of the movements of 11 

See Posidon. fr. 217–219 Edelstein–Kidd.

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the sun, both for the alternation of day and night – of fundamental importance for the entire rhythm of human life before the invention of electric light – and for the different lengths of the days in the seasons of the year – seasons that profoundly conditioned agriculture. Attention to the impact of these meteorological phenomena on agriculture is manifest in further passages of Diogenes’ inscription. One of the monolithic Maxims – in which Diogenes condenses the doctrines expounded more extensively in the other treatises of his inscription in order to make them more memorable – deals with the two phenomena that shake human life in the most profound way: lightning and earthquakes. Both phenomena are linked to the two highest divinities acting on earth, Zeus and Poseidon: Fr. 98 (Maxim of Diogenes) κεραυνὸϲ γείνεται | κατ’ ἐκπήδηϲιν | ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν |ϲύντονον, v πνεύ|5ματόϲ τε ἐκραγέν|τοϲ ὁμοῦ καὶ πυ|ρὸϲ ἀθρόου. ϲειϲμὸϲ γείνεται | κατὰ πνευμάτων |10 ἐναπόληψιν ἐν | τῇ γῇ, v καὶ ἄλλωϲ δέ. A thunderbolt occurs through a violent eruption from the clouds, when both wind and a close mass of fire have burst out together. An earthquake occurs through entrapment of winds in the earth and in other ways, too.

Here, the reference to the possibility of multiple explanations12 is worth noticing. Yet another monolithic Maxim explains the genesis of hail, a phenomenon mentioned in Theol. XVI 6 among the meteorological phenomena that cause harm rather than benefits: Fr. 99 (Maxim of Diogenes) οὐ δεῖ διαπορεῖν πῶϲ | ἐν θέρουϲ ὥρᾳ χάλα|ζα ϲυνίϲταται. v λαν|θάνει γὰρ οὖϲα χιὼν |5 καὶ τότε, v ἀλλὰ ὑ̣μ̣ε̣|νώδηϲ, v καὶ ο̣[ἷά τε] | ποιῆϲαι χάλαζ[̣ αν], | ὁμοίωϲ δὲ καὶ πν̣[εῦ]|μα ψυχρὸν ἀλλὰ |10 μετέωρον. There is no need to be puzzled how hail is formed in summertime. For snow exists unobserved even then, though in a filmy form, and can produce hail, as also can a wind that is cold but high in the air.

The text of a fragment of Diogenes’ Physics, at least as I understand it, confirms the importance of this meteorological phenomenon for his readers:13 Fr. 14 (text: Hammerstaedt 2006; translation modified on the basis of Smith 1993) [ - - - c.6 - - - ]ΙΙ . . Ι[ - - - - ] | . . . . χάλα̣ ζαν δ’ οὐκ ἀ̣|[πει]κ̣ότωϲ ποιεῖ λεπτὴ | [χ]ι ̣όνοϲ ̣ ϲυϲτροφὴ διὰ | τ̣ὴν τοῦ περιλαμβ̣[ά]|νοντοϲ αὐτε̣ν[̣ έργειαν], | εἴτε πνεύμα̣[τι γεινο]|μένη ψυ̣[χρῷ, - - - ] 12  13 

See Leone 2017: 96–102 on Diog. fr. 13. Hammerstaedt 2006: 17 = Hammerstaedt–Smith 2014: 231.

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Hail, not unreasonably, is produced by a fine conglomeration of snow, which is due to the [self-moving energy] of what surrounds it and [is formed] either by a wind [that is cold - - -.]

A further Maxim of Diogenes discovered in 2015 clearly confirms, despite its controversial textual constitution, that the proposal for an Epicurean life made by Diogenes explicitly concerns the agricultural population:14 NF 213 (Maxim of Diogenes; text of Smith) δικαίωϲ ἐ̣π’ ὄ̣[νoμα ἀν]|ῆκεν ὁ ϲπου̣δ[αῖοϲ καὶ] | προϲηγορίαϲ [πάντωϲ] | ἠξίωται· v κ[αὶ γὰρ δή] |5 ἐϲτιν ὡϲ ἀλ[ηθῶϲ ἀγα]|θόϲ. vv πολλά[κιϲ μὲν] | βλάβηϲ αἴτ[ιόϲ ἐϲτι] | τῷ γεωργεῖν̣ [χειμών], | οὐ μέ̣ντοι ̣ [καὶ κενῶν] |10 λυπῶν κ̣α[ὶ φόβων]. It is right that the virtuous person has achieved [renown] and is considered [wholly] deserving of the appellation (virtuous); [for indeed] he is truly good. [Stormy weather] is often a cause of damage [to] farming, but not [also] of [groundless] feelings of distress and [fears]. NF 213 (Maxim of Diogenes; text of Hammerstaedt) δικαίωϲ ἐ̣π’ ὄ̣[νoμα ἀν]|ῆκεν ὁ ϲπου̣δ[αῖοϲ καὶ] | προϲηγορίαϲ [τοιᾶϲδε] | ἠξίωται· v κ[αὶ γὰρ δή] |5 ἐϲτιν ὡϲ ἀλ[ηθῶϲ ἀγα]|θόϲ. vv πολλά[κιϲ μὲν] | βλάβηϲ αἴτ[ιόν ἐϲτι] | τὸ γεωργεῖν̣ [ϲώματι], | οὐ μέ̣ντοι ̣ [καὶ κενῶν] |10 λυπῶν κ̣α[ὶ φόβων]. It is right that the virtuous person has achieved [renown] and is considered deserving of [such] an appellation; [for indeed] he is truly good. Farming often is a cause of damage [to the body], but certainly not of [groundless] feelings [of] distress and[ fears].

The need for agricultural work is also emphasized in the famous fr. 56 (Ethics). Diogenes describes the salutary consequences of the hypothetical assumption that all men are able and willing to lead a life according to the principles of philosophy: Fr. 56 (Diogenes, Ethics ed. and tr. Smith 1993; punctuation in col. I 2 after δύνανται suggested by Grilli 1997) [τὴν μὲν οὖν ϲοφίαν οὐ πανταχοῦ κομι]||Iοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ πάντεϲ μὴ | δύνανται, δυνατὴν δὲ | αὐτὴν ἂν ὑποθ̣ώ̣μ̣ε̣θα̣, | τότε ὡϲ ἀληθῶϲ ὁ τῶν |5 θεῶν βίοϲ εἰϲ ἀνθρώπουϲ | μεταβήϲεται. δικαιο|ϲύνηϲ γὰρ ἔϲται μεϲτὰ | πάντα καὶ φιλαλληλίαϲ, | καὶ οὐ γενήϲεται τειχῶν |10 ἢ νόμων χρεία καὶ πάν|των ὅϲα δι’ ἀλλήλουϲ | ϲκευωρούμεθα. περὶ δὲ | τῶν ἀπὸ γεωργίαϲ ἀναν|καίων, ὡϲ οὐκ ἐϲομέ||II ν̣ω̣ν ἡμ̣[εῖν τότε δούλων] | – καὶ ̣ γὰρ ἀ[ρόϲομεν αὐτοὶ] | ̣ καὶ ϲκάψο̣[μεν, καὶ τῶν φυ]|τῶν ἐπιμελ̣[ηϲόμεθα], |5 καὶ ποταμο[ὺϲ παρατρέ]|ψ̣ομεν, καὶ τὰ̣[ϲ φορὰϲ] | ἐπιτηρήϲο̣[μεν - - - - ]|μεν ἃ μὴ τῶ[ - - - - - ]|μενοι καιρο[ - - - - - - ], |10 καὶ διακόψει ̣ [κατὰ τὸ] | δέον τὸ ϲυνε[χῶϲ ϲυνφι]|λοϲοφεῖν τοι ̣α̣[ῦτα· τὰ] | γὰρ γεωργή[ματα ὧν ἡ] | φύϲιϲ χρῄζει.̣ 14 

Hammerstaedt–Smith 2016.

Meteorological Phenomena in the Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda 263 II 1 [τότε δούλων] Smith: [ἄνευ πόνων] Gregor Staab privatim; [δούλων, μελέτη] Casanova15 3-4 [καὶ τῶν φυ]|τῶν Smith: [καὶ προβά]|των Casanova 6-9 τὰ̣[ϲ φορὰϲ] | ἐπιτηρήϲο̣[μεν - - - - ]|μεν ἃ μὴ τῶ[ - - - - - ]|μενοι καιρο[ - - - - - - ] Smith: τὰ̣ [ἄϲτρα] | ἐπιτηρήϲο̣[μεν ἀνερχό]|μενα, μὴ τῶ[ν ὡρῶν παρέ]|μενοι καιρο[ὺϲ τύχωμεν.] Casanova 10 [κατὰ] Smith: [εἰϲ] Casanova 14 [παρέξει] Smith: [ἡμεῖν πα||ρέξει] Casanova

[So we shall not achieve wisdom universally], since not all are capable of it, but if we assume it to be possible, then truly the life of the gods will pass to men. For everything will be full of justice and mutual love, and there will come to be no need of fortifications or laws and all the things which we contrive on account of one another. As for the necessities derived from agriculture, since we shall have no [slaves at that time] (for indeed [we ourselves shall plough] and dig and tend [the plants] and [divert] rivers and watch over [the crops), we shall] … such things as … not … time …, and such activities, [in accordance with what is] needful, will interrupt the continuity of the [shared] study of philosophy; for [the] farming operations [will provide what our] nature wants.

In one of Diogenes’ Fourteen-line-column-Letters (fr. 62 II 11 – fr. 63 I 10) meteorological conditions, in this case bad weather, do not only affect the less privileged country population of his native city, but also the commissioner of the inscription himself. In fact, the aged Diogenes has taken refuge from the harsh winter and snowfalls of the mountains around Oinoanda in the milder climate of the nearby island of Rhodes. However, the winter storms prevent him from visiting his Epicurean friends in the Greek motherland in Athens and Chalkis and Boeotia.

2. Main divinities and their material evidence at Oinoanda The primary importance of meteorological phenomena for the daily life of the citizens of Oinoanda finds its expression in the cult of the two main divinities of the city: on the one hand, Zeus; on the other, Apollo, Leto and Artemis.16 The cult of Apollo, closely connected with Helios/the Sun, merges at Oinoanda during the Imperial period with the adoration of the Theos Hypsistos. This common cultic practice is evidenced in a hexametric verse inscription engraved on the relief of an altar cut in a block which is part of the 200-metre-long stretch of the city walls from the Hellenistic period, near its south end. The city wall had not served for defence since the first century BC, but its remaining parts still flanked one of the two main entrances to the city as an impressive historical monument. 15 

Casanova 1984: 279. Milner 2019. The most widely worshipped divinities in Lycia were Apollo, Artemis, and Zeus; cf. Frei 1990: 1852. 16 

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Fig. 1: Hellenistic wall in the landscape of Oinoanda. Position of inscribed altar reliefs shown by arrow (left: plan of Oinoanda by J. J. Coulton, taken from Smith 1993, plate 2; right: @Oinoandateam).

The verses contain a response of the oracle of Apollo at Claros in Ionia. SGO IV 17/06/01 (YÇ [=Yazı Çeşitli, i.e. “Miscellaneous Writing”] 1103) [α]ὐτοφυής, ἀδίδακτος, ἀμήτωρ, ἀστυφέλικτος, οὔνομα μὴ χωρῶν, πολυώνυμος, ἐν πυρὶ ναίων, τοῦτο θεός· μεικρὰ δὲ θεοῦ μερὶς ἄνγε̣λοι ἡμεῖς. τούτο πευθομένοισι θεοῦ πέρι ὅστις ὑπ̣ά̣ρχε̣ ̣ ι, Α̣ ἰ[θ]έ̣[ρ]α πανδερκ̣[ῆ θε]ὸν ἔννεπεν, εἰς ὃν ὁρῶντας 5 εὔχεσθ’ ἠῴους πρὸς ἀντολίην ἐφορῶ[ν]τα̣[ς]. “Self-grown, untaught, motherless, undisturbed, not comprised by a name, having many names, dwelling in fire, this is god; and a small part of god are we, the messengers.” To those who asked about who this god is, (the oracle of Apollo at Claros) declared that the all-seeing Aether is God, and one has to look to Aether and pray, in the morning, looking towards the East.

The definition of God in the first three verses by the Clarian oracle led to a need for further clarification. The following three verses name the god as “all-seeing Aether” and advise worshipping him every morning, looking towards the “East”, which is concretized in Greek with the term “(Sun-)rise”.17 17  Parke 1985: 164–168; Merkelbach–Stauber 2002, 17/06/01. See also the collection of all Clarian oracles in Merkelbach–Stauber 1996, where this oracle is listed as no. 25, and the three first verses return, slightly modified, in no. 26 and no. 27.

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Fig. 2: SGO IV 17/06/01 (YÇ 1103) and YÇ 1205 (left: reproduction from ZPE 32 [1978] PLATE XIa; right: @Oinoandateam).

Below this inscription, slightly to the right of it, the wall bears another altar relief, the dedication of a lamp to Theos Hypsistos: YÇ 1205 Ἀρτέ[μει] | v Λητο̣ῖ ̣ | [Ὑ]ψ̣ίσ̣τῳ | vv θ̣εῷ ̣ . To Artemis, Leto, Theos Hypsistos.

Alan Hall noted that the two inscriptions, datable to the second or third century AD, find themselves in a part of the former Hellenistic city wall facing northeast, “and it is bathed by the early sunlight when the northern part of the city is still in shadow. … Moreover, the ground slopes steeply to the northeast, and the wall therefore stands isolated in the sunlight when all around lies in shadow.”18 Other inscriptions discovered during our surveys, such as the one inventoried as YÇ 1221, confirm that the cult of Theos Hypsistos was already celebrated in the neighbourhood of a pentagonal tower attached to the west side of the former Hellenistic city wall at least from the first decades of the first century AD onwards. These inscriptions increase the earliest evidence for this cult in the Greek East and confirm the close link between the cult of Apollo/the Sun and this divinity. The fact that the sun, in the eyes of many fellow-citizens of Diogenes, was not a mere meteorological phenomenon but was strongly conceived of as a deity whose duties extended far beyond the illumination and warming of the earth is confirmed 18 

Hall 1978: 265.

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by an as yet unpublished inscription (YÇ 1241c), which invokes Helios as the avenger of the killing of a πρὸ πόλεωϲ priest named Molesis. Let us remember that in the inscription which bears the Clarian oracle (SGO IV 17/06/01) the divinity is characterized as πανδερκήϲ, qualifying him as a witness to any crime committed under the open sky.

Fig. 3a: Didrachm, year 3 (186/5 B.C.?); www.wildwinds.com/coins/greece/lycia/ oinoanda/BMC_1cf-9.jpg

Fig. 3b: Didrachm, year 2 (187/6 B.C.?); www.wildwinds.com/coins/greece/lycia/ oinoanda/BMC_1cf-6.1.jpg

Silver coins of Oinoanda from the first decades of the second century BC show Zeus in his salient role as master of lightning. On their obverse their bear the head and sceptre of the highest divinity – the eminent position19 granted to him even in the philosophical inscription fr. 17 IV 10, where Diogenes characterizes the attitude of the veneration of men towards τὸν πανυπέρτατον Δία and to Demeter not as that of slaves: Fr. 17 IV 10-14 κ̣α̣ὶ [γ]ὰ̣ρ̣ [τ]ὸν π̣αν ̣ υ ̣ |̣ π̣έρτα̣τον̣ [Δ]ί[α] κ̣αὶ ̣ τ̣[ὴν] | Δη̣μήτερ’ ὡϲ θε̣οὺ̣ϲ ̣ | τε̣ι ̣μ̣ῶ̣ ντ̣εϲ τ̣οὺ ̣ [̣ ϲ ἀ]ν̣[θρώ]|πουϲ ο̣ὐχ ὡϲ δουλε̣ύο̣[ν||ταϲ αὐτοῖϲ, ἀλλ’ ὡϲ φίλουϲ νομίζομεν]. For indeed, while honouring supreme Zeus and Demeter as deities, [we regard human beings] not as [their] slaves, [but as their friends].

On the reverse of the silver coinage of Oinoanda the well-known sign of the bunch of lightning bolts is found, accompanied sometimes by a bunch of grapes and sometimes by a shield. The lightning bolts appear together with the eagle, an animal still seen nowadays in the mountains around the site.

19 

On Zeus having the leading civic cult at Oinoanda, see Milner 2019: 133.

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Fig. 4: Block from Oinoanda in the collection of Dr. Oğuz Kocagil, Fethiye (Inv. Ω 401; photo taken by the author).

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Zeus’ bunch of lightning bolts is carved on all four sides of a large block coming from Oinoanda, in exactly the same form as it is found on the Hellenistic coinage of this town. The similar sign engraved on the rocks on the precipitous south side of the socalled Martin’s Hill, overlooking the valley floor now occupied by the foundations of a large Christian basilica, looks different and perhaps belongs to a different period.

Fig. 5: Zeus’ bunch of lighting bolts on the south precipice of ‘Martin’s Hill’ (@Oinoandateam).

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As we see in fig. 6, ‘Martin’s Hill’ (1) figures – together with the Hellenistic city walls (2), the theatre, (3) and a further hill (4), which is now characterized by the protection wall heaped up by the last inhabitants of Oinoanda in the early Byzantine period – among the most elevated and visible points of the urban area; what is more, it occupies the central position.

Fig. 6: Most elevated and visible points at Oinoanda; line of sight between Zeus’ bunch of lightning bolts and the cult place of Sun/Theos Hypistos etc. (left: Oinoanda-GIS; right: orthophoto of the site, @Konrad Berner, Oinoandateam).

It should be noted that at least the position of Zeus’ bunch of lightning bolts, if not the bunch itself, must have been clearly visible from the other cult location for the deities worshipped as Apollo/Sol/Theos Hypsistos, Leto, and Artemis described previously. Rudolf Heberdey and Ernst Kalinka also mention an anepigraphic relief representing the sun and moon, which they saw near Oinoanda.20 Another divinity whose activity, despite not being connected directly with meteorological phenomena, was highly respected and probably even feared by certain individuals in Oinoanda is Nemesis. During our surveys we found a verse inscription, the most well-preserved parts of which mention the dedication of a sundial together with a statue of Nemesis. The sundial may be associated with the goddess due to her reputation as an incorruptible guarantor of justice over long periods of time. And indeed, the person on whose behalf the dedication was made owed to the goddess 80 long years of a quiet life. 20 

Heberdey–Kalinka 1896: 52.

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YÇ 1234, verses 2-5 (in future: SGO 17/06/06)21 … εἰθύδικον Νέμεϲιν· τὴν μέν, ὅτ’ ὀγδοίκ̣οντα διεκπεράϲαϲ ἐνιαυτοὺϲ πάντα̣ϲ [ἀ]μ̣ωμ̣ήτῳ πλῆϲεν ἐν ἠρεμίῃ, γνώμονα δ’, ὅττι τοι … [xy dedicated a sundial and (a statue of)] Nemesis who gives right judgement, the latter because he has passed 80 years, filling all of them with blameless tranquility, and the sundial, because […]

We will see in Diog. fr. 19 that the Epicurean Diogenes demands exactly such a positive human attitude to divinities, among whom Nemesis is explicitly named. Of course, Oinoanda does not lack the cults of other divinities, such as Poseidon22 and Hermes,23 the latter of whom also appears among the divinities mentioned in the Epicurean inscription of Diogenes (fr. 12 III 4) to which – having highlighted the great importance afforded to certain religious concepts in his native city – we can now return.

3. The right attitude to the gods, their visions, and supposed manifestations We have already seen in fr. 17 that Diogenes – in an Epicurean tradition well attested by previous Epicurean sources, such as Philodemus of Gadara in his Περὶ εὐϲεβείαϲ24 – does not deny the importance of the veneration of the gods at all, nor does he dissuade from participating in religious feasts, but he postulates an attitude devoid of fearful servility. Indeed, in fr. 19 Diogenes affirms that the cult of the gods must not be accompanied by fear but by serenity, a serenity which can only be achieved when men do not suspect the inauspicious activities of the gods: Fr. 19 II τὰ δ’ ὑπὸ θηρίων δο|ρυφορεῖται, τὰ δ’ ὀργίζε|ται τοῖϲ εὐτυχοῦϲιν, ὥϲ|5περ ἡ Νέμεϲιϲ τοῖϲ πολ|λοῖϲ δοκεῖ. ᵛ δεῖ δ’ ἱλα|ρὰ τῶν θεῶν ποιεῖν | ξόανα καὶ μειδιῶντα | ἵν’ ἀντιμειδιάϲωμεν |10 μᾶλλον αὐτοῖϲ ἢ φο|βηθῶμεν. vacat | τί οὖν ἔϲτιν, ὦ ὑμεῖϲ; | τοὺϲ μὲν θεοὺϲ εὐϲε|βῶμεν ᵛ καὶ ἐν ἑορταῖϲ ||

21 

Staab 2009. On Hermes, see Milner–Smith 1994: 70–75, Nr. 4c. 23  On Poseidon, see Milner 2019: 250. 24 Phld. Piet. lines 723–1022 Obbink; see especially the quotation from Epicurus in lines 737–743 Obbink: προϲεύχε{ι}ϲ|θαι γὰρ ἐν τῶι Περὶ | [βίων] οἰκεῖον εἶναι |740 [ἡμεῖ]ν φηϲίν, οὐχ ὡϲ | [δυϲ]μενῶν τῶν | [θεῶν] εἰ μὴ ποιή|[ϲομεν]; “For in On Lifecourses he says that praying is natural for us, not because the gods would be hostile if we did not pray”. 22 

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others are attended by a body-guard of wild beasts; others are angry with the prosperous, like Nemesis according to popular opinion; whereas we ought to make statues of the gods genial and smiling, so that we may smile back at them rather than be afraid of them. Well, then, you people, let us reverence the gods [rightly] both at festivals […]

Such suspicions of divine activity in the world derive, according to Diogenes, from the inability to understand the cause of certain appearances and visions. Fr. 15 III 8–14 ἂ̣ν γὰρ [αὐτοῖϲ] | φά̣ϲμα̣τα ̣ ̣ ἐν̣αργῆ̣ τυν̣|χάνῃ, πῶϲ δὲ γείνε̣|10 τα̣ι ταῦτα ε̣ὑρίϲκειν | μὴ̣ δύνωνται, εἰκότωϲ̣, | οἶμαι, εἰϲ ὑποψίαν πε|ρικυλείονται· ποτὲ δὲ | καὶ πίϲτιν δημιουρ||[γόν τινα εἶναι ἔχουϲι]. For if [they] experience distinct visions, and are unable to discover how these are produced, understandably, I think, they are involved in apprehension; and sometimes [they are] even convinced [that there is a] creator.

It is worth noting that the visions which lead men to believe in divine activity are characterized here as self-evident (ἐναργῆ). Likewise Diogenes, in earlier columns of his Physics25 and later on in his Ethics,26 maintains against the Stoics that the visions in our dreams do have a physical reality, even if they can give a misleading impression of the truth. Therefore it is of primary importance, as we read in fr. 15, to “to discover how these (sc. visions) are produced” (πῶϲ … γείνεται ταῦτα εὑρίϲκειν). In fact, it is this intention with which Diogenes, giving ample space to various physical explanations, tries radically to remove all kind of suspicions deriving from wrong explanations of known meteorological and celestial phenomena. Since these phenomena, due to their own distance or to the invisibility of their causes, cannot be analyzed closely, they easily lend themselves to the assumption of involvement of the gods that are traditionally connected with them. While Diogenes in Theol. XIII–XVI fundamentally turns against the view that such harmful, or at least useless, phenomena are due to divine care, he sets out in fr. 13 to reduce the Sun, the Moon, the planets (each of them traditionally identified, as already mentioned, with a divinity), and the fixed constellations to simple conglomerates of material continuously moving around in space. It is unlikely that Diogenes convinced many readers of his inscription to devote themselves deeply to the physical analysis of celestial bodies. For him, though, it was probably enough to have made them understand that mankind has nothing to fear from such bodies, confined as they are to regular, invariable movements.

25 

26 

Diog. fr. 10. On the text see Hammerstaedt 2020: 153–157. Diog. fr. 43 I. On the text see Hammerstaedt 2020: 157–158.

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4. Hedonistic calculus, the only means to reduce risks in a world devoid of divine agency Celestial bodies like the Sun are thus passive, and not active, entities. Additionally, the meteorological phenomena in the sublunar sphere are neither aroused nor calmed nor controlled by the gods. So the only way to protect ourselves from the impact of harmful natural events is prudent behaviour on the basis of hedonistic calculation based on reasoning. If we do not behave in this prudent way, salvation is no longer in our own hands, let alone the hands of divine forces, but can only result from pure chance (τύχη, τὸ αὐτόματον). Diogenes demonstrates where this wrong attitude and behaviour can lead in a Fourteen-line-column-Letter, in which he criticizes the irresponsible behavior of his recipients, who had sent him a young man by sea despite the threat of bad weather. Probably near the beginning of his letter Diogenes states as a general truth that “Chance [can] befall [even the prudent] and do harm, but rarely; for it does not have fuel, like fire, which it may lay hold of.”27 Diog. NF 214 II–III + fr. 72 I–III28 περιεϲφαλ|[μέν]οι γὰρ κεραμίοιϲ τι|[ϲὶν] ε̣ἴπερ ἦϲαν οἱ κακοδαί|̣ μ̣ονεϲ ἐνβεβλημένοι, ̣ |5 τέωϲ τ̣ὸ λυκόφωϲ ἦλθεν, | διέμεινε παρὰ δόξαν τοῖϲ | ἀνθρώποιϲ ἡ ϲωτηρία. τὸ | τηνικαῦτα δ’ ἐχρόνιϲεν | ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μεικρόν. εὐθ̣ὺ[̣ ϲ] |10 γὰρ ὁ ἄνεμοϲ γενόμε|νοϲ μείζων καὶ ἀγριώτε |ροϲ ἢ νυκτὸϲ ἦν ὑψόϲ̣ε ̣ | φέρων τὴν ναῦν μετὰ | τοῦ κύματοϲ εἴϲ τινα γῆϲ ||NF ̣ 214 ΙΙΙ+fr. 72 I Cυμαικῆϲ ἀπή[ν]ενκεν | ἐρημίαν καὶ ταῖ[ϲ] ἐκεῖ πα|ραλίοιϲ ἐπέρηξ[ε π]έτρα̣ιϲ. ̣ | διαπεϲούϲηϲ δ’ αὐτ̣[ῆ]ϲ (ἀνάν|5 κη γὰρ ἦν) καὶ τῶ[ν] ἀν|θρώπων ἐγρυέν̣[τ]ων ἄλ|λων τε ἄλλῃ τ̣ύ[̣ χ]ῃ̣ χρω|μένων ὁ Νεική[ρ]ατοϲ | ὡϲ ἀπανγέλλει v ϲ̣ώ̣ζε|10 ται τονδ̣εὶ τρόπ[ο]ν̣· v με|τέω̣ ροϲ ἀρθεὶϲ ὑ[πὸ] τοῦ | κύματοϲ εἰϲ τοι[αύ]την | τινὰ ϲυνανχία[ν] ἐν|ϲείεται ̣ μεταξὺ̣ τῶν ||II πετρῶν, ἀφ᾿ ἧϲ οὐκέ|τ’ αὐτὸν εἴϲχυϲεν ἀνα|ροφῆϲαι ἡ̣ θάλαϲϲα κ̣αὶ | ῥῆξαι πάλιν. ϲυνετρίβη |5 μὲν οὖν, ὥϲπερ εἰκόϲ, | καὶ κατε{ν}ξάνθη, ἁλι|βρῶϲι περιπεϲὼν̣ λίθοιϲ. | διένηψ̣ε δ’ οὖν κ̣αὶ κα|τὰ μεικρὸν ἐκ̣ τ̣[ο]ῦ δ̣ει̣ ̣ν̣[οῦ], |10 ἐν οἷϲ δὴ χρόν[ο]ι ̣ϲ̣ α[ἱ] τ̣ῶ̣[ν] | κυμάτων ἐπεμπτ̣ώ̣ϲε̣ ι̣ [̣ ϲ] | δ̣ιελίμπανον, εἰϲ τ̣ὸ̣ ξη|ρὸ̣ν̣ ἐϲώθη μόγιϲ ἐγδε|δαρμένoϲ ἀκρειβῶϲ ||III ὅλοϲ. ἐπὶ οὖν τῆϲ̣[δε τῆϲ] | ϲκοπιᾶϲ ἔκειτο, ἔ[νθα διῆ]|γε τὴν ἡμέραν οὕ̣[τωϲ] | καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦϲα[ν νύ]|5 κτα καὶ πάλιν ἡμέ̣[ραν] | ἕωϲ ἑϲπέραϲ, v ὑπὸ το̣[ῦ] | λειμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἑλκ̣[ῶν] | δ̣α̣πανώμενοϲ. v ἐπ̣[ιϲτάμε]|θ̣α̣ δ’ ἤδη τὸ αὐτόμ[ατον], |10 εὖ γε πο̣ι ̣οῦν ὅπερ ο̣[ἰκεῖ]|ον̣ ὑμεῖν ἐνλογεῖ[ϲθαι (οὐ] | τέ̣θνηκε γὰρ ὑμεῖ[̣ ν ὅδε | κῆρυξ ὃϲ διέϲωϲε [ταῦτα]). | εἶτα γὰρ τύχῃ Νε̣[ικήρα||τον περιεῖναι δῆλον γέ|γονε] For although the poor souls, having slipped about, had been thrown against some earthenware jars, the people (on board) remained safe, contrary to expectation, until dawn came. But then they did not continue to be safe even for a short time; for immediately the wind, having become stronger and wilder than it was during the night, carrying the ship aloft with the swell, swept it off to a (NF 214 III + fr. 72 I) 27  Diog. fr. 71 I 1–5 [καὶ τῷ φρονίμῳ δύ]||ν̣α̣ται ϲυναντᾶν ἡ τύχη | καὶ κακῶϲ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ | ϲπανίωϲ (text restored according to Hammerstaedt, see Hammerstaedt–Smith 2018: 47). 28  Hammerstaedt–Smith 2018.

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desolate part of the territory of Syme and smashed it on the rocks by the sea there. When it was broken in pieces, as was inevitable, and the people spilled out, while each of them suffered a different fate, Niceratus, as he relates, was saved in the following way. After being lifted high up by the swell, he was plunged into a sort of constriction between the rocks (II) from which the sea was no longer able to suck him back and shatter him again. So he was crushed, as one would expect, and torn to shreds from having been dashed against sea-gnawed rocks. Well, he regained consciousness, and little by little, during those times when the assaults of the waves were intermittent, he came out of the danger, barely making it safely to dry land, literally flayed (fr. III) all over. So he lay on this lookout point, [where he spent] the day [in this state] and the following night and again the day until evening, exhausted by hunger and his wounds. Now we [understand] the accidental, which did well what was [appropriate] to be allocated to you (For, my dears, [this] messenger is not dead who saved [this insight].)! Then [it has] indeed [become clear that Niceratus is safe] by chance.

The next passage of this letter (the last part that is preserved) confirms that such a lack of prudence is closely linked with disregard for the hedonistic calculus: Fr. 70 I 5 – III 1 [εἰ μὲ]ν οὖν ἐπελάθεϲ|[θε τῆ]ϲ δόξηϲ, ἣν ἀπει|[ράκι]ϲ̣ εἰρήκαμεν, καν̣ό|̣ [να τῶ]ν πράξεων εἶναι | [καὶ τὰ] ἡ̣δέα πάθη καὶ τὰ |10 [ὀχλη]ρ̣ὰ̣ πρὸϲ ἃ δεῖ βλέ|[ποντ]αϲ ἐπικρείνειν | [καὶ τὴ]ν φυγὴν αὐτῶν | [καὶ τὴ]ν δίωξίν τινόϲ | [γε ἄλ]λου, μνημονεύ||IIοιτε. v εἰ δὲ μέμνηϲθε, τί | παθόντεϲ, ὦ μακάριοι, | πρὸϲ τοιαύτην ὡρμή|ϲατε πρᾶξιν, ἀφ’ ἧϲ ὀχλη|5ρὰ μὲν τῷ Νεικηράτῳ | πάθη γέγονεν, ὀχληρὰ | δ’ ἡμεῖν διὰ τὰϲ ϲυμφο|ρὰϲ τὰϲ ἐκείνου; v εἰ γὰρ | φήϲετε τῆϲ μὲν δόξηϲ |10 ἐνκρατεῖϲ εἶναι, περὶ δὲ | τὴν γνώμην τῆϲ τἀν|θρώπου πομπῆϲ πρὸϲ | ἡμᾶϲ ἢ οὐχὶ πομπῆϲ, | πότερα ποιητέον αὐ|IIIτὴν̣ [ - - - ]. So, [if] you had forgotten the doctrine, which we have expounded countless times, that the standard of our actions are the feelings of [both] pleasure and [pain], by reference to which we must determine [both the] avoidance of them [and the] pursuit of something else, do call it to mind. (II) But if you remember it, what got into you, my blessed friends, that you embarked on an action such as this, which has given rise to feelings painful to Niceratus and painful to us on account of his misfortunes? For if you claim that you have a firm grasp of the doctrine, but that with regard to the decision of sending the man to us or not sending him, whether it had to be done (III) [or not - - - - - - ].

The words of Diogenes which were inscribed on the next block have not yet been rediscovered. Nevertheless, their tenor can easily be imagined …

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References Casanova, A. (ed.), 1984, I frammenti di Diogene d’Enoanda. Florence: Università degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Antichità ‘Giorgio Pasquali’. Corsi, F. G., 2022, Epistemologia e scienza della natura in Diogene di Enoanda, Cronache Ercolanesi Suppl. 8, Naples: Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi ‘Marcello Gigante’. Frei, P., 1990, “Die Götterkulte Lykiens in der Kaiserzeit”, Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II 18, 3, Berlin–New York: de Gruyter: 1729–1864. Grilli, A., 1997, “Il nuovo Diogene d’Enoanda”, La parola del passato 52: 225–238. Hall, A. S., 1978, “The Klarian Oracle at Oenoanda”, Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 32: 263–267. Hammerstaedt, J., 2006, “Zum Text der epikureischen Inschrift des Diogenes von Oinoanda”, Epigraphica Anatolica 39: 1–48 (= Hammerstaedt–Smith 2014: 215–262). Hammerstaedt, J., 2017, “The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes in the Epigraphic Context of Oinoanda. New Finds, New Research, and New Challenges”, in Hammerstaedt– Morel–Güremen: 29–50. Hammerstaedt, J., 2018, “Keine Furcht mit Diogenes! Die Beherrschung von Empfindungen in der philosophischen Inschrift von Oinoanda”, Elenchos 39: 301–322. Hammerstaedt, J., 2020, “Epicuro e Diogene tra sogno, visioni e realtà. Riscontri dell’opera Sulla natura di Epicuro nell’iscrizione epicurea?”, in G. Leone–F. Masi–F. Verde (eds.), Vedere l’invisibile. Il XXXIV libro Sulla natura di Epicuro (PHerc. 1431), Cronache Ercolanesi Suppl. 6, Naples: Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi ‘Marcello Gigante’, 147–162. Hammerstaedt, J.,–Morel, P.-M.,–Güremen, R. (eds.), 2017, Diogenes of Oenoanda. Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates/Diogène d’Œnoanda. Épicurisme et controverses, Leuven: Leuven University Press. Hammerstaedt, J.,–Hinzer-AlHasan, B., 2013, “First Investigations of the Three-Dimensional Scans of the Epicurean Inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda”, Epigraphica Anatolica 46: 57–67. Hammerstaedt, J.,–Smith, M. F., 2014, The Epicurean Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda. Ten Years of New Discoveries and Research, Bonn: Habelt Verlag. Hammerstaedt, J.,–Smith, M. F., 2016, “New Research at Oinoanda and a New Fragment of the Epicurean Diogenes (NF 213)”, Epigraphica Anatolica 49: 109–125. Hammerstaedt, J.,– Smith, M. F., 2018, “Diogenes of Oinoanda. The New and Unexpected Discoveries of 2017 (NF 214–219), with a Reedition of Fr. 70–72”, Epigraphica Anatolica 51: 43–79. Heberdey, R.,–Kalinka, E., 1896, Bericht über zwei Reisen im südwestlichen Kleinasien, Vienna: Böhlau. Laufer, E., 2017, “Die Entwicklung Oinoandas von der wehrhaften Kolonie zur Stadt der Agonotheten, Sportler und Philosophen. Zum Wandel urbaner Ansprüche in einer Kleinstadt im nordlykischen Bergland”, in A. W Busch–J. Griesbach–J. Lipps, Urbanitas – urbane Qualitäten, Heidelberg: Verlag Schnell & Steiner, 343–370.

Meteorological Phenomena in the Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda 275 Leone, G., 2017, “Diogène d’Œnoanda et la polémique sur les meteora”, in Hammerstaedt– Morel–Güremen: 89–110. Merkelbach, R.–Stauber, J., 1996, “Die Orakel des Apollon von Klaros”, Epigraphica Anatolica 27: 1–54. Merkelbach, R.–Stauber, J., 2002, Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten. Band 4. Die Südküste Kleinasiens, Syrien und Palästina, Munich–Leipzig: K.-G. Saur Verlag. Milner, N. P., 2019, “Leader-gods and pro poleos priests: Leto, Apollo, Zeus and the imperial cult at Oinoanda”, Anatolian Studies 69: 133–154. Milner, N. P.,–Smith, M. F., 1994, “New votive reliefs from Oinoanda”, Anatolian Studies 44: 65–76. Parke, H. W., 1985, The Oracles of Apollo in Asia Minor, London–Dover: Croom Helm. Petzl, G.,–Freyer-Schauenburg, B., 1994, Die lykischen Zwölfgötterreliefs, Asia-Minor-Studien 13, Bonn: Habelt Verlag. Roskam, G., 2017, “Diogenes’ Polemical Approach, or How to Refute a Philosophical Opponent in an Epigraphic Context”, in Hammerstaedt–Morel–Güremen: 241–269. Smith, M. F. (ed.), 1993, Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Epicurean Inscription, Naples: Bibliopolis. Smith, M. F., 1996, The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda, Tituli Asiae Minoris Ergänzungsband 20, Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Smith, M. F., 2003, Supplement to Diogenes of Oinoanda, The Epicurean Inscription, Naples: Bibliopolis. Staab, G., 2009, “Epigramm auf eine Nemesisweihung und Sonnenuhr aus Oinoanda”, Epi­ graphica Anatolica 42: 135–141.

Gassendi’s Interpretation of Epicurus’ Method of Multiple Explanations: Between Scepticism and Probabilism Frederik Bakker

1. Introduction It is no exaggeration to say that the modern study of Epicureanism started with Gassendi. Having first – in his Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos (MS probably completed before 1624) – settled the score with the Aristotelians, he then focussed his attention on Epicurus. In 1649, after a number of smaller works and preliminary studies on various aspects of Epicurean philosophy, he published his monumental Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii, an edition with translation and extensive commentary of Book 10, on Epicurus, of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers.1 This work, in turn, provided the basis for his famous Syntagma Philosophicum (published posthumously in 1658), in which he sets out his own philosophical views. Much has been written about Gassendi’s interpretation and reception of Epicurean philosophy. Apart from publications on Gassendi’s atomism or his reception of Epicurean ethics,2 much attention has also been given to his appropriation of Epicurean epistemology.3 Remarkably, one aspect of Epicurean epistemology, the so-called method of multiple explanations (henceforth MME), that is, the systematic juxtaposition of multiple alternative explanations for individual astronomical and meteorological phenomena, has received rather less attention in this context. This neglect is all the more curious and also somewhat disappointing, because the MME appears to have been an important element in the formation of Gassendi’s own probabilistic epistemology.4 For this reason, I think that a closer study of Gassendi’s interpretation of the MME is indispensable for a good understanding of his own philosophy and its relation to ancient sources. In this paper I propose to make a first attempt at such a study. Of course, Gassendi’s interpretation and appropriation of the MME have not gone wholly unnoticed. On the whole, however, modern studies on Gassendi have limited their coverage of the MME to short, passing remarks. Some scholars compare Epicurus’ MME with Gassendi’s probabilistic attitude in natural philosophy, 1 

On Gassendi’s Epicurean project, see, e.g., Joy 1987: 66–80; and LoLordo 2007: 20–24. On Gassendi’s reception of Epicurean atomism, see, e.g., Alberti 1981; and LoLordo 2007: 138–144, 149–152. On Gassendi’s reception of Epicurean ethics, see esp. Sarasohn 1996: 51–58. 3  See, e.g., Alberti 1980; Joy 1987: 167–173; and LoLordo 2007: 64–69 and 94–99. 4  Bloch (1971: 96–97) and Messeri (1985: 53) both place Epicurus’ MME at the root of Gassendi’s probabilism, while Bellis (2017: 137–138 with n. 58) is prepared to grant it a supporting part, alongside Academic scepticism. 2 

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suggesting that the latter may have been inspired by the former.5 Others refer to Gassendi’s explicit interpretation of Epicurus’ MME as a kind of (Pyrrhonian) scepticism.6 Several scholars also remark on Gassendi’s assimilation of Epicurus’ MME and the probabilistic approach to astronomical hypotheses that had gained currency in the late sixteenth century.7 Others again comment specifically on Gassendi’s application of Epicurus’ MME to the competing geocentric and Copernican hypotheses.8 Although these brief commentaries contain a number of interesting and astute observations, they suffer from a certain ambiguity of terms, at least when used to describe the MME. What does it mean for the MME to be called ‘sceptical’? What does it mean for it to be called ‘probabilistic’? Are these two designations in fact synonymous, do they overlap, or are they mutually exclusive? It is conceivable that this ambiguity was in fact already present in Epicurus or in Gassendi or both, but we can only find out when we ourselves, at least, clearly distinguish these terms and investigate whether, to what degree, and under what definition, they are actually applicable to Epicurus’ MME and/or Gassendi’s interpretation thereof. It is important, therefore, to start with clear definitions. In this article I will use the term ‘scepticism’ to denote an attitude of epistemic indifference, that is, an inability or unwillingness to decide between conflicting judgments in case of uncertainty.9 Probabilism, on the other hand, I take to mean a preparedness or willingness to make a provisional choice between conflicting judgments – despite their uncertainty – on the basis of incomplete but probable evidence.10 This definition entails that a mere reference to probability does not make a theory probabilistic, unless this probability provides us with a motive for choosing between alternatives. Part of the ambiguity in existing studies is also due to an ambivalence in the way the word ‘probability’ is used. According to James Allen the term ‘probable’ can be used in what he calls an ‘approbative’ sense, as well as a ‘pejorative’ or ‘disparaging’ sense.11 When used in an approbative sense, ‘probable’ refers to something that induces or invites us to accept it or to assent to it. Possible synonyms would be ‘con5 

See previous note. Messeri 1985: 35–36; and Brundell 1987: 43–45. The similarity of the MME and Pyrrhonism is also observed by Fisher 2005: 181–182. Bellis (2017: 137–138) acknowledges Gassendi’s characterization of the MME as a kind of scepticism, yet also stresses the probabilistic aspects of Epicureanism, which may have appealed to Gassendi’s own probabilistic outlook. 7  Messeri 1985: 53; LoLordo 2007: 29, 99; Bellis 2017; 138–140. 8  Brundell 1987: 43–46; Fisher 2005: 181–182; LoLordo 2007: 29, 32, 99, 248. 9  This definition more or less captures what Popkin (2003: 15 et passim) refers to as ‘complete scepticism’. A scepticism of this kind was propounded by the ancient Pyrrhonists and may also be attributed, with some qualifications, to the Academics of the so-called Middle Academy, which was instituted by Arcesilaus. 10  This definition more or less captures what Popkin (2003: 125 et passim) refers to as ‘constructive’ or ‘mitigated scepticism’. A position of this kind is often attributed to the Academics of the socalled New Academy, which was instituted by Carneades (see Popkin 2003: 125; and Bellis 2017: 128). 11  Allen 2014: 48–49. 6 

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vincing’, ‘compelling’, ‘plausible’, or ‘persuasive’. Probabilism implies an approbative conception of probability. Used in a pejorative sense – a sense that is often enforced by words such as ‘merely’ or ‘only’ – ‘probable’ refers to something that induces us to mistrust or doubt it, as having no certainty. Possible synonyms would be ‘doubtful’, ‘dubious’, ‘uncertain’, or ‘questionable’. Probability in this sense is not indicative of probabilism and may in fact be compatible with scepticism as defined above. Many of the cited studies also fail to distinguish between (a) Epicurus’ own conception of the MME, (b) Gassendi’s interpretation of the MME, and (c) Gassendi’s appropriation of the MME. Often Gassendi’s interpretation is simply accepted as a neutral and correct representation of Epicurus’ MME, or his adaptation is mistaken for an interpretation. Ideally, an understanding of (a) must be based on Epicurus’ own writings, aided by contemporary studies, not including Gassendi. An understanding of (b) must be based on passages of Gassendi’s work in which he explicitly expounds Epicurus’ views. An understanding of (c) must be based on passages in which Gassendi explicitly endorses – with or without modifications – the Epicurean MME. Of course, in practice these three aspects cannot always be clearly distinguished.12 It is important, however, to distinguish them at least conceptually. In this article I intend to study Gassendi’s reception of the MME while trying to avoid all these ambiguities. As it will not be possible to cover all three aspects in an article of limited scope, the focus of this article will be on Gassendi’s interpretation of the MME, which will be compared to the ancient testimonies about Epicurus’ own conception and application of the method. It is not my aim to endorse or to reject Gassendi’s interpretation, but only to indicate how Gassendi may have read and plausibly interpreted the ancient texts, in addition to how, sometimes, he may have run ahead of the evidence. For contemporary interpretations of Epicurus’ MME, the reader may consult one of the many excellent recent studies that will be referred to in the footnotes of this article. Nor will I deal with Gassendi’s general appropriation of the MME and its incorporation in his own philosophy. For evidence about Gassendi’s interpretation I will mainly look at the Animadversiones, which, being a commentary, may be expected to be more informative about Gassendi’s sources than his more systematic Syntagma Philosophicum. In addition, I will also sometimes refer to passages in other works, where Gassendi is explicitly expounding Epicurean philosophy. The article will be structured as follows. First, in section 2, I will discuss a few passages in Gassendi’s work where Epicurus’ MME is characterized as a kind of Pyrrhonian scepticism. Next, in section 3, I will have a closer look at Epicurus’ own exposition of the MME, with special attention to those details that seem to have informed Gassendi’s interpretation. In section 4, I will discuss Gassendi’s account of Epicurus’ theory of sign-inference, and the place that the MME occupies in that 12 

As Messeri (1985: 54 n. 35) also observes.

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theory. In sections 5 and 6, I will deal with some passages of the Animadversiones in which new aspects of Gassendi’s interpretation, which either supplement or contradict his general interpretation, come to the fore. Finally, in section 7, I will summarize the main findings of this investigation. It will be concluded that while Gassendi’s general interpretation of the MME is both consistent in itself and fairly faithful to the textual evidence provided by Diogenes Laertius and Epicurus himself, yet in its application to special cases, Gassendi introduced innovations that are not always warranted by Epicurus’ own account and use of the method, though they may have helped to turn the MME into a useful and flexible instrument for Gassendi’s pursuit of scientific knowledge.

2. Epicurus’ scepticism In a curious passage in the second book of his Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos (henceforth Exercitationes), which was probably completed by 1624,13 Gassendi characterizes Epicurus’ philosophy and especially the MME as a form of scepticism. Although this characterization was, as we shall see, based on indirect, partly unreliable, and misunderstood ancient testimonies rather than on an autopsy of the relevant works of Epicurus himself, still the passage is very informative about the way Gassendi positions Epicurus vis-à-vis different varieties of ancient scepticism. For this reason, I will also quote and discuss the wider context of the passage. The relevant portion of the text starts with the development of Plato’s Academy (Exerc. II vi 6, in OO III 205a):14 I only add that Plato is rightly considered the parent of the whole Academy, for his followers either considered everything incomprehensible, and withheld their assent equally from all opinions, because they reckoned that no proposition was upheld by reason whose opposite could not be upheld by a similar reason, (a practice) that was instituted by Arcesilaus, or they accepted some views as being verisimilar above others, to such an extent that they even allowed their assent to be inclined towards these views; although they did not grant them any certainty and indubitability, (a practice) that was proposed by Carneades. Indeed, they [i.e., both Arcesilaus’ and Carneades’ followers] only had this one dogma: that they knew nothing.15 13  Of this work, which was intended to comprise seven books, only two books were ever written. The first of these was published in 1624, but the second did not appear until after Gassendi’s death in 1655, when it was published, together with the first, in volume III of the posthumous Opera Omnia that saw the light in 1658. Even so, there is evidence that the second book already existed in manuscript form, when the first book appeared, i.e., in 1624. See Rochot 1959: vii. 14  Henceforth all translations are mine, unless otherwise specified. 15  Exerc. II vi 6 (OO III 205a): “Adiicio dumtaxat meritò Platonem haberi Parentem totius Academiæ; seu enim eius Sectatores habebant omnia incomprehensibilia, suúmque assensum æquè continebant ab omnibus, existimantes videlicet nullam esse Propositionem ratione suffultam, cuius opposita non posset pari ratione suffulciri, quod Arcesilai fuit institutum; siue aliqua admittebant præ

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Following Sextus Empiricus (P I 230–232), Gassendi distinguishes two versions of Academic scepticism: one version, instituted by Arcesilaus, which calls for a complete suspension of judgment with respect to opinions, and another version, instituted by Carneades, which allows a certain inclination towards such views as are considered more verisimilar than others, while insisting that verisimilitude should never be confused with certainty.16 Still following Sextus’ lead (P I 232), Gassendi goes on to stress the virtual identity of Arcesilaus’ philosophy with that of the Pyrrhonists,17 whose views Gassendi also attributes to Pyrrho himself: About Pyrrho himself — and by the same token also about the Sceptics — nothing needs to be added here, because in this Exercitation we follow entirely in their footsteps, and because it is generally accepted among those who have knowledge of the Sects that the philosophy of Pyrrho and Arcesilaus is one.18

Still equating Pyrrho’s views with Pyrrhonism, Gassendi now briefly turns to Epicurus: I could have added here that Epicurus, who admired the conversation and bearing of Pyrrho, did not philosophize any differently, as Laertius indeed testifies somewhere, and as Plutarch intimates clearly enough on account of Epicurus’ doctrine about the possibility of all opinions. But this must be rehearsed more abundantly on another occasion, and, besides, Epicurus is not generally numbered among those great men whom we undertook to mention here.19

This is a remarkable passage, and curiously ill-informed for an author who is nowadays hailed as the “reviver of Epicureanism.”20 Gassendi’s bold identification of aliis, verosimilia, adeò vt etiam assensum ad illa inclinari paterentur: cùm certa tamen ac indubitata minimè concederent; quod Carneadis propositum fuit. Profecto hoc vnum propositum ipsis fuit, Nihil sciri.” 16  In later works, e.g., Syntagma Philosophicum (OO I 18a–b), Gassendi continued to distinguish strongly between the two versions of Academic scepticism, which, again following Sextus Empiricus (P I 220), he habitually referred to as the Middle or Second Academy and the New or Third Academy, respectively. 17  Paganini (2023: 81–82) notes that in later works, e.g., Synt. Phil. (OO I 72b), Gassendi came to better distinguish between Pyrrhonian and Academic scepticism (see also 284 below). It must be noted, however, that in the very same passage Gassendi also reiterates Sextus’ view that Arcesilaus’ version of Academic scepticism hardly differs from Pyrrhonism. 18  Exerc. II vi 6 (OO III 205a): “De Pyrrhone ipso adeóque & de Scepticis nihil est quod hîc adiiciamus, cùm in hac Exercitatione toti insistamus in ipsorũ vestigiis, cúmque constet apud omnes, qui Sectarum habuerint notitiam & Pyrrhonis, & Arcesilai vnam esse Philosophiam.” 19  Exerc. II vi 6 (OO III 205a): “Adiicerem hîc Epicurum admiratum conuersationem, institutumque Pyrrhonis haud secùs fuisse philosophatum, quod sanè alicubi Laërtius testatur [in margine legitur: “in Pyrrh. libr. 9.”], & Plutarchus satis innuit ex eius de opinionum omnium possibilitate sententia. Verùm & hoc est aliis locis retexendum vberius, & Epicurus non solet vulgò adscribi magnis illis viris, de quibus mentionem hoc loco facere instituimus. ” 20  This exact phrase is found in numerous publications. See, e.g., Henry 2000: 123b.

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Epicurus’ philosophy with Pyrrho’s – namely, with Pyrrhonian scepticism – is based on just two sources: Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch. In a marginal note the first reference is specified as referring to Diogenes Laertius’ chapters on Pyrrho and Pyrrhonism in Book IX of the Lives of Eminent Philosophers (i.e., IX 61–108). Most likely Gassendi was thinking of section 64, where Epicurus is said to have admired Pyrrho’s way of life, and 69, which he may have misread as including Epicurus among the Pyrrhonians.21 The other reference must be to Pseudo-Plutarch’s Opinions of the Philosophers, where several chapters conclude with a reference to Epicurus stating that all the aforementioned views are possible.22 Gassendi does not, as one would expect, refer to Book X of the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, which deals exclusively with Epicureanism and contains Epicurus’ famous Letters to Herodotus and to Pythocles. Apparently, at the time when he wrote the Exercitationes, his knowledge of Diogenes Laertius was limited to Book IX, which is largely devoted to Pyrrhonism. This is also confirmed by the disparaging remark about Epicurus at the end of the quoted passage, which shows us that, at this moment, Gassendi had not yet developed the vast knowledge and appreciation of Epicurean philosophy that would be the fruit of his later life. Yet, for all the misunderstandings, the passage tells us something very interesting: at some time before 1624, Gassendi associated Epicurus with Pyrrhonian scepticism, not the milder, probabilistic scepticism of Carneades and his followers. However, the only Epicurean doctrine he could adduce in evidence for this presumed scepticism was Epicurus’ MME, which Gassendi knew from Pseudo-Plutarch’s Opinions of the Philosophers. When, in later years, Gassendi had thoroughly acquainted himself with Diogenes Laertius’ Book X, on Epicurus – an acquaintance that completely altered his understanding and appreciation of Epicureanism, – he continued to view the MME as a kind of scepticism. In 1642, in one of his letters to Louis de Valois, we find him likening Epicurus’ MME to Pyrrhonian scepticism.23 This assessment is not repeated in the Animadversiones of 1649, but it recurs in the Syntagma ­Philosophicum, which was published posthumously in 1658.24 Both in the Letter and in the Syntagma passage, Gassendi starts from Sextus Empiricus’ division of ancient philosophers 21  Diog. Laert. IX 69: Πρὸς τούτοις διήκουε τοῦ Πύρρωνος Ἑκαταῖός τε ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Τίμων ὁ Φλιάσιος ὁ τοὺς Σίλλους πεποιηκώς, περὶ οὗ λέξομεν, ἔτι τε Ναυσιφάνης Τήιος, οὗ φασί τινες ἀκοῦσαι Ἐπίκουρον. οὗτοι πάντες Πυρρώνειοι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, … – “Besides these, Pyrrho’s pupils includ-

ed Hecataeus of Abdera, Timon of Phlius, author of the Silli, of whom more anon, and also Nausiphanes of Teos, said by some to have been a teacher of Epicurus. All these were called Pyrrhoneans after the name of their master, …” (transl. Hicks 1931). 22 Ps.-Plutarch. Plac. II 2 (shape of the world); II 14 (substance of the stars); II 21 (size of the sun); II 22 (shape of the sun); III 15 (earthquakes). 23  Letter to Louis de Valois, dated 28 February 1642 (OO VI, 134b–135b; relevant section in 135a): “… tales autem fuere Pyrrhonij, ad quos tametsi Epicurus, pertinere interdum videatur, ac præsertim circa Meteora, seu Sublimia, atque Cælestia; attamen ad Dogmaticos, quod dogmata, tradiderit, & Sapientem esse traditurum censuerit, videtur esse referendus.” 24  Syntagma Philosophicum, ‘Liber Prooemialis’, ch.6 (OO I, 13b–17b, relevant section in 13b–14a).

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into three groups (P I 1–4): the Dogmatics, who believe they have found the truth; the Acataleptics, who believe that all things are incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτα); and the Sceptics, who practise suspension (ἐποχή) of judgment.25 Of these three groups, the Sceptics are identified with the Pyrrhonians and the Acataleptics with those Academics who took their cue from Arcesilaus. Curiously, in Sext. Emp. PH I 3, which is Gassendi’s source for this passage, the Academics are not represented by Arcesilaus but by Carneades and his pupil Clitomachus, that is, the very two who at Sext. Emp. PH I 132 are said to have introduced the notion of the πιθανόν – or the ‘verisimilar’ as it was rendered by Gassendi in Exercitationes II vi 6.26 That Gassendi did not just use Arcesilaus to represent all subsequent stages of the Academy, but really meant to exclude Carneades and his followers, is made clear by the addition, in the letter to Louis de Valois (OO VI, 134b), of the words “qui ne verisimilitudinem quidem retinuerunt” (“who did not even retain the notion of verisimilitude”). Nevertheless, it can be argued that Gassendi, by identifying Epicurus’ MME with Pyrrhonian scepticism rather than Arcesilaus’ academicism, a fortiori also dissociated it from Carneades’ probabilism, which is even further removed from Pyrrhonism. The third division of ancient philosophers, the Dogmatics, is said to include such schools as the Peripatetics and the Stoics. As for Epicurus, although in the end Gassendi follows Sextus in assigning him, too, to the Dogmatics, he expresses the following reservation (Syntagma, OO I, 13b–14a): (= Epicurus), alone among all (scil. the Dogmatics), seems to have come very close to Scepticism. For as often as something can have a multiple cause and may happen in several ways, he then opposes the causes and ways27 to each other after the manner of the Sceptics, and he treats the rest accordingly, writing to Pythocles [Pyth. 87]: “If someone retains one way, but rejects another, although this agrees with the appearances in equal measure, he clearly deviates from all true method of natural philosophy, and lapses into myth.” Also these terms of his, προσμεῖναι, ‘to wait’, or ‘that one should wait and survey all things, lest something be proclaimed rashly’, and likewise ἐνδέχεσθαι, ‘that it may happen in this way, but may also happen in another way’, which are found in Laertius and Plutarch, seem to be proper to the Sceptical way.28 25  Letter (OO VI, 135a) & Syntagma (OO I, 13b): “assensum sustinentes”. Cf. Sext. Emp. PH I 8–10 and I 196. 26  See n. 15 above, and text thereto. 27  In Epicurus’ Letter to Pythocles, individual explanations are alternately and interchangeably referred to as αἰτίαι (‘causes’ or ‘explanations’) or τρόποι ‘ways’ (see Bakker 2016: 9–10). Following Epicurus’ lead, Gassendi speaks of ‘causae’ or ‘modi’, which are also used interchangeably. In modern studies there is some debate about whether αἰτία should be translated as ‘cause’ or ‘explanation’ (see Masi 2014: 39–43; Bakker 2016: 9–10; and Masi 2022: 263–266). In this article I will generally speak of ‘explanation’, reserving the words ‘cause’ and ‘way’ to render Gassendi’s ‘causa’ and ‘modus’, respectively. 28 Gassendi, Syntagma (OO I, 13b–14a): “… vnus ex omnibus {sc. Dogmaticis} maximè accessisse ad Scepsin videtur. Quippe quotiescumque aliquid causam habere multiplicem potest, variísque modis contingere, tum causas, modosque Scepticorum more inter se opponit, ac cætera inter hoc habet, scribens ad Pythoclem, Quòd si quis unum quidem modum retineat, alium verò, tametsi æquè

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Several points can be made regarding Gassendi’s assessment. Firstly, the scepticism in question is definitely Pyrrhonian scepticism. Gassendi now clearly distinguishes between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism, reserving the word ‘scepticism’ (as Sextus had) for the latter.29 Secondly, the comparison with scepticism is limited to specific aspects of the sceptical method. In order to identify these aspects, it may be useful to compare the quoted passage with Sextus’ own description of scepticism (P I 8 & 10): Scepticism is the ability of opposing appearances and thoughts in any way whatsoever, by which, through the equipollence (ἰσοσθένεια) of the things and statements that are being opposed, we first arrive at suspension (ἐποχή) and afterwards at unperturbedness (ἀταραξία). […] With ‘equipollence’ we mean an equality in terms of probability and improbability, to the effect that none of the conflicting statements takes priority over the other as being more probable. ‘Suspension’ is a standstill of the mind owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. 30 (emphasis added)

The sceptical method consists of four stages: (1) opposing appearances and thoughts to each other, (2) establishing their equipollence or ‘equal force’, (3) suspending one’s judgment about them, and (4) thus arriving at unperturbedness or ‘ataraxia’. It is not hard to recognize most of these stages in Gassendi’s passage. When Epicurus “opposes the causes and ways to each other” or claims “that it may happen in this way, but may also happen in another way” he is practising (1) the sceptical opposition of appearances and thoughts; when he observes that different ways “agree with the appearances in equal measure”, he is in fact establishing their (2) equipollence; and when he calls upon us to προσμεῖναι, ‘to wait’, he is urging us to practise (3) ἐποχή, ‘suspension of judgement’. Only the sceptical ataraxia is missing, as was to be expected, since the Epicureans had their own, very different conception of ataraxia. A third point that needs to be made is that the application of (these aspects of) the sceptical method is limited to a well-defined area of physical inquiry. When Gassendi writes, “as often as something can have a multiple cause and may happen in several ways”, he is referring to Epicurus’ MME, which was typically applied to the so-called “meteora, or lofty and celestial phenomena”, as Gassendi calls them in the parallel passage in the letter to Louis de Valois. The reference to the verb ἐνδέχεσθαι, ‘to be possible’, points in the same direction. In Diog. Laert. X, this apparentibus consonum repudiet; is perspicuè ab omni vera de rebus naturalibus philosophandi ratione deflectit, delabiturque ad fabulas. Illæ etiam eius voces προσμεῖναι exspectare, siue exspectandũ, circumspicie˜dúmque omnia, ne quid temere pronuncietur; itémque ἐνδέχεσθαι, posse ita contingere, posse & contingere secus, quæ apud Laërtium, PIutarchúmque sunt, Scepticæ propriè esse videntur.” 29  See also n. 17 above. 30  Sext. Emp. PH I 8 & 10: Ἔστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ᾿ οἱονδήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ᾿ ἧς ἐρχόμεθα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχήν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν. […] ἰσοσθένειαν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν ἰσότητα, ὡς μηδένα μηδενὸς προκεῖσθαι τῶν μαχομένων λόγων ὡς πιστότερον. ἐποχὴ δέ ἐστι στάσις διανοίας δι᾿ ἣν οὔτε αἴρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν.

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verb is found only in Epicurus’ letters to Herodotus and Pythocles and is used exclusively in the context of multiple explanations. The same word is also used in Pseudo-Plutarch’s Opinions of the Philosophers to refer to Epicurus’ endorsement of multiple explanations for certain celestial and lofty phenomena.31 In this context, the reference to the word προσμεῖναι, ‘to wait’, is somewhat surprising. It is used by Epicurus to refer to those cases where our first observations are insufficient to support our opinion, and we need to wait until further and more accurate observations either affirm or disaffirm our opinion.32 In these cases, the doubt, and hence the need to suspend our judgment, is only temporary. In Anim. 153–154, Gassendi ascribes a very similar practice to the Stoics, the Academics, and the Neoplatonic author Macrobius, without any suggestion that he considered these thinkers sceptics for that reason. Anyway, apart from this one reference to προσμεῖναι, which does not occur in the parallel passage in the letter to Louis de Valois, Gassendi seems to have reserved the qualification ‘sceptic’ for Epicurus’ MME.33 Although in the Animadversiones Gassendi never explicitly compares the MME to scepticism, nevertheless he often describes the method in terms that strongly recall the three aspects of Pyrrhonian scepticism that I distinguished above: (1) opposing different views, (2) establishing their equal strength,34 and (3) suspending judgment.35 A good example is the following passage (772–773): Epicurus, however, while not rejecting anyone’s view absolutely, will not adhere to anyone absolutely, either, but will maintain that it may be the case that any other view is true. But if you ask him which one that is, he will frankly say that he doesn’t know; for he does not see any reasons that would affirm any one opinion, to which there could not be (1) opposed other reasons, (2) equally verisimilar, that would affirm any other opinion. Do you really think that he is therefore more ignorant than Anaxagoras or Xenophanes because, even though he has clearly perceived the reasons of both the one and the other, he is not led by those reasons in the same way as either one of them is? Surely, the difference is this, that whereas they allow themselves to be carried away by their own reasons, he contains himself and keeps his (3) judgment suspended. 36 (emphasis added) 31 

See n. 22 above. Diog. Laert. X 34; Epicur. Hrdt. 38; Id. Men. 127; Id. RS 24. See also Asmis 1984: 50–51, 190–193, 326. 33  A similar assessment of Epicurus’ MME is found in Algra 2018: 420, as well as in Tieleman 2018: 263, who both speak of “regionalized skepticism”, i.e., scepticism applied to a specific ‘region’. 34 E.g., Anim. 132 “fieri consimiliter, vt alio modo fiant, possit” (“it could equally well be the case that they occur in another way”); 803 “[Epicurus] patienter non tulerit, haberi vllam ita ratam, vt cæteræ non censerentur paris cum ea esse probabilitatis.” (“[Epicurus] did not patiently accept that any view was considered so sure, that others were not judged to be of equal probability with it.”) 35 E.g., Anim. 759 “assensum continere”; 785 “sustinere iudicium”; 792 “assensum continuit”; 1023 “continere assensum”. 36 Gassendi, Anim. 772–773: “Epicurus autem nullius sententiam absolutè reiiciens, nulli absolutè hærebit, sed fieri posse tuebitur, vt quæpiam alia vera sit. Quod si ex eo quæras, quænam illa sit? tum dicet ingenuè se id ignorare; quippe non perspiciens rationes sententiam quampiam stabilienteis, quibus non opponantur aliæ perinde verisimiles aliam quampiam constabilientes. An verò proptereà 32 

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It must be noted, however, that both in the Letter and in the Syntagma passage, having discussed the sceptical nature of Epicurus’ MME, Gassendi goes on to argue, contrary to what he wrote in the Exercitationes, that Epicurus should nevertheless be considered a dogmatic. In evidence he points to Epicurus’ claim that the sage will hold firm opinions and have no doubts (Diog. Laert. X 121; Plutarch. Adv. Col. 1117F), as well as to Lucretius’ explicit refutation of scepticism (Lucret. IV 469–475). Moreover, he even applies this assessment to the MME itself, pointing out that at the beginning of the Letter to Pythocles (Pyth. 85), Epicurus calls for “our conviction to be firm, not just about those things which occur in one way only, but also about those that may happen in several ways, in the sense that we should maintain that they can happen in several ways.”37 In other words, whereas for the real sceptic the fact of having multiple possible explanations is indicative of our lack of knowledge, for the Epicurean the very fact of having multiple possible explanations is knowledge, which warrants a firm conviction. There can be no doubt, then, that Gassendi interpreted Epicurus’ MME as a kind of (but not quite the same as) Pyrrhonian scepticism, applied and limited to a specific field of inquiry – namely, the meteora – while still being firmly imbedded in a dogmatic framework. In the next section I want to investigate more closely Epicurus’ own exposition of the MME in the Letter to Pythocles, in order to see how this account may have informed Gassendi’s interpretation of the method.

3. Epicurus’ general account of the MME The MME and its application to the meteora are introduced and explained by Epicurus in two key passages: Hrdt. 78–82 & Pyth. 85–88.38 In the first of these passages we are told that the main purpose of studying and explaining the meteora is to eradicate the false and disconcerting belief that these phenomena are caused and controlled by the gods. However, since these matters are non-evident (Hrdt. 80: ἄδηλα),39 being visible to us only from a distance (Hrdt. 80),40 we can only formulate ignorantior est Anaxagora, aut Xenophane, quòd perspectis licèt illius, istiusque rationibus, non iis perinde, ac eorum vteruis ducatur? Certè id dumtaxat discriminis est, quòd cùm illi patiantur sese suis abripi rationibus, sese ipse contineat, suumque arbitrium suspensum tueatur.” 37 Gassendi, Syntagma (OO I, 14a): “Et quod ad Doctrinã quidem attinet, rem insinuauit satis initio Epistolæ ad Pythoclem, dum constantem esse persuasionem voluit, non modò circa ea, quæ vno tantùm modo se habent; sed etiam circa ea,quæ fieri possunt pluribus, eo sensu, quo tenendum est, posse ea fieri pluribus modis.” 38  Recent studies of Epicurus’ conception of the MME are, e.g., Bénatouïl 2003; Verde 2013, 1–9; and Id. 2022, 53–65. 39  See also Epicur. Pyth. 104 (with ἀφανής instead of ἄδηλος), and Diog. Oen. fr.13 iii 3 Smith (which Gassendi did not know). 40  Gassendi, too, sees the distance as a circumstance which inhibits clear observations of the celestial bodies: see, e.g., Anim. 847.

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causes by analogy with what happens “down here” (Hrdt. 80: παρ’ ἡμῖν, literally “with us”). Yet even if in such matters we generally find several causes rather than one, as long as divine causation is excluded, our investigation will have “reached sufficient accuracy” (Hrdt. 80: ἀκρίβεια) to free us from superstitious fear. The second passage, from the Letter to Pythocles, is more informative about the epistemological background of the MME. I will quote and discuss the relevant portion (Pyth. 85–88) in full. The passage starts as follows (85)41: First of all, then, we must not suppose that any other object is to be gained from the knowledge of the meteora, whether they are dealt with in connexion or independently, than unperturbedness (ataraxia) and a firm conviction, just as in all other fields of inquiry.42

According to Epicurus the only object of meteorology is to contribute to our unperturbedness, presumably, as he stated in Hrdt. 81, by freeing us from the false belief that astronomical and meteorological phenomena are caused by the gods. Epicurus then proceeds with an account of the scientific method that must be followed when studying the meteora (86): We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning, either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems, like the proposition that ‘the universe consists of bodies and intangible nature’, or that ‘the elements are indivisible’, and all such statements that have a singular agreement (μοναχὴν συμφωνίαν) with the appearances. For this is not so with the meteora: they have a multiple explanation (πλεοναχὴν αἰτίαν) of coming-into-being and a multiple account of being that agrees with our sensations.43 (emphasis added)

Epicurus distinguishes two methods of inquiry. One method applies to the “modes of life”, that is, ethics, as well as to certain fundamental physical problems, and produces single solutions; the other applies to the meteora and produces multiple solutions. Epicurus gives two examples of fundamental physical problems that should be dealt with according to the first method: “‘the universe consists of bodies and the intangible’”, and “‘the elements are indivisible’”. Both these problems as well as others of a similar 41  All the translations of Epicurus’ Letter to Pythocles in this section have been freely adapted from Bailey (1926). 42 Epicur. Pyth. 85: Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μὴ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ μετεώρων γνώσεως εἴτε κατὰ συναφὴν λεγομένων εἴτε αὐτοτελῶς νομίζειν εἶναι ἤπερ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν βέβαιον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. 43 Epicur. Pyth. 86: μήτε τὸ ἀδύνατον [καὶ] παραβιάζεσθαι, μήτε ὁμοίαν κατὰ πάντα τὴν θεωρίαν ἔχειν ἢ τοῖς περὶ βίων λόγοις ἢ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν προβλημάτων κάθαρσιν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ πᾶν σῶμα καὶ ἀναφὴς φύσις ἐστίν, ἢ ὅτι ἄτομα στοιχεῖα, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα [ἢ] ὅσα μοναχὴν ἔχει τοῖς φαινομένοις συμφωνίαν· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μετεώρων οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε πλεοναχὴν ἔχει καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίαν καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι σύμφωνον κατηγορίαν.

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nature are discussed in the Letter to Herodotus (Hrdt. 39 and 41) under the general heading of ἄδηλα, “non-evident phenomena” (Hrdt. 38ff.). Curiously, later on in the same Letter (Hrdt. 80), the meteora are classified under the same heading. Apparently, then, there are two kinds of ἄδηλα: problems that pertain to the foundations of physics, for which there is only one true explanation, and the so-called meteora (i.e., celestial and lofty matters), which invite several explanations.44 Gassendi, as we shall see in the next section, accepts the fundamental distinction of these two types of ἄδηλα, each requiring its own method of inquiry. Epicurus goes on (86–87): For we must not conduct natural philosophy by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of the appearances: [87] for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and empty opinions, but we must live free from trouble. Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which are explained according to the multiple method (πλεοναχὸν τρόπον) in agreement (συμφώνως) with the appearances, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable arguments (τὸ πιθανολογούμενον) about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another that agrees just as well (ὁμοίως σύμφωνον) with the appearance, it is clear that he leaves all natural philosophy behind and lapses into myth.45 (emphasis added)

According to Epicurus, in studying the meteora one should admit τὸ πιθανολογούμενον, “that which is plausibly argued”.46 This compound, the first part of which is formed from the adjective πιθανός, “persuasive” or “probable”, is in fact the only instance in all the works of Epicurus quoted in Diog. Laert. X where the notion of probability is applied in the context of Epicurean theory.47 In his Latin translation (Anim. 61), Gassendi renders the expression as “quicquid verisimile est” – “whatever is verisimilar”, which is also, in fact, the only occurrence of either ‘verisimilis’ or ‘probabilis’ (Gassendi uses the two words interchangeably) in the entire translation. Nevertheless, as we shall see, verisimilitude and probability are key 44  Asmis (1984, 193–194) criticizes this division of the ἄδηλα into two distinct types. According to Asmis, there is no fundamental division, and hence no fundamental difference in the epistemological value of theories that are formulated about the ἄδηλα of either kind. For similar views, see also n. 56 below. 45 Epicur. Pyth. 86–87: οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίας φυσιολογητέον, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται· [87] οὐ γὰρ ἤδη ἀλογίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἔχει χρείαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀθορύβως ἡμᾶς ζῆν. πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀσείστως κατὰ πάντων κατὰ πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ἐκκαθαιρομένων, συμφώνως τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅταν τις τὸ πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δεόντως καταλίπῃ· ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλῃ ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὂν τῷ φαινομένῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ. 46  For Epicurus’ use of this term, as well as its Platonic and esp. Aristotelian antecedents, see Corradi 2016. 47  The only other instance of this word in those writings of Epicurus that were included in Diog. Laert. X, οὐκ ἀπιθάνως “not unconvincingly” in Pyth. 84, does not refer to any theory but is part of Epicurus’ positive evaluation of Pythocles’ success in mastering the arguments. For certain or possible instances of πιθανός in other writings of Epicurus and his followers (writings unknown to Gassendi), see Corradi 2016: 240–243, and Leone 2017: 98–99.

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terms in Gassendi’s interpretation of the MME. It is not quite clear how, precisely, Epicurus understood τὸ πιθανολογούμενον, but clearly it was not meant to suggest different degrees of probability, since immediately afterwards Epicurus specifies that various theories agree with the appearances in equal measure (ὁμοίως). Similar statements about the equal strength of alternative explanations are also found further on in the Letter to Pythocles. In Pyth. 93, Epicurus says: “The turnings of the sun and the moon may happen because of an obliquity of the whole heaven […], but equally well (ὁμοίως) by an outward thrust of air …”,48 and in Pyth. 94: “The wanings of the moon and its subsequent waxings might happen both because of a revolution of that body and equally well (ὁμοίως) because of certain conformations of air …”.49 In his commentary, Gassendi, too, emphasizes the equal strength of alternative explanations several times.50 Epicurus goes on (87–88): Now we can obtain signs (σημεῖα) of what happens up there from some of the appearances down here: for we can observe how they come to pass, though we cannot observe the appearances up there: for they may be produced in multiple ways (πλεοναχῶς). [88] Yet we must never desert the appearance of each of these phenomena and further, as regards what is connected with it, must distinguish those things whose production in multiple ways (πλεοναχῶς) is not contested (οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται) by phenomena down here. 51 (emphasis added)

Signs are a key concept in Epicurean epistemology.52 Signs about the non-evident may be obtained from similar phenomena that can be observed. In astronomy and meteorology we often find several different phenomena that all present similarities to the non-evident thing we wish to understand. In such cases we have to accept all the different explanations that are suggested by the observable phenomena. In his translation of this passage (Anim. 61), Gassendi renders the Greek expression σημεῖα φέρειν (“obtain signs”) as “coniecturas ducere” (“make conjectures”). The same or very similar expressions he also uses to translate the cognate verb σημειοῦσθαι as well as its synonym τεκμαίρεσθαι (“to infer from signs”).53 By choosing this trans48 Epicur. Pyth. 93: Τροπὰς ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἐνδέχεται μὲν γίνεσθαι κατὰ λόξωσιν οὐρανοῦ […], ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ ἀέρος ἀντέξωσιν, … 49 Epicur. Pyth. 94: Κενώσεις τε σελήνης καὶ πάλιν πληρώσεις καὶ κατὰ στροφὴν τοῦ σώματος τούτου δύναιντ’ ἂν γίνεσθαι, καὶ κατὰ σχηματισμοὺς ἀέρος ὁμοίως, …

50  See, e.g., Anim. 132, 803 (both quoted n. 34 above), Anim. 773 (quoted n. 36 above), and Synt. (OO I, 13b–14a) (quoted n. 28 above). 51 Epicur. Pyth. 87–88: σημεῖα δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις συντελουμένων φέρειν τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν τινα φαινομένων, ἃ θεωρεῖται ᾗ ὑπάρχει, καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φαινόμενα·ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται πλεοναχῶς γίνεσθαι. [88] τὸ μέντοι φάντασμα ἑκάστου τηρητέον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ συναπτόμενα τούτῳ διαιρετέον, ἃ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν γινομένοις πλεοναχῶς συντελεῖσθαι. 52  For an overview of Epicurus’ theory of signs, see, e.g., Asmis 1984: 175–180. 53  Diog. Laert. X 32 σημειοῦσθαι = Anim. 26 “coniecturam ducere”; Hrdt. 38 σημειωσόμεθα = Anim. 31 “coniecturam ducamus”; Hrdt. 39 τεκμαίρεσθαι = Anim. 32 “ducere coniecturam”; Pyth. 104 σημειῶται = Anim. 70 “desumat coniecturam”.

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lation, Gassendi makes explicit the uncertainty that seems to attach to Epicurean signs. Throughout Gassendi’s works, the notion of conjecture is closely allied to that of probability and verisimilitude.54 Gassendi may have been prompted to speak of conjecture in this context by a passage in Seneca’s Natural Questions. In NQ VI 20, 5 (quoted by Gassendi in Anim. 754), Seneca, having just cited a list of ancient theories about earthquakes, adds the following sentence: Epicurus says that all these causes may apply, and he tries his hand at several more, and he attacks others who claim that only one cause is true, even though it is hard to state something certain about those things that have to be pursued by conjecture.55

Gassendi’s interpretation of the notions of ‘sign’ and ‘sign-inference’ will be further explored in the next section. For this section, we still need to treat one further notion that is central to the MME, namely, agreement with the appearances. Epicurus’ criterion for accepting specific theories is their agreement (συμφωνία) with the appearances down here (again: παρ’ ἡμῖν, literally “with us”). In addition to the positive notion of agreement, Epicurus also employs a number of negative expressions. Instead of saying that a theory ‘agrees’ with the appearances, he may also say that it “does not disagree” (Pyth. 93 οὐθενὶ διαφωνεῖ), “does not conflict” (e.g., Pyth. 98 οὐ μάχεται), “is not impeded” (Pyth. 95 οὐθὲν ἐμποδοστατεῖ), or “is not contested” (e.g., Pyth. 88 οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται) with or by the appearances. Led by these negative formulations, Gassendi interprets agreement with the appearances as an absence of counter-evidence on the part of the appearances, which can at best establish a theory’s possibility.56 Gassendi’s interpretation appears clearly from his discussion of a passage in Epicurus’ Letter to Pythocles (Pyth. 88). In this passage, Epicurus discusses, among other things, whether the boundary of the world is rare or dense, concluding that “all options are possible, since none of the appearances contests it.”57 This position is explained by Gassendi in the following way (Anim. 759): 54  See, e.g., Gass. Exerc. I ii 7 (OO III 113b) “… probabiles solum conjecturas …”; Id. Exerc. II vi 6 (OO III 206a) “… non caret tamen sua […] probabilitate, ut quæ nitatur conjecturis …”; Id. Parhelia (OO III 653a) “Sufficit mihi coniecturam sequi, quæ vel vmbram quandam leuem probabilitatis habeat.”; Id. Letter to Gallileo, dated 1 November 1632 (OO VI, 53b–54a; relevant section in 53b) “Quantumcumque enim coniecturæ tuæ sint verisimillimæ, non sunt tibi tamen plusquam coniecturæ.” 55 Sen. NQ VI 20, 5: “Omnes istas posse esse causas Epicurus ait, pluresque alias temptat, et alios, qui aliquid unum ex istis esse affirmaverunt, corripit; cum sit arduum de iis, quae coniecturā sequenda sunt, aliquid certi promittere.” For a nuanced assessment of this report’s fidelity to Epicurus’ theory, see Verde 2013: 137–138; id 2022: 72–73. 56  More recently, a similar interpretation has been defended by, among others, Gisela Striker (1996). In contrast, based on Epicurus’ claim that every theory that is not contested (οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται) is true (Hrdt. 51; Diog. Laert. X 34; Sext. Emp. M VII 211), many modern scholars take the view that in Epicurean astronomy and meteorology all alternative explanations are individually true. See, e.g., Sedley 1982: 263–272; Asmis 1984: esp. 192–196; Allen 2001: esp. 198–199; Bénatouïl 2003: esp. 44–45; Verde 2013: 134–135; Id. 2022: 63–65. For an overview of some of the views and arguments on either side of the debate, see Bakker 2016: 13–31. 57 Epicur. Pyth. 88: πανταχῶς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται· τῶν γὰρ φαινομένων οὐδὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ …

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And indeed, he who will defend the view that the outermost boundary of the world is by itself dense, how will he show that it cannot be rare, when nothing contests58 its being rare, especially if the stars move through it, like fish in water or birds in the air, (and) although, even if they should remain at rest, they can also do this in a rare medium, just like the earth in mid-air? And he who will defend the view that it is by itself rare, how will he show that it cannot be dense, when nothing contests its being dense, especially if the stars rest in it, and (if), even if they move, they can also do this (in a dense medium), just like balls through tubes?59 (emphasis added)

If contestation proves a theory’s impossibility, then absence of contestation proves its possibility, and nothing more. However, the possibility of one theory does not preclude the possibility of another. Therefore, all alternative theories that are not contested must be considered possible.

4. Epicurean sign-inference The first explicit reference to multiple explanations in Gassendi’s commentary occurs in a long note (Anim. 131–134) on a sentence in Diog. Laert. X 32 which states that “with respect to the non-evident (τὰ ἄδηλα) one must draw sign-inferences (σημειοῦσθαι) from the appearances.”60 Gassendi compares this statement to a similar one in the Letter to Herodotus 39, where, however, instead of σημειοῦσθαι the synonymous verb τεκμαίρεσθαι is used.61 This sets him on an interesting train of thought (Anim. 132)62: When here he (scil. Epicurus) says τεκμαίρεσθαι, and there σημειοῦσθαι, this calls to mind what we read περὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ τοῦ τεκμηρίου [about τὸ σημεῖον and τὸ τεκμήριον] in Quintilian [Inst. V 9]. For although both words may seem to mean the same thing as an ‘argument’ or a ‘middle term’ accommodated to the construction of a syllogism or demonstration, nevertheless he (scil. Quintilian) so distinguishes them, that he says [Inst. V 9, 3–4] that τεκμήριον means a necessary sign or argument,

58 Epicurus’ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν (literally ‘to testify against’) is standardly translated by Gassendi as either refragari (‘to vote against’), or, as in this case, as repugnare (‘to fight against’). 59 Gassendi, Anim. 759: “Et certè, Qui Mundi extremum esse reipsâ densum defendet; quomodo ostendet non posse esse rarum; cùm rarum esse nihil repugnet; ac præsertim si Astra per illud moueantur, vt pisces in aqua, aut volucres in aëre; quanquam & tametsi quiescant, id possunt perinde in raro, ac in medio aëre terra? Et Qui defendet reipsâ rarum; quomodo ostendet non posse esse densum; cùm densum esse nihil repugnet, ac præsertim si astra in illo quiescant; quæ etiam tametsi moueantur, id possunt perinde, ac globi per tubos?” 60  Diog. Laert. X 32: Ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρὴ σημειοῦσθαι. 61 Epicur. Hrdt. 39: ἡ αἴσθησις […], καθ’ ἣν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἄδηλον τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι. – “sense-perception […], according to which it is necessary by reasoning to draw sign-inferences about the non-evident.” 62  For another discussion of this passage, see Joy 1987: 169–172.

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which, since it “cannot be otherwise,” “hardly seems to pertain to the rules of the art (of rhetoric)”. “For,” he says, “where the sign is irrefutable, there is not even a dispute.” But σημεῖον, (he says) [Inst. V 9, 8–9], refers to a sign that is not necessary, thereby understanding those (signs) “which the Greeks call εἰκότα [‘likely’]”, and “which,” he says, “even if they do not suffice to remove doubt yet, combined with others, have great force.” And I would not wish to contend that Epicurus had regard for this distinction, but still it can be said that he used the word ‘sign’ […] in such a way that at one time he conceived of it as necessary and irrefutable, but at another time as not necessary and merely verisimilar, and always knowable by sense: for in Empiricus [M. VIII 177] he teaches αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον, “that a sign is something sensible”. 63

Although there is no suggestion that Quintilian, in the quoted passage, was thinking of Epicurus, and although Epicurus, as Gassendi is quick to point out, made no apparent distinction between the two words, that is, σημεῖον and τεκμήριον (or their respective cognates), nevertheless, Gassendi argues, Epicurus did distinguish two conceptions or kinds of sign, namely, one kind that is “necessary and irrefutable” and another that is “not necessary and merely verisimilar.” Interestingly, in ascribing the latter kind of sign to Epicurus, Gassendi seems to be moving, perhaps unwittingly, from an “approbative” to a “pejorative” use (as James Allen calls them) of the notion of probable.64 Used in an approbative sense, probability invites us to accept a view, even though it is not certain. It is in this sense that probability and verisimilitude are used in rhetoric, and this is also what Quintilian must have had in mind when he said that probable signs, “even if they do not suffice to remove doubt yet, combined with others, have great force.” Used in a pejorative sense, on the other hand, probability points to the insufficiency and uncertainty of our knowledge, inviting us to doubt and suspend our judgment. It is this aspect which Gassendi seems to stress when he calls these signs “merely verisimilar”. Subsequently, Gassendi goes on to specify Epicurus’ use of the two kinds of signs. He first deals with the necessary sign: 63  Anim. 132: “Vbi cùm dicit τεκμαίρεσθαι, & loco isto σημειοῦσθαι, id reuocatur in memoriam, quod περὶ τοῦ σημείου, καὶ τοῦ τεκμηρίου, legitur apud Quintilianum [lib.5.c.9.]. Tametsi enim vtraque vox sonare posse idem videtur, quod Argumentum, siue Medium Ratiocinationi, seu demonstrationi contexendae accommodatum; nihilominùs ille sic distinguit, vt dicat Τεκμήριον appellari signum, seu Argumentum necessarium, quod cùm aliter se habere non possit, vix pertinere ad artis præcepta videatur. Nam, inquit, vbi est signum insolubile, ibi ne lis quidem est: Σημεῖον verò appellari signum non necessarium, comprehendens nempe ea quæ εἰκότα Græci vocant, quæque, inquit ille, etiam si ad tollendum dubitationem, sola non sufficiunt, tamen aduncta cæteris plurimùm valent. Et non contenderim quidem Epicurum ad distinctionem hanc respexisse; sed dici tamen potest illum inter Demonstrandum ita vsurpasse signum […], vt nunc quidem illud quasi necessarium, insolubiléque habuerit, nunc verò quasi non necessarium, & verisimile duntaxat; ac semper quidem sensu prænotum, docendo apud Empiricum [2.adu. Logic. 177] αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον, signum rem sensibilem esse.” 64  Allen 2014: 48–49.

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And, for example, a demonstration from a sign of the former kind can be that by which he (scil. Epicurus) proves that there is void from the existence of motion, which is something sensible. Therefore, indeed, Ἐπίκουρος δοκεῖ (the words are those of Empiricus [M. VIII 329]) ἰσχυροτάτην τεθεικέναι ἀπόδειξιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι κενὸν τοιαύτην· Εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν, “Epicurus believes that he has put forward the most secure demonstration for proving the existence of void, namely this: if there is motion, there is void; but there is motion; therefore there is also void.”65

The example offered here, the existence of void, is actually one of the fundamental physical problems that Epicurus discusses in the Letter to Herodotus (Hrdt. 40) under the general heading of ἄδηλα, “non-evident phenomena” (Hrdt. 38ff.). As we saw in the previous section, in the Letter to Pythocles (Pyth. 86), Epicurus explains that problems such as these have a “singular agreement” (μοναχὴν συμφωνίαν) with the appearances. Immediately afterwards, Gassendi goes on to deal with Epicurus’ use of probable signs, and it is here that we finally arrive at the MME: On the other hand, almost all those (demonstrations) that will be put forward in his meteorology [i.e., in Epicurus’ Letter to Pythocles] are – it will be agreed – from a sign of the latter kind, as if indeed those things which appear on high are demonstrated to occur in a certain way so, that this way be merely probable, since it could equally well be the case that they occur in another way, whence this famous expression of his: ἐνδεχόμενον or ἐνδέχεσθαι – “it can happen or come to pass”. 66

While the fundamental physical theories (one of the two major subdivisions of the ἄδηλα) are demonstrated by using necessary signs, the meteora (the other major subdivision of the ἄδηλα), on the other hand, are explained on the basis of signs that are merely probable.67 Although Gassendi does not explicitly refer to it here, there can be no doubt that Epicurus’ general account of the MME in Pyth. 85–88 (see the previous section) was the main source for Gassendi’s interpretation of the Epicurean use of sign-inference in explaining the meteora. His confident ascription of the use of probable signs to Epicurus will have been prompted by Epicurus’ own use of the term τὸ πιθανολογούμενον “that which is plausibly argued” (Pyth. 87), or, 65  Anim. 132: “Exempli autem gratia, potest demonstratio ex signo prioris generis ea esse, quâ dari Inane ex motu, re sensibili, probat. Proptereà enim, Ἐπίκουρος δοκεῖ (verba sunt Empirici [ibid.]) ἰσχυροτάτην τεθεικέναι ἀπόδειξιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι κενὸν τοιαύτην· Εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν. Videtur sibi Epicurus eiusmodi firmissimam probando Inani attulisse demonstrationem: Si motus est, Inane est; motus autem est; Quare & Inane.” 66  Anim. 132: “Ex signo verò generis posterioris constabit esse eas ferè omneis, quæ in Meteorologicis afferentur; quasi nempe ea quae sublimè apparent, ita demonstrentur fieri certo modo, vt ille duntaxat probabilis sit, cùm fieri consimiliter, vt alio modo fiant, possit, ex quo est illud celebre ipsius Ἐνδεχόμενον seu Ἐνδέχεσθαι, Fieri, aut Contingere posse.” 67  Note that ‘verisimilar’ and ‘probable’ are used interchangeably.

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as translated by Gassendi himself, “whatever is verisimilar” (Anim. 61). The qualification “merely” also suggests that Gassendi is here thinking of verisimilitude in the pejorative sense, that is, a verisimilitude that is the opposite of certainty. When several theories are supported by probable signs of this kind, all of them must be considered equally possible. However, this neat division – with necessary signs being used in arguments about the fundamental physical theories and probable signs in arguments about the meteora – is soon thrown into confusion again, when, on the next page of his commentary (Anim. 133), Gassendi claims, rather than argues, that Epicurus did not consider demonstrations about fundamental physical problems to be absolutely necessary after all. “For,” says Gassendi, “physical propositions are not necessary in the same way as geometrical ones, but still such propositions may be assumed, which, in the face of objections made against them, can preserve their verisimilitude.”68 With one sweeping statement and with little evidence to go on, Gassendi transforms Epicurus’ dogmatism about the foundations of his physics into a kind of probabilism.69 Still, although both types of non-evident phenomena are now said to be explained on the basis of probable signs, a basic distinction is maintained for, while the signs that are used to explain the fundamental physical problems are probable in the approbative sense, those that are used to account for the meteora are probable in the pejorative sense. In other words: while Gassendi now sees Epicurus as a probabilist about the foundations of his physical theory (i.e., as being prepared to accept some theories as virtually certain), with respect to the meteora he still considers him to be committed to a Pyrrhonian-style suspension of judgment.

5. Adding and subtracting possible theories According to Epicurus and Gassendi, a theory must be admitted when it is possible and rejected when it is impossible. Now, it has been observed that Epicurus had a special conception of possibility. According to James Allen (2001: 197): The explanations discovered by the ‘multiple method’ or the ‘possible method’, as Epicurus calls it (Ep. Pyth. 87, 97), are more than epistemically possible, i.e. possible 68  Anim. 133: “tam ipse [Epicurus], quàm cæteri Physici propositiones etiam illas pro concessis habent, non quibus omnino contradici nequeat (quotæcumque enim huiusmodi sunt? imò quod-nam est, placitum, quod non à multis improbetur?) sed quibus licèt contradicatur, sua tamen manet vberior fides. Nempe non Physicæ perinde, ac Geometricæ necessariæ sunt; sed eæ tamen possunt assumi, quæ præ sibi oppositis verisimilitudinem tueantur.” 69  Although this kind of probabilism about the foundations of physical theory cannot be found in the ancient testimonies on Epicureanism, it corresponds very well to Gassendi’s own position (see, e.g., LoLordo 2007: 248: “Almost all Gassendi’s natural philosophical claims are supposed to be probable rather than demonstrative.”) One may, therefore, suspect Gassendi of imposing his own philosophical views on Epicurus in this passage.

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for all we know or all we can say. Rather, Epicurus seems to have regarded all the explanations compatible with the phenomena as objectively possible.70

As evidence, Allen points to Lucret. V 526–533. In this passage Lucretius states that every cause that is possible must be actualized somewhere among the infinite worlds, even though we do not know which one is operative in ours. However, for possibility to be thus equated with reality, there must be some objectivity about it, an objectivity that is independent of the state of our knowledge. Indeed, nowhere in the extant works of Epicurus or Lucretius is there any suggestion that what has once been admitted as possible might turn out to be wrong.71 Although Gassendi certainly knew the cited Lucretian passage, which he actually quotes in Anim. 847, he does not address this particular implication, perhaps rightly so. The very same passage also states that within our world only one explanation is true, but since we do not know which one it is, every given explanation must be held possible. Moreover, when in Lucret. VI 703–711, Lucretius gives another general account of multiple explanations, there is no further reference to infinite worlds or to possibility being more than just possibility.72 Gassendi may, therefore, be excused for ignoring this implication as being of no practical consequence for the explanation of celestial and atmospheric phenomena. Besides, the idea that all explanations are true depends on a doctrine – the infinity of worlds – which Gassendi considers highly improbable (Anim. 234): For it must be admitted that it cannot be proved by demonstration that there are no other worlds beside this one, since we profess that God could and still can create innumerable other worlds, because neither can his infinite power ever be exhausted, nor can the same abyss of nothingness from which this world was created resist in any way. But to maintain that elsewhere a plurality of worlds really exists, is completely beyond reason, not only because God wanted nothing to be clearly known except with respect to this one world, but also because the arguments are conflicting or utterly frivolous, or do not have much probability.73

70  Allen 2001: 197–198. See also Asmis 1984: 324–325; Jürss 1994: 240; Bénatouïl 2003: 42–44; Verde 2013: 134–135; Masi 2014: 47; Bakker 2016: 34; and Verde 2022: 64. 71  See esp. Jürss 1994: 240. 72  Regarding Gassendi’s reliance on Lucret. VI 703–711 for his interpretation of Epicurus’ MME, see Piergiacomi 2022: 273. Whether Lucretius’ presentation of the MME is faithful to Epicurus’ is still contested: see esp. Verde 2013: 139–141, and Id. 2022: 76–81. 73  Anim. 234: “Nam fatendum est quidem conuinci demonstratione non posse non esse Mundos præter hunc alios; quandò profitemur potuisse, & posse adhuc condere Deum alios innumerabileis; cùm neque vnquam exhauriri vis eius infinita valeat; neque eadem nihili abyssus, è qua iste eductus est, vlla ratione obsistere. At verò tueri aliunde plureis Mundos reipsa esse, præter rationem omninò est; tum quia Deus nihil planè voluit nisi de hoc vno innotescere; tum quia rationes oppositæ aut friuolae penitùs sunt, aut non multum habent probabilitatis.”

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If the plurality of worlds is merely a possibility – and not a very probable one – as Gassendi believes, it can no longer guarantee the actual truth of every possible explanation. Besides, even if there were in fact other worlds beside this one, God did not want us to know about them, and therefore it can mean nothing to us whether something is true over there or not. Consequently, when summarizing Epicurus’ MME, Gassendi only thinks of our world and simply states that (Anim.760): [Epicurus] clearly understood that the truth of the case is unique and single, and that, although it is subject to such a variety of opinions, these cannot all be true simultaneously.74

However, while ignoring Lucretius’ doctrine of the reality of the possible, Gassendi also ignores the implication that everything which the Epicureans admitted as possible is objectively possible and hence incapable of being proved false. According to Gassendi, Epicurus’ acceptance of specific theories as possible was a function of his own imperfect knowledge and the times in which he lived. As a consequence, it is conceivable and actually the case that some of the theories which Epicurus held possible will be falsified or have been so already. This admission is used by Gassendi to exculpate Epicurus from the charge of having defended false theories. A nice example of this defence is found in Anim. 865: Even though, to be sure, those (earlier) theories seem to be indefensible in the light of the things that have become apparent by the telescope, nevertheless before the invention of the telescope it was just as acceptable to make up those theories, …75

Although specific theories may be rejected, Gassendi does his best to show that the MME as such is unimpaired. However, the very existence of the telescope, to which Gassendi here refers, threatens to undermine the method and turn it into a mere provisional scepticism. As we saw above, the meteora, to which the MME typically applies, constitute a special class of phenomena, being only imperfectly visible due to the distance that separates them from us.76 However, if, due to the telescope, their relative invisibility can be lifted, there is no reason to maintain the special epistemological status of the meteora.77 Gassendi seems to be aware of this consequence – although he does not extend this conclusion to the entire study of the meteora – when he writes about stars that, because of their enormous distance, are not yet visible by the telescope (Anim. 760): 74  Anim. 760: “Perspexit rei veritatem vnicam esse, ac simplicem; & cùm opiniones tam variæ de illa habeantur, non posse eas omneis esse simùl veras.” 75  Anim. 865: “Tametsi enim ista cum iis, quae telescopio iam apparent, defendi non posse videantur; nihilominùs ante telescopium tam licuit ipsa fingere, …” 76  See n. 40 above, and text thereto. 77  On the expansion of the observable realm through the telescope, see, e.g., Messeri 1985: 60–61; Fisher 2005: 155 n. 10, 167, 333; and Paganini 2023: 91–92.

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[N]othing would prohibit them from being detectible, if the telescope were more perfect, or someone approached them more closely.78

Another interesting case where Gassendi both defends and corrects Epicurus’ views is found in Anim. 792–793. According to Epicurus (Pyth. 92), sunset and sunrise may be caused not only by the sun’s alternate motion below and above the horizon, but also by its alternate extinction and rekindling. Already in antiquity, Epicurus was ridiculed for entertaining the latter view, for example, by the Stoic astronomer Cleomedes (Cael. II 1, 426–466 Todd). Having cited, in translation, the relevant portion of Cleomedes’ criticism, Gassendi offers the following response (Anim. 792): Therefore, the fact that he (scil. Epicurus) did not neglect this opinion, but considered it one of the probable options, may seem to be condonable both on account of his love of truth, to which he was firmly devoted, and on account of the incomplete knowledge of the terrestrial globe, which could drive not just Epicurus but many others as well into rough patches – always, however, with this distinction that, while the others considered their theories to be indubitable, he never placed so much trust in them that he was not wary of the possibility that there might be some error concealed.79

It will be recalled that, according to Gassendi, Epicurus’ notion of possibility entails the possibility of error. In other words: Epicurus had already anticipated and accepted that some of his explanations would be proved wrong. Gassendi goes on to argue that Cleomedes’ objections, while correct in hindsight, were unjustified at the time, since they were not grounded in observation. It is only in our times that it has become possible to sail around the earth and actually observe the sun’s uninterrupted illumination.80 While, according to Gassendi, the progress of knowledge may eliminate some explanations, it may also add new ones. For the latter claim he does in fact have Epicurus’ explicit endorsement. Throughout the Letter to Pythocles, Epicurus repeatedly states that other explanations may be added.81 Gassendi uses this licence several times in his commentary. In Anim. 1031, for instance, commenting on Epicurus’ account of lightning (Pyth. 101–102) and explicitly availing himself of Epicurus’ licence, he adds a recent theory of Gianbattista Della Porta’s, who suggested that lightning is produced when certain oily fumes, driven upwards by the heat of the 78  Anim. 760: “… posse detegi nihil prohibeat, si telescopium fuerit perfectius, aut quispiam propiùs accesserit.” 79  Anim. 792: “Quam-obrem quòd ipsam non neglexerit, sed probabilium vnam habuerit, videri condonandum potest, tum veritatis amori, quo assensum continuit, tum non absolutæ globi Terreni notitiæ, quæ non Epicurum modò, sed plærosque etiam alios adigere in salebras potuit; eo semper discrimine, quòd cùm cæteri commentationes suas pro indubitatis haberent, ipse sic illis nunquam fiderit, quin subesse posse errorem fuerit suspicatus.” 80 See Anim. 792–793. 81  See, e.g., Masi 2014: 59; and Bakker 2016: 11.

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sun, reach the fiery upper region of the atmosphere and catch fire.82 Having quoted Della Porta’s account, Gassendi comments: You will say: “But why is it necessary, when the true cause is explored, to linger on the others?” Epicurus would answer that no cause is so well explored, that it is completely indubitable, or that another cause would not have its specific probability. 83

And a little further on: … but, however probable the cause that he has brought forward seems to be, Epicurus will always judge that either it is not completely beyond doubt or at any rate does not deprive the others of possibility, since nothing prohibits effects of this kind from following disjunctively from various causes. 84

Although Gassendi is willing to enlist new theories among Epicurus’ multiple explanations, they have to conform to the same rules as the original ones: being no more indubitable than any other theory, they will have to share the field. Another and more famous example of Gassendi’s introduction of a new theory is found in his discussion (Anim. 803–849) of Epicurus’ account of the motions of the stars (Pyth. 92–93). After a historical overview of relevant ancient theories, in Anim. 821, he introduces, and responds to, an imaginary interlocutor: “But,” you will say, “at least the hypothesis of the earth’s motion and heaven’s rest is so improbable that not even Epicurus gave it any probability; for from the lines that were quoted above [Lucret. V 534ff.] – ‘And that the earth may rest in the middle region of the world,’ etc. – it clearly transpires, that he did not want to make the earth move.” I answer, however, that it is true that Epicurus believed the earth to be at rest in the centre of the universe, as we already argued above, but that it is reasonable to infer ἐκ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου, or from his general method, that he would have been of the opinion that the earth, whether in the centre or outside the centre of the world, could move, if only the appearances either agreed or did not disagree. And perhaps he did not consider all the options but relied on the unqualified evidence of the senses, by which we all generally experience the earth to be at rest and the heavens and stars to move. Yet he could also have relied on other experiences of the senses, by which

82  Anim. 1031: “Quod demum de pluribus aliis possibilibus modis habet; reputari potest comprehendere etiam illum, quem Ioannes Baptista à Porta in hunc modum habet. [etc.]” The reference is to section 3, 1 of Gianbattista della Porta’s De aëris transmutationibus, which was published in 1609. 83  Anim. 1031: “Dices; At, quid necesse est, cùm verus modus sit exploratus, immorari in cæteris? Responderet Epicurus, nullum modum esse ita exploratum, vt vel ipse sit indubitatissimus, vel non alius quivis habeat specialem probabilitatem.” 84  Anim. 1031: “verùm vtcumque probabilem modum afferre visus fuerit, existimabit semper Epicurus illum aut non esse penitùs indubium; aut certè non adimere cæteris possibilitatem: cùm eiuscemodi effectus à variis causis disiunctim pendere nihil prohibeat.”

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it is established that the mind is deceived, when on account of similar evidence, it judges that the ship is at rest and the harbour moves. 85

Although the theory that makes the earth move and the heavens stand still is not included among Epicurus’ theories about the motions of the stars (Pyth. 92–93), Epicurus would have included it, says Gassendi, if he had found a way to bring it into agreement with the evidence of the senses. Here Gassendi seems to overlook one thing. Although he has not yet specified the type of motion the earth would be subject to, the context shows that this motion must at least comprise a daily eastward rotation on the earth’s own axis. Such a rotation, however, would be incompatible with the Epicurean notion of gravity. According to Epicurus, gravity is not (as Gassendi assumes in his defence of the moving-earth-theory in Anim. 829–830) directed towards the centre of the earth, but (as he explains in Anim. 212–213) such that it draws everything along parallel lines down to infinity.86 Consequently, anyone who would find themselves on the underside of the earth, would fall off, and this would also happen to us if the earth revolved on its axis. Therefore, Epicurus could not have admitted the moving-earth-hypothesis without significantly altering his physical theory. Gassendi, on the other hand, treats the MME as separable from Epicurean physical theory and applicable within another physical framework. On the following pages (Anim. 821–840), Gassendi goes on to offer an extensive argumentation in favour of the moving-earth-theory, and more specifically the Copernican hypothesis, leaving no doubt as to where his sympathy lies. He even goes so far as to state that “nothing would be more verisimilar than that the earth was destined by nature to revolve to the east, rather than that some prime mover was erected in order to drag everything to the west.”87 It is somewhat unexpected, therefore, though hardly surprising after Galileo’s condemnation of 1633, that he concludes his account with what seems to be an affirmation of the orthodox view that the earth does not move (Anim. 841):

85  Anim. 821: “At, inquies, saltem Hypothesis de Telluris Motu, & Cæli Quiete, ita est improbabilis, vt ne Epicurus quidem ipsi fecerit probabilitatem; Quippe vel illis versibus recitatis superius Terráque, vt in media Mundi regione quiescat, &c. manifestè colligitur, noluisse ipsum Terram moueri. Respondeo verum quidem esse placuisse Epicuro Terram in medio Mundi quiescere, quod suprà quoque probauimus; sed par esse tamen coniicere ἐκ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου, seu ex generali eius methodo, fuisse illum opinatum, posse quoque Terram, seu in medio, seu extra medium Mundi moueri; si modò ea, quæ apparerent, aut congruerent, aut non repugnarent. Ac fortassis quidem omnia non expendit, sed simplici sensus euidentiæ stetit, quâ omnes vulgò experimur Terram quiescere, & cælum, sideráve moveri: Attamen stare quoque potuit aliis sensus experimentis, quibus constat decipi mentem, dum ob similem euidentiam, iudicat nauim quiescere, & portum moueri.” 86  On Gassendi’s interpretation of the Epicurean theory of gravity, see now Coture 2021. 87  Anim. 823: “Nihil verisimilius sit, quàm esse destinatam à natura Terram, vt versùs ortum conuertatur, potiusquàm exstructum Primum mobile, quod rapiat omnia versùs occasum.”

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Yet it [viz. the orthodox view] must surely be held in the highest esteem and, in addition to the weight of authority, must also be commended by the fact that, although the opinion about the motion of the earth seems to be approved by some verisimilar arguments, nevertheless no demonstration exists that would prove it to be true; accordingly, one cannot rightfully object to the opposite opinion [viz. that the earth does not move] that it lacks demonstrations and is refuted by the certainty of the other view. 88

Interestingly, what Gassendi presents here as a defence or even endorsement of the orthodox view against the Copernican hypothesis, is in fact nothing but a redress, in good Epicurean fashion, of the balance which he himself had done everything to tip in favour of the other view. Indeed, as he states in Anim. 1031, “however probable the cause that he has brought forward seems to be, Epicurus will always judge that either it is not completely beyond doubt or, at any rate, does not deprive the others of possibility.”89 So, the best one can say is that the orthodox view cannot be rejected, not that it is more convincing.90

6. Unequal probabilities According to Gassendi, as we saw, Epicurus’ MME constitutes a kind of scepticism, in which all alternative explanations are equally strong, or equipollent. In the Animadversiones, he makes a few references to this equipollence, sometimes in terms of possibility, as when, in Anim. 132, he writes that “it could equally well be the case that they occur in another way”, and sometimes in terms of verisimilitude or probability, as when, in Anim. 773, he speaks of alternative opinions being “equally verisimilar”, or when, in Anim. 803, he asserts that other views are “of equal probability”.91 Passages such as these, then, seem to confirm Gassendi’s sceptical interpretation of the MME. At other instances, however, Gassendi does not hesitate to ascribe unequal probabilities to alternative theories. When discussing the possible shapes of the stars, for instance, Gassendi comments (Anim. 788) that “although it must not be 88  Anim. 841: “Est tamen profectò maximi faciendum; ac præter pondus authoritatis, suaderi vel ex eo debet, quòd tametsi opinio de motu Terræ probari videatur quibusdam verisimilibus argumentis, nulla est tamen demonstratio, quæ illam esse veram conuincat; adeò vt exprobrari non possit opinioni oppositae, quòd demonstrationibus careat, certitudinéque ab ipsa vincatur.” 89  See n. 84 above. 90  Brundell (1987: 46) is inclined to take Gassendi’s defence of the orthodox view more seriously. He also points out, however, that it was only after the publication of the Animadversiones in 1649, that Gassendi began to seriously endorse the Tychonic hypothesis (which assumes the earth’s rest) over the Copernican one. 91  Anim. 132 “fieri consimiliter, vt alio modo fiant, possit”; Anim. 773 “perinde verisimiles”; and 803 “paris … probabilitatis”.

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denied that it is most verisimilar that all the stars are spherical, it is proper for us to be content with such verisimilitude.”92 How could statements such as this one be reconciled with the equipollence that Gassendi also associates with Epicurus’ multiple explanations? A possible answer would be that the attribution of greater and smaller probabilities is Gassendi’s own, rather than Epicurus’. Thus, in the previous section, we saw that Gassendi considered no theory to be more verisimilar than the Copernican hypothesis or Della Porta’s explanation of lightning, neither of which was even known to Epicurus. Yet, even in these cases, Gassendi gives the impression that he is following and describing Epicurean practice. In fact, there are two passages in the Animadversiones, where Gassendi adduces some textual evidence for ascribing this practice to Epicurus.93 The first passage is Anim. 863–864. Here, commenting on Epicurus’ account of the phases of the moon, Gassendi also quotes Lucretius’ parallel account in Lucret. V 705–750. He starts with Lucretius’ version of what he calls (Anim. 863) “the view that is generally accepted and believed to be true, about the Moon’s light being borrowed.”94 However, while in modern editions Lucretius’ description of this theory comprises only lines 705–714, Gassendi’s version adds an extra line at the end: “Therefore it is that they seem to speak the truth.”95 This line, which is in fact line 704 of the manuscripts, was relocated after line 714 in the editions of Naugerius (1515), Lambinus (1563/64 and 1570), and Gifanius (1565/66), one of which Gassendi will have consulted.96 Apparently unaware of the transposition, Gassendi understands the line to be a statement about the verisimilitude of the theory that was described in the preceding lines. After also quoting Lucretius’ other three explanations of the phases, Gassendi offers a general comment on the epistemological status of all four explanations (Anim. 864): By which, of course, he (scil. Lucretius) approves what Epicurus advises us in his text, that “although one way seems to appeal to us in preference to the others, we must not, however, condemn the others on the spot, if they agree with the appearances.”97 92  Anim. 788: “Itaque, cùm non sit negandum, quin verisimillimum sit esse sidera omnia sphærica, par est nos esse huiusmodi verisimilitudine contentos; …” 93  In more recent times, Bailey (1947: 58, 1394, et passim) has made a case for attributing to Lucretius an implicit but systematic preference for the explanations of the mathematical astronomers. For a refutation of Bailey’s view, see Bakker 2016: 42–48. 94  Anim. 863: “… sententiam vulgò & receptam, & creditam veram de mutuatitio lumine …” 95  Anim. 863: “Proptereà fit, vti videantur dicere verum.” (= Lucret. V 704). 96  For his Animadversiones (1649), Gassendi most likely used one of Lambin’s editions of Lucretius (Brundell 1987: 50), as he did for his De vita et moribus Epicuri (1647) (Argaud 2010: 23) and probably for his Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma (1949) as well (Wolff 1999: 328). See also Piergiacomi 2022: 104 with nn. 91–92. 97  This sentence, presented by Gassendi as a quotation, is not literally found in Epicurus, but seems to paraphrase such sentences as Pyth. 87 ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολίπῃ τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλῃ ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὂν τῷ φαινομένῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ. (“But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes just as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth.”, transl.

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And certainly, nothing seems to be said that is more probable than the view that the Moon borrows its splendour from the Sun and receives it as by request; whence also this very opinion was not omitted by Epicurus and was expressed most elegantly by Lucretius [V 705–714], who added – not without reason – the following words [V 704]: “Therefore it is that they seem to speak the truth.” Nothing, I repeat, is more probable than that this illumination of the moon is caused and observed by reflexion rather than kindling. […] Nothing, I say, is more probable than this. Yet Epicurus did not repudiate those other opinions, because he did not see that they contain anything that would be impossible to happen.98

According to Gassendi, Lucretius himself – by appending this line – admitted and endorsed the greater probability of this particular explanation. Another passage where Gassendi seems to find proof for an Epicurean licence to prefer one explanation over the others is found in his commentary on Epicurus’ account of earthquakes. Here, in Anim. 1043, Gassendi writes: As regards the fact that Seneca [NQ VI 20, 7] adds in conclusion that “Epicurus considers no cause to be greater than wind”, this is confirmed by the very context in which, from the three accounts that we have tried to discern, the two first and principal ones are attributed to wind.99

Gassendi accepts Seneca’s testimony about Epicurus’ preference for wind as a cause of earthquakes and tries to link it to Epicurus’ actual treatment of earthquakes both in the Letter to Pythocles and as reported by Seneca and Pseudo-Plutarch,100 observing that, indeed, among the possible causes those which involve wind are the most numerous.101 In this case, however, Epicurus’ preference does not coincide with Gassendi’s own. In Anim. 1045, Gassendi writes: Bailey 1926) and 94 … ἐὰν μή τις τὸν μοναχῇ τρόπον κατηγαπηκὼς τοὺς ἄλλους κενῶς ἀποδοκιμάζῃ, οὐ τεθεωρηκὼς τί δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τί ἀδύνατον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατα θεωρεῖν ἐπιθυμῶν. (“… provided only one does not become enamoured of the method of the single cause and groundlessly put the others out of court, without having considered what it is possible for a man to observe and what is not, and desiring therefore to observe what is impossible.”, transl. Bailey 1926). 98  Anim. 864: “scilicet innuat, quod Epicurus in textu monet, Quamvis vnus modus videatur arridere præ cæteris, non esse tamen cæteros illico damnandos, si Apparentia consenserint. Et certè, nihil quidem videtur dici probabilius, quàm quòd Luna splendorem suum à Sole mutuetur, & quasi precariò accipiat; vnde & hanc ipsam sententiam Epicurus non omisit, & Lucretius eleganter expressit, illud non vanè subiiciens, Proptereà fit, vti videantur dicere verum. Nihil rursùs probabilius, quàm illam Lunæ illustrationem reflexione potiùs, quàm accensione fieri, conspicique. […] His quidem, inquam, nihil probabilius. At cæteras tamen illas opiniones Epicurus non repudiauit, quòd non videret eas quidpiam factu impossibile continere.” 99  Anim. 1043: “Quod autem demùm Seneca addit, placere Epicuro nullam esse causam motus maiorem, quàm Spiritum; id probat vel ipse contextus, in quo ex iis tribus, quos conati sumus discernere, modis, duo priores, atque præcipui ex ipso spiritu petuntur.” 100 Epicur. Pyth. 105–106; Sen. NQ VI 20; Ps.-Plutarch. Plac. III 15, 11. 101  For other, non-probabilistic interpretations of Seneca’s statement, see Verde 2013: 138–139; Bakker 2016: 38–40; and Verde 2022: 73–74.

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Would it be permitted to add here that from all the causes enumerated by Epicurus, none seems more probable than that according to which he deemed that an earthquake is produced when [Sen. NQ VI 20, 7] “the hot force of the wind, being turned into fire, and similar to a thunderbolt, rushes forth with a mighty overthrow of obstacles”? To say nothing about the other opinions, that most common opinion of all, which was held in esteem already long ago and is so even now, which ascribes the cause to air, wind, or plain breath, does not seem verisimilar.102

After this passage, Gassendi goes on to provide arguments against Epicurus’ preferred theory and in favour of his own, yet deriving from Epicurus himself the very licence to apply different degrees of probability. Interestingly, by ascribing to the Epicureans a certain willingness to assign different degrees of probability to the various explanations, Gassendi unwittingly reproduces the probabilistic approach to multiple explanations that is endorsed in one of the fragments of the Epicurean inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda (fr.13 iii 2–13, transl. Smith, slightly modified): If one is investigating things that are non-evident (τὰ ἄδηλα), and if one sees that several explanations are possible, it is reckless to make a dogmatic pronouncement concerning any single one; such a procedure is characteristic of a seer rather than a wise man. It is correct, however, to say that, while all explanations are possible, this one is more probable than that.103

However, Gassendi did not know this inscription, which was only rediscovered in the late nineteenth century.104 If he had known it, and especially the quoted fragment, it would certainly have made it much easier for him to justify a probabilistic reading of Epicurus’ MME.105 Gassendi’s approach to the MME is also strangely reminiscent of the probabilism that he associated with Carneades and his followers (Exerc. II vi 6, in OO III 205a): [T]hey accepted some views as being verisimilar above others, to such an extent that they even allowed their assent to be inclined towards these views; although they did 102  Anim. 1045: “An verò adiicere heic liceat ex omnibus modis ab Epicuro recensitis, nullum videri probabiliorem eo, quo Terræ-motum creari censuit, cùm calida vis spiritus in ignem versa, & fulmini similis, cum magna strage obstantium fertur? Vt de aliis certè nihil dicam, illa quæ iampridem, ac nunc etiam viget opinio communissima, causam referens ad aërem, ventum, aut simplicem spiritum, verisimilis non videtur.” 103  Diog. Oen. fr.13 iii 2–13 Smith: Τὸν ζητοῦντά τι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων, ἂν βλέπῃ τοὺς τοῦ δυνατοῦ τρόπους πλείονας, περὶ τοῦδέ τινος μόνου τολμηρὸν καταποφαίνεσθαι· μάντεως γὰρ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ ἀ⟨ν⟩δρὸς σοφοῦ. Τὸ μέντοι λέγειν πάντας μὲν ἐνδεχομένους, πιθανώτερον δ’ εἶναι τόνδε τοῦδε ὀρθῶς ἔχει. 104  For the history of the inscription’s rediscovery, see Smith 1993: 59–75. 105  The similarity between Gassendi’s and Diogenes of Oinoanda’s interpretations of the MME is also noticed by Piergiacomi 2022: 273 n. 79. Whether Diogenes’ probabilism is faithful to Epicurus’ teaching or not is still a matter of debate: see, e.g., Verde 2013: 135–137; Bakker 2016: 37–42; Leone 2017: 97–100; Corsi: 2017, 277–282; and Verde 2022: 65–66.

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not grant them any certainty and indubitability, (a practice) that was proposed by Carneades.106

Just like Carneades, Gassendi’s Epicurus is willing to assign a greater verisimilitude to some theories and even permits himself a certain inclination towards such views, without, however, granting them any certainty, which would eliminate competing views. Consequently, having started with a sceptical interpretation of the MME, we end up with a probabilistic one. Yet, while Gassendi explicitly defends the sceptical interpretation, which is supported by ample evidence from Epicurus’ own writings, he never explicitly acknowledges the probabilistic interpretation,107 which is only supported by scanty and dubious evidence from secondary authors.

Conclusion In this article I have investigated Gassendi’s interpretation of Epicurus’ MME in different texts and contexts. In the Syntagma Philosophicum and in one of his letters to Louis de Valois, Gassendi explicitly characterizes the MME as a kind of Pyrrhonian scepticism, in which all competing explanations are held to be equally possible. This interpretation (while not necessarily correct) is supported by ample evidence from Epicurus’ own writings. In the Animadversiones, on the other hand, Gassendi’s interpretation seems to waver between scepticism and probabilism: while sometimes stressing the equal possibility or probability of competing explanations, at other times he seems to suggest that Epicurus himself sometimes considered one explanation more probable than another. For support of this probabilistic view of the MME, which is not confirmed by Epicurus’ own writings, Gassendi relies on indirect and ambiguous evidence from Lucretius and Seneca. In addition to introducing a probabilistic reading of the MME, Gassendi makes other innovations as well. Rather than considering Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ lists of possible explanations fixed and definitive, he chooses to add and subtract theories. Now, while the first move seems to have been sanctioned by Epicurus himself, who often concludes his lists by saying that other explanations are possible as well, the second move was certainly not foreseen by Epicurus, who seems to have conceived of his explanations as objectively and irrefutably possible. In the light of new observations, facilitated by marine explorations or the telescope, Gassendi can no longer maintain the possibility of every explanation that was accepted by Epicurus. This

106  Exerc. II vi 6 (OO III 205a): “aliqua admittebant præ aliis, verosimilia, adeò vt etiam assensum ad illa inclinari paterentur: cùm certa tamen ac indubitata minimè concederent; quod Carneadis propositum fuit.” 107  So also Bellis 2017: 138 n. 58.

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means, however, that the special epistemological status of the meteora as absolutely ἄδηλα, or ‘non-evident’, cannot be maintained. However, Gassendi’s addition of new theories, despite its sanction by Epicurus himself, can also have far-reaching consequences for the MME. This is especially clear when Gassendi tries to add the Copernican hypothesis to the list of possible explanations of the (real or apparent) motions of the stars, despite its incompatibility with Epicurus’ parallel-linear conception of gravity. Only by silently assuming his own geocentric notion of gravity is Gassendi able to argue that the Copernican hypothesis would be possible. This means, however, that for Gassendi the MME can be divorced from its original Epicurean framework and put to work in a different theoretical context. Although, in the Animadversiones, Gassendi often presents his comments on Epicurus’ MME as an interpretation, they are in many ways more like a transformation that may not be true to Epicurus’ intentions, but may have helped Gassendi to develop the MME into a useful and flexible tool in the pursuit of (probable) knowledge.108

References Alberti, A., 1980, “La canonica di Epicuro nell’interpretazione di Gassendi”, Annali dell’Istituto di filosofia dell’Università di Firenze 2: 151–194. Alberti, A., 1981, Gassendi e l’atomismo epicureo, Florence: Istituto universitario europeo. Algra, K. A., 2018, “Hellenistic Philosophy”, in L. Perilli–D. P. Taormina (eds.), Ancient Philosophy: Textual Paths and Historical Explorations, Abingdon–New York: Routledge, 409–494. Allen, J., 2001, Inference from Signs. Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence, Oxford: Clarendon. Allen, J., 2014, “Aristotle on the value of ‘probability,’ persuasiveness, and verisimilitude in rhetorical argument”, in V. Wohl (ed.), Probabilities, Hypotheticals, and Counterfactuals in Ancient Greek Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 47–64. Argaud, É., 2010, “L’autre moitié du projet: enjeux philosophiques de l’édition du De rerum natura. Lambin et la dissensio sur le corps de l’âme”, in F. Lestringant–E. Naya (eds.), La Renaissance de Lucrèce, Actes de la XXVIIe Journée d’étude du Centre V. L. Saulnier (12 mars 2009), Cahiers V. L. Saulnier, n° 27, Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 19–34. 108  Having reached the end of this article, I want to express my sincere gratitude to Francesca Masi, Pierre-Marie Morel, and Francesco Verde – the intrepid and untiring organizers and conductors of the SPIDER-project and the editors of the present volume – for graciously inviting me to participate and contribute. In addition, I would like to thank my dear colleagues Christoph Lüthy and Carla Rita Palmerino for their copious and very pertinent remarks on earlier versions of this article, from which I greatly benefitted. Naturally, the responsibility for any remaining errors and imperfections is mine alone.

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Asmis, E., 1984, Epicurus’ Scientific Method, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Bailey, C. (ed.), 1926, Epicurus. The Extant Remains, Oxford: Clarendon. Bailey, C. (ed.), 1947, Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura, ed. with prolegomena, critical apparatus, translation and commentary, 3 vols., Oxford: Clarendon. Bakker, F. A., 2016, Epicurean Meteorology: Sources, Method, Scope and Organization, Leiden: Brill. Bellis, D., 2017, “Nos in Diem Vivimus: Gassendi’s Probabilism and Academic Philosophy from Day to Day”, in P.J. Smith–S. Charles (eds.), Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early Modern Philosophy, International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 221, Cham: Springer, 125–152. Bénatouïl, T., 2003, “La méthode épicurienne des explications multiples”, in T.  Bénatouïl–V.  Laurand–A.  Macé (eds.), L’épicurisme antique, Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg 15: 15–47. Bloch, O., 1971, La philosophie de Gassendi. Nominalisme, matérialisme et métaphysique, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Brundell, B., 1987, Pierre Gassendi. From Aristotelianism to a New Natural Philosophy, Dordrecht: Reidel. Corradi, M., 2016, “Πιθανολογεῖν tra Platone, Aristotele e Epicuro: un dialogo metodologico a distanza”, in M. Tulli (ed.), Testo e forme del testo. Ricerche di filologia filosofica, Pisa– Rome: Fabrizio Serra Editore, 217–256. Corsi, F. G., 2017, “Il metodo delle molteplici spiegazioni in Diogene di Enoanda”, Syzetesis 4: 253–284. Coture, J., 2022, “What About a Flat Earth? Pierre Gassendi’s Reconstructions of Epicurus’s Atomic Motion and the Shape of the Earth”, International Journal of the Classical Tradition 29: 147–167. Fisher, S., 2005, Pierre Gassendi’s Philosophy and Science: Atomism for Empiricists, Leiden: Brill. Gassendi, P., 1649, Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii, 3 vols., Lyon: Guillaume Barbier. Gassendi, P., 1658, Opera omnia, 6 vols., Lyon: Anisson and Devenet. Henry, J., 2000, “Atomism”, in G. B. Ferngren–E. J. Larson–D. W. Amundsen (eds.), The History of Science and Religion in the Western Tradition: An Encyclopedia, New York & London: Garland Publishing, 122–127. Hicks, R. D., 1931, Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, Loeb Classical Library 185, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Joy, L. S., 1987, Gassendi the Atomist, Advocate of History in an Age of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jürss, F., 1994, “Wissenschaft und Erklärungspluralismus im Epikureismus”, Philologus 138: 235–251. Leone, G., 2017, “Diogène d’Œnoanda et la polémique sur les meteora”, in J. Hammerstaedt–P.-M. Morel–R. Güremen (eds.), Diogenes of Oinoanda: Epicureanism and Philosophical Debates, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 89–110. LoLordo, A., 2007, Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gassendi’s Interpretation of Epicurus’ Method of Multiple Explanations 307 Masi, F. G., 2014, “The Method of Multiple Explanations. Epicurus and the Notion of Causal Possibility”, in C. Natali–C. Viano (eds.), Aitia ii, Avec ou sans Aristote: le débat sur les causes à l’âge hellénistique et impérial, Leuven: Peeters, 37–63. Masi, F. G., 2022, “L’indeterminatezza ontologica dei meteora”, in Verde 2022: 259–275. Messeri, M., 1985, Causa e spiegazione. La fisica di Pierre Gassendi. Milan: Franco Angeli. Paganini, G., 2023, “Gassendi’s Interplay between Skepticism and Empiricism”, in D. Bellis–D. Garber–C. R. Palmerino (eds.), Pierre Gassendi: Humanism, Science, and the Birth of Modern Philosophy, Abingdon: Routledge, 75–105. Piergiacomi, E., 2022, Amicus Lucretius: Gassendi, il De rerum natura e l’edonismo cristiano, Berlin–Boston: Walter de Gruyter. Popkin, R., 2003, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rochot, B., 1959, Pierre Gassendi. Dissertations en forme de paradoxes contre les Aristotéliciens. Texte établi, traduit et annoté, Paris: Vrin. Sarasohn, L., 1996, Gassendi’s Ethics, Ithaca, NY–London: Cornell University Press. Sedley, D. N., 1982, “On Signs”, in J. Barnes–J. Brunschwig–M. Burnyeat–M. Schofield (eds.), Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 239–272. Smith, M. F., 1993, Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Epicurean Inscription, Naples: Bibliopolis. Striker, G., 1996, “Κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας”, in G. Striker (ed.), Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 22–76. Tieleman, T., 2018, “Epicurus and His Circle: Philosophy, Medicine, and the Sciences”, in P. Keyser–J. Scarborough (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Science and Medicine in the Classical World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 257–268. Verde, F., 2013, “Cause epicuree”, Antiquorum Philosophia 7: 127–142. Verde, F., 2022 (ed.), Epicuro, Epistola a Pitocle, In collaborazione con M. Tulli, D. De Sanctis, F. G. Masi, Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag. Wolff, É., 1999, “L’utilisation du texte de Lucrèce par Gassendi dans le Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma (1649)”, in R. Poignault (ed.), Présence de Lucrèce: actes du colloque tenu à Tours (3–5 décembre 1998), Volume 1, Tours: Centre de recherches A. Piganiol, 327–343.

Observation, Probabilism, and Humanist Methods of History in Pierre Gassendi’s Meteorology Craig Martin

1. Introduction Over the last decades, scholars have revised the picture of Pierre Gassendi as a mitigated skeptic, which Richard Popkin painted. Rather, Gassendi embraced a profound probabilism that tied his investigations into metaphysics and his natural philosophy to ethics. Gassendi’s understanding of the libertas philosophandi included a freedom to revise one’s thought and present natural philosophical conclusions as probable and provisional.1 Perhaps of all the topics of natural philosophy, meteorology was the best fit for Gassendi’s probabilism.2 Many early modern Aristotelians already considered the field probable or provisional, following Aristotle’s observation that meteorological phenomena were less ordered than those of the heavens. The difficulties in determining with certainty why rare events occur far away in the sky further contributed to embracing probabilism.3 In several other significant ways, the field of meteorology, as Aristotelians had developed it in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, was promising for reconciliation with the Epicurean explanations that Gassendi endorsed. Daniel Sennert and Niccolò Cabeo devised corpuscular models for transmutations in the air, partly based on their readings of Aristotle.4 Some of the most widely circulated late-Renaissance Aristotelian commentaries on the Meteorology, such as the Coimbrans’ and Francesco Vimercato’s, included lengthy quotations of Lucretius.5 Indeed, at times, Gassendi saw possibilities for reconciling Aristotle and Epicurus, such as in the similarities between the effluxiones of the latter and the dry exhalations of the former.6 Nevertheless, Gassendi’s meteorology offered notable deviations from the Aristotelian tradition. Even if Gassendi’s probabilism at times renders it difficult to determine what his ever-unstable theories demanded, the Syntagma philosophicum (1658) reveals degrees of uncertainty that allow for potential understandings of meteorology. In the Syntagma, he presented his probable conclusions about meteorology as following the Epicurean doctrine of multiple explanations, an approach that was also 1 

Bellis, 2017; Popkin 2003: 91–98. For Gassendi’s probabilism see Fisher 2005: 22–24, 75–83; LoLordo 2007: 60–62, 248–50; Levitin 2015: 332–334. 3  Freeland 1990; Martin 2011: 21–37. 4  Martin 2011: 98–101, 106–24. 5  Vimercato 1556: 273–281, 289–290, 335; Collegium Conimbricense 1593: 18–19, 101, 108, 120. 6  Gassendi 1658: II 70. 2 

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common to portions of Theophrastus’ and Aristotle’s meteorology.7 Yet, despite the probabilism, the employment of multiple causes, and the provisional nature of his conclusions, Gassendi proposed that some explanations are superior to others. In particular, a tone closer to certainty arises in his attempts to establish what phenomena are real and what are fabulous. While Margaret Osler portrayed Gassendi’s meteorology and much of his physics as being eclectic to the point of inconsistency, three major themes provide coherence in spite of the large number of citations of ancient and modern authors, which at times obscure Gassendi’s allegiances and goals.8 First, he rejected the Aristotelians’ three regions of the air and the existence of the hypekkauma, the sphere of fire situated just below the heavenly realm.9 Second, even if ancient authors’ explanations provided plausible accounts for many meteorological phenomena, he did not consider their theories complete. In his eyes, chemical matter theory supplies a more convincing corpuscular explanation for many subjects. Third, contemporaries’ and even his own observations help establish which historical phenomena are real and which are likely fables, giving meteorology an ethical dimension by reducing the fear provoked by allegedly portentous and ominous aerial apparitions. These three themes are interrelated. Gassendi’s humanistic presentation of ancient theories – many of which were themselves characterized as probable or as a component of multiple explanations – were fully integrated with his engagement with empirical and experimental investigations that relied on arguments based on signs and historical comparisons. While several scholars have emphasized the importance of experience and sensation in Gassendi’s epistemological writings, in practice his empiricism was closely tied to a humanistic historicism that combined direct observation with scrutiny of written accounts from the past.10 Gassendi’s techniques for the history of philosophy involved not just interpreting or reconstructing ancient theories but also using analysis of historical sources as evidence for what is real.11

7 

Bakker 2016: 8–75. Osler 2002: 87–88. LoLordo on the other hand paints Gassendi’s approach of considering multiple ancient sources as a “genealogical method”. See LoLordo 2007: 3–4. 9  For the tradition of separating the aerial region into three strata, see Martin 2011: 8–9. For the hypekkauma or kapnosphere, see Wilson 2013: 117–145. 10  Fisher 2005: 19–86; LoLordo 2007: 83–92. 11  For Gassendi’s historical reconstruction of Epicurus, see Joy 1987: 66–80. 8 

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2. Meteorology in the Syntagma 2.1 The structure of meteorology The second book of the Syntagma’s section on “inanimate terrestrial matters” addresses meteorology. This section is very similar, even at times identical, to discussions of meteorology in the Animadversiones (1649), although major differences in organization and the absence of philological commentary in the Syntagma distinguish the two works. The Animadversiones divided meteorology (meteorologia) into two parts. The first examines astronomy and celestial bodies, and the second investigates sublunary bodies.12 Gassendi described this second topic as “what is popularly called meteors (meteora).”13 Grouping astronomy together with sublunary meteorology is consistent with Epicurean philosophy, although it went against the conceptions of many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century accounts of meteorology, including those of Descartes and Aristotelians. Gassendi’s adoption of the term “meteora” for both the celestial and sublunary realms, however, suggests a material and causal homogeneity for the universe that was embraced by proponents of the new sciences, such as Galileo, Tycho Brahe, and Johannes Kepler, all of whom rejected Aristotelian contentions that the heavens are composed of unchanging ether.14 Gassendi kept the same title (“what is popularly called meteors”) in the Syntagma for the section that addresses only sublunary phenomena. The Syntagma’s second chapter of this section, which concerns clouds and rain, gives insight into how Gassendi’s meteorology both revised and coopted established theories on the subject. Gassendi firmly rejected the Aristotelian conceptions of the sublunary region, while granting plausibility to Aristotle’s efficient causes, which could even be reconciled with Epicurus’. The chapter begins with a critical account of Aristotelian meteorology, showing why he dismissively referred to the subject as being “popularly called meteors”. In this chapter, he cast doubt about Aristotelian terminology more generally. After noting that most of the ancients called the subject metarsia and not meteora, Gassendi questioningly ran through other terms he deemed inappropriate, illustrating mistaken ways of conceiving the subject. He wrote that some Aristotelians employ the term “passions” for meteorological phenomena “as if sublunar matter has their own affections”; others call them “impressions” because they think that the heavens impress qualities onto elemental matter, a concept related to astrology, which he rejected.15 He undermined Aristotelian conceptions as well, disapprovingly noting that the phrase “imperfect mixture”, which was widely 12 

Gassendi 1649: II 753. Gassendi 1649: II 981; Gassendi 1658: II 69: “De vulgo vocatis meteoris.” 14  For Gassendi’s embrace of heliocentricism, see LoLordo 2007: 24–33. For Kepler’s influence, see Sakamoto 2009. 15  Gassendi 1658: II 69: “quasi materiae sublunaris affectiones propriae sint.” For Gassendi’s polemic against astrology, see Hatch 2017. 13 

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used to categorize meteorological phenomena from Albertus Magnus to Descartes, reflects the belief that some kind of weak form is impressed on a “liquid subject”.16 The result is not a mixture of the elements but rather one made from “some kinds of wandering qualities”.17 Finally, some refer to meteorological phenomena as “portents” (ostenta), believing they are signs of terrible future events.18 All the terms that Gassendi questioned, with the possible exception of ostenta, come from the language of scholasticism. His rejection of them underscores Gassendi’s overall approach, which minimizes the role of celestial bodies, eliminates the use of formal causes, and remaps the sublunary region. The Aristotelians’ vision that Gassendi rejected reflects their conception of elemental qualities and their respective gravity and levity. According to Aristotelians, the uppermost part of the sublunary realm, the hypekkauma, is fiery. The lower aerial region, filled with exhalations and vapors, is further divided into three regions, with the middle region, where clouds are formed, being cold; the upper region is hot from the sun, and the lower region is warmed by the reflection of light from the earth’s surface.19 Basing himself, in part, on observations and experimentation using instruments, Gassendi, however, described both the region of fire and the tripartite division of the aerial region as “fictions” ( fictitia).20 Rather, he contended that not just the sun’s rays heat the air, but exhalations flowing out from the earth also contribute to its warmth. These exhalations generate inconsistencies and irregularities in the air’s movements and qualities that cannot be traced to seasonal solar changes. While Aristotle in De generatione et corruptione contended that terrestrial change depends on the sun’s annual path, Gassendi observed that some days in the summer are cooler than some days in the winter, a fact that he believed showed the limitations of astronomical or astrological explanations for the weather.21 Instead, appealing to the recently invented mercury thermometer, which he described in detail, Gassendi maintained that it is clear that daily temperatures undergo great fluctuations that correspond to the presence of subterranean exhalations and winds. Thermometers’ bubbles react to the ambient air, without needing direct exposure to the sun. Using a trope that Galileo helped popularize, Gassendi wrote that “if Aristotle had known of the thermometer, this description of the up and down flowing would have wonderfully delighted him.”22 Accordingly, he sought out 16  Gassendi 1658: II 69. On the term “imperfect mixture” and Aristotelian meteorological theory, see Martin 2011: 9–10. 17  Gassendi 1658: II 69: “quod non ex quatuor Elementis, sed fere ex uno cum peregrinis quibusdam qualitatibus adiunctis misceri ea putent.” 18  Gassendi 1658: II 69. 19  On the region of fire in Aristotle, see Wilson 2013: 117–145. For the three regions of air in the Aristotelian tradition, see Martin 2011: 8–9. 20  Gassendi 1658: II 70. 21 Aristot. De gen. et corr. II 10, 338b 1–5. 22  Gassendi 1658: II 71: “Patet res porro perquam eximie in speculo illo Calendario dicto (Thermometrum etiam appellant) quod si cognovisset Aristoteles, mirifice eum delectasset illa de fluvio

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new conjectures for the characteristics of the atmosphere that downplayed the sun’s role in sublunary alterations. These conjectures relied on corpuscular explanations. He contended that the Aristotelians’ middle region of the air is always cold not because of its distance from the sun or the region of fire but because of the presence of cold seeds or corpuscles (like those that are nitrous). Somewhat counterintuitively, Gassendi speculated that fewer of these cold corpuscles were present in this middle region of the air during the winter than in the summer, which accounted for the differences between icy summer hail and wintery snow, both of which are the product of these cold corpuscles. Noting the difficulty of determining the characteristics of the uppermost stratum of the air, Gassendi maintained that there is no reason to think the upper region is hot, but rather it seems that it is composed of subtler, dispersed particles.23 Gassendi frequently employed a bodily metaphor to explain the earth. For example, he likened subterranean conduits of hot matter that run throughout the earth to blood vessels.24 Similarly, this region of air, or atmosphere – a relatively new term that Gassendi helped popularize – is likened to skin that wraps around the earth.25 2.2 Corpuscles and winds The corpuscular explanations pointed to in Gassendi’s reformulation of the regions of air reappear throughout the Syntagma’s section on meteorology. Gassendi often presented these corpuscular explanations as chemical; the actions of cold or hot corpuscles are frequently formulated as resulting from corpuscles of chemicals. The first chapter on winds illustrates how he integrated these chemical explanations with ancient theories, while describing observations intended to reaffirm the superiority of the chemical approach over all alternatives, especially over Aristotelian explanations that employed celestial powers and motions. Gassendi opened his discussion of winds by ascribing to ancient authors a shared approach to meteorology that leads to uncertain results. The chapter begins with a lengthy quotation from Pliny that states that wind is a flowing of air that comes to be in “many ways.”26 Pointing to the theory of multiple explanations, Gassendi judged that this passage shows that Pliny “knows the brilliance and custom of Epicurus’ speaking.”27 The quotation of Pliny leads to a consideration of the three major ways that the origins of winds were conceived by ancient authorities more generally: sursum, deorsumque reciprocante commentatio.” For the tradition of this trope in the seventeenth century, see Del Soldato 2020: 109–149. 23  Gassendi 1658: II 70. 24  Gassendi 1658: II 70: “Nempe globus Terrae se habet magni alicuius Animalis instar, quatenus experientia docet vigere calorem in eius interaneis, & humorem per varios ductus, quasi per venas varie transmitti.” For Gassendi’s influence on the theory of subterranean conduits see Cocco 2013: 185–186. 25  Gassendi 1658: II 70; Martin 2015. 26 Plin. Nat. hist. II 44.114: “pluribusque etiam modis.” 27  Gassendi 1658: II 63: “nihil sane est, quod magis genium, moremque loquendi Epicuri sapiat.”

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from the earth, from water, or from air. Gassendi explored variations in each of the three positions and added observations that support the probability of each view. Frequent storms in volcanic locations point to a terrestrial origin, although the northwest Circius wind that blows at Narbonne after rains and the winds that emerge from abysses suggest aqueous beginnings. The final view, that wind is flowing air, which is assigned to Epicurus, Lucretius, the Stoics, Hippocrates, Anaximander, and Anaxagoras, while reasonable, nevertheless presents difficulties for understanding what sets them in motion and renders them hot or cold.28 Just as in the chapter on clouds, Gassendi emphasized irregularities. Winds change direction and possess qualities that do not correspond to the motion of the earth or celestial bodies. Moreover, others’ explanations for winds’ origins and characteristics – based on the sun’s heat, the seasons, or whether they come from the north or south – fail to explain the diversity of winds and the fact that cool winds sometimes arrive in the summer.29 Gassendi’s solution proposed that winds have two different matters, a common substrate and a special matter that accounts for qualitative differences, like in perfumes where oil is a substrate to other matter that gives it odors.30 If particles of air form the common matter, the differentiating matter is unlikely to be exhalations or water or even hot and cold corpuscles; rather, it is composed of chemical particles.31 In many ways, Gassendi’s endorsement of chemistry fit with his contemporaries’ ideas. While dismissive of Robert Fludd’s attempt to base alchemy on scripture, Gassendi nevertheless adopted alchemical theories, holding that metals were composed of sulfur and mercury and generated by a seminal power.32 A range of early modern thinkers adopted similar meteorological explanations. They posited that spirits of salts – a term that covered many acids – vaporized upon being heated.33 By the middle of the sixteenth century, Aristotelian natural philosophers had already begun to use gunpowder and artillery as analogies for lightning, earthquakes, and other meteorological phenomena. As Paracelsian views spread, numerous natural philosophers – both Aristotelians and their detractors, such as Giambattista Della Porta and Joseph Du Chesne – used vaporized or volatized chemicals to explain the weather.34 Most importantly, aerial nitre was considered responsible for many meteorological alterations.35 Gassendi presented the chemical explanation of winds not as certain but nonetheless more probable than theories that used the traditional elements and qual28 

29 

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Gassendi 1658: II 63–65. Gassendi 1658: II 65. Gassendi 1658: II 65–66. For hot and cold corpuscles, see LoLordo 2007: 223–225. Clericuzio 2000: 72–73; Hirai 2005: 475–479. For the rise of salts as a term of analysis for chemistry and alchemy, see Roos 2007: 10–46. Martin 2011: 93–105. Guerlac 1954.

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ities. He wrote, “it seems I say that our cause is more probable” than Macrobius’s explanation that the southerly wind is hot because it passes through the equatorial torrid zone.36 He believed that heat and cold can be explained by salts mixing with air and water. For example, halnitrum (saltpeter or potassium nitrate) generates cold; spirits of salt, when mixed in snow and ice, condense water particles; and alum and ammoniac salt (ammonium chloride) melt frozen water, thereby producing vapors. Given that it is well known that the minerals that produce these salts are buried within mountains, Gassendi thought that winds arise when these nitrous, aluminous, and ammoniac spirits mix with watery exhalations, generating either hot or cold winds.37 In this way, the cold, healthful Etesian winds of Egypt can be explained by the mixing of the nitrous waters of the Nile with the salt of the sea at the river’s mouth. These salt corpuscles possess a perpetual and vehement motion that pushes particles of air, thereby causing winds.38 Gassendi’s promotion of chemical corpuscular explanations did not come at the expense of the alternatives of ancient authorities. Air, water, and earthy exhalations and effluxiones remain, but they are insufficient to account for all phenomena. Spirits and their particles represent a more probable way to explain the irregularities of wind with respect to season and geography; in addition, they conform to experience, either of chemical material or the actions of specific winds.

3. Humanist Observations, Prodigies, and the Reliability of History 3.1 Marvelous observations Many seventeenth-century writers on meteorology, especially academics and other elites, emphasized the marvelous and rare.39 Gassendi was no exception. His descriptions and observations of seemingly marvelous phenomena run throughout the section on meteorology. Some of the observations come from the period when he was in the circle of Nicolas-Claude Fabri de Peiresc, the humanist traveler, correspondent, and antiquarian, but others were made after Peiresc’s death in 1637. Gassendi’s descriptions and explanations of these rare phenomena were designed to establish the veracity of such events, while debunking others as fables. In doing so, he pointed to the vicissitudes of meteorological phenomena, established chemicals as plausible natural causes, and helped undermine the interpretation of aerial apparitions as prodigies, portents, or omens. 36 

Gassendi 1658: II 66; Macrob. In somn. Scip. 2,5,20. Gassendi 1658: II 66–67 38  Gassendi 1658: II 66. 39  Janković 2000: 33–55. 37 

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Gassendi’s accounts in the Syntagma parallel his chronicling of Peiresc’s investigations into meteorology. Peiresc is often characterized as a humanist man of letters. Such an identity in the early seventeenth century often overlapped with studying natural philosophy, collecting observations, and conducting experiments.40 Peiresc was an innovator in using numismatics, epigraphy, chronology, and geography to assess the accuracy of both ancient and more recent historical writings.41 His emphasis on material evidence followed upon the views of Francesco Patrizi, who also probingly questioned the reliability of ancient sources because of their partiality. Patrizi proposed a methodology for extracting information from these unreliable sources, which included making comparisons between past and present.42 The erudites La Mothe Le Vayer and Gabriel Naudé, who traveled in the same circles as Peiresc and Gassendi, cited and discussed Patrizi’s historiographical writings, which Gassendi appears to have known.43 From 1637 to 1639, Gassendi wrote a biography of the late Peiresc that praised the humanist patron and described his activities and interests, which included meteorological investigations. In this biography, Gassendi wrote that Peiresc set out to observe the origins of winds in 1634, in a period in which he was also pursuing anatomical investigations and other meteorological inquiries. Gassendi described Peiresc as at first endorsing Aristotle’s view that the winds are caused by terrestrial exhalations. Having found this theory problematic, however, Peiresc asked whether fumes of vitriol, halnitrum, bitumen, and sulfur “cause the several conditions and varieties of winds.”44 To do this, he set out to collect observations of “admirable winds” (mirabileis quosdam ventos) in relation to the properties of the locales where they arise, paying particular attention to minerals and plants. Peiresc asked friends to examine a cave in Mount Coyer that was a source of winds; a cliff on Mount Ventoux; Lake Legnius, where fumes arise immediately before storms; and similar places.45 The parallels between the Syntagma and the Vita are striking, in their rejection of Aristotle, in their promotion of chemical explanations, and in the specific observations recorded. In the Syntagma, Gassendi repeated what Peiresc learned about winds at Mount Malignon, Mount Ventoux, Mount Coyer, Cannes, and the Ponticus wind that blows in the Dauphiné. Observations of all these locales suggested the irregularity of wind and the importance of local circumstances rather than broad universal causes.46 40 

For Peiresc’s intellectual activities and circles, see Miller 2000. Joy 1987: 51–52. 42  Grafton 2007: 125–134. 43  Joy 1987: 44. 44  Gassendi 1641: 283: “ut ad materiam halituum recurrendum censuerit, examinandumque, num, exempli gratia, vitriolum, halnitrum, bitumen, sulphur, & similia, dum exhalantur, conditiones, varietatesque ventorum subeant.” For Peiresc’s observations of the natural world including his speculation on winds, see Miller 2015: 241–264. 45  Gassendi 1641: 283-285. 46  Gassendi 1658: II 66–67. 41 

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Just as Peiresc used material evidence to evaluate the accuracy of historical writings, Gassendi used observations of meteorological phenomena to assess the veracity of marvelous events described by earlier writers. Accordingly, Gassendi expressed skepticism about a wide range of prodigies, doubting the histories that reported them. He characterized universal floods reported by classical authors, such as the flood of Deucalion, as fables that could not have taken place by the power of nature (vis naturae), because the flooding would have only been in a few regions and in low-lying cities. Similarly, Seneca’s description of a deluge that affected the entire human race is merely a bit of rhetorical extravagance, in Gassendi’s interpretation.47 Even though Gassendi, accepting the words of scripture, made an exception for Noah’s flood, he specified that it was a miracle directly caused by the hand of God.48 He did not, however, embrace the entire tradition surrounding Noah’s flood. For example, unlike many early modern writers on meteorology, he rejected the idea that rainbows are a sign of future serene weather and God’s good will. Instead, “experience convinces that nothing can be asserted universally,” as the maxim is often observed to be false; Pliny’s Natural History noted that the rainbow does not predict in a reliable manner.49 Epicurus in the “Letter to Pythocles” wrote that animal signs for future weather are mere coincidences. Animals’ actions have no bearing on changes in the seasons but, rather, are conjunctions of causally unrelated events.50 Gassendi went beyond Epicurus’ mistrust, questioning not only if there were a causal relation but if any correspondence actually existed, as he doubted the entire tradition of weather signs. This tradition of weather signs, found in the writings of Pliny, Virgil, Aratus, and Theophrastus, garnered greater scrutiny and interest from humanists in the first years of the seventeenth century. Numerous authors, including Girolamo Cardano, Giovanni Battista Della Porta, and Francis Bacon, revived the tradition, at times slightly modifying the rules found in these ancient writings that either used the behavior of animals or the appearances of the sun and moon – for example, a red moon supposedly predicts rain.51 The tradition of weather signs remained prominent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, offering an alternative to astrological prediction.52 Gassendi’s doubts about the reliability of weather signs largely depended on appeals to experience and observations. He declared “that most [signs] are dubious and clearly misleading”, since “the opposite happens more often to careful observ47 

Gassendi 1658: II 76; Sen. Nat. quaest. III 27,1. Gassendi 1658: II 76–77. 49  Gassendi 1658: II 102: “verum experientia convincit nihil universe asseri posse.” Plin. Nat. hist. II 60,150; XVIII 80,355. 50  Diog. Laert. X 98. 51  Martin 2019. 52  Janković 2000: 137–138. 48 

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ers than what you would usually expect from these predictions.”53 He repeated similar judgments about parhelia and halos around the sun and moon. The rules that assert that a full halo around the moon portends rain, a faded one calm, and a broken one rain, are “mere conjectures and not actual observations.”54 Similarly, Aristotle’s, Theophrastus’, and Aratus’ contentions that parhelia are signs of rain are unfounded “since experience teaches that sometimes rain follows, sometimes serene weather.”55 In the Life of Peiresc, Gassendi wrote that Peiresc had derided the popular view that these apparitions were “presages for human affairs”, when parhelia appeared in 1629.56 In the seventeenth century, rare and marvelous meteorological events were still widely held to be omens, a view that Gassendi detested. Gassendi formed a hierarchy of credibility for the prodigies that were frequently found in the books of historians from antiquity and in meteorological writings such as Della Porta’s. He labelled some fables while allowing for the reality of others that he or his contemporaries had observed. In the Syntagma, he dismissed the possibility of raining calves, falsely attributed to Avicenna, while allowing for the possibility of a calf being carried through the sky during a whirlwind.57 Similarly, he rhetorically asked “who would believe” that it has at times rained meat, unless one believed it had been blown about by a tornado. Alternatively, he speculated that there was some matter in a cloud that generated this mushroom-like matter that appears to be meat. “More tolerable”, but only slightly, was the possibility of raining frogs, a prodigy found in medieval chronicles often linked to plagues and the apocalypse.58 Even so, he noted that the authors who attested to these phenomena were neither eyewitnesses (oculati) nor reliable. Gassendi questioned the reality of raining stones, contrasting Livy’s account with the fact that, while raining stones in India are frequently mentioned in the writings of the ancients, “nothing about which the historians spoke has [happened] in our region, and there [in India] nothing similar has happened from antiquity up to our times.”59 Thus, he used his judgment about the present as a tool for evaluating ancient history.

53  Gassendi 1658: II 77: “vereor tamen, ne ex tot signis plurima sint dubia, planeque fallacia”; “Certo sedulo observanti saepius fere oppositum, quam quod ex hisce praesagiis exspectari soleat, contingit.” 54  Gassendi 1658: II 103: “attamen hae sunt merae coniecturae, non observationes germanae.” 55  Gassendi 1658: II 106: “attamen nihil est plane certi; cum experientia doceat nunc pluviam sequi, nunc serenum.” 56  Gassendi 1641: 229: “visus sum ridere persuasionem vulgi, qua ex hisce phaenomenis praesagia ducuntur pro rebus humanis.” 57  For the philosophical tradition surrounding raining calves, see Ivanov 2020. 58  Gassendi 1658: II 77: “At memorant etiam pluisse Carnibus: quis credat?” For apocalyptic raining frogs, see Smoller 2000. 59  Gassendi 1658: II 77: “id nihil ad nostras regiones, de quibus loquuti Historici sunt, & in quibus nihil simile ab antiquis usque temporibus fit.”

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In order to distinguish fables from real phenomena, Gassendi appealed to observations that he believed he could verify. He accepted accounts of raining milk and blood as “more credible”, or at least that something of a similar appearance fell from the sky.60 He had been a member of a commission, led by Govaart Wendelen, to determine the cause of purple rain that had fallen on Brussels in 1648.61 The commission concluded that the rain was not in fact blood but formed from a mixture of calcanthum and asphalt.62 While Gassendi expressed doubts while on this committee, he seemingly accepted the explanation in the Syntagma, calling it “more probable” (probabilius). He linked this example of red rain to earlier observations of the phenomenon, as well as to Peiresc’s speculations and observations made in 1608, that a red liquid falling from the sky was frequently caused by butterflies’ excretions.63 Gassendi supported a similar chemical explanation for raining milk, which he thought was merely water altered by vapors of lead, sal saturni (lead acetate), saltpeter, vinegar, or other similar substances.64 3.2 Histories of meteors One of the major goals of the section on meteorology in the Syntagma was to establish a reliable history of rare phenomena. By attesting to examples of these phenomena and giving dates and the names of witnesses, Gassendi provided plausibility for, if not their regularity, at least their recurrent nature. His use of chemical and corpuscular explanations affirmed their naturalness and undermined the interpretation of them as signs of impending doom. Lynn Joy emphasizes that Gassendi was a historian. For the most part, she presents him as a historian of ancient thought.65 Yet the meteorological section of the Syntagma is also a history of the recent past, an attempt to set down a record of extraordinary meteorological events.66 For example, after writing that he had seen single parhelia in 1636 and 1635, he then wrote that the famed Jesuit astronomer Christoph Scheiner saw five suns in 1629 in Rome, when Peiresc also witnessed parhelia; that seven suns were visible in 1630; and that six were seen in Poland in 1525. These attestations of parhelia demonstrate that Pliny’s observations were incomplete, since he never reported a parhelion greater than three.67 In a similar manner, Gassendi used observations to cast doubt about the reality of lightning or thunderstones, which were typically prehistoric artefacts that Pliny 60  Gassendi 1658: II 77: “credibilius videri potest pluisse interdum, non sane Lacte, sed albescente nonnihil aqua.” 61  Gassendi 1658: II 77. 62  Wendelen 1656: 107–120; Martin 2011: 80–81. 63  Gassendi 1641: 112–113. 64  Gassendi 1658: II 77. 65  Joy 1987. 66  For the development of historical reports in seventeenth-century scientific discourse, see Dear 1995: 12–15. 67  Gassendi 1658: II 104a. For these parhelia and the epistolary exchange in Gassendi’s circle, see Bellis 2010. Plin. Nat. hist. II 31,99.

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and Avicenna, among others, considered to be generated by lightning strikes.68 Gassendi, thinking it was difficult to believe that a stone could be formed so easily and quickly, offered alternative explanations, namely that the stones are brought up from the earth and perhaps discolored by lightning. He wrote that some of these stones that were shown to him appeared to be a composed of a very black species of flint or pumice. These smaller stones attributed to lightning could be dismissed as legendary, but it was more difficult to doubt the reality of larger stones that fell from the sky and had multiple witnesses. Gassendi described in detail a large stone – what is now referred to as a meteorite – that fell in the mountains near the village of Guillaumes in Alpes-Maritimes on November 29, 1637, at the tenth hour of the day. Among the potential eyewitnesses were a papal envoy and village magistrate, whose ranks and positions presumably assured their trustworthiness. Gassendi recounted that the stone, weighing 38 Parisian pounds, fell from the clear sky onto snow-covered ground, emitting noises like a cannon. Once it landed, black sulfurous smoke rose from the rock, which melted a circle of snow five feet around it. After locals dug the stone up, it was brought to a group of elites, who examined the physical characteristics of the rock’s matter and determined its density to be one fourth of lead’s.69 Because the sky was extremely clear and there were no clouds nearby, Gassendi rejected the possibility that the rock was a “lightning-stone expelled from the clouds.”70 It was more probable that it was ejected from the earth or a nearby mountain during an eruption of subterranean fire. He contended that the interior of mountains contain marcasite, which he deemed consistent with the matter of the rock that fell near Guillaumes. He conjectured that the rock had impure mixtures of marcasite that, when mixed with fire and saltpeter, ignited and pushed forward. “Certainly, for this reason”, Gassendi wrote, “this stone appeared to have been inflamed, ejected, and, creating a fiery orb around it while moving through the air, it turned in a circle.”71 The explosion and noise were due to “innumerable corpuscles of saltpeter”, and the smoke emitted on its landing came from thick vapors emanating from the melted snow, the crushed earth, and calcinated stones.72 Despite the rarity of such meteorites, Gassendi looked to history to confirm that many similar rocks fell. He cited as evidence Girolamo Cardano’s account of an even heavier one that fell near the river Adda in 1510, although he deemed Cardano’s assertion that the rock hung in the air for two hours as being “clearly fabulous”. Gassendi did not address Cardano’s assertion that Milan was afflicted by famine, 68 

For the history of thunderstones, see Goodrum 2008. Gassendi 1658: II 96–97. 70  Gassendi 1658: II 97: “Iam non esse istum Lapidem fulmineum, extrusumve e nubibus, vel ex eo constat, quod cum decidit, serenissimum caelum fuerit.” 71  Gassendi 1658: II 97: “Hac certe ratione is lapis videtur fuisse inflammatus, emissus, &, dum traiiciendo per aerem circumrotaretur, flammeum circa se orbem creans.” 72  Gassendi 1658: II 97: “innumerabilia halinitri corpuscula.” 69 

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plague, fire, and siege for three years after the rock fell or the fact that Cardano discussed this example in a chapter on “Ostenta terrae”, in which he laid down how rare events portended disasters.73 If the fabulous aspects are left out, however, Gassendi believed there to be many credible examples of such rocks that fell while the sky was clear in Italy, Germany, and other regions, as well as the examples that Pliny and Anaxagoras attested to. Perhaps the best example of a falling stone during the Renaissance occurred in Ensisheim in 1492, which was the subject of broadsheets that circulated quickly throughout Western Europe and was interpreted in ominous and divine terms.74 The final chapter of Gassendi’s meteorological section addresses the aurora borealis – a term that he helped popularize – and more generally fires and lights in the sky, such as shooting stars and St. Elmo’s fire.75 Many early modern writings presented these lights and fires as ominous or portentous. Gassendi attempted to determine which ones were real, attributing potential natural causes for them and downplaying potential fears. After citing Pliny and contradicting Seneca’s view that nocturnal lights “remain in a certain place”, Gassendi described the aurorae, “which he had often observed”, and which were most spectacular on September 12, 1621, when, after sunset on a clear night, in the northern sky, white clouds formed, from which pyramidal shapes, white arcs, and columns of light flashed. The lights lasted for an hour, reportedly visible in all of France. Gassendi’s description presented numerous particular details, giving an authoritativeness to the reality of the phenomenon lacking in other works of similar scope.76 In a similar manner, he recounted the event in the Life of Peiresc, which Peiresc, sick in bed, did not see. There the lights in the sky are first described as a prodigy, but, because they were seen to be caused by vapors, Peiresc dismissed the portentous interpretation of the lights, concluding that it was merely “a sport of nature” and downplaying those who believed they saw armies preparing for battle and even heard soldiers’ trumpets and cries.77 In the Syntagma, Gassendi proposed that these lights are caused by vapors arising from the earth that break free from the atmosphere and refract solar rays. He asked if it can be said with more probability (probabilius) that the earth has a disposition that causes vapors to erupt from a constant flow of corpuscles, in the same way that corpuscles cause the lapis bononesis composed of phosphorus to shine at night or iron to be excited by a magnet.78 But regardless of which cause is elicited from the observation of these lights, Gassendi concluded that we must reject the accounts 73 

Cardano 1557: 545. Rowland 1990; Marvin 1992. 75  On the origin of the term aurora borealis, see Siscoe 1978. 76  Gassendi 1658: II 107–108: “… quos saepius quidem observavi…”; Sen. Nat. quaest. I 15,2: “certo loco permanere.” 77  Gassendi 1641: 184–185: “… nihil aliud fuisse, quam naturae lusum…” 78  Gassendi 1658: II 108. 74 

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of armies in the sky as fables.79 These descriptions of armies battling among the clouds have a basis in scripture and were widespread in Aristotelian textbooks; they are discussed in Pomponazzi’s De incantationibus and Les Météores of Descartes (who explains them away), as well as in numerous histories (including Francesco Guicciardini’s The History of Italy and Niccolò Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy), which seemingly accepted them as real.80 Gassendi dismissed the authorities who accept them with rhetorical flourish: “But what should you do with men who so easily invent dreams for themselves or have faith in the dreams of others?”81 Gassendi’s discussion of shooting stars follows a similar pattern. He gave details of his own observation, including the date, where he was, the conditions of the sky, and the height and shape of the shooting star. A set of potential explanations follows, including Aristotle’s hot and dry exhalation, which Gassendi saw as being equivalent to Epicurus’ fatty exhalation composed of fiery atoms.82 These kinds of causes can account for other fires in the sky, including St. Elmo’s fire, as Gassendi concluded the section on meteorology by maintaining that there is no reason to think that the double light of St. Elmo’s fire is auspicious, while the single light of Helena is unlucky.83

4. Conclusion Lynn Joy has argued that Gassendi’s philosophy must be contextualized with his understanding of the history of philosophy. The two intellectual activities are inextricably intertwined, as explications of Epicurus supported and inspired Gassendi’s philosophical arguments. Contrary to Joy, Saul Fisher has put forward an internalist account for much of the natural philosophy in Gassendi’s Syntagma, rendering it coherent and comprehensible without understanding his goal to be essentially historical.84 Neither Joy nor Fisher treat Gassendi’s meteorology in depth. Gassendi’s discussion of meteorology, however, shows him in a different light. It is the product of the culture of érudits, but the humanism is not just geared toward the reconstruction of the history of philosophy. Gassendi’s historical techniques and scope extend beyond reconstructing Epicurus, as he used the methods of historians to interrogate the reliability of beliefs about meteorological phenomena.

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Gassendi 1658: II 108. 2 Maccabees 5:2–3; Vermij 2010: 668; Pomponazzi 2011: 136; Descartes 1902: 323–324; Guicciardini 1919: I 52; Machiavelli 2001: I 271. 81  Gassendi 1658: II 108: “Verum, quid hominibus facias, qui facile adeo sibi somnia fingunt, fidemve somniis aliorum habent?” 82  Gassendi 1658: II 109. 83  Gassendi 1658: II 111. 84  Fisher 2005. 80 

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Perhaps what stands out most in Gassendi’s meteorology is his repeated determination to evaluate the reality of phenomena. His inquiry is as much fixed on establishing the quia, the explananda, as it is in demonstrating the propter quid, that is, the causal explanations. Gassendi was concerned not just with the history of philosophy but also with constructing a natural history of meteora. Compared to some of his contemporaries, the textual investigation of ancient meteorology is limited. For example, all references to Theophrastus’ theories are to fragments in Olympiodorus, without any citations of Theophrastus’ De ventis, even though it was widely available in both Greek and Latin by the beginning of the seventeenth century.85 History, both of recent times and the past, is the foremost tool for determining the characteristics of meteorological phenomena, allowing Gassendi to dismiss many seemingly outlandish accounts as fables yet to accept some that have been verified by multiple witnesses as true. In doing so he showed skepticism for the widespread belief that extraordinary meteorological phenomena are prodigies and omens, presenting an account that is designed to remove fear of these marvels and is consequently in line with Epicurus’ ethical goals. Indeed, multiple causation serves similar roles for Gassendi and Epicurus, namely, eliminating the fear that meteorological phenomena are signs of impending disaster. Gassendi’s attempt to eliminate the fabulous and prodigious from meteorology corresponded to other seventeenth-century works on the subject, including Daniel Sennert’s dismissal of “old wives’ tales”, and Descartes’ aim to stamp out wondrous stupefaction.86 Gassendi’s approach was more systematic, though, relying on an empiricism bolstered by humanists’ ideals of historical research. He believed that the fables and falsehoods in ancient writings and repeated in more recent ones gained traction through credulity, a trait that Gassendi also held as key to explaining false pagan beliefs like the oracles.87 Employing historical narratives, based on his own experiences along with those of Peiresc and other contemporaries, was meant to forge trust in the reality of the phenomena described, even when they were difficult to explain. Giving the meteorite’s precise location, date, and weight, as well as the names and professions of those who saw it, helped give credence to its reality, despite the impossibility of explaining its causes with certainty. Establishing its reality, however, allows for the assessment of earlier accounts, whether from the previous century, like Cardano’s, or from the distant past, like Livy’s. Gassendi’s empiricism formed part of a historical practice that relied on the conviction that the distant past can be judged by what has been experienced in more recent times. Wide gaps between the two call for doubt and skepticism about past writings, especially when recent observations are reliable and detailed. 85 

Schmitt 1971: 287–291. Martin 2011: 57, 132–134. 87  Ossa-Richardson 2013: 154. 86 

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Humanism during the seventeenth century fostered an empirical and experimental culture, as is evident in attempts to recreate ancient experiments and in reevaluations of ancient empiricism. Still, in Gassendi’s case, it is also seen in habits of recording observations, in the composition of historical writing about contemporaries, and in his critical attitude towards authors of the past. History and humanistic erudition were more than just a propension to interpret and gain inspiration from antiquity, they were also the means to verify and establish facts about nature. Accordingly, meteorological investigations, both historical and causal, can help guide human action, according to Gassendi, as they cast doubt about the efficacy of traditional means of forecasting the weather and the supposedly portentous character of many meteorological phenomena. Understanding that methods for predicting weather are unreliable and that omens and portents are mere fables helps eliminate fear, a goal akin to Epicurus’ employment of naturalistic causes to argue that fear of the gods is unjustified.

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Gassendi, P., 1649, Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii, Lyon: Barbier. Gassendi, P., 1658, Opera Omnia in sex tomos divisa, Lyon: Anisson. Goodrum, M., 2008, “Questioning Thunderstones and Arrowheads: The Problem of Recognizing and Interpreting Stone Artifacts in the Seventeenth Century”, Early Science and Medicine 13: 482–508. Guerlac, H., 1954, “The Poets’ Nitre: Studies in the Chemistry of John Mayow”, Isis 45: 243–255. Grafton, A., 2007, What Was History? The Art of History in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guicciardini, F., 1919, La storia d’Italia. Florence: Sansoni. Hatch, R. A., 2017, “Between Astrology and Copernicanism: Morin – Gassendi – Boulliau”, Early Science and Medicine 22: 487–516. Hirai, H., 2005, Le concept de semence dans les théories de la matière à la Renaissance, Turnhout: Brepols. Ivanov, S., 2020, “It’s Raining Calves: History and Sources of a Spurious Citation from Avicenna in Albert the Great’s Meteorology”, Mediterranea. International Journal on the Transfer of Knowledge 5: 1–49. Janković, V., 2000, Reading the Skies: A Cultural History of English Weather, 1650-1820, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Joy, L., 1987, Gassendi the Atomist: Advocate of History in an Age of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levitin, D., 2015, Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science: Histories of Philosophy in England, c. 1640-1700, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. LoLordo, A., 2007, Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Machiavelli, N., 2001, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, Rome: Salerno Editrice. Martin, C., 2011, Renaissance Meteorology: Pomponazzi to Descartes, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Martin, C., 2015, “The Invention of Atmosphere”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52: 44–54. Martin, C., 2019, “Theories of Animals as Weather Signs in Renaissance Italy”, in S. Riccioni–L. Perissinotto (eds.), Animali figurati, Rome: Viella, 21–34. Marvin, U., 1992, “The Meteorite of Ensisheim: 1492 to 1992”, Meteoritics 27: 28–72. Miller, P., 2000, Peiresc’s Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth Century, New Haven: Yale University Press. Miller, P., 2015, Peiresc’s Mediterranean World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ossa-Richardson, A., 2013, The Devil’s Tabernacle: The Pagan Oracles in Early Modern Thought, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Osler, M., 2002, “Pierre Gassendi”, in S. Nadler (ed.), A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 80–95. Pomponazzi, P., 2011, De incantationibus, Florence: Olschki. Popkin, R., 2003, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Roos, A., 2007, The Salt of the Earth: Natural Philosophy, Medicine, and Chymistry in England, 1650-1750, Leiden: Brill. Rowland, I., 1990, “A Contemporary Account of the Ensisheim Meteorite, 1492”, Meteoritics 25: 19–22. Sakamoto, K., 2009, “German Hercules’s Heir: Pierre Gassendi’s Reception of Keplerian Ideas”, Journal of the History of Ideas 70: 69–91. Schmitt, C., 1971, “Theophrastus”, in P. O. Kristeller–F. E. Cranz (eds.), Catalogus translationum et commentariorum: Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries, vol. 2, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 239–322. Siscoe, G., 1978, “An Historical Footnote on the Origin of ‘Aurora Borealis’”, Eos 59: 994–997. Smoller, L., 2000, “Of Earthquakes, Hail, Frogs, and Geography: Plague and the Investigation of the Apocalypse in the Later Middle Ages”, in C. Walker Bynum–P. Freedman (eds.), Last Things: Death and the Apocalypse in the Middle Ages, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 156–187. Vermij, R., 2010, “A Science of Signs. Aristotelian Meteorology in Reformation Germany”, Early Science and Medicine 15: 648–674. Vimercato, F., 1556, In quatuor libros Aristotelis Meteorologicorum commentarii, Paris: Vascosan. Wendelen, G., 1656, De caussis naturalibus pluviae purpureae Bruxellensis, London: Tyler. Wilson, M., 2013, Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

About the contributors Frederik Bakker is Assistant Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the Radboud University in Nijmegen, where he is a member of the Center for the History of Philosophy and Science. His research focuses on ancient, especially Epicurean, natural philosophy and epistemology, and its reception in the early modern period. His publications include a monograph on Epicurean Meteorology (Brill, Leiden 2016) and an edited volume (together with Delphine Bellis and Carla Rita Palmerino) on Space, Imagination and the Cosmos, from Antiquity to the Early Modern Period (Springer, Cham, 2018). Vincenzo Damiani earned his PhD in Greek Philology from the Scuola Normale Superiore and the University of Würzburg. He currently serves as a lecturer in the History of Ancient Medicine and Classical Philology at both the University of Ulm and the University of Würzburg. He authored the monograph La Kompendienlite­ ratur nella scuola di Epicuro (Berlin/Boston 2021) and has recently edited the volume Giuramento Ippocratico (Pistoia 2022) as well as the new edition of Mario Vegetti’s monograph La medicina in Platone (Pistoia 2023). His primary research interests include the literary forms of Greco-Roman philosophical and scientific writing, the history of ancient medical thought, and literary papyrology. Dino De Sanctis is Associate Professor in Classical Philology at the University of Tuscia, where he teaches History and Tradition of Classical Theater, and Classical Philology and Papyrology. His main interests include the archaic Epos, Sophocles, Platonic dialogue, Herculaneum papyrology and Epicurean school. He published in 2018 Il canto e la tela: Le voci di Elena in Omero (Pisa–Rome: Serra) and in 2022 a new text, a critical study and the Italian translation of Epicurus’ Letter to Pythocles (in F. Verde (ed.), Epicuro: Epistola a Pitocle, In collaborazione con M. Tulli, D. De Sanctis, F. G. Masi, Baden Baden: Academia, 109–145). Margherita Erbì is senior Researcher in Ancient Greek Language and Literature at the University of Sassari. Her principal fields of research are: philosophical prose, biography, rhetoric, and ancient erudition, literary criticism and ancient exegesis on Demosthenes’ speeches, on which she has produced some contributions. She published (2020) a critical edition with translation and commentary on the fragments and testimonials of the Epicurus’ epistolary. She has been also studying the rhetorical and biographical production of Philodemus.

328

About the contributors

Julie Giovacchini has a PhD in Ancient Philosophy and has been a Research Engineer at the CNRS since 2009. She is a member of the Centre Jean Pépin (UMR 8230). Her research focuses on ancient philosophy and the history of medicine, specifically on ancient Epicureanism, Skepticism, Hippocratic and Galenic medicine, and more generally on the history of empiricism and its links with certain ethical positions in Antiquity. She is also interested in digital humanities in their applications to the sciences of Antiquity and leads a global reflection on new methods of editing and analysis of ancient texts and on digital philology, with a strong commitment to Open Science and free software. Jürgen Hammerstaedt is Professor of Classics and Papyrology at the University of Cologne where he directs the Research Centre for Papyrology, Epigraphy and Numismatics. Among his interests are the papyrus texts of the Epicurean library of Herculaneum. Since 2007 he also published the Diogenes fragments together with Martin Ferguson Smith which were found in the Oinoanda survey. A complete presentation of the results of this survey has recently been accepted for publication in the series ‘Istanbuler Forschungen’ and will appear in due time: M. Bachmann (†) – J. Hammerstaedt – E. Laufer (Hrsg.), Oinoanda. Ergebnisse des Surveys 2007–2015: Bauforschung, Archäologie, Epigraphik. David Konstan is Professor of Classics at New York University, USA. His research focuses on ancient Greek and Latin literature, especially comedy and the novel, and classical philosophy. In recent years, he has investigated the emotions and value concepts of classical Greece and Rome, and has written books on friendship, pity, the emotions, forgiveness, beauty, and love. He has also written on ancient physics and atomic theory, and has translated Seneca’s two tragedies about Hercules into verse. His most recent book is The Origin of Sin: Greece and Rome, Early Judaism and Christianity. David Leith is Senior Lecturer in Classics at the University of Exeter. He has published variously on the Hellenistic and Roman medical sects, especially Herophilus, Erasistratus, Asclepiades and the Methodists, and has edited medical fragments for The Oxyrhynchus Papyri series. He is currently preparing a collection, with essays and commentary, of the testimonia on Asclepiades of Bithynia. Craig Martin is Associate Professor of the History of Science and Technology at Ca’ Foscari University. He is the author of Renaissance Meteorology: Pomponazzi to Descartes (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011) and Subverting Aristotle: Religion, History, and Philosophy in Early Modern Science (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014). He translated Girolamo Mercuriale’s On Pestilence (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2022).

About the contributors

329

Francesca Masi is Associate Professor of History of Ancient Philosophy at the University Ca’ Foscari of Venice. Her main research interests focus on ontology, physics, psychology and ethics in ancient thought. She published several essays on Epicurus and Epicureanism. She is the author of Epicuro e la filosofia della mente: Il XXV libro dell’opera Sulla natura and co-editor of Epicurus on Eidola: Peri Phuseos Book II: Update, Proposal, and Discussions (Sankt Augustin 2006) and of ‘Vedere’ l’invisibile: Rileggendo il XXXIV libro Sulla natura di Epicuro (PHerc. 1431) (Naples 2020). Enrico Piergiacomi is Assistant Professor in History of Philosophy at the Technion | Israel Institute of Technology and research fellow at the Center for Religious Sciences of the Bruno Kessler Foundation of Trento. He was recipient of the international grant The Reception of Lucretius and Roman Epicureanism from the Middle Ages to the Eighteenth century (2019-2020) and fellow at Villa I Tatti | The Harvard Center for Italian Renaissance Studies (2021-2022), where he carried on the project The Pleasures of Piety. The History of a Neglected Religious Tradition. He specializes in ancient/modern theological thought and its moral implications. He published two books: Storia delle antiche teologie atomiste (Sapienza Università Editrice, Rome 2017) and Amicus Lucretius. Gassendi, il “De rerum natura” e l’edonismo cristiano (De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2022). Chiara Rover wrote her PhD dissertation on Lucretius’ epistemology (Fedeltà senza dogmatismo. L’epistemologia di Lucrezio) under the supervision of Prof. Emidio Spinelli and Prof. Francesco Verde (Sapienza University of Rome). The result of her thesis (defended in July 2021) has been submitted for publication. She was a postdoc Junior Fellow at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies – Universität Hamburg, where she is currently a Research Associate, with a project on Carneades’ (and the ‘sceptical’ Academy’s) attitude towards religion. Her research interests focus on Roman Epicureanism, Ancient Scepticism and the relationship between this latter and the religious sphere. Her publications include “La polemica antiscettica nel IV libro di Lucrezio. Un’eco antiochea?” (Ciceroniana Online, 2020), “Lucretius’ Prolepsis” (Elenchos, 2022), and “Sfuggire agli uomini, sfuggire agli dèi. Religio e giustizia in Lucrezio” (forthcoming in Archivio di Filosofia). Voula Tsouna is UCSB Distinguished Professor and member of the Philosophy Department at the University of California (Santa Barbara). She has been Fellow of the National Endowment for the Humanities, Senior Fellow of the Onassis Foundation, Centenary Fellow of the Scottish Philosophical Association, and Distinguished Visiting Scholar at Christ’s College, Cambridge. She is President of SAGP, member of the Scientific Committee of the Fondation Hardt, and co-editor of the CUP series Key Themes in Ancient Philosophy. Her publications include [Philodemus]

330

About the contributors

[On Choices and Avoidances] (Naples 1995), co-authored with Giovanni Indelli and recipient of the Theodor Mommsen Award 1995; The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School (Cambridge 1998), also translated and published in modern Greek (PEK: Athens 2018); The Ethics of Philodemus (Oxford 2007), and Plato’s Charmides. An Interpretative Commentary (Cambridge 2022). She has also published approximately eighty articles on Socrates, the Minor Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic and Roman philosophers.

Index of Ancient Names Aëtius 179n., 215n., 226n., 242 Albertus Magnus 312 Alexander the Great 1 Anaxagoras 3, 191, 194, 285, 286n., 314, 321 Anaximander 314 Andreas (physician) 150–151 Antiochus of Ascalon 122, 172–173, 184 Antonios (Epicurean) 191, 199–200, 202 Antonius Musa 167 and n. Aphrodite/Venus 260 Apollo 177, 263–265 and n., 269 Apollodorus (Epicurean) 66, 108n., 168n. Apollonides 89–91, 98 Apollonius 89 and n. Apuleius 167 Aratus 317–318 Arcesilaus 122 and n., 278n., 280–281 and n., 283 Archelaus 154 Archephon 89–90 Ares/Mars 260 Aristophanes 224n. Aristophanes of Byzantium 74n. Aristotle 4, 6, 9, 28, 29n., 57n., 67, 69–70, 76 and n., 108 and n., 109n., 110–114 and n., 116, 125n., 133, 154, 159, 188, 192, 195, 197 and n., 198, 204, 223–225 and n., 226n., 237, 250n., 309–312 and n., 316, 318, 322, 330 Arius Didymus 223 Artemis 263 and n., 265, 269 Asclepiades of Bithynia 9–10, 144–145, 150, 167–175 and n., 178–185 and n., 188–189, 191, 193–195 and n., 204, 328 Aspasius (Peripatetic) 188n. Athenaeus of Attaleia 171n.

Augustus 167 Avicenna 318, 320 Caelius Aurelianus 169–170, 173–174, 178–179 and n., 180, 181n. Carneades 278n., 280–283 and n., 303–304 and n., 329 Carneiscus 4 Cassius the Iatrosophist 181–183 and n. Celsus 167 Censorinus 146, 154 Chrysippus 120n., 202–203 and n., 232n., 235n., 250n. Cicero 2, 119 and n., 121n., 122, 134n., 144n., 146, 155, 215 Clement of Alexandria 125n., 156 Cleomedes 297 Cleon 85 Cleophantus 179 Clitomachus 283 Colotes 18, 19n. Damoxenus 141, 143, 145n. Demeter 18, 266 Demetrius Laco 4, 31, 108n., 142, 146, 148–151, 214n. Democritus 6, 9, 106n., 107n., 115 and n., 127n., 141, 142n., 145, 148, 152–154, 159–160 and n., 169, 188, 191, 195, 211, 223, 226, 252 Demosthenes 327 Deucalion 317 Diagoras 194 Dicaearchus 150 Diodorus Cronus 40 Diodorus Siculus 154 Diogenes Laertius 2, 7, 11, 16n., 66 and n., 74n., 81 and n., 97, 105, 116, 119, 121 and n., 129, 131n., 143–144, 156, 215n., 277, 280, 282, 284n. Diogenes of Babylon 118 and n., 241

332

Index of Ancient Names

Diogenes of Oinoanda 4–5, 11, 73–74, 86n., 98, 216n., 221–222, 244–249 and n., 257–266 and n., 270–273, 303 and n., 328 Diogenes of Tarsus 143 Dionysius of Alexandria 189 Dionysius of Cyrene 241 Ecphantus (Pythagorean) 215n. Empedocles 50, 145, 192, 195 Erasistratus 10, 171n., 174, 188, 191–192, 195, 204, 328 Eudoxus 83, 89–92 and n., 98, 229–230 Eutius 91 Galen 9–10, 106n., 144 and n., 146, 152–153 and n., 155, 168–169, 171, 183 and n., 184n., 187–204 and n., 223 Helios 263, 265 Heraclides of Pontus 215 and n. Heraclitus 152 and n. Hercules 328 Hermarchus 4, 26–28, 32, 132n., 143, 144n. Hermes/Mercury 260, 270 and n. Herodicus the Cratetean (physician) 145n. Herodotus (addressee of Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus) 16 and n., 43 Heron of Alexandria 77n. Herophilus 150–151, 171n., 328 Hesiod 66–67, 223 Hicetas of Syracuse 215 and n. Hippocrates 9, 142, 148, 152–153, 155, 160, 195, 314 Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq 190 Idomeneus 89–91, 144 and n. Leonteus 89–92 Leto 263, 265, 269 Livy 318, 322–323 Lucretius 2, 8–10, 12, 16n., 23, 29–30, 67, 86n., 105–135 and n., 142–149, 152, 154, 155n., 170, 175–180 and n.,

182–185, 216–222 and n., 226 and n., 233n., 241–246 and n., 247n., 249, 286, 295–296 and n., 301–302 and n., 304, 309, 314, 329 Lucullus 119n., 122, 134n. Macrobius 285, 315 Marcus Artorius 167 and n. Marcus Aurelius 144 Menoeceus (addressee of Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus) 68 Metrodorus 8, 16, 23, 39–42, 45–47, 51, 61, 98, 108n., 143, 146 and n., 150, 190 Mitre 96–98, 143 Nemesis 269–271 Niceratus 272–273 Nikon 187 Noah 317 Oedipus 177 Olympiodorus 223, 323 Parmenides 115n., 154 Philip (archon, 291/290 BC) 91 Philodemus 4, 9, 32, 74n., 89–92, 96–98 and n., 108 and n., 114n., 118, 126 and n., 130n., 131n., 142 and n., 184 and n., 241, 270, 327 Philolaus 215n. Philonides of Laodicea 99n. Plato 3, 6, 57n., 73n., 120 and n., 154, 184n., 188, 195, 197 and n., 204, 215, 223, 230, 242, 250, 280 and n., 330 Pliny the Elder 167, 223, 313, 317, 319, 321 Plotinus 126n., 189 Plutarch 2, 19n., 23, 31, 83, 88, 98, 113 and n., 114n., 116n., 122n., 155, 184n., 190, 201, 223, 281–283 and n., 284n. Polyaenus 4, 90, 108n., 145 Polystratus 4, 17, 21, Porphyry 26, 132n., 143, 201 Poseidon/Neptune 18, 240n., 260–261, 270 and n., 281n., 282–284

Index of Ancient Names

Posidonius 223, 232n., 235n., 250n., 260 Psellus 71n. Pseudo-Plutarch 282, 285, 302 Ptolemy IV Philopator 150 Pyrrho 281–282 and n. Pythocles (addressee of Epicurus’ Letter to Pythocles) 68, 92, 229n., 283, 288n. Sabinus (physician) 152–153 and n. Scribonius Largus 167 Seleucus of Babylon 260 Seneca 12, 144, 148, 167, 212n., 223, 228n., 229n., 232n., 233n., 234 and n., 235n., 250n., 290, 302 and n., 304, 317, 321, 328 Sextus Empiricus 19n., 24–25, 118n., 172–173, 281 Socrates 94–95, 154, 245 and n., 330 Sophocles 177, 327

333

Soranus of Ephesus 147, 169, 181n. Sulla 1 Tertullian 150 Theophrastus 76, 114n., 195, 215, 223–226 and n., 233, 235n., 237, 242, 250n., 310, 317–318, 323 Theos Hypsistos 263, 265, 269 Timasagoras 108n., 134n., 135n. Torquatus (Epicurean) 143 and n., 146 Velleius (Epicurean) 121n., 126n. Virgil 317 Xenophanes 285 and n., 286n. Zeno of Sidon 4, 108n., 142n., 168n., 202, 203n., 222, 241 Zeus/Jupiter 18, 202n., 240n., 260–261, 263 and n., 266 and n., 268–269 Zopyrus 143, 145–146

Index of Modern Names Acerbi, F. 77n. Acosta Méndez, E. 74n. Aikin, S. 19n. Alberti, A. 95n., 277n. Albornoz, V. D. 200n. Algra, K. A. 214n., 216n., 285n. Allen, J. 184n., 278 and n., 290n., 292 and n., 294–295 and n. Angeli, A. 24n., 81n., 86n., 89n., 91n., 92n., 94 and n. Annas, J. 54n., 55n., 56n. Arenson, K. 141n., 143n., 146n. Argaud, É. 301n. Armstrong, D. 126n. Armstrong, J. M. 95n. Arrighetti, G. 65 and n., 68n., 70n., 74n., 81n., 82 and n., 86n., 87n., 98n., 155n. Asmis, E. 5, 22n., 28n., 82n., 86n., 97n., 167n., 168n., 285n., 288n., 289n., 290n., 295n. Atherton, C. 19n., 31n., 44n., 94n. Augustin, M. 252n. Bachmann, M. 4–5, 329 Bacon, F. 317 Bailey, C. 126n., 127n., 133n., 219n., 220, 287n., 301n., 302n. Bakker, F. A. 5n., 6–7, 11–12, 67n., 69n., 176n., 177n., 211 and n., 212n., 214n., 217–218, 219n., 221n., 224n., 229n., 240n., 242n., 248n., 257n., 277, 283n., 290n., 295n., 297n., 301n., 302n., 303n., 310n., 328 Balaudé, J.-F. 66n. Barbieri, A. 89n. Barbieri, G. 89n. Barigazzi, A. 87n. Barnes, J. 19n., 23n., 187n. Belardinelli, A. M. 141n.

Bellis, D. 277n., 278n., 304n., 309n., 319n., 327 Bels, J. 146n. Bénatouïl, T. 221n., 222n., 239n., 286n., 290n., 295n. Bennett, J. 252n. Berg, R. M. 19n. Betegh, G. 252n. Blank, D. L. 24n. Blayney, J. 154n. Bloch, O. 277n. Bobzien, S. 54n., 55n., 56n., 157n. Bollack, J. 221n. Bolton, R. 223n. Börm, H. 1n. Bos, A. P. 69n. Boudon-Millot, V. 155 and n., 187n., 188n., 190 and n., 191n., 197n., 201n., 202n. Bowen, A. C. 215n. Bown, A. 17n., 19n., 21n., 24n., 26n. Brahe, T. 311 Braicovich, R. 21n. Brown, E. 95n. Brown, R. D. 146n., 154n. Brundell, B. 278n., 300n., 301n. Brunschwig, J. 19n. Cabeo, N. 309 Cacciabaudo, F. 7 Campos Daroca, F. J. 81n. Canevaro, M. 1n. Canfora, L. 1n. Capasso, M. 65n., 152n. Cardano, G. 317, 320–321 and n., 323 Casadei, E. 167n., 168n., 189n. Casanova, A. 263 and n. Castagnoli, L. 58n., 115n. Cavalli, R. 117n. Cavallo, G. 99n.

336

Index of Ancient Names

Cerasuolo, S. 146n. Charles, D. 225n., 253n. Chiaradonna, R. 7, 187n. Clay, D. 81n., 86n., 99n. Clericuzio, A. 314n. Cocco, S. 313n. Cole, T. 154n. Corradi, M. 69n., 110n., 288n. Corsi, F. G. 187n., 200n., 221n., 257n., 303n. Corti, A. 5, 48n., 115n., 123n., 146 and n., 190n. Coture, J. 299n. Coulton, J. J. 264 Daiber, 223n., 224 and n., 225n. Damiani, V. 2n., 10, 68n., 81n., 86n., 97n., 187 and n., 188n., 191n., 192n., 193n., 196n., 198n., 327 Davidson, D. 33n. de La Paz Lòpez Martinez, M. 81n. De Lacy, E. A. 97n., 130n., 241n. De Lacy, Ph. 97n., 130n., 241n. De Ley, H. 153n. De Sanctis, D. 5, 7–8, 65, 68n., 70n., 72n., 74n., 76n., 81n., 97n., 221n., 240n., 257n., 327 de Valois, L. 282–285 and n., 304 Dear, P. 319n. Debru, A. 142n. Deissmann, A. 81n. Del Mastro, G. 108n. Del Soldato, E. 313n. Delattre, D. 7, 66n., 202n. Della Porta, G. 297–198 and n., 301, 314, 317–318 Descartes, R. 311–312, 322 and n., 323 Deufert, M. 105n. Di Mattei, S. 28 and n. Di Piazza, S. 192n. Diaco, S. 252n.

Diano, C. 87n., 91n., 92n., 97n., 98n., 156n., 159n. Dohm, H. 141n. Donini, 187n., 200n. Dorandi, T. 5, 7, 16n., 65 and n., 143n., 146n., 168n., 189n., 213 and n. Droysen, J. G. 1n. Du Chesne, J. 314 Duvernoy, J.-F. 142n. Eckstein, P. 99n. Englert, W. G. 155n., 156n., 159n. Erbì, M. 4, 7–8, 65n., 68n., 81, 82n., 83n., 86n., 87n., 88n., 89n., 90n., 93n., 96n., 99n., 142n., 144n., 190n., 200n., 327 Erler, M. 5, 7, 24n., 66n., 87n., 142n., 189n., 201n. Escalante Diaz Barreiro, S. 253n. Everson, S. 19n., 30n. Falcon, A. 223n. Ferguson, J. 189n. Ferrini, M. F. 73n. Ferwerda, R. 69n. Filippetti, A. 142n., 148n. Fiorillo, M. 142n. Fisher, S. 278n., 296n., 309n., 310n., 322 and n. Fleischer, K. J. 189 and n. Flemming, R. 168n. Fletcher, R. 189n. Fludd, R. 314 Frede, D. 172n., 174n. Freeland, C. 309n. Frei, P. 258n., 263n. Freyer-Schauenburg, B. 258n. Frischer, B. 81n. Furley, D. J. 115n., 125n. Gagliarde, G. 71n., 81n. Galilei, G. 299, 311–312 Gallo, I. 141n., 143n. Galmarini, A. 152n.

Index of Modern Names

Galzerano, M. 120n. Garofalo, I. 192n. Garzya, A. 181n. Gassendi, P. 11–12, 213, 214n., 257n., 277–307 and n., 309–324 and n. Gellar-Goad, T. H. M. 216n. Gemelli Marciano, M. L. 142n., 160n. Gensini, S. 19n., 22n., 30n. Giannantoni, G. 1n. Gifanius, H. 301 Gigandet, A. 5, 7, 32n., 86n. Gigante, M. 3, 81n., 110n., 113n., 142n., 143n., 148n. Giorgianni, F. 146 and n. Giovacchini, J. 7, 15, 21n., 22n., 24n., 25n., 28n., 29n., 30n., 34n., 47n., 57n., 70n., 142 and n., 160 and n., 328 Giussani, C. 219n., 220 Giusta, M. 144n. Glidden, D. K. 22n., 44n., 105n., 124n., 125n. Goldschmidt, V. 19n., 95n., 124n. Goodman, L. E. 19n. Goodrum, M. 320n. Gottschalk, H. B. 223n. Gourinat, J.-B. 5, 7 Grafton, A. 316n. Gray, B. 1n. Grilli, A. 262 Grimaudo, S. 188n., 191n. Guerlac, H. 314n. Guicciardini, F. 322 and n. Gulick, C. B. 141n. Güremen, R. 5, 86n., 258n. Gusmani, R. 28n., 29n. Guyau, J.-M. 133n Hahmann, A. 6, 128n., 129n. Hall, A. S. 265 and n. Hammerstaedt, J. 4–5, 7, 11, 19n., 22n., 57n., 86n., 87n., 221n., 245 and n.,

337

257, 258n., 259n., 261n., 262n., 271n., 272n., 328 Hankinson, R. J. 187n., 188n., 221n., 232n., 241n., 242n., 251n., 252n. Hatch, R. A. 311n. Heberdey, R. 269 and n. Henry, J. 184, 281n. Heßler, J. E. 65n., 81n., 86n., 87n. Hinzer-AlHasan, B. 259n. Hirai, H. 314n. Holmes, C. 158n. Hourcade, A. 156n., 160n. Huby, P. 169n. Hudry, J.-L. 29n. Hunter, H. 155n. Ideler, I. L. 181n. Ierodiakonou, K. 198n. Indelli, G. 74n., 145n., 329 Ioppolo, A. M. 7 Irwin, T. H. 28n. Isnardi Parente, M. 127n. Ivanov, S. 318n. Janković, V. 315n., 317n. Johnson, M. R. 155n., 160n. Jouanna, J. 152n., 153 and n., 156n., 157n., 187n., 191n. Joy, L. S. 277n., 291n., 310n., 316n., 319 and n., 322 Jürss, F. 295n. Kalinka, E. 269 and n. Kalligas, P. 225n., 233n., 252n. Kapantais, D. 233n. Kaufman, D. H. 191n. Kazantzidis, G. 142n., 145n., 146n., 152n. Kechagia, E. 123n. Kepler, J. 311 and n. Kidd, I. G. 223n. Kilpatrick, R. S. 142n. Kindi, V. 252n. King, F. J. 200n.

338

Index of Ancient Names

Klavan, S. A. 118n. Kocagil, O. 267 Konstan, D. 5, 7, 10–11, 22n., 57n., 69n., 90n., 121n., 128n., 146n., 149n., 200n., 211, 212n., 229n., 238n., 328 Kuczewski, M. 29n. Kupreeva, I. 191n. La Mothe Le Vayer, de F. 316 Laks, A. 7, 160n., 221n., 231n., 252n. Lambinus, D. 301 Lamedica, E. 108n. Landolfi, L. 146n. Lapini, W. 67n. Laufer, E. 257n., 328 Laursen, S. 3n., 55n., 56n., 155n. Lee, M.-K. 106n. Leith, D. 7, 9–10, 145n., 167 and n., 168n., 171n., 181n., 185n., 189n., 191n., 328 Leone, G. 3n., 4–5, 7, 41 and n., 45n., 48 and n., 65 and n., 70n., 73n., 75n., 81n., 86n., 115n., 189n., 221n., 245 and n., 246n., 247n., 248n., 257n., 261n., 288n., 303n. Leunissen, M. 223n. Levitin, D. 309n. Lévy, C. 122n. Liebich, W. 89n., 97n. Lo Piparo, F. 29n. LoLordo, A. 277n., 278n., 294n., 309n., 310n., 311n., 314n. Long, A. (Alex) 252n. Long, A. A. 22n., 44n., 57n., 124n., 133n., 198n., 237n., Longo Auricchio, F. 74n., 87n., 190n. Longo, A. 189n. López Férez, J. A. 142n. Lovejoy, A. 233n. Luraghi, N. 1n. Lüthy, C. 305n. MacGillivray, E. D. 34n.

Machiavelli, N. 322 and n. Mackey, J. L. 32 and n. Magrin, S. 253n. Manetti, D. 181n. Manetti, G. 19n. Mansfeld, J. 67n., 223n., 224n., 226n. Manuli, P. 199n. Manuwald, A. 57n. Marchand, S. 7 Marcovich, M. 16n. Mari, M. 1n. Marmodoro, A. 111n. Martin, C. 7, 11–12, 309 and n., 310n., 312n., 313n., 314n., 317n., 319n., 323n., 328 Martin, J. 16n. Marvin, U. 321n. Mas Torres, S. 200n. Masi, F. G. 1, 4–8, 16n., 21n., 22n., 31n., 39, 42n., 45n., 48n., 54n., 55n., 56n., 57n., 59n., 69n., 105n., 117n., 118n., 129n., 155n., 156n., 158n., 159n., 221n., 232n., 234n., 252n., 283n., 295n., 297n., 305n., 327n., 329 Maso, S. 4–5, 7, 31n., 105n., 223n. Masullo, R. 181n. McIntyre, R. 252n. McOsker, M. 65n., 200n., 201n. Mercuriale, G. 328 Merkelbach, R. 264n. Merker, A. 76n. Messeri, M. 277n., 278n., 279n., 296n. Michler, M. 167n. Milanese, G. 19n., 21n., 25n., 74n. Militello, C. 81n., 91n., 97n., 98n. Miller, P. 316n. Milner, N. P. 263n., 266n., 270n. Miloš, A. G. 121n., 125n. Mitsis, P. 5, 7, 22n., 155n., 157n. Monet, A. 108n. Montarese, F. 110n., 142n.

Index of Modern Names

Moraux, P. 195n., 198n. Morel, P.-M. 1, 5–7, 22n., 34n., 67n., 75n., 95n., 105n., 124n., 153 and n., 155n., 159n., 221n., 235n., 252n., 258n., 305n. Moritz, M. 142n. Mugler, C. 127n. Natali, C. 4, 57n. Naudé, G. 316 Naugerius, A. 301 Nehamas, A. 252n. Németh, A. 54n., 56n., 57n., 59n., 117n., 155n., 156n., 157n., 158n. Nervi, M. 142n. Nijs, W. 147 and n. Norden, E. 65n. Notaro, E. 144n. Nussbaum, M. C. 142n., 146n. Nutton, V. 175n., 179n., 187n., 188n., 191n., 192n., 201n. O’Keefe, T. 54n., 55n., 56n., 115n., 116n., 155n., 157n., 159n., 232n. Obbink, D. 5, 94n. Olivieri, A. 191n. Orelli, L. 142n., 153 and n. Osler, M. 310 and n. Ossa-Richardson, A. 323n. Paganini, G. 281n., 296n. Palmerino, C. R. 305n., 327 Parke, H. W. 264n. Pearcy, L. T. 184 and n. Peiresc, de N.-C. F. 315–319 and n., 321, 323 Pellò, C. 252n. Peralta, A. 7 Petit, C. 188n. Petzl, G. 258n. Phillips, J. H. 142n. Piergiacomi, E. 7, 9, 44n., 69n., 141, 146n., 156n., 184n., 214n., 295n., 301n., 303n., 329

Pietrobelli, A. 187n., 191n. Pigeaud, J. 145n., 202n. Pigeaud, J.-M. 142n., 144n., 155n. Polansky, R. M. 29n. Polito, R. 145n., 172n., 189n. Pomponazzi, P. 322 and n. Pope, M. 146n. Popkin, R. 278n., 309 and n. Pormann, P. E. 187n. Protopapas, M. 252n. Puglia, E. 146 and n., 147, 150 and n. Ranocchia, G. 146 and n. Rawson, E. 167 and n. Reinhardt, T. 31n. Renna, E. 142n. Rispoli, G. M. 118n. Rist, J. M. 125n., 133n. Robitzsch, J. M. 123n., 125n., 126n., 128n., 135n. Rochot, B. 280n. Romeo, C. 214n. Roos, A. 314n. Rosa, F. 145n. Roselli, A. 142n., 148, n. Roskam, G. 5, 258n. Rover, C. 7–8, 12n., 105, 119n., 120n., 122n., 125n., 128n., 329 Rowland, I. 321n. Runia, D. T. 226n. Sakamoto, K. 311n. Sallmann, G. 133n. Sarasohn, L. 277n. Sassi, M. M. 115n., 142n. Scheiner, C. 319 Schiesaro, A. 127n., 128n. Schmid, W. 189n. Schmidt, E. A. 155n. Schmitt, C. 323n. Schneider, M. T. 190n., 203n. Schofield, M. 201n. Schorn, S. 94n.

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Index of Ancient Names

Schrijvers, P. H. 110n. Sedley, D. N. 1n., 3n., 19n., 22n., 23n., 25n., 39–41 and n., 44–45 and n., 54n., 56n., 59n., 60–61, 70n., 86n., 89n., 97n., 109n., 113n., 114n., 115n., 116n., 120n., 121n., 124n., 126n., 127n., 129n., 130n., 142n., 156n., 168n., 169n., 176n., 184 and n., 198n., 213n., 216n., 217n., 221n., 224n., 226n., 227n., 229n., 230n., 236n., 237n., 242n., 250n., 252n., 290n. Segal, C. 127n., 145n., 152n. Sennert, D. 309, 323 Serangeli, A. 144 and n., 189n., 191n. Sharples, R. W. 56n. Shorey, P. 57n. Singer, P. N. 187n., 188n., 191n., 200n. Siscoe, G. 321n. Slabon, T. 223n., 253n. Smith, M. F. 4–5, 11, 74n., 87n., 105n., 127n., 245 and n., 246n., 247n., 258n., 259n., 261n., 262n., 263–264, 270n., 272n., 303n., 328 Smoller, L. 318n. Sparling, R. 233n., 240n., 253n. Spina, L. 91n., 97n. Spinelli, E. 5, 7, 24n., 26n., 81n., 99n., 105n., 329 Staab, G. 263, 270n. Stauber, J. 264n. Steckel, H. 97n. Stok, F. 168n. Stowers, S. K. 81n., 86n., Striker, G. 97n., 106n., 119n., 201n., 290n. Taormina, D. P. 189n. Tassinari, P. 195n. Taub, L. 67n., 72n., 221n., 229n. Taylor, B. 19n. Tecusan, M. 184n.

Tepedino Guerra, A. 41 and n., 44 and n., 45n., 89n., 99n. Tieleman, T. 187n., 285n. Todd, R. B. 215n. Torraca, L. 89n. Trapp, M. 99n. Tsouna, V. 5, 11, 22n., 24n., 28n., 31n., 34n., 57n., 106n., 124n., 126n., 129n., 142n., 203n., 221, 257n., 329 Tulli, M. 7, 71n., 72n., 81n., 97n., 327 Tutrone, F. 110n., 147 and n. Untersteiner, M. 81n. Usener, H. 70n., 75n., 77n., 81n., 82 and n., 87n., 130n., 145n., 154–155 and n., 189 and n., 213 Vallance, J. 167n., 168n., 178n. van der Eijk, P. 188n. Vegetti, M. 187n., 188n., 190n., 191n., 192n., 198n., 199n., 327 Verde, F. 1, 5–7, 22n., 24n., 44n., 54n., 57n., 58n., 65n., 67n., 68 and n., 69n., 75n., 76n., 82n., 86n., 89n., 94n., 97n., 105n., 106n., 110n., 112n., 117n., 118n., 121n., 123n., 128n., 129n., 134n., 145n., 148n., 149n., 150 and n., 167n., 173 and n., 191n., 199n., 200n., 202n., 214n., 221n., 223n., 224n., 227n., 232n., 240n., 244n., 248n., 252n., 286n., 290n., 295n., 302n., 303n., 305n., 327, 329 Verlinskij, A. L. 28 and n. Vermij, R. 322n. Viano, C. 5 Vimercato, F. 309 and n. Vitali, V. 19n., 22n., 30n. Vitrac, B. 77n. Vlastos, G. 159n. Vogliano, A. 89n., 91 von Staden, H. 149n., 151n. Vuillemin, J. 222n., 243n. Wakelnig, E. 188n.

Index of Modern Names

Walzer, R. 199n. Warren, J. 12n., 73n., 87n., 131n., 169n. Wasserstein, A. 221n. Wehrli, F. 215n. Wellmann, M. 142n. Wendelen, G. 319 and n. Wenkebach, E. 152n.

Widmann, H. 65 and n., 71n., 72n. William, I. 87n. Wilson, M. 76n., 310n., 312n. Woolf, R. 227n., 252n. Xenophontos, S. 201n. Zanatta, M. 108n. Zucca, D. 108n., 109n., 111n., 125n.

341