Enterprises of Robert Hamilton: A Study of Wealth and Influence in Early Upper Canada, 1776-1812 9780773573369

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The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton: A Study of Wealth and Influence in Early Upper Canada; 1776-1812

Bruce G. Wilson

,., ~'c

CARLETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

OTTAWA - CANADA

© Carleton University Press Inc., 1983 ISBN 0-88629-010-4 (casebound) 0-88629-009-0 (paperback) Printed and bound in Canada Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Wilson, Bruce G., 1945The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton (Carleton Library Series; 128) Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph.D.University of Toronto, 1978) Bibliography: p. ISBN 0-88629-010-4 (bound) - ISBN 0-88629-009-0 (pbk.) 1. Hamilton, Robert, 1750-1809. 2. Ontario-Politics and govemment-1791-1841. 3.0ntario-History1791-1841. I. Title. II. Series: The Carleton Library; no. 128.

FC44I.H34W54 1983 F1032.H34W54 1983

971. 3/02

C83-090137-X

Distributed by: Oxford University Press 70 Wynford Drive DON MILLS, Ontario, CANADA, M3C 119. (416) 441-2941

Preface

A curiosity about development in Ontario between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, a period of the province's history which has received little attention from the last two generations of historians, was the initial stimulus for this book. Work in this period has required extensive research in a diversity of sources and a careful piecing together of fragments of information. Sources are sparse, discontinuous and scattered. The Niagara peninsula was chosen for examination because it was an area of rapid early growth. Because of this early development and because it has to this day remained a stable and prosperous agricultural region, the peninsula both generated and preserved more documentation concerning its pioneer period than did most other regions. The area was also chosen because what study there has been of Ontario before 1837 has tended to focus on the east; York, Kingston and the communities along the St. Lawrence have received most of the attention, and generalizations about Ontario have been made from findings in these areas. It was hoped that a shift to the west might provide new perspectives. What most impressed me on initial examination of the Niagara region was the impact of commerce and networks of trade upon its development. The interaction of commerce and society seemed most fruitfully traced through a study of the peninsula's most prominent entrepreneur, Robert Hamilton. He was in the region for the entire period; information about him appeared more frequently than for any other individual. Hamilton was involved in virtually all aspects of the society's early development and his career could be used as a focus for the study of certain broad aspects of social and economic development. My research for this study began as a doctoral thesis and I wish to thank the Canada Council for its generous support with three doctoral fellowships and the Ontario Ministry of Education for a Queen Elizabeth Scholarship. My debts to institutions and individuals who aided my research are many. I would like to thank in particular the Archives of Ontario and the Public Archives of Canada and their staffs. Their expert assistance in suggesting sources and in locating and retrieving material was excellent. My deepest gratitude is due to Professor M.S. Cross who supervised my thesis through most of its gestation and Professor Michael Bliss who saw it to its conclusion. My editor, Diane Mew, has made numerous and helpful suggestions for the improvement of the

text. The Ontario Heritage Foundation made a generous grant in aid of publication. The maps were prepared by Christine E. Earl, of the Department of Geography, Carleton University. Above all, I would like to thank my wife who typed the early drafts of this work and stood by me through all the onerous preparations involved in publishing a book.

BRUCE G. WILSON London. England May. 1983.

Contents

Preface,

v

Introduction,

1

1. The Apprenticeship of Robert Hamilton, 1776-83, 23

2. The Post-Revolutionary Adjustment, 3. The Distribution of Public Office,

9

35

4. Merchants, Politics and Administration, 1783-96,

48

5. Kinship and Commerce: The Hamilton Network,

58

6. The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton: Portaging and Provisioning,

68

7. The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton: Retailing and Land Speculation, 88 8. The Politics of Commerce: Preconceptions and Strategies, 9. Merchants and Patronage,

128

10. Merchants and Local Leadership in the Niagara Peninsula, 11. The Decline of the Haf!lilton Enterprises, 12. Conclusion,

164

177

Appendix 1: Land Holdings in the Niagara Peninsula, Appendix 2: Maps, 189 Notes,

194

Bibliography, Index,

243

233

101

181

141

Introduction

By the last decade of the eighteenth century, Niagara Falls was firmly established as the premier tourist attraction of North America. Mercifully unencumbered by the tawdry clutter that surrounds it now, its majestic simplicity was a source of wonder and religious awe, its site a shrine at which cultivated Europeans aspired to worship. A pilgrim wending his way toward the falls up the steep-sided course of the Niagara River might, however, be somewhat distracted by a more modest, but still surprising view. A traveller to the falls would land at the dock at Queenston, a settlement that, in 1791, was still less than a decade old. His eyes would inevitably be drawn up the river bank, past stunted wooden houses and modest pioneer clearings to a splendid Georgian mansion, the home of the Honourable Robert Hamilton. Perched high above the river, with its impressive two-storey dressed stone facade, one-storey side wings and covered galleries, it seemed, with more than a touch of symbolism, to dominate both the surrounding landscape and the river below. It was the only such grand abode a traveller would encounter in all of Upper Canada.) The reaction of the Duc de la Rochefoucault-Liancourt, a cultivated French emigre who briefly sojourned in Queenston in 1795, was typical. He curtly dismissed most of the settlement's rather mean structures in a one-sentence enumeration. But he accorded much more respect to the Hamilton property and its owner: "Mr. Hamilton, an opulent merchant, who is concerned in the whole inland trade to this part of America, possesses in Queen's Town, a very fine house, built in the English style .... This merchant bears an excellent character. He is the most valuable kind of man for a new country."2 The house accurately bespoke its owner's wealth and power. The Honourable Robert Hamilton was his colony's most influential private citizen before the War of 1812. He was a dominant figure in the early commerce of Upper Canada and a participant in a virtual monopoly of transshipment on the Niagara portage. Hamilton's commercial transactions encompassed the length and breadth of the Niagara peninsula and touched points beyond, an incredible extent for such an operation in a developing pioneer society; at his death in 1809, some twelve hundred debtors owed him an astonishing total of £69,000. His land holdings totalled more than 130,000 acres, the equivalent of more than five townships, and stretched over the entire colony from the back townships of the Johnstown District on the east to the shores of Lake St. Clair on the west. Hamilton's enterprises constituted not so much a business as a smaJI empire.

2

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

His wealth and his contacts gave Hamilton a powerful influence upon his colonial society. By intennarriage with other major merchant families, by bringing to the country and establishing his Scots relatives and, above all, by the astute cultivation of close associations he had fonned with the British anny and the Montreal fur trade, Hamilton placed himself at the centre of a small but influential network of commercial and family alliances. That network, a merchant oligarchy which functioned along the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes, secured local and provincial office, economic largesse and political influence for its members. Hamilton, indeed, was at the privileged centre of the most influential group in early Upper Canadian society. The significance of the phenomenon which Robert Hamilton represented was not lost on his contemporaries. In 1793, another traveller, the anonymous author of the "Canadian Letters" observed: The persons of greatest weight in the Canadas, are the merchants or storekeepers. Among these, the gentlemen from Scotland take a decided lead . . . . They are sent out at an early age from Scotland and by the time they arrive at early manhood are perfectly conversant in a knowledge of the country. If a superior industry and activity are grounds of pretension to affluence, I know no men whose claims are equal to those of the Scotch. 3

Those who tarried longer in the colony and who had more first-hand contact with Hamilton and his allies were not always as favourably disposed to them. The first lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada, John Graves Simcoe, accused Hamilton of being one of a small group of merchants who monopolized the economy of the province: "They are the landowners, shopkeepers, merchants and millers and it is said mortgagees of great quantity's [sic] of land.' '4 At the other end of the political spectrum, Robert Thorpe, a radical who found not a few of his aspirations thwarted by Hamilton, was even more pithy when delivering jeremiads against the "Scotch pedlars" who had "insinuated themselves" with government and had "long irritated and oppressed the people .... " There was, he declaimed, "a chain of them linked from Halifax to Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, York, Niagara and so on to Detroit ... this Shopkeeper Aristocracy has stunted the Province and goaded the people until they have turned from the greatest loyalty to the utmost disaffection."5 Despite the vociferous controversy which swirled about them, neither Hamilton nor the "Shopkeeper Aristocracy" of which he was a part have drawn much notice from Upper Canada's historians. Those historians have long been attracted to the study of the structure of political power within the colony and have written much concerning the Family Compact, local compacts and regional politics. More recently historians' attention has begun to focus on entrepreneurial history and the impact upon the colony of the strategies of its businessmen. The period of the colony's early development

INTRODUCTION

3

before the War of 1812, when economic and political elites were most closely intertwined, however, still remains largely unexplored. An examination of Robert Hamilton and his career can help to fill that gap. This study is not intended as a conventional biography of Robert Hamilton. It lacks the personal detail concerning its central figure which is the stuff of biography. Indeed, not much can be gleaned from the existing sources about what Hamilton thought or said or what others thought or said about him. A pioneer society in the first generation tends to leave remarkably little in the way of personal written records. There is now no substantial group of documentation that could be called the Robert Hamilton Papers nor is there a major set of papers for any of his Niagara contemporaries before 1812. On the other side of the coin, there is a distinct lack of census data, detailed parish registers, assessment rolls or any broadly representative collection of will dockets on which quantified studies of Niagara society could be securely based. Even significant runs of newspapers and that traditional mainstay of the historian, papers of administrators and colonial politicians, are mostly prominent by their absence. Thus the research for this book has of necessity been catholic, ranging widely over the sources which are available. Robert Hamilton has been used as a focus to argue an hypothesis about the early development of the Niagara peninsula and Upper Canada. A few preliminary words need be said about two topics of vital importance in this study-money and geography. A bewildering variety of currency systems were in use in early Upper Canada. Sums were recorded in New York Currency (Nyc), Halifax Currency (Hlfx), Sterling (Stlg) or dollars. The fixed official rate of exchange was $1.00: 8/0 Nyc: 5/0 Hlfx.: 4/6 Stlg. New York Currency was commonly used for commerce; Hamilton kept his accounts in that currency. All sums recorded in this study are New York Currency unless otherwise stated. s As to the geographical stage on which Robert Hamilton played out his career, the Niagara peninsula may be defined as the jut of land between lakes Ontario and Erie which, impeded only by the break of the Niagara River, joins what are now Ontario and New York State. The peninsula's western boundary is the line of the Grand River up from Lake Ontario to the point where it would be intersected by a line drawn from Burlington Bay. From earliest times, the peninsula has been a crossroads. East-west, it lies at the western extremity of the Hudson-Mohawk Valley and forms a vital landbridge between the lakes, the only major break along the banks of lakes Ontario and Erie. North-south, the Niagara River constitutes an essential water link in the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes chain. The great falls of Niagara increased rather than decreased the river's importance, making the peninsula a major breakpoint in the water communication with the longest portage in the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system. Before white occupation, the peninsula was inhabited by the Neutrals,

4

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Indian middlemen in the trade between the Iroquois of New York State and the Huron of the Lake Simcoe region. After the virtual extinction of the Neutrals in the Iroquois sweep of 1649-50, the peninsula was for a period a no-man's-land, claimed by the Iroquois and inhabited by roving bands of Mississauga who had moved down from the north to fill the void. As whites penetrated up the lakes, the Niagara River front assumed an important transshipment function as goods and furs were carried around the falls. To facilitate and protect their growing fur trade along the lakes, the French in 1678 constructed the tiny Fort de Conti at the foot of Lake Erie on the west side. A stockade was thrown up in the ~670s at the mouth of the Niagara River on what is now American soil, to be succeeded in 1687 by a fort with a garrison of one hundred men and in 1726 a stone castle named Fort Niagara. In 1759, Sir William Johnson with a small army of regulars, colonials and Indians took the fort for the British. Under the new regime, the functions of the small fortifications remained the same: storage and transshipment of goods along the portage road which ran on the east shore and the protection of waterborne trade and military supply lines to the west. During the American Revolution, Fort Niagara served as a frontier defence post against possible rebel incursions to cut the British supply line. More importantly, it acted as a staging area for a series of highly effective raids using white Loyalists and Indians to strike south to the settlements of the New York and Pennsylvanian frontiers. After the Revolution, Britain held Fort Niagara until 1796 when its troops were transferred across the river to Fort George, then under construction near Newark (later Niagara-on-the-Lake) on Canadian soil. The major portage route had been transferred to the Canadian side several years earlier. White settlement in the Niagara peninsula effectively commenced with the end of the American Revolution. Some small beginnings had been made opposite Fort Niagara during the war. At its end, displaced Loyalists who had served in the two major units operating from the fort-Butler's Rangers and the local contingent of the Indian Department-along with a few other Loyalists, settled in the peninsula. Their original numbers were in the vicinity of 800 to 1,000. The Indian allies of the crown, numbering about 1,850, were settled along the Grand River. Settlement in the peninsula tended to follow along distinct lines and to be relatively compact. The arable soils of the peninsula ran in a narrow band below the Niagara escarpment along the Lake Ontario shore and for a ways up along the Niagara River front. The interior was heavier, poorly drained clay soils not conducive to poineer agriculture. Water, moreover, was a much more important factor in early transportation than land. When roads were few and costly, it was much cheaper to supply settlements by water. Settlement therefore tended to move out from the first node opposite Fort Niagara in two lines: up along the Lake Ontario shore and down along the Niagara River front. Before the new century, settlement had reached Burlington Bay and

INTRODUCTION

5

was filling in back along the lakeshore. The area between Niagara-on-theLake and the mouth of the WeIland River along the Niagara River front contained the densest and most prosperous concentration of early settlement, while more scattered popUlation was found along the river to Fort Erie and along the old glacial shorelines on the edge of Lake Erie. Settlement moved slowly up the WeIland River. A node of settlement developed on the kame moraine which constituted the Short Hills. Towns emerged primarily along the Niagara River front. Newark was the first capital of the new colony from 1791 to 1796. It remained the regional administrative centre and a chief supply centre throughout the period under discussion. Queenston, further south along the front, sprang up at the beginning of the portage road at the point at which goods were transshipped for their passage around Niagara Falls. Chippawa, lying at the mouth of the Weiland River, acted as a transshipment centre where goods were transferred to riverboats and as a supply centre for settlement up the WeIland River. At Fort Erie, goods were again transshipped to lake boats. The settlement there also served as a supply centre for the southern end of the peninsula. Lack of good harbours and generally mediocre soils were the reason that towns would not emerge early along the Lake Erie shore. Along the more heavily populated Lake Ontario shore, towns grew up where rivers flowed off the escarpment, providing waterpower for mills, some access to the interior and a break in land travel. The main settlements were founded at Twelve Mile Creek (St. Catharines), Twenty Mile (Jordan), Forty Mile (Grimsby) and Head of the Lake (Ancaster). In the interior, only St. Johns in the Short Hills area, St. David's, where the main east-west road crossed onto the escarpment, and Beaver Dams at the hub of the roads leading to St. David's, Chippawa, Queenston and Head of the Lake were of early significance (see Map 1). Niagara-on-the-Lake and Queenston were by far the largest and most significant settlements in the peninsula before 1812. In 1797, Niagara-onthe-Lake was described as having seventy houses. 7 By 1812, it had grown to five hundred inhabitants, six taverns and twenty dry-goods shops where "every item could be purchased on the same terms as in Montreal."8 Queenston was described as having twelve houses in 1800, with a major growth to a population of three hundred and six stores in 1812. Heavy settlement along the Niagara River front supported several other towns. Chippawa and Fort Erie had twelve and four houses respectively in 1800. Fort Erie had twenty-five houses in 1807 and Chippawa about twelve in 1809. 9 Town growth along the Lake Ontario shore was much slower and many centres for a long period were little more than a crossroads with a few stores and a nearby mill offering their services to the surrounding farming community. It would, for instance, be 1850 before Grimsby reached a population of three hundred. Jordan would have two hundred at the same date. Above the escarpment, St. David's consisted of about thirty houses in 1812. Beaver Dams was described as having a general store, a blacksmith shop and

6

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

a tavern. There was no significant town development at this period in the Iroquois lands along the Grand River. lo Although towns and villages were often small, they might still act as service centres for significant rural populations and, as their proliferation indicates, population influx into the Niagara peninsula was rapid and heavy. The ending of the Revolution reinforced the peninsula's function as a land bridge and American settlers, a few of them late Loyalists but most seeking cheap land or fleeing the instability of early American society, flowed across the Niagara River into the peninsula. The new arrivals contained a heavy component of ethnic and religious minorities. In 1789 the chief inhabitants of the peninsula estimated its white population at 3,100, at least three times the number at the end of the Revolution. By the mid-1790s, little more than a decade after its initiation, the population of the peninsula had increased at least sixfold over the original figure to 6,000, giving the region approximately one-quarter of the total white population of the province. Settlement was sufficiently dense by 1800 that the government ceased to grant vacant lands in the peninsula, assuming the remainder could be profitably sold. II Early development provided one base for Robert Hamilton's commerce. Such rapid development, however, inevitably slowed. By 1817 the peninsula's population had only doubled again to 12,500, and several districts in the east had comparable populations. Still, in the first decades of development, no other region of the colony experienced such an influx of population. No other area so quickly developed such a heavy non-Loyalist component in its population. Based on the agriculture of its people and its continuing transshipment function, the peninsula was the most developed, the most prosperous and one of the most heavily populated regions of the colony before 1812.12 Until 1791 the peninSUla was part of the province of Quebec, constituting a portion of the territory generally known as the "upper region" or "upper Quebec." After the coming of the Loyalists, the area was often referred to simply as the "new settlements." In 1791 it became part of the new province of Upper Canada. The Niagara peninsula constituted a part of two administrative districts before 1812. In 1788 it was included in the Nassau District, the area between lines running due north from the mouth of the Trent River and the tip of Long Point on Lake Erie. In 1792 the name of this district was changed from Nassau to Home. In 1798 the geographical area defined as the Niagara peninsula was separated from the Home District to form the Niagara District, an arrangement which remained unaltered until 1816. Two counties had territory within the Niagara District-Lincoln County, created in 1792, which included the present-day counties of Lincoln and WeIland, and Haldimand County, created in 1800, which centred on the Grand River. The political ridings within the Niagara District remained constant in their boundaries for the period under discussion. First Lincoln consisted of Barton, Glanford, Saltfleet, Binbrook, Grimsby and Clinton townships. In 1792 it was

INTRODUCTION

7

combined with the riding of York to elect one member, and from 1800 with portions of Haldimand. Second Lincoln consisted of Louth, Grantham and Niagara townships; Third Lincoln of Pelham, Thorold and Stamford; and Fourth Lincoln of Wainfleet, Humberstone, Crowland, Willoughby and Bertie (see Map 2).13 With the stage thus set, attention can tum to the players upon it: in the first instance, a varied cast of British soldiers, colonial Indian Department officials, and traders, including in a minor role the man who would come to dominate the piece, Robert Hamilton.

CHAPTER 1

The Apprenticeship of Robert Hamilton, 1776-83

It was axiomatic in American merchant circles that fortunes were to be made in colonial wars. Robert Hamilton began his commercial career at Fort Niagara and other British military installations along the Great Lakes during the American Revolution and it would be easy to assume that he accumulated the basis of his fortune in that period. Although the Revolution seemed to hold out the promise of substantial wealth in the Great Lakes region through the supply of the British military and its colonial allies, Robert Hamilton in fact did not emerge from the Revolution a wealthy man. For most of the war he operated on the fringes of that lucrative trade and the war's most immediate legacy to him was a heavy burden of debts. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that Hamilton served his apprenticeship in trade during the Revolution. As befitted an apprentice, he did not assume a major role in events at wartime Niagara. He was overshadowed at the fort by colonial officers such as John Butler, commander of the Loyalist forces at Niagara, and by Butler's rivals in the Johnson family. Hamilton's enterprises were modest when compared to those of the two major firms at Niagara, Pollard and Robinson, and Taylor and Forsyth, who associated themselves with the Butler and Johnson factions respecti vely . Still, as an apprentice, Hamilton learned much about trade on the Great Lakes frontier and developed contacts which would assure his future success. An understanding of events and trends at Fort Niagara during the Revolution is essential to the understanding of the career of Robert Hamilton and the commercial group in the Niagara peninsula of which he was the chief member. The most important factor in commercial success at Niagara during the war years was the British army. Superficially, the British military presence at Niagara during the American Revolution was not impressive: "A very shabby looking set and not likely ever to do much credit to the Reg't." was one 9

10

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

officer's opinion of his men} The force was a small one of less than four hundred men assigned to protect the British supply lines where the Niagara Ri ver flowed into Lake Ontario. 2 It was a caretaker garrison that saw no direct action in the Revolution. Yet whatever the apparent deficiencies of its local contingent, Niagara's other residents---colonial merchants, officers and soldiers---could not be blind to the significance of the British army. The army was all-powerful in the frontier society of upper Quebec. From the early years of the British occupation, the Great Lakes region had been governed by the military commandants of the forts. They concerned themselves with civil affairs as well as military matters. Their orders were supreme in both spheres and their authority unlimited. No group was more aware of the power the British military wielded at the upper posts than the local merchants. For the small group of merchants who were on the Great Lakes frontier during the Revolution, the British military defined their economic and social cosmos. The army and its allies constituted the major market for goods during the war and controlled the transportation facilities which gave access to the market. It provided security for trade upon the frontier and administered the local regulation that commerce required to function. A merchant could not even locate at one of the upper posts without the military's permission. The wartime merchant community at Niagara was composed of men who had been closely associated with the military: a former naval officer was part of it, for example, as was a former clerk to the quartermaster-general and two retired commissaries. The intimate association of commerce with the military was not fortuitous. Traders on the frontier were faced with problems they could not themselves overcome: lack of investment capital, primitive organization, and small and fluctuating markets constantly dogged their enterprises. Only the military could resolve these problems for them. Supply of the army was one of the few stable markets upon which these merchants could rely. Commerce along the Great Lakes necessitated the construction of expensive facilities, ships, portages and storage depots, to move goods into the interior. During the Revolution the military was the only supplier of these facilities. Private ownership of ships and depots was forbidden and although merchants complained bitterly about this degree of control, they themselves did not have the resources to duplicate the military's facilities. The military also provided commerce with an essential minimum of security. Niagara during the Revolution was constantly balanced on the edge of violence. Merchants faced not only the obvious threat of rebel attack, but random day-to-day lawlessness. Assault, robberies by soldiers, a threatened mutiny by Butler's Rangers, and vicious brawls between whites and Indians or soldiers and civilians were commonplace. Only the military could enforce order, and without order trade could not function.:! Any merchant at the posts, moreover, found the friendship and favour of individuals in the British military essential to his success. The obvious reason

THE APPRENTICESHIP OF ROBERT HAMILTON

11

for so many men with previous military careers entering trade at the posts was the hope of winning favour from their contacts within the military. Permission from the military was necessary to trade at a post, to acquire land or to erect any building. Demand for goods at the upper posts during the war years was virtually insatiable. The major problem for any merchant was simply getting his goods to the market. Shipping was allowed only on military vessels and the number of ships was very limited. Traders competed with each other to win the military's favour and gain licences to ship their goods or, like the Niagara merchant, Taylor, exercised influence with officials at depots and portages to have their goods forwarded out of turn. 4 The real Eldorado entrepreneurs were striving to control at Niagara during the Revolution was the provisioning of the Indian Department. Delighted merchants watched this market grow from nothing at the beginning of the Revolution to major proportions. In 1776 the nearest Indian encampment to the fort had been eighty miles away. With the intensification of the war, the number of Indians at the fort increased dramatically. By December 1777 there were 2,300 Indians camped near the fort. Even these numbers were dwarfed after the Americans launched a major attack on the Iroquois settlements in upper New York in 1779. By the end of that year 5,000 Indians had fled to Niagara and, despite the sending out of war parties, the number at the fort remained above 3,500 until the end of the war.5 The provisions and presents necessary to retain the active support of these Indians for the Loyalist cause were considerable. Their cost grew from about £500 at the beginning of the war to £100,000 in 1781. The cost of provisioning the Indians at the three major upper forts of Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac reportedly exceeded the cost of the whole military establishment in Canada exclusive of provisions. Requisitions for presents in 1781 for Fort Niagara included, among other items, 12,000 blankets, 23,500 yards of cloth, 5,000 silver ear bobs, 75 dozen razors and 20 gross jews harps, some preferably "of superior quality."6 Although in theory the goods to provision the Indians were supposed to come from Britain and purchases at the posts were to be extremely limited, in fact because of problems of supply, control and transportation, a substantial portion and in some years virtually all of the goods for Indian provisioning came from local merchants. 1 There were considerable profits to be made in that. Although very lucrative, supplying the Indian Department was not the only market provided for Niagara entrepreneurs by the military. Merchants found subsidiary sources of income in provisioning troops and Loyalist refugees, acting as financial agents for the services, and retailing to the soldiers. Recorded accounts of goods and services for His Majesty's Service incurred directly at all the upper posts for the period 1775 to 1784 totalled £436,406. Slightly over one-third of the total was spent at Niagara. Provisions accounted for a large proportion of this. Although most flour was imported from

12

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

England, all Ii vestock until 1781 came from local sources. Rum is a good example of the profits to be made on provisions. Despite the attempts to import as much as possible on its own account, the military was often reduced to relying on private sources. Of the total 7,142 gallons consumed at Niagara in one year ending May 1778, 4,360 gallons came from a local merchant. Beyond this official supply, merchants benefited from private trade with individual soldiers. Officers at the upper post complained that prices were so high that they could not live within their incomes. The accounts of one lieutenant at Fort Niagara showed him owing Edward Pollard £174 in 1777, Francis Goring £166 in 1779, and Hamilton and Cartwright £213 by 1785. 8 If the merchants had ample reasons for cultivating the friendship of the British military, the British military were much less fond of the merchants. They felt that merchant cupidity and unscrupulousness in encouraging Indian demands for lUXUry goods was pushing Indian expenses to unbearable heights. There was some validity to this and there was more than a grain of truth in the remark of the commandant of Niagara that it had long been a maxim of trade in that part of the world that whatever was got from government was well got. 9 Indian trade on the frontier was an unscrupulous business. The merchants at Niagara were for the most part adventurers, gamblers who took risks for which they expected a high return-legitimate or otherwise. When they got the chance, they cheated the army blind. The well-bred officers of the British military, disdainful of commerce at the best of times, were repelled by these crass traders who seemed, as one said, •'indifferent to any consideration except that of Interest, "10 and who would "for a trifling consideration sell their sordid souls. "11 The military, so far as it was able, regulated merchant activities and attempted to discover men in trade who would demonstrate mote responsibility and patriotism. Merchants were not the only colonials on the frontier who depended upon the presence of the British military. Under the administrative strains imposed by the Revolutionary War, the British army found it convenient to devolve a portion of its authority to those who officered the colonial forces. Army senior staff and the commander-in-chief, who was also governor of Canada, made the recommendations for the major commissions in the Loyalist military corps and the colonial Indian Department. The colonials fortunate enough to receive high rank in those units wielded effective control of the army's Loyalist allies, both red and white. These chief colonial officers could use the prerogatives entailed in their' commands to further their personal careers. The most immediately useful of the powers that they derived from their position was influence over the selection of local merchants to provision their units. Merchants would pay well, if illicitly, for the privilege of supplying the military market. The careers of colonial officials, then, were often closely interwoven with those of merchants and indeed the careers of colonial officials had close

THE APPRENTICESHIP OF ROBERT HAMILTON

13

parallels to those of the merchants. John Butler was a prime example. Like the merchants, Butler relied upon the military for his advancement and, also like them, he proved adept at exploiting the army-or, more precisely, its quasi-military adjunct, the colonial Indian Department-for personal gain. Butler had risen high in the pre-Revolutionary Indian Department, becoming its chief interpreter and right-hand man of the head of the department, Sir William Johnson. Using his connection with the department, Butler had made a series of dubious land deals with the natives, making a tidy profit speculating in land for himself or acting as an agent for others. He was more than comfortably well-off and, in terms of New York frontier society, well-established at the beginning of the Revolution. 12 Despite the dislocations it caused Butler, the Revolution also held out his greatest opportunity: a possibility of becoming superintendent of the Indian Department and controlling the political influence and lavish patronage that the department had built up over the years. 13 Sir William Johnson died in 1774, leaving control of the Indian Department divided between his nephew, Guy Johnson, and his son-in-law, Daniel Claus. In 1775 these two were driven out of New York by the rebels. Although they for a period aided at Quebec in organizing the Indians for the British, they quickly became dissatisfied with certain organizational changes in the Indian Department and had a falling out with the governor of Canada, Sir Guy Carleton. They left for England to argue their case. It was a move that cost them dear. The military and the military men who ran the government considered their actions tantamount to desertion and it would be a long time before they forgave Johnson and Claus. 14 While these two were in eclipse, the star of John Butler was in the ascendant. Butler remained at his post, a fact the military noted with favour. He was assigned as deputy Indian agent to Fort Niagara. The fort was an important post, the chief British point of contact with the Iroquois and the staging area for a series of highly effecti ve raids in the New York and Pennsylvanian frontiers. The Iroquois confederacy originally attempted to remain neutral between the warring sides in the Revolution. Using all the tact, knowledge and trickery at his disposal, Butler managed to breach that neutrality and engage a significant number of Iroquois in a major campaign in 1777.15 Butler was amply rewarded for his endeavours. Sweeping aside previous Indian Department policy, Carleton granted him permission to raise his own elite corps of rangers to serve with the Indians. Success followed upon success for Butler in those early years of the Revolution. His forces scored numerous victories on the frontier. His corps grew from three companies to ten and he himself was promoted from major to lieutenant-colonel. In those palmy days, Butler could be forgiven if his thoughts were occasionally expansive and he dreamt of promotion to the giddy heights of power in the Indian Department.

14

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Still, that promotion was far from certain. Butler, like all colonials at the upper posts, was dependent upon the military's assessment of him and his capacities. Butler had made powerful enemies in the Indian Department in the persons of the Johnson family. After the return of its chief members from England, the family were concerned that Butler might usurp their power in the Indian Department and they did everything they could to prevent that occurrence. Butler's most vociferous enemy was Daniel Claus. He missed no opportunity to denigrate Butler, from whispering innuendoes in the ear of the governor to openly accusing his adversary of incompetence, corruption and brutality. Claus had considerable skill with his pen. He launched his main attack with "Remarks on the Management of the Indians in North America," a paper intended for the perusal of British officials. The Indians, Claus asserted, considered themselves a free and independent people, liable to no subjection or subordination. Consequently, they had to be managed by "Persuasion or Influence, or some kind of Awe or Military Authority and Show.' The persons therefore who are to have the Care and Superintendancy of their Affairs ... ought to be persons of Authority and Consequence, of Merit and Character in public Life. "16 The Indians, according to Claus, put great store in rank and respectability and he never tired of pointing out that Butler, the "illiterate interpreter," a man "that never was an Ensign in the Army, and was bred to the trade of sadler in New England," conspicuously lacked an established status within colonial society.17 Butler was aware of his predicament. He could not match the social pretensions of the Johnson family, nor did he have the contacts or the facility with his pen to counter their propaganda. Still, the "illiterate interpreter" might hope to entrench his influence and enrich his family by using the powers the military authorities had given him~ommand of the Loyalist forces at Niagara and an influence in their supply. As deputy agent of the Indian Department, Butler was directly responsible for the distribution of presents and provisions to the Indians. This gave him the potential to control local trade. At the beginning of the Revolution, there were two major firms functioning at Niagara, that of Edward Pollard, who for fifteen years had been a sutler of the garrison, and that of Taylor and Duffin. Butler entered into an aHiance with Pollard, whom he undoubtedly knew well, to monopolize trade at Niagara. It was made clear to the Loyalists and Indians that they would be denied the King's provisions if they did not conduct their business with Pollard. Anyone who dared to complain paid for his rashness with Butler's displeasure. IS So effective was the harassment that by 1776 Pollard's rival closed up shop and left Niagara. As well as being the only major private merchant, Pollard continued as sutler to the garrison and was supplier of the Indian Department under the patronage of Butler. He prospered mightily. So much so that by 1779 he could leave trade at Niagara and retire comfortably to England. His

THE APPRENTICESHIP OF ROBERT HAMILTON

15

account with His Majesty's Service amounted to an incredible £97,000 or about 23 per cent of the total recorded expenditures for goods and services at Fort Niagara in the war years. 19 After Pollard left, his business passed to Thomas Robinson, an employee of Pollard who in fact acted as an agent for him. The business continued to run smoothly and Butler's influence held for the firm its monopoly of the local Indian trade. Troubled times, however, lay ahead. Late in 1778 William Taylor of Pollard's old rivals, Taylor and Duffin, returned to Niagara and began to offer goods at prices well below his competitor's. Taylor could not hope to immediately break Pollard's hold on Indian supply, but he did have powerful allies within the Johnson faction to whom he wrote constantly and who were only too eager to forward Taylor's interests. 2o Taylor's chance for success came in the fall of 1779 when Guy Johnson reappeared on the Canadian scene. After his return from England and two and a half years in New York, Johnson had decided to take up his duties as superintendent ofthe Six Nations, an office he had won on his trip to London. With Johnson's arrival Butler's influence was substantially reduced; although he retained control of his own ranger corps, the general direction of Indian affairs now passed to Johnson. By the late fall, Johnson had swept away Butler's profitable little monopoly. Thomas Robinson suddenly grew "discouraged" with trade at Niagara and departed. Taylor became sutler to the garrison and supplier of the Indian Department, and entered into a partnership with a newcomer, George Forsyth. 21 Coming to the control of military provisioning at precisely the time when demand reached its wartime peak, Taylor and Forsyth were in a position to develop to the full the possibilities of merchandising at Fort Niagara. Thanks to their connection with Guy Johnson, the firm exercised a total monopoly of the private supply of the Indian Department. Any articles they did not directly supply, they purchased from other merchants and charged to Colonel Johnson. The firm acted as paymaster for the services and even for payment of such private accounts as the portage around Niagara Falls. In the two years they functioned as sutlers, the partners provided the military with goods and services to the extent of £89,032-about 20 per cent of the total military expenditure in the war period at Niagara and close to the 23 per cent provided by Pollard in the much longer period of four and a half years. The firm had extensive private accounts as well, so that by June 1782 it was owed £42,000 by more than one hundred debtors residing at Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac. Business was so brisk as to require four assistants; sales were in excess of £48,000 per annum. 22 An astute observer of the Canadian scene in 1780 might have predicted that major colonial merchants such as Taylor and Forsyth would emerge from wartime Niagara as affluent and powerful men, eclipsing even their mentors among the colonial officials. This was the case with the Macomb brothers, for instance, who held a similar position at Detroit, and who parlayed their

16

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

wartime profits into very successful postwar careers.23 The Niagara firm, however, did not prove so lucky. The fortunes of wartime merchandising could shift suddenly, especially if aided by rivals. Sudden collapse came for Taylor and Forsyth when one of their clerks, Alexander Douglas, travelled to Quebec to reveal to the military authorities that Taylor and Forsyth had been padding their books. They had charged the government £35,000 for £27,000 worth of goods. 24 "Everything is come to light," reported another clerk of the firm. "The Great Man [Johnson] trembles, [George] Forsyth is sulky, hacks and spits, in short the whole body of the Department appears to be in great perturbation. . . .' '25 The clerk who told all had been a former employee of the Butler-sponsored firms at Niagara, and Taylor and Forsyth were firmly convinced that he had been "sett up. "26 If so, Butler and his merchants must have been well satisfied with their revenge. Taylor and Forsyth were arrested and taken to Quebec for trial. Guy Johnson was also required to attend. The investigation proved a cause celebre. Taylor and Forsyth were accused of keeping a double set of books with the purpose of defrauding the government, padding accounts and falsifying entries. An inventory of the goods imported by the Indian Department itself directly from England showed them to be inadequate and Taylor and Forsyth were accused of selling these goods privately up the lakes. They were dismissed from their positions as sutlers and denied permission to trade at the upper postS. 27 The scandal also irreparably damaged the reputation of Guy Johnson. Although he repeatedly denied any wrong-doing, evidence was strong that he was in collusion with Taylor and Forsyth. Indeed, Johnson's accounts were so imaginative that the commandant at Niagara indulged a bit of whimsy in describing them: So far as I have been able to Inquire into the abstract of Coli Johnson, I have reason to think it extravagent, wonderfull and fictitious and the quality of the Articles so extraordinary, new and uncommon, that one may exclaim with Hamlet when he sees his fathers gost [sic] he comes in so questionable a shape, that I must speak to it. 211

Johnson was suspended from his post and prevented from returning to Niagara. 29 Johnson's enemies must have expected to consolidate their power through this debacle. Frederick Haldimand, Carleton's successor as commander-inchief and governor of Quebec, informed the government at home that the provisioning scandal had convinced him of the necessity to re-establish the office of superintendent general of the Northern Indian Department to supervise the activities of the various posts. Here surely was the opening which would cement the influence of John Butler in colonial society. But, in fact, the military chose according to its own social biases. Haldimand's criteria for candidates for that most desirable post were interesting. He did not

THE APPRENTICESHIP OF ROBERT HAMILTON

17

demand long service in warfare, intimate knowledge of the Indians or of problems of supply, the undoubted qUalifications of John Butler, but instead that the "Individual be a Person of Rank, Influence ... and perfect Honour. ":JO Haldimand did think highly of Butler's skills. "He certainly acquired a great share of influence with the Five Nations," Haldimand asserted, "he has long studied their Manners and dispositions and is possessed of those Qualities necessary to ,deal with them. "31 He gave Butler a good deal of support. When the Johnson faction attacked Butler, he pointedly reminded them that Butler alone had stood faithfully by his duties in the Indian Department "when the Superintendent and every officer of any Rank in that Department abandoned the duties of it. "32 Yet in the final analysis, the commander-in-chief had to admit that Butler was a man "deficient in Education and liberal Sentiments.' '33 So respectability, established status and influence had won out and Haldimand recommended Sir John Johnson, son of Sir William, for the post. Later, on the basis of similar considerations, he made him superintendent of the Loyalists and considered sponsoring him as a candidate for Iieutenantgovernor of Upper Canada. In losing that appointment as superintendent, many of Butler's hopes for power and wealth were brought to nought. As the war drew to a close, it did not bode well for the Butler family or those who were associated with them that a Johnson controlled the Indian Department once more. 34 The scandal and the fall of Taylor and Forsyth proved most beneficial in the long term not to Niagara's colonial officials, but to the small firms which, stimulated by lavish military expenditure, had sprung up at Niagara. The fall had left a vacuum in the structure of military supply that new firms might aspire to fill. Indeed, a new kind of merchant, less closely associated with the corruption of colonial officials, might hope to win the business and ultimately the social and political influence that service to the British military could entail. The sordid affair had reinforced the military's desire for respectability and patriotism in the merchants who supplied them. New faces, untouched by past scandals, might hope to benefit from this desire. One of the aspiring new firms at Niagara began in early 1780. Richard Cartwright informed a trader at Detroit, "I have embarked in Business at this Place in Conjunction with Mr. Robert Hamilton, and am building a small house for carrying it on. How it will succeed I know not. ... ' ':15 Cartwright could have afforded to be more confident. In a trade where connections were vitally important, Cartwright's were more extensive than any of his rivals. Cartwright's father, Richard Cartwright Sr., an established merchant at Albany, had had the privilege of being a personal supplier of the Johnson family and was a client of the family's patronage system. The Johnsons regarded the younger Cartwright as a protege, and no less a personage than Sir John himself had recommended Cartwright to Haldimand as deserving of

18

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

notice. Not only did he have the blessing of the Johnsons, but Cartwright was also looked upon with favour by Butler. Butler probably regarded him as a well-connected young man who might be of use to him and made him his personal secretary. He served in two campaigns in 1778 and 1779 with the Rangers. 36 Both through old family contacts and his own prominent service in the war, Cartwright was well known to the regular military. The supervisor of Loyalists at Sorel brought Cartwright to Haldimand's attention as "a faithful Loyalist . . . who has run many risks in forwarding Despatches to serve Government.' '37 Nathaniel Day, the commissary general of the British forces, had as early as 1778 suggested to Haldimand that Cartwright be given the lucrative post of sutler at Niagara in succession to Pollard. Although this request was refused, the military continued to favour Cartwright. 38 While Cartwright's background gave him easy entree into the commercial and official spheres at Niagara, his partner, Robert Hamilton, had no such direct contacts with either. He was the child of a Scottish manse. Both his father and his grandfather had been the Presbyterian minister at Bolton, a parish in East Lothian, Scotland, near the Firth of Forth. His mother had been a cousin of Thomas Carlyle and daughter of a Presbyterian minister. Bolton and its environs offered little that would directly prepare a young Scot for a highly successful commercial career. The third-smallest parish in the burgh of Haddington, even in 1881 it had a population of only 337. It was entirely landlocked, three miles from the nearest local centre, Haddington, and some seventeen miles from Edinburgh. Virtually the whole of the parish was under cultivation in small farm~. There was little else to attract attention. One author described Bolton as having no tailor, shoemaker or public house and no village. The church, manse'and schoolhouse constituted the whole place. 39 There the Hamilton family lived quietly ministering to the needs of the parish and supporting themselves largely from a modest four-acre glebe with a few livestock. Generally, members of the family showed an inclination towards the professions. Robert's father and two of his three brothers were educated at the University of Glasgow. His brother George rose to be a moderator of the Presbyterian church, a celebrated speaker, contributor to Sinclair's Statistical Account ofScotland and the author of political poems and other works. He was referred to in Burns's "Reply to a Reproof." John Hamilton rose to be a captain in the 73rd Regiment before his death at the age thirty-five, while Alexander had become a servant of the East India Company before his premature death in 1794. 40 Little is known of Robert Hamilton's early career. He was born in 1753 and appears to have been at home in Bolton in 1774-75 when he would have been about twenty-one. It is possible that before that date he followed in the family tradition and at least began a degree at the University of Glasgow. His letters are certainly those of an educated man, a mark at the least of his genteel background. Although not the most obvious training for the rough-and-tumble of colonial wartime commerce, Hamilton's upbringing would in fact stand

THE APPRENTICESHIP OF ROBERT HAMILTON

19

him in good stead at Niagara and his finesse and manners would make a good impression on those who mattered. Hamilton's first known involvement in commerce occurred in London in March 1775 when at age twenty-two he entered into an engagement with the firm of the Ellice brothers. The Ellices had long been major figures in the fur trade and army supply. Their headquarters at this period was in London, with a branch office in Montreal. Hamilton was to be in service to their firms for three years' 'to gain an insight into the trade with a salary of £30, £40, £50 ... and permission to carry on some private trade by which he expected to realize as much more.' '41 The amounts were modest and one can speculate that Hamilton may have been rather hard-pressed to accept employment on such terms in a war zone. He received training in his chosen career at Montreal and Carleton Island, the transshipment depot at the mouth of Lake Ontario, where he worked sorting, cataloguing and forwarding goods. Despite his lack of a commercial background, Hamilton had ambition and intelHgence and quickly proved adept at the business of frontier merchandising. 42 Hamilton assiduously cultivated the links the Laurentian trading system provided him, and within a year of his arrival had established a small trade on his own account, buying small supplies of goods for the Indian trade at bargain prices in Montreal and merchandising them through his own system of contacts at the upper posts. He began on a very modest scale in the summer of 1779, by speculating on "a package of Silk Handerkerc hiefs [sic], a pretty good bargain." This he wished divided among Archibald Cunningham, a clerk at Carleton Island, Francis Goring, a clerk at Niagara, and "brother Burch" an independent trader at Niagara. He promised to later send five hundred hand-made shirts up with Richard Cartwright. "They will easily sell," he predicted, "and with profit."43 Over the next year, the ambitious Scot expanded his small trade. 44 Hamilton's succe~ses must have impressed his abilities upon the greater powers in the Montreal trade, among them Isaac Todd. Todd was a valuable contact. His firm, Todd and McGill, was among the earliest and most substantial of the long-established Montreal supply houses. When Hamilton decided to leave the Ellice brothers in June of 1780 to establish himself at Niagara in partnership with Richard Cartwright, Todd and McGill proved willing to enter into an agreement to provide them with goods, capital and contacts in trade. 45 The influence of the Montreal fur trade upon the commerce of the upper regions of Quebec in the war period may have been less prominent and dramatic than that of the military, but it was equally important. Merchants at Niagara before the Revolution had long been involved in receiving and forwarding supplies and furs to and from the posts above them, although they had not engaged directly in fur trading to any significant extent. The disruptions of the Revolution, however, cut Albany off from its fur trade hinterland in western New York and the Allegheny valley, and Niagara

20

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

inherited this trade. Reliable statistics for this period are scant, but it is likely the trade in furs at Niagara remained profitable through 1778. It was then remarked of the chief merchant at Niagara, Robinson, that "if [his] Peltry Continues always to be so good, he will very soon undoubtedly make a handsome fortune. "46 The trend of the fur trade at Niagara after 1778 is not clear. It appears to have declined with the increasing dislocations of the war. Certainly the correspondence of the Niagara merchants showed their interest turning more to the provisioning of military forces. 47 Whatever the state of the trade itself, the supply houses of the fur trade at Montreal were vitally important to Niagara's merchants. Whether they were disposed of in trade for furs or in provisioning the military, all private goods passing to the upper country came through Montreal suppliers and all the Niagara merchants were clients of one or more of the major Montreal finns. Up-country merchants were totally dependent upon their suppliers for goods, credit and exchange. The Montreal companies also provided a constant flow of infonnation to the hinterland on the price and availability of supplies, shipping, and on politics as it concerned the interests of trade. The transportation system along the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes and centred at Montreal constituted an extensive communications network for the isolated up-country traders. Business letters as well as goods and furs travelled up and down the system so that a small merchant like Francis Goring at Niagara could coordinate his business activities with other traders such as Samuel Street at Quebec, Thomas Herkimer at Couteau du Lac, Archibald Cunningham at Deer Island (at the mouth of Lake Ontario), John Warren at Fort Erie, and John Symington, John Askin, George Forsyth and Meldrum and Park at Detroit. Such networks for communication and cooperation would have an enhanced impact in the agrarian settlements of the post-Revolutionary period. 48 With their connections and their experience in trade, Hamilton and Cartwright had a promising beginning. Both had a further asset, particularly valuable at Niagara: their respectability. Their establishment preceded by one year the Indian Department scandal. In its aftennath, as the new finn was beginning to take root, the military were particularly sensitive to the respectability and patriotism of their suppliers. Hamilton and Cartwright possessed both in ample quantities. Relative to their competitors, they came from genteel backgrounds. Cartwright had been educated in a private school. He was noted for his learning, especially in the classics. Before the Revolution, he had considered entering the church. 49 As for HamiIton, even that most acerbic observer of Upper Canadian society, Hannah Jarvis, would later describe him as •• a Pleasant Inteligable [sic] Man, a Gentleman in Words and Manners . . . . "50 Neither Hamilton nor Cartwright had previously had direct experience in the Indian trade and neither was tainted with its reputation for sharp practice. Both shared the language and the assumptions of the

THE APPRENTICESHIP OF ROBERT HAMILTON

21

educated officer elite of the regular army and the officers felt comfortable in dealing with them. The two young men were, moreover, astute enough to impress their patriotism on the military. Over the winter of 1782-83 their firm lent rather than sold the military large quantities of rum. Other firms refused to follow suit. The commandant at Niagara was so impressed with the actions of Hamilton and Cartwright that he twice wrote to headquarters commenting on the matter and praising them. 51 The actions of Hamilton and Cartwright on this occasion did not bring them immediate profit, but they did help establish a reputation for the future upon which the firm could later capitalize. Indeed, in 1782 Hamilton and Cartwright exploited their reputation with the military to gain the trade of the newly re-c:stablished fort at Oswego. In response to their request for permission to open a branch of their firm at the fort, Haldimand had replied that, as he wished "to prevent adventurers from Crowding to Oswego" and to establish •'such Person or Persons of Character as are really necessary for the convenience of the Garrison," he was pleased to allow Hamilton and Cartwright to establish themsel ves there. 52 As well as gaining a foothold at Oswego, the firm, perhaps partly through Cartwright's links to Butler and partly through their reputation with the military, had become a modest supplier of the Indian Department at Niagara. 53 In addition to official patronage, Hamilton and Cartwright quickly began to benefit from their contacts with the Montreal fur trade. Probably through the influence of Todd and McGill, they entered into a co-partnership, in 1780, with John Askin at Detroit, one of Todd and McGill's oldest customers and at this period, the most able man in the southwest fur trade. The co-partnership was an agreement to trade at Niagara, Detroit and the posts above. It covered all stock and capital of each concern. The affairs of the co-partnership in the lower part of the province were to be handled by Todd and McGill and it was to be in effect until 1784. The Niagara firm quickly took full ad vantage of the agreement. In the period from October 1781 to January 1782, it supplied £1,424 of the £4,530 worth of goods Askin purchased. 54 The firm apparently developed other close links with Detroit. When Angus Mackintosh, a major Detroit merchant, ordered a supply of goods in 1782, he specified that Hamilton and Cartwright were to have the preference if they could supply the order. As well as such larger accounts, Hamilton and Cartwright cultivated local business with soldiers and Loyalists at Niagara. By 1785 one lieutenant of the 8th Regiment owed them £213. The officers' mess in Detroit was in their debt to £573, while many Loyalist families made small purchases from them, such as the Cryslers who by 1782 owed them £25. These commercial involvements would have implications for the future. 55 Despite the extent of their business, the end of the American Revolution did not leave Hamilton and Cartwright rich men. By the time the firm was well

22

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

established, military expenditure was gearing down. In 1783 declining business led Hamilton to close the firm's branch at Oswego and to move it to Cataraqui (Kingston). The greatest blow to the finn was the failure of its venture with Askin. When the co-partnership dissolved in 1784, its indebtedness to Todd and McGill was £9,261. Debts of this magnitude must have swallowed up any profits the young firm made supplying the military. Yet such setbacks were temporary. Hamilton and Cartwright more than any other finn at Niagara had built up strong connections with the military and the fur trade networks which would set them on the road to affluence and power. 56

CHAPTER 2

The Post-Revolutionary Adjustment

The years between the end of the Revolution and the creation of Upper Canada lacked the intensity and drama of the preceding years of war. Those first years of peace, however, were decisive in moulding the commerce of the new communities taking form in the Niagara peninsula. The military would continue to be an important market for local merchants, but the size and expenditure of the local contingents of the army and the Indian Department were greatly reduced. The supply of other economic needs, notably those of the fur trade for the receiving and forwarding of its goods, gained in relative importance. As its economic significance declined, the army was increasingly forced to share its control of the economic infrastructure, of shipping, storage and portaging, with the merchants involved in Great Lakes trade. The postwar adjustment to changing markets was not an easy one for the merchants at Niagara. From the comfortable affluence and steady growth of wartime, they were rudely thrust into the economic dislocations of peace. The boom of the war years was followed by a period of depression that lasted until 1792. By 1785 the garrison at Niagara had been reduced by a third; within a decade of the end of the war, official spending on Indians in the Niagara area had been reduced to less than 10 per cent of its wartime peak. The changed situation was dramatized by the market for rum: by late 1783, the price of rum had dropped to half of its wartime peak and merchants at Niagara were engaged in a vicious price-cutting war to win the trade away from the official sutlers of the garrison. Too many merchants were contending for too little business. l The diminishing military market precipitated a frantic struggle among the merchants for survival: of the eighteen individuals and partnerships receiving goods at Fort Niagara in 1783 a mere four were still operating in 1789. Some merchants abandoned trade for farming; others simply closed shop and moved off, seeking new opportunities elsewhere. Among those who stayed, there was a search for some substantial economic activity to replace supply of the army and the Indian Department. To prosper, Niagara merchants had to rise 23

24

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

above their primitive local economy. Small and isolated, local firms needed an activity that would link them with some larger economic enterprise. Success in the postwar period would be determined by the discovery of, and the ability to exploit, such an enterprise. 2 Several different commercial strategies were evolved at Niagara. Some merchants who had been closely linked to military provisioning attempted to continue practices well established in the frontier economy-corrupt supply of the government or shady dealings in Indian lands. Others attempted merchandising to the new Loyalist communities or participation in companies speculating in large-scale land development. None of these activities were to provide stable markets or give them access to expanded facilities for the conduct of their businesses. The Loyalist market, to which some merchants turned, would for some time be a very small one. As of 1784 there were only 126 farms at Niagara; even by 1787 there were only 137 farms on all the Lake Ontario shore west of Four Mile Creek, one of the more heavily populated areas of early settlement. The early settlers did make heavy purchases from the local merchants both during and after the Revolution, but few had the ready money to pay for them. Even as early as 1784 the settlers were complaining to authorities that they owed substantial sums to the merchants. 3 . The extent of the settlers' purchases, however, was less important to the merchants than their obvious inability to pay for them. Most settlers had brought little with them from the colonies. Their new farms would not yield immediate profits: as of 1787, the farms along the Lake Ontario front had an average of only nine and a half acres cleared and even as clearing progressed, the major crop until the mid-1790s was com rather than more readily marketable wheat; livestock was for subsistence purposes only. Production was low; during the war years, the settlement at Niagara had never so much as managed to feed itself. The year 1786 is known to have produced miserly yields and 1789 was a year of famine. An extensive system of long-term credit came quickly into existence and such credit, if over-extended, could easily drag small merchants down to ruin." To complicate the problems of profitable merchandising even further, Niagara merchants were encountering problems of supply. With the end of the war and a decrease in the amount of specie sent to the colony by the imperial government, currency was in extremely short supply and up-country merchants were encountering grave difficulties in paying their bills in Montreal. Montreal suppliers were facing a crisis of their own. They had in the war period received lavish credit from the government on very limited securities which they were not now able to repay and they were faced with heavy debts for government transportation services in the war years which they could not meet. Many failed while others curtailed their shipments to the upper country. In 1789 London suppliers would send to Canada only goods that had already been paid for. With such problems of market and supply, the

POST-REVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENT

25

settlements of early Niagara could not provide a basis for thriving commercial enterprise. Reliance upon their custom could be the royal road to disaster. 5 A continuing exclusive reliance on supplying the military was also not an adequate strategy in the postwar economic situation. The firm of Douglas and Symington had won the position of sutler near the end of the war because Douglas had been the clerk who had revealed the corruption of Taylor and Forsyth. The new firm attempted to survive on their monopoly of the supply of rum to the garrison. As demand slackened, they tried to compensate by charging higher prices. This led to complaints from the military and a stem warning to them to keep their charges in line with those of other merchants. When they failed to do so, they lost the contract and by 1786 the firm had disappeared from Niagara. 6 One of the most assiduous seekers after new avenues of profit was Samuel Street. He had originally been an Indian trader and land speculator on the Connecticut frontier. In partnership at Niagara with Francis Goring, he, like Hamilton and Cartwright, had built up a business in the supply of Indian goods and provisions for the garrison. His firm, however, lacked a strong continuing relationship with anyone Montreal supplier or with the military, which the firm had antagonized by refusing to lend it liquor. Perhaps realizing his precarious position, Street at the end of the war withdrew from his partnership and turned more directly to the dubious practices of a frontier Indian trader. 7 In 1785 Street entered into partnership with Andrew Butler, LieutenantColonel John Butler's son. Street was probably less impressed with the abilities of the younger Butler than with the potential gains to be made from his family's influence. John Butler was quite prepared, in conjunction with Street and Andrew Butler, to exploit his official position for profit. Milking the Indian Department for illicit gain, however, was becoming a dangerous game. Stringent new instructions for the issuing of provisions had been laid down by Sir John Johnson in 1787 and although these instructions were often more observed in the breach, strenuous efforts were made to enforce them. Alerted by the scandals of the war period and less harried in peacetime, the government was becoming sensitive to Indian Department corruption. By 1789 a former official in the Indian Department was reporting to London that it was "notorious" that the Niagara firm of Street and Butler were selling at their shop goods pilfered from the Indian Department and were even shipping such goods for private sale to the Indian Department at Detroit. London demanded an explanation and John Butler was called upon in 1790 to answer these charges. He managed to brazen it out. Although he complied with an order to remove stores from an Indian Department warehouse that connected to his son's shop, he stoutly denied irregularities were occurring. His assurances were accepted for the moment, but government suspicion of his acti vities grew. 8 In 1794, alerted by complaints from the Indians that they were not receiving

26

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

their proper complement of presents, the government ordered a full investigation of the state of Indian stores at Niagara. Major deficiencies were discovered and Butler's pay was stopped until he could provide an adequate explanation. Further discipline was planned: in 1795 a strong move was under way to relieve Butler of his duties and probably only his death prevented its accomplishment. Having lost its patron in the Indian Department and itself under close official scrutiny, the partnership of Street and Butler dissolved in 1797. After that date no further Indian supply scandals occurred at Niagara. In the new postwar society, avenues for profit through the blatantly corrupt use of official position were rapidly diminishing. 9 Much more ambitious than his schemes for profiting in the now modest supply of Indian goods was Street's attempt, again with John Butler, to speculate in Indian lands. By March 1788, through a complicated sequence of events involving, among other things, the falsifying of dates on documents, Butler, along with two other members of the Indian Department at Niagara, had gained a lease to all the Iroquois lands in New York State in the vicinity of the Niagara River and to the west. Butler planned to use this lease to his own advantage in negotiations with an American land company, the New York Genessee Land Company, which actually had a prior claim to the Iroquois territory. Before negotiations could be commenced, however, another American land company appeared on the scene. The new interest, the Phelps-Gorham Company, had a stronger legal claim than either of the other groups. As this became apparent, Butler and his associates as well as the New York Genessee Land Company were persuaded to join with the favoured company and further its efforts. At a conference in July of 1788, both the land company and Butler's group agreed to surrender their leases if the Iroquois would make a sale of some of their lands to Phelps-Gorham; Butler made a speech strongly advising they do so. The Indians concurred and a purchase was made.1° As Butler later told the story, Phelps then asked him if he could use some of the land just purchased. Butler agreed to take and pay for 20,000 acres, land that would later become extremely valuable. Others-John Powell, William Johnston, Timothy Murphy, Walter Butler Sheehan and Street and Butler, all relations or Indian Department intimates of Butler-made similar agreements; Samuel Street and a Mr. Barton, an American staying with Street, were selected to settle matters with Phelps. The new group, christened the Niagara Genessee Company, was to purchase fifteen shares in all, each share consisting of 20,000 acres situated near Genessee. Such an immense holding in the fertile upstate Iroquois lands had the potential to make its owners rich men. 11 Butler's version of the happy circumstances that led to the good fortune of the Niagara Genessee Company did not jibe with the testimony of Ralfe Clench, a Loyalist at Niagara. He had seen a copy of a letter from Samuel Street to Phelps and Gorham in June of 1788, one month before the

POST-REVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENT

27

conference in July, thanking them for admitting him to their company as a proprietor and advising them that they should give certain people at Niagara, whom he would point out, a share gratis in their lands. The influence of those people with the Indians would facilitate a sale and they could prevail upon the Indians to move to Grand River by which means the purchase of the rest of the Indian lands could be expedited. 12 In the event, neither Butler nor Street benefited greatly from these grandiose schemes. The government very soon heard rumours of Indian Department officials using their influence to the benefit of Americans and in 1790 Sir John Johnson was sent to conduct an investigation. Johnson simply collected testimony on the affair which was forwarded to London for a decision. There the matter was allowed to rest. Butler and his associates, however, had been thoroughly frightened by the disclosure of their schemes. All except Street and Barton gave up their interests in the Niagara Genessee Company and Butler was so subdued that he even refused a tract of land in New York State offered to him as a gift by the Indians in 1790. 13 Street's shares in the Niagara Genessee Company would not ultimately prove profitable to him until almost two decades later. In 1791 he confided to Sir John Johnson that he was without resources and needed desperately to collect the debts owed to him.14 Despite his initial failure, Street did not abandon land speculation. In fact he appears to have believed that large-scale settlement schemes in which groups of men with capital could be interested would provide that secure and profitable enterprise for which merchants were searching. His most ambitious land speculation was in cooperation with William Berczy. In 1795 Berczy had drawn eight shareholders in America, with a number of shadowy figures behind them, into the Gennan Company. The company planned to make extensive land purchases in Upper Canada on which to settle not only certain immigrants associated with Berczy but others brought from Gennany. Street was a shareholder in the company and its agent for purchases. The Gennan Company had extremely high hopes: it planned to settle a minimum of eight hundred settlers in its first five years, with projected expenditures of $60,000 to acquire lands, build the necessary community facilities and give advances to the settlers. Nevertheless, they projected a net profit of $680,614 at the end of the five years. Street was apparently much impressed with the scheme; no sooner had the company been fonned than he entered into an agreement with Berczy to purchase one-quarter of Berczy's share. The speculation proved less successful than Street hoped. Many problems were encountered in originally locating land. Patents for additional townships were not forthcoming as speedily as expected, thus delaying a quick recovery of investment by land sales in Germany. The costs of settling Berczy's people were much higher than expected. As a result, the company's willingness to pay bills diminished and by 1796 it had dissolved. Street was a major loser in the speculation; by 1795, he claimed the company owed him £7,200 for past

28

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

goods and services. He apparently withdrew from the company before its final dissolution. There is no evidence he ever recovered any major part of the money owing him.lS Street involved himself in several other land speCUlations, but they all failed. Land was not valuable enough and the companies involved not stable enough to provide the profit and security he hoped for. Land speculation, like military supply and local retailing, could not be the immediate panacea for postwar commercial development. 16 In the postwar stiuation Robert Hamilton succeeded where many of his competitors failed. During the Revolution, he had been fortunate and astute enough to have forged strong links with both the military and the Montreal fur trading community. The good will and respect the army and fur trade felt towards him assured that his enterprises would prosper. The key to his success, and that of his partner Richard Cartwright, was his involvement in receiving and forwarding for the Laurentian fur trade. This was his initial postwar economic activity and it sustained him through the 1780s. The firm of Hamilton and Cartwright reacted quickly to the end of the war. In order to maximize their business, the partners had in 1784 or 1785 established Cartwright permanently at Cataraqui (Kingston) and Hamilton at Niagara. Fur trade traffic on the Laurentian route was quickening after the war. The loss of the Albany route at the beginning of the Revolution and the transference of most fur trade acti vity to Montreal increased traffic along the route by the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes from Montreal west. There were new opportunities now for private enterprise in the upper country. Although the military retained control of shipping after the end of the Revolution, it had no further interest in the task of receiving and handling merchant goods on the lakes and it gladly passed this function into private hands. Hamilton and Cartwright quickly gained a virtual monopoly of the handling of private goods on Lake Ontario. The partnership had probably chosen its two locations, Kingston and Niagara, so as to have agents at both the major break-points in the fur trade's Lake Ontario supply route, the mouth of Lake Ontario and the falls at Niagara. In 1785 they drew upon their Montreal connections to begin receiving and forwarding goods up the lakes. This venture proved so satisfactory that in the winter of that year, Hamilton went to reside at Detroit in order to canvass the merchants of the southwest fur trade for their forwarding business. He was successful, much to the delight of Richard Cartwright who wrote: "The Arrangement made with the Merchants at Detroit is of all others the best for the present situation of Affairs. " I i Hamilton and Cartwright for a number of years appear to have monopolized private receiving and handling on the lakes. According to the Reverend George Mitchell of Detroit, who wrote about 1788: "At present and for some years past Messrs. Hamilton & Cartwright by contract, forward all merchandize from Carleton Island to Detroit. ... "18 Mitchell must have been

POST-REVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENT

29

referring to private merchandise, since the military continued to store and forward its own goods. Cartwright took charge of goods going down the lakes at Carleton Island, where he received them, arranged for their storage and forwarded them by military vessels. At Fort Niagara, Hamilton took charge of goods, storing them until they were portaged to Fort Schlosser, where he was again responsible for the goods' storage and shipment by batteaux to Fort Erie. From there, goods were transshipped to lake vessels and forwarded to Detroit. The firm's charges for its services were substantial: $1.50 per barrel, equivalent to what had been charged in wartime for portaging of private goods around the falls at Niagara and roughly half the charge of batteauing from Lachine to Carleton Island. Furs coming down the lakes were also a source of profit to the two young entrepreneurs. They charged 25 cents a pack to receive and store furs at Niagara alone. At this period, 25 to 45 per cent of the Canadian fur trade's total goods and 40 per cent of its furs were moving over the lakes route. The profits on servicing such shipments would have been substantial. 19 Receiving and forwarding meant a new affluence for Hamilton and Cartwright. Within the first years of their new operation, the firm was able to pay to Todd and McGill most of their share of the debts they had incurred in their unsuccessful merchandising partnership with John Askin. Such a business had advantages beyond high returns for a firm of small up-country merchants. It required little investment on their part and yielded a steady profit not directly dependent on the price of goods or the state of the local market. It made them an integral part of a much larger econoptic venture which could, especially in the early postwar years, protect them from the vicissitudes of the local economy.20 Because of their profits from receiving and forwarding, Hamilton and Cartwright were able to avoid the pitfalls inherent in local retailing after the war. From at least 1786, they worked to reduce their merchandising ""into a narrow Compass. "21 When possible, they preferred to sell goods on consignment from the large Montreal houses. Hamilton's attitude to local merchandising would change in the 1790s when the growth of agriculture at Niagara made it increasingly profitable. Until that time, however, he appears to have avoided heavy involvement in retail trade. 22 Their initial involvement in the lakes carrying trade produced further new opportunities for Hamilton and Cartwright as control of transportation passed increasingly from the military to private enterprise. In the postwar period Montreal merchants were becoming increasingly restive under the constraints placed upon them by the military and began to contend for a greater control of the economic infrastructure. One major issue was shipping. The government at Quebec decided at the end of the war to continue the ban on private navigation of the lakes to prevent furs from being passed into American ports or Americans engaging in the trade. Merchant protest was sharp and constant:

30

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

the amount of shipping the military provided was inadequate to their needs. Public stores and Indian Department goods were given strict preference in shipping; as a consequence, private goods were often two seasons in passing up the lakes and were not carried in strict rotation. Mounting pressure from the merchants led to the gradual dismantling of the military shipping monopoly. In 1784 the North West Company was allowed to build a vessel at Detroit. In 1787 private vessels were permitted on Lake Ontario and throughout the Great Lakes in 1789. 23 Freeing shipping was the first step; fmancing adequate private transport, especially in the upper country, was another matter. Lake Ontario posed the greatest problems. The major run from Kingston to Niagara carrying the goods of the fur trade required ships of substantial size and cost. The first two private ships on that route after the Revolution cost £ 1,620 and £ 1,900 respectively. The struggling merchants on the shores of Lake Ontario did not have the resources for investment of that magnitude, nor did early trade on the lake provide much opportunity for small, less expensive ships and short runs; the quantity of goods and produce to be forwarded between the nascent Loyalist settlements was minimal. Hence, most merchants along Lake Ontario were not in a position to profit from shipping. By late 1788, only one private ship, the tiny Good Intent of fifteen tons and a crew of three, was plying the lake between Kingston, Oswego and Quinte. No ships owned exclusively by locals made the run to Niagara before 1797. 24 The capital for large private vessels on the lake came from Montreal and only merchants with strong Montreal connections were in a position to profit from that investment. It was the great good fortune of Hamilton and Cartwright that the first firm to involve itself in a major way in private shipping on Lake Ontario was Todd and McGill. In 1788 that firm undertook the construction of the Lady Dorchester, of 120 tons. Cartwright supervised her building and both Hamilton and Cartwright handled forwarding and receiving for her on the lake and received a proportion of her profits. With her monopoly of significant private shipping, the profits for the Lady Dorchester were high in her first years. Cartwright mentioned in 1793 that his returns on the ship for the season were in excess of £300, a nice augmentation to a small merchant's income. The ship held a contract from the North West Company to forward its goods. 25 At the end of 1793 Forsyth and Richardson of Montreal, Todd and McGill's major rivals in the southwest fur trade, entered into an agreement for a share of the Lady Dorchester. As of 1794, business was considered profitable enough for Todd and McGill and Forsyth and Richardson in conjunction with Hamilton and Cartwright and Joseph Forsyth and Company of Kingston to build the 137-ton Governor Simcoe. Despite the competition of a third vessel of 60 tons built the same year, shipping remained a profitable benefit of their Montreal links for Hamilton and Cartwright until the new century. Even more significant for Hamilton personally was the lobbying influence

POST-REVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENT

31

of the Montreal fur trade companies which gained for him the control of the portage at Niagara. The portage, necessitated by Niagara Falls, was originally located on the east bank of the Niagara River and for some years had been contracted to Philip Stedman. It had been a substantial enterprise: in 1767, Stedman had reaped £2,415 from it in a single season; in 1781, from the portaging of military goods alone, he received £2,304 and the conveying of private merchant goods must have augmented this figure. The merchants involved in the fur trade, however, were less than happy with the services provided by Stedman. In 1778 they had protested that he was showing partiality to certain merchants and was overcharging for his services. The military, perhaps in part because of its long association with Stedman, defended him. In the postwar period the Montreal merchants did not forget Stedman and the portage. As part of their drive to free themselves from military dominance, they wished to have the portage controlled by parties more amenable to their interests, specifically the up-country merchants with whom they were most closely associated. 26 In 1787, when the portage lease came up for renewal, a committee of the most prominent Montreal merchants, including Todd and McGill, wrote to the government: Monopolies having always been considered as injurious to Trade, and a free competition amongst Subjects of the same Government, esteemed the most effective means to prevent imposition, We cannot pass unnot.iced the carrying place of Niagara, which for so many years past has been in the possession of an Individual, and until last Spring, bore oppressively hard upon the Trade, by the very high rate Government allowed him to exact for Carriage of Merchants Goods ... , We take the Liberty of representing that it [Stedman's lease] ought not to be Granted for more than three years ... ,In requesting that the Lease may not be granted for a longer Term than three years we have an eye, to the new Settlements on the North side of the River of Niagara which may reap much benefit by opening a Road on that side, and allowing the Settlers to carry without restraint for such persons as may choose to employ them, and it will also be the most effectual means of Lowering the price besides, being of greater safety in case of any disturbances happening on the Frontiers; at present, the Settlers are not perhaps in a condition to undertake such Business, and it must appear that so long as they are restrained from attempting it, no Rival can ever arise to enter the Lists with the present Leasee,27

Stedman received a three-year renewal as the merchants had recommended. In 1789 the Montreal merchants, represented by James McGill, were again lobbying with the government for this plan which they had now worked out in some detail: private merchant goods should be allowed to pass on either the east or west side of the Niagara River, under the supervision of whomever the individual merchant might wish to assign his goods to, Stedman's contract notwithstanding. In order to ensure the establishment of a road on the west side, the government should either construct one or grant the right to collect a

32

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

toll to such persons as might be willing to construct a road and keep it in repair. The Committee of the Executi ve Council for Inland Commerce and Navigation accepted virtually all three recommendations: transportation was to be allowed on either side of the river for private goods, by whomever should wish to undertake it; Stedman's contract was not to be renewed upon its present terms; and in order to encourage the construction of a road on the west side of the river, a new government contract for portaging should be let to whomever would undertake the construction of a road on the west side. 211 With the freedom to portage on either side, the Montreal merchants lost no time in exercising their option. By 1790 all carriage of merchandise and furs for the upper country had been transferred to the west side of the river and placed under the supervision of the two merchants most closely associated with the fur trade companies-Robert Hamilton and George Forsyth. Hamilton's Montreal contacts had gained him a foothold in what was to be one of his most lucrative enterprises. 29 In 1791, true to its declaration, the government advertised a contract for the portage of government supplies, specifying carriage by the western route. Philip Stedman and his nephew, Philip Jr., applied basing their application on their past experience, their possession of the necessary equipment, the extensive improvements they had made on the western side of the river and heavy losses they had sustained from competition in the last two years. Stedman's major argument, however, was past services to the government: "I shall not urge our Family's long Services in time of imminent Danger to the Life and Property of the Person who undertook it [the portage], Tho' it is natural to suppose a preference would be given to an old servant of the Crown who had always given Satisfaction to the Officers who have at different times commanded at Niagara. "30 Unfortunately for Stedman, as for Butler, claims for preference based on past services and old links to the military and Indian Department were not sufficient ~o prevail in the postwar society. The present needs of the Montreal traders and their up-country subsidiaries won out over the old dependants of the military authority structure. Robert Hamilton and George Forsyth, joined by two other local businessmen, John Burch and Archibald Cunningham, made a bid for the contract. Although the initial charge they proposed was higher than that of the Stedmans, they had the advantage of powerful Montreal backing. Isaac Todd was their agent in the negotiation of the contract and Todd and McGill joined with Forsyth and Richardson to provide securities for the local merchants. The Committee of the Executive Council for Inland Commerce and Navigation unanimously supported the proposal of the Niagara merchants and they were awarded a three-year contraCt for the portage of government supplies. 31 While his links to the fur trade provide the key to understanding Hamilton's entrepreneurial success after the Revolution, the continuing importance for his enterprises of his military connections should not be discounted. Hamilton

POST-REVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENT

33

and Cartwright's profitable venture in receiving and forwarding for the fur trade could not have been accomplished without the aid of the military's transportation facilities. Shipping between the storage points utilized by them until 1789 had been done in military vessels and the storage depots they used at Carleton Island, Fort Niagara and Fort Schlosser belonged to the military. Indeed, they would, until the middle of the 1790s, continue to store some of their merchandise in the army's warehouses and a proportion of their goods would continue to travel on the lakes in military vessels. Even Hamilton and Cartwright's stock of goods depended partly on the military: before the new regulations of 1787, Cartwright obtained some of the goods he shipped to Niagara by exchange with the Indian Department. Obviously, the reputation Hamilton and Cartwright had built up with the military during the war was serving them well. Likewise, the contract for carrying supplies for the government, which meant, in fact, the supplies of the army and the Indian Department, was viewed by Hamilton and his associates as the prime factor in the success of their new portage and they organized themselves in an elaborate scheme to obtain it. 32 In 1786 Hamilton made a proposal to the commandant at Niagara that would be of great importance for the future of his enterprises and link his business even more closely to the British army. Until that date, flour for the garrison had been provided by a contract negotiated by the Treasury Board in London. The London agents supplied flour from Lower Canada through their agent in the province. Hamilton proposed instead to deliver for the supply of the troops at Niagara whatever grain was available from the neighbourhood, charging only for the making of the flour and a commission of 5 per cent. The provisioning agents were agreeable to the arrangement and the government was willing to offer very generous terms in order to aid the growth of the new settlement. It would pay the value of super-fine flour purchased in Lower Canada plus the cost of transport to Niagara exclusive of the cost of shipping over Lake Ontario, as this was usually accomplished by military vessels. Even so, the addition of an amount equal to the cost of civilian transport increased the price paid for flour by half again. Payment would be made in specie in Quebec once yearly and would bear interest of 6 per cent, a very appealing arrangement for an up-country merchant who was often short of specie. The arrangement was an important step for Hamilton towards becoming the major supplier to what was until 1800 the only important market for the growing production of Niagara flour, the garrison.:!:! Hamilton did not accomplish this promising arrangement alone. As usual in his postwar dealings with the government or the military, he relied upon his Montreal suppliers. Todd and McGill not only spoke to the Canadian provisioning agents on his behalf, but also continued to lobby for an exclusive contract at their respective posts for both Hamilton and Cartwright, as well as for their former partner, John Askin. 34

34

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

By 1791 Robert Hamilton could look with satisfaction upon his fledgling enterprises. He was well established in the receiving and forwarding of goods. His connections in the Montreal fur trade had opened further profitable opportunities for him as an agent in lakes shipping, as an associate in the new Niagara portaging concern and as a supplier of local produce to the military market. The early and stable returns from these enterprises allowed Hamilton to outdistance his local commercial rivals who were dependent on less stable and less profitable businesses. By 1791 the enterprises upon which the phenomenal commercial success of Robert Hamilton was to be based had taken form.

CHAPTER 3

The Distribution of Public Office

The main reason for the establishment of new communities in upper Quebec after the Revolution was ideological: they were created as a refuge for those from the old colonies who fought for the crown. The government officials who held the chief responsibility for the development of the Loyalist settlements, Frederick Haldimand, Lord Dorchester and John Graves Simcoe, all proclaimed that the new society was to be founded on a Loyalist military hierarchy: the lands of the rank and file would be grouped around the holdings of their former officers and the men would defer to their officers as their natural leaders. None of the first merchants of the Niagara peninsula were former Loyalist officers; most had not seen service during the war. Some, like Hamilton himself, were not even Loyalists, having never lived in the old colonies. Yet a substantial number of the first appointments to public office in the Niagara peninsula would go to that group of merchants who had been associated with the fur trade and military supply during the Revolution. Robert Hamilton was the most significant among this group. By 1796 he would emerge as a central figure in the distribution of political patronage, not only for the Niagara peninsula, but in all of western Upper Canada. Success in the postwar political structure, like success in the postwar economy at Niagara, was closely related to changes wrought by the declining influence of the British military. With the erosion of their power base and patronage, the authority and prestige of the old colonial military leaders dissipated and the major merchants, exploiting the powers inherent in their trade network, quickly seized their places. The transition was rapid and almost without direct conflict. The major merchants of the Niagara peninsula derived their political influence through the Laurentian trade network in which they participated; their suppliers and their major clients proved to be very effective patrons and powerful lobbyists for their interests. Merchants, most notably Robert Hamilton, dominated appointed offices at Niagara until well into the new century and used the administrative power they gained to regulate society according to their own commercial objectives. 35

36

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

The most obvious candidate for social and political leadership at Niagara was Lieutenant-Colonel John Butler. Butler was a politically astute and ambitious man. During the war he had attempted to use the powers of his rank to select subordinate officers whose social status might be of future use to him; he had relentlessly advanced himself and his relations in the corps he commanded and, well before the end of the war, he had assumed the direction of settlement and the distribution of land at Niagara. Although he suffered setbacks in his quest for imperial patronage after the war, Butler might well expect to use his past accomplishments as leverage in his new community. Throughout the war Butler had purposely lavished attention on his Rangers. He strove to build his corps quickly to its maximum size and to obtain for his men a high rate of pay. 1 The Rangers were important to Butler because they were his chief bulwark protecting the influence of himself and his family. The commander of the Rangers had strong opinions about their officership. His own position was to be as elevated as possible: "From my long services, the influence I have with the Indians, the rank I have held in Civil, Military, and Militia lines, and the interest I possess in the County of Albany and the Mohawk River," he wrote to Haldimand, "I am induced to hope Your Excellency will not think me unworthy of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel."2 Next to his own advancement, Butler placed that of his oldest sons, Walter and Thomas, and his nephews. He pushed their promotion relentlessly throughout the war. Indeed, his son Walter's callowness and his lack of experience in command were largely responsible for the Cherry Valley Massacre, the worst scandal of frontier warfare in the Revolution. Butler fought hard to prevent the introduction of experienced officers from the regular army into his corps and to keep all appointments the result of his personal recommendation. Outside his own family, he preferred, when he could find them, to appoint youths with influential connections in colonial society. Butler's military patronage seems to have been large. Even by 1778 his opponents at Niagara were complaining that his dependants were too numerous to combat. A loyal clientage might strengthen Butler in his wartime struggle and he could hope that in quieter times his patronage of such men might redound to his and his family's credit. 3 Much of Butler's attention during the war was also focused upon the possibilities of more immediate gain. The British military at Niagara regulated all aspects of life in the war period, including agriculture. By 1780 Haldimand had decided to relieve the pressure on provisions at Niagara 1?y establishing a temporary agricultural settlement of reduced Rangers and refugee Loyalists on the west bank of the Niagara River. Superintendence of the settlement was to rest with Butler. "Lt. Col. Butler," Haldimand wrote to the commandant at Niagara, "with whom I have conversed fully upon this subject, has promised to give you every assistance in his power and from his knowledge of farming, his being upon the spot with his Rangers and his acquaintance and influence with those who may be found to settle, I am persuaded you will find him very

DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC OFFICE 37

useful. "4 It was a perfect opportunity for Butler to impress upon headquarters his competence and his established leadership of the Loyalists at Niagara. Between 1780 and 1783 he wrote Haldimand a constant stream of letters reporting on the needs and progress of the settlement. 5 Predictably, he discovered as well a patronage value in his superintendence of agriculture. Sometime before March 1783, when it became evident peace was near, without permission he began to layout permanent lots in the best locations for his favourites and admitted that by spring of 1783, "Eight of [my] officers have already made considerable improvements. "6 The value of Butler's influence on agriculture paled in comparison to the value of his influence on trade. As already discussed, Butler had entered into a profitable partnership with Richard Pollard to exploit particularly the lucrative market provided by the Indian Department. They had prospered until supplanted by Taylor and Forsyth, the firm preferred by Butler's rivals in the Indian Department, the Johnsons. The loss of trade for Butler was a minor setback compared to those brought on by the end of the Revolution and the rebel victory. With the victory of the Revolutionary armies, Butler lost whatever chance he had of marching home to financial rewards and high position in a reconquered America. Indeed, as of June 1784 his Rangers were disbanded and he lost his direct influence and status as their commander. 7 Haldimand's choice of Sir John Johnson to head the Indian Department had destroyed Butler's chances of further advancement as a colonial official. Although he remained deputy agent of the Indian Department at Niagara, the department contingent there was drastically cut. The reductions, besides lessening the local status of the department, left little leeway for illicit profits on the scale that Butler had previously enjoyed. To complicate matters even further, Butler's personal finances were in a distressing state; if Daniel Claus was right, Butler lost whatever profits he had made at wartime Niagara in an abortive speculation in Indian trade goods involving his old client, Edward Pollard. Butler's only immediate source of income was £200 Stlg per annum which he received from the Indian Department and his officer's half-pay. Even that income by at least 1786 was being absorbed by his debts to merchants. 8 Butler's claims for war losses, moreover, were not well received: the Loyalist Claims Commissioners would not recognize his title to unsettled lands in New York valued by him at £5,720 which he had obtained from the Indians and for which he could produce no satisfactory deeds. On the rest of his Loyalist claim, he probably received less than the average 37 per cent allowed, since the Claims Commissioners tended to discount large claims more stringently. 9 Much to his dismay, Butler found the promise of wealth and power that the Revolution had held out to him slipping away. Faced with the task of re-establishing his family's influence in a new and changing society, he failed

38

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

to make the necessary adjustments. He attempted to maintain his old status by relying upon his prewar and wartime contacts and influence within the military authority structure. He first attempted to draw upon the imperial government, demanding of it the prerequisites he felt were his due as an important colonial official and officer, but found the government, now the war was over, progressively less interested in the affairs of displaced officials from the lost colonies. When his petitions for patronage failed, Butler turned to the old familiar practices: corrupt supply of the Indian Department and speculation in Indian lands. The provincial government, however, was increasingly vigilant against such practices and prevented Butler from profiting by them. Butler's natural impulse was to tum first to the imperial government, demanding of it patronage based on his past services. Even before the end of the war, Butler sought a military commission for his youngest son, a request that was refused. 1o In May 1784 he wrote to Haldimand that "my situation and circumstances not admitting of my providing for my children in a manner more suitable to my own and their wishes," he would be obliged to settle two of his sons at Niagara. This, he contended, would be an inducement to members of his corps to settle there and in order to obtain this advantage, he asked the government to give his sons the contract for portaging goods at Niagara." This also was refused. Butler travelled to Quebec in the fall of 1784 to further his claims and, meeting with no success there, took ship in 1785 for England. Armed with a eulogistic summary of his services to the British government endorsed by Haldimand, he made the rounds of official society, using every advantage open to him, even to attaching himself to Joseph Brant as an interpreter to gain an audience with the Secretary of State. Butler discovered to his chagrin, however, that now it was over and lost, the imperial authorities wished to forget the war; they were deaf to the claims of importunate colonial officers. Butler returned to Quebec in the fall of 1786 empty-handed. 12 The former Loyalist leader's only remaining strong card in his search for patronage was his position in the Indian Department, and upon his return to Quebec, he was determined to play that card to the full. "Messrs Butler and McKee, the agent at Detroit," Haldimand's secretary reported to him, were •• very lofty in their Declarations and Expectations.' '13 They demanded that new restrictions on the mode of issuing provisions, which required close supervision by the commandants of the garrisons and which would curtail the possibilities for private profit, be removed and that their salaries be increased to £600 Stlg per annum before they would return to their posts. Butler once again demanded the portage for his sons. These demands were flatly refused and the disgruntled agents returned to their postS.1 4 Butler did gain one concession in Quebec: the appointment of his nephew Walter Butler Sheehan as Indian Department storekeeper at Niagara, the official directly in charge of Indian goods. IS As we have seen, Butler's son

DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC OFFICE

39

Andrew along with Samuel Street was able to exploit that appointment only to a limited extent. Butler's failure to prosper through his influence in the Indian Department forced him to tum increasingly to the possibilities of profit through the local society. In 1784 he had complained plaintively to Haldimand that "I cannot point out anything better than the Plough for my two Sons at the present.' '16 Although he attempted a number of alternatives, in the end his statement proved accurate. No longer part of a profitable patronage system dependent on the military and without aid from the imperial authorities to bolster his local status or his sagging fortunes, Butler was now embarked on a long downward slide. Despite all his setbacks, however, Butler could still take comfort at the end of the Revolution in the fact that a substantial portion of his former officers had settled at Niagara. He could still expect, with the aid and blessing of the provincial government, to consolidate these former subordinates of his into a unified leadership group; together, they might expect to reap local office as a reward for their past military service. Because they had been selected to be officers, one might assume that Butler's subordinates had been men of some substance and standing in colonial society. Such a group with both prior status and the prestige of wartime leadership would face a limited range of competition for power and place in the Niagara peninsula. That pioneer society would produce few potential candidates for a governing elite. Early agriculture provided little base for wealth and status nor did local shopkeeping. The number of professionals within the society was minuscule. The Loyalist officers' only potential competitors for power were the major merchants with links to Laurentian supply networks. The local pre-eminence of the Loyalist officers, moreover, would seem a logical extension of the wartime authority structure. Butler had derived his powers and influence from the British military; he had attempted to entrench and extend his influence by use of his prerogatives as commander of the Loyalist forces at Niagara. Now the war was over, he could hope to continue to exercise an influence through those the military structure had formerly made his subordinates. In fact, the status and influence of the Loyalist officers at Niagara were more apparent than real. Any effective leadership group requires an established status within its society and an internal coherence among its members. The Loyalist officers at Niagara had little of either. In the guerilla warfare that had been waged on the frontier, there had been little military hierarchy and less discipline. Most of the officers, moreover, had not enjoyed an affluence or prominence in the old colonies which would give them a precedence in the new. They were also divided by the rivalries and hostilities the war had bred among them. Once the Loyalist units were disbanded, any coherence or hierarchy the military structure had imposed on their members quickly disintegrated. Commerce was the only organized force in the new civilian settlements at Niagara and merchants would exploit that organization

40

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

to exercise a potent influence on all affairs of the society. The deciding authority in the first assignment of office in the Niagara peninsula was external to the local society. All initial offices in the new society-justices of the peace, judgeships on the Court of Common Pleas and positions on the Land Board-were appointed; and they were assigned by the government in Quebec City. These appointments proved to be extremely important because administrative power in early Niagara society was cumulative. Those who received positions in the first years of settlement were often chosen for subsequent appointments or, equally important, were consulted on such appointments. The problems the government of Quebec faced in making the first local appointments in the upper country were essentially ones of communication. The central government in Quebec had little direct knowledge of the new citizenry at distant Niagara. It therefore turned for advice to the three organizations which had been closely connected with the upper country and which had knowledge of the new settlements: the army, the Indian Department and, to some extent, the fur trading community. The involvement of all three of these groups with provisioning and supply meant that their most direct contacts in settlements like Niagara had been with the local merchants who had participated in Laurentian trade. Not unnaturally, they showed a predilection for merchants in their recommendations for office at Niagara. The British army was consulted through its military commandant at Fort Niagara. The officers of the army had dealt constantly with local merchants throughout the war and possibly knew them more intimately than they knew the Loyalist officers, who were often out on distant raids. The Indian Department was also consulted on candidates through its chief local official, John Butler. Butler's recommendations, however, were more than counterbalanced by those of the new superintendent general of the department, Sir John Johnson. The government relied heavily on Johnson, who was also superintendent of the Loyalists, for advice on the new settlements. Johnson, because of their wartime rivalry, had strong reasons for favouring alternatives to Butler and his associates. The fur trade merchants were also sources of information on possible candidates because of their trade contacts along the Great Lakes and their consequent knowledge of local personnel. The major Montreal fur trade merchants favoured their local clients both from personal loyalty and because they saw obvious advantages in having their up-country contacts in control of local administration. The recommendations of their army, Indian Department, and fur trade patrons quickly gave a few merchants at Niagara control of the nascent administrative structure.

The selections made in 1786 for justices of the peace, the first public offices assigned at Niagara, came as a rude shock to Butler and his Loyalist officers. They undoubtedly expected to completely dominate appointed positions in the

DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC OFFICE 41

local government but as Robert Mathews, Haldimand's personal secretary, reported while visiting Niagara: It seems Coli. Butler refused accepting a commission for the Peace, which would naturally have given him the lead and made Him the principal acting man in the settlement. I believe there is little doubt that he looked for the chief direction of it, and feels disappointed that it is not so. The immediate, interior management falls, of course, to the Justices of the Peace, and the Coli does not approve of the choice which has been made in that appointment tho' Major Campbell [the commandant of the garrison] has had most convincing proofs of Mr. Burch's [a local merchant] zeal, activity and impartial justice, and has everything to hope, too; in the good qualities and abilities of Mr. Hamilton. Captain Tinbrook [a Ranger] was not of his [Campbell's] recommendation, and I fear is but little qualified for that status in point of abilities or respectability of characterY

The biases of the military were immediately apparent from these appointments. The commandant favoured Hamilton and John Burch, whose abilities he had seen demonstrated through their supply of the army. Burch, like Richard Cartwright's father, had been a personal supplier of the Johnson family. He had both served with the army commissariat and had been an independent trader at Niagara during the war. At the war's end, he moved into portaging and the construction of the first large-scale mill on the Niagara River near the Falls. The commandant did not approve of the one appointment made from the Loyalist officers. Sensing the direction these developments presaged, Butler himself apparently refused to serve on the Commission of Peace. I8 Butler's intuition was correct; for him and his officers, the worst was yet to come. When asked in 1787 by the government for general recommendations of persons deserving of civil trusts, Butler himself named six former members of the Indian Department and the Rangers and two merchants, Robert Hamilton and Samuel Street, who had been suppliers of the department. Captain Watson, now the temporary commandant at Niagara, however, showed a strong predilection in favour of the mercantile element. His list of six recommendations included four merchants, Hamilton among them, and only one Loyalist, Butler, who had seen military service in the war. The bias in favour of the commercial element was probably strengthened by the recommendations of Colonel Caldwell, the permanent commander of the garrison, and Mr. Jacques Baby, an important Detroit merchant engaged in the fur trade, who were also asked to recommend officers proper for the Nassau District. In the event, by 1789 the judges of the Court of Common Pleas and the justices of the peace for the settlements at Niagara consisted of four merchants and seven Loyalists, only four of whom had actually seen military service with Butler. Considering their limited numbers, the representation of the merchants among the local office holders was remarkable. 19

42

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Hamilton fared well in this initial distribution of office: he was both a justice of the peace and a judge. His power was further augmented by a recommendation from Sir John Johnson-who would have known him both as a supplier of the Indian Department and a partner of the Johnson's client, Richard Cartwright-that Hamilton be placed on the land board for his district (which assigned land grants to incoming settlers) and in addition be given a special land grant of 700 acres. In 1789, moreover, it was Hamilton that the commandant of the garrison chose to supervise the distribution of food to relieve the famine conditions in the Niagara settlements. 2o Even more significant in institutionalizing Hamilton's influence were recommendations for appointed provincial office, especially for the seats on the Legislative and Executive Councils to be filled in 1791 for the new province of Upper Canada. The lists of recommendations for these posts submitted to London were composed by Sir John Johnson. Johnson was well placed to exercise an influence on appointments in the upper country. He held a powerful position as a member of the Exec uti ve Council of Quebec and was a trusted advisor of Dorchester on all matters relating to the Loyalists. He had not forgotten the threat Butler had posed to the power of the Johnson family in the Revolutionary period and he exerted himself to prevent Butler or those who had been closely associated with him from gaining a significant amount of power in the new society. 21 In 1788 Johnson had personally recommended the men who had composed the first land board at Niagara. Three of the six had not served with Butler. Johnson sought to reinforce this tendency in 1790 when recommending additional appointments to the land board: his recommendations were two merchants, a member of his own Loyalist regiment, a Loyalist who had served under Butler in the Indian Department but who had been personally associated with Johnson before the Revolution, and a Loyalist officer who had served under Simcoe. The two merchants and the Loyalist who served in Johnson's corps were actually appointed. 22 In his most telling blow, Johnson excluded Butler from his list of recommendations for seats in the Executive and Legislative Councils, positions Butler must have expected to hold. Indeed Johnson excluded all members of Butler's Rangers from consideration, although he did recommend five officers who had served directly under his command in the King's Royal Regiment of New York. Johnson did recommend Hamilton as well as Cartwright for both the Legislative and Executive Councils. Only two of his other nominees were from Niagara, one for the Legislative Council, Nathaniel Pettit, who had seen no military service, and one for the Executive Council, Robert Kerr, who had served with Johnson's own corps rather than at Niagara. Johnson had ranked his lists and Pettit and Kerr were both at the bottom. Neither was appointed while both Hamilton and Cartwright were selected to serve on the Legislative Counci1. 23 Johnson's influence was not the only factor in the final choice of members

DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC OFFICE

43

for the councils. William Robertson, a relative of Hamilton and an important figure in the southwest fur trade, who resided in London, recommended Hamilton to Simcoe, the newly appointed lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada. Isaac Todd while in London had performed the same service for Richard Cartwright by recommending him to Simcoe. He probably recommended Hamilton as well. Indeed, when the lists of members for the councils were first published, Sir John Johnson was shocked at how few of the Loyalist officers he had recommended were included. By their influencial contacts the fur trade community had secured the most significant offices for merchants such as Hamilton and Cartwright, just as they had lobbied those merchants' interests with the Quebec government in economic matters. 24 In contrast to the merchants with their web of connections and patrons, the Loyalist officers at Niagara had no influential allies at the centres of power. As a result, their share of the initial offices in the peninsula and in the province was meagre. Nor did the Loyalist officers prove capable of improving their patronage position over time by impressing their abilities and their prior claims upon the colonial government. Initially, both numbers and patterns of settlement at Niagara appeared to favour the political interests of Butler's officers. The number of officers from Butler's Rangers and the Indian Department who settled permanently in the peninsula was high. Twenty-eight officers of the Rangers have been identified in 1784; as of 1789, twenty-four Ranger officers had received land grants in the peninsula. Nineteen officers were serving with the Indian Department in December 1783 and eighteen officers had received land at Niagara by 1789. These were joined by two officers of the regular army and two officers from other Loyalist corps according to the 1789 returns, forty-six officers in all as of 1789. A list of half-pay officers in 1806 showed twenty-nine former officers of the Loyalist corps and the regular army who served in the Revolution still alive and residing in the Niagara District. The numbers were certainly large enough to constitute a leadership group in that small society and most of the officers had the apparent advantage of having served together in two units which had fought the war side by side. 25 The rank and file of the military units were also heavily represented in the Niagara settlements. Land returns in 1789 indicate 240 men of the corps were settled at Niagara with 362 dependants. With troops from the regular army, other Loyalist corps and the Indian Department, military personnel and their dependants would have been in the range of 850 individuals. While certainly nothing near a majority, in a population of some six thousand in 1799, the military settlement in the peninsula constituted a significant nucleus. 26 Moreover, a pattern of settlement did emerge at Niagara which could have been conducive to the continuation of a military hierarchy. As a result of local topography, early settlement at Niagara was concentrated rather than scattered. It followed the thin band bf good soils below the Niagara Escarpment along the Lake Ontario shore, ending in a major concentration

44

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

along the Niagara River in Niagara and Stamford townships. Officers were fairly evenly distributed among the rank and file and well situated, geographically at least, to exercise an influence over the men (see Map 4). Despite this, however, no coherent Loyalist military elite rose to control the Niagara peninsula. 21 In part, the reasons for this failure went back to Butler's selection of officers. The number of prominent, well-established families on the New York frontier had been small; those who remained loyal and from which Butler could choose his officers was even more miniscule. Despite his own preference, in most cases Butler had had to choose as officers for his Rangers small farmers, many of whom were recent immigrants not much distinguished from their neighbours. Few of them had owned much land-the average was 100 acres owned or rented and in fact, three had owned no land at all-and none of them appear to have been entrepreneurs. 2 !1 Such men neither had nor would quickly acquire prominence in the new society. The officers of the Indian Department af Niagara were certainly a more respectable group than those of the Rangers. They had been long established in America and their holdings were substantial, averaging 1,640 acres. Unfortunately for Butler, these officers were less under his influence than those of the Rangers. Thus, over half the Indian Department officers owed their commissions to the Johnson family rather than to him. This undoubtedly created tensions between Butler and the former officers of the Indian Department, as well as tensions between the officers of the Rangers and those of the Indian Department which would have hindered cooperation in establishing their collective leadership of the community. 2!1 As important a consideration in the formation of an officer elite at Niagara as the questions of the prior status and internal coherence of the officer group was the relationship of the officers to the men they had nominally commanded. The Loyalist corps which had operated from Niagara had not been traditional military units with an instilled sense of hierarchy. They had lacked much esprit de corps or sense of subordination to their officers. The Rangers and the Indian Department forces had in fact been an informal conglomeration of guerilla units whose major function had been to conduct small raids on the isolated communities of western New York· and Pennsylvania. Even in larger operations, the Niagara Loyalist corps tended to serve in small parties mixed with Indians, other Loyalist and Indian Department units, numerous white volunteers loosely under the command of Joseph Brant, and regular army forces. Such promiscuous mixing inhibited the development of a clear chain of command. As a result, a regular army officer sent to assess the Rangers at the end of the war reported to Haldimand that "The corp ... are not only void of, but in general reluctant to, the pursuit and practice of regular Military Discipline. . .. " Their officers in general, he believed, had "scarcely the most distant Idea" of such matters. 30

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45

Whatever the weaknesses of his officer corps, and they were serious, it was even more germane to Butler's specific interests that the Revolutionary War had left no large residue of respect or affection for him among those whom he had commanded. During the Revolution, Butler had concentrated his efforts with a passion on forwarding the influence of himselfand his family, often at the expense of his subordinates. Many of his officers and men must have remembered with bitterness his bullying attempts to monopolize Loyalist trade for the merchant firms with which he was associated. Others would have hotly resented his biased choice of officers, particularly of his own sons. As many as eighty men at one time preferred to serve as unpaid volunteers under Joseph Brant rather than be subjected to the command of Walter Butler. Such resentments reached a flash point in 1781 when the Rangers came close to mutiny over what they believed were attempts by John Butler to withhold their pay. The lack of coherence in the Loyalist units which settled at Niagara and their personal lack of established status meant their officers could not expect to elicit automatic deference from the local society; the old resentments of the war period in tum meant that Butler had little prestige with either his officers or his men. 31 It is perhaps not surprising that the Loyalist military officers fared poorly in the postwar period. Starting with little capital, lacking entrepreneurial experience and often in middle age, they were not able to gain wealth and prestige through the local economy. Although Butler's officers received substantial land grants from the government, land, except that under cultivation, was of little value within the first generation of settlement and the amounts which could be cleared and cultivated would not make a man wealthy. Many of the original Loyalist grants passed into the hands of the merchants as payment for retail goods or collateral for mortgages. Some Loyalist families would eventually rise to prominence, in part through exploitation of their land, but the process would require at least a generation. In the occupations that might yield more immediate profit, the Loyalist military were sparsely represented: six of the twenty-four mill owners in the community as of 1792 were military, but only two of them were former officers. The Loyalist contingent in general merchandising was miniscule: the number of shopkeeper licences per year before 1812 varied from seventeen to thirty-six with a large turnover. On the lists of shop licences for the district from 1801 to 1812, only one Loyalist officer and four rank and file appear. 32 Butler's officers had no more success in gaining office: they represented an almost static minority within the largest group of appointed office holders, the justices of the peace. In 1789 they constituted four of eleven, in 1808 seven of twenty-eight, and in 1812 six of twenty-seven. None of the rank and file served as magistrates. No individuals bearing the family names of the officers became justices of the peace, suggesting that whatever prerogative the officers did enjoy did not extend to their offspring. Three of the five members of the

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THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Court of Common Pleas in 1789 were former Rangers and Indian Department officers and four of the eleven members of the land board in 1794. Again, none of rank and file were represented. 33 Butler himself fared better in gaining public position than did his officers. To central government officials it was probably unthinkable that the commander of the Loyalist forces at Niagara should be entirely excluded from the management of the new settlement. By 1788 Butler had been appointed a justice of the peace, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, and a member of the land board. Although he never attained provincial office, Butler was by 1792 lieutenant of the county, the most significant local office. Such offices, however, availed Butler but little, since he appears to have been unable to establish a loyal faction through which he could exercise their power. He perhaps took some role in forwarding the career of his nephew Walter Butler Sheehan who was appointed second sheriff of the district and, in the election of 1792, returning officer in three of the four ridings in the peninsula. Sheehan's prominence, however, was aided as much by the fact that he was a half-pay officer of the regular British army as by his uncle's influence. He eventually resigned his offices and moved to Grand River where his public prominence ended. A clearer indication of Butler's limited influence was that in his lifetime none of his three sons held a post more elevated than that of captain in the local militia. 34 There is little indication that Butler was able to use his offices for personal gain. His most significant request to local authorities, made to the land board, was for a grant of lands between Toronto and Head-of-the-Lake (Ancaster), six miles along Lake Ontario, extending back twelve miles. This he asked as compensation for his war losses and services. He was refused by the members of the board which included in its number some who had been his officers. 3s Butler's most important office was his position in the Indian Department. Although his attempts to exploit that position for substantial personal gain after the Revolution through use of department supplies and land speculation were foiled, it is undeniable that Butler owed what postwar prominence he did enjoy to his position in the Indian Department. He played a large part in the purchase of much of southwestern Ontario from the Mississauga Indians and was significant in the diplomatic manoeuvring with the Americans and the Indians in the years before the evacuation of the border posts in 1796. The Johnson faction, however, was vigilant to prevent Butler from turning his prestige to his own advancement. As early as 1782 Sir John Johnson made an attempt to remove Butler from his post and to replace him with his own nephew; when that failed, Johnson blocked payment of Butler's personal accounts and also stepped up his family's barrage of innuendo in official circles against him.36 Butler had few opportunities to use his influence in the local Indian Department to respond to the Johnson offensive. In 1786 the department at Niagara was slashed from a wartime peak of nineteen officers and sixty-one

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47

staff to two officers with a staff of four. In 1790 Sir John Johnson effectively blocked Butler's further rise in the department by nominating Alexander McKee, the Indian agent at Detroit and a longtime lieutenant of the Johnsons, for the post of deputy superintendent of Upper Canada. McKee received the office in 1794. 37 Butler's relations with the department remained strained for the rest of his life. Johnson and his officials attempted to curb Butler's actions and protested his independence; Butler in his turn complained bitterly that the department kept information from him and that his influence within it was being undermined. In Butler's last years, the Indian Department made no attempt to protect him against the scandals he had brought upon himself by speculations in Indian lands and corrupt department supply. When he died in 1796, Butler's successor was William Claus, the son of Butler's most vociferous opponent, Daniel Claus. Thus, the Butler influence within the Indian Department was decisively terminated. It is a further indication of the direction that patronage distribution was taking that, at his death in 1796, Butler's most important office in the local government, that of lieutenant of the county, did not pass to any connection of his, but to the major merchant of the Niagara peninsula, Robert Hamilton. 3s

CHAPTER 4

Merchants, Politics and Administration, 1783-96

Merchants had done well in gammg a large proportion of the initial administrative positions in the Niagara peninsula. But the winning of office was one matter; the exercise of the powers of office and of general political influence might have been quite another. In fact, by the vigorous use of their offices, merchants magnified their impact upon the settlements at Niagara. The other major group of office holders, the Loyalist officers, exercised less influence on local affairs. As a result of their quiescence, administration favoured the interests of commerce. Commerce was the dynamic force in the local government of the settlements at Niagara and the main voice in their contributions to the wider politics of Quebec before 1792. During the Revolution, local entrepreneurs had been able to rely upon the military for the security and social regulation their commerce required. After the war new and more complex problems faced them. The primary responsibility for local administration had passed from the British army to the new civilian society itself. While most settlers focused their attentions upon the laborious task of creating pioneer farms, merchants such as Robert Hamilton felt impelled from the beginning of the postwar era to move into local administration and gain control of it for their own interests. At Niagara, trade, government and social regulation became inextricably intertwined. A commercial authority structure was erected in the area before Upper Canada was even created. Robert Hami,ton built up a sufficient influence through it to give him substantial power when the new provincial government was created. As with local administration, the general involvement of the settlements at Niagara in the politics of Quebec was minimal, being restricted in the main to protests against the regulations respecting land granting and demands for an increase in the size of land grants. Those merchants who participated in the maintenance of supply routes for Laurentian trade, however, had compelling reasons for involving themselves immediately in politics beyond their locale. 48

MERCHANTS, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRA nON

49

They shared the interests of their Montreal supply houses in establishing a system of trade regulations favourable to the fur trade's interests. Even before peace was officially declared in 1783, Robert Hamilton joined with other merchants at Fort Niagara to protest the admission of American traders to that post and other military facilities on the route to the west. Their statement embodied arguments that Montreal traders themselves were using to propagandize the interests of the Laurentian fur trade. This first political act set the tone for Robert Hamilton's public involvement: his concerns in politics were commercial and his strongest loyalty was to the Laurentian system of trade in which he participated. 1 Other issues involving Laurentian trade early engaged Hamilton's attention. He was an interested figure in the contention of the Montreal merchants with the military government for control of lakes shipping; indeed, his letters outlining the problems created for trade by military restrictions were used as evidence by the Montreal merchants in their presentations to the Executive Council's Committee for Inland Commerce and Navigation. Hamilton was a participant, as well as a major beneficiary, in the fur trade's efforts to establish a portaging concern at Niagara amenable to its interests. Trade was the substance of Hamilton's first communication with the government of Upper Canada; the proposals he made at that time were a classic statement of the fur trade's expansionist imperialism and of its desire for cooperation between government and commerce in that drive for control of territory. For up-country merchants such as Hamilton, trade provided not only the matter of politics but the means to influence it. The network that joined traders along the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes could be used not only for trade but for communication and political lobbying. Information and opinion as well as goods and furs moved up and down the system. In the pioneer communities along the lakes, those who had knowledge of events beyond their own locales, who were privy to the direction of central government policy, and who had the ability to make their opinions known at the centres of power, possessed a significant influence denied to the rest of their society. No group, other than the British military, had a system of communication with links throughout the province of Quebec to match that of the merchants involved in Laurentian supply. Indeed, the rest of the civilian society in the new Loyalist settlements appears to have availed itself on occasion of the merchants and their contacts in its communications with the central government. Those merchants, moreover, who could communicate expeditiously with each other and who shared common political and economic objectives had the potential to become a powerful political lobby that was not available to other, more isolated groups. Hamilton and Cartwright found their trade connections to be their chief source of information on government policy and their prime means of influencing that policy. Through Todd and McGill, for instance, the two

50

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

up-country partners first heard rumours of the establishment of a new province for the Loyalist settlements. When Hamilton and Cartwright had complaints of the harsh terms imposed by the Quebec government for the building of mills or the shifting of port functions from Cataraqui to Carleton Island, it was through Todd and McGill rather than directly through government channels that they registered their complaints. The Loyalists themselves quickly learned that the most efficacious means of communication with Quebec City was through the merchants of the Laurentian trading system. At the behest of others, Hamilton and Cartwright took general social concerns-for example, the necessity of travelling to Halifax in order to make claims on Loyalist losses-to Todd and McGill in order that they and the rest of the Montreal fur trade community might use their influence with government to effect a change. 2 The problems Niagara merchants faced in their local society were more pressing than those at the provincial level. The end of the Revolution was a watershed for Niagara merchants not only in the nature of their commerce, but in the conditions under which they pursued it. The emergence of a civilian society led the military to surrender up social control to local regulation. Without the military to rely upon, merchants were forced immediately to take an active role in civilian society to ensure the continued security of their commerce. During the Revolution, the military had provided those merchants who catered to it with their chief requisite for efficient operation, a modicum of security. Frontier merchants were well aware that their businesses could not function without order. Their commerce was frail: destruction of goods and property and violence against the merchants themsel ves would lead to the rapid deterioration of trade. Any British merchant in the upper country who had lived through the American Revolution was acutely sensitive to considerations of social order. Merchants at Fort Niagara, although they had been spared the horrors of direct attack by the enemy, had suffered from day-to-day lawlessness that marked frontier posts in wartime: assault and vicious brawling that threatened a merchant's life as well as his property had been common. Army personnel had at times been the merchants' worst enemies: pilfering of goods on the portage by soldiers occurred with alarming regularity. Only the harsh justice meted out by the military authorities kept the economic situation from deteriorating into chaos. 3 In addition to frequent small eruptions of violence, the merchants had faced situations that could have precipitated the total collapse of authority at the fort. The threatened mutiny of the Rangers and the near-fatal beating of Joseph Brant, leader of the Iroquois, by members of the Indian Department in reprisal for incidents on the frontier, were angry flash points that could have flared into general conflagrations had they not been suppressed with vigour by the British army.-I Traders also had good reason to be concerned about threats to social order

MERCHANTS, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION

51

under the new civilian regime at Niagara. In 1786 Cartwright, in a letter to his partner, expressed misgivings which he would have found it discreet not to voice in pUblic: I am truly sorry at the Misfortunes & Accidents that have happened in your [Hamilton's] Neighbourhood and it is to be feared that the murders committed may lead to others, among a people so much used to Plunder & Blood, where so many Traders are dispersed and where escape to the Culprits [into the United States] so little difficult. 5

Although their motives may have been patriotic, the former Rangers and Indian Department personnel who constituted the bulk of the peninsula's earliest settlers had previously been engaged in what can only be termed a systematic pillage of the American frontier. The violent propensities such an experience engendered could, the merchants feared, give birth to a troubled, lawless society-and in a society of limited wealth, merchants and their commerce could be the prime targets. Indeed, the first major case with which the new civilian authorities at Niagara had to deal was the robbery and murder of a merchant, Nehimiah Street, the father of Samuel Street Jr.6 The danger to their commerce was compounded, in the merchants' eyes, by the settlement of the Indian allies of the crown, the Iroquois, at Grand River. Although the wording of his memorial to the government was circumspect, Hamilton, who had previously profited from the Indians, made no secret of the fact he saw in their continued presence an ominous threat to the white community: Sound Policy certainly says, that the having within,-In the heart of our Government, a sett of Inhabitants, not clearly amenable to our laws-Guided in every respect by different customs,-Influenced perhaps on future Occasions by adverse Motives of Interest,-must be highly inconvenient, & a circumstance to be avoided by every means in our power.7

Faced with potential adversaries, both red and white, the merchants of Niagara were quick to assume and exercise a role in the enforcement of law and order. By 1788 four of the eleven justices of peace at Niagara were merchants, a remarkably high proportion. In a concerted effort to forestall lawlessness, the new justices took upon themselves a policy of immediate and vigorous assertion of the civil power at Niagara. In the murder of Street and in the murder of a former Loyalist soldier, they ordered coroners' inquests, made arrests, collected the depositions of witnesses and despatched the prisoners to Montreal for trial. Anticipating future complications, they also petitioned the Executive Council at Quebec that their jurisdiction at Fort Niagara, now officially American territory, be recognized. The Executive Council immediately complied. Such decisiveness may well have forestalled more acute disruptions within white society at Niagara. 8 The problems of security associated with Indian settlement were initially more thorny. Trade was the major point of contact between the two

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THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

communities and Indian-white relations quickly became entangled with it. As early as 1785, the Indian agent at Niagara was reporting: The present state of the Indian trade requires regulation-a number of people belonging to the disbanded troops have settled themselves among the Indians on purpose to avoid the constraints of the Law . . . formerly no person was permitted to Trade without a written permission from the Superintendent of Indian Affairs. Now every idle fellow commences Indian trader.!!

Such an uncontrolled situation was pregnant with the threat of disputes and violence. In 1787 the Indian Department found it necessary to instruct the interpreter at Niagara to "endeavour to prevent Riots or disputes Between Indians & Soldiers or any other persons whatever, which has happened sundry times lately. .." I 0 The situation came to a head when two itinerant traders were murdered and their supplies stolen at Grand River in 1791. The alarmed white community at Niagara made an issue of the incident by insisting upon the right of British authorities to try crimes involving an Indian and a white. Three representatives of the white community approached the Iroquois to negotiate the surrender of the Indian suspects. The army and the Indian Department had traditionally dealt with the Indians on the frontier and the presence of the commander of the Niagara garrison and the local Indian agent as representatives was to be expected. The third individual, however, represented a new element in such negotiations, the civilian community. It is an interesting demonstration of his concern with matters of security that that representative was Robert Hamilton. The three, after much negotiation, were successful in obtaining custody of the suspects. I I The fear of Indian attack gradually diminished at Niagara, although Indian-white relations at Grand River, effectively beyond the pale of either white or traditional Indian law, grew steadily worse. With increasing prosperity at Niagara its merchants became less concerned with the trade of Grand River, and that area was allowed,to go its own troubled way. The new civilian society at Niagarci" posed less dramatic but no less important problems for Niagara's merchapts. The collection of his debts, for instance, had been a relatively simple m~tter for Hamilton in wartime when the army and the major merchants of the fur trade had been his customers. As civilian society at Niagara grew, however, collection of debt became a more acute problem: pioneer farmers were notorious for their ability to build up commercial debts and even more notorious for their reluctance to pay them. Resentment of the merchant system of payments for produce ran high and merchants found it useful to have judicial legitimization to enforce both debts and their commercial system. For merchants the most effective way to influence the decisions of the courts was personal service upon them. Likewise, the granting and transfer of land was of increasing significance in the postwar society and merchants quickly became immersed in matters of

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land speculation. The pattern of road development and the location of towns were also a prime commercial concern. Hamilton found a means to be informed of and to exercise an influence over all these matters through the Court of Common Pleas and the District Land Board. The Court of Common Pleas, established in 1788, constituted virtually the full legal apparatus for the early Niagara peninsula. It exercised civil jurisdiction within the Nassau District, even ruling on the right of possession of land and selling land in execution although the crown did not formally divest itself of any land before 1796. Until 1790 the court also held criminal jurisdiction in all non-capital felonies. No professional lawyers practised before it and its judges ruled in all cases until 1792 without benefit of a jury. The judges of the court obviously wielded one of the most substantial powers in their local society.12 None of the judges showed a more sustained interest in the court than Robert Hamilton. He maintained a perfect record of attendance at its sessions, being on the bench at each of its twenty-one sessions between its inception in October 1788 and its termination in April 1794. The other four judges had all been Loyalist military officers and one might have expected them to have taken an equal interest in the court. John Butler, however, attended fourteen sessions and Nathaniel Pettit and Benjamin Pawling only four and five respectively. Peter Tenbroeck did not attend even one. As an official of the colonial government, Peter Russell sat on four occasions. There appears to have been no quorum for the court; as a consequence of poor attendance by the others, Hamilton, often in consultation only with Butler, was able to make important decisions on a wide range of community affairs.la The basic pattern of attendance established for the Court of Common Pleas also held for the District Land Board. The board was the only effective local authority for the granting of land, the selection of townsites, the laying out of new roads and the improvement of primitive ones. Such functions made it the single most significant administrative institution in the eyes of the pioneer community it regulated. Formed in January 1789 and abolished in November 1794, the board was composed of some of the leading citizens of the peninsula: Loyalist officers, merchants and representatives of the British military. Of the sessions for which records have survived, those from January 1789 to March 1792, Hamilton attended thirty-four of the thirty-six sessions. Butler followed closely, attending thirty-three sessions. The commander of the garrison attended less than half the sessions, fifteen, while the other Loyalist appointees, Pawling and Tenbroeck attended only eighteen and ten sessions, a better record than the same two had achieved for the court, possibly because land was a more immediate concern for them, but still only mediocre compared to Hamilton's. Six more members of the board were appointed in May 1791 and it is interesting that the only entrepreneur amongst them, John

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Burch, had the best record of attendance, followed again by Loyalist officers and finally, by a representative of the Royal Engineers. H The Loyalist officers had less incentive than a merchant like Hamilton to attend the court or the land board. They all Ii ved at some distance from Niagara-on-the-Lake where sessions were held; they found the journey to attend them onerous at a time when they were absorbed in the creation of new farms and they did not find the weight of their responsibilities offset by any immediate benefit to themselves. Their plight is demonstrated by the petition of Benjamin Pawling to the lieutenant-governor. Pawling, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, a member of the District Land Board and a member of the House of Assembly, asked to be relieved of his public offices: Your Petitioner finds the portion of his time occupied in endeavours to serve the Public encroach so much upon what is necessary to the management of his own private concerns that in justice to his family he must solicit Your Excellency to relive him from the weight of his public occupations. I:,

Hamilton, on the other hand, as an important merchant, found regular attendance compensated him in an immediate fashion. The jurisdiction of the court, for instance, was wide. Through it, Hamilton was able to establish community policy on such vital economic matters as the sale of liquor, the exchange of land and the verification of wills. The major business of both the court and the land board--debt and land-was important to a merchant. The enforcement of debts was the prime concern of the court; in its six years of existence, 75 per cent of its cases involved the payment of debt. Many merchants placed a substantial reliance. on the court in the conduct of their business. Street and Butler, for instance, used the court on ten occasions to sue for sums ranging from £30 to £97. George Forsyth used it on seven occasions, suing three times for sums in excess of £250. Hamilton himself made use of the court only once, to sue one John Thompson, for £4,535 Quebec Currency. The suit appears to have been only a threat and was dropped immediately. In other cases, Hamilton handled the debts owed him by his own system of collection. Such circumspection indicates that Hamilton was sensitive to the effective limits of his own power: to use local institutions in a blatant manner to forward his interests would only have generated sharp popular resentment and resistance. HI If Hamilton did not employ the court in specific cases, it was still a useful instrument to him in the enforcement of the legal sanctity of his mercantile operations. Certainly, there was a strain of popular resentment against the court's strict interpretation of the law relating to debts. The first attorney general of Upper Canada, John White, when resident at Niagara, reported that he had been told that those who controlled the courts "have lorded it with a rod of Iron. "

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The People [he claimed] fly to me as to a protector. And it was told the Govr publicly the other day that many people (naming them) wod have gone into the States but for the succour that they had received from me . . . . 17

On two occasions in 1792 and 1793, the Legislative Assembly attempted to restrict the powers of the court and its judges in cases involving debt. On the second occasion, the agitation was led by a member from the peninsula}" Even more important to Hamilton than the enforcement of individual accounts through the court was the enforcement of the general mercantile system, specifically of the system of bons. Bons were notes of hand by which merchants paid for produce. At Niagara, they were due annually in October and subject to no interest whatsoever. If, however, the holder of a bon wished it converted to cash before that time, merchants charged a discount. Bons tended to tie farmers to the specific merchants from whom they accepted them. In the debates on the abolition of the Court of Common Pleas, it was claimed that the system of merchant bons Could never have prevailed so universally thro' the settlement had it not received the sanction of what was deemed to authority i.e. the court ... & it was suggested that a Court composed of persons regularly bred to the Profession of the Law would probably differ in their opinion from the present Expositors upon the time & place of payment of their Notes of hand. HI

As with the Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton did not use his position on the District Land Board in the most obvious ways to reward himself. Only on one occasion do the records of the board indicate that a transfer of land to Hamilton came before it. The board's 1791 survey of holdings in the peninsula show Hamilton's lands as quite modest. The massive transferences of land to himself that Hamilton did accomplish were achieved after the abolition of the board before the Land Committee of the Upper Canadian Executive Council. Nevertheless, the board was of use to Hamilton both in keeping him informed of specific land transactions and in giving him an overview of patterns of settlement and the availability of land. 20 On a more specific level, the location of a district town was a matter of intense local interest and controversy which his influence on the land board may have helped to settle in Hamilton's favour. As the administrative centre the town would draw business for shops in or near it; to farmers in its vicinity, it would be a convenience and would .ultimately increase the value of their property. Controversy over the location of the town probably pre-dated the land board. After its inception, the board declared its preference for a town site in the middle of Niagara Township on the banks of the Niagara River. The site was within half a mile of Queenston and so located on major roads that settlers coming from most parts of the peninsula would pass by Hamilton's shop on their way to and from it.

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The proposal stimulated opposition; alternative proposals for sites above the escarpment nearer to the centre of Niagara and Stamford townships were put forward. Such locations would have been more attractive to the Loyalist settlers clustered in that area, but less favourable to Hamilton's commerce. In the end, Hamilton's interests were favoured. The land board, almost certainly with Hamilton's active participation, submitted a petition to the government at Quebec asking for a grant of land near Navy Hall on which to erect government buildings. The petition was accepted. This, the present location of Niagara-on-the-Lake, was in the same geographical relationship to Hamilton's store as the site originally proposed by the board. 21 The recommendation of the land board was also instrumental in Hamilton attaining the government contract for portaging on the west side of the Niagara River. Because of the board's responsibility in the location of facilities, the central government requested its opinion on the feasibility and practicality of portaging government supplies on the west side of the river. With Hamilton and one of his portaging partners, Burch, in attendance, the board strongly recommended the awarding of a portage contract for the western bank. This was a point in Hamilton's favour since he already portaged private goods on the west bank. Moreover, the board went on to vouch for the ability of Hamilton and his partners to carry out government portaging-a recommendation which, coming as it did from those on the scene, must have carried weight with the central government. 22 On another occasion, the Court of Common Pleas was made to lend its sanction to a further demand Hamilton made of the central authorities. Speaking as a justice of the court, Hamilton recommended the creation of road commissioners responsible for laying out major roads and with powers to call upon the whole district to repair them. Such considerations of transportation were vital to the Niagara merchants. After the central government approved, Hamilton as a member of the land board took a hand in selecting the specific individuals to fill the situations. 2:1 If the land board and the court were of use to Hamilton in influencing the decisions of the central government, they also increased his prestige and influence in local society. His positions upon them gave Hamilton a certain authority in local politics and a patronage power. Through the court, Hamilton ruled on the dates for township elections and effected the removal of township office-holders who neglected their duties. Through the land board, he exercised a considerable power over the granting of land. Some settlers felt he misused this power at times to serve his own ends. Staats Springstein, a former Ranger, became involved in a dispute with his neighbours over their encroachments. Because of this dispute, according to Springstein, "a spirit of animosity against your petitioner was set loose on the land board" and the ruling of the board went against him. The accusation is an interesting demonstration of how Hamilton may have used the board to exercise a degree of control over local society. 24

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The land board could be used to bestow favours as well as punishments. In 1793 the board refused to sit for several months, as a consequence, Chief Justice Osgoode reported to Simcoe, of the refusal of the Executive Council to confirm a land grant made by the board which embodied blatant favouritism. It gave a certain individual many hundreds of acres more than the board was authorized to grant and consisting of land, moreover, that was not even the property of the crown at the time of granting. 25 By 1793, complaints against the operations and decisions of the court and the land board at Niagara were becoming frequent. Such complaints often identified the source of discontent as merchant control of those institutions. The complaints were largely justified. Impelled by the needs of their commerce and aided by the infrastructures and alliances provided by their system of commercial supply, merchants had edged aside their rivals and assumed control of the administration of the Niagara peninsula.

CHAPTER 5

Kinship and Commerce: The Hamilton Network

Hamilton's connections to systems of military and fur trade supply were not the only sources of his rise to economic, social and political power. Shortly after the Revolution, Hamilton began to further consolidate his influence by utilizing another system of linkages, the ties of marriage and consanguity among a group of Scots entrepreneurs at Niagara and Detroit. His construction of a network of family alliances was quite deliberate. He brought some of his own relations from Scotland and arranged for their training in Upper Canadian enterprise. He then organized their establishment in businesses at Niagara which were offshoots of his own. In the age before corporation law and limited liability, business structures were generally based upon family links. A merchant could draw upon the political and business contacts of his relatives. Kin could provide one with political leverage, patronage and increased business opportunities such as training apprenticeships, partnerships, openings for business expansion and cooperative enterprises; through such cooperation, a merchant could diversify his business activities-an important consideration when markets were small and specialization, of necessity, limited. Like the military and fur trade systems, a kinship network could be a hedge against business insecurity and economic fluctuation by the breadth of opportunities it offered. One's kin might even provide the capital and goods to make a start in business and loans to buoy up a faltering enterprise. The kinship trade networks in many ways paralleled the functions of the Laurentian fur trade and military supply systems, and they could certainly operate very efficiently within them. The Laurentian trade network was honeycombed with family operations reinforced by marriage alliances. Hamilton's relatives would all begin by supplying the fur trade and the military. Kinship networks among the Scots of the Laurentian trading system were a well-established fact by the time Robert Hamilton arrived in Canada.

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Hamilton had, for example, been brought to Canada by the Ellice brothers, Alexander, James and Robert. When Robert Ellice, the Montreal agent of the brothers' firm, died in 1790, his business passed to two of his relatives, his nephews, John Forsyth and John Richardson, who renamed the company Forsyth and Richardson. The new partners were also nephews of James Phyn and Alexander Ellice, partners in the major fur trade firm of Phyn, Ellice and Company which cooperated closely with Forsyth and Richardson. Two of John Forsyth's brothers, James and Thomas, were for some time partners in his firm. The firm did business at Kingston and Niagara through its agents, John Forsyth's brothers, Joseph and George. Forsyth and Richardson through marriage alliances linked themselves to other major firms: John Forsyth through marriage with Margaret, daughter of Charles Grant of Quebec, became connected with the numerous members of the Grant clan who had taken part in the Canadian fur trade. Their issue in tum married into the families of Joseph Forsyth (a cousin), of Samuel Gerrard (a partner in the firm of Gerrard, Gillespie and Company) and of John Gregory (a partner in McTavish, Frobisher and Company). All these ties facilitated trade and advanced the families involved.' Robert Hamilton does not seem to have come to North America with existing kinship links to significant commercial figures, but the importance of acquiring them was not lost upon him. In the winter of 1785-86, Hamilton resided at Detroit in a successful attempt to win for himself and Cartwright the forwarding business of the southwest fur trade. It cannot have hindered his attempt that, in 1785, he married Catherine Askin Robertson, daughter of the chief trader In the southwest and Hamilton's former partner, John Askin. The marriage linked Hamilton to a small group of three Detroit familIes-the Askins, the Grants and the Robertsons-who, through the fur trade and military supply, had risen to early prominence in the upper country. 2 Although he was already suffering serious economic reverses, Askin's capable trading had made him a wealthy and influential man. His personal inventory book valued his holdings at Detroit as of January 1, 1787 as worth £19,082, including slaves, houses, lands, ships, merchandise, livestock and outstanding accounts. Askin's brother-in-law, "Commodore" Alexander Grant, like many others on the frontier, had combined careers in the military and trading to his personal benefit. From 1763 to 1812 Grant was in command of the Provincial Marine on the Great Lakes. At various times before the Revolutionary War, he had also exercised a personal monopoly over ships and shipping on the lakes, and during the Revolution had been directly responsible for shipping on Lake Erie. He was a prominent member of the small oligarchical society of Detroit, owning what was considered the finest farm in the area. He was an original appointee to the Executive Council of Upper Canada and later an administrator of the province for a year. William Robertson arrived at Detroit in 1782 as a clerk for John Askin. Within a decade, he rose to become not only one of Detroit's leading merchants, but

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one of the most prominent men in Canada. His stature was great enough that he was appointed in 1791 to the Executive Council and later to the Legislative Council. Hamilton's new wife had formerly been the spouse of Robertson's deceased brother, Samuel. The link was strengthened by Hamilton's adopting as his own the two sons of that first marriage. 3 At the end ofthe Revolution, the triumvirate of Askin, Grant and Robertson had the potential to be a powerful force in Upper Canada. If the southwest fur trade in which all these men were involved had not gone into sharp decline in the 1790s, they, with Hamilton and his immediate relations at Niagara, might well have constituted a true "Family Compact" in the western part of the province that would have predominated in early Upper Canadian affairs. As it was, their influence was far from negligible. William Robertson was the most immediately important of his relations for Hamilton. His aid was significant in establishing Hamilton and assuring his success in politics and commerce. Due in part to Robertson's warm recommendation of him to Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe, Hamilton early gained provincial office in Upper Canada. Robertson was instrumental in obtaining an early contract for the supply of the garrison at Niagara for Hamilton. Robertson provided an important proportion of Hamilton's early capital: by his own account, he lent Hamilton "a large sum of money" with which Hamilton speculated "immensely in Lands. "4 Robertson's firm was also one of the most important for which Hamilton acted as forwarder. In 1791 Robertson took up residence in London, a privilege made possible by his business success at Detroit. From there, he handled some porchases of merchandise for Hamilton and was Hamilton's direct source of information on the state of the London market. Without Robertson's aid, Hamilton's rapid progress towards becoming an Upper Canadian merchant of the first rank might have been considerably slower than it was.!) By 1784 Robert Hamilton was confident enough of his own success to commence building a network of his Scots relatives in the Niagara peninsula. Over the next seven years, he sent home for four of his relations, Robert, William and Thomas Dickson, and Thomas Clarke. All were from Dumfries, the lowland border region where Hamilton's mother had been born. Her sister had married John Dickson of Dumfries and their offspring had included Robert, William and Thomas. Robert Hamilton's brother, George, had in turn married their sister. John Clarke, Thomas's father, was a cousin of both the Dicksons and Hamilton. The cousins came to Upper Canada in early manhood: Thomas Clarke was the oldest at twenty-one, Thomas Dickson the youngest at fourteen. 6 There was a definite pattern to the establishment of Hamilton's kin in Upper Canada. Each of them in turn served an apprenticeship in the Hamilton enterprises, working as a clerk in Hamilton's store or as an agent of his receiving and forwarding operations. Hamilton placed each one of them in a

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business of his own closely linked to fur trade and military supply. Two of the four cousins used the economic base with which Hamilton provided them to move into other profitable activities such as land speculation, milling and manufacturing. Each cousin continued to cooperate closely with his fellows, with Hamilton and with other contacts Hamilton provided. Robert Dickson, who arrived in 1785, worked for a year at Fort Erie, handling transshipment and forwarding of goods between the lakes for Hamilton and probably doing some small-scale retailing. His brother William spent five years with Hamilton as a forwarding agent at Carleton Island under the supervision of Hamilton's partner, Cartwright, and as manager of Hamilton's mills and store at Twelve Mile Creek (St. Catharines). Thomas Dickson and Thomas Clarke spent four years each in Hamilton's employ, working for the most part at the main store in Queenston. By the end of their apprenticeships, all had received a solid grounding in Upper Canadian business. Not incidentally, the manpower they provided enabled Hamilton to expand and consolidate his enterprises. 7 Clarke and the Dicksons came at an opportune time. From the first, it was understood they would ultimately be masters of their own establishments. The society and economy of the peninsula were still fluid and there were promising places for young entrepreneurs, especially those who were related to the entrepreneur whom one of them was already calling "the first Merchant in this settlement. "8 Within a year of Robert Dickson's arrival, Hamilton was exerting influence to place him in business permanently. Through Richard Cartwright, Hamilton hinted to the firm of Smith and Beasley, which was supplied by the partners, . that they take Dickson in as a partner. Smith and Beasley, unfortunately, "did not seem to relish much" the suggestion. Hamilton encountered more success in using his influence in official and fur trade circles. By late 1786 Robert Dickson was serving as a clerk and storekeeper to the Indian Department at Michilimackinac. The position gave Dickson an excellent entree into the fur trade. By at least 1798 he had his own firm, Robert Dickson and Company, a trading group powerful enough to control most of the commerce with the Sioux and Chippewa in Minnesota before 1812.9 Beyond his initial establishment, Robert Dickson's success appears to have been largely of his own making. The influence of Hamilton, however, was more evident in the careers of others of the cousins. If Robert Dickson's success was closely associated with the fur trade, that of William Dickson linked more closely with the military. "You bid me write you how my cousin Dicksons are engaged . . ." penned Thomas Clarke in 1792 to his father, "William lives at the mouth of the River opposite the Fort of Niagara where he sells merchandise to the Military, and trades with the Settlers for grain & c. which is bought up to supply the Garrisons-he has been but a short time in Business for himself-short as it is, he has made out exceedingly well. "10 So profitable did his trade prove that in 1790, at the ripe age of twenty-one,

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Dickson built the first brick house in the peninsula. 11 Hamilton's later practice with his sons and his nephews suggests that he probably provided the initial capital for Dickson's enterprise, sponsored its interest with his own Montreal supplier, and used his influence to promote its business. Thomas Dickson followed in the footsteps of his brother. In 1793 he opened a shop at Fort Erie, selling goods to the small garrison there and receiving and forwarding goods on the lake mainly for the military and fur trade. The firm almost certainly had links to Hamilton's. There are indications in the Askin correspondence that Thomas maintained modest trade links with John Askin who acted as an agent in selling small consignments for him. By 1796 Thomas had moved his business to Queenston, where he gradually built up a clientele which by 1809 extended along the lake fronts as far west as Long Point and as far north as Forty Mile Creek (Grimsby). He supplemented his profits as a merchant with a substantial income from the post of collector of customs at Queenston, a position he almost certainly got in 1801 at the instance of the lieutenant of the county, Robert Hamilton. A frail man, Thomas does not seem to have extended his activities beyond retailing and office holding. 12 His brother William was more venturesome. For him, merchandising proved only a starting point. Using the profits he made from it and the cooperation of his relatives, he moved into large-scale land speCUlation, often in conjunction with his cousins, Thomas Clarke and Robert Hamilton, and into law, a natural adjunct of speculation because a prime function for lawyers of the period was to act as land agents. Dickson's connections provided him with much of his early business. In 1795 he was already handling land matters for Cartwright's brother-in-law, James Secord, and Cartwright's cousin, Richard Beasley. "If the Rest of your operations in land bring you as handsome Profits," remarked Cartwright, .. it will be a better business than keeping shop. "13 There are indications in the papers of Dickson's relations that they gave him a good deal of legal and land business. 14 In 1803 Robert Hamilton introduced and shepherded through the Legislative Council a bill designed specifically to legitimize Dickson's legal career, "to authorize the Governor ... to licence William Dickson, Esq., to practice law in the province. "15 Law was generally a struggling profession in a new society, but Dickson did not find it so. By 1812 he was affluent enough to have built his second brick house and to have purchased a magnificent library of over one thousand volumes imported from England which he calculated to be worth almost £600. 16 By the time Thomas Clarke arrived from Scotland, he was following a path already well trodden by the Dicksons. After his apprenticeship, he entered business in 1796 at Queenston, close by his cousins Hamilton and Thomas Dickson. His career, ultimately the most successful of any of the cousins, depended upon the army, the fur trade and the influence of Robert Hamilton.

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Shortly after opening shop, he went into partnership with Samuel Street Jr. By 1798 Robert Hamilton had assured the prosperity of that new firm by arranging for it to share a portion of the army and fur trade portaging contracts he and George Forsyth held. At the end of 1799 Street left the firm and Robert Nichol, a Closer contact of the Hamilton network, became a partner until 1803. Clarke then continued on his own until 1810 when the profits he had made enabled him to enter a second partnership with Street, abandon forwarding and enter into large-scale milling, processing and manufacturing at the complex he and Street controlled at Bridgewater on the Niagara River.17 By this date Clarke was also heavily involved in land speculation in cooperation with other of his relatives. Thanks in part to the early aid his kin had given him, Clarke was an enormously successful businessman. Although he died without issue, his estate, along with Street's, went to form the base of the fortune of Upper Canada's first millionaire, appropriately named Thomas Clarke Street. 18 As an indication of their perception of where status lay within early local society, the pattern of the cousins' marriages is interesting: Thomas Dickson married, first, a daughter of Captain Wilkinson, the commandant of Fort Erie where Dickson's business was originally located, and second, a daughter of Alexander Grant, thus linking himself neatly with both the local military and the fur trade. William Dickson espoused a daughter of Captain Aldam of the Royal Navy, while Thomas Clarke's wife was a daughter of the surgeon to the Indian Department and a grand-daughter of Sir William Johnson. The wife of Robert Nichol was the grand-daughter of Alexander Grant and daughter of a surgeon in the British army.19 The kinship network centred on Robert Hamilton extended beyond the four cousins. One of its prime beneficiaries was Robert Nichol. In 1792 Clarke reported to his father, •• About 2 months ago I was a little surprised to find Bob Nichol a sailor on board a Vessel on this Lake of which Mr. Hamilton is an owner-poor fellow he had been badly used by his Captain in coming to Montreal." Nichol jumped ship and came up country. .. He now Ii ves with Mr. Hamilton and likes his situation, infinitely better than the Sea-his relations have not learned where he is-please inform them.' '20 Nichol, like the others, came from Dumfries and it has been asserted he also was a relation of the Dicksons, Clarke and Hamilton. Be that as it may, he had obviously been well known by them and their families. Nichol managed to draw extensively on the contacts the Hamilton kinship network gave him to build a profitable career. In 1794 he became a clerk to Thomas Dickson at Fort Erie. The following year the young Scot moved up to indentured clerk in the employ of John Askin at Detroit for three years with wide-ranging responsibilities. By the end of the period, he was acting as Askin's agent, collecting accounts for him as far into the Michigan Territory as Fairfield and carrying on dealings with the Indians on his own account. In

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1799 he returned to Niagara to earn a "genteel livelihood without directly trading with the Indians.' '21 His activities included acting as an agent for Askin and Robert Hamilton in certain affairs at Long Point. 22 From 1800 to 1803 Nichol was in partnership with Thomas Clarke, benefiting, like him, from Hamilton's portaging contracts. In 1804 Nichol launched out on his own, speculating heavily in the "Mackinac and Detroit Markets," supplying provisions for the fur trade, using Askin as an agent and renting one of Askin's vessels. Like Clarke, Nichol used his profits to move into milling and processing, establishing himself in 1810 at Port Dover where he became a wealthy and influential citizen. Near the end of his life in 1821, when his fortunes had reversed themselves, Nichol returned to Niagara to be the manager of Robert Hamilton's estate. 23 Through the influence of Hamilton's kinship network, other Scots came and prospered as well. In 1793 James Muirhead arrived from Dumfries and became a successful merchant at Chippawa. Thomas Clarke personally arranged for Robert Kirkpatrick, a relation of his sister's husband, to come to Niagara in 1809, and by 1816 Kirkpatrick's brother John was clerking for Clarke. The brothers also established a shop at Chippawa. In 1821 Clarke, after some delay, took the son of another old Dumfries friend: "The prospects are not very flattering," he wrote his sister, "however be so good as to make the best apology you can for me to Mr. Charters and tell him to send me out one of his boys as soon as he likes .... "24 In early 1832 Clarke placed two boys, the son of a family friend and an in-law of his sister; in the fall, he accepted two more boys from his sister. Undoubtedly, others were imported and established by members of the kinship network using the same procedure. 25 The economic benefit Hamilton, his relations and other Dumfriesshire Scots derived from their mutual association did not operate exclusively within the boundaries of the Niagara peninSUla: it had links to the Detroit-Sandwich area and encompassed the family of Hamilton's father-in-law, John Askin. Even before they became related, Askin and Hamilton had participated in a trade partnership. Later, as we have seen, Askin had furthered the careers of Hamilton's younger relations. Hamilton and his kin in turn aided Askin. Such contacts were important to the increasingly modest enterprises Askin conducted after the setbacks he suffered at the end of the Revolution. Although Niagara did not lack for merchants, there is no indication in his papers that Askin relied on continuing trade contacts in that place beyond those with Robert Hamilton and his relations. Hamilton's greatest early service to Askin was to stand security for his extensive fur trade debts in 1796. When Askin had difficulty providing the necessary grain to fulfil a provisioning contract he had with the government, it was Hamilton who supplied the remainder. Hamilton also acted as the forwarder for whatever furs Askin attempted to market and collected his debts for him at Niagara. Robert Dickson aided Askin by purchasing provisions for

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his fur trade concern from him. Robert Nichol attempted to forward his enterprises by finding a developer for a salt spring in which Askin and William Robertson had an interest. 26 Much of Askin's postwar economic activity was focused on shipping and, at various times, he owned several small vessels on Lake Erie. Robert Nichol attempted to find business for these vessels and Hamilton and the Dicksons used them when possible. When Nichol decided to speculate in the provisioning of the fur trade at Michilimackinac, it was Askin's ship, the Saguinah, he chartered, although he had the choice of several others, and when Askin wished to sell that ship it was to Nichol he first turned. It was by such exchanges of opportunity that Hamilton and his relations at Niagara and Detroit participated in Laurentian commerce beyond their own locales. 27 In Upper Canada's pioneer society, a heavy reliance on family connections to facilitate entrance into, and the conduct of, local enterprises was not unusual. As is discussed later, initial establishment in processing and merchandising in the Niagara peninsula was not easy and aspiring entrepreneurs had to make full use of their family contacts. Merchants such as David Secord and Richard Beasley, for instance, used their family relationship to Richard Cartwright as son-in-law and cousin, respectively, to gain him as their initial supplier of goods and -later used his offices to establish a commercial relationship with Robert Hamilton and Todd and McGill. The Nelles family, four brothers and their father, used close family cooperation to coordinate their milling, lumbering and retailing operations at Forty Mile Creek [Grimsby] and Grand River. By the early nineteenth century, members of that family were gaining local prominence in the north of the peninsula. Samuel Birdsall's memoirs show that he used his connections with his stepfather and uncle to attempt various milling, retailing and processing operations in the peninsula. Less well documented, but equally common, was the practice of fathers taking their sons into business or placing them with a relative, partnerships between brothers, and other such arrangements. None of these modest arrangements, however, could compare in scale to the Hamilton kinship network. Because he had access to the structures of Laurentian trade, Hamilton had been successful in weaving a web of kin and commerce which affected not only the economy of his own region, but had commercial and political influence extending in the west to Detroit and its American hinterland and on the east, through the family's trade connections, to Montreal, Quebec City and on to London itself.28 To demonstrate more concretely the lack of opportunities open to families at Niagara operating outside the Laurentian trade network, John Butler's attempts to augment his personal fortune and provide for his family through the acquisition of land and through local enterprise are worth mentioning. As previously discussed, Butler had failed to win prominence in the Niagara peninsula by the exploitation of official patronage or local office. In the end,

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he could only hope to use the economic potential of his local community. An isolated individual like Butler, however, working outside the larger structures of trade that made Hamilton's fortune, could achieve little success. Land alone was not sufficiently valuable at this period to stop the drain on Butler's fortune and he did not have access to the capital or the contacts necessary for major economic undertakings. He placed a heavy, even an excessive, emphasis on the acquisition of land in the new society; with large estates, he believed, the continuation of his family's influence and the prosperity of his heirs would be assured. Land, however, was not as valuable a commodity in early Niagara as it had been in the more established settlements in New York where it had not been as readily available. Before the end of the Revolution, Butler had taken precautions to provide himself with some of the best land at Niagara: when he laid out special grants for his officers on the west side of the Niagara River he had included one in a prime location on Lake Ontario at Four Mile Creek for himself and had even built upon it and begun to cultivate it. His holding, however, fell within the military lands reserved for a new fort and he was forced to abandon his improvements and purchase land less centrally located down Four Mile. Butler then participated in what appears to have been an attempt by some members of the Loyalist forces to monopolize the best locations at Niagara, including those to which there were prior claims or which had been designated for public or military use. This strate gem was thwarted by a stiff reprimand from the governor general. 29 Contemporaneously with this attempt to gain the prime locations at Niagara, Butler launched a petition to the Executive Council of Quebec and to the District Land Board for an area of seventy-two square miles on Lake Ontario within the Mississauga Indian lands whose purchase he had negotiated. Butler's claim, as usual, was premised on his past services as well as a demand for compensation for colonial lands which the Loyalist Claims Commissioners had refused him. He was again refused on the grounds that his request went against established government policy. 30 The precise locations of the five thousand acres Butler did receive from the government are not known. By the time deeds were being issued by the province, Butler was dead and it is impossible to disentangle his lands from those of his heirs or to tell when the land claimed by his heirs was acquired and how. However, it seems likely that most of Butler's original grant passed out of his hands as quickly as he received it. A 1791 report of lands in the peninSUla shows Butler holding only thirteen hundred acres, all of it in Louth Township. It seems probable that most of Butler's lands went to pay his heavy debts. Indeed, before 1809, 64 per cent of the family's holdings in an area of the peninsula and the west would slip through their fingers mainly into the hands of merchants. 31 In contrast to the Hamilton kinship network, the Butler family attempted only one business enterprise. In 1789 Andrew Butler and his partner, Samuel

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Street, had built a saw mill on Fifteen Mile Creek. By 1792 the mill had passed to John Butler. The modest nature of the endeavour is itself indicative of Butler's lack of entrepreneurial connections and capital. Even this small business proved disastrous. The mill was poorly built; its dam collapsed and Butler could not obtain a mill-wright to repair it. The miller he had hired abandoned the mill alleging Butler had neglected it. Butler was reduced to suing him for damages. The fortunes of the mill did not improve. After holding it less than three years, Butler sold it. a2 The slow economic decline of the Butler family continued. In his last years Butler appears to have abandoned attempts to develop his land at Fifteen Mile and concentrated his efforts on his smaller holdings at Four Mile, which his heirs later grandly referred to as the family" Seat." In their endeavours, the Butler family enjoyed limited success: most of the land at Fifteen Mile was sold shortly after Butler's death; by 1837, only 7 per cent of the family's initially vast holdings would remain in their hands. Butler's will left his sons little more than the farms they already occupied and a share of money to be collected from his debtors. Two of the sons died in the early months of the War of 1812; a will prepared by the third in 1815 shows his holdings as relatively modest. By then, the former power of the Butler family in the society and economy of the Niagara region was nothing but a memory. The real power was in the hands of the region's merchants. 33

CHAPTER 6

The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton: Portaging and Provisioning

The Niagara peninsula underwent rapid demographic as well as social and political alterations in the two decades after the American Revolution. Its population, augmented by immigration, grew substantially: the size of the militia, for example, increased fourfold between 1791 and 1804. The peninsula's scattered settlements, which had not existed prior to the Revolution, expanded from tiny satellites of a frontier outpost to modest communities. Farming, processing and retailing followed apace. 1 In the first years after the creation of Upper Canada, however, opportunities for entrepreneurial development in the Niagara peninsula remained limited. Capital was at a premium and the modes of generating it were restricted. Heavy speCUlation in land was undertaken by a few individuals, but in the first generation of settlement, most land could not be sold at what speculators considered to be an acceptable profit. Aside from land, the peninsula lacked natural resources which could be readily exploited. The marketing of agricultural produce was handicapped by the distance to major markets, the low quality of local produce and erratic production. Milling, with few exceptions', was small scale and hampered both by the seasonal nature of the peninsula's streams and by inadequate communications. Great Lakes shipping, despite its initial profitability, developed a glut of capacity by the early nineteenth century. It also suffered from lack of adequate cargo for the return run down the lakes, further complicated by growing American competition. 2 Despite rapid changes, the commerce of the peninsula exhibited a marked continuity. Functions which had been important in the war years, provisioning for the army and forwarding for the army and the fur trade, continued into the early nineteenth century as the most profitable economic undertakings. Military provisioning, indeed, was the basis of the local agrarian economy until 1800. This continuity was a striking feature in the success of the

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69

Hamilton family until the death of Robert Hamilton in 1809. Although it would be too simplistic to argue that the Hamilton enterprises were exclusively a product of a period of economic transition, thriving while the enterprises associated with the pre-settlement frontier-supply of the military and the fur trade-continued to be important and collapsing as they declined, it is true that those enterprises were the major factor in the family's fortunes. Portaging of goods was the oldest economic activity associated with white commerce at Niagara, having been carried on for one hundred years before the Revolution. The portage was the raison d' etre of the pre-Revolutionary community; necessitated by the falls at Niagara, the nine-mile path on the east side of the river was the longest transshipment point on the system of lakes and rivers that constituted the principal Canadian route to the West. The portage was moulded by traditions of frontier enterprise on the Great Lakes. Its principal users were the military and the fur trade. After the Conquest, the British army had moved the men and supplies for its western posts over the portage. For its purposes, the Montreal sector of the fur trade found the lakes route and the portage slower and more attended by risks than the Ottawa River route, but less expensive, especially for bulk goods. It was more convenient for both Montreal and Albany for the supply of the southwest fur trade centred on Detroit. The portage was a vital link to the West. In 1787 Montreal merchants estimated that 40 per cent of their furs travelled back on the lakes route and over the portage. In 1785, based on Indian trade passes, slightly more than 45 per cent of all private trade goods by value moving beyond Montreal passed over the portage, including half the liquor by volume going west. The percentages for that year were high, reflecting the optimism of the southwest fur trade at the end of the war. By 1787 the totals passing over the portage dropped to 25 per cent by value, although liquor by volume rose to 56 per cent. In 1790 the total had risen again slightly to 30 per cent by value. 3 During the Revolution struggling merchants like Hamilton and Cartwright must have looked with envy upon the individual who monopolized traffic on the portage, Philip Stedman. Like many others, Stedman made the bulk of his fortune during the Revolution. In 1781, he retired to England, passing his business to a nephew, who ran the operation until the government portage was transferred, in 1791, to the western side of the river and awarded to a partnership including Robert Hamilton. The partnership which undertook the running of the government portage after 1791 represented a continuity with the merchant community which had sprung up at wartime Niagara. All the partners had been involved in the supply and servicing of the army or fur trade during the Revolution and all had links to the Indian Department. The new operators, indeed, owed their involvement in the portage to these institutions. The creation of a new portage on the west side of the river was an ambitious

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and potentially costly undertaking for a small group of recently established merchants without extensive resources. The road was to be eleven miles in length, three miles longer than the old one on the eastern side of the river. Running from Queenston up over the Niagara Escarpment, the new portage would travel well back from the river until it descended towards it again at Goat Island and followed along its edge to Chippawa Creek; there goods which had passed over the road would be transferred into batteaux for shipment to Fort Erie. Although some sort of path existed along this route, it would need to be widened and graded. Substantial storage and docking facilities as well as defences against possible American attack would have to be created along the route at three distinct points: Queenston, Chippawa and Fort Erie. The costs involved, if borne entirely by a few private entrepreneurs, would have been overwhelming.4 Fortunately for Hamilton and his associates, the British military undertook both the creation and financing of the major facilities for the portage. In 1791 the army built a wharf, guardhouse, blockhouse and two-storey storehouse, the lower portion in stone, at Queenston. It built comparable storehouses and wharves at Chippawa and Fort Erie, as well as assuming permanent responsibility for the storage of its own goods and their batteauing from Chippawa to Fort Erie. By the end of its first year of operation, the military had spent in excess of £1,090 upon the new government portage. The merchants' investment, by contrast, was minimal: from 1791 to 1793, they expended £370, a set percentage of their profits which their government contract dictated they should expend in work on the portage road. Thanks to the British army, the merchants were able to enter upon their lucrative portage operations with a minimum of investment. 5 The military provided other facilities for private commercial use in addition to the portage road. Merchants continued, as they had in wartime, to use the army's warehouses to store their goods. In 1789 the civilian operators did seek and receive permission from the military to erect private storehouses at Queenston, Chippawa and Fort Erie. Unlike the military's, however, these were modest structures built entirely of wood and of limited capacity~ so limited that until at least 1794 the military's warehouses were used to store a proportion of the private goods. 6 The military also aided private enterprise by providing a proportion of the shipping which carried goods to and from the portage. Private shipping developed slowly at first on the lakes: in 1790 on Lake Ontario, there was only one major private vessel of 90 tons; the king's vessels, on the other hand, totalled 387 tons with total crews of 36 men. On lakes Erie and Huron, merchants had a number of small vessels totalling only 90 tons, while the government maintained 255 tons. The king's vessels made up for the inadequacies of private shipping by carrying government goods to and from the portage, as well as remaining an important auxiliary carrier of private goods. From 1789 to 1792, these ships regularly carried 10 per cent of private

PORTAGING AND PROVISIONING 71

goods shipped by barrel bulk on Lake Ontario; in 1791, a year of prosperity and heavy shipping, they carried nearly 30 per cent of private goods shipped by barrel bulk. 7 In 1793, because of a delay in the arrival of goods, military shipping was of vital importance. Hamilton and Forsyth petitioned the lieutenant-governor, urging "that from the unusual detention of the English Fleet of this season, it will be almost impossible to transport over Lake Ontario the goods necessary for the trade of these countries in the private vessel now employed," and asking for "one of the largest vessels of Government to carry a load of merchandise.' '8 After 1793 the shipping situation began to reverse itself and merchants soon faced an excess of shipping capacity rather than a lack. The military's vessels, however, had been essential to private enterprise since the beginning of the Revolutionary War and, indeed, before. One of the reasons for the profitability of the Niagara portage was the restricted number of merchants involved in portaging. No more than four merchants were involved in transshipment at anyone time before the War of 1812. Two of the four original portaging partners, Cunningham and Burch, dropped out of the business well before 1799. Hamilton's control of portaging had become strong enough that, after the lapse of the first government contract, he was able in 1799 to exlcude the fourth partner, Forsyth, from participation. The influence of the Montreal branch of Forsyth's family with the military, however, was sufficient to reinstate Forsyth and he continued to participate in the operation of the portage until his death in 1806. 9 Those who were longest involved in the portage were Hamilton and his connections. Thomas Clarke, Hamilton's cousin, was in 1798 accepted into the forwarding concerns of Hamilton and Forsyth and constructed his own facilities along the portage in 1799. He functioned for a short time in partnership with Samuel Street Jr. and then with Robert Nichol, before in 1810 turning the business over to his clerk, James Kerby, and the clerk's partner, Robert Grant. The only other individual to seriously consider entering the business was another of Hamilton's cousins, Thomas Dickson, who in 1805 applied to the military and received permission to build warehouses, but does not seem to have gone further. Hamilton's portage business remained in his family and at his death passed to two of his sons.l0 A major element restricting involvement in the portage was the continuity in the awarding of the military portaging contracts. The original contract ran to 1795; it was then allowed to continue informally until 1799, after which it was renewed at intervals to Hamilton and his partners. Not only did the contracts guarantee Hamilton and his partners the business of the military, which constituted a major part of the portaging trade, but they gave the operators official sanction for their business. That was of more than minor importance since all land along the Niagara River front for sixty feet back was military reserve and the military's permission was necessary to build wharves and storehouses upon it. 1l

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THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

The other reason more merchants were not lured into portaging ventures was costs. Initial investment could be high. The original private facilities on the portage had been small, but as the portage became established, they were replaced with more substantial and expensive ones. In 1802 Hamilton and Forsyth replaced the storehouse at Fort Erie with a stone one costing $2,920. Clarke's initial warehouse at Queenston in 1799 cost him $3,000. Those who had been originally involved in the portage could pay for such facilities from their profits. But newcomers would have had to depend on substantial existing capital or, like Clarke, on contacts and sponsorship. Such sponsorship, needless to say, was available only to those associated with the tight little circle of Scots already established at the portage. 12 Despite their heavy investment in facilities, the portage rewarded its operators well. The only major user of the portage other than the army until the mid-1790s was the fur trade. In the awarding of its transportation contracts, the fur trade, like the army, favoured those local merchants with whom it had already established close connections. In the 1780s Hamilton and Cartwright had an exclusive agreement for the forwarding of fur trade merchants' goods to Detroit. By 1802 Hamilton and his associates had a contract for the portaging of the North West Company's goods. [n the interim they probably held similar exclusive agreements. Certainly the partnerships with which Hamilton was associated had no competitors on the portage. 13 The portage reinforced Hamilton's links with the southwest sector of the fur trade and especially Detroit. In 1790, 60 per cent of the goods by value passing over the portage were destined for Detroit; a further 21 per cent would travel on to Michilimackinac. The remaining 19 per cent was destined for Grand Portage and the far west. The heavy reliance of the portage on Detroit was a disadvantage to its proprietors in the early 1790s because the Detroit trade in that period was in evident decline. The value of its furs dropped from £65,000 in 1783 to £40,000 in the mid 1790s. Any decline in business at the portage in this period, however, was relative. The loss of business at Detroit was in part offset by the trade of Michilimackinac which was in its heyday. The value of its fur exports remained constant through the period at about £65,000. The value of furs from the far west, moreover, rose from £25,000 to £100,000. 14 Certainly Hamilton found the profits on the movement of furs and goods more than adequate compensation for his efforts. In 1791 he wrote to William Robertson: [Mr. Todd] will inform you that we have obtained for the Settlement the Portage of Government Effects at 1/8 York per Quintal [112 pounds]. Low as the Price is Compared with that of the Former Contractor. still so the Labour of the Settlers will be very well Compensated ... to convince you of the Facility with which the Business can be done I have only to mention that I have frequently this Summer loaded Twenty-four Wagons in one day each drawn by 4 excellent oxen. They transferred nearly 30 Tons of Merchandize. ls

PORTAGING AND PROVISIONING 73

The charge for portaging alone of 30 tons would have been £63, while receiving and forwarding on private goods could run to double the cost of portaging, in all a total in the range of £ 190, a not insubstantial sum to an up-country merchant. 16 More revealing are the total estimated profits on the portage based on expenditures on the portage road for the period from 1791 to 1793. Profits were in the range of £5,000 for the three years or about £ 1,700 per annum, not substantially below the average of £2,000 that Stedman made on the transportation of military goods in 1781. For the first year, moreover, the portage did not have the government contract nor do the figures include any charges for receiving and forwarding. Profits from his other enterprises, augmented by such profits on the portage, allowed Hamilton to quickly out-strip rival merchants in the early Niagara peninsula. I i The military as well as the fur trade contributed to Hamilton's prosperity. The army maintained its own storage facilities and did its own batteauing so that no private profit was made from these functions. However, the volume of goods being moved by the military in the period was high enough to make their portaging lucrative: the army calculated its expenses for carriage on the portage in 1792 at £800, probably close to half the total portaging for the year. IS Much of the military's expenditures in the 1790s arose from its need to move provisions for its garrisons. Total military supplies passing over the portage in 1792 were estimated to be 5,000 barrels bulk, of which 2,037 barrels bulk were such provisions as flour, pork and peas. Spring supply alone for the Upper Canadian posts in 1794 was calculated to require 55 batteaux loads of provisions and would cost the military £522 for transportation and portaging. 19 Relative to the profits they were making from the movement of goods for the fur trade and the army, the day-to-day operating costs for the proprietors of the portage were low. The actual portaging was done by local farmers with their wagons; in the early period the farmers were paid in goods, which would further reduce the costs for merchants. The Montreal supply houses of the fur trade provided the portage operators with cheap labour for batteauing goods between Chippawa and Fort Erie: French Canadians were recruited in Montreal for the shipping season by the Montreal agents of the portage operators and returned at the end of it. In 1800, each man received rations and a modest $5 per month. 20 If Hamilton's initial profits on the portage were satisfactory to him, they were even better in the five years before the end of the century. The year 1795 found Richard Cartwright gloomily commiserating with Hamilton on the depression in the forwarding trade; 1796, however, quickly dispelled the pessimism with a marked renewal of traffic, especially in goods associated with the fur trade. Both the depression and the renewal were associated with developments at Detroit. Jay's Treaty and the transfer of Detroit and Michilimackinac to the Americans had made fur traders cautious in 1795. In

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1796 the arrival of American traders in the southwest who were optimistic that prosperity would follow automatically on their control of Detroit and its hinterland led to a boom period that lasted until 1799. Fur exports from the Detroit area rose from 910 packs in 1796 to 2,700 packs in 1798. The value of goods carried over the portage destined for Detroit almost doubled from £28,785 in 1790 to £55,220 in 1797. The amount of liquor going to Detroit increased by a quarter for the same dates from 33,262 gallons to 43,668 gallons. 21 Despite the transfer of Detroit to the Americans, its trade continued to be linked to the Canadian portage at Niagara. The lack of large-scale American manufacturing meant the bulk of Detroit's trade goods would continue to come from England and if those English goods travelled via Montreal and the lakes they escaped the American tariff. There was, moreover, no portage on the American side. As a consequence, Hamilton and the merchants of the portage basked in the glow of Detroit's renewed prosperity. Total profits on the portage for 1798, based on statistics provided by Thomas Clarke to the Earl of Selkirk, were in the range of £2,500, a rise of £800 over an average year in the earlier part of the decade. In 1799 profits were comparable: Forsyth handled 40 per cent of the business that year, Clarke, 35 per cent, and Hamilton, 25 per cent. 22 By 1797 the proprietors of the portage would have noted shifts in their business. The military's account, rather than keeping pace with the rise of the fur trade's, was levelling off. It decreased from £500 Hlfx in 1791 to £400 Hlfx in 1798, possibly the result of a decrease in the size of the garrisons and an increased use of local sources of supply. 23 A more welcome harbinger was the new market for the transportation of salt: For the only American article of Salt [Thomas Clarke exclaimed in 1797] I have this season forwarded upwards of One Thousand Barrels & Five Hundred more are this fall expected to pass . . . . The Quantity of this Article salt as. well as other species of Merchandise will most probably increase as the Colony above us gets settled. 24

Hamilton, too, was excited by the development of settlement, especially American settlement: The demand for Goods of all kinds from this Province [he wrote] must further increase with the progress of the American Settlements which are forming along the South side of the River St. Lawrence, and the Lakes. The natural, we may say the only outlet for all produce of the Settlements is by the River St. Lawrence, whose Waters are sufficient to carry the largest Raft of lumber to the Sea Port of this Province. And this lumber which is itself a valuable Article of Commerce may at the same time be made a vehicle for transporting their Wheat, Flour and Pot Ash to a Market. 25

Until at least 1800, portaging combined with receiving and forwarding were

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75

the most profitable activities in the Niagara peninsula. These undertakings made the merchants associated with them affluent far beyond the general level of their society. The other economic activities of major importance to Niagara's merchants before 1800 were the ~!1terprises associated with the marketing of produce and the retailing of goods. In the immediate postwar period, Hamilton had, with good reason, limited his sale of goods to the dispossessed and impecunious settlers. As time passed and agriculture expanded, however, settlers became more affluent and retailing more lucrative. Hamilton was quick to take advantage of this and from the mid-1790s retailing became one of the Scots merchant's major undertakings. The success of Hamilton's retailing depended in tum upon his ability to market the produce of the peninSUla. Marketing itself was not an exceptionally lucrative activity; Hamilton's commission on the sale of produce in 1786 was 5 per cent and it declined to a scant 2 ~ per cent by 1803. The commission was so unimportant to him that in 1793 Hamilton offered to act as agent for military purchases free of charge. The profit from the sale of settlers' crops, however, allowed them to purchase merchants' goods. Agrarian prosperity meant profitable retail sales for merchants. 26 In marketing the peninsula's crops before 1800, its merchants faced major problems. The settlement of the area had been the result of politics rather than economics; for reasons of loyalty, the original settlers at Niagara had clustered at a British outpost distant from established centres and markets. The prohibitive costs of transportation excluded Niagara's produce from the main Lower Canadian markets and minimized sales to the fur trade. The 1790s were a time of high and rapidly rising prices for produce on the Quebec market; wheat, for instance, more than doubled in value between 1793 and 1800. Niagara's entrepreneurs, however, were unable to take advantage of that market. In 1790, the Executive Council of Quebec calculated it would cost about 20 shillings a ton to ship grain from the upper settlements to Quebec, a cost so prohibitive that the council recommended those settlements concentrate on hemp which had a higher value relative to its weight. In 1793 the merchants of Kingston, close as they were to Montreal, calculated they would lose one-third on what they were paying the farmers of their area for produce if they were to ship to that market. Kingston did ship produce to Montreal in 1793 and 1794, but the value of its supplies to the Upper Canadian garrisons in the latter year was more than double the value of the goods it shipped down the St. Lawrence. 27 If the Lower Canadian market was closed to them, the merchants of Niagara might have hoped to profit by supplying the fur trade with provisions for its voyageurs and wintering partners. The fur trade, both northwest and southwest, however, found that the majority of its provisions were best procured from the agricultural settlements closest to its operations, Detroit and Amherstburg. In the 1780s, the Niagara area had been peripherally

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THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

involved in supply of the fur trade. The Iroquois encamped at Buffalo Creek during the Revolution had sold modest amounts of Indian com to the fur trade. It is undoubtedly these sales that the Montreal merchants referred to in their memorial of 1785 which claimed that fur trade merchants were "engaged in an extensive business, which can not be carried on but by the most Abundant Supply of Provisions, the whole of which they are under the necessity of purchasing in the Environs of Fort Erie and at Detroit. . . . "28 This supply ceased at the end of the Revolution. Statistics on fur trade provisioning are scant; in the shipping season of 1794, however, private vessels from Fort Erie carried 17,200 pounds of flour and 7,295 bushels of Indian com to Detroit. Produce carried in the king's vessels may have slightly augmented these totals, although on the other hand it is known that in 1794 Kingston was supplying the garrisons of Detroit and Michilimackinac and some of the grain moving in the private vessels may have been for that purpose. The quantities of private produce moving into Detroit from Niagara constituted only a fraction of the supplies forwarded from Detroit to Michilimackinac and the northwest trade: the flour was 7.6 per cent of the 226,000 pounds shipped in private vessels from Detroit, while the Indian com was 7.2 per cent of the 7,295 bushels shipped. These totals are exclusive of provisions which would have travelled overland to the southwest trade areas from Detro it. 29 Even assuming that all the produce shipped privately from Fort Erie was actually grown in the peninsula, the quantities involved were small relative to those purchased by the local Niagara garrison. In 1795 the garrison at Niagara purchased 283,748 pounds of flour, 60,000 pounds more than the total shipped out of Detroit the previous year. Of the five Niagara merchants involved in garrison supply, four sold the garrison amounts comparable to the total amount of flour shipped to Detroit in 1794; Hamilton, by far the largest supplier, sold it ten times as much. Sales of Indian com followed the same pattern. The first statistics for sale of Indian com to the garrison at Niagara are in 1798; the military then purchased three times the amount sent to Detroit in 1794. 30 Other evidence substantiates the assertion that the peninsula was of little importance in provisioning the fur trade. John Askin, who held major contracts for the supply of the North West Company, only once purchased supplies for the fur trade in the Niagara peninsula-800 bushels of com in 1793-and then only because the crop had failed at Detroit. In 1804, the Queenston merchant, Robert Nichol, speculated heavily in the "Mackinac and Detroit markets," but found them so disappointing that he vowed he would "not be very forward to try them Again, thinking it better to sell at a Saving price at home, than to run great risks for the prospect of an uncertain advantage. "31 The accounts of Alexander Mackenzie with the North West Company running from 1804 to 1813 do not show any substantial reliance upon the peninsula for provisions. 32

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To further complicate matters, the peninsula's early production for market was both limited and erratic. Even though the settlement had originally been established to take the pressure off food supplies at Fort Niagara, during the American Revolution it did not even manage to feed itself. Supplies for it and the garrison came from England, supplemented with produce from Detroit. It was 1786 before a surplus was realized large enough for a local merchant to offer produce to the garrison. Until 1795 military provisions for Detroit were purchased from Kingston rather than Niagara because Niagara's production was inadequate. Indeed, in two of these years, Kingston even supplied Niagara. Crops throughout Upper Canada were so poor in 1795 that the government considered an embargo on exportation from the province. It was only in 1798 and 1799 that the Niagara peninsula realized surpluses substantially beyond what was necessary to supply the local garrison market. 33 Fortunately for the Niagara peninsula, the garrisons of the British army provided an attractive market for its produce. Even more fortunately for Robert Hamilton, army purchasing favoured established merchants such as himself, giving them priority in its purchases of produce and the full benefit of certain government programs designed to aid the development of the Loyalist settlements. Relative to local production the military market was capacious: until 1798, the garrisons absorbed all the produce the settlements offered to them. Erratic supply, low quality and high price were of secondary importance to the army. Its supplies for Niagara could often have been more efficiently and cheaply purchased in areas other than the local settlements, but the military, of its own volition, limited its sources of supply. Only when local deficiencies occurred did it utilize outside sources. 34 Paternalistic in this as in other areas of economic development, the army was determined "to procure for the loyalist settlers an advantageous market for their produce. ":S5 Richard Cartwright's assessment of the Upper Canadian economy in 1792 was not much exaggerated in the light of Niagara's experience: To what is to be ascribed the present state of improvement and popUlation of this country? Certainly not to its natural advantage but to the liberality which Government has shown to the Loyalists who first settled it. ... So long as the British Government shall think proper to hire people to come over and eat our flour, we shall go on very well and continue to make a figure.: 111

In terms of quantity required and prices paid, the supply of the garrisons was an appealing undertaking for Niagara's merchants. By 1794 the army spent an estimated £10,000 Hlfx. for provisioning its garrisons in the province. To encourage production, the army offered substantial bonuses for the production of grain. It paid the market price of superfine flour in Lower Canada for its local supply, although the quality of the Upper Canadian product was probably inferior to that standard and, given the army's near monopoly position, could have been purchased for much less. 37

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In addition, the military paid as a bonus an amount equivalent to the cost of moving flour from Lower Canada to the garrisons. At Niagara this meant an augmentation of one-half to three-quarters of the price paid for flour. The bonus continued up to 1803. Even discounting the transportation bonus, the prices paid for grain at Niagara appear to have been high. When they assumed the contract in 1793, the new Quebec contractors complained that the market price of flour was 30 per cent to 40 per cent higher at Niagara than at Kingston. Not only were prices good at Niagara, but military purchases were larger there than elsewhere in the province. In 1794 the army provisioned 1,300 men at Niagara and Fort Erie, 900 at Detroit, 380 at Kingston, and 100 at Michilimackinac. In 1800 Niagara supplied by value a substantial 61 per cent of the produce purchased by the military within the province, Kingston, 33 per cent and Amherstburg, 6 per cent. 38 Purchases were heavy at Niagara not only because of its large garrison, which in fact decreased in size over time, but because of its supply function. Indeed, the chief function of Fort George, the successor on the Canadian side to Fort Niagara, was to act as a regional depot for the more advanced western posts. Until the War of 1812 almost all its blockhouses were used as warehouses for rations, munitions and military equipment. So pronounced was this supply function that Fort George, as initially constructed, was not even defensible. Only on the eve of the War of 1812 was it adapted to a defensive posture. 39 If the garrison market was an attractive one, only a few major merchants enjoyed the privilege of directly supplying it. Between 1795 and 1800 an average of only eight local merchants per year at Niagara provided supplies; Hamilton dwarfed his competitors by contributing between 34 per cent and 75 per cent of local purchases by value. 40 One factor favouring the major merchants was geography. John McGill, the provincial agent for purchases, complained bitterly of "those monopolizers residing at or near the different Posts, who deprived every other person who lived at a distance from a share of the supplies-and consequently of the Bounty intended by Government for the general benefit of the Settlers. "41 Bad roads and limited transportation handicapped those distant from the fort. In 1793 a number of farmers petitioned Governor Simcoe that while they could not cross the Niagara River in winter with supplies, in summer "the roads are so very bad that it is almost impossible to travel them with a loaded carriage.' '42 They asked for a more convenient storehouse, but the government, although it had long discussed creating a more diffused system of reception areas, took no action. In such a situation, individual farmers could not match the organization of a merchant like Hamilton, who could engineer his own bulk purchases as far distant as Grand River and charter vessels himself to move them to the garrison. The handicap of distance in part explains why seventeen of the twenty-three suppliers to the Niagara garrison between 1795 and 1811 were located on the Niagara River front. 43

PORTAGING AND PROVISIONING 79

Even more significant in narrowing the number of potential suppliers was the army's policy on minimum purchases. Paradoxically, although it desired to aid struggling local producers, the army did not want to be inconvenienced by accepting small amounts of produce. James Farquharson, the commissary at Niagara from 1787 to 1796, had a firm policy on such matters: "I should apprehend that to receive ten barrels [of flour] only from every individual would be attended with great inconvenience. If a person offered to deliver ten barrels and that [sic] Government relies upon that quantity and he disappoints Government to whom is Government to look up toT' If such small amounts went bad, would the individual, Farquharson continued rhetorically, reimburse the government? And how were so many small quantities to be identified and registered? It was the policy at Niagara, Farquharson went on to say, not to accept a quantity less than 50 barrels of flour. Several producers, however, might group together, provided one would give security that the flour would keep sound. 44 Such a standard was not too demanding: on Robert Hamilton's calculation, the average surplus of a Niagara farm in 1803 was 100 bushels of wheat, which would produce, again by Hamilton's calculations, 14 barrels of flour. Thus, four farmers would need to combine to produce the minimum requisite. In practice the minimum meant very little; the army was unlikely to contract for such petty amounts. In 1795, the smallest offer accepted was 80 barrels, the average 236 barrels; by 1811, the amounts had risen substantially to a minimum of 196 and an average of 522 barrels. 45 If efficiency inclined the army toward the larger merchants, so did its officers' social biases. Simcoe, with some reason, remarked of the commissaries at the posts that they were "men, however, who had their local particular partiality, their limited views and habitual propensities.' '46 Farquharson at Niagara obviously appreciated men of substance who could be relied upon to fulfill their obligations. Like other British officers, he admired Hamilton for his established status and for "his long residence & extensive connections with the Farmers of the County. "47 Farquharson relied upon the relationship he had built ·up with a few major merchants over time to purchase supplies and that reliance tended to shade into privilege. Indeed, when an investigation was conducted into a deficiency of stores at Niagara in 1796, it was revealed that several merchants whom Farquharson considered to have "respectability," Hamilton chief amongst them, had had the extraordinary privilege of being paid in advance for the quantity of provisions they estimated they could supply prior even to collection, let alone delivery. Other merchants could not hope to compete effectively with those who received full payments on estimates alone. 48 Prior payment was a useful privilege for Hamilton, but more important for the rapid growth of his enterprises was the government's mode of payment for army provisions. Suppliers were paid once yearly in specie on bills drawn in Quebec and received additional profit since interest was paid on the sum

80

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

owed. The mode of payment by Hamilton and other merchants to fanners, however, was different: they paid for produce received by notes of hand (bons) due annually in October and subject to no interest whatsoever. Not only fanners, but small merchants who wished to deal with the garrison found themselves obliged to sell their produce through an intennediary; they too found themselves drawn to Hamilton's enterprises. As Cartwright advised his cousin Richard Beasley, if Beasley sold his grain to Hamilton he should also buy his goods through him; if all his affairs were concentrated in Hamilton's hands, Hamilton would be more inclined to •• push and encourage [his] business.' '49 One further privilege Hamilton enjoyed in the supply of the garrisons was participation in a "monopoly" contract from 1793 to 1795. Obtained in London by Todd and McGill and William Robertson for their Upper Canadian customers, Cartwright, Hamilton, Askin and David Robertson, the contact probably had more consequences for politics than for the general economic development of Upper Canada. Government officials like John McGill made a major issue of it and predicted appalling consequences from the contract: Which by centring in the hands of four persons all greatly interested is pregnant with the most dangerous, alarming and fatal consequence to the settlers, future settlement and prosperity of this Province and if not timely prevented I dare venture to say will eventually end in the ruin of most of the settlers, and that of every fair Trader, not concerned as an agent in the present Contract. 50

Ironically, the contractors at Niagara and Kingston were themselves less than pleased with the so-called monopoly. Rather than using the contract to destroy all competition and beat down the price they paid for grain, Hamilton and Cartwright feared that, given the erratic nature of Upper Canadian supply, they might find themselves committed to providing more than they could collect and consequently lose on the enterprise. In 1794 they gladly accepted the interpretation of the contract that they should have first preference in supply rather than a monopoly. "Now this Situation I'm inclined to prefer," wrote Cartwright, "to a Contract for a Time specified & fixed Prices, for we are really in such a remote Situation, that no Exertions could bring Supplies from other Countries should our Crops fail. . . . "51 Even under these conditions, Hamilton overcommitted himself in 1795 and probably lost in his attempts in the next two years to make up his quota. The monopoly was not a complete one. It is not known what percentage of the supply at Niagara Hamilton contributed under the contract in 1793 but other suppliers were also utilized. He appears to have contributed all the supply in 1794 but shared the contract with four others in 1795. Given these circumstances, and the short duration of the contract, officially tenninated in 1796, it seems unlikely that it was of great significance in establishing Hamilton's superiority in supply in the Niagara peninsula; on the other hand, there is no indication that the ending of the contract reversed the trend towards

PORTAGING AND PROVISIONING 81

domination of the market by a few merchants. Certainly merchants were not eager to repeat the experiment. When the anny decided to offer pennanent contracts in 1805 to supply all the garrisons in Upper and Lower Canada they had but one tender, and that for a one-year contract. The idea was quietly abandoned. 52 Alternatives to the garrison market developed very slowly in Upper Canada. Civilian markets were not promising. In 1802, for instance, Hamilton through a local merchant, Alexander Wood, attempted to sell a modest 100 barrels of flour at York, apparently without success. Distilling whiskey from wheat for local consumers was a traditional outlet for grain in pioneer societies. It had reached such proportions in Upper Canada by 1798 that John McGill maintained it was driving up the price paid for supply of the garrisons. 53 In 1799, he explained: The quantity of wheat consumed by the numerous Stills enhances the price very considerably. the distillers' payments being generally made in Whiskey, he does not much care at what price the settler may rate his wheat because he has it in his power to set an equal advance upon the price of his Whiskey, an article for which I am sorry to find he can at all times meet with a sure and ready market. s4

At Niagara the first major alternative market to the British garrison for provisions was not the Lower Canadian export market but the American garrisons. The impact of American purchasing was first noted at Kingston in 1796 by John McGill, who recorded that farmers were holding back on sales of the grain, in hopes they would be able to sell to the American settlements and garrisons on their own tenns. Merchants were being equally cautious. Indeed, the settlers' hopes and McGill's fears were realized: prices for Kingston's flour were high that year; Cartwright was the only merchant to offer to sell to the garrison. 55 Hamilton had sold some small amount of pork to the American garrison at Presque Ile as early as 1793. The real impact of the American market at Niagara, however, was not felt until 1797, a year after the Americans had taken over Fort Niagara. In February of that year, McGill had given notice as usual of the letting of contracts for flour and peas. He received no tenders from Niagara. The reason, he explained, was not because of crop failure, but because of engagements to supply the American troops at Fort Niagara and Presque Ile. Hamilton sounded disgruntled with the development: "The demand for the supply of the American Troops raised the price early in the Winter, and our Farmers seem very unwilling to let it down to anything like reason. "56 Hamilton may have been upset because the local farmers were directly supplying the American garrison. The American anny's newspaper advertisements indicated that it, unlike the British anny, did organize an effective system of local collection: the Americans set no minimum for purchases and would accept wheat "delivered in any respectable mill situation at a distance

82

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

not exceeding 10 miles on the common roads from Niagara or Queenston" or at designated mills at Niagara, Queenston or Chippawa. Unlike local merchants, they paid in specie. 57 The impact in 1797 was major. In that year Niagara supplied only £153 worth of provisions to the British garrison. In the succeeding years, Niagara's supply to the British garrison returned to normal, although the years after 1797 saw abundant crops which would have allowed for supply of the American as well as the British garrison. American demand for Niagara's produce, however, seems to have slackened off quickly with the development of American agriculture. In 1801 Hamilton indicated that the peninsula was providing the American garrison with flour and beef only. The American garrison's total contract for local flour, by Hamilton's estimation, was only 3,000 barrels, while the British army contracted for 49,000 barrels at Niagara in the same year. By 1805 the American garrison was advertising only for a few tons of hay and several hundred bushels of corn and oats.58 The British army itself stimulated some diversification of production in the Upper Canadian settlements and, as usual, the merchants most closely associated with garrison supply were the major beneficiaries. Although a substantial number of hogs were raised in the early Niagara peninsula, they were used for local consumption only; no merchant attempted to produce salted pork before 1793 and the army imported its needs. The original stimulus for production came from the government which, at the suggestion of John McGill, the Commissary of Stores and Provisions, decided to attempt the supply of the garrisons with locally produced pork. Pork was given the same transportation bonus as grain and the contractors in Lower Canada agreed to contract for it "with proper and substantial people. "59 Under these conditions, with a guaranteed market and an augmented price, Robert Hamilton saw in the production of salted pork a potentially profitable undertaking. He went so far as to send in 1793 to Cork to obtain an experienced cooper. Initial production was very limited: 300 barrels were contracted for at Niagara in 1793, 500 in 1794. There were initial failures: Hamilton's entire 1795 production of 300 barrels was returned because it spoiled. Still, until 1804, Hamilton was the only beneficiary of the military market for pork at Niagara. With the encouragement of the military market, production gradually expanded. In 1804 Niagara provided the military with 607 barrels. The military market was still the only significant one: in 1803, only 108 barrels of pork had been shipped to Lower Canada from Niagara and upwards. By 1809 Niagara was providing the military with 1,015 barrels, 58 per cent of the total pork supply for the garrisons in that year. 60 Ultimately, export to the Lower Canadian market proved the major alternative to the military market. By 1799 the army was finding that more than enough grain was being produced in Upper Canada to supply its needs. It consequently dropped the price it paid at Niagara for flour from 22/6 per hundredweight in 1799 at Niagara to 15/0 per hundredweight in 1800, with an

PORTAGING AND PROVISIONING

83

expectation that the price would dip even lower. At the same time, prices on the Quebec markets, stimulated by a series of British crop failures, were rising and the cost of lakes shipping was lowering. At Quebec City in 1800 flour was commanding 24 shillings per hundredweight. 61 The combination of abundant crops, low army prices and high export prices finally tipped the scales. In 1800 the merchants of Niagara began to ship their produce to Lower Canada. The merchants' initial reaction to the new market was one of high enthusiasm. In the first year of export, Hamilton had already prepared for the lieutenant-governor a plan to erect "some considerable Works" in the form of an export flour mill on the Niagara River above Queenston to grind wheat on a large scale. "I think I might be warranted in presuming," Hamilton enthused, "that the Amount of Business that may at some time hereafter be done in such a Situation, exceeds our present powers of Calculation. "62 Hamilton's prediction of the growing significance of the Lower Canadian export market for Niagara's produce was precisely right. The following chart, based on export statistics provided by Richard Cartwright and the official abstract for army provisioning, indicates the growing importance of the Lower Canadian market.

Army provisioning from the Niagara peninsula (in barrels) 1800 1801 1802 1803

1,866 1,7~8

1,973

Export to Lower Canada from the Niagara peninsula (in barrels) 480 2,489 3,980 6,480

[n terms of the crops of the province as a whole, the export market was even more significant. Army provisioning in the province in general cost £5,561 Stlg. in 1801; on the calculation of Todd and McGill, Upper Canada exported £28,000 Stlg. worth of produce that same year. 6a The importance of garrison purchases did not immediately disappear. In fact the army's purchases at Niagara rose consistently in value from 1800 to 1811, almost doubling in value from £3,370 to £6,225 Hlfx. The Niagara region was consistently the major supplier of the army in Upper Canada, providing, for example 61 per cent of its supplies by value in 1800, 46 per cent in 1805 and 56 per cent in 1811. The army adjusted its prices upwards to compete with the Lower Canadian export market so that in 1803 it was paying an average of 23 shillings-well above the market price of 17 shillings at

84

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Quebec City, not even allowing for transport costs; in 1807 the anny was paying 29 shillings a barrel, while the price at Quebec was about 20 shillings; in 1808 the anny paid 23 shillings and Quebec City about 20. 64 Army provisioning could still affect the general market. In 1804 merchants found farmers refusing to sell at the price they offered which was based on the export market because farmers expected the garrison's demand to cause the price to rise. Even for the large merchants the anny continued to be a market of first preference: when the price for grain in Lower Canada dipped in the years 1801 to 1804, Robert Hamilton compensated by providing 24 to 30 per cent of the army's needs for the total province. Niagara merchants still found the garrison market profitable enough to submit offers to supply the garrison at Amherstburg in 1804 and to actually undertake its supply in 1807. The anny, however, could not absorb the quantities of produce that the Lower Canadian market could. In 1808, for example, the firm of Clarke and Street, a steady supplier of the garrison, sold only 15 per cent of the total produce they marketed to the army; the rest they shipped to Montreal. 65 The army did attempt to expand its purchases in Upper Canada. Because of poor crops in Lower Canada, it was proposed in 1803 that Upper Canadian produce be used to supply all of British North America and the West Indies. Although a small proportion was used to supply Lower Canada (5 per cent of the total purchased at Niagara in 1811), the scheme failed to materialize because of problems of transportation. 66 In the first years of export to Lower Canada, Hamilton appears to have done well. There are no continuing series of statistics to indicate the amount of produce supplied by the peninsula to the Lower Canadian markets. However, if one assumes that the garrison market was a mirror of the larger export market, Hamilton for some years maintained his dominance. The table on page 85 indicates the percentage by value provided to the garrison at Niagara by Hamilton and his major competitors: Hamilton did manage to hold a major proportion of the Niagara market. If one considers the Hamilton kinship group as a whole, the dominance is even more pronounced. It is notable, however, that Hamilton's percentage of the total market began to slip after 1804. Even more significant in the longer perspective, the number of Hamilton's competitors for the garrison supply rose from four in 1803 to eleven in 1808. These rivals individually and collectively were supplying an increasingly larger proportion of the provisions. The development was the reflection of a growing market and changing economic conditions. The expansion of agriculture and the increased demands of the export market encouraged the growth of more and larger firms involved in the marketing of produce. Vigorous competition made the dominance of the Hamilton enterprise less certain, and the development of a more open market than had existed before 1800 would prove very detrimental to the family firm when it began to falter after Hamilton's death in 1809.

PORT AGING AND PROVISIONING

1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 SOURCE:

Combined totals of William Dickson Robert Nichol Thomas Dickson Thomas Clarke

Hamilton

William & James Crooks

58% 34 4 50

11% 6 10 18

10 3

11% 5 30 15

44 42 24 7 19 17 13

0 8 0 31 17 21 23

0 0 0 13 11 3 0

31 19 19 31 35 18 19

Richard & Samuel Hatt

85

Based on Public Archives of Canada, Military Provisioning Abstracts.

His gradual loss of dominance in the provisioning market after 1800 was doubly worrisome for Hamilton because his portaging enterprises in the same period were also entering into a slow decline. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the portaging business had remained excellent. Fur trade traffic had been buoyant near the end of the century because of the confidence of the southwest fur trade under its new American managers. Military portaging had decreased, but the transportation of other goods, notably salt, for the growing agrarian settlements on both sides of Lake Erie above Niagara boded fair to make up the loss. The most striking proof of the optimism of the portage merchants at the end of the century was their grandiose plan for the expansion of portaging facilities. In 1799 Hamilton, Forsyth and Clarke proposed to undertake the monumental task of constructing a canal with locks and a toll road running from Chippawa to Fort Erie; in return, they expected a monopoly on the collection of tolls on it for twenty-one years. They estimated the cost of these projects at a massive £50,000 and, as in their other major projects, expected outside financing, in this case from the Upper Canadian government, to provide the necessary capital. They planned to pay for these improvements with their earnings from the tolls. With a genius for understatement, Hamilton declared that the success of the scheme depended upon the assumption that the fur trade would remain prosperous and that "the produce of the Country above the Falls will yearly increase. "67 Luckily for the three would-be promoters, their scheme was not accepted.

86

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

The bullish confidence of the Niagara Scots in the last years of the eighteenth century ignored certain hard realities. However promising agrarian development was by 1800, the bulk of the portaging business still depended on the southwest fur trade, and the renewal of that trade, given its fast depleting fur resources, could only be temporary. Moreover, the spectre of an American portage loomed over Hamilton and his associates. One of the principal reasons that the operators of the portage lobbied for a canal was in the hope that such an improvement might make the Canadian route so superior as to eliminate the possibility of American competition. Likewise, Clarke had argued for permission to build his own storehouses for portaging on the basis that increased capacity was necessary to discourage Americans from building on their side. Hamilton warned, despite his glowing predictions for British trade in the United States, against any move that would encourage Americans to establish high tariffs against British goods, thereby driving American trade into the interior American land routes. Indeed, the new century would see developments both in portaging and wholesaling that were not to the advantage of Robert Hamilton and his as soc iates. "There is a great falling off indeed," wrote Cartwright in 1801, "from the usual Quantities of Merchandise heretofore sent to the Upper Posts in the Spring of the Year." The year 1802 was even worse: "Never since I have been in Carrying Business have I had a worse Prospect of Returns," lamented the Kingston merchant. 68 The Detroit bubble had burst. Fur supplies were being drastically depleted. Even in the late 1790s, there had been a significant reduction in the number of beaver pelts traded. Skins of lesser value, raccoon and deer, had been on the increase. By the new century an absolute decline was under way. One merchant estimated in 1807 that trade amounted to about £40,OOO-only one-fifth of what it had been in the late I 790s. 6f1 The Americans were also moving to exclude the British from what remained of the southwest fur trade. In 1799 customs houses were established along the border with Canada and the following year restrictions were placed on transshipment of trade goods through American territory by British merchants. The moves marked the virtual exclusion of Montreal as a supply centre of the southwest fur trade; by 1803 Albany was the major supplier of the market, followed by Pittsburg. With the.end of Montreal's involvement, profits on the Niagara portage suffered badly. 70 The coup de grace to the Niagara merchants' hopes of benefiting from the development of American trade and agriculture came in 1806 with the establishment of a rival portage on the American side. The operators of the American portage, Porter, Barton and Company, were powerful and well financed. In 1805 they had obtained a monopoly for their firm from the government of New York State as well as a federal contract for supplying American frontier forts. The firm moved quickly and surely to build a transportation fleet on all the lakes and used it to corner the American

PORTAGING AND PROVISIONING

87

forwarding trade. By the 1820s and 1830s, they had expanded into the building of steamships and railroads, leaving their Canadian competition far behind. For all practical purposes, Porter and Barton excluded the Niagara merchants from the American market which they had regarded as their most promising trade. 71 The Niagara portage accounts for 1807 reflected both the decline of the fur trade and the impact of American competition. Only 1,100 packs of furs moved over the portage that year. Total profits were down drastically to just £650, a little more than a quarter of the 1798 profit. The mainstays of portage were slipping away. The military's account was £241, reduced by half again from its low of 1798. Likewise, the account of the fur trade was a miserable £168. Not only was the trade of the southwest in decline, but that of the northwest was beginning to suffer. The value of its fur exports and its stock was beginning to fail; its imports of such vital commodities as liquor were beginning to slip. Total payment for receiving and forwarding from the North West Company to the portage operators dropped from £475 in 1804 to £142 in 1809. 72 The only major increase on the portage was in private goods shipped to Canadian settlements on Lake Erie where portaging costs of £245 were as much as that for the now depleted military goods and half again that of the fur trade. The increase reflected the growing importance of agriculture in the economy of Upper Canada. In 1807, 1,490 hundredweight of merchandise, exclusive of fur trade goods, passed up the portage and 1,753 hundredweight, mainly flour and wheat, passed down. Still, Canadian agriculture above Niagara had not developed quickly enough to offset the loss of military and fur trade business and since the portage had been virtually excluded from American trade, it was even less likely to develop with rapidity. It is indicative of the situation that only one barrel of salt was recorded as having passed over the Canadian portage in 1807, while Porter, Barton and Company on the American side handled 17,000 to 18,000 barrels in the same year. 73 Hamilton's portaging and army provisioning, the enterprises which were the mainstays of his commercial success, had definitely entered into decline before his death in 1809. That falling off, however, came late in his career and its impact was not fully evident during his lifetime. What was more immediately striking while Hamilton lived was the continuing profitability of his economic activities associated with the army and the fur trade. For the whole of his Canadian career, the army and the fur trade guaranteed Hamilton privileged access to his local economy's most significant markets. His long association with the Laurentian supply of these organizations also gave him access to extensive facilities for portaging, shipping and storage, facilities he could not have financed from his own resources. It was through these facilities in particular that Robert Hamilton obtained the capital resources which allowed him to dominate local retailing and land speCUlation, activities which will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7

The Enterprises of Robert Hamilton: Retailing and Land Speculation

Hamilton's career as a retail merchant in the Niagara region began in 1780 when he opened his first shop at Fort Niagara in partnership with Richard Cartwright. After the war, Hamilton had moved his shop to Queenston which would remain the centre of his operations for the rest of his life. In the postwar depression he had de-emphasized retailing in favour of receiving and forwarding. Only in the early 1790s, when the pioneer fanning community began to undergo substantial growth, did he tum again to retailing. On the surface Hamilton's retailing operations may appear uncomplicated. After an early attempt to start a second store on Twelve Mile Creek (St. Catharines), he operated exclusively from his one shop at Queenston. Hamilton did function on a modest scale as a supplier of goods to other smaller retail shops in the peninSUla, but it was a business he seems to have been reluctant to accept and it does not seem to have been a major function in his activities. His store was run simply as a family affair, employing first his cousins and then his sons and stepsons. 1 In reality, however, retailing in the early Niagara peninsula was far from easy. Although detailed records for specific finns are scant, certain generalizations can be made. The first merchants at Niagara faced a host of problems: they had to establish and maintain supplies of goods, contend with high prices, and avoid the very real dangers of overextension of credit and too rapid growth, while still attempting to diversify their enterprises. To offset these problems Niagara merchants relied heavily on prior training and the aid and financing of relatives. Many merchants had a degree of entrepreneurial experience in their backgrounds through service in the supply branches of the military, clerkship in the fur trade, or through an apprenticeship in a family finn. Merchants required substantial aid in their initial establishment. Beginners were dogged by problems of initially obtaining goods: suppliers were not eager to take the risk of providing goods to aspiring new finns with limited 88

RET AILING AND LAND SPECULATION

89

collateral. Many early merchants relied upon their relatives for initial credit and supplies. Even links to established suppliers were no solid guarantee of easy access to goods. In 1795 one recently established merchant discovered that the price of salt was so high that none could be ordered for him and rum "was not to be had at any price." In 1796 another shopkeeper who had ordered goods through Richard Cartwright received nothing more than salt and saltpetre. In 1797 dry goods imported from England wholesaled to Niagara merchants at 65 per cent of their value in advance, nails and ironmongery at a fixed price, and rum and tobacco for cash only. 2 After obtaining goods, merchants still walked a tight-rope between success and disaster. Successful retailing took self-discipline and acute financial perception. The small merchant naturally wished to build his clientele rapidly. With specie in short supply, the temptation was strong to extend credit. An overextension of credit, however, could leave a merchant unable to pay for his supplies and lead him down the road to ruin. Beginning merchants likewise desired to diversity beyond retailing in the hope of expanding their base of operations and lessening the chances of ruin from anyone enterprise. On the other hand, diversification for the small merchant could easily lead to an overcommitment of resources. Merchants such as James Secord and Richard Beasley, who moved into milling, shipowning or heavy land speculation, found themsel ves deeply in debt. Overextension of credit and incautious diversification were ever-present dangers in merchandising. Supply appears to have been less of a problem after 1800, but aspiring merchants after that date faced another problem-a lack of opportunities for new businesses.!J The number of general merchant shops in the Niagara peninsula expanded substantially from four in 1789 to about twenty-seven in 1803. The latter figure, however, seems to have represented a saturation point for the first decade of the nineteenth century; despite a rapid turnover, the total number of licensed merchant shops in the peninsula varied by no more than two from 1803 to 1809. Established settlements had enough shops and there were few opportunities for new expansion. Even Charles Askin and Samuel Birdsall, who had substantial backing from the Hamiltons and the Streets, failed to establish lasting enterprises. Indeed, shop licence statistics indicate that before 1812 the majority of general merchant shops in the Niagara peninsula operated for less than five years.4 Of the seven firms that survived the first decade of the nineteenth century, one belonged to the Hamilton family and two to their cousins, Thomas Dickson and Thomas Clarke. One firm alone spanned the three decades from 1783 to 1811: that of the Hamilton family. 5 Even more impressive than the longevity of the Hamilton business was its scale. In the period before the War of 1812, there was a well-defined pyramid of merchandising in the Niagara peninsula. At the base of this pyramid were the generality of merchant shops. They were small and eked out a tenuous existence selling their limited stock to a clientele restricted to their immediate

90

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

locales. Settlers would have been very familiar with the type of shop run by William Nelles at Forty Mile Creek (Grimsby). Nelles retailed a small stock of such essentials as sugar, salt and liquor to his neighbours. To flesh out his living, he combined the skills of weaver, tailor and shoemaker with shopkeeper to provide his customers with coarse "flinnel" and "linnen" as well as "overhawls," coats and "shoos."6 Further up the pyramid were merchants whose stocks were significant enough to be inventoried at the time of their deaths. John Fanning, a small merchant operating at Chippawa left £ 1,598 worth of goods when he died in 1815. The debts owing John Boyd, who had a modest shop on the Niagara River front and died in 1804, totalled £1,111. Richard Hatt was nearer still to the apex. An Englishman who had come to Upper Canada with an inheritance, he moved beyond simple shopkeeping to combine retailing with processing. Hatt established an important milling complex at Head-of-the-Lake (Ancaster). In 1819 he owned two sawmills, a grist mill and a distillery as well as a merchant's shop, a cooper's shop, a blacksmith's shop and several small dwelling houses. Debts owing him totalled an impressive £22,837. It was near this magnitude that Thomas Dickson, one of the longest-established merchants on the Niagara River front, operated. His ledgers from 1806 to 1809 contained 542 accounts. 7 The successes of Hatt and Dickson, however, pale in comparison with that of Robert Hamilton. His shop was the regional retail centre of its day, selling a tremendous diversity of goods over the length and the breadth of the peninsula and beyond. At the time of his death in 1809, 1,218 individuals owed Hamilton money. No other merchant could have matched the £68,721 debts due him, the five to six hundred accounts he handled a year or the £6,778 total retail value of his inventory.s Much of the remarkable success of the Hamilton enterprise is attributable to its geographical location. In contrast to those merchants who began after 1800, Hamilton had had no problems finding a suitable location or a potential market. Indeed, by a combination of shrewdness and good fortune, Hamilton's Queenston shop was at one of the most important transshipment breaks in the lakes trade route and a significant point of entry for migration and goods from the south. Queenston was also located near to the largest garrison in early Upper Canada, the almost exclusive purchaser of produce in the area before 1800. His location gave Hamilton great flexibility; he had at Queenston the potential to involve himself in the full range of economic opportunities that the early peninsula held. Queenston was a major centre within the most densely populated area of the Niagara peninsula and this northeast corner of the peninSUla constituted its most attractive retail market. It was here the first white farmers had settled during the American Revolution; it was the area of heaviest settlement after the war: all the land within it along the Niagara River front and for several

.' /

RETAILING AND LAND SPECULATION 91

miles back had been granted by 1800, the earliest date for total granting within the peninsula. With its early start and fertile soils, the area developed quickly. The most important villages in the peninsula before 1812 clustered within it between Niagara-on-the-Lake and Chippawa. Gourlay's Statistical Account indicates that, by 1817, this area had the highest land values of any sector of the peninsula. With his shop in the centre of it, Hamilton could effectively exploit this area as the core of his retailing business. 9 The transportation network of the early peninsula also focused on the northeast corner. From here, early settlement moved out along two well-defined lines. The first line of settlement, along the Niagara River front, was serviced by the Portage Road. The other line, up the Lake Ontario shore, was serviced by the Iroquois and Mohawk trails. All three of these roads began at Queenston. Hamilton's shop was made accessible to the whole of the Niagara River front by the Portage Road, which he had helped to construct, and its extensions to Fort Erie. Subsidiary routes ran into the Portage Road: the Garrison Road, Lyons Creek and the Weiland River and the roads associated with them and Lundy's Lane and its extension, the Beaver Dam Road, thus integrating important settlements behind the front into Hamilton's market area. The second major road, the main line of east-west penetration, was the Iroquois Trail. Originally an Indian path, the trail ran from Queenston along the Lake Ontario shore below the Niagara Escarpment. By 1785 the trail had been widened sufficiently to take wagons to a distance of fifty miles west of Queenston. Before the close of the century settlement had moved up as far as Head-of-the-Lake. Twinned with the Iroquois Trail was the Mohawk Trail which ran above the escarpment and performed the same function there as the Iroquois below. Routes across the interior of the peninsula were poorly developed, consisting mostly of river roads which ran along the course of interior streams and linked ultimately with the two major trails. to The location of government facilities, ports and other shops in Queenston drew settlers along these routes to Hamilton's shop. Only a few miles away, and reached from most areas of the peninsula by passing through Queenston, was Niagara-on-the-Lake, the administrative centre of the region. For five years from 1791 Niagara-on-the-Lake was also the capital of Upper Canada and, for a longer period, the site of much of the provincial administrative apparatus. Even after it lost the role of provincial capital, it remained the district capital. It was at Niagara that all land holdings had to be registered, licences of all kinds obtained and court cases tried. Niagara and Queenston were also the economic centres of the peninsula. They constituted the major points of contact with the Laurentian trade route and the American interior trade route, both essential for receiving and shipping goods. Topography prevented the development of significant harbours along the Lake Ontario shore; as a consequence, until well after 1812

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all ports of entry within the peninsula were located at the Niagara River front. All goods imported into the peninsula from the east had first to stop at Niagara-on-the-Lake ot Queenston. l1 Because of his location, Hamilton could treat all settlement within the peninsula as a potential market. As early as 1800 he found it necessary to retain an outrider each year for the sole purpose of collecting the debts owed to his firm. The outrider personally delivered all accounts within a twelve-mile radius of the store and sent packets of accounts for distribution to areas beyond. By 1803 business had so expanded outside the twelve-mile perimeter that the outrider was instructed to deliver all accounts personally. The task of distributing five to six hundred accounts required six weeks a year and took the courier through as many as twenty-two townships (roughly equivalent to the total number of townships in the peninsula). In winter he traversed the distance between Ancaster and Queenston three times making his rounds. 12 His location was significant in the success of Hamilton's retail business, but it provided only the potential for developments. Two-thirds of all the merchants in the Niagara peninsula in 1803 shared similar geographical advantages without acquiring a fraction of his business. The factors which set Hamilton off from the general run of merchants were the advantages he derived from his provisioning and portaging enterprises. Hamilton's retailing grew to enormous proportions because it was a segment of a larger, integrated business. Other facets of his enterprises aided Hamilton's retailing. His predominance in the wholesaling of produce to the garrison focused much of the trade of the peninsula upon him; those who sold produce to him and accepted his merchant bons also purchased goods from him. His family network facilitated his retailing operations by providing Hamilton with the necessary manpower; his cousins and his sons and stepsons clerked in his shop. The inventory of Hamilton's shop at the time of his death resembled more that of a modem department store in its scale than it did the modest shops of his contemporaries. At his store, a settler could find almost any article he could desire from crockery to liquor to gilt paper and farm wagons. The majority of Hamilton's accounts were with the pioneer farmers of the area; 90 per cent of the accounts owing to him were for amounts less than £ 100. For such customers, Hamilton stocked essential articles such as salt, liquor, sugar, molasses, ammunition, crockery, tools, knives, combs, buttons and cloth. If the articles were common, the quantities were not. One wonders how many shops in Upper Canada kept in stock 286 wash basins, 2,726 pounds of shot, 39 dozen pocket knives and 3,387 yards of cloth. Beyond such basics, Hamilton catered also to more affluent tastes: 9 per cent of his accounts were for amounts ranging from £ 100 to £500; 1 per cent of his recorded trade was in accounts over £500. For those who could afford them, he stocked such items as gilt paper, gentlemen's fur hats, fine silver, pewter basins and snuff boxes. Perhaps the range of Hamilton's stock of cloth

RETAILING AND LAND SPECULATION 93

gives the best idea of the diversity of his clientele. It ran the gauntlet from common calico, corduroy, jean, cotton, linen and fustian, through sheeting, canvas, nankeen, dowlas, madras and osnaburgh, to special textiles with such exotic names as Pink Burant, Brown Florentine, Black Shallorn, Swansdown and Bengal Stripe. Whether the goods were common or luxury, Hamilton's profit was high: the executors of his estate, themselves merchants, estimated the profit on his stock at 40 per cent. (:1 Still, there were cracks in the mighty facade of Hamilton's mercantile enterprises. As the number of those in his debt and the extent of their indebtedness-£68,721-would suggest, Hamilton did face the very real possibility of over-reaching himself. A listing made by Hamilton's outrider of 443 accounts that he delivered in 1803 indicates that twenty-seven debtors (or about 6 per cent) announced they could not pay their debts and 15 per cent more could not be found. The outrider's comments flesh out the problems often in vol ved; •• if he had anything a Constable the best to find him-inform'd has nothing but Children"; or again, "Delivered [account] to himself at Mr. Beasleys, he slipt off before I could speak to him, am informed very little to be expected, has moved 4 times in 4 Years, and is thought will move off entirely. "H One could with good reason suspect that Hamilton could maintain such an extended system of retail credit to such poor risks only so long as the profitability of other sectors of his business allowed him to do so. As with his retailing enterprises, the most immediately impressive aspect of Robert Hamilton's dealings in land were their sheer extent. The known total of land in which Hamilton was involved during his career by purchase, crown grant or mortgage was 130,170 acres}:> If contiguous, Hamilton's known lands would have stretched along the Lake Ontario shore, one township deep from the Niagara River almost to Burlington Bay. The land in which Hamilton dealt by 1809 fell only 30,000 acres short of the total recorded crown grants to the chief civil officers of the government of Upper Canada and their families before 1810.1 6 Hamilton held pieces of land as distant from each other as the shores of Lake S1. Clair on the west and an interior township in Johnstown District on the east. About 50 per cent of his land was located within his home county of Lincoln, with a second major concentration to the west in the counties of Oxford and Norfolk. A more detailed breakdown of Hamilton's lands has been prepared for his holdings in the Niagara peninsula (Map 3). The four modes by which he acquired land have also been indicated: as collateral for a loan or mortgage, by direct grant from the crown, by purchase of title (which was possible only after 1796 when the government began to issue deeds), or by certificate. Before that time settlers were only given certificates for their lands; to verify any exchanges involving certificates which occurred before titles were issued, the government authorized first the District Land Boards and then a special

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THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

provincial Heir and Devisee Commission to examine and validate exchanges. The Executive Council often dealt with th.e larger claims made on certificates. Although many settlers did not trade their certificates for deeds until well after 1796, and although exchange in certificates long continued, it is possible to assume that most exchanges by certificate occurred before 1796. This is particularly true of Hamilton, who made his major claims on lands by certificate before 1799. 17 Within the peninsula, the almost equal division between the land Hamilton received by certificate and by title is indicative of the rapidity with which he assembled his lands in the area (see Appendix, Table 3). He acquired something close to 43 per cent of the lands he had other than by grant or mortgage before 1799. A survey of landholdings within the peninsula by the local land board showed Hamilton with only minimal holdings in 1791. Hence, he probably acquired close to half his Niagara lands within an eight-year period and virtually all his lands everywhere in the seventeen years between 1791 and 1809. I H Not only the land which Hamilton purchased or received in payment of debt was of significance within his Niagara lands. Grants he received from the government were also vitally important to him. Crown grants to Hamilton within the peninsula constituted only a modest percentage of his total holdings (see Appendix, Table 3 and Map 2). Still, he had selected them with obvious care: the lot in Niagara Township constituted the core of the Hamilton family farm and was near to the family enterprises at Queenston. Likewise, Hamilton's crown lands in Grantham concentrated around the site at which he had located a store and a mill in the late 1780s and Hamilton may have initially considered his land in Louth near the outlet of Fifteen Mile Creek as another potential commercial site. His crown lands in Stamford, besides being in a fertile and densely populated area, were close to the Iroquois Trail and to St. David's which further would have enhanced their value, while his lands in Grantham were on the outer fringes of the Fonthill kame moraine, an area of fertile, well-drained soils which were in much demand. Hamilton received his lands in Binbrook at a rather late date, 1804, when the choice of crown lands within the peninSUla had substantially narrowed, and his lands in Bertie, also interior and of poor quality, may have come as well at a late date. At first glance, there may appear to be no significant pattern to Hamilton's land other than that which he acquired by crown grant. In fact, there is a very definite relationship between these other lands and early patterns of land use and land granting. Despite the long association of the Niagara peninsula with intensive agriculture, only a very limited portion of its surface area was considered prime agricultural land in the first generation of settlement. Its most fertile and most easily tillable soils are concentrated primarily along the Lake Ontario shore in a narrow belt below the Niagara Escarpment, a belt which also extends up along the Niagara River through the fronts of Niagara

RETAILING AND LAND SPECULATION 95

and Stamford townships. These soils were the first choice of the pioneer farmers; they quite naturally ignored the heavy, more poorly drained clay soils above the Escarpment. peninsula, a striking fact emerges. With few exceptions, Hamilton's land lay outside the fertile areas that were cultivated in the first generation. Within his own lifetime, the agricultural potential and hence the monetary value of Hamilton's vast holdings were very limited. Indeed, much of Upper Canada would pass under the plough before these lands were turned. Only between 1841 and 1881 would a significant proportion of these interior lands reach the level of 50 per cent under cultivation. l9 It was not fortuitous that Hamilton accumulated so much of the interior land of the peninsula. Crown grants to the original settlers, especially to those Loyalists who received large grants, were generally allocated in two areas: a core grant in the valuable land along the edges of the peninSUla and a second grant of less valuable land in the interior (see Map 3, for example, the holdings of the Nelleses, Balls and Butlers). It is not unlikely that most settlers retained their more valuable land on the edges and used their interior lands as collateral or payment for goods. The speed with which Hamilton assembled his interior lands suggests the original holders disposed of their interior grants rapidly and that Hamilton readily accepted such lands. As a speculator in the lands of the Niagara peninsula Hamilton seems to have shown little discrimination about the quality of the lands he acquired and little concern with their immediate saleability or accessibility. He did hold significant quantities of land along the upper reaches of the WeIland, a river that was navigable forty miles from its mouth and would naturally appeal to a speculator. Most of Hamilton's land on the WeIland, however, was beyond the 1814 frontier of cultivation. Very little of Hamilton's land, moreover, touched on the shores of Lake Ontario, Lake Erie and the Niagara River. There was as well little direct relationship between Hamilton's holdings and the road pattern of the early peninSUla, although the relatively well-developed road network of the region assured that the majority of his lands would be located within five miles of a major road (see Maps 1 and 2). Hamilton's acquisitions within the peninsula do not appear to reflect an attempt at concentration of his holdings. He appears to have preferred to acquire his land in groupings of several lots, as is evident from his holdings in Gainsboro, Humberstone and Bertie, for instance, but such blocks were the result of specific purchases from individuals rather than planned land assembly. To place Hamilton's landholdings in a context, the holdings of the Hamiltons and nine other individuals and families were computed for a sample area, consisting of the counties of Lincoln, Oxford, Norfolk and Middlesex. Total holdings were taken to the year of Hamilton's death, 1809. Those selected for comparison were three other major millers and merchants

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THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

and their families, George Forsyth, Samuel Street Sr. and Samuel Street Jr.; a speculator in lands, Benjamin Canby; the families of three of Hamilton's entrepreneur cousins, Thomas Clarke, William Dickson and Thomas Dickson; and three Loyalist families, those of Jacob Ball, Henrich Nelles and John Butler, whose members served as officers during the Revolution and as a consequence received large amounts of land. All are assumed to have had the potential to be major landholders in the first generation of settlement in the peninsula and the comparison of their lands to the lands of Hamilton within a wide area was conducted to see if there were any significant similarities or divergences among them (see Appendix, Tables 1_7).20 The obvious first conclusion (Table 1) is that within the sample area no one else examined came anywhere near to matching the quantity of lands held by Hamilton. The closest among the entrepreneurs was his cousin, William Dickson, who held only 22 per cent of Hamilton's total. Among the merchants, totals were as low as 2 per cent of Hamilton's lands. Likewise, of the Loyalist families, the closest were the Balls with 22 per cent of his holdings; the furthest were the Nelleses with 9 per cent. As with Hamilton, crown grants were significant within the total holdings of the others, both inside and outside the peninsula (Tables 1, 3 and 5). For two of the three Loyalist families, crown grants constituted more than 90 per cent of their holdings. In the case of the majority of merchants, they consituted 30 per cent to 40 per cent of their holdings. In terms of quantities rather than percentages, Hamilton did very well indeed in grants, ranking below only the Butlers. The Hamilton family did well even relative to the major civil officers of the provincial government and their families. Based on an official report of 1810, the Hamiltons received as much land from the crown as the Jarvises (9,200 acres) and more than the Russells (7,450 acres) and had respectable amounts relative to the Powells (17,900) and the Grants (18,000).21 Like Hamilton, the other merchants acquired most of their holdings in the peninsula beyond the fringes of pioneer agriculture (see Map 3.) What is striking, however, is their much smaller quantities of land. Enough is known of the enterprises of such individuals as the Streets, Thomas Dickson and Thomas Clarke to assert that they held less land relative to the magnitude of their businesses than did Hamilton. Other merchants would appear to have been more cautious about receiving land for debt than Hamilton or about purchasing it outright. Hamilton may have been more eager to acquire land than other merchants because he was more confident of his ability to profit from it. He was optimistic, given the magnitude of his enterprises, that he could hold such lands long enough to profit by them. Moreover, unlike merchants with less diversified resources, he was less concerned about freezing his assets in land. The specie payments he received from portaging and army provisioning created a reserve of capital upon which he could draw to operate his retailing

RETAILING AND LAND SPECULATION 97

business and even finance land purchases. He may have believed that he and his successors could afford to wait for any piece of land to realize a significant increase in its value. Such was Hamilton's confidence that he passed beyond the acceptance of land from settlers for their commercial debts to direct purchase. Several letters he received from William Robertson indirectly give Hamilton's reasons for heavy land speculation. William Robertson, one of his relations, had lent Hamilton money with which to speculate in land. The sum was large enough that Robertson dunned Hamilton from 1804 to 1806 for payment of at least the interest on it. It is extremely interesting that Robertson, who himself had been a successful merchant in post-Revolutionary Detroit, was very sceptical of Hamilton's confidence in land investments and warned him strongly against staking his assets in land. By 1806, Robertson was bluntly demanding the money which Hamilton retain [ed] to my great picque for the purpose of speculat [ing] so immensely in Lands. what is it to me if in 20 years your ideal wealth is to produce a hundred fold when at present you are unable to do justice to your own affairs in the ordinary course of your business? Strange infatuation! If any pers[on] was to sue you upon a large portion of them what would they bring in money at hammer? far below such falacious speculations. To be plain with [you] I really want my money. I can employ it much better.:!:!

Outside the peninsula, Hamilton held a large concentration of lands to the west on Lake Erie. In this, he did not differ from most of the other large Niagara landholders examined. By 1800, in fact, most of the lands of the peninsula had been granted and the government ceased to grant vacant lands within the County of Lincoln, assuming the remainder could be profitably sold; this action tended to encourage the shift in interest of the major landholders to the west. 23 Since the lands on Lake Erie were less densely populated and less fully granted than those of the peninsula, more choice of land was possible and large contiguous blocks of land could be assembled. This was evident in Robert Hamilton's holdings to the west. A minority of Hamilton's western holdings, acquired mainly by purchase, were scattered along the Lake Erie shore in Norfolk and Middlesex. As in the peninSUla, this proportion of his lands tended to be behind the lines of pioneer settlement and showed less contiguity than in the peninSUla. Three-quarters of Hamilton's land outside the peninsula, however, was concentrated in Oxford County. This assemblage was obviously intentional: almost half of Hamilton's land in Oxford (15,000 acres in Norwich and Dereham townships) he had purchased directly from the crown in 1800 for £500. The rest was composed of the family's grants and lands for which Hamilton had most likely received unlocated certificates which he had decided to concentrate in this area. There is no land in these counties that he received by purchase from individuals. 24

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THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

This concentration of lands in the west was also characteristic of the holdings of other major landowners (see Appendix, Tables 5 and 7). William Dickson held blocks of land in the centre and interior of Walsingham as well as a block in the interior of Aamborough East and Aamborough West. The Streets, like Hamilton, had used unlocated certificates to acquire a block of land in Oxford, while the Balls had purchased whole concessions of land in Dereham. The holdings of the others were more scattered. For what purposes did these landowners intend their land? For the Butlers, there was little room for choice: they used their lands to pay their immediate debts. Because of their reduced status after the Revolution and their repeated failures to tap new sources of income, the land of the Butlers quickly slipped away from them. Before 1809 they had already alienated 64 per cent of their lands, including most of their centralized holdings in Louth. By 1834, less than 9 per cent of their lands acquired before 1809 would still be in the family's hands (see Appendix, Tables 2, 4 and 6). Others purposely treated their lands as an investment on which they could realize a quick return. Canby emphasized a rapid turnover on his lands and had sold 49 per cent of them before 1809. William Dickson mortgaged virtually all of his land to Isaac Todd in 1802 for cash which he probably intended to invest in an even larger speCUlation in the Iroquois lands on the Grand River. 25 Loyalist families such as the Balls and the Nelleses saw their land very differently. They treated it as a resource in itself, a valuable patrimony to be brought into production by themsel ves and their heirs through the generations. Members of the families had concentrated their holdings together in contiguous blocks. They clung tenaciously to their lands, alienating only in the range of 10 per cent of it outside their families before 1809. Even in 1834, they still retained more than 70 per cent and 85 per cent of it respectively. Land was passed from father to son or son-in-law; many transfers indicated the lands were a dowry for their daughters. They would ultimately bring most of their lands under cultivation and much remained in their hands even beyond Confederation. The Streets, too, held their land for extended periods although for different reasons. They sold less than 1 per cent of it in the early period before 1809 and still retained 87 per cent beyond 1834 as well as acquiring much more. They aimed not at cultivation but at long-term speculation. Their financial success allowed them to hold land until it became truly valuable. Robert Hamilton also aimed at long-term speculation. Of the massive amounts of land that came into his hands in the sample area, only 13 per cent passed out during his lifetime. Certainly the scattered interior lands he held in the peninsula could only be treated by a major merchant as a speculation. His land in Oxford at first glance resembled the concentrated holdings of the Loyalist families and one might assume he intended them as the basis of an immense family estate. Both the remarks of William Robertson and the

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location of the land, however, suggest they were intended for other purposes. Hamilton's Oxford lands were close to the boundaries of the Grand River Iroquois lands. Speculative activity in Grand River lands is shrouded in obscurity, much of it purposely created by interested parties and much evidence about the tangled webs of intrigue that enmeshed the lands is circumstantial. Still, it does seem possible that Hamilton and other members of his family network entertained ideas of massive land assemblage, planned immigration, and assisted development for profit in and near the Grand River lands. Hamilton himself felt strongly that the lands on the Grand River could best be utilized by white settlers and regretted their original granting to the Iroquois. He foresaw an inevitable march of white cultivation into the Indian lands and the displacement or "civilization" of its Iroquois inhabitants. 26 William Dickson was eager to help along such inevitable transformations of Indian land. As early as 1792 Dickson petitioned Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe for 48,000 acres of land which was then part of the Mississauga Indian Reserve to the west of Aamborough. This tract he planned to develop in a space of three years "with a decent and loyal yeomanry" which he would personally recruit in Scotland. Although the area of his proposed development would shift slightly east to the Grand River and would be delayed for twenty-four years, Dickson would finally launch his scheme. 27 Dickson was almost omnipresent in dealings in Grand River land. It was he along with Samuel Street who "discovered" in 1793 that the Iroquois desired to sell a portion of their lands on the Grand River and asked Simcoe to allow it. It was probably not by chance that two years later Dickson acted as an agent in a tentative American offer to Joseph Brant to purchase tracts of land from the Iroquois. By 1798,350,000 acres of the Grand River lands had been carved into six blocks for sale. Dickson acted as the Indians' lawyer in many of the transactions involving the blocks. 28 Block I, containing 94,035 acres, is of particular interest since Dickson eventually purchased and developed it. The history of dealings involving this block before 1807 is unclear probably because several attempts were made to sell this land to groups of American speculators, an action of which the Upper Canadian government would not approve. It is intriguing that in 1802 Dickson mortgaged more than 15,000 acres of land to Isaac Todd for the declared purpose of purchasing land. He is not, however, known to have purchased any extensive tract at that date. It is a possibility that he may have been involved in one or more of the failed schemes to purchase Block I and the money he borrowed represented the capital necessary as his share of a speculation. It is certain that in 1808 Dickson was conspiring with Augustus Jones, son-in-law of the chief sachem of the Iroquois, Tyhorihoga, to use the father-in-law's influence in gaining the purchase of Block I. This scheme also failed. 29 Block I was finally purchased in 1811 by Thomas Clarke. Again, intrigue was involved. Clarke at the time of purchase for unknown reasons concealed

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THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

the identity of his full partner in this speculation, William Dickson. In 1816 Clarke transferred all the lands to Dickson. The most interesting feature of all this when considering Hamilton's land is that Block I, later Dumfries Township, was directly opposite Blenheim Township and contiguous to the Hamilton family land. Indeed, in the 1820s when much of the Hamiltons' Oxford holdings were sold, they were purchased by William Dickson, Thomas Clarke and Clarke's partner, Samuel Street Jr. After 1816 Dickson did promote large-scale settlement with American settlers and brought Scots immigrants to Dumfries. The development of Dumfries, centred on the town of Galt, became the basis of the Dickson family fortune. This speculation as originally conceived may have involved the Hamilton lands and plans for their development along with Dickson's and other lands held by the cousins. 30 Suspicions of some larger plans for speculation among Hamilton and his relations are further fed by their ubiquitousness in dealings on the the other blocks of land. Dickson was the lawyer for the Mennonites who purchased Block II (Waterloo Township) and later for Richard Beasley,' the original speculator who sold it to them. Block V, the land at the mouth of the Grand River, was strategic for control of transportation and particularly valuable because it fronted on Lake Erie. By 1807 William Dickson had purchased an option on the block. Both his brother, Thomas Dickson, and Robert Hamilton had offered to purchase some or all of the land from him. William Dickson agreed to relinquish his rights to Lord Selkirk for a sum. Selkirk in tum for a lengthy period engaged Thomas Clarke as an agent to manage them. Clarke sold some of this land to the younger Hamiltons and Charles Askin. 31 The interest of Hamilton and his relatiVes in land near the mouth of the Grand River did not stop there. The township of Wain fleet, a low and swampy area that was largely unsettled, lay between Block V and the main body of the Niagara peninSUla. In the winter of 1807 Hamilton proposed to the goverment to pay the costs of a survey on all lots in Wainfleet that the government would grant to him. He apparently had in mind constructing a canal from the Weiland River to the lower Grand, thus increasing the accessibility of the area to both trade and settlement. In 1808 the Iroquois granted William Dickson, ostensibly in gratitude for the legal services he had rendered them, 4,000 acres at the very mouth of the Grand, adjacent to Block V.:l2 The further histories of all these lands are too tangled to enter into here. Suffice to say that only Block I would actually be developed by a member of the Hamilton clan. This does not discount the possibility, however, that the interest of Clarke, William Dickson and Hamilton in a broad range of land at or near Grand River-an interest that extended in time from the early 1790s to 1820s-may well have had as its objective large-scale land development.

CHAPTER 8

The Politics of Commerce: Preconceptions and Strategies

It was Allan MacNab who declared "Railroads are my politics. " I Sixty years before, another businessman-politician, Robert Hamilton, might with equal validity have declared, "Commerce is my politics." The political goals of Robert Hamilton were practical and limited. His aim was to forge a working relationship between his business interests and the new institutions of government inaugurated in the upper country after 1784. In the Upper Canadian political tradition, Hamilton exemplifies the pioneer stage of commercial toryism which was commercial first and foremost; ideology was of secondary importance. A study of the politics of Robert Hamilton highlights the often neglected significance of economic issues in the early public affairs of Upper Canada and its regions. This is not to deny that Hamilton was influenced by political ideology. As befitted an established and respectable merchant, Hamilton accepted the dominant tory philosophy of his time and place. He was a confinned monarchist and loyal constitutionalist who harboured no doubts about the correctness of a hierarchical society. Hamilton and his relations accepted the conventional tory wisdom that the mass of men were base and ignorant, moved, as one of them wrote, by "Low cunning & flattery"2 in political affairs. Human passions, they believed, had to be restrained by the bonds of social deference. An agitation like the one led by Robert Thorpe could, Hamilton warned, break "the Bonds of respect from the People to the Magistrates" and when that occurred "there is an end to all order and all well being.":1 It followed naturally to the Scots that political leadership should be the prerogative of the responsible and respectable elements of societyelements they tended to equate with themselves. o1 If Hamilton accepted the basic tenets of this philosophy, however, he did deviate from what previous studies have treated as the Upper Canadian tory norm in his pro-Americanism. S.F. Wise, the foremost student of political ideology in Upper Canada, has identified antipathy to American political 101

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THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

thought and institutions as a major component of the Upper Canadian political tradition and a distinguishing mark of its dominant tory ideology. Wise places a heavy stress upon the role of the War of 1812 in stimulating this antipathy and a resultant sense of threat in Upper Canada which was the catalyst for its political development. Indeed, even before the War of 1812, Graeme Patterson has found that tensions between a pro-British element, composed of Loyalists and British immigrants, and American settlers provided the essence of politics in the region centred on the Bay of Quinte, a region comparable to the Niagara peninsula in its early settlement and its important commercial functions. The national and religious tensions within the politics of the Bay of Quinte in time evolved into ideological controversies; these in tum proved potent enough to generate party organization on a provincial scale. 5 Richard Cartwright, who frequently acted as the spokesman of eastern Loyalist sentiment, firmly believed American settlement should have been excluded from Upper Canada: I will not disguise from your Excellency [he wrote to Lieutenant-Governor Hunter in 1799] the opinion I have always entertained and on every proper occasion expressed, that [American settlement] ought never to have been permitted. One necessary consequence has been to dispel the opinion fondly cherished by the loyalists that the donation of lands to them in this country was inte~ded as a mark of peculiar favour for their attachment to their sovereign. Ii

As an alternative to American settlement, Cartwright advocated the encouragement of British immigration. The eastern pro-British element, heavily represented in the Kingston area, also tended to associate itself with the Anglican Church in opposition to privileges for religious sects which it equated with Americanism. 7 Hamilton's attitude to American settlement was clearly opposed to Cartwright's. When questioned by the government on the advisability of European settlement in Upper Canada, Hamilton ignored questions of the reward of political allegiance in favour of the home truths of the North American economy: The Trade of Farming in this new Country, Requires to Europeans as much an Apprenticeship as any handicraft profession . . . . We do not want Settlers faster than we can maintain them with ease & Comfort to ourselves and there are found us [sic], in my Opinion, Better disposed and fitter for our purpose from the Neighbouring States, in sufficient Numbers."

Such a view fitted with Hamilton's economic interests. He clearly perceived that only with American settlement could he fill his lands and retail his goods. Support of a liberal policy toward American immigration in fact became a continuing family strategy. After the War of 1812, Hamilton's sons and his cousins, Robert Nichol, Thomas Clarke and William Dickson, all

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major land speculators, first launched their own protests and then supported the early stages of the Gourlay agitation in attempts to reverse an official policy prohibiting American settlement. Hamilton's receiving, forwarding and portaging enterprises, and those of others of his relations, also depended on good relations between British subjects and Americans. At the end of the Revolution, in support of the interests of the Montreal fur trade, Hamilton had opposed American use of British storage and portaging facilities to reach the fur areas of the West. His move into portaging, however, substantially altered his attitude to American trade, especially when control of the southwest fur trade passed to Americans after 1796 and when American agriculture began to develop near the Lake Erie shore. Goods to supply both these endeavours passed over the Niagara Portage. Within a few years, Hamilton moved from opposing passage of American goods to defending their right to pass in transit over the Niagara Portage without paying any customs duties. Indeed, Hamilton saw the future of his enterprises and of the Laurentian trading system in carrying both American and Canadian produce to the Atlantic. 9 Not surprisingly, Hamilton adopted a moderate stance in matters of political ideology. He emphasized the ties of British subjects and Americans rather than their differences. He distinguished sharply between the two republican states, France and the United States, emphasizing the Anglo-Saxon bond of American and Englishman rather than American's repUblican unity with France. In 1798, when rumours of a French invasion of Lower Canada were circulating, Hamilton declared himself undaunted: •• Such an attempt would I presume unite at once the States of America to the English Interest of this Country & against whom, any hostile body the French might land, could not long prevail.' '10 Hamilton's pro-Americanism also expressed the general sentiment of the Niagara peninsula. With its proximity to the American border and its function as the prime route of American migration into Upper Canada, the region had closer and more extensive contacts with America than any other area of Upper Canada. Heavy post-Loyalist settlement from the United States necessitated, in the minds of the early settlers of the peninsula, a moderate toleration of Americans. This was early expressed in the resistance of the area's representatives to legislation passed in 1800, establishing a seven-year residence requirement for the franchise. The representatives of the peninsula opposed the bill; in fact with two exceptions a recorded vote on the issue was a split of the east against the west of the province in favour of the qualification. In 1804 an attempt to repeal the limitations on American voters was solidly opposed by the representatives of the Loyalist strongholds along the St. Lawrence and supported by the rest of the province, including the three voting members from the peninsula. l l The tolerant attitude of the peninSUla towards Americans also found expression in the area's attitude to religion. Many sects who had immigrated

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from the American states were heavily represented in the Niagara peninsula and its politicians were sympathetic to their desires. From the first meeting of the legislature in 1792 to 1812, the region's representatives introduced and consistently supported legislation for the liberalization of religious privileges. They moved or seconded bills in aid of Methodists, Quakers, Mennonites and Tunkers. Hamilton himself in the Legislative Council supported liberalization of the marriage laws and seconded legislation "to afford relief to the religious society of people called Methodists. "12 Pro-American sentiment could be publicly expressed in the peninsula without fear of reprisal. When the American-born editor of the Niagara Herald was accused of being an "alien" and a "prowling democrat,"13 a resident of Queenston under the pseudonym of Wulter responded that the insults were intended for all Americans and that on the contrary, the leaders of local society who had encouraged immigration had been "patriotic" and any one "who is base enough to insult so great a part of his fellow subjects" did not deserve well of his country. Earlier, when the American who edited the Niagara Herald, Tiffany, had been editor of the Upper Canada Gazette, provincial officials had evinced extreme anxiety about the tone of the newspaper and the possibly pernicious influence of an American editor upon the official gazette. They lobbied vigorously for his removal. Hamilton and his Scots relatives exhibited little unease about the ideological impact of such Americans upon their community. After Tiffany was removed from the Gazette, Hamilton and his kin were almost certainly the major financial backers in his establishment of two subsequent newspapers in the Niagara peninsula. Hamilton actively solicited subscriptions for them.14 The moderate attitude of Robert Hamilton and his Scots relations towards Americans was not a political issue in the early peninsula. Attitudes to Americans and to religious sects tended to be points of consensus rather than division within their local society. The politics of the Niagara peninSUla did not generate sharp ideological differences. Unlike religion and nationality, commerce and the political dominance of its practitioners were matters of contention in the politics of the early peninsula. Robert Hamilton's economic power gave him an unparalleled influence upon his regional society which became a major issue of the early politics of the Niagara peninsula and of the province of Upper Canada. Using his substantial wealth, Hamilton had created an extensive network of merchandising and land speculation which touched the lives of the inhabitants of the Niagara peninsula more directly and intimately than any governmental or social institution of their time. What credit or income the settlers realized in the first years of development came to a large extent through Hamilton. He was the major wholesaler of their grain, the principal holder of their mortgages, their supplier of goods and the chief purchaser of their lands. A man of such power was, not unnaturally, resented. In politics as in commerce, Robert Hamilton had in general laboured hard

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and well to establish his influence. Through his position as justice of the peace, judge of the Court of Common Pleas and member of the Nassau Land Board, he worked in the eight years between the end of the Revolution and the inception of Upper Canada to guarantee the continuance of that degree of social order essential to the functioning of his commerce. He also used the court and the land board with notable success to facilitate his control of the new commerce generated by the Loyalist settlements at Niagara. Hamilton was successful in creating for himself the political equivalent of his commercial primacy in his community. The petitions and early politics of the community in tum reacted against his creation and control of a commercial authority structure. Hamilton's dominance faced its sharpest challenge during the Simcoe administration. Historians have emphasized the political and constitutional place of the Simcoe years in the future of Ontario. The issues which absorbed the attention of contemporaries, however, were immediate and economic: the transfer of land, the enforcement of debt, and the control of the market of greatest significance to the community, army provisioning, were the chief domestic issues of the time. It is a measure of Hamilton's prominence that he, with Richard Cartwright, was personally the focus of debate on these issues. During these years the major merchants, with their base in the regions and attempting to defend the privileges they had secured in the years after the Revolution, clashed with the newly established provincial political authority structure which believed power was properly centralized in its own hands. The provincial political elite, often unaware of local conditions or naive concerning their significance, was stimulated to action by regional agitation against the system of the merchants. In the Niagara peninsula, there was a strong and rapid coalescence of resentment against the mercantile influence upon the community. Even before the end of the Revolution, a "Humble Address of the Farmers Residing in Lands On the West side of the River, Niagara" protested to John Butler against "being obliged to pay the Merchants their Own prices for Every thing we want. "15 In their private letters, Loyalist officers complained bitterly of the burden of their commercial debts. In the minds of the pioneer settlers, and with good reason, there was a close association of merchants with government privilege. Niagara merchants were given the responsible and prestigious positions both in local government and at the provincial level. Robert Hamilton and his associates were granted control of the most significant economic functions of the early settlement. Government appointments allowed merchants to make the local court function in the interest of creditors and to influence the working of the land board in their own favour. The community's resentment of the mercantile element found expression in the first election for the new Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada in 1792. Little is known of the contests for that election, but its results were clear: all four candidates elected for seats in the peninsula were former Loyalist officers

106 THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON and fanners; none were merchants. The one merchant who was known to have run, Samuel Street Sr. in Second Lincoln, was soundly defeated by his opponent Benjamin Pawling, 148 to 48. The election was only a prelude to the stormy first parliament of Upper Canada where the agrarian element sharply and consistently opposed its interest to that of the merchants. The agrarian element, moreover, would have its position strengthened by support of the government executive, led by the Lieutenant-Governor, John Graves Simcoe. lfl For Robert Hamilton the Simcoe administration was the most turbulent and troublesome political period of his long Canadian career. In his initial theorizing about the development of Upper Canada, Simcoe gave little thought to its merchants. He assigned them no role in his schemes for development. Actual contact with Upper Canada, however, and especially with existing local discontents, led Simcoe to entirely reverse his assessment of the merchants. He came to see them as monopolizers of the local economy and subverters of the legitimate political process. The early Simcoe years can be interpreted as an attack by a nascent political elite upon established commercial hegemony in a bid to control the pioneer society. The attack appeared formidable: backed by popular support for its legislation and controlling the administrative machinery, the political elite seemed to challenge the merchants on all fronts. An examination of the controversies of the Simcoe years from the viewpoint of a contemporary protagonist, Robert Hamilton, yields a perspective different from that often assumed by historians. Most accounts of the Simcoe years have stressed their significance for the future development of Upper Canada and Ontario. Attention has focused upon broad issues of provincial development such as the location of towns, harbours and road networks, and upon such ideological issues as contention over education and church establishment and, more generally, the creation of a "British" ethos. The significant domestic controversy of the period is seen as occurring between Simcoe and the articulate spokesmen of the community, most notably, Richard Cartwright. Hamilton assessed the relative significance of the issues differently. There is no evidence that he made any contribution to the controversy on the general internal development of the province. The larger implications of the court structure he left to Cartwright who evinced a greater concern with ideology; he showed only limited interest in church establishment and none in education. Hamilton's attention focused instead upon what was for him the most pressing contemporary controversy, economic in its essence, which pitted both the administration and articulate elements of the community against the major merchants at Niagara, Kingston and, to a lesser extent, Detroit. Hamilton was not alone in his interest. Contemporaries exhibited a sharp concern with the commercial element and its predominant role in society. Debate in the provincial legislature centred upon institutions of local

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government, the structure of the courts system, and the granting of government patronage. At the core of these debates were such issues as mercantile dominance of local government, the debtor-creditor relationship, commercial speculation in land, circulation of specie, and control of army provisioning. Before its advent, Robert Hamilton was highly optimistic about the new government of Upper Canada. He saw no necessary conflict between the new political authority and the men of commerce: the flag and trade could, in his estimation of what the new administration should accomplish, march forward together. Hamilton exhibited a firm belief in the essential role of government in commercial development, a belief born of economic conditions in the upper country. Before 1792 Hamilton's survival and entrepreneurial success had depended upon the alignment of his business interests with the networks of trade and communication provided by the British army and the fur trade. Past success and continuing needs predisposed Hamilton to see in the provincial government another corporate entity potentially capable of furthering his interests. The first overtures for cooperation between Upper Canadian business and the government were in fact made by Hamilton to Simcoe before the lieutenant-governor had even reached his new province. The letter he received from Hamilton at Quebec in January 1792 must have startled even an individual as audacious as Simcoe. The proposals of this up-country merchant were not parochial, as Simcoe probably would have expected, but continental in scope and were concerned with nothing less than the future of the British presence in North America. They suggested a grand alliance of the provincial government and Canadian commerce to bring about a redefinition of the boundaries of British North America. Hamilton complained of the boundary established with the new American nation by the British commissioners in 1783. The St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes were not adequate frontiers; indeed, they were "the worst possible Boundaries between Commercial Nations settled on the same Continent. As on a highway, their carriages must certainly meet, They will often jostle, and endless contention and strife must ensue. "17 Hamilton bitterly regretted the new boundary by which every post in the upper country with the exception of the small picketted post of Fort Erie was surrendered to the United States. The other posts, important military installations and, not incidently to Hamilton's way of thinking, transportation and storage centres as well as markets for up-country merchants, would be given up: Oswegatchie, Oswego, Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac all would be surrendered and the American rivals of the Montreal fur trade would be given "a free opening ... to reach our most distant and valuable posts. "18 As a remedy, Hamilton urged massive government intervention to restore the status quo. Simcoe, as a representative of the British government, should negotiate the establishment of a native state, ostensibly neutral, but under

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British influence, in the unsettled American hinterland. The boundary between this buffer state and the American should be continued to the south of the Great Lakes. Such a boundary would contain American expansion, strengthen British influence in the interior, and regain for British trade control of the major interior east-west commercial route. The political advantage of the change would be stable borders and peace; for commerce, the advantages would be a strengthening and extension of the communications network and the market area of the Canadian fur trade. Anything that enlarged the fur trade's market and made more secure its communications would in tum benefit the portaging and receiving and forwarding operations of Robert Hamilton. 19 Hamilton, as always in his strategy, placed commerce first. He obviously saw government as the handmaiden of commercial expansionism. As a final inducement to the imperial ambitions of British political authorities, however, he suggested "a plan of Empire perhaps as grand as was ever devised by man. " Control of the Great Lakes could ultim"ately bring Britain control of the Mississippi: •• Possessed of the two Posts of Quebec and New Orleans . . . Britian WOUld, in time, enjoy a market for her manufactures extensive beyond calculation. . . . It might be worthy of the exalted character at present at the helm of her [Upper Canada's] affairs to have so glorious a prospect in his eyes. "20 What was startling about Hamilton's proposal was not so much the views expressed-they had been the arguments of the Montreal supply houses trading into the western interior since the termination of the Revolution-as their source. Hamilton, although located in what was still a very modest pioneer settlement, did not see his interests bounded by his community or even his province. Hamilton saw himself in the first instance not as a citizen of the new state of Upper Canada, but as a client of a continental trade system centred on Montreal. This would remain Hamilton's primary loyalty. Simcoe was unprepared for Hamilton's initiative. As a military man and an imperial administrator, he could readily grasp the strategic and diplomatic implications of the friendship of the western Indians. He had no grasp, however, of the functioning of Upper Canadian commerce and was oblivious of the local economic significance of the carrying trade associated with furs. In 1792 Simcoe could without qualification assert: "I consider the Fur Trade on its present foundation to be of no use whatever, to the Colony of Upper Canada. . . .' '21 The lieutenant-governor made no immediate response to Hamilton's proposals. Simcoe had given little thought to the relations of the local merchants to his regime before taking up his post in Upper Canada. In his prolific correspondence with British officials before his departure for Upper Canada, he had only a few anachronistic comments on army supply to offer on the subject of the relation of local commerce and the government: transportation of provisions to Upper Canadian posts should be efficiently organized to

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prevent merchants from taking advantage of shortages, and in particular, supply should be arranged so that' 'there will be no deficiency of Presents for Indians in the Public Stores.' '22 Simcoe's initial perception of commerce in the area he was to govern was shaped by the army's supply problems in the war years, problems Simcoe himself had encountered as an officer in charge of a Loyalist unit. In examining his relationship to the local merchants it is important to realize that Simcoe shared the perceptions of the British officers who not long before had regulated affairs at the upper posts and that his ideas of administration had parallels to those of the military regime at Quebec in the war years. Simcoe, like his predecessors, believed in the centralization of political authority and in the vital role of the military in colonial government. Some of his proposals for Upper Canada even looked to the restoration of the social and economic traditions of the upper country. Simcoe's project to use a special Ranger corps for the construction of essential economic facilities such as roads, public buildings and mills harked back to an era when the military provided the entire economic infrastructure, and Simcoe's idea of using disbanded soldiers to provide the core of settlement and thus to guarantee the security and allegiance of Upper Canada also looked to restoring to the military its former primacy in the upper country. This idea had a particular appeal for Simcoe because such a military emphasis would facilitate centralized control of the province; a strongly developed military hierarchy and its habit of obedience would help concentrate power in the hands of the commander of the province, again as in the war years. These schemes, rendered impractical by the imperial government's lack of financial commitment, nevertheless were intriguing attempts to resurrect the essence of the old military authority structure and reshape it to meet the requirements of pioneer settlement. Despite a heavy historical emphasis on the Simcoe administration as the starting point of Ontario's development, it also had strong links to the immediate past of the upper country and the struggle of merchants such as Hamilton with the Simcoe regime can be seen as an extension of earlier trends. Simcoe was an imposing opponent for the merchants. A man of extraordinary energy and enthusiasms, he was determined to mould Upper Canadian society according to his own precepts. In contrast to a merchant such as Hamilton, whose goal was economic, Simcoe's goals were grandly ideological. He wished to build in Upper Canada a beacon of monarchical principle and prosperity shining in the gloom of American repUblicanism. To create and regulate the society, Simcoe believed a powerful central government capable of making all important decisions relating to politics and the economy to be essential. The attempt to establish such an influence led Simcoe into a clash with the effective existing power, wielded by the merchants. Simcoe's stress on the military and his taste for centralization, based both

110 THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON on his perceptions of the needs of a pioneer society and his own strong personal ambition, did not augur well for the merchants, who had previously benefited from weak central control. Simcoe believed commerce should be subservient to higher imperial aims. Like his military predecessors in the upper country, he was suspicious of merchants, often labelling them unpatriotic adventurers or worse; they were to his mind arrivistes with only shallow roots in the local society. "The mercantile people," Simcoe wrote in explaining his rejection of merchants as proper material for his Executive Council, "added to their precarious situation, have rose [sic] from obscurity so rapidly and apparently to their neighbours, as would rather lessen than add strength to the Government.' '23 His declared preference in candidates for local and provincial office was for military men, amongst whom he was wont to include Loyalist officers. I am fully persuaded that both the civil & military interests of his Majesty's Subjects in this Colony can never be so well administered [he wrote] as by upright & disinterested Military Men; It is unreasonable to expect Disinterestedness among the Mercantile Part of the Community, nor do their habits or Education in the least entitle them to a shadow of pre-eminence . . . . 24

The first years of his administration would clearly demonstrate Simcoe's bias against "the Mercantile Part of the Community." The avowed intention of the first administration of Upper Canada was to dismantle the commercial authority structure which was the effective existing power in the upper country. From 1792 to 1794 Simcoe, through legislation and administrative changes, challenged the means by which merchants exercised their influence: their methods of merchandising, their control of provisioning, and their role in local government. Simcoe abolished the major governing institutions established after the Revolution-the Courts of Common Pleas and the land boards-in an attempt to diminish mercantile influence upon the communities of Upper Canada, and he attempted to wrest control of the economy from merchants' hands in order to strengthen pioneer agriculture and to bolster his administration's influence. The most vigorous opponents of these initiatives were Robert Hamilton and his old partner in Laurentian trade, Richard Cartwright. Simcoe would win his battle with the merchants on the political field. His victories, however, were less than fully effective in reducing the merchant influence. The centralizing of power in early Upper Canada was a near impossible task. The political institutions which Simcoe controlled were too underdeveloped to supervise the economy and the power of the merchants was too strong and too diffuse to be eradicated by legislative fiat or the superficial changes in administrative structure that Simcoe proposed. Despite marked differences in view on the relationship of government to commerce, open conflict between the Simcoe administration and the merchants of Upper Canada was slow to emerge. This was not due to any lack

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of political voice on the part of the merchants. Although the Executive Council had no representation from the commercial community and although the Legislative Assembly, and especially the representation of the Niagara peninsula, was largely agrarian, the Legislative Council contained both Hamilton and Cartwright. They, by mutual cooperation and a clear definition of their interests and legislative priorities, quickly became the strong and articulate voice of the merchant interest. Simcoe found little to trouble him in the first session of his legislature. There were conflicts, but Simcoe considered them to be of a parochial nature and no threat to his authority. Still, there were strong hints of what was to come. The one issue that did generate warm controversy was the proper source of taxation: land or commerce, a classic contest between the agrarian element in the Assembly and the merchants of the Legislative Council. Simcoe came down essentially on the side of the merchants. Indeed, he tended to see the Legislative Council as his natural ally against any excesses of the democratic Assembly.25 Within a year, Simcoe's assessment of the Legislative Council altered dramatically: No adverse party seems hitherto to have formed itself. But as sooner or later it [the formation of an opposition party] seems to be the natural result of all political institutions, if I were to indulge in a Spirit of Conjecture, I should be induced to think it may sooner take place in the upper than in the Lower House, altho' many of the Members are pleased to express a strong attachment to Government. 26

Simcoe recognized the novelty of an opposition centred not within the popular Assembly, but within the Legislative Council, a body appointed by the executive itself. Indeed, this "opposition party" was virtually unique within the early history of Upper Canada and its existence points up the special situation of the period: a contention was taking place between a pre-existing commercial authority structure entrenched enough that it could command positions on the Legislative Council, and a newly established political authority structure centred on Simcoe-a struggle between two nascent elites over their prerogatives. Before 1793 Simcoe had tended to view the merchants of Upper Canada as unimportant pawns in his grand imperial strategy. After that date he declared them the most potent enemies of provincial development and of his own administration. It was a controversy over provisioning the army that brought Simcoe to a realization of the power of merchants within Upper Canada and stimulated him to launch a compaign against their privileges. Simcoe did not arrive at his own perceptions unaided; the chronology of the provisioning controversy made clear the significant role played in it by popular agitation. The provincial political elite, often unaware of local conditions or naive concerning their significance, was stimulated to action by regional agitation against the system of merchants.

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As demonstrated in a previous chapter, in the early years of the province anny provisioning was the major, often the only, market for the agricultural production of most of the province. There was, naturally, a popular sensitivity to issues connected with army supply. Provisioning contracts for Canada were let in London by the Treasury Board. Those who were awarded contracts normally appointed agents in Quebec; both the contractors and their Quebec agents were eager to obtain local supplies whenever possible thus reducing their handling and transportation costs. Simcoe had no objections to the standard mode of army contracting. Indeed, the Canadian contract was awarded in 1791 to John and Alexander Davison, political intimates of Simcoe; he appears to have played a significant role in their appointment. The Davisons, in the usual manner, appointed merchants in Quebec, John Gray and Munro and Bell as their agents. With this contract, however, a new level of agents was introduced. At the instance of Isaac Todd, the Davisons inaugurated a system of local agents in Upper Canada. These local agents were to arrange the collection of the requisite quotas of flour at each of the major posts; in return, they were to be given first option in the provision of supplies within their respective regions. The agents appointed were Todd's preferred clients in Upper Canada, Cartwright at Kingston, Hamilton at Niagara, and Askin and Robertson at Detroit. The contract was the culmination of a long process of lobbying: Todd and McGill had, in fact, been attempting to negotiate such an arrangement for their up-country clients since at least 1786. 27 Simcoe did not at first see anything damaging in the new arrangements. The official announcement to him in March 1792 of the acceptance of the contract and its system of local agents elicited no response. Officials more experienced in matters of supply attempted to warn him of the dangers of monopoly and inflated prices inherent in the system of contracting. Simcoe, finding that his own "more important avocations" did not leave him time to investigate such claims, assigned the task to John McGill, his Commissary of Supply and Services. Based upon local consultation, McGill prepared a report in January 1793 damning the arrangement and recommending a more diffused system of flour collection. 28 The controversy really caught fire, however, only when the settlements experienced the new system of supply. In May the settlers of Detroit took action by memorializing Simcoe that they were being injured by the new arrangements. The contract was heatedly discussed by the Legislative Assembly in June and representatives from the entire province, including those of the peninsula, demonstrated the popular concern with the contract by achieving complete unanimity on petitioning the imperial government against it. Upper Canada's first provincial political agitation was underway.29 The commencement of the popular agitation also marked the beginning of Simcoe's personal interest in the matter. Drawing on popular complaints, he began to stress the extent of the major merchants' operations: "They are land

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owners, Shop Keepers, Merchants and Millers, and it is said mortgagees of great quantity's [sic] ofland. "30 He began to speak of the grain contract as the capstone in the creation of a monopoly of the provincial economy for the local agents. These agents would use the provisioning contract to cement their hold on the economy; settlers who wished to sell grain to the government would be forced to do so through them, the administration argued, and in turn would be forced to purchase goods from them at inflated prices; other merchants, unless they dealt with the local contractors, would be forced out of business. With their extensive interests in land, the agents might even find it to their advantage to bring about the financial ruin of the local populace through the contract in order to appropriate their land, thus ultimately bringing about "the depopulation of the Province. "31 Simcoe was genuinely concerned about the impact of the provisioning contract on the local economy, but other implications struck closer to home: the contract might give merchants the power to challenge his political authority. Osgoode, Simcoe's Chief Justice, summarized cogently the administration's perception of political threat in the contract: Should any man from Jealousy or resentment be desirous of cherishing an Opposition to the measures of the King's Lieutenant Governor in Upper Canada he will be anxious that the Management of the Flour Contract shd be in the hands of those Gentlemen [Hamilton and Cartwright] who distinguished themselves so much in the Course of the last Session. The Importance of the Engine is not sufficiently attended to Grain is the sole produce of the Country and a Market the only benefit required Give me the Controul of that Market and I will ensure the Result of evry Proposition to be made in a House where evry man is a Farmer The proceeding is not fair-You might as reasonably expect the Business of the Country to be carried through by Ministers with the whole patronage of Government in the Hands of Opposition. at

Simcoe agreed. He as discovering pragmatically what the merchants already knew: political institutions were weak in this pioneer society while the forces of the economy were extremely strong and could exercise a powerful influence on patronage and politics. Simcoe, accustomed to functioning within English politics, which depended heavily upon patronage for its coherence, was appalled by the lack of patronage available to him in Upper Canada. After several years of frustration, he summarized his bitter experience. The executive could not exercise an influence within the Assembly: Such a government as that of Upper Canada, must be extremely weak in its infancy from the total deficiency of those means of forming an influence which interested motives of the collision of opinion necessarily create in large Communities. The fact is that Government in this Province can neither return a member of the House of Assembly, nor secure his support when he shall be entered therein . . . . :1:1

114 THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON Given such conditions, Simcoe could easily see a threat to the central political power in the provisioning contract. In a state of farmers, whoever dominated agriculture had the potential to dictate policy in the Assembly. The administration's response to the dangers it saw both to the province and to itself was formulated by John McGill with Simcoe's active support. The first requisite according to McGill was that the supposed monopoly of supply of a small number of merchants be ended and that an agent directly responsible to the provincial government be appointed to purchase provisions at first market from the settlers. To facilitate direct supply by the colonists the government should agree to accept very limited quantities of flour from an individual-as little as a barrel or even a few bags. The government should construct magazines at each post for the storage of such flour. Finally, the government should pay for small deliveries of flour in specie, thus breaking the hold of merchant notes or bons on the local economy. 34 In attempting to enforce his views on the provisioning contract, Simcoe operated from a position of political strength. He complained to Alured Clarke, the lieutenant-governor of Lower Canada and later to Lord Dorchester, the governor general, about the contract. He wrote to his powerful political mentor in England, Evan Nepean, and to Henry Dundas, the minister to whom Simcoe was responsible. 3s While the contract continued, Simcoe attempted to ameliorate its workings by his influence with the contractors. In 1794, when the contract was slated for renewal, Simcoe through the Davisons delivered an intimation to Hamilton and Cartwright that if they wished to continue supplying the government with provisions they would have to soften their opposition. He felt the warning was successful and "contributed to a very visible change in the language of those gentlemen.' '36 With the support of Dundas, the Lords of the Treasury were finally prevailed upon in April 1794 to agree to alter the system of provisioning for Upper Canada. 37 Hamilton and the other major merchants of Upper Canada did not possess the political advantages of Simcoe. They were not men of sufficient note to command the ear of Dundas or the Treasury Board; their relationship to the Davisons was one of subordination. Yet they were not entirely without resources: their trade network, which had served them well in the past, operated again in their interest. With the provincial government at Niagara and later York, instead of Quebec City, the merchants would make contact directly with it rather than relying on intermediaries as they formerly had done. Most local appointments became the prerogative of the Simcoe administration, which relied on local sources of information in awarding patronage rather than on the recommendations of the army or the Montreal merchants. Still, the structure of the Laurentian trade network continued to be significant for the merchants both in internal politics and in matters of imperial concern. The cooperation of Hamilton and Cartwright is a cogent example of the

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impact of Laurentian trade on provincial politics. They continued their old partnership through politics. The existing'minutes of the Legislative Council show that Hamilton and Cartwright early seized an initiative in the presentation of measures to it. They operated as a team, one almost invariably seconding and defending the motions of the other. Their cooperation was founded upon a long association in trade and a similarity of economic interests based upon their participation in the same merchant network. 3s Just as they coordinated their actions with each other, so Cartwright and Hamilton, as well as John Askin, maintained a close contact with their suppliers on political matters. Cartwright faithfully wrote a detailed summation to Isaac Todd after each of the first three sessions of the Upper Canadian Legislature, outlining his relations with the administration and his complaints against its policy. These letters have long been used as the major source of information on the resistance to the Simcoe administration, but little thought has been given to their purpose. They were meant not to satisfy the idle curiosity of an old friend, but to keep the man who was in effect the merchants' agent in London informed of developments in Upper Canada. It is clear from the letters that Todd responded to them and clear as well that on certain specific matters, he was of aid to the merchants. 39 Todd conducted a general lobby in London to assure that all supplies that it was possible to obtain for internal use were purchased in Upper Canada itself. Cartwright acknowledged his aid: Every Body in this Province ought to be much obliged to you for your exertions in representing to the People at Home the propriety of taking as much of the Supply, for at least the Persons employed in it from the Province itself, as it can possibly afford & a different Conduct, without even a nominal Saving would be a serious Discouragement to the colonists. But the most obvious Truths require at Times Illustration & Argument and with the Aid of these are not always successful against Prejudice and Official Habits.40

Such lobbying did indeed have its purposes: at one point in the provisioning controversy, the home government considered ending the matter by purchasing all supplies outside the province. 41 Todd served his own clients as well as the general provincial interest. In a letter to Askin, he gave a hint of the arguments he used with those in authority to defend the contract he had gained for his customers: Your represe [n] tatives ought to be carefull they dont do a general injury [in agitating against the grain contract] without answering either the purposes of envy or individual benefit ... it requires attention Trouble & Expense to make the most of Farmers industry and which they cannot do of themselves . . . . 42

Todd was the eyes and ears of the major Upper Canadian merchants in London. It was he who informed a surprised and indignant Cartwright of the aspersions of disloyalty Simcoe was casting upon him and Hamilton in his official letters. A figure as powerful as Henry Dundas accepted Simcoe's

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characterization of the two merchants and recommended they be disciplined. It was very much to their advantage that, as Cartwright put it, a "Cndian gentleman" in London "took measures to offset" the effect of those aspersions. 43 In addition to political assistance, Todd aided the merchants in financial matters. In the last year during which the provisioning contract functioned Todd stood a bond of indemnity with George Davison for all the Upper Canadian agents so that Davison would continue to give them the privilege of first option on supply. 44 The merchants also maintained a continuing correspondence with Montreal which they supplemented with frequent visits to that city. William Osgoode sensed the significance of these merchant contacts. In 1795, Osgoode, then chief justice of Lower Canada, wrote Simcoe to ask: Do you know whether the ex-Justices of the Midland and Home Districts [Cartwright and Hamilton] owed their Management & Share of ye Contract to any Influence in this part of the World? I have more than once taken occasion to maintain with a degree of Exultation the Contempt with which the Opposition to the Judicature Bill was treated in Your House of Assembly-but it did not afford any Satisfaction to others. 45

Later, Osgoode was even more definite about the purposes of the merchant excursions to Lower Canada. With what is probably a reference to Hamilton, he wrote to Simcoe: Be assured that the Annual Winters' Visit to Quebec is politico-Commercial. That one so close cropped who pricks up his predestinating Ears should affect to be a Royalist exceeds the powers of Face-Caveto, Caveto. 46

Despite Osgoode's warnings, Simcoe seems never to have grasped the significance of merchant contacts outside the province, a fact which could only have increased their effectiveness. The bitterness generated between Simcoe and Hamilton and Cartwright over the provisioning contract was further intensified by their struggle over the judicial system. The reaction of the Simcoe administration to the problems of local justice paralleled its reaction to the provisioning controversy. In neither case did the administration initiated by the Legislative Assembly which in October 1792 passed an act use it was felt merchants were making of the Court of Common Pleas and, according to John White, Simcoe's attorney general, there was a widespread expectation that the Simcoe administration at its commencement would quickly legislate some change. Hamilton and his fellow justice, Butler, were anxious enough to assume a defensive position in addressing Simcoe on the subject of the court. 47 The magistrates need not have worried. The Simcoe administration did not immediately perceive the merchants' influence in the courts. The first attempt to limit the powers of the judges of the Courts of Common Pleas was in fact

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initiated by the Legislative Assembly which in October 1792 passed an act "to Abolish Summary Proceedings in the Courts of Common Pleas" by establishing jury trial for all causes above forty shillings. Simcoe did not mention the measure in his summation of the proceedings of the legislature to Dundas. In fact, he indicated to D.W. Smith that he was content to see the Courts of Common Pleas continued. A failed attempt by a member from the Niagara peninsula to further limit the powers of the courts in 1793 also received neither mention nor any known support from Simcoe. 48 Conditions were changing, however, by 1793. Already suspicious of the merchants because of the provisioning controversy, the Simcoe administration took little convincing to believe that the merchants were using the courts as part of some larger scheme to dominate local society. John White, under the influence of the bitter local discontent with the court in the Niagara area-a discontent his position particularly exposed him to-came to accept that, through the courts, "those who have had power, have lorded it with a rod of Iron. "49 The administration rapidly swung from relative indifference to the courts to unqualified assertions about the interested manner in which the merchants were using them. By 1794 the administration had decided that if the provisioning contract gave the merchants economic dominance of their local societies, the Courts of Common Pleas was the merchants' instrument for enforcing that dominance. In his official correspondence Simcoe hinted at grave personal improprieties on the part of the merchant judges. In the Western District, he pointedly asserted, "respectable merchants" had refused office because they believed no case would ever come before them in which they were not personally interested. In the Home and Midland Districts, however, the bailiwicks of Hamilton and Cartwright, merchants, "who might with gter propriety have availed themselves of a similar excuse, but in a still more extensive line," but who had not been "actuated by like scruples, accepted the Office & till the first meeting of the Legislature decided every case without even the intervention of a Jury. "50 Simcoe came to the conclusion that the Courts of Common Pleas should be abolished and replaced by one supreme court for the entire province, the Court of King's Bench, with jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters. To ensure the end of merchant influence, he recommended that all nonprofessionals be banned as judges of the court. This court was to be supplemented by District Courts with jurisdiction in civil cases to a value of £ 15. They, too, would have professional judges. 51 Hamilton and Cartwright were the chief opponents of the changes. Cartwright eloquently praised the existing courts, their simplicity and their ability to resolve cases quickly without the long delays, complicated procedures, or the expense of centralized courts which would depend upon professional judges and lawyers. Cartwright and Hamilton, however, could

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not have been insensitive to the advantage of the courts in bulwarking the local influence of their judges. 52 With the executive, strongly backed by the Assembly, ranged against them, Hamilton and Cartwright had little hope of success in defending the existing system of local courts. They could not rely upon their Montreal and London contacts for aid; the proposed changes were a domestic matter which, unlike the provisioning controversy, was mainly of interest within the province. In 1794 the two merchants moved a six months' hoist on a bill to abolish the old system of courts and establish a centralized one. They received no support. Even in the Legislative Council they stood alone. They were out-voted four to two and, as Simcoe noted with satisfaction, "it was with the greatest difficulty the House of Assembly could be restrained from reading the Bill a first, second & third time on the Day they received it. ... "5:1 Related legislation to create lawyers necessitated by the new system was passed in the Assembly in one day without debate. 54 The District Land Boards, another local institution that had been of value to the merchants, was not a source of controversy: Simcoe expeditiously and without debate terminated them by a Minute of the Executive Council on November 6, 1794. As with provisioning and justice, Simcoe moved to centralize control of land in his own hands: all petitions for land grants thenceforth were to be made to the provincial government rather than locally appointed officials. The other functions of the land boards were terminated. 55 Simcoe was pleased with the results of his crusade against merchant privilege. Three years after its commencement he appeared to be the victor in the political arena. His contest with Hamilton-whom he had called "an avowed Republican ... justly obnoxious to the settlers of this Province"and Cartwright-who, according to Simcoe, operated from a .. Spirit of vanity and sordidness"-had been bitter and marked by personal aspersions. 56 By late 1794 it seemed that Hamilton had been stripped of his local prerogatives and was so out of favour with the government that he could not exercise any influence with it. Such, in fact, was not the case. The prerogatives Simcoe had wrested from the merchants had facilitated their operations but had not been essential to them. The success and influence of the merchants did not, as Simcoe thought, depend upon specific political privileges they enjoyed and the government had not touched the social and economic roots of the merchants' power. In the case of army provisioning, for instance, despite some administrative shuffling, nothing was fundamentally altered. In February 1795 Munro and Bell did acknowledge the end of their function as provisioning agents for Upper Canada; by July John McGill had been officially appointed agent of provisions for Upper Canada with authority to negotiate contracts for provisioning the various garrisons. McGill did not, however, take the initiative in inaugurating even the first step of the program he and Simcoe had projected: the construction of a series of magazines capable of receiving small quantities of flour, a measure which they had seen

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as essential to breaking the hold of major merchants on provisioning. Having won the political battle, the Simcoe administration was content and did not follow through on its projected economic changes. 57 Even if the proposals of McGill and Simcoe had been instituted, their efficiency would have been doubtful: McGill assumed, for instance, that the introduction of an adequate amount of specie into the country would undercut the merchant system of bons, thereby releasing the grip of merchants such as Hamilton on a significant portion of trade, reducing the price of supplies, and operating to the advantage of small farmers. A merchant as well established as Hamilton, however, did not rely exclusively on his bons to hold his trade; his retailing operations were of such a scale that they had developed a dynamic of their own. Pioneer farmers in the Niagara peninsula, bons or no, would no doubt have found themselves drawn into Hamilton's extensive trade network. Moreover, major merchants themselves could see advantages in a more readily available circulating medium: it could be the means of further extending their trade. It is rather ironic that Hamilton himself, in 1794, petitioned the government to supply the province' 'with the necessary small change for internal intercourse. "58 Likewise, when Simcoe made it a favourite scheme of his to establish magazines at the various posts to store flour because he saw it as "the only possible means of purchasing flour in this Country at a market price by rendering it impossible for the Merchants to monopolize the produce of the Country ... , ' , the merchants themsel ves supported the call for the establishment of public granaries. The existence of such storehouses certainly did not preclude the major merchants from either purchasing crops on speCUlation or in exchange for goods, leaving them as usual the major possessors of grain. The existence of such storehouses, as Richard Cartwright pointed out, would simply allow "the plenty of one year . . . to supply the scarcity of the next and the abundance of one district relieve the wants of another. "59 In their advocacy of public granaries and the acceptance of small amounts of flour McGill and Simcoe made the assumption that the army could and would alter its established mode of receiving supplies. But the army could not efficiently handle such small quantities and no guarantees of quality or durability could be enforced on amounts of such size. It is clear that at Niagara the army preferred to deal with established merchants it felt it could trust and it continued to do so. 60 If Simcoe and McGill believed that the system of army supply could be altered in detail, they also believed that the essential dynamic of the provisioning system still operated as it had in the Revolution. They thought private commerce was totally subservient to the political-military authority structure and therefore alterations in the structure of supply could make or break local traders. Ultimately, of course, this was still true; by buying its provisions externally the army could have eliminated a major sector of the

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merchants' business. But, as government policy on specie and granaries indicated, the major merchants were entrenched enough by 1791 to be flexible. The government could not easily devise a scheme to eliminate their influence in the produce market; merchants could no longer be dictated to, as they had been in the Revolution, by administrative fiat. It is indicative of the government's thinking that Simcoe and McGill constantly asserted that the local agents by their grain contract had a "monopoly," a politically created exclusion of all others from army supply. Their assumption was that political privilege alone gave certain merchants control of the market. In fact, the agents did not have any such privilege; they had only the privilege of first supply at the lowest market price. They did not in reality want a monopoly of supply because of the fluctuating production of Upper Canadian agriculture; in certain years, their areas were short of provisions and they did not want the responsibility or the cost of making up the deficit. What control of supply the merchants who acted as agents exercised depended as much upon the strength of their enterprises-on their abilities to efficiently collect grain at a given price-as upon political privilege. As events would show, their enterprises could effectively compete without such privileges. 61 Ironically, the year McGill assumed his duties was marked by crop failures throughout the Canadas and the following year yielded only poor crops. The government moved quickly from protesting the large portion of the market Hamilton dominated to investigating why he was unable to fulfil his contractual obligations. In the following two years, 1797 and 1798, the government faced stiff competition for local produce from the United States government. Under such difficult conditions McGill was inclined to rely upon the strength of the merchants who were established suppliers of the garrisons rather than challenge it. Between 1795 and 1800 an average of only eight suppliers, all merchants, shared in provisioning the garrison at Niagara; the others were dwarfed by Robert Hamilton who contributed between 34 per cent and 75 per cent of local supply by value. This did not represent a significant change from the period when Hamilton had acted as a local agent, a strong indication that his dominance of local provisioning did not depend on any special privileges inherent in that provisioning contract. 62 The supreme irony of the situation was that, having eliminated the intermediaries between itself and the merchants of Upper Canada and lacking experience in provisioning in a difficult period for supply, the Simcoe administration was forced to draw closer to the major merchants and to rely upon them for information. McGill's reports on provisioning to his suppliers, both in the Simcoe period and later, consisted in essence of quotations from major merchants such as Hamilton, Cartwright and Askin on the state of crops and the availability of supply in the regions. The impact upon the merchants of the increased centralization of the functions of the former District Land Board and the Court of Common Pleas is

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more difficult to assess. Both institutions had served Hamilton well in the period of initial settlement in matters such as the location of the district town. It is difficult, however, to imagine such institutions having a continuing impact of such magnitude beyond the period of initial settlement and their major use to the merchants may have been accomplished by the time they were abolished. Certainly, the merchant interest was sufficiently entrenched by the time of their abolition that it could find other means to protect and forward itself. Established status and economic power proved more important than structures of administration. When Hamilton brought his claims for land, based upon the transfer of settlers' certificates to him, before the Heir and Devisee Committee of the Executive Council, the committee passed his claims without controversy. Likewise, the courts continued to be used by merchants to sue for debt and there is no evidence that merchants found them unduly lenient. 63 Perhaps the major change produced by Simcoe's political victories was that they ameliorated his attitude towards the merchants. His fear of the merchants and their political power relaxed. It is indicative of this change that by late 1795, after three years of delighting in the checks the Legislative Assembly had administered to the merchants of the Legislative Council, Simcoe was talking of the Council, as he had in 1792, as a salutary check on the "Elective Principle" of the Assembly. By 1796 he was happy to report to the home government that there was no disposition in either house to oppose the measures of his government. Within the province he felt secure. Simcoe did continue to battle for a centralized control of the province entrusted to his hands, but he increasingly saw his opponents as outside the province. 64 Indicative of Simcoe's new relaxed attitude towards the power of the merchants was the resolution of the last major issue that remained between the political and commercial power groups - the establishment of regulations for landownership. The merchants were in a sensitive position: their rights to the land they held were tenuous and greatly complicated by the extent and complexity of their holdings. The immense acreage which Hamilton held had accrued to him in small scattered pieces which had often passed through several hands before coming to him. His right to a large proportion of his holdings was based upon the transfer to him of certificates given the original settlers for the land they occupied. Such transfers were of precarious legality. The certificates were not' patents; they gave possession but not ownership or necessarily the right to alienate land. Although it had originally been intended to issue patents to replace the certificates within a year, ten years had been allowed to elapse, thereby greatly complicating the problems of ownership. Land had changed hands frequently, much of it passing to the major merchants. 65 By 1795 the government was taking the first steps to exchange patents for certificates. The merchants had a significant interest in this matter. At the worst they faced the nightmare possibility that the Simcoe government would

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declare certificates non-transferable and would issue patents only to original holders, thus stripping the merchants of their lands. Such a policy, however, was unlikely because of the hardship it would work upon the settlers as well as the merchants. 66 A more likely, but hardly less frightening, prospect was that the governmenJ would force the present holders to document precisely the chain of transfer from the original holders to themselves. A merchant such as Hamilton would then be confronted with the prospect of having to defend his holdings piece by piece; he would have to search for documentation, which would often be non-existent, of the land's transfer from the individual to whom it was granted, now perhaps deceased, through heirs whose rights to the land were also uncertain, or through other holders' hands to his own. Mortgages on land held by certificate might prove an even greater problem since their legality was not established. The whole process would be further complicated if it were necessary to defend possession before some authority unsympathetic to t~e merchant interest. Hamilton and Cartwright had attempted to avoid all complications by seizing the initiative in land legislation. In the second session of the legislature, with their characteristic cooperation, Cartwright moved and Hamilton seconded a motion to introduce a bill "to facilitate the alienation of landed property and to make real estate liable to simple contract debts in the hand of heirs and devisees. "67 Simcoe saw in the proposed measure an unwarranted attempt by the merchants to arrogate to themsel ves a matter which was properly the concern of the executive. "Mr. Hamilton," he complained, "a member of the Legislative Council, has not scrupled to say, what He, in his folly, may attempt to perform, that He could carry a bill through both Houses to give titles to present possessors of land. ' '68 The merchants renewed their initiatives on the land question in November 1794. In that month, the land boards, which on their own authority had been recognizing the transfer of land certificates, were abolished. Their abolition and the subsequent diminution of Hamilton and Cartwright's local influence on land led them to press even more strongly for a resolution of the problem of converting certificates into patents. Hamilton painted a grim picture to the government of the results of inaction: The apprehensions entertained to the confusion that must ensue if speedy steps are not taken to negotiate this Business [land granting] & to establish it on pennanent Principles are unfortunately but too well founded . . . . If a door is once opened for asserting old claims on the supposition that legal fonns in the Transfer were Not attended to, or that no Transfer could be Legal such a scene of confusion of Injury & of Ruin would ensue as can neither be described nor easily conce i ved. 69

Hamilton then took an action which, if he had attempted it earlier, would probably have caused an explosion of resentment within the administration.

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Shortly after the government began to issue patents for certificates, Hamilton made a single-handed attempt to stop it. He had journeyed to England and Scotland in 1795 and on his own initiative, without prior consultation with the Simcoe government, sought an opinion from William Grant, at that time solicitor general to the Queen, on the legality of the patents. Grant opined that the patents were invalid because they contained no reference to land reserved to the clergy as the Constitutional Act of 1791 required. The only secure remedy, advised Grant, was an act of the provincial legislature validating those patents. Such an opinion suited Hamilton's interests well, since it involved the interposition ofthe legislature where he could hope to exercise an influence. 70 To a surprised Upper Canadian executive, however, this opinion which they had not sought was much less satisfactory. It called into question the legality of the government's program of land granting and would cause substantial delays while some response to Grant's objection was formulated. Hamilton had acted as an entrepreneur first and a politician second in dropping this direct challenge in the government's lap. Simcoe was greatly annoyed at the impropriety, not to say the arrogance, of an individual who held office in his government, without prior consultation, seeking an outside opinion on the patents. He believed Hamilton had created unnecessary problems and delays in land granting and did not hesitate to accuse him of attempting to disturb the tranquility of the province. Hamilton himself came to regret his actions: "Could I have foreseen," he wrote to Simcoe, "that alterations in subsequent Deeds would have rendered them ... perfectly unexceptionable, I should not have thought an application for a legal opinion in London necessary.' '71 Despite his resentment of what Hamilton had done, Simcoe did not attempt to focus the controversy over patents on the merchants or the impact of their land speculation. Earlier, in the provisioning controversy the Simcoe administration had accused the merchants of attempting to monopolize land to the detriment of agricultural settlement and even of contemplating an attempt to depopulate the province in their greed to acquire land. Now, however, Simcoe was content to concentrate upon the legal complications of converting certificates to patents. The problem was not finally settled until 1797, but the solution arrived at gave the merchants everything they wanted and more. The solution was embodied in the creation of the first Heir and Devisee Commission. Its commissioners were empowered to determine claims to land brought forward by the original nominees of the crown, their heirs, devisees or assignees. Much to the relief of the merchants, the commissioners were instructed that they were to base their decisions on "the best evidence they can procure, or that is laid before them, whether the same be such evidence as the law would require in other cases or not." Moreover, the holders of mortgages accepted by the commissioners as bona fide would receive from them a certificate to

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that effect, which when registered, was to have the same effect as if the lands had been under patent at the time the mortgage was made. Hamilton could take satisfaction in the fact that this, the final matter of contention between the lieutenant-governor and the merchants, had been resolved entirely in his favour. 72 Despite his rhetoric, Simcoe had never, even at the height of their differences, entirely severed his relations with the major merchants. Hamilton, for instance, had submitted, at the government's request, memoranda on Indian policy, government regulation of the fur trade, and the creation of local specie. The informal consultation of the government with him was probably even more extensive. Simcoe as the first governor of a new province could not have afforded to ignore the experience and knowledge of its best-informed and most powerful citizens, its merchants. Indeed, in some instances, the Simcoe administration could not have foregone the merchants' advice had it wished to.73 As tensions between the government and the merchants lessened, Simcoe's reliance upon them became even greater. Simcoe did continue to assert the need for vigilance against merchant dominance by such means as continued control of the provisioning contract and creation of a circulating medium, but such an emphasis had become largely rhetorical. Three years of controversy over the economy of Upper Canada had reinforced Simcoe's determination to develop its potential. By the fall of 1794 Simcoe's attention was turning from the dismantling of the merchants' privileges, which he believed he had essentially accomplished, to more positive action on the development of the economy of Upper Canada. The change was signalled by his massive and ambitious report to the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations. In it Simcoe affirmed once again his belief in the role of government in economic development: "No maxim will bear less examination than that 'trade should be left to itself.' It is not true in theory, nor in practice, unless on a limited scale, and in petty operations. "74 The circumstances of their economic success assured that the merchants of Upper Canada would share such a view. The shared belief in the role of government in the economy drew the political elite closer to the commercial one. Indeed, in his report Simcoe passed beyond simply asking the advice of these merchants to actually advocating their ideas. Simcoe proclaimed that the economy of Upper Canada would be based upon the exploitation of one staple, flour, much as the economy of Virginia had been based upon the exploitation of tobacco. He based the development of such a trade upon the provision by the political authorities of the entire economic infrastructure for the trade: inspection facilities, storehouses, transportation, marketing facilities and the capital to improve navigation. Great Britain was to furnish the capital to finance a corporation directed by members of the Executive and Legislative Councils and others of the principal

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inhabitants. This corporation would assume responsibility for the development of flour manufacturing and flour export; it would finance a network of storehouses and flour inspectors along the lakes and the St. Lawrence. Flour would be transported on the lakes in the' king's vessels and on the St. Lawrence in batteaux for which the corporation would hold the contract. Simcoe placed a heavy emphasis upon the role of the St. Lawrence in the Upper Canadian economy. The improvement of its navigation "is of the utmost importance to the British Empire-the facility or difficulty of its transportation influences the relative cheapness or dearness of the Commodities which are exported or imported." Finally the corporation itself would purchase the flour produced and market it. That the plan drew heavily for its ideas upon the economic system which had functioned under the military government during the Revolution when the central military authority had provided the infrastructure of trade in a very similar manner and that it stressed the development of a trade and a system of navigation in which the major merchants of Upper Canada were greatly interested was far from coincidental. The plan was in fact formulated by Hamilton and his memorandum outlining it accompanied Simcoe's report. 75 The other facet of the North American economy which Simcoe believed could be further developed in the British interest was the fur trade. Here, too, Simcoe now integrated the interests and ideas of the merchants of Upper Canada. His major suggestion of a far western factory for the fur trade derived from a plan of John Askin and he included as reference with his report a letter of Robert Dickson to Robert Hamilton describing the southwestern fur trade. Simcoe endorsed a portion of the proposal which Hamilton among others had made to him that by trade the Mississippi Valley could be drawn into the British sphere of influence. Such trade, he asserted, should be so conducted as to operate in the interest of Upper Canadian merchants. The credit and capital which supported the American Mississippi trade should not be, as it then was, passed through the American Atlantic seaboard, but through' 'the Inhabitants or Factors of Upper Canada. "76 Simcoe's strategy for economic development was not simply a mirror image of the desires of the merchants. He diverged from Hamilton's original suggestions in asserting that the fur trade of both the northwest and the southwest should be developed by an interior route linked to Hudson Bay, entirely excluding Upper Canada. Moreover, he saw trade to the Mississippi following a route from York, up to Georgian Bay and down Lake Huron, a secure interior route by Simcoe's estimate but one which would have entirely eliminated the role of Niagara, and Robert Hamilton, in continental trade. Simcoe's further thoughts on the Upper Canadian economy during his last year in the province were more in keeping with the interests of the major merchants. In December 1794 he recommended to the Duke of Portland the incorporation of the two major commercial towns within Upper Canada, Niagara and Kingston. The prime function Simcoe saw for these new

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corporations was commercial: they were to maintain jurisdiction over lakes shipping. Later Simcoe moved on to expound the idea of direct government involvement in commercial shipping by the purchase of British commercial vessels to prevent them from passing into American hands. Interestingly, these plans came to Simcoe when he was wintering at Kingston in 1794-95. They originated at least in part with Cartwright whom, Simcoe admitted, he now found to be a source of "much useful information."77 As hinted by his ideas on the incorporation of the commercial towns, Simcoe's increased sensitivity to local commerce was matched by a change in his attitude to the merchant role in government, particularly local government. In order to effectively concentrate political decision-making in his own hands, Simcoe had wished to be backed by an efficient network of officials and appointees. He had felt sharply the lack of such a political infrastructure in Upper Canada. In keeping with his military principles, Simcoe had preferred to place in office military men whose sense of discipline and habits of obedience would reinforce the tenuous lines of authority. For the highest public office, membership on the Executive Council, the choices he made personally were all military men. 78 Simcoe was also greatly concerned about the regulation of local government from the centre. As he asserted to Portland, "The distance that the seat of Government, wherever placed, must be from many parts of the Province, seem to me to require a gradation of Officers as absolutely necessary for its internal and subordinate regulation.' '79 Simcoe in fact concentrated upon one local office of his own creation, lieutenant of the county. This office was to be the focus of power within each region of Upper Canada and the linchpin between the regions and the central government. Its holders were to be at the head of local government and were to control virtually all significant local offices; to the lieutenants of the counties would be gi ven the first place in the Courts of Quarter Sessions and the recommendation of its constituent justices of the peace. The lieutenants would be the commanding officers of the militia with the right to nominate their subordinate officers. In practice, they would be consulted on most local appointments made from the centre and because of the lack of other sources of information their recommendations would almost always be accepted. Simcoe concentrated much power within one office for political as well as administrative reasons: it would guarantee the creation of an acceptable and loyal social hierarchy in Upper Canada. The thirteen colonies, in Simcoe's view, had rebelled because they haa lacked the guiding hand of an aristocracy. The office of lieutenant. of the county, with its powers and prerogatives, would stimulate the development of a nucleus of privileged families around which local aristocracies would develop. The personnel to fill these offices seemed obvious to Simcoe:

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Nothing presents itself more naturally than leaving the Superintendancy of such regulation in the hands of Persons whom the Colonists, principally disbanded Soldiers, have long been accustomed to consider as their Leaders, by having exercised the Administration of Justice, or having commanded them on the Field. lln

Simcoe deliberately chose the first lieutenants of the counties from the Loyalist officers who, although placed on Sir John Johnson's list of nominees, had been neglected in the selection of members of the Legislative and Executive Councils. SI His choice for Lincoln County, although it moved outside of Johnson's list, was a natural one: Lieutenant-Colonel John Butler. Much, however, occurred between Butler's appointment in 1792 and his death in 1796, and Simcoe's choice of a successor indicated a change in his attitudes. The new lieutenant was not a military man at all, but Robert Hamilton. Nor did the choice of Hamilton seem to be a single deviation in favour of the merchant interest. When called upon to recommend individuals for the most important offices subordinate to himself, justices of the peace, Hamilton submitted a list of names for the Home District; all were merchants and he mentioned three other individuals "equally entitled with those recommended." Hamilton did not, however, push their claims because, he asserted with some understatement, "They are all merchants and I feared that such addition might, to His Excellency, have the appearance of professional preference.' 'S2 On the contrary, Simcoe accepted the list as submitted and instructed that two of the three other merchants mentioned be added to the list. Likewise, in the militia, Simcoe approved the creation of a prestigious artillery company officered, at Hamilton's recommendation, by merchants, many of them his relatives. The company was a matter of sharp controversy with the peninsula and was disbanded by the Russell administration. s3 Simcoe did not attempt to explain the changing nature of his appointments, perhaps because it would have proved embarrassing to him; but one can hypothesize that, as he had come to understand the role of the merchants in the economy, so he came to recognize their power within the society. The only effective source of power within the Niagara peninsula had proved to be commerce. If one wished, as Simcoe did, to centralize power, one had to rely on those who had effective local knowledge and control. Through commercial operations merchants had the only effective network of local contact and local influence. In the end, Simcoe decided to attempt to harness it to governmental purposes.

CHAPTER 9

Merchants and ·Patronage

If Hamilton played an active part in local politics for most of his life, his interest in legislative politics declined sharply after the Simcoe administration. From a frequent opponent of the provincial government he was transformed into a staunch, if generally quiescent, supporter of it. Hamilton introduced no major legislative measures after 1796 and he took no part in the initiation of provincial political controversies; his attendance at the legislature became increasingly fitful. Hamilton's passivity is explained by a changing relationship between politics and commerce. Once the major conflict between officials and entrepreneurs over their powers and prerogatives had been fought and the relationship between the political and economic leaders had been defined to his satisfaction, Hamilton's interest in legislative matters and provincial policy waned. Of more immediate concern to him in later years was the garnering from the central government of patronage and influence for himself and his connections and the defence of his interests in the local politics of the Niagara peninsula where resentment of his predominance remained strong for another decade. The discussion of Hamilton's political influence and control of political patronage cannot be divorced from his economic network and the privileges it obtained for him. The most important early pieces of "patronage" Hamilton received were commercial: control of the portage at Niagara and a share of the Great Lakes receiving and forwarding trade. These privileges had come to him not primarily through political channels but through his participation in a merchant network. For Hamilton, politics and commerce were inextricably mixed. His commercial contacts had obtained for him his first political offices; at the provincial level, it was through a commercial lobby composed of Hamilton and his most important economic contacts that he had fought the Simcoe administration. Hamilton was not part of any provincial or local political patronage network. He received his local offices simply in recognition of his already existing local influence exercised through his commerce. Hamilton was not 128

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beholden to any inner circle of provincial officials for his influence. As Robert Bums has pointed out, the attention of provincial officials in the period ~fore 1812 was concentrated upon consolidating their own positions and on the placement of their offspring rather than creation of a clientage network in the hinterland. For those outside the political centre the lieutenant-governor himself may have remained the fount of patronage In the prewar period. Certainly, Hamilton's standing was sufficient that he treated directly with the lieutenant-governor as a power in his own right. Hamilton's awarding oflocal position reflected strong commercial and family biases, rather than an attempt to build any broader office-holding compact at the regional level. I On the other hand, Hamilton was an active participant in a widely based commercial oligarchy composed of entrepreneurs linked by family ties, close friendships and economic interest. That oligarchy influenced the distribution of government patronage and of economic opportunities. Members of the network not only used their political influence to aid each other, but also exercised economic influence for each other, providing business opportunities and facilities for other members. This extra economic dimension gave the merchant network a breadth beyond politics and greatly increased its strength. Robert Hamilton and Richard Cartwright could, for instance, afford to oppose the Simcoe administration because they did not rely solely upon it for their power or position and could use other avenues than the administration to influence policy. Until recently, scholars examining the distribution of place and power in Upper Canada have concentrated their attention upon political patronage networks, local compacts within the regions, composed of small groups of office-holders who purportedly found coherence in the protection and perpetuation of their political privileges. These local elites were said to derive their power'from a "Family Compact," the source of power and patronage within the province, which was composed of an inner group of provincial officials linked by marriage and the exchange of privilege. 2 The efficacy and even the existence of this hierarchical structure of official patronage has been questioned, and more attention has been focused upon the regions themselves. The major study of local politics has suggested that the distribution of local office primarily reflected existing local power. The present study attempts to move one step further to examine in detail the specific social and economic base of Robert Hamilton's regional power. In so doing, it suggests that if not a larger provincial political network, then a series of commercial links, strengthened by family ties, was a major determinant in the distribution of place and power early in Upper Canada. 3 Any study of the distribution of official favour and position in Upper Canada before the War of 1812 must take Robert Hamilton into account. By 1800 he probably exercised more power over local office than any other individual in the western half of the province. The mechanics of the official distribution of

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local office in western Upper Canada in Hamilton's lifetime were a reflection of the institutional weakness of his society, a weakness which often worked to his advantage. In an attempt to buttress the weak central provincial authority, the structure of local government had been constructed to concentrate power within the hands of a limited number of nominated officials. This tendency was made even more acute in practice by the heavy reliance of the provincial authority upon the recommendation of the few individuals who had both knowledge of, and influence in, local society. Hamilton as the chief office-holder, but more importantly as the economically dominant figure in his region, exercised an influence over official patronage that was extraordinary both for its time span and its geographical range. As early as 1788 Hamilton, in consultation with John Butler, nominated the original members of the land board and the highways commission as well as officers of the militia for the Nassau District. Such influence did not diminish over time; by virtue of his position as county lieutenant, Hamilton possessed after 1795 a determining influence in the selection of positions within his own county. He had the right to nominate justices of the peace and militia officers. Official records indicate his recommendations for these positions were accepted without question. 4 Such was Hamilton's prestige that he was also directly consulted by the various lieutenant-governors on a variety of other local offices and was requested as well to assess certain individuals' pretentions to office. He is known to have had an influence in determining the holder of the ferry licence at Fort Erie, the registrars for both Lincoln and Haldimand counties, and the inspectors of beef and pork for the Western District and the districts of Niagara and London. Other offices were also undoubtedly within his purview. Hamilton through Lieutenant-Governor Hunter even affected the awarding of a commission in the regular army. 5 Hamilton's patronage power was not exclusively a function of his office, but depended in large part upon his personal influence as illustrated by his ability to influence appointments outside his district. In 1796 he, rather than any local worthy, had the disposition of the office of registrar of the County of Norfolk. Indeed, the central government informed Hamilton first of the appointment and he presented it personally to his local client. When the London District was created in 1800, Hamilton successfully garnered the prestigious office of clerk of the peace for the same candidate, Thomas Welch. Hamilton's nominee was also appointed the clerk of the District Court and registrar of the Surrogate Court, thus receiving three of the six new district offices. When Welch resigned two of these offices in 1806, Hamilton attempted to influence the choice of his successor. In the Western District, Hamilton is known to have influenced the selection of the receiver of rents for the King's Reserves, the collector of customs at St. Joseph, the vendue master at Amherstburgh, and the offices of clerk and storekeeper for the Indian Department at St. Joseph. These examples of Hamilton's influence depend

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upon the few scant sources of information on patronage that have survived and his influence was undoubtedly more extensive than they indicate. 6 Hamilton's letters indicate that in the recommendation of local appointments he operated independently rather than in conjunction with his fellow office-holders. There is little evidence that Hamilton aided or considered the interests of a broad office-holding elite; for significant posts, he is not known to have consistently favoured any locally prominent persons or groups outside his immediate family and economic contacts. Thomas Welch, for instance, was formerly a shopkeeper who had retailed goods provided by Hamilton at Fort Erie, and who as a merchant at Long Point had proved a useful agent to Hamilton in economic and political affairs. In the Western District, Hamilton favoured his relations, the Askins. Within his own district Hamilton appears to have seen first to the interests of his own relatives in the granting of office; when he moved beyond his family, as in his recommendations for magistrates to Simcoe in 1796, he tended to favour almost exclusively those who might share his economic interests, the local merchants. 7 It is impossible to know Hamilton's precise criteria in the selection of magistrates, militia officers and local officials, or to know how much he was influenced in his recommendations by local conditions and the advice of others. A few statistics, however, are revealing of the general tendency of office-granting under the influence of Hamilton. The militia of Lincoln County was hardly an effective military body; possession of a commission, however, enhanced one's local prestige. Before Hamilton's appointment as county lieutenant, the officership of the militia of Lincoln County was largely drawn from those with past military service. The militia in 1794 consisted of four battalions with eighty-two officers. Of these, fifty-seven officers (or 70 per cent) had.served with the Loyalist corps or the regular army. A further 13 per cent, eleven officers in all, were offspring of Ranger and Indian Department personnel. Of the fourteen individuals who were not related to the military, only two were known to have been merchants. By 1804, however, under Hamilton's influence, there were noticeable changes in the appointments. At that date there were six battalions and an artillery unit in the county, having a total of 169 officers. Those who had not fought in the Revolution and were not related to those who had, now constituted eighty of the officers, 47 per cent of the total. Of these, twenty-six were merchants. Hamilton himself, as well as Thomas Dickson, Thomas Clarke, Robert Nichol and William and John Robertson were all officers. Ii In 1791 there were sixteen justices of the peace. Four (or 25 per cent) were merchants, ten (or 63 per cent) were former military personnel or their offspring. By 1808, there were twenty-eight magistrates. Thirteen (or 45 per cent) were merchants; only eight (or 29 per cent) were former military personnel or their offspring. Half of the magistrates in the military personnel category were also merchants. The magistrates in 1808 included Robert Hamilton; his cousins Thomas Clarke and Thomas Dickson; Clarke's relation,

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James Muirhead; Hamilton's shipping agent at Fort Erie, John Warren Sr.; Warren's son, John Warren Jr.; Richard Beasley, a relation of Richard Cartwright; two other Scots merchants, Joseph Edwards and William Crooks; and Samuel Street Sr. Other local appointments do not reflect such a heavy representation of the commercial element or of Hamilton and his connections. Of the sixteen other offices listed in the Quebec Almanac for 1808, nine were held by military personnel and their descendants and six by merchants. One office-holder cannot be identified. Some of these positions, moreover, would not have been attractive to Hamilton and his clients. Four of the offices held by Loyalists were held by the only two Individuals in the Niagara peninsula who might be considered to derive their chief income from office, Ralfe Clench and Thomas Merritt. Merchants would not have had the time to perform the functions of such offices; likewise, other offices with limited functions and even more limited emolument, like inspector of flour, pot and pearl ash, inspector of beef and pork or inspector of shops, stills and taverns, would have been beneath the notice of major merchants. It is interesting that in the case of the collectors of customs, profitable posts which could be combined with merchandising, all four appointments were merchants and three of the four were closely connected to Hamilton. Perhaps the clearest indication of the impact of Hamilton on local office-holding was that no coherent local compact emerged in the Niagara peninsula before at least 1806. The predominance of the merchants associated with Hamilton retarded the development of a wider compact by alienating other groups such as the former Loyalist military officers, small office-holders not of Hamilton's appointment, and the smaller merchants, groups which with Hamilton and his connections might have formed a local compact. Their resentment turned these groups instead into a factional opposition to the interests of the major merchants. 9 As well as being independent of any local office-holding compact, Hamilton did not stand in any client-patron relationship to a provincial family compact. Neither of the two most important sets of papers for the study of early patronage, the Elmsley Papers and the Powell Papers, indicate that Hamilton applied directly to these officials for aid. Hamilton's prominence and influence in fact earned him the animosity of some important provincial figures. Judging by their correspondence, Hamilton's relationship with Peter Russell, the senior public official, receiver general, and administrator in Simcoe's absence, was formal and cool. IO Indeed, Russell in 1801 wrote to William Osgoode, another official with no love for the merchant, concerning a personal slight from Hamilton: .. Your prophetick opinion respecting the prevalience of Northern [Le. Scottish] Influence in this ill-fated Province is Verified every Hour-The faction is indeed become already so strong that individuals think they may safely show their contempt for public opinion by

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acting contrary to the Principles of Honour and Justice. "11 Osgoode's successor, John Elmsley, who was also Lieutenant-Governor Hunter's chief advisor among his officials on patronage matters, was likewise uneasy about the extent of Hamilton's power, especially his propensity for amassing land and his potential influence on land policy. 12 Hamilton was not without allies at the centre. He had a warm relationship with D.W. Smith, the first surveyor general of the province. The Hamilton family had close social contact with the family of William Jarvis, the provincial secretary; two of Hamilton's sons married daughters of Jarvis and William Dickson married the Jarvis's governess. A daughterofW.D. Powell, puisne judge of the Court of King's Bench, also married into the Jarvis family and the Hamiltons visited constantly with the Powells, suggesting links among the three families. Powell advised Hamilton in his contest with Simcoe over land policy. Powell, however, had practised law at Montreal during the Revolution and had been judge of the Court of Common Pleas at Detroit before the formation of Upper Canada. His intimacy with the Hamiltons may have developed out of their mutual Montreal contacts in the Revolutionary period and from Powell's close association with Hamilton's relatives at Detroit. In any case, although they would be of substantial aid to his family after his death, neither the Powells nor the Jarvises were part of the inner circle of government officials during most of Hamilton's lifetime. Hamilton is not known to have approached either of them for aid in patronage matters. 13 So far as it did depend upon the political structure, Hamilton's control over patronage rested upon his relationship with the .lieutenant-governor. Hamilton's influence was greatest in the last years of the Simcoe administration, when he gained significant office for himself and in the years when Hunter was lieutenant-governor, at which time he had the disposition of most of the patronage he bestowed upon his relatives and his economic connections. In addition to office, crown land was a source of government patronage from which Hamilton benefited. Before the Simcoe administration, crown grants to Hamilton had been modest, amounting to only 700 acres. 14 Simcoe substantially augmented this grant by approving a further 3,000 acres for Hamilton on the basis of his status and general contribution to soc iety, for the ad vantages .. deri ved to this District [N iagara] in various instances from the public spirit and exertions of the petitioner, both as a magistrate and in his private capacity." 15 Between the Simcoe and Hunter administrations, despite his distant personal relations with Russell, Hamilton did manage to exploit Russell's interest in the creation of a landed class to amass large crown grants for his family. In 1797, for example, seven of Hamilton's sons and stepsons petitioned Russell asking "such a portion of the waste lands of the Crown as His Honour may think proper to the purposes and conformable to the rank which the family have hitherto held in the society and which they with this aid will endeavour steadfastly to maintain. "16

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The administration proved very eager to uphold the status of the Hamiltons and was rather apologetic about the contribution it felt it could make towards that end: The Board considering the great benefit Mr. Hamilton has been to this infant colony & the high rank he holds in it, regret they have it not in their power to mark their sense of this by a larger donation of lands than 1,200 acres to each of his sons mentioned in this petition . . . . J7

In addition to this 8,400 acres, an eighth son had in 1798 received a similar grant of 1,200 acres almost as soon as he drew breath. An examination of the deed abstracts suggest that all this land was deeded directly to Robert Hamilton rather than his sons and remained in the family patrimony until the division of the estate. Hamilton's most profitable relationship with a lieutenant-governor was with Peter Hunter. Personal relations between them were warm: Hamilton named his youngest son after Hunter. The results of the friendship in tenns of influence were substantial. When John Askin approached Hamilton with a patronage request in 1802, Hamilton responded that he had received so many favours of late from the governor that he was ashamed for some time to ask for more. IS Of the thirteen government appointments outside his own district over which Hamilton is known to have exercised an influence, eight occurred during Hunter's tenn. Other merchants closely connected with HamiltonScots who had been involved in the fur trade-also were confident of their ability to gain patronage and favour from Hunter. William Robertson, the former Detroit merchant, was certain of his ability to clinch a land claim "by speaking to His Excellency, to whom I have for some years had the honour of being personally known. "19 Isaac Todd was also as a "particular friend" of HunterO and even before Hunter's arrival in Upper Canada as governor, both Todd and Robertson were predicting to John Askin that they could gain a salaried seat on the Executive Council for him.21 Others outside the Scots merchant group recognized these links between Hunter and an extended group of Scots merchants although they had less reason to be happy about them. Robert Thorpe protested against the •• Scotch faction" which historians have identified with certain Scots officials in Hunter's government. 22 Thorpe himself, however, focused upon the "scotch pedlars" who "had insinuated themselves into favour with General Hunter, & that have so long irritated & oppressed the people; there is a chain of them linked from Halifax to Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, York, Niagara & so on to Detroit-this Shopkeeper Aristocracy has stunted the prosperity of the Province & goaded the people until they have turned from the greatest loyalty to the utmost disaffection. ' '23 As Thorpe implied, Hunter was connected to the merchants by their mutual Scottish origins. More importantly, Hunter had served as an officer in British North America in the immediate post-Revolutionary period when links

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between the military and the Laurentian trading system were strong. He had arrived at Quebec with the 60th Regiment in 1787 and in 1788 was stationed as commandant at Niagara. There he met Robert Hamilton who undoubtedly followed with Hunter his practice of cultivating important military men. From 1789 to 1791, Hunter was stationed at Montreal where he made the acquaintance of fur trade magnates, men such as Robertson and Todd, who were always anxious to establish personal contacts with that small officer group who could exercise such powerful influence on their western enterprises. Robertson and Todd renewed their acquaintance with Hunter when they travelled to England. Hunter's affiliation with the Scots merchants, then, was based upon the old and long-established network of contacts between the military and the merchants associated with Laurentian supply.24 Although historians have long neglected the import of Thorpe's assertions about it, a small but powerful merchant oligarchy comprising Robert Hamilton and his Niagara kin, John Askin and his relations at Detroit, Hamilton's old partner, Richard Cartwright, at Kingston and Isaac Todd and James McGill at Montreal, did exercise a powerful influence in the main settlements of early Upper Canada. Indeed, this • •Shopkeeper Aristocracy" in its operations had a depth of influence and a complexity which Thorpe did not conceive. As Thorpe described the network, it worked largely through politics, members of it influencing the policy and patronage decisions of the governor. In fact, the merchant network operated through the cooperation of its members, exercising a combination of direct influence upon major political figures and influence in commercial matters beyond the realm of politics. The diversity of economic, social and political concerns with which the .. Shopkeeper Aristocracy" in vol ved itsel f and the interaction of its various members can be well illustrated from the perspective of the Askin family, Hamilton's Detroit relations. The most striking characteristics of the pioneer merchant network to which Askin and Hamilton belonged was its complexity. Its members were associated directly or indirectly in various small groups defined by kinship, trade concerns and geographical area; the subgroups constituted part of a larger Laurentian system of commerce. The interweaving of the various strands placed a web of influence at each member's disposal. John Askin Sr., for instance, in his own locale benefited from his trade links to mutual Detroit relatives of himself and Hamilton, particularly to William Robertson, his relation by marriage. 25 Askin also had strong links to the Scots kinship network which centred on Robert Hamilton at Niagara. He had aided his son-in-law, Hamilton, in his initial establishment and had cooperated with Hamilton's cousins in various trade ventures. In return, he had been included in the trade and shipping enterprises of Hamilton and his relations. 26 The Askin and Hamilton family network at Detroit and Niagara were suqsumed in a wider Laurentian trade network, centred in Montreal on their mutual suppliers, Todd and McGill, and including their old commercial

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associate at Kingston, Richard Cartwright. Askin, like his former co-partners, Hamilton and Cartwright, benefited from the contracts to supply the garrisons of Upper Canada which Todd and McGill had obtained for them in 1793. In the same year, through the influence of Isaac Todd, Askin received a contract to provision the North West Company. Todd and McGill exercised a continuing influence in Askin's favour with the Quebec and Upper Canadian governments. 27 Just as the local merchant networks in which Askin and Hamilton participated were formed upon family ties, so the broader Laurentian trade network in which they participated was reinforced by strong bonds of friendship dating back to the early days of the English fur trade. Askin's association with Todd and McGill reached back as far as 1761, two years after the Conquest. Both Todd and McGill took an avuncular interest in the Askin family. They protected John Askin from the effects of his heavy commercial debts and showered his family with largesse, giving the Askins the land on which the family estate stood, aiding the daughters in times of financial stress and, in McGill's case, leaving a substantial legacy to the family in his will. Such bonds of loyalty and friendship were characteristic of the closely knit fur trade community. Hamilton, although not as intimately connected to Todd and McGill, also benefited from these fur trade traditions of loyalty and mutual aid. 2M Askin's enterprises after the Revolution were in a state of decline; his very economic survival probably depended upon the economic aid exercised on his behalf by the merchant network to which he belonged. The merchant network, moreover, influenced the political sphere in his favour, as well as the commercial. The close coordination and the collective power of the members of Askin's merchant network can be illustrated by the efforts of Hamilton, William Robertson, Todd and McGill, Cartwright and Alexander Grant to influence the provincial government in favour of certain land claims by Askin. Like most men of some substance in his period, John Askin speculated heavily in land. Among his speculations was the purchase of forty certificates for unlocated land totalling 8,000 acres. He wished to locate this land in a block near other lands he possessed in the Western District. The unlocated lands were especially important to Askin because his creditors had agreed to take those lots at a valuation of £4,000 in payment of a proportion of his debts. In 1798 the institution of new land regulations made Askin fear for the validity of h-is title to these lands. "I do not recollect," he wrote, "having ever been more interested in any Event than this. "29 In a situation where his interests were vitally affected, Askin naturally turned to the most powerful influence available to him, his family and economic connections. Between 1798 and 1801 Askin conducted a correspondence campaign to secure the aid of his network in forwarding his land claims. "I am obliged to call on all my Friends," Askin wrote to Richard Cartwright, "not only to exercise their

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personal Influence in my behalf but also to call to their aid such as are capable from their situations of giving any. "30 His correspondents' replies affirmed the solidarity of the network. "I know you so well entitled to every favour Government can confer," Cartwright replied, •·that I shall most cheerfully exert any little Influence I may possess. " Cartwright approached the chief justice and Jacques Baby, a member of the Assembly for Askin's area, about the matter. 31 Robertson and Todd used their influence with Lieutenant-Governor Hunter. Alexander Grant personally took Askin's claims to York and presented them. As a result, Askin received all the land in contention with the exception of fourteen lots.:12 The network attempted to influence legislation as well as lobby for favours for individual members. In this respect, Hamilton was a useful contact for Askin in bringing forward a bill to increase the number of judges in each district and in using his influence with Lieutenant-Governor Hunter to recommend those from Askin's area who in his opinion were fit for the position .•• As far as my poor endeavours can go," wrote Hamilton in 1804 in response to further requests from Askin, ··it shall be extensive enough to meet the Cases you Mention, & I shall not fail to take your letter to York for the perusal of our friend Cartwright. "33 Although he discouraged a request for sponsorship for new land legislation Askin had drafted, Hamilton's • ·poor endeavours" in 1804 included passing to Askin details of proposed land legislation that might be of use to him. Interestingly, it was almost exclusively through the channels provided by his kinship and economic links that Askin attempted to exercise a political influence beyond his local society. In 1792 Askin made what appears to be his only major venture into electoral politics by acting as the election agent of D. W. Smith in the contest for the seat in the first Legislative Assembly for Essex and Suffolk. Smith did not appear in the constituency during the campaign and much of the credit for his victory probably can be attributed to Askin whom he termed his ··Worthy Patron. ":14 Askin, aware of the facility with which his merchant contacts gained him influence, expected his political representative in a like manner to forward his interests. In the first session of the first parliament he expected his member to see that his interests were considered in such general matters as the formulation of a police bill and the constitution of township government as well as to forward such specific matters as a memorial presented to Simcoe by the Detroit merchants, to influence the choice of a lieutenant-colonel of the Kent militia and of county lieutenants for Kent and Essex, and to gain a major road for his district. :15 Smith was not able to satisfy Askin. He was a young man without the established connections of Askin's merchant contacts. Even as his influence grew, Smith had other constitutents to satisfy besides Askin. In the event, Askin grew disgusted with legislative politics and abandoned any direct interest in it, turning instead to a total reliance upon his trade and kinship

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networks. Smith's solution to his failure to satisfy Askin's requests was to recommend that Askin rely upon more powerful figures, his own relatives. "I wish you by no means to neglect your application to the Commodore [Alexander Grant] & Mr. Hamilton their Age & Situation in the Province make their recommendations of weight. "36 Askin appears to have taken Smith's advice. Correspondence between the two fell off rapidly. Askin had infrequent communications with Smith between 1796 and 1800 concerning land matters in which Smith played a less prominent role than Askin's relatives and suppliers. Beyond that date, Askin found it more profitable to rely entirely upon his kin and business links and to ignore his elected representatives. Such was the political influence of the merchant network to which he belonged. Alexander Grant, Askin's brother-in-law, stood in somewhat the same relationship to him as D.W. Smith. Grant's influence, like Smith's, was almost exclusively within the realm of provincial politics; although he had been significant in the fur trade, he had retired by the end of the Revolution to a rural existence. On the surface, his potential for aiding Askin appeared very significant. Politically, he was the best placed of Askin's kin: a member of the Executive Council from 1792, he was Askin's only relative to assume cabinet status; he also for one year, in 1805-1806, enjoyed the post of administrator of the province. Grant, like Hamilton, supported Askin's wishes for legislation of a local nature. He sometimes lent a hand to the solution of Askin's complex land problems, but showed him little favouritism. His greatest aid in land matters was to promise during his presidency to help several of Askin's Essex friends in obtaining 200 acre lots-if they paid the fees. 3 ; Although Grant did aid in getting Askin appointed a school trustee and a commissioner for issuing oaths, he was of limited help in gaining important offices for the family. He gave no discernable succour in 1802 when Askin hinted his eldest son needed aid and was equally impervious to a more direct prod in 1806. Unlike those of Askin's kin who were linked to him by economic considerations, Grant took no measures on his own initiative to forward the Askin family. In all this, there appeared to be no particular animus on the part of Grant or resentment on the part of the Askins. The most likely explanation for Grant's limited use to the Askins is that business links were the vivifying force of the kinship network; those with economic connections found it easier and more to their own advantage to aid each other.3s Influence over official position in addition to influence over legislation, lobbying and commerce was the final function performed for the Askins by the merchant network. In terms of official patronage, the year 1803 proved a fortunate one for the Askin family. John Askin Sr. requested of Hamilton the post of "Receiver of the rent of the King's Reserves" for himself and was awarded it, while at his request, the influence of Isaac Todd helped gain his friend, William Hands, a well-established merchant, the office of sheriff.

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John Askin Jr. was to enjoy a long career as a government official thanks to his connections. In 1803 he received his first offices: with Todd's sponsorship, he became collector of customs at Amherstburg and his father, with success, sought the influence of Grant, Hamilton and Cartwright in obtaining for his eldest son the right to act as "vendue master" [auctioneer] at Amherstburg. The income from such posts was limited and Askin senior had higher ambitions for his son. At the father's request, Isaac Todd in 1803 began to lobby for the offices of clerk and storekeeper at St. Joseph's Island for John Jr., posts the son would receive in 1807 and hold until his death. In the interim Todd's recommendation was strengthened by those of Hamilton as well as such long-established fur trade merchants as McGill, Richardson and McGillivray. By 1809 Hamilton's influence added to these two posts that of collector of customs at St. Joseph.39 In summary, the manner in which Robert Hamilton exercised his influence reveals a good deal about the distribution of both official patronage and economic privilege within the province of Upper Canada before 1812. Hamilton's influence on official patronage was broad, extending over all of western Ontario, yet he did not function as part of any extended office-holding patronage network or Family Compact, nor is there any reason to assume the existence of such networks at least within the Niagara District on the basis of a study of Hamilton. Hamilton's most important link was simply and directly with the lieutenant-governor. Hamilton did, however, function as a part of a merchant oligarchy whose existence has previously been slighted by historians. The oligarchy exercised a very significant province-wide influence by means of cooperation among its members both in politics and economic matters. Its membership was small. Its core consisted of Todd and McGill, the Montreal suppliers, and their chief clients in the major centres of popUlation along the Great Lakes, Richard Cartwright, Robert Hamilton and John Askin. Others who benefited, mainly the second generation of the Askin and Hamilton families, participated because of their kinship to those who constituted the core. It is not inconceivable that other such merchant networks, linked to other suppliers, functioned in early Upper Canada, although they were probably less influential. In some ways, the merchant oligarchy of which Hamilton was a part does resemble the older conception of a political Family Compact linked to local compacts. The merchant oligarchy was province-wide and did have within it obvious family links. Unlike the supposed political compacts, however, the merchant oligarchy in its functioning was based upon cooperation among a number of near-equals rather than a hierarchical structure. Although many members of this merchant oligarchy were linked by kinship, the kinship network that existed was subsumed in a larger trade network without family links. Moreover, there are indications that economic interest rather than kinship was the central dynamic both within the Hamilton-Askin kinship

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network and in the larger merchant oligarchy. Many of the kinship links were tenuous. Could kinship alone, for instance, have bound the Askins strongly to Nichol, Clarke and the Dicksons, who were merely cousins of their in-law, Robert Hamilton? Or did kinship alone bind Hamilton to his wife's first husband's brother, William Robertson? Conversely, close family ties between Askin and his brother-in-law, Grant, counted for little when not augmented by trade connections. Contacts were close between entrepreneurs linked by blood or marriage because they found it economically and politically advantageous to make them so. The merchant oligarchy was a logical product of a pioneer society where the links of Laurentian trade were still the most effective network of communication and influence within the province.

CHAPTER 10

Merchants and Local Leadership in the Niagara Peninsula

The merchant network to which he belonged assured Hamilton's general success in the public sphere; it made him a power to be reckoned with in provincial politics and in the distribution of government patronage. In one significant sector, however, Hamilton's commercial contacts outside the Niagara peninsula were of little use to him: they exercised no influence over local politics. As a result, Hamilton's influence on local elections was at best fluctuating. Indeed, his outside contacts operated to his disadvantage in local politics; the privileges Hamilton and those merchants associated with him derived from outside contacts fuelled a popular resentment of them. It is important to stress that local tensions did not go very far beyond occasional rather gentlemanly electoral scraps. Despite jealousy of Hamilton's pre-eminence in his community, the social animosities engendered by it never erupted into serious and sustained local confrontation. Hamilton was admired as well as envied; his power generated a certain respect. He and the Scots associated with him, moveover, enhanced their social status by assuming both the responsibilities and the trappings of social leadership. Hamilton assumed to the full the lifestyle of a gentleman. In 1791, when others in the peninsula might be considering the construction of their first permanent home, Hamilton was completing a substantial mansion which would have done a member of the British gentry proud. There he entertained lavishly. In 1799 the local paper reported that on St. Andrew's Day, he gave "a most elegant dinner, at which were thirty Scotch gentlemen and twelve others of different nations. It is said that no diner on any occasion has been given equal to Mr. Hamilton's .... "1 Almost as a matter of right, Hamilton undertook the role of host to all important visitors. There are few accounts of prominent travellers which do not include a stay at Hamilton's. Mrs. Simcoe was Mrs. Hamilton's constant companion. When Edward, the Duke of Kent, visited Niagara Falls in August 1792, he stopped at the Hamilton residence for refreshments. Indeed, it was Hamilton's boast concerning his guests that "the 141

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House, the Cellar, the Garden and the Carriages are all put in Requisition for their service . . . . "2 His fellow citizens could not help but feel a certain grudging pride in Hamilton's public hospitality. Hamilton's relations tended to follow his lead in this matter. William Dickson built a grand brick house complete with an extensive library in Niagara-on-the-Lake, while Thomas Clarke constructed an impressive residence, overlooking, as one traveller described it, "the Great Fall, the Rapids, Goat Island, with a considerable part of the river, and commands a prospect beyond all dispute the most sublime and romantic in the world. "3 Surrounding his home, Hamilton kept a fairly extensive farm, a practice which reinforced his public image of landed gentility. Hamilton also, of course, possessed enormous landholdings. His own attitude to these holdings was pragmatic; he believed they would only be profitable when divided into small freeholds and sold and he harboured no illusions of vast family estates. Still land, even uncultivated land, carried with it an aura of stability and respectability. Virtually all of its prominent citizens were agreed in attaching this significance to Upper Canada's landholdings. D.W. Smith, the first surveyor general of the province, believed his crown grant of 1,400 acres in the Western District would give him sufficient weight and solidity with the voters of the area to win election to the Assembly. John Elmsley, an early chief justice, spoke of the "influence of extensive property" in giving "effect to the Laws" and keeping "the turbulent in good order, "4 while Simcoe's immediate successor, Peter Russell, believed that through landed holdings, high government officials could transmit the respect attached to their characters to their descendants. Russell expressed grave misgivings that mere merchants, socially inferior to government officials, should be amassing more land than they, but whether they approved or not, his contemporaries had to concede that Hamilton's lands gave him respectability.;; Hamilton and his offspring all showed a marked interest in books and learning. As an indication of his own status and as a mark of their future social roles, Hamilton was assiduous in the education of his children. Despite the size of his family, eleven children and stepchildren, Hamilton did not stint in what he saw as the crucial matter of schooling. After some preliminary preparation at Niagara, Hamilton provided his two stepsons, William and John Robertson, with a classical education in London at his expense. Hamilton gave his three oldest children, Robert, Alexander and George, at least two years local schooling before escorting them personally to Scotland for further education. For the younger members of the family, James, Samuel, Joseph, Peter, John and Mary, Hamilton provided a Scots tutor at home and education at Schenectady. After his death, all of the younger children, including the daughter, were sent to Edinburgh for further education in accordance with their father's wishes. William Dickson's sons also received a Scottish education. 6 Hamilton's respectability was based upon more than simply his possession

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of the trappings of the good life. He closely associated himself with those social institutions which provided him with concrete opportunities for benefiting his community. Such associations further enhaI1ced his status. One of the first institutions to emerge in the peninsula was the Agricultural Society. Its formation was stimulated by Simcoe who was its first president and donated ten guineas to it annually. Robert Hamilton was a founding member and its second president. William Dickson was also a member. The society offered local service by providing fruit trees and in general encouraging good agricultural practice. Even Hamilton, however, admitted that the society did not make "a great deal of noise. " Its members did flatter themselves, nevertheless, "that they have done some little good and they have enjoyed much comfort.' '7 The more convivial aspect of the society undoubtedly did much to cement relations among the social elite of the peninsula. Such relations were also, no doubt, aided by sUbscription balls, the frequency of which visitors commented upon, and by the Masonic lodges scattered through the area. The Masonic order had come to Niagara with the 8th Regiment of Foot in 1773. Hamilton was a provincial deputy grandmaster of the order and Colonel John Butler a grandmaster. The influence of such position should not be underestimated. Of the nineteen lodges in Upper Canada in 1802, eight were in the peninsula. 8 The Agricultural Society kept a small library which it eventually donated to the Niagara Library, another organization of which Hamilton was a founding member. 9 With John Butler, Hamilton was one of the first two church wardens elected for the Township of Niagara in 1793 and with Butler, he took a major role in bringing the established church to the peninsula. It was Hamilton and Butler who wrote a joint letter to the Bishop of Nova Scotia in 1789 requesting that he send an Anglican clergyman to Niagara. They with ten other principal inhabitants bonded themselves to pay £ 100 a year for seven years to any clergyman appointed by the bishop. The clergyman who accepted the call, Robert Addison, soon discovered that his sponsors were less committed to the cause of the church than he could have hoped. "The humble settler who labours on his land is kind to him [Addison]," the clergyman wrote after his arrival, "the rich Trader endeavours to be polite; but he [Addison] is sorry to say that their subscription is likely to end in words. ".0 Addison was right. He received no more than £300 of the promised subscription, and that only after years of dunning. The community did, however, find the church a valuable amenity. Hamilton himself, after he became county lieutenant in 1796, enjoyed the privilege of occupying the government pew}· Although a Scot and the son of a Presbyterian divine, Hamilton took little interest in the development of Presbyterianism in the peninsula. The first services of the Church of Scotland in the area were held in 1784 and the first Presbyterian church was built in 1791, to be followed by a second in 1795. Hamilton did contribute to the building of the second church, which was

144 THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON constructed in Niagara-on-the-Lake, but his donation was a rather niggardly £3.4; many individuals of lesser substance contributed £5 or £ 10. From the existing records, it does not appear that the Hamilton family rented a pew in St. Andrew's, the Presbyterian church, during Robert's lifetime. The family's lack of interest in the church may be explained by the church's relative instability. The first minister, John Dun, only stayed three years before deciding to engage in trade. The second clergyman, John Young, came in 1802 but remained only a short time before moving on to Nova Scotia. His successor, John Bums, arrived in 1805 and stayed until at least 1817. Bums, however, was a member of the Associate Synod of Scotland. There was some dissatisfaction with this and efforts were made by a portion of the congregation to attract a minister of the Established Church in 1806. With this uncertainty, Hamilton may well have felt that a citizen of his stature was better advised to associate himself with the Church of England. In the 1820s when the Presbyterian church became more firmly rooted, Hamilton's sons associated themselves more closely with it. 12 Interestingly, Hamilton and his relations were less well represented in community functions which were not entirely of a voluntary nature. The possession of a militia commission, awarded on the recommendation of militia officers and the county lieutenant, were important badges of status. When Charles Askin moved to Niagara from Sandwich to join his relations there, his father went as high as the lieutenant-governor to assure that his son's militia commission would be transferred with him. Hamilton and his cousins, however, did not at first fare well in the local militia. In 1792 and again in 1794, none of the family held commissions. The appointment of Hamilton as county lieutenant greatly alleviated the situation. Thomas Dickson, Thomas Clarke and Robert Nichol all received commissions in an elite artillery corps which Hamilton created. There was much local resentment of the corps and, under pressure, it was finally disbanded in 1806. By 1812, only Thomas Clarke and Thomas Dickson held commissions. The local community tended to see militia commissions as the prerogative of those who had fought in the Revolution. Legislation was introduced into the legislature from the peninsula in 1800 to assure former Loyalist officers of ranks in the militia which would not be inferior to those they held during the Revolution. As previously mentioned, commissions in the militia would gradually pass out of the hands of the Loyalist officers and their descendants. Indeed, the proposed legislation was a reaction to that trend. Resentment of the advancement of the Scots merchants in the militia remained high. The role of Hamilton's relations in elected local government was also limited. None was a consistent office-holder in township government. Like Hamilton, one of the Dicksons was a church warden in Niagara Township in 1796. Thomas Clarke was an assessor in 1807 and William Dickson poundkeeper in 1803. Clarke three times was one of the overseers of highways and fence viewer, while Hamilton held the office once. Such terms

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were quite modest. To 1820 in Niagara Township, the three longest holders held the office of clerk 83 per cent of the time, collector 38 per cent and warden 46 per cent. 13 To their community, despite their respectability and their utility, Hamilton and his kin were still often seen as intruders and usurpers. None of these Scots had fought in the Revolution; none except Hamilton had even been present at the time, yet the group enjoyed privileges denied those who actually served. The apparently easy rise of these "Caledonian gentlemen" must have been a source of jealousy to those who sat outside their charmed circle and the gall of the outsiders must have been increased by the clannishness of the Scots. Only a very few beyond their relations were ever admitted to the business enterprises of the Hamilton group, even amongst the large group of other Scots of the peninsula. Many local worthies must have feared that the times were out of joint. Mere Scots merchants, social upstarts who had risen rapidly from obscurity, stained by the crassness of trade and too biased by their commerce to be fit to assume positions of social leadership, were usurping privileges which rightly belonged to them. The attitude of local worthies towards the Scots merchants would remain ambivalent. The Scots were grudgingly respected and admired. Their social utility was admitted. Still, they would be denied most of the official accolades their local community could grant them and their influence in local politics would often be a matter of concern and jealousy. The leaders of political opposition to the merchant interest could capitalize upon this local resentment, proclaiming that a small and powerful clique was working against the general interest of the community. No adequate counter to such charges was developed by Hamilton and those merchants associated with him. In electoral politics, despite their obvious weakness through lack of numbers, they made no real attempt to assume the mantle of popular leadership or to associate themselves with the local non-commercial leaders of the peninsula. They did not attach themselves to any ideological or sectional issue that could have obscured the conflict between themselves and their community. Hamilton had developed the habit of relying upon his commercial influence to give him leverage in the public sphere. Even in local politics, where his mercantile contacts were a truncated network of his relations and the few other merchants closely associated with his enterprises, he attempted to use commercial relationships as a vehicle to achieve political ends. The candidates Hamilton supported were mostly drawn from his relations and those closely associated with them; his attempts at organization took place within the narrow circle of those entrepreneurs with whom he had business. As a result, Hamilton was not always successful in influencing local politics in favour of his own interests. If his commercial network did not attract popular support, it did, nonetheless, provide Hamilton with a continuing base for organizing a relatively cohesive merchant interest. His opposition, on the other hand, suffered from a lack of such a base; it had no equivalent of a commercial or

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kinship network within which to structure itself. Use of local appointed office by the opposition to institutionalize itself, an obvious alternative to the merchant network, was hindered by a strong commercial influence upon local appointments and by the existence of a significant merchant contingent among local office-holders. As a result, opposition to the merchant influence coalesced only when major disturbances troubled the political waters. An agitation arose at the beginning of the Simcoe administration when the formation of a provincial government first gave vent to pent-up discontent, only to dissipate by the election of 1796. Discontent crested again in 1800, but ebbed to the uneventful election of 1804. In the periods of calm, Hamilton and his associates had a better chance to influence local affairs. After 1806 the electoral influence of the merchants strengthened. The change was not due to any alteration in their strategy, but rather to the impact of new and wider political controversies introduced into the Niagara peninsula by a radical agitation under the leadership of Robert Thorpe and Joseph Willcocks which shifted the lines of political alliances, forcing the merchants and their opposition to unite in the face of a common foe. Although the general outlines of local political development can be traced, the lack of adequate sources make it impossible to discuss the organization and strategy of the merchants and their opposition with certainty. Plausible hypotheses can be suggested, however, from the known facts. Those associated with the merchant group at one time or another included Hamilton and his cousins, merchants like John Warren, Samuel Street Sr. and Thomas Welch who had close economic ties with Hamilton and his relations and other Scots merchants who participated in Laurentian trade such as George Forsyth, and James Crooks. Almost all were Scots and merchants of major stature associated with Laurentian trade. Their cooperation in politics was based upon their mutual economic interests and facilitated by trade contacts. The opposition to the merchant interest was generally composed of the many who had reason to resent the social and economic dominance of the Scots merchants. The opposition's most active leaders before 1806 were Loyalists and office-holders such as Ralfe Clench and Isaac Swayze. Small merchants whose operations were more local than those of the major Scots merchants also had some association with this opposition, particularly in the 1800 agitation against the improvement of the Niagara Portage. The local politics of the Niagara peninsula are of interest not only for their relationship to the career of Robert Hamilton, but also for the light they throw on the early development of Upper Canadian politics. The existence of an exceptionally prominent and wealthy merchant group and the dearth of other groups of comparable status and affluence gave the politics of the peninsula a configuration and dynamic of development which differed from that of other regions which have been studied. In his pioneer work on election in Upper Canada, Graeme Patterson has found the first stage of political development for the regions he studied to be marked by the emergence of local

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··compacts," administrative in essence, with their political power entrenched in the appointive offices they held. In Middlesex, the first political establishment to emerge was what Patterson has termed an ··official compact," which was in essence appointive, its raison d' etre being almost exclusi vely official favour and its possession of office. Although his work had a different orientation, Robert Bums's study of York indicates the existence of a similar official compact in the Home District, with the provincial administrative elite assuming a local prominence as well. A close correlation of local importance and local power occurred in the Johnstown District and the Bay of Quinte area, with a coalition of Loyalist officers, professional men and merchants holding office and providing leadership in the Johnstown District, while in the Bay of Quinte area, commercial, governmental, military and Anglican interests centred at Kingston assumed office and formed the local compact. In all these areas, early politics focused upon contentions between the local compact officials and radical factions to which these compacts gave birth. The formation of political opposition was stimulated by the resentment of the privileges the compacts derived from their appointive offices. 14 In the Niagara peninsula the acquisition and exercise of significant power was different. The region was first dominated by a small group of merchants, not an office-holding compact. This merchant interest represented a narrower social range than the early compacts found in other regions. Loyalist officers, local merchants and small office-holders were not generally in league with the merchant interest in local politics. Those groups who formed local compacts in other areas were in the political opposition in the peninsula and were spokesmen of political discontent instead of constituting the political establishment. Rather than deriving its power from appointed office and exercising it to protect its entrenched privileges as local compacts did in other areas, the merchant interest derived its power from the economy. As would be evident in the Norfolk, Oxford and Middlesex election of 1800, trade connections, not the influence of office, were their most formidable political weapon. As in other areas, grievances arose early in the Niagara peninsula and found their expression in electoral politics; discontents, however, were stimulated initially not by the political privileges of a local compact, entrenched in their offices, but by the economic privileges of a merchant elite. The coalescence of the merchant oligarchy with the other conservative elements in the Niagara peninsula to form a local compact occurred only towards the end of the period under discussion and then only under the pressure of radical agitation, reversing the process whereby compacts generated their own opposition. When a conservative alliance began to form in the peninsula, merchants and notably Hamilton's relations were the most active element within it. If by 1796 Robert Hamilton had accomplished the transition from opponent to ally of the provincial executive, he still faced popular resentment of his

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economic influence. Resentment of the merchant interest had been strongly expressed both in the 1792 elections in the peninsula and in the first Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada. The merchant reaction in tum influenced the electoral contests of 1796 in the peninsula. The Legislative Assembly had been a thorn in the side of the major merchants of Upper Canada from its inception. Indeed, the first contentious issue to arise in the legislature had been the source of taxation for local purposes. The Assembly had supported a tax on liquor entering the province, while the merchant representatives in the Legislative Council, Hamilton and Cartwright, had opposed the measure because they feared the impact of such a tax on their receiving and forwarding operations. They supported instead a local rate. The Assembly unanimously condemned the provisioning contract in which Hamilton had an interest and it enthusiastically supported measures to abolish the early system of courts. The merchants found such opposition difficult to counter, es~cially since it forced them to battle on two fronts at once: against the Assemb)y and against the executive as well. It is ironic that Simcoe should have accused Hamilton of democratic leanings since it was the executive which most benefited from the support of the democratic element in the first Upper Canadian legislature. The major merchants were clearly displeased with the actions of the Assembly and it took little perception on Simcoe's part to predict that in the next election the merchants would "leave no means undone to introduce their adherents" into the Assembly.1 s The forces of commerce were indeed well represented following the 1796 elections in the Niagara peninsula. None of those elected in 1792 were returned. Whereas those in the first Assembly had been Loyalist officers and farmers, three of the four in the second had entrepreneurial backgrounds. Included among the representatives were Richard Beasley, himself a merchant as well as Richard Cartwright's cousin, Samuel Street Sr. whose entrepreneurial activities in the peninsula stretched back into the Revolutionary period, and Benjamin Hardison, a miller and major storeowner at Fort Erie. The most interesting new representative, D.W. Smith, sat for Hamilton's home riding, Third Lincoln. Smith, although a British officer and a government official rather than a merchant, undoubtedly came well recommended to Hamilton by his attempts in the first Assembly to serve the interests of Hamilton's western relatives, the Askins. Smith appears to have paid his own expenses for the election of 1796,16 but he probably ran with the support of Hamilton and his mercantile associates who, in 1800, paid his election expenses in full. Smith was precisely the sort of candidate the Niagara merchants required: he had the prestige of a well-bred Englishman, an officer and an official to make him an acceptable representative of a heavily Loyalist riding. Smith's candidacy was probably the result of a strategy of indirection on the part of the merchants. The riding in 1800 would reject merchant candidates for the Assembly and might have done so in 1796 as well. Smith had already proven his attachment

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to Upper Canadian commerce and to Hamilton's kin in particular, making him a close alternative to one of their own number. The tone of the second Assembly changed markedly from that of the first. As the sheriff of the Niagara District wrote to Simcoe: "The lower house is composed of more respectable men than formerly; only two of the old members were returned at the last Election . . . . No opposition in either house. Several useful statutes have been created . . . . "17 Much of the legislation, such as acts for the better regulation of coinage, for the registration of deeds of bargain and sale, and for the regulation of trade between the United States and Upper Canada, worked to the advantage of merchants such as Hamilton. If the direction of provincial politics was satisfactory to the Niagara merchant interest, local opposition to their influence was growing. Small and conservative communities of the eighteenth century did not often indulge in public altercations for fear of the strain it would put upon their social fabric. Antagonisms in the peninsula, nevertheless, were strong enough that well before 1800 tensions between elements of the community and its major merchants were coming to the surface. As might be expected, much of the resentment focused upon the foremost member of the merchant interest, Robert Hamilton. By 1798 animosity to the growing extent of Hamilton's speCUlations in land was being added to earlier resentments of his role as chief merchant and creditor of the peninsula. John Elmsley, the chief justice of Upper Canada, noted the strain when Hamilton presented his purchased land board certificates to the local commissioners under the Land Board Act, appointed to verify land titles. The majority on the board whom Elmsley termed the "Country Gentlemen," officers who had served in the Revolution and local position-holders such as Jesse Pawling, Peter Tenbroek and John McNabb, were united in silent opposition to the Scots merchant's claims. IS Land again became a matter of contention in 1799 when, in a court case involving Samuel Street Sr., it was agreed that, following the precedents of English law, land could not be seized in payment of debt. Articles appeared pro and con in both the York and Niagara papers. For major merchants, the seizure of land for debt was a two-edged sword: if they could seize land for debt, so could their own Montreal creditors. Nevertheless, Richard Cartwright favoured an interpretation of the law which would allow seizure. One suspects that Hamilton and other major Niagara merchants took a similar stance, which would have increased tensions between them and those of their landed creditors who stood to lose large quantities of land. Chief among such creditors were Loyalist officers, small merchants and local office-holders. It was just such a group that organized a private subscription to build a turnpike from Twelve Mile Creek [St. Catharines] through a boggy area known as the "Black Swamp" to Niagara-on-the-Lake, a road which would offer effective competition to the one running on the top of the Niagara Escarpment which

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funelled trade to the Scots merchants of Queenston. •'Queenston is in alarm," John Elmsley reported, "& the Mountain trembles; but we are determined to carry it thro. "19 Transportation facilities and the interests they favoured were the issue which coalesced the local opposition to the merchant interest just before the election of 1800. Hamilton himself sparked the controversy by introducing a petition in the Legislative Council for the improvement of portaging facilities at Niagara. He and his associates in portaging believed that growing trade with the West justified improvement of the portage between lakes Ontario and Erie and that the transportation of goods could be greatly facilitated by an upgrading of the portage road between Queenston and Chippawa, construction of a tow road from Chippawa to Ford Erie and the creation of a canal with locks to overcome the rapids at Fort Erie. Hamilton, along with his cousin Thomas Clarke and George Forsyth, the three Scots partners in the only portaging enterprise at Niagara, proposed to upgrade existing facilities and construct new ones with their own capital in return for the right to collect tolls for twenty-one years. The tolls proposed (2 pence per hundred weight on all merchandise travelling the road from Queenston to Chippawa, the same toll for use of the tow road by craft travelling from Chippawa to Fort Erie, or 4 pence if goods were carried by road and a further 2 pence for goods on board passing through the canal) would have meant a major increase in the cost of portaging. Tolls would be levied on all goods using the improvements except locally produced goods passing along the roads for consumption within the County of Lincoln. Profits, which the partners throught would be substantial, were to be reviewed every three years by the Assembly and the tolls were to be lowered if profits exceeded 12.5 per cent of the value of goods transported. 20 Popular sentiment in the Niagara peninsula and along the Lake Erie shore did not find the proposals as attractive as did the Scots merchants. The improved efficiency of the portage would mainly serve the interests of the bulk shippers associated with the fur trade. The pioneer settlements above Niagara were less concerned with improved efficiency than with the added expense for portaging. The settlements of Norfolk, with their major concentration at Long Point, had particular reason for alarm; not only would they have to bear the new charges on goods received, but the area had at that date no grist mills of its own and was forced to send its grain to Niagara for grinding. Such grain would bear the toll, and furthermore, any returning to the settlements for local use would have to pay again. It is little wonder that by January 1800 a correspondent from Norfolk was informing Hamilton that he had enemies in that area. 21 Those living in the southern portion of the Niagara River front would also feel the impact of the new tolls. Much of the resistance to the proposed improvements, however; may have derived not directly from concern with tolls but from resentment of the further extension of economic privilege

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proposed for a group already greatly aided by government patronage. Hamilton and his two associates were in effect asking the government to cement their monopoly over the major bottleneck in Great Lakes trade and seeking to augment their profits at a time when it seemed certain that trade was about to boom. Given the popular concern when it was felt that Hamilton was being granted full control of army provisioning, it is hardly surprising that, five years later, his desire to consolidate the other base of his economic dominance, portaging, should become the centre of controversy. The depth of ill will felt towards the proprietors of the portage was indicated by the extraordinary petitions protesting against the proposed improvement received by the legislature. In June 1799 the third reading of the por.tage bill was given a three months' hoist in order to allow time to have the bill printed and circulated for general information. The petitioning campaign this provoked had no contemporary parallel. By June 1800 the Assembly had received six giant petitions concerning the proposed improvements on the portage, the largest, claiming one thousand signatures, from the townships of Willoughby and Crowland on the southern end of the Niagara River front and another signed by sixty-nine petitioners from Bertie in the same area. Petitions also came from the County of Norfolk, and the townships of Niagara and Stamford. According to the minutes of the Assembly, all the petitioners were united in reprobating "in nearly the same words the principles of the said Bill as monopolous and oppressive, and praying that the House may refuse its assent thereto if it should at any future period be brought forward. "22 The names at the head of the petitions were those of prominent Loyalist officers, office-holders and small merchants who were probably consolidating in this agitation their leadership of a campaign against the dominance of the major merchants. Indeed, if the petitions were as coordinated as the minutes of the Assembly suggest, this leadership must have achieved a degree of communication and cooperation extraordinary for the period. The campaign laid to rest the proposals for improvement of the portage. The antagonism which those proposals fostered, however, generated further controversy and affected the election of 1800. In September 1799, two months after the Assembly had asked for reaction to the portage proposals, tensions in the Niagara peninsula were running so high that community leaders could not even come to an agreement upon a welcoming address to the new lieutenant-governor, Peter Hunter. Two rival addresses were prepared and comments on the subject were made which the local paper refused to print. 23 In November 1799, a full nine months before the next election, a delegation from the Niagara peninsula approached John White, the attorney general, to run in the next election. The deputation offered White, who had been prominent in the campaign against merchant domination of the courts, full payment of his election expenses. 24 Although White refused, a long and bitter election campaign was already under way. Two months previous, the Canada

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Constitution at Niagara had carried an article reprinted from a Pennsylvania newspaper reporting that Isaac Swayze of the Niagara peninSUla had been seized on suspicion of being a horse thief. The publisher, who was obviously uncomfortable about printing this accusation, stressed he had done so "at the request of our friends. "25 Perhaps it was no coincidence that the publisher, who had been vainly attempting to be appointed official printer to the legislature, received that position not three weeks after this article appeared. A response from a defender of Swayze suggests that the article had more relation to local politics than is immediately evident. "A Ploughman" asserted that the incident was being agitated by the "Caledonian friends" of the editor of the paper from "envy, spite and malice" and that other charges had been circulated in the district against Swayze. In what sounds like a political rallying call, the writer asserted that the "fanners who support that gentleman" (Swayze) were willing to await clarification on the issue. 26 By late 1799 Swayze may well have been campaigning in earnest against the Scots merchants for the election of August 1800. He had been one of the representatives of the peninsula in the first Assembly, to which he had been elected, he later claimed, by "the fanners and general classes" who had "more confidence in my attachment to their interest, than they had in the nobles." It was because of his performance in that anti-commercial Assembly, Swayze claimed, that "my integrity procured me a lasting resentment . . ." and that resentment had made him a constant victim of "shafts of malice incessantly hurled from some who ranked themselves high. "27 Swayze had been elected for Third Lincoln in 1792 and again in 1800. He may well have been beaten by D.W. Smith forthat seat in 1796 and the merchants may have supported Smith in order to remove Swayze. Swayze himself differed from the rest of the opposition to the merchant interest. At best, he stood on the fringes of respectable society; he had served in the Revolution, but had never attained the status of officer. Most of his service had been as a spy and there is evidence to suggest he had been both a felon and a double agent. His fellow settlers at Niagara had had doubts about his true loyalties and he had initially been refused land on the basis of their allegations. In 1795 Swayze shocked provincial officials by assuming leadership of a popular agitation in the peninSUla against the form in which deeds were made out to grantees. The deeds lacked any mention of transfer of land to assignee, leading to suspicions that lands could not be sold. Swayze asserted before the town meeting of Niagara that "the Deeds were unjust, that they were not as they were promised to us, not being in common soccage and that the Deeds and the Register was [sic] not the same. "28 To put a stop to discontents before they got out of hand, the government charged Swayze with sedition. He was tried, convicted and forced to find sureties for good behaviour for two years.29 As a popular leader, Swayze had parallels with a figure like Robert Mathews in the London District who also stood outside the local circles of

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power and used popular agitation as an attempted means of entry. What was unusual about Swayze's early career was that rather than leading an attack on a local compact, he was closely associated with Ralfe Clench who, if there had been a local compact in the Niagara peninsula, would most assuredly have been a member of it. Clench was a Loyalist officer who rendered distinguished service in the Revolution, briefly with Butler's Rangers and for a longer period with the King's Royal Regiment of New York. He became not only one of the major holders of local office within the Niagara peninsula, but the progenitor of a family which would continue to be office-holders in the area well into the twentieth century. Yet Clench, the epitome of everything that constituted respectability in the early peninsula, associated himself with Swayze in the deeds agitation, was Swayze's running mate for the two seats in the combined ridings of Second, Third and Fourth Lincoln in 1800, and was his close ally in proposing and supporting legislation over the next four years. 30 Despite their divergent backgrounds, the alliance of Swayze and Clench was logical in terms of the electoral politics of the Niagara peninsula. Together they represented a potent electoral combination, playing upon the frustration of the populace with the merchant oligarchy and the resentment of the more prominent citizens with what they probably saw as the usurpation of their rightful status and authority by the merchants. That Swayze and Clench's support came from such a coalition is suggested by the legislation they proposed and supported in the Legislative Assembly. Both were officeholders themsel ves and they strongly and consistently worked for the establishment of fees for local offices. They sought to bolster Loyalist prestige by proposing legislation to ensure that no one who served as a non-commissioned officer or higher in His Majesty's Forces should be obliged to serve in the militia in a position inferior to the one previously held. Swayze and Clench favoured the small merchants' interest in proposing differentiated charges for commercial licences related to the size of establishments, and they sought to aid the agrarian interest against the major merchants by opposing legislation for more speedy recovery of small debts and for summary conviction for selling liquor.3t The election of 1800 along the Niagara River front saw the alignment against the merchant interest of all the forces which opposed it. In an electoral contest the merchant interest could not prevail against these forces. The merchant group was represented by candidates from within its own ranks: Samuel Street and Hamilton's cousin, William Dickson. Both were defeated. Robert Nichol was the polling clerk for the election and described it to John Askin: I wrote you a hasty line from Chippawa and mentioned how I had been employed the preceding week. What I think I hinted has actually happened & Mr. Street, though every Exertion was made by his friends, was on the Close of the Poll on Monday Evening the 4th Aug. Minus 22--this is to be more regretted as Mr.

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Street's long Acquaintance with the publick business and active talents would have been of gt. service to the County & added respectability to the Legislature-Mr. William Dickson on the 28th Ulto., came forward on the Hustings & in one of the best Speeches (perhaps) even delivered in Upper Canada, avowed himself a Candidate for the Suffrages of his fellow Subjects, he had the Support of all the discerning & respectable part of the Freeholders, which, however, was of little avail as the other party which had a decided Superiority in point of numbers. In Consequence of which he. on the 3rd day of the Poll, came forward & declined being longer considered a Candidate. Mr. Clench & Mr. Swayze have therefore been returned duly elected-you know the first-the other you must have heard, is accused of stealing Horses & c. in the United States.:!:!

The electoral contest had been bitter, so bitter that the merchants afterwards sought to avenge their losses. The spring following the election, Robert Nichol had a "jaunt" to Pittsburgh-probably to gather evidence against Swayze at the instance of his older Scots relations. In March an anonymous contributor revived the controversy over Swayze's integrity by inserting in the Niagara paper an indictment of Swayze by a Pennsylvania grand jury for horse stealing. Swayze countered in a grand style, declaring' 'The attachment of the community to me did not decrease with the increase of the enmity of the few. Last year after the utmost exertions of my opponents had been expended and opposition long exhausted with fatigue and disappointment, a handsome majority declared me again elected their representative, and in a few days I shall repair, unawed, on their behalf to the standard from which envy may in vain wish to tear me. "33 Their strategy indeed seems to have backfired on the merchants: Swayze counterattacked with a suit for slander against a voter who had accused him before three political gatherings of being a horse thief. Nichol, rather unwillingly, was forced to give evidence at the trial. Swayze seems to have won the skirmish. After printing Swayze's response to the accusation, the editor of the Niagara paper added: "Neither the printer nor his real friends think it advisable for him to risk the consequences of libelling. Those who are more interested than him must stand for it, and those who prefer the paper at York, for their purpose, are welcome to use it. "34 In what may have been a related incident of revenge, Ralfe Clench was in July 1801 suspended from his position as clerk of the district court despite the protests of the majority of the grand jury of the District of Niagara. By August, however, Clench had been reinstated. 3s The political interest of the Niagara merchant oligarchy tended to be expansive and to encompass the boundaries of their trade. The western area adjacent to the peninsula had tended to develop as its economic adjunct. As court records indicate, Niagara merchants were the first suppliers of goods to that area. Many figures from the peninsula, chief among them Hamilton and his Scots relations, had speculated heavily in the land of the area. 36

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By late July 1800 D. W. Smith had returned to Canada after an extended trip to England. The merchant group in the peninsula felt it would be very much in their interest to once again return Smith to the Assembly. As the Scots merchant, James Crooks, wrote to a correspondent: Had we been assured of his [Smith's] return again amongst us, nothing would have prevented his being re-Elected as one of our Representatives, but now the Election is so near, and the whole Country being canvassed, he cannot be proposed here .... 37

After consultation among themselves, the Niagara merchants decided to use their concerted influence to elect Smith to the seat for Norfolk, Oxford and Middlesex. The chief contact of the Hamilton family and those merchants associated with it in the London District was Thomas Welch. Welch, a retired British officer, had the good fortune to be one of the few outside the family circle to win the favour of the Hamilton clan. He had run a shop first at Chippawa and later at Charlotteville, Long Point, which was supplied with goods by Robert Hamilton. Hamilton's influence had secured for Welch important local offices, thereby making him a significant political figure within the London District. Welch was the polling clerk for his district in the election of 1800. 38 In late July the Niagara merchants began their campaign to win Smith's election. Four of the most prominent in their number-Robert Hamilton, Thomas Dickson, Hamilton's shipping agent at Fort Erie, John Warren and James Crooks-wrote to Welch asking his influence in Smith's favour.:J9 Hamilton's letter set the tone: I have understood that Mr. David Smith now returned from England to this Country wishes to represent the Counties in which you Reside in the ensuing Parliament-I have said to some of his Friends that I believed you had considerable Influence in thes'e Counties-& that I thought Mr. Smith had few better Friends-A word to the wise. 411

The merchants reached an agreement among themselves for the financing of the campaign, James Crooks assuming responsibility for the payment of a clerk and stationery and Robert Hamilton paying the rest. 41 By July 25, Hamilton was writing to Welch both as Smith's election agent and as the polling clerk for his riding dictating an election strategy: If a Poll is kept open for a few days a sufficient number may be got from this to Carry the Election .... Should a Poll be demanded [Hamilton continued] it will be a fair plea for the Returning Officer to say at [sic] now to Elect, he cannot Close it less than a Week that everyone may have a Chance to come forward. This would enable his friends here to exert themselves. 42

Hamilton, as the most prominent figure in the Niagara merchant group, also attempted to exercise a more direct influence upon the voters of the London District. Through Warren and Welch, he distributed a packet of letters to

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individuals known to him in the district. Most of these, no doubt, had had commercial dealings with Hamilton. In one of these letters, after discussing with the recipient "some Affair I had Desired of him with regard to my business," perhaps a subtle hint by Hamilton of his power over his debtors, Hamilton continued "I am told the Honorable Mr. D.W. Smith is to represent your County in the next Parliament and would I dare to say be Thankful for aid he might Receive from you or your friends." To augment the impact of this request, Hamilton's correspondent was asked to read the letter at the polls.43 With such influential support, Smith won the election over his only opponent, Richard Cockrell, a school teacher in the area. Welch may well have contributed to the victory by following the spirit if not the letter of Hamilton's instructions and closing the polls early when Smith had a lead. Cockrell later protested the election on the grounds that it was "an open violation of a firm agreement entered into, between the two contending partners & the returning officer, that the poll was not to be closed until the Evening of the 6th of August.' '44 Although Clench and Swayze proposed a rash of legislation in the third legislature in favour of the interests of small merchants, local office-holders, and agrarians, nothing of consequence from this legislation was passed. The peninsula itself was untroubled by political disturbances from the election of 1800 until 1805. The major merchants were free to develop their entrepreneurial interests in peace. Political opposition to the merchant interest in the Niagara peninsula suffered from its inability to sustain momentum at a time when major controversies and aroused public concern were not compensating for its lack of organization. A faction rather than a party, the opposition to the major merchants could not even consolidate its personnel within a network of local office. Indeed, in at least one instance, the merchants were successful in drawing off a leader of the local opposition by judicious use of patronage. The election of 1804 was a relaxed affair which brought few changes for the peninsula. Swayze and Clench were again returned for the eastern portion of the peninsula, this time without concerted opposition. Merchant antipathy to the two was moderated by the quiescence of popular discontent and by the discovery that Swayze could be bribed: he had been convinced in 1803 to support an assessment act which would operate in the interest of major land speculators in return for aid in securing the place of inspector of flour at Niagara. 45 The tranquillity did not last for long. Beginning in 1806 a new political agitation swept over the Niagara peninsula, led first by Robert Thorpe and later by Joseph Willcocks. A potent mixture of its leaders' ambitions for advancement, Irish Whig ideology and a skilful cultivation of local discontents, the Thorpe-Willcocks agitation had its deepest roots in the region. Willcocks, the leader of the agitation after Thorpe's dismissal by Gore in 1807, would be elected from the peninsula three times and his radical

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newspaper, the Upper Canadian Guardian would be published from there. With the new agitation, political alliances and the issues of politics in the peninsula began to change. The local concern with merchants and commercial issues became less visible than previously, subsumed in wider political controversies. Thorpe and Willcocks, like Clench and Swayze, attacked the merchant interest, but they were much more radical than the local leaders had been. They engaged in a controversy over issues more fundamental than a contest over the distribution of place and patronage, questioning the functioning and the very structure of local government itself. Because of the interests he chose to attack, Willcocks administered a coup de grace to the old opposition to the merchant interest and forced the merchant oligarchy and its former opponents to ally themselves in the face of a common foe. Despite its emphasis on ideology and general provincial issues, the Thorpe-Willcocks agitation drew heavily upon local issues for its support. The earliest involvement of Thorpe and his followers within the Niagara peninsula was on an economic issue: the Iroquois land at Grand River and the Indian right to sell it. Its involvement in land matters gained the agitation the nucleus of a local following but immediately brought it into conflict with the merchant oligarchy and fixed the antipathy of the merchants towards it. In 1805 William Claus, the Indian agent at Niagara, had attempted to discount the mission of John Norton, who, as a representative of the Iroquois, had journeyed to London to argue for a more liberal sale policy on Grand River lands. In retaliation an Indian council was held at Niagara in July 1806 where Joseph Brant, the principal leader of the Iroquois, delivered a scathing indictment of Claus. Present for the proceedings were Mr. Justice Robert Thorpe, who at the time was conducting his judicial circuit of the western part of the province, his close associate, William Weekes, and the clergyman at Niagara, the Reverend Robert Addison. Their attendance was not fortuitous: Thorpe and his associates were already well acquainted with the Indian cause through C.B. Wyatt, another member of the Thorpe anti-government faction, who had met Norton in London and supported his representations there. It seems probable that the Indian council was held at Niagara at the time it was to allow Thorpe to give his approbation to Brant's accusations before departing on his circuit. Moreover, the accusations Thorpe listened to so attentively may have been composed by his own faction-LieutenantGovernor Gore charged that the speech Brant delivered was in Weekes's handwriting.41l Although the details are hazy, Thorpe and his associates may also have become involved in the more mercenary aspects of the Indian land agitation. Gore was later to claim that a speculation was undertaken by Thorpe and Samuel Thompson, a small merchant who was one of Thorpe's first Niagara supporters, with the aid of Brant. A letter from which Gore quoted seems to indicate that Thorpe had a monetary interest in the sale of Block III to German settlers in 1807. 47

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Any controversy that involved land in their vicinity almost automatically involved the merchant oligarchy of the Niagara peninsula, and Hamilton in particular. Hamilton and his cousins had been watching the events surrounding the Indian council at Niagara closely. Indeed, it was William Dickson who took care to obtain the text of Brant's speech and preserve it. The agitation for more liberal land sales and the attacks upon Claus, the Indian agent, acted to the Scots merchants as a warning signal. Within a few months of the council at Niagara, Hamilton and his relations, chiefly Thomas Clarke and William Dickson, became involved in a series of purchases and proposals to purchase land at Grand River. Their chief ally was Claus, who not only consistently approved of sales of land to them but appears to have arranged Indian councils weighted in their favour to give Indian land to the merchants. 48 Once again, the issues which engaged the merchants of the Niagara peninsula in politics were economic. The threat to their interests of the controversy concerning the Iroquois lands and the Indian agent Claus helps explain the rapid animosity developed by the Scots merchants towards the Thorpe agitation, an animosity extreme enough that William Dickson, the chief Scots speculator in Grand River land, would fight a duel with William Weekes, the purported writer of Brant's speech, and kill him. The furore over the controversial addresses which the petit and grand juries of the London and Western District presented to Thorpe further alerted Hamilton and his associates at Niagara. When Thorpe arrived back at Niagara in September 1806 to conduct the assizes, they were prepared for what followed. Thorpe's obvious purpose on his circuit was to arouse popular support for his agitation. Where previously at Niagara Thorpe had involved himself with Indian grievances, he now chose to align himself against what had long been the chief source of local contention in the peninsula, the power of the commercial interest. The cause celebre of the assizes at Niagara was a case involving John Warren, Hamilton's forwarder at Fort Erie, who in carrying out his duties as a magistrate had taken back from a Mr. Hawn property Hawn had salvaged from a shipwreck. In the process Warren committed an indiscretion which led Hawn to being him to trial. As a group of magistrates led by Hamilton complained: They were sorry to observe that [Mr. Warren] was not only suffered by the Presiding Judge to be treated with the utmost indignity by the Plaintiffs Council [Weekes] (being repeatedly interrupted and pointed out as •• a man of turpitude without and turbulence within the Court") but also the whole body of the Magistrates held out to the people as petty Tyrants' whose power it was necessary to curb . . . . 411

With Thorpe's advice, the jury brought in a verdict against Warren which

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was later quashed by higher authorities. The whole incident was described by John Mills Jackson who echoed the sentiments of Thorpe: The shopkeepers are the Justices of the Peace; they have the means of extortion, and the power of enforcing payments; they are first the criminals, then the judges; and the Court of Appeal [the lieutenant-governor and the Executive Council] seems to be so constructed as to prevent an honest verdict from passing into effect. 50

It is of interest that it was after the assizes of 1806 that Thorpe first began to speak of the influence of the "Shopkeeper Aristocracy" .51 Thorpe, however, attacked more than just the merchant interest and in the process alienated many prominent citizens who themselves had formerly opposed the merchants. As had happened in other districts, the petit jury at Niagara passed a vote of thanks and an address to Thorpe. The grand jury, however, which was composed almost entirely of magistrates, acted differently. As Hamilton noted: This Judge who has been but a very short time in the Country and who now appeared for the first time in our Court, seems partial to popular applause and its said has courted this in some places, in a manner not very becoming his station. Addresses from Juries, a thing I believe hardly known in that Country from whence we derive our best customs, have been solicited and obtained in different parts of the Province. Perhaps something of the Kind might have been expected from the Grand Jury of Niagara, and it has been thought that the urging the nomination of a foreman upon them in a way totally unprecedented in this quarter might be a preliminary step to the obtaining of this, when however it was seen that nothing of the kind would take place a very apparent alteration in the manner of the Judge was perceived. The Grand Jury was almost entirely composed of the Magistrates and they were suffered to be treated (without the least check from the Bench) with the greatest abuse from a Counsellor at the Bar. 52

This was only the first of many attacks by the Thorpe-Willcocks faction upon prominent citizens and office-holders which for its end result would drive the merchants and the most articulate elements of their opposition together. The Weekes-Dickson duel, following directly upon the assizes, further heightened tensions between Thorpe and his prominent opponents in the Niagara peninsula. Despite the strength of elite reaction against the Thorpe agitation, local support for him was strong and growing. When Thorpe contested the seat in the Legislative Assembly vacated by Weekes's death, that for York, Durham and Simcoe, Joseph Brant promised to attend the polling. So did Samuel Thompson, Augustus Jones, another white who was closely connected with Grand River, David Secord, a merchant who would become an antigovernment member in the next Assembly, and "Mr. R. of Chippawa," probably Robert Randall, who was here beginning a long career of association with Upper Canadian radical movements. These gentlemen were to be

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accompanied by "several others from the Head of the Lake," an area included in the riding for which Willcocks would soon be elected. 53 Samuel Thompson and the Reverend Robert Addison stood as security for Joseph Willcocks when in February 1807 he contested one of the seats for West York, First Lincoln and Haldimand, left vacant by the death of Solomon Hill. Willcocks won not only this election but two subsequent ones and would sit for First Lincoln until his desertion to the Americans in 1813. 54 The riding of West York, First Lincoln and Haldimand, whose population was concentrated in the western part of the peninsula along the Lake Ontario shore, had remained aloof from the political controversies further east. Removed from the Niagara River front and the main route of Laurentian trade, it ignored the controversy over the proposed monopoly of the Niagara portage. In 1800 the chief election issue became the attempt of an outsider, who was both a resident of the Niagara River front and a government official, to win a seat in the riding. William Claus, who lived in Niagara-on-the-Lake, must have been surprised at the vehement parochialism his candidacy aroused. Claus, a member of the Johnson family and the deputy Indian agent at Niagara, followed long family traditions in attempting to use both his family and his office to secure his election. Through his subordinates in the Indian Department he made the preliminary arrangements for his campaign. Claus directly approached Robert Nelles, one of the most significant merchants of the area, whose family had long been clients of the Johnsons, to be his running mate. Instead of teaming with Claus, Nelles chose to league himself with Richard Beasley. Together they organized a canvass of influential local figures against Claus as an outsider and a government official. They easily defeated him. The election of 1804, in which Nelles and Solomon Hill, a prominent local Loyalist, were returned seems to have been similarly based on deference politics. 55 The candidacies of Beasley and Nelles drew upon a hinterland resistance to the major centres of the peninsula along the Niagara River front and the officials who inhabited them. Willcocks's success in the western peninsula was based upon his sensitivity to such sentiments and his grasp of the need for local political organization. Sweeping away the apparatus of deference politics, he organized the passive resistance of the area into a more aggressive sectionalism aimed against office-holders and major merchants alike. Willcocks's most potent weapon was his newspaper. In a society where any form of communication was limited, he held a virtual monopoly of the press. For most settlers of the peninSUla, the Upper Canadian Guardian was their only source of news and political opinion. With the exception of the official Upper Canada Gazette, the Guardian was the only press in the province. Unlike its predecessors in the peninsula or the government press, the Guardian was highly controversial; it had no qualms about naming names, detailing what it considered injustices or providing strong partisan support to its proprietor. Willcocks supplemented the impact on political opinion of his newspaper by a more sophisticated form of political organization than the peninsula had previously seen. It is clear he organized meetings of his constituents to advise him on issues and present him with a mandate to attempt

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legislation on matters considered locally significant. Willcocks phrased his political appeals in a language acceptable to local sentiment, always playing down the radical nature of his views and using a rhetoric of loyalty and loyalism, stressing the services and rights of those loyal to the crown and particularly those who had served it, services and rights which the colonial government, Willcocks claimed, ignored or subverted, thereby becoming itself the radical innovator. 56 Throughout his career as a representati ve of the western peninsula Willcocks was careful to champion issues with a local appeal. In an area of heavy settlement by linguistic and religious minorities, he supported liberalization of religious privileges and courted the favour of Germanlanguage groups in his press. He supported local improvements and the strengthening of local government in the County of Haldimand. Above all, in appeals to the potent local feelings of sectionalism, Willcocks strongly and constantly attacked all varieties of local office-holders: magistrates, sheriffs, coroners, and even militia officers, claiming those officials with salaries constituted an excessive drain on underdeveloped areas like his riding, while the. appointed officials were incompetent and self-interested and took little interest in affairs beyond the Niagara River front where they were concentrated. 57 Both the radical agitation in general and Willcocks's strategy in particular had a strong impact upon political developments within the Niagara peninsula. They ended conclusively the Swayze-Clench opposition. As office-holders and potential members of a local conservative establishment, neither Swayze nor Clench had much stomach for the new radical agitation. Swayze opposed Thorpe and Willcocks and generally voted against measures they supported. Clench as a Loyalist leader was attracted by the agitation's demands for more liberal land-granting to Loyalists, but he was careful on most issues not to align himself with the agitation. Swayze and Clench passed to the defensive and ceased to propose legislation of their own. The agitation appears to have robbed them of their political effectiveness and neither was returned in 1808. 58 From the beginning the leadership of the conservative reaction to Willcocks's strategy fell upon the merchant oligarchy and most spe~ifically upon the Scots associated with Robert Hamilton. Hamilton himself was increasingly ill in the last years of his life and management of his kin's political interests passed to the most enthusiastic politician associated with the family, Robert Nichol. Nichol by 1807 had moved west to the London District; in part because of his continuing personal ties in the Niagara peninsula political opposition to Willcocks in the Niagara and London districts was coordinated. The Hamilton family may initially have attempted to fight Willcocks using only its own resources and its established strategies. Nichol himself by 1807 was planning to run in the London District as an anti-Willcocks candidate and

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just as Hamilton had used family and economic connections in the 1800 election in Norfolk, Oxford and Middlesex, so Nichol attempted to prevail upon Thomas Dickson, a former fellow apprentice in the Hamilton family enterprises, to join him as a candidate. If both ran in 1808, however, they were defeated. 59 Even if they had not been successful in the election of 1808, members of the Hamilton family could take heart from the changing political atmosphere the Willcocks agitation was producing. Candidates with entrepreneurial backgrounds were once again becoming acceptable: three anti-Willcocks merchants-Samuel Street, Levi Lewis and Crowell Willson-were elected from the peninsula. In contrast to the factional controversies of only a few years previous, conservative opinion now stressed solidarity. The unquestioning support that "An Elector," an individual of some prominence from Niagara, gave the Legislative Assembly when Willcocks criticized its failure to publish and publicly distribute its journals illustrated the new sentiments: I have an unshaken confidence in their [the Assembly's] intentions and patriotic views .... I believe most solemnly that there is not one of its members who does not act upon the broad basis and pure principle of political rectitude and public advantage and I believe them to be individually animated to advance the provincial interest as well in their public as private capacities. lill

With the hardening of conservative attitudes there was little leeway for criticism, even of the merchant interest. There was, moreover, a growing tendency towards cooperation amongst prominent figures who opposed Willcocks and a tendency among those who had the power to use the granting of office and government privilege to discourage radical support. In the London District, according to the Upper Canadian Guardian, Nichol was cooperating with Samuel Ryerse, formerly a strong opponent of the merchant interest, in the petitioning campaign against the portage bill, to produce a "Black List" for the an~a. Those who would not sign it as a form of protest against the views of Willcocks could expect to be denied land and local office. Similarly, in the Niagara peninsula figures such as Ralfe Clench and John Warren, who had previously been allied to opposing factions, cooperated after the election of 1808 to remove individuals guilty of supporting the Willcocks faction from the officership of the militia units they commanded. Land grants were recommended by magistrates on the basis of anti-Willcocks sentiment. 61 Coordination of conservative elements within the society was increasingly evident in the election of 1812. Nichol, running in Norfolk, drew upon both his merchant connections and a wider conservative group at Niagara: for example, Alexander Hamilton and Charles Askin organized a group of Niagara citizens who held property in Norfolk to go to that riding and vote in his interest. To the west, Nichol reached a mutual understanding with the Nelles family-Loyalists, small merchants and previous opponents of the influence of the larger settlements of the Niagara River front-to support each

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other with whatever votes they controlled in their local elections. Not only was Nichol returned, but Thomas Dick~on won in Third Lincoln. They were joined by John Fanning, a Loyalist and miller in Fourth Lincoln and Ralfe Clench in Second Lincoln. 62 Hamilton had been dead for three years by the election of 1812, but the influence of the merchant oligarchy of which he had been the most prominent leader was by then growing vigorously within a new and broader conservative grouping. Even within his lifetime, despite the obvious weaknesses of his commercial network in accomplishing local political ends, Hamilton had had his share of successes. Before the coming of Thorpe and Willcocks, the opposition which faced him had been organizationally weaker than the merchant oligarchy and in the semi-vacuum which the lack of a continuing, strongly organized opposition left, Hamilton's influence in the economic and social sector, upon provincial politics, and upon patronage more than compensated for his failure to completely dominate local politics.

CHAPTER 11

The Decline of the Hamilton Enterprises

On March 8, 1809, after a prolonged illness, Robert Hamilton died. He was sixty years old. His passing was accorded the respect due by his community to its most prominent citizen: "His funeral, as you may imagine, was attended by a vast concourse . . .," a former tutor of the Hamilton children wrote to Thomas Welch," and since the first settlement of the country nothing of this kind ha~ occurred to occasion so much real sorrow."1 Hamilton was gone; but what of the formidable enterprises he had so successfully constructed within the confines of his pioneer society and the influence they had given him? His enterprises survi ved Hamilton only by the remarkably brief span of three years. By 1812 Hamilton's extensive retailing operations were defunct, the family supply of provisions to the government had fallen off to nothing, and the monopoly of government portaging in which Hamilton had participated since 1790 was lost. Only Hamilton's land speculations survived to provide a cushion for his family's declining economic fortunes. The family's influence was not entirely snuffed out: based on its residual prestige and old connections and aided by the capital sal vaged from Hamilton's businesses and speculations, six of the eight sons Hamilton fathered rose in time to the higher echelons of Upper Canadian society as successful entrepreneurs, office-holders and public figures. None of his offspring, however, succeeded to the social and political predominance which his enterprises had made Robert Hamilton's prerogative. How is such a sudden reversal to be explained? How did the firm which was probably the most prosperous and influential in the province deteriorate so rapidly? Given the dating of the firm's decline, the most obvious cause might seem to be the War of 1812. While that war enriched many concerns in parts of the province distant from the fighting, it devastated the commerce of the Niagara peninsula. It occasioned serious damage to the Hamiltons' commercial facilities and caused the temporary abandonment of the Niagara Portage and 164

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the normal system of army provisioning. Both had been vitally important to the Hamilton business. There is, nevertheless, strong evidence in the letter books and ledgers of the Hamilton firm to suggest that the firm was in grave difficulty before the outbreak of war. The war simply administered a final coup de grace to an already enfeebled enterprise. Further evidence for this contention exists in the failure of the firm to regenerate after the conflict. Robert Hamilton's operations were destroyed by the same factors which had initially stimulated their rapid growth and extraordinary influence: the institutional weaknesses of the society in which they functioned. Hamilton had risen to affluence and prominence within his emerging society because no other contemporary institutions had had the organization or the breadth of influence to match the structures of trade to which he was intimately allied. Yet those trade structures themselves were also fragile and lacked any guarantees of permanence. Even the commerce which Hamilton personally conducted could not be sufficiently institutionalized during his lifetime to assure its continuance after his death. The greatest single problem facing Robert Hamilton at the end of his life was the successful transfer of his enterprises to the second generation of his family. To his sons, Robert Hamilton could pass on little more than the external appurtenances of his business: his lands, his shop and his present stock-in-trade. The entrepreneurial abilities required to successfully manipulate those elements would have to be provided by the sons themselves, and in the demanding conditions under which they operated any failings could quickly lead to disaster. Likewise, the larger network of trade contacts to which Hamilton owed his economic and political advancement, although powerful within the context of its times, could easily be dismantled. That network had functioned through informal allegiances among individual merchants in the period of the Revolutionary War. Such links proved transitory: they died with the merchants who formed them. Subsidiary to his Laurentian trade network and subsumed in it, Hamilton had also participated in a sub-network of local merchants bound together by kinship ties. Those ties, too, were disastrously eroded after Hamilton's death by conflict among his surviving kin. Hamilton was aware of the problems entailed in passing on his enterprises intact to his progeny. He believed that the key to a smooth transition lay in the education of his children. "The first Duty of a Parent," he once declared, was the provision of a good education to his offspring. 2 Despite the precedent of a classical education for his stepsons, Hamilton's choice of education for his sons was relatively practical, at least within the limited range of available choice. James Hamilton wrote home from Edinburgh to complain that he was not allowed to take "Musick, drawing and fencing, " but was reduced to the mundane study of engineering, logic and "authentick French." Robert Hamilton appears to have desired that his sons receive a solid grounding in subjects that had a specific application rather than subjects which provided a preparation for a genteel existence. After the

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completion of his formal education, it was planned that James would spend three years apprenticed to a firm in either Liverpool or Quebec, "learning prices of things, etc.. . .. " Although some would ultimately become full-time office-holders, eight of Hamilton's surviving nine sons and stepsons initially followed him into commerce; only one became a professional and he, Joseph, was educated as a physician rather than entering the more gentlemanly professions associated with the law, the church, or the army.3 Unfortunately for their futures, and for the survival of the family firm, Hamilton's preparations of his successors were far from adequate. However practical the education of the Hamilton sons had been in old world terms, it was not a realistic grounding for the management of a complex and fragile enterprise under demanding Upper Canadian conditions. For the sake of the Hamilton firm, the years his sons spent abroad would have been more profitably spent in their father's shop. The boys' need for a prolonged exposure to the business was particularly acute because at the time of his death, Hamilton's sons were still little more than youths, the eld~st being only twenty-two. Because they had been so long abroad, the older sons had had a maximum of four years' exposure to the family business before they were obliged to assume control of it. Even that exposure may have been desultory. There are indications that Hamilton was an indulgent father who did not instill in his sons the self-discipline necessary for pioneer commerce. The eldest son, Robert Jr., had a reputation for wilfulness. His father allowed him at the age of eighteen to try his hand in the fur trade at Michilimackinac; his father's consent ran contrary to the advice of young Robert's uncles, John Askin and William Robertson, who were shocked that he was to be exposed to the moral laxity of the fur trade before "a time of life when his principles are fixed. William Robertson made a revealing comment on the episode: "Although Mr. Hamilton is an affectionate Father and a man undoubtedly of abilities, 1 have often thought (I suppose from being so immersed in business) he did not pay that attention to his boys requisite at their time of life and in the Instance of Robert certainly left him too much to the dictates of his own reason . . . he was never fond of being confined to the shop in which his Father rather indulged him. . . ."4 Robert returned from Michilimackinac more wild and restless than before, later throwing over a distillery business his father had financed to start him in trade and marrying below his social station, an act of rebellion which bitterly disappointed his father. In his will Hamilton passed over Robert and left the stock and facilities of his enterprises to his next two sons, George and Alexander, probably in the hope that they would prove more reliable. Like Robert, however, neither George nor Alexander proved to have the self-possession or the iron self-discipline requisite to keep the business functioning. 5 To further handicap the efficient functioning of the firm, Robert Hamilton

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left a complex and cumbersome will which allowed an equal division of his estate among his natural children only after the youngest son had reached the age of twenty-one, an event which did not occur until fourteen years after his death. The equal division of his estate could tend to dissipate its resources: eight equal shares were not comparable to a consolidated whole, and the delay in settlement froze assets necessary for the businesses' continuance. Hamilton foresaw some of these difficulties and made an attempt to soften their impact. He bequeathed to George and Alexander all his major commercial facilities: his shop, his share in the portaging warehouses and his distillery, as well as "all the goods, wares, merchandize, and stock in trade whereof I may die possessed," the value of the trade goods to be repaid to the estate, along with 6 per cent simple interest per annum at the time of the final division. To alleviate the effects of the freezing of the assets of the rest of the estate, Hamilton instructed the trustees that if they should deem it expedient Hfor the preferment and advancement in the world of any of my children or for putting or placing them or any of them to any profession, trade or business" they should cause to be paid the requisite sums of money from the estate, with an adjustment to be made for such payments at the time of the final division. The mechanics of the estate division, however, especially when combined with the problems of extracting investment quickly from the family's retailing and land speculation operations, greatly hampered attempts to find operating capital in the crucial first years after Hamilton's death. 6 Already burdened with their own inexperience and the stipulations of their father's will, Hamilton's sons also had to face and correct certain strains within their father's enterprises if they were to continue profitably. The success of the Hamilton enterprises was the product of a period of transition from a pre-settlement economy dominated by army supply and the fur trade to a settled agrarian economy. Hamilton had geared his enterprises to exploit this transition: he derived his capital and his dominance of the market from enterprises associated with the frontier economy of the Great Lakes and reinvested the capital so earned in sectors of the local pioneer economy. By the time of his death, however, the period of transition on which Hamilton depended was nearly over. The pillars of his business, provisioning and forwarding, were beginning to crumble and no replacements for them were at hand. Lake traffic over the portage associated with the fur trade had fallen off and no continuing trade of substance had yet been found to replace it. The Niagara Portage, in addition, faced stiff competition from a vigorous American rival. Provisioning of the army had declined in importance relative to the new export market for food stuffs, while the general expansion of the market beyond the military had encouraged the growth of competition to Hamilton's operation and lessened Hamilton's general dominance. If his enterprises were to falter after his death, there would be no lack of competition eager to assume their place. i Readjustment of the Hamilton firm or even assurance of its survival was not

168

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

eased by the problems of extracting investments from the business. Land was a long-term speculation. Ultimately, its sale would be part of the family's economic salvation, but land cOlild not be quickly sold at the time of Hamilton's death for an acceptable return. Between Hamilton's death and the final settlement of his affairs, the sale of his land had contributed only £5,000 to his estate, a sum which must be set against family expenses in the same period of £73,300. Likewise, the debts which Hamilton appears to have freely encouraged among his retail customers were not easily recoverable: of the roughly £69,000 owed Hamilton in 1809, £21,000 was still outstanding as late as 1823. The executors of Hamilton's estate declared £16,000 of this enormous amount unrecoverable and the rest doubtful. 7 Because of the shortage of ready funds, the Hamiltons faced a continuing series of personal and commercial crises. In September 1809 the trustees of the estate were scarcely able to scrape together enough money to send the younger children to Scotland; George and Alexander were forced to sell to Thomas Clarke a portion of the stock, valued at £5,000, which they had received from their father. The new proprietors, moreover, were already in debt to their suppliers. In the years following, the debts of the firm continued to mount and its stock to contract. In 1810 George and Alexander could not pay for the goods they had received the previous year and opted to take only a small assortment because ••our prospects this year are by no means flattering." Indeed, by late 1810 they were drawing on Gillespie for further money, still without paying any of their former debts. 8 The year 1811 saw a startling development: George and Alexander were reduced to buying from their supplier's available assortment, rather than ordering directly from Great Britain. It was probably the first time since the Revolution that the Hamilton firm had been so reduced. The economic health of the firm continued to deteriorate: by 1814 George and Alexander had owed Gillespie £ 1,000 Hlfx. for three years. By the same date the brothers had a debt of £3,588 due the Hamilton estate for advances on their inheritance, as well as a further £6,500 for their initial stock plus annual interest. The old Hamilton firm was deeply and almost inextricably mired in debt. 9 In the first year after the sons' assumption of control, whatever cash did come to the firm was more than offset by business failures. In 1809 George and Alexander collected 700 barrels of flour, only half of what they had expected. The brothers shipped their flour down the lakes only sporadically; the quantity they received was so small that it could be absorbed entirely by the garrison market. As their shrinking inventory of goods suggests, retail business for the Hamiltons dropped off. Portaging offered little succour. In 1811 Alexander was •• almost ashamed to mention" that the firm had recei ved only £100 from the government portage. 1O George and Alexander blamed poor crops, low prices and stiff competition for their failures. Their complaints were not without some basis in fact: both 1809 and 1810 were years of bad weather and poor crop yields. The

DECLINE OF THE HAMILTON ENTERPRISES

169

international situation, and especially the reimpOSition of the continental blockade against Great Britain by France, had caused a temporary sag in the imperial market, including prices paid for grain. The number of merchants in the Niagara District was increasing, from twenty-seven in 1809 to thirty-five in 1811. Equally important, there are indications that, thanks to population growth and a long-tenn increase in agricultural production, many smaller centres off the Niagara River front were beginning to build a trade of major proportions. Such growth cut into the market area of the front; merchants there complained bitterly of heavy competition and a glut of shops. Even old and well-established merchants like William and James Crooks were moving their businesses off the river front to the growing towns along the Lake Ontario shore. II It is hard to believe, however, that difficult times alone provide a full explanation for the ills of the Hamilton finn. Other, more modest businesses appear to have weathered the storms of this period without being driven to the verge of collapse. The heirs of Robert Hamilton exacerbated the situation by their own lack of entrepreneurial judgment. Inexperienced in managing the complex affairs of the business, they tended to over-react. In response to initial problems the brothers conservatively attempted to contract their enterprises, but by their errors lost further business in the process. After several years of contraction and losses, the brothers reversed their strategy radically and began to indulge in a rash expansion. In what was an obvious attempt to redeem their existing debts by an extension of their business, they moved into new areas of endeavour. The result, as for many before them, was simply an accumulation of new and heavier debts. The brothers showed little conciousness of the dangers of overexpansion or the continuing gravity of their financial situation. Initially there was much to be said for a temporary contraction of the Hamilton firm and the selling of a portion of the father's massive inventory to raise necessary funds. The wisdom of the decision the Hamilton sons made in late 1809 to contract out their portaging business was more dubious: it reduced their profits by placing in others' hands an enterprise which the family should have been able to manage for itself. The move may indicate a certain lack of confidence by the sons in their own abilities. 12 In the fall of 1809 George and Alexander initiated what can only be described as a series of blunders in their marketing of produce. During their first season in control of the business the two young merchants decided they would not ship any produce to Montreal, but rather would dispose of it to the government at Niagara. Unfortunately, the price at which they confidently offered the provisions was too high. They then dropped their asking price drastically, bidding too low. The Hamiltons won a contract but lost money, an intolerable situation given their already shaky financial position. Alexander admitted to being in a "predicament. "13 The following year the two merchants repeated this process, declining to

170

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

ship down the lakes and thus committing themselves to the garrison market. In evident distress, they declared to the government that they could not conjecture the amount of flour they would ultimately receive and could not therefore submit a tender. Because of their hesitation, they failed to get any government contract. They ended by selling their flour in Montreal after all, but complained the price they received hardly covered their costs. To further increase their troubles, the brothers, by sloppy communications, were billed for £400 worth of goods on terms they did not want and thus increased the load of their immediate debt. In 1812 the Hamiltons purchased peas with the purpose of selling to the government; they again lost money on the sale and, through carelessness, were late in delivering the provisions. To complete the fiasco the government refused to accept delivery and the Hamiltons were forced to sell the provisions once again on the Montreal market. I4 Lack of capital, declining business and sheer ineptitude were driving the Hamilton firm down. In 1811 George and Alexander further complicated their situation by over-expanding the business in an attempt to save .it. With their cousin, Charles Askin, they rented grist and saw mills in Canborough as well as a dwelling house, distillery, forty acres, and the right to cut wood on 700 acres. The next year Alexander Hamilton and Charles Askin purchased the operation, agreeing to pay £2,000 for it. George, for his part, moved heavily into land speculation, purchasing 1,200 acres in Walsingham Township and 14,000 acres on the Grand River for which he agreed to pay £7,000 and interest. IS The expansionist bubble burst in the Hamiltons' faces with the outbreak of war, which came at the worst possible moment. Already enfeebled and over-extended, the firm was destroyed by the war. The insecurity of the border caused the removal of portaging from the Niagara District to more defensible areas and broke the hold of the Hamiltons on the government contract. As well, the war caused the suspension of the regular system of army provisioning through local agents; in the crisis, the army commissariat assumed direct responsibility for ensuring its own supply. War also meant the disruption of vital water communications and extensive destruction of facilities. 16 All this hardly mattered to the Hamiltons, however, for with the outbreak of war they abandoned all attempts to revive their father's enterprises. With a mixture of anticipation and, perhaps, relief, George and Alexander, as well as their older brother Robert, all left commerce for active militia service; none of the sons would ever revive the specific enterprises of their father. In December 1812 Alexander negotiated the sale of the firm's remaining stock; combined with the heavy damage to the family store and warehouses during the war, that act spelt the effective end of the businesses initiated by Robert Hamilton. It is ironic that the Hamilton enterprises which had been given their initial impetus by the opportunities presented by the Revolutionary War should expire with the onset of the next armed conflict. 17

DECLINE OF THE HAMILTON ENTERPRISES

171

The decade from the War of 1812 until the mid-1820s, roughly the time of the settlement at the Hamilton estate, marked the nadir of the fortunes of Hamilton's heirs. None of the three adult sons achieved any substantial success in business. Alexander Hamilton emerged from the war burdened with the debts built up by him and his brother before the war, debts which would hang over him for many years. Alexander placed himself further in debt by borrowing almost £ 1,000 from his father's estate and sunk that money into an attempt to revitalize his milling concern at Can borough. Despite his attempts, the business collapsed in 1817 and he and Askin were reduced to trying to sell their Can borough holdings in an attempt to meet its debts.ls In 1817 Alexander Hamilton was approached by a William Smith who had been offered a contract for the portaging of the North West Company's goods at Niagara. It may have seemed for a short time as though the economic forces which had played so large a part in making his father's fortune were about to assure Alexander's future. Facilities proved expensive, however, and competition was stiff. Hamilton and Smith had to compete for business with Alexander's brother, Robert, who was part of the portaging firm of Hamilton and Cummings, and with Grant and Kerby, a successor firm to the portaging business of Thomas Clarke. The available trade was small and badly fragmented. Hamilton and Smith relied on the fur trade, Grant and Kerby controlled the army contract, and Hamilton and Cummings appear to have been the most significant in the transportation of salt. The market was too small to support three enterprises; in 1820, Cummings dropped out and Robert Hamilton joined forces in a price-fixing agreement with Grant and Kerby. Collapse for Hamilton and Smith came in 1821 when the North West Company amalgamated with the Hudson's Bay Company and ceased to use the lakes route for its shipments. These debts finally exhausted what remained of Alexander's share of his father's estate. 19 George Hamilton found himself in a similar predicament. In 1811 George had moved to the site of present-day Hamilton where he took up farming. It was to be his only successful enterprise for many years. George had been plunged so deeply in debt by the collapse of his partnership with Alexander that in the midst of the War of 1812 he could not even raise the £300 necessary to participate in a small merchandising speculation. After the war neither he nor Alexander attempted to renew their partnership. With his halfbrother, William Robertson, George purchased a mill at Grand River. This venture appears to have failed; by 1819 both Robertson and Hamilton were claiming to be severely in debt without any means to redeem themsel ves. 20 Robert, the eldest son, fared little better. Before the war he had managed the family farm and with a younger brother, James, had engaged in portaging, apparently in competition with George and Alexander. After the war Robert and James tried a retailing venture at St. Catharines which lasted only a year. From 1818 to 1820, after an abortive attempt to form a portaging company

172

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

with Alexander, Robert portaged in partnership with James Cummings and ran a small shop. When this partnership folded, Robert joined forces with Grant and Kerby. Even this did not prove particularly profitable; in 1822 Robert, too, faced commercial debts which, he asserted, he could only pay by the sale of the land he would ultimately receive from his father's estate. 21 Hamilton's sons also destroyed a resource less tangible than the business itself but equally significant to their ultimate success or failure: their father's network of commercial and kinship alliances. Robert Hamilton Sr. had fully realized the significance of such connections to his success in the politics and commerce of his day and had premised his entrepreneurial strategy upon them. Some deterioration in the closeness of his commercial contacts was perhaps inevitable after Hamilton's death. His contacts outside the Niagara peninsula in the Detroit-Sandwich area had been based on highly personal allegiances. Time took its toll of Hamilton's contacts: shortly after the end of the War of 1812, Cartwright, Todd and McGill all died. The replaceme~ts which the younger Hamiltons found for these long-valuable contacts were meagre: they did not develop close links to the successors of the firms to which their father had been allied. In fact they even went so far as to terminate some links with their father's old associates: George and Alexander turned down the offer of Richard Cartwright to handle the forwarding of their produce to Montreal, preferring to deal instead with the Kingston firm of Thomas Markland. The Hamiltons made few new commercial contacts; the number of their suppliers dropped off quickly and was never replenished. By 1812 the only supplier of George and Alexander was Robert Gillespie and their relations with him, rather than embodying the intimacy their father had had with his business associates, were strictly economic and, indeed, somewhat strained by the sons' inability to meet their debts.22 The loss of close personal contacts at Kingston and Montreal was less significant for the Hamiltons than it might at first appear. His Laurentian contacts had been of value to Robert Hamilton for their lobbying power with government and their influence over appointments and patronage in the early period of Upper Canada's development. By the time of his death, however, the influence of the provincial government was becoming more pervasive, a development most notable in the postwar Maitland administration. With a strong provincial government, an informal alliance among a limited number of traders would not have had the great influence it once had wielded. In contrast to the increasingly limited value of the wider Hamilton network, local contacts and family ties could have played a very major part in assuring the survival of the Hamilton firm. The process by which Robert Hamilton had established his cousins might have been expected to repeat itself in the second generation: the position of Hamilton's sons at his death was somewhat analogous to the initial position of the cousins, while the cousins themselves, particularly Thomas and William Dickson and Thomas Clarke, were now in a

DECLINE OF THE HAMILTON ENTERPRISES

173

position to assume the role of patrons to the younger Hamiltons. Given their number, moreover, the Hamilton offspring might have been expected to form a coalition amongst themselves, pool their own resources and influence and cooperate to strengthen the family enterprises and forward their interests. In fact the sons, frustrated by business failure and chaffing at their lack of resources, lashed out at each other and at their older relations; squabbles, rifts, even bitter antipathy were more evident among the heirs of Robert Hamilton than cooperation. By their own contentiousness, Hamilton's family hastened the decline of the family firm. Hamilton's will was one major cause of family tensions. Undoubtedly with the idea in mind that his cousins, because of the debts of gratitude they owed him, would be the most assiduous guardians of his affairs, Robert Hamilton had made the two Dicksons and Clarke the trustees of his estate. The older Hamilton sons, frustrated by their lack of success, tended to transfer the blame for their decline to the trustees' interpretation of their father'S wishes. A series of confrontations occurred between the nephews and uncles. The generational conflict, moreover, was exacerbated rather than soothed by the final settlement of the estate. 23 It did not take long after the death of Robert Hamilton for family relations to deteriorate. The uncles initially attempted to give their nephews some aid by settling certain business matters for them. The sons themselves showed less inclination towards mutual cooperation. From the beginning, they were divided into competing factions. Robert, who had been excluded from ownership of the family retailing and portaging facilities, appears to have started a portaging operation of his own which could only prosper at the expense of the family operation. Robert was in partnership in this endeavour with the fourth brother, James, and it is indicative of the second generation's thinking that their association was regulated by a written contract, a formality considered unnecessary within the family during the intimate cooperation of their father's day. 24 By 1812 the older sons were feuding with their uncles over the amount they owed their father's estate. Differing legal interpretations were allowed to slide into personal rancour; Charles Askin asserted of a financial matter concerning the Hamilton-controlled Canborough Mills, "Mr. Thomas Dickson is so fond of making difficulties, that I would not give myself much trouble to please him," and George Hamilton loudly declared that he dreaded an interview with the trustees "as I do the Devil. ... "25 Relations had deteriorated so far by 1818 that Clarke threatened to resign as an executor of the estate, and in 1821 Thomas Dickson did resign. Strains were further increased by the Gourlay agitation. All the family had originally supported Gourlay, but the uncles had hoped to use him to forward certain interests of their own in land speculation. When they found Gourlay was moving beyond their control, they quickly abandoned him. The Hamiltons, embittered with the provincial administration which they felt had, like their

174

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

uncles, in some way betrayed them, remained strong Gourlayites and condemned their uncles as traitors. By the height of the agitation, William Dickson and the Hamiltons were not on speaking terms. 26 The tribulations of the postwar period did not induce the Hamiltons to take any more disciplined approach to the management of their family affairs. The older sons squabbled over the debts they owed each other until, at the settlement of the estate, Alexander and Robert found it necessary to appoint an arbitrator to settle all matters between them' 'from the beginnings of the world, until the day of th~ date of these presents.' '27 The settlement of the estate also led to further quarrels with the executors, with the older sons claiming an overcharge for their services by the executors and opposing the manner in which the estate had been divided. Robert actually took his uncles to court over the matter in 1828. Even that was not the end of the matter; as late as 1836 the Hamiltons were still feuding with the sons of William Dickson over money owed for services to the estate. Thomas Clarke, in submitting his final bill of £500 to the estate, added in disgust, "for 5 times this amount I would not again undergo the like vexation & trouble. " The statement could stand as an epitaph to the Hamilton family network. The network, which had been a cornerstone of Robert Hamilton's success and which very probably could have assured the success of his sons, was in ruins. 28 The sons had reduced their father's affairs to shambles. It is indicative, nonetheless, of the exceptional influence of the senior Hamilton's enterprises that even their residual fragments were enough to establish most of his children in comfortable livelihoods and give them public prominence. The family landholdings, which remained largely intact into the 1820s, provided significant aid to the second generation. Sale of their lands after 1823 by several of the brothers to other land speculators, notably to their uncles and to Samuel Street Jr., helped them payoff old debts and provided them with some seed capital. 29 The younger sons, moreover, having been too young to participate directly in business before 1823, came out of the division of the estate with large portions of their inheritances still intact. By combining his resources with those of his older brother Robert, John Hamilton launched a major lakes shipping enterprise. The two brothers brought, built and operated steamers in an endeavour that made both their careers. George and Peter Hamilton had the good fortune to invest their money in lands which constituted a sizeable percentage of what is now central Hamilton. They both lived in comfort and respectability; George served as treasurer of the Gore District from approximately 1821 to 1827. 30 Despite the sons' inepitude in managing the family network, the many contacts of the Hamilton firm remained of importance to them. James Hamilton married into the family of Henry Warren, son of his father's old

DECLINE OF THE HAMILTON ENTERPRISES

175

forwarding agent at Fort Erie, and together with his brother-in-law, John Warren, began a successful merchant business at Sterling (Port Stanley) on Lake Erie. Records of the firm show that James' other brothers-in-law, as well as his father-in-law, his own brothers, and family contacts on the Niagara River front, played a significant role in launching the new firm, sustaining it in cooperative ventures and providing it with essential services. Having achieved local prominence, James left the business in the 1830s to become sheriff of the London District. 3t The old prestige of the family name and continuing contacts were even more important to Alexander, who had exhausted his financial resources by 1828. He withdrew from business and came to rely upon office for his income. His major positions were postmaster of the Niagara District, judge of the Surrogate Court, and, later, sheriff. Influential patrons were necessary to acquire such important posts and his correspondence indicates that Alexander relied upon his brother-in-law, Samuel Peters Jarvis, who ultimately became chief superintendent of Indian affairs, and the Reverend John Strachan. Strachan had had a long association with the Hamilton family: it was Robert Hamilton who had arranged that he be brought from Scotland as a tutor for Richard Cartwright's children, and Strachan had subsequently been a visitor at the Hamilton home. 32 Strachan, a powerful figure in postwar Upper Canada, felt a debt to the Hamilton family. He was prevailed upon "by feelings of respect for our [the Hamiltons'] later Father & Some Kindnesses rec d in early life"33 to accept a position as executor of the Hamilton estate upon the resignation of Thomas Dickson. Strachan at that time developed an admiration for Alexander's "amiable manners and Gentlemanly conduct" which obviously served Alexander well in later life. 34 Political prominence as well as appointments came to several of the Hamiltons. No doubt in part on the basis of the family name, both Robert and George were elected to the Legislative Assembly as Gourlayites in 1820; George was re-elected in 1824. John Hamilton was appointed to the Legislative Council in 1831, whither he was followed by George in 1836. John eventually became a Canadian senator in 1867.:15 The story of the second generation of Hamiltons, then, does not end in disaster or even failure. It is well to remember, however, that despite the comfort and prestige they achieved, they all fell far short of the high mark set by their father. It is interesting to note as well that the Hamiltons did not have the enduring impact upon the province of many other families who were present in the first generation of Upper Canada's development. The families of York's governing elite, for instance, families of Kingston such as the Cartwrights and Macaulays, and families of the peninSUla such as the Merritts, Nelleses, Crooks and Clenches, were more prominent for longer periods in the annals of the province, and later the nation, than the Hamiltons. The family's influence had peaked in the first generation and all further

176

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

development represented a slow descent. The second generation and their successors never acquired a power base comparable to that of the enterprises which expired almost contemporaneously with Robert Hamilton Sr.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion

During most of his Canadian career, Robert Hamilton's mansion at Queenston had presided grandly over his community. By 1815, it stood no more, reduced to a blackened shell by a fire started by British troopS.1 It was never rebuilt and today there remains no trace of it. The house's total destruction is perhaps as symbolic as its former dominance. At the end of the War of 1812, the pioneer society through which Robert Hamilton had moved with such confidence and success was quickly altering. Upper Canada was entering into a period of rapid change. The old network of merchant contacts in major centres along the lakes was being displaced by more integrated and articulate local elites, political and administrative rather than essentially commercial in their nature, and a wider range of social leadership. A provincial bureaucracy at York was beginning to exercise some influence over the province as a whole. Supply to the army and the fur trade had ceased to be of major importance; the burgeoning forwarding trade in grain was increasingly dominated by new faces. Regional economies were strengthening and local enterprises in areas like the Niagara peninSUla were becoming more attractively profitable. Within two decades, the Niagara Portage itself, the mainstay of Hamilton's enterprises, would be rendered obsolete by the WeIland Ship Canal. Equally important for regional development, that canal would stimulate water-powered industries and a consequent urban development along the canal in which the Hamiltons would not participate. The destruction of the Hamilton empire, however, does not negate its importance for the understanding of early Upper Canada. Hamilton's success points up a leading characteristic of early Upper Canadian elite development: the acquisition of wealth and power was frequently the product of a close association of entrepreneurs with the British army and the Montreal fur trade. When Robert Hamilton first arrived in the upper regions of Quebec, the area must have appeared to be stony soil for any long-term cultivation of wealth or power. Until the loss of the American colonies, upper Quebec had been little 177

178

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

more to whites than an empty frontier, a corridor to be traversed on the way to the western interior of the continent. In the thirty years following the Revolution, Upper Canada developed only modest nodes of pioneer settlement strung like beads along the edge of its east-west system of rivers and lakes. The social and political organization of the colony was small-scale and fragmented; it offered few opportunities for entrepreneurial or political aggrandizement. The colony's most striking characteristic was in fact its organizational weakness. The provincial administration was provincial in name only: handicapped by the distances between the far-flung districts under its nominal jurisdiction and its own limited administrative machinery, it pushed its influence out beyond its own immediate neighbourhood slowly. Early political organization was rudimentary: political parties did not appear upon the scene until the mid-1820s; most political groupings hardly deserved to be called factions, being little more than shifting coteries based on personality or individual grievances. Religious, social and· fraternal organizations had a desperate struggle to put down their first roots within the widely separated communities of the province. Economic development also reflected the fragmentation of the society: beyond pioneer agriculture, the major activities were shopkeeping and milling. Inadequate local communications and limited markets, fluctuating prices and low returns stunted the growth of such enterprises. Most first-generation merchants, artisans and millers could not rise much above the social level of their agrarian clientele. To a modem observer, the most striking aspect of Robert Hamilton's Upper Canadian career is its essential simplicity. It was a seamless fabric, woven from strands of the commerce associated with the supply of the British army and the Montreal fur trade. His association with supply of these groups had given Hamilton his original establishment in trade. Their business and facilities allowed him to survive and even to prosper in the depressed post-Revolutionary period. Prominent figures in the army and the fur trade through their patronage gained for Hamilton key administrative positions in his new society, positions he had used to forward his trade. Hamilton had extended his influence outward by placing his relations and connections in important positions within the structure of Laurentian commerce. His involvement in such trade allowed him to gain advantages in receiving and forwarding, portaging and the wholesaling of grain; these activities in turn provided the capital upon which his extensive retailing and land speculation were based. Hamilton's commerce constituted the essence of his politics and provoked both a provincial and a local political reaction against him. Despite that reaction and in a large measure due to the economic network to which he belonged, Hamilton was a prominent and powerful figure in the politics and patronage of his day. Just as Hamilton's fortunes rose with the Laurentian commerce associated with the fur trade and army provisioning, so they declined as it declined.

CONCLUSION

179

Despite the exceptional power and influence of the Laurentian enterprises with which he was associated, any final assessment of Hamilton must come to grips with the question of the wisdom of his heavy reliance upon them. These economic activities, closely associated with the pre-settlement frontier, did make Hamilton's fortune, but their decline was also a major factor in the demise of his enterprises. Could Hamilton have moved into areas with more potential for growth? Could he, within the range of possibilities open to him, have invested his money with greater foresight or less conservatively so as to have produced a more stable enterprise and a readier return of capital? Given the limited economic opportunities of early Upper Canada, the answer is probably no. Hamilton was ultimately the victim as well as the beneficiary of the economic state of his pioneer society. Portaging, receiving and forwarding, retailing, wholesaling of produce, and land speculation were the perimeters of his economic universe. Shipowning, manufacturing, and small-scale processing did not prove to be viable alternatives to these enterprises. Large-scale milling on the Niagara River front and at Ancaster did prove profitable and in at least one case, that of Street and Clarke, did lead into the later establishment of successful processing operations. 2 Timing perhaps provides the answer to the question why Hamilton did not involve himself in this activity: the major mills were built before the turn of the century when his enterprises were still flourishing. When his enterprises began to decline, the existence of at least three major mills might have militated against further construction. In assessing Hamilton's enterprises, it is difficult not to be impressed by what he accomplished. Hamilton's shrewd mind had grasped the major opportunities for power and profit. In a limiting pioneer environment, Hamilton's disciplined attention had allowed him to sy~tematically pursue these opportunities, while his resourcefulness, as well as his assiduity in cultivating powerful contacts and forging useful alliances, had enable him to successfully exploit them. In one sense Hamilton's influence did not die with him. He stood at the head of a tradition of "commercial Toryism" in Upper Canada, an association of business with politics whose leadership would later be assumed by such men as William Hamilton Merritt and Allan MacNab, both, by no accident, closely associated with the Niagara peninsula. That tradition would ultimately be the dominant strand in the conservatism of the nation-building era of John A. Macdonald. Like those early travellers who stood on the dock at Queenston and stared at his astonishing mansion, we would do well to take note of that long forgotten Upper Canadian, Robert Hamilton.

Appendix 1: Land Holdings in the Niagara Peninsula

00

IV

...:J

iii rn

z

Table 1: Total Lands Acquired before 1809

Crown % I acres

...:J ;:;c ." ;:;c

rn

Heir and Devisee Commission % I acres

Vi rn

en

Purchase % I acres

Total acres

0

."

;:;c 0

c:I

Robert Hamilton George Forsyth Samuel Street (Sr. & Jr.) William Dickson Thomas Dickson Thomas Clarke Butlers Balls Nelleses Canby

11 (9,150) 41 (1,200)

38 (31,550) 21 (600)

51 (42,300) 38(1,100)

83,000 2,900

29 33 10 11 93 30 73 18

51 (4,900) 27 (4,950)

20 40 90 68 7 70 27 77

9,700 18,550 2,000 1,900 11,300 17,900 7,300 3,900

(2,800) (6,100) (200) (200) (10,500) (5,300) (5,300) (700)

21 (400)

5 (200)

(2,000) (7,500) (1,800) (1,300) (800) (12,600) (2,000) (3,000)

(TJ ~

...:J

:c ;I>

s: r=...:J 0

z

Table 2: Total Lands Sold

Robert Hamilton George Forsyth Samuel Street (Sr. & Jr.) William Dickson Thomas Dickson Thomas Clarke Butlers Balls Nelleses Canby

Before /809 % / acres

%

/809-/824 I acres

/824-/834 % / acres

Total Sold % / acres

13.7 (11,400) 17.2 (500)

20.8 (17,300) 20.7 (600)

29.5 (24,550) 41. 4 (1 ,200)

64.2 (53,250) 79.3 (2,300)

1.0 (100) 98.9 (18,350)

5.2 (500)

6.2 (600) 1.1 (200)

12.4 (1,200) 100 (18,550) 60 (1,200) 37 (700) 91.2 (10,300) 27.9 (5,000) 13.6 (1,000) 71.8 (2,800)

63.7 (7,200) 10.6 (1,900) 8.2 (600) 48.7 (1,900)

60 (1,200) 16 (300) 14.2 (1,600) 10.6 (1,900) 2.7 (200) 10.3 (400)

21 (400) 13.3 (1,500) 6.7 (1,200) 2.7 (200) 12.8 (500)

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Table 3: Niagara Peninsula Lands Acquired before 1809

rr:I

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Robert Hamilton George Forsyth Samuel Street (Sr. & Jr.) William Dickson Thomas Dickson Thomas Clarke Butlers Balls Nelleses Canby

Crown % / acres

Heir and Devisee Commission % / acres

10.9 (4,400)

46.5 (18,850)

::a m en

V;

Purchase % / acres

Total acres

42.6 (17,300) 100 (500)

40,550 500

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36.3 (2,800) 39 (500) 29 (200) 100 (6,500) 92 (2,300) 95 (4,000) 10 (300)

45.5 (3,500) 8 (100)

18.2 (1,400) 53 (700) 100 (200) 71 (500) 8 (200) 5 (200) 90 (3,000)

7,700 1,300 200 700 6,500 2,500 4,200 3,300

d z

Table 4: Niagara Peninsula Lands Sold

% / acres

/824-/834 % / acres

Total % / acres

10.4 (4,200) 100 (500)

30.5 (12,300)

32.5 (13,150)

73.4 (29,650) 100 (500)

1.3 (100) 62 (800)

5.6 (500)

2.6 (200) 15 (200)

10.4 (800) 77 (1,000)

42 (300) 15.4 (1,000) 12 (300) 5 (200) 6 (200)

29 (200) 7.7 (500) 8 (200) 5 (200) 15 (500)

71 (500) 87.7(5,700) 24 (600) 24 (1,000) 67 (2,200)

Before 1809 % / acres Robert Hamilton George Forsyth Samuel Street (Sr. & Jr.) William Dickson Thomas Dickson Thomas Clarke Butlers Balls Nelleses Canby

64.6 (4,200) 4 (100) 14 (600) 46 (1,500)

/809-/824

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Table 5: Land Outside Peninsula Acquired before 1809

Crown % / acres

Heir and Devisee Commission % / acres

rn

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m Vl

Purchase % / acres

Total acres

0

'Tl ;:0

0

tJ:I

m

;:0

Robert Hamilton George Forsyth Samuel Street (Sr. & Jr.) William Dickson Thomas Dickson Thomas Clarke Butlers Balls Nelleses Canby

11.2 (4,750) 50 (1,200)

32.5 (5,600) 11 (200)

29.9 (12,700) 25 (600) 70 (1,400) 2S.1 (4,S50) 33 (400)

S3.4 (4,000) 19.5 (3,000) 42 (1,300) 60 (400)

40 (200)

5S.9 (25,000) 25 (600) 30 (600) 39.4 (6,SOO) S9 (1,600) 67 (SOO) 16.6 (SOO) SO.5 (12,400) 5S (I,SOO)

42,450 2,400 2,000 17,250 I,SOO 1,200 4,SOO 15,400 3,100 600

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Table 6: Land Outside Peninsula Sold

Robert Hamilton George Forsyth Samuel Street (Sr. & Jr.) William Dickson Thomas Dickson Thomas Clarke Butlers Balls Nelleses Canby

Before 1809 % I acres

1809-1824 % I acres

1824-1834 % I acres

Total % I acres

16.9 (7,200) 25 (600)

11. 7 (5,000) 50 (1,200)

26.S (11,400)

55.4 (23,600) 75 (I ,SOO)

20 (400)

20 (400) 100 (17,250) 67 (1,200) 17 (200) 95.S (4,600) 29 (4,400)

100 (17,250) 67 (1,200) 62.5 (3,000) 12 (1,SOO)

12.5 (600) 10 (1,600)

60 (400)

40 (200)

17 (200) 20. S (1,000) 7 (1,000)

100 (600) :> '"tl

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Table 7: Percentage of Lands Held Inside/Outside the Peninsula

Robert Hamilton George Forsyth Samuel Street (Sr. & Jr.) William Dickson Thomas Dickson Thomas Clarke Butlers Balls Nelleses Canby

Inside

Outside

48.7% 17.2

51.3% 82.8

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79.4 7.0 10.0 36.8 57.5 14.0 57.5 84.6

20.6 93.0 90.0 63.2 42.5 86.0 42.5 15.4

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Notes

INTRODUCTION I. Mary Quayle Innis, ed., Mrs. Simcoe's Diary (Toronto, 1965), p. 76.

2.

Fran~ois La Rochefoucaut-Liancourt, "Travels in Canada, 1795" inA.O. Report (1916), p. 25. Both Simcoe and La Rochefoucaut-Liancourt contain illustrations of the house.

3. Anon., "Canadian Letters: Description on a Tour thro' the Provinces of Lower and Upper Canada in the course of the years 1792 and '93" in The Canadian Antiquarian and Numismatic Journal, Third Series, IX (1912), p. 164. 4. Public Archives of Canada (PAC), C042 Transcripts, Vol. 279, pp. 299-303, Simcoe to Dundas, August 24, 1793. 5. Ibid., vol. 305, p. 190, Thorpe to Shee, December 1, 1806. 6. Based on Quebec Almanac, various years. 7. J. Carnochan "References to Niagara in Early Books of Travel, Diaries, etc." Niagara Historical Society Publications, XI (1904), p. 36. 8. Ibid., p. 37. 9. William Bentick, A Journey from Montreal to Niagara (n.p., n.d.); Carnochan, "References to Niagara," p. 37; R.C. Bond, Peninsular Village: The Story of Chippawa (n.p., n.d.), p. 25. 10. AJ. Kennie, Niagara Township: A Centennial History (n.d.), p. 30; M.H. Wetherell, Jubilee History of Thorold (Thorold, 1897), p. 63. 11. University of Western Ontario, Seaborn Collection, Addison Transcripts, p. 1, Bishop of Nova Scotia to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, March 16, 1790; D. W. Smyth, A Short Topographical Description of His Majesty's Province of Upper Canada North America (London, 1799), p. 29; PAC, Upper Canada: State Papers, Executive Council, Land Book D, p. 566, October 7, 1800. 12. Based on general population statistics in Robert Gourlay, Statistical Account of Upper Canada, 2 vols. (London, 1822). 13. For details of the various administrative and political units and their chronology, see Frederick H. Annstrong, Handbook of Upper Canadian Chronology and Territorial Legislalion, (London, On1., 1967).

NOTES

195

CHAPTER 1 1. PAC, W.O. 28/10, pp. 351-55, Ancrum to Fraser, May 30, 1785.

2. PAC, Finding Aid 654, "Regiments Stationed in the Montreal District: 1760-1870." The fort is situated on what is now the American side of the river. 3. For an excellent discussion of the problems of frontier enterprise in the pre-Revolutionary period, see C.P. Canedy III, "An Entrepreneurial History of the New York Frontier, 1736-1776" (Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, 1967). For examples of violence and military control, see: PAC, Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 103, pp. 360-62, Mclean to Lernoult, September 26, 1783; ibid., Vol. 101, p. 9, Powell to Haldimand, February 19, 1781; ibid., Vol. 114, pp. 169-71, Claus to Haldimand, April 19, 1781; Archives of Ontario (AO), Caniff Papers, "Notes on the Goring Family," John Clunes to Francis Goring, March 26, 1778; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 105, pp. 79-80, Lernoult to Harris, October 6, 1783. 4. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 125, p. 25, Mathews to Ross, June 9, 1782; PAC, Goring Papers, p. 77, Street to Goring, January 3, 1780; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 96, pt. 1, p. 224, Bolton to the Adjutant-General, October 12, 1778. 5. Ibid., Vol. 110, pp. 334-36, Board of Inquiry, October 10, 1783; ibid., Vol. 96, pt. I, p. 185, Bolton to the Adjutant-General, January 31, 1778; and W.H. Siebert, "The Loyalists and the Six Nation Indians in the Niagara Peninsula," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada , IX, Sec. II (1915), pp. 83-92. 6. PAC, Claus Papers, Vol. 26, p. 24, Claus to Pard ill , October 15, 1778; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 110, p. 72, Colonel Guy Johnson's testimony on Taylor and Forsyth's accounts, July 24, 1782; Vol. 106, p. 163, Haldimand to Guy Johnson, September 5, 1781; ibid., Vol. 117, pp. 191-95, Estimate ofindian goods for one year's consumption of the Six Nations' Indian Department by G. Johnson, July 2, 1780. As a standard of comparison to gauge the value of the Indian accounts, roughly £875 was considered the minimum income of a man of means in colonial America at the time of the Revolution. See Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America (Princeton, 1965), p. 120. 7. Claus Papers, Vol. I, pp. 9-10, Claus to Blackburn, July 20, 1778; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 106, p. 70, G. Johnson to Haldimand, October 10, 1780; ibid., Vol. 125, p. 36, Mathews to Ross, July 1, 1782. 8. PAC, AO 3, Bundle 120, Accounts of bills drawn for His Majesty's Service at the Upper Posts, October 1775-May 1784. These accounts are not absolutely complete. They are exclusive of £38,872 expended by the Provincial Marine. For Niagara, they do not appear to include Indian Department accounts for 1783-1784. They are, however, useful for a general indication of military expenditure directly at the posts. The upper posts here referred to are Niagara, Detroit, Oswego, Michilimackinac, Vincennes, and Fort George on the Mississippi; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 54, p. 314, Haldimand to Robinson, November 1778; PAC, CO 42, Transcripts, Vol. 16, p. 296, The Memorial of Peter Livius, Chief Justice of His Majesty's Province of Quebec, January 14, 1785; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 105, p. 129, Powell to Mathews, August 2, 1781; ibid., Vol. 99, pp. 7-10, Expenditure of rum at Niagara, May II, 1777-May 10, 1778, n.d.; ibid., Vol. 105, p. 129, Powell to Mathews, August 2, 1781; PAC, Saumarez Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 3, 12-13, 43, 112, Accounts.

196

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

9. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 103, p. 37, Haldimand to Germain, December 3, 1780; ibid., Vol. 103, p. 53, McLean to Haldimand, March 29, 1783. 10. Ibid., p. 37, Haldimand to Germain, December 3, 1780. I I. "Hamilton to Carleton, September 16, 1778," quoted in Wayne E. Stevens, The Northwest Fur Trade (Illinois, 1928), p. 60. 12. On Butler's pre-Revolutionary career, see Canedy, "An Entrepreneurial History ... "; James Sullivan et al.• eds., Papers of Sir William Johnson (14 vols., Albany, 1921-1965); Howard Swiggett, War Out of Niagara (New York, 1933); AO 12, Vol. 21, p. 403, Loyalist claim of John Butler. 13. On the patronage of the Indian Department, see Canedy, "An Entrepreneurial History .... " 14. For details of Guy Johnson and Daniel Claus's activities, see Barbara Graymount, The Iroquois in the American Revolution (New York, 1972); J.G. Rossie, "The Northem Indian Department in the American Revolution," Niagara Frontier, XX (1973); G.F.G. Stanley, Canada Invaded: 1775-1776 (Toronto, 1973); Claus Papers, Vol. 3, p. 291, Haldimand to Sir John Johnson, November 25, 1782. 15. See Graymounl, The Iroquois, p. 157. 16. Claus Papers, Vol. I, p. 234, . 'Remarks on the Management of the Indians in North America," n.d. 17. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 25, Claus to Pardill, October 15, 1778. Claus also produced accounts of frontier battles for British newspapers and an eulogistic biography, "Observations of J. Brant's distinguished Genius and Character from Other Indians," both of which played up Brant at Butler's expense. See ibid., Watts to Claus, March 30, 1779 and ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 207-11. 18. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 100, pp. 46-47, Bolton to Haldimand, August 29, 1778; Claus Papers, Vol. I, pp. 252-54, Claus to [?], 1777; ibid., Vol. 26, pp. 37-38, Taylor and Duffin to Claus, November 11, 1778. 19. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 254, Claus to [?], 1777; Canedy, .. An Entrepreneurial History ... ," p. 241; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 191, pp. 23-24, Day to Haldimand, November 30, 1778; AO 3, Bundle 120, [transcript], Accounts of bills drawn for His Majesty's Service at the Upper Posts, October 1775-May 1784. 20. Caniff Papers, "Notes on the Goring Family," Goring to Crespel, n.d.; Goring Papers, Robinson to Goring, July 9, 1779; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 100, pp. 91-93, Bolton to Ha:ldimand, February 8, 1779. Claus Papers, Vol. 26, pp. 116-17, Langan to Claus, August 9, 1779. 21. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 104, pp. 49-50, Haldimand to Bolton, August 27, 1779. Caniff Papers, "Notes on the Goring Family," Goring to Crespel, n.d.; Goring Papers, pp. 65-67, Pollard to Goring, September 29, 1779. 22. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 103, pp. 166-71, McLean to Mathews, May 17, 1783; ibid., Vol. 108, pp. 119-31, Observations on the remarks of the board of inquiry by Guy Johnson, [1783?]; AO 3, Bundle 120, Accounts; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 102, pp. 169-70, Forsyth to Powell, September 4, 1782; Caniff Papers, "Notes on the Goring Family," Goring to Crespel, n.d. 23. M.M. Quaife, "Alexander Macomb," Burton Historical Collection Leaflet. X (1931), pp. 3-7. 24. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 100, p. 45, Powell to Haldimand, September 20, 1781.

NOTES

197

25. Ibid., Vol. 109, pp. 154-55, Cunningham to Douglas, August 17, 1781. 26. Ibid., Vol. 101, pp. 160-63, Taylor and Forsyth to Powell, September 27,1781. 27. Ibid., p. 177, Powell to Haldimand, October 10, 1781; ibid., Vol. 109, p. 145, Powell to Haldimand, September 20, 1781; ibid., Vol. 104, pp. 303-304, Mathews to Powell, Montreal, May 5, 1782; ibid., Vol. 102, pp. 92-93, Douglas to Mathews, June 26, 1782; ibid., Vol. 104, pp. 313-14, Haldimand to Powell, May 19, 1782. 28. Ibid., Vol. 103, pp. 166-71, McLean to Mathews, May 17, 1783. 29. Ibid., Vol. 55, pp. 231-33, Haldimand to Townsend, October 22, 1782. 30. Ibid., pp. 105-108, Haldimand to Germain, October 23, 1781 (italics in original). 31. Ibid., Vol. 159, pp. 28-29, Haldimand to Guy Johnson, September 9, 1779. 32. Claus Papers, Vol. 3, Haldimand to Sir John Johnson, November 25, 1782. 33. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 159, pp. 28-29, Haldimand to Guy Johnson, September 9, 1779. 34. PAC, CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 55, pp. 105-108, Haldimand to Germain, October 23, 1781; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 65, p. 23, Haldimand to Sir John Johnson, May 17, 1784; ibid., pp. 35-36, Haldimand to Sir John Johnson, May 27, 1784. 35. PAC, Edgar Transcripts, Vol. 3, Cartwright to Edgar, May IS, 1780. 36. For example, "R. Cartwright to Sir William Johnson, Albany January 8, 1768," printed in Letters of Sir William Johnson, ... XII, p. 408; ibid., December 15, 1769, VIII, p. 1031; ibid., n.d., V, pp. 546, 555; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 160, p. 23, McAlpin to Haldimand, July 7, 1779; ibid., Vol. 105, p. 161, Walter Butler to Bolton, Canattsagoe, August 14, 1779; C.E. Cartwright, ed., Life and Letters of Hon. Richard Cartwright (Toronto, 1876), pp. 29-46. 37. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 160, p. 23, McAlpin to Haldimand, July 7, 1779. 38. Ibid., Vol. 191, pp. 23-24, Day to Haldimand, November 30, 1778. 39. Hew Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae: The Succession of Ministers in the Church of Scotland from the Reformation, 3 Vols. (Edinburgh, 1915), I, p. 357; East Lothian Biographies [Transactions of the East Lothian Antiquarian and Field Naturalists Society, Vol. IV, (1941)], pp. 60-61; John Martin, Reminiscences of Haddington (Edinburgh, 1890), p. 36-42. 40. Scottish Records Office, Presbytery of Bolton: Minutes, pp. 447-48, October I, 1771; W. Innes Addison, A Roll of the Graduates of the University of Glasgow (Glasgow, 1898), pp. 6, 76, 98, 246; Scott, Fast; Ecclesiae Sc:oticanae, I, p. 357; East Lothian Biographies, pp. 60-61. 41. PAC, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 67, Extract of a letter from Janey Gourlay, Edinburgh, October 23, 1858. In this letter Miss Gourlay, a relation of Hamilton, summarizes his correspondence to his family in Scotland. The correspondence itself is not known to be extant. The University of Glasgow has indicated in correspondence with the author that it has no record of Robert Hamilton's graduation. It is possible, however, that he could have begun a degree without leaving a record. 42. Goring Papers, pp. 23-26, Hamilton to Goring, July 25, 1779; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 127, p. 127, Accounts of goods at Carleton Island in charge of R. Hamilton, April 20, 1780. 43. Goring Papers, pp. 23-26, Hamilton to Goring, July 25, 1779.

198

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

44. See also ibid., p. 55, Hamilton to Goring, September 3, 1779; Caniff Papers, "Notes on the Goring Family," Hamilton to Goring, October 4, 1779. 45. E.E. Rich, The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1857 (Toronto, 1967), p. 158; Goring Papers, p. 94, Pollard to Goring, March 17, 1780; "Partnership between John Askin and Hamilton and Cartwright, August 3, 1781", printed in M.M. Quaife. The John Askin Papers, 2 vols. (Detroit, 1928 and 1931), I. p. 188. The agreement mentions that Todd and McGill "had a part" in the house of Hamilton and Cartwright. 46. Caniff Papers, "Notes on the Goring Family," A. Cunningham to Goring, June 15. 1778. 47. Paul C. Philips. The Fur Trade, 2 vols. (Oklahoma, 1961) I, p. 629. 48. Goring Papers; Caniff Papers, "Notes on the Goring Family." 49. Cartwright, Hon. Richard Cartwright, pp. 9-11,14. 50. PAC, Jarvis Papers. Vol. 1, p. 70, Hannah Jarvis to Rev. Samuel Peters. November 27, 1794. 51. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 103, p. 152, McLean to Haldimand, May 11, 1783; ibid .• pp. 324-26, McLean to Haldimand, August 17, 1783. 52. Ibid., Vol. 125, p. 25, Mathews to Ross, June 9, 1782. 53. Ibid., Vol. 105, p. 354, Butler to Haldimand, March 3, 1783. 54. "Partnership Agreement ... " printed in Quaife. Askin Papers. I, p. 188; Detroit Public Library (DPL), Askin Papers, Todd and McGill in account with John Askin, March 1, 1782. 55. Goring Papers, pp. 142-48, A. Mackintosh to Goring, April 16, 1782. Saumarez Transcripts. Vol. 2, p. 3, Accounts; ibid .• p. 176, Officers of the Grenadier Company in account with Hamilton and Cartwright. May 1785; J.M. Crysler. History oflhal Branch of the Crysler Family Who Settled in Township of Niagara (Niagara-on-the-Lake, 1936), p. 115. 56. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 126, p. 73, Declaration of Robert Hamilton, November 3, 1783; "McGill to Askin, December 20, 1786," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, I, pp. 273-79; DPL, Askin Papers, Ledger Book C: 1785-1787.

CHAPTER 2 1. PAC, Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, Vol. 1, folder Cc. p. 24 ff, Requisitions for Presents, 1793; ibid., Finding Aid 654, "Regiments Stationed in the Montreal District: 1760-1850," n.p.; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 103, pp. 318-19, McLean to Haldimand, August 8, 1783; ibid., p. 322, S. Street to McLean, August 14, 1783. 2. PAC, State Records: Lower Canada, Bonds, Licences and Certificates, RG 4 B28, Vol. 115, Indian Trade Passes, 1783 & 1789. 3. R.L. Gentilcore, "The Beginnings of Settlement in the Niagara Peninsula: 1782-1792," Canadian Geographer, VII (1963), p. 75; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 105A pp. 412-13, Butler to Mathews, May 8, 1784; "Return of Loyalists

NOTES

199

and disbanded troops by R. Hamilton, Niagara, 17 September, 1787," printed in E.A. Cruikshank, "Records of Niagara: 1784-89," Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XXXIX (1928), pp. 122-25; PAC, Porteous Papers, Hamilton to Porteous, December 10, 1790; Crysler, The Crysler Family, p. 115; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 103, pp. 492-93, Petition to John Butler, 1784. 4. "Return of Loyalists, 1787"; Gentilcore, "Beginnings of Settlement," p. 75; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 102, p. 99, Powell to Haldimand, June 27, 1782; ibid., Vol. 193, p. 276, McLean to Haldimand, July 19, 1783; AD, Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts] p. 209, Hamilton and Cartwright to Butler and Street, April 10, 1786. 5. F. Ouellet, Hisloire economique el sociale du Quebec: 1760-1850 (Montreal, 1966), p. 127; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], p. 200, Hamilton and Cartwright to Todd and McGill, January 18, 1786; ibid., p. 209, Hamilton and Cartwright to Butler and Street, April 10, 1786; A.L. Burt, The Old Province of Quebec, 2 vols. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), II, pp. 33-35, 117; Ouellet, Histoire economique, p. 132. 6. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 64, pp. 149-50, Mathews to Douglas, August 12, 1784; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], p. 218, Cartwright to Robert Dickson, May 11, 1786. 7. Goring Papers; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 103, p. 345, McLean to Haldimand, August, 22, 1783. 8. Simcoe Transcripts, Series I, Vol. 6, Indian Department Regulations, 1787; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 43, pp. 786-89, Captain A. Fraser to Evan Nepean, October 31,1789; ibid., Vol. 42, pp. 144-47, Grenville to Dorchester, October 20,1789; ibid., Vol. 43, pp. 411-18, Butler to Johnson, March 2, 1790. 9. "Joseph Chew to T.A. Coffin, February 20, 1794" printed in The Correspondence of Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe, ed. E.A. Cruikshank, 5 vols. (Toronto, 1923-31), II, p. 155; ··Simcoe to Dorchester, June 15, 1794," printed in ibid., II, p. 267; ··Simcoe to Dorchester, July 1, 1794," printed in ibid., II, p. 299; ··Simcoe to Dorchester, January 30, 1795" printed in ibid., III, pp. 278-79; AD, Street Papers, Cancellation of Articles of Agreement Between Andrew Butler and Samuel Street, January 4, 1797. 10. R.W. Bingham, The Cradle of the Queen Cit)': A History of Buffalo to the Incorporation of the City, ··Buffalo Historical Society Publications," Vol. XXI (1931), pp. 72-73; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 46, p. 479 ff, Statement by William Johnston, n.d. 11. Ibid., p. 431, John Butler to Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, May 18, 1790. 12. Ibid., p. 491 ff, Ralfe Clench to Sir John Johnson, August 28, 1790. 13. Ibid., p. 458 ff, Johnson to Dorchester, September 13, 1790; ibid., Vol. 50, pp. 121-22, Francis Le Maistre to Col. Gordon, April 14, 1791. 14. Ibid., pp. 128-29, Samuel Street to Johnson, March 4, 1791;John Andre, William Berczy: Co-Founder of To roIlto (Toronto, 1967), p. 32. 15. PAC, William Berczy Papers, Vol. 1, p. 51a ff, Articles of Agreement among Dedric Conrad Brauer, Charles Lewis Brauer and Son, William Berczy, Samuel Forbes, Samuel Street, Andrew Pearce, Timothy Green and Melanchton Smith, March 20, 1794; ibid., p. Sib, Articles of Agreement, William Berczy and Samuel Street, March 20, 1794; Andre, William Berczy, p. 44; Berczy Papers, Vol. 1, p. 366, Samuel Street in Account with the German Company, January 30,

200 THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON 1795; ibid., p. 44, Statement of Expenses made by the German Company previous to Samuel Street's Esquire Selling Out, July 9, 1797. 16. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 2, pp. 258-59, S. Street to Sir John Johnson, April 20, 1791; "Phineas Bond to Simcoe, February 16, 1795," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, III, p. 299; Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, II, p. xvii. 17. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], pp. 214-15, Hamilton and Cartwright to Todd and McGill, May 8, 1786; ibid., p. 204, Cartwright to Hamilton, February 12, 1786; ibid., p. 219, Cartwright to Hamilton, May 11, 1786. 18. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 2, p. 329, Extracts from the Reverend George Mitchell's remarks on Canada and the Upper Country. 19. PAC, State Papers: Quebec, Executive Council, Minute Books, Vol. 9, pp. 195-96, Report of the Merchants of Montreal, January 23, 1787; ibid., Quebec, Bonds, Licences and Certificates, Vol. 115, Indian Trade Licences, 1785, 1787 and 1790; Hiram Walker Historical Museum, Angus Mackintosh Papers, Account of Mackintosh with Hamilton and Cartwright, January 8, 1788. 20. "Todd and McGill to Askin, December 20, 1786," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 277. 21. Cartwright Letter Books, [transcripts] p. 204, Cartwright to Hamilton, February 12, 1786. 22. Ibid., p. 227, Cartwright to Hamilton, June 8, 1786. 23. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 25, p. 299, Haldimand to Lord Sidney, March 16, 1785; State Papers: Quebec, Executive Council, Minute Books, RG 1 El, Vol. 27, pp. 613-14, Memorial of William Robertson, October 8, 1788; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 216, p. 411, Memorial of Merchants of Montreal, August 9, 1784; ibid., pp. 613-14; H.A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada, rev. ed. (Toronto, 1967), pp. 183-84; State Papers: Quebec, Executive Council, Minute Books, Vol. 9, pp. 204-205, Report of Merchants of Montreal ... January 23, 1787. 24. Cartwright Letter Books [microfilm], Cartwright and Joseph Forsyth and Company to Todd and McGill, March 12, 1794; ibid., Cartwright to Hamilton, April 10, 1794; "Report of the Standing Committee to Haldimand, December 29, 1788," quoted in Cruikshank, "Records of Niagara: 1778-1783," Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XXXVIII (1927), pp. 35-36. 25. Cartwright Letter Books [microfilm], Cartwright to Todd and McGill, October 3, 1793; ibid., Cartwright to Todd and McGill, September 28, 1793, and October 12, 1793. 26. Ibid., Richard Cartwright and Joseph Forsyth and Company to Todd and McGill and Forsyth and Richardson, March 12, 1794; Canedy, "An Entrepreneurial History," p. 239; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 192, p. 148, Stedman in Account with the Crown, April 6, 1782; ibid., Vol. 99, pp. 176 ff, Memorandum on Trade by the Lakes, 1778; ibid., Vol. 96, pt. I, pp. 216-17, Lieutenant Colonel Mason Bolton to Haldimand, September 18, 1792. 27. State Papers: Quebec, Executive Council, Minute Books, Vol. 9, p. 206, Report of the Merchants of Montreal ... , January 23, 1787. 28. State Papers: Upper Canada Land Board, Records, RG I L4, Vol. 5, pp. 43-44, James McGill to William Grant, November 23, 1789; ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 46-49, William Grant to the Gentlemen of the Land Board for the District of Nassau, December 26, 1789.

NOTES

201

29. State Papers: Quebec, Executive Council, Minute Books, Vol. 28, pp. 284-85, Plan for the Portaging of the Effects of Government on the West Side of the Niagara River, July 19, 1791. 30. Ibid., pp. 282-83, Philip Stedman Jr. to Craigie, July 15, 1791. 31. Ibid., pp. 281-82, Plan for Portaging; and p. 289, Report of the Committee for Inland Navigation and Commerce, September 23, 1791. 32. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 2, p. 329, Extracts from the Reverend George Mitchell's Remarks; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], p. 211, Hamilton and Cartwright to Aldjo and Maitland, April 26, 1786; ibid., p. 209, Hamilton and Cartwright to Butler and Street, April 10, 1786. 33. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 71, pp. 234 ff, John Craigie to Brigadier General Hope, August IS, 1786. 34. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], p. 203, Cartwright to Duncan Murray, February 12, 1786.

CHAPTER 3 l. Siebert, "Loyalists and Six Nation Indians," pp. 85-89; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 39, p. 572, Carleton to Butler, July 9, 1777.

2. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 13, pp. 318-19, Butler to Carleton, June 15, 1777. 3. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 96, pt. I, p. 128, Butler to LeMaitre, April 10, 1778; ibid., Vol. 216, pp. 26-27, Memorial of John Dease, July 3, 1781; ibid., Vol. 104, pp. 195-96, Haldimand to Powell, April 11, 1781; ibid., Vol. 39, p. 572, Haldimand to Butler, July 9, 1777; on the Cherry Valley Massacre, see Graymount, Iroquois, pp. 183-84; Claus Papers, Vol. 26, pp. 37-39, Taylor and Duffin to Claus, November II, 1778; WO 28, Vol. 10, pp. 431-32, Claus to Lernoult, May 14, 1781. 4. State Records: Upper Canada, Land Board Minutes and Records, RG.I L4, Vol. 5, pp. 9-10, Haldimand to Bolton, July 12, 1780. 5. Siebert, "Loyalists and Six Nations Indians," p. 89. 6. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 105, p. 354, Butler to Mathews, March 3, 1783; ibid., Vol. 104, pp. 430-31, Haldimand to McLean, Quebec, September 11, 1783. 7. Ibid., Vol. 63, p. 334 ff, Haldimand to Lt. Col. De Peyster, May 24, 1784. 8. Claus Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 22-23, Claus to [?], June 14, 1783; W. Canniff,History of the Province of Ontario (Toronto, 1872), p. 212; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], p. 229, Cartwright to Hamilton, July 18, 1786. 9. "Memorial of Lt. Col. John Butler, October 12, 1787, Quebec Land Book," quoted in E. Cruikshank, "Records of Niagara: 1784-9," Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XXXIX (1928), pp. 24-27; M.B. Norton, The British Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England: 1774-1789 (Toronto, 1972), pp. 216, 219, 231. 10. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. lOS, p. 376, Butlerto Mathews, November 3, 1783.

202

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

II. Ibid., Vol. 105, p. 415, Butler to Haldimand, May 12, 1784. 12. Ibid., p. 418, Butler to Mathews, July 21, 1784; ibid., Vol. 215, pp. 196 ff, Narrative of Lt. Col. Butler's Services in America, May 1785; ibid., Vol. 222, pp. 70-71, Certificate by General Haldimand, May 7, 1785; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 26, p. 66, Butler to E. Nepean, March 17, 1786; Claus Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 108-10, P. Langan to D. Claus, June 27, 1786; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 76, pp. 183-85, Mathews to Haldimand, August 9, 1786; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 24, p. 79 ff, Petition of Sir John Johnson and others, April II, 1785. 13. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 76, p. 183 ff, Mathews to Haldimand, August 9, 1786. 14. Claus Papers, Vol. 4, p. 162, Sir John Johnson to Claus, October 19, 1787. 15. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 46, p. 395 ff, Dorchester to Johnson, January 21, 1790. 16. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 105A, pp. 412-14, Butler to Mathews, May 8, 1784. 17. PAC, Mathews Papers, Diary, n.d., pp. 15-16. 18. St. Catharines Public Library, Genealogical Files. 19. "Names of Persons Recommended for Civil Office in the New Districts, August 18, 1787, State Records, n.p.," printed in E.A. Cruikshank, "Records of Niagara: 1784-89," Publications of the Niagara Historical Society. XXXIX (1928), p. 60; CO 42 Transcripts, Vo. 37, p. 182, Minutes of Council, May 14, 1788; Quebec Almanac (Quebec, 1789), pp. 19-20. 20. "Extract from the Quebec Land Book, December 27, 1788," printed in Cruikshank, "Records of Niagara: 1784-89," pp. 61-62; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. I, p. 260, Hunter to Farquharson, February 12, 1789. 21. "Dorchester to Grenville, March 15, 1790," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence. I, 10; Burt, Old Province of Quebec. II, p. 145. 22. ""Extract from Quebec Land Book, December 29, 1788," printed in Cruikshank, "Records of Niagara, 1784-89," pp. 61-62; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 46, p. 77, Johnson to Dorchester, September 13, 1790; Cruikshank, ""Records of Niagara: 1789-93," Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XDI (1930), p.96. 23. "Dorchester to Grenville, March 15, 1790," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, I, 10. 24. UWO, William Robertson Collection, p. 52, Hamilton to Robertson, October 20, 1791; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], p. 21, Cartwright to Todd, October 21, 1792; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 278, pp. 32-33, Sir John Johnson to Simcoe, November 24, 1791. 25. ""Returns of Butler's Rangers by Lt. Colonel De Peyster, July 20, 1784," printed in P.A.C. Report, 1891, pp. 4-5 supplemented by the United Empire Loyalist List printed in United Empire Loyalist Centennial Committee, The Centennial of the Settlement of Upper Canada . ... (Toronto, 1885) and Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. ItO, pp. 90-91, Return ofthe Indian Department by John Butler, September 3, 1789; State Papers, Upper Canada: Land Board Records, Minutes and Records, RG I L4, Vol. 5, pp. 26-27, Return of Officers and Rank and File who have served His Majesty for whom Lands have been surveyed by Philip Frey, April 27, 1789; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 115, pp. 194-95, List of Officers belonging to the Indian Department at Niagara by John Johnson, December 4, 1783; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 306, pp. 150-61, List of half-pay officers and persons on

NOTES

203

military allowances in the Province of Upper Canada, June 1, 1806 by Francis Gore, Lieutenant-Governor, April 23, 1807.

26. P.A.C. Report, 1891, pp. 4-5, Returns of Butlers' Rangers by Lt. Colonel De Peyster, July 20, 1784, supplemented by the United Empire Loyalist Lists; State Papers, Upper Canada: Land Board Records, Vol. 5, pp. 26-27, Return of Officers and Rank and File ... by Philip Frey, April 27, 1789; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 110, pp. 90-91, Return of the Indian Department by John Butler, September 3, 1782; PAC Land Board Records, Vol. 5, pp. 26-27; D.W. Smith, A short topographical description of His Majesty's Province of Upper Canada in North America (London, 1799), p. 29. 27. The map is based upon A.O. Report, 1905, pp. 337-43, District of Nassau: Register of Lots in the Townships of that District, Received August 5, 1795. Internal evidence suggests the register records grants to 1791. Original grants to the Loyalist military appear to be indicated, but not the supplemental grants agreed to in 1789. The reg ister was the result of an inquiry by the Land Board held at various locations in the peninsula to determine what land settlers actually occupied. The Rangers and members of the Indian Department were selected out by using "Returns of Butler's Rangers by Lt. Colonel De Peyster, July 20, 1784," supplemented by United Loyalist Lists and Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 110, pp. 90-91, Return of the Indian Department by John Butler, September 3, 1782. 28. PAC, Audit Office 12 and Audit Office 13, Loyalist Claims. 29. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 115, pp. 194-95, List of Officers of the Indian Department at Niagara and Montreal, December 4, 1783. 30. Graymont,lroquois, pp. 228, 245; see also the summation of the forces involved in the Wyoming Raid, Siebert, "Loyalists and The Six Nations Indians," p. 84, and Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 105, p. 360, Major Potts to Haldimand, August 14, 1783. 31. Claus Papers, Vol. 26, pp. 53-55, Claus to Haldimand, November 20, 1778; Haldimand Papers, Vol. 101, p. 9, Powell to Haldimand, February 19, 1781; ibid., Vol. 81, p. 153, Lernoult to Maclean, April 20, 1781; ibid., Vol. 105, pp. 269-70, Butler to Mathews, July 2, 1781. 32. "District of Nassau Letter Book No.2, p. 79, Statement of the Mills in the District of Nassau, by D.W. Smith, November 7, 1792," printed inA.D. Report, 1905, p. 325; State Records: Upper Canada, Customs: Shop, Tavern, and Still Licences, Vol. 53-57, Shop Licences, 1802-1811.

33. Quebec Almanac, various years. 34. AO, Upper Canada: Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Assembly [transcripts], June 17,1793; PAC, Indian Department: Upper Canada, RG 10 A2, Vol. 105, item 141, Memorial of W.B., Henry and George Sheehan, n.d. 35. "Minutes of Nassau Land Board, July 22,1791," printed inA.D. Report (1905), p. 172. 36. See, for example, Siebert, "The Loyalists and the Six Nations;" Claus Papers, Vol. 3, Haldimand to Sir John Johnson, November 25, 1782; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 115, p. 39, Haldimand to Sir John Johnson, December 5, 1782; ibid., pp. 121-22, Sir John Johnson to Haldimand, June 2, 1783; ibid., Vol. 102, p. 237, McLean to Haldimand, December 24, 1782.

204

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

37. Quebec Almanac, 1786 and 1796; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 46, pt. 2, pp. 395-403, Dorchester to Sir John Johnson, January 21, 1790; "Dorchester to Grenville, March 15, 1790," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, I, p. 10; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 69, p. 179, Dorchester to Dundas, September 5, 1794. 38. Ibid., Vol. 50, pt. I, p. 218, Johnson to Dorchester, March 2, 1791; PAC, Indian Department Records, RG 10 A2, Vol. 8, n.p., Joseph Chew to Alexander McKee, received September 13, 1793; "Butler to Joseph Chew, March I, 1795," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, pp. 49-50; "Green to McKee, July 7, 1796," printed in ibid., IV, pp. 326-27; "Littlehales to Hamilton, July 12, 1796," printed in ibid., p. 329.

CHAPTER 4 I. "District of Nassau, Letter Book No.2, pp. 13-14, Extracts from the Minutes of the Executive Council, October 22, 1788," printed in A.O. Report, 1905, pp. 310-11; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 103, pp. 441-43, De Peyster to Haldimand, June 28, 1784; ibid., pp. 307-30, Hamilton and Cartwright, et al. to Haldimand, August I, 1783. 2. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], p. 21, Cartwright and Hamilton to Todd and McGill, February 3, 1786; ibid., pp. 206-207, Cartwright to Todd and McGill, March 6, 1786; ibid., p. 212, Cartwright and Hamilton to Todd and McGill, April 28, 1786; ibid., p. 205, Cartwright to Todd and McGill, February 13, 1786. 3. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 103, pp. 360-62, Mclean to Lemoult, September 26, 1783; ibid., Vol. 105, pp. 79-80, Lemoult to Harris, October 6, 1783. 4. Ibid., Vol. 114, pp. 171-72, Claus to Haldimand, April 19, 1781; Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 101. p. 9, Powell to Haldimand, February 19, 1781; ibid., Vol. 81, p. 153, Lemoult to Captain Butler, April 20, 1781. 5. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Hamilton, May II, 1786. 6. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 36, pp. 287-88, Extract of the Minutes of the Special Committee of Council, May 22, 1788. Samuel Street Jr. was the nephew of the Samuel Street previously referred to in the text. They will hereafter be distinguished as Samuel Street Jr. and Samuel Street Sr. 7. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, Vol. 3, Tt, pp. 18-20, Memorial respecting the Indian Lands on the Grand River by Robert Hamilton, n.d. 8. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 36, pp. 287-88, Extract of the Minutes of the Special Committee of Council, May 22, 1788. 9. Ibid., Vol. 25, pp. 183-84, John Dease to Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton, September 16, 1785. 10. State Papers: Upper Canada, Executive Council, RG I E3, Vol. 100, p. 56, John Butler to Nicholas Stevens, September 22, 1787. II. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, Vol. 2, Folder Rr, p. 14, Butler to Brant, October 2, 1791; Simcoe Papers, Envelope 9, Brant to Butler, October 8, 1791; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, Vol. 2, Folder Rr, pp. 8-11, Contents of the Indian

NOTES

205

Speeches ... October 17, 1791; ibid., pp. 15-16, Gordon to Brant, October 18, 1791; ibid., pp. 20-24, Brant to Johnson, October 27, 1791; ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 21-24, Brant to Chew, October 29, 1791; ibid., pp. 27-29, Kerr to Chew, November 5, 1791; ibid., Vol. 2, Folder Mm, p. 9, Johnson to Coffin, November 17, 1791; Simcoe Papers, Envelope 9, Extract of a letter, Brant to Johnson, December 30, 1791. 12. W.R. Riddell, The Bar and the Courts of the Province of Upper Canada (Toronto, 1928), p. 50. 13. Toronto Public Library, Upper Canada, District of Nassau, Court of Common Pleas, Minutes, 1788. Hamilton also no doubt benefited from sitting in the Court of Quarter Sessions as a justice of the peace. Unfortunately, Quarter Sessions records for Niagara have not survived. 14. AO, Nassau Land Board: Minutes and Correspondence. 15. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 3, p. 71, Petition of Benjamin Pawling to Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe, April 25, 1793. 16. Toronto Public Library, Court of Common Pleas; Minutes. 17. PAC, John White Papers, pp. 5-6, White to Sir Samuel Shepherd, February 25, 1793. 18. AO, Upper Canada: Journals of the Proceedings of the House of Assembly [transcripts], October 6, 1792; ibid., June 17, 1793. 19. .. Simcoe to Dundas, August 2. 1794," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence. III, p. 2. 20. Nassau Land Board: Minutes and Correspondence, Book 3, Register of the Lots in the Townships of that District. 21. Ibid .• Book I, p. 7, Minutes of Meeting, March 31, 1790; ibid., p. 11. Minutes of Meeting, June 21, 1790; ibid., p. 13. Minutes of Meeting, August 25, 1790. 22. Ibid .• p. 24, Minutes of Meeting, June 20, 1791. 23. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, Vol. 5, folder A9, pp. 6-8, Hunter to Mathews, September 23. 1788; Nassau Land Board: Minutes and Correspondence, Book I, p. 8, Minutes of Meeting, March 31, 1790. 24. Ibid.; quoted in E. Green, "Niagara Portage Road," Ontario Historical Society Records and Papers, (OHSRP), XXIII (1926). p. 323. 25. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, folder A17. p. 18, Osgoode to Simcoe, November 14. 1793.

CHAPTER 5 I. W. S. Wallace, •• Forsyth, Richardson and Company, ., Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada. 3rd Series, XXIV (1940), II, p. 188.

2. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts] p. 204, Cartwright to Hamilton, February 12, 1786; PAC, Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 67, p. 354, Extract of a letter from Janey Gourlay, October 23. 1858. Catherine Hamilton died in 1796. Robert,

206 THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON in 1797, married Mary Herkimer Mclean, daughter of John Jost Herkimer, a captain in the Indian Department and settler at Kingston. Mary had formerly been the wife of the deceased Neil Mclean, who had been an assistant commissary general at Carleton Island during the Revolution and responsible for forwarding the army's goods. After the war, Mclean was a prominent citizen, landholder and office holder at Kingston. Most of his estate passed to his wife. Mary died in 1808. There does not appear to have been any continuing connection between Robert Hamilton and Mary's family as there was with the Askins and Robertsons. See Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 541, n 4; Douglas Archives, Queen's University, Herkimer Family Papers; Richard A. Preston, "Neil McLean," in Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto, 1979), IV, p. 505. 3. DPL, Askin Papers, Inventory Book, January I, 1787; See M.M. Quaife, .. Alexander Grant," Burton Historical Collection Leaflet, V (1928); G.F. Macdonald, "Commodore Grant," Ontario History, XXII (1925), pp. 175-77; R.H. Fleming, "Phyn, Ellice and Company of Schenectady," in Contributions to Canadian Economics, IV (1932), pp. 14, 23; David R. Farrell, "Detroit 1783-1796: The Last Stages of the British Fur Trade in the Old Northwest," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1968), pp. 159-60; Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 14. 4. UWO, Robertson Collection, p. 52, Hamilton to Robertson, October 20, 1791; ibid., Robertson to Hamilton January 17, 1806; "John Askin to William Robertson, June 24, 1793," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 475; "Isaac Todd to John Askin, April 6, 1794," in ibid., I, pp. 500-501. 5. State Papers: Quebec, Executive Council, Minutes, Vol. 27, p. 619, William Robertson to W. D. Powell, I. W. Clarke and L. Genevay, October 8, 1788; for an example of Robertson's role as a source of information, see "William Robertson to John Askin, January 31, 1793," in Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 464. 6. W. Innis Addison, A Roll of the Graduates of the University of Glasgow (Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 1898), p. 6; James E. Kerr, "Sketch of the Life of the Honourable William Dickson," in Niagara Historical Society Publications, XXX (1917), p.6; Hew Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae: The Succession of Ministers in the Church of Scotland from the Reformation, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1915), p. 367; PAC, Clarke Papers, Vol. 2, p. 9, Thomas Clarke to Samuel Clarke, Oct. 12, 1792; "Catherine Hamilton to John Askin, May 20, 1794" in Quaife, Askin Papers, 1, p. 504. 7. Kerr, "William Dickson," p. 20; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 77, p. 135, William Dickson to the President of the Board of Enquiry, May 20, 1796; State Papers: Quebec, Vol. 127, p. 169, "Robert Dickson to William Robertson Sr., August 15, 1786," quoted in Robertson to W.D. Powell, I.W. Clarke and L. Genevay, October 8, 1798; "Argus, March 1846," quoted in Janet Carnochan, History of Niagara (Toronto, 1914), p. 249; Clarke Papers, Thomas Clarke to Samuel Clarke, July 30, 1791; "John Askin to Thomas Clarke, November 3, 1795," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, I, pp. 584-85. 8. Clarke Papers, Thomas Clarke to Samuel Clarke, July 30, 1791. 9. Cartwright Letter Books, [transcripts] p. 229, Cartwright to Hamilton, July 18, 1786; Lorus Tohill, "Robert Dickson, the Fur Trade and the Minnesota Boundary," Minnesota History Magazine, VI (1925), pp. 330-42; Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 542, n. 6; ibid., II, 428. n. 57.

NOTES

207

10. Clarke Papers, Thomas Clarke to Samuel Clarke, October 12, 1792. 11. Kerr, "William Dickson," p. 21. 12. AO, W.G. Reive Genealogical Collection [microfilm]; DPL, Askin Papers, Thomas Dickson to John Askin, November 22, 1795; UWO, Index to Thomas Dickson's Ledger, 1806-1809. The locatiqn of the ledger itself is unknown; Quebec Almanac, 180 I. 13. Cartwright Letter Books [microfilm], Cartwright to William Dickson, November 21, 1795. 14. For example, see: PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 15, pp. 5161-63, William Dickson to John Askin, July 23, 1803; DPL, Askin Papers, William Dickson to John Askin, December 17, 1803; "Robert Hamilton to John Askin, December 16, 1804," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, pp. 446-47; "Charles Askin to John Askin, August 24, 1807," printed in ibid., II, p. 567. 15. "Proceedings of the Legislative Council, February 23, 1803," printed in A.O. Report, 1907. A general act to authorize the governor to license certain other practitioners of the law was being passed at the same time, but separately. 16. PAC, Department of Finance, War of 1812 Losses Claims, Vol. 3740, No.5, Claim of William Dickson. 17. Cartwright Letter Books [microfilm], Cartwright to Clarke and Street, Kingston, May 4, 1798; E.A. Cruikshank, "A Memoir of Colonel the Honourable James Kirby," Weiland County Historical Societ), Papers and Records, II (1927), pp. 12-13. 18. St. Catharines Public Library, Genealogical File. 19. Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 542, n. 6; Kerr, "William Dickson," p. 22; W.G. Reive Genealogical Collection [microfilm] Quaife, Askin Papers, I, 324, n. 62. 20. Clarke Papers, Thomas Clarke to Samuel Clarke, October 12, 1792. 21. Quaife,1skinPapers, "John Askin toRobertNichol,June 10, 1799," II,p. 214. 22. "Articles of Clerkship for 3 Years, Detroit, September 18, 1795," printed in ibid., II, pp. 567-68; "G. Sense man to John Askin, February 9, 1799" printed in ibid., II, pp. 186-87; E.A. Cruikshank, "Public Life and Services of Robert Nichol," in OHSRP, XIX, (1922), p. 6; Clarke Papers, Thomas Clarke to Bell Clarke, March 9, 1794. 23. For an example of Askin's relationship to Nichol and Clarke, see "Askin to Nichol, January 14, 1803," printed in Quaife,Askin Papers, II, pp. 385-86; DPL, Askin Papers, Nichol to Askin, February II, 1804; Cruikshank, "Public Life ... of Nichol." p. 10; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Thomas Clarke to James Hamilton, October I, 1821. 24. Clarke Papers, Thomas Clarke to Helen Clarke, December 24, 1821. 25. Ibid., Thomas Clarke to Bell Clarke, March 9, 1794; ibid., Thomas Clarke to Helen Clarke, March 2, 1816; ibid., Thomas Clarke to Helen Clarke, January 7, 1832; ibid., Thomas Clarke to Helen Clarke, October 8, 1832; PAC, Military "C". Series, RG 8, I, Vol. 1326, p. 111; W.G. Reive Genealogical Collection [microfilm]. 26. "Todd to Askin, July 6, 1796," printed in Quaife,AskilZ Papers, II, p. 45; "John

208

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Askin to Thomas Clarke, November 3,1795," printed in ibid., I, pp. 584-85; "Isaac Todd to John Askin, July 2, 1796," printed in ibid., II, p. 42; "W.O. Powell to John Askin, October 13, 1794," printed in ibid., I, p. 520; "Robert Dickson to Askin, August 24, 1804," printed in ibid., II, pp. 428; "Askin to Nichol, July 8, 1799," printed in ibid., II, pp. 227-28; "Nichol to Askin, July 25, 1800," printed in ibid., II, p. 353. 27. "Nichol to Askin, December 15, 1804," printed in ibid., II, p. 445; "Askin to Nichol, February 26, 1806," printed in ibid., II, pp. 507-508. 28. PAC, Upper Canada Sundries, RG 5 A I, pp. 22844-45, Petition of James Secord, February 25, 1820; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Secord, October I, 1795; E.M. Chadwick, Ontarian Families: GenealogiesofU.E.L. and Other Pioneer Families of Upper Canada, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1898), I, p. 62; PAC, Robert Nelles Papers; AO, Robert Nelles Papers: Private Collection, Abraham Nelles Papers; UWO, Seaborn Collection, "Birdsall Family History," by Samuel Birdsall, 1862 [transcript]. 29. State Papers: Upper Canada, Land Board, Vol. 5, pp. 16-18, John Butler to Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter, October 12, 1788; "District of Nassau, Letter Book No.2, pp. 13-14, Extracts from the Minutes of the Executive Council, October 22, 1788," printed in A.a. Report, 1905, pp. 310-11. "Philip Frey to John Collins, May 2, 1789," printed in ibid., p. 314; "John Collins to Philip Frey, Surveyor General's Office, June 20, 1789," printed in ibid., p. 315. 30. "Extracts from Minutes of the Executive Council of Quebec, March 20, 1788," printed in ibid., p. 16. 31. "District of Nassau: Register of Lots in the Townships of that District, Received August 5, 1795," printed in ibid., pp. 337-43. 32. .. District of Nassau Letter Book 2, p. 79, Statement of the Mills in the District of Nassau by D.W. Smith, November 7, 1792," printed in ibid., 1905, pp. 334-35; TPL, Upper Canada: Court of Common Pleas, District of Nassau, Minutes, 1793. 33. PAC, Upper Canada: Executive Council, Land Book D, p. 503, Petition of Butler Family, June 12, 1800; AO, Probated Wills, Will of John Butler. 1796; Camochan, History of Niagara, p. 8; A.F. Hunter, "The Probated Wills of Persons Prominent in the Public Affairs of Early Upper Canada," OHSRP, XXIV (1927), p. 381, Probated Will of Johnston Butler, 1815.

CHAPTER 6 1. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 52, p. 196, Return of the Nassau Militia, May 2, 1791; ibid., Vol. 305, p. 367, Return of the Militia in His Majesty's Province of Upper Canada for the year 1805, dated July 24, 1806. The militia, of course, can be used only as a rough indicator of growth; the numbers were 500 and 2,000. Militia duty began at sixteen and ceased at sixty. 2. The citizens of the peninsula when questioned by Robert Gourlay in 1817, could name only saline and sulphur springs and bog iron ore (R. Gourlay, Statistical Accowu of Upper Canada 2 vols. [London, 1822], I, pp. 407-54). Early attempts to exploit these, based more on optimism than knowledge and capital, had failed.

NOTES

209

By 1792 twenty mills were scattered over the length of the peninsula (Nassau Land Board, Letter Book, No. I pp. 79-82, Statement of Mills ... November 7, 1792). Most, however, were restricted in scale by climate and topography: the meandering streams of the peninsula provided few exceptional mill sites and summer drought rendered even the fine sites along the Escarpment of little avail. Most mills were tucked away amongst the hills and roads had to make a way to them. Such locations limited their markets to their immediate neighbourhoods (see J.W. Watson, "The Geography of the Niagara Peninsula" [Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1942], pp. 9, 326, 332, 487-88, 521-22). Mills were expensive to build and the operation of mills other than sawmills was a skilled trade. The profit on the grinding of grain for use within the province was set at one-twelfth by government regulation, a toll which millers complained was "much less than in any other part of American" (M.Q. Innis, "The Industrial Development of Ontario," Ontario History, XXXII [1937], p. 105). For a revealing petition from a disgruntled group of peninsula millers, see AO, Journals of the Proceedings of the House of Assembly [transcripts], February 16, 1804. On the rising costs and increasing competition for shipping on Lake Ontario, see: Cartwright Letter Books [microfilm], Cartwright to Todd, McGill and Company, October 2, 1793; ibid., Cartwright and Forsyth and Company to Todd, McGill and Company, and Forsyth and Richardson and Company, October 30, 1795; ibid., November 10, 1795. For statistics on ships and discussion of the situation on Lakes Erie and Huron, see Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 10, p. 30, List of Vessels clearing outwards from Detroit, April-September, 1794; ibid., p. 41, September-December, 1794; ibid., p. 33, Vessels inwards, May-September, 1794; "John Askin to James and Andrew McGill, May 15, 1800," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, pp. 292-93; "John Askin to James and Andrew McGill, October I, 1805," printed in ibid., II, pp. 481-82; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Richardson, July 26, 1809. The last letter also discusses problems of American competition. Some idea of the growth of American shipping may be obtained by comparing ships paying duty for carrying American goods in 1806 and 1810. See: PAC, Department of Revenue, Customs Records, RG 16 AI, Vol. 297, Queenston, 1806 and 1810. 3. State Papers: Quebec, Executive Council, Vol. 9, pp. 195-96, Report of the Merchants of Montreal, January 23, 1787; ibid., Quebec, Licences, Bonds and Certificates, Vol. 115, Indian Trade Licences, 1785, 1787 and 1790. All private goods being sent into upper Quebec and the West before 1791 required licences. Returns indicate whether goods travelled by boat or canoe which makes possible a division by route. The total value of goods portaged for the three years was £128,662; £21,525 and £45,450 respectively. 4. Green, "Niagara Portage Road," pp. 260, 264-65. 5. PAC, National Map Collection, "Sketch of Communication between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, 1796"; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 10, p. 16, Calculation of expenditure on the Niagara Portage by Charles Stevenson, D.Q.M. General, 1792; ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 44-45, R. Hamilton to [?], March 19, 1793. 6. PAC, Military C Series, Vol. 272, pp. 121-24, R. Hamilton to James Green, April 24, 1805; Cartwright Letter Books [microfilm], Cartwright to Beasley, October 4, 1794. 7. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 49, pp. 295-96, Report of Captain Schank, May 31, 1790; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 10, p. 8, General Account of Merchandise from Kingston between May 15, 1789 and November I, 1791 by

210

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

William Mackay, Superintendent of Inland Navigation; ibid., p. 13, General Account of Transport of Merchandize from Kingston between May 4 and November 14, 1792, by William Mackay. Records were kept only for private goods shipped on private or government vessels. Unfortunately, records for Lake Erie in this period have not survived, nor have records for Lake Ontario beyond 1792. The major commodities shipped are listed by barrel bulk: flour, wheat, wine, tobacco, salt and sugar. Other items have been listed in a fashion that makes them not comparable, i.e.: trunks, cases, bales; but it is clear that these items constituted a minority of the goods shipped. 8. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 391, Hamilton and Forsyth to Simcoe, August 20, 1793. 9. Military C Series, Vol. 372, p. 30, Forsyth to Green, May 13, 1799; ibid., p. 29, Forsyth to Green, May 2, 1799; "James Green to John MacDonnell, May 16, 1799," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, III, p. 196. There is no reference to these two merchants well before this and they may easily have dropped out of the concern before 1792. Hiram Walker Historical Museum, Mackintosh Papers, Accounts June 1792-November 1792. Mackintosh entered his portage accounts as due to Forsyth and Hamilton: Quaife,Askin Papers, I, p. 308, n.43. 10. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Clarke and· Street, May 4, 1798; "Thomas Clark to James Green, September 15, 1797," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Papers, I, p. 282; PAC, Clarke Papers, James Green to Thomas Clark, April 10, 1799; Military C Series, Vol. 272, pp. 21-22, Thomas Clarke to Robert Prescott, June 25, 1799; Cruikshank" A Memoir of Colonel the Honourable James Kirby," pp. 12-13; Military C Series, Vol. 272, pp. 116-18, Thomas Dickson to Lieutenant-Colonel Green, April 8, 1805; AO, Alexander Hamilton Ledger. II. "James Green to Joseph Forsyth, May 9, 1799," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, III, p. 193: Military C Series, Vol. 110, pp. 12-17, Agreements for Carrying on the Portage, 1802; ibid., Vol. 164, p. 155, Agreements, 1806; ibid., Vol. 112, p. 129 and Vol. 279, pp. 141, 147, Agreements 1808. 12. Ibid., Vol. 272, pp. 121-24, Hamilton to Green, April 26, 1805; PAC, War Losses Claims, Vol. 3745, No. 330, Claim of Heirs of George Forsyth; Military C Series, Vol. 272, pp. 21-22, Thomas Clarke to Robert Prescott, June 25, 1799. 13. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], p. 219, Cartwright to Hamilton, May 11, 1786; PAC, Angus Mackintosh Letter Book, Mackintosh to Hamilton, May 13, 1802. 14. State Papers: Quebec, Bonds, Licences and Certificates, Vol. 115, Indian Trade Licences; Stevens, The Northwest Fur Trade. pp. 106-109; Farrell, "Detroit 1783-1796," pp. 159, 172. 15. UWO, William Robertson Papers, Hamilton to Robertson, October 20, 1791. 16. Ibid. 17. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 3, pp. 44-45, Hamilton to Simcoe, March 9, 1793. 18. Ibid., Series 3, Vol. 10, p. 16, Calculation of Expenditure on Portage, 1792. 19. Ibid., p. 15. Assistant Commissary General's Report of Provisions to be forwarded to Posts of Niagara and Oswego for the year 1792; ibid .• p. 26, Proposed Distribution of an early supply for the Upper Posts, January 14, 1794.

NOTES

211

20. State Papers: Quebec, Executive Council, Vol. 28, p. 280, Minutes of the Executive Council, Report of the Committee for Inland Navigation and Commerce, September 23, 1791; P.C.T. White, ed., Lord Selkirk's Diary: /803-/804. Publications of the Champlain Society, Vol. 35 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1958), p. 137. 21. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to William Dickson, November 21,1795; ibid., Cartwright to Hamilton, November 15,1796; ibid., Cartwright to James and Andrew McGill, July 7, 1797; ibid., Cartwright to James Ruggles, July 17, 1797; "Memorandum on Trade and Commerce by Robert Hamilton, September 24, 1798" printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, III, pp. 266-67; Indian Trade Licences, 1790. 22. Farrell, "Detroit 1783-1796," pp. 328-32; White, Lord Selkirk's Diary, p. 137. 23. Military C Series, Vol. 320, p. 119, Board of Accounts, Quebec, March 23, 1799. 24. "Thomas Clarke to James Green, September 15, 1797," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, III, pp. 266-67. 25. "Memorandum on Trade and Commerce by Robert Hamilton, September 24, 1798," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, III, pp. 266-67. 26. Ibid., Vol. 71, pt. 1, pp. 234-36, Craigie to Hope, August 15, 1786; Military C Series, Vol. 108, pp. 127-33, Hamilton to Green, June II, 1803; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. I, p. 394, Hamilton to Simcoe, October I, 1793. 27. Ouellet, Histoire economique, p. 125; State Papers: Quebec, Executive Council, Vol. 22, p. 410, Minutes of the Executive Council, February 22, 1790; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. I, p. 385, Memorial of the Merchants of Kingston, July 22, 1792; ibid., p. 401, Account of Produce of the Midland District exported from King.ston, compiled ~y Richard_C~~~ight, December 1.5, 1794. 28. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 25, p. 123, Memorial of Benjamin and Joseph Frobisher, Directors of the North West Company, May 8, 1785. 29. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 102, p. 99, Powell to Haldimand, June 27, 1782; ibid., Vol. 115, p. 279, John Johnson to Haldimand, July 29, 1784; C042 Transcripts, Vol. 25, pp. 26, 34, Memorial of Merchants of Montreal trading with the Indians in the Upper Country, January I, 1793; Simcoe Transcripts, Series, 3, Vol. 10, p. 33, List of Vessels Entered Inwards at Detroit, May 17-August 31, 1794; TPL, John McGill Papers, Vol. B38, pp. 48-49, State of Supply for the Upper Posts, 1794; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 10, pp. 30, 41, List of Vessels Cleared Outwards from Detroit, April 19-August 31, and August 3 I-December 29, 1794. 30. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 77, p. 102, Provisions Received into the King's Stores at Niagara and Kingston June 30-December 4, 1795; Military C Series, Vol. 106, pp. 225-34, Military Provisioning Abstracts, 1798. 31. "Robert Nichol to John Askin, August 26, 1804," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, pp. 429-30. 32. "John Askin to William Dickson, January 26, 1793," in ibid., I, pp. 460-61; PAC, Alexander Mackenzie Papers [microfilm], Vol. 3, Accounts Current with the North West Company, 1804-1813. 33. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 102, p. 99, Powell to Haldimand, June 27, 1782;

212 THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON ibid., Vol. 103, pp. 318-19, Mclean to Haldimand, August, 8, 1783; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 16, pt. 1, p. 296, Haldimand to Germain, June 18, 1779; ibid., Vol. 71, pt. 1, pp. 234-36, Craigie to Hope, August 15, 1786; ibid., Porteous Papers, [microfilm], Richardson to Porteous, June 14, 1789; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. I, p. 385, Memorial of the merchants of Kingston, July 22, 1792; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 71, pt. 1, pp. 242-43, Craigie to Dorchester, August 2, 1792; ibid., Vol. 279, pt. 2, pp. 317-19, McGill to Simcoe, January 8, 1793; John McGill Papers, Vol. B38, pp. 48-49, State of Supply for the Posts, 1794; "Cartwright to Simcoe, October 20, 1795," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, IV, p. 107. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], March 16, 1795, Cartwright to Munro and Bell, March 16, 1795; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 75, pt. I, pp. 41-42, Simcoe to Dorchester, November 3, 1795; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 8, p. 471, McGill to Simcoe, May 28, 1799; ibid., p. 475, McGill ~o Simcoe, October 5, 1799. 34. This is evident from the reports on supply of John McGill, Commissary of Stores and Provisions, to the military and the lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada. 35. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. I, p. 217, Hope to Campbell, August 17, 1786; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 71, pt. 1, pp. 234-36, Craigie to Hope, August 15, 1786. 36. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Todd, October 21, 1792. 37. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 3, p. 39, Proceedings of a Board to advise Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe, August 27, 1794. 38. Ibid., Vol. 10, p. 37, Distribution of Additional Supply, October I, 1794; Military C Series, Vol. 115 D, pp. 1, 50, 129, 131, Various Abstracts of Accounts for Purchases, 1800. 39. Yvon Desloges, "Structural History of Fort George," National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parts Canada, Manuscript Report No. /89 (Ottawa, 1977), pp. ix, 108. 40. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 77, p. 102, Provisions Received into the King's Stores at Niagara and Kingston June 30-December 4, 1795; Military C Series, Vol. 115C, 1150, Military Provisioning Abstracts, 1796-1800. 41. "McGill to Simcoe, January 8, 1792," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, I, p. 307. 42. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 3, p. 43, The Memorial of Jacob Ball and other subscribers ... of this District, March 18, 1793. 43. "McGill to Green, October 19, 1797," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, I, p. 307; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 77, p. 102, Abstract of Cash Paid by Thomas Coffin, April 5, 1796; Military C Series, Vol. 106, 115C, 115D, 115E, 115F, Military Provisioning Abstracts, 1796-1811 (hereafter referred to collectively as Military Provisioning Abstracts). 44. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 2, p. 272, Farquharson to McGill, December 29, 1792. 45. White, ed., Lord Selkirk's Diary. pp. 295-96; Military Provisioning Abstracts. 46. "Simcoe to Dorchester, December 10, 1794," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, III, p. 211. 47. Military C Series, Vol. 107, pp. 155-56, Coffin to Craigie, May 28, 1801.

NOTES 213

48. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 8, p. 181, McGill to Simcoe, May 13, 1796; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 77, pp. 122-23, Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry. May 17, 1796; ibid., pp. 136-37, Francis Crooks to Major Pratt, May 20, 1796. 49. Cartwright Letter Books [transcript], Cartwright to Beasley, August 23, 1793. 50. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 3, pp. 151-54, McGill to Simcoe, July 20, 1793. 51. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Hamilton, November II, 1794. 52. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 8, p. 181, McGill to Simcoe. May 13, 1796; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 77, pp. 122-23, Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry, Niagara, May 17, 1796; ibid., pp. 136-37, Francis Crooks to Major Pratt, May 20, 1796; ibid., Vol. 71, pt. 2, p. 255, Account of Flour Received in Upper Canada for the Supply of His Majesty's Forces. August 20, 1793; Military C Series, Vol. 109, pp. 86-88, [?] to Hunter. February 15, 1805. 53. TPL, Alexander Wood Papers, Vol. I, p. 134, Wood to Hamilton, March 29, 1802; "John McGill to James Green, February 22, 1798," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, II, p. 100. 54. "John McGill to James Green, February 18, 1799," printed in ibid., III, p. 112. 55. "McGill to Simcoe, May 13, 1796," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, IV, p. 262; "McGill to Simcoe, July 18, 1796," printed in ibid., IV, 336; "Cummings and Smith to McGill, August 20, 1796," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, I, p. 29. 56. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. I, p. 400, Simcoe to Cartwright, October 14, 1793; "McGill to Russell, May 9, 1797," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, I. pp. 176-77; "Hamilton to McGill, April 24, 1797" printed in ibid., I, p. 172.

57. Niagara Herald, February 14, 1801. 58. Military Provisioning Abstracts; Military C Series, Vol. 107, pp. 155-56, Coffin to Craigie, May 28, 1801; Niagara Herald, September 26, 1805. 59. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3; Vol. 3, pp. 153-54, McGill to Simcoe, July 20, 1793; "Alexander Davison to Simcoe, August I, 1793," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, I, p. 416; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 6, p. 133, George Davison to Charles Long, May 2, 1795. 60. ··Isaac Todd to John Askin, April 6, 1794," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 501; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 6, p. 133, George Davison to Charles Long, May 2, 1795; ibid., p. 201, John Craigie to James Farquharson, June II, 1795; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Articles Exported to Lower Canada for the Year 1803; Military Provisioning Abstracts, Vol. 115E, pp. 163, 185, 187; ibid., Vol. 115F, pp. 220, 222, 224, 240, 241. 61. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 8, p. 475. McGill to Simcoe, Upper Canada, October 5, 1799; ibid., p. 471, McGill to Simcoe, May 28, 1799; ibid., p. 33, McGill to Simcoe, September 19, 1801; Ouellet, Histoire economique, pp. 150, 604; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to McGill, August 9, 1800. 62. HR. Hamilton to Governor Hunter, October 10. 1800, from Canadian Archives, Upper Canadian Sundries," printed in H. Innis and A.R.M. Lower, Select Documents in Canadian Economic History: 1783-1885. 2 vols. (Toronto, 1933), I, pp. 261-62.

214

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

63. Military Provisioning Abstracts; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Accounts of articles exported from Upper Canada, 1800-1803; ibid., p. 150, Extract from a letter from James McGill, December 19, 1801. 64. Military Provisioning Abstracts; Ouellet, Histoire economique, p. 604; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 9, p. 71, McGill to Simcoe, July 5, 1803; Military C Series, Vol. III, p. 46, McGill to Green, January 21, 1807; ibid., Vol. 112, pp. 35-36, McGill to Thorton, March 6, 1808; ibid., p. 232, Green to Thorton, July 29, 1808. Statistics in the selling price of flour are available only for Quebec City, not for Montreal. 65. "Nichol to Askin, February I, 1804," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, pp. 401-402; Military Provisioning Abstracts; Military C Series, Vol. 109, p. 38, Craigie to Hunter, September 3, 1804; ibid., p. 55, Craigie to Hunter, September 27, 1804; ibid., Vol. III, p. 173, McGill to Green, October 2, 1807; Samuel Street Papers, Statement of Sales of Flour at Quebec in 1808. 66. Military C Series, Vol. 108, p. 69, N. Vansittart to Hunter, December 28, 1802; Military Provisioning Abstracts. See also: Military C Series, Vol. 108, pp. 127-32, Hamilton to Green, June II, 1803 and Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], pp. 200-204, Cartwright to Hunter, n.d. [1803?]. 67. AO, Miscellaneous Collection, "Bill to Improve and Amend the Communication Between the Lakes Erie and Ontario by Land and Water," printed by S&G Tiffany, Niagara, 1799; Upper Canada: State Papers: Upper Canada, Executive Council Minutes, Vol. 100, pp. 100-103, "Plan for the improvement of the Communication between the Lakes Ontario and Erie, June 15, 1799." 68. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Hamilton, April 24, 1801: Cartwright to Secord, July 30, 1802. 69. Farrell, "Detroit, 1783-1796," p. 332; Paul C. Phillips, The Fur Trade, 2 vols. (Norman, Oklahoma, 1961), II, p. 125. 70. Farrell, "Detroit, 1783-1796," p. 332; F.C. Bald, Detroit's First American Decade: 1796-1805 (Ann Arbor, 1948), p. 214. 71. L. W. Smith and A.C. Detmers, Guide to the Microfilm Edition of the Peter B. Porter Papers (Buffalo, 1968); C.M. Robinson, "The Life of Judge Augustus Porter," Buffalo Historical Society Publications, VII (1904), pp. 246-320. 72. Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 29, Portage Accounts February 9-September 30, 1807; H.A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto, 1967), pp. 258-59, 263, 269; Alexander Mackenzie Papers [microfilm], Accounts Current of McTavish, Frobisher and Company and Sir Alexander Mackenzie and Company, 1805-1810. 73. Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 29, Portage Accounts: February 9-September 30, 1807; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Extract from a letter to James McGill, December 19, 1801; Robinson, "Augustus Porter," p. 253.

CHAPTER 7 1. "Argus, March 1846," quoted in Janet Camochan, History of Niagara (Toronto, 1914), p. 249; AO, Nassau Land Board: Minutes and Correspondence,

NOTES

215

Letterbook I, p. 79. The date at which these operations were sold is not known, but they did not constitute a part of Hamilton's later operations. 2. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Secord, November 18, 1795; ibid., Cartwright to Samuel Thompson, November 15, 1796; ibid., Cartwright to Thomas Barry, October 20, 1796; ibid., Cartwright to Samuel Thompson, September 20, 1797. 3. These generalizations are based on the following sources: Cartwright letter books; AO, Nelles Papers; PAC, Nelles Papers; TPl, Baldwin Papers; DPl, Askin Papers; PAC, Askin Papers; UWO, Seaborn Collection, Birdsall Memoirs. 4. State Records: lower Canada, Bonds, Licences and Certificates, Vol. 115, Indian Trade Passes, 1789; State Records: Upper Canada, Customs, Vol. 53, Shop Licences, 1803. A shop licence was necessary to vend liquor to be consumed off the premises. It is assumed that virtually all general merchants sold liquor; it is also assumed that artisan and specialty shops would not. Full shop statistics are available from 1802. 5. Ibid., Vols. 53-57, Shop Licences 1802-1811. 6. AO, William Nelles Account Book, 1793-1805 [microfilm].

7. AO, Lincoln County Surrogate Court Records, Will Dockets of John Fanning, John Boyd and Richard Hatt; UWO, Index to Thomas Dickson's Ledger Books, 1806-1809 [transcripts].

8. Lincoln County Surrogate Court Records, Inventory of all the Goods, Chattels, Rights and Credits . . . of the late Honourable Robert Hamilton . . . at the time of his death March 14, 1809; PAC, Goring Papers, pp. 171-72, Facts of business done for the late Honourable Robert Hamilton Esq. by Francis Goring, n.d. Most of the records relating to the Hamilton enterprises have been destroyed; it is very fortunate that an extremely detailed inventory of his estate has survived.

9. "Years in Which Townships were finally settled," Map in J.W. Watson "The Geography of the Niagara Peninsula with Special Emphasis on Changes in land Use and Settlement" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Toronto, 1942), p. 60; R.L. Gentilcore, "The Niagara District of Robert Gourlay," Ontario History. Vol. XIV (1962), pp. 230, 294. 10. For a full analysis of road and settlement patterns, see Watson, "Geography ofthe Niagara Peninsula," pp. 322-28 and Andrew Burghardt, "The Origin and Development of the Road Network of the Niagara Peninsula, Ontario, 1770-1851," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. DIX (1969), pp. 417-40.

II. PAC, Upper Canada Sundries. Memorial of Merchants & other inhabitants of the Township of Grimsby, Feb. 19. 1821; State Records: Upper Canada, Minutes of the Executive Council, Vol. 51, pp. 148-49. March 8, 1821. 12. Goring Papers, pp. 171-72, Statement of Facts of business . . . by Francis Goring, n.d. 13. Lincoln County Surrogate Court Records, Inventory of all the Goods ... of Robert Hamilton, March 14, 1809. 14. Francis Goring Papers, Notebooks. 15. The calculations of the total holdings are based upon the deed abstracts for all available townships in lincoln. Oxford, Norfolk and Middlesex. This has been

216

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

supplemented with: Hamilton Papers, Vol. 35, Inventory of Robert Hamilton's lands, n.d. The inventory in the Hamilton Papers appears to have been prepared shortly after Hamilton's death by the executors of the estate. It lists the mode of acquisition of land, but not the date acquired or sold. The inventory is very important as the only detailed source of information on mortgages - the deed abstracts appear to have been remiss in recording such information. The inventory has been used as the source of information on Hamilton's lands outside the counties researched in the abstracts and also for the following townships within Lincoln: Niagara, Stamford, Crowland, Wainfleet, Bertie, Castor, Glanford, Saltfleet, Clinton and Grantham. Deed abstracts for the early period in these townships were lost probably in a fire and the reconstituted abstracts are confused and unreliable. Where comparisons could be made between township abstracts and the inventory, the inventory generally recorded about three-quarters of the land noted as belonging to Hamilton in the abstracts, with the exception of mortgages. Given the nature ofthe sources utilized, it seems likely the true total of Hamilton's lands was greater than the records indicate. Deed abstracts by township are available on microfilm in the Archives of Ontario. 16. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 313 pt. I, pp. 58-61, Statement of the Lands Granted to the Civil Officers of the Province of Upper Canada and to their families, Surveyor-General's Office, January 17, 1810. 17. Lillian F. Gates, Land Policies of Upper Canada, Vol. 9, Canadian Studies in History and Government, ed. Goldwin French (Toronto, 1968), pp. 53-61. 18. District of Nassau: Land Board: Minutes and Correspondence, Book 3: Register of the Lots in the Townships of that District, received August 5, 1795. The assumption that this map was produced in 1791 is based upon: ibid., Land Book 2, pp. 52-53, A. Jones to John Collins, November 16, 1791. The land board in undertaking this survey was charged to examine the holdings of actual settlers. It was authorized to recognize any transfers of land certificates it considered •• a bona fide transaction, consistent with the public good, and the true intere~ts of the settler, and his family" (see State Papers: Upper Canada, Land Board Minutes and Records, Vol. 5, pp. 32-33, Henry Motz to Land Board of Nassau, July 23, 1789). Since Hamilton was a member of the board, it would undoubtedly be aware of his holdings. The modest scale of his holdings could relate to his conscious de-emphasis of retailing in the post-Revolutionary period, the limited value of any land in this early period and a reluctance to accept any land before ownership, at least by certificates, had been legally established. 19. For the more detailed study of land use on which these generalizations are based, see Watson, .. Geography of the Niagara Peninsula," pp. 335-39 and Chapter 19. 20. For purposes of this comparison, only Hamilton's holdings within the sample areas according to the deed abstracts have been used. Mortgages were not considered because of the limited information on them. The sample is likely to be less representative for smallholders who could own large holdings in areas for which records are not available, for example, the Balls are known to have possessed a large contiguous holding along the Twenty Mile Creek in Grimsby. See: AO, RG I Series C-I-3 Vol. 13, Warrant Book I, Old Regulations: 1796-1797, Warrant 1388. Still, if the major purpose is to compare the holdings of others to Hamilton, differences in magnitude are so great and patterns appear so marked that generalizations can be safely made. The lands of all members of each Loyalist family have been treated as a unit because the families themselves acted as a unit: they located their lands together

NOTES

217

where possible and treated them as a patrimony to be passed to future generations. The two Samuel Streets, Sr. and Jr., have been treated together because it is impossible to distinguish their holdings one from the other in the abstracts. The land of Street Sr. did eventually pass to Street Jr. 21. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 313, pt. I, pp. 58-61, Statement of the Lands Granted to the Civil Officers of the Province of Upper Canada and to their families, Surveyor-General's Office, January 17, 1810. 22. William Robertson Papers, Robertson to Hamilton, January 14, 1804; ibid., October 7, 1805; ibid., January 17, 1806. 23. State Papers: Upper Canada, Executive Council, Land Book D, p. 566, October 7, 1800. 24. PAC, Govemor-General's Office: Letter Books of Despatches to the Colonial Office, Vol. I, p. 100, Memorial of D.W. Smith, List of Purchasers of Land in the Townships of Dereham and Norwich. 25. AO, Deed Abstracts; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Todd, April 18, 180 I. 26. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, Vol. 3, folder Tt, pp. 18-20, Memorial respecting the Indian Lands on the Grand River by Robert Hamilton, n.d. 27. Ibid., Series 3, Vol. 2, p. 356, Memorial of William Dickson of Newark, 1792. 28. Ibid., Series 4, Vol. 6, folder AI7, pp. 5-6, Street and Dickson to Simcoe, March 29, 1793; ibid., pp. 34-35, James Smedley to Joseph Brant, April 22, 1795; for an excellent summation of the speculation in Grand River Lands, see C.M. Johnston, ed., The Valley of the Six Nations, The Champlain Society Ontario Series, Vol. VII (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1964), pp. iv-ixix; for more detailed documentation, see ibid., pp. 120-92. 29. Deed Abstracts; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts] Cartwright to Todd, April 18, 1801; PAC, Selkirk Papers, McDonell Manuscripts, Vol. X, Baldoon Settlement Letter Book, McDonell to Selkirk, November 28, 1808. 30. See Deed Abstracts. 31. Selkirk Papers, Vol. 38, pp.' 14404-5, McDonell to Selkirk, April 19, 1807; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 7, Charles Askin to Alexander Hamilton, December 17, 1811. 32. Selkirk Papers, Vol. 39, p. 14415, McDonell to Selkirk, September 3, 1807.

CHAPTER 8 1. Quoted in John Robert Colombo, Colombo's Canadian Quotations (Edmonton, 1974), p. 399. 2. DPL, Askin Papers, John Askin to Nichol, August 28, 1800. 3. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 313, pt. 1, p. 125, Hamilton to Major Halton, January 20, 1807. 4. See, for example, DPL, Askin Papers, Nichol to John Askin, August 9, 1800. 5. S.F. Wise and R.C. Brown, Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth Century

218

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Political Attitudes (Toronto, 1967); Graeme H. Patterson, "Studies in Elections and Public Opinion in Upper Canada" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1969), Chapter 5. 6. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Hunter, August 23, 1799. 7. Ibid. 8. AO, Russell Papers, Hamilton to Russell, November 1, 1798. 9. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 103, pp. 307-309, Hamilton and Cartwright et al. to Haldimand, August 1, 1783; "Memorandum on Trade and Commerce by Robert Hamilton, September 24, 1798," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, III, pp. 266-67. 10. DPL, Askin Papers, Hamilton to John Askin, March 17, 1798. 11. Statutes of Upper Canada, 40 Geo. III, c. 3; "Journal of the Legislative Assembly, June 23, 1800," printed inA.O. Report, 1909; ibid., "February 22, 1804, ,. p. 443. The vote was upon a request for leave to introduce legislation; the assembly only sporadically recorded divisions on votes. The legislation was later defeated. 12. The only occasion on which representatives from the peninsula voted against such a measure is recorded in ibid., "June 27, 1799," p. 119. Since only the mover and seconder of the legislation voted for it, there may have been extenuating circumstances. Occasions on which peninsular members moved or seconded such legislation are recorded in "June 14,1800," (p. 138) "June 11, 1802," (p. 265); "February 11, 1806," (printed inA.O. Report 1911, pp. 65-66); "February 10, 1810," (pp. 301-303). See also report of the Assembly in Niagara Herald, August 1, 1801. "Proceedings of the Legislative Council, June 27, 1793," printed in A.O. Report, 1910, p.25; ibid., p.262; "February 20, 1806," (p. 262).

13. Upper Canada Gazette, January 29, 1801. The initial disagreement was over a New Year's Address in the Upper Canada Gazette. See Niagara Herald, February 14, 1801. 14. Ibid., March 7, 1801; for the official concern with Tiffany and his ideological purity, see: "Littlehales to William Tiffany, April 19, 1795, " printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, III, p. 346; "Littlehales to Tiffany, February 15, 1796," printed in ibid., IV, p. 196; TPL, Smith Papers, Elmsley to Smith, February 25, 1798; AO, Copies of Letters, Orders and Instructions, Lieutenant Governor's Office: 1799-1800, Elmsley to Hunter, March 27, 1800; on Tiffany's papers, the Canada Constitution and the Niagara Herald, the association of Hamilton and his kin with them and the financial assistance given them, see Canada Constitution, August 21,1798; "Hamilton to Askin, August 4, 1799," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, p. 239; Canada Constitution, September 6, 1799, article by "A Ploughman"; Niagara Herald, January 24, 1801; "Hamilton to Askin, August 4, 1799" printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, p.239. 15. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 103, pp. 492-93, The Humble Address of the Farmers Residing on Lands On the West side ~f the River, Niagara, n.d. 16. The representatives of the peninsula in the first parliament were: First Lincoln, Nathaniel Pettit; Second Lincoln, Benjamin Pawling; Third Lincoln, Isaac Swayze; Fourth Lincoln and Norfolk, Parshall Terry; .. Diary of Francis Goring," printed in Niagara Historical Society Publications, XXXVI (1924), p. 63.

NOTES

219

17. "Hamilton to Simcoe, January 4, 1792," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence. I, p. 97. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. "Simcoe to Dundas, April 28, 1792," quoted in ibid. 22. "Simcoe to Dundas, August 12, 1791," quoted in ibid. 23. "Simcoe to Dundas, November 23, 1792," quoted in ibid. 24. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, Vol. 5, p. 21, Simcoe to Captain Doyle, June 2, 1793. 25. "Simcoe to Dundas, September 16, 1793," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, p. 54. 26. Ibid., II, p. 54. 27. "Alexander Davison to Simcoe, September 20,1791," printed in ibid., IV, pp. 349-50. On the intimacy of the Davisons and Simcoe, see, for example, "Alexander Davison to Simcoe, August 12, 1792," printed in ibid., I, 193-94; "John Grey to Simcoe, March 17, 1793," printed in ibid., I, p. 300; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. I, p. 392, Munro and Bell to Hamilton, September 2, 1793; ibid., p. 214, George Davison to Simcoe, September 2, 1793; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Duncan Murray, February 12, 1786. 28. "Craigie to Simcoe, March 14, 1792," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspolldence, I, p. 121; "Craigie to Clarke, October 27, 1792," printed in ibid., I, 240-41; "Clarke to Simcoe, October 29, 1792," printed in ibid., I, 243-44; "Simcoe to Dorchester, December 10, 1794," printed in ibid., III, p. 210; "McGill to Simcoe, Queenston, January 8, 1793," printed in ibid., I, p. 272-74. 29. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 3, p. 91, Lieut.-Col. England to Simcoe, May 22, 1793; DPL, Askin Papers, D.W. Smith to John Askin, August 3, 1793. 30. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 279, pI. 2, pp. 299-303, Simcoe to Dundas, August 24, 1793. . 31. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 3, pp. 151-54, McGill to Simcoe, July 20, 1793. 32. "Simcoe to Dundas, September 20, 1793," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, pp. 55-56; "Memorandum by Chief Justice Osgoode 1793," printed in ibid., II, p. 124. 33. "Simcoe to William Pitt, October 25, 1794," printed in ibid., Ill, p. 153. 34. "Observations by John McGill [n.d.]," printed in ibid., III, p. 136; "McGill to Simcoe, January 8, 1793," printed in ibid., I, p. 272; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 3, pp. 151-54, McGill to Simcoe, July 20, 1793. 35. "Simcoe to Alured Clarke, July 26, 1793," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondellce, I, p. 400; "Simcoe to Dorchester, June 15,1794," printed in ibid., II, p. 265; "Dorchester to Simcoe, April 16, 1794," printed in ibid., II, p. 207; "Simcoe to Evan Nepean, September 28, 1793," printed in ibid., II, pp. 69-70; "Simcoe to Dundas, September 16, 1793," printed in ibid., II, p. 53. 36. "Simcoe to Dorchester, June 15, 1794," printed in ibid., II, p. 265.

220

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

37. Military C Series, Vol. 112, p. 94, George Rose to Simcoe, April 12, 1794. Further controversy occurred between Dorchester and Simcoe as to McGill's precise powers, and the decision came too late to affect provisioning arrangements for 1794, but by 1795, McGill was exercising his powers. 38. AO, The Journals to the Legislative Council of Upper Canada, 1792-1794 [transcripts] . 39. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Todd, October I, 1794; ibid., October 14, 1793; ibid., October 1, 1794. 40. Ibid., Cartwright to Todd, October 6, 1794. 41. "Todd to Askin, April 6, 1794," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 500. 42. Ibid. 43. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Todd, October I, 1794; "Dundas to Simcoe, March 16, 1794," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, pp. 187-88; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Elmsley, January 1797.

44. Ibid., Cartwright to Hamilton, November I I. 1794. 45. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, Vol. 5, pp. 87-88, Osgoode to Simcoe, November 1, 1795. 46. Ibid., p. 54, Osgoode to Simcoe, January 30, 1795. 47. White Papers, Vol. 2, p. 56, John White to Sir S. Sheperd, August 21, 1794; Simcoe Papers, Envelope 10, Butler and Hamilton to Simcoe, February 27, 1792. 48. AO, Upper Canada, Journals of the Proceedings of the House of Assembly [transcripts], October 6, 1792; "Simcoe to Dundas, November 4, 1792," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, I, pp. 249-51; .. Smith to Askin, October 19, 1792," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, p. 83; Journals of the Proceedings of the House of Assembly, June 17, 1793. 49. White Papers, Vol. I, pp. 5-6, White to Sir S. Sheperd, February 25, 1793. 50. "Simcoe to Dundas, August 2, 1794," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, p. 3. 51. W.R. Riddell, "The First Attorney-General of Upper Canada," OHSRP, XXIII, (1926), p. 420; "Simcoe to Dundas, August 2, 1794," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, III, pp. 2-3; "Cartwright to Todd, October I, 1794," printed in ibid., III, p. 110.

52. Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], pp. 42-50, Speech on the Judicature Bill, June 16, 1794; Journal of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Upper Canada, June 23, 1794. 53. "Simcoe to Dundas, August 2, 1794," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, III, pp. 2-3. 54. "Cartwright to Todd, October I, 1794," printed in ibid., III, p. 110. 55. "Minute of the Executive Council of Upper Canada, November 6, 1794," printed in ibid., III, pp. 172-73. 56. "Simcoe to Dundas, September 16, 1793," printed in ibid., II, p. 53; "Simcoe to Dorchester, June 15, 1794," printed in ibid., II, p. 265. 57. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 5, pp. 139-40, Munro and Bell to Simcoe,

NOTES 221

October I, 1794; "Simcoe to Dorchester, July 8, 1795," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, IV, p. 38; "McGill to Russell, June 29,1797," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, I, p. 201; "McGill to James Green, February 22, 1798," printed in ibid., II, p. 100; Simcoe Transcripts Series 3, Vol. 8, p. 471, McGill to Simcoe, May 28, 1799. 58. "McGill to Simcoe, February 10, 1794," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, p. 150; "Hamilton to Littlehales, February 14, 1794," printed in ibid., II, p. 153. 59. "Simcoe to George Rose, October 25, 1794," printed in ibid., Ill, p. 154; "Cartwright to Simcoe, October 20, 1795," printed in ibid., IV, p. 107. 60. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 2, p. 272, Farquharson to McGill, December 29, 1792. 61. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 392, Munro and Bell to Hamilton, September 2, 1793; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], Cartwright to Hamilton, November 11, 1794. 62. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 74, pt. 1, pp. 41-42, Simcoe to Dorchester, November 3, 1795; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 8, p. 181, McGill to Simcoe, May 13, 1796; "McGill to Russell, May 9, 1797," printed in Cruikshank, Russell Correspondence, I, pp. 176-77; "McGill to James Green, February 22, 1798," printed in ibid., II, p. 100; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 77, p. 102, Provisions Received into the King's Stores at Niagara and Kingston, June 30-December 4, 1795; Military Provisioning Abstracts, 1796-1800. 63. "Robert Richardson to John Askin, May 17, 1799," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, p. 209. 64. "Simcoe to Portland, October 30, 1795," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, IV, p. 309; "Simcoe to Portland, June 20, 1796," printed in ibid. 65. "Memorandum Respecting the General State of Landed Property in Upper Canada by Richard Cartwright, July 23, 1795," printed in ibid., IV, pp. 47-49. 66. Gates, Land Policies of Upper Canada, p. 52. 67. Journal of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council, June 24, 1793. 68. "Simcoe to J. King, August 22, 1793," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, p. 37. 69. "R. Hamilton to E.B. Littlehales, November 1794," printed in ibid., IV, pp. 150-52. Dating is based upon "E.B. Littlehales to R. Hamilton, March II, 1796," printed in ibid., IV, p. 216. 70. "R. Hamilton to Simcoe, November 22, 1795," printed in ibid., IV, pp. 141-43. 71. "Simcoe to the Duke of Portland, December 22,1795," printed in ibid., IV, pp. 162-63; "R. Hamilton to Simcoe, February 21, 1796," printed in ibid., IV, pp. 197-98. 72. Gates, Land Policies of Upper Canada, p. 56. 73. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, Vol. 3, Tt, pp. 18-20, Memorial respecting the Indian Lands on the Grand River by Robert Hamilton, n.d.; "Hamilton to Littlehales, Queenston, February 14, 1794," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, p. 153; "Simcoe to Dundas, June 20, 1794," printed in ibid., II, p. 281.

222 THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON 74. "Simcoe to the Committee of the Privy Council For Trade and Plantations, September I, 1794," printed in ibid., III, p. 65. 75. "CO 42 Transcripts, pt. 2, Vol. 280-2," cited in S.R. Mealing, "The Enthusiasms of John Graves Simcoe," in The Canadian Historical Association Annual Report (1958), p. 54. 76. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 280, pt. 2, pp. 378-79, Extract from a letter of Mr. Askin of Detroit to His Excellency Lieut. Governor Simcoe, dated 22 Feb., 1793; ibid., pp. 364-72, Extract of a Letter from Mr. R. Dickson to Hon. Robt. Hamilton, Michilimackinac, July 14, 1793. 77. "Simcoe to Portland, December 21. 1794," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence. III, p. 235; "Simcoe to Portland, January 23, 1795," printed in ibid., III, pp. 271-72; "Simcoe to Portland, December 23, 1794," printed in ibid., III, p. 241. On Cartwright and town incorporation, see "Ideas on the subject of incorporating the Town of Kingston as submitted to Lieut. Governor Simcoe, n.d." printed in C.E. Cartwright, Life and Letters of the Late Hon. Richard Cartwright (Toronto, 1876), pp. 142-43. 78. The appointments that Simcoe personally recommended were those of Alexander Grant, Aeneas Shaw, John McGill and Alexander McKee. 79. "Simcoe to Portland, October 30, 1795," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, IV, pp. 115-18. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. "Hamilton to Littlehales, June 15, 1796," printed in ibid., IV, p. 299. 83. "Littlehales to Hamilton, July 12, 1796," printed in ibid., IV, p. 329; Upper Canada: Militia, Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence, RG 9 I B I, Vol. I, p.89.

CHAPTER 9 I. Robert J. Bums, "The First Elite of Toronto: An Examination of the Genesis, Consolidation and Duration of Power in an Emerging Colonial Society" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1975), Chapter V.

2. See: W.S. Wallace, The Family Compact: Chronicle of Rebellion in Upper Canada (Toronto, 1915); Aileen Dunham, Political Unrest in Upper Callada: 1815-1836 (Toronto, 1963); R.E. Saunders, "What Was the Family Compact?" in Ontario Histor)', XLIX (1957), pp. 165-78; D.W.L. Earl, The Family Compact: Aristocracy or Oligarchy? (Toronto, 1967); Gerald Craig, Upper Canada: The Formative Years: 1784-1841 (Toronto, 1963), pp. 107-11. 3. See: Patterson, "Elections and Public Opinion in Upper Canada," General Conclusions; and Francis Michael Quealey, "The Administration of Sir Peregrine Maitland, Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada: 1818-1828" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1968), Chapter II. 4. Simcoe Transcripts, Series 4, Vol. 5, folder A9, pp. 6-8, Hunter to Mathews,

NOTES 223

September 23, 1788; Upper Canada: Civil Secretary's Letter Books, RG7 G16, Vols. 1-4, various references. 5. Ibid. 6. PAC, Norfolk Historical Society Collections: Welch Papers [microfilm] pp. 451-52, Burns to Hamilton, October 28, 1796; UWO, Welch Papers, Hamilton to Welch, January 24, 1800; Welch Papers p. 1344, Hamilton to Welch, June 26, 1806; PAC, Askin Papers, Richard Cartwright to Askin, February 22, 1803; DPL, Askin Papers, Hamilton to Askin, January 17, 1807; "John Askin Jr. to John Askin Sr., November II, 1807," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, p. 584; PAC, Askin Papers, Cartwright to Askin, February 22, 1803; DPL, Askin Papers, Hamilton to Askin, January 17, 1807. 7. "Hamilton to Littlehales, June 15, 1796," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, IV, p. 299. 8. Statistics are based upon Quebec Almanac, various years; Upper Canada Gazette, various issues. 9. See Chapter to. 10. TPL, Elmsley Papers; TPL, Powell Papers; AO, Powell-Jarvis Papers; their personal correspondence concerns business matters and contains nothing to suggest intimacy. On Hamilton's relationship to Russell, see, for example, AO, Russell Papers [microfilm], Hamilton to Russell, September 24, 1794. 11. Ibid., Russell to Osgoode, July 6,1801. 12. TPL, D.W. Smith Papers, Vol. B8, p. 38, Elmsley to Smith, March 4, 1798. 13. He aided Smith's election in Norfolk, Oxford and Middlesex in 1800; PAC, Jarvis Papers, p. 119, Hannah Jarvis to Reverend S. Jarvis, May 24, 1815; ibid., p. 113, Jarvis to Peters, July 20, 1797; Chadwick, Ontarian Families, I, p. 31; "Powell to Askin, November 14, 1794," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 528; for details of Powell's career, see: W.R. Riddell, The Life of William Dummer Powell (Lansing, Michigan, 1924). Powell's links in Montreal to the merchants may have been more than mere acquaintance: he was accused of being, with James McGill, associated in an attempt to monopolize the supply of brandy in 1782. See Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 76, p. 339, Adam Mabane to Haldimand, December 9, 1787. 14. "Quebec: Minutes of the Executive Council, November 26, 1788," printed in A.O. Report, 1928, p. 50. 15. "Upper Canada: Minutes of the Executive Council, June 10, 1794," printed in A.O. Report, 1929, p. 69. 16. "Upper Canada: Minutes of the Executive Council, January 17, 1797," printed in A.O. Report, 1930, p. 85. 17. Ibid. 18. "Ibid., June 23, 1798," printed in A.O. Report, 1931, p. 171; Chadwick, Ontarian Families, I, p. 143; PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 323-4, Askin to Cartwright, January 6, 1803. 19. "Robertson to Askin, May 26, 1801," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, p.340. 20. "Askin to Todd, July 15, 1799," printed in ibid., 11, p. 231.

224

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

21. "Todd to Askin, October 15, 1799," printed in ibid., II, p. 256. 22. See: Wallace, The Family Compact, pp. 4-6. Wallace quotes Thorpe on the "scotch Pedlars," but the only figures he discusses are provincial officials. 23. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 305, p. 189, Thorpe to Shee, December 1,1806. 24. PAC, War Office 17 [microfilm] Vol. 1500, Annual Returns of Troops. 25. On Robertson and Askin's trade agreements, see" Askin to Robertson, October 21,1799," printed in Quaife,Askin Papers, II, pp. 260-61; "Robertson to Askin, October 28, 1794," printed in ibid., II, p. 524. On Robertson's role as purchasing agent and land agent for Askin, see "Power of Attorney to William Robertson, September 9, 1796," printed in ibid., II, pp. 68-70. 26. See Chapter 5. 27. "Todd to Askin, April 23, 1793," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 474; "Askin to William Robertson, June 24, 1793," printed in ibid., I, p. 475. 28. Ibid., I, p. 5; "Askin to Todd, April 14, 1812," printed in ibid., II, pp. 704-706; "Todd to Askin, February 3, 1814," printed in ibid., II, pp. 776-78. 29. "Askin to Cartwright, July 12, 1798," printed in Quaife Askin Papers, 11, 144-47. 30. Ibid. 31. PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 14, 4701-2, Cartwright to Askin, August 20, 1799; .. Askin to Grant, July 19, 1799," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, pp. 232-33. 32. "Robertson to Askin, May 26, 1801," printed in ibid., II, p. 340; "Hamilton to Askin, July 2, 1799," printed in ibid., II, pp. 223-24. 33. "Hamilton to Askin, December 16, 1804," printed in ibid., II, pp. 446-47. 34. "Smith to Askin, July 26, 1792," printed in ibid., I, pp. 416-19; "Smith to Askin, August 8, 1792," printed in ibid., I, pp. 424-25; "Smith to Askin, August 14, 1792," printed in ibid., I, pp. 427-28; "Smith to Askin, November 13, 1792," printed in ibid., I, p. 416. 35. "Askin to Smith, September 4, 1792," printed in ibid., I, pp. 433-34; "Smith to Askin September 24, 1792," printed in ibid., I, pp. 434-35; "Smith to Askin October 2, 1792," printed in ibid., I, p. 436; "Smith to Askin, November 7, 1792," printed in ibid., I, p. 445; "Smith to Askin, November 13, 1792," printed in ibid., I, pp. 446-47. Although Askin's letters to Smith have not for the most part survived, his demands are clear from Smith's letters. 36. "Smith to Askin, September 24, 1792," printed in ibid., I, pp. 434-35; "Smith to Askin, October 2, 1792," printed in ibid., I, p. 439; "Smith to Askin, October 20, 1792," printed in ibid., I, p. 436; "Smith to Askin, November 13, 1792. 37. "Charles Askin to James Askin, July 18, 1806," printed in ibid., II, p. 529. 38. "Askin to Todd and McGill, March 25, 1807," printed in ibid., II, pp. 545-47; "John Askin to Grant, June 8, 1802," printed in ibid., II, pp. 378-79; "John Askin to Grant, May 28, 1806," printed in ibid., II, p. 520. 39. PAC, Askin Papers, Cartwright to Askin, February 22, 1803; "Askin to Todd, February 23,1802," printed in Quaife,Askin Papers, 11, pp. 369-70; "Askin to Todd, June 24, 1801," printed in ibid., 11, p. 314; "Askin to Grant, June 8, 1802," printed in ibid., II, p. 378-79; PAC, Askin Papers, Askin to Alexander Hamilton, September 30, 1802; ibid., Cartwright to Askin, February 22, 1803;

NOTES

225

"Todd to Askin, December 24, 1803," printed in Quaife. Askin Papers, II, p. 399; "Todd to Askin, December 24, 1803," printed in ibid .• II, pp. 533-34; DPL, Askin Papers, John Askin to Charles Askin, March 26, 1807; ibid., Hamilton to Askin, January 17, 1807; "John Askin Jr. to John Askin Sr., November 11, 1807," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, p. 584.

CHAPTER 10 I. UWO, William Robertson Collection, Hamilton to Robertson, October 20, 1791; The Constellation, December 7, 1799. 2. Mary Quayle Innis, Mrs. Simcoe's Diary (Toronto, 1965), pp. 14-15; Francis Goring Papers, Notebooks, August 22-27, 1792; DPL, John Askin Papers, Hamilton to John Askin, June 18, 1807. 3. John Howison, Sketches of Upper Canada (Edinburgh, 1821), p. 102. 4. TPL, D. W. Smith Papers. Elmsley to Smith, February 3, 1798. 5. AO, Russell Papers, Russell to Portland, April 18, 1797; ibid., Lincoln County Surrogate Court Records, Inventory of all the Goods ... of Robert Hamilton, March 14, 1809; "Smith to Askin, October 19, 1792," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, I, p. 442. 6. "William Robertson to John Askin, August 8, 1792," printed in ibid., I, p. 424; Francis Goring Papers, Notebooks, December 1792-December 1794; "Catherine Hamilton to John Askin, Feb. 25, 1795," printed in ibid., I, p. 539; PAC, Clarke Family Papers, Thomas Clarke to Helen Clarke, October II, 1803; DPL, Askin Papers, Robert Hamilton to John Askin, October 31, 1808; PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 20, p. 6532, Samuel Hamilton to Charles Askin, December 20, 1809.

7. Upper Canada Gazette, November 5, 1806. 8. Janet Camochan, •'Names Only But Much More," in Niagara Historical Society Publications, XXVII (1918), pp. 120,266; "Hamilton to Simcoe, February 21, 1796" printed in Simcoe Papers, IV, p. 198; J.R. Robertson, History of Freemasonry in Canada, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1899), I, pp. 181,367. 9. Carnochan, "Names Only," p. 46. 10. PAC, Society for the Propagation of the Gospel: Journals, Vol. 26, pp. 217-18. 11. Ibid., pp. 77; C042 Transcripts, Vol. 329, pt. 2, pp. 277-78, Petition of Robert Addison, n.d., enclosed in Maitland to Bathurst, July 2, 1821; PAC, Simcoe Papers, Series 3, Vol. 8, p. 252, Simcoe to Rev. G. Rush, June 7, 1797; Camochan, "Names Only," p. 8. 12. Ibid., pp. 8-11,21-22,29. 13. AO, Township Minutes; Quebec Almanac, various years. 14. Patterson, "Elections and Public Opinion;" Burns, "The First Elite of Toronto ... 15. .. Simcoe to Dundas, November 4, 1792," printed in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence I, p. 250; "Simcoe to Dundas, September 16, 1793," printed in ibid., II, p. 53; Cartwright Letter Books [transcripts], p. 22, Cartwright to Todd, October 21, 1792; "Cartwright to Todd, October 14, 1793," printed in

226

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence, II, p. 87; "Simcoe to Dundas, September 16, 1793," printed in ibid., II, p. 55; "Simcoe to Pitt, October 25, 1794," printed in ibid., III, p. 153. 16. D.W. Smith Papers, Account of James Wilson with D.W. Smith, September 7, 1796. 17. AO, Simcoe Papers, Envelope 51, Sheriff of Niagara to Simcoe, September 13, 1797. 18. D.W. Smith Papers, Vol. B8, p. 38, Elmsley to Smith, March 4, 1798. 19. Upper Canada Gazette, November 30, 1799; Canada Constitution, December 14, 1799; Upper Canada Gazette, May 2, 1800; Cartwright Letter Books

[transcripts], pp. 127-32, Cartwright to Elmsley, June 26, 1799; Upper Canada Gazette, January 30,1798; ibid., March 24,1798; D.W. Smith Papers, Vol. B8, p. 7, Elmsley to Smith, January 25, 1798. 20. "Journals of the Legislative Council, June 26, 1798," printed in A.O. Report. 1919, p. 70; "Journals of Legislative Assembly, June 26, 1798," printed in ibid., 1909, p. 76; AO, Miscellaneous Collection, Bill to Improve and Amend the Communications Between the Lakes Erie and Ontario by Land and Water, 1799. 21. Seibert, "Loyalists and Six Nations," pp. 123, 126-127; Welch Papers, Hamilton to Thomas Welch, January 24, 1800. 22. "Journals of the Legislative Assembly, June 12-14, 1800," printed in A.O. Report, 1909, pp. 135-40. 23. Canada Constitlllion, September 6, 1799. 24. White Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 126-28, White to Sheppard, November 12, 1799. 25. Canada Constitution, August 23, 1799. 26. For the publisher's petition, see "Journal of the Legislative Assembly, June 28. 1799," A.O. Report, 1909. p. 120; Canada Constitution, September 13, 1799; ibid., September 6, 1799. 27. Niagara Herald, May 13, 180 I.

28. AO, Court Records, RG 22, Series 7, Niagara District, no. 152-A, Affidavit of John Young, George Lawrance and Cornelius Lambert, March 16, 1795. 29. PAC, British Headquarters Papers, p. 8078, Memorial of Isaac Swayze to Sir Guy Carleton, June 18, 1783; "Petition of Isaac Swayze, 1790," quoted in Cruikshank, .• Settlement of the Township of Bertie." Weiland County Historical Society Records and Papers, V (1936), p. 75; Simcoe Transcripts, Series 3, Vol. 6, p. 3, Russell to Littleha1es, January 7, 1795; ibid., Series 4, Vol. 5, folder A7, pp. 65-66, Osgoode to Simcoe, April 21, 1795; W.R. Riddell, The Life of John Graves Simcoe (Toronto, 1926), pp. 432-34. 30. Haldimand Transcripts, Vol. 101, pp. 41-42, De Peyster to Powell, April 3, 1781; AO Court Records, RG 22, Series 7, Niagara District, no. 152-A, Affidavit of Elijah Collard, March 16, 1795. 31. A.O. Report, 1909, Journals of the Legislative Assembly, 1800-1804. 32. DPL, Askin Papers. Nichol to John Askin, August 9, 1800. 33. Ibid., Nichol to Askin, June IS, 1801; Niagara Herald. March 28, 1801; ibid., May 13, 1801.

NOTES

227

34. TPL, W.O. Powell Papers, Vol. B 85, pp. 16-21, notes by Powell on trial, n.d.; DPL, Askin Papers, Nichol to Askin, June 15, 1801; Niagara Herald, May 13, 1801. 35. Ibid., July 18, 1801; ibid., August 29, 1801. 36. PAC, Norfolk Historical Society Collections, Welch Papers [microfilm]. 37. Welch Papers, John Warren to Welch, July 21, 1800. 38. Norfolk Historical Society Collections, Welch Papers. 39. Welch Papers, Thomas Dickson to Welch, July 19, 1800; ibid., John Warren to Welch, July 21, 1800; Norfolk County Historical Society Collections: Thomas Welch Papers, p. 1476, Hamilton to Welch, July 20, 1800; ibid., pp. 1478-79, Hamilton to Welch, July 25, 1800; ibid., p. 904, James Crooks to Welch, July 25, 1800. 40. Ibid., p. 1476, Hamilton to Welch, July 20, 1800. 41. D.W. Smith Papers, Vol. B4, p. 100, Welch to James Crooks, n.d.; ibid., Vol. B4, p. 102, Robert Runchey to Hamilton, August 4, 1800. 42. Norfolk County Historical Society Collections: Thomas Welch Papers, pp. 1478-79, Hamilton to Welch, July 25, 1800. 43. Thomas Welch Papers, Warren to Welch, July 21, 1800; ibid., Hazen to Welch, August I, 1800. 44. Norfolk County Historical Society Collections, Thomas Welch Papers, pp. 918-19, Smith to Welch, February 20, 1801. 45. Cartwright Letter Book [transcript], Cartwright to Elmsley, June 6, 1803. 46. On Norton's mission to England, see: PAC, Governor General's Office: Upper Canada Letter Books, RG 7 GI2, Vol. I, p. 265, Claus to Hunter, January 19, 1805; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 299, p. 216, Lord Moria to Earl Camden, June 2, 1804; ibid., Vol. 303, pp. 95-96, Norton to Edward Cooke, May II, 1805; ibid., Vol. 299, pp. 222~24, Memorial of the Six Nations, presented by John Norton, ca. June 1804. On Claus's efforts at sabotage, see: "Speech of Brant, July 28, 1806," printed in Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations, p. 105; PAC, Indian Department: Upper Canada, RG 10 A2, Vol. 9, Brant to Claus, July 22, 1806; ibid., Report on Indian Council by William Claus, July 18-July 28, 1806; "Speech of Brant, July 28, 1806" printed in Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations, p. 105; Indian Department: Upper Canada, Vol. 27, Brant to Claus, September 3, 1804; CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 313, pt. I, p. 28, Gore to Castlereagh, February I, 1800. 47. Ibid., Vol. 313, pt. 2, p. 400, Gore to Watson, October 4, 1807. 48. Indian Department: Upper Canada, Vol. 27, n.p., Robert Kerr to Prideaux Selby, August 4, 1806; see, for example, ibid., Vol. 9, Speech by Claus to Iroquois, n.d.; PAC, Selkirk Transcripts, Vol. 38, pp. 14397-98, A. McDonell to Lord Selkirk, January 27, 1807; Minutes of the Executive Council: Upper Canada, RG lEI, Vol. 48, p. 343, Speech of Brant, September 23, 1806; Selkirk Transcripts, Vol. 38, pp. 14404-5, McDonell to Selkirk, April 19, 1807; "McDonell to Selkirk, November 28, 1808," printed in Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations, pp. 173-78. 49. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 313, pt. I, pp. 122-25, Hamilton to Hatton, January 20, 1807; ibid., pp. 127-29, Magistrates of Niagara to Gore, January 19, 1807.

228

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

50. John Mills Jackson, A View of the Political Situation of the Province of Upper Canada, in North America (London, 1809), pp. 11-12. 51. CO 42 Transcripts, Vol. 310, p. 113, Thorpe to Sir George Shee, January 1807. 52. 'bid., Vol. 313, pt. I, pp. 122-25, Hamilton to Hatton, January 20, 1807. 53. Ibid., pt. 2, pp. 442-43, Samuel Thompson to Thorpe, December 24, 1806; ibid., Vol. 310, p. 48, Brant to Thorpe, January 24, 1807. 54. Ibid., Vol. 306, p. 123, Affidavit of Titus Simons, February 2, 1807; ibid., Vol. 313, pp. 442-43, Samuel Thompson to Thorpe, December 24, 1806. 55. AO, Bond Collection, Claus to Nelles, July 18, 1800; AO, Nelles Papers, Beasley to Nelles, July 6, 1800; PAC, Upper Canada Sundries, pp. 439-41, Claus to Major Green, August 6, 1800; Bond Collection, Beasley to Nelles, July 26, 1800. 56. Upper Canada Gazette, February 26, 1808; see, for example, Upper Canadian Guardian, August 21, 1807; ibid., December 30, 1809; ibid., June 9, 1810.

57.

'~Journals of the Legislative Assembly, February 10, 1810," printed in A.O. Report, 1911, pp. 301-302; Upper Canadian Guardian, November 5,1807; "Journals of the Legislative Assembly, February 5, 1810," printed in A.O. Report, 1911, p. 289; ibid., p. 290, February 6,1810; ibid., p. 395, February 7, 1811; ibid., p. 401, February II, 1811; Upper Canadian Guardian, January 20, 1808; ibid., June 9, 1810; ibid., July 7, 1810; ibid., August 14, 1810.

58. On Swazye's opposition on votes, see for example, "Journals of the Legislative Assembly, February 10, 1807," A.O. Report, 1911, p. 134; ibid., pp. 167-70, March 4, 1807; ibid., pp. 222-26, February 18, 1808. On Clench's desire to distance himself from the agitation, see Upper Canada Gazette, October 18, 1806; ibid., November 22, 1806 and ibid., March 2, 1808. On Clench's support in the matter of Loyalist claims, see "Journals of the Legislative Assembly, February 24, 1806," A.O. Report, 1911, p. 88; ibid., pp. 95-99, February 27, 1806; ibid., pp. 167-70, March 4, 1807. Towards the end of the Parliament, however, Clench adapted the strategy of introducing his own address on Loyalists and military claimants, perhaps in an effort to dissociate himself further from the agitation. See ibid., pp. 254-55, March 8, 1808. 59. PAC, Edward Walsh Papers, item 8, Nichol to Dr. Walsh, March 17, 1807.

60. Upper Canadian Gazette, October 12, 1807. 61. Upper Canadian Guardian, December 30,1809; ibid., April 21, 1810; Upper Canada: Militia, Adjutant General's Correspondence, RG 9 I B I, Vol. 1, pp. 294-95, Warren to Shaw, July 16, 1808; ibid., p. 297, Clench to Halton, July 29, 1808; Upper Canada Sundries, Crowell Willson to Gore, November 2, 1809. 62. PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 19, pp. 6217-18, Alexander Hamilton to Charles Askin, May 26, 1812; Private Collection, Abraham Nelles Papers, Nichol to Abraham Nelles, April 10, 1812; ibid., notes to Nichol and Backhouse n.d. Inscriptions on the notes indicate Abraham Nelles transferred property to these two men to give them a vote in his riding.

NOTES

229

CHAPfER 11 I. Norfolk County Historical Society Collections, Welch Papers [microfilm], p. 1641, James Mitchell to Thomas Welch, March 27, 1809. 2. "Hamilton to Askin, April 23, 1808," printed in Quaife, Askin Papers, II, p. 598; "William Robertson to John Askin, August 8, 1792," printed in ibid., I, p. 424; "Catherine Hamilton to John Askin, February 25,1795," printed in ibid., I, p. 539; PAC, Clarke Family Papers, Thomas Clarke to Helen Clarke, October II, 1803; DPL, Askin Papers, Robert Hamilton to John Askin, October 31, 1808; PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 20, p. 6532, Samuel Hamilton to Charles Askin, December 20, 1809. 3. Ibid., Vol. 19, p. 6368, James Hamilton to Charles Askin, February 16, 1810; ibid., p. 6370, James Hamilton to Alexander Hamilton, April 8, 1810; ibid., pp. 6274-75, Alexander Hamilton to Charles Askin, November 3, 1819. 4. DPL, Askin Papers, Robert Hamilton to John Askin, May 16, 1805; ibid., William Robertson to John Askin, October 7, 1805. 5. Ibid., Charles Askin to John Askin, Sr., September 13, 1807; ibid., Charles Askin to John Askin, March 7, 1808; Will of Robert Hamilton, quoted in A. F. Hunter, "The Probated Wills of Men Prominent in the Public Affairs of Early Upper Canada," OHSPR, XXIII (1926), pp. 344-50. 6. Ibid. 7. PAC, Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 2, p. 281, General Statement of Affairs of the Estate of the late Honourable Robert Hamilton August 1823; ibid., p. 273, Statement of the Estate of the late Robert Hamilton Esquire as divided amongst the heirs in 1823. 8. AO, Alexander Hamilton Letter Book, A. Hamilton to Gillespie, September 13, 1809; ibid., June 8, 1810; ibid., September II, 1810. 9. Ibid., 1811; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 9, Gillespie to William Dickson, May 14, 1814; ibid., Vol. 2, Alexander Hamilton in Account Current with the Estate of Robert Hamilton, December 1821. 10. Alexander Hamilton Letter Book, A. Hamilton to Thomas Markland, May 13, 1809; ibid., A. Hamilton to Gillespie, February 7, 1811. II. Ibid., A. Hamilton to Markland, May 13, 1809; ibid., A. Hamilton to Gillespie, June 8, 1810; see Ouellet, Histoire economique. Chapitre VII; State Records, Upper Canada, Customs, Shops, Taverns and Still Licences, Vol. 53-57, Shop Licences, 1802-1811; on the growth of trade in smaller centres, see, for example, PAC, Robert Nelles Papers and A.O., Nelles Family Papers. The Abraham Nelles Papers, presently in private hands, also reflect this improvement; DPL, Askin Papers, George and Alexander Hamilton to John Askin, October 29, 1810; ibid., Charles Askin to John Askin Sr., October 8, 18 10; Upper Canada Gazette, September 2, 1811. 12. Ibid. 13. Alexander Hamilton Letter Book, A. Hamilton to R. Cartwright & Co., February 15, 1810, ibid., Hamilton to John McGill, October 26, 1809; ibid., January 17, 1810; ibid., Hamilton to James and Andrew McGill, February 28,1810; ibid., Hamilton to Markland, February 29, 1810. 14. Ibid., October 21, 1810; ibid., Hamilton to John McGill, October 21, 1810; ibid.,

230

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

December 13, 1810; ibid., Hamilton to Gillespie, 1811; ibid., Hamilton to Gillespie, [ca. August, 1811]; ibid., Hamilton to Gillespie, October 8, 1810; ibid., Hamilton to John McGill, April 22, 1812; ibid., Hamilton to Gillespie, June 9, 1812. 15. PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 38, pp. 304-306, Memorandum of Agreement between Alexander and George Hamilton, Charles Askin and Benjamin Canby, June 9, 1811; DPL, Askin Papers, Charles Askin to John Askin, May 23, 1812; PAC, . Askin Papers, Vol. 19, p. 6294, George Hamilton to Charles Askin, n.d. 16. Military 1812.

"c" Series, Vol.

116, pp. 51-52, Isaac Brock to Noah Freer, March 9,

17. PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 19, pp. 6220-21, A. Hamilton to C. Askin, August 3, 1812.; ibid., pp. 6231-32, A. Hamilton to C. Askin, December 28, 1812. 18. Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 9, Gillespie to W. Dickson, May 14, 1814; Alexander Hamilton Letter Book, Hamilton to Gillespie, September 10, 1818; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 2, Alexander Hamilton in Account Current with the Estate of Robert Hamilton, December 1821; ibid., Hamilton to Gillespie, August 12,1817; DPL, Askin Papers, G. Hamilton to C. Askin, December II, 1817; PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 19, pp. 6265-68, A. Hamilto~ to C. Askin, November 19, 1818. 19. Alexander Hamilton Letter Book, Hamilton to McTavish, McGillvray and Company, October 26, 1824. William Smith was probably a former resident of Detroit and partner in Forsyth and Smith, a fur trade concern. See Quaife, Askin Papers, II, p. 280, note 10; the accounts of Hamilton and Smith are in the Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. II; papers relating to Hamilton and Cummings in ibid., Vol. 4, and the fact that Grant and Kerby had the government contract in PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 19, p. 6277, A. Hamilton to C. Askin, April 20, 1820; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 4, Declaration of James Cummings, n.d. [ca. 1820]; ibid., Grant and Kerby to R. Hamilton May 19, 1820; ibid., August 31, 1824. 20. M.F. Campbell, Mountain and a City: The Story of Hamilton (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), p. 51; PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 16, p. 6314, George Hamilton to Charles Askin, November 23, 1813; DPL, Askin Papers, Charles Askin to Alexander Askin, November 10, 1815; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 6, George Hamilton to Alexander Hamilton, June 23, 1818; ibid., Vol. IS, William Robertson to Alexander Hamilton, November 27, 1819. 21. PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 38, pp. 298-300, Memorandum of Agreement, Robert Hamilton and James Hamilton, .April 1810; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. I, Alexander Hamilton to William Dickson, December 2, 1836; AD, Alexander Mackintosh Letter Book [microfilm], Mackintosh to Robert and James Hamilton, November 18, 1816; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 4, Papers relating to Hamilton and Cummings; PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 19, p. 6484, Robert Hamilton to Charles Askin, February 7, 1819; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 4, Grant and Kerby to R. Hamilton, May 19, 1820; ibid., Forsyth, Richardson and Company to Robert Hamilton, January 14, 1822. 22. Alexander Hamilton Letter Book, A. Hamilton to R. Cartwright & Co., February 15, 1810. 23. Hunter, "Probated Wills." 24. PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 38, pp. 298-300, Memorandum of Agreement, Robert Hamilton and James Hamilton, April 1810.

NOTES

231

25. Alexander Hamilton Letter Book, A. Hamilton to Dickson and Clarke, March 21, 1812; DPL, Askin Papers. C. Askin to John Askin. January 27, 1813; ibid., G. Hamilton to C. Askin, December II, 1817. 26. Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 1, T. Clarke to A. Hamilton July 6, 1818; PAC, James Hamilton Papers, A. Hamilton to J. Hamilton, June 28, 1821; D. Milani, Robert Gourlay, Gadfly (Thornhill, ca. 1971), especially Chapter II for material on Clarke and the Dicksons. Material on the involvement of the Hamiltons in the agitation is scattered through the Charles Askin and Alexander Hamilton Papers; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 6, George Hamilton to Alexander Hamilton, June 9, 1818; ibid., G. Hamilton to A. Hamilton, June 23, 1818. 27. Ibid., Vol. 4, R. Hamilton to A. Hamilton, June 3, 1815; R. Hamilton to A. Hamilton, n.d.; Memorandum, July 8, 1823. 28. Alexander Hamilton Letter Book. A. Hamilton to J. Strachan, October 7, 1823; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. I, Affidavit by John and Alexander Hamilton, n.d.; PAC, Askin Papers, Vol. 14, p. 4855, T. Clarke to C. Askin, March 7, 1828; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. I, A. Hamilton to W. Dickson Jr., December 20, 1836; ibid., General Statement of the Affairs of the Estate of Robert Hamilton by Thomas Clarke, December 9, 1833. 29. Based upon AO, Deed Abstracts. 30. Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 1, p. 273, Statement of the Estate of the Late Robert Hamilton 1823; "John Hamilton (1802-1882)" in W.S. Wallace, The Macmillan Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 3rd. ed. (Toronto, 1963), p. 296; DPL, Askin Papers, R. Hamilton to C. Askin, March 26, 1824; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 6, S.P. Jarvis to A. Hamilton, January 18, 1825; M.F. Campbell, Mountain and a City: The Story of Hamilton (Toronto, 1966), pp. 51-71; AO, Street Papers, Statement of Estate of Peter Hunter Hamilton, June 18, 1835; Armstrong, Upper Canadian Chronology, p. 162. 31. Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 6, James Hamilton file; James Hamilton Papers; UWO, Hamilton and Warren Papers; C.O. Ermatinger, The Talbot Regime (Sl. Thomas, Ont., 1904), pp. 43, 114, 121-34, 258; Armstrong, Upper Canadian Chronology, p. 172. 32. Ibid., pp. 181-82; Upper Canada Sundries, Vol. 66, p. 35123, A. Hamilton to Hillier, May 6, 1824; Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 6, S.P. Jarvis to A. Hamilton, January 29, 1825; ibid., February 10, 1825; ibid., February 14, 1825; ibid., February 27,1825; ibid., March 11,1825; ibid., January 7,1827; ibid., Vol. I, A. Hamilton to John Strachan, March 3, 1826; ibid., Vol. 6, S.P. Jarvis to A. Hamilton, November 11, 1833; ibid., November 12, 1833; ibid., July 20, 1834; ibid., July 15, 1835; Sylvia Bourman, John Toronto: A Biography of Bishop Strachan (Toronto, 1969), p. 3; TPL, Alexander Wood Papers, Strachan to Wood, June 13, 1806. 33. James Hamilton Papers, A. Hamilton to James Hamilton, June 28, 1821. 34. Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 1, John Strachan to A. Hamilton, September 25, 1823. 35. Armstrong Upper Canadian Chronology, pp. 44! 31; Wallace, Dictiollary, p.296.

232

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

CHAPTER 12 1. E.A. Cruikshank, The Documentary History of the Campaign Frontier in 1814,9 vols. (Weiland, [1899]-1908), 11, p. 327.

011

the Niagara

2. The major mills were the Hatt Mills at Ancaster and the Bridgewater and Falls Mills on the Niagara River. See White,Selkirk Diary, pp. 300-301; PAC, W.L. Mackenzie Papers, Vol. 13, Randall Estate Papers; ibid., Department of Finance, War of 1812 Losses, Vol. 3747, No. 523, Bridgewater Works Claim; W.J. Holt, Niagara Falls: A History of the City, (Niagara Falls, 1967), p. 19.

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c. National Map Collection Anon., "Sketch of Communication between Lake Eries and Lake Ontario, 1796" ARCHIVES OF aNT ARIa

a. Government and Official Publications District of Nassau. Land Board Lincoln County. Surrogate Court Records Upper Canada. Court of Probate Records Upper Canada. Journals and Proceedings of the House of Assembly [transcripts] Upper Canada. Journals and Proceedings of the Legislative Council [transcripts] Upper Canada. Township Deed Abstracts

b. Private Collections and Papers Bond Collection W. Caniff Papers Cartwright Family Papers [transcripts and microfilm] A. Hamilton Papers Miscellaneous Collections Nelles Family Papers Powell-Jarvis Papers W .G. Reive Genealogical Collection Russell Family Papers [microfilm] J. Simcoe Papers S. Street Papers

BIBLIOGRAPHY

TORONTO PUBLIC LIBRARY Baldwin Family Papers

J. Elmsley Papers J. McGill Papers W. Powell Papers D. W. Smith Papers A. Wood Papers Upper Canada. District of Niagara. Court of Common Pleas UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO LIBRARY T. Dickson Papers Hamilton and Warren Papers William Robertson Collection Seaborn Collection T. Welch Papers DETROIT PUBLIC LIBRARY

J. Askin Papers ST. CATHARINES PUBLIC LIBRARY Genealogical files BUFFALO AND ERIE COUNTY HISTORICAL SOCIETY Hamilton Papers QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Cartwright Papers Herkimer Family Papers HIRAM WALKER HISTORICAL MUSEUM Angus Mackintosh Papers SCOTTISH RECORD OFFICE Presbytery of Bolton: Minutes PRIVATE COLLECTIONS Abraham Nelles Papers

235

236 THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON NEWSPAPERS Canadian Constitution The Constellation The Niagara Herald Upper Canada Gazette Upper Canadian Guardian PRINTED AND GOVERNMENT SOURCES Addison, W. Innes. A Roll of the Graduates of the University of Glasgow. Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 1898. Anon. "Canadian Letters: Description of a Tour thro' the Provinces of Lower and Upper Canada in the course of the years 1792 and '93," in The Canadian Antiquarian and Numismatic Journal. 3rd Series, IX (1912). Archives of Ontario. Report, 1904. United Empire Loyalists. ___ . Report, 1905. Documents Relating to the Proceedings of the District Land Boards. ___ . Report, 1909. Journals and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1792-1804. ___ . Report, 1910. Journals and Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 1792-1819. ___ . Report, 1911. Journal and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, 1805-1811. ___ . Report, 1912. Journals and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, 1812-1818. ___ . Report, 1913. Journals and Proceedings ofthe Legislative Assembly, 1818-1821. _ _ . Report, 1928. Grants of Crown Land in Upper Canada, 1781-1791. _ _ . Report, 1929. Grants of Crown Land in Upper Canada, 1792-1796. ___ . Report, 1930. Grants of Crown Land in Upper Canada, 1796-97. ___ . Report, 1931. Grants of Crown Land in Upper Canada, 1797-98. Bentick, William. A Journey from Montreal to Niagara, n.p., n.d. Cartwright, C.E. ed. Life and Letters of Hon. Richard Cartwright. Toronto: Belford Brothers, 1876. Cruikshank, E.A., ed. The Correspondence of the Honourable Peter Russell. 3 Vols. Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1932-36. ___ . The Correspondence of Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe. 5 Vols. Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1923-31.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 237

___ . The Documentary History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier in 1814. 9 Vols. Weiland: Lundy's Lane Historical Society, [1899]-1908.

---. "Records of Niagara: 1778-83," Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XXXVIII (1927).

- - - . "Records of Niagara: 1784-89," Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XXXIX (1928).

--_.

"Records of Niagara: 1790-92," Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XD (1929).

--_.

"Records of Niagara: 1789-93," Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XDI (1930).

Goring, Francis, "Diary of Francis Goring," Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XXXVI (1924). Gourlay, R. Statistical Account of Upper Canada. 2 Vols. London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1822. Howison, John. Sketches of Upper Canada. Edinburgh, 1821. Hunter, A.F. "The Probated Wills of Persons Prominent in the Public Affairs of Early Upper Canada," Ontario Historical Society Records and Papers, XXIV (1927). Innis, H.A. and Lower, A.R.M., eds. Select Documents in Canadian Economic History: 1783-1885. 2 Vols. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1933. Innis, M.Q. Mrs. Simcoe's Diary. Toronto: Macmillan, 1965. Jackson, John Mills. A View of the Political Situation of the Province of Upper Canada in North America. London: W. Earle, 1809. Johnston, C.M., ed. The Valley of the Six Nations (The Champlain Society Ontario Series, Vol. VII). Toronto: Champlain Society, 1964. Public Archives of Canada. Report, 1891. Quaife, M.M. ed. The John Askin Papers. 2 Vols. Detroit: Detroit Library Commission, 1928-31.

Quebec Almanac. Various years. La Rochefoucault-Liancourt, "Travels in Canada, 1795," Archives of Ontario. Report, 1916. Sullivan, James et al., eds. Papers of Sir William Johnson. 14 Vols. Albany; University of the State of New York, 1921-65. United Empire Loyalist Centennial Committee. The Centennial of the Settlement of Upper Canada. Toronto: Rose, 1885. Upper Canada. Statutes.

238

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

White, P.C.T., ed. Lord Selkirk's Diary: 1803-1804. (The Publications of the Champlain Society, Vol. XXXV.) Toronto: Champlain Society, 1958.

Secondary Sources BOOKS Andre, John. William Berczy: Co-Founder of Toronto . Toronto: Borough of York, 1967. Armstrong, F.H. Handbook of Upper Canadian Chronology and Territorial Legislation. London: University of Western Ontario, 1967. Bald, F.W. Detroit's First American Decade: 1776-1805. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1948. Bingham, R.W. The Cradle of the Queen City: A History of Buffalo to the Incorporation of the City (Buffalo Historical Society Publications, Vol. XXI). Buffalo Historical Society, 1931. Bond R.C. Peninsular Village: The Story of Chippewa . Chippewa: Village of Chippewa, 1964. Boorman, Sylvia. John Toronto: A Biography of Bishop Strachan. Toronto; Clarke, Irwin, 1969. Brown, R.C. and S.F. Wise. Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth Century Political Attitudes. Toronto: Macmillan, 1967. Burt, A.L. The Old Province of Quebec (The Carleton Library Series, Nos. 37-38). Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968. Campbell, M.F. Mountain and a City: the Story of Hamilton. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966. Caniff, W. History of the Province of Ontario. Toronto: A.H. Hovey, 1872. Carnochan, Janet. History of Niagara. Toronto: W. Briggs, 1914. Chadwick, E.M. Ontarian Families. 2 Vols. Toronto: Rolph, Smith and Company, 1894-98. Colombo, John Robert. Colombo's Canadian Quotations. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1974. Craig, Gerald. Upper Canada: The Formative Years. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963. Creighton, D.G. The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence. Toronto: Ryerson, 1937. Crysler, J.M. History of that Branch of the Crysler Family Who Settled in the Township of Niagara. Niagara-on-the-Lake: Niagara Advance, 1936.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

239

Dunham, Aileen. Political Unrest in Upper Canada: 1815-36 (The Carleton Library Series No. 10). Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963. Earl, D.W.L. The Family Compact: Aristocracy or Oligarchy? Toronto: Copp-Clarke, 1967. Ermatinger, D.O. The Talbot Regime. St. Thomas Ont.: Municipal World, 1904. Gates, Lillian F. Land Politicies of Upper Canada (Canadian Studies in History and Government, Vol. IX). Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968. Graymount, Barbara. The Iroquois in the American Revolution. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1972. Holt, W.J. Niagara Falls: A History of the City. Niagara Falls: Kiwanis Club of Stamford, 1967. Innis, H.A. The Fur Trade in Canada. revised ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967. Kennie, A.J. Niagara Township: A Centennial History, n.p., n.d. Main, J .T. The Social Structure of Revolutionary America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Martine, J. Reminiscences of Haddington. Edinburgh: n.p., 1890. Mathews, Hazel. The Mark of Honour (Canadian Studies in History and Government, Vol. VI). Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965. Milani, D. Robert Gourlay: Gadfly. Thornhill: Ampersand, c. 1971. Norton, M.B. The British Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England: 1774-1789. Toronto: Little, Brown, 1972. Ouellet, F. H is to ire Economique et Socia Ie du Quebec: 1760-1850. Montreal: Fides, 1966. Published in English under the title Economic and Social History of Quebec. 1760-1850 (Carleton Library Series No. 120). Toronto: Gage Publishing Limited, 1980. Phillips, Paul C. The Fur Trade. 2 Vols. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961. Rich, E.E. The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1857. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967. Riddell, W.R. The Bar and Courts of the Province of Upper Canada of Ontario. Toronto: Macmillan, 1928.

___ . The Life of John Graves Simcoe. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1926. ___ . The Life of William Dummer Powell. Lansing, Michigan: Michigan Historical Commission, 1924.

240

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Scott, Hew. Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae: The Succession of Ministers in the Church of Scotland from the Reformation. 3 Vols. Edinburgh: 1915. Smith, D. W. A Short Topographical Description of His Majesty's Province of Upper Canada in North America. London, 1799. Smith, L.W. and A.C. Detmers, Guide to the Microfilm Edition of the Peter B. Porter Papers. Buffalo: 1968. Stanley, G.F.G. Canada Invaded: 1775-1776. Toronto: Hakkert, 1973. Stevens, Wayne E. The Northwest Fur Trade. Illinois: University of Illinois, 1928. Swigget, Howard. War Out of Niagara. New York: Columbia University Press, 1933. Vinal, Theodora. Niagara Portage: From Past to Present. Buffalo: Foster and Stewart, 1949. Wallace, W.S. The Family Compact: Chronicle of Rebellion in Upper Canada. Toronto: Glasgow, Brook and Company, 1920. ___ . The Macmillan Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 3rd ed. Toronto: Macmillan, 1963.

Wethera1l, M.H. Jubilee History of Thorold. Thorold: n.p., 1897. THESES Burns, Robert J. "The First Elite of Toronto: an Examination of the Genesis, Consolidation and Duration of Power in an Emerging Colonial Society." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1975. Cannedy, C. P. III. .• An Entrepreneurial History of the New York Frontier: 1736-1776. Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, 1967. Farrell, David R. "Detroit, 1783-1796: the Last Stages of the British Fur Trade in the Old Northwest." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1968. Patterson, Graeme H. "Studies in Elections and Public Opinion in Upper Canada." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1969. Quealey, Francis Michael. "The Administration of Sir Peregrine Maitland, Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada: 1818-1828." Ph. D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1968. Watson, J.W. "The Geography of the Niagara Peninsula with Special Emphasis on Changes in Land Use and Settlement." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1942.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

241

ARTICLES Anon. "East Lothian Biographies." East Lothian Antiquarian and Field Naturalists Society, Transactions, IV (1941). Burghardt, Andrew. "The Origin and Development of the Road Network of the Niagara Peninsula, Ontario, 1770-1851." Annals of the Association of American Geographers, DIX (1969). Camochan, J. "References to Niagara in Early Books of Travel, Diaries, etc." Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XI (1904). ___ . "Names Only But Much More." Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XXVII (1918). Cruikshank, E.A. "A Memoir of Colonel the Honourable James Kerby." Weiland County Historical Society Papers and Records, II (1927). ___ . "Public Life and Services of Robert Nichol," Ontario Historical Society Papers and Records, XIX (1922). ___ . "Settlement of the Township of Bertie." Weiland County Historical Society Papers and Records. V (1936). Desloges, Yvon. "Structural History of Fort George." National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Manuscript Report No. 189 (1977). Fleming, R.H. "Phyn, Ellice and Company of Schenectady." Contributions to Canadian Economics, IV (1932). Gentilcore, R.L. "The Beginnings of Settlement in the Niagara Peninsula: 1782-1792." Canadian Geographer, VII (1963). ___ . "The Niagara District of Robert Gourlay." Ontario History, XIV (1962). Green, E. "Niagara Portage Road." Ontario Historical Society Letters and Papers, XXIII (1926). Innis, M.Q. "The Industrial Development of Ontario." Ontario Historical Society Papers and Records XXXII (1937). Kerr, James E. "Sketch of the Life of the Honourable William Dickson." Publications of the Niagara Historical Society, XXX (1917). Macdonald, G.E. "Commodore Grant." Ontario Historical Society Records and Papers, XXII (1925). Mealing, S.R. "The Enthusiasms of John Graves Simcoe." Historical Association, Annual Report. 1958.

Canadian

Nelles, H. V. "Loyalism and Local Power, the District of Niagara: 1792-1837." Ontario History , LVIII (1966). Preston, R.A. "Neil Maclean." Dictionary of Canadian Biography, IV. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.

242 THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON Quaife, M.M. "Alexander Macomb." Burton Historical Collection Leaflet, X (1931). Riddell, W.R. "The First Attorney-General of Upper Canada." Ontario Historical Society Papers and Records, XXIII (1926). Robinson, C.M. "The Life of Judge Augustus Porter." Buffalo Historical Society Publications, VII (1904). Rossie, J .G. "The Northern Indian Department in the American Revolution." Niagara Frontier, XX (1973). Saunders, R.E. "What was the Family Compact?" Ontario History, XLIX (1957). Siebert, W.H. "The Loyalists and the Six Nation Indians in the Niagara Peninsula." Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, IX, Sec. II (1915). Tasker, L.H. "The U.E.L. Settlement at Long Point, Lake Erie." Ontario Historieal Society Papers and Records, II (1900). Tohill, Lorus. "Robert Dickson, The Fur Trade and the Minnesota Boundary." Minnesota History Magazine. VI (1925). Wallace, W.S. "Forsyth, Richardson and Company." Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada. 3rd Series, XXIV, Sec. II (1940).

Index Addison, Rev. Robert, 143, 157, 160 Albany, NY, 180 Aldam, Captain, 136 Americans, attitudes to, 101-17 Amherstburg, 75, 78 Ancaster, 5, 90, 92 Anglican Church, 143 Army, British, 9-12, IS, 20-23, 25, 28-29, 32-33, 35, 40-41, 50, 52-53, 61-63, 69-74, 77-85, 87, 89, 109, 112-16,118-21,167-70,177-78; 193, n. 8 Askin, Charles, 89, 100, 144, 162, 170, 173 Askin, John, Jr., 139 Askin, John, Sr., 20-22, 29, 59-60, 62-65, 76, 81, 112, 120, 125, 134-39, 148, 153, 166 Baby, Jacques, 41, 137 Ball, Jacob, 96, 98 Beasley, Richard, 62,80,89, 100, 132, 148, 160. See also Smith and Beasley. Beaver Dams,S Berczy, William, 27 Birdsall, Samuel, 89 Bons, 55,80, 119 Boyd, John, 90 Brant, Joseph, 38,45,50,99, 157, 159 Bridgewater, 63 Buffalo Creek, NY, 76 Burch, John, 19,32,41,53-54,56,71 Burns, John, 144 Butler, Andrew, 25, 66-67 Butler, John: early career, 13; in Revolutionary War, 14-17; supply of Indian Department, 25-26; speculation in Indian lands, 26-27; leadership and patronage, 36-37; financial problems, 37-38; war losses claim, 37; government patronage, 38; influence over former military subordinates, 39-40; postwar patronage, 41-42; and local office, 44-47; and Court of Common Pleas, 53; and Land Board, 53; and postwar economic development, 65-67; land holdings, 96, 98; chosen as lieutenant

of the county, 127; and the Masonic Order, 143; and the Anglican Church, 143 Butler, Thomas, 36 Butler, Walter, 36 Butler's Rangers, 13,36-37,43-46,50. See also Loyalists. Caldwell, Colonel, 41 Campbell, Major, 41 Canada Constitlllion, 151-52 Canborough, 170, 173 Canby, Benjamin, 96, 98 Carleton Island, NY, 19, 29, 50, 61 Carleton, Sir Guy, 13. See also Lord Dorchester. Cartwright, Richard, 9-10, 11, 14-15, 21,61,73-74, 77, 80-81, 86, 88-89, 92, 102, 106-11, 115-120, 122-23, 136-37, 148-50, 172. See also Hamilton and Cartwright. Cataraqui. See Kingston Chippawa, 5, 64, 73, 82, 85, 90 Chippawa Creek. See Weiland River Clarke, Alured, 114 Clarke, John, 60 Clarke, Thomas, 60-64, 71-72, 14, 85, 89,96,99-100,102,131,142,144, 150, 158, 168, 171-74. See also Clarke and Street Clarke and Street, 84. See also Thomas Clarke and Samuel Street, Jr. Claus, Daniel, 13-14,37,47 Claus, William, 47, 157-58, 160 Clench, Ralfe, 26, 132, 146, 153-54, 156-57, 161-63; 226, n.58 Cockrell, Richard, 156 Collector of Customs, 62, 132 Conservatism. See Toryism Court of Common Pleas, 40, 46, 52-57, 116-18, 120-21 Court of Quarter Sessions, 126; 203, n.13 Crooks, James, 146, 154, 169 Crooks, William, 132, 169 Cummins, James, 172. See also Hamilton and Cummings. Cunningham, Archibald, 19-20,32, 71 Currency, 3; 193, n.6

244

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Davison, Alexander, 112 Davison, George, 116 Davison, John, 112 Debt, 52, 54-55, 93, 149 Detroit, 59-60, 63-64, 72-78, 86, 112 Dickson, John, 60 Dickson, Robert, 60-61, 64, 125; and Company, 61 Dickson, Thomas, 60-63, 71, 85, 89-90, 100, 131, 144, 155, 162-63, 172-73, 175 Dickson, William, 60-63, 85, 96, 98-100, 102, 141-44, 153-54, 158, 172, 174 Dorchester, Lord, 114. See also Sir Guy Carleton. Douglas, Alexander, 16. See also Douglas and Symington. Dumfries (Scotland), 61 Dun, John, 144 Education, of Hamilton children, 165-66 Edward, Duke of Kent, 141 Edwards, Joseph, 132 Election of 1792, 105-06, 152; of 1796, 148, 152; of 1800, 148-56; of 1804, 156 Ellice, Alexander, 59 Ellice Brothers, 19, 59 Ellice, James" 59 Ellice, Robert, 59 Elmsley, John, 132-33, 142, 149-50 Executive Council of U.C., 42, 59-60, 66,94 Family Compact, 129 Fanning, John, 90, 163 Farquharson, James, 79 Fifteen Mile Creek, 67 Hour, 33, 124-25. See also Provisioning Forsyth, George, 15, 20, 32, 54, 59, 63, 71, 74, 85, 96, 146, 150 Forsyth, James, 59 Forsyth, John, 59. See also Forsyth and Richardson. Forsyth, Joseph, 59; and Company, 30 Forsyth, Thomas, 59 Forsyth and Richardson, 30, 59. See also John Forsyth and John Richardson.

Fort de Conti, 4. See also Fort Erie. Fort Erie, 5, 29, 61-63, 70, 72-73, 76, 78, 85, 107, 175. See also Fort de Conti. Fort George, 78 Fort Niagara, NY, 4, 29, 78,81, 88 Fort Schlosser, 29 Forty Mile. See Grimsby Four Mile Creek, 66-67 Fur trade, 19-21, 23, 28-32, 41, 43, 49-50, 58-59, 61-65, 68-69, 72-74, 76,85-87, 125, 166, 171, 177-78 German Company, 27-28 Gerrard, Gilliespie and Company, 59 Gillespie, Robert, 168, 172 Goat Island, 70 Gore, Francis, 157 Goring, Francis, 12, 20, 25 Gourlay agitation, 173-74 Gourlay, Janey, 195, n.41 Grand Portage, 72 Grand River, 78, 99-100, 171 Grant, Alexander, 59-60, 63, 136-38 Grant, Robert, 71. See also Grant and Kerby. Grant, William, 123 Grant and Kerby, 171-72. See also Robert Grant and James Kerby. Gray, John, 112 Gregory, John, 59 Grimsby, 5, 62, 90 Haldimand, Frederick, 16-17, 21, 36-37 Hamilton (city), 174 Hamilton, Alexander, 142, 162, 174-75. See also Hamilton and Smith. Hamilton, Catherine Askin Robertson, 59; 204, n.2 Hamilton, George, 142, 166-75 Hamilton, James, 142, 165, 173-75 Hamilton, John, 142, 174-75 Hamilton, Joseph, 142, 166 Hamilton, Mary Herkimer McLean, 204, n.2 Hamilton, Peter, 142, 174 Hamilton, Robert, Jr. 142, 166, 171, 173-76 Hamilton, Robert, Sr.: house, I, 177; achievements, 1-2, 177-79;

INDEX partnership with Cartwright, 17; early life, 18-19, 195, n.41; early career in Upper Canada, 19-20; links to Todd and McGill, 19-20; links to military, 20-21; at Oswego, 21; co-partnership with John Askin, 21; portaging and provisioning, 28-34; early public office, 41, 43; and early local issues, 48-51; and Iroquois, 51-53; and courts and land board, 53-57; marries Catherine Askin Robertson, 59; and his Detroit relations, 59-60, 64-65, 135-39; and his Scots relations, 60-64; and portaging, 68-74, 85-87; and provisioning of army and fur trade, 74-85; and retailing, 88-93; and land speculation, 93-100; and conservative ideology, 102-104; and politics in Simcoe era, 104-27; appointed lieutenant of the county, 127; and patronage, 128-35; his social position and local office, 141-45; and local politics, 145-63; his death, 164; education and training of his children, 165-67; and John Strachan, 175; Hamilton Papers, 195, n.4. See also Hamilton and Cartwright. Hamilton, Samuel, 142 Hamilton and Cartwright, 12, 21-22, 28-30, 32-33, 59, 69, 72, 114-15. See also Robert Hamilton and Richard Cartwright. Hamilton and Cummins. 171. See also Robert Hamilton, Jr. Hamilton and Smith, 171. See also Alexander Hamilton and William Smith. Hands, William, 138 Hardison, Benjamin, 148 Hatt, Richard, 90 Head of the Lake. See Ancaster Heir and Devisee Commission, 94, 123 Herkimer, John Jost, 204, n.2 Herkimer, Thomas, 20 Hill, Solomon, 160 Hudson's Bay Company, 171. See also Fur Trade. Hunter, Peter, 130, 134

Indian Department, 11-17, 23, 25, 26-27, 32-33, 37-41, 43-44, 46-47, 50-52, 61, 69, 175 Indian Trade Licences, 207, n.3 Indians. See Iroquois, Mississauga, Neutral Indians Inspector of beef and pork, 132 Inspector of flour, pot and pearl ash, 132 Inspector of shops, stills and taverns, 132 Iron ore, 206, n.2 Iroquois, 11, 13,26,51-52,76, 99-100, 157-58 Iroquois Trail, 91 Jackson, John Mills, 158-59 Jarvis, Hannah, 20 Jarvis, Samuel Peters, 175 Jarvis, William, 133 Johnson, Guy, 13, 15-16 Johnson, Sir John, 17, 27, 40, 42-43, 46-47 Johnson, Sir William, 4, 13 Jones, Augustus, 99, 159 Jordan, 5 Justice of the Peace, 39-41, 45-46, 51, 126-27, 131 Kerby, James, 71. See also Grant and Kerby Kerr, Robert, 42 King's Royal Regiment of New York, 42 Kingston, 22, 28,50,75-78,81, 125-126, 172 Kingship networks, 58, 64-66, 172-73 Kirkpatrick, John, 64 Kirkpatrick, Robert, 64 Land Boards, 40, 42, 46, 53, 55-57, 66, 93, 118, 120, 149 Land certificates, 93-94, 121-22 Land granting, 121-23, 152 Land holdings, attitudes to, 142 Land speculation, 24, 26-28, 52-53, 55, 60, 63, 66, 93-100, 149, 157-58, 168, 174, 178 Land Committee of the Executive Council of U.C., 55

245

246

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

Legislative Assembly ofV.C., 55, 111, 148-49 Legislative Council of V.C., 42, III Lewis, Levi, 162 Lieutenant of the County, 46, 62, 126-27 Local Compacts, 146-47 London District, 130 Long Point, 62, 64 Louth Township, 66 Loyalists, 4-6, 21, 24, 35-46, 48, 53-54, 66, 127, 131-32, 148-49, 151, 153, 160-61. See also Butler's Rangers, King's Royal Regiment of New York. McGill, James, 31. See also Todd and McGill. McGill, John, 78-79, 81-82, 112, 114, 118-20 Mackintosh, Angus, 21 McKee, Alexander, 38, 47 Mclean, Neil, 203-204, n.2 MacNab, Allan, 101, 179 McNabb, John, 149 McTavish, Frobisher and Company, 59 Markland, T., 172 Masons, 143 Mathews, Robert, 41 Meldrum and Park, 20 Mennonites, 104 Merritt, Thomas, 132 Merritt, William Hamilton, 179 Methodists, 104 Michilimackinac, 61, 64, 72-73, 76, 78, 166 Militia, 68, 126, 131, 144, 153 Milling, 63-64, 67-68, 90; 207, n.2; 230, n.2. See also Flour. Mississauga Indians, 4, 46, 66 Mitchell, Rev. George, 28 Mohawk Trail, 91 Montreal, 73-75, 86 Montreal merchants, 24-25, 30-32, 35-36,40-41,48-49, 73-74. See also Ellice Brothers, Forsyth and Richardson, Fur Trade, Montreal, North West Company; Phyn, Ellice and Company. Muirhead, James, 64, 132 Munro and Bell, 112, 118

Navy Hall, 56 Nelles, Henrich, 96, 98 Nelles, Robert, 160 Nelles, William, 90 Neutral Indians, 3-4 Newark. See Niagara-on-the-Lake New York-Genesse Land Company, 26-27 Niagara Agricultural Society, 143 Niagara Herald, 104, 154 Niagara libraI)', 143 Niagara-on-the-Lake, 5,56, 82, 91, 125, 149 Niagara peninsula: geography, development and settlement, 3-7, 68, 177 Niagara Portage, 31-32, 56, 64, 70-71, 85-87, 103, 148-51, 170, 177. See also Portaging Nichol, Robert, 63-65, 71, 76, 85, 102, 131, 144, 153-54,161 North West Company, 72, 76,87,171. See also Fur trade. Norton, John, 157; 225, n.46 Osgoode, William, 57, 113, 116, 132-33 Oswego, 21-22 Pawling, Benjamin, 53-54, 106 Pawling, Jesse, 149 Petit, Nathaniel, 42, 53 Phelps-Gorham Company, 26 Phyn, James, 59 Phyn, Ellice and Company, 59 Pittsburg, 86 Pollard, Edward, 12, 14-15, 37 Pork, 82. See also Provisioning. Portage Road, 91. See also Niagara Portage, Portaging. Portaging, 68-74, 168, 171-72. See also Niagara Portage, Portage Road. Port Do ver, 64 Port Stanley, 175 Porter, Barton and Company, 86-87 Portland, Duke of, 125 Powell, W.O., 221, n.13 Presbyterian Church, 143-44 Presque lie, Michigan, 81 Provincial Marine, 59. See also Shipping: Great Lakes.

INDEX Provisioning, 68, 75-85. See also Flour, Pork Quakers, 104 Queenston, 5, 55, 61-62, 70, 72, 82-83, 88, 90-92, 150

Springstein, Staats, 56 Stedman, Philip, Jr., 32 Stedman, Philip, Sr., 31-32, 69, 73 Strachan, Rev. John, 175 Street, Nehimiah, 51 Street, Samuel, Jr., 51, 63, 71, 96, 98-100, 174 Street, Samuel, Sr., 20, 25-28, 41, 66-67, 96, 98-99, 106, 132, 146, 148, 153-54, 162 Street, Thomas Clarke, 63 Street and Butler, 25-26, 54. See also Andrew Butler and Samuel Street, Sr. Sulphur Springs, 206, n.2 Swayze, Isaac, 146, 151-54, 156-57, 161 Symington, John, 20. See also Douglas and Symington.

Randall, Robert, 159 Religion, attitudes to, 103-104 Retailing, 45, 68, 88-93 Richardson, John, 59. See also Forsyth and Richardson. Road Commissioners, 56 Robertson, David, 80, 112 Robertson, John, 131, 142 Robertson, William (stepson of Robert Hamilton Sr.), 131, 142, 171 Robertson, William, (uncle of Robert Hamilton's step-son), 43, 59, 60, 65, 72, 80, 97, 134-37, 166 Robinson, Thomas, 15 Taylor, William, 11, 14-15. See also Rochefoucault-Liancourt, Duc de la, Taylor and Duffin. Russell, Peter, 53, 132-33, 142 Taylor and Duffin, 14-15. See also Ryerse, Samuel, 162 William Taylor. · 5 61 88 49 1 Taylor and Forsyth, 15-16. See also St. Cat harmes" , ,1 , 71 St. Johns, 5 William Taylor. St. David's. 5 Tenbrook. Peter. 41, 53, 149 Saline Springs, 206, n.2 Thompson, John 54 SaIt, 74 Thompson, Samuel, 157, 159 Secord, David, 159 Thorpe, Robert, 2, 101, 134, 156-59, Secord, James, 62, 89 161 Selkirk, Earl of, 74, 100 Thorpe-Willcocks agitation, 156-163. Sheehan, Walter Butler, 26, 38. 46 See also Robert Thorpe, Joseph Sheriff, 46 . Willcoc~s. Shipping: Great Lakes, 28-30, 49, 59. Tiffany, GIdeon, 104; 216, n.14 65, 68,70-71; 207, n.2. See also Todd, Isaac, 19,32, 43, 72, 98-99, Provincial Marine. 112, 115-}6, 135-37. See also Todd Ships: Good Intent. 30; Governor and McGIll .. Simcoe, 30; Lady Dorchester, 30; Todd and McGIll, 19, 21-22, 30, 32, Saguinah, 65 49-50, 80, 112, 135-36. Se~ also Shop licences. 213, n.4 Isaac Todd and James McGdl. "Shopkeeper aristocracy," 2, 134 Toro?to, 81 Simcoe, Elizabeth 141 Toryism, 101-105 . ' Tunkers, 104 Simcoe, John Graves, 2, 43, 78, TIM. . 106-27, 133, 143, 148 we ve I.le Creek. See St. Cathannes Smith, D.W., 117, 133, 137, 142, Twent?, Mde Creek. See Jordan 148-49, 152, 155 Tyhonhoga, 99 Smith, William, 171; 228, n.19. See Upper Canadian Guardian. 157, 160. also Hamilton and Smith. Smith and Beasley, 61. See also 162 Richard Beasley. Upper Canada Gazette, 104. 160

247

248

THE ENTERPRISES OF ROBERT HAMILTON

War of 1812, 164, 170-71 Warren, Henry, 174 Warren, John, Jr., 132, 175 Warren, John, Sr., 20, 132, 146, 155, 158, 162 Watson, Captain, 41 Weekes, William, 157-58 Welch, Thomas, 130, 146, 155, 164 Weiland River, 70 Weiland Ship Canal, 177

Western District, 131 White, John, 54, 116, 151 Wilkinson, Captain, 63 Willcocks, Joseph, 157, 159-63 Willson, Crowell, 162 Wood, Alexander, 81 Wyan, C.B., 157 York. See Toronto Young, John, 144.

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