Enhancing Cooperation in Defence Against Terrorism [1 ed.] 9781614991038, 9781614991021

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Copyright © 2012. IOS Press, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

ENHANCING COOPERATION IN DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

Enhancing Cooperation in Defence Against Terrorism, edited by K. Tokgoz, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division.

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Enhancing Cooperation in Defence Against Terrorism, edited by K. Tokgoz, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Enhancing Cooperation in Defence against Terrorism

Edited by

Kenan Tokgöz

Copyright © 2012. IOS Press, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Centre of Excellence – Defence against Terrorism Ankara, Turkey

Published in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division

Enhancing Cooperation in Defence Against Terrorism, edited by K. Tokgoz, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Training Course on Enhancing Cooperation in Defence against Terrorism Astana, Kazakhstan 27 September-1 October 2010

© 2012 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-61499-102-1 (print) ISBN 978-1-61499-103-8 (online) Library of Congress Control Number: 2012944004

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Enhancing Cooperation in Defence Against Terrorism K. Tokgöz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2012 © 2012 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

v

Preface The Centre of Excellence – Defence against Terrorism (COE-DAT) traveled to Astana, Kazakhstan to conduct an advanced training course (ATC) entitled "Enhancing Cooperation in Defense against Terrorism" on 27 September-01 October 2010. A total of eleven experts from five countries helped the participants discuss these issues in order to facilitate interoperability between these countries and NATO in the fight against terrorism. The articles in this book reflect those presentations and discussions. The first presentation was an overview of terrorism entitled “A Round-the-World Tour of Terrorism,” presented by Ercan Çitliolu from Bahçeehir University, who gave an overview of the landscape in which terrorism currently exists. He examined why a different type of mentality is needed to fight against terrorism rather than the Cold War-type model we have become accustomed to.

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Mitat Çelikpala of Istanbul Kadir Has University was the second speaker with the topic of “Countering the Ideology of Terrorism,” where he examined the relationship between ideology (a set of beliefs) and terrorism (a method to achieve them), outlining the basic divisions of these two. He then discussed the fight against terrorism, which has to be conducted at both the operational level to prevent attacks and capture terrorists, as well as the strategic level where the ideology behind the terrorism must be countered. He argued the best way to do this is from within that ideological community itself by engaging all elements of society to influence this group and prevent recruitment of the young. “Legal Responses to Terrorist Use of the Internet” was the topic of the third presentation by Marco Gercke of the Cybercrime Research Institute. In his talk he addressed internet-related attacks, illegal content, communications, and financing of terrorism – both the status of the threat and the legal responses in each of these areas. In the area of legal responses, some nations are taking an Internet-specific approach, some are taking a general approach to terrorist related crimes, while some are taking a combination of both; he analyzed these approaches. The fourth presentation was done by Ercan Çitliolu from Bahçesehir University again on the topic of “Organized Crime and Terrorism: The Financial Roots of Systematic Violence,” where he examined the links between organized crimes. Although the two groups have differing reasons for their work – financial for organized crime and political for terrorists groups – they have mutually supporting skills and needs that cause them to work together. The loss of financial support to terrorist groups after the fall of the USSR in 1991 is also cited as a contributing factor. Therefore, he argued, to eliminate terrorist groups you also have to take on organized crime. Mitat Çelikpala of Istanbul Kadir Has University was also the fifth speaker of the course, speaking on the topic of “What does Energy Security Mean?” Tracing the history of the concept of energy security from the beginning of the 20th Century when

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it referred to the supply of oil for British warships to the present day with a great expanded meaning to cover the availability – reliability – of energy from various sources. This problem has a political aspect because energy concerns can force a nation into certain actions, as well as present a possibility for terrorists to achieve their aims if they are able to successfully target the energy sector. He concluded by urging governments to innovate their energy markets and needs so as to reduce this vulnerability. Larry White of TOBB University of Economics and Technology gave the sixth presentation on “The Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism” where he outlined a twostep approach to battling terrorism from a legal point-of-view: preventing attacks and convicting terrorists. By acting with current legal authorities, most terrorist attacks can be stopped; prosecution of terrorists can discourage others and lead to greater knowledge of the threat to prevent future attacks. He also outlined some current hot issues in the legal field regarding counterterrorism. The seventh presentation by Dan Radu Voica of COE-DAT addressed “Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism.” His presentation focused on the WMD threat – chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear – that could be developed by terrorists or fall into terrorist hands. He emphasized the threat while at the same time outlining the capability that NATO has to counter this threat.

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“International Humanitarian Law in Military Counterterrorist Operations” was the topic of the eighth presentation, again by Larry White of TOBB University. In this presentation, he discussed the concept of IHL – also known as the law of war – in fighting terrorism. Although the application of IHL to counterterrorism will be the exception, it is important for counterterrorist forces to be aware of these concepts since they can help fill in gaps in counterterrorism laws. He also pointed out that IHL is greatly out-of-date with regards to fighting terrorism and needs to be updated. The ninth article “Suicide Terrorism: Media Representations and Strategic Communication” reflects the views of Keith Spence of the University of Leicester who discussed suicide terrorism. He addressed some of the perceptions in the media of suicide terrorism, which he considers to be unpredictable based on the conclusion the every such attack has its own circumstances. Therefore, he advocated the use of strategic communications to reduce the possibility of such attacks. Kenan Tokgöz of COE-DAT next talked about the role of the media in terrorism and counterterrorism. The media is very powerful in democratic nations; he called it the fourth power (after the legislative, executive and judicial powers) of a government. However, in the rush to remain competitive, the media can prioritize speed over accuracy. Since terrorist events are newsworthy and terrorism needs the media to achieve its objectives, terrorists and the media have a symbiotic relationship. The key is for governments to work with media to promote responsible action. The final article resulting from this ATC is once again from Keith Spence and deals with the topic “Counterterrorism Strategy: Analysis and Dilemmas,” where he discussed four dilemmas that governments have in counterterrorism. He highlighted the problems these dilemmas have presented in Iraq and Afghanistan, then concluded that the medium- and long-term outcomes of both these developments are highly uncertain, but present an opportunity to rethink and reorient key elements of counterterrorism strategy.

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Although not part of the presentations in Astana, we have included in this book two articles from Brigitte Nacos of Columbia University. In “The Importance of Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy in Combating Terrorism,” she addresses the use of soft power – public diplomacy and strategic communication – to overcome negative perceptions of the West in Muslim countries as a part of the war against terrorism. Although the West was fairly good at this in the Cold War, she maintains the West has stumbled in the post-9/11 world. In “Terrorism, Media and Censorship,” she discusses the concept of censorship and terrorism. Although the concept of censorship is generally abhorrent, in the counterterrorism context some restrictions on media may be warranted. She examines how this has been attempted in some nations but concludes that in the age of global media and communication it is very difficult, if not impossible to censor mass-mediated communications. I would like to thank all contributors for their help in the success of this Advanced Training Course.

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Kenan TOKGÖZ Lieutenant Colonel, Turkish Army ATC Director

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Contents Preface

v

Terrorism Overview: A Round-the-World Tour of Terrorism Ercan Çitliolu

1

Countering the Ideology of Terrorism Mitat Çelikpala

11

Legal Responses to Terrorist Use of the Internet Marco Gercke

19

Organized Crime and Terrorism: The Financial Roots of Systematic Violence Ercan Çitliolu

35

What does Energy Security Mean? Mitat Çelikpala

43

The Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism Larry D. White

49

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism Dan Radu Voica

57

International Humanitarian Law in Military Counterterrorist Operations Larry D. White

75

Suicide Terrorism: Media Representations and Strategic Communication Keith Spence

81

Terrorism and Media Kenan Tokgöz

105

Counterterrorism Strategy: Analysis and Dilemmas Keith Spence

113

The Importance of Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy in Combating Terrorism Brigitte L. Nacos

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x

139

Subject Index

149

Author Index

151

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Terrorism, Media and Censorship Brigitte L. Nacos

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Enhancing Cooperation in Defence Against Terrorism K. Tokgöz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2012 © 2012 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-103-8-1

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Terrorism Overview: A Round-the-World Tour of Terrorism Ercan ÇTLOLU1 Baçheehir University

Abstract. The international system is facing serious rapid and structural changes which directly affect the security environment and threat landscape, including terrorism and assymetric threats. The relatively ‘stable’ characteristics of the Cold War era had enabled predictibility in security affairs and made things easier for analysts. However, after the end of the Cold War, dramatic structural transformations caused several “unknown zones” to come into existance. Terrorism, especially the new wave of this threat, is one of the most significant “unknown zone” for states and their orthodox security apparatuses. The conceptual preferences of terrorists are unusual to most as well as their “ideological habitats.” This article will focus on the determining parameters of the terrorism threat and analyze the destructive capability of the new threat. Keywords. Terrorism, security environment, terrorist concepts, asymmetric threat.

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Introduction As the threats that have been faced in the past and perceptions based on those past threats have lost their validity due to change, evolution, and shifts of paradigm, present sources and perceptions of threat shall also face objective and subjective transformation and lose their current validity in future.2 Therefore, creating projections and trustworthy analyzes, based on today’s threats to produce foresights on future security issues, does not seem possible due to either fast and radical or slow but sneaky changes in this field. The Cold War days, when the bipolar world system and the balance of power prevented total wars and created strong alliances based on ideologies, have ended. Consequently, understanding and interpreting the system of international relations is not as easy as it used to be in the past. In today’s international relations environment, where the participation of non-governmental actors has gained significant importance, we cannot reduce our strategic view to a simple level, as we could do before when the perceptions were based on the balance of a bipolar world system. In line with the points mentioned above, it is getting harder to gather increased ‘results’ due to the increased ‘causes.’ As a result, we are becoming more concerned about the new threats that could not have been anticipated in the past, while trying to produce new security theories and concepts due to our new concerns. Sometimes those unidentified concerns might cause 1

President, International Security and Strategic Research Center. E-mail: [email protected]. Beril Dedeolu, Uluslararas Güvenlik ve Strateji [International Security and Strategy](Yeni Yüzyl Yaynlar, 2008). 2

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irrational reactions as they are “reactions to the unknown,” so we may be identified with irrational and radical academic approaches which are far away from real politics. As Machiavelli suggested in The Prince, sometimes it is extremely costly to understand that “it is much harder to find a cure for a disease which is easy to diagnosis than to easily diagnosis a disease which is easy to find a cure.”3

1. Changing Security Environment Threat Landscape The multidimensional structure of international relations, changes in conflicts of interests which are accelerated by fast transformations of paradigms, cause our perceptions to be ‘shaken’ and we gain more passive roles. As a result of the emergence of unforeseen threats, our mind fails to prioritize sources of future threats against the current ones. In today’s security environment, it can be observed that the major powers are seeking to direct conflicts to the periphery instead of being engaged in central areas; while, in contrast, intensifying asymmetric threats are centralizing the conflicts which depend on states’ will to sustain the welfare of people and seem to continue by transforming into survival efforts with increasing violence.4

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The population projections, which estimate the world population to be 7.2 billion in 2015 and 9.1 billion in 2050 (which is currently 6.9 billion), are showing that there will be, in five years time, 1.1 billion and, in 40 years time, 3 billion more people who will share the natural resources which are already scarce even today.5 Considering issues such as that 95% of the fastest world population growth will take place in underdeveloped and developing countries as well as that 80% of the estimated world population by 2050 will live in Asia, Middle East, and North Africa where, while harboring nearly 70% of energy resources, there will be a scarcity of water; it is obvious to say that threat sources and perceptions are going to change dramatically in the future.6 Global warming is causing changes in world geopolitics. In line with those changes, geostrategic concepts are radically changing as well, as a natural consequence of reductions in agricultural fields and habitable areas.7 These changes are likely to cause huge famines, and huge famines may trigger mass migrations which may remind the migration of tribes in the history. These migrations would probably cause socioeconomic and cultural booms which might be future’s main threats.

2. Characteristics of New Threats and Terrorism as a Rising Trend Within this perspective in the global arena, when one looks at the common features of terrorist organizations whose root causes are ethnic or racist nationalism, whose final 3

Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince (CAN Yaynlar, 2010). CACI International Inc., Dealing With Today’s Asymmetric Threat to U.S. Global Security (2008), available at: http://asymmetricthreat.net/docs/asymmetric_threat_1_paper.pdf (last visited Jun. 20, 2012). 5 UN, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision (2009), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_highlights.pdf (last visited Jun. 20, 2012). 6 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2010). 7 Peter Haldén, “The Geopolitics of Climate Change” (Swedish Defence Research Agency Report, 2007). 4

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aim is based on separatism, and which use violence as a means to reach their political aims, it can be observed that two factors have come to the fore: political support and economic support. International relations have been inverted with the disintegration of the bipolar system of the Cold War era and the end of the world of two blocs. There has emerged a much more complicated system, with the participation of civil actors who are not bound by states and who are sometimes even more powerful than states. In this new and unaccustomed process, amid the international interests which are constantly changing, overlapping and differentiating, there have appeared new structures that have been forcing states to change their recognized attitudes and stereotyped behaviors, actions and reactions. When this reality is combined with the complication of the turmoil that the world is going through, it becomes difficult to make accurate predictions about which methods states and non-state actors will appeal to in order to attain their political and economic aims. The bipolar system masked some of the tensions in the global arena, with the result that these were overlooked by analysts. That is why, in the current process, it is necessary for perceptions relating to terrorism to undergo a transformation to accompany the new assessments.

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While terrorism is turned into a political instrument by some states in order to impose their interests as well as to fulfill their political and economic aims in the new value system and structure of the world, conflicts between states appear less likely. Instead, it has opened a window of opportunity for a new system of conflict against the hegemonic powers in the hands of non-state actors and the weak states that may, by their actions or inactions, support terrorist operations. The characteristics of this new era of conflict are that there is a shift from symmetry to asymmetry, from conventional, total, and multilateral wars, to low-density fighting, and from regional wars to local internal conflicts. Some state sponsors, including religious and ethnic groups within those states, whose economic and military power and technology is not sufficient to confront the hostile or rival superior powers, have discovered terrorism as a new system of warfare to be used to reach their aims and obtaining results. Parallel to this, some powerful states have regarded terrorism as the means to wage “a covert and proxy war” to increase their power, to broaden their areas of dominance, to consolidate their positions, and to exercise control, in spite of the fact that international law and established rules do not allow them to use such methods. Dating back to the emergence of mankind and expected to last for as long as humanity lasts, the structure and philosophy of ‘terror’ making it the most important weapon in the hands of extremist groups are expected to evolve parallel to the changes in the world. These groups will continue to appear before us with new methods, orientations and implications when considering the: x

inevitable socioeconomic imbalances,

x

conflicting and competitive policies in the use and transportation of an ever-decreasing fuel supply,

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reduction in arable lands already insufficient to feed the expanding population,

x

reduction in water sources,

x

droughts fed by climate changes as a result of grave pollution,

x

conflicts caused by the expansionist and colonialist policies maintained by major powers for the sustainability of their nations and the welfare of their citizens,

x

ethnic conflicts fuelled by rampant micro-nationalist tendencies, and

x

developments brought by globalization, and

x

"new slavery" by underdeveloped or developing nations.8

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It would not be wrong to assume that one of the most significant facets of this change will be new concentrations of international power, led by a decrease in state authority and the emergence of powerful non-governmental organizations forming a ‘supranational’ platform. These are expected to increase their power over national administrations and on an international level, to evolve from just pursuing intergovernmental relations to leading and domineering governments – all of which may result in terrorism not only being the major instrument of struggle for marginal groups, but also an important weapon in the arsenal of states that wish to expand their influence and dominance, as well as extra-governmental foci of power for civilian actors. In this respect, it will be beneficial to understand the history of terrorism, its sociological and psychological aspects, its nourishing and motivating factors, and how paradigm shifts may occur in the next 25 years in parallel to the existing circumstances. Within the last five years, terrorism has been experiencing radical shifts in ideology and action that serve to abandon its conventional methods that call for ‘tactical moves,’ and it is expected that this change will continue rapidly in the foreseeable future.9 Terrorism emerges as the new method of warfare owing to its low cost, limited manpower requirements, extreme effectiveness due to unexpected strikes, and influence on many focal points due to an extensive communication network. Terrorism by nature does not require large organizations, is extremely difficult to eliminate at its source due to its asymmetrical properties, has a high level of mobility and quick reaction, is almost impossible to associate with a state due to the inability to prove connections and its inherent secrecy, and takes full advantage of the shortcomings of international law with respect to persons and authorities to address and convict.10 These and many other reasons help terrorism gain the aspect of a modern warfare method. Considering that those who may resort to this new method of warfare will not be limited to ideologically marginal groups or organizations that wish to project 8 Ercan Çitliolu, “Understanding the Roots of Terrorism: An Evaluation of Its Origins and Future,” in Transportation Security against Terrorism (Mete Tahmisolu and Çnar Özen, eds., NATO Science for Peace and Security Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 54, 2009). 9 Ibid. 10 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998).

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micronationalism onto a macro level, suppress ethnic differences by force or seek the liberation or independence of an ethnic identity through violence, but may include states, supranational actors and concentrations of power that may choose to maintain their subjective policies by prioritizing terrorism. The struggle against terror must be taken to a new dimension that surpasses national borders and the required international cooperation, requiring not only professionalism but also a scientific approach. Moreover, acts of terrorism have greatly increased their destructive effects in recent years to further terrorize the general public and assert the notion that no one is guaranteed to avoid being the subject or victim of terrorist acts, thereby becoming a global threat through a conscious effort. Based on these facts, it will not be wrong to claim that terrorism may become a threat that is both external and internal to nations.11 Since the extremely subjective and changeable nature of the concept of ‘injustice’ is readily apparent through a short analysis of the history of terrorism, terror seems to be able to maintain its perpetuity however much we may wish to the contrary. Although a linear reasoning that terrorism will not be terminated unless the sources that provide the bases for it are eliminated brings an increased struggle towards sources that spawn and nourish terrorism, such an expectation is unfortunately nothing but a dream.12

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"If you want to eliminate the mosquitoes, dry the swamp" is a catchphrase that has been excessively repeated and is nevertheless logically sound; however, it is equally impossible to execute in the struggle against terrorism and does not coincide with sociological facts. Therefore, it is nothing but a widespread discourse and a fantasy that is yet to be realized. It is an utterly romantic opinion that the sources of terrorism may be eliminated altogether when the organizational foundations of terror are known to almost everyone. Considering that the elements spawning and nourishing terror may only be eliminated when the ‘paradise’ asserted by Marx, Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin is reached, it is the unfortunate truth that the imaginary ‘paradise’ is actually hell itself given the conflicts of existence and interest in the present day; when coupled with the indigenous violence of human beings, terror will never terminate. Also, remembering that terror is not only a method of action restored to by groups, organizations and societies wishing to achieve their political targets, but also a low-cost resource that states sometimes – or even often – employ, the hope that some states which know or have created the conditions that give rise to terrorism, having fed on the circumstances to achieve their national objectives, will contribute positively to the struggle against terrorism is a hollow expectation. The fact that no global consensus has been reached on the definition of terrorism despite heated and widespread discussions on the international level for the past half century may be explained by certain states being reluctant to relinquish the weapon they resort to time and again. There is no other logical explanation to the fact that a movement agreed upon by almost all countries of the world to be a global threat is not exhaustively defined, with no measures taken on the basis of an accepted definition. Although the existence, type and properties of the threat are wholly agreed upon, it still lacks a theoretical definition,

11 12

Çitliolu, “Understanding the Roots of Terrorism: An Evaluation of Its Origins and Future.” Ibid.

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and the only rational explanation may be that some states believe such a definition will hamper them. Ethnic, religious and ideological groups who observe that the destructive effects of terrorism cause physical and psychological trauma on subjected nations, thereby reducing their ability to make sound decisions, not only seek to influence other nations, but are also aware that they can exploit terrorism to change the order of their own countries in accordance with their ideologies and agendas, emerging as sources of international and supranational as well as local threat in the near future.13 As globalization coupled with information technologies converts the world to a ‘global village,’14 the expectations of individuals and societies from their administrators are on the rise. The wish to reach the level of welfare the people of developed nations enjoy coagulates into a widespread and common desire, while the walls of taboo surrounding underdeveloped nations succumb under the weight of global communication, with capitalism and imperial colonialism lying beneath socioeconomic differences running rampant, all of which lead us to the conclusion that acts of terrorism will not decline but rather increase in the foreseeable future. As a result, the terrorism of today has evolved away from the accustomed definitions, well-known clichés, and methods against which countermeasures have been developed, into a “half-military strategy” using technologies which are simple but effective.15

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Parallel to all these developments, since terrorism has been carried to the level which questions the hegemonic relationships of the globalized world and since people have started to raise their voices more against the injustices of the status quo, we find that violence has grown into an anonymous style of expression and communication. Terrorism, going beyond its classical meaning, has turned into a kind of communication phenomenon based on modern technologies.

3. The “Globalizing Terrorism” Phenomenon At this point, globalization, which should have made the world smaller in terms of communication, transportation, and decision and control mechanisms, has also fragmented societies through single-issue and identity politics.16 It has made the target selection by terrorists easier, as people are far more conscious of the power centers of our smaller world. People are more aware of each other and more aware of their perceived enemies. By contrast, the principal powers have tried to consolidate their positions by spreading their military activities, sovereignty, interests and conflicts into neighboring areas. This is designed to prevent the conflict reaching inwards, to the centers of their 13

Abdülkadir Çevik, Politik Psikoloji [Political Psychology](Dost Kitabevi, Ankara, 2010). Marshall McLuhan and Bruce R. Powers, Global Köy [Global Village](Bahar Öcal Düzgören, trans., Scala Yaynclk, 2001). 15 Ercan Çitliolu, Terrorism and Globalization (Centre of Excellence – Defence against Terrorism Conference, Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina, 04-06 February 2008). 16 UNDP, Human Development Report (United Nations, 1999). 14

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political culture, and it can be seen as a prevention tactic to block conflicts which would otherwise be carried to those centers through a kind of centripetal force. All in all, there has emerged between the power centers, which want to increase and perpetuate their political and economic dominance, and the terrorist organizations, which want to maintain their existence and reach their aims – on the basis of common interest – a joint ownership of certain political issues, which are even open to collaboration or the principal law of the economy – the supply and demand equilibrium. As a matter of fact, in the report of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command named “A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,” under the main topic of “Government Affiliation, Terrorist Organization Categories,” this joint internship or distorted relationships system has been defined as “state supported” and “state directed terrorist organizations,” so in a way, it has been approved.17 Since the strong and oppressive socioeconomic model that accompanies globalization is intervening in the nation-state and the age of information technologies is fuelling the hunger for information, the expectations of the masses are increasing throughout the world. This combination is worth scrutinizing as it creates a fertile ground for widespread terrorism taking the form of religious and ethnic organizations.

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It is above all feelings of belonging among individuals that play a principal role in the development of identities and in the shaping of social structures. As these may emerge as religious and/or ethnic identities in time, terrorist actions and groups based on radical religion and ethnic nationalism constitute the two main movements. These protect their continuity by the promotion of ideological justifications.18 These could be seen as times in which many ideologies have lost their effectiveness and importance, have been rejected, and as a result have been externalized, being replaced by individual conjectures. Against this background, religious faith and ethnic identity are two fundamental factors which are key elements constituting the social dynamics. Throughout history, when separatist actions based on racism have been examined neutrally, it can be observed that once these movements have emerged they never disappear, no matter how conditions change on the basis of the ‘time–place– opportunity and capability’ triangle. After making their cause and aims heard by violence-based actions, the separatist terrorist organizations, which work together with other illegal organizations as these are equally against the system, continue their struggle with tactics that aim to support each other in ‘political and operational areas.’ They may retreat underground or live a long period as sleepers in silence when there are conditions which do not suit them or when their ideology is questioned. However, in spite of this tactic of withdrawal and postponing, they never depart from the aims that they decided to make their reason for being.

17 US Army Training Doctrine Command, “A Military Guide to Terrorism in the 21st Century,” (TRADOC, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/guide.pdf (last visited Jun. 20, 2012). 18 Çitliolu, “Terrorism and Globalization.”

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It is self-evident that no the terrorist organization would be able to maintain its durability without ensuring the political and economic support of a state, or of powerful non-state actors, covert or overt, whether the support is moral or physical in nature. In this regard, all terrorist organizations appear to be under the illusion of defining themselves as idealist in their subjective objectives, as they believe throughout their foundation and evolution process. However, they find themselves associated and cooperating with organized crime organizations through economic necessity after a while.19 In order to supply logistics consisting of accommodation, arms, explosives, communication assets, fake passports, identity cards, propaganda means and intelligence activities, terrorist organizations need funds. Once they grow numerous and transfer their activities from the local perspective to international platforms, their financial requirements will increase. Accordingly, they begin marketing their malicious activities and they associate more with those of powerful circles who could support them rather than those of organized crime organizations.

Conclusion

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It is reality that terrorism is a common threat to threaten the whole of mankind in the same way. However, terrorism may create a boomerang effect. Furthermore, there are sanctions and obligations based upon decisions made by international organizations and institutions in the fight against terrorism. Certainly all those international decisions were also related to the domestic legislation of the signatory nations. Yet it is not easy to say that such efforts help to end the political support for terrorism, as it generally develops in the form of covert action. At this point, reciprocity or mutuality principles of international relations need to be defined clearly, so that these principles can become instruments in the struggle of hampering political support for terrorism. Moreover, changes in international relations may help to supply some deterrence and the possibility of taking action against those who are identified clearly as providing political and economical support for terrorist organizations. For that reason, it is necessary to identify and analyze with clear evidence the objectives of those states that support the terrorist organizations, in order to decide which actions aimed at deterrence should be taken with regard to the relations between other states. All these examples aim to highlight the need for a long-term strategy. To that end, conjectural changes, new policies, or breaks in support given to terrorist organizations must be taken into consideration in order to develop future projections. That variability in international policies gives us plenty of options. Such options can be formulated into new policies with no limitation in time, in place or in condition. Accordingly, rationalized thinking must be enriched with wisdom and vigilance instead of dogma and sensationalism, in order to be the primary foundation for resolving issues. States which are not able to shape their futures and be effective in international affairs are condemned to react passively to events. Instead, states should employ an

19

See Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.

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active, dynamic, versatile, and even aggressive foreign policy, supported by elements of the national resources and power.

Bibliography

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BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2010). CACI International Inc., Dealing With Today’s Asymmetric Threat to U.S. Global Security (2008), Çitliolu, Ercan, Terrorism and Globalization, Centre of Excellence – Defence against Terrorism Conference, Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina, 04-06 February 2008. Çevik, Abdülkadir, Politik Psikoloji (Dost Kitabevi, Ankara, 2010). Çitliolu, Ercan, “Understanding the Roots of Terrorism: An Evaluation of Its Origins and Future,” in Transportation Security against Terrorism (Mete Tahmisolu and Çnar Özen, eds., NATO Science for Peace and Security Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 54, 2009). Dedeolu, Beril, Uluslararas Güvenlik ve Strateji [International Security and Strategy](Yeni Yüzyl Yaynlar, 2008). Haldén, Peter, “The Geopolitics of Climate Change” (Swedish Defence Research Agency Report, 2007). Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998). Machiavelli, Nicolo, The Prince (CAN Yaynlar, Istanbul, 2010). McLuhan, Marshall, and Bruce R. Powers, Global Köy [Global Village](Bahar Öcal Düzgören, trans., Scala Yaynclk, 2001). UN, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision (2009). UNDP, Human Development Report (United Nations,1999). US Army Training Doctrine Command, “A Military Guide to Terrorism in the 21st Century,” (TRADOC, 2007).

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Countering the Ideology of Terrorism Mitat ÇELKPALA1 Istanbul Kadir Has University, Turkey

Abstract. Terrorist ideologies are explanations of how the social world operates, and calls for individuals to undertake violent actions in support of that vision of the world. Terrorism occurs when ideological motivation meets with operational capability. Ideology provides justification for terrorist acts of violence. Ideology is a language of mass mobilization. How can we counter the ideology of terrorism? Is it possible to counter an ideology? In order to counter the terrorist ideology it is necessary to accumulate sufficient knowledge and expertise in the terrorist ideology before we can develop an effective counter-ideology program. Keywords. Ideology, terrorism, classification of terrorism

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Introduction Currently terrorism has been most commonly and systematically employed as a tactic in conflicts. Terrorism is the form of violence against civilians and an asymmetric confrontation against a stronger opponent. Terrorism occurs when ideological motivation meets with operational capability. The way in which a terrorist group shapes its radical worldview and disseminates it to audiences worldwide plays an important role in the public interface between the group and its target audience. Using terrorist propaganda, a group can successfully radicalize and indoctrinate public into terrorist sympathizers, mobilize terrorist supporters, and recruit terrorist members. How can we counter this activity? Is it possible to counter the terrorist ideology and in which ways? This article aimed at searching answers to those kinds of questions.

1. Ideology and Terrorism We may start to discuss the issue by clarifying the definition of ideology. In the literature of political science, an ideology can be thought of as “an image of society and a political program.” Ideology is a rigid set of beliefs – a system of beliefs that compels people to behave in particular ways. Ideology, especially the extremist version, does not allow compromise. Ideology is a system of reasoning that does not serve as a basis for a daily political activity.2 It is the antithesis of politics in a system that thrives on debate and compromise. It is also distinguishable from philosophy and religion, which guide how individuals choose to live. Ideology is an attempt to make the world simple

 1

Department of International Relations. E-mail: [email protected]. Paul Shemella, “Reducing Ideological Support for Terrorism,” Strategic Insight (The Center for Contemporary Conflict of the Naval Postgraduate School, 2009) available at http://www.nps.edu/ Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/shemellaApr09.pdf (last visited Jun 5, 2012). 2

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and it offers the members of the group a set of basic rules that are easy to follow and easy to teach others. In this light, terrorist ideologies are explanations of how the social world operates, and calls for individuals to undertake violent actions in support of that vision of the world. Terrorism occurs when ideological motivation meets with operational capability. Terrorist organizations target the disaffected members of a population by attempting to convince them that there is an alternative way of thinking that will make their lives more meaningful and simpler. If the population has a large number of disaffected individuals susceptible to the ideology, enough of them can be recruited. Once recruited, they soon take part in terrorist actions that validate and strengthen the ideology they share. Thus, the war on terror ought to be called ‘the ideological battle against radical extremists who happen to use terror as a weapon to disrupt the conscience of the free and peaceful world.’ What is the distinction between a political aim and terrorism? What about the relationship between them?

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A political aim distinguishes terrorism from crime that is motivated by economic gain, including organized crime. The political aim can range from the concrete to the abstract. While such an aim may include ideological or religious motivations or be formulated in ideological or religious forms, it always has a political dimension. There are criminal aspects but, whereas for criminals gaining the greatest material profit is the ultimate goal, for terrorists it is primarily the means to advance their main political, religious or ideological aims. Terrorism is not the political aim itself, but a specific tactic to achieve that aim. Thus it makes sense to refer to terrorist means rather than terrorist aims. Different groups may have the same political aims but may use different forms of violence, combine different tactics and even use non-violent means to achieve that aim. The important implication is that if a group chooses terrorism as a means to achieve a political aim, the aim of its struggle, however benign, cannot be used to justify its actions. In sum, terrorism among other things is a weapon used by the weak against the strong. Ideology is the organizing principle of the terrorist organizations. It provides a motive and framework for the actions. Additionally, as demonstrated by several examples like World Trade Center or Istanbul bombings, ideology provides justification for the terrorist acts of violence. Ideology is a language of mass mobilization. Calling for jihad in the name of Islamic duty, for example, has enabled al-Qaeda and some other radical terrorist groups to continuously indoctrinate and recruit terrorist constituents. In the guise of a social program, ideology can generate public support whether it is supporters who provide financial, logistical assistance or sympathizers who do not morally condemn these acts. Ideology, over time, further radicalizes communities by indoctrinating them into a culture of violence and radical interpretations.

2. Classifying Terrorism One of the basic and traditional classifications of the terrorism is based on the distinction between domestic and international. In today’s modern world, this distinction appears to have become increasingly blurred. In particular, the removal of state borders makes this classification redundant. Currently, terrorist actions conducted

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on the territory of more than one state or involving citizens of more than one state as victims or perpetrators brings an international element. More than that, the ideology of terrorist groups is internationalized and forces those terrorist organizations to extend their actions beyond a national context. Moreover the technical, financial, propaganda and some other aspects of terrorist activity have also been internationalized. Those entire factors have made the domestic and international dichotomy outmoded.3 An alternative classification could be done on the basis of motivation.4 Typology by motivation works as an efficient classification. In this manner, three types of terrorism can be classified: socio-political terrorism, nationalist terrorism and religious terrorism. Socio-political terrorism is the type of terrorism used by revolutionary leftist, anarchist, right-wing or other bent. During the 1970s and 1980s, Marxism was a key ideology for many European terrorist groups; Maoism continues to motivate Asian and some South American groups. 5 The ideologies that originate in political theory are significantly superseded by political practice, leaving governments an opening for dialogue.

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The second type of motivating ideology is ethnic nationalism: nationalist terrorism, ranging from that practiced by national liberation movements fighting colonial or foreign occupation to that employed by ethno-separatist organizations against central governments. The desire of small groups to earn recognition from the larger society often involves issues of territory, and separatism continues to drive political dissent in most of the world. What transforms separatist feelings into terrorism is the ideology associated with ethnicity. The post-World War II decolonization struggles brought a wave of terrorist campaigns affecting Africa, Asian and the Middle East as well as the territories of the colonial powers themselves. The post-Soviet or post-Cold War environment has encouraged a new wave of ethno-nationalist violence and much outright terrorism. Terrorism is likely to be an accompanying feature of ethnic and national assertiveness.6 The third type of terrorism is a religious terrorism. Religious terrorism is practiced by groups ranging from totalitarian sects and cults to broader movements whose ideology is dominated by religious imperatives. Religion that has taken the evolutionary leap to ideology can be a platform for the worst kind of atrocities. Religious extremists have abused the power of faith by transforming it into an ideology to guide destructive behaviour. The rise of religious terrorist movements over the past decades is significant in several respects. First, it represents a significant shift away from the measured political agendas associated with ideological and ethnic/national groups. Second, as a result of its transcendental or total character, it has been responsible for much of the increase in terrorism’s lethality over the past decade. Third, terrorism has been a favored tactic for violent confrontations across religious faultfinding within and between states.



3 Ekaterina Stepanova, Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects (SIPRI Research Report No. 23, Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 5-8. 4 Ibid. 5 Ian Lesser, “Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy,” in Countering the New Terrorism (Ian O. Lesser, et al, eds, , RAND, 1999), pp. 85-144. 6 Ibid.

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An alternative typology, which is called a functional typology of terrorism, is offered by Stepanova.7 This typology centers on the function that terrorist tactics play for a non-state actor, depending on its level of activity and relation to an armed conflict. Consequently this typology is based on two criteria: the level and scale of a group’s ultimate goals and agenda, i.e. whether global or more localized and the extent to which terrorist activities are related to or are part of a broader armed confrontation combined with other forms of armed violence. On the basis of these two criteria, three functional types of modern terrorism can be classified: the classic terrorism of peacetime, conflict-related terrorism and super or new terrorism. The classic terrorism of peacetime includes the communist and other leftist terrorism in Western Europe in the 1970s and the 1980s; right-wing terrorism when it is not a tactic used by loyalist and other anti-insurgency groups in armed conflict; and ecological or other special interest terrorism. Regardless of its motivation, terrorism of this type is independent of any broader armed conflict.

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Conflict-related terrorism is systematically employed as a tactic in asymmetrical local or regional armed conflicts (e.g. by Chechen, Kashmiri, Palestinian, Tamil and other militants). Conflict-related terrorism is tied to the concrete agenda of a particular armed conflict and terrorists identify themselves with a particular political cause (or causes) – the incompatibility over which the conflict is fought. This cause may be quite ambitious (e.g. to seize power in a state, to create a new state or to fight against foreign occupation), but it normally does not extend beyond a local or regional context. In this sense, the terrorists’ goals are limited, as are the technical means they normally use. Conflict-related terrorism is practised by groups that enjoy at least some local popular support and tend to use more than one form of violence. For example, they frequently combine terrorist means with guerrilla attacks against regular army and other security targets or with symmetrical intercommunal, sectarian and other violence against other non-state actors.8 Superterrorism/new terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon. It is also known as megaterrorism, macroterrorism or global terrorism. 9 Superterrorism is by definition global, or at least seeks global outreach, and, as such, does not have to be tied to any particular local or national context or armed conflict. Superterrorism ultimately pursues existential, non-negotiable, global and in this sense unlimited goals – such as that of challenging and changing the entire world order, as in the case of al-Qaeda and the broader, post-al-Qaeda transnational violent Islamist movement.

3. How to Counter Terrorist Ideology Countering terrorism is vital. An effective and multipronged approach is needed to combat terrorism in the long run. Any effective blueprint for an ideological response to fight with terrorism should conceptualize counterterrorism, not only as a military or law enforcement problem but as a war of ideas as well.

 7 8 9

Stepanova, Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects, pp. 9-11. Ibid, p. 10. Ibid, pp. 10-11; Lesser, “Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy,” pp. 99-105.

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Technically, counterterrorism can be divided into two approaches, namely operational and strategic counterterrorism.10 While operational counterterrorism aims at reducing the immediate threat by targeting the terrorist cells and disrupting their attack plans, strategic counterterrorism aims at changing the mindset and to create a hostile environment for the terrorists. In other words, it aims at changing the hearts and minds of the terrorists. Given the unique challenges posed by ideologically motivated terrorism, effective counterterrorism measures demand a multi-pronged approach.

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First, counterideology means will provide alternative solutions to terrorist propagating violence. Given the alienated and uncompromising worldview of the terrorists, they cannot be bought by political concessions, amnesties or other personal incentives. The best chances for success is to engage them in dialogue, show them where they have gone astray or provide them better alternatives to their violent acts. Second, it is important to note that a geopolitical battle rather than the ideological battle will result in the loss of human lives, damage to property and vital installations that will create a greater sense of fear and insecurity. In fact, engaging in physical battle may create the opposite effect desired in that the terrorists may have reason to validate their actions and in turn increase their pool of recruits, supporters and sympathizers. Third, counterideological work will prevent further radicalization of communities. And finally, it is immensely crucial for us to immunize especially the youth from being indoctrinated into a culture of violence, hence preventing a new generation of terrorists from being recruited.11 In order to develop a viable blueprint for an ideological response, we must factor in the multifaceted, global threat of radically-motivated terrorism. Therefore before developing an effective counterideology program, it is necessary to accumulate sufficient knowledge and expertise in the terrorist ideology. Towards this end, there is a need to accelerate academic research, particularly to study various concepts that have been misinterpreted by the extremists and terrorists. Countering the threat through education can be implemented by engaging the channels of intellectual activity and the traditional routes for knowledge transmission. Additionally, a kind of a regulatory or supervisory body is needed to filter out deviant teachings and teachers. In order to counter terrorist ideology, the counterterrorism strategy should be developed with an eye on the broader security environment as well as the full range of instruments – including diplomatic, economic, military and even covert – that are at the disposal of policy makers. Public diplomacy is an important tool in the hands of policy makers. The general public should be targeted in order to create awareness within the community of the danger of radical ideologies. In the short term, we need to pre-empt and prevent the propagation of terrorist messages by obstructing its channel of communication, like the websites and sales of books, etc. In the longer term it is important for us to target the terrorist recruitment mechanisms. This can be done by marginalizing radical elements, promoting mainstream ideological tenets and strengthening the bonds between the individuals/communities and the state. The spread



10 See Mohamed bin Ali, Ideological Response to Terrorism and Extremism (International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, undated) at http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Ideology%20Response/ Ideological%20Response%20to%20Terrorism%20and%20Extremism.pdf (last visited Jun 5, 2012). 11 Andrew L. Stigler, “Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism” (Paper presented at the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28, 2007), available at http://www.allacademic.com/ meta/p181549_index.html (last visited Jun. 27, 2012).

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of radical ideology cannot be halted without the participation of the masses. It is important to engage radical deviants in dialogue or counselling sessions in an attempt to bring them in in order to correct them. It is equally important to extend the counselling services to the families of deviants to break the cycle of violence as direct families members are highly exposed to the ideology. Active involvement by community leaders and intellectuals is crucial as they follow incentives to speak out against radicals, define and counter the terrorism.

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As it is put forward by Paul Shemella, anyone attempting to counter ideological support for terrorism must realize that such efforts can only succeed from within the ideological community itself. 12 Governments, non-governmental organizations, and individuals from the outside can influence the debate, but they cannot finish it. In a domestic context, the image of an onion, with a hard core of committed terrorists at its center, clarifies the problem and suggests a solution. Overlapping the core are layers of active supporters, passive supporters, those who do not care either way, and those who oppose the committed terrorists and their supporters. In this image, the government surrounds the onion looking for ways to counter the terrorism produced in the core. Many governments, particularly those with the resources, are tempted to use a hammer to smash the onion. Other governments have developed a combination of strategies to deal with each of the layers, gently or harshly peeling the inner layers away from the core while mobilizing the outer layers against the center. The most effective strategies mobilize the moral resources of civil society. Isolating the core allows governments to apply coercive force selectively – even surgically – without damaging the society itself. Such an approach, over time, can reduce terrorism and the ideology that underlies it. The international context is more challenging. Domestic efforts to isolate the hard core often result in a terrorist diaspora along networked pathways around the globe. The clarifying image here might be a “network of networks.” In this world, relationships are more important than capabilities. Individual governments, networked within, must reach out bilaterally and regionally to assist other governments to isolate hard-core terrorists, while winning the loyalty of their own societies. Governments that develop foreign policies that strengthen this network of networks will find themselves with improved security at home. We have come to point where terrorism anywhere is terrorism everywhere. We should seek to move terrorism to the very fringes of human behaviour. Once common, piracy, slavery, and genocide have been systematically diminished through collective efforts over time. Most importantly, such efforts destroyed the ideologies that legitimized these behaviours. Governments must go after ideologically-motivated terrorists with the same kind of collective approach.

Bibliography bin Ali, Mohamed bin, “Ideological Response to Terrorism and Extremism,” (International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, undated). Lesser, Ian, Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy, Countering the New Terrorism (Ian O. Lesser, et al, eds., RAND, 1999). Shemella, Paul, “Reducing Ideological Support for Terrorism,” Strategic Insight (The Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009).

 12

See Shemella, “Reducing Ideological Support for Terrorism.”

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Stepanova, Ekaterina, Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects (SIPRI Research Report No.23, Oxford University Press, 2008). Stigler, Andrew. L., Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism (Paper presented at the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28, 2007).

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Legal Responses to Terrorist Use of the Internet Marco Gercke1 Cybercrime Research Institute

Abstract. Terrorist organisations have already stated to make use of the Internet. Possible activities include cyber-attacks, fundraising, training, recruitment, secret communication, data mining, propaganda and radicalisation.2 The following article summarises the result of a research undertaken by the author for the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and provides an overview about legal response to terrorist use of the Internet. Keywords. terrorist use of Internet, counterterrorism, legal tools

Introduction The use of the Internet by terrorists is an issue of great concern because of the widespread coverage and anonymity that can be achieved. Terrorists have been able to exploit the Internet in a number of ways. This article will explain hose ways as well as the possible responses to this use.

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1. Structure With regard to the debate about legal responses to terrorist use of the Internet, it is possible to define terrorist use of the Internet in four categories: internet-related attacks, illegal content, communications, and financing of terrorism. Each will be examined in turn. 1.1 Internet-related Attacks The first category covers various forms of Internet-related attacks, such as denial of service attacks (DoS), the use of computer viruses to infect computer systems and illegal access to computer systems. In this regard, the debate about legal approaches to address the issue focuses on the implementation of substantive criminal law provisions, procedural instruments, means of international cooperation, and regulatory instruments.

 1

Prof. Dr., Director. United Nations, Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (CTITF, 2009, pp. 5-8, available at http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/CTITF%20Internet%20WG%202009%20Report.pdf (last visited Jun. 26, 2012). 2

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1.2 Illegal Content The second category covers activities of terrorist organisations whereby illegal material is either made available or obtained. Similar to the case of Internet-related attacks, the discussion about legal approaches to address the issue focuses on the implementation of substantive criminal law provisions, procedural instruments, means of international cooperation, and regulatory instruments. 1.3 Communications This category covers acts related to the use of the Internet by terrorists for communications. There are two main aspects related to legal approaches: the criminalisation of preparatory acts, such as planning of an offence, and the application of procedural instruments. As the criminalisation of such acts – for example by criminalising conspiracy – is not Internet-related, the overview about different approaches will be limited to the procedural aspects. 1.4 Financing of Terrorism The final category describes acts connected to terrorist financing. Given that in recent years several legal instruments have been developed in this context, the debate currently focuses on the applicability of existing instruments to new payment systems and the adequacy of the related investigation instruments.

2. Internet-related Attacks (Cyberattacks)

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Terrorists have been able to use the Internet to conduct attacks. We will address first the phenomena and then the possible legal responses. 2.1 Phenomena The continuing popularity and growth of the Internet have a significant impact on the development of societies worldwide.3 There is a global process of countries either in the process of becoming, or already transformed into, information societies.4 The transition process is in general characterised by an emerging use of information technology to access and share information.5 This process brings many opportunities for members of the information society, ranging from access to information, to the

 3

Regarding the development of the Internet, see Miao Yang, “Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Electronic Commerce,” ACM International Conference Proceeding Series 113 (2005), pp. 52 – 56. 4 For more information on the information society, see Yoneji Masuda, The Information Society as PostIndustrial Society (Transaction Publishers, 1980); Soumitra Dutta, et al, The Information Society in an Enlarged Europe (Springer, 2006); Dan Maldoom, Broadband in Europe: How Brussels Can Wire the Information Society (Springer, 2005); Susan Hornby and Zoe Clarke, Challenge and Change in the Information Society (Facet, 2002). 5 United Nations, World Summit on the Information Society, U.N. Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/5-E, 12 December 2003, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/poa.html (last visited Jun. 25, 2012).

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ability to communicate with any user who has Internet access.6 Very often this process is also associated with fostering democracy, the protection of human rights and the rule of law. Around 2 billion people already use the Internet.7 Individuals as well as businesses benefit from the emerging use of the Internet. This is especially relevant with regard to e-commerce, as businesses can offer goods and services in a global environment with little financial investment.8 Attacks can take place in various ways. Offenders can hinder network-based computer systems from operating by carrying out denial of service attacks; they can design malicious software and infect computer systems where they can illegally access computer systems and either obtain computer data or delete such data. Especially with regard to the debate about terrorist-related attacks against computer systems, it is necessary to differentiate between two types of attacks: targeted attacks against one specific computer system and widespread attacks. Private users and small businesses do not always maintain the most efficient protection systems. As a result, it is easier to carry out large-scale attacks where the offender focuses not on a specific target, but instead aims for the maximum amount of victims. In 2004, the Sasser computer worm9 infected more than one million computers around the world, among them computer systems of major airlines, which forced the cancellation of flights.10 This demonstrates the magnitude of the threat. An example for a focussed attack is the malicious software Stuxneti, discovered in 2010, which underlines the threat of attacks focusing on critical infrastructure.11 This software, with more than 4000 possible functions,12 focused on computer systems running software that is typically used to control critical infrastructure.13 The growing reliance on information technology makes critical infrastructure more vulnerable to attacks.14 This is especially the case with regard to attacks against interconnected systems which are

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6

See, e.g., European Commission, “Challenges for the European Information Society beyond 2005,” COM(2004) 757 (19 November 2009), p. 3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/ i2010/docs/communications/new_chall_en_adopted.pdf (last visited Jun. 26, 2012). 7 For recent statistics, see International Telecommunications Union, “ITU Data and Statistics,” at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 8 See, e.g., G7 Finance Ministers, “Impact of the IT Revolution on the Economy and Finance,” (8 July 2000), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/ summit/2000/pdfs/it_g7.pdf?fa84e3d0 (last visited Jun 26, 2012). 9 Symantec, “Sasser B Worm, Quick Reference Guide,” at http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/ enterprise/other_resources/sasser_quick_reference_guide_05-2004.en-us.pdf (last visited Jun. 26, 2012).. 10 Robert Schperberg and Richard A. Stanley, Cybercrime: Incident Response and Digital Forensics (ISACA, 2005); TrendMicro, The Sasser Event: History and Implications (Trend Micro, June 2004), available at http://us.trendmicro.com/imperia/ md/content/us/pdf/threats/securitylibrary/wp02sasserevent 040812us.pdf (last visited Jun 26, 2012). 11 Regarding the discovery and functions of the computer virus, see Aleksandr Matrosov, et al, “Stuxnet Unter the Microscope,” (2010), available at: http://www.eset.com/resources/white-papers/Stuxnet_Under_ the_Microscope.pdf Last visited Jun. 26, 2012); Nicholas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric Chien, “W32.Suxnet Dossier,” (Symantec, Version 1.3, November 2010), available at http://www.symantec.com/ content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf (last visited Jun. 26, 2012). 12 American Gas Association, “Cyber Security Communique,” (2010), at https://www.aga.org/membercenter/ gotocommitteepages/NGS/Documents/1011StuxnetMalware.pdf (last visited Jun. 26, 2012). 13 Matrosov, et al, “Stuxnet Unter the Microscope, Rev. 1.2, 2010.” 14 Abraham Sofaer and Seymour Goodman, “Cyber Crime and Security – The Transnational Dimension,” in Abraham Sofaer and Seymour Goodman, eds, The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terrorism (Hoover Institution Press, 2001).

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linked by computer and communication networks.15 In those cases, the disruption caused by a network-based attack goes beyond the failure of a single system. Even short interruptions to services could cause huge financial damages to e-commerce businesses – not only for civil services but also for military infrastructure and services.16 Although terrorist-related computer attacks especially remain an area where scientifically reliable information about the capacities of terrorist organisations to carry out such attacks is missing, the threat is not totally fictitious. Several computer-related attacks have been detected in the last years that – based on the context – could be characterised as politically motivated. The most well known are the attacks against computer systems in Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008). In April and May 2007 Estonia experienced heated debate over the removal of a Second World War memorial that included street riots in the capital Tallinn.17 In addition to traditional forms of protest, Estonia at that time discovered several waves of computer-related attacks against government, private business websites and online services.18 Those attacks included defacement of websites,19 as well as attacks against Domain Name Servers and Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS), where botnets were used.20 With regard to the latter, experts explained afterwards that successful attacks against the official website of governmental organizations in Estonia21 could only take place due to inadequate protection measures.22 The impact of the attacks, as well as their origin, was debated following the incidents. While news reports23 and articles24 indicated that the attacks came close to shutting down the country’s digital infrastructure, more reliable research shows that the impact of the attacks was limited with regard to the computer

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15 James A. Lewis, Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats (Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2002), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/ 021101_risks_of_cyberterror.pdf (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 16 Timothy Shimeall, Phil Williams, and Casey Dunlevy, ”Countering Cyber War,” NATO Review (Winter 2001/2002), available at http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/counter_cyberwar.pdf (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 17 Steven L. Myers, “Estonia Removes Soviet-era War Memorial after a Night of Violence,” The New York Times (27 April 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/world/europe/27iht-estonia.4. 477141.html?_r=1 (last visited Jun. 25, 2012); BBC News, Estonia Removes Soviet Memorial, BBC News (27 April 2007), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6598269.stm (last visited Jun. 25, 2012); Jari Tanner, “Violence Continues over Estonia’s Removal of Soviet War Statue,” The Boston Globe (28 April 2007), available at http://articles.boston.com/2007-04-28/news/29227348_1_estonian-government-riot-policeprotesters (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 18 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations (NATO CCD COE, 2010), p.18; William C. Ashmore, “Impact of Alleged Russia Cyber Attacks,” Baltic Security & Defence Review 11(1) (2009), p. 8. 19 Peter Finn, “Cyber Assaults on Estonia Typify a New Battle Tactic,” Washington Post (19 May 2007), available at http://www.washington post. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/18/AR2007051802122.html (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 20 Tikk, Kaska, and Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations, p. 20; Iain Thomson, “Estonia under Cyber-Attack,” ITNews (18 May 2007), at http://www.itnews.com.au/News/ 81398,estoniaunder-cyber-attack.aspx (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 21 Regarding the attack, see Thompson, “Estonia under Cyber-Attack.” 22 See Shaun Waterman, “Analysis: Who Cyber Smacked Estonia,” United Press International (11 June 2007), available at http://www.upi.com/Business_News/ Security-Industry/2007/06/11/Analysis-Who-cybersmacked-Estonia/UPI-26831181580439/ (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 23 See, e.g. Mark Landler and John Markoff, “Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Estonia,” The New York Times (29 May 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia .html?pagewanted=all (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 24 Scott J. Shackelford, “From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 27 (3)(2009), p. 193.

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systems affected, as well as the duration of unavailability of services.25 The same debate is taking place with regard to the determination of the origin of the attack. While the territory of the Russian Federation was reported to be the origin of the attack,26 given the underlying political conflict, analysis of the attacks shows that they in fact involved more than 170 countries.27 In August 2008, during the armed conflict28 between the Russian Federation and Georgia, several large scale attacks occurred, targeting Georgian government websites as well as businesses.29 During the three weeks of attacks, various methods were detected, such as defacement of websites and Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS).30 As with the Estonian incident, the origin of the attack was much debated afterwards. While again news reports31 indicated that the origin of the attack was the Russian Federation, technology-focused research points to the use of botnets in the attack, which makes it difficult to determine the actual origin.32 2.2 Legal Response Analysing the different legal approaches that could address the issue underlines that the focus is on criminalizing the relevant acts. Two different approaches exist: the application of cybercrime provisions to terrorist-related acts and the implementation of specific legislation focusing on terrorist attacks only. Regional legal frameworks, such as the 2002 Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime,33 the European Union Framework Decision on

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Tikk, Kaska, and Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations, pp. 18-20. BBC, “Estonia Hit by ‘Moscow Cyber War,’” BBC News (17 May 2007), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm (last visited Jun. 25, 2012); Ian Traynor, “Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,” The Guardian (17 May 2007), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 27 Tikk, Kaska, and Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations, p. 23. 28 For background on the conflict, see Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1633, The Consequences of the War between Georgia and Russia (2008), available at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp? Link=/ documents/adoptedtext/ta08/eres1633.htm (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 29 Eneken Tikk, et al, Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified (CCD-COE, November 2008), p. 4, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Georgia%201%200.pdf (last visited Jun. 25, 2012); Kim Hart, “Longtime Battle Lines are Recast in Russia and Georgia’s Cyberwar,” Washington Post (14 August 2008), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2008/ 08/13/ AR2008081303623.html (last visited Jun. 25, 2012); Paul Cornish, Cyber Security and Politically, Socially and Religiously Motivated Cyber Attacks (European Union Foreign Affairs, February 2009), p. 15, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International %20Security/0209_eu_cybersecurity.pdf (last visited Jun. 21, 2012); Ashmore, “Impact of Alleged Russia Cyber Attacks,” p. 10. 30 Tikk, Kaska and Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations, p. 23. 31 See, e.g., Tom Partitt,”Georgian Blogger Cyxymu Blames Russia for Cyber Attack,” The Guardian (07 August 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/07/georgian-blogger-accuses-russia (last visited Jun. 25, 2012). 32 Tikk, Kaska and Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations, p.75; see also Ashmore, Impact of Alleged Russia Cyber Attacks. 33 The Commonwealth Organization, Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime, (LMM(02)17, ICT, 2002), available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/ shared_asp_ files/uploadedfiles/%7BDA109 CD2-5204-4FAB-AA77 86970A639 B05%7D_ Computer%20Crime.pdf; see also Richard Bourne, 2002 Commonwealth Law Ministers Meeting: Policy Brief (CPSU, 2002), p. 9; Lucie Angers, “Combating Cyber-Crime: National Legislation as a Pre-requisite to International Cooperation,” in Crime and Technology: New Frontiers for Regulation, Law Enforcement and Research (Ernesto U. Savona, ed., Springer 2004), pp. 39-54; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Information Economy

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Attacks against Information Systems and the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime,34 all contain provisions that can be used to prosecute offenders carrying out offences such as interference with computer systems. Some of the regional legal framework extends the criminalization to data interference35 and even the production of tools that are used to commit such offences.36 One example is Section 7 of the Commonwealth Model Law. Such approaches do not only criminalize non-terroristrelated attacks but are also applicable to terrorist-related acts. In addition, some countries have implemented specific legislation dealing with terrorist-related attacks against computer systems. One approach is Section 66F of the Indian Information Technology Act 2000 that was amended in 2008 to deal specifically with Internet-related terrorist attacks. A similar approach can be found in Section 4f of the Draft ITU Cybercrime Legislation Toolkit. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the UN organization that has the most responsibility for the practical aspects of cybersecurity.37 The aim38 of the Draft Toolkit is to give countries sample language and reference material for use in the process of developing national cybercrime legislation that can assist, according to the Toolkit’s developers, the “establishment of harmonized cybercrime laws and procedural rules.”39 The Toolkit was developed by the American Bar Association on the basis of a ‘comprehensive analysis’ of the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on Cybercrime and the cybercrime legislation of developed countries. It aims to be a fundamental resource for legislators, policy experts, and industry representatives in order to provide them with the pattern for the development of the consistent cybercrime legislation. In addition to traditional approaches, the Toolkit contains several specific terrorist-related offences.40

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 Report 2005, (UNCTAD/SDTE/ECB/2005/1, United Nations, 2005), p. 233, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdteecb20051ch6_en.pdf (last visited Jun. 26, 2012). 34 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, CETS No. 185 (23 November 2001), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185 &CM=8&DF=26/06/2012&CL=ENG [hereinafter ‘Convention against Cybercrime]. Regarding the Convention on Cybercrime, see Abraham Sofaer, “Toward an International Convention on Cybercrime,” in Abraham Sofaer and Seymour Goodman, eds, The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terrorism (Hoover Institution Press, 2001); Marco Gercke, “The Slow Wake of a Global Approach against Cybercrime,” Computer Law Review International 2006 (5) (2006), p. 140; Marco Gercke, “National, Regional and International Approaches in the Fight against Cybercrime,” Computer Law Review International 2008 (1) (2008), p. 7; Albert I. Aldesco, “The Demise of Anonymity: A Constitutional Challenge to the Convention on Cybercrime,” Entertainment Law Review 23(1) (2002); Richard Jones, The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Themes and Critiques (2005); Roderic Broadhurst, “Developments in the Global Law Enforcement of Cyber-crime,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 29(3) (2006), pp. 408-433; “Adoption of Convention on Cybercrime,” International Journal of International Law 95(4) (2001), pp. 889-891. 35 Convention on Cybercrime, art. 4 36 Ibid, art. 5. 37 Cornish, Cyber Security and Politically, Socially and Religiously Motivated Cyber Attacks, p. 17. 38 For more information, see Marco Gercke and Tatiana Tropina, “From Telecommunication Standardisation to Cybercrime Harmonisation? ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation,” Computer Law Review International 2009, No. 5, 2009, pp. 136-140. 39 ITU, “Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation (Draft),” (ITU, April 2009), p. 8. 40 Sec. 2 d) (Unauthorized Access for Purposes of Terrorism), Sec. 3 f) (Unauthorized Access to or Acquisition of Computer Programs or Data for Purposes of Terrorism), Sec. 4 f) (Intent to Cause Interference or Disruption for Purposes of Terrorism), Sec. 6 h) (Intent to Furtherance of Terrorism). Ibid.

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3. Illegal content A concern in this battle against terrorist use of the Internet is how to address content that is clearly inappropriate within the confines of internationally-accepted concept of freedom of speech. 3.1 Phenomena In addition to tradition propaganda, terrorist organisations today use the Internet to spread and collect information. The use of the Internet to either disseminate or obtain such material is highly relevant as the emerging use of Internet services has changed the way information is exchanged. While in the past books, videos, DVDs and music were purchased by buying physical goods, today e-books and online movie/music stores are extensively used. The same transformation process took place with regard to the propaganda of terrorist organizations. While in 1998, only 12 of the 30 foreign terrorist organisations listed by the US State Department maintained websites to inform the public about their activities,41 in 2004 the United States Institute of Peace reported that nearly all terrorist organizations maintained websites – among them Hamas, Hezbollah, PKK and al-Qaeda.42 Terrorists have also started to use video communities (such as YouTube) to distribute video messages and propaganda.43 This trend clearly signals a more professional public relations focus by subversive groups.44 Websites and other media are used to disseminate propaganda,45 to describe and publish justifications for their activities,46 to recruit47 new members and to contact existing members and donors.48 The Internet is also used to spread training material such as instructions on how to use weapons and select targets. Such material is available on a large scale online.49 In 2008, Western secret services discovered an Internet server that allowed for

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41 Anti Defamation League, “Terrorist Activities on the Web,” Terrorism Update 1998, at http://www.adl.org/terror/focus/16_focus_a.asp (last visited Jun. 26, 2012). 42 Gabriel Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet (Special Report, US Institute of Peace, 2004), p. 3. Regarding the use of the Internet for propaganda purposes, see also Kathy Crilley, “Information Warfare: New Battlefields – Terrorists, Propaganda and the Internet,” Aslib Proceedings 53(7) (2001), p. 253. 43 Regarding the use of YouTube by terrorist organisations, see Heise Online News, “Schünemann fordert Verbot des Herunterladens von Hassbotschaften,” (11 October 2006), at http://www.heise.de/newsticker/ meldung/79311. 44 Michaeel Zanini and John J. A. Edwards, “The Networking of Terror in the Information Age” in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., RAND, 2001), p. 42. 45 U.S. Homeland Security Advisory Council, Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007), pp. 4-5, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsacfuture-terrorism-010107.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2012). 46 Regarding the justification, see James Brandon, Virtual Caliphate: Islamic Extremists and the Internet (Center for Social Cohesion, 2008), available at http://www.cleanitproject.eu/thirdpartydocs/2008%20 VirtualCaliphate.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2012). 47 Jarret M. Brachman, “High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30(2) (2006), pp. 149-164. 48 See Maura Conway, “Terrorist Use of the Internet and Fighting Back,” Information and Security 18 (2005), p. 16. 49 Phillip Brunst, Cyberterrorism – The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (Council of Europe Publication, 2007); U.S. Homeland Security Advisory Council, Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force, p. 5; Anne Stenersen, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2) (2008), p. 215.

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the exchange of training material as well as communications.50 Different websites were reported to be operated by terrorist organisations to coordinate activities.51 There is no doubt that information available online – such as instructions how to build bombs – carry the risk that those individuals or groups that have access to the information might use it for terrorist-related purposes. There is a considerable amount of information about possible targets available on the Internet. For example,52 architects involved in the construction of public buildings publish building plans on their websites. High resolution satellite pictures, previously available only to a handful of military institutions, can today be accessed for free on various Internet services.53 Furthermore, websites containing instructions on how to build bombs – even virtual training camps – provide instructions on the use of weapons in an e-learning approach.54 In addition, sensitive or confidential information that is not adequately protected from search robots can be found via search engines.55 In 2003, the U.S. Department of Defence was informed about a training manual, linked to al-Qaeda, that was providing information how to use public sources, including the Internet, to find details about potential targets.56 In 2006, the New York Times reported that basic information related to the construction of nuclear weapons was published on a government website that provided evidence about Iraqi attempts to develop nuclear weapons.57 A similar incident was reported in Australia, where detailed information about potential targets for terrorist attacks was available on government websites.58 In 2005, the press in Germany reported that investigators had found downloaded manuals on how to build explosives on the computer of two suspects who then attempted to attack the German public transportation system with homemade bombs.59

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3.2 Legal Response The debate about an adequate legal response to the threat very much focuses on criminalizing illegal content. However, there are several challenges related to such criminalization. The extent of criminalization of illegal content significantly differs from country to country and region to region. But information made available by one computer user in one country can be accessed from nearly anywhere in the world. If

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Yassin von Musharbash, “Bin Ladens Intranet,” Der Spiegel 39 (22 September 2008), p. 127. Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, p. 10. Regarding the related challenges, see Marco Gercke, “The Challenge of Fighting Cybercrime,” Multimedia und Recht (2008), p. 292. 53 Barry Levine, “Does Google Earth Reveal Military Secrets,” Global Security, (27 June 2006), at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2006/060627-google- earth.htm (last visited Jun. 27, 2012); regarding the discovery of a secret submarine on a satellite picture provided by a free of charge Internet service, see Der Standard Online, “Google Earth: Neues Chinesisches Kampf-Uboot Entdeckt,” 11 July 2007, at http://www.derstandard.at/?url/?id=2952935 (last visited Jun. 27, 2012). 54 For further reference, see Gercke, “The Challenge of Fighting Cybercrime,” p. 292. 55 For more information regarding the search for secret information with the help of search engines, see Johnny Long, Ed Skoudis and Alrik van Eijkelenborg, Google Hacking for Penetration Testers, Vol. 1 (Syngress, 2005). 56 ‘Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least eighty per cent of information about the enemy.’ Conway, “Terrorist Use of the Internet and Fighting Back,” p.17. 57 See William J. Broad, “US Analysts Had Flagged Atomic Data on Web Site’” New York Times (04 November 2006). 58 Conway, “Terrorist Use the Internet and Fighting Back, Information and Security,” p. 18. 59 See Annette Ramelsberger, “BKA Findet Anleitung zum Sprengsatzbau,“ Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 07 March 2007, available at http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ deutschland/artikel/766/104662/print.html. 51 52

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‘offenders’ create content that is illegal in some countries, but not in the country they are operating from, prosecution of the ‘offenders’ is difficult, if not impossible.60 One legal solution could be to globally criminalize the publication of information related to terrorist organizations. A number of countries already criminalize the publication of illegal content such as hate speech61 or propaganda. The challenge in implementing this approach is to harmonize national legal standards, some of which strongly protect the freedom on speech, while avoiding a ban on legitimate reports about terrorist activities. For illegal content, value systems and legal systems differ extensively between societies. This is relevant with regard to illegal content in general and terrorist-related content in particular. The dissemination of xenophobic material is, for example, illegal in many European countries,62 but can be protected by the principle of freedom of speech63 in the United States.64 The use of derogatory remarks in respect of the Holy Prophet is criminal in many Arabic countries,65 but not in some European countries. The drafting process for the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime highlights the challenges that such a course of action would face. In 2001 the Convention on Cybercrime66 and the First Additional Protocol to the Convention were

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In many cases, the principle of dual criminality hinders international cooperation. In this context, see, e.g., Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems, ETS No. 189, 28 January 2003. 62 One example of the wide criminalisation of illegal content is Sec. 86a of the German Penal Code. The provision criminalises the use of symbols of unconstitutional parties: Section 86a: Use of Symbols of Unconstitutional Organizations (1) Whoever: 1. domestically distributes or publicly uses, in a meeting or in writings (Section 11 subsection (3)) disseminated by him, symbols of one of the parties or organizations indicated in Section 86 subsection (1), nos. 1, 2 and 4; or 2. produces, stocks, imports or exports objects which depict or contain such symbols for distribution or use domestically or abroad, in the manner indicated in number 1, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine. (2) Symbols, within the meaning of subsection (1), shall be, in particular, flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans and forms of greeting. Symbols which are so similar as to be mistaken for those named in sentence 1 shall be deemed to be equivalent thereto. (3) Section 86 subsections (3) and (4), shall apply accordingly. 63 Regarding the principle of freedom of speech, see Thomas L. Tedford and Dale A. Herbeck, Freedom of Speech in the United States (5th ed., Strata Pub Co, 2005); Eric M. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2007); C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 1992); Jonathon W. Emord, Freedom, Technology and the First Amendment ( Pacific Reseacrh Institute, 1991). Regarding the importance of the principle with regard to electronic surveillance, see Christopher Woo and Miranda So, “The Case for Magic Lantern: September 11 Highlights the Need for Increasing Surveillance,” Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 15 (2) (2002), pp. 530-537; Michael R. Chesterman, Freedom of Speech in Australian Law, A Delicate Plant (Ashgate Pub. Co., 2000); Eugene Volokh, “Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious Accommodation Law,” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 33 (2001), pp. 57-69; Henry Cohen, Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment (CRS Report for Congress 95-815, 16 October 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2012). 64 Concerns over freedom of expression (e.g. the First Amendment to the United States Constitution) explain why certain acts of racism were not made illegal by the Convention on Cybercrime, but their criminalisation was included in the First Additional Protocol. See Explanatory Report to the First Additional Protocol, No. 4. 65 See, e.g., Sec. 295C of the Pakistan Penal Code: 295-C. Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet: Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 66 Convention on Cybercrime. For more details about the offences covered by the Convention, see Sofaer, “Toward an International Convention on Cybercrime;” Gercke, “The Slow Wake of a Global Approach Against Cybercrime,” p. 140 ; Gercke, “National, Regional and International Approaches in the Fight

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opened for signature. The reason for the development of an additional protocol was the inability of the negotiating countries to agree on mandatory criminalization of illegal content in any of these cases.67 To enable those countries that strongly protect the freedom of expression to sign the Convention, offences like hate speech and propaganda were shifted to the Additional Protocol.68 This may be indicative of similar problems in regulating terrorist ‘speech’ in the Internet. As there is no global consensus and no harmonization, the national approaches significantly differ. It is possible to distinguish between the application of non-Internet specific legislation to terroristrelated material made available online and the development of Internet-specific legislation. Another distinction can be made with regard to focus of the criminalization. While some countries focus on criminalizing the act of publication of material, others focus on the effect of the act by criminalising incitement.

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One example for a non-Internet specific approach is Article 10 of the Russian Federal Law 149-FZ of 27 July 2006 on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information, that criminalizes the spreading of information, aimed at war propaganda. Like the approach undertaken in other countries, the provision does not specifically address the distribution of illegal content through computer networks or making content available in such networks, but was drafted technology neutral. Another example is the 2008 amendment of the EU Framework Decision69 on combating terrorism.70 In the introduction, the EU emphasises the fact that the existing legal framework criminalizes aiding, abetting and inciting terrorism but does not criminalize the dissemination of terrorist expertise through the Internet. The drafter of the Framework decision pointed out that “the Internet is used to inspire and mobilise local terrorist networks and individuals in Europe and also serves as a source of information on terrorist means and methods, thus functioning as a ‘virtual training camp’.”71Although terrorist use of the Internet was explicitly mentioned in the introduction to the Framework Decision, the provision provided is drafted technology neutral and as a consequence covers the online and offline acts of training for terrorism.72 Some countries follow a different approach and focus on criminalizing incitement. It is again possible to divide between Internet-specific and technology-neutral approaches. One example for an Internet-specific approach is Article 5 of the Chinese Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations.

 Against Cybercrime,” p. 7; Aldesco, “The Demise of Anonymity: A Constitutional Challenge to the Convention on Cybercrime,” Jones, “The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Themes and Critiques;” Broadhurst, “Developments in the Global Law Enforcement of Cyber-Crime.” 67 With the exception of child pornography. Convention on Cybercrime, art. 9. 68 Regarding the motivation to develop the First Additional Protocol, see Convention on Cybercrime, Explanatory Report, No. 35. 69 EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, COM (2007) 650 (6 November 2007)(amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism). 70 EU Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008, OJ L330/21 (9 December 2008 (amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism). 71 Ibid, No. 4. 72 The intention of the drafters to cover online and offline activities was highlighted several time. See, e.g. ibid, No. 11. (“These forms of behavior should be equally punishable in all Member States irrespective of whether they are committed through the Internet or not.”).

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4. Communication In addition to in recruiting and inappropriate content, use of the Internet for terrorist communications poses its own set of concerns and problems. 4.1 Phenomena In the context of the investigations after the 9/11 attacks, it was reported that the terrorists used e-mail communications to coordinate their attacks.73 The press reported that detailed instructions about the targets and the number of attackers had been exchanged via e-mail.74 As means of communication for terrorist organisations exist outside the Internet as well as inside, the use of communication systems does not seem to be an Internet-specific topic. However the variety of Internet services, as well as the traceability, makes it necessary to discuss Internet-specific approaches. 4.2 Challenges and Legal Response

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With regard to the variety of Internet services, one major difference between traditional means of communication – such as postal services, fax and phone calls – and Internetrelated means of communication – such as email, voice-over-IP communication (VoIP) and instant messaging – is the fact that the number of operators of traditional communication services is in general limited. Most countries only have a handful of companies/entities offering postal, fixed line or cell-phone services. With regard to Internet services, the situation is different. With regard to legal obligations, approaches to force operators of Internet services to implement means of control to monitor or trace terrorist activities are limited to certain branches (especially financial services). With regard to wide-ranging legal obligations, several issues were highlighted that must be taken into consideration to avoid interference with the right of users as well as the operators of services. They especially referred to the financial impact of such obligations that could influence the development of Internet services in general and in developing countries in specific. As was pointed out above, traceability is another issue that needs to be taken into consideration. The general impression of many Internet users that the Internet offers little or no possibility to trace users back is incorrect. Most Internet users are simply unaware of the electronic trail they leave while using Internet services.75 However, offenders can make use of technology to make investigations more difficult. This is

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See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (22 July 2004), p. 249. The text of the final message was reported to be: ‘The semester begins in three more weeks. We’ve obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering.’ The name of the faculties was apparently the code for different targets. For more detail, see Weimann, “How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet;” Timothy L. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of ‘Cyberplanning,’ Parameters 33(Spring) (2003). Tom Zeller, Jr., “On the Open Internet, a Web of Dark Alleys,” The New York Times (20 December 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/20/technology/ 20covert.html?_r=1(last visited Jun. 27, 2012). 75 Regarding the possibilities of tracing offenders of computer-related crimes, see: Howard Lipson, Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues (CMU/SEI-2002-SR-009, Carnegie Mellon University, 2002), available at http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/ 02sr009.cfm (last visited Jun. 26, 2012). 74

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particularly the case if offenders use forms of anonymous communication.76 In addition to simply using public Internet terminals (e.g. at airport terminals or Internet cafés),77 anonymity can also be achieved by making use of sophisticated anonymous communication servers78 and anonymous remailers (a system which hides the source of e-mails).79 Anonymous communications may give rise to anti-social behavior, but they can also allow users to act more freely.80 In addition, it might be necessary to take into consideration that as users leave various traces while using Internet services, anonymous communication can prevent the users from unwanted or even illegal profiling activities.81 Therefore various states and organizations support the principle of anonymous use of Internet e-mail services. It is, for example, expressed in the European Union Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications.82 One example of a legal approach to protect user privacy can be found in Article 37 of the European Union Regulation on Data Protection.83 However, the discussion within the working group and the response to the questionnaire also showed that some countries are addressing the challenges of anonymous communications by implementing legal



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Ian Clarke, et al, Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2001), at http://lsirwww.epfl.ch/courses/dis/2003ws/papers/ clarke00freenet.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2012); Tom Chothia and Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, “A Survey of Anonymous Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing,” undated, at http://www.spinellis.gr/pubs/jrnl/2004-ACMCS-p2p/html/AS04.pdf (last visited Jun. 27, 2012); Jinsong Han, et al, “A Mutual Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Protocol Design,” Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (2005). 77 Regarding legislative approaches requiring identification prior to the use of public terminals, see Italian Decree-Law No. 144, 27 July 2005, art. 7. 78 Regarding technical approaches in tracing back users of Anonymous Communication Servers based on the TOR structure, see Dario V. Forte, “Analyzing the Difficulties in Backtracing Onion Router Traffic,” International Journal of Digital Evidence 1 (3) (2002), available at https://www.utica.edu/ academic/institutes/ecii/publications/articles/ A04AA07D-D4B8-8B5F-450484589672E1F9.pdf (last visited Jun. 26, 2012). 79 See Joris Claessens, Bart Preneel and Joos Vandewalle, “Solutions for Anonymous Communication on the Internet,” Proceedings of the IEEE 33rd Annual 1999 International Carnahan Conference of Security Technology, Madrid, Spain, 5-7 October 1999, available at https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ publications/article-361.pdf (last visited Jun. 26, 2012). 80 Judith Donath, Sociable Media (unpublished paper, 15 April 2004), available at http://smg.media.mit.edu/papers/Donath/SociableMedia.encyclopedia.pdf (last visited Jun.26, 2012). 81 Regarding the possibilities of tracing offenders of computer-related crimes, see Lipson, Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues.” Regarding the benefits of anonymous communication, see George F. du Pont, “The Time Has Come for Limited Liability for Operators of True Anonymity Remails in Cyberspace: An Examination of the Possibilities and Perils,” Journal of Technology Law and Policy 6 (2) (2010), available http://jtlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/ December2001.pdf (last visited Jun. 26 2012). 82 The introduction of itemised bills has improved the possibilities for the subscriber to check the accuracy of the fees charged by the service provider but, at the same time, it may jeopardise the privacy of the users of publicly available electronic communications services. Therefore, in order to preserve the privacy of the user, Member States should encourage the development of electronic communication service options such as alternative payment facilities which allow anonymous or strictly private access to publicly available electronic communications services [...]. Source: Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector. 83 Article 37 - Traffic and billing data 1. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, traffic data relating to users which are processed and stored to establish calls and other connections over the telecommunications network shall be erased or made anonymous upon termination of the call or other connection. - Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by the Community Institutions and Bodies and on the Free Movement of Such Data.

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restrictions. One example is Italy, which – as explained in more detail above – requires public Internet access providers to identify users before they start using the service.84

5. Terrorist financing Although the Internet is not crucial to terrorist financing, the extent that the Internet can be and is being used by terrorist is a topic of current emphasis because it appears to be increasing. 5.1 Phenomena After the 9/11 attacks, tracing terrorists’ financial transactions became a key task in the fight against terrorism,85 as most terrorist organizations depend on financial resources they receive from third parties. Like in other areas of terrorist activities, the Internet is today playing a role in terrorist financing. However the expert debate during the working group meeting highlighted the uncertainty concerning the scope and extent of the use of the Internet for terrorist financing purposes, as experts believe that money transferred for terrorist purposes is predominately transferred in cash.

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5.2 Legal Response After the 9/11 attacks, a number of legal frameworks were developed to combat terrorist financing.86 The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), developed a set of 9 (originally 8) Special Recommendations to Counter Terrorist Financing.87 Although most of them do not specifically address Internet-related terrorist financing, the debate within the working group showed broad agreement that those instruments that criminalize terrorist financing in general cover both online and offline activities. Nevertheless, concerns were expressed with regard to the ability of authorities involved in fighting terrorist financing to investigate those crimes due to a lack of procedural instruments. While international instruments, as well as available model legislation,88 often contain general terrorist-related procedural instruments, such as freezing of funds related to terrorist activities, specific Internet-related instruments are in general not covered. But with regard to Internet-related terrorist financing, such instruments are important to trace offenders.

 84

Decree-Law No. 144, 27 July 2005, no. 144. – Urgent Measures for Combating International Terrorism. The Commission analyzing the 9/11 attacks calculated that the costs for the attack could have been between USD 400,000 and 500,000. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (22 July 2004), p. 187. Taking into account the duration of the preparation and the number of people involved, the cost per person have been relatively small. Regarding the related challenges see also Martin A. Weiss, “Terrorist Financing: The 9/11 Commission Recommendation,” (CRS Report for Congress RS 21902, 25 February 2005), p. 4. 86 For an overview see Kilian Strauss, “Combating Terrorist Financing – Are Transition Countries the Weak Link?,” in Countering Terrorist Financing (Mark Pieth, Daniel Thelesklaf and Radha Ivory, eds., Peter Lang, 2009). 87 Financial Action Task Force, FATF IX Special Recommendations (FATF, October 2001, amended February 2008). 88 See, e.g. the United Nations, Model Legislative Provisions against Terrorism (draft) (UNODC, 2009). 85

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Conclusion It is clear that terrorists are employing the Internet for a number of functions and for the fight against terrorism to succeed, this use must be stopped or at least greatly curtailed. Although there have been a number of policy initiatives, it is clear that the legislative framework continual to receive emphasis to ensure success in this area.

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Bibliography “Adoption of Convention on Cybercrime,” International Journal of International Law 95(4) (2001). Aldesco, Albert L. “The Demise of Anonymity: A Constitutional Challenge to the Convention on Cybercrime,” Entertainment Law Review 23(1) (2002). Angers, Lucie, “Combating Cyber-Crime: National Legislation as a Pre-requisite to International Cooperation,” in Crime and Technology: New Frontiers for Regulation, Law Enforcement and Research (Ernesto U. Savona, ed., Springer 2004). Ashmore, William C., “Impact of Alleged Russia Cyber Attacks,” Baltic Security & Defence Review 11(1) (2009). Baker, C. Edwin, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 1992); Jonathon W. Emord, Freedom, Technology and the First Amendment ( Pacific Research Institute, 1991). Barendt, Eric M., Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2007). BBC, “Estonia Hit by ‘Moscow Cyber War,’” BBC News (17 May 2007). BBC News, Estonia Removes Soviet Memorial, BBC News (27 April 2007). Broad, William J., “US Analysts Had Flagged Atomic Data on Web Site’” New York Times (04 November 2006).Broadhurst, Roderic, “Developments in the Global Law Enforcement of Cyber-crime,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 29(3) (2006). Bourne, Richard, 2002 Commonwealth Law Ministers Meeting: Policy Brief (CPSU, 2002). Brachman, Jarret M., “High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30(2) (2006). Brandon, James, Virtual Caliphate: Islamic Extremists and the Internet (Center for Social Cohesion, 2008). Brunst, Phillip, Cyberterrorism – The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (Council of Europe Publication, 2007). Chesterman, Michael R., Freedom of Speech in Australian Law, A Delicate Plant (Ashgate Pub. Co., 2000). Chothia, Tom, and Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, “A Survey of Anonymous Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing,” undated. Claessens, Joris, Bart Preneel and Joos Vandewalle, “Solutions for Anonymous Communication on the Internet,” Proceedings of the IEEE 33rd Annual 1999 International Carnahan Conference of Security Technology, Madrid, Spain (5-7 October 1999). Clarke, Ian, et al, “Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System” (2001). Cohen, Henry, Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment (CRS Report for Congress 95-815, 16 October 2009). Conway, Maura, “Terrorist Use of the Internet and Fighting Back,” Information and Security 18 (2005). Cornish, Paul, Cyber Security and Politically, Socially and Religiously Motivated Cyber Attacks (European Union Foreign Affairs, February 2009). Crilley, Kathy, “Information Warfare: New Battlefields – Terrorists, Propaganda and the Internet,” Aslib Proceedings 53(7) (2001). Donath, Judith, Sociable Media (unpublished paper, 15 April 2004), du Pont, George F., “The Time Has Come for Limited Liability for Operators of True Anonymity Remails in Cyberspace: An Examination of the Possibilities and Perils,” Journal of Technology Law and Policy 6 (2) (2010). Dutta, Soumitra, et al, The Information Society in an Enlarged Europe (Springer, 2006). Falliere, Nicholas, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric Chien, “W32.Suxnet Dossier,” (Symantec, Version 1.3, November 2010).

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Finn, Peter, “Cyber Assaults on Estonia Typify a New Battle Tactic,” Washington Post (19 May 2007). Forte, Dario V., “Analyzing the Difficulties in Backtracing Onion Router Traffic,” International Journal of Digital Evidence 1 (3) (2002). Gercke, Marco, “The Slow Wake of a Global Approach against Cybercrime,” Computer Law Review International 2006 (5) (2006). Gercke, Marco, “The Challenge of Fighting Cybercrime,” Multimedia und Recht (2008). Gercke, Marco, “National, Regional and International Approaches in the Fight against Cybercrime,” Computer Law Review International 2008 (1) (2008). Gercke, Marco, and Tatiana Tropina, “From Telecommunication Standardisation to Cybercrime Harmonisation? ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation,” Computer Law Review International 2009(5) (2009). Han, Jinsong, et al, “A Mutual Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Protocol Design,” Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (2005). Hart, Kim, “Longtime Battle Lines are Recast in Russia and Georgia’s Cyberwar,” Washington Post (14 August 2008). Heise Online News, “Schünemann fordert Verbot des Herunterladens von Hassbotschaften,” (11 October 2006). Hornby, Susan, and Zoe Clarke, Challenge and Change in the Information Society (Facet, 2002). Jones, Richard, The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Themes and Critiques (2005). Landler, Mark, and John Markoff, “Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Estonia,” The New York Times (29 May 2007). Levine, Barry, “Does Google Earth Reveal Military Secrets,” Global Security, (27 June 2006). Lewis, James, A., Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats (Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2002). Lipson, Howard, Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues (CMU/SEI-2002-SR-009, Carnegie Mellon University, 2002). Long, Johnny, Ed Skoudis and Alrik van Eijkelenborg, Google Hacking for Penetration Testers, Vol. 1 (Syngress, 2005). Maldoom, Dan, Broadband in Europe: How Brussels Can Wire the Information Society (Springer, 2005). Masuda, Yoneji, The Information Society as Post-Industrial Society (Transaction Publishers, 1980). Matrosov, Aleksandr, et al, “Stuxnet Unter the Microscope” (2010). Myers, Steven L., “Estonia Removes Soviet-era War Memorial after a Night of Violence,” The New York Times (27 April 2007). Partitt, Tom, ”Georgian Blogger Cyxymu Blames Russia for Cyber Attack,” The Guardian (07 August 2009). Ramelsberger, Annette, “BKA Findet Anleitung zum Sprengsatzbau,“ Sueddeutsche Zeitung (07 March 2007). Schperberg, Robert, and Richard A. Stanley, Cybercrime: Incident Response and Digital Forensics (ISACA, 2005); Shackelford, Scott J., “From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 27(3) (2009). Shimeall, Timothy, Phil Williams, and Casey Dunlevy, ”Countering Cyber War,” NATO Review (Winter 2001/2002). Sofaer, Abraham, and Seymour Goodman, eds, The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terrorism (Hoover Institution Press, 2001). Strauss, Killin, “Combating Terrorist Financing – Are Transition Countries the Weak Link?,” in Countering Terrorist Financing (Mark Pieth, Daniel Thelesklaf and Radha Ivory, eds., Peter Lang, 2009). Stenersen, Anne, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2) (2008). Tanner, Jari, “Violence Continues over Estonia’s Removal of Soviet War Statue,” The Boston Globe (28 April 2007). Tedford, Thomas L., and Dale A. Herbeck, Freedom of Speech in the United States (5th ed., Strata Pub Co, 2005). Thomas, Timothy L., “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of ‘Cyberplanning,’” Parameters 33(Spring) (2003). Thomson, Iain, “Estonia under Cyber-Attack,” ITNews (18 May 2007). Tikk, Eneken, et al, “Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified (CCD-COE, November 2008). Tikk, Eneken, Kadri Kaska and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations (NATO CCD COE, 2010). Traynor, Ian, “Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,” The Guardian (17 May 2007).

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TrendMicro, The Sasser Event: History and Implications (Trend Micro, June 2004). Volokh, Eugene, “Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious Accommodation Law,” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 33 (2001). von Musharbash, Yassin, “Bin Ladens Intranet,” Der Spiegel 39 (22 September 2008). Waterman, Shaun, “Analysis: Who Cyber Smacked Estonia,” United Press International (11 June 2007). Weimann, Gabriel, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet (Special Report, US Institute of Peace, 2004). Weiss, Martin A., “Terrorist Financing: The 9/11 Commission Recommendation,” (CRS Report for Congress RS 21902, 25 February 2005). Woo, Christopher, and Miranda So, “The Case for Magic Lantern: September 11 Highlights the Need for Increasing Surveillance,” Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 15 (2) (2002). Yang, Miao, “Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Electronic Commerce,” ACM International Conference Proceeding Series 113 (2005). Zanini, Michael, and John J. A. Edwards, “The Networking of Terror in the Information Age” in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., RAND, 2001). Zeller, Jr., Tom, “On the Open Internet, a Web of Dark Alleys,” The New York Times (20 December 2004).

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Organized Crime and Terrorism: The Financial Roots of Systematic Violence Ercan ÇTLOLU1 Bahçeehir University

Abstract. Any systematic violent activity, regardless whether it is political (terrorism) or not (organized crime) needs enduring financing for its existence. Furthermore, the globalization of organized crime and terrorism has also brought about the globalization of criminal/terrorist financing and cooperation between them as well. This study focuses on the financial roots and determinants of organized crime and terrorism, considering the security environment of globalizing international system. Keywords. Organized crime, terrorism, financing terrorism.

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Introduction Organized crime has traditionally been seen as a domestic problem bedeviling a relatively small number of states. In the last years, however, there has been recognition that the current problem we face is no longer limited to just a few numbers of states and can no longer be treated as such an occurrence that falls only within a single jurisdiction. The rise but not fall of a global market for illicit drugs, the end of the Cold War (which is caused the breakdown of the barriers between East and West), the collapse of the criminal justice system in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union after 1991, the development of free trade areas in Western Europe and North America, and the emergence of global financial and trading systems have fundamentally and rapidly changed the context in which both terrorist and criminal organizations operate and encouraged what had been predominantly domestic groups to develop into transnational criminal organizations. Moreover, as a rising threat, today we are faced with a new kind of terrorism that does not emanate from one country, one religion or even one group, but from the networks that span the globe from East to West and North to South, irrespective of national frontiers and need the partnership or, in other words, the logistic supply of the transnational criminal organizations, such as fire arms, ammunitions, explosives, fake documents.

1

President, International Security and Strategic Research Center. E-mail: [email protected].

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1. Organized Crime Groups and their Financing It is possible to describe and define organized crime based on various sources as “[a] non-ideological enterprise involving a number of persons in close social interaction, organized on a hierarchical basis, with at least three levels / ranks, for the purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities.”2 The aim of organized crime groups is providing benefit which could be money or power, in most cases the two of them together. Howard Abadinsky, an American researcher, describes the formation of organized crime groups as: Position in the hierarchy and positions involving functional specialization may be assigned on the basis of kinship or friendship, or rationally assigned according to skill. The positions are not dependent on the individuals occupying them at any particular time. Permanency is assumed by the members who strive to keep the enterprise integral and active in pursuit of its goals. It abstains from the competition and strives monopoly on an industry, marketing or territorial basis.3 There is a willingness to use violence and/or bribery to achieve ends or to maintain discipline. Membership is restricted, although nonmembers may be involved on a contingency basis. There are explicit rules, oral or written, which are enforced by sanctions that include murder. According to the IIT Research Institute’s Chicago Crime Commission Reports: “Organized crime consists of participation of persons and group of persons (organized either formally or informally) in transactions characterized by some elements.

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These elements are: x

Intent to commit, or the actual commission of, substantive crimes,

x

A conspiracy to execute these crimes,

x

A persistence of this conspiracy through time (at least one year) or to intent that this conspiracy should persist through time.

x

The acquisition of substantial power or money, and the seeking of a high degree of political or economic security, as primary motivations.

x

An operational framework that seeks the preservation of institutions of politics, government, and society in their present form.”4

The Council of Europe defines organized crime as [t]he illegal activities carried out by structured groups of two or more persons existing for a prolonged period of time and having the aim of committing serious crimes through concerned action by using

2 United Nations, UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (UNODC, 2004). 3 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime (9th ed., Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010). 4 IIT Research Institute, “A Study of Organized Crime” (Chicago Crime Commission Report, 1971).

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intimidation, violence, corruption or other means in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.5 In a working paper issued by the UN, Changes in Forms and Dimensions of Criminality, transnational and national organized crime is defined as: Organized crime is understood to be the large-scale and complex criminal activity carried on by groups of persons, however loosely or tightly organized, for the enrichment of those participating and at the expense of the community and its members. It is frequently, accomplished through ruthless disregard of law, including offences against the person, and frequently in connection with political corruption.6

2. Conceptual Analyses of Organized Crime Today’s dominant concept of organized crime is heterogeneous and contradictory when the entire range of pertinent statements in the criminal-policy debate is taken into account. But when focused on the imagery that dominates the general perception of organized crime, it is possible to ascertain a tendency towards equating organized crime with ethnically homogeneous, formally-structured, multifunctional, monopolistic criminal organizations which strive to undermine and subdue the legal institutions of society.7

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As far as the structures of illicit markets and criminal subcultures as a whole are concerned, the dominating understanding of organized crime is based on the notion that they tend to be monopolized and that all criminal groups strive for monopoly positions on an ever increasing scale. The World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, held in Naples, Italy in 1994, developed a series of characteristics typical of transnational organized crime which are could be still taken as a reference doesn’t matter it was issued 13 years ago.8 These characteristics included; x

Group organization to commit crime;

x

Hierarchical links or personal relationships which permit leaders to control the group,

5 Klaus von Lampe, “Definitions of Organized Crime,” at: http://www.organized-crime.de/ OCDEF1.htm #coe (last visited Jun. 20, 2012). 6 Dimitri Vlasis, “The Global Situation of Transnational Organized Crime, The Decision of The International Community to Develop an International Convention and The Negotiation Process” (2000), available at http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no59/ch24.pdf (last visited Jun. 20, 2012). 7 Karl von Lampe, “Not a Process of Enlightenment: The Conceptual History of Organized Crime in Germany and the United States of America,” Forum on Crime and Society 1(2) (2000), pp. 99-118. 8 Allen Castle, “Transnational Organized Crime and International Security,” (Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No.19, 1997), available at http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/webwp19.pdf (last visited Jun. 20, 2012).

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x

Violence, intimidation and corruption used to earn profits or control territories or markets

x

Laundering of illicit proceeds both in furtherance of criminal activity and to infiltrate the legitimate economy

x

The potential for expansion into any new activities and beyond national borders,

x

Cooperation with other organized transnational criminal groups.

The actors involved and the basic structure of organized transnational criminal activity may change with the crime being committed. The network of relationships required in the cocaine trade, for instance, is a cooperative structure of growers, refineries, mules, transshipment middlemen, wholesalers and street–level distributors to deliver the product from the point of origin to that of consumption, a process of coordination rendered more difficult by the difficulties of transporting the product across state frontiers. Subsequently, complex and unique networks for laundering drug profits are brought into play, involving laundering specialists, offshore and domestic institutions, real firms and shell companies, and other actors.9 By contrast, arm traffickers rarely deal in the production of the commodity and/or their clientele are often state-backed (or national) armed groups, the problems of detection are regularly less than that of the drug smugglers, despite the unwieldy nature of the commodity. Thus to sum up these points, the gaps in our knowledge surrounding the nature of criminal organizations and their involvement in the spectrum of organized transnational crime leave us with significant difficulties in developing a coordinated response to this problem.

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3. Organized Crime Growing Options Phil Williams described these difficulties as: There may be a set of discrete criminal groups on whom we may focus, there may be strategic alliances among criminal groups on whom we may focus, there may be a globally-coordinated network of these groups; or, conversely there may be a looser, more ad hoc set of affiliations among criminal groups.10 Why are transnational crimes growing and becoming more professional and sophisticated with terrorist activities? The fundamental forces underlying the growth and increasingly international character of organized crime are the technological explosion and economic boom of the post-Second World War period as well as the current geopolitical situation, which has been rapidly evolving since the collapse of the socialist world. The 1960s represent the benchmark for many of the technological and

9

Ibid. Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances,” The Washington Quarter 18(1) (1994), pp. 57-72. 10

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economic changes affecting transnational crimes, whereas the political changes contributing to the spread of transnational crime emerged in subsequent decades.11 The growth in transnational illegal activities is largely due to the increasingly international scope of legitimate business and the ease with which it is conducted. Significant technological advances most affecting the growth of transnational crime and terror activities include the rise of commercial airline travel, telecommunication (including cable and cellular telephones, fax and computer networks) and the use of computers in business. For example, passenger volume on international flights increased at least 30 times from 1974 to 2009. This rise has contributed to an increasingly mobile world population; mobility was equally enjoyed by carriers of illicit commodities, as cargo is loaded and unloaded at numerous points around the globe to avoid detection. Advances in telecommunications and satellite technology, the development of fiber-optic cable and the miniaturization and complexity of computers have resulted in a communications explosion of international phone calls, fax transmission and wire transfers. Criminal and terrorist groups benefiting from the global village and its instant and anonymous telecommunications are able to operate without frontiers in unprecedented ways. This leads to another factor underlying the increase in international crime, the growth of international business. Organized crime groups follow the winds of international business. Global markets have developed in both legitimate goods and illicit goods, the most notable of which is the international narcotics trade.

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The transnational character of organized crime means that these groups are now part of the global political agenda. As they develop from their domestic bases, their members establish links with fellow nationals living abroad. Tribal links among similar ethnic groups in different countries may facilitate international illicit activity, such as that seen across borders in Africa, the Golden Triangle and along the southern frontier of the former Soviet Union. Small wars, low intensity conflicts or terrorist activities contribute to transnational organized crime by increasing the supply of narcotics and by feeding the trade in arms. Developing countries with poor economies that once depended upon agricultural commodities are, with falling agricultural prices, often attracted to drug cultivation as a means of obtaining cash. This money can then be used to purchase arms and ammunition for use in low intensity conflicts. Weapons for such purposes are often bought on the illegal arms market, which is supplied by transnational organized crime groups. As you will notice, there are a links and rotation between drugs and arms traffic which continuously feed and help the growth of transnational organized crime groups so far. However, despite a veritable explosion in illicit trade, the hegemony of global international crime is exaggerated. Increasing links exist among different international organized groups, but the idea of a pax mafia is premature. The cooperation among organized crime groups from different regions of the world enhances drug trafficking 11

Louise Shelly, “Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State,” Journal of International Affairs 48(2) (1995), pp. 463-489.

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capacities and permits the smuggling of nuclear materials, as well as trafficking in human beings, but does not yet present a consolidated threat to the established political order. An emerging pax mafiosa is precluded because many parts of the world are not under the domination of a particular organized crime group.12 On the other hand, it does not mean that the transnational organized crime groups are not posing a threat to mankind. At an international conference on transnational organized crime in Tokyo, of January 2001, a senior UN official Pino Arlacchi, the undersecretary-general at the United Nations office for Drug Control and Crime Preventions, claimed that “internationally organized crime is now a bigger threat to security for ordinary people than a war.” He also added the following points: x

The fight against the organized criminals behind human trafficking, corruption and cyber crime must be a genuinely global effort.

x

Organized criminals can cooperate across borders with greater ease than law enforcement officials; that is why international cooperation is so vital.

x

The level and intensity of international crime has gone beyond what governments and the general population is prepared to accept.

x

As many as one million women and children are trafficked last year across national borders by criminal groups.

x

The profits from corruption, drug trafficking and other crimes have become so big that the numbers are difficult to grasp, while money laundering is estimated by the US government to be equivalent to much as five per cent of the world’s GDP ( Gross Domestic Product).13

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4. Categorizing Organized Crime and Ties with Terrorism There are tens of types of organized crime activities which exist all over the world, some of which are major activities. These major activities include: -

Drug trafficking,

-

Conventional arms trafficking and illegal fire arms trading,

-

Smuggling in nuclear materials,

-

Trafficking in human beings and illegal migration,

-

Cybercrime (computer-related crimes)

But in recent years we have begun to witness another activity of organized crime groups which is posing a great deal of threat to the world peace and tranquility: the links and cooperation between transnational organized crime groups and the terrorist organizations. Understanding the international terrorism and organized crime

12

Ibid. Peter Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism (Kogan Page Limited, London, 2000).

13

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structures requires knowledge of the relationship between the inseparable aspects of weapons and their marketing dimensions. Crime and terror always use the human factor but the instrument has always dominated. In other words, international terrorism always needs the arms. Aspects of a relationship have existed since the 1970s in the Middle East and Asia and the 1980s in Latin America, where drug cartels and terrorist groups have engaged in de facto strategic alliances. Terrorist and criminal groups during these decades primarily entered into cooperative relationships for operational purposes. Terrorists received revenues to use for future operations and the cartels found an efficient way to secure their lucrative operations. Although these early relations between terrorist and criminal entities could be considered extremely clinical and business-like in nature, these ties are responsible for one of the most important transformations of international security in the days we are now living. Despite being traced back to the 1970s, the relationship between transnational organized crime and terrorism grew in importance after 1991 as a result of various strategic factors: the end of the Cold War, the most recent wave of globalization and associated developments in illicit operations worldwide. Among the most important consequences, emanating from the end of the Cold War and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union, was the erosion of communism as a motivating international ideology and a source of significant external support for several countries in the world.

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From this reality, emerged other factors that had an impact on the international security environment, such as the subsequent decline in state-sponsorship for terrorist groups, the opening of territorial borders, the creation of surplus of arms, and the expansion of the market place to a near global status.

Conclusion Since the activities of organized crime organizations are especially focused on the smuggling of humans, arms, drugs and nuclear materials, a parallel system starts to work, with the two types of organizations feeding off each other, and structures utilizing human resources and communication/transportation/protection networks, aiming to meet the logistical requirements of terrorist organizations. Although it is relatively easy to cut the financial resources of terrorist organizations, to fight against organized crime and to counter extorted money by means of national and international police organizations, it is almost impossible, or at least very difficult, to resolve the issue totally since those actors who provide economic support also provide political support to the terrorist organization. For that reason it is possible to say that that the police struggle to stop the economic support can only be successful when political actors change their attitudes towards the terrorist organization. Actually, they provide a great political support to the terrorists by all possible means.

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Bibliography

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Abadinsky, Howard, Organized Crime (9th ed., Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010). IIT Research Institute, “A Study of Organized Crime” (Chicago Crime Commission Report, 1971). Castle, Allen, “Transnational Organized Crime and International Security,” (Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No.19, 1997). Lilley, Peter, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism (Kogan Page Limited, London, 2000). Shelly, Louise, “Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State,” Journal of International Affairs 48(2) (1995). United Nations, UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (UNODC, 2004). Vlasis, Dmitri, “The Global Situation of Transnational Organized Crime, The Decision of The International Community to Develop an International Convention and The Negotiation Process” (2000). von Lampe, Karl, “Not a Process of Enlightenment: The Conceptual History of Organized Crime in Germany and the United States of America,” Forum on Crime and Society 1(2) (2000). Williams, Phil, “Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances,” The Washington Quarter 18(1) (1994).

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What does Energy Security Mean? Mitat ÇELKPALA1 Istanbul Kadir Has University, Turkey

Abstract. Energy security has emerged as an issue of great importance. As well as the traditional aspects of energy security, a myriad of new aspects has emerged and continues to emerge such as tight oil and gas markets, increasing prices, alternative energy sources and their role, the threat of terrorism, instability in some exporting and importing countries, geopolitical rivalries, and the increasing need for energy to fuel economic growth. The concept of energy security is vague. Energy security is an umbrella term that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth and political power. Keywords. Energy, security, terrorism.

Introduction

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As Daniel Yergin has suggested, energy security became an issue on the eve of the first world war, when First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill made a historic decision to shift the power source of the British Navy’s ships from coal to oil. 2 Churchill’s basic intention behind this decision was to make the British fleet faster than its German counterpart. This underlying decision was a watershed event that made the issue of energy security an important issue of national strategy and security. With this decision, British decision makers shifted their attention towards the Middle East. This switch meant that the Royal Navy could rely not on coal from British sources anymore but instead had to rely on oil supplies from the Middle East. This meant a new strategy for the British decision makers and a new threat for security structures. Thus, from then on, energy security became a question of national strategy and energy security means in Churchill’s words “safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone.” Since Churchill’s momentous decision, energy security has repeatedly emerged as an issue of great importance and it is so once again in today’s world. Currently, as well as the traditional aspects of energy security, a myriad of new aspects has emerged and continues to emerge: tight oil and gas markets, increasing prices, alternative energy sources and their role, the threat of terrorism, instability in some exporting and importing countries, geopolitical rivalries, and the increasing need for energy to fuel economic growth. At present, the issue of energy security is not restricted to oil. High natural gas prices and the situation in the gas sector, the electric power blackouts in the US and power cuts in Europe, hurricanes and their negative

 1 2

Department of International Relations, e-mail: [email protected] Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85 (2006), pp. 69-70.

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effects on supply, and nuclear energy-related issues together with alternative resources make the issue more complicated. This presentation aims at discussing and analyzing the basic parameters of energy security by taking different aspects into account.

1. Definition: What does Energy Security Mean? The concept of energy security is vague. Definitions range from uninterrupted oil supplies to the physical security of energy facilities to support for bio-fuels and renewable energy sources. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that the energy security is an umbrella term that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth and political power. Traditionally, the concept of energy security was limited to the security of consuming countries and energy security issues focused on disruptions of the crude oil supply from the Middle East. From this perspective the traditional elements of energy security were classified as supply sources, demand centers, geopolitics and market structures. Especially during the energy crisis of the 1970s, the primary focus for the Western industrial countries was on sources of oil supply and geopolitics.3

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The current energy security system was created in the 1970s to counter the crude oil disruptions in the Middle East. As a response to the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the industrialized countries, most of whom were the members of the OECD, established the International Energy Agency. The basic aim of this organization was to ensure coordination among those countries to counter the disruption of energy supply, encourage collaboration on energy policies, avoid bruising scrambles for supplies, and deter any future use of an oil weapon by the exporters.4 Thus the term ‘energy security’ was narrowly viewed as reduced dependence on oil consumption and imports, particularly in the OECD and other major oil importing countries. From those days on, the term ‘diversification’ then became the main or key concept in energy security. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the term diversification is still a key concept in energy security, the environment and content has changed a lot in the last couple of decades. Some issues remained the same of course but some has changed. Regional and social turmoil are still unsettled in the main producing areas but there are new aspects in the system. The potential for global terrorism focused on energy supply systems was not a consideration in the mid-1970s. Currently global or local terrorism threatens the entire system. The Iraqi war or Iran’s nuclear program has led to oil and gas disruptions and could lead to new ones. Political turmoil in Nigeria and Venezuela could have serious consequences in the energy supply chain and have disrupted significant oil supplies. Climate change and related regulations as a new aspect of the energy security are also on the agenda. Natural disasters and their consequences are new phenomena that researchers have to take into account. The hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in 2005 showed everyone that consumers in the US or elsewhere are at risk and have to face new risks in terms of higher and more volatile prices, both at the gasoline pump and in their heating bills.



3 Cambridge Energy Research Associates, The New Energy Security Paradigm (World Economic Forum, 2006), availavle at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Energy.pdf (last visited June 4, 2012). 4 Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” p. 75.

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As a result, the G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg in July 2006 took energy security as the key concept in its agenda. The G-8 countries renewed their focus on energy security and discussed the tight oil market, high oil and gas prices, the threat of terrorism, instability in some exporting countries, a nationalist backlash in those regions, geopolitical rivalries and developing countries’ increasing need for energy to power their economic growth. The oil and gas crisis just before the economic crises in 2008 forced everyone to think about the issue of energy security on a wider dimension. With the overall energy system stretched to its limits, the critical physical connections between gas and power, between oil refineries and power, and between pipeline distribution systems and power led everyone on the planet to think about energy security-related issues once more. Thus the term energy security does not encompass only the flow of oil and diversification. It now extends to the entire infrastructure of energy supply that supports the global economy – off-shore platforms, long distance oil and gas pipelines, oil and gas tankers, as well as refineries, storage and generating facilities, transmission lines and distribution systems. More narrowly, energy security is defined as the “reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable prices” or as “securing adequate energy supplies at reasonable and stable prices in order to sustain economic performance and growth.” Within this definition, prices and supply diversity are critical components of energy security. It should be stressed that energy security (the continuous availability of energy in varied forms, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable prices) has several aspects. It means limited vulnerability to transient or longer disruptions of imported supplies. It also means the availability of local and imported resources to meet growing demand over time at reasonable prices. This perspective put three basic elements in front of us, essentially encapsulated in the energy security: availability, accessibility and affordability. Among those three elements, availability means availability on demand. We may clarify this by saying that when a country needs or wants energy, it should be available. Accessibility means the nation should be able to access energy sources globally in order to ensure uninterrupted growth. Affordability also means the affordability of the energy being procured to ensure that the growth engine is not impacted by the price impact. From this perspective, it could be said that while rich countries are able to find willing sellers, the issue of energy security gains importance for developing countries which have invested huge amounts of money in infrastructure but still face issues of high costs for energy. As a result, the energy security issue is becoming related with reducing risks and dealing with risks.5 Reducing risks is meant to reduce energy requirements by increasing efficiency in the production and use of energy. Looking at the global sources to stake equity and generate alternate sources of energy are other aspects. When it comes to the issue of dealing with risks, topics such as strategic storage, infrastructure, technology and inplace resources are coming to the fore. Thus the current definition of energy widens from how to handle any disruption of oil supplies from producing countries to include the protection of the entire energy supply chain and infrastructure. The challenge of energy security grows because the scale of the global trade in energy grows substantially as world markets become more integrated.



5 Hisham Khatib, “Energy Security,” in Energy and the Challange of Sustainability (UNDP, 2000), pp. 112131.

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In line with this perspective, Daniel Yergin defines ten key principles of energy security: 1. Diversification of energy supply source is the starting point for energy security. 2. There is only one oil market. 3. A ‘security margin’ consisting of spare capacity, emergency stocks and redundancy in critical infrastructure is important. 4. Relying on flexible markets and avoiding the temptation to micromanage them can facilitate speedy adjustment and minimizing long-term damage. 5. Understand the importance of mutual interdependence among companies and governments at all levels. 6. Foster relationships between suppliers and consumers in recognition of mutual interdependence. 7. Create a proactive physical security framework that involves both producers and consumers. 8. Provide good quality information to the public before, while and after a problem occurs. 9. Invest regularly in technological change within the industry. 10. Commit to research, development and innovation for longer-term energy balance and transitions.6

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As can be seen clearly from this analysis, the definition of the energy security widens to encompass different aspects of political, financial, technological, social and security agendas.

2. Maximizing Energy Security By taking these myriad aspects of the issue, some authors suggest different dimensions of energy security for both energy-consuming and energy-producing countries in order to reach a comprehensive and clear definition of the term. Alhaji identifies six competing dimensions of the term: economic, environmental, social, foreign policy, technical and security. 7 He argues that these dimensions reflect the integration of energy policy into other policies; balancing all these dimensions within an energy policy is not an easy task because, despite their universal and general character, the weight of each of these dimensions differs by place and time; the interaction between them also differs from country to country and from time to time. Thus, he sees the concept of energy security is “an amoebaean concept at its best.”8 It changes shape and dimensions continuously. Thus, a careful and efficient policy maker in the long run can only maximize energy security.

 6

Daniel Yergin, “Energy Security and Markets,” in Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, eds., Woodrow Wilson Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 7 A. F. Alhaji, “What is Energy Security,” Energy Politics IV (2008), pp. 62-82. 8 Ibid, p. 73.

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The economic dimension of energy security is related to the strength of the relationship between energy consumption and GDP. That necessitates the use of fiscal and monetary policies. The economic dimension of energy security ensures that the scarcity of energy resources does not stall economic growth, increase inflation, raise unemployment, weaken the balance of payments or reduce the value of a country’s currency. The impact of the scarcity of those resources on these key macroeconomic variables depends on the strength of the relationship between energy consumption and the GDP. The solution does not lie in the energy sector nor is it related to the policy makers in the ministries of energy but requires the use of fiscal and monetary policies. Therefore, fiscal and monetary policies should be integrated into any energy policy and vice versa. Policy makers can enhance the economic dimension of energy security through the implementation of a combination of fiscal and monetary policies. The environmental dimension is related to the incorporation of environmental objectives into energy policies. Pollution or increasing prices are aspects of the environmental dimension. Since the environmental impact of producing, transporting and burning fossil fuels has health and economic consequences, several countries have incorporated environmental objectives into their energy policy. Nevertheless the dichotomy of development and environmental concerns is still on the table.

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The social dimension is most ignored dimension of energy security. Most energy policies do not focus on the social dimension. The energy security debate mostly focuses on external factors that are related to the security of supplies and the political situation in the producing countries. The environmental dimension of the domestic aspects has precedence currently but the social dimension has barely attracted attention. The social dimension of energy security might require governments to intervene to reduce the energy gap between the rich and poor. The larger the proportion of the poor who are not able to get energy resources, the more energy insecurity the country experiences. When energy prices are high, the gap between the rich and the poor became obvious. The result of such an energy gap could well be political unrest, which will reduce economic growth. The foreign policy dimension of energy security deals with the relationship between energy sources and politics. Energy and politics are intertwined each other. A fear of shortage of energy resources may force a country into some disadvantageous relationships with countries having energy producing powers with which it would not otherwise cooperate. The need for energy might force some countries to take foreign policy decisions that would compromise them on other important issues or principles. Accordingly, several countries have linked energy security to strategic and defense considerations, an indication that they realize the foreign policy dimension of their country’s energy security. The need for energy might force some countries to limit their foreign policy options. This dimension thus focuses on diplomatic and trade relations. The technical dimension is a government’s push to improve energy security by supporting technologies that facilitate the production of renewable energy resources. Technology is the eternal partner of energy security. The security dimension of energy security deals with the physical security of the energy infrastructure and the energy needs of the security apparatus. Threats to the physical security of the energy infrastructure include terrorist attacks, human error,

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natural disasters and technical malfunctions. Measures of the security dimension include the geographical location of energy resources and facilities relative to the location of the market, the locations of various threats and the natural disaster prone areas. These measures also include frequency of terrorist attacks and energy consumption.

Conclusion

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In sum, all indications point to a broadening in the definition of energy security. There is improvement in energy security in all parts of the world, thanks to technological advances, adequacy of resources, and regional cooperation. The world will continue to depend on fossil fuels for decades to come. These fuels, nevertheless, have detrimental impacts on the environment that must be dealt with to achieve sustainable development. This requires promoting clean energy technologies, pursuing energy efficiency, developing renewable forms of energy, and providing technical assistance to developing countries, where most growth in energy use will take place. Being aware of all these facts, it has to be mentioned that no energy policy is complete or successful without focusing on energy security. A discussion of energy security is useless without understanding its meaning in order to able to measure and assess it. The energy market is global. Deregulation and market liberalization pose questions for energy security and for the future role of the state with respect to energy security. To improve energy security, any country needs to collect relevant, up-to-date data, measure the various dimensions and assess energy security. Only then can policy makers make an informed decision and protect their country from future crises. A market leading to innovation reduces costs, increases trade, improves allocation of resources, and spurs technological development, all of which enhance energy security. Markets also normally pursue short-term objectives, while energy security demands long-term planning, investment and political will. The state therefore needs to continue to play a role in ensuring national long-term security of supplies and protecting consumers.

Bibliography Alhaji, A. F., What is Energy Security, Energy Politics IV (2008). Cambridge Energy Research Associates,The New Energy Security Paradigm (World Economic Forum 2006). Khatib, Hisham, “Energy Security,” in Energy and the Challange of Sustainability (UNDP, 2000). Yergin, Daniel, Energy Security and Markets, in Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, eds., Woodrow Wilson Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). Yergin, Daniel, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85 (2006).

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The Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism Larry D. WHITE1 TOBB University of Economics and Technology

Abstract. The legal challenges of the fight against terrorism involve a two-step process; the initial step is to prevent terrorist attacks through the timely identification and arrest of terrorists and then trying to obtain time-sensitive information. The second step is to convict terrorists and discourage others by obtaining needed evidence to use the judicial process to obtain just results. Current issues addressed deal with the historical background and legal standards associated with the treatment of terrorists. Security forces involved in the fight against terrorists must be cognizant of international norms dealing with terrorism and how new issues like bounties created new problems in this area. The emergence of lawfare in the area of antiterrorism will be a new challenge where terrorists are starting to use the legal system to advance their causes. Planning must anticipate this issue. The legal procedures against terrorism cannot be ad hoc but should be planned before operations. Also, the distinction between terrorists and criminals should not be blended but treatment should stem from an early determination of a particular individual’s status. A final guideline for the students suggested that, although the minimum standards of treatment of suspected terrorists can be hard to pin down, the suspects should be treated at least as well as the security forces holding them. Keywords. Legal aspects of terror, combating terror, lawfare

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Introduction The primary fight against terrorism is done by security forces to protect the populace, but the secondary battle is in the legal system. Unless we ensure that the legal system is capable of dealing with the issue of terrorism so as to provide a disincentive to continue terrorism, then security forces will be playing ‘whack-a-mole’ with terrorists, always striking the place where the terrorists just were. Being proactive in the fight against terrorism entails ensuring that the battle is conducted within the correct legal parameters when engaged in actual operations or trying to obtain information about future operations, yet also entails ensuring the procedures followed in handling terrorists after capture will be sufficient to support legal action. This article addresses some of those concerns relating to the interaction of the legal community and the security forces. Section 1 addresses the interaction between legal concerns and security forces in the two phases of counterterrorism operations. Section 2 looks at current issues in the legal aspects of counterterrorism while Section 3 formulates those issues into concrete recommendations for the future. 1

J.D. School of Law, Ankara, Turkey. Email: [email protected].

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1. Legal Challenges in the Fight against Terrorism Although not at the forefront of security forces, legal advisors have to be an integral part of the planning and execution of counterterrorist operations, otherwise opportunities can be lost either by failing to not be aggressive enough based on an excess amount of concern for legal issues or by being too aggressive so as to interfere with human rights and preventing prosecution of the guilty. However, it is appropriate for security forces to be familiar with broad legal concepts so as to aid them in making correct decisions on the spot. For ease of understanding, these will be discussed in two phases – prevention and conviction. 1.1. Prevent Terrorist Attacks The primary goal of all security forces is to prevent terrorist attacks and the subsequent loss of life or injuries. There are two parts to this: the timely identification of terrorists to prevent the attacks and developing time-sensitive information that allows these actions. To some extent, these are self-reinforcing concepts.

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To prevent terrorism, it is essential to find and stop the terrorists before they can strike. This will often require their arrest or at least interference in the actions of the suspected terrorists. It is a fundamental principle of democratic societies that governments, particularly security forces, can only interfere with the lives of people based on solid evidence. It does not to have be evidence sufficient to convict, but should be enough to provide an individualized suspicion of the particular person. If search or questioning of possible suspects is done based on personal (benign) characteristics like how they look – skin color or facial features, for example – this is not individualized suspicion but is instead (racial) profiling, a concept contrary to human rights concerns.2 Individualized suspicion can only be based on actions – the action that a particular individual has taken that mark him/her as a suspect. The more actions of a person that can be considered to be suspicious, the stronger the individualized suspicion is and the stronger the action that can be taken against him or her. One or two actions may be sufficient to allow non-intrusive surveillance, while one or two more may be required for a judge to allow intrusive surveillance (search of home or electronic surveillance of telephones, for example). Other actions or evidence found based on the previous actions may be then sufficient to allow for arrest and questioning. As can be clearly seen, developing the intelligence to know what actions are suspicious is key to effective prevention of terrorist attacks. To minimize false responses, ideally a set of actions could be determined and employed. The second aspect of this issue – obtaining the necessary intelligence – is actually intertwined with the first. Having a good reason for stopping and questioning an individual in relation to antiterrorism activities is dependent upon the information that a member of the security force has – which actions tend to indicate that a person of interest may be involved in terrorist activities? This can be answered a number of ways but three of them involve the capture of a possible terrorist. First, the terrorist may give up information willingly in an interview. Second, the information can be given up 2 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Muslim Profiles Post 9/11: Is Racial profiling an Effective Countermeasure and Does It Violate the Right to be Free from Discrimination? (University of Chicago, Olin Paper 288, March 2006).

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in reward for some incentive – no prosecution, favorable sentencing or other benefits.3 Third, once a terrorist has been identified, an analysis of his/her planned activities, combined with an investigation into recent activities provides an excellent information source. All three of these methods can be helpful to developing guidelines for security personnel to use in order to determine whether a particular person poses a threat to society or not and giving a permissible basis for taking action. For the prevention of attacks, the two functions of timely identification of a terrorist threat and obtaining information are mutually supporting. 1.2 Convict Terrorists and Discourage Others When we transition to the judicial process to prosecute terrorists in order to discourage others, we need to be able to properly obtain evidence and achieve a just result.

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The process of obtaining evidence is the point where security forces objectives begin to diverge. Once the immediate threat is past, the security forces, whether a single force operating in both the normal police and counterterrorist roles or separate forces for each role, need to transition to the evidence preservation mode for possible prosecutions. The proper gathering of evidence, coupled with the proper chain-ofcustody procedures, is critical to successful criminal prosecutions. An error in either collection or custody can undermine a prosecution and force a dismissal of the case or an acquittal. For this reason, having an evidentiary specialist embedded in the security forces may be advisable. Additionally, offers of immunity or light sentences to minor players in the terrorist organization may help develop multiple ways to the critical evidence in case an error is made at some point in time; having an alternate path to the same evidence may allow help overcome procedural errors. The procedures used in the trials, as well as the perceived fairness in the trials, are critical to counterterrorism efforts. Since terrorism, by definition, has a political purpose, the trials will serve a political purpose – if the trials are perceived as biased for the state, then they serve the terrorist purpose; if the trials are perceived as fair, they serve the purpose of the state. Care must also be taken to not allow the terrorist defendant(s) to mount a political attack rather than a defense in the courtroom; close control of the trials by the judges will counter this possibility. International human rights law sets forth the criteria for a trial to be recognized internationally as fair – presumption of innocence, right to effective counsel, and an independent, impartial tribunal – are among them. Failure to provide a fair trial may hurt even worse than no trial at all. The international community must be convinced that the trial was conducted fairly – even if normal national procedures are followed – if the government is to have credibility in the prosecutions. As security forces transition from a mindset of preventing attacks to one of prosecuting attacks, the professional collection and handling of evidence goes hand in hand with achieving a just result in the process.

3 See Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of American Values (Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p.154 (quoting Brigadier Ewan Duncan, British Army).

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2. Current Issues Just as legal principles evolve over time, so do the issues associated with legal tools to fight terrorism. This article will now examine five such issues. 2.1 Standard of Care The standard of care that must be provided to detainees has been a matter of discussion for the last nine years. When in a peacetime situation, the basic standard would be derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where Article 25 states that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living … including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.” It has been argued that in the nature of a war against terrorism, that perhaps such standards are not applicable because such detainees would be more combatants than criminals, as is normal in antiterrorism operations. However, even in the failure to qualify for protection as a combatant, a detainee under the laws of armed conflict is entitled to certain minimum protections as is contained in Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, often called Common Article 3 because it is common to all four treaties. These provisions are designed to ensure that all people, regardless of their status in the conflict, are treated humanely, and are not to be humiliated or degraded. There can also be no violence to life, especially no cruelty or torture.4 The problem lies in the large variances in interpretation of Article 3 that are possible. The wording of the provisions of Article 3 is vague and easy to meet, according to some interpretations, without providing any real protection. Without further formal definition or case law, Article 3 could be viewed as an empty promise.

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2.2 Bounty Programs The recent use of bounty programs has shown this idea to be dangerous. The use of bounty programs in Afghanistan resulted in a number of detainees being held whose only crime appears to have been having a personal enemy with a damaged moral compass.5 Bounty programs, where payments are tied to just producing the person, invite such abuse. If bounty programs are used at all, payments should be based on conviction of the person turned in. Another check would be to hold an immediate status hearing for the person turned in with the hearing officer having the power to order the immediate release of the alleged terrorist. Unless such controls are implemented, the use of bounty programs is not likely to be effective in producing a high percentage of actual terrorists. 2.3 Torture The use of torture is clearly in violation of international norms. The Pinochet case in the UK clearly indicated the supremacy of the Convention against Torture over all others treaties – there is no acceptable justification for torture in the eyes of the 4

See Gary D. Solis and Fred L. Borch, Genera Conventions (Kaplan Publishing, 2010), pp. 26-29. See Laurel E. Fletcher and Eric Stover, The Guantanamo Effect: Exposing the Consequences of U.S. detention and Interrogation Practices (University of Californai Press, 2009), p. 118. 5

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international community. 6 However, the problem comes in trying to define what torture is. In the most recent instance of allegations of torture, the U.S. settled on a precise definition that focused on organ failure or lasting injury – basically allowing any level of pain that caused no permanent damage. Although this certainly provided a workable definition, but the outcry of the international community in protest has been vocal. Therefore, this standard remains ill-defined but the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has had mixed results at best – post-event justification has tried to justify the methods used based on the amount of operational intelligence obtained, and the resulting savings of lives, but it is clear that al-Qaeda operatives had been trained in counterinterrogation techniques and were able to resist questioning for a long time, requiring extended application of ‘enhanced techniques.’ Still most experts contend that harsh techniques are counterproductive in the fight against terrorism and have limited value with very real legal complications, such as the inadmissibility of evidence obtained using such techniques and the prosecution of the interrogators later. 7 Logically, if prosecution of a terrorist suspect is anticipated, any questionable techniques should not be used at all. Post-World War II and Cold War analysis has shown that less coercive techniques are normally more successful and comport better with the counterterrorist techniques that encourage terrorists to give up the fight and turn themselves in. Security forces need to focus on developing and training in more humane techniques because torture, even in its mildest forms in illegal and counterproductive in the fight against terrorism.

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2.4 Historical The historical aspects of this issue, where we have distinguished terrorists from other types of fighters, cannot be ignored. In World War II, the concept of unlawful combatants was used for German infiltrators who came ashore in the U.S. in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Applying the same, the infiltrators were tried by military commission and executed. The unlawful combatant procedures were also used in Angola against American and British mercenaries fighting there. After the 9/11 terrorists attacks, the same mass desire for retribution existed in the U.S. as it had in World War II, so the idea of the military commission was resurrected. This was initially applied to the foreign fighters, not of Afghan nationality, who opposed international forces fighting against the Taliban government of Afghanistan. The NATO nations had taken action against the Taliban government for harboring the al Qaeda terrorists. Although the foreign fighters in Afghanistan probably are correctly labeled as unlawful combatants because they had no command structure under a government, did not use distinctive insignia, and did not follow the rules of war. However, the suspected terrorists captured in Iraq and Afghanistan who have been tagged with the same label probably are not – they made no pretense of fighting against another force 6

Sands, Torture Team, p. 184. Jane Meyer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals (Anchor Press, 2009).

7

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but instead targeted the civilian populace – a terrorist targeting strategy. Therefore those terrorists committed criminal acts, not wartime act. This problem most likely began with the pronouncement of President George Bush that a ‘war’ against terrorism existed, thereby blurring the distinction between terms used for combatants and terrorists, and thereby blurring the terms, treatments, and distinction in treatment as well. Declaring that a ‘state of war’ exists triggers a new situation with the legal implication that the Geneva Conventions will control (allowing privileged killing under certain circumstances) the situation rather than international human rights law (that prohibits killing). Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this issue is the apparent assumption that military commission – trials by military officers – is automatically a bad thing. Based on the opposition that the legal community has shown to this concept, one might think military commissions would guarantee 100% conviction, but that has not been the case nor should one expect it. A military commission, closely resembling a court-martial in procedure and protections, composed of experienced combat veterans, could react sympathetically to someone who is considered to be a true ‘freedom fighter.’ History shows that military officers sitting on such commissions will exercise independent judgment. However, the most recent example in application – the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan – have shown the danger in getting so bogged down in procedure that justice is delayed although the blame for this lies squarely with the legal community. Although it may not have evolved along with human rights law, the historical basis of the concept of unlawful combatants should not be forgotten because it provides an incentive to follow the laws of armed conflict and to prevent terrorists from trying to evolve into this concept.

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2.5 Lawfare Just like quickly adapting to the use of the Internet, terrorists have also started to adopted the use of ‘lawfare.’ Defined as the use of legal concepts to further the battle, documents recovered from al Qaeda bases, as well as the actions of the terrorists themselves, show that it is apparent that terrorist groups have thought about lawfare. In particular, the misuse of legal defenses to take the opportunity to orate in courtrooms as well as the use of constitutional rights to delay court proceedings with no practical benefit other and manipulation of media coverage displays cognizance of the value of warfare.

3. Recommendations As a result of this discussion, we can come to some observations as to what needs to be done from a practical aspect. Through proper planning, many of these problems can be avoided or at least anticipated, not the least of which is ensuring that the distinction between terrorists (criminals) and combatants (lawful or not) is maintained. Although it can be difficult to define minimum standards for treatment of detainees, whether they be suspected terrorists or combatants, the treatment must be humane. In all cases, human rights must be respected, all the way to any trial that may take place later.

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3.1 Planning Must Anticipate This Issue When planning counterterrorist operations, flushed-out provisions must be made for detainees from the start. After operations start, there is no time to develop a plan for detainees on the fly. Detainees must be removed from the scene of operations as soon as possible while at the same time either beginning to prosecute or beginning to interrogate for tactical information. If either is done wrong, valuable intelligence could be lost or a violation of criminal procedure could occur that may preclude prosecution. 3.2 Combatants or Criminals? The principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as recognized by the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, establish a desire of the international community to regulate the conduct of war. While recognizing that war is not a desired state, but may happen, IHL has created the distinction of ‘unlawful combatant.’ However, in practice, the international community has found that label to be harsh and demanded that unlawful combatants be tried as lawful combatants or as criminals. This thinking is false – the status of a combatant is far from that of a criminal and does disservice to the lawful combatant by undermining the incentives under UHL for a combatant to adhere to the principles and rules of IHL and remain lawful. If all those who claim combatant status are treated the same, there is no incentive to adhere to IHL. The sanctions imposed on an unlawful combatant were intended to be harsh – and should remain so – as a means to moderate the horrors of war.

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This system has been somewhat confused by the so-called war on terrorism that President George Bush declared in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks – by ‘declaring war’ on terrorism, he created confusion in this classification and incentive system that leads to a dilution of the protections of IHL. Those who commit terrorist acts (targeting the civilian populace) are criminals; unlawful combatants can only come from those who target only military targets in the service of a political entity. 3.3 Minimum Standards for Detainee Treatment It can be difficult for a commander of security forces to understand what has to be provided to detainees. Although Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention provides some guidelines, and international human rights law does as well, the tactical situation may not allow for a lot of debate over the subject. However, a fair reading of the applicable documents would result in a conclusion that a commander should ensure that any detainees are protected from danger (especially retribution) and are fed equivalent to what the security forces have for food. Doing so may provide for more than is necessary in some cases but will arguably ensure that the commander did his best consistent with the situation. 3.4 Terrorist Proceedings Must Conform to Other Procedures As the discussion in Section 3.2 supra covered, keeping the division between terrorists as criminals separate from the status of ‘unlawful combatant’ is advisable. However, criminals and unlawful combatants are still entitled with a minimum level of procedural and substantive fairness in any proceedings against them. Common Article

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3 requires that detainees be tried by a “regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Although this a very broad statement subject to differing interpretation, the Universal Convention on Human Rights requires a presumption of innocence before a fair and impartial court with the assistance of counsel. Many nations provide more protections in their criminal and should provide such protections, or the equivalent, to those accused of terrorism, either as a criminal or as a combatant.

Conclusion Security forces must pay attention to the legal aspects of the fight against terrorists throughout the fight. Not only do we have to be careful while preventing attacks, but also in ensuring that no mistakes are made in the prosecution of terrorists, because one way to discourage terrorism is through sure prosecution of terrorists. Although the legal aspects of the fight against terrorism can sometimes complicate the operational aspects, it is important that the legal aspects not be forgotten. If security forces fail to follow their own laws regarding the treatment of terrorists, then the overall faith in the legal system is reduced within the populace. It also discourages the surrender of terrorists and may prolong the conflict. Outside of the country, this situation discourages foreign development and investment. In the end, the failure to ensure minimum levels of treatment of suspected terrorists discourages peaceful resolution and supports the terrorist cause.

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Bibliography Harcourt, Bernard E., Muslim Profiles Post 9/11: Is Racial profiling an Effective Countermeasure and Does It Violate the Right to be Free from Discrimination? (University of Chicago, Olin Paper 288, March 2006). Meyer, Jane, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals (Anchor Press, 2009). Sands, Philippe, Torture Team: Rumfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of American Values (Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). Solis, Gary D., and Fred L. Borch, Genera Conventions (Kaplan Publishing, 2010). .

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Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism Dan Radu VOICA1 Centre of Excellence – Defence against Terrorism, Ankara

Abstract. During the first decade of this century, terrorist attacks claimed thousands of lives in New York, London, Madrid, Bali, Jakarta, Mumbay, Istanbul, Ankara, Amman, Riyadh, Baghdad, Kabul and many other cities in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world. Meanwhile, in many countries such as Canada, England, Germany, Pakistan and the U.S., among others, significant terror plots have been disrupted. Clearly the international community is facing a terrorist threat of historical proportions; countering this threat requires an understanding of both the intensions and capabilities of terrorist groups and individuals (lone wolves) to carry out violent acts. The national counterterrorist strategies mainly focus on constricting the capabilities of terrorists (through military action and disrupting the financial and logistics networks, all of which require a significant amount of intelligence capabilities) and destroying their will to attack. This is particularly the case when addressing the threat of terrorists who seek to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction2 (WMD). However, there is much more that nations and international organizations can do to understand and counter the ideological motivations behind the threat of catastrophic terrorism. Key words. terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological weapons, NATO.

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Introduction From the late 1940s until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the world lived with the constant threat of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War offered hope that the nuclear arsenals built by the United States, Russia, China, and other countries would never be used and might eventually be completely dismantled. But a new nuclear threat quickly arose. In the final years of the 20th century and in the early years of the 21st, international terrorist organizations have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to kill large number of innocent civilians. They have also made efforts to gain access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 1

Colonel Dan Radu VOICA (RO) is an instructor at the Center of Excellence -- Defence against Terrorism. The first use of the term on record is by Cosmo Gordon Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1937 in reference to the Luftwaffe German aerial bombardment on the town of Guernica, Spain. The attack reportedly lasted for 3 hours, destroyed 70% of the town, killed a third of the population and it served as a testing ground for a new military tactic – blanket-bombing of a civilian population to demoralize the enemy. Although the phrase”Weapons of Mass Destruction” was used to describe the massive amount of damage by conventional bombs, it was not associated with biological or chemical weapons. Now, the term is widely used to denote nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. For some, particularly in the wake of 9/11 airliner attacks, the term WMD has come to include any means capable of inflicting mass casualties. Cosmo Gordon Lang, “Archbishop's Appeal," Times (London) (28 December 1937), p. 9. 2

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including nuclear weapons, by contacting nuclear weapon scientists and casing nuclear facilities.3 The motivations that inspire terrorists to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons4 are their awesome potential. While a largescale biological attack could cause more fatalities than or as many fatalities as nuclear detonation, indeed some powerful nuclear weapons are able to destroy the core of a major city.

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In the past, CBRN weapons have been accessible only to state actors. This position has been guaranteed through technical, financial and logistical problems associated with the production, maintenance and dissemination of such agents. With the passage of time, these ‘barriers to entry’ have gradually become blurred, reaching the point where CBRN agents are increasingly accessible to terrorist organizations. Also, advances in dual-use technologies have reduced the technical barriers associated with the production of chemical or biological agents. While there is disagreement among experts and scientists on the ease of use of serviceable CBR agents, several believe that they are within reach of both groups and individuals. Mainly, the disagreements over the ease by which terrorist organizations could use these agents are in reference to the different phases required for the production of CBRN weapons: development, storage, dissemination; completing each stage requires specific knowledge and skills. With information on the production stage increasingly available, we can argue that production is easier today than a few years ago. For example, in July 2002, a group of scientists were able to create a polio virus using segments of DNA ordered by mail and genetic information publicly available on the Internet. The synthetic virus was effective when injected into animals – demonstrating the potential to carry out agroterrorism. Also, in 2003, a ‘sting operation’ conducted by the US General Accounting Office found that individuals and companies could easily purchase the precursor materials needed to produce certain biological weapons through the Defense Department’s surplus material sales. With respect to radiological threats, the materials needed to make ‘dirty’ bombs are theoretically within reach. Hospitals regularly cache or dispose of radioactive material, as do many other institutions using such materials. In reference to the dissemination stage, some specialists agree that terrorist organizations still require specialized tools and know-how that are not widely known, making serviceable CBR agents a difficult objective to attain. Further complicating the task of maintaining CBRN agents is the need to ensure adequate storage. In the case of biological agents, the micro-organisms require specific protection against the elements, which can lead to desiccation, humidity and oxidation,5 while in the case of radioactive materials, the handling and storage process to avoid accidental exposure is very complex. Despite disagreements, it is likely that many of the challenges faced today will be overcome over time.

3

David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” The Washington Quarterly 2 (2)(Spring 2005), pp. 111-128. 4 CBRNE is an acronym referring to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives. It is in common use worldwide, generally to refer to protective measures taken against CBRNE weapons or hazards. 5 Verena Wohlleben, “Civil Protection, a General Overview,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 143 CC 03 rev.1 (8 November 2003), available at http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=357 (last visited Jun. 19, 2012).

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1. WMD Weapons As stated above, there are four generally accepted categories of WMD that terrorists may seek to acquire and use in an attack: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear devices, ranging from the silent threat of a poison gas attack to a cataclysmic nuclear explosion. Those who would launch such attacks know thousands could die, of course, but their fundamental motive would be to strike fear and panic among the population.6 1.1 Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons (CW)7 are considered the simplest and cheapest of the WMDs. A terrorist organization could produce a CW from materials available at the local pharmacy, sabotage an existing chemical plant or contaminate a water resource. The resulting toxic cloud or water would enter into populated areas and public places like shopping malls, railway stations and airports, causing fear and panic and thus achieving the major terrorist objective. Although, such places usually have (private) security guards, their education and training does not equip them with the necessary skills to combat chemical terrorism. Although most people believe that CW has been used only in the 20th Century, the truth is they have been used since 431 BC.8 Coming to the 20th Century, the first to use it was the French Army9 during WW I, followed by the Germans,10; due to the effects and panic that these weapons raised, after the war many nations began to research and produce11 such reasons.

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Chemical agents are either persistent or non-persistent type. Non-persistent ones are designed to dissipate or degrade after they come in contact with wind, water, sunshine, and/or other natural elements. Persistent agents, however, have an oily base and are designed to remain in place and deny access to personnel in the area where they are used. Another classification used by the specialists is military toxins and ecological toxins. There are 5 categories of military toxins:

6 Liza Porteus, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Handbook,” Fox News (20 June 2006), available at http://www.foxnews.com /story/ 0,2933,76887,00.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 7 Use various chemical substances, dispersed in liquid, vapor, gas, or aerosol form to cause incapacitation, injury, or death of the target population including humans, animals, and plants. Civilian and commercial chemical installations can easily be converted to CW products. Damage is generally limited to the immediate target area, though some chemicals can remain for years. See NTI, “Understanding the Chemical Weapons Threats,” at http://www.nti.org/threats/chemical/ (last visited Jun, 19, 2012). 8 In 429 B.C. , the Spartans burned wood drenched in sulfur and pitch to produce clouds of suffocating sulfur dioxide in their sieges against Athenian cities. Adrienne Mayor, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World (Overlook Duckworth, 2009), p. 222. 9 August 1914, the French Army fired for the first time tear-gas grenades against the Germans. See Ludwig Fritz Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford University Press, 1986). 10 In 1915, at Ypres, Belgium, the German Army used chemical weapons (approximately 160 tons of chlorine gas). Ibid. 11 During the 20th Century, about 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as chemical weapons (CW) agents. World Health Organization, “Chemical Warfare Agents,” at http://www.searo.who.int/en/ Section23/Section1001/Section1471_5997.htm (last visited Jun. 19, 2012).

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x

Nerve agents are agents that attack the victim’s nervous system, and most belong to the family of chemicals known as organophosphates.

x

Blister agents, also known as vesicants, attack the skin of the victim resulting in blisters and skin burns. Mustard gas and Lewisite are the most common.

x

Blood agents attack the ability of the blood to hold and deliver oxygen, making the victim to suffocate. The most common types of these agents are cyanide gases and compounds.

x

Choking agents attack the lungs causing them to fill with fluid; typical agents are chlorine gas and Phosgene.

x

Incapacitating agents usually irritate the skin, mucous membranes, eyes, nose, lips and mouth, and they may cause vomiting or intolerable pain. While they may lead to serious medical situation such as seizure or heart attacks, they are not designed to kill or cause permanent harm. Used alone, the intention is to temporary incapacitate or harass the target, or force them to evacuate the area. However, incapacitating agents may be used in combination with other agents to force responders to remove their gas masks and other protective gear, so that they will be exposed to lethal doses of other agents. Examples of incapacitation agents are pepper spray, tear gas, riot control agents and several military chemicals from different nations.12

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CW can be delivered by a wide variety of weapon systems, including missiles, aerial bombs, artillery shells, and land mines. According to a General Accounting Office report, during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq delivered Mustard Gas and Tabun with artillery shells, aerial bombs, missiles, rocket grenades, and bursting smoke munitions. The Soviets also have Scud-B and FROG-7 weapons which can deliver warheads filled with chemical agents and North Korea is also believed to have developed chemical weapons for its Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles. However, chemical agent-filled warheads delivered by ballistic missiles pose some complex engineering problems. Each warhead would have to be engineered to a specific agent since each agent has different and unique proprieties. For maximum effectiveness, the warheads are fused to detonate at a set altitude depending on the agent carried; different agents require different concentrations and dispersals in order to be effective. For this reason, missiles fitted with spray tanks would serve as particularly effective delivery vehicles.13 When talking about ecological toxins, these are capable of damaging both the ecosystem and health. Agents Orange, White, Green, and Pink, for example, were first used in South Vietnam to destroy crops and cattle herds. Agent Orange, contained Dioxin – the most toxic substance ever known by mankind.14 Agent Orange was sprayed at a rate of about 22.3 lb/acre (25 kg/ha), equivalent to about ten times the rate 12 Robert J. Heyer, Introduction to CBRNE Terrorism: An Awareness Primer and Preparedness Guide for Emergency Responders (DERA, January 10, 2006), available at http://www.disasters.org/dera/ library/ Heyer%20WMD.pdf (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 13 Steven L. Hoenig, Handbook of Chemical Warfare and Terrorism (Greenwood Press, 2002), p. 2. 14 1 gram contains 14 million lethal doses, and the half-life time is 9-25 years at surface and in deeper layers 25-100 years. For humans the half-life time is 5-7 years. Dan Radu Voica, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats from Terrorism,” COE-DAT Newsletter 4(18) (Jan-Mar 2011), p. 20.

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at which those same chemicals were used for plant control in forestry. The spray rate was much more intense because the intention was to destroy the ecosystems through ecocide, rather than to manage them towards a more positive purpose. Another example was the use of petroleum as a chemical weapon during Gulf War I (1991). The Iraqis deliberately released almost 1 million tons (900,000 metric tons) of crude oil into the Persian Gulf from several tankers and an offshore facility for loading tankers. The oil was spilled to establish a defensive barrier against an amphibious counterinvasion of Kuwait by coalition forces. Presumably, if the immense quantities of spilled petroleum could have been ignited, the floating inferno might have provided an effective barrier to a seaborne invasion. The spilled oil might also have created some military advantage by contaminating the seawater intakes of Saudi Arabian desalination plants, which were supplying most of that nation's fresh water and, therefore, had great strategic value.15 1.2 Biological Weapons (BW) Biological warfare (BW) is the use of microorganisms (or pathogens) dispersed by animals, aerosol packages, artillery shells, or warheads, to cause sickness or death. Symptoms of illness do not appear immediately but only after a delay, or incubation period, that may last for days to weeks and, even in some cases, years. The level of damage depends primarily on the biological agent’s transmissibility, lethality, and susceptibility to countermeasures.16

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Terrorism involving BW – referred to by some specialists as "the poor man's nuclear weapon" – can range from putting deadly substances in the nation's food or water supply to the aerosolized release of a contagious virus over a city the size of New York or Istanbul. Because biological agents often take weeks or months to take their toll, public health systems often cannot pinpoint bioterrorism right away because symptoms often mirror ones exhibited by a person with the common cold or the flu. The intentional use of living organisms or infected materials derived from them has occurred over centuries during times of war and peace by armies, states, groups and individuals.17 One of the first recorded uses of a biological agent in the war was in 184 BC. The Carthaginian soldiers led by Hannibal used snakes in the battle against King Eumenes of Perganium and achieved a victory.18 Also, as early as 300 BC, the Greeks polluted the wells and drinking water supplies of their enemies with animal corpses. The use of catapults and siege machines introduced new technology to biological warfare. Some of the more recent events of biological warfare are chronicled below: x

Between 1930 and 1942, Japanese Unit 731 (specialized in Band C warfare) released up to 15 million plague-infected fleas in the Chinese cities of Quxian and Ning-hsien, resulting in at least 120 deaths. Water supplies and food items

15 Bill Freeman, Environmental Ecology: The Effects of Pollution, Disturbance and Other Stresses, (2nd ed., Academic Press, 1994), pp. 400-401. 16 Susan D. Moller, “Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction “ (University of Maryland Paper, March 9, 2004), available at http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/wmdstudy_full.pdf (last visited Jun. 178, 2012). 17 Nicholas J. Beeching, et al, “Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism,” BMJ 324 (2002), pp. 324-336. 18 George W. Christopher, et al, “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective,” Journal of the American Medical Association 278 (5) (1997), pp. 412-417.

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were also contaminated with B. anthracis, V. Cholera, Shigella spp., Salmonella and Yersinia pestis. x

In 1970, a United States revolutionary group called the Weather Underground, intended to obtain agents at Ft. Detrick by blackmail and to temporarily incapacitate United States cities to demonstrate the impotence of the federal government. Report originated with a US Customs informant.

x

In 1972, Allen Schwander and Stephen Pera, two American college students, influenced by the ecoterrorist ideology and the 1960s drug culture, formed the R.I.S.E. organization and planned on using agents of typhoid fever, diphtheria, dysentery and meningitis to target the entire world population initially and later narrowed the plan to five cities near Chicago. The attack was aborted when the cultures were discarded.

x

In 1984, the Indian religious cult headed by Rajneeshee plotted to contaminate restaurant salad bars with Salmonella typhimanice in Dallas, Oregon. The motivation was to incapacitate voters in order to win local elections and seize political control of the county; the incident resulted in a large community outbreak of salmonellosis involving 751 patients and at least 45 hospitalizations. The plot was revealed when the cult collapsed and members turned into informants.

x

In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, the New Age Doomsday cult seeking to establish a theocratic state in Japan, attempted at least 10 times to use anthrax, botulinum toxin, Q fever agent and Ebola virus in aerosol form. All attempts with biological weapons failed. Multiple chemical weapon attacks with Sarin, Vx, and hydrogen cyanide in Matsumato, Tokyo and an assassination campaign were conducted. The release of the nerve gas Sarin killed 12 and injured 5500 in a Tokyo subway.

x

In Texas in 1997, the intentional contamination of muffins and donuts with laboratory cultures of Shigella dysenteriae caused gastroenteritis in 45 laboratory workers and 4 were hospitalized.

x

In 1998, Larry Wayne Harris allegedly threatened to release ‘military grade anthrax’ in Las Vegas, Nevada. He obtained plague and anthrax (vaccine strains) then repeatedly isolated several other bacteria. He made vague threats against US federal officials on behalf of right wing ‘patriot’ groups but When arrested when he talked openly about biological weapons terrorism.

x

In 2001, an unknown individual/group intentionally disseminated anthrax spores through the U.S. Postal System leading to the death of five people, infecting 22 others and contaminating several government buildings. Investigation into the attacks so far had not led to any conclusions.

Far more, BW has also been used for political assassinations. For example, the umbrella weapon used to fire ricin in the case of Bulgarian resident Gheorghi Markov, in London (1978). On September 7, 1978 Markov, 49, who worked for the BBC and lived in London since defecting to the West in 1969, was waiting for a bus on Waterloo Bridge. He felt a slight sharp pain, as if from a bug bite or sting, on the back of his right thigh. He looked behind him and saw a man picking up an umbrella off the ground. The

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man hurriedly crossed to the other side of the street and got in a taxi which than drove away. The event is recalled as the ‘Umbrella Murder’ with the assassin claimed to be Francesco Gullino codename ‘Agent Piccadilly.’ Markov died at the hospital 4 days later. The files suggest that the hit was arranged for 50,000 pounds and a key figure was former Bulgarian Intelligence chief general Vladimir Todorov (jailed in 1992 for 16 months for destroying files).19 Another known attempt was on CIA double agent Boris Korczak in the U.S. state of Virginia (1978). He was also shot with a ricin-laced pellet while shopping in Giant Food store in Vienna, Virginia.20 Based on the ease of transmission, severity of morbidity, mortality, and likelihood of use, biological agents can be classified into three categories: A, B and C. Category A includes the highest priority agents that pose a risk to national security because of the following features: they can be easily disseminated or transmitted person-to-person to cause secondary and tertiary cases, they cause high mortality with potential for major public health impact including the impact on health care facilities, they may cause public panic and social disruption and require special action for public health preparedness. Some of the agents are: Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin), Plague (Yersinia pestis), Smallpox (variola major), Tularemia (Francisella tularensis), Viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses [e.g., Ebola, Marburg] and arenaviruses [e.g., Lassa, Machupo]). Category B are moderately easy to disseminate, result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates, but require specific enhancements of the CDC's (U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention) diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance, while Category C includes emerging pathogens, such as Nipah virus and hantavirus, that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of availability, ease of production and dissemination, and potential for high morbidity/mortality rates with major health impact.

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1.3 Radiological Weapons These weapons use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material, with different radiological levels such as nuclear waste or radioactive isotopes over an area, and cause radiation sickness, cancer, death (eventually), and contamination of the target: Contamination of downwind areas makes the immediate zone uninhabitable until cleaned up or razed. These weapons are useful primarily as an area denial weapon forcing evacuation. This weapon can be also used to contaminate livestock, fish and food crops. While many members of the public associate the term ‘dirty bomb’ with any type of radiological weapon (RW), or even a nuclear detonation, we strictly refer to the spread of radioactive material.

19 Jon Clemons, “New Clue to Georgi Markov Umbrella Assassin as Police see Cold War Files,” Daily Mirror (February 01, 2010), available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/new-clue-to-georgi-markovumbrella-198439 (last visited Jun. 19, 2012). During the autopsy, the forensic pathologists discovered a 1.52 mm in diameter spherical metal pellet composed of 90% platinum and 10% iridium. It had 2 holes with diameters of 0,35 mm drilled through it, which contained ricin. A sugary substance coated the tiny holes creating a bubble which trapped the ricin inside the cavities. Ibid. 20 Wikipedia. “Boris Korczak,” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Korczak(last visited Jun. 19, 2012).

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In the policy and technical literature, three terms are used: radiological dispersal device (RDD), radiation emission device (RED), and radiological incendiary device (RID). Of these, the RDD encompasses the largest variety of mechanisms, which could include explosive or non-explosive and passive or active means, to spread radioactive material. An RED refers particularly to a stationary or mobile radioactive source that emits radiation. Terrorists, criminals, or other malicious people could use an RED to expose many people, few people, or just one specific person to ionizing radiation. The former and possibly the intermediate acts are usually associated with terrorists because they would typically want to instill fear in many people. In contrast, a criminal would most likely try to harm or kill one or a few people; this was the case in the 2006 poisoning-murder of Russian dissident Alexander Litvinenko, who died after ingesting Polonium-210. An RID refers to a device that couples fire with radioactive material. One reason a terrorist group may want to use an RID is to complicate firefighter efforts to rescue people and protect property.21 Emergency responders would have to contend not only with public panic regarding the fire, but also with the radioactivity. Radioactive materials are available from military, medical, academic, research and industrial sources. For example, Cobalt-60 is used in food irradiation, while Americium is used in smoke detectors and oil exploitation. The health effects depend on the type of radioactive material used; certain radioactive isotopes, such as Cesium-137 and Cobalt60, tend to be more deadly than, for example, nuclear waste. Damage is limited to the immediate area of the explosion and an area downwind of the target.22 Atomic experts say that the explosion of a dirty bomb containing one kilogram of plutonium in the center of Munich, Germany, could ultimately lead to 120 cancer cases attributable to the blast.23

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Methods of detonating a dirty bomb include devices such as bombs or artillery shells that could be used to disperse harmful radioactive material. Most radioactive material is not soluble in water, so that virtually rules it out as a way for terrorists to contaminate reservoirs or other water supplies.24 There exist several generalized human exposure pathways for the materials that would be dispersed in an act of radiological terrorism: external exposure, inhalation, ingestion, and immersion. External exposure is typically associated with gamma emitters, since alpha and beta particles have a low ability to penetrate human tissue, and with scenarios that include exposure to an intact radioactive source or contamination from a dirty bomb or other RDD. It is the most commonly considered pathway, especially regarding environmental decontamination and the regulatory challenges that would be posed by the distribution of radiation. Inhalation requires that a terrorist convert the radioactive source into an aerosol form in order to create particles small enough to be suspended in air and drawn in through the nose. Common inhalation scenarios include dispersal through ventilation systems, sprays, powders, or the small (micron- and submicron-sized) particles that could result from an RID. Inhalation is overall the most damaging exposure pathway, especially with alpha

21

Joseph W. Pfeifer, “Improvised Incendiary Devices: Risk Assessment, Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 2006). 22 Moller, “Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 23 Liza Porteus, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Handbook.” 24 Ibid.

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emitters.25 However, it is rather challenging and complex to effectively execute on a massive scale. The ingestion pathway is also fraught with difficulty since the primary scenarios – contamination of the water supply, agriculture, or food production and processing – would involve vexing but not intractable problems of scale (the radioactivity would be quickly diluted) and access. It should also be noted that particles small enough to be inhaled could also be ingested. Except in cases where soluble radioactive materials are dispersed, the ingestion pathway is generally less serious than that of inhalation because the digestive system would cycle the material out of the body with relative speed, limiting the amount of exposure to the radiation. Finally, it is plausible that terrorists could cover people with contaminated water. This immersion pathway could lead to external injury (radiation burns) and inhalation or ingestion of radioactive material.26 In summary, once dispersal and subsequent exposure have occurred, the factors influencing the biological impact of a radiological attack include the kind of radiation emitted by the isotope used in the attack and its energy levels, as previously discussed, and the chemical form of the isotopes, which takes into account the varying solubility of different radioactive materials. Finally, it is worthwhile to emphasize again that a radiological attack carried out in any method, even if it does not succeed in exposing or killing large numbers of people, will still foster fear, uncertainty, and other social and economic disruptions.

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1.4 Nuclear Weapons (NW) Nuclear weapons (NW) would involve the use of nuclear fission or fusion to produce large explosions and hazardous radioactive materials. Nuclear weapons can be delivered by artillery, plane, ship, ballistic missile, or suitcase and can be either tactical weapons (with an explosion force less than a kiloton of high-explosive equivalent) or strategic weapons (explosive force up to thousands of kilotons of high-explosive equivalent). Damage is complete or nearly complete within a few miles of the target area due to explosive forces and extreme heat, but radiation and radioactive debris (“fallout”) would affect large populations in surrounding areas as well, depending on weather conditions.27 Nuclear weapons cannot be manufactured directly from the key raw material found in nature, uranium. Natural uranium must be enriched before it becomes usable in nuclear weapons, an extremely complex and costly task that only nations or large-scale commercial enterprises have the resources to undertake. For this reason, a terrorist organization could probably acquire a nuclear explosive only by obtaining an intact nuclear weapon from a national stockpile or by obtaining fissile material from stocks that were produced in highly advanced industrial facilities and than making the fissile material into a nuclear explosive.28

25

Joseph Magill, et al, “Consequences of a Radiological Dispersal Event with Nuclear and Radioactive Sources,” Science and Global Security 15(2) (2007), pp. 112-116. 26 Charles D. Ferguson and Michelle M. Smith, “Assessing Radiological Weapons: Attack Methods and Estimated Effects,” Defence against Terrorism Review 2(2) (Fall 2009). 27 Moller, “Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 28 See NTI, “Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” at http://www.nti.org/threats/nuclear/ (last visited Jun. 19, 2012).

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The most important and effective steps for reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism are therefore to secure, consolidate, reduce, and, where possible, eliminate nuclear weapons and fissile material. Programs to implement such measures are under way in many countries but are far from reaching their goals.29 Ensuring that every nuclear warhead and every kilogram of material worldwide is secure and accounted for is the most important step in preventing nuclear weapons terrorism and a key element in the global struggle to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency oversees 900 of the world's nuclear facilities. Pakistan and India have both exploded nuclear devices in test blasts. Israel and North Korea are two countries believed to possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons produce devastating and long-term effects on human and animal life, as well as the environments in which they live. These are the hardest of all types of weapons to make because the critical nuclear elements – plutonium and/or highly enriched uranium – are hard to come by and are very expensive. These weapons are most likely to be delivered in the form of ballistic missiles or bombs dropped by overflying bombers. Terrorists could also cause accidents involving nuclear power plants, nuclear medicine machines in hospitals and vehicles used in the transportation of nuclear waste. The size of an actual nuclear weapon can be quite small, however, and could easily fit into a large car or truck.30 That has sparked a fear among many experts that a nuclear warhead could simply be driven into a large city by terrorists and detonated by either a suicide bomber or by remote control.31 These weapons are atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and ‘suitcase’ bombs.

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Most specialists agree that four types of radiological and nuclear terrorism exist:32 1.

The acquisition and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon from a nationstate’s arsenal;

2.

The acquisition of weapons-usable fissile material, such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium, in order to make and detonate an improvised nuclear device, which is a crude nuclear explosive;

3.

An attack on or sabotage of nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants, spent fuel pools, other radioactive waste storage or processing facilities, or research reactors in order to disperse radioactive material; and

4.

The acquisition of radioactive materials from commercially available devices or other radioactive materials in order to build a radiological weapon that disperses radioactive material or emits ionizing radiation.

Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, are beyond the capabilities of terrorists to produce, but with enough of these materials in hand, nearly any state, and some particularly well-organized terrorist

29

Ibid. Howard Baker and Lloyd Butler, A Report Card on the Development of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia (Russia Task Force, Secretary of Energy Advisor Board, United States Department of Energy , Jan 10, 2000), available at http://myweb.clemson.edu/~maloney/download/RussianNucs/pdfs/ seab_draft_report1.pdf (last visited Jun. 19, 2012). 31 Porteus, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Handbook..” 32 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Routledge, 2005), pp. 46-258. 30

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groups, could have the potential to make at least a crude nuclear bomb.33 Keeping these weapons and materials from being stolen in the first place is the key to keeping these items out of the hands of terrorists and hostile states. The theft and smuggling of weapons-usable nuclear material is not a hypothetical concern, but an ongoing reality: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented 18 cases, confirmed by the states involved, of seizures of stolen plutonium of highly enriched uranium (HEU) over the past decade.34 The last confirmed case involved two Armenians who in March 2010 smuggled into Georgia 89.4% enriched uranium, encased in lead in a cigarette pack, which was hidden in a Yerevan-Tbilisi train. According to Georgian officials, Armenians Sumbat Tonoyan and Hrant Ohanyan received the sample from Garik Dadaian, also an Armenian citizen, who was arrested in Georgia in 2003 while trying to smuggle 180 grams of highly-enriched uranium to Georgia. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) was again seized in Georgia in 2006; in all these three cases, including the recent one, there seems to be evidence linking the stolen HEU to a nuclear fuel plant in Novosibirsk, Russia. "Most likely, the materials were stolen in the mid-or early 90s when a big amount of material disappeared. It's hidden somewhere and from time to time, someone is trying to find new buyers."35 In this respect, it is sometimes said that the easiest way to bring nuclear material into any country would be to hide it in a package of cocaine or bale of marijuana. Every nation’s border is vulnerable to various types of illicit movement, be it drugs, terrorists, or the material needed to unleash nuclear terror, and in today’s global world the borders are becoming ever more porous.

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2. Terrorist Organizations and the Use of WMD First of all we must address the following question: Why would terrorists want to use them? To answer this we have to bear in mind at least 3 answers: 1. If used effectively, these weapons are potentially capable of inflicting a large number of casualties. 2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons (CBRNW) can have a greater psychological impact than conventional explosives, as suggested by the year 2001 anthrax letter attacks, which killed five people but frightened millions of people. 3. Although CBR agents are not nearly as destructive as nuclear weapons, they are much easier and cheaper to acquire.

33

See NTI, “Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” International Atomic Energy Agency, “Facts&Figures: The IAEA’s Database on Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials,” (IAEA Press Release, Vienna, Austria, October 8, 2002). 35 Loretta Duchamps, “Armenians Plead Guilty in Georgia to Uranium Smuggling,” The Epoch Times (9 November 2010)(quotingArchil Pavlenishvili, head of the nuclear smuggling unit at the Georgian Interior Ministry), available at http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/armenians-plead-guilty-georgia-uraniumsmuggling-45648.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 34

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The first successful use of chemical agents by terrorists against a general civilian population was on March 20, 1995. Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic group based in Japan, released Sarin into the Tokyo subway system killing 12 and injuring 5,500. Also, in 2001, after carrying out the 9/11 attacks in New York City, the al-Qaeda terrorist organization announced that they were attempting to acquire radiological, biological and chemical weapons. This threat was lent a great deal of credibility when a large archive of videotapes was obtained by the cable television network CNN in August of 2002 showing the killing of three dogs by an apparent nerve agent called Agent X.36 Today, relying on conventional agents, such as explosives, against unconventional targets such as chemical plants, nuclear facilities or hazardous materials transport vehicles, terrorists may also use a hybrid strategy. A hybrid attack is attractive to terrorists for a variety of reasons. First, it provides an opportunity to produce substantial casualties using limited resources. Second, there are multiple targets available, ranging from chemical plants in the proximity of urban areas to railway wagons transporting hazardous materials. Third, a hybrid strategy is consistent with the way terrorists operate. Fourth, by doing so, they can achieve results comparable to those of a ‘traditional’ CBR attack without having to manufacture or acquire CBR agents themselves, thereby substantially lowering costs and risks. As a conclusion, the possibility to use such means to produce a CBR-like result makes this type of attack both attractive and attainable. On the other hand, terrrorists may seek to obtain greater status by demonstrating that they have the technological capabilities to develop, produce and deliver CBW agents. 2.1 Terrorist foiled plots after 9/11

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There have been a number of terrosit plots foiled since 9/11: Heathrow Express. The deadly poison attack was planned in 2002 by al-Qaeda terrorist Kamel Bourgass and the targets were businessmen and holidaymakers using the Heathrow Express. The 32-year-old Islamic extremist, an illegal immigrant from Algeria, intended to smear ricin, a potentially lethal and fast-acting poison, in lavatories and on hand-rails in trains. The plot was uncovered when maps of the Heathrow Express route were found in the home of a co-conspirator. Although the ricin might not have killed anyone, it would still have been regarded as a major terror coup, because it would have caused chaos on London's public transport system if they had succeeded.37 Paris 2004. Eight suspected Islamist militants related to al-Qaeda were arrested in the Lyon area at the beginning of January, 2004 on charges of planning and preparing an attack with the botulism or ricin toxins. They were mainly relatives of Menad Benchellali, the son of a radical imam in the Lyon suburb of Venisseux (in jail since December 2002), when he was arrested during a police investigation of French Islamists efforts to send young Muslim volunteers to fight the Russian forces in 36

Nic Robertson, “Disturbing Scenes of Death Show Capability with Chemical Gas,” CNN (19 August 2002), available at http://articles.cnn.com/2002-08-19/us/terror.tape.chemical_1_chemical-weapons-nerveagent-al-qaeda-tapes?_s=PM:US (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 37 David Bamler, “Ricin Terror Gang 'Planned to Unleash Terror on the Heathrow Express,'” The Telegraph (17 April 2005), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1488016/Ricin-terror-gang-plannedto-unleash-terror-on-the-Heathrow-Express.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012).

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Chechnya. Based on police statements, Mr Benchellali was a chemicals expert who had been trained in poison-making in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and was actively trying to produce a botulism toxin and ricin; he had even tested his chemicals on animals. The imam had admitted that he was aware of his son's chemical experiments, the products of which were stored in Nivea face cream jars and 70 cl flasks and later given to a local chemist, identified only as Mourad M, for safekeeping. Several relatives had helped buy 9-10kg of ingredients.38 Why are Islamist terrorist groups like Al Qaeda employing and indoctrinating scientists, trained microbiologists, in its fold? The answer may be still unknown, but conventional wisdom suggests that there is a hidden design in place and that certainly involves intentional fiddling with life science and living organisms. The picture is still hazy. The news about a couple of doctors of Indian origin, among others, in their fraternity from Jordan and Iraq had been detained and suspected in connection with the foiled attacks in Glasgow and London in 2007 might make the picture more clear. The attempted bomb attacks by trained doctors who have undergone life science and pathological laboratory training to save human life, now on a terror call, are certainly very disturbing. This is not all! Investigations into a terror web forum suggest that around 45 (all Muslim) doctors planned a consorted jihad against the US. Again, analysts have stumbled upon chemical and biological weapon manuals being circulated in jihadi web forums over the internet. This finding makes the bioterror threat more plausible, even though, these openly available manuals can help terrorist to develop crude biological weapon with minimum lethal factor. A survey published by Jane’s Intelligence Review indicates that chemical and biological weapons on password-protected web forums constitute a part of jihadi discussion. At least two longer manuals on biological weapons have found in these jihadi forums which describe methods for growing plague bacteria and botulinum toxin.39

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3. NATO’s Response Recognizing the difficulties associated with defending against these threats – especially those that derive from non-State actors – the Alliance begun to take a pragmatic and practical approach to address them; on 31 August 2009 it made public a new strategic policy for preventing the proliferation of WMD, protecting against WMD attacks or CBRN events and recovering from an WMD attack or CBRN event.40 This new document also highlighted ‘strategic enablers’ that will allow the Alliance to prevent the proliferation of WMD, protect against a WMD attack, and recover should an attack take place. These enablers consist of intelligence and information sharing, international outreach and partner activities, as well as public diplomacy and strategic communication. 38 Jon Henley, “Al-Qaida Terror Plot Foiled, Say French Police,” The Guardian (12 January 2004), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jan/12/alqaida.france (last visited Jun.18, 2012). 39 Animesh Roul, “Is Bioterrorism Threat Credible?, CBW Magazine 1 (3) (April 2009), available at http://www.idsa.in/cbwmagazine/IsBioterrorismThreatCredible_aroul_0408 (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 40 NATO, “NATO Publishes New Policy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” (31 August 2009), at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-34852433-30729564/natolive/news_57234.htm?selected Locale=en (last visited Jun. 18, 2012).

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3.1 Preventing the Proliferation of WMD On this, NATO will continue to evaluate how it can support traditional measures of proliferation prevention that can dissuade and impede proliferant states and terrorist networks, in line with the agreed framework from Bucharest. Allies shall emphasize the importance of, the implementation of, and compliance with the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, such as UNSCR 1540. In addition, NATO will continue to explore ways to support or complement efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). As an example, the Alliance could consider establishing a ‘Trust Fund’ or similar mechanism dedicated to the support of the implementation of UNSCR 1540. Moreover, NATO will continue to add value to non-proliferation efforts by fostering the development of allied capabilities to impede or stop the trafficking of WMD, related materials and their means of delivery. For instance, in maritime operations aimed at stemming the trafficking of these materials, these capabilities could be employed and the Alliance could bring its military capabilities to bear, subject to political decisions and on a case-by-case basis, to aid in the detection, identification, monitoring, surveillance and tracking of WMD acquisition or development activities; information operations aimed at disabling, discouraging and denying proliferation of WMD; and intelligence fusion and information exchange among Allies, and partners where appropriate, to produce actionable intelligence for NATO non-proliferation activities. The Alliance can also develop and promote common operational standards, concepts, doctrine and tactics, also encourages or facilitates relevant training and exercises in this field.

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3.2 Protecting against WMD Attack or CBRN Event On this second issue, NATO must have the capability to appropriately and effectively address the risks associated with the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, which pose a potential threat to the Allies’ populations, territory and forces. A balanced mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defenses are needed in order to deter and defend against the use of WMD. The Alliance will be prepared to utilize all options at its disposal to deter a potential aggressor from employing WMD. Deterrence is conveyed through maintaining a credible overall deterrence posture as well as declaratory statements that, inter alia, demonstrate NATO cohesion and resolve. The Alliance reaffirms and communicates its resolve to hold accountable all those who support or enable the use of WMD against Allies. NATO and NATO allies have significantly improved and are further improving the Alliance’s CBRN defense posture with the establishment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre (WMDC), the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force (CJCBRND-TF), the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Defence COE), the Defence Against Terrorism COE, and other COE and agencies that support NATO’s response to the WMD threat. NATO allies have invested significant resources in warning and reporting, individual protection and CBRN hazard management capabilities. However, capability shortfalls remain and are due, to some extent, to the

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limits of existing technologies or national capability deficits among Alliance members, and should be appropriately addressed. To enhance Alliance CBRN defense capabilities, allies endeavor to actively participate in the above-mentioned structures and the Intelligence Fusion Centre, as well as a CBRN Reachback and Fusion Centre. Allies will consider transforming current CBRN units into more appropriately-sized, more multifunctional, more mobile, more rapidly-deployable units which are capable of tailored missions. The Alliance also seeks to enhance capabilities that are critical to a robust CBRN defense, such as biodetection and disease surveillance, by investing more national resources – when possible – to accelerate NATO’s efforts within CBRN defense and by entering into partnerships for further research and development of innovative technologies and strategies. 3.3. Recovering from WMD attack or CBRN event When efforts to prevent or defend against a WMD attack do not succeed, NATO must be fully prepared to recover from the consequences of WMD use against populations, territory and forces, whether by hostile States or by terrorists, and similarly to assist the partners, if necessary. Likewise, should Alliance members or partners suffer a CBRN event, NATO, if requested, will be able to assist whenever it can bring added value.

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Allied governments have primary sovereign responsibility to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of a CBRN event. Their first responders should have the full range of protective, medical, and remediation tools to identify, assess, and respond rapidly to an event on home territory. However, major civil emergencies can pose a threat to security and stability; because CBRN consequence management is challenging and could be a massive and costly undertaking, NATO is prepared to lend its capabilities to national authorities if requested. NATO has considerable CBRN defense capabilities to offer to first responders of both allied and partner nations; it also serves as a forum where planning arrangements for such eventualities can be coordinated among countries. Upon request and on a caseby-case basis, NATO is prepared to assist with CBRN defense assessments; provide CBRN training, funding, technical and legal assistance, and information; work with partners to develop response plans, training protocols, equipment and interoperability standards and mutual aid agreements; conduct exercises, share intelligence and threat information (both within the Alliance and, when appropriate, with key international actors); lend its capabilities for international surveillance and early warning; engage in joint research and development; coordinate technical assistance to partners; deploy the CJ-CBRND-TF in the event of a crisis; offer support via the Joint CBRN Defence COE and the Disease Surveillance System, and cooperate in other ways to address CBRN threats.

Conclusion In the new WMD environment, states and international organizations are diversifying the role international law plays in connection with the WMD threat. The traditional arms control approach no longer monopolizes the international legal strategy against

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WMD. This development suggests that the need for international law in connection with the WMD threat may be higher now than in previous historical periods. The threat of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon attack by terrorists or hostile regimes requires a layered, global defense strategy. Today’s world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counterproliferation and defense.41 Nations must expand and deepen their efforts in an effective multinational way to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD.42 To succeed in their effort to combat WMD proliferation, they must apply all elements of their national and international power: diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement and military. Thus, they will work to harness all relevant collective resources to establish more coordinated and effective capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to the global threat of terrorism.

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In addition, contributions to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability should be increased in due course to detect nuclear proliferation and uncover clandestine nuclear programs. It is clear that some states will cynically manipulate the provisions of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to acquire sensitive technologies to enable them to pursue nuclear weapon capabilities. To close this loophole, the uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities, the two primary paths to acquiring fissile material for nuclear weapons, must be limited to those states that already operate full scale, fully-functioning facilities. The most important issue that I would mention is the need to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD, especially of biological and nuclear weapons. If terrorists acquire these weapons, they are likely to employ them. The biggest hurdle that a wellorganized terrorist group with appropriate technical expertise would have to overcome to make a crude nuclear device is to gain access to sufficient quantities of fissile material. The interdiction of WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists requires many tools relevant to WMD terrorism. A few examples are reducing the global stocks of fissile, bacteriological and chemical materials and securing those which remain; improved nuclear, chemical and biological detection capability; and the interdiction of trafficking in nuclear weapons and biological components. But even by taking these measures, the world cannot rest as long as enough material for even one WMD weapon remains unsecured.

Bibliography Albright, David, and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” The Washington Quarterly 2 (2)(Spring 2005). Baker, Howard, and Lloyd Butler, A Report Card on the Development of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia (Russia Task force, Secretary of Energy Advisor Board, United States Department of Energy, Jan 10, 2000). Bamler, David, “Ricin Terror Gang 'Planned to Unleash Terror on the Heathrow Express,'” The Telegraph (17 April 2005). Beeching, Nicholas J., et al, “Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism,” BMJ 324 (2002). Bush, George W., Speech at the National Defense University, (Washington,1 May 2001).

41

George W. Bush, Speech at the National Defense University, (Washington,1 May 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/010501bush.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). Ibid.

42

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Christopher, George W., et al, “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective,” Journal of the American Medical Association 278 (5) (1997). Clemons, Jon, “New Clue to Georgi Markov Umbrella Assassin as Police see Cold War Files,” Daily Mirror (February 01, 2010). Duchamps, Loretta, “Armenians Plead Guilty in Georgia to Uranium Smuggling,” The Epoch Times (9 November 2010). Ferguson, Charles D., and Michelle M. Smith, “Assessing Radiological Weapons: Attack Methods and Estimated Effects,” Defence against Terrorism Review 2(2)(Fall 2009). Ferguson, Charles D., and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Routledge, 2005). Freeman, Bill, Environmental Ecology: The Effects of Pollution, Disturbance and Other Stresses, (2nd ed., Academic Press, 1994). Haber, Ludwig Fritz, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford University Press, 1986). Henley, Jon, “Al-Qaida Terror Plot Foiled, Say French Police,” The Guardian (12 January 2004). Heyer, Robert J. Introduction to CBRNE Terrorism: An Awareness Primer and Preparedness Guide for Emergency Responders (DERA, January 10, 2006). Hoenig, Steven L., Handbook of Chemical Warfare and Terrorism (Greenwood Press, 2002). International Atomic Energy Agency, “Facts&Figures: The IAEA’s Database on Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials,” (IAEA Press Release, Vienna, Austria, October 8, 2002). Lang, Cosmo Gordon, “Archbishop's Appeal," Times (London) (28 December 1937). Magill, Joseph, et al, “Consequences of a Radiological Dispersal Event with Nuclear and Radioactive Sources,” Science and Global Security 15 (2)(2007). Mayor, Adrienne, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World (Overlook Duckworth, 2009). Moller, Susan D., “Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction “ (University of Maryland Paper, March 9, 2004). NATO, “NATO Publishes New Policy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” (31 August 2009). Robertson, Nic, “Disturbing Scenes of Death Show Capability with Chemical Gas,” CNN (19 August 2002). Pfeifer, Joseph W., “Improvised Incendiary Devices: Risk Assessment, Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 2006). Porteus, Liza, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Handbook,” Fox News (20 June 2006). Roul, Animesh, “Is Bioterrorism Threat Credible?, CBW Magazine 1 (3) (April 2009). Voica, Dan Radu, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats from Terrorism,” COE-DAT Newsletter 4(18) (Jan-Mar 2011). Wohlleben, Verna, “Civil Protection, a General Overview,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 143 CC 03 rev.1 (8 November 2003).

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International Humanitarian Law in Military Counterterrorist Operations Larry D. WHITE1 TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Ankara, Turkey

Abstract. This presentation looked at the application of IHL in the fight against terrorism. The history and development of IHL lays the groundwork for views on applying IHL in counterterrorism. The concept of an unlawful combatant addresses a current concern in this area of law while highlighting that the minimum standard – common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions – may be impractical in application. However, by drawing parallels between approaches in civilian and military counterterrorism operations, one can discern practical guidelines for security forces. While IHL directly applies in military counterterrorism operations, IHL should be updated to better address current concerns in the fight against terrorism. Keywords. International humanitarian law, counterterrorism, unlawful combatant

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Introduction It is critical for military forces engaged in counterterrorist activities to be familiar with the terms and principles associated with international humanitarian law (IHL) or the laws of war. These rules of conduct for military forces prescribe the minimum levels of humanity to be shown in wartime or war-like conditions and proscribe particular actions as contrary to humanitarian concerns. Although it may seem inherently inconsistent to talk about humanity in war, IHL represents a pragmatic approach of the international community that accepts that countries do go to war in spite of best efforts to avoid it or trying to discourage adversaries from engaging in war, but that the outbreak of war is not a reason for belligerents to debase themselves to the lowest level and engage in wanton behavior. By making certain actions taboo (targeting of civilians or misusing symbols of protection, for example), we can ensure a certain level of humanity exists in the most exigent of circumstances.

1. Development of IHL Being only approximately 150 years old, IHL is relatively new in the history of mankind but goes a long way to making us a better species on our planet. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) dates back to the Battle of Solferino in 1859, where Swiss national Henri Dunant observed the wounded from battle suffer for days. Shortly thereafter, he started the International Red Cross movement to relieve the 1

J.D. School of Law, Email: [email protected].

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suffering in battle. The result has been a series on conventions on IHL starting with the first Geneva Convention in 1864. This convention has been updated and expanded three times: in 1906, 1929 and 1949 – corresponding to questions that arose during preceding major conflicts.2 Currently this series of conventions addresses the rules for sick and wounded, shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war, and protection of civilians. There was some attempt to update the Geneva Conventions with the Protocols of 1977 to address the issues that have arisen regarding terrorism through wars of liberation (remember the oft-quoted precept that ‘one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist’) but these have not met with complete acceptance.3

2. Combatants in War The status of a person in a wartime situation determines their treatment. By determining who is a combatant, and then whether they are a lawful combatant in that context, triggers the application of different sets of rules based on that status. 2.1. Terrorists are not Combatants

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Although a common definition of terrorist does not exist, most would agree that it involves violence, or the threat of violence, for some political purpose and would specifically exclude those who have just a financial motive in mind. However, unless a person employing such tactics is operating under the control of a nation-state, that person would be considered a terrorist, and since the methods he/she is employing are illegal, then such person is just another type of criminal. There is no circumstance in which a terrorist is permitted to take another life just based on the status of that other person. A combatant, conversely, is able to take the life of a recognized enemy just on sight alone – there is no necessity for the person targeted to be engaged in any hostile activity – just recognition alone is enough. In order to be a lawful combatant, and therefore lawfully able to take a life in combat, one must fulfill four criteria:    

Be a member of an organized force Wear distinctive markings Carry arms openly Follow the rules of war

A person failing to meet all four criteria is then not a lawful combatant and thus not able to lawfully engage in hostilities and take a life with legal privilege.

2

Michael Byers, War Law (Atlantic Books, Great Britain, 2005), pp. 115-116. While almost every nation is a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, there are a number of countries not parties to the 1977 Additional Protocols, including the United States. 3

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2.2. Unlawful Combatants The conventions of 1949 reflect lessons learned from the Second World War. Reflected in these updated standards is the status of ‘unlawful combatant’ – an unprotected status for those who do not meet the standards for a lawful combat as discussed just above. For terrorists, they may not be able to meet most of the criteria. However, persons cannot be deemed to be an unlawful combatant until they have been adjudged in a status hearing which should conform to the normal human rights protections.4 Even unlawful combatants are entitled to certain protections on what is called common Article 3 because it is common to all four conventions. This article prevents “outrages on personal dignity” and “violence to life and person” that guard against torture and other maltreatment. However, it does allow such unlawful combatants to be tried for their crimes in a “regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” However, although these provisions sound wonderful, they are quite frankly legally insufficient, since they provide no measurable standard by which to gauge actions. The trial of suspected unlawful combatants is not without precedent. In 1976, Angola executed four British and American mercenaries as for their ‘crimes.’5 2.3. The Problem of Unlawful Combatants

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The problem of ‘unlawful combatants’ is not going to arise in any outbreak of violence but only under a rather narrow set of circumstances. If a person commits terrorist acts within a country, he/she would be, and should be, tried as a criminal, unless they are acting under the authority of another nation-state, in which circumstances they would be a lawful combatant and their conduct would be judged under the Geneva Conventions. The most likely circumstances leading to the status of an unlawful combatant would be in a failed state, such as was present in Afghanistan in 2001. There, the Taliban government was either unable or unwilling to exert central authority and exercise its responsibilities as a sovereign nation but instead allowed for irregular bands of foreign fighters (i.e. no-Afghan) not formally allied with the existing government, to engage invading forces operating under an international mandate to restore order and eliminate a terrorist sanctuary. Such a set of circumstances would not normally be expected in a wartime situation. The discussions regarding the unlawful combatants detained by the U.S. and its coalition partners in the war against the Taliban government of Afghanistan has not been against the correctness of the status of the unlawful combatants per se but the corresponding treatment. The perceived harshness of the status is what seems to be the issue. Since a captured unlawful combatant is not a protected person (non-combatants 4 Knut Dorfman, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,” International Review of the Red Cross 85 (2003), pp. 45-74. 5 Executed Today, 1976: Costas Georgiou and Three Other Mercenaries in Angola, at http://www.executedtoday.com/2010/07/10/1976-costas-georgiou-colonel-callan-mercenaries-angola/ (last visited Jun. 28, 2012)..

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are protected and captured lawful combatants are protected as prisoners of war), then only common Article 3 provides guidance as to the treatment of an unlawful combatant as discussed in the previous sub-section. The wording of common Article 3 is very broad and almost non-measurable. In particular, although detainees should be treated “humanely” and without being subject to “degrading treatment,” there is no standard by which to measure such treatment.6 Should international standards be used or should national standards be used? Should we use precedent, but understanding that the concepts of international human rights have evolved considerably since the Conventions were last revised in 1949. How long can we hold an unlawful combatant, and if we are to try an unlawful combatant, how “regularly constituted” does the court have to be?

3. IHL in Counterterrorism Beyond the combatant issue, there may be cases where IHL will be the controlling guidance for the fight against terrorism. Even though counterterrorism efforts are generally equivalent to the fight against crime in general so that normal crime-fighting techniques and standards will apply, some counterterrorism efforts will involve military forces fighting outside their own land, as we have seen with NATO efforts in Afghanistan. In such cases, IHL will apply.

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3.1. Principles of IHL As discussed in Section 2 supra, IHL attempts to keep some humanity in the worst of the human condition – war. In general, IHL allows for the targeting of military forces until such time as they are unable to fight anymore – hors de combat – wounded or surrendered, when they become a protected person. IHL demands that pain not be intentionally inflicted or that intentional wounding occur. There is a vital duty to protect non-combatants as well.7 Although one of the central questions in IHL is when deadly force may be used, the right of self-defense is never denied. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) under the auspices of the Rome Treaty provides an international body to oversee the application of IHL in war. This should provide an added measure of enforcement in international conflicts. 3.2. Application of IHL in Counterterrorism The use of IHL in a counterterrorist situation may very well differ from other wartime scenarios. Given that there may be less of an invasion setting and more of an occupation setting, the duty to protect non-combatants may be more onerous. Although authorized to engage combatants on sight, the terrorist as an unlawful combatant means that they may not stand out on sight and one has to wait on an overt act to engage the terrorist. Therefore, even though the wartime environment allows engage the enemy 6 Although the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 attempt to addess this, in the author’s view, they do not achieve this purpose. 7 David Kennedy, Of Law and War (Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 46-98.

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(terrorist) on sight, the practical disadvantages in this situation may preclude counterterrorist action much different from a peacetime law enforcement approach. In such a situation, military counterterrorism and criminal counterterrorism basically share the same priorities – protect the civilian populace while taking the strongest possible measures to thwart terrorism. In addition, as an occupying force, the military forces in an IHL situation must also preserve order – often within a population that sympathizes with, if not outright supports, the terrorists. A further important aspect of IHL is commander responsibility for actions of his troops – not only what the commander knows, but also what he should have known. In short, IHL provides a minimum standard of conduct to guide the profession of arms in the full range of operations. In the absence of stronger standards of conduct (like national rules guiding police forces), IHL establishes practical rules to govern conduct. Security forces should generally assume that a law enforcement situation exists when conducting counterterrorism operations, but if not, IHL will. Under IHL standards, security forces should assume that detainees are prisoners of war until proven to be an unlawful combatant. This will allow the most humane treatment possible. However, even though IHL may be the guide for a given situation, security forces should not forget that preservation of evidence should be a concern consistent with the tactical situation.

Conclusion

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It is clear that IHL is useful for counterterrorism operations. It is directly applicable in a wartime situation; otherwise it has indirect effect as a minimum standard. However, there is substantial disagreement over the meaning of some of the provisions in light of current counterterrorism efforts, so there is a definite need to update IHL to meet modern counterterrorism concerns.

Bibliography Byers, Michael, War Law (Atlantic Books, 2005) Dorfman, Knut, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,” International Review of the Red Cross 85 (2003). David Kennedy, Of Law and War (Princeton University Press, 2006).

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Suicide Terrorism: Media Representations and Strategic Communication Keith SPENCE1 University of Leicester

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Abstract : Analysis of media coverage and political responses to the suicide attack on the NATO (ISAF) headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan on August 15, 2009 illustrates the presence of a pattern of established conventions that structure the representation of suicide terror events. The framework described by these conventions incorporates a range of implicit but deeply inscribed assumptions concerning the origins and motivations of terrorists in general and suicide terrorists in particular. These assumptions predate the events of September 11, 2001, but received their clearest articulation in the aftermath of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. The vocabulary associated with the 'war against terror,' and the constructions of terrorism and terrorist to which it gives rise, are identified and contested through discussion of available demographic data pertaining to suicide terrorism, to the discourse of the 'clash of civilizations' associated with the work of S.P. Huntington, and to the paradoxically commensurable self-presentation of suicide terrorists themselves. Analysis of these materials significantly undermines accounts of cause and motivation that seek to explain suicide terrorism in terms of religious fundamentalism and economic deprivation. Disputes concerning global military policies and claims against perceived territorial interference emerge as being of greater significance. The conventions established within the prevailing assumptions and frameworks adopted in the course of media productions are, however, firmly established and not readily susceptible to adaptation or control. By critically challenging this established framework, however, and exposing its assumptions and limits to scrutiny, the possibility of using strategic communication policies to challenge, and over time to transform, some of the currently prevailing perceptions and representations of both terrorism in general and suicide terror in particular can be envisaged, but not guaranteed. Keywords. Terrorism, Suicide Terrorism, Media, Strategic Communication, Framing, Representation

1

Ph.D, Lecturer in Criminology, email: [email protected].

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Introduction The Wazir Akhbar Khan district of Kabul contains the Presidential Palace, embassies, diplomatic missions and headquarters for many international organizations operating in Afghanistan. Defended heavily and in depth by manned checkpoints and physical barriers, the area had not been significantly attacked since a car bomb outside the Indian embassy took the lives of over fifty in July 2008. NATO’s ISAF command centre is naturally located here, at the centre of the most highly protected and hypothetically secure area of the city. On August 15, 2009 the nameless suicide bomber detonated his vehicle around 08:30 local time. His 4x4, packed with up to 500kg of explosives, negotiated a number of security posts before reaching the perimeter of the ISAF compound. Seven were killed and over a hundred – including five ISAF personnel – were injured by the explosion.

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The site was rapidly cordoned off, but almost immediately throngs of reporters – drawn from the nearby Serena hotel by the blast and its lingering plume of smoke – gathered at the edge of a hastily improvised barrier. Reports streamed onto 24/7 television news networks within minutes, looping onto the accompanying websites of (amongst others) al-Jazeera,2 the BBC,3 broadcasting simultaneously as BBC News 24, BBC World, BBC Persian TV, ChinaView,4 CNN,5 and Sky News6 populating the networks with words and images in an exemplary demonstration of global real-time coverage. Images of troops manning the makeshift barricade showed expressions of blank uncertainty, a discomfort doubtless compounded by the possibility that bombers conveying secondary devices might be at hand amidst the gathering crowds. The surprise registered in their faces and in those of journalists at the scene was not at the attack itself but rather its location. National elections, which the Taliban had a declared an intention to disrupt, were taking place in five days’ time. That a significant incident of some sort would occur seemed inevitable and the build-up towards polling day had seen violence steadily encroaching upon the capital, with uncertainty as to the precise form and location of the impending act, produced an unfocussed tension across Kabul. This anxiety and the ensuing state of alert that it fostered, did little to lessen the shock engendered by the attack on the compound. Had a ‘softer’ target elsewhere in the city been selected, the materialization of the anticipated threat might even have served to relieve the apprehension. Instead, the realization that the sense of relative sanctuary 2 Al-Jazeera, “Deadly Blast Strikes Afghan Capital,” (16 August 2009), available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/08/2009815852129221.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 3 BBC, “Karzai Condemns Kabul NATO Blast,” (15 August 2009), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8203607.stm (last visited Jun. 17, 2012). 4 Abbas Ali, “Afghan Security Surveillance Threatened by Suicide Attack ahead of Polls,” China View (17 August 2009), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/17/content_11898114.htm (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 5 CNN, “Blast in Kabul kills 7, injures dozens,” (15 August 2009), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/08/15/afghanistan.explosion/index.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 6 Sky News, “Suicide Bomb at Afghan NATO Base Kills Seven,” (15 August 2009), available at http://news.sky.com/story/717320/suicide-bomb-at-afghan-nato-base-kills-seven (last visited Jun. 28, 2012).

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enjoyed by those within Wazir Akhbar Khan was illusory served to intensify the atmosphere of unease.

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This effect was evident in the initial burst of reports from the scene, which quickly framed the story as one of a security failure on the part of both the ISAF and the Afghan National Forces. Both had declared, in support of the electoral process, that following recent intense operations, the security situation was improving across the country. A suicide attack in the centre of the diplomatic district, with all of its barricades, checkpoints and surveillance balloons, served to contest that claim decisively. The reporting cycle proceeded in stages over the following twenty-four hours. In its initial phase, journalists and spokespersons from the scene relayed particular and specific details of the event. This visceral imagery segued into claims of responsibility by the Taliban, countered in turn by ascriptions of blame and condemnation by the Afghan authorities and ISAF representatives. Shortly after the blast, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid claimed responsibility for the attack, noting that the intended target had been the U.S. embassy, not the ISAF compound. In response, ISAF spokesperson Captain Elizabeth Mathias suggested that the interception of the vehicle before it reached the embassy should therefore be viewed as a success for the Afghan security forces. This attempt to divert the initial narrative of insecurity surrounding the attack was, however, fleeting and unsuccessful. When the official ISAF press statement on the incident was released later that day, the suggestion had been dropped.7 Moving away from the scene, coverage relocated to production studios, with presenters conducting ‘one-on-one’ conversations with foreign affairs correspondents, studio-based security analysts, terrorism experts and similarly styled figures. These dialogues, although unscripted, followed an consistent pattern, with the initial dominant theme of deteriorating local security expanded into a series of wider contexts including: the resurgence of the Taliban and its capabilities as disclosed by the penetration of the diplomatic district; the extent of the challenge posed to the elections by threats of disruptive violence; regional consequences for the ‘Af-Pak’ classification of the Taliban security threat; escalating costs, both human and financial, of the Afghanistan intervention; declining public support, in particular in the UK and US, for the ISAF mission; the significance of a recrudescence of al-Qaeda, a movement conjoined with the Taliban in media representations; the possibility of failure or withdrawal from Afghanistan and the consequences of such an outcome; and the enduring global menace posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. As this compressed list suggests, the thematic shifts across the coverage are progressively removed from the suicide event itself and increasingly abstract in content. By the final stage, discussion of the global threat associated with al-Qaeda returned to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the possibility of their repetition in the form of another ‘spectacular’ event. Although in the almost eight years since the event no such repetition had occurred and no credible intention or capacity on the part of al-Qaeda and those acting in its name had been identified, the use of 9/11 as signifier and reference point is not spurious. It functions to relate the otherwise abstract dialogue 7

ISAF, “Taliban Blast Kills and Injures Innocent Afghans,” ISAF News Release 2009#607 (5 August 2009), available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/08/pr090815-607.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012).

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and analysis to a substantive reality, invoked as a point of focus in order to connect the commentaries to a collective memory of terror, fear and uncertainty that is indelibly associated with the World Trade Center attacks. Without this reference point, the almost entirely speculative analysis would be all but meaningless, lacking an anchor in, or connection to, the experience of the intended audience. By the following day, the attack had been dropped from the front pages of both electronic and paper news media. Although its immediate impact was limited, the reporting constructed a framework within which violence – including further acts of suicide terror involving NATO personnel – that unfolded across Afghanistan prior to the election was perceived, interpreted and represented by the international media over the following days. The effect of this was sufficiently damaging that, amidst reports of harassment and intimidation experienced by journalists, the Afghan Foreign Ministry requested on August 19 that media agencies ‘refrain from broadcasting any incident of violence during the election process.’ Unusually, the ‘request’ was released in both English and Dari, and as CNN8 reported, in the local language a much stronger formulation, ‘reporting on any possible terrorist attacks is strongly prohibited,’ was adopted. The outcry provoked by the attempt to restrict the reporting process rendered it predictably counterproductive.

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Later that day, President Barack Obama, under pressure as opinion polls in the United States indicated declining support for his policy on Afghanistan,9 was moved to restate its centrality to his administration.10 “This is not a war of choice,” he insisted. “This is a war of necessity. Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al-Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting. This is a – this is fundamental to the defense of our people.” This concise declaration attests to the continuing impact on perceptions of media audiences of suicide attacks, and to the priority accorded to them by the mass media. As London Observer correspondent Jason Burke commented, the key target of the attack was not military or diplomatic, but was rather the court of international public opinion.11 In responding directly to the coverage and to the wider questioning of the ongoing Afghan mission that it engendered, the President confirmed the precision with which that target had been struck.12 His remarks also acknowledged, and located his discourse within, the interpretive framework of insecurity and deterioration established in the course of the reporting cycle. Moreover, by invoking the memory – and with it, the symbolically laden imagery – of September 11, 2001, the trajectory of that narrative, moving from the particular event to the contestation of its more general meanings and significance, is reproduced. With that, the psychological power of the suicidal event is recalled and reaffirmed. 8

CNN, “Blast in Kabul Kills 7, Injures Dozens,” (15 August 2009). Gary Langer, “On Election Eve, Support Slips for Afghan War,” ABC News (19 August 2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/Afghanistan/story?id=8363179 (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 10 Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by the President at the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention,” (August 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-veteransof-foreign-wars-convention (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 11 Jason Burke, “Why Taliban Leaders Prefer Dead Diplomats,” The Observer (16 August 2009). http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/16/taliban-prefer-dead-diplomats/print (June 12, 2012). 12 Daniel Dombey, “Obama’s Afghanistan Strategy at Stake,” Financial Times (August 21, 2009), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/128698b4-8e8d-11de-87d0-00144feabdc0.html (last visited Jun 12, 2012). 9

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Subsequent debate concerning whether or not the President was analytically accurate in defining the Afghan mission as a necessity rather than a choice13 overlooks the deliberate and emotively targeted effect of his employment of an elemental vocabulary, and of a scheme of interpretation linking the Kabul attacks with those of 2001. Using the language of fundamental necessity involves more than merely stating or justifying a policy stance; it is a rhetorical move defining the condition of security and the strategic measures adopted to preserve it, in exclusive and non-negotiable terms. The resolution and conviction conveyed by this mode of address is substantial. When categorized within this framework, however, to the extent that any issue is specified outside the area of contingency, deliberation, and choice, the space of political judgment and nuance surrounding it is diminished. With that potential strategy and policy, options are correspondingly constrained or, at best, problematized. The President’s replication of the final stage of the reporting sequence thereby allowed him to connect with, and to cultivate emotional leverage from, the memory of trauma associated with September 11 and its aftermath. This was not though an opportunity that was embraced without future, and as yet unquantifiable, political consequences.

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1. Suicide Terrorism: Perceptions and Representations Had the attack on the ISAF compound been a conventional one, it is likely to have received considerably less extensive and vivid coverage and might well have left international public opinion entirely undisturbed. The extensive impact of the Kabul incident provides but one example of the enduring capacity of suicide attacks to confound and provoke the sensitivities of those exposed, however penumbrally, to their effects. This capacity resides in very nature of the act itself. Suicide is an enigmatic and psychologically disturbing phenomenon. To voluntarily take one’s life is perhaps the most radical existential act, when combined with terrorism into an act of mass murder, its force is compounded. All societies invoke prohibitions against suicide, which is typically proscribed within moral codes and behavioral conventions, which can be a source of enduring shame or stigmatization. Yet it is also the case that all societies celebrate as heroic figures those whose sacrificial acts can readily be interpreted as suicidal in form. Within military cultures, for example, the concept of a suicide mission – from which safe return is unlikely, if not impossible – is an elevated one associated with bravery and heroism. There are of course significant differences in motivation and objective between conventional military and terrorist operations – the two cannot be simply equated. The parallel does, however, illustrate how suicide is charged with deep-seated but multiple, and often contradictory, cultural meanings. This complexity in turn underlines the ambivalence and uncertainty that makes the act, particularly when expressed as terrorism, both psychologically disquieting and effective as a means of transmitting and amplifying fear. This discussion considers three related elements of the present phase of the suicide terrorism phenomenon, exploring how they combine in the construction and representation of the act, as well as in shaping perceptions surrounding it. In so doing, a 13 Robert Kagan “The President and the 'Necessary War' Myth,” The Washington Post (Aug. 23, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/21/ AR2009082102922. html (last visited Jun 12, 2012)

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number of myths and assumptions established and entrenched by these representations are identified and challenged. Firstly, consideration of demographic evidence addresses issues concerning the characteristics and attributes of potential suicide terrorists, the limits of knowledge in respect of identifying potential agents and preventing possible adverse events. Available information does permit the development of an outline of certain general factors and the features of the environments within which dispositions towards extreme acts such as suicide terror tend to be produced. This awareness contributes towards a developing understanding of the problem, but is unquestionably tentative and unstable, falling considerably short of a profile that might permit reliable pre-emptive identification of specific individuals in situ prior to undertaking the act. One significant observation is, however, that religious motivations are much less significant than might be expected given the imprimatur that is claimed by many recent perpetrators of suicide attacks, which are adopted as convenient but insufficiently examined labels throughout the media and popular commentaries. Secondly, if the role of religion is, as indicated, less significant than it first appears, questions concerning the origins, persistence and repetition of the perception that it is a dominant explanatory characteristic arise. Although President Obama’s comments on the threat associated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban did not explicitly refer to religion, the uncompromising terms adopted in defense and justification of his foreign policy stance iterated a variation of well-established themes. In many areas of policy and rhetoric, President Obama has sought to clearly distinguish his administration from that of his predecessor. The comments following the Kabul suicide bombing, however, with their calculated reference to September 11, clearly recall those of President George W. Bush in the wake of the 2001 attacks. In so doing, they reveal strong continuities in their respective understandings of the perceived terrorist threat. This is unsurprising given the centrality of national security to political discourse within the United States, where the requirement to avoid any sense that a politician might be somehow ‘weak’ on issues of security in part explains the tendency of candidates to adopt an ‘absolute’ or exclusive conception of security,14 with all the restrictions upon judgment that entails. Samuel Huntington’s thesis of a 'clash of civilizations' is identified as a significant constituent part of recent discourses through which that concept of security is articulated can be identified.15 Although over two decades have passed since its first formulation, the influence and response generated by Huntington's ideas remains implicitly present throughout the politics of national security in the United States, and in the encoding of concepts and prejudgments surrounding terrorism that is thereby consolidated. Thirdly, the deployment of religion and conflict in the narrative provided by the rhetoric of clashing civilizations is considered in relation to sample representations offered by suicide terrorists themselves. The images promoted of a radical and violent ideological commitment derived from and justified by religious authority and obligation, largely coincided with those established by Huntington’s typology of conflict and the framework associated with the global war against terror derived from 14

David C. Hendrickson, “Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security,” World Policy Journal 19 (3) (2002). 15 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (3)(1993); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon & Schuster, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, “The Age of Muslim Wars,” Newsweek (17 December 2001).

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it. Paradoxically, just as the account of clashing civilizations promotes an understanding of terrorism that elevates the significance of religion over alternative sociopolitical explanatory factors, so the self-presentation of suicide terrorists occludes precisely the same elements. A mutually reinforcing model of antagonism is thereby reproduced and entrenched within discussions addressing both contemporary terrorism, in general, and suicide terror, in particular. Returning to the example provided by events in Kabul in the autumn of 2009, the discussion concludes by reflecting upon the persistence of such framing devices and the difficulties surrounding attempts to intervene in the trajectories of public discourse that they inscribe. Under conditions of global, plural and instantaneous mass media, the impacts of political violence and the messages that it conveys, can be neither contained nor controlled in a reliable manner. Exposing the frameworks of meaning and prejudgment through which these impacts and messages are mediated can, however, permit the consideration of elements that might otherwise fall outside the framework and be excluded from discourse. In so doing, interpretation makes possible a redescription of the terms of political discourse and with that the formulation of alternative, more perspicuous, viewpoints, understandings and responses.

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2. Demographic Patterns and Contested Assumptions Demographically, there is no straightforward template that can be used to identify possible suicide terrorists. Each particular actor and discrete event is a product of complex and unpredictable interactions of history, politics, psychology and contingency. Moreover, despite the prominence accorded to suicide terror in the mindset of contemporary politics and media, other than within certain quite specific locations and periods – such as Israel during the first intifada or Iraq during intense periods of instability and insurgency following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime – suicide terror is an infrequent and unusual event. That this is the case is of course to be welcomed, but it does mean that identifying specific determining characteristics or environmental features shared by suicide terrorists, or acquiring reliable insights into their psychological states or dispositions, is extremely difficult. To generate and support such conclusions, a sizeable body of verifiable data would ideally be required. Despite the absence of such material, two illuminating analyses of the evidence that is available are, however, extant. The first, by Allan Kreuger assesses documented features of terrorists (including, but not limited to, suicide terrorists) primarily located within Southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.16 The second, by Robert Pape, presents a broader survey of suicide terrorism over almost four decades.17 Each of the studies is independently interesting; more significant still is how their outcomes converge to challenge some of the assumptions and preconceptions commonly attributed to terrorist actors.

16 Alan B. Krueger, “What Makes a Terrorist,” The American (Nov/Dec 2007), available at http://www.american.com/archive/2007/november-december-magazine-contents/what-makes-a-terrorist (last visited Jun 12, 2012); Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism (Princeton University Press, 2007). 17 Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House, 2005).

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Taking the two studies in turn, Kreuger's principal finding is that, from data drawn from investigations in the Gaza strip, those associated with terrorism in that environment tend to be educationally and materially above the average range. Suicide bombers in particular are less likely to come from families below the poverty line, with sixty percent of Gazan suicide bombers undertaking study beyond high school level, as compared with less than fifteen percent of the general population. Similarly, in the nearby southern area of Lebanon, terrorists linked with Hezbollah tended to experience lower rates of poverty and higher levels of educational attainment: according to UN measures, twenty-eight percent were classified below the Lebanese poverty line, against an overall measure of thirty-three percent amongst the wider population; with forty-seven percent receiving secondary or further education, compared with thirtyeight percent of comparable Lebanese adults.

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The records from Lebanon are less dramatic than those from Gaza, reflecting the extreme conditions prevailing in that narrow and contested territory. A consistent tendency is nonetheless exhibited, which is reinforced by the available data on proven al-Qaeda operatives, of whom thirty-five percent had received college-level or better further education, with forty-five percent established in commensurably recognized skilled professions.18 It follows from this analysis that staple explanations of poverty, inequality, and ignorance are not direct or simple causes of terrorism – that investment in aid, economic redistribution and education alone do not constitute an adequate response to the problem of terrorism – however necessary and desirable they may be on other grounds. It is instead the case that states with failed, corrupt, unstable or ineffective political systems are most likely to produce terrorists. Whilst failed states (such as Somalia) are readily identifiable by the scale of their multiple internal dysfunctions, the criteria of effectiveness and stability can be more subtle, involving factors such as variable levels of guaranteed civil liberties, restricted capacities to access and participate in political processes and traditions, and inconsistent or arbitrary enforcement of the rule of law. The discontents that such deficiencies incubate are, in Kreuger's analysis, more likely to account for the origins or identifications, of perpetrators of terrorist attacks. International terrorists drawn to Iraq in the aftermath of the removal of the Hussein regime, for example, proved 'more likely to come from nations that suppress civil liberties and provide few political rights.’19 Local environments and political commitments thereby coincide with potentially global consequences. Ideological or religious extremism, rather than providing a straightforward source of political violence, is better understood as an effect of systemic political failure, dysfunction or, in worst-case scenarios, collapse. Terrorism and degraded civil liberties therefore exhibit a relationship identifies as one of 'simultaneous causality.’20 The data assessed by Kreuger, although to some extent limited by its primary geographical focus upon the greater Levant, is consistent with the wider survey into suicide terrorism conducted by Robert Pape. Whereas Kreuger's primary objective is to challenge assumptions about poverty and education, Pape's concern was more sharply focused on the role commonly attributed to religion, and in particular by Islam, in the 18 19 20

Krueger, “What Makes a Terrorist.” Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, p. 164. Ibid, p.148.

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constitution of suicide terrorism. Compiling a data set of three hundred and fifteen suicide attacks between 1980 and 2003 in support of an analysis extending beyond that period to encompass the proliferation of suicide terrorism in Iraq from 2005, coupled with events in Europe up to the July 7, 2005 attacks on the London transport system, Pape’s concisely formulated conclusion is that “what over 95 percent of all suicide attacks around the world since 1980 until today have in common is not religion, but a clear, strategic objective: to compel a modern democracy to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland.”21 In consequence, claims Pape, the current organizing principle of the ongoing war against terror, that “suicide terrorism is mainly a product of an evil ideology called Islamic fundamentalism,” is itself “fundamentally flawed.”22 Rather than addressing the identified threat, the continuation of military operations within such territories as Iraq and Afghanistan in their present form is likely only to compound the problem of suicide terror. This conclusion by no means denies that relationships can and do exist between religion and terror. It more accurately functions to contest narrative and rhetorical devices that conflate the two, with the related temptation to identify Islam in particular with suicide terrorism. Simply put, the notion that Islam (or, indeed any other faith) is somehow a cause of suicide terrorism on the grounds that some suicide terrorists are, or claim to be, its adherence is a logically false syllogism.

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Because the characteristics of identified suicide terrorists are so broad, hopes that an emergent profile might permit the pre-emptive identification of potential actors are, and will remain, firmly within the realm of fiction. This is even the case with such a basic category as gender. Until recently, suicide terrorism was overwhelmingly committed by males, but in 2008 over thirty attacks in Iraq alone were perpetrated by women. More disturbingly still, reports from Afghanistan have documented the increasing use of children in suicide attacks.23 Adaptive strategies such as these inevitably frustrate the most sophisticated profiling methodologies. In addition, global demographic trends – most notably the development of ‘youth bulges,’ combined with environmental change leading to cost and distribution pressures upon the fundamental needs of water, food and energy – point to an extension in future decades, in areas of sociopolitical and economic vulnerability, of issues with potential to produce pressures and resentments that can fuel political violence and ultimately contribute to the production of terrorism. Identifying and attributing psychological characteristics to suicide terrorists is also of limited diagnostic benefit. In so doing we are always likely to fall into error and assumption – labeling an individual after the fact as extremist, depressive or unusually susceptible may well allow his or her actions to be located within a preferred explanatory narrative, but is of questionable benefit in terms of either knowledge or deterrence given the multitude of contingent motivating factors and potential trigger 21 Caryle Murphy, “A Scholarly Look at Terror Sees Bootprints in the Sand,” Washington Post (July 10, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/09/ AR2005070901425. html (last visited Jun 12, 2012); Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, pp. 4, 241. 22 Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, p. 251. 23 Brian G. William, “The Taliban Fedayeen: The World’s Worst Suicide Bombers?” Terrorism Monitor 5 (14) (July 19, 2007), pp. 1-4, available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5 Btt_news%5D=4285 (last visited Jun 12, 2012).

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events impinging upon every separate event. Moreover, although suicide may well be a signal of despair, weakness or desperation on the part of an individual, under conditions of global asymmetric conflict characteristic of the present era, it is also, as communications from al-Qaeda and those claiming affiliation or association with it make clear, conducted as a tactical response to the prevailing environment. In commenting on the strategy and logic of suicide terror, Ayman al-Zawahiri makes clear that the selection and justification of suicide terror as a matter of method is a matter of efficiency. Eschewing the distractions of theology, “the method of martyrdom operations,” he notes, is simply “the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and least costly to the mujahideen in terms of casualties.”24

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The material surveyed here inevitably treats but a small fragment of the coverage addressing possible sources of terrorism in its multiple manifest forms. The challenges presented to some familiar assumptions regarding its causes are, however, inevitably contestable but unquestionably well founded. That this is the case raises the question of why prejudgments concerning the supposed ignorance and fanaticism of terrorists are so persistent and entrenched within the naturalized assumptions of mainstream media and political discourse. A full response to this question would require a comprehensive survey far exceeding the scope of this discussion. As highlighted earlier, however, one key intervention that continues to resonate throughout contemporary discourse – not the least within the comments of President Obama following the August 2009 Kabul suicide attack – is of particular note. Samuel Huntington's 1993 identification of a clash of civilizations between 'Islam' and 'the West', a perspective restated following 9/11, even more pejoratively, as an 'Age of Muslim Wars' provided a readily applicable perspective through which analysis of and responses to 9/11 was constructed, both in the U.S. and amongst a wider audience of multiple globally attuned publics. Tracing elements of their reception, appropriation and reproduction, the persistent and continuing effects of Huntington's ideas, which are no longer explicitly prominent and might easily be dismissed as part of an outmoded and discredited political project, can be readily discerned.

3. Strategic Communication and Political Myth: The Clash of Civilizations Given the apparent differences in political substance and conviction, not to mention style and presentation, separating President Obama from his predecessor, the suggestion that his remarks following the Kabul bombing demonstrates a shared perspective may at first appear quixotic. Upon examination, however, that this is the case is not entirely surprising. Firstly, the requirement – especially when addressing a military audience – to address issues associated with national and, latterly, homeland security in a robust manner is compelling for any commander-in-chief. Secondly, beneath the immediate demands of political appearance, Obama's remarks exhibit a deeper convergence upon an understanding that global terrorism, especially in its suicidal forms, makes manifest a profound challenge to ‘Western’ norms and values. Given the power, capacities and demonstrated resilience of the U.S. and its partners, this assessment is, to say the least, questionable. It is, however, by no means novel, having received its most forceful and influential formulation in Huntington's polemics. 24 Cited in Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (Greenwood Press, 2006), p. 55.

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Amongst many controversial claims, Huntington posited a fundamental incompatibility between an archetype of ‘Western’ civilization and its Islamic counterpart, with the former envisioned as a naïve amalgamation of modernization, democracy and universal rights while the latter is a ‘challenger civilization’ notoriously depicted as disordered to the extent that in his view “Islam's borders are bloody and so are its innards.”25

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The notion of clashing civilizations was not wholly original, having been deployed but not in depth, three years previously by the historian Bernard Lewis in an article entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage,”26 and a subsequent highly critical work on contemporary Muslim societies, controversially entitled What Went Wrong?27 Both authors argued that a deficit of modernization and freedom, (conceived according to broadly mid-Atlantic norms) along with a concomitant surplus of resentment and underdevelopment, explain the decline over centuries of a once open, progressive and tolerant form of life that flourished as an ideal type during the Ottoman period. Both Lewis and Huntingdon also acquired positions of informal influence with the coterie of self-designating 'neoconservative' political advisors (including Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld) associated first with the administration of Ronald Reagan, and then with those of both George H. and George W. Bush.28 The Huntingdon-Lewis hypothesis was much debated and criticized, most effectively on the related grounds that the conception of civilizations involved is a totalizing and unrealistic one that presents ‘civilizations’ (be they Western, Eastern, Muslim, Asiatic or of any other type) as homogenous unitary entities. Under the most cursory examination, all civilizations and attendant social formations are, inevitably, sociologically complex and highly differentiated in ways that escape the understanding of a general classificatory scheme, such as that proposed by Huntington. Any living tradition or civilization, rather than being static or singular in form, is better understood as “an historically extended, socially embodied argument…in part about the goods which constitute that tradition.”29 Such complexity is substantially beyond the scope of the model proposed by Huntington and in respect of Islam in particular he was widely criticized for the adoption of an inaccurate and intellectually outmoded Orientalist stance.30 Later, and more damagingly, Huntington’s views on identity and on Hispanic immigration into the United States became, in at least one damaging interview, perilously prejudicial in tone.31 Lewis’s longstanding scholarly engagement with the Middle East ensured that he was less susceptible to such criticisms. The intentions and objectives of his political interventions did, though, provoke questions of a deeper psychological type. Rather than harboring antipathy towards the region, suggested Ian Baruma, “perhaps he loves it too much. It is a common phenomenon among Western students of the Orient to fall in love with a civilization. Such love often ends in bitter 25

Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 258. Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly (September 1990), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199009/muslim-rage (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 27 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford University Press, 2001). 28 Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Belknap Press, 2004), pp. 57-62. 29 Alassdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2nd ed., Duckworth, 1985), p. 222. 30 Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation (October 22, 2001), available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said/print (last visited Jun 12, 2012). 31 Bernard-Henri Levy, American Vertigo: Traveling America in the Footsteps of Tocqueville (Random House, 2006). 26

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impatience when reality fails to conform to the ideal. The rage, in this instance, is that of the Western scholar.”32 The romanticized, eroticized, infantilizing artistic and literary representations of Delacroix, John Frederick Lewis, Richard Burton and even T. E. Lawrence are reproduced in Lewis’s declared affection for Arab cultures, perhaps more poignantly for their histories than their present realities. Frustration at contemporary failure to emulate these posited ideals led that bitterness to find expression in his advocacy of neoconservative ambitions, in what history seems likely to record as an equally misguided political infatuation. Despite these criticisms, Huntington’s hypothesis set the agenda for foreign policy debate in the U.S. throughout the 1990s, a period when a new world order to succeed the familiar bipolarity of the cold war was much heralded but lacked decisive definition. Although never formally adopted as policy, his arguments nonetheless exerted unquestionable influence within Washington's corridors of power, and in the columns of polemical journals such as the neoconservative Weekly Standard. Through these conduits the idea of a clash of civilizations and the hegemonic role accorded to the U.S. within the global confrontation that idea projected, became an intrinsic element of the context conferring intelligibility upon the declaration of global war against terror in the fall of 2001.

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Neither Huntington nor Lewis specifically anticipated the events of September 11, but their speculated confrontation between improbably constructed but attractively simplistic categories of 'Islam' and 'the West' become a self-fulfilling prediction in the aftermath of the attacks. This effect was double-sided, simultaneously providing an implicit template for policymakers whilst confirming the suspicions of those minded to interpret the intentions and ambitions of the U.S. and its allies in terms of antagonism and hostility. Although the degree of President Bush's direct familiarity with the work of Huntington and Lewis is unclear, in the days immediately following the World Trade Center attacks two comments in particular demonstrated the extent to which they served to inform the view from the Oval Office. On September 16, 2001, some three weeks before the operations in Afghanistan began under the operational title of ‘Enduring Freedom,’ the President set out the emerging strategy of his administration in the following terms: “This is a new kind of…a new kind of evil. And the American people are beginning to understand…this crusade, this war on terrorism.”33 The adoption of a vocabulary of ‘war’ was predictable given previous U.S. policies against drugs, crime corruption and other identified ills. Its conjunction with the notion of crusade had a powerful negative effect that confirmed the concerns of many observers, immediately identifying the war against terror as a war against Islam. “Bush,” according to Albert Agazarian of Ramallah’s Bir Zeit University, “sent chills through this part of the world with the word.”34 Five days later, in a formal address to a joint session of Congress, the President sought to moderate his pronouncement, declaring his respect for Islam and portraying those undertaking terrorism in its name as “traitors to their own faith, trying, 32 Ian Baruma, “Lost In Translation: The Two Minds of Bernard Lewis,” The New Yorker (July 14, 2004), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/06/14/040614crbo_books?printable=true (last visited Jun.12, 2012). 33 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President Upon Arrival: The South Lawn,” (16 September 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 34 Charles Glass, The Tribes Triumphant: Return Journey to the Middle East (Harper Press, 2006), p. 272.

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in effect, to hijack Islam itself.” These sentiments lacked the force and resonance of his earlier statement, however, and had limited emollient effect. When, later in the same address, Bush stridently asserted that “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,”35 the pattern of antagonism influenced by Huntingdon’s arguments and, perhaps more importantly, by the clarity and rhetorical force of its expression as a crusade, was confirmed and reinforced.

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Despite the continuing reassurances of politicians and diplomats, it is neither accidental nor expedient that ‘war on terror’ was and remains understood by many, however erroneously, in the contexts of its initial formation. Following the lead provided by President Bush and unencumbered by the political baggage that he carried, President Obama, most explicitly in his inaugural address and in the 2009 speech at Cairo University,36 sought to emphasize that the campaign against terror is not conceived, and should not be received, in terms of religious antagonism or clashing civilizations. The Cairo speech in particular, styled by the White House as 'remarks on a new beginning' exposes the difficulty of executing a transformation of discourse once ideas as forceful as those adopted from Huntingdon and Lewis become established. Although President Obama’s speeches were met in a generally positive manner and his personal ratings remain considerably higher than those of his predecessor, international opinion polling consistently demonstrates that confidence in the U.S., as well as support for its foreign policy, remains low across the Middle East and South Asia.37 President Obama’s oratory is undoubtedly as sincere as his expression is compelling. The contexts within which his rhetoric is received remain, however, deeply conditioned by connections between war, crusade, Islam and terror that were forged in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, drawing on materials furnished by Huntington, Lewis and debates surrounding their work. These associations, once established, are not easily dislodged and are inevitably recalled and reinforced even by carefully calibrated comments such as those made following the Kabul attack. Returning to the example provided by that incident, the intricate mechanisms through which particular acts – such as the suicide event on the ISAF compound – are encoded and depicted in mainstream global media begin to emerge. The complex set of references, receding from the details at the scene to a September morning almost eight years earlier, and back to the decade of policy debate that preceded it, constitute and reproduce sets of highly contested, but deeply inscribed, perceptions and representations. These discursive effects draw heavily upon vocabulary and imagery furnished by, and derived from, the notion of clashing civilizations. As well as being 35 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” (September 20, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/200109208.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 36 Barack H. Obama, “Inaugural Address,” (Washington, DC, January 20, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/ (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning,” (Cairo, June 4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/ (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 37 Steven Kull, et al, “America’s Global Image in the Obama Era,” (Program on International Public Attitudes, Washington, D.C. 2009), available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/WPO_ USObama_Jul09_packet.pdf (last visited Jun. 18, 2012); Pew Research Center “Confidence in the U.S. President,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, at http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=6 (last visited Jun. 17, 2012).

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highly effective and, to a significant degree, self-fulfilling, in the course of these developments the extent to which this discourse exceeds the intent and escapes the control of both mass media and military-industrial complex begins to emerge.

4. Strategic Discourse and Enduring Conflict

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Over fifteen years after its first publication, Huntington’s ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ remains the third most viewed article on the website of the prominent policy and strategy journal Foreign Affairs. The attractions and influence of the piece reside to a significant degree in its directness and clarity of formulation. Most importantly, in the paralysis of shock and uncertainty that immediately followed the events of 9/11, the notion of a civilization-level conflict supplied a ready explanation of the attack that excluded the U.S. and its policies, whilst providing directions towards a response grounded in familiar strategies of hegemonic power and physical force. That the explanation was limited and partial was unimportant. In a situation of crisis demanding simplicity and directness, accuracy and complexity were not required. Huntingdon offered a straightforward and easily communicated narrative of opposition and conflict, organized around uncomplicated accounts of civilization, otherness, and the identities and antagonisms that they inexorably generate. This narrative also sustained a policy doctrine that simultaneously defended 'Western' values whilst anticipating a coming century, American leadership of which was perceived through the neoconservative prism as a matter of both destiny and responsibility. Although this millenarian ideal of U.S. ascendancy was a short-lived one, the continuing popularity of Huntingdon’s article attests to the enduring resonance of the images and lexicon that it animated.38 That this is the case is not only demonstrated in the formulation of global war against terror, but also in the impressions and confusions surrounding attitudes towards Muslim communities and nations that it generated. It is also borne out in the appropriation and transformation of this discourse by terrorist groups and the actors themselves. The discourse of conflict condenses and structures grievances into identities that might otherwise appear fragmented and incoherent or even remain unformed. The extent of this influence is established by Kepel, who suggests that Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 2001 tract, Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner, can be understood as a “jihadist reading of the clash of civilizations” offering its readers “a worldview comparable – but in reverse – to Huntington’s … within which “the battle is universal” and “Western forces hostile to Islam have clearly identified their enemy – which they call ‘Islamic fundamentalism.’”39 Huntingdon’s influence in framing policy debates and media representations is thereby mirrored by the very target of his analysis. The identity constructed within that inverse projection is amplified and disseminated by Zawahiri, reproducing and entrenching its effects, while sustaining discourses that label and connect religion with violence. In so doing, potentially significant sociopolitical factors identified in the analyses of Kreuger and Pape are further marginalized and the inaccurate but prevailing identification of Islam with terror and with suicide terror, in particular, is reinforced.

38

Francis Fukayama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy. (Yale University Press, 2006). Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, pp. 94-100.

39

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Notwithstanding this misnomer, it is not the case that suicide terrorists commit the act that comes to define them simply because they are in some sense 'extreme' or 'radical' in the beliefs that they come to maintain. Ideologies, whether religious or otherwise, offer at best a partial account of motivation. Those who become suicide terrorists do not undertake the act solely because they succumb to the appeals of Islamism or become adherents of any other system that can similarly contain and structure impulses and tendencies towards suicide. Indeed, it is easily overlooked that although, within the conventional grammar of identity and choice, decisions are made by and attributed to individual actors, identity is always open and contingent, so that “decisions also make people.”40 The identity that suicide terrorists come to acquire occurs through the act itself and, in at least some cases as examples of 'selfradicalization' suggest, individuals become 'Islamists' (or profess such beliefs, however shallowly understood) in order to contain and give form to already discontents and grievances – be they real, perceived or imagined – that receive expression through that most radical terrorist act. Rather than causing or originating the act of suicide, religion or ideology functions as the authorizing or justificatory creed or doctrine, attracting vulnerable individuals and providing an environment within which that most radical act becomes intelligible and permissible. This is by no means to deny that connections obtained between religion and violence, or even more specifically between Islam – within which suicide is, and remains, an explicit and grievous sin – and the surrendering of life in the form described as martyrdom. The history of these connections is, however, not a simple one of doctrinal authorization or command. Debates surrounding the issue, extending back to the 7th Century separation of sunni and shia within Islam, are and remain to this day complex, contested and bound up with the contingencies of political life. In the decade leading up to 9/11, punctuated by the stillborn peace accords between Israel and Palestine at Oslo, the emergence of Hamas and Hezbollah and the first intifada against Israel, and the series of conflicts in the Balkan regions,41 the status of suicide operations was the subject of ongoing argument. These debates were convoluted and inconclusive, but – at precisely the same point in time that the clash of civilizations attained prominence – facilitated the emergence of ‘grand narrative of martyrdom…as the best way to bear witness to the reality of oppression.’42 This emergence, not coincidentally, paralleled the growth of globalized mass communication technologies, with channels such as al-Jazeera exploited in particular by al-Zawahiri. As previously noted, the al-Qaeda second in command’s advocacy of suicide operations was mounted in instrumental rather than theological terms, so he proceeded on similar lines in disseminating the strategy of martyrdom. To achieve this al-Zawahiri “developed [alQaeda’s] mobilizing myth by presenting it just as the Western media would,” editing excerpts from prominent figures, including Huntingdon, into film packages “with the difference that Arabic was put into the mouths of English-speaking westerners”43 accompanied by English subtitles. The complexities attending interpenetrating historical, political and theological dialogue was thereby dissolved by the techniques and technologies of the new global media. Just as the simplicity of Huntingdon’s 40

Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought (2nd ed., Basic Books 1987), p. 123. 41 Gilles Kepel, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East (Belknap Press, 2008), p. 72 42 Ibid, p. 102. 43 Ibid, p.146.

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narrative of conflict came to prevail within US media reporting and policy debates, so Zawahiri’s appropriation and inversion of that discourse achieved ascendancy within the small but undeniably significant audience of those susceptible to the appeal of its corresponding message. The perceptions and representations of terror shaped by these discourses or interpretive frameworks are therefore a dual production. Moreover, because their strength and appeal resides in their simplicity, the limitations of the narratives of clashing civilizations and of martyrdom to which they relate is as easy to challenge as it is to duplicate. This is, perhaps surprisingly, clearly demonstrated by the invocation of Islam in the video testimonies left by suicide terrorists. These media productions are a part of an emerging genre. Although its conventions are not firmly established, a number of recurrent tropes can be discerned. So-called ‘martyrdom videos’ are typically scripted in advance and rich in politico-military iconography. They often feature young men in military-style garb, frequently carrying weapons, filmed against backdrops including flags and political slogans. In terms of verbal content, one of the most striking aspects is the lack of theological substance. The religious component of these recordings often appears to be offered by actors as a matter of exculpatory routine, almost as an afterthought, and certainly without the profundity one might expect of a profession of faith prior to the undertaking of such an extreme act. A case in point here is provided by Mohammed Siddique Khan, leader of the London bombers of July 7, 2005. In his final video message, Khan notes his “obedience to the one true God, Allah,” but beyond this perfunctory acknowledgment struggles with the brief Arabic elements of his script, stumbling over phrases in a manner suggesting that his thinking has not been shaped by religious concerns in a significant manner.44 Similarly, in a second video, recorded shortly before the attacks, but which did not enter the public domain until some two years later, he is pictured addressing his infant daughter and offers no more detail than that “I'm doing what I'm doing for the sake of Islam … not, you know … it's not for materialistic or worldly benefits.”45 Where Khan does demonstrate a measure of eloquence, if not accuracy, it is in the opposition that he expresses against the foreign policies of the United Kingdom, which leads him to conclude that by attacking the London transport system he will in some way be discharging a declared responsibility “for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters … Until we feel security, you will be our targets … . We are at war and I am a soldier.”46 These brief comments reveal motivations that are grounded in and fuelled by politics rather than religion, expressed in terms of a projected affinity with a globalized, homogeneous – and of course imaginary – Muslim identity, adopted and adapted from Huntingdon’s work and its conceptions of identity and conflict. This is invoked in a weak attempt to offer justification for actions to come, and is distinct from the elements that precede it in the recordings. It also elides more personal factors in Khan’s life and character that emerged in investigations following the London bombings. The most penetrating biographical account to date offers the succinct assessment that Khan

44 BBC, “London Bomber: Text in Full,” (1 September 2005), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/ 4206800.stm (last visited Jun. 17, 2012). 45 BBC, “7/7 Bomber's Farewell Video Shown,” (24 April 2008), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ england/7364628.stm (last visited Jun 17, 2012). 46 Ibid.

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may have felt indignant about western foreign policy, as many anti-war campaigners do, but that wasn’t the reason he led a cell of young men to kill themselves … At the heart of this tragedy is a conflict between the first and subsequent generations of British Pakistanis - with many young people using Islamism as a kind of liberation theology … It is a conflict between tradition and individuality, culture and religion, tribalism and universalism, passivity and action.47

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Although the case of Mohammad Siddique Khan offers but one example, it is a telling and suggestive one that exploits the exclusive logic of President Bush’s formulations following September 11, 2001, imposing a logic of divided civilizations and locating their division within culture, rather than nation or territory. The outcome, a binary depiction of incommensurable ways of being, was memorably captured within the declaration that ‘you’re either with us or with the terrorists.’ This rhetorical device echoes throughout video testimonies such as Khan’s, self-replicating recordings that function as recruitment devices for their successors. The quixotic attempt to fix the sources and meanings of terror thereby proceeds by connecting it with ostensibly religious sources, with both perpetrators and critics converging to name the act in terms ironically – in the most tragic sense of that term – consistent with Huntingdon’s explanatory scheme. In forging a largely spurious but simple and effective label, confirmation of and justification for the crude and largely empty propagandist theology of terror espoused by those seeking affinity with al-Qaeda was, unwittingly or otherwise, produced as much in the seminar rooms of Harvard College as the madrassas of South Asia and the Middle East. The rhetoric of terrorist discourse and final messages of actors that are collated, reproduced and discussed at length across the Internet, pulls into focus the multiple effects of media representations and the discourses that often subtly and perhaps unconsciously, become ingrained in their reproduction. With the reception and adaptations of the notion of clashing civilizations, language that equates or conjoins Islam per se with extremism, terror and suicide is misleading and potentially damaging insofar as it sustains the rhetoric and communicative strategies adopted by terrorist groups. However carefully qualified this usage may be – when, for example ‘Islamist’ or ‘political Islam’ is invoked – in the course of reporting and repetition nuance is invariably lost and the message received, even if it differs from that originally transmitted and intended, is one of a perceived condemnation and labeling of Islam in general as somehow inherently extreme and hospitable to terror. This in turn reinscribes and, at its worst, functions to legitimate the message of antagonism and marginalization adopted by terrorist groups. Common reference in mass media discourse to ‘Islamic terrorists’ or ‘jihadi suicide bombers,’ to note but two obvious examples, is therefore not only descriptively incomplete. It is also misleading in its reduction of the irreducibly complex, particular, historical and always partially opaque, sources of terror in the modern world. The conjunction is also counterproductive in that the messages conveyed to the overwhelming majority of Muslims opposed to all forms of terrorism can function to sustain a sense of otherness, separation and isolation and, in so doing, undermine attempts to resist and counter the appeal exerted by the rhetoric 47

Shiv Malik, “My Brother the Bomber,” Prospect (June 2007), available at http://www.prospectmagazine. co.uk/2007/06/mybrotherthebomber/ (last visited Jun. 18, 2012).

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of terrorist groups and their sympathizers. This contemporary variation on longestablished binary divisions between East and West, Orient and Occident, Tradition and Modernity is neither novel nor surprising. Yet despite the limitations and distortions exposed in the considerations here, the undeniably enduring and effective character of these discourses inevitably raises the question of how their impact can be more effectively countered or corrected. 5. Changing Strategies and Challenging Assumptions

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Suicide terrorism is at present sufficiently widespread to be subject to a variation upon the law of diminishing returns in terms of media effect, becoming progressively less newsworthy with repetition despite its undiminished horror. An attack upon a marketplace in Iraq or Afghanistan in which all of the victims are from the local population, for example, may only briefly register upon the radar of international news media organisations. That this is the case is a self-contained critique of the values of both the media and its audiences exceeding the scope of this discussion. An attack such as that against the ISAF compound on August 15, 2009, however, retains the capacity to command the full attention, however temporarily, of both producers and consumers of global news. The August 15 bombing was the first of a series of suicide and IED attacks attempting to disrupt the Afghan electoral process, in order to compromise its outcomes. These events included further targeting of NATO forces in Kabul, and a repeat of the 2008 attack on the Indian Embassy in the heart of the Wazir Akhbar Khan district. The election did take place as scheduled but, in an atmosphere of tension and insecurity, was beset by charges of intimidation and fraud. Some six weeks after the poll and under growing international pressure, President Karzai acknowledged the adverse findings of the Electoral Complaints Commission.48 This capitulation effectively set aside the result of the poll, initiating a second run-off vote between Karzai and his leading challenger, Dr Abdullah Abdullah. Preparations for this second round prompted a renewed threat, again delivered by Zabiullah Mujahid, that the Taliban would use ‘different, unspecified but implicitly more disruptive techniques, “to interrupt the election.”49 Days later Mujahid claimed responsibility on behalf of the Taliban for the 28 October attack on a UN guesthouse that resulted in twelve deaths (including three suicide bombers).50 Whilst the mode of attack was far from original, targeting the United Nations (which provided substantial support for the electoral process) for the first time in Afghanistan did mark a development in Taliban tactics. On November 1, Dr. Abdullah withdrew from the second poll, claiming that it could not take place in a free or fair manner. Amidst chaotic scenes, President Karzai was appointed to a second term in office,51 but the manner of its achievement ensured that from the outset the credibility and legitimacy of his administration was significantly 48 Electoral Complaints Commission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “ECC Issues Its Decisions to the IEC with respect to the Certification of Presidential Election Results (October 19, 2009). 49 Jerome Starkey, “Winter Election Looms as Karzai Bows to Pressure after Rigged Poll,” The Times, (October 21, 2009), p. 33. 50 Jerome Starkey, “Six UN Staff Killed in Taleban Attack on Kabul Guesthouse,” The Times (October 29, 2009). 51 Golnar Motavelli, “Karzai named Afghan Leader,” Reuters (November 2, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE59T1YY20091102?sp=true (last visited Jun. 18, 2012).

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compromised, and that the interruption of the electoral process envisaged by Mujahid had been comprehensively (albeit, perhaps, inadvertently) achieved. The conjunction of the attacks with the election ensured that prominence was accorded to the terrorist incidents and coverage of the violence by major news organizations was consistent in both thoroughness and in maintaining the pattern of themes established on August 15. This schema consolidated notions of vulnerability, insecurity and doubt surrounding strategic objectives, while compounding the deepening perceived fragility regarding both public and political support for the wider Afghanistan mission. These perceptions in turn prompted renewed assurances from the United States and NATO. Speaking at a Ministers Meeting in Bratislava on October 23, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates found it necessary to make explicit that “we're not pulling out,” and that “any reduction [in the US commitment to ISAF] is very unlikely.”52 At the same meeting, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen reiterated the importance of the mission as “[t]he only way to ensure that Afghanistan does not become once again a safe haven for terrorism.”53

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The statements of Gates and Rassmussen demonstrate how the interpretive frame established after the August 15 suicide bombing, through its initial reporting cycle, and in President Obama’s subsequent remarks, persisted throughout the coverage of, and response to, violence surrounding the election. Moreover, as the discussion has established, this is not a spontaneously generated analytical device. As President Obama’s comments recalling the impact of September 11, 2001 revealed, it is also a manifestation of earlier discourses of security, terror, order and power, connecting current events with history and memory, and with sensations of vulnerability, uncertainty and fear that the visceral impacts of 9/11 so deeply inscribed. Although the 'shock of the new' experienced globally in the images of that September morning inevitably fades with the distance of time, it is never fully erased or suppressed and is readily and vividly amenable to recall and to reimagination. Located within this context of debates, President Obama's disavowal of the explicit rhetoric associated with Global War on Terror is certainly a welcome one, but is constrained by the frame of reference through which issues surrounding security and terror are constructed and represented. To a significant extent, constructed around the events of 9/11, using materials drawn from debates addressing the uncertain consequences of globalization, the structure of international relations in the aftermath of the cold war and the notion of clashing civilizations that emerged from them remains. These dialogues are by no means historical and continue to shape perceptions and judgments in deeply rooted and pervasive forms. As Nicholas Lemann argues, from its inception the very label ‘War on Terror’ "framed the way people think about how the United States is reacting to the September 11th attacks so completely, that the

52

Department of Defence (U.S), “Press Conference with Secretary Gates during the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting,” (News Transcript: 4503, October 23. 2009), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4503(last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 53 Julian E. Barnes, “NATO Members Support U.S. Troop Hike in Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times (October 24, 2009), available at latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghanistan-nato242009 oct24,0,3409109. story (last visited Jun. 18, 2012).

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idea that declaring and waging war on terror was not the sole, inevitable, logical consequence of the attacks just isn't in circulation."54 One function of a frame, as suggested in Lemann’s comment, is to create boundaries within which a scene or event is pictured and contained. Indeed, as part of the process of reporting and interpretation, framing is an inescapable device that allows meaning to be established and narrative sense conveyed. Yet once a frame is established around an issue it tends to become naturalized and increasingly transparent to both producers and recipients of the messages constructed within it. This invisibility serves both to obscure the origins of the frame and to exclude inconvenient complexity, alternative meanings, and perspectives located outside the frame that might challenge its prevailing assumptions and biases. In discharging this function of marginalization, the frame functions in “the confinement of the parameters of meaningful citizen debate,”55 becoming inseparable from and simultaneously a part of, the problem that it ostensibly represents.

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Although such a device can be formulated as an articulation of the interests of political elites, and a demonstration of their pervasive influence,56 once established and entrenched they are not straightforwardly amenable to revision or replacement. Instead, the reproduction and interpretation of the frame can prove resistant to control in media environments that are global, plural and reflexively critical of media messages and communicative effects. This is readily evidenced in the continuing difficulties encountered by the United States in attempting to engender a transition in terminology from ‘war on terror’ to ‘long war’57 or, more recently, to ‘overseas contingency operation.’58 The attempt to move away from the vocabulary of war against terror is highly problematic, if not impossible, when the underlying conceptions of security and terror, as disclosed in President Obama’s remarks following the Kabul bombing, serve to maintain and – intentionally or otherwise – to reinforce that frame. Communicative processes are continuous both with terrorist events and with the sensitivities and responses that they provoke and reproduce. Governments, journalists, terrorists, insurgents and audiences are aware of this in varying degrees. Moreover, as Jeremy Bowen, currently the BBC's Middle East Editor, has candidly acknowledged, the interplay between acts of terrorism and the processes of their mediation is often a calculated one. “Unequal wars, especially ones between states and guerrilla armies, are all about perceptions … to achieve the classic military and political objective of breaking the will of the enemy to fight on … [n]o weapon in asymmetrical warfare is more important than the media.”59 Coverage of suicide attacks, both in the recent examples from Afghanistan drawn upon here and those occurring elsewhere, 54 Diego Gambetta, “Reason and Terror: Has 9/11 Made it Hard to Think Straight?” Boston Review, (April/May 2004), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR29.2/gambetta.html (last visited Jun. 12, 2012). 55 Amy Reynolds and Barnett, Brooke, “‘America under Attack’: CNN’s Verbal and Visual Framing of September 11,” in Media Representations of September 11 (Steven Chermak, Frankie Y. Bailey, and Michelle Brown, Praeger, 2003), pp. 85-101. 56 W. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion (7th ed, Longman, 2006). 57 William M. Arkin,“Goodbye War on Terrorism, Hello Long War,” The Washington Post (26 January 2006), available at http://hanan-revue.blogspot.com/2006/01/goodbye-war-on-terrorism-hello-long.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2012). 58 Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, “‘Global War On Terror' Is Given New Name,” The Washington Post, (March 25 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/ AR2009032402818_pf.html (last visited Jun. 18, 2009). 59 Jeremy Bowen, War Stories (Simon and Schuster 2006), pp. 120-121.

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demonstrates both the significance of that weapon and the difficulties involved in controlling its deployment.

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In response to this question of control, criticism of the use of hyperbole and proposals to counter exaggeration in media reporting are entirely apposite but of limited effect. It is difficult, for example, to fault Dan Gardner’s call for the promotion of moderation in reporting of terrorism, for statistically-informed probabilistic assessments of presented threats, and for a Rooseveltian stoicism against the excesses of media manipulation and ‘unreasoning fear.’60 The tendency towards the amplification of natural but disproportionate fears evoked by terrorism is of course unfortunate, but contemporary experience is some way removed from the era of trust, deference and hierarchy characteristic of Roosevelt’s era, which preceded the growth of modern media technologies and the interdependent military, industrial and political structures that accompany them. In these circumstances, the suggestion that alternative patterns and modes of reporting might displace those that presently hold sway are at best optimistic in their estimation of the prospects for successful enforcement of censorious requirements upon media organizations that prize independence over accuracy or truth, regardless how insensible their use of that autonomy might be. The application of moderation and perspective is also, of course, exponentially more problematic within the literally uncontrollable circulations of coverage and commentary that populate interlocked blogs, chat rooms and message boards throughout the Internet. More subtly, in much media reporting the issue is not primarily one of hyperbolic or exploitative coverage. As the coverage of the Kabul incidents demonstrates, the issue is a deeper structural one concerning the emergence and persistence of frameworks coupled with the beliefs and assumptions that are conveyed and reproduced concerning, in this case, the sources of suicide terror, the interpretation of religion in relation to it, and the structure of interests and conflicts in an era of accelerating globalization. Issues surrounding perception and representation are not that coverage is, in itself, necessarily excessive or fear mongering, but rather that even the most measured coverage and commentary is deeply influenced by established patterns of thought, language and action.

Conclusion The considerations presented here by no means offer a complete treatment of the subject, but do identify inescapable questions that an adequate understanding of the issues of strategic communications that a concerted attempt to confront the challenge of suicide terror must address. These are issues that preclude the pronouncement of a simple diagnostic explanation of, or solution to, the phenomenon of suicide terror. As with the viral spread of messages across global transmission networks (and it is not by coincidence that infiltration of the network by advertising media is known as ‘guerrilla marketing’), so the conceptual extension of suicide terrorism is reminiscent of a virus within the global body politic. The viral analogy need not, however, be considered a wholly negative one. Once established, a virus is carried in the memory and responses of the system but never completely eradicated. Understanding the virus can, however, 60

Dan Gardner, Risk: The Science and Politics of Fear (Random House, 2009), pp. 340-347.

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shape targeted responses that limit and contain the effects of contagion. The vaccination process retains the trace of the disorder that it counters, managing and mitigating the risks presented on an ongoing basis. Effective prophylaxis also crucially avoids the trap that awaits all forms of counterterrorism, that of an excessive or disproportionate response that aggravates rather than undermines both the multiple effects of terror and the claims of those seeking to perpetrate it. Analysis of media processes such as those identified within this discussion is not a fringe activity. It makes explicit and enables more transparent critical scrutiny of dominant associations and established meanings attached to acts such as suicide terror, exposing and potentially undermining their force. The pattern of these discourses is, however predictable, not an inevitable one. In the course of repetition discourse is open to variation, disruption and debate as well as to reinscription. Conceived in these terms, critical understanding can challenge the messages communicated by terror. The extent to which the emotive effects of suicide terror can be reduced or mitigated is at best uncertain – our responses to such acts may, as a matter of 'gut feeling' not ultimately not prove fully amenable to reasoned political debate. The assumptions that are registered and reproduced in representations of such acts remain, however, contestable, and insofar as the medium is the message, to do so is both necessary and potentially effective in three dimensions: firstly by disturbing myths surrounding the causes of terrorism and characteristics of terrorist actors; secondly by undermining claims to legitimacy and justification linked with those characteristics, particularly in the present situation those that spuriously invoke religion; and thirdly by placing in question the contexts of concepts, meanings, and prejudgments constituting the frame through which terrorism is mediated in the reporting cycles of global media organizations. The illusion that the communicative response to terror can be rationalized and controlled is as profound as the illusion that, by the application of military force or any other means, the multidimensional threat posed by terrorism can be eradicated or in some other manner conclusively resolved. Once established, a frame such as that surrounding the events of 9/11 cannot simply be replaced or revoked, but critical accounts of communicative functions and effects can at least serve to expose a frame and its constitutive elements to more detailed scrutiny than might otherwise occur. In so doing, deliberation and reconsideration makes possible the achievement of a wider set of perspectives and redescriptions, not only upon immediate events such as the suicide attacks in Kabul, but also upon the underlying conceptions of security and terror through which they are represented and perceived.

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Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought (2nd ed., Basic Books 1987). Burke, Jason, “Why Taliban Leaders Prefer Dead Diplomats,” The Observer (16 August 2009). Bush, George W., “Remarks by the President Upon Arrival: The South Lawn,” (16 September 2001). Bush, George W, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” (September 20, 2001). Clarke, Ronald V. and Graeme R. Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (Greenwood Press, 2006). CNN, “Blast in Kabul Kills 7, Injures Dozens,” (15 August 2009). Department of Defence (U.S), “Press Conference with Secretary Gates During the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting,” (News Transcript: 4503, October 23. 2009). Dombey, Daniel, “Obama’s Afghanistan Strategy at Stake,” Financial Times (August 21, 2009). Electoral Complaints Commission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “ECC Issues Its Decisions to the IEC with respect to the Certification of Presidential Election Results (October 19, 2009). Fukayama, Francis, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy. (Yale University Press, 2006). Gambetta, Diego, “Reason and Terror: Has 9/11 Made it Hard to Think Straight?” Boston Review, (April/May 2004). Gardner, Dan, Risk: The Science and Politics of Fear (Random House, 2009). Glass, Charles, The Tribes Triumphant: Return Journey to the Middle East (Harper Press, 2006). Hendrickson, David C., “Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security,” World Policy Journal 19 (3) (2002). Huntington, Samuel P., “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (3)(1993). Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon & Schuster, 1996). Huntington, Samuel P., “The Age of Muslim Wars,” Newsweek (17 December 2001). ISAF, “Taliban Blast Kills and Injures Innocent Afghans,” ISAF News Release 2009#607 (5 August 2009). Jackson, Richard, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism (Manchester University Press, 2005). Kagan, Robert, “The President and the 'Necessary War' Myth,” The Washington Post (August 23, 2009). Kepel, Gilles, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Belknap Press, 2004). Kepel, Gilles, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East (Belknap Press, 2008). Krueger Alan B., “What Makes a Terrorist,” The American (Nov/Dec 2007) . Krueger, Alan B., What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism (Princeton University Press, 2007). Kull, Steven, et al, “America’s Global Image in the Obama Era,” (Program on International Public Attitudes, Washington, D.C. 2009). Langer, Gary, “On Election Eve, Support Slips for Afghan War,” ABC News (19 August 2009). Levy, Bernard-Henri, American Vertigo: Traveling America in the Footsteps of Tocqueville (Random House, 2006). Lewis, Bernard, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly (September 1990). Lewis, Bernard, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford University Press, 2001). MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue (2nd ed., Duckworth, 1985). Malik, Shiv, “My Brother the Bomber,” Prospect (June 2007). Motavelli, Golnar, “Karzai named Afghan Leader,” Reuters (November 2, 2009). Murphy, Caryle, “A Scholarly Look at Terror Sees Bootprints in the Sand,” Washington Post (Jul. 10, 2005). Obama, Barack H., “Inaugural Address,” (Washington, DC, January 20, 2009). Obama, Barack H., “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning,” (Cairo, June 4, 2009). Obama, Barack H., “Remarks by the President at the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention,” (August 22, 2009). Pape, Robert A., Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House, 2005). Pew Research Center “Confidence in the U.S. President,” Pew Global Attitudes Project (undated). Reynolds, Amy, and Brooke Barnett, “‘America under Attack’: CNN’s Verbal and Visual Framing of September 11,” in Media Representations of September 11 (Steven Chermak, Frankie Y. Bailey, and Michelle Brown, Praeger, 2003), pp. 85-101. Said, Edward W., “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation (October 22, 2001). Sky News, “Suicide Bomb at Afghan NATO Base Kills Seven,” (15 August 2009). Starkey, Jerome, “Winter Election Looms as Karzai Bows to Pressure after Rigged Poll,” The Times, (October 21, 2009). Starkey, Jerome, “Six UN Staff Killed in Taleban Attack on Kabul Guesthouse,” The Times (October 29, 2009).

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William, Brian G., “The Taliban Fedayeen: The World’s Worst Suicide Bombers?” Terrorism Monitor 5 (14) (July 19, 2007). Wilson, Scott and Al Kamen, “‘Global War On Terror' Is Given New Name,” The Washington Post, (March 25 2009).

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Terrorism and Media Kenan TOKGÖZ1 NATO Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism

Abstract. As a global threat, the fight against terrorism requires international cooperation. To make it possible, we should establish a common understanding of terrorism among democratic nations. The media is the main tool to establish this perception both nationwide and internationally. Democratic governments must provide security for their people while protecting the core values of democracy. Keywords. Terrorism, media, international cooperation, democracy, perception.

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Introduction This article examines the approaches of the media toward the terrorism that causes devastating social problems. The article also examines the responsibilities of governments and media institutions to mitigate the effects of terrorist activities without disregarding civil liberties, which is fundamental for an open and democratic society. Last, the media’s pivotal role in ensuring the public’s right to know is also discussed. In a globalizing world, terrorism has also gained a global form, especially after 9/11 attacks, and in this era, one of the most restrictive factors in countering terrorism appeared as the issue of different perceptions in different nations about terrorism. Each nation defined terrorism according to its own perception and created its own responses against terrorism. The requirement of a common definition of terrorism for international cooperation against global terrorism has been raised but not achieved by the international community so far. The lack of effective international cooperation against terrorism has given terrorist organizations freedom of movement to be able to conduct their murderous actions. There are some similar legal regulations in each democratic country about how the media must frame events of violence and terror. But terrorist organizations need the media for publicity and the media overrate terrorist events to be able to draw the attention of the public and get ratings easily. This symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media makes the situation more complicated but the solution requires not only legislation but also acting with social responsibility by considering the destructive and bloody ends of terrorism to a society. This article also focuses on what can be done to improve the conscious of social responsibility and to enhance the media’s sensitivity about the news-making process and transition from a news-based approach to an effect-based approach, in order to correct common mistakes in the news broadcasting process.

1

Public Affairs & Protocol Officer at COE-DAT.

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1. Definition of Terrorism and the Issue of Different Perceptions The word ‘terror’ is derived from Latin word ‘terrere’ which means “to make tremble.” 2 From a one-dimensional perspective, terrorism can be perceived as the “killing of innocent people inhumanly by some psychopathic persons for reasons that never can be legitimized.” However, terrorism is a phenomenon that is more complicated and multidimensional that can cause many problems for societies and governments if it is approached in such a simple manner.3 When the related literature is reviewed, it is possible to find hundreds of different definitions of terrorism offered by experts, professional committees, political organizations, national laws and international bodies but, despite all the efforts of the past decades, unfortunately there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism. NATO defines terrorism as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objective.” Alex P. Schmit & Albert J. Jongman made a study on definitions of terrorism. They examined 109 different definitions and found 22 definitional elements. Among them, “violence, force” was the most common definitional element as that element was in 83.5% of the definitions, “political affiliation” was the second with 65% and “fear” was the third with 51%.4 Indeed, when we look at these results, it looks reasonable to use the frequency of some elements to be able to reach a common definition but up to now it also has not helped us reach an internationally agreed definition of terrorism.

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The issue of different perceptions of different nations is not new. Countries that experience problems related with terrorism have already established their own definitions and countered terrorism by using different methods in accordance with their definition. The main point creating the problem is generally that terrorist groups find some safe heavens outside the targeted country and can conduct their activities freely by using the opportunities offered by a neighboring country. Why is the definitional issue so important? The answer is that defining a problem means diagnosing the illness. To be able to treat the illness effectively, you should first diagnose it properly. Since terrorism is a global threat, combating terrorism also requires global cooperation. The absence of a clear and common definition is the sign of absence of mutual cooperation and understanding in international community. In the past, some countries thought that they were immune from the threat of terrorism or some of them thought that if they did not interfere with terrorists, the terrorists would not harm them. But today we see that no country is immune from this threat and you cannot get rid of terrorism by simply ignoring it. Since the international community has not been able to agree upon a common definition, international media also approach the issue from different perspectives. While the same terrorist action is defined in some channels as “abjectness,” “dishonor” or “shamefulness, it may be defined on the contrary in some other channels as “an 2

Faruk Orgun, Küresel Terör [Global Terror] (Adam Yaynlar, 2001), p. 13. Deniz Ülke Ariboan, Nefretten Teröre [From Hate to Terror] (Ümit Yaynclk, 2005), pp. 21-22. 4 Alex P. Schmit and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (Transaction Books, 1988). 3

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acceptable or explainable way of struggling.” Nations have been condemning or complaining about terrorism with the harshest available terminology when they themselves suffer from it, but otherwise prefer to turn a blind eye to the sufferings of other nations. For example, the PKK terrorist organization, which is responsible for the deaths of thousands of Turkish citizens, including not only soldiers and police officers but also civilians – women and children and even babies, is on the list of terrorist organizations of both the EU and the US. But when we look at certain media channels in these countries, we see that they still present the PKK as a guerrilla group or insurgents. The issue of different perceptions or in other words, the illness of “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is the fundamental reason for the absence of international cooperation. Nations have to cooperate sincerely to win the struggle against terrorism and, to be able to cooperate, they have to create a common definition as a result of a common understanding.

2. Definition of the Media and its Characteristics The origin of the word ‘media’ comes from the Latin word ‘medium.’ When medium was first brought into English late in the sixteenth century, it was used for “something lying in a middle or intermediate position,” Media (plural of medium) is a transformation of the term “media of communication,” referring to those organized means of dissemination of fact, opinion, entertainment, and other information such as newspapers, magazines, cinema films, radio, television, the World Wide Web, billboards, books, CDs, DVDs, and other forms of publishing.

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Since the media is the tool of transferring established forms of social communication, beside information, its main function is to follow the changes (the changes also are set down by the media) that have occurred in a society.5 The media also ensures connection between the rulers and the ruled ones since it is not possible to have direct contact in big societies.6 In democracies, the media is very important and guaranteed by law within the context of civil liberties. It is even accepted as the fourth power in a society after the legislative, executive and judicial. The public’s right to know can be assured only by a free media. The media is (or should be) a watchdog for democracy. For a pluralistic approach, it is not possible to talk about democracy if the media does not function properly. The media should be free to meet the requirements of a pluralist, participatory, emancipatory, and democratic system; only free media is the assurance of forming public opinion freely. Thus, for a functioning democracy, the basic condition is the freedom of the media. However, there is no form of regime in which the media has an absolute freedom. The restrictions rise on the freedom of the media correspondingly with the stability of the government and the concerns about the structure of the public. There is a fierce competition in the media to be the first with the story. Pressure on the media to transmit real time news instantly in today’s high-communication environment is an undeniable fact. Reporters are competitive and always have concerns 5

Orhan Gökçe and Uur Demiray, Terörün Görüntüleri Gorüntülerin Terörü (Çizgi Yayinevi, 2004), p. 21. Hüseyin Bilir, Terör Medya ve Devlet [Terror Media and the State](IQ Kültür Sanat ve Yaynclk, 2009). p. 81. 6

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about being left behind, so they desire to get the most accurate news in a timely manner and they use every possible method to collect information. A reporter would rather be the one who gives the news first than being the one who gives it correctly. Therefore, not to be late, they disseminate the news they get without confirming and without caring about the consequences that it may create in society.

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Attention is the most precious good of mass communication because only a few issues can be processed at once. Additionally, the attention spans of audience members are short, but the media depends on the same economy of attention as their audience. The media wants to make the story as timely and dramatic as possible to get the attention of the public and to get higher ratings. The news selection criteria listed below can be understood as the media’s rules of attention: x

Impact: How many people an event affects and how seriously it affects them determine its importance as news. For example, a swine flu pandemic may cause the death of millions of people and is therefore newsworthy.

x

Proximity: If an event is closer to your audience not only in terms of geographical location but also in terms of ideological, cultural, national or religious perspectives it will attract more attraction and will have greater news value.

x

Timeliness: As mentioned earlier, old news is no news. Timeliness is one of the most important factors in deciding news value. Today, the agenda of the media changes faster than before. Reporters always search for new stories and want to be first with the new story.

x

Prominence: It is also an important factor. Important names make news important and more attractive.

x

Novelty: The unusual, the first, the last or the once-in-a-lifetime event is news.

x

Conflict: War, politics, crime and terror are the most common news of all.

3. The Symbiotic Relationship between Terrorism and Media While the problem of common definition still continues to stay as a restrictive factor in countering terrorism, we face another problem when the media appears to help the terrorists (generally unintentionally) spread fear and amplify panic in the society. Analyzing the relationship between the media and terrorists is one of the important steps in defense against terrorism. We can mention a symbiotic relationship between them stemming from their nature – both terrorists and media organizations use democratic fair-game rules in order to further their cause. The terrorists are trying to obtain political advantages and the media organizations are seeking more ratings to get more money. Therefore the media and terrorists have a symbiotic relationship. Metaphorically, terrorism is like a theatre; terrorists want to play to the target audience and the media sells the tickets. Terrorism requires audiences so the media can serve as a vehicle where various actors and groups try to convince audiences and gain influence. If an act of political violence is not reported, it is almost as if it has never occurred.

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Terrorist organizations in the modern age are rational organizations, which act in a rational way of thinking. In contrast to a conventional war, casualties are not the targets of terrorism, but merely a means to an end. When a terrorist organization plans a terror attack, its final goal is a political goal, but in order to achieve that goal, the terrorist must first achieve a vital intermediate goal, which is the creation of an irrational and extended sense of anxiety among the target population. Through the target population, terrorists struggle to pressure governments to surrender to the political demands of the terrorists. The main tool is by using the media as a platform, among other things, to intimidate the target population, the terrorists will pressure governments to surrender to their political demands. We can say terrorism is a wild communication strategy. There is a source (terrorist), an encoder (victim) and a receiver (public). Another goal of terrorism is the undermining of governments by proving that officials, institutions and symbols can be attacked without being able to defend themselves. The symbolic face of terrorism is aimed at destroying the regime’s authority, ability to govern and legitimacy. Terrorist organizations want to show that they can terrorize the public order. Terrorism creates a sense of vulnerability and defenselessness within the target population while undermining the state’s governance. Terrorist organizations frame the news in such a way as to attract maximum attraction from the media and obtain the highest impact. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, most terrorist events have many news attributes and are certainly newsworthy from the media’s viewpoint. Sometimes attacks are staged especially for the benefit of the media, occurring where reporters have easy access to the site and ability to file their stories quickly. Prime –time media coverage is also an important factor in deciding the timing of an attack.

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4. Media’s Manner in Framing Terrorist Events Broadcasting terror events as news to the public is both an unavoidable mission for the mass media and a part of public’s right to know. In today’s open societies, freedom of information and reception that is guaranteed by the constitution and other laws is unrestrainable. But another fact that should not be neglected is that media has a social responsibility when carrying out its mission. The main principle of journalism is to relay ‘realities’ to the public impartially, correctly, precisely and as soon as possible. This principle should be valid for either state-sponsored or private sector media institutions. According to Picard, there are four different media approaches to coverage of media in reporting terrorist events: (1) Informative Approach: The news is presented to answer the questions ‘what,’ ‘when,’ ‘where,’ ‘who’ and ‘how.’ The use of emotional statements is generally avoided (e.g.: Eight persons were killed and twenty others injured when a bomb loaded truck exploded in a bank in Istanbul yesterday). (2) Sensational Approach: The news content is presented by using some emotional statements including ‘anger,’ ‘horror’ and ‘surprise.’ This approach is away from objectivism (e.g.: A terrorist bomb loaded in a truck ripped a crowded bank

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yesterday, mortally wounding eight persons and leaving twenty persons covered with blood from their injuries and broken body parts were scattered to the street). (3) Narrative Approach: The reporter collects information about the perpetrators or victims of the event and present the news in storytelling form by giving some details about heroes and/or heroines of the story to make the news more dramatic and attractive (e.g.: A couple on their honeymoon was killed yesterday when a bomb destroyed a bank in Istanbul. The bride and groom, who had been married for less than a week, were among eight persons killed and twenty wounded when the bomb exploded). (4) Didactic Approach: The political or social reasons and results of the event are also explained in addition to the details of the event (e.g.: The bombing of a bank in Istanbul yesterday is believed to signal of a new wave of violence by radical religious groups angered by Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East).7

5. Media-Oriented Defence against Terrorism

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Democratic governments have to defend their citizens and borders while defending democratic procedures, freedoms and rights. This dual obligation can be met in a proportional manner that balances security and freedom. We must never forget that the most important human right is the right to live. Other civil liberties can be used only by people who are alive. The exploitation of civil liberties by terrorists must be prevented. It is the duty of governments to come up with a firm position against terrorism. The media is equally responsible in deploring this threat and must act with the awareness that the kingpins of terror aim to create a wave of horror to sow the seeds of distrust and bring down all the concepts of a free and open society with such acts. It is indeed one of the leading fundamental ethics of journalism to avoid graphic content that could enrage or anger the public, such as decapitations, body parts and other images which could damage the honour of the victims. Government officials should focus on educating the public and the media, editors in particular, on the harmful effects of fear appeals. It is the media and not the terrorists who have the final say on what makes the news. The government has a constitutional mandate to protect the people, but not at the expense of their fundamental rights as citizens. Governments should finance joint media/government training exercises and establish an official information center and promote voluntary press coverage guidelines. Media should avoid glorifying terrorists by making public the full messages of the terrorist organizations so as not to allow them to ‘gain’ positive publicity in that way in front of their target audience. Inappropriate actions of news media in takeovers, kidnappings, hijackings, hostage rescue operations, and building sieges may put the lives of innocent people in danger. Also, these improper actions may prevent security forces from performing their duties. In order to not endanger the lives of innocent 7

Robert G. Picard, Media Portrayals of Terrorism: Functions and Meaning of News Coverage (Iowa State University Press, 1993).

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people, media should limit information on hostages, military, and police movements in conjunction with rescue operations. They should not make live interviews with terrorists. Media should check sources of information and avoid broadcasting unfounded speculation. Media should tone down information that may cause widespread panic. While trying to manipulate the mainstream media, terrorists also establish and run their own media institutions to use as a tool of propaganda and spread their ideology. At this point it should be emphasized that censorship should not be considered as an alternate way of controlling the mainstream media. Because if people know or feel censorship, they will lose their confidence in the media and they will search for alternate sources of information to learn the realities. Then, the gap of information may be filled by terrorist-sponsored media and rumours created by terrorists.

Conclusion

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By using the media as a tool, while spreading fear and panic among the public to intimidate governments, terrorists also spread their ideology, while raising the morale of their militants and sympathizers by relaying their messages. To restrain terrorists from gaining publicity, which is the oxygen of the terrorism, a relationship between the security forces and media must be established based on a wide, mutual confidence between the parties involved that the media is given true information and honestly briefed whenever it is possible, especially after the crisis. ‘Maximum disclosure’ and ‘minimum delay’ should be the principal for the government officials to inform the media members. The strategy of “no comment” in today’s global society is no longer adequate for handling the media. The media plays an important role in providing a check and balance on the government’s actions. When used appropriately, the media control a powerful instrument that informs a citizenry with accurate, reliable information needed to function in an open society. Nations must understand that they have to cooperate to counter globalized terrorism effectively. To achieve effective cooperation, a common understanding and perception must be created; the international community must insist on finding a common definition of terrorism as a basis for further cooperation. The boomerang effect of the terrorism must not be forgotten in that those nations that use terrorism as a method to reach their goals will be the target of the terrorists one day in the future. The support of the public is essential to win the battle against terrorism. In this sense, the media’s role is vital to gaining the support of the public. If you are not aware of the necessity to inform the public, accurately and timely about your intentions, objectives, developments and progress, you are losing the media battle, and therefore, you can lose the whole war.

Bibliography Ariboan,Deniz Ülke, Nefretten Teröre [From Hate to Terror] (Ümit Yaynclk, 2005). Bilir, Hüseyin, Terör Medya ve Devlet (IQ Kültür Sanat ve Yaynclk, 2009).

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Gökçe, Orhan, and Uur Demiray, Terörün Görüntüleri Gorüntülerin Terörü (Çizgi Yayinevi, 2004). Orgun, Faruk, Küresel Terör (Adam Yaynlar, 2001). Picard, Robert G., Media Portrayals of Terrorism: Functions and Meaning of News Coverage (Iowa State University Press, 1993). Schmit, Alex P. and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (Transaction Books, 1988).

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Enhancing Cooperation in Defence Against Terrorism K. Tokgöz (Ed.) IOS Press, 2012 © 2012 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-103-8-113

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Counterterrorism Strategy: Analysis and Dilemmas Keith SPENCE1 University of Leicester

Abstract. Elements of counterterrorist strategy, and the Global War on Terror that has defined it in the wake of September 11, 2001, are discussed in terms of four dilemmas. A key feature of a dilemma is that it presents a problem, or decision situation, which is not resolvable without significant side effects or unintended consequences. Recognizing and addressing these side effects and consequences is key to practices of understanding and learning from experience and of reformulating strategy in response to changing operational environments. Four key dilemmas are identified and briefly discussed: The labeling of groups as terrorist; the priority accorded to force protection within military doctrine; the emphasis on freedom and democracy as a justification for both military and humanitarian intervention; and the extent and duration of the political commitment to engage in a campaign against terrorism on a global basis. Costs and consequences of recent responses to these dilemmas within counterterrorist strategy, and particularly within Iraq and Afghanistan, are briefly highlighted before a discussion of some of the possibilities and risks arising from the conjunction of the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 and the death of Osama Bin Laden. The medium and long term outcomes of both these developments are highly uncertain, but present an opportunity to rethink, and reorient, key elements of counterterrorism strategy. Incorporating dilemmas such as those addressed within the evaluation of new strategic directions will help to formulate an understanding of potential costs as well as benefits more clearly than may have been the case in the past.

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Keywords: Strategy, Dilemma, Labeling, Protection, Intervention Commitment

Introduction The threat posed by terrorism in the Twenty-first Century exhibits continuities as well as differences with that which preceded it. Although we are well into the second decade of the century, understanding and coming to terms with these issues of stability and change remains an ongoing challenge. Concentrating on new aspects of the operational environment for counterterrorism, a number of key features are readily identifiable. Firstly, although terrorism is by its nature extreme in terms of both ideological character and the types of acts that are sanctioned and committed in its name, the formations of the early Twenty-first Century are marked by an extension of this tendency, exhibiting a pathological fanaticism evidenced, for example, in the exponential growth of suicide terrorism. Secondly, and in conjunction with this fanaticism, a dual ambition to commit ‘spectacular’ crimes of violence (of which 9/11, of course, provides the paradigm contemporary example), and to acquire weapons of 1

Ph.D, Lecturer in Criminology, email: [email protected].

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mass destruction is emergent. This latter objective remains largely unrealised to date, but does define a horizon of risk which strategy must anticipate and respond to. Thirdly, in previous campaigns, targets of violence were commonly determined by discrete characteristics of identity, belief or territory, or limited to physical infrastructure rather than human life. In the current phase of terror, however, targeting is indiscriminate and consequently much less predictable and manageable than in the past. Fourthly, the structures of terrorist movements are, in the age of global mass communication, posttraditional in form. A movement can define its identity and ambitions by affinity and by simply adopting a label (such as al-Qaeda) with little direct contact with the root organization. Moreover, within such groupings cellular structures can be radically disaggregated and anonymised in ways which make monitoring and tracking movements in real time highly problematic. Indeed, it is often only in retrospect that the reconstruction of contacts and networks allows the structure of a group to be discerned. These elements – and many others beside – combine to inform the construction in response to a ‘new type of war’. The initial vocabulary surrounding the ‘global war against terror’ with which we are all currently familiar may fade or be replaced over time, but the essential characteristics in terms of scale, scope and method – of preemptive intervention, civil mobilization and vigilant defense within the ‘homelands’ – are enduring ones. This environment, and the strategic issues that it generates, are briefly assessed here in terms of four dilemmas.

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1. The Problem with Dilemmas All strategies, whether they are political, military, corporate, or in almost any other sphere of life, are a form of communicative device that seeks to define and transmit understandings, values, objectives and responses to highly complex and often unstable situations in clear and direct terms. By combining values and objectives, strategy attempts to define and enframe a situation or task as a first step towards its engagement and, ultimately, resolution. Within the field of counterterrorism, however, operational circumstances mandate the negotiation of multiple strategic dilemmas. A dilemma is a problem or question to which there are multiple potentially plausible responses, none of which are likely to present convenient, cost-free or readily justifiable options. 2 In highlighting some of the dilemmas encountered by counterterrorism strategy, the aim here is to consider the difficulty and intractability of the problems encountered, rather than to offer simple or obvious solutions. A fundamental feature of a dilemma is that no such solutions are obviously available. Acknowledging this absence can be important. It can firstly help us to resist jumping to apparently easy solutions which might involve costly and counterproductive unexamined consequences and unintended side effects, and in so doing support our understanding of why the formulation and execution of strategy – especially when engaging problems as complex as those posed by contemporary terrorism – is such an unremitting, challenging, and often frustrating undertaking.

2

Christopher W. Gowans, ed., Moral Dilemmas (Oxford University Press, 1987).

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1.1. The Labeling Dilemma The first dilemma concerns labeling. The acquisition and application of the label ‘terrorist’ by a group serves many functions. Often the use of the label is necessary and appropriate; the definition helps to shape agreement amongst partners about the characteristics of a particular group or movement and aids agreement as to collective sanctions and responses. Labeling is, however, a multi-faceted process, and amongst myriad potential effects can also function to consolidate a group identity, can enhance its appeal to potential supporters, and can unintentionally elicit behaviors that might otherwise not have otherwise received expression. Convergence amongst government and media on the label ‘terrorist’ also serves to consolidate and reproduced received opinion, and thereby frame and limit appropriate responses.3

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An analogy here can be drawn with the example of youth justice – if a young offender is labeled ‘criminal’ at an early age (rather than being, for example, warned, subjected to familial discipline or offered rehabilitation) – he or she is at risk of accepting that label and acting accordingly in terms of future behavior. The application of the label terrorist to a movement with political, social, and economic functions and grievances (real or imagined) that are susceptible to non-violent expression can therefore have significant side effects. Furthermore, once a group does acquire the label ‘terrorist’ – whether it accepts it or not – the label serves as a barrier to participation in processes of negotiation, recognition, and of re-entry into civic and economic life, that are invariably central to the ultimate resolution of political grievances and the reintegration of those concerned within the community and society. The dilemma presented is therefore that whilst it may be strategically necessary to label a group as ‘terrorist,’ doing so can simultaneously act to define their identity and to produce both individuals and subsequent acts with terroristic attributes. This conjunction in turn functions to impede practices of dialogue and reconciliation that are equally necessary from a strategic standpoint in order to address (if it is at all possible to do so) the underlying antagonisms driving particular groups and conflicts. 4 The adoption and diffusion of the label al-Qaeda throughout the Middle East and much of North Africa provides a clear and present set of examples of this process. Adequately understanding and responding to particular and very different environments – such as the Niger Delta, the convoluted Maghreb, and the divided state of Yemen – requires the patient exploration of hosts of fundamentally local and complex issues. Progress towards the understanding of these complexities is, however, not well-served by the deployment of a common label, such as that of ‘Al-Qaeda in…’, which tends to encourage a reductive analysis and commensurably restricted set of ‘one size fits all’ responses. Similarly, the spread of the identifier ‘Taliban’ from its origins in Afghanistan, through areas of Pakistan and on to other areas of the subcontinent functions to simultaneously obscure local sources of grievance and discontent; in so doing makes them harder to distinguish and address.

3

Na’ama Nagar, ‘Who is Afraid of the T-word? Labeling Terror in the Media Coverage of Political Violence Before and After 9/11’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33 (6) (2010), pp. 533-547. 4 Nicholas Appleby, “Labelling the Innocent: How Government Counter-terrorism Advice Creates Labels That Contribute to the Problem, Critical Studies on Terrorism 3 (2) (2010), pp. 421-436.

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Once a label had been applied and established within the vocabularies of mass media and political debate, it is very difficult, and often impossible to change – as demonstrated by the attempts of the Bush administration to substitute ‘long war’ for ‘global war on terror.’ Care and consistency in the selection and repetition of labels can, however, be an important element of strategic communication, and a disciplined refusal to use key terms and labels loosely can contribute significantly to the development amongst key audiences of a more nuanced and less simplistic appreciation of the realities that counterterrorism seeks to confront. 1.2. The Protection Dilemma

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A second dilemma concerns the emphasis within counterterrorist strategy, especially within conflict and post-conflict zones, firstly upon the provision of physical security over competing objectives, and within that priority upon force protection. Although force protection is – entirely appropriately and understandably – the operational pillar and first priority of commanding officers and their political leaders, and is the foundation upon which counterterrorist practice rests within hostile environments, its impact can be double-sided. A policy of force protection that locates forces ostensibly dedicated to the provision of security and reconstruction within isolated and highly visibly barricaded locations communicates clear messages to local and host communities: that the territory is not regarded as secure; that the forces concerned are separate from, and uncertain of, the populations they are ostensibly securing; and in the worst-case scenario, that rather than a mission of liberation and reconstruction, the forces are instead agents of occupation or even domination. In such circumstances the achievement of force protection can function to limit the effectiveness of the wider security and reconstruction objectives of the mission. To complicate the security dilemma further, as a mission becomes progressively more focused upon security and protection, it encounters the danger of taking on a ‘siege mentality.’ To the extent that this occurs, the mission inevitably loses focus upon other crucial elements – most notably functioning governance, legal and policing systems, economic and trading environments, and necessary aid and development – which are necessary to entrench and reproduce security over time. These are indispensable features of human and societal security that are coextensive with (rather than supplementary to) basic physical security, which may be initially achieved by means of force, but cannot be maintained by force alone without undermining wider mission objectives. The dilemma presented is therefore that whilst basic physical security is an inevitable priority, without which wider mission objectives are effectively unattainable, achieving the required level of physical security and force protection can serve to undermine the very basis upon which the wider mission can succeed – and as with the issue of labeling, the protection dilemma is not susceptible to simple or convenient resolution. The dominating recent examples of the protection dilemma are, of course, presented to us by the cases of Iran and Afghanistan. To offer a capsule history, in the former, after a rapid and apparently successful period of initial combat in 2002-2003, by mid-2006 the reconstruction mission within the country had atrophied, and for many officers the focus of operations on the ground had become oriented entirely around

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force protection to the exclusion of other objectives, including the security and safety of host populations. These perceived failures to construct and protect, in turn, provoked amongst local populations resistance to coalition forces that may at first have been welcomed, or at least tacitly accepted, by populations who had endured four decades of Ba’athist despotism under the regime of Saddam Hussein. Initial expectations of coalition and cooperation thus rapidly transformed into a perceived occupation, where figures welcomed (by at least a significant part of the Iraqi population) as liberators came to be seen as no better – if not significantly worse – than the predecessor regime.

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The ensuing insurgency in Iraq was thereby produced, rather than occurring as an inevitable stage of post-Hussein political development, and in an ever-decreasing spiral the imperative of force protection progressively separated coalition forces from local populations as they retreated into ever heavier armor and were quartered in larger and more strongly-barricaded bases. This separation in turn sustained insurgent propaganda – much of which, by no accident of labeling, was promulgated by ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’ – and consolidated the view of the coalition as a force of invasion and domination rather than protection and support. This spiral of decline – and of missed opportunity – was arrested, but by no means reversed, by the ‘surge’ provided by five additional brigades in 2007-2008, guided by the new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine 5 produced under the aegis of General Petraeus. This doctrine notably elevated civilian protection over force protection to reinstate goals of development and reconstruction as central strategic objectives. At this stage, it is too early to assess the long-term impact of the surge, but in the short-term, it is clear that a determined military effort to undermine the capacity of the insurgents, combined with the cultivation of relationships with ‘awakening councils,’ permitted a stabilization and subsequent coalition drawdown to occur that would not otherwise have been possible. These achievements, however, inevitably came with costs and consequences attached. Although during the course of the surge, deaths of US service personnel stabilized and then declined towards drawdown, the closer relationships between forces and local populations essential to COIN inevitably increased exposure to risk by coalition forces, in particular to the risks posed by remotely triggered and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This enhanced exposure, predictably enough, was repeated in Afghanistan, where a similar counterinsurgency surge was implemented – after much debate in Washington – from 2009, most significantly in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. The initial outcome was an increase in attacks on coalition forces, with up to 800 incidents occurring each month, of which some 75% were classed as IED-based.6 The effectiveness of the surge in Iraq is inevitably a matter of debate7 but even a skeptical assessment cannot fail to acknowledge the coincidence of the initiative with a movement away from the abyss of failure and systemic collapse that was extant in 2006. For forces placed in situations of elevated risk by the principles of COIN, which 5 Sarah Sewall, et al, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (University of Chicago Press, 2007). 6 Tom Vanden Brook, “IEDs Now Cause 75% of Afghanistan Casualties,” Army Times, April 3, 2009, available at http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/04/gns_afghanistan_casualties_ieds_040309/ (last visited Jun 9, 2012). 7 Steve Simon, “The Price of the Surge,” Foreign Affairs 87 (3) (2008), pp. 57-76, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63398/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge (last visited Jun 9, 2012).

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move away from force protection and heavy armor towards a more engaged and less hostile but potentially more dangerous relationship with host populations whom they were predisposed by past experience in large measure to mistrust, the assessment of costs and benefits is often – and understandably – more personal and problematic. This question of assessment is largely submerged within mainstream military communications and media debates preoccupied with the transient detail of day-to-day events and tactics, budgets, procurement, politics and personality. It achieved brief prominence, however, in the magazine profile that precipitated the resignation of one of the largest personalities within recent cohorts of senior US military officers. The thirteen-month tenure of General Stanley McChrystal as joint U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan was brought to a premature end by comments attributed to aides of the general slighting the person – and by implication the office – of the Vice President. Granting permission to publish the profile in the pop-culture magazine Rolling Stone was certainly an interesting decision on the part of the general and amidst the media furor perhaps the most interesting element of the feature escaped the scrutiny of commentators. The profile includes an account of a meeting between McChrystal – a strong advocate of the new COIN doctrine – and two dozen unnamed soldiers. After listening to the General’s briefing, the session is described as follows:

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During the question-and-answer period, the frustration boils over. The soldiers complain about not being allowed to use lethal force, about watching insurgents they detain be freed for lack of evidence. They want to be able to fight – like they did in Iraq, like they had in Afghanistan before McChrystal... . As the discussion ends, McChrystal seems to sense that he hasn’t succeeded at easing the men’s anger. He makes one lastditch effort to reach them [but] the session ends with no clapping, and no real resolution. McChrystal may have sold President Obama on counterinsurgency, but many of his own men aren’t buying it.8 Given the hagiographic approach of the profile to its subject, the inclusion of this passage is striking, exposing the full complexity of the force protection dilemma as it is played out in the environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. As a part of the global response to the problem of terrorism in the wake of September 11, 2001, strong force protection is a necessary political prerequisite, and is central to the political acceptability of, and concomitant support and funding for, large-scale, long-term campaigns such as those mounted by the US-led coalition and by ISAF. Yet the modes of force protection employed during initial hostilities inevitably alienated local populations and predisposed many amongst them towards support, or tacit acceptance, of the ensuing insurgency. In order to address the progressing insurgency, and to make possible an exit on terms other than humiliation and defeat, a strategy such as the new COIN doctrine is inescapable. But COIN – with its animating principles of engagement, restraint and of movement away from heavy armor and force protection within territories that have been cleared and are deemed capable of being held and politically developed – involves increasing risk exposure, and with that, amplifying the political costs, especially in terms of morale and domestic support, that are necessary to support any campaign over time. Moreover, notwithstanding the broad agreement of leading politicians and commanding officers that COIN represents the only available viable 8

Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General,” Rolling Stone (July 8-22, 2010), p. 120.

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approach, a significant number of soldiers on the ground – evidenced in dialogue with Gen McChrystal – become resistant to, and distrustful of, a strategy that ostensibly exposes them to heightened risk yet prevents them from using the full range of force previously at their disposal. This sentiment inevitably feeds back, both directly via the families of serving forces, and through nightly news media reports, into the homes of voters and the political discourses and pressure to protect troops on operations abroad that follows. The outcome is a double dilemma: once established as an operational pillar, the imperative of force protection is politically very difficult (if not impossible) to dilute, even if doing so is a self-evident precondition of progress towards a strategic objective. Awareness of the dilemma, and its intractability, further complicates essential processes of political decision-making and support, uncertainties that in turn fuel the skepticism of personnel ultimately responsible for the implementation of the strategy, but who, as the General found, ‘simply aren’t buying it.’ Force protection, as practiced in parts of the long campaign against terrorism, therefore emerges as simultaneously essential but self-defeating, presenting a dilemma that is as inescapable as it is resistant to straightforward resolution.

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1.3 The Political Dilemma Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the policy orientations of both ‘the West’, broadly conceived, and the transnational institutions that it constitutes, have with varying enthusiasm and consistency followed an arc shaped by a conviction in the precedence of classically liberal values. From Berlin to Baghdad and beyond, the fundamental priority of individual freedom and the institutionalization of that freedom within democratic, party-based electoral systems and competitive interdependent market economies, is affirmed and invoked as the basis of political judgment and rationality. This priority is often conjoined with ideas of American global leadership and with ideological formations such as neoliberalism and neoconservatism.9 Jumping too quickly to such an association, however, overlooks the way in which the priority of rights and of individual liberty cuts across ideological divisions, providing the basis, for example, for the initiatives and interventions of the UN in its promotion of human security, for NATO in its operations in the former Yugoslavian, for much of the ISAF mission, and most recently in Libya, where the aerial mission and no fly-zones were explicitly justified in terms of protecting civilians and defending their right to political self-determination. The new operating environment is therefore one of increasing intervention (setting aside questions concerning the status of proxy conflicts during the Cold War era) and it is an environment that inevitably contains its own dilemmas of decision and action. The impacts of globalization do not include the dissolution of the nation-state, but do involve increasing interdependencies, with national interests and vulnerabilities constituted fluidly across traditional territorial boundaries. Flourishing states are global and interdependent social, political and economic actors, but the impacts of fragile and 9 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Simon and Schuster, London, 1992); Francis Fukuyama, After the Neo Cons: Where the Right Went Wrong (Profile Books, London, 2006); Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest (Winter 2002- 2003), pp. 5-17.

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unsuccessful states are similarly widely manifested. In responding to the threat posed by fragile and failing states, it is inevitable that the favored political solution involves advocacy of the ostensibly most successful scheme of political institutions, that of representative democracy. It is also by no means accidental that contemporary democratic principles, coupled with the doctrine and apparatuses surrounding human rights that supports them, are structured as global and universal in form that inevitably leads to the conclusion that intervention – be it military or in other forms – is an obligation entailed by logic of the concepts themselves: if human rights are properties universally held by all individuals and the international community recognizes a responsibility to protect these individuals and their rights, then the stance of the bystander, or of the ‘political realist’ content with a relative stability provided by a balance of power between groups of nation states, is no longer tenable either politically or morally. The standpoint of the globalist and universalist is a compelling one, and has underpinned a number of operations in the post-Cold War era. The dilemma that it encounters concerns the reality that political cultures are local and historic, not universal and abstract. Democratic cultures, plus the habits of thought and action that provide their grounding, cannot be rapidly transplanted and cultivated. The ‘right to democracy’ is therefore undeniable, but often undeliverable, and the regimes that emerge within rapidly democratized states (especially when the direction of change is overdetermined by external actors, rather than through internal processes of development) may well fall short of the political ideals envisaged. In the present cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, the regimes emerging appear to be hybrid forms that incorporate important aspects of democratic process, but are inevitably shaped by loyalties, resentments, and structures of power inherited from predecessor regimes. To further complicate this issue, the democratic dilemma can also be readily compounded by the problem of labeling addressed above, as when a political party associated with a recognized and labeled terrorist organization achieves electoral recognition. The dilemma posed is that in such cases, although the outcomes of democratic processes can be either undemocratic, or democratically incomplete, the alternative – a counterterror strategy that pragmatically ignores, condones or acquiesces in the denial of ostensibly universal human rights and protections – is equally problematic. This problem is both moral and practical in the messages that it communicates concerning the universality claimed for the values associated with democracy and human rights, and the depth of the commitment to uphold and maintain those values. Although certainly preferable to those that preceded them, the current regimes in many of the areas where NATO is currently engaged are far from ideal types. Their deficiencies, however, are not necessarily attributable to a democratic deficit or soluble by addressing that problem. The view that the solution to the problems of democracy is more democracy, although undeniably optimistic and attractive, is more a hunch or gamble – albeit a congenial one – than a reliably demonstrated proposition. The precariousness of this gamble was well illustrated by the journalist Jason Burke, writing from Afghanistan at the time of the troubled 2009 elections that were awarded, amidst high controversy, to the incumbent President Kharzai. ‘We’, wrote Burke of the coalition partners and their political leaders: “...are still hoping to build the state we want the Afghans to want, rather than the state that they actually want. Ask many Afghans which state they hope their own will resemble in a few decades and the

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answer is ‘Iran.’”10 Here the dilemma is that although modern democratic values and meanings are conceptually structured as global and universal, actual political cultures are local, historical and often in tension with those values and meanings, they are starkly formulated. With it comes the discomfiting possibility that the ‘right to democracy’ underpinning much political judgment in our era of globalization might prove to be simultaneously undeniable and undeliverable other than in highly questionable forms. An answer of sorts to this dilemma may well be presented in the coming years not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and elsewhere. Whether the systems of order and power that emerge meet the democratic aspirations invoked to justify that initial intervention in a form that the leading powers find reassuring is very much open to question. If it does not, then the commitment to future interventions – some of which, such as the prevention of massacre in Benghazi, Libya in March 2011, proved to be unquestionably necessary and effective – may well be placed in doubt as universal ideals find themselves with particular and often far less than ideal realities.

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1.4 The Commitment Dilemma This question of commitment is the fourth strategic dilemma to be considered here, and concerns the potential costs, both obvious and commonly overlooked, of campaigns such as the global campaign against terrorism. Twenty-first Century terrorism adeptly exploits the infrastructures of global communications, disseminating its messages in order to recruit from a pool of potential sympathizers, and to spread fear amongst a wider audience. This is done in the knowledge that political leaders, in seeking to avoid accusations of failure to respond adequately to a suspected threat that becomes real, are always likely to make caution the maxim of their reactions to a perceived terrorist threat. These reactions, whether in the form of pre-emptive intervention away from the ‘homeland’ or as increasingly vigilant and intrusive security provision within it, carry considerable burdens. The most obvious costs are in lives lost in the course of security interventions undertaken in pursuit of counterterrorism, and in the very significant financial costs of mounting and maintaining long-term initiatives, both military and civilian, on a global scale. Less visible than blood and treasure, but arguably even more significant, are costs concerning paths not taken when the decision to respond in a particular way during a point of crisis comes to dominate a government’s agenda. Lyndon Baines Johnson famously experienced this dilemma in the early 1960s when, as US President, he was forced to decide between committing to the US intervention in Vietnam – which ultimately consumed his Presidency – or withdrawing from Vietnam in order to focus upon his domestic agenda for the ‘Great Society.’ Johnson knew, however, that withdrawal from Vietnam would be regarded as a concession to the Communist bloc which would terminally undermine his stature as President and so was presented with a choice that condemned him to failure.11 In the aftermath of 9/11, many Western leaders (most obviously in the US and the UK) were confronted by dilemmas of a similar structure. The instinctive declaration of a war against terror opened up the United States and its allies to a series of unfolding 10 Jason Burke, “Our Skewed World View Won’t Let Us See the Real Pakistan,” The Observer (15 March 2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/15/jason-burke-pakistan (last visited Jun. 9, 2012). 11 Doris Kearns Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (Harper and Row, 1976).

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commitments and concomitant costs. Merely in terms of finance, for example, the cost of the operation in Iraq alone was estimated in 2008 at $3 trillion12 and, on that basis, that of the war on terror as a whole can be comfortably predicted as standing at well over $4 trillion.

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Little imagination is required to envisage how such sums might have been used to alternative effect and also to understand a reluctance to significantly change strategy in the absence of clearly successful outcomes that might serve to justify such heavy expenditures. This reluctance, although never explicitly stated, was nonetheless evident in the extended period of review and consideration that preceded President Obama’s decision to commit to a surge in Afghanistan in late 2009. That renewed commitment was, of course, a time-limited one, with a phased drawdown envisaged for 2012 that left the shape of operations afterwards at best opaquely described. This was understandable, indeed to be expected, given the parallel uncertainty concerning what a successful, or merely defensible outcome, sufficiently robust to justify accelerated withdrawal from Afghanistan, might look like in detail. Thus President Obama, despite careful calibration and comprehensive reviews of policies and options, with trepidation followed his predecessor Lyndon Johnson into the ‘swamp of commitment.’13 By early 2011 the continuing toll of the operation on both forces exhibiting reluctance to ‘buy into’ COIN in Afghanistan (a markedly different society and culture to that of Iraq) and on public opinion and political support at home, placed the wisdom of the decision – and with that the President’s prospects for re-election in 2012 – in question. The conjunction of two events – the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt that spread across the region in the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 and the assassination of Osama Bin Laden shortly afterwards, significantly shifted these opinions, lifting domestic support for the President accordingly. More pertinently, these timely developments (one intricately planned over a period of years, the other entirely unforeseen) make possible a renewed and refocused commitment in respect of counterterrorism strategy that might reasonably hope to advance the task of draining the swamp, rather than becoming mired within it. A reversal of the strategic direction embarked upon in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 is neither possible nor desirable but, carefully handled, a transformation of approach is within reach. Pursuing such a course means, however, engaging anew with the dilemmas highlighted in the discussion, with all of the potential costs, side effects and challenges that inevitably involves.

2. Dilemmas of the Present: After bin Laden The attack by US Special Forces in Abbottabad on Sunday, May 1, 2011 was unquestionably a successful one, efficiently achieving its mission objective (the option of capturing bin Laden is not one to be taken unduly seriously). The physical removal of bin Laden from the global scene inevitably also prompted the reproduction of his portrait on screens and front pages across the world to an extent not seen since 9/11 12 Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (W. W. Norton & Company, 2008). 13 Ori Brafman and Rom Brafman, Sway: The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior (Doubleday, 2009), pp. 33-39.

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itself. Paradoxically, the assassination returned to prominence an undeniably infamous but increasingly marginal and operationally inactive symbol of, and figurehead for, the al-Qaeda movement. The strategic impact of the assassination on the image and identity of al-Qaeda are therefore more mixed than the initially jubilant response to the mission would suggest. The reinscription – and relabeling – of bin Laden’s image will involve adjustments of representation, most particularly away from the symbolism of evasion and resistance and towards that of martyrdom and sacrifice. These shifts, however, will not necessarily deprive al-Qaeda as an organization of its icon and focal point in terms of identity and may, for a time at least, even make that identity – and the label that it employs and embraces – a more attractive one for those vulnerable to its appeal.

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With regard to the label and practices associated with the ‘Global War on Terror’, areas of vulnerability in the Middle East and in North Africa are not significantly changed by the death of bin Laden; the subsequent pledge by President Obama to ‘go after al-Qaeda’ in areas such as Yemen and Algeria (perhaps aided by intelligence materials supposedly recovered in the raid on Sunday night) indicates a continuation, and perhaps a short-term intensification, of the ‘Global War on Terror’, but not a significant change or rethink in terms of military focus or communicative rhetoric. In addition, the ambitious plans to begin withdrawing ground forces from Afghanistan later this year – the abatement of the surge launched in 2010 – are unlikely to be accelerated and may well be quietly pushed back if a backlash of additional violence to that already expected over the coming months materialises in the southern provinces. More complicated still, the discovery of bin Laden in a villa compound just a short walk from Pakistan’s leading military academy reconfirmed that country’s status as a central part of the current problem. Yet it is also inescapably true that Pakistan is amongst the heaviest victims of terrorism in the 21st Century, and in great need of help and support to confront its deeply embedded and intricate social, political and institutional interactions with terror. Finding ways to effectively provide that support, whilst curtailing elements within Pakistan’s established centers of power that are sympathetic to movements including, but not limited to, Taliban groups in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is, and will continue to be, an extremely taxing exercise in the deployment of smart power, encompassing responses to each of the dilemmas highlighted here. In pursuit of this undertaking, the short-term tactical gains of the Predator missile strikes, and the labeling of Pakistan as a vulnerable or failing state, will need to be forsaken – or at least moderated – in favor of a more demanding strategy that commits the West, in partnership with Pakistan, to a long term regional plan of collaborative protection and modernization. The very possibility of such a strategy is, however, a vanishingly faint one and a deep challenge to the strains of commitment. The campaign against terror is not referred to as ‘the long war’ without reason, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan territories may well provide its most enduring front. Within America and the North Atlanticist ‘West’, Osama bin Laden was a key factor in the election to a second term in 2004 of President G.W. Bush, and in death seems likely to fulfill the same function for President Obama in 2012. The success of the mission to Abbotabad provides Obama, who was castigated by right-wing critics as weak and indecisive prior to the raid, with a cast-iron security myth and narrative that all but guarantees him a second term in office. Before May 1, 2011 this was far from

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certain, especially if the Republican Party could manage, in the course of their primary selection process, to contrive a plausible candidate to challenge Barack Obama. That the nascent political ambitions of Donald Trump, in particular, have been dealt a potentially terminal blow, might be regarded as an unanticipated outcome of the Abbottabad operation. In terms of ‘the West’ calls for heightened awareness and concerns about ‘reprisal attacks’ were understandable but exaggerated, overblown and within a very short period of time a normalized state of terrorist awareness was re-established. The legislation, institutions and infrastructures of securitisation and counterterrorism are now firmly embedded on a global scale. The DHS, TSA and their equivalents may have to fight a little harder for additional resources in years to come, but are by no means going to disappear without a fight. One further impact concerns the reconsideration of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques.’ Early reports – ironically, using information circulated by WikiLeaks – on the Abbottabad raid have suggested that crucial information was provided by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay and/or at the (not so) secret ‘black sites’ maintained as a part of the war on terror. President Obama’s first executive action upon entering office was to pledge that Guantanamo would be closed within 12 months and to declare that techniques such as waterboarding were unequivocally illegal. It may be considered a further irony if it is indeed the case that intelligence obtained in this manner did significantly contribute to the operation against bin Laden. Such an irony should not, however, be mistaken for a justification of such acts on legal, moral or utilitarian grounds, nor be used to excuse or revive them on grounds of protection which serve only to undermine the reputation – and with it, in the final analysis, the security – of those who advance and rely upon such reasons.

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3. Security and Strategy in a Post-Osama World The ‘Muslim world’ is not, in general, not a helpful construction (and neither of course is ‘the West’), and it seems, initially at least, unlikely that death of Osama will significantly impact upon the course of events collected as the ‘Arab spring’ – which are connected by communication and information flows, as well as a common exhausted resistance to decades of tyranny, corruption, and incompetence but which, as discussed above, are ineradicably local, particular and ultimately unpredictable in character. Perceptions of external actors in Libya, coupled with intervention and nonintervention in Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere, by both ‘Western’ and ‘regional’ actors are, however, unquestionably more important than Osama bin Laden, either alive or dead. Pending rapprochement between Hamas and al-Fatah in Gaza and the West Bank has also been overshadowed by the assassination of bin Laden, but is potentially highly significant with regard to the question of Palestine. A unitary Palestinian negotiating partner that incorporates Hamas would, without doubt, prove diplomatically testing for the United States, but just might in turn present the Obama administration with an opportunity to relaunch foreign policy balloons with which the Presidency commenced. These include the posting as envoys of George Mitchell and the late Richard Holbrooke, the ‘open hand’ section of the inaugural speech, and the subsequent address at Cairo

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University that was derided and ignored in 2009, but which could well in time receive reconsideration as a signpost on the road to 2011 and the ‘Arab Spring.’ An opportunity for political commitment to flourish, perhaps in a way that permits desirable adjustments to military force levels, is thereby presented – albeit within a narrow window. With regard to that uprising, media commentators are spinning a myth that the apparent absence of explicit political Islamism or al-Qaeda support from the ‘Arab Spring’ demonstrates a waning or weakening of support for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. That is – at best – speculative wish fulfillment and at the time of writing (in the summer of 2011) the long-term outcomes of regime change in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and elsewhere are far from certain. One likely short-term development, however, is the rise to prominence of political parties and actors with dispositions and features at some remove from the ideal envisaged in occidental models of democracy. In that predictable event, the imperative to avoid the pitfalls of labeling is a pressing one to which all concerned parties need to be attentive.

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The myriad groups that adopt and adapt the label of al-Qaeda are not and never were a unity. Following the assassination, they may splinter in their adoption of the brand, coalesce around the image of bin Laden as martyr or even converge around a new dominating figure. This last option is the least likely. Bin Laden’s deputy and successor as leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, commands a measure of authority but lacks the charisma that was key to the significance of his predecessor, whilst Anwar alAwlaki, the next most likely candidate for the role of media figurehead, provides fluent Internet diatribes in English but lacks the authenticity that a leader (of any group, be it terrorist or otherwise) requires. After the furor surrounding the death of bin Laden subsides – a period likely to take months rather than years – patterns of terrorist disruption with which we are now familiar will likely resume. With Europe and the US for the most part fairly effectively ‘hardened’ against attack, such events are more likely to take place, as we saw in the immediate aftermath of bin Laden’s death, in places like Morocco, and of course in Pakistan, which as suggested is perhaps the most critical site and potential point of origin for future terrorist threats. The main security issues in a ‘post-Osama world’ are the same as those that preceded his death: hopefully his removal will help a measure of perspective to be achieved and create a space within which some of the negative consequences of the post-9/11 invasions might begin to be unravelled. This, however, is likely to be – at best – a generational process and, given the propensity to overreact and the uncertainties of the ‘Arab spring,’ is one that is unlikely to proceed smoothly.

Conclusion Terrorism is effective because the ‘gut politics’ of fear and emotion too often trump that of reason and clarity, obscuring fundamental issues concerning water security, energy security, economic security, environmental security and human security in general that are the most pressing issues in a post-Osama world, just as they were before September 11, 2001. An optimistic prediction is that ‘after bin Laden’ this reality might be recognised and considered in a more coherent fashion than has been

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the case in the post 9/11 era. That suggestion is, however, one made more in hope than expectation as the dilemmas of labeling, protection, democracy and commitment remain at the fore. By analyzing counterterrorism strategies through a prism of dilemmas surrounding these issues, some of the difficulties attending the task of formulating and executing strategy coherently and consistently are raised for investigation. As argued, however, dilemmas are problems that do not admit of easy solutions, and it is often the case that compromise or even failure is inescapable. Exploring predicaments such as those identified here can, however, help us to understand the underlying issues more thoroughly, stimulate debate and discussion, and potentially work towards future responses that respond better to the inescapable difficulties that strategic dilemmas expose.

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Bibliography Appleby, Nicholas, “Labelling the Innocent: How Government Counter-terrorism Advice Creates Labels That Contribute to the Problem, Critical Studies on Terrorism 3(2) (2010). Bilmes, Linda J. and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (W. W. Norton & Company, 2008). Brafman, Ori, and Rom Brafman, Sway: The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior (Doubleday, New York, 2009). Burke, Jason, “Our Skewed World View Won’t Let Us See the Real Pakistan,” The Observer (15 March 2009). Fukuyama, Francis, After the Neo Cons: Where the Right Went Wrong (Profile Books, 2006). Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (Simon and Schuster, 1992). Goodwin, Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (Harper and Row, 1976). Gowans, Christopher W., ed., Moral Dilemmas (Oxford University Press, 1987). Hastings, Michael, “The Runaway General,” Rolling Stone (July 8-22, 2010). Krauthammer, Charles, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest (Winter 2002- 2003). Nagar, Na’ama, “Who is Afraid of the T-word? Labeling Terror in the Media Coverage of Political Violence Before and After 9/11,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33 (6) (2010). Simon, Steve, “The Price of the Surge,” Foreign Affairs 87 (3) (2008). Sewall, Sarah, et al, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (University of Chicago Press, 2007). Vanden Brook, Tom, “IEDs Now Cause 75% of Afghanistan Casualties,” Army Times (April 3, 2009).

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The Importance of Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy in Combating Terrorism Brigitte L. Nacos1 Columbia University

Abstract. In the fights against terrorism, a perception has developed in the Muslim world that this is a fight against Islam, as poll results show. This problem may at least partially be the result of different perceptions of the same messages in different parts of the world. In order to combat this perception while at the same time maintaining counterterrorist efforts, it is important to use the appropriate messages in both strategic communications and public diplomacy. After explaining these terms, this article delves into how this can be improved by examining some successes in this realm. In particular, the use of specialists native to the target areas and populations could be very helpful in winning the communications battle as well as the counterterrorist battles. Keywords. strategic communication, public diplomacy, counterterrorism

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Introduction In August 2010, a bitter controversy arose in New York City about the plan of a Muslim congregation to build a downtown community center some two-and-one-half blocks away from ‘Ground Zero,”’ the site of the destroyed World Trade Center bombing. Conservative demagogues seized the opportunity to link Islam and Muslims to the 9/11 attacks. Republican Newt Gingrich, a former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said, “Nazis don't have the right to put up a sign next to the Holocaust museum in Washington; we would never accept the Japanese putting up a site next to Pearl Harbor,” and “there is no reason for us to accept a mosque next to the World Trade Center.”2 In September 2010, during the days leading up to the 9th anniversary of the 9/11, Terry Jones, pastor at the Dove World Outreach Center in Gainesville, repeated again and again that he and his congregation would stage the burning of the Quran, the Muslim holy book, in commemoration of the attacks on September 11. This publicity stunt resulted in a national and international media hype that informed the whole word about the despicable plan. For days, global TV networks, among them al-Jazeera, led their newscasts with this story – without mentioning that Jones was better characterized as the leader of an extremist, very small cult rather than a pastor of a reputable church. 1

Adjunct professor of political science, email: [email protected]. Andy Barr, “Newt Gingrich Compares Mosque to Nazis,” Politico (August 16, 2010), available at http://www.politico. com/news/stories/0810/41112.html (last visited Jun. 12, 2012). 2

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It took appeals by President Barack Obama and Defense Secretary Robert Gates to persuade Jones to abandon his plan that led to outrage, demonstrations, and violence in several Muslim countries. In September 2010, two days before the ninth anniversary of 9/11, the international news media reported that a dozen U.S. soldiers were charged with forming a secret ‘kill team’ which blew up and shot Afghan civilians at random, then collected their fingers as trophies. Five of them were members of a Stryker infantry brigade based in Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan. While five soldiers were reportedly charged with killing three Afghan men in separate attacks earlier in 2010, the seven others were accused of covering up the murder and assaulting one of their comrades who had exposed their crimes Add to these particular items the frequent reports of U.S.-launched Predator attacks against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan, as well as actions by the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan that had resulted in collateral damage and left civilians dead or injured. All of these reports were communicated through local, national, and global news channels of communication but perceived differently by different people around the world. Communication receivers process information based on their preexisting ideologies, values, and experiences. Thus, as one astute observer noted in the 1990s:

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The same visual images transmitted simultaneously across the globe trigger opposing perceptions. Western living rooms applaud when cruise missiles strike Baghdad. Most living outside see that the West will deliver swift retribution to non-white Iraqis or Somalis but not to white Serbians, a dangerous signal by any standard.3 Indeed, the same information that is perceived by Muslims as proof that Americans and Westerners disrespect their religion, their rights, and even their life and welfare, is perceived by Westerners as the ugly but unavoidable side of war, pluralist competition between various interests – including religious ones – and the manifestation of freedom of expression. The same information that is perceived by Americans and other Westerners as proof that Muslims and Arabs distort their policies and values are perceived in the Muslim world as depicting reality.

1. Current Situation There is no doubt that in the years since 9/11 the image of the United States in Arab and Muslim countries has been and remains overwhelmingly negative; with the exception of Indonesia and Lebanon, only a minority of the public has a favorable view of the U.S. (see Table 1). Table 1: Favorable View bin of theLaden United and Statessupport for al-Qaeda have In spite of all this, confidence in Osama not increased but rather declined in the last several years. Indeed, solid majorities have 2002 2006 2008 2009 2010 unfavorable opinions of al-Qaeda according to a 2010 Egypt -30% 22% survey (72% 27% with unfavorable 17% Indonesia

10%

30%

37%

63%

59%

3 Kishore Mahbubani, “The Danger of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West,” Foreign Affairs 72 (September/October 1993), p. 12.

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Table 1: Favorable View of the United States

Egypt Indonesia Jordan Lebanon Pakistan Turkey

2002 2006 2008 2009 -30% 22% 27% 10% 30% 37% 63% 25% 15% 19% 25% 36% -51% 55% 10% 27% 19% 16% 30% 12% 12% 14% Source: Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Survey

2010 17% 59% 21% 52% 17% 17%

attitudes in Egypt, 56% in Indonesia, 62% in Jordan, 94% in Lebanon, and 74% in Turkey).4 Moreover, confidence in bin Laden decreased significantly from the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks to the first years of the Obama administration (see Table 2).

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But in the countries in which vast majorities have rejected al-Qaeda, bin Laden, and terrorism, there has been equally strong opposition to U.S. policies and the motivations behind them along the lines of bin Laden’s often expressed criticism. Transnational surveys conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in 2008 revealed, for example, that in the six countries combined, 80% of respondents based their attitudes about the United States on U.S. policies in the Middle East, while only 12% based their attitudes on American values which they probably thought to determine policies.5 When asked about the most important factors in driving U.S. policy in the Middle East, 50% of Muslim respondents picked “controlling oil,” 47% “protecting Israel,” 33% “weakening the Muslim world,” and 30% “preserving regional and global dominance;” while only 12% selected “preventing the spread of nuclear weapons,” 7% “fighting terrorism;” 4% “spreading human rights,” and 4% “promoting democracy.”6 In short, while most Muslims and Arabs do not embrace bin Laden’s terrorist methods, they share his opposition to U.S. policies as they affect these and other Muslim countries. The ‘war on terrorism’ especially has damaged the image of the United States and that of other Western countries, namely those involved along with U.S. forces in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. Even Iraqis who appreciate the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime and Afghans who appreciate life without Taliban rule do not credit the United States or its coalition partners. Because ‘bad’ news that inflames Arabs and Muslims overshadows the ‘good’ news by far, the growing anti-American and antiWestern sentiments in the Muslim world and in the Muslim diaspora in the West play into the hands of al-Qaeda Central and an international network of like-minded, affiliated or unaffiliated extremist groups in their propaganda and recruitment efforts. Thus, Hamdi Issac, one of the participants in the failed London bombing attacks on July 21, 2005, told Italian interrogators after he was arrested in Rome that he had been recruited by another would-be bomber, Said Ibrahim. According to Isaac:

4 Pew Research Center, Pew Global Atitutudes Survey (April 7 – May 8, 2010), available at http://www.pewglobal.org/ category/datasets/ (last visited Jun. 20, 2012). 5 Shibley Telhami, “2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll: Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development,” University of Maryland with Zogby International (March 2008), (surveying Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2008/4/ 14%20middle%20east/0414_middle_east_telhami.pdf (last visited Jun. 29, 2012). 6 Ibid.

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We met each other at a muscle-building class in Notting Hill and Muktar (Said Ibrahim) showed us some DVDs with images of the war in Iraq, especially women and children killed by American and British soldiers. During our meetings we analyzed the political situation and the fact that everywhere in the West Muslims are humiliated and that we must react.7 Today, jihadi web sites either post or link to videotapes (i.e., those available at YouTube) that depict alleged GIs bragging about the thrill of murdering Muslims or show them involved in other despicable crimes. Table 2: Confidence in Osama bin Laden 2003 2006 2008 2009 Egypt -27% 19% 23% Indonesia 59% 35% 37% 25% Jordan 56% 24% 19% 28% Lebanon 19% -2% 4% Turkey 15% 4% 3% 2% Source: Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Survey, 2010

2010 25% 25% 14% 0% 3%

When you add to this the resentment and outrage in reaction to growing antiIslamic extremism in Western Europe and, more recently, in the United States, the 64,000 dollar question is whether there are still opportunities for strategic communication and public diplomacy to make a difference in efforts to combat terrorism.

2. Strategic Communication

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According to the U.S. Defense Department’s “Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” strategic communication means: focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. The NATO Policy on Strategic Communication defines strategic communication as "the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations, as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims" (SG(2009)0794). The U.S. Department of Defense’s definition of strategic communication is very similar. Strategic communication has been defined by military organizations as much as by those charged with the diplomatic side of foreign policy. Strategic communication, then, is firmly situated within the overall security strategy of individual states, multinational organizations, and unified commands of particular military missions. For NATO, a unified strategic communication policy would need to bring 28 member 7

“Italy Arrests Another Brother of London Bomb Suspect.” Agence France Presse (July 31, 2005).

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nations – among them the U.S. – under one big umbrella. Even if you have a case like Afghanistan with its central ISAF command, it is hard enough to come up with an overall communication strategy, but even more difficult to coordinate multinational forces in this respect. The same difficulties arise within one nation’s national security and foreign policy apparatus. Take the example of the U.S. government with often competing entities, say, the Departments of Defense and State, the different components of the military, the intelligence community, and not to mention the growing ranks of private contractors and NGOs involved in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflict areas. While not questioning the usefulness of and need for a comprehensive and military engagement-specific approach for strategic communication, the suggestion here is that a public diplomacy model might be best suited to respond to and counter in, an overarching way, terrorist propaganda and demagoguery in what comes down to a battle for the hearts and minds of individuals. Effective unilateral and/or multilateral public diplomacy is seen here as two-dimensional in the sense of influencing the perceptions of foreign publics and, at the same time, providing a narrative for the various components of strategic communication during particular military deployments. Multinational organizations like NATO and national governments recognize the importance of public diplomacy as an important part of strategic communication. The following discussion, then, centers on the role of public diplomacy in combating terrorism using the example of the United States.

3. Public Diplomacy

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According to the United States Information Agency (USIA), a free-standing government agency in charge of public diplomacy during the Cold War: Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.8 After the Cold War ended, the Clinton administration decided that there was no longer a need for large-scale propaganda or public diplomacy. The United States Information Agency was dismantled – its remnants became part of the Department of State in 1999. The assumption was that with the end of the Cold War, the fight over the best governmental system had been won by the United States and the West. It was, as Francis Fukayama wrote in his book The End of History and the Last Man, the end of fundamental global conflicts. But then came 9/11, the ‘war against terrorism,’ and once again the recognition that there was an urgent need for public diplomacy – especially with respect to Arabs and Muslims.

8 For more public diplomacy definitions and explanations, see Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, “About U.S. Public Diplomacy,” at http://publicdiplomacy.org/pages/index.php?page=about-publicdiplomacy (last visited Jun 12, 2012).

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Whether civilian or military leaders, there seems to be agreement that the so-called global war against extremism cannot be won by hard power, at least not solely by military force and economic sanctions, etc., but rather by also utilizing soft power in finding political solutions. The catch word here is smart power – a combination of hard and soft power. During the Cold War, the USIA’s public diplomacy rested on three main pillars: information, international exchanges, and cultural exchanges x

Information – Information about the U.S. for the foreign media was provided to foreign press centers in Washington and New York while information officers available all over the country served foreign correspondents and visiting foreign journalists. There were “America Houses” abroad with libraries, movies, courses, and speakers; there were specialists in U.S. embassies that provided local media with material about the United States. Most of all, there were great efforts to beam information into the countries of the Eastern block, the Soviet Union's client states, who were sympathetic to Moscow and Communism. This was the high time of the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, Radio and Television Marti, etc.

x

International exchanges – International exchanges were conducted at the high school, university, graduate and post-doctoral level. The Fulbright Act of 1946 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 were instrumental here.

x

Cultural exchanges – Through cultural exchanges, the best of American achievements in the arts was made accessible to people in other countries and the best achievements in the arts on the other side were brought to the United States.

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4. Failed Post-9/11 Public Diplomacy After 9/11, when U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell introduced Charlotte Beers, a Madison Avenue executive known for her successful branding of consumer products, he said the goal was to have this marketing expert, who had gotten him to buy Uncle Ben’s rice, “to rebrand American foreign policy.” Her advertising campaign in the Middle East, designed to sell America’s values by showing the wonderful life of Arabs and Muslims in America, flopped. Arabs and Muslims abroad were upset about U.S. foreign policy, not the lives of their Muslim and Arab brethren in the United States. Her successors Margaret Tutweiler and Karan Hughes were also unable to replace the image of the ‘ugly American’ with a positive ‘brand.’ While astute in domestic politics, Hughes lacked knowledge of the Middle East. During her first ‘listening tour’ through several Arab states, she was perceived as clueless and patronizing. But even with all-around capable officials at the helm of the State Department’s public diplomacy, it is next to impossible to succeed with traditional strategies and tactics. While branding and packaging matter in the marketing of wash detergents, cereals, and other products with pretty similar characteristics, in public diplomacy it is the content of the box that determines the success or failure. Similarly, while public diplomacy in the form of public officials granting interviews to al-Jazeera and other media in Arab

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and Muslim regions receive attention, ultimately it is U.S. policy, not the rhetorical skills of American public diplomacy vendors that make the difference. Calling on the U.S. government to spend more money and yield to ‘soft power’ because “the military alone cannot defend America's interests around the world,” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said: The government must improve its skills at public diplomacy and public affairs to better describe the nation's strategy and values to a global audience. We are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than America.9

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Spending more money and putting more effort into ‘soft power’ will not assure a more effective “public diplomacy” in the Middle East and among Muslims and Arabs. Even if the United States Information Agency of old were revived and its onceexcellent parts revitalized, these vehicles of public diplomacy would not be successful in current target regions as they were during the Cold War when they were working within a far more limited and controlled communication environment. In the age of information, when a multitude of global television and radio networks and the Internet provide instant news, information, and communication, the successful broadcast strategies of the past will no longer do. There are more vehicles and opportunities to reach and engage larger audiences overseas than ever before -- but only with innovative programs conceived, produced, and presented by professionals who speak the languages and know the cultures of the target audiences and, of course, the public relations goals in the first place. Although well financed, the U.S. government’s Arab-language television network al-Hurra and radio station al-Sawa, for example, have neither displayed the excellence nor found the audiences of the Cold War broadcasts of the Voice of America or Radio Free Europe, nor have they found promising new approaches in this completely different media and communication environment. According to a 2008 survey conducted in six Arab countries, the U.S.-run Arab language al-Hurra television was merely watched by 2% of the respondents.10 As for the Internet, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was right on target when he said: Public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than America. As one foreign diplomat asked a couple of years ago, ‘How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world’s greatest communication

9

Tom Shanker, “From U.S. ‘Hard Power” Sector, a Please of ‘Softer’ Assist,” International Herald Tribune (November 27, 2007). Shibley Telhami, “2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll.”

10

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society?’ Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing U.S. strategic communications.11

5. New Public Diplomacy Approaches To be sure, coming up with a more promising public diplomacy model is easier said than done. The following section presents some thoughts and suggestions. To begin with, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the three components of public diplomacy as described above. However, what worked in the much more restricted communication and media landscape of yesterday does no longer work today. Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault suggest three areas as the core of modern-day public diplomacy: monologue, dialogue, and collaborative projects.12 When it comes to public diplomacy as monologue or providing public information through various channels of communication, it would be wise for officials to heed what Edward R. Murrow, then Director of the USIA, said nearly half-a-century ago:

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American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.13 Spinning the news is not an option in the age of global communication and information networks. Instead, for public diplomacy to help over time in efforts to combat terrorism, Washington decision-makers, not just those in the Department of State, must consider how to explain and justify U.S. policies, actions and non-actions, and how to gauge the effects of those policies on particular foreign publics, at this particular time meaning the publics in Arab and Muslim countries. To be sure, foreign publics should not have undue influence on policies just as foreign governments should not. By anticipating likely reactions in these particular populations abroad, the best possible public information mode can be prepared ahead of time. In the face of news that is likely to outrage Muslim and Arabs, prudent public diplomacy would not deny or sugarcoat the revelations but rather condemn. This was not the way the Bush administration reacted to the reports and images of the torturing of detainees in US-run prison facilities. Instead, there was denial and the often repeated phrase, “the United States does not torture.” Just as important, if the words and deeds of public officials and other public figures reflect disregard for the sensitivities of foreign audiences, there should be swift reprimands on the part of leaders. Inviting a preacher who publicly characterized Islam

11 Robert M. Gates, Remarks as Delivered for the Landon Lecture, Kansas State University (November 26, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (last visited Jun. 12, 2012). 12 Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” in Public Diplomacy in a Changing World: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull, eds. March 2008). 13 Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, “About Public Diplomacy,” at http://publicdiplomacy.org/pages/index.php?page =about-public-diplomacy (last visited Jun. 12, 2012).

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an evil religion to official government functions, as happened during the Bush administration, wipes out any progress made by prudent public diplomacy monologue. Channels of communication must be utilized to counter the divisive messages of terrorists and their supporter. Take bin Laden’s embrace of Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilization theory of the U.S.-led West waging a war against Islam – not against terrorism. Since this alleged war between the Christian-Judeo and the Islamic world is often invoked by violent extremists and non-violent opinion-makers, many ordinary people in Muslim countries and in the Western diaspora also subscribe to this idea. In the West, there must be strong messages against the promoters of Islamophobia that push the clash of civilization myth as well.

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Turning to public diplomacy in the form of international exchanges and person-toperson dialogues to engage Americans on the one hand and Muslims/Arabs on the other, a modernized public diplomacy model must focus on the Internet’s ample opportunities for virtual exchanges. However, public diplomacy in the form of blogs by State Department personnel or their counterparts in other countries is unlikely to engage in meaningful dialogue with persons that one would like to target, namely, vulnerable targets of terrorist propaganda that is designed to incite and recruit. Instead, members of civic associations, university communities, and others knowledgeable should be encouraged to use the Internet’s social networking facilities to seek meaningful dialogue with individuals abroad, provide alternative views in extremist chat room or on discussion boards. Before cyberspace, during the Cold War, studentto-student letters were an important form of transnational dialogue between the young in victorious and defeated countries; today, thanks to the Internet, the possibilities for all kinds of interactions are far greater and immediate. Virtual dialogue, however, should never be promoted at the expense of direct cultural and educational exchanges since surveys reveal that many Arabs and Muslims are in favor of such interactions. For this purpose, visa restrictions for young people from countries that are most suspected of breeding terrorists need to be eased. Nobody wants to allow terrorists to enter the country but denying perfectly fine people the opportunity to study or otherwise learn about the United States forecloses the chance of winning friends. To treat all foreign Muslims and Arabs as if they were suspected terrorists does not make for good will. Finally, joint people-to-people ventures or collaborative projects seem to be perhaps the most promising component of developing new public diplomacy approaches. When I talk about soft power and public diplomacy within my course on terrorism and counterterrorism, I never fail to discuss the work of an extraordinary American – Greg Mortenson and his one-man initiative to promote understanding and peace by building many schools in Pakistan – one at a time – in what seemed from the start to be a mission impossible but continues to succeed in miraculous ways. As one village chief told Mortenson “Here, we drink three cups of tea to do business; the first you are a stranger, the second you become a friend, and the third you join our family, and for our family we are prepared to do anything—even die.”14 Mortenson became part of the chief’s family and of many other families in Pakistan. In all these school initiatives, it is the local community that makes the 14

Greg Mortonson and David Oliver Relin, Three Cups of Tea (Penguin, 2006), back cover.

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decisions and carries out the work. Mortenson was there to raise funds, advise, and assist. To be sure, few people have the compassion, courage, and determination of Greg Mortenson but one would image that more people could be engaged in these sorts of initiatives within a collaborative effort. Smaller and completely different projects can bring people of different religions and ethnicities together to promote mutual understanding. The following example is a case in point. During his tour of duty in Tunis, a U.S. diplomat met local musicians who in turn liked the blue grass music he introduced them to. They formed a group that eventually toured Africa and the United States playing a unique mixture of African and blue grass tunes. This was an ad hoc collaborative project, but lasting collaboration projects can be and have been organized. One of the hopeful examples is that of the West-Eastern Diwan Orchestra, a youth orchestra that brings together musicians of Egyptian, Iranian, Israeli, Jordanian, Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian backgrounds. Founded by the Argentine-Israeli conductor Daniel Barenboim and PalestinianAmerican literary theorist and advocate for Palestinian rights and named after an anthology of poems by German writer and poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the group performs and holds workshops around the world. Referring to an Israeli colleague in the orchestra, Egyptian violinist Mini Zikri said the following: “Images can be very misleading. The suicide bomber brings to mind a certain image, so does the military operation. But these must not be fixed in one’s brain. Now when I see her again I think, ‘Here is my friend,’ not ‘Here is the Israeli person.’15

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6. Soft Underbelly of Anti-American/Anti-Western Attitudes? When it comes to the Arab and Muslim world, public opinion polls in Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and several other countries have revealed that anti-American attitudes may have a soft underbelly and could be altered by the right public diplomacy approaches. Surveys conducted by the organization Terror Free Tomorrow affirmed resentment toward the United States but at the same time potential for attitudinal turnarounds in favor of America without drastic policy adjustments.16 Pakistan is a case in point. Eighty percent of respondents in a June 2008 survey said that al-Qaeda’s top goal was standing up to America and 57% agreed with that objective. The same survey revealed that only one-third of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of bin Laden and al-Qaeda. When asked what would improve their opinion of the United States, the vast majority picked educational scholarships and U.S. visas, free trade between the two countries, American disaster relief, medical aid, and resources to build schools and train teachers as measures to better Pakistanis’ esteem of America. The most surprising result was that a larger percentage of bin Laden supporters than non-supporters reacted positively when asked about the above measures deemed likely to improve Pakistanis’ attitudes toward America and Americans. Or take Indonesia, where public opinion became much more favorable toward the United States and much less positive toward bin Laden after American-led relief efforts following the deadly tsunami of 2005. With these and 15 Cowan and Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy.” 16 For survey summaries and news accounts about them, see Terror Free Tomorrow, “Public Opinion Surveys,” at http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/template.php?section=PL (last visited Jun. 20, 2012).

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similar results in other Muslim countries in mind, Ken Ballen, the president of Terror Free Tomorrow wrote, What our surveys uncovered is that the U.S. would witness dramatic improvements in the view of the United States among the overwhelming majority of Muslims, including those who express support for al Qaeda and Bin Laden, if we demonstrate respect and caring for people in their daily lives through practical, relatively achievable steps such as increasing direct humanitarian assistance (medical, education, food), visas and better trade terms.17 Last but not least, the United States and other countries should persuade moderate Muslim clerics and other opinion-makers, such as media personnel, especially editorial writers, columnists, and news analysts, to provide balance to the lopsidedly negative depiction of the United States and the West; they could also speak out against terrorism that is carried out in the name of Islam. In the wake of the 2004 take-over of a Russian school in Beslan by Chechen separatists and the eventual death of several hundred children, there were voices in Arab and Muslim countries that condemned the attack and terrorism in general. Abdel Rahman al-Rashed, the general manager of the satellite TV-network Al Arabiya wrote in the pan-Arab newspaper Al Sharq al Awsat, It is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists, but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims. The majority of those who manned the suicide bombings against buses, vehicles, schools, houses and buildings, all over the world, were Muslim. '’What a pathetic record. What an abominable 'achievement.’ Does this tell us anything about ourselves, our societies and our culture?18

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Khaled Hamed al-Suleiman wrote in the Saudi Arabian government daily Okaz, The propagandists of jihad succeeded in the span of a few years in distorting the image of Islam. They turned today's Islam into something having to do with decapitations, the slashing of throats, abducting innocent civilians and exploding people.19 Similarly, at the height of violent uproars in Muslim countries over the Danish cartoons that depicted the Prophet Muhammad in less than respectful ways, some Arab opinion-makers questioned the Muslim world’s mass protests against drawings and its collective silence about jihadis who beheaded their Western hostages and posted videotapes of these most cruel executions on the Internet. Nothing would be more helpful than finding surrogate public diplomats among influential Muslims and Arabs who discredit terrorists and terrorism despite threats to silence them. As Lawrence Wright, the author of the most authoritative work about alQaeda (“The Looming Tower”) put it recently, “The best ally in the struggle against violent Islamism is moderate Islam.”20

17

Ken Ballen, “Even al Qaeda Supporters Can Be Won Over,” Los Angeles Times (June 14, 2008). John Kifner, “Massacre Draws Self-Criticism in Muslim Press,” New York Times (Sep. 9, 2004). Ibid. 20 Lawrence Wright, “Intolerance,” The New Yorker (Sep. 20, 2010), p. 48. 18 19

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Conclusion When foreign governments decide to utilize strategic communication in order to convince Western publics and elites to support or oppose particular policies, they do not rely on their own public relations, publicity, and public diplomacy specialists. Instead, they hire leading and well-connected Westerners in the most prestigious firms to promote their interests. For example, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Kuwaitis hired and paid many millions of dollars to Hill and Knowlton, a large American public relations firm, to push the ‘Free Kuwait’ cause in the United States. This action ultimately influenced America’s decision to enter the first Gulf War. While one would not want to repeat the tactics used in the Kuwaiti ‘public diplomacy’ campaign, the advantage of using homegrown public diplomacy experts is indisputable. To make inroads against Islamic extremists’ propaganda and its consequences, a promising course of action is to find experts in the Arab and Muslim world and in the Western diaspora to communicate non-violent alternatives to the messages of hate and violence via the same range of media and communications that terrorist organizations and their supporters exploit. In sum, then, the global terrorism threat and the global media landscape of the 21st Century call for multifaceted approaches in an overarching public diplomacy model that also sets the stage for strategic communications in theaters of irregular warfare.

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Bibliography Ballen, Ken, “Even al Qaeda Supporters Can Be Won Over,” Los Angeles Times (June 14, 2008). Barr, Andy, “Newt Gingrich Compares Mosque to Nazis,” Politico (August 16, 2010). Cowan, Geoffrey, and Amelia Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” in Public Diplomacy in a Changing World: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull, eds. March 2008). “Italy Arrests Another Brother of London Bomb Suspect.” Agence France Presse (July 31, 2005). Kifner, John, “Massacre Draws Self-Criticism in Muslim Press,” New York Times (Sep. 9, 2004). Mahbubani, Kishore, “The Danger of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West,” Foreign Affairs 72 (September/October 1993). Mortonson, Greg, and David Oliver Relin, Three Cups of Tea (Penguin, 2006). Pew Research Center, Pew Global Atitutudes Survey (April 7 – May 8, 2010). Shanker, Tom, “From U.S. ‘Hard Power” Sector, a Please of ‘Softer’ Assist,” International Herald Tribune (November 27, 2007). Telhami, Shibley, “2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll: Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development,” University of Maryland with Zogby International (March 2008). Gates, Robert M., Remarks as Delivered for the Landon Lecture, Kansas State University (November 26, 2007) Wright, Lawrence, “Intolerance,” The New Yorker (Sep. 20, 2010).

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Terrorism, Media and Censorship Brigitte L. NACOS1 Columbia University

Abstract. Although a number of freedoms are considered vital in democracies, as well as a basic right under international human rights human law, these freedoms are not absolute. This article looks at the interaction between those rights and government limitations on those rights in the fight against terrorism, breaking the issue into five cases and evaluating each case in turn. The articles concludes that in times of perceived crisis, the majority of the public tends to support government censorship over freedom of the press, but the globalization of communications and media systems has made it far more difficult to restrain the press altogether. Keywords. Media support to terrorism, censorship, freedoms

Introduction

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Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.2 While freedom of the press, freedom of expression, freedom of religion are widely recognized as fundamental civil liberties in democratic systems, neither constitutions nor laws, nor declarations guarantee that freedom of the press and freedom of speech are absolute; instead, literally all states assert the right — in many cases supported by landmark court rulings — to censor for the sake of national security and public safety. While such curbs are more likely during times of war (i.e., WW I, WW II), they can and do come into play in response to terrorism and the threat of further terrorist strikes. Censorship in this context has different meanings, namely, (1) censorship of direct terrorist communications; (2) censorship of terrorist communications carried by legitimate news organizations (3) self-censorship on the part of media organizations; (4) suppression of knowledge-based speech, and (5) withholding of information from or denial of access to the press.

1

Adjunct professor of political science, email: [email protected]. U.N. G.A. Res. 217, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (10 December 2948), art. 19. 2

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1. Censoring Direct Terrorist Speech In the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits Congress from making laws that abridge the freedom of the press and the freedom of expression. Yet, during times of internal and external threats, there has been the adoption of sedition and espionage acts, coupled with a multitude of court decisions that did not rule out limits on those freedoms. The litmus test was established by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 1919 ruling according to which: the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.3

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In the following decades, it became far more difficult, but still not impossible, for the government and other plaintiffs to satisfy the ‘clear and present danger’ test. The one case of censorship in the context of political violence/terrorism in recent times arose from the so so-called Nuremberg Files – data of abortion providers and of politicians, judges, and other officials that support legalized abortions that was posted on the websites of anti-abortion extremists (terrorists). Framed by drippings of animated blood, the registry listed working "baby butchers" (names printed in black font), "wounded" abortion providers (names of those injured in anti-abortion actions grayed out) and "fatalities" (names of doctors assassinated by anti-abortion terrorists struck out). In essence, this was a hit list that kept score of physicians killed and injured by anti-abortion extremists. The site encouraged visitors to "search for the office address of the baby butchers listed above" and listed the URL of the American Medical Association as a source of such information. In addition to physicians, the site listed the names of clinic owners and workers, judges ("their shysters"), politicians ("their mouthpieces"), law enforcement officials ("their bloodhounds"), and of "miscellaneous spouses & other blood flunkies." If the inflamed language that accompanied the list was not enough to stir hate and militancy in supporters of radical anti-abortion actions, the gruesome images in the picture gallery of aborted babies may have done so. In the United States, abortion clinics have been the targets of hundreds of attacks, eight abortion providers have been killed, and there have been more than a dozen assassination attempts. A Planned Parenthood organization on the western U.S. coast sued the group responsible for the Nuremberg Files and the distribution of “Wanted” leaflets with the pictures of abortion providers in the area. The district court recognized the material as a “clear and present danger” to the lives of those whose names were publicized, awarded the plaintiffs one hundred million dollars in actual and punitive damage, and ordered the removal of the website. However, a panel of judges of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the verdict and ruled that the publication of the Nuremberg Files on the Internet fell within the limits of constitutionally protected free speech. The court held that abortion foes could

3

Schenck vs. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

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not be held responsible for the possibility that their inflammatory Internet postings and leaflets might encourage some persons to commit violence against abortion providers and clinics. Judge Alex Kozinski wrote: If defendants threatened to commit violent acts, by working alone or with others, then their statements could properly support the [guilty] verdict. But if their statements merely encouraged unrelated terrorists, then their words are protected by the First Amendment. Political speech may not be punished just because it makes it more likely that someone will be harmed at some unknown time in the future by an unrelated third party.4 The Appeals Court, however, ruled 6-5 en banc that the website material amounted to serious threats and was not protected by the First Amendment; the Court reinstated the original verdict, including the order to remove the Nuremberg Files from the website.5 The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case — although the close 6-5 Appeals Court decision left doubts about the issues central in this case.

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It did not take long for the same material and more drastic encouragements to kill ‘baby-killers’ and the glorification of anti-abortion terrorism to reappear on the web. Obviously, the close ruling discouraged further legal action by targeted groups — and the government did not take up the case either. Nor did the U.S. government make efforts to challenge material that seems to inspire violence. Take the example of neo-Nazi/white supremacist William Pierce who authored two novels. His first book, "The Turner Diaries," was about white American supremacists' all-out war against non-white minorities and the Jewish-controlled Federal government, which served as the blueprint for Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh to model his attack on the Murrah Federal Building on the bombing of the Washington FBI headquarters as described in Pierce's book. One of the three white Texans who beat and decapitated James Byrd, Jr., an African-American man, as he was dragged by a chain attached to a pick-up truck, said according to one of his accomplices, "We're starting The Turner Diaries early."6 A copy of Pierce’s second book, "Hunter," was found in the home of McVeigh's accomplice Terry Nichols. While these volumes are written in the form of a novel, they contain in fact most of the hateful ideas and the call for the all-out racial war that Pierce and other right-extremists spread via the Internet and make accessible to increasingly larger audiences. Other democracies do not have to overcome the same high constitutional hurdles as the United States to make laws against hate speech and what often comes down to the incitement of violence. Over the years, German authorities threatened and, in some cases, took legal actions against internet service providers (ISPs) that hosted neo-Nazi websites. In France, two interest groups won a court judgment against Internet portal Yahoo that ordered the U.S. company to deny French web surfers access to e-auctions

4 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir 2001). 5 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (en banc, 9th Cir. 2002). 6 The brutal killing occurred in June1998 in Jasper, Texas. Phil Miller, “Black Man's Killer Said: 'We're Starting the Turner Diaries Early,'" The Scotsman (Scotsman Publications, 2000).

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of Nazi memorabilia. Threatened to be fined $13,000 for each day, Yahoo obeyed by filtering out these sites for their customers in France. A number of ISPs have denied service to the most offensive among the many hundreds of hate sites originating in the United States and Canada without known government action. Thus, one U.S.-based, neo-Nazi voice on the Internet complained that Geocities and other free Web hosting services, as well as America Online, "adopted policies censoring pro-White pages as soon as they can find them."7 Kahane.org, the U.S.-based website of the extremist Jewish Kahane movement, whose political organizations Kach and Kahane Chai were outlawed in Israel as terrorist groups and designated by the U.S. State Department as foreign terrorist organizations, was dropped by its American server as well.8 But the rejects can and do find alternative servers. In the past several years, many of these sites disappeared when their content happened to catch the eyes of law enforcement and/or hate site watch groups, then reappeared with new domain names. But in most cases, the driving forces behind the most offensive sites with terrorist speech are clever enough to refrain from direct calls for political violence against the targets of their hate and seem to keep their public statements just within the parameters of their constitutional right to free expression.

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Governments can enforce restrictions on free speech when actors operate in domestic and even regional settings; it is a sheer impossibility to censor effectively even the most direct calls for violence when they come from transnational organizations and global networks of leaderless cells that use ISPs in remote jurisdictions. While the appeals for violence in Nuremberg Files-type postings are implicit, the call to kill Americans is explicit in communications from al-Qaeda and similar groups. Take the fatwa, or religious pronouncement, signed by Osama bin Laden and four other radical Islamic leaders in February 1998. The document that was posted in several languages and on many web sites – including American ones – contained the following call to violence: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of the Almighty God… .9

7 Stormfront, “White Nationalist Resources Page," at http://www.uiowa.edu/policult/politick/smithson/ stormfro.htm (last visited Jun. 20, 2012). 8 While site server Scorpion Communications cancelled its contract with the Kahane organization, another firm, McMurtrey/Whitaker & Associates struggled with the decision of whether to let Kahane.org use its software to sell merchandise on its site. See Dean E. Murphy, "Ugliness Online isn't Terrorism." New York Times (Jan. 7, 2001). 9 See, e.g., Middle East Web, “Osama Bin Laden's 1998 Fatwa,” at http://www.mideastweb.org/osamabin laden2.htm (last visited Jun. 20, 2012) . Most sites that posted the so-called fatwa were neither associated with bin Laden or his allies nor shared their views.

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There is no way for the U.S. government or any other government, democratic or authoritarian, to ban this sort of material from all media – whether distributed via manuals, books, DVDs, or web sites.

2. Silencing Terrorist Speech in Legitimate Media Following the Iran hostage crisis (1979-1981), Middle East expert Gary Sick observed that the situation “was the longest running human interest story in the history of television, in living colors from the other side of the world. Commercially it was a stunning success.” Furthermore, he wrote, “It may never be known how many pairs of pantyhose and how many tubes of toothpaste were sold to this captive audience as a direct result of the hostage crisis, but the numbers are substantial.” Far more troubling was that during the 444 days of that crisis and subsequent incidents in the 1980s during which Americans were held hostage, the news media provided terrorists with unlimited access to print and airwaves to publicize their propaganda, whether they staged press conferences, gave interviews, provided their own film footage, or released communiqués.

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The widely respected journalist and columnist David Broder suggested at the time that “the essential ingredient of any effective antiterrorist policy must be the denial to the terrorist of access to mass media outlets. The way by which this denial is achieved – whether by voluntary means of those of us in press and television, self-restraint, or by government control – is a crucial question for journalists and for all other citizens who share our beliefs in civil liberties.”10 But Katharine Graham, the publisher of the Washington Post and Broder’s boss, did not agree. She argued strongly in favor of no press restraint at all, when she wrote, Publicity may be the oxygen of terrorists. But I say this: News is the lifeblood of liberty. If the terrorists succeed in depriving us of freedom, their victory will be far greater than they ever hoped and far worse than we ever feared. Let it never come to pass. 11 While there was criticism of, and self-criticism by, the media after each so-called terrorist spectacular and while media insiders promised to heed the appeals for selfrestraint, when the next terrorist incident occurred, there was neither change in the reporting patterns nor any government efforts to curb this coverage. This has been different in other liberal democracies. The terrorist activities of the IRA in Northern Ireland and in England, the Baader-Meinhof group in then-West Germany, and various Marxist groups in Greece resulted in government curbs of massmediated terrorist communications. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, adopted legislation that made media glorification of terrorist violence a criminal offense; more recently, the United Kingdom adopted a similar law against the glorification of terrorism. Greece enacted an antiterrorism law that gives prosecutors

10

David Broder, “The Media and Terrorism,” seminar sponsored by the Center for Communication, Inc. (October 23, 1985). Katharine Graham, “The Media Must Report Terrorism,” in Terrorism: Opposing Viewpoints (Bonnie Szumski, ed. Greenhaven Press, 1986), p. 81. 11

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the power to ban the communications from terrorists following violent incidents. Editors who violated the law have been convicted and punished. But while some of these restrictions worked before the more recent advances in global communication and media networks, in the 21st Century, even governments with tough press laws cannot censor this sort of material from being publicized by non-state domestic and transnational actors. Take the following example: In October 2002, several dozen armed Chechen separatists took over a Moscow theater and 850 people hostage – obviously to put pressure on the Kremlin to listen to and give in to their demands. The Russian government moved quickly to deny the hostage-holders access to the media and particularly the airwaves. According to one observer, the Russian Media Ministry issued warnings to several Russian news providers, and shut down the Moskoviya television station for its ‘flagrant violations of the existing legislation’ by broadcasting an interview with a hostage who called for an end to the war in Chechnya. The station was allowed to resume its broadcasts the next day.12

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Yet, in spite of the press ministry’s overall success in preventing the domestic media from carrying terrorist communications, the Chechens got their message across because comrades of the actual hostage holders delivered a pre-produced video tape to the Moscow bureau of al-Jazeera, not to a Russian media organization. On the tape, the Chechens demanded the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from their territories and threatened to blow themselves and the hostages up if their demand was not met. Shortly after it was delivered, the video was not only aired by the Arab satellite network but soon by other TV networks around the world as well; the text was available in many forms on the web sites of legitimate news organization. In one form or the other, the Russian public was soon informed about the very information that their government tried to suppress. In short, in the age of global media and communication it is very difficult, if not impossible to censor mass-mediated terrorist communications.

3. Media Self-Censorship In the case of the theater take-over in Moscow, most of the Russian news media heeded the press ministry’s warning that terrorist communication could play into the hands of the hostage holders by voluntarily ‘filtering out’ this sort of information. While Western observers were quick to criticize this case of self-censorship in response to government warnings, governments in liberal democracies are also known to pressure news organizations to exercise self-censorship. Following a series of bloody attacks and hostage takings by the Red Army Faction (RAF) in the 1970s, German media agreed to deny the terrorists access and to buy into the government’s news management. After industrialist Hans Martin Schleyer was

12 PBS, “Putin Vetoes AntiTerror Meassures,” News Hour Report (25 November 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/media/media_watch/july-dec02/putin_11-25.html (last visited Jun. 20, 2012).

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kidnapped in 1977, for example, this news management/self-censorship model worked. Although the RAF managed to get out more than a hundred messages with their demands and threats, the news media ignored almost all of them. Moreover, news organizations agreed to the government’s request to publicize false reports designed to misinform the RAF about Bonn’s true counterterrorist measures. For the duration of the hostage situation, there was a news blackout of the incident. Or a more recent example: A month after 9/11 and following a request that National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice made during a conference call with leading news executives of ABC, CBS, CNN, FOX, and NBC, the networks agreed to edit future videotapes released by Osama bin Laden and to omit inflammatory passages and hate speech. Rice expressed concern that the videotapes contained secret messages for al-Qaeda operatives inside the country and could inflame Muslims abroad. There was apparently no resistance by the networks. According to one report, the agreement “was described by one network executive as a ‘patriotic’ decision.” It did not matter that no secret codes had been found to justify curbs on bin Laden’s communications and that the Arab news network al-Jazeera and other foreign satellite networks showed the complete videotapes in the Arab and Muslim world. If there was opposition to the voluntary curbs, it was not reported and therefore not heard by the public. Dan Rather seemed to speak for many in the media when he said that this was an extraordinary time and therefore it was a reasonable solution for both sides.

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More importantly, the U.S. media censored themselves in the months and even years after 9/11 by paying little or no attention to legitimate voices that challenged the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policy – most of all, the lack of sound evidence for the invasion of Iraq. Nor did the influential media challenge the administration’s propaganda campaign designed to overinflate the threat of further terrorism as a means to enlist public support for the “war against terrorism,” but that is a big story for a comprehensive book.

4. Suppression of Information that Terrorists Seek Less than two months after 9/11, Newsweek carried a cover story entitled “Protecting America: What Must Be Done?” that described the most vulnerable targets for terrorist attacks as “airports, chemical plants, dams, food supplies, the Internet, malls, mass transit, nuclear power plans, post offices, seaports, skyscrapers, stadiums, water supplies.” The ten priorities “to protect ourselves” was just as much a list of attractive targets for terrorist planners. Citing a list of similar articles with particularly alarming headlines, national security expert Dennis Pluchinsky condemned this kind of investigative reporting in an article published by the Washington Post. “I say the following with a heavy heart, but if there were an "Osama bin Laden" award given out by al Qaeda, I believe that it would be awarded to the U.S news media for their investigative reporting,” he wrote. “This type of reporting – carrying specifics about U.S. vulnerabilities – must be stopped or

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censored.13 A week later, the Post responded to Pluchinsky’s criticism and editorialized in his support: Mr. Pluchinsky correctly notes that reputable media organizations and highly skilled reporters are unwittingly doing the legwork for terrorists in identifying security vulnerabilities and interviewing expert sources to whom terrorists would be unlikely to have access. When national security is at stake, the media should not view the promotion of public awareness of security problems as an end in itself.14 In these cases and similar ones, no government actions were taken. Nor were there actions against the spread of detailed information about devastating methods of attack. A variety of potent homemade explosives are described in easily available books, such as The Anarchist Cookbook or Home Workshop Explosives. One customer reviewer of The Anarchist Cookbook wrote the following on the Amazon.com web site,

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Almost all (with the exception of a few) of the things in here are accurate in the sense that they show you BASICALLY how to do something, but also in the sense that the way it tells you how to do it is so dangerous that it will most likely fail. . . .If you really want to know how to make homemade exploseives [sic] try “Home Workshop Explosives” by Uncle Fester, now that book is a real deal. This books [sic] techniques are tooken [sic] from military handbooks that date back to about 30 years ago! But one doesn’t even have to buy a book; instructions for putting together bombs were easy to come by in the past and still are today. Following the pipe bomb explosion in the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta in July 1996, the CNN.com website carried a story that detailed in its text and an accompanying illustration how such a device is put together. Years after the initial posting, the same story was still available on CNN’s web site. However, while the CNN story seemed to provide basic information about the nature of pipe bombs unwittingly, other websites wittingly carried explicit instructions on building explosives such as Molotov cocktails and bombs consisting of fertilizer and fuel. It is amazing that this sort of information did not vanish altogether after a federal statute made unlawful the transmission of “information about how to build conventional and WMD explosive devices” as part of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.” The act was adopted in reaction to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. What Laura Donahue has called knowledge-based speech goes to the heart of “information on its face innocuous, but which can be used for good or ill.”15 This is in particularly information about biological, chemical, and nuclear research that could have devastating consequences if falling into the hands of terrorists. There are a number of laws on the book designed to prevent this sort of information falling into the hands of enemies going back to the Cold War era.

13

Dennis Pluchinsky, “They Heard It All, and That’s the Trouble,” Washington Post (June 16, 2002), p. B03. “Tipsheets for Terrorists?” Washington Post (June 23, 2002), p. B06. Laura K. Donohue, “Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression.” Cardozo Law Review 27 (1)(2005), p. 271. 14 15

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5. Withholding of Information from or Denial of Access to the Press Finally, in modern times, censorship has the meaning of withholding information on the part of governments and denial of access to the press from certain sites. Freedom of information tends to be curbed during times of crisis – including in the wake of major terrorist attacks and in the face of terror threats. Much has been said and written about media access before and during military deployment and during occupation – mostly in the context of war, and, of course, including the “war on terrorism.” But access issues arise also during hostage situations when news reports could (and have) tipped off hostage-takers and endangered hostages and rescuers. Here, too, the technological advances have made it much more difficult to seal up areas because even an emergency responder may be tempted to use his or her cell phone to provide information to the outside world in this era of ‘citizen journalism.’

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Conclusion When it comes to terrorism and counterterrorism, not only authoritarian governments but liberal democracies as well, try to curb news deemed to be harmful to the national interest in one way or the other. In times of perceived crisis, the majority of the public tends to support government censorship rather than press freedom. Thus, at the end of November 29, 2001, according to a Pew Center for the People & the Press survey, 53% of Americans agreed that the government should be able to censor news deemed to threaten national security. But the globalization of communication and media systems has made it far more difficult to restrain the press altogether: Even if domestic media are forced or volunteer to refrain from publicizing certain information, global media networks with headquarters abroad and/or Internet sites will spread the news across all borders. In short, censorship or self-censorship in today’s global media/communication landscape is far more difficult to carry out and thus far less likely to succeed.

Bibliography Miller, Phil, “Black Man's Killer Said: 'We're Starting the Turner Diaries Early,'" The Scotsman (Scotsman Publications, 2000). Murphy, Dean E., "Ugliness Online isn't Terrorism." New York Times, (Jan. 7, 2001). Broder, David, “The Media and Terrorism,” seminar sponsored by the Center for Communication, Inc. (October 23, 1985). Donohue, Laura K., “Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression.” Cardozo Law Review 27 (1)(2005). Graham, Katharine, “The Media Must Report Terrorism,” in Terrorism: Opposing Viewpoints (Bonnie Szumski, ed. Greenhaven Press, 1986). PBS, “Putin Vetoes AntiTerror Meassures,” News Hour Report (25 November 2002). Pluchinsky, Dennis, “They Heard It All, and That’s the Trouble,” Washington Post (June 16, 2002). “Tipsheets for Terrorists?” Washington Post (June 23, 2002).

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Subject Index media 81, 105 media support to terrorism 139 NATO 57 nuclear 57 organized crime 35 perception 105 protection 113 public diplomacy 127 radiological weapons 57 representation 81 security 43 security environment 1 strategic communication 81, 127 strategy 113 suicide terrorism 81 terrorism 1, 11, 35, 43, 57, 81, 105 terrorist concepts 1 terrorist use of internet 19 unlawful combatant 75 weapons of mass destruction 57

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asymmetric threat 1 biological 57 censorship 139 chemical 57 classification of terrorism 11 combating terror 49 counterterrorism 19, 75, 127 democracy 105 dilemma 113 energy 43 financing terrorism 35 framing 81 freedoms 139 ideology 11 international cooperation 105 International humanitarian law 75 intervention commitment 113 labeling 113 lawfare 49 legal aspects of terror 49 legal tools 19

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Author Index 11, 43 1, 35 19 127, 139

Spence, K. Tokgöz, K. Voica, D.R. White, L.D.

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Çelikpala, M. Çitliolu, E. Gercke, M. Nacos, B.L.

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81, 113 v, 105 57 49, 75

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