Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process: The Peacebuilding-Transitional Justice Nexus (Memory Politics and Transitional Justice) 3030739694, 9783030739690

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Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process The PeacebuildingTransitional Justice Nexus Grace Mieszkalski Benjamin Zyla

Memory Politics and Transitional Justice

Series Editors Jasna Dragovic-Soso, Goldsmiths University of London, London, UK Jelena Subotic, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA Tsveta Petrova, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

The interdisciplinary fields of Memory Studies and Transitional Justice have largely developed in parallel to one another despite both focusing on efforts of societies to confront and (re—)appropriate their past. While scholars working on memory have come mostly from historical, literary, sociological, or anthropological traditions, transitional justice has attracted primarily scholarship from political science and the law. This series bridges this divide: it promotes work that combines a deep understanding of the contexts that have allowed for injustice to occur with an analysis of how legacies of such injustice in political and historical memory influence contemporary projects of redress, acknowledgment, or new cycles of denial. The titles in the series are of interest not only to academics and students but also practitioners in the related fields. The Memory Politics and Transitional Justice series promotes critical dialogue among different theoretical and methodological approaches and among scholarship on different regions. The editors welcome submissions from a variety of disciplines—including political science, history, sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies—that confront critical questions at the intersection of memory politics and transitional justice in national, comparative, and global perspective. Memory Politics and Transitional Justice Book Series (Palgrave) Co-editors: Jasna Dragovic-Soso (Goldsmiths, University of London), Jelena Subotic (Georgia State University), Tsveta Petrova (Columbia University) Editorial Board Paige Arthur, New York University Center on International Cooperation Alejandro Baer, University of Minnesota Orli Fridman, Singidunum University Belgrade Carol Gluck, Columbia University Katherine Hite, Vassar College Alexander Karn, Colgate University Jan Kubik, Rutgers University and School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London Bronwyn Leebaw, University of California, Riverside Jan-Werner Mueller, Princeton University Jeffrey Olick, University of Virginia Kathy Powers, University of New Mexico Joanna R. Quinn, Western University Jeremy Sarkin, University of South Africa Leslie Vinjamuri, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London Sarah Wagner, George Washington University

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14807

Grace Mieszkalski · Benjamin Zyla

Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process The Peacebuilding-Transitional Justice Nexus

Grace Mieszkalski School of International Development and Global Studies University of Ottawa Ottawa, ON, Canada

Benjamin Zyla School of International Development and Global Studies University of Ottawa Ottawa, ON, Canada

ISSN 2731-3840 ISSN 2731-3859 (electronic) Memory Politics and Transitional Justice ISBN 978-3-030-73969-0 ISBN 978-3-030-73970-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: © Harvey Loake This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Until recently, the literatures on post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice had barely connected (von Billerbeck, 2016). Crossreferencing or even cross-fertilization was nearly non-existent, which is surprising given that both literatures appear to focus, at least in part, on the same dependent variable (broadly speaking), namely peace in divided societies. A few years ago, a rapprochement commenced with the evolving so-called critical peacebuilding literature that started to question the core assumptions of the dominant (liberal) peacebuilding school. Séverine Autesserre and others were at the forefront of this wave, advocating for a turn of focus from macro-peacebuilding perspectives that had dominated much of the earlier peacebuilding literature towards studying micro- or local perspectives. Focusing on this local perspective of international peacebuilding not only resulted in a still growing critical peacebuilding literature, it also opened the door for analyzing processes of transitional justice in complex post-conflict peacebuilding processes (s.f. Mani, 2002, p. 4). With this door open, peacebuilding scholars suggested that these approaches (local peacebuilding and transitional justice) should better cross-fertilize and inform each other (s.f. Arthur, 2011). Inadvertently, this also increased the interdisciplinarity (Bell, 2009, p. 24) of the field of peacebuilding (and transitional justice for that matter), which we view as a positive development, given that it is heavily dominated by political scientists (in the former case) and legal scholars (in the latter

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case). Our aim in this book is to contribute to this evolving literature that cross-fertilizes the peacebuilding and the transitional justice literatures. While we discussed the theoretical foundations of these two literatures, as well as theoretical avenues of how to better connect them in a graduate seminar held at the School of International Development and Global Studies at the University of Ottawa, the so-called Syrian refugee crisis started to advance, with thousands of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iran and elsewhere arriving especially in Greece (and later in Italy) and moving northward through the so-called Balkan route (initially passing through Albania, Serbia, Hungary and Austria). Many migrants identified Germany as the country of final destination, fleeing their home countries that were plagued with ongoing civil wars, which in the case of Syria had begun with the Arab Spring in 2011, and resulted in thousands of deaths and a widespread humanitarian crisis. As scholars who are genuinely interested in questions of peacebuilding, we were of course affected by the crisis and joined the chorus of debates how it could be addressed. However, we soon realized that the crisis could serve as a contemporary case study where we could ‘apply’ some of the theoretical arguments we had studied in the literature and perhaps deduce some concrete (policy) implications. At that point, our attention was less on how to contribute the evolving humanitarian crisis, which undoubtedly is a critical aspect in a highly complex and evolving environment, requiring rapid responses from the international community and humanitarian actors. Alternatively, and in drawing on insights from the peacebuilding literature noting strong statistical evidence that once a civil war has ended by a peace agreement that the state is less likely to revert back to war (s.f. Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell et al., 2001; Collier et. al., 2003; Howard, 2008; Wantchekon, 2004; Fortna, 2004, 2008),1 we asked ourselves what role transitional justice processes and mechanisms could play after such agreement has been reached?2 Thus, the tragic situation in Syria led us to consider how the sustained human rights violations and war crimes (e.g. war crimes, genocide, torture, or disappearance) could possibly be addressed in a post-conflict

1 For a disagreement, see Dubey (2002). 2 Transitional justice is a concept and a process that encompass a number of different

legal, political, and cultural instruments and mechanisms, which can be categorized into procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice measures.

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setting, particularly in the context of widespread human displacements3 in the country. This discussion seemed to be quite absent from the academic discussions on peacebuilding and transitional justice in Syria, which ultimately prompted us to analyze options for a prospective Syrianled approach to transitional justice—an approach that is founded on the participation of displaced populations and Syrian refugees. However, we must be cognizant of the fact that while the Syrian civil war appears to have slowed to a low-level conflict with the frontlines largely unchanged since 2019, it has by no means ended.4 Nonetheless, at some point in the near future violence will most likely have come to an end and Syrian refugees currently living in camps either in neighboring Lebanon and Jordan or in temporary host societies in Europe could return to their home countries. We understand from other transitional justice cases (e.g. in Liberia) that their integration in said process is vital to achieve sustainable peace. It is our hope that this book can make a small contribution to better understand this process—that is, to better understand how Syrian refugees can participate in the challenging, albeit important transitional justice process. We would not have been able to complete the research for this project without the generous financial support from two projects funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant numbers 430-2015-00502 and 890-2019-0026). Moreover, we are grateful for our wonderful colleagues in the School of International Development and Global Studies (EDIM) and the stimulating scholarly environment at the School, the Faculty of Social Sciences for granting a sabbatical leave in 2017/18, a fellowship from the Institute for Advanced Study at the University of Constance in Germany (2018–2019), and a visiting scholar affiliation with the Government Department as well as the Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs at Harvard University where the final parts of this project were completed.

3 Displacement represents a fundamental rupture between individuals and their homeland as a result of government failure to protect or worse still as a perpetrator of human rights violations of its people (Hovil, 2012). 4 Neither at the time of writing nor during the corrections phase has an agreement been reached thus far, unfortunately. For example, countries in the great lakes of Africa such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda have experienced war-induced displacement.

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We would like to thank Roland Paris and the two reviewers for their insightful and constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this manuscript. Michael Nkansah and especially Seul Ki Cadavez provided excellent research assistance by helping us to trace the most recent literature on transitional justice and ensuring that our data is factually correct and up to date. Last but not least, Grace wishes to thank her friends and family for their love and encouragement along her graduate studies journey. The ideas and arguments presented in this book do not represent in any way or form the position of the Canadian Government. All errors, of course, remain ours. Ottawa, ON, Canada Cambridge, MA, USA January 2020

Grace Mieszkalski Benjamin Zyla

Contents

1

Introduction 1.1 Aims and Argument of the Book 1.2 Background to the Syrian Civil War 1.3 Major Recent Developments Inside Syria 1.4 Major Players and Their Interest in the Civil War Bibliography

1 1 7 13 19 21

2

Research Design and Methodology 2.1 Research Design and Case Selection 2.2 Data Collection 2.3 Data Analysis Bibliography

31 31 33 34 38

3

Theorizing the Nexus Between Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding 3.1 The Peacebuilding Concept and Its Liberal Domination 3.2 (Liberal) Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 3.3 From Liberal to Hybrid and Critical Peacebuilding 3.4 The Localization of Transitional Justice and the Integration of Displaced Populations Bibliography

52 57

Evolution of Transitional Justice 4.1 A Brief Transitional Justice Genealogy

65 65

4

41 42 47 48

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4.2

Contemporary Transitional Justice and the ‘Local Turn’ 4.3 Gender Dynamics and Youth as Proactive Agents 4.4 Critiques 4.5 Conclusion Bibliography 5

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Lessons from Liberia’s Transitional Justice Process 5.1 The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (LTRC) Diaspora Project 5.2 Key Findings: Levels of Integration of Displaced Populations in Liberia’s Transitional Justice Process Bibliography Outlook Towards a Syrian-Led Approach to Transitional Justice Bibliography

69 73 76 80 81 89 90 92 99 101 117

Complexities of the Safe Return of Refugees 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Complexities of Safe Return 7.3 Safe Return and Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Processes 7.4 Safe Return of Refugees 7.5 Resettlement Versus Repatriation 7.6 Conclusion Bibliography

121 121 122

Conclusion 8.1 Fruitful Avenues for Future Research 8.2 COVID-19 and Transitional Justice in Syria Bibliography

133 136 138 141

124 126 127 129 129

Appendices

145

Index

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter offers an introduction to the book’s analysis on a prospective transitional justice process for Syria, rooted in the engagement of displaced populations. It provides a short overview of the Syrian conflict, including the Arab Spring uprisings, the response of the Assad regime, and the largescale flows of refugees across borders. Major recent developments inside Syria are also explored, particularly related to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 towards a “Syrian-led” and “Syrian-owned” plan for peace, as well as the COVID19 crisis and the involvement of key regional and international players in the conflict. Keywords Syria · Conflict · Transitional justice · Peacebuilding · Displacement · UNSCR 2254

1.1

Aims and Argument of the Book

Our analysis of the forthcoming transitional justice process in Syria is embedded in the rich literature on international peacebuilding that has dominated the field over the past two decades (s.f. Clark, 2012, p. 339; Richmond, 2011, 2012, 2014; von Billerbeck, 2016). In general terms, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. Mieszkalski and B. Zyla, Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6_1

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peacebuilding originates from the understanding of the UN in the aftermath of the Cold War that conflict-affected states require a democratic state and institutions, as well as a market-oriented economy as the surest foundations for sustainable peace (Bellamy, 2010). With the obvious failures of the international peacebuilding missions in both Afghanistan and Iraq and its externally led, one-size-fits-all approach (Baker & Obradovi´cWochnik, 2016; Richmond, 2010; Visoka & Doyle, 2014;), this literature has become increasingly diverse, as several schools of peacebuilding have emerged. Naturally, this has provoked wide-ranging debates in both the policy world and the academy from the liberal school, a republican, as well as critical-, local-, and hybrid perspectives (Bendaña, 2003; Jahn, 2007a, 2007b; Newman et al., 2009). The latter three schools in particular provide fruitful ontological grounds to connect with the literature on transitional justice. In this book, we not only join this choir of critique that the (liberal) peacebuilding framework is inappropriate for rebuilding war-torn societies because of its strong Western cultural predispositions and thus, externally imposed norms and values. We also take this critique as our (theoretical) starting point to demonstrate how the ‘local turn’ in the peacebuilding literature can help us to better understand, and perhaps even implement, a Syrian-led and forthcoming transitional justice process. As successful experiences in other transitional justice environments have shown, for example in Timor-Leste (s.f. Burgess, 2006) and Sierra Leone (s.f. Hawkins & Losee, 2014; Horovitz, 2006), in order to foster longterm legitimacy and sustainability, transitional justice processes must be locally-owned, carried by all parts of society, and carefully designed to suit the country’s context (Arthur, 2011a, 2011b; Duthie & Seils, 2017; Hudson & Taylor, 2010; Schabas, 2004). The international community has progressively embraced transitional justice discourses and apparatuses in post-conflict environments as a means for serving justice and supporting a society’s recovery from a legacy of widespread atrocity (Lundy & McGovern, 2008; Muvingi, 2016; Vandeginste & Sriram, 2011). It has thus increasingly embraced

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transitional justice1 discourses and apparatuses, such as judicial proceedings and truth commissions (Goldstone, 1996; Mani, 2005; Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 1995; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000; WiebelhausBrahm, 2010), in post-conflict countries as a means of serving justice2 after conflicts have ceased and supporting a society’s recovery (Lundy & McGovern, 2008; Muvingi, 2016; Ratner et al., 2009; Vandeginste & Sriram, 2011).3 Empirically, however, the case of Syria has yet to be part of the discussions (Kovras, 2016).4 The notion that international donors are best suited to kick-start a negotiated and monitored transition process seems commonly accepted in the literature as a first step towards transitional justice and eventually reconciliation (s.f. Crocker, 2000), and this is the starting point for our discussion on the (future) role of international donors in Syria’s transitional justice process. Despite a recent movement in scholarship towards bottom-up peacebuilding approaches and participatory transitional justice models, the transitional justice and local peacebuilding nexus remains under-theorized to date. Sarah von Billerbeck, for example, has shown that while the 1 Transitional justice can be defined as the “range of formal, informal, or grassroots mechanisms deployed by societies emerging from civil war or authoritarian rule to address past human rights violations” (Kovras, 2016, p. 1; see also, Arthur [2011a, p. 1]). These mechanisms include criminal prosecutions of past violations of human rights through trials; truth commissions that document human rights abuses; amnesty of past perpetrators; and public apologies and educational investments to correct, for example, textbooks. Some causes of human violations include civil wars and authoritarian regimes. Moreover, some of these transitional processes include national reconciliation, truth recovery, and transitional justice, which have gained currency in the literature of international politics. 2 We follow the UN Secretary-General’s Report Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Countries here which notes that the rule of law and justice activities must “be consistent with international human rights norms and standards” and must comply with “the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency” (United Nations, S/2004/616, para. 6). 3 To be sure, the literature is broadly divided along the peace versus justice debate, yet it did not put the peacebuilding and transitional justice literature at a nexus (Bratt, 1997; Kerr, 2007; Schuett, 1997). For former discusses if post-conflict societies should at all deal with past human rights violations; the latter argues that to reach a sustainable peace, societies should forgive and ultimately forget violence that occurred in the past. For a more elaborate discussion, see Huntington (1991), Elster (2004), Teitel (2000), and Nobles (2010). 4 The literature thus far has only focused on the larger middle east (s.f. Sriram, 2007; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2017).

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interconnections exist, they were not explored in greater detail and questions remain over how this scholarly movement could inform the practice (2016, pp. 62, 64; see also Baker & Obradovi´c-Wochnik, 2019; Bell, 2008; Boesenecker & Vinjamuri, 2016; Mani, 2002, p. 4; Sharp, 2013, p. 157; Sriram, 2007, p. 582). One major group in this nexus are displaced populations (Lundy & McGovern, 2008; Andrieu, 2010), who not only have fled the country to seek refuge from war abroad, many displaced persons also aspire to return to the home country once the violence has abated and conditions allow. Accordingly, our intention with this book is to address these two gaps through the conceptualization of a locally driven transitional justice process (for Syria) that is founded upon the integration of displaced populations. More specifically, the first aim is to contribute to the emerging discussions on the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction process in Syria by explicitly discussing the role of refugees and displaced people in the nexus process and thus building a bridge between the peacebuilding literature and that of transitional justice. In particular, we explore (1) how displaced Syrian populations (internally displaced as well as refugees)5 can 5 There is an important difference between refugees and internally displaced to be noted. According to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (OHCHR, n.d., https://www.ohchr. org/en/issues/idpersons/pages/issues.aspx). Refugees are people whose lives have been torn apart when violence arrives on their doorstep, or when they are persecuted for their religious or political beliefs. Refugees are driven from their homes and communities by factors outside their control; they remain uprooted for an average of 20 years (UNCHR, n.d.). An internally displaced person (IDP) are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border” (OHCHR, n.d.). News reports tend to spotlight refugees in sprawling camps, but a large number of people forced to flee their homes never cross an international border. These individuals are known as internally displaced persons, or IDPs, who seek safety anywhere they can find it—in nearby towns, schools, settlements, internal camps, even forests and fields. IDPs, which include people displaced by internal strife and natural disasters, are the largest

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become part of prospective local transitional justice processes; and (2) what is required to foster local ownership and participation of displaced Syrians at all stages of the country’s transitional justice process—that is the conception and design; decision-making and management; and operationalization of such processes.6 Empirically, our study is informed by the case of Liberia (see Chapter 2 for a detailed justification of our case study). The second aim of this book is to help build a bridge of exchange between the policy/practitioner world and the academy by offering some policy recommendations of how to implement such transitional justice based on evidence-based analysis of the comparative case study of Liberia. We argue first that in order to foster long-term legitimacy and sustainability of peace in Syria its transitional justice processes must be locally owned and carefully designed to suit the local contexts, rather than the interests of international donors or interveners. Furthermore, we charge that Syrian transitional justice ought to take an unprecedented form in order to suit the needs and aspirations of all members of Syrian civil society, which, as noted, is currently scattered across the globe and heavily divided.7 More precisely, the integration of displaced Syrian populations in all levels of the country’s transitional justice process would significantly contribute to ensuring that the Syrian civil society can move past the country’s long legacy of conflict and human rights violations. However, the latter is not a guarantee that Syria’s transitional justice will be successful.

group that UNHCR assists (UNCHR, n.d.), https://www.unhcr.ca/about-us/who-wehelp/. Unlike refugees, IDPs are not protected by international law or eligible to receive many types of aid because they are legally under the protection of their own government. A crucial requirement to be considered a “refugee” is crossing an international border. Persons forcibly displaced from their homes who cannot or choose not to cross a border, therefore, are not considered refugees, even if they share many of the same circumstances and challenges as those who do. Unlike refugees, these IDPs do not have a special status in international law with rights specific to their situation. The term “internally displaced person” is merely descriptive (OHCHR, n.d.; UNCHR, n.d.). 6 It is important to note that this project uses the umbrella term “displaced” in reference to migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), diasporas, and returnees. Displacement “occurs when the government or government-sponsored actors deliberately use coercive tactics to directly or indirectly cause large numbers of their own citizens to flee their homes” (Orchard, 2010, p. 43). 7 The majority of Syrians currently live outside of the country in Turkey and Lebanon.

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At this stage, the best case scenario for Syria would be if the parties to the civil war (as well as their proxies) formally agree on a peace treaty, which some have considered not only a first but also perhaps the most important step towards a sustainable peace (s.f. Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004a, 2004b; Osiander, 1994). States who have signed peace treaties are statistically known to be less likely to revert to a civil war. Regardless of how long it will take to negotiate such a peace agreement, once it has been negotiated, Syria will undoubtedly be faced with the task of how to rebuild the warn torn country politically, economically, and socially. Such processes of reconstruction and healing undoubtedly will take several years if not decades to complete. Psychologically, justice is necessary to heal traumas and old wounds, which is required to reach reconciliation and peace and to strengthen the legitimacy of the postconflict government (Gates et al., 2007). It must also address issues of transitional justice for Syria to overcome its ethnic and religious divisions, as well as the pertinent societal grievances that have fueled the civil war. An added layer of complexity will be facilitating the potential repatriation of Syrians currently living abroad and offering them a perspective of life in a rebuilt Syria. More specifically, as the transitional justice literature has found, one of the key elements of a (Syrian) post-conflict peacebuilding process is the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, such as those who currently reside in neighboring countries (e.g. Jordan and Lebanon8 ), as well as Syrian expats who have fled the country prior

8 One hastens to add that Lebanon itself only recently came out of a civil war. After the

collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Lebanon and Syria were mandated to France who identified the borders of the two countries and established their constitution. Both countries emerged as independent states in 1943. Lebanon went through a period of calm and prosperity until the breakout of the civil war in 1975, whereas Syria went through unstable political event until the government fell under the autocratic rule of Hafez El Assad in 1963 (Salem, 2014; Ziadeh, 2011). After fifteen years of a devastating civil war in Lebanon (1975–1990), the Arab states took the initiative to find solutions and end the hostilities in the country. Under the auspices of the Arab league, and with the support of the United States and other international players, an agreement was reached in what was known as the Taif Agreement (Najem, 2012; Salem, 2014; Ziadeh, 2011). The Taif Agreement was divided into four parts: the first part declared a wider distribution of power, primarily among the three leaders of the system, the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament; the second part called for all nongovernmental militias to turn their weapons to the government; and the third part focused on the liberation of the Lebanese territory from the Israeli occupation. The most significant part in the Taif agreement was providing Syria

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to the civil war and now aspire to help rebuild the country and shape its future moving forward.9 They need a perspective of return.

1.2

Background to the Syrian Civil War

In March 2011, three months after the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (Henry & Jang, 2012, p. 16), fifteen Syrian schoolchildren were arrested and tortured for writing on a wall the anti-regime slogan: “The people want the overthrow of the regime” (Danahar, 2013; Ma’oz, 2014). This event sparked massive outrage across the country, notably in Homs and the capital Damascus, and protests and uprisings against President Bashar al-Assad, who has been the President of Syria since 2000 (CBC News, 2014; Danahar, 2013; Henry & Jang, 2012, p. 214).10 This protest eventually culminated in a civil war that has been referred to as “the worst humanitarian crisis of our time” (Amnesty International, 2015; Ban, 2015; Hashemi, 2013).11 In the years leading up to the uprising, President Assad’s opposition was fragmented and struggled to form a united front (Ajami, 2012). The2013 opposition was made up of Islamist, liberal, leftist, and nationalist figures and factions that initially had difficulties maintaining a prominent public profile and were largely disconnected by their varying grievances (Hokayem, 2013, p. 74). For instance, the civil-nationalist opposition was unable to exert meaningful influence and faced both internal and external challenges. From the outset, the opposition advocated for the removal of President Assad (Draege, 2016), but lacked a detailed vision of a post-Assad Syria and thus clarity in defining achievable

with the right to interfere in the Lebanese affairs as the ultimate guarantor of Lebanese security, stability, and independence. 9 The concept of transitional justice tries to study how recovering societies from civil wars and conflict could rebuild the physical, political, and judicial infrastructure, as well as how to reconcile fractured communities, reshaping contested memories (Arthur, 2011a, p. 2; De Brito et al., 2001; Osiel, 1997; Suboti´c, 2016), and healing emotional and psychological wounds, which is necessary to reach reconciliation and peace (Clark, 2012, p. 327; Gates et al., 2007). 10 For a discussion as to why the Syrian revolution is different from the Arab Spring, see Droz-Vincent (2014). 11 Erlich (2014) superbly unravels the complex dynamics underlying the Syrian civil war, and is one of the best sources of ‘local’ knowledge on the ground, and includes interviews with rebel leaders and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

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political objectives, isolating themselves from the military actors inside the country who were gaining more control and power over the country. Moreover, the military escalation in Syria provided opportunities to the newly formed Islamic factions who sought to demonstrate their organization and capability of large-scale coordination, mobilization, and recruitment compared to their non-Islamist counterparts (Alsarraj & Hoffman, 2020). In an effort to contain the 2011 uprising, President Assad assembled a strong, militarized front comprised mainly of the Syrian Armed Forces (Syria’s national army), the National Defence Force (a unit made up exclusively of Alawites), which is a pro-government militia led by members of Assad’s extended family (Malantowicz, 2013, p. 57), and Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Hokayem, 2013). In response to this military build-up, rebel forces rallied together to form the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in July 2011 to support the protesting civilians (Lesch, 2012). Over the course of the conflict, Russia has heavily supported the Assad regime (and continues to do so) whose forces almost took back control of the country (with the exception of the province of Idlib in the north-west bordering Turkey with a population of circa 1.5 million people). As such, without Russian support, in particular its air and aerial defence support, Assad’s forces would not have had the capability to ‘recapture’ Aleppo in December 2016, which was a symbolic victory for Assad. President Assad’s government responded to regime critics and uprisings with high levels of brutality, in an effort to subjugate those who protested the President’s rule (Adams, 2015, p. 6). The FSA gradually seized control of various towns and villages and surprised the government with their military capacity and resilience (c.f. Starr, 2012). On the logistical level, Russia’s intervention in Syria complicated military operations of other actors, such as France and the United States (Kreutz, 2010). Despite the risks associated with getting involved in the Syrian conflict, Moscow pursued three particular interests in Syria: the first being the prevention of a U.S.-backed regime change in a post-Assad context; the second interest was breaking out of political isolation and forcing Washington to engage with Russia as an equal partner; and third, demonstrating domestically that Russia is a great power on the international stage (Kofman, 2018, p. 11). In other words, while economic and material interests exist, Russia’s support for the preservation of the Syrian government mainly lies within the wider regional and global perspective, and its geopolitical aspirations (Pieper, 2019). As such, Russia has strived

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to uphold the principles of regime stability, the stability of state borders, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of the state as international norms (ibid.). However, the Syrian civil war is still ongoing and Russia is increasingly facing pressures domestically and internationally to cease its support for the Assad regime. If Russia were to withdraw from Syria, it would be marked as a “lost war” for Putin and may adversely affect his power. Staying in Syria also presents risks since the situation in Syria is still evolving and becoming increasingly complex. Specifically, until recently, Russia and Israel have maintained constructive relations (Souleimanov, 2018). However, as the presence of Russia in Syria continues, Russia has closely worked with Iran, relying on Iranian ground forces in Syria and placing Russia in a challenging situation. Israelis have sought to drive Iranians out of Syria, including through conducting repeated airstrikes against Iran-linked targets, which goes against the long-term agenda of Syria. Israel plays an important role because it acts as an intermediary between Russia and the West; it also provides access to modern technology (Souleimanov, 2018). In June 2011, the civil war reached a temporary military impasse while Syrians started to flee their country to neighboring states in light of the escalation of violence and worsening living conditions in Syria.12 At the time of writing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that since the civil war started in 2011 more than 13.5 million Syrians have been in need of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, 6.6 million people have been internally displaced, while 5.6 million have fled the country (the latest data is available from December 2019 by the UNHCR dashboard; see also Barkey, 2015; Barnard, 2016). Among those that were able to flee, the majority have sought refuge in neighboring countries, with approximately 3.9 million Syrian refugees13 in Turkey; 910,600 in Lebanon; 654,700 in Jordan, 245,800 in Iraq, and 12 This first paragraph is largely taken with permission from Winter and Zyla (2016, p. 11). 13 According to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, a “refugee” is a person who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.

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129,200 in Egypt (UNHCR, 2020).14 This influx of refugees constituted significant financial and political burdens for the host countries who themselves are experiencing or have experienced fragility in the recent past (e.g. Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq). In Lebanon for example, the World Bank estimates that the total cost of the Syrian civil war to Lebanon reached US$7.5 billion in 2014 (The World Bank, 2014), and has undoubtedly increased since then. Moreover, the impact of the Syrian crisis is felt on many levels. In one vein, with regards to economic growth, Lebanon relies heavily on the service sector, in particular trade and tourism. Yet, the trade and tourism sectors were the ones most affected by the pandemic; trade routes have been cut completely and the number of international visitors have been steadily declining since 2011 due to the instability in the region (ibid.). With regards to public services in Jordan, although the government has allowed access to health and education services for Syrian refugees, the demands for such services exceeds the capacities of the local institutions. Put differently, this increase in demand is straining the country’s health and education system and has an adverse effect on the quality provided (The World Bank, 2014; UNHCR, 2015). Moreover, the Syrian crisis had significant implications for Jordan’s infrastructure. Lebanon had already a weak public infrastructure prior to the Syrian civil war erupted, particularly in terms of electricity and water supply, and it was not prepared to deal with a surge in usage. According to the World Bank, the fiscal cost of the Syrian conflict on infrastructure is estimated at US$589 million, while US$1.1 billion would be needed for restoring access and quality of Lebanon’s infrastructure to its pre-crisis level, which is a significant amount for a state with a GDP of only $89 billion in 2017, the latest year where data was available (The World Bank, 2014; UNHCR, 2015). Finally, prior to the onset of the Syrian conflict, poverty in Lebanon was widespread.15 It is estimated that 27.4% of the population lives below the poverty line. Against this backdrop, the conflict is estimated to negatively and materially affect poverty and livelihood conditions of the 14 Again, these are the numbers cited at the time of writing. But since the conflict is still ongoing and the security environment continuously changing, they should be seen as estimates rather than as definitives. 15 Jordan is a small but open economy heavily dependent on worker remittances from abroad. Jordan has no oil, but its workers were drawn to the Gulf, especially after the 1970s.

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Lebanese population. By the end of 2014, 170,000 additional Lebanese were pushed into poverty (The World Bank, 2014). In 2020, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN ESCWA) estimates that more than 55% of the country’s population is now trapped in poverty and struggling for basic necessities; extreme poverty has increased from 8% in 2019 to 23% in 2020 (UNESCWA, 2020). More than two million Syrians have also attempted to travel across the Mediterranean Sea to seek refuge in Europe (arriving primarily on Lesbos, a small island in Greece as well as Italy—marking extensive, transnational spillovers to countries that either lacked the capacity or the (political) will to assume responsibility for them (Lawson, 2014; UNHCR, 2018). In turn, this intake of refugees caused significant political sensitives in many Western European governments, posing difficulties with managing the intake of refugees and governing the local contest against allowing too many refugees to enter. In Germany, for example, Angela Merkel’s mantra “We will manage” indirectly let to the growth of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland), a right wing party with neo-narcist inclinations among some of its membership, and almost broke up the conservative party caucus composed of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and their sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) from Bavaria. The stream of refugees also started to bare a significant burden on the refugee camps. In December 2014, the World Food Program (WFP) announced a suspension of food vouchers in refugee camps due to a lack of funding, which further aggravated the humanitarian crisis.16 Six months later (June 2015), the UN was forced to announce a funding shortage for its agencies as well as NGOs providing immediate assistance on the ground, with only 23% of program funding requirements met at that point. Against this backdrop, and in light of the suffering refugees being televised on European TV channels and after having had extensive exchanges with the Austrian government, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced in August 2015 that Germany would temporarily accept roughly 800,000 refugees who have come on the so-called Balkan route 16 This paragraph is again taken heavily with permission from Winter and Zyla (2016, p. 11).

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Map 1.1 Refugee streams from Syria

(see Map 1.1), passing from Turkey to Greece and then further through Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, and Austria to Western Europe. Months of what appeared to be uncontrolled flows of refugees arriving in European countries resulted in temporary border closures among many EU member states. For example, Hungary closed its borders with Serbia and subsequently Croatia in an attempt to stem the influx of migrants. Sweden also started border controls in November 2015 after roughly 10,000 migrants were arriving on a weekly basis. Part of the challenge was that among this large number of refugees was not only Syrians but also migrants from other fragile and conflict-affected states, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia. Some of these individuals have recently been determined ‘economic migrants’ rather than refugees, and thus cannot obtain refugee or permanent residency status and must leave the country. At the supranational level, the European Union (EU) had significant difficulties with finding an adequate and workable solution to the refugee challenge. After several states boycotted the intake of migrants, the EU

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was finally able to reach a complex agreement with Turkey in March 2016 that Turkey would host the refugees, rather than elsewhere in the EU.17 The aim of the agreement is that Syrians stay in Turkey, rather than attempt the dangerous crossing through the Mediterranean Sea to Greece. To this end, Turkey has since been obliged to control its borders with Europe (especially Greece) more strictly. Syrian refugees who cross from Turkey to the Greek Aegean Islands are not granted asylum and must be taken back by Turkey. For every refugee that is returned, the EU takes in another official refugee from Turkey. For its support and burden-sharing, Turkey was guaranteed up to 6 billion Euro from the EU. Furthermore, it is evident that as the crisis in Syria continued on and as European countries were restricting their family reunification programs, the percentage of women and children among the refugees increased significantly. In fact, 81% of those fleeing Syria were women and children (MEMO, 2020). An estimated 11 million people—more than half of Syria’s population—require humanitarian assistance, including 2.6 million children displaced inside Syria and 2.5 million Syrian children living as refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey (UNICEF, 2019).

1.3

Major Recent Developments Inside Syria

In Syria itself, the chaos has persisted as government forces and non-state armed groups continued to wage war, including launching indiscriminate attacks on civilians (Erameh, 2017, p. 520) as well as civilian institutions such as hospitals. Indeed, it has been well-documented by now (Lewis & Tertrais, 2015) that systematic human rights violations and war crimes have been a defining feature of President Assad’s offensive military strategy in Syria (Dinstein, 2016; Güçtürk, 2014, p. 15). The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) found daunting evidence that the Assad regime had used sarin or chlorine gas several times throughout the civil war (e.g. in Chan Schaichun on 4 April 2017), killing hundreds of people, including civilians (see OPCW, 2020). Moreover, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 17 To be sure, this agreement was struck primarily for internal EU and domestic reasons of particular EU member states (here especially Germany) who have come under pressure from populists and right wing parties in their polities. The agreement also includes yearly payments of e6 billion from the EU to Turkey to help host the refugees.

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Republic, established by the UN Human Right Council, underscores that “civilians have not only been the unintentional victims of violence; they also have often been deliberately targeted through unlawful means and methods of warfare” (UN General Assembly, 2018, p. 1). The United Nations General Assembly’s most recent report (2020) highlights that Syrians continue to be killed and suffer severe hardships and grave human rights violations (OHCHR, 2020). For example, on 1 March 2019, the Syrian Arab Army launched a ground attack in the regions around Dar’a and Suwayda, which resulted in a series of attacks and killings by government and allied forces, as well as civilian casualties. On March 18th, Mortar and rocket attacks launched by the Syrian Arab Army killed and wounded civilians (OHCHR, 2020). Furthermore, United Nations investigators are examining accusations that in 2019, the Syrian government and its allies were still carrying out indiscriminate airstrikes in the northwest province of Idlib. In their efforts to regain control over Idlib, pro-government forces carried out attacks, affecting markets and medical facilities, and residential areas have been largely destroyed where basic services are virtually non-existent (OHCHR, 2020). The United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry also states that it is probable that the Syrian government or its allies carried out several airstrikes in northwest Syria hitting healthcare and education facilities (UN SG, 2020). It is also investigating whether the Syrian rebel force allied with Turkey and the Syrian National Army has committed war crimes, with the most recent murder of the Syrian Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf and her driver in 2019 (Cumming-Bruce, 2020; OHCHR, 2020). Despite the March 2020 ceasefire negotiated by Russia and Turkey, the risk of renewed hostilities and continued violence against civilians remains. Arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, and sexual and gender-based violence used against thousands of individuals in detention have also been documented. The latest report by the United Nations General Assembly (2020) records that arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture, sexual violence and death in detention facilities remain ongoing issues. Most recently, in the city of Suwayda’, at least 15 people were detained between June 9th and June 16th, 2020 after their participation in peaceful protests to demand better life conditions. The Commission also documented 13 accounts of torture held in detention by the Syrian authorities, some experienced torture for more than 7 years (OHCHR, 2020). Civilian infrastructure has been destroyed by repeated attacks on medical facilities, schools, and stores. Moreover,

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humanitarian aid has been used as a weapon of war, as life-saving assistance has been repeatedly denied, compelling civilians and parties to the conflict to surrender (UN General Assembly, 2018, p. 1). The Commission continues its efforts in Syria to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law; to establish the facts and circumstances that amounted to such violations; and to identify those responsible to ensure that perpetrators of violations are held accountable (UN Human Rights Council, 2011). Meanwhile, efforts have been underway by the international community for quite some time to assist with finding a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. For example, in December 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ratified Resolution 2254 that focuses exclusively on a “Syrian-led and Syrian-owned” plan for peace, enshrined in sixteen leading principles to ending the conflict and reconstructing the country towards a state that is democratic, lawful, and committed to human rights (UN Security Council, 2015, p. 1). As we will see further below, this was well aligned with what the local peacebuilding school would recommend. Similar efforts have been undertaken since then. Resolution 2254, for example, addresses the refugee crisis and emphasizes the “critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home areas” (UN Security Council, 2015, p. 4). In addition, Resolution 2504 renewed the authorization of crossborder humanitarian aid into Syria through two border crossings (Bab al-Salam and Bab al-Hawa) for six months. Most recently, Resolution 2533 further renewed the Bab al-Hawa crossing agreement (Syria and Turkey) until July 2021 as twelve UN Security Council members voted in favor of the resolution (Security Council Report, 2020). The updated Resolution 2533 will allow the delivery of food, medicine, and other lifesaving assistance through the Bab al-Hawa Border crossing. The resolution did not approve the renewal of the Bab al-Salam crossing on Syria’s border with Turkey, which has posed logistical and operational challenges for humanitarian agencies seeking to deliver assistance in northwest Syria, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. On 11 July 2020, the UN Security Council Resolution that enables the crossborder humanitarian response through the Bab al-Hawa border crossing was renewed for twelve months until 10 July 2021. Bab al-Salam, the other border crossing to north-west Syria, was closed. The closure of this crossing has posed a number of challenges to humanitarian agencies,

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given the reduction to one authorized border crossing in northwest Syria (Lowcock, 2020). The international community continues to work towards a diplomatic resolution of the civil war in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, without much avail. Government forces and non-state armed groups continue to engage in violent warfare at the time of writing and conduct indiscriminate attacks on civilians (Erameh, 2017, p. 520). The implementation of this resolution is still considered by the international community as the only way towards “sustainable peace for Syrian people (…) put[ting] an end to the unimaginable suffering endured by Syrians for far too long” (UN Security Council, 2019, p. 16). But efforts have gained little traction over the past few years as major international players to the conflict (e.g. Turkey, Russia,18 USA) and their respective and often conflicting interests19 have led to a quagmire. In December 2015, the UNSC ratified Resolution 2254 that focused exclusively on a “Syrian-led and Syrian-owned” plan for peace, enshrined in sixteen leading principles to ending the conflict and reconstructing the country towards a state that is democratic, lawful, and committed to human rights (UN Security Council, 2015, p. 1). Moreover, UN Security Council Resolution 2254 established a timeline for a political transition, including negotiations on the establishment of a credible, inclusive, non-sectarian governance and a process for drafting a new constitution (Castillo, 2016). It also called for free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution and held under the direction of the UN, which would include voting rights for displaced populations. The Resolution addressed the refugee crisis by emphasizing the “critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home areas” (UN Security Council, 2015, p. 4). Yet, not much progress has been achieved on that Resolution at the time of writing. From January 2016 to January 2018, former UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, conducted a series of intra-Syrian negotiations, known as the Geneva Process, to discuss a long-lasting political settlement of the conflict. However, parallel efforts within the international community related to the Syrian conflict have complicated the implementation 18 For a discussion of Russia’s interests and strategy, see Allison (2013) and Katz (2013). 19 For an overview, see, for example, Haddad (2012), Hashemi (2013), Hetou (2019), Lesch (2012), and Robinson (2012).

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of Resolution 2254. Russia initiated a series of peace talks, known as the Astana talks, which include Iran, Turkey, members of Syria’s government, and armed opposition leaders. This effort resulted in a cease-fire agreement and the establishment of four de-escalation zones. However, shortly after the cease-fire was announced, attacks by Syrian government forces against rebel-held areas in the de-escalation zones resumed (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). The 14th iteration of the Astana talks took place in December 2019. Despite such efforts, hostilities in the de-escalation zones, particularly Idlib, have increased dramatically due to air strikes, artillery shelling and clashes between government forces, non-State armed groups, and terrorist groups (UN Security Council, 2019, p. 2). The latest Astana talks at the time of writing took place in December 2019 but ended without a ceasefire agreement, reportedly due to the anti-government side’s refusal to accept new Russian terms regarding the control of the Idlib province. In January 2019, Geir O. Pedersen was appointed the fourth Special Envoy for Syria. He continues to call for de-escalation of hostilities between Syrian and international stakeholders and urges the international community to remain committed to Resolution 2254 (UN Security Council, 2019). In September 2019, he established an inclusive constitutional drafting committee under the auspices of the UN, facilitated within the framework of the Geneva process and in accordance with UN Resolution 2254. The committee is composed of three delegations with representatives from the Syrian regime, opposition, and civil society. Its mandate is to “prepare and draft for popular approval a constitutional reform, as a contribution to the political settlement in Syria” (UN Security Council, 2019, p. 2). The committee is charged with reviewing the 2012 Syrian Constitution, and is responsible for either amending it or drafting a new constitution. Meetings of the constitutional committee continue, despite reports of staunch disagreements between parties, which have prevented the process from moving forward over the last year. In a recent briefing to the UN Security Council on the situation in Syria, Pedersen highlighted the need to take stock of the implementation of UN Resolution 2254 and explore what different approaches could be taken to move forward with these efforts (UN Security Council, 2020). In September 2020, Pedersen provided an updated briefing to the SecurityCouncil. He outlined the COVID-19 pandemic as an emerging major challenge for the Syrian people, especially for Syrian refugees, both inside and outside the camps (UN Geneva, 2020). The pandemic will add

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to the increasing humanitarian needs in Syria as many Syrians face food insecurity, poverty, and deprivation, and faces unprecedented economic collapse and socio-economic strain. For example, Pedersen notes that food prices remain at the highest level. The World Food Programme estimates that the price of a standard reference food basket has increased by over 250% last year (UN Geneva, 2020). Pedersen also calls for continued support from the UN and the UN Security Council to build on Resolution 2254 that calls for a nationwide ceasefire to protect civilians, maintain international peace and security, and support a political process. In addition, while Pedersen mentions that it is too early to say whether the increasingly shared assessments of the realities would turn into common diplomatic pathways for the implementation of Resolution 2254, he is committed to fully support and nurture this resolution. Lastly, in light of the COVID-19 crisis (UN Geneva, 2020), Pedersen highlights the importance of waiving any sanctions and measures that can undermine the capacity of the country to ensure access to food, essential health supplies, and COVID-19 medical support (UN Geneva, 2020). For instance, Lebanon is currently under curfew to better control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, prices of food and medicine are soaring in a country that relies heavily on imports to meet its needs (Kassem, 2020, p. 3). So far, there is no report of an outbreak of a COVID-19 pandemic in refugee camps in Turkey and Lebanon, although, refugees live in overcrowded conditions without regular access to potable drinking water. There is speculation that this could be the result of refugees not reporting infections due to: (i) a lack of knowledge about infections, (ii) a lack of access to tests, which are already limited and insufficient for hosting communities, and (iii) fear of stigma, which might lead to increasing restriction and crackdown on the refugees and their camps (Kassem, 2020, p. 2). It is also been speculated that an outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic among detainees, security forces, and aid workers as well as the personnel who maintain detention sites could pose severe security risks as well as creating uncertainty among detainees, disrupting humanitarian assistance, and limiting security forces’ ability to operate in the facilities. This speculation is made based on past experiences of discontent among detainees, which has culminated in breakout attempts, riots, the proliferation of smuggling networks, and attacks on guards (Alexander, 2020, p. 16). Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic presents a challenge for refugees’ economic inclusion, as refugees largely work in sectors of the economy

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that have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, such as accommodation and food services, manufacturing and retail thereby diminishing opportunities for economic inclusion (Dempster et al., 2020, p. 1).

1.4 Major Players and Their Interest in the Civil War The book is not only timely as the conflicting parties as well as the regional (Iran,20 ISIS, Turkey) and international players (EU, Russia, USA) (Souleimanov, 2014) seem to move closer to a peace settlement of some kind.21 In particular, the United States’ influence and intervention in Syria has largely focused on either the fight against terrorism and ISIS or the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. One of the consistencies among both the Obama and Trump administration has been public opinion on the United States’ intervention in Syria, in particular the deposition of President Assad (Mazza-Hilway, 2019). The polls have repeatedly pointed towards the opposition of large-scale military intervention in Syria, including regime change (Humud et al., 2016; Mazza-Hilway, 2019). In addition, Russia has clearly stated that if the United States seeks a regime change it would result in limited cooperation between the two countries, which poses as a challenge for the United States’ efforts to induce changes to Syria’s political systems (Ratney, 2019). Since 2017, the United States under President Donald Trump has scaled down its commitment towards Syria. The US interest is to prevent the resurgence of ISIS and to counter Iranian influence in the region. This involves its leadership of the Global Coalition against ISIS, patrols in North-Eastern Syria, a presence in al-Tanf on the Iraqi border, and stabilization and humanitarian assistance in the areas liberated from ISIS east of the Euphrates (Asseburg, 2020). Most recently, with President Trump signing the law “Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019” (The Caesar Act), the US government imposed sanctions under the Caesar Act 20 On Iran’s interests, see Milani (2013). 21 This is, of course, a preliminary statement, as the conflict is still in full force at the

time of writing. Having said that, it will most likely come to some form of settlement at some point in the near future, at which point the issue of transitional justice will be vital and at the forefront of reconciliation. For a broader discussion of how to possibly settle the conflict, see Gatilov (2014).

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and Executive Order 13890 to promote accountability for the Assad’s regime’s violence and destruction. Since the beginning of the sanctions, the United States focused on ensuring to provide humanitarian assistance, but has not expressed interest to contribute to the reconstruction of the country (Asseburg, 2020; U.S. Department of State, 2020). Iran and Russia are struggling with a severe domestic economic crisis and are not in a position to finance the comprehensive economic reconstruction of Syria. A recently signed memorandum of understanding signed between Tehran, Moscow, and Damascus has two aims: (i) to recoup the cost of participating in the war through resource extraction; and (ii) to secure states’ long-term strategic interests with military bases, control of ports, and transport links. Iran is interested in strengthening allied militias and bolstering its ties with local communities to entrench its influence in Syria. Iran and Russia find themselves competing over profitable concessions, above all for phosphate mining and in the oil and gas sector (Asseburg, 2020). Iran has also granted the Assad regime sizable loans in recent years while Russia financially supported the stabilization of the Syrian currency (lira) (Asseburg, 2020). European engagement on the ground has remained largely restricted to humanitarian aid and the imposition of trade sanctions, resulting in the erosion of the EU’s united front on Syria (Asseburg, 2020; Turkmani & Haid, 2016). Under the conditional approach of the April 2017 Syria Strategy, the EU and its member states have agreed to pursue a set of objectives: to end the war through an inclusive political transition; to address the humanitarian needs of especially vulnerable groups; to support democracy, human rights, and freedom of expression; to promote accountability for war crimes; and to enhance the resilience of the Syrian population (Asseburg, 2020). The EU and its member states have provided more than e17 billion in aid since the beginning of the conflict (EU Council, 2020). In 2011, the EU Council imposed a series of autonomous restrictive measures, which targets individuals responsible for the violence repression of the civil population in Syria. Currently, 270 individuals and 70 entities are targeted by a travel ban and a freezing of financial assets. EU sanctions in place against Syria include an oil embargo; restrictions on certain investments; a freeze of the assets of the Syrian central bank held in the EU; and export restrictions on equipment and technology (EU Council, 2020).

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The book is organized into six chapters. Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the research design and methodology, including explanations and justifications for the case selection, data collection, and the conceptual framework. Chapter 3 presents a comprehensive review of the literature on transitional justice, concentrating on its genealogy. In Chapter 4, we discuss the theoretical convergence between the liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice literature, the conceptual framework of critical perspectives on liberal peacebuilding (local peacebuilding), and the movement in the literature towards the localization of transitional justice and the integration of displaced populations in such processes. Chapter 5 analyzes the comparative mini case study of Liberia and key findings related to efforts to engage displaced populations in the country’s transitional justice process. Chapter 6 analyzes the Syrian context and applies the lessons learned from the Liberian case to Syria in order to offer recommendations for a prospective transitional justice process for Syria that is founded on the engagement of displaced populations. Chapter 7 discusses some of the major obstacles and considerations for a safe return of Syrian refugees and expats. Finally, the conclusion reflects on this project’s main findings and concludes by exploring future avenues for research on the nexus between transitional justice and forced displacement.

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Droz-Vincent, P. (2014, Winter). ‘State of Barbary’ (take two): From the Arab spring to the return of violence in Syria. Middle East Journal, 68(1), 33–58. Duthie, R., & Seils, P. (2017). Justice mosaics: How context shapes transitional justice in fractured societies. International Centre for Transitional Justice. Elster, J. (2004). Closing the books: Transitional justice in historical perspective. Cambridge University Press. Erameh, N. I. (2017). Humanitarian intervention, Syria and the politics of human rights protection. The International Journal of Human Rights, 21(5), 517–530. Erlich, R. W. (2014). Inside Syria: The backstory of their civil war and what the world can expect. Prometheus Books. European Council of the European Union. (2020). Syria: Council response to the crisis. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/syria/. Fortna, V. P. (2004a). Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war. International Studies Quarterly, 48, 269–292. Fortna, V. P. (2004b). Peace time: Cease fire agreements and the durability of peace. Princeton University Press. Gates, S., Binningsbo, H. M., & Lie, T. G. (2007). Post-conflict justice and sustainable peace. The World Bank. Gatilov, G. (2014). A Syrian settlement formula. International Affairs (Minneapolis), 60(1), 23–33. Goldstone, R. J. (1996). Justice as a tool for peace-making: Truth commissions and international criminal tribunals. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 28(3), 485–503. Güçtürk, Y. (2014). The loss of humanity: The human rights dimension of the civil war in Syria. Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research. Haddad, B. (2012). Syria, the Arab uprisings, and the political economy of authoritarian resilience. In C. Henry & J-H. Jang (Eds.), The Arab spring: Will it lead to democratic transitions? (pp. 211–227). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hashemi, N. (Ed.). (2013). The Syria dilemma (p. 2013). MIT Press. Hawkins, D., & Losee, C. (2014). States and international courts: The politics of prosecution in Sierra Leone. Journal of Human Rights, 13(1), 48–68. Henry, C., & Jang, J.-H. (2012). Syria, the Arab uprisings, and the political economy of authoritarian resilience. In The Arab Spring: Will it lead to democratic transitions (pp. 212–226). Palgrave Macmillan. Hetou, G. (2019). The Syrian conflict: The role of Russia, Iran and the US in a global crisis. Routledge. Hokayem, E. (2013). Syria’s uprising and the fracturing of the Levant (p. 2013). Routledge.

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Horovitz, S. (2006). Transitional criminal justice in Sierra Leone. In N. RohtArriaza & J. Mariezcurrena (Eds.), Transitional justice in the twenty-first century: Beyond truth versus justice (pp. 43–69). Cambridge University Press. Hudson, A., & Taylor, A. W. (2010). The international commission against impunity in Guatemala: A new model for international criminal justice mechanisms. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 8(1), 53–74. Humud, C., Blanchard, C., & Nikitin, M. (2016). Armed conflict in Syria: Overview and US response. Congressional Research Service. https://apps.dtic. mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018239.pdf. Huntington, S. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. University of Oklahoma Press. Jahn, B. (2007a). The tragedy of liberal diplomacy: Democratization, intervention, statebuilding (Part I). Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1(1), 87–106. Jahn, B. (2007b). The tragedy of liberal diplomacy: Democratization, intervention, statebuilding (Part II). Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1(2), 211–229. Kassem, I. I. (2020). Refugees besieged: The lurking threat of COVID-19 in Syrian war refugee camps. Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease, 36. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.tmaid.2020.101736. Katz, M. N. (2013, Summer). Russia and the conflict in Syria: Four myths. Middle East Policy, 20(2), 38–46. Kerr, R. (2007). Peace through justice? The international criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 7 (3), 373–385. Kofman, R. (2018). What kind of victory for Russia in Syria? Military Review, 98(2), 6–23. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/ Archives/English/Rojansky-Victory-for-Russia-1.pdf. Kovras, I. (2016). Post-conflict and transitional justice. Oxford Bibliographies online. https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-978 0199743292/obo-9780199743292-0157.xml?rskey=PmU1a2&result=1&q= Post-Conflict+and+Transitional+Justice#firstMatch. Kreutz, A. (2010). Syria: Russia’s best asset in the Middle East. Russie. Nei. Visions, 55. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/kreutzeng russiasyrianov2010.pdf. Lawson, F. (2014, November). Syria’s mutating civil war and its impact on Turkey, Iraq and Iran. International Affairs, 90(6), 1351–1365. Lesch, D. W. (2012). Syria: The fall of the house of Assad. Yale University Press. Lewis, J., & Tertrais, B. (2015). Deterrence at three: US, UK and French nuclear cooperation. Survival, 57 (4), 29–52.

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Lowcock, M. (2020). Remarks by Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs. UN. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ Under%20Secretary-General%20for%20Humanitarian%20Affairs%20and%20E mergency%20Relief%20Coordinator%2C%20Mark%20Lowcock%2C%20brie fing%20to%20the%20Security%20Council%20on%20the%20humanitarian%20s ituation%20in%20Syria.pdf. Lundy, P., & McGovern, M. (2008). Whose justice? Rethinking transitional justice from the bottom up. Journal of Law and Society, 35(2), 265–292. Malantowicz, A. (2013). Civil war in Syria and the ‘new wars’ debate. Amsterdam Law Forum, 5(3), 52–60. Mani, R. (2002). Beyond retribution: Seeking justice in the shadows of war. Polity. Mani, R. (2005). Rebuilding an inclusive political community after war. Security Dialogue, 36(4), 511–526. Ma’oz, M. (2014, November). The Arab Spring in Syria: Domestic and regional developments. Dynamics of Asymentic Conflict, 7 (1–3), 49–57. Mazza–Hilway, R. (2019). Regime change, deferred: Regarding United States’ foreign policy in Syria. Political Analysis, 20(2). https://scholarship.shu.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=pa. MEMO. (2020). UN: Over 80% of Syria refugees are women and children. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200305-un-over-80-of-syriarefugees-are-women-and-children/. Milani, M. (2013, Fall). Why Tehran won’t abandon Assad(ism). Washington Quarterly, 36(4), 79–93. Muvingi, I. (2016). Donor-driven transitional justice and peacebuilding. Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 11(1), 10–25. Najem, T. (2012). Lebanon the politics of a penetrated society. Routledge. Newman, E., Paris, R., & Richmond, O. P. (2009). Introduction. In E. Newman, R. Paris, & O. P. Richmond (Eds.), New perspectives on liberal peacebuilding (pp. 3–25). United Nations University Press. Nobles, M. (2010). The prosecution of human rights violations. Annual Review of Political Science, 13, 165–182. OHCHR. (2020). Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/iicisyria/ pages/independentinternationalcommission.aspx. OPCW, Note by the Technical Secretariat: First report by the Open Investigation and Identification Team Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS4/DEC.3 “ADDRESSING THE THREAT FROM CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE” LTAMENAH (SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC) 24, 25, AND 30 MARCH 2017; S/1867/2020, 8 April 2020. Orchard, P. (2010). The perils of humanitarianism: Refugee and IDP protection in situations of regime-induced displacement. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 29(1), 38–60.

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Osiander, A. (1994). The states system of Europe 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the conditions of international security. Oxford University Press. Osiel, M. (1997). Mass atrocity, collective memory, and the law. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Pieper, M. (2019). “Rising power” status and the evolution of international order: Conceptualising Russia’s Syria policies. Europe-Asia Studies, 71(3), 365–387. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019.1575950. Popkin, M., & Roht-Arriaza, N. (1995). Truth as justice: Investigatory commissions in Latin America. Law and Social Inquiry, 20(1), 79–116. Ratner, S. R., Abrams, J. S., & Bischoff, J. L. (2009). Accountability for human rights atrocities in international law: Beyond the Nuremberg legacy (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press. Ratney, M. (2019). Five conundrums: The United States and the conflict in Syria. Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, 32(1). https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/ Strategic-Perspectives-32.pdf?ver=2019-07-31-110328-543. Richmond, O. P. (2010). A genealogy of peace and conflict theory. In O. P. Richmond (Ed.), Advances in peacebuilding: Critical developments and approaches (pp.14–38). Palgrave Macmillan. Richmond, O. P. (2011). A post-liberal peace. Routledge. Richmond, O. P. (2012). Beyond local ownership in the architecture of international peacebuilding. Ethnopolitics, 11(4), 354–375. Richmond, O. P. (2014). New approaches to peacebuilding. International Peacekeeping, 21(5), 696–700. Robinson, G. E. (2012, December). Syria’s long civil war author. Current History, 111(749), 331–336. Rotberg, R. I., & Thompson, D. (Eds.). (2000). Truth v. justice: The morality of truth commissions. Princeton University Press. Salem, P. (2014). Lebanon. In E. Lust (Ed.) The middle east (pp. 609–630). SAGE. Schabas, W. (2004). Conjoined twins of transitional justice? The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2, 1082–1099. Security Council Report. (2020). UN documents for Syria: Security Council Resolutions. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/sec urity-council-resolutions/?ctype=Syria&cbtype=syria. Sharp, D. N. (2013). Interrogating the peripheries: The preoccupations of fourth generation transitional justice. Harvard Human Rights Journal, 26, 149–178. Souleimanov, E. (2014, Fall). Globalizing Jihad? North Caucasians in the Syrian civil war. Middle East Policy, 21(3), 154–162. Souleimanov, D. (2018). Russia’s Syria war: A strategic trap? Middle East Policy, 25(2), 42–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12341.

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Sriram, C. L. (2007). Justice as peace? Liberal peacebuilding and strategies of transitional justice. Global Society, 21(4), 579–591. Starr, S. (2012). Revolt in Syria: Eye-witness to the uprising. Hurst. Suboti´c, J. (2016). Political memory as an obstacle to justice in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In M. Fischer and O. Simic (Eds.), Transitional justice and reconciliation: Lessons from the Balkans. Routledge. Teitel, R. (2000). Transitional justice. Oxford University Press. The World Bank. (2014). Economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict. World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/ 09/18292074/lebanon-economic-social-impact-assessment-syrian-conflict. Turkmani, R., & Haid, M. (2016). The role of the EU in the Syrian conflict. Security in Transition: An Interdisciplinary Investigation into the Security Gap. https://www.fes-europe.eu/fileadmin/public/editorfiles/ events/Maerz_2016/FES_LSE_Syria_Turkmani_Haid_2016_02_23.pdf. UNESCWA. (2020). Lebanon’s population trapped in poverty. https://www.une scwa.org/news/Lebanon-poverty-2020. UNICEF. (2019). Syria child refugee and migrant crisis. https://www.unicefusa. org/mission/emergencies/child-refugees-and-migrants. UN Geneva. (2020). Updates from the UN special envoy for Syria. https://www. unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpPages)/8E48025F709CAB5 9C12583BB003D1CFF?OpenDocument. UN SG. (2020). Summary by the Secretary-General of the report of the United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry into certain incidents in northwest Syria. https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/summary-secretarygeneral-report-united-nations-headquarters-board-0. United Nations General Assembly. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/37/72 (1 February 2018). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2018). Operational portal: Mediterranean situation. http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/med iterranean. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2020). Syria regional refugee response data. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria. United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution. Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, S-17/1 (22 August 2011). United Nations General Assembly. Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/45/31 (15 September 2020). United Nations Security Council. The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: Report of the Secretary-General, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616. Retrieved October 8, 2020, from https://www.refworld. org/docid/45069c434.html.

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United Nations Security Council. Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018), S/2019/505 (19 June 2019). U.S. Department of State. (2020). Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. Office of the Spokesperson Fact Sheet. https://www.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protec tion-act/. Vandeginste, S., & Sriram, C. L. (2011). Power sharing and transitional justice: A clash of paradigms? Global Governance, 17, 489–505. Visoka, G., & Doyle, J. (2014). Peacebuilding and international responsibility. International Peacekeeping, 21(5), 673–692. von Billerbeck, S. B. K. (2016). Whose peace? Local ownership and United Nations peacekeeping. Oxford University Press. Wiebelhaus-Brahm, E. (2010). Truth commissions and transitional societies: The impact on human rights and democracy. Routledge. Wiebelhaus-Brahm, E. (2017). After shocks: Exploring the relationships between transitional justice and resilience in post-conflict societies. In R. Duthie & P. Seils (Eds.), Justice mosaics: How context shapes transitional justice in fractured societies. International Center for Transitional Justice. Winter, E., & Zyla, B. (2016). Pathways into the Syrian refugee crisis and some escape routes out. Canadian Diversity, 13(2), 11–16. Ziadeh, R. (2011). Power and policy in Syria. Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 2

Research Design and Methodology

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the research design and methodology employed for the book, including explanations and justifications for the case selection, data collection, and the conceptual framework. The primary objective is to outline lessons learned and challenges faced with regard to fostering (local) ownership and participation of displaced populations in transitional justice situations in order to inform the prospective Syrian experience. The case of Liberia was selected, given the level of engagement of diaspora members in the country’s truth and reconciliation commission. Keywords Liberia · Truth and reconciliation commission · Displacement · Transitional justice · Syria

2.1

Research Design and Case Selection

Before we proceed with the theoretical discussion and subsequently the empirical analysis of our case study, we provide a brief overview of the methodology employed for this book. As noted, our primary objective is to outline lessons learned and challenges faced with regard to fostering

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. Mieszkalski and B. Zyla, Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6_2

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(local) ownership and participation of displaced populations in transitional justice situations in order to deduce possibilities of how successful such a transitional justice process might be in Syria once a peace agreement has been signed and implemented (Clark, 2012, p. 331; Cohen, 2007). Given that Syria’s transitional justice has yet to unfold due to the ongoing civil war, we initially sought to conduct a comparative analysis of other cases where displaced populations have successfully been engaged in transitional justice processes, which is a common methodological practice. Specifically, originally three cases were selected for analysis: Liberia, Timor-Leste, and Sierra Leone. These cases were selected because large portions of displaced populations were involved in transitional justice processes in varying fashions and to varying degrees in these countries, and thus, methodologically speaking, these cases would have been ideal for a comparison. However, when we further examined the cases in greater detail, we found that there was insufficient data and secondary literature available especially on the methods that were used how to engage displaced populations in two of the three countries, namely Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. The involvement of displaced populations in transitional justice was only mentioned in most general terms, and in four articles on the case of Timor-Leste, and in two articles on the case of Sierra-Leone. This is not sufficient secondary source material to conduct an in-depth comparative case study. Although these sources vaguely referred to efforts to gather testimonies from refugees, there was insufficient data on the concrete methods that were used to do so. Moreover, these articles were secondary sources and there was no primary data available on the efforts of truth and reconciliation1 commissions to engage displaced populations in either country context. As a result, we determined that there was not sufficient information available to analyze lessons learned and challenges faced in these cases for us to draw inferences for Syria’s forthcoming transitional justice processes, especially at the conception and design, operationalization, and decisionmaking and management levels. Ultimately, we determined that there was no value added of including Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone as comparative cases, particularly given that the Liberian transitional justice process in its efforts to foster the participation of displaced populations was so well documented. 1 Reconciliation is part of the broader peacebuilding approach that is trying to unite divided societies (s.f. Crocker, 2000; Gibson, 2002; Huyse, 2003).

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For this reason, our initial research design was amended in order to reflect the data that was available to us and Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone were dropped as comparative cases. As a result, this project now concentrates solely on the case of Liberia as a comparative case and its transitional justice experiences. Specifically, by examining Liberia, our objective is to outline lessons learned and challenges faced with regards to fostering local ownership and participation of displaced populations in transitional justice in order to inform the prospective Syrian experience with transitional justice processes once a peace agreement has been signed by the conflict parties. As explained further in Sect. 2.3, we employ Bradley’s (2012) steps to involve displaced populations in transitional justice to draw recommendations from the Liberian case. Methodologically speaking, our research design is rooted in Robert Stake’s understanding of the quintain—that is “something that we want to understand more thoroughly, and we choose to study it through its cases, by means of a multicase study” (2006, p. vi). In this light, Syria is framed as a case study of the quintain, with an examination of Liberia’s transitional justice experience as an embedded case. This allows us to conceptualize the engagement of displaced populations at the various levels in transitional justice. This mini-case of Liberia was “formalized,” so that the primary focus is on the selected variables in this case, not the case as a whole (Stake, 2006). It is important to note that this project does not examine the successes of the transitional justice processes in terms of their ability to foster longlasting peace and reconciliation. Instead, this project concentrates on the engagement of displaced populations in transitional justice and the lessons that can be drawn from such an approach.

2.2

Data Collection

The nature of a case study of the quintain requires data to be drawn from a variety of secondary sources, because the analysis is made up of two separate sections: the embedded case study (Liberia) and the quintain (Syria), as well as different sources of data that were used for each section. The first section of the analysis focuses on the embedded case of Liberia. The data on this case was gathered from numerous secondary sources in order to put together a holistic account of how displaced Liberians became an integral part of Liberia’s transitional justice experience. Here, the overarching objective was to outline lessons learned and

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challenges that actors faced regarding the involvement of displaced populations in the transitional justice process. Key sources include scholarly articles; official reports published by the truth and reconciliation commissions; and reports published by the International Center for Transitional Justice. The following key words were used to filter through the respective databases: refugee, diaspora, displace*, “internally-displaced,” IDP, “transitional justice,” “truth and reconciliation commission,” and Liberia. These key words enabled the collection of twenty articles, which were subsequently coded and analyzed using the approach that we further explain below in Sect. 2.3. The second section of the analysis, which we explain in greater detail in section six, applied the lessons drawn from the embedded Liberian case study to the Syrian context. As the conflict in Syria evolved, information related to the conflict and to the UN’s political transition process was pulled from various official UN reports, as well as the UN News Centre. The specific contextual circumstances in Syria were analyzed in order to determine which transitional justice processes could be carried out in this context, and how displaced populations could engage in such processes. This was ultimately used to answer the overarching research question, namely how displaced Syrian populations can engage in the country’s prospective transitional justice processes.

2.3

Data Analysis

In order to analyze the embedded case and the quintain, this project uses the method of “structured, focused comparison” (George & Bennett, 2004). As George and Bennett explain, the method is “structured” in that the researcher uses general questions that align with the research objective and these questions are asked of each case to guide and standardize data collection (2004, p. 67). This enables the systematic comparison of findings. George and Bennett further explain that a research method is “focused” in that it only uses certain aspects of the cases under study (ibid., p. 67). This assists in moving away from a holistic portrayal of the case to a more constrained focus. As noted above, Bradley (2012, p. 3) identifies a list of six necessary steps to allow displaced populations to participate in transitional justice processes. These steps are as follows:

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consulting with displaced populations on the design of transitional justice initiatives; seeking input of refugees and IDPs as witnesses in trials and truth commissions; convening truth commission sessions in camps or in countries with large diaspora populations […]; appointing displaced persons to positions of responsibility in transitional justice bodies and coexistence projects; and employing information and communication technologies to support the involvement of displaced populations in dispersed geographic locations.2

This project reformulates Bradley’s (2012) steps to involve displaced populations in transitional justice into questions that were asked of the Liberian case study. These questions allowed us to deduce how displaced populations were engaged in Liberia’s transitional justice processes. More specifically, the following questions were asked about the Liberian case study of transitional justice: (1) Were displaced populations consulted on or involved in the design of transitional justice initiatives, and if so, how?; (2) Did refugees and IDPs provide input as witnesses in trials and truth commissions as trials as well as other types of justices have been found to lead to a more durable peace in democratic and non-democratic societies (Gates et al., 2007)?; (3) Were truth commission sessions convened in camps?; (4) Were truth commission sessions convened in countries with large diaspora populations?; (5) Were information and communication technologies employed to support the involvement of displaced populations in dispersed geographic locations?; and finally (6) Were displaced persons appointed to positions of responsibility in transitional justice bodies and coexistence projects, and why? Thus, in line with the approach suggested by George and Bennett (2004), this research is “structured” in that it reformulates Bradley’s (2012) steps to involve displaced populations in transitional justice into questions to guide the empirical data collection. Moreover, this project is “focused” in that it examines three specific thematic levels of the integration of displaced populations into transitional justice processes: (1) conception and design level; (2) operationalization level; and (3) decision making and management level. We conducted a qualitative content analysis in order to effectively apply Bradley’s (2012) inspired but reformulated steps to the embedded case

2 See also Rotberg and Thompson (2000).

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study. Qualitative content analysis is defined as “the subjective interpretation of content of text data through the systematic process of coding and identifying themes” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) identify three distinct approaches to content analysis, namely conventional, directed, and summative approaches. This project follows a directed approach, which aims to “validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). In this approach, preliminary stages of research help to identify key concepts as initial coding categories. This is also referred to as deductive category application (Mayring, 2000). The following preliminary codes, inspired by Bradley’s (2012) steps to involve displaced populations in transitional justice, were assigned to the data. Over the course of the research, a more refined coding system was subsequently developed and applied (Saldana, 2009, p. 81). The software NVivo was used for data management and more importantly to code the qualitative data that we collected from the Liberian case. The following preliminary codes were used to filter through the case study information: 1.1 Conception and Design: Involvement in design stage 2.1 Operationalization: Provision of input as witnesses 2.2 Operationalization: Implementation of transitional justice in camps 2.3 Operationalization: Use of information or communication technologies 3.1 Decision-making and Management: Appointment to positions of responsibility As noted, over the course of the research, a slightly more refined coding system was developed and applied to accurately trace the formal and informal mechanisms by which returning refugees and the displaced population have become an integral part of a nation-wide transitional justice process. It became apparent that the codes for the level of integration of displaced populations in the (2.0) operationalization of transitional justice process required refining. Specifically, preliminary research revealed that outreach targeting displaced populations by the truth and reconciliation commission was a key method to collect their statements and testimonies. In the case of Liberia, transitional justice processes were not

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only carried out in camps, but also in diaspora communities. Accordingly, the secondary codes listed below were identified and used to classify themes and reduce the case study information to a new, standardized dataset. It was then necessary to conduct a second coding cycle to ensure that a systematic approach was used to code all of the data. 1.1 Conception and Design: Involvement in design stage 2.1 Operationalization: Targeted outreach and provision of statements 2.2 Operationalization: Implementation of transitional justice in camps 2.3 Operationalization: Implementation of transitional justice in diaspora communities 2.4 Operationalization: Use of information or communication technologies 3.1 Decision-making and Management: Appointment to positions of responsibility Subsequently, the analytical framework, which we explain further below, was used to systematically track and compare the data. A directed approach to qualitative content analysis assisted with identifying and categorizing all instances of the integration of displaced populations in transitional justice in the case of Liberia. Ultimately, the objective was to analyze the various methods and mechanisms used to engage displaced populations, along with the challenges faced and obstacles to their participation in order to build on insights from past experiences. This project applies these lessons learned in order to put forth recommendations for a transitional justice process for Syria that is rooted in the integration of displaced populations at all levels, that we elaborate on in greater detail in Chapter 5. Levels of integration of displaced populations into transitional justice processes 1.0 Conception and Design 1.1 Were displaced populations consulted on or involved in the design of transitional justice initiatives?

Liberia’s transitional justice process

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(continued) Levels of integration of displaced populations into transitional justice processes

Liberia’s transitional justice process

2.0 Operationalization 2.1 Did displaced populations provide input as witnesses in transitional justice processes? 2.2 Were truth commission sessions convened in camps? 2.3 Were truth commissions convened in countries with large diaspora populations? 2.4 Were information and communication technologies employed to support the involvement of displaced populations in dispersed geographic locations? 3.0 Decision-making and Management 3.1 Were displaced persons appointed to positions of responsibility in transitional justice bodies

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Bibliography Bradley, M. (2012). Displacement, transitional justice and reconciliation: Assumptions, challenges and lessons. Refugee Studies Centre. https://www.refworld. org/pdfid/4f993f1d2.pdf. Clark, P. (2012). Transitional justice in post-conflict societies. In G. K. Brown & A. Langer (Eds.), Elgar handbook of civil war and fragile states (pp. 327–341). Edward Elgar. Cohen, D. (2007). Hybrid justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: Lessons learned and prospects for the future. Stanford Journal of International Law, 43, 1. Crocker, D. A. (2000). Retribution and reconciliation. Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly, 20, 1–6. Gates, S., Binningsbo, H. M., & Lie, T. G. (2007). Post-conflict justice and sustainable peace. The World Bank

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George, A., & Bennett, A. (2004). The method of structured, focused comparison. In Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (pp. 67–72). The MIT Press. Gibson, J. L. (2002). Truth, justice, and reconciliation: Judging the fairness of amnesty in South Africa. American Journal of Political Science, 46(3), 540– 556. Hsieh, H., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277–1288. Huyse, Luc. (2003). The Process of reconciliation. In D. Bloomfield, T. Barnes, & L. Huyse (Eds.), Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook (pp. 12– 14). International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Mayring, P. (2000). Qualitative content analysis. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 1(2). Rotberg, R. I., & Thompson, D. (Eds.). (2000). Truth v. justice: The morality of truth commissions. Princeton University Press. Saldana, J. (2009). Coding manual for qualitative researchers. Sage. Stake, R. (2006). Multiple case study analysis. The Guilford Press.

CHAPTER 3

Theorizing the Nexus Between Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding

Abstract This chapter explores the theoretical convergence between the liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice literature, the conceptual framework of critical perspectives on liberal peacebuilding, and the movement towards the localization of transitional justice and the integration of displaced populations in such processes. While scholars are increasingly recognizing the importance of fostering local ownership in transitional justice, there remains a gap in how to do so in practical terms, particularly with respect to engaging locals in cases of large-scale displacement. From a theoretical perspective, this chapter aims to analyze the undertheorized link between transitional justice, displacement, and local peacebuilding. Keywords Liberal peacebuilding · Transitional justice · Local · Displacement

Beneath the surface and in spite of three decades of practice, the field of transitional justice studies remains tremendously undertheorized (De Greiff, 2012; Sriram, 2016). Sriram points out that over the last decade, the literature has begun to reflect on a “significant discontent in academic writing in the area, questioning this absence of strong theoretical inquiry in the field, as well as the value and validity of the enterprise altogether” © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. Mieszkalski and B. Zyla, Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6_3

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(2016, p. 226). Davidovic (2019) echoes this sentiment but also points out that the field is heavily politicized. The current model of transitional justice overlooks the collective dimensions of violence and structural inequalities, and has focused on short-term objectives such as obtaining a certain number of convictions before a criminal tribunal (Kastner, 2020) as tribunals may serve better as vehicles for human rights prosecutions in a post-conflict context than domestic trials, because the international community constructs and directs the tribunals (Kim & Hong, 2019). In short, despite this turn towards the “local”, there remains a lacuna in the literature regarding how to foster local ownership in transitional justice processes in practical terms (s.f. von Billerbeck, 2016). Theoretically speaking, our aim in this chapter is to analyze the undertheorized link between local transitional justice, displacement, and local peacebuilding.

3.1 The Peacebuilding Concept and Its Liberal Domination1 With the high volume of UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and a primary focus on returning order to conflict-affected societies, the international community was in search of a passe-partout of how to transition from periods of war to sustainable peace that either (international) organizations or respective states could use and apply effectively, and on a short notice. Moreover, there appeared to be a wide gap between a focus on immediate intervention for humanitarian purposes and long-term development, as well as the need for a new UN capacity for successful transition between the two (Chandler, 2017). Transitional justice became increasingly important towards the end of civil wars, and in the 1990s, the UN was called upon to help overcome the various societal grievances (ethnic, religious, or otherwise). The UN’s current comprehensive approach to peacebuilding was developed following the end of the Cold War, in response to significant geopolitical shifts, and a surge of intra-state conflicts especially in fragile 1 It is important to recall the aim of this section, which is to introduce the concept of (liberal) peacebuilding to our discussion. Our aim is not to comprehensively review the entire (liberal) peacebuilding literature. This has been done elsewhere (see Chandler, 2017).

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states (Kaldor, 2006; von der Schulenburg, 2014). These shifts marked a significant departure from ‘classical’ interstate conflicts of the Cold War, to which and that international peace actors (diplomats, military, development actors, NGOs) had to adjust. More specifically, in the aftermath of the Cold War, a “shared conviction that political and economic liberalism” was the road to peace, produced only limited successes and often failures in the peacebuilding practice (Paris, 2010, pp. 340–341; von der Schulenburg, 2014, p. 4). As such, by the end of the 1990s both in theory and policy emphasized the need for longer term, comprehensive approaches to peace, targeted towards “statebuilding” (Paris, 2010, p. 342). In the early 1990s, the term peacebuilding started to emerge as a preferred concept to help conflict-affected and war-torn societies to overcome civil wars and intra-state conflicts. However, the term peacebuilding, at least in the initial phase, was not as clearly defined as it perhaps should have been.2 Indeed, as Barnett et al. point out, “peacebuilding exhibits an impressive range of definitions” (2014, p. 610; see also Chetail, 2009). The term was first used in the UN’s Agenda for Peace in 1992 by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. It was later revised and further developed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, and resulted in the creation of three new entities based at the UN Headquarters in New York: the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) (United Nations, 2015) in an attempt to strengthen the

2 It gets even more confusing when distinguishing the term peacebuilding from peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement. To start with, Gawerc (2006, p. 438; see also Fortna, 2008, p. 6; Paris, 2004, p. 38; Williams, 2020) differentiates between negative and positive peace, whereas “negative peace is the absence of direct violence (e.g., people being killed) [and] positive peace also includes the absence of structural violence (e.g., dying as a result of poverty, and cultural violence (e.g., factors that blind people to injustice).” Peacemaking tends to refer to the process of negotiation between policymakers to determine an official resolution to a specific conflict. Peacekeeping speaks more to the post-conflict settlement process, in which negotiations between former combatants are facilitated by a third party as a means to maintain the absence of violence. Peacebuilding is the least understood term in this context, as it is associated with a wide range of political, economic, social, and psychological factors at various global, national, and grassroots levels and tries to address the root causes of conflict. This deeper understanding of the term peace further complicates and broadens the concepts of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

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institutional focus on peacebuilding.3 Indeed, these new institutions were intended to fill a “gaping hole” in the Organization’s “institutional and structural capacity to support countries in transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace” (United Nations, 2015). The fact that the UN initially did not define peacebuilding properly explains why various peacebuilding actors and agencies at the national (e.g. states) as well as the international level (e.g. international organizations) often use their own definitions of peacebuilding (s.f. Cousens et al., 2001; Jeong, 2005; Schwartz, 2005). Unfortunately, this has led to the term having varying interpretations among different actors until this day (Castañeda, 2014). According to Barnett et al. (2007, p. 37), peacebuilding can generally be understood as “external interventions that are intended to reduce the risk that a state will erupt into or return to war”.4 The United Nations considers peacebuilding as more than putting an end to armed conflict (Barnett et al., 2007); it entails the creation of a positive peace, meaning that the root causes of violence and conflict must be eradicated so that actors no longer have the motive to use violence to settle their issues. Thus, “peacebuilding is aimed at prevention of the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms” (United Nations, 2001). In this sense, peacebuilding is a dynamic and transformative process that can “contribute to every phase of a conflict and always chang[es] in response to the situation” (Gawerc, 2006, p. 439). Ramesh Thakur (2012) therefore considers it consistent with provisions of Chapter 6 of the UN charter. Barnett et al. (2014, p. 610) argue along similar lines and refer to peacebuilding as a “multidimensional and highly intrusive undertaking” as it involves the reconstruction of political, economics, culture, and society and leaves no stone unturned. It is thus hardly surprising that in recent years peacebuilding has been increasingly associated with the complex and comprehensive process of rebuilding states in the aftermath

3 See, for example, Debiel et al. (2016). 4 For a discussion of principles of humanitarian interventions applicable to Syria, see

Stahn (2014).

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of conflict. This has been referred to in the recent literature as statebuilding (Bickerton, 2006; Jahn, 2007a, 2007b; Lemay-Hébert, 2009), and the two concepts have often been used interchangeably, which they are not (s.f. Paris & Sisk, 2009; Sisk, 2013). While peacebuilding was initially defined vaguely, as noted above, international peacebuilding actors, including the UN, have revised their broad definitions over the years.5 In 2010, for example, the UN SecretaryGeneral’s Policy Committee defined peacebuilding as a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. (United Nations, 2010, p. 5)

The UN’s approach was heavily marked by liberal values of the peacebuilding approach. Indeed, there is an agreement among most analysts of peacebuilding scholars now is that its liberal strand dominated much of the UN’s decisions and actions since the Cold War’s end (s.f. Chandler, 2017; Sisk, 2013). In other words, peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts has come to imply a particular form of peacebuilding, namely a desire “to produce a particular kind of state—a liberal, democratic state organized around markets, the rule of law, and democracy” (Barnett et al., 2014, p. 610). It is founded on the premises of the democratic peace theory (Sriram, 2007, p. 581), which suggests that the establishment of a democratic state and a market-oriented economy are the surest

5 In recent years the list of essential tasks for UN peacebuilding activities has grown significantly as noted in the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the so-called Brahimi Report). See the following documents to trace the evolution of tasks: UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 Aug. 2000; UN Secretary-General, Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, UN Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009; and UN Secretary-General, Peace- building in the aftermath of conflict, UN Doc. A/69/399S/2014/694, 23 September 2014.

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foundations for a sustainable peace.6 This particular strand of the peacebuilding literature has been labeled as ‘liberal’ peacebuilding (Newman et al., 2009; Sriram, 2009). The origins of “liberal peace” as a solution to state fragility are rooted in the writings of Immanuel Kant (see Barnett, 2006; Paris, 1997). To achieve “perpetual peace”, Kant identified several principles constraining a state’s incentives and abilities to wage war (Kant, 1795).7 He argued that a civil state, based on a republican constitution, was the optimal way to combat the “natural state […] of war” (Kant, 1795). Barnett similarly argues for the potential advantage of a republican peace, emphasizing the principles of “deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation”, as a pragmatic ‘stepping-stone’ on the road to liberal peace (2006, pp. 89–90). Its advantages lie in being representative, while also distributing political power (Barnett, 2006, p. 90), and in emphasizing the public, civic good over the rights of the individual. Liberal peace, by contrast, holds “individual freedoms” as its conceptual fulcrum, manifest in “representative government”, and preserved through “constitutional limits on arbitrary power” (Paris, 2010, p. 360). Liberal peace ultimately relies on the creation of effective and legitimate institutions to support political freedoms and the efficient functioning of the market. Its theorists demand a certain level of security or state effectiveness prior to democratization (Jarstad, 2008, p. 28; Paris, 2004; Rustow, 1970). The liberal peacebuilding approach has been put to action in a series of international interventions in conflict-affected states, for example, the Balkans in the 1990s or Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s. With the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent “peace-as-statebuilding” 6 Moreover, the democratic peace theory suggests that democratic states are less likely to engage in armed conflict with each other. The idea is that democracy and a free market economy allow citizens to effectively communicate and settle their differences through a peaceful avenue and this is the strongest basis for governance (Newman, 2009, p. 39). For a more elaborate discussion of the liberal peace theory in the field of international relations, see, for example, Doyle (2011), Huth and Allee (2002), Russett (1993), Russett and Oneal (2001), and Weart (1998). 7 Kant identifies the following principles as necessary for perpetual peace. He calls for good faith in the formation of peace agreements; for self-determination to underpin such agreements; for the dissolution of standing armies to remove the temptation of states to meet challenge with violence; the constraint on financial resources lent to the state so that the costs of war may serve to dissuade the incidence of war; the maintenance of sovereignty so that territorial acquisition did not tempt nations to violence; and adherence to normative behavioural constraints on states in times of war so that unforgivable crimes do not come to pass (Kant, 1795).

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(Paris, 2010, p. 342)8 program set up by (Western) donors there, the liberal peacebuilding concept has become the most prominent and most often prescribed tool to help conflict-affected and war-torn societies (Paris, 1997, 2010).

3.2 (Liberal) Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice Concepts of transitional justice were born into this context of the liberal peace. In recent years, a number of studies emerged analyzing the nexus between transitional justice and peacebuilding in post-conflict settings (Baker & Obradovic-Wochnik, 2016; Sriram, 2009). As Andrieu explains, transitional justice is an “instrument of broad social transformation that rests on the assumption that societies need to confront past abuses in order to come to terms with their history and move on” (2010, p. 538). In that sense, it is compatible with the UN’s definition of peacebuilding noted above. Efforts to address past wrongdoings is increasingly perceived as central to establishing a culture of human rights, reforming state institutions, and rebuilding civil society after mass violence (s.f. Drumbl, 2005; Jo & Simmons, 2016), in short sustainable peace.9 At the conceptual level, it is therefore hardly surprising that transitional justice processes have become an integral component of peacebuilding operations that were carried out by the international community in conflict-affected states. The centrality of transitional justice to peacebuilding is particularly notable in the UN Secretary-General’s 2004 report on The Rule of Law

8 For a critical perspective, see Lemay-Hébert who attributes the failures, or limited successes of the statebuilding-as-peacebuilding project to the creation of institutions, or statebuilding, without considering matters of socio-political cohesion, or nationbuilding (2009, p. 32). Ayoob also distinguishes between statebuilding and “socio-political cohesion”, or “nationbuilding”, but in a rather different capacity. He points to the practice of statebuilding-before-nationbuilding employed in fragile and conflict-affected states as having roots in the historical trajectory of Europe, in which “the emergence of the modern sovereign state was the precondition for the formation of the nation” (2001, pp. 129–130). Rather than calling for upheaval of this process, he calls for longer timelines and greater lenience with respect to international norms and human rights, in order to allow for governments in the developing world to consolidate their sovereign (territorial, military) power, as was the necessary process in Europe (ibid.). 9 For a critical view, see Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003/2004).

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and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies. The Report notes that justice, peace, and democracy are “mutually reinforcing imperatives” in the reconstruction of a post-conflict society (United Nations Security Council, 2004, p. 1), and thus provide a broad framework for peacebuilding. The integration of transitional justice into the liberal peacebuilding paradigm is further evident in several UN peace operations, such as “the creation of the Iraqi Special Tribunal; the referral of crimes committed in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the International Criminal Court (ICC); the creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone; and the continuing trials at the ad hoc tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda” (Sriram, 2009, p. 116; see also Hagan, 2003; Kerr, 2004; Neier, 1998; Nouwen & Werner, 2010; Peskin, 2008).10 Having established the incorporation of transitional justice into the liberal peacebuilding agenda, however, has also subjected the transitional justice literature to some of the most prevalent assumptions and criticisms of contemporary peacebuilding (Sriram, 2007, p. 586). Discussing these weaknesses in the next section is important because, as noted above, transitional justice remains largely undertheorized, particularly in the context of liberal peacebuilding frameworks and its competing models (De Greiff, 2012; Sriram, 2016).

3.3 From Liberal to Hybrid and Critical Peacebuilding Emerging from criticisms of the underperforming liberal peacebuilding system and the salience of the human security framework (Chandler, 2017; Donais 2009a), since the early 2000s we have seen a shift away from the technocratic, top-down, liberal approaches of the 1990s toward a prioritization of locally owned, bottom-up, micro peacebuilding, and in 10 It must be noted that the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was one of several so-called Hybrid International Tribunals (s.f. Aptel, 2011; Cohen, 2007; Lutz and Reiger, 2009; Kim and Sikkink, 2010; Sikkink and Walling, 2007), including the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor Leste (SPSC), the International Judges and Prosecutors Program in Kosovo (IJPP, or Regulation 64 Panels), the War Crimes Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (WCC), and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). For a discussion, see Ambos & Othman (2003), Ascensio et al. (2006), Dickinson (2003), Nouwen (2006), and Romano et al. (2004).

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line with broader trends in development policy (s.f. OECD DAC, 2007, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012; UN, 2010). Empirically speaking, over the past decade, especially in light of the international intervention in Afghanistan, it has become clear that liberal peacebuilding has not held an impressive track record (Fortna, 2004; Goodman, 2006; Helman & Ratner, 1992–1993; von der Schulenburg, 2014). Richmond reminds us that there is a “monumental gap between the expectations of peacebuilding and what it has actually delivered so far in practice, particularly from the perspective of local communities” (2010, p. 25). In part, this is due to the fact that, as Michael Barnett notes, “it is virtually unimaginable that peacebuilders [practicing liberalism] can create […] a nearly ideal society with scant resources and little time under […] unfavorable conditions” (Barnett, 2006). Indeed, liberal peacebuilding seems to be doing more harm than good (Chandler, 2017). It is therefore hardly surprising that the contemporary peacebuilding practice has provoked wide-ranging debates and controversies in both scholarship and policy, leading to the emergence of critical perspectives on liberal peacebuilding (s.f. Bellamy, 2010; Bendaña, 2003; Jahn, 2007a, 2007b; Newman et al., 2009; Richmond, 2007 for some of the most vocal critiques). This new scholarship challenges the dominant ontological assumptions of peacebuilding theory and points to the obvious limitations of the paradigm. One of the main critiques is that the establishment of market economies and domestic democratic institutions is actually destabilizing the conflict-affected state(s), rather than an effective strategy for consolidating peace (Barnett, 2006; Paris, 1997). While statistically speaking it is true that well-established liberal democracies are less prone to go to war, states emerging from conflict may have little or no experience with democracy and are therefore prone to revert back to conflict. It is especially this ‘transitioning’ period from being a war-torn, conflictaffected state towards an evolving democratic state that is crucial and important (s.f. Russett & Oneal, 2001). Thus, the argument is that there are tensions between the processes of creating peace in a wartorn society and building a robust, self-sustaining state in the aftermath of a conflict. It is also here where the peacebuilding and transitional justice literatures intersect (Sharp, 2013a, 2013b)—namely questioning what ‘justice’ might consist of, whose interests it meets (and serves), and who should implement it. Barnett goes further and suggests adopting a republican approach that practices deliberation, representation and constitutionalism when working on rebuilding states. Although this process is

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slower, it ensures that all actors, namely the citizens and other actors within the state themselves, are fairly represented and have a say in the decision-making processes in building their new state and how it should be structured (Barnett, 2006). Another critique of the liberal peacebuilding approach is rooted in the question of whether or not democracy and liberal economics are universally applicable values. Richmond notes that at the moment the liberal peace is an uncontested and unsophisticated concept; peace is considered a concept that is “so ontologically solid” that there is no need to criticize or debate it (Richmond, 2007, p. 250). He further argues that normative assumptions underpinning the concept of peace and the current approaches of the international community to building peace (e.g. in Afghanistan) are not universal but hegemonic. Moreover, peace has a subjective and dynamic nature that evolves over time; it is not static and cannot easily be exported. In short, the argument is that the liberal peacebuilding model is based on a narrow, Western conception of what constitutes a state as a working political community (Brown et al., 2010, p. 100). Once again, the peacebuilding mission in Afghanistan serves as perhaps the most recent example. For more than a decade Western donor did not understand the tribal structure that governs Afghans and organizes their society (Grant & Zyla, 2021). Moreover, international donors exported activities and reforms to Afghanistan, ultimately creating a significant disconnect between the local reality on the ground and the Western-backed model of the ideal, Weberian state. In short, the liberal peacebuilding paradigm is criticized for its “alleged ethnocentrism- its promotion of essentially Western values and its belief in the universalism of liberal goals” (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 394) while informal indigenous societal institutions are repeatedly overlooked or disregarded. Liberal peacebuilding is further criticized by scholars due to its failure to encourage local ownership in the process of post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. Issues and concerns that pertain to local contexts have been ignored in the externally driven liberal “peaceas-governance” approach (Richmond, 2010, p. 25) than a process of reconciliation” (2010, pp. 24–25). Again, this underlines its links to the concept of transitional justice as well as the gaps in the literature. While the external reconstruction of a state through the transplantation of democracy appears to be theoretically sound, in practice a donor-directed approach creates an institutional shell that lacks grassroots legitimacy (Ottaway, 2002). Specifically, as Donais reminds us, “[e]emphasized by

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both theorists and practitioners, local ownership refers to the extent to which domestic actors control both the design and implementation of the political process; in post-conflict contexts, the term conveys the common sense that any process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail” (2009b, p. 3). In short, the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding demands greater local participation (including engagement with those manifestations of the local that constitute resistance to the international project [Richmond, 2011, p. 203]), context-specific solutions, “microlevel perspectives” and the inclusion of local institutions conducive to the overall aims of the intervention (Fetherston & Nordstrom, 1995, p. 102; Lemay-Hébert, 2009, p. 41). Accordingly, indigenous, societal institutions must be recognized as decisive agents in post-conflict governance processes and be encouraged to implement their own logic and rules alongside state actors and structures (Brown et al., 2010, p. 103). Richmond adds that engaging with the local indicates the importance of “legitimacy, custom, culture, identity, reconciliation, and local politics or power structures…[and] the more we know about them…the more we understand ‘our’ limitations” (2014, p. 697).11 The overarching objective of the critical peacebuilding literature is to develop better peace practices by gaining a more nuanced understanding of the methods, needs, and norms of local actors. Hybrid approaches of peacebuilding try to find a middle ground and call for peacebuilders to simultaneously and coherently engage in bottomup and top-down efforts to bring sustainable resolution and security to conflict-affected societies (Fetherston & Nordstrom, 1995, p. 94; Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 397; Peterson, 2012, p. 12; Richmond, 2010, p. 26). In short, hybridity in peacebuilding implies an approach that reflects the interests, identities, and needs of all state and non-state actors (Arthur, 2011, p. 271; Richmond, 2010, p. 26). Mac Ginty illustrates hybridity as a process whereby “different actors coalesce and conflict to different extents on different issues to produce a fusion of peace” (2010, p. 397). At its core, hybridity relates to the interaction between various international and local actors that mix to create peace. Designed as an alternative to the assumption that the Western, liberal state model is the most effective path to creating peace, hybridity provides an avenue for more flexible and contextually appropriate models of governance that “recognize the 11 For the argument that law is an extension of politics and thus should be judged as such, see Shklar (1964), Beigbeder (1999), and Peskin (2008).

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strengths of social order and resilience embedded in the communal life of societies within the global south (ibid., p. 101). The vast majority of these ‘local-turn’ arguments, however, are largely theoretical, and the literature clearly lacks empirical research on local peacebuilding and the ways in which it is enacted or manifest in practice. In part, this book contributes to filling this gap by focusing on transitional justice as one avenue to achieve this. Specifically, we show (further below) that the liberal peacebuilding approach is both culturally inappropriate and too externally driven to inform discussions on transitional justice in Syria. Instead, in order to foster long-term legitimacy and sustainability of peace in Syria, we argue that its transitional justice processes must be locally owned and carefully designed to suit the local contexts rather than the interests of international donors or interveners. More specifically, the integration of displaced populations into all levels of transitional justice is essential to meet the needs and wants of all members of Syrian civil society. At the moment, however, the needs and wants of Syrian civil society in relation to transitional justice remain unclear, particularly with respect to local definitions of justice, reconciliation, accountability (Darehshori, 2009; Stahn, 2005) and the necessary means to achieve these ideals. Indeed, a participatory approach to transitional justice founded on the engagement of displaced populations would contribute to determining how Syrians could possibly move past the country’s long legacy of conflict and human rights violations.

3.4 The Localization of Transitional Justice and the Integration of Displaced Populations A recent movement in favor of ‘localizing’ transitional justice has found traction in the academic community (Autesserre, 2017; Muvingi, 2016; Robbins, 2012; Shaw & Waldorf, 2010). While, as noted, scholars are increasingly recognizing the importance of fostering local ownership in transitional justice per se, there is a gap in the literature regarding how to do so in practical terms. This is particularly true with respect to engaging locals in cases of large-scale forced displacement crises, as exemplified in the Syrian civil war and its evolving post-conflict reconstruction process. External determination has heavily influenced the nature of the transitional justice field. Scholars have framed the transitional justice agenda by noting that the international community has employed so far as an “amalgam of human rights, liberal democracy, rule of law, and

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market economies” (Muvingi, 2016, p. 14). A Western understanding of an ideal type of justice has largely defined the transitional justice paradigm in conflict-affected societies, leading to direct clashes between the international understanding of justice and local realities and aspirations. Ultimately, Muvingi (2016) emphasizes the importance of shifting away from a westernized transitional justice framework towards locally determined practices, in an effort to engage locals in the identification of the causes of the conflict and empower locals to participate in transitional justice decision-making. He urges scholars and policymakers alike to “reconfigure transitional justice as processes of inclusion that facilitate and support societies affected by violence to address the legacies of the violence and chart pathways for more just and peaceable futures” (Muvingi, 2016, p. 20). By definition, this implies that there cannot be any ‘blue-prints’ of how to do transitional justice in conflict-affected states. Similarly, Autesserre contends that further investigation of local peacebuilding initiatives is sorely needed, particularly as it relates to the role of foreign actors and how they can support credible alternatives to liberal peacebuilding at the grassroots level (2017, p. 126). It is precisely here where the literatures on peacebuilding and transitional justice meet (s.f. Langer & Brown, 2016). Indeed, the value of local agency in transitional justice is increasingly recognized in the scholarly literature. Lundy and McGovern underline the critical need of a fully participatory process, as the sheer involvement of locals in the implementation of mainly Western initiatives is inadequate (2008, p. 266). Similar to Muvingi (2016), they decry the one-size-fits-all approach of the international community to reconciliation and call for a fully participatory process that is designed, implemented, and governed by the local populations, because participation in that process ultimately means empowerment: “[Empowerment] concerns the ability of local people to define obstacles or problems, conceptualize, initiate, design and implement programs to address these problems” (Lundy & McGovern, 2008, p. 280). The purpose is for locals to be able to sustainably continue shaping and governing the process of consolidating peace and fostering reconciliation after official transitional justice processes have come to an end, independent of international donors and their interests. However, questions remain regarding what a localized transitional justice process would look like in practical terms, particularly in the context of large-scale forced displacements where a significant number of locals had to flee the country and became refugees in another country.

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In fact, certain factors like geographic isolation, political marginalization, inadequate outreach, minimal civil society engagement, and limited institutional mandates have frequently led to the exclusion of displaced populations from transitional justice processes (Bradley, 2012; Duthie, 2011). Conflict-generated displacement is an important factor in the contexts in which transitional justice is carried out. However, this relationship is relatively unproblematized in both the literature and practice. Duthie, for example, analyzes the nexus between displacement and transitional justice, and argues that displacement is integrally linked to widespread human rights violations for the following reasons: “[…] widespread human rights violations often lead to displacement; systematic displacement can itself constitute a serious human rights violation, including a crime against humanity; and displaced people are often particularly vulnerable to human rights violations” (2011, pp. 243–244). Because transitional justice aims to help societies come to terms with long legacies of human rights violations, it makes sense to address displacement as well. Bradley (2012) examines ways in which displaced persons figure in transitional justice by identifying various steps to “equitably involve stakeholders directly affected by displacement” in transitional justice (p. 3). These steps include consulting with displaced populations on the design of transitional justice initiatives; seeking input of refugees and IDPs as witnesses in trials and truth commissions; convening truth commission sessions in camps or in countries with large diaspora populations; appointing displaced persons to positions of responsibility in transitional justice bodies and coexistence projects; and employing information and communication technologies to support the involvement of displaced populations in dispersed geographic locations (ibid.). In practice, efforts to engage displaced populations in transitional justice have been modest at best. Transitional justice mechanisms have primarily functioned in cooperation with institutions within the borders of the conflict-affected country and have had limited outreach to populations beyond them (Haider, 2014; Mey, 2008; Harris-Rimmer, 2010). Some scholars, however, have highlighted recent examples of varying attempts to include displaced or diaspora populations in transitional justice processes, including in Kenya, Sierra Leone, Haiti, and most notably, Liberia. For instance, the 2011 Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission specifically conducted interviews with refugees in camps in Uganda to determine how to support the participation of

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refugees that fled from electoral violence in 2007 (Haider, 2014; Iyodu, 2012). The truth and reconciliation commissions (TRC) in Timor-Leste was explicitly mandated to engage refugee populations in neighboring countries and facilitate their return and reintegration (Bradley, 2012). This was carried out through conducting interviews with returning refugees from West Timor, facilitated by the support and funding of the UNHCR. Although significant concerns were raised over the effectiveness of this process, the final report produced by Sierra Leone’s TRC stated that 175 statements were taken from refugees in Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria, and Guinea (Young & Park, 2009, p. 349). In some cases, diaspora communities have mobilized to initiate a transitional justice process. In the 1990s, the Haitian diaspora community was considered the primary driver of Haiti’s truth commission and was responsible for developing a proposal that outlined the parameters of the Commission’s activities (Young & Park, 2009, p. 348). Furthermore, the recent literature has focused on diaspora communities and their participation in transitional justice. Haider (2014) argues the important role that diaspora communities can play in the transitional justice and reconciliation process. Orjuela (2020) states that diasporas at times are better able to document atrocities, protect witnesses, and prosecute perpetrators compared to people who are living back home. However, in the past, there have been limited considerations of participation of diasporas in transitional justice as much of the literature has focused on how diasporas play a role in fueling conflict in the homeland. Recently, Haider (2014) and Young and Park (2009) have examined and recognized how diasporas can play a positive role in the development of their home country through remittances. Indeed, transnationalism and refugee diaspora research have underlined the importance of remittances (money, knowledge, and experience) to the country of origin (Lindley, 2009) as well as diaspora engagement in homeland conflict (Baser, 2015). Young and Park (2009) argue that to better understand the significance of engaging diasporas in truth commission processes as it could benefit both the truth commissions process and the diasporas themselves as seen in the case for Liberia. Transitional justice processes that focus on a specific definition of refugee populations may miss important groups; thus, missing important views of people who are nevertheless victims of the conflict. The composition of diaspora populations varies so at times people in migration flows do not easily fall into categories like ‘economic migrant’, ‘refugee’, or ‘perpetrator’. The research conducted by Young

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and Park (2009) reveal that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (LTRC) statements and public hearings show that no matter what the circumstances or reasons of why Liberians have left Liberia, the majority are victims and so they are entitled to know the fate of family members, as well as the circumstances, causes, and conditions surrounding violations of human rights and the right to reparation. In the context of Syria, Ziadeh (2019) notes that it is not clear yet what specific accountability mechanisms would be implemented in Syria but points out that a start would be to have a historical record to determine how many people have been killed in order to establish legal responsibility. In addition, there is a need for quantitative analyses of human rights violations and not just fatalities in order to establish historical records and identify patterns of violence (Ziadeh, 2019). In addition, Haider (2014) finds that the benefits of engaging diasporas in transitional justice include diversity of perspectives, more comprehensive truth gathering, greater international awareness, and the potential for addressing societal divisions within diaspora communities. In the case of Liberia, Young and Park (2009) examine how diasporas played an active role in creating awareness on the Liberian commission process internationally and the authors also point out that incorporating diasporas in the transitional justice processes benefits in addressing divisions and trauma in diaspora communities. They also note that diaspora engagement in LTRC provided “further opportunities for dialogue on a variety of issues such as the effects of trauma and conflict within diaspora communities, the relationship and networks between Liberian communities around the world, refugee and immigration policy breakdowns, and how reconciliation could proceed in a diaspora setting” (p. 342). Diasporas were also engaged in reaching out to civil society organizations (CSOs) in their homeland and provided resources and skills and capacity training to CSOs in their home country (Mohamoud, 2005). Sinatti et al. (2010) shows that in some cases, the governments of the diasporas home country have encouraged such activities, providing them with funding for development and peacebuilding projects. In sum, these examples demonstrate the various ways in which nationals living outside the borders of their country of origin have participated in a transitional justice process of their home country, either as conceivers of the process, statement givers in the collection of testimonies, or advocates for justice. The Liberian case is arguably the most systematic and concerted attempt to engage displaced populations in transitional

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justice to date, as they were incorporated in varying phases of the process (Haider, 2014; Young & Park, 2009), which is one of the reasons why we chose it as our case study and discuss it in greater detail in the next two chapters.

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CHAPTER 4

Evolution of Transitional Justice

Abstract This chapter presents a comprehensive review of the literature on transitional justice, concentrating on its genealogy and how participation has evolved over time. The transitional justice literature has seen three distinct waves, with the most recent increasingly focused on national ownership and reconciliation, merging local peacebuilding, and local transitional justice research agendas. The importance of the participation of diaspora populations in transitional justice features prominently in this regard. Keywords Transitional justice genealogy · Local · Diaspora · Displacement

4.1

A Brief Transitional Justice Genealogy

Transitional justice is founded on principles of justice that demand holding individuals accountable for committing the most severe human rights violations, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Best, 1994; Greenwood, 1983). It is defined by the UN as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. Mieszkalski and B. Zyla, Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6_4

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order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (United Nations, 2004, p. 4). The proliferation of transitional justice measures offers wide-ranging (policy) options. They include, for example, trials and other judicial proceedings against individuals suspected to have perpetrated human rights violations (Cronin-Furman, 2013), which have been found to lead to a more durable peace (Gates et al., 2007); truth commissions designed to establish a factual historical record of past crimes and abuses (Goldstone, 1996); reparations to victims of past abuses (Brooks, 1999; Murphy et al., 2013); and vetting individuals to determine if their past activities or affiliations make them ineligible to hold certain public service positions (Thoms et al., 2010, p. 9). In short, transitional justice in practice can be understood as a package of intertwined, complementary measures that vary according to context (Arthur, 2011), post-conflict justice institutions (such as truth commissions, amnesties, reparations, and trials), and their individual contribution to the prevention of conflict recurrence, all of which are important elements in bringing about sustainable peace (Loyle & Appel, 2017). In the 1990s, the study of how societies transitioned from periods of conflict or authoritarianism and how to address legacies of widespread violence attracted significant scholarly and policy attention (e.g. human rights activism) (Gibler & Tir, 2010; Roht-Arriaza, 2006; Russett & Oneal, 2001). This is rather unsurprising given the ongoing civil wars in the Balkans and parts of Africa at the time (Hagan, 2003; Kaldor, 2006). However, the study of post-conflict transitions, which includes questions of transitional justice, is hardly new and dates back to the end of World War II. Teitel (2003) lays out a genealogy of transitional justice with three phases that begin with the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals of World War II (see also Berger, 2012; Boister & Cryer, 2008; Elster, 2004; Totani, 2009). This first phase takes place in the post-World War II era, in which Allied Powers opted to convene international proceedings and thereby replaced the traditional, national models of justice. While the asserted purpose of transitional justice at the time was criminal accountability, what was extraordinary then was the turn towards international law and the extension of its reach beyond the state and to the individual (Bass, 2000; Maga, 2001; Minear, 1971; Teitel,

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2003, p. 73). The jurisprudence that emerged from such trials1 “influenced the shape of future international(ized) courts […] and aided in the further development of international norms” (Fleck, 2013; McGonigle Leyh, 2016, p. 560; Mettraux, 2008). The legacy of the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals is the understanding and general acceptance of the notion that individuals are subjects of international law, and they should be held criminally responsible for perpetrating war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (Greenwood, 1983; McGonigle Leyh, 2016, p. 561; Meron, 2000; van Engeland, 2011). The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials also became pivotal as a permanent international criminal court (Cooper, 2000). A study by Mutua (1997) finds that the tribunal itself did not provide the space for victims to participate or voice their grievances and so the judges and prosecutors were unaware about the local history and culture of the victims and perpetrators. Teitel’s second phase in the transitional justice genealogy takes place in the last two decades of the twentieth century, in a period that he characterized as a “veritable wave of political transition” (2003, p. 75). This post-Cold War phase emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of bipolar balance of power contestations, and the concomitant proliferation of political democratization (Teitel, 2003, p. 75; see also Kritz, 1995). The fall of the Soviet Union sparked a wave of democratic transitions especially in Eastern Europe (Offe, 1996).2 In an effort to deal with long legacies of repressive authoritarianism and in the context of transitioning towards democracy, multiple concepts of justice emerged that were much more than one of criminal prosecutions (Thoms et al., 2010). The rule of law was gradually equated with a state’s efforts to advance nation-building and bring legitimacy to the successor regime. It was clear that the process to establishing the rule of law in countries undergoing democratic transitions would depend on the political realities on the ground. As Teitel put it, “the feasibility of pursuing justice and its ability to contribute to transitional rule of law depended on the scale of prior wrongdoings and the extent to which they were systematic or state-sponsored” (2003, p. 76). However, one must keep in mind that “criminal prosecutions without reparations provide no direct benefit to 1 For a good overview literature on trials, see, for example, Méndez (1997) and Cohen (2007). 2 For an account of transitional justice processes in Eastern Europe, see, for example, Michnik and Havel (1993), McAdams (1997), Nedelsky (2004), and Stan (2009).

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victims other than a sense of vindication that otherwise does not change the circumstances of their lives. A policy based exclusively on prosecution is likely to be experienced by victims as an insufficient response to their own justice claims” (De Greiff, 2012, p. 37). Ultimately, phase II moved beyond criminal prosecutions towards a more comprehensive approach aimed at societal healing, reconciliation, and collective restoration, which had been previously left out of the transitional justice discourse (Sikkink, 2011). The current phase of transitional justice research is characterized by an expansion of understanding transitional justice in the context of contemporary conditions of ongoing conflict, including the rise of inter-state conflict, state fragility, and political fragmentation (Andreevska, 2013; Teitel, 2003). Specifically, transitional justice has moved from the exception to the norm (Birdsall, 2009), to become a “paradigm of rule of law,” as it is increasingly exercised in post-conflict situations (Teitel, 2014, p. 51). This reflects the politicization of the law, as it has come to be associated with situations of political flux (ibid., p. 90; Sikkink, 2011). The outcome has been an increased focus on societies emerging from conflict by a wide range of international actors, including regional and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international financial institutions, and, most notably the UN (Hokayem, 2013; Lundy & McGovern, 2008). An all-encompassing list of policy options is now available to policymakers to hold individuals accountable for the most serious violations of human rights, in hopes of establishing the rule of law and consolidating peace in fragile and conflict-affected countries in the long-term (see also Chapter 6 for an elaborate discussion). Against this backdrop, we find a significant gap in that most studies have focused on “transitional justice as a set of issues facing countries whose previous regimes carried out widespread crimes against their own people in the interest of maintaining power and ideological control” (Siegel, 1998, p. 434). There have been limited studies that have focused on the participation of the local population, local ownership, or the specific context of local structures or a bottom-up approach to transitional justice. While studies have challenged the term transitional justice as only being equated with penal justice, the focus has still lingered on a onedimensional focus of how societies should achieve democracy to solve human rights abuses and atrocities. For example, as Crocker (2000) argues, there was an increasing focus on integrating public platforms

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for victims through truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) and acknowledging that victims and their families should be provided with a platform to tell their stories and to have their testimonies publicly acknowledged. In South Africa, the TRC took more than 22,000 testimonies from victims or their families and encouraged extensive media and radio coverage (Van Zyl, 1999). Furthermore, there has been an increasing trend to dwell beyond the so-called Western style courtroom justice since the role of civil society was being viewed as being able to play an important role in connecting ideals of the public sphere, discursive democracy, and public deliberation (Crocker, 1998). Nonetheless, again, it is questionable who determines this public sphere and who gets to be part of these discussions. Mutua (1997) finds that it is significant to be critical of these spaces because forms of formal courts and tribunals were predominantly a form of Western style courtroom justice. These spaces are still fundamentally rooted in Western modes of truth-telling, and these mechanisms may not be appropriate in cultures with different historical and cultural grounding. It is therefore unsurprising that prosecutions and truth commissions had to conform to international standards, leading to the involvement of international actors. Van Zyl charges that countries such as South Africa were viewed as incapable and unable to deal successfully in holding those responsible for human rights violations accountable (ibid.). This reinforces the paradigm where the locals need assistance from the ‘saviors’ such as the international experts and institutions (Mutua, 2001). This inherently neglects the political, legal, social, cultural, and economic complexities in the post-conflict context.

4.2 Contemporary Transitional Justice and the ‘Local Turn’ Most pertinent perhaps for this book is the movement in scholarship towards “localizing” transitional justice through efforts ranging from consultations with locals on internationally defined processes to complete shifts from international to local practices (Lundy & McGovern, 2008; Robbins, 2012). At the policy level, the United Nations (UN) report on “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Postconflict Societies” (2004) marked a major turning point in highlighting the importance of the local transitional justice when commitments were made to encourage local agency and participation in transitional

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justice processes among policy makers. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2004) stated that due regard must be given to indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice or settling disputes, to help them to continue their often vital role and to do so in conformity with both international standards and local tradition. (p. 12)

Muvingi finds, however, that “localization” in transitional justice has led to “direct confrontation between local communities and the international donor community when the former has perceived serious incongruence between international criminal justice and their own realities” (2016, p. 13). This is echoed by van Zyl (1999), who notes that that recent scholarship has pointed towards studying the ontological conceptualizations of the term ‘local’ more carefully. Similarly, Lundy and McGovern posit that the failure to embrace the experiences and opinions of locals can lead to the failure of the transitional justice process (and thus sustainable peace), and that “the answer is to view local people as stakeholders, and active agents of change” (2008, p. 278). Again, as explained in the Introduction, this is similar to what Sarah von Billerbeck (2016) suggests by pointing to the need to better linking the transitional justice literature with that of local peacebuilding (see also May & Edenberg, 2014). The importance of addressing the ‘local’ has clearly been noted in the transitional justice practice, however. For instance, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) integrated a local transitional justice mechanism (Pigou, 2003), called the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP), which was part of the country’s Commission for Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation. Local authorities “presided over these community hearings, which drew on a Timorese customary dispute resolution practice known as nahe biti” (Kochanski, 2020, p. 34). A traditional leader would collect testimonies from both the victims and the perpetrators in order to come up with a feasible form of compensation. The heightened focus to local forms of justice has been greatly endorsed by the United Nations. Pigou (2003) echoes this and finds that according to the UN Development Program Report, the CRP proved to resolve approximately fourteen hundred disputes in three years. Nevertheless, there was no system in place to integrate feedback from the general population from the outset (Triponel & Pearson, 2010). In other

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countries, for example in Sierra Leone, the UN planning mission held meetings with civil society organizations (CSOs) and human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); that, in 2002, led to an agreement that set up the Special Court (Perriello & Wierda, 2006). At almost the same time, there was a shift toward local ownership in international policies, especially in development aid and peace building. This was particularly evident in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as well as the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action (Macdonald, 2013). The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 also took a shift towards noting that local ownership and participation are vital components for successful peacebuilding interventions (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011). Hence, studies reflected this shift, where local agency and local participation were needed to establish sustainable peace in conflict and post-conflict environments (Kochanski, 2020; Perriello & Wierda, 2006; Pigou, 2003). In short, the growing focus to consult with the locals influenced how transitional justice mechanisms are studied today. As such, there has been an increased focus on ‘local’ ownership and participation in transitional justice where locally rooted methods, such as traditional courts, healing and reintegration rituals are being incorporated (Kochanski, 2020). Selim (2017) examines how these efforts have generated a multilayered and more holistic approach to transitional justice, recognizing that local participation in transitional justice cannot be defined as a single phenomenon, nor is there one method or mechanism that can encompass meaningful participation in transitional justice. Specifically, inclusivity or bottom-up processes cannot be smoothly transferred from one context to another. Kastner (2020) finds that in the context of the Central African Republic, there has been a vast process of national consultations and efforts to involve the local population in deciding on the types of transitional justice mechanisms to be established; yet there is still little progress that has been made. Building upon local ownership, practices and values are seen to be key factors in embracing successful transitional justice interventions (Sharp, 2014). From a resilience perspective, fostering local or customary practices may present to be an alternative form since it may empower local communities. However, this may in turn threaten their resilience by undermining existing inequalities and patriarchal power structures (Fontana et al., 2020; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2017). In addition, Sharp (2014) argues that when using the consensus of building

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local ownership, local elites may hide their interests and oppressive power structures. In some contexts, localizing transitional justice encourages active participation of survivors, which make these initiatives more meaningful and sustainable (Donais, 2009; Kochanski, 2020). Sharp (2014) states that it is important to acknowledge that concepts such as local ownership or participation may present a loose theme and thus there is a need for a multifaceted approach in unpacking concerns around control (agency decision making, funding), process (bottom-up, participatory), and substance (values, practices, priorities). Other studies have focused on acknowledging that notions of simply placing an emphasis on local ownership, a partnership, or a non-Western alternative is not sufficient and “reflects the simple recognition that neither global nor local dimensions of justice holds a monopoly on emancipatory projects, possibilities and wisdom” (Okello, 2010, p. 275). There is a need to question how ‘local’ and by whom ‘local’ is being interpreted and what kind of methods are being used to foster inclusivity. Victims of human rights violations in war and conflict zones include a broad range of people and are targeted for a variety of reasons. Moreover, Okello (2010) argues that simply labeling these people as ‘local’ does not capture the different forms of violations they might have experienced and the fact that different people will have different needs to “access redress and to rebuild their lives” (Van der Merwe & Masiko, 2020, p. 3). In other words, generalizing the ‘local’ is not easy and means understanding the diversity of people affected by human rights violations in war and conflict zones. It is also relevant to examine which organizations gain a seat at the table and to question if the needs of the population are truly being identified by the locals (Carolan, 2020). Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2017) and Sharp (2014) add that caution needs to be heeded since there are dangers to inclusivity as short-term participative processes may expose vulnerable groups to re-traumatize or raise unrealistic expectations. As Fontana et al. (2020) argue, this reveals the need to have a global–local balance and a continuum from the international level, to the national level, to the local level, as well as a reconsideration of the Western style courtroom justice. Another shift to the turn to local saw national governments implementing customary law and traditional forms of justice systems in order to attract public participation, viewing this form as an integral mechanism. The example of Rwanda and the Gacaca system have been regarded as a success story by some analysts (Shaw & Waldorf, 2010). By integrating

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the Gacaca system, the Rwandan government established a transitional justice system (Ingelaere, 2009) where public participation played an important role to its success (Ingelaere, 2016). Triponel and Pearson (2010) find that public input was sought at “every step of the process, and the feedback was used to improve and streamline the final traditional justice system seen in the country now” (Triponel & Pearson, 2010, p. 21). The objective of the Gacaca system was to expedite the pace of trials from the genocide, identify reparations, and advance national unity and reconciliation (Clark, 2010). Keeping with the objectives of traditional forms of justice, in the Gacaca system judges were elected amongst the local population in where they have jurisdiction. As such and with information from the residents, the judge determines the category of the perpetrator’s crime (Ingelaere, 2016). Furthermore, in Triponel and Pearson’s (2010) study, they showed how the Rwandan government continuously improved the transitional justice system by creating pilot programs and integrating feedback from the public before its actual fullscale implementation. For example, in 2002, the Rwandan government conducted a pilot Gacaca courts in “751 localities, approximately three years before the new Gacaca court system was implemented nationwide” in order to identify areas for improvements and modifications (Triponel & Pearson, 2010, p. 23). Hence, between 2005 and 2012 approximately 12,103 Gacaca courts functioned across the country, hearing nearly two million cases (Gacaca Community Justice, 2015). Daly (2002) goes perhaps the furthest and notes that transitional justice has been overly top-down and elite oriented, even with the shift in trend to place an emphasis on the ‘local’. Moreover, the turn to the local in transitional justice has overlooked the agency of local actors and neglected to examine the complex ways in which power has been exercised between the national and subnational levels (Kim & Hong, 2019).

4.3 Gender Dynamics and Youth as Proactive Agents In terms of who is included in transitional justice, the United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice (2010), the European Union’s Policy Framework on Support to Transitional Justice (2015), and the African Union Transitional Justice Policy (2019) have all emphasized the need to focus on dimensions of diversity, especially of women, youth, and

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members of marginalized groups (Merwe & Masiko, 2020). Historically, women have been constrained in their freedom to take part in transitional justice and this exacerbates vulnerabilities during conflict. Hence, merely turning to the concept of local ownership or participation is not sufficient (Rubin, 2018). These areas largely remain understudied in the literature (Macdonald, 2013). Merwe and Masiko (2020) find that while a peace deal was signed in South Sudan on September 2018, sexual violence against women continues to increase. Existing structural challenges limit women’s access to opportunities and resources and unequal gender dynamics create an environment that is conducive to women’s insecurity in refugee and IDP camps (Van de Merwe & Masiko, 2020). Transitional justice has continuously failed to address the issue of gender justice, and participation of women has been absent in policy development and implementation of these processes (Oette, 2011; Rubin, 2018). In the context of Africa, while there has been a normative shift towards supporting inclusivity and diversity in transitional justice process, there is still a lack of recognizing the importance of marginalized groups as the central element of policy development and transitional justice practice (Hovil, 2012a, 2012b). As Kusafuka (2009) points out, in the South African truth commission, there was a lack of engagement in documenting gender-based analysis on abuses and there were no appropriate spaces for women to engage with the commission. Other countries such as Guatemala and Liberia have faced similar structural challenges (Macdonald, 2013). In this context, access to justice has been proven difficult within refugee and IDP camps. These camps are perceived to be outside of national jurisdiction and what is going inside is seen as irrelevant “to wider national processes unless it has direct bearing on the outside (Mbwana, 2019, p. 6). In addition, refugees often have ambiguous legal status and they would be prone not to report crimes committed against them (Hovil, 2012a, 2012b). Various scholars have also pointed out that there have been explicit violations of the rights of LGBTQIA+ individuals and the communities writ large, which again is an area that has been under-researched (Maier, 2020; Mbwana, 2020). Moreover, global policy frameworks have not been that proactive with recognizing LGBTQIA+ individuals and communities being disproportionately affected by conflict. In the transitional justice literature, sexual and gender-based violence has usually been equated with women. As such, there is lack of recognition on looking at violence against sexual and gender minorities (Mbwana, 2019; Van

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de Merwe & Masiko, 2020). Mbwana (2020) examines that currently, homosexuality is criminalized in 32 countries in Africa, while there have been great strides for inclusivity, such as Angola and Botswana, decriminalizing homosexuality in 2019 and the African Commission for Human and People’s Rights, signaling a more inclusive approach to acknowledging “different sexual orientations and genders identities in its General Comment No. 4 on the right to redress” (African Union Transitional Justice Policy, 2019). Gender norms such as hegemonic masculinity function to promote aggression and dominance over marginalized groups such as women and LGBTQIA+ individuals and groups (Maier, 2020). This condition further heightens during conflict because there are limited consequences for crimes committed, coupled with lack of safety nets for marginalized individuals and groups (Bueno-Hansen, 2018). Having said this, research has shown that gender dynamics impact transitional and traditional justice mechanisms and processes (Buckley-Zistel & Stanley, 2012; Lahai & Moyo, 2018). For example, vulnerable groups may be excluded from participating in criminal justice proceedings or truth-seeking and truth-telling processes. This further implicates LGBTQIA+ communities because of anti-gay laws and existing oppressive patriarchal norms, their voices are often overlooked and neglected (Mbwana, 2020). There are fears of being ostracized and stigmatized from their communities and a fear for legal repercussions (Bueno-Hansen, 2018). Nevertheless, Mbwana (2020) and Maier (2020) argue that it is significant to recognize that progress and developments are being made to ensure the inclusion of the LGBTQIA+ agenda in transitional justice. Maier (2020) considers Colombia as a case study of how LGBTQIA+ rights can be integrated into transitional justice. In 2015, Colombia was the first country to include LGBTQIA+ activists in peace talks “as part of the agenda of victims of the armed conflict” (Mbwana, 2020, p. 11). The initiative focused on implementing a truth commission that includes LGBTQIA+ rights in all processes and ensuring that LGBTQIA+ individual can have equal access in terms of holistic reparations, healing, and assistance (Mbwana, 2020). The role of youth as key stakeholders in transitional justice processes have also been overlooked in the literature. Wa Kambala (2017) argues that the importance of youth inclusion is increasingly being highlighted; nevertheless, there has not been sufficient policies or efforts to include

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youth through participation in these processes or a focus on youth experiences in conflict and post-conflict environments. Children have often been treated as passive actors or victims, rather than seeing them as proactive agents. Their inputs are often neglected in shaping policies even though youth activism. However, there is evidence that student activists are having a local impact and hold those in power accountable by campaigning for democracy and social justice (Karabegovi´c, 2018; Ladisch, 2018). For example, van de Merwe and Masiko (2020) examine how in Sierra Leone, there have been efforts to engage youth as proactive actors by initiating a youth truth commission called ‘Accountability Now’ in order to enhance their understanding on human rights issues.

4.4

Critiques

While the international community refers to the benefits of meaningful local participation as a ‘prerequisite’ during the planning phase, there are inherent limitations to this approach, as scholars have tended to overlook important dimensions, such as local–national power asymmetries and veiled political agendas, producing blind spots (Kochanski, 2020; Triponel & Pearson, 2010). Key critiques in recent studies point out that local ownership and participation in transitional justice remain idealistic and unsubstantiated as a claim (Fontana et al., 2020; Kochanski, 2020; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). For instance, Davidovic (2019), Swaine (2018), Sharp (2018), as well as Gready and Robins (2019) recently challenged conceptions of justice and question what aspects are being neglected in current transitional justice processes. Daly (2002) goes perhaps furthest and notes that transitional justice has been overly topdown and elite oriented, even with the shift in trend to place an emphasis on the ‘local’. The turn to the local in transitional justice has overlooked the agency of local actors and neglected to examine the complex ways in which power has been exercised between the national and subnational levels (Kim & Hong, 2019). It is precisely here where we see a significant gap in the literature that, as noted, we are trying to help fill with this book. Moreover, from a politics perspective critical studies on local ownership should focus on “on the capacities of local societies to create their own social institutions and take their own decision about the future” (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015, p. 831).

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A persistent critique of transitional justice is that there is insufficient attention being paid to trying to understand the complexities of locality and that in some cases the participation of victims and the larger community has been distant (Perriello & Wierda, 2006; Sharp, 2014; Shaw & Waldorf, 2010). For example, in Sierra Leone the negotiation process to create the Special Court primarily involved government actors such as the Attorney-General and the Minister of Justice (Perriello & Wierda, 2006). Similarly, Muddell (2003) finds that in Cambodia, CSOs often voiced out their concern at their lack of involvement in playing a larger role in the process of creating courts. Oomen (2005) reminds us that there is a lack of robust research on the power dynamics and asymmetries between the global and local level in the transitional justice literature (Kochanski, 2020), as well as a lack of critical analysis moving beyond the superficial concepts of local ownership, resulting in overlooking the significance in identifying subnational stakeholders as actors with varying degrees of agency. For instance, the effect of uneven power dynamics on local transitional justice can be seen in the case of the Rwandan gacaca court. Specifically, it was mostly carried out and implemented through the support from international donors (Oomen, 2005). Hence, the adaptation of the Gacaca system cannot be merely labeled as local because this process has been shaped between global, national, regional, and community levels (see also McEvoy & McGregor, 2008). It is also significant to differentiate that local ownership does not equate with ownership by the national government, and various studies have failed to examine this binary. Shaw and Waldorf (2010) further point out that while the Gacaca hearings involved participation by ordinary Rwandans as examined earlier, attendance in these hearings became more mandatory and Rwandans did not have a space to contest dimensions of the larger processes of Gacaca. Furthermore, while the Gacaca system was hailed for its bottom-to-up approach, the goal was inevitably aligned with the narratives that were favored by the Rwandan Patriotic Front. As such, Oomen (2005) argues, there is a need to further examine how to achieve a better balance between the local and the global. In this regard, the gacaca court has been viewed as a success story in employing a bottom-to-up approach of local transitional justice, it is important to note that the government (the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front) had considerable control over the authorities tasked with carrying out the proceedings, including the participants themselves (Ingelaere, 2009). The RPF party regularly monitored the ability and willingness of

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local officials to conform to the party’s interests. Hence, in some cases, citizens themselves engaged in self-censorship to avoid repercussions from government authorities (Thomson, 2011). Kochanski (2020) and Paffenholz (2015) argue that there is a need to look beyond simple narratives and framing local actors as a unified entity that belong to a power-free space. Scholars have pointed out that transitional justice has been politicized (Davidovic, 2019). In the case of Rwanda, the type of truth has been framed between politics and power where the gacaca community courts have used these narratives to shape national reconciliation. The power relations dynamic may determine who gets to be included or excluded from participating in transitional justice initiatives. Along similar lines, Kochanski (2020) argues that it is important to examine the relationship between the international community and the host country. It is significant to acknowledge that interests and goals between the international community and the domestic authorities may be different (Ingelaere, 2016; Richmond, 2009). On the one hand, national governments may implement certain policies or mechanisms such as the TRC in an attempt to align with the narratives of the international community. On the other hand, non-state actors and the international community writ large may use local ownership as a means to obtain their interests (Sharp, 2014). Sharp (2018) goes even further to charge that the concept of local ownership and the turn to local have been romanticized as full local ownership may not be realistic. There is a need to better balance between global and local in order to maintain legitimacy in transitional justice. The most recent transitional justice literature has also focused its attention on the exclusionary forces of transitional justice. Transitional justice puts in place “initiatives that aim to restore victim’s dignity, encourage reform and pave the way for long-term political and socio-economic change in the aftermath of human rights violations” (Mbwana, 2019, p. 7). However, depending on the structure of these mechanisms and the actors involved in these processes, transitional justice at times further discriminates against LGBTQIA+ voices. Moreover, Mbwana (2019) argues that transitional justice has often excluded gender and sexual minorities. Similarly, Davidovic (2019) examines that the literature and practice of transitional justice has not sufficiently learned how these groups experience transition and how transitional justice mechanisms may further perpetuate or diminish their

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marginalization. Swaine’s (2018) empirical study demonstrates that transitional justice mechanisms have engaged with gender and gendered violence, but only in a selective way, choosing some and neglecting others. For example, the international community has focused on strategic rape in conflict, overlooking certain forms of violence and the complexities of women’s experiences in conflict, which cannot be fully represented through transitional justice. It has also overlooked questioning how transitional justice, operating within international legal frameworks, has disregarded connections and disconnections between violence and women in conflict as well as forms of violence that existed before the conflict and after the conflict. Finally, the literature has critically debated the role that states’ colonial history plays in donor’s funding choices (Muck & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2016). Many of the transitional justice contributions are regional (Roper & Barria, 2007). For instance, Australia and New Zealand have mostly supported the transitional justice institutions in the Asia–Pacific region. Belgium contributed 30% of total contribution for the ICTR, while the UK contributed almost 23% of total funding for SCSL. On the international level, however, truth commissions possess relatively small operating budgets and there are few international donor countries that support them. It is little surprising that developing countries themselves have not contributed substantially to transitional justice institutions (especially tribunals) apart from countries that have created them in their polities. While individual member states of the European Union often support tribunals, funds for truth commissions are channeled primarily through the supranational European Union. As Roper and Barria (2007) remind us, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were established under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which guarantees funding from the UN budget. After the UN moved away from establishing War Crimes Tribunal Courts as auxiliary organs of the UN, such courts have been funded by voluntary contributions from the international community. Some of these are the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Foreign assistance for these tribunals has very few economic and strategic advantages. In turn, the dependence of these tribunals on foreign assistance is often inadequate and requires the state resources to complement international donor efforts.

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Roper and Barria (2007) also examine the factors that influence the amount of contribution that states make to war crimes tribunals. They find that the level of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) highly correlate with regards to the contribution levels of donors. More specifically, states that provide larger ODA are likely to provide larger contributions to tribunals. For instance, Japan and Austria had the highest contributions, contrary to other states in the Asian region.

4.5

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how participation in transitional justice has evolved over time. The roots of modern transitional justice mechanisms have been predominantly traced back to the 1980s and 1990s and the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. At that time, the literature increasingly pointed towards the shortcomings of framing transitional justice on merely the terms of penal justice. As a result, there was a shift from a Western style courtroom justice to a focus in committing that transitional justice should integrate local agency and participation in transitional justice processes among policy makers. The transitional justice literature has seen three distinct waves and the most recent has focused increasingly on national ownership and reconciliation, thereby merging the local peacebuilding and the local transitional justice research agendas. Over the past few years, comprehensive efforts have been undertaken to assess transitional justice and its role in peace processes as well as its overall impact on sustainable peace (Fontana et al., 2020). As such, scholars placed an emphasis to locate transitional justice within local and national ownership. Moreover, local post-conflict trials as well as other types of justices were found to lead to a more durable peace in democratic and non-democratic societies. In contrast, the critical transitional justice literature notes that the turn to local has been romanticized and remains idealistic. It also argues that local participation in transitional justice cannot be defined as a single phenomenon and there can be no one method or mechanism that can encompass meaningful participation in transitional justice (Selim, 2017). Hence, it is crucial to question the kinds of methods that are being used to foster inclusivity, given that the experiences of victims in human rights violations in war and conflict zones vary for each person. As a result, merely framing people as ‘local’ may not capture the different forms of

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violations that the victims have experienced. There also remain debates around conceptual confusions relating to the overarching goals of transitional justice (De Greiff, 2012), as well as the normative underpinnings of the field of study that question the meaning of justice and its normative universality (Andrieu, 2013). It has also been noted that scholars need to be careful when using the term ‘local’ or ‘ownership’ since different actors may define ‘local’ differently or frame ‘local’ and ‘ownership’ into their own interests. Moreover, insufficient attention has been placed on studying the complex ways in which power has been exercised between the national and subnational levels of transitional justice processes. There has also been a lack of understanding of how societal groups experience transition and how transitional justice mechanisms may further perpetuate or diminish their marginalization. Nevertheless, the recent literature explored the importance of the participation of diasporas in transitional justice and finds that diaspora populations at times are better able to document atrocities, protect witnesses, and prosecute perpetrators compared to people who are living back home.

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CHAPTER 5

Lessons from Liberia’s Transitional Justice Process

Abstract This chapter analyzes the comparative case study of the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and key findings related to efforts to engage displaced populations at various levels, with the objective of conceptualizing a locally driven transitional justice process for Syria. The following questions were used to guide the analysis of the Liberian case: (1) Were displaced populations consulted on or involved in the design of transitional justice initiatives?; (2) Did displaced populations provide input as witnesses transitional justice processes?; (3) Were truth commission sessions convened in refugee camps?; (4) Were truth commissions convened in countries with large diaspora populations?; (5) Were information and communication technologies employed to support the involvement of displaced populations in dispersed geographic locations?; and (6) Were displaced persons appointed to positions of responsibility in transitional justice bodies and coexistence projects? Keywords Liberia · Transitional justice · Truth and reconciliation commission · Diaspora · Displacement · Syria

Recognizing that the link between forced displacement and transitional justice remains relatively undertheorized in both literature and practice © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. Mieszkalski and B. Zyla, Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6_5

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(Roht-Arriaza, 2006), in the next section we explore what local agency in transitional justice might look like in the context of a widespread displacement crisis such as the one in Syria. Currently, Syrian civil society is scattered both within the country and across the globe, and little attention has been paid to addressing the human rights violations that led to the refugee crisis in the first place, and subsequently how to integrate refugees and internally displaced people in transitional justice processes. Accordingly, this book contributes to the literature empirically by conducting a case study on the involvement of displaced populations at varying levels of Liberia’s transitional justice as a comparative case, with the objective of conceptualizing a locally driven transitional justice for Syria. The aboveidentified steps outlined by Bradley (2012) are used in the analysis as criteria to analyze the level of involvement of displaced populations in transitional justice.

5.1

The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (LTRC) Diaspora Project

In Liberia, more than 1.5 million people were displaced due to ongoing conflicts from 1979 to 2003 (Foster et al., 2009, p. 3). Specifically, the people of Liberia suffered from a coup d’état, a military regime and two civil wars, which resulted in severe violations of human rights and mass displacement. Approximately 25% of the Liberian population fled the country, with 36,000 becoming refugees in Ghana; 26,000 in Guinea; 18,000 in Sierra Leone; and 13,000 in Nigeria (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 143). Moreover, records from the U.S. Office of Immigration Statistics indicate that 17,833 Liberians immigrated to the US between 1995 and 2004, and 21,023 Liberian refugees arrived in the U.S. during that time claiming refugee status (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 143). The Liberian civil war lasted for fourteen years until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 18 August 2003. As part of this agreement, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (LTRC) was negotiated (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 142) and subsequently enacted into law by the National Transitional Legislative Assembly in 2005. Its mandate was to “promote national peace, security, unity and reconciliation, and to make it possible to hold perpetrators accountable for gross violations of human rights that occurred in Liberia between January 1979 and October 2006” (Young & Park, 2009, p. 342). President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf inaugurated the LTRC in

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February 2006 and appointed nine commissioners (Young & Park, 2009, p. 342) to head the investigations. As the LTRC began its work, a clear decision was made by the Commission to systematically engage the diaspora, particularly Liberians residing in the United States, the United Kingdom, and in the Buduburam refugee camp in Ghana. The LTRC contended that the involvement of diaspora had various potential benefits for participants, as well as the country’s overall peacebuilding process. Given the large volume of Liberians who fled the country, the LTRC could produce a more holistic account of the conflict by reaching out to the diaspora, particularly given that many Liberians in the diaspora were victims of human rights abuses. The diaspora was also accused of fueling the conflict and there were known perpetrators living in the diaspora community. Moreover, the LTRC hoped that engaging the diaspora would encourage individuals to contribute to Liberia’s post-conflict development and reconciliation process (Weibelhaus-Brahm, 2013, pp. 75–76). In 2006, the LTRC reached out to the Advocates for Human Rights, a non-governmental organization (NGO) based in Minnesota, to seek assistance for diaspora engagement. It established a Diaspora Committee, chaired by Commissioner Massa Washington, who had fled the country from the conflict and was residing in the U.S. at the time of her appointment (Young & Park, 2009, p. 343). It was through these efforts that the LTRC Diaspora Project was established. Displaced persons participated as “conceivers of the process, statement givers in the data collection process, and advocates for justice” (Duthie, 2011, p. 248). The case of the LTRC was ground-breaking in that it was the first in the short history of truth and reconciliation commissions to reach outside of the borders of the state to take statements from Liberians living in the diaspora, and hold public hearings for the diaspora (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 141). This case is a unique example of an innovative strategy to enable the participation of displaced populations in truth-telling processes from great distances, and an experience that can shed light on Syria’s prospective transitional justice experience.

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5.2 Key Findings: Levels of Integration of Displaced Populations in Liberia’s Transitional Justice Process This sub-section analyzes how displaced populations were engaged in Liberia’s transitional justice experience. We do so by measuring the findings of the Liberian case against Bradley’s “steps to involve displaced populations in transitional justice” (2012, p. 3), which we explained in Chapter 2. We used the following questions to guide our analysis of the Liberian case: (1) Were displaced populations consulted on or involved in the design of transitional justice initiatives?; (2) Did displaced populations provide input as witnesses transitional justice processes?; (3) Were truth commission sessions convened in refugee camps?; (4) Were truth commissions convened in countries with large diaspora populations?; (5) Were information and communication technologies employed to support the involvement of displaced populations in dispersed geographic locations?; and (6) Were displaced persons appointed to positions of responsibility in transitional justice bodies and coexistence projects? These questions that we reformulated based on Bradley’s work to gain insight into how displaced populations were applied to Liberia’s transitional justice process. Below, we discuss the particular findings to the posed questions above. Question 1:

Were displaced persons appointed to positions of responsibility in transitional justice bodies and coexistence projects?

Select efforts were carried out by the LTRC to engage displaced populations in the consultation and design stages of transitional justice initiatives. The Advocates for Human Rights (The Advocates) group was responsible for coordinating the work of the LTRC in the diaspora. Accordingly, they established an Advisory Committee composed of Liberians living in the U.S. to ensure a close link with the diaspora and to involve them in their outreach activities (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009). In particular, this committee allowed Liberian diaspora members to provide advisory input on the project while it was operational. However, there was minimal data available to demonstrate that displaced populations provided input to shape the overarching design or the plan for Liberian transitional justice initiatives prior to its operationalization. Ultimately,

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as Purkey (2016) effectively explains, the LTRC’s consultative initiatives were largely one sided, soliciting information from the participant. However, they lacked real dialogue or genuine feedback. Moreover, engagement was sought only at the implementation stage, not in the early planning and development stages (ibid., p. 18). The use of information and communication technologies was a prominent feature of the LTRC Diaspora Project, which served to support the involvement of displaced populations located in dispersed geographic locations. While this approach will be discussed further below in answer to question five, it is important to note here that members of the Liberian diaspora participated in the early-stage design process for such technologies. Specifically, the LTRC partnered with the Georgia Institute of Technology to construct a novel interactive kiosk system, called MOSES, which allowed users to browse, watch, create, and share video messages. This enabled the remote submission of claims and testimonies by video (Smyth et al., 2010, p. 1059), and made them transparent.1 Officials from the Georgia Institute of Technology consulted with communities of the Atlanta-based Liberians throughout the design stages of the kiosk system. In total, eleven meetings were held with Liberian participants at various locations, including the Georgia Institute of Technology campus, Emory University, and a local Liberian restaurant (Best et al., 2010, p. 2). Input from the diaspora revealed that recently arrived Liberians had little experience with information and communication technologies. This lead the team from the Georgia Institute of Technology to drastically simplify the design of the product and to include an animated help agent (Best et al., 2010, p. 2). The initial user studies were useful for informing the design of the system and refining the icons and symbols for a Liberian audience (Smyth et al., 2010, p. 1061). Question 2:

Did displaced populations provide statements and input as witnesses transitional justice processes?

As mentioned above, the LTRC Diaspora Project was carried out through a partnership with The Advocates, an NGO based in Minnesota, to seek assistance for diaspora engagement. A memorandum of understanding 1 For much of what the world thinks it knows about the conflict has come from information circulated through online social networks. On their importance, see Lynch et al. (2014).

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was signed between The Advocates and the LTRC, authorizing The Advocates to implement the LTRC’s work in the diaspora (Young & Park, 2009, p. 345). This organization was selected due to its long history of working with Liberian asylum seekers by providing them with pro bono attorneys hoping that it would be viewed as neutral by the Liberian community (Weibelhaus-Brahm, 2010, p. 389). The Advocates’ experience with pro bono work offered the LTRC a nationwide network of legal partners, including law firms, law schools, legal aid clinics, community organizations, and NGOs that it could employ for the Diaspora Project (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009). Its broad reach enabled The Advocates to answer calls from Liberians in the U.K. who were interested in participating in the LTRC process. Partner law firms in the U.S. and the U.K. had offices in various cities, which were able to leverage the resources and personnel necessary to conduct outreach and support such a large-scale statement collection process (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 146). Websites and toll-free telephone numbers were set up and operated by the administrative staffs of partner firms in a number of cities, including Chicago, to provide Liberians with information about the LTRC and the Diaspora Project and to arrange statement-taking (Weibelhaus-Brahm, 2010, p. 390). The Advocates mobilized more than 800 volunteers to support statement taking, public hearings, research, and outreach (Young & Park, 2009, p. 359). Volunteers were required to undergo comprehensive training on how to properly take statements, empathic listening, addressing vicarious trauma, Liberian history, and the ongoing conflict itself. Volunteers also gained a general background on truth commissions, international humanitarian law, and the role of international actors in the Liberian conflict (Weibelhaus-Brahm, 2010; Young & Park, 2009). Before the statement taking process began, The Advocates established specific procedures to inform diaspora participants of potential risks related to giving a statement, including prosecution or negative immigration repercussions due to confession of crime committed in Liberia. All participants needed to give informed consent prior to giving a statement to the LTRC. The Advocates could not protect statement givers from “legal consequences in any jurisdiction and the information provided by the participants would eventually be sent back to entities in Liberia” (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 40). However, the participants also had the option of providing an anonymous statement if they had concerns about their security or legal ramifications. The Advocates

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offered pre-statement referrals to a pro-bono immigration or criminal law attorney for any statement giver with concerns about the legal implications of providing a statement (Young & Park, 2009, p. 346). Moreover, each pro bono affiliate provided a referral sheet for statement givers with information on legal service providers, housing, health, and other resources (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 41). Extensive outreach and public awareness raising was conducted by The Advocates and the LTRC in order to answer questions about the project’s operation and goals (Amnesty International, 2008). In several cities, events with food and cultural performances were held to launch statement taking. The Advocates contend that the most effective outreach efforts targeted apartment buildings or neighborhoods populated by Liberians (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p.42). The Advocates and the LTRC also worked to develop outreach materials about the statement-taking process, including brochures, videos, online messaging, presentations, logos, graphics, and a LTRC Peace Song (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 41). These efforts intended to ensure that the Diaspora Project was viewed as a fully integrated component of the overarching LTRC. Ultimately, significant efforts were made to gather statements from displaced populations for Liberia’s transitional justice process. During its period of operation, the LTRC Diaspora Project collected 1631statements from Liberians based in the U.S., U.K., and Ghana, which represented more than 9% of the total LTRC statements gathered (Young & Park, 2009, p. 343). Question 3:

Were truth commission sessions convened in camps?

There was no evidence indicating that truth commission sessions or public hearings were convened in the Buduburam refugee camp near Accra, Ghana. However, efforts were made by The Advocates to conduct statement taking in the camp, at which point there were more than 35,000 Liberians, many of whom had resided there for 17 years (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009; Young & Park, 2009, p. 342). Drawing from its vast network of pro bono affiliates, The Advocates sent approximately 20 volunteers on three separate trips to document the statements of refugees in the Buduburam camp (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009). The organization targeted the offices of several community organizations that

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were based in the camp, which allowed the team to conduct outreach and collect statements in an area that was already familiar to the participants (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 154). Approximately 1377 statements were gathered in the Buduburam camp, which account for more than 80% of diaspora statements collected for the LTRC Diaspora Project (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 44.; Young & Park, 2009). Despite the fact that the vast majority of testimonies were collected from this location, there was no evidence of any truth commission or public hearing for these individuals. Question 4:

Were truth commission sessions convened in countries with large diaspora populations?

The LTRC Diaspora Project held public hearings at Hamline University in Saint Paul, Minnesota in June 2008 to conduct public testimony from Liberians in the U.S. diaspora. The hearings were focused on the theme of “confronting our difficult past for a better future: the diaspora experience” (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 44). All nine of the LTRC commissioners travelled to the U.S. to convene five days of public hearings in Minnesota, a state home to the largest Liberian diaspora population in the country (Steinberg, 2010, p. 36). The commissioners invited wide-ranging subject-matter experts to participate in hearings, such as those who have expertise in studying the roles and experiences of women and children in conflict, and economic crimes (James-Allen et al., 2010, p. 9). Twenty-nine witnesses from ten states testified about the human rights abuses in Liberia that forced them to flee, as well as their experiences in flight, the refugee camps, and ultimately resettlement to the U.S. (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 44). The event was streamed live on the internet for those who would or could not attend in person (Steinberg, 2010). The public hearings also offered participants the opportunity to hear from victims and to make recommendations directly to the LTRC, which was mandated to make binding recommendations to the Government of Liberia (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 44). This process also brought important information to light, including details of individuals that were killed and abducted, and in some cases even provided the name of the victims (Dabo, 2012, p. 11).

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The public hearings in Minnesota were viewed as the culmination of the diaspora statement taking process, demonstrating the importance in which the commission held the diaspora testimony (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 148). By bringing the process to the diaspora, these public hearings offered a transparent platform to inform the Liberian and the U.S. people about various human rights violations and the need for reparations (Young & Park, 2009, p. 355). This work was made possible by more than $10 million of in-kind contributions and pro bono hours donated to the project over two years by individuals, partner law firms, and institutions around the United States and in the United Kingdom (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 4). Question 5:

Were information and communication technologies employed to support the involvement of displaced populations in dispersed geographic locations?

The use of information and communication technologies was a prominent feature of the LTRC Diaspora Project, which was used to support the involvement of displaced populations located in dispersed geographic locations. As outlined above, the LTRC partnered with the Georgia Institute of Technology in order to design new information and communication technologies to facilitate the engagement of displaced populations in Liberia’s transitional justice process. The work of the Georgia Institute of Technology focused on the following two principal technologies: the world’s first interactive TRC website and a mobile interactive kiosk which recorded video testimonies (Best et al., 2010, p. 1). The TRC website was designed specifically for diaspora members, allowing users to submit formal statements over the internet to the truth commission. It offered an online communications forum, as well as a memorial section in which users could upload their own material. In addition, individuals seeking amnesty could complete and submit their applications online (Dancy, 2017; Pelsinger, 2010, p. 736).2 The mobile interactive kiosk, known as MOSES (the mobile story exchange system), targeted users in remote areas of Liberia and allowed them to submit personal video testimonies. MOSES was a touch-screen 2 Amnesties continue to be frequently used in practice. For a good overview, including their advantages and disadvantages, see, for example, Cohen (2001), Fernández (2002), Mallinder (2008), Freeman (2009), Laplante (2008), and Olsen et al. (2010).

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computer system that was mounted on the back of a jeep. The project allowed users to record stories, view other recordings, learn about the mandate and activities of the LTRC, and view hearings. Users were also able to upload any type of personalized message, and they could view the other testimonies that had been previously recorded. The MOSES jeep travelled to areas with no access to electricity and no telecommunications network (Pelsinger, 2010). The device delivered its instructions aloud to the user, in consideration of Liberia’s low literacy rate. The process was narrated in Liberian-English by an animated help agent that guided users through the system (ibid., p. 736). In order to record the voice of the animated help agent, Georgia Tech officials contacted a former Liberian radio host based in the U.S., who was willing to help with the project. He was provided with a script, which he recorded in his studio and mailed to the team at Georgia Institute of Technology (Best et al., 2010, p. 2). Although videos recorded by the MOSES jeep were submitted to the LTRC, MOSES was not referenced at all in the LTRC final report. The relationship between the LTRC and MOSES submission remained unclear. The Advocates also partnered with Benetech, a nonprofit social enterprise organization that empowers communities with software for social good. Moreover, they were asked to develop a system to manage the data from collected statements (Weibelhaus-Brahm, 2013). This allowed the volunteers to input statements in a password protected database from remote locations (ibid., p. 391). Benetech also provided technical advice on collecting, coding, and analyzing the data, and was responsible for conducting statistical analysis of the information for the LTRC (Weibelhaus-Brahm, 2013). Question 6:

Were displaced persons appointed to positions of responsibility in transitional justice bodies and coexistence projects?

The U.S.-based Liberian diaspora provided expertise to the LTRC through Commissioner Masa Washington, one of the nine LTRC commissioners. Commissioner Washington was a long-time member of the Liberian diaspora in the U.S. and was trusted with the responsibility of leading the LTRC Diaspora Project (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 141). The LTRC established a Diaspora Advisory Committee, chaired by Commissioner Massa Washington, which sought to provide input

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and strategic advice throughout the project (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, pp. 36–37). According to Bradley, it is for these reasons that the LTRC Diaspora Project stands out as an important example of diaspora members assuming leadership roles in transitional justice and reconciliation processes, which has potential to strengthen state–diaspora relations (2012, p. 12). However, limited data is available on which recommendations diaspora members made, which calls into question the extent to which they had decision-making authority to shape the project.

Bibliography Amnesty International. (2008). Liberia: Towards the final phase of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/ en/documents/AFR34/002/2008/en/. Best, M. L., Smyth, T. N. & Serrano-Baquero, D. (2010). Designing with Diaspora: A case study of work with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia. Georgia Institute of Technology. Bradley, M. (2012). Displacement, transitional justice and reconciliation: Assumptions, challenges and lessons. Refugee Studies Centre. https://www.refworld. org/pdfid/4f993f1d2.pdf. Cohen, D. (2001). The rhetoric of justice: Strategies of reconciliation and revenge in the restoration of Athenian democracy in 403 BC. European Journal of Sociology, 42(2), 335–356. Dabo, A. (2012). In the presence of absence: Truth-telling and displacement in Liberia. International Center for Transitional Justice. Dancy, G. (2017). Deals with the devil? Conflict amnesties, civil war, and sustainable peace. International Organization. Duthie, R. (2011). Transitional justice and displacement. The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 5, 241–261. Fernández, P. A. (2002). Memory and amnesia: The role of the Spanish civil war in the transition to democracy. Berghahn. Foster, D., Heins, D., Kalla, M., Garnett McKenzie, M., O’Neal, J., Park, R., & Young, L. A. (2009). A house with two rooms: Final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia Diaspora Project. The Advocates for Human Rights. Freeman, M. (2009). Necessary evils: Amnesties and the search for justice. Cambridge University Press. James-Allen, P., Weah, A., & Goodfriend, L. (2010). Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional justice options in Liberia. International Centre for Transitional Justice.

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Laplante, L. J. (2008). Outlawing amnesty: The return of criminal justice in transitional justice schemes. Virginia Journal of International Law, 49, 915. Lynch, M., Freelon, D., & Aday, S. (2014). Blogs and bullets III: Syria’s socially mediated civil war. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Mallinder, L. (2008). Amnesty, human rights and political transitions: Bridging the peace and justice divide. Hart. Minikon, P. B., & Shepler, S. (2009). Documenting human rights abuses among the diaspora: Lessons learned from the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In N. Shawki & M. Cox (Eds.), Negotiating sovereignty and human rights (pp. 141–158). Routledge. Olsen, T., Payne, L., & Reiter, A. (2010). Transitional justice in balance: Comparing processes, weighing efficacy. US Institute of Peace. Pelsinger, S. (2010). Liberia’s long tail: How web 2.0 is changing and challenging truth commissions. Human Rights Law Review, 10(4), 730–748. Purkey, A. (2016). Justice, reconciliation, and ending displacement: Legal empowerment and refugee engagement in transitional processes. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 35(4), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdw015. Roht-Arriaza, N. (2006). The new landscape of transitional justice. In N. RohtArriaza & J. Mariezcurrena (Eds.), Transitional justice in the twenty-first century: Beyond truth vs. justice (pp.1–16). Cambridge University Press. Smyth, T. N., Etherton, J., & Best, M. L. (2010). MOSES: Exploring new ground in media and post-conflict reconciliation. CHI 2010: Crisis Informatics. Steinberg, J. (2009). Briefing: Liberia’s experiment with transitional justice. African Affairs, 109(434), 135–144. Steinberg, J. (2010). A truth commission goes abroad: Liberian transitional justice in New York. African Affairs, 110(483), 35–53. Weibelhaus-Brahm, E. (2010). A volunteer’s perspective on the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project. Journal of Human Rights Practice, 2(3), 386–400. Weibelhaus-Brahm, E. (2013). Truth-seeking at a distance: Engaging diaspora populations in transitional justice processes. In J. Lannon & E. F. Halpin (Eds.), Human rights and information communication technologies: Trends and consequences of use. IGI Global. Young, L. A., & Park, R. (2009). Engaging diasporas in truth commissions: Lessons from the Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3(3), 341–361.

CHAPTER 6

Outlook Towards a Syrian-Led Approach to Transitional Justice

Abstract This chapter analyzes the Syrian context and draws on lessons learned from the Liberian transitional justice experience. Specific transitional justice options that are suited to the Syrian context and tailored to its complex displacement scenario are explored. This chapter offers policy recommendations for a prospective transitional justice process for Syria, arguing that Syria’s prospective transitional justice process ought to take an extraordinary form in order to meet the needs and aspirations of all members of the country’s civil society, including the estimated 11.7 million persons displaced by the conflict thus far. Keywords Syria · Transitional justice · Displacement · Participation · Ownership · Policy recommendations

Working under the assumption that in the near future the international community will pursue similar post-conflict justice efforts in Syria once a peace agreement has been negotiated, signed, and implemented, in this chapter we analyze the specific transitional justice options that are suited for this context and tailored to its complex displacement scenario. We draw on and make inferences from the experiences the international

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. Mieszkalski and B. Zyla, Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6_6

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community made in Liberia, as discussed in the previous chapter. Accordingly, it is argued that Syria’s prospective transitional justice process ought to take an extraordinary form in order to suit the needs and aspirations of all members of the country’s civil society, including the estimated 11.7 million people that have been displaced by the conflict thus far (UNHCR, 2018a). It is important to recall that it is beyond the scope of this project to predict the outcome of the Syrian civil war, or to speculate what will come of the regime of Syria’s President Assad (if anything at all). Rather, this project focuses strictly on exploring the ways in which displaced populations could successfully engage in prospective transitional justice processes. In an effort to answer the research question we set out in the Introduction, several recommendations are provided to envisage a transitional justice process for Syria that fosters (local) ownership and participation of displaced populations at all levels of the transitional justice process, including its conception and design; operationalization; and decision-making and management. (1) Concerted efforts must be made to identify all of Syria’s displaced populations in the country’s prospective transitional justice efforts, including the diaspora, migrants , refugees , returnees , and internally displaced persons (IDPs)

While the case of the Liberian LTRC Diaspora Project highlighted opportunities for engaging diaspora populations, there was no concerted effort to identify and include IDPs, returnees, or migrants (Dabo, 2012). Instead, in Liberia, efforts focused primarily on gathering statements from Liberian diaspora populations based in the U.S. and U.K., and at the Buduburam refugee camp in Ghana. This restricted approach should not be repeated with Syria. While we are restricted to exploring options to engage IDPs due to the limited scope of this case study, migrants, and returnees, in order to facilitate their engagement in Syria’s prospective transitional justice process, it is likely that the lead transitional justice agency will need to conduct an international mapping exercise in order to identify where these groups are located geographically. This exercise will then assist with taking stock of what mechanisms are required to empower displaced populations to participate in all levels of the transitional justice process. This task could, for example, be carried out through

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a partnership with the UNHCR, an agency that has been closely monitoring and tracking Syria’s protracted refugee crisis and is thus familiar with the context of the crisis and its key players and actors. Moreover, such a mapping exercise would be particularly critical given that the Syrian context is largely characterized by its complex displacement scenario, with more than 5.6 million having fled the country and 6.1 million people internally displaced in Syria (UNHCR, 2018a). Of those that are internally displaced, 2.9 million people are living in hard to reach or besieged areas (UNHCR, 2018a). As noted, many of those who have fled sought refuge in neighboring countries, with the vast majority of them living in urban areas and only approximately 8% of them having been accommodated in refugee camps (UNHCR, 2018a). In addition, at the time of writing, many Syrians affected by the conflict have sought refuge overseas, including in Australia (15,864), Canada (76,530), Germany (1.5 million), the U.K. (20,000), and the U.S. (65,032) (UNHCR, 2018b). Ultimately, it will be important for the implementing organization of Syria’s transitional justice process to develop a comprehensive strategy of how to reach these displaced Syrians currently are scattered across the globe, to solicit their input for the transitional justice processes as, for example, in the Liberian case. (2) Extensive consultations must be conducted that target all members of Syrian civil society, including the diaspora, migrants , refugees , IDPs, and returnees , in order to inform the design of a Syrian transitional justice process

In the case of the LTRC Diaspora Project, minimal efforts were made to consult with displaced populations on the design of Liberia’s transitional justice process. The LTRC solely established a committee to obtain advisory input from a fraction of the diaspora during the operationalization of the project. This largely resulted in one-way information channels and outreach activities, which kept the diaspora informed of LTRC activities. However, there was little evidence to show that diaspora populations actually had a voice in influencing the design of Liberia’s transitional justice process. This must be changed in the Syrian case if this process aims to be sustainable and effective. Put differently, in order to avoid an externally determined, one-size-fits-all approach to Syria’s transitional justice process, concerted efforts should be made to conduct comprehensive, international consultations to inform and shape its design (and ultimately

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its outcome). Transitional justice consultations are particularly beneficial in the way that they contribute to highlighting the experience of otherwise neglected victim groups, identifying culturally appropriate truth-telling mechanisms, determining the role in proceedings of cultural practices, defining elements for a criminal prosecutorial strategy, adjusting inappropriate procedures, deciding on the time period to be covered by various transitional justice mechanisms and how best to craft recommendations on such matters as reparations. (OHCHR, 2020, p. 2)

Specifically, various mixed quantitative and qualitative methods could be employed by a set of international researchers seeking input from affected populations and serve as the basis for designing a large-scale and inclusive transitional justice process with all members of Syrian society being represented. Possible methods for consultation include population surveys, opinion polls, focus groups, and in-depth interviews (Thoms et al., 2008). Again, these consultations should target and engage all members of Syrian civil society, including the diaspora, migrants, refugees, IDPs, rebels, and returnees. It is important to note that such evaluations should be carried out by an external organization that is independent of the transitional justice implementing agency to avoid conflicts of interest, and in person by researchers who have extensive training with these methods. An established university research centre would perhaps be such an independent institution and as much as possible outside of the realm of politics. Such distancing would contribute to conducting legitimate consultations by a credible and neutral third party that has no specific political or organizational stake in the transitional justice process and its resulting policy choices (Thoms et al., 2008, p. 48). In the case of Liberia, the LTRC Diaspora Project approached The Advocates for a similar reason, to engage a “non-Liberian organization that would be viewed in the community as a ‘neutral’ convener for truth-telling and reconciliation” in the context of “lingering ethnic and political fractures” (Young & Park, 2009, p. 343). Ultimately, widespread consultative efforts would foster ownership of displaced populations, as they themselves would be enabled to be the architects of Syria’s post-conflict justice, deciding which mechanisms are needed to support the millions of people affected Syria’s legacy of violence and chart pathways towards more just and peaceful futures. Considering

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that such consultations would be so large-scale, it would be beneficial for this process to begin as early as possible after the ink on the peace agreement has dried. The contribution of diaspora to transitional justice in Syria is not restricted to the transfer of funds, as one might have expected from the development literature. Diasporas have also been found to have an impact on governments and their policy, the media, the private sectors and other influential (pressure) groups in both their home country and current place of residence. Diaspora lobbying and advocacy have increasingly engaged in promoting action and policy implementation. These movements are driven by both individuals and groups; they are inspired by different causes and motivations to do something in the interest of their countries of origin (Aman, 2014). Diasporas are playing a critical role in the peace and development process of transitional justice (UNCHR, 2016). With regards to Syria, there are a number of diaspora groups especially in Germany that should be encouraged to play a prominent role in Syria’s transitional justice process. For example, Barada Syrienhlife is a humanitarian and medical NGO that was established by the Syrian diaspora in Germany in 2012. It focuses on relief and medical aid to affected communities inside Syria through its wide-ranging local networks from doctors to students and engineers. Barada Help for Syria, which is the English translation, works across a range of sectors including food security, sanitation, water and hygiene, education and healthcare. Moreover, the German-Syrian Association for the Promotion of Freedom and Human Right s (Deutsch-Syrischer Verein zur Förderung der Freiheiten und Menschenrechte e.V.) is a humanitarian and development NGO that was founded by the first and the second generation of the Syrian diaspora in Germany in 2011. It was initially created to support the people in Syria in their work for freedom and democracy. Currently, the association has evolved into an organization that provides humanitarian aid for people exposed to war and violence. The major focus of the organization has been on relief activities in providing healthcare inside Syria and the neighboring countries. It has trucked medical convoys and ambulances loaded with medical supplies into areas in northern Syria and refugee camps in Turkey. Also based in Germany is the civil society organization Homs League Abroad which provides training in tailoring and life-skills. They also provide Turkish language classes and seminars to inform especially female refugees about their rights.

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Outside of Germany Hand in Hand for Syria was established by the Syrian diaspora in the U.K. to focus on helping Syrian communities to regain the skills, confidence, and dignity to rebuild their own lives. Their teams are inside Syria assessing, planning, prioritizing, and implementing projects to help the most vulnerable in the community. They have set up aid programs focusing on emergency aid, health, shelter, education, protection, livelihood and community support, and sanitation. In light of modern technology, distance learning, which was developed through a transnationally co-created materials based on the indigenous principles of non-hierarchical, “circle” learning, is becoming not only increasingly possible but a lifeline for young children as only 1% of refugees worldwide manage to reach post-secondary education, which restricts their life choices as well as the development of their societies (Wills et al., 2020).1 In sum, these diaspora organizations are most likely part of a network of like-minded civil society organizations who aim to assist with the peacebuilding process in Syria (including transitional justice). This network should work more closely together and unify and tighten their linkages to increase the impact of their voice. Moreover, they have specific local knowledge on who to get in contact with on the ground, which people to talk to (or not), to identify the specific local needs and gatekeepers among the Syrians still living in Syria to engage in a successful peacebuilding process in the country and avoid the much cited fallacy of adopting a hierarchical top-down model whereby the international community would identify the needs of the Syrian society without having solicited their local peacebuilding interests and preferences. (3) Syria’s transitional justice process must be built on partnerships between NGO’s and Syrian communities to facilitate the participation and ownership of displaced populations

As explained in Chapter 4, the LTRC Diaspora Project forged a valuable partnership with The Advocates, a U.S.-based NGO with truth commission experience, to coordinate the work of LTRC in the diaspora (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009). The Advocates was a key partner

1 One of the problems, however, is a conceptual dilemma with the offering of postsecondary education. The Canadian government, for example, sometimes perceives it as development but also as humanitarian, when it is in a community affected by conflict. This practice is pursued among many Western donors.

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due to its significant experience working with Liberian asylum seekers by providing them with pro bono attorneys, which earned it a neutral reputation among the Liberian diaspora community. Partner law firms helped to leverage the resources and personnel necessary to conduct outreach and support such a large-scale statement collection process, for example through training and mobilizing over 800 volunteers (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 146). The Advocates referred statement givers to legal services, immigration firms, housing services, mental health care providers, and other important resources (Young & Park, 2009). The organization’s extensive legal experience afforded the LTRC with a vast, international network of law firms, law schools, legal aid clinics, and community organizations, and thus enabled Liberians living in the U.S., U.K. and at a refugee camp in Ghana to share their testimonies, and participate in the country’s truth and reconciliation commission. It would be beneficial for similar partnerships to be forged for Syria’s prospective transitional justice experience. Like the LTRC Diaspora Project, an entire initiative could be developed that is designed specifically to empower displaced Syrian populations to participate in the country’s transitional justice process. Partnerships with local or regional organizations that have legal expertise, truth commission experience, a far-reaching network, knowledge of the Syrian context would significantly contribute to developing a Syrian-led transitional justice process that is rooted in the engagement of displaced populations. The mobilization of extensive legal networks would help leverage the pro bono resources and personnel necessary to implement this large-scale initiative. The work of the LTRC was made possible by more than $10 million of in-kind contributions and pro bono hours donated over two years to the project by individuals, partner law firms, and institutions around the United States and in the United Kingdom (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 4). It is expected that a transitional justice process designed specifically for Syria’s displaced populations would be much costlier, given the extent of the country’s displacement crisis and the geographically wide-spread location of Syrian refugees. Significant financial contributions and charitable donations of resources and personnel will be required to make such an initiative possible. (4) Targeted outreach and statement -taking must be carried out so that all displaced Syrian populations are reached

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Extensive outreach and public awareness-raising campaigns proved to be valuable for informing Liberian communities about the LTRC Diaspora Project’s activities and launching the statement taking efforts. Some of the most effective activities targeted food shops, restaurants, barber shops, churches, mosques, sporting events, and county association meetings. The Advocates also worked to develop outreach materials about the statement-taking process, including brochures, videos, online messaging, presentations, logos, graphics, and a LTRC Peace Song (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 41). These activities enabled the LTRC Diaspora Project to collect 1631statements from Liberians based in the U.S., U.K., and at the Buduburam refugee camp in Ghana (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009). In order to collect statements from Syria’s displaced populations, it would be beneficial to build on documentation efforts that are already underway and gathering information on human rights violations. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, various institutions have worked to collect evidence on alleged human rights violations, notably the International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council established the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law, to establish the facts that led to the perpetrated crimes, and where possible to identify the perpetrators to ensure that they are held accountable (UN Human Rights Council, 2011). Since the beginning of its mandate, the Commission has produced over 20 reports, in addition to numerous periodic updates detailing the human rights violations committed throughout the country that were based on interviews with over 6000 witnesses and victims (UN Human Rights Council, 2018). Moreover, the UN General Assembly passed the resolution 71/248 in December 2016 establishing the “International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2019; Tenove, 2019). This mechanism was established in order to provide assistance in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law, aiming to do so in full independence, impartiality and objectivity. There are two main goals which are (1) to collect, consolidate, preserve, and analyze evidence of violations of international humanitarian

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law and human rights violations and abuses, and (2) to prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, in national, regional or international courts and tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law. The IIIM is not a prosecutor’s office or a court, but focuses on collecting and analyzing information and evidence of international crimes committed in Syria. As such, the IIIM seeks to support accountability processes and bring justice for the victims of serious international crimes committed in Syria since March 2011 (United Nations, 2017). After assessing the information that has already been collected, Syria’s transitional justice process could follow a similar approach of the LTRC Diaspora Project in gathering statements through a broad network of volunteers and conducting large-scale outreach in Syrian communities. One of the biggest and most unanticipated challenges of the LTRC Diaspora Project was the difficulty with getting people to volunteer to give statements (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 147). This was largely due to three major concerns which deterred Liberians from giving such statement: first, there were fears that people’s statements could negatively affect their immigration status; second, the anonymity and use of their statement was sometimes perceived (by Liberian refugees) to be not guaranteed; and third, Liberians living in exile feared retribution for collaborating with the LTRC (Weibelhaus-Brahm, 2010, pp. 397–398). It has been argued that these worries were largely due to the perception that Liberians did not fully own the process and that they were doing the LTRC a favor by giving a statement (Weibelhaus-Brahm, 2010, pp. 397– 398). Such apprehension could be resolved in the case of Syria, indeed it should be, by empowering displaced populations to be leaders within their transitional justice process. For example, Syrian people could volunteer as statement-takers—an approach which would foster the ownership of displaced populations in the documentation process and potentially contribute to its legitimization. Moreover, efforts could be made to raise awareness within Syrian communities, educating displaced populations on documentation efforts with the view of dispelling their concerns. Like the LTRC Diaspora Project, specific procedures could be established to inform participants of potential legal implications of giving a statement, such as offering pre-statement referrals to pro-bono immigration or criminal law firms (Young & Park, 2009, p. 346).

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(5) Transitional justice mechanisms must be carefully selected and operationalized, in accordance with the needs and aspirations of displaced Syrians

The LTRC Diaspora Project focused exclusively on engaging diaspora and refugee populations in the country’s truth and reconciliation commission through statement taking and hearings. Specifically, it held five days of public hearings in St. Paul, Minnesota, during which 31 witnesses from 10 states testified before the Commission (Young & Park, 2009, p. 343). While participants collectively called for justice for human rights and humanitarian violations that occurred in Liberia, no consensus emerged on what type of punitive measures were to be put in place (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p.18). The final report of the LTRC Diaspora Project put forth wide-ranging recommendations made by displaced Liberians for transitional justice measures, including apologies (Nobles, 2008), lustration, compensation for lost property, assistance with finding missing family members, and the establishment of a war crimes court (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009, p. 17). The final report did not specifically call for any reparations to be made to Liberians as redress for their displacement experiences (Dabo, 2012). This is an issue that a transitional peace process in Syria eventually has to find an answer to. Truth and reconciliation commissions are only one option on a much larger laundry list of possible transitional justice mechanisms, which are typically designed to establish a factual historical record of past crimes and abuses.2 Other options include, but are not limited to trials and other judicial proceedings against individuals suspected to have perpetrated human rights violations; reparations to victims of past abuses; and vetting individuals to determine if their past activities or affiliations make the ineligible to hold certain public service positions (Thoms et al., 2010, p. 9). These other mechanisms must also be carefully considered for the Syrian case. Due to the restrictions of Liberia as a comparative case to Syria (see our discussion in Chapter 3 for details), we are limited to exploring transitional justice options outside of truth and reconciliation commissions to make inferences for their potential utility for Syria. However, in order to inform Syria’s prospective transitional justice process, we suggest an 2 For a discussion of the other tools, see, for example, Biton and Salomon (2006), Ghosn and Khoury (2011), Irani (2006), Teitel (2000), Bass (2000), and Clark (2010).

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extensive consultations and statement-taking processes as discussed in the Liberian case in Chapter 4. However, if possible, this statement-taking process should reach larger numbers of the Syrian refugees currently living abroad. This would produce what researchers have called a “thick” dataset that would allow international as well as local Syrian reconciliation practitioners (as well as researchers) to thoroughly review the historical facts and alleged perpetrations. Moreover, it would allow the transitional justice implementing agency to explore various options that best reflect a locally determined definition of justice, and one that incorporates the diverse perspectives of displaced populations. Transitional justice mechanisms should then be selected and sequenced according to the input given by Syrian people. In this way, all members of Syrian civil society, including those who have been displaced, will have a say in what is needed to move past the atrocities that were suffered over the course of the conflict. (6) Innovative information and communication technologies must be used to support the involvement of displaced populations in Syria’s transitional justice process

The LTRC Diaspora project prioritized the use of information and communication technologies in order to support the participation of displaced Liberian populations in the country’s transitional justice process. It forged strategic partnerships with the Georgia Institute of Technology and Benetech in order to build the technological capacity of the LTRC and design new devices at minimal costs. Specifically, the innovative development of an interactive TRC website and a mobile kiosk enabled participants to submit formal testimonies, view hearings, learn about the LTRC Diaspora Project, and communicate with other users. This technology offered a “bottom-up network of Liberian participants,” allowing the voices of locals to be heard (Pelsinger, 2010, p. 734) and that information to be made transparent and publicly accessible. This case effectively demonstrates that technology has the potential to enable truth commissions to collect increased amounts of information, without surpassing limited resources. Moreover, as Tenove (2019) reminds us, modern digital communication technologies (DCTs) creates opportunities for diaspora communities to pursue transitional justice aims, even in the absence of homeland-based processes. Media and communication technologies are important both to recording the perpetration of mass rights violations and to the promotion of transitional justice responses

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to them. These are achieved by exposing, resisting and remembering violence, and repression. Thus, the diaspora including diaspora refugees use DCTs for accountability-seeking, truth-telling, and the recognition or memorialization of victims. For Syria’s prospective transitional justice process, a similar strategic partnership with an academic institution specialized in the innovation of information and communication technologies would be extremely valuable. Specifically, such a partnership could support the creation of a website, enabling victims and witnesses to participate through uploading statements and viewing hearings from afar (Moffett, 2014). An analysis of the LTRC Diaspora Project revealed that few statements were not actually submitted online due to a lack of access to computers and internet services among diaspora members (Haider, 2014). The availability of modern communications technology to displaced persons most likely has changed since the case of Liberia as the availability of such technology has sped up significantly since then. At that time, social media and instant messenger services (e.g. WhatsApp) were less widely used, but the tools have come to allow people to communicate at a significantly large scales and scopes. The advantages of such new technology should be explored and ultimately leveraged in the Syrian transitional justice process, especially since modern smartphones are widely utilized among the refugee community. While a transitional justice website could allow for scaling up participation of displaced Syrians, it would need to be complemented by additional mechanisms to account for interested participants who are unable to access the website (e.g. elderly people). A device like MOSES, the mobile kiosk could also contribute to broadening the reach of transitional justice proceedings while effectively managing limited resources. This type of initiative could be used to collect statements from displaced Syrians in hard-to-reach areas, while significantly reducing the cost through its ability to travel to locations with “no electricity grid and no telecommunications network” (Pelsinger, 2010, p. 738) nearby. Such a cost reduction could mean that the implementing organization of Syria’s prospective transitional justice process could interview Syrians based in both rural and urban areas, rather than having to choose between them based on limited financial resources. Due to the extent of the Syrian displacement crisis, it would likely need to be deployed on a significantly larger scale. MOSES was also carefully designed through an “iterative, participatory process,” involving technological experts, members of the Liberian

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diaspora, and Liberians living in-country (Smyth et al., 2010, p. 1061). It was customized to reflect the circumstances of Liberians living in remote areas, accounting for the country’s low adult literacy rate of 56%, limited internet connectivity, minimal electricity, technological illiteracy, and the country’s rugged terrain (Pelsinger, 2010, p. 736; Smyth et al., 2010, p. 1060). Moreover, the system delivered verbal instructions to the user through audio that was recorded by a Liberian, in an effort to minimize possible language barriers. For Syria’s prospective transitional justice experience, technologies should be designed through a participatory process, in order to ensure that they are carefully customized according to the particularities of the country’s context. Although the videos recorded by the MOSES kiosk were submitted to the LTRC Diaspora Project, the relationship between the two initiatives remained unclear. The MOSES kiosk was not referenced at all in the final report of the LTRC and, after the final report was issued, the device was slated to remain in the field collecting data for three additional years (Pelsinger, 2010, p. 741). Ultimately, MOSES was not considered an official truth-seeking initiative (Pelsinger, 2010). For this reason, concerns were raised that a user could be misled by participating under the false impression that their testimony would result in concrete legal action (Pelsinger, 2010). Accordingly, an important lesson from this Liberian case for Syria is the need to draw a clear distinction between official and unofficial transitional justice mechanisms—that is those that are collected informally and anonymously for documentary and analysis purposes and those that are passed on to the government for legal purposes (e.g. persecutions). Thus, Syria’s prospective transitional justice process should conduct outreach and advocacy events to minimize confusion over the mandates of official and unofficial initiatives. It would be logical to incorporate technological initiatives into official transitional justice proceedings, given that it would be highly costly and time-consuming to collect testimonies in-person. It is important to note that the MOSES kiosk is not the only initiative to record formal testimonies, collect visual evidence, view hearings, etc. The so-called Caesar Exhibit highlights the ongoing torture and mass death carried out by the Assad regime in its prisons and Amnesty International have called the prisons as “Human Slaughterhouse” (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Caesar (pseudonym) was a Syrian military photographer who was conscripted by the Assad regime to take pictures of people who died in military detention centres. In early 2011, Caesar

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began to take notice of civilians being tortured and killed in the detention centers and he began amassing photographic documentation of the civilian deaths. He fled Syria with a flash drive full of photographs as his life became endangered (the flash drive is at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in DC) (Syrian Emergency Task Force, n.d.). There were about 55,000 photos and the majority of the photos were taken between 2011 and 2013 at Syrian military hospitals and the photos depicted groups of people and individuals, men and women, children and elderly and people from different ethnic groups. Most of the 6 786 victims shown in the Caesar photographs were detained by five intelligence agency branches in Damascus. An 86-page report, “If the Dead Could Speak: Mass Deaths and Torture in Syria’s Detention Facilities,” lays out new evidence regarding the authenticity of the Caesar photographs. Human Rights Watch was able to locate and interview 33 relatives and friends of the 27 victims identified in the photographs to verify their authenticity. (7) Displaced populations must be involved in the decision-making and management of Syria’s prospective transitional justice process, including through appointments to positions of responsibility

In the case of Liberia, select efforts were made to involve displaced populations in the decision-making as well as the management of the LTRC Diaspora Project. One of the nine appointed commissioners of the LTRC, Masa Washington, was in fact a long-time member of the Liberian diaspora based in the U.S. (Minikon & Shepler, 2009, p. 141). In addition, a Diaspora Advisory Committee was established, which allowed diaspora members to provide input and strategic advice over the course of the project (The Advocates for Human Rights, 2009). However, there was no reporting available on the recommendations made by the committee. This raises doubts on the extent to which it could actually influence the mandate, activities, and trajectory of the project. A similar mistake should be avoided in the case of Syria’s transitional justice process. It is also recommended that this process goes beyond the formation of a single advisory committee to foster ownership of displaced populations in the decision-making and management stages of the process. Systematic efforts should be made to ensure that displaced populations have a seat at the table, which would allow them to shape the process from the bottom up—that is to help establish a local transitional justice process as opposed to a top-down one (Baines, 2007; Clark, 2010; Garbett, 2012).

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This would signify ‘real participation’ involving ‘co-generative dialogue’ where local people not only advise on the shape and direction of the process, but also have the opportunity to be collaboratively involved in the decision-making of the entire transitional justice process (Drumbl, 2007; Gibson, 2006; Lundy & McGovern, 2008, p. 281). Put differently, the decision-making body for Syria’s transitional justice process should be composed of representatives from all segments of the country’s displaced populations, including migrants, refugees, IDPs, diaspora, and returnees. Moreover, efforts should be made to ensure the diverse representation of ‘local’ Syrians, based on gender, age, ethnicity, religion, and geographic location. Moreover, a diverse, and inclusive representation in management would allow for wide-ranging perspectives to be taken into consideration over the course of the country’s transitional justice process (s.f. Stover & Weinstein, 2004). Finally, it would be important to carefully document the observations and recommendations of the decision-making authority. Ongoing reporting over the course of the initiative would enhance transparency and accountability of the management, and ultimately ensure that the transitional justice process is truly both Syrian-led and Syrian-owned. (8) Monitor legal cases to document atrocities in Syria

Finally, there are a number of ongoing legal cases in a number of different states against individuals who have allegedly committed war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. These cases can be used to puzzle together and ultimately document what happened on the ground and by who. Grant and Paulet (2020) highlight a number of ongoing trials. For instance, war crimes allegedly committed between 2013 and 2014 in Syria by a Palestinian national and former member of the Farouq Brigades who is suspected to have executed at least twenty unarmed and injured Syrian government soldiers in Al Khalidiya and Homs between 2013 and 2014. These murders were allegedly intended to intimidate the population and to force the Syrian army to leave the contested area. The trial is still ongoing in Austria. Moreover, the Syrian Intelligence Services (SIS), which includes the Military intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, and General Intelligence services, and particularly a high-ranking official of the SIS is under investigation for having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. Specifically, the investigation concerns crimes against humanity and war crimes including murder, extermination, torture, serious bodily harm, and

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deprivation of liberty between February 2011 and January 2017 in thirteen detention centers in Damascus, Daraa, Hama, and Aleppo. Again, Austrian authorities initiated an investigation into the Syrian intelligence services after sixteen women and men from Syria filed a criminal complaint to the public prosecutor in Vienna in May 2018. There is also on-going joint investigation in France and Germany for crimes against humanity and torture allegedly committed by Syrian officials in Syria since 2011. Abdulhamid A. was indicted on 15 February 2019 by the investigative judges of the specialized unit for the prosecution of genocide, placed in pre-trial detention. The suspect is a Syrian national and former member of the General Intelligence Directorate, one of the four Syrian intelligence agencies. The charges levied against this person are crimes against humanity. What is known about this case is that since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syrian Intelligence Services have reportedly been systematically arresting, torturing, and killing opposition activists. As a former member of the GID, Abdulhamid A. is suspected of having participated in crimes committed against the civilian population by the Syrian regime between 2011 and 2013. In an ongoing investigation in France for international crimes committed in Syria in 2013, Ali Mamluk (Director of the National Security Bureau), Jamil Hassan (head of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence), and Abdel Salam Mahmoud (Director of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Investigative Branch) are suspects in having committed crimes against humanity, torture and enforced disappearances, and war crimes. Specifically, in November 2013, Patrick Dabbagh and his father Mazen Dabbagh, both dual French-Syrian nationals, were arrested from their home in Damascus by Syrian Air Force Intelligence agents and detained for interrogation at the Mezzeh detention center. Neither one has been seen since. In summer 2018, the Dabbagh family received formal notification from the Syrian authorities that Patrick and Mazen Dabbagh had died. According to the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, Mezzeh has one of the highest mortality rates in Syria. The judicial investigation is ongoing and international arrest warrants have been issued after around 20 witnesses who were held in the Mezzeh detention centre in Damascus have given testimony to the court. Moreover, there are three ongoing investigations against the uncle of Bashar (Hafez al-Assad), the former Vice President and head of the Defense Brigades in Syria in Switzerland. This individual is accused of having committed war crimes in Hama in 1982. The suspect is the

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brother of the former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and uncle of the current President Bashar al-Assad. That person was also the former head of the Defense Brigades, Syria’s elite commando troops, from 1971 to 1984. As noted, the investigation is ongoing in Switzerland as well as in France (yet on different grounds). On 9 December 2019, his trial opened in Paris. He is suspected of having embezzled Syrian public funds and then laundered the money through numerous companies. The charges include organized gang laundering, aggravated tax evasion, and misappropriation of Syrian public funds between 1984 and 2016. In Spain, an indictment has been issued by a judge on similar grounds. In sum, these judicial proceedings are likely to take years to complete. But when prosecutors collect evidence to be presented to the court, that information will not only become public, but will also help peacebuilders engaged in transitional justice processes to establish facts and document abuses, crimes against humanity, or even war crimes. This documentation is necessary to initiate a post-conflict healing process in Syria.

Bibliography Aman, M. (2014). Diaspora organisations as strategic agents of development. The Africa Diaspora Policy Center. https://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/ EADPD/24022014EADPD-Report-def.pdf. Baines, E. K. (2007). The haunting of Alice: local approaches to justice and reconciliation in northern Uganda. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1(1), 91–114. Bass, G. J. (2000). Stay the hand of vengeance: The politics of war crimes tribunals. Princeton University Press,. Biton, Y., & Salomon, G. (2006). Peace in the eyes of Israeli and Palestinian youths: Effects of collective narrative and peace education program. Journal of Peace Research, 43(2), 167–180. Clark, P. (2010). The Gacaca courts, post-genocide justice and reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without lawyers. Cambridge University Press. Dabo, A. (2012). In the presence of absence: Truth-Telling and displacement in liberia. International Center for Transitional Justice. Drumbl, M. A. (2007). Atrocity, punishment and international law. Cambridge University Press,. Foster, D., Heins, D., Kalla, M., Garnett McKenzie, M., O’Neal, J., Park, R., & Young, L.A. (2009). A house with two rooms: Final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia Diaspora Project. The Advocates for Human Rights.

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Garbett, C. (2012). Transitional justice and ‘national ownership’: An assessment of the institutional development of the war crimes chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Human Rights Review, 13(1), 65–84. Ghosn, F., & Khoury, A. (2011). Lebanon after the civil war: Peace or the illusion of peace? Middle East Journal, 65(3), 381–397. Gibson, J. L. (2006). The contributions of truth to reconciliation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(3), 409–432. Grant, P., & Paulet, V. (2020). Universal jurisdiction annual review 2020. TRIAL International. https://trialinternational.org/wp-content/upl oads/2020/03/TRIAL-International_UJAR-2020_DIGITAL.pdf. Haider, H. (2014). Transnational transitional justice and reconciliation: The participation of conflict-generated diasporas in addressing the legacies of mass violence. Journal of Refugee Studies, 27 (2), 207–233. https://doi.org/10. 1093/jrs/feu002. Human Rights Watch. (2016). Syria: Stories behind photos of killed detainees. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/16/syria-stories-behind-photos-kil led-detainees. Irani, G. E. (2006). Apologies and reconciliation: Middle eastern rituals. In E. Barkin & A. Karn (Eds.), Taking wrongs seriously: Apologies and reconciliation (pp. 132–151). Stanford University Press. Lundy, P., & McGovern, M. (2008). Whose justice? Rethinking transitional justice from the bottom up. Journal of Law and Society, 35(2), 265–292. Minikon, P. B., & Shepler, S. (2009). Documenting human rights abuses among the diaspora: Lessons learned from the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In N. Shawki & M. Cox (Eds.), Negotiating sovereignty and human rights (pp. 141–158). Routledge. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. (2019). Development policy and development cooperation. https://um.fi/development-policy-and-development-coo peration. Moffett, L. (2014). Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court. Routledge. Nobles, M. (2008). The politics of official apologies. Cambridge University Press. OHCHR. (2020). Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/iicisyria/ pages/independentinternationalcommission.aspx. Pelsinger, S. (2010). Liberia’s long tail: How web 2.0 is changing and challenging truth commissions. Human Rights Law Review, 10(4), 730–748. Smyth, T. N., Etherton, J., & Best, M. L. (2010). MOSES: Exploring new ground in media and post-conflict reconciliation. CHI 2010: Crisis Informatics. Stover, E., & Weinstein, H. M. (Eds.). (2004). My neighbor, my enemy: Justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity. Cambridge University Press.

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Syrian Emergency Task Force. (n.d). The Caesar exhibit. https://www.syriantas kforce.org/exhibi. Teitel, R. (2000). Transitional justice. Oxford University Press. Tenove, C. (2019). Networking justice: Digitally-enabled engagement in transitional justice by the Syrian diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 42(11), 1950–1969. Thoms, O., Ron, J., & Paris, R. (2008). The effects of transitional justice mechanisms (pp. 1–86). University of Ottawa Centre for International Policy Studies. Thoms, O., Ron, J., & Paris, R. (2010). State-level effects of transitional justice: What do we know? International Journal of Transitional Justice, 4(3), 329– 354. United Nations. (2017). Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the resolution establishing the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanisms to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. United Nations Report. https://und ocs.org/A/71/755/Add.1. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2016). Joint contribution of DRC Diaspora Programme. https://www.unhcr.org/5a324e9f7.pdf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2018a). Syria emergency. http://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2018b). Resettlement and other admission pathways for syrian refugees. http://www.unhcr.org/enus/protection/resettlement/573dc82d4/resettlement-other-admission-pat hways-syrian-refugees.html. United Nations Human Rights Council. (2018). Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. https://www.ohchr.org/ EN/hrbodies/hrc/iicisyria/pages/independentinternationalcommission.aspx. United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution. Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, S-17/1 (22 August 2011). Weibelhaus-Brahm, E. (2010). A volunteer’s perspective on the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project. Journal of Human Rights Practice, 2(3), 386–400. Wills, E. R., El Richani, D., & Abu-Zahra, N. (2020). Building new practices of solidarity: The community mobilization in a crisis project. Gender & Development, 28(1), 51–68. Young, L. A., & Park, R. (2009). Engaging Diasporas in Truth Commissions: Lessons from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3(3), 341–361.

CHAPTER 7

Complexities of the Safe Return of Refugees

Abstract This chapter examines the complexities of the safe return of refugees, in the context of forced displacement from conflict-affected countries. Specifically, it explores how the concept of repatriation has evolved, what returnees see as a condition for a safe return, as well as the challenges that complicate a safe return. Transitional justice mechanisms may be a critical tool in creating the conditions for a safe and sustainable return. Keywords Safe return · Refugees · Repatriation · Transitional justice · Reconciliation

7.1

Introduction

Recent studies have emphasized the importance of security conditions and guaranteeing protection for refugees returning to their home country (Bradley, 2012; Içduygu & Nimer, 2020). Important questions have been raised such as: “What are the conditions of just return?” and “Who is responsible for ensuring that these conditions are met? (Bradley, 2012). There are gaps within the literature due in part to a lack of emphasis on examining what states of origin owe to returning refugees. Success © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. Mieszkalski and B. Zyla, Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6_7

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of return has been measured in terms of the number of refugees, rather than the sustainability of their reintegration in their home countries. This neglects looking at what it means for the refugees to return home (Duthie, 2011), and can lead to missing the need for institutional monitoring of refugees’ experiences and needs once they reintegrate in their home country (Black et al., 2004; Butman, 2009). A number of possible factors that could complicate the safe return of refugees have been examined, such as continued repression, abuse, threats, access to land, housing shortages, economic difficulties, inadequate infrastructure, administrative problems, and antagonism from local populations in their home countries (Stefansson, 2006). Transitional mechanisms could be a critical tool in creating the conditions for a safe return and also ensuring sustainable return once the returnees are back in their home country (Hovil, 2012). In this chapter, we examine how the concept of repatriation has evolved, what returnees see as a condition for a safe return, and we analyze the challenges surrounding the achievement of safe return.

7.2

Complexities of Safe Return

Due to the civil war in Syria, it has been reported that the number of Syrian refugees are at approximately 5.2 million and this only accounts for Syrians that are registered with UNHCR (2018). This number, of course, needs to be considered with caution as the situation on the ground in Syria is still in flux. Vignal (2018) examines the volatile and complex situation that Syrian refugees have to face given “the progressive closure of borders by the main neighboring countries hosting refugees, the hardening of conditions in Jordan and Lebanon, and the costs to the international community incurred by the deployment of the largest humanitarian response ever” (p. 69). Given the volatile and unpredictable environment, conditions for repatriation have not been clear-cut. Yahya (2018) notes that many of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon have the same concerns about repatriation due to fears of their safety. Some fear persecution from the government, and young men fear conscription to the army and thus the war. For Syrian refugees to return, they are looking to receive reliable information on the outcome of the civil war and to see prospects of a future, such as the reconstruction of the country (Gantri & Mufti, 2017; Içduygu & Nimer, 2020). Furthermore, various studies have noted that Syrian refugees are rejecting the government’s proposal to split the country into safe zones; they want to return to their own homes and not

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be placed in stable and low-tension areas (Gantri & Mufti, 2017; Içduygu & Nimer, 2020; Vignal, 2018). As such, Gantri and Mufti (2017) and El Asmar et al. (2019) examines the common priorities among Syrian refugees for return. This includes safety and security; access to shelter and sustainable livelihoods, physical reconstruction of homes and infrastructure; compensation for restitution for the loss of property; and access to education for children and family reunification. While there have been studies that explore return aspirations, in particular among Syrian refugees residing in Turkey and Lebanon, there has been a gap in the literature that deeply examines what happens after refugees return back home (Içduygu & Nimer, 2020). In the context of Syria, Ziadeh (2019) notes that it is not clear yet what specific accountability mechanisms would be implemented in Syria, but points out that a start would be to have a historical record to determine how many people have been killed in order to establish legal responsibility. In addition, there is a need for quantitative analyses of human rights violations and not just fatalities in order to establish historical records and identify patterns of violence (Ziadeh, 2019). At the same time, there are reports outlining that repatriation faces many challenges, especially for those who have returned to their home country (Black, 2001; Butman, 2009; Stefansson, 2006). For example, in Kosovo, returning refugees faced the reality of ethnic divisions and violence. When Kosovo declared independence in 2008, efforts were placed to encourage Serbian refugees to return. As a result, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) invested in personnel and monetary resources to address property restitution for the returning refugees (Joireman, 2017). Joireman (2017) examines how Serbian returnees have chosen to live in rural areas, which contrasts with the findings of studies pertaining to Colombia and Liberia. Butman (2009) and Williams show that returnees to Colombia and Liberia preferred to settle in urban areas when they returned due to work opportunities there and being close to health or education facilities. However, Joireman’s (2017) study of Kosovo looks at how rural enclaves were preferred by Serbian returnees because they are isolated from the majority of the population, to avoid societal tensions. In many areas, there were cases of violence and attacks against Serbian returnees. The study shows that between 2012 and 2014, there were about 1181 reported security incidents against Serbian returnees. For example, attacks consisted of burglary, land occupation, verbal and physical harassment as well as

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shooting and arson (Joireman, 2017). In addition, Stefansson (2006) examines why repatriated Bosniaks (mostly ethnic minority groups) in Bosnia and Herzegovina rarely ventured into public spaces such as coffee shops, restaurants, or shops located in central locations. They were careful not to reveal their ethnicity and the study shows how property restitution did not change the demographic result of ethnic cleansings. While there was still ethnic division taking place in Bosnia, the international community perceived that the return of ethnic minority in their home country would foster reconciliation (Black, 2001).

7.3 Safe Return and Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Processes The most recent literature has examined the challenges of linking return and transitional justice and reconciliation processes (Bradley, 2012; Hovil, 2012). Most researchers have argued that refugees returning to their home country cannot be seen as a manifestation of reconciliation. Instead, the social, economic, and cultural fabrics of these divided countries needs to be improved through designing innovative projects (Ogata, 2003). Studies have pointed out UNCHR’s initiation of a program called ‘Imagine Coexistence’ where the program focused on the fact that while reconciliation may not be unattainable during the early stages of conflict, when refugees return to their home country, interventions that benefited members of divided communities could lead to a sustainable return (Chayes & Minow, 2003; Haider, 2009). The project employed programs such as employment, education, sports and culture and the media (Babbitt et al., 2002). Nevertheless, some argue about the feasibility and sustainability of this approach because these reintegration programs were planned and integrated without taking into account the national development priorities and processes. A range of transitional justice interventions have been attributed to the safe return of refugees, such as the establishment of restitution commissions where hundreds of thousands of displaced persons have been able to reclaim their property. Duthie (2011) states that ensuring access to property does not encompass the entirety of safe return or reconciliation for refugees, but represents a valuable resource and embeds to a certain degree trust in their government, which, as we have known from the fragile states literature, is essential to overcome fragile situations.

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Domestic tribunals in countries such as Bosnia and Cambodia have persecuted those involved for uprooting refugees, and labeled these acts as a violation of human rights. Tribunals may play a role to allow for a safe return by holding those people accountable from the communities the refugees would be returning to (Bradley, 2012). Harris-Rimmer (2010) and Roht-Arriaza (2004) examine Timor-Leste’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). The CAVR aimed to “facilitate the return of displaced persons, including about 10,000 low-level offenders and former militia members, the CAVR’s reception function enabled those accused of ‘less serious’ crimes to return after admitting their wrongdoing according to the terms set by the community” (Bradley, 2012, p. 14). According to Bradley (2012), Harris-Rimmer (2010), and Roht-Arriaza (2004), this did not only resolve the displacement of low-level perpetrators, but most importantly, it allowed Timor-Leste to advance broader reintegration processes by strengthening their local level governance structures. However, Duthie (2011), Bradley (2012), and Longman et al. (2004) examine challenges because transitional justice institutions and programs may have to make decisions on who may be eligible or not for such benefits and assistance, leading to further conflicts in order access benefits. In addition, transitional justice institutions may not share the same perspective as those who have taken over the refugee’s property or home, which further undermines efforts of the return of refugees. Hovil (2012) argues that caution is needed when promoting reconciliation because this may unintentionally exacerbate returnees’ marginalization and feelings of tension. For example, the UNCHR established a network called ‘Peace Villages’ in order to accommodate refugees who have returned and who were landless in Burundi (Falisse & Niyonkuru, 2015). While the “villages were to reflect a vision of an ethnically reconciled Burundi, in practice they were mono-ethnic, economically and geographically isolated communities that returnees saw as a new form of exile” (Bradley, 2012, p. 15). Most importantly, reconciliation must proceed with caution because citizens who have remained during the conflict may experience feelings of resentment towards returning refugees, further complicating societal reintegration, as seen in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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7.4

Safe Return of Refugees

As Zeender and McCallin (2013) examine, in the example of the return process in Burundi, the signing of the Arusha Agreement shows issues that typically follow as refugees return to their home country due to lack of transitional mechanisms being in place. Since 2002, almost half a million refugees returned back to Burundi, refugees have stayed mainly in Tanzania, which has pressured Burundian refugees to return back to their country. Several challenges have hampered the safe return of refugees, such as limitations on resources and limited land availability for Burundian refugees to rebuild their livelihood (Zeender & McCallin, 2013). Burundian law exacerbated these challenges, given that the law excludes refugees from re-accessing their land as they have been out of the country for an extended period of time; the majority have been out of the country since 1972. In many contexts, there are certain differences between national laws and international norms, which constitutes a further layer of complexity. As such, the Arusha Peace Accord acknowledged the need to accommodate returning refugees by ensuring that their right to own, recover their property, or compensation if needed are provided. Nevertheless, in many cases, returning refugees are faced to share their land that they previously owned with current owners of the land (Hovil, 2012). A study by Stein and Cuny has pointed out that “too often, women’s needs and concerns are treated as an additional and separate category, or as an afterthought rather than as an integral part of overall planning for returnees (2006, p. 182). Efforts must ensure that women have access to land resources, credit, health care, and agricultural inputs. Women encounter significant challenges to re-access their land and in the case of Burundi, the law prohibits women to inherit land from their parents and widows struggle to possess their husband’s land (Dolgopol, 2006; Hovil, 2012). As such, women-headed households, in particular widows and women without husbands, face challenges accessing land and in some cases supporting their families. Dolgopol (2006) argues that the Arusha Peace Accord and the overall process was flawed because women were not active participants in the negotiations; women were only consulted at the last stage of the peace processes. Studies have shown that there has been a push to integrate women’s rights within the pre-conflict context and the need to address inequalities and discrimination that existed before the conflict (Dolgopol, 2006). In this regard, Hovil (2012) points to the importance of transitional justice mechanisms, as it can recognize the

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specific nature of suffering that groups have experienced such as the realization of equal citizenship regardless of gender. This in turn can become a driver for post-conflict resolution and restore the citizen-state bond. The restitution of property or accessing and re-claiming land for returning refugees has been identified as a key obstacle in various literatures (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2014). For example, Huggins has pointed out that the majority of refugees returning back to their home country are engaged in agricultural work, especially in Africa and Asia. Land therefore is a crucial factor in determining successful reintegration that ensures a sustainable livelihood. Similar to Burundi and the African Great Lake region, other countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan, and Rwanda have experienced complications in ensuring access to land for returning refugees due to the conflicts that destroyed their former home and land, making it inhabitable to access. Upon returning, refugees discover that another person now owns their land. Moreover, returnees are not welcomed in certain communities and national policies may have changed land rights or the state now owns the land (Hammond, 2010; Pantuliano et al., 2007). Nishimori (2016) also points out that a major concern that Myanmar refugees face has been “land-grabbing” because many of the refugees have been away from Myanmar for many years. Once they returned, someone else may now own their land and in some cases the military has transformed their land into a military post or plantation. In the Syrian context, recent studies have shown that housing, land, and property issues are seen as an important factor for return among refugees (El Asmar et al., 2019).

7.5

Resettlement Versus Repatriation

During the Cold War there was very little research on exploring what would occur once refugees return to their home country. This changed with the Cold War’s end. Hence, there is not much information on analyzing either the safe-return or the sustainable return or just return of refugees (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018) from a longitudinal perspective. As Allen and Morsink (1994) and Allen (1996) have pointed out, during the Cold War resettlement was preferred rather than seeing repatriation as a solution to refugee situations. During this period, refugees from Eastern Europe were welcomed by the U.S. and allied countries, promoting the value and ideology of the ‘free world’ (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot, 2018). In some cases, highly skilled and educated refugees

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served to provide valuable information from the USSR or from Eastern European countries. As a result, United States and other allied countries adopted flexible asylum policies in order to advance local resettlement and integration of refugees. Crisp (2001) notes that this trend was reflected in the UNHCR’s approach in repatriation operations as reintegration assistance was not fully outlined or included in their policies. Moreover, Kibreab (1999) and Warner (1994) explore that during this period, repatriation was not seen as a complex process; it was seen as refugees simply returning to their home country and thereby overcoming important obstacles, such as political stability. The end of the Cold War and the rise of conflicts in Africa brought major changes to repatriation; in light of the refugee crises in the Balkans, Africa, and Southeast Asia (Chimni, 2004). Macrae (1999) and Duffy Toft (2016) argue that Western countries were becoming increasingly reluctant to welcome refugees. As a result, asylum policies became stricter and indeed restrictive. During this period, scholars were examining voluntary repatriation which has raised criticism noting that this field of study remains relatively undeveloped (Takahashi, 1997). Towards the end of the 1990s, other studies focused on examining the conditions of the returning refugees’ home country (Black & Koser, 1999). For example, Takahashi (1997) argues that for the international community to encourage the return of refugees to their home country, their country of origin needs to induce fundamental change in order to ensure the safe returns for refugees. Stein (1997) examines the challenges to the safe return of refugees since repatriation has become a global threat where repatriation has become militarized. Others have found that refugees who had returned back to their home country have experienced economic, psychological, and social challenges (Black & Koser, 1999; Majodina, 1995). For example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, armed militias were formed to prevent the return of refugees to the areas and similarly, in Bhutan, repatriation was violently blocked by locals. Hence, there has been a shift for proactive policies that focused on the country of origin and an emphasis that the international community and the country of origin needs to create conditions that are conducive for their safe return (Ogata, 1995).

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7.6

129

Conclusion

In this chapter we have provided an overview of how the repatriation of refugees to their home countries has evolved over time, in particular after the Cold War and in light of the rise of conflicts in Africa, the Balkans, and Southeast Asia. Recently, the conflict in Syria has exacerbated issues around the refugee crisis. We found that the main reasons that complicate the safe return of refugees were concerned with political problems and the refugee’s socio-economic wellbeing in their country of origin (or home country). As such, the most recent literature has found that the process of refugees returning back to their country is accompanied by a number of socioeconomic barriers and does not solve all the problems, and there is no reason to believe that the case of Syria might be an exception in this regard. This is an issue that international donors should examine closely when supporting Syria in its transitional justice process. In many cases, humanitarian aid contributes to alleviating some of the struggles for returning refugees, but as we have shown, this is only a short-term solution as it fails to recognize and deal with the root causes of inequality. As such, long-term solutions and transitional justice mechanisms can play a role in ensuring that policies for a safe return can be achieved.

Bibliography Allen, B. (1996). Rape warfare. The hidden genocide in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Allen, T., & Morsink, H. (1994). When refugees go home: African experiences (1st American ed.). Africa World Press. Babbitt, et al. (2002). Imagine coexistence: Assessing refugee reintegration efforts in divided communities. Geneva: UN High Commissioner on Refugees. Black, R. (2001). Return and reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Missing link, or mistaken priority? The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 21(2), 177–199. https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2001.0031. Black, R., & Koser, K. (1999). The end of the refugee cycle? Refugee repatriation and reconstruction. Berghahn Books. Black, et al. (2004). Understanding voluntary return, Home Office Report 50/04. London: Home Office. Bradley, M. (2012). Displacement, transitional justice and reconciliation: Assumptions, challenges and lessons. Refugee Studies Centre. https://www.refworld. org/pdfid/4f993f1d2.pdf.

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Butman, M. (2009). Urbanization vs. rural return in post-conflict Liberia (Dissertation). Chayes, A., & Minow, M. (2003). Imagine coexistence: Restoring humanity after violent ethnic conflict (1st ed.). Jossey-Bass. Chimni, B. (2004). From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: Towards a critical history of durable solutions to refugee problems. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 23(3), 55–73. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/23.3.55. Crisp, J. (2001). Mind the gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process. International Migration Review, 35(1), 168–191. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2001.tb00010.x. Dolgopol, U. (2006). WOMEN AND PEACE BUILDING: What we can learn from the Arusha Peace Agreement. Australian Feminist Studies, 21(50), 257– 273. https://doi.org/10.1080/08164640600731804. Duffy Toft, M. (2016). The myth of the borderless world: Refugees and repatriation policy. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 24(2), 139–157. https:// doi.org/10.1080/07388940701257549. Duthie, R. (2011). Transitional justice and displacement. The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 5, 241–261. El Asmar, F., Shwaf, N., & Mikdashi, D. (2019). No one asked: Amplyfying the voices of Syrian Refugee women in Lebanon on their power to decide (Oxfam Research Reports). https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com. Falisse, J., & Niyonkuru, R. (2015). Social engineering for reintegration: Peace villages for the “uprooted” returnees in Burundi. Journal of Refugee Studies, 28(3), 388–411. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fev002. Fransen, S., & Kuschminder, K. (2014). Lessons learned from refugee return settlement policies: A case study on Burundi’s rural integrated villages. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 33(1), 59–76. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/ hdt023. Gantri, R., & Mufti, K. (2017). Not without dignity: Views of Syrian refugees in Lebanon on displacement, conditions of return, and coexistence (ICTJ Report). Haider, H. (2009). (Re)Imagining coexistence: Striving for sustainable return, reintegration and reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3(1), 91–113. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ ijn035. Hammond, L (2010). Moving people in Ethiopia: Development, displacement and the state. Edited by Alula Pankhurst and François Piguet. Journal of Refugee Studies, 23(3), 398–400. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feq029. Harris-Rimmer, S. (2010). Women cut in half: Refugee women and the commission for reception, truth-seeking, and reconciliation in Timor-Leste. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 29(2), 85–103.

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Hovil, L. (2012). Gender, transitional justice, and displacement: Challenges in Africa’s Great Lakes region. International Center for Transitional Justice & Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement. Içduygu, A., & Nimer, M. (2020). The politics of return: Exploring the future of Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Third World Quarterly, 41(3), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1675503. Joireman, S. (2017). Ethnic violence, local security and return migration: Enclave communities in Kosovo. International Migration, 55(5), 122–135. https:// doi.org/10.1111/imig.12316. Kibreab, G. (1999). Revisiting the debate on people, place, identity and displacement. Journal of Refugee Studies, 12(4), 384–410. https://doi.org/10.1093/ jrs/12.4.384. Longman, T., Pham, P., & Weinstein, H. (2004). Connecting justice to human experience: Attitudes toward accountability and reconciliation in Rwanda. In E. Stover & H. Weinstein (Eds.), My neighbour, my enemy: Justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity. Cambridge University Press. Macrae, J. (1999). Aiding peace and war: UNCHR, returnee reintegration, and the relief-development debate. New Issues in Refugee Research. https://media. africaportal.org http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pubs/pubon.htm. Majodina, Z. (1995). Dealing with difficulties of return to South Africa: The role of social support and coping. Journal of Refugee Studies, 8(2), 210–227. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/8.2.210. Nishimori, Y. (2016). The reality and dilemmas of voluntary repatriation: A case study of the refugees in the Myanmar-Thailand border areas. Journal of Human Security Studies, 5(2), 123–141. https://www.jahss-web.org/. Ogata, S. (1995).Opening statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In UNHCR, Report of the Forty-sixth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme. Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org. Ogata, S. (2003). Human Security and state security. Human security now. Final report from the UN commission on human security. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/91BAEEDBA 50C6907C1256D19006A9353-chs-security-may03.pdf. Pantuliano, S., Buchanan-Smith, M., & Murphy, P. (2007). The long road home: Opportunities and obstacles to the reintegration of IDPs and refugees returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas (Report). Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London. Roht-Arriaza, N. (2004). Reparations in the aftermath of repression and mass violence. In E. Stover & H. Weinsten (Eds.), My neighbour, my enemy: Justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity. Cambridge University Press.

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Stefansson, A. (2006). Homes in the making: Property restitution, refugee return, and senses of belonging in a post-war Bosnian town. International Migration, 44(3), 115–139. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435. 2006.00374.x. Stein, B. (1997). Refugee repatriation, return, and refoulement during conflict. USAID Conference. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi= 10.1.1.500.8396&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Stein, B., & Cuny, F. (2006). Refugee repatriation during conflict: Protection and post-return assistance. Development in Practice, 4(3), 173–187. https:// doi.org/10.1080/096145249100077811. Takahashi, S. (1997). The UNHCR handbook on voluntary repatriation: The emphasis of return over protection. International Journal of Refugee Law, 9(4), 593–612. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/9.4.593. Tegenbos, J., & Vlassenroot, K. (2018). Going home? A systematic review of the literature on displacement, return and cycles of violence. Fraunhofer-Institut fur Materialfluss und Logistik. https://doi.org/10.21953/lse.90o7jyrklz54. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2018). Syria emergency. http://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html. Vignal, L. (2018). Perspectives on the return of Syrian refugees. Forced Migration Review, University of Oxford. https://hal.univ-rennes2.fr/hal-02057056/ document. Warner, D. (1994). Voluntary repatriation and the meaning of return to home: A critique of liberal mathematics. Journal of Refugee Studies, 7 (2–3), 160–174. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/7.2-3.160. Yahya, M. (2018). Unheard voices (pp. 1–73) (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—Reports). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Zeender, G., & McCallin, B. (2013). Durable solutions for internally displaced persons in Burundi within reach. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 32(1), 74–100. Ziadeh, R. (2019). Accountability in Syria: Achieving transitional justice in a post conflict society. Lexington Books.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

Abstract This chapter reflects on this project’s main findings and concludes by exploring future avenues for research on the nexus between transitional justice and forced displacement. It also offers a preliminary analysis on the potential implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in Syria, and how it could affect transitional justice processes. Keywords Syria · Transitional justice · Displacement · Refugee · COVID-19

To recall, the objective of this book was to contribute to emerging discussions on transitional justice processes that are an integral part of the larger local peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes in Syria. Specifically, our aim was to show that based on lessons learned from other cases (primarily here Liberia), Syria’s transitional justice process must be locally designed, owned, and implemented in order to suit the needs and aspirations of all members of Syrian civil society. This process also includes the Syrian refugees that are currently displaced abroad. In other words, one key argument was that in order to foster long-term legitimacy and sustainability in said transitional justice process, the Syrian transitional justice process must be locally owned and carefully designed to suit © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. Mieszkalski and B. Zyla, Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6_8

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the country’s context. In this regard, the integration of displaced Syrian populations and refugees at all levels of the country’s transitional justice process would greatly contribute to ensuring that Syria’s civil society can move past the country’s long legacy of conflict and human rights violations (even war crimes) once the civil war has ended. Theoretically, this book contributed to addressing a lacuna in the literature on local peacebuilding by examining the nexus between transitional justice, forced displacement, and (local) peacebuilding. More specifically, despite a recent movement in scholarship towards bottomup, and participatory transitional justice, there is a limited understanding of how to carry out such an approach in practical terms. We tried to help fill this gap, but undoubtedly more research is needed in this regard. Moreover, our analysis was informed critical perspectives on liberal peacebuilding as the theoretical foundation for our analysis, which supports the argument that long-term legitimacy and sustainability in peacebuilding requires processes to be contextually customized and locally owned (Baker & Obradovic-Wochnik, 2016; Richmond, 2010; Visoka & Doyle, 2014). Accordingly, we sought to address these two gaps through the conceptualization of a locally driven transitional justice for Syria that is founded upon the integration of displaced populations in the peace and reconciliation process. In addition to these theoretical contributions, we explained the practical value of bottom-up, participatory transitional justice processes, as well as the lessons learned from comparative case studies where these processes have been implemented and successfully engaged displaced populations (our case here Liberia). Finally, in spite of the fact that the peace process in Syria continues to be in flux at the time of writing due to the ongoing conflict, we also offered some practical policy recommendations for international peacebuilders of how to involve the ‘local’ Syrian population in possible transitional justice processes once a peace agreement has been signed. In other words, our findings also speak to policy officials and we provide (some) recommendations for a locally driven transitional justice process for Syria that is founded on lessons learned from the Liberian transitional justice process and especially the integration of displaced populations and refugees in said process. Bradley’s (2012) “steps to involve displaced populations in transitional justice” were followed in our analysis as a methodological tool to identify lessons learned with regard to fostering ownership and participation of displaced

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Liberians. These lessons were then used to develop seven policy recommendations on how to integrate displaced ‘local’ Syrians at all levels of the country’s prospective transitional justice process, including its conception and design; operationalization; and decision-making and management. Although this book sought to contribute to the literature on peacebuilding in Syria by developing practical recommendations on the integration of displaced populations in local transitional justice processes, additional research is evidently required in order to further advance this undertheorized area of research. Specifically, we have yet to fully understand how knowledge by the local population transmits and perhaps even fosters a locally informed and driven peacebuilding process. Moreover, empirically speaking, there is limited publicly available data on transitional justice cases that involve displaced populations and refugees aside from the case of Liberia. This lack of primary data was the main reason for why we discarded Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone as comparative cases in this study, and they would not be able to yield much analytical value for our analysis. Moreover, as previously mentioned, it was beyond the scope of this book to carry out a large-scale, cross-case or even longitudinal analysis to exhaustively examine all possible options of how to engage displaced populations. As the contemporary conflict in Syria continues to be characterized by complex displacement scenarios and remains very much in flux, additional research is clearly needed to carve out more comprehensive and practical approaches to better understand how international donors could foster local transitional justice processes, as well as increase the participation of displaced populations in said processes.1 We should also be reminded of some of the shortfalls of transitional justice processes, as noted by the most recent literature on this subject, in particular with regards to neglecting the complex ways in which power has been exercised between the national and subnational levels. The most recent literature, however, has also underlined the importance of the participation of diaspora populations in transitional justice, given that these groups at times are better able to document atrocities, protect witnesses, and prosecute perpetrators, in comparison to those who are living back home. This finding is consistent with those in our comparative case study on Liberia.

1 For more, see Shaw and Waldorf (2010) and Wilson (2001).

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Ultimately, it is indisputable that Syria has a long road ahead. Recent media reporting reveals that discussions are already underway on the possible timing for the return of Syrian refugees (Wroughton, 2018). Many questions remain, however, including how the international community could go about addressing the systematic human rights abuses conducted by all conflict parties. Although Syria’s future is unclear, the diplomatic efforts that are currently underway at the time of writing afford a glimmer of hope to all of those who have been affected by the country’s ongoing violent conflict. In the meantime, it will be important for actors like the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to continue their efforts to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law; to establish the facts and circumstances that amounted to such violations; and to identify those responsible to ensure that perpetrators of violations are held accountable (UN Human Rights Council, 2011). It is with hope that these efforts will start a process of bringing justice, reconciliation, and peace to all levels of the Syrian civil society, including displaced Syrians currently residing abroad. However, we must be conscious of the fact that truth and reconciliation processes are highly context-specific (Meernik & Guerrero, 2014; Mendeloff, 2004). Thus, a mere replication of ready-made blueprints and toolkits is most likely going to be ineffective (Clark, 2012, p. 338). Nevertheless, past lessons learned from the Liberian can undoubtedly inform the Syrian-led truth and reconciliation process.

8.1

Fruitful Avenues for Future Research

In addition to the aforementioned findings, scholars have also pointed out that transitional justice has been politicized (Davidovic, 2019). In the case of Rwanda, the type of truth has been framed between politics and power where the gacaca community courts have used these narratives to shape national reconciliation. The power relations dynamic may determine who gets to be included or excluded from participating in transitional justice initiatives. Recent literature has examined artistic and cultural initiatives to engage individuals and communities in transitional justice processes. Cohen (2020) argues that artistic and cultural forms and processes can indeed facilitate the expression and participation of groups that have been

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marginalized, allowing to open spaces for diverse perspectives. In addition, artistic and cultural processes “can be crafted to engage individuals and communities in transforming consciousness, building relationships and reimagining the future and even in the context of ongoing violence and repression, the arts can suggest the possibility of accountability, offer glimpses of freedom, and even bring the idea of reconciliation into the communal imaginary” (Cohen, 2020, p. 2). Similarly, Jeffery (2020) argues that formal criminal justice processes cannot fully address the complexities of interpersonal issues and the human rights violations that individuals and societies have experienced. As such, the arts may play an effective role in filling those gaps. Jeffery (2020) looks at Cambodia as a case study where a range of different art projects has been used to foster intergenerational dialogue as a means of achieving formal and legal processes as well as to encourage reconciliation, rebuilding relationships, encouraging, understanding and healing emotional wounds. For example, Vann Narth’s paintings were accepted as evidence in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) as his works reflected his experience under the Khmer Rouge. His paintings were used as a means of uncovering historical truth and to campaign for justice for the victims and survivors of the Khmer Rouge. The ECCC’s acceptance of his paintings as evidence established the legitimacy of the arts in the international legal process and widened the scope of the ability to use visual arts such as photography and film as evidence (Jeffery, 2020). Furthermore, Orjuela (2020) examines the need to further explore how youth “grapple with inherited memories and how that shapes their agency in transitional justice” (p. 380). Specifically, the author focuses on the diasporas from Rwanda living in Europe and North America and looks at how the young generation in these diasporas relate to transitional justice and their homeland. Orjuela (2020) discovers that some youth who have taken part in Rwandan-government sponsored events aligned their perspective with the global transitional justice discourse, while supporting the Rwandan government’s patriotic project. In contrast, those who opposed the government’s one-sided narrative of the past has focused more on international human rights and justice discourse. Hence, transitional justice activism with their varying perspectives is closely intertwined with and shapes their diasporic identities. As Orjuela (2020) argues, we need to recognize the young generation as relevant actors as their education, citizenship, language skills, and transnational connections may make them more credible and efficient in putting across

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messages.2 Similarly, Jeffery (2020) examines the importance of engaging the youth in transitional justice processes. For example, the Turtle Project is an interactive production that was launched in 2015 and it aimed to educate Cambodian youth about Khmer rouge history and provoke further dialogues and reflections. This project was included as an official reparations project where more than 50,000 students participated in the effort. The project incorporated arts as a means of educating Cambodian youth of their history and social issues and explored how they could contribute to society. This forged new opportunities for youths to be involved in intergenerational dialogue with civil societies, governments, and the survivors of the conflict (Jeffery, 2020). An additional under researched area is to better understand how language of transitional justice and the pursuit of justice can go beyond prioritizing people in the aftermath of conflict (Gready & Robins, 2019; Sharp, 2018). Instead, it is crucial to encompass other aspects such as economic needs, security, and rehabilitation. We would like to close our analysis by joining the quest for more interdisciplinary research on transitional justice. For example, Davidovic (2019), Sharp (2018), and Gready and Robins (2014) remind us of the importance of examining concepts and ideas from other fields of study that would allow us to better understand the challenges and best practices that could be applied to transitional justice. There is much exciting work to be done.

8.2

COVID-19 and Transitional Justice in Syria3

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected millions of people since the spring of 2020. According to the World Health Organization, 54,558,120 confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been reported thus far, with 1.32 million people have died thus far from the virus.4 Most affected by the virus and its spread are societies who do not possess a resilient health care system, especially those in fragile states where the government is 2 Transnationalism is defined as “any process transcending national borders” (Mencütek, 2020). 3 We would like to thank the two reviewers for their suggestion to include such section here. 4 Both figures were taken from the WHO dashboard on COVID-19 on 17 November 2020. Obviously, these numbers change daily and can thus only be seen as an indicator.

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unable (or unwilling) to provide the basic public services, including access to health care (s.f. Nickels, 2020; OECD, 2020; Tsukamoto, 2020). In this sense, COVID-19 is adding to existing economic, health and societal vulnerabilities in fragile and conflict-affected states and thereby exacerbate standing pressures that are driving fragility, conflict, and violence in these countries. While the pandemic is still unfolding and thus the scientific literature still evolving on how COVID-19 affects transitional justice processes and particular that in Syria, we can obviously make some inferences based on the facts that we know thus far. According to Dempster et al. refugees primarily work in sectors of the economy that have been most heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, such as accommodation and food services, manufacturing, and retail, which has significantly diminished opportunities for economic inclusion (Dempster et al., 2020, p. 1). Moreover, as a result of the pandemic and the tightening domestic labour markets of their host countries, refugees have increasingly difficulties with entering the labor market altogether. They also face barriers. To be sure, these barriers often existed before (e.g. restrictions of where and how to work in host countries), but the COVID-19 pandemic has even increased these barriers and thus the pressures for their economic inclusion. The World Bank has estimated that COVID-19 will cause the fourth-worst global recession over the past 150 years, and the IMF has estimated global contraction of 4.9% as the worst downturn since the Great Depression (Dempster et al., p. 2). Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to expect that the COVID-19 pandemic will also have a negative impact on humanitarian aid for refugee communities alongside rising xenophobia, which once again will serve to increase their economic precarity even more (Dempster et al., p. 2). Therefore, for refugees the COVID-19 pandemic is a dual crisis, namely a health crisis as well as a socio-economic and protection crisis (Dempster et al., p. 3). Aside from the economic dimension, the COVID-19 pandemic also has an impact on the countries that currently host Syrian refugees. In Jordan, for example, the rate of infection is about 4.4 per 100,000 inhabitants with 1.6% fatality rate reported across the country (El-Khatib et al., 2020, p. 511). Moreover, Syrian refugees who have experienced any form of trauma are at high risk for a number of mental health issues, including depression, prolonged grief disorder, post-traumatic stress, disorders, and various forms of anxiety disorders, if those are not detected and adequately treated. The children of Syrian refugees in particular are at

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a considerably higher risk to experience mental health issues (El-Khatib et al., 2020, p. 511). To be fair, the Zataari refugee camp has a number of activities to support the mental health of refugees by the Ministry of Health and NGOs. This includes psychotherapy and psychoeducation provided over the phone (El-Khatib et al., 2020, p. 512). Meanwhile, the living conditions in the refugee camps increase the risk of a rapidly spreading COVID-19 outbreak among refugees due to refugee camps’ overpopulation and insufficient access to clean and safe drinking water. It is reported that only a third of all Syrian refugees have access to tap water for more than two hours per day. It is also estimated that the water used by informal settlements varies between 50 and 90 liters per person per day (Kassem & Jaafar 2020, p. 423). The COVID-19 pandemic has increased the health risks even further due to temporary lack of sanitation and waste management measures in the refugee camps. International stakeholders and NGOs have not been able to provide additional sewage and waste management services for refugees in the Bekaa Valley (Kassem & Jaafar 2020, p. 424). Moreover, surface water within the proximity to the refugee camps have contaminations and approximately 39% of Syrian households use unapproved drinking water sources (Kassem & Jaafar 2020, p. 424). Also, Lebanon is currently under curfew in order to control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, prices of food and medicine are soaring in a country that relies heavily on imports to meet its needs (Kassem, 2020, p. 3). Against this backdrop, Fawad et al. (2020) remind us that disease control amongst refugee populations is a critical component of the global response to COVID-19 pandemic with particular emphasis on Syrian refugees and non-communicable diseases. Such disease control efforts include clinical care and medications at no cost through clinics that are supported by humanitarian organizations. Particular attention is given to Syrians and uninsured Jordanians with poorly controlled diabetes and hypertension, as well as elderly people with multiple morbidities (Fawad et al., 2020, p. 1). However, without any reports of outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in refugee camps in Turkey and Lebanon, Kassem speculates that refugees might not be reporting infections due to: (i) lack of knowledge about infections; (ii) lack of access to tests, which are already limited and insufficient for hosting communities; and (iii) fear of stigma, which might lead to increasing restriction and crackdown on the refugees (Kassem, 2020,

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p. 2). This means that COVID-19 cases in the camps remain largely undetected, and thus this increases the risks for further spreading of the virus in those camps. Nevertheless, we do not want to close by emphasizing the negatives and current challenges facing the complex transitional justice process in Syria. As Rothe and Maggard (2012) remind us, the involvement of the United Nations and NGOs increased the likelihood of PCJ implementation such as the truth commission, persecution as well as administrative charges after the conflict. Moreover, the UN and NGOs involvement during and after conflict reduces the number of casualties or deaths. For example, the Liberian Truth Commission was designed to deal with the root cause of the conflict in the country. It was opened to all segments of the populations, but it was not able to hold key government officials accountable for participating in the violence. Notwithstanding, the Truth Commission has done well to promote peace, and is widely regarded as a success.

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the Zaatari camp during the period of COVID-19 lockdown. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 12(5), 511. Fawad, M., Rawashdeh, F., Parmar, P. K., & Ratnayake, R. (2020). Simple ideas to mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 epidemic on refugees with chronic diseases. Conflict and Health, 14(1), 1–2. Gready, P., & Robins, S. (2014). From transitional to transformative justice: A new agenda for practice. The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 8(3), 339–361. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/iju013. Gready, P., & Robins, S. (2019). From transitional to transformative justice. Cambridge University Press. Jeffery, R. (2020). The role of the arts in Cambodia’s transitional justice process. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. Kassem, I. I. (2020). Refugees besieged: The lurking threat of COVID-19 in Syrian war refugee camps. Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease, 28. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.tmaid.2020.101736. Kassem, I. I., & Jaafar, H. (2020). The potential impact of water quality on the spread and control of COVID-19 in Syrian refugee camps in Lebanon. Water International, 45(5), 423–429. Meernik, J., & Guerrero, J. R. (2014). Can international criminal justice advance ethnic reconciliation? The ICTY and ethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzogovina. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 14(3), 383–407. Mencütek, Z. S. ¸ (2020). Emerging transnational practices and capabilities of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Migration Letters, 17 (1), 125–138. Mendeloff, D. (2004). Truth-seeking, truth-telling, and postconflict peacebuilding: Curb the enthusiasm? International Studies Review, 6(3), 355–380. Nickels, B. P. (2020, April 20). A fragile state of health: COVID-19 in Africa. George C. Marshall Centre,. https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publicati ons/security-insights/fragile-state-health-covid-19-africa-0. OECD. (2020, April 29). Covid 19. Crises and fragility. https://read.oecd-ili brary.org/view/?ref=131_131938-b9ys3suiav&title=COVID-19-Crises-andFragility. Orjuela, C. (2020). Passing on the torch of memory: Transitional Justice and the transfer of diaspora identity across generations. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 14(2), 360–380. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijaa005. Richmond, O. P. (2010). A genealogy of peace and conflict Theory. In O. P. Richmond (Ed.), Advances in peacebuilding: Critical developments and approaches (pp. 14–38). Palgrave Macmillan. Rothe, D. L., & Maggard, S. (2012). Factors that impede or facilitate post-conflict justice mechanisms? An empirical investigation. International Criminal Law Review, 12(2), 193–217. Sharp, D. N. (2018). Rethinking transitional justice for the twenty-first century: Beyond the end of history. Cambridge University Press.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Timeline Syrian Refugee Crisis Date

Title

Description

Original source

24-Mar-11

First protests in Syria begin in the city of Deraa during the Arab Spring, protests in Homs, Hama, Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, and Tel begin Army is deployed in Latakia to use force against protesters

Thousands of Syrians take to the streets to protest President Assad’s government

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/mar/ 24/syria-funeral-marchersdefy-government-cra ckdown

27-Mar-11

1-Apr-11

9-Apr-11

Apr-11

“Friday of Martyrs” protests as Syrians react to President Assad’s speech addressing dissent Syria’s biggest day of unrest yet sees at least 20 people killed. Protests move closer to the centre of Damascus as Bashar al-Assad’s concessions fail to quell calls for reform The Syrian refugee crisis begins

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/mar/ 27/syrian-army-protestspreads http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/apr/ 01/syria-security-forcescrackdown http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/apr/ 08/syria-unrest-killed-dam ascus-assad

Up to 5000 refugees flee to Lebanon from harsh fighting in Talkalakh, mostly women and children

http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163

(continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. Mieszkalski and B. Zyla, Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6

145

146

APPENDICES

(continued) Date

Title

19-Apr-11

Syria to lift emergency rule after 48 years, but violence continues

25-Apr-11

Syria’s crackdown on protesters becomes dramatically more brutal—Tanks and troops enter towns and villages for the first time as scores of people are reportedly killed across Syria Army tanks enter Deraa, Banyas, Homs, and suburbs of Damascus in an effort to crush anti-regime protests Lebanese police send fleeing Syrians back to face Assad regime’s violence

May-11

10-May-11

18-May-11

5-Jun-11

6-Jun-11

The US and the EU plan to target Syrian president Bashar al-Assad for the first time by imposing sanctions against him in response to his brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests Israeli troops clash on Syrian border with protesters marking six-day war

Refugee flow intensifies into Turkey

Description

Original source http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/apr/ 19/syria-lift-emergencyrule-violence http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/apr/ 25/syria-crackdown-pro testers-brutal

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http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/may/ 10/syrians-sent-backassad-regime http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/may/ 18/bashar

The Syrian village of Majd al-Shams was again the focal point with an estimated 1000 Syrians and Palestinians surging to within 20 metres of the fenced off border over six hours. They threw stones and molotov cocktails at Israeli troops as snipers fired rubber-coated bullets and live rounds at some activists The military siege of Jisr al-Shughour in the northwestern part of Syria sparks a major flow of refugees into neighboring Turkey. Shelling and fighting causes thousands to cross the border

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/jun/ 05/israel-syria-violenceborder-protest

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147

(continued) Date

Title

1-Jul-11

The US has again increased the pressure on President Bashar al-Assad to implement “genuine reforms” Syrian refugees flee into Jordan

12-Jul-11

2-Aug-11

13-Aug-11

21-Aug-11

Oct-11

5-Oct-11

2-Nov-11

12-Nov-11

Syrian forces continue to attack civilian protesters in Hama and Damascus while UN struggles to agree to condemn violence Assad orders tanks into rebel towns as Syria’s brutal crackdown intensifies Syrian forces storm Homs as Assad defies international calls to step down New Syrian National Council says it has forged a common front of internal and exiled opposition activists Russia and China veto UN resolution against Syrian regime Anger from Europe and US as two security council powers argue implied threat of sanctions will not bring peace Syrian acceptance of Arab League ceasefire plan met with skepticism Assad’s representative says regime would agree to release detainees, withdraw tanks and armored vehicles, and hold talks with opposition Syria suspended from Arab League Member states agree to exclude Syria and impose sanctions over its failure to end government crackdown on protests

Description

Original source http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/jul/ 01/clinton-urgent-ref orms-syria-protests

Jordan sees an increase in refugees, with the majority coming from the Syrian border town of Deraa

http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/aug/ 02/syria-deaths-protestscrackdown http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/aug/ 13/assad-tanks-rebeltowns-syrian http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/aug/ 21/syrian-forces-stormhoms-assad http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east14703995

Russia and China have vetoed a European-backed UN security council resolution that threatened sanctions against the Syrian regime if it did not immediately halt its military crackdown against civilians

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/oct/ 05/russia-china-vetosyria-resolution

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/nov/ 02/syrian-acceptance-ofarab-league-ceasefire-plan

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/nov/ 12/syria-suspended-arableague

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APPENDICES

(continued) Date

Title

Description

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14-Nov-11

Turkey assumes greater role in accepting Syrian refugees

By the end of 2011, Turkey had spent up to $15 million to set up six camps for thousands of refugees and military defectors. More than 19,000 Syrians have fled to Turkey since a brutal crackdown on antigovernment protests hit northern Syria in June. Today more than 7600 of them live in Turkish government-sponsored camps

http://www.nytimes. com/2011/11/15/ world/middleeast/ref ugees-from-syria-settle-infor-long-wait-in-turkey. html?pagewanted=all&_ r=0=

12-Dec-11

Syrians go to the polls as unrest continues Local elections take place amid continuing strikes and protests against the government Syria has reacted with fury to a call by the UN human rights commissioner for it to face investigation by the international criminal court (ICC) over the killing of more than 5000 people since the uprising began nine months ago Twin suicide bombs outside security buildings in Damascus kill 44, the first in a series of large blasts in the capital that continue into the following summer Government steps up the bombardment of Homs and other cities

13-Dec-11

Dec-11

Feb-12

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/dec/ 12/syria-troops-battle-opp osition-fighters

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/dec/ 13/syria-icc-investigationhuman-rights

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APPENDICES

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(continued) Date

Title

Description

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1-Mar-12

The Bekaa becomes a major destination of refugees

http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163

4-Apr-12

Domiz Camp opens in Iraq

6-Apr-12

Refugee surge increases ahead of UN ceasefire

Eastern Lebanon’s Bekaa valley becomes the principle destination in Lebanon for Syrian refugees, many of whom flee fierce fighting in nearby Homs, Quseir, Zabadani and Hama. In 2011, refugees settled mostly in the northern Lebanon cities of Wadi Khaled and Tripoli. The Bekaa is a poor and mostly agricultural region. Most refugees settle in towns with friends and relatives or in squatter communities in the hills Most Syrian refugees of Kurdish origin head for the Iraqi Kurdistan region in northern Iraq. Significant numbers of Syrian refugees begin arriving in Iraqi Kurdistan early in 2012 and are generally well-received by their Kurdish host communities Domiz refugee camp officially opens on 4 April 2012, near the city of Dahuk in the Kurdistan region. The camp soon becomes the largest Syrian refugee camp in Iraq and by 2013 is stretched to capacity Fighting worsens in advance of April 12th UN ceasefire: Over 2500 swell across Turkish–Syrian border in one day, the highest ever recorded. Rebels and refugees claim that Syrian forces plant mines near the Turkish border in an attempt to block the flow of refugees and supplies for insurgents

More information on Domiz Camp: http://syr ianrefugees.eu/?page_id= 97%22here%22

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APPENDICES

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Title

Jul-12

Free Syria Army blows up three security chiefs in Damascus and seizes Aleppo in the north Fighting flares up in Aleppo, many flee to Turkish border

3-Jul-12

18-Jul-12

Exodus into Lebanon following Damascus fighting

29-Jul-12

UNHCR opens Za’atari camp in northern Jordan

22-Aug-12 to 12-Dec-12

Fighting in Tripoli, Lebanon mirrors Syria conflict

11-Sep-12

Up to 11,000 people flee Syria in 24-hour period due to escalating violence

25-Sep-12

Riots in Za’atari camp

Description

Original source http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east14703995

Intense warfare causes up to 200,000 to flee, with thousands crossing over to Turkey In response, Greece beefs up border guards in case of an influx of Syrian refugees On 18 July 2012, a bomb explodes in Damascus, killing President Bashar al-Assad’s brother-in-law and other high-ranking security officials. Anywhere from 18,000 to 40,000 refugees crossed the Masnaa border post into Lebanon over the next few days UNHCR claims the Za’atari camp in northern Jordan can eventually host up to 113,000 refugees Gunfights and clashes between members of Tripoli’s Sunni and Alawite communities in Lebanon’s second-largest city. Heavy fighting in December sees 17 people killed UNHCR reports that more than 11,000 Syrians flee into Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon in a day’s time Hundreds of refugees protest living conditions in Jordan’s Za’atri camp, one of several demonstrations held by refugees since it opened in July 2012

http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163

http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163

More information on camps in Jordan: http:// syrianrefugees.eu/? page_id=87=%22exclusive http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163

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(continued) Date

Title

Oct-12

Turkish tension rises when Syrian mortar fire on a Turkish border town kills five civilians. Turkey returns fire and intercepts a Syrian plane allegedly carrying arms from Russia Fire in Aleppo destroys much of the historic market as fighting and bomb attacks continue in various cities National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces formed in Qatar, excludes Islamist militias. Arab League stops short of full recognition Israeli military fire on Syrian artillery units after several months of occasional shelling from Syrian positions across the Golan Heights Tuberculosis found among Syrian refugees in Lebanon Lebanese government agrees to register refugees Poor weather conditions The worst storms in a affect refugees throughout decade in the region the region affects Syrian refugees in neighboring countries Syrian warplanes bomb the northern city of Raqqa after rebels seize control Syrian refugees reach 1 million Government and allied Lebanese Hezbollah forces recapture strategically important town of Qusair between Homs and Lebanese border

Nov-12

17-Dec-12 4-Jan-13 12-Jan-13

Mar-13

6-Mar-13 Jun-13

Description

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Title

Description

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Jul-13 to Jan-14

Beirut bombings sign that war spreading into Lebanon

http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163

16-Jul-13

UN: Largest refugee outflow since Rwandan genocide

18-Aug-13

Thousands of refugees pour into Iraq

23-Aug-13

Hundreds of people are killed when rockets filled with the nerve agent sarin are fired at several districts in the Ghouta agricultural belt around Damascus

A string of bombings in Lebanon’s capital are widely seen as proof that Syria’s internecine conflict has spread across the border. Individuals identified as Hezbollah, Iranian, and Shia were the target of bombings throughout 2013. In late December 2013, a car bomb targets a prominent critic of the Syrian Regime By the end of 2013, nearly 100 Lebanese have died in bombings in Tripoli and Beirut With an average 6000 people a day fleeing conflict in Syria by summer 2013, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres says such a rate has not been seen since the mid-1990s Thousands of refugees from Syria are pouring over the border into Iraqi Kurdistan, the UN refugee agency says Up to 10,000 crossed at Peshkhabour on Saturday, adding to an earlier influx of 7000 on Thursday The international community expresses outrage at the most significant confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians since Halabja in 1988. Western powers say the attack could only have been carried out by Syria’s government, but President Assad blames rebels

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(continued) Date

Title

Sep-13

UN weapons inspectors conclude that chemical weapons were used in an attack on the Ghouta area of Damascus in August that killed about 300 people, but do not explicitly allocate responsibility for the attack Largest plan for Syrian Germany agrees to resettle refugee resettlement 5000 Syrian refugees, the largest program yet. Refugees can stay for two years Sweden offers permanent The Swedish Migration residency to Syrian Board announces that all refugees asylum seekers from Syria who have been granted temporary residency in Sweden can receive permanent permits. Applies to family members as well Turkey builds wall on Turkey builds a two-metre Syrian border wall in the district of Nusaybin, site of frequent clashes between rebels, Kurds, and Arab tribes. Protests break out during the wall’s construction The attack is one of at At least 30 people are least 27 suicide bombings killed by a suicide truck that take place in Syria bomb blast at a during 2013, leaving some checkpoint in the central 400 people dead. Their city of Hama frequency increases in line with the growth in power and influence of extremist jihadist groups like al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis)

11-Sep-13

20-Sep-13

7-Oct-13

20-Oct-13

Description

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APPENDICES

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Title

1-Nov-13

Unguided barrel bombs—typically constructed from oil drums, gas cylinders and water tanks, and filled with high explosives and scrap metal—are dropped indiscriminately from helicopters on densely populated areas. The attacks kill hundreds of civilians NGO: Greek special forces A German NGO claims push back Syrian refugees that Greek armed forces are conducting operations around the Turkish border to repel Syrian refugees. The report, called “Pushed Back,” details what it calls “systematic” operations by special-op forces on land and sea Bulgaria to build fence on In response to a spike in Turkish border Syrian asylum seekers, Bulgaria begins construction of a 30 km border fence south of the town Elhovo Isis fighters and allied tribesmen capitalize on tensions between Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority and its Shia Arab-led government by taking control of the city of Falluja and seizing parts of nearby Ramadi, the capital of the western province of Anbar Thousands of people are Syrian rebels from the killed in the rebel Islamic Front, an alliance infighting, which allows of hardline Islamist government forces to groups, al-Nusra and the consolidate their control of pro-Western Free Syrian southern and central Syria. Army launch a joint Isis is pushed out of much offensive against Isis of Aleppo province, but is fighters, angered by their able to hold on to its attacks on fellow rebels stronghold of Raqqa and abuse of civilians province UK announces it will take Syrian refugees

7-Nov-13

11-Nov-13

30-Dec-13

1-Jan-14

30-Jan-14

Syrian government forces launch a large-scale air campaign on opposition-held parts of the northern city of Aleppo and its surrounding countryside

Description

Original source http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east28850956

http://www.proasyl.de/fil eadmin/fm-dam/l_EU_F luechtlingspolitik/pro asyl_pushed_back_24.01. 14_a4.pdf

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APPENDICES

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(continued) Date

Title

Jan–Feb 2014

UN-brokered peace talks in Geneva fail, largely because Syrian authorities refuse to discuss a transitional government Syrian refugee outnumber Lebanese residents in Lebanon border town

1-Feb-14

Mar-14

2-Mar-14

One million refugees in Lebanon

8-May-14

Hundreds of rebels are evacuated from their last stronghold in the central city of Homs. The withdrawal marks the end of three years of resistance in the city Six months after seizing Falluja, Isis militants launch a major offensive in northern Iraq

Original source http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east14703995

Al Jazeera visits the town of Arsal, where new arrivals set up makeshift shelters outside of town

http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163

http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east14703995

Syrian Army and Hezbollah forces recapture Yabroud, the last rebel stronghold near the Lebanese border Viral photo raises public awareness of Syria’s refugee problem

3-Apr-14

1-Jun-14

Description

UNHCR: Almost 1 in 5 people in Lebanon a Syrian refugee

http://www.npr.org/sec tions/parallels/2014/02/ 28/283991476/syria-ontrack-to-become-worldslargest-source-of-refugees http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163 http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east14703995

They overrun the country’s http://www.bbc.com/ second largest city, Mosul, news/world-middle-east28850956 in only two days as 30,000 soldiers drop their weapons and flee. Emboldened, the jihadists advance southwards with the support of Sunni Arab tribesmen and other militant groups, seizing a series of towns, military bases and oil refineries before being stopped not far from the capital, Baghdad. Nouri Maliki rejects calls from Sunni Arabs, Kurds and fellow Shia Arabs to step aside as prime minister (continued)

156

APPENDICES

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Title

9-Jun-14

Isis Refugee Crisis Begins: 500,000 flee Mosul

29-Jun-14

2-Aug-14

8-Aug-14

11-Aug-14

Aug-14

Description

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant takes control of the Iraqi city of Mosul and a new refugee crisis begins in the Middle East. Many flee the jihadists to the countryside Isis announces “Caliphate” The group claims that the state will erase all state in Syria and Iraq, stretching from Aleppo in borders. The next day the north-western Syria to the UN declares that an estimated 1.2 million Iraqis eastern Iraqi province of have fled their homes Diyala The town of Sinjar is IS fighters push further overrun and the into northern Iraq, strategically important overwhelming lightly armed Kurdish Peshmerga Mosul Dam, which supplies water and forces that had moved electricity to much of Iraq, into areas abandoned by is seized, and get within the Iraqi army 40 km (25 miles) of Irbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan This is the first direct The US launches air strikes against IS militants involvement in a military operation in Iraq since near Irbil and around American troops withdrew Mount Sinjar in late 2011 Isis,now known as the By mid-August, Isis is the Islamic State, takes control most successful rebel group in Syria, controlling the main Syrian oil and gas fields. In September, President Barak Obama authorizes US airstrikes against Isis inside Syria Tabqa airbase, near the northern city of Raqqa, falls to Islamic State militants, who now control entire Raqqa province

Original source http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163

http://syrianrefugees. eu/?page_id=163

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Title

13-Aug-14

Islamic State militants launch an offensive in north-western Syria, capturing several villages and moving to within 50 km (30 miles) of opposition-controlled suburbs of the city of Aleppo and within striking distance of key rebel positions leading to the Turkish border United States and five Arab countries launch air strikes against Islamic State around Aleppo and Raqqa Isis attacks spark massive Isis fighters begin attacking refugee influx into Turkey Kurdish villages along the Syrian–Turkey border, sparking fears of a massive refugee influx. A UN official says states that this could be the “greatest yet” refugee flow since the start of the Syrian civil war. More than 130,000 Syrian Kurds flee in late-September Aid Agencies: Jordan According to the New refuses entry to Syrians York Times, the border closing might have been prompted by Jordan’s participation in the U.S.-led campaign against Isis in Syria Siege of Turkish Border The Turkish border city of City Kobani Suruc doubles in population as almost 400,000 Kurds flee across the border from the besieged city of Kobani and surrounding villages. Refugees arriving in Turkey tell of civilian executions

Sep-14

21-Sep-14

8-Oct-14

14-Oct-14

Description

Original source http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east28850956

http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east14703995 http://www.nytimes. com/2014/10/09/ world/middleeast/syrianrefugees-jordan-borderunited-nations.html?_r=0

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Title

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1-Dec-14

1.7 million Syrian refugees face food crisis as UN funds dry up World Food Programme forced to suspend food voucher scheme to refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt

The voucher scheme’s suspension comes nearly three months after the WFP first warned it was running out of money and weeks after it said it had reached a critical point in its efforts to help Syrian refugees because of an 89% funding shortfall

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/dec/ 01/syrian-refugees-foodcrisis-un-world-pro gramme

Jan-15

Kurdish forces push Islamic State out of Kobane on Turkish border after four months of fighting Opposition offensives push back government forces. New Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest) Islamist rebel alliance, backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, captures provincial capital of Idlib Southern Front alliance of secular and Islamist groups take Jordanian border crossing at Nassib Islamic State fighters seize the ancient city of Palmyra in central Syria, raising concerns that they might destroy the pre-Islamic World Heritage site. They also capture last border crossing to Iraq The report showed that against the $4.53 billion required for programmes implemented by UN agencies and NGOs under the plan launched last December, only $1.06 billion—23%—had been received as of the end of May

Mar-15

May-15

Jun-15

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Jaish al-Fatah takes control http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-eastof Idlib Province, putting 14703995 pressure on government’s coastal stronghold of Latakia

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Jun-15

23-Aug-15

Title Already, this has meant that 1.6 million refugees have had their food assistance reduced this year; 750,000 children are not attending school; and life-saving health services are becoming too expensive for many, including 70,000 pregnant women at risk of unsafe deliveries Islamic State and Kurdish fighters intensify fighting between Raqqa and Turkish border. Kurds take Ain Issa and border town of Tal Abyad, Islamic State attacks Kobane and seizes part of Hassakeh, the main city in north-eastern Syria Thousands of migrants have been allowed to walk through police lines into Macedonia at the country’s border with Greece

Description

Original source

http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east14703995

A large number of migrants, many of whom are refugees from the war in Syria, have built up in recent days, after Macedonia declared a state of emergency and sealed its southern frontier. Migrants have been arriving at a rate of 2000 a day in the hope of taking trains through Serbia to make it to Hungary and other EU member states. On Sunday, the migrants—many with children and babies—orderly boarded trains and buses that took them to the border with Serbia before heading farther north toward EU-member Hungary, which is building a razor wire fence on its frontier to prevent them from entering If they manage to enter Hungary, the migrants could travel freely across the borders of most of the 28 EU-member states

http://www.independent. co.uk/news/world/eur ope/macedonian-policestop-tear-gassing-mig rants-and-let-them-crossthe-border-instead-104 68319.html

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24-Aug-15

Germany opens doors to refugees

Germany opens its gates: Berlin says all Syrian asylum-seekers are welcome to remain. Germany, which expects to take a staggering 800,000 migrants this year, became the first EU country to suspend a 1990 protocol which forces refugees to seek asylum in the first European country in which they set foot

http://www.independent. co.uk/news/world/eur ope/germany-opens-itsgates-berlin-says-all-syrianasylum-seekers-are-wel come-to-remain-as-britainis-10470062.html

Sep-15

UN food program forced to cut food aid to Syrian refugees

Sep-15

Russia carries out first air strikes in Syria, saying it targets the Islamic State group. But West and Syrian opposition say it overwhelmingly targets anti-Assad rebels instead Hungary’s closed border with Serbia leaves many stranded

15-Sep-15

18-Sep-15

Croatia closes almost all border crossings with Serbia

http://www.cbc.ca/ radio/asithappens/as-ithappens-monday-edition1.3237042/un-food-pro gram-forced-to-cut-foodaid-to-syrian-refugees-1. 3237048 http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east14703995

Hundreds of migrants are http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-342 stranded at the 60071 Serbia–Hungary border after the Hungarian government closed the frontier with a new razor-wire fence The move aims to stop migrants who are trying to enter the EU http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-342 86432 (continued)

APPENDICES

161

(continued) Date

Title

Description

Original source

17-Oct-15

Migrant crisis: Hungary closes border with Croatia—Refugees flow into Slovenia

http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-345 56682

1-Nov-15

Sweden starts to introduce border controls

Dec-15

Britain joins US-led bombing raids against Islamic State in wake of Paris suicide bombing attacks

Hungary has closed its border with Croatia in an effort to stem the flow of migrants through the country en route to western Europe Croatia said it would begin directing migrants to Slovenia instead Hungary has been a major transit country for migrants, many of whom aim to continue on to Austria and Germany It announced the closure on Friday after EU leaders failed to agree a plan backed by Hungary to send a force to prevent migrants reaching Greece The border, reinforced with a razor-wire fence, closed at midnight (22:00 GMT) on Friday A group of several hundred migrants who arrived near the village of Zakany minutes before the deadline were the last to be allowed through Sweden started to introduce border controls in November to stem the number of asylum seekers arriving there, which was running at 10,000 each week. In January it made it impossible for refugees to cross the bridge linking Sweden with Denmark unless they could show a passport or driving license, since when the numbers are down to about 800 a week Syrian army allows rebels to evacuate remaining area of Homs, returning Syria’s third-largest city to government control after four years

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2016/jan/ 28/sweden-to-expel-upto-80000-rejected-asylumseekers

http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east14703995

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APPENDICES

(continued) Date

Title

Jan-16

US-Russian-brokered partial ceasefire between government and major rebel forces comes into effect, after major pro-government drive to capture Aleppo. Islamic State not included Sweden sends sharp signal with plan to expel up to 80,000 asylum seekers

28-Jan-16

Description

Original source http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east14703995

Sweden is to reject up to 80,000 people who applied for asylum in the country last year, as many as half of whom will be forced to leave against their will, according to official estimates The interior ministry has called on police and migration authorities to prepare for a sharp increase in deportations, and to arrange charter flights to expel refused asylum seekers to their country of origin. Sweden is also approaching other EU countries, including Germany, to discuss cooperation to increase efficiency and make sure flights are filled to capacity, it said On Thursday Finland’s interior minister said Helsinki also intended to expel about 20,000 of the 32,000 asylum seekers it received in 2015. “In principle we speak of about two-thirds, meaning approximately 65% of the 32,000 will get a negative decision (to their asylum application),” Paivi Nerg, the ministry’s administrative director, told Agence France-Presse

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2016/jan/ 28/sweden-to-expel-upto-80000-rejected-asylumseekers

(continued)

APPENDICES

163

(continued) Date

Title

Description

29-Jan-16

Germany tightens refugee policy as Finland joins Sweden in deportations

5-Mar-16

People stuck at Greece–Macedonia border face growing misery

Sweden received more than 160,000 asylum applications last year—by far the biggest influx in the EU as a proportion of the population. Between 60,000 and 80,000 of them will be rejected, the interior minister, Anders Ygeman, told Swedish media on Thursday The revelation that a large proportion of asylum seekers will be turned down, and as many as half of failed applications will be forcibly ejected, sends another signal to refugees that Sweden is no longer extending the warm welcome it offered to them just a few months ago Germany will close its borders to Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans and will also prevent migrants from bringing their families to join them for two years. The new German rules on family reunification will mean migrants with so-called “subsidiary protection”, a status just below that of refugee, would be blocked from bringing their families to join them in Germany for two years A regional governor called on the Greek government Saturday to declare a state of emergency for the area surrounding the Idomeni border crossing where thousands of migrants are stranded due to border restrictions along the route toward western Europe

Original source

http://www.theguardian. com/world/2016/jan/ 29/germany-tightens-bor ders-as-finland-joins-swe den-in-deporting-refugees

http://www.cbc.ca/ news/world/europe-mig rants-unhcr-1.3477517

(continued)

164

APPENDICES

(continued) Date

Title

18-Mar-16

EU–Turkey migrant deal

4-Apr-16

The first migrants deported from Greece have arrived in Turkey as part of a controversial EU plan aimed at easing mass migration to Europe

Description Some 13,000–14,000 people are trapped in Idomeni, while another 6000–7000 are being housed in refugee camps around the region, said Apostolos Tzitzikostas, governor of the Greek region of Central Macedonia. That means the area handles about 60% of the total number of migrants in the country. The neighboring former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has stopped all but a trickle of Iraqi and Syrian refugees from crossing, following similar restrictions by countries further north on the migration route. The moves have caused a huge bottleneck in Greece, whose islands’ proximity to the Turkish coast has made it the preferred entry point for refugees and other migrants seeking better lives in Europe The idea at the heart of the deal—sending virtually all irregular migrants back to Turkey from the Greek islands—is the most controversial Turkey has now signed readmission agreements with 14 countries. Syrians refused asylum in Greece will be taken to refugee camps in southern Turkey, where in time they will take the place of those Syrians directly resettled in the EU under the so-called “one-for-one plan”

Original source

http://www.bbc.com/ news/blogs-eu-35848181

http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-359 58933

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APPENDICES

165

(continued) Date

Title

Description

Original source

18-Apr-18

The U.S. admitted just 44 Syrian refugees in last 6 months

https://www.cnn.com/ 2018/04/18/politics/ussyria-refugees/index.html

03-Jan-19

The U.S. has not done much for Syrian refugees: Expert

27-Apr-19

Dozens of Syrian refugees evicted in Lebanon anti-pollution drive

As President Donald Trump and his national security team debate their future plans for Syria, one element of U.S. policy is patently clear: The administration is not willing to accept large numbers of Syrian refugees fleeing the brutal civil war in the country Since the start of the 2018 fiscal year last October, the U.S. has resettled just 44 Syrian refugees, according to State Department data. That’s down from about 6000 in the same time frame last year, most of whom were admitted before Trump’s inauguration Despite causing a lot of the displacement in Syria with its military inaction, the U.S. has not done much for civilians of a civil war as it enters its ninth year, a Syrian expert said. Saying that there are no sharp differences between the former and current U.S. administrations toward their approaches to the refugee crisis, Kahf said the Trump administration at least has a “coherent” policy and team on Syria The LRA wrote to the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) in August, asking the body to stop the Syrians, who had fled war in their country, from causing environmental damage, he said

https://www.aa.com.tr/ en/americas/us-has-notdone-much-for-syrian-ref ugees-expert/1691004

https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2019/4/27/ dozens-of-syrian-refugeesevicted-in-lebanon-antipollution-drive

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APPENDICES

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Title

07-May-19

The U.S. has slashed its refugee intake. Syrians feeling war are most affected

1-Jul-19

Lebanon troops demolish Syrian refugee homes as deadline expires

29-Jul-19

Syrian refugees in Beirut and Istanbul detained and deported

Description But the UNHCR and other agencies failed to take “serious action”, he said, and “the LRA has proceeded to eliminate the encroachments to stop sewage effluents from polluting irrigation waters.” The country used to allow thousands of Syrians to immigrate, but the flow of Syrian refugees is at an almost complete stop

The Lebanese army demolished at least 20 concrete settlements in three Syrian refugee camps in the village of Arsal, government officials and aid groups have said The demolitions took place early Monday morning following a decision by Lebanon’s Higher Defense Council in April to take down refugee structures made of any material other than plastic and wood Countries neighbouring the still rumbling Syrian war are rounding up hundreds of workers and sending many back to volatile parts of the country, raising fears of mass deportations that will imperil large numbers of refugees Syrians living in Istanbul and Beirut have been targeted by immigration authorities in recent weeks, with more than 1000 detained in Turkey’s biggest city last weekend and given 30 days to leave

Original source

https://www.washingto npost.com/immigration/ the-us-has-slashed-its-ref ugee-intake-syrians-fle eing-war-are-most-aff ected/2019/05/07/f76 4e57c-678f-11e9-a1b6b29b90efa879_story.html https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2019/7/1/ lebanon-troops-demolishsyrian-refugee-homes-asdeadline-expires

https://www.theguardian. com/world/2019/jul/ 29/syrian-refugees-in-bei rut-and-istanbul-detainedand-deported

(continued)

APPENDICES

167

(continued) Date

27-Aug-19

22-Dec-19

28-Feb-20

Title

Description

Some refugees described a whirlwind deportation process of being transferred through three detention facilities. Their mobile phones confiscated, they were held incommunicado from families or lawyers and forced to sign papers saying they “voluntarily” agreed to return to war-ravaged Syria Amnesty calls on Lebanon Almost 2500 Syrian to stop expulsion of Syrian refugees have been refugees “forcibly deported” from Lebanon to their war-torn country over the past three months, a rights group has said, urging authorities to “immediately” halt the expulsions In a statement on Tuesday, Amnesty International cited data from Lebanon’s General Security agency and the Lebanese government which that about 2447 Syrians had been expelled between mid-May and August 9 Turkey cannot handle a Erdogan says Turkey fresh wave of migrants cannot handle new from Syria, President migrant wave from Syria, Tayyip Erdogan said on warns Europe Sunday, warning that European countries will feel the impact of such an influx if violence in Syria’s northwest is not stopped Turkey, Pressing E.U. for Turkish news outlets showed live broadcasts of Help in Syria, Threatens migrants travelling to the to Open Borders to border with Greece, Refugees hinting at a revival of the 2015 crisis that shook Europe

Original source

https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2019/8/27/ amnesty-calls-on-lebanonto-stop-expulsion-of-syr ian-refugees

https://www.reuters. com/article/us-syria-sec urity-turkey-migrants-idU SKBN1YQ07D

https://www.nytimes. com/2020/02/28/ world/europe/turkey-ref ugees-Geece-erdogan.html

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168

APPENDICES

(continued) Date

Title

04-Mar-20

Germany tweets to deter Syrian refugees, fearing ‘repeat of 2015’

05-Mar-20

27-Mar-20

Description

The German government—anxious about the political consequences of a “repeat of 2015”—is tolerating Greece’s decision to suspend asylum claims at its borders and has launched a social media campaign to deter Syrian refugees from embarking on a journey to central Europe As the Syrian refugee crisis The chaos triggered by returns, the EU appears more clashes and deaths at heartless the Greek border risks hardline measures from Europe. Greece, having suspended EU asylum law, is implementing summary deportations and ignoring asylum applications. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen praised Greece as “Europe’s shield”, but the EU’s cold response to the human catastrophe at its doors speaks poorly of European values While many around the Coronavirus is exacerbating the precarious world are aware of the situation of Syrian refugees precautions to limit the spread of the and IDPs coronavirus—frequent handwashing, social distancing, self-isolating, and eating healthy—these measures are often not possible for the 6.6 million internally displaced Syrians and the 5.6 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, or asylum-seekers living under difficult conditions in Europe

Original source https://www.theguardian. com/world/2020/mar/ 04/germany-tweets-todeter-syrian-refugees-fea ring-repeat-of-2015

https://www.newstates man.com/world/middleeast/2020/03/syrian-ref ugee-crisis-returns-eu-app ears-heartless

https://www.atlanticcoun cil.org/blogs/menaso urce/coronavirus-is-exacer bating-the-precarious-sit uation-of-syrian-refugeesand-idps/

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APPENDICES

169

(continued) Date

Title

30-Mar-20

Cyprus pushes Syrian refugees back at sea due to coronavirus

05-Apr-20

Syrian refugees villainized as Turkey faces costs of coronavirus

Description Among these groups, the most at risk seem to be the more than 900,000 people—including half a million children—who fled Syria’s Idlib and Aleppo governorates towards the Turkish border since December 2019 following the Russian-backed Syrian regime offensive Nearly 200 Syrian asylum seekers are stranded in northern Cyprus after they were pushed back in the middle of the sea by authorities in the government-controlled south Quarantined and under threat of deportation, they have become the latest victims of a multiplying border shutdown as countries grapple with the advance of coronavirus Whenever Turkey’s economy staggers and the public’s financial woes increase, the assistance extended to Syrian refugees becomes an issue for the cash-tight government. Ankara has had to tap the central bank’s legal reserves, a sum normally set aside for extraordinary circumstances such as war, and has spent more than $40 billion on 3.6 million Syrians since 2011

Original source

https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2020/03/ 30/cyprus-pushes-syrianrefugees-back-at-sea-dueto-coronavirus/?gb=true

https://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/originals/ 2020/04/turkey-syria-ref ugees-blamed-corona virus-economic-turmoil. html

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170

APPENDICES

(continued) Date

06-Apr-20

16-Jun-20

20-Jun-20

Title

Description

The stimulus package that Ankara announced last month to help small and medium-sized enterprises and low-income citizens against the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic is worth only 100 billion Turkish liras, or about $15 billion, less than half of its spending on the refugees “Is the state now incapable of looking after its own people?” asked Faik Oz Syrian refugees in Lebanon “They are in constant fear and confusion because they fear deportation for seeking coronavirus test or might have symptoms, and they are too afraid to care reach out,” he says This is not an issue confined to Lebanon. Advocates for displaced people around the world are increasingly concerned that undocumented people may be deterred from seeking help because of fear of the authorities Since pandemic lockdown Syrian refugees resort to measures have been ever more desperate implemented, Mr. Mahecic measures to resist noted that in addition to pandemic impact families already identified as vulnerable, UNHCR had seen “another 200,000 refugees just in this period of three months who because of the impact needed emergency assistance” Syrian refugees in Lebanon is currently the Lebanon: After corona, home to some 900,000 there is no food anymore refugees who have fled Syria’s bloody civil war. But after Lebanon’s economy crashed late last year and the country was hit by the coronavirus crisis, the refugees are struggling even more to put food on the table

Original source

https://www.npr.org/ 2020/04/06/825158 835/syrian-refugees-feardeportation-if-they-seekcoronavirus-testing-andtreatment

https://news.un.org/en/ story/2020/06/1066382

https://www.france24. com/en/20200620-syr ian-refugees-in-lebanonafter-corona-there-s-nofood-anymore

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APPENDICES

171

(continued) Date

Title

Description

Original source

29-Jun-20

Economic misery engulfs Syrian refugees and their hosts

https://www.unhcr.org/ news/stories/2020/6/5ef 9dd944/economic-mis ery-engulfs-syrian-ref ugees-hosts.html

10-Jul-20

MEPs approve e585 million to support Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries

12-Sep-20

Divide between Turks and Syrian refugees widening, survey shows

In Lebanon, the capacity of local community and Syrian refugees to provide mutual support is being stretched to breaking point by economic turmoil and the COVID-19 crisis Parliament gave its green light to top up support to refugees and host communities in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon in response to the Syrian crisis Syrian refugees are facing growing problems integrating in Turkey, according to a wide-ranging survey that shows up to 85% of Turks want the newcomers to live in isolation away from Turkish neighborhoods Almost a decade after their first arrival from the war-torn nation, Syrians are still viewed negatively by their hosts, according to Murat Erdogan, a professor at the Turkish-German University in Istanbul who led the study “If this polarization is not reduced in a bid to provide Syrians with decent living standards, political tensions and hate speech will further hinder integration,” he warned Jordanian authorities have on August 10 forcibly transferred at least 16 Syrian refugees, including eight children aged between four and 14, to an informal camp in a no man’s land located in the desert between Syria and Jordan, said Amnesty International today

15-Sep-20

https://www.europarl.eur opa.eu/news/en/pressroom/20200706IPR8 2727/meps-approveEU585-million-to-sup port-syrian-refugees-in-nei ghbouring-countries https://www.arabnews. com/node/1733181/mid dle-east

https://www.amnesty. org/en/latest/news/ 2020/09/jordan-stop-for cible-transfer-of-syrian-ref ugees-to-a-no-mans-landin-the-desert/

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172

APPENDICES

(continued) Date

Title

Description

Original source

24-Oct-20

Syrian refugees have become a tool of duplicitous politics

No one pays attention to the lives of people who are used as a change coin in big politics. This is equally true for Rukban where refugees are held in inhuman conditions and not allowed to return to their homeland. In those rare exceptions that they are able to leave, refugees have to pay large sums of money that most of those living in camp are not able to come by It’s hard to predict how long the Syrian conflict will go on and when—or if—the American military will leave the Al-Tanf base. One thing can be said for sure: the kind of criminal inaction and disregard for humanitarian catastrophe witnessed in refugee camps is a humiliating failure of modern diplomacy and an unforgivable mistake for the international community. People shouldn’t be a tool in the games of politicians

https://moderndiplom acy.eu/2020/10/24/syr ian-refugees-have-becomea-tool-of-duplicitous-pol itics/

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APPENDICES

173

(continued) Date

Title

Description

Original source

26-Oct-20

Stay and stare, or leave and die

https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/10/26/altanf-rukban-refugee-syriahumanitarian/

29-Oct-20

From open door to eviction: Five years ago, Angela Merkel threw open Germany’s borders to more than a million migrants. Today, writes SUE REID, they’re being deported in their thousands—or fleeing overt racism, many for Britain

Over the past three months, dozens of Syrians who had been living in Jordan were escorted into military vehicles, driven through stretches of arid desert past several security checkpoints, and dumped into a U.S.-controlled no man’s land, known as a “deconfliction zone,” along the Jordan–Syria border. Their ultimate destination: Rukban, an informal refugee camp that sits within the U.S.-protected zone. Rukban is known for its dire humanitarian conditions, an airtight blockade surrounding it, and an apparent deadlock among Jordan, Russia, Syria, and the United States as to who is responsible for the thousands of civilians who inhabit it But today the celebrations for migrants are over in this powerhouse of the European Union Many of the foreigners who entered Germany in those heady days are being forcibly sent home to Africa, south Asia, the Middle East, Russia, and the Balkans on secret flights, marshalled by security officers, after being frogmarched to airports from their beds by armed police As a result of this policy, some have disappeared into hiding and live on the streets in a bid to evade deportation orders handed out with alacrity by German courts

https://www.dailymail.co. uk/news/article-889 0545/Five-years-ago-Ang ela-Merkel-threw-openborders-million-migrants. html

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174

APPENDICES

(continued) Date

Title

Description

Original source

30-Oct-20

Russia calls for int’l conference on Syrian refugees in Damascus

https://www.dailysabah. com/world/syrian-crisis/ russia-calls-for-intl-confer ence-on-syrian-refugeesin-damascus

02-Nov-20

In Turkey, life for Syrian refugees and Kurds is becoming increasingly violent

07-Nov-20

Syrian refugees in isolated Kurdistan Region Camp struggle to find work

Russia has proposed to jointly host an international conference on the return of refugees in the Syrian capital Damascus next month Western nations any many of the more than 5.6 million Syrian refugees, however, are against an international conference on the return of refugees and displaced persons unless a political is found to the nine-year-old war A spate of attacks in Turkey on Syrian refugees and Kurdish internal migrants and displaced people in recent months have put both communities on edge. In July, a Syrian teenager working as a market seller in Bursa, northwestern Turkey, died after he was attacked by a group of men Another Syrian teenager who worked in a bakery in Samsun, another northern province, was killed during a fight in a street in September. His brother, who witnessed it, said it was a racist attack Though the World Food Program (WFP) supports the camp’s residents, WFP funding has decreased since 2018, according to the camp manager. Out of 500 families, only 200 are supported by the organization, he said. With the Syrian conflict dragging into a tenth year, the work of international organizations has largely come to a standstill, Ahmed explained

https://theconversation. com/in-turkey-life-for-syr ian-refugees-and-kurds-isbecoming-increasingly-vio lent-147704

https://www.rudaw.net/ english/kurdistan/061 120201

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APPENDICES

175

(continued) Date

9-Nov-19

11-Nov-20

Title

Description

COVID-19 concerns have led various organizations responsible for providing critical goods and services to refugees and IDPs to slow down or completely halt their operations. Decreased funding from donors has led local and international organizations to dedicate their limited resources to dire humanitarian situations. As a result, those considered to be living in relatively stable conditions are receiving less assistance Syrian refugees should Millions of Syrian refugees start returning home: who fled their country’s Putin civil war should start returning home to help rebuild Syria now that large parts of the Arab nation enjoy relative peace, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Monday Putin’s comments came in a video call with Syrian President Bashar Assad ahead of a two-day international conference on refugees in Damascus, scheduled to begin Wednesday. The controversial gathering, organized by Russia, has been criticized by the U.N. and the U.S. officials Assad says West preventing The Syrian government is millions of refugees from working to secure the returning to Syria return of millions of refugees who fled war in their country, but Western sanctions are hindering the work of state institutions, complicating those plans, President Bashar Assad said Wednesday

Original source

https://www.cp24.com/ world/syrian-refugees-sho uld-start-returning-homeputin-1.5180559

https://globalnews.ca/ news/7456452/assad-bla mes-west-syrian-refugees/

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176

APPENDICES

(continued) Date

Title

11-Nov-20

Lebanon holds ‘productive’ sea border talks with Israel, joins conference on Syrian refugees

12-Nov-20

Syria blames U.S. for hindering return of refugees

Description His comments came at the opening session of a Russia-organized two-day international conference in Damascus on the return of refugees. The event is being boycotted by many Arab and Western countries and has been criticized by the U.N. and the U.S. who say the time is not ripe yet for the return of refugees. They insist the first priority should be to make it safe for people to go back to the war-torn country The Lebanese delegation to the negotiations with the Israeli side adhered to its demand for a marine area of 2290 sq. km, in the fourth round of border demarcation negotiations that were held on Wednesday at the UNIFIL headquarters in Ras Al-Naqoura, which was described as a sensitive round of negotiations Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad yesterday blamed US sanctions and pressure on the United Nations and the country’s neighbours for the reluctance of more than five million refugees to return to Syria In the opening session of a Russia-organized two-day international conference in Damascus on the return of refugees, Al-Assad said that there were “many hurdles, including pressures exerted on refugees not to return and the illegitimate economic sanctions and the siege imposed by the American regime and its allies”

Original source

https://www.arabnews. com/node/1761601/mid dle-east

https://www.middleeas tmonitor.com/20201112syria-blames-us-for-hinder ing-return-of-refugees/

APPENDICES

177

Appendix 2: Total Persons of Concern by Country of Asylum (UNHCR, 2020) Year

Turkey

Lebanon

Jordan

Iraq

Other (North Africa)

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

155,755 560,428 1,552,839 2,503,549 2,814,631 3,424,237 3,622,366 3,576,369 3,630,702

804,848 1,144,389 1,069,111 1,011,366 997,552 948,849 914,648 879,529

576,354 622,865 633,466 648,836 654,903 671,350 654,422 659,673

232,317 243,215 229,774 245,793 255,877 245,810 241,738

31,657

Source UNHCR. (2020). Syria regional response. Operational Portal. https://data2.unhcr. org/en/situations/syria

Index

A Accountability, 3, 20, 52, 56, 66, 76, 109, 112, 115, 123, 137 Agency, 11, 15, 44, 53, 69, 71–73, 76, 77, 80, 90, 102–104, 111, 114, 116, 137, 152, 157, 158, 165–167 Arab Spring, vi, 7, 145 Astana talks, 17 Asylum, 13, 94, 107, 128, 153, 154, 160–164, 168, 169 Atrocity, 2, 55, 68, 81, 111, 135

B Bottom-up, 3, 48, 51, 68, 71, 72, 111, 134

C Case study, vi, 5, 21, 31–37, 57, 75, 90, 102, 134, 135, 137 Ceasefire, 14, 17, 18, 147, 149, 162

Civil society, 5, 17, 47, 52, 54, 56, 69, 71, 90, 102–106, 111, 133, 134, 136, 138 Coexistence, 35, 54, 92, 124 Communication technologies, 35–38, 54, 92, 93, 97, 111, 112 Conception and design, 5, 32, 35–37, 102, 135 COVID-19, 15, 17–19, 138–141, 171, 175 Crimes against humanity, 65, 67, 115–117 Critical perspectives on liberal peacebuilding, 49, 134 Culture, 44, 47, 51, 67, 69, 124

D Decision-making and management, 5, 32, 36, 37, 102, 114, 135 Democracy, 20, 45, 46, 48–50, 52, 67–69, 76, 105 Democratic institution, 49

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. Mieszkalski and B. Zyla, Engaging Displaced Populations in a Future Syrian Transitional Justice Process, Memory Politics and Transitional Justice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73970-6

179

180

INDEX

Detainee, 18, 147 Diaspora, 5, 34, 35, 37, 38, 54–56, 81, 91–99, 102–107, 110–115, 135, 137 Displacement, vii, 5, 42, 54, 90, 101, 103, 107, 110, 112, 125, 135, 165 Donor, 3, 5, 47, 50, 52, 53, 70, 77, 79, 80, 106, 129, 135, 175

E Empowerment, 53 European Union, 12, 20, 79, 173 External determination, 52

F Forced displacement, 21, 52, 53, 89, 134 Fragility, 10, 46, 68, 139

G Gender, 14, 73–75, 78, 79, 115, 127 Geneva Process, 16, 17 Governance, 16, 46, 50, 51, 125 Grassroots, 3, 43, 50, 53

H Host country, 10, 78, 139 Humanitarian assistance, 9, 13, 18–20 Human rights, 3, 4, 15, 16, 20, 42, 44, 47, 52, 56, 66, 68, 71, 76, 90–92, 94–97, 99, 106, 108, 110, 114, 125, 136, 137, 148 Human rights violation, vi, vii, 3, 5, 13, 14, 52, 54, 56, 65, 66, 69, 72, 78, 80, 90, 97, 108–110, 123, 134, 137 Human security, 48

I Identity, 51, 75, 137 Integration, vii, 4, 5, 21, 35–37, 48, 52, 92, 128, 134, 135, 171 Internally displaced person, 4, 5, 90 International law, 5, 66, 67, 108, 109 J Justice, vi, 2, 3, 6, 35, 48, 49, 52–54, 56, 65–70, 72–77, 80, 81, 91, 101, 104, 109–111, 136–138 L Liberal economy, 50 Liberia, vii, 5, 21, 32–37, 54–56, 74, 90–92, 94–98, 102–104, 110, 112, 114, 123, 133–135 Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (LTRC) Diaspora Project, 90, 91, 93, 95–99, 102–104, 106–114 Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (LTRC) Diaspora Project, 90 Literature review, 21 Local, v, 2, 5, 7, 10, 11, 20, 32, 42, 49–53, 67–73, 76–78, 80, 81, 90, 93, 102, 105–107, 111, 114, 115, 122, 125, 128, 134, 135, 148, 171, 175 Localized transitional justice, 53 Local ownership, 5, 33, 42, 50–52, 68, 71, 72, 74, 76–78 Local peacebuilding, v, 3, 15, 21, 42, 52, 70, 80, 106, 133, 134 M Marginalization, 54, 79, 81, 125 Migrant, vi, 5, 12, 55, 102–104, 115, 159–161, 163, 164, 167, 173, 174

INDEX

Military intervention, 19 N Nuremberg trials, 67, 80 O Operationalization, 5, 32, 35–38, 92, 102, 103, 135 Outreach, 36, 37, 54, 92, 94–96, 103, 107–109, 113 P Participation, vii, 3, 5, 14, 32, 33, 37, 51, 53–55, 68, 69, 71–74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 91, 102, 106, 111, 112, 115, 134–136, 157 Peacebuilding, v–vii, 1–4, 6, 32, 42–51, 53, 56, 71, 106, 134, 135 Perpetrator, vii, 3, 15, 55, 67, 70, 73, 81, 90, 91, 108, 125, 135, 136 Policy, vi, 2, 5, 43, 45, 49, 56, 66, 68–71, 74–76, 78, 80, 104, 105, 127–129, 134, 135, 163, 165, 173 Political settlement, 16, 17 Political transition, 16, 20, 34, 67 Post-conflict, v, vi, 2–4, 6, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50–52, 66, 68, 69, 71, 76, 80, 91, 101, 104, 117, 127, 133 Q Quintain, 33, 34 R Reconciliation, 3, 6, 7, 19, 32, 33, 50–56, 66, 68, 70, 73, 78, 80, 90, 91, 99, 104, 111, 124, 125, 134, 136, 137

181

Reconstruction, 4, 6, 20, 44, 48, 50, 52, 122, 123, 133 Refugee, vi, vii, 4–6, 9–13, 15–18, 21, 32, 34–36, 53–56, 74, 90–92, 95, 96, 102–112, 115, 121–129, 133–136, 139, 140, 145–161, 163–176 Reintegration, 55, 71, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128 Remittance, 10, 55 Reparation, 56, 66, 67, 73, 75, 97, 104, 110, 138 Repatriation, 6, 122, 123, 127–129 Resettlement, 96, 127, 128, 153 Resilience, 8, 20, 52, 71 Returnee, 5, 102–104, 115, 122, 123, 125–127 Rule of law, 3, 45, 52, 67, 68 Russia, 8, 9, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 147, 151, 160, 173–176

S Safe return, 21, 122, 124–126, 128, 129 Security, 7, 10, 15–18, 46, 51, 90, 94, 105, 116, 121, 123, 138, 147, 148, 150, 165, 167, 173 Stabilization, 19, 20 Statebuilding, 43, 45–47, 71 Statement, 19, 36, 37, 55, 56, 91, 93–98, 102, 107–112, 167 Syria, vi, vii, 1, 3–9, 12–21, 32–34, 37, 44, 52, 56, 90, 91, 101–110, 112–117, 122, 123, 129, 133– 136, 139, 141, 145–148, 150, 152–161, 165, 167, 169–171, 173, 175, 176 Syrian civil war, vii, 7, 9, 10, 52, 102, 108, 116, 157 Syrian refugee crisis, vi, 145, 168

182

INDEX

T Testimony, 32, 36, 56, 69, 70, 93, 96–98, 107, 111, 113, 116 Transitional justice, v–viii, 1–7, 19, 21, 32–38, 41, 42, 47–50, 52–57, 65–81, 89–93, 95, 97, 99, 101–107, 109–115, 117, 124–126, 129, 133–139, 141 Trial, 3, 35, 42, 48, 54, 66, 67, 73, 80, 110, 115–117 Truth and reconciliation commission, 32, 34, 36, 55, 69, 91, 107, 110 Truth-telling, 69, 75, 91, 104, 112 Turkey, 5, 8, 9, 12–19, 105, 123, 140, 146, 148, 150, 151, 153, 157, 158, 164, 166, 167, 169, 171, 174, 177 U UN Commission of Inquiry of Syria, 14 United Nations, 3, 14, 43–45, 66, 69, 70, 109, 123, 141, 176

United States, 6, 8, 19, 91, 97, 107, 157, 173 UN Security Council Resolution 2254, 16 UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir O. Pedersen, 16

V Victim, 14, 55, 56, 66–70, 72, 75–78, 80, 81, 91, 96, 104, 108–110, 112, 114, 137, 169

W War crime, vi, 13, 14, 20, 48, 65, 67, 80, 110, 115–117, 134 Western, 2, 11, 12, 47, 50, 51, 53, 69, 72, 80, 106, 128, 152, 154, 156, 157, 161, 163, 174–176 Witness, 35, 36, 38, 54, 55, 81, 92, 93, 96, 108, 110, 112, 116, 135